For the reader: The notation [oe] is used in this text to indicate thepresence of the oe-ligature in the original text. Further transcriber'snotes to be found at the end of the text. 

[Illustration: THE CATHEDRAL OF NOTRE DAME AT RHEIMS]

WORLD'S WAR EVENTS

 RECORDED BY STATESMEN · COMMANDERS HISTORIANS AND BY MEN WHO FOUGHT OR SAW THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS

COMPILED AND EDITED BY

FRANCIS J. REYNOLDS

FORMER REFERENCE LIBRARIAN · LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

AND

ALLEN L. CHURCHILL

 ASSOCIATE EDITOR "THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR" ASSOCIATE EDITOR "THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA"

VOLUME I

[Illustration]

 P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY NEW YORK

Copyright 1919

BY P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY

WORLD'S WAR EVENTS

VOLUME I

 BEGINNING WITH THE CAUSES OF THE WAR AND THE INVASION OF BELGIUM IN 1914 AND CARRYING THE HISTORY OF THE WAR TO THE CLOSE OF 1915

CONTENTS

 ARTICLE PAGE

 I. WHAT CAUSED THE WAR 7 _Baron Beyens_

 II. THE DEFENSE OF LIÈGE 41 _Charles Bronne_

 III. THE GREAT RETREAT 62 _Sir John French_

 IV. THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 73 _Sir John French_

 V. HOW THE FRENCH FOUGHT 83 _French Official Account_

 VI. THE RACE FOR THE CHANNEL 96 _French Official Account_

 VII. THE LAST DITCH IN BELGIUM 108 _Arno Dosch_

 VIII. WHY TURKEY ENTERED THE WAR 125 _Roland G. Usher_

 IX. THE FALKLAND SEA FIGHT 142 _A. N. Hilditch_

 X. CRUISE OF THE EMDEN 176 _Captain Mücke_

 XI. CAPTURE OF TSING-TAO 198 _A. N. Hilditch_

 XII. GALLIPOLI 221 _A. John Gallishaw_

 XIII. GAS: SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES 240 _Colonel E. D. Swinton_

 XIV. THE CANADIANS AT YPRES 248 _By the Canadian Record Officer_

 XV. SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA 277 _Judicial Decision by Judge J. M. Mayer_

 XVI. MOUNTAIN WARFARE 313 _Howard C. Felton_

 XVII. THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE OF 1915 322 _Official Account of the French Headquarters Staff_

 XVIII. THE TRAGEDY OF EDITH CAVELL 348 _Brand Whitlock_

 XIX. GALLIPOLI ABANDONED 366 _General Sir Charles C. Monro_

 XX. THE DEATH-SHIP IN THE SKY 375 _Perriton Maxwell_

WHAT CAUSED THE WAR

BARON BEYENS

The National Review, June, 1916. 

I

[Sidenote: Political designs of Francis Ferdinand. ]

The Archduke Francis Ferdinand will go down to posterity without havingyielded up his secret. Great political designs have been ascribed tohim, mainly on the strength of his friendship with William II. What dowe really know about him? He was strong-willed and obstinate, veryClerical, very Austrian, disliking the Hungarians to such an extent thathe kept their statesmen at arm's-length, and having no love for Italy. He has been credited with sympathies towards the Slav elements of theEmpire; it has been asserted that he dreamt of setting up, in place ofthe dual monarchy, a "triune State, " in which the third factor wouldhave been made up for the most part of Slav provinces carved out of theKingdom of St. Stephen. Immediately after he had been murdered, the_Vossische Zeitung_ refuted this theory with arguments which seemed tome thoroughly sound. 

The Archduke, said the Berlin newspaper, was too keen-witted not to seethat he would thus be creating two rivals for Austria instead of one, and that the Serb populations would come within the orbit of Belgraderather than of Vienna. Serbia would become the Piedmont of the Balkans;she would draw to herself the Slavs of the Danube valley by a process ofcrystallization similar to that which brought about Italian unity. 

[Sidenote: Army and Navy reorganized. ]

From year to year the Archduke had acquired more and more weight in thegovernance of the Empire, in proportion as his uncle's will grew weakerbeneath the burden of advancing age. Thus he had succeeded in hisefforts to provide Austria-Hungary with a new navy, the counterpart, ona more modest scale, of the German fleet, and to reorganize theeffective army, here again taking Germany for his model. Among certaincliques, he was accused of not keeping enough in the background, ofshowing little tact or consideration in the manner of thrusting asidethe phantom Emperor, who was gently gliding into the winter of the yearsat Schönbrunn amid the veneration of his subjects of every race. 

Another charge was that he appointed too many of his creatures toimportant civil and military posts. 

[Sidenote: Antagonism of Russia and Austria. ]

We may well believe that this prince, observing the gradual decay of themonarchy, tried to restore its vigour, and that his first thought was tohold with a firm grasp, even before assuming the Imperial crown, thecluster of nationalities, mutually hostile and always discontented, thatgo to make up the Dual Empire. So far as foreign relations areconcerned, we may assume that he was bent on winning her a place in thefirst rank of Powers; that he wished, above all, to see her predominantall along the Danube and in the Balkans; that he even aimed at givingher the road to Salonika and the Levant, though it were at the price ofa collision with Russia. This antagonism between the two neighbourEmpires must have often been among the topics of his conversations withWilliam II. 

The Archduke needed military glory, prestige won on the battle-field, inorder to seat his consort firmly on the throne and make his childrenheirs to the Cæsars. He had been suspected, both in Austria and abroad, of not wishing to observe the family compact which he had signed at thetime of his marriage with Countess Sophie Chotek. It was thought that heperhaps reserved the right to declare it null and void, in view of theconstraint that had been put upon him. The successive honours that haddrawn the Duchess of Hohenberg from the obscurity in which themorganatic wife of a German prince is usually wrapped, and had broughther near to the steps of the throne, showed clearly that her rise wouldnot stop half-way. 

[Sidenote: Domestic life of the Archduke. ]

The Archduke, like William II himself, was reputed to be an exemplaryfather and husband. He was one of those princes who adore their ownchildren, but, under the spur of political ambition, are very prone tosend the children of others to the shambles. A fine theme for Socialistand Republican preachers to enlarge upon!

I often met the heir to the Imperial crown, especially at Vienna in1910, where I had the honour of accompanying my Sovereign, and two yearslater at Munich, the Prince Regent's funeral. 

On each occasion this Hapsburg, with his heavy features, his scowlingexpression, and his rather corpulent figure (quite different from theslim build characteristic of his line), struck me as a singular type. His face was certainly not sympathetic, nor was his manner engaging. TheDuchess of Hohenberg, whom, after having known her as a little girl whenher father was Austrian Minister at Brussels, I found gracefully doingthe honours in the Belvedere Palace, had retained in her high stationthe genial simplicity of the Chotek family. This probably did notprevent her from cherishing the loftiest ambitions for herself, andabove all for her eldest son, and from coveting the glory of the doublecrown. 

II

[Sidenote: Assassination of Francis Ferdinand. ]

The news that an assassin's hand had struck down the Archduke and hiswife, inseparable even in death, burst upon Berlin on the afternoon ofSunday, June 28, like an unexpected thunderclap in the midst of a calmsummer's day. I went over at once to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, inorder to express all the horror that I felt at this savage drama. CountSzögyen, the senior member of the diplomatic corps, was on the eve ofresigning the post that he had held for twenty years, honoured by allhis colleagues. It was whispered that his removal had been asked for bythe Archduke, who was anxious to introduce young blood into thediplomatic service. I found the Ambassador quite overcome by theterrible news. He seemed stricken with grief at the thought of his agedSovereign, who had already lost so many of his nearest and dearest, andof the Dual Empire, robbed of its most skillful pilot, and with no oneto steer it now but an octogenarian leaning on a youth of twenty-six. M. Cambon had come to the Embassy at the same time, and we left togetherdiscussing the results, still impossible to foresee clearly, that thisfatality might have for European affairs. 

[Sidenote: Serajevo tragedy a menace. ]

From the very next day the tone of the Berlin Press, in commenting onthe Serajevo tragedy, was full of menace. It expected the Vienna Cabinetto send to Belgrade an immediate request for satisfaction, if Serbiansubjects, as it was believed, were among those who had devised andcarried out the plot. But how far would this satisfaction go, and inwhat form would it be demanded? There was the rub. The report, issued bythe semi-official _Lokalanzeiger_, of a pressure exerted by theAustro-Hungarian Minister, with a view to making the Serbian Governmentinstitute proceedings against the anarchist societies of which theArchduke and his wife had been the victims, surprised no one, but wasnot confirmed. On the other hand, a softer breeze soon blew from Viennaand Budapest, and under its influence the excitement of the Berlinnewspapers suddenly abated. An order seemed to have been issued: therage and fluster of the public were to be allowed to cool down. TheAustro-Hungarian Government, so we were informed by the news agencies, were quietly taking steps to prosecute the murderers. Count Berchtold, in speaking to the diplomatic corps at Vienna, and Count Tisza, inaddressing Parliament at Budapest, used reassuring language, whichraised hopes of a peaceful solution. 

[Sidenote: Opinion is moderate in Berlin. ]

The Wilhelmstrasse also expressed itself in very measured terms on theguarantees that would be demanded from Serbia. Herr Zimmermann, withoutknowing (so he said to me) what decision had been arrived at in Vienna, thought that no action would be taken in Belgrade until theAustro-Hungarian Government had collected the proofs of the complicityof Serbian subjects or societies in the planning of the Serajevo crime. He had made a similar statement to the Russian Ambassador, who hadhastened to impart to him his fears for the peace of Europe, in theevent of any attempt to coerce Serbia into proceeding against the secretsocieties, if they were accused of intrigues against the AustrianGovernment in Bosnia and Croatia. Herr Zimmermann declared to M. Sverbeeff that, in his opinion, no better advice could be given to theSerbian Government than this: that it should put a stop to the nefariouswork of these societies and punish the accomplices of the Archduke'sassassins. The moderation of this remark fairly reflected the generalstate of public opinion in Berlin. 

[Sidenote: Kaiser William's opinion. ]

But what of the Emperor, the Archduke's personal friend? Would not hisgrief and anger find voice in ringing tones? All eyes were turnedtowards Kiel, where the fatal news reached William II while he wastaking part in a yacht race on board his own clipper. He turned pale, and was heard to murmur: "So my work of the past twenty-five years willhave to be started all over again!" Enigmatic words which may beinterpreted in various ways! To the British Ambassador, who was also atKiel, with the British squadron returning from the Baltic, he unburdenedhimself in more explicit fashion: "Es ist ein Verbrechen gegen dasDeutschtum" ("It is a crime against Germanity"). By this he probablymeant that Germany, feeling her own interests assailed by the Serajevocrime, would make common cause with Austria to exact a full retribution. With more self-control than usual, however, he abstained from allfurther public utterances on the subject. 

It had been announced that he would go to Vienna to attend theArchduke's funeral. What were the motives that prevented him fromoffering to the dead man this last token of a friendship which, at firstmerely political, had become genuine and even tender, with a touch ofpatronage characteristic of the Emperor?

[Sidenote: William II not at the funeral. ]

He excused himself on the ground of some slight ailment. The truth is, no doubt, that he was disgusted with the wretched stickling foretiquette shown by the Grand Chamberlain of the Viennese Court, thePrince di Montenuovo, who refused to celebrate with fitting splendourthe obsequies of the late heir apparent and his morganatic wife. Underthese circumstances, Vienna could have no desire either for the presenceof William II or for his criticisms. 

[Sidenote: The Kaiser goes to Norway. ]

At the beginning of July, the Emperor left for his accustomed cruisealong the Norwegian coast, and in Berlin we breathed more freely. If hecould withdraw so easily from the centre of things, it was a sign thatthe storm-clouds that had nearly burst over Serbia were also passing offfrom the Danube valley. Such, I fancy, was the view taken by the BritishGovernment, for its Ambassador, who was already away on leave, was notsent back to Berlin. Other diplomats, among them the Russian Ambassador, took their annual holiday as usual. But the Emperor, in the remotefiords of Norway, was all the time posted up in the secret designs ofthe Vienna Cabinet. The approaching ultimatum to Serbia was telegraphedto him direct by his Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, a veryactive worker, who strenuously advocated a policy of hostility towardsRussia, and from the first moment had wanted war. 

[Sidenote: The Kaiser decides. ]

We may assume that the Emperor, if his mind was not already made up atKiel, came to a decision during his Norwegian cruise. His departure forthe north had been merely a snare, a device for throwing Europe and theTriple Entente off the scent, and for lulling them into a falsesecurity. While the world imagined that he was merely seeking to soothehis nerves and recruit his strength with the salt sea breezes, he wasbiding his time for a dramatic reappearance on the stage of events, allowing the introductory scenes to be played in his absence. 

III

During the first half of July, my colleagues and I at Berlin did notlive in a fool's paradise. As the deceptive calm caused by Vienna'ssilence was prolonged, a latent, ill-defined uneasiness took hold of usmore and more. Yet we were far from anticipating that in the space of afew days we should be driven into the midst of a diplomatic maelstrom, in which, after a week of intense anguish, we should look on, mute andhelpless, at the shipwreck of European peace and of all our hopes. 

[Sidenote: Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. ]

The ultimatum, sent in the form of a Note by Baron von Giesl to theSerbian Cabinet on July 23, was not disclosed by the Berlin newspapersuntil the following day, in their morning editions. This bolt from theblue proved more alarming than anything we had dared to imagine. Theshock was so unexpected that certain journals, losing their composure, seemed to regard the Vienna Cabinet's arraignment as having overshot themark. "Austria-Hungary, " said the _Vossische Zeitung_, "will have tojustify the grave charges that she makes against the Serbian Governmentand people by publishing the results of the preliminary investigationsat Serajevo. "

[Sidenote: Russia would defend Serbia. ]

My own conviction, shared by several of my colleagues, was that theAustrian and Hungarian statesmen could not have brought themselves torisk such a blow at the Balkan kingdom, without having consulted theircolleagues at Berlin and ascertained that the Emperor William wouldsanction the step. His horror of regicides and his keen sense ofdynastic brotherhood might explain why he left his ally a free hand, inspite of the danger of provoking a European conflict. That danger wasonly too real. Not for one moment did I suppose that Russia would proveso careless of Serbia's fate as to put up with this daring assault onthe latter's sovereignty and independence; that the St. PetersburgCabinet would renounce the principle of "The Balkans for the Balkannations, " proclaimed to the Duma two months before by M. Sazonoff, inshort, that the Russian people would disown the ancient ties of bloodthat united it with the Slav communities of the Balkan peninsula. 

The pessimistic feeling of the diplomatic corps was increased on thefollowing day, the 25th, by the language addressed to it at theWilhelmstrasse. Herren von Jagow and Zimmermann said that they had notknown beforehand the contents of the Austrian Note. This was a merequibble: they had not known its actual wording, I grant, but they hadcertainly been apprised of its tenor. They hastened to add, by the way, that the Imperial Government approved of its ally's conduct, and did notconsider the tone of its communication unduly harsh. The Berlin Press, still with the exception of the Socialist organs, had recovered from itsastonishment of the day before; it joined in the chorus of the Viennaand Budapest newspapers, from which it gave extracts, and faced theprospect of a war with perfect calm, while expressing the hope that itwould remain localized. 

[Sidenote: No signs of peaceful settlement. ]

In comparison with the attitude of the German Government and Press, thesigns pointing to a peaceful settlement seemed faint indeed. They allcame from outside Germany, from the impressions recorded in foreigntelegrams. Public opinion in Europe could not grasp the need for suchhectoring methods of obtaining satisfaction, when there was no case forrefusing discussion on the normal diplomatic lines. It seemed impossiblethat Count Berchtold should ignore the general movement of reproof whichappeared spontaneously everywhere but in Berlin against his ultimatum. Amoderate claim would have seemed just; but Serbia could not be asked toaccept a demand for so heavy an atonement, couched in a form of suchunexampled brutality. 

[Sidenote: Key to the situation in Berlin. ]

The more I reflected on the ghastly situation created by the collusionof German and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, the more certain did I feelthat the key to that situation (as M. Sazonoff said later) lay inBerlin, and that there was no need to look further for the solution ofthe problem. If, however, the choice between peace and war was left tothe discretion of the Emperor William, whose influence over his ally inVienna had always overruled that of others, then, considering what Iknew as to His Majesty's personal inclinations and the plans of theGeneral Staff, the upshot of it all was no longer in doubt, and no hopeof a peaceful arrangement could any longer be entertained. Icommunicated this dismal forecast to the French Ambassador, whom I wentto see on the evening of the 25th. Like myself, M. Cambon laboured underno illusions. That very night I wrote to my Government, in order toacquaint it with my fears and urge it to be on its guard. This report, dated the 26th, I entrusted, as a measure of precaution, to one of mysecretaries, who at once left for Brussels. Early next morning, mydispatch was in the hands of the Belgian Foreign Minister. 

[Sidenote: War aimed at Russia and France. ]

The ultimatum to Serbia [it ran] is a blow contrived by Vienna andBerlin, or rather, contrived here and carried out at Vienna. Requitalfor the assassination of the Austrian heir apparent and the Pan-Serbpropaganda serves as a stalking-horse. The real aim, apart from thecrushing of Serbia and the stifling of Jugo-Slav aspirations, is to deala deadly thrust at Russia and France, with the hope that England willstand aside from the struggle. In order to vindicate this theory, I begto remind you of the view prevailing in the German General Staff, namely, that a war with France and Russia is unavoidable and close athand--a view which the Emperor has been induced to share. This war, eagerly desired by the military and Pan-German party, might beundertaken to-day under conditions extremely favourable for Germany, conditions that are not likely to arise again for some time to come. 

After a summary of the situation and of the problems that it raised, myreport concluded as follows:

 We, too, have to ask ourselves these harassing questions, and keep ourselves ready for the worst; for the European conflict that has always been talked about, with the hope that it would never break out, is to-day becoming a grim reality. 

[Sidenote: Dangers for Belgium. ]

 The worst contingencies that occurred to me, as a Belgian, were the violation of a part of our territory and the duty that might fall upon our soldiers of barring the way to the belligerents. In view of the vast area over which a war between France and Germany would be fought, dared we hope that Belgium would be safe from any attack by the German army, from any attempt to use her strategic routes for offensive purposes? I could not bring myself to believe that she would be so fortunate. But between such tentatives and a thoroughgoing invasion of my country, plotted a long time in advance and carried out before the real operations of the war had begun, there was a wide gulf, a gulf that I never thought the Imperial Government capable of leaping over with a light heart, because of the European complications which so reckless a disdain for treaties would not fail to involve. 

IV

Until the end of the crisis, the idea of a preventive war continuallyrecurred to my mind. Other heads of legations, however, while sharingmy anxieties on this point, did not agree with me as to thepremeditation of which I accused the Emperor and the military chiefs. Iwas not content with putting my questions to the French Ambassador, whose unerring judgment always carried great weight with me. I alsovisited his Italian colleague, an astute diplomat, thoroughly versed inGerman statecraft. He had always put me in mind of those dexterousagents employed by the sixteenth-century Italian republics. 

[Sidenote: Signor Bollati's views. ]

[Sidenote: Germany and Austria confident. ]

According to Signor Bollati, the German Government, agreeing inprinciple with the Vienna Cabinet as to the necessity for chastisingSerbia, had not known beforehand the terms of the Austrian Note, theviolence of which was unprecedented in the language of Chancelleries. Vienna, as well as Berlin, was convinced that Russia, in spite of theofficial assurances that had recently passed between the Tsar and M. Poincaré regarding the complete readiness of the French and Russianarmies, was not in a position to enter on a European war, and that shewould not dare to embark upon so hazardous an adventure. Internaltroubles, revolutionary intrigues, incomplete armaments, inadequatemeans of communication--all these reasons would compel the RussianGovernment to be an impotent spectator of Serbia's undoing. The sameconfidence reigned in the German and Austrian capitals as regards, notthe French army, but the spirit prevailing among Government circles inParis. 

At present [added the Ambassador] feeling runs so high in Vienna thatall calm reflection goes by the board. Moreover, in seeking toannihilate Serbia's military power, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet ispursuing a policy of personal revenge. It cannot realize the mistakesthat it made during the Balkan War, or remain satisfied with thepartial successes then gained with our aid--successes that, whateverjudgment may be passed upon them, were certainly diplomatic victories. All that Count Berchtold sees to-day is Serbia's insolence and thecriticism he has had to endure even in Austria. By this bold stroke, very unexpected from a man of his stamp, he hopes to turn the criticisminto applause. 

The Ambassador held that Berlin had false ideas as to the course thatthe Tsar's Government would adopt. The latter would find itself forcedinto drawing the sword, in order to maintain its prestige in the Slavworld. Its inaction, in face of Austria's entry into the field, would beequivalent to suicide. Signor Bollati also gave me to understand that awidespread conflict would not be popular in Italy. The Italian peoplehad no concern with the overthrow of the Russian power, which wasAustria's enemy; it wished to devote all its attention to otherproblems, more absorbing from its own point of view. 

[Sidenote: Vienna welcomes war on Serbia. ]

The blindness of the Austrian Cabinet with regard to Russianintervention has been proved by the correspondence, since published, ofthe French and British representatives at Vienna. The Viennese populacewas beside itself with joy at the announcement of an expedition againstSerbia, which, it felt sure, would be a mere military parade. Not for asingle night were Count Berchtold's slumbers disturbed by the vision ofthe Russian peril. He is, indeed, at all times a buoyant soul, who canhappily mingle the distractions of a life of pleasure with the heavyresponsibilities of power. His unvarying confidence was shared by theGerman Ambassador, his most trusted mentor. We can hardly suppose thatthe Austrian Minister shut his eyes altogether to the possibility of astruggle with the Slav world. Having Germany as his partner, however, he determined, with the self-possession of a fearless gambler, toproceed with the game. 

At Berlin, the theory that Russia was incapable of facing a conflictreigned supreme, not only in the official world and in society, butamong all the manufacturers who made a specialty of war material. 

[Sidenote: Berlin believes Russia weak. ]

Herr Krupp von Bohlen, who was more entitled to give an opinion than anyother of this class, declared on July 28 that the Russian artillery wasneither efficient nor complete, while that of the German army had neverbefore been so superior to all its rivals. It would be madness onRussia's part, he inferred, to take the field against Germany underthese conditions. 

V

The foreign diplomatic corps was kept in more or less profound ignoranceas to the _pourparlers_ carried on since the 24th by the ImperialForeign Office with the Triple Entente Cabinets. Nevertheless, to thediplomats who were continually going over to the Wilhelmstrasse fornews, the crisis was set forth in a light very favourable to Austria andGermany, in order to influence the views of the Governments which theyrepresented. Herr von Stumm, the departmental head of the politicalbranch, in a brief interview that I had with him on the 26th, summed uphis exposition in these words: "Everything depends on Russia. " I shouldrather have thought that everything depended on Austria, and on the wayin which she would carry out her threats against Serbia. 

On the following day I was received by Herr Zimmermann, who adopted thesame line of argument, following it in all its bearings from the originof the dispute. 

It was not at our prompting [he said], or in accordance with our advice, that Austria took the action that you know of towards the BelgradeCabinet. The answer was unsatisfactory, and to-day Austria ismobilizing. She can no longer draw back without risking a collapse athome as well as a loss of influence abroad. It is now a question of lifeand death to her. She must put a stop to the unscrupulous propagandawhich, by raising revolt among the Slav provinces of the Danube valley, is leading towards her internal disintegration. Finally, she must exacta signal revenge for the assassination of the Archduke. For all thesereasons Serbia is to receive, by means of a military expedition, a sternand salutary lesson. An Austro-Serbian War is, therefore, impossible toavoid. 

[Sidenote: Attempts to limit conflict. ]

England has asked us to join with her, France, and Italy, in order toprevent the conflict from spreading and a war from breaking out betweenAustria and Russia. Our answer was that we should be only too glad tohelp in limiting the area of the conflagration, by speaking in a pacificsense to Vienna and St. Petersburg; but that we could not use ourinfluence with Austria to restrain her from inflicting an exemplarypunishment on Serbia. We have promised to help and support our Austrianallies, if any other nation should try to hamper them in this task. Weshall keep that promise. 

If Russia mobilizes her army, we shall at once mobilize ours, and thenthere will be a general war, a war that will set ablaze all CentralEurope and even the Balkan peninsula, for the Rumanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Turks will not be able to resist the temptation to comein. 

As I remarked yesterday to M. Boghitchevitch [the former Serbian Chargéd'Affaires, who was on a flying visit to Berlin, where he had beengreatly appreciated during the Balkan War], the best advice I can giveSerbia is that she should make no more than a show of resistance toAustria, and should come to terms as soon as possible, by accepting allthe conditions of the Vienna Cabinet. I added, in speaking to him, thatif a universal war broke out and went in favor of the Triplice, Serbiawould probably cease to exist as a nation; she would be wiped off themap of Europe. I still hope, though, that such a widespread conflict maybe avoided, and that we shall succeed in inducing Russia not tointervene on Serbia's behalf. Remember that Austria is determined torespect Serbia's integrity, once she has obtained satisfaction. 

I pointed out to the Under-Secretary that the Belgrade Cabinet's reply, according to some of my colleagues who had read it, was, apart from afew unimportant restrictions, an unqualified surrender to Austria'sdemands. Herr Zimmermann said that he had no knowledge of this reply (ithad been handed in two days before to the Austrian Minister atBelgrade!) and that, in any case, there was no longer any possibility ofpreventing an Austro-Hungarian military demonstration. 

[Sidenote: Serbian reply. ]

The Serbian document was not published by the Berlin newspapers untilthe 29th. On the previous day they all reproduced a telegram fromVienna, stating that this apparent submission was altogether inadequate. The prompt concessions made by the Pasitch Cabinet, concessions that hadnot been anticipated abroad, failed to impress Germany. She persisted inseeing only with Austria's eyes. 

[Sidenote: Zimmermann's arguments. ]

Herr Zimmermann's arguments held solely on the hypothesis that, in theaction brought by Austria against Serbia, no Power had the right tocome forward as counsel for the defendant, or to interfere in the trialat all. This claim amounted to depriving Russia of her historic rôle inthe Balkans. Carried to its logical conclusion, the theory meantcondemning unheard every small State that should be unfortunate enoughto have a dispute with a great Power. According to the principles of theBerlin Cabinet, the great Power should be allowed, without let orhindrance, to proceed to the execution of its weak opponent. England, therefore, would have had no right to succor Belgium when the latter wasinvaded by Germany, any more than Russia had a right to protect Serbiafrom the Austrian menace. 

Russia, it was asserted at the Wilhelmstrasse, ought to be satisfiedwith the assurance that Austria would not impair the territorialintegrity of Serbia or mar her future existence as an independent State. What a hollow mockery such a promise would seem, when the whole countryhad been ravaged by fire and sword! Surely it was decreed that, afterthis "exemplary punishment, " Serbia should become the lowly vassal ofher redoubtable neighbour, living a life that was no life, cowed by thejealous eye of the Austrian Minister--really the Austrian Viceroy--atBelgrade. Had not Count Mensdorff declared to Sir Edward Grey thatbefore the Balkan War Serbia was regarded as gravitating towards theDual Monarchy's sphere of influence? A return to the past, to the tamedeference of King Milan, was the least that Austria would exact. 

[Sidenote: German opinion is misled. ]

The version given out by the Imperial Chancellery, besides beingintended to enlighten foreign Governments, had a further end in view. Repeated _ad nauseam_ by the Press, it aimed at misleading Germanpublic opinion. From the very opening of the crisis, Herr vonBethmann-Hollweg and his colleagues strove, with all the ingenuity attheir command, to hoodwink their countrymen, to shuffle the cards, tothrow beforehand on Russia, in case the situation should grow worse, theodium of provocation and the blame for the disaster, to represent thatPower as meddling with a police inquiry that did not concern her in theleast. This cunning man[oe]uvre resulted in making all Germany, withoutdistinction of class or party, respond to her Emperor's call at thedesired moment, since she was persuaded (as I have explained in aprevious chapter) that she was the object of a premeditated attack byTsarism. 

VI

[Sidenote: German diplomacy. ]

The game of German diplomacy during these first days of the crisis, July24 to 28, has already been revealed. At first inclined to bludgeon, itsoon came to take things easily, even affecting a certain optimism, andby its passive resistance bringing to naught all the efforts and all theproposals of the London, Paris, and St. Petersburg Cabinets. To gaintime, to lengthen out negotiations, seems to have been the task imposedupon Austria-Hungary's accomplice in order to promote rapid action bythe Dual Monarchy, and to face the Triple Entente with irrevocabledeeds, namely the occupation of Belgrade and the surrender of theSerbians. But things did not go as Berlin and Vienna had hoped, and thedetermined front shown by Russia, who in answer to the partialmobilization of Austria mobilized her army in four southern districts, gave food for reflection to the tacticians of the Wilhelmstrasse. Theirlanguage and their frame of mind grew gentler to a singular degree onthe fifth day, July 28. It may be recalled, in passing, that in 1913, during the Balkan hostilities, Austria and Russia had likewise proceededto partial mobilizations; yet these steps had not made them come toblows or even brought them to the verge of hostilities. 

[Sidenote: The Kaiser returns to Berlin. ]

On the evening of the 26th the Emperor's return was announced in Berlin. Why did he come back so suddenly? I think I am justified in saying that, at this news, the general feeling among the actors and spectators of thedrama was one of grave anxiety. Our hearts were heavy within us; we hada foreboding that the decisive moment was drawing near. It was the sameat the Wilhelmstrasse. To the British Chargé d'Affaires Herr vonZimmermann frankly confessed his regret at this move, on which WilliamII had decided without consulting any one. 

Nevertheless, our fears at first seemed to be unwarranted. The 28th wasmarked by a notable loosening of Germany's stiff-necked attitude. TheBritish Ambassador, who had returned to Berlin on the previous day, wassummoned in the evening by the Chancellor. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, while rejecting the conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey, promised touse his good offices to induce Russia and Austria to discuss theposition in an amicable fashion. "A war between the Great Powers must beaverted, " were his closing words. 

It is highly probable that the Chancellor at that time sincerely wantedto keep the peace, and his first efforts, when he saw the danger comingnearer and nearer, succeeded in curbing the Emperor's impatience forforty-eight hours. The telegram sent by William II to the Tsar on theevening of the 28th is friendly, almost reassuring: "Bearing in mindthe cordial friendship that has united us two closely for a long timepast, I am using all my influence to make Austria arrive at a genuineand satisfactory understanding with Russia. "

How are we to explain, then, the abrupt change of tack that occurred thefollowing day at Berlin, or rather, at Potsdam, and the peculiarlanguage addressed by the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on theevening of the 29th? In that nocturnal scene there was no longer anyquestion of Austria's demands on Serbia, or even of the possibility ofan Austro-Russian war. The centre of gravity was suddenly shifted, andat a single stride the danger passed from the southeast of Europe to thenorthwest. 

[Sidenote: Will England be neutral?]

What is it that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg wants to know at once, as hecomes straight from the council held at Potsdam under the presidency ofthe Emperor? Whether Great Britain would consent to remain neutral in aEuropean war, provided that Germany agreed to respect the territorialintegrity of France. "And what of the French colonies?" asks theAmbassador with great presence of mind. The Chancellor can make nopromise on this point, but he unhesitatingly declares that Germany willrespect the integrity and neutrality of Holland. As for Belgium, France's action will determine what operations Germany may be forced toenter upon in that country; but when the war is over, Belgium will loseno territory, unless she ranges herself on the side of Germany's foes. 

[Sidenote: A bargain proposed. ]

Such was the shameful bargain proposed to England, at a time when noneof the negotiators had dared to speak in plain terms of a European waror even to offer a glimpse of that terrifying vision. This interview wasthe immediate result of the decisive step taken by German diplomacy onthe same day at St. Petersburg. The step in question has been made knownto us through the diplomatic documents which have been printed by theorders of the belligerent Governments, and all of which concur in theiraccount of this painful episode. Twice on that day did M. Sazonoffreceive a visit from the German Ambassador, who came to make a demandwrapped up in threats. 

[Sidenote: Germany's demands on Russia. ]

Count de Pourtalès insisted on Russia contenting herself with thepromise, guaranteed by Germany, that Austria-Hungary would not impairthe integrity of Serbia. M. Sazonoff refused to countenance the war onthis condition. Serbia, he felt, would become a vassal of Austria, and arevolution would break out in Russia. Count de Pourtalès then backed hisrequest with the warning that, unless Russia desisted from her militarypreparations, Germany would mobilize. A German mobilization, he said, would mean war. The results of the second interview, which took place attwo o'clock in the morning, were as negative as those of the first, notwithstanding a last effort, a final suggestion by M. Sazonoff tostave off the crisis. His giving in to Germany's brutal dictation wouldhave been an avowal that Russia was impotent. 

To the Emperor William, who had resumed the conduct of affairs since themorning of the 27th--the Emperor William, itching to cut the knot, driven on by his Staff and his generals--to him and no other must wetrace the responsibility for this insolent move which made warinevitable. "The heads of the army insisted, " was all that Herr vonJagow would vouchsafe a little later to M. Cambon by way of explanation. The Chancellor, and with him the Foreign Secretary and Under-Secretary, associated themselves with these hazardous tactics, from sheer inabilityto secure the adoption of less hasty and violent methods. If theybelieved that this summary breaking off of negotiations would meet withsuccess, they were as grievously mistaken as Count de Pourtalès, whosereports utterly misled them as to the sacrifices that Russia wasprepared to make for Serbia. 

At all events this upright man, when he realized the appalling effectsof his blunder, gave free play to his emotion. Such sensitiveness israre indeed in a German, and redounds entirely to his credit. 

[Sidenote: Russian military development. ]

[Sidenote: French military situation. ]

But the Emperor and his council of generals--what was their state ofsoul at this critical moment? Perhaps this riddle will never be whollysolved. From the military point of view, which in their eyes claimedfirst attention, they must have rejoiced at M. Sazonoff's answer, fornever again would they find such a golden opportunity for vanquishingRussia and making an end of her rivalry. In 1917 the reorganization ofher army would have been complete, her artillery would have been at fullstrength, and a new network of strategic railways would have enabled herto let loose upon the two Germanic empires a vast flood of fighting mendrawn from the inexhaustible reservoir of her population. The strugglewith the colossus of the North, despite the vaunted technicalsuperiority of the German army, would in all likelihood have ended inthe triumph of overwhelming might. In the France of 1917, again, thethree years' term of service would have begun to produce its fullresults, and her first-line troops would have been both more numerousand better trained than at present. 

On the other hand, William II could cherish no false hopes as to theconsequences of this second pressure that he was bringing to bear onSt. Petersburg. Had it succeeded in 1914 as in 1909, the encounterbetween Germany and the great Slav Empire would only have been put offto a later day, instead of being finally shelved. How could the Tsar orthe Russian people have forgiven the Kaiser for humbling them once more?If they had pocketed the affront in silence, it would only have been inorder to bide their time for revenge, and they would have chosen themoment when Russia, in possession of all her resources, could haveentered upon the struggle with every chance of winning. 

[Sidenote: William II and Russia. ]

Here an objection may be raised. The German Emperor, some may hold, fancying that the weight of his sword in the scale would induce the Tsarto shrink from action, had foreseen the anger of the Slav nation at itssovereign's timorous scruples, and looked forward to revolutionaryoutbreaks which would cripple the Government for years to come and makeit unable to think of war, if indeed they did not sweep the Romanoffsfrom the throne. I would answer that this Machiavellian scheme couldnever have entered the head of such a ruler as William II, with his deepsense of monarchial solidarity, and his instinctive horror of anarchistoutrages and of revolution. 

[Sidenote: The Kaiser eager to act. ]

No: the Emperor, together with the military authorities whose advice hetook, wished to profit by a juncture which he had awaited with longing, and which fickle Fortune might never again offer to his ambition. Everything proves it, down to his feverish haste, as soon as M. Sazonoff's reply was conveyed to him, to learn the intentions ofEngland, and to suggest, on that very day, a bargain that might purchaseher neutrality. This is why Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg received orders tosummon the British Ambassador on the night of the 29th. The Emperorcould not wait until the following morning, so eager was he to act. Isthis impatience the mark of one who was the victim of a concertedsurprise? If he had not wanted war, would he not have tried to resumenegotiations with Russia on a basis more in keeping with her dignity asa Great Power, however heavy a blow it was to his own pride that he hadfailed to intimidate her?

VII

The abortive efforts to overawe St. Petersburg and the offers made tothe British Ambassador, as if Great Britain's inaction could be sold tothe highest bidder, brought results that were not hard to foresee. 

[Sidenote: Sir Edward Grey's telegram. ]

In London, Sir Edward Grey's indignation found immediate vent in thefollowing passage of his telegram of July 30 to Sir Edward Goschen: "Itwould be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at theexpense of France--a disgrace from which the good name of this countrywould never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargainaway whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutralityof Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. "

Through the brazen overtures of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, however, theBritish Cabinet henceforth came to occupy itself, before all things, with the fate allotted to our country by the Imperial Government in thewar that it was preparing. In order to tear off the mask from Germanstatesmanship, the surest method was to ask it a straightforwardquestion. On July 31, Sir Edward Grey, following the example of theGladstone Ministry of 1870, inquired both of Germany and France whetherthey would respect the neutrality of Belgium. At the same time he gaveBelgium to understand that Britain counted on her doing her utmost tomaintain her neutrality. 

[Sidenote: Neutrality of Belgium. ]

The answer of the Republican Government was frank and unhesitating. Itwas resolved to respect Belgian neutrality, and would only act otherwiseif the violation of that neutrality by some other Power forced it to doso in self-defence. 

The Belgian Government, for its part, hastened to assure the BritishMinister at Brussels of its determination to resist with might and mainshould its territory be invaded. 

At Berlin, however, the Foreign Secretary eluded Sir Edward Goschen'squestions. He said that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor. In his opinion, any answer would entail the risk, in the event of war, of partly divulging the plan of campaign. It seemed doubtful to him, therefore, whether he would be able to give a reply. This way ofspeaking was perfectly clear in its ambiguity. It did not puzzle SirEdward Grey for a moment. On the following day he declared to the GermanAmbassador that the reply of the German Government was a matter of verygreat regret. Belgian neutrality, he pointed out, was highly importantin British eyes, and if Belgium was attacked, it would be difficult torestrain public feeling in his country. 

On the same day, August 1, in accordance with instructions from myGovernment, I read to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (at thesame time giving him a copy) a dispatch drafted beforehand and addressedto the Belgian Ministers attached to the Powers that had guaranteed ourneutrality. This dispatch affirmed that Belgium, having observed, withscrupulous fidelity, the duties imposed on her as a neutral State by thetreaties of April 19, 1839, would manifest an unshaken purpose infulfilling them; and that she had every hope, since the friendlyintentions of the Powers towards her had been so often professed, ofseeing her territory secure from all assault, if hostilities shouldarise near her frontiers. The Belgian Government added that it hadnevertheless taken all the necessary steps for maintaining itsneutrality, but that, in so doing, it had not been actuated by a desireto take part in an armed struggle among the Powers, or by a feeling ofdistrust towards any one of them. 

Herr Zimmermann listened without a word of comment to my reading of thisdispatch, which expressed the loyal confidence of my Government inGermany's goodwill. He merely took note of my communication. His silencedid not surprise me, for I had just learnt of Herr von Jagow's evasivereply to the British Government concerning Belgium; but it bore out allmy misgivings. His constrained smile, by the way, told me quite as muchas his refusal to speak. 

[Sidenote: Russia and Germany hasten preparations. ]

[Sidenote: Austria mobilizes. ]

From the 30th, Russia and Germany--as an inevitable sequel to theconversations of the 29th--went forward actively with their militarypreparations. What was the exact nature of these preludes to the Germanmobilization? It was impossible to gain any precise notion at Berlin. The capital was rife with various rumors that augured ill for thefuture. We heard tell of regiments moving from the northern provincestowards the Rhine. We learnt that reservists had been instructed to keepthemselves in readiness for marching orders. At the same time, postalcommunication with Belgium and France had been cut off. At theWilhelmstrasse, the position was described to me as follows: "Austriawill reply to Russia's partial mobilization with a general mobilizationof her army. It is to be feared that Russia will then mobilize herentire forces, which will compel Germany to do the same. " As it turnedout, a general mobilization was indeed proclaimed in Austria on thenight of the 30th. 

Nevertheless, the peace _pourparlers_ went on between Vienna and St. Petersburg on the 30th and 31st, although on the latter date Russia, asBerlin expected, in answer both to the Austrian and the Germanpreparations, had mobilized her entire forces. Even on the 31st thesediscussions seemed to have some chance of attaining their object. Austria was now more accurately gauging the peril into which her ownblind self-confidence and the counsels of her ally were leading her, andwas pausing on the brink of the abyss. The Vienna Cabinet even consentedto talk over the gist of its Note to Serbia, and M. Sazonoff at oncesent an encouraging reply. 

It was desirable, he stated, that representatives of all the GreatPowers should confer in London under the direction of the BritishGovernment. 

Was a faint glimmer of peace, after all, dawning above the horizon?Would an understanding be reached, at the eleventh hour, among the onlyStates really concerned with the Serbian question? We had reckonedwithout our host. The German Emperor willed otherwise. Suddenly, at theinstance of the General Staff, and after a meeting of the FederalCouncil, as prescribed by the constitution, he issued the decree of_Kriegsgefahrzustand_ (Imminence-of-War). This is the first phase of ageneral mobilization--a sort of martial law, substituting the militaryfor the civil authorities as regards the public services (means ofcommunication, post, telegraphs, and telephones). 

This momentous decision was revealed to us on the 31st by a specialedition of the _Berliner Lokalanzeiger_, distributed at every streetcorner. The announcement ran as follows:

 RUSSIA WANTS WAR!

 "From official sources we have just received (at 2 P. M. ) the following report, pregnant with consequences:

 "'The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg sends us word to-day that a general mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy had previously been ordered. That is why His Majesty the Emperor William has decreed an Imminence-of-War. His Majesty will take up his residence in Berlin to-day. '

 "Imminence-of-War is the immediate prelude to a general mobilization, in answer to the menace that already hangs over Germany to-day, owing to the step taken by the Tsar. "

[Sidenote: The Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia. ]

As a drowning man catches at a straw, those who in Berlin sawthemselves, with horror, faced by an impending catastrophe, clutched ata final hope. The German general mobilization had not yet been ordered. Who knew whether, at the last moment, some happy inspiration from theBritish Cabinet, that most stalwart champion of peace, might cause theweapons to drop from the hands that were about to wield them? Once more, however, the Emperor, by his swift moves, shattered this fond illusion. On the 31st, at seven o'clock in the evening, he dispatched to theRussian Government a summons to demobilize both on its Austrian and onits German frontiers. An interval of twelve hours was given for a reply. 

It was obvious that Russia, who had refused two days before to ceasefrom her military preparations, would not accept the German ultimatum, worded as it was in so dictatorial a form and rendered still moreinsulting by the briefness of the interval granted. As, however, noanswer had come from St. Petersburg by the afternoon of August 1st, Herren von Jagow and Zimmermann (so the latter informed me) rushed tothe Chancellor and the Emperor, in order to request that the decree fora general mobilization might at least be held over until the followingday. They supported their plea by urging that the telegraphiccommunication with St. Petersburg had presumably been cut, and that thiswould explain the silence of the Tsar. Perhaps they still hoped againsthope for a conciliatory proposal from Russia. This was the last flickerof their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. Their efforts could make no headway against the stubborn opposition ofthe War Minister and the army chiefs, who represented to the Emperor thedangers of a twenty-four hours' delay. 

[Sidenote: Germany mobilizes. ]

The order for a mobilization of the army and navy was signed at fiveo'clock in the afternoon and was at once given out to the public by aspecial edition of the _Lokalanzeiger_. The mobilization was to begin onAugust 2nd. On the 1st, at ten minutes past seven in the evening, Germany's declaration of war was forwarded to Russia. 

[Sidenote: Pretexts given in Germany. ]

[Sidenote: Heroism of France. ]

As all the world knows, the Berlin Cabinet had to resort to wildpretexts, such as the committing of acts of hostility (so the militaryauthorities alleged) by French aviators on Imperial soil, in order tofind motives, two days later, for its declaration of war on France. Although Germany tried to lay the blame for the catastrophe at Russia'sdoor, it was in reality her western neighbour that she wished to attackand annihilate first. On this point there can be no possible doubtto-day. "Poor France!" said the Berlin newspapers, with feignedcompassion. They acknowledged that the conduct of the French Governmentthroughout the crisis had been irreproachable, and that it had workedwithout respite for the maintenance of peace. While her leadersfulfilled this noble duty to mankind, France was offering the world animpressive sight--the sight of a nation looking calmly and without fearat a growing peril that she had done nothing to conjure up, and, regarding her word as her bond, determined in cold blood to follow thedestiny of her ally on the field of battle. At the same time she offeredto Germany, who had foolishly counted on her being torn by internaltroubles and political feuds, the vision of her children closely linkedtogether in an unconquerable resolve--the resolve to beat back aniniquitous assault upon their country. Nor was this the only surprisethat she held in store. With the stone wall of her resistance, she wassoon to change the whole character of the struggle, and to wreck thecalculations of German strategy. 

No one had laboured with more energy and skill to quench the flames litby Austria and her ally than the representative of the Republic atBerlin. 

"Don't you think M. Cambon's attitude has been admirable?" remarked theBritish Ambassador to me, in the train that was whirling us far awayfrom the German capital on August 6th. "Throughout these terrible daysnothing has been able to affect his coolness, his presence of mind, andhis insight. " I cannot express my own admiration better than byrepeating this verdict of so capable a diplomat as Sir Edward Goschen, who himself took a most active part in the vain attempt of the TripleEntente to save Europe from calamity. 

VIII

[Sidenote: Berlin enthusiastic. ]

The Berlin population had followed the various phases of the crisis withtremendous interest, but with no outward show of patriotic fervour. Those fine summer days passed as tranquilly as usual. Only in theevenings did some hundreds of youths march along the highways of thecentral districts, soberly singing national anthems, and dispersingafter a few cries of "Hoch!" outside the Austro-Hungarian and ItalianEmbassies and the Chancellor's mansion. 

On August 2nd I watched the animation of the Sunday crowd that throngedthe broad avenue of the Kurfürstendamm. It read attentively the specialeditions of the newspapers, and then each went off to enjoy his or herfavourite pastime--games of tennis for the young men and maidens, longbouts of drinking in the beer-gardens, for the more sedate citizens withtheir families. When the Imperial motor-car flashed like a streak oflightning down Unter den Linden, it was hailed with loud, but by nomeans frantic, cheers. It needed the outcries of the Press againstRussia as the instigator of the war, the misleading speeches of theEmperor and the Chancellor, and the wily publications of the Government, to kindle a patriotism rather slow to take fire. Towards the close of mystay, feeling displayed itself chiefly by jeers at the unfortunateRussians who were returning post-haste to their native country, andblackguardly behaviour towards the staff of the Tsar's Ambassador as hewas leaving Berlin. 

[Sidenote: German people deluded. ]

That the mass of the German people, unaware of Russia's peacefulintentions, should have been easily deluded, is no matter forastonishment. The upper classes, however, those of more enlightenedintellect, cannot have been duped by the official falsehoods. They knewas well as we do that it was greatly to the advantage of the Tsar'sGovernment not to provoke a conflict. In fact, this question is hardlyworth discussing. Once more we must repeat that, in the plans of WilliamII and his generals, the Serbian affair was a snare spread for theNorthern Empire before the growth of its military power should have madeit an invincible foe. 

[Sidenote: Uncertainty regarding Britain. ]

[Sidenote: England's attitude. ]

There is no gainsaying that uncertainty as to Britain's intervention wasone of the factors that encouraged Germany. We often asked ourselvesanxiously at Berlin whether Germany's hand would not have been stayedaltogether if the British Government had formally declared that it wouldnot hold aloof from the war. We even hoped, for a brief moment, that SirEdward Grey would destroy the illusions on which the German people lovedto batten. The British Foreign Secretary did indeed observe to PrinceLichnowsky on July 29th that the Austro-Serbian issue might become sogreat as to involve all European interests, and that he did not wish theAmbassador to be misled by the friendly tone of their conversations intothinking that Britain would stand aside. If at the beginning she hadopenly taken her stand by the side of her Allies, she might, to be sure, have checked the fatal march of events. This, at any rate, is the mostwidespread view, for a maritime war certainly did not enter into thecalculations of the Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz, while it was thenightmare of the German commercial world. In my opinion, however, anoutspoken threat from England on the 29th, a sudden roar of the Britishlion, would not have made William II draw back. The memory of Agadirstill rankled in the proud Germanic soul. The Emperor would have riskedlosing all prestige in the eyes of a certain element among his subjectsif at the bidding of the Anglo-Saxon he had refused to go further, andhad thus played into the hands of those who charged him with conductinga policy of mere bluff and intimidation. "Germany barks but does notbite" was a current saying abroad, and this naturally tended toexasperate her. An ominous warning from the lips of Sir Edward Greywould only have served to precipitate the onslaught of the Kaiser'sarmies, in order that the intervention of the British fleet might haveno influence on the result of the campaign, the rapid and decisivecampaign planned at Berlin. 

[Sidenote: British opinion. ]

We know, moreover, from the telegrams and speeches of the BritishForeign Minister, how carefully he had to reckon with public feelingamong his countrymen in general and among the majority in Parliament. Awar in the Balkans did not concern the British nation, and the strifebetween Teuton and Slav left it cold. It did not begin to be properlyroused until it grasped the reality of the danger to France's veryexistence, and it did not respond warmly to the eloquent appeals of Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey until the day when it knew that the Germanswere at the gates of Liège, where they threatened both Paris andAntwerp--Antwerp, "that pistol pointed at the heart of England. "

 * * * * *

With the failure of diplomatic efforts to prevent war as a result of thedeliberate intention of Germany to bring about the conflict, the greatGerman war machine was put in motion. It was anticipated by the GeneralStaff that the passage across Belgium would be effected withoutdifficulty and with the acquiescence of King and people. 

How wrong was this judgment is one of the curious facts of history. TheGermans discovered this error when their armies presented themselvesbefore the strong fortress of Liège, the first fortified place in theirpath. Its capture was necessary for the successful passage of the Germantroops. 

[Sidenote: Importance of the delay. ]

It was captured, but at a cost in time and in their arrangement of planswhich were a great element in the great thrust--back at the Marne. 

THE DEFENCE OF LIÈGE

CHARLES BRONNE

English Review, April, 1915. 

[Sidenote: Germany invades Belgium. ]

On Sunday, August 2nd, while the news was going round that a train hadentered Luxembourg with German forces, the German Minister at Brusselsdelivered an ultimatum to Belgium demanding the free passage through ourterritory of the German armies. The following day, Monday, the BelgianGovernment replied that the nation was determined to defend itsneutrality. The same night the German advanced posts entered ourterritory. Tuesday morning they were before Visé, at Warsage, atDolhain, and at Stavelot. The bridges of Visé and Argenteau and thetunnels of Troisponts and Nas-Proué were blown up. 

[Sidenote: Atrocities begin. ]

From this day the atrocities committed by the pioneers of German"Kultur" began at Visé with fire and the massacre of inhabitants. OnThursday, they were to continue at Warsage and Berneau. On Wednesday, August 5th, the investment of Liège began, the bombardment beingspecially directed to the north-west sector which comprises the forts ofEvegnée, Barchon, and Fléron. In the afternoon the attack extended asfar as the fort of Chaudfontaine. The region attacked by the foe wasthus that between the Meuse and the Vesdre, the beautiful country ofHerve, where cornfields are followed by vineyards, where meadowlandencroaches on the sides of narrow but picturesque valleys, where smallbut thick woods conceal the number of the assailants. It was foundnecessary to destroy some prosperous little farms, several countryhouses, and pretty villas. This was but a prelude to the devastationbrought by the soldiers of the Kaiser. 

The enemy was in force. Later it was known that around Liège were the10th Prussian Army Corps from Aix-la-Chapelle on the way to Visé, the7th Corps, which had passed through the Herve country, the 8th, whichhad entered through Stavelot, and also a brigade of the 11th Corps, making up a total of about 130, 000 men. 

[Sidenote: Forts of Liège. ]

To resist these forces, General Leman had forts more than twenty-fouryears old and 30, 000 men: the 3rd division of the army increased by the15th mixed brigade, _i. E. _, the 9th, 11th, 12th, and 14th of the line, apart of the 2nd Lancers, a battalion of the 1st Carabineers, and theDivisional Artillery. 

 * * * * *

Thursday, August 6th, was rich in moving incidents. 

While the enemy were in force before Barchon, in a night attack, anattempt was made on General Leman. The story has been variously told. Here is the true version. 

[Sidenote: German spies. ]

The enemy's spies, so numerous in Liège, had been able to give the mostexact information regarding the installation of the General Staff in theRue Sainte Foy. They were quite aware that for a week the defender ofLiège had only been taking two or three hours' rest in his office, so asto be more easily in telephonic communication with the forts andgarrison. These offices in the Rue Sainte Foy were very badly situated, at the extreme end of the northern quarter, and were defended only by afew gendarmes. General Leman had been warned, however, and the Kinghimself had at last persuaded him to take some precautions against apossible attempt. He had finally given way to this advice, and arudimentary structure, but a sure one, fitted with electric light andtelephone, was being set up under the railway tunnel near the Palaisstation. 

This was, then, the last night the General would pass at Rue Sainte Foy. 

[Sidenote: General Leman in danger. ]

Towards half-past four in the morning a body of a hundred men descendedfrom the heights of Tawes. Whence did they come? How had they been ableto penetrate into the town? Some have said that they dressed in Liègeitself. In reality, they represented themselves to the advanced posts ofthe fort of Pontisse as being Englishmen come to the aid of Liège, andasked to be conducted to the General Staff. They were soldiers of aHanoverian regiment, and bore upon their sleeves a blue band with theword "Gibraltar. " This contributed in no small degree to cause them tobe taken for British sharpshooters. They were preceded by a spy who hadput on the Belgian uniform of the 11th of the line and who seemed toknow the town very well. At Thier-à-Liège, they stopped a moment todrink at a wine-shop and then went on. They were more than a hundred innumber and were preceded by two officers. A detachment of Garde Civique, posted at the gas factory of the Rue des Bayards, did not consider ittheir duty to interfere. A few individuals accompanied the troop, crying"Vive les Anglais. " A few passers-by, better-aware of the situation, protested. The troop continued its imperturbable march. The officerssmiled. Thus they arrived at Rue Sainte Foy where, as we have said, theoffices of the General Staff of General Leman were installed. 

A German officer asked of the sentinel on the door an interview withGeneral Leman. The officers of the latter, who now appeared, understoodthe ruse at once, and drew their revolvers. Shots were exchanged. One ofthe officers, Major Charles Marchand, a non-commissioned officer ofgendarmes, and several gendarmes were killed. The Germans attempted toenter the offices, of which the door had been closed. They fired throughthe windows, and even attempted to attack the house by scaling theneighbouring walls. General Leman, who was working, ran out on hearingthe first shots. He was unarmed. He demanded a revolver. Captain Lebbe, his aide-de-camp, refused to allow him to expose himself uselessly, andbegged him to keep himself for the defence of Liège. He even used someviolence to his chief, and pushed him towards the low door whichseparated the house from the courtyard of a neighbouring cannon foundry. With the help of another officer, the captain placed his General insafety. While this was happening, the alarm had been given, and theGermans, seeing that their attempt to possess themselves of the personof General Leman had failed, retired. The guard, which comprised somefifty men, fired repeatedly on the retreating party. Some fifty Germans, including a standard-bearer and a drummer, were killed. Others were madeprisoners. 

[Sidenote: General Leman in Fort Loncin. ]

The General retired to the citadel of Sainte Walburge, and later to thefort of Loncin. From there he followed the efforts of the enemyattacking anew the north-east and south-east sectors. The environs ofFort Boncelles are as difficult to defend as those of theBarchon-Evegnée-Fléron front. There is first the discovered part whichsurrounds what remains of the unfortunate village of Boncelles, whichthe Belgians themselves were forced to destroy to free their field offire, but for the rest, there are only woods, that of Plainevaux, whichreaches to the Ourthe, Neuville, and Vecquée woods, that of Bégnac, which continues Saint Lambert wood as far as Trooz and the Meuse. 

[Sidenote: Belgian troops fight heroically. ]

Every place here swarmed with Germans, 40, 000 at least, an army corpswhich had spent a day and a night in fortifying themselves, and had beenable to direct their artillery towards Plainevaux, to the north ofNeuville, and upon the heights of Ramet. Thirty thousand men at leastwould have been needed to defend this gap and less than 15, 000 wereavailable. A similar attack was delivered at the same time between theMeuse and the Vesdre. On both sides miracles of heroism were performed, but the enemy poured on irresistibly. They were able to pass, on the oneside, Val Saint Lambert, on the other, between Barchon and the Meuse, between Evegnée and Fléron. Fighting took place well into the night, theenemy being repulsed at Boncelles twice. The following morning I sawpieces of German corpses. The Belgian artillery had made a real carnage, and no smaller number of victims fell in the bayonet charges. The 9thand the Carabineers, who had fought the day before at Barchon, werepresent here. 

[Sidenote: Retreat ordered. ]

In the other sector, the soldiers of the 12th of the line particularlybehaved like heroes. The battle began towards two o'clock in the morningat Rétinne where, after prodigies of valour and a great slaughter of theenemy, the Belgian troops were forced to retire. The struggle continuedat Saine and at Queue du Bois. Here Lieutenant F. Bronne and forty ofhis men fell while covering the retreat. In spite of such devotion andof a bravery that will not be denied, the enemy passed through. Why?Some troops surrendered with their officers, who were afterwards setfree upon parole at Liège. But this was only a very small exception, andit was under the pressure of an enemy four times as numerous that the3rd division succumbed after three days of repeated fighting, duringwhich the soldiers were compelled to make forced marches from onesector to another, and stop the rest of the time in the trenchesfighting. The enemy's losses were 5, 000 killed and 30, 000 wounded. 

General Leman considered that he had obtained from his troops themaximum effort of which they were capable and ordered a retreat. It wasexecuted in good order, and the enemy had suffered so severely that theydid not dream of pursuit. They contented themselves with pushing forwardas far as the plateau of Saint-Tilman (close to Boncelles) and that ofRobermont (behind Fléron) some cannons of 15, which had bombarded thetown the first time on Thursday, August 6th, at four o'clock in themorning. No German troops, except some 200 men who entered as prisoners, penetrated into the town on this day. 

Although this retreat left behind a few men with several guns, it may besaid to have been effected in good order. I was able to see that formyself in passing through with the troops, from the fifth limit of theSaint Trond route, near Fort Loncin, up to the centre of the town. Theauto in which I was seated was able to pass easily. 

[Sidenote: Refugees. ]

The terrified population from Bressoux began to arrive. There werepeople half-dressed, but who carried some object which to them seemedthe most precious, sometimes a simple portrait of a loved one. Othersdrove cattle before them. The men carried children, while women followedpainfully loaded with household goods. Mixed up with them were the GardeCivique. It had just been assembled and informed that it was disbanded, and a certain number of them had told the inhabitants that the Prussianswere coming, and that there was nothing better to do than for everyoneto bolt himself in. The cannon had thundered all night. The citizens ofLiège had found in their letter-boxes a warning from the burgomasterconcerning the behaviour of the inhabitants in case of the town beingoccupied by the enemy. This urgent notice, distributed the night beforebetween 9 and 11 p. M. , foreshadowed an imminent occupation. The hastyflight of the people of Bressoux stopped when they had crossed theMeuse; but as the bombardment recommenced towards noon, fright againseized on the population. The bombardment lasted till two. Some thirtyshells fell on different parts of the town. 

[Sidenote: Bridge of Arches destroyed. ]

At half-past twelve a dull noise was heard as far as the furthest fort;it was the old Bridge of Arches which gave way, towards the left bank. The engineers had just blown it up. It seemed wiser to destroy thebridge at Val Bénoit, which left the Germans railway communication. Butno one thought of this; or rather, orders to that effect were not givenby the higher authorities. This was afterwards to cause the degradationto the ranks of the chief officer of engineers who was responsible forthis unpardonable lapse. 

The second bombardment lasted till two o'clock. Several projectiles nowfell upon the citadel, where everything was in readiness to set fire tothe provisions and munitions which remained there along with someunserviceable cannon, generally used in the training of the GardeCivique. By 10 a. M. The citadel had been evacuated, only very fewpersons remaining, among them a major, who hastily hoisted the whiteflag. 

[Sidenote: German envoys in Liège. ]

Burgomaster Kleyer awaited developments at the Town Hall. At half-pastthree, he received envoys, who demanded the surrender of the town andforts. Put into communication with General Leman, who was all the timeat Loncin with his Staff, he informed him that if the forts persisted intheir resistance, the town would be bombarded a third time. GeneralLeman replied that the threat was an idle one, that it would be a cruelmassacre, but that the higher interests of Belgium compelled him toimpose this sacrifice on the town of Liège. 

[Sidenote: Bombardment of Liège. ]

[Sidenote: Gloomy aspect of the town. ]

At 9 p. M. Fresh shells fell on different parts of the city and causedmore damage if not more victims. This bombardment lasted till 2 a. M. Itrecommenced at intervals of half-an-hour, and caused two fires, one inRue de Hanque, and the other in Rue de la Commune. After midday, thestreets were deserted and all dwelling houses closed. In the afternoon aconvoy of Germans taken prisoners were seen to pass along theboulevards, and were then shut up in the Royal Athenæum. Then there wasan interminable defile of autos and carts conveying both German andBelgian wounded, especially the former, those who came from Boncellesmore particularly. Bodies of stragglers re-entered Liège slowly, ignorant of what had happened, as they were either untouched by theorder to retire, or had been forgotten in the advanced posts or in thetrenches. They were very tired and hardly had the courage to acceleratetheir pace, except when the few passers-by explained the position in acouple of words. The aspect of the town was very gloomy, and the onlyplaces where any animation was to be seen were around Guilleminsstation, where trains full of fugitives were leaving for Brussels, theWest quarter, towards which the last of the retiring companies weremarching, and the North, where many were still ignorant of thismovement. 

[Sidenote: Germans enter Liège. ]

On Friday, August 7th, at 3 a. M. , the bombardment of Liège began again, chiefly directed against the citadel, where only a few soldiers nowremained. These evacuated the place after setting fire to someprovisions they were unable to carry off. The population passed throughhours of anguish, which were destined not to be the last. Everybodytook refuge in the cellars. Some people lived there for several days infear that a shell might fall upon their house. On this Friday theGermans penetrated into the town at five o'clock in the morning by thedifferent bridges which had remained intact. They came in throughJupille and Bois de Breux chiefly. They seemed tired and, above all, hungry. Leaving detachments in the Place de Bavière and near thebridges, they successively occupied the Provincial Palace and thecitadel. 

Count Lammsdorf, Chief of the Staff of the 10th Corps, Commander of theArmy of the Meuse, arrested Burgomaster Kleyer at the Town Hall, andconducted him to the citadel, where he at first made him a ratherreassuring communication as to the fate of the town. . . . He then spokeanew and said that he understood all the forts would surrender, indefault of which the bombardment would recommence. M. Kleyer vainlyprotested against a measure so contrary to the laws both of war and ofhumanity. He was simply authorized to pass through the German lines witha safe conduct, to discuss the matter with General Leman, or even withthe King himself. 

[Sidenote: The Burgomaster's task. ]

This task of the burgomaster of Liège was a heavy one, and terrible wasthe expectant attitude of the German authorities. Later, some peoplehave discussed the attitude he should have taken up and conceived thenature of what should have been his reply; they would have desired wordsof defiance on his lips and an immediate answer. 

He lacked courage for this, and who will dare to-day to blame him forthe immense anxiety he felt on hearing of the horrible fate with whichhis beloved town and his unhappy fellow-citizens were threatened?

He gathered together at the Town Hall several communal and provincialdeputies, some deputies and senators. The general opinion at thebeginning of the discussion was that it was necessary to obtain thesurrender of the forts. Someone pointed out that there was not muchlikelihood of getting this decision from General Leman, who had alreadypronounced himself upon that question, and thought it would be necessaryto continue the work heroically begun of arresting the progress of theinvader, and that the forts, all intact, would powerfully contribute tothat end. 

It was finally decided to approach General Leman again with a messagewhich was entrusted to the burgomaster, the Bishop of Liège, and M. Gaston Grégoire, permanent deputy. These gentlemen repaired to thecitadel in search of the promised safe conduct. They were met there, according to the demand of Count Lammsdorf, by some prominent Liègecitizens, to whom he had expressed his desire to explain the situation. 

[Sidenote: Hostages to the Germans. ]

At the moment the three delegates were about to depart on their mission, with a good faith upon which it would be foolish to insist, the Germancommander declared that all the persons present were detained ashostages. He gave as a specious pretext for this violation of right thatsome German soldiers had been killed by civilians in some neighbouringvillages, and that the hostages would enable the Germans to guardagainst the repetition of such acts, the more so as they were preparedto make a striking example at the beginning of the campaign. 

All the Liège citizens who had entered the citadel on this day were keptthere till the next day, Saturday. Moreover, the following persons wereretained as responsible hostages for three days: 1. Mgr. Rutien, Bishopof Liège; 2. M. Kleyer, Burgomaster of Liège; 3. M. Grégoire, PermanentDeputy; 4. M. Armand Flechet, Senator; 5. Senator Van Zuylen; 6. SenatorEdouard Peltzer; 7. Senator Colleaux; 8. Deputy De Ponthière; 9. DeputyVan Hoegaerden; 10. M. Falloise, Alderman. 

The hostages were shut up in damp case-mates, palliasses were given themfor the night and, as food, the first day each one had half a loaf andsome water. The burgomaster and the bishop were, however, allowed to goabout their duties after they had given their parole to remain at thedisposal of the German military authorities. 

[Sidenote: Last train for Brussels. ]

The same day at 9 a. M. The last train left Liège for Brussels withnumbers of fugitives. The number of persons who abandoned Liège and itssuburbs may be calculated at some five thousand. From this moment andfor several days Liège was absolutely cut off from the rest of theworld, all communications having been cut. 

On Saturday, August 8th, while the Germans were methodically organisingthe occupation of Liège, Burgomaster Kleyer was authorised to wait uponthe King, in order to discuss the surrender of the forts. Furnished witha safe conduct and accompanied by a German officer, he reached Waremmeearly in the afternoon, and placed himself in communication with theGeneral Staff. The King was consulted, and the reply brought back toLiège was the one the mayor had foreseen. 

The same day saw the appearance of the following order of the dayaddressed to the soldiers of the army of Liège:--

 "Our comrades of the 3rd Army Division and of the 15th mixed brigade are about to re-enter our lines, after having defended, like heroes, the fortified position of Liège. 

[Sidenote: The King encourages the army. ]

 "Attacked by forces four times as numerous, they have repulsed all assaults. None of the forts have been taken; the town of Liège is always in our power. Standards and a number of prisoners are the trophies of these combats. In the name of the Nation I salute you, officers and soldiers of the 3rd Army Division and the 15th mixed brigade. 

 "You have done your duty, done honour to our arms, shown the enemy what it costs to attack unjustly a peaceable people, but one who wields in its just cause an invincible weapon. The Fatherland has the right to be proud of you. 

 "Soldiers of the Belgian Army, do not forget that you are in the van of immense armies in this gigantic struggle, and that you await but the arrival of our brothers-in-arms in order to march to victory. The whole world has its eyes fixed upon you. Show it by the vigour of your blows that you mean to live free and independent. 

 "France, that noble country which has throughout history been associated with just and generous causes, is hurrying to our aid and her armies will enter our territory. 

