TEXTBOOK EDITION

 THE YALE CHRONICLES OF AMERICA SERIES

 ALLEN JOHNSON EDITOR

 GERHARD R. LOMER CHARLES W. JEFFERYS ASSISTANT EDITORS

 WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD WAR

 A CHRONICLE OF OUR OWN TIMES BY CHARLES SEYMOUR 1921

 [Illustration]

 TORONTO: GLASGOW, BROOK & CO. NEW YORK: UNITED STATES PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 

 _Copyright, 1921, by Yale University Press_

 Printed in the United States of America

+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+|Transcribers note: In this plain text the breve has been rendered as [)c]|+-------------------------------------------------------------------------+

 CONTENTS

 I. WILSON THE EXECUTIVE Page 1

 II. NEUTRALITY " 27

 III. THE SUBMARINE " 47

 IV. PLOTS AND PREPAREDNESS " 71

 V. AMERICA DECIDES " 94

 VI. THE NATION IN ARMS " 116

 VII. THE HOME FRONT " 150

 VIII. THE FIGHTING FRONT " 192

 IX. THE PATH TO PEACE " 228

 X. WAYS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE " 254

 XI. BALANCE OF POWER OR LEAGUE OF NATIONS? " 281

 XII. THE SETTLEMENT " 310

 XIII. THE SENATE AND THE TREATY " 330

 XIV. CONCLUSION " 352

 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE " 361

 INDEX " 367

WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER I

WILSON THE EXECUTIVE

When, on March 4, 1913, Woodrow Wilson entered the White House, the firstDemocratic president elected in twenty years, no one could have guessedthe importance of the rôle which he was destined to play. While businessmen and industrial leaders bewailed the mischance that had brought intopower a man whose attitude towards vested interests was reputed none toofriendly, they looked upon him as a temporary inconvenience. Nor did theincreasingly large body of independent voters, disgusted by the"stand-pattism" of the Republican machine, regard Wilson much moreseriously; rather did they place their confidence in a reinvigoration ofthe Grand Old Party through the progressive leadership of Roosevelt, whose enthusiasm and practical vision had attracted the approval of morethan four million voters in the preceding election, despite his lack ofan adequate political organization. Even those who supported Wilson mostwhole-heartedly believed that his work would lie entirely within thefield of domestic reform; little did they imagine that he would play apart in world affairs larger than had fallen to any citizen of the UnitedStates since the birth of the country. 

The new President was fifty-six years old. His background was primarilyacademic, a fact which, together with his Scotch-Irish ancestry, thePresbyterian tradition of his family, and his early years spent in theSouth, explains much in his character at the time when he entered uponthe general political stage. After graduating from Princeton in 1879, where his career gave little indication of extraordinary promise, hestudied law, and for a time his shingle hung out in Atlanta. He seemedunfitted by nature, however, for either pleasure or success in thepractice of the law. Reserved and cold, except with his intimates, he wasincapable of attracting clients in a profession and locality whereability to "mix" was a prime qualification. A certain lack of tolerancefor the failings of his fellow mortals may have combined with hisPresbyterian conscience to disgust him with the hard give-and-take of thestruggling lawyer's life. He sought escape in graduate work in historyand politics at Johns Hopkins, where, in 1886, he received his Ph. D. Fora thesis entitled _Congressional Government_, a study remarkable forclear thinking and felicitous expression. These qualities characterizedhis work as a professor at Bryn Mawr and Wesleyan and paved his path toan appointment on the Princeton faculty in 1890, as Professor ofJurisprudence and Politics. 

Despite his early distaste to the career of practicing lawyer, Wilson wasby no means the man to bury himself in academic research. He lacked thescrupulous patience and the willingness to submerge his own personalitywhich are characteristic of the scientific scholar. His gift was forgeneralization, and his writings were marked by clarity of thought andwealth of phrase, rather than by profundity. But such qualities broughthim remarkable success as a lecturer and essayist, and constant practicegave him a fluency, a vocal control, and a power of verbal expressionwhich assured distinction at the frequent public meetings and dinnerswhere he was called upon to speak. Professional interest in the scienceof government furnished him with topics of far wider import than theordinary pedagogue cares to handle, and he became, even as professor, well known outside of Princeton. His influence, already broad in theeducational and not without some recognition in the political world, wasextended in 1902, when he was chosen President of the University. 

During the succeeding eight years Wilson enjoyed his first taste ofexecutive power, and certain traits which he then displayed deserve briefnotice. Although a "conservative" in his advocacy of the maintenance ofthe old-time curriculum, based upon the ancient languages and mathematics, and in his opposition to the free elective system, he proved an inflexiblereformer as regards methods of instruction, the efficiency of which he wasdetermined to establish. He showed a ruthless resolution to eliminate whathe looked upon as undemocratic social habits among the undergraduates, anddid not hesitate to cut loose from tradition, regardless of the prejudicethereby aroused against him. As an executive he evoked intense admirationand virulent dislike; the Board of Trustees and the alumni body were alikedivided between enthusiastic support and bitter anathematization of themeasures he proposed. What seems obvious is that many graduatessympathized with his purposes but were alienated by his methods. Hisstrength lay chiefly in the force of his appeal to democratic sentiment;his weakness in complete inability to conciliate opponents. 

At the moment when the issue of the struggle at Princeton was stillundecided, opportunity was given Wilson to enter political life; anambition for such a career had evidently stirred him in early days andwas doubtless resuscitated by his success as a public speaker. WhilePresident of Princeton he had frequently touched upon public issues, andso early as 1906 Colonel George Harvey had mentioned him as a possiblePresident of the United States. From that time he was often considered asavailable for political office, and in 1910, with New Jersey stirred by astrong popular movement against boss-rule, he was tendered the nominationfor Governor of that State. He accepted and proved an ideal candidate. Though supported by the Democratic machine, which planned to elect areformer and then control him, Wilson won the adherence of independentsand progressive Republicans by his promise to break the power of the bosssystem, and by the clarity of his plans for reform. His appeals to thespirit of democracy and morality, while they voiced nothing new in anelectoral campaign, rang with unusual strength and sincerity. The State, which had gone Republican by eighty-two thousand two years before, nowelected Wilson its Governor by a plurality of forty-nine thousand. 

He retained office in New Jersey for only two years. During that period heachieved a high degree of success. Had he served longer it is impossibleto say what might have been his ultimate position, for as at Princeton, elements of opposition had begun to coalesce against him and he had foundno means to disarm them. As Governor, he at once declared himself head ofthe party and by a display of firm activity dominated the machine. TheDemocratic boss, Senator James Smith, was sternly enjoined from seekingreëlection to the Senate, and when, in defiance of promises and the wishof the voters as expressed at the primaries, he attempted to run, Wilsonentered the lists and so influenced public opinion and the Legislaturethat the head of the machine received only four votes. Attempts of theDemocratic machine to combine with the Republicans, in order to nullifythe reforms which Wilson had promised in his campaign, proved equallyfutile. With strong popular support, constantly exercising his influenceboth in party conferences and on the Legislature, the Governor was able totranslate into law the most important of the measures demanded by theprogressives. He himself summed up the essence of the situation when hesaid: "The moment the forces in New Jersey that had resisted reformrealized that the people were backing new men who meant what they hadsaid, they realized that they dare not resist them. It was not thepersonal force of the new officials; it was the moral strength of theirbacking that accomplished the extraordinary result. " Supreme confidence inthe force of public opinion exerted by the common man characterizes muchof Wilson's political philosophy, and the position in the world which hewas to enjoy for some months towards the end of the war rested upon thesame basis. 

In 1912 came the presidential election. The split in the Republicanforces promised if it did not absolutely guarantee the election of aDemocrat, and when the party convention met at Baltimore in June, excitement was more than ordinarily intense. The conservative elements inthe party were divided. The radicals looked to Bryan for leadership, although his nomination seemed out of the question. Wilson had stampedhimself as an anti-machine progressive, and if the machine conservativesthreatened he might hope for support from the Nebraskan orator. From thefirst the real contest appeared to be between Wilson and Champ Clark, whoalthough hardly a conservative, was backed for the moment by the machineleaders. The deciding power was in Bryan's hand, and as the strifebetween conservatives and radicals waxed hot, he turned to the support ofWilson. On the forty-sixth ballot Wilson was nominated. With division inthe Republican ranks, with his record in New Jersey for legislativeaccomplishment, and winning many independent votes through a successionof effective campaign speeches, Wilson more than fulfilled the highest ofDemocratic hopes. He received on election day only a minority of all thevotes cast, but his majority in the electoral college was overwhelming. 

 * * * * *

The personality of an American President has seldom undergone so muchanalysis with such unsatisfactory results; almost every discussion ofWilson's characteristics leads to the generation of heat rather thanlight. Indeed the historian of the future may ask whether it is asimportant, in this age of democracy, to know exactly what sort of man hewas as to know what the people thought he was. And yet in the case of astatesman who was to play a rôle of supreme importance in the affairs ofthe country and the world, it is perhaps more than a matter of merelypersonal interest to underline his salient traits. Let it be premisedthat a logical and satisfactory analysis is well-nigh impossible, for hisnature is self-contradictory, subject to gusts of temperament, and hehimself has pictured the struggle that has gone on between the impulsiveIrish and the cautious Scotch elements in him. Thus it is that he hashandled similar problems in different ways at different times, and hasproduced upon different persons diametrically opposed impressions. 

As an executive, perhaps his most notable characteristic is the will todominate. This does not mean that he is the egocentric autocrat picturedby his opponents, for in conference he is apt to be tolerant of theopinions of others, by no means dictatorial in manner, and apparentlyanxious to obtain facts on both sides of the argument. An unfriendlycritic, Mr. E. J. Dillon, has said of him at Paris that "he was a verygood listener, an intelligent questioner, and amenable to argumentwhenever he felt free to give practical effect to his conclusions. "Similar evidence has been offered by members of his Cabinet. Butunquestionably, in reaching a conclusion he resents pressure and hepermits no one to make up his mind for him; he is, said the GermanAmbassador, "a recluse and lonely worker. " One of his enthusiasticadmirers has written: "Once in possession of every fact in the case, thePresident withdraws, commences the business of consideration, comparison, and assessment, and then emerges with a decision. " From such a decisionit is difficult to shake him and continued opposition serves merely tostiffen his resolution. Wherever the responsibility is his, he insistsupon the finality of his judgment. Those who have worked with him haveremarked upon his eagerness, once he has decided a course of action, tocarry it into practical effect. The President of the Czecho-SlovakRepublic, Thomas G. Masaryk, said that of all the men he had met, "yourvisionary, idealistic President is by far and away the most intenselypractical. " One of the Big Four at Paris remarked: "Wilson works. Therest of us play, comparatively speaking. We Europeans can't keep up witha man who travels a straight path with such a swift stride, never lookingto right or left. " But with all his eagerness for practical effect he isnotably less efficient in the execution than in the formation ofpolicies. 

Wilson lacks, furthermore, the power of quick decision which is apt tocharacterize the masterful executive. He is slow to make up his mind, atrait that results partly, perhaps, from his Scotch blood and partly fromhis academic training. Except for his steadfast adherence to what heregards as basic principles, he might rightly be termed an opportunist. For he is prone to temporize, anxious to prevent an issue from approachinga crisis, evidently in the hope that something may "turn up" to improvethe situation and obviate the necessity of conflict. "Watchful waiting" inthe Mexican crises and his attitude towards the belligerents during thefirst two years of the European war are cases in point. There areinstances of impulsive action on his part, when he has not waited foradvice or troubled to acquire exact knowledge of the facts underlying asituation, but such occasions have been infrequent. 

Wilson's dislike of advice has been widely advertized. It is probablycloser to the truth to say that he is naturally suspicious of advisersunless he is certain that their basic point of view is the same as hisown. This is quite different from saying that he wants only opinions thatcoincide with his own and that he immediately dispenses with advisers whodisagree with him. Colonel House, for example, who for five years exertedconstant influence on his policy, frequently advanced opinions quite atvariance from those of the President, but such differences did not weakenHouse's influence inasmuch as Wilson felt that they were both startingfrom the same angle towards the same point. Prejudiced though he seemedto be against "financiers, " Wilson took the opinions of Thomas W. Lamontat Paris, because the underlying object of both, the acquisition of asecure peace, was identical. It is true, however, that with the exceptionof Colonel House, Wilson's advisers have been in the main purveyors offacts rather than colleagues in the formation of policies. Wilson hasgenerally been anxious to receive facts which might help him to build hispolicy, as will be attested by those who worked with him at Paris. [1] Buthe was less interested in the opinions of his advisers, especially whenit came to principles and not details, for he decides principles forhimself. In this sense his Cabinet was composed of subordinates ratherthan counselors. Such an attitude is, of course, characteristic of mostmodern executives and has been intensified by war conditions. The summarydisregard of Lansing, shown by Wilson at Paris, was less striking thanthe snubbing of Balfour by Lloyd George, or the cold brutality with whichClemenceau treated the other French delegates. 

[Footnote 1: Mr. Lamont says of the President at Paris: "I never saw aman more ready and anxious to consult than he.... President Wilson didnot have a well-organized secretarial staff. He did far too much of thework himself, studying until late at night papers and documents that heshould have largely delegated to some discreet aides. He was by all odds, the hardest worked man at the Conference; but the failure to delegatemore of his work was not due to any inherent distrust that he had ofmen--and certainly not to any desire to 'run the whole show' himself--butsimply to the lack of facility in knowing how to delegate work on a largescale. In execution we all have a blind spot in some part of our eye. President Wilson's was in his inability to use men; an inability, mindyou, not a refusal. On the contrary, when any of us volunteered orinsisted upon taking responsibility off his shoulders he was delighted. "]

General conviction of Wilson's autocratic nature has been intensified byhis choice of assistants, who have not as a rule enjoyed publicconfidence. He debarred himself from success in the matter ofappointments, in the first place, by limiting his range of choice throughunwillingness to have about him those who did not share his point ofview. It is more epigrammatic than exact to say that he was the sole unitin the Government giving value to a row of ciphers, for his Cabinet, asa whole, was not composed of weak men. But the fact that the members ofhis Cabinet accepted implicitly his firm creed that the Cabinet ought tobe an executive and not a political council, that it depended upon thePresident's policy, and that its main function should be merely to carrythat policy into effect, gave to the public some justification for itsbelief that Wilson's was a "one-man" Government. This belief was furtherintensified by the President's extreme sensitiveness to hostilecriticism, which more than anything else hindered frank interchange ofopinion between himself and strong personalities. On more than oneoccasion he seemed to regard opposition as tantamount to personalhostility, an attitude which at times was not entirely unjustified. Inthe matter of minor appointments Wilson failed generally of successbecause he consistently refused to take a personal interest, leaving themto subordinates and admitting that political necessities must go far todetermine the choice. Even in such an important problem as theappointment of the Peace Commission the President seems to have made hisselection almost at haphazard. Many of his war appointments provedultimately to be wise. But it is noteworthy that such men as Garfield, Baruch, and McCormick, who amply justified their choice, were appointedbecause Wilson knew personally their capacity and not because of previoussuccess along special lines which would entitle them to publicconfidence. 

The obstinacy of the President has become proverbial. The square chin, unconsciously protruded in argument, indicates definitely his capacity, as a British critic has put it, "to dig his toes in and hold on. " Onmatters of method, however, where a basic principle is not involved, heis flexible. According as you approve or disapprove of him, he is"capable of development" or "inconsistent. " Thus he completely changedfront on the question of preparedness from 1914 to 1916. When thequestion of the initiative and referendum arose in Oregon, his attitudewas the reverse of what it had been as professor of politics. Whenmatters of detail are under discussion, he has displayed much willingnessfor and some skill in compromise, as was abundantly illustrated at Paris. But when he thinks that a principle is at stake, he prefers to accept anyconsequences, no matter how disastrous to his policy; witness his refusalto accept the Lodge reservation on Article X of the League Covenant. 

All those included within the small circle of Wilson's intimates attestthe charm and magnetism of his personality. The breadth of his reading isreflected in his conversation, which is enlivened by anecdotes thatillustrate his points effectively and illumined by a sense of humor whichsome of his friends regard as his most salient trait. His manner ismarked by extreme courtesy and, in view of the fixity of his opinions, asurprising lack of abruptness or dogmatism. But he has never been able tocapitalize such personal advantages in his political relations. Apartfrom his intimates he is shy and reserved. The antithesis of Roosevelt, who loved to meet new individualities, Wilson has the college professor'sshrinking from social contacts, and is not at ease in the presence ofthose with whom he is not familiar. Naturally, therefore, he lackscompletely Roosevelt's capacity to make friends, and there is in him notrace of his predecessor's power to find exactly the right compliment forthe right person. Under Roosevelt the White House opened its doors toevery one who could bring the President anything of interest, whether inthe field of science, literature, politics, or sport; and the ChiefMagistrate, no matter who his guest, instantly found a common ground fordiscussion. That capacity Wilson did not possess. Furthermore his healthwas precarious and he was physically incapable of carrying the burden ofthe constant interviews that characterized the life of his immediatepredecessors in the presidential office. He lived the life of a recluseand rarely received any one but friends of the family at the White Housedinner table. 

While he thus saved himself from the social intercourse which forRoosevelt was a relaxation but which for him would have proved a nervousand physical drain, Wilson deprived himself of the political advantagesthat might have been derived from more extensive hospitality. He wasunable to influence Congressmen except by reason of his authority as headof the party or nation. He lost many a chance of removing politicalopposition through the personal appeal which is so flattering andeffective. He seems to have thought that if his policy was right initself, Congressmen ought to vote for it, without the satisfaction ofpersonal arguments, a singular misappreciation of human nature. The samewas true of his relations with the Washington correspondents; he was neverable to establish a man to man basis of intercourse. This incapacity inthe vital matter of human contacts was, perhaps, his greatest politicalweakness. If he had been able to arouse warm personal devotion in hisfollowers, if he could have inflamed them with enthusiasm such as thatinspired by Roosevelt, rather than mere admiration, Wilson would havefound his political task immeasurably lightened. It is not surprising thathis mistakes in tactics should have been so numerous. His isolation anddependence upon tactical advisers, such as Tumulty and Burleson, lackingbroad vision, led him into serious errors, most of which--such as hisappeal for a Democratic Congress in 1918, his selection of the personnelof the Peace Commission, his refusal to compromise with the "mildreservationist Senators" in the summer of 1919--were committed, significantly, when he was not in immediate contact with Colonel House. 

The political strength of Wilson did not result primarily fromintellectual power. His mind is neither profound nor subtle. His seriouswritings are sound but not characterized by originality, nor in hispolicies is there anything to indicate creative genius. He thinks straightand possesses the ability to concentrate on a single line of effort. He isskillful in catching an idea and adapting it to his purposes. Combinedwith his power of expression and his talent for making phrases, suchqualities were of great assistance to him. But the real strength of thePresident lay rather in his gift of sensing what the common people wantedand his ability to put it into words for them. Few of his speeches aregreat; many of them are marred by tactless phrases, such as "too proud tofight" and "peace without victory. " But nearly all of them expresshonestly the desires of the masses. His strength in New Jersey and theextraordinary effect produced in Europe by his war speeches might be citedas evidence of this peculiar power. He sought above everything to catchthe trend of inarticulate rather than vociferous opinion. If one objectsthat his patience under German outrages was not truly representative, wemust remember that opinion was slow in crystallizing, that his policy wasendorsed by the election of 1916, and that when he finally advocated warin April, 1917, the country entered the struggle practically a unit. 

But it is obvious that, however much political strength was assured thePresident by his instinctive appreciation of popular feeling, this waslargely offset by the _gaucherie_ of his political tactics. He had a geniusfor alienating persons who should have supported him and who agreed ingeneral with the broad lines of his policies. Few men in public life haveso thoroughly aroused the dislike of "the man in the street. " Admittingthat much of Wilson's unpopularity resulted from misunderstanding, from thefeeling that he was a different sort, perhaps a "highbrow, " the degree ofdislike felt for him becomes almost inexplicable in the case of a Presidentwho, from all the evidence, was willing to sacrifice everything for what heconsidered to be the benefit of the common man. He might almost repeatRobespierre's final bitter and puzzled phrase: "To die for the people andto be abhorred by them. " So keen was the irritation aroused by Wilson'smethods and personality that many a citizen stated frankly that hepreferred to see Wilsonian policies which he approved meet defeat, ratherthan see them carried to success by Wilson. This executive failing of thePresident was destined to jeopardize the greatest of his policies and toresult in the personal tragedy of Wilson himself. 

Certain large political principles stand out in Wilson's writings andcareer as Governor and President. Of these the most striking, perhaps, ishis conviction that the President of the United States must be somethingmore than a mere executive superintendent. The entire responsibility forthe administration of government, he believed, should rest upon thePresident, and in order to meet that responsibility, he must keep thereins of control in his own hands. In his first essays and in his laterwritings Wilson expressed his disgust with the system of congressionalcommittees which threw enormous power into the hands of irresponsibleprofessional politicians, and called for a President who would break thatsystem and exercise greater directive authority. For a time he seemed, under the influence of Bagehot, to have believed in the feasibility ofintroducing something like the parliamentary system into the governmentof the United States. To the last he regarded the President as a sort ofPrime Minister, at the head of his party in the Legislature and able tocount absolutely upon its loyalty. More than this, he believed that thePresident should take a large share of responsibility for the legislativeprogramme and ought to push this programme through by all means at hisdisposal. Such a creed appeared in his early writings and was largelycarried into operation during his administration. We find him bringingall possible pressure upon the New Jersey Legislature in order to redeemhis campaign pledges. When elected President, he went directly toCongress with his message, instead of sending it to be read. Time andagain he intervened to forward his special legislative interests bydirect influence. 

Both in his writings and in his actions Wilson has always advocatedgovernment by party. Theoretically and in practice he has been opposed tocoalition government, for, in his belief, it divides responsibility. Although by no means an advocate of the old-type spoils system, rewardsfor party service seem to him essential. Curiously enough, whileinsisting that the President is the leader of his party like a PrimeMinister, he has also described him, with an apparent lack of logic, asthe leader of the country. Because Wilson has thus confused party andpeople, it is easy to understand why he has at times claimed to representthe nation when, in reality, he was merely representing partisan views. Such an attitude is naturally irritating to the Opposition and explainssomething of the virulence that characterized the attacks made upon himin 1918 and later. 

Wilson's political sentiments are tinged by a constant and intenseinterest in the common man. More than once he has insisted that it wasmore important to know what was said by the fireside than what was saidin the council chamber. His strongest political weapon, he believes, hasbeen the appeal over the heads of politicians to public opinion. Hisdislike of cliques and his strong prejudice against anything that savorsof special privilege shone clear in his attack upon the Princeton clubsystem, and the same light has not infrequently dazzled his vision asPresident. Thus, while by no means a radical, he instinctively turned tothe support of labor in its struggles with capital because of the abuseof its privilege by capital in the past and regardless of more recentabuse of its power by labor. Similarly at the Peace Conference hissympathies were naturally with every weak state and every minority group. 

Such tendencies may have been strengthened by the intensity of hisreligious convictions. There have been few men holding high office inrecent times so deeply and constantly affected by Christian faith asWoodrow Wilson. The son of a clergyman and subjected during his earlyyears to the most lively and devout sort of Presbyterianism, he preservedin his own family circle, in later years, a similar atmosphere. Nor washis conviction of the immanence and spiritual guidance of the Deity everdivorced from his professional and public life. We can discover in hispresidential speeches many indications of his belief that the duties hehad undertaken were laid upon him by God and that he might not deviatefrom what seemed to him the straight and appointed path. There issomething reminiscent of Calvin in the stern and unswerving determinationnot to compromise for the sake of ephemeral advantage. This aspect ofWilson has been caught by a British critic, J. M. Keynes, who describesthe President as a Nonconformist minister, whose thought and temperamentwere essentially theological, not intellectual, "with all the strengthand weakness of that manner of thought, feeling, and expression. " Theobservation is exact, although it does not in itself completely explainWilson. Certainly nothing could be more characteristic of the Presidentthan the text of a Baccalaureate sermon which he preached at Princeton in1907: "And be ye not conformed to this world. " He believed with intensitythat each individual must set up for himself a moral standard, which hemust rigidly maintain regardless of the opinions of the community. 

Entirely natural, therefore, is the emphasis which he has placed, whetheras President of Princeton or of the United States, upon moral ratherthan material virtues. This, indeed, has been the essence of hispolitical idealism. Such an emphasis has been for him at once a source ofpolitical strength and of weakness. The moralist unquestionably secureswide popular support; but he also wearies his audience, and many a voterhas turned from Wilson in the spirit that led the Athenian to vote forthe ostracism of Aristides, because he was tired of hearing him called"the Just. " Whatever the immediate political effects, the country owes toWilson a debt, which historians will doubtless acknowledge, for hisinsistence that morality must go hand in hand with public policy, that aswith individuals, so with governments, true greatness is won by servicerather than by acquisition, by sacrifice rather than by aggression. Wilson and Treitschke are at opposite poles. 

During his academic career Wilson seems to have displayed little interestin foreign affairs, and his knowledge of European politics, althoughsufficient for him to produce an admirable handbook on governments, including foreign as well as our own, was probably not profound. Duringhis first year in the White House, he was typical of the Democraticparty, which then approved the political isolation of the United States, abhorred the kind of commercial imperialism summed up in the phrase"dollar diplomacy, " and apparently believed that the essence of foreignpolicy was to keep one's own hands clean. The development of Wilson fromthis parochial point of view to one which centers his whole being upon apolicy of unselfish international service, forms, to a large extent, themain thread of the narrative which follows. 

CHAPTER II

NEUTRALITY

Despite the wars and rumors of wars in Europe after 1910, few Americansperceived the gathering of the clouds, and probably not one in tenthousand felt more than an ordinary thrill of interest on the morning ofJune 29, 1914, when they read that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand ofAustria had been assassinated. Nor, a month later, when it became obviousthat the resulting crisis was to precipitate another war in the Balkans, did most Americans realize that the world was hovering on the brink ofmomentous events. Not even when the most dire forebodings were realizedand the great powers of Europe were drawn into the quarrel, could Americaappreciate its significance. Crowds gazed upon the bulletin boards andtried to picture the steady advance of German field-gray through thestreets of Liège, asked their neighbors what were these French 75's, andendeavored to locate Mons and Verdun on inadequate maps. Interest couldnot be more intense, but it was the interest of the moving-picturedevotee. Even the romantic voyage of the _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_ withher cargo of gold, seeking to elude the roving British cruisers, seemedmerely theatrical. It was a tremendous show and we were the spectators. Only the closing of the Stock Exchange lent an air of reality to thecrisis. 

It was true that the Spanish War had made of the United States a worldpower, but so firmly rooted in American minds was the principle ofcomplete political isolation from European affairs that the typicalcitizen could not imagine any cataclysm on the other side of the Atlanticso engrossing as to engage the active participation of his country. Thewhole course of American history had deepened the general feeling ofaloofness from Europe and heightened the effect of the advice given bythe first President when he warned the country to avoid entanglingalliances. In the early nineteenth century the United States was acountry apart, for in the days when there was neither steamship nortelegraph the Atlantic in truth separated the New World from the Old. After the close of the "second war of independence, " in 1815, thepossibility of foreign complications seemed remote. The attention of theyoung nation was directed to domestic concerns, to the building up ofmanufactures, to the extension of the frontiers westward. The Americannation turned its back to the Atlantic. There was a steady and welcomestream of immigrants from Europe, but there was little speculation orinterest as to its headwaters. 

Governmental relations with European states were disturbed at times bycrises of greater or less importance. The proximity of the United Statesto and interest in Cuba compelled the Government to recognize thepolitical existence of Spain; a French army was ordered out of Mexicowhen it was felt to be a menace; the presence of immigrant Irish in largenumbers always gave a note of uncertainty to the national attitudetowards Great Britain. The export of cotton from the Southern Statescreated industrial relations of such importance with Great Britain that, during the Civil War, after the establishment of the blockade on theConfederate coast, wisdom and forbearance were needed on both sides toprevent the breaking out of armed conflict. But during the last third ofthe century, which was marked in this country by an extraordinaryindustrial evolution and an increased interest in domesticadministrative issues, the attitude of the United States towards Europe, except during the brief Venezuelan crisis and the war with Spain, wasgenerally characterized by the indifference which is the natural outcomeof geographical separation. 

In diplomatic language American foreign policy, so far as Europe wasconcerned, was based upon the principle of "non-intervention. " The rightto manage their affairs in their own way without interference was concededto European Governments and a reciprocal attitude was expected of them. The American Government followed strictly the purpose of not participatingin any political arrangements made between European states regardingEuropean issues. Early in the life of the nation Jefferson had correlatedthe double aspect of this policy: "Our first and fundamental maxim, " hesaid, "should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; oursecond, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. "The influence of John Quincy Adams crystallized this double policy in theMonroe Doctrine, which, as compensation for denying to European states theright to intervene in American politics, sacrificed the generoussympathies of many Americans, among them President Monroe himself, withthe republican movements across the Atlantic. With the continued andincreasing importance of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle of nationalpolicy, the natural and reciprocal aspect of that doctrine, implyingpolitical isolation from Europe, became more deeply imbedded in thenational consciousness. 

There was, it is true, another aspect to American foreign policy besidesthe European, namely, that concerning the Pacific and the Far East, which, as diplomatic historians have pointed out, does not seem to have beenaffected by the tradition of isolation. Since the day when the westernfrontier was pushed to the Golden Gate, the United States has taken anactive interest in problems of the Pacific. Alaska was purchased fromRussia. An American seaman was the first to open the trade of Japan to theoutside world and thus precipitated the great revolution which has touchedevery aspect of Far Eastern questions. American traders watched carefullythe commercial development of Oriental ports, in which Americans haveplayed an active rôle. In China and in the maintenance of the open doorespecially, has America taken the keenest interest. It is a matter ofpride that American policy, always of a purely commercial and peacefulnature, showed itself less aggressive than that of some European states. But the Government insisted upon the recognition of American interest inevery Far Eastern issue that might be raised, and was ready to intervenewith those of Europe in moments of crisis or danger. 

A fairly clear-cut distinction might thus be made between Americanpretensions in the different parts of the world. In the Americas thenation claimed that sort of preëminence which was implied by the MonroeDoctrine, a preëminence which as regards the Latin-American states northof the Orinoco many felt must be actively enforced, in view of specialinterests in the Caribbean. In the Far East the United States claimed anequality of status with the European powers. In the rest of the world, Europe, Africa, the Levant, the traditional American policy of abstentionheld good absolutely, at least until the close of the century. 

The war with Spain affected American foreign policy vitally. The holdingof the Philippines, even if it were to prove merely temporary, created newrelations with all the great powers, of Europe as of Asia; AmericanCaribbean interests were strengthened; and the victory over a Europeanpower, even one of a second class in material strength, necessarilyaltered the traditional attitude of the nation towards the other states ofEurope and theirs towards it. This change was stimulated by the closeattention which American merchants and bankers began to give to Europeancombinations and policies, particularly to the exploitation of thinlypopulated districts by European states. Even before the Spanish War akeen-sighted student of foreign affairs, Richard Olney, had declared thatthe American people could not assume an attitude of indifference towardsEuropean politics and that the hegemony of a single continental statewould be disastrous to their prosperity if not to their safety. ConverselyEuropeans began to watch America with greater care. The victory over Spainwas resented and the fear of American commercial development began tospread. The Kaiser had even talked of a continental customs union to meetAmerican competition. On the other hand, Great Britain, which haddisplayed a benevolent attitude during the Spanish War and whose admiralat Manila had perhaps blocked German interference, showed an increasingdesire for a close understanding. The friendship of the United States, itself once a British dependency, for the British colonies was naturaland American interests in the Far East had much in common with those ofGreat Britain. 

External evidence of the new place of the United States in the world mightbe found in the position taken by Roosevelt as peacemaker between Russiaand Japan, and, more significantly, in the rôle played by the Americanrepresentative, Henry White, at the Conference of Algeciras in 1906. Notmerely did the American Government consent to discuss matters essentiallyEuropean in character, but its attitude proved almost decisive in thesettlement then drafted. It is true that the Senate, in approving thatsettlement, refused to assume responsibility for its maintenance andreiterated its adherence to traditional policy. But those who watcheddevelopments with intelligent eyes must have agreed with Roosevelt when hesaid: "We have no choice, we people of the United States, as to whether weshall play a great part in the affairs of the world. That has been decidedfor us by fate, by the march of events. " Yet it may be questioned whetherthe average American, during the first decade of the twentieth century, realized the change that had come over relations with Europe. The majorityof citizens certainly felt that anything happening east of the Atlanticwas none of their business, just as everything that occurred in theAmericas was entirely outside the scope of European interference. 

There is little to show that Woodrow Wilson, at the time when he enteredupon his duties as President, was one of the few Americans who fullyappreciated the new international position of the United States and itsconsequences, even had there been no war. The Democratic platform of 1912hardly mentioned foreign policy, and Wilson's Inaugural contained noreference to anything except domestic matters. Certain problems inheritedfrom the previous Administration forced upon the President, however, theformulation, if not of a policy, at least of an attitude. The questions ofthe Panama Canal tolls and Japanese immigration, the Mexican situation, the Philippines, general relations with Latin-America, all demandedattention. In each case Wilson displayed a willingness to sacrifice, adesire to avoid stressing the material strength of the United States, ananxiety to compromise, which matched in spirit the finest traditions ofAmerican foreign policy, which has generally been marked by high ideals. Many of his countrymen, possibly without adequate study or command of thefacts, supposed that Wilson was inspired less by positive ideals than bythe belief that no problem of a foreign nature was worth a quarrel. Peopleliked the principle contained in the sentence: "We can afford to exercisethe self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its ownstrength and scorns to misuse it. " But they also wondered whether thepassivity of the Government did not in part proceed from the fact that thePresident could not make up his mind what he wanted to do. They lookedupon his handling of the Mexican situation as clear evidence of a lack ofpolicy. Nevertheless the country as a whole, without expressing enthusiasmfor Wilson's attitude, was obviously pleased by his attempts to avoidforeign entanglements, and in the early summer of 1914 the eyes of thenation were focused upon domestic issues. 

Then came the war in Europe. 

 * * * * *

Today, after the long years of stress and struggle in which the crimes ofGermany have received full advertisement, few Americans will admit thatthey did not perceive during that first week of August, 1914, thecomplete significance of the moral issues involved in the European war. They read back into their thoughts of those early days the realizationwhich, in truth, came only later, that Germany was the brutal aggressorattacking those aspects of modern civilization which are dear to America. In fact there were not many then who grasped the essential truth that thecause defended by Great Britain and France was indeed that of America andthat their defeat would bring the United States face to face with vitaldanger, both material and moral. 

Partisanship, of course, was not lacking and frequently it was of anearnest kind; in view of the large number of European-born who enjoyedcitizenship, sympathy with one side or the other was inevitably warm. West of the Mississippi it was some time before the masses were stirredfrom their indifference to and their ignorance of the struggle. But onthe Atlantic seaboard and in the Middle West opinion became sharplydivided. The middle-class German-Americans naturally espoused with somevehemence the justice of the Fatherland's cause. German intellectuals ofinfluence, such as Hugo Münsterberg, inveighed against the hypocrisy andthe decadence of the Entente powers. Many Americans who had lived or hadbeen educated in Germany, some professors who had been brought intocontact with the Kaiser explained the "essentially defensive character"of Germany's struggle against the threatening Slav. Certain of thepolitically active Irish elements, anxious to discredit the British, alsolent their support to the German cause. 

On the Atlantic coast, however, the general trend of opinion ran stronglyin favor of the Entente. The brave defense of the Belgians at Liègeagainst terrible odds evoked warm sympathy; the stories of the atrocitiescommitted by the invading Germans, constantly more frequent and morebrutal in character, enhanced that feeling. The valorous retreat of theFrench and their last-ditch stand on the Marne compelled admiration. Moreover, the school histories of the United States with their emphasisupon La Fayette and the aid given by the French in the first fight forliberty proved to be of no small importance in the molding of sympathy. Business men naturally favored Great Britain, both because of financialrelationships and because of their dislike and fear of German commercialmethods. 

But in all this partisanship there was little appreciation of the perilthat might result from German victory and no articulate demand that theUnited States intervene. Warm sympathy might be given to one side or theother, but the almost universal opinion was that the war was none of ourbusiness. Even Theodore Roosevelt, who later was to be one of the mostdetermined advocates of American intervention on the side of the Entente, writing for _The Outlook_ in September, 1914, congratulated the countryon its separation from European quarrels, which made possible thepreservation of our peace. 

Whatever the trend of public opinion, President Wilson would haveinsisted upon neutrality. Everything in his character and policy demandedthe maintenance of peace. He had entered office with a broad programme ofsocial reform in view, and the attainment of his ideals depended upondomestic tranquillity. He was, furthermore, a real pacifist, believingthat war is debasing morally and disastrous economically. Finally, he wasconvinced that the United States was consecrated to a special task, namely, the inspiration of politics by moral factors; if the nation wasto accomplish this task its example must be a higher example than one offorce. Unquestionably he looked forward to acting as mediator in thestruggle and thus securing for the country and himself new prestige suchas had come in Roosevelt's mediation between Russia and Japan. But themain thought in his mind was, first, the preservation of peace for thesake of peace; and next, to attain the supreme glory of showing the worldthat greatness and peaceableness are complementary in national characterand not antithetic. "We are champions of peace and of concord, " he said, "and we should be very jealous of this distinction which we have soughtto earn. "

Wilson's determination was strengthened by his obvious failure todistinguish between the war aims of the two sides. He did not at first seethe moral issue involved. He was anxious to "reserve judgment until theend of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in theirentirety and in their true relations. " When appeals and protests were sentto him from Germany, Belgium, and France dealing with infractions of thelaw and practice of nations, he was willing to return a response toGermany, which had confessedly committed an international wrong, identicalwith that sent to Belgium which had suffered from that wrong. Wilson hashimself confessed that "America did not at first see the full meaning ofthe war. It looked like a natural raking out of the pent-up jealousies andrivalries of the complicated politics of Europe.... We, at the distanceof America, looked on at first without a full comprehension of what theplot was getting into. "[2] That the aims of the belligerent powers mightaffect the conscience or the fortunes of America he did not perceive. Heurged us not to be "thrown off our balance by a war with which we havenothing to do, whose causes cannot touch us, whose very existence affordsus opportunities of friendship and disinterested service which should makeus ashamed of any thought of hostility or fearful preparation fortrouble. " Hence his proclamation of neutrality, which was universallyaccepted as right. Hence, also, his adjuration to be "impartial in thoughtas well as in action, " which was not so universally accepted and marks, perhaps, a definite rift between Wilson and the bulk of educated opinionin the Northeast. 

[Footnote 2: Speech on the _George Washington_, July 4, 1919. ]

During the early days of August Wilson had proclaimed his desire to actas mediator between the warring forces, although he must have realizedthat the suggestion would prove fruitless at that moment. Again, afterthe battle of the Marne, he took advantage of German discouragement, apparently receiving a hint from Johann von Bernstorff, GermanAmbassador in Washington, to sound the belligerents on the possibility ofan arrangement. Failing a second time to elicit serious consideration ofpeace, he withdrew to wait for a better opportunity. Thus the Germans, beaten back from Paris, vainly pounded the allied lines on the Yser; theRussians, after forcing their path through Galicia, defended Warsaw withdesperation; while Wilson kept himself and his country strictly alooffrom the conflict. 

But no mere desires or declarations could prevent the war from touchingAmerica, and each day made more apparent the difficulties and the dangersof neutrality. The Atlantic no longer separated the two worlds. InSeptember and October the British Government, taking advantage of thenaval supremacy assured by their fleet, issued Orders in Council designedto provide for close control of neutral commerce and to prevent theimportation of contraband into Germany. British supervision of war-timetrade has always been strict and its interpretation of the meaning ofcontraband broad; the present instance was no exception. American shipsand cargoes were seized and confiscated to an extent which, while itdoubtless seemed justified to the British, who were fighting for theirlives, evoked a chorus of bitter complaints from American producers andexporters. Commerce with neutral countries of Europe threatened to becomecompletely interrupted. On the 21st of October and again on the 26th ofDecember, the State Department sent notes of protest to the BritishGovernment. The tone of the discussion was notably sharpened by theseizure of the _Wilhelmina_, supposedly an American ship, though, aslater developed, she had been chartered by a German agent in New York, Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, in order to bring the Anglo-American dispute to ahead. 

How far the interference with our trade by the British might haveembittered relations, if other issues had not seemed more pressing, no onecan say. Precisely at the moment when business men were beginning to callupon Wilson for a sturdier defense of American commercial rights, acontroversy with Germany eclipsed, at least from the eye of the generalpublic, all other foreign questions. From the moment when the defeat onthe Marne showed the Germans that victory was not likely to come quicklyto their arms, the Berlin Government realized the importance of preventingthe export of American munitions. Since the allies held control of theseas an embargo on such export would be entirely to German advantage, andthe head of German propaganda in this country, a former ColonialSecretary, Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, attempted to mobilize German-Americansentiment and to bring pressure upon Congressmen through theirconstituents in favor of such an embargo. It was easy to allege that theexport of arms, since they went to the allied camp alone, was on its face, unneutral. Several Senators approved the embargo, among them the chairmanof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William J. Stone of Missouri. Against the proposed embargo Wilson set his face steadfastly. He perceivedthe fallacy of the German argument and insisted that to prevent the exportof arms would be itself unneutral. The inability of the Central Powers toimport arms from the United States resulted from their inferiority on thehigh seas; the Government would be departing from its position ofimpartiality if it failed to keep American markets open to every nation ofthe world, belligerent or neutral. The United States could not change therules in the middle of the game for the advantage of one side. The perfectlegality of Wilson's decision has been frankly recognized since the war bythe German Ambassador. 

But the execution of German military plans demanded that the alliedshortage in munitions, upon which the Teutons counted for success in thespring campaigns, should not be replenished from American sources. Failing to budge Wilson on the proposal of an embargo, they launchedthemselves upon a more reckless course. On February 4, 1915, the GermanAdmiralty issued a proclamation to the effect that after the 18th ofFebruary, German submarines would destroy every enemy merchant vesselfound in the waters about the British Isles, which were declared a "warzone"; and that it might not be possible to provide for the safety ofcrew or passengers of destroyed vessels. Neutral ships were warned of thedanger of destruction if they entered the zone. The excuse alleged forthis decided departure from the custom of nations was the Britishblockade upon foodstuffs, which had been declared as a result of thecontrol of food in Germany by the Government. Here was quite a differentmatter from British interference with American trade-rights; for if theGerman threat were carried into effect it signified not merely thedestruction or loss of property, for which restitution might be made, butthe possible drowning of American citizens, perhaps women and children, who would be entirely within their rights in traveling upon merchantvessels and to whom the Government owed protection. 

Wilson's reply was prompt and definite. "If the commanders of Germanvessels of war should ... Destroy on the high seas an American vessel orthe lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Governmentof the United States to view the act in any other light than as anindefensible violation of neutral rights.... The Government of the UnitedStates would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to astrict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to takeany steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives andproperty and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of theiracknowledged rights on the high seas. " It was the clearest of warnings. Would Germany heed it? And if she did not, would Wilson surrender hispacific ideals and take the nation into war?

CHAPTER III

THE SUBMARINE

Early in the winter of 1914-1915 President Wilson apparently foresawsomething of the complications likely to arise from the measures andcounter-measures taken by the belligerents to secure control of overseascommerce, and sent his personal adviser, Colonel House, across theAtlantic to study the possibilities of reaching a _modus vivendi_. Therewas no man so well qualified for the mission. Edward Mandell House was aTexan by birth, but a cosmopolitan by nature. His hobby was practicalpolitics; his avocation the study of history and government. Hiscatholicity of taste is indicated by the nature of his library, whichincludes numerous volumes not merely on the social sciences but also onphilosophy and poetry. His intellectual background was thus no lessfavorable than his political for the post which he assumed as Wilson'spersonal adviser. Disqualified by physical delicacy from entering thepolitical arena himself and consistently refusing office, he had foryears controlled the political stage in his own State; in 1912, exercising strong influence in the national party organization, he haddone much to crystallize sentiment in favor of Wilson as presidentialcandidate. Slight in stature, quiet in manner and voice, dislikingpersonal publicity, with an almost uncanny instinct for divining themotives that actuate men, he possessed that which Wilson lacked--thecapacity to "mix, " to meet his fellow mortals, no matter what theirestate, on a common ground. 

Courteous and engaging, Colonel House was an unexcelled negotiator: hehad a genius for compromise, as perfect a control of his emotions as ofhis facial expression, and a pacific magnetism that soothed intoreasonableness the most heated interlocutor. His range of acquaintance inthe United States was unparalleled. Abroad, previous to the war, he haddiscussed international relations with the Kaiser and the chief statesmenof France and England. His experience of American politics and knowledgeof foreign affairs, whether derived from men or from books, were matchedby an almost unerring penetration in the analysis of a politicalsituation, domestic or European. As a liberal idealist and pacifist, hesaw eye to eye with Wilson; his sense of political actualities, however, was infinitely more keen. 

But even the skill of Colonel House was not sufficient to induce Germanyto hold her hand, and, as spring advanced, it became increasingly clearthat she was resolved to carry her threats of unrestricted submarinewarfare into effect. The quality of Wilson's pacifism was about to be putto the test. In March a British steamer, the _Falaba_, was sunk and anAmerican citizen drowned; some weeks later an American boat, the_Cushing_, was attacked by a German airplane; and on the 1st of May, another American steamer, the _Gulflight_, was sunk by a submarine withthe loss of two American lives. When was Wilson going to translate intoaction his summary warning of "strict accountability?" Even as thequestion was asked, we heard that the Germans had sunk the _Lusitania_. On the 7th of May, 1915, at two in the afternoon, the pride of theBritish merchant marine was struck by two torpedoes fired from a Germansubmarine. She sank in half an hour. More than eleven hundred of herpassengers and crew were drowned, among them one hundred and twenty-fourAmericans, men, women, and children. 

The cry that went up from America was one of anguish, but still more oneof rage. This attack upon non-combatant travelers, citizens of a neutralstate, had been callously premeditated and ruthlessly executed in coldblood. The German Government had given frigid warning, in a newspaperadvertisement, of its intention to affront the custom of nations and thelaws of humanity. A wave of the bitterest anti-German feeling swept downthe Atlantic coast and out to the Mississippi; for the first time therebecame apparent a definite trend of opinion demanding the entrance of theUnited States into the war on the side of the Entente. On that day Wilsonmight have won a declaration of war, so strong was popular sentiment; anddespite the comparative indifference of the Missouri valley and the FarWest, he might have aroused enthusiasm if not unity. 

