ULSTER'S STAND FOR UNION

by

RONALD McNEILL

With Frontispiece

LondonJohn Murray, Albemarle Street, W. 

1922

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF THE UNIONIST PARTY

PREFACE

The term "Ulster, " except when the context proves the contrary, is usedin this book not in the geographical, but the political meaning of theword, which is quite as well understood. 

The aim of the book is to present an account of what I have occasionallyin its pages referred to as "the Ulster Movement. " The phrase is perhapssomewhat paradoxical when applied to a political ideal which was themaintenance of the _status quo_; but, on the other hand, the steps takenduring a period of years to organise an effective opposition tointerference with the established constitution in Ireland did involve amovement, and it is with these measures, rather than with the policybehind them, that the book is concerned. 

Indeed, except for a brief introductory outline of the historicalbackground of the Ulster standpoint, I have taken for granted, or onlyreferred incidentally to the reasons for the unconquerable hostility ofthe Ulster Protestants to the idea of allowing the government ofIreland, and especially of themselves, to pass into the control of aParliament in Dublin. Those reasons were many and substantial, basedupon considerations both of a practical and a sentimental nature; but Ihave not attempted an exposition of them, having limited myself to anarrative of the events to which they gave rise. 

Having been myself, during the most important part of the periodreviewed, a member of the Standing Committee of the Ulster UnionistCouncil, and closely associated with the leaders of the movement, I havehad personal knowledge of practically everything I have had to record. Ihave not, however, trusted to unaided memory for any statement of fact. It is not, of course, a matter where anything that could be calledresearch was required; but, in addition to the _Parliamentary Reports_, the _Annual Register_, and similar easily accessible books of reference, there was a considerable mass of private papers bearing on the subject, for the use of some of which I am indebted to friends. 

I was permitted to consult the Minute-books of the Ulster UnionistCouncil and its Standing Committee, and also verbatim reports made forthe Council of unpublished speeches delivered at private meetings ofthose bodies. A large collection of miscellaneous documents accumulatedby the late Lord Londonderry was kindly lent to me by the presentMarquis; and I also have to thank Lord Carson of Duncairn for the use ofletters and other papers in his possession. Colonel F. H. Crawford, C. B. E. , was good enough to place at my disposal a very detailed accountwritten by himself of the voyage of the _Fanny_, and the log kept byCaptain Agnew. My friend Mr. Thomas Moles, M. P. , took full shorthandnotes of the proceedings of the Irish Convention and the principalspeeches made in it, and he kindly allowed me to use his transcript. AndI should not like to pass over without acknowledgment the help given meon several occasions by Miss Omash, of the Union Defence League, intracing references. 

R. McN. 

February 1922. 

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

 I. INTRODUCTION: THE ULSTER STANDPOINT

 II. THE ELECTORATE AND HOME RULE

 III. ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP

 IV. THE PARLIAMENT ACT: CRAIGAVON

 V. THE CRAIGAVON POLICY AND THE U. F. V. 

 VI. MR. CHURCHILL IN BELFAST

 VII. "WHAT ANSWER FROM THE NORTH?"

 VIII. THE EXCLUSION OF ULSTER

 IX. THE EVE OF THE COVENANT

 X. THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT

 XI. PASSING THE BILL

 XII. WAS RESISTANCE JUSTIFIABLE?

 XIII. PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PROPAGANDA

 XIV. LORD LOREBURN'S LETTER

 XV. PREPARATIONS AND PROPOSALS

 XVI. THE CURRAGH INCIDENT

 XVII. ARMING THE U. V. F. 

XVIII. A VOYAGE OF ADVENTURE

 XIX. ON THE BRINK OF CIVIL WAR

 XX. ULSTER IN THE WAR

 XXI. NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT

 XXII. THE IRISH CONVENTION

XXIII. NATIONALISTS AND CONSCRIPTION

 XXIV. THE ULSTER PARLIAMENT

APPENDIX

A. NATIONALIST LETTER TO PRESIDENT WILSON

B. UNIONIST LETTER TO PRESIDENT WILSON

INDEX

ULSTER'S STAND FOR UNION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE ULSTER STANDPOINT

Like all other movements in human affairs, the opposition of theNorthern Protestants of Ireland to the agitation of their Nationalistfellow-countrymen for Home Rule can only be properly understood by thosewho take some pains to get at the true motives, and to appreciate thespirit, of those who engaged in it. And as it is nowhere more true thanin Ireland that the events of to-day are the outcome of events thatoccurred longer ago than yesterday, and that the motives of to-day haveconsequently their roots buried somewhat deeply in the past, it is noeasy task for the outside observer to gain the insight requisite forunderstanding fairly the conduct of the persons concerned. 

It was Mr. Asquith who very truly said that the Irish question, of whichone of the principal factors is the opposition of Ulster to Home Rule, "springs from sources that are historic, economic, social, racial, andreligious. " It would be a hopeless undertaking to attempt here to probeto the bottom an origin so complex; but, whether the sympathies of thereader be for or against the standpoint of the Irish Loyalists, theactual events which make up what may be called the Ulster Movement wouldbe wholly unintelligible without some introductory retrospect. Indeed, to those who set out to judge Irish political conditions withouttroubling themselves about anything more ancient than their own memorycan recall, the most fundamental factor of all--the line of cleavagebetween Ulster and the rest of the island--- is more thanunintelligible. In the eyes of many it presents itself as an example ofperversity, of "cussedness" on the part of men who insist on magnifyingmere differences of opinion, which would be easily composed byreasonable people, into obstacles to co-operation which have no realitybehind them. 

Writers and speakers on the Nationalist side deride the idea of "twonations" in Ireland, calling in evidence many obvious identities ofinterest, of sentiment, or of temperament between the inhabitants of theNorth and of the South. The Ulsterman no more denies these identitiesthan the Greek, the Bulgar, and the Serb would deny that there arefeatures common to all dwellers in the Balkan peninsula; but he is moredeeply conscious of the difference than of the likeness between himselfand the man from Munster or Connaught. His reply to those who denouncedthe Irish Government Act of 1920 on the ground that it set up a"partition of Ireland, " is that the Act did not "set up, " but onlyrecognised, the partition which history made long ago, and which wreckedall attempts to solve the problem of Irish Government that neglected totake it into account. If there be any force in Renan's saying that theroot of nationality is "the will to live together, " the Nationalist cryof "Ireland a Nation" harmonises ill with the actual conditions ofIreland north and south of the Boyne. This dividing gulf between the twopopulations in Ireland is the result of the same causes as the politicaldissension that springs from it, as described by Mr. Asquith in wordsquoted above. The tendencies of social and racial origin operate for themost part subconsciously--though not perhaps less powerfully on thataccount; those connected with economic considerations, with religiouscreeds, and with events in political history enter directly andconsciously into the formation of convictions which in turn become themotives for actions. 

In the mind of the average Ulster Unionist the particular point ofcontrast between himself and the Nationalist of which he is moreforcibly conscious than of any other, and in which all otherdistinguishing traits are merged, is that he is loyal to the BritishCrown and the British Flag, whereas the other man is loyal to neither. Religious intolerance, so far as the Protestants are concerned, ofwhich so much is heard, is in actual fact mainly traceable to the samesentiment. It is unfortunately true that the lines of political and ofreligious division coincide; but religious dissensions seldom flare upexcept at times of political excitement; and, while it is undeniablethat the temper of the creeds more resembles what prevailed in Englandin the seventeenth than in the twentieth century, yet when overthostility breaks out it is because the creed is taken--and usually takenrightly--as _prima facie_ evidence of political opinion--politicalopinion meaning "loyalty" or "disloyalty, " as the case may be. The labelof "loyalist" is that which the Ulsterman cherishes above all others. Itmeans something definite to him; its special significance is reinforcedby the consciousness of its wearers that they are a minority; itsustains the feeling that the division between parties is somethingdeeper and more fundamental than anything that in England is calleddifference of opinion. This feeling accounts for much that sometimesperplexes even the sympathetic English observer, and moves the hostilepartisan to scornful criticism. The ordinary Protestant farmer orartisan of Ulster is by nature as far as possible removed from the beingwho is derisively nicknamed the "noisy patriot" or the "flag-waggingjingo. " If the National Anthem has become a "party tune" in Ireland, itis not because the loyalist sings it, but because the dis-loyalist shunsit; and its avoidance at gatherings both political and social whereNationalists predominate, naturally makes those who value loyalty themore punctilious in its use. If there is a profuse display of the UnionJack, it is because it is in Ulster not merely "bunting" for decorativepurposes as in England, but the symbol of a cherished faith. 

There may, perhaps, be some persons, unfamiliar with the Ulster cast ofmind, who find it hard to reconcile this profession of passionateloyalty with the methods embarked upon in 1912 by the Ulster people. Itis a question upon which there will be something to be said when thenarrative reaches the events of that date. Here it need only be statedthat, in the eyes of Ulstermen at all events, constitutional orthodoxyis quite a different thing from loyalty, and that true allegiance tothe Sovereign is by them sharply differentiated from passive obedienceto an Act of Parliament. 

