[Transcriber's Note:

Typographical errors in the original have been corrected and notedusing the notation ** . 

Macrons, breves, umlauts etc have been removed from the body of the textsince they were very obtrusive and made reading difficult. However, theyare retained in the Index for reference. 

The convention used for these marks is:Macron (straight line over letter) [=x]Umlaut (2 dots over letter) [:x]Grave accent [`x]Acute accent ['x]Circumflex [^x]Breve (u-shaped symbol over letter) [)x]Cedilla [, x]]

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EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY

EDITED BY ERNEST RHYS

CLASSICAL

CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES

TRANSLATED BY W. A. MACDEVITT

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THOMAS DE QUINCEY

THIS IS NO. 702 OF _EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY_. THE PUBLISHERS WILL BE PLEASEDTO SEND FREELY TO ALL APPLICANTS A LIST OF THE PUBLISHED AND PROJECTEDVOLUMES ARRANGED UNDER THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS:

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TRAVEL--SCIENCE--FICTION

THEOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY

HISTORY--CLASSICAL

FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

ESSAYS--ORATORY

POETRY & DRAMA

BIOGRAPHY

REFERENCE

ROMANCE

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THE ORDINARY EDITION IS BOUND IN CLOTH WITH GILT DESIGN AND COLOUREDTOP. THERE IS ALSO A LIBRARY EDITION IN REINFORCED CLOTH

THE SAGES OF OLD LIVE AGAIN IN US

GLANVILL

"DE BELLO GALLICO" & OTHER COMMENTARIES:OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR

FIRST PUBLISHED IN THIS EDITION, 1915REPRINTED 1923, 1929

INTRODUCTION

BY THOMAS DE QUINCEY

The character of the First Caesar has perhaps never been worseappreciated than by him who in one sense described it best; that is, with most force and eloquence wherever he really _did_ comprehend it. This was Lucan, who has nowhere exhibited more brilliant rhetoric, norwandered more from the truth, than in the contrasted portraits of Caesarand Pompey. The famous line, _"Nil actum reputans si quid superessetagendum, "_ is a fine feature of the real character, finely expressed. But, if it had been Lucan's purpose (as possibly, with a view toPompey's benefit, in some respects it was) utterly and extravagantly tofalsify the character of the great Dictator, by no single trait could hemore effectually have fulfilled that purpose, nor in fewer words, thanby this expressive passage, _"Gaudensque viam fecisse ruina. "_ Such atrait would be almost extravagant applied even to Marius, who (though inmany respects a perfect model of Roman grandeur, massy, columnar, imperturbable, and more perhaps than any one man recorded in Historycapable of justifying the bold illustration of that character in Horace, "_Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae_") had, however, a ferocity in his character, and a touch of the devil in him, veryrarely united with the same tranquil intrepidity. But, for Caesar, theall-accomplished statesman, the splendid orator, the man of eleganthabits and polished taste, the patron of the fine arts in a degreetranscending all example of his own or the previous age, and as a man ofgeneral literature so much beyond his contemporaries, except Cicero, that he looked down even upon the brilliant Sylla as an illiterateperson--to class such a man with the race of furious destroyers exultingin the desolations they spread is to err not by an individual trait, butby the whole genus. The Attilas and the Tamerlanes, who rejoice inavowing themselves the scourges of God, and the special instruments ofhis wrath, have no one feature of affinity to the polished and humaneCaesar, and would as little have comprehended his character as he couldhave respected theirs. Even Cato, the unworthy hero of Lucan, might havesuggested to him a little more truth in this instance, by a celebratedremark which he made on the characteristic distinction of Caesar, incomparison with other revolutionary disturbers; for, said he, whereasothers had attempted the overthrow of the state in a continued paroxysmof fury, and in a state of mind resembling the lunacy of intoxication, Caesar, on the contrary, among that whole class of civil disturbers, wasthe only one who had come to the task in a temper of sobriety andmoderation _(unum accessisse sobrium ad rempublicam delendam)_. . . . 

Great as Caesar was by the benefit of his original nature, there can beno doubt that he, like others, owed something to circumstances; andperhaps amongst those which were most favourable to the prematuredevelopment of great self-dependence we must reckon the early death ofhis father. It is, or it is not, according to the nature of men, anadvantage to be orphaned at as early age. Perhaps utter orphanage israrely or never such: but to lose a father betimes may, underappropriate circumstances, profit a strong mind greatly. To Caesar itwas a prodigious benefit that he lost his father when not much more thanfifteen. Perhaps it was an advantage also to his father that he diedthus early. Had he stayed a year longer, he might have seen himselfdespised, baffled, and made ridiculous. For where, let us ask, in anyage, was the father capable of adequately sustaining that relation tothe unique Caius Julius--to him, in the appropriate language ofShakespeare

 "The foremost man of all this world?"

And, in this fine and Caesarean line, "this world" is to be understoodnot of the order of co-existences merely, ` but also of the order ofsuccessions; he was the foremost man not only of his contemporaries, butalso, within his own intellectual class, of men generally--of all thatever should come after him, or should sit on thrones under thedenominations of Czars, Kesars, or Caesars of the Bosphorus and theDanube; of all in every age that should inherit his supremacy of mind, or should subject to themselves the generations of ordinary men byqualities analogous to his. Of this infinite superiority some part mustbe ascribed to his early emancipation from paternal control. There arevery many cases in which, simply from considerations of sex, a femalecannot stand forward as the head of a family, or as its suitablerepresentative. If they are even ladies paramount, and in situations ofcommand, they are also women. The staff of authority does not annihilatetheir sex; and scruples of female delicacy interfere for ever to unnerveand emasculate in their hands the sceptre however otherwise potent. Hence we see, in noble families, the merest boys put forward torepresent the family dignity, as fitter supporters of that burden thantheir mature mothers. And of Caesar's mother, though little is recorded, and that little incidentally, this much at least we learn--that, if shelooked down upon him with maternal pride and delight, she looked up tohim with female ambition as the re-edifier of her husband's honours, --looked with reverence as to a column of the Roman grandeur and with fearand feminine anxieties as to one whose aspiring spirit carried him buttoo prematurely into the fields of adventurous strife. One slight andevanescent sketch of the relations which subsisted between Caesar andhis mother, caught from the wrecks of time, is preserved both byPlutarch and Suetonius. We see in the early dawn the young patricianstanding upon the steps of his patrimonial portico, his mother with herarms wreathed about his neck, looking up to his noble countenance, sometimes drawing auguries of hope from features so fitted for command, sometimes boding an early blight to promises so dangerously magnificent. That she had something of her son's aspiring character, or that hepresumed so much in a mother of his, we learn from the few words whichsurvive of their conversation. He addressed to her no language thatcould tranquillise her fears. On the contrary, to any but a Roman motherhis valedictory words, taken in connexion with the known determinationof his character, were of a nature to consummate her depression, as theytended to confirm the very worst of her fears. He was then going tostand his chance in a popular electioneering contest for an office ofthe highest dignity, and to launch himself upon the storms of the CampusMartius. At that period, besides other and more ordinary dangers, thebands of gladiators, kept in the pay of the more ambitious or turbulentamongst the Roman nobles, gave a popular tone of ferocity and ofpersonal risk to the course of such contests; and, either to forestallthe victory of an antagonist, or to avenge their own defeat, it was notat all impossible that a body of incensed competitors might intercepthis final triumph by assassination. For this danger, however, he had noleisure in his thoughts of consolation; the sole danger which _he_contemplated, or supposed his mother to contemplate, was the danger ofdefeat, and for that he reserved his consolations. He bade her fearnothing; for that his determination was to return with victory, and withthe ensigns of the dignity he sought, or to return a corpse. 

Early indeed did Caesar's trials commence; and it is probable, that, hadnot the death of his father, by throwing him prematurely upon his ownresources, prematurely developed the masculine features of hischaracter, forcing him whilst yet a boy under the discipline of civilconflict and the yoke of practical life, even _his_ energies might havebeen insufficient to sustain them. His age is not exactly ascertained;but it is past a doubt that he had not reached his twentieth year whenhe had the hardihood to engage in a struggle with Sylla, then Dictator, and exercising the immoderate powers of that office with the licence andthe severity which History has made so memorable. He had neither anydistinct grounds of hope, nor any eminent example at that time, tocountenance him in this struggle--which yet he pushed on in the mostuncompromising style, and to the utmost verge of defiance. The subjectof the contest gives it a further interest. It was the youthful wife ofthe youthful Caesar who stood under the shadow of the great Dictator'sdispleasure; not personally, but politically, on account of herconnexions: and her it was, Cornelia, the daughter of a man who had beenfour times consul, that Caesar was required to divorce: but he spurnedthe haughty mandate, and carried his determination to a triumphantissue, notwithstanding his life was at stake, and at one time saved onlyby shifting his place of concealment every night; and this young lady itwas who afterwards became the mother of his only daughter. Both motherand daughter, it is remarkable, perished prematurely, and at criticalperiods of Caesar's life; for it is probable enough that theseirreparable wounds to Caesar's domestic affections threw him with moreexclusiveness of devotion upon the fascinations of glory and ambitionthan might have happened under a happier condition of his private life. That Caesar should have escaped destruction in this unequal contest withan enemy then wielding the whole thunders of the state, is somewhatsurprising; and historians have sought their solution of the mystery inthe powerful intercessions of the vestal virgins, and several others ofhigh rank amongst the connexions of his great house. These may have donesomething; but it is due to Sylla, who had a sympathy with everythingtruly noble, to suppose him struck with powerful admiration for theaudacity of the young patrician, standing out in such severe solitudeamong so many examples of timid concession; and that to this magnanimousfeeling in the Dictator much of the indulgence which he showed may havebeen really due. In fact, according to some accounts, it was not Sylla, but the creatures of Sylla (_adjutores_), who pursued Caesar. We know, at all events, that Sylla formed a right estimate of Caesar's character, and that, from the complexion of his conduct in this one instance, hedrew that famous prophecy of his future destiny; bidding his friendsbeware of that slipshod boy, "for that in him lay couchant many aMarius. " A grander testimony to the awe which Caesar inspired, or fromone who knew better the qualities of that Cyclopean man by whose scalehe measured the patrician boy, cannot be imagined. 

It is not our intention, or consistent with our plan, to pursue thisgreat man through the whole circumstances of his romantic career; thoughit is certain that many parts of his life require investigation muchkeener than has ever been applied to them, and that many might be placedin a new light. Indeed, the whole of this most momentous section ofancient history ought to be recomposed with the critical scepticism of aNiebuhr, and the same comprehensive collation, resting, if possible, onthe felicitous interpretation of authorities. In reality it is the hingeupon which turned the future destiny of the whole earth, and, havingtherefore a common relation to all modern nations whatsoever, shouldnaturally have been cultivated with the zeal which belongs to a personalconcern. In general, the anecdotes which express most vividly thegrandeur of character in the first Caesar are those which illustrate hisdefiance of danger in extremity: the prodigious energy and rapidity ofhis decisions and motions in the field (looking to which it was thatCicero called him [Greek: teras] or portentous revelation); the skillwith which he penetrated the designs of his enemies, and the electricspeed with which he met disasters with remedy and reparation, or, wherethat was impossible, with relief; the extraordinary presence of mindwhich he showed in turning adverse omens to his own advantage, as when, upon stumbling in coming on shore (which was esteemed a capital omen ofevil), he transfigured as it were in one instant its whole meaning byexclaiming, "Thus, and by this contact with the earth, do I takepossession of thee, O Africa!" in that way giving to an accident thesemblance of a symbolic purpose. Equally conspicuous was the grandeur offortitude with which he faced the whole extent of a calamity whenpalliation could do no good, "non negando, minuendove, sed insuperamplificando, _ementiendoque_"; as when, upon finding his soldieryalarmed at the approach of Juba, with forces really great, butexaggerated by their terrors, he addressed them in a military harangueto the following effect:--"Know that within a few days the king willcome up with us, bringing with him sixty thousand legionaries, thirtythousand cavalry, one hundred thousand light troops, besides threehundred elephants. Such being the case, let me hear no more ofconjectures and opinions, for you have now my warrant for the fact, whose information is past doubting. Therefore, be satisfied; otherwise, I will put every man of you on board some crazy old fleet, and whistleyou down the tide--no matter under what winds, no matter towards whatshore. " Finally, we might seek for _characteristic_ anecdotes of Caesarin his unexampled liberalities and contempt of money. 

Upon this last topic it is the just remark of Casaubon that someinstances of Caesar's munificence have been thought apocryphal, or torest upon false readings, simply from ignorance of the heroic scale uponwhich the Roman splendours of that age proceeded. A forum which Caesarbuilt out of the products of his last campaign, by way of a present tothe Roman people, cost him--for the ground merely on which it stood--nearly eight hundred thousand pounds. To the citizens of Rome hepresented, in one _congiary_, about two guineas and a half a head. Tohis army, in one _donation_, upon the termination of the Civil War, hegave a sum which allowed about two hundred pounds a man to the infantry, and four hundred to the cavalry. It is true that the legionary troopswere then much reduced by the sword of the enemy, and by the tremendoushardships of their last campaigns. In this, however, he did perhaps nomore than repay a debt. For it is an instance of military attachment, beyond all that Wallenstein or any commander, the most beloved amongsthis troops, has ever experienced, that, on the breaking out of the CivilWar, not only did the centurions of every legion severally maintain ahorse soldier, but even the privates volunteered to serve without pay, and (what might seem impossible) without their daily rations. This wasaccomplished by subscriptions amongst themselves, the more opulentundertaking for the maintenance of the needy. Their disinterested lovefor Caesar appeared in another and more difficult illustration: it was atraditionary anecdote in Rome that the majority of those amongstCaesar's troops who had the misfortune to fall into the enemy's handsrefused to accept their lives under the condition of serving against_him_. 

In connexion with this subject of his extraordinary munificence, thereis one aspect of Caesar's life which has suffered much from themisrepresentations of historians, and that is--the vast pecuniaryembarrassments under which he laboured, until the profits of war hadturned the scale even more prodigiously in his favour. At one time ofhis life, when appointed to a foreign office, so numerous and soclamorous were his creditors that he could not have left Rome on hispublic duties had not Crassus come forward with assistance in money, orby guarantees, to the amount of nearly two hundred thousand pounds. Andat another he was accustomed to amuse himself with computing how muchmoney it would require to make him worth exactly nothing (_i. E. _ simplyto clear him of debts); this, by one account, amounted to upwards of twomillions sterling. Now, the error of historians has been to representthese debts as the original ground of his ambition and his revolutionaryprojects, as though the desperate condition of his private affairs hadsuggested a civil war to his calculations as the best or only mode ofredressing it. Such a policy would have resembled the last desperateresource of an unprincipled gambler, who, on seeing his final game atchess, and the accumulated stakes depending upon it, all on the brink ofirretrievable sacrifice, dexterously upsets the chess-board, orextinguishes the lights. But Julius, the one sole patriot of Rome, couldfind no advantage to his plans in darkness or in confusion. Honestlysupported, he would have crushed the oligarchies of Rome by crushing inits lairs that venal and hunger-bitten democracy which made oligarchyand its machineries resistless. Caesar's debts, far from beingstimulants and exciting causes of his political ambition, stood in aninverse relation to the ambition; they were its results, and representedits natural costs, being contracted from first to last in the service ofhis political intrigues, for raising and maintaining a powerful body ofpartisans, both in Rome and elsewhere. Whosoever indeed will take thetrouble to investigate the progress of Caesar's ambition, from suchmaterials as even yet remain, may satisfy himself that the scheme ofrevolutionizing the Republic, and placing himself at its head, was nogrowth of accident or circumstances; above all, that it did not ariseupon any so petty and indirect a suggestion as that of his debts; butthat his debts were in their very first origin purely ministerial to hiswise, indispensable, and patriotic ambition; and that his revolutionaryplans were at all periods of his life a direct and foremost object, butin no case bottomed upon casual impulses. In this there was not onlypatriotism, but in fact the one sole mode of patriotism which could haveprospered, or could have found a field of action. 

Chatter not, sublime reader, commonplaces of scoundrel moralists againstambition. In some cases ambition is a hopeful virtue; in others (as inthe Rome of our resplendent Julius) ambition was the virtue by which anyother could flourish. It had become evident to everybody that Rome, under its present constitution, must fall; and the sole question was--bywhom? Even Pompey, not by nature of an aspiring turn, and prompted tohis ambitious course undoubtedly by circumstances and, the friends whobesieged him, was in the habit of saying, "Sylla potuit: ego nonpotero?" _Sylla found it possible: shall I find it not so?_ Possible todo what? To overthrow the political system of the Republic. This hadsilently collapsed into an order of things so vicious, growing also sohopelessly worse, that all honest patriots invoked a purifyingrevolution, even though bought at the heavy price of a tyranny, ratherthan face the chaos of murderous distractions to which the tide of feudsand frenzies was violently tending. 

Such a revolution at such a price was not less Pompey's object thanCaesar's. In a case, therefore, where no benefit of choice was allowedto Rome as respected the thing, but only as respected the person, Caesarhad the same right to enter the arena in the character of combatant ascould belong to any one of his rivals. And that he _did_ enter thatarena constructively, and by secret design, from his very earliestmanhood, may be gathered from this--that he suffered no openings towardsa revolution, provided they had any hope in them, to escape hisparticipation. It is familiarly known that he was engaged pretty deeplyin the conspiracy of Catiline, and that he incurred considerable risk onthat occasion; but it is less known that he was a party to at least twoother conspiracies. There was even a fourth, meditated by Crassus, whichCaesar so far encouraged as to undertake a journey to Rome from a verydistant quarter merely with a view to such chances as it might offer tohim; but, as it did not, upon examination, seem to him a very promisingscheme, he judged it best to look coldly upon it, or not to embark in itby any personal co-operation. Upon these and other facts we build ourinference--that the scheme of a revolution was the one great purpose ofCaesar from his first entrance upon public life. Nor does it appear thathe cared much by whom it was undertaken, provided only there seemed tobe any sufficient resources for carrying it through, and for sustainingthe first collision with the regular forces of the existing oligarchies, taking or _not_ taking the shape of triumvirates. He relied, it seems, on his own personal superiority for raising him to the head of affairseventually, let who would take the nominal lead at first. 

To the same result, it will be found, tended the vast stream of Caesar'sliberalities. From the senator downwards to the lowest _faex Romuli_, hehad a hired body of dependents, both in and out of Rome, equal innumbers to a nation. In the provinces, and in distant kingdoms, hepursued the same schemes. Everywhere he had a body of mercenarypartisans; kings even are known to have taken his pay. And it isremarkable that even in his character of commander-in-chief, where thenumber of legions allowed to him for the accomplishment of his Gaulishmission raised him for a number of years above all fear of coercion orcontrol, he persevered steadily in the same plan of providing for thedistant day when he might need assistance, not _from_ the state, but_against_ the state. For, amongst the private anecdotes which came tolight under the researches made into his history after his death, wasthis--that, soon after his first entrance upon his government in Gaul, he had raised, equipped, disciplined, and maintained, from his ownprivate funds, a legion amounting, possibly, to six or seven thousandmen, who were bound to no sacrament of military obedience to the state, nor owed fealty to any auspices except those of Caesar. This legion, from the fashion of their crested helmets, which resembled the heads ofa small aspiring bird, received the popular name of the _Alauda_ (orLark) legion. And very singular it was that Cato, or Marcellus, or someamongst those enemies of Caesar who watched his conduct during theperiod of his Gaulish command with the vigilance of rancorous malice, should not have come to the knowledge of this fact; in which case we maybe sure that it would have been denounced to the Senate. 

Such, then, for its purpose and its uniform motive, was the sagaciousmunificence of Caesar. Apart from this motive, and considered in and foritself, and simply with a reference to the splendid forms which it oftenassumed, this munificence would furnish the materials for a volume. Thepublic entertainments of Caesar, his spectacles and shows, hisnaumachiae, and the pomps of his unrivalled triumphs (the closingtriumphs of the Republic), were severally the finest of their kind whichhad then been brought forward. Sea-fights were exhibited upon thegrandest scale, according to every known variety of nautical equipmentand mode of conflict, upon a vast lake formed artificially for thatexpress purpose. Mimic land-fights were conducted, in which all thecircumstances of real war were so faithfully rehearsed that evenelephants "indorsed with towers, " twenty on each side, took part in thecombat. Dramas were represented in every known language (_per omniumlinguarum histriones_). And hence (that is, from the conciliatoryfeeling thus expressed towards the various tribes of foreigners residentin Rome) some have derived an explanation of what is else a mysteriouscircumstance amongst the ceremonial observances at Caesar's funeral--that all people of foreign nations then residing at Rome distinguishedthemselves by the conspicuous share which they took in the publicmourning; and that, beyond all other foreigners, the Jews for nightafter night kept watch and ward about the Emperor's grave. Never before, according to traditions which lasted through several generations inRome, had there been so vast a conflux of the human race congregated toany one centre, on any one attraction of business or of pleasure, as toRome on occasion of these triumphal spectacles exhibited by Caesar. 

In our days, the greatest occasional gatherings of the human race are inIndia, especially at the great fair of the _Hurdwar_ on the Ganges innorthern Hindustan: a confluence of some millions is sometimes seen atthat spot, brought together under the mixed influences of devotion andcommercial business, but very soon dispersed as rapidly as they had beenconvoked. Some such spectacle of nations crowding upon nations, and somesuch Babylonian confusion of dresses, complexions, languages, andjargons, was then witnessed at Rome. Accommodations within doors, andunder roofs of houses, or roofs of temples, was altogether impossible. Myriads encamped along the streets, and along the high-roads, fields, orgardens. Myriads lay stretched on the ground, without even the slightprotection of tents, in a vast circuit about the city. Multitudes ofmen, even senators, and others of the highest rank, were trampled todeath in the crowds. And the whole family of man might seem at that timeto be converged at the bidding of the dead Dictator. But these, or anyother themes connected with the public life of Caesar, we notice only inthose circumstances which have been overlooked, or partiallyrepresented, by historians. Let us now, in conclusion, bring forward, from the obscurity in which they have hitherto lurked, the anecdoteswhich describe the habits of his private life, his tastes, and personalpeculiarities. 

In person, he was tall, fair, gracile, and of limbs distinguished fortheir elegant proportions. His eyes were black and piercing. Thesecircumstances continued to be long remembered, and no doubt wereconstantly recalled to the eyes of all persons in the imperial palacesby pictures, busts, and statues; for we find the same description of hispersonal appearance three centuries afterwards in a work of the EmperorJulian's. He was a most accomplished horseman, and a master(_peritissimus_) in the use of arms. But, notwithstanding his skill andhorsemanship, it seems that, when he accompanied his army on marches, hewalked oftener than he rode; no doubt, with a view to the benefit of hisexample, and to express that sympathy with his soldiers which gained himtheir hearts so entirely. On other occasions, when travelling apart fromhis army, he seems more frequently to have ridden in a carriage than onhorseback. His purpose, in this preference, must have been with a viewto the transport of luggage. The carriage which he generally used was a_rheda_, a sort of gig, or rather curricle; for it was a _four_-wheeledcarriage, and adapted (as we find from the imperial regulations for thepublic carriages, etc. ) to the conveyance of about half a ton. The merepersonal baggage which Caesar carried with him was probablyconsiderable; for he was a man of elegant habits, and in all parts ofhis life sedulously attentive to elegance of personal appearance. Thelength of journeys which he accomplished within a given time appearseven to us at this day, and might well therefore appear to hiscontemporaries, truly astonishing. A distance of one hundred miles wasno extraordinary day's journey for him in a _rheda_, such as we havedescribed it. So refined were his habits, and so constant his demand forthe luxurious accommodations of polished life as it then existed inRome, that he is said to have carried with him, as indispensable partsof his personal baggage, the little ivory lozenges, squares and circlesor ovals, with other costly materials, wanted for the tessellatedflooring of his tent. Habits such as these will easily account for histravelling in a carriage rather than on horseback. 

The courtesy and obliging disposition of Caesar were notorious; and bothwere illustrated in some anecdotes which survived for generations inRome. Dining on one occasion, as an invited guest, at a table where theservants had inadvertently, for salad-oil, furnished some sort of coarselamp-oil, Caesar would not allow the rest of the company to point outthe mistake to their host, for fear of shocking him too much by exposingwhat might have been construed into inhospitality. At another time, whilst halting at a little _cabaret_, when one of his retinue wassuddenly taken ill, Caesar resigned to his use the sole bed which thehouse afforded. Incidents as trifling as these express the urbanity ofCaesar's nature; and hence one is the more surprised to find thealienation of the Senate charged, in no trifling degree, upon a grossand most culpable failure in point of courtesy. Caesar, it is alleged--but might we presume to call upon antiquity for its authority?--neglected to rise from his seat, on their approaching him with anaddress of congratulation. It is said, and we can believe it, that hegave deeper offence by this one defect in a matter of ceremonialobservance than by all his substantial attacks upon their privileges. What we find it difficult to believe is not that result from thatoffence--this is no more than we should all anticipate--not _that_, butthe possibility of the offence itself, from one so little arrogant asCaesar, and so entirely a man of the world. He was told of the disgustwhich he had given; and we are bound to believe his apology, in which hecharged it upon sickness, that would not at the moment allow him tomaintain a standing attitude. Certainly the whole tenor of his life wasnot courteous only, but kind, and to his enemies merciful in a degreewhich implied so much more magnanimity than men in general couldunderstand that by many it was put down to the account of weakness. 

Weakness, however, there was none in Caius Caesar; and, that there mightbe none, it was fortunate that conspiracy should have cut him off in thefull vigour of his faculties, in the very meridian of his glory, and onthe brink of completing a series of gigantic achievements. Amongst theseare numbered:--a digest of the entire body of laws, even then becomeunwieldy and oppressive; the establishment of vast and comprehensivepublic libraries, Greek as well as Latin; the chastisement of Dacia(that needed a cow-hiding for insolence as much as Affghanistan from usin 1840); the conquest of Parthia; and the cutting a ship canal throughthe Isthmus of Corinth. The reformation of the Calendar he had alreadyaccomplished. And of all his projects it may be said that they wereequally patriotic in their purpose and colossal in their proportions. 

As an orator, Caesar's merit was so eminent that, according to thegeneral belief, had he found time to cultivate this department of civilexertion, the received supremacy of Cicero would have been madequestionable, or the honour would have been divided. Cicero himself wasof that opinion, and on different occasions applied the epithet_splendidus_ to Caesar, as though in some exclusive sense, or with somepeculiar emphasis, due to him. His taste was much simpler, chaster, andless inclined to the _florid_ and Asiatic, than that of Cicero. So farhe would, in that condition of the Roman culture and feeling, have beenless acceptable to the public; but, on the other hand, he would havecompensated this disadvantage by much more of natural and Demosthenicfervour. 

In literature, the merits of Caesar are familiar to most readers. Underthe modest title of _Commentaries_, he meant to offer the records of hisGallic and British campaigns, simply as notes, or memoranda, afterwardsto be worked up by regular historians; but, as Cicero observes, theirmerit was such in the eyes of the discerning that all judicious writersshrank from the attempt to alter them. In another instance of hisliterary labours he showed a very just sense of true dignity. Rightlyconceiving that everything patriotic was dignified, and that toillustrate or polish his native language was a service of real andparamount patriotism, he composed a work on the grammar and orthoepy ofthe Latin language. Cicero and himself were the only Romans ofdistinction in that age who applied themselves with true patriotism tothe task of purifying and ennobling their mother tongue. Both were awareof a transcendent value in the Grecian literature as it then stood; butthat splendour did not depress their hopes of raising their own tosomething of the same level. As respected the natural wealth of the twolanguages, it was the private opinion of Cicero that the Latin had theadvantage; and, if Caesar did not accompany him to that length--which, perhaps, under some limitations he ought to have done--he yet felt thatit was but the more necessary to draw forth any special or exceptionaladvantage which it really had. 

Was Caesar, upon the whole, the greatest of men? We restrict thequestion, of course, to the classes of men great in _action_: great bythe extent of their influence over their social contemporaries; great bythrowing open avenues to extended powers that previously had beenclosed; great by making obstacles once vast to become trivial, or prizesthat once were trivial to be glorified by expansion. I (said AugustusCaesar) found Rome built of brick; but I left it built of marble. Well, my man, we reply, for a wondrously little chap, you did what inWestmoreland they call a good _darroch_ (day's work); and, if _navvies_had been wanted in those days, you should have had our vote to acertainty. But Caius Julius, even under such a limitation of thecomparison, did a thing as much transcending this as it was greater toproject Rome across the Alps and the Pyrenees, --expanding the grandRepublic into crowning provinces of i. France (_Gallia_), 2. Belgium, 3. Holland (_Batavia_), 4. England (_Britannia_), 5. Savoy (_Allobroges_), 6. Switzerland (_Helvetia_), 7. Spain (_Hispania_), --than to decorate astreet or to found an amphitheatre. Dr. Beattie once observed that, ifthat question as to the greatest man in action upon the rolls of Historywere left to be collected from the suffrages already expressed in booksand scattered throughout the literature of all nations, the scale wouldbe found to have turned prodigiously in Caesar's favour as against anysingle competitor; and there is no doubt whatsoever that even amongsthis own countrymen, and his own contemporaries, the same verdict wouldhave been returned, had it been collected upon the famous principle ofThemistocles, that he should be reputed the first whom the greatestnumber of rival voices had pronounced to be the second. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

_Works_: Latin folio, Rome, 1469; Venice, 1471; Florence, 1514; London, 1585. De Bello Gallico, Esslingen (?), 1473. Translations by JohnTiptoft, Earl of Worcester (John Rastell), of Julius Caesar'sCommentaries-"newly translated into Englyshe . . . As much as concerneththys realme of England"--1530 folio; by Arthur Goldinge, The EyghtBookes of C. Julius Caesar, London, 1563, 1565, 1578, 1590; by Chapman, London, 1604 folio; by Clem. Edmonds, London, 1609; the same, withHirtius, 1655, 1670, 1695 folio with commendatory verses by Camden, Daniel, and Ben Johnson (_sic_). Works: Translated by W. Duncan, 1753, 1755; by M. Bladen, 8th ed. , 1770; MacDevitt, Bohn's Library, 1848. DeBello Gallico, translated by R. Mongan, Dublin, 1850; by J. B. Owgan andC. W. Bateman, 1882. Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic War, translatedby T. Rice Holmes, London, 1908 (see also Holmes' Caesar's Conquest ofGaul, 1911). Caesar's Gallic War, translated by Rev. F. P. Long, Oxford, 1911; Books IV. And V. Translated by C. H. Prichard, Cambridge, 1912. ForLatin text of De Bello Gallico see Bell's Illustrated Classical Series;Dent's Temple Series of Classical Texts, 1902; Macmillan and Co. , 1905;and Blackie's Latin Texts, 1905-7. 

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CONTENTS

THE WAR IN GAUL

THE CIVIL WAR

THE COMMENTARIES OFCAIUS JULIUS CAESAR

THE WAR IN GAUL

BOOK I

I. --All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgaeinhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own language arecalled Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. All these differ from each otherin language, customs and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gaulsfrom the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from theBelgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they arefarthest from the civilisation and refinement of [our] Province, andmerchants least frequently resort to them and import those things whichtend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Germans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war;for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls invalour, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, whenthey either repel them from their own territories, or themselves wagewar on their frontiers. One part of these, which it has been said thatthe Gauls occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone: it is boundedby the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae: itborders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon theriver Rhine, and stretches towards the north. The Belgae rise from theextreme frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine;and look towards the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends fromthe river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of theocean which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun andthe north star. 

II. --Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished andwealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso were consuls, incitedby lust of sovereignty, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, andpersuaded the people to go forth from their territories with all theirpossessions, [saying] that it would be very easy, since they excelledall in valour, to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this hethe more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii are confined onevery side by the nature of their situation; on one side by the Rhine, avery broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory fromthe Germans; on a second side by the Jura, a very high mountain which is[situated] between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lakeof Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates our Province from theHelvetii. From these circumstances it resulted that they could rangeless widely, and could less easily make war upon their neighbours; forwhich reason men fond of war [as they were] were affected with greatregret. They thought, that considering the extent of their population, and their renown for warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits, although they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles. 

III. --Induced by these considerations, and influenced by the authorityof Orgetorix, they determined to provide such things as were necessaryfor their expedition--to buy up as great a number as possible of beastsof burden and waggons--to make their sowings as large as possible, sothat on their march plenty of corn might be in store--and to establishpeace and friendship with the neighbouring states. They reckoned that aterm of two years would be sufficient for them to execute their designs;they fix by decree their departure for the third year. Orgetorix ischosen to complete these arrangements. He took upon himself the officeof ambassador to the states: on this journey he persuades Casticus, theson of Catamantaledes (one of the Sequani, whose father had possessedthe sovereignty among the people for many years, and had been styled"_friend_" by the senate of the Roman people), to seize upon thesovereignty in his own state, which his father had held before him, andhe likewise persuades Dumnorix, an Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus, who at that time possessed the chief authority in the state, and wasexceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt the same, and gives himhis daughter in marriage. He proves to them that to accomplish theirattempts was a thing very easy to be done, because he himself wouldobtain the government of his own state; that there was no doubt that theHelvetii were the most powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures themthat he will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire thesovereignty for them. Incited by this speech, they give a pledge andoath to one another, and hope that, when they have seized thesovereignty, they will, by means of the three most powerful and valiantnations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole of Gaul. 

IV. --When this scheme was disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they, according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause inchains; it was the law that the penalty of being burned by fire shouldawait him if condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of hiscause, Orgetorix drew together from all quarters to the court all hisvassals to the number of ten thousand persons; and led together to thesame place, and all his dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had agreat number; by means of these he rescued himself from [the necessityof] pleading his cause. While the state, incensed at this act, wasendeavouring to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates weremustering a large body of men from the country, Orgetorix died; andthere is not wanting a suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of his havingcommitted suicide. 

V. --After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that whichthey had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their territories. Whenthey thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking, they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve--to theirvillages about four hundred--and to the private dwellings that remained;they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them;that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the moreready for undergoing all dangers. They order every one to carry forthfrom home for himself provisions for three months, ready ground. Theypersuade the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, theirneighbours, to adopt the same plan, and after burning down their townsand villages, to set out with them: and they admit to their party andunite to themselves as confederates the Boii, who had dwelt on the otherside of the Rhine, and had crossed over into the Norican territory, andassaulted Noreia. 

VI. --There were in all two routes by which they could go forth fromtheir country--one through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, betweenMount Jura and the river Rhone (by which scarcely one waggon at a timecould be led; there was, moreover, a very high mountain overhanging, sothat a very few might easily intercept them); the other, through ourProvince, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the Rhone flowsbetween the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, whohad lately been subdued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. Thefurthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories ofthe Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to theHelvetii. They thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges, because they did not seem as yet well-affected towards the Roman people, or compel them by force to allow them to pass through their territories. Having provided everything for the expedition, they appoint a day onwhich they should all meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was thefifth before the kalends of April [_i. E. _ the 28th of March], in theconsulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B. C. 58]. 

VII. --When it was reported to Caesar that they were attempting to maketheir route through our Province, he hastens to set out from the city, and, by as great marches as he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, andarrives at Geneva. He orders the whole Province [to furnish] as great anumber of soldiers as possible, as there was in all only one legion inFurther Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When theHelvetii are apprised of his arrival, they send to him, as ambassadors, the most illustrious men of their state (in which embassy Numeius andVerudoctius held the chief place), to say "that it was their intentionto march through the Province without doing any harm, because they had"[according to their own representations] "no other route:--that theyrequested they might be allowed to do so with his consent. " Caesar, inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, hadbeen slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by theHelvetii, did not think that [their request] ought to be granted; norwas he of opinion that men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity ofmarching through the Province were given them, would abstain fromoutrage and mischief. Yet, in order that a period might intervene, untilthe soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished] should assemble, hereplied to the ambassadors, that he would take time to deliberate; ifthey wanted anything, they might return on the day before the ides ofApril [on April 12th]. 

VIII. --Meanwhile, with the legion which he had with him and the soldierswho had assembled from the Province, he carries along for nineteen[Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles a wall, to the height ofsixteen feet, and a trench, from the lake of Geneva, which flows intothe river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories of theSequani from those of the Helvetii. When that work was finished, hedistributes garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that hemay the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross overagainst his will. When the day which he had appointed with theambassadors came, and they returned to him, he says that he cannot, consistently with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, grantany one a passage through the Province; and he gives them to understandthat, if they should attempt to use violence, he would oppose them. TheHelvetii, disappointed in this hope, tried if they could force a passage(some by means of a bridge of boats and numerous rafts constructed forthe purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth of theriver was least, sometimes by day, but more frequently by night), butbeing kept at bay by the strength of our works, and by the concourse ofthe soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this attempt. 

IX. --There was left one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, onaccount of its narrowness, they could not pass without the consent ofthe Sequani. As they could not of themselves prevail on them, they sendambassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that through his intercession theymight obtain their request from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularityand liberality, had great influence among the Sequani, and was friendlyto the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married the daughterof Orgetorix; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for arevolution, and wished to have as many states as possible attached tohim by his kindness towards them. He, therefore, undertakes the affair, and prevails upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march throughtheir territories, and arranges that they should give hostages to eachother--the Sequani not to obstruct the Helvetii in their march--theHelvetii, to pass without mischief and outrage. 

X. --It-is again told Caesar that the Helvetii intend to march throughthe country of the Sequani and the Aedui into the territories of theSantones, which are not far distant from those boundaries of theTolosates, which [viz. Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province. Ifthis took place, he saw that it would be attended with great danger tothe Province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, borderingupon an open and very fertile tract of country. For these reasons heappointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant, to the command of thefortification which he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy by forcedmarches, and there levies two legions, and leads out from winter-quartersthree which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these fivelegions marches rapidly by the nearest route across the Alps intoFurther Gaul. Here the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges, having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt to obstruct thearmy in their march. After having routed these in several battles, hearrives in the territories of the Vocontii in the Further Province onthe seventh day from Ocelum, which is the most remote town of the HitherProvince; thence he leads his army into the country of the Allobroges, and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These people are the firstbeyond the Province on the opposite side of the Rhone. 

XI. --The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through thenarrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at theterritories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui, asthey could not defend themselves and their possessions against them, send ambassadors to Caesar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they hadat all times so well deserved of the Roman people, that their fieldsought not to have been laid waste--their children carried off intoslavery--their towns stormed, almost within sight of our army. At thesame time the Ambarri, the friends and kinsmen of the Aedui, appriseCaesar that it was not easy for them, now that their fields had beendevastated, to ward off the violence of the enemy from their towns: theAllobroges likewise, who had villages and possessions on the other sideof the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Caesar and assure him thatthey had nothing remaining, except the soil of their land. Caesar, induced by these circumstances, decides that he ought not to wait untilthe Helvetii, after destroying all the property of his allies, shouldarrive among the Santones. 

XII. --There is a river [called] the Saone, which flows through theterritories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhone with such incredibleslowness, that it cannot be determined by the eye in which direction itflows. This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joinedtogether. When Caesar was informed by spies that the Helvetii hadalready conveyed three parts of their forces across that river, but thatthe fourth part was left behind on this side of the Saone, he set outfrom the camp with three legions during the third watch, and came upwith that division which had not yet crossed the river. Attacking them, encumbered with baggage, and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a greatpart of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and concealedthemselves in the nearest woods. That canton [which was cut down] wascalled the Tigurine; for the whole Helvetian state is divided into fourcantons. This single canton having left their country, within therecollection of our fathers, had slain Lucius Cassius the consul, andhad made his army pass under the yoke [B. C. 107]. Thus, whether bychance, or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of theHelvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Romanpeople was the first to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not onlythe public, but also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini hadslain Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of LuciusCalpurnius Piso, his [Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle asCassius himself. 

XIII. --This battle ended, that he might be able to come up with theremaining forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made acrossthe Saone, and thus leads his army over. The Helvetii, confused by hissudden arrival, when they found that he had effected in one day whatthey themselves had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty, namely, the crossing of the river, send ambassadors to him; at the headof which embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii inthe war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar:--that, "if theRoman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to thatpart and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be;but if he should persist in persecuting them with war, that he ought toremember both the ancient disgrace of the Roman people and thecharacteristic valour of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked onecanton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had crossed the rivercould not bring assistance to their friends, that he ought not on thataccount to ascribe very much to his own valour, or despise them; thatthey had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to rely more onvalour than on artifice or stratagem. Wherefore let him not bring it topass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a name, from the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction of their armyor transmit the remembrance [of such an event to posterity]. "

XIV. --To these words Caesar thus replied:--that "on that very account hefelt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance those circumstanceswhich the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the moreindignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly tothe Roman people: for if they had been conscious of having done anywrong it would not have been difficult to be on their guard, but forthat very reason had they been deceived, because neither were they awarethat any offence had been given by them, on account of which they shouldbe afraid, nor did they think that they ought to be afraid withoutcause. But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage, couldhe also lay aside the remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they hadagainst his will attempted a route through the Province by force, inthat they had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? Thatas to their so insolently boasting of their victory, and as to theirbeing astonished that they had so long committed their outrages withimpunity, [both these things] tended to the same point; for the immortalgods are wont to allow those persons whom they wish to punish for theirguilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer impunity, in order thatthey may suffer the more severely from a reverse of circumstances. Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be given him bythem in order that he may be assured they will do what they promise, andprovided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages whichthey had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to theAllobroges, he [Caesar] will make peace with them. " Divico replied, that"the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors that they wereaccustomed to receive, not to give, hostages; of that fact the Romanpeople were witness. " Having given this reply, he withdrew. 

XV. --On the following day they move their camp from that place; Caesardoes the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of fourthousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province andfrom the Aedui and their allies), to observe towards what parts theenemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued theenemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in adisadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elatedwith this battle because they had with five hundred horse repulsed solarge a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too fromtheir rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrainedhis men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to preventthe enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for aboutfifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or sixmiles between the enemy's rear and our van. 

XVI. --Meanwhile, Caesar kept daily importuning the Aedui for the cornwhich they had promised in the name of their state; for, in consequenceof the coldness (Gaul being, as before said, situated towards thenorth), not only was the corn in the fields not ripe, but there was notin store a sufficiently large quantity even of fodder: besides he wasunable to use the corn which he had conveyed in ships up the riverSaone, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire, haddiverted their march from the Saone. The Aedui kept deferring from dayto day, and saying that it was being "collected--brought in--on theroad. " When he saw that he was put off too long, and that the day wasclose at hand on which he ought to serve out the corn to his soldiers, --having called together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number inhis camp, among them Divitiacus, and Liscus who was invested with thechief magistracy (whom the Aedui style the Vergobretus, and who iselected annually, and has power of life and death over his countrymen), he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisted by them on sourgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at hand, and when[corn] could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, particularlyas, in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken thewar; much more bitterly, therefore, does he complain of his beingforsaken. 

XVII. --Then at length Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses whathe had hitherto kept secret:--that "there are some whose influence withthe people is very great, who, though private men, have more power thanthe magistrates themselves: that these by seditious and violent languageare deterring the populace from contributing the corn which they oughtto supply; [by telling them] that, if they cannot any longer retain thesupremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the government of Gaulsthan of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans shouldoverpower the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the Aeduitogether with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men [said he] are ourplans, and whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; thatthey could not be restrained by _him_: nay more, he was well aware that, though compelled by necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, athow great a risk he had done it; and for that reason, he had been silentas long as he could. "

XVIII. --Caesar perceived that, by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, thebrother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was unwilling thatthese matters should be discussed while so many were present, hespeedily dismisses the council, but detains Liscus: he inquires from himwhen alone, about those things which he had said in the meeting. He[Liscus] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. He [Caesar] makesinquiries on the same points privately of others, and discovers that itis all true; that "Dumnorix is the person, a man of the highest daring, in great favour with the people on account of his liberality, a maneager for a revolution: that for a great many years he has been in thehabit of contracting for the customs and all the other taxes of theAedui at a small cost, because when _he_ bids, no one dares to bidagainst him. By these means he has both increased his own privateproperty and amassed great means for giving largesses; that he maintainsconstantly at his own expense and keeps about his own person a greatnumber of cavalry, and that not only at home, but even among theneighbouring states, he has great influence, and for the sake ofstrengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among theBituriges to a man the most noble and most influential there; that hehas himself taken a wife from among the Helvetii, and has given hissister by the mother's side and his female relations in marriage intoother states; that he favours and wishes well to the Helvetii on accountof this connection; and that he hates Caesar and the Romans, on his ownaccount, because by their arrival his power was weakened, and hisbrother, Divitiacus, restored to his former position of influence anddignity: that, if anything should happen to the Romans, he entertainsthe highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii, but that under the government of the Roman people he despairs not onlyof royalty but even of that influence which he already has. " Caesardiscovered too, on inquiring into the unsuccessful cavalry engagementwhich had taken place a few days before, that the commencement of thatflight had been made by Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was incommand of the cavalry which the Aedui had sent for aid to Caesar); thatby their flight the rest of the cavalry was dismayed. 

XIX. --After learning these circumstances, since to these suspicions themost unequivocal facts were added, viz. , that he had led the Helvetiithrough the territories of the Sequani; that he had provided thathostages should be mutually given; that he had done all these things, not only without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of his own state's, but even without their [the Aedui] knowing anything of it themselves;that he [Dumnorix] was reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of theAedui; he [Caesar] considered that there was sufficient reason why heshould either punish him himself, or order the state to do so. One thing[however] stood in the way of all this--that he had learned byexperience his brother Divitiacus's very high regard for the Romanpeople, his great affection towards him, his distinguished faithfulness, justice, and moderation; for he was afraid lest by the punishment ofthis man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus. Therefore, beforehe attempted anything, he orders Divitiacus to be summoned to him, andwhen the ordinary interpreters had been withdrawn, converses with himthrough Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province of Gaul, anintimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest confidence ineverything; at the same time he reminds him of what was said aboutDumnorix in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present, andshows what each had said of him privately in his [Caesar's] ownpresence; he begs and exhorts him, that, without offence to hisfeelings, he may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix] aftertrying the case, or else order the [Aeduan] state to do so. 

XX. -Divitiacus, embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with manytears, that "he would not pass any very severe sentence upon hisbrother; saying, that he knows that those [charges] are true, and thatnobody suffered more pain on that account than he himself did; for whenhe himself could effect a very great deal by his influence at home andin the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little on account of hisyouth, the latter had become powerful through his means, which power andstrength he used not only to the lessening of his [Divitiacus]popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influencedboth by fraternal affection and by public opinion. But if anything verysevere from Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no one would think thatit had been done without his consent, since he himself held such a placein Caesar's friendship; from which circumstance it would arise that theaffections of the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him. " As he waswith tears begging these things of Caesar in many words, Caesar takeshis right hand, and, comforting him, begs him to make an end ofentreating, and assures him that his regard for him is so great that heforgives both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs, athis desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him; he brings in hisbrother; he points out what he censures in him; he lays before him whathe of himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he warns himfor the future to avoid all grounds of suspicion; he says that hepardons the past, for the sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spiesover Dumnorix that he may be able to know what he does, and with whom hecommunicates. 

XXI. --Being on the same day informed by his scouts that the enemy hadencamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp, hesent persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and ofwhat kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back that it waseasy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenantwith praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountainwith two legions, and with those as guides who had examined the road; heexplains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastensto them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on allthe cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be veryexperienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of LuciusSulla, and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward withthe scouts. 

XXII. --At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in thepossession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than amile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterwards ascertainedfrom the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus beendiscovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him--says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized byLabienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this bythe Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the nexthill: [and] draws them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had beenordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] ownforces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemymight be made on every side at the same time, was, after having takenpossession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining frombattle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learnedthrough spies that the mountain was in possession of his own men, andthat the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck withfear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On thatday he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his campthree miles from theirs. 

XXIII. --The next day (as there remained in all only two days' space [tothe time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was notmore than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and best-storedtown of the Aedui) he thought that he ought to provide for asupply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advancedrapidly to Bibracte. This circumstance is reported to the enemy by somedeserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain of the Gallic horse. TheHelvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck withterror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before, though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joinedbattle; or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut offfrom the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, beganto pursue and to annoy our men in the rear. 

XXIV. --Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the nexthill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. Hehimself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line ofhis four veteran legions in such a manner that he placed above him onthe very summit the two legions which he had lately levied in HitherGaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountainshould be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should bebrought together into one place, and the position be protected by thosewho were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii, having followed withall their waggons, collected their baggage into one place: theythemselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx, advanced up to our front line in very close order. 

XXV. --Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, thenthose of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do awaywith the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle. Hissoldiers, hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily brokethe enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a charge on themwith drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting, that, when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the(Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the pointof the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, withtheir left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many, after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away thebuckler from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected. Atlength, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and as there wasin the neighbourhood a mountain about a mile off, to betake themselvesthither. When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancingup, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15, 000 men closed the enemy'sline of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed ourmen on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them;upon seeing which, the Helvetii, who had betaken themselves to themountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romanshaving faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions; the firstand second line to withstand those who had been defeated and driven offthe field; the third to receive those who were just arriving. 

XXVI. --Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtfulsuccess. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, theone division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to themountain; the other repaired to their baggage and waggons. For duringthe whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventhhour [_i. E. _ 12 (noon)--1 P. M. ] to eventide, no one could see an enemywith his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage tilllate in the night, for they had set waggons in the way as a rampart, andfrom the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they cameon, and some from between the waggons and the wheels kept darting theirlances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fighthad lasted some time, our men gained possession of their baggage andcamp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were taken. After that battle about 130, 000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, whomarched incessantly during the whole of that night; and after a marchdiscontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of theLingones on the fourth day, whilst our men, having stopped for threedays, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial ofthe slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters andmessengers to the Lingones [with orders] that they should not assistthem with corn or with anything else; for that if they should assistthem, he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii. After thethree days' interval he began to follow them himself with all hisforces. 

XXVII. --The Helvetii, compelled by the want of everything, sentambassadors to him about a surrender. When these had met him in the wayand had thrown themselves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant tonehad with tears sued for peace, and [when] he had ordered them to awaithis arrival, in the place where they then were, they obeyed hiscommands. When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, theirarms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst those things arebeing sought for and got together, after a night's interval, about 6000men of that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified byfear, lest, after delivering up their arms, they should sufferpunishment, or else induced by the hope of safety, because they supposedthat, amid so vast a multitude of those who had surrendered themselves, _their_ flight might either be concealed or entirely overlooked, havingat night-fall departed out of the camp of the Helvetii, hastened to theRhine and the territories of the Germans. 

XXVIII. --But when Caesar discovered this, he commanded those throughwhose territories they had gone, to seek them, out and to bring themback again, if they meant to be acquitted before him; and consideredthem, when brought back, in the light of enemies; he admitted all therest to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages, arms, anddeserters. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi toreturn to their territories from which they had come, and as there wasat home nothing whereby they might support their hunger, all theproductions of the earth having been destroyed, he commanded theAllobroges to let them have a plentiful supply of corn; and ordered themto rebuild the towns and villages which they had burnt. This he did, chiefly on this account, because he was unwilling that the country, fromwhich the Helvetii had departed, should be untenanted, lest the Germans, who dwell on the other side of the Rhine, should, on account of theexcellence of the lands, cross over from their own territories intothose of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the province of Gauland the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui, that theymight settle the Boii, in their own (_i. E. _ in the Aeduan) territories, as these were known to be of distinguished valour to whom they gavelands, and whom they afterwards admitted to the same state of rights andfreedom as themselves. 

XXIX. --In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greekcharacters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had beendrawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from theircountry of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, theold men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was:-

Of the _Helvetii_ [lit. Of the heads of the Helvetii] 263, 000Of the _Tulingi_ 36, 000Of the _Latobrigi_ 14, 000Of the _Rauraci_ 23, 000Of the _Boii_ 32, 000 -------The sum of all amounted to 368, 000

Out of these, such as could bear arms [amounted] to about 92, 000. Whenthe _census_ of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar hadcommanded, the number was found to be 110, 000. 

XXX. --When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors fromalmost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled tocongratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, althoughhe had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrongs doneby them to the Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no lessto the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because theHelvetii, while their affairs were most flourishing, had quitted theircountry with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul, andseizing the government of it, and selecting, out of a great abundance, that spot for an abode which they should judge to be the most convenientand most productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states astributaries. They requested that they might be allowed to proclaim anassembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular day, and to do that withCaesar's permission, [stating] that they had some things which, with thegeneral consent, they wished to ask of him. This request having beengranted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and ordained by an oathwith each other, that no one should disclose [their deliberations]except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by the generalassembly. 

XXXI. --When that assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of states, whohad before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they might beallowed to treat with him privately (in secret) concerning the safety ofthemselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threwthemselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less beggedand earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosedthan that they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuchas they saw that, if a disclosure were made, they should be put to thegreatest tortures. For these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him:--"That there were two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stoodat the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other. After these hadbeen violently struggling with one another for the superiority for manyyears, it came to pass that the Germans were called in for hire by theArverni and the Sequani. That about 15, 000 of them [_i. E. _ of theGermans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after that these wild andsavage men had become enamoured of the lands and the refinement and theabundance of the Gauls, more were brought over, that there were now asmany as 120, 000 of them in Gaul: that with these the Aedui and theirdependants had repeatedly struggled in arms, that they had been routedand had sustained a great calamity--had lost all their nobility, alltheir senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such engagements andcalamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in Gaul, bothfrom their own valour and from the Roman people's hospitality andfriendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of theirstate as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath, that they would neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aidfrom the Roman people, nor refuse to be for ever under their sway andempire. That he was the only one out of all the state of the Aedui whocould not be prevailed upon to take the oath or to give his children ashostages. On that account he had fled from his state and had gone to thesenate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither by oath norhostages. But a worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani than thevanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, had settledin their territories, and had seized upon a third of their land, whichwas the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to departfrom another third part, because a few months previously 24, 000 men ofthe Harudes had come to him, for whom room and settlements must beprovided. The consequence would be, that in a few years they would allbe driven from the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would crossthe Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be compared with the landof the Germans, nor must the habit of living of the latter be put on alevel with that of the former. Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no soonerdid he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle, which took place atMagetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to demandas hostages the children of all the principal nobles, and wreak on themevery kind of cruelty, if everything was not done at his nod orpleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and thathis commands could no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid inCaesar and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing thatthe Helvetii had done, [viz. ] emigrate from their country, and seekanother dwelling place, other settlements remote from the Germans, andtry whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to bedisclosed to Ariovistus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that hewould inflict the most severe punishment on all the hostages who are inhis possession, [and says] that Caesar could, either by his owninfluence and by that of his army, or by his late victory, or by name ofthe Roman people, intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number ofGermans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect all Gaul fromthe outrages of Ariovistus. "

XXXII. --When this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who werepresent began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar. Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did noneof those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down, gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of thisconduct, he inquired of themselves. No reply did the Sequani make, butsilently continued in the same sadness. When he had repeatedlyinquired of them and could not elicit any answer at all, the sameDivitiacus the Aeduan answered, that--"the lot of the Sequani was morewretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, becausethey alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid; andshuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if hewere present; for, to the rest, despite of everything, there was anopportunity of flight given; but all tortures must be endured by theSequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories, and whosetowns were all in his power. "

XXXIII. --Caesar, on being informed of these things, cheered the minds ofthe Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be anobject of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ariovistus, induced both by his kindness and his power, would put an end to hisoppression. After delivering this speech, he dismissed the assembly;and, besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to thinkthat this affair ought to be considered and taken up by him; especiallyas he saw that the Aedui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by thesenate "brethren" and "kinsmen, " were held in the thraldom and dominionof the Germans, and understood that their hostages were with Ariovistusand the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Romanpeople he considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic. That, moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross theRhine, and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw[would be] dangerous to the Roman people, and judged that wild andsavage men would not be likely to restrain themselves, after they hadpossessed themselves of all Gaul, from going forth into the province andthence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri and Teutones had done beforethem), particularly as the Rhone [was the sole barrier that] separatedthe Sequani from our province. Against which events he thought he oughtto provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus, for his part, had assumed to himself such pride and arrogance that he was felt to bequite insufferable. 

XXXIV. --He therefore determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus todemand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference betweenthe two, [saying] that he wished to treat with him on state-business andmatters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassyAriovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of anything fromCaesar, he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted anythingfrom him he ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he gowithout an army into those parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of, nor could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his army togetherto one place; that to him, moreover, it appeared strange what businesseither Caesar or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which hehad conquered in war. 

XXXV. --When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends ambassadorsto him a second time with this message "Since, after having been treatedwith so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (as he had in hisconsulship [B. C. 59] been styled 'king and friend' by the senate), hemakes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the Roman people, [viz. ]that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not think that itconcerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of mutualinterest, these are the things which he requires of him; first, that hedo not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul;in the next place, that he restore the hostages which he has from theAedui, and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with hisconsent those hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke theAedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies; if he wouldaccordingly do this, " [Caesar says] that "he himself and the Romanpeople will entertain a perpetual feeling of favour and friendshiptowards him; but that if he [Caesar] does not obtain [his desires], thathe (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso[B. C. 61] the senate had decreed that, whoever should have theadministration of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do soconsistently with the interests of the republic, protect the Aedui andthe other friends of the Roman people) will not overlook the wrongs ofthe Aedui. "

XXXVI. --To this Ariovistus replied, that "the right of war was, thatthey who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, inwhat manner they pleased; that in that way the Roman people were wont togovern the nations which they had conquered, not according to thedictation of any other, but according to their own discretion. If he forhis part did not dictate to the Roman people as to the manner in whichthey were to exercise their right, he ought not to be obstructed by theRoman people in his right; that the Aedui, inasmuch as they had triedthe fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been conquered, hadbecome tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, inthat by his arrival he was making his revenues less valuable to him;that he should not restore their hostages to the Aedui, but should notmake war wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abided bythat which had been agreed on, and paid their tribute annually: if theydid _not_ continue to do that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers'would avail them nought. As to Caesar's threatening him that be wouldnot overlook the wrongs of the Aedui, [he said] that no one had everentered into a contest with _him_ [Ariovistus] without utter ruin tohimself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose; he would feelwhat the invincible Germans, well-trained [as they were] beyond allothers to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof, could achieve by their valour. "

XXXVII. --At the same time that this message was delivered to Caesar, ambassadors came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the Aedui tocomplain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul, were ravaging their territories; that they had not been able to purchasepeace from Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri, [to state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banksof the Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuasand Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things, Caesar thought that he ought to use all despatch, lest, if thus new bandof Suevi should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus]might be less easily withstood. Having, therefore, as quickly as hecould, provided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forcedmarches. 

XXXVIII. --When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was brought tohim that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize onVesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advancedthree days' journey from his territories. Caesar thought that he oughtto take the greatest precautions lest this should happen, for there wasin that town a most ample supply of everything which was serviceable forwar; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to afford agreat facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubsalmost surrounds the whole town, as though it were traced round it witha pair of compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in the remainingspace, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, insuch a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bankon either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this[mountain], and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens byforced marches by night and day, and, after having seized the town, stations a garrison there. 

XXXIX. --Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of cornand provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of theGauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of hugestature, of incredible valour and practice in arms, that ofttimes they, on encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and thefierceness of their eyes)--so great a panic on a sudden seized the wholearmy, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and therest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives offriendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessaryfor them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might beallowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in orderthat they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neithercompose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: buthidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored withtheir comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universallythroughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of thesemen, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, bothsoldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in commandof the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished tobe considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, butfeared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests whichlay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not bebrought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar that when hegave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, thesoldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance inconsequence of their fear. 

XL. --When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, andsummoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severelyreprimanded them, "particularly for supposing that it belonged to themto inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching, or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's] consulship, had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; whyshould any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? Hefor his part was persuaded that, when his demands were known and thefairness of the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor theRoman people's favour. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, heshould make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of?--or whyshould they despair either of their own valour or of his zeal? Of thatenemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, onthe defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army wasregarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself. It had been made lately, too, in Italy; during the rebellion of theslaves, whom, however, the experience and training which they hadreceived from us, assisted in some respect. From which a judgment mightbe formed of the advantages which resolution carries with it, --inasmuchas those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterwards vanquished, when well armed and flushed withsuccess. In short, that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, infrequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also intheirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet cannot have beena match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gaulsdisquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, whenthe Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in themarshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenlyupon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in alldirections, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning thanvalour. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savageand unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that therebyour armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to apretence about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness of theroads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust theirgeneral's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these thingswere his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were tofurnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as tothe road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to itsbeing reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, oradvance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew that in thecase of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, eitherupon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or, that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearlyproved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his wholelife, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he wouldtherefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till amore distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in thefourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether asense of honour and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them. But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only thetenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be hispraetorian cohort. "--This legion Caesar had both greatly favoured, andin it, on account of its valour, placed the greatest confidence. 

XLI. -Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed ina surprising, manner, and the highest ardour and eagerness forprosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the firstto return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his havingexpressed this most favourable opinion of them; and assured him thatthey were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legionsendeavoured, through their military tribunes and the centurions of theprincipal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying] that theyhad never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determinationof the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Havingaccepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitred byDivitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, [hefound] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might leadhis army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as hehad said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue hismarch, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were onlyfour and twenty miles distant from ours. 

XLII. --Upon being apprised of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sendsambassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to aconference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, sincehe [Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might nowdo it without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and began tothink that he was now returning to a rational state of mind, as hespontaneously proffered that which he had previously refused to him whenrequesting it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his ownand the Roman people's great favours towards him, the issue would bethat he would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being madeknown. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of conference. Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier withhim to the conference, [saying] that "he was afraid of being ensnared byhim through treachery; that both should come accompanied by cavalry;that he would not come on any other condition. " Caesar, as he neitherwished that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, beset aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, decidedthat it would be most expedient to take away from the Gallic cavalry alltheir horses, and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenthlegion, in which he placed the greatest confidence; in order that hemight have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be anyneed for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of thetenth legion said, not without a touch of humour, "that Caesar did morefor them than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legionin place of his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them intohorse. "

XLIII. --There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth ofconsiderable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from bothcamps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference. Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought [with him] onhorseback, 200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus alsotook their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded thatthey should confer on horseback, and that, besides themselves, theyshould bring with them ten men each to the conference. When they werecome to the place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed hisown and the senate's favours towards him [Ariovistus], "in that he hadbeen styled king, in that [he had been styled] friend, by the senate--in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstancehe informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually beenbestowed in consideration of important personal services; that he, although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground for therequest, had obtained these honours through the kindness and munificenceof himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how old and howjust were the grounds of connexion that existed between themselves [theRomans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the senate had been passed intheir favour, and how frequent and how honourable; how from timeimmemorial the Aedui had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even[said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was thecustom of the Roman people to desire not only that its allies andfriends should lose none of their property, but be advanced ininfluence, dignity, and honour: who then could endure that what they hadbrought with them to the friendship of the Roman people, should be tornfrom them?" He then made the same demands which he had commissioned theambassadors to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either uponthe Aedui or their allies, that he should restore the hostages; that, ifhe could not send back to their country any part of the Germans, heshould at all events suffer none of them any more to cross the Rhine. 

XLIV. --Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Caesar; butexpatiated largely on his own virtues, "that he had crossed the Rhinenot of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls;that he had not left home and kindred without great expectations andgreat rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gaulsthemselves; that the hostages had been given by their own good-will;that he took by right of war the tribute which conquerors are accustomedto impose on the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, butthe Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, andhad encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed andbeaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make a secondtrial, he was ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoypeace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute, which of their own free-willthey had paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Roman peopleought to prove to him an ornament and a safeguard, not a detriment; andthat he sought it with that expectation. But if through the Roman peoplethe tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to beseduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman peopleno less heartily than he had sought it. As to his leading over a host ofGermans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securinghimself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, inthat he did not come without being invited, and in that he did not makewar, but merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before theRoman people. That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond thefrontiers of the province of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire?--why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains?--that this was his provinceof Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him, ifhe were to make an attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that wewere unjust to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar's sayingthat the Aedui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was not souncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui inthe very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance tothe Romans, nor received any from the Roman people in the struggleswhich the Aedui had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. Hemust feel suspicious that Caesar, though feigning friendship as thereason for his keeping an army in Gaul; was keeping it with the view ofcrushing him. And that unless he depart, and withdraw his army fromthese parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe; andthat, even if he should put him to death, he should do what would pleasemany of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he had assuranceof that from themselves through their messengers, and could purchase thefavour and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if hewould depart and resign to him the free possession of Gaul, he wouldrecompense him with a great reward, and would bring to a close whateverwars he wished to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him. "

XLV. --Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]: "why hecould not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Romanpeople's practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies, nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to theRoman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war byQuintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them andhad not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. Andif the most ancient period was to be regarded--then was the sovereigntyof the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the senate wasto be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] hadconquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws. "

XLVI. --While these things are being transacted in the conference, it wasannounced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approachingnearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones andweapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself tohis men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weaponupon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalrywould be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not thinkproper to engage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be saidthat they had been ensnared by him under the sanction of a conference. When it was spread abroad among the common soldiery with whathaughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he hadordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attackupon our men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greateralacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army. 

XLVII. --Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to state"that he wished to treat with him about those things which had beenbegun to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded"; [andto beg] that "he would either again appoint a day for a conference; or, if he were not willing to do that, that he would send one of his[officers] as an ambassador to him. " There did not appear to Caesar anygood reason for holding a conference; and the more so as the day beforethe Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our men. Hethought he should not without great danger send to him as ambassador oneof his [Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed[therefore] most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son ofC. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage andaccomplishments (whose father had been presented with the freedom of thecity by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and onaccount of his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, bylong practice, now spoke fluently; and because in his case the Germanswould have no motive for committing violence; and [as his colleague] M. Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissionedthem to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him. But whenAriovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the presenceof his army, "Why were they come to him? was it for the purpose ofacting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to speak, and castthem into chains. 

XLVIII. --The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a hillsix miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces pastCaesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design--thathe might cut off Caesar from, the corn and provisions which might beconveyed to him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For five successive daysfrom that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the camp, and put themin battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage inbattle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all thistime kept his army in camp: but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. Themethod of battle in which the Germans had practised themselves was this. There were 6000 horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, oneof whom each of the horse selected out of the whole army for his ownprotection. By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in theirengagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emergency rushedforward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen fromhis horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary to advancefarther: than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, so great, frompractice, was their swiftness, that, supported by the manes of thehorses, they could keep pace with their speed. 

XLIX. --Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that hemight not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenientposition for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped, at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in threelines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines tobe under arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distantfrom the enemy about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistussent light troops, about 16, 000 men in number, with all his cavalry;which forces were to intimidate our men, and hinder them in theirfortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged, orderedtwo lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute the work. Thecamp being fortified, he left there two legions and a portion of theauxiliaries; and led back the other four legions into the larger camp. 

L. --The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forcesfrom both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drewup his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When he found that they did not even then come out [from theirentrenchments], he led back his army into camp about noon. Then at lastAriovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battlewas vigorously maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset, after many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led backhis forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners, whereforeAriovistus did not come to an engagement, he discovered this to be thereason--that among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons topronounce from lots and divination whether it were expedient that thebattle should be engaged in or not; that they had said, "that it was notthe will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged inbattle before the new moon. "

LI. --The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guardfor both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of theenemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in thenumber of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that[thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. Hehimself, having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the campof the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forcesout of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, theHarudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; andsurrounded their whole army with their chariots and waggons, that nohope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who, with dishevelled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they wentforward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans. 

LII. --Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, thatevery one might have them as witnesses of his valour. He himself beganthe battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed thatpart of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon thesignal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and theenemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time forcasting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins, they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according totheir custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of ourswords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon thephalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded theenemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the leftwing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from theright wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry--as he was moredisengaged than those who were employed in the fight--sent the thirdline as a relief to our men who were in distress. 

LIII. --Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turnedtheir backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the riverRhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relyingon their strength, endeavoured to swim over, or, finding boats, procuredtheir safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who meeting with a smallvessel tied to the bank, escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew allthe rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whomhe had brought with him from home; the other a Norican, the sister ofking Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thitherfor that purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of theirtwo daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus, as he was being dragged by his guards in the flight, bound with a triplechain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing theenemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no lesspleasure than the victory itself; because he saw a man of the first rankin the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescuedfrom the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune hadnot diminished aught of the joy and exultation [of that day] by hisdestruction. He [Procillus] said that in his own presence the lots hadbeen thrice consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately beput to death by fire, or be reserved for another time: that by thefavour of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found andbrought back to him [Caesar]. 

LIV. --This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, whohad come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when theUbii, who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed, slew a great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very importantwars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among theSequani, a little earlier than the season of the year required. Heappointed Labienus over the winter quarters, and set out in person forHither Gaul to hold the assizes. 

BOOK II

I. --While Caesar was in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shownabove, frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also informed byletters from Labienus, that all the Belgae, who we have said are a thirdpart of Gaul, were entering into a confederacy against the Roman people, and giving hostages to one another; that the reasons of the confederacywere these--first, because they feared that, after all [Celtic] Gaul wassubdued, our army would be led against them; secondly, because they wereinstigated by several of the Gauls; some of whom as [on the one hand]they had been unwilling that the Germans should remain any longer inGaul, so [on the other] they were dissatisfied that the army of theRoman people should pass the winter in it, and settle there; and othersof them, from a natural instability and fickleness of disposition, wereanxious for a revolution; [the Belgae were instigated] by several, also, because the government in Gaul was generally seized upon by the morepowerful persons and by those who had the means of hiring troops, andthey could less easily effect this object under our dominion. 

II. --Alarmed by these tidings and letters, Caesar levied two new legionsin Hither Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius, hislieutenant, to conduct them further into Gaul. He himself, as soon asthere began to be plenty of forage, came to the army. He gives acommission to the Senones and the other Gauls who were neighbours of theBelgae, to learn what is going on amongst them [_i. E. _ the Belgae], andinform him of these matters. These all uniformly reported that troopswere being raised, and that an army was being collected in one place. Then, indeed, he thought that he ought not to hesitate about proceedingtowards them, and having provided supplies, moves his camp, and in aboutfifteen days arrives at the territories of the Belgae. 

III. --As he arrived there unexpectedly and sooner than any oneanticipated, the Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic]Gaul, sent to him Iccius and Antebrogius, [two of] the principal personsof the state, as their ambassadors: to tell hum that they surrenderedthemselves and all their possessions to the protection and disposal ofthe Roman people: and that they had neither combined with the rest ofthe Belgae, nor entered into any confederacy against the Roman people:and were prepared to give hostages, to obey his commands, to receive himinto their towns, and to aid him with corn and other things; that allthe rest of the Belgae were in arms; and that the Germans, who dwell onthis side the Rhine, had joined themselves to them; and that so greatwas the infatuation of them all that they could not restrain even theSuessiones, their own brethren and kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights, and the same laws, and who have one government and one magistracy [incommon] with themselves, from uniting with them. 

IV. --When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerfulthey were, and what they could do in war, he received the followinginformation: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung from theGermans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they hadsettled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and haddriven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were theonly people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul wasoverrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering theirterritories; the effect of which was that, from the recollection ofthose events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtinessin military matters. The Remi said that they had known accuratelyeverything respecting their number, because, being united to them byneighbourhood and by alliances, they had learnt what number each statehad in the general council of the Belgae promised for that war. That theBellovaci were the most powerful amongst them in valour, influence, andnumber of men; that these could muster 100, 000 armed men, [and had]promised 60, 000 picked men out of that number, and demanded forthemselves the command of the whole war. That the Suessiones were theirnearest neighbours and possessed a very extensive and fertile country;that among them, even in our own memory, Divitiacus, the most powerfulman of all Gaul, had been king; who had held the government of a greatpart of these regions, as well as of Britain; that their king at presentwas Galba; that the direction of the whole war was conferred by theconsent of all upon him, on account of his integrity and prudence; thatthey had twelve towns; that they had promised 50, 000 armed men; and thatthe Nervii, who are reckoned the most warlike among them, and aresituated at a very great distance, [had promised] as many; theAtrebates, 15, 000; the Ambiani, 10, 000; the Morini, 25, 000; the Menapu, 9000; the Caleti, 10, 000; the Velocasses and the Veromandui as many; theAduatuci, 19, 000; that the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, thePaemani, who are called by the common name of Germans, [had promised], they thought, to the number of 40, 000. 

V. --Caesar, having encouraged the Remi, and addressed them courteously, ordered the whole senate to assemble before him, and the children oftheir chief men to be brought to him as hostages; all which commandsthey punctually performed by the day [appointed]. He, addressing himselfto Divitiacus the Aeduan, with great earnestness, points out how much itconcerns the republic and their common security, that the forces of theenemy should be divided, so that it might not be necessary to engagewith so large a number at one time. [He asserts] that this might beeffected if the Aedui would lead their forces into the territories ofthe Bellovaci, and begin to lay waste their country. With theseinstructions he dismissed him from his presence. After he perceived thatall the forces of the Belgae, which had been collected in one place, were approaching towards him, and learnt from the scouts whom he hadsent out, and [also] from the Remi, that they were not then far distant, he hastened to lead his army over the Aisne, which is on the borders ofthe Remi, and there pitched his camp. This position fortified one sideof his camp by the banks of the river, rendered the country which lay inhis rear secure from the enemy, and furthermore ensured that provisionsmight without danger be brought to him by the Remi and the rest of thestates. Over that river was a bridge: there he places a guard; and onthe other side of the river he leaves Q. Titurus Sabinus, hislieutenant, with six cohorts. He orders him to fortify a camp with arampart twelve feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in breadth. 

VI. --There was a town of the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distantfrom this camp. This the Belgae on their march began to attack withgreat vigour. [The assault] was with difficulty sustained for that day. The Gauls' mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae: whenafter having drawn a large number of men around the whole of thefortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on allsides, and the wall has been stript of its defenders, [then], forming atestudo, they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which waseasily effected on this occasion; for while so large a number werecasting stones and darts, no one was able to maintain his position uponthe wall. When night had put an end to the assault, Iccius, who was thenin command of the town, one of the Remi, a man of the highest rank andinfluence amongst his people, and one of those who had come to Caesar asambassador [to sue] for a peace, sends messengers to him, [to report]"That, unless assistance were sent to him, he could not hold out anylonger. "

VII. --Thither immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides thesame persons who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends someNumidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearian slingers as a relief tothe townspeople, by whose arrival both a desire to resist together withthe hope of [making good their] defence was infused into the Remi, and, for the same reason, the hope of gaining the town abandoned the enemy. Therefore, after staying a short time before the town, and laying wastethe country of the Remi, when all the villages and buildings which theycould approach had been burnt, they hastened with all their forces tothe camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles [of it]; andtheir camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more thaneight miles in breadth. 

VIII. --Caesar at first determined to decline a battle, as well onaccount of the great number of the enemy as their distinguishedreputation for valour: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove toascertain by frequent trials what the enemy could effect by theirprowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men werenot inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally convenient andsuitable for marshalling an army (since the hill where the camp waspitched, rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth asfar as the space which the marshalled army could occupy, and had steepdeclines of its side in either direction, and gently sloping in frontgradually sank to the plain), on either side of that hill he drew across trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities of thattrench built forts, and placed there his military engines, lest, afterhe had marshalled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful inpoint of number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, whilefighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legionswhich he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, theymight be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in orderof battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up theirforces which they had brought out of the camp. 

IX. --There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that ofthe enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this;our men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, ifthe first attempt to pass should be made by them. In the meantime battlewas commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neitherarmy began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse[proving] favourable to our men, led back his forces into the camp. Theenemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which ithas been stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, theyendeavoured to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design, that, if they could, they might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant, commanded, and might cut off the bridge;but, if they could not do that, they should lay waste the lands of theRemi, which were of great use to us in carrying on the war, and mighthinder our men from foraging. 

X. --Caesar, being apprised of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalryand light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, andhastens towards them. There was a severe struggle in that place. Ourmen, attacking in the river the disordered enemy, slew a great part ofthem. By the immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest, who in a most courageous manner were attempting to pass over theirbodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those whohad first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that theirhopes had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town bystorm and also their passing the river, and did not see our men advanceto a more disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and whenprovisions began to fail them, having called a council, determined thatit was best for each to return to his country, and resolved to assemblefrom all quarters to defend those into whose territories the Romansshould first march an army; that they might contend in their own ratherthan in a foreign country, and might enjoy the stores of provisionswhich they possessed at home. Together with other causes, thisconsideration also led them to that resolution, viz. : that they hadlearnt that Divitiacus and the Aedui were approaching the territories ofthe Bellovaci. And it was impossible to persuade the latter to stay anylonger, or to deter them from conveying succour to their own people. 

XI. --That matter being determined on, marching out of their camp at thesecond watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, norunder any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place inthe journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departureappear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through hisscouts, [but] fearing an ambuscade, because he had not yet discoveredfor what reason they were departing, kept his army and cavalry withinthe camp. At daybreak, the intelligence having been confirmed by thescouts, he sent forward his cavalry to harass their rear; and gave thecommand of it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. AurunculeiusCotta. He ordered T. Labienus, another of his lieutenants, to followthem closely with three legions. These, attacking their rear, andpursuing them for many miles, slew a great number of them as they werefleeing; while those in the rear with whom they had come up, halted, andbravely sustained the attack of our soldiers; the van, because theyappeared to be removed from danger, and were not restrained by anynecessity or command, as soon as the noise was heard, broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their safety in flight. Thus without any risk [tothemselves] our men killed as great a number of them as the length ofthe day allowed; and at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betookthemselves into the camp, as they had been commanded. 

XII. --On the day following, before the enemy could recover from theirterror and flight, Caesar led his army into the territories of theSuessiones, which are next to the Remi, and having accomplished a longmarch, hastens to the town named Noviodunum. Having attempted to take itby storm on his march, because he heard that it was destitute of[sufficient] defenders, he was not able to carry it by assault, onaccount of the breadth of the ditch and the height of the wall, thoughfew were defending it. Therefore, having fortified the camp, he began tobring up the vineae, and to provide whatever things were necessary forthe storm. In the meantime, the whole body of the Suessiones, aftertheir flight, came the next night into the town. The vineae having beenquickly brought up against the town, a mound thrown up, and towersbuilt, the Gauls, amazed by the greatness of the works, such as they hadneither seen nor heard of before, and struck, also, by the despatch ofthe Romans, send ambassadors to Caesar respecting a surrender, andsucceed in consequence of the Remi requesting that they [the Suessiones]might be spared. 

XIII. --Caesar, having received as hostages the first men of the state, and even the two sons of king Galba himself; and all the arms in thetown having been delivered up, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender, and led his army against the Bellovaci. Who, when they had conveyedthemselves and all their possessions into the town called Bratuspantium, and Caesar with his army was about five miles distant from that town, all the old men, going out of the town, began to stretch out their handsto Caesar, and to intimate by their voice that they would throwthemselves on his protection and power, nor would contend in armsagainst the Roman people. In like manner, when he had come up to thetown, and there pitched his camp, the boys and the women from the wall, with outstretched hands, after their custom, begged peace from theRomans. 

XIV. --For these Divitiacus pleads (for after the departure of theBelgae, having dismissed the troops of the Aedui, he had returned toCaesar). "The Bellovaci had at all times been in the alliance andfriendship of the Aeduan state; that they had revolted from the Aeduiand made war upon the Roman people, being urged thereto by their nobles, who said that the Aedui, reduced to slavery by Caesar, were sufferingevery indignity and insult. That they who had been the leaders of thatplot, because they perceived how great a calamity they had brought uponthe state, had fled into Britain. That not only the Bellovaci, but alsothe Aedui, entreated him to use his [accustomed] clemency and lenitytowards them [the Bellovaci]: which if he did, he would increase theinfluence of the Aedui among all the Belgae, by whose succour andresources they had been accustomed to support themselves whenever anywars occurred. "

XV. --Caesar said that on account of his respect for Divitiacus and theAeduans, he would receive them into his protection, and would sparethem; but, because the state was of great influence among the Belgae, and pre-eminent in the number of its population, he demanded 600hostages. When these were delivered, and all the arms in the towncollected, he went from that place into the territories of the Ambiani, who, without delay, surrendered themselves and all their possessions. Upon their territories bordered the Nervii, concerning whose characterand customs when Caesar inquired he received the following information:--That "there was no access for merchants to them; that they suffered nowine and other things tending to luxury to be imported; because theythought that by their use the mind is enervated and the courageimpaired: that they were a savage people and of great bravery: that theyupbraided and condemned the rest of the Belgae who had surrenderedthemselves to the Roman people and thrown aside their national courage:that they openly declared they would neither send ambassadors, noraccept any condition of peace. "

XVI. --After he had made three days' march through their territories, hediscovered from some prisoners, that the river Sambre was not more thanten miles from his camp: that all the Nervii had stationed themselves onthe other side of that river, and together with the Atrebates and theVeromandui, their neighbours, were there awaiting the arrival of theRomans; for they had persuaded both these nations to try the samefortune of war [as themselves]: that the forces of the Aduatuci werealso expected by them, and were on their march; that they had put theirwomen, and those who through age appeared useless for war, in a place towhich there was no approach for an army, on account of the marshes. 

XVII. --Having learnt these things, he sends forward scouts andcenturions to choose a convenient place for the camp. And as a greatmany of the surrounding Belgae and other Gauls, following Caesar, marched with him; some of these, as was afterwards learnt from theprisoners, having accurately observed, during those days, the army'smethod of marching, went by night to the Nervii, and informed them thata great number of baggage-trains passed between the several legions, andthat there would be no difficulty, when the first legion had come intothe camp, and the other legions were at a great distance, to attack thatlegion while under baggage, which being routed, and the baggage-trainseized, it would come to pass that the other legions would not dare tostand their ground. It added weight also to the advice of those whoreported that circumstance, that the Nervii, from early times, becausethey were weak in cavalry (for not even at this time do they attend toit, but accomplish by their infantry whatever they can), in order thatthey might the more easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbours ifthey came upon them for the purpose of plundering, having cut youngtrees, and bent them, by means of their numerous branches [extending] onto the sides, and the quick-briars and thorns springing up between them, had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through whichit was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of our army would be obstructed by thesethings, the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to be neglected bythem. 

XVIII. --The nature of the ground which our men had chosen for the campwas this: A hill, declining evenly from the top, extended to the riverSambre, which we have mentioned above: from this river there arose a[second] hill of like ascent, on the other side and opposite to theformer, and open from about 200 paces at the lowest part; but in theupper part, woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to see through itinto the interior. Within those woods the enemy kept themselves inconcealment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared on the open ground, along the river. The depth of the river was about three feet. 

XIX. --Caesar, having sent his cavalry on before, followed close afterthem with all his forces; but the plan and order of the march wasdifferent from that which the Belgae had reported to the Nervii. For ashe was approaching the enemy Caesar, according to his custom, led on [asthe van] six legions unencumbered by baggage; behind them he had placedthe baggage-trains of the whole army; then the two legions which hadbeen last raised closed the rear, and were a guard for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, commenced action with the cavalry of the enemy. While they fromtime to time betook themselves into the woods to their companions, andagain made an assault out of the wood upon our men, who did not dare tofollow them in their retreat further than the limit to which the plainand open parts extended, in the meantime the six legions which hadarrived first, having measured out the work, began to fortify the camp. When the first part of the baggage-train of our army was seen by thosewho lay hid in the woods, which had been agreed on among them as thetime for commencing action, as soon as they had arranged their line ofbattle and formed their ranks within the woods, and had encouraged oneanother, they rushed out suddenly with all their forces and made anattack upon our horse. The latter being easily routed and thrown intoconfusion, the Nervii ran down to the river with such incredible speedthat they seemed to be in the woods, the river, and close upon us almostat the same time. And with the same speed they hastened up the hill toour camp and to those who were employed in the works. 

XX. --Caesar had everything to do at one time: the standard to bedisplayed, which was the sign when it was necessary to run to arms; thesignal to be given by the trumpet; the soldiers to be called off fromthe works; those who had proceeded some distance for the purpose ofseeking materials for the rampart, to be summoned; the order of battleto be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged; the watchword to be given. A great part of these arrangements was prevented by the shortness oftime and the sudden approach and charge of the enemy. Under thesedifficulties two things proved of advantage; [first] the skill andexperience of the soldiers, because, having been trained by formerengagements, they could suggest to themselves what ought to be done, asconveniently as receive information from others; and [secondly] thatCaesar had forbidden his several lieutenants to depart from the worksand their respective legions, before the camp was fortified. These, onaccount of the near approach and the speed of the enemy, did not thenwait for any command from Caesar, but of themselves executed whateverappeared proper. 

XXI. --Caesar, having given the necessary orders, hastened to and frointo whatever quarter fortune carried him to animate the troops, andcame to the tenth legion. Having encouraged the soldiers with no furtherspeech than that "they should keep up the remembrance of their wontedvalour, and not be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the assaultof the enemy"; as the latter were not farther from them than thedistance to which a dart could be cast, he gave the signal forcommencing battle. And having gone to another quarter for the purpose ofencouraging [the soldiers], he finds them fighting. Such was theshortness of the time, and so determined was the mind of the enemy onfighting, that time was wanting not only for affixing the militaryinsignia, but even for putting on the helmets and drawing off the coversfrom the shields. To whatever part any one by chance came from the works(in which he had been employed), and whatever standards he saw first, atthese he stood, lest in seeking his own company he should lose the timefor fighting. 

XXII. --The army having been marshalled, rather as the nature of theground and the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the time, thanas the method and order of military matters required; whilst the legionsin the different places were withstanding the enemy, some in onequarter, some in another, and the view was obstructed by the very thickhedges intervening, as we have before remarked, neither could properreserves be posted, nor could the necessary measures be taken in eachpart, nor could all the commands be issued by one person. Therefore, insuch an unfavourable state of affairs, various events of fortunefollowed. 

XXIII. --The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, as they had beenstationed on the left part of the army, casting their weapons, speedilydrove the Atrebates (for that division had been opposed to them), whowere breathless with running and fatigue, and worn out with wounds, fromthe higher ground into the river; and following them as they wereendeavouring to pass it, slew with their swords a great part of themwhile impeded (therein). They themselves did not hesitate to pass theriver; and having advanced to a disadvantageous place, when the battlewas renewed, they [nevertheless] again put to flight the enemy, who hadreturned and were opposing them. In like manner, in another quarter twodifferent legions, the eleventh and the eighth, having routed theVeromandui, with whom they had engaged, were fighting from the higherground upon the very banks of the river. But, almost the whole camp onthe front and on the left side being then exposed, since the twelfthlegion was posted in the right wing, and the seventh at no greatdistance from it, all the Nervii, in a very close body, withBoduognatus, who held the chief command, as their leader, hastenedtowards that place; and part of them began to surround the legions ontheir unprotected flank, part to make for the highest point of theencampment. 

XXIV. --At the same time our horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who hadbeen with those who, as I have related, were routed by the first assaultof the enemy, as they were betaking themselves into the camp, met theenemy face to face, and again sought flight into another quarter; andthe camp-followers who from the Decuman Gate and from the highest ridgeof the hill had seen our men pass the river as victors, when, aftergoing out for the purposes of plundering, they looked back and saw theenemy parading in our camp, committed themselves precipitately toflight; at the same time there arose the cry and shout of those who camewith the baggage-train; and they (affrighted) were carried some one way, some another. By all these circumstances the cavalry of the Treviri weremuch alarmed (whose reputation for courage is extraordinary among theGauls, and who had come to Caesar, being sent by their state asauxiliaries), and, when they saw our camp filled with a large number ofthe enemy, the legions hard pressed and almost held surrounded, thecamp-retainers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing on all sidesdivided and scattered, they, despairing of our affairs, hastened home, and related to their state that the Romans were routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy were in possession of their camp and baggage-train. 

XXV. --Caesar proceeded, after encouraging the tenth legion, to the rightwing; where he perceived that his men were hard pressed, and that inconsequence of the standards of the twelfth legion being collectedtogether in one place, the crowded soldiers were a hindrance tothemselves in the fight; that all the centurions of the fourth cohortwere slain, and the standard-bearer killed, the standard itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other cohorts either wounded or slain, and among them the chief centurion of the legion, P. Sextius Baculus, avery valiant man, who was so exhausted by many and severe wounds, thathe was already unable to support himself; he likewise perceived that therest were slackening their efforts, and that some, deserted by those inthe rear, were retiring from the battle and avoiding the weapons; thatthe enemy [on the other hand], though advancing from the lower ground, were not relaxing in front, and were [at the same time] pressing hard onboth flanks; he also perceived that the affair was at a crisis, and thatthere was not any reserve which could be brought up; having thereforesnatched a shield from one of the soldiers in the rear (for he himselfhad come without a shield), he advanced to the front of the line, andaddressing the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest of thesoldiers, he ordered them to carry forward the standards, and extend thecompanies, that they might the more easily use their swords. On hisarrival, as hope was brought to the soldiers and their courage restored, whilst every one for his own part, in the sight of his general, desiredto exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the enemy was a littlechecked. 