But a declaration of war then would, in all probability, have been amistake. Entrance into the war at that time would have been based uponneither judgment nor ideals, but merely upon emotion. The American peoplewere in no way prepared to bring material aid to the cause of justice, nor did the nation yet appreciate the moral issues involved. It wouldhave been a war of revenge for American lives lost. The President was bytemperament disinclined to listen to the passionate demands forintervention, and, as historian, he must have had in mind the errorcommitted by McKinley when he permitted the declaration of war on Spain, after the sinking of the _Maine_ in 1898. Sober afterthought hasgenerally agreed that Wilson was right. But he was himself led into aserious error that produced consequences which were not soon to bedissipated. Speaking three days after the event, when the world looked tohim to express the soul of America, and dealing with the spirit ofAmericanism, he permitted an unfortunate phrase to enter his address andto cloud his purpose. "There is such a thing, " he said, "as a man beingtoo proud to fight. " The phrase was by no means essential to the mainpoints of his address; it was preceded by one of greater importance, namely that "the example of America must be a special example ... Ofpeace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the worldand strife is not. " It was followed by another of equal importance, thata nation may be so much in the right "that it does not need to convinceothers by force that it is right. " These two phrases expressed what wasin the President's mind clearly and definitely: the United States wasconsecrated to ideals which could not be carried into effect throughforce, unless every other method dictated by supreme patience had failed. But the world did not notice them. All that it remembered was that theUnited States was "too proud to fight. " What did this mean to the averageman except that the country was afraid to fight? The peoples of theEntente powers were contemptuous; Germans were reassured; Americans werehumiliated. 

Wilson the phrase-maker was betrayed by a phrase, and it was to pursue himlike a Fury. The chorus of indignation and shame aroused by this phrasecovered completely the determination and skill with which he entered uponthe diplomatic struggle with Germany. His purpose was definite. He hadgone on record in February that the United States Government would protectthe rights of American citizens, and he was bound to secure from Germany apromise that merchant ships should not be torpedoed without warning orassuring the lives of crew and passengers. And yet by virtue of hispacific principles this promise could not be forcibly extracted untilevery other possible method had been attempted in vain. Unquestionably hewas supported in his policy by many, perhaps most, thoughtful people, although wherever support was given him in the East it was generallygrudging. Such a representative and judicial mind as that of ex-PresidentTaft favored cool consideration and careful action. But the difficultiesencountered by the President were tremendous. On the one hand he met thebitter denunciations of the group, constantly increasing in numbers, whichdemanded our immediate intervention on the side of the Entente. Led byRoosevelt, who no longer felt as in the previous September, that theUnited States had no immediate interest in the war, this group includedinfluential men of business and many writers. They had lost patience withWilson's patience. His policy was, in their opinion, that of a coward. Onthe other hand, Wilson was assailed by pro-Germans and die-hard pacifists;the former believed that the British blockade justified Germany'ssubmarine warfare; the latter were afraid even of strong language indiplomatic notes, lest it lead to war. At the very outset of thediplomatic controversy with Germany, before the second _Lusitania_ notewas dispatched, the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, resigned, in the belief that the President's tone was too peremptory. For Bryan waswilling to arbitrate even Germany's right to drown American citizens onthe high seas. The defection of this influential politician a yearprevious would have weakened Wilson seriously, but by now the Presidenthad won secure control of the party. He was, indeed, strengtheneddiplomatically by Bryan's resignation, as the latter, in a conversationwith the Austrian Ambassador, had given the impression that Americanprotests need not be taken over-seriously. His continuance in office mighthave encouraged German leaders to adopt a bolder tone. 

From the very beginning of his attempts to obtain from Germany a disavowalfor the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and a promise not to sink withoutwarning, the President took his stand upon high ground. Not merely did heinsist upon the rights guaranteed to neutrals by the law of nations; hetook the controversy out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomaticdiscussion and contended "for nothing less high and sacred than the rightsof humanity. " To this he recurred in each of his notes. Germany avoidedthe issue. At first she insisted that the _Lusitania_ was armed, carryingexplosives of war, transporting troops from Canada, and thus virtuallyacting as a naval auxiliary. After the falsity of this assertion wasshown, she adduced the restrictions placed by Great Britain on neutraltrade as excuse for submarine operations, and contended that thecircumstances of naval warfare in the twentieth century had so changedthat the principles of international law no longer held good. 

Each time Wilson returned to his point that the "rights of neutrals arebased upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles areimmutable. Illegal and inhuman acts ... Are manifestly indefensible whenthey deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights, particularly whenthey violate the right to life itself. If a belligerent cannot retaliateagainst an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals, as well as theirproperty, humanity, as well as justice and a due regard for the dignityof neutral powers should dictate that the practice be discontinued. "Wilson terminated his third note to Germany with a warning, which had thetone, if not the form, of an ultimatum: there must be a scrupulousobservance of neutral rights in this critical matter, as repetition of"acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Governmentof the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberatelyunfriendly. "

The exchange of notes consumed much time and proved a severe test forAmerican patience. The first _Lusitania_ note was sent on the 13th ofMay and it was not until the 1st of September that the German Governmentfinally gave a pledge that was acceptable to Wilson. In the meantimethere had been continued sinkings, or attempts to sink, in clearviolation of the principles for which the President was contending. The_Nebraskan_, the _Armenian_, the _Orduna_, were subjected to submarineattacks. On the 19th of August the _Arabic_ was sunk and two Americanslost. The ridicule heaped upon the President by the British and certainsections of the American press, for his writing of diplomatic notes, wasonly equaled by the sense of humiliation experienced by pro-Ententeelements in this country. _Punch_ issued a cartoon in which Uncle Sampointed to Wilson as having outstripped the record made by Job forpatience. Nevertheless Wilson obtained the main point for which he wasstriving. On September 1, 1915, the German Government gave the definitepledge that "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warningand without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that theliners do not try to escape or offer resistance. " Wilson had sought tosafeguard a principle by compelling from Germany a written acknowledgmentof its validity. So much he had won and without the exercise of force. Even those whose nerves were most overwrought by the long-drawn-outnegotiations, admitted that it was a diplomatic victory. 

The victory was not clean-cut, for Germany had not yet disavowed thesinking of the _Lusitania_, nor did the category "liners" seem to includeall merchant vessels. How real was even the partial victory remained tobe seen. Within three days of the German pledge the _Hesperian_ was sunkand an American citizen drowned. On the 7th of November the _Ancona_ wastorpedoed in the Mediterranean by an Austrian submarine with the loss ofmore American lives. It is true that after each case a disavowal was madeand a renewal of promises vouchsafed. But it seemed obvious that Germanywas merely playing for time and also that she counted upon pro-German andpacifist agitation in this country. For a brief period it appeared as ifher hopes were not to be entirely disappointed. British merchant vessels, following long-established custom, had for some months been armed forpurposes of defense. The German Government on February 10, 1916, announced that henceforward such armed merchantmen would be regarded asauxiliary cruisers and would be sunk without warning. It was unfortunatethat Robert Lansing, who had succeeded Bryan as Secretary of State, hadproposed on January 18, 1916, to the diplomatic representatives of theAllied forces that they cease the arming of merchantmen as a means ofsecuring from Germany a pledge which would cover all merchantmen as wellas passenger liners; this proposal gave to Germany a new opportunity forraising the issue of the submarine. But either Lansing's proposal hadbeen made without Mr. Wilson's sanction or the President changed hismind, since on the 10th of February Wilson declared that he intended torecognize the right of merchantmen to arm for purposes of defense. Oncemore he insisted that the rules of war could not be changed during warfor the advantage of one side. 

His declaration led at once to something like a revolt of Congress. Already some of those who especially feared intervention had beensuffering from an attack of panic as a result of Wilson's recent decisionto support the preparedness movement. They were further terrified by thepossibility that some American citizen traveling on an armed merchantmanmight lose his life and that the demand for entrance into the war mightthus become irresistible. Bryanites, pro-German propagandists, and Irishcombined against the President, and were reinforced by all thediscontented elements who hoped to break Wilson's control of theDemocratic party. The combination seemed like a new cave of Adullam. Resolutions were introduced in the Senate by Thomas P. Gore and in theHouse by Jeff McLemore, based upon suggestions made by Bryan nine monthsbefore, that American citizens should be warned not to travel on armedmerchant vessels. Senator Stone, of the Foreign Relations Committee, supported these resolutions and it appeared probable that Germany wouldfind her strongest support in the American Congress. 

Wilson struck sharply. Not merely his leadership of the party and thecountry was at stake, but also that moral leadership of neutral nationsand the world toward which the struggle with Germany was to take him. Refusing to receive Senator Stone, he sent him a letter in which thecardinal points of his position were underlined. "Once accept a singleabatement of right, " he insisted, "and many other humiliations wouldcertainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law mightcrumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are now contending for inthis matter is the very essence of the things that have made America asovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her ownimpotency as a Nation and making virtual surrender of her independentposition among the nations of the world. " This definite enunciation wasin effect an appeal to the American people, which came as a relief tothose who had suffered from presidential patience under German outrages. The storm of public feeling aroused against the rebellious Congressmenwas such that Wilson's victory became assured. Demanding concretejustification of his stand, he insisted that the resolutions be put tothe vote. The issue was somewhat confused in the Senate so that the votewas not decisive; but in the House the McLemore resolution was defeatedby a vote of 276 to 142. 

And yet the submarine issue was not finally closed. Less than a monthafter the rights of American citizens were thus maintained, the Britishpassenger steamer _Sussex_, crossing the English Channel, was torpedoedwithout warning. It was the clearest violation of the pledge given by theGerman Government the previous September. Once again Wilson acted withoutprecipitancy. He waited until the Germans should present explanationsand thereafter took more than a week in which to formulate his decision. Finally, on April 19, 1916, he called the two houses of Congress in jointsession to lay before them his note to Germany. Unlike his _Lusitania_notes, this was a definite ultimatum, clearly warranted by the undeniablefact that Germany had broken a solemn pledge. After recounting the longlist of events which had so sorely tried American patience, Wilsonconcluded that "unless the Imperial German Government should nowimmediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods ofwarfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels this Governmentcan have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Governmentof the German Empire altogether. " The force of the ultimatum wasemphasized by the general tone of the note, in which, as in the_Lusitania_ notes, the President spoke not so much for the legal rightsof the United States, as in behalf of the moral rights of all humanity. He stressed the "principles of humanity as embodied in the law ofnations, " and excoriated the "inhumanity of submarine warfare"; heterminated by stating that the United States would contemplate adiplomatic break with reluctance, but would feel constrained to take thestep "in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations. " This noteof emphasis upon America's duty to mankind rather than to herself formedthe main theme of a speech delivered two days previous: "America willhave forgotten her traditions whenever upon any occasion she fightsmerely for herself under such circumstances as will show that she hasforgotten to fight for all mankind. And the only excuse that America canever have for the assertion of her physical force is that she asserts itin behalf of the interests of humanity. "

Germany yielded before Wilson's ultimatum, though with bad grace, andpromised that no more merchant ships would be sunk "without warning andwithout saving human lives. " But she also tried to make her promiseconditional upon the cessation by Great Britain of methods of warfarewhich Germany called illegal, implying that her pledge might be withdrawnat her pleasure: "the German Government ... Must reserve itself completeliberty of action. " This condition Wilson, in taking note of Germany'spledge, definitely waved aside: "the Government of the United Statesnotifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authoritiesfor the rights of American citizens upon the high seas should in any wayor in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of anyother government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, notrelative. " By its silence the German Government seemed to acquiesce andthe crisis was over. The country had been close to war, but interventionmight yet be avoided if Germany kept her word. That, however, was acondition upon which people were learning not to rely. 

It is obvious that by the early summer of 1916 President Wilson'sattitude on foreign affairs had undergone a notable transformation fromthat parochial spirit of 1914 which had led him to declare that the warwas no concern of America; he had given over completely the traditionthat if we keep our own hands clean we fulfill our duty. He had begun toelaborate an idealistic policy of service to the world, not unreminiscentof the altruistic schemes of Clay and Webster for assisting oppressedrepublicans in Europe during the first third of the nineteenth century. Wilson, like those statesmen, had always felt that the position of theUnited States in the world was of a special sort, quite different fromthat of the European states, and circumstances were forcing him to takethe stand that the nation must assume the lead in the world in order toensure the operation of the principles that Americans believe in. "We arein some sort and by the force of circumstances the responsible spokesmanof the rights of humanity. " He still opposed active intervention in thewar; the mission of the United States was a higher one than couldadequately be fulfilled through war; the kind of service we could bestgive was not fighting. Yet he was brought to admit, even before the_Sussex_ crisis (February 26, 1916), that in the last instance war mightbe necessary if the American people were to assume the rôle of championof liberty in the world at large, as they had championed it in theAmericas; for the rights of humanity must be made secure against menace:"America ought to keep out of this war ... At the expense of everythingexcept this single thing upon which her character and history arefounded, her sense of humanity and justice.... Valor withholds itselffrom all small implications and entanglements and waits for the greatopportunity, when the sword will flash as if it carried the light ofheaven upon its blade. " Thus the possibility of ultimate force wasimplied. Eighteen months previous, peace had been for Wilson an end initself. Now it was subordinated to the greater end implied in maintainingthe principle of justice in the world. 

During this period popular sentiment also underwent a notabledevelopment. Americans reacted sharply to German threats and outrages, and were thrown off their comfortable balance by the events which touchedAmerican honor and safety so closely. Like Wilson, they were shaken outof that sense of isolation which enveloped them in 1914, and they werethus prepared for the reception of broader ideals. The process ofeducation was slow and difficult. It was hampered by the confusion offoreign issues. Propagandists took advantage of the controversy withGreat Britain in order to obscure the principles upon which thediscussions with Germany were based. The increasing stringency of Britishcontrol of commerce and the blacklisting of various American firms by theBritish authorities resulted in numerous American protests and to somewarmth of feeling. Wilson was no particular friend of the British, but herightly insisted upon the distinction between the dispute with Germany, which involved the common right of humanity to life, and that with GreatBritain, which involved merely rights of property. Nevertheless thatdistinction was blurred in the minds of many Americans, and theirperception of the new ideals of foreign policy was necessarily confused. 

The education of the American people to the significance of the issue wasalso hampered by the material change that came over the country duringthe latter part of 1915 and the spring of 1916. The influx of gold andthe ease with which fortunes were accumulated could not but havewidespread effects. The European war came at a moment when the UnitedStates was passing through a period of comparatively hard times. Stringency was naturally increased by the liquidation of foreigninvestments in 1914 and the closing of European markets to Americancommerce. Business was dull. But this condition was rapidly alteredthrough the placing of large contracts by the Entente Governments and themost extensive buying by foreign purchasers. New markets were found amongthe neutral states, which were unable to buy in Europe. Naturally theredeveloped a rapid extension of industrial activities. New manufacturingconcerns grew up, large and small, as a result of these adventitiousconditions, which paid enormous returns. Activities upon the stock marketwere unparalleled. New and sudden fortunes were made; millionairesbecame common. The whole world was debtor to America and a golden streamflowed across the Atlantic. Prices rose rapidly and wages followed. 

Inevitably materialism conquered, at least for the moment. The demand forluxuries was only equaled by the craze for entertainment. Artisans andshopgirls invaded the jewelry stores of Fifth Avenue. Metropolitan lifewas a succession of luncheons and teas, where fertile brains were busiedwith the invention of new dancing steps rather than the issues of theEuropean war. Cabarets were crowded and seats for midnight beauty showsmust be secured well in advance or by means of gargantuan tips toplutocratic head waiters. Much of the materialism was simply external. Inevery town American women by the thousand gave lavishly of their time andstrength to knit and roll bandages for the fighters and wounded overseas. America was collecting millions for the relief of Belgium, Serbia, andfor the Red Cross. The American Ambulance in France was served by menimbued with the spirit of sacrifice. Thousands of American youthsenlisted in the Canadian forces. The general atmosphere of the country, however, was heavy with amusement and money-making. Not yet did Americafully realize that the war was a struggle of ideals which must concernevery one closely. In such an atmosphere the idealistic policy of Wilsonwas not easily understood. 

The President himself cannot escape a large share of the blame forAmerica's blindness to the issue. During the first twelve months of thewar, when the country looked to him for leadership, he had, purposely orotherwise, fostered the forces of pacifism and encouraged the advocatesof national isolation. He had underlined the separation of the UnitedStates from everything that went on in Europe and insisted that in theissues of the war the American people had no interest. In deference tothe spirit of pacifism that engrossed the Middle West, he had opposed themovement for military preparedness. When, late in 1915, Wilson changedhis attitude and attempted to arouse the country to a sense of Americaninterest in world affairs and to the need of preparing to acceptresponsibility, he encountered the opposition of forces which he himselfhad helped to vitalize. 

Popular education, especially upon the Atlantic coast, was furtherhampered by the personal irritation which the President aroused. Dislikedwhen inaugurated, he had attracted bitter enmity among the business menwho dominate opinion in New England and the Eastern States. They accusedhim of truckling to labor. They were wearied by his idealism, whichseemed to them all words and no deeds. They regarded his handling offoreign affairs, whether in the Mexican or submarine crises, as weak andvacillating. He was, in Rooseveltian nomenclature, a "pussyfooter. " Hencegrew up the tradition, which was destined to endure among many elementsof opinion, that everything advocated by Wilson must, simply by reason ofits authorship, be essentially wrong. The men of Boston, New York, andPhiladelphia were beginning to give over their attitude of isolation andadmit with Roosevelt that the United States ought to stand with theEntente. The Wilsonian doctrine of service to the world, however, was notto their taste, partly because they did not like Wilson. 

It was to the rural districts of the upper Mississippi and to the Souththat the President looked most eagerly for support of his new policy. These were the regions where indifference to and ignorance of foreignaffairs had been most conspicuous, but they were also the regions wherethe President's personal influence was strongest; finally they were thedistricts where extreme pacifism was most deeply embedded. If Wilson'schampionship of the rights of liberty throughout the world could beaccomplished by pacific methods, they would follow him; but if it meantwar, no one could guarantee what their attitude might be. Bryan waspopular in those parts. As yet Wilson, while he had formulated his policyin broad terms, had not indicated the methods or mechanism by which hisprinciples were to be put into operation. He would without questionencounter strong opposition among the German-Americans; he would find theattitude of the Irish foes of the Entente hostile; he would find thePacific coast more interested in Japanese immigration than in the idealsof the European war. Fortunately events were to unify the heterogeneouselements of the country, at least for the moment, in a way thatsimplified greatly the President's problem. Not the least of the unifyingforces was to be found in German psychology, which led the ImperialGovernment to believe that the United States could be rendered helplessthrough the intrigues of German spies. 

CHAPTER IV

PLOTS AND PREPAREDNESS

The Government of the German Empire was inspired by a spirit that was atonce modern and medieval, and this contradictory spirit manifested itselfin the ways and means employed to win the sympathy of the United Statesand to prevent it, as a neutral power, from assisting the Entente. Germany worked on the one hand by means of open propaganda, which is themethod of modern commercial advertisement translated into the politicalfield, and on the other by secret intrigue reminiscent of the days ofLouis XI. Her propaganda took the form of organized campaigns toinfluence opinion through speeches, pamphlets, and books, which weredesigned to convince the country of the justice of Germany's cause andthe dangers of becoming the catspaw of the Entente. Her plans of intriguewere directed towards the use of German-Americans or German spies toassist in the return of German officers from this country, to hinder thetransport of Canadian troops, to destroy communications, and to hamperthe output of munitions for the Entente by strikes, incendiary fires, andexplosions. 

During the first weeks of the war a German press bureau was establishedin New York for the distribution of pro-German literature and the supportof the German-American press. Its activities were chiefly directed by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, who defended Germany from the charge of responsibilityfor the war and expatiated upon her efficiency and the beneficence of herculture in the same breath that he attacked the commercial greed of GreatBritain, the cruel autocracy of Russia, and the imperialistic designs ofJapan in the Pacific. Its pamphlets went so far as to excoriate alliedmethods of warfare and to level accusations of inhumanity against theBelgians. It distributed broadcast throughout the country an appealsigned by ninety-three German professors and intellectuals, andcountersigned by a few notable Americans, which besought the Americanpeople not to be deceived by the "lies and calumnies" of the enemies ofGermany. 

This propaganda left all cold except those who already sympathized withGermany. Indeed it reacted unfavorably against the German cause, as soonas the well-authenticated reports came of German atrocities in Belgium, of the burning of the Louvain library, and of the shelling of Rheimscathedral. The efforts of German agents then shifted, concentrating in anattack upon the United States Government for its alleged unneutralattitude in permitting the export of munitions to the Entente. In somesections of the country they were able to arouse an opinion favorable tothe establishment of an embargo. In the Senate, on December 10, 1914, abill was offered by John D. Works of California providing for theprohibition of the sale of war supplies to any belligerent nation and asimilar bill was fathered in the House by Charles L. Bartlett of Georgia. These efforts were warmly supported by various associations, some ofwhich were admittedly German-American societies, although the majorityattempted to conceal their partisan feeling under such titles as_American Independence Union_ and _American Neutrality League_. Thelatter effectively displayed its interest in America and in neutrality bytumultuous singing of _Deutschland über Alles_ and _Die Wacht am Rhein_. Of sincerely pacifist organizations there were not a few, among whichshould not be forgotten the fantastic effort of Henry Ford in December, 1915, to end the war by sending a "Peace Ship" to Europe, designed toarouse such public opinion abroad in favor of peace that "the boys wouldbe out of the trenches by Christmas. " The ship sailed, but theexpedition, which was characterized by equal amounts of honesty andfoolishness, broke up shortly in dissension. For the most part pacifismand pro-Germanism went hand in hand--a tragic alliance of good and evilwhich was to hamper later efforts to evolve an international organizationfor the preservation of peace. 

The attempts of German propagandists to influence the policy of theGovernment met, as we have seen, the stubborn resolve of the Presidentnot to favor one camp of the belligerents by a departure frominternational custom and law during the progress of the war. Theirefforts, however, were not entirely relaxed. Appeals were made to workmento stop the war by refusing to manufacture munitions; vigorous campaignswere conducted to discredit the Administration by creating the beliefthat it was discriminating in favor of the British. But more and moreGermany took to secret intrigue, the strings of which were pulled by themilitary and naval attachés, von Papen and Boy-Ed. The German Ambassador, von Bernstorff, also took a lively interest in the plans to controlpublic opinion and later to hamper munitions production. With hisapproval, German manufacturing companies were organized at Bridgeport andelsewhere to buy up the machinery and supplies essential to theproduction of powder, shrapnel, and surplus benzol; arrangements weremade with the Bosch Magneto Company to enter into contracts with theEntente for fuses and at the last moment to refuse to complete thecontract. Von Bernstorff was careful to avoid active participation inplots for the destruction of property; but his interest and complicity, together with that of Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, Financial Adviser of theGerman Embassy, are evidenced by the checks drawn on their joint accountand paid to convicted criminals. 

One of the first of the plots was the attempted blowing up of theinternational bridge at Vanceboro, Maine, on December 31, 1914. Thematerials for this explosion were collected and the fuse set by a Germanreservist lieutenant, Werner Horn, who admitted that he acted under theorders of von Papen. Another plan of the German agents was thedestruction of the Welland Canal, which was entrusted to a brilliant anderratic adventurer, von der Goltz, who later confessed that he was underthe supervision of von Papen and had secured his materials from CaptainHans Tauscher, the agent in New York of the Hamburg-American Line. Thiscompany was involved in securing false manifests for vessels that carriedcoal and supplies to German cruisers, thus defrauding the United States, and in obtaining false passports for German reservists and agents; itacted, in fact, as an American branch of the German Admiralty. Moreserious yet was an attempt of the naval attaché, Boy-Ed, to involve theUnited States and Mexico in a dispute by a plot to bring back Huerta. This unhappy Mexican leader was arrested on the Mexican border in June, 1915, and shortly afterwards died. 

For some months the existence of such activities on the part of Germanagents had been suspected by the public. A series of disclosuresfollowed. In July, 1915, Dr. Albert, while riding on a New York elevatedtrain, was so careless as to set his portfolio on the seat for a fewmoments; it was speedily picked up by a fellow passenger who made a hastyexit. Soon afterwards the chief contents of the portfolio were published. They indicated the complicity of the German Embassy in differentattempts to control the American press and to influence public opinion, and proved the energy of less notable agents in illegal undertakings. Towards the end of August, the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Constantin Dumba, made use of an American correspondent, James F. J. Archibald by name, tocarry dispatches to the Central Empires. He was arrested by the Britishauthorities at Falmouth, and his effects proved Dumba's interest in plansto organize strikes in American munitions plants. "It is my impression, "wrote the Austrian Ambassador, "that we can disorganize and hold up formonths, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions inBethlehem and the Middle West, which in the opinion of the Germanmilitary attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs theexpenditure of money involved. " Archibald also carried a letter from vonPapen to his wife in which he wrote: "I always say to these idioticYankees that they had better hold their tongues. " Its publication did notserve to allay the warmth of American feeling. 

It was with great satisfaction, therefore, that the public learned inSeptember that President Wilson had requested the recall of AmbassadorDumba in the following words: "By reason of the admitted purpose andintent of Ambassador Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industriesof the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimatetrade, and by reason of the flagrant diplomatic impropriety in employingan American citizen protected by an American passport, as a secret bearerof official despatches through the lines of the enemy ofAustria-Hungary.... Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Governmentof the United States. " The two German attachés were given a longershrift, but on the 30th of November von Bernstorff was told that theywere no longer acceptable; von Papen sailed on the 22d of December andwas followed a week later by Boy-Ed. 

During the two preceding months there had been a constant series ofstrikes and explosions in munitions plants and industrial works, andpublic opinion was now thoroughly aroused. The feeling that Germany andAustria were thus through their agents virtually carrying on warfare inthe United States was intensified by the revelations of Dr. JosephGori[)c]ar, formerly an Austrian consul, but a Jugoslav who sympathizedwith the Entente; according to his statement every Austrian consul inthe country was "a center of intrigue of the most criminal character. "His charges came at the moment when Americans were reading that thenumber of strikes in munitions plants was unparalleled, no less than onehundred and two in a few months, of which fifty were in Bridgeport, which was known to be a center of German activities. Explosions andfires at the plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company and the BaldwinLocomotive Works, and at the Roebling wire-rope shop in Trenton were ofmysterious origin. 

To what extent explosions in munitions plants were the result of Germanincendiarism and not of an accidental nature, it is difficult todetermine. But the Department of Justice was so thoroughly convinced ofthe far-reaching character of German plots that President Wilson, in hisannual message of December, 1915, frankly denounced the "hyphenates" wholent their aid to such intrigues. "I am sorry to say that the gravestthreats against our national peace and safety have been uttered withinour own borders. There are citizens of the United States ... Who havepoured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our nationallife; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of ourGovernment into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thoughtit effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and todebase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. " His attack drewforth the bitter resentment of the foreign language press, but was hailedwith delight in the East, where German intrigues aroused as greatexcitement against the Fatherland as the submarine campaign. Nor was itcalmed by the continuance of fires and explosions and the evidentcomplicity of German officials. During the spring of 1916 a German agent, von Igel, who occupied the former offices of von Papen, was arrested, andthe activities of Franz von Rintelen, who had placed incendiary bombs onvessels leaving New York with food and supplies for the Allies, werepublished. Taken in conjunction with the sinking of the _Sussex_, Germanplots were now stimulating the American people to a keen sense of theirinterest in the war, and preparing them effectively for a new attitudetoward foreign affairs in general. 

It was inevitable that such revelations should have created a widespreaddemand for increased military efficiency. The nation was approaching thepoint where force might become necessary, and yet it was in no wayprepared for warfare, either on land or sea. During the first months ofthe war the helplessness of the United States had been laid bare byGeneral Leonard Wood, who declared that we had never fought a reallyfirst-class nation and "were pitifully unprepared, should such a calamitybe thrust upon us. " The regular army "available to face such a crisis"would be "just about equal to the police forces of Boston, New York, andPhiladelphia. " The "preparedness movement" thus inaugurated wascrystallized by the formation of the National Security League, designedto organize citizens in such a way "as may make practical an intelligentexpression of public opinion and may ensure for the nation an adequatesystem of national defense. " Pacifists and pro-Germans immediatelyorganized in opposition; and the movement was hampered by PresidentWilson's unwillingness to coöperate in any way. He was flatly opposed, inthe autumn of 1914 and the spring of the following year, to compulsorymilitary service: "We will not ask our young men to spend the best yearsof their lives making soldiers of themselves. " He insisted that theAmerican people had always been able to defend themselves and should beable to continue to do so without altering their military traditions. Itmust not be forgotten that at this time Wilson still believed in absoluteisolation and refused to consider force as an element in our foreignpolicy. His attitude was sufficient to render fruitless variousresolutions presented by Congressman Augustus P. Gardner and SenatorGeorge E. Chamberlain, who proposed improvements in the military system. Congress was pacifically-minded. This was the time when many Congressmenwere advocating an embargo on arms, and so far from desiring to learn howto make and use munitions of war they concentrated their efforts onmethods of preventing their export to the Allies. 

The preparedness movement, none the less, spread through the country andthe influence of the National Security League did much to inform thepublic. In the summer of 1915 there was organized at Plattsburg, NewYork, under the authority of General Wood, a civilian camp designed togive some experience in the rudiments of military science. It was notencouraged by the Administration, but at the end of the year thePresident himself confessed that he had been converted. He was about toabandon his policy of isolation for his new ideal of internationalservice, and he realized the logical necessity of supporting it by atleast a show of force. Mere negative "neutrality" no longer sufficed. Hisfear that greater military strength might lead to an aggressive spirit inthe country had been obliterated by the attacks of submarines and by theGerman plots. He admitted frankly that he had changed his mind. "I wouldbe ashamed, " he said, "if I had not learned something in fourteenmonths. " To the surprise of many who had counted upon his pacifictendencies to the end, he did what he had not heretofore done for any ofhis policies; he left his desk in Washington and took to the platform. 

During January and February, 1916, President Wilson delivered asuccession of speeches in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and other places in the upper Mississippi Valley, emphasizing hisconversion to preparedness. Aware that his transformation would beregarded as anti-German and tending to draw the United States into theconflict, he apparently sought out pro-German and pacifist centers, andfor the first time utilized something of the traditional "patriotic"style to rouse those citizens who, as yet, failed to appreciate thesignificance of the international situation. "I know that you aredepending upon me to keep the nation out of war. So far I have done so, and I pledge you my word that, God helping me, I will--if it is possible. You have laid another duty upon me. You have bidden me see that nothingstains or impairs the honor of the United States. And that is a matternot within my control. That depends upon what others do, not upon whatthe Government of the United States does, and therefore there may be atany moment a time when I cannot both preserve the honor and the peace ofthe United States. Do not exact of me an impossible and contradictorything, but stand ready and insist that everybody that represents youshould stand ready to provide the means for maintaining the honor of theUnited States. " And later: "America cannot be an ostrich with its head inthe sand. America cannot shut itself out from the rest of the world.... Do you want the situation to be such that all the President can do is towrite messages, to utter words of protest? If these breaches ofinternational law which are in daily danger of occurring should touch thevery vital interests and honor of the United States, do you wish to donothing about it? Do you wish to have all the world say that the flag ofthe United States, which we all love, can be stained with impunity?" Whata transformation from those days of December, 1914, when he believed thatmilitary preparation would prove that the American people had been thrownoff their balance by a war with which they had nothing to do! And what arevelation of the wounds inflicted by the barbed taunts cast against thePresident for his patience in the writing of diplomatic notes!

Had the President carried his enthusiasm into actual accomplishment andprovided for effective military and naval preparation, his claim to thetitle of great statesman would be more clear. Unfortunately when it cameto forcing Congress to take the necessary steps, he failed. The inertiaand reluctance of pacifist or partisan representatives would have beenbroken by Roosevelt. But Wilson did mere lip-service to the principle ofmilitary efficiency. The bills introduced in Congress were denounced bymilitary experts as half-measures likely to produce no efficient result, and the President, who in most matters was determined to dominate, inthis permitted congressional committees to have their way. The protestsof the Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, led to his resignation; and(most curious development) the President replaced him by a man, Newton D. Baker, who, whatever his capacity, was generally known as a pacifist. Wilson's intelligence told him that military preparation was necessary, if his policy of international service was to be anything more thanacademic; but his pacific instincts prevented him from securing realmilitary efficiency. 

An example of the unreadiness of the United States was furnished in thelate spring and summer of 1916, when relations with Mexico became strainedalmost to the breaking point. President Wilson's handling of the knottyMexican problem had been characteristic. He had temporized in the hopethat anything like a break might be avoided and was resolutely opposed toformal armed intervention. But after refusing to recognize Huerta, who hadgained his position of provisional president of Mexico through the murderof Madero, in which he was evidently implicated, the President had orderedthe occupation of Vera Cruz by United States troops in retaliation for thearrest of an American landing party and Huerta's refusal to fire anapologetic salute. Huerta was forced to give up his position and fled, butthe crisis continued and American-Mexican relations were not improved. Thecountry was left in the hands of three rival presidents, of whom Carranzaproved the strongest, and, after an attempt at mediation in which thethree chief South American powers participated, President Wilson decidedto recognize him. But Mexican conditions remained chaotic and Americaninterests in Mexico were either threatened or destroyed. In the spring of1916 an attack on American territory led by a bandit, Francisco Villa, again roused Wilson to action. He dispatched General John J. Pershingacross the border to pursue and catch Villa. The expedition was difficult, but well-conducted; it extended far south of the frontier and provoked theprotests of Carranza. At the moment when Pershing's advance guard seemedto have its hands on the bandit, orders were given to cease the pursuit. 

The opponents of the Administration had some excuse for laughing at the"inglorious and ineffectual war" thus waged. It had failed to result inthe capture of Villa and it gave rise to serious danger of an open breakwith Mexico. On the 21st of June an attack at Carrizal by Carranza'stroops resulted in the capture of some United States cavalrymen and themobilization of the national guard troops for the protection of theborder. But President Wilson was not to be drawn into intervention. Hemight be compelled to exercise force in carrying out his ideals ofinternational service against an international criminal like Germany; hewould not use it against a weaker neighbor and particularly at the momentwhen the United States must be free to face European complications. Butthe Mexican crisis proved definitely the weakness of the military system. Though the regulars who accompanied Pershing proved their worth, theclumsy inefficient mobilization of the National Guard, on the other hand, indicated as plainly as possible the lack of trained troops and officers. 

The President's determination not to intervene in Mexico probably assuredhim many votes in the pacifist regions of the Middle West in thepresidential election of 1916. That he would be renominated by theDemocrats was a foregone conclusion. He had alienated the machine leadersby his strict domination of Congress and the party; if he had permittedcertain political leaders to distribute offices for necessary organizationinterests, he had seen to it, none the less, that the Democratic bosseshad no share in the determination of policies. Still they could not hopeto prevent his nomination. Whatever chance the party might have in thecoming election lay in the personal strength of Wilson with the masses. Inthe South and the districts west of the Mississippi he was regarded as thegreatest Democrat since Jackson. His patience in dealing with Germany, aswith Carranza, convinced them of his desire for peace; the slogan, "He haskept us out of war, " was a powerful argument in those regions. Hisattitude towards labor had been friendly, so that the support of theunions in the large industrial centers might be expected. Placards wereposted showing a poor man's family with the caption, "He has protected meand mine, " in answer to the Republican posters which showed a widow andorphans (presumably of a drowned American citizen) and the caption, "Hehas neglected me and mine. " The remnants of the Progressives, who were notpurely Roosevelt supporters, were attracted by Wilson's legislativeprogramme and record of accomplishment. He could look to an independentvote such as no other Democrat could hope for. 

Despite this strength, the Republican leaders, if they could succeed ineffecting a reunion of their party, awaited the results of the electionwith confidence. They counted chiefly upon the personal unpopularity ofWilson on the Atlantic seaboard and the normal Republican vote in theindustrial centers of the Middle West. His foreign policy, east of theMississippi, was generally looked upon as anæmic and nebulous. He hadpermitted, so the Republicans contended, the honor of the country to bestained and Americans to be destroyed, without effective action. Hisearly opposition to preparedness and the half-hearted measures of armyreform had proved his weakness, at least to the satisfaction ofRepublican stump orators. He had won the hearty dislike of the bankers, the manufacturers, and the merchants by his attacks on capitalistinterests and by his support of labor unions. The Clayton Act, whichexempted strikes from Federal injunctions, and the Adamson Act, whichgranted, under threat, the immediate demands of the striking railroademployees, were cited as clear proof of his demagogic character. Furthermore, while he alienated the pro-Entente elements in New Englandand the Eastern States, he had drawn upon himself the hatred of theGerman-Americans by his attacks upon hyphenates and his refusal to acceptan embargo on American munitions. 

Had the Republicans been willing to accept Theodore Roosevelt, victorywould probably have come to them. He alone could have gathered in theProgressive and independent vote, and that of the Pacific coast, whichultimately went to Wilson. But the Old Guard of the Republicans refusedto consider Roosevelt; they could not take a man who had broken partylines four years before; above all they wanted a "safe and sane"President, who would play the political game according to rule--the ruleof the bosses--and they knew that were Roosevelt elected they could nothope to share in the spoils. The Republican convention ultimately settledupon Charles E. Hughes, who certainly was not beloved by the bosses, butwho was regarded as "steadier" than Roosevelt. The latter, in order todefeat Wilson, refused the offer of the Progressives, practicallydisbanded the party he had created, and called upon his friends to returnwith him to their first allegiance. 

Hughes did not prove a strong candidate. Whereas Wilson had stated hisposition on the German-American problem plainly, "I neither seek thefavor nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element among us whichputs loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States, "Hughes was ordered by his party managers not to offend foreign-bornvoters, and in his attempt to steer a middle course, gave a clearimpression of vacillation. Many of those who had been most thoroughlydisgusted with Wilson turned back to him again, as the weeks passed andHughes more and more sought refuge in vague generalizations. In acampaign in which the issues were largely personal the Republicancandidate's failure to evolve a constructive policy greatly weakened him, especially as Wilson had the advantage of the maxim that it is best notto change horses in the middle of the stream. Finally, Hughes did notprove adept in reconciling the Progressives. Indeed it was said to be apolitical _gaucherie_ on his part, or that of his advisers, whichalienated the friends of Governor Hiram Johnson of California and threwthe electoral vote of that State to Wilson. 

California turned the scale. When on the evening of the 7th of Novemberthe first returns came in and it was seen that Wilson had lost New Yorkand Illinois, the election of Hughes was generally conceded. Even the_New York Times_ and the _World_ admitted Wilson's defeat. But the nextmorning, news from the west indicated that the President still had achance. Later in the day the chance grew larger; he had won Ohio;Minnesota and California were doubtful. In both States voting was close;if Wilson won either the election would be his. It was not until the 11thof November that the returns from California definitely showed a smallWilson plurality, and only on the 21st that the Republicans finallyabandoned hope. Wilson had secured 277 electoral votes to 254 forHughes. He had been saved by the pacifist Middle and Far West, incombination with the South. But the victory meant something far differentfrom peace at any price. 

CHAPTER V

AMERICA DECIDES

The presidential campaign of 1916, taken in conjunction with theincreasing tension of European relations, forced Wilson to a furtherdevelopment of his international ideals and a more definite formulation ofthe means by which to attain them. As we have observed, the spring of thatyear saw him reject the doctrine of isolation. "We are participants, " hesaid on the 27th of May, "whether we would or not, in the life of theworld. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners withthe rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as theaffair of the nations of Europe and of Asia. " This recognition of ourinterest in world affairs immediately took him considerably beyond theposition he had assumed during the earlier stages of the submarinecontroversy. Until the spring of 1916 he had restricted his aims to thechampionship of neutral and human rights in time of war. But now he beganto demand something more far-reaching, namely a system that would preventunjust war altogether and would protect the rights of all peoples in timeof peace. He insisted, in this same speech of the 27th of May, before theLeague to Enforce Peace at Washington, "First that every people has aright to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live.... Second, that the small states of the world have a right to enjoy the same respectfor their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great andpowerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has aright to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its originin aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations. " Thesewords sum up the gist of his international aims during the three followingyears. His later speeches are merely refinement of details. 

In order that these ends might be secured it was necessary that someinternational system be inaugurated other than that which had permittedthe selfishness of the great powers to produce war in the past. In hissearch for a concrete mechanism to realize his ideals and secure themfrom violation, Wilson seized upon the essential principles of theLeague to Enforce Peace, of which William Howard Taft was president. Thebasis of permanent peace, Wilson insisted, could be found only bysubstituting international coöperation in place of conflict, through amobilization of the public opinion of the world against internationallawbreakers: "an universal association of the nations to maintain theinviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common andunhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any warbegun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and fullsubmission of the causes to the opinion of the world--a virtual guaranteeof territorial integrity and political independence. " These were theprinciples and methods which formed the keynote of his foreign policyuntil the end of the Peace Conference. The first part of the programme, that which concerned the security of the seas and which originated in theparticular circumstances of 1915, faded from his sight to a large extent;the second portion, more general in its nature, became of increasingimportance until, as Article X of the League Covenant, it seemed to himthe heart of the entire settlement. 

The unselfish nature of his idealism, as well as his continued detachmentfrom both camps of the belligerents, was obvious. "We have nothingmaterial of any kind to ask for ourselves, " he said, "and are quite awarethat we are in no sense or degree parties to the present quarrel. Ourinterest is only in peace and in its future guarantees. " But _noblesseoblige_, and we must serve those who have not had our good fortune. "Thecommands of democracy are as imperative as its privileges are wide andgenerous. Its compulsion is upon us.... We are not worthy to stand hereunless we ourselves be in deed and truth real democrats and servants ofmankind. "

That the United States might be drawn into the conflict evidently seemedpossible to the President, despite pacific whispers that came fromGermany in the spring and summer of 1916. There was a note ofapprehension in his speeches. No one could tell when the extremistfaction in Berlin might gain control and withdraw the _Sussex_ pledge. The temper of Americans was being tried by continued sinkings, althoughthe exact circumstances of each case were difficult to determine. Theattacks made by the German U-53 immediately off the American coast andthe deportation of Belgian civilians into Germany made more difficult thepreservation of amicable relations. In view of the possibility of warWilson wanted to define the issue exactly. "We have never yet, " he saidat Omaha, a peace center, on the 5th of October, "sufficiently formulatedour programme for America with regard to the part she is going to play inthe world, and it is imperative that she should formulate it at once.... It is very important that the statesmen of other parts of the worldshould understand America.... We are holding off, not because we do notfeel concerned, but because when we exert the force of this nation wewant to know what we are exerting it for. " Ten days later at Shadowlawnhe said: "Define the elements, let us know that we are not fighting forthe prevalence of this nation over that, for the ambitions of this groupof nations as compared with the ambitions of that group of nations; letus once be convinced that we are called in to a great combination tofight for the rights of mankind and America will unite her force andspill her blood for the great things which she has always believed in andfollowed. " He thus gave warning that the United States might have tofight. He wanted to be certain, however, that it did not fight as so manyother nations have fought, greedily or vindictively, but rather as in acrusade and for clearly defined ideals. 

His reëlection gave to the President an opportunity for bringing beforethe world his international aims. He purposed not merely to end theexisting conflict but also to provide a basis for permanent peace and thesecurity of democracy. During the early summer of 1916 he had receivedfrom Berlin hints that his mediation would not be unacceptable and it ispossible that he planned at that time new efforts to bring the war to aclose. But such a step was bound to be regarded as pro-German and in thestate of opinion immediately after the _Sussex_ crisis would haveproduced a storm of American protests. Then the entrance of Rumania intothe war so encouraged the Entente powers that there seemed little chanceof winning French and British acceptance of mediation. The presidentialelection further delayed any overt step towards peace negotiations. Finally the wave of anti-German feeling that swept the United States inNovember, on account of Belgian deportations, induced Wilson to hold backthe note which he had already drafted. But it was important not to delayhis pacific efforts over-long, since news came to Washington that unlessGermany could obtain a speedy peace the extremist group in Berlin wouldinsist upon a resumption of "ruthless" submarine warfare. In thesecircumstances, early in December, the President prepared to issue hisnote. 

But Germany acted more rapidly. Warned of Wilson's purpose the BerlinGovernment, on December 12, 1916, proposed negotiations. The occasionseemed to them propitious. Rumania had gone down to disastrous defeat. Russia was torn by corruption and popular discontent. On the westernfront, if the Germans had failed at Verdun, they were aware of the deepdisappointment of the Allies at the paltry results of the great Sommedrive. German morale at home was weakening; but if the Allies could bepictured as refusing all terms and determined upon the destruction ofGermany, the people would doubtless agree to the unrestricted use of thesubmarine as purely defensive in character, even if it brought to theAllies the questionable assistance of America. The German note itselfcontained no definite terms. But its boastful tone permitted theinterpretation that Germany would consider no peace which did not leaveCentral and Southeastern Europe under Teuton domination; the specificterms later communicated to the American Government in secret, verifiedthis suspicion. A thinly veiled threat to neutral nations was to be readbetween the lines of the German suggestion of negotiations. 

Although it was obvious that he would be accused of acting in collusionwith Germany, President Wilson decided not to postpone the peace notealready planned. He looked upon the crisis as serious, for if peace werenot secured at this time the chances of the United States remaining outof the war were constantly growing less. If he could compel a cleardefinition of war aims on both sides, the mutual suspicion of the warringpeoples might be removed; the German people might perceive that the warwas not in reality for them one of defense; or finally the Allies, towardwhom Wilson was being driven by the threats of German extremists, mightdefine their position in such terms as would justify him before the worldin joining with them in a conflict not waged for selfish nationalpurposes but for the welfare of humanity. Issued on December 18, 1916, his note summed up the chief points of his recently developed policy. Itemphasized the interest of the United States in the future peace of theworld, the irreparable injury to civilization that might result from afurther continuance of the existing struggle, the advantages that wouldfollow an explicit exposure of belligerent purposes, and the possibilityof making "the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediatefuture, a concert of nations immediately practicable. "

As a step towards peace the note was unsuccessful. Germany was evasive. There was nothing her Government wanted less than the definite exposureof her purposes that Wilson asked. Her leaders were anxious to beginnegotiations while German armies still held conquered territories aspawns to be used at the peace table. They would not discuss a League ofNations until Germany's continental position was secured. The Allies onthe other hand would not make peace with an unbeaten Germany, whichevidently persisted in the hope of dominating weaker nationalities andsaid no word of reparations for the acknowledged wrongs committed. Feeling ran high in England and France because Wilson's note had seemedto place the belligerents on the same moral plane, in its statement thatthe objects on both sides "are virtually the same, as stated in generalterms to their own people and to the world. " The statement was verballyaccurate and rang with a certain grim irony which may have touchedWilson's sense of humor. But the Allies were not in a state of mind toappreciate such humor. Their official answer, however, was frank, and insubstance accepted the principles of permanent peace propounded byWilson. It was evident to most Americans that the main purpose of Germanywas to establish herself as the dominating power of the continent andpossibly of the world; the aim of the Allies, on the other hand, seemedto be the peace of the world based upon democracy and justice rather thanmaterial force. 