 "In your name I address them a fraternal salute. ALBERT. "

[Sidenote: German precautions. ]

[Sidenote: Barricades constructed. ]

On this day the Germans, who were not yet sure as to the intentions ofthe Belgian field army, and who feared a possible offensive on the partof the French advanced guards, put Liège in a state of defence. Moreover, they distrusted the civilian population, and fortifiedthemselves in the town itself. They placed machine guns at the head ofthe bridges, and upon one of them, Boverie, which they feared might beblown up, or might be bombarded by the forts, they placed a curtainedrecess in which they shut up several citizens. They caused the soldiersto occupy Quai des Pêcheurs, Quai l'Industrie, and the houses inproximity to the bridge, after clearing out the occupants. They placedbags of earth in the windows, behind which were installed machine guns. In the arteries leading to La Hesbaye and La Campine, and in the streetsof the latter, they erected barricades, and installed themselves in theriverside houses. These labours continued during several days on theheights of Saint Nicholas and Hollogne, while the soldiers of the 10thCorps installed themselves on the plateau of Cointe, the General Staffhaving taken possession there of a convent, although this had beentransformed into a hospital. In the town, the German troops, delayed fora short time by the necessity of carrying off their dead, shifting theirwounded, and of taking a much-needed rest, entered in large numbers. They occupied the different stations, that of Ans on the Herbignonplateau being the last one where they established themselves. 

On Sunday, September 6th, there were at Liège more than 100, 000 Germans. On this day, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the hostages were giventheir unconditional liberty. On the same date, in the neighbourhood ofLanden, the King, accompanied by the General Staff, reviewed the valiantand now reconstituted 3rd Division, reconstituted in spite of the heavylosses in officers suffered by certain regiments. General Leman receivedfrom M. Schollaert, President of the Belgian Chamber, the followingtelegram: "With a heart overflowing with enthusiasm and patriotic pride, I acclaim the glorious defender of Liège. "

[Sidenote: Praise for defense of the city. ]

[Sidenote: President Poincaré honors General Leman. ]

With reference to the defence of Liège, letters, despatches, andaddresses of felicitation were received at Brussels from the Presidentsof the French Chamber and the French Senate, from the Paris MunicipalCouncil, and other French municipalities, words of friendship andencouragement were pronounced later in the British Parliament, while theKing of the Belgians received the congratulations of King George, theTsar, and the President of the French Republic. Finally, M. Poincarésent him the most envied of distinctions, the military medal. Theresistance of Liège had everywhere aroused grateful enthusiasm, for thedays, and even the hours gained from the invader were now of inestimablevalue. But while the twelve forts were not yet to harass, as they could, the progress of the enemy, Liège, whose hatred of the Prussian isingrained, was to pay dearly for the resistance it had made, and itsheart was to suffer cruelly over the vexations of which it was to be theobject, while awaiting pillage and burning. 

Here we enter upon a new period, which cannot, however, be separatedfrom the siege of Liège, for at this time the forts still held out. 

[Sidenote: The twelve forts. ]

[Sidenote: Forts on the banks of the Meuse. ]

The forts still held out, but the resistance of their garrisons had tobe heroic. The defences crumbled quite rapidly. We should not besurprised at this, but should rather remember that these forts were morethan twenty years old. Their construction began in 1889, and theirarmament, though modified later in certain details, was not capable ofresisting the heavy artillery of the Germans. Liège was defended bytwelve forts, large and small. The most important works were Barchon, Fléron, Boncelles, Flémalle, Loncin, and Pontisse. These forts possessedfive large cupolas and three or four small ones. They were armed withtwo guns of 15 centimetres, four of 12, two howitzers of 21, and threeor four guns of 5'7, ten more of 5'7 flanking the ditches. The littleforts counted upon four large and three or four small cupolas. They werearmed with two pieces of 15, two of 12, a howitzer of 21, three or fourguns, without cupola, of 5'7, and of seven or eight commanding theditches. The forts are arranged around Liège in the following order:--Onthe left bank of the Meuse: Flémalle, Hollogne, Loncin, Lantin, andPontisse. On the right bank, between the Meuse and the Vesdre: Barchon, Evegnée, and Fléron. Between the Vesdre and the Ourthe: Chaudfontaineand Embourg. Between the Ourthe and the Meuse: Boncelles. The forts arefour kilometres apart, except Flémalle-Boncelles and Embourg-Pontisse, which are six kilometres apart, while Chaudfontaine and Embourg are onlytwo kilometres from one another. The forts are eight kilometres from thelimits of the town. The forts of Hollogne, Loncin, Lantin, and Liers arein grassy country. Boncelles is nearly completely surrounded by woods;Embourg and Chaudfontaine dominate the deep and winding valleys of theOurthe and the Vesdre. Pontisse, Flémalle, and Barchon, commanding theMeuse, are on broken ground. This last-named fort, with Evegnée andFléron, holds the most important strategic position in the Hervecountry, facing the German frontier, in a land cut up by meadows plantedwith trees and by little woods, traversed by many vales, not very deep, but winding. 

[Sidenote: War conditions changed. ]

It is known that in the Brialmont project the intervening spaces were tobe defended and fortified with siege artillery. To tell the truth, theeminent military engineer, in the pamphlets where he set out theproject, only allowed for a small mobile garrison, but he confessedlater that the difficulties which he knew he would meet with in theBelgian Parliament over the credits for the fortifications made himunderestimate the number of men required. Besides which, the conditionsof war have been greatly modified during the twenty-five years whichhave passed, owing to the increased power of siege guns. So that it maybe laid down that 80, 000, if not 100, 000, men were needed to properlydefend the entrenched camp of Liège. 

[Sidenote: Troops in the forts. ]

As for the forts, they were each occupied by a battery of artillery (250men) and three companies (120 men), a total of 370 men. About 4, 500artillerymen for the twelve forts. 

General Leman was shut up in Loncin, one of the chief forts, whichcommanded the road towards Waremme and Brussels. He had sent away allhis General Staff with the division, in spite of the supplications ofhis officers, who begged to be allowed to share his fate. He continuedto direct the longest resistance possible. The enemy was anxious to cutall the communications between the forts, but soldiers volunteered forcarrying messages to the different commanders. Several succeeded, butmany were killed, for the investment became steadily tightened. Indeed, certain gaps, where the ground was most broken, could not be swept bythe guns from the forts, and, under cover of the night, troops ensconcedthemselves there comfortably. Moreover, the Germans, having receivedreinforcements and heavy artillery, undertook the siege systematically, first of Barchon, which it was unable to take by storm any more thanBoncelles, but which it subjected to a formidable deluge of shells. Barchon could only reply haphazard to heavy guns the position of whichit could not tell. It was, indeed, deprived of its observation posts, and was in the position of a blind man desperately parrying the blows ofan adversary who could see where to strike. 

[Sidenote: Fort Barchon taken. ]

The struggle was not for long, and the fort, reduced to impotence, lefta wide breach through which the invader scrambled. Through there hecould also introduce his heavy siege guns, howitzers of 28, and evenpieces of 42 cms. 

[Sidenote: Forty-two centimetre guns. ]

The enemy then followed a tactic which was to succeed rapidly. Heattacked the different fortifications in a reverse way. Thus Loncin, Lantin, Liers, and Pontisse were bombarded by batteries placed in thecitadel itself and to which the Belgians could not reply withoutshelling the town and doing frightful damage. A battery was also placedin a bend of ground up Rue Naniot, under the "Tomb, " where some of thosewho fell in 1830 are buried, but it was discovered and had to bewithdrawn. Forts Boncelles and Embourg were attacked by guns placed onthe hill at Tilff, a pretty village, which would have been completelydestroyed had the firing been responded to. Finally, along the line ofthe plateau of Herve, no longer dominated by Barchon and Fléron, nowdestroyed, the enemy was able to bring into the very centre of the townfour of those howitzers of 42 cms. Which were later to bombard Namur, Maubeuge, and Antwerp. 

The following are the dates on which the different forts succumbed:Barchon and Evegnée fell on August 9th. Right from the 5th they had notceased to be the object of continual attacks. They had valiantlyresisted repeated assaults and field artillery. The heavy pieces pouredin a hurricane of fire. 

Pontisse, which had so usefully barred the passage of the enemy belowVisé, did not give way till the 12th. On the 13th Embourg surrenderedafter a twenty-six hours' bombardment. 

[Sidenote: Forts yield one by one. ]

The same day saw the fall of Chaudfontaine and Nameche, where twoaccidents happened worthy of being related. A shell burst on a cupolagun as it was finishing its movement after being loaded. The whole gunwas shattered and ten men were wounded. A little while after, a shellentered the fort through the embrasure and set fire to the powdermagazine. One hundred and ten artillerymen were terribly burned, fiftydying upon the spot. The 14th saw the fall of Boncelles, Liers, andFléron. Boncelles from the 5th had offered an admirable resistance. Commandant Lefert had been wounded on the 8th, when 200 Germans, presenting themselves to surrender, treacherously fired upon him. Suffering greatly, he none the less went on directing the defence untilhis officers met together in a kind of council of war, and had him takenaway in an ambulance. The unfortunate man was seized by a fever andbecame delirious. Boncelles was bombarded unceasingly for a whole dayand the following morning. It was nearly destroyed, and may beconsidered as the fort which was the centre of the worst carnage ofGerman soldiers. The enormous heaps of dead buried around it bearwitness to the fact. Liers was put out of action by guns installed atSainte Walburge. 

[Sidenote: Loncin and Lantin fall. ]

To get the better of the obstinate resistance of Fléron (CommandantMozin), the Germans united twenty guns by an electric battery and firedthem all off at the same time upon the fort, which trembled in itsmassive foundations. No one can have an idea of how demoralising thisrain of projectiles was. On the 15th, Loncin and Lantin fell, thedefenders firing until they were overcome by asphyxia. On the 16th, itwas the turn of Flémalle, and on the 18th, of Hollogne. 

We know that it was at Loncin, which dominated the roads of La Hesbaye, where General Leman was shut up. Commandant Naessens and LieutenantMonard had the honour of defending the fort under the General's eyes. Electrified by the presence of the governor of the fortress, thesoldiers of Loncin wrote with their blood the most heroic page of theheroic defence of Liège. Commandant Naessens modestly narrated thestory when he had been wounded and transported to the military hospitalof Saint Laurent. General Leman has also _résuméd_ the different phasesof the attack, while a prisoner at Magdeburg. We will listen to hisclear and crisp recital. 

[Sidenote: General Leman's story. ]

He distinguishes four periods during the bombardment. The firstcommenced on August 14th at 4. 15 p. M. The shell fire, directed withgreat exactitude, lasted two hours without interruption. After a breakof half-an-hour, some 21-centimetre guns opened fire. All night, atintervals of ten minutes, they rained shells upon the fort, causing itconsiderable damage. The escarpment was damaged, the protecting walls ofthe left flank battery destroyed, and the shutters of the windowspierced. Another unfavourable circumstance was that all the places ofthe escarpment where shelter could be obtained were full of smoke fromthe shells which had burst either in the protecting wall or in theditches. The deleterious gases rendered it impossible to stand in thecovered places, and forced the General to assemble the garrison in theinterior and in the gallery. Even in these refuges the stupefyingeffects of the gases allowed themselves to be felt, and weakened thefighting value of the garrison. 

[Sidenote: Horrors of the bombardments. ]

The third period of bombardment began on the 15th at 5. 30 a. M. Andcontinued until two o'clock in the afternoon. The projectiles causedfearful havoc. The vault of the commanding post, where General Leman waspresent with his two adjutants, was subjected to furious shocks, and thefort trembled to its foundations. Towards two o'clock, a lull occurredin the firing, and the general took advantage of it to inspect the fort. He found part of it completely in ruins. 

[Sidenote: Currents of poisonous gas. ]

The fourth period is described as follows: "It was two o'clock when thebombardment recommenced with a violence of which no idea can be given. It seemed to us as if the German batteries were firing salvoes. When thelarge shells fell we heard the hissing of the air, which graduallyincreased into a roar like a furious hurricane, and which finished by asudden noise of thunder. At a certain moment of this formidablebombardment, I wished to reach the commanding post in order to see whatwas happening, but at the end of a few paces in the gallery I wasknocked down by a shock of violent air and fell face forward. I got upand wished to continue my way, but I was held back by a current ofpoisonous air which invaded the whole space. It was a mixture of the gasfrom the exploded powder and of the smoke of a fire which had started inthe rooms of the troops where furniture and bedding were kept. 

[Sidenote: The fort blown up. ]

[Sidenote: General Leman a prisoner. ]

"We were thus driven back to the place whence we had come, but the airhad become unbreathable. We were near to being asphyxiated when myadjutant, Major Collard, had the idea of taking off the top of theshutter, which gave us a little air. I was, however, obsessed by theidea of placing part of the garrison in safety, and I told my comrade Idesired to reach the counter-escarpment. I managed to pass the gap andreach the ditch, which I crossed. What was my amazement when I perceivedthat the fort was blown up, and that the front was strewn with ruins, forming a quay reaching from the escarpment to the counter-escarpment. Some soldiers were running to and fro upon it. I took them for Belgiangendarmes and called to them. But I was being suffocated, giddinessseized upon me, and I fell to the ground. When I came to, I found myselfin the midst of my comrades, who tried to come to my aid. Among them wasa German major, who gave me a glass of water to drink. As I learntafterwards, it was then about 6. 30 p. M. I was placed in an ambulancecarriage and transported to Liège. 

"I was taken, but I had not yet surrendered. "

 * * * * *

[Sidenote: Surrender of Namur. ]

Following the capture of Liège the German armies made rapid progressthrough Belgium. After several sharp engagements with Belgian troops, which resisted with heroic tenacity, the Germans on August 19 tookLouvain, and then began the deliberate system of atrocities whichhorrified the civilized world. The most valuable parts of the city, including many beautiful and important edifices, were burned, citizenswere killed and tortured, and the utmost brutality was practiced, underthe excuse that German troops had been fired upon by citizens of thetown. On August 17 Brussels had been abandoned by the Belgian Governmentwhich withdrew to Antwerp. The former city was surrendered withoutresistance. In the meantime the French had hurried their armies toassist the Belgian forces and, joined by the available troops of theEnglish Expeditionary Force, they encountered the Germans at Charleroi. On August 23 the great fortress of Namur was surrendered under the fireof the heavy German artillery, and on the following day, the Alliedarmies were defeated at Charleroi, and began the Great Retreat towardParis which was to continue to the banks of the Marne. The French armieswere under the command of General Joffre, while Sir John Frenchcommanded the British Expeditionary Force. In the following narrativeGeneral French describes the heroic performances of his gallant troopsduring the terrible ordeal. 

THE GREAT RETREAT

SIR JOHN FRENCH

The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail waseffected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at itsdestination in this country well within the scheduled time. 

[Sidenote: Disposition of British forces. ]

The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, September 21st, and I was able to make dispositions to move the forceduring Saturday, the 22d, to positions I considered most favorable fromwhich to commence operations which the French Commander in Chief, General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans inprosecution of the campaign. 

The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Condé on thewest, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up asfollows:

From Condé to Mons inclusive was assigned to the Second Corps, and tothe right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. TheFifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche. 

In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the cavalrydivision as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, ormove in support of any threatened part of the line. The forwardreconnoissance was intrusted to Brigadier General Sir Philip Chetwodewith the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to sendforward a few squadrons to assist in this work. 

[Sidenote: Advance on Soignies. ]

During the 22d and 23d these advanced squadrons did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters tookplace in which our troops showed to great advantage. 

2. At 6 A. M. On August 23, I assembled the commanders of the First andSecond Corps and cavalry division at a point close to the position andexplained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood tobe General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length theimmediate situation in front of us. 

From information I received from French Headquarters I understood thatlittle more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's army corps, withperhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position; and I wasaware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmedin this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undueopposition in their reconnoitring operations. The observations of myaeroplanes seemed also to bear out this estimate. 

[Sidenote: Attack on Mons line. ]

About 3 P. M. On Sunday, the 23d, reports began coming in to the effectthat the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently insome strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray wasbeing particularly threatened. 

The commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some highground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche, moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche. 

[Sidenote: Germans gain passages of the Sambre. ]

The right of the Third Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the commanderof the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salienttoo long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the centre behindMons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 P. M. , Ireceived a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three German corps, viz. , a reserve corps, theFourth Corps and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from thedirection of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve Frenchdivisions and the Fifth French Army on my right were retiring, theGermans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages ofthe Sambre between Charleroi and Namur. 

3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitred. Thisposition rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extendedwest to Jenlain, southeast of Valenciennes, on the left. The positionwas reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildingsmade the siting of trenches very difficult and limited the field of firein many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few goodartillery positions. 

[Sidenote: British retire to Maubeuge position. ]

When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy Germanthreatening on my front reached me, I endeavored to confirm it byaeroplane reconnoissance; and as a result of this I determined to effecta retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th. 

A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughoutthe night and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division from theneighborhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retakeBinche. This was supported by the artillery of both the First and SecondDivisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in theneighborhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the SecondCorps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The Third Divisionon the right of the corps suffered considerable loss in this operationfrom the enemy, who had retaken Mons. 

The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially intrenchedthemselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually towithdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much furtherloss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 P. M. Toward midday theenemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left. 

I had previously ordered General Allenby with the cavalry to actvigorously in advance of my left front and endeavor to take the pressureoff. 

[Sidenote: General Allenby supports Fifth Division. ]

About 7:30 A. M. General Allenby received a message from Sir CharlesFergusson, commanding the Fifth Division, saying that he was very hardpressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this messageGeneral Allenby drew in the cavalry and endeavored to bring directsupport to the Fifth Division. 

During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the SecondCavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyze thefurther advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack onhis flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held upby wire about 500 yards from his objective, and the Ninth Lancers andthe Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of thebrigade. 

The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line ofcommunications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22d and23d. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position southof Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps. 

[Sidenote: Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien suffers great losses. ]

With the assistance of the cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabledto effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps ofthe enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered greatlosses in doing so. 

At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the westof Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by thefortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in positionbetween Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank. 

4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such aswas afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts ofthe enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was hisintention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that nota moment must be lost in retiring to another position. 

I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhatexhausted and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent meeffecting my object. 

The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not onlyowing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustionof the troops. 

The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to aposition in the neighborhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were orderedto be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 5:30 A. M. 

[Sidenote: General Allenby covers west flank. ]

Two cavalry brigades, with the divisional cavalry of the Second Corps, covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the cavalrydivision, with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command ofGeneral Allenby, covered the west flank. 

The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigadeof artillery with divisional staff were available for service. 

I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his rightsouth of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-Le Cateau Road southof La Chaprie. In this position the division rendered great help to theeffective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position. 

Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-LeCateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, beenpartially prepared and intrenched, I had grave doubts--owing to theinformation I had received as to the accumulating strength of the enemyagainst me--as to the wisdom of standing there to fight. 

[Sidenote: Retirement of French troops on right. ]

Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, myexposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II. ) toenvelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, Idetermined to make a great effort to continue the retreat till I couldput some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between mytroops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest andreorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the corps commanders tocontinue their retreat as soon as they possibly could toward the generalline Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont. 

The cavalry, under General Allenby, were ordered to cover theretirement. 

Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continuedits march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border ofthe Forêt de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I hadintended that the corps should come further west so as to fill up thegap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted andcould not get further in without rest. 

[Sidenote: British brigade in Landrecies. ]

[Sidenote: French reserve divisions support First Corps. ]

The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9:30 P. M. A report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies washeavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who werecoming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade foughtmost gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss inissuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This losshas been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1, 000. At thesame time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his FirstDivision was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I senturgent messages to the commander of the two French reserve divisions onmy right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which theyeventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to theskillful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from anexceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they wereable at dawn to resume their march south toward Wassigny on Guise. 

By about 6 P. M. The Second Corps had got into position with their righton Le Cateau, their left in the neighborhood of Caudry, and the line ofdefense was continued thence by the Fourth Division toward Seranvillers, the left being thrown back. 

During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the cavalry became a good dealscattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby hadsucceeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai. 

The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the general officercommanding the Second Army Corps. 

On the 24th the French cavalry corps, consisting of three divisionsunder General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my wayback from Bavai, which was my "Poste de Commandement" during thefighting of the 23d and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestlyrequested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanctionfrom his army commander to act on my left flank, but said that hishorses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he renderedme valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he wasunable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the mostcritical day of all, viz. , the 26th. 

[Sidenote: British Second Corps and Fourth Division heavily attacked. ]

At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk ofhis strength against the left of the position occupied by the SecondCorps and the Fourth Division. 

At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position againstthem, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged itimpossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in faceof such an attack. 

I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the actionand retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for meto send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapableof movement. 

The French cavalry corps, under General Sordêt, was coming up on ourleft rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him todo his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank;but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable tointervene in any way. 

There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the troopsshowed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them. 

[Sidenote: British artillery outmatched by four to one. ]

The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made asplendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents. 

At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to beavoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given tocommence it about 3:30 P. M. The movement was covered with the mostdevoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had itselfsuffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the furtherretreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion ofthis most difficult and dangerous operation. 

Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in anenergetic pursuit. 

[Sidenote: General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien cited for conspicuousservice. ]

I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the Britishtroops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuableservices rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. 

I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the armyunder my command on the morning of the 26th August could never have beenaccomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conductthe operation. 

[Sidenote: British retreat holding on line Noyon-Chauny-La Fère. ]

The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the lineNoyon-Chauny-La Fère, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy'spursuit. 

On the 27th and 28th August I was much indebted to General Sordêt andthe French cavalry division which he commands for materially assistingmy retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy onCambrai. 

General D'Amade also, with the Sixty-first and Sixty-second FrenchReserve Divisions, moved down from the neighborhood of Arras on theenemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the Britishforces located there. 

[Sidenote: End of four days' battle at Mons. ]

This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced atMons on Sunday afternoon, 23d August, and which really constituted afour days' battle. 

At this point, therefore, I propose to close the present dispatch. 

[Sidenote: Serious losses in British forces. ]

I deeply deplore the very serious losses which the British forces havesuffered in this great battle; but they were inevitable in view of thefact that the British Army--only two days after a concentration byrail--was called upon to withstand a vigorous attack of five German armycorps. 

It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by thetwo general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing anddevoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops bydivisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smallerunits by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayedby non-commissioned officers and men. 

[Sidenote: Royal Flying Corps cited for admirable work. ]

I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirablework done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Theirskill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They havefurnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which hasbeen of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired atconstantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in everykind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout. 

Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded indestroying five of the enemy's machines. 

I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the incalculable assistance Ireceived from the General and Personal Staffs at Headquarters duringthis trying period. 

[Sidenote: Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, Major GeneralWilson, Brigade General Hon. Lambton cited for admirable work. ]

Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, Chief of the General Staff;Major General Wilson, Sub-Chief of the General Staff; and all under themhave worked day and night unceasingly with the utmost skill, self-sacrifice, and devotion; and the same acknowledgment is due by meto Brigadier General Hon. W. Lambton, my Military Secretary, and thepersonal Staff. 

[Sidenote: Major General Sir William Robertson cited for admirablework. ]

In such operations as I have described the work of the QuartermasterGeneral is of an extremely onerous nature. Major General Sir WilliamRobertson has met what appeared to be almost insuperable difficultieswith his characteristic energy, skill, and determination; and it islargely owing to his exertions that the hardships and sufferings of thetroops--inseparable from such operations--were not much greater. 

[Sidenote: Major General Sir Nevil Macready. ]

Major General Sir Nevil Macready, the Adjutant General, has also beenconfronted with most onerous and difficult tasks in connection withdisciplinary arrangements and the preparation of casualty lists. He hasbeen indefatigable in his exertions to meet the difficult situationswhich arose. 

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

SIR JOHN FRENCH

 17th September, 1914. 

My Lord: In continuation of my dispatch of September 7, I have the honorto report the further progress of the operations of the forces under mycommand from August 28. 

On that evening the retirement of the force was followed closely by twoof the enemy's cavalry columns, moving southeast from St. Quentin. 

The retreat in this part of the field was being covered by the Third andFifth Cavalry Brigades. South of the Somme General Gough, with the ThirdCavalry Brigade, threw back the Uhlans of the Guard with considerableloss. 

[Sidenote: General Chetwode routs German attack. ]

General Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, encountered theeastern column near Cerizy, moving south. The brigade attacked androuted the column, the leading German regiment suffering very severecasualties and being almost broken up. 

The Seventh French Army Corps was now in course of being railed up fromthe south to the east of Amiens. On the 29th it nearly completed itsdetrainment, and the French Sixth Army got into position on my left, itsright resting on Roye. 

The Fifth French Army was behind the line of the Oise, between La Fèreand Guise. 

[Sidenote: Vigorous pursuit of retreating German forces. ]

The pursuit of the enemy was very vigorous; some five or six Germancorps were on the Somme, facing the Fifth Army on the Oise. At least twocorps were advancing toward my front, and were crossing the Somme eastand west of Ham. Three or four more German corps were opposing the SixthFrench Army on my left. 

This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 29th, when I received a visitfrom General Joffre at my headquarters. 

I strongly represented my position to the French Commander in Chief, whowas most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He toldme that he had directed the Fifth French Army on the Oise to moveforward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checkingpursuit. He also told me of the formation of the Sixth French Army on myleft flank, composed of the Seventh Army Corps, four reserve divisions, and Sordêt's corps of cavalry. 

[Sidenote: Short retirement towards Compiègne-Soissons. ]

I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further shortretirement toward the line Compiègne-Soissons, promising him, however, to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him. 

In pursuance of this arrangement the British forces retired to aposition a few miles north of the line Compiègne-Soissons on the 29th. 

[Sidenote: Right flank of German army in dangerous line of connection. ]

The right flank of the Germany Army was now reaching a point whichappeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. Ihad already evacuated Amiens, into which place a German reserve divisionwas reported to have moved. 

Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish anadvance base at Le Mans. This operation was well carried out by theInspector General of Communications. 

[Sidenote: Retirement to the Marne ordered. ]

In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard Tenth and GuardReserve Corps of the German Army by the First and Third French Corps onthe right of the Fifth Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan topursue this advantage; and a general retirement to the line of theMarne was ordered, to which the French forces in the more easterntheatre were directed to conform. 

A new Army (the Ninth) had been formed from three corps in the south byGeneral Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the Fifthand left of the Fourth Armies. 

While closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy onat all points until a favorable situation was created from which toassume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify fromday to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owingto the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the generalsituation. 

In conformity with the movements of the French forces, my retirementcontinued practically from day to day. Although we were not severelypressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually. 

[Sidenote: Attack on British First Cavalry Brigade. ]

On the 1st September, when retiring from the thickly wooded country tothe south of Compiègne, the First Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by someGerman cavalry. They momentarily lost a horse artillery battery, andseveral officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help, however, of some detachments from the Third Corps operating on theirleft, they not only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in capturingtwelve of the enemy's. 

Similarly, to the eastward, the First Corps, retiring south, also gotinto some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguardaction ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the Fourth Guards Brigadesuffered considerably. 

[Sidenote: British forces in position south of the Marne. ]

On September 3 the British forces were in position south of the Marnebetween Lagny and Signy-Signets. Up to this time I had been requestedby General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long aspossible, and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made thenecessary dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had beeneffected, I was asked by the French Commander in Chief to continue myretirement to a point some twelve miles in rear of the position I thenoccupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. This retirement was duly carried out. In the meantime the enemy hadthrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable force, and wasthreatening the Allies all along the line of the British forces and theFifth and Ninth French Armies. Consequently several small outpostactions took place. 

On Saturday, September 5, I met the French Commander in Chief at hisrequest, and he informed me of his intention to take the offensiveforthwith, as he considered conditions very favorable to success. 

[Sidenote: General Joffre announces intention to take offensive. ]

General Joffre announced to me his intention of wheeling up the leftflank of the Sixth Army, pivoting on the Marne and directing it to moveon the Ourcq; cross and attack the flank of the First German Army, whichwas then moving in a southeasterly direction east of that river. 

He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left restingon the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army--to fill the gap betweenthat army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against the enemy in myfront and join in the general offensive movement. 

[Sidenote: Battle begins Sunday, September 6. ]

These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September 6, at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened ona front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the leftflank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Mauperthuis, which was about the British centre, Courtecon, which was on the left ofthe Fifth French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of theNinth Army under General Foch, and so along the front of the Ninth, Fourth and Third French Armies to a point north of the fortress ofVerdun. 

[Sidenote: Battle concluded September 10. Germans driven to the lineSoissons-Rheims. ]

This battle, in so far as the Sixth French Army, the British Army, theFifth French Army, and the Ninth French Army were concerned, may be saidto have concluded on the evening of September 10, by which time theGermans had been driven back to the line Soissons-Rheims, with a loss ofthousands of prisoners, many guns, and enormous masses of transport. 

About September 3 the enemy appears to have changed his plans and tohave determined to stop his advance south direct upon Paris, for onSeptember 4 air reconnoissances showed that his main columns were movingin a southeasterly direction generally east of a line drawn throughNanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. 

On September 5 several of these columns were observed to have crossedthe Marne, while German troops, which were observed moving southeast upthe left flank of the Ourcq on the 4th, were now reported to be haltedand facing that river. Heads of the enemy's columns were seen crossingat Changis, La Ferté, Nogent, Château Thierry, and Mezy. 

[Sidenote: German columns converging on Montmirail. ]

Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging onMontmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were locatedin the neighborhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferté-Gaucher, and Dagny. 

I should conceive it to have been about noon on September 6, after theBritish forces had changed their front to the right and occupied theline Jouy-Le Chatel-Faremoutiers-Villeneuve Le Comte, and the advanceof the Sixth French Army north of the Marne toward the Ourcq becameapparent, that the enemy realized the powerful threat that was beingmade against the flank of his columns moving southeast, and began thegreat retreat which opened the battle above referred to. 

[Sidenote: Position of allies and Germans on September 6. ]

On the evening of September 6, therefore, the fronts and positions ofthe Allied Army were roughly as follows:

_Sixth French Army. _--Right on the Marne at Meux, left toward Betz. 

_British Forces. _--On the line Dagny-Coulommiers-Maison. 

_Fifth French Army. _--At Courtagon, right on Esternay. 

_Conneau's Cavalry Corps. _--Between the right of the British and theleft of the French Fifth Army. 

The position of the German Army was as follows:

_Fourth Reserve and Second Corps. _--East of the Ourcq and facing thatriver. 

_Ninth Cavalry Division. _--West of Crecy. 

_Second Cavalry Division. _--North of Coulommiers. 

_Fourth Corps. _--Rebais. 

_Third and Seventh Corps. _--Southwest of Montmirail. 

[Sidenote: First and Second German army. ]

All these troops constituted the First German Army, which was directedagainst the French Sixth Army on the Ourcq, and the British forces, andthe left of the Fifth French Army south of the Marne. 

The Second German Army (IX. , X. , X. R. , and Guard) was moving against thecentre and right of the Fifth French Army and the Ninth French Army. 

On September 7 both the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were heavilyengaged on our flank. The Second and Fourth Reserve German Corps on theOurcq vigorously opposed the advance of the French toward that river, but did not prevent the Sixth Army from gaining some headway, theGermans themselves suffering serious losses. The French Fifth Army threwthe enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin River after inflictingsevere losses upon them, especially about Montceaux, which was carriedat the point of the bayonet. 

The enemy retreated before our advance, covered by his Second and Ninthand Guard Cavalry Divisions, which suffered severely. 

Our cavalry acted with great vigor, especially General De Lisle'sbrigade, with the Ninth Lancers and Eighteenth Hussars. 

[Sidenote: Germans retreat September 8. ]

On September 8 the enemy continued his retreat northward, and our armywas successfully engaged during the day with strong rearguards of allarms on the Petit Morin River, thereby materially assisting the progressof the French armies on our right and left, against whom the enemy wasmaking his greatest efforts. On both sides the enemy was thrown backwith very heavy loss. The First Army Corps encountered stubbornresistance at La Trétoire, (north of Rebais. ) The enemy occupied astrong position with infantry and guns on the northern bank of the PetitMorin River; they were dislodged with considerable loss. Several machineguns and many prisoners were captured, and upward of 200 German deadwere left on the ground. 

[Sidenote: Forcing of Petit Morin September 9. ]

The forcing of the Petit Morin at this point was much assisted by thecavalry and the First Division, which crossed higher up the stream. 

Later in the day a counter-attack by the enemy was well repulsed by theFirst Army Corps, a great many prisoners and some guns again fallinginto our hands. 

On this day (September 8) the Second Army Corps encountered considerableopposition, but drove back the enemy at all points with great loss, making considerable captures. 

The Third Army Corps also drove back considerable bodies of the enemy'sinfantry and made some captures. 

[Sidenote: British First and Second Army Corps forced passage of Marne. ]

On September 9 the First and Second Army Corps forced the passage of theMarne and advanced some miles to the north of it. The Third Corpsencountered considerable opposition, as the bridge at La Ferté wasdestroyed and the enemy held the town on the opposite bank in somestrength, and thence persistently obstructed the construction of abridge; so the passage was not effected until after nightfall. 

During the day's pursuit the enemy suffered heavy loss in killed andwounded, some hundreds of prisoners fell into our hands and a battery ofeight machine guns was captured by the Second Division. 

[Sidenote: Sixth French Army heavily engaged west of River Ourcq. ]

On this day the Sixth French Army was heavily engaged west of the RiverOurcq. The enemy had largely increased his force opposing them; and veryheavy fighting ensued, in which the French were successful throughout. 

The left of the Fifth French Army reached the neighborhood of ChâteauThierry after the most severe fighting, having driven the enemycompletely north of the river with great loss. 

The fighting of this army in the neighborhood of Montmirail was verysevere. 

[Sidenote: British and French advance on the line of the Ourcq, September 10. ]

The advance was resumed at daybreak on the 10th up to the line of theOurcq, opposed by strong rearguards of all arms. The First and SecondCorps, assisted by the cavalry divisions on the right, the Third andFifth Cavalry Brigades on the left, drove the enemy northward. Thirteenguns, seven machine guns, about 2, 000 prisoners, and quantities oftransport fell into our hands. The enemy left many dead on the field. On this day the French Fifth and Sixth Armies had little opposition. 

[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE MARNE--END OF GERMAN RETREAT AND THEINTRENCHED LINE ON THE AISNE RIVER]

[Sidenote: First and Second German armies in full retreat. ]

As the First and Second German Armies were now in full retreat, thisevening marks the end of the battle which practically commenced on themorning of the 6th inst. ; and it is at this point in the operations thatI am concluding the present dispatch. 

In concluding this dispatch I must call your Lordship's specialattention to the fact that from Sunday, August 23, up to the presentdate, (September 17, ) from Mons back almost to the Seine, and from theSeine to the Aisne, the army under my command has been ceaselesslyengaged without one single day's halt or rest of any kind. 

[Sidenote: Continuous fighting of British from Sunday, August 23, toSeptember 17, from Mons to Seine and from Seine to the Aisne. ]

[Sidenote: Amiens and Rheims captured. ]

In the narratives preceding we have seen how the English forcesconducted themselves during the Great Retreat and at the Marne. It mustbe remembered, however, that they comprised but a small proportion ofthe armies opposing the Germans. The French bore the brunt of theattack, and a French army turned the tide of battle. Beginning with thefirst days of September all other military events were overshadowed bythe Great Retreat. On September 1 the Germans, in spite of French andBritish resistance, had reached Senlis. On September 4th Amiens wascaptured, and two days later the German army entered Rheims. In thefollowing narrative is shown, through the official records, how theFrench armies bore themselves during the Great Retreat, the First Battleof the Marne, and in the fighting which marked the hurried return of theGerman armies to the banks of the Aisne which they had, with trueforesight, fortified with such a possible situation in mind. 

HOW THE FRENCH FOUGHT

THE FRENCH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

The first month of the campaign began with successes and finished withdefeats for the French troops. Under what circumstances did these comeabout?

[Sidenote: Two principal actions. ]

Our plan of concentration had foreseen the possibility of two principalactions, one on the right between the Vosges and the Moselle, the otheron the left to the north of Verdun-Toul line, this double possibilityinvolving the eventual variation of our transport. On August 2, owing tothe Germans passing through Belgium, our concentration was substantiallymodified by General Joffre in order that our principal effort might bedirected to the north. 

From the first week in August it was apparent that the length of timerequired for the British Army to begin to move would delay our action inconnection with it. This delay is one of the reasons which explain ourfailures at the end of August. 

[Sidenote: Mulhouse occupied. ]

Awaiting the moment when the operations in the north could begin, and toprepare for it by retaining in Alsace the greatest possible number ofGerman forces, the General in Chief ordered our troops to occupyMulhouse, (Mülhousen, ) to cut the bridges of the Rhine at Huningue andbelow, and then to flank the attack of our troops, operating inLorraine. 

This operation was badly carried out by a leader who was at oncerelieved of his command. Our troops, after having carried Mulhouse, lostit and were thrown back on Belfort. The work had, therefore, to berecommenced afresh, and this was done from August 14 under a newcommand. 

[Sidenote: Enemy losses. ]

Mulhouse was taken on the 19th, after a brilliant fight at Dornach. Twenty-four guns were captured from the enemy. On the 20th we held theapproaches to Colmar, both by the plain and by the Vosges. The enemy hadundergone enormous losses and abandoned great stores of shells andforage, but from this moment what was happening in Lorraine and on ourleft prevented us from carrying our successes further, for our troops inAlsace were needed elsewhere. 

On August 28 the Alsace army was broken up, only a small part remainingto hold the region of Thann and the Vosges. 

The purpose of the operations in Alsace was, namely, to retain a largepart of the enemy's forces far from the northern theatre of operations. It was for our offensive in Lorraine to pursue still more directly byholding before it the German army corps operating to the south of Metz. 

This offensive began brilliantly on August 14. On the 19th we hadreached the region of Saarburg and that of the Etangs, (lakes, ) and weheld Dieuze, Morhange, Delme, and Château Salins. 

[Sidenote: French offensive stopped. ]

On the 20th our success was stopped. The cause is to be found in thestrong organization of the region, in the power of the enemy'sartillery, operating over ground which had been minutely surveyed, and, finally, in the default of certain units. 

[Sidenote: German reinforcements. ]

On the 22d, in spite of the splendid behavior of several of our armycorps, notably that of Nancy, our troops were brought back on to theGrand Couronne, while on the 23d and 24th the Germans concentratedreinforcements--three army corps, at least--in the region of Lunévilleand forced us to retire to the south. 

This retreat, however, was only momentary. On the 25th, after twovigorous counter-attacks, one from south to north and the other fromwest to east, the enemy had to fall back. From that time a sort ofbalance was established on this terrain between the Germans andourselves. Maintained for fifteen days, it was afterward, as will beseen, modified to our advantage. 

[Sidenote: Battle of the north. ]

There remained the principal business, the battle of thenorth--postponed owing to the necessity of waiting for the British Army. On August 20 the concentration of our lines was finished and the Generalin Chief gave orders for our centre and our left to take the offensive. Our centre comprised two armies. Our left consisted of a third army, reinforced to the extent of two army corps, a corps of cavalry, thereserve divisions, the British Army, and the Belgian Army, which hadalready been engaged for the previous three weeks at Liège, Namur, andLouvain. 

The German plan on that date was as follows: From seven to eight armycorps and four cavalry divisions were endeavoring to pass between Givetand Brussels, and even to prolong their movements more to the west. Ourobject was, therefore, in the first place, to hold and dispose of theenemy's centre and afterward to throw ourselves with all availableforces on the left flank of the German grouping of troops in the north. 

[Sidenote: The offensive fails. ]

On August 21 our offensive in the centre began with ten army corps. OnAugust 22 it failed, and this reverse appeared serious. 

The reasons for it are complex. There were in this affair individual andcollective failures, imprudences committed under the fire of the enemy, divisions ill-engaged, rash deployments, precipitate retreats, apremature waste of men, and, finally, the inadequacy of certain of ourtroops and their leaders, both as regards the use of infantry andartillery. 

In consequence of these lapses the enemy, turning to account thedifficult terrain, was able to secure the maximum of profit from theadvantages which the superiority of his subaltern complements gave him. 

[Sidenote: Enemy crosses the Sambre. ]

In spite of this defeat our manoeuvre had still a chance of success, ifour left and the British Army obtained a decisive result. This wasunfortunately not the case. On August 22, at the cost of great losses, the enemy succeeded in crossing the Sambre and our left army fell backon the 24th upon Beaumont-Givet, being perturbed by the belief that theenemy was threatening its right. 

On the same day, (the 24th, ) the British Army fell back after a Germanattack upon the Maubeuge-Valenciennes line. On the 25th and 26th itsretreat became more hurried. After Landrecies and Le Cateau it fell backsouthward by forced marches. It could not from this time keep its holduntil after crossing the Marne. 

[Sidenote: The British retreat. ]

The rapid retreat of the English, coinciding with the defeat sustainedin Belgian Luxembourg, allowed the enemy to cross the Meuse and toaccelerate, by fortifying it, the action of his right. 

The situation at this moment may be thus summed up: Either our frontierhad to be defended on the spot under conditions which the Britishretreat rendered extremely perilous, or we had to execute a strategicretirement which, while delivering up to the enemy a part of thenational soil, would permit us, on the other hand, to resume theoffensive at our own time with a favorable disposition of troops, stillintact, which we had at our command. The General in Chief determined onthe second alternative. 

[Sidenote: New offensive planned. ]

Henceforward the French command devoted its efforts to preparing theoffensive. To this end three conditions had to be fulfilled:

1. The retreat had to be carried out in order under a succession ofcounter-attacks which would keep the enemy busy. 

2. The extreme point of this retreat must be fixed in such a way thatthe different armies should reach it simultaneously, ready at the momentof occupying it to resume the offensive all together. 

3. Every circumstance permitting of a resumption of the offensive beforethis point should be reached must be utilized by the whole of our forcesand the British forces. 

[Sidenote: Counter-attacks. ]

The counter-attacks, executed during the retreat, were brilliant andoften fruitful. On August 20 we successfully attacked St. Quentin todisengage the British Army. Two other corps and a reserve divisionengaged the Prussian Guard and the Tenth German Army Corps, which wasdebouching from Guise. By the end of the day, after variousfluctuations, the enemy was thrown back on the Oise and the Britishfront was freed. 

On August 27 we had also succeeded in throwing back upon the Meuse theenemy, who was endeavoring to gain a foothold on the left bank. Oursuccesses continued on the 28th in the woods of Marfée and of Jaulnay. Thanks to them we were able, in accordance with the orders of theGeneral in Chief, to fall back on the Buzancy-Le Chesne-Bouvellemontline. 

Further to the right another army took part in the same movement andcarried out successful attacks on August 25 on the Othain and in theregion of Spincourt. 

[Sidenote: Recrossing the Meuse. ]

On the 26th these different units recrossed the Meuse without beingdisturbed and were able to join in the action of our centre. Our armieswere, therefore, again intact and available for the offensive. 

On August 26 a new army composed of two army corps, five reservedivisions, and a Moorish brigade was constituted. This army was toassemble in the region of Amiens between August 27 and September 1 andtake the offensive against the German right, uniting its action withthat of the British Army, operating on the line of Ham-Bray-sur-Somme. 

[Sidenote: The retreat continues. ]

The hope of resuming the offensive was from this moment rendered vain bythe rapidity of the march of the German right wing. This rapidity hadtwo consequences, which we had to parry before thinking of advancing. Onthe one hand, our new army had not time to complete its detraining, and, on the other hand, the British Army, forced back further by the enemy, uncovered on August 31 our left flank. Our line, thus modified, contained waves which had to be redressed before we could pass to theoffensive. 

To understand this it is sufficient to consider the situation created bythe quick advance of the enemy on the evening of September 2. 

A corps of cavalry had crossed the Oise and advanced as far asChâteau-Thierry. The First Army, (General von Kluck, ) comprising fouractive army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiègne. 

The Second Army, (General von Bülow, ) with three active army corps andtwo reserve corps, was reaching the Laon region. 

The Third Army, (General von Hausen, ) with two active army corps and areserve corps, had crossed the Aisne between the Château Porcien andAttigny. 

[Sidenote: The German armies. ]

More to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Armies, namely, twelve army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous Ersatz formations, were in contact with our troops, the Fourth and Fifth Armies betweenVouziers and Verdun and the others in the positions which have beenindicated above, from Verdun to the Vosges. 

[Sidenote: The left in peril. ]

It will, therefore, be seen that our left, if we accepted battle, mightbe in great peril through the British forces and the new French Army, operating more to the westward, having given way. 

A defeat in these conditions would have cut off our armies from Parisand from the British forces and at the same time from the new army whichhad been constituted to the left of the English. We should thus berunning the risk of losing by a single stroke the advantage of theassistance which Russia later on was to furnish. 

General Joffre chose resolutely for the solution which disposed of theserisks, that is to say, for postponing the offensive and the continuanceof the retreat. In this way he remained on ground which he had chosen. He waited only until he could engage in better conditions. 

[Sidenote: The limit of the retreat. ]

In consequence, on September 1, he fixed as an extreme limit for themovement of retreat, which was still going on, the line ofBray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-François, andthe region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if thetroops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack beforereaching it, as soon as there was a possibility of bringing about anoffensive disposition, permitting the co-operation of the whole of ourforces. 

On September 5 it appeared that this desired situation existed. 

The First German Army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued itsendeavor to envelop our left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reachedthe region of Chauffry, to the north of Rebaix and of Esternay. It aimedthen at cutting our armies off from Paris, in order to begin theinvestment of the capital. 

[Sidenote: The German lines. ]

The Second Army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergeres, and Vertus. 

The Third and Fourth Armies reached to Chalons-sur-Marne andBussy-le-Repos. The Fifth Army was advancing on one side and the otherfrom the Argonne as far as Triacourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. TheSixth and Seventh Armies were attacking more to the east. 

But--and here is a capital difference between the situation of September5 and that of September 2--the envelopment of our left was no longerpossible. 

In the first place, our left army had been able to occupy the line ofSézanne, Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps. Furthermore, the Britishforces, gathered between the Seine and the Marne, flanked on their leftby the newly created army, were closely connected with the rest of ourforces. 

[Sidenote: Allies' armies ready. ]

This was precisely the disposition which the General in Chief had wishedto see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it, andordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from hisright two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisionsof cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his centre. 

On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies amessage ordering them to attack. 

[Sidenote: Joffre orders the advance. ]

"The hour has come, " he wrote, "to advance at all costs, and to diewhere you stand rather than give way. "

If one examines on the map the respective positions of the German andFrench armies on September 6 as previously described, it will be seenthat by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluckwas exposing his right to the offensive action of our left. This is thestarting point of the victory of the Marne. 

[Sidenote: The Battle of the Marne. ]

On the evening of September 5 our left army had reached the frontPenchard-Saint-Soutlet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued itsattacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening ofthe 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the frontChambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, whohad in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second andFourth Army Corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacksof extreme violence. They occupied Betz, Thury-en-Valois, andNanteuil-le-Haudouin. But in spite of this pressure our troops heldtheir ground well. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and, being reinforced, prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment thatthis attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat towardthe north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th we establishedourselves on the Aisne. 

[Sidenote: Enemy left exposed. ]

Why did the German forces which were confronting us and on the eveningbefore attacking so furiously retreat on the morning of the 10th?Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south tothe north to face our left the enemy had exposed his left to the attacksof the British Army, which had immediately faced around toward thenorth, and to those of our armies which were prolonging the Englishlines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bringabout. This is what happened on September 8 and allowed the developmentand rehabilitation which it was to effect. 

[Sidenote: The part of the British. ]

On the 6th the British Army had set out from the line Rozcy-Lagny andhad that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to thenorth of the Marne below Château-Thierry, taking in flank the Germanforces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, our left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British Army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reachedthe Aisne between Soissons and Longueval. 

[Sidenote: The rôle of the French army. ]

The rôle of the French Army, which was operating to the right of theBritish Army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking onits left. It had on its right to support our centre, which fromSeptember 7 had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps andthe reserve corps which faced it. 

On the 7th it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached andcrossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and 1, 300, 000 cartridges. On the 12th it establisheditself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with ourcentre, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat inhaste. 

[Sidenote: Attack on the French centre. ]

Our centre consisted of a new army created on August 29 and of one ofthose which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in BelgianLuxembourg. The first had retreated on August 29 to September 5 from theAisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general frontSézanne-Mailly. 

The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the lineHumbauville-Château-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy. 

[Sidenote: A further retreat. ]

The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of hisenveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 10th topierce our centre to the west and to the east of Fère-Champenoise. Onthe 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of our new army, whichretired as far as Gouragançon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on theleft the other army corps also had to go back to the lineAllemant-Connantre. 

[Sidenote: Foch out-man[oe]uvres Germans. ]

Despite this retreat the General commanding the army ordered a generaloffensive for the same day. With the Morocco Division, whose behaviorwas heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left towardthe marshes of Saint Gond. Then with the division which had justvictoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sézanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack inthe evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surpriseby this bold man[oe]uvre, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat. 

[Sidenote: Centre armies established. ]

On the 11th we crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of us in disorder. On the 12th we were incontact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. Our otherarmy of the centre, acting on the right of the one just referred to, hadbeen intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th ofdisengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that, beingreinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make itsaction effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormousexpenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th theresult had none the less been attained, and our two centre armies weresolidly established on the ground gained. 

To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders tocover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on theflank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. Buta wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them fromour centre. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliantsuccess for our artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of theSixteenth German Army Corps. 

[Sidenote: Germans retreat on the right. ]

On the 10th inst. The Eighth and Fifteenth German Army Corpscounter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th our progress continuedwith new successes, and on the 12th we were able to face round towardthe north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of theenemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th. 

The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of theleft. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating betweenNancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before our two armies of theEast, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy hadevacuated. The offensive of our right had thus prepared and consolidatedin the most useful way the result secured by our left and our centre. 

Such was this seven days' battle, in which more than two millions of menwere engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road toits neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversarywhich the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of onearticulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity ofintention and method animating the supreme command. 

[Sidenote: Meaning of the victory. ]

To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it wasgained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardentas on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had tomeet the whole German army, and that from the time they marched forwardthey never again fell back. Under their pressure the German retreat atcertain times had the appearance of a rout. 

[Sidenote: Numbers of German prisoners. ]

In spite of the fatigue of our men, in spite of the power of the Germanheavy artillery, we took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, more thana million cartridges, and thousands of prisoners. A German corps lostalmost the whole of its artillery, which, from information brought byour airmen, was destroyed by our guns. 

 * * * * *

[Sidenote: The next objective is the Channel ports. ]

After the failure of the German drive against Paris, whose capture wasthe first objective in the plan of campaign of the German General Staff, preparations were made to carry out the plans for the second objective, the capture of the Channel seaports, and the control of the coasts. TheAllied commanders were quite aware of this purpose, and made plans tocircumvent it. Then followed the famous Race for the Channel, which isdescribed by official French observers in the pages that follow. 

THE RACE FOR THE CHANNEL

FRENCH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

As early as September 11 the Commander in Chief had directed our leftarmy to have as important forces as possible on the right bank of theOise. On September 17 he made that instruction more precise by ordering"a mass to be constituted on the left wing of our disposition, capableof coping with the outflanking movement of the enemy. " Everything led usto expect that flanking movement, for the Germans are lacking ininvention. Indeed, their effort at that time tended to a renewal oftheir manoeuvre of August. In the parallel race the opponents were boundin the end to be stopped only by the sea; that is what happened aboutOctober 20. 

[Sidenote: Allies in the race to the sea. ]

The Germans had an advantage over us, which is obvious from a glance atthe map--the concentric form of their front, which shortened the lengthof their transports. In spite of this initial inferiority we arrived intime. 

From the middle of September to the last week in October fighting wenton continually to the north of the Oise, but all the time we werefighting we were slipping northward. On the German side this movementbrought into line more than eighteen new army corps (twelve active armycorps, six reserve corps, four cavalry corps). On our side it ended inthe constitution of three fresh armies on our left and in the transportinto the same district of the British Army and the Belgian Army fromAntwerp. 

[Sidenote: Resistance in Battle of Flanders. ]

For the conception and realization of this fresh and extendeddisposition the French command, in the first place, had to reduce to aminimum the needs for effectives of our armies to the east of the Oise, and afterwards to utilize to the utmost our means of transport. Itsucceeded in this, and when, at the end of October, the battle ofFlanders opened, when the Germans, having completed the concentration oftheir forces, attempted with fierce energy to turn or to pierce ourleft, they flung themselves upon a resistance which inflicted upon thema complete defeat. 

The movement began on our side only with the resources of the army whichhad held the left of our front during the battle of the Marne, reinforced on September 15 by one army corps. 

This reinforcement, not being sufficient to hold the enemy's offensive(district of Vaudelincourt-Mouchy-Uaugy), a fresh army was transportedmore to the left, with the task "of acting against the German right wingin order to disengage its neighbor, * * * while preserving a flankingdirection in its march in relation to the fresh units that the enemymight be able to put into line. "

[Sidenote: Reinforcements for the First Army. ]

To cover the detrainments of this fresh army in the districtClermont-Beauvais-Boix a cavalry corps and four territorial divisionswere ordered to establish themselves on both banks of the Somme. In thewooded hills, however, which extend between the Oise and Lassigny theenemy displayed increasing activity. Nevertheless, the order stillfurther to broaden the movement toward the left was maintained, whilethe territorial divisions were to move toward Bethune and Aubigny. Themarch to the sea went on. 

[Sidenote: Alternate reverse and success. ]

From the 21st to the 26th all our forces were engaged in the districtLassigny-Roye-Peronne, with alternations of reverse and success. 

It was the first act of the great struggle which was to spread as itwent on. On the 26th the whole of the Sixth German Army was deployedagainst us. We retained all our positions, but we could do no more;consequently there was still the risk that the enemy, by means of afresh afflux of forces, might succeed in turning us. 

Once more reinforcements, two army corps, were directed no longer onBeauvais, but toward Amiens. The front was then again to extend. A fresharmy was constituted more to the north. 

From September 30 onward we could not but observe that the enemy, already strongly posted on the plateau of Thiepval, was continuallyslipping his forces from south to north, and everywhere confronting uswith remarkable energy. 

[Sidenote: Cavalry operations. ]

Accordingly, on October 1 two cavalry corps were directed to make a leapforward and, operating on both flanks of the Scarpe, to put themselvesin touch with the garrison of Dunkirk, which, on its side, had pushedforward as far as Douai. 

But on October 2 and 3 the bulk of our fresh army was very stronglyattacked in the district of Arras and Lens. Confronting it were twocorps of cavalry, the guards, four active army corps, and two reservecorps. A fresh army corps was immediately transported and detrained inthe Lille district. 

But once more the attacks became more pressing, and on October 4 it wasa question whether, in view of the enemy's activity both west of theOise and south of the Somme, and also further to the north, a retreatwould not have to be made. General Joffre resolutely put thishypothesis aside and ordered the offensive to be resumed with thereinforcements that had arrived. It was, however, clear that, despitethe efforts of all, our front, extended to the sea as it was by a mereribbon of troops, did not possess the solidity to enable it to resistwith complete safety a German attack, the violence of which could wellbe foreseen. 

[Sidenote: Transport of the British Army. ]

In the Arras district the position was fairly good. But between the Oiseand Arras we were holding our own only with difficulty. Finally, to thenorth, on the Lille-Estaires-Merville-Hazebrouck-Cassel front, ourcavalry and our territorials had their work cut out against eightdivisions of German cavalry, with very strong infantry supports. It wasat this moment that the transport of the British Army to the northerntheatre of operations began. 

[Sidenote: British Army taken from the Aisne. ]

Field Marshal French had, as early as the end of September, expressedthe wish to see his army resume its initial place on the left of theallied armies. He explained this wish on the ground of the greaterfacility of which his communications would have the advantage in thisnew position, and also of the impending arrival of two divisions ofinfantry from home and of two infantry divisions and a cavalry divisionfrom India, which would be able to deploy more easily on that terrain. In spite of the difficulties which such a removal involved, owing to theintensive use of the railways by our own units, General Joffre decidedat the beginning of October to meet the Field Marshal's wishes and tohave the British Army removed from the Aisne. 

It was clearly specified that on the northern terrain the British Armyshould co-operate to the same end as ourselves, the stopping of theGerman right. In other terms, the British Army was to prolong the frontof the general disposition without a break, attacking as soon aspossible, and at the same time seeking touch with the Belgian Army. 

But the detraining took longer than had been expected, and it was notpossible to attack the Germans during the time when they had onlycavalry in the Lille district and further to the north. 

[Sidenote: Wearied Belgian troops. ]

There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on October 9 theBelgian Army, which was covered by 8, 000 British bluejackets and 6, 000French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the northof Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgianterritory. Unfortunately, the condition of the Belgian troops, exhaustedby a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediatehopes to be based upon them. This situation weighed on our plans anddelayed their execution. 

On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th ourcavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that, in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left wasnot capable of maintaining the advantages obtained during the previousfew days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable a fresh effortwas necessary. That effort was immediately made by the dispatch to thenorth of the Lys of considerable French forces, which formed the FrenchArmy of Belgium. 

The French Army of Belgium consisted, to begin with, of two territorialdivisions, four divisions of cavalry, and a naval brigade. Directlyafter its constitution it was strengthened by elements from other pointson the front whose arrival extended from October 27 to November 11. These reinforcements were equivalent altogether in value to five armycorps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, and sixteenregiments of cavalry, plus sixty pieces of heavy artillery. 

Thus was completed the strategic manoeuvre defined by the instructionsof the General in Chief on September 11 and developed during the fivefollowing weeks with the ampleness we have just seen. The movements oftroops carried out during this period were methodically combined withthe pursuit of operations, both defensive and offensive, from the Oiseto the North Sea. 

[Sidenote: Five armies co-ordinated. ]

On October 22 our left, bounded six weeks earlier by the Noyon district, rested on Nieuport, thanks to the successive deployment of five fresharmies--three French armies, the British Army, and the Belgian Army. 

Thus the co-ordination decided upon by the General in Chief attained itsend. The barrier was established. It remained to maintain it against theenemy's offensive. That was the object and the result of the battle ofFlanders, October 22 to November 15. 

The German attack in Flanders was conducted strategically and tacticallywith remarkable energy. The complete and indisputable defeat in which itresulted is therefore significant. 

The forces of which the enemy disposed for this operation between thesea and the Lys comprised:

[Sidenote: German forces between the sea and the Lys. ]

(1) The entire Fourth Army commanded by the Duke of Württemberg, consisting of one naval division, one division of Ersatz Reserve, (menwho had received no training before the war, ) which was liberated by thefall of Antwerp; the Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-sixth andTwenty-seventh Reserve Corps, and the Forty-eighth Division belonging tothe Twenty-fourth Reserve Corps. 

(2) A portion of another army under General von Fabeck, consisting ofthe Fifteenth Corps, two Bavarian corps and three (unspecified)divisions. 

(3) Part of the Sixth Army under the command of the Crown Prince ofBavaria. This army, more than a third of which took part in the battleof Flanders, comprised the Nineteenth Army Corps, portions of theThirteenth Corps and the Eighteenth Reserve Corps, the Seventh andFourteenth Corps, the First Bavarian Reserve Corps, the Guards, and theFourth Army Corps. 

(4) Four highly mobile cavalry corps prepared and supported the actionof the troops enumerated above. Everything possible had been done tofortify the "morale" of the troops. At the beginning of October theCrown Prince of Bavaria in a proclamation had exhorted his soldiers "tomake the decisive effort against the French left wing, " and "to settlethus the fate of the great battle which has lasted for weeks. "

[Sidenote: Importance of thrusts in Flanders. ]

[Sidenote: German plan in Flanders. ]

On October 28, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria declared in an army orderthat his troops "had just been fighting under very difficultconditions, " and he added: "It is our business now not to let thestruggle with our most detested enemy drag on longer * * * The decisiveblow is still to be struck. " On October 30, General von Deimling, commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps (belonging to General von Fabeck'scommand), issued an order declaring that "the thrust against Ypres willbe of decisive importance. " It should be noted also that the Emperorproceeded in person to Thielt and Courtrai to exalt by his presence theardor of his troops. Finally, at the close of October, the entire Germanpress incessantly proclaimed the importance of the "Battle of Calais. "It is superfluous to add that events in Poland explain in a largemeasure the passionate resolve of the German General Staff to obtain adecision in the Western theatre of operations at all costs. Thisdecision would be obtained if our left were pierced or driven in. Toreach Calais, that is, to break our left; to carry Ypres, that is, tocut it in half; through both points to menace the communications andsupplies of the British expeditionary corps, perhaps even to threatenBritain in her island--such was the German plan in the Battle ofFlanders. It was a plan that could not be executed. 

[Sidenote: Dunkirk the first objective. ]

The enemy, who had at his disposal a considerable quantity of heavyartillery, directed his efforts at first upon the coast and the countryto the north of Dixmude. His objective was manifestly the capture ofDunkirk, then of Calais and Boulogne, and this objective he pursueduntil November 1. 

[Sidenote: Ramscapelle retaken. ]

[Sidenote: Allies win the Battle of Calais. ]

On October 23 the Belgians along the railway line from Nieuport toDixmude were strengthened by a French division. Dixmude was occupied byour marines (fusiliers marins). During the subsequent day our forcesalong the railway developed a significant resistance against an enemysuperior in number and backed by heavy artillery. On the 29th theinundations effected between the canal and the railway line spread alongour front. On the 30th we recaptured Ramscapelle, the only point on therailway which Belgians had lost. On the 1st and 2d of November the enemybombarded Furnes, but began to show signs of weariness. On the 2d heevacuated the ground between the Yser and the railway, abandoningcannon, dead and wounded. On the 3d our troops were able to re-enter theDixmude district. The success achieved by the enemy at Dixmude at thisjuncture was without fruit. They succeeded in taking the town. Theycould not debouch from it. The coastal attack had thus proved a totalfailure. Since then it has never been renewed. The Battle of Calais, sonoisily announced by the German press, amounted to a decided reverse forthe Germans. 

The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor, in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as arenewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in thenorth. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought todrive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerfulmasses. This was the Battle of Ypres. 

[Sidenote: Importance of the Ypres position. ]

[Sidenote: British cavalry a connecting link. ]

In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle we musthark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalryreached Roulers and Cortemark (October 28) our territorial divisionsfrom Dunkirk, under General Biden, had occupied and organized adefensive position at Ypres. It was a point d'appui, enabling us toprepare and maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From October23 two British and French army corps were in occupation of thisposition, which was to be the base of their forward march in thedirection of Roulers-Menin. The delays already explained and thestrength of the forces brought up by the enemy soon brought to astandstill our progress along the line Poelcapelle, Paschendaele, Zandvorde, and Gheluvelt. But in spite of the stoppage here, Ypres wassolidly covered, and the connections of all the allied forces wereestablished. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurledfrom October 25 to November 13, to the north, the east, and the south ofYpres. From October 26 on the attacks were renewed daily withextraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at themost threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on October 31, wewere obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the twoBritish corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, andfinally to intercalate between these two corps a force equivalent to twoarmy corps. Between October 30 and November 6 Ypres was several times indanger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wytschaete. The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult todefend; but defended it was without a recoil. 

[Sidenote: French reinforcements. ]

The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resumefrom the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and 11th thisoffensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, waschecked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforcementshad to be awaited, which were dispatched to the north on November 12. Bythe 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road toYpres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, whoadvanced in massed formation, losses which were especially terrible inconsequence of the fact that the French artillery had crowded nearly 300guns on to these few kilometers of front. 

Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as thedetachments operating further to the north along the coast. The supportwhich, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack onYpres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attackitself had been. 

[Sidenote: Losses of the enemy. ]

During the second half of November the enemy, exhausted and having lostin the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150, 000 men, did not attempt torenew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We, on the contrary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and southof Ypres, and insured definitely by a powerful defensive organization ofthe position the inviolability of our front. 

 * * * * *

[Sidenote: The war in Belgium. ]

[Sidenote: Siege of Antwerp. ]

[Sidenote: Belgian troops retreat to Ostend. ]

[Sidenote: The territory left to the Belgians. ]

We have seen that, with the fall of Liège the German armies sweptthrough Belgium on their way to Paris. Brussels was abandoned as thecapital, and the Government moved hastily to Antwerp, where a portion ofthe Belgian army also gathered to defend the city. The remainder of theBelgian forces, under the leadership of their gallant King, opposed asstoutly as their numbers would permit the advance of the Germans. Battles were fought at Alost and Termonde in which the Germans were, forthe time, repulsed, but their ever-increasing reinforcements enabledthem to advance despite the efforts of the Belgians to check them. Ghentwas captured on September 5 and the Belgians, in an effort to stay theGerman advance on Antwerp, opened the dikes and let in the waters of theNorth Sea. Termonde fell on September 13, and seven days later theGerman armies began the siege of Antwerp. The military authorities incommand of the city had taken whatever measures were possible fordefense. A body of British marines was hurried to the beleaguered cityand preparations were made for a long siege. The Germans brought up gunsof heavy caliber, with which they bombarded the city at long range. After a brave defense of two weeks, during which the inhabitants enduredmany hardships, it was plain that further resistance was useless, andthe city was surrendered on October 10. The Belgian troops in the city, and many of the noncombatants escaped. The Belgian troops retreated toOstend, which they reached on October 11 and 12, after having beengreatly harassed by the pursuing Germans. On the 13th, Ostend wasevacuated, and was occupied by the Germans, and Bruges on the followingday. The German forces now controlled the whole of Belgium, with theexception of the northwest corner, north of Ypres, to the coast of theChannel. This little slip of territory they held throughout the entirewar, and at what a cost! But the heroic defense of this territory by theBelgians saved the French coast cities and prevented the Germans frombreaking through the line which extended now from the North Sea toBelgium. 

THE LAST DITCH IN BELGIUM

ARNO DOSCH

Copyright, World's Work, January, 1915. 

[Sidenote: The Yser the Belgian's last ditch. ]

A little piece of the Low Countries, so small I walked across it in twohours, was all that remained of Belgium in the last days of October. Atide-water stream, the Yser, ebbed and flowed through the sunken fields, and there King Albert with his remnant of an army stopped the Germanmilitary machine in its advance on Calais. If he and his forty thousandmen had been crushed back ten miles farther they would have beenfighting on French soil. The Yser was the last ditch in Belgium. 

The Belgians were able to hold that mere strip of land against more menand better artillery because they had determined to die there. Some ofthose who had not yet paid the price of death told me. They were nottragic about it. There was no display of heroics. They said itseriously, but they smiled a little, too, over their wine glasses, andthe next morning they were back in the firing-line. 

I counted on my American passport and my _permit de sejour_ in Parisseeing me through the zone of the fighting, and they did. At the stationat Dunkirk, when I admitted I had no _laisser passer_, an obliginggendarme led me to his commander, and he placed his visée on my passportwithout question. He asked me whether I was a correspondent, and Iconfessed to it, but it seemed only to facilitate the affair. Earlierexperiences had made me feel that the French gendarmes were my naturalenemies, but I have had a kindlier regard for them since. 

[Sidenote: Troop trains. ]

The train I was on had ten cars full of French and Belgian soldiers. TheBelgians had all been recently re-equipped. On other troop trains whichpassed us going forward there were many more Belgian soldiers, some ofwhom I had seen only a few hours earlier in the streets of Calaiswithout rifles. As their trains passed now I could see them studying themechanism and fondling their new firearms. 

Coming in through the suburbs of Dunkirk we passed hundreds of childrenperched on the fences singing the Marseillaise. Nor were their voicesflat and colorless like most school children's. They felt every wordthey sang, and they put their little hearts into it. Looking back alongthe side of the cars at the faces of soldiers leaning out, I could seethey were touched by the faith of the children. 

[Sidenote: In Dunkirk. ]

As I rattled along on the cobbles of Dunkirk half an hour later I heardan explosion with a note unfamiliar to me. It sounded close, too, but itdid not seem to bother the people of the street. A few children ranbehind their mothers' skirts and a young girl hurried from the middle ofthe street to the protection of an archway, but that was all. 

Standing up in the fiacre I could see a thin smoke about three hundredfeet away in a garden in the direction from which the explosion came, and high in the evening sky I could barely make out an aeroplane. "AGerman bomb?" I asked the driver in some excitement. 

"Oh, yes, " he replied, cracking his whip, "we usually get three or fourevery afternoon about this time, but they have not hurt any one. "

Dunkirk that night answered the description of what a threatened townwhich was not afraid should look like. It had none of the depressingatmosphere of Calais. All the refugees and the wounded were passed onto a safer place. It was full of French, English, and Belgian soldiers, with a scattering of sailors and breezy officers from both the Frenchand English navies. They kept the waiters in the cafés on the run, andthere was only an occasional bandage showing from under a cap or arounda hand to indicate these men were engaged in any more serious businessthan a man[oe]uvre. 