XXVI. --Caesar, when he perceived that the seventh legion, which stoodclose by him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, directed the tribunesof the soldiers to effect a junction of the legions gradually, and maketheir charge upon the enemy with a double front; which having been done, since they brought assistance the one to the other, nor feared lesttheir rear should be surrounded by the enemy, they began to stand theirground more boldly, and to fight more courageously. In the meantime, thesoldiers of the two legions which had been in the rear of the army, as aguard for the baggage-train, upon the battle being reported to them, quickened their pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top of the hill;and Titus Labienus, having gained possession of the camp of the enemy, and observed from the higher ground what was going on in our camp, sentthe tenth legion as a relief to our men, who, when they had learnt fromthe flight of the horse and the sutlers in what position the affair was, and in how great danger the camp and the legion and the commander wereinvolved, left undone nothing [which tended] to despatch. 

XXVI. --By their arrival, so great a change of matters was made, that ourmen, even those who had fallen down exhausted with wounds, leant ontheir shields, and renewed the fight: then the camp-retainers, thoughunarmed, seeing the enemy completely dismayed, attacked [them though]armed; the horsemen too, that they might by their valour blot out thedisgrace of their flight, thrust themselves before the legionarysoldiers in all parts of the battle. But the enemy, even in the lasthope of safety, displayed such great courage that when the foremost ofthem had fallen, the next stood upon them prostrate, and fought fromtheir bodies; when these were overthrown, and their corpses heaped uptogether, those who survived cast their weapons against our men[thence], as from a mound, and returned our darts which had fallenbetween [the armies]; so that it ought not to be concluded, that men ofsuch great courage had injudiciously dared to pass a very broad river, ascend very high banks, and come up to a very disadvantageous place;since their greatness of spirit had rendered these actions easy, although in themselves very difficult. 

XXVIII. --This battle being ended, and the nation and name of the Nerviibeing almost reduced to annihilation, their old men, whom together withthe boys and women we have stated to have been collected together in thefenny places and marshes, on this battle having been reported to them, since they were convinced that nothing was an obstacle to theconquerors, and nothing safe to the conquered, sent ambassadors toCaesar by the consent of all who remained, and surrendered themselves tohim; and in recounting the calamity of their state, said that theirsenators were reduced from 600 to three; that from 60, 000 men they [werereduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear arms; whom Caesar, that he mightappear to use compassion towards the wretched and the suppliant, mostcarefully spared; and ordered them to enjoy their own territories andtowns, and commanded their neighbours that they should restrainthemselves and their dependants from offering injury or outrage [tothem]. 

XXIX. --When the Aduatuci, of whom we have written above, were comingwith all their forces to the assistance of the Nervii, upon this battlebeing reported to them, they returned home after they were on the march;deserting all their towns and forts, they conveyed together all theirpossessions into one town, eminently fortified by nature. While thistown had on all sides around it very high rocks and precipices, therewas left on one side a gently ascending approach, of not more than 200feet in width; which place they had fortified with a very lofty doublewall: besides, they had placed stones of great weight and sharpenedstakes upon the walls. They were descended from the Cimbri and Teutones, who, when they were marching into our province and Italy, havingdeposited on this side the river Rhine such of their baggage-trains asthey could not drive or convey with them, left 6000 of their men as aguard and defence for them. These having, after the destruction of theircountrymen, been harassed for many years by their neighbours, while onetime they waged war offensively, and at another resisted it when wagedagainst them, concluded a peace with the consent of all, and chose thisplace as their settlement. 

XXX. --And on the first arrival of our army they made frequent salliesfrom the town, and contended with our men in trifling skirmishes:afterwards, when hemmed in by a rampart of twelve feet [in height], andfifteen miles in circuit, they kept themselves within the town. When, vineae having been brought up and a mound raised, they observed that atower also was being built at a distance, they at first began to mockthe Romans from their wall, and to taunt them with the followingspeeches. "For what purpose was so vast a machine constructed at sogreat a distance?" "With what hands, " or "with what strength did they, especially [as they were] men of such very small stature" (for ourshortness of stature, in comparison with the great size of their bodies, is generally a subject of much contempt to the men of Gaul), "trust toplace against their walls a tower of such great weight. "

XXXI. --But when they saw that it was being moved, and was approachingtheir walls, startled by the new and unaccustomed sight, they sentambassadors to Caesar [to treat] about peace; who spoke in the followingmanner: "That they did not believe the Romans waged war without divineaid, since they were able to move forward machines of such a height withso great speed, and thus fight from close quarters: that they resignedthemselves and all their possessions to [Caesar's] disposal: that theybegged and earnestly entreated one thing, viz. , that if perchance, agreeably to his clemency and humanity, which they had heard of fromothers, he should resolve that the Aduatuci were to be spared, he wouldnot deprive them of their arms; that all their neighbours were enemiesto them and envied their courage, from whom they could not defendthemselves if their arms were delivered up: that it was better for them, if they should be reduced to that state, to suffer any fate from theRoman people, than to be tortured to death by those among whom they hadbeen accustomed to rule. "

XXXII. --To these things Caesar replied, "That he, in accordance with hiscustom, rather than owing to their desert, should spare the state, ifthey should surrender themselves before the battering-ram should touchthe wall; but that there was no condition of surrender, except upontheir arms being delivered up; that he should do to them that which hehad done in the case of the Nervii, and would command their neighboursnot to offer any injury to those who had surrendered to the Romanpeople. " The matter being reported to their countrymen, they said thatthey would execute his commands. Having cast a very large quantity oftheir arms from the wall into the trench which was before the town, sothat the heaps of arms almost equalled the top of the wall and therampart, and nevertheless having retained and concealed, as weafterwards discovered, about a third part in the town, the gates wereopened, and they enjoyed peace for that day. 

XXXIII. --Towards evening Caesar ordered the gates to be shut, and thesoldiers to go out of the town, lest the townspeople should receive anyinjury from them by night. They [the Aduatuci], by a design beforeentered into, as we afterwards understood, because they believed that, as a surrender had been made, our men would dismiss their guards, or atleast would keep watch less carefully, partly with those arms which theyhad retained and concealed, partly with shields made of bark orinterwoven wickers, which they had hastily covered over with skins (asthe shortness of time required) in the third watch, suddenly made asally from the town with all their forces [in that direction] in whichthe ascent to our fortifications seemed the least difficult. The signalhaving been immediately given by fires, as Caesar had previouslycommanded, a rush was made thither [_i. E. _ by the Roman soldiers] fromthe nearest fort; and the battle was fought by the enemy as vigorouslyas it ought to be fought by brave men, in the last hope of safety, in adisadvantageous place, and against those who were throwing their weaponsfrom a rampart and from towers; since all hope of safety depended ontheir courage alone. About 4000 of the men having been slain, the restwere forced back into the town. The day after, Caesar, after breakingopen the gates, which there was no one then to defend, and sending inour soldiers, sold the whole spoil of that town. The number of 53, 000persons was reported to him by those who had bought them. 

XXXIV. --At the same time he was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had sentwith one legion against the Veneti, the Unelli, the Osismii, theCuriosolitae, the Sesuvii, the Aulerci, and the Rhedones, which aremaritime states, and touch upon the [Atlantic] ocean, that all thesenations were brought under the dominion and power of the Roman people. 

XXXV. --These things being achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, sohigh an opinion of this war was spread among the barbarians, thatambassadors were sent to Caesar by those nations who dwelt beyond theRhine, to promise that they would give hostages and execute hiscommands. Which embassies Caesar, because he was hastening into Italyand Illyricum, ordered to return to him at the beginning of thefollowing summer. He himself, having led his legions into winter-quartersamong the Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, which stateswere close to those regions in which he had waged war, set out forItaly; and a thanksgiving of fifteen days was decreed for thoseachievements, upon receiving Caesar's letter; [an honour] which beforethat time had been conferred on none. 

BOOK III

I. --When Caesar was setting out for Italy, he sent Servius Galba withthe twelfth legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, theVeragri, and Seduni, who extend from the territories of the Allobroges, and the lake of Geneva, and the river Rhone to the top of the Alps. Thereason for sending him was, that he desired that the pass along theAlps, through which [the Roman] merchants had been accustomed to travelwith great danger, and under great imposts, should be opened. Hepermitted him, if he thought it necessary, to station the legion inthese places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba having fought somesuccessful battles, and stormed several of their forts, upon ambassadorsbeing sent to him from all parts and hostages given and a peaceconcluded, determined to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, and towinter in person with the other cohorts of that legion in a village ofthe Veragri, which is called Octodurus; and this village being situatedin a valley, with a small plain annexed to it, is bounded on all sidesby very high mountains. As this village was divided into two parts by ariver, he granted one part of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other, which had been left by them unoccupied, to the cohorts to winter in. Hefortified this [latter] part with a rampart and a ditch. 

II. --When several days had elapsed in winter quarters, and he hadordered corn to be brought in, he was suddenly informed by his scoutsthat all the people had gone off in the night from that part of the townwhich he had given up to the Gauls, and that the mountains which hungover it were occupied by a very large force of the Sedani and Veragri. It had happened for several reasons that the Gauls suddenly formed thedesign of renewing the war and cutting off that legion. First, becausethey despised a single legion, on account of its small number, and thatnot quite full (two cohorts having been detached, and severalindividuals being absent, who had been despatched for the purpose ofseeking provision); then, likewise, because they thought that on accountof the disadvantageous character of the situation, even their firstattack could not be sustained [by us] when they would rush from themountains into the valley, and discharge their weapons upon us. To thiswas added, that they were indignant that their children were torn fromthem under the title of hostages, and they were persuaded that theRomans designed to seize upon the summits of the Alps, and unite thoseparts to the neighbouring province [of Gaul], not only to secure thepasses, but also as a constant possession. 

III. --Having received these tidings, Galba, since the works of thewinter quarters and the fortifications were not fully completed, nor wassufficient preparation made with regard to corn and other provisions(since, as a surrender had been made, and hostages received, he hadthought he need entertain no apprehension of a war), speedily summoninga council, began to anxiously inquire their opinions. In which council, since so much sudden danger had happened contrary to the generalexpectation, and almost all the higher places were seen already coveredwith a multitude of armed men, nor could [either] troops come to theirrelief, or provisions be brought in, as the passes were blocked up [bythe enemy]; safety being now nearly despaired of, some opinions of thissort were delivered; that, "leaving their baggage, and making a sally, they should hasten away for safety by the same routes by which they hadcome thither. " To the greater part, however, it seemed best, reservingthat measure to the last, to await the issue of the matter, and todefend the camp. 

IV. --A short time only having elapsed, so that time was scarcely givenfor arranging and executing those things which they had determined on, the enemy, upon the signal being given, rushed down [upon our men] fromall parts, and discharged stones and darts upon our rampart. Our men atfirst, while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, nor did theycast any weapon ineffectually from their higher station. As soon as anypart of the camp, being destitute of defenders, seemed to be hardpressed, thither they ran, and brought assistance. But they wereover-matched in this, that the enemy when wearied by the long continuanceof the battle, went out of the action, and others with fresh strengthcame in their place; none of which things could be done by our men, owingto the smallness of their number; and not only was permission not givento the wearied [Roman] to retire from the fight, but not even to thewounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post where he had beenstationed, and recover. 

V. --When they had now been fighting for more than six hours, withoutcessation, and not only strength, but even weapons were failing our men, and the enemy were pressing on more rigorously, and had begun todemolish the rampart and to fill up the trench, while our men werebecoming exhausted, and the matter was now brought to the lastextremity, P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, whom wehave related to have been disabled by severe wounds in the engagementwith the Nervii, and also C. Volusenus, a tribune of the soldiers, a manof great skill and valour, hasten to Galba, and assure him that the onlyhope of safety lay in making a sally, and trying the last resource. Whereupon, assembling the centurions, he quickly gives orders to thesoldiers to discontinue the fight a short time, and only collect theweapons flung [at them], and recruit themselves after their fatigue, andafterwards, upon the signal being given, sally forth from the camp, andplace in their valour all their hope of safety. 

VI. --They do what they were ordered; and, making a sudden sally from allthe gates [of the camp], leave the enemy the means neither of knowingwhat was taking place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune thus takinga turn, [our men] surround on every side, and slay those who hadentertained the hope of gaining the camp, and having killed more thanthe third part of an army of more than 30, 000 men (which number of thebarbarians it appeared certain had come up to our camp), put to flightthe rest when panic-stricken, and do not suffer them to halt even uponthe higher grounds. All the forces of the enemy being thus routed, andstripped of their arms, [our men] betake themselves to their camp andfortifications. Which battle being finished, inasmuch as Galba wasunwilling to tempt fortune again, and remembered that he had come intowinter quarters with one design, and saw that he had met with adifferent state of affairs; chiefly however urged by the want of cornand provision, having the next day burned all the buildings of thatvillage, he hastens to return into the province; and as no enemy opposedor hindered his march, he brought the legion safe into the [country ofthe] Nantuates, thence into [that of] the Allobroges, and therewintered. 

VII. --These things being achieved, while Caesar had every reason tosuppose that Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, the Belgaebeing overcome, the Germans expelled, the Seduni among the Alpsdefeated, and when he had, therefore, in the beginning of winter, setout for Illyricum, as he wished to visit those nations, and acquire aknowledge of their countries, a sudden war sprang up in Gaul. Theoccasion of that war was this: P. Crassus, a young man, had taken up hiswinter quarters with the seventh legion among the Andes, who border uponthe [Atlantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of corn in thoseparts, sent out some officers of cavalry and several military tribunesamongst the neighbouring states, for the purpose of procuring corn andprovision; in which number T. Terrasidius was sent amongst the Esubii;M. Trebius Gallus amongst the Curiosolitae; Q. Velanius, with T. Silius, amongst the Veneti. 

VIII. --The influence of this state is by far the most considerable ofany of the countries on the whole sea coast, because the Veneti bothhave a very great number of ships, with which they have been accustomedto sail to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their knowledge andexperience of nautical affairs; and as only a few ports lie scatteredalong that stormy and open sea, of which they are in possession, theyhold as tributaries almost all those who are accustomed to traffic inthat sea. With them arose the beginning [of the revolt] by theirdetaining Silius and Velanius; for they thought that they should recoverby their means the hostages which they had given to Crassus. Theneighbouring people, led on by their influence (as the measures of theGauls are sudden and hasty), detain Trebius and Terrasidius for the samemotive; and quickly sending ambassadors, by means of their leading men, they enter into a mutual compact to do nothing except by generalconsent, and abide the same issue of fortune; and they solicit the otherstates to choose rather to continue in that liberty which they hadreceived from their ancestors, than endure slavery under the Romans. Allthe sea coast being quickly brought over to their sentiments, they senda common embassy to P. Crassus [to say], "If he wished to receive backhis officers, let him send back to them their hostages. "

IX. --Caesar, being informed of these things by Crassus, since he was sofar distant himself, orders ships of war to be built in the meantime onthe river Loire, which flows into the ocean; rowers to be raised fromthe province; sailors and pilots to be provided. These matters beingquickly executed, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permits, hastens to the army. The Veneti, and the other states also, beinginformed of Caesar's arrival, when they reflected how great a crime theyhad committed, in that the ambassadors (a character which had amongstall nations ever been sacred and inviolable) had by them been detainedand thrown into prison, resolve to prepare for a war in proportion tothe greatness of their danger, and especially to provide those thingswhich appertain to the service of a navy; with the greater confidence, inasmuch as they greatly relied on the nature of their situation. Theyknew that the passes by land were cut off by estuaries, that theapproach by sea was most difficult, by reason of our ignorance of thelocalities, [and] the small number of the harbours, and they trustedthat our army would not be able to stay very long among them, on accountof the insufficiency of corn; and again, even if all these things shouldturn out contrary to their expectation, yet they were very powerful intheir navy. They, well understood that the Romans neither had any numberof ships, nor were acquainted with the shallows, the harbours, or theislands of those parts where they would have to carry on the war; andthat navigation was very different in a narrow sea from what it was inthe vast and open ocean. Having come to this resolution, they fortifytheir towns, convey corn into them from the country parts, bringtogether as many ships as possible to Venetia, where it appeared Caesarwould at first carry on the war. They unite to themselves as allies forthat war, the Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambiliati, theMorini, the Diablintes, and the Menapii; and send for auxiliaries fromBritain, which is situated over against those regions. 

X. --There were these difficulties which we have mentioned above, incarrying on the war, but many things, nevertheless, urged Caesar to thatwar; the open insult offered to the state in the detention of the Romanknights, the rebellion raised after surrendering, the revolt afterhostages were given, the confederacy of so many states, but principally, lest if [the conduct of] this part was overlooked, the other nationsshould think that the same thing was permitted them. Wherefore, since hereflected that almost all the Gauls were fond of revolution, and easilyand quickly excited to war; that all men likewise, by nature, loveliberty and hate the condition of slavery, he thought he ought to divideand more widely distribute his army, before more states should join theconfederation. 

XI. --He therefore sends T. Labienus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry tothe Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He charges him to visitthe Remi and the other Belgians, and to keep them in their allegianceand repel the Germans (who were said to have been summoned by the Belgaeto their aid) if they attempted to cross the river by force in theirships. He orders P. Crassus to proceed into Aquitania with twelvelegionary cohorts and a great number of the cavalry, lest auxiliariesshould be sent into Gaul by these states, and such great nations beunited. He sends Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with threelegions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolitae, and the Lexovii, to takecare that their forces should be kept separate from the rest. Heappoints D. Brutus, a young man, over the fleet and those Gallic vesselswhich he had ordered to be furnished by the Pictones and the Santoni, and the other provinces which remained at peace; and commands him toproceed towards the Veneti, as soon as he could. He himself hastensthither with the land forces. 

XII. --The sites of their towns were generally such that, being placed onextreme points [of land] and on promontories, they neither had anapproach by land when the tide had rushed in from the main ocean, whichalways happens twice in the space of twelve hours; nor by ships, because, upon the tide ebbing again, the ships were likely to be dashedupon the shoals. Thus, by either circumstance, was the storming of theirtowns rendered difficult; and if at any time perchance the Veneti, overpowered by the greatness of our works (the sea having been excludedby a mound and large dams, and the latter being made almost equal inheight to the walls of the town), had begun to despair of theirfortunes, bringing up a large number of ships, of which they had a verygreat quantity, they carried off all their property and betookthemselves to the nearest towns; there they again defended themselves bythe same advantages of situation. They did this the more easily during agreat part of the summer, because our ships were kept back by storms, and the difficulty of sailing was very great in that vast and open sea, with its strong tides and its harbours far apart and exceedingly few innumber. 

XIII. --For their ships were built and equipped after this manner. Thekeels were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, whereby they couldmore easily encounter the shallows and the ebbing of the tide: the prowswere raised very high, and in like manner the sterns were adapted to theforce of the waves and storms [which they were formed to sustain]. Theships were built wholly of oak, and designed to endure any force andviolence whatever; the benches, which were made of planks a foot inbreadth, were fastened by iron spikes of the thickness of a man's thumb;the anchors were secured fast by iron chains instead of cables, and forsails they used skins and thin dressed leather. These [were used] eitherthrough their want of canvas and their ignorance of its application, offor this reason, which is more probable, that they thought that suchstorms of the ocean, and such violent gales of wind could not beresisted by sails, nor ships of such great burden be conveniently enoughmanaged by them. The encounter of our fleet with these ships was of sucha nature that our fleet excelled in speed alone, and the plying of theoars; other things, considering the nature of the place [and] theviolence of the storms, were more suitable and better adapted on theirside; for neither could our ships injure theirs with their beaks (sogreat was their strength), nor on account of their height was a weaponeasily cast up to them; and for the same reason they were less readilylocked in by rocks. To this was added, that whenever a storm began torage and they ran before the wind, they both could weather the stormmore easily and heave to securely in the shallows, and when left by thetide feared nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of all which thingswas much to be dreaded by our ships. 

XIV. --Caesar, after taking many of their towns, perceiving that so muchlabour was spent in vain and that the flight of the enemy could not beprevented on the capture of their towns, and that injury could not bedone them, he determined to wait for his fleet. As soon as it came upand was first seen by the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fullyequipped and appointed with every kind of [naval] implement, sailedforth from the harbour, and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it appearclear to Brutus, who commanded the fleet, or to the tribunes of thesoldiers and the centurions, to whom the several ships were assigned, what to do, or what system of tactics to adopt; for they knew thatdamage could not be done by their beaks; and that, although turrets werebuilt [on their decks], yet the height of the stems of the barbarianships exceeded these; so that weapons could not be cast up from [our]lower position with sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls fellthe more forcibly upon us. One thing provided by our men was of greatservice, [viz. ] sharp hooks inserted into and fastened upon poles, of aform not unlike the hooks used in attacking town walls. When the ropeswhich fastened the sail-yards to the masts were caught by them andpulled, and our vessel vigorously impelled with the oars, they [theropes] were severed; and when they were cut away, the yards necessarilyfell down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic vessels depended ontheir sails and rigging, upon these being cut away, the entiremanagement of the ships was taken from them at the same time. The restof the contest depended on courage; in which our men decidedly had theadvantage; and the more so because the whole action was carried on inthe sight of Caesar and the entire army; so that no act, a little morevaliant than ordinary, could pass unobserved, for all the hills andhigher grounds, from which there was a near prospect of the sea, wereoccupied by our army. 

XV. --The sail-yards [of the enemy], as we have said, being brought down, although two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs] surrounded eachone [of ours], the soldiers strove with the greatest energy to board theships of the enemy: and, after the barbarians observed this takingplace, as a great many of their ships were beaten, and as no relief forthat evil could be discovered, they hastened to seek safety in flight. And, having now turned their vessels to that quarter in which the windblew, so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, that they could not moveout of their place, which circumstance, truly, was exceedingly opportunefor finishing the business; for our men gave chase and took them one byone, so that very few out of all the number, [and those] by theintervention of night, arrived at the land, after the battle had lastedalmost from the fourth hour till sunset. 

XVI. --By this battle the war with the Veneti and the whole of the seacoast was finished; for both all the youth, and all, too, of moreadvanced age, in whom there was any discretion or rank, had assembled inthat battle; and they had collected in that one place whatever navalforces they had anywhere; and when these were lost, the survivors had noplace to retreat to, nor means of defending their towns. Theyaccordingly surrendered themselves and all their possessions to Caesar, on whom Caesar thought that punishment should be inflicted the moreseverely, in order that for the future the rights of ambassadors mightbe more carefully respected, by barbarians: having, therefore, put todeath all their senate, he sold the rest for slaves. 

XVII. --While these things are going on amongst the Veneti, Q. TituriusSabinus with those troops which he had received from Caesar, arrives inthe territories of the Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, andheld the chief command of all those states which had revolted: fromwhich he had collected a large and powerful army. And in those few days, the Aulerci and the Sexovii, having slain their senate because theywould not consent to be promoters of the war, shut their gates [againstus] and united themselves to Viridovix; a great multitude besides ofdesperate men and robbers assembled out of Gaul from all quarters, whomthe hope of plundering and the love of fighting had called away fromhusbandry and their daily labour. Sabinus kept himself within his camp, which was in a position convenient for everything; while Viridovixencamped over against him at a distance of two miles, and daily bringingout his forces, gave him an opportunity of fighting; so that Sabinus hadnow not only come into contempt with the enemy, but also was somewhattaunted by the speeches of our soldiers; and furnished so great asuspicion of his cowardice that the enemy presumed to approach even tothe very rampart of our camp. He adopted this conduct for the followingreason: because he did not think that a lieutenant ought to engage inbattle with so great a force, especially while he who held the chiefcommand was absent, except on advantageous ground or some favourablecircumstance presented itself. 

XVIII. --After having established this suspicion of his cowardice, heselected a certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one of those whomhe had with him as auxiliaries. He induces him by great gifts andpromises to go over to the enemy; and informs [him] of what he wished tobe done. Who, when he arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays beforethem the fears of the Romans; and informs them by what difficultiesCaesar himself was harassed, and that the matter was not far removedfrom this--that Sabinus would the next night privately draw off his armyout of the camp and set forth to Caesar, for the purpose of carrying[him] assistance, which, when they heard, they all cry out together thatan opportunity of successfully conducting their enterprise ought not tobe thrown away; that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. Many thingspersuaded the Gauls to this measure; the delay of Sabinus during theprevious days; the positive assertion of the [pretended] deserter; wantof provisions, for a supply of which they had not taken the requisiteprecautions; the hope springing from the Venetic war; and [also] becausein most cases men willingly believe what they wish. Influenced by thesethings, they do not discharge Viridovix and the other leaders from thecouncil, before they gained permission from them to take up arms andhasten to [our] camp; which being granted, rejoicing as if victory werefully certain, they collected faggots and brushwood, with which to fillup the Roman trenches, and hasten to the camp. 

XIX. --The situation of the camp was a rising ground, gently sloping fromthe bottom for about a mile. Thither they proceeded with great speed (inorder that as little time as possible might be given to the Romans tocollect and arm themselves), and arrived quite out of breath. Sabinushaving encouraged his men, gives them the signal, which they earnestlydesired. While the enemy were encumbered by reason of the burdens whichthey were carrying, he orders a sally to be suddenly made from two gates[of the camp]. It happened, by the advantage of situation, by theunskilfulness and the fatigue of the enemy, by the valour of oursoldiers, and their experience in former battles, that they could notstand one attack of our men, and immediately turned their backs: and ourmen with full vigour followed them while disordered, and slew a greatnumber of them; the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who escapedby flight. Thus at the same time, Sabinus was informed of the navalbattle and Caesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and all the statesimmediately surrendered themselves to Titurius: for as the temper of theGauls is impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so their mind is weak, and by no means resolute in enduring calamities. 

XX. --About the same time, P. Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania(which, as has been before said, both from its extent of territory andthe great number of its people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul), understanding that he was to wage war in these parts, where a few yearsbefore L. Valerius Praeconinus, the lieutenant, had been killed, and hisarmy routed, and from which L. Manilius, the proconsul, had fled withthe loss of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary care must be usedby him. Wherefore, having provided corn, procured auxiliaries andcavalry, [and] having summoned by name many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, which are the states of the province of Gaul, thatborder on these regions [Aquitania], he led his army into theterritories of the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the Sotiateshaving brought together great forces and [much] cavalry, in which theirstrength principally lay, and assailing our army on the march, engagedfirst in a cavalry action, then when their cavalry was routed, and ourmen pursuing, they suddenly display their infantry forces, which theyhad placed in ambuscade in a valley. These attacked our men [while]disordered, and renewed the fight. 

XXI. --The battle was long and vigorously contested, since the Sotiates, relying on their former victories, imagined that the safety of the wholeof Aquitania rested on their valour; [and] our men, on the other hand, desired it might be seen what they could accomplish without theirgeneral and without the other legions, under a very young commander; atlength the enemy, worn out with wounds, began to turn their backs, and agreat number of them being slain, Crassus began to besiege the[principal] town of the Sotiates on his march. Upon their valiantlyresisting, he raised vineae and turrets. They at one time attempting asally, at another forming mines to our rampart and vineae (at which theAquitani are eminently skilled, because in many places amongst themthere are copper mines); when they perceived that nothing could begained by these operations through the perseverance of our men, theysend ambassadors to Crassus, and entreat him to admit them to asurrender. Having obtained it, they, being ordered to deliver up theirarms, comply. 

XXII. --And while the attention of our men is engaged in that matter, inanother part Adcantuannus, who held the chief command, with 600 devotedfollowers, whom they call soldurii (the conditions of whose associationare these, --that they enjoy all the conveniences of life with those towhose friendship they have devoted themselves: if anything calamitoushappen to them, either they endure the same destiny together with them, or commit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of men, has there beenfound any one who, upon his being slain to whose friendship he haddevoted himself, refused to die); Adcantuannus, [I say] endeavouring tomake a sally with these, when our soldiers had rushed together to arms, upon a shout being raised at that part of the fortification, and afierce battle had been fought there, was driven back into the town, yethe obtained from Crassus [the indulgence] that he should enjoy the sameterms of surrender [as the other inhabitants]. 

XXIII. --Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, marched intothe territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. But then, thebarbarians being alarmed, because they had heard that a town fortifiedby the nature of the place and by art had been taken by us in a few daysafter our arrival there, began to send ambassadors into all quarters, tocombine, to give hostages one to another, to raise troops. Ambassadorsalso are sent to those states of Hither Spain which are nearest toAquitania, and auxiliaries and leaders are summoned from them; on whosearrival they proceed to carry on the war with great confidence, and witha great host of men. They who had been with Q. Sertorius the wholeperiod [of his war in Spain] and were supposed to have very great skillin military matters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the practice ofthe Roman people, begin to select [advantageous] places, to fortifytheir camp, to cut off our men from provisions, which, when Crassusobserves, [and likewise] that his forces, on account of their smallnumber, could not safely be separated; that the enemy both madeexcursions and beset the passes, and [yet] left sufficient guard fortheir camp; that on that account, corn and provision could not veryconveniently be brought up to him, and that the number of the enemy wasdaily increased, he thought that he ought not to delay in giving battle. This matter being brought to a council, when he discovered that allthought the same thing, he appointed the next day for the fight. 

XXIV. --Having drawn out all his forces at the break of day, andmarshalled them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries in thecentre, and waited to see what measures the enemy would take. They, although on account of their great number and their ancient renown inwar, and the small number of our men, they supposed they might safelyfight, nevertheless considered it safer to gain the victory without anywound, by besetting the passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and ifthe Romans, on account of the want of corn, should begin to retreat, they intended to attack them while encumbered in their march anddepressed in spirit [as being assailed while] under baggage. Thismeasure being approved of by the leaders and the forces of the Romansdrawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves in their camp. Crassushaving remarked this circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by theirown delay, and by the reputation [_i. E. _ for cowardice arising thence]had rendered our soldiers more eager for fighting, and the remarks ofall were heard [declaring] that no longer ought delay to be made ingoing to the camp, after encouraging his men, he marches to the camp ofthe enemy, to the great gratification of his own troops. 

XXV. --There, while some were filling up the ditch, and others, bythrowing a large number of darts, were driving the defenders from therampart and fortifications, and the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did notmuch rely in the battle, by supplying stones and weapons [to thesoldiers], and by conveying turf to the mound, presented the appearanceand character of men engaged in fighting; while also the enemy werefighting resolutely and boldly, and their weapons, discharged from theirhigher position, fell with great effect; the horse, having gone roundthe camp of the enemy, reported to Crassus that the camp was notfortified with equal care on the side of the Decuman gate, and had aneasy approach. 

XXVI. --Crassus, having exhorted the commanders of the horse to animatetheir men by great rewards and promises, points out to them what hewished to have done. They, as they had been commanded, having broughtout the four cohorts, which, as they had been left as a guard for thecamp, were not fatigued by exertion, and having led them round by asomewhat longer way, lest they could be seen from the camp of the enemy, when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the battle, quicklyarrived at those fortifications which we have spoken of, and, havingdemolished these, stood in the camp of the enemy before they were seenby them, or it was known what was going on. And then, a shout beingheard in that quarter, our men, their strength having been recruited(which usually occurs on the hope of victory), began to fight morevigorously. The enemy, surrounded on all sides, [and] all their affairsbeing despaired of, made great attempts to cast themselves down over theramparts and to seek safety in flight. These the cavalry pursued overthe very open plains, and after leaving scarcely a fourth part out ofthe number of 50, 000, which it was certain had assembled out ofAquitania and from the Cantabri, returned late at night to the camp. 

XXVII. --Having heard of this battle, the greatest part of Aquitaniasurrendered itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent hostages, inwhich number were the Tarbelli, the Bigerriones, the Preciani, theVocasates, the Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the Ausci, theGarumni, the Sibuzates, the Cocosates. A few [and those] most remotenations, relying on the time of the year, because winter was at hand, neglected to do this. 

XXVIII. --About the same time Caesar, although the summer was nearlypast, yet since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini and the Menapiialone remained in arms, and had never sent ambassadors to him [to make atreaty] of peace, speedily led his army thither, thinking that that warmight soon be terminated. They resolved to conduct the war on a verydifferent method from the rest of the Gauls; for as they perceived thatthe greatest nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, had been routedand overcome, and as they possessed continuous ranges of forests andmorasses, they removed themselves and all their property thither. WhenCaesar had arrived at the opening of these forests, and had begun tofortify his camp, and no enemy was in the meantime seen, while our menwere dispersed on their respective duties, they suddenly rushed out fromall parts of the forest, and made an attack on our men. The latterquickly took up arms and drove them back again to their forests; andhaving killed a great many, lost a few of their own men while pursuingthem too far through those intricate places. 

XXIX. --During the remaining days after this, Caesar began to cut downthe forests; and that no attack might be made on the flank of thesoldiers, while unarmed and not foreseeing it, he placed together(opposite to the enemy) all that timber which was cut down, and piled itup as a rampart on either flank. When a great space had been, withincredible speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle [of the enemy]and the rear of their baggage-train were already seized by our men, andthey themselves were seeking for the thickest parts of the forests, storms of such a kind came on that the work was necessarily suspended, and, through the continuance of the rains, the soldiers could not anylonger remain in their tents. Therefore, having laid waste all theircountry, [and] having burnt their villages and houses, Caesar led backhis army and stationed them in winter-quarters among the Aulerci andLexovii, and the other states which had made war upon him last. 

BOOK IV

I. -The following winter (this was the year in which Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls), those Germans [called] the Usipetes, and likewisethe Tenchtheri, with a great number of men, crossed the Rhine, not farfrom the place at which that river discharges itself into the sea. Themotive for crossing [that river] was that, having been for several yearsharassed by the Suevi, they were constantly engaged in war, and hinderedfrom the pursuits of agriculture. The nation of the Suevi is by far thelargest and the most warlike nation of all the Germans. They are said topossess a hundred cantons, from each of which they yearly send fromtheir territories for the purpose of war a thousand armed men: theothers who remain at home, maintain [both] themselves and those engagedin the expedition. The latter again, in their turn, are in arms the yearafter: the former remain at home. Thus neither husbandry nor the art andpractice of war are neglected. But among them there exists no privateand separate land; nor are they permitted to remain more than one yearin one place for the purpose of residence. They do not live much oncorn, but subsist for the most part on milk and flesh, and are much[engaged] in hunting; which circumstance must, by the nature of theirfood, and by their daily exercise and the freedom of their life (forhaving from boyhood been accustomed to no employment, or discipline, they do nothing at all contrary to their inclination), both promotetheir strength and render them men of vast stature of body. And to sucha habit have they brought themselves, that even in the coldest partsthey wear no clothing whatever except skins, by reason of the scantinessof which a great portion of their body is bare, and besides they bathein open rivers. 

II. --Merchants have access to them rather that they may have persons towhom they may sell those things which they have taken in war, thanbecause they need any commodity to be imported to them. Moreover, evenas to labouring cattle, in which the Gauls take the greatest pleasure, and which they procure at a great price, the Germans do not employ suchas are imported, but those poor and ill-shaped animals which belong totheir country; these, however, they render capable of the greatestlabour by daily exercise. In cavalry actions they frequently leap fromtheir horses and fight on foot; and train their horses to stand still inthe very spot on which they leave them, to which they retreat with greatactivity when there is occasion; nor, according to their practice, isanything regarded as more unseemly, or more unmanly, than to usehousings. Accordingly, they have the courage, though they be themselvesbut few, to advance against any number whatever of horse mounted withhousings. They on no account permit wine to be imported to them, becausethey consider that men degenerate in their powers of enduring fatigue, and are rendered effeminate by that commodity. 

III. --They esteem it their greatest praise as a nation that the landsabout their territories lie unoccupied to a very great extent, inasmuchas [they think] that by this circumstance is indicated that a greatnumber of nations cannot, withstand their power; and thus on one side ofthe Suevi the lands are said to lie desolate for about six hundredmiles. On the other side they border on the Ubii, whose state was largeand flourishing, considering the condition of the Germans, and who aresomewhat more refined than those of the same race and the rest [of theGermans], and that because they border on the Rhine, and are muchresorted to by merchants, and are accustomed to the manners of theGauls, by reason of their approximity to them. Though the Suevi, aftermaking the attempt frequently and in several wars, could not expel thisnation from their territories, on account of the extent and populationof their state, yet they made them tributaries, and rendered them lessdistinguished and powerful [than they had ever been]. 

IV. --In the same condition were the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri (whom wehave mentioned above), who for many years resisted the power of theSuevi, but being at last driven from their possessions, and havingwandered through many parts of Germany, came to the Rhine, to districtswhich the Menapii inhabited, and where they had lands, houses, andvillages on either side of the river. The latter people, alarmed by thearrival of so great a multitude, removed from those houses which theyhad on the other side of the river, and having placed guards on thisside the Rhine, proceeded to hinder the Germans from crossing. They, finding themselves, after they had tried all means, unable either toforce a passage on account of their deficiency in shipping, or cross bystealth on account of the guards of the Menapii, pretended to return totheir own settlements and districts; and, after having proceeded threedays' march, returned; and their cavalry having performed the whole ofthis journey in one night, cut off the Menapii, who were ignorant of, and did not expect [their approach, and] who, having moreover beeninformed of the departure of the Germans by their scouts, had withoutapprehension returned to their villages beyond the Rhine. Having slainthese, and seized their ships, they crossed the river before that partof the Menapii, who were at peace in their settlements over the Rhine, were apprised of [their intention]; and seizing all their houses, maintained themselves upon their provisions during the rest of thewinter. 

V. --Caesar, when informed of these matters, fearing the fickledisposition of the Gauls, who are easily prompted to take upresolutions, and much addicted to change, considered that nothing was tobe entrusted to them; for it is the custom of that people to compeltravellers to stop, even against their inclination, and inquire whatthey may have heard, or may know, respecting any matter; and in townsthe common people throng around merchants and force them to state fromwhat countries they come, and what affairs they know of there. Theyoften engage in resolutions concerning the most important matters, induced by these reports and stories alone; of which they mustnecessarily instantly repent, since they yield to mere unauthorisedreports; and since most people give to their questions answers framedagreeably to their wishes. 

VI. --Caesar, being aware of their custom, in order that he might notencounter a more formidable war, sets forward to the army earlier in theyear than he was accustomed to do. When he had arrived there, hediscovered that those things, which he had suspected would occur, hadtaken place; that embassies had been sent to the Germans by some of thestates, and that they had been entreated to leave the Rhine, and hadbeen promised that all things which they desired should be provided bythe Gauls. Allured by this hope, the Germans were then making excursionsto greater distances, and had advanced to the territories of theEburones and the Condrusi, who are under the protection of the Treviri. After summoning the chiefs of Gaul, Caesar thought proper to pretendignorance of the things which he had discovered; and having conciliatedand confirmed their minds, and ordered some cavalry to be raised, resolved to make war against the Germans. 

VII. --Having provided corn and selected his cavalry, he began to directhis march towards those parts in which he heard the Germans were. Whenhe was distant from them only a few days' march, ambassadors come to himfrom their state; whose speech was as follows:--"That the Germansneither make war upon the Roman people first, nor do they decline, ifthey are provoked, to engage with them in arms; for that this was thecustom of the Germans handed down to them from their forefathers, toresist whatsoever people make war upon them and not to avert it byentreaty; this, however, they confessed, --that they had come hitherreluctantly, having been expelled from their country. If the Romans weredisposed to accept their friendship, they might be serviceable allies tothem; and let them either assign them lands, or permit them to retainthose which they had acquired by their arms; that they are inferior tothe Suevi alone, to whom not even the immortal gods can show themselvesequal; that there was none at all besides on earth whom they could notconquer. "

VIII. --To these remarks Caesar replied in such terms as he thoughtproper; but the conclusion of his speech was, "That he could make noalliance with them, if they continued in Gaul; that it was not probablethat they who were not able to defend their own territories, should getpossession of those of others, nor were there any lands lying waste inGaul which could be given away, especially to so great a number of men, without doing wrong [to others]; but they might, if they were desirous, settle in the territories of the Ubii; whose ambassadors were then withhim, and were complaining of the aggressions of the Suevi, andrequesting assistance from him; and that he would obtain this requestfrom them. "

IX. --The ambassadors said that they would report these things to theircountrymen; and, after having deliberated on the matter, would return toCaesar after the third day, they begged that he would not in themeantime advance his camp nearer to them. Caesar said that he could notgrant them even that; for he had learned that they had sent a great partof their cavalry over the Meuse to the Ambivariti, some days before, forthe purpose of plundering and procuring forage. He supposed that theywere then waiting for these horse, and that the delay was caused on thisaccount. 

X. --The Meuse rises from mount Le Vosge, which is in the territories ofthe Lingones; and, having received a branch of the Rhine, which iscalled the Waal, forms the island of the Batavi, and not more thaneighty miles from it it falls into the ocean. But the Rhine takes itscourse among the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and is carried with arapid current for a long distance through the territories of theSarunates, Helvetii, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Tribuci, and Treviri, andwhen it approaches the ocean, divides into several branches; and, havingformed many and extensive islands, a great part of which are inhabitedby savage and barbarous nations (of whom there are some who are supposedto live on fish and the eggs of sea-fowl), flows into the ocean byseveral mouths. 

XI. --When Caesar was not more than twelve miles distant from the enemy, the ambassadors return to him, as had been arranged; who meeting him onthe march, earnestly entreated him not to advance any farther. When theycould not obtain this, they begged him to send on a despatch to thosewho had marched in advance of the main army, and forbid them to engage;and grant them permission to send ambassadors to the Ubii, and if theprinces and senate of the latter would give them security by oath, theyassured Caesar that they would accept such conditions as might beproposed by him; and requested that he would give them the space ofthree days for negotiating these affairs. Caesar thought that thesethings tended to the self-same point [as their other proposal]; [namely]that, in consequence of a delay of three days intervening, their horsewhich were at a distance might return; however, he said, that he wouldnot that day advance farther than four miles for the purpose ofprocuring water; he ordered that they should assemble at that place inas large a number as possible the following day, that he might inquireinto their demands. In the meantime he sends messengers to the officerswho had marched in advance with all the cavalry to order them not toprovoke the enemy to an engagement, and if they themselves wereassailed, to sustain the attack until he came up with the army. 

XII. --But the enemy, as soon as they saw our horse, the number of whichwas 5000, whereas they themselves had not more than 800 horse, becausethose which had gone over the Meuse for the purpose of foraging had notreturned, while our men had no apprehensions, because their ambassadorshad gone away from Caesar a little before, and that day had beenrequested by them as a period of truce, made an onset on our men, andsoon threw them into disorder. When our men, in their turn, made astand, they, according to their practice, leaped from their horses totheir feet, and stabbing our horses in the belly and overthrowing agreat many of our men, put the rest to flight, and drove them forward somuch alarmed that they did not desist from their retreat till they hadcome in sight of our army. In that encounter seventy-four of our horsewere slain; among them, Piso, an Aquitanian, a most valiant man, anddescended from a very illustrious family; whose grandfather had held thesovereignty of his state, and had been styled friend by our senate. He, while he was endeavouring to render assistance to his brother who wassurrounded by the enemy, and whom he rescued from danger, was himselfthrown from his horse, which was wounded under him, but still opposed[his antagonists] with the greatest intrepidity, as long as he was ableto maintain the conflict. When at length he fell, surrounded on allsides and after receiving many wounds, and his brother, who had thenretired from the fight, observed it from a distance, he spurred on hishorse, threw himself upon the enemy, and was killed. 

XIII. --After this engagement, Caesar considered that neither oughtambassadors to be received to audience, nor conditions be accepted byhim from those who, after having sued for peace by way of stratagem andtreachery, had made war without provocation. And to wait till theenemy's forces were augmented and their cavalry had returned, heconcluded, would be the greatest madness; and knowing the fickleness ofthe Gauls, he felt how much influence the enemy had already acquiredamong them by this one skirmish. He [therefore] deemed that no time forconverting measures ought to be afforded them. After having resolved onthese things and communicated his plans to his lieutenants and quaestorin order that he might not suffer any opportunity for engaging to escapehim, a very seasonable event occurred, namely, that on the morning ofthe next day, a large body of Germans, consisting of their princes andold men, came to the camp to him to practise the same treachery anddissimulation; but, as they asserted, for the purpose of acquittingthemselves for having engaged in a skirmish the day before, contrary towhat had been agreed and to what, indeed, they themselves had requested;and also if they could by any means obtain a truce by deceiving him. Caesar, rejoicing that they had fallen into his power, ordered them tobe detained. He then drew all his forces out of the camp, and commandedthe cavalry, because he thought they were intimidated by the lateskirmish, to follow in the rear. 

XIV. --Having marshalled his army in three lines, and in a short timeperformed a march of eight miles, he arrived at the camp of the enemybefore the Germans could perceive what was going on; who being suddenlyalarmed by all the circumstances, both by the speediness of our arrivaland the absence of their own officers, as time was afforded neither forconcerting measures nor for seizing their arms, are perplexed as towhether it would be better to lead out their forces against the enemy, or to defend their camp, or seek their safety by flight. Theirconsternation being made apparent by their noise and tumult, oursoldiers, excited by the treachery of the preceding day, rushed into thecamp: such of them as could readily get their arms for a short timewithstood our men, and gave battle among their carts and baggage-waggons;but the rest of the people, [consisting] of boys and women (for they hadleft their country and crossed the Rhine with all their families), beganto fly in all directions; in pursuit of whom Caesar sent the cavalry. 

XV. --The Germans when, upon hearing a noise behind them, [they lookedand] saw that their families were being slain, throwing away their armsand abandoning their standards, fled out of the camp, and when they hadarrived at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, the survivorsdespairing of farther escape, as a great number of their countrymen hadbeen killed, threw themselves into the river and there perished, overcome by fear, fatigue, and the violence of the stream. Our soldiers, after the alarm of so great a war, for the number of the enemy amountedto 430, 000, returned to their camp, all safe to a man, very few beingeven wounded. Caesar granted those whom he had detained in the campliberty of departing. They however, dreading revenge and torture fromthe Gauls, whose lands they had harassed, said that they desired toremain with him. Caesar granted them permission. 

XVI. --The German war being finished, Caesar thought it expedient for himto cross the Rhine, for many reasons; of which this was the mostweighty, that, since he saw the Germans were so easily urged to go intoGaul, he desired they should have their fears for their own territorieswhen they discovered that the army of the Roman people both could anddared pass the Rhine. There was added also, that that portion of thecavalry of the Usipetes and the Tenchtheri, which I have above relatedto have crossed the Meuse for the purpose of plundering and procuringforage, and was not present at the engagement, had betaken themselves, after the retreat of their countrymen, across the Rhine into theterritories of the Sigambri, and united themselves to them. When Caesarsent ambassadors to them, to demand that they should give up to himthose who had made war against him and against Gaul, they replied, "Thatthe Rhine bounded the empire of the Roman people; if he did not think itjust for the Germans to pass over into Gaul against his consent, why didhe claim that anything beyond the Rhine should be subject to hisdominion or power?" The Ubii also, who alone, out of all the nationslying beyond the Rhine, had sent ambassadors to Caesar, and formed analliance and given hostages, earnestly entreated "that he would bringthem assistance, because they were grievously oppressed by the Suevi;or, if he was prevented from doing so by the business of thecommonwealth, he would at least transport his army over the Rhine; thatthat would be sufficient for their present assistance and their hope forthe future; that so great was the name and the reputation of his army, even among the most remote nations of the Germans, arising from thedefeat of Ariovistus and this last battle which was fought, that theymight be safe under the fame and friendship of the Roman people. " Theypromised a large number of ships for transporting the army. 

XVII. --Caesar, for those reasons which I have mentioned, had resolved tocross the Rhine; but to cross by ships he neither deemed to besufficiently safe, nor considered consistent with his own dignity orthat of the Roman people. Therefore, although the greatest difficulty informing a bridge was presented to him, on account of the breadth, rapidity, and depth of the river, he nevertheless considered that itought to be attempted by him, or that his army ought not otherwise to beled over. He devised this plan of a bridge. He joined together at thedistance of two feet, two piles, each a foot and a half thick, sharpeneda little at the lower end, and proportioned in length to the depth ofthe river. After he had, by means of engines, sunk these into the river, and fixed them at the bottom, and then driven them in with rammers, notquite perpendicularly, like a stake, but bending forward and sloping, soas to incline in the direction of the current of the river; he alsoplaced two [other piles] opposite to these, at the distance of fortyfeet lower down, fastened together in the same manner, but directedagainst the force and current of the river. Both these, moreover, werekept firmly apart by beams two feet thick (the space which the bindingof the piles occupied), laid in at their extremities between two braceson each side; and in consequence of these being in different directionsand fastened on sides the one opposite to the other, so great was thestrength of the work, and such the arrangement of the materials, that inproportion as the greater body of water dashed against the bridge, somuch the closer were its parts held fastened together. These beams werebound together by timber laid over them in the direction of the lengthof the bridge, and were [then] covered over with laths and hurdles; andin addition to this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, at thelower side of the bridge, and these serving as buttresses, and beingconnected with every portion of the work, sustained the force of thestream: and there were others also above the bridge, at a moderatedistance; that if trunks of trees or vessels were floated down the riverby the barbarians for the purpose of destroying the work, the violenceof such things might be diminished by these defences, and might notinjure the bridge. 

XVIII. --Within ten days after the timber began to be collected, thewhole work was completed, and the whole army led over. Caesar, leaving astrong guard at each end of the bridge, hastens into the territories ofthe Sigambri. In the meantime ambassadors from several nations come tohim, whom, on their suing for peace and alliance, he answers in acourteous manner, and orders hostages to be brought to him. But theSigambri, at the very time the bridge was begun to be built, madepreparations for a flight (by the advice of such of the Tenchtheri andUsipetes as they had amongst them), and quitted their territories andconveyed away all their possessions, and concealed themselves in desertsand woods. 

XIX. --Caesar, having remained in their territories a few days, and burntall their villages and houses, and cut down their corn, proceeded intothe territories of the Ubii; and having promised them his assistance, ifthey were ever harassed by the Suevi, he learned from them theseparticulars: that the Suevi, after they had by means of their scoutsfound that the bridge was being built, had called a council, accordingto their custom, and sent orders to all parts of their state to removefrom the towns and convey their children, wives, and all theirpossessions into the woods, and that all who could bear arms shouldassemble in one place; that the place thus chosen was nearly the centreof those regions which the Suevi possessed; that in this spot they hadresolved to await the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle there. When Caesar discovered this, having already accomplished all thosethings on account of which he had resolved to lead his army over, namely, to strike fear into the Germans, take vengeance on the Sigambri, and free the Ubii from the invasion of the Suevi, having spentaltogether eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and thinking he had advancedfar enough to serve both honour and interest, he returned into Gaul, andcut down the bridge. 

XX. --During the short part of summer which remained, Caesar, although inthese countries, as all Gaul lies towards the north, the winters areearly, nevertheless resolved to proceed into Britain, because hediscovered that in almost all the wars with the Gauls succours had beenfurnished to our enemy from that country; and even if the time of yearshould be insufficient for carrying on the war, yet he thought it wouldbe of great service to him if he only entered the island, and saw intothe character of the people, and got knowledge of their localities, harbours, and landing-places, all which were for the most part unknownto the Gauls. For neither does any one except merchants generally gothither, nor even to them was any portion of it known, except thesea-coast and those parts which are opposite to Gaul. Therefore, afterhaving called up to him the merchants from all parts, he could learnneither what was the size of the island, nor what or how numerous werethe nations which inhabited it, nor what system of war they followed, nor what customs they used, nor what harbours were convenient for agreat number of large ships. 

XXI. --He sends before him Caius Volusenus with a ship of war, to acquirea knowledge of these particulars before he in person should make adescent into the island, as he was convinced that this was a judiciousmeasure. He commissioned him to thoroughly examine into all matters, andthen return to him as soon as possible. He himself proceeds to theMorini with all his forces. He orders ships from all parts of theneighbouring countries, and the fleet which the preceding summer he hadbuilt for the war with the Veneti, to assemble in this place. In themeantime, his purpose having been discovered, and reported to theBritons by merchants, ambassadors come to him from several states of theisland, to promise that they will give hostages, and submit to thegovernment of the Roman people. Having given them an audience, he afterpromising liberally, and exhorting them to continue in that purpose, sends them back to their own country, and [despatches] with themCommius, whom, upon subduing the Atrebates, he had created king there, aman whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and who he thought would befaithful to him, and whose influence ranked highly in those countries. He orders him to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them toembrace the protection of the Roman people, and apprise them that hewould shortly come thither. Volusenus, having viewed the localities asfar as means could be afforded one who dared not leave his ship andtrust himself to barbarians, returns to Caesar on the fifth day, andreports what he had there observed. 

XXII. --While Caesar remains in these parts for the purpose of procuringships, ambassadors come to him from a great portion of the Morini, toplead their excuse respecting their conduct on the late occasion;alleging that it was as men uncivilised, and as those who wereunacquainted with our custom, that they had made war upon the Romanpeople, and promising to perform what he should command. Caesar, thinking that this had happened fortunately enough for him, because heneither wished to leave an enemy behind him, nor had an opportunity forcarrying on a war, by reason of the time of year, nor considered thatemployment in such trifling matters was to be preferred to hisenterprise on Britain, imposes a large number of hostages; and whenthese were brought, he received them to his protection. Having collectedtogether and provided about eighty transport ships, as many as hethought necessary for conveying over two legions, he assigned such[ships] of war as he had besides to the quaestor, his lieutenants, andofficers of cavalry. There were in addition to these eighteen ships ofburden which were prevented, eight miles from that place, by winds, frombeing able to reach the same port. These he distributed amongst thehorse; the rest of the army he delivered to Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to lead into the territories of theMenapii and those cantons of the Morini from which ambassadors had notcome to him. He ordered P. Sulpicius Rufus, his lieutenant, to holdpossession of the harbour, with such a garrison as he thoughtsufficient. 

XXIII. --These matters being arranged, finding the weather favourable forhis voyage, he set sail about the third watch, and ordered the horse tomarch forward to the farther port, and there embark and follow him. Asthis was performed rather tardily by them, he himself reached Britainwith the first squadron of ships, about the fourth hour of the day, andthere saw the forces of the enemy drawn up in arms on all the hills. Thenature of the place was this: the sea was confined by mountains so closeto it that a dart could be thrown from their summit upon the shore. Considering this by no means a fit place for disembarking, he remainedat anchor till the ninth hour, for the other ships to arrive there. Having in the meantime assembled the lieutenants and military tribunes, he told them both what he had learnt from Volusenus, and what he wishedto be done; and enjoined them (as the principle of military matters, andespecially as maritime affairs, which have a precipitate and uncertainaction, required) that all things should be performed by them at a nodand at the instant. Having dismissed them, meeting both with wind andtide favourable at the same time, the signal being given and the anchorweighed, he advanced about seven miles from that place, and stationedhis fleet over against an open and level shore. 

XXIV. --But the barbarians, upon perceiving the design of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry and charioteers, a class of warriors of whomit is their practice to make great use in their battles, and followingwith the rest of their forces, endeavoured to prevent our men landing. In this was the greatest difficulty, for the following reasons, namely, because our ships, on account of their great size, could be stationedonly in deep water; and our soldiers, in places unknown to them, withtheir hands embarrassed, oppressed with a large and heavy weight ofarmour, had at the same time to leap from the ships, stand amidst thewaves, and encounter the enemy; whereas they, either on dry ground, oradvancing a little way into the water, free in all their limbs, inplaces thoroughly known to them, could confidently throw their weaponsand spur on their horses, which were accustomed to this kind of service. Dismayed by these circumstances and altogether untrained in this mode ofbattle, our men did not all exert the same vigour and eagerness whichthey had been wont to exert in engagements on dry ground. 

XXV. --When Caesar observed this, he ordered the ships of war, theappearance of which was somewhat strange to the barbarians and themotion more ready for service, to be withdrawn a little from thetransport vessels, and to be propelled by their oars, and be stationedtowards the open flank of the enemy, and the enemy to be beaten off anddriven away with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan was of greatservice to our men; for the barbarians being startled by the form of ourships and the motions of our oars and the nature of our engines, whichwas strange to them, stopped, and shortly after retreated a little. Andwhile our men were hesitating [whether they should advance to theshore], chiefly on account of the depth of the sea, he who carried theeagle of the tenth legion, after supplicating the gods that the mattermight turn out favourably to the legion, exclaimed, "Leap, fellowsoldiers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to the enemy. I, for mypart, will perform my duty to the commonwealth and my general. " When hehad said this with a loud voice, he leaped from the ship and proceededto bear the eagle toward the enemy. Then our men, exhorting one anotherthat so great a disgrace should not be incurred, all leaped from theship. When those in the nearest vessels saw them, they speedily followedand approached the enemy. 

XXVI. --The battle was maintained vigorously on both sides. Our men, however, as they could neither keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as one from one ship and another fromanother assembled around whatever standards they met, were thrown intogreat confusion. But the enemy, who were acquainted with all theshallows, when from the shore they saw any coming from a ship one byone, spurred on their horses, and attacked them while embarrassed; manysurrounded a few, others threw their weapons upon our collected forceson their exposed flank. When Caesar observed this, he ordered the boatsof the ships of war and the spy sloops to be filled with soldiers, andsent them up to the succour of those whom he had observed in distress. Our men, as soon as they made good their footing on dry ground, and alltheir comrades had joined them, made an attack upon the enemy, and putthem to flight, but could not pursue them very far, because the horsehad not been able to maintain their course at sea and reach the island. This alone was wanting to Caesar's accustomed success. 

XXVII. --The enemy being thus vanquished in battle, as soon as theyrecovered after their flight, instantly sent ambassadors to Caesar tonegotiate about peace. They promised to give hostages and perform whathe should command. Together with these ambassadors came Commius theAtrebatian, who, as I have above said, had been sent by Caesar intoBritain. Him they had seized upon when leaving his ship, although in thecharacter of ambassador he bore the general's commission to them, andthrown into chains: then after the battle was fought, they sent himback, and in suing for peace cast the blame of that act upon the commonpeople, and entreated that it might be pardoned on account of theirindiscretion. Caesar, complaining that after they had sued for peace, and had voluntarily sent ambassadors into the continent for thatpurpose, they had made war without a reason, said that he would pardontheir indiscretion, and imposed hostages, a part of whom they gaveimmediately; the rest they said they would give in a few days, sincethey were sent for from remote places. In the meantime they orderedtheir people to return to the country parts, and the chiefs assembledfrom all quarters, and proceeded to surrender themselves and theirstates to Caesar. 

XXVIII. --A peace being established by these proceedings four days afterwe had come into Britain, the eighteen ships, to which reference hasbeen made above, and which conveyed the cavalry, set sail from the upperport with a gentle gale; when, however, they were approaching Britainand were seen from the camp, so great a storm suddenly arose that noneof them could maintain their course at sea; and some were taken back tothe same port from which they had started;--others, to their greatdanger, were driven to the lower part of the island, nearer to the west;which, however, after having cast anchor, as they were getting filledwith water, put out to sea through necessity in a stormy night, and madefor the continent. 

XXIX. --It happened that night to be full moon, which usually occasionsvery high tides in that ocean; and that circumstance was unknown to ourmen. Thus, at the same time, the tide began to fill the ships of warwhich Caesar had provided to convey over his army, and which he haddrawn up on the strand; and the storm began to dash the ships of burdenwhich were riding at anchor against each other; nor was any meansafforded our men of either managing them or of rendering any service. Agreat many ships having been wrecked, inasmuch as the rest, having losttheir cables, anchors, and other tackling, were unfit for sailing, agreat confusion, as would necessarily happen, arose throughout the army;for there were no other ships in which they could be conveyed back, andall things which are of service in repairing vessels were wanting, andcorn for the winter had not been provided in those places, because itwas understood by all that they would certainly winter in Gaul. 

XXX. --On discovering these things the chiefs of Britain, who had come upafter the battle was fought to perform those conditions which Caesar hadimposed, held a conference, when they perceived that cavalry, and ships, and corn were wanting to the Romans, and discovered the small number ofour soldiers from the small extent of the camp (which, too, was on thisaccount more limited than ordinary because Caesar had conveyed over hislegions without baggage), and thought that the best plan was to renewthe war, and cut off our men from corn and provisions and protract theaffair till winter; because they felt confident that, if they werevanquished or cut off from a return, no one would afterwards pass overinto Britain for the purpose of making war. Therefore, again enteringinto a conspiracy, they began to depart from the camp by degrees andsecretly bring up their people from the country parts. 

XXXI. --But Caesar, although he had not as yet discovered their measures, yet, both from what had occurred to his ships, and from the circumstancethat they had neglected to give the promised hostages, suspected thatthe thing would come to pass which really did happen. He thereforeprovided remedies against all contingencies; for he daily conveyed cornfrom the country parts into the camp, used the timber and brass of suchships as were most seriously damaged for repairing the rest, and orderedwhatever things besides were necessary for this object to be brought tohim from the continent. And thus, since that business was executed bythe soldiers with the greatest energy, he effected that, after the lossof twelve ships, a voyage could be made well enough in the rest. 

XXXII. --While these things are being transacted, one legion had beensent to forage, according to custom, and no suspicion of war had arisenas yet, and some of the people remained in the country parts, otherswent backwards and forwards to the camp, they who were on duty at thegates of the camp reported to Caesar that a greater dust than was usualwas seen in that direction in which the legion had marched. Caesar, suspecting that which was [really the case], --that some new enterprisewas undertaken by the barbarians, ordered the two cohorts which were onduty to march into that quarter with him, and two other cohorts torelieve them on duty; the rest to be armed and follow him immediately. When he had advanced some little way from the camp, he saw that his menwere overpowered by the enemy and scarcely able to stand their ground, and that, the legion being crowded together, weapons were being cast onthem from all sides. For as all the corn was reaped in every part withthe exception of one, the enemy, suspecting that our men would repair tothat, had concealed themselves in the woods during the night. Thenattacking them suddenly, scattered as they were, and when they had laidaside their arms, and were engaged in reaping, they killed a smallnumber, threw the rest into confusion, and surrounded them with theircavalry and chariots. 

XXXIII. --Their mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generallybreak the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and thenoise of their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in betweenthe troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot. Thecharioteers in the meantime withdraw some little distance from thebattle, and so place themselves with the chariots that, if their mastersare overpowered by the number of the enemy, they may have a readyretreat to their own troops. Thus they display in battle the speed ofhorse, [together with] the firmness of infantry; and by daily practiceand exercise attain to such expertness that they are accustomed, even ona declining and steep place, to check their horses at full speed, andmanage and turn them in an instant and run along the pole, and stand onthe yoke, and thence betake themselves with the greatest celerity totheir chariots again. 

XXXIV. -Under these circumstances, our men being dismayed by the noveltyof this mode of battle, Caesar most seasonably brought assistance; forupon his arrival the enemy paused, and our men recovered from theirfear; upon which, thinking the time unfavourable for provoking the enemyand coming to an action, he kept himself in his own quarter, and, ashort time having intervened, drew back the legions into the camp. Whilethese things were going on, and all our men engaged, the rest of theBritons, who were in the fields, departed. Storms then set in forseveral successive days, which both confined our men to camp andhindered the enemy from attacking us. In the meantime the barbariansdespatched messengers to all parts and reported to their people thesmall number of our soldiers, and how good an opportunity was given forobtaining spoil and for liberating themselves for ever, if they shouldonly drive the Romans from their camp. Having by these means speedilygot together a large force of infantry and of cavalry, they came up tothe camp. 

XXXV. --Although Caesar anticipated that the same thing which hadhappened on former occasions would then occur--that, if the enemy wererouted, they would escape from danger by their speed; still, having gotabout thirty horse, which Commius the Atrebatian, of whom mention hasbeen made, had brought over with him [from Gaul], he drew up the legionsin order of battle before the camp. When the action commenced, the enemywere unable to sustain the attack of our men long, and turned theirbacks; our men pursued them as far as their speed and strengthpermitted, and slew a great number of them; then, having destroyed andburnt everything far and wide, they retreated to their camp. 

XXXVI. --The same day, ambassadors sent by the enemy came to Caesar tonegotiate a peace. Caesar doubled the number of hostages which he hadbefore demanded; and ordered that they should be brought over to thecontinent, because, since the time of the equinox was near, he did notconsider that, with his ships out of repair, the voyage ought to bedeferred till winter. Having met with favourable weather he set sail alittle after midnight, and all his fleet arrived safe at the continent, except two of the ships of burden which could not make the same portwhich the other ships did, and were carried a little lower down. 

XXXVII. --When our soldiers, about 300 in number, had been drawn out ofthese two ships, and were marching to the camp, the Morini, whom Caesar, when setting forth for Britain, had left in a state of peace, excited bythe hope of spoil, at first surrounded them with a small number of men, and ordered them to lay down their arms, if they did not wish to beslain; afterwards however, when they, forming a circle, stood on theirdefence, a shout was raised and about 6000 of the enemy soon assembled;which being reported, Caesar sent all the cavalry in the camp as arelief to his men. In the meantime our soldiers sustained the attack ofthe enemy, and fought most valiantly for more than four hours, and, receiving but few wounds themselves, slew several of them. But after ourcavalry came in sight, the enemy, throwing away their arms, turned theirbacks, and a great number of them were killed. 

XXXVIII. --The day following Caesar sent Labienus, his lieutenant, withthose legions which he had brought back from Britain, against theMorini, who had revolted; who, as they had no place to which they mightretreat, on account of the drying up of their marshes (which they hadavailed themselves of as a place of refuge the preceding year), almostall fell into the power of Labienus. In the meantime Caesar'slieutenants, Q. Titurius and L. Cotta, who had led the legions into theterritories of the Menapii, having laid waste all their lands, cut downtheir corn and burnt their houses, returned to Caesar because theMenapii had all concealed themselves in their thickest woods. Caesarfixed the winter quarters of all the legions amongst the Belgae. Thitheronly two British states sent hostages; the rest omitted to do so. Forthese successes, a thanksgiving of twenty days was decreed by the senateupon receiving Caesar's letter. 

BOOK V

I. --Lucius Domitius and Appius Claudius being consuls, Caesar whendeparting from his winter quarters into Italy, as he had been accustomedto do yearly, commands the lieutenants whom he appointed over thelegions to take care that during the winter as many ships as possibleshould be built, and the old repaired. He plans the size and shape ofthem. For despatch of lading, and for drawing them on shore, he makesthem a little lower than those which we have been accustomed to use inour sea; and that so much the more, because he knew that, on account ofthe frequent changes of the tide, less swells occurred there; for thepurpose of transporting little and a great number of horses, [he makesthem] a little broader than those which we use in other seas. All thesehe orders to be constructed for lightness and expedition, to whichobject their lowness contributes greatly. He orders those things whichare necessary for equipping ships to be brought thither from Spain. Hehimself, on the assizes of Hither Gaul being concluded, proceeds intoIllyricum, because he heard that the part of the province nearest themwas being laid waste by the incursions of the Pirustae. When he hadarrived there, he levies soldiers upon the states, and orders them toassemble at an appointed place. Which circumstance having been reported[to them], the Pirustae send ambassadors to him to inform him that nopart of those proceedings was done by public deliberation, and assertthat they were ready to make compensation by all means for the injuries[inflicted]. Caesar, accepting their defence, demands hostages, andorders them to be brought to him on a specified day, and assures themthat unless they did so he would visit their state with war. These beingbrought to him on the day which he had ordered, he appoints arbitratorsbetween the states, who should estimate the damages and determine thereparation. 

II. --These things being finished, and the assizes being concluded, hereturns into Hither Gaul, and proceeds thence to the army. When he hadarrived there, having made a survey of the winter quarter, he findsthat, by the extraordinary ardour of the soldiers, amidst the utmostscarcity of all materials, about six hundred ships of that kind which wehave described above, and twenty-eight ships of war, had been built, andwere not far from that state that they might be launched in a few days. Having commended the soldiers and those who had presided over the work, he informs them what he wishes to be done, and orders all the ships toassemble at port Itius, from which port he had learned that the passageinto Britain was shortest, [being only] about thirty miles from thecontinent. He left what seemed a sufficient number of soldiers for thatdesign; he himself proceeds into the territories of the Treviri withfour legions without baggage, and 800 horse, because they neither cameto the general diets [of Gaul], nor obeyed his commands, and were, moreover, said to be tampering with the Germans beyond the Rhine. 

III. --This state is by far the most powerful of all Gaul in cavalry, andhas great forces of infantry, and as we have remarked above, borders onthe Rhine. In that state, two persons, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, werethen contending with each other for the supreme power; one of whom, assoon as the arrival of Caesar and his legions was known, came to him;assures him that he and all his party would continue in theirallegiance, and not revolt from the alliance of the Roman people, andinforms him of the things which were going on amongst the Treviri. ButIndutiomarus began to collect cavalry and infantry, and makepreparations for war, having concealed those who by reason of their agecould not be under arms in the forest Arduenna, which is of immensesize, [and] extends from the Rhine across the country of the Treviri tothe frontiers of the Remi. But after that, some of the chief persons ofthe state, both influenced by their friendship for Cingetorix, andalarmed at the arrival of our army, came to Caesar and began to solicithim privately about their own interests, since they could not providefor the safety of the state; Indutiomarus, dreading lest he should beabandoned by all, sends ambassadors to Caesar, to declare that heabsented himself from his countrymen, and refrained from coming to himon this account, that he might the more easily keep the state in itsallegiance, lest on the departure of all the nobility the commonaltyshould, in their indiscretion, revolt. And thus the whole state was athis control; and that he, if Caesar would permit, would come to the campto him, and would commit his own fortunes and those of the state to hisgood faith. 

IV. --Caesar, though he discerned from what motive these things weresaid, and what circumstance deterred him from his meditated plan, still, in order that he might not be compelled to waste the summer among theTreviri, while all things were prepared for the war with Britain, ordered Indutiomarus to come to him with 200 hostages. When these werebrought, [and] among them his son and near relations whom he haddemanded by name, he consoled Indutiomarus, and enjoined him to continuein his allegiance; yet, nevertheless, summoning to him the chief men ofthe Treviri, he reconciled them individually to Cingetorix: this he boththought should be done by him in justice to the merits of the latter, and also judged that it was of great importance that the influence ofone whose singular attachment towards him he had fully seen, shouldprevail as much as possible among his people. Indutiomarus was very muchoffended at this act, [seeing that] his influence was diminished amonghis countrymen; and he, who already before had borne a hostile mindtowards us, was much more violently inflamed against us throughresentment at this. 

V. --These matters being settled, Caesar went to port Itius with thelegions. There he discovers that forty ships which had been built in thecountry of the Meldi, having been driven back by a storm, had beenunable to maintain their course, and had returned to the same port fromwhich they had set out; he finds the rest ready for sailing, andfurnished with everything. In the same place, the cavalry of the wholeof Gaul, in number 4000, assembles, and [also] the chief persons of allthe states; he had determined to leave in Gaul a very few of them, whosefidelity towards him he had clearly discerned, and take the rest withhim as hostages; because he feared a commotion in Gaul when he should beabsent. 

VI. --There was together with the others, Dumnorix, the Aeduan, of whomwe have made previous mention. Him in particular he had resolved to havewith him, because he had discovered him to be fond of change, fond ofpower, possessing great resolution, and great influence among the Gauls. To this was added that Dumnorix had before said in an assembly ofAeduans, that the sovereignty of the state had been made over to him byCaesar; which speech the Aedui bore with impatience and yet dared notsend ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose of either rejecting ordeprecating [that appointment]. That fact Caesar had learned from hisown personal friends. He at first strove to obtain by every entreatythat he should be left in Gaul; partly, because, being unaccustomed tosailing, he feared the sea; partly, because he said he was prevented bydivine admonitions. After he saw that this request was firmly refusedhim, all hope of success being lost, he began to tamper with the chiefpersons of the Gauls, to call them apart singly and exhort them toremain on the continent; to agitate them with the fear that it was notwithout reason that Gaul should be stript of all her nobility; that itwas Caesar's design to bring over to Britain and put to death all thosewhom he feared to slay in the sight of Gaul, to pledge his honour to therest, to ask for their oath that they would by common deliberationexecute what they should perceive to be necessary for Gaul. These thingswere reported to Caesar by several persons. 

VII. --Having learned this fact, Caesar, because he had conferred so muchhonour upon the Aeduan state, determined that Dumnorix should berestrained and deterred by whatever means he could; and that, because heperceived his insane designs to be proceeding farther and farther, careshould be taken lest he might be able to injure him and thecommonwealth. Therefore, having stayed about twenty-five days in thatplace, because the north wind, which usually blows a great part of everyseason, prevented the voyage, he exerted himself to keep Dumnorix in hisallegiance [and] nevertheless learn all his measures: having at lengthmet with favourable weather, he orders the foot soldiers and the horseto embark in the ships. But, while the minds of all were occupied, Dumnorix began to take his departure from the camp homewards with thecavalry of the Aedui, Caesar being ignorant of it. Caesar, on thismatter being reported to him, ceasing from his expedition and deferringall other affairs, sends a great part of the cavalry to pursue him, andcommands that he be brought back; he orders that if he use violence anddo not submit, that he be slain: considering that Dumnorix would donothing as a rational man while he himself was absent, since he haddisregarded his command even when present. He, however, when recalled, began to resist and defend himself with his hand, and implore thesupport of his people, often exclaiming that "he was free and thesubject of a free state. " They surround and kill the man as they hadbeen commanded; but the Aeduan horsemen all return to Caesar. 

VIII. --When these things were done [and] Labienus, left on the continentwith three legions and 2000 horse, to defend the harbours and providecorn, and discover what was going on in Gaul, and take measuresaccording to the occasion and according to the circumstance; he himself, with five legions and a number of horse, equal to that which he wasleaving on the continent, set sail at sunset and [though for a time]borne forward by a gentle south-west wind, he did not maintain hiscourse, in consequence of the wind dying away about midnight, and beingcarried on too far by the tide, when the sun rose, espied Britain passedon his left. Then, again, following the change of tide, he urged on withthe oars that he might make that port of the island in which he haddiscovered the preceding summer that there was the best landing-place, and in this affair the spirit of our soldiers was very much to beextolled; for they with the transports and heavy ships, the labour ofrowing not being [for a moment] discontinued, equalled the speed of theships of war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at mid-day; nor wasthere seen a [single] enemy in that place, but, as Caesar afterwardsfound from some prisoners, though large bodies of troops had assembledthere, yet being alarmed by the great number of our ships, more thaneight hundred of which, including the ships of the preceding year, andthose private vessels which each had built for his own convenience, hadappeared at one time, they had quitted the coast and concealedthemselves among the higher points. 

IX. --Caesar, having disembarked his army and chosen a convenient placefor the camp, when he discovered from the prisoners in what part theforces of the enemy had lodged themselves, having left ten cohorts and300 horse at the sea, to be a guard to the ships, hastens to the enemy, at the third watch, fearing the less for the ships for this reason, because he was leaving them fastened at anchor upon an even and openshore; and he placed Q. Atrius over the guard of the ships. He himself, having advanced by night about twelve miles, espied the forces of theenemy. They, advancing to the river with their cavalry and chariots fromthe higher ground, began to annoy our men and give battle. Beingrepulsed by our cavalry, they concealed themselves in woods, as they hadsecured a place admirably fortified by nature and by art, which, as itseemed, they had before prepared on account of a civil war; for allentrances to it were shut up by a great number of felled trees. Theythemselves rushed out of the woods to fight here and there, andprevented our men from entering their fortifications. But the soldiersof the seventh legion, having formed a testudo and thrown up a rampartagainst the fortification, took the place and drove them out of thewoods, receiving only a few wounds. But Caesar forbade his men to pursuethem in their flight any great distance; both because he was ignorant ofthe nature of the ground, and because, as a great part of the day wasspent, he wished time to be left for the fortification of the camp. 

X. --The next day, early in the morning, he sent both foot-soldiers andhorse in three divisions on an expedition to pursue those who had fled. These having advanced a little way, when already the rear [of the enemy]was in sight, some horse came to Caesar from Quintus Atrius, to reportthat the preceding night, a very great storm having arisen, almost allthe ships were dashed to pieces and cast upon the shore, because neitherthe anchors and cables could resist, nor could the sailors and pilotssustain the violence of the storm; and thus great damage was received bythat collision of the ships. 

XI. --These things being known [to him], Caesar orders the legions andcavalry to be recalled and to cease from their march; he himself returnsto the ships: he sees clearly before him almost the same things which hehad heard of from the messengers and by letter, so that, about fortyships being lost, the remainder seemed capable of being repaired withmuch labour. Therefore he selects workmen from the legions, and ordersothers to be sent for from the continent; he writes to Labienus to buildas many ships as he could with those legions which were with him. Hehimself, though the matter was one of great difficulty and labour, yetthought it to be most expedient for all the ships to be brought up onshore and joined with the camp by one fortification. In these matters heemployed about ten days, the labour of the soldiers being unremittingeven during the hours of night. The ships having been brought up onshore and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same forces which hedid before as a guard for the ships; he sets out in person for the sameplace that he had returned from. When he had come thither, greaterforces of the Britons had already assembled at that place, the chiefcommand and management of the war having been entrusted toCassivellaunus, whose territories a river, which is called the Thames, separates from the maritime states at about eighty miles from the sea. At an earlier period perpetual wars had taken place between him and theother states; but, greatly alarmed by our arrival, the Britons hadplaced him over the whole war and the conduct of it. 

XII. --The interior portion of Britain is inhabited by those of whom theysay that it is handed down by tradition that they were born in theisland itself: the maritime portion by those who had passed over fromthe country of the Belgae for the purpose of plunder and making war;almost all of whom are called by the names of those states from whichbeing sprung they went thither, and having waged war, continued thereand began to cultivate the lands. The number of the people is countless, and their buildings exceedingly numerous, for the most part very likethose of the Gauls: the number of cattle is great. They use either brassor iron rings, determined at a certain weight, as their money. Tin isproduced in the midland regions; in the maritime, iron; but the quantityof it is small: they employ brass, which is imported. There, as in Gaul, is timber of every description, except beech and fir. They do not regardit lawful to eat the hare, and the cock, and the goose; they, however, breed them for amusement and pleasure. The climate is more temperatethan in Gaul, the colds being less severe. 

XIII. --The island is triangular in its form, and one of its sides isopposite to Gaul. One angle of this side, which is in Kent, whitheralmost all ships from Gaul are directed, [looks] to the east; the lowerlooks to the south. This side extends about 500 miles. Another side liestowards Spain and the west, on which part is Ireland, less, as isreckoned, than Britain by one-half; but the passage [from it] intoBritain is of equal distance with that from Gaul. In the middle of thisvoyage is an island, which is called Mona; many smaller islands besidesare supposed to lie [there], of which islands some have written that atthe time of the winter solstice it is night there for thirty consecutivedays. We, in our inquiries about that matter, ascertained nothing, except that, by accurate measurements with water, we perceived thenights to be shorter there than on the continent. The length of thisside, as their account states, is 700 miles. The third side is towardsthe north, to which portion of the island no land is opposite; but anangle of that side looks principally towards Germany. This side isconsidered to be 800 miles in length. Thus the whole island is [about]2000 miles in circumference. 

XIV. --The most civilised of all these nations are they who inhabit Kent, which is entirely a maritime district, nor do they differ much from theGallic customs. Most of the inland inhabitants do not sow corn, but liveon milk and flesh, and are clad with skins. All the Britons, indeed, dyethemselves with wood, which occasions a bluish colour, and thereby havea more terrible appearance in fight. They wear their hair long, and haveevery part of their body shaved except their head and upper lip. Ten andeven twelve have wives common to them, and particularly brothers amongbrothers, and parents among their children; but if there be any issue bythese wives, they are reputed to be the children of those by whomrespectively each was first espoused when a virgin. 

XV. --The horse and charioteers of the enemy contended vigorously in askirmish with our cavalry on the march; yet so that our men wereconquerors in all parts, and drove them to their woods and hills; but, having slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, and lost some oftheir men. But the enemy, after some time had elapsed, when our men wereoff their guard, and occupied in the fortification of the camp, rushedout of the woods, and making an attack upon those who were placed onduty before the camp, fought in a determined manner; and two cohortsbeing sent by Caesar to their relief, and these severally the first oftwo legions, when these had taken up their position at a very smalldistance from each other, as our men were disconcerted by the unusualmode of battle, the enemy broke through the middle of them mostcourageously, and retreated thence in safety. That day, Q. LaberiusDurus, a tribune of the soldiers, was slain. The enemy, since morecohorts were sent against them, were repulsed. 

XVI. --In the whole of this method of fighting since the engagement tookplace under the eyes of all and before the camp, it was perceived thatour men, on account of the weight of their arms, inasmuch as they couldneither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, nor dare quit theirstandards, were little suited to this kind of enemy; that the horse alsofought with great danger, because they [the Britons] generally retreatedeven designedly, and, when they had drawn off our men a short distancefrom the legions, leaped from their chariots and fought on foot inunequal [and to them advantageous] battle. But the system of cavalryengagement is wont to produce equal danger, and indeed the same, both tothose who retreat and those who pursue. To this was added, that theynever fought in close order, but in small parties and at greatdistances, and had detachments placed [in different parts], and then theone relieved the other, and the vigorous and fresh succeeded thewearied. 

XVII. --The following day the enemy halted on the hills, a distance fromour camp, and presented themselves in small parties, and began tochallenge our horse to battle with less spirit than the day before. Butat noon, when Caesar had sent three legions, and all the cavalry with C. Trebonius, the lieutenant, for the purpose of foraging, they flew uponthe foragers suddenly from all quarters, so that they did not keep off[even] from the standards and the legions. Our men making an attack onthem vigorously, repulsed them; nor did they cease to pursue them untilthe horse, relying on relief, as they saw the legions behind them, drovethe enemy precipitately before them, and, slaying a great number ofthem, did not give them the opportunity either of rallying or halting, or leaping from their chariots. Immediately after this retreat, theauxiliaries who had assembled from all sides, departed; nor after thattime did the enemy ever engage with us in very large numbers. 

XVIII. --Caesar, discovering their design, leads his army into theterritories of Cassivellaunus to the river Thames; which river can beforded in one place only, and that with difficulty. When he had arrivedthere, he perceives that numerous forces of the enemy were marshalled onthe other bank of the river; the bank also was defended by sharp stakesfixed in front, and stakes of the same kind fixed under the water werecovered by the river. These things being discovered from [some]prisoners and deserters, Caesar, sending forward the cavalry, orderedthe legions to follow them immediately. But the soldiers advanced withsuch speed and such ardour, though they stood above the water by theirheads only, that the enemy could not sustain the attack of the legionsand of the horse, and quitted the banks, and committed themselves toflight. 

XIX. --Cassivellaunus, as we have stated above, all hope [rising out] ofbattle being laid aside, the greater part of his forces being dismissed, and about 4000 charioteers only being left, used to observe our marchesand retire a little from the road, and conceal himself in intricate andwoody places, and in those neighbourhoods in which he had discovered wewere about to march, he used to drive the cattle and the inhabitantsfrom the fields into the woods; and, when our cavalry, for the sake ofplundering and ravaging the more freely, scattered themselves among thefields, he used to send out charioteers from the woods by all thewell-known roads and paths, and, to the great danger of our horse, engagewith them; and this source of fear hindered them from straggling veryextensively. The result was that Caesar did not allow excursions to bemade to a great distance from the main body of the legions, and orderedthat damage should be done to the enemy in ravaging their lands andkindling fires only so far as the legionary soldiers could, by their ownexertion and marching, accomplish it. 

XX. --In the meantime, the Trinobantes, almost the most powerful state ofthose parts, from which the young man Mandubratius embracing theprotection of Caesar had come to the continent of Gaul to [meet] him(whose father, Imanuentius, had possessed the sovereignty in that state, and had been killed by Cassivellaunus; he himself had escaped death byflight), send ambassadors to Caesar, and promise that they willsurrender themselves to him and perform his commands; they entreat himto protect Mandubratius from the violence of Cassivellaunus, and send totheir state some one to preside over it, and possess the government. Caesar demands forty hostages from them, and corn for his army, andsends Mandubratius to them. They speedily performed the things demanded, and sent hostages to the number appointed, and the corn. 

XXI. --The Trinobantes being protected and secured from any violence ofthe soldiers, the Cenimagni, the Segontiaci, the Ancalites, the Bibroci, and the Cassi, sending embassies, surrender themselves to Caesar. Fromthem he learns that the capital town of Cassivellaunus was not far fromthat place, and was defended by woods and morasses, and a very largenumber of men and of cattle had been collected in it. (Now the Britons, when they have fortified the intricate woods, in which they are wont toassemble for the purpose of avoiding the incursion of an enemy, with anentrenchment and a rampart, call them a town. ) Thither he proceeds withhis legions: he finds the place admirably fortified by nature and art;he, however, undertakes to attack it in two directions. The enemy, having remained only a short time, did not sustain the attack of oursoldiers, and hurried away on the other side of the town. A great amountof cattle was found there, and many of the enemy were taken and slain intheir flight. 

XXII. --While these things are going forward in those places, Cassivellaunus sends messengers into Kent, which, we have observedabove, is on the sea, over which districts four several kings reigned, Cingetorix, Carvilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, and commands them tocollect all their forces, and unexpectedly assail and storm the navalcamp. When they had come to the camp, our men, after making a sally, slaying many of their men, and also capturing a distinguished leadernamed Lugotorix, brought back their own men in safety. Cassivellaunus, when this battle was reported to him, as so many losses had beensustained, and his territories laid waste, being alarmed most of all bythe desertion of the states, sends ambassadors to Caesar [to treat]about a surrender through the mediation of Commius the Atrebatian. Caesar, since he had determined to pass the winter on the continent, onaccount of the sudden revolts of Gaul, and as much of the summer did notremain, and he perceived that even that could be easily protracted, demands hostages, and prescribes what tribute Britain should pay eachyear to the Roman people; he forbids and commands Cassivellaunus that hewage not war against Mandubratius or the Trinobantes. 

XXIII. --When he had received the hostages, he leads back the army to thesea, and finds the ships repaired. After launching these, because he hada large number of prisoners, and some of the ships had been lost in thestorm, he determines to convey back his army at two embarkations. And itso happened, that out of so large a number of ships, in so many voyages, neither in this nor in the previous year was any ship missing whichconveyed soldiers; but very few out of those which were sent back to himfrom the continent empty, as the soldiers of the former convoy had beendisembarked, and out of those (sixty in number) which Labienus had takencare to have built, reached their destination; almost all the rest weredriven back, and when Caesar had waited for them for some time in vain, lest he should be debarred from a voyage by the season of the year, inasmuch as the equinox was at hand, he of necessity stowed his soldiersthe more closely, and, a very great calm coming on, after he had weighedanchor at the beginning of the second watch, he reached land at break ofday and brought in all the ships in safety. 

XXIV. --The ships having been drawn up and a general assembly of theGauls held at Samarobriva, because the corn that year had not prosperedin Gaul by reason of the droughts, he was compelled to station his armyin its winter-quarters, differently from the former years, and todistribute the legions among several states: one of them he gave to C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to be marched into the territories of theMorini; a second to Q. Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L. Roscius, into those of the Essui; a fourth he ordered to winter with T. Labienus among the Remi in the confines of the Treviri; he stationedthree in Belgium; over these he appointed M. Crassus, his questor, andL. Munatius Plancus and C. Trebonius, his lieutenants. One legion whichhe had raised last on the other side of the Po, and five cohorts, hesent amongst the Eburones, the greatest portion of whom lie between theMeuse and the Rhine, [and] who were under the government of Ambiorix andCativolcus. He ordered Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to take the command of these soldiers. The legionsbeing distributed in this manner, he thought he could most easily remedythe scarcity of corn; and yet the winter-quarters of all these legions(except that which he had given to L. Roscius to be led into the mostpeaceful and tranquil neighbourhood) were comprehended within [about]100 miles. He himself in the meanwhile, until he had stationed thelegions and knew that the several winter-quarters were fortified, determined to stay in Gaul. 

XXV. --There was among the Carnutes a man named Tasgetius, born of veryhigh rank, whose ancestors had held the sovereignty in his state. To himCaesar had restored the position of his ancestors, in consideration ofhis prowess and attachment towards him, because in all his wars he hadavailed himself of his valuable services. His personal enemies hadkilled him when in the third year of his reign, many even of his ownstate being openly promoters [of that act]. This event is related toCaesar. He fearing, because several were involved in the act, that thestate might revolt at their instigation, orders Lucius Plancus, with alegion, to proceed quickly from Belgium to the Carnutes, and winterthere, and arrest and send to him the persons by whose instrumentalityhe should discover that Tasgetius was slain. In the meantime, he wasapprised by all the lieutenants and questors to whom he had assigned thelegions, that they had arrived in winter-quarters, and that the placefor the quarters was fortified. 

XXVI. --About fifteen days after they had come into winter-quarters, thebeginning of a sudden insurrection and revolt arose from Ambiorix andCativolcus, who, though they had met with Sabinus and Cotta at theborders of their kingdom, and had conveyed corn into our winter-quarters, induced by the messages of Indutiomarus, one of the Treviri, excited their people, and after having suddenly assailed the soldiers, engaged in procuring wood, came with a large body to attack the camp. When our men had speedily taken up arms and had ascended the rampart, and sending out some Spanish horse on one side, had proved conquerors ina cavalry action, the enemy, despairing of success, drew off theirtroops from the assault. Then they shouted, according to their custom, that some of our men should go forward to a conference, [alleging] thatthey had some things which they desired to say respecting the commoninterest, by which they trusted their disputes could be removed. 