The President's attempt thus cleared the air. It made plain to themajority of Americans that in sympathy, at least, the United States mustbe definitely aligned with Great Britain and France. Furthermore thereplies of the belligerents gave to Wilson an opportunity to inform theworld more definitely of the aims of the United States, in case it shouldbe drawn into the war. This he did in a speech delivered to the Senate onJanuary 22, 1917. America would play her part in world affairs, he said, but the other nations must clearly understand the conditions of ourparticipation. The basis of peace must be the right of each individualnation to decide its destiny for itself without interference from astronger alien power. "I am proposing as it were, that the nations shouldwith one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine ofthe world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over anyother nation or people, but that every people should be left free todetermine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. "Instead of the old system of alliances there should be a general concertof powers: "There is no entangling alliance in a concert of powers. Whenall unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act inthe common interest and are free to live their own lives under a commonprotection. " As the result of such a concert no one power would dominatethe sea or the land; armaments might safely be limited; peace would beorganized by the major force of mankind. As a guarantee of future justiceand tranquillity the terms that settled the present war must be basedupon justice and not be of the sort ordinarily dictated by the victor tothe vanquished. It must be a "peace without victory. " Thus while Wilsonwarned Germany that her ambitions for continental domination would not betolerated, he also warned the Allies that they could not count upon theUnited States to help them to crush Germany for their selfish individualpurposes. 

This speech, despite the unfortunate phrase, "peace without victory, " washailed in all liberal circles, amongst the Allies and in the UnitedStates, as a noble charter of the new international order. Wilson hadexpressed the hope that he was "speaking for the silent mass of mankindeverywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their realhearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come alreadyupon the persons and the homes they hold most dear. " This hope wasdoubtless realized. The first reaction in France and England was one ofrather puzzled contempt, if we may judge by the press. But the newspaperwriters soon found that what Wilson said many people had been thinking, and waiting for some one to say. Hall Caine wrote to the _Public Ledger_, "Let President Wilson take heart from the first reception of hisremarkable speech. The best opinion here is one of deep feeling andprofound admiration. " From that moment Wilson began to approach theposition he was shortly to hold--that of moral leader of the world. 

The President had been anxious to make plain his principles, before theUnited States became involved in the conflict through the withdrawal ofGerman submarine pledges, as well as to convince the world that everyhonest effort possible had been made to preserve the peace. He was onlyjust in time. Already the advocates of ruthlessness in Berlin hadpersuaded the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg. They recognized that theresumption of unrestricted submarine warfare meant, in all probability, the intervention of the United States, but they recked little of theconsequences. On January 16, 1917, the Kaiser telegraphed: "If a breakwith America is unavoidable, it cannot be helped; we proceed. " The sameday the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann, telegraphed to theGerman Minister in Mexico, instructing him to form an alliance withMexico in the event of war between Germany and the United States, and tooffer as bribe the States of New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas; he alsosuggested the possibility of winning Japan from her allegiance to theEntente and persuading her to enter this prospective alliance. 

On the 31st of January, von Bernstorff threw off the mask. The GermanAmbassador informed our Government of the withdrawal of the _Sussex_pledge. On and after the 1st of February, German submarines would sink onsight all ships met within a delimited zone around the British Isles andin the Mediterranean. They would permit the sailing of a few Americansteamships, however, provided they followed a certain defined route toFalmouth and nowhere else, and provided there were marked "on ship's hulland superstructure three vertical stripes one meter wide, to be paintedalternately white and red. Each mast should show a large flag checkeredwhite and red, and the stern the American national flag. Care should betaken that during dark, national flag and painted marks are easilyrecognizable from a distance, and that the boats are well lightedthroughout. " Other conditions followed. There might sail one steamship aweek "in each direction, with arrival at Falmouth on Sunday and departurefrom Falmouth on Wednesday. " Furthermore the United States Governmentmust guarantee "that no contraband (according to the German contrabandlist) is carried by those steamships. " Such were the orders issued to theUnited States. No native American could escape the humor of thestipulations, which for a moment prevented the national irritation fromswelling into an outburst of deep-seated wrath. 

There seems to have been little hesitation on the part of the President. On April 19, 1916, he had warned Germany that unrestricted submarinewarfare meant a severance of diplomatic relations. Now, on February 3, 1917, addressing both houses of Congress, he announced that thoserelations had been broken. Von Bernstorff was given his papers and theAmerican Ambassador, James W. Gerard, was recalled from Berlin. No othercourse of action could have been contemplated in view of the formality ofthe President's warning and the definiteness of Germany's defiance. Despite the protests of scattered pacifists, the country was as nearly aunit in its approval of Wilson's action as its heterogeneous nationalcharacter permitted. All the pent-up emotions of the past two years foundexpression in quiet but unmistakable applause at the departure of theGerman Ambassador. 

The promptitude of the President's dismissal of von Bernstorff did notconceal the disappointment which he experienced from Germany's revelationof her true purposes. He seems to have hoped to the end that the Germanliberals would succeed in bringing their Government to accept moderateterms of peace. Even now he expressed the hope that Germany's actionswould not be such as to force the United States into the War: "I refuseto believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do infact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do.... Onlyactual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now. " But"if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed bytheir naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just andreasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictatesof humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congressto ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessaryfor the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution oftheir peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothingless. I take it for granted that all neutral governments will take thesame course. " He was careful, moreover, to underline the fact that hisaction was dictated always by a consistent desire for peace: "We wish toserve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought andin action to the immemorial principles of our people.... These are thebases of peace, not war. God grant we may not be challenged to defendthem by acts of willful injustice on the part of the Government ofGermany!"

But Germany proceeded heedlessly. Warned that American intervention wouldresult only from overt acts, the German Admiralty hastened to commit suchacts. From the 3d of February to the 1st of April, eight American vesselswere sunk by submarines and forty-eight American lives thus lost. Because of the practical blockade of American ports which followed thehesitation of American shipping interests to send boats unarmed into thedangers of the "war zone, " President Wilson came again to Congress on the26th of February to ask authority to arm merchant vessels for purposes ofdefense. Again he stressed his unwillingness to enter upon formal warfareand emphasized the idealistic aspect of the issue: "It is not of materialinterests merely that we are thinking. It is, rather, of fundamentalhuman rights, chief of all the right of life itself. I am thinking notonly of the rights of Americans to go and come about their properbusiness by way of the sea, but also of something much deeper, much morefundamental than that. I am thinking of those rights of humanity withoutwhich there is no civilization.... I cannot imagine any man with Americanprinciples at his heart hesitating to defend these things. "

Blinded by prejudice and tradition, a handful of Senators, twelve"willful men, " as Wilson described them, blocked, through a filibuster, the resolution granting the power requested by the President. But thestorm of popular obloquy which covered them proved that the nation as awhole was determined to support him in the defense of American rights. The country was stirred to the depths. The publication of the plans ofGermany for involving the United States in war with Mexico and Japan camemerely as added stimulus. So also of the story of the cruelties heaped bythe Germans on the American prisoners of the _Yarrowdale_. There was somuch of justice in the cause that passion was notable by its absence. When finally on the 17th of March news came of the torpedoing of the_Vigilancia_ without warning, America was prepared and calmly eager forthe President's demand that Congress recognize the existence of a stateof war. 

The demand was made by Wilson in an extraordinary joint session ofCongress, held on the 2d of April. In this, possibly his greatest speech, he was careful not to blur the idealistic principles which, since thespring of 1916, he had been formulating. War existed because Germany byits actions had thrust upon the United States the status of belligerent. But the American people must meet the challenge with their purposeclearly before them. "We must put excited feeling away. Our motive willnot be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of thenation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which weare only a single champion.... The wrongs against which we now arrayourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of humanlife. " He went on to define the objects of the war more specifically, referring to his earlier addresses: "Our object now, as then, is tovindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world asagainst selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the reallyfree and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose andaction as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. "Democracy must be the soul of the new international order: "A steadfastconcert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership ofdemocratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keepfaith within it or observe its covenants.... Only free peoples can holdtheir purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer theinterests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own. " Because theexisting German Government was clearly at odds with all such ideals, "Weare glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense aboutthem, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for theliberation of its peoples, the German people included: for the rights ofnations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choosetheir way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe fordemocracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations ofpolitical liberty. "

Wilson thus imagined the war as a crusade, the sort of crusade forAmerican ideals which Clay and Webster once imagined. He was in truthoriginating nothing, but rather resuscitating the generous dreams whichhad once inspired those statesmen. In conclusion, he reiterated his loveof peace. "But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fightfor the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, --fordemocracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voicein their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples asshall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself atlast free. " At the moment of the declaration of war Wilson was still theman of peace, and the war upon which the nation was embarking was, in hismind, a war to ensure peace. To such a task of peace and liberation, heconcluded in a peroration reminiscent of Lincoln and Luther, "we candedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are andeverything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the dayhas come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might forthe principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which shehas treasured. God helping her, she can do no other. "

How many Americans caught the real significance of Wilson's thought withall its consequences is doubtful. The country certainly looked upon thewar as a crusade. But there was in the national emotion much that did notaccord with the ideals of Wilson. The people hated Germany for thesinking of the _Lusitania_ and all the other submarine outrages, for hercrimes in Belgium, for the plots and explosions in this country, for theZimmermann note, and finally for her direct and insulting defiance ofAmerican rights. They recognized that the Allies were fighting forcivilization; they sympathized with the democracies of Europe, of which, since the Russian revolution of March, the Allied camp was composed, andthey wanted to help them. They feared for America's safety in the future, if Germany won the war. Most Americans entered the struggle, therefore, with a sober gladness, based partly on emotional, partly on quixotic, andpartly on selfish grounds. But nearly all fought rather to beat Germanythan to secure a new international order. Hence it was that after Germanywas beaten, Wilson was destined to discover that his idealistic preachinghad not fully penetrated, and that he had failed to educate his country, as completely as he believed, to the ideal of a partnership of democraticand peace-loving peoples as the essential condition of a new and safeworld. 

CHAPTER VI

THE NATION IN ARMS

When Congress declared that the United States was in a state of war withGermany, on April 6, 1917, the public opinion of the country was unifiedto a far greater extent than at the beginning of any previous war. Theextreme patience displayed by President Wilson had its reward. When theyear opened the majority of citizens doubtless still hoped that peace waspossible. But German actions in February and March had gone far towardsthe education of the popular mind, and the final speeches of the Presidentcrystallized conviction. By April there were few Americans, except thosein whom pacifism was a mania, who were not convinced that war with Germanywas the only course consistent with either honor or safety. It is probablethat many did not understand exactly the ideals that actuated Wilson, butnine persons out of ten believed it absolutely necessary to fight. 

But, however firmly united, the country was completely unprepared for warin a military sense, and must now pay the penalty for President Wilson'sopposition to adequate improvement of the military system in 1915 and forthe half-hearted measures taken in 1916. Total military forces, includingregular army, national guard, and reserves amounted to hardly threehundred thousand men and less than ten thousand officers. Even the regulararmy was by no means ready for immediate participation in the sort offighting demanded by the European war; and, even if adequate troops wereraised, the lack of trained officers would create the most seriousdifficulties. No wonder that the German General Staff ranked the UnitedStates, from the military point of view, somewhere between Belgium andPortugal. Furthermore, military experts had been discouraged by theattitude of the Administration. The Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, hadfailed, either through lack of administrative capacity or because ofpacifistic tendencies, to prepare his department adequately. He had donenothing to rouse Congress or the nation from its attitude of indifferencetowards preparation. By faith a pacifist, he had been opposed to universalmilitary service. An extreme liberal, he distrusted the professionalmilitary type and was to find it difficult to coöperate with the captainsof industry whose assistance was essential. 

Thus with a President and War Secretary, both of whom had beeninstinctively opposed to a large army and who had expressed their fear ofthe development of a militaristic spirit, and with a majority in Congressfavoring the traditional volunteer system, adherence to which had costthe British thousands of lives that might better have been used at home, the building of an effective army seemed a matter of extreme doubt. Greatcredit must go to both President Wilson and Secretary Baker for sinkingtheir natural instincts and seeking, as well as following, the advice ofthe military experts, who alone were capable of meeting the problems thatarose from a war for which the nation was not prepared. 

The President must face not only the special problems caused byunreadiness, but also the general difficulties which confront everyAmerican war-President and which had tried nearly to the breaking-pointeven the capacity of Lincoln. The President of the United States in timeof war is given the supreme unified command of the army and navy. Butwhile the responsibility is his, actual control often rests in the handsof others. Members of Congress always take a keen interest in armymatters; many of them have been or are militia-men. They have alwaysopposed a single army which could be recruited, trained, and operated asa unit, and approved the system of State militia which makes fordecentralization and gives to the separate States large influence in theformation of military policy. Even the President's control of the Federalarmy, regulars and volunteers, is limited by the decentralizedorganization of the different army bureaus, which depend upon Congressfor their appropriations and which operate as almost independent andfrequently competing units. The creation of a single programme for thearmy as a whole is thus a task of extreme difficulty. 

President Wilson, as historian, was well aware of the tremendous pricethat had been paid in past wars for such decentralization, accompanied asit was, inevitably, by delays, misunderstandings, and mistakes. He wasdetermined to create a single coördinating command, and his war policieswere governed from beginning to end by this purpose. He set up no newmachinery, but utilized as his main instrument the General Staff, whichhad been created in 1903 as a result of the blunders and confusion thathad been so painfully manifest in the Spanish War. When the United Statesentered the World War the General Staff had by no means acquired theimportance expected by those who had created it. [3] But to it thePresident turned, and it was this body enlarged in size and influencethat ultimately put into operation Wilson's policy of centralization. Itwas in accordance with the advice of the men who composed the GeneralStaff that the President elaborated the larger lines of the militaryprogramme, and they were the men who supervised the operation of details. 

[Footnote 3: In April, 1917, the General Staff consisted of fifty-oneofficers, only nineteen of whom were on duty in Washington. Of these, eight were occupied with routine business, leaving but eleven free forthe real purpose for which the staff had been created--"the study ofmilitary problems, the preparation of plans for national defense, andutilization of the military forces in time of war. "]

None of the processes which marked the transition of the United Statesfrom a peace to a war basis are comprehensible unless we remember thatthe President was constantly working to overcome the forces ofdecentralization, and also that the military programme was always on anemergency basis, shifting almost from week to week in accordance withdevelopments in Europe. 

The original programme did not provide for an expeditionary force inFrance. During the early days of participation in the war it was generallybelieved that the chief contributions of the United States to Alliedvictory would not be directly upon the fighting front. If the UnitedStates concentrated its efforts upon financing the Allies, furnishing themwith food, shipping, and the munitions which had been promised--so manypersons argued--it would be doing far better than if it weakenedassistance of that sort by attempting to set up and maintain a largefighting force of its own. The impression was unfortunately prevalent incivilian circles that Germany was on her last legs, and that the outcomeof the war would be favorably settled before the United States could putan effective army in the field. Military experts, on the other hand, morethoroughly convinced of German strength, believed that the final campaignscould not come before the summer of 1919, and did not expect to provide agreat expeditionary force previous to the spring of that year if indeed itwere ever sent. Thus from opposite points of view the amateur and theprofessional deprecated haste in dispatching an army to France. From themoment the United States entered the war, President Wilson certainlyseems to have resolved upon the preparation of an effective fightingforce, if we may judge from his insistence upon the selective draft, although he did not expect that it would be used abroad. But it may beasked whether he did not hope for the arrangement of a negotiated peace, which if not "without victory" would at least leave Germany uncrushed. Itis probable that he did not yet perceive that "force to the utmost" wouldbe necessary before peace could be secured; that realization was to comeonly in the dark days of 1918. 

A few weeks after America's declaration of war, however, France and GreatBritain dispatched missions led by Balfour, Viviani, and Joffre, torequest earnestly that at least a small American force be sent overseasat once for the moral effect upon dispirited France. The plea determinedthe President to send General Pershing immediately with a force of abouttwo thousand, who were followed in June and July, 1917, by sufficientadditional forces to make up a division. Wilson had been authorized byCongress, under the Selective Service Act, to send four volunteerdivisions abroad under the command of Roosevelt. But he refused tointerfere with the plans of the military experts, who strongly objectedto any volunteer forces whatever. Neither the valiant ex-President northe prospective volunteers were trained for the warfare of the moment, and their presence in France would bring no practical good to the Alliedcause; moreover the officers whom Roosevelt requested were sorely neededin American training camps. 

General Pershing, to whom was now entrusted the military fortunes of theAmerican army abroad, was an officer fifty-seven years old, who hadundergone wide military and administrative experience in Cuba and thePhilippines; he had been given extraordinary promotion by PresidentRoosevelt, who had jumped him from the rank of captain to that ofBrigadier General; and he had been selected to lead the punitive forcedispatched in pursuit of Villa in the spring of 1916. Distinguished inappearance, with superb carriage, thin lips, and squarely-chiselled chin, he possessed military gifts of a sound rather than brilliant character. Astrict disciplinarian, he failed to win from his troops that affectionwhich the _poilus_ gave to Pétain, while he never displayed the geniusthat compelled universal admiration for Foch. Neither ultimate successnor the stories of his dramatic remarks (as at the grave of La Fayette:"La Fayette, we are here!") succeeded in investing him with the heroichalo that ought to come to a victorious commander. As time passes, however, Pershing takes higher rank. His insistence upon soldierlyqualities, his unyielding determination to create American armies underan independent command, his skill in building up a great organization, his successful operations at St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne drive, despite faulty staff work--all these facts become more plain as weacquire perspective. If historians refuse to recognize him as a greatgeneral, they will surely describe his talents as more than adequate tothe exigencies of the military situation. 

The sending of the Pershing expedition did not at once alterfundamentally the original programme for raising an army of about amillion men to be kept in the United States, as a reserve in case ofemergency. There was no intention of sending to France more troops thanwould be needed to keep filled the ranks of the small expeditionaryforce. But the urgent representations of the Allies and reports fromAmerican officers induced a radical change in policy. The latteremphasized the unsound military position of our Allies and insisted thatthe deadlock could be broken and the war won only by putting a reallyeffective American army beside the French and British by the summer of1918. A programme was drawn up in France and sent to the War Department, according to which an army of thirty divisions should be sent abroadbefore the end of that year. Throughout 1917 this plan remained rather ahope than a definite programme and it was not until early in 1918 that itwas officially approved. It was thus of an emergency character and thisfact combined with the indefiniteness prevalent during the autumn of 1917to produce extreme confusion. In July, 1918, an eighty-division programmewas adopted and more confusion resulted. Furthermore the entire problemwas complicated by the question as to whether or not ships could be foundfor transportation. It had been assumed that it would take six months totransport five hundred thousand troops. But in May, 1918, and thereafternearly three hundred thousand troops a month were carried to France, largely through tonnage obtained from the British. Such a development oftransportation facilities was not and could not be foreseen. It increasedthe confusion. In the face of such difficulties, the problems ofman-power, training, and supplies had to be met and ultimately solved, largely through the centralization carried into effect by the GeneralStaff. 

The problem of man-power had been carefully considered during the weeksthat preceded our entrance into the war and the declaration of war foundthe Government prepared with a plan for a selective draft. On the 7th ofApril, the day after the declaration of war, President Wilson insistedthat "the safety of the nation depended upon the measure. "

Congress, however, was slow to accept the principle of conscription, andthe President encountered fierce opposition on the part of the advocatesof the volunteer system, who were led by men of such influence as SpeakerChamp Clark, House Leader Claude Kitchin, and the chairman of the HouseCommittee on Military Affairs, Stanley H. Dent. The President wasinflexible, declaring that the Administration would not "yield an inch ofany essential parts of the programme for raising an army by conscription, "and exercised his personal influence to its fullest extent in order tosecure a favorable vote. He was ably seconded by Julius Kahn, the rankingRepublican member of the House Military Committee, who was himself born inGermany. The failure of House and Senate to agree on the matter of ageliability delayed action for some weeks. Finally, on May 18, 1917, whatis popularly known as the Selective Service Act became law. 

This Act gave to the President power to raise the regular army byenlistment to 287, 000 men, to take into the Federal service all membersof the national guard, and to raise by selective draft, in twoinstallments, a force of a million troops. All men between the ages oftwenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, were registered on the 5th ofJune; this with the subsequent registration of men coming of age later, produced an available body of more than ten millions. And when in thefollowing year, the draft age was extended to include all men between theages of eighteen and forty-five, both inclusive, thirteen millions morewere added. From this body the names of those who were to serve weredrawn by lot. All men registered were carefully classified, in order thatthe first chosen might be those not merely best fitted for fighting, butthose whose absence on the firing line would least disturb the essentialeconomic life of the nation. Liberal exemptions were accorded, includingartisans employed in industries necessary to war production and men uponwhom others were dependent. On the 20th of July the first drawings weremade, and by the end of the year about half a million of the drafted men, now called the National Army, were mustered in. In the meantimeenlistments in the regular army and the national guard had raised thetotal number of troops to about a million and a quarter and of officersto more than one hundred thousand. Less than a year later, when thearmistice was signed, the army included over three and a half millions, of whom nearly two millions were in France. 

The real military contribution of the United States to allied victory layin man-power. It could not of its own resources transport the troops norequip them completely, but the raising of an enormous number of freshforces, partially trained, it is true, but of excellent fighting caliber, made possible the maneuvers of Foch that brought disaster to German arms. When once these armies arrived in numbers on the battle-line in France, the realization of the inexhaustible man-power of America did more thananything else to revive the spirit of the Allies and discourage theenemy. 

Infinitely more difficult than the problem of man-power were those oftraining and supplies. As we have seen, these problems were complicatedby the decision to send abroad an effective fighting force, a decisionwhich completely changed the entire military situation. The originalplan of maintaining an army only in the United States, as a reserve, permitted the questions of camps, supplies, equipment, munitions, andtraining to be undertaken at comparative leisure. But if a large army wasto be placed in France by 1918, these problems must be solved immediatelyand upon an emergency basis. Hence resulted the confusion and expensewhich nearly led to the breakdown of the whole programme in the winter of1917-18. The War Department faced a dilemma. If it waited until supplieswere ready, the period of training would be too short. On the other hand, if it threw the new draft armies immediately into the camps, assumingthat the camps could be prepared, the troops would lack the wool uniformsand blankets necessary for protection, as well as the equipment withwhich to drill. The second alternative appeared the less dangerous, andin September the first draft calls were made and by December the campswere filled. [4]

[Footnote 4: The size of the army raised in 1917 demanded the building ofenormous cantonments. Within three months of the first drawings sixteencomplete cities of barracks had sprung up, each to accommodate 40, 000inhabitants. They had their officers' quarters, hospitals, sewagesystems, filter plants, and garbage incinerators, electric lightingplants, libraries, theaters. By the 4th of September the National Armycantonments were ready for 430, 000 men, two-thirds of the first draft. Asingle camp involved the expenditure of approximately $11, 000, 000. CampGrant, at Rockford, Illinois, included 1600 buildings with space for45, 000 men and 12, 000 horses. The water, which before use was tested andfiltered, was supplied from six huge wells drilled 175 feet deep, carriedthrough 38 miles of water main, and stored in reservoir tanks holding550, 000 gallons. For lighting purposes there were 1450 miles of electricwire, 1200 poles, 35, 000 incandescent lamps. During the period ofconstruction, 50 carloads of building material were daily unloaded, andfor several weeks an average of 500, 000 board feet of lumber set updaily. The entire construction of the camp demanded 50, 000, 000 feet oflumber, 700 tons of nails, 4, 000, 000 feet of roofing, and 3, 000, 000square feet of wall board. ]

Many apprehensions were fulfilled in fact, when the terrible winterweather came, the worst in years. The northern camps faced it withinsufficient clothing. Pneumonia made its invasion. Artillerymen weretrained with wooden guns; infantrymen with wooden rifles or antiquatedKrags. But all the time the essential training proceeded and the callsfor replacements sent by General Pershing in France were met. 

The first and vital need was for officers to train the willing butinexperienced recruits. To meet this need a series of officers' trainingcamps had been established in the spring of 1917 and continued for a year. Each camp lasted for three months, where during twelve hours a day thecandidates for commissions, chiefly college graduates and young businessmen, were put through the most intensive drill and withering study. Alltold, more than eighty thousand commissions were granted through thecamps, and the story of the battlefields proved at once the caliber ofthese amateur officers and the effectiveness of their training. Specialcamps, such as the school of fire at Fort Sill, carried the officers astep further, and when they went overseas they received in schools inFrance instruction in the latest experience of the Allied armies. Thecolleges of the country were also formed into training schools andultimately about 170, 000 young men, under military age, in five hundredinstitutions of learning, joined the Students' Army Training Corps. 

In all the army schools French and British officers coöperated asinstructors and gave the value of their three years' experience on thefighting front. But the traditions of the American regular army, formulated in the Indian and frontier fights, rather than the siegemethods of the trenches, formed the basic principles of the instruction;General Pershing was insistent that an offensive spirit must be instilledinto the new troops, a policy which received the enthusiastic endorsementof the President. The development of "a self-reliant infantry by thoroughdrill in the use of a rifle and in the tactics of open warfare" was alwaysuppermost in the mind of the commander of the expeditionary force, whofrom first to last refused to approve the extreme specialization in trenchwarfare that was advised by the British and the French. 

The emergency nature of the military programme, resulting from the suddendecision to send a large army to France, the decentralization of armyaffairs, and the failure to prepare adequately in the years precedingentrance into the war--all these factors made a shortage of supplies inthe training camps inevitable. 

The first appropriation bill which was to provide the funds to purchaseclothing, blankets, and other necessities was not passed until the 15th ofJune, leaving a pitifully brief space of time for the placing of contractsand the manufacture and transport of supplies. Many factories had to bebuilt, and many delays resulted from the expansion of the QuartermasterDepartment, which had not been manned or equipped for such an emergency. The shortage of clothing was felt the more because of the extreme severityof the winter. After the initial difficulties had been passed supplies ofthis kind were furnished in profusion; but lack of preparation on thepart of the War Department and the slowness of Congress to appropriatepromptly produced a temporary situation of extreme discomfort and worse. The provision of food supplies was arranged more successfully. Soldierswould not be soldiers if they did not complain of their "chow. " But thequality and variety of the food given to the new troops reached a higherdegree than was reasonably to have been expected. The average soldiergained from ten to twelve pounds after entering the service. Provision wasalso made for his entertainment. Vaudeville, concerts, moving picturesformed an element of camp life, much to the surprise of the visitingFrench officers and Civil War veterans. 

Americans naturally look back with pride to the making of their new army. The draft was accomplished smoothly and rapidly. Demonstrations againstconscription, which in view of the Civil War draft riots had caused someapprehension, were almost unheard of and never serious. Of the threemillion called for service on the first draft, all but 150, 000 wereaccounted for, and of those missing most were aliens who had left toenlist in their own armies. The problem of the slacker and of theconscientious objector, although vexatious, was never serious. Theeducative effect of the training upon the country was very considerable. All ranks and classes were gathered in, representing at least fifty-sixdifferent nationalities; artisans, millionaires, and hoboes bunked side byside; the youthful plutocrat saw life from a new angle, the wildmountaineer learned to read, the alien immigrant to speak English. Finallythe purpose of the training was achieved, for America sent over a forcethat could fight successfully at the moment of crisis. 

Amateur critics had assumed that the problem of raising an effectivenumber of troops would prove far more difficult than that of producingthe necessary equipment and munitions. It was generally believed that theindustrial genius of America was such that American factories couldprovide all the artillery, small-arms, and aircraft that the armies coulduse. The most fantastic prophecies were indulged in. Experience showed, however, that it is easier to raise, train, and organize troops ofsuperior sort in a brief period than it is to arm them. It stands as amatter of record that foreign artillery and machine guns alone madepossible the attack on the St. Mihiel salient and the advance in theArgonne. As for military airplanes, had the Government relied upon thoseof American manufacture there would have been no American squadronsflying over the German lines previous to August, 1918, and not manybetween then and the signing of the armistice. 

Such a statement should not imply blanket criticism of the OrdnanceDepartment. The Government was perhaps slow, even after the United Statesentered the war, to realize the serious character of the militarysituation abroad and to appreciate the extent to which American aid wouldbe necessary to allied victory. Hence the changes in the militaryprogramme which inevitably created confusion. But the decision to ensureagainst unforeseen disaster by preparing heavily for 1919 and 1920 andpartially disregarding 1918 was based upon sound strategical reasoning. The war was brought to a close sooner than had been expected; hence theperiod of actual hostilities was devoted to laying down the foundationsof a munitions industry, and the munitions actually produced, in thewords of Assistant Secretary Crowell, "might almost be termed casual tothe main enterprise, pilots of the quantities to come. " Such a policy waspossible because of the surplus production of the Allies. The latterstated that their production of artillery was such that they could equipall American divisions as they arrived in France during the year1918. [5] This gave time "to build manufacturing capacity on a grand scalewithout the necessity of immediate production, time to secure the best indesign, time to attain quality in the enormous outputs to come later asopposed to early quantities of indifferent class. "

[Footnote 5: As a result of the agreement thus made the United Statesshipped overseas between the time of the declaration of war and thesigning of the armistice only 815 complete pieces of mobile artillery, including all produced for France and Great Britain as well as forAmerican troops. Of the 75's only 181 complete units were shipped abroad, the American Expeditionary Force securing 1828 from the French. Of the155 millimeter howitzers none of American manufacture reached the front. French deliveries amounted to 747. --_America's Munitions_, 1917-1918(Report of Benedict Crowell, Assistant Secretary of War), p. 90. ]

The lack of preparation in the matter of machine guns has received widepublicity. In this, as in artillery, the deficiency was made good by theAllies up to the final weeks of the war. In April, 1917, the armypossessed only a small number of machine guns entirely inadequate evenfor the training of the new troops and half of which would not takeAmerican service cartridges. Less than seven hundred machine rifles wereon hand. Manufacturing facilities for machine guns were limited; therewere only two factories in the United States actually producing inquantity. Orders for four thousand Vickers had been placed the precedingDecember, but deliveries had not been made by the beginning of April. Either because of jealousy in the department, or because of justifiabletechnical reasons, various experts demanded a better machine gun than anyused by the Allies, and Secretary Baker took the responsibility ofdelaying matters so as to hold the competition recommended by a board ofinvestigation. This competition was planned for May 1, 1917, with theresult that we entered the war without having decided upon any type ofmachine gun, and it was not until some weeks later that the Browning wasapproved. 

First deliveries of this gun could not be made until April, 1918, a yearafter the declaration of war. In the meantime, the War Departmentutilized existing facilities to the limit, and placed large orders forColt, Lewis, and Vickers machine guns. But the heavy machine guns andautomatic rifles used by our troops in the field were furnished by theFrench and the British until May, 1918. During that month and June theeleven American divisions that sailed were provided with American-madeVickers, although they still used the French-made Chauchat automaticrifles. After June, all American troops to sail received a full equipmentof Brownings, both heavy machine guns and automatic rifles. Altogether27, 000 heavy Brownings and 29, 000 light Brownings were shipped to theAmerican Expeditionary Force, sufficient by the time of the armistice toequip completely all the American troops in France. They were not used incombat until the Meuse-Argonne battle, where they amply justified thefaith of General Pershing. 

The policy of delaying production in order to obtain the best quality wasnot followed in the case of the rifle, and the results unquestionablyjustified the plan, ultimately adopted, of accepting a slightly inferiortype which could be produced at once in quantity. The American armyrifle, the Springfield, was generally regarded as the most accurate theworld had seen. Unfortunately there was little hope of expanding theproduction of Springfields sufficiently to meet the necessities of thenew National Army. For several years previous to 1917 the Government, with myopic vision, had cut down expenditures for the manufacture ofsmall-arms and ammunition, with the result that artisans skilled inmaking Springfields had been scattered. Even if the two factories thathad been turning out Springfields could be restaffed, their combinedproduction would be insufficient. Private plants could not be utilizedfor early quantity production, because of the time that would be taken inbuilding up an adequate manufacturing equipment and training theartisans. Fortune intervened. It happened that three large American firmswere about to complete important contracts for supplying Enfield riflesto the British Government. Their plants and skilled labor might be turnedto account, but the Enfield was not regarded as satisfactory, principallybecause its ammunition was inferior to that taken by the Springfield. TheWar Department decided to attempt a change in the bore of the Enfield sothat it would use Springfield cartridges, and to make other minorsimplifications and improvements. The experiment proved successful to thehighest degree. The modified Enfields were reported to be only slightlyinferior to the Springfields and by the end of December, 1917, fivethousand a day were being turned out. Altogether American manufactoriesproduced during the war about two and a half million rifles, of which allbut three hundred thousand were modified Enfields. 

In the matter of airplane production the record is far less satisfactory. It is, perhaps, too early to distribute with justice the blame for thedelays in production, and full cognizance should be taken of thedifficulties which had to be overcome. But whatever explanations are to befound, it is an undeniable fact that not until August, 1918, three monthsbefore the armistice, was an American squadron equipped with Americanplanes. The Allies had looked to America for the production of combatplanes in quantity and Congress, responding to popular enthusiasm, had inthe first days of the war appropriated more than half a billion dollarsfor their manufacture. An Aircraft Production Board was organized, withHoward E. Coffin as chairman, although the actual manufacture of themachines was under the supervision of the Signal Corps. Promises were madethat by the spring of 1918 the Germans would be completely at the mercy ofAmerican airmen. 

But difficulties developed. A new type of motor had to be produced, capable of serving in any kind of airplane; this was rapidly andsuccessfully accomplished, and in July, 1917, the Liberty Motor wasapproved. But just as manufacturing was about to begin changes in thedesign were demanded, with ensuing delays. There was confusion betweenthe jurisdiction of the Aircraft Board and that of the Signal Corps. Theorganization of the latter was less efficient than had been expected, and men who knew little or nothing of the technique of aircraft wereplaced in charge of production. When orders were given for planes to beconstructed in France, seven thousand American machinists had to be sentover to release the French machinists who were to work on thesecontracts, with consequent delays to American production. Repeatedalterations in the designs of airplanes must be made to meet changingrequirements sent from the front, and large numbers of planes almostready for delivery had to be scrapped. Two of the types manufacturedproved to be unsatisfactory and were condemned, with an estimated loss oftwenty-six million dollars. Finally the bitter cold of the winter made itdifficult to secure the indispensable spruce from the northwesternforests, and lumbering operations were hampered by extensive strikes, which were said to have resulted from German intrigues. 

General disappointment at the failure to produce airplanes in quantity bythe spring of 1918 was the more bitter because of the high hopes that hadbeen aroused by those in authority. Instead of confessing the seriousnature of the delays, the War Department attempted to conceal not merelythe mistakes made but the fact that airplanes could not possibly reachFrance in any numbers before the autumn of 1918. Thus when at last, inFebruary, a single combat plane was completed and shipped, the WarDepartment issued the statement: "The first American-built battle planesare to-day _en route_ to France. This first shipment, although not initself large, marks the final overcoming of many difficulties met inbuilding up a new and intricate industry. " When General Wood returnedfrom France in March and reported that not one American-built plane wasin action there, and when the Senate investigation committee unearthedthe existence of all the delays, the disillusioned public gave vent tofierce criticism. It was to some extent calmed by the appointment, inApril, of John D. Ryan, of the Anaconda Copper Company, as director ofaircraft production for the army. By this time many of the most seriousdifficulties had been passed. When the armistice was signed about twelvethousand airplanes had been produced by American plants, of which a thirdwere service-planes. [6]

[Footnote 6: Ayres. _The War with Germany_, 87-90. ]

It is impossible here to trace the activities of the various departmentsin the herculean task of arming the nation. But one should not forgetthat there was much which never received wide publicity. The developmentof ordnance carried with it the manufacture of quantities of ammunitionhitherto undreamt of, the building of railway and motorized artillery, the improvement of sight and fire-control apparatus, the making of allsorts of trench-warfare _matériel_. The Air Service had to concern itselfwith the manufacture of radio telephones, armament for airplanes, thesynchronizing of machine guns to fire through propeller blades, airplanebombs, air photography, and pyrotechnics. The Chemical Warfare Servicewas busy with the making of toxic gases and gas defense equipment, usingthe peach stones and cocoanut shells which every one was asked to save. The enormous quantities of medical and dental supplies must be gatheredby the Quartermaster Department, which also had charge of the salvageservice and the thousand gargantuan household occupations, such aslaundering and incineration of garbage, that went with the maintenance ofthe army in camp. The Signal Corps must produce wire, telegraphs, telephones, switchboards, radio equipment, batteries, field glasses, photographic outfits, and carrier pigeons. 

Upon its navy the United States has always relied chiefly for defense andin this branch of the service the country was better prepared for war in1917 than in the army. Indeed when the nation entered the struggle manypersons believed that the sole practical fighting assistance the UnitedStates should give the Allies would be upon the sea. Josephus Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, was a Southern politician, of limitedadministrative experience and capacity. During the first years of hisappointment he had alienated navy officers through the introduction ofpet reforms and his frank advocacy of a little navy. Resiliency, however, was one of his characteristics and he followed President Wilson in 1916, when the latter demanded from Congress authority for an expansion in thenavy which seemed only prudent in view of international conditions. Largely owing to the efforts of the Assistant Secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the months immediately preceding the declaration of warwitnessed strenuous preparations to render aid to the Allies in case theUnited States should participate. Thereafter Secretary Daniels tended tosink his personality and judgment in the conduct of the naval war and todefer to the opinion of various officers, of whom Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations was the most influential. When war wasdeclared two flotillas of destroyers were at once sent to Queenstown toassist in chasing and sinking submarines, and were placed under thecommand of Admiral William S. Sims. Battleships and cruisers followed, though by no means with the expedition nor in the numbers desired bySims, who believed that by using practically the entire naval force atonce the submarine could be exterminated and the war ended. 

At home, the Navy Department entered upon a process of expansion whichincreased its personnel from 65, 000 to 497, 000 when the armistice wassigned. A rapid development in naval construction was planned, withemphasis upon destroyers. The effects of this programme became visiblewithin a year; during the first nine months of 1918 no less thaneighty-three destroyers were launched, as against sixty-two for thepreceding nine years. Submarine chasers of a special design were builtand many private yachts taken over and adapted to the war against thesubmarine. During the course of the war two battleships and twenty-eightsubmarines were completed. Expansion in naval shipbuilding plans wasparalleled by the construction of giant docks; by camps sufficient forthe training of two hundred thousand men; and by a naval aircraftfactory from which a seaplane was turned out seven months after work onthe factory was begun. Naval aviators returning from the Channel coastssuperintended flying schools and undertook the patrol of our Atlanticseaboard. 

If much of these military preparations was not translated intoaccomplishment before the war ended, it was because the United States waspreparing wisely for a long struggle and it seemed necessary that thefoundations should be broad and deep. "America was straining her energiestowards a goal, " said the Director of Munitions, "toward the realizationof an ambition which, in the production of munitions, dropped the year1918 almost out of consideration altogether, which indeed did not bringthe full weight of American men and _matériel_ into the struggle even in1919, but which left it for 1920, if the enemy had not yet succumbed tothe growing American power, to witness the maximum strength of the UnitedStates in the field. " It was the knowledge of this preparation which, tosome extent, helped to convince the German General Staff of the futilityof further resistance and thus to bring the war to an early end. 

The dependence of the United States upon the Allies for equipment andmunitions does not deserve the vitriolic anathemas of certain critics. The country did not enter the struggle as if it expected to fight the warsingle-handed. Distribution of labor and supplies between the UnitedStates and the Allies was merely a wise and economic measure. At theirown request, the Allies were furnished with that which they mostneeded--money, food, and man-power. In return they provided the UnitedStates with the artillery and machine guns which they could spare andwhich they could manufacture more cheaply and rapidly. Finally there isthe outstanding fact, of which America may always be proud, that thisheterogeneous democracy, organized, so far as organization existed, forthe pursuits of peace, was able in the space of sixteen months, toprovide an army capable of fighting successfully one of the mostdifficult campaigns of the war, and that which led directly to themilitary defeat of Germany. 

The ultimate success of President Wilson's war policies could hardly havebeen achieved except by the process of centralization which he never lostfrom view. His insistence upon centralized responsibility and control inpolitical matters was paralleled in the military field. Nothingillustrates this principle better than the centralization of the AmericanExpeditionary Force under the absolute and unquestioned command of GeneralPershing. The latter was given free rein. The jealousies which so weakenedthe Union armies during the first years of the Civil War were ruthlesslyrepressed. No generals were sent to France of whom he did not approve. When the Allies threatened to appeal to Washington over Pershing's head, President Wilson turned a deaf ear. 

In the United States, the President sought similar centralization throughthe General Staff. It was this body which prepared the different plans forthe Draft Act, the Pershing expedition, and finally for the gigantic taskof putting a million men in France by the summer of 1918. To the staff wasgiven the formulation of the training programme along the linesrecommended by Pershing. Always, however, it was hampered by the multipleresponsibility that characterized the old-style army machine with itsbureau chiefs competing with each other, with the navy, and with theAllies. Quartermaster Department, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, andthe other bureaus were uncoördinated, and inevitable waste andinefficiency followed all their operations. It was the crisis that arosefrom the problem of supplies, in the winter of 1917, that furnished thePresident with the opportunity to cut red-tape and secure thecentralization he desired. That opportunity came with the blanket powersbestowed upon him by the Overman Act, the full significance of which canonly be appreciated after a consideration of the measures taken tocentralize the industrial resources of the nation. 

CHAPTER VII

THE HOME FRONT

On May 18, 1917, President Wilson issued a proclamation in which are tobe found the following significant sentences:

 In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies there are no armies in this struggle, there are entire nations armed. Thus, the men who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less a part of the army that is in France than the men beneath the battle flags. It must be so with us. It is not an army that we must shape and train for war--it is a Nation. To this end our people must draw close in one compact front against a common foe. But this cannot be if each man pursues a private purpose. All must pursue one purpose. The Nation needs all men, but it needs each man, not in the field that will most pleasure him, but in the endeavor that will best serve the common good. Thus, though a sharpshooter pleases to operate a trip-hammer for the forging of great guns, and an expert machinist desires to march with the flag, the Nation is being served only when the sharpshooter marches and the machinist remains at his levers. The whole Nation must be a team, in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted. 

If President Wilson deserves severe criticism for his failure to endorseadequate plans of preparation for war while his country was at peace, heshould be given due credit for his appreciation that the home front mustbe organized if the fighting front was to be victorious. He perceivedclearly that it was necessary to carry into the industrial life of thenation that centralizing process which characterized his military policy. That the nation at home was made to feel itself part of the fightingforces and coöperated enthusiastically and effectively in the organizationof the national resources was not the least of the triumphs of the UnitedStates. Such organization demanded great sacrifice, not merely of luxuriesor comforts, but of settled habits, which are difficult to break. It mustnecessarily be of an emergency character, for the United States possessedno bureaucratic system like that which obtains on the continent of Europefor the centralization of trade, manufactures, food production, and thethousand activities that form part of economic life. But the event provedthat both the spirit and the brains of the American people were equal tothe crisis. 

The problem of coördinating the national industries for the supply of thearmy was complicated by the military decentralization described in thepreceding chapter, which President Wilson was not able to remedy beforethe final months of the war. The army did not form or state itsrequirements as one body but through five supply bureaus, which actedindependently and in competition with each other. Bids for materials fromthe different bureaus conflicted with each other, with those of the navy, and of the Allies. Not merely was it essential that such demands shouldbe coördinated, but that some central committee should be able to say howlarge was the total supply of any sort of materials, how soon they couldbe produced, and to prevent the waste of such materials in unessentialproduction. If the army was decentralized, American industry as a wholewas in a state of complete chaos, so far as any central organization wasconcerned. On the side of business every firm in every line of productionwas competing in the manufacture of essential and unessential articles, in transportation, and in bidding for and holding the necessary labor. Mr. Wilson set himself the task of evolving order out of this chaos. 

The President, as in the purely military problem where he utilized theGeneral Staff as his instrument, prepared to adapt existing machinery, rather than to create a completely new organization. For a time he seemsto have believed that his Cabinet might serve the function. But it wasill-adapted to handle the sort of problems that must be solved. It wascomposed of men chosen largely for political reasons, and despite muchpublic complaint it had not been strengthened after Wilson's reëlection. Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior, was generally recognizedas a man of excellent business judgment, willing to listen to experts, andcapable of coöperating effectively with the economic leaders of thecountry. His influence with the President, however, seemed to beovershadowed by that of Newton D. Baker and William G. McAdoo, Secretariesof War and of the Treasury, who had inspired the distrust of most businessmen. McAdoo in particular alienated financial circles because of hisapparent suspicion of banking interest, and both, by their appeals tolaboring men, laid themselves open to the charge of demagogic tactics. Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, had won recognition as an expertinternational lawyer of long experience, but he could not be expected toexercise great influence, inasmuch as the President obviously intended toremain his own foreign secretary. Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster-General, was a politician, expert in the minor tactics of party, whose conduct ofthe postal and telegraphic systems was destined to bring a storm ofprotest upon the entire Administration. Thomas W. Gregory, theAttorney-General, had gained entrance into the Cabinet by means of arailroad suit which had roused the ire of the transportation interests. The other members were, at that time, little known or spoken of. Wilsonspent much time and effort in defending his Cabinet members from attacks, and yet it was believed that he rarely appealed to them for advice in theformulation of policies. Thus the Cabinet as a whole lacked the veryqualities essential to a successful organizing committee: ability tosecure the coöperation and respect of the industrial leaders of thecountry. 

Titular functions of an organizing character, nevertheless, had beenconferred upon six members of the Cabinet in August, 1916, through thecreation of a "Council of National Defense"; they were charged with the"coördination of industries and resources for the national security andwelfare. " The actual labor of coördination, however, was to be exercisedby an advisory commission of seven, which included Howard E. Coffin, incharge of munitions, Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and OhioRailroad, in charge of transportation, Julius Rosenwald, president of theSears-Roebuck Company, in charge of supplies including clothing, BernardM. Baruch, a versatile financial trader, in charge of metals, minerals, and raw materials, Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federationof Labor, in charge of labor and the welfare of workers, Hollis Godfreyin charge of engineering and education, and Franklin H. Martin in chargeof medicine. The commission at once prepared to lay down its programme, to create sub-committees and technical boards, and to secure theassistance of business leaders, without whose coöperation their taskcould not be fulfilled. 