[Sidenote: Armored motor-car. ]

In the street, however, in front of the statue of Jean Bart, an armoredBelgian motor-car was standing. It was built with a turret where thetonneau usually is and it was covered with thick sheet steel right downto the ground. Just in front of the driver was a slit with a lipextending over it, giving it somewhat the effect of the casque belongingto an ancient suit of armor. That was the only opening except the onefor the barrel of the rapid-fire gun in the turret. The armor was dentedin a dozen places where bullets had glanced off, but it had only beenpenetrated at one spot, about six inches from the muzzle of the gun. From the soldier at the steering gear I learned that that bullet hadpassed over the shoulder of the man in the turret. 

[Sidenote: Bombardment of Nieuport. ]

Twenty-four hours later, at Nieuport, when the German shells seemed tobe falling in every street and on every house, I saw this car again, going forward at not less than forty miles an hour. The turret was beingswung to bring the gun-muzzle forward, as if the gunner were expectingto go into action almost immediately. As the last of the Belgiantrenches were just the other side of the town, I have no doubt that hedid. 

[Sidenote: A walk to the firing line. ]

Getting out of Dunkirk was rather more of a problem than going in. Toobtain permission to ride toward the Belgian line in any kind ofconveyance was an elaborate performance, and quite properly so, as Isoon learned. There were preparations for defence going on there whichshould not have been publicly known. The country was full of spies. Foursuspects had been picked up on the boat coming from Folkestone. If I hadrealized what I was to see in the next few miles I would not haveattempted what I did. But, as I was anxious to get on and thefiring-line was only twenty miles away, I decided to walk. 

A French hat and a French suit of clothes, I think, were aloneresponsible for my success in passing through the city gate. Twomilitary automobiles were stopped and forced to show their credentials, but I strolled through unmolested. Once outside, the reservists guardingthe various barricades let me pass as soon as I showed them my passportviséd in Dunkirk. I was stopped many times, too, trying each time not togive an appearance of too great interest in the works of defence beingbuilt all around me. 

[Sidenote: Sand-dune barricades. ]

Even though this cannot be published for some time I do not feel free totell what these defences were. I have no doubt there are completedescriptions of these works in the hands of the German army, their spysystem is so thorough, but I would not care to have any military secretsescape through anything I write. I think I can go so far as to say, though, that I received a liberal education in how to barricadesand-dunes and low-lying fields. 

Ten miles out of Dunkirk I was surprised to see a civilian on a bicycle, as civilians were no longer permitted to go near the theatre of war onbicycles, a precaution taken against spies. As he approached Irecognized Mr. J. Obels, the Belgian correspondent of the Chicago _DailyNews_, whom I had last seen under arrest near Brussels when the Germanarmy first passed through Belgium. He told me he had been kept in prisonseventeen days by the German military governor of Brussels, but, oncereleased, was given every possible kind of pass. I was relieved to seehim alive and free. 

As Obels left me to continue his journey to Dunkirk and on to London todeliver his own "copy, " he advised me to go directly to Furnes, the mostconsiderable town in what was left of Belgium, and have my passportviséd again. So I continued down the long, flat highway, bordered onboth sides by sunken fields, toward the cannonading I could now hearahead. The road had been fairly full of automobiles, motor-trucks, motorcycles, and bicycles over its whole length, but it became crowdednow with the addition of a long string of Parisian motor-buses takingseveral infantry regiments forward. A whole artillery division of yellowFrench "Schneiders" also took up its share of the wide road, and at thebarricades there were traffic blockades lasting at times for tenminutes. 

[Sidenote: The road to Furnes. ]

All the way from Dunkirk I had been struck by the character of the land. As I approached Furnes, the dykes were being opened and half the fieldswere already inundated. It seemed a poor country for militaryoperations. There were at most three highways, all defended. They couldonly be taken at a price no army could afford, and any departure fromthem meant being mired in the heavy fields, now being hastily harvestedof a bumper crop of sugar-beets: at one place a whole French regiment inuniform was gathering the beets preparatory to inundation. With thedykes open these fields would be covered with four feet of water halfthe time. The only possible course for an army was over the sand-dunes, which lay a mile to the north, looking like the imitation mountains yousee in the scenic-railways at every amusement resort in the UnitedStates. 

[Sidenote: Tommies' battles on the sand-dunes. ]

A reservist with whom I walked a mile or so told me Dunkirk had neverbeen successfully attacked except over those sand-dunes, and the Englishand French had fought some of the bloodiest battles of history thereagainst the Spanish, when they held Dunkirk. I doubt, though, that theywere as bloody as the battle I was to see within a few hours. 

[Sidenote: Belgian soldiers. ]

The old Flemish town of Furnes had much less military precision about itthan Dunkirk. It was on the very edge of the battle, and an occasionalshell was dropping in the town. One exploded as I crossed the bridge andentered a narrow street, but it was on the far side of town, too faraway for the soldiers halted in the street to notice. These were tiredand dirty men, but not too tired to be courteous. They were also passingjokes among themselves, and laughing. By that, even if I had not knowntheir uniforms, I could have told they were Belgians. 

[Sidenote: The enemy held at the Yser. ]

Every street and every courtyard in Furnes was full of Belgian soldiers. They were resting for the day, waiting to go forward at night-fall torelieve the men on the firing line only five miles away. Even above thenoises of the street I could hear the answer of their small fieldartillery to the heavy assault of the German guns. Nothing I heard thesoldiers say, however, would have given the idea that the Belgiansconsidered themselves outclassed by their enemy. They seemed superblyunconscious of the absurdity of their position. This was the tenth daythey had held the Germans at the Yser, and they had done it with riflesand machine guns, taking punishment every minute from the bigfieldpieces the Germans had brought against them. So far they had losttwelve thousand men at that ditch, but the thought of giving it up hadevidently not even occurred to them. They could not give it up, one ofthem explained to me later, it was all they had left. There was a littleirritation in his tone, too, as he said it, such as one might feeltoward a child who was slow at grasping a simple fact. 

[Sidenote: Military automobiles and wagons. ]

The town square was full of military automobiles and a few provisionwagons. I did not see any fieldpieces or machine guns. Every last onewas right up on the firing-line. My feet were tired from walking overthe Belgian blocks, and I held tenaciously to the sidewalk passingaround the square, though it was mostly taken up with café tables andbay trees in boxes. At one point the tables were empty and a singlesentry was sauntering up and down. I stopped to ask him the way to the_gendarmerie_, and, in the middle of giving me the directions, he cameto attention, as a door opened behind me, and saluted. 

[Sidenote: Two Belgian generals. ]

Two men came out of the door, one rather tall, with an easy manner, andsmartly dressed as a general in the Belgian army. The other was older, also a general, wearing, if anything, the more gold braid of the two. They entered a waiting automobile and drove off as casually as two menat home might leave their office for their club. 

Something about the first of the two men impressed me as familiar. I hadonly seen his back, but that had arrested my attention. I thoughtpossibly I had seen him at the beginning of the war in Brussels, so Iasked the sentry his name. 

[Sidenote: King Albert. ]

"That is our king, Albert, " he said quite simply. 

During the next couple of days I saw the King of Belgium a number oftimes. He spent his nights at a small villa on the seashore at La Panne, a hundred yards possibly beyond the hotel where I spent mine. He passedthrough the streets as unnoticed as any one of the other Belgians whohad retreated from Antwerp and Ghent ahead of the army, but preferredthe chilly nights in an unheated seaside hotel in Belgium to comfortsomewhere beyond. It seemed to be a point of courtesy on the part of theBelgians not to bother their king with ceremony at this trying time. Idoubt if he cares much for ceremony, anyhow. Searching around for asingle adjective to describe him, I should call him off-handed. Hismanner, even then, while alert, was casual. It is easy to see why theBelgians love him. If kings had always been as simple and direct asAlbert, I am inclined to think democracy would have languished. 

[Sidenote: Luncheon at La Panne. ]

At La Panne, which I reached at noon on a little steam railway runningfrom Furnes, I had luncheon with several Belgian soldiers and a Belgianin civilian clothes, who told me I would see all the fighting I waslooking for at Nieuport, just beyond. The civilian, a tall youth with ablond beard, volunteered to show me the way to the beach, the shortestroute, and ended by going all the way. He told me he was recovering froman "attack of Congo, " which I take to be an intermittent fever. He hadjust been mustered out of the civic guard and was waiting for a uniformto join the army. He had the afternoon free and his Belgian sense ofhospitality impelled him to see that the stranger was properly lookedafter. 

For several miles along the wide, flat beach, which stretchesunobstructed as far as Ostend, except for the piers at Nieuport-les-Bainsand Westende, there were Belgian soldiers bathing in the shallow water. Some of them, cavalrymen, were riding naked into the deeper water, andthis, mind you, was late October. They were even playing jokes on oneanother, and did not seem to be paying any attention to the fifteenEnglish and French cruisers and gunboats which were standing off theshore almost opposite them, keeping up a steady stream of fire obliquelyalong the beach at the sand dunes just beyond the pier atNieuport-les-Bains. In these dunes, _five_ miles away, big German gunswere hidden. 

[Sidenote: Fishermen unconcerned. ]

Farther on, and even right up to the pier at Nieuport, we passed, alongthe beach behind the shrimp fishermen, who seemed even less interestedin the novel fight on land and sea. The barelegged men and women were asindustriously taking advantage of the low-tide as if nothing at all werehappening. The French and English warships were directly opposite them, and, by this time, they were drawing the German fire. German shells, probably from siege guns, were plumping down into the water all aroundthem only a couple of miles off-shore, but, though the shrimpers lookedup occasionally when the explosion of a shell fairly shook the face ofthe ocean, their attention would be directed again to their work beforethe column of water raised by the shell had had time to fall again. Theshelling kept up about an hour, but none of the warships was struck. They kept moving at full-speed in an uneven line, making it impossibleto get their range. 

[Sidenote: A panorama of battle. ]

[Sidenote: Germans try to cross the Yser. ]

Just before we reached the pier heavy cannonading began inland. Weclimbed the sand dunes and there we came suddenly upon a perfectpanoramic view of the battle all the way from the dunes across theinundated fields to Dixmude in the distance. The whole line of battlefor ten miles was in the midst of a German attack, covered by a terrificartillery fire. Over the white, red-tiled cottages of the fishermen, almost lost among the lesser sand dunes, we could make out the Belgianline by the fire of their rifle and machine guns. At two points we couldsee the Yser Canal and at one of these the Germans were trying to throwacross a pontoon bridge. 

We could see it only through the smoke of breaking shells, but it wasthe most exciting event I have ever witnessed. At three miles or more, though, the figures of the men were so small, it was hard to keep thefact in mind that those who dropped were not merely stooping, but hadbeen shot. Eager to get closer, we ran over the sand dunes, but nevergot another view of it. 

[Sidenote: Running to see a battle. ]

My Belgian friend knew his way and we trotted along a raised path amongthe fields toward Nieuport. It was under fire, but it seemed worth therisk to get close enough so we could see the pontoons being rushed intothe water. As we neared Nieuport, however, the firing became much moreactive and we stopped for second thought. After catching our breath, wedecided to pass through the edge of Nieuport and to go on to the villageof Ramscapelle to the south of it. Few shells seemed to be breakingthere. 

[Sidenote: Almost under fire. ]

Along the cross road we took, alternately running and walking. TheBelgian trenches were perhaps a half mile beyond us, and we could makeout the tap-tap of the rifle fire which had been only a continuouscracking a mile in the rear. Into this the machine guns cut with a whir. Spent bullets dropped here and there in the inundated field to the westof us, but the German shell fire must have been right in the trenches. 

Somewhere before we reached Ramscapelle we crossed a road with militaryautomobiles going both ways, but my desire to get behind the shelteringbuildings of Ramscapelle was too strong at the moment to take it in. 

[Sidenote: Fires and explosions in Ramscapelle. ]

About a hundred yards from the village there was a house on the edge ofa canal, and we stopped behind it, safe from bullet-fire, to catch ourbreath again. It was as far as we were destined to get. All at onceshells began dropping on the village, and I have not seen shells drop sofast in so small an area. In the first minute there must have beentwenty. Three fires broke out almost at once. Between the explosions wecould hear the falling tiles. 

The short October day grew unexpectedly dusk and the fires in thevillage reflected in the water on the fields. After the bombarding hadbeen going on without the least let-up for fully fifteen minutes, a bentold woman, a man perhaps older but less bent, and a younger womanappeared on the road to Furnes just beyond us, hurrying along withoutonce looking back. They were the only people we saw and the destructionof the town looked like the most ruthless piece of vandalism. It had amilitary purpose, however. The Germans were concentrating an attack onit with the hope of reaching Furnes. They occupied it that night, butwere later driven out again. I have learned since some of the villagersremained through that bombardment, and were killed in their houses. 

[Sidenote: Destruction of Ramscapelle. ]

While we stood sheltered by the house on the canal, speculating as towhich one of the houses still standing in Ramscapelle would be hit next, the light from those on fire reflected on the dark, brackish water ofthe canal, which was running in with the tide. Presently we noticedsomething in the water, and, stooping down in the twilight, we made outthe body of a man face downward. The color of the coat and the littleshort skirt to it showed it was the body of a German soldier. It passedon and was followed by three more before we left. They had been in thewater several days. 

The fire from the trenches died down at dusk and we made our way backalong the empty crossroad. Half way back to the dunes we passed a RedCross motor ambulance, headed toward Ramscapelle. On the seat beside thedriver was a young English woman. She was wearing the gray-brown coatand gray-brown puttees of the English soldier. We called out to her wethought the town was empty, but the only answer we got from the speedingambulance was an assuring wave of the young woman's hand, which wasevidently meant to inform us she knew where she was going. 

[Sidenote: Ambulances and infantry pass. ]

On the main road from Nieuport to Furnes, which we followed a shortdistance, there were dozens of ambulances going to the rear and a longcolumn of infantry going forward. Headed toward the rear there were alsomany wounded men on foot. They had been dressed at Nieuport, but therewere not enough ambulances to take them all away. One who was walkingslowly and painfully told me he had a bullet in his back. 

During the afternoon the Schneiders I had seen had evidently been placedamong the sand dunes, and they were now bombarding the German lines overour heads. Crossing over the sand dunes to the beach, we passed undertwo batteries, though we did not see them. We could tell they wereFrench, though, by the rapidity of the fire. The French seem to be ableto fire their guns several times as fast as the Germans or the English. 

A cluster of houses belonging to shrimp fishermen was right under thesebatteries, where they were sure to get some of the return fire. But wenoticed there were lights in every one of the cottages. Inside were thesame fishermen who were so apathetic about the fight off-shore. 

[Sidenote: Battle of the sand dunes. ]

[Sidenote: Red flashing of the contact shells. ]

The view from the sand dunes was what the war artists on Englishillustrated weeklies try so hard to show. The French batteries wereusing shrapnel on the German trenches, the shrapnel leaving puffs ofwhite smoke in long, uneven lines; and the Germans were keeping up theirsteady pounding of contact shells, with a short red flash after eachexplosion. The firing of the guns on both sides gave the effect ofcontinuous summer lightning. 

Into the panorama the fleet off-shore kept up a new attack on the Germanbatteries in the sand dunes just beyond Nieuport-les-Bains. As it wasdark now we could see where they were only by the streaks of fire fromtheir guns. These flashes came and went like the strokes of a dagger, asif they were stabbing the dark. 

[Sidenote: French soldiers. ]

We went back along the beach to avoid being questioned, turning aroundconstantly to watch the fleet. At Coxyde a whole company of Frenchsoldiers was standing along the edge of the water, jumping back insurprise when the little waves advanced on them. They told us they werefrom the centre of France and had never seen salt water before. 

The shore there is lined with new villas made of light colored bricks. One of these had been dynamited, because it belonged to a German and wassuspected of having a concrete floor for siege guns. I had heard ofcases of this kind before, but I had never had an opportunity to examineone. 

[Sidenote: Concrete foundations. ]

My private thought was that the villa had probably been built by aGerman with a passion for solidity, but, examining it under a half-fullmoon, I could see the foundations were brick walls two feet thickcovered with mosaic backed by reinforced concrete about a foot thick. Itseemed like something more than Teutonic thoroughness. 

A little later in La Panne I was shown a concrete tennis court belongingto a German which had been punched full of holes. It was in no placethick enough, however, to give cause for suspicion that its realpurpose was in any way sinister. 

By the time we regained La Panne I was hardly able to walk as I had beengoing hard all day, a good deal of the way through soft sand. But evenif I had been much more tired I would have sensed the atmosphere of thattown. To me the little seaside village, built for summer gayety, hadmore of the romance of war in it than any place I have seen. 

The half dozen summer hotels and all the villas were filled with themothers, wives, and children of the Belgian soldiers whose firing line Ihad just left. Their homes had been in Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent. Nowthey were in the last little town in Belgium. To some their soldiers hadalready returned, and they were dining as merrily as if to-morrow didnot hold out a reasonable likelihood of being killed. At the doors ofthe hotels and on the street were many others waiting, and, as thestreet had filled up with another French artillery division bivouackedfor a few hours, they could not see their men folk until they were closeat hand. 

[Sidenote: Refugees at La Panne. ]

Now and then as we passed we could hear little gasps of happiness. Forsome, of course, there were disappointment and bad news. But they musthave carried their sorrow to their chambers, as La Panne was all gayety. 

A comment on the Belgian soldiers made at the beginning of the waroccurred to me: "They shoot the enemy all day; at night they come homeand kiss mother. In the morning they kiss mother again and go back toshoot some more. "

They certainly showed themselves capable of shaking off the horrors ofwar before their women folk. To see them there in La Panne that nightyou might have thought it was all a sham battle if it had not been fora conviction of reality that would not shake off. 

It was nearly ten o'clock, now but Belgian soldiers relieved from thefiring line and off duty for the night were still coming into La Panne. In the Hotel Des Arcades, which incidentally, has no arcades, the barand the dining room were full of soldiers. Officers and their men wereeating and drinking together in the pleasant democratic way they have inthe Belgian army. Room was made for us at the long central table in thedining room, and all at the table were solicitous to see that we were atonce given plenty to eat and drink. Several of the fifteen men at thetable had hands or heads bandaged, but that did not seem to detract fromtheir gayety. 

[Sidenote: Spirit of the Belgian soldiers. ]

A joke was being told as we sat down, and every one was taking a livelyinterest in it, the narrator was a bearded man of fifty, and he wastelling to the delight of the others how his son had once got the betterof him in Brussels before the war. There were other stories of mattersequally foreign to war. The private on one side of me told me he was themanager for Belgium of an American typewriter. The lieutenant on theother side was in ordinary times an insurance agent. All the men therewere in business and talked and acted like a company of young Americanbusiness men. 

My first hint that these men had been through any trying experience wasthe apology offered by a new-comer for being late. He entered rathergravely and said something about having to take the word to his sisterof his brother-in-law's death. The whole company turned grave then andconversation from being general was carried on for a few minutes betweenthose near together. I asked the typewriter agent, to fill an awkwardpause, whether they had seen much action, and he told me their story. 

[Sidenote: The fight on the road to Nieuport. ]

This was a crack mitrailleuse company of Brussels. It had been in thefight from Liège back to Malines and from Antwerp back to Dixmude andNieuport. Three days before it was told to hold a road into Nieuport. Itwas a road the Germans must take, if they were to advance, but theBelgians would not give way. They were too clever with their rapid-fireguns to be rushed, and the German bayonet charges only blocked the roadwith their dead. Again and again the gray line came on, but each time itcrumpled before their fire. They were attacked every hour of the day ornight, but they were always ready. Finally the Germans got their rangeand dropped shell after shell right among them. 

"They blew us all to pieces, " the story went on in a low tone at myelbow. "Those shells don't leave many wounded, but they littered theplace with arms and legs. They got a good many of us, but they did notseem to be able to get our guns. "

I asked what their loss had been, and he looked around the table, counting, before he answered. 

"Let's see, now, " he said. "We lost some at Dixmude first. I think therewere just seventy last Monday. " This was Thursday. "We had a pretty badtime, " he ended; looking down. 

"How many are there now?" I asked, and he answered with a sweep of hishand around the table. "Five or six more, " he said. There were eighteenof them at table now. That meant twenty-three or twenty-four--out ofseventy. 

"The dogs suffered, too, " he added. "We've only got eight out of twenty, and I just heard the dogs around here have already been pressed intoservice. "

[Sidenote: Courtesy of the machine gunners. ]

When I went to bed four of the members of that shattered mitrailleusecompany climbed three flights of stairs to see that I had a comfortableroom. And these men had just come out of a trench where they had lostmore than two thirds their number in three days stopping one of the mainlines of the German advance. 

[Sidenote: Back to the lines. ]

In the twilight of early morning, when the cannonading had at last dieddown, I heard the movement of troops in the street and saw my friends ofthe night before falling into line and getting their equipment straight. By the time I reach the sidewalk they were moving off, some of the menhelping the dogs with the mitrailleuse. 

"Big fight last night, " said the typewriter agent smiling. "Company thatrelieved us got it hard. We must hurry back. "

They were all very alert and soldierlike in the chill of the morning, but they were a pitifully small company as they passed up the road andwere lost in the sand dunes. 

 * * * * *

In August and September, while on the western front were being foughtthe great initial struggles of the Great War, Turkey, long under Germanpolitical influence, was making ready to cast her lot with the TeutonicPowers. Germany had already made diplomatic and military moves whichindicated that she was certain of a Turkish alliance. The strongestfigures of the Ottoman Empire, Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey were stronglypro-German, although the latter endeavored for a time to conceal hisreal sentiments and intentions under a cloak of pretended neutrality. The causes which induced Turkey to side with the Central Powers ratherthan with the Allies are explained in the narrative which follows. 

WHY TURKEY ENTERED THE WAR

ROLAND G. USHER

Copyright, World's Work, January, 1915. 

[Sidenote: Extreme danger of Turkey. ]

Many people entirely misunderstand the significance of the declarationof war by Turkey against Russia, France, and England. Why thesedespairing gasps of the dying? they ask. What possible chance has thisweak, moribund state to survive a clash of arms with the Triple Entente?Has not the Turk, in fact, dug his own grave and committed suicide? Inall probability the Turk is in considerable danger, but the danger doesnot arise from his joining Germany. In fact, the war and the presentinternational situation provide the Turk with the best opportunity in acentury to achieve the aims cherished by Turkish statesmen who have thebest interests of Turkey itself at heart. For several years Turkey hasbeen in extreme peril. It was condemned to death by the Triple Ententesome time ago, and the prediction of the British Prime Minister in arecent public speech that this war would end the existence of Turkey asan independent power was only the publication of the sentence of deathlong since decided upon. The Sick Man was kept alive by his friends, thedoctors, largely because they deemed his malady incurable. The moment heshowed signs of convalescence they agreed to poison him. But for theprotection of Germany the political existence of Turkey would be alreadya thing of the past. The Turk, therefore, will stand or fall accordingto the decision in this war for or against Germany. He will beexcessively foolish not to do everything he can to insure a Germanvictory. 

[Sidenote: Entrance of Turkey into War. ]

[Sidenote: Constantinople core of the War. ]

The entrance of Turkey into the war has long been foreseen, and its vastsignificance has long been clear to students. Some trained observers gomuch further: Sir Harry Johnston, a traveler, statesman, and diplomat ofrepute, has declared: "Constantinople is really the core of the war. " Indiplomatic circles in Vienna this summer there was a general agreementthat the loss of Salonika, which the Turk was forced to hand over toGreece at the end of the Balkan wars, was a vital blow to the TripleAlliance, and its recovery would be of sufficient importance to justifythe risk of a European war to accomplish it. The situation in the NearEast and in the Balkans is an integral part of the European war. Infact, the war is not a European war at all; it is a world war in themost literal sense of the words. 

[Sidenote: Control of exit from the Black Sea imperative to Russia. ]

At the beginning of the twentieth century keen observers saw clearlythat the old order of things, which had preserved the Turk so long inthe face of many enemies, had passed away beyond a peradventure and hadleft the Turk in great peril. Ever since the decay of the strength ofthe Ottoman Empire the Turk had been hardly pressed in Europe by Russiaand by Austria, both of whom coveted sections of his dominions, and bothof whom would have been glad to obtain Constantinople, the gatewaybetween Europe and Asia. Of the two, Russia was more insistent becauseher interests made the control of the exit from the Black Sea imperativefor her. The Turk, however, until very recently, was himself strongenough to throw considerable obstacles in the face of the invader; hewas probably, in 1900, more efficient than in 1850; but his enemies hadgrown by leaps and bounds. He was confronted by a new Austria and a newRussia. 

What was worse, the Balkan nations, who had long been subject peoples, ill-organized, poverty stricken, had grown with the help of the Turk'senemies into sturdy, self-reliant, independent communities withgood-sized armies and something approaching national wealth. The longyears of subjection had left behind a consuming hatred of the Turk intheir breasts; as Christians, they hated the Turk as the Infidel; andthey promised themselves some day the control of Constantinople in theinterest of Christianity. The neighbors of the Turk had grown formidableand would be able to make short work of him unless help arrived. 

[Sidenote: Industrial growth of Germany. ]

[Sidenote: Old order changes. ]

There was none to be had from his past friends; so much was only tooclear. The shift in the international situation caused by the astoundingindustrial growth of Germany, the rapid development of the German, Austrian, and Italian fleets, the increased efficiency of the armies ofthe Triple Alliance had all made the control of the Mediterranean farmore difficult for England and France. They could no longer spare shipsand troops in sufficient numbers to rescue the Turk from Russia withoutexposing themselves more than was wise in northern Europe. Besides, thedesigns of the Triple Alliance made it seem only too probable that thepossession of Constantinople by Russia and the creation of a fleet inthe Black Sea might be the only means of preserving for the French andEnglish control of the western Mediterranean. The old order had changed:the Turk's friends were now his enemies bent on his destruction. 

[Sidenote: Ambition of new Turkish party. ]

[Sidenote: Democratic and nationalist revival. ]

Yet there had never been a time when the Sick Man was more desperatelydetermined to get well, when life had seemed to him so entirelydesirable. The passing of the old order caused no grief among theTurks--outside of those few henchmen who had long drawn a fat revenuefrom foreign nations. The Turks had become fired with ambition, withdemocratic conceptions, highly inconsistent with the state of thingswhich the old order had so long sanctioned. The new democrats declaredindignantly that Turkey had been for years conducted for the benefit offoreign nations; it should be conducted in the future solely in theinterests of Turkey. They were roused to enthusiasm by the past historyof the Ottoman empire and burned to reconquer its old provinces, toestablish a closer relationship between the provinces which remained. Animperialistic movement, a nationalistic revival, if you will, waspreached in Turkey by ardent enthusiasts whose words fell on willingears. To the democratic and nationalist revival was joined religiousdiscontent. The Sultan was the religious head of the Mohammedan world. Everywhere the true Believers were in chains. Everywhere the infidelreigned supreme. From Constantinople to Mecca, from the confines ofMorocco to the plains of India, the Mohammedan world was ground underthe heel of the conqueror and the conqueror was the Arch Enemy of Truth. There must be, they preached, a great crusade, a united rising to castout the Christian dogs and restore the sceptre of empire to the hand ofa devout believer in Allah. Turkey, Assyria, Asia Minor, Persia, Arabia, India, Egypt, the whole of Africa, should be freed from the yoke of theoppressor. 

[Sidenote: Great Confederation of States. ]

[Sidenote: From Berlin to Bagdad railroad. ]

And now appeared an ally, unfortunately a Christian, in fact apeculiarly devout Christian, but one able to save the Turk from hisfoes, glad to foster his ambitions. The plans of Germany for her futureinvolved the creation of a great confederation of states stretching fromthe North Sea to the Persian Gulf and including Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Balkans, Turkey, and Persia. These states controlled the great overland roads from central Europe tothe Persian Gulf and would make possible overland trade with the East. Arailroad already existed as far as Constantinople, and a railroad fromConstantinople to Bagdad and the Gulf would not only throw open AsiaMinor and the great plains of Mesopotamia to European capital, but wouldfurnish a perfectly practicable commercial road to the East throughwhich in time would flow a trade which would make the greatConfederation rich. Of this Confederation, Turkey would be an integraland essential part. Adrianople, the key to the Balkans; Salonika, key tothe Ægean; Constantinople, controlling the outlet to the Black Sea andthe crossing to Asia Minor; the land approaches of the Tigris andEuphrates valleys--all these the Turk had, all these an alliance withhim would give Germany. The stronger the Turkish State, the betterorganized, the larger its army and fleet, the greater its resources, themore useful it would be to Germany and the more thoroughly it wouldinsure the success of Pan-Germanism. 

[Sidenote: England and France sustain courteous hold on Constantinople. ]

It had been for the interests of England and France to keep Turkey weak. The Turk must hold Constantinople, but must not be strong enough to useit; as a tenant, as a nominal owner, he was extremely useful; some onehad to own it; England and France could not hold it themselves; theywere determined Russia should not have it; and the Turk was a useful_locum tenens_. They, therefore, frowned upon Turkish ambitions fordemocratic government and would, undoubtedly, have sacrificed the Turkrather than see an independent Mohammedan State take real control ofAsia Minor and Northern Africa. 

[Sidenote: Pan-Germanic Confederation. ]

Germany, on the contrary, wished an active agent to pursue anaggressive policy in her favor. If the Sick Man could get out of bedonly with assistance, Germany was anxious to help him; and the Turkvastly preferred an alliance with a Power which was eager to make himwell to one with Powers almost afraid to keep him alive. The Turkswished a capable government, a good army, a State deserving ofindependence, and were overjoyed to find Germany ready and desirous tofoster this ambition. Indeed, as a member of the Pan-GermanicConfederation, the Turk must be strong enough to hold Constantinople andthe Bagdad Railway in the event of a general European war, withoutdepending upon Germany for more than assistance, supplies, and advice. Germany and Austria, menaced on both sides at home, would not be able totake the risks of sending troops to the Near East, and the Turk wouldhave to be strong enough to keep at bay such forces as it seemed likelyRussia would be able to spare from the battlefields of northern Europe. 

[Sidenote: Pan-Islam. ]

Germany was equally ready to have the Turk gratify his imperialist andreligious ambitions. Pan-Islam would destroy the political control ofEngland and France in northern Africa and in Egypt. It might evenoverturn the British Empire in India. This would be the greatestpossible service any one could render Germany, and it might be one whichGermany could accomplish in no other way. If the Triple Entente was thegreatest foe of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Germanism should be its greatestfriend. Where ambition and interest coincide, co-operation is simple. 

[Sidenote: Reorganization of Turkey. ]

In complete accord, therefore, the Germans and the Turks undertook thereorganization of Turkey above five years or more ago. They saw withclear vision the real truth about Turkey. With engaging candor they laidthe blame for the deficiencies of Turkish government upon England andFrance and declared them the work of intention. Turkey, they saw, wasnot a nation in the European sense of the word; it was not even a singlerace. It was not a geographical unit by any means, but a series ofdistricts on the whole geographically disconnected. Far from being aneconomic unit with a single interest vital to all its inhabitants, itproduced nothing essential to the outside world which its inhabitantscould depend upon exchanging for European manufactured goods. 

[Sidenote: Turkey's economic interests. ]

Its economic interests were potential rather than real; its trade, theresult of its strategic position rather than of the interests and thecapacity of its population. Normally and naturally the Turk should be amiddleman, a distributor rather than a producer. He was placed incontrol of the continental roads between Asia and Central Europe, andwas able to control the overland trade as soon as it emerged from theCaucasus or the Persian Gulf, and maintain that control until thecontinental highway passed into the defiles of the Balkans beyondAdrianople. Constantinople itself, controlling the narrow passage whichformed the exit of the Black Sea, was in a position to foster or hinderthe entire trade of southern Russia with the rest of the world. In fact, it was impossible to deny, and the Germans thoroughly well understoodit, that the trade of the East with Europe and the trade of Russia withthe rest of the world might pass through Turkey, but was not likely tostay there. 

[Sidenote: Turkey's important strategic position. ]

In this important strategic position, economically valuable to othersbut not to its inhabitants, had been collected a peculiar andextraordinary conglomeration of races, creeds, and interests; few ofwhich had much in common, and all of which cherished for each otherantipathies and jealousies almost as old as history. The racial problemof Turkey would be less difficult if the races were only located side byside in solid masses. With few exceptions the races interpenetrate oneanother to a remarkable extent and the Turk himself is numerically inthe majority in comparatively few districts of Asia Minor, where thebulk of the Turkish population lives, and in scarcely any part ofEuropean Turkey. The Turks are literally overlords, a ruling class. 

[Sidenote: Turkey's weak political fabric. ]

The Turk has governed this vast territory and this conglomeration ofraces and religions by a peculiarly weak political fabric which seemedin the nineteenth century to combine in one structure all thedisadvantages of centralization, and all those of decentralization. Subject peoples have been ruled by a combination of military, civil, andreligious authority which has been dependent in the long run for itssupport on the army. However, had the subject peoples hated each otherless cordially, had they been more capable of organization and willingto compromise, they might have ended the Turkish rule decades ago, armyor no army. Some observers, indeed, have thought the Turkish Governmentan artificial sham kept alive by France and England for their ownpurposes. Whatever reasons were to be given, the Germans and the Turkssaw that Turkey as a nation and Turkey as a state had been, both ofthem, practically non-existent. Both had been names, not realities. Turkey had appeared on the European maps. A series of so-calledstatesmen had taken European bribes in Constantinople; numerousincompetent and venal officials had robbed the populace with the help ofthe soldiers in the provinces, and this Government plus the army wasTurkey. Turkey had, indeed, been sick, but that particular kind ofillness, the Turks thought, could be cured; and the Germans agreed withthem. 

[Sidenote: Germany's willingness to assist Turkey. ]

[Sidenote: Germany's influence in Turkey. ]

[Sidenote: Reasons for Turkey's joining Germany. ]

We must not forget as observers the exceeding importance of Germanwillingness to assist the ambitions of the educated Turks forself-government and for independence from European influence. TheEnglish and French control of Turkey was fortuitous and artificial anddepended solely upon the control of a little group of men inConstantinople. German influence in Turkey has deep and fundamentalroots in a large and significant part of the Turkish population andappeals to their best and highest impulses. We have here in the lastanalysis the reasons why Turkey has joined Germany in the war. Theenlightened Turks see in Pan-Germanism a democratic Turkey withconstitutional self-government, a Turkey developing its own resources, aTurkey gradually freeing itself from the fetters of European alliancesand becoming gradually but certainly strong enough to take its place inthe Pan-Germanic chain as a state of worth, integrity, and importance. They see in the victory of Pan-Germanism the effective promise of therealization of such ideals. They see in the defeat of Pan-Germanismpolitical and national death, the annexation of Turkey by its enemies, and the subjection of the Turks to the rule of the Infidel. For thesereasons they joined Germany in the first place. For these deep, fundamental reasons they hold staunchly to their friend. We shall beguilty of quibbling and of shortsightedness if we look for anexplanation of Turkish policy in the seizure of warships and the breachof treaties. 

[Sidenote: Reorganization of Turkey. ]

The reorganization of Turkey was duly observed by the Triple Entente andits purpose thoroughly well understood. Their opposition to it wasprompt, and Italy attempted by the Tripolitan War to rob the Turk of oneof his distant provinces. Having seized Tripoli with the consent of theTriple Entente, Italy then changed sides, returned to the TripleAlliance and took Tripoli with her. The result was a prompt reversal ofthe strategic situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and placed Englandand France in such danger that they saw the moment had probably comewhen it would be positively to their advantage to gratify Russia'sambition and allow her to seize Constantinople. The Tripolitan Warsuspended the sword of Damocles over the Turk's head. 

[Sidenote: The Balkan War. ]

[Sidenote: The loss of Macedonia. ]

The Balkan War threatened for a time to annihilate him. The prompt aidof Austria and Germany as stout representatives in the internationalconclave, the mobilization of the Austrian army, the knowledge thatGermany was ready to mobilize, saved the Turk. The ambitions of Bulgariabrought her over to the side of the Triple Alliance, which was more thanready to assist her in dominating the Balkans. The second war costBulgaria dear but gave back to the Turk Adrianople. Macedonia, however, was lost entirely, and much of Thrace, with Salonika, the key of theÆgean, was also lost and fell into the hands of the Turk's enemy, Greece. 

[Sidenote: Little likelihood of attack on Constantinople. ]

The reorganized state was now undeniably in great peril; and theprobability of an outbreak of a European war in the near future, theknowledge that the Turk must himself defend Constantinople and theBagdad Railway, urged the Germans and the Turks to great efforts inreorganizing the army and providing equipment. The fleet also receivedattention; two battleships were building in England and another waspurchased from one of the South American states. There would this timebe no escape. The death sentence had been passed upon the Turk, and ifhe waited for his enemies to gather and descend upon him defense wouldbe problematical. It was, of course, realized that in the long runGermany would save Turkey by battles won in France or in Poland, andalso that German defeats in Europe would in the long run spell thedownfall of Turkey whatever the Turk did. It was, therefore, advisableto postpone action as long as possible. While Russia was exertingherself to the utmost to mobilize an army in Poland, there was smalllikelihood of an attack on Constantinople, and the Turk might wellremain neutral, equip and organize the army, acquire supplies, andchoose the moment to take the offensive. 

[Sidenote: German cruisers at Constantinople. ]

England, on the outbreak of the war, seized the two battleships buildingin England, and, therefore, weakened the Turkish strength in the BlackSea. The deficiency was supplied by sending two German cruisers toConstantinople and selling them to the Turkish Government. Some weeksago the Germans judged that the time had come when the Turk must openlyjoin in the war, send his troops to the frontier in order to hold theinvader as far as possible from Constantinople. Indeed, action at thistime might allow the Turk to accomplish results of the utmostimportance. Those who see simply the fact that Russia could easilyoverwhelm the Turk standing alone, that the Balkan States united mightalso dispose of him, entirely fail to grasp the possibilities before theTurk at the present moment when Russia is extremely busy in the North, when the Balkan States seem hopelessly divided, and when Italy ismaintaining with determination her neutrality. 

[Sidenote: Closing of the Black Sea by Turkey. ]

[Sidenote: Enormous value of oil supplies in the Black Sea District. ]

The most important thing the Turk has done for Germany has been theclosing of the Black Sea. The sowing of a few mines in the Straitspromptly put an end to Russian trade from the Black Sea and dealtsouthern Russia a great blow commercially. Germany thus struck atEngland, because a large part of the English food supply has normallycome from the Black Sea district, and the desire to protect the grainships through the Mediterranean has been one of England's chief reasonsfor maintaining control of that sea. So large were these suppliesnormally that England has had considerable difficulty in replacing themand is destined soon to experience greater difficulty in furnishing asupply equivalent in volume and accessibility. The Black Sea districtalso has large oil supplies which would be of enormous value to Englandand France, now that the extensive use of the automobile in warfare hasmade gasolene a supply second in importance only to powder and food. Ifthe Turkish navy, augmented by the German cruisers, can dispose of theRussian ships in the Black Sea, and this seems not improbable, the Turkmight annex for Germany this supply of oil. That would be a stroke ofthe utmost consequence. 

[Sidenote: Isolation of Russia. ]

[Sidenote: Importance of Turkey to Germany. ]

Closing the Black Sea by the Turk, plus the closing of the Baltic by theGerman fleet in the North Sea, would also accomplish another extremelyimportant result, the absolute and complete isolation of Russia fromcontact with all parts of the world except Germany, Austria, and Turkey. The question has often arisen as to the ability of Germany to prolongthe war in the face of her inability to export goods to her usualcustomers. The complete cessation of manufacture in Germany would sooneror later bankrupt the country and bring her to her knees. The Germanspoint out that the isolation of Russia will have precisely the sameeffect on that country unless Russia can find some place where her rawproducts can be exchanged for the manufactured goods which are much morenecessary in warfare than the crude products which she always has tosell. The experience of the past has proved again and again thatbelligerent countries persistently trade with one another when it isprofitable. The Germans expect to sell their manufactured goods inRussia in exchange for the raw materials which Russia produces, just aslong as their fleet holds the mouth of the Baltic and the Turk controlsConstantinople. A brisk trade between Germany, Austria, and Russia isalready reported and if it attains the proportions the Germans expect, their commercial problem will have been largely solved. But itscontinued solution will depend upon the maintaining of Turkey inConstantinople. If these considerations are as important as thePan-Germanists have usually claimed, it will be obvious that theadhesion of the Turk has exceeding importance for Germany and had longbeen arranged in advance. 

[Sidenote: Control of the Suez Canal vital to Great Britain. ]

The possibilities before the Turkish army, well equipped with modernmunitions of war and capably officered by Germans, have been by no meansforgotten. The great objective of Pan-Germanism is not in Europe but inAsia and Africa. The defense of the English and French dominions in bothwill have to be made in Europe. The strength of the German army, thesize of the German fleet, would prevent the English and French fromdissipating their forces over the vast territory which they claim tocontrol. The experienced troops in India, in Egypt, and in Morocco wereshipped to France upon the outbreak of the war exactly as the Germansexpected and hoped. Their places were filled by less experiencedregiments from France, England, and the English colonies. Egypt and theSuez Canal, India, and the great defenses would not be so strongly held. The Turk occupied a position flanking Persia and a position flankingEgypt. A strong, well-trained Turkish army might conceivably captureeither or both. Assistance from within might well be expected in both, and victory in either would exert a moral effect upon the war in Europewhich would be of the utmost importance. A few hours' possession of theSuez Canal, furthermore, would allow the Germans to obstruct it andeffectually block the approach of England to Australia and India exceptby the long road around Africa. Conceivably this might interfereseriously with the English food supplies from Australia and New Zealand, particularly with the supplies of meat from the latter. This would bemore than usually important in view of the deficiency of meat suppliesin the United States and Canada, and the length of time necessary toprocure them from the Argentine Republic. It is by these blows at thefood supply that the Germans expect to make the greatest impression uponEngland. Short of actual invasion, the stoppage of supplies is the onlymethod by which the Germans can inflict suffering upon England. 

[Sidenote: Bulgaria ally of Germany. ]

[Sidenote: All Balkan states weakened by Balkan War. ]

No one in Berlin or Constantinople has forgotten the existence of theBalkans. Servian enmity, Greek hatred for the Turk, are only tooobvious; Bulgaria is believed to be entirely faithful to the Germaninterests; Roumania has never been very trustworthy, and has at timesbeen an ally of both the coalitions in Europe. The ability of the Turk, of course, to hold Constantinople and above all to take the offensivewould depend upon the continued neutrality or alliance of the BalkanStates. Combined, they are amply strong enough to overrun Turkey inEurope and probably to invade Asia Minor in force. All the Balkan Statesexcept Roumania--which is hardly a Balkan State--were very much weakenedin men and in resources by the late Balkan wars, and will probably haveconsiderable difficulty in obtaining any quantity of supplies fromforeign countries, though we are told of large purchases by the Greeksin the United States. The fact, however, that the Turk has taken theoffensive against Egypt and Persia makes it extremely probable that theBalkan hatreds have offset each other. Bulgaria's existence probablydepends upon Austrian protection. Roumania is probably afraid to takethe field with Bulgaria, Turkey, Russia, and Austria against her, whilethe Greeks and Servians have still to recover from the recent wars. Itis probable, therefore, that, Bulgaria and Roumania being neutral, Servia at war with Austria, Turkey can take from Greece Salonika andpossibly Macedonia. Should the war in Europe progress favorably forGermany, the attitude of the Balkan States toward Germany would beinfluenced and a scramble would ensue to join the victor, which wouldprobably result in the extinction of Servia and Greece and thestrengthening of Bulgaria and Turkey. Naturally, the Turk would retakethe islands in the Ægean Sea which are now in Italy's hands. 

[Sidenote: Turkey's position if Germany wins in Europe. ]

Let us suppose that all goes as they hope: that the Germans win inEurope; that the Turks and Bulgarians take control of the Balkans; thatthe Russians are excluded from Persia, and the English from Egypt. Thevictorious Turkish army is then in a position to advance along thePersian Gulf road upon India, and would assail India at her weakestpoint, outflanking the great defenses at Quetta which have beendeveloped primarily against Russia. 

[Sidenote: Possibilities of Pan-Islam. ]

We must not forget to enumerate, among the possibilities, Pan-Islam. Success by the Turks in Egypt or Persia would undoubtedly give animpulse to Pan-Islam which might put all the fanatical enthusiasm of theMohammedans into a vast uprising which might sweep the French andEnglish out of northern Africa and India. The Sultan of Turkey is theofficial head of the Mohammedan religion. His orders Moslems are allbound to obey. At present the Mohammedans in the English and Frenchpossessions, who are, of course, under English and French influence, areclaiming that the acts of the Sultan are not really his, but those ofGerman officers; and the reports at the time of writing indicate that atthe present moment the order from Constantinople for a holy war willprobably not be regarded or obeyed. But a victory by Turkish arms wouldprobably instantly change the situation and might loose the pent-upfanaticism of the most intensely emotional of the Oriental races. Hereis another weapon in the German arsenal whose use will depend upon thecoöperation of the Turk. 

[Sidenote: Key of situation is Constantinople. ]

It should now be evident that there is much to be said for the view thatthe key to the present situation is Constantinople. We are dealing withworld politics, with a world war which is being fought on thebattlefields of Europe; but we are dealing with a world war whoseresults are not expected to develop in Europe proper. The key to thissituation lies in Constantinople, and the Turk holds it. 

 * * * * *

The outbreak of the Great War found the British navy in a high state ofpreparedness, and so preponderant in number of vessels and in weight ofguns that the German Grand Fleet as a whole was content to remain behindthe walls of Helgoland. Squadrons were sent out, however, to attackisolated British ships, and on August 28 the first naval battle of thewar occurred in the Bight of Helgoland. Here British and German cruisersengaged in a struggle in which the honors were for a time even. Thearrival of British dreadnoughts quickly turned the scale, and the Germanships fled to the safety of their harbor. The Germans lost four largeships, while the British fleet lost none. 

The German navy was revenged in November 3, when a fleet of warships metand sunk three British cruisers off the Coronel. On December 9, however, a British fleet, after a search of many days, came up with and sankthree German cruisers, and severely damaged two others in the Battle ofFalkland Islands. 

THE FALKLAND SEA FIGHT

A. N. HILDITCH

Battle Sketches by A. N. Hilditch, Oxford University Press. 

[Sidenote: The Falkland Islands. ]

In 1592, John Davis, the arctic explorer, after whom the strait betweenGreenland and the North American mainland is named, made an attempt, incompany with Thomas Cavendish, to find a new route to Asia by theStraits of Magellan. Differences arose between the two leaders. One wasan explorer: the other had a tendency towards freebooting. They partedoff the coast of Patagonia. Davis, driven out of his course by stormyweather, found himself among a cluster of unknown and uninhabitedislands, some three hundred miles east of the Straits of Magellan. Thisgroup, after many changes and vicissitudes, passed finally into thehands of Great Britain, and became known as the Falkland Islands. 

[Sidenote: Climate surface, and vegetation. ]

They consist of two large islands and of about one hundred islets, rocks, and sandbanks. The fragments of many wrecks testify to thedangers of navigation, though masses of giant seaweed act as buoys formany of the rocks. So numerous are the penguins, thronging in battalionsthe smaller islands and the inland lagoons, that the governor of thecolony is nicknamed King of the Penguins. As New Zealand is said to bethe most English of British possessions, the Falklands may perhaps beappropriately termed the most Scottish. Their general appearanceresembles that of the Outer Hebrides. Of the population, a largeproportion are of Scottish extraction. The climate is not unlike that ofScotland. The winters are misty and rainy, but not excessively cold. Soviolent are the winds that it is said to be impossible to play tennis orcroquet, unless walls are erected as shelter, while cabbages grown inthe kitchen-gardens of the shepherds, the only cultivated ground, are attimes uprooted and scattered like straw. The surface, much of which isbogland, is in some parts mountainous, and is generally wild and rugged. Small streams and shallow freshwater tarns abound. A natural curiosity, regarded with great wonder, exists in 'stone-rivers'; long, glisteninglines of quartzite rock débris, which, without the aid of water, slidegradually to lower levels. There are no roads. Innumerable sheep, thefamiliar Cheviots and Southdowns, graze upon the wild scurvy-grass andsorrel. The colony is destitute of trees, and possesses but few shrubs. The one tree that the Islands can boast, an object of much care andcuriosity, stands in the Governor's garden. The seat of government, andthe only town, is Port Stanley, with a population of about 950. Itsgeneral aspect recalls a small town of the western highlands ofScotland. Many of the houses, square, white-washed, and grey-slated, possess small greenhouse-porches, gay with fuchsias and pelargoniums, inpleasing contrast to the prevailing barrenness. A small cathedral, Christ Church, and an imposing barracks, generally occupied by a companyof marines, stand in the midst of the town. The Government House mightbe taken for an Orkney or Shetland manse. 

[Sidenote: Government. ]

[Sidenote: Prosperity of the colony. ]

The administration of the colony and of its dependencies is vested in aGovernor, aided by a Colonial Secretary, and by an executive and alegislative council. The Governor acts as Chief Justice, and theColonial Secretary as Police Magistrate. There is a local jail, capableof accommodating six offenders at a time. Its resources are not stated, however, to be habitually strained. Education is compulsory: theGovernment maintains schools and travelling teachers. The inhabitantsare principally engaged in sheep-farming and seafaring industries. Thecolony is prosperous, with a trade that of late years has grown withextraordinary rapidity. The dividends paid by the Falkland IslandsCompany might excite the envy of many a London director. Stanley'simportance has been increased by the erection of wireless installation;and as a coaling and refitting station for vessels rounding the Horn, the harbour, large, safe, and accessible, is of immense value. 

[Sidenote: A raid expected. ]

To this remote outpost of empire came tidings of war in August, 1914. Great excitement and enthusiasm prevailed. News was very slow in gettingthrough: the mails, usually a month in transit, became very erratic. Butthe colony eagerly undertook a share in the burden of the Empire; £2, 250was voted towards the war-chest; £750 was collected on behalf of thePrince of Wales's Fund. Detached, though keen, interest changed, however, as the weeks passed, to intimate alarm. The Governor, Mr. Allardyce, received a wireless message from the Admiralty that he mustexpect a raid. German cruisers were suspected to be in theneighbourhood. Never before had the colony known such bustle and suchexcitement. They, the inhabitants of the remote Falklands, were to playa part in the struggle that was tugging at the roots of the world'scivilization. The exhilaration of expectancy and of danger brokesuddenly into their uneventful, though not easy, lives. But there wascause for keen anxiety. The colonists were, however, reassured for atime by a visit from three British warships, the cruisers _Good Hope_, _Monmouth_, and _Glasgow_, with the armed liner _Otranto_. 

[Sidenote: British warships arrive. ]

[Sidenote: Search for German cruisers. ]

The _Good Hope_ had, at the declaration of war, been patrolling theIrish coast. She was ordered to sweep the Atlantic trade routes forhostile cruisers. She reached the coast of North America, after manyfalse alarms, stopping English merchantmen on the way, and informing theastonished skippers of the war and of their course in consequence. Whenforty miles east of New York, Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock cameaboard with his staff, and hoisted his flag. The Admiral turnedsouthwards, sweeping constantly for the enemy. Passing through the WestIndies, he proceeded to the coast of Brazil. Here he was joined by the_Glasgow_. The _Good Hope_ had picked up the _Monmouth_ previously. Thethree ships, accompanied by the auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_, kept asoutherly course. The discovery at Pernambuco of twenty-three Germanmerchantmen snugly ensconced behind the breakwater, in neutral harbour, proved very galling. The Straits of Magellan and the cold Tierra delFuego were at length reached. The squadron was on the scent of threeGerman cruisers, the _Leipzig_, _Dresden_, and _Nürnberg_. It wassuspected that they had gone to coal in this remote corner of theoceans. Their secret and friendly wireless stations were heard talkingin code. The British made swoops upon wild and unsurveyed bays andinlets. The land around was covered with ice and snow, and the many hugeglaciers formed a sight wonderful to behold. But the search had provedfruitless. After rounding the Horn several times, the squadron hadturned towards the Falklands. 

[Sidenote: Rumors of disaster. ]

The inhabitants could not long rely, however, upon these powerfulguardians. The squadron, after coaling, departed, again bound for theStraits of Magellan and the Pacific. Its strength was certainly adequateto tackle with success the three German ships believed to be in thevicinity. The colony could depend upon Admiral Cradock to protect it tothe best of his ability. But it was not improbable that the enemy mightevade the patrolling cruisers, and descend upon the hapless Falklandswithout warning. The Governor saw the advisability of instantpreparation. On October 19, he issued a notice that all women andchildren were to leave Stanley. Provisions, stores, and clothes werehastily removed into the interior, which was locally termed the 'camp'. The colony possessed a Volunteer Rifle Company, some 120 strong, and twonine-pounder field-guns. Further volunteers were enrolled and armed. Suddenly, on November 3, an alarming wireless message was received. The_Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_ were reported to have been sunk off thecoast of Chili. It was unsigned. There was no proof of its authenticity. But the next day another message followed from the captain of the_Glasgow_. The disaster was confirmed. The _Glasgow_, in company with H. M. S. _Canopus_, was running with all speed for the Falklands. They wereprobably being followed by the victorious Germans. Four days of acutesuspense followed. The situation seemed critical. The Governor passedseveral nights without taking off his clothes, in expectancy of wirelessmessages that needed instant decoding. People slept beside theirtelephones. Early in the morning of Sunday, November 8, the two warshipsarrived. 

[Sidenote: The _Glasgow_ arrives. ]

The _Glasgow_ was badly damaged. An enormous hole, three feet by ninefeet, gaped in her side. A shell had wrecked Captain Luce's cabin, giving off fumes such as rendered unconscious several men who rushed into put out the fire. The vessel had escaped any serious outbreak, however, and had suffered only four slight casualties. Warm tributeswere paid by the captain to the cool and disciplined conduct of bothofficers and men. The _Canopus_ had not been engaged. But a narrative ofthe preceding events may now be appropriate. 

[Sidenote: German cruisers in Pacific. ]

Vice-Admiral the Graf Maximilian von Spee was in command, at theoutbreak of hostilities, of the German China fleet stationed atTsing-tao. A successor, indeed, had been appointed, and was on the wayto relieve him. But just before war was declared von Spee and hissquadron steamed off into the open seas. To remain at Tsing-tao whilevastly superior forces were closing in upon him would be to littlepurpose. Commerce raiding offered a field for rendering valuable serviceto the Fatherland. The _Emden_ was dispatched to the southern seas. The_Leipzig_ and the _Nürnberg_ proceeded across the Pacific, and began toprey upon the western coast of South America. Half the maritime trade ofChili was carried in English ships. Many of them might be seized anddestroyed at little risk. The Admiral, with his two remaining vessels, the _Scharnhorst_ and the _Gneisenau_, successfully evaded the hostilefleets for some time. On September 14 he touched at Apia, in GermanSamoa, familiar to readers of Robert Louis Stevenson. It could beremembered how, fifteen years before, this colony, shortly to fallbefore a New Zealand expeditionary force, had been a bone of contentionbetween Great Britain and Germany. Captain Sturdee, whom von Spee wassoon to meet in more arduous operations, had on that occasion commandedthe British force in the tribal warfare. Eight days later, on September22, the two German cruisers arrived off Papeete, in Tahiti, one of theloveliest of Pacific islands. A small disarmed French gunboat lyingthere was sunk, and the town was bombarded. The Admiral, planning aconcentration of German ships, then steamed east across the Pacific. Hegot into touch with friendly vessels. By skilful man[oe]uvring hefinally brought five warships, with colliers, together near Valparaiso. 

[Sidenote: Armament of cruisers. ]

[Sidenote: Coal needed. ]

[Sidenote: Drake's exploits. ]

[Sidenote: Search for cruisers. ]

The German ships were all of recent construction. The _Scharnhorst_ andthe _Gneisenau_ were armoured cruisers of 11, 600 tons. The _Leipzig_, the _Nürnberg_, and the _Dresden_ were light cruisers of about 3, 500tons. The armament of the larger vessels included eight 8·2-inch and six6-inch guns. The smaller relied upon either ten or twelve 4-inch pieces. Each ship carried torpedo tubes, and the speed of each was abouttwenty-two or twenty-three knots an hour. The _Dresden_, however, couldgo to twenty-seven knots. The squadron possessed all-important allies. Several German merchant-marine companies, notably the Kosmos, pliedalong the Chilian coast. The tonnage of their vessels, indeed, amountedto no less than half that of the English companies. The advance ofGerman enterprise in Chili in recent years had been very marked. VonSpee's great stumbling-block was coal. The laws of war prevented himfrom sending more than three of his warships into a neutral port at thesame time, from staying there more than twenty-four hours, from takingmore coal than was necessary to reach the nearest German harbour, fromcoaling again for three months at a port of the same nationality. But ifGerman merchantmen, hampered by no such restrictions, could constantlyrenew his supplies, the difficulty of fuel could be to some extent met. Provisions and secret information as to British movements could also beobtained through the same source. Such employment of merchantmen, however, being contrary to international law, would have to beclandestine. The great Pacific coast offered numerous harbours andabundant facilities for being utilized as a base under such conditions. It showed many historic precedents for bold and adventurous exploitswhich could not fail to appeal to an admiral whose family, ennobled bythe Emperor Charles VI, took pride in its ancient and aristocraticlineage. The occasion seemed opportune, moreover, for theaccomplishment, by himself, his officers, and men, of deeds which shouldinspire their posterity as British naval traditions, for lack of other, at present inspired them. They could recall how, on this very coast, in1578-9, Drake, the master raider, had seized a Spanish treasure-ship offValdivia, had descended like a hawk upon Callao, had pounced uponanother great galleon, taking nearly a million pounds in gold andsilver; and how the intrepid mariner, sailing off into the unknownocean, had circumnavigated the globe, while the furious de Toledowaited, with eleven warships, in the Straits of Magellan. Why, indeed, should not the Germans imitate, in the twentieth century, the deeds ofDrake in the sixteenth? If they preyed ruthlessly upon Englishmerchantmen, laden with the wealth of the West, if they made a descentupon the Falkland Islands, if then they were to disappear into the widePacific, a career of splendid adventure and of unbounded usefulnesswould earn for them both the respect and the plaudits of the world. Australian and Japanese warships were sweeping the eastern Pacific forthem. Many British vessels, called from useful employment elsewhere, would have to join in the search for them. But so vast was the area thatthey might elude their enemies for months. 

British ships were already cruising near the Horn, possibly unaware thata concentration of the Germans had been effected. It was not unlikelythat von Spee might be able to cut off and to destroy stray units of thepatrolling squadrons. The Graf could see many opportunities of servingeffectively the cause of the Fatherland. He must utilize them to thefull. 

[Sidenote: Cradock near coast of Chili. ]

[Sidenote: German cruisers sighted. ]

Sir Christopher Cradock, meanwhile, had rounded the Horn once more, andwas cruising northwards up the coast of Chili. That coast, indeed, oncethe haunt of corsairs and filibusters, was rich in historic associationsand in natural beauties. An element of grandeur and of mystery seemed tohover around the countless ridges and peaks of the Andes, stretching, with the gleam of their eternal snows, for four thousand miles, andgazing down across the illimitable waters of the occident. Upon theplateaux, miles above sea level, stood old stone temples and pyramidswhich rivalled in massiveness and ingenuity those of Egypt and ofBabylon. The student of ancient civilizations could trace, in the mysticdeities of the Incas and Araucanians, a strange similarity to thedeities of the Chaldeans and Babylonians. Speculation upon this analogyformed a fascinating theme. This coast, too, was sacred to memories thatcould not but be dear to sailors as gallant and daring as Cradock, sincehis services in China, in 1900, was known to be. Among other familiarBritish names, Cochrane, Lord Dundonald, had won enduring glory in thestruggle for Chilian independence, nearly a hundred years before. Theconditions of naval warfare had, indeed, through the introduction ofarmour and the perfection of weapons, radically changed since Cochrane, in a series of singularly audacious exploits, had overcome the fleets ofSpain. Sea-fighting had become purely a matter of science. The object ofstrategy was to concentrate faster ships and more powerful guns againstweaker force. The odds with which Cradock was to contend against theGermans were greater in proportion, if less in bulk, than the odds withwhich Cochrane had contended, with his peasant crews and his hulks, against the Spanish "wooden-walls". Admiral Cradock now knew that therewere two more cruisers in the neighbourhood than had at first beensupposed. The _Canopus_ had accordingly been sent to join his squadron. But she was a battleship, and much slower than the cruisers. She couldtravel no faster than at eighteen knots. Cradock proceeded northwards, ahead of the _Canopus_, made a rendezvous off Concepcion Bay for hiscolliers, and went into Coronel and on to Valparaiso to pick up news andreceive letters. The squadron then returned to the rendezvous andcoaled. This completed, the Admiral directed the _Glasgow_ to proceedagain to Coronel to dispatch certain cables. Captain Luce duly carriedout his mission, and left Coronel at nine o'clock on Sunday morning, November 1, steaming northwards to rejoin the other ships. A gale wasrising. The wind was blowing strongly from the south. Heavy seascontinually buffeted the vessel. At two o'clock a wireless signal wasreceived from the _Good Hope_. Apparently from wireless calls there wasan enemy ship to northward. The squadron must spread out in line, proceeding in a direction north-east-by-east, the flagship forming oneextremity, the _Glasgow_ the other. It was to move at fifteen knots. Attwenty minutes past four in the afternoon, smoke was observed upon thehorizon. The _Glasgow_ put on speed and approached. Officers soon madeout the funnels of four cruisers. It was the enemy. The Germans, theirbig armoured cruisers leading, and the smaller behind, gave chase. 

[Sidenote: The squadrons approach. ]

The _Glasgow_ swept round to northward, calling to the flagship with herwireless. Von Spee, anticipating this move, at once set his wireless inoperation, in order to jamb the British signals. Captain Luce soonpicked up the _Monmouth_ and the _Otranto_, and the three ships racednorthwards towards the flagship, the _Glasgow_ leading. At about fiveo'clock the _Good Hope_ was seen approaching. The three ships wheeledinto line behind her, and the whole squadron now proceeded south. VonSpee, coming up from that direction in line ahead, about twelve milesoff, changed his course and also proceeded south, keeping nearer to thecoast. The wind was now blowing almost with the force of a hurricane. Soheavy was the sea that small boats would have been unable to keepafloat. But the sky was not completely overcast, and the sun wasshining. Firing had not opened. The washing of the seas and the roaringof the wind deafened the ear to other sounds. The warship of to-day, when her great turbines are whirling round at their highest speed, moveswithout throb and almost without vibration through the waves. The twosquadrons, drawing level, the Germans nearer to the coast, raced in theteeth of the gale, in two parallel lines, to the south. 

[Sidenote: British vessels. ]

[Sidenote: Cradock orders attack. ]

Sir Christopher Cradock could not but realize that the situation washazardous. He had three vessels capable of fighting men-of-war. The_Otranto_ was only an armed liner, and must withdraw when the battledeveloped. The _Good Hope_ displaced some 14, 000 tons, and was armedwith two 9'2-inch and sixteen 6-inch guns. The _Monmouth_, with atonnage of 9, 800, carried fourteen 6-inch pieces, but the _Glasgow_, aship of 4, 800 tons, had only two of the 6-inch weapons. It was certainthat the German 8·2-inch guns, if the shooting was at all good, would befound to outrange and outclass the British. Cradock was certainly at adisadvantage in gun-power. His protective armour was weaker than that ofthe enemy. Nor did his speed give him any superiority. Though the_Glasgow_ was capable of twenty-six knots, the flagship and the_Monmouth_ could only go to twenty-three. But there was anotherconsideration which the Admiral might weigh. Coming slowly up from thesouth, but probably still a considerable distance off, was thebattleship _Canopus_. Her presence would give the British a decidedpreponderance. She was a vessel of some 13, 000 tons, and her armamentincluded four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch pieces. How far was she away?How soon could she arrive upon the scene? Evening was closing in. Cradock was steering hard in her direction. If the British, engaging theenemy immediately, could keep them in play throughout the night, whenfiring must necessarily be desultory, perhaps morning would bring the_Canopus_ hastening into the action. It was possible that the Germansdid not know of her proximity. They might, accepting the contest, andexpecting to cripple the British next morning at their leisure, findthemselves trapped. But in any case they should not be allowed toproceed without some such attempt being made to destroy them. It mustnot be said that, because the enemy was in greater force, a Britishsquadron had taken to flight. Perhaps it would be better, since darknesswould afford little opportunity of man[oe]uvring for action, to drawnearer and to engage fairly soon. It was about a quarter past six. TheGermans were about 15, 000 yards distant. Cradock ordered the speed ofhis squadron to seventeen knots. He then signalled by wireless to the_Canopus_, 'I am going to attack enemy now'. 

[Sidenote: At closer range. ]

[Sidenote: Only gun flashes to direct fire. ]

[Sidenote: The _Good Hope_ blown up. ]

The sun was setting. The western horizon was mantled by a canopy ofgold. Von Spee's man[oe]uvre in closing in nearer to the shore hadplaced him in an advantageous position as regards the light. The Britishships, when the sun had set, were sharply outlined against the glowingsky. The Germans were partly hidden in the failing light and by themountainous coast. The island of Santa Maria, off Coronel, lay in thedistance. Von Spee had been gradually closing to within 12, 000 yards. The appropriate moment for engaging seemed to be approaching. A fewminutes after sunset, about seven o'clock, the leading German cruiseropened fire with her largest guns. Shells shrieked over and short of the_Good Hope_, some falling within five hundred yards. As battle was nowimminent, the _Otranto_ began to haul out of line, and to edge away tothe south-west. The squadrons were converging rapidly, but the smallercruisers were as yet out of range. The British replied in quicksuccession to the German fire. As the distance lessened, each shipengaged that opposite in the line. The _Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_had to bear the brunt of the broadsides of the _Scharnhorst_ and the_Gneisenau_. The _Glasgow_, in the rear, exchanged shots with the lightcruisers, the _Leipzig_ and the _Dresden_. The shooting was deadly. Thethird of the rapid salvos of the enemy armoured cruisers set the _GoodHope_ and the _Monmouth_ afire. Shells began to find their mark, someexploding overhead and bursting in all directions. In about ten minutesthe _Monmouth_ sheered off the line to westward about one hundred yards. She was being hit heavily. Her foremost turret, shielding one of her6-inch guns, was in flames. She seemed to be reeling and shaking. Shefell back into line, however, and then out again to eastward, her 6-inchguns roaring intermittently. Darkness was now gathering fast. The rangehad narrowed to about 5, 000 yards. The seven ships were all in action. Many shells striking the sea sent up columns of white spray, showingweirdly in the twilight. It was an impressive scene. The dim light, theheavy seas, the rolling of the vessels, distracted the aim. Some of theguns upon the main decks, being near the water-line, became with eachroll almost awash. The British could fire only at the flashes of theenemy's guns. Often the heavy head seas hid even the flashes from thegun-layers. It was impossible to gauge the effect of their shells. Thefore-turret of the _Good Hope_ burst into flames, and she began to fallaway out of line towards the enemy. The _Glasgow_ kept up a continualfire upon the German light cruisers with one of her 6-inch guns and herport batteries. A shell struck her below deck, and men waited for theplanks to rise. No explosion nor fire, however, occurred. But theBritish flagship was now burning brightly forward, and was falling moreand more out of line to eastward. It was about a quarter to eight. Suddenly there was the roar of an explosion. The part about the _GoodHope's_ after-funnel split asunder, and a column of flame, sparks, anddébris was blown up to a height of about two hundred feet. She neverfired her guns again. Total destruction must have followed. SirChristopher Cradock and nine hundred brave sailors went down in thestormy deep. The other ships raced past her in the darkness. The_Monmouth_ was in great distress. She left the line after a while, andturned back, steaming with difficulty to northwest. She had ceasedfiring. The vessels had been travelling at a rate which varied fromseven to seventeen knots. The _Glasgow_, now left alone, eased her speedin order to avoid shells intended for the _Monmouth_. The Germansdropped slowly back. The _Scharnhorst_ and the _Gneisenau_ nowconcentrated their salvos upon the _Glasgow_. The range was about 4, 500yards. A shell struck the second funnel: five others hit her side at thewaterline, but fortunately not in dangerous places. Luce, her captain, since the flagship was no more, was senior officer. He brought hisvessel round and moved rapidly back. 