The sincerity with which this loyalist creed is held by practically theentire Protestant population of Ulster cannot be questioned by anyonewho knows the people, however much he may criticise it on other grounds. And equally sincere is the conviction held by the same people thatdisloyalty is, and always has been, the essential characteristic ofNationalism. The conviction is founded on close personal contactcontinued through many generations with the adherents of that politicalparty, and the tradition thus formed draws more support from authentichistory than many Englishmen are willing to believe. Consequently, whenthe General Election of 1918 revealed that the whole of NationalistIreland had gone over with foot, horse, and artillery, with bag andbaggage, from the camp of so-called Constitutional Home Rule, to theSinn Feiners who made no pretence that their aim was anything short ofcomplete independent sovereignty for Ireland, no surprise was felt inUlster. It was there realised that nothing had happened beyond thethrowing off of the mask which had been used as a matter of politicaltactics to disguise what had always been the real underlying aim, if notof the parliamentary leaders, at all events of the great mass ofNationalist opinion throughout the three southern provinces. The wholepopulation had not with one consent changed their views in the course ofa night; they had merely rallied to support the first leaders whom theyhad found prepared to proclaim the true objective. Curiously enough, this truth was realised by an English politician who was in otherrespects conspicuously deficient in insight regarding Ireland. TheEaster insurrection of 1916 in Dublin was only rendered possible by thenegligence or the incompetence of the Chief Secretary; but, in givingevidence before the Commission appointed to inquire into it, Mr. Birrellsaid: "The spirit of what to-day is called Sinn Feinism is mainlycomposed of the old hatred and distrust of the British connection ... Always there as the background of Irish politics and character"; and, after recalling that Cardinal Newman had observed the same state offeeling in Dublin more than half a century before, Mr. Birrell addedquite truly that "this dislike, hatred, disloyalty (so unintelligible tomany Englishmen) is hard to define but easy to discern, though incapableof exact measurement from year to year. " This disloyal spirit, whichstruck Newman, and which Mr. Birrell found easy to discern, was ofcourse always familiar to Ulstermen as characteristic of "the South andWest, " and was their justification for the badge of "loyalist, " theirassumption of which English Liberals, knowing nothing of Ireland, heldto be an unjust slur on the Irish majority. 

If this belief in the inherent disloyalty of Nationalist Ireland to theBritish Empire did any injustice to individual Nationalist politicians, they had nobody but themselves to blame for it. Their pronouncements inAmerica, as well as at home, were scrutinised in Ulster with a care thatEnglishmen seldom took the trouble to give them. Nor must it beforgotten that, up to the date when Mr. Gladstone made Home Rule a plankin an English party's programme--which, whatever else it did, could notalter the facts of the case--the same conviction, held in Ulster sotenaciously, had prevailed almost universally in Great Britain also; andhad been proclaimed by no one so vehemently as by Mr. Gladstone himself, whose famous declarations that the Nationalists of that day were"steeped to the lips in treason, " and were "marching through rapine tothe dismemberment of the Empire, " were not so quickly forgotten inUlster as in England, nor so easily passed over as either meaningless oruntrue as soon as they became inconvenient for a political party toremember. English supporters of Home Rule, when reminded of suchutterances, dismissed with a shrug the "unedifying pastime of unearthingburied speeches"; and showed equal determination to see nothing inspeeches delivered by Nationalist leaders in America inconsistent withthe purely constitutional demand for "extended self-government. "

Ulster never would consent to bandage her own eyes in similar fashion, or to plug her ears with wool. The "two voices" of Nationalist leaders, from Mr. Parnell to Mr. Dillon, were equally audible to her; and, of thetwo, she was certain that the true aim of Nationalist policy wasexpressed by the one whose tone was disloyal to the British Empire. Look-out was kept for any change in the direction of moderation, for anyreal indication that those who professed to be "constitutionalNationalists" were any less determined than "the physical force party"to reach the goal described by Parnell in the famous sentence, "None ofus will be ... Satisfied until we have destroyed the last link whichkeeps Ireland bound to England. "

No such indication was ever discernible. On the contrary, Parnell'sphrase became a refrain to be heard in many later pronouncements of hissuccessors, and the policy he thus described was again and againpropounded in after-years on innumerable Nationalist platforms, inspeeches constantly quoted to prove, as was the contention of Ulsterfrom the first, that Home Rule as understood by English Liberals was nomore than an instalment of the real demand of Nationalists, who, if theyonce obtained the "comparative freedom" of an Irish legislature--toquote the words used by Mr. Devlin at a later date--would then, withthat leverage, "operate by whatever means they should think best toachieve the great and desirable end" of complete independence of GreatBritain. 

This was an end that could not by any juggling be reconciled with theUlsterman's notion of "loyalty. " Moreover, whatever knowledge hepossessed of his country's history--and he knows a good deal more, manfor man, than the Englishman--confirmed his deep distrust of those whom, following the example of John Bright, he always bluntly described as"the rebel party. " He knew something of the rebellions in Ireland in theseventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and was under noillusion as to the design for which arms had been taken up in the past. He knew that that design had not changed with the passing ofgenerations, although gentler methods of accomplishing it mightsometimes find favour. Indeed, one Nationalist leader himself tookpains, at a comparatively recent date, to remove any excuse there mayever have been for doubt on this point. Mr. John Redmond was an oratorwho selected his words with care, and his appeals to historicalanalogies were not made haphazard. When he declared (in a speech in1901) that, "in its essence, the national movement to-day is the same asit was in the days of Hugh O'Neill, of Owen Roe, of Emmet, or of WolfeTone, " those names, which would have had but a shadowy significance fora popular audience in England, carried very definite meaning to the earsof Irishmen, whether Nationalist or Unionist. Mr. Gladstone, in thefervour of his conversion to Home Rule, was fond of allusions to thework of Molyneux and Swift, Flood and Grattan; but these were men whoseIrish patriotism never betrayed them into disloyalty to the BritishCrown or hostility to the British connection. They were reformers, notrebels. But it was not with the political ideals of such men that Mr. Redmond claimed his own to be identical, nor even with that ofO'Connell, the apostle of repeal of the Union, but with the aims of menwho, animated solely by hatred of England, sought to establish thecomplete independence of Ireland by force of arms, and in some cases bycalling in (like Roger Casement in our own day) the aid of England'sforeign enemies. 

In the face of appeals like this to the historic imagination of animpressionable people, it is not surprising that by neither Mr. Redmond's followers nor by his opponents was much account taken of hisown personal disapproval of extremes both of means and ends. Hisopponents in Ulster simply accepted such utterances as confirmation ofwhat they had known all along from other sources to be the actual facts, namely, that the Home Rule agitation was "in its essence" a separatistmovement; that its adherents were, as Mr. Redmond himself said onanother occasion, "as much rebels as their fathers were in 1798"; andthat the men of Ulster were, together with some scattered sympathisersin the other Provinces, the depositaries of the "loyal" tradition. 

The latter could boast of a pedigree as long as that of the rebels. IfMr. Redmond's followers were to trace their political ancestry, as hetold them, to the great Earl of Tyrone who essayed to overthrow Englandwith the help of the Spaniard and the Pope, the Ulster Protestants couldclaim descent from the men of the Plantation, through generation aftergeneration of loyalists who had kept the British flag flying in Irelandin times of stress and danger, when Mr. Redmond's historical heroes weremaking England's difficulty Ireland's opportunity. 

There have been, and are, many individual Nationalists, no doubt, especially among the more educated and thoughtful, to whom it would beunjust to impute bad faith when they professed that their politicalaspirations for Ireland were really limited to obtaining local controlof local affairs, and who resented being called "Separatists, " sincetheir desire was not for separation from Great Britain but for the"union of hearts, " which they believed would grow out of extendedself-government. But the answer of Irish Unionists, especially inUlster, has always been that, whatever such "moderate, " or"constitutional" Nationalists might dream, it would be found inpractice, if the experiment were made, that no halting-place could befound between legislative union and complete separation. Moreover, thesame view was held by men as far as possible removed from the standpointof the Ulster Protestant. Cardinal Manning, for example, although anintimate personal friend of Gladstone, in a letter to Leo XIII, wrote:"As for myself, Holy Father, allow me to say that I consider aParliament in Dublin and a separation to be equivalent to the samething. Ireland is not a Colony like Canada, but it is an integral andvital part of one country. "[1]

It is improbable that identical lines of reasoning led the RomanCatholic Cardinal and the Belfast Orangeman and Presbyterian to thisidentical conclusion; but a position reached by convergent paths fromsuch distant points of departure is defensible presumably on groundsmore solid than prejudice or passion. It is unnecessary here to examinethose grounds at length, for the present purpose is not to argue theUlster case, but to let the reader know what was, as a matter of fact, the Ulster point of view, whether that point of view was well or illfounded. 

But, while the opinion that a Dublin Parliament meant separation wasshared by many who had little else in common with the UlsterProtestants, the latter stood alone in the intensity of their convictionthat "Home Rule meant Rome Rule. " It has already been mentioned that itis the "disloyalty" attributed rightly or wrongly to the Roman Catholicsas a body that has been, in recent times at all events, the mainspringof Protestant distrust. But sectarian feeling, everywhere common betweenrival creeds, is, of course, by no means absent. Englishmen find it hardto understand what seems to them the bigoted and senseless animosity ofthe rival faiths in Ireland. This is due to the astonishing shortness oftheir memory in regard to their own history, and their very limitedoutlook on the world outside their own island. If, without lookingfurther back in their history, they reflected that the "No Popery"feeling in England in mid-Victorian days was scarcely less intense thanit is in Ulster to-day; or if they realised the extent to whichGambetta's "Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi" continues still toinfluence public life in France, they might be less ready to censure theIrish Protestant's dislike of priestly interference in affairs outsidethe domain of faith and morals. It is indeed remarkable thatNonconformists, especially in Wales, who within living memory havedisplayed their own horror of the much milder form of sacerdotalism tobe found in the Anglican Church, have no sympathy apparently with thePresbyterian and the Methodist in Ulster when the latter kick againstthe encompassing pressure of the Roman Catholic priesthood, not ineducational matters alone, but in all the petty activities of every-daylife. 