Following plans developed by the Council of National Defense, experts inevery business likely to prove of importance were called upon tocoördinate and stimulate war necessities, to control their distribution, to provide for the settlement of disputes between employers andwage-earners, to fix prices, to conserve resources. Scientific andtechnical experts were directed in their researches. The General MedicalBoard and the Committee on Engineering and Education were supervised intheir mobilization of doctors and surgeons, engineers, physicists andchemists, professors and graduate students in the university laboratories. Everywhere and in all lines experience and brains were sought andutilized. State Councils of Defense were created to oversee the work ofsmaller units and to establish an effective means of communication betweenthe individual and the national Government. Naturally muchover-organization resulted and some waste of time and energy; but theuniversal spirit of voluntary coöperation evoked by the Councilsoverbalanced this loss and aided greatly in putting the country on aneffective war basis. As Wilson said, "beyond all question the highest andbest form of efficiency is the spontaneous coöperation of a free people. "In return for their efforts the people received an education in publicspirit and civic consciousness such as could have come in no other way. 

Of the committees of the Council, that on munitions developed along themost elaborate lines, becoming of such importance that on July 28, 1917, it was reorganized as the War Industries Board. As such it graduallyabsorbed most of the functions of the Council which were not transferredto other agencies of the Government. During the autumn of 1917 theactivities of the Board underwent rapid extension, but it lacked thepower to enforce its decisions. As in the case of the General Staff, itwas important that it should have authority not merely to plan but alsoto supervise and execute. Such a development was foreshadowed in thereorganization of the Board in March, 1918, under the chairmanship ofBernard M. Baruch, and when the President received the blanket authorityconferred by the Overman Act, he immediately invested the War IndustriesBoard with the centralizing power which seemed so necessary. Henceforthit exercised an increasingly strict control over all the industries ofthe country. 

The purpose of the Board was, generally speaking, to secure for theGovernment and the Allies the goods essential for making warsuccessfully, and to protect the civil needs of the country. The supplyof raw materials to the manufacturer as well as the delivery of finishedproducts was closely regulated by a system of priorities. The power ofthe Board in its later development was dictatorial, inasmuch as it mightdiscipline any refractory producer or manufacturer by the withdrawal ofthe assignments he expected. The leaders of each of the more importantindustries were called into council, in order to determine resources andneeds, and the degree of preference to which each industry was entitled. Some were especially favored, in order to stimulate production in a linethat was of particular importance or was failing to meet the exigenciesof the military situation; shipments to others of a less essentialcharacter were deferred. Committees of the Board studied industrialconditions and recommended the price that should be fixed for variouscommodities; stability was thus artificially secured and profiteeringlessened. The Conservation Division worked out and enforced methods ofstandardizing patterns in order to economize materials and labor. TheSteel Division coöperated with the manufacturers for the speeding-up ofproduction; and the Chemical Division, among other duties, stimulated thevitally important supply of potash, dyes, and nitrates. Altogether it hasbeen roughly estimated that the industrial capacity of the country wasincreased by twenty per cent through the organizing labors and authorityof the War Industries Board. 

The success of this Board would have been impossible without the buildingup of an extraordinary _esprit de corps_ among the men who were broughtface to face with these difficult problems of industry and commerce. Their chairman relied, of course, upon the coöperation of the leaders of"big business, " who now, in the hour of the country's need, sank theirprejudice against governmental interference and gave freely of theirexperience, brains, and administrative power. Men whose incomes weremeasured in the hundreds of thousands forgot their own business andworked at Washington on a salary of a dollar a year. 

The same spirit of coöperation was evoked when it came to the conservationand the production of food. If steel was to win the war, its burden couldnot be supported without wheat, and for some months in 1917 and 1918victory seemed to depend largely upon whether the Allies could find enoughto eat. Even in normal times Great Britain and France import largequantities of foodstuffs; under war conditions they were necessarilydependent upon foreign grain-producing countries. The surplus grain of theArgentine and Australia was not available because of the length of thevoyage and the scarcity of shipping; the Russian wheat supply was cut offby enemy control of the Dardanelles even before it was dissipated bycorrupt officials or reckless revolutionaries. The Allies, on the verge ofstarvation, therefore looked to North America. Yet the stock of cerealswhen the United States entered the war was at a lower level than it hadbeen for years and the number of food animals had also been reduced. 

To meet the crisis President Wilson called upon one of the mostinteresting and commanding personalities of modern times. Herbert ClarkHoover was a Californian mining engineer, of broad experience inAustralia, China, and England, who in 1914 had been given control ofAllied Relief abroad. The following year he undertook the difficult anddelicate task of organizing food relief for Belgium. He was able toarouse the enthusiastic sympathy of Americans, win financial support on alarge scale, procure the much-needed food, and provide for its effectivedistribution among the suffering Belgians, in spite of the suspicions ofthe Germans and the hindrances thrown in his path. A master organizer, with keen flair for efficient subordinates, of broad vision never muddiedby details, with sound knowledge of business economics, and a gift fordramatic appeal, Hoover was ideally fitted to conduct the greatestexperiment in economic organization the world had seen. Unsentimentalhimself, he knew how to arouse emotion--a necessary quality, since thefood problem demanded heavy personal sacrifices which would touch everyindividual; brusque in manner, he avoided giving the offense whichnaturally follows any interference with the people's dinner and whichwould destroy the essential spirit of voluntary coöperation. 

Five days after the declaration of war, President Wilson, through theCouncil of National Defense, named a committee on food supply, with Hooverat its head, and shortly thereafter named him food commissioner. Hooverbegan his work of educating the people to realize the necessity of economyand extra-production; but he lacked the administrative powers which wereessential if his work was to prove effective, and it was not until Augustthat Congress passed the Lever Act which provided for strict control offood under an administrator. This measure encountered strong opposition inthe Senate and from the farmers, who feared lest the provisions againsthoarding of food would prevent them from holding their products for highprices. Wilson exerted his personal influence vigorously for the bill inthe face of congressional opposition, which demanded that large powers ofcontrol should be given to a Senate committee of ten, and he was finallysuccessful in his appeal. He thereupon appointed Hoover Food Administratorwith practically unlimited powers, legalizing the work already begun onhis own initiative. 

Hoover at once made arrangements to prevent the storage of wheat in largequantities and to eliminate speculative dealings in wheat on the grainexchanges. He then offered to buy the entire wheat crop at a fair priceand agreed with the millers to take flour at a fair advance on the priceof wheat. Fearful lest the farmers should be discouraged from planting thefollowing year, 1918, he offered to buy all the wheat that could be raisedat two dollars a bushel. If peace came before the crop was disposed of, the Government might be compelled to take over the wheat at a higher pricethan the market, but the offer was a necessary inducement to extensiveplanting. In the meantime Hoover appealed to the country to utilize everyscrap of ground for the growing of food products. Every one of whateverage and class turned gardener. The spacious and perfectly trimmed lawns ofthe wealthy, as well as the weed-infested back yards of the poor, were dugup and planted with potatoes or corn. Community gardens flourished in thevillages and outside of the larger towns, where men, women, and childrencame out in the evening, after their regular work, to labor with rake andhoe. There were perhaps two million "war gardens" over and beyond thealready established gardens, which unquestionably enabled many a citizento reduce his daily demands on the grocer, and stimulated his interest inthe problem of food conservation. As a result of Hoover's dealing with thefarmers, during the year 1917 the planted wheat acreage exceeded theaverage of the preceding five years by thirty-five million acres, or byabout twelve per cent, and another additional five million acres wereplanted in 1918. The result was the largest wheat crop in American historyexcept that of 1915, despite the killing cold of the winter of 1917 andthe withering drought of the summer of 1918. An increase in the number oflive stock was also secured and the production of milk, meat, and woolshowed a notable development. 

Hoover achieved equal success in the problem of conserving food. Herealized that he must bring home to the individual housewife the need ofthe closest economy, and he organized a nation-wide movement to securevoluntary pledges that the rules and requests of the Food Administrationwould be observed. People were asked to use other flours than wheatwhenever possible, to be sparing of sugar and meat, to utilizesubstitutes, and rigidly to avoid waste. On every billboard and in allthe newspapers were to be seen appeals to save food. Housewives wereenrolled as "members of the Food Administration" and were given placardsto post in their windows announcing their membership and the willingnessof the family to abide by its requests. Certain days of the week weredesignated as "wheatless" or "meatless" when voluntary demi-fasts were tobe observed, the nonobservance of which spelled social ostracism. To"Hooverize" became a national habit, and children were denied a spoonfulof sugar on their cereal, "because Mr. Hoover would not like it. " Hoover, with his broad forehead, round face, compelling eyes, and underhung jaw, became the benevolent bogey of the nation. It was a movement of generalrenunciation such as no country had undergone except at the pinch ofbiting necessity. [7] In the meantime prices were prevented from rapidincrease by a system of licenses, which tended to prevent hoarding orspeculation. Attempts to capitalize the need of the world for privategain, or in common parlance, to "profiteer, " were comparatively rare andwere adequately punished by revocation of license or by forced sale ofhoardings. 

[Footnote 7: Restaurants and hotels coöperated; during a period of onlytwo months they were reported as having saved nine thousand tons of meat, four thousand tons of flour, and a thousand tons of sugar. City garbageplants announced a decrease in the amount of garbage collected rangingfrom ten to thirteen per cent. ]

As a result of the organization of food supply, the stimulation ofproduction, and the prevention of waste, America was able to save theEntente nations, and, later, much of central and southeastern Europe fromstarvation, without herself enduring anything worse than discomfort. TheGovernment was able at the same time to provide the troops in France withfood which, to the _poilus_ at least, seemed luxurious. When the UnitedStates entered the war the country was prepared to export 20, 000, 000bushels of wheat; instead it sent over 141, 000, 000. In four months, inthe summer of 1918, the American people saved out of their regularconsumption and sent abroad half a million tons of sugar. The autumn of1918 saw an increase of nearly a million tons of pork products over whatwas available the previous year. Altogether, during the crop year of1918, America doubled the average amount of food sent to Europeimmediately before the war, notwithstanding unfavorable weatherconditions and the congestion of freight that resulted from other warnecessities. The total contribution in foodstuffs exported to Europethat year amounted to a value of about two billion dollars. This was donewithout food cards and with a minimum of edicts. It was the work ofeducation and conscience. 

Fuel like food was a war necessity and there was equal need ofstimulating production by assuring a fair profit and of eliminating allpossible waste. Without the steam power provided by coal, raw materialscould not be transformed into the manufactured articles demanded bymilitary necessity, nor distributed by the railroads and steamships. Soonafter the declaration of war, a committee of coal operators, meetingunder the authorization of the Council of National Defense, drew up aplan for the stimulation of coal production and its more economicaldistribution. This committee voluntarily set a price for coal lower thanthe current market price, in order to prevent a rise in manufacturingcosts; it was approved by the Secretary of the Interior, who warmlypraised the spirit of sacrifice displayed by the operators. Unfortunatelythe Secretary of War, as chairman of the Council of National Defense, repudiated the arrangement, on the ground that the price agreed upon wastoo high. The operators were discouraged, because of the difficulty ofstimulating production under the lower price which Secretary Bakerinsisted upon; they were further disappointed at the postponement ofplans for a zone system and an elimination of long cross hauls, designedto relieve the load that would be thrown upon railroad transportation inthe coming winter. 

In August, Wilson was empowered by the Lever Act to appoint a FuelAdministrator and chose Harry A. Garfield, President of Williams College. Conditions, however, became more confused. The fuel problem was one oftransportation quite as much as of production; the railroads were unableto furnish the needed coal-cars, and because of an expensive and possiblyunfair system of car allotment, coal distribution was hampered. Add tothis the fact that numerous orders for coal shipments had been deferreduntil autumn, in the belief that the Administration, which in the personof Baker was not believed to look on the coal operators with favor, wouldenforce low prices. Hence during the last three months of the year anunprecedented amount of coal had to be shipped, and the congestion on thecompeting railroads was such that the country faced a real coal famine. In December, the Government recognized the obvious fact that the railroadmust be placed under one management, if the confusion in the wholeindustrial situation were to be eliminated. President Wilson accordinglyannounced that the Federal Government would take over the railroads forthe period of the war. 

This measure came too late to save the country from the evil effects ofthe fuel shortage. The penalty for the delays of the preceding summer hadto be paid, and it was the heavier because of the severity of the winter. Overloaded trains were stalled and harbors froze over, imprisoning thecoal barges. Thirty-seven ships laden with essential military supplieswere held up in New York harbor for lack of fuel, and long strings ofempties blocked the sidings, while the shippers all over the country criedfor cars. To meet the crisis Garfield decreed that all manufacturingplants east of the Mississippi should be shut down for five days and for aseries of Mondays, until the 25th of March. The order applied also toplaces of amusement, private offices, and most stores, which were notallowed to furnish heat. Munitions plants and essential industries, aswell as Government offices were naturally excepted. "Heatless Mondays"caused great inconvenience and bitter criticism, for they came at themoment when it was most important that the economic life of the nationshould be functioning at its greatest efficiency. But the embargo helpedto tide over the crisis. As in the case of food, the public, once itappreciated the necessity of the situation, accepted it cheerfully. Domestic economy was also widely preached and applied, to the slogan, "Save a shovelful of coal a day. " The elimination of electricadvertisements and the diminution of street lighting, served to lessen thenon-essential demand for coal; and the crisis also forced the introductionof "daylight saving, " the advancement of the clock by an hour, during themonths extending from March to October, thus saving artificial light. 

In the meantime the Fuel Administration, the operators, and the minerswere coöperating to increase coal production. The enthusiasm of the mineworkers was stimulated by making them realize that they were indeed partof the fighting forces. A competitive spirit was aroused and miningconditions were bettered to keep them satisfied. Labor responded to thecall. Holidays were omitted and emulation between different shifts becamekeen. [8] Increased production was paralleled by more efficientdistribution. A zone system, finally put into operation, eliminatedapproximately 160, 000, 000 car miles. Local fuel administrators kept inconstant touch with the need of the localities under their jurisdiction, studied methods of abolishing unnecessary manufacturing use of coal andrefused coal to non-essential industries. 

[Footnote 8: In 1918 the average number of days worked by each miner inthe bituminous fields was greater by twelve than that of 1917, and bytwenty-five than that of 1916. During the half-year period from April toSeptember, 1918, bituminous production was twelve per cent greater thanin the corresponding period of the previous year, which had itselfestablished a record, despite the decrease in the number of mineworkers. ]

Similar increase in the production and saving of oil was accomplished. The oil-burning vessels of the allied navies and merchant marines, themotor transport service of the armies, all made this necessary. In 1918the production of oil in the United States was fourteen per cent greaterthan in 1914. In response to an urgent cable from Marshal Foch, whichran: "If you don't keep up your petrol supply we shall lose the war, " aseries of "gasless Sundays" was suggested. For nearly two months, merelyat the request of the Fuel Administration and without any compulsionexcept that arising from public opinion, Sunday motoring was practicallyabandoned. That most crowded of motor thoroughfares, the Boston PostRoad from New York to Stamford, might have served as playground for akindergarten. The estimated saving of gasoline amounted to a millionbarrels: about four per cent of the gasoline sent abroad in 1918 wasprovided by the gasless Sundays. 

Credit must be given the Fuel Administration for the large measure ofsuccess which it finally secured. It was slow in its early organizationand at first failed to make full use of the volunteer committees of coaloperators and labor representatives who offered their assistance andwhose experience qualified them to give invaluable advice. But Garfieldshowed his capacity for learning the basic facts of the situation, andultimately chose strong advisers. When he entered upon his duties hefound the crisis so far advanced that it could not be immediately solved. Furthermore, in a situation which demanded the closest coöperationbetween the Fuel and the Railroad Administration, he did not alwaysreceive the assistance from the latter which he had a right to expect. 

As a war measure, the temporary nationalization of the railroads wasprobably necessary. Whatever the ultimate advantages of private ownershipand the system of competition, during the period of military necessityperfect coördination was essential. Railroad facilities could not beimproved because new equipment, so far as it could be manufactured, hadto be sent abroad; the only solution of the problem of congestion seemedto be an improvement of service. During the first nine months after thedeclaration of war a notable increase in the amount of freight carriedwas effected; nevertheless, as winter approached, it became obvious thatthe roads were not operating as a unit and could not carry the loaddemanded of them. Hence resulted the appointment of McAdoo in December, 1917, as Director-General, with power to operate all the railroads as asingle line. 

During the spring of 1918 the Administration gradually overcame the worstof the transportation problems. To the presidents and management of thevarious railroads must go the chief share of credit for the successfulaccomplishment of this titanic task. Despite their distrust of McAdoo andtheir objections to his methods, they coöperated loyally with theRailroad Administration in putting through the necessary measures ofcoördination and in the elimination of the worst features of the formercompetitive system. They adopted a permit system which prevented theloading of freight unless it could be unloaded at its destination; theyinsisted upon more rapid unloading of cars; they consolidated terminalsto facilitate the handling of cars; they curtailed circuitous routing offreight; they reduced the use of Pullman cars for passenger service. As aresult, after May, 1918, congestion was diminished and during the summerwas no longer acute. This was accomplished despite the number of troopsmoved, amounting during the first ten months of 1918 to six and a halfmillions. In addition the railroads carried large quantities of food, munitions, building materials for cantonments, and other supplies, mostof which converged upon eastern cities and ports. The increase in thenumber of grain-carrying cars alone, from July to November, was 135, 000over the same period of the previous year. 

Unquestionably the Government's administration of the railroads has adarker side. Complaints were frequent that the Railroad Administrationsacrificed other interests for its own advantage. The future of the roadswas said not to be carefully safeguarded, and equipment and rolling stockmishandled and allowed to deteriorate. Above all, at the moment when itwas quite as essential to preserve the morale of labor on the home frontas that of the troops in France, McAdoo made concessions to labor thatwere more apt to destroy discipline and _esprit de corps_ than tomaintain them. The authority given for the unionization of railroademployees, the stopping of piecework, the creation of shop committees, weakened the control of the foremen and led to a loss of shop efficiencywhich has been estimated at thirty per cent. Government control wasnecessary, but in the form in which it came it proved costly. 

During the months when manufacturing plants were built and their outputspeeded up, when fuel and food were being produced in growing amounts, when the stalled freight trains were being disentangled, there wasunceasing call for ocean-going tonnage. Food and war materials would beof little use unless the United States had the ships in which totransport them across the Atlantic. The Allies sorely needed Americanhelp to replace the tonnage sunk by German submarines; during somemonths, Allied shipping was being destroyed at the rate of six milliontons a year. Furthermore if an effective military force were to betransported to France, according to the plans that germinated in thesummer of 1917, there would be need of every possible cubic inch oftonnage. The entire military situation hinged upon the shipping problem. Yet when the United States joined in war on Germany there was not ashipyard in the country which would accept a new order; every inch ofavailable space was taken by the navy or private business. 

In September, 1916, the United States Shipping Board had been organizedto operate the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which had been set upprimarily to develop trade with South America. This body now prepared agigantic programme of shipbuilding, which expanded as the need fortonnage became more evident. By November 15, 1917, the Board planned for1200 ships with dead weight tonnage of seven and a half millions. Thedifficulties of building new yards, of collecting trained workmen andtechnicians were undoubtedly great, but they might have been overcomemore easily had not unfortunate differences developed between WilliamDenman, the chairman of the Board, who advocated wooden ships, andGeneral George W. Goethals, the head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, who depended upon steel construction. The differences led to theresignation of both and continued disorganization hampered the rapidfulfillment of the programme Edward N. Hurley became chairman of theShipping Board, but it was not until the spring of 1918, when Charles M. Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Company was put in charge of the EmergencyFleet Corporation as Director General of shipbuilding, that publicconfidence in ultimate success seemed justified. 

Much of the work accomplished during the latter days of the war wasspectacular. Waste lands along the Delaware overgrown with weeds weretransformed within a year into a shipyard with twenty-eight ways, a shipunder construction on each one, with a record of fourteen ships alreadylaunched. The spirit of the workmen was voiced by the placard that hungabove the bulletin board announcing daily progress, which proclaimed, "Three ships a week or bust. " The Hog Island yards near Philadelphia andthe Fore River yards in Massachusetts became great cities with docks, sidings, shops, offices, and huge stacks of building materials. Existingyards, such as those on the Great Lakes, were enlarged so that infourteen months they sent to the ocean a fleet of 181 steel vessels. Thenew ships were standardized and built on the "fabricated" system, whichprovided for the manufacture of the various parts in different factoriesand their assembling at the shipyards. In a single day, July 4, 1918, there were launched in American shipyards ninety-five vessels, with adead weight tonnage of 474, 464. In one of the Great Lakes yards a 5500ton steel freighter was launched seventeen days after the keel was laid, and seventeen days later was delivered to the Shipping Board, completeand ready for service. 

This work was not accomplished without tremendous expenditure and muchwaste. The Shipping Board was careless in its financial management andunwise in many of its methods. By introducing the cost plus system in theletting of contracts it fostered extravagance and waste and increased andintensified the industrial evils that had resulted from its operation inthe building of army cantonments. The contractors received the cost ofconstruction plus a percentage commission; obviously they had no incentiveto economize; the greater the expense the larger their commission. Hencethey willingly paid exorbitant prices for materials and agreed to "fancy"wages. Not merely was the expense of securing the necessary tonnagemultiplied, but the cost of materials and labor in all other industrieswas seriously enhanced. The high wages paid tended to destroy thepatriotic spirit of the shipworkers, who were enticed by greed ratherthan by the glory of service. The effect on drafted soldiers was bound tobe unfortunate, for they could not but realize the injustice of a systemwhich gave them low pay for risking their lives, while their friends inthe shipyards received fabulous wages. Such aspects of the early days ofthe Shipping Board were ruthlessly reformed by Schwab when he tookcontrol of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Appealing to the patriotism ofthe workers he reduced costs and increased efficiency, according to somecritics, by thirty per cent, according to others, by no less than onehundred and ten per cent. 

By September, 1918, the Shipping Board had brought under its jurisdiction2600 vessels with a total dead weight tonnage of more than ten millions. Of this fleet, sixteen per cent had been built by the Emergency FleetCorporation. The remainder was represented by ships which the Board hadrequisitioned when America entered the war, by the ships of Allied andneutral countries which had been purchased and chartered, and by internedenemy ships which had been seized. The last-named were damaged by theircrews at the time of the declaration of war, but were fitted for servicewith little delay by a new process of electric welding. Such German boatsas the _Vaterland_, rechristened the _Leviathan_, and the _GeorgeWashington_, together with smaller ships, furnished half a million tonsof German cargo-space. The ships which transported American soldiers werenot chiefly provided by the Shipping Board, more than fifty per centbeing represented by boats borrowed from Great Britain. [9]

[Footnote 9: In the last six months of the war over 1, 500, 000 men werecarried abroad as follows: 44 per cent in United States ships 51 per cent in British ships 3 per cent in Italian ships 2 per cent in French shipsThe United States transports included 450, 000 tons of German origin;300, 000 tons supplied by commandeered Dutch boats; and 718, 000 tonsprovided by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. ]

More effective use of shipping was fostered by the War Trade Board, whichhad been created six months after the declaration of war by the Tradingwith the Enemy Act (October 6, 1917), and which, in conjunction with theactivities of the Alien Property Custodian, possessed full powers tocurtail enemy trade. It thereby obtained practical control of the foreigncommerce of this country, and was able both to conserve essential productsfor American use and to secure and economize tonnage. 

Such control was assured through a system of licenses for exports andimports. No goods could be shipped into or out of the country without alicense, which was granted by the War Trade Board only after investigationof the character of the shipment and its destination or source. Theearlier export of goods which had found their way to Germany throughneutral countries was thus curtailed and the blockade on Germany becamestrangling. Products necessary to military effectiveness were secured fromneutral states in return for permission to buy essentials here. Twomillions of tonnage were obtained from neutral states for the use of theUnited States and Great Britain. Trade in non-essentials with the Orientand South America was limited, extra bottoms were thus acquired, and theproduction of non-essentials at home discouraged. Altogether, the WarTrade Board exercised tremendous powers which, however necessary, mighthave provoked intense resentment in business circles; but these powerswere enforced with a tact and discretion characteristic of the head of theBoard, Vance McCormick, who was able successfully to avoid the irritationthat might have been expected from such governmental interference withfreedom of commerce. 

The problem of labor was obviously one that must be faced by each of thewar boards or administrations, and nearly all of them were compelled toestablish some sort of labor division or tribunal within each separatefield. The demands made upon the labor market by war industry were heavy, for the withdrawal of labor into the army created an inevitable scarcityat the moment when production must be increased, and the differentindustries naturally were brought to bid against each other; the value ofany wage scale was constantly affected by the rising prices, while theintroduction of inexperienced workmen and women affected the conditionsof piecework, so that the question of wages and conditions of labor gaverise to numerous discussions. The Labor Committee of the Council ofNational Defense had undertaken to meet such problems as early asFebruary, 1917, but it was not until the beginning of the next year thatthe Department of Labor underwent a notable reorganization with thepurpose of effecting the coördination necessary to complete success. 

Unlike the food, fuel, and transportation problems, which were solvedthrough new administrations not connected with the Department ofAgriculture, the Bureau of Mines, or the Interstate Commerce Commissionrespectively, that of labor was met by new bureaus and boards which wereorganic parts of the existing Department of Labor. In January, 1918, thatDepartment undertook the formulation and administration of a national warlabor policy. Shortly afterwards delegates of the National IndustrialConference Board and of the American Federation of Labor, representingcapital and labor, worked out a unanimous report upon the principles tobe followed in labor adjustment. To enforce these recommendations thePresident, on April 9, 1918, appointed a National War Labor Board, whichuntil November sat as a court of final appeal in labor disputes. An indexof the importance of the Board was given by the choice of ex-PresidentTaft as one of its chairmen. A month later, a War Labor Policies Boardwas added to the system to lay down general rules for the use of the WarLabor Board in the rendering of its judgments. 

Not merely enthusiasm and brains enabled America to make theextraordinary efforts demanded by the exigencies of war. Behind everyline of activity lay the need of money: and the raising of money inamounts so large that they passed the comprehension of the averagecitizen, forms one of the most romantic stories of the war. It is thestory of the enthusiastic coöperation of rich and poor: Wall Street andthe humblest foreign immigrants gave of their utmost in the attempt toprovide the all-important funds for America and her associates in thewar. Citizens accepted the weight of income and excess profit taxes farheavier than any American had previously dreamed of. They were asked inaddition to buy government bonds to a total of fourteen billions, andthey responded by oversubscribing this amount by nearly five billions. Ofthe funds needed for financing the war, the Government planned to raiseabout a third by taxation, and the remainder by the sale of bonds andcertificates maturing in from five to thirty years. It would have provedthe financial statesmanship of McAdoo had he dared to raise a largerproportion by taxation; for thus much of the inflation which inevitablyresulted from the bond issues might have been avoided. But the Governmentfeared alike for its popularity and for the immediate effect uponbusiness, which could not safely be discouraged. As it was, the excessprofit taxes aroused great complaint. The amount raised in directtaxation represented a larger proportion of the war budget than anyforeign nation had been able to secure from tax revenues. 

In seeking to sell its bonds the Government, rather against its will, wascompelled to rely largely upon the capitalists. The large popularsubscriptions would have been impossible but for the assistance andenthusiasm shown by the banks in the selling campaign. Wall Street andthe bankers of the country were well prepared and responded with alltheir strength, a response which deserves the greater credit when weremember the lack of sympathy which had existed between financial circlesand President Wilson's Administration. Largely under banking auspices thegreatest selling campaign on record was inaugurated. Bonds were placed onsale at street corners, in theaters, and restaurants; disposed of byeminent operatic stars, moving-picture favorites, and wounded heroes fromthe front. Steeple jacks attracted crowds by their perilous antics, inorder to start the bidding for subscriptions. Villages and isolatedfarmhouses were canvassed. The banks used their entire machinery toinduce subscriptions, offering to advance the subscription price. Whenduring the first loan campaign the rather unwise optimism of the Treasurycooled enthusiasm for a moment, by making it appear that the loan couldbe floated without effort, Wall Street took up the load. The first loanwas oversubscribed by a billion. The success of the three loans thatfollowed was equally great; the fourth, coming in October, 1918, was setfor six billion dollars, the largest amount that had ever been asked ofany people, and after a three weeks' campaign, seven billions weresubscribed. Quite as notable as the amount raised was the progressiveincrease in the number of subscribers, which ranged from four millionindividuals in the first loan to more than twenty-one millions in thefourth. Equally notable, as indicating the educative effect of the warand of the sale of these Liberty Bonds, was the successful effort toencourage thrift. War Savings societies were instituted and childrensaved their pennies and nickels to buy twenty-five cent "thrift stamps"which might be accumulated to secure interest-bearing savingscertificates. Down to November 1, 1918, the sale of such stamps totalled$834, 253, 000, with a maturity value of more than a billion dollars. 

The successful organizing of national resources to supply militarydemands obviously depended, in the last instance, upon the education ofthe people to a desire for service and sacrifice. The Liberty Loancampaigns, the appeals of Hoover, and the Fuel Administration, all wereof importance in producing such morale. In addition the Council ofNational Defense, through the Committee on Public Information, spreadpamphlets emphasizing the issues of the war and the objects for which wewere fighting. At every theater and moving-picture show, in the factoriesduring the noon hours, volunteer speakers told briefly of the needs ofthe Government and appealed for coöperation. These were the so-called"Four Minute Men. " The most noted artists gave their talent to coveringthe billboards with patriotic and informative posters. Blue Devils whohad fought at Verdun, captured tanks, and airplanes, were paraded inorder to bring home the realities of the life and death struggle in whichAmerica was engaged. The popular response was inspiring. In the face ofthe national enthusiasm the much-vaunted plans of the German Governmentfor raising civil disturbance fell to the ground. Labor was sometimesdisorganized by German propaganda; destruction of property or warmaterial was accomplished by German agents; and valuable informationsometimes leaked out to the enemy. But the danger was always kept incheck by the Department of Justice and also by a far-reaching citizenorganization, the American Protective League. Equally surprising was thelack of opposition to the war on the part of pacifists and socialists. Itwas rare to find the "sedition" for which some of them were punished, perhaps over-promptly, translated from words to actions. 

 * * * * *

The organization of the industrial resources of the nation wascomplicated by the same conditions that affected the purely militaryproblems--decentralization and the emergency demands that resulted fromthe sudden decision to send a large expeditionary force to France. Thevarious organizing boards were so many individual solutions forindividual problems. At the beginning of the war the Council of NationalDefense represented the only attempt at a central business organization, and as time went on the importance and the influence of the Councildiminished. The effects of decentralization became painfully apparentduring the bitter cold of the winter months, when the fuel, transportation, and food crises combined to threaten almost completeparalysis of the economic and military mobilization. 

The distrust and discouragement that followed brought forth furiousattacks upon the President's war policies, led not merely by Rooseveltand Republican enemies of the Administration, but by Democratic Senators. The root of the whole difficulty, they contended, lay in the fact thatWilson had no policy. They demanded practically the abdication of thepresidential control of military affairs, either through the creation ofa Ministry of Munitions or of a War Cabinet. In either case Congresswould control the situation through its definition of the powers of thenew organization and the appointment of its personnel. 

President Wilson utilized the revolt to secure the completecentralization toward which he had been aiming. He fought the newproposals on the ground that they merely introduced new machinery tocomplicate the war organization, and he insisted that true policydemanded rather an increase in the efficiency of existing machinery. Ifthe General Staff and the War Industries Board were given power tosupervise and execute as well as to plan, the country would have themachinery at hand capable of forming a central organization, which coulddetermine in the first place what was wanted and where, and in the secondplace how it could be supplied. All that was necessary was to give thePresident a free hand to effect any transfer of organization, funds, orfunctions in any of the existing departments of government, without beingcompelled to apply to Congress in each case. 

The struggle between Wilson and his opponents was sharp, but thePresident carried the day. He exerted to the full his influence onCongress and utilized skillfully the argument that at this moment ofcrisis a swapping of horses might easily prove fatal. OpposingCongressmen drew back at the thought of shouldering the responsibilitywhich they knew the President would throw upon them if he were defeated. On May 20, 1918, the Overman Act became law, giving to the President theblanket powers which he demanded and which he immediately used tocentralize the military and industrial organization. Bureau chiefs werebitter in their disapproval; the National Guard grumbled, even as itfought its best battles in France; politicians saw their chance ofinfluencing military affairs disappear; business men complained of theeconomic dictatorship thus secured by the President. But Mr. Wilson wasat last in a position to effect that which seemed to him of greatestimportance--the concentration of responsibility and authority. 

Upon the shoulders of the President, accordingly, must rest in the lastinstance the major portion of the blame and the credit to be distributedfor the mistakes and the achievements of the military and economicorganization. He took no part in the working out of details. Once thedevelopment of any committee of organization had been started, he leftthe control of it entirely to those who had been placed in charge. But hewould have been untrue to his nature if he had not at all times beendetermined to keep the reins of supreme control in his own hands. Hisopponents insisted that the organization was formed in spite of him. Itis probable that he did not himself perceive the crying need forcentralization so clearly in 1917 as he did in 1918; and the protests ofhis political opponents doubtless brought the realization of itsnecessity more definitely home to him. But there is no evidence toindicate that the process of centralization was forced upon him againsthis will and much to show that he sought always that concentration ofresponsibility and power which he insisted upon in politics. The task washerculean; ironically enough it was facilitated by the revolt against hiswar policies which resulted in the Senate investigation and the OvermanAct. His tactics were by no means above reproach, and his entire policynearly went on the rocks in the winter of 1917 because of his inabilityto treat successfully with the Senate and with Republican Congressmen. 

When all is said, however, the organization that was developed during thelast six months of the war transported and maintained in Europe more thana million and a half American soldiers; at home it maintained twomillions more, ready to sail at the earliest opportunity; and it wasprepared to raise and equip an army of five and a half millions by June30, 1920. The process had been slow and the results were not apparent formany months. Furthermore, because of the intensity of the danger and theabsolute need of victory, cherished traditions were sacrificed and stepstaken which were to cost much later on; for the price of theseachievements was inevitable reaction and social unrest. But with all themistakes and all the cost, the fact still remains that the most gigantictransformation of history--the transformation of an unmilitary andpeace-loving nation of ninety million souls into a belligerent power--wassuccessfully accomplished. 

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIGHTING FRONT

The encouragement given to the Allies by the entrance of the UnitedStates into the war injected a temporary ray of brightness into thesituation abroad, but with the realization that long months must elapsebefore American aid could prove effective, came deep disappointment. Thespring of 1917 did not bring the expected success to the French andBritish on the western front; and the summer and autumn carried intensediscouragement. Hindenburg, early in the spring, executed a skillfulretreat on the Somme front, which gave to the Allies the territory towhich their previous capture of Peronne and Bapaume entitled them. Butthe Germans, losing some square miles, saved their troops and supplies. British attacks on the north gained little ground at terrible cost. TheFrench offensive, planned by Nivelle, which was designed to break theGerman line, had to be given up after bloody checks. There was mutiny inthe French armies and the morale of the civilian population sank. 

The hopes that had been aroused by the Russian revolution were seen to bedeceptive; instead of a national movement directed towards a more activestruggle against Germany, it now appeared in its true colors as a demandfor peace and land above everything. The Brusilov attack, which theAllies insisted upon, proved to be a flash in the pan and ended with thecomplete military demoralization of Russian armies. The collapse of theItalian forces at Caporetto followed. Italy was not merely unable todistract the attention of the Central Powers by a determined offensiveagainst Austria, but she threatened to become a liability; no one knewhow many French divisions might have to be diverted to aid in the defenseof the new Piave front. General Byng's break of the German lines atCambrai was more than offset by the equally brilliant Germancounter-attack. And every day the submarine was taking its toll of Alliedshipping. 

Following the Italian débâcle, the Bolshevik revolution of Novemberindicated that Russia would wholly withdraw and that that great potentialsource of man-power for the Allies could no longer be counted upon. Allied leaders realized that Germany would be able to transfer largenumbers of troops to the western front, and became seriously alarmed. "The Allies are very weak, " cabled General Pershing, on the 2d ofDecember, "and we must come to their relief this year, 1918. The yearafter may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919unless we give them a lot of support this year. " Showing that theschedule of troop shipments would be inadequate and complaining that theactual shipments were not even being kept up to programme, Pershinginsisted upon the importance of the most strenuous efforts to secureextra tonnage, which alone would make it possible for the American armyto take a proper share in the military operations of 1918. 

The serious representations of General Pershing were reinforced byColonel House when he returned from abroad on the 15th of December. Forsix weeks he had been in conference, as head of a war mission, with theAllied political and military leaders, who now realized the necessity ofunity of plan. Because of his personal intimacy with French and Britishstatesmen and his acknowledged skill in negotiations, House had donemuch to bring about Allied harmony and to pave the way for a suprememilitary command. Like Pershing, he was convinced of the dangerthreatening the Allies, and from the moment of his return began thespeeding-up process, which was to result in the presence of a largeAmerican force on the battle front at the moment of crisis in the earlysummer of 1918. 

Tonnage was obviously the vital factor upon which effective militaryassistance depended. The United States had the men, although they werenot completely trained, but the apparent impossibility of transportingthem formed the great obstacle. The problem could not have been solvedwithout the assistance of the Allies. With the threat of the Germandrive, and especially after the first German victories of 1918, theybegan to appreciate the necessity of sacrificing everything to thetonnage necessary to transport American soldiers to France. After longhesitation they agreed to a pooling of Allied tonnage for this purpose. Most of the Allied ships ultimately furnished the United States wereprovided by the British, whose transports carried a million Americantroops to France. French and Italian boats transported 112, 000; our owntransports, 927, 000. 

Thus by relying largely upon the shipping assistance of our associates inthe war we were able to respond to the demands of General Pershing and, later, Marshal Foch. And thus came about the extraordinary development ofour military programme from the thirty to the eighty and one hundreddivision plans, which resulted in tremendous confusion, but which alsoultimately ensured Allied victory in 1918. Until the end of the year1917, we had put into France only 195, 000 troops, including 7500 marines, an average of about 28, 000 a month. From December to February the averagerose to 48, 000; from March to May it was 149, 000; and from June to Augustit was 290, 000 men a month. During the four months from May to Augustinclusive, 1, 117, 000 American troops were transported to France. 

Altogether about two million Americans were sent to France, without theloss of a single man while under the escort of United States vessels. Nonavy troop transports were torpedoed on east-bound trips although threewere sunk on the return trip with loss of 138 lives. To the American andBritish navies must go the credit for carrying through this stupendousfeat, and in the work of assuring the safety of the troop transports thenavy of the United States may claim recognition for the larger share, since 82 per cent of the escorts furnished were American cruisers anddestroyers. It was a nerve-racking and tantalizing experience--the troopships sailing in echelon formation, preceded, followed, and flanked bydestroyers; at night every glimmer of light eclipsed, the ships speedingahead in perfect blackness, each inch of the sea swept by watchful eyesto discover the telltale ripple of a periscope or the trail of a torpedo, gun crews on the alert, depth bombs ready. Nor was the crossing anythinglike a vacation yachting cruise for the doughboys transported, packed asthey were like sardines two and three decks below the waterline, broughtup in shifts to catch a brief taste of fresh air, assailed at once byhomesickness, seasickness, and fears of drowning like rats in a trap. 

The work of the navy was far more extensive, moreover, than the safeconvoying of troop ships, important though that was. The very firstcontingent of American overseas fighting forces was made up of twoflotillas of destroyers, which upon the declaration of war had been sentto Queenstown where they were placed under the command of Admiral WilliamS. Sims. Their main function was to hunt submarines, which, since thedecree of the 1st of February, had succeeded in committing frightfulravages upon Allied commerce and seriously threatened to starve theBritish Isles. Admiral Sims was two years older than Pershing and astypical a sailor as the former was soldier. With his bluff and genial, yet dignified, manner, his rubicund complexion, closely-trimmed whitebeard, and piercing eyes, no one could have mistaken his calling. Free ofspeech, frank in praise and criticism, abounding in indiscretions, hepossessed the capacity to make the warmest friends and enemies. He was anardent admirer of the British, rejoiced in fighting with them, andashamed that our Navy Department was unwilling to send more adequate andimmediate assistance to their fleet. Sims's international reputation asan expert in naval affairs was of long standing. Naval officers in everycountry of Europe knew of him as the inventor of a system of fire controlwhich had been adopted by the great navies of the world, and it waslargely because of his studies and devices that the extraordinary recordsof the American fleets at target practice had been secured. The Britishnaval officers reciprocated Sims's admiration for them, and, according topopular belief, it was at their special request that he had been sent tocommand our overseas naval forces. No one else could have obtained sucheffective coöperation between the British and American fleets. 

While at first the major portion of the American fleet was retained inhome waters for the protection of American coasts and ports, a policywhich aroused the stinging criticism of Admiral Sims, gradually the fleetadded strength to the Allied navies in their patrol of European coastsand the bottling-up of the German high seas fleet. Destroyer bases weremaintained at Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar, from which weredispatched constant patrols. Individual destroyers, during the first yearof service overseas, steamed a total of 60, 000 miles. Their crews were onthe watch in the dirtiest weather, unable to sleep, tossed and batteredby the incessant rolling, without warm food, facing the constant peril ofbeing swept overboard and knowing that their boat could not stop to pickthem up. American submarine-chasers and converted yachts, mine-sweeperson their beneficent and hazardous duty, were equally active. Navalaviators coöperated with the British to patrol the coasts in search ofsubmarines. Late in 1917, six battleships were sent to join the BritishGrand Fleet, which was watching for the Germans in the North Sea, thusconstituting about twelve per cent of the guarding naval force. Moreimportant, perhaps, was the American plan for laying a mine barrage fromthe Scotch coast across to Norwegian waters. The Ordnance Bureau of thenavy, despite the discouragement of British experts, manufactured themines, 100, 000 of them, and shipped them abroad in parts ready for finalassembling. The American navy was responsible for eighty per cent of thelaying of the barrage, which when finished was 245 miles long and twentymiles wide. The complete story of the achievements of the navy cannot nowbe told in detail. It was not always inspiring, for numerous mistakeswere made. Confusion of counsels in the Naval Board left one importantbombing squadron so bereft of supplies that after an expenditure of fourmillions only two bombs were dropped in the entire course of itsoperations. But there are also to be remembered the unheralded stories ofheroism and skill, such as the dash of the submarine-chasers anddestroyers through the mine fields at Durazzo, and the work of our navalguns in the attack on Zeebrugge. 

The armies, safely brought to France, were meanwhile undergoing theessential intensive training, and the task of organizing the service ofsupply was being undertaken. The training given in the United Statesbefore sailing had been in the ordinary forms of drill and tactics; nowit was necessary that there should be greater specialization. Numerousschools for the training of officers were established. For the troops theplan for training allowed, according to the intent of General Pershing, "a division one month for acclimatization and instruction in small unitsfrom battalions down, a second month in quiet trench sectors bybattalion, and a third month after it came out of the trenches when itshould be trained as a complete division in war of movement. "[10] Theentire process of training was a compromise between speed and efficiency. During the latter months of the war many of the American troops were puton the battle-line when they were by no means sufficiently trained. Certain draft units were transported and thrown up to the front afterexperience of a most superficial character; there are instances of mengoing into action without knowing how to load their rifles or adjusttheir gas masks properly. But on the whole the training given wassurprisingly effective in view of the speed with which it wasaccomplished. American skill with the rifle won the envy of foreignofficers, and the value of American troops in open warfare was soon to beacknowledged by the Germans. 

[Footnote 10: This plan could not be fulfilled for troops coming toFrance in 1918, because of lack of time. ]

The same sort of centralization sought by Wilson in America obviouslybecame necessary in France with the expanding plans for an enormous army. In February, 1918, the Service of Supply was organized. With itsheadquarters at Tours, the S. O. S. Was responsible for securing, organizing, and distributing all the food, equipment, building materials, and other necessities demanded by the expeditionary force. In order toprovide for the quantities of essential supplies and to avoid thecongestion of the chief ports of France, certain ports were especiallyallotted to our army, of which the most important were St. Nazaire, Bordeaux, and Brest. The first, a somnolent fishing village, wastransformed by the energy of American engineers into a first-class portwith enormous docks, warehouses, and supply depots; Brest rose in thespace of twelve months from the rank of a second-class port to one thatmatched Hamburg in the extent of its shipping. In all, more than a dozenports were used by the Americans and in each extensive improvements andenlargements proved necessary. At Bordeaux not more than two ships aweek, of any size, could conveniently be unloaded prior to June, 1917. Eight months later, docks a mile long had been constructed, concreteplatforms and electric cranes set up; within a year fourteen ships couldbe unloaded simultaneously, the rate of speed being determined only bythe number of stevedores. For unloading purposes regiments of negroeswere stationed at each port. 

A few miles back from the coast were the base depots where the materialswere stored as they came from the ships. Thence distribution was made tothe intermediate depots in the cities of supply, and finally to thedepots immediately behind the fighting front. All these depots involvedenormous building operations; at first the lumber was shipped, but later, American lumber jacks were brought over to cut French forests. At onesupply depot three hundred buildings were put up, covering an area of sixsquare miles, operated by 20, 000 men, and holding in storage a hundredmillion dollars' worth of supplies. For distribution purposes it provednecessary for American engineers to take over the construction andmaintenance of communications. At first American engines and cars wereoperated under French supervision; but ultimately many miles of Frenchrailroads were taken over bodily by the American army and many more builtby American engineers. More than 400 miles of inland waterways were alsoused by American armies. This transportation system was operated byAmerican experts of all grades from brakemen to railroad presidents, numbering altogether more than 70, 000. 