XXVII. --C. Arpineius, a Roman knight, the intimate friend of Q. Titurius, and with him Q. Junius, a certain person from Spain, whoalready on previous occasions had been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, atCaesar's mission, is sent to them for the purpose of a conference:before them Ambiorix spoke to this effect: "That he confessed that forCaesar's kindness towards him he was very much indebted to him, inasmuchas by his aid he had been freed from a tribute which he had beenaccustomed to pay to the Aduatuci, his neighbours; and because his ownson and the son of his brother had been sent back to him, whom, whensent in the number of hostages, the Aduatuci had detained among them inslavery and in chains; and that he had not done that which he had donein regard to the attacking of the camp, either by his own judgment ordesire, but by the compulsion of his state; and that his government wasof that nature, that the people had as much of authority over him as heover the people. To the state moreover the occasion of the war was this--that it could not withstand the sudden combination of the Gauls; thathe could easily prove this from his own weakness, since he was not solittle versed in affairs as to presume that with his forces he couldconquer the Roman people; but that it was the common resolution of Gaul;that that day was appointed for the storming of all Caesar'swinter-quarters, in order that no legion should be able to come to therelief of another legion, that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls, especially when a measure seemed entered into for recovering their commonfreedom. Since he had performed his duty to them on the score of patriotism[he said], he has now regard to gratitude for the kindness of Caesar; thathe warned, that he prayed Titurius by the claims of hospitality, toconsult for his and his soldiers' safety; that a large force of theGermans had been hired and had passed the Rhine; that it would arrive intwo days; that it was for them to consider whether they thought fit, before the nearest people perceived it, to lead off their soldiers whendrawn out of winter-quarters, either to Cicero or to Labienus; one ofwhom was about fifty miles distant from them, the other rather more;that this he promised and confirmed by oath, that he would give them asafe passage through his territories; and when he did that, he was bothconsulting for his own state, because it would be relieved from thewinter-quarters, and also making a requital to Caesar for hisobligations. "

XXVIII. --Arpineius and Junius relate to the lieutenants what they hadheard. They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, though thosethings were spoken by an enemy, still thought they were not to bedisregarded; and they were especially influenced by this consideration, that it was scarcely credible that the obscure and humble state of theEburones had dared to make war upon the Roman people of their ownaccord. Accordingly, they refer the matter to a council, and a, greatcontroversy arises among them. L. Aurunculeius, and several tribunes ofthe soldiers and the centurions of the first rank, were of opinion "thatnothing should be done hastily, and that they should not depart from thecamp without Caesar's orders"; they declared, "that any forces of theGermans, however great, might be encountered by fortified winter-quarters;that this fact was a proof [of it]; that they had sustained the firstassault of the Germans most valiantly, inflicting many wounds upon them;that they were not distressed for corn; that in the meantime reliefwould come both from the nearest winter-quarters and from Caesar"; lastly, they put the query, "what could be more undetermined, more undignified, than to adopt measures respecting the most important affairs on theauthority of an enemy?"

XXIX. --In opposition to those things Titurius exclaimed, "That theywould do this too late, when greater forces of the enemy, after ajunction with the Germans, should have assembled; or when some disasterhad been received in the neighbouring winter-quarters; that theopportunity for deliberating was short; that he believed that Caesar hadset forth into Italy, as the Carnutes would not otherwise have taken themeasure of slaying Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he had beenpresent, have come to the camp with so great defiance of us; that he didnot regard the enemy, but the fact, as the authority; that the Rhine wasnear; that the death of Ariovistus and our previous victories weresubjects of great indignation to the Germans; that Gaul was inflamed, that after having received so many defeats she was reduced under thesway of the Roman people, her pristine glory in military matters beingextinguished. " Lastly, "who would persuade himself of this, thatAmbiorix had resorted to a design of that nature without sure grounds?That his own opinion was safe on either side; if there be nothing veryformidable, they would go without danger to the nearest legion; if allGaul conspired with the Germans, their only safety lay in despatch. Whatissue would the advice of Cotta and of those who differed from him, have? from which, if immediate danger was not to be dreaded, yetcertainly famine, by a protracted siege, was. "

XXX. --This discussion having been held on the two sides, when oppositionwas offered strenuously by Cotta and the principal officers, "Prevail, "said Sabinus, "if so you wish it"; and he said it with a louder voice, that a great portion of the soldiers might hear him; "nor am I theperson among you, " he said, "who is most powerfully alarmed by thedanger of death; these will be aware of it, and then, if any thingdisastrous shall have occurred, they will demand a reckoning at yourhands; these, who, if it were permitted by you, united three days hencewith the nearest winter-quarters, may encounter the common condition ofwar with the rest, and not, as if forced away and separated far from therest, perish either by the sword or by famine. "

XXXI. --They rise from the council, detain both, and entreat, that "theydo not bring the matter into the greatest jeopardy by their dissensionand obstinacy; the affair was an easy one, if only they all thought andapproved of the same thing, whether they remain or depart; on the otherhand, they saw no security in dissension. " The matter is prolonged bydebate till midnight. At last Cotta, being overruled, yields his assent;the opinion of Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed that they will marchat day-break; the remainder of the night is spent without sleep, sinceevery soldier was inspecting his property, [to see] what he could carrywith him, and what, out of the appurtenances of the winter-quarters, hewould be compelled to leave; every reason is suggested to show why theycould not stay without danger, and how that danger would be increased bythe fatigue of the soldiers and their want of sleep. At break of daythey quit the camp, in a very extended line and with a very large amountof baggage, in such a manner as men who were convinced that the advicewas given by Ambiorix, not as an enemy, but as most friendly [towardsthem]. 

XXXII. --But the enemy, after they had made the discovery of theirintended departure by the noise during the night and their not retiringto rest, having placed an ambuscade in two divisions in the woods, in asuitable and concealed place, two miles from the camp, waited for thearrival of the Romans; and when the greater part of the line of marchhad descended into a considerable valley, they suddenly presentedthemselves on either side of that valley, and began both to harass therear and hinder the van from ascending, and to give battle in a placeexceedingly disadvantageous to our men. 

XXXIII. --Then at length Titurius, as one who had provided nothingbeforehand, was confused, ran to and fro, and set about arranging histroops; these very things, however, he did timidly and in such a mannerthat all resources seemed to fail him: which generally happens to thosewho are compelled to take council in the action itself. But Cotta, whohad reflected that these things might occur on the march, and on thataccount had not been an adviser of the departure, was wanting to thecommon safety in no respect; both in addressing and encouraging thesoldiers, he performed the duties of a general, and in the battle thoseof a soldier. And since they [Titurius and Cotta] could less easilyperform everything by themselves, and provide what was to be done ineach place, by reason of the length of the line of march, they ordered[the officers] to give the command that they should leave the baggageand form themselves into an orb, which measure, though in a contingencyof that nature it was not to be condemned, still turned outunfortunately; for it both diminished the hope of our soldiers andrendered the enemy more eager for the fight, because it appeared thatthis was not done without the greatest fear and despair. Besides thathappened, which would necessarily be the case, that the soldiers for themost part quitted their ensigns and hurried to seek and carry off fromthe baggage whatever each thought valuable, and all parts were filledwith uproar and lamentation. 

XXXIV. --But judgment was not wanting to the barbarians; for theirleaders ordered [the officers] to proclaim through the ranks "that noman should quit his place; that the booty was theirs, and for them wasreserved whatever the Romans should leave; therefore let them considerthat all things depended on their victory. " Our men were equal to themin fighting, both in courage and in number, and though they weredeserted by their leader and by fortune, yet they still placed all hopeof safety in their valour, and as often as any cohort sallied forth onthat side, a great number of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when heobserved this, orders the command to be issued that they throw theirweapons from a distance and do not approach too near, and in whateverdirection the Romans should make an attack, there give way (from thelightness of their appointments and from their daily practice no damagecould be done them); [but] pursue them when betaking themselves to theirstandards again. 

XXXV. --Which command having been most carefully obeyed, when any cohorthad quitted the circle and made a charge, the enemy fled veryprecipitately. In the meantime, that part of the Roman army, ofnecessity, was left unprotected, and the weapons received on their openflank. Again, when they had begun to return to that place from whichthey had advanced, they were surrounded both by those who had retreatedand by those who stood next them; but if, on the other hand, they wishedto keep their place, neither was an opportunity left for valour, norcould they, being crowded together, escape the weapons cast by so largea body of men. Yet, though assailed by so many disadvantages, [and]having received many wounds, they withstood the enemy, and, a greatportion of the day being spent, though they fought from day-break tillthe eighth hour, they did nothing which was unworthy of them. At length, each thigh of T. Balventius, who the year before had been chiefcenturion, a brave man and one of great authority, is pierced with ajavelin; Q. Lucanius, of the same rank, fighting most valiantly, isslain while he assists his son when surrounded by the enemy; L. Cotta, the lieutenant, when encouraging all the cohorts and companies, iswounded full in the mouth by a sling. 

XXXVI. --Much troubled by these events, Q. Titurius, when he hadperceived Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, sends to him hisinterpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg that he would spare him and hissoldiers. He, when addressed, replied, "If he wished to confer with him, it was permitted; that he hoped what pertained to the safety of thesoldiers could be obtained from the people; that to him howevercertainly no injury would be done, and that he pledged his faith to thateffect. " He consults with Cotta, who had been wounded, whether it wouldappear right to retire from battle, and confer with Ambiorix; [saying]that he hoped to be able to succeed respecting his own and the soldiers'safety. Cotta says he will not go to an armed enemy, and in thatperseveres. 

XXXVII. --Sabinus orders those tribunes of the soldiers whom he had atthe time around him, and the centurions of the first ranks, to followhim, and when he had approached near to Ambiorix, being ordered to throwdown his arms, he obeys the order and commands his men to do the same. In the meantime, while they treat upon the terms, and a longer debatethan necessary is designedly entered into by Ambiorix, being surroundedby degrees, he is slain. Then they according to their custom shout out"Victory, " and raise their war-cry, and, making an attack on our men, break their ranks. There L. Cotta, while fighting, is slain, togetherwith the greater part of the soldiers; the rest betake themselves to thecamp from which they had marched forth, and one of them, L. Petrosidius, the standard bearer, when he was overpowered by the great number of theenemy, threw the eagle within the entrenchments and is himself slainwhile fighting with the greatest courage before the camp. They withdifficulty sustain the attack till night; despairing of safety, they allto a man destroy themselves in the night. A few escaping from thebattle, make their way to Labienus at winter-quarters, after wanderingat random through the woods, and inform him of these events. 

XXXVIII. --Elated by this victory, Ambiorix marches immediately with hiscavalry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his kingdom; he halts neitherday nor night, and orders the infantry to follow him closely. Havingrelated the exploit and roused the Aduatuci, the next day he arrivedamong the Nervii, and entreats "that they should not throw away theopportunity of liberating themselves for ever and of punishing theRomans for those wrongs which they had received from them"; [he tellsthem] "that two lieutenants have been slain, and that a large portion ofthe army has perished; that it was not a matter of difficulty for thelegion which was wintering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenlyassaulted; he declares himself ready to co-operate in that design. " Heeasily gains over the Nervii by this speech. 

XXXIX. --Accordingly, messengers having been forthwith despatched to theCentrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, allof whom are under their government, they assemble as large bodies asthey can, and rush unexpectedly to the winter-quarters of Cicero, thereport of the death of Titurius not having as yet been conveyed to him. That also occurred to him which was the consequence of a necessarywork, --that some soldiers who had gone off into the woods for thepurpose of procuring timber and therewith constructing fortifications, were intercepted by the sudden arrival of [the enemy's] horse. Thesehaving been entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the Aduatuci andall their allies and dependants, begin to attack the legion: our menquickly run together to arms and mount the rampart: they sustained theattack that day with great difficulty, since the enemy placed all theirhope in despatch, and felt assured that, if they obtained this victory, they would be conquerors for ever. 

XL. --Letters are immediately sent to Caesar by Cicero, great rewardsbeing offered [to the messengers] if they carried them through. All thepasses having been beset, those who were sent are intercepted. Duringthe night as many as 120 towers are raised with incredible despatch outof the timber which they had collected for the purpose of fortification:the things which seemed necessary to the work are completed. Thefollowing day the enemy, having collected far greater forces, attack thecamp [and] fill up the ditch. Resistance is made by our men in the samemanner as the day before: this same thing is done afterwards during theremaining days. The work is carried on incessantly in the night: noteven to the sick, or wounded, is opportunity given for rest: whateverthings are required for resisting the assault of the next day areprovided during the night: many stakes burnt at the end, and a largenumber of mural pikes are procured: towers are built up, battlements andparapets are formed of interwoven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he wasin very weak health, did not leave himself the night-time for repose, sothat he was forced to spare himself by the spontaneous movement andentreaties of the soldiers. 

XLI. --Then these leaders and chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacyand grounds of friendship with Cicero, say they desire to confer withhim. When permission was granted, they recount the same things whichAmbiorix had related to Titurius, namely, "that all Gaul was in arms, that the Germans had passed the Rhine, that the winter-quarters ofCaesar and of the others were attacked. " They report in addition also, about the death of Sabinus. They point to Ambiorix for the purpose ofobtaining credence; "they are mistaken, " say they, "if they hoped forany relief from those who distrust their own affairs; that they bearsuch feelings towards Cicero and the Roman people that they deny themnothing but winter-quarters and are unwilling that this practice shouldbecome constant; that through their [the Nervii's] means it is possiblefor them [the Romans] to depart from their winter-quarters safely and toproceed without fear into whatever parts they desire. " To these Ciceromade only one reply: "that it is not the custom of the Roman people toaccept any condition from an armed enemy: if they are willing to laydown their arms, they may employ him as their advocate and sendambassadors to Caesar: that he believed, from his [Caesar's] justice, they would obtain the things which they might request. "

XLII. --Disappointed in this hope, the Nervii surround the winter-quarterswith a rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen feet indepth. These military works they had learnt from our men in theintercourse of former years, and, having taken some of our armyprisoners, were instructed by them: but, as they had no supply of irontools which are requisite for this service, they were forced to cut theturf with their swords, and to empty out the earth with their hands andcloaks, from which circumstance the vast number of the men could beinferred; for in less than three hours they completed a fortification often miles in circumference; and during the rest of the days they beganto prepare and construct towers of the height of the ramparts, andgrappling irons, and mantlets, which the same prisoners had taught them. 

XLIII. --On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind having sprungup, they began to discharge by their slings hot balls made of burnt orhardened clay, and heated javelins, upon the huts, which, after theGallic custom, were thatched with straw. These quickly took fire, and bythe violence of the wind, scattered their flames in every part of thecamp. The enemy following up their success with a very loud shout, as ifvictory were already obtained and secured, began to advance their towersand mantlets, and climb the rampart with ladders. But so great was thecourage of our soldiers, and such their presence of mind, that thoughthey were scorched on all sides, and harassed by a vast number ofweapons, and were aware that their baggage and their possessions wereburning, not only did no one quit the rampart for the purpose ofwithdrawing from the scene, but scarcely did any one even then lookbehind; and they all fought most vigorously and most valiantly. This daywas by far the most calamitous to our men; it had this result, however, that on that day the largest number of the enemy was wounded and slain, since they had crowded beneath the very rampart, and the hindmost didnot afford the foremost a retreat. The flame having abated a little, anda tower having been brought up in a particular place and touching therampart, the centurions of the third cohort retired from the place inwhich they were standing, and drew off all their men: they began to callon the enemy by gestures and by words, to enter if they wished; but noneof them dared to advance. Then stones having been cast from everyquarter, the enemy were dislodged, and their tower set on fire. 

XLIV. --In that legion there were two very brave men, centurions, whowere now approaching the first ranks, T. Pulfio, and L. Varenus. Theseused to have continual disputes between them which of them should bepreferred, and every year used to contend for promotion with the utmostanimosity. When the fight was going on most vigorously before thefortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says, "Why do you hesitate, Varenus? or what [better] opportunity of signalising your valour do youseek? This very day shall decide our disputes. " When he had utteredthese words, he proceeds beyond the fortifications, and rushes on thatpart of the enemy which appeared the thickest. Nor does Varenus remainwithin the rampart, but respecting the high opinion of all, followsclose after. Then, when an inconsiderable space intervened, Pulfiothrows his javelin at the enemy, and pierces one of the multitude whowas running up, and while the latter was wounded and slain, the enemycover him with their shields, and all throw their weapons at the otherand afford him no opportunity of retreating. The shield of Pulfio ispierced and a javelin is fastened in his belt. This circumstance turnsaside his scabbard and obstructs his right hand when attempting to drawhis sword: the enemy crowd around him when [thus] embarrassed. His rivalruns up to him and succours him in this emergency. Immediately the wholehost turn from Pulfio to him, supposing the other to be pierced throughby the javelin. Varenus rushes on briskly with his sword and carries onthe combat hand to hand, and having slain one man, for a short timedrove back the rest: while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into ahollow, he fell. To him, in his turn, when surrounded, Pulfio bringsrelief; and both having slain a great number, retreat into thefortifications amidst the highest applause. Fortune so dealt with bothin this rivalry and conflict, that the one competitor was a succour anda safeguard to the other, nor could it be determined which of the twoappeared worthy of being preferred to the other. 

XLV. --In proportion as the attack became daily more formidable andviolent, and particularly because, as a great number of the soldierswere exhausted with wounds, the matter had come to a small number ofdefenders, more frequent letters and messengers were sent to Caesar; apart of which messengers were taken and tortured to death in the sightof our soldiers. There was within our camp a certain Nervian, by nameVertico, born in a distinguished position, who in the beginning of theblockade had deserted to Cicero, and had exhibited his fidelity to him. He persuades his slave, by the hope of freedom, and by great rewards, toconvey a letter to Caesar. This he carries out bound about his javelin, and mixing among the Gauls without any suspicion by being a Gaul, hereaches Caesar. From him they received information of the imminentdanger of Cicero and the legion. 

XLVI. --Caesar having received the letter about the eleventh hour of theday, immediately sends a messenger to the Bellovaci, to M. Crassus, questor there, whose winter-quarters were twenty-five miles distant fromhim. He orders the legion to set forward in the middle of the night andcome to him with despatch. Crassus set out with the messenger. He sendsanther to C. Fabius, the lieutenant, ordering him to lead forth hislegion into the territories of the Atrebates, to which he knew his marchmust be made. He writes to Labienus to come with his legion to thefrontiers of the Nervii, if he could do so to the advantage of thecommonwealth: he does not consider that the remaining portion of thearmy, because it was somewhat farther distant, should be waited for; butassembles about 400 horse from the nearest winter-quarters. 

XLVII. --Having been apprised of the arrival of Crassus by the scouts atabout the third hour, he advances twenty miles that day. He appointsCrassus over Samarobriva and assigns him a legion, because he wasleaving there the baggage of the army, the hostages of the states, thepublic documents, and all the corn, which he had conveyed thither forpassing the winter. Fabius, without delaying a moment, meets him on themarch with his legion, as he had been commanded. Labienus, having learntthe death of Sabinus and the destruction of the cohorts, as all theforces of the Treviri had come against him, beginning to fear lest, ifhe made a departure from his winter-quarters, resembling a flight, heshould not be able to support the attack of the enemy, particularlysince he knew them to be elated by their recent victory, sends back aletter to Caesar, informing him with what great hazard he would lead outhis legion from winter-quarters; he relates at large the affair whichhad taken place among the Eburones; he informs him that all the infantryand cavalry of the Treviri had encamped at a distance of only threemiles from his own camp. 

XLVIII. --Caesar, approving of his motives, although he was disappointedin his expectation of three legions, and reduced to two, yet placed hisonly hopes of the common safety in despatch. He goes into theterritories of the Nervii by long marches. There he learns from someprisoners what things are going on in the camp of Cicero, and in howgreat jeopardy the affair is. Then with great rewards he induces acertain man of the Gallic horse to convey a letter to Cicero. This hesends written in Greek characters, lest the letter being intercepted, our measures should be discovered by the enemy. He directs him, if heshould be unable to enter, to throw his spear with the letter fastenedto the thong inside the fortifications of the camp. He writes in theletter, that he having set out with his legions, will quickly be there:he entreats him to maintain his ancient valour. The Gaul apprehendingdanger, throws his spear as he had been directed. It by chance stuck ina tower, and, not being observed by our men for two days, was seen by acertain soldier on the third day: when taken down, it was carried toCicero. He, after perusing it, reads it out in an assembly of thesoldiers, and fills all with the greatest joy. Then the smoke of thefires was seen in the distance, a circumstance which banished all doubtof the arrival of the legions. 

XLIX. --The Gauls, having discovered the matter through their scouts, abandon the blockade, and march towards Caesar with all their forces:these were about 60, 000 armed men. Cicero, an opportunity being nowafforded, again begs of that Vertico, the Gaul, whom we mentioned above, to convey back a letter to Caesar; he advises him to perform his journeywarily; he writes in the letter that the enemy had departed and hadturned their entire force against him. When this letter was brought tohim about the middle of the night, Caesar apprises his soldiers of itscontents, and inspires them with courage for fighting: the followingday, at the dawn, he moves his camp, and, having proceeded four miles, he espies the forces of the enemy on the other side of a considerablevalley and rivulet. It was an affair of great danger to fight with suchlarge forces in a disadvantageous situation. For the present, therefore, inasmuch as he knew that Cicero was released from the blockade, andthought that he might, on that account, relax his speed, he halted thereand fortifies a camp in the most favourable position he can. And this, though it was small in itself, [there being] scarcely 7000 men, andthese too without baggage, still by the narrowness of the passages, hecontracts as much as he can, with this object, that he may come into thegreatest contempt with the enemy. In the meanwhile, scouts having beensent in all directions, he examines by what most convenient path hemight cross the valley. 

L. --That day, slight skirmishes of cavalry having taken place near theriver, both armies kept in their own positions: the Gauls, because theywere awaiting larger forces which had not then arrived; Caesar, [to see]if perchance by pretence of fear he could allure the enemy towards hisposition, so that he might engage in battle, in front of his camp, onthis side of the valley; if he could not accomplish this, that, havinginquired about the passes, he might cross the valley and the river withthe less hazard. At day-break the cavalry of the enemy approaches to thecamp and joins battle with our horse. Caesar orders the horse to giveway purposely, and retreat to the camp: at the same time he orders thecamp to be fortified with a higher rampart in all directions, the gatesto be barricaded, and in executing these things as much confusion to beshown as possible, and to perform them under the pretence of fear. 

LI. --Induced by all these things the enemy lead over their forces anddraw up their line in a disadvantageous position; and as our men alsohad been led down from the ramparts, they approach nearer, and throwtheir weapons into the fortification from all sides, and sending heraldsround, order it to be proclaimed that, if "any, either Gaul or Roman, was willing to go over to them before the third hour, it was permitted;after that time there would not be permission"; and so much did theydisregard our men, that the gates having been blocked up with singlerows of turf as a mere appearance, because they did not seem able toburst in that way, some began to pull down the rampart with their hands, others to fill up the trenches. Then Caesar, making a sally from all thegates, and sending out the cavalry, soon puts the enemy to flight, sothat no one at all stood his ground with the intention of fighting; andhe slew a great number of them, and deprived all of their arms. 

LII. --Caesar, fearing to pursue them very far, because woods andmorasses intervened, and also [because] he saw that they suffered nosmall loss in abandoning their position, reaches Cicero the same daywith all his forces safe. He witnesses with surprise the towers, mantlets, and [other] fortifications belonging to the enemy: the legionhaving been drawn out, he finds that even every tenth soldier had notescaped without wounds. From all these things he judges with what dangerand with what great courage matters had been conducted; he commendsCicero according to his desert and likewise the legion; he addressesindividually the centurions and the tribunes of the soldiers, whosevalour he had discovered to have been signal. He receives information ofthe death of Sabinus and Cotta from the prisoners. An assembly beingheld the following day, he states the occurrence; he consoles andencourages the soldiers; he suggests that the disaster, which had beenoccasioned by the misconduct and rashness of his lieutenant, should beborne with a patient mind, because by the favour of the immortal godsand their own valour, neither was lasting joy left to the enemy, norvery lasting grief to them. 

LIII. --In the meanwhile the report respecting the victory of Caesar isconveyed to Labienus through the country of the Remi with incrediblespeed, so that, though he was about sixty miles distant from thewinter-quarter of Cicero, and Caesar had arrived there after the ninthhour, before midnight a shout arose at the gates of the camp, by whichshout an indication of the victory and a congratulation on the part ofthe Remi were given to Labienus. This report having been carried to theTreviri, Indutiormarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienusthe following day, flies by night and leads back all his forces into thecountry of the Treviri. Caesar sends back Fabius with his legion to hiswinter-quarters; he himself determines to winter with three legions nearSamarobriva in three different quarters, and, because such greatcommotions had arisen in Gaul, he resolved to remain during the wholewinter with the army himself. For the disaster respecting the death ofSabinus having been circulated among them, almost all the states of Gaulwere deliberating about war, sending messengers and embassies into allquarters, inquiring what further measure they should take, and holdingcouncils by night in secluded places. Nor did any period of the wholewinter pass over without fresh anxiety to Caesar, or without hisreceiving some intelligence respecting the meetings and commotions ofthe Gauls. Among these, he is informed by L. Roscius, the lieutenantwhom he had placed over the thirteenth legion, that large forces ofthose states of the Gauls, which are called the Armoricae, had assembledfor the purpose of attacking him and were not more than eight milesdistant; but intelligence respecting the victory of Caesar being carried[to them], had retreated in such a manner that their departure appearedlike a flight. 

LIV. --But Caesar, having summoned to him the principal persons of eachstate, in one case by alarming them, since he declared that he knew whatwas going on, and in another case by encouraging them, retained a greatpart of Gaul in its allegiance. The Senones, however, which is a stateeminently powerful and one of great influence among the Gauls, attempting by general design to slay Cavarinus whom Caesar had createdking among them (whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the sovereignty atthe period of the arrival of Caesar in Gaul, and whose ancestors hadalso previously held it) when he discovered their plot and fled, pursuedhim even to the frontiers [of the state], and drove him from his kingdomand his home; and, after having sent ambassadors to Caesar for thepurpose of concluding a peace, when he ordered all their senate to cometo him, did not obey that command. So far did it operate among thosebarbarian people, that there were found some to be the first to wagewar; and so great a change of inclinations did it produce in all, thatexcept the Aedui and the Remi, whom Caesar had always held in especialhonour, the one people for their long standing and uniform fidelitytowards the Roman people, the other for their late service in the Gallicwar, there was scarcely a state which was not suspected by us. And I donot know whether that ought much to be wondered at, as well for severalother reasons, as particularly because they who ranked above all nationsfor prowess in war, most keenly regretted that they had lost so much ofthat reputation as to submit to commands from the Roman people. 

LV. --But the Treviri and Indutiomarus let no part of the entire winterpass without sending ambassadors across the Rhine, importuning thestates, promising money, and asserting that, as a large portion of ourarmy had been cut off, a much smaller portion remained. However, none ofthe German states could be induced to cross the Rhine, since "they hadtwice essayed it, " they said, "in the war with Ariovistus and in thepassage of the Tenchtheri there; that fortune was not to be tempted anymore. " Indutiomarus disappointed in this expectation, nevertheless beganto raise troops, and discipline them, and procure horses from theneighbouring people and allure to him by great rewards the outlaws andconvicts throughout Gaul. And such great influence had he alreadyacquired for himself in Gaul by these means, that embassies wereflocking to him in all directions, and seeking, publicly and privately, his favour and friendship. 

LVI. --When he perceived that they were coming to him voluntarily; thaton the one side the Senones and the Carnutes were stimulated by theirconsciousness of guilt, on the other side the Nervii and the Aduatuciwere preparing war against the Romans, and that forces of volunteerswould not be wanting to him if he began to advance from his ownterritories, he proclaims an armed council (this according to the customof the Gauls is the commencement of war) at which, by a common law, allthe youth were wont to assemble in arms; whoever of them comes last iskilled in the sight of the whole assembly after being racked with everytorture. In that council he declares Cingetorix, the leader of the otherfaction, his own son-in-law (whom we have above mentioned, as havingembraced the protection of Caesar, and never having deserted him) anenemy and confiscates his property. When these things were finished, heasserts in the council that he, invited by the Senones and the Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul, was about to march thither through theterritories of the Remi, devastate their lands, and attack the camp ofLabienus: before he does that, he informs them of what he desires to bedone. 

LVII. --Labienus, since he was confining himself within a camp stronglyfortified by the nature of the ground and by art, had no apprehensionsas to his own and the legion's danger, but was devising that he mightthrow away no opportunity of conducting the war successfully. Accordingly, the speech of Indutiomarus, which he had delivered in thecouncil, having been made known [to him] by Cingetorix and his allies, he sends messengers to the neighbouring states and summons horse fromall quarters: he appoints to them a fixed day for assembling. In themeantime, Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, nearly every day used toparade close to his [Labienus's] camp; at one time, that he might informhimself of the situation of the camp; at another time, for the purposeof conferring with or of intimidating him. Labienus confined his menwithin the fortifications and promoted the enemy's belief of his fear bywhatever methods he could. 

LVIII. --Since Indutiomarus was daily advancing up to the camp withgreater defiance, all the cavalry of the neighbouring states which he[Labienus] had taken care to have sent for, having been admitted in onenight, he confined all his men within the camp by guards with such greatstrictness, that that fact could by no means be reported or carried tothe Treviri. In the meanwhile Indutiomarus, according to his dailypractice, advances up to the camp and spends a great part of the daythere: his horse cast their weapons, and with very insulting languagecall out our men to battle. No reply being given by our men, the enemywhen they thought proper, depart towards evening in a disorderly andscattered manner, Labienus unexpectedly sends out all the cavalry by twogates; he gives this command and prohibition, that, when the enemyshould be terrified and put to flight (which he foresaw would happen, asit did), they should all make for Indutiomarus, and no one wound any manbefore he should have seen him slain, because he was unwilling that heshould escape, in consequence of gaining time by the delay [occasionedby the pursuit] of the rest. He offers great rewards for those whoshould kill him: he sends up the cohorts as a relief to the horse. Theissue justifies the policy of the man, and, since all aimed at one, Indutiomarus is slain, having been overtaken at the very ford of theriver, and his head is carried to the camp: the horse, when returning, pursue and slay all whom they can. This affair having been known, allthe forces of the Eburones and the Nervii which had assembled, depart;and for a short time after this action, Caesar was less harassed in thegovernment of Gaul. 

BOOK VI

I. --Caesar, expecting for many reasons a greater commotion in Gaul, resolves to hold a levy by the means of M. Silanus, C. AntistiusReginus, and T. Sextius, his lieutenants: at the same time he requestedof Cn. Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was remaining near the cityinvested with military command for the interests of the commonwealth, hewould command those men whom when consul he had levied by the militaryoath in Cisalpine Gaul, to join their respective corps, and to proceedto him; thinking it of great importance, as far as regarded the opinionwhich the Gauls would entertain for the future, that the resources ofItaly should appear so great, that if any loss should be sustained inwar, not only could it be repaired in a short time, but likewise befurther supplied by still larger forces. And when Pompey had grantedthis to the interests of the commonwealth and the claims of friendship, Caesar having quickly completed the levy by means of his lieutenants, after three legions had been both formed and brought to him before thewinter [had] expired, and the number of those cohorts which he had lostunder Q. Titurius had been doubled, taught the Gauls, both by hisdispatch and by his forces, what the discipline and the power of theRoman people could accomplish. 

II. --Indutiomarus having been slain, as we have stated, the governmentwas conferred upon his relatives by the Treviri. They cease not toimportune the neighbouring Germans and to promise them money: when theycould not obtain [their object] from those nearest them, they try thosemore remote. Having found some states willing to accede to their wishes, they enter into a compact with them by a mutual oath, and give hostagesas a security for the money: they attach Ambiorix to them by an allianceand confederacy. Caesar, on being informed of their acts, since he sawthat war was being prepared on all sides, that the Nervii, Aduatuci, andMenapii, with the addition of all the Germans on this side of the Rhinewere under arms, that the Senones did not assemble according to hiscommand, and were concerting measures with the Carnutes and theneighbouring states, that the Germans were importuned by the Treviri infrequent embassies, thought that he ought to take measures for the warearlier [than usual]. 

III. -Accordingly, while the winter was not yet ended, havingconcentrated the four nearest legions, he marched unexpectedly into theterritories of the Nervii, and before they could either assemble, orretreat, after capturing a large number of cattle and of men, andwasting their lands and giving up that booty to the soldiers, compelledthem to enter into a surrender and give him hostages. That businesshaving been speedily executed, he again led his legions back intowinter-quarters. Having proclaimed a council of Gaul in the beginning ofthe spring, as he had been accustomed [to do], when the deputies fromthe rest, except the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri, had come, judging this to be the commencement of war and revolt, that he mightappear to consider all things of less consequence [than that war], hetransfers the council to Lutetia of the Parisii. These were adjacent tothe Senones, and had united their state to them during the memory oftheir fathers, but were thought to have no part in the present plot. Having proclaimed this from the tribunal, he advances the same daytowards the Senones with his legions and arrives among them by longmarches. 

IV. --Acco, who had been the author of that enterprise, on being informedof his arrival, orders the people to assemble in the towns; to them, while attempting this and before it could be accomplished, news isbrought that the Romans are close at hand: through necessity they giveover their design and send ambassadors to Caesar for the purpose ofimploring pardon; they make advances to him through the Aedui, whosestate was from ancient times under the protection of Rome. Caesarreadily grants them pardon and receives their excuse at the request ofthe Aedui; because he thought that the summer season was one for animpending war, not for an investigation. Having imposed one hundredhostages, he delivers these to the Aedui to be held in charge by them. To the same place the Carnutes send ambassadors and hostages, employingas their mediators the Remi, under whose protection they were: theyreceive the same answers. Caesar concludes the council and imposes alevy of cavalry on the states. 

V. --This part of Gaul having been tranquillized, he applies himselfentirely both in mind and soul to the war with the Treviri and Ambiorix. He orders Cavarinus to march with him with the cavalry of the Senones, lest any commotion should arise either out of his hot temper, or out ofthe hatred of the state which he had incurred. After arranging thesethings, as he considered it certain that Ambiorix would not contend inbattle, he watched his other plans attentively. The Menapii bordered onthe territories of the Eburones, and were protected by one continuedextent of morasses and woods; and they alone out of Gaul had never sentambassadors to Caesar on the subject of peace. Caesar knew that a tie ofhospitality subsisted between them and Ambiorix: he also discovered thatthe latter had entered into an alliance with the Germans by means of theTreviri. He thought that these auxiliaries ought to be detached from himbefore he provoked him to war; lest he, despairing of safety, shouldeither proceed to conceal himself in the territories of the Menapii, orshould be driven to coalesce with the Germans beyond the Rhine. Havingentered upon this resolution, he sends the baggage of the whole army toLabienus, in the territories of the Treviri and orders two legions toproceed to him: he himself proceeds against the Menapii with fivelightly-equipped legions. They, having assembled no troops, as theyrelied on the defence of their position, retreat into the woods andmorasses, and convey thither all their property. 

VI. --Caesar, having divided his forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant, and M. Crassus, his questor, and having hastily constructed somebridges, enters their country in three divisions, burns their houses andvillages, and gets possession of a large number of cattle and men. Constrained by these circumstances, the Menapii send ambassadors to himfor the purpose of suing for peace. He, after receiving hostages, assures them that he will consider them in the number of his enemies ifthey shall receive within their territories either Ambiorix or hisambassadors. Having determinately settled these things, he left amongthe Menapii, Commius the Atrebatian with some cavalry as a guard; hehimself proceeds toward the Treviri. 

VII. --While these things are being performed by Caesar, the Treviri, having drawn together large forces of infantry and of cavalry, werepreparing to attack Labienus and the legion which was wintering in theirterritories, and were already not further distant from him than ajourney of two days, when they learn that two legions had arrived by theorder of Caesar. Having pitched their camp fifteen miles off, theyresolve to await the support of the Germans. Labienus, having learnedthe design of the enemy, hoping that through their rashness there wouldbe some opportunity of engaging, after leaving a guard of five cohortsfor the baggage, advances against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts anda large body of cavalry, and, leaving the space of a mile between them, fortifies his camp. There was between Labienus and the enemy a riverdifficult to cross and with steep banks: this neither did he himselfdesign to cross, nor did he suppose the enemy would cross it. Their hopeof auxiliaries was daily increasing. He [Labienus] openly says in acouncil that "since the Germans are said to be approaching, he would notbring into uncertainty his own and the army's fortunes, and the next daywould move his camp at early dawn. These words are quickly carried tothe enemy, since out of so large a number of cavalry composed of Gauls, nature compelled some to favour the Gallic interests. Labienus, havingassembled the tribunes of the soldiers and principal centurions bynight, states what his design is, and, that he may the more easily givethe enemy a belief of his fears, he orders the camp to be moved withgreater noise and confusion than was usual with the Roman people. Bythese means he makes his departure [appear], like a retreat. Thesethings, also, since the camps were so near, are reported to the enemy byscouts before daylight. 

VIII. --Scarcely had the rear advanced beyond the fortifications when theGauls, encouraging one another "not to cast from their hands theanticipated booty, that it was a tedious thing, while the Romans werepanic stricken, to be waiting for the aid of the Germans, and that theirdignity did not suffer them to fear to attack with such great forces sosmall a band, particularly when retreating and encumbered, " do nothesitate to cross the river and give battle in a disadvantageousposition. Labienus suspecting that these things would happen, wasproceeding quietly, and using the same pretence of a march, in orderthat he might entice them across the river. Then, having sent forwardthe baggage some short distance and placed it on a certain eminence, hesays, "Soldiers, you have the opportunity you have sought: you hold theenemy in an encumbered and disadvantageous position: display to us yourleaders the same valour you have ofttimes displayed to your general:imagine that he is present and actually sees these exploits. " At thesame time he orders the troops to face about towards the enemy and formin line of battle, and, despatching a few troops of cavalry as a guardfor the bag gage, he places the rest of the horse on the wings. Our men, raising a shout, quickly throw their javelins at the enemy. They, when, contrary to their expectation, they saw those whom they believed to beretreating, advance towards them with threatening banners, were not ableto sustain even the charge, and, being put to flight at the firstonslaught, sought the nearest woods: Labienus pursuing them with thecavalry, upon a large number being slain, and several taken prisoners, got possession of the state a few days after; for the Germans who werecoming to the aid of the Treviri, having been informed of their flight, retreated to their homes. The relations of Indutiomarus, who had beenthe promoters of the revolt, accompanying them, quitted their own statewith them. The supreme power and government were delivered toCingetorix, whom we have stated to have remained firm in his allegiancefrom the commencement. 

IX. --Caesar, after he came from the territories of the Menapii intothose of the Treviri, resolved for two reasons to cross the Rhine; oneof which was, because they had sent assistance to the Treviri againsthim; the other, that Ambiorix might not have a retreat among them. Having determined on these matters, he began to build a bridge a littleabove that place, at which he had before conveyed over his army. Theplan having been known and laid down, the work is accomplished in a fewdays by the great exertion of the soldiers. Having left a strong guardat the bridge on the side of the Treviri, lest any commotion shouldsuddenly arise among them, he leads over the rest of the forces and thecavalry. The Ubii, who before had sent hostages and come to acapitulation, send ambassadors to him, for the purpose of vindicatingthemselves, to assure him that "neither had auxiliaries been sent to theTreviri from their state, nor had they violated their allegiance"; theyentreat and beseech him "to spare them, lest, in his common hatred ofthe Germans, the innocent should suffer the penalty of the guilty: theypromise to give more hostages, if he desire them. " Having investigatedthe case, Caesar finds that the auxiliaries had been sent by the Suevi;he accepts the apology of the Ubii, and makes minute inquiriesconcerning the approaches and the routes to the territories of theSuevi. X. --In the meanwhile he is informed by the Ubii, a few daysafter, that the Suevi are drawing all their forces into one place, andare giving orders to those nations which are under their government tosend auxiliaries of infantry and of cavalry. Having learned thesethings, he provides a supply of corn, selects a proper place for hiscamp, and commands the Ubii to drive off their cattle and carry away alltheir possessions from the country parts into the towns, hoping thatthey, being a barbarous and ignorant people, when harassed by the wantof provisions, might be brought to an engagement on disadvantageousterms: he orders them to send numerous scouts among the Suevi, and learnwhat things are going on among them. They execute the orders, and, a fewdays having intervened, report that all the Suevi, after certainintelligence concerning the army of the Romans had come, retreated withall their own forces and those of their allies, which they hadassembled, to the utmost extremities of their territories: that there isa wood there of very great extent, which is called Bacenis; that thisstretches a great way into the interior, and, being opposed as a naturalbarrier, defends from injuries and incursions the Cherusci against theSuevi, and the Suevi against the Cherusci: that at the entrance of thatforest the Suevi had determined to await the coming up of the Romans. 

XI. --Since we have come to this place, it does not appear to be foreignto our subject to lay before the reader an account of the manners ofGaul and Germany, and wherein these nations differ from each other. InGaul there are factions not only in all the states, and in all thecantons and their divisions, but almost in each family, and of thesefactions those are the leaders who are considered according to theirjudgment to possess the greatest influence, upon whose will anddetermination the management of all affairs and measures depends. Andthat seems to have been instituted in ancient times with this view, thatno one of the common people should be in want of support against onemore powerful; for none [of those leaders] suffers his party to beoppressed and defrauded, and if he do otherwise, he has no influenceamong his party. This same policy exists throughout the whole of Gaul;for all the states are divided into two factions. 

XII. --When Caesar arrived in Gaul, the Aedui were the leaders of onefaction, the Sequani of the other. Since the latter were less powerfulby themselves, inasmuch as the chief influence was from of old among theAedui, and their dependencies were great, they had united to themselvesthe Germans and Ariovistus, and had brought them over to their party bygreat sacrifices and promises. And having fought several successfulbattles and slain all the nobility of the Aedui, they had so farsurpassed them in power, that they brought over, from the Aedui tothemselves, a large portion of their dependants and received from themthe sons of their leading men as hostages, and compelled them to swearin their public character that they would enter into no design againstthem; and held a portion of the neighbouring land, seized on by force, and possessed the sovereignty of the whole of Gaul. Divitiacus urged bythis necessity, had proceeded to Rome to the senate, for the purpose ofentreating assistance, and had returned without accomplishing hisobject. A change of affairs ensued on the arrival of Caesar, thehostages were returned to the Aedui, their old dependencies restored, and new acquired through Caesar (because those who had attachedthemselves to their alliance saw that they enjoyed a better state and amilder government), their other interests, their influence, theirreputation were likewise increased, and in consequence, the Sequani lostthe sovereignty. The Remi succeeded to their place, and, as it wasperceived that they equalled the Aedui in favour with Caesar, those, whoon account of their old animosities could by no means coalesce with theAedui, consigned themselves in clientship to the Remi. The lattercarefully protected them. Thus they possessed both a new and suddenlyacquired influence. Affairs were then in that position, that the Aeduiwere considered by far the leading people, and the Remi held the secondpost of honour. 

XIII. --Throughout all Gaul there are two orders of those men who are ofany rank and dignity: for the commonality is held almost in thecondition of slaves, and dares to undertake nothing of itself and isadmitted to no deliberation. The greater part, when they are pressedeither by debt, or the large amount of their tributes, or the oppressionof the more powerful, give themselves up in vassalage to the nobles, whopossess over them the same rights without exception as masters overtheir slaves. But of these two orders, one is that of the Druids, theother that of the knights. The former are engaged in things sacred, conduct the public and the private sacrifices, and interpret all mattersof religion. To these a large number of the young men resort for thepurpose of instruction, and they [the Druids] are in great honour amongthem. For they determine respecting almost all controversies, public andprivate; and if any crime has been perpetrated, if murder has beencommitted, if there be any dispute about an inheritance, if any aboutboundaries, these same persons decide it; they decree rewards andpunishments if any one, either in a private or public capacity, has notsubmitted to their decision, they interdict him from the sacrifices. This among them is the most heavy punishment. Those who have been thusinterdicted are esteemed in the number of the impious and the criminal:all shun them, and avoid their society and conversation, lest theyreceive some evil from their contact; nor is justice administered tothem when seeking it, nor is any dignity bestowed on them. Over allthese Druids one presides, who possesses supreme authority among them. Upon his death, if any individual among the rest is pre-eminent indignity, he succeeds; but, if there are many equal, the election is madeby the suffrages of the Druids; sometimes they even contend for thepresidency with arms. These assemble at a fixed period of the year in aconsecrated place in the territories of the Carnutes, which is reckonedthe central region of the whole of Gaul. Hither all, who have disputes, assemble from every part, and submit to their decrees anddeterminations. This institution is supposed to have been devised inBritain, and to have been brought over from it into Gaul; and now thosewho desire to gain a more accurate knowledge of that system generallyproceed thither for the purpose of studying it. 

XIV. --The Druids do not go to war, nor pay tribute together with therest; they have an exemption from military service and a dispensation inall matters. Induced by such great advantages, many embrace thisprofession of their own accord, and [many] are sent to it by theirparents and relations. They are said there to learn by heart a greatnumber of verses; accordingly some remain in the course of trainingtwenty years. Nor do they regard it lawful to commit these to writing, though in almost all other matters, in their public and privatetransactions, they use Greek characters. That practice they seem to meto have adopted for two reasons; because they neither desire theirdoctrines to be divulged among the mass of the people, nor those wholearn, to devote themselves the less to the efforts of memory, relyingon writing; since it generally occurs to most men, that, in theirdependence on writing, they relax their diligence in learningthoroughly, and their employment of the memory. They wish to inculcatethis as one of their leading tenets, that souls do not become extinct, but pass after death from one body to another, and they think that menby this tenet are in a great degree excited to valour, the fear of deathbeing disregarded. They likewise discuss and impart to the youth manythings respecting the stars and their motion, respecting the extent ofthe world and of our earth, respecting the nature of things, respectingthe power and the majesty of the immortal gods. 

XV. --The other order is that of the knights. These, when there isoccasion and any war occurs (which before Caesar's arrival was for themost part wont to happen every year, as either they on their part wereinflicting injuries or repelling those which others inflicted on them), are all engaged in war. And those of them most distinguished by birthand resources, have the greatest number of vassals and dependants aboutthem. They acknowledge this sort of influence and power only. 

XVI. --The nation of all the Gauls is extremely devoted to superstitiousrites; and on that account they who are troubled with unusually severediseases and they who are engaged in battles and dangers, eithersacrifice men as victims, or vow that they will sacrifice them, andemploy the Druids as the performers of those sacrifices; because theythink that unless the life of a man be offered for the life of a man, the mind of the immortal gods cannot be rendered propitious, and theyhave sacrifices of that kind ordained for national purposes. Others havefigures of vast size, the limbs of which formed of osiers they fill withliving men, which being set on fire, the men perish enveloped in theflames. They consider that the oblation of such as have been taken intheft, or in robbery, or any other offence, is more acceptable to theimmortal gods; but when a supply of that class is wanting, they haverecourse to the oblation of even the innocent. 

XVII. --They worship as their divinity, Mercury in particular, and havemany images of him, and regard him as the inventor of all arts, theyconsider him, the guide of their journeys and marches, and believe himto have very great influence over the acquisition of gain and mercantiletransactions. Next to him they worship Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter, and Minerva; respecting these deities they have for the most part thesame belief as other nations: that Apollo averts diseases, that Minervaimparts the invention of manufactures, that Jupiter possesses thesovereignty of the heavenly powers; that Mars presides over wars. To himwhen they have determined to engage in battle, they commonly vow thosethings they shall take in war. When they have conquered, they sacrificewhatever captured animals may have survived the conflict, and collectthe other things into one place. In many states you may see piles ofthese things heaped up in their consecrated spots; nor does it oftenhappen that any one, disregarding the sanctity of the case, dares eitherto secrete in his house things captured, or take away those deposited;and the most severe punishment, with torture, has been established forsuch a deed. 

XVIII. --All the Gauls assert that they are descended from the god Dis, and say that this tradition has been handed down by the Druids. For thatreason they compute the divisions of every season, not by the number ofdays, but of nights; they keep birthdays and the beginnings of monthsand years in such an order that the day follows the night. Among theother usages of their life, they differ in this from almost all othernations, that they do not permit their children to approach them openlyuntil they are grown up so as to be able to bear the service of war; andthey regard it as indecorous for a son of boyish age to stand in publicin the presence of his father. 

XIX. --Whatever sums of money the husbands have received in the name ofdowry from their wives, making an estimate of it, they add the sameamount out of their own estates. An account is kept of all this moneyconjointly, and the profits are laid by: whichever of them shall havesurvived [the other], to that one the portion of both reverts, togetherwith the profits of the previous time. Husbands have power of life anddeath over their wives as well as over their children: and when thefather of a family, born in a more than commonly distinguished rank, hasdied, his relations assemble, and, if the circumstances of his death aresuspicious, hold an investigation upon the wives in the manner adoptedtowards slaves; and if proof be obtained, put them to severe torture, and kill them. Their funerals, considering the state of civilizationamong the Gauls, are magnificent and costly; and they cast into the fireall things, including living creatures, which they suppose to have beendear to them when alive; and, a little before this period, slaves anddependants, who were ascertained to have been beloved by them, were, after the regular funeral rites were completed, burnt together withthem. 

XX. --Those states which are considered to conduct their commonwealthmore judiciously, have it ordained by their laws, that, if any personshall have heard by rumour and report from his neighbours anythingconcerning the commonwealth, he shall convey it to the magistrate andnot impart it to any other; because it has been discovered thatinconsiderate and inexperienced men were often alarmed by false reportsand driven to some rash act, or else took hasty measures in affairs ofthe highest importance. The magistrates conceal those things whichrequire to be kept unknown; and they disclose to the people whateverthey determine to be expedient. It is not lawful to speak of thecommonwealth, except in council. 

XXI. --The Germans differ much from these usages, for they have neitherDruids to preside over sacred offices, nor do they pay great regard tosacrifices. They rank in the number of the gods those alone whom theybehold, and by whose instrumentality they are obviously benefited, namely, the sun, fire, and the moon; they have not heard of the otherdeities even by report. Their whole life is occupied in hunting and inthe pursuits of the military art; from childhood they devote themselvesto fatigue and hardships. Those who have remained chaste for the longesttime, receive the greatest commendation among their people: they thinkthat by this the growth is promoted, by this the physical powers areincreased and the sinews are strengthened. And to have had knowledge ofa woman before the twentieth year they reckon among the most disgracefulacts; of which matter there is no concealment, because they bathepromiscuously in the rivers and [only] use skins or small cloaks ofdeers' hides, a large portion of the body being in consequence naked. 

XXII. --They do not pay much attention to agriculture, and a largeportion of their food consists in milk, cheese, and flesh; nor has anyone a fixed quantity of land or his own individual limits; but themagistrates and the leading men each year apportion to the tribes andfamilies, who have united together, as much land as, and in the place inwhich, they think proper, and the year after compel them to removeelsewhere. For this enactment they advance many reasons--lest seduced bylong-continued custom, they may exchange their ardour in the waging ofwar for agriculture; lest they may be anxious to acquire extensiveestates, and the more powerful drive the weaker from their possessions;lest they construct their houses with too great a desire to avoid coldand heat; lest the desire of wealth spring up, from which causedivisions and discords arise; and that they may keep the common peoplein a contented state of mind, when each sees his own means placed on anequality with [those of] the most powerful. 

XXIII. --It is the greatest glory to the several states to have as widedeserts as possible around them, their frontiers having been laid waste. They consider this the real evidence of their prowess, that theirneighbours shall be driven out of their lands and abandon them, and thatno one dare settle near them; at the same time they think that theyshall be on that account the more secure, because they have removed theapprehension of a sudden incursion. When a state either repels war wagedagainst it, or wages it against another, magistrates are chosen topreside over that war with such authority, that they have power of lifeand death. In peace there is no common magistrate, but the chiefs ofprovinces and cantons administer justice and determine controversiesamong their own people. Robberies which are committed beyond theboundaries of each state bear no infamy, and they avow that these arecommitted for the purpose of disciplining their youth and of preventingsloth. And when any of their chiefs has said in an assembly "that hewill be their leader, let those who are willing to follow, give in theirnames"; they who approve of both the enterprise and the man arise andpromise their assistance and are applauded by the people; such of themas have not followed him are accounted in the number of deserters andtraitors, and confidence in all matters is afterwards refused them. Toinjure guests they regard as impious; they defend from wrong those whohave come to them for any purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable;to them the houses of all are open and maintenance is freely supplied. 

XXIV. --And there was formerly a time when the Gauls excelled the Germansin prowess, and waged war on them offensively, and, on account of thegreat number of their people and the insufficiency of their land, sentcolonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the Volcae Tectosages seized onthose parts of Germany which are the most fruitful [and lie] around theHercynian forest (which, I perceive, was known by report to Eratosthenesand some other Greeks, and which they call Orcynia) and settled there. Which nation to this time retains its position in those settlements, andhas a very high character for justice and military merit: now also theycontinue in the same scarcity, indigence, hardihood, as the Germans, anduse the same food and dress; but their proximity to the Province andknowledge of commodities from countries beyond the sea supplies to theGauls many things tending to luxury as well as civilization. Accustomedby degrees to be overmatched and worsted in many engagements, they donot even compare themselves to the Germans in prowess. 

XXV. --The breadth of this Hercynian forest, which has been referred toabove, is to a quick traveller, a journey of nine days. For it cannot beotherwise computed, nor are they acquainted with the measures of roads. It begins at the frontiers of the Helvetii, Nemetes, and Rauraci, andextends in a right line along the river Danube to the territories of theDaci and the Anartes: it bends thence to the left in a differentdirection from the river, and owing to its extent touches the confinesof many nations; nor is there any person belonging to this part ofGermany who says that he either has gone to the extremity of thatforest, though he had advanced a journey of sixty days, or has heard inwhat place it begins. It is certain that many kinds of wild beasts areproduced in it which have not been seen in other parts; of which thefollowing are such as differ principally from other animals, and appearworthy of being committed to record. 

XXVI. --There is an ox of the shape of a stag, between whose ears a hornrises from the middle of the forehead, higher and straighter than thosehorns which are known to us. From the top of this, branches, like palms;stretch out a considerable distance. The shape of the female and of themale is the same; the appearance and the size of the horns is the same. 

XXVII. --There are also [animals] which are called elks. The shape ofthese, and the varied colour of their skins, is much like roes, but insize they surpass them a little and are destitute of horns, and havelegs without joints and ligatures; nor do they lie down for the purposeof rest, nor, if they have been thrown down by any accident, can theyraise or lift themselves up. Trees serve as beds to them; they leanthemselves against them, and thus reclining only slightly, they taketheir rest; when the huntsmen have discovered from the footsteps ofthese animals whither they are accustomed to betake themselves, theyeither undermine all the trees at the roots, or cut into them so farthat the upper part of the trees may appear to be left standing. Whenthey have leant upon them, according to their habit, they knock down bytheir weight the unsupported trees, and fall down themselves along withthem. 

XXVIII. -There is a third kind, consisting of those animals which arecalled uri. These are a little below the elephant in size, and of theappearance, colour, and shape of a bull. Their strength and speed areextraordinary; they spare neither man nor wild beast which they haveespied. These the Germans take with much pains in pits and kill them. The young men harden themselves with this exercise, and practicethemselves in this kind of hunting, and those who have slain thegreatest number of them, having produced the horns in public, to serveas evidence, receive great praise. But not even when taken very youngcan they be rendered familiar to men and tamed. The size, shape, andappearance of their horns differ much from the horns of our oxen. Thesethey anxiously seek after, and bind at the tips with silver, and use ascups at their most sumptuous entertainments. 

XXIX. --Caesar, after he discovered through the Ubian scouts that theSuevi had retired into their woods, apprehending a scarcity of corn, because, as we have observed above, all the Germans pay very littleattention to agriculture, resolved not to proceed any farther; but, thathe might not altogether relieve the barbarians from the fear of hisreturn, and that he might delay their succours, having led back hisarmy, he breaks down, to the length of 200 feet, the farther end of thebridge, which joined the banks of the Ubii, and, at the extremity of thebridge raises towers of four stories, and stations a guard of twelvecohorts for the purpose of defending the bridge, and strengthens theplace with considerable fortifications. Over that fort and guard heappointed C. Volcatius Tullus, a young man; he himself, when the cornbegan to ripen, having set forth for the war with 40 Ambiorix (throughthe forest Arduenna, which is the largest of all Gaul, and reaches fromthe banks of the Rhine and the frontiers of the Treviri to those of theNervii, and extends over more than 500 miles), he sends forward L. Minucius Basilus with all the cavalry, to try if he might gain anyadvantage by rapid marches and the advantage of time, he warns him toforbid fires being made in the camp, lest any indication of his approachbe given at a distance: he tells him that he will follow immediately. 

XXX. --Basilus does as he was commanded; having performed his marchrapidly, and even surpassed the expectations of all, he surprises in thefields many not expecting him; through their information he advancestowards Ambiorix himself, to the place in which he was said to be with afew horse. Fortune accomplishes much, not only in other matters, butalso in the art of war. For as it happened by a remarkable chance, thathe fell upon [Ambiorix] himself unguarded and unprepared, and that hisarrival was seen by the people before the report or information of hisarrival was carried thither; so it was an incident of extraordinaryfortune that, although every implement of war which he was accustomed tohave about him was seized, and his chariots and horses surprised, yet hehimself escaped death. But it was effected owing to this circumstance, that his house being surrounded by a wood, (as are generally thedwellings of the Gauls, who, for the purpose of avoiding heat, mostlyseek the neighbourhood of woods and rivers) his attendants and friendsin a narrow spot sustained for a short time the attack of our horse. While they were fighting, one of his followers mounted him on a horse:the woods sheltered him as he fled. Thus fortune tended much bothtowards his encountering and his escaping danger. 

XXXI. --Whether Ambiorix did not collect his forces from cooldeliberation, because he considered he ought not to engage in a battle, or [whether] he was debarred by time and prevented by the sudden arrivalof our horse, when he supposed the rest of the army was closelyfollowing, is doubtful; but certainly, despatching messengers throughthe country, he ordered every one to provide for himself; and a part ofthem fled into the forest Arduenna, a part into the extensive morasses;those who were nearest the ocean, concealed themselves in the islandswhich the tides usually form; many, departing from their territories, committed themselves and all their possessions to perfect strangers. Cativolcus, king of one-half of the Eburones, who had entered into thedesign together with Ambiorix, since, being now worn out by age, he wasunable to endure the fatigue either of war or flight, having cursedAmbiorix with every imprecation, as the person who had been thecontriver of that measure, destroyed himself with the juice of the yewtree, of which there is a great abundance in Gaul and Germany. 

XXXII. --The Segui and Condrusi, of the nation and number of the Germans, and who are between the Eburones and the Treviri, sent ambassadors toCaesar to entreat that he would not regard them in the number of hisenemies, nor consider that the cause of all the Germans on this side theRhine was one and the same; that they had formed no plans of war, andhad sent no auxiliaries to Ambiorix. Caesar, having ascertained thisfact by an examination of his prisoners commanded that if any of theEburones in their flight had repaired to them, they should be sent backto him; he assures them that if they did that, he will not injure theirterritories. Then, having divided his forces into three parts, he sentthe baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca. That is the name of a fort. This is nearly in the middle of the Eburones, where Titurius andAurunculeius had been quartered for the purpose of wintering. This placehe selected as well on other accounts as because the fortifications ofthe previous year remained, in order that he might relieve the labour ofthe soldiers. He left the fourteenth legion as a guard for the baggage, one of those three which he had lately raised in Italy and brought over. Over that legion and camp he places Q. Tullius Cicero and gives him 200horse. 

XXXIII. --Having divided the army, he orders T. Labienus to proceed withthree legions towards the ocean into those parts which border on theMenappii; he sends C. Trebonius with a like number of legions to laywaste that district which lies contiguous to the Aduatuci; he himselfdetermines to go with the remaining three to the river Sambre, whichflows into the Meuse, and to the most remote parts of Arduenna, whitherhe heard that Ambiorix had gone with a few horse. When departing, hepromises that he will return before the end of the seventh day, on whichday he was aware corn was due to that legion which was being left ingarrison. He directs Labienus and Trebonius to return by the same day, if they can do so agreeably to the interests of the republic; so thattheir measures having been mutually imparted, and the plans of the enemyhaving been discovered, they might be able to commence a different lineof operations. 

XXXIV. --There was, as we have above observed, no regular army, nor atown, nor a garrison which could defend itself by arms; but the peoplewere scattered in all directions. Where either a hidden valley, or awoody spot, or a difficult morass furnished any hope of protection or ofsecurity to any one, there he had fixed himself. These places were knownto those that dwelt in the neighbourhood, and the matter demanded greatattention, not so much in protecting the main body of the army (for noperil could occur to them altogether from those alarmed and scatteredtroops), as in preserving individual soldiers; which in some measuretended to the safety of the army. For both the desire of booty wasleading many too far, and the woods with their unknown and hidden routeswould not allow them to go in large bodies. If he desired the businessto be completed and the race of those infamous people to be cut off, more bodies of men must be sent in several directions and the soldiersmust be detached on all sides; if he were disposed to keep the companiesat their standards, as the established discipline and practice of theRoman army required, the situation itself was a safeguard to thebarbarians, nor was there wanting to individuals the daring to laysecret ambuscades and beset scattered soldiers. But amidst difficultiesof this nature as far as precautions could be taken by vigilance, suchprecautions were taken; so that some opportunities of injuring the enemywere neglected, though the minds of all were burning to take revenge, rather than that injury should be effected with any loss to oursoldiers. Caesar despatches messengers to the neighbouring states; bythe hope of booty he invites all to him, for the purpose of plunderingthe Eburones, in order that the life of the Gauls might be hazarded inthe woods rather than the legionary soldiers; at the same time, in orderthat a large force being drawn around them, the race and name of thatstate may be annihilated for such a crime. A large number from allquarters speedily assembles. 

XXXV. --These things were going on in all parts of the territories of theEburones, and the seventh day was drawing near, by which day Caesar hadpurposed to return to the baggage and the legion. Here it might belearned how much fortune achieves in war, and how great casualties sheproduces. The enemy having been scattered and alarmed, as we relatedabove, there was no force which might produce even a slight occasion offear. The report extends beyond the Rhine to the Germans that theEburones are being pillaged, and that all were without distinctioninvited to the plunder. The Sigambri, who are nearest to the Rhine, bywhom, we have mentioned above, the Tenchtheri and Usipetes were receivedafter their retreat, collect 2000 horse; they cross the Rhine in shipsand barks thirty miles below that place where the bridge was entire andthe garrison left by Caesar; they arrive at the frontiers of theEburones, surprise many who were scattered in flight, and get possessionof a large amount of cattle, of which barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured by booty, they advance farther; neither morass nor forestobstructs these men, born amidst war and depredations; they inquire oftheir prisoners in what parts Caesar is; they find that he has advancedfarther, and learn that all the army has removed. Thereon one of theprisoners says, "Why do you pursue such wretched and trifling spoil;you, to whom it is granted to become even now most richly endowed byfortune? In three hours you can reach Aduatuca; there the Roman army hasdeposited all its fortunes; there is so little of a garrison that noteven the wall can be manned, nor dare any one go beyond thefortifications. " A hope having been presented them, the Germans leave inconcealment the plunder they had acquired; they themselves hasten toAduatuca, employing as their guide the same man by whose informationthey had become informed of these things. 

XXXVI. --Cicero, who during all the foregoing days had kept his soldiersin camp with the greatest exactness, and agreeably to the injunctions ofCaesar, had not permitted even any of the camp-followers to go beyondthe fortification, distrusting on the seventh day that Caesar would keephis promise as to the number of days, because he heard that he hadproceeded farther, and no report as to his return was brought to him, and being urged at the same time by the expressions of those who calledhis tolerance almost a siege, if, forsooth, it was not permitted them togo out of the camp, since he might expect no disaster, whereby he couldbe injured, within three miles of the camp, while nine legions and allthe cavalry were under arms, and the enemy scattered and almostannihilated, sent five cohorts into the neighbouring cornlands, betweenwhich and the camp only one hill intervened, for the purpose offoraging. Many soldiers of the legions had been left invalided in thecamp, of whom those who had recovered in this space of time, being about300, are set together under one standard; a large number of soldiers'attendants besides, with a great number of beasts of burden, which hadremained in the camp, permission being granted, follow them. 

XXXVII. --At this very time, the German horse by chance come up, andimmediately, with the same speed with which they had advanced, attemptto force the camp at the Decuman gate, nor were they seen, inconsequence of woods lying in the way on that side, before they werejust reaching the camp: so much so, that the sutlers who had theirbooths under the rampart had not an opportunity of retreating within thecamp. Our men, not anticipating it, are perplexed by the sudden affair, and the cohort on the outpost scarcely sustains the first attack. Theenemy spread themselves on the other sides to ascertain if they couldfind any access. Our men with difficulty defend the gates; the veryposition of itself and the fortification secures the other accesses. There is a panic in the entire camp, and one inquires of another thecause of the confusion, nor do they readily determine whither thestandards should be borne, nor into what quarter each should betakehimself. One avows that the camp is already taken, another maintainsthat, the enemy having destroyed the army and commander-in-chief, arecome thither as conquerors; most form strange superstitious fancies fromthe spot, and place before their eyes the catastrophe of Cotta andTiturius, who had fallen in the same fort. All being greatlydisconcerted by this alarm, the belief of the barbarians is strengthenedthat there is no garrison within, as they had heard from their prisoner. They endeavour to force an entrance and encourage one another not tocast from their hands so valuable a prize. 

XXXVIII. -P. Sextius Baculus, who had led a principal century underCaesar (of whom we have made mention in previous engagements), had beenleft an invalid in the garrison, and had now been five days withoutfood. He, distrusting his own safety and that of all, goes forth fromhis tent unarmed; he sees that the enemy are close at hand and that thematter is in the utmost danger; he snatches arms from those nearest, andstations himself at the gate. The centurions of that cohort which was onguard follow him; for a short time they sustain the fight together. Sextius faints, after receiving many wounds; he is with difficultysaved, drawn away by the hands of the soldiers. This space havingintervened, the others resume courage, so far as to venture to taketheir place on the fortifications and present the aspect of defenders. 

XXXIX. --The foraging having in the meantime been completed, our soldiersdistinctly hear the shout; the horse hasten on before and discover inwhat danger the affair is. But here there is no fortification to receivethem, in their alarm: those last enlisted and unskilled in militarydiscipline turn their faces to the military tribune and the centurions;they wait to find what orders may be given by them. No one is socourageous as not to be disconcerted by the suddenness of the affair. The barbarians, espying our standard in the distance, desist from theattack; at first they suppose that the legions, which they had learnedfrom their prisoners had removed farther off, had returned; afterwards, despising their small number, they make an attack on them at all sides. 

XL. -The camp-followers run forward to the nearest rising ground; beingspeedily driven from this they throw themselves among the standards andcompanies: they thus so much the more alarm the soldiers alreadyaffrighted. Some propose that, forming a wedge, they suddenly breakthrough, since the camp was so near; and if any part should besurrounded and slain, they fully trust that at least the rest may besaved; others, that they take their stand on an eminence, and allundergo the same destiny. The veteran soldiers, whom we stated to haveset out together [with the others] under a standard, do not approve ofthis. Therefore encouraging each other, under the conduct of CaiusTrebonius, a Roman knight, who had been appointed over them, they breakthrough the midst of the enemy, and arrive in the camp safe to a man. The camp-attendants and the horse following close upon them with thesame impetuosity, are saved by the courage of the soldiers. But thosewho had taken their stand upon the eminence having even now acquired noexperience of military matters, neither could persevere in thatresolution which they approved of, namely, to defend themselves fromtheir higher position, nor imitate that vigour and speed which they hadobserved to have availed others; but, attempting to reach the camp, haddescended into an unfavourable situation. The Centurions, some of whomhad been promoted for their valour from the lower ranks of other legionsto higher ranks in this legion, in order that they might not forfeittheir glory for military exploits previously acquired, fell togetherfighting most valiantly. The enemy having been dislodged by theirvalour, a part of the soldiers arrived safe in camp contrary to theirexpectations; a part perished, surrounded by the barbarians. 

XLI. --The Germans, despairing of taking the camp by storm, because theysaw that our men had taken up their position on the fortifications, retreated beyond the Rhine with that plunder which they had deposited inthe woods. And so great was the alarm, even after the departure of theenemy, that when C. Volusenus, who had been sent with the cavalry, arrived that night, he could not gain credence that. Caesar was close athand with his army safe. Fear had so pre-occupied the minds of all, that, their reason being almost estranged, they said that all the otherforces having been cut off, the cavalry alone had arrived there byflight, and asserted that, if the army were safe, the Germans would nothave attacked the camp: which fear the arrival of Caesar removed. 

XLII. --He, on his return, being well aware of the casualties of war, complained of one thing [only], namely, that the cohorts had been sentaway from the outposts and garrison [duty], and pointed out that roomought not to have been left for even the most trivial casualty; thatfortune had exercised great influence in the sudden arrival of theirenemy; much greater, in that she had turned the barbarians away from thevery rampart and gates of the camp. Of all which events, it seemed themost surprising that the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine with thisobject, that they might plunder the territories of Ambiorix, being ledto the camp of the Romans, rendered Ambiorix a most acceptable service. 

XLIII. --Caesar, having again marched to harass the enemy, aftercollecting a large number [of auxiliaries] from the neighbouring states, despatches them in all directions. All the villages and all thebuildings, which each beheld, were on fire: spoil was being driven offfrom all parts; the corn not only was being consumed by so great numbersof cattle and men, but also had fallen to the earth, owing to the timeof the year and the storms; so that if any had concealed themselves forthe present, still, it appeared likely that they must perish throughwant of all things, when the army should be drawn off. And frequently itcame to that point, as so large a body of cavalry had been sent abroadin all directions, that the prisoners declared Ambiorix had just thenbeen seen by them in flight, and had not even passed out of sight, sothat the hope of overtaking him being raised, and unbounded exertionshaving been resorted to, those who thought they should acquire thehighest favour with Caesar, nearly overcame nature by their ardour, andcontinually a little only seemed wanting to complete success; but herescued himself by [means of] lurking-places and forests, and, concealedby the night, made for other districts and quarters, with no greaterguard than that of four horsemen, to whom alone he ventured to confidehis life. 

XLIV. --Having devastated the country in such a manner, Caesar leads backhis army with the loss of two cohorts to Durocortorum of the Remi, and, having summoned a council of Gaul to assemble at that place, he resolvedto hold an investigation respecting the conspiracy of the Senones andCarnutes, and having pronounced a most severe sentence upon Acco, whohad been the contriver of that plot, he punished him after the custom ofour ancestors. Some fearing a trial, fled; when he had forbidden thesefire and water, he stationed in winter quarters two legions at thefrontiers of the Treviri, two among the Lingones, the remaining six atAgendicum, in the territories of the Senones; and, having provided cornfor the army, he set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold theassizes. 

BOOK VII

I. --Gaul being tranquil, Caesar, as he had determined, sets out forItaly to hold the provincial assizes. There he receives intelligence ofthe death of Clodius; and, being informed of the decree of the senate[to the effect] that all the youth of Italy should take the militaryoath, he determined to hold a levy throughout the entire province. Report of these events is rapidly borne into Transalpine Gaul. The Gaulsthemselves add to the report, and invent what the case seemed torequire, [namely] that Caesar was detained by commotions in the city, and could not, amidst so violent dissensions, come to his army. Animatedby this opportunity, they who already, previously to this occurrence, were indignant that they were reduced beneath the dominion of Rome, begin to organize their plans for war more openly and daringly. Theleading men of Gaul, having convened councils among themselves in thewoods, and retired places, complain of the death of Acco: they point outthat this fate may fall in turn on themselves: they bewail the unhappyfate of Gaul; and by every sort of promises and rewards, they earnestlysolicit some to begin the war, and assert the freedom of Gaul at thehazard of their lives. They say that special care should be paid tothis, that Caesar should be cut off from his army, before their secretplans should be divulged. That this was easy, because neither would thelegions, in the absence of their general, dare to leave their winterquarters, nor could the general reach his army without a guard: finally, that it was better to be slain in battle than not to recover theirancient glory in war, and that freedom which they had received fromtheir forefathers. 

II. --Whilst these things are in agitation, the Carnutes declare "thatthey would decline no danger for the sake of the general safety, " andpromise that they would be the first of all to begin the war; and sincethey cannot at present take precautions, by giving and receivinghostages, that the affair shall not be divulged they require that asolemn assurance be given them by oath and plighted honour, theirmilitary standards being brought together (in which manner their mostsacred obligations are made binding), that they should not be desertedby the rest of the Gauls on commencing the war. 

III. --When the appointed day came, the Carnutes, under the command ofCotuatus and Conetodunus, desperate men, meet together at Genabum, andslay the Roman citizens who had settled there for the purpose of trading(among the rest, Caius Fusius Cita, a distinguished Roman knight, who byCaesar's orders had presided over the provision department), and plundertheir property. The report is quickly spread among all the states ofGaul; for, whenever a more important and remarkable event takes place, they transmit the intelligence through their lands and districts by ashout; the others take it up in succession, and pass it to theirneighbours, as happened on this occasion; for the things which were doneat Genabum at sunrise were heard in the territories of the Arvernibefore the end of the first watch, which is an extent of more than ahundred and sixty miles. 

IV. --There in like manner, Vercingetorix the son of Celtillus theArvernian, a young man of the highest power (whose father had held thesupremacy of entire Gaul, and had been put to death by his fellowcitizens, for this reason, because he aimed at sovereign power), summoned together his dependents, and easily excited them. On his designbeing made known, they rush to arms: he is expelled from the town ofGergovia by his uncle Gobanitio and the rest of the nobles, who were ofopinion, that such an enterprise ought not to be hazarded: he did nothowever desist, but held in the country a levy of the needy anddesperate. Having collected such a body of troops, he brings over to his30 sentiments such of his fellow citizens as he has access to: heexhorts them to take up arms in behalf of the general freedom, andhaving assembled great forces he drives from the state his opponents, bywhom he had been expelled a short time previously. He is saluted king byhis partisans; he sends ambassadors in every direction, he conjures themto adhere firmly to their promise. He quickly attaches to his intereststhe Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovice, andall the others who border on the ocean; the supreme command is conferredon him by unanimous consent. On obtaining this authority, he demandshostages from all these states, he orders a fixed number of soldiers tobe sent to him immediately; he determines what quantity of arms eachstate shall prepare at home, and before what time; he pays particularattention to the cavalry. To the utmost vigilance he adds the utmostrigour of authority; and by the severity of his punishments brings overthe wavering: for on the commission of a greater crime he puts theperpetrators to death by fire and every sort of tortures; for a slightercause, he sends home the offenders with their ears cut off, or one oftheir eyes put out, that they may be an example to the rest, andfrighten others by the severity of their punishment. 

V. --Having quickly collected an army by their punishments, he sendsLucterius, one of the Cadurci, a man of the utmost daring, with part ofhis forces, into the territory of the Ruteni; and marches in person intothe country of the Bituriges. On his arrival, the Bituriges sendambassadors to the Aedui, under whose protection they were, to solicitaid in order that they might more easily resist the forces of the enemy. The Aedui, by the advice of the lieutenants whom Caesar had left withthe army, send supplies of horse and foot to succour the Bituriges. Whenthey came to the river Loire, which separates the Bituriges from theAedui, they delayed a few days there, and, not daring to pass the river, return home, and send back word to the lieutenants that they hadreturned through fear of the treachery of the Bituriges, who, theyascertained, had formed this design, that if the Aedui should cross theriver, the Bituriges on the one side, and the Arverni on the other, should surround them. Whether they did this for the reason which theyalleged to the lieutenants, or influenced by treachery, we think that weought not to state as certain, because we have no proof. On theirdeparture, the Bituriges immediately unite themselves to the Arverni. 

VI. --These affairs being announced to Caesar in Italy at the time whenhe understood that matters in the city had been reduced to a moretranquil state by the energy of Cneius Pompey, he set out forTransalpine Gaul. After he had arrived there, he was greatly at a lossto know by what means he could reach his army. For if he should summonthe legions into the province, he was aware that on their march theywould have to fight in his absence; he foresaw too, that if he himselfshould endeavour to reach the army, he would act injudiciously, intrusting his safety even to those who seemed to be tranquillized. 

VII. --In the meantime Lucterius the Cadurcan, having been sent into thecountry of the Ruteni, gains over that state to the Arverni. Havingadvanced into the country of the Nitiobriges, and Gabali, he receiveshostages from both nations, and, assembling a numerous force, marches tomake a descent on the province in the direction of Narbo. Caesar, whenthis circumstance was announced to him, thought that the march to Narboought to take the precedence of all his other plans. When he arrivedthere, he encourages the timid, and stations garrisons among the Ruteni, in the province of the Volcae Arecomici, and the country around Narbowhich was in the vicinity of the enemy; he orders a portion of theforces from the province, and the recruits which he had brought fromItaly, to rendezvous among the Helvii who border on the territories ofthe Arverni. 

VIII. --These matters being arranged, and Lucterius now checked andforced to retreat, because he thought it dangerous to enter the line ofRoman garrisons, Caesar marches into the country of the Helvii; althoughmount Cevennes, which separates the Arverni from the Helvii, blocked upthe way with very deep snow, as it was the severest season of the year;yet having cleared away the snow to the depth of six feet, and havingopened the roads, he reaches the territories of the Arverni, withinfinite labour to his soldiers. This people being surprised, becausethey considered themselves defended by the Cevennes as by a wall, andthe paths at this season of the year had never before been passable evento individuals, he orders the cavalry to extend themselves as far asthey could, and strike as great a panic as possible into the enemy. These proceedings are speedily announced to Vercingetorix by rumour andhis messengers. Around him all the Arverni crowd in alarm, and solemnlyentreat him to protect their property, and not to suffer them to beplundered by the enemy, especially as he saw that all the war wastransferred into their country. Being prevailed upon by their entreatieshe moves his camp from the country of the Bituriges in the direction ofthe Arverni. 

IX. --Caesar, having delayed two days in that place, because he hadanticipated that, in the natural course of events, such would be theconduct of Vercingetorix, leaves the army under pretence of raisingrecruits and cavalry: he places Brutus, a young man, in command of theseforces; he gives him instructions that the cavalry should range asextensively as possible in all directions; that he would exert himselfnot to be absent from the camp longer than three days. Having arrangedthese matters, he marches to Vienna by as long journeys as he can, whenhis own soldiers did not expect him. Finding there a fresh body ofcavalry, which he had sent on to that place several days before, marching incessantly night and day, he advanced rapidly through theterritory of the Aedui into that of the Lingones, in which two legionswere wintering, that, if any plan affecting his own safety should havebeen organised by the Aedui, he might defeat it by the rapidity of hismovements. When he arrived there, he sends information to the rest ofthe legions, and gathers all his army into one place before intelligenceof his arrival could be announced to the Arverni. 

Vercingetorix, on hearing this circumstance, leads back his army intothe country of the Bituriges; and after marching from it to Gergovia, atown of the Boii, whom Caesar had settled there after defeating them inthe Helvetian war, and had rendered tributary to the Aedui, hedetermined to attack it. 

X. --This action caused great perplexity to Caesar in the selection ofhis plans; [he feared] lest, if he should confine his legions in oneplace for the remaining portion of the winter, all Gaul should revoltwhen the tributaries of the Aedui were subdued, because it would appearthat there was in him no protection for his friends; but if he shoulddraw them too soon out of their winter quarters, he might be distressedby the want of provisions, in consequence of the difficulty ofconveyance. It seemed better, however, to endure every hardship than toalienate the affections of all his allies, by submitting to such aninsult. Having, therefore, impressed on the Aedui the necessity ofsupplying him with provisions, he sends forward messengers to the Boiito inform them of his arrival, and encourage them to remain firm intheir allegiance, and resist the attack of the enemy with greatresolution. Having left two legions and the luggage of the entire armyat Agendicum, he marches to the Boii. 

XI. --On the second day, when he came to Vellaunodunum, a town of theSenones, he determined to attack it, in order that he might not leave anenemy in his rear, and might the more easily procure supplies ofprovisions, and drew a line of circumvallation around it in two days: onthe third day, ambassadors being sent from the town to treat of acapitulation, he orders their arms to be brought together, their cattleto be brought forth, and six hundred hostages to be given. He leavesCaius Trebonius, his lieutenant, to complete these arrangements; hehimself sets out with the intention of marching as soon as possible toGenabum, a town of the Carnutes, who having then for the first timereceived information of the siege of Vellaunodunum, as they thought thatit would be protracted to a longer time, were preparing a garrison tosend to Genabum for the defence of that town. Caesar arrived here in twodays; after pitching his camp before the town, being prevented by thetime of the day, he defers the attack to the next day, and orders hissoldiers to prepare whatever was necessary for that enterprise; and as abridge over the Loire connected the town of Genabum with the oppositebank, fearing lest the inhabitants should escape by night from the town, he orders two legions to keep watch under arms. The people of Genabumcame forth silently from the city before midnight, and began to crossthe river. When this circumstance was announced by scouts, Caesar, having set fire to the gates, sends in the legions which he had orderedto be ready, and obtains possession of the town so completely, that veryfew of the whole number of the enemy escaped being taken alive, becausethe narrowness of the bridge and the roads prevented the multitude fromescaping. He pillages and burns the town, gives the booty to thesoldiers, then leads his army over the Loire, and marches into theterritories of the Bituriges. 

XII. --Vercingetorix, when he ascertained the arrival of Caesar, desistedfrom the siege [of Gergovia], and marched to meet Caesar. The latter hadcommenced to besiege Noviodunum; and when ambassadors came from thistown to beg that he would pardon them and spare their lives, in orderthat he might execute the rest of his designs with the rapidity by whichhe had accomplished most of them, he orders their arms to be collected, their horses to be brought forth, and hostages to be given. A part ofthe hostages being now delivered up, when the rest of the terms werebeing performed, a few centurions and soldiers being sent into the townto collect the arms and horses, the enemy's cavalry, which hadoutstripped the main body of Vercingetorix's army, was seen at adistance; as soon as the townsmen beheld them, and entertained hopes ofassistance, raising a shout, they began to take up arms, shut the gates, and line the walls. When the centurions in the town understood from thesignal-making of the Gauls that they were forming some new design, theydrew their swords and seized the gates, and recovered all their mensafe. 

XIII. --Caesar orders the horse to be drawn out of the camp, andcommences a cavalry action. His men being now distressed, Caesar sendsto their aid about four hundred German horse, which he had determined, at the beginning, to keep with himself. The Gauls could not withstandtheir attack, but were put to flight, and retreated to their main body, after losing a great number of men. When they were routed, the townsmen, again intimidated, arrested those persons by whose exertions theythought that the mob had been roused, and brought them to Caesar, andsurrendered themselves to him. When these affairs were accomplished, Caesar marched to the Avaricum, which was the largest and best fortifiedtown in the territories of the Bituriges, and situated in a most fertiletract of country; because he confidently expected that on taking thattown, he would reduce beneath his dominion the state of the Bituriges. 

XIV. --Vercingetorix, after sustaining such a series of losses atVellaunodunum, Genabum, and Noviodunum, summons his men to a council. Heimpresses on them "that the war must be prosecuted on a very differentsystem from that which had been previously adopted; but they should byall means aim at this object, that the Romans should be prevented fromforaging and procuring provisions; that this was easy, because theythemselves were well supplied with cavalry and were likewise assisted bythe season of the year; that forage could not be cut; that the enemymust necessarily disperse, and look for it in the houses, that all thesemight be daily destroyed by the horse. Besides that the interests ofprivate property must be neglected for the sake of the general safety;that the villages and houses ought to be fired, over such an extent ofcountry in every direction from Boia, as the Romans appeared capable ofscouring in their search for forage. That an abundance of thesenecessaries could be supplied to them, because they would be assisted bythe resources of those in whose territories the war would be waged: thatthe Romans either would not bear the privation, or else would advance toany distance from the camp with considerable danger; and that it made nodifference whether they slew them or stripped them of their baggage, since, if it was lost, they could not carry on the war. Besides that, the towns ought to be burnt which were not secured against every dangerby their fortifications or natural advantages; that there should not beplaces of retreat for their own countrymen for declining militaryservice, nor be exposed to the Romans as inducements to carry offabundance of provisions and plunder. If these sacrifices should appearheavy or galling, that they ought to consider it much more distressingthat their wives and children should be dragged off to slavery, andthemselves slain; the evils which must necessarily befall the conquered. 

XV. --This opinion having been approved of by unanimous consent, morethan twenty towns of the Bituriges are burnt in one day. Conflagrationsare beheld in every quarter; and although all bore this with greatregret, yet they laid before themselves this consolation, that, as thevictory was certain, they could quickly recover their losses. There is adebate concerning Avaricum in the general council, whether they shoulddecide that it should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges threwthemselves at the feet of all the Gauls, and entreat that they shouldnot be compelled to set fire with their own hands to the fairest city ofalmost the whole of Gaul, which was both a protection and ornament tothe state; they say that "they could easily defend it, owing to thenature of the ground, for, being enclosed almost on every side by ariver and a marsh, it had only one entrance, and that very narrow. "Permission being granted to them at their earnest request, Vercingetorixat first dissuades them from it, but afterwards concedes the point, owing to their entreaties and the compassion of the soldiers. A propergarrison is selected for the town. 

XVI. --Vercingetorix follows closely upon Caesar by shorter marches, andselects for his camp a place defended by woods and marshes, at thedistance of fifteen miles from Avaricum. There he received intelligenceby trusty scouts, every hour in the day, of what was going on atAvaricum, and ordered whatever he wished to be done; he closely watchedall our expeditions for corn and forage, and whenever they werecompelled to go to a greater distance, he attacked them when dispersed, and inflicted severe loss upon them; although the evil was remedied byour men, as far as precautions could be taken, by going forth atirregular times, and by different ways. 

XVII. --Caesar pitching his camp at that side of the town which was notdefended by the river and marsh, and had a very narrow approach, as wehave mentioned, began to raise the vineae and erect two towers; for thenature of the place prevented him from drawing a line ofcircumvallation. He never ceased to importune the Boii and Aedui forsupplies of corn; of whom the one [the Aedui], because they were actingwith no zeal, did not aid him much; the others [the Boii], as theirresources were not great, quickly consumed what they had. Although thearmy was distressed by the greatest want of corn, through the poverty ofthe Boii, the apathy of the Aedui, and the burning of the houses, tosuch a degree, that for several days the soldiers were without corn, andsatisfied their extreme hunger with cattle driven from the remotevillages; yet no language was heard from them unworthy of the majesty ofthe Roman people and their former victories. Moreover, when Caesaraddressed the legions, one by one, when at work, and said that he wouldraise the siege, if they felt the scarcity too severely, theyunanimously begged him "not to do so; that they had served for severalyears under his command in such a manner, that they never submitted toinsult, and never abandoned an enterprise without accomplishing it; thatthey should consider it a disgrace if they abandoned the siege aftercommencing it; that it was better to endure every hardship than not toavenge the manes of the Roman citizens who perished at Genabum by theperfidy of the Gauls. " They entrusted the same declarations to thecenturions and military tribunes, that through them they might becommunicated to Caesar. 

XVIII. --When the towers had now approached the walls, Caesar ascertainedfrom the captives that Vercingetorix, after destroying the forage, hadpitched his camp nearer Avaricum, and that he himself with the cavalryand light-armed infantry, who generally fought among the horse, had goneto lay an ambuscade in that quarter to which he thought that our troopswould come the next day to forage. On learning these facts, he set outfrom the camp secretly at midnight, and reached the camp of the enemyearly in the morning. They having quickly learned the arrival of Caesarby scouts, hid their cars and baggage in the thickest parts of thewoods, and drew up all their forces in a lofty and open space: whichcircumstance being announced, Caesar immediately ordered the baggage tobe piled, and the arms to be got ready. 

XIX. --There was a hill of a gentle ascent from the bottom; a dangerousand impassable marsh, not more than fifty feet broad, begirt it onalmost every side. The Gauls, having broken down the bridges, postedthemselves on this hill, in confidence of their position, and beingdrawn up in tribes according to their respective states, held all thefords and passages of that marsh with trusty guards, thus determinedthat if the Romans should attempt to force the marsh, they wouldoverpower them from the higher ground while sticking in it, so thatwhoever saw the nearness of the position, would imagine that the twoarmies were prepared to fight on almost equal terms; but whoever shouldview accurately the disadvantage of position, would discover that theywere showing off an empty affectation of courage. Caesar clearly pointsout to his soldiers, who were indignant that the enemy could bear thesight of them at the distance of so short a space, and were earnestlydemanding the signal for action, "with how great loss and the death ofhow many gallant men the victory would necessarily be purchased: andwhen he saw them so determined to decline no danger for his renown, thathe ought to be considered guilty of the utmost injustice if he did nothold their life dearer than his own personal safety. " Having thusconsoled his soldiers, he leads them back on the same day to the camp, and determined to prepare the other things which were necessary for thesiege of the town. 