Whenever this aspect of the Home Rule controversy was emphasisedEnglishmen asked what sort of persecution Irish Protestants had to fearfrom a Parliament in Dublin, and appeared to think all such fearillusory unless evidence could be adduced that the Holy Office was to beset up at Maynooth, equipped with faggot and thumb-screw. Of persecutionof that sort there never has been, of course, any apprehension inmodern times. Individual Catholics and Protestants live side by side inIreland with fully as much amity as elsewhere, but whereas the Catholicinstinctively, and by upbringing, looks to the parish priest as hisdirector in all affairs of life, the Protestant dislikes and resistsclerical influence as strongly as does the Nonconformist in England andWales--and with much better reason. For the latter has never knownclericalism as it exists in a Roman Catholic country where the Church iswholly unrestrained by the civil power. He has resented what he regardsas Anglican arrogance in regard to educational management or the use ofburying-grounds, but he has never experienced a much more aggressiveclerical temper exercised in all the incidents of daily life--in themarket, the political meeting, the disposition of property, theamusements of the people, the polling booth, the farm, and the home. 

This involves no condemnation of the Irish priest as an individual or asa minister of his Church. He is kind-hearted, charitable, andconscientious; and, except that it does not encourage self-reliance andenterprise, his influence with his own people is no more open tocriticism than that of any other body of religious ministers. But theRoman Catholic Church has always made a larger claim than any other onthe obedience of its adherents, and it has always enforced thatobedience whenever it has had the power by methods which, in Protestantopinion, are extremely objectionable. In theory the claim may be limitedto affairs concerned with faith and morals; but the definition of suchaffairs is a very elastic one. Cardinal Logue not many years ago said:"When political action trenches upon faith or morals or affectsreligion, the Vicar of Christ, as the supreme teacher and guardian offaith and morals, and as the custodian of the immunities of religion, has, by Divine Right, authority to interfere and to enforce hisdecisions. " How far this principle is in practice carried beyond thelimits so denned was proved in the famous Meath election petition in1892, in which the Judge who tried it, himself a devout Catholic, declared: "The Church became converted for the time being into a vastpolitical agency, a great moral machine moving with resistlessinfluence, united action, and a single will. Every priest who wasexamined was a canvasser; the canvas was everywhere--on the altar, inthe vestry, on the roads, in the houses. " And while an election was inprogress in County Tyrone in 1911 a parish priest announced that anyCatholic who should vote for the Unionist candidate "would be heldresponsible at the Day of Judgment. " A still more notorious example ofclericalism in secular affairs, within the recollection of Englishmen, was the veto on the Military Service Act proclaimed from the altars ofthe Catholic Churches, which, during the Great War, defeated theapplication to Ireland of the compulsory service which England, Scotland, and Wales accepted as the only alternative to national defeatand humiliation. 

But these were only conspicuous examples of what the Irish Protestantsees around him every day of his life. The promulgation in 1908 of theVatican decree, _Nec Temere_, a papal reassertion of the canonicalinvalidity of mixed marriages, followed as it was by notorious cases ofthe victimisation of Protestant women by the application of itsprinciples, did not encourage the Protestants to welcome the prospect ofa Catholic Parliament that would have control of the marriage law; nordid they any more readily welcome the prospect of national education onpurely ecclesiastical lines. Another Vatican decree that was equallyalarming to Protestants was that entitled _Motu Proprio_, by which anyCatholic layman was _ipso facto_ excommunicated who should have thetemerity to bring a priest into a civil court either as defendant orwitness. Medievalism like this was felt by Ulster Protestants to beirreconcilable with modern ideas of democratic freedom, and to indicatea temper that boded ill for any regime which would be subject to itsinspiration. These were matters, it is true, --and there were perhapssome others of a similar nature--on which it is possible to conceivemore or less satisfactory legislative safeguards being provided; but asregards the indefinable but innumerable minutiae in which the prevailingecclesiastical standpoint creates an atmosphere in which daily life hasto be carried on, no safeguards could be devised, and it was therealisation of this truth in the light of their own experience that madethe Ulstermen continually close their ears to allurements of that sort. 

The Roman Church is quite consistent, and from its own point of viewpraiseworthy, in its assertion of its right, and its duty, to controlthe lives and thoughts of men; but this assertion has produced a clashwith the non-ecclesiastical mind in almost every country, whereCatholicism is the dominant religious faith. But in Ireland, unlikeContinental countries, there is no Catholic lay opinion--or almostnone--able to make its voice heard against clerical dictation, andconsequently the Protestants felt convinced, with good reason, that anylegislature in Ireland must take its tone from this pervading mental andmoral atmosphere, and that all its proceedings would necessarily betainted by it. 

Prior to 1885 the political complexion of Ulster was in the mainLiberal. The Presbyterians, who formed the majority of the Protestantpopulation, collateral descendants of the men who emigrated in theeighteenth century and formed the backbone of Washington's army, anddirect descendants of those who joined the United Irishmen in 1798, wereof a pronounced Liberal type, and their frequently strong disapproval ofOrangeism made any united political action an improbable occurrence. Butthe crisis brought about by Gladstone's declaration in favour of HomeRule instantly swept all sections of Loyalists into a single camp. Therewas practically not a Liberal left who did not become Unionist, and, although a separate organisation of Liberal Unionists was maintained, the co-operation with Conservatives was so whole-hearted and complete asalmost to amount to fusion from the outset. 

The immediate cessation of class friction was still more remarkable. Formore than a decade the perennial quarrel between landlord and tenant hadbeen increasing in intensity, and the recent land legislation haddisposed the latter to look upon Gladstone as a deliverer. Theirgratitude was wiped out the moment he hoisted the green flag, while thelabourers enfranchised by the Act of 1884 eagerly enrolled themselvesas the bitterest enemies of his new Irish policy. The unanimity of thecountry-side was matched in the towns, and especially in Belfast, where, with the single exception of a definitely Catholic quarter, employer andartisan were as whole-heartedly united as were landlord and tenant inpassionate resentment at what they regarded as the betrayal by England'sforemost statesman of England's only friends in Ireland. 

The defeat of the Home Rule Bill of 1886 brought relief from theimmediate strain of anxiety. But it was at once realised that theencouragement and support given to Irish disloyalty for the first timeby one of the great political parties in Great Britain was a step thatcould never be recalled. Henceforth the vigilance required to preventbeing taken unawares, and the untiring organisation necessary for makingeffective defence against an attack which, although it had signallyfailed at the first onslaught, was certain to be renewed, welded all thepreviously diverse social and political elements in Ulster into a singlecompact mass, tempered to the maximum power of resistance. There wasroom for no other thought in the minds of men who felt as if living in abeleaguered citadel, whose flag they were bound in honour to keep flyingto the last. The "loyalist" tradition acquired fresh meaning andstrength, and its historical setting took a more conscious hold on thepublic mind of Ulster, as men studied afresh the story of the Relief ofDerry or the horrors of 1641. Visits of encouragement from the leadersof Unionism across the Channel, men like Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Randolph Churchill, fortified the resolution of apopulace that came more and more to regard themselves as a bulwark ofthe Empire, on whom destiny, while conferring on them the honour ofupholding the flag, had imposed the duty of putting into actual practicethe familiar motto of the Orange Lodges--"No surrender. "

From a psychology so bred and nourished sprang a political temper which, as it hardened with the passing years, appeared to English Home Rulersto be "stiff-necked, " "bigoted, " and "intractable. " It certainly was astate of mind very different from those shifting gusts of transientimpression which in England go by the name of public opinion; and, ifthese epithets in the mouths of opponents be taken as no more thansynonyms for "uncompromising, " they were not undeserved. At a memorablemeeting at the Albert Hall in London on the 22nd of April, 1893, Dr. Alexander, Bishop of Derry, poet, orator, and divine, declared in aneloquent passage that was felt to be the exact expression of Ulsterconviction, that the people of Ulster, when exhorted to show confidencein their southern fellow-countrymen, "could no more be confiding aboutits liberty than a pure woman can be confiding about her honour. "

Here was the irreconcilable division. The Nationalist talked ofcenturies of "oppression, " and demanded the dissolution of the Union inthe name of liberty. The Ulsterman, while far from denying themisgovernment of former times, knew that it was the fruit of false ideaswhich had passed away, and that the Ireland in which he lived enjoyed asmuch liberty as any land on earth; and he feared the loss of the trueliberty he had gained if put back under a regime of Nationalist andUtramontane domination. And so for more than thirty years the people ofUlster for whom Bishop Alexander spoke made good his words. If in theend compromise was forced upon them it was not because their standpointhad changed, and it was only in circumstances which involved nodishonour, and which preserved them from what they chiefly dreaded, subjection to a Dublin Parliament inspired by clericalism and disloyaltyto the Empire. 