In order to meet the difficulty of securing tonnage for supplies and toavoid competition with the Allies, a General Purchasing Board was createdfor the coördination of all purchases. Agents of this board werestationed in the Allied countries, in Switzerland, Holland, and Spain, who reconnoitered resources, analyzed requirements, issued forecasts ofsupplies, supervised the claims of foreign governments on American rawmaterials, and procured civilian manual labor. Following theestablishment of the supreme interallied command, the Interallied Boardof Supplies was organized in the summer of 1918, with the Americanpurchasing agent as a member. Other activities of the S. O. S. , toonumerous to recount in detail, included such important tasks as thereclassification of personnel, the installation and operation of ageneral service of telephone and telegraph communication, with 115, 500kilometers of lines, and the renting and requisitioning of the land andbuildings needed by the armies. It was a gigantic business undertaking, organized at top speed, involving tremendous expenditure. Its successwould have been impossible without the coöperation of hundreds of men ofbusiness, who found in it a sphere of service which enabled the army toutilize the proverbial American genius for meeting large problems ofeconomic organization. At the time of the armistice the S. O. S. Reacheda numerical strength in personnel of 668, 000, including 23, 000 civilianemployees. 

From the first, Pershing had been determined that the AmericanExpeditionary Force should ultimately operate as an independent unit, although in close coöperation with the Allies. During the autumn of 1917the disasters in Italy and the military demoralization of Russia had ledto the formation of the Supreme Military Council of the Allies, uponwhich the United States was represented by General Tasker Bliss, whoserough visage and gruff manner gave little indication of his wideinterests. Few suspected that this soldierly character took secretpleasure in the reading of Latin poets. The coördination that resultedfrom the creation of the Supreme Council, however, proved insufficient tomeet the crisis of the spring of 1918. 

On the 21st of March, the Germans attacked in overwhelming force thesouthern extremity of the British lines, near where they joined theFrench, and disastrously defeated General Gough's army. The break-throughwas clean and the advance made by the endless waves of Germanshock-troops appalling. Within eight days the enemy had swept forward toa depth of fifty-six kilometers, threatening the capture of Amiens andthe separation of the French and British. As the initial momentum of theonslaught was lost, the Allied line was re-formed with the help of Frenchreserves under Fayolle. But the Allies had been and still were close todisaster. Complete unity of command was essential. It was plain also, inthe words of Pershing's report, that because of the inroads made uponBritish and French reserves, "defeat stared them in the face unless thenew American troops should prove more immediately available than even themost optimistic had dared to hope. " The first necessity was satisfiedearly in April. The extremity of the danger reinforced the demand longmade by the French, and supported by President Wilson through ColonelHouse, that a generalissimo be appointed. The British finally sank theirobjection, and on the 28th of March it was agreed that General FerdinandFoch should be made commander-in-chief of all the Allied armies with thepowers necessary for the strategic direction of all military operations. The decision was ratified on the 3d and approved by President Wilson onthe 16th of April. 

General Foch had long been recognized as an eminent student of strategy, and he had proved his practical capacity in 1914 and later. It was he whocommanded the French army that broke the German line at the marshes ofSt. Gond, in the battle of the Marne, thus assuring victory to Joffre, and he had later in the year secured fresh laurels in the first battle ofthe Yser. At the moment of extreme danger to Italy, after Caporetto, in1917, he had been chosen to command the assisting force sent down by theFrench. Unsentimental and unswayed by political factors, he wastemperamentally and intellectually the ideal man for the post of supremeAllied commander; he was furthermore supported by the capacity of GeneralPétain, the French commander-in-chief, and by a remarkable group of armycommanders, among whom Fayolle, Mangin, and Gouraud were to winparticular fame. But he lacked troops, the Germans disposing of 200divisions as against 162 Allied divisions. 

Hence the hurry call sent to America and hence the heavy sacrifice nowforced upon Pershing. Much against his will and only as a result ofextreme pressure, the American commander-in-chief agreed to a temporarycontinuance of the brigading of American troops with the British and theFrench. He had felt all along that "there was every reason why we couldnot allow them to be scattered among our Allies, even by divisions, muchless as replacements, except by pressure of pure necessity. " He dislikedthe emphasis placed by the Allies upon training for trench warfare; hefeared the effect of the lack of homogeneity which would render the mixeddivisions "difficult to maneuver and almost certain to break up under thestress of defeat, " and he believed that the creation of independentAmerican armies "would be a severe blow to German morale. " When the pinchof necessity came, however, Pershing sank his objections to amalgamationand, to his credit, agreed with a _beau geste_ and fine phrase whichconcealed the differences between the Allied chiefs and won the heartiestsympathy from France and England. The principle of an independent Americanforce, however, Pershing insisted upon, and he made clear that theamalgamation of our troops with the French and British was merely atemporary expedient. 

Immediately after the stabilization of the battle-line near Amiens, theGermans began their second great drive, this time against the Britishalong the Lys, in Flanders. The initial success of the attack, which beganon the 9th of April, was undeniable, and Sir Douglas Haig himself admittedthe danger of the moment: "Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing inthe justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safetyof our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct ofeach one of us at this critical moment. " The value of Allied unity ofcommand now became apparent, for heavy French reinforcements were broughtup in time to help stave off the German drive on the Channel Ports. 

But still the demand went up for more men and ships. "Scrap beforeshipping every pound that takes tonnage and is not necessary to thekilling of Germans, " wrote a French military authority. "Send the mostinfantry by the shortest route to the hottest corner. No matter what flagthey fight under, so long as it is an Allied flag. " On the 27th of Maythe Germans caught Foch by surprise and launched a violent attack on theChemin des Dames, between Soissons and Berry-au-Bac. This formed thethird phase of their great offensive. In four days they pushed beforethem the tired French divisions, sent into that sector to recuperate, adistance of fifty kilometers and reached the Marne. Again, as in 1914, Paris began to empty, fearful of capture. A statement sent to Wilson onthe 2d of June and signed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando, readas follows: "There is great danger of the war being lost unless thenumerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly aspossible by the advent of American troops.... We are satisfied thatGeneral Foch ... Is not over-estimating the needs of the case. " Such wasthe peril of the Allies. But in the month of May 245, 000 Americans hadbeen landed, and in the following month there were to be 278, 000 more. 

Previous to June, 1918, the participation of American troops in militaryoperations had been of comparative unimportance and less for tacticalpurposes than as a part of their training. In October, 1917, the FirstDivision had been sent into trenches on the quiet Lorraine front and hadengaged in raids and counter-raids. Three other divisions, the Second, theForty-second, or "Rainbow, " and the Twenty-sixth from New England, followed, and by March, 1918, they were all described by Pershing as"equal to any demands of battle action. " On the 29th of April, thelast-named division was engaged in something more serious than a mere raidat Seicheprey, near St. Mihiel; the number of prisoners lost indicatedlack of experience, but the vigor of the American counter-attack proveddefinitely the will to fight. That belligerent spirit was equallydisplayed by various engineering units which, during the break of GeneralGough's army before the German assault of March, near St. Quentin, haddropped their tools, seized rifles, and, hastily organizing to cover theretreat, had secured valuable respite for various fleeing units. 

More important yet, because of the moral effect achieved, was theengagement at Cantigny near Montdidier, on the 28th of May. The Americanslaunched their attack with skill as well as dash, and stood firm againstthe violence of the German reaction; this they met without assistancefrom the French, who had been called to oppose the German advance on theMarne. Pershing spoke of the "desperate efforts" of the enemy atCantigny, "determined at all costs to counteract the most excellenteffect the American success had produced. " For three days guns of allcalibers were vainly concentrated upon the new positions. Coming at themoment of extreme discouragement, Cantigny was of an importance entirelyout of proportion to the numbers involved. For months France had beenawaiting American assistance. A year before the French had seen Pershingand the first few doughboys, but the long delay had caused them to losethe confidence which that sight had aroused. Now suddenly came the newsthat the Americans were arriving in tremendous numbers and from Cantigny, north and south along the lines, spread the report: "These men willfight. "

Four days later at Château-Thierry, [11] Americans proved not merely themoral but the practical value of their assistance. The German drive of the27th of May, beginning on the Chemin des Dames, had pushed south to theMarne and westward towards Meaux. The French falling back in haste hadmaintained their lines intact, but were pessimistic as to the possibilityof stopping the enemy advance. On the 31st of May, German vanguard unitsentered Château-Thierry, crossed the river, and planned to secure thebridges. At this moment American machine gunners of the Third Divisioncame up with a battalion of French colonials in support, drove the Germansback to the north bank, covered the retreat of the French forces acrossthe Marne, on the following day, and gave time to blow up the bridges. Onthe same day, the 1st of June, northwest of Château-Thierry, the SecondDivision came into line to support the wearied French, and as the lattercame filtering back and through, soon found itself meeting direct Germanassaults. Stretching across the road to Paris, with the French too weak tomake a stand, it blocked the German advance. Even so, the danger was notentirely parried, since the enemy held strong positions from Vauxnorthwest to Veuilly, which, when German reinforcements came up, wouldenable them to deliver deadly assaults. Those positions had to be taken. From the 6th to the 11th of June, American troops, among them marineregiments, struck viciously, concentrating against the railroadembankment at Bouresches and the hill of Belleau Woods. The stiffness ofthe German defense, maintained by their best troops, was overcome byfearless rushing of machine-gun nests, ruthless mopping-up of isolatedstragglers, and a final clearing of the Woods by heavy artillery fire. Onthe 18th of June the Americans took the approaches to Torcy and on the 1stof July the village of Vaux. If the attack on Belleau Woods proved theircourage, the capture of Vaux vindicated their skill, for losses werenegligible. 

[Footnote 11: The reader should distinguish the defensive operations atChâteau-Thierry, on the 1st of June, from the attack launched from thissector in July. Both are known as the battle of Château-Thierry. ]

The Allied line was now in a position to contest actively any deepeningof the Marne salient to the west, and American troops had so clearlyproved their quality that Pershing could with justice demand a radicalrevision of the Allied opinion that American soldiers were fit only forthe defense. His confidence in their fighting capacity was soon furtherput to the test and vindicated. On the 15th of July the Germans openedthe fourth and last of their great drives, with tremendous artillery firefrom Rheims to the Marne. They hoped to capture the former, swing far tothe south and west, and, if they failed to take Paris, at least to drawsufficient troops from Flanders and Picardy as to assure a successfuldrive on Amiens and the Channel Ports. For the first time, however, theelement of surprise in their attack was lacking. At the eastern end ofthe battle-line General Gouraud, with whom were fighting the Forty-secondDivision and four colored regiments, warned of the moment of attack, withdrew his front lines and permitted the Germans to shell emptytrenches; all important positions he held firmly. On the Marne, east ofChâteau-Thierry, the enemy succeeded in crossing the river in the earlymorning. At various points the American line was compelled to yield, although one of the American regiments stood its ground while on eitherflank the Germans, who had gained a footing on the south bank, pressedforward; it was, according to Pershing's report, "one of the mostbrilliant pages in our military annals. " At noon, heedless of the warninggiven by the French commander, American reinforcements launched a strongcounter-attack and drove the enemy back to the river; on the next morningno Germans were to be found on the south bank in front of the Americantroops. During the next two days German efforts to press forward wereunrelaxing but in vain, and on the 18th of July, Foch launched hiscounter-offensive. 

The inherent weakness of the Marne salient from the German point of viewand the opportunity which it offered the Allied command had not beenforgotten by the generalissimo. Foch waited until the enemy had spent hisstrength in the attacks around Rheims and on the Marne, then struckfiercely between Soissons and Château-Thierry. The spearhead of the maindrive was composed of the First and Second American Divisions, immediately to the south of Soissons, who were operating under Manginwith the First French Moroccan Division between them. Straightway, without the orthodox preliminary artillery fire, a deep thrust was madeagainst the western side of the salient; near Soissons, despite fierceresistance, advances of from eight to ten kilometers and large numbers ofprisoners were reported in the first twenty-four hours. "Due to themagnificent dash and powers displayed on the field of Soissons by ourFirst and Second Divisions, " said Pershing, "the tide of war wasdefinitely turned in favor of the Allies. " Further to the south, theFourth and Twenty-sixth Divisions crossed the road running fromChâteau-Thierry to Soissons, pushing east; while from the southern bankof the Marne, the Third Division pushed north across the river. It wasobvious to the Germans that retreat from the perilous salient mustproceed at once, especially as Franco-British counter-attacks on theeastern side threatened to close it at the neck and cut the main line ofGerman withdrawal. The retreat was executed with great skill and valor. While holding on the sides, the enemy forces were slowly pulled back fromthe apex, striving to win time to save artillery, although they mustperforce lose or destroy great quantities of ammunition. Against theretreating foe fresh American divisions were hurled. On the 25th of Julythe Forty-second division relieved the Twenty-sixth, advancing toward theVesle, with elements of the Twenty-eighth, until relieved on August 3d, by the Fourth Division. Farther east the Thirty-second had relieved theThird. The Americans had to face withering fire from machine-gun nestsand fight hand to hand in the crumbled streets of the Champagne villages. Here were carried on some of the fiercest conflicts of American militaryhistory. Finally on the 6th of August the Germans reached the line of theVesle, their retreat secured, although their losses had been terrific. But the pause was only momentary. Before they could bring upreplacements, the British launched their great drive south of the Somme, the American Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Seventy-seventh divisionscrossed the Vesle pushing the Germans before them, and there began whatLudendorff in his memoirs calls "the last phase. "

Pershing had not lost sight of his original object, which was to assemblethe American divisions into a separate army. After the victories of July, which wiped out the Marne salient, and those of August, which put theenemy definitely on the defensive, he felt that "the emergency which hadjustified the dispersion of our divisions had passed. " Soon after thesuccessful British attack, south of Amiens, he overcame the objections ofFoch and concluded arrangements for the organization of this army, whichwas to operate in the Lorraine sector. [12] It contained 600, 000 men, fourteen American divisions and two French. On the 30th of August thesector was established and preparations made for the offensive, the firststep in which was to be the wiping out of the St. Mihiel salient. Thissalient had existed since 1914, when the Germans, failing to storm thescarp protecting Verdun on the east, had driven a wedge across the lowerheights to the south. The elimination of this wedge would have greatmoral effect; it would free the Paris-Nancy railway from artillery fire;and would assure Pershing an excellent base for attack against theMetz-Sedan railway system and the Briey iron basin. The German positionswere naturally strong and had withstood violent French attacks in 1915. But there was only one effective line of retreat and the enemy, if hepersisted in holding the apex of the salient, risked losing his entiredefending force, should the sides be pressed in from the south and west. 

[Footnote 12: Allied opposition to an American army was so strong as tobring threats of an appeal to Wilson. The President steadfastly supportedPershing. ]

On the 12th of September the attack was launched. It was originallyplanned for the 15th, but word was brought that the Germans were about toretire at a rate which would have left none of them in the salient bythat date. Hence the attack was advanced by three days. The attemptedwithdrawal secured the retreat of the German main force, but they wereunable to save their rear guard. After four hours of vigorous artillerypreparation, with the largest assemblage of aviation ever engaged in asingle operation (mainly British and French) and with American heavy gunsthrowing into confusion all rail movements behind the German lines, theadvancing Americans immediately overwhelmed all of the enemy thatattempted to hold their ground. By the afternoon of the second day thesalient was extinguished, 16, 000 prisoners were taken, 443 guns and largestores of supplies captured. American casualties totaled less than 7000. The effects of the victory were incalculable. Apart from the materialresults, hope of which had motivated the attack, the moral influence ofthe battle of St. Mihiel in the making of American armies and thediscouragement of the German High Command was of the first importance. "An American army was an accomplished fact, " wrote Pershing, "and theenemy had felt its power. No form of propaganda could overcome thedepressing effect on the morale of the enemy of this demonstration of ourability to organize a large American force and drive it successfullythrough his defense. It gave our troops implicit confidence in theirsuperiority and raised their morale to the highest pitch. For the firsttime wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable barriers andopen-warfare training, which had been so urgently insisted upon, provedto be the correct doctrine. "

The victory of St. Mihiel was merely the necessary prelude to greaterthings. During the first week of September the Allied command decidedthat the general offensive movement of their armies should be pressed asrapidly as possible, converging upon the main line of German retreatthrough Mezières and Sedan. The British were to pursue the attack in thedirection of Cambrai, the center of the French armies, west of Rheims, was to drive the enemy beyond the Aisne, while the Americans were toattack through the Argonne and on both sides of the Meuse, aiming forSedan. Pershing was given his choice of the Champagne or Argonne sectors, and chose the latter, which was the more difficult, insisting that noother Allied troops possessed the offensive spirit which would benecessary for success. In the meantime a new American army was to beorganized, to operate south of Verdun and against Metz, in the spring of1919; in fact this was designed to be the chief American effort. Asmatters turned out this second American army was ready to make itsoffensive early in November, but in September none of the Allied chiefsexpressed the opinion that the final victory could be achieved in 1918. Such were the difficulties of terrain in the Argonne advance that theFrench did not believe that the attack could be pushed much beyondMontfaucon, between the forest and the Meuse, before winter forced acessation of active operations. 

The defensive importance of the Argonne for the Germans could hardly beoverestimated, for if the railway line running through Sedan and Mezièreswere severed, they would be cut in two by the Ardennes and would beunable to withdraw from France the bulk of their forces, which, leftwithout supplies, would suffer inevitable disaster. As a consequence theArgonne had been strengthened by elaborate fortifications which, taken inconjunction with the natural terrain, densely wooded, covered with ruggedheights, and marked by ridges running east and west, made it apparentlyimpregnable. The dense undergrowth, the bowlders, and the ravines offeredideal spots for machine-gun nests. The Germans had the exact range ofeach important position. 

But Pershing's confidence in the offensive valor of the Americans wasamply justified. On the morning of the 26th of September the initialattack was delivered, the main force of the blow falling east of theforest, where the natural strength of the enemy positions was lessformidable. By noon of the second day Montfaucon was captured, and by the29th all the immediate objectives of the attack were secured. Losses wereheavy, staff work was frequently open to severe criticism, communicationswere broken at times, the infantry had not always received adequateartillery support, but the success of the drive was undeniable. Before theAmerican troops, however, still lay two more lines of defense, the Freyaand Kriemhilde, and the Germans were bringing up their best divisions. Onthe 4th of October the attack was renewed, in coöperation with the Frenchunder Gouraud to the west of the forest who pressed forward actively; aweek's more bitter fighting saw the Argonne itself cleared of the enemy. Hard struggles ensued, particularly around Grandpré, which was taken andretaken, while on the east of the Meuse the enemy was pushed back. By theend of the month the Kriemhilde line had been broken and the great railwayartery was threatened. On the 1st of November the third phase of the greatadvance began. The desperate efforts of the Germans to hold were neverrelaxed, but by the evening of that day the American troops broke throughtheir last defense and forced rapid retreat. Motor trucks were hurriedlybrought up for the pursuit, and by the fifth the enemy's withdrawal becamegeneral. Two days later Americans held the heights which dominated Sedan, the strategic goal, and the German line of communications was as good assevered. 

The converging offensive planned by Foch had succeeded. At Cambrai, LeCâtelet, and St. Quentin, the British, with whom were operating fourAmerican divisions (the Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, Thirty-seventh, andNinety-first), had broken the Hindenburg line; the French had pushed theGermans back from Laon, north of the Aisne, and with the British weredriving them into the narrow neck of the bottle; and now the French andAmericans, by their Argonne-Meuse advance had closed the neck. The enemyfaced an appalling disaster. A few weeks, if not days, of continuedfighting meant the most striking military débâcle of history. Germany'sallies had fallen from her. Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary hadsued for peace and agreed to cease fighting on what amounted to terms ofunconditional surrender. At home, the German Government faced revolution;the Kaiser was about to abdicate and flee. On the 6th of November, theBerlin Government begged for an immediate armistice and five days lateragreed to the stringent terms which the Allies presented. On the 11th ofNovember, at eleven in the morning, firing ceased. Until the last secondthe battle raged with a useless intensity dictated by stern militarytradition: then perfect quiet on the battle front. 

At the present moment we lack the perspective, perhaps, to evaluateexactly the share of credit which the American Expeditionary Forcedeserves for the Allied military victory of 1918. Previous to June themilitary contribution of the United States had no material effects. Thedefense of Château-Thierry at the beginning of the month and theoperations there and at Belleau Woods had, however, important practicalas well as moral effects. The fighting was of a purely local character, but it came at a critical moment and at a critical spot. It was a crisiswhen the importance of standing firm could not be overestimated, and thedefensive capacity of the French had been seriously weakened. The advanceof American divisions with the French in the clearing of the Marne sectorwas of the first military importance. The Americans were better qualifiedthan any European troops, at that stage of the war, to carry throughoffensive operations. They were fearless not merely because of naturalhardihood, but through ignorance of danger; they were fresh andundefeated, physically and morally capable of undergoing the gruellingpunishment delivered by the rearguards of the retreating Germans; theirtraining had been primarily for open warfare. The same qualities wereessential for the arduous and deadly task of breaking the German line inthe Argonne, which was the finishing blow on the western battlefields. 

The defects of the American armies have been emphasized by Europeanexperts. They point especially to the faulty staff-work, apparent in theArgonne particularly, which resulted in heavy losses. Staff-officers innumerous instances seem to have been ill-trained and at times positivelyunequal to the exigencies of the campaign. Mistakes in selection accountfor this to some degree, for men were appointed who were not equippedtemperamentally or intellectually for the positions given them. Equallyfrequent were mistakes in the distribution of staff-officers. It is anotable fact, however, that such mistakes resulted from inexperience andignorance and not from the intrusion of politics. President Wilsonguaranteed to General Pershing complete immunity from the pleas ofpoliticians and in no war fought by the United States have politicalfactors played a rôle of such insignificance. 

Finally, and aside from the fighting qualities of the rank and file andcertain defects of the higher command, the Americans represented numbers;and without the tremendous numerical force transported to Europe in thespring and summer, the plans of Foch could not have been completed. Wehave the testimony of the Allied chiefs in June that without Americanman-power they faced defeat. It is equally obvious that without the1, 390, 000 American troops which, by November, had appeared on thefighting line, the autumn of 1918 would not have witnessed the militarytriumph of the Allies. 

CHAPTER IX

THE PATH TO PEACE

The armistice of November 11, 1918, resulted directly from the militarydefeat of German armies in France, following upon the collapse of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary. But there were many circumstances otherthan military that led to Germany's downfall, and by no means of leastimportance were the moral issues so constantly stressed by Wilson. Hisspeeches had been carefully distributed through the Central Empires; theyhad done much to arouse the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary to revoltfor their freedom, and also to weaken the morale of the German people. Thevalue of Wilson's "verbiage drives" was questioned in this country. Abroad, his insistence upon a peace of justice was generally reckoned avital moral force in the political movements that supplemented thevictories of Marshal Foch. Jugoslavs consented to coöperate with theirItalian enemies because they felt that "Wilson's justice" would guaranteea fair court for their aspirations in the Adriatic; Magyars and Austriansthrew down their arms in the belief that his promise to "be as just toenemies as to friends" secured a better future than they could hope forthrough the continuance of the war; the leaders of the German Reichstagdemanded the Kaiser's abdication in November, under the impression thatWilson had laid it down as a condition of peace. 

From the time when the United States entered the war it was obvious thatWilson placed less emphasis upon defeating Germany than upon securing ajust peace. Military victory meant nothing to him except as the road topeace. In his first war speeches the President, much to the irritation ofmany Americans, insisted that the United States was fighting thegovernment and not the people of Germany. "We have no quarrel, " he said, "with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one ofsympathy and friendship. " In his Flag Day address he was careful not toattack "Germany" but only "the military masters under whom Germany isbleeding. " Certain effects of this attitude were to be seen in theReichstag revolt of July, 1917, led by that most sensitive of politicalweathercocks, Matthias Erzberger, which was designed to take politicalcontrol out of the hands of the military clique. That crisis, however, was safely survived by Ludendorff, who remained supreme. President Wilsonthen returned to the attack in his reply to the Pope's peace proposals ofAugust. "The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of theworld from the menace and the actual power of a vast militaryestablishment controlled by an irresponsible government.... This power isnot the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people.... We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guaranteeof anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by suchconclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German peoplethemselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified inaccepting. "

There was serpentine wisdom in these words, for their very vaguenessattracted German liberals. Wilson did not demand a republic; he did notinsist upon the Kaiser's abdication, for which Germany was not thenprepared; all that he asked was a government responsible to the people, and more and more the Germans were demanding that themselves. Furthermore, he again laid stress upon the fact that the Germans need notfear vengeance such as the Allies had threatened. "Punitive damages, thedismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusiveeconomic leagues, we deem inexpedient. " The appeal was fruitless in itsimmediate effects, for the political party leaders were still dominatedby the military; but ultimately, in conjunction with a dozen otherappeals, its influence acted like a subtle corrosive upon the German willto conquer. 

Still less successful were the attempts to win Austria away from her allyby secret diplomatic conversations. In these neither President Wilson norhis personal adviser, Colonel House, placed great confidence. They hadbeen undertaken by the French through Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, and inAugust, 1917, Major Armand of France discussed with the Austrian emissary, Revertata, possible means of bringing about peace between Austria and theAllies. Lloyd George enthusiastically approved this attempt to drive awedge between Austria and Germany, was anxious to send Lord Reading asintermediary, and, upon the refusal of the latter to undertake themission, actually dispatched General Smuts to Switzerland. The EmperorCarl seemed sincerely anxious to make sacrifices for peace and was urgedby liberal counselors, such as Förster and Lammasch, in whom the Allieshad confidence, to meet many of the demands of his discontented Slavsubjects by granting autonomy to the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs. Negotiations were hampered by the belief of the Italians that immediatepeace with Austria would prevent them from securing the territories theycoveted; by the sullen obstinacy of the Magyars, who were jealous of theirmastery over the Hungarian Slavs, and above all, as Colonel House hadforeseen, by Austria's fear of Germany. In fact it was a stern ultimatumsent by Ludendorff that brought the wavering Carl back to his allegiance. 

In the autumn of 1917, however, talk of peace was in the air and adefinite demand for its consideration was made in a noteworthy speech byLord Lansdowne, a Conservative leader in England. Negotiations wereinaugurated between Germany and the new Bolshevik Government of Russia, and for a few weeks at the beginning of the new year the war-weary worldseemed close to the possibility of a general understanding. For the firsttime Lloyd George outlined in specific language the main terms that wouldbe considered by the Allies. It was President Wilson's opportunity. Careless of securing an overwhelming military victory, indeed unwilling tocrush Germany, anxious to pledge the Entente to his programme in thismoment of their discouragement, he formulated on January 8, 1918, hisFourteen Points, upon which he declared the final peace settlement shouldbe based. His speech was at once an appeal to the liberals andpeace-hungry of the Central Empires, a warning to the military clique inGermany then preparing to enforce degrading terms upon Russia, and anotification to the Allies that the United States could not be countedupon to fight for selfish national interests. He reiterated the principleswhich had actuated the United States when it entered the war: "What wedemand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It isthat the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that itbe made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes tolive its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justiceand fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force andselfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners inthis interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unlessjustice be done to others it will not be done to us. "

Of the Fourteen Points into which he then divided his peace programme, the first five were general in nature. The first insisted upon opendiplomacy, to begin with the approaching Peace Conference: "Opencovenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be noprivate international understandings of any kind. " Next came "absolutefreedom of navigation upon the seas ... Alike in peace and in war. " Then"the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and theestablishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nationsconsenting to the peace. " There followed a demand for the reduction ofarmaments "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. " Thefifth point called for an "impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon ... The interests of the populations concerned" as well as"the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. "

These generalizations were not so much God-given tables which mustdetermine the international law of the future as they were subtleinducements to cease fighting; they were idealistic in tone, butintensely practical in purpose. They guaranteed to any Germans whowanted peace that there would be protection against British "navalism, "against the threatened Allied economic boycott, as well as a chance ofthe return of the conquered colonies. The force of their seductivenesswas proved, when, many months later, in October, 1918, defeated Germanygrasped at them as a drowning man at a straw. At the same time Wilsonoffered to liberals the world over the hope of ending the old-stylesecret diplomacy, and to business men and labor the termination of thesystem of competitive armaments, with their economic and moral waste. Noone would suggest that Wilson did not believe in the idealism of thesefirst five points; no one should forget, however, that they werecarefully drafted with the political situation of the moment definitelyin view. They might be construed as a charter for future internationalrelations, but they were designed primarily to serve as a diplomaticweapon for the present. 

Each of the succeeding eight points was more special in character, anddealt with the territorial and political problems of the warring states. They provided for the evacuation and restoration of all conqueredterritories in Europe, including Russia, Belgium, France, and the BalkanStates. The sovereignty of Belgium should be unlimited in future; the"wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine... Should be righted"; Italian frontiers should be readjusted "alongclearly recognizable lines of nationality"; the peoples of Austria-Hungary"should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development"; therelations of the Balkan States should be determined "along historicallyestablished lines of allegiance and nationality"; nationalities underTurkish rule should receive opportunity for security of life andautonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently openedto all nations under international guarantees; an independent Polish stateshould be erected to "include the territories inhabited by indisputablyPolish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access tothe sea. "

Generally speaking these stipulations seemed to guarantee the moderatewar aims of the Entente and corresponded closely to the demands made byLloyd George; they certainly repudiated the extreme purposes attributedto German imperialists. And yet these eight points were so vague andcapable of such diverse interpretation that, like the first five generalpoints, they might prove not unattractive to liberals in Germany andAustria. France was not definitely promised Alsace-Lorraine; any hint atthe dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was carefully avoided; thereadjustment of Italian frontiers might mean much or little. What were"historically established lines of allegiance and nationality" in theBalkans? And if Poland were to include only populations "indisputablyPolish, " was it possible to assure them "free and secure access to thesea"? The political advantage in such generalities was obvious. But therewas also great danger. The time might come when both belligerent campswould accept the Fourteen Points and would still be uncertain of theirmeaning and application. The struggle for definite interpretation wouldbe the real test. The President's fourteenth and last point, however, wasunmistakable and expressed the ideal nearest his heart: "A generalassociation of nations must be formed under specific covenants for thepurpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence andterritorial integrity to great and small states alike. "

Later events have magnified the significance of this notable speech ofthe 8th of January. It was a striking bid for peace, which indeed was notfar away and it ultimately formed the general basis of the peace termsactually drafted. But it contained nothing new. Its definition of theconditions of peace was vague; its formulation of principles followedexactly along the lines developed by President Wilson ever since he hadadopted the idea of a League of Nations founded upon internationaljustice. His summing up of the main principle underlying his whole policywas merely the echo of his speeches for the past twelve-month: "Theprinciple of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right tolive on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether theybe strong or weak. " The importance of the speech does not lie in itsnovelty but in its timeliness. It came at a moment when the world wasanxiously listening and the undeniable idealism of its content assured toPresident Wilson, at least temporarily, the moral leadership of mankind. Unfortunately as the event proved, it promised more than could ever besecured by any single man. The President was to pay the price for hisleadership later when he encountered the full force of the reaction. 

As a step toward immediate peace the speech of the Fourteen Pointsfailed. What might have been the result had von Hertling, Chancellor ofGermany, and Czernin, in Austria, possessed full powers, it is difficultto say. But the military masters of Germany could not resist thetemptation which the surrender of Russia brought before their eyes. Bysecuring the eastern front and releasing prisoners as well as troopsthere, they would be able to establish a crushing superiority in thewest; France would be annihilated before the American armies could count, if indeed they were ever raised. Hence the heavy terms of Brest-Litovskand Bucharest and the preparations for the great drive of March. AsWilson said, "The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germanyis apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death toprevent what all the world now sees to be just. " Thus Germany lost herlast chance to emerge from the war uncrushed. 

The ruthless policy followed by Ludendorff and his associates gave thePresident new opportunities to appeal to the peoples of the CentralEmpires. He incorporated in his speeches the phrases of the GermanSocialists. "Self-Determination" and "No annexations and no indemnities"were phrases that had been made in Germany before Russia imported them;and when they formed the text of presidential addresses, many Germans, despite themselves, doubtless felt a twinge of sympathy. Coupled withthese appeals went the President's warnings that if they persisted intying up their fortunes with those of their rulers, they must share thepenalties. If Germany insisted upon making force alone the decidingelement, then he must accept the challenge and abide the issue. "Thereis, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, Force to theutmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Forcewhich shall make Right the law of the world and cast every selfishdominion down in the dust. " Neither the appeals nor the warnings ofWilson had any effect apparent at the moment, and yet the seed was sown. During the victorious German drives of March, April, and May, opinion tothe east of the Rhine seemed to have rallied firmly behind the TeutonGovernment; but with the first slight setbacks of the following month theprocess of crumbling began. An American economist and banker, Henry C. Emery, then prisoner in Germany, tells of the pessimism prevalent asearly as June and the whispers of the approaching fall of the Kaiser. Inhis memoirs Ludendorff lays the failure of the German armies in August tothe complete breakdown of the national spirit. 

The end came with extraordinary speed. Already in September, after thedefection of Bulgaria and the startling success of Foch's convergingmovement on Sedan, Germany knew that she was defeated. The BerlinGovernment turned to Wilson and on the 5th of October requested anarmistice. At the same time Austria-Hungary made a similar requestoffering to negotiate on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Wilson'sposition was delicate. He knew in September that the end was near andprepared for the situation in some degree by sending Colonel House abroadto be ready to discuss armistice terms with the Allies. But the suddencharacter of the German collapse had intoxicated public opinion to suchan extent that the political idealism which he had voiced ran the risk ofbecoming swamped. If Germany were indeed helpless and the Alliestriumphant, there was the danger that, in the flush of victory, all thepromises of a just peace would be forgotten. He must provide against sucha contingency. On the other hand he must secure guarantees that Germanyhad indeed thrown off her militaristic cloak, as Prince Max of Baden, thenew Chancellor, insisted; and also that under cover of an armistice shemight not effect a withdrawal of her defeated armies, only to renew thestruggle under more favorable conditions on her own borders. He wascaught between the danger of German fraud and Allied exuberance. 

There ensued a month of negotiations, during which the military victory ofthe Allies was further assured, as described in the preceding pages. TheGerman Government was first asked by Wilson if it accepted the FourteenPoints and the similar stipulations made by the President in subsequentaddresses. Replying in the affirmative, Prince Max then promised toacquiesce in armistice terms that would leave the military situationunchanged, and further agreed to order a cessation of unrestrictedsubmarine warfare and of the wanton destruction caused by the Germanarmies in their retreat. Finally he declared in answer to Wilson's demand, that the request for an armistice and peace came from a government "whichis free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence, and is supportedby the approval of an overwhelming majority of the German people. " ThePresident then formally transmitted the correspondence to the Allies, andColonel House entered upon discussions to establish with them theunderstanding that the basis of the peace negotiations would be theWilsonian programme. He was successful; and the Fourteen Points, withreservation of the second, "Freedom of the seas, " were accepted by theAllied governments. The Allies, on the other hand, secured PresidentWilson's approval of the principle that "compensation will be made byGermany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies andtheir property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from theair. " Upon this understanding the details of the armistice were left tothe military leaders. The terms as fixed reflected the military situationon the fighting front and the political situation in Germany and placedGermany entirely in the power of the victors without possibility ofrenewing the war. The conditions laid down were so stringent that untilthe last moment a refusal by the German delegates seemed imminent; but onthe 11th of November, just before the expiration of the time limit allowedthem, they accepted the inevitable. 

It is a mistake to regard the armistice as forced upon the Allies byPresident Wilson. Many persons abroad, as in this country, felt, it istrue, that it was wrong to permit the peaceful withdrawal of the Germanarmies, even though the full military advantages of victory were securedby the armistice conditions; the Allies ought, they argued, to impresson the Germans the magnitude of their defeat on the field of battle, andthis could not be done so long as German soil had been free from warfare. General Pershing was strongly opposed to the granting of an armistice. The Allied chiefs knew, however, that although the continuation of thefighting would lead to the surrender of a great German force, every daywould cost the victorious armies a heavy toll of killed and wounded, andthe advantage to be gained thereby was at least questionable. This factwas emphasized even by Marshal Foch. They hesitated, certainly, to acceptthe Fourteen Points as the basis for peace, for they feared lest theinterpretation put upon them at the Peace Conference might rob them ofwhat they believed to be the just fruits of victory. In both France andEngland there was, it is true, a body of liberal opinion which would notbrook open repudiation of the ideals that Wilson had sponsored during thewar and to which Allied ministers had themselves paid tribute. In eachcountry there was another group demanding a "peace of annihilation, " withthe payment of all war costs by the defeated, but Lloyd George andClemenceau feared at the moment to raise this issue. Both England andFrance were dependent upon American assistance for the immediate futureas they had been during the war. They needed American food, rawmaterials, and money. A break with Wilson, who for the moment was thepopular hero of Europe, taken in conjunction with an economic crisis, might be the signal for domestic disturbances if not revolution. 

Thus with Germany helpless and the Allies at least outwardly acceptinghis peace programme, Woodrow Wilson seemed to be master of the situation. And yet his power was more apparent than real. Apart from that moralinfluence which he exercised over the European liberals and which amongsome of the working classes was so extreme that candles were burnt beforehis picture, but which also was inevitably unstable and evanescent, Wilson's power rested upon the fact that he was President of the UnitedStates. But the nation was no longer united behind him or his policy, ifindeed it had ever been so. That hatred and distrust which had marked theelectoral campaign of 1916, and which, stifled for the moment by entranceinto the war, had flamed out early in 1918 in the attack upon his waradministration, now in the autumn threatened an explosion of populardisapprobation in some parts of the country. Men had long whispered"autocrat" but had generally been silenced during the war by theadmonition not to weaken the government by factious criticism. Now theybegan to shout it from the house-tops. Because of his inability to graspthe importance of either tact or tactics, the President made the way ofhis opponents easy for them. 

Shortly before the Congressional elections of November, at the momentwhen he felt the need of national support in order to strengthen hisposition with the Allies, the President was prevailed upon to issue anappeal to the electors, asking them to vote for Democratic candidates onthe ground that the nation ought to have unified leadership in the comingmoment of crisis, and that a Republican Congress would divide theleadership. There was nothing novel in such an appeal; in 1898, McKinleyhad begged for a Republican Congress on the ground that "this is no timefor divided councils, " the same ground as that taken by Wilson in 1918. Roosevelt in the same year (1898) had said: "Remember that whether youwill or not your votes this year will be viewed by the nations of Europefrom one standpoint only.... A refusal to sustain the President this yearwill, in their eyes, be read as a refusal to sustain the war and tosustain the efforts of the peace commission. " Wilson's appeal in 1918 wasmerely an echo of Roosevelt's in 1898. Yet it was a mistake in tactics. It enabled the Republicans to assert that, whereas they had sunk partisandifferences during the war in order to secure the victory of the nation, Wilson was now capitalizing the war and foreign problems to win apartisan advantage. The result of the elections was Republican success, assuring to that party a slight majority in the Senate and a goodlymajority in the House after March 4, 1919. 

The President made other tactical mistakes. Instead of taking the Senateinto his confidence by entering upon numerous conferences with itsleaders, he stood upon the letter of the Constitution and gave the clearimpression that he would conduct the peace negotiations himself withoutSenatorial assistance, leaving the Senators merely their constitutionalprivilege of "advice and consent" when a treaty should be laid beforethem. He would have done better to remember a remarkable passage in one ofhis own lectures, delivered ten years before. Speaking of the difficultyof bringing pressure to bear upon the Senate, he had said that there is a"course which the President may follow, and which one or two Presidentsof unusual political sagacity have followed, with the satisfactoryresults that were to have been expected. He may himself be less stiff andoffish, may himself act in the true spirit of the Constitution andestablish intimate relations of confidence with the Senate on his owninitiative, not carrying his plans to completion and then laying them infinal form before the Senate to be accepted or rejected, but keepinghimself in confidential communication with the leaders of the Senate whilehis plans are in course, when their advice will be of service to him andhis information of the greatest service to them, in order that there maybe veritable counsel and a real accommodation of views, instead of a finalchallenge and contest. " Had Wilson in 1918, and after, followed his ownadvice, the outcome might have been different. But nothing describes soperfectly the exact opposite of his attitude as the passage quoted above. 

The President might at least have assuaged the sense of injury thatrankled in the hearts of the Senators by asking for their advice in theappointment of the Peace Commission. Instead he kept his own counsel. Hedecided to go to Paris himself as head of the Commission, and chose forhis associates men who were not qualified to win for him the supportthat he needed in the Senate or in the country. Robert Lansing, asSecretary of State, was a necessary appointment. Colonel House wasprobably the best-fitted man in America for the approaching negotiations, alike by his temperament, by the breadth of his knowledge of foreignquestions, and by his intimacy with foreign statesmen. But at least twoplaces on the Commission should have been given to eminent Republicansand to men universally known and respected. If Wilson was unwilling toselect members of the Senate, he might have heeded public opinion whichcalled definitely for William Howard Taft and Elihu Root. Both werepledged to the most important item of Wilson's programme, the League ofNations; both exercised wide influence in the country and in theRepublican party. The Senate, with a Republican majority, would almostcertainly ratify any treaty which they had signed. But the President, forreasons of a purely negative character, passed them over and with whatlooked to the public like mere carelessness, chose General Tasker HowardBliss and Henry White, formerly Ambassador to Rome and Paris underPresidents Roosevelt and Taft. Both were men of ability and experience, but neither enjoyed the particular confidence of the American people;and what Americans chiefly wanted was the assurance of persons they knewand trusted, that the peace was right. In the existing state of publicopinion, the assurance of the President was not in itself sufficient. 

President Wilson's decision to go to Paris as a member of the Commissionaroused still fiercer opposition, but had reasons infinitely more cogent. He knew that there would be great difficulty in translating his idealsinto fact at the Peace Conference. He believed that he could count uponthe support of liberal opinion in Europe, but realized that the leadingpoliticians had not yet been won sincerely to his policy. The pledge theyhad given to accept the Fourteen Points might mean much or little;everything depended upon interpretation. A peace of justice and a Leagueof Nations still hung in the balance. At this moment, with Germany clearlyhelpless, opinion abroad appeared to be tending, naturally enough, towardthe old-style division of the spoils among the victors. More than oneinfluential French and British newspaper began to sound the cry _Vævictis_. Moreover, in America broke forth a chorus of encouragement to theAllies to pay no attention to Wilsonian idealism. On the 27th ofNovember, shortly before the Commission sailed, Roosevelt wrote: "OurAllies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself should all understand thatMr. Wilson has no authority whatever to speak for the American people atthis time. His leadership has just been emphatically repudiated bythem.... Mr. Wilson and his Fourteen Points and his four supplementarypoints and his five complementary points and all his utterances everywhich way have ceased to have any shadow of right to be accepted asexpressive of the will of the American people.... Let them [the Allies]impose their common will on the nations responsible for the hideousdisaster which has almost wrecked mankind. " It was frank encouragement tothe Allies, coming from the American who, with Wilson, was best-knownabroad, to divide the spoils and to disregard all promises to introduce anew international order, and it must have brought joy to Clemenceau andSonnino. 

Wilson feared that having won the war the United States might lose thepeace: not by softness towards Germany--as yet there was no danger ofthat--but by forgetting the ideals for which it had entered the war, byforgetting that a peace of injustice sows the seeds of the next war, andby a relapse into the old bankrupt system of the Balance of Power. Herealized that the peoples of France, England, and Italy had felt thepinch of war as the American people had never done, and that it wasdemanding too much of human nature to expect that their attitude would beone of moderation. He knew that in the negotiations Clemenceau andSonnino would be definitely opposed to his programme and that he couldnot count upon Lloyd George. He decided therefore that he must himself goto Paris to fight for his ideals. The decision was one of tremendoussignificance. At the moment when domestic problems of reconstructionwould be most acute, an American President was going to leave the countrybecause of the interest of America in European affairs. The United Stateswas now so much a part of the world system that domestic issues seemed ofless importance than the danger that Europe might fall back into the oldinternational system which had proved unable to keep the peace. ThePresident's voyage to France was the clearest manifestation yetvouchsafed of the settled position of the United States as a world power. 

If the justice of his policy and the necessity of full participation inthe peace as in the war be admitted, Wilson was probably right in goingto Paris. No one else could have secured so much of his programme. Noone else was possessed of the political power or the personal prestigewhich belonged to him. The history of the Conference was to show thatwhen he absented himself in February and after he left Paris in June, hissubordinates found great difficulty in meeting Allied opposition. But thedecision of the President to attend the Peace Conference furnished freshmaterial for criticism at home. It was a new thing in our history; peopledid not understand the importance of the issues involved and attributedhis voyage to vanity. Unquestionably it weakened Wilson in America asmuch as it strengthened him abroad. When on the 4th of December, thepresidential ship, _George Washington_, sailed out of New York harbor, saluted by the wild shrieks of a thousand sirens and the showers ofglittering white papers streaming from the windows of the skyscrapers, preceded by the battleship _Pennsylvania_, flanked by destroyers, withacrobatic airplanes and a stately dirigible overhead, external enthusiasmwas apparently at its height. But Wilson left behind him glowing embersof intense opposition which, during the next six months, were to befanned into a dangerous flame. 

CHAPTER X

WAYS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

On Friday, December 13, 1918, the _George Washington_ steamed slowly intoBrest harbor through a long double line of gray battleships anddestroyers, greeted by the thunder of presidential salutes and the blareof marine bands. Europe thrilled with emotion, which was half curiosityand half genuine enthusiasm: it was to see and applaud the man who duringthe past eighteen months had crystallized in speech the undefined thoughtof the Allied world, who represented (at least in European eyes) thestrength and idealism of America, and who stood, for the moment, as thepolitical Messiah to liberals in every country of the Old World, victorsor defeated. The intensity of the curiosity as well as the sincerity ofthe enthusiasm was attested on the following day, when President Wilsondrove through the streets of Paris, welcomed by the vociferous plauditsof the close-packed crowd. It was for him a public triumph, no greaterthan that accorded to King Albert of Belgium and certainly lessdemonstrative than the jubilations of armistice night, but neverthelessundeniably sweet to the President, who looked to popular opinion as thebulwark upon which he must rely during the difficult days ahead. 

Further triumphs awaited him in his trips to England and to Italy. InLondon and Rome, as in Paris, he was the object of demonstrations whichat times became almost delirious; more than once his admirers must havebeen reminded of the Biblical phrase that alludes to the honor of aprophet outside his own country. The emotion of Europe is not difficultto understand. The man in the street was ready to shout, for the war wasfinished and the miseries of the peace that was no peace were not yetrealized, Wilson stood for Justice above everything, and the people ofeach country believed whole-heartedly that their particular demands werejust; the President, therefore, must stand with them. To Frenchmen it wasobvious that he must approve the "simple justice" of the claim thatGermany pay the entire cost of the war; Italians were convinced that hewould sanction their "just" demand for the annexation of Fiume. So longas Justice remained something abstract his popularity remained secure. Could he retain it when concrete issues arose? As early as the beginningof January ebullitions of approval became less frequent. Discordantvoices were audible suggesting that Wilson was too prone to sacrifice thematerial necessities of the war-burdened nations to his idealisticnotions. People asked why he failed to visit Belgium and the devastatedregions of France, so as to see for himself what sufferings had beenendured. And the historian may well inquire if it were because he had notgauged the depth of feeling aroused by German war practices, or becausehe had determined to show the Germans that he would not let his judgmentbe clouded by emotion. Whatever the explanation, his popularity suffered. 