XX. --Vercingetorix, when he had returned to his men, was accused oftreason, in that he had moved his camp nearer the Romans, in that he hadgone away with all the cavalry, in that he had left so great forceswithout a commander, in that, on his departure, the Romans had come atsuch a favourable season, and with such despatch; that all thesecircumstances could not have happened accidentally or without design;that he preferred holding the sovereignty of Gaul by the grant ofCaesar, to acquiring it by their favour. Being accused in such a manner, he made the following reply to these charges:--"That his moving his camphad been caused by want of forage, and had been done even by theiradvice; that his approaching near the Romans had been a measure dictatedby the favourable nature of the ground, which would defend him by itsnatural strength; that the service of the cavalry could not have beenrequisite in marshy ground, and was useful in that place to which theyhad gone; that he, on his departure, had given the supreme command to noone intentionally, lest he should be induced by the eagerness of themultitude to hazard an engagement, to which he perceived that all wereinclined, owing to their want of energy, because they were unable toendure fatigue any longer. That, if the Romans in the meantime came upby chance, they [the Gauls] should feel grateful to fortune; if invitedby the information of some one they should feel grateful to him, becausethey were enabled to see distinctly from the higher ground the smallnessof the number of their enemy, and despise the courage of those who, notdaring to fight, retreated disgracefully into their camp. That hedesired no power from Caesar by treachery, since he could have it byvictory, which was now assured to himself and to all the Gauls; nay, that he would even give them back the command, if they thought that theyconferred honour on him, rather then received safety from him. That youmay be assured, " said he, "that I speak these words with truth;--listento these Roman soldiers!" He produces some camp-followers whom he hadsurprised on a foraging expedition some days before, and had tortured byfamine and confinement. They being previously instructed in what answersthey should make when examined, say, "That they were legionary soldiers, that, urged by famine and want, they had recently gone forth from thecamp, [to see] if they could find any corn or cattle in the fields; thatthe whole army was distressed by a similar scarcity, nor had any one nowsufficient strength, nor could bear the labour of the work; andtherefore that the general was determined, if he made no progress in thesiege, to draw off his army in three days. " "These benefits, " saysVercingetorix, "you receive from me, whom you accuse of treason--me, bywhose exertions you see so powerful and victorious an army almostdestroyed by famine, without shedding one drop of your blood; and I havetaken precautions that no state shall admit within its territories thisarmy in its ignominious flight from this place. "

XXI. --The whole multitude raise a shout and clash their arms, accordingto their custom, as they usually do in the case of him whose speech theyapprove; [they exclaim] that Vercingetorix was a consummate general, andthat they had no doubt of his honour; that the war could not beconducted with greater prudence. They determine that ten thousand menshould be picked out of the entire army and sent into the town, anddecide that the general safety should not be entrusted to the Biturigesalone, because they were aware that the glory of the victory must restwith the Bituriges, if they made good the defence of the town. 

XXII. --To the extraordinary valour of our soldiers, devices of everysort were opposed by the Gauls; since they are a nation of consummateingenuity, and most skilful in imitating and making those things whichare imparted by any one; for they turned aside the hooks with nooses, and when they had caught hold of them firmly, drew them on by means ofengines, and undermined the mound the more skilfully on this account, because there are in their territories extensive iron mines, andconsequently every description of mining operations is known andpractised by them. They had furnished, moreover, the whole wall on everyside with turrets, and had covered them with skins. Besides, in theirfrequent sallies by day and night, they attempted either to set fire tothe mound, or attack our soldiers when engaged in the works; and, moreover, by splicing the upright timbers of their own towers, theyequalled the height of ours, as fast as the mound had daily raised them, and countermined our mines, and impeded the working of them by stakesbent and sharpened at the ends, and boiling pitch, and stones of verygreat weight, and prevented them from approaching the walls. 

XXIII. --But this is usually the form of all the Gallic walls. Straightbeams, connected lengthwise and two feet distant from each other atequal intervals, are placed together on the ground; these are mortisedon the inside, and covered with plenty of earth. But the intervals whichwe have mentioned, are closed up in front by large stones. These beingthus laid and cemented together, another row is added above, in such amanner that the same interval may be observed, and that the beams maynot touch one another, but equal spaces intervening, each row of beamsis kept firmly in its place by a row of stones. In this manner the wholewall is consolidated, until the regular height of the wall be completed. This work, with respect to appearance and variety, is not unsightly, owing to the alternate rows of beams and stones, which preserve theirorder in right lines; and, besides, it possesses great advantages asregards utility and the defence of cities; for the stone protects itfrom fire, and the wood from the battering ram, since it [the wood]being mortised in the inside with rows of beams, generally forty feeteach in length, can neither be broken through nor torn asunder. 

XXIV. --The siege having been impeded by so many disadvantages, thesoldiers, although they were retarded during the whole time, by the mud, cold, and constant showers, yet by their incessant labour overcame allthese obstacles, and in twenty-five days raised a mound three hundredand thirty feet broad and eighty feet high. When it almost touched theenemy's walls, and Caesar, according to his usual custom, kept watch atthe work, and encouraged the soldiers not to discontinue the work for amoment: a little before the third watch they discovered that the moundwas sinking, since the enemy had set it on fire by a mine; and at thesame time a shout was raised along the entire wall, and a sally was madefrom two gates on each side of the turrets. Some at a distance werecasting torches and dry wood from the wall on the mound, others werepouring on it pitch, and other materials, by which the flame might beexcited, so that a plan could hardly be formed, as to where they shouldfirst run to the defence, or to what part aid should be brought. However, as two legions always kept guard before the camp by Caesar'sorders, and several of them were at stated times at the work, measureswere promptly taken, that some should oppose the sallying party, othersdraw back the towers and make a cut in the rampart; and moreover, thatthe whole army should hasten from the camp to extinguish the flames. 

XXV. --When the battle was going on in every direction, the rest of thenight being now spent, and fresh hopes of victory always arose beforethe enemy: the more so on this account because they saw the coverings ofour towers burnt away, and perceived that we, being exposed, could noteasily go to give assistance, and they themselves were always relievingthe weary with fresh men, and considered that all the safety of Gaulrested on this crisis; there happened in my own view a circumstancewhich, having appeared to be worthy of record, we thought it ought notto be omitted. A certain Gaul before the gate of the town, who wascasting into the fire opposite the turret balls of tallow and fire whichwere passed along to him, was pierced with a dart on the right side andfell dead. One of those next him stepped over him as he lay, anddischarged the same office: when the second man was slain in the samemanner by a wound from a cross-bow, a third succeeded him, and a fourthsucceeded the third: nor was this post left vacant by the besieged, until, the fire of the mound having been extinguished, and the enemyrepulsed in every direction, an end was put to the fighting. 

XXVI. --The Gauls having tried every expedient, as nothing had succeeded, adopted the design of fleeing from the town the next day, by the adviceand order of Vercingetorix. They hoped that, by attempting it at thedead of night, they would effect it without any great loss of men, because the camp of Vercingetorix was not far distant from the town, andthe extensive marsh which intervened was likely to retard the Romans inthe pursuit. And they were now preparing to execute this by night, whenthe matrons suddenly ran out into the streets, and weeping castthemselves at the feet of their husbands, and requested of them, withevery entreaty, that they should not abandon themselves and their commonchildren to the enemy for punishment, because the weakness of theirnature and physical powers prevented them from taking to flight. Whenthey saw that they (as fear does not generally admit of mercy in extremedanger) persisted in their resolution, they began to shout aloud, andgive intelligence of their flight to the Romans. The Gauls beingintimidated by fear of this, lest the passes should be pre-occupied bythe Roman cavalry, desisted from their design. 

XXVII. --The next day Caesar, the tower being advanced, and the workswhich he had determined to raise being arranged, a violent stormarising, thought this no bad time for executing his designs, because heobserved the guards arranged on the walls a little too negligently, andtherefore ordered his own men to engage in their work more remissly, andpointed out what he wished to be done. He drew up his soldiers in asecret position within the vineae, and exhorts them to reap, at least, the harvest of victory proportionate to their exertions. He proposed areward for those who should first scale the walls, and gave the signalto the soldiers. They suddenly flew out from all quarters and quicklyfilled the wall. 

XXVIII. --The enemy being alarmed by the suddenness of the attack, weredislodged from the wall and towers, and drew up, in form of a wedge, inthe market-place and the open streets, with this intention that, if anattack should be made on any side, they should fight with their linedrawn up to receive it. When they saw no one descending to the levelground, and the enemy extending themselves along the entire wall inevery direction, fearing lest every hope of flight should be cut off, they cast away their arms, and sought, without stopping, the most remoteparts of the town. A part was then slain by the infantry when they werecrowding upon one another in the narrow passage of the gates; and a parthaving got without the gates, were cut to pieces by the cavalry: nor wasthere one who was anxious for the plunder. Thus, being excited by themassacre at Genabum and the fatigue of the siege, they spared neitherthose worn out with years, women, or children. Finally, out of all thatnumber, which amounted to about forty thousand, scarcely eight hundred, who fled from the town when they heard the first alarm, reachedVercingetorix in safety: and he, the night being now far spent, receivedthem in silence after their flight (fearing that any sedition shouldarise in the camp from their entrance in a body and the compassion ofthe soldiers), so that, having arranged his friends and the chiefs ofthe states at a distance on the road, he took precautions that theyshould be separated and conducted to their fellow countrymen, towhatever part of the camp had been assigned to each state from thebeginning. 

XXIX. --Vercingetorix having convened an assembly on the following day, consoled and encouraged his soldiers in the following words:--"That theyshould not be too much depressed in spirit, nor alarmed at their loss;that the Romans did not conquer by valour nor in the field, but by akind of art and skill in assault, with which they themselves wereunacquainted; that whoever expected every event in the war to befavourable, erred; that it never was his opinion that Avaricum should bedefended, of the truth of which statement he had themselves aswitnesses, but that it was owing to the imprudence of the Bituriges, andthe too ready compliance of the rest, that this loss was sustained;that, however, he would soon compensate it by superior advantages; forthat he would, by his exertions, bring over those states which severedthemselves from the rest of the Gauls, and would create a generalunanimity throughout the whole of Gaul, the union of which not even thewhole earth could withstand, and that he had it already almost effected;that in the meantime it was reasonable that he should prevail on them, for the sake of the general safety, to begin to fortify their camp, inorder that they might the more easily sustain the sudden attacks of theenemy. "

XXX. --This speech was not disagreeable to the Gauls, principally, because he himself was not disheartened by receiving so severe a loss, and had not concealed himself, nor shunned the eyes of the people: andhe was believed to possess greater foresight and sounder judgment thanthe rest, because, when the affair was undecided, he had at first beenof opinion that Avaricum should be burnt, and afterwards that it shouldbe abandoned. Accordingly, as ill success weakens the authority of othergenerals, so, on the contrary, his dignity increased daily, although aloss was sustained: at the same time they began to entertain hopes, onhis assertion, of uniting the rest of the states to themselves, and onthis occasion, for the first time, the Gauls began to fortify theircamps, and were so alarmed that although they were men unaccustomed totoil, yet they were of opinion that they ought to endure and suffereverything which should be imposed upon them. 

XXXI. --Nor did Vercingetorix use less efforts than he had promised, togain over the other states, and [in consequence] endeavoured to enticetheir leaders by gifts and promises. For this object he selected fittingemissaries by whose subtle pleading or private friendship each of thenobles could be most easily influenced. He takes care that those whofled to him on the storming of Avaricum should be provided with arms andclothes. At the same time, that his diminished forces should berecruited, he levies a fixed quota of soldiers from each state, anddefines the number and day before which he should wish them brought tothe camp, and orders all the archers, of whom there was a very greatnumber in Gaul, to be collected and sent to him. By these means, thetroops which were lost at Avaricum are speedily replaced. In themeantime, Teutomarus, the son of Ollovicon, the king of the Nitiobriges, whose father had received the appellation of friend from our senate, came to him with a great number of his own horse and those whom he hadhired from Aquitania. 

XXXII. --Caesar, after delaying several days at Avaricum, and findingthere the greatest plenty of corn and other provisions, refreshed hisarmy after their fatigue and privation. The winter being almost ended, when he was invited by the favourable season of the year to prosecutethe war and march against the enemy, [and try] whether he could drawthem from the marshes and woods, or else press them by a blockade; somenoblemen of the Aedui came to him as ambassadors to entreat "that in anextreme emergency he should succour their state; that their affairs werein the utmost danger, because, whereas single magistrates had beenusually appointed in ancient times and held the power of king for asingle year, two persons now exercised this office, and each assertedthat he was appointed according to their laws. That one of them wasConvictolitanis, a powerful and illustrious youth; the other Cotus, sprung from a most ancient family, and personally a man of very greatinfluence and extensive connections. His brother Valetiacus had bornethe same office during the last year: that the whole state was up inarms; the senate divided, the people divided; that each of them had hisown adherents; and that, if the animosity would be fomented any longerthe result would be that one part of the state would come to a collisionwith the other; that it rested with his activity and influence toprevent it. "

XXXIII. --Although Caesar considered it ruinous to leave the war and theenemy, yet, being well aware what great evils generally arise frominternal dissensions, lest a state so powerful and so closely connectedwith the Roman people, which he himself had always fostered and honouredin every respect, should have recourse to violence and arms, and thatthe party which had less confidence in its own power should summon aidfrom Vercingetorix, he determined to anticipate this movement; andbecause, by the laws of the Aedui, it was not permitted those who heldthe supreme authority to leave the country, he determined to go inperson to the Aedui, lest he should appear to infringe upon theirgovernment and laws, and summoned all the senate, and those between whomthe dispute was, to meet him at Decetia. When almost all the state hadassembled there, and he was informed that one brother had been declaredmagistrate by the other, when only a few persons were privately summonedfor the purpose, at a different time and place from what he ought, whereas the laws not only forbade two belonging to one family to beelected magistrates while each was alive, but even deterred them frombeing in the senate, he compelled Cotus to resign his office; he orderedConvictolitanis, who had been elected by the priests, according to theusage of the state, in the presence of the magistrates, to hold thesupreme authority. 

XXXIV. --Having pronounced this decree between [the contending parties], he exhorted the Aedui to bury in oblivion their disputes anddissensions, and, laying aside all these things, devote themselves tothe war, and expect from him, on the conquest of Gaul, those rewardswhich they should have earned, and send speedily to him all theircavalry and ten thousand infantry, which he might place in differentgarrisons to protect his convoys of provisions, and then divided hisarmy into two parts: he gave Labienus four legions to lead into thecountry of the Senones and Parisii; and led in person six into thecountry of the Arverni, in the direction of the town of Gergovia, alongthe banks of the Allier. He gave part of the cavalry to Labienus, andkept part to himself. Vercingetorix, on learning this circumstance, broke down all the bridges over the river and began to march on theother bank of the Allier. 

XXXV. --When each army was in sight of the other, and was pitching theircamp almost opposite that of the enemy, scouts being distributed inevery quarter, lest the Romans should build a bridge and bring overtheir troops; it was to Caesar a matter attended with greatdifficulties, lest he should be hindered from passing the river duringthe greater part of the summer, as the Allier cannot generally be fordedbefore the autumn. Therefore, that this might not happen, having pitchedhis camp in a woody place opposite to one of those bridges whichVercingetorix had taken care should be broken down, the next day hestopped behind with two legions in a secret place: he sent on the restof the forces as usual, with all the baggage, after having selected somecohorts, that the number of the legions might appear to be complete. Having ordered these to advance as far as they could, when now, from thetime of day, he conjectured they had come to an encampment, he began torebuild the bridge on the same piles, the lower part of which remainedentire. Having quickly finished the work and led his legions across, heselected a fit place for a camp, and recalled the rest of his troops. Vercingetorix, on ascertaining this fact, went before him by forcedmarches, in order that he might not be compelled to come to an actionagainst his will. 

XXXVI. --Caesar, in five days' march, went from that place to Gergovia, and after engaging in a slight cavalry skirmish that day, on viewing thesituation of the city, which, being built on a very high mountain, wasvery difficult of access, he despaired of taking it by storm, anddetermined to take no measures with regard to besieging it before heshould secure a supply of provisions. But Vercingetorix, having pitchedhis camp on the mountain near the town, placed the forces of each stateseparately and at small intervals around himself, and having occupiedall the hills of that range as far as they commanded a view [of theRoman encampment], he presented a formidable appearance; he ordered therulers of the states, whom he had selected as his council of war, tocome to him daily at the dawn, whether any measure seemed to requiredeliberation or execution. Nor did he allow almost any day to passwithout testing in a cavalry action, the archers being intermixed, whatspirit and valour there was in each of his own men. There was a hillopposite the town, at the very foot of that mountain, strongly fortifiedand precipitous on every side (which if our men could gain, they seemedlikely to exclude the enemy from a great share of their supply of water, and from free foraging; but this place was occupied by them with a weakgarrison): however, Caesar set out from the camp in the silence ofnight, and dislodging the garrison before succour could come from thetown, he got possession of the place and posted two legions there, anddrew from the greater camp to the less a double trench twelve feetbroad, so that the soldiers could even singly pass secure from anysudden attack of the enemy. 

XXXVII. --Whilst these affairs were going on at Gergovia, Convictolitanis, the Aeduan, to whom we have observed the magistracy wasadjudged by Caesar, being bribed by the Arverni, holds a conference withcertain young men, the chief of whom were Litavicus and his brothers, who were born of a most noble family. He shares the bribe with them, andexhorts them to "remember that they were free and born for empire; thatthe state of the Aedui was the only one which retarded the most certainvictory of the Gauls; that the rest were held in check by its authority;and, if it was brought over, the Romans would not have room to stand onin Gaul; that he had received some kindness from Caesar, only so far, however, as gaining a most just cause by his decision; but that heassigned more weight to the general freedom; for, why should the Aeduigo to Caesar to decide concerning their rights and laws, rather than theRomans come to the Aedui?" The young men being easily won over by thespeech of the magistrate and the bribe, when they declared that theywould even be leaders in the plot, a plan for accomplishing it wasconsidered, because they were confident their state could not be inducedto undertake the war on slight grounds. It was resolved that Litavicusshould have the command of the ten thousand which were being sent toCaesar for the war, and should have charge of them on their march, andthat his brothers should go before him to Caesar. They arrange the othermeasures, and the manner in which they should have them done. 

XXXVIII. --Litavicus, having received the command of the army, suddenlyconvened the soldiers, when he was about thirty miles distant fromGergovia, and, weeping, said, "Soldiers, whither are we going? All ourknights and all our nobles have perished. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, the principal men of the state, being accused of treason, have beenslain by the Romans without even permission to plead their cause. Learnthis intelligence from those who have escaped from the massacre; for I, since my brothers and all my relations have been slain, am prevented bygrief from declaring what has taken place. " Persons are brought forwardwhom he had instructed in what he would have them say, and make the samestatements to the soldiery as Litavicus had made: that all the knightsof the Aedui were slain because they were said to have held conferenceswith the Arverni; that they had concealed themselves among the multitudeof soldiers, and had escaped from the midst of the slaughter. The Aeduishout aloud and conjure Litavicus to provide for their safety. "As if, "said he, "it were a matter of deliberation, and not of necessity, for usto go to Gergovia and unite ourselves to the Arverni. Or have we anyreasons to doubt that the Romans, after perpetrating the atrociouscrime, are now hastening to slay us? Therefore, if there be any spiritin us, let us avenge the death of those who have perished in a mostunworthy manner, and let us slay these robbers. " He points to the Romancitizens, who had accompanied them, in reliance on his protection. Heimmediately seizes a great quantity of corn and provisions, cruellytortures them, and then puts them to death, sends messengers throughoutthe entire state of the Aedui, and rouses them completely by the samefalsehood concerning the slaughter of their knights and nobles; heearnestly advises them to avenge, in the same manner as he did, thewrongs which they had received. 

XXXIX. --Eporedorix, the Aeduan, a young man born in the highest rank andpossessing very great influence at home, and, along with Viridomarus, ofequal age and influence, but of inferior birth, whom Caesar had raisedfrom a humble position to the highest rank, on being recommended to himby Divitiacus, had come in the number of horse, being summoned by Caesarby name. These had a dispute with each other for precedence, and in thestruggle between the magistrates they had contended with their utmostefforts, the one for Convictolitanis, the other for Cotus. Of theseEporedorix, on learning the design of Litavicus, lays the matter beforeCaesar almost at midnight; he entreats that Caesar should not suffertheir state to swerve from the alliance with the Roman people, owing tothe depraved counsels of a few young men, which he foresaw would be theconsequence if so many thousand men should unite themselves to theenemy, as their relations could not neglect their safety, nor the stateregard it as a matter of slight importance. 

XL. --Caesar felt great anxiety on this intelligence, because he hadalways especially indulged the state of the Aedui, and, without anyhesitation, draws out from the camp four light-armed legions and all thecavalry: nor had he time, at such a crisis, to contract the camp, because the affair seemed to depend upon despatch. He leaves CaiusFabius, his lieutenant, with two legions to guard the camp. When heordered the brothers of Litavicus to be arrested, he discovers that theyhad fled a short time before to the camp of the enemy. He encouraged hissoldiers "not to be disheartened by the labour of the journey on such anecessary occasion, " and, after advancing twenty-five miles, all beingmost eager, he came in sight of the army of the Aedui, and, by sendingon his cavalry, retards and impedes their march; he then issues strictorders to all his soldiers to kill no one. He commands Eporedorix andViridomarus, who they thought were killed, to move among the cavalry andaddress their friends. When they were recognized and the treachery ofLitavicus discovered, the Aedui began to extend their hands to intimatesubmission, and, laying down their arms, to deprecate death. Litavicus, with his clansmen, who after the custom of the Gauls consider it a crimeto desert their patrons, even in extreme misfortune, flees forth toGergovia. 

XLI. --Caesar, after sending messengers to the state of the Aedui, toinform them that they whom he could have put to death by the right ofwar were spared through his kindness, and after giving three hours ofthe night to his army for his repose, directed his march to Gergovia. Almost in the middle of the journey, a party of horse that were sent byFabius stated in how great danger matters were; they inform him that thecamp was attacked by a very powerful army, while fresh men werefrequently relieving the wearied, and exhausting our soldiers by theincessant toil, since, on account of the size of the camp, they hadconstantly to remain on the rampart; that many had been wounded by theimmense number of arrows and all kinds of missiles; that the engineswere of great service in withstanding them; that Fabius, at theirdeparture, leaving only two gates open, was blocking up the rest, andwas adding breast-works to the ramparts, and was preparing himself for asimilar casualty on the following day. Caesar, after receiving thisinformation, reached the camp before sunrise owing to the very greatzeal of his soldiers. 

XLII. --Whilst these things are going on at Gergovia, the Aedui, onreceiving the first announcements from Litavicus, leave themselves notime to ascertain the truth of these statements. Some are stimulated byavarice, others by revenge and credulity, which is an innate propensityin that race of men to such a degree that they consider a slight rumouras an ascertained fact. They plunder the property of the Roman citizens, and either massacre them or drag them away to slavery. Convictolitanisincreases the evil state of affairs, and goads on the people to fury, that by the commission of some outrage they may be ashamed to return topropriety. They entice from the town of Cabillonus, by a promise ofsafety, Marcus Aristius, a military tribune, who was on his march to hislegion; they compel those who had settled there for the purpose oftrading to do the same. By constantly attacking them on their march theystrip them of all their baggage; they besiege day and night those thatresisted; when many were slain on both sides, they excite a greaternumber to arms. 

XLIII. --In the meantime, when intelligence was brought that all theirsoldiers were in Caesar's power, they run in a body to Aristius; theyassure him that nothing had been done by public authority; they order aninquiry to be made about the plundered property; they confiscate theproperty of Litavicus and his brothers; they send ambassadors to Caesarfor the purpose of clearing themselves. They do all this with a view torecover their soldiers; but being contaminated by guilt, and charmed bythe gains arising from the plundered property, as that act was shared inby many, and being tempted by the fear of punishment, they began to formplans of war and stir up the other states by embassies. Although Caesarwas aware of this proceeding, yet he addresses the ambassadors with asmuch mildness as he can: "That he did not think worse of the state onaccount of the ignorance and fickleness of the mob, nor would diminishhis regard for the Aedui. " He himself, fearing a greater commotion inGaul, in order to prevent his being surrounded by all the states, beganto form plans as to the manner in which he should return from Gergoviaand again concentrate his forces, lest a departure arising from the fearof a revolt should seem like a flight. 

XLIV. --Whilst he was considering these things an opportunity of actingsuccessfully seemed to offer. For, when he had come into the smallercamp for the purpose of securing the works, he noticed that the hill inthe possession of the enemy was stript of men, although, on the formerdays, it could scarcely be seen on account of the numbers on it. Beingastonished, he inquires the reason of it from the deserters, a greatnumber of whom flocked to him daily. They all concurred in asserting, what Caesar himself had already ascertained by his scouts, that the backof that hill was almost level; but likewise woody and narrow, by whichthere was a pass to the other side of the town; that they had seriousapprehensions for this place, and had no other idea, on the occupationof one hill by the Romans, than that, if they should lose the other, they would be almost surrounded, and cut off from all egress andforaging; that they were all summoned by Vercingetorix to fortify thisplace. 

XLV. --Caesar, on being informed of this circumstance, sends severaltroops of horse to the place immediately after midnight; he orders themto range in every quarter with more tumult than usual. At dawn he ordersa large quantity of baggage to be drawn out of the camp, and themuleteers with helmets, in the appearance and guise of horsemen, to rideround the hills. To these he adds a few cavalry, with instructions torange more widely to make a show. He orders them all to seek the samequarter by a long circuit; these proceedings were seen at a distancefrom the town, as Gergovia commanded a view of the camp, nor could theGauls ascertain at so great a distance what certainty there was in themanoeuvre. He sends one legion to the same hill, and after it hadmarched a little, stations it in the lower ground, and conceals it inthe woods. The suspicions of the Gauls are increased, and all theirforces are marched to that place to defend it. Caesar, having perceivedthe camp of the enemy deserted, covers the military insignia of his men, conceals the standards, and transfers his soldiers in small bodies fromthe greater to the less camp, and points out to the lieutenants whom hehad placed in command over the respective legions, what he should wishto be done; he particularly advises them to restrain their men fromadvancing too far, through their desire of fighting, or their hope ofplunder; he sets before them what disadvantages the unfavourable natureof the ground carries with it; that they could be assisted by despatchalone: that success depended on a surprise, and not on a battle. Afterstating these particulars, he gives the signal for action, and detachesthe Aedui at the same time by another ascent an the right. 

XLVI. --The town wall was 1200 paces distant from the plain and foot ofthe ascent, in a straight line, if no gap intervened; whatever circuitwas added to this ascent, to make the hill easy, increased the length ofthe route. But almost in the middle of the hill, the Gauls hadpreviously built a wall six feet high, made of large stones, andextending in length as far as the nature of the ground permitted, as abarrier to retard the advance of our men; and leaving all the lowerspace empty, they had filled the upper part of the hill, as far as thewall of the town, with their camps very close to one another. Thesoldiers, on the signal being given, quickly advance to thisfortification, and passing over it, make themselves masters of theseparate camps. And so great was their activity in taking the camps, that Teutomarus, the king of the Nitiobriges, being suddenly surprisedin his tent, as he had gone to rest at noon, with difficulty escapedfrom the hands of the plunderers, with the upper part of his personnaked, and his horse wounded. 

XLVII. --Caesar, having accomplished the object which he had in view, ordered the signal to be sounded for a retreat; and the soldiers of thetenth legion, by which he was then accompanied, halted. But the soldiersof the other legions, not hearing the sound of the trumpet, becausethere was a very large valley between them, were however kept back bythe tribunes of the soldiers and the lieutenants, according to Caesar'sorders; but being animated by the prospect of speedy victory, and theflight of the enemy, and the favourable battles of former periods, theythought nothing so difficult that their bravery could not accomplish it;nor did they put an end to the pursuit, until they drew nigh to the wallof the town and the gates. But then, when a shout arose in every quarterof the city, those who were at a distance being alarmed by the suddentumult, fled hastily from the town, since they thought that the enemywere within the gates. The matrons begin to cast their clothes andsilver over the wall, and bending over as far as the lower part of thebosom, with outstretched hands beseech the Romans to spare them, and notto sacrifice to their resentment even women and children, as they haddone at Avaricum. Some of them let themselves down from the walls bytheir hands, and surrendered to our soldiers. Lucius Fabius, a centurionof the eighth legion, who, it was ascertained, had said that day amonghis fellow soldiers that he was excited by the plunder of Avaricum, andwould not allow any one to mount the wall before him, finding three menof his own company, and being raised up by them, scaled the wall. Hehimself, in turn, taking hold of them one by one, drew them up to thewall. 

XLVIII. --In the meantime those who had gone to the other part of thetown to defend it, as we have mentioned above, at first, aroused byhearing the shouts, and, afterwards, by frequent accounts that the townwas in possession of the Romans, sent forward their cavalry, andhastened in larger numbers to that quarter. As each first came he stoodbeneath the wall, and increased the number of his countrymen engaged inaction. When a great multitude of them had assembled, the matrons, who alittle before were stretching their hands from the walls to the Romans, began to beseech their countrymen, and after the Gallic fashion to showtheir dishevelled hair, and bring their children into public view. Neither in position nor in numbers was the contest an equal one to theRomans; at the same time, being exhausted by running and the longcontinuation of the fight, they could not easily withstand fresh andvigorous troops. 

XLIX. --Caesar, when he perceived that his soldiers were fighting onunfavourable ground, and that the enemy's forces were increasing, beingalarmed for the safety of his troops, sent orders to Titus Sextius, oneof his lieutenants, whom he had left to guard the smaller camp, to leadout his cohorts quickly from the camp, and post them at the foot of thehill, on the right wing of the enemy; that if he should see our mendriven from the ground, he should deter the enemy from following tooclosely. He himself, advancing with the legion a little from that placewhere he had taken his post, awaited the issue of the battle. 

L. --While the fight was going on most vigorously, hand to hand, and theenemy depended on their position and numbers, our men on their bravery, the Aedui suddenly appeared on our exposed flank, as Caesar had sentthem by another ascent on the right, for the sake of creating adiversion. These, from the similarity of their arms, greatly terrifiedour men; and although they were discovered to have their right shouldersbare, which was usually the sign of those reduced to peace, yet thesoldiers suspected that this very thing was done by the enemy to deceivethem. At the same time Lucius Fabius the centurion, and those who hadscaled the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were cast from thewall. Marcus Petreius, a centurion of the same legion, after attemptingto hew down the gates, was overpowered by numbers, and, despairing ofhis safety, having already received many wounds, said to the soldiers ofhis own company who followed him: "Since I cannot save you as well asmyself, I shall at least provide for your safety, since I allured by thelove of glory, led you into this danger, do you save yourselves when anopportunity is given. " At the same time he rushed into the midst of theenemy, and slaying two of them, drove back the rest a little from thegate. When his men attempted to aid him, "In vain, " he says, "youendeavour to procure my safety since blood and strength are now failingme, therefore leave this, while you have the opportunity, and retreat tothe legion. " Thus he fell fighting a few moments after, and saved hismen by his own death. 

LI. --Our soldiers, being hard pressed on every side, were dislodged fromtheir position, with the loss of forty-six centurions; but the tenthlegion, which had been posted in reserve on ground a little more level, checked the Gauls in their eager pursuit. It was supported by thecohorts of the thirteenth legion, which, being led from the smallercamp, had, under the command of Titus Sextius, occupied the higherground. The legions, as soon as they reached the plain, halted and facedthe enemy. Vercingetorix led back his men from the part of the hillwithin the fortifications. On that day little less than seven hundred ofthe soldiers were missing. 

LII. --On the next day, Caesar, having called a meeting, censured therashness and avarice of his soldiers, "In that they had judged forthemselves how far they ought to proceed, or what they ought to do, andcould not be kept back by the tribunes of the soldiers and thelieutenants;" and stated, "what the disadvantage of the ground couldeffect, what opinion he himself had entertained at Avaricum, when havingsurprised the enemy without either general or cavalry, he had given up acertain victory, lest even a trifling loss should occur in the contestowing to the disadvantage of position. That as much as he admired thegreatness of their courage, since neither the fortifications of thecamp, nor the height of the mountain, nor the wall of the town couldretard them; in the same degree he censured their licentiousness andarrogance, because they thought that they knew more than their generalconcerning victory, and the issue of actions: and that he required inhis soldiers forbearance and self-command, not less than valour andmagnanimity. "

LIII. --Having held this assembly, and having encouraged the soldiers atthe conclusion of his speech, "That they should not be dispirited onthis account, nor attribute to the valour of the enemy what thedisadvantage of position had caused;" entertaining the same views of hisdeparture that he had previously had, he led forth the legions from thecamp, and drew up his army in order of battle in a suitable place. WhenVercingetorix, nevertheless, would not descend to the level ground, aslight cavalry action, and that a successful one, having taken place, heled back his army into the camp. When he had done this, the next day, thinking that he had done enough to lower the pride of the Gauls, and toencourage the minds of his soldiers, he moved his camp in the directionof the Aedui. The enemy not even then pursuing us, on the third day herepaired the bridge over the river Allier, and led over his whole army. 

LIV. --Having then held an interview with Viridomarus and Eporedorix theAeduans, he learns that Litavicus had set out with all the cavalry toraise the Aedui; that it was necessary that they too should go beforehim to confirm the state in their allegiance. Although he now sawdistinctly the treachery of the Aedui in many things, and was of opinionthat the revolt of the entire state would be hastened by theirdeparture; yet he thought that they should not be detained, lest heshould appear either to offer an insult, or betray some suspicion offear. He briefly states to them when departing his services towards theAedui: in what a state and how humbled he had found them, driven intotheir towns, deprived of their lands, stripped of all their forces, atribute imposed on them, and hostages wrested from them with the utmostinsult; and to what condition and to what greatness he had raised them, [so much so] that they had not only recovered their former position, butseemed to surpass the dignity and influence of all the previous eras oftheir history. After giving these admonitions he dismissed them. 

LV. --Noviodunum was a town of the Aedui, advantageously situated on thebanks of the Loire. Caesar had conveyed hither all the hostages of Gaul, the corn, public money, a great part of his own baggage and that of hisarmy; he had sent hither a great number of horses, which he hadpurchased in Italy and Spain on account of this war. When Eporedorix andViridomarus came to this place, and received information of thedisposition of the state, that Litavicus had been admitted by the Aeduiinto Bibracte, which is a town of the greatest importance among them, that Convictolitanis the chief magistrate and a great part of the senatehad gone to meet him, that ambassadors had been publicly sent toVercingetorix to negotiate a peace and alliance; they thought that sogreat an opportunity ought not to be neglected. Therefore, having put tothe sword the garrison of Noviodunum and those who had assembled therefor the purpose of trading or were on their march, they divided themoney and horses among themselves; they took care that the hostages ofthe [different] states should be brought to Bibracte, to the chiefmagistrate; they burnt the town to prevent its being of any service tothe Romans, as they were of opinion that they could not hold it; theycarried away in their vessels whatever corn they could in the hurry;they destroyed the remainder, by [throwing it] into the river or settingit on fire; they themselves began to collect forces from theneighbouring country, to place guards and garrisons in differentpositions along the banks of the Loire, and to display the cavalry onall sides to strike terror into the Romans, [to try] if they could cutthem off from a supply of provisions. In which expectation they weremuch aided, from the circumstance that the Loire had swollen to such adegree from the melting of the snows, that it did not seem capable ofbeing forded at all. 

LVI. --Caesar on being informed of these movements was of opinion that heought to make haste, even if he should run some risk in completing thebridges, in order that he might engage before greater forces of theenemy should be collected in that place. For no one even then consideredit an absolutely necessary act, that changing his design he shoulddirect his march into the Province, both because the infamy and disgraceof the thing, and the intervening mount Cevennes, and the difficulty ofthe roads prevented him; and especially because he had seriousapprehensions for the safety of Labienus whom he had detached, and thoselegions whom he had sent with him. Therefore, having made very longmarches by day and night, he came to the river Loire, contrary to theexpectation of all; and having by means of the cavalry found out a ford, suitable enough considering the emergency, of such depth that their armsand shoulders could be above water for supporting their accoutrements, he dispersed his cavalry in such a manner as to break the force of thecurrent, and having confounded the enemy at the first sight, led hisarmy across the river in safety; and finding corn and cattle in thefields, after refreshing his army with them, he determined to march intothe country of the Senones. 

LVII. --Whilst these things are being done by Caesar, Labienus, leavingat Agendicum the recruits who had lately arrived from Italy, to guardthe baggage, marches with four legions to Lutetia (which is a town ofthe Parisii, situated on an island of the river Seine), whose arrivalbeing discovered by the enemy, numerous forces arrived from theneighbouring states. The supreme command is entrusted to Camulogenus, one of the Aulerci, who, although almost worn out with age, was calledto that honour on account of his extraordinary knowledge of militarytactics. He, when he observed that there was a large marsh whichcommunicated with the Seine, and rendered all that country impassable, encamped there, and determined to prevent our troops from passing it. 

LVIII. --Labienus at first attempted to raise vineae, fill up the marshwith hurdles and clay, and secure a road. After he perceived that thiswas too difficult to accomplish, he issued in silence from his camp atthe third watch, and reached Melodunum by the same route by which hecame. This is a town of the Senones, situated on an island in the Seine, as we have just before observed of Lutetia. Having seized upon aboutfifty ships and quickly joined them together, and having placed soldiersin them, he intimidated by his unexpected arrival the inhabitants, ofwhom a great number had been called out to the war, and obtainspossession of the town without a contest. Having repaired the bridge, which the enemy had broken down during the preceding days, he led overhis army, and began to march along the banks of the river to Lutetia. The enemy, on learning the circumstance from those who had escaped fromMelodunum, set fire to Lutetia, and order the bridges of that town to bebroken down: they themselves set out from the marsh, and take theirposition on the banks of the Seine, over against Lutetia and oppositethe camp of Labienus. 

LIX. --Caesar was now reported to have departed from Gergovia;intelligence was likewise brought to them concerning the revolt of theAedui, and a successful rising in Gaul; and that Caesar, having beenprevented from prosecuting his journey and crossing the Loire, andhaving been compelled by the want of corn, had marched hastily to theprovince. But the Bellovaci, who had been previously disaffected ofthemselves, on learning the revolt of the Aedui, began to assembleforces and openly to prepare for war; Then Labienus, as the change inaffairs was so great, thought that he must adopt a very different systemfrom what he had previously intended, and he did not now think of makingany new acquisitions, or of provoking the enemy to an action; but thathe might bring back his army safe to Agendicum. For, on one side, theBellovaci, a state which held the highest reputation for prowess inGaul, were pressing on him; and Camulogenus, with a disciplined andwell-equipped army, held the other side; moreover, a very great riverseparated and cut off the legions from the garrison and baggage. He sawthat, in consequence of such great difficulties being thrown in his way, he must seek aid from his own energy of disposition. 

LX. --Having, therefore, called a council of war a little before evening, he exhorted his soldiers to execute with diligence and energy suchcommands as he should give; he assigns the ships which he had broughtfrom Melodunum to Roman knights, one to each, and orders them to falldown the river silently for four miles, at the end of the fourth watch, and there wait for him. He leaves the five cohorts, which he consideredto be the most steady in action, to guard the camp; he orders the fiveremaining cohorts of the same legion to proceed a little after midnightup the river with all their baggage, in a great tumult. He collects alsosome small boats; and sends them in the same direction, with orders tomake a loud noise in rowing. He himself, a little after, marched out insilence, and, at the head of three legions, seeks that place to which hehad ordered the ships to be brought. 

LXI. --When he had arrived there, the enemy's scouts, as they werestationed along every part of the river, not expecting an attack, because a great storm had suddenly arisen, were surprised by oursoldiers: the infantry and cavalry are quickly transported, under thesuperintendence of the Roman knights, whom he had appointed to thatoffice. Almost at the same time, a little before daylight, intelligencewas given to the enemy that there was an unusual tumult in the camp ofthe Romans, and that a strong force was marching up the river, and thatthe sound of oars was distinctly heard in the same quarter, and thatsoldiers were being conveyed across in ships a little below. On hearingthese things, because they were of opinion that the legions were passingin three different places, and that the entire army, being terrified bythe revolt of the Aedui, were preparing for flight, they divided theirforces also into three divisions. For leaving a guard opposite to thecamp and sending a small body in the direction of Metiosedum, withorders to advance as far as the ships would proceed, they led the restof their troops against Labienus. 

LXII. --By day-break all our soldiers were brought across and the army ofthe enemy was in sight. Labienus, having encouraged his soldiers "toretain the memory of their ancient valour, and so many most successfulactions, and imagine Caesar himself, under whose command they had sooften routed the enemy, to be present, " gives the signal for action. Atthe first onset the enemy are beaten and put to flight in the rightwing, where the seventh legion stood: on the left wing, which positionthe twelfth legion held, although the first ranks fell transfixed by thejavelins of the Romans, yet the rest resisted most bravely; nor did anyone of them show the slightest intention of flying. Camulogenus, thegeneral of the enemy, was present and encouraged his troops. But whenthe issue of the victory was still uncertain, and the circumstanceswhich were taking place on the left wing were announced to the tribunesof the seventh legion, they faced about their legion to the enemy's rearand attacked it: not even then did any one retreat, but all weresurrounded and slain. Camulogenus met the same fate. But those who wereleft as a guard opposite the camp of Labienus, when they heard that thebattle was commenced, marched to aid their countrymen and takepossession of a hill, but were unable to withstand the attack of thevictorious soldiers. In this manner, mixed with their own fugitives, such as the woods and mountains did not shelter were cut to pieces byour cavalry. When this battle was finished, Labienus returns toAgendicum, where the baggage of the whole army had been left: from it hemarched with all his forces to Caesar. 

LXIII. --The revolt of the Aedui being known, the war grows moredangerous. Embassies are sent by them in all directions: as far as theycan prevail by influence, authority, or money, they strive to excite thestate [to revolt]. Having got possession of the hostages whom Caesar haddeposited with them, they terrify the hesitating by putting them todeath. The Aedui request Vercingetorix to come to them and communicatehis plans of conducting the war. On obtaining this request they insistthat the chief command should be assigned to them; and when the affairbecame a disputed question, a council of all Gaul is summoned toBibracte. They come together in great numbers and from every quarter tothe same place. The decision is left to the votes of the mass: all to aman approve of Vercingetorix as their general. The Remi, Lingones, andTreviri were absent from this meeting; the two former because theyattached themselves to the alliance of Rome; the Treviri because theywere very remote and were hard pressed by the Germans; which was alsothe reason of their being absent during the whole war, and their sendingauxiliaries to neither party. The Aedui are highly indignant at beingdeprived of the chief command; they lament the change of fortune, andmiss Caesar's indulgence towards them; however, after engaging in thewar, they do not dare to pursue their own measures apart from the rest. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, youths of the greatest promise, submitreluctantly to Vercingetorix. 

LXIV. --The latter demands hostages from the remaining states: nay, more, appointed a day for this proceeding; he orders all the cavalry, fifteenthousand in number, to quickly assemble here; he says that he will becontent with the infantry which he had before, and would not temptfortune nor come to a regular engagement; but since he had abundance ofcavalry, it would be very easy for him to prevent the Romans fromobtaining forage or corn, provided that they themselves shouldresolutely destroy their corn and set fire to their houses, by whichsacrifice of private property they would evidently obtain perpetualdominion and freedom. After arranging these matters he levies tenthousand infantry on the Aedui and Segusiani, who border on ourprovince: to these he adds eight hundred horse. He sets over them thebrother of Eporedorix, and orders him to wage war against theAllobroges. On the other side he sends the Gabali and the nearestcantons of the Arverni against the Helvii; he likewise sends the Ruteniand Cadurci to lay waste the territories of the Volcae Arecomici. Besides, by secret messages and embassies, he tampers with theAllobroges, whose minds, he hopes, had not yet settled down after theexcitement of the late war. To their nobles he promises money, and totheir state the dominion of the whole province. 

LXV. --The only guards provided against all these contingencies weretwenty-two cohorts, which were collected from the entire province byLucius Caesar, the lieutenant, and opposed to the enemy in everyquarter. The Helvii, voluntarily engaging in battle with theirneighbours, are defeated, and Caius Valerius Donotaurus, the son ofCaburus, the principal man of the state, and several others, beingslain, they are forced to retire within their towns and fortifications. The Allobroges, placing guards along the course of the Rhine, defendtheir frontiers with great vigilance and energy. Caesar, as he perceivedthat the enemy were superior in cavalry, and he himself could receive noaid from the province or Italy, while all communication was cut off, sends across the Rhine into Germany to those states which he had subduedin the preceding campaigns, and summons from them cavalry and thelight-armed infantry, who were accustomed to engage among them. On theirarrival, as they were mounted on unserviceable horses, he takes horsesfrom the military tribunes and the rest, nay, even from the Romanknights and veterans, and distributes them among the Germans. 

LXVI. --In the meantime, whilst these things are going on, the forces ofthe enemy from the Arverni, and the cavalry which had been demanded fromall Gaul, meet together. A great number of these having been collected, when Caesar was marching into the country of the Sequani, through theconfines of the Lingones, in order that he might the more easily renderaid to the province, Vercingetorix encamped in three camps, about tenmiles from the Romans: and having summoned the commanders of the cavalryto a council, he shows that the time of victory was come; that theRomans were fleeing into the province and leaving Gaul; that this wassufficient for obtaining immediate freedom; but was of little moment inacquiring peace and tranquillity for the future; for the Romans wouldreturn after assembling greater forces, and would not put an end to thewar; Therefore they should attack them on their march, when encumbered. If the infantry should [be obliged to] relieve their cavalry, and beretarded by doing so, the march could not be accomplished: if, abandoning their baggage, they should provide for their safety (a resultwhich, he trusted, was more likely to ensue), they would lose bothproperty and character. For as to the enemy's horse, they ought not toentertain a doubt that none of them would dare to advance beyond themain body. In order that they [the Gauls] may do so with greater spirit, he would marshal all their forces before the camp, and intimidate theenemy. The cavalry unanimously shout out, "That they ought to bindthemselves by a most sacred oath, that he should not be received under aroof, nor have access to his children, parents, or wife, who shall nottwice have ridden through the enemy's army. " LXVII. --This proposalreceiving general approbation, and all being forced to take the oath, onthe next day the cavalry were divided into three parts, and two of thesedivisions made a demonstration on our two flanks; while one in frontbegan to obstruct our march. On this circumstance being announced, Caesar orders his cavalry also to form three divisions and charge theenemy. Then the action commences simultaneously in every part: the mainbody halts; the baggage is received within the ranks of the legions. Ifour men seemed to be distressed, or hard pressed in any quarter, Caesarusually ordered the troops to advance, and the army to wheel round inthat quarter; which conduct retarded the enemy in the pursuit, andencouraged our men by the hope of support. At length the Germans, on theright wing, having gained the top of the hill, dislodge the enemy fromtheir position and pursue them even as far as the river at whichVercingetorix with the infantry was stationed, and slay several of them. The rest, on observing this action, fearing lest they should besurrounded, betake themselves to flight. A slaughter ensues in everydirection, and three of the noblest of the Audi are taken and brought toCaesar: Cotus, the commander of the cavalry, who had been engaged in thecontest with Convictolitanis the last election, Cavarillus, who had heldthe command of the infantry after the revolt of Litavicus, andEporedorix, under whose command the Aedui had engaged in war against theSequani, before the arrival of Caesar. 

LXVIII. --All his cavalry being routed, Vercingetorix led back his troopsin the same order as he had arranged them before the camp, andimmediately began to march to Alesia, which is a town of the Mandubii;and ordered the baggage to be speedily brought forth from the camp, andfollow him closely. Caesar, having conveyed his baggage to the nearesthill, and having left two legions to guard it, pursued as far as thetime of day would permit, and after slaying about three thousand of therear of the enemy, encamped at Alesia on the next day. On reconnoitringthe situation of the city, finding that the enemy were panic-stricken, because the cavalry in which they placed their chief reliance werebeaten, he encouraged his men to endure the toil, and began to draw aline of circumvallation round Alesia. 

LXIX. --The town itself was situated on the top of a hill, in a verylofty position, so that it did not appear likely to be taken, except bya regular siege. Two rivers, on two different sides, washed the foot ofthe hill. Before the town lay a plain of about three miles in length; onevery other side hills at a moderate distance, and of an equal degree ofheight, surrounded the town. The army of the Gauls had filled all thespace under the wall, comprising the part of the hill which looked tothe rising sun, and had drawn in front a trench and a stone wall sixfeet high. The circuit of that fortification, which was commenced by theRomans, comprised eleven miles. The camp was pitched in a strongposition, and twenty-three redoubts were raised in it, in whichsentinels were placed by day, lest any sally should be made suddenly;and by night the same were occupied by watches and strong guards. 

LXX. -The work having been begun, a cavalry action ensues in that plain, which we have already described as broken by hills, and extending threemiles in length. The contest is maintained on both sides with the utmostvigour; Caesar sends the Germans to aid our troops when distressed, anddraws up the legions in front of the camp, lest any sally should besuddenly made by the enemy's infantry. The courage of our men isincreased by the additional support of the legions; the enemy being putto flight, hinder one another by their numbers, and as only the narrowergates were left open, are crowded together in them; then the Germanspursue them with vigour even to the fortifications. A great slaughterensues; some leave their horses, and endeavour to cross the ditch andclimb the wall. Caesar orders the legions which he had drawn up in frontof the rampart to advance a little. The Gauls, who were within thefortifications, were no less panic-stricken, thinking that the enemywere coming that moment against them, and unanimously shout "to arms;"some in their alarm rush into the town; Vercingetorix orders the gatesto be shut, lest the camp should be left undefended. The Germansretreat, after slaying many and taking several horses. 

LXXI. --Vercingetorix adopts the design of sending away all his cavalryby night, before the fortifications should be completed by the Romans. He charges them when departing "that each of them should go to hisrespective state, and press for the war all who were old enough to beararms; he states his own Merits, and conjures them to consider hissafety, and not surrender him, who had deserved so well of the generalfreedom, to the enemy for torture; he points out to them that, if theyshould be remiss, eighty thousand chosen men would perish with him;that, upon making a calculation, he had barely corn for thirty days, butcould hold out a little longer by economy. " After giving theseinstructions he silently dismisses the cavalry in the second watch, [onthat side] where our works were not completed; he orders all the corn tobe brought to himself; he ordains capital punishment to such as shouldnot obey; he distributes among them, man by man, the cattle, greatquantities of which had been driven there by the Mandubii; he began tomeasure out the corn sparingly, and by little and little; he receivesinto the town all the forces which he had posted in front of it. In thismanner he prepares to await the succours from Gaul, and carry on thewar. 

LXXII. --Caesar, on learning these proceedings from the deserters andcaptives, adopted the following system of fortification; he dug a trenchtwenty feet deep, with perpendicular sides, in such a manner that thebase of this trench should extend so far as the edges were apart at thetop. He raised all his other works at a distance of four hundred feetfrom that ditch; [he did] that with this intention, lest (since henecessarily embraced so extensive an area, and the whole works could notbe easily surrounded by a line of soldiers) a large number of the enemyshould suddenly, or by night, sally against the fortifications; or lestthey should by day cast weapons against our men while occupied with theworks. Having left this interval, he drew two trenches fifteen feetbroad, and of the same depth; the innermost of them, being in low andlevel ground, he filled with water conveyed from the river. Behind thesehe raised a rampart and wall twelve feet high: to this he added aparapet and battlements, with large stakes cut like stags' horns, projecting from the junction of the parapet and battlements, to preventthe enemy from scaling it, and surrounded the entire work with turrets, which were eighty feet distant from one another. 

LXXIII. --It was necessary, at one and the same time, to procure timber[for the rampart], lay in supplies of corn, and raise also extensivefortifications, and the available troops were in consequence of thisreduced in number, since they used to advance to some distance from thecamp, and sometimes the Gauls endeavoured to attack our works, and tomake a sally from the town by several gates and in great force. On whichCaesar thought that further additions should be made to these works, inorder that the fortifications might be defensible by a small number ofsoldiers. Having, therefore, cut down the trunks of trees or very thickbranches, and having stripped their tops of the bark, and sharpened theminto a point, he drew a continued trench everywhere five feet deep. These stakes being sunk into this trench, and fastened firmly at thebottom, to prevent the possibility of their being torn up, had theirbranches only projecting from the ground. There were five rows inconnection with, and intersecting each other; and whoever entered withinthem were likely to impale themselves on very sharp stakes. The soldierscalled these "cippi. " Before these, which were arranged in oblique rowsin the form of a quincunx, pits three feet deep were dug, whichgradually diminished in depth to the bottom. In these pits taperingstakes, of the thickness of a man's thigh, sharpened at the top andhardened in the fire, were sunk in such a manner as to project from theground not more than four inches; at the same time for the purpose ofgiving them strength and stability, they were each filled with trampledclay to the height of one foot from the bottom: the rest of the pit wascovered over with osiers and twigs, to conceal the deceit. Eight rows ofthis kind were dug, and were three feet distant from each other. Theycalled this a lily from its resemblance to that flower. Stakes a footlong, with iron hooks attached to them, were entirely sunk in the groundbefore these, and were planted in every place at small intervals; thesethey called spurs. 

LXXIV. --After completing these works, having selected as level ground ashe could, considering the nature of the country, and having enclosed anarea of fourteen miles, he constructed, against an external enemy, fortifications of the same kind in every respect, and separate fromthese, so that the guards of the fortifications could not be surroundedeven by immense numbers, if such a circumstance should take place owingto the departure of the enemy's cavalry; and in order that the Romansoldiers might not be compelled to go out of the camp with great risk, he orders all to provide forage and corn for thirty days. 

LXXV. --Whilst those things are carried on at Alesia, the Gauls, havingconvened a council of their chief nobility, determine that all who couldbear arms should not be called out, which was the opinion ofVercingetorix, but that a fixed number should be levied from each state;lest, when so great a multitude assembled together, they could neithergovern nor distinguish their men, nor have the means of supplying themwith corn. They demand thirty-five thousand men from the Aedui and theirdependents, the Segusiani, Ambivareti, and Aulerci Brannovices; an equalnumber from the Arverni in conjunction with the Eleuteti Cadurci, Gabali, and Velauni, who were accustomed to be under the command of theArverni; twelve thousand each from the Senones, Sequani, Bituriges, Santones, Ruteni, and Carnutes; ten thousand from the Bellovaci; thesame number from the Lemovici; eight thousand each from the Pictones, and Turoni, and Parisii, and Helvii; five thousand each from theSuessiones, Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, andNitiobriges; the same number from the Aulerci Cenomani; four thousandfrom the Atrebates; three thousand each from the Bellocassi, Lexovii, and Aulerci Eburovices; thirty thousand from the Rauraci, and Boii; sixthousand, from all the states together which border on the Atlantic, andwhich in their dialect are called Armoricae (in which number arecomprehended the Curisolites, Rhedones, Ambibari, Caltes, Osismii, Lemovices, Veneti, and Unelli). Of these the Bellovaci did notcontribute their number, as they said that they would wage war againstthe Romans on their own account, and at their own discretion, and wouldnot obey the order of any one: however, at the request of Commius, theysent two thousand, in consideration of a tie of hospitality whichsubsisted between him and them. 

LXXVI. --Caesar had, as we have previously narrated, availed himself ofthe faithful and valuable services of this Commius, in Britain, informer years: in consideration of which merits he had exempted fromtaxes his [Commius's] state, and had conferred on Commius himself thecountry of the Morini. Yet such was the unanimity of the Gauls inasserting their freedom, and recovering their ancient renown in war, that they were influenced neither by favours, nor by the recollection ofprivate friendship; and all earnestly directed their energies andresources to that war, and collected eight thousand cavalry, and abouttwo hundred and forty thousand infantry. These were reviewed in thecountry of the Aedui, and a calculation was made of their numbers:commanders were appointed: the supreme command is entrusted to Commiusthe Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Eporedorix the Aeduans, andVergasillaunus the Arvernian, the cousin-german of Vercingetorix. Tothem are assigned men selected from each state, by whose advice the warshould be conducted. All march to Alesia, sanguine and full ofconfidence: nor was there a single individual who imagined that theRomans could withstand the sight of such an immense host: especially inan action carried on both in front and rear, when [on the inside] thebesieged would sally from the town and attack the enemy, and on theoutside so great forces of cavalry and infantry would be seen. 

LXXVII. --But those who were blockaded at Alesia, the day being past onwhich they had expected auxiliaries from their countrymen, and all theircorn being consumed, ignorant of what was going on among the Aedui, convened an assembly and deliberated on the exigency of their situation. After various opinions had been expressed among them, some of whichproposed a surrender, others a sally, whilst their strength wouldsupport it, the speech of Critognatus ought not to be omitted for itssingular and detestable cruelty. He sprung from the noblest family amongthe Arverni, and possessing great influence, says, "I shall pay noattention to the opinion of those who call a most disgraceful surrenderby the name of a capitulation; nor do I think that they ought to beconsidered as citizens, or summoned to the council. My business is withthose who approve of a sally: in whose advice the memory of our ancientprowess seems to dwell in the opinion of you all. To be unable to bearprivation for a short time is disgraceful cowardice, not true valour. Those who voluntarily offer themselves to death are more easily foundthan those who would calmly endure distress. And I would approve of thisopinion (for honour is a powerful motive with me), could I foresee noother loss, save that of life: but let us, in adopting our design, lookback on all Gaul, which we have stirred up to our aid. What courage doyou think would our relatives and friends have, if eighty thousand menwere butchered in one spot, supposing that they should be forced to cometo an action almost over our corpses? Do not utterly deprive them ofyour aid, for they have spurned all thoughts of personal danger onaccount of your safety; nor by your folly, rashness, and cowardice, crush all Gaul and doom it to an eternal slavery. Do you doubt theirfidelity and firmness because they have not come at the appointed day?What then? Do you suppose that the Romans are employed every day in theouter fortifications for mere amusement? If you cannot be assured bytheir despatches, since every avenue is blocked up, take the Romans asevidence that their approach is drawing near; since they, intimidated byalarm at this, labour night and day at their works. What, therefore, ismy design? To do as our ancestors did in the war against the Cimbri andTeutones, which was by no means equally momentous; who, when driven intotheir towns, and oppressed by similar privations, supported life by thecorpses of those who appeared useless for war on account of their age, and did not surrender to the enemy: and even if we had not a precedentfor such cruel conduct, still I should consider it most glorious thatone should be established, and delivered to posterity. For in what wasthat war like this? The Cimbri, after laying Gaul waste, and inflictinggreat calamities, at length departed from our country, and sought otherlands; they left us our rights, laws, lands, and liberty. But what othermotive or wish have the Romans, than, induced by envy, to settle in thelands and states of those whom they have learned by fame to be noble andpowerful in war, and impose on them perpetual slavery? For they neverhave carried on wars on any other terms. But if you know not thesethings which are going on in distant countries, look to the neighbouringGaul, which being reduced to the form of a province, stripped of itsrights and laws, and subjected to Roman despotism, is oppressed byperpetual slavery. "

LXXVIII. --When different opinions were expressed, they determined thatthose who, owing to age or ill health, were unserviceable for war, should depart from the town, and that themselves should try everyexpedient before they had recourse to the advice of Critognatus:however, that they would rather adopt that design, if circumstancesshould compel them and their allies should delay, than accept any termsof a surrender or peace. The Mandubii, who had admitted them into thetown, are compelled to go forth with their wives and children. Whenthese came to the Roman fortifications, weeping, they begged of thesoldiers by every entreaty to receive them as slaves and relieve themwith food. But Caesar, placing guards on the rampart, forbade them to beadmitted. 

LXXIX. --In the meantime, Commius and the rest of the leaders, to whomthe supreme command had been intrusted, came with all their forces toAlesia, and having occupied the entire hill, encamp not more than a milefrom our fortifications. The following day, having led forth theircavalry from the camp, they fill all that plain, which, we have related, extended three miles in length, and draw out their infantry a littlefrom that place, and post them on the higher ground. The town Alesiacommanded a view of the whole plain. The besieged run together whenthese auxiliaries were seen; mutual congratulations ensue, and the mindsof all are elated with joy. Accordingly, drawing out their troops, theyencamp before the town, and cover the nearest trench with hurdles andfill it up with earth, and make ready for a sally and every casualty. 

LXXX. --Caesar, having stationed his army on both sides of thefortifications, in order that, if occasion should arise, each shouldhold and know his own post, orders the cavalry to issue forth from thecamp and commence action. There was a commanding view from the entirecamp, which occupied a ridge of hills; and the minds of all the soldiersanxiously awaited the issue of the battle. The Gauls had scatteredarchers and light-armed infantry here and there, among their cavalry, togive relief to their retreating troops, and sustain the impetuosity ofour cavalry. Several of our soldiers were unexpectedly wounded by these, and left the battle. When the Gauls were confident that their countrymenwere the conquerors in the action, and beheld our men hard pressed bynumbers, both those who were hemmed in by the line of circumvallationand those who had come to aid them, supported the spirits of their menby shouts and yells from every quarter. As the action was carried on insight of all, neither a brave nor cowardly act could be concealed; boththe desire of praise and the fear of ignominy, urged on each party tovalour. After fighting from noon almost to sunset, without victoryinclining in favour of either, the Germans, on one side, made a chargeagainst the enemy in a compact body, and drove them back; and, when theywere put to flight, the archers were surrounded and cut to pieces. Inother parts, likewise, our men pursued to the camp the retreating enemy, and did not give them an opportunity of rallying. But those who had comeforth from Alesia returned into the town dejected and almost despairingof success. 

LXXXI. --The Gauls, after the interval of a day, and after making, duringthat time, an immense number of hurdles, scaling ladders, and ironhooks, silently went forth from the camp at midnight and approached thefortifications in the plain. Raising a shout suddenly, that by thisintimation those who were besieged in the town might learn theirarrival, they began to cast down hurdles and dislodge our men from therampart by slings, arrows, and stones, and executed the other movementswhich are requisite in storming. At the same time, Vercingetorix havingheard the shout, gives the signal to his troops by a trumpet, and leadsthem forth from the town. Our troops, as each man's post had beenassigned him some days before, man the fortifications; they intimidatethe Gauls by slings, large stones, stakes which they had placed alongthe works, and bullets. All view being prevented by the darkness, manywounds are received on both sides; several missiles are thrown from theengines. But Marcus Antonius, and Caius Trebonius, the lieutenants, towhom the defence of these parts had been allotted, draughted troops fromthe redoubts which were more remote, and sent them to aid our troops, inwhatever direction they understood that they were hard pressed. 

LXXXII. --Whilst the Gauls were at a distance from the fortification, they did more execution, owing to the immense number of their weapons:after they came nearer, they either unawares empaled themselves on thespurs, or were pierced by the mural darts from the ramparts and towers, and thus perished. After receiving many wounds on all sides, and havingforced no part of the works, when day drew nigh, fearing lest theyshould be surrounded by a sally made from the higher camp on the exposedflank, they retreated to their countrymen. But those within, whilst theybring forward those things which had been prepared by Vercingetorix fora sally, fill up the nearest trenches; having delayed a long time inexecuting these movements, they learned the retreat of their countrymenbefore they drew nigh to the fortifications. Thus they returned to thetown without accomplishing their object. 

LXXXIII. --The Gauls, having been twice repulsed with great loss, consultwhat they should do: they avail themselves of the information of thosewho were well acquainted with the country; from them they ascertain theposition and fortification of the upper camp. There was, on the northside, a hill, which our men could not include in their works, on accountof the extent of the circuit, and had necessarily made their camp inground almost disadvantageous, and pretty steep. Caius AntistiusReginus, and Caius Caninius Rebilus, two of the lieutenants, with twolegions, were in possession of this camp. The leaders of the enemy, having reconnoitred the country by their scouts, select from the entirearmy sixty thousand men; belonging to those states which bear thehighest character for courage: they privately arrange among themselveswhat they wished to be done, and in what manner; they decide that theattack should take place when it should seem to be noon. They appointover their forces Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, one of the fourgenerals, and a near relative of Vercingetorix. He, having issued fromthe camp at the first watch, and having almost completed his march alittle before the dawn, hid himself behind the mountain, and ordered hissoldiers to refresh themselves after their labour during the night. Whennoon now seemed to draw nigh, he marched hastily against that camp whichwe have mentioned before; and, at the same time, the cavalry began toapproach the fortifications in the plain, and the rest of the forces tomake a demonstration in front of the camp. 

LXXXIV. --Vercingetorix, having beheld his countrymen from the citadel ofAlesia, issues forth from the town; he brings forth from the camp longhooks, movable pent-houses, mural hooks, and other things, which he hadprepared for the purpose of making a sally. They engage on all sides atonce, and every expedient is adopted. They flocked to whatever part ofthe works seemed weakest. The army of the Romans is distributed alongtheir extensive lines, and with difficulty meets the enemy in everyquarter. The shouts which were raised by the combatants in their rear, had a great tendency to intimidate our men, because they perceived thattheir danger rested on the valour of others: for generally all evilswhich are distant most powerfully alarm men's minds. 

LXXXV. --Caesar, having selected a commanding situation, sees distinctlywhatever is going on in every quarter, and sends assistance to histroops when hard pressed. The idea uppermost in the minds of bothparties is, that the present is the time in which they would have thefairest opportunity of making a struggle; the Gauls despairing of allsafety, unless they should succeed in forcing the lines: the Romansexpecting an end to all their labours if they should gain the day. Theprincipal struggle is at the upper lines, to which, we have said, Vergasillaunus was sent. The least elevation of ground, added to adeclivity, exercises a momentous influence. Some are casting missiles, others, forming a testudo, advance to the attack; fresh men by turnsrelieve the wearied. The earth, heaped up by all against thefortifications, gives the means of ascent to the Gauls, and covers thoseworks which the Romans had concealed in the ground. Our men have nolonger arms or strength. 

LXXXVI. --Caesar, on observing these movements, sends Labienus with sixcohorts to relieve his distressed soldiers: he orders him, if he shouldbe unable to withstand them, to draw off the cohorts and make a sally;but not to do this except through necessity. He himself goes to therest, and exhorts them not to succumb to the toil; he shows them thatthe fruits of all former engagements depend on that day and hour. TheGauls within, despairing of forcing the fortifications in the plains onaccount of the greatness of the works, attempt the places precipitous inascent: hither they bring the engines which they had prepared; by theimmense number of their missiles they dislodge the defenders from theturrets: they fill the ditches with clay and hurdles, then clear theway; they tear down the rampart and breast-work with hooks. 

LXXXVII. --Caesar sends at first young Brutus, with six cohorts, andafterwards Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with seven others: finally, asthey fought more obstinately, he leads up fresh men to the assistance ofhis soldiers. After renewing the action, and repulsing the enemy, hemarches in the direction in which he had sent Labienus, drafts fourcohorts from the nearest redoubt, and orders part of the cavalry tofollow him, and part to make the circuit of the external fortificationsand attack the enemy in the rear. Labienus, when neither the ramparts orditches could check the onset of the enemy, informs Caesar by messengersof what he intended to do. Caesar hastens to share in the action. 

LXXXVIII. --His arrival being known from the colour of his robe, and thetroops of cavalry, and the cohorts which he had ordered to follow himbeing seen, as these low and sloping grounds were plainly visible fromthe eminences, the enemy join battle. A shout being raised by bothsides, it was succeeded by a general shout along the ramparts and wholeline of fortifications. Our troops, laying aside their javelins, carryon the engagement with their swords. The cavalry is suddenly seen in therear of the Gauls: the other cohorts advance rapidly; the enemy turntheir backs; the cavalry intercept them in their flight, and a greatslaughter ensues. Sedulius the general and chief of the Lemovices isslain; Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, is taken alive in the flight, seventy-four military standards are brought to Caesar, and few out of sogreat a number return safe to their camp. The besieged, beholding fromthe town the slaughter and flight of their countrymen, despairing ofsafety, lead back their troops from the fortifications. A flight of theGauls from their camp immediately ensues on hearing of this disaster, and had not the soldiers been wearied by sending frequentreinforcements, and the labour of the entire day, all the enemy's forcescould have been destroyed. Immediately after midnight, the cavalry aresent out and overtake the rear, a great number are taken or cut topieces, the rest by flight escape in different directions to theirrespective states. Vercingetorix, having convened a council thefollowing day, declares, "That he had undertaken that war, not onaccount of his own exigencies, but on account of the general freedom;and since he must yield to fortune, he offered himself to them foreither purpose, whether they should wish to atone to the Romans by hisdeath, or surrender him alive. " Ambassadors are sent to Caesar on thissubject. He orders their arms to be surrendered, and their chieftainsdelivered up. He seated himself at the head of the lines in front of thecamp, the Gallic chieftains are brought before him. They surrenderVercingetorix, and lay down their arms. Reserving the Aedui and Arverni, [to try] if he could gain over, through their influence, theirrespective states, he distributes one of the remaining captives to eachsoldier, throughout the entire army, as plunder. 

XC. --After making these arrangements, he marches into the [country ofthe] Aedui, and recovers that state. To this place ambassadors are sentby the Arverni, who promise that they will execute his commands. Hedemands a great number of hostages. He sends the legions to winterquarters; he restores about twenty thousand captives to the Aedui andArverni; he orders Titus Labienus to march into the [country of the]Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and to him he attaches MarcusSempronius Rutilus; he places Caius Fabius, and Lucius Minucius Basilus, with two legions in the country of the Remi, lest they should sustainany loss from the Bellovaci in their neighbourhood. He sends CaiusAntistius Reginus into the [country of the] Ambivareti, Titus Sextiusinto the territories of the Bituriges, and Caius Caninius Rebilus intothose of the Ruteni, with one legion each. He stations Quintus TulliusCicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the Aedui at Cabillo and Matisco onthe Saone, to procure supplies of corn. He himself determines to winterat Bibracte. A supplication of twenty days is decreed by the senate atRome, on learning these successes from Caesar's despatches. 

BOOK VIII

CONTINUATION OF CAESAR'S GALLIC WAR ASCRIBED TO AULUS HIRTIUS

PREFACE

Prevailed on by your continued solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged ina most difficult task, as my daily refusals appear to plead not myinability, but indolence, as an excuse. I have compiled a continuationof the Commentaries of our Caesar's Wars in Gaul, not indeed to becompared to his writings, which either precede or follow them; andrecently, I have completed what he left imperfect after the transactionsin Alexandria, to the end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which wesee no issue, but of Caesar's life. I wish that those who may read themcould know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I mightthe more readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, inpresuming to intrude among Caesar's writings. For it is agreed on allhands, that no composition was ever executed with so great care, that itis not exceeded in elegance by these Commentaries, which were publishedfor the use of historians, that they might not want memoirs of suchachievements; and they stand so high in the esteem of all men, thathistorians seem rather deprived of than furnished with materials. Atwhich we have more reason to be surprised than other men; for they canonly appreciate the elegance and correctness with which he finishedthem, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar possessed notonly an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also athorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had noteven the good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war; andthough these were partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, inconversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention tothose things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and thosewhich we design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, whilst I urgeevery apology, that I may not be compared to Caesar, I incur the chargeof vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the judgment of any onebe put in competition with him. Farewell. 

I. --Gaul being entirely reduced, when Caesar having waged warincessantly during the former summer, wished to recruit his soldiersafter so much fatigue, by repose in winter quarters, news was broughthim that several states were simultaneously renewing their hostileintentions, and forming combinations. For which a probable reason wasassigned: namely, that the Gauls were convinced that they were not ableto resist the Romans with any force they could collect in one place; andhoped that if several states made war in different places at the sametime, the Roman army would neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, toprosecute them all: nor ought any single state to decline anyinconveniences that might befall them, provided that by such delay therest should be enabled to assert their liberty. 

II. --That this notion might not be confirmed among the Gauls, Caesarleft Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, in charge of his quarters, and setout himself with a guard of horse, the day before the kalends ofJanuary, from the town Bibracte, to the thirteenth legion, which he hadstationed in the country of the Bituriges, not far from the territoriesof the Aedui, and joined to it the eleventh legion which was next it. Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of his armyinto the most plentiful part of the country of the Bituriges; who, possessing an extensive territory and several towns, were not to bedeterred, by a single legion quartered among them, from making warlikepreparation, and forming combinations. 

III. -By Caesar's sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, toan unprovided and dispersed people, that they were surprised by ourhorse, whilst cultivating the fields without any apprehensions, beforethey had time to fly to their towns. For the usual sign of an enemy'sinvasion, which is generally intimated by the burning of their towns, was forbidden by Caesar's orders: lest if he advanced far, forage andcorn should become scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires to maketheir escape. Many thousands being taken, as many of the Bituriges aswere able to escape the first coming of the Romans, fled to theneighbouring states, relying either on private friendship, or publicalliance. In vain; for Caesar, by hasty marches, anticipated them inevery place, nor did he allow any state leisure to consider the safetyof others, in preference to their own. By this activity, he bothretained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear, obliged the waveringto accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the Bituriges, whenthey perceived that through Caesar's clemency, an avenue was open to hisfriendship, and that the neighbouring states had given hostages, withoutincurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection, they did the same. 

IV. -Caesar promises his soldiers, as a reward for their labour andpatience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships from the severity of thewinter, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, twohundred sestertii each, and to every centurian two thousand, to be giveninstead of plunder; and sending his legions back to quarters, he himselfreturned on the fortieth day to Bibracte. Whilst he was dispensingjustice there, the Bituriges send ambassadors to him, to entreat his aidagainst the Carnutes, who they complained had made war against them. Upon this intelligence, though he had not remained more than eighteendays in winter quarters, he draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out ofquarters on the Saone, where he had posted them as mentioned in a formerCommentary to procure supplies of corn. With these two legions hemarches in pursuit of the Carnutes. 

V. --When the news of the approach of our army reached the enemy, theCarnutes, terrified by the sufferings of other states, deserted theirvillages and towns (which were small buildings, raised in a hurry, tomeet the immediate necessity, in which they lived to shelter themselvesagainst the winter, for, being lately conquered, they had lost severaltowns), and dispersed and fled. Caesar, unwilling to expose his soldiersto the violent storms that break out, especially at that season, took uphis quarters at Genabum, a town of the Carnutes; and lodged his men inhouses, partly belonging to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter thetents, and hastily covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries hesends to all parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and notwithout effect, as our men generally returned loaded with booty. TheCarnutes, overpowered by the severity of the winter, and the fear ofdanger, and not daring to continue long in any place, as they weredriven from their houses, and not finding sufficient protection in thewoods, from the violence of the storms, after losing a considerablenumber of their men, disperse, and take refuge among the neighbouringstates. 

VI. --Caesar, being contented, at so severe a season, to disperse thegathering foes, and prevent any new war from breaking out, and beingconvinced, as far as reason could foresee, that no war of consequencecould be set on foot in the summer campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius, with the two legions which he had with him, in quarters at Genabum: andbeing informed by frequent embassies from the Remi, that the Bellovaci(who exceed all the Gauls and Belgae in military prowess), and theneighbouring states, headed by Correus, one of the Bellovaci, andComius, the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and assembling at ageneral rendezvous, designing with their united forces to invade theterritories of the Suessiones, who were put under the patronage of theRemi: and moreover, considering that not only his honour, but hisinterest was concerned, that such of his allies, as deserved well of therepublic, should suffer no calamity; he again draws the eleventh legionout of quarters and writes besides to Caius Fabius, to march with histwo legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he sends to Treboniusfor one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of thequarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden ofthe expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to hisown toils. 

VII. --As soon as his troops were collected, he marched against theBellovaci: and pitching his camp in their territories, detached troopsof horse all round the country, to take prisoners, from whom he mightlearn the enemy's plan. The horse, having executed his orders, bring himback word that but few were found in the houses: and that even these hadnot stayed at home to cultivate their lands (for the emigration wasgeneral from all parts), but had been sent back to watch our motions. Upon Caesar's inquiring from them, where the main body of the Bellovaciwere posted, and what was their design: they made answer, "that all theBellovaci, fit for carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and alongwith them the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, andthat they had chosen for their camp an elevated position, surrounded bya dangerous morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into themost remote woods: that several noblemen were united in the managementof the war; but that the people were most inclined to be governed byCorreus, because they knew that he had the strongest aversion to thename of the Roman people: that a few days before Comius had left thecamp to engage the Germans to their aid whose nation bordered on theirs, and whose numbers were countless: that the Bellovaci had come to aresolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest desireof the people, if Caesar should come with only three legions, as wasreported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged toencounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in amore wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a strongerforce, they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and byambuscade to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which at thatseason was both scarce and much scattered), corn, and othernecessaries. "

VIII. --When Caesar was convinced of the truth of this account from theconcurring testimony of several persons, and perceived that the planswhich were proposed were full of prudence, and very unlike the rashresolves of a barbarous people, he considered it incumbent on him to useevery exertion, in order that the enemy might despise his small forceand come to an action. For he had three veteran legions of distinguishedvalour, the seventh, eighth, and ninth. The eleventh consisted of chosenyouth of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but who, comparedwith the others, had not yet acquired any great reputation forexperience and valour. Calling therefore a council, and laying before itthe intelligence which he had received, he encouraged his soldiers. Inorder if possible to entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearanceof only three legions, he ranged his army in the following manner: thatthe seventh, eighth, and ninth legions should march before all thebaggage; that then the eleventh should bring up the rear of the wholetrain of baggage (which however was but small, as is usual on suchexpeditions), so that the enemy could not get a sight of a greaternumber than they themselves were willing to encounter. By thisdisposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought themwithin sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated. 

IX. --When the Gauls, whose bold resolutions had been reported to Caesar, saw the legions advance with a regular motion, drawn up in battle array;either from the danger of an engagement, or our sudden approach, or withthe design of watching our movements, they drew up their forces beforethe camp, and did not quit the rising ground. Though Caesar wished tobring them to battle, yet being surprised to see so vast a host of theenemy, he encamped opposite to them, with a valley between them, deeprather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with arampart twelve feet high, with breast-works built on it proportioned toits height; and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, withperpendicular sides to be sunk: likewise several turrets, three storieshigh, to be raised, with a communication to each other by galleries laidacross and covered over; which should be guarded in front by smallparapets of osiers; that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows ofsoldiers. The one of whom, being more secure from danger by theirheight, might throw their darts with more daring and to a greaterdistance; the other, which was nearer the enemy, being stationed on therampart, would be protected by their galleries from darts falling ontheir heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of aconsiderable height. 

X. -Caesar had a double design in this fortification; for he both hopedthat the strength of his works, and his [apparent] fears would raiseconfidence in the barbarians; and when there should be occasion to makea distant excursion to get forage or corn, he saw that his camp would besecured by the works with a very small force. In the meantime there werefrequent skirmishes across the marsh, a few on both sides sallying outbetween the two camps. Sometimes, however, our Gallic or Germanauxiliaries crossed the marsh, and furiously pursued the enemy; or onthe other hand the enemy passed it and beat back our men. Moreover therehappened in the course of our daily foraging, what must of necessityhappen, when corn is to be collected by a few scattered men out ofprivate houses, that our foragers dispersing in an intricate countrywere surrounded by the enemy; by which, though we suffered but aninconsiderable loss of cattle and servants, yet it raised foolish hopesin the barbarians; but more especially, because Comius, who I said hadgone to get aid from the Germans, returned with some cavalry, and thoughthe Germans were only 500, yet the barbarians were elated by theirarrival. 

XI. -Caesar, observing that the enemy kept for several days within theircamp, which was well secured by a morass and its natural situation, andthat it could not be assaulted without a dangerous engagement, nor theplace enclosed with lines without an addition to his army, wrote toTrebonius to send with all despatch for the thirteenth legion which wasin winter-quarters among the Bituriges under Titus Sextius, one of hislieutenants; and then to come to him by forced marches with the threelegions. He himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, and Lingones, andother states, from whom he had required a vast number, to guard hisforaging parties, and to support them in case of any sudden attack ofthe enemy. 

XII. --As this continued for several days, and their vigilance wasrelaxed by custom (an effect which is generally produced by time), theBellovaci, having made themselves acquainted with the daily stations ofour horse, lie in ambush with a select body of foot in a place coveredwith woods; to it they sent their horse the next day, who were first todecoy our men into the ambuscade, and then when they were surrounded, toattack them. It was the lot of the Remi to fall into this snare, to whomthat day had been allotted to perform this duty; for, having suddenlygot sight of the enemy's cavalry, and despising their weakness, inconsequence of their superior numbers, they pursued them too eagerly, and were surrounded on every side by the foot. Being by this meansthrown into disorder they returned with more precipitation than is usualin cavalry actions, with the loss of Vertiscus, the governor of theirstate, and the general of their horse, who, though scarcely able to siton horseback through years, neither, in accordance with the custom ofthe Gauls, pleaded his age in excuse for not accepting the command, norwould he suffer them to fight without him. The spirits of the barbarianswere puffed up and inflated at the success of this battle, in killingthe prince and general of the Remi; and our men were taught by thisloss, to examine the country, and post their guards with more caution, and to be more moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy. 

XIII. --In the meantime daily skirmishes take place continually in viewof both camps; these were fought at the ford and pass of the morass. Inone of these contests the Germans, whom Caesar had brought over theRhine, to fight intermixed with the horse, having resolutely crossed themarsh, and slain the few who made resistance, and boldly pursued therest, so terrified them, that not only those who were attacked hand tohand, or wounded at a distance, but even those who were stationed at agreater distance to support them, fled disgracefully; and being oftenbeaten from the rising grounds, did not stop till they had retired intotheir camp, or some, impelled by fear, had fled farther. Their dangerdrew their whole army into such confusion, that it was difficult tojudge whether they were more insolent after a slight advantage, or moredejected by a trifling calamity. 

XIV. --After spending several days in the same camp, the guards of theBellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was advancing nearer with hislegions, and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, send off by night allwho were disabled by age or infirmity, or unarmed, and along with themtheir whole baggage. Whilst they are preparing their disorderly andconfused troop for march (for the Gauls are always attended by a vastmultitude of waggons, even when they have very light baggage), beingovertaken by daylight, they drew their forces out before their camp, toprevent the Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their baggagehad advanced to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not think itprudent to attack them when standing on their defence, with such a steephill in their favour, nor keep his legions at such a distance that theycould quit their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp wasdivided from the enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that hecould not pursue with expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass, which extended almost to the enemy's camp, was separated from it only bya small valley, he laid a bridge over the morass and led his armyacross, and soon reached the plain on the top of the hill, which wasfortified on either side by a steep ascent. Having there drawn up hisarmy in order of battle, he marched to the furthest hill, from which hecould, with his engines, shower darts upon the thickest of the enemy. 

XV. --The Gauls, confiding in the natural strength of their position, though they would not decline an engagement if the Romans attempted toascend the hill, yet dared not divide their forces into small parties, lest they should be thrown into disorder by being dispersed, andtherefore remained in order of battle. Caesar, perceiving that theypersisted in their resolution, kept twenty cohorts in battle array, and, measuring out ground there for a camp, ordered it to be fortified. Having completed his works, he drew up his legions before the rampartand stationed the cavalry in certain positions, with their horsesbridled. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans prepared to pursue them, andthat they could not wait the whole night, or continue longer in the sameplace without provisions, they formed the following plan to secure aretreat. They handed to one another the bundles of straw and sticks onwhich they sat (for it is the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn upin order of battle, as has been asserted in former commentaries), ofwhich they had great plenty in their camp, and piled them in the frontof their line; and at the close of the day, on a certain signal, setthem all on fire at one and the same time. The continued blaze soonscreened all their forces from the sight of the Romans, which no soonerhappened than the barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation. 

XVI. --Though Caesar could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for theintervention of the fire, yet, suspecting that they had adopted thatmethod to favour their escape, he made his legions advance, and sent aparty of horse to pursue them; but, apprehensive of an ambuscade, andthat the enemy might remain in the same place and endeavour to draw ourmen into a disadvantageous situation, he advances himself but slowly. The horse, being afraid to venture into the smoke and dense line offlame, and those who were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely ableto see their horses' heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat, through fear of an ambuscade. Thus, by a flight, full at once ofcowardice and address, they advanced without any loss about ten miles, and encamped in a very strong position. From which, laying numerousambuscades, both of horse and foot, they did considerable damage to theRoman foragers. 

XVII. --After this had happened several times, Caesar discovered, from acertain prisoner, that Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, hadselected six thousand of his bravest foot and a thousand horse, withwhich he designed to lie in ambush in a place to which he suspected theRomans would send to look for forage, on account of the abundance ofcorn and grass. Upon receiving information of their design Caesar drewout more legions than he usually did, and sent forward his cavalry asusual, to protect the foragers. With these he intermixed a guard oflight infantry, and himself advanced with the legions as fast as hecould. 

XVIII. --The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action alevel piece of bound, not more than a mile in extent, enclosed on everyside by a thick wood or a very deep river, as by a toil, and this theysurrounded. Our men, apprised of the enemy's design, marched in goodorder to the ground, ready both in heart and hand to give battle, andwilling to hazard any engagement when the legions were at their back. Ontheir approach, as Correus supposed that he had got an opportunity ofeffecting his purpose, he at first shows himself with a small party andattacks the foremost troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, anddid not crowd together in one place, as commonly happens from surprisein engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious tothemselves. 

XIX. --When by the judicious arrangement of our forces only a few of ourmen fought by turns, and did not suffer themselves to be surrounded, therest of the enemy broke out from the woods whilst Correus was engaged. The battle was maintained in different parts with great vigour, andcontinued for a long time undecided, till at length a body of footgradually advanced from the woods in order of battle and forced ourhorse to give ground: the light infantry, which were sent before thelegions to the assistance of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing withthe horse, fought with great courage. The battle was for some timedoubtful, but, as usually happens, our men, who stood the enemy's firstcharge, became superior from this very circumstance that, thoughsuddenly attacked from an ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In themeantime the legions were approaching, and several messengers arrivedwith notice to our men and the enemy that the [Roman] general was nearat hand, with his forces in battle array. Upon this intelligence, ourmen, confiding in the support of the cohorts, fought most resolutely, fearing, lest if they should be slow in their operations they should letthe legions participate in the glory of the conquest. The enemy losecourage and attempt to escape by different ways. In vain; for they werethemselves entangled in that labyrinth in which they thought to entrapthe Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and having lost thegreater part of their men, they fled in consternation whither-soeverchance carried them; some sought the woods, others the river, but werevigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in themeantime, Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on toquit the field and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers ofquarter, but, fighting courageously and wounding several, provoked ourmen, elated with victory, to discharge their weapons against him. 

XX. --After this transaction, Caesar, having come up immediately afterthe battle, and imagining that the enemy, upon receiving the news of sogreat a defeat, would be so depressed that they would abandon theircamp, which was not above eight miles distant from the scene of action, though he saw his passage obstructed by the river, yet he marched hisarmy over and advanced. But the Bellovaci and the other states, beinginformed of the loss they had sustained by a few wounded men who havingescaped by the shelter of the woods, had returned to them after thedefeat, and learning that everything had turned out unfavourable, thatCorreus was slain, and the horse and most valiant of their foot cut off, imagined that the Romans were marching against them, and calling acouncil in haste by sound of trumpet, unanimously cry out to sendambassadors and hostages to Caesar. 

XXI. --This proposal having met with general approbation, Comius theAtrebatian fled to those Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliariesfor that war. The rest instantly send ambassadors to Caesar; andrequested that he would be contented with that punishment of his enemy, which if he had possessed the power to inflict on them before theengagement, when they were yet uninjured, they were persuaded from hisusual clemency and mercy, he never would have inflicted; that the powerof the Bellovaci was crushed by the cavalry action; that many thousandsof their choicest foot had fallen, that scarce a man had escaped tobring the fatal news. That, however, the Bellovaci had derived from thebattle one advantage, of some importance, considering their loss; thatCorreus, the author of the rebellion, and agitator of the people, wasslain: for that whilst he lived, the senate had never equal influence inthe state with the giddy populace. 

XXII. --Caesar reminded the ambassadors who made these supplications, that the Bellovaci had at the same season the year before, inconjunction with other states of Gaul, undertaken a war, and that theyhad persevered the most obstinately of all in their purpose, and werenot brought to a proper way of thinking by the submission of the rest;that he knew and was aware that the guilt of a crime was easilytransferred to the dead; but that no one person could have suchinfluence, as to be able by the feeble support of the multitude to raisea war and carry it on without the consent of the nobles, in oppositionto the senate, and in despite of every virtuous man; however he wassatisfied with the punishment which they had drawn upon themselves. 