The development which brought about the change from Ulster's resolutestand for unimpaired union with Great Britain to her reluctantacceptance of a separate local constitution for the predominantlyProtestant portion of the Province, presents a deeply interestingillustration of the truth of a pregnant dictum of Maine's on the workingof democratic institutions. 

"Democracies, " he says, "are quite paralysed by the plea of nationality. There is no more effective way of attacking them than by admitting theright of the majority to govern, but denying that the majority soentitled is the particular majority which claims the right. "[2]

This is precisely what occurred in regard to Ulster's relation to GreatBritain and to the rest of Ireland respectively. The will of themajority must prevail, certainly. But what majority? Unionistsmaintained that only the majority in the United Kingdom could decide, and that it had never in fact decided in favour of repealing the Act ofUnion; Lord Rosebery at one time held that a majority in Great Britainalone, as the "Predominant Partner, " must first give its consent; IrishNationalists argued that the majority in Ireland, as a distinct unit, was the only one that should count. Ulster, whilst agreeing with thegeneral Unionist position, contended ultimately that her own majoritywas as well entitled to be heard in regard to her own fate as themajority in Ireland as a whole. To the Nationalist claim that Irelandwas a nation she replied that it was either two nations or none, andthat if one of the two had a right to "self-determination, " the otherhad it equally. Thus the axiom of democracy that government is by themajority was, as Maine said, "paralysed by the plea of nationality, "since the contending parties appealed to the same principle withouthaving any common ground as to how it should be applied to the case indispute. 

If the Union with Great Britain was to be abrogated, which Pitt had onlyestablished when "a full measure of Home Rule" had produced a bloodyinsurrection and Irish collusion with England's external enemies, Ulstercould at all events in the last resort take her stand on AbrahamLincoln's famous proposition which created West Virginia: "A minority ofa large community who make certain claims for self-government cannot, inlogic or in substance, refuse the same claims to a much largerproportionate minority among themselves. "

The Loyalists of Ulster were successful in holding this second line, when the first was no longer tenable; but they only retired from thefirst line--the maintenance of the legislative union--after a long andobstinate defence which it is the purpose of the following pages torelate. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Henry Edward Manning_, by Shane Leslie, p. 406. 

[2] Sir S. H. Maine, _Popular Government_, p. 28. 

CHAPTER II

THE ELECTORATE AND HOME RULE

We profess to be a democratic country in which the "will of the people"is the ultimate authority in determining questions of policy, and theLiberal Party has been accustomed to regard itself as the most zealousguardian of democratic principles. Yet there is this curious paradox inrelation to the problem which more than any other taxed Britishstatesmanship during the thirty-five years immediately following theenfranchisement of the rural democracy in 1884, that the solutionpropounded by the Liberal Party, and inscribed by that party on theStatute-book in 1914, was more than once emphatically rejected, and hasnever been explicitly accepted by the electorate. 

No policy ever submitted to the country was more decisively condemned atthe polls than Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule proposals in the GeneralElection of 1886. The issue then for the first time submitted to thepeople was isolated from all others with a completeness scarcely everpracticable--a circumstance which rendered the "mandate" to Parliamentto maintain the legislative union exceptionally free from ambiguity. Theparty which had brought forward the defeated proposal, although led by astatesman of unrivalled popularity, authority, and power, was shatteredin the attempt to carry it, and lost the support of numbers of its mostconspicuous adherents, including Chamberlain, Hartington, Goschen, andJohn Bright, besides a multitude of its rank and file, who entered intopolitical partnership with their former opponents in order to withstandthe new departure of their old Chief. 

The years that followed were a period of preparation by both sides forthe next battle. The improvement in the state of Ireland, largely theresult of legislation carried by Lord Salisbury's Government, especiallythat which promoted land purchase, encouraged the confidence felt byUnionists that the British voter would remain staunch to the Union. Thedownfall of Parnell in 1890, followed by the break-up of his party, andby his death in the following year, seemed to make the danger of HomeRule still more remote. The only disquieting factor was the personalityof Mr. Gladstone, which, the older he grew, exercised a more and moreincalculable influence on the public mind. And there can be no doubtthat it was this personal influence that made him, in spite of hispolicy, and not because of it, Prime Minister for the fourth time in1892. In Great Britain the electors in that year pronounced against HomeRule again by a considerable majority, and it was only by coalition withthe eighty-three Irish Nationalist Members that Gladstone and his partywere able to scrape up a majority of forty in support of his second HomeRule Bill. Whether there was any ground for Gladstone's belief that butfor the O'Shea divorce he would have had a three-figure majority in 1892is of little consequence, but the fall of his own majority in Midlothianfrom 4, 000 to below 700, which caused him "intense chagrin, "[3] does notlend it support. Lord Morley says Gladstone was blamed by some of hisfriends for accepting office "depending on a majority not large enoughto coerce the House of Lords"[4]; but a more valid ground of censure wasthat he was willing to break up the constitution of the United Kingdom, although a majority of British electors had just refused to sanctionsuch a thing being done. That Gladstone's colleagues realised full wellthe true state of public opinion on the subject, if he himself did not, was shown by their conduct when the Home Rule Bill, after being carriedthrough the House of Commons by diminutive majorities, was rejected onsecond reading by the Peers. Even their great leader's entreaty couldnot persuade them to consent to an appeal to the people[5]; and whenthey were tripped up over the cordite vote in 1895, after Gladstone haddisappeared from public life, none of them probably were surprised atthe overwhelming vote by which the constituencies endorsed the action ofthe House of Lords, and pronounced for the second time in ten yearsagainst granting Home Rule to Ireland. 

If anything except the personal ascendancy of Gladstone contributed tohis small coalition majority in 1892 it was no doubt the confidence ofthe electors that the House of Lords could be relied upon to prevent thepassage of a Home Rule Bill. It is worth noting that nearly twenty yearslater Lord Crewe acknowledged that the Home Rule Bill of 1893 could nothave stood the test of a General Election or of a Referendum. [6]

During the ten years of Unionist Government from 1895 to 1905 thequestion of Home Rule slipped into the background. Other issues, such asthose raised by the South African War and Mr. Chamberlain's tariffpolicy, engrossed the public mind. English Home Rulers showed adisposition to hide away, if not to repudiate altogether, the legacythey had inherited from Gladstone. Lord Rosebery acknowledged thenecessity to convert "the predominant partner, " a mission which everypassing year made appear a more hopeless undertaking. At by-electionsHome Rule was scarcely mentioned. In the eyes of average Englishmen thequestion was dead and buried, and most people were heartily thankful tohear no more about it. Mr. T. M. Healy's caustic wit remarked that "HomeRule was put into cold storage. "[7]

Then came the great overthrow of the Unionists in 1906. Home Rule, except by its absence from Liberal election addresses, contributednothing at all to that resounding Liberal victory. The battle of"terminological inexactitudes" rang with cries of Chinese "slavery, "Tariff Reform, Church Schools, Labour Dispute Bills, and so forth; buton Ireland silence reigned on the platforms of the victors. The eventwas to give the successors of Mr. Gladstone a House of Commons incomplete subjection to them. For the first time since 1885 they had amajority independent of the Nationalists, a majority, if ever there wasone, "large enough to coerce the House of Lords, " as they would havedone in 1893, according to Lord Morley, if they had had the power. Butto do that would involve the danger of having again to appeal to thecountry, which even at this high tide of Liberal triumph they could notface with Home Rule as an election cry. So, with the tame acquiescenceof Mr. Redmond and his followers, they spent four years of unparalleledpower without laying a finger on Irish Government, a course which wasrendered easy for them by the fact that, on their own admission, theyhad found Ireland in a more peaceful, prosperous, and contentedcondition than it had enjoyed for several generations. Occasionally, indeed, as was necessary to prevent a rupture with the Nationalists, some perfunctory mention of Home Rule as a _desideratum_ of the futurewas made on Ministerial platforms--by Mr. Churchill, for example, atManchester in May 1909. But by that date even the contest over TariffReform--which had raged without intermission for six years, and byrending the Unionist Party had grievously damaged it as an effectiveinstrument of opposition--had become merged in the more immediatelyexciting battle of the Budget, provoked by Mr. Lloyd George's financialproposals for the current year, and by the possibility that they mightbe rejected by the House of Lords. This the House of Lords did, on the30th of November, 1909, and the Prime Minister at once announced that hewould appeal to the country without delay. 

Such a turn of events was a wonderful windfall for the IrishNationalists, beyond what the most sanguine of them can ever have hopedfor. The rejection of a money Bill by the House of Lords raised ademocratic blizzard, the full force of which was directed against theconstitutional power of veto possessed by the hereditary Chamber inrelation not merely to money Bills, but to general legislation. For along time the Liberal Party had been threatening that part of theConstitution without much effect. Sixteen years had passed since Mr. Gladstone in his last speech in the House of Commons declared thatissue must be joined with the Peers; but the emphatic endorsement by theconstituencies in 1895 of the Lords' action which he had denounced, followed by ten years of Unionist Government, damped down the ardour ofattack so effectually that, during the four years in which the Liberalsenjoyed unchallengeable power, from 1906 to 1910, they did nothing tocarry out Gladstone's parting injunction. Had they done so at any timewhen Home Rule was a living issue in the country an attack on the Lordswould in all probability have proved disastrous to themselves. For therewas not a particle of evidence that the electors of Great Britain hadchanged their minds on this subject, and there were great numbers ofvoters in the country--those voters, unattached to party, who constitute"the swing of the pendulum, " and decide the issue at GeneralElections--who felt free to vote Liberal in 1906 because they believedHome Rule was practically dead, and if revived would be again given its_quietus_, as in 1893, by the House of Lords. But the defeat of theBudget in November 1909 immediately opened a line of attack whollyunconnected with Ireland, and over the most favourable ground that couldhave been selected for the assault. 