[Sidenote: _Monmouth_ in distress. ]

[Sidenote: Enemy is signalling in Morse. ]

[Sidenote: _Glasgow_ draws away. ]

[Sidenote: The _Monmouth_ finally capsizes. ]

The _Monmouth_ had now fallen away to a north-easterly course. Lucestood by signalling. Could she steer north-west? She was making waterbadly forward, Captain Brandt answered, and he wanted to get stern tosea. The enemy were following, Luce signalled again. There was no reply. The _Glasgow_ steamed nearer. The _Monmouth_ was in a sinking condition. Her bows were under water, and the men were assembled at the stern. Thesea was running very high. Rain and mist had come on, though a moon wasnow rising. The enemy had altered course, and were approaching in lineabreast about 6, 000 yards away. A light kept twinkling at regularintervals from one of the ships. They were signalling in Morse, andevidently were forming plans of action. Firing was still proceedingintermittently. It was about half-past eight. Captain Luce could seenothing for it but to abandon the _Monmouth_ to her fate. To rescue hercrew, under such conditions, was impossible, while to stand by andendeavour to defend her would be folly. The _Glasgow_ was not armoured, and could not contend with armoured vessels. Of the two guns shepossessed capable of piercing the enemy's armour, one had been put outof action ten minutes after the start. If she stayed and fought to theend, 370 good lives, in addition to the sufficiently heavy toll of 1, 600in the _Good Hope_ and the _Monmouth_, would be needlessly sacrificed. The _Canopus_, moreover, must be warned. She was coming up from thesouth to sure destruction. She could hardly be expected successfully tocombat the whole German squadron. Nevertheless, it must have been withheavy hearts that the men of the _Glasgow_ turned away to seek safety inflight. It is recorded that, as they moved off into the darkness, acheer broke forth from the _Monmouth's_ decks. Before the sinking vesselbecame lost to sight another and a third went up. At about a quarterpast nine the _Nürnberg_, which had not been engaged in the main action, came across the _Monmouth_. It is said that, though in a sinkingcondition, the British ship attempted to ram her enemy. But the_Nürnberg_ began to bombard her, and she capsized. 

[Sidenote: _Glasgow_ and _Canopus_ start for Rio de Janeiro. ]

The _Glasgow_ steamed off in a north-westerly direction. A few minutesbefore nine the enemy became lost to sight. Half an hour later manydistant flashes of gunfire, the death-struggle of the _Monmouth_, wereseen. The play of a searchlight, which lasted a few seconds and thendisappeared, was also observed. The vessel bore round gradually to thesouth. Her wireless was put into operation, and she made efforts to getthrough to the _Canopus_. But the Germans had again set their apparatusin motion, and the messages were jambed. Only after some hours was the_Glasgow_ successful. Steaming hard at twenty-four knots through theheavy seas, her engines and boilers fortunately being intact, she atlength joined the battleship. The two ships made straight for theFalkland Islands. 

The news of the disaster stirred great alarm in the colony. Before theday on which the ships arrived was out the dismay was further increased. The _Canopus_ at first expected to stay ten days. Her presence providedsubstantial relief. If the enemy appeared, she and even the damaged_Glasgow_ could give a very good account of themselves. But during themorning Captain Grant of the _Canopus_ received a wireless message fromthe Admiralty. He was to proceed immediately to Rio de Janeiro with the_Glasgow_. The Brazilian Government had granted the latter permission toenter the dry dock there to make urgent repairs. But seven days onlywere allowed for this purpose. In the evening the warships cast off, andsteamed away to northward. 

[Sidenote: The colony almost defenseless. ]

[Sidenote: Falklands prepare for attack. ]

[Sidenote: Burying the Governor's silver and table linen. ]

Stanley was now in an unenviable situation. A powerful German squadron, flushed with victory, was probably making for the Islands. The colonywas almost defenceless. All the opposition that the enemy would meetwould be from a few hundred volunteers. A wireless message that camethrough emphasized the imminence of the danger. Warnings andinstructions were outlined. If the enemy landed, the volunteers were tofight. But retiring tactics must be adopted. Care should be taken tokeep out of range of the enemy's big guns. The Governor at once called acouncil of war. There could be little doubt that a descent would be madeupon the colony. The position was full of peril. But resistance mustcertainly be offered. The few women, children, and old men who stillremained at Stanley must be sent away immediately. Fortunately the timeof year was propitious. November is, indeed, in the Falklands consideredthe only dry month. The ground is then covered with a variety ofsweet-scented flowers. Further, all the stores it was possible to removemust be taken into the 'camp'. Quantities of provisions must be hiddenaway at various points within reach of the town. In order to add to themobility of the defending force, it would be well to bring in anotherhundred horses from the 'camp'. Every man should be mounted. Thesemeasures were duly carried out. Every preparation was made and everyprecaution taken. Everybody began to pack up boxes of goods. Clothes, stores, and valuables were all taken away to safety. Books, papers, andmoney were removed from the Government offices, and from theheadquarters of the Falkland Islands Company. What was not sent away wasburied. The official papers and code-books were buried every night, anddug up and dried every morning. The Governor's tableclothes gave rise tomuch anxiety. It was thought, since they were marked 'G. R. ', they wouldbe liable to insult by the Germans. They were accordingly buried. Thisconscientious loyalty, however, proved costly. The Governor's silver, wrapped in green baize, was, unfortunately, placed in the same hole. Thetablecloths became mixed up with the baize. The damp got through, andthe linen was badly stained. There was a feeling that the attack wouldcome at dawn. People sat up all night, and only went to bed when morningwas well advanced. All offices were closed and business was suspended. This state of tension lasted several days. At length, from the look-outpost above the town, a warship, apparently a cruiser, was seen makingstraight for the wireless station. When she got within range she turnedbroadside on. Her decks were cleared for action. 

[Sidenote: _Canopus_ arrives. ]

There was a call to arms. Church and dockyard bells pealed out thealarm. Non-combatants streamed out of the town into the 'camp'. Thevolunteers paraded, and lined up with their horses. It would soon becomea question whether to resist a landing or to retire. In any event themen were ready and provided with emergency rations. But no firingsounded. Signals were exchanged between the vessel and the shore. It wasa false alarm. The new-comer was H. M. S. _Canopus_. 

[Sidenote: A serious outlook--decks are cleared for action. ]

She had proceeded, in accordance with her orders, towards Rio de Janeirowith the _Glasgow_. When two days' journey off her destination, however, she received another message. She was directed to return and to defendthe Falklands in case of attack. These instructions were received withmingled feelings. To fight alone a powerful squadron was by no means anattractive prospect. Duty, however, was duty. The _Canopus_ turnedabout, and retraced her passage. She set her wireless in operation, andtried to get through to Stanley. But for some reason she was unable todo so. It was concluded that the Germans had made a raid and haddestroyed the wireless station. Probably they had occupied the town. Theoutlook seemed serious. The _Canopus_ had her instructions, however, andthere was no drawing back. The decks were cleared for action. Ammunitionwas served out. Guns were loaded and trained. With every man at his postthe ship steamed at full speed into the harbour. Great was the reliefwhen it was found that all was well. 

[Sidenote: German raid anticipated. ]

[Sidenote: Shackleton's visit to South Georgia. ]

The inhabitants were not less relieved. The presence of the battleshipwas felt to add materially to the security of the town. The Germanswould probably hesitate before attacking a ship of her size. If theysustained damage involving loss of fighting efficiency, there was noharbour they could turn to for repair, except so far as theirseaworthiness was affected. Nevertheless, it was almost certain thatsome raid upon the Islands would be attempted. Guns were landed from theship, and measures were taken to make the defence as effective aspossible. Perhaps if the enemy blockaded Stanley, the British would beable to hold out until other warships, certain to be sent to avenge thedefeat, arrived. Relief could hardly be expected for two or three weeks. The Falklands formed a very distant corner of the Empire. It wasdoubtful, indeed, whether even the ubiquitous German spy had penetratedto these remote and barren shores. It could, however, be recalled that, in 1882, a German expedition had landed on South Georgia, a dependentisland of the Falklands, eight hundred miles to their south-east, toobserve the transit of Venus. Upon that same island, indeed, anotherand a quite unsuspicious expedition had landed, early in that verymonth, November. Sir Ernest Shackleton, the explorer, had left BuenosAyres on the morning of October 26, on his way across the antarcticcontinent. His little vessel of 230 tons, the _Endurance_, passedthrough the war zone in safety, and reached South Georgia on November 5. He remained for about a month before leaving for the lonely tracts forwhich his little party was bound. The island was his last link withcivilization. Though sub-antarctic, it possessed features as up-to-dateas electric-light, universal even in pigsties and henhouses. And themarch of man, it was observed, had introduced the familiar animals ofthe farmyard, and even a monkey, into a region whose valleys, destituteof tree or shrub, lay clothed with perpetual snow. 

[Sidenote: Sturdee's squadron reaches Port Stanley. ]

[Sidenote: German cruisers sighted. ]

Meanwhile, November passed into December without any appearance of theGermans off the Falklands. The tension became very much relieved. Womenand children were brought back to Stanley, after being away a month orsix weeks. Messages emanating from the hostile squadron, registered bythe wireless station, indicated that the enemy were still in thevicinity. But the condition of the colony became again almost normal. The relief and security were complete when, at length, on Monday, December 7, a powerful British squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir DovetonSturdee, arrived at Port Stanley. There were seven warships, besides the_Canopus_. The _Invincible_ and the _Inflexible_ had left Plymouth onNovember 11, and had proceeded to the West Indies. Their mission was toavenge Coronel. They had picked up at Albatross Rock the _Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_, _Bristol_, _Kent_, _Glasgow_, now repaired, and _Macedonia_, an armed liner. All had then steamed southwards towards the Falklands. The vessels started coaling. Officers came ashore to stretch their legs. Certain stores were laid in. It was anticipated that the squadron woulddepart in search of the enemy on the evening of the following day. Thatsearch might, indeed, be a matter of months. Early next morning, December 8, at about eight o'clock, a volunteer observer posted onSapper's Hill, two miles from Stanley, sighted two vessels upon thehorizon. Twenty minutes later the smoke of two others came into view inthe same direction. They were soon recognized as German cruisers. Theexcitement was intense. The news was immediately carried to theauthorities. It was hastily signalled to the fleet. Most of the shipswere at anchor in Port William, the outer entrance to Port Stanley. Someof the naval officers were aroused from their repose. It is recordedthat, upon hearing the news, the flag-lieutenant dashed down to AdmiralSturdee's cabin, clad in his pyjamas. Sir Doveton was shaving. Thelieutenant poured forth his information. 'Well, ' said the Admiral, dryly, 'you had better go and get dressed. We'll see about it later. '[1]

FOOTNOTE:

[1] The writer cannot vouch for the truth of this anecdote, which he merely records as given in a letter published in the press. Butthe source from which it was taken, together with many of the precedingdetails of the condition of Stanley during the period of tension, hasproved so accurate in essential points of fact, that their insertionseems justifiable. 

[Sidenote: Achievements of the raiders. ]

[Sidenote: Supplies hard to obtain. ]

[Sidenote: The question of neutrality. ]

[Sidenote: Chile's neutrality. ]

[Sidenote: Falklands a possible base. ]

[Sidenote: _Gneisenau_ and _Nürnberg_ fire on wireless station. ]

[Sidenote: Germans are surprised. ]

The Graf von Spee had, meanwhile, after the Battle of Coronel, beendevoting himself to harrying maritime commerce. The Falklands could waitfor the present. Since the beginning of hostilities the work of hislight cruisers had been moderately successful. The _Nürnberg_ had cutthe cable between Bamfield, British Columbia, and Fanning Island. The_Leipzig_ had accounted for at least four British merchantmen, and the_Dresden_ for at least two more. The armed liner _Eitel Friedrich_ hadalso achieved some success. Several traders had had narrow escapes. TheChilian coast was in a state of blockade to British vessels, the portsbeing crowded with shipping that hesitated to venture forth into thedanger zone. The Germans were masters of the Pacific and South Atlantictrade routes. The Straits of Magellan and the Horn formed a greatwaterway of commerce, which for sailing vessels was, indeed, the onlyeastern outlet from the Pacific. But completely as he had the situationin hand, von Spee was experiencing increasing problems and difficultieswith regard to supplies of coal and provisions. Without these he wasimpotent. He had been employing German merchantmen to great advantagefor refueling. But trouble was brewing with the Chilian authorities. Many signs were leading the latter to suspect that, contrary tointernational law, German traders were loading at Chilian ports cargoesof coal and provisions, contraband of war, and were transferring them atsea to the German warships. There were other causes of complaint. JuanFernandez, the isle of romance and of mystery, the home of the originalof Robinson Crusoe, was said to have been degraded into use as a basefor apportioning the booty, coals and victuals, among the belligerentvessels. The island was a Chilian possession. It was practically certainthat von Spee's squadron had stayed there beyond the legal limit oftime. A French merchantman had, contrary to rule, also been sunk thereby the _Dresden_, within Chilian territorial waters. Inquiries in otherquarters were being made, moreover, as to the friendly wireless stationswhich the Germans had been utilizing secretly in Colombia and Ecuador;while a rumour was current in the United States that neutral vessels hadbeen seized and pillaged on the high seas. Von Spee soon found that hewas nearing the end even of his illegitimate resources. He had tried thepatience of the Chilian authorities too far. About the middle ofNovember they suddenly prohibited, as a provisional measure, the vesselsof the Kosmos Company from leaving any Chilian port. On November 24 aGovernment ship was sent to Juan Fernandez to investigate, and to seethat Chilian neutrality was upheld. Many such signs seemed to warn vonSpee that the time was appropriate to a sudden disappearance. Hegathered his squadron for a descent at last upon the Falklands. Hisplans must be, not merely for a raid, but for an occupation. There wereprobably two or three small ships there. They should be sunk. Thewireless station must be destroyed. The Islands, after a landing hadbeen effected and the defence reduced, could be used as a base for theGerman operations. There were large quantities of coal and stores atStanley. The harbour possessed facilities for refitting. To dislodge astrong German naval force, with adequate guns, placed in occupation ofthe colony, would be a difficult task for the enemy. The Falklands hadmany possibilities. According to von Spee's information they were feeblydefended and would fall an easy prey. At length, early in the morning ofDecember 8, the Admiral brought his fleet off Stanley. His five cruisersapproached from the south. They were, of course, observed. A warninggun, probably from one of the small ships which he would shortly sink, sounded the alarm inside the harbour. There was no need, however, forhaste. At twenty minutes past nine the _Gneisenau_ and the _Nürnberg_moved towards the wireless station, and brought their guns to bear uponit. But suddenly from inside the harbour there came the thunder of a biggun. Five shells, of very heavy calibre, screamed in quick successionfrom over the low-lying land. One of the vessels was struck. Surpriseand bewilderment took the Germans. This was most unexpected. The_Gneisenau_ and the _Nürnberg_ hastily retired out of range. 

[Sidenote: Strength of British squadron. ]

[Sidenote: Admiral Sturdee both confident and cautious. ]

[Sidenote: Enemy eight miles away. ]

[Sidenote: _Canopus_ opens fire. ]

Sir Doveton and his fleet, meanwhile, had gone to breakfast. Steam forfull speed was got up as rapidly as possible. Coaling operations hadrecommenced at 6. 30 that morning. The colliers were hurriedly cast off, and the decks were cleared for action. Officers and men were delightedat the prospect of an early fight. The Germans had saved them a longcold search around the Horn by calling for them. There was going to beno mistake this time. The enemy could not escape. Sturdee's squadron wassuperior both in weight and speed to the German. It consisted of twobattle-cruisers of over 17, 000 tons, the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_;of three cruisers of about 10, 000 tons, the _Carnarvon_, _Kent_, and_Cornwall_; and of two light cruisers of 4, 800 tons, the _Glasgow_ and_Bristol_. The primary armament of the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ waseight 12-inch guns; of the _Carnarvon_, four 7'5-inch; of the _Kent_ and_Cornwall_, fourteen 6-inch; of the _Glasgow_ and _Bristol_, two 6-inch. The speed of the battle-cruisers was twenty-eight knots; of the threemiddle-class cruisers, twenty-two to twenty-four knots; and of the lightcruisers, twenty-five to twenty-six knots. In size, in armament, inspeed, the British squadron would decidedly preponderate. AdmiralSturdee, however, though confident of victory, was determined to take norisks, and to minimize loss in men and material by making full use ofhis superior long-range gunfire, and of his superior speed. He wouldwait, screened by the land, until the Germans had drawn nearer. Everything should be got ready carefully. Undue excitement was to bedeprecated. Meanwhile, he watched the enemy closely. At about a quarterto nine, Captain Grant of the _Canopus_ reported that the first twoships sighted were now about eight miles away: the other two were stillat a distance of some twenty miles. The _Kent_ passed down the harbourand took up a position at the entrance. Five minutes later the smoke ofa fifth German vessel was observed. When, in about half an hour's time, the two leading enemy ships made a threatening move in the direction ofthe wireless station, the Admiral ordered a swift counterstroke. Officers upon the hills above the town signalled the range, 11, 000yards, to the _Canopus_. She opened fire with her 12-inch guns. TheGermans hoisted their colours and drew back. Their masts and smoke werenow visible from the upper bridge of the _Invincible_ across the lowland bounding Port William on the south. Within a few minutes the twocruisers altered course and made for the harbour-mouth. Here the _Kent_lay stationed. It seemed that the Germans were about to engage her. As, however, they approached, the masts and funnels of two large ships atanchor within the port became visible to them. The _Gneisenau_ and the_Nürnberg_ could hardly expect to contend alone with this force. They atonce changed their direction, and moved back at increased speed to jointheir consorts. 

[Sidenote: Weather unusually fair. ]

[Sidenote: Chase begins. ]

[Sidenote: More German ships sighted. ]

[Sidenote: Battle joined. ]

The morning was gloriously fine. The sun shone brightly, the sky wasclear, the sea was calm, and a breeze blew lightly from the north-west. It was one of the rare bright stretches that visit the Islands, forusually rain falls, mostly in misty drizzles, on about 250 days in theyear. At twenty minutes to ten the _Glasgow_ weighed anchor, and joinedthe _Kent_ at the harbour-mouth. Five minutes later the rest of thesquadron weighed, and began to steam out. The battleship _Canopus_, herspeed making her unsuitable for a chase, was left in harbour. The_Bristol_ and the _Macedonia_ also remained behind for the present. By adexterous use of oil fuel the two battle-cruisers were kept shrouded asmuch as possible in dense clouds of smoke. The enemy for some time couldnot gauge their size. But as vessel after vessel emerged, Admiral vonSpee grew uneasy. The English were in altogether unexpected strength. His squadron could not cope with such force. He had played into theenemy's hands, and unless he could outspeed their ships, the game wasup. Without hesitation, he steamed off at high speed to eastward. TheBritish followed, steaming at fifteen to eighteen knots. The enemy, totheir south-east, were easily visible. At twenty past ten an order for ageneral chase was signalled. The _Invincible_ and the _Inflexible_quickly drew to the fore. The Germans were roughly in line abreast, 20, 000 yards, or some eleven miles, ahead. The morning sunlight, thegleaming seas, the grey warships, white foam springing from their bows, tearing at high speed through the waves, formed a magnificent spectacle. Crowds of the inhabitants of Stanley gathered upon the hills above thetown to view the chase. The excitement and enthusiasm were intense. Thevessels were in sight about two hours. At about a quarter past eleven itwas reported from a point in the south of East Falkland that three otherGerman ships were in sight. They were probably colliers or transports. The _Bristol_ signalled the information to Admiral Sturdee. He at onceordered her, with the armed liner _Macedonia_, to hasten in theirdirection and destroy them. The newcomers made off to south-west, andthe British followed. Meanwhile the rest of the squadron, now travellingat twenty-three knots, were slowly closing upon the enemy. The distancehad narrowed to 15-16, 000 yards. The British were within strikingrange. Nevertheless, Sturdee decided to wait till after dinner beforeengaging. His guns could outdistance those of the enemy. It would beadvisable for him to keep at long range. The Germans, on the other hand, would be forced, when firing commenced, to alter course and draw in, inorder to bring their own guns into play. The men had their midday mealat twelve o'clock as usual. It is said that comfortable time was allowedafterwards for a smoke. The _Invincible_, _Inflexible_, and _Glasgow_ atabout 12. 30 increased their speed to between twenty-five andtwenty-eight knots, and went on ahead. Just after a quarter to one therewas a signal from the Admiral: 'Open fire and engage the enemy. ' A fewminutes later there were sharp commands. The ranges were signalled, andthe bigger guns were laid. Fiery glares and dense clouds of smoke burstsuddenly from their muzzles. The air quivered with their thunder. Shellswent screaming in the direction of the nearest light cruiser, the_Leipzig_, which was dropping rapidly astern. The firing wasuncomfortably accurate. The three smaller German cruisers very soon leftthe line, and made an attempt, veering off to the south, to scatter andescape. Flame and smoke issued from the _Leipzig_, before she drewclear, where a shell had struck. Sir Doveton Sturdee directed the_Glasgow_, _Kent_, and _Cornwall_ to pursue the German light cruisers. With his remaining vessels, the _Invincible_, the _Inflexible_, and theslower _Carnarvon_, he turned upon the _Scharnhorst_ and the_Gneisenau_, and began operations in earnest. 

[Sidenote: The _Scharnhorst_ on fire. ]

[Sidenote: The _Scharnhorst_ sinks. ]

[Sidenote: The _Gneisenau_ goes down. ]

The interval of sunlight which had opened the day with such promise wasof short duration. The sky became overcast. Soon after four o'clock theair was thick with rain-mist. From 1. 15 onwards for three hours a fierceduel was maintained between the two British battle-cruisers and the twoGerman armoured cruisers. The enemy made every effort to get away. Theyreplied to the British fire for some time, having dropped back to within13, 500 yards. But shortly after two o'clock they changed their course, and began to haul out to south-east. The _Invincible_ and the_Inflexible_ had eased their speed, and the range now widened by about3, 000 yards. A second chase ensued. A full-rigged sailing-ship appearedin the distance at about a quarter to three. Her crew must have beheldan awe-inspiring scene. Shortly before the hour firing recommenced. Theaction began to develop. Great coolness and efficiency were shown onboard the British vessels. Every man was at his battle-station, behindarmour. Fire-control parties were at their instruments. Water fromnumerous hoses was flooding the decks as a precaution against fire. Theroaring of the discharges, the screaming of the shells, the clangour ofmetal upon metal, the crashes of the explosions, made up a tumult thatwas painful in its intensity. During intervals in the firing came therushing of the waves and of the breeze, and the grinding and grunting ofthe hydraulic engines in the turrets, where swung, training constantlyupon the enemy, the greater guns. The Germans soon began to show signsof distress. The _Scharnhorst_ particularly suffered. Dense clouds ofsmoke, making it difficult for the British accurately to gauge thedamage, rose from her decks. Shells rending her side disclosedmomentarily the dull red glow of flame. She was burning fiercely. Thefiring on both sides was deadly, though the German had slackenedconsiderably. But the British vessels, through their preponderance ingunfire, suffered little damage. Their 12-inch guns hit their marksconstantly, while 8·2-inch guns of the _Scharnhorst_ were accurate, butineffective. She veered to starboard at about 3. 30, to bring into playher starboard batteries. Both her masts and three of her four funnelswere shot away. At length the German flagship began to settle downrapidly in the waters. It was about a quarter past four. There was aswirl of the seas and a rush of steam and smoke. The _Scharnhorst_disappeared. She went down with her flag flying to an ocean grave, bearing 760 brave men and a gallant admiral, whose name will deservedlyrank high in the annals of German naval history. The _Gneisenau_ passedon the far side of her sunken flagship. With the guns of bothbattle-cruisers now bearing upon her alone, the German was soon in sorestraits. But she fought on gallantly for a considerable time. Athalf-past five she had ceased firing, and appeared to be sinking. Shehad suffered severe damage. Smoke and steam were rising everywhere. Herbridge had been shot away. Her foremost funnel was resting against thesecond. Her upper deck was so shattered that it could not be crossed, and every man upon it had been killed. An exploding shell had hurled oneof the gun-turrets bodily overboard. Fire was raging aft. Her colourshad been shot away several times, and hoisted as often. One of the flagswas hauled down at about twenty to six, though that at the peak wasstill flying. She began to fire again with a single gun. The_Invincible_, the _Inflexible_, and the _Carnarvon_, which had now comeup, closed in upon the doomed vessel. Firing was recommenced. The_Gneisenau_ was not moving. Both her engines were smashed. Shellsstriking the water near her sent up colossal columns of water, which, falling upon the ship, put out some of the fires. She soon began tosettle down in the waves. All her guns were now out of action, andSturdee ordered the "Cease fire". There could be little doubt that herstubborn resistance was nearing its end. The German commander lined uphis men on the decks. The ammunition was exhausted. The ship would soongo down. Some six hundred men had already been killed. The survivors hadbetter provide themselves with articles for their support in the water. At six o'clock the _Gneisenau_ heeled over suddenly. Clouds of steamsprang forth. Her stem swung up into the air, and she sank. Largenumbers of her crew could be seen floating in the icy waves, hanging onto pieces of wreckage, and uttering terribly uncanny cries. The sea waschoppy. Drizzling rain was falling. The British steamed up immediately. All undamaged boats were got out. Ropes were lowered. Lifebuoys andspars were thrown to the drowning men. But many of them, numbed by thefreezing water, let go their hold and sank. About 180, among them thecaptain of the _Gneisenau_, were saved. It is said that much agreeablesurprise, upon the discovery that their anticipations of being shotwould not be realized, was manifested by the German sailors. 

[Sidenote: The _Eitel Friedrich_ escapes. ]

[Sidenote: The _Leipzig_ is sunk. ]

Meanwhile, battle had been in progress elsewhere. The _Bristol_ and the_Macedonia_ had overtaken the transports _Baden_ and _Santa Isabel_, hadcaptured their crews, and had sunk the ships. The armed lineraccompanying them, the _Eitel Friedrich_, had, however, made off and gotaway by means of her superior speed. The _Kent_, _Glasgow_ and_Cornwall_ had pursued the German light cruisers in a southerlydirection. The _Dresden_, the fastest, proved too speedy a vessel toovertake. She was ahead of her consorts, upon either quarter, and madeher escape whilst they were being engaged. The _Kent_ gave chase to the_Nürnberg_. The _Glasgow_, in pursuit of the _Leipzig_, raced ahead ofthe _Cornwall_, and by about three o'clock in the afternoon had closedsufficiently, within 12, 000 yards, to open fire with her foremost guns. The German ship turned every now and then to fire a salvo. Soon aregular battle began which was maintained for some hours. Shells fellall around the _Glasgow_. There were several narrow escapes, but thecasualties were few. Shortly after six a wireless message was receivedfrom Admiral Sturdee, announcing that the _Scharnhorst_ and the_Gneisenau_ had been sunk. A cheer surged up, and the men set to workwith renewed spirits and energy. The _Cornwall_ had come up some timebefore, and the _Leipzig_ was now severely damaged. But she fought onfor three more hours. Darkness came on. The German cruiser began to burnfore and aft. It was nine o'clock before she at last turned over andsank. 

[Sidenote: The _Kent_ returns. ]

[Sidenote: Sinking of the _Nürnberg_. ]

The British vessels had, during the course of the action, steamed milesapart, and far out of sight of land. During the evening and night theybegan to get into touch with one another and with Stanley by means oftheir wireless. All the ships except the _Kent_ were accounted for, andreported all well. But no reply was forthcoming to the numerous calls, "Kent, Kent, Kent", that were sent out. She had, in chase of the_Nürnberg_, lost all touch with the rest of the squadron. There wasgreat uneasiness. It was feared that she had been lost. The other shipswere directed to search for her, and for the _Nürnberg_ and the_Dresden_. Late in the afternoon of the following day, however, sheentered Stanley harbour safely. Her wireless had been destroyed, but shehad sunk the _Nürnberg_, after a very stern struggle. The Germancaptain, Schönberg, is reported, indeed, to have said at Honolulu, "The_Nürnberg_ will very likely be our coffin. But we are ready to fight tothe last". He had fought and died true to his words. The German ship wasordinarily more than a knot faster than the British. But the engineersand stokers of the _Kent_ rose magnificently to the occasion. Fuel waspiled high. Her engines were strained to the utmost. Soon she wasspeeding through the waves at twenty-five knots, a knot and a half morethan her registered speed. The _Nürnberg_ drew nearer. At five o'clockshe was within range, and firing was opened. A sharp action began whichlasted some two and a half hours. The _Kent_ was struck many times, andlost several men. She had one narrow escape. A bursting shell ignitedsome cordite charges, and a flash of flame went down the hoist into theammunition passage. Some empty shell bags began to burn. But a sergeantpicked up a cordite charge and hurled it out of danger. Seizing a firehose, he flooded the compartment and extinguished the fire. A disastrousexplosion, which might have proved fatal to the vessel, was thusaverted. Her silken ensign and jack, presented by the ladies of Kent, were torn to ribbons. The gallant captain collected the pieces, somebeing caught in the rigging, and carefully preserved them. The_Nürnberg_, however, was soon in sore straits. Many shells struck her, and she was set afire. Day drew into evening, and darkness deepened. TheGermans ceased firing, and the _Kent_, within about 3, 000 yards, followed suit upon the enemy's colours being hauled down. The _Nürnberg_sank just before half-past seven. As she disappeared beneath thesurface, men upon her quarterdeck were waving the German ensign. The_Kent_, after picking up some survivors, put about, and returned toStanley. 

Here the rest of the squadron soon gathered. Congratulatory telegramsbegan to pour in to Sir Doveton Sturdee. And the curtain closed, in theflush of triumph, upon the most memorable and most dramatic episode inthe history of the Falklands. 

[Sidenote: Exploits of the _Eitel Friedrich_. ]

[Sidenote: The _Eitel Friedrich_ comes to Newport News. ]

[Sidenote: The _Dresden_ sinks. ]

One further episode remains to complete the story. The _Dresden_ andthe armed liner _Eitel Friedrich_, the sole survivors of the Germansquadron, made once more for the Pacific. They were lost sight of formany weeks. Suspicious movements and activities on the part of Germanmerchantmen were, however, again observed. The Government wirelessstation at Valparaiso intercepted messages from the _Dresden_ summoningfriendly vessels to bring her supplies. Persistent rumours began to becirculated that she was hiding in the inlets of southern Chili. DuringJanuary, 1915, the _Eitel Friedrich_ seized and destroyed six vessels, chiefly sailing-ships, some in Pacific, most in Atlantic waters. InFebruary she accounted for four more. Towards the end of the month aBritish barque was sunk by the _Dresden_. The position was again rapidlybecoming troublesome. The movement of British shipping, on the Chiliancoast had to be suspended. But the _Glasgow_ and the _Kent_ were on the_Dresden's_ track. The _Kent_ entered Coronel on March 13, coaled, anddeparted the same night. The _Eitel Friedrich_, meanwhile, had arrivedat Newport News, a United States port, with her engines badly in need ofrepair. Much indignation was aroused among Americans by the announcementthat one of her victims had been an American vessel. The German linerhad many prisoners on board. Declarations of a resolve, if he had beencaught by the British, to have sunk fighting to the last, wererepeatedly and emphatically declaimed by the German captain. Five dayslater he learned that the _Dresden_ had tamely surrendered off JuanFernandez after a five minutes' action. The _Kent_, at nine o'clock onthe morning after she had left Coronel, together with the _Glasgow_ andthe auxiliary cruiser _Orama_, came up with the _Dresden_ near theisland. A sharp encounter followed. The German cruiser was hit heavily. Fire broke out. In five minutes' time she hauled down her colours andhoisted a white flag. The crew were taken off. The _Dresden_ continuedto burn for some time, until finally her magazine exploded and she sank. The German officers contended that their vessel was sunk within Chilianterritorial waters. It had not hitherto been noticeable that theirconsciences were concerned to maintain Chilian neutrality inviolate. 

[Sidenote: Results of the Falkland battle. ]

The Battle of the Falkland Islands was the first decisive naval contestof the war. It removed a formidable menace to the trade routes. Itrelieved British convoys and transports from danger of interruption. Itfreed many battleships and cruisers, engaged in sweeping the oceans, forother usefulness. It gave Great Britain effective mastery of the outerseas. Henceforth German naval ambition, frustrated in its endeavour todisorganize the trade routes, was forced, within the limits of the NorthSea and of British waters, to seek less adventurous but moredisreputable ends. A series of bombardments of coast towns was planned. A preliminary success was followed by a galling disaster. 

 * * * * *

With the exception of the naval engagements described above, theoperations of the Germans in the sea was limited chiefly to preying uponenemy commerce by isolated vessels. Of these terrors of the sea the mostfamous was the cruiser _Emden_, which began her career on October 29 bysinking the Russian cruiser _Jemtchug_ in Penang Harbor. Her careeruntil her destruction and the adventures of those of her crew whoescaped are described in the following chapter. 

CRUISE OF THE EMDEN

CAPTAIN MÜCKE

[Sidenote: The _Indus_ sunk. ]

"We on the _Emden_ had no idea where we were going, as on August 11, 1914, we separated from the cruiser squadron, escorted only by thecoaler _Markomannia_. Under way, the _Emden_ picked up three officersfrom German steamers. That was a piece of luck, for afterward we neededmany officers for the capturing and sinking of steamers, or manning themwhen we took them with us. On September 10 the first boat came in sight. We stop her. She proves to be a Greek tramp, chartered from England. Onthe next day we met the _Indus_, bound for Bombay, all fitted up as atroop transport, but still without troops. That was the first one wesunk. The crew we took aboard the _Markomannia_. 'What's the name ofyour ship?' the officers asked us. '_Emden!_ Impossible. Why, the_Emden_ was sunk long ago in battle with the _Ascold_!'

[Sidenote: Capturing ships a habit. ]

[Sidenote: Provisions secured. ]

"Then we sank the _Lovat_ a troop transport ship, and took the _Kabinga_along with us. One gets used quickly to new forms of activity. After afew days capturing ships became a habit. Of the twenty-three which wecaptured, most of them stopped after our first signal. When they didn't, we fired a blank shot. Then they all stopped. Only one, the _ClanMattesen_, waited for a real shot across the bow before giving up itsmany automobiles and locomotives to the seas. The officers were mostlyvery polite and let down rope ladders for us. After a few hours they'dbe on board with us. We ourselves never set foot in their cabins, nortook charge of them. The officers often acted on their own initiativeand signaled to us the nature of their cargo; then the Commandantdecided as to whether to sink the ship or take it with us. Of the cargo, we always took everything we could use, particularly provisions. Many ofthe English officers and sailors made good use of the hours of transferto drink up the supply of whisky instead of sacrificing it to the waves. I heard that one Captain was lying in tears at the enforced separationfrom his beloved ship, but on investigation found that he was merelydead drunk. But much worse was the open betrayal which many practicedtoward their brother Captains, whom they probably regarded as rivals. 'Haven't you met the _Kilo_ yet? If you keep on your course two hourslonger, you must overhaul her, ' one Captain said to me of his ownaccord. To other tips from other Captains we owed many of our prizes. Iam prepared to give their names, " Captain Mücke added. 

"The Captain of one ship once called out cheerily: 'Thank God I've beencaptured!' He had received expense money for the trip to Australia, andwas now saved half the journey!

[Sidenote: The process of sinking. ]

"We had mostly quiet weather, so that communication with captured shipswas easy. They were mostly dynamited, or else shot close to the waterline. The sinking process took longer or shorter, according to wherethey were struck and the nature of the cargo. Mostly the ships keeledover on their sides till the water flowed down the smokestacks, a lastpuff of smoke came out, and then they were gone. Many, however, wentdown sharply bow first, the stern rising high in the air. 

[Sidenote: The _Kabinga_. ]

"On the _Kabinga_ the Captain had his wife and youngster with him. Hewas inclined at first to be disagreeable. 'What are you going to dowith us? Shall we be set out in boats and left to our fate?' he asked. Afterward he grew confidential, like all the Captains, called us 'OldChap, ' gave the Lieutenant a nice new oilskin, and as we finally let the_Kabinga_ go wrote us a letter of thanks, and his wife asked for anEmden armband and a button. They all gave us three cheers as theysteamed away. 'Come to Calcutta some time!' was the last thing theCaptain said, 'and catch the pilots so that those [unprintable seaman'sepithet] fellows will feel something of the war, too. '

"A few days later, by Calcutta, we made one of our richest hauls, the_Diplomat_, chock full of tea--we sunk $2, 500, 000 worth. On the same daythe _Trabbotch_, too, which steered right straight toward us, literallyinto our arms. 

[Sidenote: Madras oil tanks burned. ]

"But now we wanted to beat it out of the Bay of Bengal, because we hadlearned from the papers that the _Emden_ was being keenly searched for. By Rangoon we encountered a Norwegian tramp, which, for a cashconsideration, took over all the rest of our prisoners of war. Later onanother neutral ship rejected a similar request and betrayed us to theJapanese into the bargain. On September 23 we reached Madras and steeredstraight for the harbor. We stopped still 3, 000 yards before the city. Then we shot up the oil tanks. Three or four burned up and illuminatedthe city. They answered. Several of the papers asserted that we leftwith lights out. On the contrary, we showed our lights so as to seem toindicate that we were going northward; only later did we put them out, turn around, and steer southward. As we left we could see the fireburning brightly in the night, and even by daylight, ninety sea milesaway, we could still see the smoke from the burning oil tanks. Two dayslater we navigated around Ceylon, and could see the lights of Colombo. On the same evening we gathered in two more steamers, the _King Lund_and _Tyweric_. The latter was particularly good to us, for it brought usthe very latest evening papers from Colombo, which it had only left twohours before. 

[Sidenote: Ships that the _Emden_ captured. ]

"Everything went well, the only trouble was that our prize, the_Markomannia_, didn't have much coal left. We said one evening in themess: 'The only thing lacking now is a nice steamer with 500 tons ofnice Cardiff coal. ' The next evening we got her, the _Burresk_, brand-new, from England on her maiden voyage, bound for Hongkong. Thenfollowed in order the _Riberia_, _Foyle_, _Grand Ponrabbel_, _Benmore_, _Troiens_, _Exfort_, _Grycefale_, _Sankt Eckbert_, _Chilkana_. Most ofthem were sunk; the coal ships were kept. The _Eckbert_ was let go witha load of passengers and captured crews. We also sent the _Markomannia_away because it hadn't any more coal. She was later captured by theEnglish together with all the prize papers about their own capturedships. All this happened before October 20; then we sailed southward, toDeogazia, southwest of Colombo. South of Lakadiven on Deogazia someEnglishmen came on board, solitary farmers who were in touch with theworld only every three months through schooners. They knew nothing aboutthe war, took us for an English man-of-war, and asked us to repair theirmotor boat for them. We kept still and invited them to dinner in ourofficers' mess. Presently they stood still in front of the portrait ofthe Kaiser, quite astounded. 'This is a German ship!' We continued tokeep still. 'Why is your ship so dirty?' they asked. We shrugged ourshoulders. 'Will you take some letters for us?' they asked. 'Sorry, impossible; we don't know what port we'll run into. ' Then they left ourship, but about the war we told them not a single word. 

[Sidenote: Coal steamers captured. ]

"Now we went toward Miniko, where we sank two ships more. The Captain ofone of them said to us: 'Why don't you try your luck around north ofMiniko? There's lots of ships there now?' On the next day we found threesteamers to the north, one of them with much desired Cardiff coal. FromEnglish papers on captured ships we learned that we were being hotlypursued. The stokers also told us a lot. Our pursuers evidently mustalso have a convenient base. Penang was the tip given us. There we hadhopes of finding two French cruisers. 

[Sidenote: The fourth smokestack. ]

"One night we started for Penang. On October 28 we raised our verypracticable fourth smokestack--Mücke's own invention. As a result, wewere taken for English or French. The harbor of Penang lies in a channeldifficult of access. There was nothing doing by night; we had to do itat daybreak. At high speed, without smoke, with lights out, we steeredinto the mouth of the channel. A torpedo boat on guard slept well. Westeamed past its small light. Inside lay a dark silhouette; that must bea warship! But it wasn't the French cruiser we were looking for. Werecognized the silhouette--dead sure; that was the Russian cruiser_Jemtchug_. There it lay, there it slept like a rat. No watch to beseen. They made it easy for us. Because of the narrowness of the harborwe had to keep close; we fired the first torpedo at 400 yards. Then tobe sure things livened up a bit on the sleeping warship. At the sametime we took the crew quarters under fire, five shells at a time. Therewas a flash of flame on board, then a kind of burning aureole. After thefourth shell, the flame burned high. The first torpedo had struck theship too deep because we were too close to it, a second torpedo which wefired off from the other side didn't make the same mistake. Aftertwenty seconds there was absolutely not a trace of the ship to be seen. The enemy had fired off only about six shots. 

[Sidenote: French ships fight the _Emden_. ]

[Sidenote: A burial at sea. ]

"But now another ship, which we couldn't see, was firing. That was theFrench _D'Ibreville_, toward which we now turned at once. A few minuteslater an incoming torpedo destroyer was reported. He mustn't find us inthat narrow harbor, otherwise we were finished! But it proved to be afalse alarm; only a small merchant steamer that looked like a destroyer, and which at once showed the merchant flag and steered for shore. Shortly afterward a second one was reported. This time it proved to bethe French torpedo boat _Mousquet_. It comes straight toward us. That'salways remained a mystery to me, for it must have heard the shooting. Anofficer whom we fished up afterward explained to me that they had onlyrecognized we were a German warship when they were quite close to us. The Frenchman behaved well, accepted battle and fought on, but waspolished off by us with three broadsides. The whole fight with bothships lasted half an hour. The commander of the torpedo boat lost bothlegs by the first broadside. When he saw that part of his crew wereleaping overboard, he cried out: 'Tie me fast; I will not survive afterseeing Frenchmen desert their ship!' As a matter of fact, he went downwith his ship as a brave Captain, lashed fast to the mast. Then wefished up thirty heavily wounded; three died at once. We sewed aTri-color (the French flag), wound them in it and buried them at sea, with seamen's honors, three salvos. That was my only sea fight. Thesecond one I did not take part in. "

Mücke, who had been recounting his lively narrative, partly like anofficer, partly like an artist, and not trying to eliminate the flavorof adventure, now takes on quite another tone as he comes to tell ofthe end of the _Emden_:

[Sidenote: Landing on Cocos Island. ]

[Sidenote: Order to weigh anchor. ]

"On November 9 I left the _Emden_ in order to destroy the wireless planton the Cocos Island. I had fifty men, four machine guns, about thirtyrifles. Just as we were about to destroy the apparatus it reported:'Careful; _Emden_ near. ' The work of destruction went smoothly. Thewireless operator said: 'Thank God! it's been like being under arrestday and night lately. ' Presently the _Emden_ signaled to us: 'Hurry up. 'I pack up, but simultaneously wails the _Emden's_ siren. I hurry up tothe bridge, see the flag 'Anna' go up. That means 'Weigh anchor. ' We ranlike mad into our boat, but already the _Emden's_ pennant goes up, thebattle flag is raised, they fire from starboard. 

[Sidenote: The _Sydney_ traps the _Emden_. ]

"The enemy is concealed by the island and therefore not to be seen, butI see the shells strike the water. To follow and catch the _Emden_ isout of the question; she's going twenty knots, I only four with my steampinnace. Therefore, I turn back to land, raise the flag, declare Germanlaws of war in force, seize all arms, set up my machine guns on shore inorder to guard against a hostile landing. Then I run again in order toobserve the fight. From the splash of the shells it looked as if theenemy had fifteen-centimeter guns, bigger, therefore, than the_Emden's_. He fired rapidly, but poorly. It was the Australian cruiser_Sydney_. "

"Have you heard?" Mücke suddenly asked in between, "if anything hashappened to the _Sydney_? At the Dardanelles maybe?" And his hatred ofthe _Emden's_ "hangman" is visible for a second in his blue eyes. Thenhe continues:

[Sidenote: The _Emden_ on fire. ]

"According to the accounts of the Englishmen who saw the first part ofthe engagement from shore, the _Emden_ was cut off rapidly. Her forwardsmokestack lay across the ship. She went over to circular fighting andto torpedo firing, but already burned fiercely aft. Behind the mainmastseveral shells struck home; we saw the high flame. Whether circularfighting or a running fight now followed, I don't know, because I againhad to look to my land defenses. Later I looked on from the roof of ahouse. Now the _Emden_ again stood out to sea about 4, 000 to 5, 000yards, still burning. As she again turned toward the enemy, the forwardmast was shot away. On the enemy no outward damage was apparent, butcolumns of smoke showed where shots had struck home. Then the _Emden_took a northerly course, likewise the enemy, and I had to stand therehelpless gritting my teeth and thinking: 'Damn it; the _Emden_ isburning and you aren't on board!' An Englishman who had also climbed upto the roof of the house, approached me, greeted me politely, and asked:'Captain, would you like to have a game of tennis with us?'

[Sidenote: The fighting ships disappear. ]

"The ships, still fighting, disappeared beyond the horizon. I thoughtthat an unlucky outcome for the _Emden_ was possible, also a landing bythe enemy on Keeling Island, at least for the purpose of landing thewounded and taking on provisions. As, according to the statements of theEnglishmen, there were other ships in the neighborhood, I saw myselffaced with the certainty of having soon to surrender because of a lackof ammunition. But for no price did I and my men want to get intoEnglish imprisonment. As I was thinking about all this, the masts againappear on the horizon, the _Emden_ steaming easterly, but very muchslower. All at once the enemy, at high speed, shoots by, apparently, quite close to the _Emden_. A high, white waterspout showed among theblack smoke of the enemy. That was a torpedo. I see how the twoopponents withdrew, the distance growing greater between them; how theyseparate, till they disappear in the darkness. The fight had lasted tenhours. 

[Sidenote: Mücke seizes a schooner. ]

"I had made up my mind to leave the island as quick as possible. The_Emden_ was gone; the danger for us growing. In the harbor I had noticeda three-master, the schooner _Ayesha_. Mr. Ross, the owner of the shipand of the island, had warned me that the boat was leaky, but I found itquite a seaworthy tub. Now quickly provisions were taken on board foreight weeks, water for four. The Englishmen very kindly showed us thebest water and gave us clothing and utensils. They declared this wastheir thanks for our 'moderation' and 'generosity. ' Then they collectedthe autographs of our men, photographed them, and gave three cheers asour last boat put off. It was evening, nearly dark. We sailed away. After a short address, amid three hurrahs, I raised the German war flagon 'S. M. S. _Ayesha_. '"

[Sidenote: The _Ayesha_ sails westward. ]

"The _Ayesha_ proved to be a really splendid ship, " Mücke continued, andwhenever he happens to speak of this sailing ship he grows warmer. Onenotices the passion for sailing which this seaman has, for he wastrained on a sailing ship and had won many prizes in the regattas atKiel. "But we had hardly any instruments, " he narrated, "we had only onesextant and two chronometers on board, but a chronometer journal waslacking. Luckily I found an old 'Indian Ocean Directory' of 1882 onboard; its information went back to the year 1780. 

[Sidenote: En route to Padang. ]

"At first we had to overhaul all the tackle, for I didn't trust topeace, and we had left the English Captain back on the island. I hadsaid: 'We are going to East Africa. ' Therefore I sailed at firstwestward, then northward. There followed the monsoons, but then alsolong periods of dead calm. Then we scolded! Only two neutral ports cameseriously under consideration: Batavia and Padang. At Keeling Icautiously asked about Tsing-tao, of which I had naturally thoughtfirst, and so quite by chance learned that it had fallen. Now I decidedfor Padang, because I knew I would be more apt to meet the _Emden_there, also because there was a German Consul there, because my schoonerwas unknown there, and because I hoped to find German ships there andlearn some news. 'It'll take you six to eight days to reach Batavia, ' aCaptain had told me at Keeling. Now we needed eighteen days to reachPadang, the weather was so rottenly still. 

[Sidenote: Life on board the _Ayesha_. ]

"We had an excellent cook on board; he had deserted from the FrenchForeign Legion. But with water we had to go sparingly, each man receivedthree glasses daily. When it rained, all possible receptacles wereplaced on deck and the main sail was spread over the cabin roof to catchthe rain. The whole crew went about naked, in order to spare our wash, for the clothing from Keeling was soon in rags. Toothbrushes were longago out of sight. One razor made the rounds of the crew. The entire shiphad one precious comb. 

[Sidenote: A Dutch torpedo boat. ]

"As at length we came in the neighborhood of Padang, on November 26, aship appeared for the first time and looked after our name. But the namehad been painted over, because it was the former English name. As Ithink, 'You're rid of the fellow, ' the ship comes again in the evening, comes within a hundred yards of us. I send all men below deck. Ipromenade the deck as the solitary skipper. Through Morse signals thestranger betrayed its identity. It was the Hollandish torpedo boat_Lyn_. I asked by signals, first in English, then twice in German: 'Whydo you follow me?' No answer. The next morning I find myself inHollandish waters, so I raise pennant and war flag. Now the _Lyn_ cameat top speed past us. As it passes, I have my men line up on deck, andgive a greeting. The greeting is answered. Then, before the harbor atPadang, I went aboard the _Lyn_ in my well and carefully preserveduniform and declared my intentions. The commandant opined that I couldrun into the harbor, but whether I might come out again was doubtful. "

[Sidenote: A German ship. ]

"On the South Coast, " interjected Lieutenant Wellman, who at that timelay with a German ship before Padang and only later joined the landingcorps of the _Emden_, "we suddenly saw a three-master arrive. Greatexcitement aboard our German ship, for the schooner carried the Germanwar flag. We thought she came from New Guinea and at once made all boatsclear, on the _Kleist_, _Rheinland_, and _Choising_, for we were all onthe search for the _Emden_. When we heard that the schooner carried thelanding corps, not a man of us would believe it. "

[Sidenote: Supplies are refused. ]

"They wanted to treat me as a prize!" Mücke now continued. "I said, 'Iam a man of war, ' and pointed to my four machine guns. The harborauthorities demanded a certification for pennant and war flag, alsopapers to prove that I was the commander of this warship. I answered, for that I was only responsible to my superior officers. Now theyadvised me the most insistently to allow ourselves to be internedpeacefully. They said it wasn't at all pleasant in the neighborhood. We'd fall into the hands of the Japanese or the English. As a matter offact, we had again had great luck. On the day before a Japanese warshiphad cruised around here. Naturally, I rejected all the well-meant andkindly advice, and did this in presence of my lieutenants. I demandedprovisions, water, sails, tackle, and clothing. They replied we couldtake on board everything which we formerly had on board, but nothingwhich would mean an increase in our naval strength. First thing, Iwanted to improve our wardrobe, for I had only one sock, a pair ofshoes, and one clean shirt, which had become rather seedy. My comradeshad even less. But the Master of the Port declined to let us have notonly charts, but also clothing and toothbrushes, on the ground thatthese would be an increase of armament. Nobody could come aboard, nobodycould leave the ship without permission. I requested that the Consul beallowed to come aboard. This Consul, Herr Schild, as also the BrothersBäumer, gave us assistance in the friendliest fashion. From the Germansteamers boats could come alongside and talk with us. Finally we wereallowed to have German papers. They were, to be sure, from August. UntilMarch we saw no more papers. 

[Sidenote: The German ship _Choising_. ]

"Hardly had we been towed out again after twenty-four hours, on theevening of the 28th, when a searchlight appeared before us. I think:'Better interned than prisoner. ' I put out all lights and withdrew tothe shelter of the island. But they were Hollanders and didn't doanything to us. Then for two weeks more we drifted around, lying stillfor days. The weather was alternately still, rainy and blowy. At lengtha ship comes in sight--a freighter. It sees us and makes a big curvearound us. I make everything hastily 'clear for battle. ' Then one of ourofficers recognizes her for the _Choising_. She shows the German flag. Isend up light rockets, although it was broad day, and go with all sailsset that were still setable, toward her. The _Choising_ is a coaster, from Hongkong for Siam. It was at Singapore when the war broke out, thenwent to Batavia, was chartered loaded with coal for the _Emden_, andhad put into Padang in need, because the coal in the hold had caughtfire. There we had met her. 

[Sidenote: The crew board the _Choising_. ]

"Great was our joy now. I had all my men come on deck and line up forreview. The fellows hadn't a rag on. Thus, in Nature's garb, we gavethree cheers for the German flag on the _Choising_. The men on the_Choising_ told us afterward 'we couldn't make out what that meant, those stark naked fellows all cheering!' The sea was too high, and wehad to wait two days before we could board the _Choising_ on December16. We took very little with us; the schooner was taken in tow. In theafternoon we sunk the _Ayesha_ and we were all very sad. The good old_Ayesha_ had served us faithfully for six weeks. The log showed that wehad made 1, 709 sea miles under sail since leaving Keeling. She wasn't atall rotten and unseaworthy, as they had told me, but nice and white anddry inside. I had grown fond of the ship, on which I could practice myold sailing manoeuvres. The only trouble was that the sails would go topieces every now and then because they were so old. 

[Sidenote: The _Ayesha_ is sunk. ]

"But anyway she went down quite properly, didn't she?" Mücke turned tothe officer. "We had bored a hole in her; she filled slowly and then allof a sudden plump disappeared! That was the saddest day of the wholemonth. We gave her three cheers, and my next yacht at Kiel will be named_Ayesha_, that's sure. 

[Sidenote: Turkey an ally of Germany. ]

"To the Captain of the _Choising_ I had said, when I hailed him: 'I donot know what will happen to the ship. The war situation may make itnecessary for me to strand it. ' He did not want to undertake theresponsibility. I proposed that we work together, and I would take theresponsibility. Then we traveled together for three weeks, from Padangto Hodeida. The _Choising_ was some ninety meters long and had a speedof nine miles, though sometimes only four. If she had not accidentallyarrived I had intended to cruise high along the west coast of Sumatra tothe region of the northern monsoon. I came about six degrees north, thenover Aden to the Arabian coast. In the Red Sea the northeastern monsoon, which here blows southeast, could bring us to Djidda. I had heard inPadang that Turkey is allied with us, so we would be able to get safelythrough Arabia to Germany. 

"I next waited for information through ships, but the _Choising_ did notknow anything definite, either. By way of the _Luchs_, the _Königsberg_, and _Kormoran_ the reports were uncertain. Besides, according tonewspapers at Aden, the Arabs were said to have fought with the English. Therein there seemed to be offered an opportunity near at hand to damagethe enemy. I therefore sailed with the _Choising_ in the direction ofAden. Lieutenant Gerdts of the _Choising_ had heard that the Arabianrailway now already went almost to Hodeida, near the Perim Strait. Theship's surgeon there, Docounlang, found confirmation of this in Meyer'straveling handbook. This railway could not have been taken over by theEnglishmen, who always dreamed of it. By doing this they would havefurther and completely wrought up the Mohammedans by making moredifficult the journey to Mecca. Best of all, we thought, we'll simplystep into the express train and whizz nicely away to the North Sea. Certainly there would be safe journeying homeward through Arabia. To besure, we hadn't maps of the Red Sea; but it was the shortest way to thefoe, whether in Aden or in Germany. 

[Sidenote: On toward Aden. ]

"Therefore, courage! Adenwards!"

[Sidenote: Through the Strait of Perim. ]

"On the 7th of January, between 9 and 10 o'clock in the evening, wesneaked through the Strait of Perim. That lay swarming full ofEnglishmen. We steered along the African coast, close past an Englishcable layer. That is my prettiest delight--how the Englishmen will bevexed when they learn that we have passed smoothly by Perim. On the nextevening we saw on the coast a few lights upon the water. We thought thatmust be the pier of Hodeida. But when we measured the distance by night, 3, 000 meters, I began to think that must be something else. At dawn Imade out two masts and four smokestacks; that was an enemy ship, and, what is more, an armored French cruiser. I therefore ordered the_Choising_ to put to sea, and to return at night. 

[Sidenote: Mücke's party enters Hodeida. ]

"The next day and night the same; then we put out four boats--these wepulled to shore at sunrise under the eyes of the unsuspecting Frenchmen. The sea reeds were thick. A few Arabs came close to us; then thereensued a difficult negotiation with the Arabian Coast Guards. For we didnot even know whether Hodeida was in English or French hands. We wavedto them, laid aside our arms, and made signs to them. The Arabs, gathering together, begin to rub two fingers together; that means 'Weare friends. ' We thought that meant 'We are going to rub against you andare hostile. ' I therefore said: 'Boom-boom!' and pointed to the warship. At all events, I set up my machine guns and made preparations for askirmish. But, thank God! one of the Arabs understood the word'Germans'; that was good. 

"Soon a hundred Arabs came and helped us, and as we marched into Hodeidathe Turkish soldiers, who had been called out against us, saluted us asallies and friends. To be sure, there was not a trace of a railway, butwe were received very well, and they assured us we could get through byland. Therefore, I gave red-star signals at night, telling the_Choising_ to sail away, since the enemy was near by. Inquiries anddetermination concerning a safe journey by land proceeded. I also heardthat in the interior, about six days' journey away, there was healthyhighland where our fever invalids could recuperate. I thereforedetermined to journey next to Sana. On the Kaiser's birthday we held agreat parade in common with the Turkish troops--all this under the nosesof the Frenchmen. On the same day we marched away from Hodeida to thehighland. 

"Two months after our arrival at Hodeida we again put to sea. The timespent in the highlands of Sana passed in lengthy inquiries anddiscussions that finally resulted in our foregoing the journey by landthrough Arabia, for religious reasons. But the time was not altogetherlost. The men who were sick with malaria had, for the most part, recuperated in the highland air. 

[Sidenote: To sea in sambuks. ]

"The Turkish Government placed at our disposal two 'sambuks' (sailingships) of about twenty-five tons, fifteen meters long and four meterswide. But in fear of English spies, we sailed from Jebaua, ten milesnorth of Hodeida. That was on March 14. At first we sailed at aconsiderable distance apart, so that we would not both go to pot if anEnglish gunboat caught us. Therefore, we always had to sail in coastalwater. That is full of coral reefs, however. "

[Sidenote: One sambuk runs on a reef. ]

"The Commander, " Lieutenant Gerdts said, "had charge of the firstsambuk; I of the second, which was the larger of the two, for we hadfour sick men aboard. At first everything went nicely for three days. For the most part I could see the sails of the first ship ahead of me. On the third day I received orders to draw nearer and to remain in thevicinity of the first boat, because its pilot was sailing lessskillfully than mine. Suddenly, in the twilight, I felt a shock, thenanother, and still another. The water poured in rapidly. I had run uponthe reef of a small island, where the smaller sambuk was able barely topass because it had a foot less draught than mine. Soon my ship wasquite full, listed over, and all of us--twenty-eight men--had to sit onthe uptilted edge of the boat. The little island lies at Jesirat Marka, 200 miles north of Jebaua. To be sure, an Arab boat lay near by, butthey did not know us. Nobody could help us. If the Commander had notchanged the order a few hours before and asked us to sail up closer, wewould probably have drowned on this coral reef--certainly would havedied of thirst. Moreover, the waters thereabouts are full of sharks, andthe evening was so squally that our stranded boat was raised and bangedwith every wave. We could scarcely move, and the other boat was nowherein sight. And now it grew dark. At this stage I began to build a raft ofspars and old pieces of wood, that might at all events keep us afloat. 

[Sidenote: The crew finally rescued. ]

[Sidenote: Machine guns brought up. ]

"But soon the first boat came into sight again. The commander turnedabout and sent over his little canoe; in this and in our own canoe, inwhich two men could sit at each trip, we first transferred the sick. Nowthe Arabs began to help us. But just then the tropical helmet of ourdoctor suddenly appeared above the water in which he was standing up tohis ears. Thereupon the Arabs withdrew; we were Christians, and they didnot know that we were friends. Now the other sambuk was so near that wecould have swam to it in half an hour, but the seas were too high. Ateach trip a good swimmer trailed along, hanging to the painter of thecanoe. When it became altogether dark we could not see the boat anymore, for over there they were prevented by the wind from keeping anylight burning. My men asked 'In what direction shall we swim?' Ianswered: 'Swim in the direction of this or that star; that must beabout the direction of the boat. ' Finally a torch flared up overthere--one of the torches that were still left from the _Emden_. But wehad suffered considerably through submersion. One sailor cried out: 'Oh, pshaw! it's all up with us now; that's a searchlight. ' The man who heldout best was Lieutenant Schmidt, who later lost his life. About 10o'clock we were all safe aboard, but one of our typhus patients, SeamanKeil, wore himself out completely by the exertion; he died a week later. On the next morning we went over again to the wreck in order to seek theweapons that had fallen into the water. You see, the Arabs dive so well;they fetched up a considerable lot--both machine guns, all but ten ofthe rifles, though these were, to be sure, all full of water. Later theyfrequently failed to go off when they were used in firing. 

[Sidenote: Sami Bey becomes guide. ]

"Now we numbered, together with the Arabs, seventy men on the littleboat, until evening. Then we anchored before Konfida, and met Sami Bey, who is still with us. He had shown himself useful even before in theservice of the Turkish Government, and has done good service as guide inthe last two months. He is an active man, thoroughly familiar with thecountry. He procured for us a larger boat, of fifty-four tons, and hehimself, with his wife, sailed alongside on the little sambuk. We sailedfrom the 20th to the 24th unmolested to Lith. There Sami Bey announcedthat three English ships were cruising about in order to intercept us. Itherefore advised traveling a bit overland. I disliked leaving the sea asecond time, but it had to be done. "

[Sidenote: Travelling overland. ]

"Lith is, to be sure, nothing but this, " said Mücke, with a sweepinggesture toward the desert through which we were traveling, "andtherefore it was very difficult to get up a caravan at once. We remainedaboard ship so long. We marched away on the 28th. We had only a vaguesuspicion that the English might have agents here also. We could travelonly at night, and when we slept or camped around a spring, there wasonly a tent for the sick men. Two days' march from Jeddah, the TurkishGovernment, as soon as it had received news about us, sent us sixteengood camels. 

[Sidenote: An attack. ]

"Suddenly, on the night of April 1, things became uneasy. I was ridingat the head of the column. All our shooting implements were cleared foraction, because there was danger of an attack by Bedouins, whom theEnglish here had bribed. When it began to grow a bit light, I alreadythought: 'We're through for to-day'; for we were tired--had been ridingeighteen hours. Suddenly I saw a line flash up before me, and shotswhizzed over our heads. Down from the camels! Form a fighting line! Youknow how quickly it becomes daylight here. The whole space around thedesert hillock was occupied. Now, up with your bayonets! Rush 'em! * * *They fled, but returned again, this time from all sides. Several of thegendarmes that had been given us as an escort are wounded; the machinegun operator, Rademacher, falls, killed by a shot through his heart;another is wounded; Lieutenant Schmidt, in the rear guard, is mortallywounded--he has received a bullet in his chest and abdomen. 

[Sidenote: A flag of truce and a barricade. ]

"Suddenly they waved white cloths. The Sheik, to whom a part of ourcamels belonged, went over to them to negotiate, then Sami Bey and hiswife. In the interim we quickly built a sort of wagon barricade, acircular camp of camel saddles, rice and coffee sacks, all of which wefilled with sand. We had no shovels, and had to dig with our bayonets, plates, and hands. The whole barricade had a diameter of about fiftymeters. Behind it we dug trenches, which we deepened even during theskirmish. The camels inside had to lie down, and thus served very wellas cover for the rear of the trenches. Then an inner wall wasconstructed, behind which we carried the sick men. In the very centre weburied two jars of water, to guard us against thirst. In addition we hadten petroleum cans full of water; all told, a supply for four days. Latein the evening Sami's wife came back from the futile negotiations, alone. She had unveiled for the first and only time on this day of theskirmish, had distributed cartridges, and had conducted herselffaultlessly. 

[Sidenote: Death of Schmidt and Rademacher. ]

"Soon we were able to ascertain the number of the enemy. There wereabout 300 men; we numbered fifty, with twenty-nine guns. In the night, Lieutenant Schmidt died. We had to dig his grave with our hands and withour bayonets, and to eliminate every trace above it, in order to protectthe body. Rademacher had been buried immediately after the skirmish, both of them silently, with all honors. 

[Sidenote: The men suffer from thirst. ]

"The wounded had a hard time of it. We had lost our medicine chest inthe wreck; we had only little packages of bandages for skirmishes; butno probing instrument, no scissors were at hand. On the next day our mencame up with thick tongues, feverish, and crying 'Water! water!' Buteach one received only a little cupful three times a day. If our watersupply was exhausted, we would have to sally from our camp and fight ourway through. Then we should have gone to pot under superior numbers. TheArab gendarmes simply cut the throats of those camels that had beenwounded by shots, and then drank the yellow water that was contained inthe stomachs. Those fellows can stand anything. At night we alwaysdragged out the dead camels that had served as cover, and had beenshot. The hyenas came, hunting for dead camels. I shot one of these, taking it for an enemy in the darkness. 

"That continued about three days. On the third day there were newnegotiations. Now the Bedouins demanded arms no longer, but only money. This time the negotiations took place across the camp wall. When Ideclined, the Bedouin said: 'Beaucoup de combat, ' (lots of fight. ) Ireplied:

"'Please go to it!'

[Sidenote: Troops of the Emir of Mecca. ]

"We had only a little ammunition left, and very little water. Now itreally looked as if we would soon be dispatched. The mood of the men waspretty dismal. Suddenly, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, therebobbed up in the north two riders on camels, waving white cloths. Soonafterward there appeared, coming from the same direction, far back, along row of camel troops, about a hundred; they draw rapidly near by, ride singing toward us, in a picturesque train. They were the messengersand troops of the Emir of Mecca. 

"Sami Bey's wife, it developed, had, in the course of the firstnegotiations, dispatched an Arab boy to Jeddah. From that place theGovernor had telegraphed to the Emir. The latter at once sent cameltroops, with his two sons and his personal surgeon; the elder, Abdullah, conducted the negotiations; the surgeon acted as interpreter, in French. Now things proceeded in one-two-three order, and the whole Bedouin bandspeedily disappeared. From what I learned later, I know definitely thatthey had been corrupted with bribes by the English. They knew when andwhere we would pass and they had made all preparations. Now our firstact was a rush for water; then we cleared up our camp, but had toharness our camels ourselves, for the camel drivers had fled at thevery beginning of the skirmish. More than thirty camels were dead. Thesaddles did not fit, and my men know how to rig up schooners, but notcamels. Much baggage remained lying in the sand for lack of packanimals. 

[Sidenote: The party reaches Mecca. ]

"Then, under the safe protection of Turkish troops, we got to Jeddah. There the authorities and the populace received us very well. From therewe proceeded in nineteen days, without mischance, by sailing boat toElwesh, and under abundant guard with Suleiman Pasha in a five-daycaravan journey toward this place, to El Ula, and now we are seated atlast in the train and are riding toward Germany--into the war at last!"

"Was not the war you had enough?" I asked. 

"Not a bit of it, " replied the youngest Lieutenant; "the _Emden_ simplycaptured ships each time; only a single time, at Penang, was it engagedin battle, and I wasn't present on that occasion. War? No, that is justto begin for us now. "

[Sidenote: Mücke's great task. ]

"My task since November, " said Mücke, "has been to bring my men asquickly as possible to Germany against the enemy. Now, at last, I can doso. "

"And what do you desire for yourself?" I asked. 

"For myself, " he laughed, and the blue eyes sparkled, "a command in theNorth Sea. "

 * * * * *

Japan was bound by alliance with Great Britain to join with her toattack any aggressor, and to carry out her pledges she, at the outbreakof the war, prepared to capture the German stronghold Tsing-tao, thecapital of the concession of Kiao-chau, which Germany had obtained fromChina, and had converted into a German possession. 

CAPTURE OF TSING-TAO

A. N. HILDITCH

Battle Sketches by A. N. Hilditch, Oxford University Press. 