XXIII. --The night following the ambassadors bring back his answer totheir countrymen, and prepare the hostages. Ambassadors flock in fromthe other states, which were waiting for the issue of the [war with the]Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive his orders; all exceptComius, whose fears restrained him from entrusting his safety to anyperson's honour. For the year before, while Caesar was holding theassizes in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus, having discovered that Comiuswas tampering with the states, and raising a conspiracy against Caesar, thought he might punish his infidelity without perfidy; but judging thathe would not come to his camp at his invitation, and unwilling to puthim on his guard by the attempt, he sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, withorders to have him put to death under pretence of a conference. Toeffect his purpose, he sent with him some chosen centurions. When theycame to the conference, and Volusenus, as had been agreed on, had takenhold of Comius by the hand, and one of the centurions, as if surprisedat so uncommon an incident, attempted to kill him, he was prevented bythe friends of Comius, but wounded him severely in the head by the firstblow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much with a design tofight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius had receiveda mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they had seen, dreading that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this transaction, itwas said that Comius made a resolution never to come within sight of anyRoman. 

XXIV. --When Caesar, having completely conquered the most warlikenations, perceived that there was now no state which could makepreparations for war to oppose him, but that some were removing andfleeing from their country to avoid present subjection, he resolved todetach his army into different parts of the country. He kept withhimself Marcus Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh legion; CaiusFabius was detached with twenty-five cohorts into the remotest part ofGaul, because it was rumoured that some states had risen in arms, and hedid not think that Caius Caninius Rebilus, who had the charge of thatcountry, was strong enough to protect it with two legions. He orderedTitus Labienus to attend himself, and sent the twelfth legion which hadbeen under him in winter quarters, to Hither Gaul, to protect the Romancolonies, and prevent any loss by the inroads of barbarians, similar tothat which had happened the year before to the Tergestines, who were cutoff by a sudden depredation and attack. He himself marched to depopulatethe country of Ambiorix, whom he had terrified and forced to fly, butdespaired of being able to reduce under his power; but he thought itmost consistent with his honour to waste his country both ofinhabitants, cattle, and buildings, so that from the abhorrence of hiscountrymen, if fortune suffered any to survive, he might be excludedfrom a return to his state for the calamities which he had brought onit. 

XXV. --After he had sent either his legions or auxiliaries through everypart of Ambiorix's dominions, and wasted the whole country by sword, fire, and rapine, and had killed or taken prodigious numbers, he sentLabienus with two legions against the Treviri, whose state, from itsvicinity to Germany, being engaged in constant war, differed but littlefrom the Germans, in civilization and savage barbarity; and nevercontinued in its allegiance, except when awed by the presence of hisarmy. 

XXVI. --In the meantime Caius Caninius, a lieutenant, having receivedinformation by letters and messages from Duracius, who had alwayscontinued in friendship to the Roman people, though a part of his statehad revolted, that a great multitude of the enemy were in arms in thecountry of the Pictones, marched to the town Limonum. When he wasapproaching it, he was informed by some prisoners, that Duracius wasshut up by several thousand men, under the command of Dumnacus, generalof the Andes, and that Limonum was besieged, but not daring to face theenemy with his weak legions, he encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus, having notice of Caninius's approach, turned his whole force against thelegions, and prepared to assault the Roman camp. But after spendingseveral days in the attempt, and losing a considerable number of men, without being able to make a breach in any part of the works, hereturned again to the siege of Limonum. 

XXVII. --At the same time, Caius Fabius, a lieutenant, brings back manystates to their allegiance, and confirms their submission by takinghostages; he was then informed by letters from Caninius, of theproceedings among the Pictones. Upon which he set off to bringassistance to Duracius. But Dumnacus hearing of the approach of Fabius, and despairing of safety, if at the same time he should be forced towithstand the Roman army without, and observe, and be under apprehensionfrom the town's people, made a precipitate retreat from that place withall his forces. Nor did he think that he should be sufficiently securefrom danger, unless he led his army across the Loire, which was too deepa river to pass except by a bridge. Though Fabius had not yet comewithin sight of the enemy, nor joined Caninius; yet being informed ofthe nature of the country, by persons acquainted with it, he judged itmost likely that the enemy would take that way, which he found they didtake. He therefore marched to that bridge with his army, and ordered hiscavalry to advance no further before the legions, than that they couldreturn to the same camp at night, without fatiguing their horses. Ourhorse pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear, andattacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden withbaggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Havingexecuted the affair so successfully, they retired to the camp. 

XXVIII. --The night following, Fabius sent his horse before him, withorders to engage the enemy, and delay their march till he himself shouldcome up. That his orders might be faithfully performed, Quintus AtiusVarus, general of the horse, a man of uncommon spirit and skill, encouraged his men, and pursuing the enemy, disposed some of his troopsin convenient places, and with the rest gave battle to the enemy. Theenemy's cavalry made a bold stand, the foot relieving each other, andmaking a general halt, to assist their horse against ours. The battlewas warmly contested. For our men, despising the enemy whom they hadconquered the day before, and knowing that the legions were followingthem, animated both by the disgrace of retreating, and a desire ofconcluding the battle expeditiously by their own courage, fought mostvaliantly against the foot: and the enemy, imagining that no more forceswould come against them, as they had experienced the day before, thoughtthey had got a favourable opportunity of destroying our whole cavalry. 

XXIX. -After the conflict had continued for some time with greatviolence, Dumnacus drew out his army in such a manner, that the footshould by turns assist the horse. Then the legions, marching in closeorder, came suddenly in sight of the enemy. At this sight, the barbarianhorse were so astonished, and the foot so terrified, that breakingthrough the line of baggage, they betook themselves to flight with aloud shout, and in great disorder. But our horse, who a little beforehad vigorously engaged them, whilst they made resistance, being elatedwith joy at their victory, raising a shout on every side, poured roundthem as they ran, and as long as their horses had strength to pursue, ortheir arms to give a blow, so long did they continue the slaughter ofthe enemy in that battle, and having killed above twelve thousand men inarms, or such as threw away their arms through fear, they took theirwhole train of baggage. 

XXX. --After this defeat, when it was ascertained that Drapes, a Senonian(who in the beginning of the revolt of Gaul, had collected from allquarters men of desperate fortunes, invited the slaves to liberty, called in the exiles of the whole kingdom, given an asylum to robbers, and intercepted the Roman baggage and provisions), was marching to theprovince with five thousand men, being all he could collect after thedefeat, and that Luterius a Cadurcian who, as it has been observed in aformer commentary, had designed to make an attack on the Province in thefirst revolt of Gaul, had formed a junction with him, Caius Caniniuswent in pursuit of them with two legions, lest great disgrace might beincurred from the fears or injuries done to the Province by thedepredations of a band of desperate men. 

XXXI. --Caius Fabius set off with the rest of the army to the Carnutesand those other states, whose forces he was informed had served asauxiliaries in that battle, which he fought against Dumnacus. For he hadno doubt that they would be more submissive after their recentsufferings, but if respite and time were given them, they might beeasily excited by the earnest solicitations of the same Dumnacus. Onthis occasion Fabius was extremely fortunate and expeditious inrecovering the states. For the Carnutes, who, though often harassed hadnever mentioned peace, submitted and gave hostages: and the otherstates, which lie in the remotest parts of Gaul, adjoining the ocean, and which are called Armoricae, influenced by the example of theCarnutes, as soon as Fabius arrived with his legions, without delaycomply with his command. Dumnacus, expelled from his own territories, wandering and skulking about, was forced to seek refuge by himself inthe most remote parts of Gaul. 

XXXII. --But Crapes in conjunction with Literius, knowing that Caniniuswas at hand with the legions, and that they themselves could not withoutcertain destruction enter the boundaries of the province, whilst an armywas in pursuit of them, and being no longer at liberty to roam up anddown and pillage, halt in the country of the Cadurci, as Luterius hadonce in his prosperity possessed a powerful influence over theinhabitants, who were his countrymen, and being always the author of newprojects, had considerable authority among the barbarians; with his ownand Drapes' troops he seized Uxellodunum, a town formerly in vassalageto him and strongly fortified by its natural situation; and prevailed onthe inhabitants to join him. 

XXXIII. --After Caninius had rapidly marched to this place, and perceivedthat all parts of the town were secured by very craggy rocks, which itwould be difficult for men in arms to climb even if they met with noresistance; and, moreover, observing that the town's people werepossessed of effects, to a considerable amount, and that if theyattempted to convey them away in a clandestine manner, they could notescape our horse, nor even our legions; he divided his forces into threeparts, and pitched three camps on very high ground, with the intentionof drawing lines round the town by degrees, as his forces could bear thefatigue. 

XXXIV. --When the townsmen perceived his design, being terrified by therecollection of the distress at Alesia, they began to dread similarconsequences from a siege; and above all Luterius, who had experiencedthat fatal event, cautioned them to make provision of corn; theytherefore resolve by general consent to leave part of their troopsbehind, and set out with their light troops to bring in corn. The schemehaving met with approbation, the following night Drapes and Luterius, leaving two thousand men in the garrison, marched out of the town withthe rest. After a few days' stay in the country of the Cadurci (some ofwhom were disposed to assist them with corn, and others were unable toprevent their taking it) they collected a great store. Sometimes alsoattacks were made on our little forts by sallies at night. For thisreason Caninius deferred drawing his works round the whole town, lest heshould be unable to protect them when completed, or by disposing hisgarrisons in several places, should make them too weak. 

XXXV. --Drapes and Luterius, having laid in a large supply of corn, occupy a position at about ten miles distance from the town, intendingfrom it to convey the corn into the town by degrees. They chose each hisrespective department. Drapes stayed behind in the camp with part of thearmy to protect it; Luterius conveys the train with provisions into thetown. Accordingly, having disposed guards here and there along the road, about the tenth hour of the night, he set out by narrow paths throughthe woods, to fetch the corn into the town. But their noise being heardby the sentinels of our camp, and the scouts which we had sent out, having brought an account of what was going on, Caninius instantly withthe ready-armed cohorts from the nearest turrets made an attack on theconvoy at the break of day. They, alarmed at so unexpected an evil, fledby different ways to their guard: which as soon as our men perceived, they fell with great fury on the escort, and did not allow a single manto be taken alive. Luterius escaped thence with a few followers, but didnot return to the camp. 

XXXVI. --After this success, Caninius learnt from some prisoners, that apart of the forces was encamped with Drapes, not more than ten milesoff; which being confirmed by several, supposing that after the defeatof one general, the rest would be terrified, and might be easilyconquered, he thought it a most fortunate event that none of the enemyhad fled back from the slaughter to the camp, to give Drapes notice ofthe calamity which had befallen him. And as he could see no danger inmaking the attempt, he sent forward all his cavalry and the German foot, men of great activity, to the enemy's camp. He divides one legion amongthe three camps, and takes the other without baggage along with him. When he had advanced near the enemy, he was informed by scouts, which hehad sent before him, that the enemy's camp, as is the custom ofbarbarians, was pitched low, near the banks of a river, and that thehigher grounds were unoccupied: but that the German horse had made asudden attack on them, and had begun the battle. Upon this intelligence, he marched up with his legion, armed and in order of battle. Then, on asignal being suddenly given on every side, our men took possession ofthe higher grounds. Upon this, the German horse observing the Romancolours, fought with great vigour. Immediately all the cohorts attackthem on every side; and having either killed or made prisoners of themall, gained great booty. In that battle, Drapes himself was takenprisoner. 

XXXVII. --Caninius, having accomplished the business so successfully, without having scarcely a man wounded, returned to besiege the town;and, having destroyed the enemy without, for fear of whom he had beenprevented from strengthening his redoubts, and surrounding the enemywith his lines, he orders the work to be completed on every side. Thenext day, Caius Fabius came to join him with his forces, and took uponhim the siege of one side. 

XXXVIII. --In the meantime, Caesar left Caius Antonius in the country ofthe Bellovaci, with fifteen cohorts, that the Belgae might have noopportunity of forming new plans in future. He himself visits the otherstates, demands a great number of hostages, and by his encouraginglanguage allays the apprehensions of all. When he came to the Carnutes, in whose state he has in a former commentary mentioned that the warfirst broke out; observing, that from a consciousness of their guilt, they seemed to be in the greatest terror: to relieve the state thesooner from its fear, he demanded that Guturvatus, the promoter of thattreason, and the instigator of that rebellion, should be delivered up topunishment. And though the latter did not dare to trust his life even tohis own countrymen, yet such diligent search was made by them all, thathe was soon brought to our camp. Caesar was forced to punish him, by theclamours of the soldiers, contrary to his natural humanity, for theyalleged that all the dangers and losses incurred in that war, ought tobe imputed to Guturvatus. Accordingly, he was whipped to death, and hishead cut off. 

XXXIX. --Here Caesar was informed by numerous letters from Caninius ofwhat had happened to Drapes and Luterius, and in what conduct the town'speople persisted: and though he despised the smallness of their numbers, yet he thought their obstinacy deserving a severe punishment, lest Gaulin general should adopt an idea that she did not want strength butperseverance to oppose the Romans; and lest the other states, relying onthe advantage of situation, should follow their example and assert theirliberty; especially as he knew that all the Gauls understood that hiscommand was to continue but one summer longer, and if they could holdout for that time, that they would have no further danger to apprehend. He therefore left Quintus Calenus, one of his lieutenants behind him, with two legions, and instructions to follow him by regular marches. Hehastened as much as he could with all the cavalry to Caninius. 

XL. --Having arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary to the general expectation, and perceiving that the town was surrounded by the works, and that theenemy had no possible means of retiring from the assault, and beinglikewise informed by the deserters that the townsmen had abundance ofcorn; he endeavoured to prevent their getting water. A river divided thevalley below, which almost surrounded the steep craggy mountain on whichUxellodunum was built. The nature of the ground prevented his turningthe current; for it ran so low down at the foot of the mountain, that nodrains could be sunk deep enough to draw it off in any direction. Butthe descent to it was so difficult, that if we made opposition, thebesieged could neither come to the river, nor retire up the precipicewithout hazard of their lives. Caesar, perceiving the difficulty, disposed archers and slingers, and in some places, opposite to theeasiest descents, placed engines, and attempted to hinder the townsmenfrom getting water at the river, which obliged them afterwards to go allto one place to procure water. 

XLI. --Close under the walls of the town, a copious spring gushed out onthat part, which for the space of nearly three hundred feet, was notsurrounded by the river. Whilst every other person wished that thebesieged could be debarred from this spring, Caesar alone saw that itcould be effected, though not without great danger. Opposite to it hebegan to advance the vineae towards the mountain, and to throw up amound, with great labour and continual skirmishing. For the townsmen randown from the high ground, and fought without any risk, and woundedseveral of our men, yet they obstinately pushed on and were not deterredfrom moving forward the vineae, and from surmounting by their assiduitythe difficulties of situation. At the same time they work mines, andmove the crates and vineae to the source of the fountain. This was theonly work which they could do without danger or suspicion. A mound sixtyfeet high was raised; on it was erected a turret of ten stories, notwith the intention that it should be on a level with the wall (for thatcould not be effected by any works), but to rise above the top of thespring. When our engines began to play from it upon the paths that ledto the fountain, and the townsmen could not go for water without danger, not only the cattle designed for food and the working cattle, but agreat number of men also died of thirst. 

XLII. --Alarmed at this calamity, the townsmen fill barrels with tallow, pitch, and dried wood; these they set on fire, and roll down on ourworks. At the same time, they fight most furiously, to deter the Romans, by the engagement and danger, from extinguishing the flames. Instantly agreat blaze arose in the works. For whatever they threw down theprecipice, striking against the vine and agger, communicated the fire towhatever was in the way. Our soldiers on the other hand, though theywere engaged in a perilous sort of encounter, and labouring under thedisadvantages of position, yet supported all with very great presence ofmind. For the action happened in an elevated situation, and in sight ofour army; and a great shout was raised on both sides; therefore everyman faced the weapons of the enemy and the flames in as conspicuous amanner as he could, that his valour might be the better known andattested. 

XLIII. --Caesar, observing that several of his men were wounded, orderedthe cohorts to ascend the mountain on all sides, and, under pretence ofassailing the walls, to raise a shout: at which the besieged beingfrightened, and not knowing what was going on in other places, call offtheir armed troops from attacking our works, and dispose them on thewalls. Thus our men, without hazarding a battle, gained time partly toextinguish the works which had caught fire, and partly to cut off thecommunication. As the townsmen still continued to make an obstinateresistance, and even, after losing the greatest part of their forces bydrought, persevered in their resolution: At last the veins of the springwere cut across by our mines, and turned from their course. By thistheir constant spring was suddenly dried up, which reduced them to suchdespair that they imagined that it was not done by the art of man, butthe will of the gods; forced, therefore, by necessity, they at lengthsubmitted. 

XLIV. --Caesar, being convinced that his lenity was known to all men, andbeing under no fears of being thought to act severely from a naturalcruelty, and perceiving that there would be no end to his troubles ifseveral states should attempt to rebel in like manner and in differentplaces, resolved to deter others by inflicting an exemplary punishmenton these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of those who had borne armsagainst him. Their lives he spared, that the punishment of theirrebellion might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who I have said wastaken by Caninius, either through indignation and grief arising from hiscaptivity, or through fear of severer punishments, abstained from foodfor several days, and thus perished. At the same time, Luterius, who, Ihave related, had escaped from the battle, having fallen into the handsof Epasnactus, an Arvernian (for he frequently changed his quarters, andthrew himself on the honour of several persons, as he saw that he darenot remain long in one place, and was conscious how great an enemy hedeserved to have in Caesar), was by this Epasnactus, the Arvernian, asincere friend of the Roman people, delivered without any hesitation, aprisoner to Caesar. 

XLV. --In the meantime, Labienus engages in a successful cavalry actionamong the Treviri; and, having killed several of them and of theGermans, who never refused their aid to any person against the Romans, he got their chiefs alive into his power, and, amongst them, Surus, anAeduan, who was highly renowned both for his valour and birth, and wasthe only Aeduan that had continued in arms till that time. Caesar, beinginformed of this, and perceiving that he had met with good success inall parts of Gaul, and reflecting that, in former campaigns, [Celtic]Gaul had been conquered and subdued; but that he had never gone inperson to Aquitania, but had made a conquest of it, in some degree, byMarcus Crassus, set out for it with two legions, designing to spend thelatter part of the summer there. This affair he executed with his usualdespatch and good fortune. For all the states of Aquitania sentambassadors to him and delivered hostages. These affairs beingconcluded, he marched with a guard of cavalry towards Narbo, and drewoff his army into winter quarters by his lieutenants. He posted fourlegions in the country of the Belgae, under Marcus Antonius, CaiusTrebonius, Publius Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius, his lieutenants. Twohe detached to the Aedui, knowing them to have a very powerful influencethroughout all Gaul. Two he placed among the Turoni, near the confinesof the Carnutes, to keep in awe the entire tract of country bordering onthe ocean; the other two he placed in the territories of the Lemovices, at a small distance from the Arverni, that no part of Gaul might bewithout an army. Having spent a few days in the province, he quickly ranthrough all the business of the assizes, settled all public disputes, and distributed rewards to the most deserving; for he had a goodopportunity of learning how every person was disposed towards therepublic during the general revolt of Gaul, which he had withstood bythe fidelity and assistance of the Province. 

XLVII. --Having finished these affairs, he returned to his legions amongthe Belgae and wintered at Nemetocenna: there he got intelligence thatComius, the Atrebatian had had an engagement with his cavalry. For whenAntonius had gone into winter quarters, and the state of the Atrebatescontinued in their allegiance, Comius, who, after that wound which Ibefore mentioned, was always ready to join his countrymen upon everycommotion, that they might not want a person to advise and head them inthe management of the war, when his state submitted to the Romans, supported himself and his adherents on plunder by means of his cavalry, infested the roads, and intercepted several convoys which were bringingprovisions to the Roman quarters. 

XLVIII. --Caius Volusenus Quadratus was appointed commander of the horseunder Antonius, to winter with him: Antonius sent him in pursuit of theenemy's cavalry; now Volusenus added to that valour which was pre-eminentin him, a great aversion to Comius, on which account he executedthe more willingly the orders which he received. Having, therefore, laidambuscades, he had several encounters with his cavalry and came offsuccessful. At last, when a violent contest ensued, and Volusenus, through eagerness to intercept Comius, had obstinately pursued him witha small party; and Comius had, by the rapidity of his flight, drawnVolusenus to a considerable distance from his troops, he, on a sudden, appealed to the honour of all about him for assistance not to suffer thewound, which he had perfidiously received, to go without vengeance; and, wheeling his horse about, rode unguardedly before the rest up to thecommander. All his horse following his example, made a few of our menturn their backs and pursued them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, rode up to Volusenus, and, pointing his lance, pierced him in the thighwith great force. When their commander was wounded, our men no longerhesitated to make resistance, and, facing about, beat back the enemy. When this occurred, several of the enemy, repulsed by the greatimpetuosity of our men, were wounded, and some were trampled to death instriving to escape, and some were made prisoners. Their general escapedthis misfortune by the swiftness of his horse. Our commander, beingseverely wounded, so much so that he appeared to run the risk of losinghis life, was carried back to the camp. But Comius, having eithergratified his resentment, or, because he had lost the greatest part ofhis followers, sent ambassadors to Antonius, and assured him that hewould give hostages as a security that he would go wherever Antoniusshould prescribe, and would comply with his orders, and only entreatedthat this concession should be made to his fears, that he should not beobliged to go into the presence of any Roman. As Antonius judged thathis request originated in a just apprehension, he indulged him in it andaccepted his hostages. 

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Caesar, I know, has made a separate commentary of each year'stransactions, which I have not thought it necessary for me to do, because the following year, in which Lucius Paulus and Caius Marcelluswere consuls, produced no remarkable occurrences in Gaul. But that noperson may be left in ignorance of the place where Caesar and his armywere at that time, I have thought proper to write a few words inaddition to this commentary. 

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XLIX. --Caesar, whilst in winter quarters in the country of the Belgae, made it his only business to keep the states in amity with him, and togive none either hopes of, or pretext for, a revolt. For nothing wasfurther from his wishes than to be under the necessity of engaging inanother war at his departure; lest, when he was drawing his army out ofthe country, any war should be left unfinished, which the Gauls wouldcheerfully undertake, when there was no immediate danger. Therefore, bytreating the states with respect, making rich presents to the leadingmen, imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of their subjectionlighter, he easily kept Gaul (already exhausted by so many unsuccessfulbattles) in obedience. 

L. --When the winter quarters were broken up, he himself, contrary to hisusual practice, proceeded to Italy, by the longest possible stages, inorder to visit the free towns and colonies, that he might recommend tothem the petition of Marcus Antonius, his treasurer, for the priesthood. For he exerted his interest both cheerfully in favour of a man stronglyattached to him, whom he had sent home before him to attend theelection, and zealously to oppose the faction and power of a few men, who, by rejecting Marcus Antonius, wished to undermine Caesar'sinfluence when going out of office. Though Caesar heard on the road, before he reached Italy, that he was created augur, yet he thoughthimself in honour bound to visit the free town and colonies, to returnthem thanks for rendering such service to Antonius by their presence insuch great numbers [at the election], and at the same time to recommendto them himself, and his honour in his suit for the consulate theensuing year. For his adversaries arrogantly boasted that LuciusLentulus and Caius Marcellus had been appointed consuls, who would stripCaesar of all honour and dignity: and that the consulate had beeninjuriously taken from Sergius Galba, though he had been much superiorin votes and interest, because he was united to Caesar, both byfriendship, and by serving as lieutenant under him. 

LI. --Caesar, on his arrival, was received by the principal towns andcolonies with incredible respect and affection; for this was the firsttime he came since the war against united Gaul. Nothing was omittedwhich could be thought of for the ornament of the gates, roads, andevery place through which Caesar was to pass. All the people with theirchildren went out to meet him. Sacrifices were offered up in everyquarter. The market places and temples were laid out withentertainments, as if anticipating the joy of a most splendid triumph. So great was the magnificence of the richer and zeal of the poorer ranksof the people. 

LII. --When Caesar had gone through all the states of Cisalpine Gaul, hereturned with the greatest haste to the army at Nemetocenna; and havingordered all his legions to march from winter quarters to the territoriesof the Treviri, he went thither and reviewed them. He made TitusLabienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul, that he might be the more inclinedto support him in his suit for the consulate. He himself made suchjourneys, as he thought would conduce to the health of his men by changeof air; and though he was frequently told that Labienus was solicited byhis enemies, and was assured that a scheme was in agitation by thecontrivance of a few, that the senate should interpose their authorityto deprive him of a part of his army; yet he neither gave credit to anystory concerning Labienus, nor could be prevailed upon to do anything inopposition to the authority of the senate; for he thought that his causewould be easily gained by the free voice of the senators. For CaiusCurio, one of the tribunes of the people, having undertaken to defendCaesar's cause and dignity, had often proposed to the senate, "that ifthe dread of Caesar's arms rendered any apprehensive, as Pompey'sauthority and arms were no less formidable to the forum, both shouldresign their command, and disband their armies. That then the city wouldbe free, and enjoy its due rights. " And he not only proposed this, butof himself called upon the senate to divide on the question. But theconsuls and Pompey's friends interposed to prevent it; and regulatingmatters as they desired, they broke up the meeting. 

LIII. --This testimony of the unanimous voice of the senate was verygreat, and consistent with their former conduct; for the preceding year, when Marcellus attacked Caesar's dignity, he proposed to the senate, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to dispose of Caesar'sprovince, before the expiration of his command, and when the votes werecalled for, and Marcellus, who endeavoured to advance his own dignity, by raising envy against Caesar, wanted a division, the full senate wentover to the opposite side. The spirit of Caesar's foes was not broken bythis, but it taught them, that they ought to strengthen their interestby enlarging their connections, so as to force the senate to comply withwhatever they resolved on. 

LIV. --After this a decree was passed by the senate, that one legionshould be sent by Pompey, and another by Caesar, to the Parthian war. But these two legions were evidently drawn from Caesar alone. For thefirst legion which Pompey sent to Caesar, he gave Caesar, as if itbelonged to himself, though it was levied in Caesar's province. Caesar, however, though no one could doubt the design of his enemies, sent thelegion back to Cneius Pompey, and in compliance with the decree of thesenate, ordered the fifteenth, belonging to himself, and which wasquartered in Cisalpine Gaul, to be delivered up. In its room he sent thethirteenth into Italy, to protect the garrisons from which he haddrafted the fifteenth. He disposed his army in winter quarters, placedCaius Trebonius, with four legions among the Belgae, and detached CaiusFabius, with four more, to the Aedui; for he thought that Gaul would bemost secure if the Belgae, a people of the greatest valour, and theAedui, who possessed the most powerful influence, were kept in awe byhis armies. 

LV. --He himself set out for Italy; where he was informed on his arrival, that the two legions sent home by him, and which by the senate's decree, should have been sent to the Parthian war, had been delivered over toPompey, by Caius Marcellus the consul, and were retained in Italy. Although from this transaction it was evident to every one that war wasdesigned against Caesar, yet he resolved to submit to any thing, as longas there were hopes left of deciding the dispute in an equitable manner, rather than have recourse to arms. 

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THE CIVIL WAR

BOOK I

I. --When Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, they were withgreat difficulty, and a hard struggle of the tribunes, prevailed on tosuffer it to be read in the senate; but the tribunes could not prevail, that any question should be put to the senate on the subject of theletter. The consuls put the question on the regulation of the state. Lucius Lentulus the consul promises that he will not fail the senate andrepublic, "if they declared their sentiments boldly and resolutely, butif they turned their regard to Caesar, and courted his favour, as theydid on former occasions, he would adopt a plan for himself, and notsubmit to the authority of the senate: that he too had a means ofregaining Caesar's favour and friendship. " Scipio spoke to the samepurport, "that it was Pompey's intention not to abandon the republic, ifthe senate would support him; but if they should hesitate and actwithout energy, they would in vain implore his aid, if they shouldrequire it hereafter. "

II. --This speech of Scipio's, as the senate was convened in the city, and Pompey was near at hand, seemed to have fallen from the lips ofPompey himself. Some delivered their sentiments with more moderation, asMarcellus first, who in the beginning of his speech, said, "that thequestion ought not to be put to the senate on this matter, till levieswere made throughout all Italy, and armies raised under whose protectionthe senate might freely and safely pass such resolutions as they thoughtproper": as Marcus Calidius afterwards, who was of opinion, "that Pompeyshould set out for his province, that there might be no cause for arms:that Caesar was naturally apprehensive as two legions were forced fromhim, that Pompey was retaining those troops, and keeping them near thecity to do him injury": as Marcus Rufus, who followed Calidius almostword for word. They were all harshly rebuked by Lentulus, whoperemptorily refused to propose Calidius's motion. Marcellus, overawedby his reproofs, retracted his opinion. Thus most of the senate, intimidated by the expressions of the consul, by the fears of a presentarmy, and the threats of Pompey's friends, unwillingly and reluctantlyadopted Scipio's opinion, that Caesar should disband his army by acertain day, and should he not do so, he should be considered as actingagainst the state. Marcus Antonius, and Quintus Cassius, tribunes of thepeople, interposed. The question was immediately put on theirinterposition. Violent opinions were expressed: whoever spoke with thegreatest acrimony and cruelty, was most highly commended by Caesar'senemies. 

III. --The senate having broken up in the evening, all who belonged tothat order were summoned by Pompey. He applauded the forward, andsecured their votes for the next day; the more moderate he reproved andexcited against Caesar. Many veterans, from all parts, who had served inPompey's armies, were invited to his standard by the hopes of rewardsand promotions. Several officers belonging to the two legions, which hadbeen delivered up by Caesar, were sent for. The city and the Comitiumwere crowded with tribunes, centurions, and veterans. All the consuls'friends, all Pompey's connections, all those who bore any ancient enmityto Caesar, were forced into the senate house. By their concourse anddeclarations the timid were awed, the irresolute confirmed, and thegreater part deprived of the power of speaking their sentiments withfreedom. Lucius Piso, the censor, offered to go to Caesar: as didlikewise Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of these affairs, and require only six days' time to finish the business. Opinions wereexpressed by some to the effect that commissioners should be sent toCaesar to acquaint him with the senate's pleasure. 

IV. --All these proposals were rejected, and opposition made to them all, in the speeches of the consul, Scipio, and Cato. An old grudge againstCaesar and chagrin at a defeat actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought uponby the magnitude of his debts, and the hopes of having the government ofan army and provinces, and by the presents which he expected from suchprinces as should receive the title of friends of the Roman people, andboasted amongst his friends, that he would be a second Sylla, to whomthe supreme authority should return. Similar hopes of a province andarmies, which he expected to share with Pompey on account of hisconnection with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover, [he was influencedby] the fear of being called to trial, and the adulation and anostentatious display of himself and his friends in power, who at thattime had great influence in the republic, and courts of judicature. Pompey himself, incited by Caesar's enemies, because he was unwillingthat any person should bear an equal degree of dignity, had whollyalienated himself from Caesar's friendship, and procured areconciliation with their common enemies; the greatest part of whom hehad himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity with him. At thesame time, chagrined at the disgrace which he had incurred by convertingthe two legions from their expedition through Asia and Syria, to[augment] his own power and authority, he was anxious to bring mattersto a war. 

V. --For these reasons everything was done in a hasty and disorderlymanner, and neither was time given to Caesar's relations to inform him[of the state of affairs] nor liberty to the tribunes of the people todeprecate their own danger, nor even to retain the last privilege, whichSylla had left them, the interposing their authority; but on the seventhday they were obliged to think of their own safety, which the mostturbulent tribunes of the people were not accustomed to attend to, norto fear being called to an account for their actions, till the eighthmonth. Recourse is had to that extreme and final decree of the senate(which was never resorted to even by daring proposers except when thecity was in danger of being set on fire, or when the public safety wasdespaired of). "That the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, andproconsuls in the city should take care that the state received noinjury. " These decrees are dated the eighth day before the ides ofJanuary; therefore, in the first five days, on which the senate couldmeet, from the day on which Lentulus entered into his consulate, the twodays of election excepted, the severest and most virulent decrees werepassed against Caesar's government, and against those most illustriouscharacters, the tribunes of the people. The latter immediately madetheir escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar, who was then atRavenna, awaiting an answer to his moderate demands; [to see] if matterscould be brought to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on thepart of the enemies. 

VI. --During the succeeding days the senate is convened outside the city. Pompey repeated the same things which he had declared through Scipio. Heapplauded the courage and firmness of the senate, acquainted them withhis force, and told them that he had ten legions ready; that he wasmoreover informed and assured that Caesar's soldiers were disaffected, and that he could not persuade them to defend or even follow him. Motions were made in the senate concerning other matters; that leviesshould be made through all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent aspropraetor into Mauritania; that money should be granted to Pompey fromthe public treasury. It was also put to the vote that king Juba shouldbe [honoured with the title of] friend and ally. But Marcellus said thathe would not allow this motion for the present. Philip, one of thetribunes, stopped [the appointment of] Sylla; the resolutions respectingthe other matters passed. The provinces, two of which were consular, theremainder praetorian, were decreed to private persons; Scipio got Syria, Lucius Domitius Gaul: Philip and Marcellus were omitted, from a privatemotive, and their lots were not even admitted. To the other provincespraetors were sent, nor was time granted as in former years, to refer tothe people on their appointment, nor to make them take the usual oath, and march out of the city in a public manner, robed in the militaryhabit, after offering their vows; a circumstance which had never beforehappened. Both the consuls leave the city, and private men had lictorsin the city and capital, contrary to all precedents of former times. Levies were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted fromthe municipal towns, and violently taken from the temples. Alldistinctions between things human and divine are confounded. 

VII. --These things being made known to Caesar, he harangued hissoldiers; he reminded them "of the wrongs done to him at all times byhis enemies, and complained that Pompey had been alienated from him andled astray by them through envy and a malicious opposition to his glory, though he had always favoured and promoted Pompey's honour and dignity. He complained that an innovation had been introduced into the republic, that the intercession of the tribunes, which had been restored a fewyears before by Sylla, was branded as a crime, and suppressed by forceof arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the tribunes of every other power, had, nevertheless, left the privilege of intercession unrestrained; thatPompey, who pretended to restore what they had lost, had taken away theprivileges which they formerly had; that whenever the senate decreed, "that the magistrates should take care that the republic sustained noinjury" (by which words and decree the Roman people were obliged torepair to arms), it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; whenthe tribunes attempted violent measures; when the people seceded, andpossessed themselves of the temples and eminences of the city; (andthese instances of former times, he showed them were expiated by thefate of Saturninus and the Gracchi): that nothing of this kind wasattempted now, nor even thought of: that no law was promulgated, nointrigue with the people going forward, no secession made; he exhortedthem to defend from the malice of his enemies, the reputation and honourof that general, under whose command they had for nine years mostsuccessfully supported the state; fought many successful battles, andsubdued all Gaul and Germany. " The soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which was present (for in the beginning of the disturbances he hadcalled it out, his other legions not having yet arrived), all cry outthat they are ready to defend their general, and the tribunes of thecommons, from all injuries. 

VIII. --Having made himself acquainted with the disposition of hissoldiers, Caesar set off with that legion to Ariminum, and there met thetribunes, who had fled to him for protection; he called his otherlegions from winter quarters, and ordered them to follow him. Thithercame Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was a lieutenant generalunder Caesar. He, after concluding the rest of his speech, and statingfor what purpose he had come, told Caesar that he had commands of aprivate nature for him from Pompey; that Pompey wished to clear himselfto Caesar, lest he should impute those actions which he did for therepublic, to a design of affronting him; that he had ever preferred theinterest of the state to his own private connections; that Caesar, too, for his own honour, ought to sacrifice his desires and resentment to thepublic good, and not vent his anger so violently against his enemies, lest in his hopes of injuring them, he should injure the republic. Hespoke a few words to the same purport from himself, in addition toPompey's apology. Roscius, the praetor, conferred with Caesar almost inthe same words, and on the same subject, and declared that Pompey hadempowered him to do so. 

IX. --Though these things seemed to have no tendency towards redressinghis injuries, yet having got proper persons by whom he could communicatehis wishes to Pompey; he required of them both, that as they hadconveyed Pompey's demands to him, they should not refuse to convey hisdemands to Pompey; if by so little trouble they could terminate a greatdispute, and liberate all Italy from her fears. 

"That the honour of the republic had ever been his first object, anddearer to him than life; that he was chagrined, that the favour of theRoman people was wrested from him by the injurious reports of hisenemies; that he was deprived of a half-year's command, and dragged backto the city, though the people had ordered that regard should be paid tohis suit for the consulate at the next election, though he was notpresent; that, however, he had patiently submitted to this loss ofhonour for the sake of the republic; that when he wrote letters to thesenate, requiring that all persons should resign the command of theirarmies, he did not obtain even that request; that levies were madethroughout Italy; that the two legions which had been taken from him, under the pretence of the Parthian war, were kept at home, and that thestate was in arms. To what did all these things tend, unless to hisruin? But, nevertheless, he was ready to condescend to any terms, and toendure everything for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his ownprovince; let them both disband their armies; let all persons in Italylay down their arms; let all fears be removed from the city; let freeelections, and the whole republic be resigned to the direction of thesenate and Roman people. That these things might be the more easilyperformed, and conditions secured and confirmed by oath, either letPompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar to go to him; it might be thatall their disputes would be settled by an interview. "

X. --Roscius and Lucius Caesar, having received this message, went toCapua, where they met the consuls and Pompey, and declared to themCaesar's terms. Having deliberated on the matter, they replied, and sentwritten proposals to him by the same persons, the purport of which was, that Caesar should return into Gaul, leave Ariminum, and disband hisarmy: if he complied with this, that Pompey would go to Spain. In themeantime, until security was given that Caesar would perform hispromises, that the consuls and Pompey would not give over their levies. 

XI. --It was not an equitable proposal, to require that Caesar shouldquit Ariminum and return to his province; but that he [Pompey] shouldhimself retain his province and the legions that belonged to another, and desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded, whilst he himself wasmaking new levies: and that he should merely promise to go to hisprovince, without naming the day on which he would set out; so that ifhe should not set out till after Caesar's consulate expired, yet hewould not appear bound by any religious scruples about asserting afalsehood. But his not granting time for a conference, nor promising toset out to meet him, made the expectation of peace appear very hopeless. Caesar, therefore, sent Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts from Ariminumto Arretium; he himself stayed at Ariminum with two legions, with theintention of raising levies there. He secured Pisaurus, Fanum, andAncona, with a cohort each. 

XII. --In the meantime, being informed that Thermus the praetor was inpossession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the town, but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclinedtowards himself; he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had atAriminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrustingthe affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it, and made hisescape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curiorecovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants. Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on theaffections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of thethirteenth legion from the garrisons, and set out for Auximum, a towninto which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had takenpossession, and from which he had sent senators round about the countryof Picenum, to raise new levies. 

XIII. --Upon news of Caesar's approach, the senate of Auximum went in abody to Attius Varus; and told him that it was not a subject for them todetermine upon: yet neither they, nor the rest of the freemen wouldsuffer Caius Caesar, a general, who had merited so well of the republic, after performing such great achievements, to be excluded from their townand walls; wherefore he ought to pay some regard to the opinion ofposterity, and his own danger. Alarmed at this declaration, Attius Varusdrew out of the town the garrison which he had introduced, and fled. Afew of Caesar's front rank having pursued him, obliged him to halt, andwhen the battle began, Varus is deserted by his troops: some of themdisperse to their homes, the rest come over to Caesar; and along withthem, Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion, is taken prisoner and broughtto Caesar. He had held the same rank before in Cneius Pompey's army. ButCaesar applauded the soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at liberty, returnedthanks to the people of Auximum, and promised to be grateful for theirconduct. 

XIV. --Intelligence of this being brought to Rome, so great a panicspread on a sudden that when Lentulus, the consul, came to open thetreasury, to deliver money to Pompey by the senate's decree, immediatelyon opening the hallowed door he fled from the city. For it was falselyrumoured that Caesar was approaching, and that his cavalry were alreadyat the gates. Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and so did most ofthe magistrates. Cneius Pompey had left the city the day before, and wason his march to those legions which he had received from Caesar, and haddisposed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levies were stopped withinthe city. No place on this side of Capua was thought secure. At Capuathey first began to take courage and to rally, and determined to raiselevies in the colonies, which had been sent thither by the Julian law:and Lentulus brought into the public market-place the gladiators whichCaesar maintained there for the entertainment of the people, andconfirmed them in their liberty, and gave them horses and ordered themto attend him; but afterwards, being warned by his friends that thisaction was censured by the judgment of all, he distributed them amongthe slaves of the districts of Campania, to keep guard there. 

XV. --Caesar, having moved forward from Auximum, traversed the wholecountry of Picenum. All the governors in these countries most cheerfullyreceived him, and aided his army with every necessary. Ambassadors cameto him even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had laid out and builtat his own expense, and offered most earnestly to comply with hisorders. He demanded soldiers: they sent them. In the meantime, thetwelfth legion came to join Caesar; with these two he marched toAsculum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus Spinther occupied that townwith ten cohorts; but, on being informed of Caesar's approach, he fledfrom the town, and, in attempting to bring off his cohorts with him, wasdeserted by a great part of his men. Being left on the road with a smallnumber, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by Pompey intoPicenum to confirm the people [in their allegiance]. Vibullius, beinginformed by him of the transactions in Picenum, takes his soldiers fromhim and dismisses him. He collects, likewise, from the neighbouringcountries, as many cohorts as he can from Pompey's new levies. Amongstthem he meets with Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum, with sixcohorts, which he had in the garrison there; by a junction with which hemade up thirteen cohorts. With them he marched by hasty journeys toCorfinium, to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed him that Caesar wasadvancing with two legions. Domitius had collected about twenty cohortsfrom Alba, and the Marsians, Pelignians, and neighbouring states. 

XVI. --Caesar, having recovered Asculum and driven out Lentulus, orderedthe soldiers that had deserted from him to be sought out and a muster tobe made; and, having delayed for one day there to provide corn, hemarched to Corfinium. On his approach, five cohorts, sent by Domitiusfrom the town, were breaking down a bridge which was over the river, atthree miles' distance from it. An engagement taking place there withCaesar's advanced-guard, Domitius's men were quickly beaten off from thebridge and retreated precipitately into the town. Caesar, having marchedhis legions over, halted before the town and encamped close by thewalls. 

XVII. --Domitius, upon observing this, sent messengers well acquaintedwith the country, encouraged by a promise of being amply rewarded, withdespatches to Pompey to Apulia, to beg and entreat him to come to hisassistance. That Caesar could be easily enclosed by the two armies, through the narrowness of the country, and prevented from obtainingsupplies: unless he did so, that he and upwards of thirty cohorts, and agreat number of senators and Roman knights, would be in extreme danger. In the meantime he encouraged his troops, disposed engines on the walls, and assigned to each man a particular part of the city to defend. In aspeech to the soldiers he promised them lands out of his own estate; toevery private soldier four acres, and a corresponding share to thecenturions and veterans. 

XVIII. --In the meantime, word was brought to Caesar that the people ofSulmo, a town about seven miles distant from Corfinium, were ready toobey his orders, but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, andAttius, a Pelignian, who were in possession of the town with a garrisonof seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius thither, with five cohorts ofthe eighth legion. The inhabitants, as soon as they saw our standards, threw open their gates, and all the people, both citizens and soldiers, went out to meet and welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Attius leaped offthe walls. Attius, being brought before Antonius, begged that he mightbe sent to Caesar. Antonius returned the same day on which he had setout with the cohorts and Attius. Caesar added these cohorts to his ownarmy, and sent Attius away in safety. The three first days Caesaremployed in fortifying his camp with strong works, in bringing in cornfrom the neighbouring free towns, and waiting for the rest of hisforces. Within the three days the eighth legion came to him, andtwenty-two cohorts of the new levies in Gaul, and about three hundredhorse from the king of Noricum. On their arrival he made a second campon another part of the town, and gave the command of it to Curio. Hedetermined to surround the town with a rampart and turrets during theremainder of the time. Nearly at the time when the greatest part of thework was completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey returned. 

XIX. --Having read Pompey's letter, Domitius, concealing the truth, gaveout in council that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance; andencouraged them not to despond, but to provide everything necessary forthe defence of the town. He held private conferences with a few of hismost intimate friends, and determined on the design of fleeing. AsDomitius's countenance did not agree with his words, and he dideverything with more confusion and fear than he had shown on thepreceding days, and as he had several private meetings with his friends, contrary to his usual practice, in order to take their advice, and as heavoided all public councils and assemblies of the people, the truthcould be no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had written back inanswer, "That he would not put matters to the last hazard; that Domitiushad retreated into the town of Corfinium, without either his advice orconsent. Therefore, if any opportunity should offer, he [Domitius]should come to him with the whole force. " But the blockade and worksround the town prevented his escape. 

XX. --Domitius's design being noised abroad, the soldiers in Confinium[**error in original: should be CORFINIUM] early in the evening began tomutiny, and held a conference with each other by their tribunes andcenturions, and the most respectable amongst themselves: "that they werebesieged by Caesar; that his works and fortifications were almostfinished; that their general, Domitius, on whose hopes and expectationsthey had confided, had thrown them off, and was meditating his ownescape; that they ought to provide for their own safety. " At first theMarsians differed in opinion, and possessed themselves of that part ofthe town which they thought the strongest. And so violent a disputearose between them, that they attempted to fight and decide it by arms. However, in a little time, by messengers sent from one side to theother, they were informed of Domitius's meditated flight, of which theywere previously ignorant. Therefore they all with one consent broughtDomitius into public view, gathered round him, and guarded him; and sentdeputies out of their number to Caesar, to say that they were ready tothrow open their gates, to do whatever he should order, and to deliverup Domitius alive into his hands. 

XXI. --Upon intelligence of these matters, though Caesar thought it ofgreat consequence to become master of the town as soon as possible, andto transfer the cohorts to his own camp, lest any change should bewrought on their inclinations by bribes, encouragement, or fictitiousmessages, because in war great events are often brought about bytrifling circumstances; yet, dreading lest the town should be plunderedby the soldiers entering into it, and taking advantage of the darknessof the night, he commended the persons who came to him, and sent themback to the town, and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. Hedisposed his soldiers on the works, which he had begun, not at certainintervals, as was his practice before, but in one continued range ofsentinels and stations, so that they touched each other, and formed acircle round the whole fortification; he ordered the tribunes andgeneral officers to ride round; and exhorted them not only to be ontheir guard against sallies from the town, but also to watch that nosingle person should get out privately. Nor was any man so negligent ordrowsy as to sleep that night. To so great height was their expectationraised, that they were carried away, heart and soul, each to differentobjects, what would become of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what ofLentulus, what of the rest; what event would be the consequence ofanother. 

XXII. --About the fourth watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our sentinelsand guards from the walls, that he desired to have an interview withCaesar, if permission were given him. Having obtained it, he wasescorted out of town; nor did the soldiers of Domitius leave him tillthey brought him into Caesar's presence. He pleaded with Caesar for hislife, and entreated him to spare him, and reminded him of their formerfriendship; and acknowledged that Caesar's favours to him were verygreat; in that through his interest he had been admitted into thecollege of priests; in that after his praetorship he had been appointedto the government of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him in hissuit for the consulate. Caesar interrupted him in his speech, and toldhim, "that he had not left his province to do mischief [to any man], butto protect himself from the injuries of his enemies; to restore to theirdignity the tribunes of the people who had been driven out of the cityon his account, and to assert his own liberty, and that of the Romanpeople, who were oppressed by a few factious men. " Encouraged by thisaddress, Lentulus begged leave to return to the town, that the securitywhich he had obtained for himself might be an encouragement to the restto hope for theirs; saying that some were so terrified that they wereinduced to make desperate attempts on their own lives. Leave beinggranted him, he departed. 

XXIII. --When day appeared Caesar ordered all the senators and theirchildren, the tribunes of the soldiers, and the Roman knights, to bebrought before him. Among the persons of senatorial rank were LuciusDomitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Vibullius Rufus, SextusQuintilius Varus, the quaestor, and Lucius Rubrius, besides the son ofDomitius, and several other young men, and a great number of Romanknights and burgesses, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipaltowns. When they were brought before him he protected them from theinsolence and taunts of the soldiers; told them in few words that theyhad not made him a grateful return, on their part, for his veryextraordinary kindness to them, and dismissed them all in safety. Sixtysestertia, which Domitius had brought with him and lodged in the publictreasury, being brought to Caesar by the magistrates of Corfinium, hegave them back to Domitius, that he might not appear more moderate withrespect to the life of men than in money matters, though he knew that itwas public money, and had been given by Pompey to pay his army. Heordered Domitius's soldiers to take the oath to himself, and that daydecamped and performed the regular march. He stayed only seven daysbefore Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the country of theMarrucinians, Frentanians, and Larinates. 

XXIV. --Pompey, being informed of what had passed at Corfinium, marchesfrom Luceria to Canusium, and thence to Brundusium. He orders all theforces raised everywhere by the new levies to repair to him. He givesarms to the slaves that attended the flocks, and appoints horses forthem. Of these he made up about three hundred horse. Lucius, thepraetor, fled from Alba, with six cohorts: Rutilus Lupus, the praetor, from Tarracina, with three. These having descried Caesar's cavalry at adistance, which were commanded by Bivius Curius, and having deserted thepraetor, carried their colours to Curius and went over to him. In likemanner during the rest of his march, several cohorts fell in with themain body of Caesar's army, others with his horse. Cneius Magius, fromCremona, engineer-general to Pompey, was taken prisoner on the road andbrought to Caesar, but sent back by him to Pompey with this message: "Ashitherto he had not been allowed an interview, and was now on his marchto him at Brundusium, that it deeply concerned the commonwealth andgeneral safety that he should have an interview with Pompey; and thatthe same advantage could not be gained at a great distance when theproposals were conveyed to them by others, as if terms were argued bythem both in person. "

XXV. --Having delivered this message he marched to Brundusium with sixlegions, four of them veterans: the rest those which he had raised inthe late levy and completed on his march, for he had sent all Domitius'scohorts immediately from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that theconsuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable part of the army, and that Pompey remained at Brundusium with twenty cohorts; but couldnot find out, for a certainty, whether Pompey stayed behind to keeppossession of Brundusium, that he might the more easily command thewhole Adriatic sea, with the extremities of Italy and the coast ofGreece, and be able to conduct the war on either side of it, or whetherhe remained there for want of shipping; and, being afraid that Pompeywould come to the conclusion that he ought not to relinquish Italy, hedetermined to deprive him of the means of communication afforded by theharbour of Brundusium. The plan of his work was as follows:--Where themouth of the port was narrowest he threw up a mole of earth on eitherside, because in these places the sea was shallow. Having gone out sofar that the mole could not be continued in the deep water, he fixeddouble floats, thirty feet on either side, before the mole. These hefastened with four anchors at the four corners, that they might not becarried away by the waves. Having completed and secured them, he thenjoined to them other floats of equal size. These he covered over withearth and mould, that he might not be prevented from access to them todefend them, and in the front and on both sides he protected them with aparapet of wicker work; and on every fourth one raised a turret, twostories high, to secure them the better from being attacked by theshipping and set on fire. 

XXVI. --To counteract this, Pompey fitted out large merchant ships, whichhe found in the harbour of Brundusium: on them he erected turrets threestories high, and, having furnished them with several engines and allsorts of weapons, drove them amongst Caesar's works, to break throughthe floats and interrupt the works; thus there happened skirmishes everyday at a distance with slings, arrows, and other weapons. Caesarconducted matters as if he thought that the hopes of peace were not yetto be given up. And though he was very much surprised that Magius, whomhe had sent to Pompey with a message, was not sent back to him; andthough his attempting a reconciliation often retarded the vigorousprosecution of his plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means topersevere in the same line of conduct. He therefore sent CaniniusRebilus to have an interview with Scribonius Libo, his intimate friendand relation. He charges him to exhort Libo to effect a peace, but, above all things, requires that he should be admitted to an interviewwith Pompey. He declared that he had great hopes, if that were allowedhim, that the consequence would be that both parties would lay downtheir arms on equal terms; that a great share of the glory andreputation of that event would redound to Libo, if, through his adviceand agency, hostilities should be ended. Libo, having parted from theconference with Caninius, went to Pompey, and, shortly after, returnswith answer that, as the consuls were absent, no treaty of compositionscould be engaged in without them. Caesar therefore thought it time atlength to give over the attempt which he had often made in vain, and actwith energy in the war. 

XXVII. --When Caesar's works were nearly half finished, and after ninedays were spent in them, the ships which had conveyed the first divisionof the army to Dyrrachium being sent back by the consuls, returned toBrundusium. Pompey, either frightened at Caesar's works or determinedfrom the beginning to quit Italy, began to prepare for his departure onthe arrival of the ships; and the more effectually to retard Caesar'sattack, lest his soldiers should force their way into the town at themoment of his departure, he stopped up the gates, built walls across thestreets and avenues, sunk trenches across the ways, and in them fixedpalisadoes and sharp stakes, which he made level with the ground bymeans of hurdles and clay. But he barricaded with large beams fastenedin the ground and sharpened at the ends two passages and roads withoutthe walls, which led to the port. After making these arrangements, heordered his soldiers to go on board without noise, and disposed here andthere, on the wall and turrets, some light-armed veterans, archers andslingers. These he designed to call off by a certain signal, when allthe soldiers were embarked, and left row-galleys for them in a secureplace. 

XXVIII. --The people of Brundusium, irritated by the insolence ofPompey's soldiers, and the insults received from Pompey himself, were infavour of Caesar's party. Therefore, as soon as they were aware ofPompey's departure, whilst his men were running up and down, and busiedabout their voyage, they made signs from the tops of the houses: Caesar, being apprized of the design by them, ordered scaling ladders to be gotready, and his men to take arms, that he might not lose any opportunityof coming to an action. Pompey weighed anchor at nightfall. The soldierswho had been posted on the wall to guard it, were called off by thesignal which had been agreed on, and knowing the roads, ran down to theships. Caesar's soldiers fixed their ladders and scaled the walls: butbeing cautioned by the people to beware of the hidden stakes and coveredtrenches, they halted, and being conducted by the inhabitants by a longcircuit, they reached the port, and captured with their long boats andsmall craft two of Pompey's ships, full of soldiers, which had struckagainst Caesar's moles. 

XXIX. -Though Caesar highly approved of collecting a fleet, and crossingthe sea, and pursuing Pompey before he could strengthen himself with histransmarine auxiliaries, with the hope of bringing the war to aconclusion, yet he dreaded the delay and length of time necessary toeffect it: because Pompey, by collecting all his ships, had deprived himof the means of pursuing him at present. The only resource left toCaesar, was to wait for a fleet from the distant regions of Gaul, Picenum, and the straits of Gibraltar. But this, on account of theseason of the year, appeared tedious and troublesome. He was unwillingthat, in the meantime, the veteran army, and the two Spains, one ofwhich was bound to Pompey by the strongest obligations, should beconfirmed in his interest; that auxiliaries and cavalry should beprovided and Gaul and Italy reduced in his absence. 

XXX. --Therefore, for the present, he relinquished all intention ofpursuing Pompey, and resolved to march to Spain, and commanded themagistrates of the free towns to procure him ships, and to have themconveyed to Brundusium. He detached Valerius, his lieutenant, with onelegion to Sardinia; Curio, the proprietor, to Sicily with three legions;and ordered him, when he had recovered Sicily, to immediately transporthis army to Africa. Marcus Cotta was at this time governor of Sardinia:Marcus Cato, of Sicily: and Tubero, by the lots, should have had thegovernment of Africa. The Caralitani, as soon as they heard thatValerius was sent against them, even before he left Italy, of their ownaccord drove Cotta out of the town; who, terrified because he understoodthat the whole province was combined [against him], fled from Sardiniato Africa. Cato was in Sicily, repairing the old ships of war, anddemanding new ones from the states, and these things he performed withgreat zeal. He was raising levies of Roman citizens, among the Lucaniand Brutii, by his lieutenants, and exacting a certain quota of horseand foot from the states of Sicily. When these things were nearlycompleted, being informed of Curio's approach, he made a complaint thathe was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who had undertaken anunnecessary war, without making any preparation, and when questioned byhim and other members in the senate, had assured them that every thingwas ready and provided for the war. After having made these complaintsin a public assembly, he fled from his province. 

XXXI. --Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio, Sicily, deserted by theirgovernors when they arrived there with their armies. When Tubero arrivedin Africa, he found Attius Varus in the government of the province, who, having lost his cohorts, as already related, at Auximum, had straightwayfled to Africa, and finding it without a governor, had seized it of hisown accord, and making levies, had raised two legions. From hisacquaintance with the people and country, and his knowledge of thatprovince, he found the means of effecting this; because a few yearsbefore, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had obtained thatprovince. He, when Tubero came to Utica with his fleet, prevented hisentering the port or town, and did not suffer his son, though labouringunder sickness, to set foot on shore; but obliged him to weigh anchorand quit the place. 

XXXIL. --When these affairs were despatched, Caesar, that there might bean intermission from labour for the rest of the season, drew off hissoldiers to the nearest municipal towns, and set off in person for Rome. Having assembled the senate, he reminded them of the injustice of hisenemies; and told them, "That he aimed at no extraordinary honour, buthad waited for the time appointed by law, for standing candidate for theconsulate, being contented with what was allowed to every citizen. Thata bill had been carried by the ten tribunes of the people(notwithstanding the resistance of his enemies, and a very violentopposition from Cato, who in his usual manner, consumed the day by atedious harangue) that he should be allowed to stand candidate, thoughabsent, even in the consulship of Pompey; and if the latter disapprovedof the bill, why did he allow it to pass? if he approved of it, whyshould he debar him [Caesar] from the people's favour? He made mentionof his own patience, in that he had freely proposed that all armiesshould be disbanded, by which he himself would suffer the loss both ofdignity and honour. He urged the virulence of his enemies, who refusedto comply with what they required from others, and had rather that allthings should be thrown into confusion, than that they should lose theirpower and their armies. He expatiated on their injustice, in taking awayhis legions: their cruelty and insolence in abridging the privileges ofthe tribunes; the proposals he had made, and his entreaties of aninterview, which had been refused him: For which reasons, he begged anddesired that they would undertake the management of the republic, andunite with him in the administration of it. But if through fear theydeclined it, he would not be a burden to them, but take the managementof it on himself. That deputies ought to be sent to Pompey, to propose areconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey had lately asserted inthe senate, that authority was acknowledged to be vested in thosepersons to whom ambassadors were sent, and fear implied in those thatsent them. That these were the sentiments of low, weak minds: that forhis part, as he had made it his study to surpass others in glory, so hewas desirous of excelling them in justice and equity. "

XXXIII. --The senate approved of sending deputies, but none could befound fit to execute the commission: for every person, from his ownprivate fears, declined the office. For Pompey, on leaving the city, haddeclared in the open senate, that he would hold in the same degree ofestimation, those who stayed in Rome and those in Caesar's camp. Thusthree days were wasted in disputes and excuses. Besides, LuciusMetellus, one of the tribunes, was suborned by Caesar's enemies, toprevent this, and to embarrass everything else which Caesar shouldpropose. Caesar having discovered his intention, after spending severaldays to no purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose anymore time, and went to Transalpine Gaul, without effecting what he hadintended. 

XXXIV. --On his arrival there, he was informed that, Vibullius Rufus, whom he had taken a few days before at Corfinium, and set at liberty, was sent by Pompey into Spain; and that Domitius also was gone to seizeMassilia with seven row-galleys, which were fitted up by some privatepersons at Igilium and Cosa, and which he had manned with his ownslaves, freedmen, and colonists: and that some young noblemen ofMassilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey, when leaving Rome hadexhorted, that the late services of Caesar should not erase from theirminds the memory of his former favours. On receiving this message, theMassilians had shut their gates against Caesar, and invited over to themthe Albici, who had formerly been in alliance with them, and whoinhabited the mountains that overhung Massilia: they had likewiseconveyed the corn from the surrounding country, and from all the fortsinto the city; had opened armouries in the city: and were repairing thewalls, the fleet, and the gates. 

XXXV. --Caesar sent for fifteen of the principal persons of Massilia toattend him. To prevent the war commencing among them, he remonstrates[in the following language]; "that they ought to follow the precedentset by all Italy, rather than submit to the will of any one man. " Hemade use of such arguments as he thought would tend to bring them toreason. The deputies reported his speech to their countrymen, and by theauthority of the state bring him back this answer: "That they understoodthat the Roman people was divided into two factions: that they hadneither judgment nor abilities to decide which had the juster cause; butthat the heads of these factions were Cneius Pompey and Caius Caesar, the two patrons of the state: the former of whom had granted to theirstate the lands of the Volcae Arecomici, and Helvii; the latter hadassigned them a part of his conquests in Gaul, and had augmented theirrevenue. Wherefore, having received equal favours from both, they oughtto show equal affection to both, and assist neither against the other, nor admit either into their city or harbours. "

XXXVI. --Whilst this treaty was going forward, Domitius arrived atMassilia with his fleet, and was received into the city, and madegovernor of it. The chief management of the war was entrusted to him. Athis command they send the fleet to all parts; they seize all themerchantmen they could meet with, and carry them into the harbour; theyapply the nails, timber, and rigging, with which they were furnished torig and refit their other vessels. They lay up in the public stores, allthe corn that was found in the ships, and reserve the rest of theirlading and convoy for the siege of the town, should such an event takeplace. Provoked at such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions againstMassilia, and resolved to provide turrets, and vinae to assault thetown, and to build twelve ships at Arelas, which being completed andrigged in thirty days (from the time the timber was cut down), and beingbrought to Massilia, he put under the command of Decimus Brutus; andleft Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to invest the city. 

XXXVII. --Whilst he was preparing and getting these things in readiness, he sent Caius Fabius one of his lieutenants into Spain with threelegions, which he had disposed in winter quarters in Narbo, and theneighbouring country; and ordered him immediately to seize the passes ofthe Pyrenees, which were at that time occupied by detachments fromLucius Afranius, one of Pompey's lieutenants. He desired the otherlegions, which were passing the winter at a great distance, to followclose after him. Fabius, according to his orders, by using expedition, dislodged the party from the hills, and by hasty marches came up withthe army of Afranius. 

XXXVIII. --On the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have alreadymentioned, Pompey had sent into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, his lieutenants (one of whom had the command of Hither Spain, with threelegions; the second of the country from the forest of Castulo to theriver Guadiana with two legions; the third from the river Guadiana tothe country of the Vettones and Lusitania, with the like number oflegions), divided amongst themselves their respective departments. Petreius was to march from Lusitania through the Vettones, and joinAfranius with all his forces; Varro was to guard all Further Spain withwhat legions he had. These matters being settled, reinforcements ofhorse and foot were demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius; from theCeltiberi, Cantabri, and all the barbarous nations which border on theocean, by Afranius. When they were raised, Petreius immediately marchedthrough the Vettones to Afranius. They resolved by joint consent tocarry on the war in the vicinity of Ilerda, on account of the advantagesof its situation. 

XXXIX. --Afranius, as above mentioned, had three legions, Petreius two. There were besides about eighty cohorts raised in Hither and FurtherSpain (of which, the troops belonging to the former province hadshields, those of the latter targets), and about five thousand horseraised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions into Spain, withabout six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, which hadserved under him in all his former wars, and the same number from Gaul, which he himself had provided, having expressly called out all the mostnoble and valiant men of each state. The bravest of these were from theAquitani and the mountaineers, who border on the Province in Gaul. Hehad been informed that Pompey was marching through Mauritania with hislegions to Spain, and would shortly arrive. He at the same time borrowedmoney from the tribunes and centurions, which he distributed amongst hissoldiers. By this proceeding he gained two points; he secured theinterest of the centurions by this pledge in his hands, and by hisliberality he purchased the affections of his army. 

XL. --Fabius sounded the inclinations of the neighbouring states byletters and messengers. He had made two bridges over the river Segre, atthe distance of four miles from each other. He sent foraging partiesover these bridges, because he had already consumed all the forage thatwas on his side of the river. The generals of Pompey's army did almostthe same thing, and for the same reason: and the horse had frequentskirmishes with each other. When two of Fabius's legions had, as wastheir constant practice, gone forth as the usual protection to theforagers, and had crossed the river, and the baggage, and all the horsewere following them, on a sudden, from the weight of the cattle, and themass of water, the bridge fell, and all the horse were cut off from themain army, which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from the timberand hurdles that were carried down the river, Afranius immediatelycrossed his own bridge, which communicated between his camp and thetown, with four legions and all the cavalry, and marched againstFabius's two legions. When his approach was announced, Lucius Plancus, who had the command of those legions, compelled by the emergency, tookpost on a rising ground; and drew up his army with two fronts, that itmight not be surrounded by the cavalry. Thus, though engaged withsuperior numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions and thehorse. When the battle was begun by the horse, there were observed at adistance by both sides the colours of two legions, which Caius Fabiushad sent round by the further bridge to reinforce our men, suspecting, as the event verified, that the enemy's generals would take advantage ofthe opportunity which fortune had put in their way, to attack our men. Their approach put an end to the battle, and each general led back hislegions to their respective camps. 

XLI. --In two days after Caesar came to the camp with nine hundred horse, which he had retained for a bodyguard. The bridge which had been brokendown by the storm was almost repaired, and he ordered it to be finishedin the night. Being acquainted with the nature of the country, he leftbehind him six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and all hisbaggage, and the next day set off in person for Ilerda, with all hisforces drawn up in three lines, and halted just before the camp ofAfranius, and having remained there a short time under arms, he offeredhim battle on equal terms. When this offer was made, Afranius drew outhis forces, and posted them on the middle of a hill, near his camp. WhenCaesar perceived that Afranius declined coming to an engagement, heresolved to encamp at somewhat less than half a mile's distance from thevery foot of the mountain; and that his soldiers whilst engaged in theirworks, might not be terrified by any sudden attack of the enemy, ordisturbed in their work, he ordered them not to fortify it with a wall, which must rise high, and be seen at a distance, but draw, on the frontopposite the enemy, a trench fifteen feet broad. The first and secondlines continued under arms as was from the first appointed. Behind themthe third line was carrying on the work without being seen; so that thewhole was completed before Afranius discovered that the camp was beingfortified. 

XLII. --In the evening Caesar drew his legions within this trench, andrested them under arms the next night. The day following he kept hiswhole army within it, and as it was necessary to bring materials from aconsiderable distance, he for the present pursued the same plan in hiswork; and to each legion, one after the other, he assigned one side ofthe camp to fortify, and ordered trenches of the same magnitude to becut: he kept the rest of the legions under arms without baggage tooppose the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, to frighten us and obstruct thework, drew out their forces at the very foot of the mountain, andchallenged us to battle. Caesar, however, did not interrupt his work, relying on the protection of the three legions, and the strength of thefosse. After staying for a short time, and advancing no great distancefrom the bottom of the hill, they led back their forces to their camp. The third day Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, and ordered theother cohorts which he had left in the upper camp, and his baggage to beremoved to it. 

XLIIL-Between the town of Ilerda and the next hill, on which Afraniusand Petreius were encamped, there was a plain about three hundred pacesbroad, and near the middle of it an eminence somewhat raised above thelevel: Caesar hoped that if he could get possession of this and fortifyit, he should be able to cut off the enemy from the town, the bridge, and all the stores which they had laid up in the town. In expectation ofthis he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his army inan advantageous position, he ordered the advanced men of one legion tohasten forward and seize the eminence. Upon intelligence of this thecohorts which were on guard before Afranius's camp were instantly sent anearer way to occupy the same post. The two parties engage, and asAfranius's men had reached the eminence first, our men were repulsed, and, on a reinforcement being sent, they were obliged to turn theirbacks and retreat to the standards of legions. 

XLIV. --The manner of fighting of those soldiers was to run forward withgreat impetuosity and boldly take a post, and not to keep their ranksstrictly, but to fight in small scattered parties: if hard pressed theythought it no disgrace to retire and give up the post, being accustomedto this manner of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarousnations; for it commonly happens that soldiers are strongly influencedby the customs of those countries in which they have spent much time. This method, however, alarmed our men, who were not used to such adescription of warfare. For they imagined that they were about to besurrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who ran forward fromtheir ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their ranks, and notto quit their colours, nor, without good reason, to give up the postwhich they had taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, thelegion which was stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, butretreated to the next hill. 

XLV. --Almost the whole army being daunted at this, because it hadoccurred contrary to their expectations and custom, Caesar encouragedhis men and led the ninth legion to their relief, and checked theinsolent and eager pursuit of the enemy, and obliged them, in theirturn, to show their backs and retreat to Ilerda, and take post under thewalls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, being over zealous torepair the dishonour which had been sustained, having rashly pursued thefleeing enemy, advanced into disadvantageous ground and went up to thefoot of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built. And when theywished to retire they were again attacked by the enemy from the risingground. The place was craggy in the front and steep on either side, andwas so narrow that even three cohorts, drawn up in order of battle, would fill it; but no relief could be sent on the flanks, and the horsecould be of no service to them when hard pressed. From the town, indeed, the precipice inclined with a gentle slope for near four hundred paces. Our men had to retreat this way, as they had, through their eagerness, advanced too inconsiderately. The greatest contest was in this place, which was much to the disadvantage of our troops, both on account of itsnarrowness, and because they were posted at the foot of the mountain, sothat no weapon was thrown at them without effect: yet they exerted theirvalour and patience, and bore every wound. The enemy's forces wereincreasing, and cohorts were frequently sent to their aid from the campthrough the town, that fresh men might relieve the weary. Caesar wasobliged to do the same, and relieve the fatigued by sending cohorts tothat post. 

XLVI. --After the battle had in this manner continued incessantly forfive hours, and our men had suffered much from superior numbers, havingspent all their javelins, they drew their swords and charged the enemyup the hill, and, having killed a few, obliged the rest to fly. Thecohorts being beaten back to the wall, and some being driven by theirfears into the town, an easy retreat was afforded to our men. Ourcavalry also, on either flank, though stationed on sloping or lowground, yet bravely struggled up to the top of the hill, and, ridingbetween the two armies, made our retreat more easy and secure. Such werethe various turns of fortune in the battle. In the first encounter aboutseventy of our men fell: amongst them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurionof the second line of the fourteenth legion, who, for his extraordinaryvalour, had been promoted from the lower ranks to that post. About sixhundred were wounded. Of Afranius's party there were killed TitusCaecilius, principal centurion, and four other centurions, and above twohundred men. 

XLVII. --But this opinion is spread abroad concerning this day, that eachparty thought that they came off conquerors. Afranius's soldiers, because, though they were esteemed inferior in the opinion of all, yetthey had stood our attack and sustained our charge, and, at first, hadkept the post and the hill which had been the occasion of the dispute;and, in the first encounter, had obliged our men to fly: but ours, because, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground and thedisparity of numbers, they had maintained the battle for five hours, hadadvanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced the enemy to fly fromthe higher ground and driven them into the town. The enemy fortified thehill, about which the contest had been, with strong works, and posted agarrison on it. 

XLVIII. --In two days after this transaction, there happened anunexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreedthat there were never seen higher floods in those countries; it sweptdown the snow from all the mountains, and broke over the banks of theriver, and in one day carried away both the bridges which Fabius hadbuilt, --a circumstance which caused great difficulties to Caesar's army. For as our camp, as already mentioned, was pitched between two rivers, the Segre and Cinca, and as neither of these could be forded for thespace of thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined within thesenarrow limits. Neither could the states, which had espoused Caesar'scause, furnish him with corn, nor the troops, which had gone far toforage, return, as they were stopped by the waters: nor could theconvoys, coming from Italy and Gaul, make their way to the camp. Besides, it was the most distressing season of the year, when there wasno corn in the blade, and it was nearly ripe: and the states wereexhausted, because Afranius had conveyed almost all the corn, beforeCaesar's arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left, had beenalready consumed by Caesar. The cattle, which might have served as asecondary resource against want, had been removed by the states to agreat distance on account of the war. They who had gone out to getforage or corn, were chased by the light troops of the Lusitanians, andthe targeteers of Hither Spain, who were well acquainted with thecountry, and could readily swim across the river, because it is thecustom of all those people not to join their armies without bladders. 

XLIX. --But Afranius's army had abundance of everything; a great stock ofcorn had been provided and laid in long before, a large quantity wascoming in from the whole province: they had a good store of forage. Thebridge of Ilerda afforded an opportunity of getting all these withoutany danger, and the places beyond the bridge, to which Caesar had noaccess, were as yet untouched. 

L. --Those floods continued several days. Caesar endeavoured to repairthe bridges, but the height of the water did not allow him: and thecohorts disposed along the banks did not suffer them to be completed;and it was easy for them to prevent it, both from the nature of theriver and the height of the water, but especially because their dartswere thrown from the whole course of the bank on one confined spot; andit was no easy matter at one and the same time to execute a work in avery rapid flood, and to avoid the darts. 

LI. --Intelligence was brought to Afranius that the great convoys, whichwere on their march to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from theRutheni, and horse from the Gauls, with a long train of baggage, according to the Gallic custom of travelling, had arrived there; therewere besides about six thousand people of all descriptions, with slavesand freed men. But there was no order, or regular discipline, as everyone followed his own humour, and all travelled without apprehension, taking the same liberty as on former marches. There were several youngnoblemen, sons of senators, and of equestrian rank; there wereambassadors from several states; there were lieutenants of Caesar's. Theriver stopped them all. To attack them by surprise, Afranius set out inthe beginning of the night, with all his cavalry and three legions, andsent the horse on before, to fall on them unawares; but the Gallic horsesoon got themselves in readiness, and attacked them. Though but few, they withstood the vast number of the enemy, as long as they fought onequal terms: but when the legions began to approach, having lost a fewmen, they retreated to the next mountains. The delay occasioned by thisbattle was of great importance to the security of our men; for havinggained time, they retired to the higher grounds. There were missing thatday about two hundred bow-men, a few horse, and an inconsiderable numberof servants and baggage. 

LII. --However, by all these things, the price of provisions was raised, which is commonly a disaster attendant, not only on a time of presentscarcity, but on the apprehension of future want. Provisions had nowreached fifty denarii each bushel; and the want of corn had diminishedthe strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were increasingevery day: and so great an alteration was wrought in a few days, andfortune had so changed sides, that our men had to struggle with the wantof every necessary; while the enemy had an abundant supply of allthings, and were considered to have the advantage. Caesar demanded fromthose states which had acceded to his alliance, a supply of cattle, asthey had but little corn. He sent away the camp followers to the moredistant states, and endeavoured to remedy the present scarcity by everyresource in his power. 

LIII. --Afranius and Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller and morecircumstantial accounts of these things to Rome, to their acquaintances. Report exaggerated them so that the war appeared to be almost at an end. When these letters and despatches were received at Rome, a greatconcourse of people resorted to the house of Afranius, andcongratulations ran high: several went out of Italy to Cneius Pompey;some of them, to be the first to bring him the intelligence; others, that they might not be thought to have waited the issue of the war, andto have come last of all. 

LIV. --When Caesar's affairs were in this unfavourable position, and allthe passes were guarded by the soldiers and horse of Afranius, and thebridges could not be prepared, Caesar ordered his soldiers to make shipsof the kind that his knowledge of Britain a few years before had taughthim. First, the keels and ribs were made of light timber, then, the restof the hulk of the ships was wrought with wicker-work, and covered overwith hides. When these were finished, he drew them down to the river inwaggons in one night, a distance of twenty-two miles from his camp, andtransported in them some soldiers across the river, and on a sudden tookpossession of a hill adjoining the bank. This he immediately fortified, before he was perceived by the enemy. To this he afterwards transporteda legion: and having begun a bridge on both sides, he finished it in twodays. By this means, he brought safe to his camp the convoys, and thosewho had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a conveyance for theprovisions. 

LV. --The same day he made a great part of his horse pass the river, who, falling on the foragers by surprise as they were dispersed without anysuspicions, intercepted an incredible number of cattle and people; andwhen some Spanish light-armed cohorts were sent to reinforce the enemy, our men judiciously divided themselves into two parts, the one toprotect the spoil, the other to resist the advancing foe, and to beatthem back, and they cut off from the rest and surrounded one cohort, which had rashly ventured out of the line before the others, and afterputting it to the sword, returned safe with considerable booty to thecamp over the same bridge. 

LVI. --Whilst these affairs are going forward at Ilerda, the Massilians, adopting the advice of Domitius, prepared seventeen ships of war, ofwhich eleven were decked. To these they add several smaller vessels, that our fleet might be terrified by numbers: they man them with a greatnumber of archers and of the Albici, of whom mention has been alreadymade, and these they incited by rewards and promises. Domitius requiredcertain ships for his own use, which he manned with colonists andshepherds, whom he had brought along with him. A fleet being thusfurnished with every necessary, he advanced with great confidenceagainst our ships, commanded by Decimus Brutus. It was stationed at anisland opposite to Massilia. 

LVII. --Brutus was much inferior in number of ships; but Caesar hadappointed to that fleet the bravest men selected from all his legions, antesignani and centurions, who had requested to be employed in thatservice. They had provided iron hooks and harpoons, and had furnishedthemselves with a vast number of javelins, darts, and missiles. Thusprepared, and being apprised of the enemy's approach, they put out fromthe harbour, and engaged the Massilians. Both sides fought with greatcourage and resolution; nor did the Albici, a hardy people, bred on thehighlands and inured to arms, fall much short of our men in valour: andbeing lately come from the Massilians, they retained in their mindstheir recent promises: and the wild shepherds, encouraged by the hope ofliberty, were eager to prove their zeal in the presence of theirmasters. 

LVIII. --The Massilians themselves, confiding in the quickness of theirships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the shock, and as long as they were permitted by clear space, lengthening theirline they endeavoured to surround us, or to attack single ships withseveral of theirs, or to run across our ships, and carry away our oars, if possible; but when necessity obliged them to come nearer, they hadrecourse, from the skill and art of the pilots, to the valour of themountaineers. But our men, not having such expert seamen, or skilfulpilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, andwere not yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging, weremoreover impeded by the heaviness and slowness of our vessels, whichhaving been built in a hurry and of green timber, were not so easilymanoeuvred. Therefore, when Caesar's men had an opportunity of a closeengagement, they cheerfully opposed two of the enemy's ships with one oftheirs. And throwing in the grappling irons, and holding both shipsfast, they fought on both sides of the deck, and boarded the enemy's;and having killed numbers of the Albici and shepherds, they sank some oftheir ships, took others with the men on board, and drove the rest intothe harbour. That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including thosethat were taken. 

LIX. --When news of this battle was brought to Caesar at Ilerda, thebridge being completed at the same time, fortune soon took a turn. Theenemy, daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the country asfreely or as boldly as before: but sometimes advancing a small distancefrom the camp, that they might have a ready retreat, they foraged withinnarrower bounds: at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid ouroutposts and parties of horse; or having sustained some loss, ordescried our horse at a distance, they fled in the midst of theirexpedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at length they resolvedto leave off foraging for several days, and, contrary to the practice ofall nations, to go out at night. 

LX. --In the meantime the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were underthe government of the Oscenses, send ambassadors to Caesar, and offer tosubmit to his orders. They are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani, and Ausetani, and in a few days more by the Illurgavonenses, who dwellnear the river Ebro. He requires of them all to assist him with corn, towhich they agreed, and having collected all the cattle in the country, they convey them into his camp. One entire cohort of theIllurgavonenses, knowing the design of their state, came over to Caesar, from the place where they were stationed, and carried their colours withthem. A great change is shortly made in the face of affairs. The bridgebeing finished, five powerful states being joined to Caesar, a wayopened for the receiving of corn, and the rumours of the assistance oflegions which were said to be on their march, with Pompey at their head, through Mauritania, having died away, several of the more distant statesrevolt from Afranius, and enter into league with Caesar. 

LXI. --Whilst the spirits of the enemy were dismayed at these things, Caesar, that he might not be always obliged to send his horse a longcircuit round by the bridge, having found a convenient place, began tosink several drains, thirty feet deep, by which he might draw off a partof the river Segre, and make a ford over it. When these were almostfinished, Afranius and Petreius began to be greatly alarmed, lest theyshould be altogether cut off from corn and forage, because Caesar wasvery strong in cavalry. They therefore resolved to quit their posts, andto transfer the war to Celtiberia. There was, moreover, a circumstancethat confirmed them in this resolution: for of the two adverse parties, that which had stood by Sertorius in the late war, being conquered byPompey, still trembled at his name and sway, though absent: the otherwhich had remained firm in Pompey's interest, loved him for the favourswhich they had received: but Caesar's name was not known to thebarbarians. From these they expected considerable aid, both of horse andfoot, and hoped to protract the war till winter, in a friendly country. Having come to this resolution, they gave orders to collect all theships in the river Ebro, and to bring them to Octogesa, a town situatedon the river Ebro, about twenty miles distant from their camp. At thispart of the river, they ordered a bridge to be made of boats fastenedtogether, and transported two legions over the river Segre, andfortified their camp with a rampart, twelve feet high. 

LXII. --Notice of this being given by the scouts, Caesar continued hiswork day and night, with very great fatigue to the soldiers, to drainthe river, and so far effected his purpose, that the horse were bothable and bold enough, though with some difficulty and danger, to passthe river; but the foot had only their shoulders and upper part of theirbreast above the water, so that their fording it was retarded, not onlyby the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of the current. However, almost at the same instant, news was received of the bridgebeing nearly completed over the Ebro, and a ford was found in the Segre. 

LXIII. --Now indeed the enemy began to think that they ought to hastentheir march. Accordingly, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the garrisonat Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with their whole force, and formed onecamp with the two legions which they had led across a few days before. Caesar had no resource, but to annoy and cut down their rear; since withhis cavalry to go by the bridge, required him to take a long circuit; sothat they would arrive at the Ebro by a much shorter route. The horse, which he had detached, crossed the ford, and when Afranius and Petreiushad broken up their camp about the third watch, they suddenly appearedon their rear, and spreading round them in great numbers, began toretard and impede their march. 

LXIV. --At break of day, it was perceived from the rising grounds whichjoined Caesar's camp, that their rear was vigorously pressed by ourhorse; that the last line sometimes halted and was broken; at othertimes, that they joined battle and that our men were beaten back by ageneral charge of their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued them whenthey wheeled about: but through the whole camp the soldiers gathered inparties, and declared their chagrin that the enemy had been suffered toescape from their hands and that the war had been unnecessarilyprotracted. They applied to their tribunes and centurions, and entreatedthem to inform Caesar that he need not spare their labour or considertheir danger; that they were ready and able, and would venture to fordthe river where the horse had crossed. Caesar, encouraged by their zealand importunity, though he felt reluctant to expose his army to a riverso exceedingly large, yet judged it prudent to attempt it and make atrial. Accordingly, he ordered all the weaker soldiers, whose spirit orstrength seemed unequal to the fatigue, to be selected from eachcentury, and left them, with one legion besides, to guard the camp: therest of the legions he drew out without any baggage, and, havingdisposed a great number of horses in the river, above and below theford, he led his army over. A few of his soldiers being carried away bythe force of the current, were stopped by the horse and taken up, andnot a man perished. His army being safe on the opposite bank, he drewout his forces and resolved to lead them forward in three battalions:and so great was the ardour of the soldiers that, notwithstanding theaddition of a circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fordingthe river, before the ninth hour of the day they came up with those whohad set out at the third watch. 

LXV. --When Afranius, who was in company with Petreius, saw them at adistance, being affrighted at so unexpected a sight, he halted on arising ground and drew up his army. Caesar refreshed his army on theplain that he might not expose them to battle whilst fatigued; and whenthe enemy attempted to renew their march, he pursued and stopped them. They were obliged to pitch their camp sooner than they had intended, forthere were mountains at a small distance; and difficult and narrow roadsawaited them about five miles off. They retired behind these mountainsthat they might avoid Caesar's cavalry, and, placing parties in thenarrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead their own forcesacross the Ebro without danger or apprehension. This it was theirinterest to attempt and to effect by any means possible; but, fatiguedby the skirmishes all day, and by the labour of their march, theydeferred it till the following day: Caesar likewise encamped on the nexthill. 

LXVI. --About midnight a few of their men who had gone some distance fromthe camp to fetch water, being taken by our horse, Caesar is informed bythem that the generals of the enemy were drawing their troops out of thecamp without noise. Upon this information Caesar ordered the signal tobe given and the military shout to be raised for packing up the baggage. When they heard the shout, being afraid lest they should be stopped inthe night and obliged to engage under their baggage, or lest they shouldbe confined in the narrow roads by Caesar's horse, they put a stop totheir march and kept their forces in their camp. The next day Petreiuswent out privately with a few horse to reconnoitre the country. Asimilar movement was made from Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa wasdetached with a small party to explore the nature of the country. Eachreturned with the same account to his camp, that there was a level roadfor the next five miles, that there then succeeded a rough andmountainous country. Whichever should first obtain possession of thedefiles would have no trouble in preventing the other's progress. 

LXVII. --There was a debate in the council between Afranius and Petreius, and the time of marching was the subject. The majority were of opinionthat they should begin their march at night, "for they might reach thedefiles before they should be discovered. " Others, because a shout hadbeen raised the night before in Caesar's camp, used this as an argumentthat they could not leave the camp unnoticed: "that Caesar's cavalrywere patrolling the whole night, and that all the ways and roads werebeset; that battles at night ought to be avoided, because in civildissension, a soldier once daunted is more apt to consult his fears thanhis oath; that the daylight raised a strong sense of shame in the eyesof all, and that the presence of the tribunes and centurions had thesame effect: by these things the soldiers would be re strained and awedto their duty. Wherefore they should, by all means, attempt to forcetheir way by day; for, though a trifling loss might be sustained, yetthe post which they desired might be secured with safety to the mainbody of the army. " This opinion prevailed in the council, and the nextday, at the dawn, they resolved to set forward. 

LXVIII. --Caesar, having taken a view of the country, the moment the skybegan to grow white, led his forces from the camp and marched at thehead of his army by a long circuit, keeping to no regular road; for theroad which led to the Ebro and Octogesa was occupied by the enemy'scamp, which lay in Caesar's way. His soldiers were obliged to crossextensive and difficult valleys. Craggy cliffs, in several places, interrupted their march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed toone another, and the soldiers were forced to perform a great part oftheir march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. But nota man murmured at the fatigue, because they imagined that there would bea period to all their toils if they could cut off the enemy from theEbro and intercept their convoys. 

LXIX. --At first, Afranius's soldiers ran in high spirits from their campto look at us, and in contumelious language upbraided us, "that we wereforced, for want of necessary subsistence, to run away, and return toIlerda. " For our route was different from what we proposed, and weappeared to be going a contrary way. But their generals applauded theirown prudence in keeping within their camp, and it was a strongconfirmation of their opinion, that they saw we marched without waggonsor baggage, which made them confident that we could not long endurewant. But when they saw our army gradually wheel to the right, andobserved our van was already passing the line of their camp, there wasnobody so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think it necessary tomarch from the camp immediately, and oppose us. The cry to arms wasraised, and all the army, except a few which were left to guard thecamp, set out and marched the direct road to the Ebro. 

LXX. --The contest depended entirely on despatch, which should first getpossession of the defile and the mountain. The difficulty of the roadsdelayed Caesar's army, but his cavalry pursuing Afranius's forces, retarded their march. However, the affair was necessarily reduced tothis point, with respect to Afranius's men, that if they first gainedthe mountains, which they desired, they would themselves avoid alldanger, but could not save the baggage of their whole army, nor thecohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which, beingintercepted by Caesar's army, by no means could assistance be given. Caesar first accomplished the march, and having found a plain behindlarge rocks, drew up his army there in order of battle and facing theenemy. Afranius, perceiving that his rear was galled by our cavalry, andseeing the enemy before him, having come to a hill, made a halt on it. Thence he detached four cohorts of Spanish light infantry to the highestmountain which was in view: to this he ordered them to hasten with allexpedition, and to take possession of it, with the intention of going tothe same place with all his forces, then altering his route, andcrossing the hills to Octogesa. As the Spaniards were making towards itin an oblique direction, Caesar's horse espied them and attacked them, nor were they able to withstand the charge of the cavalry even for amoment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces in the sight of thetwo armies. 

LXXI. --There was now an opportunity for managing affairs successfully, nor did it escape Caesar, that an army daunted at suffering such a lossbefore their eyes, could not stand, especially as they were surroundedby our horse, and the engagement would take place on even and openground. To this he was importuned on all sides. The lieutenants, centurions, and tribunes, gathered round him, and begged "that he wouldnot hesitate to begin the battle: that the hearts of all the soldierswere very anxious for it: that Afranius's men had by severalcircumstances betrayed signs of fear; in that they had not assistedtheir party; in that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did notsustain the charge of our cavalry, but crowding their standards into oneplace, did not observe either rank or order. But if he had anyapprehensions from the disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunitywould be given him of coming to battle in some other place: for thatAfranius must certainly come down, and would not be able to remain therefor want of water. "

LXXII. --Caesar had conceived hopes of ending the affair without anengagement, or without striking a blow, because he had cut off theenemy's supplies. Why should he hazard the loss of any of his men, evenin a successful battle? Why should he expose soldiers to be wounded; whohad deserved so well of him? Why, in short, should he tempt fortune?especially when it was as much a general's duty to conquer by tactics, as by the sword. Besides, he was moved with compassion for thosecitizens, who, he foresaw, must fall: and he had rather gain his objectwithout any loss or injury to them. This resolution of Caesar was notgenerally approved of; but the soldiers openly declared to each other, that since such an opportunity of victory was let pass, they would notcome to an engagement, even when Caesar should wish it. He perseveredhowever in his resolution, and retired a little from that place to abatethe enemy's fears. Petreius and Afranius, having got this opportunity, retired to their camp. Caesar, having disposed parties on the mountains, and cut off all access to the Ebro, fortified his camp as close to theenemy as he could. 