Without question the original strength of President Wilson's position, resting in part upon the warmth of popular feeling, which is everuncertain, was undermined by the delays that marked the opening of thePeace Conference. Such delays may have resulted in part from the purposeof the Allied leaders, who wished to permit public enthusiasm for Wilsonto cool; they may also have been caused in part by the differences thatdeveloped over the incorporation of the League of Nations in the Treaty. But a prime cause of delay is to be found in the fact that a PeaceConference of this character was a new experience and the statesmenassembled were not quite sure how to conduct it. Too little thought hadbeen given to the problem of organization, and the plans which had beendrawn up by the French and Americans were apparently forgotten. The hostof diplomatic attachés and technical advisers, who crowded the Quaid'Orsay and the hotels of Paris, had only a vague notion as to theirduties and waited uneasily, wondering why their chiefs did not set themto work. In truth the making of peace was to be characterized by alooseness of organization, a failure to coördinate, and a waste of timeand energy resulting from slipshod methods. In the deliberations of theConference there was a curious mixture of efficiency and ineffectiveness;a wealth of information upon the topics under discussion and an inabilityto concentrate that information. Important decisions were made andforgotten in the welter of conferential disorganization. 

No one could complain that delays were caused by the kind of gay frivolitythat characterized the Vienna Congress a hundred years ago. Theatmosphere of the Paris Conference was more like that of a convention oftraveling salesmen. The Hotel Crillon, home of the American Commission, was gray and gaunt as the State, War, and Navy Building in Washington. Banquets were rare; state balls unheard of. The President who had separateheadquarters, first in the Parc Monceau and later on the Place des ÉtatsUnis, avoided the orthodox diversions of diplomacy and labored with anintensity that was destined to result in physical collapse. The very dressof the delegates mirrored their businesslike attitude: high silk hats wereseldom seen; Lloyd George appeared in the plainest of bowlers and ColonelHouse in his simple, black felt. Experts worked far into the early morninghours in order that principals might have statistics; principals laboredeven on Easter Day, and were roused from their beds at four in the morningto answer telegrams. Unique departure in the history of diplomacy: thiswas a working Peace Conference!

Each of the different commissions had brought to Paris a staff of attachésand experts, upon whom the principal delegates were to rely in questionsof fact, and who were themselves to decide points of detail in draftingthe economic and political clauses of the treaties and in determining newboundaries. The expert staff of the American Commission had been carefullyselected and was generally regarded as equal to that of any other power. Compared with the foreign experts, its members lacked experience indiplomatic methods, no doubt, but they were as well or better equippedwith exact information. There is an instance of an American expert on aminor commission asking that a decision be altered in view of new factsjust brought to light, and offering to place those facts in detail beforethe commission. "I suggest, " said a foreign delegate, "that we accept theamendment without investigation. Hitherto the facts presented by theAmericans have been irrefutable; it would be waste of time to investigatethem. "

Such men as Hoover, Hurley, and Gompers were at hand to give their expertopinions on questions which they had mastered during the course of thewar. Norman Davis and Thomas Lamont acted as financial advisers. Baruchand McCormick brought the wealth of experience which resulted from theiradministration of the War Industries and War Trade Boards. The foresightof Colonel House, furthermore, had gathered together a group of men who, organized since the summer of 1917 in what had been called "TheInquiry, " had been studying the conditions that would determine newpolitical boundaries on the basis of justice and practicability. Theprincipal delegates could not be expected to know the details that woulddecide the disposition of Danzig, the fate of Fiume, the division of theBanat of Temesvar. They would need some one to tell them the amount ofcoal produced in the Saar Basin, the location of mines in Teschen, theethnic character of eastern Galicia, the difference between Slovaks andRuthenians. It was all very well to come to the Conference with demandsfor justice, but our commissioners must have cold facts to support thosedemands. The fact that exact information was available, and played a rôlein the decisions of the Conference, marks a step forward in the historyof diplomatic relations. 

Contrary to general expectation and rumor, Wilson, although hedisregarded the American Commissioners, except Colonel House, madeconstant use of the various experts. On the _George Washington_ he hadtold a group of them that he would rely absolutely upon the results oftheir investigations. "Tell me what's right, " he had said, "and I'llfight for it. Give me a guaranteed position. " During the negotiations hecalled in the experts for daily consultations; they sat behind him at thesessions of the Council of Ten and on the sofa beside him in the Councilof Four. Their advice was not always followed to the letter; in theShantung issue it was reluctantly discarded; but in such importantmatters as the Fiume problem, Wilson rested his case wholly upon theknowledge and opinions of the experts. 

In defiance of the example of the Congress of Vienna, which neverformally gathered in plenary session, the Paris Conference met with alldelegates for the first time, on January 18, 1919. It was a picturesquescene, cast in the long Clock Room of the Quai d'Orsay, the conventionalblack of the majority of delegates broken by the horizon-blue uniform ofMarshal Foch, the natty red-trimmed khaki of British staff officers, andthe white flowing robes and golden headdress of the Arabian Emir Faisal;down the center of the room ran the traditionally diplomatic green baizetables behind which sat the delegates; attachés and press correspondentscrowded into the corners or peered around the curtains of adjoiningrooms; at the end, in front of the white marble fireplace, sat thedominating personalities of the Allied world. But such plenary sessionswere not to witness the actual work of the Conference, nor was Wilson'sdemand for "open covenants openly arrived at" to be translated literallyinto accomplishment. To conduct the Peace Conference by sessions open tothe public was obviously not feasible. There were too many delegates. Time, which was precious beyond evaluation, would be lost in the makingof speeches for home consumption. More time would be lost in translationof the Babel of languages. Frankness and directness of negotiation wouldbe impossible, for if the papers should print what the delegates saidabout each other there would be a national crisis every day. Finally, acongress is by nature ill-adapted for the study of intricateinternational problems, as was later to be illustrated in the history ofthe United States Senate. 

The representatives of the larger European Powers had assumed that thedirection of the Conference would be taken by a small executive committee, corresponding to the Supreme War Council, and to this President Wilsonagreed. Such a committee would necessarily meet in secret, in order thatit might not be hampered by formalities and that there might be frankspeech. Only a brief communiqué, stating the subject of discussion andthe decision reached, would be issued to the press. The committee wouldprovide for the executive measures that must be taken to oppose the growthof economic and political anarchy in central and southeastern Europe, would distribute the problems that were to be studied by specialcommissions, and would formulate or approve the solutions to thoseproblems. It would supervise the drafting of the treaties and present themto the plenary conference in practically final form. Since the bulk of thefighting had been carried by the major powers and since they wouldguarantee the peace, this supreme council of the Conference was composedof two representatives of the major five, France, Great Britain, theUnited States, Italy, and Japan, the last-named now entering the sacredcoterie of "Great Powers. " Among the delegates of the smaller powers therewas lively dissatisfaction at the exclusion from the inner council of suchstates as Belgium and Serbia, which had been invaded by the enemy and hadmade heavy sacrifices in the war: they complained also that the number ofdelegates allotted them was insufficient. Already, it was whispered, thephrases that dealt with the "rights of small nations" were beingforgotten, and this peace congress was to be but a repetition of thoseprevious diplomatic assemblies where the spoils went to the strong. ButWilson, who was regarded as the defender of the rights of the smallstates, agreed with Clemenceau that practical necessity demanded anexecutive council of restricted numbers, and felt that such a body couldbe trusted to see that effective justice was secured. In truth thePresident was almost as much impressed by the extreme nationalistic ardorof the small powers, as a source of future danger, as he was by theselfishness of the large. 

The Supreme Council, during the early days of the Conference, wasgenerally known as the Council of Ten. It met in the study of StephanePichon, the French Foreign Minister, which opened on to the garden of theFrench Foreign Office, and which, with its panelled walls, covered withgorgeous Gobelins picturing Ruben's story of Marie de' Medici, itsstately brocaded chairs, and old-rose and gray Aubusson carpets, wasredolent of old-time diplomacy. In the center, behind a massive desk, satthe president of the Conference, Georges Clemenceau--short, squat, round-shouldered, with heavy white eyebrows and mustache servingperfectly to conceal the expression both of eyes and of mouth. Ordinarilyhe rested immobile, his hands folded in the eternal gray gloves, on hisface an expression of bored tolerance, the expression of a man who, afterhalf a century in the political arena of France, had little to learneither of men or of affairs, even from a Peace Conference. Skeptical inattitude, a cold listener, obviously impermeable to mere verbiage andaffected by the logic of facts alone, he had a ruthless finger ready topoke into the interstices of a loosely-woven argument. Clemenceau spokebut rarely, in low even tones, with a paucity and awkwardness of gesturesurprising in a Latin; he was chary of eloquence, disdaining the obviousarts of the rhetor, but he had at his command an endless string of bitingepigrams, and his satire wounded with a touch so sharp that it wasscarcely felt or seen except by the unfortunate recipient. Uponinfrequent occasion, in the course of hot debate, some one would piercehis armor and touch him upon the unguarded quick; then the man wastransformed, the eyebrows would shoot up, the eyes flash, the mustachebristle, the voice vibrate, and the invective which he poured forthscalded like molten lead. One understood at such a moment why he wascalled "the Tiger. " But such outbursts were rare. More characteristic ofhis method of debate was the low-voiced ironical phrase, when his aridhumor crackled like a wireless message. 

Clemenceau dwarfed the other French delegates, with a single exception, not alone by the magic of his personality but by the grip which he had onthe imagination of France. The people remembered that long career, beginning with the early days of the Republic and culminating with themiracle of the political salvation he brought to France in the dark daysof 1917, when the morale of the nation was near the breaking-point, andwhich made possible the military victory of Foch. France was grateful. Hehad no political party in the Chamber upon which to rely, but the nationwas behind him, at least for the moment. "If I should die now, " he isreported to have said during the early days of the Conference, "Francewould give me a great funeral. If I live six months, no one knows whatmay happen. " For Clemenceau was a realist; he did not permit himself theluxury of being deceived even by the good qualities of his owncountrymen. If he feared anything it was the domination of politics bythe impractical. Mankind must be taken as it is and not as we should likeit to be. He was troubled by what he called the "noble simplicity" ofWilson. Statesmen must be inspired by the sacred egotism which providesfor the material safety and progress of their own nation. Above all, inhis mind, France was particularly vulnerable and thus must insist uponparticular means of defense against the secular enemy across the Rhine. 

Behind Clemenceau, in the Council, hovered his friend and ForeignSecretary, Stephane Pichon. More in evidence, however, was André Tardieu, who alone of the French delegates remained undwarfed by the PrimeMinister. Journalist, politician, captain of Blue Devils, Franco-AmericanCommissioner, now the youngest of the French peace commission, Tardieu, more than any one else supplied the motive energy that carried the treatyto completion. Debonair and genial, excessively practical, he was the"troubleman" of the Conference: when difficulties arose over the Saar, orFiume, or reparations, Tardieu was called in to work with a specialcommittee and find a compromise. Not a regular member of the Council ofTen, he was nevertheless at Clemenceau's elbow, and especially after theattempt on the latter's life, he labored day and night on the detailswhich were too much for the strength and time of the older man. 

On Clemenceau's right, and half facing him, sat the two Americandelegates, Wilson and Lansing. The President, to the surprise of many, wasby no means the awkward college professor lost among practicalpoliticians. His speech was slow and his manner might almost be calledponderous, but the advisers who whispered over his shoulder, during thecourse of the debate, attested the rapidity with which his mind operatesand his skill in catching the points suggested. There was far less of thedogmatic doctrinaire in his attitude than had been looked for. Occasionally his remarks bordered upon the sententious, but he never"orated, " invariably using a conversational tone; many of his points weredriven home by humorous allusions or anecdotes rather than by didacticlogic. Like that of the other delegates his manner was informal. Duringthe cold days of late January he walked about the room during discussionsin order to keep his feet warm. Indeed the proceedings of the Council ofTen were characterized by a noted absence of stiffness. It was evidentlyexpected that the prestige which Wilson possessed among the masses wouldevaporate in this inner council; but nothing of the kind was apparent. Itwas not uninteresting to note that when a point was raised every onelooked involuntarily to see how it would be taken by the President; andwhen the delegates of the smaller Powers appeared before the Council theyaddressed their remarks almost directly at him. Lansing spoke seldom, butthen with force and conviction, and was evidently more troubled thanWilson by the compromises with expediency which the Americans werecompelled to make. His attention was never distracted by the sketcheswhich he drew without ceasing, during the course of the debates--grotesqueand humorous figures, much in demand by every one present as mementos ofthe Conference. 

Next on the right sat David Lloyd George, with thick gray hair andsnapping Celtic eyes. Alert and magnetic, he was on the edge of hischair, questioning and interrupting. Frankly ignorant of the details ofcontinental geography and politics, naïve in his inquiries, he possessedthe capacity for acquiring effective information at lightning speed. Unfortunately he was not over-critical and the source of his informationwas not invariably the highest authority; he was prone to accept theviews of journalists rather than those of his own Foreign Office. Effervescent as a bottle just rid of its cork, he was also unstable, twisting and veering in his suggestions; not so much blown about by thewinds of hostile criticism, to which he paid but little attention, ascarried on by the shifting tides of political events at home. For his eyewas always across the Channel, calculating the domestic effect of eachtreaty provision. Few could resist his personal magnetism in conversationand no one would deny him the title of master-politician of his age. During the first weeks of the Conference, Wilson seems to have fallenunder the spell of Lloyd George to some extent, who showed himself quiteas liberal as the President in many instances. But Wilson was clearlytroubled by the Welshman's mercurial policy, and before he finally leftfor America, found relief in the solid consistency of Clemenceau. Healways knew where the French Premier stood, no matter how much he mightdiffer from him in point of view. 

Beside Lloyd George, a perfect foil, sat Arthur J. Balfour, assuming theattitude habitual to him after long years in the House of Commons--head onthe back of his chair, body reclining at a comfortable angle, long legsstretched in front, hands grasping the lapels of his coat, eyes atfrequent intervals closed. Rising, he overtopped every one present, whiteand bent though he was, in physical stature as he did also in pureintellectual power. Graceful in tone and expression his outlook was thephilosophical, possibly over-tolerant for the exigencies of the situation, although upon occasion his judgment proved a valuable counterweight to thehasty enthusiasm of Lloyd George. But Balfour, like Lansing, was sometimestreated with scant consideration by his chief and by no means exercisedthe influence which his experience and capacity would lead one to expect. 

On the right of the British delegates sat the two Japanese, silent, observant, their features immobile as the Sphinx. It was a bold man whowould attempt to guess the thoughts masked by their impassive faces. Theywaited for the strategic moment when they were to present their specialclaims; until then they attended all meetings, scarcely speaking a word, unwilling to commit themselves. Upon one occasion, in a minor commission, the Japanese delegate held the deciding vote, the other four delegationsbeing tied; when asked by the chairman how he voted, whether with theFrench and Americans or with the British and Italians, the Japaneseresponded simply, "Yes. " Next the Japanese, but facing Clemenceau andabout twelve feet from him, were the Italians: Sonnino with hisclose-cropped white bullet head and heavy drooping mustache, his greatRoman nose coming down to meet an equally strong out-jutting chin, his jawset like a steel latch. The hawklike appearance of the man was softened indebate by the urbanity of his manner and the modulations of his voice. Orlando was less distinctive in appearance and character. Eloquent andwarm-hearted, he was troubled by the consciousness that failure to securethe full extent of Italian claims spelled the downfall of his ministry inRome. It is of some historical importance that Sonnino, who spoke perfectEnglish with just a trace of Etonian inflection, was the more obstinate inhis demands; Orlando, who showed himself inclined to compromise, spoke noEnglish and therefore could come into intellectual contact with Wilson andLloyd George only through the medium of an interpreter. 

Proceedings were necessarily in both French and English, because none ofthe big men except Clemenceau and Sonnino used the two languages withcomfort. The interpreter, Mantoux, who sat behind Clemenceau, was no meretranslator. A few notes scribbled on a pad were sufficient for him torender the sense of a speech with keen accuracy and frequently with afire and a pungency that surpassed the original. He spoke always in thefirst person as though the points made in debate were his own, and thecarrying of each particular point the ideal nearest his heart. Behind theprincipals, the "Olympians, " as they came to be called, were the expertsand attachés, with long rolls of maps and complex tables of statistics, ready to answer questions of detailed facts. In truth there was morereference to sources of exact information by the chief delegates thanwould have been expected by the student of former diplomatic practices. 

In the center of the room, facing the Olympians, stood or sat theparticular claimant or expert witness of the séance. Now it might beMarshal Foch, with wrinkled, weary, war-worn visage, and thin rumpledhair, in shabby uniform, telling of Germany's failure to fulfill thearmistice conditions; one would meet him later in the corridoroutside--like Grant, he was apt to have the stump of a black cigar in thecorner of his mouth--usually shaking his head ominously over the failureof the politicians to treat Germany with the requisite severity. Or theclaimant before the Ten might be the grave, self-contained Venizelos, once outlaw and revolutionary, now, after many turns of fortune's wheel, master of Greece and perhaps the greatest statesman of them all. Thenagain would appear the boyish Foreign Minister of the Czecho-SlovakRepublic, Edward Benes, winning friends on all sides by his franksincerity and ready smile; or, perfect contrast, the blackbeardedBratiano of Rumania, claiming the enforcement of the secret treaty thatwas to double the area of his state. Later, Paderewski came from Warsaw, his art sacrificed on the altar of patriotism, leonine in appearance, butsurprisingly untemperamental in diplomatic negotiation. 

To each of these and to many others who presented problems for immediatesettlement the Council listened, for it had not merely to draw uptreaties and provide for the future peace of the world, but also to meetcrises of the moment. The starving populations of central andsoutheastern Europe must be fed; tiny wars that had sprung up betweensmaller nationalities must be attended to and armistice commissionsdispatched; the rehabilitation of railroads and river transportationdemanded attention; coal mines must be operated and labor difficultiesadjusted. This economic renaissance had to be accomplished in face ofnationalistic quarrels and the social unrest that threatened to spreadthe poison of communistic revolution as far west as the Rhine and theAdriatic. 

From the beginning it was clear that the actual drafting of the treatyclauses would have to be undertaken by special commissions. The workcould never be completed except by a subdivision of labor and theassignment of particular problems to especially competent groups. As theCouncil of Ten faced the situation, they decided that the number of thecommissions must be increased. By the beginning of February the work waslargely subdivided. There was a commission headed by President Wilsonworking on the League of Nations, while others studied such problems asresponsibility for the war, reparations, international labor legislation, international control of ports, waterways, and railways, financial andeconomic problems, military, naval, and aerial questions. When theCouncil of Ten found themselves puzzled by the conflicting territorialclaims of different Allied nations, they decided to create also specialterritorial commissions to study boundaries and to report theirrecommendations back to the Supreme Council. It was President Wilson, chafing at the early delays of the Conference, who eagerly adopted asuggestion of Colonel House to the effect that time might be saved ifthe experts of the different states attacked boundary problems and thusrelieved the strain upon the time and nerves of the Olympians, who couldnot be expected to know or understand the details of each question. Thesuggestion was approved by the chiefs of the Allied governments. Therewere five such territorial commissions, which were in turn subdivided, while a single central territorial commission was appointed to coördinatethe reports. 

The more important commissions, such as that upon the League of Nations, were composed of plenipotentiaries and included generally representativesfrom the smaller states. The reparations, financial, and laborcommissions were made up of business men and financiers, the Americanrepresentatives including such figures as Lamont, Norman Davis, Baruch, and McCormick. The territorial commissions were composed of therepresentatives of the four principal Powers; most of the Europeandelegates, who were in some cases also plenipotentiaries, were chosenfrom the staffs of the Foreign Offices, and included such men as Sir EyreCrowe, Jules Cambon, Tardieu, and Salvago Raggi. The American delegateswere generally members of the Inquiry, men who had been working on thesevery problems for more than a year. The special commissions worked withcare and assiduity, and their decisions rested generally on factsestablished after long discussion. To this extent, at least, the ParisConference was characterized by a new spirit in diplomacy. 

Upon the reports of these commissions were based the draft articles ofthe treaties, which were then referred back to the Supreme Council. Bythe time the reports were finished, that body had divided into twosmaller bodies: the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Council ofPremiers, composed of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson, and Orlando. Thelatter body, which came to be known as the Council of Four, or, colloquially, the "Big Four, " naturally assumed complete direction. Itwas unfortunate certainly that a congress which had started with the cryof "open covenants" should thus find itself practically resolved into acommittee of four. Disappointed liberals have assumed that the innercouncil was formed with the object of separating President Wilson fromcontact with popular ideas and bringing him to acceptance of theold-style peace desired by Clemenceau. In reality the Council of Four wassimply a revival of the informal committee which had sat during theautumn of 1918, when Colonel House, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau had metby themselves to formulate the policy to be adopted when Germanypresented her demand for an armistice. When Wilson left Paris inFebruary, Colonel House, who became chiefly responsible for the Americanside of negotiations, found the Council of Ten unwieldy. It was attendedby as many as thirty or forty persons, some of whom seemed inclined tospread colored accounts of what was going on, and the very size of themeeting tended toward the making of speeches and the slowing-down ofprogress. Furthermore, at that time Clemenceau, confined to his house bythe wound inflicted by a would-be assassin, was unable to attend thesessions of the Council of Ten. It was natural, therefore, that the threestatesmen who had worked so effectively the preceding autumn should nowrenew their private conferences. When Wilson returned to Paris in March, and learned from Colonel House how much more rapidly the small committeewas able to dispose of vexatious questions, he readily agreed to it. Noris there any valid evidence extant to show that his influence wasseriously impaired by the change, although the sessions of the Council ofFour took on a greater appearance of secrecy than had been desired byColonel House. 

The Council of Four acted as a board of review and direction rather thanof dictators. When the reports of the expert commissions were unanimousthey were generally accepted with little or no alteration. When a dividedreport was sent up, the Four were compelled to reach a compromise, sinceevery delay threatened to give new opportunity to the forces of socialdisorder in Germany and southeastern Europe. The Council met ordinarilyin the house used by President Wilson, on the Place des États-Unis. Someof the conferences were held in a small room downstairs without thepresence of secretaries or advisers; frequently, however, the expertswere called in to meet with the chiefs in the large front room upstairs, and would often monopolize the discussion, the Four playing the part oflisteners merely. Formality was dispensed with. During a debate upon thesouthern boundary of Austria, President Wilson might have been seen onall fours, kneeling on the floor and tracing out the suggested frontieron a huge map, while other peace commissioners and experts surroundedhim, also on their hands and knees. Hours of labor were long. There was, certainly, much discussion that hinged upon selfish nationalistinterests, but also much that was inspired by a sincere desire to securethe solution that would permanently restore the tranquillity of Europe. 

The presence of President Wilson did much to maintain the idealism thatjostled national self-seeking in the final drafting of the treaties. Though he lacked the political brilliance of Lloyd George and had not thesuppressed but irresistible vehemence that characterized Clemenceau, hisvery simplicity of argument availed much. He was not destined to carrythrough the full programme of idealism as set out in the Fourteen Points, at least not as interpreted by most liberals. He could not secure thepeace of reconciliation which he had planned, but even with hispopularity in France, Belgium, and Italy lost, and his prestige dimmed, he retained such a strong position in the Council of Four that he wasable to block some of the more extreme propositions advanced byimperialist elements, and, more positively, to secure what he had most atheart, the League of Nations. Whether he yielded more than he gained is aquestion which demands more detailed consideration. 

CHAPTER XI

BALANCE OF POWER OR LEAGUE OF NATIONS?

Whatever mistakes President Wilson made at Paris, he did not greatlyunderestimate the difficulties of his task when he set forth from theUnited States. The liberal utterances of the Allied chiefs during the warhad never succeeded in winning his sincere confidence; more than once hehad even intimated that he did not consider their governments completelyrepresentative of public opinion. He anticipated a struggle withClemenceau and Lloyd George over the amount of indemnity which was to bedemanded from Germany, as well as over the territory of which she was tobe deprived. Their formal approval of the Fourteen Points had been a causeof intense satisfaction to him, but he realized definitely that they wouldmake every effort to interpret them in terms of purely nationalself-interest. This he regarded as the greatest difficulty to be met atParis. The second difficulty lay in the extreme demands that were beingmade by the smaller nationalities, now liberated from Teuton dominion oroverlordship. Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Greece, were all asking forterritory which could only be assigned to them on the ancient principle ofthe division of spoils among the victors. The spirit of nationalism whichhad played a rôle of so much importance in the antecedents of the war, aswell as in the downfall of the Central Empires, now threatened to ruin thepeace. As we have seen, it was partly because of this second danger thatWilson agreed to the exclusion of the smaller states from the SupremeCouncil of the Allies. 

Upon the details of the treaties, whether of an economic or a territorialcharacter, the President did not at first lay great stress. He wasinterested chiefly in the spirit that lay behind the treaties. The peace, he insisted, must be one of justice and, if possible, one ofreconciliation. More concretely, the great point of importance was theestablishment of a League of Nations; for the President believed thatonly through the building up of a new international system, based uponthe concert of all democratic states, could permanent justice and amitybe secured. Only a new system could suffice to prevent the injusticethat great states work upon small, and to stamp out the germs of futurewar. It would be the single specific factor that would make this treatydifferent from and better than treaties of the past. The ultimate originof the great war was less to be sought in the aspirations and malevolenceof Germany, he believed, than in the disorganized international system ofEurope. Unless that were radically reformed, unless a régime ofdiplomatic coöperation were substituted for the Balance of Power, neitherjustice nor peace could last. The old system had failed too often. 

Wilson does not seem to have formulated definitely before he reachedParis the kind of League which he desired to see created. He was opposedto such intricate machinery as that proposed by the League to EnforcePeace, and favored an extremely simple organization which might evolvenaturally to meet conditions of the future. The chief organ of a League, he felt, should be an executive council, possibly composed of theambassadors to some small neutral power. If trouble threatened in anyquarter, the council was to interfere at once and propose a settlement. If this proved unsuccessful, a commercial boycott might be institutedagainst the offending state: it was to be outlawed, and, as Wilson said, "outlaws are not popular now. " He regarded it as important that theGerman colonies should not be divided among the Allies, but should begiven to the League, to be administered possibly through some smallerpower; for an institution, he felt, is always stabilized by thepossession of property. 

Such were, broadly speaking, the ideas which seemed uppermost in thePresident's mind when he landed in France, and which he was determinedshould form the basis of the peace. He anticipated opposition, and he wasin a measure prepared to fight for his ideals. But he failed adequatelyto appreciate the confusion which had fallen upon Europe, after fouryears and more of war, and which made the need of a speedy settlement soimperative. If he had gauged more accurately the difficulties of his taskhe would have been more insistent upon the drafting of a quickpreliminary peace, embodying merely general articles, and leaving all thedetails of the settlement to be worked out by experts at their leisure. He might thus have utilized his popularity and influence when it was atits height, and have avoided the loss of prestige which inevitablyfollowed upon the discussion of specific issues, when he was compelledto take a stand opposed to the national aspirations of the variousstates. Such a general preliminary treaty would have gone far towardsrestoring a basis for the resumption of normal political and economicactivity; it would have permitted Wilson to return to the United Statesas the unquestioned leader of the world; it would have blunted the edgeof senatorial opposition; and finally it might have enabled him to avoidthe controversies with Allied leaders which compelled him to surrendermuch of his original programme in a series of compromises. 

It is only fair to Wilson to remember that his original plan, inNovember, was to secure such a preliminary treaty, which was to embodymerely the general lines of a territorial settlement and the disarmamentof the enemy. The delays which postponed the treaty were not entirely hisfault. Arriving in France on the 13th of December, he expected that theConference would convene on the seventeenth, the date originally set. Butdays passed and neither the French nor the British took steps toward theopening of negotiations. They had not even appointed their delegates. Lloyd George sent messages of welcome from across the Channel, butexplained that domestic affairs detained him in England. Conscious of thestruggle that was likely to arise between the "practical" aspirations ofEurope and the "idealism" of America, the Allied leaders evidently werein no hurry to give to the exponent of the ideal the advantage of thepopular support that he enjoyed during the early days following hisarrival upon European shores. Hence it was not until the second week ofJanuary that the delegations began to assemble at Paris. In the intervalWilson had become involved in various detailed problems and he had lostthe opportunity, if indeed it ever offered, to demand immediate agreementon preliminary terms of peace. 

Notwithstanding the delays, the President secured an early triumph in thematter which he had closest at heart, namely, a League of Nations and itsincorporation in the Treaty. Clemenceau had taken issue publicly withWilson. When the President, in the course of his English speeches, affirmed that this was the first necessity of a world which had seen thesystem of alliances fail too often, the French Premier replied in theChamber of Deputies, on the 29th of December, that for his part he heldto the old principle of alliances which had saved France in the past andmust save her in the future, and that his sense of the practical wouldnot be affected by the "_noble candeur_" of President Wilson. The politesneer that underlay the latter phrase aroused the wrath of the moreradical deputies, but the Chamber gave Clemenceau an overwhelming vote ofconfidence as he thus threw down the gage. In the meantime Lloyd Georgehad shown himself apparently indifferent to the League and much moreinterested in what were beginning to be called the "practical issues. "

With the opening of the Conference, however, it soon became apparent thatWilson had secured the support of the British delegates. It is possiblethat a trade had been tacitly consummated. Certain it is that the"freedom of the seas, " which the British delegates were determined shouldnot enter into the issues of the Peace Conference and which hadthreatened to make the chief difficulty between British and Americans, was never openly discussed. Had Wilson decided to drop or postpone thismost indefinite of his Fourteen Points, on the understanding that theBritish would give their support to the League? At all events, the Leagueof Nations was given an important place on the programme ofdeliberations, and at the second of the plenary sessions of theConference, held on January 25, 1919, the principle of a League wasapproved without a dissentient voice; it was also decided that theLeague should be made an integral part of the Treaty. Wilson, in additionto acquiring British support had won that of the Italians, to whom he hadpromised his aid in securing the Brenner frontier in the Tyrol. Clemenceau, according to an American delegate, "had climbed on theband-wagon. "

The President's victory was emphasized when he also won the Europeans andthe representatives of the British overseas Dominions to acceptance ofthe principle of "mandatories, " according to which the German colonieswere not to be distributed as spoils amongst the victors, but to becomethe property of the League and to be administered by the mandatorystates, not for their own benefit but for that of the colonies. Thevictory was not complete, since Wilson's first intention had been thatthe mandatory states should not be the great powers, but such states asHolland or one of the Scandinavian nations. He was compelled to admit theright of the British and French to take over the colonies as mandatories. Even so, the struggle over the issue was intense, Premier Hughes ofAustralia leading the demand that the German colonies should be givenoutright to the Allies and the British self-governing Dominions. Againthe support of Lloyd George brought success to the American policy. 

In order to assure his victory in the foundation of a League of Nations, it was necessary that before returning home Wilson should see somedefinite scheme elaborated. Until the 14th of February he labored withthe special committee appointed to draft a specific plan, which includedmuch of the best political talent of the world: Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, Venizelos, Léon Bourgeois. In order to avoid the criticismthat consideration of a League was delaying the preparation of peaceterms, the commission met in the evenings so as not to interrupt theregular meetings of the Council of Ten. It was a _tour de force_, thiselaboration of a charter for the new international order, in less thanthree weeks. At times the task seemed hopeless as one deadlock afteranother developed. Wilson, who presided over the commission, lacked theskill and courage displayed by Clemenceau in his conduct of the plenarysessions, and proved unable to prevent fruitless discussion; possibly hefeared lest he be regarded as autocratic in pushing his pet plan. At allevents precious moments were dissipated in long speeches, and generalprinciples threatened to be lost in a maze of details. With but two daysleft before the plenary session of the Conference and the date set forWilson's sailing, the commission had approved only six of thetwenty-seven articles of the Covenant. Fortune intervened. The presenceof Wilson was demanded at the Council of Ten and his place as chairmanwas taken by Lord Robert Cecil. The latter showed himself effective. Ablyseconded by Colonel House, he passed over all details and pushed thefinal stages of the report through at top speed; on the 14th of Februarythe Covenant of the League was completed. It was sanctioned by theplenary session of the Conference that afternoon, and in the eveningWilson left for America with the document in his pocket. Doubtless itseemed to him that the major portion of his task had been accomplished. 

The mechanism of the League thus proposed is said to have been largelyevolved by Smuts and Cecil, but it coincided roughly with the ideas thatWilson had already conceived. Much of the language of the Covenant isWilson's; its form was mainly determined by the British and Americanlegal experts, C. J. B. Hurst and D. H. Miller. It provided for anexecutive council representing nine powers, and a deliberative assemblyof all the members of the League. The Council must meet annually andtake under advisement any matters threatening to disturb internationalpeace. Its recommendations must be unanimous. The Assembly was entirelywithout executive power. The members of the League were to agree not tomake war without first submitting the matter under dispute to arbitrationor to the consideration of the Council. Failure to abide by thisagreement would constitute an act of war against the League, which uponrecommendation of the Council, might boycott the offending stateeconomically or exercise military force against it. The Covenant declaredit "to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to theattention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whateveraffecting international relations which threatens to disturbinternational peace or the good understanding between nations upon whichpeace depends. " The members of the League, furthermore, undertook "torespect and preserve as against external aggression the territorialintegrity and existing independence of all members of the League. In caseof any such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by whichthis obligation shall be fulfilled" (Article X). These two provisionsembodied the particular contributions of Wilson to the Covenant, whobelieved that the capacity of the League to preserve justice and peacedepended chiefly upon them. The Covenant also provided in some measurefor military and naval disarmament by giving to the Council the right torecommend the size of the force to be maintained by each member of theLeague, and it attacked secret diplomacy by abrogating previousobligations inconsistent with the Covenant and by providing that everyfuture treaty must be registered and published. 

If the President expected to be hailed at home as conquering hero, he wasdestined to bitter disappointment. He must now pay the price for thosetactical mistakes which had aroused opinion against him in the previousautumn. The elements which he had antagonized by his war-policies, by hisdemand for a Democratic Congress, by his failure to coöperate with theSenate in the formulation of American policy and in the appointment ofthe Peace Commission, and which had opposed his departure in person toParis--all those elements now had their chance. Having won a difficultvictory over reactionary forces in Europe, Wilson was now compelled tobegin the struggle over again at home. And whereas at Paris he haddisplayed some skill in negotiation and an attitude of conciliation evenwhen firm in his principles, upon his return he adopted a tone whichshowed that he had failed to gauge the temper of the people. He probablyhad behind him the majority of the independent thinkers, even many whodisliked him personally but who appreciated the importance and the valueof the task he was trying to carry through. The mass of the people, however, understood little of what was going on at Paris. The situationabroad was complex and it had not been clarified adequately by the press. Opinion needed to be educated. It wanted to know why a League wasnecessary and whether its elaboration was postponing peace and the returnof the doughboys. Why must the League be incorporated in the Treaty? Anddid the League put the United States at the mercy of European politiciansand would it involve our country in a series of European wars in which wehad no interest?

What followed must be counted as little less than a tragedy. The man ofacademic antecedents with masterly powers of exposition, who had voicedpopular thought during the years of the war so admirably, now failedcompletely as an educator of opinion. The President might have shown thatthe League Covenant, instead of postponing peace, was really essential toa settlement, since it was to facilitate solutions of various territorialproblems which might otherwise hold the Conference in debate for months. He could have demonstrated with a dramatic vigor which the facts madepossible, the anarchical condition of Europe and the need for some sort ofinternational system of coöperation if a new cataclysm was to be avoided, and he might have pictured the inevitable repercussive effect of such acataclysm upon America. He might have shown that in order to give effectto the terms of the Treaty, it was necessary that the League Covenantshould be included within it. He could have emphasized the fact that theCovenant took from Congress no constitutional powers, that the Council ofthe League, on which the United States was represented, must be unanimousbefore taking action, and then could only make recommendations. But thePresident failed to explain the situation in terms comprehensible to theaverage man. However adequate his addresses seemed to those who understoodthe situation abroad, they left the American public cold. His final speechin the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City was especiallyunfortunate, for his statement that he would bring back the Treaty and theLeague so intertwined that no one could separate them sounded like athreat. At the moment when he needed the most enthusiastic support to curbthe opposition of the Senate, he alienated thousands and lost the chanceto convince tens of thousands. 

These developments did not pass unnoticed in Europe. Clemenceau and LloydGeorge had yielded to Wilson during the first weeks of the Conferencebecause they could not afford to separate their fortunes from the UnitedStates, upon whom they depended for economic support, and because an openbreak with Wilson would weaken their own position with liberals in Franceand England. But now it became apparent to them that Wilson's position athome was so unstable that they might be justified in adopting a strongertone. Each of them could point to the tangible evidence of victoriouselections and votes of confidence. President Wilson could not. The partyin the Senate which, after the 4th of March, would hold the majority, expressly repudiated Wilson's policy. When the President returned toParis, on the 14th of March, he found a different atmosphere. The Leaguewas no longer the central topic of discussion. Concrete questions wereuppermost. How much should Germany pay? What territory should be takenfrom her? How was the Kaiser to be punished? Wilson had been given thesatisfaction of securing approval for the principle of the League. Now hemust permit the Conference to satisfy the practical aspirations ofFrance, England, and Italy. 

It is a tribute to the personality of Wilson that by his presence at thiscritical juncture, when the attitude of the Allies differed but slightly, if at all, from that of the powers at the Congress of Vienna, he was ableto bring back something of the spirit of justice which had been sofrequently and loudly declaimed before the armistice, and to repress atleast in some degree the excessive claims which demanded satisfaction inthe treaties. The plans which, during his absence, had been evolved forthe separation of the Covenant from the Treaty and for its postponement, and which had received the hearty support of several French and Britishdiplomats, were quickly dropped. Wilson was able to announce withoutcontradiction, that the Covenant would be an integral part of the Treaty, as decided on the 25th of January. Far more difficult was the situationthat resulted from French and British plans for indemnities from Germany, and from the French territorial claims on the Rhine. In each of thesematters Wilson could secure nothing better than a compromise. 

From the day when peace dawned upon Europe, the question that had touchedAllied peoples most closely was, How much will Germany pay? It was not somuch the shout of the brutal victor greedy for loot, as the involuntarycry of nations which had seen their homes and factories pulverized, theirships sunk, the flower of their youth killed and maimed, and which nowfaced years of crushing taxation. They had carried the load of wargallantly and they would enter the struggle for recuperation courageously. But they would not endure that the enemy, which had forced these miseriesupon them, should not make good the material damage that had been done. What was the meaning of the word justice, if the innocent victors were toemerge from the war with keener sufferings and more gloomy future than theguilty defeated? Another question stirred the mind of every Frenchman. Forgenerations the eastern frontier of France had lain open to the invasionof the Teuton hordes. The memory of Prussian brutality in 1814 had beenkept alive in every school; the horrors of 1870 had been told and retoldby participants and eye-witnesses; and the world had seen the Germancrimes of 1914. From all France the cry went up, How long? It would be themost criminal stupidity if advantage were not taken of the momentaryhelplessness of the inevitable enemy in order to make that vulnerablefrontier secure. This was not the end. Some day the struggle would berenewed. Already, within two months of the armistice, the French GeneralStaff were considering mobilization plans for the next war. France must bemade safe while she had the chance. 

These feelings had such a hold on the people that the statesmen of Europewould have been over-thrown on the day they forgot them. Popularsentiment was reënforced by practical considerations less justifiable. Crushing indemnities would not merely ease the load of Allied taxationand furnish capital for rapid commercial development; they would alsoremove Germany as an economic competitor. French control of all territorywest of the Rhine would not only assure France against the danger ofanother German invasion, but would also provide her capitalists with apreponderating economic advantage in regions by no means French incharacter. Such selfish interests the Americans strove to set aside, although they never forgot their desire to secure as complete justicefor the Allies as seemed compatible with a stable and tranquilsettlement. 

In the matter of indemnities, or reparations as they came to be called, the experts of the various powers soon established the fact that Germanywould be unable to pay the total bill of reparation, even at the mostconservative reckoning. There was a long discussion as to whether or notthe costs of war, aside from material damage done, that had been incurredby the Allies, should be included in the amount that Germany was to pay. It was finally determined, in accordance with the arguments of theAmerican financial delegates who were warmly supported by PresidentWilson, that such war costs should be excluded. On the other hand it wasagreed that pensions might properly be made part of Germany's reparationbill. The two items of damages and pensions were calculated by theAmerican experts as amounting to a total figure of not less than$30, 000, 000, 000 present capital sum, which Germany ought to pay. 

The next step was to determine how much Germany could be made to pay. Bydrafting too severe terms German trade might be destroyed completely andGermany left without the economic capacity to make the money that was topay the bill. It was obvious to careful students that the total amountwhich she could turn over to the Allies could not be much more than theexcess of her exports over imports; and that even if payments wereextended over twenty or thirty years their value for purposes ofreparation would probably not much exceed twenty-five billion dollars. Lloyd George in his election pledges had promised that the completereparations account would be settled by the enemy; neither he norClemenceau dared to confess that the sum which could be exacted fromGermany would fall far below their early promises. The British experts, Sumner and Cunliffe, continued to encourage Lloyd George in his beliefthat Germany could afford to pay something in the neighborhood of ahundred billion dollars, and the French Finance Minister, Klotz, wasequally optimistic. At first, accordingly, Allied demands on Germanyseemed likely to be fantastic. 

The Americans, on the other hand, were infinitely more conservative intheir estimates of what Germany could pay. Even after certain Alliedexperts, including Montagu and Loucheur, affirmed the necessity of scalingdown the suggested sum of reparations, the difference between theAmerican proposals and those of the Allies was serious. [13] Politicalconsiderations, however, interposed, and preventing the settling of adefinite total sum which Germany must pay. Neither Lloyd George norClemenceau dared to go to their constituents with the truth, namely thatGermany could not possibly pay the enormous indemnities which thepoliticians had led the people to expect. (Lloyd George, for example, hadstated the sum that Germany must pay at about $120, 000, 000, 000. ) Both thechiefs of state asserted that they were almost certain to be turned out ofoffice as a result, with consequent confusion in the Peace Conference, anda prolongation of the crisis. The only escape seemed to be in apostponement of the problem by not naming any definite sum which Germanymust pay, but requiring her to acknowledge full liability. Thedisadvantages of this method were apparent to the President and hisfinancial advisers, for it was clear that the economic stability of theworld could not be restored until the world knew how much Germany wasgoing to pay. 

[Footnote 13: At first the French and British refused to name anyspecific sum that might be collected from Germany, requesting theAmericans to submit estimates. The latter named $5, 000, 000, 000 asrepresenting a sum that might be collected prior to May 1, 1921, andthereafter a capital sum as high as $25, 000, 000, 000, always provided thatthe other clauses in the treaty did not too greatly drain Germany'sresources. After some weeks of discussion the French experts stated thatif the figures could be revised up to $40, 000, 000, 000 they wouldrecommend them to their chiefs. The British refused to accept a figurebelow $47, 000, 000, 000. ]

Equally difficult was the problem of the French frontier. The return ofAlsace-Lorraine to France was unanimously approved. The French claimed inaddition, the districts of the Saar, with their valuable coal-fields, aportion of which had been left to France after the first abdication ofNapoleon but annexed to Prussia after his defeat at Waterloo; and theycontended that if the German territories west of the Rhine were not to beannexed to France, they must at least be separated from Germany, whichhad secured a threatening military position mainly through theirpossession. American experts had felt inclined to grant a part of theSaar region to France as compensation for the wanton destruction ofFrench mines at Lens and Valenciennes by the Germans; but both Wilson andLloyd George were opposed to absolute annexation of the district whichthe French demanded, including, as it did, more than six hundred thousandGermans and no French. Wilson was definitely hostile to any attempt toseparate from the Fatherland such purely German territory as that on theleft bank of the Rhine. The Allies, as well as himself, had givenassurances that they did not aim at the dismemberment of Germany, and itwas on the basis of such assurances that the Germans had asked for anarmistice. Wilson admitted that from the point of view of militarystrategy the argument of Foch was unanswerable, under the old conditions;but he insisted that the League of Nations would obviate the necessity ofthe strategic protection asked for. 

The struggle over these issues nearly broke the back of the Conference. If Clemenceau had yielded in January when the League was demanded byWilson, it was with the mental reservation that when the "practical"issues came up, the victory should be his. The French press were not slowto give support to their Government, and within a short time thePresident, so recently a popular idol, found himself anathematized as apro-German and the sole obstacle to a speedy and satisfactory peace. Themore noisy section of the British press followed suit. Liberals weresilenced and American idealism was cursed as meddlesome myopia. For somedays the deadlock appeared interminable and likely to become fatal. In acontest of obstinacy even Wilson could be matched by Clemenceau. Theincreasing bitterness of French attacks upon the Americans began to tellupon Wilson; for the first time his physical strength seemed likely tocollapse under the strain. Matters were brought to a head by a boldstroke, on the 7th of April, when Wilson ordered the _George Washington_to sail for Brest. The inference was plain: the President would leave theConference unless the Allies abated their claims. 

The week of strain was followed by one of adjustment. Fearing an openbreak with America, Allied leaders showed themselves anxious to find acompromise, and Wilson himself was willing to meet them part way, sincehe realized that without France and England his new international systemcould never operate. Colonel House found opportunity for his tested skilland common sense as a mediator, and he was assisted by Tardieu, whoproved himself to be fertile in suggestions for a practical middlecourse. As in the case of all compromises, the solutions satisfied no onecompletely. But clearly some sort of treaty had to be framed, if theworld were to resume normal life and if the spread of social revolutionwere to be checked. At least the compromises had the virtue of winningunanimity, without which Europe could not be saved. 