[Sidenote: Qualities of the Japanese. ]

[Sidenote: Count Okuma Prime Minister. ]

[Sidenote: Japanese ultimatum. ]

Tokyo, capital of Japan, lies at the head of Tokyo Bay, in thesouth-east of Nippon. Its two million inhabitants are distributed amonghouses and streets which present curious intermixtures of Japanese andEuropean architecture, customs, or science. The jinrikisha notably hasbeen displaced largely by tramcars which, carrying all passengers at auniform rate of four sen, make it possible to travel ten miles for apenny. It is an industrial city, but on account of occasionalearthquakes no very large buildings line the thoroughfares. Thetraveller can here observe to advantage the strange characteristics ofthe most stoical race upon earth, or can contrast, if he will, thecourteous, imperturbably serene disposition of the most martial nationof the East with the present disposition of the most rabidly bellicosenation of the West. When Japanese and German, indeed, met in conflictbefore Tsing-tao in the autumn of 1914, there was seen, in the Japanesesoldier, during a campaign of peculiar hardship and difficulty, arevival of the qualities of the old Samurai, with his quiet courage, hisburning patriotism, his patience, his habitual suppression of emotionaldisplay singularly distinct from those of the modern Goth. Nor was thestatesmanship which brought about that conflict less admirable. Japan'salliance with Great Britain was at once a solemn pledge and the guidingprinciple of her foreign policy. August 1914 found British interestsand the vast trade that centred at Hong-kong in danger: German armedvessels prowled the seas, and the German naval base of Tsing-tao wasbusy with warlike preparations. Great Britain appealed to Japan to freetheir joint commerce from the menace. The Japanese Prime Minister, CountOkuma, might well hesitate, however, before recommending intervention. Was he the right minister to direct a war? He was nearer eighty thanseventy years old, and recently had been for seven years in retirement:his Government had a minority in the Diet, and to the Genro his name wasanathema: he claimed the allegiance of no party, and the powerfulmilitary and naval clans, Choshiu and Satsuma, were openly hostile. Hehad been raised to power a few months before by public demand forprogressive government. There were considerations other than domestic orpersonal, indeed, which might have tempted some statesmen to hold theirhands. To temporize while events revealed themselves in Europe would besafer than immediate action; while to remain neutral might lead to thetransference to the Japanese of much trade with China now in Britishhands, inevitably hampered by the menace of German commerce-destroyers. Nevertheless, Count Okuma's Cabinet came to a bold and loyal decision. Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister, reassured Great Britain of activeJapanese aid, and on August 15 sent an ultimatum to Germany. The latterwas requested to withdraw at once all German armed vessels from Easternwaters, and to deliver to Japan before September 15 the entire leasedterritory of Kiao-chau, with a view to its eventual restoration toChina. The ultimatum was timed to expire at noon on August 23. That dayarrived without satisfaction having been given to Japan. Within a fewhours the 2nd Japanese squadron steamed off towards Tsing-tao. 

[Sidenote: German Pacific squadron sails. ]

[Sidenote: Tsing-tao's importance. ]

[Sidenote: Germans prepare defense. ]

[Sidenote: Japanese warships approach. ]

Before the outbreak of hostilities with Great Britain, Vice-Admiral theGraf von Spee, who commanded the German Pacific squadron, had steamedaway from Tsing-tao with most of his ships. To use Tsing-tao as a navalbase while engaging in commerce-raiding seemed a sound and a practicableplan, since the British and Australian naval forces, though superior, were hardly strong enough simultaneously to blockade the harbour and tosearch the seas. The plan was, however, rendered impossible by theJapanese ultimatum, and the Admiral, after having lingered for someweeks in the Western Pacific, departed for other seas and otheradventures. Such was the result of Japan's action, and thus dangerouswere the tactics that Japan's action had frustrated. For Tsing-tao, situated upon one of the two peninsulas, divided by two miles ofwaterway, enclosing the bay of Kiao-chau, with its safe and spaciousanchorage for vessels of any size, constituted one of the most importantnaval bases on the Chinese coast. It had, indeed, been described as thekey to Northern China. Dominating the eastern coast of the Shantungpeninsula, the port formed the centre of the semicircular area known asKiao-chau, extending on a radius of 32 miles around the shores of thebay, with a population of 60, 000. This area was, under the ChineseGerman agreement as to Tsing-tao, influenced and controlled by Germany, though not strictly subject to her, and regarded as neutral territory. Its surface was mainly mountainous and bare, though the lowlands werewell cultivated, but in parts it was rich in mineral wealth, large butundeveloped supplies of coal being present. In winter the port, connected to the junction of Tsi-nan by a German-built railway, was thenatural outlet for the trade of Northern China. The heights whichsurrounded the bay offered admirable sites for fortification, while theland-approaches to Tsing-tao were guarded by formidable defencesstretched across its peninsula. In many quarters the stronghold wasregarded as a second Port Arthur. The Germans had paid particularattention to defence, so much so, indeed, that over five-sixths of thewhite inhabitants were engaged in military occupations. Five thousandGerman marines constituted the normal garrison, though the outbreak ofwar in August called about a thousand more men--volunteers, reservists, and sailors--to the colours. The complement of the _Kaiserin Elizabeth_, an Austrian cruiser sheltering in the harbour, left for Tientsin, havingreceived orders to disarm their ship, but returned in time to join thedefenders. The garrison was amply provisioned for five or six months, and well provided with weapons, stores, and munitions. Most of theGerman ships off the Chinese coast at the outbreak of war, indeed, hadmade immediately for Tsing-tao, and discharged upon its wharves manythousand tons of cargo. When war with Japan became inevitable, therefore, the defenders could anticipate a successful resistance, provided the expected instantaneous victories in Europe materialized. Elaborate preparations were made for the defence. The harbour mouth wasblocked by three sunken vessels, enabling only small craft to enter. Chinese villages within the leased territory, and the bridge where therailway crossed the boundary, were destroyed, partial compensation beingpaid to the inhabitants. Native labourers were engaged to throw upearthworks to strengthen the town fortifications. Many foreigners, women, children, and non-combatants, meanwhile, had left the town. OnFriday evening, August 21, at roll-call, the Governor, CaptainMeyer-Waldeck, read out a message from the German Emperor exhorting thegarrison to defend the town to their utmost, and to do their 'duty tothe last'. It was listened to stoically. The following day a diversionoccurred which opened hostilities propitiously for the Germans. TheBritish destroyer _Kennet_, encountering the German destroyer _S. 90_off the coast, gave chase. The _S. 90_ immediately made for port, andthe _Kennet_, in the ardour of pursuit, closed in unawares within rangeof the German land batteries. The latter opened fire, and before shecould draw off the _Kennet_ sustained ten casualties, though littlematerial damage. Next day the term of the Japanese ultimatum expired. Itwas doubtful at what point the Japanese would begin operations, or whattactics they would adopt. The fear was prevalent among Germans that theenemy would enter Chinese territory to reach the town from the land:newspapers under German influence, indeed, circulating in Chinese coasttowns, started a press campaign with the object of stirring the ChineseGovernment to oppose by force any Japanese landing in her territory. Outposts were placed by the Germans along the shores of the neutral zoneto watch for developments: they descried, on August 24, the approach ofJapanese warships. 

Vice-Admiral Sadakichi Kato, who commanded the approaching squadron, immediately upon arrival took measures to protect himself against dangerfrom mines. Seven islets clustering round the mouth of Kiao-chau Baywere occupied, to form a convenient local naval base, whilemine-sweepers swept the surrounding seas. No less than a thousand mineswere taken from the water. A blockade of the whole Kiao-chau coast wasdeclared, as commencing from 9 a. M. , August 27, and war vesselspatrolled the shores, some seventy miles long. Action soon began, andcontinued during ensuing days, with shells that at intervals screamedtowards the town. The position was, however, reconnoitred carefully. Japanese airmen went up frequently to scan the fortifications and todrop bombs. All protruding structures, spires and factory-chimneys, hadbeen levelled to the ground by the Germans so as to afford no mark forfire. Bombs were dropped on the railway station and on one of thenumerous barrack buildings. The operations continued spasmodically intoSeptember, while Kato was awaiting the approach by land of aco-operating army, which had now disembarked on the northern coast ofthe Shantung peninsula, about 150 miles due north of Tsing-tao. 

[Sidenote: Landing effected. ]

[Sidenote: Floods hinder advance. ]

The landing was effected on September 2, without hindrance or oppositionon the part of the Chinese. The Government, following the precedent ofthe Russo-Japanese War, immediately published a declaration refusing tohold itself responsible for the obligations of strict neutrality inareas that formed, within Lung-kow, Lai-chau, and the neighbourhood ofKiao-chau Bay, passage-ways essential to the belligerent troops. It was, of course, incumbent upon the Powers involved to respect Chineseproperty and administrative rights. Japan, therefore, was permitted tomake use of the main roads to transport an army to the rear ofTsing-tao. The forces landed composed a division numbering 23, 000, andcommanded by Lieutenant-General Mitsuomi Kamio. An advance-guard wassent forward without delay, but soon found its way rendered impassableby torrential floods which at this time swept down upon and devastatedthe province of Shantung, bridges, roads, and even villages beingsubmerged and destroyed, with great loss of life, largely owing toChinese official incompetence. The Japanese, after covering 20kilometres in two days, reached a stream so swollen that crossing wasimpossible. The artillery had to return to Lung-kow. German diplomacy, meanwhile, exasperated at its inability to prevent a Japanese landing, had not been inactive. 

[Sidenote: Chinese neutrality. ]

[Sidenote: Rivalry of British and Japanese. ]

[Sidenote: Japanese advance. ]

The German and Austrian ministers at Peking, on hearing of the Japaneselanding, protested strongly. China, it was claimed, ought to haveforestalled and resisted the landing, but instead had deliberatelyextended the war-zone in order to facilitate Japanese movements. Shewould be held responsible for any injury to the German cause orproperty. To this China replied that, if it was incumbent upon her toprevent by force Japan operating in her territory, it was equally herduty to prevent by force Germany fortifying and defending Tsing-tao. China had endeavoured, indeed, but unsuccessfully, to precludebelligerent operations in her territory: only after the Japaneselanding, when she was powerless to do otherwise, had she extended thezone of war. As to the responsibility, she reiterated her previousdeclaration. The baffled Germans fell back on threats: the right wasreserved to visit upon China dire consequences for her alleged breach ofneutrality. The incident, thrown into striking contrast with Germany'soffer to Belgium, marked the unscrupulousness of German diplomacy, butstirred also many doubts among the foreign communities in China, inwhich the British, allied as they were to the Japanese, formed apredominating element. An anomaly of the situation was that Britishlocal interests had long conflicted with Japanese national interests. Japan's activities had, at every stage of her recent history, reducedBritish opportunities. Japanese trader competed with British trader forthe markets of China, and Japan's share of the annual trade expansionwas increasing, that of Great Britain decreasing. High tariffs andpreferential rates had closed Corea and Manchuria to British enterprise. It is easy to estimate in what commercial jealousy and rivalry suchcircumstances had resulted. While the expediency of the British-Japanesealliance was fully recognized, and its consequences admitted to be thefreedom of the China seas from menace of commerce-destroyers, nevertheless the fact remained that the hostilities against Tsing-taowould constitute a fresh impulse to Japanese expansion. The operationsin Shantung were watched with critical eyes by many British in theforeign settlements of China. The floods had, meanwhile, subsidedconsiderably, and on September 12 Japanese cavalry reached Tsimo, tenmiles outside the Kiao-chau zone. No trace of the enemy north of thePai-sha River had been seen, beyond a German aeroplane that occasionallypassed overhead on reconnoitring flights. On the following day a numberof sharp skirmishes with outposts occurred, and one Japanese patrolfound its way to the small town of Kiao-chau, situated at the head ofthe bay, some 22 miles from Tsing-tao itself. The brushes with theGermans became of daily occurrence, and in one of them a high officialof the German Legation at Peking, who had volunteered for service, waskilled. On September 17 the Japanese attacked Wang-ko-huang, 13 milesfrom Tsimo, the enemy being in a fortified position and provided withmachine-guns. At sunset, however, they abandoned the village andwithdrew under cover of darkness, leaving behind quantities of equipmentand supplies. A little later a development came about that brought thedissatisfaction of British traders to a head. About September 18, afterhostile patrols had been driven away from the shore by the fire ofdestroyers, Japanese artillery and troops were landed at Laoshan Bay, north of Tsing-tao, just within the leased territory. Why was itnecessary that troops should have been landed on the northern shore ofthe peninsula of Shantung, 150 miles from their objective, when gunscould be disembarked with perfect safety on the eastern shore, not 40miles from the objective, and within the German zone?

[Sidenote: A British force co-operates. ]

The British were not as critical of Japan's strategy as they weresuspicious of her policy. Dark suggestions got afoot that she hadulterior designs upon the whole Chinese province of Shantung. Such viewscould not but have reached the ears of the British authorities atWei-hei-wei and elsewhere, nor could they have been deaf to previousmurmurs. Diplomatic circles, however, could extend little sympathy tothe critics. Nevertheless, it was undeniable that the latter wereaggrieved, and that their attitude might produce unfortunate effects. IfGreat Britain herself took some share in the Tsing-tao operations, greater sympathy with their purpose might be induced, and a better stateof feeling in the Orient between the two peoples might possibly result. It must have been some aim such as this that prompted the dispatch of aBritish force to the Tsing-tao area to co-operate with General Kamio, astep which the earlier symptoms of the British discontent cannot buthave influenced. On September 19, however, 1, 000 of the 2nd South WalesBorderers, a force so small as to be nominal, under Brigadier-GeneralBarnardiston, left Tientsin and proceeded to Wei-hei-wei. Transportmules having here been taken on board, the expedition on September 22coasted down the eastern shore of Shantung, and next day landed atLaoshan Bay. A month later, as will be seen, they were joined by 500 ofthe 36th Sikhs. 

[Sidenote: Faint opposition. ]

[Sidenote: Artillery battle. ]

Meanwhile, it was probably about this time, or shortly after, that the_Triumph_, a British battleship of nearly 12, 000 tons displacement, 19-1/2 knots speed, and four 10-inch guns primary armament, joined theJapanese squadron off Tsing-tao. A spasmodic bombardment had beenmaintained during the preceding weeks, and seaplanes had been busy, bombing and range-finding. The wireless station, the electric-powerstation, and several ships in harbour were damaged by explosivemissiles. Little could be done, however, from the sea alone, and theattack by land, owing largely to transport difficulties, had still todevelop. But the weather was now improving considerably. Anotherset-back to Japanese military ardour was, indeed, constituted by themarked reluctance of the Germans to form a line of resistance. Germanoutposts, upon encountering hostile patrols, invariably retired afteroffering faint opposition. When the British troops, after a circuitousmarch of 40 miles, much hampered by bad roads, came up in the rear ofthe Japanese, then preparing to assault the enemy's advanced positionson high ground between the rivers Pai-sha and Li-tsun, the part that ithad been arranged they should take in the Japanese attack, on September26, fell through owing to a disinclination of the Germans to fight. Their resistance was so meagre that the Allies were hardly engaged, andnext day gained without difficulty the easterly banks of the Li-tsun andChang-tsun rivers, only seven miles north-east of Tsing-tao. The enemyat all points fell back, and the advance upon the town continued. TheJapanese had now drawn their lines across the neck of the narrowpeninsula upon which Tsing-tao stands. There were indications that themain forces were now in contact. The only obstacle, but a formidableone, between the invaders and the forts themselves was constituted bythe dominating height of Prince Heinrich Hill, from whose crest, risingsome five miles from the town, all the forts could be bombarded. GeneralKamio estimated that three days of fighting would be required for itscapture: it was as all-important to the defence as to the attack, andwas sure to be strongly held. The forts themselves, of the latest type, were elaborately constructed, and equipped with concrete and steelcupolas, mounting high calibre pieces. They commanded both landward andseaward approaches to the town, those nearest the invading Japanesebeing situated upon, and named Moltke Berg, Bismarck Berg, and IltisBerg. Earth redoubts and trenches between formed the German line ofdefence. Plans for the most considerable engagement, the assault ofPrince Heinrich Hill, that had so far taken place, to begin on Sunday, September 27, were made by the Japanese General. It developed morespeedily than had been expected. German artillery opened a terrificcannonade upon the Japanese lines, while three warships shelled theattacking right wing from the bay. The German fire was heavy andaccurate. Japanese warships and aeroplanes, and also the Britishbattleship _Triumph_, however, created a diversion that relieved theassaulting forces. Two of the forts were shelled from the sea, andsuffered serious injury, a barrack-house and other buildings being, moreover, damaged. For many hours the great guns, thundering theirchallenges from sea and land and estuary, maintained continual uproar. Darkness began to gather. Fighting continued into the night, and earlynext morning was renewed. But the defenders seemed to lack enthusiasm. It is doubtful, indeed, whether their forces were sufficiently numerousto hold with strength their advanced positions, and at the same time toman adequately their main fortified positions. During the morning of the28th the Germans withdrew from Prince Heinrich Hill, leaving fifty oftheir number and four machine-guns in Japanese hands, and many dead uponthe slopes. The Japanese casualties numbered 150. By noon the wholeposition was in the attackers' hands, and the beleaguered town, visiblefrom the height, was now face to face with siege. German officers whoknew all the points, weak and strong, of the defences, could not butrealize their inability to withstand the siege guns which Japan wouldsooner or later bring to the attack. But the heavy artillery was yet faraway. A month was to elapse before the pieces could be dragged acrossthe difficult country, and emplaced in prepared positions on PrinceHeinrich Hill. 

[Sidenote: The siege continues. ]

[Sidenote: Gunboats sunk. ]

This month, which covered the whole of October, saw many interestingincidents, and betrayed no signs of idleness on the part of besiegers orbesieged. The Germans, indeed, proved extraordinarily prodigal inammunition, firing on an average 1, 000 to 1, 500 shells daily, a factwhich lent support to the current view that, while undesirous ofincurring their emperor's displeasure, they realized the hopelessness, so far as Tsing-tao was concerned, of their emperor's cause. Warships inthe bay assisted the cannonade from the forts, and Lieutenant vonPluschow, the airman of the single aeroplane the town possessed, ventured forth at intervals to reconnoitre or to bomb. Life in the townitself continued to be quite normal. Japanese and British, meanwhile, drew their lines closer and closer to the fortress by sap and mine, though hindered greatly by terrible weather, and occasionally havingslight encounters with the enemy. In one of these, on October 5, aGerman night-attack was heavily repulsed, forty-seven dead being leftbehind by the attackers. At sea the operations were also spasmodic. Atthe end of September a landing force occupied Lao-she harbour, in thevicinity of Tsing-tao, where four abandoned field-guns were takenpossession of. Mine-sweeping had constantly to be maintained, under firefrom the shore, and proved a dangerous task. Several vessels thusengaged were sunk or damaged, though with comparatively few casualties, through coming into contact with mines. Some German gunboats, however, among them the _Cormoran_ and the _Iltis_, were apparently sunk aboutthis time, either deliberately by the Germans, or from the fire of theJapanese guns. A torpedo flotilla bombarded one of the barracks, moreover, to some effect, while Japanese aeroplanes were also active. Von Pluschow twice attempted to attack vessels of the blockadingsquadron, but unsuccessfully, and on one occasion a Japanese aeroplanepursuing him gave a German balloon, floating captive above the town, some critical moments before it could be hauled to safety. A few dayslater, about October 7, the rope which held this balloon was, during thespasmodic firing, severed by a shot, and the great bag floated away, apparently across the bay in the direction of Kiao-chau town and therailway line inland. In this quarter, indeed, over the line itself, serious friction had arisen between the Japanese and the Chineseauthorities. 

[Sidenote: Railway seized. ]

[Sidenote: China protests. ]

The line ran from Tsing-tao and Kiao-chau to the junction of Tsi-nan, adistance of about 250 miles, passing through the towns of Wei-hsien andTsing-chau. It was German built and almost wholly German owned. Fromsome points of view it might reasonably be said to constitute anadjunct, if not a part, of the leased territory itself. In any case theJapanese claimed that, since the outbreak of war, the line had beenconsistently utilized to bring reservists, supplies, and ammunition tothe town. The Austrian crew of the disarmed _Kaiserin Elizabeth_, bothwhen they left and later returned to Tsing-tao, had used this means oftransit. The railway, being still under German control, constituted amenace in the Japanese rear, which the latter, upon consolidating theirposition towards the end of September, took measures to remove. Afteroccupying Wei-hsien, they began to arrange for the seizure of the wholeline as far as Tsi-nan itself. Hints of such action drew forth protestsfrom China, whose Government, however, adopted too compromising anattitude. The Japanese Government was firm. China's right to formalprotest was admitted, but the occupation was stated to be an urgentmilitary necessity, and without any prejudice to Chinese claims afterthe war. Since China was unable to enforce the neutrality of the line, flagrantly violated by the Germans, the Japanese had no alternative butto bring it under their own control. The Chino-German Treaty of 1898 andthe German Government's charter clearly proved that the railway wasessentially German. A compromise, hastened by the unhesitating andthorough measures taken by the Japanese to effect the occupation, wasarrived at. The Japanese were temporarily to control the administration, while the Chinese conducted the traffic, of the railway. Its fate, sinceChina did not admit the contention that it was purely German, was to bedecided after the war. A bellicose attitude noticeable in Chinesemilitary circles became very marked when, three days later, on October6, unquestionably in breach of the arrangement, Japanese soldiersarrived at Tsi-nan, and took over the control of the rolling stock onthe Shantung line. It was alleged at Peking that this force had declaredmartial law in the town, which contained, indeed, many Germansympathizers who, rumour added, had destroyed several collieries therein their anxiety to obstruct the Allies. But the Chinese Governmentsubmitted under further strong protest, and with a request that thetroops should be withdrawn. The Japanese action occasioned, however, further distrust among British residents in the Orient. Meanwhile, asecond British force, consisting of 500 Sikhs, was being prepared toreinforce General Barnardiston. 

[Sidenote: Non-combatants depart. ]

[Sidenote: Heavy weather. ]

[Sidenote: Difficulties on land. ]

[Sidenote: Bombardment on Mikado's birthday. ]

At one o'clock on October 12, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, the Governor ofTsing-tao, received a joint wireless message from the commanders of thebesieging troops and the blockading squadron, offering a safe escort outof the town of Tientsin of neutrals and non-combatants. He at onceassented. Delegates met next day at ten o'clock to discuss details, andon the 15th the American consul, accompanied by German women andchildren and Chinese subjects, left the town. On the previous day therehad been a combined sea and air attack upon forts Iltis and Kaiser, inwhich the _Triumph_ participated and suffered the only Alliedcasualties. It is recorded that, before reopening bombardment after thedeparture of the non-combatants, the Japanese, ever polite, signalled'Are you now quite ready, gentlemen?' For reply a German sniper, takingcareful but faulty aim, sent a bullet which removed three out of theeleven hairs on the signalman's moustache. Two days later, days notablefor torrential rains, which intensified the discomforts of the troopsashore, the Japanese suffered a severe naval loss. The _Takachiho_, anold cruiser of some 3, 000 tons, which had seen service in theChino-Japanese War, was on patrol duty on Saturday night, October 17, when she fouled a mine, released by and adrift in the rough seas. Destroyers hastened to her aid, but rescue work was difficult in thedarkness and the heavy weather. The cruiser sank rapidly. Two hundredand seventy-one officers and seamen lost their lives. The rough weatherwhich contributed to the disaster continued with little break, andhindered operations, till the end of the month. The landing of the Sikhcontingent at Laoshan Bay on October 21 was, indeed, attended by greatdifficulties and some loss of life. A strong southerly gale had raisedhigh seas, and enormous lighters and sampans, employed fordisembarkation, were thrown high and dry upon the beach. SixteenJapanese were drowned in trying to save other boats that broke loose. The Sikhs got safely ashore, but next morning again the winds blew andthe rains descended, and the camping-ground was soon a miry pool. Circumstances other than the weather, however, helped to put the Britishofficers out of humour. Trouble ahead threatened in connexion withtransport arrangements. While the Chinese carts and drivers, broughthurriedly from Tientsin, were doubtfully reliable, many of the muleswere raw and quite unused to harness. When a start for the front waspreparing on the morning of the 23rd, it was found that the best of theharness, which had been purchased from peasants in the locality, hadbeen stolen in the night by the people who had brought it in, and thatwhat was left was tied up with string. The column, however, at lengthset off, and made a march memorable for hardship and difficulty. FromLaoshan to Lutin, where a metalled road began, was 30 miles, crossed bya track formed at one time by quagmire, at another by slippery boulders. During eleven hours 6 miles were covered, by which time the Sikhs werecompletely exhausted with digging carts or mules out of the mud, haulingthem out with drag-ropes, reloading overturned carts, or unloading thoseimmovable. Next day the column was on the road at seven o'clock, andcovered 13 miles. So deep was the mud in parts that when, owing to therotten harness giving way, a mule would occasionally lurch forwardsuddenly and walk away by itself, the body of the cart would be leftfloating on the surface. One cart was pulled completely off its axles bya squad of men, and slid along admirably for a considerable distance. Seventy Chinese wheelbarrows, however, obtained from a Japanese dépôt, rendered invaluable aid on this day. Tsimo, the halting-place, wasreached in the evening, and next day, after the first ten miles, sawplain sailing. A few days later, on October 30, after the Sikhs hadrested and recovered, the whole British force, now some 1, 500 strong, moved up to the front in readiness for the bombardment of Tsing-tao, which had been arranged to begin next morning in celebration of thebirthday of the Mikado. Siege artillery, 150 pieces, including six28-cm. Howitzers and some heavy naval guns, had now been brought up andplaced in position. The shelling was timed to start, in royal salute, atdawn. 

[Sidenote: Oil-tanks blaze. ]

Men who, stationed upon Prince Heinrich Hill, could look below upon thedoomed town, athwart the narrowing peninsula, with the sea, studded withgrey warships, surrounding, had before them a wonderful spectacle as themorning sun, rising from the Pacific, slowly dispersed the darkness. Thethunder of the great guns broke suddenly upon that stillness which onlydawn knows, and their discharges flashed redly on the darkling slopes. The Japanese shooting, it is related, displayed remarkable accuracy, some of the first projectiles bursting upon the enormous oil-tanks ofthe Standard Oil Company and the Asiatic Petroleum Company. A blazeroared skywards, and for many hours the heavens were darkened by animmense cloud of black petroleum smoke which hung like a pall over thetown. Shells passing over these fires drew up columns of flame to agreat height. Chinese coolies could be seen running before the spreadingand burning oil. Fires broke out also on the wharves of the outerharbour, in which during the day a gunboat, apparently damaged fatallyby a shot which carried away her funnel, disappeared. The redoubts andinfantry works particularly were heavily bombarded. On the left of theGerman line 100 Chinese in the village of Tao-tung-chien wereunfortunately caught by shell-fire directed on the redoubt close athand, while the fort of Siao-chau-shan, near by, was set afire. The topsof several of the forts were soon concealed by clouds of dust and smoke. A heavy fusillade was concentrated upon an observation point which thedefenders had constructed on a hill in the town, and had considerableeffect. The Germans did not on this first day of general bombardmentreply strongly, two only of the forts persistently firing. At length thesun sank and night obscured the conflict. It had been a bad day for thebesieged: and dismantled guns, shattered concrete platforms andentrenchments, devastated barbed-wire entanglements, augured the town'sapproaching fate. 

[Sidenote: Aeroplanes direct guns. ]

[Sidenote: The _Triumph_ attacks Fort Bismarck. ]

[Sidenote: _Kaiserin Elizabeth_ sinks. ]

[Sidenote: Night activity. ]

The bombardment continued for a week. During that period the Japaneseand British guns, directed from land and sea by a balloon, byaeroplanes, or by observation stations on the hills, in daytimethundered incessantly. The German shelling, though severe, was far lessheavy, because, it is said, the men in the forts, sheltering most ofthe time in bomb-proof caverns, issued forth only at night, and duringpauses of the Japanese to return the fire. The airman von Pluschowactively directed the replies. The latter seemed not, indeed, impartially distributed. The marked attention paid to British troops andships afforded an illustration of that attitude of peculiar malevolencewhich Germans have adopted towards the British nation and name. TheGerman airman singled out the British camp, recognizable by its whitetents, for his bombs, while for the German artillery it had aninordinate attraction. Officers on board the _Triumph_, moreover, observed that the largest German guns, of 12-inch calibre, wereconsistently directed upon their vessel. But of many projectiles oneonly, which struck the mast, being fired from Hui-tchien-huk, provedeffective. This hit, however, caused rejoicing in Tsing-tao which, it isasserted, would not have been equalled by the sinking of a JapaneseDreadnought. The _Triumph_ singled out for attack Fort Bismarckespecially, and two of the German 6-inch guns were early put out ofaction. The British gunners adopted the ingenious plan of heeling theirship by five degrees, and bombarding the enemy, from sight stripsspecially calculated, without exposing themselves or their weapons. Itbecame customary aboard to call the bombardment 'pressing the enemy'from an exhortation sent by the Japanese Crown Prince to 'press theenemy, braving all hardships'. Ashore, indeed, the pressure on the enemydeveloped steadily as the days passed. On November 2 the Austriancruiser _Kaiserin Elizabeth_, which had, with the German gunboats stillafloat, been engaging vigorously in the fighting, sank, having probablybeen blown up deliberately, and the floating dock also disappeared. Iltis Fort, moreover, was silenced, two guns being smashed andammunition giving out, and Japanese infantry advanced and captured aneminence in German hands. On another ridge, however, hard by thesilenced fort, some German naval gunners carried out a ruse which savedfor the present both their position and their battery, composed of naval9-cm. Pieces, which were exposed dangerously to fire from sea and land. Lieutenant von Trendel, in command, during the night constructed woodenmodels of cannon, which he placed in position 200 yards from his realguns. Next morning he exploded powder near by, and drew the fire of thebesiegers, attracted by the flashes, upon the dummies. That day thewireless and electric power stations were wrecked, and large attackingforces crept further forward, despite severe fire, and entrenched closerto the enemy's lines. In the evening and night the latter showed specialactivity, star rockets and other fireworks being used to illumine theopposing positions, which were heavily fusilladed. A German night-attackwas delivered, but was repulsed. Next day, the 4th, and on the twofollowing days, progress was maintained. The Allied trenches were pushedforward until they were right up to and almost half round the nearestGerman forts. Many casualties were suffered, but the German fire waskept down by the Japanese guns, whose accuracy was remarkable. Theweather conditions were unfavourable, high winds and heavy rainsprevailing, and the troops in the trenches had to endure hardprivations. So effective was the bombardment, however, that duringNovember 5 and 6 plans were prepared for the final assault. It wasarranged that a general infantry attack should be made as soon aspracticable. The garrisons in the forts, meanwhile, were beginning toexhaust their ammunition, of which they had been, during thepreliminary operations, strangely prodigal. Guns lay silent for otherreasons than structural injury, though the latter cause, indeed, wasfrequent, a single shot, in one case, from the _Suwo_, the Japaneseflagship, having destroyed a 24-cm. Gun and killed eight men on FortHui-tchien-huk. In the town itself the streets, not immune from fallingprojectiles, were deserted, and the only centre of social intercourseand conviviality was the German Club, where regularly officers ornon-combatants slipped in for dinner, luncheon, or a glass of beer. Butit was realized that the end was not far distant. 

[Sidenote: Central redoubt taken. ]

[Sidenote: Mass attack on forts. ]

[Sidenote: The white flag. ]

Early in the morning of November 6 the airman von Pluschow flew awayacross Kiao-chau Bay, and did not return. He escaped with the Governor'slast dispatches into Chinese territory, where his machine was interned. That day and night saw no cessation of the firing, the guns of thedefenders still roaring at intervals. About an hour after midnight thefirst impulse of the general attack took effect. While a particularlyheavy artillery fire kept the Germans in their bomb-proof shelters, thecentral redoubt of the first line of defence, which had been badlyshattered by the bombardment, was rushed by a storming party headed byGeneral Yoshimi Yamada. Engineers had in the darkness sapped right up tothe barbed-wire entanglements, which being cut provided way for theinfantry, who, while part held the enemy in front, rushed the redoubt onboth flanks. Two hundred prisoners were taken, and the Japanese flag washoisted. The besiegers were through the German line, but the positionhad to be consolidated, or disaster would follow. Danger from the flankwas, however, soon obviated by advances in other parts of the line. Justafter five o'clock a battery on Shao-tan Hill was captured; half an hourlater another battery in Tao-tung-chien redoubt was taken, and FortChung-shan-wa, the base of the German right wing, fell. The shadows werestill dense, and the final phase of the siege, viewed from PrinceHeinrich Hill, presented a sight brilliant with many flashes and flamingfireworks, and a sound dominated by the thunder of the batteries. Butdawn, as the besiegers began in mass to close in upon the main line offorts Iltis, Moltke, and Bismarck, was breaking. It was decided to stormthese positions forthwith, since the German fire, owing to exhaustion ofthe ammunition, was dying away. Governor Meyer-Waldeck, who had beenwounded, realized now that further resistance was futile. Shortly beforesix o'clock he sent Major von Kayser, his adjutant, accompanied byanother officer and a trumpeter, from the staff headquarters bearing thewhite flag: at the same time a signal of surrender was made from theObservatory. This was not, however, observed, while von Kayser's party, coming under fire, was dispersed by a shell which killed the trumpeterand the adjutant's horse. Meanwhile, Japanese and British were closingin, and were tensely awaiting the final assault. It was never made. Soonafter seven o'clock a welcome sight relaxed the tension of the troops, torn, dirty, and weary, calling forth cheers from the British, andshouts of 'Banzai!' from the Japanese. The campaign was over: Tsing-taohad fallen. White flags were fluttering from the forts. 

[Sidenote: Terms of capitulation. ]

[Sidenote: War material taken. ]

[Sidenote: Cost of victory. ]

That evening delegates from the two armies met and signed the terms ofcapitulation, which were unconditional. Honours of war were accorded thedefenders, the Governor and his officers being permitted to retain theirswords. The Allies marched into the town, and on November 10 thegarrison was formally transferred. Over 4, 000 Germans were sent toJapan as prisoners, and large quantities of war material wereconfiscated. The captures included 30 field-guns, 100 machine-guns, 2, 500 rifles, 40 motor-cars, £1, 200 in bullion, and 15, 000 tons of coal. All ships in harbour, and also the floating dock, had been destroyed, but it seemed probable that the _Kaiserin Elizabeth_ could besuccessfully raised. Sufficient provisions were found to feed 5, 000persons for three months, and the victors were able to regale theirappetites with luxuries such as butter, crab, or salmon, which wereplentiful. Looting, however, was strictly forbidden. For fastidiouspersons the bath, after many weeks, was again available, and proved, indeed, in view of steady accumulations of mud, a salutary course. Measures, meanwhile, were at once taken to restore the town to itsnormal condition. The troops and sailors were employed in removingdébris or undischarged land and sea mines. Another Japanese gunboat wassunk, and several officers and men lost their lives, while engaged inthis dangerous work. The victory had to be paid for, indeed, with aheavy toll of life and limb. The Japanese casualties numbered 236 killedand 1, 282 wounded; the British, 12 killed and 53 wounded. On November 16the Allies formally took possession of Tsing-tao; and a memorial servicewas held for the dead. 

 * * * * *

[Sidenote: Plan for Dardanelles campaign. ]

The plan of breaking through the Straits of the Dardanelles, and thusclearing the way to Constantinople, is believed to have been conceivedby Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the British Admiralty. Aftercareful consideration it was approved by the military and navalauthorities, and plans were made to carry out the project. The initialsteps are described in the following chapter. 

GALLIPOLI

A. JOHN GALLISHAW

Copyright, Century Magazine, July, 1916. 

[Sidenote: The Newfoundlanders in the War. ]

Husky, steel-muscled lumbermen; brawny, calloused-handed fishermen;loose-jointed, easy-swinging trappers; athletes from the city foot-balland hockey teams; and gawky, long-armed farmers joined the FirstNewfoundland Regiment at the outbreak of war. A rigid medicalexamination sorted out the best of them, and ten months of bayonetfighting, physical drill, and twenty-mile route marches over Scottishhills had molded these into trim, erect, bronzed soldiers. They weregarrisoning Edinburgh Castle when word came of the landing of theAustralians and New-Zealanders at Gallipoli. At Ypres the Canadians hadjust then recaptured their guns and made for themselves a deathlessname. 

[Sidenote: Not militaristic. ]

So the Newfoundlanders felt that as colonials they had been overlooked. They were not militaristic and hated the ordinary routine of army life, but they wanted to do their share. That was the spirit all through theregiment. It was the spirit that possessed them on the long-waited-forday at Aldershot when Kitchener himself pronounced them "just the men Iwant for the Dardanelles. " That day at Aldershot every man was given achance to go back to Newfoundland. They had enlisted for one year only, and could demand to be sent home at the end of the year; and whenKitchener reviewed them ten months of that year had gone. 

[Sidenote: Re-enlistment at Aldershot. ]

[Sidenote: The desire to get to the front. ]

With the chance to go home in his grasp, every man of the firstbattalion reenlisted for the duration of war. And it is on record, totheir eternal honor, that during the week preceding their departure fromAldershot breaches of discipline were unknown, for over their heads hungthe fear that they would be punished by being kept back from activeservice. To break a rule that week carried with it the suspicion ofcowardice. This was the more remarkable because many of the men werefishermen, trappers, hunters, and lumbermen who until their enlistmenthad said "Sir" to no man, and who gloried in the reputation given themby one inspecting officer as "the most undisciplined lot he had everseen. " From the day the Canadians left Salisbury Plain to take theirplaces in the trenches in Flanders the Newfoundlanders were obsessed byone idea: they had to get to the front. 

[Sidenote: Troop-ships in Mudros Harbor. ]

So it was with eleven hundred of such eager spirits that I lined up, ona Sunday evening early in August, 1915, on the deck of the troop-ship inMudros Harbor, which is the center of the historic island of Lemnos, about fifty miles from Gallipoli. Around us lay all sorts of ships, fromocean leviathans to tiny launches and rowboats. There weregray-and-black-painted troopers, their rails lined with soldiers;immense four-funneled men-of-war; and brightly lighted, white hospitalships, with their red crosses outlined in electric lights. The landingofficer left us in a little motor-boat. We watched him glide slowlyshoreward, where we could faintly discern through the dusk the white ofthe tents that were the headquarters for the people at Lemnos; to theright of the tents we could see the hospital for wounded Australians andNew-Zealanders. A French battleship dipped its flag as it passed, andour boys sang "The Marseillaise. "

[Sidenote: The Iron Ration. ]

A mail that had come that day was being sorted. While we waited, eachman was served with his "iron ration. " This consisted of a one-poundtin of pressed corned beef--the much-hated and much-maligned "bullybeef"--a bag of biscuits, and a small tin that held two tubes of Oxo, with tea and sugar in specially constructed air- and damp-proofenvelopes. This was an emergency ration, to be kept in case of direstneed, and to be used only to ward off actual starvation. After that wewere given our ammunition, two hundred and fifty rounds to each man. 

[Sidenote: The solitary letter home. ]

But what brought home to me most the seriousness of our venture was thesolitary sheet of letter paper, with its envelope, that was given toevery man to be used for a parting letter home. For some poor chaps itwas indeed the last letter. Then we went over the side and aboard thedestroyer that was to take us to Suvla Bay. 

The night had been well chosen for a surprise landing. There was nomoon, but after a little while the stars came out. Away on the port bowwe could see the dusky outline of land, and once, when we were abouthalf-way, an airship soared phantomlike out of the night, poised over usa short time, then ducked out of sight. At first the word ran along theline that it was a hostile airship, but a few inquiries soon reassuredus. 

[Sidenote: Approaching Cape Hellas. ]

[Sidenote: Passing Anzac. ]

[Sidenote: The name Anzac. ]

Suddenly we changed our direction. We were near Cape Hellas, which isthe lowest point of the peninsula of Gallipoli. Under Sir Ian Hamilton'sscheme it was here that a decoy party of French and British troops wereto be landed to draw the Turks from Anzac. Simultaneously anoverwhelming British force was to land at Suvla Bay and Anzac to make asurprise attack on the Turks' right flank. Presently we were goingupshore past the wrecked steamer _River Clyde_, the famous "Ship ofTroy" from the side of which the Australians had issued after the shiphad been beached on the shore hitherto nameless, but now known as Anzac. Australian New Zealand Army Corps those five letters stand for; but tothose of us who have been on Gallipoli they stand for a great deal more;they represent the achievement of the impossible. They are a gloriousrecord of sacrifice, reckless devotion, and unselfish courage; to puteach letter there cost the men from Australasia ten thousand of theirbest soldiers. 

And so we edged our way along, fearing mines or, even more disastrousthan mines, discovery by the enemy. From the Australasians over at Anzacwe could hear desultory rifle fire. Once we heard the boom of some bigguns that seemed almost alongside the ship. Four hours it took us to gofifty miles in a destroyer that could make thirty-two knots easily. Byone o'clock the stars had disappeared, and for perhaps three-quarters ofan hour we nosed our way through pitch darkness. Gradually we sloweddown until we had almost stopped. Something scraped along our side. Somebody said it was a floating mine, but it turned out to be a buoythat had been put there by the navy to mark the channel. 

Out of the gloom directly in front some one hailed, and our peopleanswered. 

"Who have you on board?" we heard a casual English voice say, and thencame the reply from our colonel:

"Newfoundlanders. " There was to me something very reassuring about thatcool, self-contained voice out of the night. It made me feel that wewere being expected and looked after. 

[Sidenote: Arrival of a launch. ]

"Move up those boats, " I heard the English voice say, and from rightunder our bow a naval launch with a middy in charge swerved alongside. In a little while it, with a string of boats, was securely fastened. 

Just before we went into the boats the adjutant passed me. 

"Well, " he said, "you've got your wish. In a few minutes you'll beashore. Let me know how you like it when you're there a little while. "

"Yes, sir, " I said. But I never had a chance to tell him. The firstshrapnel shell fired at the Newfoundlanders burst near him, and he hadscarcely landed when he was taken off the peninsula, seriously wounded. 

[Sidenote: The Newfoundlanders land. ]

In a short time we had all filed into the boats. There was no noise, noexcitement; just now and then a whispered command. I was in a tug withabout twenty others who formed the rear-guard. The wind had freshenedconsiderably, and was now blowing so hard that our unwieldy tug darednot risk a landing. We came in near enough to watch the other boats. About twenty yards from shore they grounded. We could see the boys jumpover the side and wade ashore. Through the half-darkness we could barelydistinguish them forming up on the beach. Soon they were lost to sight. 

[Sidenote: Enemy artillery in action. ]

During the Turkish summer dawn comes early. We transhipped from our tugto a lighter. When it grounded on the beach day was just breaking. Daylight disclosed a steeply sloping beach, scarred with ravines. Theplace where we landed ran between sheer cliffs. A short distance up thehill we could see our battalion digging themselves in. To the left Icould see the boats of another battalion. Even as I watched, the enemy'sartillery located them. It was the first shell I had ever heard. It cameover the hill close to me, screeching through the air like anexpress-train going over a bridge at night. Just above the boat I waswatching it exploded. A few of the soldiers slipped quietly from theirseats to the bottom of the boat. At first I did not realize that anyone had been hit. There was no sign of anything having happened out ofthe ordinary, no confusion. As soon as the boat touched the beach thewounded men were carried by their mates up the hill to a temporarydressing-station. 

[Sidenote: Beginning of bombardment. ]

[Sidenote: Coolness of the Newfoundlanders. ]

The first shell was the beginning of a bombardment. Beachy Bill, abattery that we were to become better acquainted with, was in excellentshape. Every few minutes a shell burst close to us. Shrapnel-bullets andfragments of shell-casing forced us to huddle under the baggage forprotection. A little to the left some Australians were severelypunished. Shell after shell burst among them. A regiment of Sikh troops, mule-drivers, and transport-men were caught half-way up the beach. Abovethe din of falling shrapnel and the shriek of flying shells rose thepiercing scream of wounded mules. The Newfoundlanders did not escape. That morning Beachy Bill's gunners played no favorites. On all sides theshrapnel came in a shower. Less often, a cloud of thick, black smoke anda hole twenty feet deep showed the landing-place of a high-explosiveshell. The most amazing thing was the coolness of the men. TheNewfoundlanders might have been practising trench-digging in camp inScotland. When a man was hit some one gave him first aid, directed thestretcher-bearers where to find him, and coolly resumed digging. In twohours our position had become untenable. We had been subjected to amerciless and devastating shelling, and our first experience of war hadcost us sixty-five men. In a new and safer position we dug ourselves in. 

[Sidenote: Four miles of graveyard. ]

No move could be made in daylight. That evening we received our rationof rum, and under cover of darkness moved in open order across the SaltLake for about a mile, then through three miles of knee-high, pricklyunderbrush, to where our division was intrenched. Our orders were toreinforce the Irish. The Irish sadly needed reinforcing. Some of themhad been on the peninsula for months. Many of them are still there. Fromthe beach to the firing-line is not over four miles, but it is a ghastlyfour miles of graveyard. Everywhere along the route are small, rudewooden crosses, mute record of advances. Where the crosses are thickestthere the fighting was fiercest, and where the fighting was fiercestthere were the Irish. On every cross, besides a man's name and the dateof his death, is the name of his regiment. No other regiments have somany crosses as the Dublins and the Munsters. And where the shrapnelflew so fast that bodies mangled beyond hope of identity were buried ina common grave, there also are the Dublins and Munsters; and the crossover them reads "In Memory of Unknown Comrades. "

[Sidenote: The incomparable Twenty-ninth. ]

[Sidenote: How the hill was taken, and lost. ]

The line on the left was held by the Twenty-ninth Division; the Dublins, the Munsters, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, and the Newfoundlandersmade up the 88th Brigade. The Newfoundlanders were reinforcements. Fromthe very first days of the Gallipoli campaign the other three regimentshad formed part of what General Sir Ian Hamilton in his report calls the"incomparable Twenty-ninth Division. " When the first landing was made, this division, with the New-Zealanders, penetrated to the top of a hillthat commanded the Narrows. For forty-eight hours the result was indoubt. The British attacked with bayonet and bombs, were driven back, and repeatedly re-attacked. The New-Zealanders finally succeeded inreaching the top, followed by the 88th Brigade. The Irish fought on thetracks of a railroad that leads into Constantinople. At the end offorty-eight hours of attacks and counter-attacks the position wasconsidered secure. The worn-out soldiers were relieved and went intodug-outs. Then the relieving troops were attacked by an overwhelminghostile force, and the hill was lost. A battery placed on that hillcould have shelled the Narrows and opened to our ships the way toConstantinople. The hill was never retaken. When reinforcements came upit was too late. The reinforcements lost their way. In his reportGeneral Hamilton attributes our defeat to "fatal inertia. " Just howfatal was that inertia is known only to those who formed some of theburial-parties. 

[Sidenote: Newfoundlanders run in battle. ]

[Sidenote: The Turks charge in mass formation. ]

[Sidenote: Terrible casualties of the enemy. ]

After the first forty-eight hours we settled down to regular trenchwarfare. The routine was four days in the trenches, eight days in restdug-outs, four in the trenches again, and so forth, although two orthree months later our ranks were so depleted that we stayed in eightdays and rested only four. We had expected four days' rest after ourfirst trip to the firing-line, but at the end of two days came word of adetermined advance of the enemy. We arrived just in time to beat it off. Our trenches, instead of being at the top, were at the foot of the hillthat meant so much to us. The ground here was a series of four or fivehogback ridges about a hundred yards apart. Behind these towered thehill that was our objective. From the nearest ridge, about seven hundredyards in front of us, the Turks had all that day constantly issued inmass formation. During that attack we were repaid for the havoc wroughtby Beachy Bill. As soon as the Turk topped the crest they were subjectedto a demoralizing rain of shell from the navy and the artillery. Againstthe hazy blue of the sky-line we could see the dark mass clearlysilhouetted. Every few seconds, when a shell landed in the middle of theapproaching columns, the sides of the column would bulge outward for aninstant, then close in again. Meanwhile every man in our trenches stoodon the firing-platform, head and shoulders above the parapet, with fixedbayonet and loaded rifle, waiting for the order to begin firing. Stillthe Turks came on, big, black, bewhiskered six-footers, reforming ranksand filling up their gaps with fresh men. Now they were only six hundredyards away, but still there was no order to open fire. It was uncanny. At five hundred yards our fire was still withheld. When the order came, "At four hundred yards, rapid fire, " everybody was tingling withexcitement. Still the Turks came on, magnificently determined. But itwas too desperate a venture. The chances against them were too great, our artillery and machine-gun fire too destructively accurate. Some fewTurks reached almost to our trenches, only to be stopped byrifle-bullets. "Allah! Allah!" yelled the Turks as they came on. Asweating, grimly happy machine-gun sergeant between orders was shoutingto the Turkish army in general, "'Tis not a damn' bit of good to yell toAllah now. " Our artillery opened huge gaps in their lines; ourmachine-guns piled them dead in the ranks where they stood. Our owncasualties were very slight, but of the waves of Turks that surged overthe crest all that day only a mere shattered remnant ever straggled backto their own lines. 

[Sidenote: The armies in a state of siege. ]

That was the last big attack the Turks made. From that time on it wasvirtually two armies in a state of siege. Every night at dark we stoodto arms for an hour. Every man fixed his bayonet and prepared to repulseany attack of the enemy. After that sentry groups were formed, threereliefs of two men each. Two men stood with their heads over the parapetwatching for any movement in the no-man's-land between the lines. Thataccounts for the surprisingly large number of men one sees wounded inthe head. 

At daylight every morning came "Stand to arms" again. Then day dutiesbegan. In the daytime, by using a periscope, an arrangement of doublemirrors, a sentry can keep his head below the parapet while he watchesthe ground in front. Sometimes a bullet struck one of the mirrors, andthe splintered glass blinded the sentry. It was a common thing to see aman go to hospital with his face badly lacerated by periscope glass. 

[Sidenote: When a shell comes. ]

Ordinarily a man is much safer on the firing-line than in the restdug-outs. Trenches are so constructed that even if a shell drops rightin the traverse where men are, only half a dozen or so suffer. In openor slightly protected ground where the dug-outs are the burst of ashrapnel-shell covers an area twenty-five by two hundred yards inextent. 

[Sidenote: Shrapnel and bullets. ]

A shell can be heard coming. Experts claim to identify the caliber of agun by the sound the shell makes. Few live long enough to become suchexperts. In Gallipoli the average length of life was three weeks. Indug-outs we always ate our meals, such as they were, to theaccompaniment of "Turkish Delight, " the Newfoundlanders' name forshrapnel. We had become accustomed to rifle-bullets. When you hear the_zing_ of a spent bullet or the sharp crack of an explosive you know ithas passed you. The one that hits you you never hear. At first we dodgedat the sound of a passing bullet, but soon we came actually to believethe superstition that a bullet would not hit a man unless it had on ithis regimental number and his name. Then, too, a bullet leaves a cleanwound, and a man hit by it drops out quietly. The shrapnel makes nasty, jagged, hideous wounds, the horrible recollection of which lingers fordays. It is little wonder that we preferred the firing-line. 

[Sidenote: The mode of intrenching. ]

Most of our work was done at night. When we wished to advance our line, we sent forward a platoon of men the desired distance. Every man carriedwith him three empty sand-bags and his intrenching-tool. Temporaryprotection is secured at short notice by having every man dig a hole inthe ground that is large and deep enough to allow him to lie flat in it. The intrenching-tool is a miniature pickax, one end of which resembles alarge-bladed hoe with a sharpened and tempered edge. The pick end isused to loosen hard material and to break up large lumps; the other endis used as a shovel to throw up the dirt. When used in this fashion thewooden handle is laid aside, the pick end becomes a handle, and theintrenching-tool is used in the same manner as a trowel. 

[Sidenote: The necessity for concealment. ]

Lying on our stomach, our rifles close at hand, we dug furiously. Firstwe loosened up enough earth in front of our heads to fill a sand-bag. This sand-bag we placed beside our heads on the side nearest the enemy. Out in no-man's-land, with bullets and machine-gun balls pattering aboutus, we did fast work. As soon as we had filled the second and thirdsand-bags we placed them on top of the first. In Gallipoli every othermilitary necessity was subordinated to concealment. Often we couldcomplete a trench and occupy it before the enemy knew of it. 

[Sidenote: The Turks use star-shells. ]

Sometimes while we were digging the Turks surprised us by sending upstar-shells. They burst like rockets high overhead. Everything wasoutlined in a strange, uncanny way that gave the effect of stage-fire. At first when a man saw a star-shell he dropped flat on his face; butafter a good many men had been riddled by bullets, we saw our mistake. The sudden blinding glare makes it impossible to identify objectsbefore the light fades. Star-shells show only movement. The first stirbetween the lines becomes the target for both sides. So after that, evenwhen a man was standing upright, he simply stood still. 

[Sidenote: Aëroplanes attacked by artillery. ]

Every afternoon from just behind our lines an aëroplane buzzed up. Atthe tremendous height it looked like an immense blue-bottle fly. Atfirst the enemy's aëroplanes came out to meet ours, but a few encounterswith our men soon convinced them of the futility of this. After thatthey relied on their artillery. In the air all around the tiny speck wecould see white puffs of smoke where their shrapnel was exploding. Sometimes those puffs were perilously close to it; at such times ourhearts were in our mouths. Everybody in the trench craned his neck tosee. When our aëroplane man[oe]uvered clear you could hear a sigh ofrelief run along the trench. 

[Sidenote: An air-man's adventure. ]

One of our air-men, Samson, captured a German Taube that he used fordaily reconnaissance. Every day we watched him hover over the Turkishlines, circle clear of their bursting shrapnel, and return to ourartillery with his report. One day we watched two hostile planes chasehim back right to our trench. When they came near us we opened rapidfire that forced them to turn; but before Samson reached hislanding-place at Salt Lake we could see that he was in trouble; one ofthe wings of the machine was drooping badly. We watched him land insafety, saw him jump out of his seat, and walk about ten yards to awaiting motor-ambulance. The ambulance had just turned when a shell hitthe aëroplane. A second shell blew it to pieces. 

[Sidenote: A naval and artillery bombardment. ]

But Samson had completed his mission. About half an hour later the navyin the bay and our artillery began a bombardment. From our trenches, looking through ravines, we could see the men-of-war lined up pouringbroadsides over our heads into the Turkish lines. From our position inthe valley we watched our shells demolish the enemy's front-linetrenches on the hill well to our left. Through field-glasses we couldsee the communication-trenches choked with fleeing Turks. Some of ourartillery concentrated on the support-trenches, preventingreinforcements from coming up. A mule-train of supplies was caught inthe curtain of fire. The Turks, caught between two fires, could notescape. In a few minutes all that was left of the scientificallyconstructed intrenchments was a conglomerate heap of sand-bags, equipments, and machine-guns; and on top of it all lay the mangledbodies of men and mules. 

All through the bombardment we had hoped for the order to go over theparapet, but for the Worcesters on our left was reserved the distinctionof making the charge. High explosives cleared the way for their advance, and cheering and yelling they went over the parapet. The Turks in thefront-line trenches, completely demoralized, fled to the rear. A few, too weak or too sorely wounded to run, surrendered. 

[Sidenote: The Turk's dislike for German officers. ]

Prisoners taken in this engagement told us that the Turkish rank andfile heartily hated their German officers. One prisoner said that he hadbeen an officer, but since the outbreak of this war had been replaced bya German. At present the Turks are officered entirely by Germans. 

[Sidenote: Losses from disease. ]

With the monotony varied occasionally by some local engagement like thiswe dragged through the hot, fly-pestered days and cold, drafty, vermin-infested nights of September and early October. By the middle ofOctober, 1915, disease and scarcity of water had depleted our ranks;instead of having four days on the firing-line and eight days' rest, wewere holding the firing-line eight days and resting only four. In myplatoon, of the six non-commissioned officers who started with us, onlytwo corporals were left, I and one other. For a week after he had beenordered by the doctor to leave the peninsula the other chap hung on, pluckily determined not to leave me alone, although staying meantkeeping awake nearly all night. By this time dysentery and enteric hadtaken toll of more men than bullets. These diseases became epidemicuntil the clearing-stations and the beaches were choked with sick. Thetime we should have been sleeping was spent in digging, but still themen worked uncomplainingly. Some, too game to quit, would not report tothe doctor, working on courageously until they dropped, although down inthe bay beckoned the Red Cross of the hospital-ship, with its assuranceof safety, rest, and cleanliness. By sickness and snipers' bullets welost thirty men a day. Every day the sun poured down relentlessly, adding to the torment of parched throats and tongues. Every night, doubly cold in comparison with the day's burning heat, found us chilledand shivering. 

[Sidenote: The wounded considered lucky. ]

Nobody in the front-line trenches or on the shell-swept area behind everexpected to leave the peninsula alive. Their one hope was to get offwounded. Every night men leaving the trenches to bring up rations fromthe beach shook hands with their comrades. From every ration party oftwenty men we always counted on losing two. Those who were wounded werelooked on as lucky. The best thing we could wish a man was a "cushywound, " one that would not prove fatal. But no one wanted to quit. Everyday rumors flew through the trenches that in four days all the Turkswould surrender. Men dying from dysentery and enteric lingered to seeit, but the surrender never materialized. 

[Sidenote: Faith in Australians. ]

We knew that in the particular section of trench held by us an advancewas hopeless. Still, we thought that some other parts of the line mightadvance. There was always faith in the invincible Australasians. Earlyin October, 1915, had come the news of the British advance at Loos. Thereport that reached us said that the enemy on the entire Western fronthad begun to retreat. The Australians, catching the Turks napping, tooktwo lines of trenches. 

[Sidenote: The man who stood on a bomb. ]

By the time I left, the sordid monotony had begun to tell on the men. Every day officers were besieged with requests for permission to go outbetween the lines to locate snipers. When men were wanted for nightpatrol every one volunteered. Ration parties, which had formerly been adread, were now an eagerly sought variation. Any change was welcome. Thethought of being killed had lost its fear. Daily intercourse with deathhad robbed it of its horror. One chap had his leg blown off fromstanding on a bomb. Later, in hospital, he told me that he feltsatisfied. He had always wondered what would happen if a man stood on abomb; now he knew. It illustrates how the men hated the deadly sameness. Anything was better than waiting in the trenches, better than beingkilled without a chance to struggle. 

[Sidenote: Donnelly's post on Caribou Ridge. ]

The men our regiment lost, although they gladly fought a hopeless fight, have not died in vain; the foremost advance on the Suvla Bay front, Donnelly's Post on Caribou Ridge, was made by Newfoundlanders. It iscalled Donnelly's Post because it is here that Lieutenant Donnelly wonhis military cross. The hitherto nameless ridge from which the Turkishmachine-guns poured their concentrated death into our trenches standsas a monument to the initiative of the Newfoundlanders. It is nowCaribou Ridge as a recognition of the men who wear the deer's-headbadge. 

[Sidenote: Swept by machine-guns. ]

From Caribou Ridge the Turks could enfilade parts of our firing-line. For weeks they had continued to pick off our men one by one. You couldalmost tell when your turn was coming. I know, because from CaribouRidge came the bullet that sent me off the peninsula. The machine-gunson Caribou Ridge not only swept parts of our trench, but commanded allof the intervening ground. Several attempts had been made to rush thoseguns. All had failed, held up by the murderous machine-gun fire. Undercover of darkness, Lieutenant Donnelly, with only eight men, surprisedthe Turks in the post that now bears his name. The captured machine-gunhe used to repulse constantly launched bomb and rifle attacks. 

[Sidenote: How Donnelly surprised the Turks. ]

[Sidenote: Deeds of great heroism. ]

Just at dusk one evening Donnelly stole out to Caribou Ridge andsurprised the Turks. All night the Turks strove to recover their lostground. Darkness was the Newfoundlanders' ally. When reinforcementsarrived, Donnelly's eight men were reduced to two. Dawn showed the havocwrought by the gallant little group. The ground in front of the post wasa shambles of piled-up Turkish corpses. But daylight showed somethingmore to the credit of the Newfoundlanders than the mere taking of theridge. It showed one of Donnelly's men, Jack Hynes, who had crawled awayfrom his companion to a point about two hundred yards to the left. Fromhere he had all alone kept up through the whole night a rapid fire onthe enemy's flank that duped them into believing that we had men therein force. It showed Hynes purposely falling back over exposed ground todraw the enemy's attention from Sergeant Greene, who was coolly makingtrip after trip between the ridge and our lines, carrying a wounded manin his arms every time until all our wounded were in safety. Hynes andGreene were each given a distinguished-conduct medal. None was ever morenobly earned. 

One Saturday morning near the end of October, 1915, the brigade majorpassed through our lines. Before we took over the trench the occupantsof the firing-line threw their refuse over the parapet into the shortunderbrush. Since coming in we had made a dump for it. I was sent outwith five men to remove the rubbish from the underbrush to the dump, andthis despite the fact that a short distance to our right we had justlost two men sent over the parapet in broad daylight to pick up somecans. 

[Sidenote: The writer is wounded. ]

About nine in the morning we started. It was about half-an-hour's work. There was no cover for men standing. The small bushes hid men lying orsitting. Every little while I gave the men a rest, making them sit inthe shelter of the underbrush. We had almost finished when the sniperssomewhere on our left began to bang at us. I ordered the men to cover, and was just pointing out a likely place to young Hynes when I felt adull thud in the left shoulder-blade and a sharp pain in my chest. Thencame a drowsy, languid feeling, and I sank down first on my knees, thenmy head dropped over on my chest, and down I went like a Mohammedansaying his prayers. Connecting the hit in the back with the pain in mychest, I concluded that I was done for, and can distinctly rememberthinking quite calmly that I was indeed fortunate to be conscious longenough to tell them what to do about my will and so forth. I tried tosay, "I'm hit, " and must have succeeded, because immediately I heard myhenchman Hynes yell with a frenzied oath: "The corporal's struck! Can'tyou see the corporal's struck?" and heard him curse the Turk. Then Iheard the others say, "We must get him in out of this. " After that I wasquite clear-headed, and when three or four of the finest boys that everstepped risked their lives to come out over the parapet under fire, Iwas able to tell them how to lift me, and when the stretcher-bearersarrived to give me first aid I was conscious enough to tell them whereto look for the wound. Also I became angry at the crowd who gatheredaround to watch the dressing and make remarks about the amount of blood. I asked them if they thought it was a nickel-show. This when I feltalmost certain I was dying. I don't remember even feeling relieved whenthey told me the bullet had not gone through my heart. 

[Sidenote: Hospital at Alexandria. ]

That night I was put on board a hospital-ship, and a few days later Iwas in hospital at Alexandria. 

[Sidenote: The rear-guard action. ]

The night the First Newfoundland Regiment landed in Suvla Bay there wereabout eleven hundred of us. In December, 1915, when the British forcesevacuated Gallipoli, to the remnant of our regiment fell the honor offighting the rear-guard action. This is the highest recognition aregiment can receive; for the duty of the rear-guard in a retreat is tokeep the enemy from reaching the main body of troops, even if this meansannihilation for itself. At Lemnos island the next day, when the rollwas called, of the eleven hundred men who landed when I did, only onehundred and seventy-one answered "Here. "

 * * * * *

The German armies, following the Great Retreat from the Marne to theAisne, and after the series of mighty struggles which make up the Battleof the Aisne, and the attempts to win the Channel ports, continued theefforts to break through the British and French lines. The British heldthe strong line of Ypres, and in March made gains at Neuve Chapelle. InApril the Germans made a desperate effort to break through at Ypres. There followed the Second Battle of Ypres, terrific in itself, butespecially notable because of the first employment by the Germans ofpoisonous gas. 

GAS: SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

COL. E. D. SWINTON

[Sidenote: Second Battle of Ypres. ]

Since the last summary there has been a sudden development in thesituation on our front, and very heavy fighting has taken place to thenorth and northeast of Ypres, which can be said to have assumed theimportance of a second battle for that town. With the aid of a method ofwarfare up to now never employed by nations sufficiently civilized toconsider themselves bound by international agreements solemnly ratifiedby themselves, and favored by the atmospheric conditions, the Germanshave put into effect an attack which they have evidently contemplatedand prepared for some time. 

Before the battle began our line in this quarter ran from thecross-roads at Broodseinde, east of Zonnebeke on the Ypres-MoorsledeRoad to the cross-roads half a mile north of St. Julien, on theYpres-Poelcapelle Road, roughly following the crest of what is known asthe Grafenstafel Ridge. The French prolonged the line west of theYpres-Poelcapelle Road, whence their trenches ran around the north ofLangemarck to Steenstraate on the Yperlee Canal. The area covered by theinitial attack is that between the canal and the Ypres-Poelcapelle Road, though it was afterward extended to the west of the canal and to theeast of the road. 

[Sidenote: Germans plan a gas attack. ]

An effort on the part of the Germans in this direction was notunexpected, since movements of troops and transport behind their frontline had been detected for some days. Its peculiar and novel nature, however, was a surprise which was largely responsible for the measure ofsuccess achieved. Taking advantage of the fact that at this season ofthe year the wind not infrequently blows from the north, they secretlybrought up apparatus for emitting asphyxiating vapor or gas, anddistributed it along the section of their front line opposite that ofour allies, west of Langemarck, which faced almost due north. Their planwas to make a sudden onslaught southwestward, which, if successful, might enable them to gain the crossings on the canal south of Bixschooteand place them well behind the British left in a position to threatenYpres. 

The attack was originally fixed for Tuesday, the 20th, but since allchances of success depended on the action of the asphyxiating vapor itwas postponed, the weather being unfavorable. On Thursday, the 22d, thewind blew steadily from the north, and that afternoon, all being ready, the Germans put their plan into execution. Since then events have movedso rapidly and the situation has moved so frequently that it isdifficult to give a consecutive and clear story of what happened, butthe following account represents as nearly as can be the general courseof events. The details of the gas apparatus employed by them are givenseparately, as also those of the asphyxiating grenades, bombs, andshells of which they have been throwing hundreds. 

[Sidenote: The first gas battle in war. ]

At some time between 4 and 5 p. M. The Germans started operations byreleasing gases with the result that a cloud of poisonous vapor rolledswiftly before the wind from their trenches toward those of the Frenchwest of Langemarck, held by a portion of the French Colonial Division. Allowing sufficient time for the fumes to take full effect on the troopsfacing them, the Germans charged forward over the practicallyunresisting enemy in their immediate front, and, penetrating through thegap thus created, pressed on silently and swiftly to the south and west. By their sudden irruption they were able to overrun and surprise a largeproportion of the French troops billeted behind the front line in thisarea and to bring some of the French guns as well as our own under a hotrifle fire at close range. 

The first intimation that all was not well to the north was conveyed toour troops holding the left of the British line between 5 and 6 p. M. Bythe withdrawal of some of the French Colonials and the sight of the wallof vapor following them. Our flank being thus exposed the troops wereordered to retire on St. Julien, with their left parallel to but to thewest of the high road. The splendid resistance of these troops, whosaved the situation, has already been mentioned by the Commander inChief. 

[Sidenote: Bombardment by shell and gas projectiles. ]

Meanwhile, apparently waiting till their infantry had penetrated wellbehind the Allies' line, the Germans had opened a hot artillery fireupon the various tactical points to the north of Ypres, the bombardmentbeing carried out with ordinary high-explosive shell and shrapnel ofvarious calibres and also with projectiles containing asphyxiating gas. About this period our men in reserve near Ypres, seeing the shellsbursting, had gathered in groups, discussing the situation andquestioning some scattered bodies of Turcos who had appeared; suddenly astaff officer rode up shouting "Stand to your arms, " and in a fewminutes the troops had fallen in and were marching northward to thescene of the fight. 

Nothing more impressive can be imagined than the sight of our menfalling in quietly in perfect order on their alarm posts amid the sceneof wild confusion caused by the panic-stricken refugees who swarmedalong the roads. 

[Sidenote: Steadiness of the British. ]

In the meantime, to the north and northeast of the town, a confusedfight was taking place, which gave proof not only of great gallantry andsteadiness on the part of the troops referred to above, but ofremarkable presence of mind on the part of their leaders. Behind thewall of vapor, which had swept across fields, through woods, and overhedgerows, came the German firing line, the men's mouths and noses, itis stated, protected by pads soaked in a solution of bicarbonate ofsoda. Closely following them again came the supports. These troops, hurrying forward with their formation somewhat broken up by theobstacles encountered in their path, looked like a huge mob bearing downupon the town. A battery of 4. 7-inch guns a little beyond the left ofour line was surprised and overwhelmed by them in a moment. Further tothe rear and in a more easterly direction were several field batteries, and before they could come into action the Germans were within a fewhundred yards. Not a gun, however, was lost. 