LXXIII. --The day following, the generals of his opponents, being alarmedthat they had lost all prospect of supplies, and of access to the Ebro, consulted as to what other course they should take. There were tworoads, one to Ilerda, if they chose to return, the other to Tarraco, ifthey should march to it. Whilst they were deliberating on these matters, intelligence was brought them that their watering parties were attackedby our horse: upon which information, they dispose several parties ofhorse and auxiliary foot along the road, and intermix some legionarycohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart from the camp to the water, that they might be able to procure water within their lines, bothwithout fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius divided thistask between themselves, and went in person to some distance from theircamp for the purpose of seeing it accomplished. 

LXXIV. --The soldiers having obtained by their absence a free opportunityof conversing with each other, came out in great numbers, and inquiredeach for whatever acquaintance or fellow citizen he had in our camp, andinvited him to him. First they returned them general thanks for sparingthem the day before, when they were greatly terrified, and acknowledgedthat they were alive through their kindness; then they inquired aboutthe honour of our general, and whether they could with safety entrustthemselves to him; and declared their sorrow that they had not done soin the beginning, and that they had taken up arms against theirrelations and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conferences, they desired thegeneral's parole for the lives of Petreius and Afranius, that they mightnot appear guilty of a crime, in having betrayed their generals. Whenthey were assured of obtaining their demands, they promised that theywould immediately remove their standards, and sent centurions of thefirst rank as deputies to treat with Caesar about a peace. In themeantime some of them invite their acquaintances, and bring them totheir camp, others are brought away by their friends, so that the twocamps seemed to be united into one, and several of the tribunes andcenturions came to Caesar, and paid their respects to him. The same wasdone by some of the nobility of Spain, whom they summoned to theirassistance, and kept in their camp as hostages. They inquired aftertheir acquaintance and friends, by whom each might have the means ofbeing recommended to Caesar. Even Afranius's son, a young man, endeavoured by means of Sulpitius the lieutenant, to make terms for hisown and his father's life. Every place was filled with mirth andcongratulations; in the one army, because they thought they had escapedso impending danger; in the other, because they thought they hadcompleted so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in everyman's judgment, reaped the advantage of his former lenity, and hisconduct was applauded by all. 

LXXV. --When these circumstances were announced to Afranius, he left thework which he had begun, and returned to his camp determined, as itappeared, whatever should be the event to bear it with an even andsteady mind. Petreius did not neglect himself; he armed his domestics;with them and the praetorian cohort of Spaniards, and a few foreignhorse, his dependants, whom he commonly kept near him to guard hisperson, he suddenly flew to the rampart, interrupted the conferences ofthe soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put to death as many ashe caught. The rest formed into a body, and, being alarmed by theunexpected danger, wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and drewtheir swords, and in this manner, depending on the nearness of theircamp, defended themselves against the Spaniards, and the horse, and madegood their retreat to the camp, where they were protected by thecohorts, which were on guard. 

LXXVI. --Petreius, after accomplishing this, went round every maniple, calling the soldiers by their names and entreating with tears, that theywould not give up him and their absent general Pompey, as a sacrifice tothe vengeance of their enemies. Immediately they ran in crowds to thegeneral's pavilion, when he required them all to take an oath that theywould not desert nor betray the army nor the generals, nor form anydesign distinct from the general interest. He himself swore first to thetenor of those words, and obliged Afranius to take the same oath. Thetribunes and centurions followed their example; the soldiers werebrought out by centuries, and took the same oath. They gave orders, thatwhoever had any of Caesar's soldiers should produce them; as soon asthey were produced, they put them to death publicly in the praetorium, but most of them concealed those that they had entertained, and let themout at night over the rampart. Thus the terror raised by the generals, the cruelty of the punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removedall hopes of surrender for the present, changed the soldiers' minds, andreduced matters to the former state of war. 

LXXVII. --Caesar ordered the enemy's soldiers, who had come into his campto hold a conference, to be searched for with the strictest diligence, and sent back. But of the tribunes and centurions, several voluntarilyremained with him, and he afterwards treated them with great respect. The centurions he promoted to higher ranks, and conferred on the Romanknights the honour of tribunes. 

LXXVIII. --Afranius's men were distressed in foraging, and procured waterwith difficulty. The legionary soldiers had a tolerable supply of corn, because they had been ordered to bring from Ilerda sufficient to lasttwenty-two days; the Spanish and auxiliary forces had none, for they hadbut few opportunities of procuring any, and their bodies were notaccustomed to bear burdens; and therefore a great number of them cameover to Caesar every day. Their affairs were under these difficulties;but of the two schemes proposed, the most expedient seemed to be toreturn to Ilerda, because they had left some corn there; and there theyhoped to decide on a plan for their future conduct. Tarraco lay at agreater distance; and in such a space they knew affairs might admit ofmany changes. Their design having met with approbation, they set outfrom their camp. Caesar having sent forward his cavalry, to annoy andretard their rear, followed close after with his legions. Not a momentpassed in which their rear was not engaged with our horse. 

LXXIX. --Their manner of fighting was this: the light cohorts closedtheir rear, and frequently made a stand on the level grounds. If theyhad a mountain to ascend, the very nature of the place readily securedthem from any danger; for the advanced guards, from the rising grounds, protected the rest in their ascent. When they approached a valley ordeclivity, and the advanced men could not impart assistance to thetardy, our horse threw their darts at them from the rising grounds withadvantage; then their affairs were in a perilous situation; the onlyplan left was, that whenever they came near such places, they shouldgive orders to the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse ourhorse; and these being forced to give way, they should suddenly, withthe utmost speed, run all together down to the valley, and having passedit, should face about again on the next hill. For so far were they fromderiving any assistance from their horse (of which they had a largenumber), that they were obliged to receive them into the centre of theirarmy, and themselves protect them, as they were daunted by formerbattles. And on their march no one could quit the line without beingtaken by Caesar's horse. 

LXXX. --Whilst skirmishes were fought in this manner, they advanced butslowly and gradually, and frequently halted to help their rear, as thenhappened. For having advanced four miles, and being very much harassedby our horse, they took post on a high mountain, and there entrenchedthemselves on the front only, facing the enemy; and did not take theirbaggage off their cattle. When they perceived that Caesar's camp waspitched, and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to forage, theysuddenly rushed out about twelve o'clock the same day, and, having hopesthat we should be delayed by the absence of our horse, they began tomarch, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with the legions thatremained. He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and ordered theforagers to be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to followhim. The horse shortly returned to their daily duty on march, andcharged the rear so vigorously, that they almost forced them to fly; andseveral privates and some centurions were killed. The main body ofCaesar's army was at hand, and universal ruin threatened them. 

LXXXI. --Then indeed, not having opportunity either to choose aconvenient position for their camp, or to march forward, they wereobliged to halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and on groundnaturally unfavourable. But for the reasons already given, Caesar didnot attack them, nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his menmight be the readier to pursue them whether they attempted to run off bynight or by day. Observing the defect in their position, they spent thewhole night in extending their works, and turn their camp to ours. Thenext day, at dawn, they do the same, and spend the whole day in thatmanner, but in proportion as they advanced their works, and extendedtheir camp, they were farther distant from the water; and one evil wasremedied by another. The first night, no one went out for water. Thenext day, they left a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces towater: but not a person was sent to look for forage. Caesar was moredesirous that they should be humbled by these means, and forced to cometo terms, than decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavoured tosurround them with a wall and trench, that he might be able to checktheir most sudden sally, to which he imagined that they must haverecourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that they might be thereadier for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle. 

LXXXII. --In this work, and the deliberations on it, two days were spent. By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's works was finished. Tointerrupt his progress, they drew out their legions about the eighthhour, by a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle beforetheir camp. Caesar calling his legions off from their work, and orderingthe horse to hold themselves in readiness, marshalled his army: for toappear to decline an engagement contrary to the opinion of the soldiersand the general voice, would have been attended with great disadvantage. But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded from wishing toengage, and the more especially, because the short space between thecamps, even if the enemy were put to flight, would not contribute muchto a decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from eachother above two thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by thearmies, and one third left for the soldiers to charge and make theirattack. If a battle should be begun, the nearness of the camps wouldafford a ready retreat to the conquered party in the flight. For thisreason Caesar had resolved to make resistance, if they attacked him, butnot to be the first to provoke the battle. 

LXXXIII. --Afranius's five legions were drawn up in two lines, theauxiliary cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves. Caesarhad three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed thefirst line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: andthree others were behind these. The slingers and archers were stationedin the centre of the line; the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostilearmies being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined to adhereto his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a battle, unless forced toit; Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the matter wasdeferred, and both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they bothreturned to their camp. The next day Caesar prepared to finish the workswhich he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the river Segre by aford. Caesar, having perceived this, sent some light-armed Germans and aparty of horse across the river, and disposed several parties along thebanks to guard them. 

LXXXIV. --At length, beset on all sides, their cattle having been fourdays without fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg aconference; and that, if possible, in a place remote from the soldiers. When this was refused by Caesar, but a public interview offered if theychose it, Afranius's son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met inthe place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing of both armies, Afraniusspoke thus: "That Caesar ought not to be displeased either with him orhis soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment to their general, Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently discharged their duty tohim, and had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the want ofevery necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts, they wereprevented from procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; andwere not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: butconfessed themselves vanquished: and begged and entreated, if there wasany room left for mercy, that they should not be necessitated to sufferthe most severe penalties. " These sentiments were delivered in the mostsubmissive and humble language. 

LXXXV. --Caesar replied, "That either to complain or sue for mercy becameno man less than him: for that every other person had done their duty:himself, in having declined to engage on favourable terms, in anadvantageous situation and time, that all things tending to a peacemight be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having preserved andprotected the men whom they had in their power, notwithstanding theinjuries which they had received, and the murder of their comrades; andeven Afranius's soldiers, who of themselves treated about concluding apeace, by which they thought that they would secure the lives of all. Thus, that the parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that thegenerals only were averse to peace: that they paid no regard to the lawseither of conference or truce; and had most inhumanly put to deathignorant persons, who were deceived by a conference: that therefore, they had met that fate which usually befalls men from excessiveobstinacy and arrogance; and were obliged to have recourse, and mostearnestly desire that which they had shortly before disdained. That forhis part, he would not avail himself of their present humiliation, orhis present advantage, to require terms by which his power might beincreased, but only that those armies, which they had maintained for somany years to oppose him, should be disbanded: for six legions had beensent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many and powerfulfleets provided, and generals of great military experience sent tocommand them, for no other purpose than to oppose him; that none ofthese measures were adopted to keep the Spains in peace, or for the useof the province, which, from the length of the peace, stood in need ofno such aid; that all these things were long since designed against him:that against him a new sort of government was established, that the sameperson should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of thecity; and though absent, have the government of two most warlikeprovinces for so many years: that against him the laws of themagistrates had been altered; that the late praetors and consuls shouldnot be sent to govern the provinces as had been the constant custom, butpersons approved of and chosen by a faction. That against him the excuseof age was not admitted: but persons of tried experience in former warswere called up to take the command of the armies, that with respect tohim only, the routine was not observed which had been allowed to allgenerals, that, after a successful war, they should return home anddisband their armies, if not with some mark of honour, at least withoutdisgrace: that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and wouldstill submit to them: nor did he now desire to take their army from themand keep it to himself (which, however, would not be a difficultmatter), but only that they should not have it to employ against him:and therefore, as he said before, let them quit the provinces, anddisband their army. If this was complied with, he would injure noperson; that these were the last and only conditions of peace. "

LXXXVI. --It was very acceptable and agreeable to Afranius's soldiers, asmight be easily known from their signs of joy, that they who expectedsome injury after this defeat, should obtain without solicitation thereward of a dismissal. For when a debate was introduced about the placeand time of their dismissal, they all began to express, both by wordsand signs, from the rampart where they stood, that they should bedischarged immediately: for although every security might be given thatthey would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain, if it wasdeferred to a future day. After a short debate on either side, it wasbrought to this issue: that those who had any settlement or possessionin Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest at the river Var. Caesar gave security that they should receive no damage, and that noperson should be obliged against his inclination to take the militaryoath under him. 

LXXXVII. --Caesar promised to supply them with corn from the presenttime, till they arrived at the river Var. He further adds, that whateverany of them lost in the war, which was in the possession of hissoldiers, should be restored to those that lost them. To his soldiers hemade a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation beingmade. Whatever disputes Afranius's soldiers had afterwards amongstthemselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar's decision. Afraniusand Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions, a sedition almostbreaking out, asserted that the time had not yet come, and required thatCaesar should take cognizance of it: and both parties were content withhis decision. About a third part of their army being dismissed in twodays, Caesar ordered two of his legions to go before, the rest to followthe vanquished enemy: that they should encamp at a small distance fromeach other. The execution of this business he gave in charge to QuintusFufius Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to his directions, they marched from Spain to the river Var, and there the rest of the armywas disbanded. 

BOOK II

I. --Whilst these things were going forward in Spain, Caius Trebonius, Caesar's lieutenant, who had been left to conduct the assault ofMassilia, began to raise a mound, vineae, and turrets against the town, on two sides: one of which was next the harbour and docks, the other onthat part where there is a passage from Gaul and Spain to that sea whichforces itself up the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed almoston three sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is the only sidewhich has access by land. A part even of this space, which reaches tothe fortress, being fortified by the nature of the country, and a verydeep valley, required a long and difficult siege. To accomplish theseworks, Caius Trebonius sends for a great quantity of carriages and menfrom the whole Province, and orders hurdles and materials to befurnished. These things being provided, he raised a mound eighty feet inheight. 

II. --But so great a store of everything necessary for a war had been along time before laid up in the town, and so great a number of engines, that no vineae made of hurdles could withstand their force. For polestwelve feet in length, pointed with iron, and these too shot from verylarge engines, sank into the ground through four rows of hurdles. Therefore the arches of the vineae were covered over with beams a footthick, fastened together, and under this the materials of the agger werehanded from one to another. Before this was carried a testudo sixty feetlong, for levelling the ground, made also of very strong timber, andcovered over with every thing that was capable of protecting it againstthe fire and stones thrown by the enemy. But the greatness of the works, the height of the wall and towers, and the multitude of engines retardedthe progress of our works. Besides, frequent sallies were made from thetown by the Albici, and fire was thrown on our mound and turrets. Theseour men easily repulsed, and, doing considerable damage to those whosallied, beat them back into the town. 

III. --In the meantime, Lucius Nasidius, being sent by Cneius Pompey witha fleet of sixteen sail, a few of which had beaks of brass, to theassistance of Lucius Domitius and the Massilians, passed the straits ofSicily without the knowledge or expectation of Curio, and, putting withhis fleet into Messana, and making the nobles and senate take flightwith the sudden terror, carried off one of their ships out of dock. Having joined this to his other ships, he made good his voyage toMassilia, and, having sent in a galley privately, acquaints Domitius andthe Massilians of his arrival, and earnestly encourages them to hazardanother battle with Brutus's fleet with the addition of his aid. 

IV. --The Massilians, since their former loss, had brought the samenumber of old ships from the docks, and had repaired and fitted them outwith great industry: they had a large supply of seamen and pilots. Theyhad got several fishing-smacks, and covered them over, that the seamenmight be secure against darts: these they filled with archers andengines. With a fleet thus appointed, encouraged by the entreaties andtears of all the old men, matrons, and virgins to succour the state inthis hour of distress, they went on board with no less spirit andconfidence than they had fought before. For it happens, from a commoninfirmity of human nature, that we are more flushed with confidence, ormore vehemently alarmed at things unseen, concealed, and unknown, as wasthe case then. For the arrival of Lucius Nasidius had filled the statewith the most sanguine hopes and wishes. Having got a fair wind, theysailed out of port and went to Nasidius to Taurois, which is a fortbelonging to the Massilians, and there ranged their fleet and againencouraged each other to engage, and communicated their plan ofoperation. The command of the right division was given to theMassilians, that of the left to Nasidius. 

V. --Brutus sailed to the same place with an augmented fleet: for tothose made by Caesar at Arelas were added six ships taken from theMassilians, which he had refitted since the last battle and hadfurnished with every necessary. Accordingly, having encouraged his mento despise a vanquished people whom they had conquered when yetunbroken, he advanced against them full of confidence and spirit. FromTrebonius's camp and all the higher grounds it was easy to see into thetown--how all the youth which remained in it, and all persons of moreadvanced years, with their wives and children, and the public guards, were either extending their hands from the wall to the heavens, or wererepairing to the temples of the immortal gods, and, prostratingthemselves before their images, were entreating them to grant themvictory. Nor was there a single person who did not imagine that hisfuture fortune depended on the issue of that day; for the choice oftheir youth and the most respectable of every age, being expresslyinvited and solicited, had gone on board the fleet, that if any adversefate should befall them they might see that nothing was left for them toattempt, and, if they proved victorious, they might have hopes ofpreserving the city, either by their internal resources or by foreignassistance. 

VI-. -When the battle was begun, no effort of valour was wanting to theMassilians, but, mindful of the instructions which they had a littlebefore received from their friends, they fought with such spirit as ifthey supposed that they would never have another opportunity to attempta defence, and as if they believed that those whose lives should beendangered in the battle would not long precede the fate of the rest ofthe citizens, who, if the city was taken, must undergo the same fortuneof war. Our ships being at some distance from each other, room wasallowed both for the skill of their pilots and the manoeuvring of theirships; and if at any time ours, gaining an advantage by casting the ironhooks on board their ships, grappled with them, from all parts theyassisted those who were distressed. Nor, after being joined by theAlbici, did they decline coming to close engagement, nor were they muchinferior to our men in valour. At the same time, showers of darts, thrown from a distance from the lesser ships, suddenly inflicted severalwounds on our men when off their guard and otherwise engaged; and two oftheir three-decked galleys, having descried the ship of Decimus Brutus, which could be easily distinguished by its flag, rowed up against himwith great violence from opposite sides: but Brutus, seeing into theirdesigns, by the swiftness of his ship extricated himself with suchaddress as to get clear, though only by a moment. From the velocity oftheir motion they struck against each other with such violence that theywere both excessively injured by the shock; the beak, indeed, of one ofthem being broken off, the whole ship was ready to founder, whichcircumstance being observed, the ships of Brutus's fleet, which werenearest that station, attack them when in this disorder and sink themboth. 

VII. --But Nasidius's ships were of no use, and soon left the fight; forthe sight of their country, or the entreaties of their relations, didnot urge them to run a desperate risk of their lives. Therefore, of thenumber of the ships not one was lost: of the fleet of the Massiliansfive were sunk, four taken, and one ran off with Nasidius: all thatescaped made the best of their way to Hither Spain, but one of the restwas sent forward to Massilia for the purpose of bearing thisintelligence, and when it came near the city, the whole people crowdedout to hear the tidings, and on being informed of the event, were sooppressed with grief, that one would have imagined that the city hadbeen taken by an enemy at the same moment. The Massilians, however, began to make the necessary preparations for the defence of their citywith unwearied energy. 

VIII. --The legionary soldiers who had the management of the works on theright side observed, from the frequent sallies of the enemy, that itmight prove a great protection to them to build a turret of brick underthe wall for a fort and place of refuge, which they at first built lowand small, [to guard them] against sudden attacks. To it they retreated, and from it they made defence if any superior force attacked them; andfrom it they sallied out either to repel or pursue the enemy. Itextended thirty feet on every side, and the thickness of the walls wasfive feet. But afterwards, as experience is the best master ineverything on which the wit of man is employed, it was found that itmight be of considerable service if it was raised to the usual height ofturrets, which was effected in the following manner. 

IX. -When the turret was raised to the height for flooring, they laid iton the walls in such a manner that the ends of the joists were coveredby the outer face of the wall, that nothing should project to which theenemy's fire might adhere. They, moreover, built over the joists withsmall bricks as high as the protection of the plutei and vineaepermitted them; and on that place they laid two beams across, angle-ways, at a small distance from the outer walls, to support the rafterswhich were to cover the turret, and on the beams they laid joists acrossin a direct line, and on these they fastened down planks. These joiststhey made somewhat longer, to project beyond the outside of the wall, that they might serve to hang a curtain on them to defend and repel allblows whilst they were building the walls between that and the nextfloor, and the floor of this story they faced with bricks and mortar, that the enemy's fire might do them no damage; and on this they spreadmattresses, lest the weapons thrown from engines should break throughthe flooring, or stones from catapults should batter the brickwork. They, moreover, made three mats of cable ropes, each of them the lengthof the turret walls, and four feet broad, and, hanging them round theturret on the three sides which faced the enemy, fastened them to theprojecting joists. For this was the only sort of defence which, they hadlearned by experience in other places, could not be pierced by darts orengines. But when that part of the turret which was completed wasprotected and secured against every attempt of the enemy, they removedthe plutei to other works. They began to suspend gradually, and raise byscrews from the first-floor, the entire roof of the turret, and thenthey elevated it as high as the length of the mats allowed. Hid andsecured within these coverings, they built up the walls with bricks, andagain, by another turn of the screw, cleared a place for themselves toproceed with the building; and, when they thought it time to lay anotherfloor, they laid the ends of the beams, covered in by the outer bricksin like manner as in the first story, and from that story they againraised the uppermost floor and the mat-work. In this manner, securelyand without a blow or danger, they raised it six stories high, and inlaying the materials left loop-holes in such places as they thoughtproper for working their engines. 

X. --When they were confident that they could protect the works which layaround from this turret, they resolved to build a musculus, sixty feetlong, of timber, two feet square, and to extend it from the brick towerto the enemy's tower and wall. This was the form of it: two beams ofequal length were laid on the ground, at the distance of four feet fromeach other; and in them were fastened small pillars, five feet high, which were joined together by braces, with a gentle slope, on which thetimber which they must place to support the roof of the musculus shouldbe laid: upon this were laid beams, two feet square, bound with ironplates and nails. To the upper covering of the musculus and the upperbeams, they fastened laths, four fingers square, to support the tileswhich were to cover the musculus. The roof being thus sloped and laidover in rows in the same manner as the joists were laid on the braces, the musculus was covered with tiles and mortar, to secure it againstfire, which might be thrown from the wall. Over the tiles hides arespread, to prevent the water let in on them by spouts from dissolvingthe cement of the bricks. Again, the hides were covered over withmattresses, that they might not be destroyed by fire or stones. Thesoldiers under the protection of the vineae, finish this whole work tothe very tower, and suddenly, before the enemy were aware of it, movedit forward by naval machinery, by putting rollers under it, close up tothe enemy's turret, so that it even touched the building. 

XI. --The townsmen, affrighted at this unexpected stroke, bring forwardwith levers the largest stones they can procure; and pitching them fromthe wall, roll them down on the musculus. The strength of the timberwithstood the shock; and whatever fell on it slid off, on account of thesloping roof. When they perceived this, they altered their plan and setfire to barrels, filled with resin and tar, and rolled them down fromthe wall on the musculus. As soon as they fell on it, they slid offagain, and were removed from its side by long poles and forks. In themeantime, the soldiers, under cover of the musculus, were looting outwith crowbars the lowest stones of the enemy's turret, with which thefoundation was laid. The musculus was defended by darts, thrown fromengines by our men from the brick tower, and the enemy were beaten offfrom the wall and turrets; nor was a fair opportunity of defending thewalls given them. At length several stones being picked away from thefoundation of that turret next the musculus, part of it fell downsuddenly, and the rest, as if following it, leaned forward. 

XII. --Hereupon, the enemy, distressed at the sudden fall of the turret, surprised at the unforeseen calamity, awed by the wrath of the gods, anddreading the pillage of their city, rush all together out of the gateunarmed, with their temples bound with fillets, and suppliantly stretchout their hands to the officers and the army. At this uncommonoccurrence, the whole progress of the war was stopped, and the soldiers, turning away from the battle, ran eagerly to hear and listen to them. When the enemy came up to the commanders and the army, they all felldown at their feet, and besought them "to wait till Caesar's arrival;they saw that their city was taken, our works completed, and their towerundermined, therefore they desisted from a defence; that no obstaclecould arise, to prevent their being instantly plundered at a beck, assoon as he arrived, if they refused to submit to his orders. " Theyinform them that, "if the turret had entirely fallen down, the soldierscould not be withheld from forcing into the town and sacking it, inhopes of getting spoil. " These and several other arguments to the sameeffect were delivered, as they were a people of great learning, withgreat pathos and lamentations. 

XIII. --The lieutenants, moved with compassion, draw off the soldiersfrom the work, desist from the assault, and leave sentinels on theworks. A sort of a truce having been made through compassion for thebesieged, the arrival of Caesar is anxiously awaited; not a dart wasthrown from the walls or by our men, but all remit their care anddiligence, as if the business was at an end. For Caesar had givenTrebonius strict charge not to suffer the town to be taken by storm, lest the soldiers, too much irritated both by abhorrence of theirrevolt, by the contempt shown to them, and by their long labour, shouldput to the sword all the grown-up inhabitants, as they threatened to do. And it was with difficulty that they were then restrained from breakinginto the town, and they were much displeased, because they imagined thatthey were prevented by Trebonius from taking possession of it. 

XIV. --But the enemy, destitute of all honour, only waited a time andopportunity for fraud and treachery. And after an interval of some days, when our men were careless and negligent, on a sudden, at noon, whensome were dispersed, and others indulging themselves in rest on the veryworks, after the fatigue of the day, and their arms were all laid by andcovered up, they sallied out from the gates, and, the wind being highand favourable to them, they set fire to our works; and the wind spreadit in such a manner that, in the same instant, the agger, plutei, testudo, tower, and engines all caught the flames and were consumedbefore we could conceive how it had occurred. Our men, alarmed at suchan unexpected turn of fortune, lay hold on such arms as they could find. Some rush from the camp; an attack is made on the enemy: but they wereprevented, by arrows and engines from the walls, from pursuing them whenthey fled. They retired to their walls, and there, without fear, set themusculus and brick tower on fire. Thus, by the perfidy of the enemy andthe violence of the storm, the labour of many months was destroyed in amoment. The Massilians made the same attempt the next day, having gotsuch another storm. They sallied out against the other tower and agger, and fought with more confidence. But as our men had on the formeroccasion given up all thoughts of a contest, so, warned by the event ofthe preceding day, they had made every preparation for a defence. Accordingly, they slew several, and forced the rest to retreat into thetown without effecting their design. 

XV. --Trebonius began to provide and repair what had been destroyed, withmuch greater zeal on the part of the soldiers; for when they saw thattheir extraordinary pains and preparations had an unfortunate issue, they were fired with indignation that, in consequence of the impiousviolation of the truce, their valour should be held in derision. Therewas no place left them from which the materials for their mound could befetched, in consequence of all the timber, far and wide, in theterritories of the Massilians, having been cut down and carried away;they began therefore to make an agger of a new construction, never heardof before, of two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and to lay floorsover them of almost the same breadth with the agger, made of timber. Butwherever the space between the walls, or the weakness of the timber, seemed to require it, pillars were placed underneath and traversed beamslaid on to strengthen the work, and the space which was floored wascovered over with hurdles, and the hurdles plastered over with mortar. The soldiers, covered overhead by the floor, on the right and left bythe wall, and in the front by the mantlets, carried whatever materialswere necessary for the building without danger: the business was soonfinished--the loss of their laborious work was soon repaired by thedexterity and fortitude of the soldiers. Gates for making sallies wereleft in the wall in such places as they thought proper. 

XVI. --But when the enemy perceived that those works, which they hadhoped could not be replaced without a great length of time, were putinto so thorough repair by a few days' labour and diligence, that therewas no room for perfidy or sallies, and that no means were left them bywhich they could either hurt the men by resistance or the works by fire, and when they found by former examples that their town could besurrounded with a wall and turrets on every part by which it wasaccessible by land, in such a manner that they could not have room tostand on their own fortifications, because our works were built almoston the top of their walls by our army, and darts could be thrown fromour hands, and when they perceived that all advantage arising from theirengines, on which they had built great hopes, was totally lost, and thatthough they had an opportunity of fighting with us on equal terms fromwalls and turrets, they could perceive that they were not equal to ourmen in bravery, they had recourse to the same proposals of surrender asbefore. 

XVII. --In Further Spain, Marcus Varro, in the beginning of thedisturbances, when he heard of the circumstances which took place inItaly, being diffident of Pompey's success, used to speak in a veryfriendly manner of Caesar. That though, being pre-engaged to CneiusPompey in quality of lieutenant, he was bound in honour to him, that, nevertheless, there existed a very intimate tie between him and Caesar;that he was not ignorant of what was the duty of a lieutenant, who borean office of trust; nor of his own strength, nor of the disposition ofthe whole province to Caesar. These sentiments he constantly expressedin his ordinary conversation, and did not attach himself to eitherparty. But afterwards, when he found that Caesar was detained beforeMassilia, that the forces of Petreius had effected a junction with thearmy of Afranius, that considerable reinforcements had come to theirassistance, that there were great hopes and expectations, and heard thatthe whole Hither province had entered into a confederacy, and of thedifficulties to which Caesar was reduced afterwards at Ilerda for wantof provisions, and Afranius wrote to him a fuller and more exaggeratedaccount of these matters, he began to regulate his movements by those offortune. 

XVIII. --He made levies throughout the province; and, having completedhis two legions, he added to them about thirty auxiliary cohorts: hecollected a large quantity of corn to send partly to the Massilians, partly to Afranius and Petreius. He commanded the inhabitants of Gadesto build ten ships of war; besides, he took care that several othersshould be built in Spain. He removed all the money and ornaments fromthe temple of Hercules to the town of Gades, and sent six cohortsthither from the province to guard them, and gave the command of thetown of Gades to Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, and friend ofDomitius, who had come thither sent by Domitius to recover an estate forhim; and he deposited all the arms, both public and private, inGallonius's house. He himself [Varro] made severe harangues againstCaesar. He often pronounced from his tribunal that Caesar had foughtseveral unsuccessful battles, and that a great number of his men haddeserted to Afranius. That he had these accounts from undoubtedmessengers, and authority on which he could rely. By these means heterrified the Roman citizens of that province, and obliged them topromise him for the service of the state one hundred and ninety thousandsesterces, twenty thousand pounds weight of silver, and a hundred andtwenty thousand bushels of wheat. He laid heavier burdens on thosestates which he thought were friendly disposed to Caesar, and billetedtroops on them; he passed judgment against some private persons, andcondemned to confiscation the properties of those who had spoken or madeorations against the republic, and forced the whole province to take anoath of allegiance to him and Pompey. Being informed of all thathappened in Hither Spain, he prepared for war. This was his plan ofoperations. He was to retire with his two legions to Gades, and to layup all the shipping and provisions there. For he had been informed thatthe whole province was inclined to favour Caesar's party. He thoughtthat the war might be easily protracted in an island, if he was providedwith corn and shipping. Caesar, although called back to Italy by manyand important matters, yet had determined to leave no dregs of warbehind him in Spain, because he knew that Pompey had many dependants andclients in the Hither province. 

XIX. --Having therefore sent two legions into Further Spain under thecommand of Quintus Cassius, tribune of the people; he himself advanceswith six hundred horse by forced marches, and issues a proclamation, appointing a day on which the magistrates and nobility of all the statesshould attend him at Corduba. This proclamation being published throughthe whole province, there was not a state that did not send a part oftheir senate to Corduba, at the appointed time; and not a Roman citizenof any note but appeared that day. At the same time the senate atCorduba shut the gates of their own accord against Varro, and postedguards and sentinels on the wall and in the turrets, and detained twocohorts (called Colonicae, which had come there accidentally), for thedefence of the town. About the same time the people of Carmona, which isby far the strongest state in the whole province, of themselves droveout of the town the cohorts, and shut the gates against them, althoughthree cohorts had been detached by Varro to garrison the citadel. 

XX. --But Varro was in greater haste on this account to reach Gades withhis legion as soon as possible, lest he should be stopped either on hismarch or on crossing over to the island. The affection of the provinceto Caesar proved so great and so favourable, that he received a letterfrom Gades, before he was far advanced on his march: that as soon as thenobility of Gades heard of Caesar's proclamation, they had combined withthe tribune of the cohorts, which were in garrison there, to driveGallonius out of the town, and to secure the city and island for Caesar. That having agreed on the design they had sent notice to Gallonius, toquit Gades of his own accord whilst he could do it with safety; if hedid not, they would take measures for themselves; that for fear of thisGallonius had been induced to quit the town. When this was known, one ofVarro's two legions, which was called Vernacula, carried off the coloursfrom Varro's camp, he himself standing by and looking on, and retired toHispalis, and took post in the market and public places without doingany injury, and the Roman citizens residing there approved so highly ofthis act, that every one most earnestly offered to entertain them intheir houses. When Varro, terrified at these things, having altered hisroute, proposed going to Italica, he was informed by his friends thatthe gates were shut against him. Then indeed, when intercepted fromevery road, he sends word to Caesar that he was ready to deliver up thelegion which he commanded. He sends to him Sextus Caesar, and orders himto deliver it up to him. Varro, having delivered up the legion, went toCaesar to Corduba, and having laid before him the public accounts, handed over to him most faithfully whatever money he had, and told himwhat quantity of corn and shipping he had, and where. 

XXI. --Caesar made a public oration at Corduba, in which he returnedthanks to all severally: to the Roman citizens, because they had beenzealous to keep the town in their own power; to the Spaniards, forhaving driven out the garrison; to the Gaditani, for having defeated theattempts of his enemies, and asserted their own liberty; to the Tribunesand Centurions who had gone there as a guard, for having by their valourconfirmed them in their purpose. He remitted the tax which the Romancitizens had promised to Varro for the public use: he restored theirgoods to those who he was informed had incurred that penalty by speakingtoo freely, having given public and private rewards to some: he filledthe rest with flattering hopes of his future intentions; and havingstayed two days at Corduba, he set out for Gades: he ordered the moneyand ornaments which had been carried away from the temple of Hercules, and lodged in the houses of private persons, to be replaced in thetemple. He made Quintus Cassius governor of the province, and assignedhim four legions. He himself, with those ships which Marcus Varro hadbuilt, and others which the Gaditani had built by Varro's orders, arrived in a few days at Tarraco, where ambassadors from the greatestpart of the nearer province waited his arrival. Having in the samemanner conferred marks of honour both publicly and privately on somestates, he left Tarraco, and went thence by land to Narbo, and thence toMassilia. There he was informed that a law was passed for creating adictator, and that he had been nominated dictator by Marcus Lepidus thepraetor. 

XXII. --The Massilians, wearied out by misfortunes of every sort, reducedto the lowest ebb for want of corn, conquered in two engagements at sea, defeated in their frequent sallies, and struggling moreover with a fatalpestilence, from their long confinement and change of victuals (for theyall subsisted on old millet and damaged barley, which they had formerlyprovided and laid up in the public stores against an emergency of thiskind), their turret being demolished, a great part of their wall havinggiven way, and despairing of any aid, either from the provinces or theirarmies, for these they had heard had fallen into Caesar's power, resolved to surrender now without dissimulation. But a few days before, Lucius Domitius, having discovered the intention of the Massilians, andhaving procured three ships, two of which he gave up to his friends, went on board the third himself, having got a brisk wind, put out tosea. Some ships, which by Brutus's orders were constantly cruising nearthe port, having espied him, weighed anchor, and pursued him. But ofthese, the ship on board of which he was, persevered itself, andcontinuing its flight, and by the aid of the wind got out of sight: theother two, affrighted by the approach of our galleys, put back againinto the harbour. The Massilians conveyed their arms and engines out ofthe town, as they were ordered: brought their ships out of the port anddocks, and delivered up the money in their treasury. When these affairswere despatched, Caesar, sparing the town more out of regard to theirrenown and antiquity than to any claim they could lay to his favour, left two legions in garrison there, sent the rest to Italy, and set outhimself for Rome. 

XXIII. --About the same time Caius Curio, having sailed from Sicily toAfrica, and from the first despising the forces of Publius Attius Varus, transported only two of the four legions which he had received fromCaesar, and five hundred horse, and having spent two days and threenights on the voyage, arrived at a place called Aquilaria, which isabout twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, and in the summer season hasa convenient harbour, and is enclosed by two projecting promontories. Lucius Caesar, the son, who was waiting his arrival near Clupea with tenships which had been taken near Utica in a war with the pirates, andwhich Publius Attius had had repaired for this war, frightened at thenumber of our ships, fled the sea, and running his three-decked coveredgalley on the nearest shore, left her there and made his escape by landto Adrumetum. Caius Considius Longus, with a garrison of one legion, guarded this town. The rest of Caesar's fleet, after his flight, retiredto Adrumetum. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor, pursued him with twelve ships, which Curio had brought from Sicily as convoy to the merchantmen, andseeing a ship left on the shore, he brought her off by a towing rope, and returned with his fleet to Curio. 

XXIV. --Curio detached Marcus before with the fleet to Utica, and marchedthither with his army. Having advanced two days, he came to the riverBagrada, and there left Caius Caninius Rebilus, the lieutenant, with thelegions; and went forward himself with the horse to view the Corneliancamp, because that was reckoned a very eligible position for encamping. It is a straight ridge, projecting into the sea, steep and rough on bothsides, but the ascent is more gentle on that part which lies oppositeUtica. It is not more than a mile distant from Utica in a direct line. But on this road there is a spring, to which the sea comes up, andoverflows; an extensive morass is thereby formed; and if a person wouldavoid it, he must make a circuit of six miles to reach the town. 

XXV. --Having examined this place, Curio got a view of Varus's camp, joining the wall and town, at the gate called Bellica, well fortified byits natural situation, on one side by the town itself, on the other by atheatre which is before the town, the approaches to the town beingrendered difficult and narrow by the very extensive out-buildings ofthat structure. At the same time he observed the roads very full ofcarriages and cattle which they were conveying from the country into thetown on the sudden alarm. He sent his cavalry after them to plunder themand get the spoil. And at the same time Varus had detached as a guardfor them six hundred Numidian horse, and four hundred foot, which kingJuba had sent to Utica as auxiliaries a few days before. There was afriendship subsisting between his [Juba's] father and Pompey, and a feudbetween him and Curio, because he, when a tribune of the people, hadproposed a law, in which he endeavoured to make public property of thekingdom of Juba. The horse engaged; but the Numidians were not able tostand our first charge; but a hundred and twenty being killed, the restretreated into their camp near the town. In the meantime, on the arrivalof his men-of-war, Curio ordered proclamation to be made to the merchantships, which lay at anchor before Utica, in number about two hundred, that he would treat as enemies all that did not set sail immediately forthe Cornelian camp. As soon as the proclamation was made, in an instantthey all weighed anchor and left Utica, and repaired to the placecommanded them. This circumstance furnished the army with plenty ofeverything. 

XXVI. --After these transactions, Curio returned to his camp at Bagrada;and by a general shout of the whole army was saluted imperator. The nextday he led his army to Utica, and encamped near the town. Before theworks of the camp were finished, the horse upon guard brought him wordthat a large supply of horse and foot sent by king Juba were on theirmarch to Utica, and at the same time a cloud of dust was observed, andin a moment the front of the line was in sight. Curio, surprised at thesuddenness of the affair, sent on the horse to receive their firstcharge, and detain them. He immediately called off his legions from thework, and put them in battle array. The horse began the battle: andbefore the legions could be completely marshalled and take their ground, the king's entire forces being thrown into disorder and confusion, because they had marched without any order, and were under noapprehensions, betake themselves to flight: almost all the enemy's horsebeing safe, because they made a speedy retreat into the town along theshore, Caesar's soldiers slay a great number of their infantry. 

XXVII. --The next night two Marsian centurions, with twenty-two menbelonging to the companies, deserted from Curio's camp to Attius Varus. They, whether they uttered the sentiments which they really entertained, or wished to gratify Varus (for what we wish we readily give credit to, and what we think ourselves, we hope is the opinion of other men), assured him, that the minds of the whole army were disaffected to Curio, that it was very expedient that the armies should be brought in view ofeach other, and an opportunity of a conference be given. Induced bytheir opinion, Varus the next day led his troops out of the camp: Curiodid so in like manner, and with only one small valley between them, eachdrew up his forces. 

XXVIII. --In Varus's army there was one Sextus Quintilius Varus who, aswe have mentioned before, was at Corfinium. When Caesar gave him hisliberty, he went over to Africa; now, Curio had transported to Africathose legions which Caesar had received under his command a short timebefore at Corfinium: so that the officers and companies were still thesame, excepting the change of a few centurions. Quintilius, making thisa pretext for addressing them, began to go round Curio's lines, and toentreat the soldiers "not to lose all recollection of the oath whichthey took first to Domitius and to him their quaestor, nor bear armsagainst those who had shared the same fortune, and endured the samehardships in a siege, nor fight for those by whom they had beenopprobriously called deserters. " To this he added a few words by way ofencouragement, what they might expect from his own liberality, if theyshould follow him and Attius. On the delivery of this speech, nointimation of their future conduct is given by Curio's army, and thusboth generals led back their troops to their camp. 

XXIX. --However, a great and general fear spread through Curio's camp, for it is soon increased by the various discourses of men. For every oneformed an opinion of his own; and to what he had heard from others, added his own apprehensions. When this had spread from a single authorto several persons, and was handed from one another, there appeared tobe many authors for such sentiments as these: ["That it was a civil war;that they were men; and therefore that it was lawful for them to actfreely, and follow which party they pleased. " These were the legionswhich a short time before had belonged to the enemy; for the custom ofoffering free towns to those who joined the opposite party had changedCaesar's kindness. For the harshest expressions of the soldiers ingeneral did not proceed from the Marsi and Peligni, as those whichpassed in the tents the night before; and some of their fellow soldiersheard them with displeasure. Some additions were also made to them bythose who wished to be thought more zealous in their duty. ]

XXX. --For these reasons, having called a council, Curio began todeliberate on the general welfare. There were some opinions, whichadvised by all means an attempt to be made, and an attack on Varus'scamp; for when such sentiments prevailed among the soldiers, theythought idleness was improper. In short, they said, "that it was betterbravely to try the hazard of war in a battle, than to be deserted andsurrounded by their own troops, and forced to submit to the greatestcruelties. " There were some who gave their opinion, that they ought towithdraw at the third watch to the Cornelian camp; that by a longerinterval of time the soldiers might be brought to a proper way ofthinking; and also, that if any misfortune should befall them, theymight have a safer and readier retreat to Sicily, from the great numberof their ships. 

XXXI. --Curio, censuring both measures, said, "that the one was asdeficient in spirit, as the other exceeded in it: that the latteradvised a shameful flight, and the former recommended us to engage at agreat disadvantage. For on what, says he, can we rely that we can storma camp, fortified both by nature and art? Or, indeed, what advantage dowe gain if we give over the assault, after having suffered considerableloss; as if success did not acquire for a general the affection of hisarmy, and misfortune their hatred? But what does a change of camp implybut a shameful flight, and universal despair, and the alienation of thearmy? For neither ought the obedient to suspect that they aredistrusted, nor the insolent to know that we fear them; because ourfears augment the licentiousness of the latter, and diminish the zeal ofthe former. But if, says he, we were convinced of the truth of thereports of the disaffection of the army (which I indeed am confident areeither altogether groundless, or at least less than they are supposed tobe), how much better to conceal and hide our suspicions of it, than byour conduct confirm it? Ought not the defects of an army to be ascarefully concealed as the wounds in our bodies, lest we should increasethe enemy's hopes? but they moreover advise us to set out at midnight, in order, I suppose, that those who attempt to do wrong may have afairer opportunity; for conduct of this kind is restrained either byshame or fear, to the display of which the night is most adverse. Wherefore, I am neither so rash as to give my opinion that we ought toattack their camp without hopes of succeeding; nor so influenced by fearas to despond: and I imagine that every expedient ought first to betried; and I am in a great degree confident that I shall form the sameopinion as yourselves on this matter. "

XXXII. --Having broken up the council he called the soldiers together, and reminded them "what advantage Caesar had derived from their zeal atCorfinium; how by their good offices and influence he had brought over agreat part of Italy to his interest. For, says he, all the municipaltowns afterwards imitated you and your conduct; nor was it withoutreason that Caesar judged so favourably, and the enemy so harshly ofyou. For Pompey, though beaten in no engagement, yet was obliged toshift his ground, and leave Italy, from the precedent established byyour conduct. Caesar committed me, whom he considered his dearestfriend, and the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he was notable to protect Rome or Italy, to your protection. There are some herepresent who encourage you to revolt from us; for what can they wish formore, than at once to ruin us, and to involve you in a heinous crime? orwhat baser opinions could they in their resentment entertain of you, than that you would betray those who acknowledged themselves indebted toyou for everything, and put yourselves in the power of those who thinkthey have been ruined by you? Have you not heard of Caesar's exploits inSpain? that he routed two armies, conquered two generals, recovered twoprovinces, and effected all this within forty days after he came insight of the enemy? Can those who were not able to stand against himwhilst they were uninjured resist him when they are ruined? Will you, who took part with Caesar whilst victory was uncertain, take part withthe conquered enemy when the fortune of the war is decided, and when youought to reap the reward of your services? For they say that they havebeen deserted and betrayed by you, and remind you of a former oath. Butdid you desert Lucius Domitius, or did Lucius Domitius desert you? Didhe not, when you were ready to submit to the greatest difficulties, castyou off? Did he not, without your privacy, endeavour to effect his ownescape? When you were betrayed by him, were you not preserved byCaesar's generosity? And how could he think you bound by your oath tohim, when, after having thrown up the ensigns of power, and abdicatedhis government, he became a private person, and a captive in another'spower? A new obligation is left upon you, that you should disregard theoath, by which you are at present bound; and have respect only to thatwhich was invalidated by the surrender of your general, and hisdiminution of rank. But I suppose, although you are pleased with Caesar, you are offended with me; however I shall not boast of my services toyou, which still are inferior to my own wishes or your expectations. But, however, soldiers have ever looked for the rewards of labour at theconclusion of a war; and what the issue of it is likely to be, not evenyou can doubt. But why should I omit to mention my own diligence andgood fortune, and to what a happy crisis affairs are now arrived? Areyou sorry that I transported the army safe and entire, without the lossof a single ship? That on my arrival, in the very first attack, I routedthe enemy's fleet? That twice in two days I defeated the enemy's horse?That I carried out of the very harbour and bay, two hundred of theenemy's victuallers, and reduced them to that situation that they canreceive no supplies either by land or sea? Will you divorce yourselvesfrom this fortune and these generals; and prefer the disgrace ofCorfinium, the defeat of Italy, the surrender of both Spains, and theprestige of the African war? I, for my part, wished to be called asoldier of Caesar's; you honoured me with the title of Imperator. If yourepent your bounty, I give it back to you; restore to me my former namethat you may not appear to have conferred the honour on me as areproach. "

XXXIII. --The soldiers, being affected by this oration, frequentlyattempted to interrupt him whilst he was speaking, so that they appearedto bear with excessive anguish the suspicion of treachery, and when hewas leaving the assembly they unanimously besought him to be of goodspirits, and not hesitate to engage the enemy and put their fidelity andcourage to a trial. As the wishes and opinions of all were changed bythis act, Curio, with the general consent, determined, wheneveropportunity offered, to hazard a battle. The next day he led out hisforces and ranged them in order of battle on the same ground where theyhad been posted the preceding day; nor did Attius Varus hesitate to drawout his men, that, if any occasion should offer, either to tamper withour men or to engage on equal terms, he might not miss the opportunity. 

XXXIV. -There lay between the two armies a valley, as already mentioned, not very deep, but of a difficult and steep ascent. Each was waitingtill the enemy's forces should to attempt to pass it, that they mightengage with the advantage of the ground. At the same time, on the leftwing, the entire cavalry of Publius Attius, and several light-armedinfantry intermixed with them, were perceived descending into thevalley. Against them Curio detached his cavalry and two cohorts of theMarrucini, whose first charge the enemy's horse were unable to stand, but, setting spurs to their horses, fled back to their friends: thelight-infantry being deserted by those who had come out along with them, were surrounded and cut to pieces by our men. Varus's whole army, facingthat way, saw their men flee and cut down. Upon which Rebilus, one ofCaesar's lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicilyknowing that he had great experience in military matters, cried out, "You see the enemy are daunted, Curio! why do you hesitate to takeadvantage of the opportunity?" Curio, having merely "expressed this, that the soldiers should keep in mind the professions which they hadmade to him the day before, " then ordered them to follow him, and ranfar before them all. The valley was so difficult of ascent that theforemost men could not struggle up it unless assisted by those behind. But the minds of Attius's soldiers being prepossessed with fear and theflight and slaughter of their men, never thought of opposing us; andthey all imagined that they were already surrounded by our horse, and, therefore, before a dart could be thrown or our men come near them, Varus's whole army turned their backs and retreated to their camp. 

XXXV. -In this flight one Fabius, a Pelignian and common soldier inCurio's army, pursuing the enemy's rear, with a loud voice shouted toVarus by his name, and often called him, so that he seemed to be one ofhis soldiers, who wished to speak to him and give him advice. WhenVarus, after being repeatedly called, stopped and looked at him, andinquired who he was and what he wanted, he made a blow with his sword athis naked shoulder and was very near killing Varus, but he escaped thedanger by raising his shield to ward off the blow. Fabius was surroundedby the soldiers near him and cut to pieces; and by the multitude andcrowds of those that fled, the gates of the camps were thronged and thepassage stopped, and a greater number perished in that place without astroke than in the battle and flight. Nor were we far from driving themfrom this camp; and some of them ran straightway to the town withouthalting. But both the nature of the ground and the strength of thefortifications prevented our access to the camp; for Curio's soldiers, marching out to battle, were without those things which were requisitefor storming a camp. Curio, therefore, led his army back to the camp, with all his troops safe except Fabius. Of the enemy about six hundredwere killed and a thousand wounded, all of whom, after Curio's return, and several more under pretext of their wounds, but in fact throughfear, withdrew from the camp into the town, which Varus perceiving andknowing the terror of his army, leaving a trumpeter in his camp and afew tents for show, at the third watch led back his army quietly intothe town. 

XXXVI. --The next day Curio resolved to besiege Utica, and to draw linesabout it. In the town there was a multitude of people, ignorant of war, owing to the length of the peace; some of them Uticans, very wellinclined to Caesar, for his favours to them; the Roman population wascomposed of persons differing widely in their sentiments. The terroroccasioned by former battles was very great; and therefore they openlytalked of surrendering, and argued with Attius that he should not sufferthe fortune of them all to be ruined by his obstinacy. Whilst thesethings were in agitation, couriers, who had been sent forward, arrivedfrom king Juba, with the intelligence that he was on his march, withconsiderable forces, and encouraged them to protect and defend theircity, a circumstance which greatly comforted their desponding hearts. 

XXXVII. --The same intelligence was brought to Curio; but for some timehe could not give credit to it, because he had so great confidence inhis own good fortune. And at this time Caesar's success in Spain wasannounced in Africa by messages and letters. Being elated by all thesethings, he imagined that the king would not dare to attempt anythingagainst him. But when he found out, from undoubted authority, that hisforces were less than twenty miles distant from Utica, abandoning hisworks, he retired to the Cornelian camp. Here he began to lay in cornand wood, and to fortify his camp, and immediately despatched orders toSicily, that his two legions and the remainder of his cavalry should besent to him. His camp was well adapted for protracting a war, from thenature and strength of the situation, from its proximity to the sea, andthe abundance of water and salt, of which a great quantity had beenstored up from the neighbouring salt-pits. Timber could not fail himfrom the number of trees, nor corn, with which the lands abounded. Wherefore, with the general consent, Curio determined to wait for therest of his forces, and protract the war. 

XXXVIII. --This plan being settled, and his conduct approved of, he isinformed by some deserters from the town that Juba had stayed behind inhis own kingdom, being called home by a neighbouring war, and a disputewith the people of Leptis; and that Sabura, his commander-in-chief, whohad been sent with a small force, was drawing near to Utica. Curiorashly believing this information, altered his design, and resolved tohazard a battle. His youth, his spirits, his former good fortune andconfidence of success, contributed much to confirm this resolution. Induced by these motives, early in the night he sent all his cavalry tothe enemy's camp near the river Bagrada, of which Sabura, of whom wehave already spoken, was the commander. But the king was coming afterthem with all his forces, and was posted at a distance of six milesbehind Sabura. The horse that were sent perform their march that night, and attack the enemy unawares and unexpectedly; for the Numidians, afterthe usual barbarous custom, encamped here and there without anyregularity. The cavalry having attacked them, when sunk in sleep anddispersed, killed a great number of them; many were frightened and ranaway. After which the horse returned to Curio, and brought someprisoners with them. 

XXXIX. --Curio had set out at the fourth watch with all his forces, except five cohorts which he left to guard the camp. Having advanced sixmiles, he met the horse, heard what had happened, and inquired from thecaptives who commanded the camp at Bagrada. They replied Sabura. Througheagerness to perform his journey, he neglected to make furtherinquiries, but looking back to the company next him, "Don't you see, soldiers, " says he, "that the answer of the prisoners corresponds withthe account of the deserters, that the king is not with him, and that hesent only a small force which was not able to withstand a few horse?Hasten then to spoil, to glory; that we may now begin to think ofrewarding you, and returning you thanks. " The achievements of the horsewere great in themselves, especially if their small number be comparedwith the vast host of Numidians. However, the account was enlarged bythemselves, as men are naturally inclined to boast of their own merit. Besides, many spoils were produced; the men and horses that were takenwere brought into their sight, that they might imagine that every momentof time which intervened was a delay to their conquest. By this meansthe hopes of Curio were seconded by the ardour of the soldiers. Heordered the horse to follow him, and hastened his march, that he mightattack them as soon as possible, while in consternation after theirflight. But the horse, fatigued by the expedition of the precedingnight, were not able to keep up with him, but fell behind in differentplaces. Even this did not abate Curio's hopes. 

XL. --Juba, being informed by Sabura of the battle in the night, sent tohis relief two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, which he wasaccustomed to keep near him to guard his person, and that part of hisinfantry on which he had the greatest dependence, and he himselffollowed slowly after with the rest of his forces and forty elephants, suspecting that as Curio had sent his horse before, he himself wouldfollow them. Sabura drew up his army, both horse and foot, and commandedthem to give way gradually and retreat through the pretence of fear;that when it was necessary he would give them the signal for battle, andsuch orders as he found circumstances required. Curio, as his idea oftheir present behaviour was calculated to confirm his former hopes, imagined that the enemy were running away, and led his army from therising grounds down to the plain. 

XLI. --And when he had advanced from this place about sixteen miles, hisarmy being exhausted with the fatigue, he halted. Sabura gave his menthe signal, marshalled his army, and began to go around his ranks andencourage them. But he made use of the foot only for show; and sent thehorse to the charge: Curio was not deficient in skill, and encouragedhis men to rest all their hopes in their valour. Neither were thesoldiers, though wearied, nor the horse, though few and exhausted withfatigue, deficient in ardour to engage, and courage: but the latter werein number but two hundred: the rest had dropped behind on the march. Wherever they charged they forced the enemy to give ground, but theywere not able to pursue them far when they fled, or to press theirhorses too severely. Besides, the enemy's cavalry began to surround uson both wings and to trample down our rear. When any cohorts ran forwardout of the line, the Numidians, being fresh, by their speed avoided ourcharge, and surrounded ours when they attempted to return to their post, and cut them off from the main body. So that it did not appear safeeither to keep their ground and maintain their ranks, or to issue fromthe line, and run the risk. The enemy's troops were frequentlyreinforced by assistance sent from Juba; strength began to fail our menthrough fatigue; and those who had been wounded could neither quit thefield nor retire to a place of safety, because the whole field wassurrounded by the enemy's cavalry. Therefore, despairing of their ownsafety, as men usually do in the last moment of their lives, they eitherlamented their unhappy deaths, or recommended their parents to thesurvivors, if fortune should save any from the impending danger. Allwere full of fear and grief. 

XLII. --When Curio perceived that in the general consternation neitherhis exhortations nor entreaties were attended to, imagining that theonly hope of escaping in their deplorable situation was to gain thenearest hills, he ordered the colours to be borne that way. But a partyof horse, that had been sent by Sabura, had already got possession ofthem. Now indeed our men were reduced to extreme despair: and some ofthem were killed by the cavalry in attempting to escape: some fell tothe ground unhurt. Cneius Domitius, commander of the cavalry, standinground Curio with a small party of horse, urged Curio to endeavour toescape by flight, and to hasten to his camp; and assured him that hewould not forsake him. But Curio declared that he would never moreappear in Caesar's sight, after losing the army which had been committedby Caesar to his charge, and accordingly fought till he was killed. Veryfew of the horse escaped from that battle, but those who had stayedbehind to refresh their horses having perceived at a distance the defeatof the whole army, retired in safety to their camp. 

XLIII. --The soldiers were all killed to a man. Marcus Rufus, thequaestor, who was left behind in the camp by Curio, having gotintelligence of these things, encouraged his men not to be disheartened. They beg and entreat to be transported to Sicily. He consented, andordered the masters of the ships to have all the boats brought close tothe shore early in the evening. But so great was the terror in generalthat some said that Juba's forces were marching up, others that Varuswas hastening with his legions, and that they already saw the dustraised by their coming; of which not one circumstance had happened:others suspected that the enemy's fleet would immediately be upon them. Therefore, in the general consternation, every man consulted his ownsafety. Those who were on board of the fleet, were in a hurry to setsail, and their flight hastened the masters of the ships of burden. Afew small fishing boats attended their duty and his orders. But as theshores were crowded, so great was the struggle to determine who of sucha vast number should first get on board, that some of the vessels sankwith the weight of the multitude, and the fears of the rest delayed themfrom coming to the shore. 

XLIV. --From which circumstances it happened that a few foot and agedmen, that could prevail either through interest or pity, or who wereable to swim to the ships, were taken on board, and landed safe inSicily. The rest of the troops sent their centurions as deputies toVarus at night, and surrendered themselves to him. But Juba, the nextday having spied their cohorts before the town, claimed them as hisbooty, and ordered a great part of them to be put to the sword; a few heselected and sent home to his own realm. Although Varus complained thathis honour was insulted by Juba, yet he dare not oppose him: Juba rodeon horseback into the town, attended by several senators, amongst whomwere Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, and in a few daysarranged and ordered what he would have done in Utica, and in a few daysmore returned to his own kingdom, with all his forces. 

BOOK III

I. --Julius Caesar, holding the election as dictator, was himselfappointed consul with Publius Servilius; for this was the year in whichit was permitted by the laws that he should be chosen consul. Thisbusiness being ended, as credit was beginning to fail in Italy, and thedebts could not be paid, he determined that arbitrators should beappointed: and that they should make an estimate of the possessions andproperties [of the debtors], how much they were worth before the war, and that they should be handed over in payment to the creditors. This hethought the most likely method to remove and abate the apprehension ofan abolition of debt, the usual consequence of civil wars anddissensions, and to support the credit of the debtors. He likewiserestored to their former condition (the praetors and tribunes firstsubmitting the question to the people) some persons condemned forbribery at the elections, by virtue of Pompey's law, at the time whenPompey kept his legions quartered in the city (these trials werefinished in a single day, one judge hearing the merits, and anotherpronouncing the sentences), because they had offered their service tohim in the beginning of the civil war, if he chose to accept them;setting the same value on them as if he had accepted them, because theyhad put themselves in his power. For he had determined that they oughtto be restored, rather by the judgment of the people, than appearadmitted to it by his bounty: that he might neither appear ungrateful inrepaying an obligation, nor arrogant in depriving the people of theirprerogative of exercising this bounty. 

II. --In accomplishing these things, and celebrating the Latin festival, and holding all the elections, he spent eleven days; and having resignedthe dictatorship, set out from the city, and went to Brundisium, wherehe had ordered twelve legions and all his cavalry to meet him. But hescarcely found as many ships as would be sufficient to transport fifteenthousand legionary soldiers and five hundred horse. This [the scarcityof shipping] was the only thing that prevented Caesar from putting aspeedy conclusion to the war. And even these troops embarked very shortof their number, because several had fallen in so many wars in Gaul, andthe long march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and asevere autumn in Apulia and the district about Brundisium, after thevery wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul, had impaired the health ofthe whole army. 

III. --Pompey having got a year's respite to provide forces, during whichhe was not engaged in war, nor employed by an enemy, had collected anumerous fleet from Asia, and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had givendirections that a great number should be built in every other place. Hehad exacted a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and all the kings, dynasts, tetrarchs, and free states of Achaia; and had obliged thecorporations of those provinces, of which he himself had the government, to count down to him a large sum. 

IV. --He had made up nine legions of Roman citizens; five from Italy, which he had brought with him; one veteran legion from Sicily, whichbeing composed of two, he called the Gemella; one from Crete andMacedonia, of veterans who had been discharged by their former generals, and had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, which had been leviedby the activity of Lentulus. Besides he had distributed among hislegions a considerable number, by way of recruits, from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus: with his legions he also intermixed thesoldiers taken from Caius Antonius. Besides these, he expected twolegions from Syria, with Scipio; from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria, and other states, he got about three thousand archers, six cohorts ofslingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and seven thousand horse; sixhundred of which, Deiotarus had brought from Gaul; Ariobarzanes, fivehundred from Cappadocia. Cotus had given him about the same number fromThrace, and had sent his son Sadalis with them. From Macedonia therewere two hundred, of extraordinary valour, commanded by Rascipolis; fivehundred Gauls and Germans; Gabinius's troops from Alexandria, whom AulusGabinius had left with king Ptolemy, to guard his person. Pompey, theson, had brought in his fleet eight hundred, whom he had raised amonghis own and his shepherds' slaves. Tarcundarius, Castor and Donilaus hadgiven three hundred from Gallograecia: one of these came himself, theother sent his son. Two hundred were sent from Syria by ComagenusAntiochus, whom Pompey rewarded amply. The most of them were archers. Tothese were added Dardanians, and Bessians, some of them mercenaries;others procured by power and influence: also, Macedonians, Thessalians, and troops from other nations and states, which completed the numberwhich we mentioned before. 

V. --He had laid in vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and other countries. He had resolved to fix his winterquarters at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other sea-ports, to hinderCaesar from passing the sea: and for this purpose had stationed hisfleet along the sea-coast. The Egyptian fleet was commanded by Pompey, the son: the Asiatic, by Decimus Laelius, and Caius Triarius: theSyrian, by Caius Cassius: the Rhodian, by Caius Marcellus, inconjunction with Caius Coponius; and the Liburnian, and Achaian, byScribonius Libo, and Marcus Octavius. But Marcus Bibulus was appointedcommander-in-chief of the whole maritime department, and regulated everymatter. The chief direction rested upon him. 

VI. --When Caesar came to Brundisium, he made a speech to the soldiers:"That since they were now almost arrived at the termination of theirtoils and dangers, they should patiently submit to leave their slavesand baggage in Italy, and to embark without luggage, that a greaternumber of men might be put on board: that they might expect everythingfrom victory and his liberality. " They cried out with one voice, "hemight give what orders he pleased, that they would cheerfully fulfilthem. " He accordingly set sail the fourth day of January, with sevenlegions on board, as already remarked. The next day he reached land, between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places; meeting with asafe road for his shipping to ride in, and dreading all other portswhich he imagined were in possession of the enemy, he landed his men ata place called Pharsalus, without the loss of a single vessel. 

VII. --Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were at Oricum, witheighteen Asiatic ships, which were given into their charge by the ordersof Decimus Laelius: Marcus Bibulus at Corcyra, with a hundred and tenships. But they had not the confidence to dare to move out of theharbour; though Caesar had brought only twelve ships as a convoy, onlyfour of which had decks; nor did Bibulus, his fleet being disordered andhis seamen dispersed, come up in time: for Caesar was seen at thecontinent before any account whatsoever of his approach had reachedthose regions. 

VIII. --Caesar, having landed his soldiers, sent back his ships the samenight to Brundisium, to transport the rest of his legions and cavalry. The charge of this business was committed to lieutenant Fufius Kalenus, with orders to be expeditious in transporting the legions. But the shipshaving put to sea too late, and not having taken advantage of the nightbreeze, fell a sacrifice on their return. For Bibulus, at Corcyra, beinginformed of Caesar's approach, hoped to fall in with some part of ourships, with their cargoes, but found them empty; and having taken aboutthirty, vented on them his rage at his own remissness, and set them allon fire: and, with the same flames, he destroyed the mariners andmasters of the vessels, hoping by the severity of the punishment todeter the rest. Having accomplished this affair, he filled all theharbours and shores from Salona to Oricum with his fleets. Havingdisposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself in the depthof winter, declining no fatigue or duty, and not waiting forreinforcements, in hopes that he might come within Caesar's reach. 

IX. --But after the departure of the Liburnian fleet, Marcus Octaviussailed from Illyricum with what ships he had to Salona; and havingspirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations, he drew Issaoff from its connection with Caesar; but not being able to prevail withthe council of Salona, either by promises or menaces, he resolved tostorm the town. But it was well fortified by its natural situation, anda hill. The Roman citizens built wooden towers, the better to secure it;but when they were unable to resist, on account of the smallness oftheir numbers, being weakened by several wounds, they stooped to thelast resource, and set at liberty all the slaves old enough to beararms; and cutting the hair off the women's heads, made ropes for theirengines. Octavius, being informed of their determination, surrounded thetown with five encampments, and began to press them at once with a siegeand storm. They were determined to endure every hardship, and theirgreatest distress was the want of corn. They, therefore, sent deputiesto Caesar, and begged a supply from him; all other inconveniences theybore by their own resources, as well as they could: and after a longinterval, when the length of the siege had made Octavius's troops moreremiss than usual, having got an opportunity at noon, when the enemywere dispersed, they disposed their wives and children on the walls, tokeep up the appearance of their usual attention; and forming themselvesinto one body, with the slaves whom they had lately enfranchised, theymade an attack on Octavius's nearest camp, and having forced that, attacked the second with the same fury; and then the third and thefourth, and then the other, and beat them from them all: and havingkilled a great number, obliged the rest and Octavius himself to fly forrefuge to their ships. This put an end to the blockade. Winter was nowapproaching, and Octavius, despairing of capturing the town, aftersustaining such considerable losses, withdrew to Pompey, to Dyrrachium. 

X. --We have mentioned that Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's, hadfallen twice into Caesar's power; first at Corfinium, and afterwards inSpain. Caesar thought him a proper person, on account of his favoursconferred on him, to send with proposals to Pompey: and he knew that hehad an influence over Pompey. This was the substance of his proposals:"That it was the duty of both, to put an end to their obstinacy, andforbear hostilities, and not tempt fortune any further; that sufficientloss had been suffered on both sides, to serve as a lesson andinstruction to them, to render them apprehensive of future calamities, by Pompey, in having been driven out of Italy, and having lost Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Spains, and one hundred and thirty cohorts ofRoman citizens, in Italy and Spain: by himself, in the death of Curio, and the loss of so great an army in Africa, and the surrender of hissoldiers in Corcyra. Wherefore, they should have pity on themselves, andthe republic: for, from their own misfortunes, they had sufficientexperience of what fortune can effect in war. That this was the onlytime to treat of peace; when each had confidence in his own strength, and both seemed on an equal footing. Since, if fortune showed ever solittle favour to either, he who thought himself superior, would notsubmit to terms of accommodation; nor would he be content with an equaldivision, when he might expect to obtain the whole. That, as they couldnot agree before, the terms of peace ought to be submitted to the senateand people in Rome. That in the meantime, it ought to content therepublic and themselves, if they both immediately took oath in a publicassembly, that they would disband their forces within the threefollowing days. That having divested themselves of the arms andauxiliaries, on which they placed their present confidence, they mustboth of necessity acquiesce in the decision of the people and senate. Togive Pompey the fuller assurance of his intentions, he would dismiss allhis forces on land, even his garrisons. 

XI. --Vibullius, having received this commission from Caesar, thought itno less necessary to give Pompey notice of Caesar's sudden approach, that he might adopt such plans as the circumstance required, than toinform him of Caesar's message; and therefore continuing his journey bynight as well as by day, and taking fresh horses for despatch, he postedaway to Pompey, to inform him that Caesar was marching towards him withall his forces. Pompey was at this time in Candavia, and was on hismarch from Macedonia to his winter quarters in Apollonia and Dyrrachium;but surprised at the unexpected news, he determined to go to Apolloniaby speedy marches, to prevent Caesar from becoming master of all themaritime states. But as soon as Caesar had landed his troops, he set offthe same day for Oricum: when he arrived there, Lucius Torquatus, whowas governor of the town by Pompey's appointment, and had a garrison ofParthinians in it, endeavoured to shut the gates and defend the town, and ordered the Greeks to man the walls, and to take arms. But as theyrefused to fight against the power of the Roman people, and as thecitizens made a spontaneous attempt to admit Caesar, despairing of anyassistance, he threw open the gates, and surrendered himself and thetown to Caesar, and was preserved safe from injury by him. 

XII. --Having taken Oricum, Caesar marched without making any delay toApollonia. Staberius the governor, hearing of his approach, began tobring water into the citadel, and to fortify it, and to demand hostagesof the town's people. But they refuse to give any, or to shut theirgates against the consul, or to take upon them to judge contrary to whatall Italy and the Roman people had judged. As soon as he knew theirinclinations, he made his escape privately. The inhabitants of Apolloniasent ambassadors to Caesar, and gave him admission into their town. Their example was followed by the inhabitants of Bullis, Amantia, andthe other neighbouring states, and all Epirus: and they sent ambassadorsto Caesar, and promised to obey his commands. 

XIII. --But Pompey having received information of the transactions atOricum and Apollonia, began to be alarmed for Dyrrachium, andendeavoured to reach it, marching day and night. As soon as it was saidthat Caesar was approaching, such a panic fell upon Pompey's army, because in his haste he had made no distinction between night and day, and had marched without intermission, that they almost every mandeserted their colours in Epirus and the neighbouring countries; severalthrew down their arms, and their march had the appearance of a flight. But when Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium, and had given orders formeasuring out the ground for his camp, his army even yet continuing intheir fright, Labienus first stepped forward and swore that he wouldnever desert him, and would share whatever fate fortune should assign tohim. The other lieutenants took the same oath, and the tribunes andcenturions followed their example: and the whole army swore in likemanner. Caesar, finding the road to Dyrrachium already in the possessionof Pompey, was in no great haste, but encamped by the river Apsus, inthe territory of Apollonia, that the states which had deserved hissupport might be certain of protection from his out-guards and forts;and there he resolved to wait the arrival of his other legions fromItaly, and to winter in tents. Pompey did the same; and pitching hiscamp on the other side of the river Apsus, collected there all histroops and auxiliaries. 

XIV. --Kalenus, having put the legions and cavalry on board atBrundisium, as Caesar had directed him, as far as the number of hisships allowed, weighed anchor: and having sailed a little distance fromport, received a letter from Caesar, in which he was informed, that allthe ports and the whole shore was occupied by the enemy's fleet: onreceiving this information he returned into the harbour, and recalledall the vessels. One of them, which continued the voyage and did notobey Kalenus's command, because it carried no troops, but was privateproperty, bore away for Oricum, and was taken by Bibulus, who sparedneither slaves nor free men, nor even children; but put all to thesword. Thus the safety of the whole army depended on a very short spaceof time and a great casualty. 

XV. --Bibulus, as has been observed before, lay with his fleet nearOricum, and as he debarred Caesar of the liberty of the sea andharbours, so he was deprived of all intercourse with the country byland; for the whole shore was occupied by parties disposed in differentplaces by Caesar. And he was not allowed to get either wood or water, oreven anchor near the land. He was reduced to great difficulties, anddistressed with extreme scarcity of every necessary; insomuch that hewas obliged to bring, in transports from Corcyra, not only provisions, but even wood and water; and it once happened that, meeting with violentstorms, they were forced to catch the dew by night which fell on thehides that covered their decks; yet all these difficulties they borepatiently and without repining, and thought they ought not to leave theshores and harbours free from blockade. But when they were sufferingunder the distress which I have mentioned, and Libo had joined Bibulus, they both called from on ship-board to Marcus Acilius and StatiusMarcus, the lieutenants, one of whom commanded the town, the other theguards on the coast, that they wished to speak to Caesar on affairs ofimportance, if permission should be granted them. They add somethingfurther to strengthen the impression that they intended to treat aboutan accommodation. In the meantime they requested a truce, and obtainedit from them; for what they proposed seemed to be of importance, and itwas well known that Caesar desired it above all things, and it wasimagined that some advantage would be derived from Bibulus's proposals. 

XVI. --Caesar having set out with one legion to gain possession of themore remote states, and to provide corn, of which he had but a smallquantity, was at this time at Buthrotum, opposite to Corcyra. Therereceiving Acilius and Marcus's letters, informing him of Libo's andBibulus's demands, he left his legion behind him, and returned himselfto Oricum. When he arrived, they were invited to a conference. Libo cameand made an apology for Bibulus, "that he was a man of strong passion, and had a private quarrel against Caesar, contracted when he was aedileand praetor; that for this reason he had avoided the conference, lestaffairs of the utmost importance and advantage might be impeded by thewarmth of his temper. That it now was and ever had been Pompey's mostearnest wish, that they should be reconciled, and lay down their arms;but they were not authorized to treat on that subject, because theyresigned the whole management of the war, and all other matters, toPompey, by order of the council. But when they were acquainted withCaesar's demands, they would transmit them to Pompey, who would concludeall of himself by their persuasions. In the meantime, let the truce becontinued till the messengers could return from him; and let no injurybe done on either side. " To this he added a few words of the cause forwhich they fought, and of his own forces and resources. 

XVII. --To this, Caesar did not then think proper to make any reply, nordo we now think it worth recording. But Caesar required "that he shouldbe allowed to send commissioners to Pompey, who should suffer nopersonal injury; and that either they should grant it, or should takehis commissioners in charge, and convey them to Pompey. That as to thetruce, the war in its present state was so divided, that they by theirfleet deprived him of his shipping and auxiliaries; while he preventedthem from the use of the land and fresh water; and if they wished thatthis restraint should be removed from them, they should relinquish theirblockade of the seas, but if they retained the one, he in like mannerwould retain the other; that nevertheless, the treaty of accommodationmight still be carried on, though these points were not conceded, andthat they need not be an impediment to it. " They would neither receiveCaesar's commissioners, nor guarantee their safety, but referred thewhole to Pompey. They urged and struggled eagerly to gain the one pointrespecting a truce. But when Caesar perceived that they had proposed theconference merely to avoid present danger and distress, but that theyoffered no hopes or terms of peace, he applied his thoughts to theprosecution of the war. 

XVIII. --Bibulus, being prevented from landing for several days, andbeing seized with a violent distemper from the cold and fatigue, as hecould neither be cured on board, nor was willing to desert the chargewhich he had taken upon him, was unable to bear up against the violenceof the disease. On his death, the sole command devolved on no singleindividual, but each admiral managed his own division separately, and athis own discretion. Vibullius, as soon as the alarm, which Caesar'sunexpected arrival had raised, was over, began again to deliver Caesar'smessage in the presence of Libo, Lucius Lucceius, and Theophanes, towhom Pompey used to communicate his most confidential secrets. He hadscarcely entered on the subject when Pompey interrupted him, and forbadehim to proceed. "What need, " says he, "have I of life or Rome, if theworld shall think I enjoy them by the bounty of Caesar; an opinion whichcan never be removed whilst it shall be thought that I have been broughtback by him to Italy, from which I set out. " After the conclusion of thewar, Caesar was informed of these expressions by some persons who werepresent at the conversation. He attempted, however, by other means tobring about a negotiation of peace. 

XIX. --Between Pompey's and Caesar's camp there was only the river Apsus, and the soldiers frequently conversed with each other; and by a privatearrangement among themselves, no weapons were thrown during theirconferences. Caesar sent Publius Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, tothe bank of the river, to make such proposals as should appear mostconducive to peace; and to cry out frequently with a loud voice[asking], "Are citizens permitted to send deputies to citizens to treatof peace? a concession which had been made even to fugitives on thePyrenean mountains, and to robbers, especially when by so doing theywould prevent citizens from fighting against citizens. " Having spokenmuch in humble language, as became a man pleading for his own and thegeneral safety, and being listened to with silence by the soldiers ofboth armies, he received an answer from the enemy's party that AulusVarro proposed coming the next day to a conference, and that deputiesfrom both sides might come without danger, and explain their wishes, andaccordingly a fixed time was appointed for the interview. When thedeputies met the next day, a great multitude from both sides assembled, and the expectations of every person concerning this subject were raisedvery high, and their minds seemed to be eagerly disposed for peace. Titus Labienus walked forward from the crowd, and in submissive termsbegan to speak of peace, and to argue with Vatinius. But theirconversation was suddenly interrupted by darts thrown from all sides, from which Vatinius escaped by being protected by the arms of thesoldiers. However, several were wounded; and among them CorneliusBalbus, Marcus Plotius, and Lucius Tiburtius, centurions, and someprivates; hereupon Labienus exclaimed, "Forbear, then, to speak any moreabout an accommodation, for we can have no peace unless we carryCaesar's head back with us. "

XX. --At the same time in Rome, Marcus Caelius Rufus, one of thepraetors, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on entering intohis office, fixed his tribunal near the bench of Caius Trebonius, thecity praetor, and promised if any person appealed to him in regard tothe valuation and payment of debts made by arbitration, as appointed byCaesar when in Rome, that he would relieve them. But it happened, fromthe justice of Trebonius's decrees and his humanity (for he thought thatin such dangerous times justice should be administered with moderationand compassion), that not one could be found who would offer himself thefirst to lodge an appeal. For to plead poverty, to complain of his ownprivate calamities, or the general distresses of the times, or to assertthe difficulty of setting the goods to sale, is the behaviour of a maneven of a moderate temper; but to retain their possessions entire, andat the same time acknowledge themselves in debt, what sort of spirit, and what impudence would it not have argued! Therefore nobody was foundso unreasonable as to make such demands. But Caelius proved more severeto those very persons for whose advantage it had been designed; andstarting from this beginning, in order that he might not appear to haveengaged in so dishonourable an affair without effecting something, hepromulgated a law, that all debts should be discharged in six equalpayments, of six months each, without interest. 

XXI. --When Servilius, the consul, and the other magistrates opposed him, and he himself effected less than he expected, in order to raise thepassions of the people, he dropped it, and promulgated two others; one, by which he remitted the annual rents of the houses to the tenants, theother, an act of insolvency: upon which the mob made an assault on CaiusTrebonius, and having wounded several persons, drove him from histribunal. The consul Servilius informed the senate of his proceedings, who passed a decree that Caelius should be removed from the managementof the republic. Upon this decree, the consul forbade him the senate;and when he was attempting to harangue the people, turned him out of therostrum. Stung with the ignominy and with resentment, he pretended inpublic that he would go to Caesar, but privately sent messengers toMilo, who had murdered Clodius, and had been condemned for it; andhaving invited him into Italy, because he had engaged the remains of thegladiators to his interest, by making them supple presents, he joinedhim, and sent him to Thurinum to tamper with the shepherds. When hehimself was on his road to Casilinum, at the same time that his militarystandards and arms were seized at Capua, his slaves seen at Naples, andthe design of betraying the town discovered: his plots being revealed, and Capua shut against him, being apprehensive of danger, because theRoman citizens residing there had armed themselves, and thought he oughtto be treated as an enemy to the state, he abandoned his first design, and changed his route. 

XXII. --Milo in the meantime despatched letters to the free towns, purporting that he acted as he did by the orders and commands of Pompey, conveyed to him by Bibulus: and he endeavoured to engage in his interestall persons whom he imagined were under difficulties by reason of theirdebts. But not being able to prevail with them, he set at liberty someslaves from the work-houses, and began to assault Cosa in the districtof Thurinum. There having received a blow of a stone thrown from thewall of the town which was commanded by Quintus Pedius with one legion, he died of it; and Caelius having set out, as he pretended for Caesar, went to Thurii, where he was put to death as he was tampering with someof the freemen of the town, and was offering money to Caesar's Gallicand Spanish horse, which he had sent there to strengthen the garrison. And thus these mighty beginnings, which had embroiled Italy, and keptthe magistrates employed, found a speedy and happy issue. 

XXIII. --Libo having sailed from Oricum, with a fleet of fifty ships, which he commanded, came to Brundisium, and seized an island, which liesopposite to the harbour; judging it better to guard that place, whichwas our only pass to sea, than to keep all the shores and ports blockedup by a fleet. By his sudden arrival, he fell in with some of ourtransports, and set them on fire, and carried off one laden with corn;he struck great terror into our men, and having in the night landed aparty of soldiers and archers, he beat our guard of horse from theirstation, and gained so much by the advantage of situation, that hedespatched letters to Pompey, that if he pleased he might order the restof the ships to be hauled upon shore and repaired; for that with his ownfleet he could prevent Caesar from receiving his auxiliaries. 

XXIV. --Antonius was at this time at Brundisium, and relying on thevalour of his troops, covered about sixty of the long-boats belonging tothe men-of-war with penthouses and bulwarks of hurdles, and put on boardthem select soldiers; and disposed them separately along the shore: andunder the pretext of keeping the seamen in exercise, he ordered twothree-banked galleys, which he had built at Brundisium, to row to themouth of the port. When Libo saw them advancing boldly towards him, hesent five four-banked galleys against them, in hopes of interceptingthem. When these came near our ships, our veteran soldiers retreatedwithin the harbour. The enemy, urged by their eagerness to capture them, pursued them unguardedly; for instantly the boats of Antonius, on acertain signal, rowed with great violence from all parts against theenemy; and at the first charge took one of the four-banked galleys, withthe seamen and marines, and forced the rest to flee disgracefully. Inaddition to this loss, they were prevented from getting water by thehorse which Antonius had disposed along the sea-coast. Libo, vexed atthe distress and disgrace, departed from Brundisium, and abandoned theblockade. 

XXV. --Several months had now elapsed, and winter was almost gone, andCaesar's legions and shipping were not coming to him from Brundisium, and he imagined that some opportunities had been neglected, for thewinds had at least been often favourable, and he thought that he musttrust to them at last. And the longer it was deferred, the more eagerwere those who commanded Pompey's fleet to guard the coast, and weremore confident of preventing our getting assistance: they receivefrequent reproofs from Pompey by letter, that as they had not preventedCaesar's arrival at the first, they should at least stop the remainderof his army: and they were expecting that the season for transportingtroops would become more unfavourable every day, as the winds grewcalmer. Caesar, feeling some trouble on this account, wrote in severeterms to his officers at Brundisium, [and gave them orders] that as soonas they found the wind to answer, they should not let the opportunity ofsetting sail pass by, if they were even to steer their course to theshore of Apollonia: because there they might run their ships on ground. That these parts principally were left unguarded by the enemy's fleet, because they dare not venture too far from the harbour. 

XXVI. --They [his officers], exerting boldness and courage, aided by theinstructions of Marcus Antonius, and Fufius Kalenus, and animated by thesoldiers strongly encouraging them, and declining no danger for Caesar'ssafety, having got a southerly wind, weighed anchor, and the next daywere carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, and being seen from thecontinent, Quintus Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian fleet atDyrrachium, put out of the port with his ships; and when they had almostcome up with us, in consequence of the breeze dying away, the south windsprang up afresh, and rescued us. However, he did not desist from hisattempt, but hoped by the labour and perseverance of his seamen to beable to bear up against the violence of the storm; and although we werecarried beyond Dyrrachium, by the violence of the wind, he neverthelesscontinued to chase us. Our men, taking advantage of fortune's kindness, for they were still afraid of being attacked by the enemy's fleet, ifthe wind abated, having come near a port, called Nymphaeum, about threemiles beyond Lissus, put into it (this port is protected from asouth-west wind, but is not secure against a south wind); and thought lessdanger was to be apprehended from the storm than from the enemy. But assoon as they were within the port, the south wind, which had blown fortwo days, by extraordinary good luck veered round to the south-west. 

XXVII. --Here one might observe the sudden turns of fortune. We who, amoment before, were alarmed for ourselves, were safely lodged in a verysecure harbour: and they who had threatened ruin to our fleet, wereforced to be uneasy on their own account: and thus, by a change ofcircumstances, the storm protected our ships, and damaged the Rhodianfleet to such a degree, that all their decked ships, sixteen in number, foundered, without exception, and were wrecked: and of the prodigiousnumber of seamen and soldiers, some lost their lives by being dashedagainst the rocks, others were taken by our men: but Caesar sent themall safe home. 

XXVIII. --Two of our ships, that had not kept up with the rest, beingovertaken by the night, and not knowing what port the rest had made to, came to an anchor opposite Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commandedPompey's fleet, detached after them several barges and small craft, andattempted to take them. At the same time, he treated with them aboutcapitulating, and promised them their lives if they would surrender. Oneof them carried two hundred and twenty recruits, the other was mannedwith somewhat less than two hundred veterans. Here it might be seen whatsecurity men derive from a resolute spirit. For the recruits, frightenedat the number of vessels, and fatigued with the rolling of the sea; andwith sea-sickness, surrendered to Otacilius, after having first receivedhis oath, that the enemy would not injure them; but as soon as they werebrought before him, contrary to the obligation of his oath, they wereinhumanly put to death in his presence. But the soldiers of the veteranlegion, who had also struggled, not only with the inclemency of theweather, but by labouring at the pump, thought it their duty to remitnothing of their former valour: and having protracted the beginning ofthe night in settling the terms, under pretence of surrendering, theyobliged the pilot to run the ship aground: and having got a convenientplace on the shore, they spent the rest of the night there, and atdaybreak, when Otacilius had sent against them a party of the horse, whoguarded that part of the coast, to the number of four hundred, besidessome armed men, who had followed them from the garrison, they made abrave defence, and having killed some of them, retreated in safety toour army. 

XXIX. --After this action, the Roman citizens, who resided at Lissus, atown which Caesar had before assigned them, and had carefully fortified, received Antony into their town, and gave him every assistance. Otacilius, apprehensive for his own safety, escaped out of the town, andwent to Pompey. All his forces, whose number amounted to three veteranlegions, and one of recruits, and about eight hundred horse, beinglanded, Antony sent most of his ships back to Italy, to transport theremainder of the soldiers and horse. The pontons, which are a sort ofGallic ships, he left at Lissus with this object, that if Pompey, imagining Italy defenceless, should transport his army thither (and thisnotion was spread among the common people), Caesar might have some meansof pursuing him; and he sent messengers to him with great despatch, toinform him in what part of the country he had landed his army, and whatnumber of troops he had brought over with him. 

XXX. --Caesar and Pompey received this intelligence almost at the sametime; for they had seen the ships sail past Apollonia and Dyrrachium. They directed their march after them by land; but at first they wereignorant to what part they had been carried; but when they were informedof it, they each adopted a different plan; Caesar, to form a junctionwith Antonius as soon as possible, Pompey, to oppose Antonius's forceson their march to Caesar, and, if possible, to fall upon themunexpectedly from ambush. And the same day they both led out theirarmies from their winter encampment along the river Apsus; Pompey, privately by night; Caesar, openly by day. But Caesar had to march alonger circuit up the river to find a ford. Pompey's route being easy, because he was not obliged to cross the river, he advanced rapidly andby forced marches against Antonius, and being informed of his approach, chose a convenient situation, where he posted his forces; and kept hismen close within camp, and forbade fires to be kindled, that his arrivalmight be the more secret. An account of this was immediately carried toAntonius by the Greeks. He despatched messengers to Caesar, and confinedhimself in his camp for one day. The next day Caesar came up with him. On learning his arrival, Pompey, to prevent his being hemmed in betweentwo armies, quitted his position, and went with all his forces toAsparagium, in the territory of Dyrrachium, and there encamped in aconvenient situation. 

XXXI. --During these times, Scipio, though he had sustained some lossesnear mount Amanus, had assumed to himself the title of imperator, afterwhich he demanded large sums of money from the states and princes. Hehad also exacted from the tax-gatherers two years' rents that they owed;and enjoined them to lend him the amount of the next year, and demandeda supply of horse from the whole province. When they were collected, leaving behind him his neighbouring enemies, the Parthians (who shortlybefore had killed Marcus Crassus, the imperator, and had kept MarcusBibulus besieged), he drew his legions and cavalry out of Syria; andwhen he came into the province, which was under great anxiety and fearof the Parthian war, and heard some declarations of the soldiers, "Thatthey would march against an enemy, if he would lead them on; but wouldnever bear arms against a countryman and consul"; he drew off hislegions to winter quarters to Pergamus, and the most wealthy cities, andmade them rich presents: and in order to attach them more firmly to hisinterest, permitted them to plunder the cities. 