The indemnity problem was settled, at least for the moment, by postponinga final definite statement of the total amount that Germany must pay. Itwas decided that the sum of five billion dollars (twenty billion goldmarks), in cash or kind, should be demanded from Germany as an initialpayment, to be made before May 1, 1921. Certain abatements were to bepermitted the Germans, since this sum was to include the expenses of thearmy of occupation, which were reckoned as in the neighborhood of abillion dollars; and supplies of food and raw materials, which Germanymight need to purchase, could be paid for out of that sum. In the secondplace, Germany was required to deliver interest-bearing bonds to a furtheramount of ten billions; and, if the initial payment of cash fell short offive billions by reason of permitted deductions, the amount of bonds wasto be so increased as to bring the total payments in cash, kind, or bonds, up to fifteen billions by May 1, 1921. If a Reparations Commission, thedecisions of which Germany must agree to accept, should be satisfied thatmore yet could be paid, a third issue of bonds, amounting to a further tenbillions might be exacted. Even this total of twenty-five billions was notto be regarded as final, if Germany's capacity to pay more were determinedby the Reparations Commission. Germany was required to acknowledge fullliability, and the total sum which she might theoretically have to pay wasreckoned by a British expert as between thirty-two and forty-fourbillions. The Reparations Commission, however, was given the power torecommend abatements as well as increased payments; upon the wisdom of itsmembers the practical application of the treaty would obviouslydepend. [14]

[Footnote 14: The proposal of a permanent commission for handling thewhole matter of reparations was made first by an American financialadviser, John Foster Dulles. The idea was accepted by Lloyd George andClemenceau as an efficacious method of enabling them to postpone thedecision of a definite sum to be paid by Germany until the politicalsituation in France and Great Britain should be more favorable. ]

In truth the reparations clauses of the treaty, which compelled Germanyto hand over what was practically a blank check to the Allies, represented no victory for Wilson. But he had at least prevented theimposition of the crushing indemnities that had been proposed, and whichmust have been followed by political and economic consequences hardlyshort of disastrous. As for the eastern frontier of France, it was agreedthat the right of property in the coal mines of the Saar district shouldbe given outright to France, as partial but immediate compensation forthe damage done at Lens and elsewhere. But the district itself was to beplaced under the League of Nations and a plebiscite at the end of fifteenyears was to determine its final destiny. The territory on the left bankof the Rhine was left to Germany, but it was to be demilitarizedentirely, a condition which also applied to a zone fifty kilometers broadto the east of the Rhine. The bridgeheads on the Rhine, as well as theGerman districts to the west of the river, were to be occupied forperiods extending from five to fifteen years, in order to ensure theexecution of the treaty by the Germans. The French press contended thatClemenceau had made over-great concessions, protesting that the Leaguewould be utterly unable to protect France against sudden attack, especially since the Covenant had not provided for a general militaryforce. In return for these concessions by Clemenceau, Wilson gave anextraordinary _quid pro quo_. He who had declaimed vigorously against allspecial alliances now agreed that until the League was capable ofoffering to France the protection she asked, there should be a separatetreaty between France, Great Britain, and the United States, according towhich the two latter powers should promise to come to the defense ofFrance in case of sudden and unprovoked attack by Germany. The treatydid not, according to Wilson, constitute a definite alliance but merelyan "undertaking, " but it laid him open to the charge of seriousinconsistency. 

Thus was passed, by means of compromise, the most serious crisis of theConference. In France Wilson never recovered the popularity which he thenlost by his opposition to French demands. In many quarters of GreatBritain and the United States, on the other hand, he was attacked byliberals for having surrendered to the forces of reaction. In theConference, however, he had maintained his prestige, and most moderateswho understood the situation felt that he had done as well as or betterthan could be expected. He had by no means had his way in the matter ofreparations or frontiers, but he had gone far towards a vindication ofhis principles by avoiding a defeat under circumstances where the oddswere against him. More he probably could not have obtained and no otherAmerican at that time could have secured so much. The sole alternativewould have been for the American delegates to withdraw from theConference. Such a step might have had the most disastrous consequences. It was true, or Europe believed it to be true, that the Conferencerepresented for the moment the single rallying-point of the elements ofsocial order on the Continent. The withdrawal of the Americans would haveshattered its waning prestige, discouraged liberals in every country, andperhaps have led to its dissolution. Nearly every one in Paris wasconvinced that the break-up of the Conference would be the signal forwidespread communistic revolt throughout central Europe. By his broadconcessions President Wilson had sacrificed some of his principles, buthe had held the Conference together, the supreme importance of whichseemed at the time difficult to over-emphasize. Having weathered thiscrisis the Conference could now meet the storms that were to arise fromthe demands of the Italians and the Japanese. 

Wilson himself was to be encouraged in the midst of those difficulties bythe triumph accorded him on the 28th of April. On that day the plenarysession of the Conference adopted without a word of dissent the revisedCovenant of the League of Nations, including the amendment that formallyrecognized the validity of the Monroe Doctrine. 

CHAPTER XII

THE SETTLEMENT

President Wilson's success in securing approval for the League as thebasis of the Peace Treaty was his greatest triumph at Paris; and it wasaccentuated by the acceptance of certain of the amendments that weredemanded in America, while those which the French and Japanese insistedupon were discarded or postponed. In comparison with this success, hedoubtless regarded his concessions in the matter of reparations and thespecial Franco-British-American alliance as mere details. His task, however, was by no means completed, since Italian and Japanese claimsthreatened to bring on crises of almost equal danger. 

From the early days of the Conference there had been interestedspeculation in the corridors of the Quai d'Orsay as to whether thepromises made to Italy by the Entente Powers in 1915, which wereincorporated in the secret Treaty of London, would be carried into effectby the final peace settlement. That treaty had been conceived in thespirit of old-time diplomacy and had assigned to Italy districts whichdisinterested experts declared could not be hers except upon the principleof the spoils to the strong. Much of the territories promised in theTyrol, along the Julian Alps, and on the Adriatic coast was inhabitedentirely by non-Italians, whose political and economic fortunes were boundup with states other than Italy; justice and wisdom alike seemed todictate a refusal of Italian claims. The annexation of such districts byItaly, the experts agreed, would contravene directly the right ofself-determination and might lead to serious difficulties in the future. Would the President sanction the application of treaties consummatedwithout the knowledge of the United States and in defiance of theprinciples upon which he had declared that peace must be made? Theapplication of the Treaty of London, furthermore, would be at the expense, chiefly, of the Jugoslavs, that is, a small nation. The Allies, as well asWilson, had declared that the war had been waged and that the peace mustbe drafted in defense of the rights of smaller nationalities. Justice forthe weak as for the strong was the basis of the new international orderwhich Wilson was striving to inaugurate. 

Had the struggle been simply over the validity of the Treaty of London, Wilson's position would have been difficult enough, for the Premiers ofFrance and Great Britain had declared that they could do nothing else buthonor the pledges given in 1915. But Italian opinion had been steadilyaroused by a chauvinist press campaign to demand not merely theapplication of the Treaty of London but the annexation of Fiume, whichthe treaty assigned to the Jugoslavs. To this demand both the British andFrench were opposed, although they permitted Wilson to assume the burdenof denying Italian claims to Fiume. As time went on, Orlando and Sonninopressed for a decision, even threatening that unless their demands weresatisfied, Italy would have nothing to do with the German treaty. Finally, on the 23d of April, the crisis came to a head. On that day thePresident published a statement setting forth the American position, which he felt had been entirely misrepresented by a propagandist press. Emphasizing the fact that Italian claims were inconsistent with theprinciples upon which all the Allies had agreed, as necessary to thefuture tranquillity of the world, he appealed directly to the Italianpeople to join with the United States in the application of thoseprinciples, even at the sacrifice of what seemed their own interest. 

The appeal was based upon sound facts. Its statements were approvedpublicly by allied experts who knew the situation, and privately byClemenceau and Lloyd George. It had been discussed in the Council of Fourand by no means took Orlando by surprise. But it gave Orlando anopportunity for carrying out his threat of retiring from the Conference. Insisting that Wilson had appealed to the Italian people over his head andthat they must choose between him and the President, he set forth at oncefor Rome, followed by the other Italian commissioners, although theeconomic experts remained at Paris. Orlando was playing a difficult game. He was hailed in Rome as the defender of the sacred rights of Italy, butin Paris he lacked partners. Both the British and French agreed withWilson that Italy ought not to have Fiume. They secretly regretted thepromises of the London Treaty, although they were prepared to keep theirword, and they were by no means inclined to make further concessions inorder to bring Orlando and his colleagues back. After a few days ofhesitation, they decided to go on with the German treaty and to warn theItalians that, if they persisted in absenting themselves from theConference, their withdrawal would be regarded as a breach of the Treatyof London which stipulated a common peace with the enemy. They alsodecided that Italy could not expect to share in German reparations if herdelegates were not present to sign the German treaty. Such arguments couldnot fail to weigh heavily with the Italian delegates, even at the momentwhen the Italian press and people were giving them enthusiasticencouragement to persist in their uncompromising course. On the 5th of MayOrlando left Rome to resume his place in the Peace Conference. 

In the meantime the Japanese had taken advantage of the embarrassmentcaused by the Italian withdrawal, to put forward their special claims inthe Far East. During the early days of the Conference they had played acautious game, as we have seen, attending meetings but taking no decidedstand upon European matters. They had even refused to press to the limitthe amendment to the League Covenant which enunciated their favoriteprinciple of the equality of races. But now they insisted that on onepoint, at least, Japanese claims must be listened to; their right ofinheritance to the German lease of Kiau-Chau and economic privileges inthe Shantung peninsula must receive recognition. This claim had long beenapproved secretly by the British and French; it had even been accepted bythe Chinese at the time when Japan had forced the twenty-one demands uponher. It was disapproved, however, by the American experts in Paris, andWilson argued strongly for more generous treatment of China. Hisstrategic position, one must admit, was not nearly so strong as in theFiume controversy. In the latter he was supported, at least covertly, byFrance and England, whose treaty with Italy explicitly denied her claimto Fiume. The Japanese threat of withdrawal from the Conference, if theirclaims were not satisfied, carried more real danger with it than that ofthe Italians; if the Japanese delegates actually departed making thesecond of the big five to go, the risk of a complete débâcle was by nomeans slight. Even assuming that justice demanded as strong a stand forthe Chinese as Wilson had taken for the Jugoslavs, the practicalimportance of the Shantung question in Europe was of much lesssignificance. The eyes of every small nation of Europe were upon Fiume, which was regarded as the touchstone of Allied professions of justice. Ifthe Allied leaders permitted Italy to take Fiume, the small nations wouldscoff at all further professions of idealism; they would take no furtherinterest either in the Conference or its League. Whereas, on the otherhand, the small nationalities of Europe knew and cared little about thejustice of Chinese pleas. 

Such considerations may have been in the mind of the President when hedecided to yield to Japan. The decision throws interesting light upon hischaracter; he is less the obstinate doctrinaire, more the practicalpolitician than has sometimes been supposed. The pure idealist would haveremained consistent in the crisis, refused to do an injustice in the FarEast as he had refused in the settlement of the Adriatic, and would havetaken the risk of breaking up the Conference and destroying all chance ofthe League of Nations. Instead, Wilson yielded to practical considerationsof the moment. The best that he could secure was the promise of theJapanese to retire from the peninsula, a promise the fulfillment of whichobviously depended upon the outcome of the struggle between liberal andconservative forces in Japan, and which accordingly remained uncertain. Hewas willing to do what he admitted was an injustice, in order to assurewhat seemed to him the larger and the more certain justice that wouldfollow the establishment of the League of Nations. 

The settlement of the Shantung problem removed the last great difficultyin completing the treaty with Germany, and on the 7th of May the Germandelegates appeared to receive it. Nearly eight weeks of uncertaintyfollowed, taken up with the study of German protests, the construction ofthe treaty with Austria, and finally the last crisis that preceded thesignature. The terms were drastic and the German Government, in thepersons of Scheidemann, the Premier, and Brockdorff-Rantzau, Minister forForeign Affairs, seemed determined that, helpless as she was, Germanyshould not accept them without radical modifications. Their proteststouched chiefly upon the economic clauses and reparations, the solution ofthe Saar problem, the cession of so much German territory to Poland, andthe exclusion of Germany from the League of Nations. Ample opportunity wasgiven their delegates to formulate protests, which, although they rarelyintroduced new facts or arguments that had not been discussed, werecarefully studied by Allied experts. Week after week passed. In certainquarters among the Allies appeared a tendency to make decided concessionsin order to win the consent of the German delegates. No one wanted tocarry out an invasion of the defeated country, and there was no guaranteethat a military invasion would secure acquiescence. Germany's strength wasin sitting still, and she might thus indefinitely postpone the peace. Wasit not the wise course, one heard whispered in Paris, to sugar thebitterness of the treaty and thus win Germany's immediate signature?

Early in June, Lloyd George, evidently under pressure from his Cabinet, declared himself for a decided "softening" of the peace terms in order tosecure the acceptance of the enemy. What would Wilson do? He had beenanathematized at home and abroad as pro-German and desirous of savingGermany from the consequences of her misdeeds; here was his chance. Wouldhe join with the British in tearing up this treaty, which after fourmonths of concentrated effort had just been completed, in order to securethe soft peace that he was supposed to advocate? His attitude in thiscontingency showed his ability to preserve an even balance. In themeeting of the American delegation that was called to consider theBritish proposal, he pronounced himself as strongly in favor of anychanges that would ensure more complete justice. If the British andFrench would consent to a definite and moderate sum of reparations (aconsent which he knew was out of the question) he would gladly agree. Buthe would not agree to any concessions to Germany that were not based uponjustice, but merely upon the desire to secure her signature. He was notin favor of any softening which would mar the justice of the settlementas drafted. "We did not come over, " he said, "simply to get any sort ofpeace treaty signed. We came over to do justice. I believe, even, that ahard peace is a good thing for Germany herself, in order that she mayknow what an unjust war means. We must not forget what our soldiersfought for, even if it means that we may have to fight again. " Wilson'sstand for the treaty as drafted proved decisive. Certain modifications indetails were made, but the hasty and unwise enthusiasm of Lloyd Georgefor scrapping entire sections was not approved. The Conference couldhardly have survived wholesale concessions to Germany: to prolong thecrisis would have been a disastrous confession of incompetence. For whatconfidence could have been placed in statesmen who were so patentlyunable to make and keep their minds?

Still the German Government held firm and refused to sign. Foch inspectedthe Allied troops on the Rhine and Pershing renounced his trip toEngland, in order to be ready for the invasion that had been ordered ifthe time limit elapsed without signature. Only at the last moment did thecourage of the Germans fail. A change of ministry brought into power menwho were willing to accept the inevitable humiliation. On the 20th ofJune, the guns and sirens of Paris announced Germany's acceptance of thepeace terms and their promise to sign, and, surprising fact, a vast crowdgathered on the Place de la Concorde to cheer Wilson; despite his loss ofpopularity and the antagonism which he had aroused by his opposition tonational aspirations of one sort or another, he was still the man whosename stood as symbol for peace. 

Eight days later in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, where forty-eightyears before had been born the German Empire, the delegates of the Alliedstates gathered to celebrate the obsequies of that Empire. It was nopeace of reconciliation, this treaty between the new German Republic andthe victorious Allies. The hatred and distrust inspired by five years ofwar were not so soon to be liquidated. As the German delegates, awkwardand rather defiant in their long black frock coats, marched to the tableto affix their signatures, they were obviously, in the eyes of the Allieddelegates and the hundreds of spectators, always "the enemy. " The placeof the Chinese at the treaty table was empty; for them it was no peace ofjustice that gave Shantung to the Japanese, and they would not sign. TheSouth African delegate, General Smuts, could not sign without explainingthe balance of considerations which led him to sanction an internationaldocument containing so many flaws. 

It was not, indeed, the complete peace of justice which Wilson hadpromised and which, at times, he has since implied he believed it to be. Belgians complained that they had not been given the left bank of theScheldt; Frenchmen were incensed because their frontier had not beenprotected; Italians were embittered by the refusal to approve theirclaims on the Adriatic; radical leaders, the world over, were frank intheir expression of disappointment at the failure to inaugurate a newsocial order. The acquiescence in Japanese demands for Kiau-Chau wasclearly dictated by expediency rather than by justice. Austria, reducedin size and bereft of material resources, was cut off from the sea andrefused the possibility of joining with Germany. The nationalisticambitions of the Rumanians, of the Jugoslavs, of the Czechoslovaks, andof the Poles were aroused to such an extent that conflicts could hardlybe avoided. Hungary, deprived of the rim of subject nationalities, lookedforward to the first opportunity of reclaiming her sovereignty over them. The Ruthenians complained of Polish domination. Further to the east laythe great unsettled problem of Russia. 

But the most obvious flaws in the treaty are to be found in the economicclauses. It was a mistake to compel Germany to sign a blank check in thematter of reparations. Germany and the world needed to know the exactamount that was to be paid, in order that international commerce might beset upon a stable basis. The extent of control granted to the Allies overGerman economic life was unwise and unfair. 

Complete justice certainly was not achieved by President Wilson at Paris, and it may be questioned whether all the decisions can be regarded evenas expedient. The spirit of the Fourteen Points, as commonly interpreted, had not governed the minds of those who sat at the council table. Themethods adopted by the Council of Ten and the Council of Four were by nomeans those to which the world looked forward when it hailed the idealexpressed in the phrase, "Open covenants openly arrived at. " The "freedomof the seas, " if it meant the disappearance of the peculiar position heldby Great Britain on the seas, was never seriously debated, and Wilsonhimself, in an interview given to the London _Times_, sanctioned"Britain's peculiar position as an island empire. " Adequate guaranteesfor the reduction of armaments were certainly not taken at Paris; allthat was definitely stipulated was the disarmament of the enemy, a stepby no means in consonance with the President's earlier policy which aimedat universal disarmament. An "absolutely impartial adjustment of allcolonial claims" was hardly carried out by granting the German coloniesto the great powers, even as mandatories of the League of Nations. 

Nevertheless the future historian will probably hold that the PeaceConference, with all its selfish interests and mistakes, carried intoeffect an amazingly large part of President Wilson's programme, when allthe difficulties of his position are duly weighed. The territorialsettlements, on the whole, translated into fact the demands laid down bythe more special of Wilson's Fourteen Points. France, Belgium, and theother invaded countries were, of course, evacuated and their restorationpromised; Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France and the wrong of 1871thus righted; an independent Poland was recognized and given the assuredaccess to the sea that Wilson had insisted upon; the subject nationalitiesof Austria-Hungary received not merely autonomy but independence. Even asregards the larger principles enunciated in the Fourteen Points, it may atleast be argued that President Wilson secured more than he lost. Opendiplomacy in the sense of conducting international negotiations in an openforum was not the method of the Peace Conference; and it may not bepossible or even desirable. The article in the Covenant, however, whichinsists upon the public registration of all treaties before their validityis recognized, goes far towards a fulfillment of the President's pledge ofopen covenants, particularly if his original meaning is liberallyinterpreted. Similarly the Covenant makes provision for the reduction ofarmaments. If the treaty did not go far in assuring the "removal ofeconomic barriers, " at all events the Conference did much to provide foran international control of traffic which would ensure to all Europeancountries, so far as possible, equal facilities for forwarding theirgoods. 

Apart from the Fourteen Points Wilson had emphasized two other principlesas necessary to a just and permanent peace. The first of these was thatthe enemy should be treated with a fairness equal to that accorded to theAllies; the second was the principle that peoples should have the rightto choose the government by which they were to be ruled--the principle ofself-determination. Neither of these principles received full recognitionin the peace settlement. Yet their spirit was infused more completelythroughout the settlement than would have been the case had not Wilsonbeen at Paris, and to that extent the just and lasting qualities of thepeace were enhanced. In the matter of German reparations the question ofjustice was not the point at issue; the damage committed by Germanysurpassed in value anything that the Allies could exact from her. As tofrontiers, the unbiased student will probably admit that full justice wasdone Germany when the aspirations of France for annexation of the Saardistrict and the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine weredisappointed; it was the barest justice to France, on the other hand, that she should receive the coal mines of the former district and thatthe latter should be demilitarized. In the question of Danzig, and thePolish corridor to the sea, it was only fair to Poland that she receivethe adequate outlet which was necessary to her economic life and whichhad been promised her, even if it meant the annexation of large Germanpopulations, many of which had been artificially brought in as colonistsby the Berlin Government; and in setting up a free city of Danzig, theConference broke with the practices of old style diplomacy and paid atribute to the rights of peoples as against expediency. The same may besaid of the decision to provide for plebiscites in East Prussia and inupper Silesia. On the other hand, the refusal to permit the incorporationof the new, lesser Austria within Germany was at once unjust andunwise--a concession to the most shortsighted of old-style diplomaticprinciples. 

In the reorganization of the former Hapsburg territories, Wilsonianprinciples were always in the minds of the delegates, although in a fewcases they were honored more in the breach than in the observance. Wilsonhimself surrendered to Italy extensive territories in the Tyrol south ofthe Brenner which, if he had followed his own professions, would have beenleft to Austria. A large Jugoslav population on the Julian Alps and inIstria was placed under Italian rule. The new Czechoslovak state includesmillions of Germans and Magyars. The boundaries of Rumania were extendedto include many non-Rumanian peoples. Bulgars were sacrificed to Greeksand to Serbs. In the settlement of each problem the balance alwaysinclined a little in favor of the victors. But the injustices committedwere far less extensive than might have been expected, and in most caseswhere populations were included under alien rule, the decision was basedless on political considerations than on the practical factors of terrain, rivers, and railroads which must always be taken into consideration in thedrawing of a frontier. Wherever the issue was clean-cut, as for examplebetween the selfish nationalism of the Italians in their Adriatic demandsand the claim to mere economic life of the Jugoslavs, the old rule whichgranted the spoils to the stronger power was vigorously protested. 

Whatever the mistakes of the Conference, Wilson secured that which heregarded as the point of prime importance, the League of Nations. This, hebelieved, would remedy the flaws and eradicate the vices of the treaties. No settlement, however perfect at the moment, could possibly remainpermanent, in view of the constantly changing conditions. What wasnecessary was an elasticity that would permit change as change becamenecessary. If the disposition of the Saar basin, for example, proved to beso unwise or unjust as to cause danger of violence, the League would takecognizance of the peril and provide a remedy. If the boundaries of easternGermany gave undue advantage to the Poles, the League would find ways andmeans of rectifying the frontier peacefully. If Hungary or Czechoslovakiafound themselves cut off from sea-ports, the League could hear and actupon their demands for freedom of transit or unrestricted access to fairmarkets. That the League was necessary for such and other purposes wasrecognized by many notable economic experts and statesmen besides thePresident. Herbert Hoover insisted upon the necessity of a League if thefood problems of central Europe were to be met, and Venizelos remarkedthat "without a League of Nations, Europe would face the future withdespair in its heart. " Because he had the covenant of such an associationincorporated in the German treaty, Wilson accepted all the mistakes andinjustices of the treaty as minor details and could say of it, doubtlessin all sincerity, "It's a good job. " Conscious of victory in the matterwhich he had held closest to his heart, the President embarked upon the_George Washington_ on the 29th of June, the day after the signing of thetreaty, and set forth for home. All that was now needed was theratification of the treaty by the Senate. 

CHAPTER XIII

THE SENATE AND THE TREATY

Neither President Wilson nor those who had been working with him at Parisseriously feared that, after securing the point of chief importance tohim at the Conference, he would fail to win support for the League ofNations and the treaty at home. They recognized, of course, that hispolitical opponents in the Senate would not acquiesce without a struggle. The Republicans were now in the majority, and Henry Cabot Lodge, the newchairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, had gone far in hisefforts to undermine Wilson's policy at Paris. He had encouraged theItalians in their imperialistic designs in the Adriatic and had done hisbest to discredit the League of Nations. Former Progressive Senators, such as Johnson and Borah, who like Lodge made personal hostility toWilson the chief plank in their political programme, had declaredvigorously their determination to prevent the entrance of the UnitedStates into a League. The Senators as a whole were not well-informed uponforeign conditions and Wilson had done nothing to enlighten them. He hadnot asked their advice in the formulation of his policy, nor had hesupplied them with the facts that justified the position he had taken. Naturally their attitude was not likely to be friendly, now that hereturned to request their consent to the treaty, and the approach of apresidential election was bound to affect the action of all ardentpartisans. 

Opposition was also to be expected in the country. There was always theancient prejudice against participation in European affairs, which had notbeen broken even by the events of the past two years. The people, evenmore than the Senate, were ignorant of foreign conditions and failed tounderstand the character of the obligations which the nation would assumeunder the treaty and the covenant of the League. There was genuine fearlest the United States should become involved in wars and squabbles inwhich it had no material interest, and lest it should surrender itsindependence of action to a council of foreign powers. This wasaccompanied by the belief that an irresponsible President might commit thecountry to an adventurous course of action which could not be controlledby Congress. The chief opposition to the treaty and covenant, however, probably resulted from the personal dislike of Wilson. This feeling, whichhad always been virulent along the Atlantic coast and in the industrialcenters of the Middle West, had been intensified by the President'sapparent disregard of Congress. More than one man of business argued thatthe treaty must be bad because it was Wilson's work and the covenant worstof all, since it was his pet scheme. One heard daily in the clubs and onthe golf-courses of New England and the Middle Atlantic States the remark:"I know little about the treaty, but I know Wilson, and I know he must bewrong. "

And yet the game was probably in the President's hands, had he known howto play it. Divided as it was on the question of personal devotion toWilson, the country was a unit in its desire for immediate peace andnormal conditions. Admitting the imperfections of the treaty, it wasprobably the best that could be secured in view of the conflictinginterests of the thirty-one signatory powers, and at least it would bringpeace at once. To cast it aside meant long delays and prolongation of theeconomic crisis. The covenant of the League might not be entirelysatisfactory, but something must be done to prevent war in the future;and if this League proved unsatisfactory, it could be amended aftertrial. Even the opposing Senators did not believe that they could defeatthe treaty outright. They were warned by Republican financiers, whounderstood international economic conditions, that the safety andprosperity of the world demanded ratification, and that the United Statescould not afford to assume an attitude of isolation even if it werepossible. Broad-minded statesmen who were able to dissociate partisanemotion from intellectual judgment, such as ex-President Taft, agreedthat the treaty should be ratified as promptly as possible. All thatSenator Lodge and his associates really hoped for was to incorporatereservations which would guarantee the independence of American actionand incidentally make it impossible for the President to claim all thecredit for the peace. 

Had the President proved capable of coöperating with the moderateRepublican Senators it would probably have been possible for him to havesaved the fruits of his labor at Paris. An important group honestlybelieved that the language of the covenant was ambiguous in certainrespects, particularly as regards the extent of sovereignty sacrificedby the national government to the League, and the diminution ofcongressional powers. This group was anxious to insert reservationsmaking plain the right of Congress alone to declare war, defining moreexactly the right of the United States to interpret the Monroe Doctrine, and specifying what was meant by domestic questions that should be exemptfrom the cognizance of the League. Had Wilson at once combined with thisgroup and agreed to the suggested reservations, he would in allprobability have been able to secure the two-thirds vote necessary toratification. The country would have been satisfied; the Republicansmight have contended that they had "Americanized" the treaty; and thereservations would probably have been accepted by the co-signatories. Itwould have been humiliating to go back to the Allies asking specialprivileges, but Europe needed American assistance too much to fail toheed these demands. After all America had gained nothing in the way ofterritorial advantage from the war and was asking for nothing in the wayof reparations. 

It was at this crucial moment that Wilson's peculiar temperamental faultsasserted themselves. Sorely he needed the sane advice of Colonel House, who would doubtless have found ways of placating the opposition. But thatpractical statesman was in London and the President lacked the capacityto arrange the compromise that House approved. 

President Wilson alone either would not or could not negotiatesuccessfully with the middle group of Republicans. He went so far as toinitiate private conferences with various Senators, a step indicating hisdesire to avoid the appearance of the dictatorship of which he wasaccused; but his attitude on reservations that altered the meaning of anyportion of the treaty or covenant was unyielding, and he even insistedthat merely interpretative reservations should not be embodied in thetext of the ratifying resolution. The President evidently hoped that thepressure of public opinion would compel the Senate to yield to the demandfor immediate peace and for guarantees against future war. His appearanceof rigidity, however, played into the hands of the opponents of thetreaty, who dominated the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. Senator Lodge, chairman of the committee, adopted a stand which, to theAdministration at least, did not seem to be justified by anything but adesire to discredit the work of Wilson. He had, in the previous year, warmly advocated a League of Nations, but in the spring of 1919 he hadgiven the impression that he would oppose any League for which Wilsonstood sponsor. Thus he had raised objections to the preliminary draft ofthe covenant which Wilson brought from Paris in February; but when Wilsonpersuaded the Allies to incorporate some of the amendments then demandedby Republican Senators, he at once found new objections. He did not dareattack the League as a principle, in view of the uncertainty of publicopinion on the issue; but he obviously rejoiced in the President'sinability to unite the Democrats with the middle-ground Republicans, forwhom Senator McCumber stood as spokesman. 

On the 19th of August a conference was held at the White House, in whichthe President attempted to explain to the Foreign Relations Committeedoubtful points and to give the reasons for various aspects of thesettlement. A careful study of the stenographic report indicates that hisanswers to the questions of the Republican Senators were frank, and thathe was endeavoring to remove the unfortunate effects of his formerdistant attitude. His manner, however, had in it something of theschoolmaster, and the conference was fruitless. Problems which had beenstudied for months by experts of all the Powers, and to the solution ofwhich had been devoted long weeks of intelligent discussion, were nowpassed upon superficially by men whose ignorance of foreign questions wasonly too evident, and who barely concealed their determination to nullifyeverything approved by the President. Hence, when the report of thecommittee was finally presented on the 10th of September, the Republicanmajority demanded no less than thirty-eight amendments and fourreservations. A quarter of the report was not concerned at all with thesubject under discussion, but was devoted to an attack upon Wilson'sautocratic methods and his treatment of the Senate. As was pointed out bySenator McCumber, the single Republican who dissented from the majorityreport, "not one word is said, not a single allusion made, concerningeither the great purposes of the League of Nations or the methods bywhich these purposes are to be accomplished. Irony and sarcasm have beensubstituted for argument and positions taken by the press or individualsoutside the Senate seem to command more attention than the treatyitself. "

The President did not receive the popular support which he expected, andthe burst of popular wrath which he believed would overwhelm senatorialopposition was not forthcoming. In truth public opinion was confused. America was not educated to understand the issues at stake. Wilson'spurposes at Paris had not been well reported in the press, and he himselfhad failed to make plain the meaning of his policy. It was easy foropponents of the treaty to muddy discussion and to arouse emotion wherereason was desirable. The wildest statements were made as to the effect ofthe covenant, such as that entrance into the League would at once involvethe United States in war, and that Wilson was sacrificing the interests ofAmerica to the selfish desires of European states. The same men who, ayear before, had complained that Wilson was opposing England and France, now insisted that he had sold the United States to those nations. Theyinvented the catchword of "one hundred per cent Americanism, " the test ofwhich was to be opposition to the treaty. They found strange coadjutors. The German-Americans, suppressed during the war, now dared to emerge, hoping to save the Fatherland from the effects of defeat by preventing theratification of the treaty; the politically active Irish found opportunityto fulminate against British imperialism and "tyranny" which theydeclared had been sanctioned by the treaty; impractical liberals, who weredisappointed because Wilson had not inaugurated the social millennium, joined hands with out-and-out reactionaries. But the most discouragingaspect of the situation was that so many persons permitted their judgmentto be clouded by their dislike of the President's personality. Howevermuch they might disapprove the tactics of Senator Lodge they could not butsympathize to some extent with the Senate's desire to maintain itsindependence, which they believed had been assailed by Wilson. Discussionswhich began with the merits of the League of Nations almost invariablyculminated with vitriolic attacks upon the character of Woodrow Wilson. 

In the hope of arousing the country to a clear demand for immediate peacebased upon the Paris settlement, Wilson decided to carry out the planformulated some weeks previous and deliver a series of speeches from theMiddle West to the Pacific coast. He set forth on the 3d of September andmade more than thirty speeches. He was closely followed by some of hisfiercest opponents. Senators Johnson and Borah, members of the ForeignRelations Committee, who might have been expected to remain in Washingtonto assist in the consideration of the treaty by the Senate, followed inWilson's wake, attempting to counteract the effect of his addresses, andincidentally distorting many of the treaty's provisions, which it ischaritable to assume they did not comprehend. The impression produced bythe President was varied, depending largely upon the political characterof his audience. East of the Mississippi he was received with comparativecoolness, but as he approached the coast enthusiasm became high, and atSeattle and Los Angeles he received notable ovations. And yet in thesehours of triumph as in the previous moments of discouragement, farthereast, he must have felt that the issues were not clear. The struggle wasno longer one for a new international order that would ensure peace, somuch as a personal conflict between Lodge and Wilson. Whether thePresident were applauded or anathematized, the personal note was alwayspresent. 

It was evident, during the tour, that the nervous strain was telling uponWilson. He had been worn seriously by his exertions in Paris, where hewas described by a foreign plenipotentiary as the hardest worker in theConference. The brief voyage home, which was purposely lengthened to givehim better chance of recuperation, proved insufficient. Forced to resumethe struggle at the moment when he thought victory was his, repudiatedwhere he expected to find appreciation, the tour proved to be beyond hisphysical and nervous strength. At Pueblo, Colorado, on the 25th ofSeptember, he broke down and returned hastily to Washington. Shortlyafterwards the President's condition became so serious that hisphysicians forbade all political conferences, insisting upon a period ofcomplete seclusion and rest, which was destined to continue for manymonths. 

Thus at the moment of extreme crisis in the fortunes of the treaty itschief protagonist was removed from the scene of action and the Democraticforces fighting for ratification were deprived of effective leadership. Had there been a real leader in the Senate who could carry on the fightwith vigor and finesse, the treaty might even then have been saved; butWilson's system had permitted no understudies. There was no one to leadand no one to negotiate a compromise. From his sick-room, where hisnatural obstinacy seemed to be intensified by his illness, the Presidentstill refused to consider any reservations except of a purelyinterpretative character, and the middle-ground Republicans would notvote to ratify without "mild reservations, " some of which seemed to himmore than interpretative. 

Senatorial forces were roughly divided into four groups. There were the"bitter-enders, " typified by Johnson, Borah, and Brandegee, who franklywanted to defeat the treaty and the League outright; there were the"reservationists, " most of whom, like Lodge, wanted the same but did notdare say so openly; there were the "mild reservationists, " most of whomwere Republicans, who sincerely desired immediate peace and asked for noimportant changes in the treaty; and finally there were those who desiredto ratify the treaty as it stood. The last-named group, made up ofDemocrats, numbered from forty-one to forty-four, and obviously neededthe assistance of the "mild reservationists, " if they were to secure atwo-thirds vote of the Senate. During October, all the amendments whichthe Foreign Relations Committee brought forward were defeated through thecombination of the last two groups. Early in November, however, fourteenreservations were adopted, the "mild reservationists" voting with SenatorLodge, for lack of any basis of compromise with the Democrats. The effectof these reservations would, undoubtedly, have been to release theUnited States from many of the obligations assumed by other members, while assuring to it the benefits of the League. The most serious of thereservations was that concerned with Article X of the covenant, whichstated that the United States would assume no obligations to preserve theterritorial integrity or political independence of any other country, orto interfere in controversies between nations, unless in any particularcase Congress should so provide. From the moment when Wilson firstdeveloped his policy of international service, coöperative interferencein order to prevent acts of aggression by a strong against a weaker powerhad been the chief point in his programme. It was contained in his earlyPan-American policy; it ran through his speeches in the campaign of 1916;it was in the Fourteen Points. It was his specific contribution to thecovenant in Paris. Article X was the one point in the covenant whichWilson would not consent to modify or, as he expressed it, see"nullified. " Just because it lay nearest Wilson's heart, it was thearticle against which the most virulent attacks of the "die-hards" weredirected. 

The President denounced the reservation on Article X, as a "knife-thrustat the heart of the covenant, " and its inclusion in the ratifyingresolution of the Senate, spelled the defeat of ratification. On the eveof voting he wrote to Senator Hitchcock, leader of the Democratic forcesin the Senate, "I assume that the Senators only desire my judgment uponthe all-important question of the resolution containing the manyreservations of Senator Lodge. On that I cannot hesitate, for, in myopinion, the resolution in that form does not provide for ratificationbut rather for nullification of the treaty. I sincerely hope that thefriends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodgeresolution of ratification. " The "mild reservationists" led by McCumbervoted with the Lodge group for the resolution; but the "bitter-enders, "combining with the supporters of the original treaty, outnumbered them. The vote stood thirty-nine in favor of the resolution and fifty-fiveagainst. When a motion for unconditional ratification was offered bySenator Underwood, it was defeated by a vote of fifty-three tothirty-eight. 

The Republicans on the Foreign Relations Committee had succeeded farbeyond the hopes of their leaders in August. They had killed the treaty, but in such an indirect fashion as to confuse the public and to fix uponthe President the blame for delaying the peace. It was easy to picturethe obstinacy of the President as the root of all the evil whichresulted from the political and economic uncertainty overhanging ourEuropean relations. So widespread was this feeling among his naturalopponents, that the Republican Senators began to assume a far loftiertone, and to laugh at the tardy efforts of the Democrats to arrange acompromise. When Senator Pomerene, after consultation with Administrationleaders, proposed the appointment of a "committee of conciliation, " tofind a basis of ratification that would secure the necessary two-thirdsvote, the motion was killed by forty-eight to forty-two. Senator Lodgeannounced that he would support the resolution suggested by Knox, whichwould end the war by congressional resolution and thus compel Wilson tonegotiate a separate treaty of peace with Germany. 

Intelligent public opinion, however, was anxious that the quarrels of thePresident and the Senate should not be allowed to delay thesettlement[15]. Rightly or wrongly the people felt that the struggle waslargely a personal one between Lodge and Wilson, and insisted that eachmust yield something of their contention. On the one hand, ex-PresidentTaft and others of the more far-seeing Republicans worked anxiously forcompromise, with the assistance of such men as Hoover, who perceived thenecessity of a League, but who were willing to sacrifice its efficiencyto some extent, if only the United States could be brought in. On theother hand, various Democrats who were less directly under Wilson'sinfluence wanted to meet these friends of the League half-way. DuringDecember and January unofficial conferences between the senatorial groupstook place and progress towards a settlement seemed likely. TheRepublicans agreed to soften the language of their minor reservations, and Wilson even intimated that he would consent to a mild reservation onArticle X, although as he later wrote to Hitchcock, he felt strongly thatany reservation or resolution stating that the "United States assumes noobligation under such and such an article unless or except, would chillour relationship with the nations with whom we expect to be associated inthis great enterprise of maintaining the world's peace. " It wasimportant "not to create the impression that we are trying to escapeobligations. "

[Footnote 15: A straw vote taken in 311 colleges and including 158, 000students and professors showed an inclination to favor Wilson rather thanLodge, but the greatest number approved compromise: four per cent favoreda new treaty with Germany; eight per cent favored killing the Versaillestreaty; only seventeen per cent approved the Lodge programme; thirty percent approved ratification of the treaty without change; and thirty-eightper cent favored compromise. ]

On the 31st of January the country was startled by the publication of aletter written by Viscount Grey, who had been appointed British Ambassadorto the United States, but who had returned to England after a four months'stay, during which he had been unable to secure an interview with the sickPresident. In this letter he attempted to explain to the British thecauses of American hesitancy to accept the League. He then went on tostate that the success of the League depended upon the adherence of theUnited States, and while admitting the serious character of thereservations proposed by Senator Lodge, insisted that American coöperationought not to be refused because conditions were attached. His views wereunofficial, but it seemed clear that they were approved by the BritishCabinet, and they received a chorus of endorsement from the French andBritish press. 

The publication of Grey's letter opened a path to peace to both Senateand President had they been willing to follow it. The Senate, by veryslight verbal softening of the language of its reservations, thePresident by taking the British Ambassador at his word, might havereached an agreement. The Lodge group, however, which had shown someindications of a desire for compromise, was threatened by the "die-hards"who were determined to defeat the treaty; fearing beyond everything tobreak party unity, Lodge finally refused to alter the language of thestrong reservation on Article X, which stated that the United Stateswould assume no obligation to preserve the independence of other nationsby military force or the use of its resources or any form of economicdiscrimination, unless Congress should first so provide. Inasmuch as theeconomic outlawry of the offending state was the means which Wilsonchiefly counted upon, the reservation took all practical significancefrom Article X, since the delays resulting from congressionaldeliberation would prevent effective action. The President, possiblybelieving that imperialist elements abroad were not sorry to see ArticleX nullified, refused to accept the resolution of ratification so long asit contained this reservation. "The imperialist, " he wrote, "wants noLeague of Nations, but if, in response to the universal cry of masseseverywhere, there is to be one, he is interested to secure one suited tohis own purposes, one that will permit him to continue the historic gameof pawns and peoples--the juggling of provinces, the old balance ofpower, and the inevitable wars attendant upon these things. Thereservation proposed would perpetuate the old order. Does any one reallywant to see the old game played again? Can any one really venture to takepart in reviving the old order? The enemies of a League of Nations haveby every true instinct centered their efforts against Article X, for itis undoubtedly the foundation of the whole structure. It is the bulwark, and the only bulwark of the rising democracy of the world against theforces of imperialism and reaction. "

The deadlock was complete, and on March 19, 1920, when the vote onratification was taken, the necessary two-thirds were lacking by sevenvotes. At the last moment a number of Democrats joined with theRepublican reservationists, making fifty-seven in favor of ratification. On the other hand the bitter-end Republicans voted against it with theDemocrats who stood by the President, thus throwing thirty-seven votesagainst ratification. It had taken the Peace Conference five months toconstruct the treaty with Germany in all its complexities, and secure theunanimous approval of the delegates of thirty-one states. The Senate hadconsumed more than eight months merely in criticizing the treaty and hadfinally refused to ratify it. 

We are, perhaps, too close to the event to attempt any apportionment ofresponsibility for this failure to cap our military successes by a peacewhich--when all has been said--was the nearest possible approach to theideal peace. It is clear that the blame is not entirely on one side. Historians will doubtless level the indictment of ignorance and politicalobliquity against the Senators who tried, either directly or indirectly, to defeat the treaty; they will find much justification for their charge, although it will be more difficult to determine the dividing line betweenmere incapacity to appreciate the necessities of the world, and thedesire to discredit, at any cost, the work of Woodrow Wilson. On theother hand, the President cannot escape blame, although the charge willbe merely that of tactical incapacity and mistaken judgment. Hisinability to combine with the moderate Republican Senators first gave achance to those who wanted to defeat the treaty. His obstinate refusal toaccept reservations at the end, when it was clear that the treaty couldnot be ratified without them, showed a regard for form, at the expense ofpractical benefit. Granted that the reservations altered the characterof the League or the character of American participation in it, some sortof a League was essential and the sooner the United States entered thebetter it would be. Its success would not rest upon phrases, but upon thespirit of the nations that composed it; the building-up of a new andbetter international order would not be determined by this reservation orthat. Wilson's claim to high rank as a statesmen would probably be moreclear if he had accepted what was possible at the moment, in the hopethat the League would be improved as the country and the world becamebetter educated. 

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

By the accident of history the Presidency of Woodrow Wilson, which hedesigned to utilize for a series of social reforms, was characterized bythe supreme importance of foreign affairs. Whatever the significance ofthe legislative enactments of his first year of office, he will beremembered as the neutrality President, the war President, and the peacePresident. Each phase of his administration represents a distinct aspectof his policy and called into prominence distinct aspects of hischaracter. It is the third, however, which gives to his administrationthe place of importance which it will hold in history; not merely becauseof the stamp which he attempted to place upon the peace, but because thetwo earlier phases are in truth expressive of his whole-hearted devotionto the cause of peace. The tenacity with which he held to neutrality inthe face of intense provocation resulted less from his appreciation ofthe pacific sentiments of the nation, or a desire to assure its economicprosperity, than it did from his instinctive abhorrence of war. Whenfinally forced into war, he based his action upon the hope of securing anew international order which would make war in the future impossible orless frequent. In his mind the war was always waged in order to ensurepeace. 

Whatever his mistakes or successes as neutrality President or warPresident, therefore, it is as peace President that he will be judged byhistory. Inevitably future generations will study with especial attentionthe unfolding of his constructive peace policy, from his declaration ofthe Fourteen Points to the Peace Conference. In reality his policy ofinternational service, to be rendered by the strong nations of the worldin behalf of peace and of absolute justice toward the weaker nations, wasdeveloped all through the year 1916. It was then that he seized upon aLeague of Nations as the essential instrument. But the true significanceof this policy was hardly perceived before the speech of the FourteenPoints, in January, 1918. That speech gave to Wilson his position in theworld, as prëeminent exponent of the new ideals of internationalrelations. 

What the President demanded was nothing new. The principle of justice, asthe underlying basis of intercourse between nations, has received widesupport at all epochs of history; the cause of international peace, as anultimate ideal, has always been advocated in the abstract; the idea of aLeague of Nations has frequently been mooted. But it was Wilson's fate tobe ruler of a great nation at the moment when the need of peace, justice, and international organization was more clearly demonstrated than everbefore in the world's history. Germany's cynical disregard of Belgianindependence, the horrors and waste of the war for which Germany waschiefly responsible, the diplomatic disorganization of Europe, whichpermitted this world disaster, desired by merely a handful offirebrands--all these tragic and pitiful facts had been burned into themind of the age. There was a definite determination that a recurrence ofsuch catastrophes should not be permitted. The period of the war will beregarded by future historians as one of transition from the internationalchaos of the nineteenth century to an organization of nations, which, however loose, should crystallize the conscience of the world, preserveits peace, and translate into international politics the standards ofmorality which have been set up for the individual. 

In this transition President Wilson played a part of the first importance. His rôle was not so much that of the executive leader as of the prophet. He was not the first to catch the significance of the transition, nor didhe possess the executive qualities which would enable him to break downall obstacles and translate ideals into facts. But he alone of the notablestatesmen of the world was able to express adequately the ill-definedhopes of the peoples of all nations. He gave utterance to the words whichthe world had been waiting for, and they carried weight because of hisposition. Alone of the great powers the United States had no selfishdesigns to hide behind fair promises of a better future. As President ofthe United States, Woodrow Wilson might look for the confidence of Europe;there was no European Government which could arouse similar trust. So longas the war lasted, the President's success as a prophet of the ideal wasassured, alike by his ability to voice inarticulate hopes and by reason ofhis position as chief of the most powerful and most disinterested nationof the world. 