Nothing could have been more skilful than the tactics employed by theLiberal leaders. Concentrating on the constitutional question raised bythe alleged encroachment of the Lords on the exclusive privilege of theCommons to grant supply, they tried to excite a hurricane of popularfury by calling on the electorate to decide between "Peers and People. "The rejected Finance Bill was dubbed "The People's Budget. " A "BudgetLeague" was formed to expatiate through the constituencies on thedemocratic character of its provisions, and on the personal and classselfishness of the Peers in throwing it out. As little as possible wassaid about Ireland, and probably not one voter in ten thousand who wentto the poll in January 1910 ever gave a thought to the subject, ordreamed that he was taking part in reversing the popular verdict of 1886and 1895. Afterwards, when it was complained that an election soconducted had provided no "mandate" for Home Rule, it was found that inthe course of a long speech delivered by Mr. Asquith at the Albert Hallon the 10th of December there was a sentence in which the Prime Ministerhad declared that "the Irish problem could only be solved by a policywhich, while explicitly safeguarding the supreme authority of theImperial Parliament, would set up self-government in Ireland in regardto Irish affairs. " The rest of the speech dealt with Tariff Reform andwith the constitutional question of the House of Lords, on which thepublic mind was focused throughout the election. 

In the unprecedented deluge of oratory that flooded the country in themonth preceding the elections the Prime Minister's sentence on Irelandat the Albert Hall passed almost unnoticed in English and Scottishconstituencies, or was quickly lost sight of, like a coin in acornstack, under sheaves of rhetoric about the dear loaf and theintolerable arrogance of hereditary legislators. Here and there aUnionist candidate did his best to warn a constituency that everyLiberal vote was a vote for Home Rule. He was invariably met with animpatient retort that he was attempting to raise a bogey to divertattention from the iniquity of the Lords and the Tariff Reformers. HomeRule, he was told, was dead and buried. 

On the 19th of January, 1910, when the elections were over in theboroughs, Mr. Asquith claimed that "the great industrial centres hadmainly declared for Free Trade, " and the impartial chronicler of the_Annual Register_ stated that "the Liberals had fought on Free Trade andthe constitutional issue. " The twice-repeated decision of the countryagainst Home Rule for Ireland was therefore in no sense reversed by theGeneral Election of January 1910. 

But from the very beginning of the agitation over the Budget and theaction of the House of Lords in relation to it, in the summer of 1909, the gravity of the situation so created was fully appreciated by bothpolitical parties in Ireland itself. Only the most languid interest wasthere taken in the questions which stirred the constituencies acrossthe Channel. Neither Nationalist nor Unionist cared anything whateverfor Free Trade; neither of them shed a tear over the rejected Budget. Indeed, Mr. Lloyd George's new taxes were so unpopular in Ireland thatMr. Redmond was violently attacked by Mr. William O'Brien and Mr. Healyfor his neglect of obvious Irish interests in supporting the Government. Mr. Redmond, for his part, made no pretence that his support was givenbecause he approved of the proposals for which he and his followers gavetheir votes in every division. The clauses of the Finance Bill weretrifles in his eyes that did not matter. His gaze was steadily fixed onthe House of Peers, which he saw before him as a huntsman views a foxwith bedraggled brush, reduced to a trot a field or two ahead of thehounds. That House was, as he described it, "the last obstacle to HomeRule, " and he was determined to do all he could to remove the obstacle. Lord Rosebery said at Glasgow in September 1909 that he believedMinisters wanted the House of Lords to reject the Budget. Whether theydid or not, there can be no doubt that Mr. Redmond did, for he knewthat, in that event, the whole strength of the Liberal Party would bedirected to the task of beating down the "last obstacle, " and that thenit would be possible to carry Home Rule without the Britishconstituencies being consulted. It was with this end in view that hetook his party into the lobby in support of a Budget that was detestedin Ireland, and threw the whole weight of his influence in Britishconstituencies on to the Liberal side in the elections of January 1910. 

But, notwithstanding the torrent of class prejudice and democraticpassion that was stirred up by six weeks of Liberal oratory, the resultof the elections was a serious loss of strength to the Government. Thecommanding Liberal majority of 1906 over all parties in the House ofCommons disappeared, and Mr. Asquith and his Cabinet were once moredependent on a coalition of Labour Members and Nationalists. TheLiberals by themselves had a majority of two only over the Unionists, who had won over one hundred seats, so that the Nationalists wereeasily in a position to enforce their leader's threat to make Mr. Asquith "toe the line. "

When the Parliament elected in January 1910 assembled disputes arosebetween the Government and the Nationalists as to whether priority wasto be given to passing the Budget rejected in the previous session, orto the Parliament Bill which was to deprive the House of Lords of itsconstitutional power to reject legislation passed by the Commons; andMr. Redmond expressed his displeasure that "guarantees" had not yet beenobtained from the King, or, in plain language, that a promise had notbeen extorted from the Sovereign that he would be prepared to create asufficient number of Peers to secure the acceptance of the ParliamentBill by the Upper House. 

The whole situation was suddenly changed by the death of King Edward inMay 1910. Consideration for the new and inexperienced Sovereign led tothe temporary abandonment of coercion of the Crown, and resort was hadto a Conference of party leaders, with a view to settlement of thedispute by agreement. But no agreement was arrived at, and theConference broke up on the 10th of November. Parliament was againdissolved in December, "on the assumption, " as Lord Crewe stated, "thatthe House of Lords would reject the Parliament Bill. "

During the agitation of this troubled autumn preceding the GeneralElection, the question of Home Rule was not quite so successfullyconcealed from view as in the previous year. The Liberals, indeed, maintained the same tactical reserve on the subject, alike in theirwritings and their speeches. The Liberal Press of the period may besearched in vain for any clear indication that the electors were aboutto be asked to decide once more this momentous constitutional question. Such mention of it as was occasionally to be found in ministerialspeeches seemed designed to convey the idea that, while the door leadingto Home Rule was still formally open, there was no immediate prospect ofits being brought into use. The Prime Minister in particular dideverything in his power to direct the attention of the country to thesame issues as in the preceding January, among which Ireland had had noplace. In presenting the Government's case at Hull on the 25th ofNovember, he reminded the country that in the January elections the vetoof the Peers was "the dominant issue"; in the intervening months theGovernment, he said, had brought forward proposals for dealing with theveto, and had given the Lords an opportunity to make proposals of theirown; a defeat of the Liberals in the coming elections would bring in"Protection disguised as Tariff Reform"; but he (Mr. Asquith) preferredto concentrate his criticism on Lord Lansdowne's "crude and complexscheme" for Second Chamber reform; he made a passing mention of"self-government for Ireland" as a policy that would have the sympathyof the Dominions, but added that "the immediate task was to secure fairplay for Liberal legislation and popular government. " And in hiselection address Mr. Asquith declared that "the appeal to the countrywas almost narrowed to a single issue, and on its determination hung thewhole future of democratic Government. "

This zeal for "popular, " or "democratic" government was, however, notinconsistent apparently with a determination to avoid at all hazardsconsulting the will of the people, before doing what the people hadhitherto always refused to sanction. The suggestion had been madeearlier in the autumn that a Referendum, or "Poll of the People" mightbe taken on the question of Home Rule. The very idea filled the Liberalswith dismay. Speaking at Edinburgh on the 2nd of December, Mr. LloydGeorge, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, made the curiously naiveadmission, for a "democratic" politician, that the Referendum wouldamount to "a prohibitive tariff against Liberalism. " A few days earlierat Reading (November 29th) his Chief sought to turn the edge of thisdisconcerting proposal by asking whether the Unionists, if returned topower, would allow Tariff Reform to be settled by the same mode ofappeal to the country; and when Mr. Balfour promptly accepted thechallenge by promising that he would do so Mr. Asquith retreated undercover of the excuse that no bargain had been intended. 

While the Liberal leaders were thus doing all they could to hold downthe lid of the Home Rule Jack-in-the-box, the Unionists were warning thecountry that as soon as Mr. Asquith secured a majority his thumb wouldrelease the spring. Speakers from Ulster carried the warning into manyconstituencies, but it was noticed that they were constantly met withthe same retort as in January--that Home Rule was a "bogey, " or a "redherring" dragged across the trail of Tariff Reform and the Peers' veto;and it is a significant indication of the straits to which theGovernment afterwards felt themselves driven to find justification fordealing with so fundamental a question as the repeal of the Unionwithout the explicit approval of the electorate, that they devised thestrange doctrine that speeches by their opponents provided them with amandate for a policy about which they had themselves kept silence, evenalthough those speeches had been disbelieved and derided on the veryground that it would be impossible for Ministers to bring forward apolicy they had not laid before the country during the election. 