XXXII. --In the meantime, the money which had been demanded from theprovince at large, was most rigorously exacted. Besides, many newimposts of different kinds were devised to gratify his avarice. A tax ofso much a head was laid on every slave and child. Columns, doors, corn, soldiers, sailors, arms, engines, and carriages, were made subject to aduty. Wherever a name could be found for anything, it was deemed asufficient reason for levying money on it. Officers were appointed tocollect it, not only in the cities, but in almost every village andfort: and whosoever of them acted with the greatest rigour andinhumanity, was esteemed the best man, and best citizen. The provincewas overrun with bailiffs and officers, and crowded with overseers andtax-gatherers; who, besides the duties imposed, exacted a gratuity forthemselves; for they asserted, that being expelled from their own homesand countries, they stood in need of every necessary; endeavouring by aplausible pretence to colour the most infamous conduct. To this wasadded the most exorbitant interest, as usually happens in times of war;the whole sums being called in, on which occasion they alleged that thedelay of a single day was a donation. Therefore, in those two years, thedebt of the province was doubled: but notwithstanding, taxes wereexacted, not only from the Roman citizens, but from every corporationand every state. And they said that these were loans, exacted by thesenate's decree. The taxes of the ensuing year were demanded beforehandas a loan from the collectors, as on their first appointment. 

XXXIII. --Moreover, Scipio ordered the money formerly lodged in thetemple of Diana at Ephesus, to be taken out with the statues of thatgoddess which remained there. When Scipio came to the temple, letterswere delivered to him from Pompey, in the presence of several senators, whom he had called upon to attend him; [informing him] that Caesar hadcrossed the sea with his legions; that Scipio should hasten to him withhis army, and postpone all other business. As soon as he received theletter, he dismissed his attendants, and began to prepare for hisjourney to Macedonia; and a few days after set out. This circumstancesaved the money at Ephesus. 

XXXIV. --Caesar, having effected a junction with Antonius's army, andhaving drawn his legion out of Oricum, which he had left there to guardthe coast, thought he ought to sound the inclination of the provinces, and march farther into the country; and when ambassadors came to himfrom Thessaly and Aetolia, to engage that the states in those countrieswould obey his orders, if he sent a garrison to protect them, hedespatched Lucius Cassius Longinus, with the twenty-seventh, a legioncomposed of young soldiers, and two hundred horse, to Thessaly: andCaius Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a small party of horse, into Aetolia. He recommended them to be especially careful to providecorn, because those regions were nearest to him. He ordered CneiusDomitius Calvinus to march into Macedonia with two legions, the eleventhand twelfth, and five hundred horse; from which province, Menedemus, theprincipal man of those regions, on that side which is called the Free, having come as ambassador, assured him of the most devoted affection ofall his subjects. 

XXXV. --Of these Calvisius, on his first arrival in Aetolia, being verykindly received, dislodged the enemy's garrisons in Calydon andNaupactus, and made himself master of the whole country. Cassius went toThessaly with his legion. As there were two factions there, he found thecitizens divided in their inclinations. Hegasaretus, a man ofestablished power, favoured Pompey's interest. Petreius, a young man ofa most noble family, warmly supported Caesar with his own and hisfriends' influence. 

XXXVI. --At the same time, Domitius arrived in Macedonia: and whennumerous embassies had begun to wait on him from many of the states, news was brought that Scipio was approaching with his legions, whichoccasioned various opinions and reports; for in strange events, rumourgenerally goes before. Without making any delay in any part ofMacedonia, he marched with great haste against Domitius; and when he wascome within about twenty miles of him, wheeled on a sudden towardsCassius Longinus in Thessaly. He effected this with such celerity, thatnews of his march and arrival came together; for to render his marchexpeditious, he left the baggage of his legions behind him at the riverHaliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, under the care ofMarcus Favonius, with a guard of eight cohorts, and ordered him to builda strong fort there. At the same time, Cotus's cavalry, which used toinfest the neighbourhood of Macedonia, flew to attack Cassius's camp, atwhich Cassius being alarmed, and having received information of Scipio'sapproach, and seen the horse, which he imagined to be Scipio's, hebetook himself to the mountains that environ Thessaly, and thence beganto make his route towards Ambracia. But when Scipio was hastening topursue him, despatches overtook him from Favonius, that Domitius wasmarching against him with his legions, and that he could not maintainthe garrison over which he was appointed, without Scipio's assistance. On receipt of these despatches, Scipio changed his designs and hisroute, desisted from his pursuit of Cassius, and hastened to relieveFavonius. Accordingly, continuing his march day and night, he came tohim so opportunely, that the dust raised by Domitius's army, andScipio's advanced guard, were observed at the same instant. Thus, thevigilance of Domitius saved Cassius, and the expedition of Scipio, Favonius. 

XXXVII--Scipio, having stayed for two days in his camp, along the riverHaliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius's camp, on the third day, at dawn, led his army across a ford, and having made a regularencampment the day following, drew up his forces in front of his camp. Domitius thought he ought not to show any reluctance, but should drawout his forces and hazard a battle. But as there was a plain six milesin breadth between the two camps, he posted his army before Scipio'scamp; while the latter persevered in not quitting his entrenchment. However, Domitius with difficulty restrained his men, and preventedtheir beginning a battle; the more so as a rivulet with steep banks, joining Scipio's camp, retarded the progress of our men. When Scipioperceived the eagerness and alacrity of our troops to engage, suspectingthat he should be obliged the next day, either to fight, against hisinclination, or to incur great disgrace by keeping within his camp, though he had come with high expectation, yet by advancing rashly, madea shameful end; and at night crossed the river, without even giving thesignal for breaking up the camp, and returned to the ground from whichhe came, and there encamped near the river, on an elevated situation. After a few days, he placed a party of horse in ambush in the night, where our men had usually gone to forage for several days before. Andwhen Quintus Varus, commander of Domitius's horse, came there as usual, they suddenly rushed from their ambush. But our men bravely supportedtheir charge, and returned quickly every man to his own rank, and intheir turn, made a general charge on the enemy: and having killed abouteighty of them, and put the rest to flight, retreated to their camp withthe loss of only two men. 

XXXVIII. --After these transactions, Domitius, hoping to allure Scipio toa battle, pretended to be obliged to change his position through want ofcorn, and having given the signal for decamping, advanced about threemiles, and posted his army and cavalry in a convenient place, concealedfrom the enemy's view. Scipio being in readiness to pursue him, detachedhis cavalry and a considerable number of light infantry to exploreDomitius's route. When they had marched a short way, and their foremosttroops were within reach of our ambush, their suspicions being raised bythe neighing of the horses, they began to retreat: and the rest whofollowed them, observing with what speed they retreated, made a halt. Our men, perceiving that the enemy had discovered their plot, andthinking it in vain to wait for any more, having got two troops in theirpower, intercepted them. Among them was Marcus Opimius, general of thehorse, but he made his escape: they either killed or took prisoners allthe rest of these two troops, and brought them to Domitius. 

XXXIX. --Caesar, having drawn his garrisons out of the sea-ports, asbefore mentioned, left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town, andcommitted to them the charge of his ships of war, which he hadtransported from Italy. Acilius, as lieutenant-general, had the chargeof this duty and the command of the town; he drew the ships into theinner part of the harbour, behind the town, and fastened them to theshore, and sank a merchant-ship in the mouth of the harbour to block itup; and near it he fixed another at anchor, on which he raised a turret, and faced it to the entrance of the port, and filled it with soldiers, and ordered them to keep guard against any sudden attack. 

XL. --Cneius, Pompey's son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having gotintelligence of these things, came to Oricum, and weighed up the ship, that had been sunk, with a windlass, and by straining at it with severalropes, and attacked the other which had been placed by Acilius to watchthe port with several ships, on which he had raised very high turrets, so that fighting as it were from an eminence, and sending fresh menconstantly to relieve the fatigued, and at the same time attempting thetown on all sides by land, with ladders and his fleet, in order todivide the force of his enemies, he overpowered our men by fatigue, andthe immense number of darts, and took the ship, having beat off the menwho were put on board to defend it, who, however, made their escape insmall boats; and at the same time he seized a natural mole on theopposite side, which almost formed an island over against the town. Hecarried over land, into the inner part of the harbour, four galleys, byputting rollers under them, and driving them on with levers. Thenattacking on both sides the ships of war which were moored to the shore, and were not manned, he carried off four of them, and set the rest onfire. After despatching this business, he left Decimus Laelius, whom hehad taken away from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to hinderprovisions from being brought into the town from Biblis and Amantia, andwent himself to Lissus, where he attacked thirty merchantmen, leftwithin the port by Antonius, and set them on fire. He attempted to stormLissus, but being delayed three days by the vigorous defence of theRoman citizens who belonged to that district, and of the soldiers whichCaesar had sent to keep garrison there, and having lost a few men in theassault, he returned without effecting his object. 

XLI. --As soon as Caesar heard that Pompey was at Asparagium, he set outfor that place with his army, and having taken the capital of theParthinians on his march, where there was a garrison of Pompey's, hereached Pompey in Macedonia, on the third day, and encamped beside him;and the day following, having drawn out all his forces before his camp, he offered Pompey battle. But perceiving that he kept within histrenches, he led his army back to his camp, and thought of pursuing someother plan. Accordingly, the day following, he set out with all hisforces by a long circuit, through a difficult and narrow road toDyrrachium; hoping, either that Pompey would be compelled to follow himto Dyrrachium, or that his communication with it might be cut off, because he had deposited there all his provisions and mat['e]riel ofwar. And so it happened; for Pompey, at first not knowing his design, because he imagined he had taken a route in a different direction fromthat country, thought that the scarcity of provisions had obliged him toshift his quarters; but having afterwards got true intelligence from hisscouts, he decamped the day following, hoping to prevent him by taking ashorter road; which Caesar suspecting might happen, encouraged histroops to submit cheerfully to the fatigue, and having halted a verysmall part of the night, he arrived early in the morning at Dyrrachium, when the van of Pompey's army was visible at a distance, and there heencamped. 

XLII. --Pompey, being cut off from Dyrrachium, as he was unable to effecthis purpose, took a new resolution, and entrenched himself strongly on arising ground, which is called Petra, where ships of a small size cancome in, and be sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of hismen-of-war to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought fromAsia, and from all the countries of which he kept possession. Caesar, imagining that the war would be protracted to too great a length, anddespairing of his convoys from Italy, because all the coasts wereguarded with great diligence by Pompey's adherents; and because his ownfleets, which he had built during the winter, in Sicily, Gaul, andItaly, were detained; sent Lucius Canuleius into Epirus to procure corn;and because these countries were too remote, he fixed granaries incertain places, and regulated the carriage of the corn for theneighbouring states. He likewise gave directions that search should bemade for whatever corn was in Lissus, the country of the Parthini, andall the places of strength. The quantity was very small, both from thenature of the land (for the country is rough and mountainous, and thepeople commonly import what grain they use); and because Pompey hadforeseen what would happen, and some days before had plundered theParthini, and having ravaged and dug up their houses, carried off allthe corn, which he collected by means of his horse. 

XLIII. --Caesar, on being informed of these transactions, pursuedmeasures suggested by the nature of the country. For round Pompey'scamps there were several high and rough hills. These he first of alloccupied with guards, and raised strong forts on them. Then drawing afortification from one fort to another, as the nature of each positionallowed, he began to draw a line of circumvallation round Pompey; withthese views; as he had but a small quantity of corn, and Pompey wasstrong in cavalry, that he might furnish his army with corn and othernecessaries from all sides with less danger: secondly, to prevent Pompeyfrom foraging, and thereby render his horse ineffectual in theoperations of the war; and thirdly, to lessen his reputation, on whichhe saw he depended greatly, among foreign nations, when a report shouldhave spread throughout the world that he was blockaded by Caesar, anddare not hazard a battle. 

XLIV. --Neither was Pompey willing to leave the sea and Dyrrachium, because he had lodged his mat['e]riel there, his weapons, arms, andengines; and supplied his army with corn from it by his ships: nor washe able to put a stop to Caesar's works without hazarding a battle, which at that time he had determined not to do. Nothing was left but toadopt the last resource, namely, to possess himself of as many hills ashe could, and cover as great an extent of country as possible with histroops, and divide Caesar's forces as much as possible; and so ithappened: for having raised twenty-four forts, and taken in a compass offifteen miles, he got forage in this space, and within this circuitthere were several fields lately sown, in which the cattle might feed inthe meantime. And as our men, who had completed their works by drawinglines of communication from one fort to another, were afraid thatPompey's men would sally out from some part, and attack us in the rear;so the enemy were making a continued fortification in a circuit withinours to prevent us from breaking in on any side, or surrounding them onthe rear. But they completed their works first; both because they had agreater number of men, and because they had a smaller compass toenclose. When Caesar attempted to gain any place, though Pompey hadresolved not to oppose him with his whole force or to come to a generalengagement; yet he detached to particular places slingers and archers, with which his army abounded, and several of our men were wounded, andfilled with great dread of the arrows; and almost all the soldiers madecoats or coverings for themselves of hair cloths, tarpaulins, or rawhides to defend them against the weapons. 

XLV. --In seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost power: Caesar, toconfine Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible; Pompey, to occupyas many hills as he could in as large a circuit as possible, and severalskirmishes were fought in consequence of it. In one of these, whenCaesar's ninth legion had gained a certain post, and had begun tofortify it; Pompey possessed himself of a hill near to and opposite thesame place, and endeavoured to annoy the men while at work; and as theapproach on one side was almost level, he first surrounded it witharchers and slingers, and afterwards by detaching a strong party oflight infantry, and using his engines, he stopped our works: and it wasno easy matter for our men at once to defend themselves, and to proceedwith their fortifications. When Caesar perceived that his troops werewounded from all sides, he determined to retreat and give up the post;his retreat was down a precipice, on which account they pushed on withmore spirit, and would not allow us to retire, because they imaginedthat we resigned the place through fear. It is reported that Pompey saidthat day in triumph to his friends about him, "That he would consent tobe accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions effected aretreat without considerable loss from that ground into which they hadrashly advanced. "

XLVI. --Caesar, being uneasy about the retreat of his soldiers, orderedhurdles to be carried to the further side of the hill, and to be placedopposite to the enemy, and behind them a trench of a moderate breadth tobe sunk by his soldiers under shelter of the hurdles: and the ground tobe made as difficult as possible. He himself disposed slingers inconvenient places to cover our men in their retreat. These things beingcompleted, he ordered his legions to file off. Pompey's men insultinglyand boldly pursued and chased us, levelling the hurdles that were thrownup in the front of our works, in order to pass over the trench. Which assoon as Caesar perceived, being afraid that his men would appear not toretreat, but to be repulsed, and that greater loss might be sustained, when his men were almost half way down the hill, he encouraged them byAntonius, who commanded that legion, ordered the signal of battle to besounded, and a charge to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninthlegion suddenly closing their files threw their javelins, and advancingimpetuously from the low ground up the steep, drove Pompey's menprecipitately before them, and obliged them to turn their backs; buttheir retreat was greatly impeded by the hurdles that lay in a long linebefore them, and the pallisadoes which were in their way, and thetrenches that were sunk. But our men being contented to retreat withoutinjury, having killed several of the enemy, and lost but five of theirown, very quietly retired, and having seized some other hills somewhaton this side of that place, completed their fortifications. 

XLVII. --This method of conducting a war was new and unusual, as well onaccount of the number of forts, the extent and greatness of the works, and the manner of attack and defence, as on account of othercircumstances. For all who have attempted to besiege any person, haveattacked the enemy when they were frightened or weak, or after a defeat;or have been kept in fear of some attack, when they themselves have hada superior force both of foot and horse. Besides, the usual design of asiege is to cut off the enemy's supplies. On the contrary, Caesar, withan inferior force, was enclosing troops sound and unhurt, and who hadabundance of all things. For there arrived every day a prodigious numberof ships, which brought them provisions: nor could the wind blow fromany point that would not be favourable to some of them. Whereas, Caesar, having consumed all the corn far and near, was in very great distress, but his soldiers bore all with uncommon patience. For they rememberedthat they lay under the same difficulties last year in Spain, and yet bylabour and patience had concluded a dangerous war. They recollected toothat they had suffered an alarming scarcity at Alesia, and a muchgreater at Avaricum, and yet had returned victorious over mightynations. They refused neither barley nor pulse when offered them, andthey held in great esteem cattle, of which they got great quantitiesfrom Epirus. 

XLVIII. --There was a sort of root, called chara, discovered by thetroops which served under Valerius. This they mixed up with milk, and itgreatly contributed to relieve their want. They made it into a sort ofbread. They had great plenty of it: loaves made of this, when Pompey'smen upbraided ours with want, they frequently threw among them to damptheir hopes. 

XLIX. --The corn was now beginning to ripen, and their hope supportedtheir want, as they were confident of having abundance in a short time. And there were frequently heard declarations of the soldiers on guard, in discourse with each other, that they would rather live on the bark ofthe trees, than let Pompey escape from their hands. For they were oftentold by deserters, that they could scarcely maintain their horses, andthat their other cattle was dead: that they themselves were not in goodhealth from their confinement within so narrow a compass, from thenoisome smell, the number of carcasses, and the constant fatigue tothem, being men unaccustomed to work, and labouring under a great wantof water. For Caesar had either turned the course of all the rivers andstreams which ran to the sea, or had dammed them up with strong works. And as the country was mountainous, and the valleys narrow at thebottom, he enclosed them with piles sunk in the ground, and heaped upmould against them to keep in the water. They were therefore obliged tosearch for low and marshy grounds, and to sink wells, and they had thislabour in addition to their daily works. And even these springs were ata considerable distance from some of their posts, and soon dried up withthe heat. But Caesar's army enjoyed perfect health and abundance ofwater, and had plenty of all sorts of provisions except corn; and theyhad a prospect of better times approaching, and saw greater hopes laidbefore them by the ripening of the grain. 

L. --In this new kind of war, new methods of managing it were invented byboth generals. Pompey's men, perceiving by our fires at night, at whatpart of the works our cohorts were on guard, coming silently upon themdischarged their arrows at random among the whole multitude, andinstantly retired to their camp: as a remedy against which our men weretaught by experience to light their fires in one place, and keep guardin another. 

 * * * * *

LI. --In the meantime, Publius Sylla, whom Caesar at his departure hadleft governor of his camp, came up with two legions to assist thecohort; upon whose arrival Pompey's forces were easily repulsed. Nor didthey stand the sight and charge of our men, and the foremost falling, the rest turned their backs and quitted the field. But Sylla called ourmen in from the pursuit, lest their ardour should carry them too far, but most people imagine, that if he had consented to a vigorous pursuit, the war might have been ended that day. His conduct however does notappear to deserve censure; for the duties of a lieutenant-general and ofa commander-in-chief are very different; the one is bound to actentirely according to his instructions, the other to regulate hisconduct without control, as occasion requires. Sylla, being deputed byCaesar to take care of the camp, and having rescued his men, wassatisfied with that, and did not desire to hazard a battle (althoughthis circumstance might probably have had a successful issue), that hemight not be thought to have assumed the part of the general. Onecircumstance laid the Pompeians under great difficulty in making good aretreat: for they had advanced from disadvantageous ground, and wereposted on the top of a hill. If they attempted to retire down the steep, they dreaded the pursuit of our men from the rising ground, and therewas but a short time till sunset: for in hopes of completing thebusiness, they had protracted the battle almost till night. Takingtherefore measures suited to their exigency, and to the shortness of thetime, Pompey possessed himself of an eminence, at such a distance fromour fort, that no weapon discharged from an engine could reach him. Herehe took up a position, and fortified it, and kept all his forces there. 

LII. --At the same time, there were engagements in two other places; forPompey had attacked several forts at once, in order to divide ourforces; that no relief might be sent from the neighbouring posts. In oneplace, Volcatius Tullus sustained the charge of a legion with threecohorts, and beat them off the field. In another, the Germans, havingsallied over our fortifications, slew several of the enemy, andretreated safe to our camp. 

LIII. --Thus six engagements having happened in one day, three atDyrrachium, and three at the fortifications, when a computation was madeof the number of slain, we found that about two thousand fell onPompey's side, several of them volunteer veterans and centurions. Amongthem was Valerius, the son of Lucius Flaccus, who as praetor hadformerly had the government of Asia, and six military standards weretaken. Of our men, not more than twenty were missing in all the action. But in the fort, not a single soldier escaped without a wound; and inone cohort, four centurions lost their eyes. And being desirous toproduce testimony of the fatigue they underwent, and the danger theysustained, they counted to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which hadbeen thrown into the fort; and in the shield of the centurion Scaeva, which was brought to him, were found two hundred and thirty holes. Inreward for this man's services both to himself and the republic, Caesarpresented to him two hundred thousand pieces of copper money, anddeclared him promoted from the eighth to the first centurion. For itappeared that the fort had been in a great measure saved by hisexertions; and he afterwards very amply rewarded the cohorts with doublepay, corn, clothing, and other military honours. 

LIV. --Pompey, having made great additions to his works in the night, thefollowing days built turrets, and having carried his works fifteen feethigh, faced that part of his camp with mantlets; and after an intervalof five days, taking advantage of a second cloudy night, he barricadedall the gates of his camp to hinder a pursuit, and about midnightquietly marched off his army, and retreated to his old fortifications. 

LV. --Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochis, being reduced, as we haverelated, by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, Caesar thought heought to attempt the conquest of Achaia, and to advance farther into thecountry. Accordingly, he detached Fufius thither, and ordered QuintusSabinus and Cassius to join him with their cohorts. Upon notice of theirapproach, Rutilius Lupus, who commanded in Achaia, under Pompey, beganto fortify the Isthmus, to prevent Fufius from coming into Achaia. Kalenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus, by a voluntarysubmission of those states. Some he subdued by force, the rest heendeavoured to win over to Caesar's interest, by sending deputies roundto them. In these things, principally, Fufius was employed. 

LVI. --Every day afterwards, Caesar drew up his army on a level ground, and offered Pompey battle, and led his legions almost close to Pompey'scamp; and his front line was at no greater distance from the rampartthan that no weapons from their engines could reach it. But Pompey, tosave his credit and reputation with the world, drew out his legions, butso close to his camp that his rear lines might touch the rampart, andthat his whole army, when drawn up, might be protected by the dartsdischarged from it. 

LVII. --Whilst these things were going forward in Achaia and atDyrrachium, and when it was certainly known that Scipio was arrived inMacedonia, Caesar, never losing sight of his first intention, sendsClodius to him, an intimate friend to both, whom Caesar, on theintroduction and recommendation of Pompey, had admitted into the numberof his acquaintance. To this man he gave letters and instructions toPompey, the substance of which was as follows: "That he had made everyeffort towards peace, and imputed the ill success of those efforts tothe fault of those whom he had employed to conduct those negotiations:because they were afraid to carry his proposals to Pompey at an impropertime. That Scipio had such authority, that he could not only freelyexplain what conduct met his approbation, but even in some degreeenforce his advice, and govern him [Pompey] if he persisted in error;that he commanded an army independent of Pompey, so that besides hisauthority, he had strength to compel; and if he did so, all men would beindebted to him for the quiet of Italy, the peace of the provinces, andthe preservation of the empire. " These proposals Clodius made to him, and for some days at the first appeared to have met with a favourablereception, but afterwards was not admitted to an audience; for Scipiobeing reprimanded by Favonius, as we found afterwards when the war wasended, and the negotiation having miscarried, Clodius returned toCaesar. 

LVIII. --Caesar, that he might the more easily keep Pompey's horseenclosed within Dyrrachium, and prevent them from foraging, fortifiedthe two narrow passes already mentioned with strong works, and erectedforts at them. Pompey perceiving that he derived no advantage from hiscavalry, after a few days had them conveyed back to his camp by sea. Fodder was so exceedingly scarce that he was obliged to feed his horsesupon leaves stripped off the trees, or the tender roots of reedspounded. For the corn which had been sown within the lines was alreadyconsumed, and they would be obliged to supply themselves with fodderfrom Corcyra and Acarnania, over a long tract of sea; and as thequantity of that fell short, to increase it by mixing barley with it, and by these methods support their cavalry. But when not only the barleyand fodder in these parts were consumed, and the herbs cut away, whenthe leaves too were not to be found on the trees, the horses beingalmost starved, Pompey thought he ought to make some attempt by a sally. 

LIX. --In the number of Caesar's cavalry were two Allobrogians, brothers, named Roscillus and Aegus, the sons of Abducillus, who for several yearspossessed the chief power in his own state; men of singular valour, whose gallant services Caesar had found very useful in all his wars inGaul. To them, for these reasons, he had committed the offices ofgreatest honour in their own country, and took care to have them choseninto the senate at an unusual age, and had bestowed on them lands takenfrom the enemy, and large pecuniary rewards, and from being needy hadmade them affluent. Their valour had not only procured them Caesar'sesteem, but they were beloved by the whole army. But presuming onCaesar's friendship, and elated with the arrogance natural to a foolishand barbarous people, they despised their countrymen, defrauded theircavalry of their pay, and applied all the plunder to their own use. Displeased at this conduct, their soldiers went in a body to Caesar, andopenly complained of their ill usage; and to their other charges added, that false musters were given in to Caesar, and the surcharged payapplied to their own use. 

LX. --Caesar, not thinking it a proper time to call them to account, andwilling to pardon many faults, on account of their valour, deferred thewhole matter, and gave them a private rebuke, for having made a trafficof their troops, and advised them to expect everything from hisfriendship, and by his past favours to measure their future hopes. This, however, gave them great offence, and made them contemptible in the eyesof the whole army. Of this they became sensible, as well from thereproaches of others, as from the judgment of their own minds, and aconsciousness of guilt. Prompted then by shame, and perhaps imaginingthat they were not liberated from trial, but reserved to a future day, they resolved to break off from us, to put their fortune to a newhazard, and to make trial of new connections. And having conferred witha few of their clients, to whom they could venture to entrust so base anaction, they first attempted to assassinate Caius Volusenus, general ofthe horse (as was discovered at the end of the war), that they mightappear to have fled to Pompey after conferring an important service onhim. But when that appeared too difficult to put in execution, and noopportunity offered to accomplish it, they borrowed all the money theycould, as if they designed to make satisfaction and restitution for whatthey had defrauded: and having purchased a great number of horses, theydeserted to Pompey along with those whom they had engaged in their plot. 

LXI. --As they were persons nobly descended and of liberal education, andhad come with a great retinue, and several cattle, and were reckoned menof courage, and had been in great esteem with Caesar, and as it was anew and uncommon event, Pompey carried them round all his works, andmade an ostentatious show of them, for till that day, not a soldier, either horse or foot, had deserted from Caesar to Pompey, though therewere desertions almost every day from Pompey to Caesar: but morecommonly among the soldiers levied in Epirus and Aetolia, and in thosecountries which were in Caesar's possession. But the brothers, havingbeen acquainted with all things, either what was incomplete in ourworks, or what appeared to the best judges of military matters to bedeficient, the particular times, the distance of places, and the variousattention of the guards, according to the different temper and characterof the officer who commanded the different posts, gave an exact accountof all to Pompey. 

LXII. --Upon receiving this intelligence, Pompey, who had already formedthe design of attempting a sally, as before mentioned, ordered thesoldiers to make ozier coverings for their helmets, and to providefascines. These things being prepared, he embarked on board small boatsand row galleys by night, a considerable number of light infantry andarchers, with all their fascines, and immediately after midnight, hemarched sixty cohorts drafted from the greater camp and the outposts, tothat part of our works which extended towards the sea, and were at thefarthest distance from Caesar's greater camp. To the same place he sentthe ships, which he had freighted with the fascines and light-armedtroops; and all the ships of war that lay at Dyrrachium; and to each hegave particular instructions: at this part of the lines Caesar hadposted Lentulus Marcellinus, the quaestor, with the ninth legion, and ashe was not in a good state of health, Fulvius Costhumus was sent toassist him in the command. 

LXIII. --At this place, fronting the enemy, there was a ditch fifteenfeet wide, and a rampart ten feet high, and the top of the rampart wasten feet in breadth. At an interval of six hundred feet from that therewas another rampart turned the contrary way, with the works lower. Forsome days before, Caesar, apprehending that our men might be surroundedby sea, had made a double rampart there, that if he should be attackedon both sides, he might have the means in defending himself. But theextent of the lines, and the incessant labour for so many days, becausehe had enclosed a circuit of seventeen miles with his works, did notallow time to finish them. Therefore the transverse rampart which shouldmake a communication between the other two, was not yet completed. Thiscircumstance was known to Pompey, being told to him by the Allobrogiandeserters, and proved of great disadvantage to us. For when our cohortsof the ninth legion were on guard by the sea-side, Pompey's army arrivedsuddenly by break of day, and their approach was a surprise to our men, and at the same time, the soldiers that came by sea cast their darts onthe front rampart; and the ditches were filled with fascines: and thelegionary soldiers terrified those that defended the inner rampart, byapplying the scaling ladders, and by engines and weapons of all sorts, and a vast multitude of archers poured round upon them from every side. Besides, the coverings of oziers, which they had laid over theirhelmets, were a great security to them against the blows of stones whichwere the only weapons that our soldiers had. And therefore, when our menwere oppressed in every manner, and were scarcely able to makeresistance, the defect in our works was observed, and Pompey's soldiers, landing between the two ramparts, where the work was unfinished, attacked our men in the rear, and having beat them from both sides ofthe fortification, obliged them to flee. 

LXIV. --Marcellinus, being informed of this disorder, detached somecohorts to the relief of our men, who seeing them flee from the camp, were neither able to persuade them to rally at their approach, northemselves to sustain the enemy's charge. And in like manner, whateveradditional assistance was sent, was infected by the fears of thedefeated, and increased the terror and danger. For retreat was preventedby the multitude of the fugitives. In that battle, when the eagle-bearerwas dangerously wounded, and began to grow weak, having got sight of ourhorse, he said to them, "This eagle have I defended with the greatestcare for many years, at the hazard of my life, and now in my lastmoments restore it to Caesar with the same fidelity. Do not, I conjureyou, suffer a dishonour to be sustained in the field, which never beforehappened to Caesar's army, but deliver it safe into his hands. " By thisaccident the eagle was preserved, but all the centurions of the firstcohorts were killed, except the principal. 

LXV. --And now the Pompeians, after great havoc of our troops, wereapproaching Marcellinus's camp, and had struck no small terror into therest of the cohorts, when Marcus Antonius, who commanded the nearestfort, being informed of what had happened, was observed descending fromthe rising ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival checked thePompeians, and encouraged our men to recover from their extremeaffright. And shortly after, Caesar having got notice by the smoke fromall the forts, which was the usual signal on such occasions, drafted offsome cohorts from the outposts, and went to the scene of action. Andhaving there learnt the loss he had sustained, and perceiving thatPompey had forced our works, and had encamped along the coast, so thathe was at liberty to forage, and had a communication with his shipping, he altered his plan for conducting the war, as his design had notsucceeded, and ordered a strong encampment to be made near Pompey. 

LXVI. --When this work was finished, Caesar's scouts observed that somecohorts, which to them appeared like a legion, were retired behind thewood, and were on their march to the old camp. The situation of the twocamps was as follows: a few days before, when Caesar's ninth legion hadopposed a party of Pompey's troops, and were endeavouring to enclosethem, Caesar's troops formed a camp in that place. This camp joined acertain wood, and was not above four hundred paces distant from the sea. Afterwards, changing his design for certain reasons, Caesar removed hiscamp to a small distance beyond that place; and after a few days, Pompeytook possession of it, and added more extensive works, leaving the innerrampart standing, as he intended to keep several legions there. By thismeans, the lesser camp included within the greater, answered the purposeof a fort and citadel. He had also carried an entrenchment from the leftangle of the camp to the river, about four hundred paces, that hissoldiers might have more liberty and less danger in fetching water. Buthe too, changing his design for reasons not necessary to be mentioned, abandoned the place. In this condition the camp remained for severaldays, the works being all entire. 

LXVII. --Caesar's scouts brought him word that the standard of a legionwas carried to this place. That the same thing was seen he was assuredby those in the higher forts. This place was half a mile distant fromPompey's new camp. Caesar, hoping to surprise this legion, and anxiousto repair the loss sustained that day, left two cohorts employed in theworks to make an appearance of entrenching himself, and by a differentroute, as privately as he could, with his other cohorts amounting tothirty-three, among which was the ninth legion, which had lost so manycenturions, and whose privates were greatly reduced in number, hemarched in two lines against Pompey's legion and his lesser camp. Nordid this first opinion deceive him. For he reached the place beforePompey could have notice of it; and though the works were strong, yethaving made the attack with the left wing, which he commanded in person, he obliged the Pompeians to quit the rampart in disorder. A barricadehad been raised before the gates, at which a short contest wasmaintained, our men endeavouring to force their way in, and the enemy todefend the camp; Titus Pulcio, by whose means we have related that CaiusAntonius's army was betrayed, defending them with singular courage. Butthe valour of our men prevailed, and having cut down the barricade, theyfirst forced the greater camp, and after that the fort which wasenclosed within it: and as the legion on its repulse had retired tothis, they slew several defending themselves there. 

LXVIII. --But Fortune, who exerts a powerful influence as well in othermatters, as especially in war, effects great changes from triflingcauses, as happened at this time. For the cohorts on Caesar's rightwing, through ignorance of the place, followed the direction of thatrampart, which ran along from the camp to the river, whilst they were insearch of a gate, and imagined that it belonged to the camp. But whenthey found that it led to the river, and that nobody opposed them, theyimmediately climbed over the rampart, and were followed by all ourcavalry. 

LXIX. --In the meantime Pompey, by the great delay which this occasioned, being informed of what had happened, marched with the fifth legion, which he called away from their work to support his party; and at thesame time his cavalry were advancing up to ours, and an army in order ofbattle was seen at a distance by our men who had taken possession of thecamp, and the face of affairs was suddenly changed. For Pompey's legion, encouraged by the hope of speedy support, attempted to make a stand atthe Decuman gate, and made a bold charge on our men. Caesar's cavalry, who had mounted the rampart by a narrow breach, being apprehensive oftheir retreat, were the first to flee. The right wing, which had beenseparated from the left, observing the terror of the cavalry, to preventtheir being overpowered within the lines, were endeavouring to retreatby the same way as they burst in; and most of them, lest they should beengaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves down a rampart ten feethigh into the trenches; and the first being trodden to death, the restprocured their safety and escaped over their bodies. The soldiers of theleft wing, perceiving from the rampart that Pompey was advancing, andtheir own friends fleeing, being afraid that they should be enclosedbetween the two ramparts, as they had an enemy both within and without, strove to secure their retreat the same way they came. All was disorder, consternation, and flight; insomuch that, when Caesar laid hold of thecolours of those who were running away, and desired them to stand, someleft their horses behind, and continued to run in the same manner;others through fear even threw away their colours, nor did a single manface about. 

LXX. --In this calamity, the following favourable circumstance occurredto prevent the ruin of our whole army, viz. , that Pompey suspecting anambuscade (because, as I suppose, the success had far exceeded hishopes, as he had seen his men a moment before fleeing from the camp), durst not for some time approach the fortification; and that his horsewere retarded from pursuing, because the passes and gates were inpossession of Caesar's soldiers. Thus a trifling circumstance proved ofgreat importance to each party; for the rampart drawn from the camp tothe river, interrupted the progress and certainty of Caesar's victory, after he had forced Pompey's camp. The same thing, by retarding therapidity of the enemy's pursuit, preserved our army. 

LXXI. --In the two actions of this day, Caesar lost nine hundred andsixty rank and file, several Roman knights of distinction, FelginasTuticanus Gallus, a senator's son; Caius Felginas from Placentia; AulusGravius from Puteoli; Marcus Sacrativir from Capua; and thirty-twomilitary tribunes and centurions. But the greatest part of all theseperished without a wound, being trodden to death in the trenches, on theramparts and banks of the river by reason of the terror and flight oftheir own men. Pompey, after this battle, was saluted Imperator; thistitle he retained, and allowed himself to be addressed by it afterwards. But neither in his letters to the senate, nor in the fasces, did he usethe laurel as a mark of honour. But Labienus, having obtained hisconsent that the prisoners should be delivered up to him, had them allbrought out, as it appeared, to make a show of them, and that Pompeymight place a greater confidence in him who was a deserter; and callingthem fellow soldiers, and asking them in the most insulting mannerwhether it was usual with veterans to flee, ordered them to be put todeath in the sight of the whole army. 

LXXII. -Pompey's party were so elated with confidence and spirit at thissuccess, that they thought no more of the method of conducting the war, but thought that they were already conquerors. They did not considerthat the smallness of our numbers, and the disadvantage of the place andthe confined nature of the ground occasioned by their having firstpossessed themselves of the camp, and the double danger both from withinand without the fortifications, and the separation of the army into twoparts, so that the one could not give relief to the other, were thecause of our defeat. They did not consider, in addition, that thecontest was not decided by a vigorous attack, nor a regular battle; andthat our men had suffered greater loss from their numbers and want ofroom, than they had sustained from the enemy. In fine, they did notreflect on the common casualties of war; how trifling causes, eitherfrom groundless suspicions, sudden affright, or religious scruples, haveoftentimes been productive of considerable losses; how often an army hasbeen unsuccessful either by the misconduct of the general, or theoversight of a tribune; but as if they had proved victorious by theirvalour, and as if no change could ever take place, they published thesuccess of the day throughout the world by reports and letters. 

LXXIII. --Caesar, disappointed in his first intentions, resolved tochange the whole plan of his operations. Accordingly, he at once calledin all out-posts, gave over the siege, and collecting his army into oneplace, addressed his soldiers and encouraged them "not to be troubled atwhat had happened, nor to be dismayed at it, but to weigh their manysuccessful engagements against one disappointment, and that, too, atrifling one. That they ought to be grateful to Fortune, through whosefavour they had recovered Italy without the effusion of blood; throughwhose favour they had subdued the two Spains, though protected by a mostwarlike people under the command of the most skilful and experiencedgenerals: through whose favour they had reduced to submission theneighbouring states that abounded with corn: in fine, that they ought toremember with what success they had been all transported safe throughblockading fleets of the enemy, which possessed not only the ports, buteven the coasts: that if all their attempts were not crowned withsuccess, the defects of Fortune must be supplied by industry; andwhatever loss had been sustained, ought to be attributed rather to hercaprices than to any faults in him: that he had chosen a safe ground forthe engagement, that he had possessed himself of the enemy's camp; thathe had beaten them out, and overcome them when they offered resistance;but whether their own terror or some mistake, or whether Fortune herselfhad interrupted a victory almost secured and certain, they ought all nowto use their utmost efforts to repair by their valour the loss which hadbeen incurred; if they did so, their misfortunes would turn to theiradvantage, as it happened at Gergovia, and those who feared to face theenemy would be the first to offer themselves to battle. 

LXXIV. --Having concluded his speech, he disgraced some standard-bearers, and reduced them to the ranks; for the whole army was seized with suchgrief at their loss, and with such an ardent desire of repairing theirdisgrace, that not a man required the command of his tribune orcenturion, but they imposed each on himself severer labours than usualas a punishment, and at the same time were so inflamed with eagerness tomeet the enemy, that the officers of the first rank, sensibly affectedat their entreaties, were of opinion that they ought to continue intheir present posts, and commit their fate to the hazard of a battle. But, on the other hand, Caesar could not place sufficient confidence inmen so lately thrown into consternation, and thought he ought to allowthem time to recover their dejected spirits; and having abandoned hisworks, he was apprehensive of being distressed for want of corn. 

LXXV. --Accordingly, suffering no time to intervene but what wasnecessary for a proper attention to be paid to the sick and wounded, hesent on all his baggage privately in the beginning of the night from hiscamp to Apollonia, and ordered them not to halt till they had performedtheir journey; and he detached one legion with them as a convoy. Thisaffair being concluded, having retained only two legions in his camp; hemarched the rest of his army out at three o'clock in the morning byseveral gates, and sent them forward by the same route; and in a shortspace after, that the military practice might be preserved, and hismarch known as late as possible, he ordered the signal for decamping tobe given; and setting out immediately, and following the rear of his ownarmy, he was soon out of sight of the camp. Nor did Pompey, as soon ashe had notice of his design, make any delay to pursue him; but with aview to surprise them whilst encumbered with baggage on their march, andnot yet recovered from their fright, he led his army out of his camp, and sent his cavalry on to retard our rear; but was not able to come upwith them, because Caesar had got far before him, and marched withoutbaggage. But when we reached the river Genusus, the banks being steep, their horse overtook our rear, and detained them by bringing them toaction. To oppose whom, Caesar sent his horse, and intermixed with themabout four hundred of his advanced light troops, who attacked theirhorse with such success, that having routed them all, and killedseveral, they returned without any loss to the main body. 

LXXVI. --Having performed the exact march which he had proposed that day, and having led his army over the river Genusus, Caesar posted himself inhis old camp opposite Asparagium; and kept his soldiers close within theentrenchments; and ordered the horse, who had been sent out underpretence of foraging, to retire immediately into the camp, through theDecuman gate. Pompey, in like manner, having completed the same day'smarch, took post in his old camp at Asparagium; and his soldiers, asthey had no work (the fortifications being entire), made longexcursions, some to collect wood and forage; others, invited by thenearness of the former camp, laid up their arms in their tents, andquitted the entrenchments in order to bring what they had left behindthem, because the design of marching being adopted in a hurry, they hadleft a considerable part of their waggons and luggage behind. Being thusincapable of pursuing, as Caesar had foreseen, about noon he gave thesignal for marching, led out his army, and doubling that day's march, headvanced eight miles beyond Pompey's camp; who could not pursue him, because his troops were dispersed. 

LXXVII. --The next day Caesar sent his baggage forward early in thenight, and marched off himself immediately after the fourth watch: thatif he should be under the necessity of risking an engagement, he mightmeet a sudden attack with an army free from incumbrance. He did so forseveral days successively, by which means he was enabled to effect hismarch over the deepest rivers, and through the most intricate roadswithout any loss. For Pompey, after the first day's delay, and thefatigue which he endured for some days in vain, though he exertedhimself by forced marches, and was anxious to overtake us, who had gotthe start of him, on the fourth day desisted from the pursuit, anddetermined to follow other measures. 

LXXVIII. --Caesar was obliged to go to Apollonia, to lodge his wounded, pay his army, confirm his friends, and leave garrisons in the towns. Butfor these matters, he allowed no more time than was necessary for aperson in haste. And being apprehensive for Domitius, lest he should besurprised by Pompey's arrival, he hastened with all speed andearnestness to join him; for he planned the operations of the wholecampaign on these principles: that if Pompey should march after him, hewould be drawn off from the sea, and from those forces which he hadprovided in Dyrrachium, and separated from his corn and magazines, andbe obliged to carry on the war on equal terms; but if he crossed overinto Italy, Caesar, having effected a junction with Domitius, wouldmarch through Illyricum to the relief of Italy; but if he endeavoured tostorm Apollonia and Oricum, and exclude him from the whole coast, hehoped, by besieging Scipio, to oblige him, of necessity, to come to hisassistance. Accordingly, Caesar despatching couriers, writes toDomitius, and acquaints him with his wishes on the subject: and havingstationed a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, andthree at Oricum, besides those who were sick of their wounds, he setforward on his march through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, also, guessing at Caesar's design, determined to hasten to Scipio, that ifCaesar should march in that direction, he might be ready to relieve him;but that if Caesar should be unwilling to quit the sea-coast andCorcyra, because he expected legions and cavalry from Italy, he himselfmight fall on Domitius with all his forces. 

LXXIX. --For these reasons, each of them studied despatch, that he mightsuccour his friends, and not miss an opportunity of surprising hisenemies. But Caesar's engagements at Apolloma had carried him aside fromthe direct road. Pompey had taken the short road to Macedonia, throughCandavia. To this was added another unexpected disadvantage, thatDomitius, who for several days had been encamped opposite Scipio, hadquitted that post for the sake of provisions, and had marched toHeraclea Sentica, a city subject to Candavia; so that fortune herselfseemed to throw him in Pompey's way. Of this, Caesar was ignorant up tothis time. Letters likewise being sent by Pompey through all theprovinces and states, with an account of the action at Dyrrachium, verymuch enlarged and exaggerated beyond the real facts, a rumour had beencirculated, that Caesar had been defeated and forced to flee, and hadlost almost all his forces. These reports had made the roads dangerous, and drawn off some states from his alliance: whence it happened, thatthe messengers despatched by Caesar, by several different roads toDomitius, and by Domitius to Caesar, were not able by any means toaccomplish their journey. But the Allobroges, who were in the retinue ofAegus and Roscillus, and who had deserted to Pompey, having met on theroad a scouting party of Domitius; either from old acquaintance, becausethey had served together in Gaul, or elated with vain glory, gave theman account of all that had happened, and informed them of Caesar'sdeparture, and Pompey's arrival. Domitius, who was scarce four hours'march distant, having got intelligence from these, by the courtesy ofthe enemy, avoided the danger, and met Caesar coming to join him atAeginium, a town on the confines of and opposite to Thessaly. 

LXXX. --The two armies being united, Caesar marched to Gomphi, which isthe first town of Thessaly on the road from Epirus. Now, theThessalians, a few months before, had of themselves sent ambassadors toCaesar, offering him the free use of everything in their power, andrequesting a garrison for their protection. But the report, alreadyspoken of, of the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had exaggerated in manyparticulars, had arrived before him. In consequence of which, Androsthenes, the praetor of Thessaly, as he preferred to be thecompanion of Pompey's victory, rather than Caesar's associate in hismisfortunes, collected all the people, both slaves and freemen, from thecountry into the town and shut the gates, and despatched messengers toScipio and Pompey "to come to his relief, that he could depend on thestrength of the town, if succour was speedily sent; but that it couldnot withstand a long siege. " Scipio, as soon as he received advice ofthe departure of the armies from Dyrrachium, had marched with hislegions to Larissa: Pompey was not yet arrived near Thessaly. Caesarhaving fortified his camp, ordered scaling ladders and pent-houses to bemade for a sudden assault, and hurdles to be provided. As soon as theywere ready, he exhorted his soldiers, and told them of what advantage itwould be to assist them with all sorts of necessaries if they madethemselves masters of a rich and plentiful town: and, at the same time, to strike terror into other states by the example of this, and to effectthis with speed, before auxiliaries could arrive. Accordingly, takingadvantage of the unusual ardour of the soldiers, he began his assault onthe town at a little after three o'clock on the very day on which hearrived, and took it, though defended with very high walls, beforesunset, and gave it up to his army to plunder, and immediately decampedfrom before it, and marched to Metropolis, with such rapidity as tooutstrip any messenger or rumour of the taking of Gomphi. 

LXXXI. --The inhabitants of Metropolis, at first influenced by the samerumours, followed the same measures, shut the gates and manned theirwalls. But when they were made acquainted with the fate of the city ofGomphi by some prisoners, whom Caesar had ordered to be brought up tothe walls, they threw open their gates. As he preserved them with thegreatest care, there was not a state in Thessaly (except Larissa, whichwas awed by a strong army of Scipio's), but on comparing the fate of theinhabitants of Metropolis with the severe treatment of Gomphi, gaveadmission to Caesar, and obeyed his orders. Having chosen a positionconvenient for procuring corn, which was now almost ripe on the ground, he determined there to wait Pompey's arrival, and to make it the centreof all his warlike operations. 

LXXXII. --Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days after, and havingharangued the combined army, returned thanks to his own men, andexhorted Scipio's soldiers, that as the victory was now secured, theyshould endeavour to merit a part of the rewards and booty. And receivingall the legions into one camp, he shared his honours with Scipio, ordered the trumpet to be sounded at his tent, and a pavilion to beerected for him. The forces of Pompey being thus augmented, and two suchpowerful armies united, their former expectations were confirmed, andtheir hopes of victory so much increased, that whatever time intervenedwas considered as so much delay to their return into Italy: and wheneverPompey acted with slowness and caution, they used to exclaim, that itwas the business only of a single day, but that he had a passion forpower, and was delighted in having persons of consular and praetorianrank in the number of his slaves. And they now began to dispute openlyabout rewards and priesthoods, and disposed of the consulate for severalyears to come. Others put in their claims for the houses and propertiesof all who were in Caesar's camp, and in that council there was a warmdebate, whether Lucius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompey against theParthians, should be admitted a candidate for the praetorship in hisabsence at the next election; his friends imploring Pompey's honour tofulfil the engagements which he had made to him at his departure, thathe might not seem deceived through his authority: whilst others, embarked in equal labour and danger, pleaded that no individual ought tohave a preference before all the rest. 

LXXXIII. --Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinthur, in theirdaily quarrels about Caesar's priesthood, openly abused each other inthe most scurrilous language. Lentulus urging the respect due to hisage, Domitius boasting his interest in the city and his dignity, andScipio presuming on his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus chargedLucius Afranius before Pompey with betraying the army in the action thathappened in Spain, and Lucius Domitius declared in the council that itwas his wish that, when the war should be ended, three billets should begiven to all the senators who had taken part with them in the war, andthat they should pass sentence on every single person who had stayedbehind at Rome, or who had been within Pompey's garrisons and had notcontributed their assistance in the military operations; that by thefirst billet they should-have power to acquit, by the second to passsentence of death, and by the third to impose a pecuniary fine. Inshort, Pompey's whole army talked of nothing but the honours or sums ofmoney which were to be their rewards, or of vengeance on their enemies;and never considered how they were to defeat their enemies, but in whatmanner they should use their victory. 

LXXXIV. --Corn being provided, and his soldiers refreshed, and asufficient time having elapsed since the engagement at Dyrrachium, whenCaesar thought he had sufficiently sounded the disposition of histroops, he thought that he ought to try whether Pompey had any intentionor inclination to come to a battle. Accordingly he led his troops out ofthe camp, and ranged them in order of battle, at first on their ownground, and at a small distance from Pompey's camp: but afterwards forseveral days in succession he advanced from his own camp, and led themup to the hills on which Pompey's troops were posted, which conductinspired his army every day with fresh courage. However he adhered tohis former purpose respecting his cavalry, for as he was by many degreesinferior in number, he selected the youngest and most active of theadvanced guard, and desired them to fight intermixed with the horse, andthey by constant practice acquired experience in this kind of battle. Bythese means it was brought to pass that a thousand of his horse woulddare, even on open ground, to stand against seven thousand of Pompey's, if occasion required, and would not be much terrified by their number. For even on one of those days he was successful in a cavalry action, andkilled one of the two Allobrogians who had deserted to Pompey, as webefore observed, and several others. 

LXXXV. --Pompey, because he was encamped on a hill, drew up his army atthe very foot of it, ever in expectation, as may be conjectured, thatCaesar would expose himself to this disadvantageous situation. Caesar, seeing no likelihood of being able to bring Pompey to an action, judgedit the most expedient method of conducting the war, to decamp from thatpost, and to be always in motion: with this hope, that by shifting hiscamp and removing from place to place, he might be more convenientlysupplied with corn, and also, that by being in motion he might get someopportunity of forcing them to battle, and might by constant marchesharass Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to fatigue. These mattersbeing settled, when the signal for marching was given, and the tentsstruck, it was observed that shortly before, contrary to his dailypractice, Pompey's army had advanced farther than usual from hisentrenchments, so that it appeared possible to come to an action onequal ground. Then Caesar addressed himself to his soldiers, when theywere at the gates of the camp, ready to march out. "We must defer, " sayshe, "our march at present, and set our thoughts on battle, which hasbeen our constant wish; let us then meet the foe with resolute souls. Weshall not hereafter easily find such an opportunity. " He immediatelymarched out at the head of his troops. 

LXXXVI. --Pompey also, as was afterward known, at the unanimoussolicitation of his friends, had determined to try the fate of a battle. For he had even declared in council a few days before that, before thebattalions came to battle, Caesar's army would be put to the rout. Whenmost people expressed their surprise at it, "I know, " says he, "that Ipromise a thing almost incredible; but hear the plan on which I proceed, that you may march to battle with more confidence and resolution. I havepersuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to execute it, as soon asthe two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right wing on the flank, andenclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put themto the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy. By thismeans we shall put an end to the war, without endangering the legions, and almost without a blow. Nor is this a difficult matter, as we faroutnumber them in cavalry. " At the same time he gave them notice to beready for battle on the day following, and since the opportunity whichthey had so often wished for was now arrived, not to disappoint theopinion generally entertained of their experience and valour. 

LXXXVII. --After him Labienus spoke, as well to express his contempt ofCaesar's forces, as to extol Pompey's scheme with the highest encomiums. "Think not, Pompey, " says he, "that this is the army which conqueredGaul and Germany; I was present at all those battles and do not speak atrandom on a subject to which I am a stranger: a very small part of thatarmy now remains, great numbers lost their lives, as must necessarilyhappen in so many battles, many fell victims to the autumnal pestilencein Italy, many returned home, and many were left behind on thecontinent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundisium arecomposed of invalids? The forces which you now behold, have beenrecruited by levies lately made in Hither Spain, and the greater partfrom the colonies beyond the Po; moreover, the flower of the forcesperished in the two engagements at Dyrrachium. " Having so said, he tookan oath, never to return to his camp unless victorious; and heencouraged the rest to do the like. Pompey applauded his proposal, andtook the same oath; nor did any person present hesitate to take it. After this had passed in the council they broke up full of hopes andjoy, and in imagination anticipated victory; because they thought thatin a matter of such importance, no groundless assertion could be made bya general of such experience. 

LXXXVIII. --When Caesar had approached near Pompey's camp, he observedthat his army was drawn up in the following manner:--On the left wingwere the two legions delivered over by Caesar at the beginning of thedisputes in compliance with the senate's decree, one of which was calledthe first, the other the third. Here Pompey commanded in person. Scipiowith the Syrian legions commanded the centre. The Cilician legion inconjunction with the Spanish cohorts, which we said were brought over byAfranius, were disposed on the right wing. These Pompey considered hissteadiest troops. The rest he had interspersed between the centre andthe wing, and he had a hundred and ten complete cohorts; these amountedto forty-five thousand men. He had besides two cohorts of volunteers, who having received favours from him in former wars, flocked to hisstandard: these were dispersed through his whole army. The sevenremaining cohorts he had disposed to protect his camp, and theneighbouring forts. His right wing was secured by a river with steepbanks; for which reason he placed all his cavalry, archers, andslingers, on his left wing. 

LXXXIX. --Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenthlegion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very muchweakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion soclose to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered themto support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making atotal of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp. He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P. Sulla, and of the centre to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his postopposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of theenemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might besurrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohortfrom each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them afourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting themwith his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day dependedon their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and theentire army not to charge without his command: that he would give thesignal whenever he wished them to do so. 

XC. --When he was exhorting his army to battle, according to the militarycustom, and spoke to them of the favours that they had constantlyreceived from him, he took especial care to remind them "that he couldcall his soldiers to witness the earnestness with which he had soughtpeace, the efforts that he had made by Vatinius to gain a conference[with Labienus], and likewise by Claudius to treat with Scipio, in whatmanner he had exerted himself at Oricum, to gain permission from Libo tosend ambassadors; that he had been always reluctant to shed the blood ofhis soldiers, and did not wish to deprive the republic of one or otherof her armies. " After delivering this speech, he gave by a trumpet thesignal to his soldiers, who were eagerly demanding it, and were veryimpatient for the onset. 

XCI. --There was in Caesar's army a volunteer of the name of Crastinus, who the year before had been first centurion of the tenth legion, a manof pre-eminent bravery. He, when the signal was given, says, "Follow me, my old comrades, and display such exertions in behalf of your general asyou have determined to do: this is our last battle, and when it shall bewon, he will recover his dignity, and we our liberty. " At the same timehe looked back to Caesar, and said, "General, I will act in such amanner to-day, that you will feel grateful tome living or dead. " Afteruttering these words he charged first on the right wing, and about onehundred and twenty chosen volunteers of the same century followed. 

XCII. --There was so much space left between the two lines, as sufficedfor the onset of the hostile armies: but Pompey had ordered his soldiersto await Caesar's attack, and not to advance from their position, orsuffer their line to be put into disorder. And he is said to have donethis by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the impetuosity of the chargeof Caesar's soldiers might be checked, and their line broken, and thatPompey's troops remaining in their ranks, might attack them while indisorder; and he thought that the javelins would fall with less force ifthe soldiers were kept in their ground, than if they met them in theircourse; at the same time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, afterrunning over double the usual ground, would become weary and exhaustedby the fatigue. But to me Pompey seems to have acted without sufficientreason: for there is a certain impetuosity of spirit and an alacrityimplanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by adesire to meet the foe. This a general should endeavour not to repress, but to increase; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, thatthe trumpets should sound on all sides, and a general shout be raised;by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with terror, and theirown army inspired with courage. 

XCIII. --But our men, when the signal was given, rushed forward withtheir javelins ready to be launched, but perceiving that Pompey's mendid not run to meet their charge, having acquired experience by custom, and being practised in former battles, they of their own accordrepressed their speed, and halted almost midway, that they might notcome up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after ashort respite they again renewed their course, and threw their javelins, and instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them. Nor didPompey's men fail in this crisis, for they received our javelins, stoodour charge, and maintained their ranks: and having launched theirjavelins, had recourse to their swords. At the same time Pompey's horse, according to their orders, rushed out at once from his left wing, andhis whole host of archers poured after them. Our cavalry did notwithstand their charge: but gave ground a little, upon which Pompey'shorse pressed them more vigorously, and began to file off in troops, andflank our army. When Caesar perceived this, he gave the signal to hisfourth line, which he had formed of the six cohorts. They instantlyrushed forward and charged Pompey's horse with such fury, that not a manof them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, butgalloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By theirretreat the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenceless, were all cut to pieces. The cohorts, pursuing their success, wheeledabout upon Pompey's left wing, whilst his infantry still continued tomake battle, and attacked them in the rear. 

XCIV. --At the same time Caesar ordered his third line to advance, whichtill then had not been engaged, but had kept their post. Thus, new andfresh troops having come to the assistance of the fatigued, and othershaving made an attack on their rear, Pompey's men were not able tomaintain their ground, but all fled, nor was Caesar deceived in hisopinion that the victory, as he had declared in his speech to hissoldiers, must have its beginning from those six cohorts which he hadplaced as a fourth line to oppose the horse. For by them the cavalrywere routed; by them the archers and slingers were cut to pieces; bythem the left wing of Pompey's army was surrounded, and obliged to bethe first to flee. But when Pompey saw his cavalry routed, and that partof his army on which he reposed his greatest hopes thrown intoconfusion, despairing of the rest, he quitted the field, and retreatedstraightway on horseback to his camp, and calling to the centurions, whom he had placed to guard the praetorian gate, with a loud voice, thatthe soldiers might hear: "Secure the camp, " says he, "defend it withdiligence, if any danger should threaten it; I will visit the othergates, and encourage the guards of the camp. " Having thus said, heretired into his tent in utter despair, yet anxiously waiting the issue. 

XCV. --Caesar having forced the Pompeians to flee into theirentrenchment, and thinking that he ought not to allow them any respiteto recover from their fright, exhorted his soldiers to take advantage offortune's kindness, and to attack the camp. Though they were fatigued bythe intense heat, for the battle had continued till mid-day, yet, beingprepared to undergo any labour, they cheerfully obeyed his command. Thecamp was bravely defended by the cohorts which had been left to guardit, but with much more spirit by the Thracians and foreign auxiliaries. For the soldiers who had fled for refuge to it from the field of battle, affrighted and exhausted by fatigue, having thrown away their arms andmilitary standards, had their thoughts more engaged on their furtherescape than on the defence of the camp. Nor could the troops who wereposted on the battlements long withstand the immense number of ourdarts, but fainting under their wounds, quitted the place, and under theconduct of their centurions and tribunes, fled, without stopping, to thehigh mountains which joined the camp. 

XCVI. --In Pompey's camp you might see arbours in which tables were laid, a large quantity of plate set out, the floors of the tents covered withfresh sods, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and others shaded with ivy, andmany other things which were proofs of excessive luxury, and aconfidence of victory, so that it might readily be inferred that theyhad no apprehensions of the issue of the day, as they indulgedthemselves in unnecessary pleasures, and yet upbraided with luxuryCaesar's army, distressed and suffering troops, who had always been inwant of common necessaries. Pompey, as soon as our men had forced thetrenches, mounting his horse, and stripping off his general's habit, went hastily out of the back gate of the camp, and galloped with allspeed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there, but with the same despatchcollecting a few of his flying troops, and halting neither day nornight, he arrived at the sea-side, attended by only thirty horse, andwent on board a victualling barque, often complaining, as we have beentold, that he had been so deceived in his expectation, that he wasalmost persuaded that he had been betrayed by those from whom he hadexpected victory, as they began the flight. 

XCVII. --Caesar having possessed himself of Pompey's camp, urged hissoldiers not to be too intent on plunder, and lose the opportunity ofcompleting their conquest. Having obtained their consent, he began todraw lines round the mountain. The Pompeians distrusting the position, as there was no water on the mountain, abandoned it, and all began toretreat towards Larissa; which Caesar perceiving, divided his troops, and ordering part of his legions to remain in Pompey's camp, sent back apart to his own camp, and taking four legions with him, went by ashorter road to intercept the enemy: and having marched six miles, drewup his army. But the Pompeians observing this, took post on a mountainwhose foot was washed by a river. Caesar having encouraged his troops, though they were greatly exhausted by incessant labour the whole day, and night was now approaching, by throwing up works cut off thecommunication between the river and the mountain, that the enemy mightnot get water in the night. As soon as the work was finished, they sentambassadors to treat about a capitulation. A few senators who hadespoused that party, made their escape by night. 

XCVIII. --At break of day, Caesar ordered all those who had taken post onthe mountain, to come down from the higher grounds into the plain, andpile their arms. When they did this without refusal, and withoutstretched arms, prostrating themselves on the ground, with tears, implored his mercy: he comforted them and bade them rise, and havingspoken a few words of his own clemency to alleviate their fears, hepardoned them all, and gave orders to his soldiers that no injury shouldbe done to them, and nothing taken from them. Having used thisdiligence, he ordered the legions in his camp to come and meet him, andthose which were, with him to take their turn of rest, and go back tothe camp; and the same day went to Larissa. 

XCIX. --In that battle, no more than two hundred privates were missing, but Caesar lost about thirty centurions, valiant officers. Crastinus, also, of whom mention was made before, fighting most courageously, losthis life by the wound of a sword in the mouth; nor was that false whichhe declared when marching to battle: for Caesar entertained the highestopinion of his behaviour in that battle, and thought him highlydeserving of his approbation. Of Pompey's army, there fell about fifteenthousand; but upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners: foreven the cohorts which were stationed in the forts, surrendered toSylla. Several others took shelter in the neighbouring states. Onehundred and eighty stands of colours, and nine eagles, were brought toCaesar. Lucius Domitius, fleeing from the camp to the mountains, hisstrength being exhausted by fatigue, was killed by the horse. 

C. --About this time, Decimus Laelius arrived with his fleet atBrundisium and in the same manner as Libo had done before, possessedhimself of an island opposite the harbour of Brundisium. In like manner, Valimus, who was then governor of Brundisium, with a few decked barques, endeavoured to entice Laelius's fleet, and took one five-benched galleyand two smaller vessels that had ventured farther than the rest into anarrow part of the harbour: and likewise disposing the horse along theshore, strove to prevent the enemy from procuring fresh water. ButLaelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for hisexpedition, supplied himself with water brought in transports fromCorcyra and Dyrrachium, and was not deterred from his purpose; and tillhe had received advice of the battle in Thessaly, he could not be forcedeither by the disgrace of losing his ships, or by the want ofnecessaries, to quit the port and islands. 

CI. --Much about the same time, Cassius arrived in Sicily with a fleet ofSyrians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians: and as Caesar's fleet was dividedinto two parts, Publius Sulpicius the praetor commanding one division atVibo near the straits, Pomponius the other at Messana, Cassius got intoMessana with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of his arrival, andhaving found him in disorder, without guards or discipline, and the windbeing high and favourable, he filled several transports with fir, pitch, and tow, and other combustibles, and sent them against Pomponius'sfleet, and set fire to all his ships, thirty-five in number, twenty ofwhich were armed with beaks: and this action struck such terror, thatthough there was a legion in garrison at Messana, the town withdifficulty held out, and had not the news of Caesar's victory beenbrought at that instant by the horse stationed along the coast, it wasgenerally imagined that it would have been lost, but the town wasmaintained till the news arrived very opportunely; and Cassius set sailfrom thence to attack Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, and our ships beingmoored to the land, to strike the same terror, he acted in the samemanner as before. The wind being favourable, he sent into the port aboutforty ships provided with combustibles, and the flame catching on bothsides, five ships were burnt to ashes. And when the fire began to spreadwider by the violence of the wind, the soldiers of the veteran legions, who had been left to guard the fleet, being considered as invalids, could not endure the disgrace, but of themselves went on board the shipsand weighed anchor, and having attacked Cassius's fleet, captured twofive-banked galleys, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he madehis escape by taking to a boat. Two three-banked galleys were takenbesides. Intelligence was shortly after received of the action inThessaly, so well authenticated, that the Pompeians themselves gavecredit to it; for they had hitherto believed it a fiction of Caesar'slieutenants and friends. Upon which intelligence Cassius departed withhis fleet from that coast. 

CII. --Caesar thought he ought to postpone all business and pursuePompey, whithersoever he should retreat; that he might not be able toprovide fresh forces, and renew the war; he therefore marched on everyday, as far as his cavalry were able to advance, and ordered one legionto follow him by shorter journeys. A proclamation was issued by Pompeyat Amphipolis, that all the young men of that province, Grecians andRoman citizens, should take the military oath; but whether he issued itwith an intention of preventing suspicion, and to conceal as long aspossible his design of fleeing farther, or to endeavour to keeppossession of Macedonia by new levies, if nobody pursued him, it isimpossible to judge. He lay at anchor one night, and calling togetherhis friends in Amphipolis, and collecting a sum of money for hisnecessary expenses, upon advice of Caesar's approach, set sail from thatplace, and arrived in a few days at Mitylene. Here he was detained twodays, and having added a few galleys to his fleet he went to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus. There he is informed that, by the consent of allthe inhabitants of Antioch and Roman citizens who traded there, thecastle had been seized to shut him out of the town; and that messengershad been despatched to all those who were reported to have taken refugein the neighbouring states, that they should not come to Antioch; thatif they did that, it would be attended with imminent danger to theirlives. The same thing had happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had beenconsul the year before, and to Publius Lentulus a consular senator, andto several others at Rhodes, who having followed Pompey in his flight, and arrived at the island, were not admitted into the town or port; andhaving received a message to leave that neighbourhood, set sail muchagainst their will; for the rumour of Caesar's approach had now reachedthose states. 

CIII. --Pompey, being informed of these proceedings, laid aside hisdesign of going to Syria, and having taken the public money from thefarmers of the revenue, and borrowed more from some private friends, andhaving put on board his ships a large quantity of brass for militarypurposes, and two thousand armed men, whom he partly selected from theslaves of the tax farmers, and partly collected from the merchants, andsuch persons as each of his friends thought fit on this occasion, hesailed for Pelusium. It happened that king Ptolemy, a minor, was therewith a considerable army, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, whoma few months before, by the assistance of his relations and friends, hehad expelled from the kingdom; and her camp lay at a small distance fromhis. To him Pompey applied to be permitted to take refuge in Alexandria, and to be protected in his calamity by his powerful assistance, inconsideration of the friendship and amity which had subsisted betweenhis father and him. But Pompey's deputies having executed theircommission, began to converse with less restraint with the king'stroops, and to advise them to act with friendship to Pompey, and not tothink meanly of his bad fortune. In Ptolemy's army were several ofPompey's soldiers, of whom Gabinius had received the command in Syria, and had brought them over to Alexandria, and at the conclusion of thewar had left with Ptolemy the father of the young king. 

CIV. --The king's friends, who were regents of the kingdom during theminority, being informed of these things, either induced by fear, asthey afterwards declared, lest Pompey should corrupt the king's army, and seize on Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his bad fortune, as inadversity friends commonly change to enemies, in public gave afavourable answer to his deputies, and desired him to come to the king;but secretly laid a plot against him, and despatched Achillas, captainof the king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and Lucius Septimius amilitary tribune to assassinate him. Being kindly addressed by them, anddeluded by an acquaintance with Septimius, because in the war with thepirates the latter had commanded a company under him, he embarked in asmall boat with a few attendants, and was there murdered by Achillas andSeptimius. In like manner, Lucius Lentulus was seized by the king'sorder, and put to death in prison. 

CV. --When Caesar arrived in Asia, he found that Titus Ampius hadattempted to remove the money from the temple of Diana at Ephesus; andfor this purpose had convened all the senators in the province that hemight have them to attest the sum, but was interrupted by Caesar'sarrival, and had made his escape. Thus, on two occasions, Caesar savedthe money of Ephesus. It was also remarked at Elis, in the temple ofMinerva, upon calculating and enumerating the days, that on the very dayon which Caesar had gained his battle, the image of Victory which wasplaced before Minerva, and faced her statue, turned about towards theportal and entrance of the temple; and the same day, at Antioch inSyria, such a shout of an army and sound of trumpets was twice heard, that the citizens ran in arms to the walls. The same thing happened atPtolemais; a sound of drums too was heard at Pergamus, in the privateand retired parts of the temple, into which none but the priests areallowed admission, and which the Greeks call Adyta (the inaccessible), and likewise at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, in which there stooda statue consecrated to Caesar; a palm-tree at that time was shown thathad sprouted up from the pavement, through the joints of the stones, andshot up above the roof. 

CVI. --After a few days' delay in Asia, Caesar, having heard that Pompeyhad been seen in Cyprus, and conjecturing that he had directed hiscourse into Egypt, on account of his connection with that kingdom, setout for Alexandria with two legions (one of which he ordered to followhim from Thessaly, the other he called in from Achaia, from Fufius, thelieutenant-general) and with eight hundred horse, ten ships of war fromRhodes, and a few from Asia. These legions amounted but to threethousand two hundred men; the rest, disabled by wounds received invarious battles, by fatigue and the length of their march, could notfollow him. But Caesar, relying on the fame of his exploits; did nothesitate to set forward with a feeble force, and thought that he wouldbe secure in any place. At Alexandria he was informed of the death ofPompey: and at his landing there, heard a cry among the soldiers whomthe king had left to garrison the town, and saw a crowd gatheringtowards him, because the fasces were carried before him; for this thewhole multitude thought an infringement of the king's dignity. Thoughthis tumult was appeased, frequent disturbances were raised for severaldays successively, by crowds of the populace, and a great many of hissoldiers were killed in all parts of the city. 

CVIL--Having observed this, he ordered other legions to be brought tohim from Asia, which he had made up out of Pompey's soldiers; for he washimself detained against his will, by the etesian winds, which aretotally unfavourable to persons on a voyage from Alexandria. In themeantime, considering that the disputes of the princes belonged to thejurisdiction of the Roman people, and of him as consul, and that it wasa duty more incumbent on him, as in his former consulate a league hadbeen made with Ptolemy the late king, under sanction both of a law, anda decree of the senate, he signified that it was his pleasure, that kingPtolemy, and his sister Cleopatra, should disband their armies, anddecide their disputes in his presence by justice, rather than by thesword. 

CVIII. --A eunuch named Pothinus, the boy's tutor, was regent of thekingdom on account of his youthfulness. He at first began to complainamongst his friends, and to express his indignation, that the kingshould be summoned to plead his cause: but afterwards, having prevailedon some of those whom he had made acquainted with his views to join him, he secretly called the army away from Pelusium to Alexandria, andappointed Achillas, already spoken of, commander-in-chief of the forces. Him he encouraged and animated by promises both in his own and theking's name, and instructed him both by letters and messages how heshould act. By the will of Ptolemy the father, the elder of his two sonsand the more advanced in years of his two daughters were declared hisheirs, and for the more effectual performance of his intention, in thesame will he conjured the Roman people by all the gods, and by theleague which he had entered into at Rome, to see his will executed. Oneof the copies of his will was conveyed to Rome by his ambassadors to bedeposited in the treasury, but the public troubles preventing it, it waslodged with Pompey: another was left sealed up, and kept at Alexandria. 

CIX. --Whilst these things were debated before Caesar, and he was veryanxious to settle the royal disputes as a common friend and arbitrator;news was brought on a sudden that the king's army and all his cavalrywere on their march to Alexandria. Caesar's forces were by no means sostrong that he could trust to them, if he had occasion to hazard abattle without the town. His only resource was to keep within the townin the most convenient places, and get information of Achillas'sdesigns. However he ordered his soldiers to repair to their arms; andadvised the king to send some of his friends, who had the greatestinfluence, as deputies to Achillas and to signify his royal pleasure. Dioscorides and Serapion, the persons sent by him, who had both beenambassadors at Rome, and had been in great esteem with Ptolemy thefather, went to Achillas. But as soon as they appeared in his presence, without hearing them, or learning the occasion of their coming, heordered them to be seized and put to death. One of them, after receivinga wound, was taken up and carried off by his attendants as dead: theother was killed on the spot. Upon this, Caesar took care to secure theking's person, both supposing that the king's name would have greatinfluence with his subjects, and to give the war the appearance of thescheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been begun by theking's consent. 

CX. --The forces under Achillas did not seem despicable, either fornumber, spirit, or military experience; for he had twenty thousand menunder arms. They consisted partly of Gabinius's soldiers, who were nowbecome habituated to the licentious mode of living at Alexandria, andhad forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman people, and hadmarried wives there, by whom the greatest part of them had children. Tothese was added a collection of highwaymen and free-booters, from Syria, and the province of Cilicia, and the adjacent countries. Besides severalconvicts and transports had been collected: for at Alexandria all ourrunaway slaves were sure of finding protection for their persons on thecondition that they should give in their names, and enlist as soldiers:and if any of them was apprehended by his master, he was rescued by acrowd of his fellow soldiers, who being involved in the same guilt, repelled, at the hazard of their lives, every violence offered to any oftheir body. These by a prescriptive privilege of the Alexandrian army, used to demand the king's favourites to be put to death, pillage theproperties of the rich to increase their pay, invest the king's palace, banish some from the kingdom, and recall others from exile. Besidesthese, there were two thousand horse, who had acquired the skill ofveterans by being in several wars in Alexandria. These had restoredPtolemy the father to his kingdom, had killed Bibulus's two sons; andhad been engaged in war with the Egyptians; such was their experience inmilitary affairs. 

CXI. --Full of confidence in his troops, and despising the small numberof Caesar's soldiers, Achillas seized Alexandria, except that part ofthe town which Caesar occupied with his troops. At first he attempted toforce the palace; but Caesar had disposed his cohorts through thestreets, and repelled his attack. At the same time there was an actionat the port: where the contest was maintained with the greatestobstinacy. For the forces were divided, and the fight maintained inseveral streets at once, and the enemy endeavoured to seize with astrong party the ships of war; of which fifty had been sent to Pompey'sassistance, but after the battle in Thessaly had returned home. Theywere all of either three or five banks of oars, well equipped andappointed with every necessary for a voyage. Besides these, there weretwenty-two vessels with decks, which were usually kept at Alexandria, toguard the port. If they made themselves masters of these, Caesar beingdeprived of his fleet, they would have the command of the port and wholesea, and could prevent him from procuring provisions and auxiliaries. Accordingly that spirit was displayed, which ought to be displayed whenthe one party saw that a speedy victory depended on the issue, and theother their safety. But Caesar gained the day, and set fire to all thoseships, and to others which were in the docks, because he could not guardso many places with so small a force; and immediately he conveyed sometroops to the Pharos by his ships. 

CXIL--The Pharos is a tower on an island, of prodigious height, builtwith amazing works, and takes its name from the island. This islandlying over against Alexandria forms a harbour; but on the upper side itis connected with the town by a narrow way eight hundred paces inlength, made by piles sunk in the sea, and by a bridge. In this islandsome of the Egyptians have houses, and a village as large as a town; andwhatever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the channel, or by the storm, have been driven from their course upon the coast, theyconstantly plunder like pirates. And without the consent of those whoare masters of the Pharos, no vessels can enter the harbour, on accountof its narrowness. Caesar being greatly alarmed on this account, whilstthe enemy were engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized thePharos, and placed a garrison in it. By this means he gained this point, that he could be supplied without danger with corn and auxiliaries: forhe sent to all the neighbouring countries, to demand supplies. In otherparts of the town, they fought so obstinately, that they quitted thefield with equal advantage, and neither were beaten (in consequence ofthe narrowness of the passes); and a few being killed on both sides, Caesar secured the most necessary posts, and fortified them in thenight. In this quarter of the town was a wing of the king's palace, inwhich Caesar was lodged on his first arrival, and a theatre adjoiningthe house which served as for citadel, and commanded an avenue to theport and other docks. These fortifications he increased during thesucceeding days, that he might have them before him as a rampart, andnot be obliged to fight against his will. In the meantime Ptolemy'syounger daughter, hoping the throne would become vacant, made her escapefrom the palace to Achillas, and assisted him in prosecuting the war. But they soon quarrelled about the command, which circumstance enlargedthe presents to the soldiers, for each endeavoured by great sacrificesto secure their affection. Whilst the enemy was thus employed, Pothinus, tutor to the young king, and regent of the kingdom, who was in Caesar'spart of the town, sent messengers to Achillas, and encouraged him not todesist from his enterprise, nor to despair of success; but hismessengers being discovered and apprehended, he was put to death byCaesar. Such was the commencement of the Alexandrian war. 

 * * * * *

INDEX

N. B. The numerals refer to the book, the figures to the chapter. G. Stands for the Gallic War, C. For the Civil. 

Acarn[=a]n[)i]a, a region of Greece, _Carnia_

Acco, prince of the Sen[)o]nes, his conduct on Caesar's approach, G. Vi. 4; condemned in a council of the Gauls, vi. 44

Achaia, sometimes taken for all Greece, but most commonly for a part ofit only; in Peloponnesus, _Romania alta_

Achillas, captain of Ptolemy's guards, sent to kill Pompey, C. Iii. 104;appointed by Pothinus commander of all the Egyptian forces, _ibid_. 108;heads an army of twenty thousand veteran troops, _ibid_. 110

Acilla, or Achilla, or Acholla. There were two cities in Africa of thisname, one inland, the other on the coast. The modern name of the latteris _Elalia_

Acilius, Caesar's lieutenant, C. Iii. 15

Act[)i]um, a promontory of Epirus, now called the _Cape of Tigalo_, famous for a naval victory gained near it, by Augustus, over M. Antony

Act[)i]us, a Pelignian, one of Pompey's followers, taken by Caesar, anddismissed in safety, C. I. 18

Act[)i]us Rufus accuses L. Apanius of treachery, C. Iii. 83

Act[)i]us Varus prevents Tubero from landing in Africa, C. I. 31; hisforces, C. Ii. 23; his camp, _ibid_. 25; engages Curio, _ibid_. 34; hisdanger, defeat, and stratagem, _ibid_. 35

Adcant[)u]annus sallies upon Crassus at the head of a chosen body oftroops, G. Iii. 22

Add[)u]a, the _Adda_, a river that rises in the Alps, and, separatingthe duchy of Milan from the state of Venice, falls into the Po aboveCremona

Adriatic Sea, the _Gulf of Venice_, at the extremity of which that cityis situated

Adrum[=e]tum, a town in Africa, _Mahometta_; held by Considius Longuswith a garrison of one legion, C. Ii. 23

Aduat[)u]uci (in some editions Atuatici), descendants of the Teutonesand Cimbri, G. Ii. 29; they furnish twenty-nine thousand men to thegeneral confederacy of Gaul, _ibid_. 4; Caesar obliges them to submit, _ibid_. 29

Aed[)u]i, the _Autunois_, a people of Gaul, near _Autun_, in the countrynow called _Lower Burgundy_; they complain to Caesar of the ravagescommitted in their territories by the Helvetii, G. I. 11; join in apetition against Ariovistus, _ibid_. 33; at the head of one of the twoleading factions of Gaul, G. Vi. 12; Caesar quiets an intestinecommotion among them, C. Vii. 33; they revolt from the Romans, G. Vii. 54; their law concerning magistrates, _ibid_. 33; their clients, i. 31;vii. 75

Aeg[=e]an Sea, the _Archipelago_, a part of the Mediterranean which liesbetween Greece, Asia Minor, and the Isle of Crete

Aeg[=i]n[)i]um, a town of Thessaly; Domitius joins Caesar near thatplace, C. Iii. 79

Aegus and Roscillus, their perfidious behaviour towards Caesar, C. Iii. 59, 60

Aegyptus, _Egypt, _ an extensive country of Africa, bounded on the westby part of Marmarica and the deserts of Lybia, on the north by theMediterranean, on the east by the Sinus Arabicus, and a line drawn fromArsino[)e] to Rhinocolura, and on the south by Aethiopia. Egypt, properly so called, may be described as consisting of the long andnarrow valley which follows the course of the Nile from Syene(_Assooan_) to _Cairo, _ near the site of the ancient Memphis. The nameby which this country is known to Europeans comes from the Greeks, someof whose writers inform us that it received this appellation fromAegyptus, son of Belus, it having been previously called Aeria. In theHebrew scriptures it is called Mitsraim, and also Matsor and HaretsCham; of these names, however, the first is the one most commonlyemployed

Aemilia Via, a Roman road in Italy, from Rimini to Aquileia, and fromPisa to Dertona

Aet[=o]lia, a country of Greece, _Despotato;_ recovered from Pompey bythe partisans of Caesar, C. Iii. 35

Afr[=a]nius, Pompey's lieutenant, his exploits in conjunction withPetreius, C. I. 38; resolves to carry the war into Celtiberia, _ibid_. 61; surrenders to Caesar, _ibid_. 84

Afr[)i]ca, one of the four great continents into which the earth isdivided; the name seems to have been originally applied by the Romans tothe country around Carthage, the first part of the continent with whichthey became acquainted, and is said to have been derived from a smallCarthaginian district on the northern coast, called _Frigi. _ Hence, evenwhen the name had become applied to the whole continent, there stillremained in Roman geography the district of Africa Proper, on theMediterranean coast, corresponding to the modem kingdom of _Tunis, _ withpart of that of _Tripoli_

Agend[)i]cum, a city of the Senones, _Sens_; Caesar quarters fourlegions there, G. Vi. 44; Labienus leaves his baggage in it under aguard of new levies, and sets out for Lutetia, G. Vii. 57

Alba, a town of Latium, in Italy, _Albano_; Domitius levies troops inthat neighbourhood, C. I. 15

Alb[=i]ci, a people of Gaul, unknown; some make them the same with the_Vivarois_; taken into the service of the Marseillians, C. I. 34

Albis, the _Elbe, _ a large and noble river in Germany, which has itssource in the Giant's Mountains in Silesia, on the confines of Bohemia, and passing through Bohemia, Upper and Lower Saxony, falls into theNorth Sea at Ritzbuttel, about sixty miles below Hamburg

Alces, a species of animals somewhat resembling an elk, to be found inthe Hercynian forests, C. Vi. 27

Alemanni, or Alamanni, a name assumed by a confederacy of German tribes, situated between the Neckar and the Upper Rhine, who united to resistthe encroachments of the Roman power. According to Mannert, they derivedtheir origin from the shattered remains of the army of Ariovistusretired, after the defeat and death of their leader, to the mountainouscountry of the Upper Rhine. After their overthrow by Clovis, king of theSalian Franks, they ceased to exist as one nation, and were dispersedover Gaul, Switzerland, and Nether Italy. From them L'Allemagne, theFrench name for Germany, is derived

Alemannia, the country inhabited by the Alemanni

Alesia, or Alexia, a town of the Mandubians, _Alise_; Caesar shuts upVercingetorix there, C. Vii. 68; surrounds it with lines ofcircumvallation and contravallation, _ibid_. 69, 72; obliges it tosurrender, _ibid_. 89

Alexandr[=i]a, a city of Egypt, _Scanderia_. It was built by Alexanderthe Great, 330 years before Christ; Caesar pursues Pompey thither, C. Iii. 106

Aliso, by some supposed to be the town now called _Iselburg_; or, according to Junius, _Wesel_, in the duchy of Cleves, but more probably_Elsen_

Allier (El[=a]ver), Caesar eludes the vigilance of Vercingetorix, and byan artifice passes that river, G. Vii. 35

All[)o]br[)o]ges, an ancient people of Gallia Transalp[=i]na, whoinhabited the country which is now called _Dauphiny, Savoy, _ and_Piedmont_. The name, Allobroges, means highlanders, and is derived fromAl, "high, " and Broga, "land. " They are supposed to be disaffected tothe Romans, G. I. 6; complain to Caesar of the ravages of theHelvetians, _ibid_. 11

Alps, a ridge of high mountains, which separates France and Germany fromItaly. That part of them which separates Dauphiny from Piedmont wascalled the Cottian Alps. Their name is derived from their height, Alpbeing an old Celtic appellation for "a lofty mountain"; Caesar crossesthem with five legions, G. I. 10; sends Galba to open a free passageover them to the Roman merchants, G. Iii. 1

Alsati[)a], a province of Germany, in the upper circle of the Rhine, _Alsace_

Amagetobr[)i]a, a city of Gaul, unknown; famous for a defeat of theGauls there by Ariovistus, G. I. 31

Amant[)i]a, a town in Macedonia, _Porto Raguseo_; it submits to Caesar, and sends ambassadors to know his pleasure, C. Iii. 12

Am[=a]nus, a mountain of Syria, _Alma Daghy, _ near which Scipio sustainssome losses, C. Iii. 31

Am[=a]ni Pylae, or Am[=a]nicae Portae, _Straits of Scanderona_

Ambarri, a people of Gaul, uncertain; they complain to Caesar of theravages committed in their territories by the Helvetii, G. I. 11

Ambialites, a people of Gaul, of _Lamballe in Bretagne_. Others take theword to be only a different name for the Ambiani; they join in aconfederacy with the Veneti against Caesar, G. Iii. 9

Ambi[=a]ni, or Ambianenses, the people of _Amiens;_ they furnish tenthousand men to the general confederacy of the Belgians against Caesar, G. Ii. 4; sue for peace, and submit themselves to Caesar's pleasure, G. Ii. 15

Ambi[=a]num, a city of Belgium, _Amiens_

Amb[)i]b[)a]ri, a people of Gaul, inhabiting _Ambie_, in NormandyAmb[)i][)o]rix, his artful speech to Sabinus and Cotta, G. V. 27; Caesarmarches against him, G. Vi. 249. Ravages and lays waste his territories, _ibid_. 34; endeavours in vain to get him into his hands, _ibid_. 43

Ambivar[)e]ti, a people of Gaul, the _Vivarais_. They are ordered tofurnish their contingent for raising the siege of Alesia, G. Vii. 75

Ambivar[=i]ti, an ancient people of _Brabant_, between the Rhine and theMaese; the German cavalry sent to forage among them, G. Iv. 9

Ambr[)a]c[)i]a, a city of Epirus, _Arta_; Cassius directs his marchthither, C. Iii. 36

Ambrones, an ancient people, who lived in the country which is nowcalled the _Canton of Bern_, in Switzerland

Amph[)i]l[)o]chia, a region of Epirus, _Anfilocha_. Its inhabitantsreduced by Cassius Longinus, C. Iii. 55

Amph[)i]p[)o]lis, a city of Macedonia, _Cristopoli_, or _Emboli_. Anedict in Pompey's name published there, C. Iii. 102

Anartes, a people of Germany, _Walachians_, _Servians_, or _Bulgarians_, bordering upon the Hercynian Forest, G. Vi. 25

Anas, a river of Spain, the _Guadiana_, or _Rio Roydera_, bounding thatpart of Spain under the government of Petreius, C. I. 38

Anc[)a]l[=i]tes, a people of Britain, of the hundred of _Henley_, inOxfordshire; they send ambassadors to Caesar with an offer ofsubmission, G. V. 21

Anch[)i][)a]los, a city of Thrace, near the Euxine Sea, now called_Kenkis_

Ancibarii, or Ansivarii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, of andabout the town of _Ansestaet_, or _Amslim_

Anc[=o]na, _Ancona_, a city of Italy, on the coast of Pisenum. It issupposed to derive its name from the Greek word [Greek: agkon], an angleor elbow, on account of the angular form of the promontory on which itis built. The foundation of Ancona is ascribed by Strabo to someSyracusans, who were fleeing from the tyranny of Dionysius. Livy speaksof it as a naval station of great importance in the wars of Rome withthe Illyrians. We find it occupied by Caesar (C. I. 2) shortly aftercrossing the Rubicon; Caesar takes possession of it with a garrison ofone cohort, C. I. 11

Andes, _Angers_, in France, the capital of the duchy of Anjou

Andes, a people of Gaul, the ancient inhabitants of the duchy of Anjou;Caesar puts his troops into winter quarters among them, G. Ii. 35

Andomad[=u]num Ling[)o]num, a large and ancient city of Champagne, atthe source of the river Marne, _Langres_

Anglesey (Mona), an island situated between Britain and Ireland, wherethe night, during the winter, is said to be a month long, G. V. 13

Angrivarii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, who dwelt between theEms and the Weser, below the Lippe

Ansivarii, see _Ancibarii_

Antioch[=i]a, _Antachia_, an ancient and famous city, once the capitalof Syria, or rather of the East. It is situate on two rivers, theOrontes and the Phaspar, not far from the Mediterranean; refuses toadmit the fugitives after the battle of Pharsalia, C. Iii. 102

Ant[=o]nius (Mark Antony), Caesar's lieutenant, G. Vii. I i; quaestor, G. Viii. 2; governor of Brundusium, C. Iii. 24; his standing for thatpriesthood, G. Vii. 50; obliges Libo to raise the siege of Brundusium, C. Iii. 24; and in conjunction with Kalenus transports Caesar's troopsto Greece, _ibid_. 26

Apam[=e]a, _Apami_, a city of Bithynia, built by Nicomedes, the son ofPrusias

Apennine Mountains, a large chain of mountains, branching off from theMaritime Alps, in the neighbourhood of Genoa, running diagonally fromthe Ligurian Gulf to the Adriatic, in the vicinity of Ancona; from whichit continues nearly parallel with the latter gulf, as far as thepromontory of Garg[=a]nus, and again inclines to Mare Inf[)e]rum, tillit finally terminates in the promontory of Leucopetra, near Rhegium. Theetymology of the name given to these mountains must be traced to theCeltic, and appears to combine two terms of that language nearlysynonymous, Alp, or Ap, "a high mountain, " and Penn, "a summit"

Apoll[=o]n[)i]a, a city of Macedonia, _Piergo_. Pompey resolves towinter there, C. Iii. 5; Caesar makes himself master of it, _ibid_. Iii. 12

Appia Via, the Appian road which led from Rome to Campania, and from thesea to Brundusium. It was made, as Livy informs us, by the censor, Appius Caecus, A. U. C. 442, and was, in the first instance, only laiddown as far as Capua, a distance of about 125 miles. It was subsequentlycarried on to Beneventum, and finally to Brundusium. According toEustace (_Classical Tour_, vol. Iii. ), such parts of the Appian Way ashave escaped destruction, as at _Fondi_ and _Mola_, show few traces ofwear and decay after a duration of two thousand years

Apsus, a river of Macedonia, the _Aspro_. Caesar and Pompey encamp overagainst each other on the banks of that river, C. Iii. 13

Apulia, a region of Italy, _la Puglia_. Pompey quarters there thelegions sent by Caesar, C. I. 14

Aquil[=a]ria, a town of Africa, near Clupea. Pompey quarters there thelegions sent by Caesar, C. I. 14; Curio arrives there with the troopsdesigned against Africa. C. Ii. 23

Aquileia, formerly a famous and considerable city of Italy, not far fromthe Adriatic, now little more than a heap of ruins, _Aquilegia_. Caesardraws together the troops quartered there, G. I. 10

Aquitania, a third part of ancient Gaul, now containing _Guienne_, _Gascony_, etc. 