But with the end of the war he faced a new task and one which wasinfinitely more difficult. The flush of victory obliterated from the mindsof many in the Allied countries the high ideals which they had nourishedduring the bitterness of the struggle. The moment had arrived whenpractical advantage might be taken from the defeat of the enemy, and itseemed madness to surrender such advantage for the sake of quixoticideals. The statesmen of Europe once more viewed affairs through thecolored prism of national selfishness. In America, where Wilsonian idealshad at best been imperfectly appreciated, men were wearied byinternational problems and longed for a return to the simple complexity ofthe business life which they understood. The President was confronted by adouble problem. He must win from Europe acceptance of his programme, crystallized in the League of Nations; from his fellow countrymen he mustsecure the support necessary if the United States were to continue to playthe rôle in world affairs which she had undertaken during the war, andwhich alone would make possible an effective League of Nations. To meetthe difficulties of the task, President Wilson was imperfectly equipped. He lacked the dynamic qualities of a Roosevelt, which might have enabledhim to carry his opponents off their feet by an overwhelming rush; he wasnot endowed with the tactical genius of a skillful negotiator; he was, above all, handicapped by the personal hostilities which he had aroused athome. 

In Europe the President achieved at least partial success. He provedunable to marshal the forces of liberalism in such a way as to carry hiscomplete programme to victory, and the sacrifices which he made to thespirit of selfish nationalism cost him the support and the confidence ofmany progressive elements, while they did not placate the hostility ofthe reactionaries. But he secured the League of Nations, the symbol andthe instrument of the new international organization which he sought. Thereby at least a beginning was made in concrete form, which might laterbe developed, when the force of the post-bellum reaction had wasteditself. 

At home, however, the forces of opposition proved strong enough to robthe President of what might have been a triumph. He lacked the capacityto reconcile his personal and political opponents, as well as the abilityto compromise with the elements that were inclined to meet him half-way. In accordance with his basic principles he appealed from the politiciansto the people. But here again he failed, whether because of personalunpopularity, or because of the poor publicity which had been given hisefforts at Paris, or because of the physical breakdown which shatteredhis persuasive powers and finally led to his retirement from thestruggle. The vindication which he sought in the presidential election of1920 was denied him. The country was tired of a Democratic Administrationand gave to the Republican candidate an overwhelming plurality. The solecomfort that Wilson could take, in the face of the election returns, wasthat both candidates had declared for the principle of internationalorganization and that the most distinguished supporters of the successfulRepublican candidate had pledged themselves to a League of Nations. 

The months that followed the President's return from Paris until the closeof his administration thus form a period of personal tragedy. He hadachieved a broad measure of success in Europe, where the difficultiesappeared stupendous, only to have the cup dashed from his lips at the lastmoment in his own country. The bitterness of the experience wasintensified by his physical helplessness. But we should lack perspectiveif we made the mistake of confusing personal tragedy with failure. Hiswork remained uncrowned, but there was much that could never be undone. The articulate expression of the hopes of the world, which PresidentWilson voiced during the war, remains imperishable as a guide to this andfuture generations. The League of Nations, weakened by the absence of theUnited States but actually organized and in operation, was the President'swork. Whatever the fortunes of this particular League the steps takentoward international coöperation by its foundation can never be completelyretraced. 

Woodrow Wilson, however, is not to be assessed by his accomplishment. Itis as prophet and not as man of action that he will be regarded byhistory. Like the prophets of old, like Luther or Mazzini, he lacked thecapacity for carrying to practical success the ideal which he preached. But to assume that he must accordingly be adjudged a failure is to ignorethe significance of the ideals to which he awakened the world. Much therewas that was unattainable and intangible, but its value to mankind in thedevelopment of international relations may be inestimable. 

 Not on the vulgar mass Called "work" must sentence pass Things done, that took the eye and had the price.... But all, the world's coarse thumb And finger failed to plumb, So passed in making up the main account; All instincts immature, All purposes unsure, That weighed not as his work, yet swelled the man's amount. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Thus far no adequate biography of President Wilson, covering his careerthrough the Peace Conference, has been published. The most suggestive isHenry Jones Ford's _Woodrow Wilson: The Man and His Work_ (1916) whichstops with the close of the first term. The author, a Princeton professor, is a warm personal and political admirer of the President, but he makes adefinite attempt at critical appreciation. W. E. Dodd's _Woodrow Wilsonand His Work_ (1920) is comprehensive and brings the story to the end ofthe Peace Conference, but it is marred by eulogistic interpretation andanti-capitalistic bias. An interesting effort to interpret the Presidentto British readers in the form of biography has been made by H. W. Harrisin _President Wilson: His Problems and His Policy_ (1917). W. B. Hale, in_The Story of a Style_ (1920), attempts to analyze the motives by whichthe President is inspired. But the best material to serve this end is tobe found in the President's writings, especially _CongressionalGovernment_ (1885), _An Old Master and Other Political Essays_ (1893), _Constitutional Government in the United States_ (1908), _The New Freedom_(1913), _International Ideals_ (1919). The two last-named are collectionsof addresses made in explanation and advocacy of his plans of domestic andinternational reform. The most convenient edition of the President'sofficial writings and speeches is Albert Shaw's _President Wilson's StatePapers and Addresses_ (1918), edited with an analytical index. 

For the period of neutrality a storehouse of facts is to be found in _TheNew York Times Current History_, published monthly. The _American YearBook_ contains a succinct narrative of the events of each year, which maybe supplemented by that in the _Annual Register_ which is written from theBritish point of view. A brief résumé of Wilson's first term is containedin F. A. Ogg's _National Progress_ (1918). More detailed is the firstvolume of J. B. McMaster's _The United States in the World War_ (1918), which is based upon the newspapers and necessarily lacks perspective, butis comprehensive and extremely useful for purposes of reference. Theclearest outline of President Wilson's treatment of foreign affairs is tobe found in E. E. Robinson and V. J. West's _The Foreign Policy ofPresident Wilson, 1913-1917_ (1917). The narrative is brief butinterpretative and is followed by numerous excerpts from the President'sspeeches and state papers. The tone of the narrative is extremelyfavorable and President Wilson is credited with consistency rather thancapacity for development, but the arrangement is excellent. Morecomprehensive is the edition by J. B. Scott, entitled _President Wilson'sForeign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers_ (1918). Johann vonBernstorff's _My Three Years in America_ (1920) is a well-reasonedapologia by the German Ambassador, which contains information of muchvalue; it is not impossible for the critically minded to distinguish thetrue from the false. The description of German criminal activitiescontained in Horst von der Goltz's _My Adventures as a German SecretAgent_ (1917), should be checked up with the report of the SenateCommittee of Inquiry into the German propaganda. _The Real Colonel House_, by A. D. Howden-Smith (1918), throws useful sidelights on Wilson andcontains valuable material on the activities of Colonel House asnegotiator before the entrance into the war of the United States. 

The best general narrative of America's war effort is J. S. Bassett's_Our War with Germany_ (1919); it is clear and succinct, beginning withthe early effects of the war on the United States in 1914, and endingwith the Peace Conference. An interesting, but irritating, account is tobe found in George Creel's _The War, the World and Wilson_ (1920), whichis passionate in its defense of the President, and blurs truth withinaccuracy on almost every page. F. F. Kelly's _What America Did_ (1919)is a brief popular account of the building of the army at home and abroadand the organization of industry: clear, inaccurate, uncritical. The mostconvenient summary of the organization of national resources is F. L. Paxson's "The American War Government, " in _The American HistoricalReview_, October, 1920, which should be supplemented by the _Handbook ofEconomic Agencies for the War of 1917_, monograph No. 3 of the HistoricalBranch, War Plans Division, General Staff (1919). The former containsmany references in footnotes, of which the most important are the _Reportof the Chief of Staff_ (1919) and the _Report of the Provost MarshalGeneral_ (1919). The published _Investigation of the War Department, Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs_ (1918) is invaluableThe most complete information on ordnance is to be found in the report ofGeneral Benedict Crowell, _America's Munitions, 1917-1918_ (1919); it isan official defense and should be read critically. A graphic picture ofAmerican accomplishments is given in L. P. Ayres's _The War with Germany;A Statistical Summary_ (1919). The best account of operations in Franceis still General Pershing's _Report to the Secretary of War_, which isprinted in _New York Times Current History_, January and February, 1920. It may be supplemented by Shipley Thomas's _The History of the A. E. F. _(1920). 

The American point of view on the Peace Conference is set forthauthoritatively in _What Really Happened at Paris_ (1921), a collectionof lectures delivered by members of the American Peace Commission andedited by Edward M. House and Charles Seymour. _Some Problems of thePeace Conference_ (1920), by C. H. Haskins and R. H. Lord, is an accurateand comprehensive analysis of the territorial questions settled at Paris. The British point of view and the most important documents are given in_A History of the Peace Conference of Paris_ (1920), written chiefly byBritish delegates and edited by H. W. V. Temperley. The French point ofview is admirably presented in André Tardieu's _The Truth about theTreaty_ (1921). An excellent picture of the conflict of interests and themanner in which they were decided is to be found in C. T. Thompson's _ThePeace Conference Day by Day_ (1920). Robert Lansing's _The PeaceNegotiations_ (1921) is interesting as giving the opinions of an AmericanCommissioner who disagreed with Mr. Wilson's methods at Paris. J. M. Keynes's _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_ (1920) contains aneconomic analysis which is more trustworthy than his brilliant, butmisleading, picture of the Conference. It should not be read except incompany with the authoritative and accurate _The Making of the Reparationand Economic Clauses_ (1920), by B. M. Baruch. A clever but superficialcriticism of President Wilson's peace policies is to be found in J. M. Beck's _The Passing of the Freedom_ (1920). 

INDEX

Adams, J. Q. , and Monroe Doctrine, 30

Adamson Act, 90

Adriatic coast, Italy's claims on, 311; _see also_ Fiume

Aircraft Production Board, 140

Airplanes, production for army, 134-35, 139-42

Alaska purchased from Russia, 31

Albert, King of Belgium, in Paris, 255

Albert, Dr. H. F. , and the _Wilhelmina_, 43; and German plots, 75; loses portfolio, 76

Algeciras Conference (1906), 34

Alien Property Custodian, 179

Alsace-Lorraine returned to France, 302, 324

American Ambulance in France, 67

American Expeditionary Force, no provision at first for, 121; Pershing sent to France, 122; plans for, 124-25; centralization under Pershing, 148; training in France, 200-02; ports for, 202-03; supply depots, 203; distribution of supplies, 203-04; credit due, 225-27; defects, 226; _see also_ Argonne, Château-Thierry, St. Mihiel

American Federation of Labor, delegates aid in formation of war labor policy, 182

American Protective League, 187

_Ancona_, torpedoed in Mediterranean, 57

_Arabia_, submarine sinks, 56

Archibald, J. F. J. , Dumba makes use of, 77

Argentine, grain not available for Europe, 159

Argonne, foreign artillery used in, 134; plans for advance, 221; defensive importance for Germans, 222; American offensive, 222-23; _see also_ Meuse-Argonne

Arizona offered by Germany as bribe to Mexico, 106

Armaments, Reduction of, guarantees not taken at Paris, 323; League Covenant provides, 324

Armand, Major, discusses separate peace with Austria, 231

_Armenian_, submarine attack, 56

Armistice (Nov. 11, 1918), 224, 228; terms, 243

Army, General Staff, 119-20, 157, 188; American Expeditionary Force, 121, 122, 124 _et seq. _, 148, 200-04, 225-27; _see also_ Argonne, Château-Thierry, St. Mihiel; original programme (1917), 121; Roosevelt's request to command volunteers, 122-23; Selective Service Act, 122, 126-27, 133; National Army, 128; training, 128-29, 130-32; cantonments 129-30 (note); supplies, 129, 132-133, 134-43, 152; democracy of, 134; transportation of troops, 195, 196-97

Australia, grain not available for Europe, 159

Austria, Italy's offensive against, 193; attempts for separate peace with, 231-32; treaty, 317, 321-22; denied right to incorporate with Germany, 322, 326; _see also_ Austria-Hungary

Austria-Hungary, collapse, 224, 228; offers to negotiate on basis of Fourteen Points, 241; subject nationalities receive independence, 324; _see also_ Austria, Hungary

Ayres, L. P. , _The War with Germany_, cited, 142 (note)

Baker, N. D. , Secretary of War, as pacifist, 85-86, 117-18; delays approving machine gun, 137; and Wilson, 153; and coal price agreement, 166-67

Baldwin Locomotive Works, suspected German plot at, 79

Balfour, A. J. , Lloyd George and, 13; in Council of Ten, 270-71

Baltimore, Democratic convention (1912), 7-8

Banat of Temesvar, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, 260

Bapaume, capture of, 192

Bartlett, C. L. , introduces bill in House prohibiting sales to belligerents, 73

Baruch, B. M. , appointment by Wilson, 15; on Council of National Defense, 155; chairman of War Industries Board, 157; at Peace Conference, 259, 276

Belgium, American sympathy for, 38, 73, 114; Wilson's answer to appeal, 40; relief, 67; effect in America of deportation of civilians, 97, 99; Germans rank United States Army with that of, 117; Hoover in, 160; complaint against treaty, 321; treaty provision regarding, 324

Belleau Woods, attack on, 214, 225

Benes, Edward, Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovak Republic, and Council of Ten, 274

Benson, Admiral W. S. , and Daniels, 144

Bernstorff, Johann von, German Ambassador in Washington, 41-42, 75, 106; dismissed, 108

Bethlehem Steel Company, suspected German plots in plant of, 79

Bethmann-Hollweg and submarine warfare, 106

"Big Four, " _see_ Council of Four

Bliss, General T. H. , on Supreme Military Council, 205-206; on Peace Commission, 249

Blockade, British blockade of foodstuffs, 45; as justification of submarine warfare, 53; effect of submarine warfare upon American ports, 110

Bolshevik revolution, 193

Borah, W. E. , against treaty and League of Nations, 330-331, 342; speech-making tour, 339-40

Bordeaux, port allotted American Expeditionary Force, 202, 203

Bosch Magneto Company, German intrigue and, 75

Bourgeois, Léon, on committee to draft plan for League of Nations, 289

Boy-Ed, Karl, German naval attaché, 75; and Mexico, 76; dismissed, 78

Brandegee, F. B. , against treaty and League of Nations, 342

Bratiano, J. J. C. , of Rumania, and Council of Ten, 274

Brest, destroyer base at, 199; port allotted American Expeditionary Force, 202-03; _George Washington_ reaches, 254

Brest-Litovsk treaty, 239

Bridgeport, German manufacturing company at, 75; strikes at, 79

British Grand Fleet, American battleships join, 199

Brockdorff-Rantzau, U. K. C. , graf von, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, 317

Browning machine gun, 137, 138

Brusilov attack, 193

Bryan, W. J. , leader in Democratic convention (1912), 7, 8; resigns as Secretary of State, 53-54; pacifist suggestion, 59; popular with pacifists, 70

Bryn Mawr College, Wilson professor at, 3

Bucharest treaty, 239

Bulgaria, collapse, 224, 228, 241; treaty term regarding, 327

Burleson, A. S. , and Wilson, 18; Postmaster-General, 154

Byng, General, at Cambrai, 193

Caine, Hall, quoted, 105

California and election of Wilson (1916), 92

Cambon, Jules, 276

Cambrai, German lines broken at, 193, 224

Canada, Americans in forces of, 67

Cantigny, engagement at, 211-212

Caporetto, Italian collapse at, 193; Foch commands French forces in Italy after, 207

Carl, Emperor of Austria, desire for separate peace, 232

Carranza, Venustiano, Wilson recognizes, 86; protests American expedition, 87

Carrizal, attack by Carranza's troops at, 87

Cecil, Lord Robert, on committee to draft plan for League of Nations, 289, 290

Chamberlain, G. E. , and preparedness, 82

Château-Thierry, 212-13, 216, 225

Chauchat automatic rifles, 137

Chemical Warfare Service, 143

Chemin des Dames, 210, 212

Chicago, Wilson speaks at, 83

China, American policy toward, 31; accepts Japan's Shantung claim, 315; delegates refuse to sign treaty, 321

Civil War, relations with Great Britain during, 29

Clark, Champ, candidate for Presidential nomination (1912), 8; and conscription, 126

Clayton Act, 90

Clemenceau, Georges, treatment of other French delegates at Paris, 13; signs plea for American troops, 210; and question of indemnity, 281, 300, 301; opposition to Fourteen Points, 251, 252; in Council of Ten, 264-67; languages, 272; on Council of Premiers, 277; helps formulate armistice policy, 278; wounded, 278; and League of Nations, 286-87, 288, 303; ability to conduct plenary sessions, 289; change in attitude towards Wilson, 295; and Fiume, 313

Cleveland, Wilson speaks at, 83

Coal, _see_ Fuel Administration

Coffin, H. E. , chairman Aircraft Production Board, 140; on Council of National Defense, 155

Colleges, Students' Army Training Corps, 131; straw vote on treaty in, 345 (note)

Colt machine gun, 137

Commerce, British Orders in Council to control, 42-43; _see also_ Submarine warfare, United States Shipping Board, War Trade Board

Committee on Engineering and Education, 155-56

Congress, Wilson and, 17, 21, 191; Wilson's appeal for Democratic, 18, 246-47; and arming of merchant vessels, 58-59, 60, 110-11; and note to Germany (April 19, 1916), 61; pacifically-minded, 82; preparedness, 85; Wilson's speech in Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), 103-05; announcement of severance of diplomatic relations with Germany to, 107-08; Wilson's speech (April 2, 1917), 111-13; declares war, 116; and the army, 119, 133; and conscription, 126; appropriation for airplanes, 140; Overman Act, 149, 157, 189, 190; Lever Act, 161, 167; proposes control of military affairs, 188; attacks on Wilson's war policies by Senate, 188-89; Senate and the treaty, 330 _et seq. _; Foreign Relations Committee meets Wilson at White House, 336-37

Conscientious objectors, 133

Conscription, _see_ Draft

Contraband, British interpretation of, 42

Council of Foreign Ministers, 277

Council of Four, 277-80

Council of National Defense, 154 _et seq. _; War Industries Board, 156-59; food conservation, 159-66; fuel conservation, 166-71; Labor Committee, 181; publicity, 186; influence lessened, 187

Council of Premiers, 277

Council of Ten, experts at meetings of, 261; organization of, 262-64; Supreme Council called, 264; meetings, 264, 272-74; personnel, 264-72; and commissions, 275; becomes unwieldy, 278; Wilson leaves League committee to attend, 290

Crillon, Hotel, home of American Commission at Paris, 258

Crowe, Sir Eyre, on territorial commission, 276

Crowell, Benedict, Assistant Secretary of War, quoted, 135

Cuba, interest of United States in, 29; Pershing in, 123

Cunliffe, British financial expert, 300

_Cushing_ attacked by German aeroplane, 49

Czechoslovakia, question of autonomy for Czechs, 232; nationalistic ambitions aroused by treaty, 322; Germans and Magyars in, 327; and the League, 328

Czernin von Chudenitz, Ottokar, count, Austrian Chancellor, 239

Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of Navy, 144

Danzig, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, 260; treaty provision, 326;

Davis, Norman, financial advisor to Peace Commission, 259, 276

"Daylight saving, " 169

Democratic party, Wilson and, 5, 6; convention (1912), 7-8; Wilson makes plea for Democratic Congress, 18, 246-47; foreign policy, 25-26, 35; Wilson and machine leaders, 88

Denman, William, chairman of United States Shipping Board, 175

Dent, S. H. , and conscription, 126

Dernburg, Dr. Bernhard, and German propaganda, 44, 72

Dillon, E. J. , on Wilson, 9-10

Disarmament, _see_ Armaments, Reduction of

Draft, Wilson and, 122, 126; Selective Service Act, 122, 127; National Army, 128; success of, 133; General Staff prepares plans for, 148

Dulles, J. F. , proposes Reparations Commission, 306 (note)

Dumba, Dr. Constantin, Austrian Ambassador at Washington, 77; recall requested, 77-78

Durazzo, navy at, 200

East, Far, American policy regarding, 31-32; _see also_ China, Japan

Embargo, question of embargo on munitions, 43-45, 73

Emergency Fleet Corporation, 175, 176, 178

Emery, H. C. , on German pessimism in June, 1918, 240

Enfield rifles, 139

Entente, American opinion favors, 38; _see also_ Allies, names of countries

Erzberger, Matthias, leader of Reichstag revolt, 229-30

Expeditionary Force, _see_ American Expeditionary Force

Faisal, Emir, Arabian representative at Peace Conference, 261

_Falaba_ sunk by submarine, 49

Fayolle, General, French leader, 206; supports Foch, 208

Fiume, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, 260; question of Italian claim, 261, 312-14, 315-16

Foch, General Ferdinand, Pershing compared with, 123; on gasoline conservation, 170; and American troops, 196, 227; made commander-in-chief of Allied armies, 207; Chemin des Dames, 210; launches counter-offensive (July 18, 1918), 215-216; political movements supplement victories of, 228; movement on Sedan, 241; and armistice, 244; at Peace Conference, 261; and Council of Ten, 273; inspects troops on Rhine, 320

Food Administration, 160-66

Ford, Henry, sends "Peace Ship" to Europe, 74

Fore River shipyards, 176

Förster, Austrian counselor, 232

"Four Minute Men, " 186

Fourteen Points, Wilson introduces, 233-34, 353; discussion of, 234-38; failure of, 238, 280, 322-23; Austria-Hungary offers to negotiate on basis of, 241; Germans accept as basis of negotiations, 242; accepted by Allies, 243, 244, 281; Wilson goes to Paris to defend, 250; Wilson's concessions, 287; territorial settlements carry out, 323-24

France, American Expeditionary Force, _see_ American Expeditionary Force; French army ordered out of Mexico by United States, 29; American cause identical with that of, 37; messages to Wilson, 40; and Wilson's note (Dec. 18, 1916), 102; mission to United States, 122; French officers instruct in American schools, 131; military disappointment (1917), 192; morale low, 193; problem of frontier, 302-03, 306-07, 325-26; complaint against treaty, 321; Alsace-Lorraine returned to, 324

Franco-British-American alliance, 310

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, assassination, 27

Freedom of the seas, one of Fourteen Points, 234; not discussed at Peace Conference, 287, 323

Freya, German line of defense, 223

Fuel Administration, 167-71, 186

Galicia, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, 260

Gardner, A. P. , and preparedness, 82

Garfield, H. A. , Wilson and, 15; Fuel Administrator, 167, 171

Garrison, L. M. , Secretary of War, resigns, 85

Gasoline savings effected by gasless Sundays, 170-71

General Medical Board, 155

General Purchasing Board, 204

General Staff, 119-20, 157, 188

_George Washington_, Wilson's speech on, quoted, 40-41; German boat, 179; Wilson sails on, 253, 254, 329; Wilson and experts on, 260; ordered to Brest, 304

Gerard, J. W. , American Ambassador to Germany, recalled, 108

German-Americans, opposition to Wilson, 70; Wilson and, 79-80, 90, 91; and the treaty, 338

Germany, American sympathy, 37-38; Wilson answer to protest from, 40; Wilson and mediation, 41-42, 99; Great Britain blockades, 42; tries to prevent export of American munitions, 43-45; propaganda in America, 44, 65, 71-74, 186; submarine warfare, 45-46, 47, _et seq. _, 97, 99-100, 106-07, 109-10; Wilson's reply to submarine threat, 46; sinks _Lusitania_, 49-50; _Lusitania_ notes, 54-56; pledges not to sink liners without warning, 56-57; announcement regarding armed merchantmen, 57; _Sussex_ torpedoed, 60; Wilson's note (April 16, 1916), 61-63; opinion of United States, 70, 117; secret intrigue in United States, 74-80; appeal of ninety-three professors, 72; officials dismissed from United States, 78; U-53 off American coast, 97; proposes negotiations (Dec. 12, 1916), 100-01; peace note to, 101-03; warning in Wilson's speech (Jan. 22, 1917), 104; withdraws _Sussex_ pledge, 106; diplomatic relations broken off, 107-08; overt acts, 109-10; publication of plans regarding Mexico and Japan, 111; United States declares war on, 111-14, 116; attack (March 21, 1918), 206; drive along Lys, 209; fourth and last drive (July 15, 1918), 214; requests armistice, 224, 241; abdication of Kaiser, 229; Reichstag revolt (July, 1917), 229-30; negotiations with Russia, 232; Wilson on disposition of colonies, 284; delegates at Peace Conference, 317; protests treaty terms, 317; accepts treaty, 320; responsibility for war, 354

Gibraltar, destroyer base at, 199

Godfrey, Hollis, on Council of National Defense, 155

Goethals, General G. W. , head of Emergency Fleet Corporation, 175

Goltz, von der, plots destruction of Welland Canal, 76

Gompers, Samuel, on Council of National Defense, 155; at Peace Conference, 259

Gore, T. P. , introduces Senate resolution regarding armed merchant vessels, 59

Gori[)c]ar, Dr. Joseph, revelations concerning German intrigue, 78-79

Gough, General, army defeated, 206

Gouraud, General, supports Foch, 208; and German drive of July, 1918, 215

Grandpré, battle around, 223

Great Britain, relations with United States, 29, 33-34, 38; American cause identical with that of, 37; Orders in Council for control of neutral commerce, 42-43; United States disputes shipping rights with, 42-43, 65-66; and Wilson's note (Dec. 18, 1916), 102; and Wilson's speech (Jan. 22, 1917), 105; mission to United States, 122; British officers instruct in American schools, 131; provides transports for troops, 179; American battleships join British Grand Fleet, 199; _see also_ Allies, Lloyd George

Greece, demand for territory, 282; treaty term concerning, 327

Gregory, T. W. , Attorney-General, 154

Grey, Viscount, British Ambassador to United States, letter concerning League, 347

_Gulflight_ sunk by submarine, 49

Haig, Sir Douglas, quoted, 209

Hamburg-American Line, 76

Harvey, Colonel George, mentions Wilson as possible President (1906), 5

Hertling, von, German Chancellor, 238-39

_Hesperian_ sunk by Germans, 57

Hindenburg, General Paul von, retreat on Somme front, 192; line broken, 224

Hitchcock, G. M. , Wilson writes to, 344, 346

Hog Island shipyards, 176

Holland, agents of General Purchasing Board in, 204

Hoover, H. C. , head of Food Administration, 160-64; personal characteristics, 160; and morale, 186; at Peace Conference, 259; and League of Nations, 328, 346

Horn, Werner, plans destruction of bridge at Vanceboro (Maine), 75

House, Colonel E. M. , and Wilson, 12, 18, 49, 260, 334-335; sent to Europe, (1914-15), 47-49; personal characteristics, 47-48; war mission (1917), 194-95; and appointment of a generalissimo, 207; and separate peace with Austria, 231; sent abroad for armistice plan, 241, 242, 278; on Peace Commission, 249; at Peace Conference, 258; and "The Inquiry, " 259-60; suggests territorial commissions, 275-76; and Council of Four, 278-79; and League of Nations Covenant, 290; as mediator between Wilson and Allied leaders, 304

Huerta, Victoriano, German plot to restore, 76; at Vera Cruz, 86

Hughes, C. E. , Republican candidate for Presidency (1916), 91-92

Hughes, W. M. , Premier of Australia, demands German colonies for Allies, 288-89

Hungary, treaty and, 322; and League, 328; _see also_ Austria-Hungary

Hurley, E. N. , chairman of Shipping Board, 176; at Peace Conference, 259

Hurst, C. J. B. , legal expert, 290

Igel, von, German agent, 80

Indemnities, Allies delay raising issue, 244-45; question of German, 296-302; settlement in treaty, 304-06; flaw in treaty regarding, 322; justice of, 325

Initiative and referendum in Oregon, 15

"Inquiry, The, " Colonel House establishes, 260, 276-277

Interallied Board of Supplies, 204

Irish in United States, 29; against Wilson, 59

Italy, offensive against Austria, 193; claims, 310-14; complaint against treaty, 321; annexations, 326-27

Japan, interest of United States in, 31; Roosevelt as peacemaker between Russia and, 34; question of immigration from, 35, 70; German intrigue concerning, 106; delegates in Council of Ten, 271; claims, 310, 315-317; and League Covenant, 314; threatens withdrawal from Conference, 315; demands acceded to, 321

Jefferson, Thomas, policy of non-intervention, 30

Joffre, General, J. J. C. , with mission to United States, 122; battle of the Marne, 207

Johns Hopkins University, Wilson at, 3

Johnson, Hiram, Governor of California, 92; as Senator hostile to League and treaty, 330, 339-40, 342

Jugoslavs, and Wilson, 228-229; Austria counselled to grant autonomy to, 232; application of Treaty of London against, 311; nationalistic ambitions aroused by treaty, 322; placed under Italian rule, 326-27

Julian Alps, Italy's claim, 311

Kahn, Julius, and conscription, 126

Keynes, J. M. , on Wilson, 24

Kiau-Chau, Japan's claim to, 315, 321

Kitchin, Claude, leader of House, and draft, 126

Klotz, French Finance Minister, and indemnities, 300

Knox, P. C. , treaty resolution, 345

_Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, voyage of, 28

Labor, McAdoo's concessions, 174; and German propaganda, 186

Labor Department, reorganization, 181; national war labor policy, 182

La Fayette, Marquis de, emphasis of history on, 38; "La Fayette, we are here!" 123

Lammasch, Austrian liberal, 232

Lamont, T. W. , and Wilson, 12; on Wilson, 12-13 (note); at Peace Conference, 259, 276

Lane, F. K. , Secretary of Interior, 153

Lansdowne, Lord, peace speech (1917), 232

Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State, 58, 153-54; Wilson and, 13, 271; proposes ceasing to arm merchantmen, 58; on Peace Commission, 249; in Council of Ten, 268, 269

Latin America, United States' relations with, 35

League to Enforce Peace, Wilson's speech before, 95; Taft president of, 96; Wilson and, 283

League of Nations, 281 _et seq. _; refusal to discuss (1916), 102; Wilson and, 238, 353; Taft and Root pledged to, 249; Wilson heads commission working on, 275, 276; incorporation in treaty, 286, 287-88, 327; Covenant completed, 290; mechanism, 290-92; revised Covenant adopted, 309; Germany excluded from, 317; opposition to, 330 _et seq. _; reservations suggested by Senate, 334; in operation, 359

Lever Act, 161, 167

_Leviathan_, _Vaterland_ rechristened, 179

Lewis machine gun, 137

Liberty Bonds, 183, 184-186

Liberty Motor, 140

Lloyd George, and Balfour, 13; signs plea for American troops, 210; and separate peace with Austria, 231; outlines terms of peace (1917), 232-33, 236; and indemnity, 244, 281, 300, 301; and Wilson's peace programme, 252; at Peace Conference, 258; in Council of Ten, 269-70; on Council of Premiers, 277; on committee to formulate armistice policy, 278; delays opening of Peace Conference, 285; and League of Nations, 287; and "mandatories, " 289; change in attitude toward Wilson, 295; opposes French annexation of Saar region, 302; and Fiume, 313; on modification of treaty terms, 318, 319

Lodge, H. C. , reservation on Article X of League Covenant, 15; opposition to treaty and League, 330, 333, 335, 339, 342, 344, 345, 347, 348; personal conflict with Wilson, 340, 346

Lorraine front, Americans on, 211

Loucheur, financial expert, 300

Louvain library burned, 73

Ludendorff, General Erich von, German leader, 230, 232, 239, 240

_Lusitania_, Germans sink, 49; effect on America, 50-51, 114; notes, 53, 54, 56; German pledge, 56-57; Germany does not disavow, 57

McAdoo, W. G. , Secretary of Treasury, 153; Director-General of Railroads, 172; concessions to labor, 174; and taxation, 183

McCormick, Vance, Wilson and, 15; heads War Trade Board, 180; at Peace Conference, 259, 276

McCumber, Senator, spokesman in Senate for middle-ground Republicans on treaty, 336, 337, 344

McKinley, William, and declaration of war on Spain, 51; begs for Republican Congress (1898), 246

McLemore, Jeff, introduces House resolution concerning armed merchant vessels, 59

Magyars, and Wilson, 229; prevent separate peace with Austria, 232

_Maine_, sinking of (1898), 51

"Mandatories, " 288

Mangin, General, supports Foch, 208

Mantoux, interpreter for Council of Ten, 272-73

Marne, Foch at battle of the, 207; Germans reach, 210

Martin, F. H. , on Council of National Defense, 155

Masaryk, T. G. , President of Czecho-Slovak Republic, on Wilson, 10

Max, Prince, of Baden, German Chancellor, 241

Merchant vessels, submarine warfare against, 45-46, 57-58; British arm, 57; question of ceasing to arm, 58; question of warning Americans from, 59-60; Wilson asks authority to arm, 110

Meuse-Argonne drive, 124; Browning machine guns used in, 138; _see also_ Argonne

Mexico, United States orders French army from, 29; problem in 1912, 35; relations (1916), 86; expedition against Villa, 87-88, 123; German intrigue, 106, 111

Miller, D. H. , legal expert, 290

Milwaukee, Wilson speaks at, 83

Minnesota, election (1916), 92

Monroe Doctrine, 30-31, 32, 103-04, 309, 334

Montagu, financial expert, 300

Munitions, Ministry of, proposed, 188

Münsterberg, Hugo, 37

National Army, 128; cantonments built, 129-30 (note)

National Guard, 189

National Industrial Conference Board, 182

National Security League, 81, 82

National War Labor Board, 182

Navy, preparedness, 143-45; expansion of, 145-46; convoy troop ships, 197; hunt submarines, 197; Ordnance Bureau manufactures mines, 200; and mine barrage, 200

_Nebraskan_, submarine attack on, 56

Neutrality, 27 _et seq. _, 352-53; bibliography, 362

New Jersey, Wilson as Governor of, 5-7, 21

New Mexico, promised by Germany as bribe to Mexico, 106

New York (State), election (1916), 92

New York City, German press bureau in, 72; Wilson's speech, 294-95

_New York Times_, and election (1916), 92

Nivelle, General R. G. , plans French offensive, 192-93

"Non-intervention, " policy of, 30

North Sea, American battleships in, 199-200

Notes, protest to British Government, 43; warning to Germany of American rights on high seas, 46; _Lusitania_ notes, 53-57, 61; to Germany (April 19, 1916), 61, 107

Officers' training camp, 130-131

Olney, Richard, on American foreign policy, 33

_Orduna_, submarine attack on, 56

Oregon, question of initiative and referendum in, 15

Orlando, V. E. , signs plea for American troops, 210; in Council of Ten, 272; on Council of Premiers, 277; and Fiume claim, 312; retires from Conference, 313; resumes place in Conference, 314

Overman Act, 149, 157, 189, 190

Pacifists, Wilson as pacifist, 39-40; organizations, 73; Ford's "Peace Ship, " 74; oppose preparedness, 81; and Liberty Loans, 187

Paderewski, I. J. , and Council of Ten, 274

Panama Canal, question of tolls, 35

Papen, Franz von, German military attaché, 75, 76; letter to his wife, 77; dismissed, 78

Paris, fears capture (1918), 210; _see also_ Peace Conference

Peace Conference, 254 _et seq. _; Wilson at, 23; American Commission, 248-50; delay in opening, 256-57, 285; lack of organization, 257; atmosphere, 257-58; meets (Jan. 18, 1919), 261; commissions, 275-76; German delegates at, 317; bibliography, 364-65

"Peace Ship, " Henry Ford sends to Europe, 74

_Pennsylvania_, battleship, precedes _George Washington_ out of New York harbor, 253

Peronne, capture of, 192

Pershing, General J. J. , Mexican expedition, 87, 88; commands American Expeditionary Force, 122, 123-24, 148; personal characteristics, 123; calls for replacements, 130; insistent on offensive spirit, 131; and Browning guns, 138; plea for troops, 194, 196; policy, 205; policy shattered, 208-09; confidence in American troops, 211, 222; on Americans at Soissons, 216; and armistice, 244; ready for invasion of Germany, 320

Pétain, General H. P. , Pershing compared with, 123; supports Foch, 207

Philippines, and American foreign policy, 32; problem in 1912, 35; Pershing's experience in, 123

Pichon, Stephane, French Foreign Minister, Council of Ten meets in study of, 264; in Council of Ten, 267

Pittsburgh, Wilson speaks at, 83

Plattsburg (N. Y. ), civilian camp at, 82

Plebiscites, 326; _see also_ Self-determination

Poland, Austria and Poles, 232; claims, 282; nationalistic ambitions aroused by treaty, 322; independence recognized, 324; outlet to sea, 326; and League, 328

Politics, insignificant rôle in Great War, 226; _see also_ Democratic party, Republican party

Pomerene, Atlee, proposes committee of conciliation for treaty, 345

Portugal, Germany ranks American army with that of, 117

Preparedness, 71 _et seq. _; Wilson and, 15, 58, 117, 118; Wood on, 80-81; of army when war declared, 117

Princeton University, Wilson at, 3-5

Progressive party, 92

Propaganda, German, 44, 65, 71-74, 186

_Punch_, cartoon on Wilson's patience, 56

Quai d'Orsay, Peace Conference held at, 261, 310

Queenstown, destroyers sent to, 145, 197, 199

Raggi, Salvago, on territorial commission of Peace Conference, 276

Reading, Lord, refuses mission for separate peace with Austria, 231

Red Cross, American help for, 67

Reparations Commission, 305-306; _see also_ Indemnities

Republican party, and Wilson, 1, 5-6; and election of 1916, 89-92; success (1918), 247

Revertata, Austrian emissary, 231

Rheims cathedral shelled, 73

Rintelen, Franz von, German agent, 80

Roebling wire-rope shop, suspected German plots in, 79

Roosevelt, F. D. , Assistant Secretary of Navy, 144

Roosevelt, Theodore, Wilson contrasted to, 16-17, 18; as peacemaker between Russia and Japan, 34; on America's policy of non-intervention in Europe, 39, 53, 69; Republicans refuse as candidate (1916), 90-91; Wilson refuses volunteer command, 122-23; attack on Wilson's war policies, 188; plea for Republican Congress (1898), 246-47; on making of the peace, 251

Root, Elihu, popular demand for membership on Peace Commission, 249

Rosenwald, Julius, on Council of National Defense, 155

Rumania, enters war, 99; defeat, 100; demand for territory, 282; nationalistic ambitions aroused by treaty, 322; boundaries extended, 327

Russia, Alaska purchased from, 31; Roosevelt as peacemaker between Japan and, 34; in 1916, 100; wheat supply cut off from Europe, 159; Bolshevik revolution, 193; Brusilov attack, 193; negotiations with Germany, 232; Brest-Litovsk treaty, 239; problem unsettled, 322

Ruthenians complain of treaty, 322

Ryan, J. D. , director of aircraft production for army, 142

S. O. S. , _see_ Service of Supply

Saar, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning, 260; French claim, 302, 325; and the League, 328

St. Louis, Wilson speaks at, 83

St. Mihiel, battle, 124, 134, 211, 218, 219-20

St. Nazaire, port allotted to American Expeditionary Force, 202

St. Quentin, American engineering units at, 211; Hindenburg line broken at, 224

Scheidemann, Philipp, German premier, 317

Schwab, C. M. , in charge of Emergency Fleet Corporation, 176, 178

Selective Service Act, 122, 127; _see also_ Draft

Self-determination, principle of, 325; _see also_ Plebiscites

Serbia, relief, 67; demand for territory, 282; treaty term concerning, 327

Service of Supply, 202-05

Shadowlawn, Wilson's speech at, 98

Shantung, Japan's claim, 315-317; Chinese resent settlement, 321

Shipping Board, _see_ United States Shipping Board

Sims, Admiral W. S. , commands destroyer flotillas, 145, 197; personal characteristics, 198; international reputation, 198-99

Smith, James, Democratic boss of New Jersey, Wilson and, 6

Smuts, General, mission to Switzerland in behalf of peace with Austria, 231; and League of Nations, 289, 290; signs treaty, 321

Soissons, American troops at, 216

Somme front, Hindenburg's retreat, 192

Sonnino, S. C. , Baron, Italian Peace Commissioner, 251; opposed Wilson's programme, 252; in Council of Ten, 271-72; languages, 272; and Fiume, 312

Spain, war with, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 51; agent of General Purchasing Board in, 204

Springfield rifle, 138

Stone, W. J. , approves embargo on munitions, 44; supports resolutions concerning armed merchant vessels, 59

Students' Army Training Corps, 131

Submarine warfare, 45, 47 _et seq. _, 105, 106-07, 109-10, 193

Sumner, British financial expert, 300

_Sussex_, torpedoed without warning, 60, 80; pledge, 62, 97; feeling in America regarding, 99; withdrawal of pledge, 106

Switzerland, agent of General Purchasing Board in, 204

Taft, W. H. , attitude toward America's entering war, 53; president of League to Enforce Peace, 96; on National War Labor Board, 182; popular demand for membership on Peace Commission, 249; for compromise on treaty, 346

Tardieu, André, in Council of Ten, 267; on territorial commission, 276; assists House in reconciling Wilson and Allied leaders, 304

Tauscher, Captain Hans, and German plots, 76

Teschen, "The Inquiry" gathers facts concerning mines in, 260

Texas promised by Germany as bribe to Mexico, 106

_Times_, London, Wilson sanctions Britain's position on seas in, 323

Treaty, flaws in, 321-22; Senate and, 330 _et seq. _; _see also_ League of Nations, Peace Conference

Treaty of London, 310-11, 312, 313, 314

Tumulty, J. P. , Wilson and, 18

Turkey, collapse, 224, 228

Tyrol, Italian claim in, 288, 311; Italy granted territory, 326

Underwood, O. W. , motion for ratification of treaty, 344

United States, foreign policy, 30-36; material change due to war (1914-16), 66-68; blindness to war issues, 68; reasons for entering war, 114-15

United States Shipping Board, 175

Vanceboro (Maine), German plot to destroy bridge at, 75

_Vaterland_ rechristened _Leviathan_, 179

Venezuelan crisis, 30

Venizelos, Eleutherios, and Council of Ten, 273-74; member of League of Nations commission, 289; on League, 328

Vera Cruz, occupation of, 86

Vickers machine guns, 137

_Vigilancia_ torpedoed, 111

Villa, Francisco, expedition against, 87, 123

War Industries Board, 156, 188

War Labor Policies Board, 182

War Trade Board, 179, 259

Washington, George, warns against entangling alliances, 28

Welland Canal, German plot to destroy, 75-76

Wesleyan University, Wilson as professor at, 3

White, Henry, at Algeciras Conference, 34; on Peace Commission, 249

_Wilhelmina_, British seize, 43

Willard, Daniel, on Council of National Defense, 155

Wilson, Woodrow, as an executive, 1 _et seq. _; elected President, 1, 8; age, 2; early life, 2; personal characteristics, 2-3, 8 _et seq. _; _Congressional Government_, thesis, 3; Professor at Princeton, 3; graduate work at Johns Hopkins, 3; President of Princeton, 4; enters politics, 5; Governor of New Jersey, 5-7; Presidential nomination, 7-8; Cabinet, 13-14, 153-54; appointments, 13-15; social relations, 17; tactical mistakes, 18, 19-20, 247-48, 292; speeches, 19; as phrase-maker, 19, 51-52; unpopularity, 19-20, 68-70, 89, 245-46, 253, 332, 337-38; political principles, 20-23; religious convictions, 23-24; and foreign affairs, 25-26, 35; and neutrality, 39-41; and mediation, 41-42, 99, 100; and proposed embargo on munitions, 44; answer to German submarine proclamation, 46; and House, 47, 48; diplomatic struggle with Germany, 52-57; and right of merchantmen to arm for defense, 58-60, 110-11; _Sussex_ note to Germany, 61-62; change in foreign policy, 63-65; on German-Americans, 79-80, 90, 91; and preparedness, 81, 82, 84-85, 90, 117-118, 151; speech-making tour (1916), 83-84; and Mexico, 86-88; political strength, 88-89; reëlection (1916), 88-93, 99; development of international ideal, 94-97; speech at Omaha, 98; speech at Shadowlawn, 98; peace note (Dec. 18, 1916), 100, 101-03; demands definition of war aims, 101; speech in Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), 103-05; severs diplomatic relations with Germany, 107-08; speech in Congress (Feb. 3, 1917), 107-09; demand that Congress recognize state of war (April 2, 1917), 111-113; idealism, 113-14, 115, 280; policy of centralization, 119-120, 147-49, 152-53, 188-91; and Pershing, 122, 226; and Roosevelt, 122-23; and draft, 126; proclamation (May 18, 1917), 150-51; on coöperation of people, 156; and Hoover, 160, 161; and Garfield, 167; and revolt in Senate against war policies, 188-189, 190-91; supports appointment of generalissimo, 207; receives plea for troops from Allies, 210; distribution of speeches in Central Empires, 228; Flag Day address, 229; reply to Pope's peace proposals, 230-31; and question of separate peace with Austria, 231; formulates Fourteen Points, 233-38; appeals to peoples of Central Empire, 239-40; Germany requests armistice of, 241; negotiations with Germany, 242; responsibility for armistice, 243; power in situation, 245; appeal for Democratic Congress, 246, 247; appointment of Peace Commission, 248-50; decision to go to Paris, 250, 251-53; Roosevelt on, 251; arrival in Europe, 254; in Paris, 254; in England, 255; in Italy, 255; stands for justice, 255-256, 282; popularity wanes, 256; use of experts, 260; in Council of Ten, 268; and Lloyd George, 270; heads League of Nations commission, 275, 276; on Council of Premiers, 277; and Council of Four, 279, 280; difficulties of task, 281, 284; and indemnities, 281, 296-97; and demands of smaller nationalities, 281-82; and League of Nations, 282-84, 286, 289-90, 310, 343-44, 346, 348-49, 353; on disposition of German colonies, 284, 288; original treaty plan, 285; and Clemenceau, 286-287; British delegates support, 287, 288; and "mandatories, " 288; returns to United States, 290, 292-95; failure to convince America of League's value, 293-95; speech in Metropolitan Opera House, New York City, 294-295; returns to Paris, 295; opposes French annexation of Saar region, 302; French attacks on, 303-04; threatens to leave Conference, 304; compromises, 304-08, 309; and Fiume, 312-13; and Shantung claim, 315, 316-17; on modification of treaty, 318-19; cheered upon Germany's acceptance of treaty, 320; returns to United States, 329; inability to negotiate with Senate, 333-35; conference at White House, 336-37; lack of popular support, 337-38; speech-making tour in West, 339-40; breakdown, 341; and treaty reservations, 341-42, 348; blame for defeat of treaty, 350, 351; phases of administration, 352-53; estimate of achievement, 353-59; bibliography, 361-62

Wood, General Leonard, on unpreparedness of army, 80-81; at Plattsburg, 82; on failure of American airplane production, 142

Works, J. D. , introduces Senate bill prohibiting sale of munitions, 73

_World_, New York, admits Wilson's defeat (1916), 92

_Yarrowdale_, German cruelty to American prisoners on, 111

Yser, battle of the, Foch at, 207

Zeebrugge, naval work at, 200

Zimmermann, A. F. M. , German Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 106, 114