[Sidenote: The left retires slowly. ]

One battery, taken in flank, swung around, fired on the enemy atpoint-blank range, and checked the rush. Another opened fire with theguns pointing in almost opposite directions, the enemy being on threesides of them. It was under the very heavy cannonade opened about thistime by the Germans, and threatened by the advance of vastly superiornumbers, that our infantry on our left steadily, and without any sign ofconfusion, slowly retired to St. Julien, fighting every step. 

[Sidenote: British reserves arrive. ]

Help was not long in arriving, for some of our reserves near Ypres hadstood to arms as soon as they were aware of the fact that the Frenchline had been forced, and the officers on their own initiative, withoutwaiting for orders, led them forward to meet the advancing enemy, who, by this time, were barely two miles from the town. These battalionsattacked the Germans with the bayonet, and then ensued a mêlée, in whichour men more than held their own, both sides losing very heavily. 

One German battalion seems to have been especially severely handled, theColonel being captured among several other prisoners. Otherreinforcements were thrown in as they came up, and, when night fell, thefighting continued by moonlight, our troops driving back the enemy byrepeated bayonet charges, in the course of which our heavy guns wererecaptured. 

[Sidenote: Germans cross the canal. ]

By then the situation was somewhat restored in the area immediatelynorth of Ypres. Further to the west, however, the enemy had forced theirway over the canal, occupying Steenstraate and the crossing at Het Sast, about three-quarters of a mile south of the former place, and hadestablished themselves at various points on the west bank. All nightlong the shelling continued, and about 1. 30 a. M. Two heavy attacks weremade on our line in the neighborhood of Broodseinde, east of Zonnebeke. These were both repulsed. The bombardment of Ypres itself and itsneighborhood had by now redoubled in intensity and a part of the townwas in flames. 

In the early morning of Friday, the 23d, we delivered a strongcounter-attack northward in co-operation with the French. Our advanceprogressed for some little distance, reaching the edge of the wood abouthalf a mile west of St. Julien and penetrating it. Here our men got intothe Germans with the bayonet, and the latter suffered heavily. Thelosses were also severe on our side, for the advance had to be carriedout across the open. But in spite of this nothing could exceed the dashwith which it was conducted. One man--and his case is typical of thespirit shown by the troops--who had had his rifle smashed by a bullet, continued to fight with an intrenching tool. Even many of the woundedmade their way out of the fight with some article of German equipment asa memento. 

[Sidenote: The British intrench. ]

About 11 a. M. , not being able to progress further, our troops dugthemselves in, the line then running from St. Julien practically duewest for about a mile, whence it curved southwestward before turningnorth to the canal near Boesinghe. Broadly speaking, on the section ofthe front then occupied by us the result of the operations had been toremove to some extent the wedge which the Germans had driven into theallied line, and the immediate danger was over. 

During the afternoon our counter-attack made further progress south ofPilkem, thus straightening the line still more. Along the canal thefighting raged fiercely, our allies making some progress here and there. During the night, however, the Germans captured Lizerne, a village onthe main road from Ypres to Steenstraate. 

[Sidenote: The enemy throws bridges across the canal. ]

When the morning of the 24th came the situation remained much the same, but the enemy, who had thrown several bridges across the canal, continued to gain ground to the west. On our front the Germans, undercover of their gas, made a further attack between 3 and 4 a. M. To theeast of St. Julien and forced back a portion of our line. Nothing elsein particular occurred until about midday, when large bodies of theenemy were seen advancing down the Ypres-Poelcapelle road toward St. Julien. Soon after a very strong attack developed against that villageand the section of the line east of it. 

[Sidenote: A French counter-attack. ]

Under the pressure of these fresh masses our troops were compelled tofall back, contesting every inch of ground and making repeatedcounter-attacks; but until late at night a gallant handful, some 200 to300 strong, held out in St. Julien. During the night the line wasre-established north of the hamlet of Fortuin, about 700 yards furtherto the rear. All this time the fighting along the canal continued, theenemy forcing their way across near Boesinghe, and holding Het Sase, Steenstraate, and Lizerne strongly. The French counter-attacked in theafternoon, captured fifty prisoners, and made some further progresstoward Pilkem. The Germans, however, were still holding the west bankfirmly, although the Belgian artillery had broken the bridge behind themat Steenstraate. 

[Sidenote: German assaults on Broodseinde. ]

On the morning of Sunday, the fourth day of the battle, we made a strongcounter-attack on St. Julien, which gained some ground but was checkedin front of the village. To the west of it we reached a point a fewhundred yards south of the wood which had been the objective on the 23dand which we had had to relinquish subsequently. In the afternoon theGermans made repeated assaults in great strength on our line nearBroodseinde. These were backed up by a tremendous artillery bombardmentunder the throwing of asphyxiating bombs; but all were beaten off withgreat slaughter to the enemy, and forty-five prisoners fell into ourhands. When night came the situation remained unchanged. 

This determined offensive on the part of the enemy, although it hasmenaced Ypres itself, has not so far the appearance of a great effort tobreak the line and capture the Channel ports. Its initial success wasgained by the surprise rendered possible by the use of a device whichGermany pledged herself not to employ. 

[Illustration: THE GAS BATTLE OF YPRES]

THE CANADIANS AT YPRES

BY THE CANADIAN RECORD OFFICER

[Sidenote: Position of the Canadian Division. ]

On April 22 the Canadian Division held a line of, roughly, 5, 000 yards, extending in a northwesterly direction from the Ypres-Roulers Railway tothe Ypres-Poelcapelle road, and connecting at its terminus with theFrench troops. The division consisted of three infantry brigades, inaddition to the artillery brigades. Of the infantry brigades the Firstwas in reserve, the Second was on the right, and the Third establishedcontact with the Allies at the point indicated above. 

[Sidenote: The sudden gas attack. ]

The day was a peaceful one, warm and sunny, and except that the previousday had witnessed a further bombardment of the stricken town of Ypres, everything seemed quiet in front of the Canadian line. At 5 o'clock inthe afternoon a plan, carefully prepared, was put into execution againstour French allies on the left. Asphyxiating gas of great intensity wasprojected into their trenches, probably by means of force pumps andpipes laid out under the parapets. The fumes, aided by a favorable wind, floated backward, poisoning and disabling over an extended area thosewho fell under their effect. 

[Sidenote: The French give ground. ]

The result was that the French were compelled to give ground for aconsiderable distance. The glory which the French Army has won in thiswar would make it impertinent to labor the compelling nature of thepoisonous discharges under which the trenches were lost. The French did, as every one knew they would do, all that stout soldiers could do, andthe Canadian Division, officers and men, look forward to many occasionsin the future in which they will stand side by side with the bravearmies of France. 

The immediate consequences of this enforced withdrawal were, of course, extremely grave. The Third Brigade of the Canadian Division was withoutany left, or, in other words, its left was in the air. 

[Sidenote: Gap on the Canadian left. ]

It became imperatively necessary greatly to extend the Canadian lines tothe left rear. It was not, of course, practicable to move the FirstBrigade from reserve at a moment's notice, and the line, extending from5, 000 to 9, 000 yards, was naturally not the line that had been held bythe Allies at 5 o'clock, and a gap still existed on its left. 

It became necessary for Brigadier General Turner, commanding the ThirdBrigade, to throw back his left flank southward to protect his rear. 

In the course of the confusion which followed upon the readjustments ofposition, the enemy, who had advanced rapidly after his initialsuccesses, took four British 4. 7 guns in a small wood to the west of thevillage of St. Julien, two miles in the rear of the original Frenchtrenches. 

[Sidenote: Heroism of the Canadian Division. ]

The story of the second battle of Ypres is the story of how the CanadianDivision, enormously outnumbered--for they had in front of them at leastfour divisions, supported by immensely heavy artillery--with a gap stillexisting, though reduced, in their lines, and with dispositions madehurriedly under the stimulus of critical danger, fought through the dayand through the night, and then through another day and night; foughtunder their officers until, as happened to so many, those perishedgloriously, and then fought from the impulsion of sheer valor becausethey came from fighting stock. 

The enemy, of course, was aware--whether fully or not may perhaps bedoubted--of the advantage his breach in the line had given him, andimmediately began to push a formidable series of attacks upon the wholeof the newly-formed Canadian salient. If it is possible to distinguishwhen the attack was everywhere so fierce, it developed with particularintensity at this moment upon the apex of the newly formed line, runningin the direction of St. Julien. 

[Sidenote: Assault on the wood. ]

It has already been stated that four British guns were taken in a woodcomparatively early in the evening of the 22d. In the course of thatnight, and under the heaviest machine-gun fire, this wood was assaultedby the Canadian Scottish, Sixteenth Battalion of the Third Brigade, andthe Tenth Battalion of the Second Brigade, which was intercepted forthis purpose on its way to a reserve trench. The battalions wererespectively commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leckie and LieutenantColonel Boyle, and after a most fierce struggle in the light of a mistymoon they took the position at the point of the bayonet. At midnight theSecond Battalion, under Colonel Watson, and the Toronto Regiment, Queen's Own, Third Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Rennie, both ofthe First Brigade, brought up much-needed reinforcement, and though notactually engaged in the assault were in reserve. 

All through the following days and nights these battalions shared thefortunes and misfortunes of the Third Brigade. An officer who took partin the attack describes how the men about him fell under the fire of themachine guns, which, in his phrase, played upon them "like a wateringpot. " He added quite simply, "I wrote my own life off. " But the linenever wavered. When one man fell another took his place, and with afinal shout the survivors of the two battalions flung themselves intothe wood. The German garrison was completely demoralized, and theimpetuous advance of the Canadians did not cease until they reached thefar side of the wood and intrenched themselves there in the position sodearly gained. They had, however, the disappointment of finding that theguns had been blown up by the enemy, and later on in the same night amost formidable concentration of artillery fire, sweeping the wood as atropical storm sweeps the leaves from a forest, made it impossible forthem to hold the position for which they had sacrificed so much. 

The fighting continued without intermission all through the night, and, to those who observed the indications that the attack was being pushedwith ever-growing strength, it hardly seemed possible that theCanadians, fighting in positions so difficult to defend and so littlethe subject of deliberate choice, could maintain their resistance forany long period. At 6 A. M. On Friday it became apparent that the leftwas becoming more and more involved, and a powerful German attempt tooutflank it developed rapidly. The consequences, if it had been brokenor outflanked, need not be insisted upon. They were not merely local. 

[Sidenote: Counter-attack on German lines. ]

It was therefore decided, formidable as the attempt undoubtedly was, totry and give relief by a counter-attack upon the first line of Germantrenches, now far, far advanced from those originally occupied by theFrench. This was carried out by the Ontario First and Fourth Battalionsof the First Brigade, under Brigadier General Mercer, acting incombination with a British brigade. 

It is safe to say that the youngest private in the rank, as he set histeeth for the advance, knew the task in front of him, and the youngestsubaltern knew all that rested upon its success. It did not seem thatany human being could live in the shower of shot and shell which beganto play upon the advancing troops. They suffered terrible casualties. For a short time every other man seemed to fall, but the attack waspressed ever closer and closer. 

[Sidenote: Enemy's first line trenches taken. ]

The Fourth Canadian Battalion at one moment came under a particularlywithering fire. For a moment--not more--it wavered. Its most gallantcommanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Burchill, carrying, after an oldfashion, a light cane, coolly and cheerfully rallied his men and, at thevery moment when his example had infected them, fell dead at the head ofhis battalion. With a hoarse cry of anger they sprang forward, (for, indeed, they loved him, ) as if to avenge his death. The astonishingattack which followed--pushed home in the face of direct frontal firemade in broad daylight by battalions whose names should live for ever inthe memories of soldiers--was carried to the first line of Germantrenches. After a hand-to-hand struggle the last German who resisted wasbayoneted, and the trench was won. 

The measure of this success may be taken when it is pointed out thatthis trench represented in the German advance the apex in the breachwhich the enemy had made in the original line of the Allies, and that itwas two and a half miles south of that line. This charge, made by menwho looked death indifferently in the face, (for no man who took part init could think that he was likely to live, ) saved, and that was much, the Canadian left. But it did more. Up to the point where the assailantsconquered, or died, it secured and maintained during the most criticalmoment of all the integrity of the allied line. For the trench was notonly taken, it was held thereafter against all comers, and in the teethof every conceivable projectile, until the night of Sunday, the 25th, when all that remained of the war-broken but victorious battalions wasrelieved by fresh troops. 

[Sidenote: The poisonous gas attack. ]

It is necessary now to return to the fortunes of the Third Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Turner, which, as we have seen, at 5o'clock on Thursday was holding the Canadian left, and after the firstattack assumed the defense of the new Canadian salient, at the same timesparing all the men it could to form an extemporized line between thewood and St. Julien. This brigade also was at the first moment of theGerman offensive, made the object of an attack by the discharge ofpoisonous gas. The discharge was followed by two enemy assaults. Although the fumes were extremely poisonous, they were not, perhapshaving regard to the wind, so disabling as on the French lines, (whichran almost east to west, ) and the brigade, though affected by the fumes, stoutly beat back the two German assaults. 

Encouraged by this success, it rose to the supreme effort required bythe assault on the wood, which has already been described. At 4 o'clockon the morning of Friday, the 23d, a fresh emission of gas was made bothupon the Second Brigade, which held the line running northeast, and uponthe Third Brigade, which, as has been fully explained, had continued theline up to the pivotal point, as defined above, and had then spread downin a southeasterly direction. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning that twoprivates of the Forty-eighth Highlanders who found their way into thetrenches commanded by Colonel Lipsett, Ninetieth Winnipeg Rifles, EighthBattalion, perished in the fumes, and it was noticed that their facesbecame blue immediately after dissolution. 

[Sidenote: A brief retirement. ]

The Royal Highlanders of Montreal, Thirteenth Battalion, and theForty-eighth Highlanders, Fifteenth Battalion, were more especiallyaffected by the discharge. The Royal Highlanders, though considerablyshaken, remained immovable upon their ground. The Forty-eighthHighlanders, which, no doubt, received a more poisonous discharge, wasfor the moment dismayed, and, indeed, their trench, according to thetestimony of very hardened soldiers, became intolerable. The battalionretired from the trench, but for a very short distance, and for anequally short time, in a few moments they were again their own men. Theyadvanced upon and occupied the trenches which they had momentarilyabandoned. 

In the course of the same night the Third Brigade, which had alreadydisplayed a resource, a gallantry, and a tenacity for which no eulogycould be excessive, was exposed (and with it the whole allied case) to aperil still more formidable. 

[Sidenote: Germans pass gap on left. ]

It has been explained, and, indeed, the fundamental situation made theperil clear, that several German divisions were attempting to crush ordrive back this devoted brigade, and in any event to use their enormousnumerical superiority to sweep around and overwhelm its left wing. Atsome point in the line which cannot be precisely determined the lastattempt partially succeeded, and in the course of this critical struggleGerman troops in considerable though not in overwhelming numbers swungpast the unsupported left of the brigade, and, slipping in between thewood and St. Julien, added to the torturing anxieties of the long-drawnstruggle by the appearance, and indeed for the moment the reality, ofisolation from the brigade base. 

[Sidenote: The Royal Highlanders of Montreal. ]

In the exertions made by the Third Brigade during this supreme crisis itis almost impossible to single out one battalion without injustice toothers, but though the efforts of the Royal Highlanders of Montreal, Thirteenth Battalion, were only equal to those of the other battalionswho did such heroic service, it so happened by chance that the fate ofsome of its officers attracted special attention. 

[Sidenote: Death of Captain McCuaig. ]

Major Norsworth, already almost disabled by a bullet wound, wasbayoneted and killed while he was rallying his men with easycheerfulness. The case of Captain McCuaig, of the same battalion, wasnot less glorious, although his death can claim no witness. This mostgallant officer was seriously wounded, in a hurriedly constructedtrench, at a moment when it would have been possible to remove him tosafety. He absolutely refused to move and continued in the discharge ofhis duty. 

But the situation grew constantly worse, and peremptory orders werereceived for an immediate withdrawal. Those who were compelled to obeythem were most insistent to carry with them, at whatever risk to theirown mobility and safety, an officer to whom they were devotedlyattached. But he, knowing, it may be, better than they, the exertionswhich still lay in front of them, and unwilling to inflict upon them thedisabilities of a maimed man, very resolutely refused, and asked of themone thing only, that there should be given to him, as he lay alone inthe trench, two loaded Colt revolvers to add to his own, which lay inhis right hand as he made his last request. And so, with three revolversready to his hand for use, a very brave officer waited to sell his life, wounded and racked with pain, in an abandoned trench. 

On Friday afternoon the left of the Canadian line was strengthened byimportant reinforcements of British troops amounting to sevenbattalions. From this time forward the Canadians also continued toreceive further assistance on the left from a series of Frenchcounter-attacks pushed in a northeasterly direction from the canal bank. 

[Sidenote: The defenders give ground. ]

But the artillery fire of the enemy continually grew in intensity, andit became more and more evident that the Canadian salient could nolonger be maintained against the overwhelming superiority of numbers bywhich it was assailed. Slowly, stubbornly, and contesting every yard, the defenders gave ground until the salient gradually receded from theapex, near the point where it had originally aligned with the French, and fell back upon St. Julien. 

[Sidenote: The enemy in St. Julien. ]

Soon it became evident that even St. Julien, exposed to fire from rightand left, was no longer tenable in the fact of overwhelming numericalsuperiority. The Third Brigade was therefore ordered to retreat furthersouth, selling every yard of ground as dearly as it had done since 5o'clock on Thursday. But it was found impossible, without hazarding farlarger forces, to disentangle the detachment of the Royal Highlanders ofMontreal, Thirteenth Battalion, and of the Royal Montreal Regiment, Fourteenth Battalion. The brigade was ordered, and not a moment toosoon, to move back. It left these units with hearts as heavy as thosewith which his comrades had said farewell to Captain McCuaig. The Germantide rolled, indeed, over the deserted village, but for several hoursafter the enemy had become master of the village the sullen andpersistent rifle fire which survived showed that they were not yetmaster of the Canadian rearguard. If they died, they died worthily ofCanada. 

The enforced retirement of the Third Brigade (and to have stayed longerwould have been madness) reproduced for the Second Brigade, commanded byBrigadier General Curry, in a singularly exact fashion, the position ofthe Third Brigade itself at the moment of the withdrawal of the French. The Second Brigade, it must be remembered, had retained the whole lineof trenches, roughly 2, 500 yards, which it was holding at 5 o'clock onThursday afternoon, supported by the incomparable exertions of the ThirdBrigade, and by the highly hazardous employment in which necessity hadinvolved that brigade. The Second Brigade had maintained its lines. 

[Sidenote: General Curry's maneuvres. ]

[Sidenote: Lieutenant Colonel Lipsett holds the left. ]

It now devolved upon General Curry, commanding this brigade, toreproduce the tactical maneuvres with which, earlier in the fight, theThird Brigade had adapted itself to the flank movement of overwhelmingnumerical superiority. He flung his left flank around south, and hisrecord is, that in the very crisis of this immense struggle he held hisline of trenches from Thursday at 5 o'clock till Sunday afternoon. Andon Sunday afternoon he had not abandoned his trenches. There were noneleft. They had been obliterated by artillery. He withdrew his undefeatedtroops from the fragments of his field fortifications, and the hearts ofhis men were as completely unbroken as the parapets of his trenches werecompletely broken. In such a brigade it is invidious to single out anybattalion for special praise, but it is, perhaps, necessary to the storyto point out that Lieutenant Colonel Lipsett, commanding the NinetiethWinnipeg Rifles, Eighth Battalion of the Second Brigade, held theextreme left of the brigade position at the most critical moment. 

The battalion was expelled from the trenches early on Friday morning byan emission of poisonous gas, but, recovering in three-quarters of anhour, it counter-attacked, retook the trenches it had abandoned, andbayoneted the enemy. And after the Third Brigade had been forced toretire Lieutenant Colonel Lipsett held his position, though his leftwas in the air, until two British regiments filled up the gap onSaturday night. 

The individual fortunes of these two brigades have brought us to theevents of Sunday afternoon, but it is necessary, to make the storycomplete, to recur for a moment to the events of the morning. After avery formidable attack the enemy succeeded in capturing the village ofSt. Julien, which has so often been referred to in describing thefortunes of the Canadian left. This success opened up a new andformidable line of advance, but by this time further reinforcements hadarrived. Here, again, it became evident that the tactical necessities ofthe situation dictated an offensive movement as the surest method ofarresting further progress. 

[Sidenote: Cheers for the Canadians. ]

General Alderson, who was in command of the reinforcements, accordinglydirected that an advance should be made by a British brigade which hadbeen brought up in support. The attack was thrust through the Canadianleft and centre, and as the troops making it swept on, many of themgoing to certain death, they paused an instant, and, with deep-throatedcheers for Canada, gave the first indication to the division of the warmadmiration which their exertions had excited in the British Army. 

The advance was indeed costly, but it could not be gainsaid. The storyis one of which the brigade may be proud, but it does not belong to thespecial account of the fortunes of the Canadian contingent. It issufficient for our purpose to notice that the attack succeeded in itsobject, and the German advance along the line, momentarily threatened, was arrested. 

[Sidenote: Second and Third Brigades relieved. ]

We had reached, in describing the events of the afternoon, the points atwhich the trenches of the Second Brigade had been completely destroyed. This brigade, the Third Brigade, and the considerable reinforcementswhich this time filled the gap between the two brigades were graduallydriven fighting every yard upon a line running, roughly, from Fortuin, south of St. Julien, in a northeasterly direction toward Passchendaele. Here the two brigades were relieved by two British brigades, afterexertions as glorious, as fruitful, and, alas! as costly as soldiershave ever been called upon to make. 

Monday morning broke bright and clear and found the Canadians behind thefiring line. This day, too, was to bring its anxieties. The attack wasstill pressed, and it became necessary to ask Brigadier General Currywhether he could once more call upon his shrunken brigade. "The men aretired, " this indomitable soldier replied, "but they are ready and gladto go again to the trenches. " And so once more, a hero leading heroes, the General marched back the men of the Second Brigade, reduced to aquarter of its original strength, to the very apex of the line as itexisted at that moment. 

[Sidenote: Back to the apex of the line. ]

This position he held all day Monday; on Tuesday he was still occupyingthe reserve trenches, and on Wednesday was relieved and retired tobillets in the rear. 

Such, in the most general outline, is the story of a great and gloriousfeat of arms. A story told so soon after the event, while rendering barejustice to units whose doings fell under the eyes of particularobservers, must do less than justice to others who played theirpart--and all did--as gloriously as those whose special activities it ispossible, even at this stage, to describe. But the friends of men whofought in other battalions may be content in the knowledge that they, too, shall learn, when time allows the complete correlation of diaries, the exact part which each unit played in these unforgettable days. Itis rather accident than special distinction which had made it possibleto select individual battalions for mention. 

[Sidenote: Signalers and dispatch carriers. ]

It would not be right to close even this account without a word oftribute to the auxiliary services. The signalers were always cool andresourceful. The telegraph and telephone wires being constantly cut, many belonging to this service rendered up their lives in the dischargeof their duty, carrying out repairs with the most complete calmness inexposed positions. The dispatch carriers, as usual, behaved with thegreatest bravery. Theirs is a lonely life, and very often a lonelydeath. One cycle messenger lay upon the ground, badly wounded. Hestopped a passing officer and delivered his message, together with someverbal instructions. These were coherently given, but he swooned almostbefore the words were out of his mouth. 

[Sidenote: Artillery and engineers. ]

The artillery never flagged in the sleepless struggle in which so muchdepended upon its exertions. Not a Canadian gun was lost in the longbattle of retreat. And the nature of the position renders such a recordvery remarkable. One battery of four guns found itself in such asituation that it was compelled to turn two of its guns directly aboutand fire upon the enemy in positions almost diametrically opposite. 

It is not possible in this account to attempt a description of theservices rendered by the Canadian Engineers or the Medical Corps. Theirmembers rivaled in coolness, endurance, and valor the Canadian infantry, whose comrades they were, and it is hoped in separate communications todo justice to both these brilliant services. 

No attempt has been made in this description to explain the recentoperations except in so far as they spring from, or are connected with, the fortunes of the Canadian Division. It is certain that the exertionsof the troops who reinforced and later relieved the Canadians were notless glorious, but the long, drawn-out struggle is a lesson to the wholeempire. "Arise, O Israel!" The empire is engaged in a struggle, withoutquarter and without compromise, against an enemy still superblyorganized, still immensely powerful, still confident that its strengthis the mate of its necessities. To arms, then, and still to arms! InGreat Britain, in Canada, in Australia there is need, and there is neednow, of a community organized alike in military and industrialco-operation. 

That our countrymen in Canada, even while their hearts are stillbleeding, will answer every call which is made upon them, we well know. 

[Sidenote: The Canadian graveyard in Flanders. ]

The graveyard of Canada in Flanders is large; it is very large. Thosewho lie there have left their mortal remains on alien soil. To Canadathey have bequeathed their memories and their glory. 

 On Fame's eternal camping ground Their silent tents are spread, And Glory guards with solemn round The bivouac of the dead. 

Assaults accompanied with gas were not made on every position of thefront held by the British to the north of Ypres at the same time. At onepoint it was not until the early morning of Saturday, April 24, that theGermans brought this method into operation against a section of our linenot far from our left flank. 

[Sidenote: Germans fire poison gas shells. ]

Late on Thursday afternoon the men here saw portions of the Frenchretiring some distance to the west, and observed the cloud of vaporrolling along the ground southward behind them. Our position was thenshelled with high explosives until 8 P. M. On Friday also it wasbombarded for some hours, the Germans firing poison shells for one hour. Their infantry, who were intrenched about 120 yards away, evidentlyexpected some result from their use of the latter, for they put theirheads above the parapets, as if to see what the effect had been on ourmen, and at intervals opened rapid rifle fire. The wind, however, wasstrong and dissipated the fumes quickly, our troops did not sufferseriously from their noxious effect, and the enemy did not attempt anyadvance. 

[Sidenote: Stupefying gas employed. ]

On Saturday morning, just about dawn, an airship appeared in the sky tothe east of our line at this point, and dropped four red stars, whichfloated downward slowly for some distance before they died out. When ourmen, whose eyes had not unnaturally been fixed on this display ofpyrotechnics, again turned to their front it was to find the Germantrenches rendered invisible by a wall of greenish-yellow vapor, similarto that observed on the Thursday afternoon, which was bearing down onthem on the breeze. Through this the Germans started shooting. DuringSaturday they employed stupefying gas on several occasions in thisquarter, but did not press on very quickly. One reason for this, givenby a German prisoner, is that many of the enemy's infantry were soaffected by the fumes that they could not advance. 

To continue the narrative from the night of Sunday, April 25. At 12:30A. M. , in face of repeated attacks, our infantry fell back from a partof the Grafenstafel Ridge, northwest of Zonnebeke, and the line then ranfor some distance along the south bank of the little Haanebeek stream. The situation along the Yperlee Canal remained practically unchanged. 

[Sidenote: Line pierced at Broodseinde. ]

When the morning of the 26th dawned the Germans, who had been seenmassing in St. Julien, and to the east of the village on the previousevening, made several assaults, which grew more and more fierce as thehours passed, but reinforcements were sent up and the position wassecured. Further east, however, our line was pierced near Broodseinde, and a small body of the enemy established themselves in a portion of ourtrenches. In the afternoon a strong, combined counter-attack wasdelivered by the French and British along the whole front fromSteenstraate to the east of St. Julien, accompanied by a violentbombardment. This moment, so far as can be judged at present, marked theturning point of the battle, for, although it effected no great changein the situation, it caused a definite check to the enemy's offensive, relieved the pressure, and gained a certain amount of ground. 

[Sidenote: Attack near St. Julien. ]

During this counter-attack the guns concentrated by both sides on thiscomparatively narrow front poured in a great volume of fire. From theright came the roar of the British batteries, from the left the rollingthunder of the _soixante-quinze_, and every now and then above theturmoil rose a dull boom as a huge howitzer shell burst in the vicinityof Ypres. On the right our infantry stormed the German trenches close toSt. Julien, and in the evening gained the southern outskirts of thevillage. In the centre they captured the trenches a little to the southof the Bois des Cuisinirs, west of St. Julien, and still further westmore trenches were taken. This represented an advance of some 600 or 700yards, but the gain in ground could not at all points be maintained. Opposite St. Julien we fell back from the village to a position justsouth of the place, and in front of the Bois des Cuisinirs and on theleft of the line a similar retirement took place, the enemy makingextensive use of his gas cylinders and of machine guns placed in farmsor at other points of vantage. None the less, the situation at nightfallwas more satisfactory than it had been. We were holding our own well allalong the line and had made progress at some points. On the right theenemy's attacks on the front of the Grafenstafel Ridge had all beenrepulsed. 

[Sidenote: Enemy lines. ]

In the meantime the French had achieved some success, having retakenLizerne and also the trenches round Het Sast, captured some 250prisoners, and made progress all along the west bank of the canal. Heavyas our losses were during the day, there is little doubt that the enemysuffered terribly. Both sides were attacking at different points, thefighting was conducted very largely in the open, and the closeformations of the Germans on several occasions presented excellenttargets to our artillery, which did not fail to seize its opportunities. 

Nothing in particular occurred during the night. 

[Sidenote: The new battle lines. ]

The morning of the 27th found our troops occupying the followingpositions; North of Zonnebeke the right of the line still held theeastern end of the Grafenstafel Ridge, but from here it bentsouthwestward behind the Haanebeek stream, which it followed to a pointabout half a mile east of St. Julien. Thence it curved back again to theVamheule Farm, on the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, running from here in aslight southerly curve to a point a little west of the Ypres-Langemarckroad, where it joined the French. In the last mentioned quarter of thefield it followed generally the line of a low ridge running from west toeast. On the French front the Germans had been cleared from the westbank of the canal, except at one point, Steenstraate, where theycontinued to hold the bridgehead. 

About 1 P. M. A counter-attack was made by us all along the linebetween the canal and the Ypres-Poelcappelle road, and for about an hourwe continued to make progress. Then the right and centre were checked. Alittle later the left was also held up, and the situation remained verymuch as it had been on the previous day. The Germans were doubtless muchencouraged by their initial success, and their previous boldness inattack was now matched by the stubborn manner in which they clung on totheir positions. In the evening the French stormed some trenches east ofthe canal, but were again checked by the enemy's gas cylinders. 

[Sidenote: German exhaustion. ]

The night passed quietly, and was spent by us in reorganizing andconsolidating our positions. The enemy did not interfere. This is notsurprising, in view of the fact that by Tuesday evening they had beenfighting for over five days. Their state of exhaustion is confirmed bythe statements of the prisoners captured by the French, who alsoreported that the German losses had been very heavy. 

On Wednesday, the 28th, there was a complete lull on this sector of ourline, and the shelling was less severe. Some fighting, however, occurredalong the canal, the French taking over 100 prisoners. 

[Sidenote: Air battles. ]

Nothing of any importance has occurred on other parts of the front. Onthe 27th at the Railway Triangle opposite Guinchy, the south side of theembankment held by the Germans was blown up by our miners. On the 28th ahostile aeroplane was forced to descend by our anti-aircraft guns. Oncoming down in rear of the German lines, it was at once fired upon anddestroyed by our field artillery. Another hostile machine was broughtdown by rifle fire near Zonnebeke. 

Splendid work has been done during the past few days by our airmen, whohave kept all the area behind the hostile lines under closeobservation. On the 26th they bombed the stations of Staden, Thielt, Courtrai, Roubaix, and other places, and located an armored train nearLangemarck, which was subsequently shelled and forced to retire. Therehave been several successful conflicts in the air, on one occasion apilot in a single seater chasing a German machine to Roulers, andforcing it to land. 

[Sidenote: Raid on Courtrai]. 

The raid on Courtrai unfortunately cost the nation a very gallant life, but it will live as one of the most heroic episodes of the war. Theairman started on the enterprise alone in a biplane. On arrival atCourtrai he glided down to a height of 300 feet and dropped a large bombon the railway junction. While he did this he was the target of hundredsof rifles, of machine guns, and of anti-aircraft armament, and wasseverely wounded in the thigh. Though he might have saved his life by atonce coming down in the enemy's lines, he decided to save his machine atall costs, and made for the British lines. Descending to a height ofonly 100 feet in order to increase his speed, he continued to fly andwas again wounded, this time mortally. He still flew on, however, andwithout coming down at the nearest of our aerodromes went all the wayback to his own base, where he executed a perfect landing and made hisreport. He died in hospital not long afterward. 

[Sidenote: Steadiness of the Canadians. ]

The outstanding feature of the action of the past week has been thesteadiness of our troops on the extreme left; but of the deeds ofindividual gallantry and devotion which have been performed it would beimpossible to narrate one-hundredth part. At one place in this quarter amachine gun was stationed in the angle of a trench when the German rushtook place. One man after another of the detachment was shot, but thegun still continued in action, through five bodies lay around it. Whenthe sixth man took the place of his fallen comrades, of whom one was hisbrother, the Germans were still pressing on. He waited until they wereonly a few yards away, and then poured a stream of bullets on to theadvancing ranks, which broke and fell back, leaving rows of dead. He wasthen wounded himself. 

[Sidenote: Telephone wires cut. ]

Under the hot fire to which our batteries were subjected in the earlypart of the engagement telephone wires were repeatedly cut. The wireconnecting one battery with its observing officer was severed on nineseparate occasions, and on each occasion repaired by a Sergeant, who didthe work out in the open under a perfect hail of shells. 

About 5 P. M. A dense cloud of suffocating vapors was launched fromtheir trenches along the whole front held by the French right and by ourleft from the Ypres-Langemarck road to a considerable distance east ofSt. Julien. The fumes did not carry much beyond our front trenches. Butthese were to a great extent rendered untenable, and a retirement fromthem was ordered. 

[Sidenote: Strange appearance of gas battle. ]

No sooner had this started than the enemy opened a violent bombardmentwith asphyxiating shells and shrapnel on our trenches and on ourinfantry as they were withdrawing. Meanwhile our guns had not been idle. From a distance, perhaps owing to some peculiarity of the light, the gason this occasion looked like a great reddish cloud, and the moment itwas seen our batteries poured a concentrated fire on the Germantrenches. 

Curious situations then arose between us and the enemy. The poison belt, the upper part shredding into thick wreaths of vapor as it was shaken bythe wind, and the lower and denser part sinking into all inequalities ofthe ground, rolled slowly down the trenches. Shells would rend it for amoment, but it only settled down again as thickly as before. 

Nevertheless, the German infantry faced it, and they faced a hail ofshrapnel as well. In some cases where the gas had not reached our linesour troops held firm and shot through the cloud at the advancingGermans. In other cases the men holding the front line managed to moveto the flank, where they were more or less beyond the affected area. Here they waited until the enemy came on and then bayoneted them whenthey reached our trenches. 

[Sidenote: A charge through the gas. ]

On the extreme left our supports waited until the vapor reached ourtrenches, when they charged through it and met the advancing Germanswith the bayonet as they swarmed over the parapets. 

South of St. Julien the denseness of the vapor compelled us to evacuatetrenches, but reinforcements arrived who charged the enemy before theycould establish themselves in position. In every case the assaultsfailed completely. Large numbers were mown down by our artillery. Menwere seen falling and others scattering and running back to their ownlines. Many who reached the gas cloud could not make their way throughit, and in all probability a great number of the wounded perished fromthe fumes. 

It is to that extent, from a military standpoint, a sign of weakness. Another sign of weakness is the adoption of illegal methods of fighting, such as spreading poisonous gas. It is a confession by the Germans thatthey have lost their former great superiority in artillery and are, atany cost, seeking another technical advantage over their enemy as asubstitute. 

[Sidenote: The enemy sticks at nothing. ]

Nevertheless, this spirit, this determination on the part of our enemiesto stick at nothing must not be underestimated. Though it may not paythe Germans in the long run, it renders it all the more obvious thatthey are a foe that can be overcome only by the force of overwhelmingnumbers of men and guns. 

Further to the east a similar attack was made about 7 P. M. Which seemsto have been attended with even less success, and the assaultinginfantry was at once beaten back by our artillery fire. 

It was not long before all our trenches were reoccupied and the wholeline reestablished in its original position. The attack on the Frenchmet with the same result. 

Prisoners captured in the recent fighting, the narrative continues, stated that one German corps lost 80 per cent. Of its men in the firstweek; that the losses from our artillery fire, even during days when noattacks were taking place, had been very heavy and that many of theirown men had suffered from the effects of the gas. 

[Sidenote: German gains due to poison gas. ]

In regard to the recent fighting on our left, the German offensive, effected in the first instance by surprise, resulted in a considerablegain of ground for the enemy. Between all the earlier German efforts, the only difference was that on this latest occasion the attempt wascarried out with the aid of poisonous gases. 

There is no reason why we should not expect similar tactics in thefuture. They do not mean that the Allies have lost the initiative in theWestern theatre, nor that they are likely to lose it. They do mean, however, and the fact has been repeatedly pointed out, that the enemy'sdefensive is an active one, that his confidence is still unshaken andthat he still is able to strike in some strength where he sees thechance or where mere local advantage can be secured. 

The true idea of the meaning of the operations of the Allies can begained only by bearing in mind that it is their primary object to bringabout the exhaustion of the enemy's resources in men. 

In the form now assumed by this struggle--a war of attrition--theGermans are bound ultimately to lose, and it is the consciousness ofthis fact that inspires their present policy. This is to achieve asearly as possible some success of sufficient magnitude to influence theneutrals, to discourage the Allies, to make them weary of the struggleand to induce the belief among the people ignorant of war that nothinghas been gained by the past efforts of the Allies because the Germanshave not yet been driven back. It is being undertaken with a politicalrather than a strategical object. 

[Sidenote: Violent artillery fire. ]

The calm that prevailed Thursday and Friday proved to be only the lullbefore the storm. Early Saturday morning it became apparent that theGermans were preparing an attack in strength against our line runningeast and northeast from Ypres, for they were concentrating under coverof a violent artillery fire, and at about 10 o'clock the battle began inearnest. 

At that hour the Germans attacked our line from the Ypres-Poelcappelleroad to within a short distance of the Menin highroad, it beingevidently their intention while engaging us closely on the whole of thissector to break our front in the vicinity of the Ypres-Roulers Railway, to the north and to the south of which their strongest and mostdetermined assaults were delivered. 

Under this pressure our front was penetrated at some points aroundFrezenberg, and at 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon we made acounter-attack between the Zonnebeke road and the railway in order torecover the lost ground. Our offensive was conducted most gallantly, butwas checked before long by the fire of machine guns. 

[Sidenote: Enemy attacks near Menin road. ]

Meanwhile, the enemy launched another attack through the woods south ofthe Menin road, and at the same time threatened our left to the north ofYpres with fresh masses. Most desperate fighting ensued, the Germaninfantry coming on again and again and gradually forcing our troopsback, though only for a short distance, in spite of repeatedcounter-attacks. 

[Sidenote: On the Poelcappelle road. ]

During the night the fighting continued to rage with ever-increasingfury. It is impossible to say at exactly what hour our line was brokenat different points, but it is certain that at one time the enemy'sinfantry poured through along the Poelcappelle road, and even got as faras Wieltje at 9 P. M. 

There was also a considerable gap in our front about Frezenberg, wherehostile detachments had penetrated. At both points counter-attacks wereorganized without delay. To the east of the salient the Germans firstwere driven back to Frezenberg, but there they made a firm stand, andunder pressure of fresh reinforcements we fell back again towardVerlorenhoek. 

[Sidenote: Canadian counter-attack. ]

Northeast of the salient a counter-attack carried out by us about 1 A. M. Was more successful. Our troops swept the enemy out of Wieltje at thebayonet's point, leaving the village strewn with German dead and, pushing on, regained most of the ground to the north of that point. Andso the fight surged to and fro throughout the night. All around thescene of the conflict the sky was lit up by the flashes of the guns andthe light of blazing villages and farms, while against this backgroundof smoke and flame, looking out in the murky light over the crumblingruins of the old town, rose the battered wreck of the cathedral town andthe spires of Cloth Hall. 

[Sidenote: German assaults on the east. ]

When Sunday dawned there came a short respite, and the firing for a timedied down. The comparative lull enabled us to reorganize andconsolidate our position on the new line we had taken up and to obtainsome rest after the fatigue and strain of the night. It did not lastlong, however, and in the afternoon the climax of the battle wasreached, for, under the cover of intense artillery fire, the Germanslaunched no less than five separate assaults against the east of thesalient. 

To the north and northeast their attacks were not at first pressed sohard as on the south of the Menin road, where the fighting wasespecially fierce. In the latter direction masses of infantry werehurled on with absolute desperation and were beaten off withcorresponding slaughter. 

At one point, north of the town, 500 of the enemy advanced from thewood, and it is affirmed by those present that not a single man of themescaped. 

[Sidenote: German losses at Château Hooge. ]

On the eastern face, at 6:30 P. M. , an endeavor was made to storm thegrounds of the Château Hooge, a little north of the Menin road, but theforce attempting it broke and fell back under the hail of shrapnelpoured upon them by our guns. It was on this side, where they had toface the concentrated fire of guns, Maxims and rifles again and again intheir efforts to break their way through, that the Germans incurredtheir heaviest losses, and the ground was literally heaped with dead. 

They evidently, for the time being at least, were unable to renew theirefforts, and as night came on the fury of their offensive graduallyslackened, the hours of darkness passing in quietness. 

During the day our troops saw some of the enemy busily employed instripping the British dead in our abandoned trenches, east of the HoogeChâteau, and several Germans afterward were noticed dressed in khaki. 

[Sidenote: A successful day. ]

So far as the Ypres region is concerned, this for us was a mostsuccessful day. Our line, which on the northeast of the salient had, after the previous day's fighting, been reconstituted a short distancebehind the original front, remained intact. Our losses werecomparatively slight, and, owing to the targets presented by the enemy, the action resolved itself on our part into pure killing. 

The reason for this very determined effort to crush our left on the partof the Germans is not far to seek. It is probable that for some dayspreviously they had been in possession of information which led them tosuppose that we intended to apply pressure on the right of our line, andthat their great attack upon Ypres on the 7th, 8th, and 9th wasundertaken with a view to diverting us from our purpose. 

In this the Germans were true to their principles, for they rightly holdthat the best manner of meeting an expected hostile offensive is toforestall it by attacking in some other quarter. In this instance theirleaders acted with the utmost determination and energy and theirsoldiers fought with the greatest courage. 

[Sidenote: The enemy held in check. ]

The failure of their effort was due to the splendid endurance of ourtroops, who held the line around the salient under a fire which againand again blotted out whole lengths of the defenses and killed thedefenders by scores. Time after time along those parts of the frontselected for assault were parapets destroyed, and time after time didthe thinning band of survivors build them up again and await the nextonset as steadily as before. 

Here, in May, in defense of the same historic town, have ourincomparable infantry repeated the great deeds their comrades performedhalf a year ago and beaten back most desperate onslaughts of hostilehordes backed by terrific artillery support. 

The services rendered by our troops in this quarter cannot at presentbe estimated, for their full significance will only be realized in thelight of future events. But so far their devotion has indirectlycontributed in no small measure to the striking success already achievedby our allies. 

Further south, in the meantime, on Sunday another struggle had been inprogress on that portion of the front covered by the right of our lineand the left of the French, for when the firing around Ypres wastemporarily subsiding during the early hours of the morning another andeven more tremendous cannonade was suddenly started by the artillery ofthe Allies some twenty miles to the south. 

The morning was calm, bright, and clear, and opposite our right, as thesun rose, the scene in front of our line was the most peacefulimaginable. Away to the right were Guinchy, with its brickfields and theruins of Givenchy. To the north of them lay low ground, where, hidden bytrees and hedgerows, ran the opposing lines that were about to becomethe scene of the conflict, and beyond, in the distance, rose the longridge of Aubers, the villages crowning it standing out clear cut againstthe sky. 

[Sidenote: Bombardment of Guinchy. ]

At 5 o'clock the bombardment began, slowly at first and then growing involume until the whole air quivered with the rush of the larger shellsand the earth shook with the concussion of guns. In a few minutes thewhole distant landscape disappeared in smoke and dust, which hung for awhile in the still air and then drifted slowly across the line ofbattle. 

[Sidenote: The battle near Festubert. ]

Shortly before 6 o'clock our infantry advanced along our front betweenthe Bois Grenier and Festubert. On the left, north of Fromelles, westormed the German first line trenches. Hand-to-hand fighting went onfor some time with bayonet, rifle, and hand grenade, but we continued tohold on to this position throughout the day and caused the enemy veryheavy loss, for not only were many Germans killed in the bombardment, but their repeated efforts to drive us from the captured positionsproved most costly. 

On the right, to the north of Festubert, our advance met withconsiderable opposition and was not pressed. 

[Sidenote: A French victory. ]

Meanwhile, the French, after a prolonged bombardment, had taken theGerman positions north of Arras on a front of nearly five miles, and hadpushed forward from two to three miles, capturing 2, 000 prisoners andsix guns. This remarkable success was gained by our allies in the courseof a few hours. 

As may be supposed from the nature of the fighting which has been inprogress, our losses have been heavy. On other parts of the front ouraction was confined to that of the artillery, but this proved mosteffective later, all the communications of the enemy being subjected toso heavy and accurate a fire that in some quarters all movement bydaylight within range of our lines was rendered impracticable. At oneplace opposite our centre a convoy of ammunition was hit by a shell, which knocked out six motor lorries and caused two to blow up. Oppositeour centre we fired two mines, which did considerable damage to theenemy's defenses. 

[Sidenote: Air fighting. ]

During the day also our aeroplanes attacked several points ofimportance. One of our airmen, who was sent to bomb the canal bridgenear Don, was wounded on his way there, but continued and fulfilled hismission. Near Wytschaete, one of our aviators pursued a German aeroplaneand fired a whole belt from his machine gun at it. The Taube suddenlyswerved, righted itself for a second, and then descended from a heightof several thousand feet straight to the ground. 

On the other hand, a British machine unfortunately was brought down overLille by the enemy's anti-aircraft guns, but it is hoped that theaviator escaped. 

_In regard to the German allegation, that the British used gas in theirattacks on Hill 60, the Eyewitness says_:

[Sidenote: British had not used gas. ]

No asphyxiating gases have been employed by us at any time, nor havethey yet been brought into play by us. 

 * * * * *

Germany, desperate at her failure to win the rapid victories she hadanticipated on the land, resorted, in 1915, to a ruthless policy ofsinking the ships of the belligerent powers, whether or not they wereengaged on legitimate errands. This policy culminated on May 7, 1915, inthe sinking of the great transatlantic steamship the _Lusitania_, withthe loss of over a thousand men, women, and children. 

SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA

THE JUDICIAL DECISION BY JUDGE J. M. MAYER

[Sidenote: The _Lusitania_ sails. ]

On May 1, 1915, the British passenger-carrying merchantman _Lusitania_sailed from New York bound for Liverpool, with 1, 257 passengers and acrew of 702, making a total of 1, 959 souls on board, men, women, andchildren. At approximately 2:10 on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, weatherclear and sea smooth, without warning, the vessel was torpedoed and wentdown by the head in about eighteen minutes, with an ultimate tragic lossof 1, 195. 

[Sidenote: Passengers and equipment. ]

So far as equipment went, the vessel was seaworthy in the highest sense. Her carrying capacity was 2, 198 passengers and a crew of about 850, orabout 3, 000 persons in all. She had 22 open lifeboats capable ofaccommodating 1, 322 persons, 26 collapsible boats with a capacity for1, 283, making a total of 48 boats with a capacity for 2, 605 in all, orsubstantially in excess of the requirements of her last voyage. Hertotal of life belts was 3, 187, or 1, 959 more than the total number ofpassengers, and, in addition, she carried 20 life buoys. She was classed100 A1 at Lloyd's being 787 feet long over all, with a tonnage of 30, 395gross and 12, 611 net. She had 4 turbine engines, 25 boilers, 4 boilerrooms, 12 transverse bulkheads, dividing her into 13 compartments, witha longitudinal bulkhead on either side of the ship for 425 feet, covering all vital parts. 

[Sidenote: The _Lusitania_ unarmed. ]

The proof is absolute that she was not and never had been armed nor didshe carry any explosives. She did carry some 18 fuse cases and 125shrapnel cases, consisting merely of empty shells without any powdercharge, 4, 200 cases of safety cartridges, and 189 cases of infantryequipment, such as leather fittings, pouches, and the like. All thesewere for delivery abroad, but none of these munitions could be explodedby setting them on fire in mass or in bulk, nor by subjecting them toimpact. She had been duly inspected on March 17, April 15, 16, and 17, all in 1915, and before she left New York the boat gear and boats wereexamined, overhauled, checked up, and defective articles properlyreplaced. 

[Sidenote: The drills sufficient. ]

There is no reason to doubt that this part of her equipment was inexcellent order when she left New York. The vessel was under the commandof a long service and experienced Captain and officered by competent andexperienced men. The difficulties of the war prevented the company fromgathering together a crew fully reaching a standard as high as in normaltimes, (many of the younger British sailors having been called to thecolors, ) but, all told, the crew was good and, in many instances, highlyintelligent and capable. Due precaution was taken in respect of boatdrills while in port, and the testimony shows that those drills wereboth sufficient and efficient. Some passengers did not see any boatdrills on the voyage, while others characterized the drills, in effect, as formally superficial. Any one familiar with ocean traveling knowsthat it is not strange that boat drills may take place unobserved bysome of the passengers who, though on deck, may be otherwise occupied orwho may be in another part of the ship, and such negative testimony mustgive way to the positive testimony that there were daily boat drills, the object of which mainly was to enable the men competently and quicklyto lower the boats. 

[Sidenote: Emergency precautions. ]

Each man had a badge showing the number of the boat to which he wasassigned, and a boat list was posted in three different places in theship. Each day of the voyage a drill was held with the emergency boat, which was a fixed boat, either No. 13 on the starboard side or No. 14 onthe port side, according to the weather, the idea, doubtless, being toaccustom the men quickly to reach the station on either side of theship. The siren was blown and a picked crew from the watch assembled atthe boat, put on life belts, jumped into the boat, took their places, and jumped out again. 

Throughout this case it must always be remembered that the disasteroccurred in May, 1915, and the whole subject must be approached with theknowledge and mental attitude of that time. It may be that moreelaborate and effective methods and precaution have been adopted sincethen, but there is no testimony which shows that these boat drills, aspracticed on the voyage, were not fully up to the then existingstandards and practices. There can be no criticism of the bulkhead doordrills, for there was one each day. 

[Sidenote: Speed reduced. ]

In November, 1914, the Directors of the Cunard Company, in view of thefalling off of the passenger traffic, decided to withdraw the_Lusitania's_ sister ship, _Mauretania_, and to run the _Lusitania_ atthree-fourths boiler power, which involved a reduction of speed from anaverage of about twenty-four knots to an average of about twenty-oneknots. The ship was operated under this reduced boiler power and reducedrate of speed for six round trips until and including the fatal voyage, although at the reduced rate she was considerably faster than anypassenger ship crossing the Atlantic at that time. This reduction was inpart for financial reasons and in part "a question of economy of coaland labor in time of war. " No profit was expected and none was made, but the company continued to operate the ship as a public service. Thereduction from twenty-four to twenty-one knots is, however, quiteimmaterial to the controversy, as will later appear. 

Having thus outlined the personnel, equipment, and cargo of the vessel, reference will now be made to a series of events preceding her sailingon May 1, 1915. 

On February 4, 1915, the Imperial German Government issued aproclamation as follows:

[Sidenote: The German proclamation. ]

 "1. The waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, are hereby declared to be war zone. On and after the 18th of February, 1915, every enemy merchant ship found in the said war zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on that account. 

 "2. Even neutral ships are exposed to danger in the war zone, as in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the British Government and of the accidents of naval war, it cannot always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at enemy ships. 

 "3. Northward navigation around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern waters of the North Sea and in a strip of not less than thirty miles width along the Netherlands coast is in no danger. 

 "VON POHL, "Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy. "Berlin, February 4, 1915. "

[Sidenote: Submarine blockade declared. ]

This was accompanied by a so-called memorial, setting forth the reasonsadvanced by the German Government in support of the issuance of thisproclamation, an extract from which is as follows:

 "Just as England declared the whole North Sea between Scotland and Norway to be comprised within the seat of war, so does Germany now declare the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, to be comprised within the seat of war, and will prevent by all the military means at its disposal all navigation by the enemy in those waters. To this end it will endeavor to destroy, after February 18 next, any merchant vessels of the enemy which present themselves at the seat of war above indicated, although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise. Neutral powers are accordingly forewarned not to intrust their crews, passengers, or merchandise to such vessels. "

[Sidenote: Protests sent by the United States. ]

To this proclamation and memorial the Government of the United Statesmade due protest under date of February 10, 1915. On the same dayprotest was made to England by this Government regarding the use of theAmerican flag by the _Lusitania_ on its voyage through the war zone onits trip from New York to Liverpool of January 30, 1915, in response towhich, on February 19, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for ForeignAffairs, handed a memorandum to Mr. Page, the American Ambassador toEngland, containing the following statement:

[Sidenote: British reply to American protest. ]

 "It is understood that the German Government had announced their intention of sinking British merchant vessels at sight by torpedoes without giving any opportunity of making any provisions for saving the lives of noncombatant crews and passengers. It was in consequence of this threat that the _Lusitania_ raised the United States flag on her inward voyage and on her subsequent outward voyage. A request was made by the United States passengers who were embarking on board her that the United States flag should be hoisted, presumably to insure their safety. "

The British Ambassador, the Hon. Cecil Spring-Rice, on March 1, 1915, in a communication to the American Secretary of State regarding aneconomic blockade of Germany, stated in reference to the Germanproclamation of February 4:

[Sidenote: British statement on the submarine blockade. ]

 "Germany has declared that the English Channel, the north and west coasts of France, and the waters around the British Isles are a war area and has officially notified that all enemy ships found in that area will be destroyed, and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger. This is in effect a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the safety of the crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these waters, this attack can only be delivered by submarine agency. "

[Sidenote: Submarines sink merchant ships. ]

Beginning with the 30th of January, 1915, and prior to the sinking ofthe _Lusitania_ on May 7, 1915, German submarines attacked and seemed tohave sunk twenty merchant and passenger ships within about 100 miles ofthe usual course of the _Lusitania_, chased two other vessels whichescaped, and damaged still another. 

It will be noted that nothing is stated in the German memorandum as tosinking enemy merchant vessels without warning, but, on the contrary, the implication is that settled international law as to visit and searchand an opportunity for the lives of passengers to be safeguarded will beobeyed, "although it may not always be possible to avert the dangerswhich may menace persons and merchandise. "

As a result of this submarine activity, the _Lusitania_ on its voyagesfrom New York to Liverpool, beginning with that of January 30, 1915, steered a course further off from the south coast of Ireland thanformerly. 

[Sidenote: Precautions in danger zone. ]

In addition, after the German proclamation of February 4, 1915, the_Lusitania_ had its boats swung out and provisioned while passingthrough the danger zone, did not use its wireless for sending messages, and did not stop at the Mersey Bar for a pilot, but came directly up toits berth. 

The petitioner and the master of the _Lusitania_ received certainadvices from the British Admiralty on February 10, 1915, as follows:

 "Vessels navigating in submarine areas should have their boats turned out and fully provisioned. The danger is greatest in the vicinity of ports and off prominent headlands on the coast. Important landfalls in this area should be made after dark whenever possible. So far as is consistent with particular trades and state of tides, vessels should make their ports at dawn. "

[Sidenote: Advices from the British Admiralty. ]

On April 15 and 16, 1915, and after the last voyage from New York, preceding the one on which the _Lusitania_ was torpedoed, the CunardCompany and the master of the _Lusitania_ received at Liverpool thefollowing advices from the British Admiralty:

 "Confidential Daily Voyage Notice 15th April, 1915, issued under Government War Risks Scheme. 

 "German submarines appear to be operating chiefly off prominent headlands and landfalls. Ships should give prominent headlands a wide berth. 

 "Confidential memorandum issued 16th April, 1915:

[Sidenote: Fast steamers follow a zigzag course. ]

 "War experience has shown that fast steamers can considerably reduce the chance of successful surprise submarine attacks by zigzagging--that is to say, altering the course at short and irregular intervals, say in ten minutes to half an hour. This course is almost invariably adopted by warships when cruising in an area known to be infested by submarines. The underwater speed of a submarine is very slow and it is exceedingly difficult for her to get into position to deliver an attack unless she can observe and predict the course of the ship attacked. "

Sir Alfred Booth, Chairman of the Cunard Line, was a member of the WarRisks Committee at Liverpool, consisting of ship owners, representativesof the Board of Trade and the Admiralty, which received theseinstructions and passed them on to the owners of vessels, including theCunard Company, which distributed them to the individual masters. 

[Sidenote: Advertisement in the New York papers. ]

On Saturday, May 1, 1915, the advertised sailing date of the _Lusitania_from New York to Liverpool on the voyage on which she was subsequentlysunk, there appeared the following advertisement in the New York"Times, " New York "Tribune, " New York "Sun, " New York "Herald, " and theNew York "World, " this advertisement being in all instances except oneplaced directly over, under, or adjacent to the advertisement of theCunard Line, regarding the sailing of the _Lusitania_:

 "Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies. That the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles. That in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or of any of her allies are liable to destruction in those waters, and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk. "

 "IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY, "April 22, 1915. Washington, D. C. "

This was the first insertion of this advertisement, although it wasdated more than a week prior to its publication. Captain Turner, themaster of the vessel, saw the advertisement or "something of the kind"before sailing, and realized that the _Lusitania_ was included in thewarning. The Liverpool office of the Cunard Company was advised of thesailing and the number of passengers by cable from the New York office, but no mention was made of the above quoted advertisement. Sir AlfredBooth was informed through the press of this advertisement on eitherSaturday evening, May 1, or Sunday morning, May 2. 

[Sidenote: _Lusitania_ justified in sailing. ]

The significance and construction to be given to this advertisement willbe discussed infra, but it is perfectly plain that the master was fullyjustified in sailing on the appointed day from a neutral port with manyneutral and non-combatant passengers, unless he and his company werewilling to yield to the attempt of the German Government to terrifyBritish shipping. No one familiar with the British character wouldexpect that such a threat would accomplish more than to emphasize thenecessity of taking every precaution to protect life and property whichthe exercise of judgment would invite. 

And so, as scheduled, the _Lusitania_ sailed, undisguised, with her fourfunnels and a figure so familiar as to be readily discernible not onlyby naval officers and marines, but by the ocean-going public generally. 

[Sidenote: In the submarine war zone. ]

The voyage was uneventful until May 6. On approaching the Irish coast onMay 6 the Captain ordered all the boats hanging on the davits to beswung out and lowered to the promenade deckrail, and this order wascarried out under the supervision of Staff Captain Anderson, who laterwent down with the ship. All bulkhead doors which were not necessary forthe working of the ship were closed, and it was reported to CaptainTurner that this had been done. Lookouts were doubled, and two extrawere put forward and one on either side of the bridge; that is, therewere two lookouts in the crow's-nest, two in the eyes of the ship, twoofficers on the bridge, and a quartermaster on either side of thebridge. 

Directions were given to the engine room to keep the highest steam theycould possibly get on the boilers, and in case the bridge rang for fullspeed, to give as much as they possibly could. Orders were also giventhat ports should be kept closed. 

[Sidenote: Wireless messages from the Admiralty. ]

At 7:50 P. M. , on May 6, the _Lusitania_ received the following wirelessmessage from the Admiral at Queenstown: "Submarines active off southcoast of Ireland, " and at 7:56 the vessel asked for and received arepetition of his message. The ship was then going at a rate of 21 knotsper hour. 

At 8:30 P. M. Of the same day the following message was received fromthe British Admiralty:

 "To All British Ships 0005:

 "Take Liverpool pilot at bar and avoid headlands. Pass harbors at full speed; steer midchannel course. Submarines off Fastnet. "

[Sidenote: The _Lusitania's_ speed reduced. ]

At 8:32 the Admiralty received a communication to show that this messagehad been received by the _Lusitania_, and the same message was offeredto the vessel seven times between midnight of May 6 and 10 A. M. Of May7. 

At about 8 A. M. On the morning of May 7, on approaching the Irishcoast, the vessel encountered an intermittent fog, or Scotch mist, called "banks" in seafaring language, and the speed was reduced to 15knots. Previously the speed, according to Captain Turner's recollection, had been reduced to 18 knots. This adjustment of speed was due to thefact that Captain Turner wished to run the last 150 miles of the voyagein the dark, so as to make Liverpool early on the morning of May 8, atthe earliest time when he could cross the bar without a pilot. 

[Sidenote: Approaching the most dangerous waters. ]

Judging from the location of previous submarine attacks, the mostdangerous waters in the _Lusitania's_ course were from the entrance toSt. George's Channel to Liverpool Bar. There is no dispute as to theproposition that a vessel darkened is much safer from submarine attackat night than in the daytime, and Captain Turner exercised proper andgood judgment in planning accordingly as he approached dangerous waters. It is futile to conjecture as to what would or would not have happenedhad the speed been higher prior to the approach to the Irish coast, because, obviously, until then the Captain could not figure out hissituation, not knowing how he might be impeded by fog or otherunfavorable weather conditions. 

On the morning of May 7, 1915, the ship passed about twenty-five ortwenty-six, and, in any event, at least eighteen and a half miles southof Fastnet, which was not in sight. The course was then held up slightlyto bring the ship closer to land, and a little before noon land wassighted, and what was thought to be Brow Head was made out. 

Meanwhile, between 11 A. M. And noon, the fog disappeared, the weatherbecame clear, and the speed was increased to 18 knots. The course of thevessel was S. 87 E. Mag. At 11:25 A. M. Captain Turner received thefollowing message:

 "Submarines active in southern part of Irish Channel, last heard of twenty miles south of Coningbeg. Light vessel make certain '_Lusitania_' gets this. "

[Sidenote: Submarines reported by wireless. ]

At 12:40 P. M. The following additional wireless message from theAdmiralty was received:

 "Submarines five miles south of Cape Clear, proceeding west when sighted at 10 A. M. "

After picking up Brow Head and at about 12:40 P. M. , the course wasaltered in shore by about 30 degrees, to about N. 63 or 67 E. Mag. , Captain Turner did not recall which. Land was sighted which the Captainthought was Galley Head, but he was not sure, and therefore held inshore. This last course was continued for an hour at a speed of 18 knotsuntil 1:40 P. M. , when the Old Head of Kinsale was sighted and thecourse was then changed back to the original course of S. 87 E. Mag. 

[Sidenote: The _Lusitania_ torpedoed. ]

At 1:50 P. M. The Captain started to take a four-point bearing on theOld Head of Kinsale, and while thus engaged and at about 2:30 P. M. , asheretofore stated, the ship was torpedoed on the starboard side. Whetherone, two, or three torpedoes were fired at the vessel cannot bedetermined with certainty. Two of the ship's crew were confident that athird torpedo was fired and missed the ship. While not doubting the goodfaith of these witnesses, the evidence is not sufficiently satisfactoryto be convincing. 

[Sidenote: Conflicting testimony. ]

[Sidenote: Probably two torpedoes. ]

[Sidenote: No explosives on board. ]

There was, however, an interesting and remarkable conflict of testimonyas to whether the ship was struck by one or two torpedoes, andwitnesses, both passengers and crew, differed on this point, conscientiously and emphatically. The witnesses were all highlyintelligent, and there is no doubt that all testified to the best oftheir recollection, knowledge, or impression, and in accordance withtheir honest conviction. The weight of the testimony (too voluminous toanalyze) is in favor of the "two torpedo" contention, not only becauseof some convincing direct testimony, (as, for instance, Adams, Lehman, Morton, ) but also because of the unquestioned surrounding circumstances. The deliberate character of the attack upon a vessel whose identitycould not be mistaken, made easy on a bright day, and the fact that thevessel had no means of defending herself, would lead to the inferencethat the submarine commander would make sure of her destruction. Further, the evidence is overwhelming that there was a second explosion. The witnesses differ as to the impression which the sound of thisexplosion made upon them--a natural difference due to the fact, known bycommon experience, that persons who hear the same explosion even at thesame time will not only describe the sound differently, but will notagree as to the number of detonations. As there were no explosives onboard, it is difficult to account for the second explosion, except onthe theory that it was caused by a second torpedo. Whether the number oftorpedoes was one or two is relevant, in this case, only upon thequestion of what effect, if any, open ports had in accelerating thesinking of the ship. 

While there was much testimony and some variance as to the places wherethe torpedoes struck, judged by the sound or shock of the explosions, certain physical effects, especially as to smoke and blown-up débris, tend to locate the areas of impact with some approach of accuracy. 

From all the testimony it may be reasonably concluded that one torpedostruck on the starboard side somewhere abreast of No. 2 boiler room andthe other, on the same side, either abreast of No. 3 boiler room orbetween No. 3 and No. 4. From knowledge of the torpedoes then used bythe German submarines, it is thought that they would effect a rupture ofthe outer hull thirty to forty feet long and ten to fifteen feetvertically. 

[Sidenote: Flooding of boiler rooms and coal bunkers. ]

Cockburn, senior Second Engineer, was of opinion that the explosion haddone a great deal of internal damage. Although the lights were out, Cockburn could hear the water coming into the engine room. Water at onceentered No. 1 and No. 2 boiler rooms, a result necessarily attributableto the fact that one or both of the coal bunkers were also blown open. Thus, one torpedo flooded some or all of the coal bunkers on thestarboard side of Nos. 1 and 2 boiler rooms, and apparently flooded bothboiler rooms. 

The effect of the other torpedo is not entirely clear. If it struckmidway between two bulkheads, it is quite likely to have done seriousbulkhead injury. The _Lusitania_ was built so as to float with twocompartments open to the sea, and with more compartments open she couldnot stay afloat. As the side coal bunkers are regarded as compartments, the ship could not float with two boiler rooms flooded and also anadjacent bunker, and, therefore, the damage done by one torpedo wasenough to sink the ship. 

To add to the difficulties, all the steam had gone as the result of theexplosions, and the ship could not be controlled by her engines. 

Little, senior Third Engineer, testified that in a few seconds after theexplosion the steam pressure fell from 190 to 50 pounds, his explanationbeing that the main steam pipes or boilers had been carried away. 

[Sidenote: Engines disabled. ]

The loss of control of and by the engines resulted in disability to stopthe engines, with the result that the ship kept her headway until shesank. That the ship commenced to list to starboard immediately isabundantly established by many witnesses. 

[Sidenote: The ship's behavior in going down. ]

Some of the witnesses, (Lauriat and Adams, passengers; Duncan, Bestic, and Johnson, officers, ) testified that the ship stopped listing tostarboard and started to recover and then listed again to starboarduntil she went over. 

This action, which is quite likely, must have resulted from the inrushof water on the port side. There can be no other adequate explanationconsistent with elementary scientific knowledge; for, if the shiptemporarily righted herself, it must have been because the weight ofwater on the two sides was equal or nearly so. The entry of water intothe port side must, of course, have been due to some rupture on thatside. Such a result was entirely possible, and, indeed, probable. 

The explosive force was sufficiently powerful to blow débris far abovethe radio wires--i. E. , more than 160 feet above the water. The boilerrooms were not over sixty feet wide, and so strong a force could readilyhave weakened the longitudinal bulkheads on the port side in addition tosuch injury as flying metal may have done. It is easy to understand, therefore, how the whole pressure of the water rushing in from thestarboard side against the weakened longitudinal bulkheads on the portside would cause them to give way and thus open up some apertures on theport side for the entry of water. Later, when the water continued torush in on the starboard side, the list to starboard naturally againoccurred, increased and continued to the end. As might be expected, thedegree of list to starboard is variously described, but there is nodoubt that it was steep and substantial. 