Aquit[=a]ni, the Aquitanians reduced under the power of the Romans byCrassus, G. Iii. 20-22; very expert in the art of mining, _ibid_. 21

Arar, or Araris, a river of Gaul, the Sa[^o]ne; the Helvetians receive aconsiderable check in passing this river, G. I. 12

Arduenna Silva, the forest of _Ardenne_, in France, reaching from theRhine to the city of Tournay, in the low countries; Indutiom[)a]rusconceals in it the infirm and aged, G. V. 3; Caesar crosses it in questof Ambiorix, G. Vi. 29

Arecomici Volcae, Caesar plants garrisons among them, G. Vii. 7

Arel[=a]te, or Arel[=a]tum, or Arelas, a city of Gaul, _Arles_. Caesarorders twelve galleys to be built there, C. I. 36

Ar[)i]m[)i]num, a city of Italy, _Rimini_; Caesar having sounded thedisposition of his troops, marches thither, C. I. 8

Ar[)i][)o]vistus, king of the Germans, his tyrannical conduct towardsthe Gauls, G. I. 31; Caesar sends ambassadors to him demanding aninterview, _ibid_. 34; he is defeated and driven entirely out of Gaul, _ibid_. 52

Arles, see _Arelate_

Arm[)e]n[)i]a, a country of Asia, divided into the greater or lesser, and now called _Turcomania_

Armorici, the ancient people of Armorica, a part of Gallia Celtica, now_Bretagne_; they assemble in great numbers to attack L. Roscius in hiswinter quarters, G. V. 53

Arr[=e]t[)i]um, a city of Etruria, in Italy, _Arezzo_; Antony sentthither with five cohorts, C. I. 10

Arverni, an ancient people of France, on the Loire, whose chief city wasArvernum, now _Clermont_, the capital of _Auvergne_; suddenly invaded, and their territories ravaged by Caesar, G. Vii. 8

Asculum, a town of Italy, _Ascoli_; Caesar takes possession of it, C. I. 16

Asparagium, a town in Macedonia, unknown; Pompey encamps near it withall his forces, C. Iii. 30

Astigi, or Astingi, a people of Andalusia, in Spain

Athens, one of the most ancient and noble cities of Greece, the capitalof Attica. It produced some of the most distinguished statesmen, orators, and poets that the world ever saw, and its sculptors andpainters have been rarely rivalled, never surpassed. No city on theearth has ever exercised an equal influence on the educated men of allages. It contributes to fit out a fleet for Pompey, C. Iii. 3

Atreb[)a]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, who lived in that part of theNetherlands which is now called _Artois_; they furnish fifteen thousandmen to the general confederacy of Gaul, G. Ii. 4

Attica, a country of Greece, between Achaia and Macedonia, famous onaccount of its capital, Athens

Attuarii, a people of ancient Germany, who inhabited between the Maeseand the Rhine, whose country is now a part of the duchy of _Gueldes_

Atuatuca, a strong castle, where Caesar deposited all his baggage, onsetting out in pursuit of Ambiorix, G. Vi. 32; the Germans unexpectedlyattack it, _ibid_. 35

Augustod[=u]num, _Autun_, a very ancient city of Burgundy, on the riverArroux

Aulerci Eburovices, a people of Gaul, in the country of _Evreux_, inNormandy

Aulerci Brannovices, a people of Gaul, _Morienne_

Aulerci Cenomanni, a people of Gaul, the country of _Maine_

Aulerci Diablintes, a people of Gaul, _le Perche_

Aulerci reduced by P. Crassus, G, ii. 34; massacre their senate, andjoin Viridovix, G. Iii. 17; Aulerci Brannovices ordered to furnish theircontingent to the relief of Alesia, G. Vii. 7; Aulerci Cenomanni furnishfive thousand, _ibid_. ; Aulerci Eburovices three thousand, _ibid_. 

Ausci, a people of Gaul, those of _Auchs_ or _Aux_, in Gascony; theysubmit to Crassus and send hostages, G. Iii. 27

Auset[=a]ni, a people of Spain, under the Pyrenean mountains; they sendambassadors to Caesar, with an offer of submission, C. I. 60

Aux[)i]mum, a town in Italy, _Osimo_, or _Osmo_; Caesar makes himselfmaster of it, C. I. 15

Av[=a]r[)i]cum, a city of Aquitaine, the capital of the Biturigians, _Bourges_; besieged by Caesar, G. Vii. 13; and at last taken by storm, _ibid_. 31

Ax[)o]na, the river _Aisne_, Caesar crosses it in his march against theBelgians, G. Ii. 5, 6

Bac[=e]nis, a forest of ancient Germany, which parted the Suevi from theCherusci; by some supposed to be the Forests of _Thuringia_, by othersthe _Black Forest_; the Suevians encamp at the entrance of that wood, resolving there to await the approach of the Romans, G vi. 10

Bac[)u]lus, P. Sextius, his remarkable bravery, G. Vi. 38

Baet[)i]ca, in the ancient geography, about a third part of Spain, containing _Andalusia_, and a part of _Granada_

Bagr[)a]das, a river of Africa, near Ut[)i]ca, the _Begrada_; Curioarrives with his army at that river, C. Ii. 38

Bale[=a]res Ins[)u]lae, several islands in the Mediterranean Sea, formerly so called, of which _Majorca_ and _Minorca_ are the chief; theinhabitants famous for their dexterity in the use of the sling, G. Ii. 7

Bat[)a]vi, the ancient inhabitants of the island of Batavia

Batavia, or Batavorum Insula, _Holland_, a part of which still retainsthe name of _Betuwe_; formed by the Meuse and the Wal, G. Iv. 10

Belgae, the inhabitants of Gallia Belgica. The original Belgae weresupposed to be of German extraction; but passing the Rhine, settledthemselves in Gaul. The name Belgae belongs to the Cymric language, inwhich, under the form _Belgiaid_, the radical of which is _Belg_, itsignifies warlike; they are the most warlike people of Gaul, G. I. 1;withstand the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, G. Ii. 4; originallyof German extraction, _ibid_. ; Caesar obliges them to decamp and returnto their several habitations, _ibid_. 11

Belgia, Belgium, or Gallia Belgica, the _Low Countries_, or_Netherlands_

Bellocassi, or Velocasses, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of_Bayeux_, in Normandy; they furnish three thousand men to the relief ofAlesia, G. Vii. 75

Bell[)o]v[)a]ci, an ancient renowned people among the Belgae, inhabitingthe country now called _Beauvais_ in France; they furnish a hundredthousand men to the general confederacy of Belgium, G. Ii. 4; join inthe general defection under Vercingetorix, G. Vii. 59; again take uparms against Caesar, viii. 7; but are compelled to submit and sue forpardon

Bergea, a city of Macedonia, now called _Veria_

Berones, see _Retones_

Bessi, a people of Thrace, _Bessarabia_; they make part of Pompey'sarmy, C. Iii. 4

Bethuria, a region of Hispania Lusitanica, _Estremadura_

Bibracte, a town of Burgundy, now called _Autun_, the capital of theAedui; Caesar, distressed for want of corn, marches thither to obtain asupply, G. I. 23

Bibrax, a town of Rheims, _Braine_, or _Bresne_; attacked with greatfury by the confederate Belgians, G. Ii. 6

Bibr[)o]ci, a people of Britain; according to Camden, _the hundred ofBray_, in Berkshire; they send ambassadors to Caesar to sue for peace, G. V. 21

Bib[)u]lus burns thirty of Caesar's ships, C. Iii. 8; his hatred ofCaesar, _ibid_. 8, 16; his cruelty towards the prisoners that fell intohis hands, _ibid_. 14; his death, _ibid_. 18; death of his two sons, _ibid_. 110

Bigerriones, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country now called_Bigorre, _ in Gascony; they surrender and give hostages to Crassus, G. Iii. 27

Bithynia, a country of Asia Minor, adjoining to Troas, over againstThrace, _Becsangial_

Bit[:u]r[)i]ges, a people of Guienne, in France, of the country of_Berry;_ they join with the Arverni in the general defection underVercingetorix, G. Vii. 5

Boeotia, a country in Greece; separated from Attica by Mount Citheron. It had formerly several other names and was famous for its capital, Thebes; it is now called _Stramulipa_

Boii, an ancient people of Germany who, passing the Rhine, settled inGaul, the _Bourbonnois;_ they join with the Helvetians in theirexpedition against Gaul, G. I. 5; attack the Romans in flank, _ibid_. 25; Caesar allows them to settle among the Aeduans, _ibid_. 28

Bor[=a]ni, an ancient people of Germany, supposed by some to be the sameas the Burii

Bosphor[=a]ni, a people bordering upon the Euxine Sea, _the Tartars_

Bosph[)o]rus, two straits of the sea so called, one Bosphorus Thracius, now the _Straits of Constantinople;_ the other Bosphorus Climerius, nowthe _Straits of Caffa_

Brannov[=i]ces, the people of _Morienne, _ in France

Brannovii furnished their contingent to the relief of Alesia, C. Vii. 75

Bratuspant[)i]um, a city of Gaul, belonging to the Bellov[)a]ci, _Beauvais;_ it submits, and obtains pardon from Caesar, G. Ii. 13

Bridge built by Caesar over the Rhine described, G. Iv. 7

Br[)i]tannia, Caesar's expedition thither, G. Iv. 20; description of thecoast, 23; the Romans land in spite of the vigorous opposition of theislanders, 26; the Britons send ambassadors to Caesar to desire a peace, which they obtain on delivery of hostages, 27; they break the peace onhearing that Caesar's fleet was destroyed by a storm, and set upon theRoman foragers, 30; their manner of fighting in chariots; they fall uponthe Roman camp, but are repulsed, and petition again for peace, whichCaesar grants them, 33-35; Caesar passes over into their island a secondtime, v. 8; drives them from the woods where they had taken refuge, 9;describes their manners and way of living, 12; defeats them in severalencounters, 15-21; grants them a peace, on their giving hostages, andagreeing to pay a yearly tribute, 22

Brundusium, a city of Italy, _Brindisi. _ By the Greeks it was called[Greek: Brentesion], which in the Messapian language signified a stag'shead, from the resemblance which its different harbours and creeks boreto that object; Pompey retires thither with his forces, C. I. 24; Caesarlays siege to it, 26; Pompey escapes from it by sea, upon which itimmediately surrenders to Caesar, 28; Libo blocks up the port with afleet, C. Iii. 24; but by the valour of Antony is obliged to retire, _ibid_. 

Brutii, a people of Italy, _the Calabrians. _ They were said to berunaway slaves and shepherds of the Lucanians, who, after concealingthemselves for a time, became at last numerous enough to attack theirmasters, and succeeded at length in gaining their independence. Theirvery name is said to indicate that they were revolted slaves: [Greek:Brettious gar kalousi apostatas], says Strabo, speaking of the Lucanians

Br[=u]tus, appointed to command the fleet in the war against the peopleof Vannes, G. Iii. 11; engages and defeats at sea the Venetians, 14; andalso the people of Marseilles, C. I. 58; engages them a second time withthe same good fortune, ii. 3

Bullis, a town in Macedonia, unknown; it sends ambassadors to Caesarwith an offer of submission, C. Iii. 12

Buthr[=o]tum, a city of Epirus, _Butrinto, _ or _Botronto_

Byzantium, an ancient city of Thrace, called at different times Ligos, Nova Roma, and now _Constantinople_

Cabill[=o]num, a city of ancient Gaul, _Chalons sur Sa[^o]ne_

Cad[=e]tes, a people of Gaul, unknown

Cadurci, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of _Quercy_

Caeraesi, a people of Belgic Gaul, inhabiting the country round Namur;they join in the general confederacy of Belgium against Caesar, G. I. 4

Caesar, hastens towards Gaul, C. I. 7; refuses the Helvetians a passagethrough the Roman province, _ibid_. ; his answer to their ambassadors, 14; defeats and sends them back into their own country, 25-27; sendsambassadors to Ariovistus, 34; calls a council of war: his speech, 40;begins his march, 41; his speech to Ariovistus, 43; totally routs theGermans, and obliges them to repass the Rhine, 53; his war with theBelgians, ii. 2; reduces the Suessi[)o]nes and Bellov[)a]ci, 12, 13; hisprodigious slaughter of the Nervians, 20-27; obliges the Atuatici tosubmit, 32; prepares for the war against the Venetians, iii. 9; defeatsthem in a naval engagement, and totally subdues them, 14, 15; is obligedto put his army into winter quarters, before he can complete thereduction of the Menapians and Morini, 29; marches to find out theGermans; his answer to their ambassadors, iv. 8; attacks them in theircamp and routs them, 14, 15; crosses the Rhine, and returns to Gaul, 17--19; his expedition into Britain described, 22; refits his navy, 31;comes to the assistance of his foragers whom the Britons had attacked, 34; returns to Gaul, 36; gives orders for building a navy, v. 1; hispreparations for a second expedition into Britain, 2; marches into thecountry of Treves to prevent a rebellion, 3; marches to Port Itius, andinvites all the princes of Gaul to meet him there, 5; sets sail forBritain, 8; describes the country and customs of the inhabitants, 12;fords the river Thames, and puts Cassivellaunus, the leader of theBritons, to flight, 18; imposes a tribute upon the Britons and returnsinto Gaul, 23; routs the Nervians, and relieves Cicero, 51; resolves towinter in Gaul, 53; his second expedition into Germany, vi. 9; hisdescription of the manners of the Gauls and Germans, 13; his return intoGaul, and vigorous prosecution of the war against Ambiorix, 27; crossesthe mountains of the Cevennes in the midst of winter, and arrives atAuvergne, which submits, vii. 8; takes and sacks Genabum, 11; takesNoviodunum, and marches from thence to Avaricum, 12; his works beforeAlesia, 69; withstands all the attacks of the Gauls, and obliges theplace to surrender, 89; marches into the country of the Biturigians, andcompels them to submit, viii. 2; demands Guturvatus, who is delivered upand put to death, 38; marches to besiege Uxellodunum, 39; cuts off thehands of the besieged at Uxellodunum, 44; marches to Corfinium, andbesieges it, C. I. 16, which in a short time surrenders, 22; he marchesthrough Abruzzo, and great part of the kingdom of Naples, 23; hisarrival at Brundusium, and blockade of the haven, 24; commits the siegeof Marseilles to the case of Brutus and Trebonius, 36; his expedition toSpain, 37; his speech to Afranius, 85; comes to Marseilles, whichsurrenders. C. Ii. 22; takes Oricum, iii. 8; marches to Dyrrhachium tocut off Pompey's communication with that place, 41; sends Canuleius intoEpirus for corn, 42; besieges Pompey in his camp, his reasons for it, 43; encloses Pompey's works within his fortifications: a skirmishbetween them, 45; his army reduced to great straits for want ofprovisions, 47; offers Pompey battle, which he declines, 56; sendsClodius to Scipio, to treat about a peace, whose endeavours proveineffectual, 57; joins Domitius, storms and takes the town of Gomphis inThessaly, in four hours' time, 80; gains a complete victory over Pompeyin the battle of Pharsalia, 93; summons Ptolemy and Cleopatra to attendhim, 107; burns the Alexandrian fleet, 111

Caesar[=e]a, the chief city of Cappadocia

Caesia Sylva, the _Caesian_ Forest, supposed to be a part of theHercynian Forest, about the duchy of Cleves and Westphalia

Calagurritani, a people of Hispania Tarraconensis, inhabiting theprovince of _Calahorra;_ send ambassadors to Caesar with an offer ofsubmission, C. I. 60

Cal[)e]tes, an ancient people of Belgic Gaul, inhabiting the countrycalled _Le Pais de Caulx, _ in Normandy, betwixt the Seine and the sea;they furnish ten thousand men in the general revolt of Belgium, G. Ii. 4

Cal[)y]don, a city of Aetolia, _Ayton, _ C. Iii. 35

C[)a]m[)e]r[=i]num, a city of Umbria, in Italy, _Camarino_

Camp[=a]n[)i]a, the most pleasant part of Italy, in the kingdom ofNaples, now called _Terra di Lavoro_

Campi Can[=i]ni, a place in the Milanese, in Italy, not far fromBelizona

Campi Catalaunici, supposed to be the large plain which begins about twomiles from Chalons sur Marne

Cam[=u]l[)o]g[=e]nus appointed commander-in-chief by the Parisians, G. Vii. 57; obliges Labienus to decamp from before Paris, _ibid. ;_ isslain, 62

Cadav[)i]a, a country of Macedonia, _Canovia_

Caninefates, an ancient people of the lower part of Germany, nearBatavia, occupying the country in which Gorckum, on the Maese, in SouthHolland, now is

Can[=i]nius sets Duracius at liberty, who had been shut up in Limonum byDumnacus, G. Viii. 26; pursues Drapes, 30; lays siege to Uxellodunum, 33

Cant[)a]bri, the Cantabrians, an ancient warlike people of Spain, properly of the provinces of _Guipuscoa_ and _Biscay_; they are obligedby Afranius to furnish a supply of troops, C. I. 38

Cantium, a part of England, _the county of Kent_

C[)a]nus[=i]um, a city of Apulia, in Italy, _Canosa_. The splendidremains of antiquity discovered among the ruins of Canosa, together withits coins, establish the Grecian origin of the place

Cappadocia, a large country in Asia Minor, upon the Euxine Sea

Capr[)e]a, _Capri_, an island on the coast of Campania

Cap[)u]a, _Capha_, a city in the kingdom of Naples, in the Provincia diLavoro

C[)a]r[)a]les, a city of Sardinia, _Cagliari_

C[)a]r[)a]l[)i]t[=a]ni, the people of _Cagliari_, in Sardinia; theydeclare against Pompey, and expel Cotta with his garrison, C. I. 30

Carc[)a]so, a city of Gaul, _Carcassone_

Carm[=o]na, a town of Hispania Baetica, _Carmone_; declares for Caesar, and expels the enemy's garrison, C. Ii. 19

Carni, an ancient people, inhabiting a part of Noricum, whose country isstill called _Carniola_

Carn[=u]tes, an ancient people of France, inhabiting the territory nowcalled _Chartres_; Caesar quarters some troops among them, G. Ii. 35;they openly assassinate Tasgetins, G. V. 25; send ambassadors to Caesarand submit, vi. 4; offer to be the first in taking up alms against theRomans, vii. 2; attack the Biturigians, but are dispersed and put toflight by Caesar. Viii. 5

Carpi, an ancient people near the Danube

Cassandr[)e]a, a city of Macedonia, _Cassandria_

Cassi, a people of ancient Britain, _the hundred of Caishow_, in_Hertfordshire_; they send ambassadors and submit to Caesar, G. V. 21

Caesil[=i]num, a town in Italy, _Castelluzzo_

Cassivellaunus, chosen commander-in-chief of the confederate Britons, G. V. 11; endeavours in vain to stop the course of Caesar's conquests, 18;is obliged to submit, and accept Caesar's terms, 22

Cassius, Pompey's lieutenant, burns Caesar's fleet in Sicily, C. Iii. 101

Castellum Menapiorum, _Kessel_, a town in Brabant, on the river Neerse, not far from the Maese

Cast[)i]cus, the son of Catam['a]ntaledes, solicited by Orgetorix toinvade the liberty of his country, G. I. 3

Castra Posthumiana, a town in Hispania Baetica, _Castro el Rio_

Castra Vetera, an ancient city in Lower Germany, in the duchy of Cleves;some say where _Santon_, others where _Byrthon_ now is

Castulonensis Saltus, a city of Hispania Tarraconensis, _Castona laVieja_

Cativulcus takes up arms against the Romans at the instigation ofIndutiomarus, G. V. 24; poisons himself, vi. 31

Cato of Utica, the source of his hatred to Caesar, C. I. 4; made praetorof Sicily, prepares for war, and abdicates his province, 30

Catur[)i]ges, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of_Embrun_, or _Ambrun_, or _Chagres_; oppose Caesar's passage over theAlps, G. I. 10

Cavalry, their institution and manner of fighting among the Germans, G. I. 48, iv. 2

Cavarillus taken and brought before Caesar, G. Vii. 62

Cavarinus, the Senones attempt to assassinate him, G. V. 54; Caesarorders him to attend him with the cavalry of the Senones, vi. 5

Cebenna Mons, the mountains of the _Cevennes_, in Gaul, separating theHelvians from Auvergne

Celeja, a city of Noricum Mediterraneum, now _Cilley_

Celtae, a people of Thrace, about the mountains of Rhodope and Haemus

Celtae, an ancient people of Gaul, in that part called Gallia Comata, between the Garumna (_Garonne_) and Sequana (_Seine_), from whom thatcountry was likewise called Gallia Celtica. They were the most powerfulof the three great nations that inhabited Gaul, and are supposed to bethe original inhabitants of that extensive country. It is generallysupposed that they called themselves _Gail_, or _Gael_, out of whichname the Greeks formed their [Greek: Keltai], and the Romans Galli. Some, however, deduce the name from the Gaelic "_Ceilt, _" an inhabitantof the forest

Celt[)i]b[=e]ri, an ancient people of Spain, descended from the Celtae, who settled about the River Iberus, or _Ebro_, from whom the country wascalled Celtiberia, now _Arragon_; Afranius obliges them to furnish asupply of troops, C. I. 38

Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix, assassinated by the Arverni, G. Vii. 4

Cenimagni, or Iceni, an ancient people of Britain, inhabiting thecounties of _Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridgeshire_, and _Huntingdonshire_

Cenis Mons, that part of the Alps which separates Savoy from Piedmont

Cenni, an ancient people of Celtic extraction

Cenom[=a]ni, a people of Gallia Celtica, in the country now called _LeManseau_, adjoining to that of the Insubres

Centr[=o]nes, an ancient people of Flanders, about the city of_Courtray_, dependent on the Nervians

Centr[=o]nes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country ofTarantaise

Cerauni Montes, Mountains of Epirus, _Monti di Chimera_

Cerc[=i]na, an island on the coast of Africa, _Chercara, Cercare_

Cevennes, mountains of, Caesar passes them in the midst of winter, though covered with snow six feet deep, G. Vii. 8

Chara, a root which served to support Caesar's army in extremenecessity, C. Iii. 48; manner of preparing it, _ibid_. 

Chariots, manner of fighting with them among the Britons, G. Iv. 33;dexterity of the British charioteers, _ibid_. 

Cherron[=e]sus, a peninsula of Africa, near Alexandria

Cherson[=e]sus Cimbr[=i]ca, a peninsula on the Baltic, now _Jutland_, part of _Holstein, Ditmarsh_, and _Sleswic_

Cherusci, a great and warlike people of ancient Germany, between theElbe and the Weser, about the country now called _Mansfield_, part ofthe duchy of _Brunswick_, and the dioceses of _Hildesheim_ and_Halberstadt_. The Cherusci, under the command of Arminius (Hermann), lured the unfortunate Varus into the wilds of the Saltus Teutoburgiensis(Tutinger Wold), where they massacred him and his whole army. They wereafterwards defeated by Germanicus, who, on his march through the forestso fatal to his countrymen, found the bones of the legions where theyhad been left to blanch by their barbarian conqueror. --See Tacitus'saccount of the March of the Roman Legions through the German forests, _Annals, _ b. I. C. 71

Cicero, Quintus, attacked in his winter quarters by Ambi[)o]rix, G. V. 39; informs Caesar of his distress, who marches to relieve him, 46;attacked unexpectedly by the Sigambri, who are nevertheless obliged toretire, vi. 36

Cimbri, _the Jutlanders, _ a very ancient northern people, who inhabitedChersonesus Cimbrica

Cing[)e]t[)o]rix, the leader of one of the factions among the Treviri, and firmly attached to Caesar, G. V. 3; declared a public enemy, and hisgoods confiscated by Indutiom[)a]rus, 56

Cing[)u]lum, a town of Pic[=e]num, in Italy, _Cingoli_

Cleopatra, engaged in a war with her brother Ptolemy, C. Iii. 103

Clod[)i]us sent by Caesar to Scipio, to treat about a peace, but withouteffect, C. Iii. 90

Cocas[=a]tes, a people of Gaul, according to some the _Bazadois_

Caelius Rufus raises a sedition in Rome, C. Iii. 20; is expelled thatcity, then joins with Milo, 21; he is killed, 22

C[)o]imbra, an ancient city of Portugal, once destroyed, but nowrebuilt, on the river _Mendego_

Colchis, a country in Asia, near Pontus, including the present_Mingrelia_ and _Georgia_

Com[=a]na Pont[)i]ca, a city of Asia Minor, _Com, _ or, _Tabachzan_

Com[=a]na of Cappadocia, _Arminacha_

Comius sent by Caesar into Britain to dispose the British states tosubmit, G. Iv. 21; persuades the Bellov[)a]ci to furnish theircontingent to the relief of Alesia, vii. 76; his distrust of the Romans, occasioned by an attempt to assassinate him, viii. 23; harasses theRomans greatly, and intercepts their convoys, 47; attacks VolusenusQuadratus, and runs him through the thigh, 48; submits to Antony, oncondition of not appearing in the presence of any Roman, _ibid_. 

Compsa, a city of Italy, _Conza, _ or _Consa_

Concordia, an ancient city of the province of _Triuli, _ in Italy, now inruins

Condr[=u]si, or Condr[=u]s[=o]nes, an ancient people of Belgium, dependent on the Treviri, whose country is now called _Condrotz_, between Liege and Namur

Conetod[=u]nus heads the Carnutes in their revolt from the Romans, andthe massacre at Genabum, G. Vii. 3

Confluens Mosae et Rheni, the confluence of the Meuse and Rhine, or thepoint where the Meuse joins the Vahalis, or Waal, which little riverbranches out from the Rhine

Convictolit[=a]nis, a division on his account among the Aeduans, C. Vii. 32; Caesar confirms his election to the supreme magistracy, 33; hepersuades Litavicus and his brothers to rebel, 37

Corc[=y]ra, an island of Epirus, _Corfu_

Cord[)u]ba, a city of Hispania Baetica, _Cordova;_ Caesar summons theleading men of the several states of Spain to attend him there, C. Ii. 19; transactions of that assembly, 21

Corf[=i]n[)i]um, a town belonging to the Peligni, in Italy, _St. Pelino, _ al. _Penlina;_ Caesar lays siege to it, C. I. 16; and obligesit to surrender, 24

Corinth, a famous and rich city of Achaia, in Greece, in the middle ofthe Isthmus going into Peloponnesus

Corneli[=a]na Castra, a city of Africa, between Carthage and Utica

Correus, general of the Bellov[)a]ci, with six thousand foot, and athousand horse, lies in ambush for the Roman foragers, and attacks theRoman cavalry with a small party, but is routed and killed, G. Viii. 19

Cors[)i]ca, a considerable island in the Mediterranean Sea, nearSardinia, which still retains its name

Cosanum, a city of Calabria, in Italy, _Cassano_

Cotta, L. Aurunculeius, dissents from Sabinus in relation to the advicegiven them by Ambiorix, G. V. 28; his behaviour when attacked by theGauls, 33; is slain, with the great part of his men, after a braveresistance, 37

Cotuatus and Conetodunus massacre all the Roman merchants at Genabum, G. Vii. 3

Cotus, a division on his account among the Aeduans, G. Vii. 32; obligedto desist from his pretensions to the supreme magistracy, 33

Crassus, P. , his expedition into Aquitaine, G. Iii. 20; reduces theSotiates, 22; and other states, obliging them to give hostages, 27

Crast[)i]nus, his character, and courage at the battle of Pharsalia, C. Iii. 91; where he is killed, 99

Cr[)e]m[=o]na, an ancient city of Gallia Cisalpina, which retains itsname to this day, and is the metropolis of the _Cremonese_, in Italy

Crete, one of the noblest islands in the Mediterranean Sea, now called_Candia_

Critognatus, his extraordinary speech and proposal to the garrison ofAlesia, G. Vii. 77

Curio obliges Cato to abandon the defence of Cicily, C. I. 30; sails forAfrica, and successfully attacks Varus, ii. 25; his speech to revive thecourage of his men, 32; defeats Varus, 34; giving too easy credit to apiece of false intelligence, is cut off with his whole army, 42

Curiosol[=i]tae, a people of Gaul, inhabiting _Cornoualle, _ in Bretagne

Cycl[)a]des, islands in the Aegean Sea, _L'Isole dell' Archipelago_

Cyprus, an island in the Mediterranean Sea, between Syria and Cilicia, _Cipro_

Cyr[=e]ne, an ancient and once a fine city of Africa, situate overagainst Matapan, the most southern cape of Morea, _Cairoan_

Cyz[=i]cus, Atraki, formerly one of the largest cities of Asia Minor, inan island of the same name, in the Black Sea

Dacia, an ancient country of Scythia, beyond the Danube, containing partof _Hungary, Transylvania, Walachia, _ and _Moldavia_

Dalm[=a]tia, a part of Illyricum, now called _Sclavonia_, lying betweenCroatia, Bosnia, Servia, and the Adriatic Gulf

D[=a]n[)u]b[)i]us, the largest river in Europe, which rises in the BlackForest, and after flowing through that country, Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, Servia, Bulgaria, Moldavia, and Bessarabia, receiving in itscourse a great number of noted rivers, some say sixty, and 120 minorstreams, falls into the Black or Euxine Sea, in two arms

Dard[=a]nia, the ancient name of a country in Upper Moesia, which becameafterwards a part of Dacia; _Rascia_, and part of _Servia_

Dec[=e]tia, a town in Gaul, _Decise_, on the Loire

Delphi, a city of Achaia, _Delpho_, al. _Salona_

Delta, a very considerable province of Egypt, at the mouth of the Nile, _Errif_

Diablintes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country called _LePerche_; al. _Diableres_, in Bretagne; al. _Lintes_ of Brabant; al. _Lendoul_, over against Britain

Divit[)i][)a]cus, the Aeduan, his attachment to the Romans and Caesar, G. I. 19; Caesar, for his sake, pardons his brother Dumnorix, _ibid_. ;he complains to Caesar, in behalf of the rest of the Gauls, of thecruelty of Ariovistus, 31; marches against the Bellov[)a]ci create adiversion in favour of Caesar, ii. 10; intercedes for the Bellov[)a]ci, and obtains their pardon from Caesar, 14; goes to Rome to implore aid ofthe senate, but without effect, vi. 12

Domitius Ahenobarbus, besieged by Caesar in Corfinium, writes to Pompeyfor assistance, C. I. 15; seized by his own troops, who offer to deliverhim up to Caesar, 20; Caesar's generous behaviour towards him, 23; heenters Marseilles, and is entrusted with the supreme command, 36; isdefeated in a sea fight by Decimus Brutus, 58; escapes with greatdifficulty a little before the surrender of Marseilles, ii. 22

Domitius Calvinus, sent by Caesar into Macedonia, comes very opportunelyto the relief of Cassius Longinus, C. Iii. 34; gains several advantagesover Scipio, 32

Drapes, in conjunction with Luterius, seizes Uxellodunum, G. Viii. 30;his camp stormed, and himself made prisoner, 29; he starves himself, 44

Druids, priests so called, greatly esteemed in Gaul, and possessed ofmany valuable privileges, G. Vi. 13

D[=u]bis, a river of Burgundy, _Le Doux_

Dumn[)a]cus besieges Duracius in Limonum, G. Viii. 26; is defeated byFabius, 27

Dumn[)o]rix, the brother of Divitiacus, his character, G. I. 15;persuades the noblemen of Gaul not to go with Caesar into Britain, v. 5;deserts, and is killed for his obstinacy, 6

Duracius besieged in Limonum by Dumnacus, general of the Andes, G. Viii. 26

Durocort[=o]rum, a city of Gaul, _Rheims_

D[)y]rrh[)a]ch[)i]um, a city of Macedonia, _Durazzo, Drazzi_; Caesarendeavours to enclose Pompey within his lines near that place, C. Iii. 41

Ebur[=o]nes, an ancient people of Germany, inhabiting part of thecountry, now the bishopric of _Liege_, and the county of _Namur_. Caesartakes severe vengeance on them for their perfidy, G. Vi. 34, 35

Eb[=u]r[)o]v[=i]ces, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of_Evreux_, in Normandy; they massacre their senate, and join withViridovix, G. Iii. 17

Egypt, see _Aegypt_

El[=a]ver, a river of Gaul, the _Allier_

Eleut[=e]ti Cadurci, a branch of the Cadurci, in Aquitania. They arecalled in many editions Eleutheri Cadurci, but incorrectly, sinceEleutheri is a term of Greek origin, and besides could hardly be appliedto a Gallic tribe like the Eleuteti, who, in place of being free [Greek:eleutheroi], seem to have been clients of the Arverni; they furnishtroops to the relief of Alesia, G. Vii. 75

Elis, a city of Peloponnesus, _Belvidere_

Elus[=a]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of_Euse_, in Gascony

Eph[)e]sus, an ancient and celebrated city of Asia Minor, _Efeso_; thetemple of Diana there in danger of being stripped, G. Iii. 32

Epidaurus, a maritime city of Dalmatia, _Ragusa_

Ep[=i]rus, a country in Greece, between Macedonia, Achaia, and theIonian Sea, by some now called _Albania inferior_

Eporedorix, treacherously revolts from Caesar, G. Vii. 54

Essui, a people of Gaul; the word seems to be a corruption from Aedui, C. V. 24

Etesian winds detain Caesar at Alexandria, which involves him in a newwar, C. Iii. 107

Eusubii, corrupted from _Unelli_, or _Lexovii_, properly the people of_Lisieux_, in Normandy

Fabius, C. , one of Caesar's lieutenants, sent into Spain, with threelegions, C. I. 37; builds two bridges over the Segre for the convenienceof foraging, 40

Fanum, a city of Umbria in Italy, _Fano_, C. I. 11

Fortune, her wonderful power and influence on matters of war, G. Vi. 30

Faesulae, _Fiesoli_, an ancient city of Italy, in the duchy of Florence, anciently one of the twelve considerable cities of Etruria. 

Flavum, anciently reckoned the eastern mouth of the Rhine, now calledthe _Ulie_, and is a passage out of the Zuyder Sea into the North Sea

Gab[)a]li, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country of_Givaudan_. Their chief city was Anduitum, now _Mende_, G. Vii. 64; theyjoin the general confederacy of Vercingetorix, and give hostages toLuterius, G. Vii. 7

Gadit[=a]ni, the people of Gades, C. Ii. 18

Gal[=a]tia, a country in Asia Minor, lying between Cappadocia, Pontus, and Paphlagonia, now called _Chiangare_

Galba Sergius, sent against the Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni, G. Iii. 1; the barbarians attack his camp unexpectedly, but are repulsedwith great loss, iii. 6

Galli, the Gauls, the people of ancient Gaul, now _France_; theircountry preferable to that of the Germans, G. I. 31; their manner ofattacking towns, ii. 6; of greater stature than the Romans, 30; quick andhasty in their resolves, iii. 8; forward in undertaking wars, but soonfainting under misfortunes, 19; their manners, chiefs, druids, discipline, cavalry, religion, origin, marriages, and funerals, vi. 13;their country geographically described, i. 1

Gall[=i]a, the ancient and renowned country of Gaul, now _France_. Itwas divided by the Romans into--

Gallia Cisalpina, Tonsa, or Togata, now _Lombardy_, between the Alps andthe river Rubicon: and--

Gallia Transalpina, or Com[=a]ta, comprehending _France, Holland, theNetherlands_: and farther subdivided into--

Gallia Belg[)i]ca, now a part of _Lower Germany_, and the _Netherlands_, with _Picardy_; divided by Augustus into Belgica and Germania__ and thelatter into Prima and Secunda

Gallia Celt[)i]ca, now _France_ properly so called, divided by Augustusinto Lugdun[=e]nsis, and Rothomagensis

Gallia Aquitan[)i]ca, now _Gascony_; divided by Augustus into Prima, Secunda, and Tertia: and--

Gallia Narbonensis, or Bracc[=a]ta, now _Languedoc, Dauphiny_, and_Provence_

Gallograecia, a country of Asia Minor, the same as _Galatia_

Gar[=i]tes, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country now called _Gavre, Gavaraan_

Garoceli, or Graioc[)e]li, an ancient people of Gaul, about _MountGenis_, or _Mount Genevre_ others place them in the _Val de Gorienne_;they oppose Caesar's passage over the Alps, G. I. 10

Garumna, the _Garonne_, one of the largest rivers of France, which, rising in the Pyrenees, flows through Guienne, forms the vast Bay ofGaronne, and falls, by two mouths, into the British Seas. The Garonne isnavigable as far as _Toulouse_, and communicates with the Mediterraneanby means of the great canal, G. I. 1

Garumni, an ancient people of Gaul, in the neighbourhood of the_Garonne_, G. Iii. 27

Geld[=u]ra, a fortress of the Ubii, on the Rhine, not improbably thepresent village of _Gelb_, on that river eleven German miles fromN[=e]us

Gen[)a]bum, _Orleans_, an ancient town in Gaul, famous for the massacreof the Roman citizens committed there by the Carn[=u]tes

Gen[=e]va, a city of Savoy, now a free republic, upon the borders ofHelvetia, where the Rhone issues from the Lake Lemanus, anciently a cityof the Allobr[)o]ges

Gen[=u]sus, a river of Macedonia, uncertain

Gerg[=o]via, the name of two cities in ancient Gaul, the one belongingto the Boii, the other to the Arverni. The latter was the only Galliccity which baffled the attacks of Caesar

Gerg[=o]via of the Averni, Vercingetorix expelled thence by Gobanitio, G. Vii. 4; the Romans attacking it eagerly, are repulsed with greatslaughter, 50

Gerg[=o]via of the Boii, besieged in vain by Vercingetorix, G. Vii. 9

Germania, _Germany_, one of the largest countries of Europe, and themother of those nations which, on the fall of the Roman empire, conquered all the rest. The name appears to be derived from _wer_, war, and _man_, a man, and signifies the country of warlike men

Germans, habituated from their infancy to arms, G. I. 36; their mannerof training their cavalry, 48; their superstition 50; defeated byCaesar, 53; their manners, religion, vi. 23; their huge stature andstrength, G. I. 39

G[=e]tae, an ancient people of Scythia, who inhabited betwixt Moesia andDacia, on each side of the Danube. Some think their country the samewith the present _Walachia_, or _Moldavia_

Getulia, a province in the kingdom of Morocco, in Barbary

Gomphi, a town in Thessaly, _Gonfi_, refusing to open its gates toCaesar, is stormed and taken, C. Iii. 80

Gord[=u]ni, a people of Belgium, the ancient inhabitants of _Ghent_, according to others of _Courtray_; they join with Ambiorix in his attackof Cicero's camp, G. V. 39

Got[=i]ni, an ancient people of Germany, who were driven out of theircountry by Maroboduus Graecia, _Greece, _ a large part of Europe, calledby the Turks _Rom[=e]lia, _ containing many countries, provinces, andislands, once the nursery of arts, learning, and sciences

Graioc[)e]li, see _Garoceli_

Grudii, the inhabitants about _Louvaine, _ or, according to some, about_Bruges;_ they join with Ambiorix in his attack of Cicero's camp, G. V. 39

Gugerni, a people of ancient Germany, who dwelt on the right banks ofthe Rhine, between the Ubii and the Batavi

Gutt[=o]nes, or Gyth[=o]nes, an ancient people of Germany, inhabitingabout the Vistula

Haemus, a mountain dividing Moesia and Thrace, _Argentaro_

Haliacmon, a river of Macedonia, uncertain; Scipio leaves Favonius withorders to build a fort on that river, C. Iii. 36

Har[=u]des, or Har[=u]di, a people of Gallia Celtica, supposed to havebeen originally Germans: and by some to have inhabited the country about_Constance_ Helv[=e]tia, _Switzerland, _ now divided into thirteencantons

Helv[=e]tii, _the Helvetians, or Switzers, _ ancient inhabitants of thecountry of _Switzerland;_ the most warlike people of Gaul, G. I. 1;their design of abandoning their own country, 2; attacked withconsiderable loss near the river Sa[^o]ne, 12; vanquished and obliged toreturn home by Caesar, 26

Helvii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country now possessedby the _Vivarois;_ Caesar marches into their territories, G. Vii. 7

Heracl[=e]a, a city of Thrace, on the Euxine Sea, _Pantiro_

Heracl[=e]a Sent[)i]ca, a town in Macedonia, _Chesia_

Hercynia Silva, _the Hercinian Forest, _ the largest forest of ancientGermany, being reckoned by Caesar to have been sixty days' journey inlength, and nine in breadth. Many parts of it have been since cut down, and many are yet remaining; of which, among others, is that called the_Black Forest;_ its prodigious extent, G. Vi. 4

Hermand[=u]ri, an ancient people of Germany, particularly in the countrynow called _Misnia, _ in Upper Saxony; though they possessed a muchlarger tract of land, according to some, all _Bohemia_

Hermin[)i]us Mons, a mountain of _Lusitania, Monte Arm[)i]no;_ accordingto others, _Monte della Strella_

Her[)u]li, an ancient northern people, who came first out of Scandavia, but afterwards inhabited the country now called _Mecklenburg_ in LowerSaxony, towards the Baltic

Hibernia, _Ireland, _ a considerable island to the west of Great Britain, G. V. 13

Hisp[=a]n[)i]a, Spain, one of the most considerable kingdoms of Europe, divided by the ancients into Tarraconensis, Baetica, and Lusitania. Thisname appears to be derived from the Phoenician _Saphan, _ a rabbit, vastnumbers of these animals being found there by the Phoenician colonists

Ib[=e]rus, a river of Hispania Tarraconensis, the _Ebro, _ C. I. 60

Iccius, or Itius Portus, a seaport town of ancient Gaul; _Boulogne, _ or, according to others, _Calais_

Ig[)i]l[)i]um, an island in the Tuscan Sea, _il Giglio, l'Isle du Lys_

Ig[)u]v[)i]um, a city of Umbria in Italy, _Gubio;_ it forsakes Pompey, and submits to Caesar, C. I. 12

Illurgavonenses, a people of Hispania Tarraconensis, near the Iberus;they submit to Caesar, and supply him with corn, C. I. 60

Illurgis, a town of Hispania Baetica, _Illera_

Induti[)o]m[)a]rus, at the head of a considerable faction among theTreviri, G. V. 3; endeavouring to make himself master of Labienus'scamp, is repulsed and slain, 53

Is[)a]ra, the _Is[`e]re, _ a river of France, which rises in Savoy, andfalls into the Rhone above Valance

Isauria, a province anciently of Asia Minor, now a part of _Caramania, _and subject to the Turks

Issa (an island of the Adriatic Sea, _Lissa_), revolts from Caesar atthe instigation of Octavius, C. Iii. 9

Ister, that part of the Danube which passed by Illyricum

Istr[)i]a, a country now in Italy, under the Venetians, bordering onIllyricum, so called from the river Ister

Istr[)o]p[)o]lis, a city of Lower Moesia, near the south entrance of theDanube, _Prostraviza_

It[)a]l[)i]a, _Italy, _ one of the most famous countries in Europe, oncethe seat of the Roman empire, now under several princes, and freecommonwealths

It[)a]l[)i]ca, a city of Hispania Baetica, _Servila la Veja;_ accordingto others, _Alcala del Rio;_ shuts its gates against Varro, C. Ii. 20

Itius Portus, Caesar embarks there for Britain, G. V. 5

It[=u]raea, a country of Palestine, _Sacar_

Jacet[=a]ni, or Lacet[=a]ni, a people of Spain, near the PyreneanMountains; revolt from Afranius and submit to Caesar, C. I. 60

Jadert[=i]ni, a people so called from their capital Jadera, a city ofIllyricum, _Zara_

Juba, king of Numidia, strongly attached to Pompey, C. Ii. 25; advanceswith a large army to the relief of Utica, 36; detaches a part of histroops to sustain Sabura, 40; defeats Cario, ii. 42; his cruelty, ii. 44

J[=u]ra, a mountain in Gallia Belgica, which separated the Sequani fromthe Helvetians, most of which is now called _Mount St. Claude. _ The nameappears to be derived from the Celtic, _jou-rag, _ which signifies the"domain of God;" the boundary of the Helvetians towards the Sequani, G. I. 2

Labi[=e]nus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, is attacked in his camp, G. V. 58, vi. 6; his stratagem, G. Vii. 60; battle with the Gauls, G. Vii. 59;is solicited by Caesar's enemies to join their party, G. Viii. 52; builtthe town of Cingulum, C. I. 15; swears to follow Pompey, C. Iii. 13; hisdispute with Valerius about a peace, C. Iii. 19; his cruelty towardsCaesar's followers, C. Iii. 71; flatters Pompey, C. Iii. 87

Lacus B[)e]n[=a]cus, _Lago di Guardo, _ situated in the north of Italy, between Verona, Brescia, and Trent

Lacus Lem[)a]nus, the lake upon which Geneva stands, formed by the RiverRhone, between _Switzerland_ to the north, and Savoy to the south, commonly called the _Lake of Geneva_, G. I. 2, 8

Larin[=a]tes, the people of Larinum, a city of Italy, _Larino_; C. I. 23

Larissa, the principal city of Thessaly, a province of Macedonia, on theriver Peneo

L[)a]t[=i]ni, the inhabitants of Latium, an ancient part of Italy, whence the Latin tongue is so called

Lat[=o]br[)i]gi, a people of Gallia Belgica, between the Allobroges andHelvetii, in the country called _Lausanne_; abandon their country, G. I. 5; return, G. I. 28; their number, G. I. 29

Lemnos, an island in the Aegean Sea, now called _Stalimane_

Lemov[=i]ces, an ancient people of Gaul, _le Limosin_, G. Vii. 4

Lemov[=i]ces Armorici, the people of _St. Paul de Leon_

Lenium, a town in Lusitania, unknown

Lent[)u]lus Marcellinus, the quaestor, one of Caesar's followers, C. Iii. 62

Lentulus and Marcellus, the consuls, Caesar's enemies, G. Viii. 50;leave Rome through fear of Caesar, C. I. 14

Lenunc[)u]li, fishing-boats, C. Ii. 43

Lepontii, a people of the Alps, near the valley of _Leventini_, G. Iv. 10

Leuci, a people of Gallia Belgica, where now Lorrain is, well skilled indarting. Their chief city is now called _Toul_, G. I. 40

Lev[)a]ci, a people of Brabant, not far from Louvain, whose chief townis now called _Leew_; dependants on the Nervii, G. V. 39

Lex, law of the Aedui respecting the election of magistrates, G. Vii. 33

Lex, Julian law, C. Ii. 14

Lex, the Pompeian law respecting bribery, C. Iii. 1

Lex, two Caelian laws, C. Iii. 20, 21

Lexovii, an ancient people of Gaul, _Lisieux_ in Normandy, G. Iii. 11, 17

Liberty of the Gauls, G. Iii. 8; the desire of, G. V. 27; the sweetnessof, G. Iii. 10; the incitement to, G. Vii. 76; C. I. 47

Libo, praefect of Pompey's fleet, C. Iii. 5; converses with Caesar atOricum, C. Iii. 16; takes possession of the Island at Brundisium, C. Iii. 23; threatens the partisans of Caesar, C. Iii. 24; withdraws fromBrundisium, _ibid_. 

Liburni, an ancient people of Illyricum, inhabiting part of the present_Croatia_

Liger, or Ligeris, the _Loire_; one of the greatest and most celebratedrivers of France, said to receive one hundred and twelve rivers in itscourse; it rises in Velay, and falls into the Bay of Aquitain, belowNantz, G. Iii. 5

Lig[)u]ria, a part of ancient Italy, extending from the Apennines to theTuscan Sea, containing _Ferrara_, and the territories of _Genoa_

Limo, or Lim[=o]num, a city of ancient Gaul, _Poitiers_

Ling[)o]nes, a people of Gallia Belgica, inhabiting in and about_Langres_, in Champagne, G. I. 26, 40

Liscus, one of the Aedui, accuses Dumnorix to Caesar, G. I. 16, 17

Lissus, an ancient city of Macedonia, _Alessio_

Litavicus, one of the Aedui, G. Vii. 37; his treachery and flight, G. Vii. 38

Lucani, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the country now called_Basilicate_

Luceria, an ancient city of Italy, _Lucera_

Lucretius Vespillo, one of Pompey's followers, C. Iii. 7

Lucterius or Laterius, one of the Cadurci, vii. 5, 7

Lusit[=a]nia, _Portugal_, a kingdom on the west of Spain, formerly apart of it

Lusitanians, light-armed troops, C. I. 48

Lutetia, _Paris_, an ancient and famous city, now the capital of allFrance, on the river _Seine_

Lygii, an ancient people of Upper Germany, who inhabited the country nowcalled _Silesia_, and on the borders of _Poland_

M[)a]c[)e]d[=o]nia, a large country, of great antiquity and fame, containing several provinces, now under the Turks

Macedonian cavalry among Pompey's troops, C. Iii. 4

Mae[=o]tis Palus, a vast lake in the north part of Scythia, now called_Marbianco_, or _Mare della Tana_. It is about six hundred miles incompass, and the river Tanais disembogues itself into it

Maget[)o]br[)i]a, or Amagetobria, a city of Gaul, near which Ariovistusdefeated the combined forces of the Gauls. It is supposed to correspondto the modern _Moigte de Broie_, near the village of _Pontailler_

Mandub[)i]i, an ancient people of Gaul, _l'Anxois_, in Burgundy; theirfamine and misery, G. Vii. 78

Mandubratius, a Briton, G. V. 20

Marcellus, Caesar's enemy, G. Viii 53

Marcius Crispus, is sent for a protection to the inhabitants of Thabena

Marcomanni, a nation of the Suevi, whom Cluverius places between theRhine, the Danube and the Neckar; who settled, however, underMaroboduus, in _Bohemia_ and _Moravia_. The name Marcomanni signifiesborder-men. Germans, G. I. 51

Marruc[=i]ni, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the country nowcalled _Abruzzo_, C. I. 23; ii. 34

Mars, G. Vi. 17

Marsi, an ancient people of Italy inhabiting the country now called_Ducato de Marsi_, C. Ii. 27

Massilia, _Marseilles_, a large and flourishing city of Provence, inFrance, on the Mediterranean, said to be very ancient, and, according tosome, built by the Phoenicians, but as Justin will have it, by thePhocaeans, in the time of Tarquinius, king of Rome

Massilienses, the inhabitants of Marseilles, C. I. 34-36

Matisco, an ancient city of Gaul, _Mascon_, G. Vii. 90

Matr[)o]na, a river in Gaul, the _Marne_, G. I. 1

Mauritania, _Barbary_, an extensive region of Africa, divided into M. Caesariensis, Tingitana, and Sitofensis

Mediomatr[=i]ces, a people of Lorrain, on the Moselle, about the city of_Mentz_, G. Iv. 10

Mediterranean Sea, the first discovered sea in the world, still veryfamous, and much frequented, which breaks in from the Atlantic Ocean, between Spain and Africa, by the straits of Gibraltar, or Hercules'Pillar, the _ne plus ultra_ of the ancients

Meldae, according to some the people of _Meaux_; but more probablycorrupted from _Belgae_

Melodunum, an ancient city of Gaul, upon the Seine, above Paris, _Melun_, G. Vii. 58, 60

Menapii, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, who inhabited on bothsides of the Rhine. Some take them for the inhabitants of _Cleves_, andothers of _Antwerp, Ghent_, etc. , G. Ii. 4; iii. 9

Menedemus, C. Iii. 34

Mercurius, G. V. 17

Mes[)o]p[)o]t[=a]mia, a large country in the middle of Asia, between theTigris and the Euphrates, _Diarbeck_

Mess[=a]na, an ancient and celebrated city of Sicily, still known by thename of _Messina_, C. Iii. 101

M[)e]taurus, a river of Umbria, now called _Metoro_, in the duchy ofUrbino

Metios[=e]dum, an ancient city of Gaul, on the Seine, below Paris, _Corbeil_, G. Vii. 61

Metr[)o]p[)o]lis, a city of Thessaly, between Pharsalus and Gomphi, C. Iii. 11

Milo, C. Iii. 21

Minerva, G. Vi. 12

Minutius Rufus, C. Iii. 7

Mitylene, a city of Lesbos, _Metelin_

Moesia, a country of Europe, and a province of the ancient Illyricum, bordering on Pannonia, divided into the Upper, containing _Bosnia_ and_Servia_, and the Lower, called _Bulgaria_

Mona, in Caesar, the Isle of _Man_; in Ptolemy, _Anglesey_, G. V. 13

Mor[)i]ni, an ancient people of the Low Countries, who probablyinhabited on the present coast of _Bologne_, on the confines of_Picardy_ and _Artois_, because Caesar observes that from their countrywas the nearest passage to Britain, G. Ii. 4

Moritasgus, G. V. 54

Mosa, the _Maess_, or _Meuse_, a large river of Gallia Belgica, whichfalls into the German Ocean below the Briel, G. Iv. 10

Mosella, the _Moselle_, a river which, running through Lorrain, passesby Triers and falls unto the Rhine at Coblentz, famous for the vinesgrowing in the neighbourhood of it

Mysia, a country of Asia Minor, not far from the Hellespont, dividedInto Major and Minor

Nabathaei, an ancient people of Arabia, uncertain

Nann[=e]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country about_Nantes_, G. Iii. 9

Nantu[=a]tes, an ancient people of the north part of Savoy, whosecountry is now called _Le Chablais_, G. Iii. 1

Narbo, _Narbonne_, an ancient Roman city in Languedoc, in France, saidto be built a hundred and thirty-eight years before the birth of Christ, G. Iii. 20

Narisci, the ancient people of the country now called _Nortgow_, inGermany, the capital of which is the famous city of Nuremburg

Nasua, the brother of Cimberius, and commander of the hundred cantons ofthe Suevi, who encamped on the banks of the Rhine with the intention ofcrossing that river, G. I. 37

Naupactus, an ancient and considerable city of Aetolia, now called_Lepanto_, C. Iii. 35

Nem[=e]tes, a people of ancient Germany, about the city of Spire, on theRhine, G. I. 51

Nemetocenna, a town of Belgium, not known for certain; according tosome, _Arras_, G. Viii, 47

Neocaesarea, the capital of Ponts, on the river Licus, now called_Tocat_

Nervii, an ancient people of _Gallia Belgica_, thought to have dwelt inthe now diocese of _Cambray_. They attacked Caesar on his march, andfought until they were almost annihilated, G. Ii. 17

Nessus, or Nestus, a river is Thrace, _Nesto_ Nicaea, a city ofBithynia, now called _Isnick_, famous for the first general council, anno 324, against Arianism

Nit[=o]br[)i]ges, an ancient people of Gaul, whose territory lay oneither side of the Garonne, and corresponded to the modern Agennois, inthe department of Lot-et-Garonne. Their capital was Agrimum, now_Agen_, G. Vii. 7, 31, 46, 75

Noreia, a city on the borders of Illyricum, in the province of Styria, near the modern village of Newmarket, about nine German miles fromAquileia, G. I. 5

N[=o]r[)i]cae Alpes, that part of the Alps which were in, or borderingupon, Noricum

N[=o]r[)i]cum, anciently a large country, and now comprehending a greatpart of _Austria, Styria, Carinthia_, part of _Tyrol, Bavaria_, etc. , and divided into Noricum Mediterraneum and Ripense. It was firstconquered by the Romans under Tiberius, in the reign of Augustus, andwas celebrated for its mineral treasures, especially iron

N[)o]v[)i][)o]d[=u]num Belgarum, an ancient city of Belgic Gaul, nowcalled _Noyon_

N[)o]v[)i][)o]d[=u]num Bitur[)i]gum, _Neuvy_, or _Neufvy_, G. Vii. 12

N[)o]v[)i][)o]d[=u]num Aeduorum, _Nevers_, G. Vii. 55

N[)o]v[)i][)o]d[=u]num Suessionum, _Soissons, al. Noyon_, G. Ii. 12

N[)o]v[)i]om[=a]gum, _Spire_, an ancient city of Germany, in the nowupper circle of the Rhine, and on that river

Numantia, a celebrated city of ancient Spain, famous for a gallantresistance against the Romans, in a siege of fourteen years; _Almasan_

Numeius, G. I. 7

Num[)i]dae, the inhabitants of, G. Ii. 7

Numid[)i]a, an ancient and celebrated kingdom of Africa, bordering onMauritania; _Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli_, etc. 

N[=y]mphaeum, a promontory of Illyricum, exposed to the south wind, anddistant about three miles from Lissus, _Alessio_, C. Iii. 26

Oc[)e]lum, a town situated among the Cottian Alps, Usseau in Piedmont, G. I. 10

Octavius, C. Iii. 9

Octod[=u]rus, a town belonging to the Veragrians, among the PennineAlps, now _Martigny_ in the Valois, G. Iii. 1 Octog[=e]sa, a city ofHispania Tarraconensis, _Mequinenza_, C. I. 61

Ollovico, G. Vii. 31

Orch[)o]m[)e]nus, a town in Boeotia, _Orcomeno_, C. Iii. 5 5

Orcynia, the name given by Greek writers to the Hercynian forest

Orget[=o]rix, G. I. 2, 3

Or[)i]cum, a town in Epirus, _Orco, or Orcha_, C. Iii. 11, 12

Osc[=e]nses, the people of Osca, a town in Hispania Tarraconensis, now_Huescar_, C. I. 60

Os[=i]sm[)i]i, an ancient people of Gaul, one of the Gentes Armoricae. Their country occupied part of Neodron Brittany; capital Vorganium, afterwards Osismii, and now _Korbez_. In this territory also stoodBrivatas Portus, now _Brest_, G. I. 34

Otacilii, C. Iii. 28

Padua, the _Po_, the largest river in Italy, which rises in Piedmont, and dividing Lombardy into two parts, falls into the Adriatic Sea, bymany mouths; south of Venice

Paem[=a]ni, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica; according to some, those of _Luxemburg_; according to others, the people of _Pemont_, nearthe Black Forest, in part of the modern _Lugen_, G. Ii. 4

P[)a]laeste, a town in Epirus, near Oricurn

Pann[=o]n[)i]a, a very large country in the ancient division of Europe, divided into the Upper and Lower, and comprehended betwixt Illyricum, the Danube, and the mountains Cethi

P[)a]ris[)i]i, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the country nowcalled the _Isle of France_. Their capital was Lutetia, afterwardsParisii, now _Paris_, G. Vi. 3

P[=a]rth[)i]a, a country in Asia, lying between Media, Caramania, andthe Hyreanian Sea

Parthians at war with Rome, C. Iii. 31

P[=a]rth[=i]ni, a people of Macedonia; their chief city taken by storm, C. Iii. 41

P[=e]l[=i]gni, a people of Italy in Abruzzo, C. I. 15

P[)e]l[)o]ponn[=e]sus, the _Morea_, a famous, large, and fruitfulpeninsula of Greece, now belonging to the Venetians

P[=e]l[=u]s[)i]um, an ancient and celebrated city of Egypt, _Belbais_;Pompey goes to it, C. Iii. 103; taken by Mithridates

P[=e]rg[)a]mus, an ancient and famous city of Mysia, _Pergamo_

Per[)i]nthus, a city of Thrace, about a day's journey west ofConstantinople, now in a decaying condition, and called _Heraclea_

P[=e]rs[)i]a, one of the largest, most ancient and celebrated kingdomsof Asia

P[=e]tra, an ancient city of Macedonia, uncertain

Petreius, one of Pompey's lieutenants, C. I. 38

P[=e]tr[)o]g[)o]r[)i]i, a country in Gaul, east of the mouth of theGarumna; their chief city was Vesuna, afterwards Petrocorii, now_Perigueux_, the capital of Perigord

Pe[=u]c[=i]ni, the inhabitants of the islands of Peuce, in one of themouths of the Danube

Ph[=a]rs[=a]l[)i]a, a part of Thessaly, famous for the battle betweenCaesar and Pompey, which decided the fate of the Roman commonwealth

Pharus, an isle facing the port of Alexandria in ancient Egypt; _Farion_

Phasis, a large river in Colchis, now called _Fasso_, which flows intothe Euxine Sea

Ph[)i]lippi, a city of Macedonia, on the confines of Thrace, _Filippo_

Ph[)i]l[=i]pp[)o]p[)o]lis, a city of Thrace, near the river Hebrus, _Filippopoli_

Phr[)y]g[)i]a, two countries in Asia Minor, one called Major, the otherMinor

P[=i]c[=e]num, an ancient district of Italy, lying eastward of Umbria;_the March of Ancona_; according to others, _Piscara_

P[=i]cti, _Picts_, an ancient barbarous northern people, who byinter-marriages became, in course of time, one nation with the Scots; butare originally supposed to have come out of Denmark or Scythia, to theIsles of Orkney, and from thence into Scotland

P[=i]ct[)o]nes, an ancient people of Gaul, along the southern bank ofthe Liger, or Loire. Their capital was Limonum, afterwards Pictones, now_Paitross_, in the department _de la Vienne_, G. Iii. 11

Pir[=u]stae, an ancient people of Dalmatia, Illyricum, on the confinesof Pannonia. They are the same as the Pyraci of Pliny (H. N. Iii. 22), G. V. I

P[)i]saurum, a city of Umbria in Italy, _Pisaro_

Piso, an Aquitanian, slain, G. Iv. 12

Placentia, an ancient city of Gallia Cisalpina, near the Po, now themetropolis of the duchy of _Piacenza_, which name it also bears

Pleum[)o]si, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, subject to theNervians, and inhabiting near _Tournay_

Pompey, at first friendly to Caesar, G. Vi. 1; subsequently estranged, G. Viii. 53; could not bear an equal his authority, power, andinfluence, C. I. 61; sends ambassadors to Caesar, C. I. 8, 10; alwaysreceived great respect from Caesar, C. I. 8; Caesar desires to bring himto an engagement, C. Iii. 66; his unfortunate flight, C. Iii. 15, 94, 102; his death, C. Iii. 6, 7. 

Pomponius, C. Iii. 101

Pontus Eux[=i]nus, the _Euxine, _ or _Black Sea_, from the Aegean alongthe Hellespont, to the Maeotic Lake, between Europe and Asia

Posth[)u]m[)i][=a]na Castra, an ancient town in Hispania Baetica, nowcalled _Castro el Rio_

Pothinus, king Ptolemy's tutor, C. Iii. 108; his death, C. Iii. 112

Praeciani, an ancient people of Gaul, _Precius_; they surrendered to theRomans, G. Iii. 27

Provincia Rom[=a]na, or Romanorum, one of the southern provinces ofFrance, the first the Romans conquered and brought into the form of aprovince, whence it obtained its name; which it still in some degreeretains, being called at this day _Provence_. It extended from thePyrenees to the Alps, along the coast. _Provence_ is only part of theancient Provincia, which in its full extent included the departments ofPyr['e]n['e]es-Orientales, l'Arri[`e]ge, Aude[**Note: misprint "Ande" inthe original], Haute Garonne, Tarn, Herault, Gard, Vaucluse, Bouches-du-Rh[^o]ne, Var, Basses-Alpes, Hautes-Alpes, La Dr[^o]me, l'Is[`e]re, l'Ain

Prusa, or Prusas, _Bursa_, a city of Bithynia, at the foot of Olympus, built by Hannibal

Ptolemaeius, Caesar interferes between him and Cleopatra, C. Iii. 107;his father's will, C. Iii. 108; Caesar takes the royal youth into hispower, C. Iii. 109

Pt[)o]l[)e]m[=a]is, an ancient city of Africa, _St. Jean d'Acre_

Publius Attius Varus, one of Pompey's generals, C. Ii. 23 PyrenaeiMontes, the _Pyrenees_, or _Pyrenean mountains_, one of the largestchains of mountains in Europe, which divide Spain from France, runningfrom east to west eighty-five leagues in length. The name is derivedfrom the _Celtic Pyren_ or _Pyrn_, a high mountain, hence also Brenner, in the Tyrol

Ravenna, a very ancient city of Italy, near the coast of the AdriaticGulf, which still retains its ancient name. In the decline of the Romanempire, it was sometimes the seat of the emperors of the West; as it waslikewise of the Visi-Gothic kingdom, C. I. 5

Raur[=a]ci, a people of ancient Germany, near the Helvetii, whoinhabited near where _Basle_ in Switzerland now is; they unite with theHelvetii, and leave home, G. I. 5, 29

Rebilus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, a man of great militaryexperience, C. Ii. 34

Remi, the people of _Rheims_, a very ancient, fine, and populous city ofFrance, in the province of Champagne, on the river Vesle; surrender toCaesar, G. Ii. 3; their influence and power with Caesar, G. V. 54; vi. 64; they fall into an ambuscade of the Bellovaci, G. Viii. 12

Rh[-e][)d]ones, an ancient people of Gaul inhabiting about _Rennes, _ inBretagne; they surrender to the Romans, G. Ii. 34

Rhaetia, the country of the _Grisons, _ on the Alps, near the HercynianForest

Rhenus, the _Rhine, _ a large and famous river in Germany, which itformerly divided from Gaul. It springs out of the Rhaetian Alps, in thewestern borders of Switzerland, and the northern of the Grisons, fromtwo springs which unite near Coire, and falls into the Meuse and theGerman Ocean, by two mouths, whence Virgil calls it Rhenus bicornis. Itpasses through Lacus Brigantinus, or the Lake of Constance, and LacusAcronius or the Lake of Zell, and then continues its westerly directionto Basle (Basiliae). It then bends northward, and separates Germany fromFrance, and further down Germany from Belgium. At Schenk the Rhine sendsoff its left-hand branch, the Vahalis (Waal), by a western course tojoin the Mosa or Meuse. The Rhine then flows on a few miles, and againseparates into two branches--the one to the right called the Flevo, orFelvus, or Flevum--now the Yssel, and the other called the Helium, nowthe _Leek_. The latter joins the Mosa above Rotterdam. The Yssel wasfirst connected with the Rhine by the canal of Drusus. It passed throughthe small lake of Flevo before reaching the sea which became expandedinto what is now called the Zuyder Zee by increase of water through theYssel from the Rhine. The whole course of the Rhine is nine hundredmiles, of which six hundred and thirty are navigable from Basle to thesea. --G. Iv. 10, 16, 17; vi. 9, etc. ; description of it, G. Iv. 10

Rh[)o]d[)a]nus, the _Rhone_, one of the most celebrated rivers ofFrance, which rises from a double spring in Mont de la Fourche, a partof the Alps, on the borders of Switzerland, near the springs of theRhine. It passes through the Lacus Lemanus, Lake of Geneva, and flowswith a swift and rapid current in a southern direction into the SinusGallicus, or Gulf of Lyons. Its whole course is about four hundred miles

Rhod[)o]pe, a famous mountain of Thrace, now called _Valiza_

Rh[)o]dus, Rhodes, a celebrated island in the Mediterranean, upon thecoast of Asia Minor, over against Caria

Rhynd[)a]gus, a river of Mysia in Asia, which falls into the Propontis

R[)o]ma, _Rome_, once the seat of the Roman empire, and the capital ofthe then known world, now the immediate capital of Camagna di Roma only, on the river Tiber, and the papal seat; generally supposed to have beenbuilt by Romulus, in the first year of the seventh Olympiad, B. C. 753

Roscillus and Aegus, brothers belonging to the Allobroges, revolt fromCaesar to Pompey, C. Iii. 59

Roxol[-a]ni, a people of Scythia Europaea, bordering upon the Alani;their country, anciently called Roxolonia, is now _Red Russia_

R[)u]t[-e]ni, an ancient people of Gaul, to the north-west of the VolcaeArecomici, occupying the district now called Le Rauergne. Their capitalwas Segodunum, afterwards Ruteni, now Rhodes, G. I. 45; vii. 7, etc. 

S[=a]bis, _the Sambre_, a river of the Low Countries, which rises inPicardy, and falls into the Meuse at Namur, G. Ii. 16, 18; vi. 33

Sabura, general of king Juba, C. Ii. 38; his stratagem against Curio, C. Ii. 40; his death, C. Ii. 95

Sadales, the son of king Cotys, brings forces to Pompey, C. Iii. 4

Salassii, an ancient city of Piedmont, whose chief town was where now_Aosta_ is situate

Salluvii, _Sallyes_, a people of Gallia Narbonensis, about where _Aix_now is

Sal[=o]na, an ancient city of Dalmatia, and a Roman colony; the placewhere Dioclesian was born, and whither he retreated, after he hadresigned the imperial dignity

S[=a]lsus, a river of Hispania Baetica, _Rio Salado_, or _Guadajos_

S[)a]m[)a]r[:o]br[=i]va, _Amiens_, an ancient city of Gallia Belgica, enlarged and beautified by the emperor Antoninus Pius, now Amicus, thechief city of Picardy, on the river Somme; assembly of the, Gauls heldthere, G. V. 24

S[=a]nt[)o]nes, the ancient inhabitants of _Guienne_, or _Xantoigne_, G. I. 10

S[=a]rd[)i]n[)i]a, a large island in the Mediterranean, which in thetime of the Romans had forty-two cities, it now belongs to the Duke ofSavoy, with the title of king

S[=a]rm[=a]t[)i]a, a very large northern country, divided into SarmatiaAsiatica, containing _Tartary, Petigora, Circassia_, and the country ofthe _Morduitae_; and Sarmatia Europaea, containing _Russia_, part of_Poland, Prussia_, and _Lithuania_

Savus, the _Save_, a large river which rises in Upper Carniola, andfalls into the Danube at Belgrade

Scaeva, one of Caesar's centurions, displays remarkable valour, C. Iii. 5 3; his shield is pierced in two hundred and thirty places

Sc[=a]ldis, the _Scheld_, a noted river in the Low Countries, whichrises in Picardy, and washing several of the principal cities ofFlanders and Brabant in its course, falls into the German Ocean by twomouths, one retaining its own name, and the other called the _Honte_. Its whole course does not exceed a hundred and twenty miles. G. Vi. 33

Scandinav[)i]a, anciently a vast northern peninsula, containing what isyet called _Schonen_, anciently Scania, belonging to _Denmark_; and partof _Sweden_, _Norway_, and _Lapland_

Scipio, his opinion of Pompey and Caesar, C. I. 1, 21; his flight, C. Iii. 37

S[)e]d[=u]l[)i]us, general of the Lemovices; his death, G. Vii. 38

S[=e]d[=u]ni, a people of Gaul, to the south-east of the Lake of Geneva, occupying the upper part of the Valais. Their chief town was CivitusSedunorum, now _Sion_, G. Iii. I

S[=e]d[=u]s[)i]i, an ancient people of Germany, on the borders ofSuabia, G. I. 51

S[=e]gni, an ancient German nation, neighbours of the Condrusi, _Zulpich_

S[=e]g[=o]nt[)i][=a]ci, a people of ancient Britain, inhabiting aboutHolshot, in Hampshire, G. V. 21

Segovia, a city of Hispania Baetica, _Sagovia la Menos_

S[)e]g[=u]s[)i][=a]ni, a people of Gallia Celtica, about where _LionoisForest_ is now situate

Sen[)o]nes, an ancient nation of the Celtae, inhabiting the countryabout the _Senonois_, in Gaul

Sequ[)a]na, the _Seine_, one of the principal rivers of France, whichrising in the duchy of Burgundy, not far from a town of the same name, and running through Paris, and by Rouen, forms at Candebec a great armof the sea

Sequ[)a]ni, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, inhabiting the countrynow called the _Franche Comt['e]_, or the _Upper Burgundy_; they bringthe Germans into Gaul, G. Vi. 12; lose the chief power, _ibid_. 

Servilius the consul, C. Iii. 21

S[=e]s[=u]v[)i]i, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about _Seez_;they surrender to the Romans, G. Ii. 34

Sextus Bibaculus, sick in the camp, G. Vi. 38; fights bravely againstthe enemy, _ibid_. 

Sextus Caesar, C. Ii. 20

Sextus, Quintilius Varus, qaestor, C. I. 23; C. Ii. 28

Sib[=u]z[=a]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the countryaround the _Adour_; they surrender to the Romans, G. Iii. 27

Sicil[)i]a, _Sicily_, a large island in the Tyrrhene Sea, at thesouth-west point of Italy, formerly called the storehouse of the Romanempire, it was the first province the Romans possessed out of Italy, C. I. 30

S[)i]c[)o]ris, a river in Catalonia, the _Segre_

S[)i]g[)a]mbri, or S[)i]c[)a]mbri, an ancient people of Lower Germany, between the Maese and the Rhine, where _Cuelderland_ is; though by someplaced on the banks of the Maine, G. Iv. 18

Silicensis, a river of Hispania Baetica, _Rio de las Algamidas_. Othersthink it a corruption from _Singuli_

Sinuessa, a city of Campania, not far from the Save, an ancient Romancolony, now in a ruinous condition; _Rocca di Mondragon['e]_

Soldurii, G. Iii. 22

S[)o]t[)i][=a]tes, or Sontiates, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabitingthe country about _Aire_; conquered by Caesar Aquillus, G. Iii. 20, 21

Sp[=a]rta, a city of Peloponnesus, now called _Mucithra_, said to be asancient as the days of the patriarch Jacob

Spolet[)i]um, _Spoleto_, a city of great antiquity, of Umbria, in Italy, the capital of a duchy of the same name, on the river Tesino, where areyet some stately ruins of ancient Roman and Gothic edifices

Statius Marcus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, C. Iii. I 5

S[)u][=e]ss[)i][=o]nes, an ancient people of Gaul, _les Soissanois_; akindred tribe with the Remi, G. Ii. 3; surrender to Caesar, G. Iii. 13

Su[=e]vi, an ancient, great, and warlike people of Germany, whopossessed the greatest part of it, from the Rhine to the Elbe, butafterwards removed from the northern parts, and settled about theDanube; and some marched into Spain, where they established a kingdom, the greatest nation in Germany, G. I. 37, 51, 54; hold a levy againstthe Romans, G. Iv. 19; the Germans say that not even the gods are amatch for them, G. Iii. 7; the Ubii pay them tribute, G. Iv. 4

S[=u]lmo, an ancient city of Italy, _Sulmona_; its inhabitants declarein favour of Caesar, C. I. 18

Sulpicius, one of Caesar's lieutenants, stationed among the Aedui, C. I. 74

Supplications decreed in favour of Caesar on several occasions, G. Ii. 15; _ibid_. 35; iv. 38

Suras, one of the Aeduan nobles, taken prisoner, G. Viii. 45

Sylla, though a most merciless tyrant, left to the tribunes the right ofgiving protection, C. I. 5, 73

Syrac[=u]sae, _Saragusa_, once one of the noblest cities of Sicily, saidto have been built by Archias, a Corinthian, about seven hundred yearsbefore Christ. The Romans besieged and took it during the second Punicwar, on which occasion the great Archimedes was killed

S[=y]rtes, _the Deserts of Barbary_; also two dangerous sandy gulfs inthe Mediterranean, upon the coast of Barbary, in Africa, called the oneSyrtis Magna, now the _Gulf of Sidra_; the other Syrtis Parva, now the_Gulf of Capes_

T[)a]m[)e]sis, the _Thames_, a celebrated and well-known river of GreatBritain; Caesar crosses it, G. V. 18

Tan[)a]is, the _Don_, a very large river in Scythia, dividing Asia fromEurope. It rises in the province of Resan, in Russia, and flowingthrough Crim-Tartary, runs into the Maeotic Lake, near a city of thesame name, now in ruins

T[=a]rb[=e]lli, a people of ancient Gaul, near the Pyrenees, inhabitingabout _Ays_ and _Bayonne_, in the country of _Labourd_; they surrenderto Crassus, G. Iii. 27

Tarcundarius Castor, assists Pompey with three hundred cavalry, C. Iii. 4

Tarr[)a]c[=i]na, an ancient city of Italy, which still retains the samename

T[=a]rr[)a]co, _Tarragona_, a city of Spain, which in ancient time gavename to that part of it called Hispania Tarraconensis; by some said tobe built by the Scipios, though others say before the Roman conquest, and that they only enlarged it. It stands on the mouth of the riverTulcis, now _el Fracoli_, with a small haven on the Mediterranean; itsinhabitants desert to Caesar, C. I. 21, 60

Tar[=u]s[=a]tes, an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain; according tosome, _le Teursan_; they surrender to the Romans, G. Iii. 13, 23, 27

Tasg[=e]t[)i]us, chief of the Carnutes, slain by his countrymen, G. V. 25

Taur[=o]is, a fortress of the inhabitants of Massilia

Taurus, an island in the Adriatic Sea, unknown

Taurus Mons, the largest mountain in all Asia, extending from the Indianto the Aegean Seas, called by different names in different countries, viz. , Imaus, Caucasus, Caspius, Cerausius, and in Scripture, Ar[)a]rat. Herbert says it is fifty English miles over, and 1500 long

Taximagulus, one of the four kings or princes that reigned over Kent, G. V. 22

Tect[)o]s[)a]ges, a branch of the Volcae, G. Vi. 24

Tegea, a city of Africa, unknown

Tenchth[)e]ri, a people of ancient Germany, bordering on the Rhine, near_Overyssel_; they and the Usip[)e]tes arrive at the banks of the Rhine, iv. 4; cross that river by a stratagem, _ibid_. ; are defeated with greatslaughter, _ibid_. 15

Tergeste, a Roman colony, its inhabitants in the north of Italy cut offby an incursion, G. Viii. 24

Terni, an ancient Roman colony, on the river Nare, twelve miles fromSpol[=e]tum

Teutomatus, king of the Nitobriges, G. Vii. 31

Teut[)o]nes, or Teutoni, an ancient people bordering on the Cimbri, thecommon ancient name for all the Germans, whence they yet call themselves_Teutsche_, and their country _Teutschland_; they are repelled from theterritories of the Belgae, G. Ii. 4

Thebae, Thebes, a city of Boeotia, in Greece, said to have been built byCadmus, destroyed by Alexander the Great, but rebuilt, and now known bythe name of _Stives_; occupied by Kalenus, C. Iii. 55

Therm[)o]pylae, a famous pass on the great mountain Oeta, leading intoPhocis, in Achaia, now called _Bocca di Lupa_

Thessaly, a country of Greece, formerly a great part of Macedonia, nowcalled _Janna_; in conjunction with Aetolia, sends ambassadors toCaesar, C. Iii. 34; reduced by Caesar, _ibid_. 81

Thessalon[=i]ca, a chief city of Macedonia, now called _Salonichi_

Thracia, a large country of Europe, eastward from Macedonia, commonlycalled _Romania_, bounded by the Euxine and Aegean Seas

Th[=u]r[=i]i, or T[=u]r[=i]i, an ancient people of Italy, _TorreBrodogneto_

Tigur[=i]nus Pagus, one of the four districts into which the Helvetiiwere divided according to Caesar, the ancient inhabitants of the cantonof _Zurich_ in Switzerland, cut to pieces by Caesar, G. I. 12

Titus Ampius attempts sacrilege, but is prevented, C. Iii. 105

Tol[=o]sa, _Thoulouse_, a city of Aquitaine, of great antiquity, thecapital of Languedoc, on the Garonne

Toxandri, an ancient people of the Low Countries, about _Breda_, and_Gertruydenburgh_; but according to some, of the diocese of _Liege_

Tralles, an ancient city of Lydia in, Asia Minor, _Chara_, C. Iii. 105

Trebonius, one of Caesar's lieutenants, C. I. 36; torn down from thetribunal, C. Iii. 21; shows remarkable industry in repairing the works, C. Ii. 14; and humanity, C. Iii. 20

Trev[)i]ri, the people of _Treves_, or _Triers_, a very ancient city ofLower Germany, on the Moselle, said to have been built by Trebetas, thebrother of Ninus. It was made a Roman colony in the time of Augustus, and became afterwards the most famous city of Gallia Belgica. It was forsome time the seat of the western empire, but it is now only the seat ofthe ecclesiastical elector named from it, G. I. 37; surpass the rest ofthe Gauls in cavalry, G. Ii. 24; solicit the Germans to assist themagainst the Romans, G. V. 2, 55; their bravery, G. Viii. 25; theirdefeat, G. Vi. 8, vii. 63

Tr[)i]b[)o]ci, or Tr[)i]b[)o]ces, a people of ancient Germany, inhabiting the country of _Alsace_, G. I. 51

Tribunes of the soldiers and centurions desert to Caesar, C. I. 5

Tribunes (of the people) flee to Caesar, C. I. 5

Trin[)o]bantes, a people of ancient Britain, inhabitants of the countiesof _Middlesex_ and _Hertfordshire_, G. V. 20

Troja, _Troy_, a city of Phrygia, in Asia Minor, near Mount _Ida_, destroyed by the Greeks, after a ten years' siege

Tubero is prevented by Attius Varus from landing on the African coast, G. I. 31

Tulingi, an ancient people of Germany, who inhabited about where now_Stulingen_ in Switzerland is; border on the Helvetii, G. I. 5

Tungri, an ancient people inhabiting about where Tongres, in Liege, nowis

Tur[=o]nes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about _Tours_

Tusc[)i], or Hetrusci, the inhabitants of _Tuscany_, a very large andconsiderable region of Italy, anciently called Tyrrh[=e]nia, and Etruria

Ubii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, who inhabited about where_Cologne_ and the duchy of _Juliers_ now are. They seek protection fromthe Romans against the Suevi, G. Iv. 3; tributary to the Suevi, _ibid_. ;declare in favour of Caesar, G. Iv. 9, 14

Ulcilles Hirrus, one of Pompey's officers, C. I. 15

Ulla, or Ulia, a town in Hispania Baetica, in regard to whose situationgeographers are not agreed; some making it _Monte Major_, others_Vaena_, others _Vilia_

Umbria, a large country of Italy, on both sides of the Apennines

Unelli, an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain, G. Ii. 34

Urbigenus, one of the cantons of the Helvetii, G. I. 27

Usip[)e]tes, an ancient people of Germany, who frequently changed theirhabitation

Usita, a town unknown

Uxellod[=u]num, a town in Gaul, whose situation is not known; accordingto some, _Ussoldun_ besieged and stormed, G. Viii. 32

Vah[)a]lis, the _Waal_, the middle branch of the Rhine, which, passingby Nim[)e]guen, falls into the Meuse, above Gorcum, G. Iv. 10

Valerius Flaccus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, C. I. 30; his death, C. Iii. 5 3

Val[=e]t[)i][)a]cus, the brother of Cotus, G. Vii. 32

Vangi[)o]nes, an ancient people of Germany, about the city of _Worms_, G. I. 51

V[=a]r[=e]nus, a centurion, his bravery, G. V. 44

Varro, one of Pompey's lieutenants, C. I. 38; his feelings towardsCaesar, C. Ii. 17; his cohorts driven out by the inhabitants of Carmona, C. Ii. 19; his surrender, C. Ii. 20

V[=a]rus, the _Var_, a river of Italy, that flows into the MediterraneanSea, C. I. 87

Varus, one of Pompey's lieutenants, is afraid to oppose Juba. C. Ii. 44;his flight, C. Ii. 34

Vatinius, one of Caesar's followers, C. Iii. 100

V[)e]launi, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about _Velai_

Vellaunod[=u]num, a town in Gaul, about which geographers are muchdivided; some making it _Auxerre_, others _Chasteau Landon_, others_Villeneuve_ in Lorraine, others _Veron_. It surrenders, G. Vii. 11

Velocasses, an ancient people of Normandy, about _Rouen_, G. Ii. 4

V[)e]n[)e]ti, this name was anciently given as well to the _Venetians_as to the people of _Vannes_, in Bretagne, in Gaul, for which last itstands in Caesar. They were powerful by sea, G. Iii. 1; their senate isput to death by Caesar, G. Iii. 16; they are completely defeated, _ibid_. 15; and surrender, _ibid_. 16

Veragri, a people of Gallia Lugdunensls, whose chief town was Aguanum, now _St. Maurice_, G. Iii. 1

Verb[)i]g[)e]nus, or Urb[)i]g[)e]nus Pagus, a nation or canton of theHelvetians, inhabiting the country in the neighbourhood of _Orbe_

Vercelli Campi, the _Plains of Vercellae_, famous for a victory theRomans obtained there over the Cimbri. The city of that name is inPiedmont on the river Sesia, on the borders of the duchy of Milan

Vercingetorix, the son of Celtillus, receives the title of king from hisfollowers, G. Vii. 4; his plans, G. Vii. 8; is accused of treachery, G. Vii. 20; his acts, G. Vii. 8; surrenders to Caesar, G. Vii. 82

Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, one of the Gallic leaders, G. Vii. 76;taken prisoner, G. Vii. 88

Vergobr[)e]tus, the name given to the chief magistrate among the Aedui, G. I. 16

V[)e]r[)u]doct[)i]us, one of the Helvetian embassy who requestpermission from Caesar to pass through the province, G. I. 7

Veromand[)u]i, a people of Gallia Belgica, whose country, now a part ofPicardy, is still called _Vermandois_

Ver[=o]na, a city of Lombardy, the capital of a province of the samename, on the river Adige, said to have been built by the Gauls twohundred and eighty-two years before Christ. It has yet several remainsof antiquity

Vertico, one of the Nervii. He was in Cicero's camp when it was attackedby the Eburones, and prevailed on a slave to carry a letter to Caesarcommunicating that information, G. V. 49

Vertiscus, general of the Remi, G. Viii. 12

Vesontio, _Besan[, c]on_, the capital of the Sequani, now the chief cityof Burgundy, G. I. 38

Vett[=o]nes, a people of Spain, inhabiting the province of_Estremadura_, C. I. 38

Vibo, a town in Italy, not far from the Sicilian Straits, _Bibona_

Vibullius Rufus, one of Pompey's followers, C. I. 15

Vienna, a city of Narbonese Gaul, _Vienne in Dauphiny_, G. Vii. 9

Vindel[)i]ci, an ancient people of Germany, inhabitants of the countryof Vindelicia, otherwise called Raetia secunda

Viridomarus, a nobleman among the Aedui, G. Vii. 38

Viridorix, king of the Unelli, G. Iii. 17

Vist[)u]la, the _Weichsel_, a famous river of Poland, which rises in theCarpathian mountains, in Upper Silesia, and falls into the Baltic, notfar from Dantzic, by three mouths

Visurgis, the _Weser_, a river of Lower Germany, which rises inFranconia, and, among other places of note, passing by Bremen, fallsinto the German Ocean, not far from the mouth of the Elbe, between thatand the Ems

V[)o]c[=a]tes, a people of Gaul, on the confines of the Lapurdenses, G. Iii. 23

Vocis, the king of the Norici, G. I. 58

V[)o]contii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about _Die_, inDauphiny, and _Vaison_ in the county of Venisse

Vog[)e]sus Mons, the mountain of _Vauge_ in Lorrain, or, according toothers, _de Faucilles_, G. Iv. 10

Volcae Arecom[)i]ci, and Tectosages, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the _Upper_ and _Lower Languedoc_

Volcae, a powerful Gallic tribe, divided into two branches, theTectosages and Arecomici, G. Vii. 7

Volcatius Tullus, one of Caesar's partisans, C. Iii. 52