The extent to which this ministerial reserve was carried was shown by aquestion put to Mr. Asquith in his own constituency in East Fife on the6th of December. Scottish "hecklers" are intelligent and well informedon current politics, and no one who knows them can imagine one of themasking the Prime Minister whether he intended to introduce a Home RuleBill if Home Rule had been proclaimed as one of the chief items in thepolicy of the Government. Mr. Asquith gave an affirmative reply; but theelections were by this time half over, and in the following week Mr. Balfour laid stress on the fact that five hundred contests had beendecided before any Minister had mentioned Home Rule. Even after givingthis memorable answer in East Fife Mr. Asquith, speaking at Bury St. Edmunds on the 12th of December, declared that "the sole issue at thatmoment was the supremacy of the people, " and he added, in deprecation ofall the talk about Ireland, that "it was sought to confuse this issue bycatechising Ministers on the details of the next Home Rule Bill. "

Even if this had been, as it was not, a true description of theattempts that had been made to extract a frank declaration from theGovernment as to their intentions in regard to this vitally importantmatter--far more important to hundreds of thousands of people than anyquestion of Tariff, or of limiting the functions of the Second Chamber--it was surely a curious doctrine to be propounded by a statesmanzealous to preserve "popular government "! There had been two Home RuleBills in the past, differing one from the other in not a few importantrespects; discussion had shown that many even of those who supported theprinciple of Home Rule objected strongly to this or that proposal forembodying it in legislation Language had been used by Mr. Asquithhimself, as well as by some of his principal colleagues, which impliedthat any future Home Rule Bill would be part of a general scheme of"devolution, " or federation, or "Home Rule All Round"--a solution of thequestion favoured by many who hotly opposed separate treatment forIreland Yet here was the responsible Minister, in the middle of aGeneral Election, complaining that the issue was being "confused" bypresumptuous persons who wanted to know what sort of Home Rule, if any, he had in contemplation in the event of obtaining a majority sufficientto keep him in power. 

Under such circumstances it would have been a straining ofconstitutional principles, and a flagrant violation of the canons ofthat "democratic government" of which Mr Asquith had constituted himselfthe champion, to pass a Home Rule Bill by means of a majority soobtained, even if the majority had been one that pointed to a sweepingturnover of public opinion to the side of the Government The electionsof December 1910, in point of fact, gave no such indication. TheGovernment gained nothing whatever by the appeal to the country. Liberals and Unionists came back in almost precisely the same strengthas in the previous Parliament. They balanced each other within a coupleof votes in the new House of Commons, and the Ministry could not haveremained twenty-four hours in office except in coalition with Labour andthe Irish Nationalists. 

The Parliament so elected and so constituted was destined not merely todestroy the effective power of the House of Lords, and to place on theStatute-book a measure setting up an Irish Parliament in Dublin, but tobe an assembly longer in duration and more memorable in achievement thanany in English history since the Long Parliament. During the eight yearsof its reign the Great War was fought and won; the "rebel party" inIreland once more, as in the Napoleonic Wars, broke into armedinsurrection in league with the enemies of England; and before it wasdissolved the political parties in Great Britain, heartily supported bythe Loyalists of Ulster, composed the party differences which had ragedwith such passion over Home Rule and other domestic issues, and joinedforces in patriotic resistance to the foreign enemy. 

But before this transformation took place nearly four years of agitationand contest had to run their course. In the first session of theParliament, by a violent use of the Royal Prerogative, the ParliamentBill became law, the Peers accepting the measure under duress of thethreat that some four or five hundred peerages would, if necessary, becreated to form a majority to carry it. It was then no longer possiblefor the Upper House to force an appeal to the country on Home Rule, asit had done in 1893. All that was necessary was for a Bill to be carriedin three successive sessions through the House of Commons, to becomelaw. "The last obstacle to Home Rule, " as Mr. Redmond called it, hadbeen removed. The Liberal Government had taken a hint from the procedureof the careful burglar, who poisons the dog before breaking into thehouse. 

The significance of the manner in which the Irish question had been keptout of view of the electorate by the Government and their supporters wasnot lost upon the people of Ulster. In January 1911, within a month ofthe elections, a meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council was held atwhich a comprehensive resolution dealing with the situation that hadarisen was adopted, and published as a manifesto. One of its clauseswas:

 "The Council has observed with much surprise the singular reticence as regards Home Rule maintained by a large number of Radical candidates in England and Scotland during the recent elections, and especially by the Prime Minister himself, who barely referred to the subject till almost the close of his own contest. In view of the consequent fact that Home Rule was not at the late appeal to the country placed as a clear issue before the electors, it is the judgment of the Council that the country has given no mandate for Home Rule, and that any attempt in such circumstances to force through Parliament a measure enacting it would be for His Majesty's Ministers a grave, if not criminal, breach of constitutional duty. "

The great importance, in relation to the policy subsequently pursued byUlster, of the historical fact here made clear--namely, that the "willof the people" constitutionally expressed in parliamentary elections hasnever declared itself in favour of granting Home Rule to Ireland, lies, first, in the justification it afforded to the preparations for activeresistance to a measure so enacted; and, secondly, in the influence ithad in procuring for Ulster not merely the sympathy but the open supportof the whole Unionist Party in Great Britain. Lord Londonderry, one ofUlster's most trusted leaders, who afterwards gave the whole weight ofhis support to the policy of forcible resistance, admitted in the Houseof Lords in 1911, in the debates on the Parliament Bill, that theverdict of the country, if appealed to, would have to be accepted. Theleader of the Unionist Party, Mr. Bonar Law, made it clear in February1914, as he had more than once stated before, that the support he andhis party were pledging themselves to give to Ulster in the strugglethen approaching a climax, was entirely due to the fact that theelectorate had never sanctioned the policy of the Government againstwhich Ulster's resistance was threatened. The chance of success in thatresistance "depended, " he said, "upon the sympathy of the Britishpeople, and an election would undoubtedly make a great difference inthat respect"; he denied that Mr. Asquith had a "right to pass any formof Home Rule without a mandate from the people of this country, whichhe has never received"; and he categorically announced that "if you getthe decision of the people we shall obey it. " And if, as then appearedlikely, the unconstitutional conduct of the Government should lead tobloodshed in Ireland, the responsibility, said Mr. Bonar Law, would betheirs, "because you preferred to face civil war rather than face thepeople. "[8]

FOOTNOTES:

[3] Morley's _Life of Gladstone_, in, 492. 

[4] Ibid. , 493. 

[5] Ibid. , 505. 

[6] _Annual Register_, 1910, p. 240. 

[7] See _Letters to Isabel_, by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, p. 130. 

[8] _Parliamentary Debates_ (5th Series), vol. I viii, pp. 279-84. 

CHAPTER III

ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP

From the day when Gladstone first made Home Rule for Ireland the leadingissue in British politics, the Loyalists of Ulster--who, as alreadyexplained, included practically all the Protestant population of theProvince both Conservative and Liberal, besides a small number ofCatholics who had no separatist sympathies--set to work to organisethemselves for effective opposition to the new policy. In the hour oftheir dismay over Gladstone's surrender Lord Randolph Churchill, hurrying from London to encourage and inspirit them, told them in theUlster Hall on the 22nd of February, 1886, that "the Loyalists in Ulstershould wait and watch--organise and prepare. "[9] They followed hisadvice. Propaganda among themselves was indeed unnecessary, for no onerequired conversion except those who were known to be inconvertible. Thechief work to be done was to send speakers to British constituencies;and in the decade from 1885 to 1895 Ulster speakers, many of whom wereministers of the different Protestant Churches, were in request onEnglish and Scottish platforms. 

A number of organisations were formed for this purpose, some of which, like the Irish Unionist Alliance, represented Unionist opinionthroughout Ireland, and not in Ulster alone. Others were exclusivelyconcerned with the northern Province, where from the first theopposition was naturally more concentrated than elsewhere. In the earlydays, the Ulster Loyalist and Patriotic Union, organised by LordRanfurly and Mr. W. R. Young, carried on an active and sustained campaignin Great Britain, and the Unionist Clubs initiated by Lord Templetownprovided a useful organisation in the smaller country towns, which stillexists as an effective force. The Loyal Orange Institution, founded atthe end of the eighteenth century to commemorate, and to keep alive theprinciples of, the Whig Revolution of 1688, had fallen into notunmerited disrepute prior to 1886. Few men of education or standingbelonged to it, and the lodge meetings and anniversary celebrations hadbecome little better than occasions for conviviality wholly inconsistentwith the irreproachable formularies of the Order. But its system oflocal Lodges, affiliated to a Grand Lodge in each county, supplied theready-made framework of an effective organisation. Immediately after theintroduction of Gladstone's first Bill in 1886 it received an immenseaccession of strength. Large numbers of country gentlemen, clergymen ofall Protestant denominations, business and professional men, farmers, and the better class of artisans in Belfast and other towns, joined thelocal Lodges, the management of which passed into capable hands; thecharacter of the Society was thereby completely and rapidly transformed, and, instead of being a somewhat disreputable and obsolete survival, itbecame a highly respectable as well as an exceedingly powerful politicalorganisation, the whole weight of whose influence has been on the sideof the Union. 