[Sidenote: Ports had all been ordered closed. ]

A considerable amount of testimony was taken upon the contention ofclaimants that many of the ship's ports were open, thus reducing herbuoyancy and substantially hastening her sinking. There is no doubt thaton May 6 adequate orders were given to close all ports. The testimony isconclusive that the ports on Deck F (the majority of which were dummyports) were closed. Very few, if any, ports on E deck were open, and, ifso, they were starboard ports in a small section of the first class inthe vicinity where one of the torpedoes did its damage. A very limitednumber of passengers testified that the portholes in their stateroomswere open, and if their impressions are correct, these portholes, concerning which they testified, were all, or nearly all, so far abovethe water that they could not have influenced the situation. 

[Sidenote: Sinking not affected by open ports. ]

There was conflicting testimony as to the ports in the dining room on Ddeck. The weight of the testimony justifies the conclusion that some ofthese ports were open--how many it is impossible to determine. Theseports, however, were from twenty-three to thirty feet above water, andwhen the gap made by the explosion and the consequent severe and suddenlist are considered, it is plain that these open ports were not acontributing cause of the sinking, and had a very trifling influence, ifany, in accelerating the time within which the ship sank. 

From the foregoing the situation can be visualized. Two sudden andextraordinary explosions, the ship badly listed so that the port sidewas well up in the air, the passengers scattered about on the decks andin the staterooms, saloons and companion ways, the ship under headwayand, as it turned out, only eighteen minutes afloat--such was thesituation which confronted the officers, crew, and passengers in theendeavor to save the lives of those on board. 

[Sidenote: Calm heroism of the passengers. ]

The conduct of the passengers constitutes an enduring record of calmheroism with many individual instances of sacrifice and, in general, amarked consideration for women and children. There was no panic, butnaturally, there was a considerable amount of excitement and rush andmuch confusion, and, as the increasing list rendered ineffective thelowering of the boats on the port side, the passengers, as is readilyunderstandable, crowded over on the starboard side. 

The problem presented to the officers of the ship was one of exceedingdifficulty, occasioned largely because of the serious list and theimpossibility of stopping the ship or reducing her headway. 

[Sidenote: Lookouts sighted the torpedo. ]

[Sidenote: Boats ordered lowered. ]

The precaution of extra lookouts resulted in a prompt report to theCaptain, via the bridge, of the sighting of the torpedo. Second OfficerHeppert, who was on the bridge, immediately closed all watertight doorsworked from the bridge, and the testimony satisfactorily shows that allwatertight doors worked by hand were promptly closed. Immediately afterCaptain Turner saw the wake of the torpedo there was an explosion andthen Turner went to the navigation bridge and took the obvious course, i. E. , had the ship's head turned to the land. He signaled the engineroom for full speed astern, hoping thereby to take the way off the ship, and then ordered the boats lowered down to the rail and directed thatwomen and children should be first provided for in the boats. As theengine room failed to respond to the order to go full speed astern, andas the ship was continuing under way, Turner ordered that the boatsshould not be lowered until the vessel should lose her headway, and hetold Anderson, the Staff Captain, who was in charge of the port boats, to lower the boats when he thought the way was sufficiently off to allowthat operation. Anderson's fidelity to duty is sufficiently exemplifiedby the fact that he went down with the ship. 

[Sidenote: The officers display courage and skill. ]

Jones, First Officer, and Lewis, Acting Third Officer, were in charge ofthe boats on the starboard side and personally superintended theirhandling and launching. Too much cannot be said both for their courageand skill, but, difficult as was their task, they were not confrontedwith some of the problems which the port side presented. There, inaddition to Anderson, were Bestic, Junior Third Officer, and anotherofficer, presumably the Second Officer. These men were apparently doingthe best they could and standing valiantly to their duty. Anderson'sfate has already been mentioned, and Bestic, although surviving, stuckto his post until the ship went down under him. The situation canreadily be pictured even by a novice. 

With the ship listed to starboard, the port boats, of course, swunginboard. If enough man power were applied, the boats could be put overthe rail, but then a real danger would follow. Robertson, the ship'scarpenter, aptly described that danger in answer to a question as towhether it was possible to lower the open boats on the port side. Hesaid:

[Sidenote: Port boats could not be lowered. ]

"No. To lower the port boats would just be like drawing a crate ofunpacked china along a dock road. What I mean is that if you started tolower the boats you would be dragging them down the rough side of theship on rivets which are what we call "snap-headed rivets"--they standup about an inch from the side of the ship, so you would be dragging thewhole side of the boat away if you tried to lower the boats with a15-degree list. "

That some boats were and others would have been seriously damaged isevidenced by the fact that two port boats were lowered to the water andgot away, (though one afterward filled, ) and not one boat reachedQueenstown. 

Each boat has its own history, (except possibly Boats 2 and 4, ) althoughit is naturally difficult, in each case, to allocate all the testimonyto a particular boat. 

[Sidenote: Accidents in lowering. ]

There is some testimony, given in undoubted good faith, that painted orrusted davits stuck out, but the weight of the testimony is to thecontrary. There were some lamentable occurrences on the port side, whichresulted in spilling passengers, some of whom thus thrown out or injuredwent to their death. These unfortunate accidents, however, were dueeither to lack of strength of the seaman who was lowering, or possibly, at worst, to an occasional instance of incompetency due to the personalequation so often illustrated, where one man of many may not be equal tothe emergency. But the problem was of the most vexatious character. Inaddition to the crowding of passengers in some instances was thisextremely hazardous feat of lowering boats swung inboard from a tiltedheight, heavily weighted by human beings, with the ship still under way. It cannot be said that it was negligent to attempt this, because, obviously, all the passengers could not be accommodated in the starboardboats. 

[Sidenote: Six boats get away from starboard. ]

On the starboard side, the problem, in some respects, was not sodifficult, while, in others, troublesome conditions existed quitedifferent from those occurring on the port side. Here the boats swung sofar out as to add to the difficulty of passengers getting in them, adifficulty intensified by the fact that many more passengers went to thestarboard side than to the port side and, also that the ship maintainedher way. Six boats successfully got away. In the case of the remainingboats, some were successfully lowered but later met with someunavoidable accident, and some were not successfully launched (such asNos. 1, 5, and 17) for entirely explainable reasons which should not becharged to inefficiency on the part of the officers or crew. 

[Sidenote: Collapsible boats cut loose. ]

The collapsible boats were on the deck under the open lifeboats, andwere intended to be lifted and lowered by the same davits which loweredthe open boats after the open boats had gotten clear of the ship. It wasthe duty of the officers to get the open boats away before givingattention to the collapsible boats, and that was a question of time. These boats are designed and arranged to float free if the ship shouldsink before they can be hoisted over. They were cut loose and somepeople were saved on these boats. 

It is to be expected that those passengers who lost members of theirfamily or friends, and who saw some of the unfortunate accidents, shouldfeel strongly and entertain the impression that inefficiency orindividual negligence was widespread among the crew. Such an impression, however, does an inadvertent injustice to the great majority of thecrew, who acted with that matter-in-fact courage and fidelity to dutywhich are traditional with men of the sea. Such of these men, presumablyfairly typical of all, as testified in this court, were impressive notonly because of inherent bravery, but because of intelligence andclear-headedness, and they possessed that remarkable gift of simplicityso characteristic of truly fearless men who cannot quite understand whyan ado is made of acts which seem to them merely the day's work. 

Mr. Grab, one of the claimants and an experienced transatlantictraveler, concisely summed up the situation when he said:

"They were doing the best they could--they were very brave and workingas hard as they could without any fear. They didn't care aboutthemselves. It was very admirably done. While there was great confusion, they did the best they could. "

[Sidenote: Captain Turner's comment on the crew. ]

It will unduly prolong a necessarily extended opinion to sift thevoluminous testimony relating to this subject of the boats and theconduct of the crew and something is sought to be made of comments ofCaptain Turner, construed by some to be unfavorable but afterwardsatisfactorily supplemented and explained, but if there were someinstances of incompetency they were very few and the charge ofnegligence in this regard cannot be successfully maintained. 

In arriving at this conclusion, I have not overlooked the argumentearnestly pressed that the men were not sufficiently instructed anddrilled; for I think the testimony establishes the contrary in the lightof conditions in May, 1915. 

I now come to what seems to be the only debatable question of fact inthe case, i. E. , whether Captain Turner was negligent in not literallyfollowing the Admiralty advices and, also, in not taking a coursedifferent from that which he adopted. 

[Sidenote: The Captain's judgment free. ]

The fundamental principle in navigating a merchantman, whether in timesof peace or of war, is that the commanding officer must be left free toexercise his own judgment. Safe navigation denies the proposition thatthe judgment and sound discretion of the Captain of a vessel must beconfined in a mental straitjacket. Of course, when movements are undermilitary control, orders must be strictly obeyed, come what may. No suchsituation, however, was presented either to the Cunard Steamship Co. OrCaptain Turner. The vessel was not engaged in military service nor undernaval convoy. True, she was, as between the German and BritishGovernments, an enemy ship as to Germany, but she was unarmed and acarrier of not merely noncombatants, but, among others, of many citizensof the United States, then a neutral country, at peace with all theworld. 

[Sidenote: Admiralty advices considered. ]

In such circumstances the Captain could not shield himself automaticallyagainst error behind a literal compliance with the general advices orinstructions of the Admiralty, nor can it be supposed that theAdmiralty, any more than the Cunard Steamship Co. , expected him so todo. What was required of him was that he should seriously consider and, as far as practicable, follow the Admiralty advices and use his bestjudgment as events and exigencies occurred; and if a situation arosewhere he believed that a course should be pursued to meet emergencieswhich required departure from some of the Admiralty advices as togeneral rules of action, then it was his duty to take such course, if inaccordance with his carefully formed deliberate judgment. After adisaster has occurred, it is not difficult for the expert to show how itmight have been avoided, and there is always opportunity for academicdiscussion as to what ought or ought not to have been done; but the trueapproach is to endeavor, for the moment, to possess the mind of him uponwhom rested the responsibility. 

[Sidenote: Enemy obligations in care of merchant ships. ]

Let us now see what that responsibility was and how it was dealt with. The rules of naval warfare allowed the capture and, in somecircumstances, the destruction of an enemy merchant ship, but, at thesame time, it was the accepted doctrine of all civilized nations (aswill be more fully considered infra) that, as Lord Mersey put it, "thereis always an obligation first to secure the safety of the lives of thoseon board. "

The responsibility, therefore, of Captain Turner, in his task ofbringing the ship safely to port, was to give heed not only to generaladvices advanced as the outcome of experience in the then developingknowledge as to submarine warfare, but particularly to any specialinformation which might come to him in the course of the voyage. 

[Sidenote: Advices of the Admiralty. ]

Realizing that if there was a due warning, in accordance withinternational law, and an opportunity, within a limited time, for thepassengers to leave the ship, nevertheless that the operation must bequickly done, Captain Turner, on May 6, had taken the full precautions, such as swinging out the boats, properly provisioned, which have beenheretofore described. The principal features of the Admiralty adviceswere (1) to give the headlands a wide berth; (2) to steer a midchannelcourse; (3) to maintain as high a speed as practicable; (4) to zigzag, and (5) to make ports, if possible, at dawn, thus running the last partof the voyage at night. 

[Sidenote: Fastnet given a wide berth. ]

The reason for the advice as to keeping off headlands was that thesubmarines lurked near those prominent headlands and landfalls to andfrom which ships were likely to go. This instruction Captain Turnerentirely followed in respect of Fastnet, which was the first point onthe Irish coast which a vessel bound from New York to Liverpool wouldordinarily approach closely, and, in normal times, the passing would bevery near, or even inside of Fastnet. The _Lusitania_ passed Fastnet sofar out that Captain Turner could not see it. Whether the distance wasabout twenty-five miles, as the Cunard Steamship Co. Contends, or abouteighteen and one-half miles, as the claimants calculate, the result isthat either distance must be regarded as a wide berth, in comparisonwith the customary navigation at that point, and, besides, nothinghappened there. At 8:30 P. M. On May 6 the message had been receivedfrom the British Admiralty that submarines were off Fastnet, so thatCaptain Turner, in this regard, not only followed the general advices, but the specific information from the Admiralty. 

At 11:25 A. M. On May 7 Captain Turner received the wireless from theAdmiralty plainly intended for the _Lusitania_, informing him thatsubmarines (plural) were active in the southern part of the IrishChannel and when last heard of were twenty miles south of ConingbegLight Vessel. This wireless message presented acutely to the Captainthe problem as to the best course to pursue, always bearing in mind hisdetermination and the desirability of getting to the Liverpool Bar whenit could be crossed while the tide served and without a pilot. Further, as was stated by Sir Alfred Booth, "The one definite instruction we didgive him with regard to that was to authorize him to come up without apilot. " The reasons for this instruction were cogent and were conciselysummed up by Sir Alfred Booth during his examination as a witness asfollows:

[Sidenote: The Mersey sandbar. ]

"It was one of the points that we felt it necessary to make the Captainof the _Lusitania_ understand the importance of. The _Lusitania_ canonly cross the Liverpool Bar at certain states of the tide, and wetherefore warned the Captain, or whoever might be Captain, that we didnot think it would be safe for him to arrive off the bar at such a timethat he would have to wait there, because that area had been infestedwith submarines, and we thought therefore it would be wiser for him toarrange his arrival in such a way, leaving him an absolutely free handas to how he would do it, that he could come straight up withoutstopping at all. The one definite instruction we did give him withregard to that was to authorize him to come up without a pilot. "

The tide would be high at Liverpool Bar at 6:53 on Saturday morning, May8. Captain Turner planned to cross the bar as much earlier than that ashe could get over without stopping, while at the same time figuring onpassing during the darkness the dangerous waters from the entrance ofSt. George's Channel to the Liverpool Bar. 

[Sidenote: The Captain decides to work inshore. ]

Having thus in mind his objective, and the time approximately when heintended to reach it, the message received at 11:25 A. M. Required thathe should determine whether to keep off land approximately the samedistance as he was when he passed Fastnet, or to work inshore and goclose to Coningbeg Lightship. He determined that the latter was thebetter plan to avoid the submarines reported in midchannel ahead of him. 

[Sidenote: Taking a bearing. ]

When Galley Head was sighted the course was changed so as to haul closerto the land, and this course was pursued until 1:40 P. M. , at which timeCaptain Turner concluded that it was necessary for him to get hisbearings accurately. This he decided should be done by taking afour-point bearing, during which procedure the ship was torpedoed. It isurged that he should have taken a two-point bearing or a cross bearing, which would have occupied less time, but if, under all the conditionswhich appealed to his judgment as a mariner, he had taken a differentmethod of ascertaining his exact distance and the result would have beeninaccurate, or while engaged in taking a two-point bearing the ship hadbeen torpedoed, then somebody would have said he should have taken afour-point bearing. The point of the matter is that an experiencedCaptain took the bearing he thought proper for his purposes, and topredicate negligence upon such a course is to assert that a Captain isbound to guess the exact location of a hidden and puzzling danger. 

[Sidenote: Testimony about the ship's speed. ]

Much emphasis has been placed upon the fact that the speed of the shipwas eighteen knots at the time of the attack instead of twenty-four, or, in any event, twenty-one knots, and upon the further fact (for such itis) that the ship was not zigzagging as frequently as the Admiraltyadvised or in the sense of that advice. 

Upon this branch of the case much testimony was taken, (some in camera, as in the Wreck Commissioners' Court, ) and, for reasons of publicinterest, the methods of successfully evading submarines will not bediscussed. If it be assumed that the Admiralty advices as of May, 1915, were sound and should have been followed, then the answer to the chargeof negligence is twofold: (1) that Captain Turner, in taking afour-point bearing off the Old Head of Kinsale, was conscientiouslyexercising his judgment for the welfare of the ship, and (2) that it isimpossible to determine whether, by zigzagging off the Old Head ofKinsale or elsewhere, the _Lusitania_ would have escaped the Germansubmarine or submarines. 

As to the first answer I cannot better express my conclusion than in thelanguage of Lord Mersey:

[Sidenote: Lord Mersey's opinion. ]

"Captain Turner was fully advised as to the means which in the view ofthe Admiralty were best calculated to avert the perils he was likely toencounter, and in considering the question whether he is to blame forthe catastrophe in which his voyage ended I have to bear thiscircumstance in mind. It is certain that in some respects Captain Turnerdid not follow the advice given to him. It may be (though I seriouslydoubt it) that had he done so his ship would have reached Liverpool insafety. But the question remains: Was his conduct the conduct of anegligent or of an incompetent man? On this question I have sought theguidance of my assessors, who have rendered me invaluable assistance, and the conclusion at which I have arrived is that blame ought not to beimputed to the Captain. The advice given to him, although meant for hismost serious and careful consideration, was not intended to deprive himof the right to exercise his skilled judgment in the difficult questionsthat might arise from time to time in the navigation of his ship. Hisomission to follow the advice in all respects cannot fairly beattributed either to negligence or incompetence. 

[Sidenote: Skilled and experienced judgment. ]

"He exercised his judgment for the best. It was the judgment of askilled and experienced man, and although others might have acteddifferently, and, perhaps, more successfully, he ought not, in myopinion, to be blamed. "

[Sidenote: More than one submarine in wait. ]

As to the second answer, it is only necessary to outline the situationin order to realize how speculative is the assertion of fault. It isplain from the radio messages of the Admiralty, (May 6, 7:50 P. M. , "Submarines active off south coast of Ireland"; May 6, 8:30 P. M. , "Submarines off Fastnet"; the 11:25 message of May 7, supra; May 7, 11:40 A. M. , "Submarines five miles south of Cape Clear, proceeding westwhen sighted at 10 A. M. , ") that more than one submarine was lying inwait for the _Lusitania_. 

[Sidenote: Submarines bold with unarmed vessels. ]

A scientific education is not necessary to appreciate that it is muchmore difficult for a submarine successfully to hit a naval vessel thanan unarmed merchant ship. The destination of a naval vessel is usuallynot known, that of the _Lusitania_ was. A submarine commander, whenattacking an armed vessel, knows that he, as the attacker, may andlikely will also be attacked by his armed opponent. The _Lusitania_ wasas helpless in that regard as a peaceful citizen suddenly set upon bymurderous assailants. There are other advantages of the naval vesselover the merchant ship which need not be referred to. 

[Sidenote: Probably two submarines. ]

It must be assumed that the German submarine commanders realized theobvious disadvantages which necessarily attached to the _Lusitania_, and, if she had evaded one submarine, who can say what might havehappened five minutes later? If there was, in fact, a third torpedofired at the _Lusitania's_ port side, then that incident would stronglysuggest that, in the immediate vicinity of the ship, there were at leasttwo submarines. 

It must be remembered also that the _Lusitania_ was still in the opensea, considerably distant from the places of theretofore submarineactivity and comfortably well off the Old Head of Kinsale, from whichpoint it was about 140 miles to the Scilly Islands, and that she wasnearly 100 miles from the entrance to St. George's Channel, the firstchannel she would enter on her way to Liverpool. 

[Sidenote: Attack intended to destroy life. ]

No transatlantic passenger liner, and certainly none carrying Americancitizens, had been torpedoed up to that time. The submarines, therefore, could lay their plans with facility to destroy the vessel somewhere onthe way from Fastnet to Liverpool, knowing full well the easy prey whichwould be afforded by an unarmed, unconvoyed, well-known merchantman, which from every standpoint of international law had the right to expecta warning before its peaceful passengers were sent to their death. Thatthe attack was deliberate and long contemplated and intended ruthlesslyto destroy human life, as well as property, can no longer be open todoubt. And when a foe employs such tactics it is idle and purelyspeculative to say that the action of the Captain of a merchant ship, indoing or not doing something or in taking one course and not another, was a contributing cause of disaster or that had the Captain not donewhat he did or had he done something else, then that the ship and herpassengers would have evaded their assassins. 

[Sidenote: The Captain and company not negligent. ]

I find, therefore, as a fact, that the Captain and, hence, the CunardCompany were not negligent. 

The importance of the cause, however, justifies the statement of anotherground which effectually disposes of any question of liability. 

It is an elementary principle of law that even if a person is negligentrecovery cannot be had unless the negligence is the proximate cause ofthe loss or damage. 

There is another rule, settled by ample authority, viz. : that, even ifnegligence is shown, it cannot be the proximate cause of the loss ordamage if an independent illegal act or a third party intervenes tocause the loss. 

The question, then, is whether the act of the German submarine commanderwas an illegal act. 

[Sidenote: International law. ]

The United States courts recognize the binding force of internationallaw. 

At least since as early as June 5, 1793, in the letter of Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to the French Minister, our Government hasrecognized the law of nations as an "integral part" of the laws of theland. 

To ascertain international law, "resort must be had to the customs andusages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works ofcommentators and jurists. * * * Such works are resorted to by judicialtribunals * * * for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. "

Let us first see the position of our Government, and then ascertainwhether that position has authoritative support. Mr. Lansing, in hisofficial communication to the German Government dated June 9, 1915, stated:

[Sidenote: Mr. Lansing's communication. ]

[Sidenote: Responsibility of the German Government. ]

[Sidenote: A principle of humanity. ]

"But the sinking of passenger ships involves principles of humanitywhich throw into the background any special circumstances of detail thatmay be thought to affect the cases, principles which lift it, as theImperial German Government will no doubt be quick to recognize andacknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomaticdiscussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other factsregarding the _Lusitania_, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying morethan a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, andthat men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstancesunparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than one hundredAmerican citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of theGovernment of the United States to speak of these things and once morewith solemn emphasis to call the attention of the Imperial GermanGovernment to the grave responsibility which the Government of theUnited States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests. The Government of the United States is contending for something muchgreater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It iscontending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which noGovernment is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its careand authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stopwhen ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded thecommander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting thelives of those on board the ship in jeopardy. This principle theGovernment of the United States understands the explicit instructionsissued on August 3, 1914, by the Imperial German Admiralty to itscommanders at sea to have recognized and embodied as do the naval codesof all other nations, and upon it every traveler and seaman had a rightto depend. It is upon this principle of humanity, as well as upon thelaw founded upon this principle, that the United States must stand. * * *

[Sidenote: Americans must be safeguarded. ]

"The Government of the United States cannot admit that the proclamationof a war zone from which neutral ships have been warned to keep away maybe made to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights eitherof American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errandsas passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality. It does notunderstand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. Itunderstands it, also, to accept as established beyond question theprinciple that the lives of non-combatants cannot lawfully or rightfullybe put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresistingmerchantman, and to recognize the obligation to take sufficientprecaution to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact ofbelligerent nationality or is in fact carrying contraband of war under aneutral flag. The Government of the United States therefore deems itreasonable to expect that the Imperial German Government will adopt themeasures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect ofthe safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks forassurances that this will be done. (See White Book of Department ofState entitled 'Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent GovernmentsRelating to Neutral Rights and Duties, European War, No. 2, ' at p. 172. Printed and distributed October 21, 1915. )"

The German Government found itself compelled ultimately to recognize theprinciples insisted upon by the Government of the United States, for, after considerable correspondence, and on May 4, 1916, (after the_Sussex_ had been sunk, ) the German Government stated:

[Sidenote: The _Sussex_ agreement. ]

"The German submarine forces have had in fact, orders to conductsubmarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visitand search and destruction of merchant vessels as recognized byinternational law, the sole exception being the conduct of warfareagainst the enemy trade carried on enemy freight ships that areencountered in the war zone surrounding Great Britain. * * *

[Sidenote: Merchant ships not to be sunk without warning. ]

"The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government ofthe United States that the German naval forces have received thefollowing orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit andsearch and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by internationallaw, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as navalwar zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving humanlives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance. SeeOfficial Communication by German Foreign Office to Ambassador Gerard, May 4, 1916. (White Book No. 3 of Department of State, pp. 302, 305. )"

[Sidenote: Right to make a prize. ]

There is, of course, no doubt as to the right to make prize of an enemyship on the high seas, and, under certain conditions, to destroy her, and equally no doubt of the obligation to safeguard the lives of allpersons aboard, whether passengers or crew. 

Two quotations from a long list of authorities may be given forconvenience, one stating the rule and the other the attitude whichobtains among civilized Governments. Oppenheim sets forth as amongviolations of the rules of war:

"(12) Attack on enemy merchantmen without previous request to submit tovisit. "

The observation in Vattel's "Law of Nations" is peculiarly applicable tothe case of the _Lusitania_:

"Let us never forget that our enemies are men. Though reduced to thedisagreeable necessity of prosecuting our right by force of arms, let usnot divest ourselves of that charity which connects us with all mankind. Thus shall we courageously defend our country's rights withoutviolating those of human nature. Let our valor preserve itself fromevery stain of cruelty and the lustre of victory will not be tarnishedby inhuman and brutal actions. "

[Sidenote: Codes and rules of nations. ]

In addition to these authorities are the regulations and practices ofvarious Governments. In 1512 Henry VIII. Issued instructions to theAdmiral of the Fleet which accord with our understanding of moderninternational law. Such has been England's course since. 

Substantially the same rules were followed in the Russian and Japaneseregulations, and probably in the codes or rules of many other nations. 

The rules recognized and practiced by the United States, among otherthings, provide:

"(10) In the case of an enemy merchantman it may be sunk, but only if itis impossible to take it into port, and provided always that the personson board are put in a place of safety. (U. S. White Book, European War, No. 3, p. 192. )"

[Sidenote: Humane principles in American wars. ]

These humane principles were practiced both in the war of 1812 andduring our own war of 1861-65. Even with all the bitterness (now happilyended and forgotten) and all the difficulties of having no port to whichto send a prize, Captain Semmes of the _Alabama_ strictly observed therule as to human life, even going so far as to release ships because hecould not care for the passengers. But we are not confined to Americanand English precedents and practices. 

While acting contrary to its official statements, yet the ImperialGerman Government recognized the same rule as the United States, andprior to the sinking of the _Lusitania_ had not announced any otherrule. The war zone proclamation of February 4, 1915, contained nowarning that the accepted rule of civilized naval warfare would bediscarded by the German Government. 

Indeed, after the _Lusitania_ was sunk, the German Government did notmake any such claim, but in answer to the first American note inreference to the _Lusitania_ the German Foreign Office, per von Jagow, addressed to Ambassador Gerard a note dated May 18, 1915, in which, inter alia, it is stated in connection with the sinking of the Britishsteamer _Falaba_:

[Sidenote: The _Falaba_ case. ]

"In the case of the sinking of the English steamer _Falaba_, thecommander of the German submarine had the intention of allowingpassengers and crew ample opportunity to save themselves. It was notuntil the Captain disregarded the order to lay to and took to flight, sending up rocket signals for help, that the German commander orderedthe crew and passengers by signals and megaphone to leave the shipwithin ten minutes. As a matter of fact, he allowed them twenty-threeminutes, and did not fire the torpedo until suspicious steamers werehurrying to the aid of the _Falaba_. (White Book No. 2, U. S. Departmentof State, p. 169. )"

Indeed, as late as May 4, 1916, Germany did not dispute theapplicability of the rule, as is evidenced by the note written to ourGovernment by von Jagow of the German Foreign Office, an extract ofwhich has been quoted supra. 

Further, Section 116 of the German Prize Code, (Huberich and Kindtranslation, p. 68, ) in force at the date of the _Lusitania's_destruction, conformed with the American rule. It provided:

[Sidenote: Safety of passengers necessary. ]

"Before proceeding to a destruction of the vessel the safety of allpersons on board, and, so far as possible, their effects, is to beprovided for, and all ship's papers and other evidentiary materialwhich, according to the views of the persons at interest, is of valuefor the formulation of the judgment of the prize court, are to be takenover by the commander. "

Thus, when the _Lusitania_ sailed from New York, her owner and masterwere justified in believing that, whatever else and theretoforehappened, this simple, humane and universally accepted principle wouldnot be violated. Few, at that time, would be likely to construe thewarning advertisement as calling attention to more than the perils to beexpected from quick disembarkation and the possible rigors of the seaafter the proper safeguarding of the lives of passengers by at leastfull opportunity to take to the boats. 

It is, of course, easy now in the light of many later events, added topreceding acts, to look back and say that the Cunard Line and itsCaptain should have known that the German Government would authorize orpermit so shocking a breach of international law and so foul an offense, not only against an enemy, but as well against peaceful citizens of athen friendly nation. 

But the unexpected character of the act was best evidenced by the horrorwhich it excited in the minds and hearts of the American people. 

[Sidenote: Fault with the Imperial German Government. ]

[Sidenote: Those who plotted the crime. ]

The fault, therefore, must be laid upon those who are responsible forthe sinking of the vessel, in the legal as well as moral sense. It is, therefore, not the Cunard Line, petitioner, which must be held liablefor the loss of life and property. The cause of the sinking of the_Lusitania_ was the illegal act of the Imperial German Government, acting through its instrument, the submarine commander, and violating acherished and humane rule observed, until this war, by even thebitterest antagonists. As Lord Mersey said, "The whole blame for thecruel destruction of life in this catastrophe must rest solely withthose who plotted and with those who committed the crime. "

 * * * * *

Italy, bound at the outbreak of the war to Germany and Austria by atreaty which formed the so-called Triple Alliance, was in a mostdifficult position. Her people, however, were strongly convinced of theaggressive intentions of Germany, and, after careful consideration, theGovernment and the people alike decided to cast their lot with theAllies. Active operations were at once begun along the border betweenItaly and Austria, and in this difficult terrain the events which aredescribed in the following chapter occurred. 

MOUNTAIN WARFARE

HOWARD C. FELTON

Copyright, Munsey's Magazine, May, 1916. 

[Sidenote: New style of warfare. ]

At the outbreak of the great war huge and well-equipped bodies of men, led by highly trained officers, rich in the strategic lore of centuries, set out to demonstrate the value of the theories that they had learnedin time of peace. In a few months an entirely new style of warfaredeveloped, and most of the military learning of the past was interestingchiefly because of its antiquity. 

[Sidenote: Italy and Austria fight in the Alps. ]

After the tremendous conflict at the Marne and the German rush forCalais, which was halted on the line of the Yser, there were on thewestern front no more battles in the old sense of the word. From theNorth Sea to the Swiss frontier, the fighting was just a novel andgigantic form of siege warfare. Cavalry became an obsolete arm. Battletactics, in the old sense, ceased to have any meaning. Of strategynothing much remained save the dictionary definition. 

And now, since Italy and Austria have locked horns above the clouds, among the glaciers and snow-faced slopes of the Alps, even the oldtext-books on mountain warfare have lost their significance. In theTrentino and along the Isonzo we see the consummation of a new style ofmountain fighting, which grew out of the old methods in the struggle forthe Carpathian passes during the first winter and spring of the war. 

In the old days, during a campaign in a mountain region, most of thebattles were fought on the level--in the literal, not the colloquialsense of the word. There was a deal of marching and scouting among cragsand precipices, but all with the object of obtaining the best positionin an open valley or upland plain where the real fighting must takeplace. Now the smooth floors of the valleys are comparatively deserted, while whole armies are spread out over great peaks and dizzy snow-fieldsthousands of feet above sea-level, chopping trenches in the ice andsparring for some vantage-point on a crag that in peace times might taxthe strength and skill of the amateur mountain-climber. 

[Sidenote: Bourcet's "Principles of Mountain Warfare. "]

Some time between 1764 and 1770, Pierre de Bourcet wrote a treatiseentitled "The Principles of Mountain Warfare. " This may seem to be goinga long way back, but Bourcet's volume and that of the young Comte deGuilbert on general tactics have historical interest and importancebecause, according to Spenser Wilkinson, they show where some ofNapoleon's strategic "miracles" were born. Bourcet's observations are asvital as if they had been written in 1910, but, as will be seen, many ofthem are somewhat musty in 1916. 

[Sidenote: Passes and defiles once the strong positions. ]

Bourcet, without the slightest idea of a battle-line extending fromfrontier to sea, lays down as the first principle of mountain warfarethat when the enemy holds a strong position, the assailant should forcehim to leave it by turning it. These strong positions in the mountainswere, until this war, the passes and defiles. 

"These contracted places, " he explains, "as they generally constitutethe principal objects of the defense, must compel the general who istaking the offensive to seek every possible means of turning them, or ofmisleading the enemy by diversions which will weaken him and facilitateaccess to them. 

"Suppose, for example, that the general on the defensive should beentrenched at all points surrounding his position in such a way as to beable to resist any direct attack that might be attempted against him, itwould be necessary to attempt to turn him by some more distant point, choosing positions that would facilitate the scheme, and which, bysuggesting some different object, could not raise the suspicion that thetroops there collected were destined for the purpose really in view. 

[Sidenote: Unlike modern warfare. ]

"It often happens in the mountains that the only passages favorable toour plans are interrupted by narrow defiles. In such cases we must avoidletting the enemy know our real purpose, and must undertake diversions, dividing our forces into small bodies. This method, which would bedangerous in any other sort of country, is indispensable in themountains, and is the whole science of this kind of warfare, providedthat the general who uses it always has the means to reconcentrate hisforces when necessary. "

Bourcet's conclusion is that in such a campaign the offensive has greatadvantages over the defensive. It will always possess the initiative;and if it prepares its blow with sufficient secrecy and strikes swiftly, the enemy, whose troops are necessarily scattered along the whole linemenaced, can never be ready to meet the attack. 

[Sidenote: Generals understand each other's strategy. ]

To-day, the only trouble about this beautifully tricky system ofstrategy is that the defending general would pay no attention to it. TheAustrian general staff, for instance, knew that the Italians would tryto smash through the frontier defenses of the Dual Empire, and that thenatural avenues of attack were up the valley of the Adige, along therailway through Pontebba and Malborghetto, or between Malborghetto andthe sea. The Austrians have enough men and guns to defend all theseroutes and all the tortuous pathways in between. So all they had to dowas plant themselves on their chosen ground along the whole carefullyfortified mountain line, and wait for the Italians to attack whereverthey pleased. 

"It is only by marching and countermarching, " Bourcet said, "that we canhope to deceive the enemy and induce him to weaken himself in certainpositions in order to strengthen himself in others. "

[Sidenote: The enemy cannot be outflanked. ]

But this cannot be done in the mountain fighting in the Alps to-day. TheItalians might march and countermarch as much as they pleased, but thereis no possible way of turning the enemy out of his position byoutflanking him. It is a case of frontal attack, with every valleyblocked and every peak a fortress. 

[Sidenote: Italy's great objectives. ]

The Italians campaign has two principal objectives--Trent and Gorizia. These two lovely cities of Italia Irrendenta are respectively the keysto the right and left flank of the Austrian frontier. Trent guards thevalley of the Adige, one of the few natural highways from Italy intoAustrian territory. Bourcet himself, in 1735, designed the defense ofthis pathway at Rivoli, just inside the Italian boundary, where he laidout what were considered impregnable positions. To the north; whereTrent lies, the country becomes more and more difficult for an invader, and up to this time the Italians have not been able to come withinstriking distance of the great Austrian fortress, though they holdRovereto, and have cut the direct line of communication between Trentand Toblach. 

[Sidenote: Italian game on the Gorizia front. ]

On the Gorizia front they have made what in this war may be consideredas important gains. Gorizia stands watch over the valley of the Isonzoand Austria's Adriatic littoral. Besides occupying Grado and Monfalconein the coastlands, General Cadorna's forces have crossed the Isonzo atseveral points, have smashed through to the north, and now threaten toenvelop Gorizia. Indeed, many observers believe that Cadorna could atany time take the place by a grand assault if he were willing to pay thecost in blood. 

Despite the very unfavorable character of the country, the Italians havegained more ground here in the same period than either the Germans orthe Anglo-French forces in the flat or rolling plains of Flanders andnorthern France. But the outflanking tactics of Bourcet, with feints andswift maneuvering, have had little to do with it. The assailants havehad to fight their way step by step. 

The Austrians had prepared all sorts of disagreeable surprises. They hadhewn gun-positions out of solid cliffs, skilfully placed so as to coverthe routes of approach, and had cemented up the embrasures. It wasmerely necessary to knock the cement out and pour shells upon theadvancing Italians at a range of several miles. The batteries wereinaccessible to storming parties, and the Italians had to drag up gunsof equal caliber to put them out of business. 

[Sidenote: Ancient methods employed. ]

In some places rocks and masses of ice were rolled down the slopes, asin the brave old days of the Helvetians; and in this line the Austriansintroduced an innovation. When the Italians began driving their trenchesup the steep slopes of Podgora--the Gibraltar of Gorizia--the defendersrolled down barrels of kerosene and set them alight with artillery fire. This enterprise throve joyously until the Italian gunners got the rangeof the launching-point and succeeded in exploding a few barrels amongthe Austrians themselves. 

[Sidenote: Austria had possession of the heights. ]

The writer does not mean to give the impression that Italy's job in theAlps is all but finished. A glance at the map of the frontier will cureany one of such a notion. The Italians were forced to start thiscampaign under every strategic disadvantage. By the frontier delimitedin 1866, they were left without natural defenses on the north and east. All along the Austrian boundary the heights remained in the hands of theHapsburgs as natural menaces to Venetia and Lombardy. Italy received theplains, but Austria held the mountain fastnesses that hung above them. 

This is so much the case that when Italy declared war, the Austriangeneral orders reminded the troops that they were in the position of menon the top floor of a six-story house, defending it from attackers whomust mount from the street under a plunging fire. 

[Sidenote: Chasseurs Alpins in the Vosges. ]

But in one way or another the Italians have been doggedly fighting theirway up the walls of the house. For one thing, their Alpini have broughtto great perfection the use of skis in military operations on thesnow-clad slopes. This is the first war in which skis have really cometo the front. In France, too, the Chasseurs Alpins have been able toshow the Germans some astonishing things with their long woodensnow-shoes in the winter fighting among the crests of the Vosges. 

A typical instance of this is the story of the capture of a German poston the Alsatian frontier in the winter of 1914-15. The Germans, holdingthe railroad from Ste. Marie to Ste. Croix, were expecting an attackfrom the French position at St. Dié. This impression was deliberatelystrengthened by a heavy artillery fire from St. Dié, while aconsiderable detachment of the Chasseurs Alpins led a body of infantryalong a winding mountain road to the village of Bonhomme. There theyposted themselves just out of sight of the German lines, while the_chasseurs_ scaled the snow-covered heights and crept along the flankof the German position. 

When they had reached the desired position, the infantry charged alongthe road and the Chasseurs Alpins simultaneously whizzed down the slopeon their skis. The swift flank attack did the business, and the Germanswere driven for some miles down the valley of the Weiss toward Colmar. 

[Sidenote: Austrians capture of Mt. Lövchen. ]

One of the greatest single mountain successes of the war was theAustrian capture of Mount Lövchen, the huge black mass of rock, nearlysix thousand feet high, which dominates the Austrian port of Cattaro andsentinels the little kingdom of Montenegro on the west. 

Ever since the war began the Austrians have from time to time madeattempts to reach the summit of this mighty rock. It is only a matter ofan hour or two by winding road in peace times, but the Austrians weresomething like eighteen months on the job; and in all this time it isdoubtful if the defenders ever numbered much more than five thousand. Itwas not captured until the Montenegrins had practically run out ofammunition and of reasons for holding the position. The rest of theirkingdom was overrun, and they were to all intents and purposes out ofthe war. 

[Sidenote: Russians in the Carpathians. ]

The Russian campaign in the Carpathians, before the great German driveof a year ago pushed the Czar's armies back into their own country, alsoillustrates how the mountain warfare of to-day grew by naturaltendencies from the tactics of Bourcet into the trench warfare ofnorthern France. 

In the first weeks of the war, when the great offensive movement of theAustrian army toward Lublin was crushed by the Grand Duke Nicholas, andthe broken hosts of the Dual Monarchy were sent flying through Galiciaand the Carpathians, a cloud of Cossack cavalry followed them andpenetrated into the plains of Hungary. This last operation was merely araid, however, and the Cossacks were soon galloping back through themountain passes. 

Then the Russians laid siege to Przemysl, and occupied the whole ofGalicia up to the line of the San. Later they pushed on westward to theDunajec, threatening Cracow. This was their high tide. On their leftflank was the mass of the Carpathians, pierced by a number of passes. The more important of these, from west to east, are the Tarnow, Dukla, Lupkow, and Uzsok. 

[Sidenote: The Carpathian passes. ]

The Austrians were rallied after some weeks, and put up something of afight for these "contracted places. " The Russians, following theprecepts of Bourcet, threatened the passage which seemed most desirable, because of the railroad facilities, and delivered a heavy blow at theDukla Pass, the least important of the four. Here they pushed through toBartfeld, on the Hungarian plain. Then, however, Mackensen's fearfulblow smashed the Russian line on the Dunajec and poured the Germanlegions across Galicia in the rear of the Carpathian armies, forcing theMuscovites to abandon the passes and scurry home. 

[Sidenote: Plains more often battlegrounds. ]

Mountain warfare has always had a certain romantic glamour, and it hasfilled many pages in the literature of fighting. As a matter ofhistorical fact, however, it has played a comparatively small part inthe world's annals. Almost all the great campaigns have been fought outin the lowlands. It is Belgium, for instance, and not Switzerland, thathas been proverbially the battle-ground of Europe. Napoleon and Suwaroffmarched armies through the Alps, but only as a means of strikingunexpectedly at the enemy who occupied the plains beyond. 

Up to the time of the present war, mountain campaigns have usually beenno more than picturesque foot-notes to history, illuminated by the valorof raiding clansmen like Roderick Dhu of the Scottish Highlands, orguerrilla chiefs like Andreas Hofer, the Tyrolese patriot. Hofer'sstruggle against Napoleon was indeed a gallant and notable one, but itscarcely entered into the main current of history. 

[Sidenote: Garibaldi's mountain campaigns. ]

If, however, we include Garibaldi among the mountain fighters--and suchwas the characteristic bent of his remarkable military genius--we mustaccord him a place among the molders of modern Europe, for without hisflashing sword Italy could not have been liberated and united. His twoAlpine campaigns against the Austrians were successful and effective, but his most brilliant powers were shown in his memorable invasion ofSicily in 1860. Chased ashore at Marsala by the Neapolitan war-ships, and narrowly escaping capture, he led his followers--one thousandred-shirted volunteers armed with obsolete muskets--into the Sicilianmountains, where he played such a game that within two months hecompelled the surrender of a well-equipped army of nearly thirtythousand regulars. The history of warfare can show but few exploits sodaring and so dramatic. 

 * * * * *

The most important military movement on the western front in the earlyautumn of 1915 was the great French offensive in Champagne. During thepreceding months of the spring and summer, there had been hard fightingall along the 400-mile line from the North Sea to Switzerland. Themilitary results had been small on either side and now the Frenchresolved on a mighty offensive which should be decisive in itsaccomplishments. What these results actually were is told in thefollowing narrative. 

THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE OF 1915

OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE FRENCH HEADQUARTERS STAFF

Copyright, National Review, January, 1916. 

[Sidenote: Menace of the French in Alsace. ]

After the battles of May and June, 1915, in Artois, activity on theWestern front became concentrated in the Vosges, where, by a series ofsuccessful engagements, we managed to secure possession of morefavorable positions and to retain them in spite of incessantcounter-attacks. The superiority established over the adversary, thewearing down of the latter through vain and costly counter-offensives, which absorbed in that sector his local resources; the state ofuncertainty in which the Germans found themselves in view of the menaceof a French division in Alsace--such were the immediate results of theseengagements. From the number of the effectives engaged, and the limitedfront along which the attacks took place, those attacks neverthelesswere no more than local. 

[Sidenote: Preparing for a great offensive. ]

While those operations were developing, the higher command was carefullypreparing for a great offensive. The situation of the Russian armiesimposed on us, as their Allies, obligations the accomplishment of whichhad been made possible by the results of a long course of preparation noless than by the aid of circumstances. 

[Sidenote: Improved defensive organizations. ]

The inaction of the adversary, engaged on the Eastern front in a seriesof operations of which he had not foreseen the difficulties, and thusreduced to the defensive on our front, left the initiative of theoperations in our hands. The landing in France of fresh British troopsenabled Marshal French to take upon himself the defence of a portion ofthe lines hitherto held by French troops. The improvement of ourdefensive organizations, which made possible certain economies in theeffectives, the regrouping of units and the creation of new units, alsohad the effect of placing a larger number of men at the disposal of theGeneralissimo. The increased output of war _matériel_ ensured him thenecessary means for a complete artillery preparation. 

[Sidenote: Joffre's appeal to the troops. ]

Among all the elements of success which were thus united at the end ofthe summer of 1915, not the least was the incomparable individual worthof the French soldier. It was to the traditional warlike qualities ofthe race that the Generalissimo appealed when, on September 23, 1915, headdressed to the troops the following general order, which was read tothe regiments by their officers:

 "SOLDIERS OF THE REPUBLIC

 "After months of waiting, which have enabled us to increase our forces and our resources, while the adversary has been using up his own, the hour has come to attack and conquer and to add fresh glorious pages to those of the Marne and Flanders, the Vosges and Arras. 

 "Behind the whirlwind of iron and fire let loose, thanks to the factories of France, where your brothers have, night and day, worked for us, you will proceed to the attack, all together, on the whole front, in close union with the armies of our Allies. 

[Sidenote: The spirit of the soldier. ]

 "Your _élan_ will be irresistible. It will carry you at a bound up to the batteries of the adversary, beyond the fortified lines which he has placed before you. 

 "You will give him neither pause nor rest until victory has been achieved. 

 "Set to with all your might for the deliverance of the soil of la Patrie, for the triumph of justice and liberty. 

 "J. JOFFRE. "

The description of the operations in Champagne will show under whatconditions our troops acquitted themselves of the task assigned to them, and also the value and significance of this success, without precedentin the war of positions in which we are at present engaged. 

[Sidenote: The German line that was broken. ]

The German line that was broken in Champagne is the same that wasfortified by our adversaries after the victory of the Marne. It rests onthe western side on the Massif de Moronvillers; to the east it stretchesas far as the Argonne. It was intended to cover the railway line fromChallerange to Bazancourt, a line indispensable for the concentrationmovements of the German troops. The offensive front, which extended fromAuberive to the east of Ville-sur-Tourbe, presents a varied aspect. Fromeast to west may be seen:

[Sidenote: A wooded glacis. ]

(1) A glacis about eight kilometres in width, the gentle slopes of whichare covered by numerous little woods. The road from Saint-Hilaire toSaint-Souplet, with the Baraque de l'Epine de Vedegrange, marksapproximately its axis. 

[Sidenote: Valley of Souain. ]

(2) The hollow, at the bottom of which is the village of Souain and ofwhich the first German line followed the further edge. The road fromSouain to Pomme-Py describes the radius of this semi-circle. The farm ofNavarin, at a distance of three and a half kilometres to the north ofSouain, stands on the top of the hills. 

[Sidenote: Second German line. ]

(3) To the north of Perthes a comparatively tranquil region of uniformaspect, forming between the wooded hills of the Trou Bricot and those ofthe Butte du Mesnil a passage three kilometres wide, barred by severallines of trenches and ending at a series of heights, the Butte deSouain, Hills 195 and 201, and the Butte de Tahure, surmounted by thesecond German line. 

[Sidenote: A strong German position. ]

(4) To the north of Le Mesnil, a very strong position, bastioned on thewest by two twin heights (Mamelle Nord and Trapèze), on the east by theButte du Mesnil. The German trenches formed between these two bastions apowerful curtain, behind which extended as far as Tahure a thicklywooded, undulating region. 

(5) To the north of Beauséjour a bare terrain easily practicable, with agentle rise in the direction of Ripon as far as the farm of Maisons deChampagne. 

[Sidenote: Eastern flank of the German line. ]

(6) To the north of Massiges, Hills numbered 191 and 199, describing onthe map the figure of a hand, very strongly constructed and constitutingthe eastern flank of the whole German line. This tableland slopes downgently in the direction of Ville-sur-Tourbe. 

[Sidenote: German system of trench defenses. ]

The achievements of our troops from September 25 to October 3, 1915, inthis region may be thus summarised: They scaled the whole of the glacisof l'Epine de Vedegrange; they occupied the ridge of the hollow atSouain; debouched in the opening to the north of Perthes to the slopesof Hill 195 and as far as the Butte de Tahure; carried the westernbastions of the curtain of le Mesnil; advanced as far as Maisons deChampagne and took by assault the "hand" of Massiges. That is to saythat they captured an area about forty square kilometres in extent. Theimportance of that figure is shown when one examines on the mapaccompanying this report the position of the German trenches, with aview to understanding the system of defence adopted by our adversaries. Two positions, distant from three to four kilometres from each other, stand out clearly. The first is the more dense; the trenches with theiralleys of communication present at certain points the appearance of awirework chessboard. Everywhere, to a depth of from 300 to 400 metresthere are at least three parallel lines, sometimes five. The trenchesare separated from each other as a rule by wire entanglements varying inwidth from 15 to 60 metres. 

[Sidenote: The second position. ]

[Sidenote: Alleys of communication. ]

The second position comprises only one trench, reinforced at certainpoints by a supporting trench. It is everywhere constructed, as is thewire network in front of it, in the form of a slope. On top there aremerely observation stations with machine-gun shelters connected with thetrench by an alley of communication. Between the two positions theterrain was also specially prepared, being cut up by transverse ordiagonal trenches. The alleys of communication constructed to facilitatethe firing, which were in many cases protected by wirework, makepossible, according to the German method, a splitting up of the terrainby lateral fire and the maintenance, even after the tide of theassailants had flooded the trenches, of centres of resistance, veritablestrongholds that could only be reduced after a siege. The positions ofthe artillery were established, as were also the camps and provisiondepots, behind the first position, the principal line of defence. 

[Sidenote: German organization known. ]

The whole German organization was known to us. It was shown on our maps, and every defensive work, trench, alley of communication, and clump oftrees was given a special name or a number preceded by a certain letter, according to the sector of attack wherein it was situated. This minuteprecision in the details of the preparation is worthy of being pointedout; it constitutes one of the peculiarities of the present war, averitable siege war, in which the objective has to be realisedbeforehand and clearly determined, every piece of ground having to becaptured by heavy fighting, as was formerly every redan and everycurtain. 

The bombardment of the German positions began on September 22, 1915 andwas pursued night and day according to a time scheme and a division oflabour previously determined upon. The results expected were:

[Sidenote: Results of bombardment. ]

(1) The destruction of the wire entanglements. 

(2) The burial of the defenders in their dug-out. 

(3) The razing of the trenches and the demolition of the embrasures. 

(4) The stopping-up of the alleys of communication. 

[Sidenote: Work of the long-range guns. ]

The gun-fire covered not only the first trench but also the supportingtrench and even the second position, although the distance at which thelast was situated and the outline of its wire entanglements made itdifficult to make field observations in that direction. At the same timethe heavy long-range guns bombarded the headquarters, the cantonmentsand the railway stations; they cut the railway lines, causing asuspension of the work of revictualling. The best witnesses to theeffectiveness of our bombardment are to be found in unfinished lettersfound upon prisoners. 

[Sidenote: Letters found on prisoners. ]

 "SEPTEMBER 23. 

 "The French artillery fired without intermission from the morning of the 21st to the evening of the 23rd, and we all took refuge in our dug-outs. On the evening of the 22nd we were to have gone to get some food, and the French continued to fire on our trenches. In the evening we had heavy losses, and we had nothing to eat. "

 "SEPTEMBER 25. 

 "I have received no news, and probably I shall not receive any for some days. The whole postal service has been stopped; all places have been bombarded to such an extent that no human being could stand against it. 

 "The railway line is so seriously damaged that the train service for some time has been completely stopped. 

 "We have been for three days in the first line; during those three days the French have fired so heavily that our trenches are no longer visible. "

[Sidenote: Number of wounded. ]

 "SEPTEMBER 24. 

 "For the last two days the French have been firing like mad. To-day, for instance, a dug-out has been destroyed. There were sixteen men in it. Not one of them managed to save his skin. They are all dead. Besides that, a number of individual men have been killed and there are a great mass of wounded. 

 "The artillery fires almost as rapidly as the infantry. A mist of smoke hangs over the whole battle-front, so that it is impossible to see anything. Men are dropping like flies. 

 "The trenches are no longer anything but a mound of ruins. "

[Sidenote: Sufferings of the soldiers. ]

 "SEPTEMBER 24. 

 "A rain of shells is pouring down upon us. The kitchen and everything that is sent to us is bombarded at night. The field-kitchens no longer come to us. Oh, if only the end were near! That is the cry every one is repeating. Peace! Peace!"

Extract from the notebook of a man of the 103rd Regiment:

 "From the trench nothing much can now be seen; it will soon be on a level with the ground. "

Letter of an artilleryman of the 100th Regiment of Field Artillery:

 "SEPTEMBER 25. 

 "We have passed through some terrible hours. It was as though the whole world was in a state of collapse. We have had heavy losses. One company of two hundred and fifty men had sixty killed last night. A neighboring battery had sixteen killed yesterday. 

[Sidenote: Destructiveness of the French shells. ]

 "The following instance will show you the frightful destructiveness of the French shells. A dug-out five metres deep, surmounted by 2 metres 50 centimetres of earth and two thicknesses of heavy timber, was broken like a match. "

Report made on September 24 in the morning, by the captain commandingthe 3rd company of the 135th Regiment of Reserve:

 "The French are firing on us with great bombs and machine-guns. We must have reinforcements at once. Many men are no longer fit for anything. It is not that they are wounded, but they are Landsturmers. Moreover the wastage is greater than the losses announced. 

 "Send rations immediately; no food has reached us to-day. Urgently want illuminating cartridges and hand grenades. Is the hospital corps never coming to fetch the wounded?"

[Sidenote: German troops exhausted. ]

 "SEPTEMBER 25, 11. 45. 

 "I urgently beg for reinforcements; the men are dying from fatigue and want of sleep. I have no news of the battalion. "

The time fixed for all the attacks on the Champagne front was aquarter-past nine in the morning. There was no hesitation. At the timementioned the troops came out of the trenches with the aid of steps orscaling ladders and drew up in line before making a rush at the Germantrenches. 

The operation was rapidly effected. The objective was at an averagedistance of two hundred metres; this was covered without serious losses. The Germans were nearly everywhere surprised, and their defensive firewas not opened until after the invading tide of the attackers had passedby. 

[Sidenote: First German trench penetrated. ]

Over the whole attacking front our troops penetrated into the firstGerman trench. But subsequently the progress was no longer uniform. While certain units continued their forward movement with extremerapidity, others came up against machine guns still in action and eitherstopped or advanced only with difficulty. Some centres of the Germanresistance maintained their position for several hours and even forseveral days. 

[Sidenote: Outline of advance in Champagne. ]

[Sidenote: The battle a series of assaults. ]

A line showing the different stages of our advance in Champagne wouldassume a curiously winding outline, and would reveal on the one hand thedefensive power of an adversary resolved to stick to the ground at allcosts and on the other the victorious continuity of the efforts of ourtroops in this hand-to-hand struggle. The battle of Champagne must beconsidered in the light of a series of assaults, executed at the samemoment, in parallel or convergent directions and having for their objecteither the capture or the hemming in of the first German position, theunits being instructed to reform in a continuous line before the secondposition. 

[Sidenote: Unity of the action. ]

In order to understand the development, the terrain must be divided intoseveral sectors, in each of which the operations, although closelyco-ordinated, assumed, as a consequence either of the nature of theground or of the peculiarities of the enemy defences, a differentcharacter. The unity of the action was nevertheless ensured by thesimultaneity of the rush, which carried all the troops beyond the firstposition, past the batteries, to the defences established by the enemyon the heights to the south of Py. 

[Sidenote: At extremities offensive does not progress. ]

At the two extremities of our attacking front, subjected to convergingfires and to counter-attacks on the flanks, our offensive made noprogress. The fighting which took place in Auberive and round aboutServon were distinguished by more than one trait of heroism, but theywere destined to have no other result than that of containing the forcesof the enemy and of immobilising him at the wings while the attack wasprogressing in the centre. 

[Sidenote: Position from Auberive to Souain a triangle. ]

[Sidenote: Wire checks the attackers. ]

[Sidenote: Gains maintained. ]

(1) _Sector of l'Epine de Vedegrange. _ The first German line wasestablished at the base of a wide glacis covered with clumps of trees, and formed a series of salients running into each other. At certainpoints it ran along the edge of the woods where the supplementarydefences were completed by abattis. The position as a whole betweenAuberive and Souain described a vast triangle. To the west of the road, from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet, the troops traversed the firstenemy line and rushed forward for a distance of about a kilometre as faras a supporting trench, in front of which they were stopped by thewirework. A counterattack debouching from the west and supported by theartillery of Moronvillers caused a slight retirement of our left. Thetroops of the right, on the contrary, maintained their gains andsucceeded on the following days in enlarging and extending them, remaining in touch with the units which were attacking on the east ofthe road. The latter had succeeded in a particularly brilliant mannerin overcoming the difficulties with which they were confronted. 

[Sidenote: Nature of the position captured. ]

[Sidenote: Prisoners and guns seized. ]

The German position which they captured, with its triple and quadruplelines of trenches, its small forts armed with machine guns, its woodsadapted for the purpose in view, constituted one of the most completeschemes of defence on the Champagne front and afforded cover to anumerous artillery concealed in the woods of the glacis. On this front, which was about three and a half kilometres wide, the attack onSeptember 25, 1915 achieved a varying success. The troops on the left, after having penetrated into the first trench, had their progressarrested by machine guns. On the right, however, in spite of theobstacle presented by four successive trenches, each of which wascovered by a network of wire entanglements and was concealed in thewoods, where our artillery had difficulty in reaching them, theattacking troops gained nearly two kilometres, capturing seven hundredprisoners, of whom seventeen were officers, and seizing two guns of 77and five guns of 105. 

The advance recommenced on September 27, 1915. The left took possessionof the woods lining the road from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet as faras the Epine de Vedegrange. Along the whole extent of the wooded heightsas far as the western side of the hollow at Souain the success wasidentical. Notwithstanding the losses they sustained, notwithstandingthe fatigue involved in the incessant fighting, the troops pushedforward, leaving behind them only a sufficient force to clear the woodsof isolated groups of the enemy who still remained there. Between 4 and6 p. M. We arrived immediately in front of the second German position. 

[Sidenote: Second German position penetrated. ]

[Sidenote: Results of attack in this sector. ]

On the 27th we penetrated into this position at two points. We tookpossession of a trench about a kilometre wide, called the "parallel ofthe Epine de Vedegrange, " which is duplicated almost throughout byanother trench (the parallel of the wood of Chevron), and the wireworkentanglements of which were intact, and precluded an assault. Furthereast our soldiers also continued, thanks to the conformation of theterrain, to penetrate into the enemy trench to a depth of about fourhundred metres. But it was impossible to take advantage of this breachowing to a concentration of the German heavy artillery, a rapidlycontinued defence of the surrounding woods, and the fire of machine gunswhich it was not possible to capture and which were directed from thetrenches on the right and left of the entry and exit to the breach. Theresults attained in this attacking sector alone may be stated thus:fifteen square miles of territory organized for defence throughoutnearly the whole of its extent; on September 28, forty-four cannon, seven of 105 and six of 150, and more than three thousand prisoners. 

(2) _Sector of Souain. _ The enemy lines round about Souain described awide curve. In the immediate vicinity of our trenches, to the west atthe Mill and to the east of the wood of Sabot, they swerved to theextent of over a kilometre to the north of the village and of the sourceof the Ain. 

[Sidenote: Sapping operations. ]

[Sidenote: Assault made in three directions. ]

When the offensive was decided upon it was necessary, in order to extendour lines forward to striking distance, to undertake sapping operationsin parallel lines, and at times to make dashes by night over theintervening ground. The men working underground got into communicationwith the trenches by digging alleys of communication. This difficultundertaking was effected with very slight losses, under the eyes andunder the fire of the enemy. Our parallel lines approached to within adistance of two hundred metres of the German trenches. The assault wasmade in three different directions: on the west in the direction ofHills 167 and 174; in the centre along a line running parallel with theroad from Souain to Pomme-Py, in the direction of the farm of Navarin;on the east in the direction of the woods intersected by the road fromSouain to Tahure, and in the direction of the Butte de Souain. 

[Sidenote: Machine gun positions surrounded. ]

The advance was extremely rapid--on the left two kilometres in less thanone hour, in the centre three kilometres in forty-five minutes. At 10a. M. We had reached the farm of Navarin. Towards the east the forwardmarch was more difficult. Some German machine guns stood their ground inthe wood of Sabot and contributed to the resistance of the enemy. Thisdefence was destined to be overcome by surrounding them. Arriving at thewooded region in that part where it is intersected by the road fromSouain to Tahure, the assailants joined up on September 27, 1915 withthose of our troops who were attacking to the north of Perthes. Theyleft behind them only what was barely necessary in the way of troops toclear the woods of stragglers. 

[Sidenote: The French take guns and supplies. ]

Parlementaires were sent to the Germans, who received them with a volleyof rifle shots and endeavored to escape during the night. The majoritywere killed and the survivors surrendered. Several batteries and a largequantity of _matériel_ (supplies of shells and provisions, grenades, telephones, wire, light railways) remained in our hands. On the 28th, along the entire length of the sector, we were immediately in front ofthe second German position. The troops had shown an unparalleled ardourand energy. They had been trained by officers whose courage and spiritof self-sacrifice are indicated by this casualty list; a general ofdivision and four colonels wounded; two colonels killed. 

[Sidenote: Wooded region between Souain and Perthes. ]

[Sidenote: Region broken up by mines and trenches. ]

(3) _Sector of Perthes. _ Between Souain and Perthes stretches a woodedregion in which already, in February and March, heavy fighting had takenplace. At that period we had contrived to take possession on the easternextremity of this region of the German defences of the wood of Sabot. Wehad also made progress to the north-west of Perthes, on the summit ofHill 200. But between these two positions the Germans had retained astrong system of trenches forming a salient almost triangular in shape, to which we gave the name of the Pocket (_la Poche_). During the wholeyear a war of mining had been going on, and the region, which was brokenup by concave constructions and intersected in all directions bytrenches and alleys of communication, constituted an attacking groundall the more difficult because to the north of la Poche the somewhatthickly wooded Trou Bricot, the edges of which were in a state ofdefence, obstructed a rapid advance. This wooded region extends over awidth of a kilometre and a half and a depth of four kilometres. Thearrangements made for the attack contemplated, after the capture of laPoche, the surrounding of the wood of the Trou Bricot. The junction wasto be made at the road from Souain to Tahure, with the troops assignedfor the attack on the eastern border of the hollow at Souain. 

[Sidenote: The York trench. ]

The ground to the east of the Trou Bricot was less difficult. Open andcomparatively flat, it was defended on the north of Perthes by a tripleline of trenches distant 100 metres from each other. At a distance of1000 metres to 1200 metres a supporting trench, called the "Yorktrench, " was almost unique in its entire construction. The open countrybeyond stretched for a distance of three kilometres up to the secondGerman position (Hill 195, Butte de Tahure). The principal effort wasdirected against this passage, the left flank of the attack beingsecured by a subsidiary action confined to the capture of la Poche. 

[Sidenote: Attack preceded by artillery fire. ]

At 9 a. M. Our artillery directed its fire successively against thefirst-line trenches and the supporting trenches. The attack took placein the most perfect order. The assailants were already swarming in theGerman lines when the enemy artillery opened its defensive fire. Ourcounter-batteries hampered the German pieces and our reserves in therear suffered little from their fire. 

[Sidenote: La Poche position surrendered. ]

[Sidenote: The York trench occupied. ]

At 9. 45 a. M. The two columns which were attacking the extremities of thesalient of la Poche joined hands. The position was surrounded. TheseGermans who remained alive inside it surrendered. At the same time abattalion was setting foot in the defences of the southern edges of thewood of Trou Bricot. The battalions that followed, marching to theoutside of the eastern edges, executed with perfect regularity a "leftturn" and came and formed up alongside the alleys of communication asfar as the supporting trench. At the same moment, in the open country tothe north of Perthes, the troops surmounted the three first-linetrenches and, preceded by our artillery, made a quick march towards theYork trench and occupied it almost without striking a blow. 

[Sidenote: Cleaning up the sector. ]

Further to the East, along the road from Perthes to Tahure, theiradvance encountered greater difficulties. Some centres of the Germanresistance could not be overcome. A sheltered machine gun continued itsfire. An infantry officer, with a quartermaster of artillery, succeededin getting into action a gun at a distance of three hundred metres fromthe machine gun and in firing at it at close quarters. Of the troopswhich were advancing to the north of Perthes, some made for the easternborder of the wood of Bricot, where they penetrated into the camps, ousting the defenders and surprising several officers in bed. Late inthe afternoon one of our regiments had reached the road from Souain toTahure. Other units were marching straight towards the north, clearingout the little woods on the way. They there captured batteries of whichthe artillerymen were riveted to their guns by means of bayonets(notably ten pieces of 105 and five of 150). 

[Sidenote: Progress hindered by weather. ]

The same work was being performed in the woods extending east of theroad from Perthes to Souain and Tahure, where batteries were charged andcaptured while in action. At this spot a regiment covered fourkilometres in two hours and captured ten guns, three of 105 and seven of77. But, from twelve o'clock midday onwards the rate of progressdecreased, the bad weather making it impossible for our artillery to seewhat was going on, and rendering the joining up of the different corpsextremely difficult. From the Buttes de Souain and Tahure the enemydirected converging fires on our men, who were advancing along very openground. Nevertheless they continued their advance as far as the slopesof Hill 193 and the Butte de Tahure, and there dug themselves in. 

[Sidenote: Contact with second German position. ]

The night passed without any counter-attack by the enemy. Our artillery, including several field batteries, which had arrived immediately afterthe attack beyond the York trench, also brought forward its heavypieces. At dawn the reconstituted regiments made another forward rushwhich enabled them to establish themselves in immediate contact with thesecond German position from the Butte de Souain to the Butte de Tahure, and even to seize several advanced posts in that neighbourhood. 

But on the lower slopes some of the wire entanglements remained intact;a successful assault on them would have been possible only after a freshpreparation. Up to October 6, 1915, the troops remained where they were, digging trenches and organizing a defensive system which had to beconstructed all over again on ground devastated by the enemy fire. 

[Sidenote: Ravin des Cuisines. ]

(4) _Sector of Le Mesnil. _ It was to the north of Le Mesnil that weencountered the greatest resistance on the part of the adversary. In thecourse of the engagements of the preceding winter we had succeeded insecuring a foothold on top of the hill numbered 196. The Germansremained a little to the east, in a ravine which we continued to call byits designation of the "Ravine of the Kitchens" (Ravin des Cuisines). Our assault rendered us masters of it, but we could make no furtherprogress. 

[Sidenote: Fighting on the Butte du Mesnil. ]

The German trenches are constructed on the northern slopes of Hill 196, and are concealed from field observation so that it is difficult for theartillery to play upon them. Moreover, they are flanked on one side bythe twin heights of the Mamelles, on the other by the Butte du Mesnil. To the eastward some of our units contrived on September 25, 1915, topenetrate into the trenches of the _butte_ (knoll), but failed tomaintain their ground, in consequence of a counter-attack supported byflank fires. Westward, it was not until the night of the 1st to the 2ndof October, 1915, that we captured the northern Mamelle, thussurrounding the works of the Trapèze which surmount the southernMamelle. 

[Sidenote: Rapid and brilliant advance. ]

(5) _Sector of Beauséjour. _ The attacks launched north of Beauséjour metwith a more rapid and more brilliant success. The swarm of invadersthrowing themselves on the first German lines captured one after theother the enemy works in the very sparsely timbered woods called the Ferde Lance wood and the Demi-Lune wood, and afterwards all the works knownas the Bastion. In one rush certain units gained the top of Maisons deChampagne, past several batteries, killing the artillerymen as theyserved their pieces. The same movement took the assailants across theintricate region of the mine "funnels" of Beauséjour up to the extendedwood intersected by the road to Maisons de Champagne. Our soldiers thencame across German artillerymen engaged in unlimbering their guns. Theykilled the drivers and horses; the survivors surrendered. 