A rallying cry was given to the Ulster Loyalists in the famous phrasecontained in a letter from Lord Randolph Churchill to a correspondent inMay 1886: "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right. " From this timeforward the idea that resort to physical resistance would be preferableto submission to a Parliament in Dublin controlled by the "rebel party"took hold of the popular mind in Ulster, although after the elections of1886 there was no serious apprehension that the necessity would arise, until the return to power of Mr. Gladstone at the head of a smallmajority in 1892 brought about a fresh crisis. 

The work of organisation was then undertaken with greater energy andthoroughness than before. It was now that Lord Templetown founded theUnionist Clubs, which spread in an affiliated network through Ulster, and proved so valuable that, after falling into neglect during the tenyears of Conservative Government, they were revived at the specialrequest of the Ulster Unionist Council in December 1910. Nothing, however, did so much to stimulate organisation and concentration ofeffort as the great Convention held in Belfast on the 19th of June 1892, representing on a democratic basis all the constituencies in Ulster. Numerous preliminary meetings were arranged for the purpose of electingthe delegates; and of these the Special Correspondent of _The Times_wrote:

 "Nothing has struck me more in the present movement than the perfect order and regularity with which the preliminary meetings for the election of delegates has been conducted. From city and town and village come reports of crowded and enthusiastic gatherings, all animated by an equal ardour, all marked by the same spirit of quiet determination. There has been no 'tall talk, ' no over-statement; the speeches have been dignified, sensible, and practical. One of the most marked features in the meetings has been the appearance of men who have never before taken part in public life, who have never till now stood on a public platform. Now for the first time they have broken with the tranquil traditions of a lifetime, and have come forward to take their share and their responsibility in the grave danger which threatens their country. "[10]

There being no building large enough to hold the delegates, numberingnearly twelve thousand, every one of whom was a registered voterappointed by the polling districts to attend the Convention, a pavilion, the largest ever used for a political meeting in the kingdom, wasspecially constructed close to the Botanical Gardens in Belfast. Itcovered 33, 000 square feet, and, owing to the enthusiasm of the workmenemployed on the building, it was erected (at a cost of over £3, 000)within three weeks. It provided seating accommodation for 13, 000 people, but the number who actually gained admittance to the Convention wasnearly 21, 000, while outside an assemblage, estimated by thecorrespondent of _The Times_ at 300, 000, was also addressed by theprincipal speakers. 

The commencement of the proceedings with prayer, conducted by thePrimate of all Ireland and the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, seta precedent which was extensively followed in later years throughoutUlster, marking the spirit of seriousness which struck numerousobservers as characteristic of the Ulster Movement. The speakers weremen representative of all the varied interests of the Province---religious, agricultural, commercial, and industrial--and among them weretwo men, Mr. Thomas Sinclair and Mr. Thomas Andrews, who had beenlife-long Liberals, but who from this time forward were distinguishedand trusted leaders of Unionist opinion in Ulster. It was Mr. Andrewswho touched a chord that vibrated through the vast audience, making themleap to their feet, cheering for several minutes. "As a last resource, "he cried, "we will be prepared to defend ourselves. " But the climax ofthis memorable assembly was reached when the chairman, the Duke ofAbercorn, with upraised arm, and calling on the audience solemnly torepeat the words one by one after him, gave out what became for thefuture the motto and watchword of Ulster loyalty: "We will not have HomeRule. " It was felt that this simple negation constituted a solemn vowtaken by the delegates, both for themselves and for those theyrepresented--an act of self-dedication to which every loyal man andwoman in Ulster was committed, and from which there could be no turningback. 

The principal Resolution, adopted unanimously by the Convention, formulated the grounds on which the people of the Province based theirhostility to the separatist policy of Home Rule; and as frequentreference was made to it in after-years as an authoritative definitionof Ulster policy, it may be worth while to recall its terms:

 "That this Convention, consisting of 11, 879 delegates representing the Unionists of every creed, class, and party throughout Ulster, appointed at public meetings held in every electoral division of the Province, hereby solemnly resolves and declares: 'That we express the devoted loyalty of Ulster Unionists to the Crown and Constitution of the United Kingdom; that we avow our fixed resolve to retain unchanged our present position as an integral portion of the United Kingdom, and protest in the most unequivocal manner against the passage of any measure that would rob us of our inheritance in the Imperial Parliament, under the protection of which our capital has been invested and our homes and rights safeguarded; that we record our determination to have nothing to do with a Parliament certain to be controlled by men responsible for the crime and outrages of the Land League, the dishonesty of the Plan of Campaign, and the cruelties of boycotting, many of whom have shown themselves the ready instruments of clerical domination; that we declare to the people of Great Britain our conviction that the attempt to set up such a Parliament in Ireland will inevitably result in disorder, violence, and bloodshed, such as have not been experienced in this century, and announce our resolve to take no part in the election or proceedings of such a Parliament, the authority of which, should it ever be constituted, we shall be forced to repudiate; that we protest against this great question, which involves our lives, property, and civil rights, being treated as a mere side-issue in the impending electoral struggle; that we appeal to those of our fellow countrymen who have hitherto been in favour of a separate Parliament to abandon a demand which hopelessly divides Irishmen, and to unite with us under the Imperial Legislature in developing the resources and furthering the best interests of our common country. '"

There can be no doubt that the Ulster Convention of 1892, and thenumerous less imposing demonstrations which followed on both sides ofthe Channel and took their tone from it, of which the most notable wasthe great meeting at the Albert Hall in London on the 22nd of April, 1893, had much effect in impressing and instructing public opinion, andthus preparing the way for the smashing defeat of the Liberal Home RuleParty in the General Election of 1895. After that event vigilance againrelaxed during the ten years of Unionist predominance which followed. But the organisation was kept intact, and its democratic method ofappointing delegates in every polling district provided a permanentelectoral machinery for the Unionist Party in the constituencies, aswell as the framework for the Ulster Unionist Council, which was broughtinto existence in 1905, largely through the efforts of Mr. WilliamMoore, M. P. For North Armagh. This Council, with its executive StandingCommittee, was thenceforward the acknowledged authority for determiningall questions of Unionist policy in Ulster. 

Its first meeting was held on the 3rd of March, 1905, under thepresidency of Colonel James McCalmont, M. P. For East Antrim. The firstten members of the Standing Committee were nominated by ColonelSaunderson, M. P. , as chairman of the Ulster Parliamentary Party. Theywere, in addition to the chairman himself, the Duke of Abercorn, theMarquis of Londonderry, the Earl of Erne, the Earl of Ranfurly, ColonelJames McCalmont, M. P. , the Hon. R. T. O'Neill, M. P. , Mr. G. Wolff, M. P. , Mr. J. B. Lonsdale, M. P. , and Mr. William Moore, K. C. , M. P. Thesenominations were confirmed by a ballot of the members of the Council, and twenty other members were elected forthwith to form the StandingCommittee. This first Executive Committee of the organisation which forthe next fifteen years directed the policy of Ulster Unionism includedseveral names that were from this time forward among the most prominentin the movement. There were the two eminent Liberals, Mr. ThomasSinclair and Mr. Thomas Andrews, and Mr. John Young, all three of whomwere members of the Irish Privy Council; Colonel R. H. Wallace, C. B. , Mr. W. H. H. Lyons, and Sir James Stronge, leaders of the Orangemen; ColonelSharman-Crawford, Mr. E. M. Archdale, Mr. W. J. Allen, Mr. R. H. Reade, andSir William Ewart. Among several "Unionist candidates for Ulsterconstituencies" who were at the same meeting co-opted to the Council, wefind the names of Captain James Craig and Mr. Denis Henry, K. C. The Dukeof Abercorn accepted the position of President of the Council, and Mr. E. M. Archdale was elected chairman of the Standing Committee. Mr. T. H. Gibson was appointed secretary. In October 1906 the latter resigned hispost owing to failing health, and, on the motion of Mr. William Moore, M. P. , Mr. Richard Dawson Bates, a solicitor practising in Belfast, was"temporarily" appointed to fill the vacancy. This temporary appointmentwas never formally made permanent, but no question in regard to thesecretaryship was ever raised, for Mr. Bates performed the duties yearafter year to the complete satisfaction of everyone connected with theorganisation, and in a manner that earned the gratitude of all UlsterUnionists. The funds at the disposal of the Council in 1906 only enableda salary of £100 a year to be paid to the secretary--a salary that waspurely nominal in the case of a professional gentleman of Mr. Bates'sstanding; but the spirit in which he took up his duties was seen twoyears later, when it was found that out of this salary he had himselfbeen paying for clerical assistance; and then, of course, this matterwas properly adjusted, which the improved financial position of theCouncil happily rendered possible. 

The declared purpose of the Ulster Unionist Council was to form a unionof all local Unionist Associations in Ulster; to keep the latter inconstant touch with their parliamentary representatives; and "to be themedium of expressing Ulster Unionist opinion as current events may fromtime to time require. " It consisted at first of not more than 200members, of whom 100 represented local Associations, and 50 representedthe Orange Lodges, the remaining 50 being made up of Ulster members ofboth Houses of Parliament and of certain "distinguished residents in ornatives of Ulster" to be co-opted by the Council. As time went on theCouncil was considerably enlarged, and its representative characterimproved. In 1911 the elected membership was raised to 370, and includedrepresentatives of local Associations, Orange Lodges, Unionist Clubs, and the Derry Apprentice Boys. In 1918 representatives of the Women'sAssociations were added, and the total elected membership was increasedto 432. The delegates elected by the various constituent bodies were inthe fullest sense representative men; they were drawn from all classesof the population; and, by the regularity with which they attendedmeetings of the Council whenever business of any importance was to betransacted, they made it the most effective political organisation inthe United Kingdom. 