[Sidenote: Cavalry supports the infantry. ]

[Sidenote: Enemy counter-attacks. ]

Further westward the left wing of the attacking troops advanced withgreater difficulty, being hampered by small forts and covered works withwhich the trenches were everywhere protected. It was at this moment thatthe cavalry came unexpectedly to the support of the infantry. Twosquadrons of hussars having crossed our old trenches in face of a heavydefensive artillery fire prepared to gallop against the German batteriesnorth of Maisons de Champagne, when they reached that part of the lineswhere the Germans still maintained their position. The latterimmediately directed the fire of their machine guns against thecavalrymen, several of whose horses were hit. The hussars dismountedand, with drawn sabres, made for the trenches, while favoured by thisdiversion, the infantrymen resumed their forward movement. Theresistance of the enemy broke down; more than six hundred Germans werecaptured in this way. In the course of the afternoon and during the dayof September 25, 1915, some enemy counter-attacks were made from thedirection of Ripont, but were unsuccessful in ousting us from the summitof Maisons de Champagne. 

On the following days a fierce struggle took place north of the summitin the region of a defensive work known as the "Ouvrage de la Défaite, "which was captured by us, lost, then recaptured, and finally evacuatedin consequence of an extremely violent bombardment. 

[Sidenote: Heights of Massiges. ]

(6) _Sector of Massiges. _ The safety of our troops which had advanced asfar as the extended wood and Maisons de Champagne was assured by thecapture of the summits of the heights of Massiges. This sharplyundulating upland, numbered 199 on the north and 191 on the south, constituted in the hands of the Germans a fortress which they believedto be impregnable and from the top of which they commanded our positionsin several directions. At 9. 15 a. M. The two first attacking partiesmarched out in columns. The men went forth gaily and deliberately, preceded by the firing of the field artillery. By 9. 30 a. M. Ourinfantry, before the enemy had had time to recover themselves, hadreached the summit. 

[Sidenote: Enemy machine gun fire. ]

[Sidenote: Lines of grenadiers. ]

From this moment, subject to machine gun and musketry fire, the mencould only proceed slowly along the summits by the alleys ofcommunication, with hand grenades, supported by the artillery, with whomthey remained in constant touch by flag-signalling. As the advance ofour grenadiers continued, the Germans surrendered in large numbers. Anuninterrupted chain of grenade-bearers, like the chains ofbucket-holders at a fire in former times, was established in the alleysof communication from Massiges forward, and each fresh arrival ofgrenades was accompanied by a fresh advance. 

[Sidenote: Value of possessing the heights. ]

From September 25 to October 3, 1915, the fight continued in this wayand was carried on by our soldiers with fierce persistency. The Germanshurled upon the spot constant reinforcements and offered an obstinateresistance that has rarely been equalled. They stood up to be shotdown--the machine-gun men at their guns, the grenadiers on their grenadechests. All attempts at a counter-attack remained equally unproductive. The possession of the heights of Massiges enabled us to extend our gainstowards Ville-sur-Tourbe, while taking in flank the trenches which wehad failed to secure by a frontal attack. 

The loss of the heights of Massiges appears to have particularly upsetthe German General Staff, which, after having denied the fact, represented that the ground which it had lost as a consequence ofgrenade fighting had been abandoned owing to artillery fire. 

[Sidenote: Attitude of the enemy. ]

The attitude of the enemy was characterized by: (1) Surprise; (2)disorganization; (3) a sudden and almost disorderly engagement of thereserves; (4) the exhaustion and demoralization of the soldiers. 

[Sidenote: Reasons for surprise. ]

(1) It is beyond doubt that the Germans were surprised by the extent andviolence of our attacks. They were expecting a French offensive. Theorders of the day of Generals von Fleck and Von Ditfurth prove this. ("The possibility of a great French offensive must be considered": VonDitfurth, August 15. "The French Higher Command appears to be disposedto make another desperate effort": Von Fleck, September 26. ) But theGermans foresaw neither the strength nor the success of the effort. During our artillery preparation twenty-nine battalions only werebrought back to Champagne (the 183rd Brigade, the 5th Division of the3rd Corps, and one-half of the 43rd Division of Reserve). In thuslimiting before the attack the reinforcements of its effectives theGerman General Staff showed that they did not suspect the vigour of theblow that was about to be delivered. 

The same thing happened with regard to the subordinate forces. Insidethe shelters in the second line officers were captured while lying down;they had an unwarranted confidence in the strength of their first line, and the interruption of telephone communications had prevented theirbeing informed of the rapid progress of our offensive. 

[Sidenote: Rapidity of French attack. ]

(2) This rapidity of our attack explains the disorganization of theadversary on the morning of September 25. At some points certainofficers and non-commissioned officers were able to continue theresistance until the investment, followed by capitulation. But elsewherethere were prompt surrenders. Men were also seen flying before ourattacking troops and being killed while making for their secondposition. 

[Sidenote: How the German reserves were utilized. ]

(3) In order to make up for the insufficiency of the local reserves theGerman military authorities had to put in line not only the importantunits which they held at their disposal behind the front (10th Corpsbrought back from Russia), but the local reserves from other sectors(Soissonnais, Argonne, Woevre, Alsace), which were despatched toChampagne one battalion after another, and even in groups of doublecompanies. 

Nothing better indicates the disorganization of the German command andthe significance of the check suffered than the conditions under whichthese reserves were engaged. 

The units were despatched to the fight completely disassociated. Amongthe regiments of the 5th Division (3rd Corps), one, the 81st, wasidentified near Massiges, while a battalion of the 12th was at Tahureand a battalion of the 32nd at the Trou Bricot. It was the same asregards the 56th Division, of which the 88th and 35th Regiments weredespatched to Massiges and the 91st to Souain, while a battalion of the79th took up a position to the west of the Butte de Tahure. 

[Sidenote: Haste increased German losses. ]

Ill provided with food and munitions, the reinforcements were throwninto the engagement on an unknown terrain without indication as to thedirection they had to take and without their junction with neighbouringunits having been arranged. Through the haste with which they threwtheir reserves under the fire of our artillery and of our infantry, already in possession of the positions, the German General Staffconsiderably increased the number of their losses. 

[Sidenote: Soldiers brought by motor-car. ]

A letter taken from a soldier of the 118th Regiment furnishes us withproof of this: "We were put in a motor-car and proceeded at a headlongpace to Tahure, by way of Vouziers. Two hours' rest in the open air, with rain falling and then we had a six hours' march to take up ourpositions. On our way we were greeted by the fire of the enemy shells, so that, for instance, out of 280 men of the second company, only 224arrived safe and sound inside the trenches. These trenches, freshly dug, were barely from 35 to 50 centimetres deep. Continually surrounded bymines and bursting shells, we had to remain in them and do the best wecould with them for 118 hours without getting anything hot to eat. 

"Hell itself could not be more terrible. To-day, at about twelve o'clocknoon, 600 men, fresh troops, joined the regiment. In five days we havelost as many and more. "

[Sidenote: Battalions from many regiments. ]

The disorder amid which the reinforcements were engaged appears clearlyfrom this fact, that on the only part of the front included betweenMaisons de Champagne and Hill 189 there were on October 2, 1915, thirty-two battalions belonging to twenty-one different regiments. 

(4) The violence of the shock sustained, and the necessity of replacingin the fighting line units which had almost entirely disappeared, hampered the German military authorities. On the first day they wereunable to respond effectively even with their artillery, the fire ofwhich along the whole front was badly directed and as a rule poorlysustained. The loss of numerous batteries obviously deprived them of aportion of their resources. 

[Sidenote: Enemy endeavors to stem advance. ]

[Sidenote: Isolated battalion on the heights of Massiges. ]

The following days the enemy seemed to have but one idea, to strengthentheir second line to stem our advance. The counter-attacks wereconcentrated on a comparatively unimportant part of the battlefront incertain places, the loss of which appeared to them to be particularlydangerous. Therefore on the heights of Massiges the German militaryauthorities threw in succession isolated battalions of the 123rd, 124th, and 120th regiments, of the 30th regular regiment and of the 2ndregiment of Ersatz Reserve (16th Corps), which were each in turndecimated, for these counter-attacks, hastily and crudely prepared, allresulted in sanguinary failures. Generally speaking, the offensivecapacity of the Germans appeared to be broken. The following order ofthe day of General von Ditfurth bears witness to this:

[Sidenote: General von Ditfurth's order. ]

"It seemed to me that the infantry at certain points was confining itsaction to a mere defensive. . . . I cannot protest too strongly againstsuch an idea, which necessarily results in destroying the spirit ofoffensive in our own troops and in arousing and strengthening in themind of the enemy a feeling of his superiority. 

"The enemy is left full liberty of action and our own action issubjected to the will of the enemy. "

[Sidenote: Prisoners exhausted. ]

(5) In an engagement in the open the number of prisoners is anindication of the spirit of the enemy. In Champagne the Germanssurrendered in constituted units (sections or companies), and even ingroups of several hundred men. They confessed that they were worn out. They had been, for the most part, without supplies for several days andhad suffered more particularly from thirst. They all showed that theyhad been greatly impressed by our uninterrupted artillery fire, thefeeble response of their own guns, and the extent of their losses. 

Here by way of specimen is what was set down by a reserve lieutenant ofthe 90th Regiment of infantry (10th Corps):

"Yesterday I had sixteen men killed by high explosive bombs. The trenchwas nearly filled up. Extreme activity of the French howitzers. Ourartillery fires shrapnel, but unfortunately does not get the range. 

"B . . . Was also killed. The second battalion, too, has had heavy losses. It is frightful. Those confounded high explosive shells!

[Sidenote: An officer wishes for rain. ]

"The weather is becoming fine again. If only it would rain again, or fogwould come. As it is, the aviators will arrive and we shall have morehigh explosive bombs and flank firing on the trenches. Abominable fineweather! Fog, fog, come to our assistance. "

[Sidenote: The enemy's lines. ]

It is difficult to estimate precisely the German losses. Certainindications however serve to indicate their extent. A _vizefeldwebel_declares that he is the only man remaining out of his company. A soldierof the third battalion of the 123rd Regiment engaged on the 26th, statesthat his regiment was withdrawn from the front after only two days'fighting because its losses were too great. The 118th Regiment relievedin the trenches the 158th Regiment after it had been reduced to fifteenor twenty men per company. Certain units disappeared completely, as forinstance the 27th Reserve Regiment and the 52nd Regular Regiment, which, by the evening of the 25th had left in our hands, the firstthirteen officers and 933 men, the second twenty-one officers and 927men. In order to arrive at the total of the losses certain figures mayserve as an indication. 

[Sidenote: German strength in Champagne. ]

[Sidenote: Ninety-three fresh battalions. ]

At the beginning of September, 1915 the Germans had on the Champagnefront seventy battalions. In anticipation of our attack they broughtthere, before September 25, 1915, twenty-nine battalions. This makesninety-nine battalions, representing, if account be taken of thecorresponding artillery and pioneer formations, 115, 000 men directlyengaged. The losses due to the artillery preparation and the firstattacks were such that from September 25 to October 15, 1915, the GermanGeneral Staff was compelled to renew its effectives almost in theirentirety by sending ninety-three fresh battalions. 

It may be assumed that the units engaged on September 25 and 26, 1915, suffered losses amounting to from 60 to 80 per cent. (even more forcertain corps, which have entirely disappeared). The new units broughtinto line for the counter-attacks, and subjected in connection withthese to an incessant bombardment, lost 50 per cent. Of theireffectives, if not more. We think we shall be understating the case ifwe set down 140, 000 men as the sum of the German losses in Champagne. Account must be taken of the fact that of this number the proportion ofslightly wounded men able to recuperate rapidly and return to the frontis, in the case of the Germans, very much below the average proportionin connection with other engagements by reason of the fact that theywere unable to gather up their wounded, and thus left in our handsnearly the whole of the troops entrusted with the defence of the firstposition. 

[Sidenote: Enthusiasm of the French. ]

All those who lived through the engagements of the battle of Champagneexperienced the sensation of victory. The aspect of the battlefield, thelong columns of prisoners, the look in the eyes of our soldiers, theiranimation and their enthusiasm, all this gave expression to theimportance of a success which the Generalissimo recognized in theseterms. 

[Sidenote: Thanks of the commander-in-chief. ]

 "Grand Headquarters, "OCTOBER 5, 1915. 

 "The Commander-in-Chief addresses to the troops under his orders the expression of his profound satisfaction at the results obtained up to the present day by the attacks. 

 "Twenty-five thousand prisoners, three hundred and fifty officers, a hundred and fifty guns, a quantity of material which it has not yet been possible to gauge, are the trophies of a victory the echo of which throughout Europe indicates its importance. 

 "The sacrifices willingly made have not been in vain. All have been able to take part in the common task. The present is a sure guarantee to us of the future. 

 "The Commander-in-Chief is proud to command the finest troops France has ever known. 

 "J. JOFFRE. "

 * * * * *

Of all the brutal atrocities perpetrated by the Germans in Belgium, nonearoused such world-wide horror and execration as the murder of EdithCavell, an English nurse, on the charge of aiding English and Belgiansoldiers who escaped from Belgium in order to rejoin their respectivearmies. 

THE TRAGEDY OF EDITH CAVELL

BRAND WHITLOCK

Copyright, Delineator, November, 1918. 

[Sidenote: The first letter of inquiry not answered. ]

[Sidenote: Reasons given for Miss Cavell's arrest. ]

One day in August it was learned at the Legation that an English nurse, named Edith Cavell, had been arrested by the Germans. I wrote a letterto the Baron von der Lancken to ask if it was true that Miss Cavell hadbeen arrested, and saying that if it were I should request that Maîtrede Leval, the legal counselor of the Legation, be permitted to see herand to prepare for her defense. There was no reply to this letter, andon September tenth I wrote a second letter, repeating the questions andthe requests made in the first. On the twelfth of September I had areply from the Baron stating that Miss Cavell had been arrested on thefifth of August, that she was confined in the prison of St. Gilles, thatshe had admitted having hidden English and French soldiers in her home, as well as Belgians, of an age to bear arms, all anxious to get to thefront, that she had admitted also having furnished these soldiers withmoney to get to France, and had provided guides to enable them to crossthe Dutch frontier; that the defense of Miss Cavell was in the hands ofMaître Thomas Braun, and that inasmuch as the German Government, onprinciple, would not permit accused persons to have any interviewswhatever, he could not obtain permission for Maître de Leval to visitMiss Cavell as long as she was in solitary confinement. 

[Sidenote: The German mentality. ]

[Sidenote: The principle that power makes right. ]

[Sidenote: The accused without rights. ]

For one of our Anglo-Saxon race and legal traditions to understandconditions in Belgium during the German occupation, it is necessary tobanish resolutely from the mind every conception of right we haveinherited from our ancestors--conceptions long since crystallized intoinimitable principles of law and confirmed in our charters of liberty. In the German mentality these conceptions do not exist; they think inother sequences; they act according to another principle, if it is aprinciple, the conviction that there is only one right, one privilege, and that it belongs exclusively to Germany, the right, namely, to dowhatever they have the physical force to do. These so-called courts, ofwhose arbitrary and irresponsible and brutal nature I have tried toconvey some notion, were mere inquisitorial bodies, guided by noprinciple save that of interest in their own bloody nature; they did asthey pleased, and would have scorned a Jeffreys as too lenient, a Lynchas too formal, a Spanish _auto da fé_ as too technical, and a tribunalof the French Revolution as soft and sentimental. Before them theaccused had literally no rights, not even to present a defense, and ifhe was permitted to speak in his own behalf, it was only as a generousand liberal favor. 

It was before such a court that Edith Cavell was to be arraigned. I hadasked Maître de Leval to provide for her defense, and on his advice, inasmuch as Maître Braun was already of counsel in the case, chosen bycertain friends of Miss Cavell, I invited him into consultation. 

[Sidenote: Personality of Edith Cavell. ]

[Sidenote: Miss Cavell's character and ability. ]

Edith Cavell was a frail and delicate little woman about forty years ofage. She had come to Brussels some years before the war to exercise hercalling as a trained nurse. She soon became known to the leadingphysicians of the capital and nursed in the homes of the leadingfamilies. But she was ambitious, and devoted to her profession, and erelong had entered a nursing-home in the Rue de la Clinique, where sheorganized for Doctor Depage a training-school for nurses. She was awoman of refinement and education; she knew French as she knew her ownlanguage; she was deeply religious, with a conscience almost puritan, and was very stern with herself in what she conceived to be her duty. Inher training-school she showed great executive ability, was firm inmatters of discipline, and brought it to a high state of efficiency. Andevery one who knew her in Brussels spoke of her with that unvarying termof respect which her noble character inspired. 

[Sidenote: Mr. Whitlock engages a defender. ]

Some time before the trial, Maître Thomas Braun announced to theLegation that for personal reasons he would be obliged to withdraw fromthe case, and asked that some one else appear for Miss Cavell. Weengaged Maître Sadi Kirschen. 

[Sidenote: The court martial in the Senate chamber. ]

It was the morning of Thursday, October seventh, that the case camebefore the court martial in the Senate chamber, where the militarytrials always took place, and Miss Cavell was arraigned with thePrincess de Croy, the Countess de Belleville, and thirty-two others. Theaccused were seated in a circle facing the court, in such a way thatthey could neither see nor communicate with their own counsel, who werecompelled to sit behind them. Nor could they see the witnesses, who werealso placed behind them. 

The charge brought against the accused was that of having conspired toviolate the German Military Penal Code, punishing with death those whoconduct troops to the enemy. 

[Sidenote: The trial secret. ]

[Sidenote: Miss Cavell's attitude. ]

[Sidenote: Admits aiding English soldiers. ]

We have no record of that trial; we do not know all that occurred therebehind the closed doors of that Senate chamber, where for fourscoreyears laws based on another and more enlightened principle of justicehad been discussed. Miss Cavell did not know, or knew only in thevaguest manner, the offense with which she was charged. She did not denyhaving received at her hospital English soldiers whom she nursed and towhom she gave money; she did not deny that she knew they were going totry to cross the border into Holland. She even took a patriotic pride inthe fact. She was very calm. She was interrogated in German, a languageshe did not understand, but the questions and responses were translatedinto French. Her mind was very alert, and she was entirelyself-possessed, and frequently rectified any inexact details andstatements that were put to her. When, in her interrogatory, she wasasked if she had not aided English soldiers left behind after the earlybattles of the preceding Autumn about Mons and Charleroi, she said yes;they were English and she was English, and she would help her own. Theanswer seemed to impress the court. They asked her if she had not helpedtwenty. 

"Yes, " she said "more than twenty; two hundred. "

"English?"

"No, not all English; French and Belgians, too. "

But the French and Belgians were not of her own nationality, said thejudge--and that made a serious difference. She was subjected to anagging interrogatory. One of the judges said that she had been foolishto aid the English because, he said, the English are ungrateful. 

"No, " replied Miss Cavell, "the English are not ungrateful. "

"How do you know they are not?" asked the inquisitor. 

[Sidenote: Miss Cavell makes a fatal admission. ]

"Because, " she answered, "some of them have written to me from Englandto thank me. "

It was a fatal admission on the part of the tortured little woman; underthe German military law her having helped soldiers to reach Holland, aneutral country, would have been a less serious offense, but to aid themto reach an enemy country, and especially England, was the last offensein the eyes of the German military court. 

[Sidenote: Rumor that death sentence is asked. ]

The trial was concluded on Saturday, and on Sunday one of the nurses inMiss Cavell's school came to tell me that there was a rumor about townthat the prosecuting officer had asked the court to pronounce a sentenceof death in the cases of the Princess de Croy, the Countess deBelleville, and of Miss Cavell, and of several others. I remember tohave said to Maître de Leval, when he came up to my room to report theastounding news:

"That's only the usual exaggeration of the prosecutor; they all ask forthe extreme penalty, everywhere, when they sum up their cases. "

[Sidenote: Leval's opinion of German courts. ]

"Yes, " said Maître de Leval, "and in German courts they always get it. "

Maître de Leval sent a note to Maître Kirschen, asking him to come onMonday, at eight-thirty o'clock, to the Legation or to send a wordregarding Miss Cavell. Maître Kirschen did not send Maître de Leval theword he had requested, and on that Sunday, de Leval saw another lawyerwho had been on the case and could tell him what had taken place at thetrial. The lawyer thought that the court martial would not condemn MissCavell to death. At any rate, no judgment had been pronounced, and thejudges themselves did not appear to be in agreement. 

[Sidenote: Leval asks to see Miss Cavell. ]

On Monday, the eleventh of October, at eight-thirty in the morning, Maître de Leval went to the _Politische Abteilung_ in the RueLambermont, and found Conrad. He spoke to him of the case of Miss Cavelland asked that, now that the trial had taken place, he and the ReverendMr. Gahan, the rector of the English church, be allowed to see MissCavell. Conrad said he would make inquiries and inform de Leval bytelephone, and by one of the messengers of the Legation who that morninghappened to deliver some papers to the _Politische Abteilung_, Conradsent word that neither the Reverend Mr. Gahan nor Maître de Leval couldsee Miss Cavell at that time, but that Maître de Leval could see her assoon as the judgment had been pronounced. 

[Sidenote: Waiting for judgment to be pronounced. ]

[Sidenote: Promise to inform the Legation. ]

At eleven-thirty o'clock on the Monday morning, Maître de Leval himselftelephoned to Conrad, who repeated this statement. The judgment had notyet been rendered, he said, and Maître de Leval asked him to let himknow as soon as the judgment had been pronounced, so that he might go tosee Miss Cavell. Conrad promised this, but added that even then theReverend Mr. Gahan could not see her, because there were GermanProtestant pastors at the prison, and that if Miss Cavell neededspiritual advice or consolation she could call on them. Conrad concludedthis conversation by saying that the judgment would be rendered on themorrow, that is, on Tuesday, or the day after, and that even when it hadbeen pronounced it would have to be signed by the Military Governor, andthat the Legation would be kept informed. 

At twelve-ten on the Monday, not having received any news from MaîtreKirschen, Maître de Leval went to his house, but did not find him there, and left his card. 

[Sidenote: Leval makes repeated inquiries. ]

At twelve-twenty o'clock, Maître de Leval went to the house of thelawyer to whom reference has already been made, and left word for him togo to his home. 

At four o'clock that afternoon the lawyer arrived at the Legation andsaid that he had been to see the Germans at eleven o'clock, and thatthere he had been told no judgment would be pronounced before thefollowing day. Before leaving the Legation to go home, Maître de Levaltold to Gibson all that had happened, and asked him to telephone againto Conrad before going home himself. Then at intervals all day long theinquiry had been repeated, and the same response was made. 

[Sidenote: The chancellerie was closed for the night. ]

Monday evening at six-twenty o'clock, Belgian time, Topping, one of theclerks of the Legation, with Gibson standing by, again called Conrad onthe telephone, again was told that the judgment had not been pronounced, and that the Political Department would not fail to inform the Legationthe moment the judgment was confirmed. And the _chancellerie_ was closedfor the night. 

[Sidenote: A nurse informs Leval of the death sentence. ]

At nine o'clock that Monday evening, Maître de Leval appeared suddenlyat the door of my chamber; his face was deadly pallid; he said that hehad just heard from the nurse who kept him informed, that the judgmenthad been confirmed and that the sentence of death had been pronounced onMiss Cavell at half-past four o'clock that afternoon, and that she wasto be shot at two o'clock the next morning. It seemed preposterous, especially the immediate execution of sentence; there had always beentime at least to prepare and present a plea for mercy. To condemn awoman in the evening and then to hurry her out to be shot before anotherdawn! Impossible! It could not be!

[Sidenote: Judgment read in the afternoon. ]

[Sidenote: Plea for mercy had been prepared. ]

But no; Maître de Leval was certain. That evening he had gone home andwas writing at his table when about eight o'clock two nurses wereintroduced. One was Miss Wilkinson, little and nervous, all in tears;the other, taller and more calm. Miss Wilkinson said that she had justlearned that the judgment of the court condemned Miss Cavell to death, that the judgment had been read to her in her cell at four-thirty thatafternoon, and that the Germans were going to shoot her that night attwo o'clock. Maître de Leval told her that it was difficult to believesuch news, since twice he had been told that the judgment had not beenrendered and that it would not be rendered before the following day, buton her reiteration that she had this news from a source that wasabsolutely certain, de Leval left at once with her and her friends andcame to the Legation. And there he stood, pale and shaken. Even then Icould not believe; it was too preposterous; surely a stay of executionwould be granted. Already in the afternoon, in some premonition, Maîtrede Leval had prepared a plea for mercy, to be submitted to theGovernor-General, and a letter of transmittal to present to the Baronvon der Lancken. I asked Maître de Leval to bring me these documents andI signed them, and then, at the last minute, on the letter addressed tovon der Lancken, I wrote these words:

[Sidenote: Mr. Whitlock's personal appeal. ]

 "MY DEAR BARON:

 "I am too sick to present my request to you in person, but I appeal to your generosity of heart to support it, and save this unfortunate woman from death. Have pity on her. "

[Sidenote: Search for the Spanish ambassador. ]

I told Maître de Leval to send Joseph at once to hunt up Gibson topresent my plea and, if possible, to find the Marquis de Villalobar andto ask him to support it with the Baron von der Lancken. Gibson wasdining somewhere; we did not know where Villalobar was. The _PolitischeAbteilung_, in the Ministry of Industry, where Baron von der Lanckenlived, was only half a dozen blocks away. The Governor-General was inhis château at Trois Fontaines, ten miles away, playing bridge thatevening. Maître de Leval went; and I waited. 

The nurses from Miss Cavell's school were waiting in a lower room; othernurses came for news; they, too, had heard, but could not believe. Thenthe Reverend Mr. H. Stirling T. Gahan, the British chaplain at Brusselsand pastor of the English church, came. He had a note from some one atthe St. Gilles prison, a note written in German, saying simply:

[Sidenote: English rector summoned. ]

"Come at once; some one is about to die. "

[Sidenote: A delay of execution expected. ]

He went away to the prison; his frail, delicate little wife remained atthe Legation, and there, with my wife and Miss Larner, sat with thosewomen all that long evening, trying to comfort them, to reassure them. Outside a cold rain was falling. Up in my chamber I waited; a stay ofexecution would be granted, of course; they always were; there was not, in our time, anywhere, a court, even a court martial, that would condemna woman to death at half-past four in the afternoon and hurry her outand shoot her before dawn--not even a German court martial. 

[Sidenote: Miss Cavell calm and courageous. ]

When Mr. Gahan arrived at the prison that night Miss Cavell was lying onthe narrow cot in her cell; she arose, drew on a dressing gown, foldedit about her thin form, and received him calmly. She had never expectedsuch an end to the trial, but she was brave and was not afraid to die. The judgment had been read to her that afternoon, there in her cell. Shehad written letters to her mother in England and to certain of herfriends, and entrusted them to the German authorities. 

She did not complain of her trial; she had avowed all, she said; and itis one of the saddest, bitterest ironies of the whole tragedy that sheseems not to have known that all she had avowed was not sufficient, evenunder German law, to justify the judgment passed upon her. The Germanchaplain had been kind, and she was willing for him to be with her atthe last, if Mr. Gahan could not be. Life had not been all happy forher, she said, and she was glad to die for her country. Life had beenhurried, and she was grateful for these weeks of rest in prison. 

"Patriotism is not enough, " she said, "I must have no hatred and nobitterness toward any one. "

[Sidenote: Notes made in Bible and prayer-book. ]

She received the sacrament, she had no hatred for any one, and she hadno regrets. In the touching report that Mr. Gahan made there is astatement, one of the last that Edith Cavell ever made, which, in itsexquisite pathos, illuminates the whole of that life of stern duty, ofhuman service and martyrdom. She said that she was grateful for the sixweeks of rest she had just before the end. During those weeks she hadread and reflected; her companions and her solace were her Bible, herprayer-book and the "Imitation of Christ. " The notes she made in thesebooks reveal her thoughts in that time, and will touch the uttermostdepths of any nature nourished in that beautiful faith which is at onceso tender and so austere. The prayer-book with those laconic entries onits fly-leaf, in which she set down the sad and eloquent chronology ofher fate, the copy of the "Imitation" which she had read and markedduring those weeks in prison--weeks, which, as she so pathetically said, had given her rest and quiet and time to think in a life that had been"so hurried"--and the passages noted in her firm hand have a deep andappealing pathos. 

Just before the end, too, as I have said, she wrote a number of letters. She forgot no one. Among the letters that she left one was addressed tothe nurses of her school; and there was a message for a girl who wastrying to break herself of the morphine habit--Miss Cavell had beentrying to help her, and she sent her word to be brave, and that if Godwould permit she would continue to try to help her. 

[Sidenote: The petitioners fail. ]

Midnight came, and Gibson, with a dark face, and de Leval, paler thanever. There was nothing to be done. 

[Sidenote: Errand of Marquis Villalobar, Gibson and de Leval. ]

De Leval had gone to Gibson, and together they went in search of theMarquis, whom they found at Baron Lambert's, where he had been dining;he and Baron Lambert and M. Francqui were over their coffee. The three, the Marquis, Gibson and de Leval, then went to the Rue Lambermont. Thelittle Ministry was closed and dark; no one was there. They rang, andrang again, and finally the _concierge_ appeared--no one was there, hesaid. They insisted. The _concierge_ at last found a German functionarywho came down, stood staring stupidly; every one was gone; _sonExcellence_ was at the theater. At what theater? He did not know. Theyurged him to go and find out. He disappeared inside, went up and downstairs two or three times, finally came out and said that he was at LeBois Sacré. They explained that the presence of the Baron was urgent andasked the man to go for him; they turned over the motor to him and hemounted on the box beside Eugene. They reached the little varietytheater there in the Rue d'Arenberg. The German functionary went in andfound the Baron, who said he could not come before the piece was over. 

[Sidenote: The sad wait for der Lancken. ]

All this while Villalobar, Gibson and de Leval were in the salon at theMinistry, the room of which I have spoken so often as the yellow salon, because of the satin upholstery of its Louis XVI. Furniture of whitelacquer--that bright, almost laughing little salon, all done in thegayest, lightest tones, where so many little dramas were played. Allthree of them were deeply moved and very anxious--the eternal contrast, as de Leval said, between things and sentiments. Lancken entered atlast, very much surprised to find them; he was accompanied by CountHarrach and by the young Baron von Falkenhausen. 

"What is it, gentlemen?" he said. "Has something serious happened?"

They told him why they were there, and Lancken, raising his hands, said:

"_Impossible!_"

[Sidenote: Der Lancken believes the rumor false. ]

He had vaguely heard that afternoon of a condemnation for spying, but hedid not know that it had anything to do with the case of Miss Cavell, and in any event it was impossible that they would put a woman to deaththat night. 

"Who has given you this information? Because, to come and disturb me atsuch an hour you must have actual information, " he said. 

De Leval replied: "Without doubt I consider it so, but I must refuse totell you from whom I received the information. Besides, what differencedoes it make? If the information is true, our presence at this hour isjustified; if it is not true, I am ready to take the consequences of mymistake. "

The Baron grew irritated. 

"What, " he said, "is it on the hint of mere rumor that you come anddisturb me at such an hour, me and these gentlemen? No, no, gentlemen, this news can not be true. Orders are never executed with suchprecipitation, especially when a woman is concerned. Come and see meto-morrow. Besides, how do you think that at this hour I can obtain anyinformation? The Governor-General must certainly be sleeping. "

Gibson, or one of them, suggested to him that a very simple way offinding out would be to telephone to the prison. 

"Quite right, " said he. "I had not thought of that. "

He went out, was gone a few minutes and came back embarrassed, so theysaid, even a little bit ashamed, for he said:

[Sidenote: The sad news confirmed. ]

"You are right, gentlemen; I have heard by telephone that Miss Cavellhas been condemned and that she will be shot to-night. "

Then de Leval drew out the letter that I had written to the Baron andgave it to him, and he read it in an undertone--with a little sardonicsmile, de Leval said--and when he had finished he handed it back to deLeval and said:

[Sidenote: The plea for mercy. ]

"But it is necessary to have a plea for mercy at the same time. "

"Here it is, " said de Leval, and gave him the document. Then they allsat down. 

[Sidenote: Von der Lancken's attitude. ]

[Sidenote: Miss Cavell not a spy. ]

I could see the scene as it was described to me by Villalobar, byGibson, by de Leval, in that pretty little Louis XVI. Salon that I knewso well--Lancken giving way to an outburst of feeling against "thatspy, " as he called Miss Cavell, and Gibson and de Leval by turnspleading with him, the Marquis sitting by. It was not a question ofspying as they pointed out; it was a question of the life of a woman, alife that had been devoted to charity, to helping others. She had nursedwounded soldiers, she had even nursed German wounded at the beginning ofthe war, and now she was accused of but one thing: having helped Englishsoldiers make their way toward Holland. She may have been imprudent, shemay have acted against the laws of the occupying power, but she was nota spy, she was not even accused of being a spy, she had not beenconvicted of spying, and she did not merit the death of a spy. They satthere pleading, Gibson and de Leval, bringing forth all the argumentsthat would occur to men of sense and sensibility. Gibson calledLancken's attention to their failure to inform the Legation of thesentence, of their failure to keep the word that Conrad had given. Heargued that the offense charged against Miss Cavell had long since beenaccomplished, that as she had been for some weeks in prison a slightdelay in carrying out the sentence could not endanger the German cause;he even pointed out the effect such a deed as the summary execution ofthe death sentence against a woman would have upon public opinion, notonly in Belgium, but in America, and elsewhere; he even spoke of thepossibility of reprisals. 

[Sidenote: The military authority supreme. ]

But it was all in vain. Baron von der Lancken explained to them that theMilitary Governor, that is, General von Saubersweig, was the supremeauthority in matters of this sort, that an appeal from his decision layonly to the Emperor, that the Governor-General himself had no authorityto intervene in such cases, and that under the provisions of Germanmartial law it lay within the discretion of the Military Governorwhether he would accept or refuse an appeal for clemency. And thenVillalobar suddenly cried out:

"Oh, come now! It's a woman; you can't shoot a woman like that!"

The Baron paused, was evidently moved. 

"Gentlemen, " he said, "it is past eleven o'clock; what can be done?"

[Sidenote: Lancken goes to von Saubersweig. ]

It was only von Saubersweig who could act, he had said, and they urgedthe Baron to go to see von Saubersweig. Finally he consented. While hewas gone Villalobar, Gibson and de Leval repeated to Harrach and vonFalkenhausen all the arguments that might move them. Von Falkenhausenwas young, he had been to Cambridge in England, and he was touched, though of course he was powerless. And de Leval says that when he gavesigns of showing pity, Harrach cast a glance at him, so that he saidnothing more, and then Harrach said:

"The life of one German soldier seems to us much more important thanthat of all these old English nurses. "

[Sidenote: Lancken's return. ]

At last Lancken returned and, standing there, announced:

"I am exceedingly sorry, but the Governor tells me that only after duereflection was the execution decided upon, and that he will not changehis decision. Under his prerogative he even refuses to receive the pleafor mercy. Therefore, no one, not even the Emperor, can do anything foryou. "

[Sidenote: The plea for mercy handed back. ]

With this he handed my letter and the _requête en grace_ back to Gibson. There was a moment of silence in the yellow salon. Then Villalobarsprang up and seizing Lancken by the shoulder said to him in anenergetic tone:

"Baron, I wish to speak to you. "

"It is useless, " began Lancken. 

[Sidenote: The Marquis Villalobar pleads. ]

But the old Spanish pride had been mounting in the Marquis, and heliterally dragged the tall von der Lancken into a little room near by, and then voices were heard in sharp discussion, and even through thepartition the voice of Villalobar:

"It is idiotic, this thing you are going to do; you will have anotherLouvain. "

A few moments later they came back, Villalobar in silent rage, Lanckenvery red. And, as de Leval said, without another word, dumb, inconsternation, filled with an immense despair, they came away. 

[Sidenote: The messengers withdraw. ]

I heard the report, and they withdrew. A little while and I heard thestreet door open. The women who had waited all that night went out intothe rain. 

The rain had ceased and the air was soft and warm the next morning; thesunlight shone through an autumn haze. But over the city the horror ofthe dreadful deed hung like a pall. 

[Sidenote: Other prisoners condemned. ]

Twenty-six others were condemned with Miss Cavell, four of whom weresentenced to death: Philippe Baucq, an architect of Brussels; LouiseThuiliez, a school-teacher at Lille; Louis Severin, a pharmacist ofBrussels; and the Countess Jeanne de Belleville of Montignies-sur-Roc. 

[Sidenote: Severe sentences. ]

Harman Capian, a civil engineer of Wasmes; Mrs. Ada Bodart of Brussels;Albert Libiez, a lawyer of Wasmes; and Georges Derveau, a pharmacist ofPâturages, were sentenced each to fifteen years' penal servitude at hardlabor. 

The Princess Maria de Croy was sentenced to ten years' penal servitudeat hard labor. 

Seventeen others were sentenced to hard labor or to terms ofimprisonment of from two to five years. The eight remaining wereacquitted. 

[Sidenote: The people horrified at Miss Cavell's execution. ]

All day long sad and solemn groups stood under the trees in theboulevards amid the falling leaves discussing the crime in horrifiedtones. The horror of it pervaded the house. I found my wife weeping atevening; no need to ask what was the matter; the wife of the chaplainhad been there, with some detail of Miss Cavell's last hours: how shehad arisen wearily from her cot at the coming of the clergyman, drawingher dressing-gown about her thin throat. 

[Sidenote: The body not given to friends. ]

I sent a note to Baron von der Lancken asking that the Governor-Generalpermit the body of Miss Cavell to be buried by the American Legation andthe friends of the dead girl. In reply he came himself to see me in theafternoon. He was very solemn, and said that he wished to express hisregret in the circumstances, but that he had done all he could. Thebody, he said, had already been interred, with respect and withreligious rites, in a quiet place, and under the law it could not beexhumed without an order from the Imperial Government. TheGovernor-General himself had gone to Berlin. 

[Sidenote: Whitlock and Villalobar. ]

And then came Villalobar, and I thanked him for what he had done. Hetold me much, and described the scene the night before in that anteroomwith Lancken. The Marquis was much concerned about the Countess Jeannede Belleville and Madame Thuiliez, both French, and hence protégées ofhis, condemned to die within eight days; but I told him not to beconcerned; that the effect of Miss Cavell's martyrdom did not end withher death; it would procure other liberations, this among them; thethirst for blood had been slaked and there would be no more executionsin that group; it was the way of the law of blood vengeance. We talked along time about the tragedy and about the even larger tragedy of thewar. 

"We are getting old, " he said. "Life is going; and after the war, if welive in that new world, we shall be of the old--the new generation willpush us aside. "

[Sidenote: Miss Cavell's death wins mercy for others. ]

Gibson and de Leval prepared reports of the whole matter, and I sentthem by the next courier to our Embassy at London. But somehow that veryday the news got into Holland and shocked the world. Richards, of theC. R. B. , just back from The Hague, said that they had already heard ofit there and were filled with horror. And even the Germans, who seemedalways to do a deed and to consider its effect afterward, knew that theyhad another Louvain, another _Lusitania_, for which to answer before thebar of civilization. The lives of the three others remaining, of thefive condemned to death, were ultimately spared, as I had toldVillalobar they would be. The King of Spain and the President of theUnited States made representations at Berlin in behalf of the Countessde Belleville and Madame Thuiliez, and their sentences were commuted toimprisonment, as was that of Louis Severin, the Brussels druggist. Thestorm of universal loathing and reprobation for the deed was too mucheven for the Germans. 

 * * * * *

In an earlier chapter we have read of the beginning of the attempt tocross the Dardanelles and to capture the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Aftergreat losses and terrible suffering had been endured in these attempts, it was decided in December, 1915, by the British war authorities thatfurther sacrifices were not justified. Preparations were accordinglymade to abandon the enterprise. How these plans were carried out is toldin the chapter following. 

GALLIPOLI ABANDONED

GENERAL SIR CHARLES C. MONRO

On October 20, 1915, in London, I received instructions to proceed assoon as possible to the Near East and take over the command of theMediterranean Expeditionary Force. 

[Sidenote: General Monro's orders on arrival. ]

My duty on arrival was in broad outline:

(a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula. 

(b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds thePeninsula should be evacuated or another attempt made to carry it. 

(c) The number of troops that would be required--

(1) To carry the Peninsula. 

(2) To keep the strait open, and

(3) To take Constantinople. 

[Sidenote: Military defects in positions occupied. ]

The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situationunique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements inpersonnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artilleryfire. Our intrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. Theforce, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure anddependent on the weather. 

No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troopsdestined for the offensive--while the Turks enjoyed full powers ofobservation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given thetime to supplement the natural advantages which the position presentedby all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer. 

[Sidenote: Disease, loss of competent officers, make-shiftorganization. ]

Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on thePeninsula had suffered much from various causes--exposure to shell fire, disease, the dearth of competent officers owing to earlier losses, and"make-shifts" due to the attachment of Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades tothe Territorial Divisions. Other arguments, irrefutable in theirconclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wisecourse to pursue. 

[Sidenote: Consequences of unusual storms. ]

On November 21, 1915 the Peninsula was visited by a storm said to benearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The storm was accompaniedby torrential rain, which lasted for twenty-four hours. This wasfollowed by hard frost and a heavy blizzard. In the areas of the EighthCorps and the Anzac Corps the effects were not felt to a very markeddegree owing to the protection offered by the surrounding hills. TheNinth Corps was less favorably situated, the water courses in this areabecame converted into surging rivers, which carried all before them. Thewater rose in many places to the height of the parapets and all means ofcommunications were prevented. 

The men, drenched as they were by the rain, suffered from the subsequentblizzard most severely. Large numbers collapsed from exposure andexhaustion, and in spite of untiring efforts that were made to mitigatethe suffering I regret to announce that there were 200 deaths fromexposure and over 10, 000 sick evacuated during the first few days ofDecember. 

From reports given by deserters it is probable that the Turks sufferedeven to a greater degree. 

[Sidenote: Difficulties pertaining to withdrawal. ]

The problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an armyof a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yardsfrom the enemy's trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, everypart of which was within effective range of Turkish guns, and from whichin winds from the south or southwest, the withdrawal of troops was notpossible. 

I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitelymore probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal lifewhich we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did notfully fulfill its purpose would have been worse than useless, and therewas the obvious danger that the suspicions of the Turks would be arousedby our adoption of a course the real purport of which could not havebeen long disguised. 

[Sidenote: Unsettled weather a menace. ]

Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weatherwhich might be expected in the Ægean. The success of our operations wasentirely dependent on weather conditions. Even a mild wind from thesouth or southwest was found to raise such a ground swell as to greatlyimpede communication with the beaches, while anything in the nature of agale from this direction could not fail to break up the piers, wreck thesmall craft, and thus definitely prevent any steps being taken towardwithdrawal. 

[Sidenote: Evacuation of supplies continues satisfactorily. ]

Throughout the period December 10 to 18, 1915 the withdrawal proceededunder the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of December 18, 1915, found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbersdetermined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores, and supplieshad continued most satisfactorily. 

It was imperative, of course, that the front-line trenches should beheld, however lightly, until the very last moment and that thewithdrawal from these trenches should be simultaneous throughout theline. 

The good fortune which had attended the evacuation continued during thenight of the 19th-20th. The night was perfectly calm with a slight hazeover the moon, an additional stroke of good luck, as there was a fullmoon on that night. 

[Sidenote: Final withdrawals from Anzac and Suvla. ]

Soon after dark the covering ships were all in position, and the finalwithdrawal began. At 1:30 A. M. The withdrawal of the rear partiescommenced from the front trenches at Suvla and the left of Anzac. Thoseon the right of Anzac who were nearer the beach remained in positionuntil 2 A. M. By 5:30 A. M. The last man had quit the trenches. 

At Anzac, four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4. 7 naval gun, one anti-air craft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns were left, but theywere destroyed before the troops finally embarked. In addition, fifty-six mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of theirwheels, and some supplies which were set on fire, were also abandoned. 

[Sidenote: A few supplies destroyed. ]

At Suvla every gun, vehicle and animal was embarked, and all thatremained was a small stock of supplies, which were burned. 

On December 28, 1915, your Lordship's telegram ordering the evacuationof Helles was received, whereupon, in view of the possibility of badweather intervening, I instructed the General Officer CommandingDardanelles Army to complete the operation as rapidly as possible. Hewas reminded that every effort conditional on not exposing the personnelto undue risk should be made to save all 60-pounder and 18-pounderguns, 6-inch and 4. 5 howitzers, with their ammunition and otheraccessories, such as mules, and A. T. Carts, limbered wagons, &c. 

[Sidenote: Situation on Gallipoli Peninsula. ]

[Sidenote: Increase in Turkish artillery. ]

At a meeting which was attended by the Vice Admiral and the GeneralOfficer Commanding Dardanelles Army I explained the course which Ithought we should adopt to again deceive the Turks as to our intentions. The situation on the Peninsula had not materially changed owing to ourwithdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a markedincreased activity in aerial reconnoissance over our positions, and theislands of Mudros and Imbros, and that hostile patrolling of ourtrenches was more frequent and daring. The most apparent factor was thatthe number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had beenconsiderably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally suppliedwith German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches werecontinuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore. I gave it as myopinion that in my judgment I did not regard a feint as an operationoffering any prospect of success; and it was decided the navy should dotheir utmost to pursue a course of retaliation against the Turkishbatteries, but to refrain from any unusually aggressive attitude shouldthe Turkish guns remain quiescent. 

[Sidenote: General Birdwood's comprehensive plans. ]

General Sir W. Birdwood had, in anticipation of being ordered toevacuate Helles, made such complete and far-seeing arrangements that hewas able to proceed without delay to the issue of the comprehensiveorders which the consummation of such a delicate operation in warrequires. 

[Sidenote: French infantry embarked. ]

The evacuation, following the same system as was practiced at Suvla andAnzac, proceeded without delay. The French infantry remaining on thePeninsula were relieved on the night of January 1-2, 1916, and wereembarked by the French navy on the following nights. Progress, however, was slower than had been hoped, owing to delays caused by accident andthe weather. One of our largest horse ships was sunk by a Frenchbattleship, whereby the withdrawal was considerably retarded, and at thesame time strong winds sprang up which interfered materially with workon the beaches. The character of the weather now setting in offered solittle hope of a calm period of any duration that General Sir W. Birdwood arranged with Admiral Sir J. De Robeck for the assistance ofsome destroyers in order to accelerate the progress of re-embarkation. 

[Sidenote: Turks shell trenches and beaches. ]

Meanwhile the Eighth Corps had maintained the offensive spirit inbombing and minor operations with which they had established the moralsuperiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On December 29, 1915 theFifty-second Division completed the excellent work which they had beencarrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of theTurkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face ofrepeated counter-attacks. The shelling of our trenches and beaches, however, increased in frequency and intensity, and the average dailycasualties continued to increase. 

On January 7, 1916, the enemy developed heavy artillery fire on thetrenches held by the Thirteenth Division, while the Asiatic guns shelledthose occupied by the Royal Naval Division. The bombardment, which wasreported to be the heaviest experienced since we landed in April, lastedfrom noon until 5 P. M. , and was intensive between 3 and 3:30 P. M. 

January 8, 1916 was a bright, calm day, with a light breeze from thesouth. There was every indication of the continuance of favorableconditions, and, in the opinion of the meteorological officer, noimportant change was to be expected for at least twenty-four hours. TheTurkish artillery was unusually inactive. All preparations for theexecution of the final stage were complete. 

[Sidenote: Unfavorable weather. ]

[Sidenote: Hostile submarine near by. ]

About 7 P. M. The breeze freshened considerably from the southwest, themost unfavorable quarter, but the first trip, timed for 8 P. M. , wasdispatched without difficulty. The wind, however, continued to riseuntil, by 11 P. M. , the connecting pier between the hulks and the shoreat "W" Beach was washed away by heavy seas, and further embarkation intodestroyers from these hulks became impracticable. In spite of thesedifficulties the second trips, which commenced at 11:30 P. M. , werecarried out well up to time, and the embarkation of guns continueduninterruptedly. Early in the evening reports had been received from theright flank that a hostile submarine was believed to be moving down thestrait, and about midnight H. M. S. _Prince George_, which had embarked2, 000 men, and was sailing for Mudros, reported she was struck by atorpedo which failed to explode. The indications of the presence of asubmarine added considerably to the anxiety for the safety of the troopcarriers, and made it necessary for the Vice Admiral to modify thearrangements made for the subsequent bombardment of the evacuatedpositions. 

[Sidenote: Gully Beach embarkation completed. ]

At 1:50 A. M. , Gully Beach reported that the embarkation at that beachwas complete, and that the lighters were about to push off, but at 2:10A. M. A telephone message was received that one of the lighters wasaground and could not be refloated. The N. T. O. At once took allpossible steps to have another lighter sent in to Gully Beach, and thiswas, as a matter of fact, done within an hour, but in the meantime, at2:30 A. M. It was decided to move the 160 men who had been relandedfrom the grounded lighter to "W" Beach and embark them there. 

[Sidenote: Conflagrations show Turks the allies have withdrawn. ]

At 3:30 A. M. The evacuation was complete, and abandoned heaps of storesand supplies were successfully set on fire by time fuses after the lastman had embarked. Two magazines of ammunition and explosives were alsosuccessfully blown up at 4 A. M. These conflagrations were apparentlythe first intimation received by the Turks that we had withdrawn. Redlights were immediately discharged from the enemy's trenches, and heavyartillery fire opened on our trenches and beaches. This shelling wasmaintained until about 6:30 A. M. 

[Sidenote: Good luck and skilled organization forthcoming. ]

Apart from four unserviceable fifteen-pounders which had been destroyedearlier in the month, ten worn-out fifteen-pounders, one six-inch MarkVII gun, and six old heavy French guns, all of which were previouslyblown up, were left on the Peninsula. In addition to the above, 508animals, most of which were destroyed, and a number of vehicles andconsiderable quantities of stores, material, and supplies, all of whichwere destroyed by burning, had to be abandoned. 

[Sidenote: Competent officers in charge. ]

The entire evacuation of the Peninsula had now been completed. Itdemanded for its successful realization two important militaryessentials, viz. , good luck and skilled disciplined organization, andthey were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Ourluck was in the ascendant by the marvelous spell of calm weather whichprevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage theseaccidents of fortune. 

Lieutenant General Sir W. Birdwood and his corps commanders elaboratedand prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence, and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we hada further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice AdmiralSir J. De Robeck, K. C. B. , Vice Admiral Wemyss, and a body of navalofficers whose work remained throughout this anxious period at thatstandard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the powerof criticism or cavil. 

 * * * * *

The form of "frightfulness" in which the Germans placed the greatestfaith was the terrorizing of the inhabitants of unprotected enemy citiesby bombs from Zeppelins and aeroplanes. While the objects for whichthese atrocities were perpetrated were not attained, hundreds ofinnocent men, women, and children were murdered. The following narrativedescribes one of these German air raids. 

THE DEATH-SHIP IN THE SKY

PERRITON MAXWELL

Copyright Forum, August, 1916. 

[Sidenote: The switchman at Walthamstow. ]

For twenty-six years old Tom Cumbers had held his job as switchman atthe Walthamstow railroad junction where the London-bound trains come upfrom Southend to the great city. It was an important post and old Tomfilled it with stolid British efficiency. A kindly man who felt himselfan integral part of the giant railroad system that employed him, old Tomhad few interests beyond his work, his white-haired wife, his reekingpipe and the little four-room tenement in Walthamstow which he calledhome. The latter was one of the thousands of two-storied rabbit-hatchesof sooty, yellow brick, all alike and all incredibly ugly, whichstretch, mile upon mile, from Walthamstow toward London's tumultuousheart. 

[Sidenote: The workshops near Epping Forest. ]

[Sidenote: An appalling tragedy of the war. ]

Within a radius of four dun miles, just on the nearer edge of EppingForest--the scene in a forgotten day of Robin Hood's adventurings--asection of these huddling homes of the submerged, together with a streetof trams and some pathetic shops, constitute this town of Walthamstow. It is a sordid, unlovely place, but for some ten thousandwage-strugglers it is all of England. There are workshops hereabout inwhich one may mingle one's copious sweat with the grime of machinery andhave fourteen shillings a week into the bargain--if one is properlyskilled and muscular and bovinely plodding. Walthamstow is not the placewhere one would deliberately choose to live if bread could be earnedelsewhere with equal certainty. But for all its dirt and dullness it hasa spot on the map and a meaning in the dull souls of its inhabitants, and here, within half an hour's train travel of the Lord Mayor's Mansionand the golden vaults of the Bank of England, transpired on thesweltering night of which I write, one of the most witless and appallingtragedies of the present war. Forever memorable in the hithertocolorless calendar of Walthamstow will be this tragedy in the secondyear of Armageddon. 

[Sidenote: An ordinary hot night. ]

[Sidenote: News of the war. ]

Beyond the stenchful heat-stress of it, there was nothing up tohalf-past eleven to mark this night as different from its fellows of thepast. From eight o'clock till ten the small activities of the towncentered chiefly about its tramway terminus, its smudgy station, itsthree or four moving-picture theatres, and its fetid pubs. On thepavements, in the roadways and at every crossing, corduroyed men yawnedand spat, and slatternly women, most of them with whimpering infants intheir arms, talked of shop or household cares and the frailties of theirneighbors. Some, more alive to the big events of a clashing world, repeated the meagre news of the ha'penny press and dwelt with pridefulfervor on the latest bit of heroism reported from the front. Now andagain an outburst of raucous humor echoed above the babble of cockneytongues. The maudlin clamor of "a pore lone lidy 'oos 'subing 'addesarted 'er" failed to arouse anyone's curiosity. Ladies in their cupsare not a rarity in Walthamstow. In side streets, lads in khaki, many ofthem fresh from fields of slaughter "somewhere in Flanders, " sportedboisterously with their factory-girl sweethearts or spooned in theshadows. Everywhere grubby children in scant clothing shrilled andscampered and got in the way. Humidity enveloped the town like a soddencloak and its humanity stewed in moist and smelly discomfort. 

[Sidenote: Street lamps out. ]

But shortly after eleven o'clock the whole place became suddenly andmajestically still and black. People who go to their work at sunrisecannot afford the extravagance of midnight revelry, and there are fewstreet-lamps alight after ten o'clock in any London suburb in thesetimes of martial law. Walthamstow slept in heated but profound oblivionof its mean existence. Beyond the town lay, like a prostrate giantcamel, the heat-blurred silhouette of the classic forest. Low overWalthamstow hung the festoons of flat, humid clouds, menacing storm, butmotionless. 

[Sidenote: The rhythm of the Zeppelin. ]

[Sidenote: The train to serve as pilot to London. ]

[Sidenote: The Zeppelin forced to travel low. ]

If there was no disturbance in the clouds themselves there was amongthem something very active, something that drilled its way through themwith a muffled whirring, something that was oblong and lean and light oftexture, that was ominous and menacing for all its buoyancy. The soundit made was too high up, too thickly shrouded by clouds, to determineits precise position. It gave forth a breathing of persistent, definiterhythm. This was plainly not the wing-stroke of a nocturnal bird; for nobird, big or little, could advertise its flight in such perfectpulsation. And yet it was a bird, a Gargantuan, man-made bird withmurder in its talons and hatred in its heart. From its steel nest inGermanized Belgium this whirring monster had soared eight thousand feetand crossed the Channel with little fear of discovery. It had penetratedthe English Coast somewhere down Sheerness way and over Southend andthen, dropping lower, had sought and found through the haze the tinytrain whose locomotive had just fluted its brief salutation toWalthamstow. To the close-cropped men on the Zeppelin, the string ofcars far down under their feet, with its side-flare from lightedwindows, its engine's headlamp and its sparks, had proved a providentialpilotage. They knew that this train was on the main line, and that itwould lead them straight to the great Liverpool Street Station, and thatwas London, and it was London wharfs and ammunition works along theThames that they had planned to obliterate with their cylinders ofmechanical doom. But the moist clouds which aided so materially inhiding the Zeppelin's presence from below also worked for its defeat, inso far as its ultimate objective was concerned, for to keep the guidingtrain in view it was compelled to travel lower and yet lower--so low, indeed, as to make it a target for Kitchener's sentinels. 

[Sidenote: The switchman signals "danger. "]

[Sidenote: The train stops at Walthamstow. ]

Somehow, by sight or intuition or the instant commingling of the two, old Tom Cumbers became aware of the danger above him; for he sprang tohis switch, shut off all the cheery blue and white lights along "theline" and swung on with a mighty jerk the ruby signal of danger. Theengineer in the on-rushing train jammed down his brakes and brought uphis locomotive with a complaining, grinding moan, a hundred yards beyondWalthamstow station. Tom Cumbers had done a greater thing than any otherin all his existence. 

[Sidenote: The German revenge. ]

That by his act the Germans in their speeding sky-craft were baffledthere is no doubt. They had lost their trail of fire; their involuntaryguide had disappeared in the gloom. The airmen's long journey hadsuddenly become fruitless; their peril from hidden British guns andflying scouts was increased tenfold. The heat of the night was asnothing to the hot surge of disappointment that must have swept thebrains of the Zeppelin crew. Their commander, too, must have lost hisjudgment utterly, forgotten his sense of military effectiveness. Whatever happened, he sacrificed his soul when he turned his cloud-shipaside from the railway line, steered over the shabby roofs ofWalthamstow and, at less than two thousand feet, unloosed his iron dogsof destruction. 

[Sidenote: Bombing tenements of a defenseless town. ]

I have it on the authority of experienced aviators that it is notimpossible on a dark night to distinguish buildings of importance likeSt. Paul's or the Houses of Parliament or a great gun factory or a riveras broad as the Thames with its uprearing and frequent bridges. Thecrowding tenements of Walthamstow could have had no semblance to any ofthese, at any height. It would seem a cheap and worthless revenge, then, to wreck an unimportant and defenceless town, having failed to wreck themilitary nerve-center of the world's metropolis. But this is what one ofCount Zeppelin's soaring dreadnoughts did in this night, in thisblood-drenched year. 

[Sidenote: When a bomb explodes. ]

Like the mirage of a tropical island the dirigible hung motionless inspace for a breathless minute. There was a wavering pin-prick of lightin the carriage suspended from the leviathan's belly--a light thatfluttered fore and aft as of a man with a fairy lantern running to andfro giving orders or taking them. Then faintly discernible against thesky, like a rope hung down for anchorage, came a thin, gray streak--thetail of a bomb with all hell in its wake. From somewhere near the town'scentre the earth split and roared apart. The world reeled and abrain-shattering crash compounded of all the elements of pain and hurledfrom the shoulders of a thousand thunderclaps smote the senses. It was ablast of sickening and malignant fury. It did not so much stun as itstopped one--stopped the breath and the heart's beat, suspendingthought, halting life itself for a fraction of time. One was, somehow, aware of existence but without sensation. And then came reaction andthe realization of what was really taking place. The German's bomblanded fully ten blocks away, but you would have taken oath in courtthat it had fallen at your feet, behind you, above you and into yourvery brain. 

[Sidenote: Terror of the people. ]

[Sidenote: A broken gas main. ]

An air raid on Walthamstow, which drab town can boast neither ammunitionworks nor the ownership of war material of any description, could not beat once realized. But here was the cyclonic fact, hideously real, appallingly actual; and there in the heavens was the buoyant Zeppelinmaneuvering for further mischief. The reverberation of the firstexplosion was still grumbling back in Epping Forest when allWalthamstow, rubbing its eyes, tumbled out into the black streets. Men, women, children, all ludicrously clotheless, swarmed aimlessly like beesin an overturned hive. Stark terror gripped them. It distorted theirfaces and set their legs quivering. The dullest among these toil-dulledpeople knew what that explosion meant, knew that it was part of thepunishment promised by the German foe. "Gott strafe England" had come topass. But they could not understand why the enemy had singled them outfor such drastic distinction. The more alert and cool-headed of the menbattled with their fellows and shouted instructions to get the womenfolks and the kiddies back indoors and down into their cellars. Thenight-gowned and pajamaed throng could not be persuaded that safety laynot in sight of the Zeppelin but away from it. The hypnotism of horrorlured them on to where twelve houses lay spread about in smoking chaos, a plateau of blazing and noisome havoc. Somewhere a gas-main burst witha roar and drove the crowd back with its choking fumes as no human handscould have done. Women frankly hysterical or swooning were roughlythrust aside. Children shrieking in uncomprehending panic were sweptalong with the crowd or trodden upon. Lumbering men ran and shouted andcursed and shook hairy fists at the long blot on the clouds. Some of themen leaped over iron palings like startled rabbits and flung themselvesin the grass, face downward and quaking. And yet, I dare say that mostof these would have walked straight into a familiar danger without thewaver of an eyelash; it was the unknown peril, the doubt as to how andwhence this hurtling death might spring upon them out of the night, thatunhinged their manhood. And while Walthamstow's walls went down andgreat flame-tongues spouted where homes had stood, while the thick, hotair was tortured with agonized and inhuman cries, the enemy up above letloose another bolt. 

[Sidenote: The second bomb as the town blazes. ]

[Sidenote: Effects of the explosion. ]

More terrible than the first explosion was, or seemed, this second one. It mowed down half a hundred shrieking souls. And it was curious to notethe lateral action of the blast when it hit a resisting surface. Dynamite explodes with a downward or upward force, lyddite andnitro-glycerine and what not other devil's own powers act more or lessin the same set manner. But the furious ingredients of these bombshurled on Walthamstow contained stuff that released a discharge whichswept all things from it horizontally, in a quarter-mile, lightningsweep, like a scythe of flame. A solid block of shabby villas was laidout as flat as your palm by the explosion of this second bomb. Scarcelya brick was left standing upright. What houses escaped demolition aroundthe edge of the convulsion had their doors and windows splintered intorubbish. The concussion of this chemical frenzy was felt, like anearthquake, in a ten-mile circle. Wherever the scorching breath of thebombs breathed on stone or metal it left a sulphurous, yellow-whiteveneer, acrid in odor and smooth to the touch. Whole street-lengths oftwisted iron railings were coated with this murderous white-wash. 

[Sidenote: More bombs as the Zeppelin rises. ]

[Sidenote: Freaks of the explosion. ]

Having made sure of its mark, the ravaging Zeppelin rose higher on thedischarge of its first bomb and still higher after firing the second. Atthe safe distance of four thousand feet it dropped three more shellsrecklessly, haphazard. One of these bored cleanly through a slate-tiledroof, through furniture and two floorings and burrowed ten feet into theground without exploding. This intact shell has since been carefullyanalyzed by the experts of the Board of Explosions at the British WarOffice. Another bomb detonated on the steel rails of the Walthamstowtram-line and sent them curling skyward from their rivetted foundationslike serpentine wisps of paper. Great cobblestones were heaved throughshop windows and partitions and out into the flower-beds of reargardens; some of the cobbles were flung through solid attic blinds andothers were catapulted through brick walls a foot in thickness. A holeas big as a moving-van burned into the road at one place. In a sidestreet an impromptu fountain squirted playfully into the dust-burdenedair, the result of a central water-pipe punctured by a slug from one ofthe bomb's iron entrails. But these things were not noted until dawn andcomparative peace had returned to Walthamstow and men could count withsome degree the cost of the reckless invasion. 

[Sidenote: British aeroplanes pursue. ]

Before the clouds had swallowed up the hateful visitant the noise of itsattack had aroused the military guards across Epping Forest, inChingford village, and, aided by a search-light, the anti-aircraft-gunopened its unavailing fire on the Zeppelin--ineffective, except that itsreturning shrapnel smashed up several roofs and battered some innocentheads. The Germans had gauged their skyward path to London along which, apparently, they felt reasonably safe from gun-reach. But they hadbarely headed homeward before a flock of army aeroplanes, rising fromall points of the compass, were in hot pursuit. One of the Britisherswas shot down by the men aboard the Zeppelin. Neither speed nor daringcounts for much in an encounter between flying-machines and swiftdirigibles of the latest types. The advantage lies solely with the onethat can overfly his adversary. This can be achieved by a biplane ormonoplane pilot only if he has a long start from the ground and timeenough to surmount his opponent. This is difficult even in daylight witha cloudless sky. Given darkness and clouds, the chances for success aretremendously against the smaller craft. 

[Sidenote: The old switchman a victim. ]

Eight bombs in all were launched on Walthamstow--two of themineffectual. The sixth bomb fell into a field close beside the railwayline and worked a hideous wonder. It blew into never-to-be-gatheredfragments all that was mortal of old Tom Cumbers, the signalman. Theyfound only his left hand plastered gruesomely against the grassy bank ofthe railway cut--not a hair nor button else. 

 * * * * *

The great series of attacks by the massed German Army against the mightyforces of Verdun began in February, 1917, and continued throughout thefollowing months. Taken as a whole, it was the most dramatic effort inall its phases which took place between the German and French forces. The French showed during these terrible months, the spirit of devotionand sacrifice which was never excelled during the war. 

 * * * * *

Transcriber's Notes:

Obvious punctuation errors repaired. 

Page 5, "Liege" changed to "Liège" (The Defense of Liège)

Page 11, "again" changed to "against" (against the anarchist)

Page 24, "Petersberg" changed to "Petersburg" (and St. PetersburgCabinets)

Page 28, "thave" changed to "have" (must have rejoiced)

Page 35, "neighbor" changed to "neighbour" to match rest of text (herwestern neighbour)

Page 41, "Liege" changed to "Liège" (strong fortress of Liège)

Page 41, "LIEGE" changed to "LIÈGE"

Page 57, Sidenote: "centimeter" changed to "centimetre" to match text(Forty-two centimetre)

Page 74, Sidenote: "Compiegne" changed to "Compiègne" (towardsCompiègne-Soissons)

Page 77, "Ferte" changed to "Ferté" (Changis, La Ferté, Nogent)

Page 83, "betweeen" changed to "between" (right between the Vosges)

Page 85, "Liége" changed to "Liège" (weeks at Liège Namur)

Page 92, "Chateau" changed to "Château" (Marne below Château-Thierry)

Page 92, Sidenote: "center" changed to "centre" to match text (on theFrench centre)

Page 92, "Chateau" changed to "Château"(Humbauville-Château-Beauchamp-Bignicourt)

Page 93, "Fére" changed to "Fère" (east of Fère-Champenoise)

Page 93, Sidenote: "man[oe]uvers" changed to "man[oe]uvres" to matchtext (Foch out-man[oe]uvres Germans)

Page 93, "center" changed to "centre" to match text (Centre armiesestablished)

Page 110, "statute" changed to "statue" (in front of the statue)

Page 119, Sidenote: "sand-dunes" changed to "sand dunes" (Battle of thesand dunes)

Page 124, "is" changed to "are" (Allies are explained)

Page 136, word "her" inserted into text (to her knees)

Page 137, "strongely" changed to "strongly" (not be so strongly)

Page 169, "most" changed to "must" (crew must have beheld)

Page 171, double word "the" deleted. Original text read: "overtaken thethe transports". 

Page 191, "ships" changed to "ship" (sails of the first ship)

Page 195, "intrument" changed to "instrument" (no probing instrument)

Page 221, "hocky" changed to "hockey" (and hockey teams)

Page 233, Sidenote: "Aeroplanes" changed to "Aëroplanes" (Aëroplanesattacked by artillery)

Page 236, "oof" changed to "of" (mere taking of the)

Page 251, "blow" changed to "blown" (been blown up)

Page 276, "asphxiating" changed to "asphyxiating" (No asphyxiating gases)

Page 280, "advoided" changed to "avoided" (always be avoided)

Page 288, "ships's" changed to "ship's" (ship's crew were confident)

Page 288, "volminous" changed to "voluminous" (voluminous to analyze)

Page 302, "that" changed to "than" (conclusion than in)

Page 307, "submarines" changed to "submarine" (submarine warfare in)

Page 314, word "a" inserted into text (vantage-point on a crag)

Page 310, "N. " changed to "No. " (Book No. 2, U. S. )

Page 333, "to" changed to "of" (advantage of this)

Page 336, "These" changed to "Those" (Those Germans who)

Page 338, "Trapeze" changed to "Trapèze" (of the Trapèze which)

Page 339, word "the" inserted into text (from the summit)

Page 343, "arrival" changed to "arrived" (224 arrived safe)

Page 356, Sidenote: "executive" changed to "execution" (delay ofexecution)

Page 359, Sidenote: "De-" changed to "Der" (Der Lancken believes)

Page 367, word "had" inserted into text (and they had been)

Both "Ypres-Poelcapelle" and "Ypres-Poelcappelle" appear in the text. Both spellings were retained. 

Manoeuvre, man[oe]uvre and maneuvre were used and retained. 

Both Ripon and Ripont appear in this text. Ripont seems more accurate.