A campaign of public meetings in England and Scotland conducted jointlyby the Ulster Unionist Council and the Irish Unionist Alliance in 1908led to a scheme of co-operation between the two bodies, the onerepresenting Unionists in the North and the other those in the southernProvinces, which worked smoothly and effectively. A joint Committee ofthe Unionist Associations of Ireland was therefore formed in the sameyear, the organisations represented on it being the two already namedand the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union. The latter, which in earlieryears had done excellent spade-work under the fostering zeal of LordRanfurly and Mr. William Robert Young, was before 1911 amalgamated withthe Unionist Council, so that all rivalry and overlapping wasthenceforward eliminated from the organisation of Unionism in Ulster. The Council in the North and the Irish Unionist Alliance in Dublinworked in complete harmony both with each other and with the UnionDefence League in London, whose operations were carried on under thedirection of its founder, Mr. Walter Long. 

The women of Ulster were scarcely less active than the men in the matterof organisation. Although, of course, as yet unenfranchised, they tookas a rule a keener interest in political matters--meaning thereby theone absorbing question of the Union--than their sex in other parts ofthe United Kingdom. When critical times for the Union arrived there was, therefore, no apathy to be overcome by the Protestant women in Ulster. Early in 1911 the "Ulster Women's Unionist Council" was formed under thepresidency of the Duchess of Abercorn, and very quickly became a mosteffective organisation side by side with that of the men. The leadingspirit was the Marchioness of Londonderry, but that it was noaristocratic affair of titled ladies may be inferred from the fact thatwithin twelve months of its formation between forty and fifty thousandmembers were enrolled. A branch in Mr. Devlin's constituency of WestBelfast, which over four thousand women joined in its first month ofexistence, of whom over 80 per cent, were mill-workers and shop-girls inthe district, held a very effective demonstration on the 11th ofJanuary, 1912, at which Mr. Thomas Sinclair, the most universallyrespected of Belfast's business men, made one of his many tellingspeeches which familiarised the people with the commercial and financialaspects of Home Rule, as it would be felt in Ulster. The central Women'sCouncil followed this up with a more imposing gathering in the UlsterHall on the 18th, which adopted with intense enthusiasm the declaration:"We will stand by our husbands, our brothers, and our sons, in whateversteps they may be forced to take in defending our liberties against thetyranny of Home Rule. "

Thus before the end of 1911 men and women alike were firmly organised inUlster for the support of their loyalist principles. But the mosteffective organisation is impotent without leadership. Among thedeclared "objects" of the Ulster Unionist Council was that of acting "asa connecting link between Ulster Unionists and their parliamentaryrepresentatives. " In the House of Commons the Ulster Unionist Members, although they recognised Colonel Edward Saunderson, M. P. , as theirleader until his death in 1906, did not during his lifetime, or for someyears afterwards, constitute a separate party or group. When ColonelSaunderson died the Right Hon. Walter Long, who had held the office ofChief Secretary in the last year of the Unionist Administration, and whohad been elected for South Dublin in 1906, became leader of the IrishUnionists--with whom those representing Ulster constituencies wereincluded. But in the elections of January 1910 Mr. Long was returned fora London seat, and it therefore became necessary for Irish Unionists toselect another leader. 

By this time the Home Rule question had, as the people of Ulsterperceived, become once more a matter of vital urgency, although, asexplained in the preceding chapter, the electors of Great Britain weretoo engrossed by other matters to give it a thought, and the LiberalMinisters were doing everything in their power to keep it in thebackground. The Ulster Members of the House of Commons realised, therefore, the grave importance of finding a leader of the calibrenecessary for dealing on equal terms with such orators andParliamentarians as Mr. Asquith and Mr. John Redmond. They did notdeceive themselves into thinking that such a leader was to be foundamong their own number. They could produce several capable speakers, andmen of judgment and good sense; but something more was needed for thecritical times they saw ahead. After careful consideration, they took astep which in the event proved to be of momentous importance, and ofextreme good fortune, for the enterprise that the immediate future hadin store for them. Mr. J. B. Lonsdale, Member for Mid Armagh, Hon. Secretary of the Irish Unionist Parliamentary Party, was deputed torequest Sir Edward Carson, K. C. , to accept the leadership of the IrishUnionist party in the House of Commons. 

Several days elapsed before they received an answer; but when it came itwas, happily for Ulster, an acceptance. It is easy to understand SirEdward Carson's hesitation before consenting to assume the leadership. After carrying all before him in the Irish Courts, where he had been LawOfficer of the Crown, he had migrated to London, where he had beenSolicitor-General during the last six years of the UnionistAdministration, and by 1910 had attained a position of supremacy at theEnglish Bar, with the certain prospect of the highest legal advancement, and with an extremely lucrative practice, which his family circumstancesmade it no light matter for him to sacrifice, but which he knew it wouldbe impossible for him to retain in conjunction with the political dutieshe was now urged to undertake. Although only in his fifty-seventh year, he was never one of those who feel younger than their age; nor did heminimise in his own mind the disability caused by his too frequentphysical ailments, which inclined him to shrink from embarking uponfresh work the extent and nature of which could not be exactly foreseen. As to ambition, there are few men who ever were less moved by it, but hecould not leave altogether out of consideration his firmconviction--which ultimately proved to have been ill-founded--thatacceptance of the Ulster leadership would cut him off from allpromotion, whether political or legal. [11]

Moreover, although for the moment it was the leadership of aparliamentary group to which he was formally invited, it was obviousthat much more was really involved; the people in Ulster itself neededguidance in the crisis that was visibly approaching. Ever since LordRandolph Churchill, with the concurrence of Lord Salisbury, firstinspired them in 1886 with the spirit of resistance in the last resortto being placed under a Dublin Parliament, and assured them of Britishsympathy and support if driven to that extremity, the determination ofUlster in this respect was known to all who had any familiarity with thetemper of her people. Any man who undertook to lead them at such ajuncture as had been reached in 1910 must make that determination thestarting-point of his policy. It was a task that would require not onlystatesmanship, but political courage of a high order. Lord RandolphChurchill, in his famous Ulster Hall speech, had said that "noportentous change such as the repeal of the Union, no change sogigantic, could be accomplished by the mere passing of a law; thehistory of the United States will teach us a different lesson. " Ulsteralways took her stand on the American precedent, though the exemplar wasLincoln rather than Washington. But although the scale of operationswas, of course, infinitely smaller, the Ulster leader would, if it cameto the worst, be confronted by certain difficulties from which AbrahamLincoln was free. He might have to follow the example of the latter inforcibly resisting secession, but his legal position would be verydifferent. He might be called upon to resist technically legalauthority, whereas Lincoln had it at his back. To guide and control aheadstrong people, smarting under a sense of betrayal, when entering ona movement pregnant with these issues, and at the same time to stand upagainst a powerful Government on the floor of the House of Commons, wasan enterprise upon which any far-seeing man might well hesitate toembark. 

Pondering over the invitation conveyed to him in his Chambers in theTemple, Carson may, therefore, well have asked himself what inducementthere was for him to accept it. He was not an Ulsterman. As a Southernerhe was not familiar with the psychology of the northern Irish; thesectarian narrowness popularly attributed to them outside their provincewas wholly alien to his character; he was as far removed by nature froma fire-eater as it was possible for man to be; he was not fond ofunnecessary exertion; he preferred the law to politics, and dislikedaddressing political assemblies. In Parliament he represented, not apopular constituency, but the University of Dublin. But, on the otherhand, he was to the innermost core of his nature an Irish Loyalist. Hisyouthful political sympathies had, indeed, been with the Liberal Party, but he instantly severed his connection with it when Gladstone joinedhands with Parnell. He had made his name at the Irish Bar as CrownProsecutor in the troubled period of Mr. Balfour's Chief Secretaryship, and this experience had bred in him a hearty detestation of the whiningsentimentality, the tawdry and exaggerated rhetoric, and themanufactured discontent that found vent in Nationalist politics. Asincere lover of Ireland, he had too much sound sense to credit thenotion that either the freedom or the prosperity of the country would beincreased by loosening the tie with Great Britain. Although he as yetknew little of Ulster, he admired her resolute stand for the Union, herpassionate loyalty to the Crown; he watched with disgust the way inwhich her defences were being sapped by the Liberal Party in England;and the thought that such a people were perhaps on the eve of beingdriven into subjection to the men whose character he had had so muchopportunity to gauge in the days of the Land League filled him withindignation. 

If, therefore, he could be of service in helping to avert so great awrong Sir Edward Carson came to the conclusion that it would be shirkinga call of duty were he to decline the leadership that had been offeredhim. Realising to the full all that it meant for himself--inevitablesacrifice of income, of ease, of chances of promotion, a burden ofresponsibility, a probability of danger--he gave his consent; and theday he gave it--the 21st of February, 1910--should be marked for alltime as a red-letter day in the Ulster calendar. 

FOOTNOTES:

[9] _Lord Randolph Churchill_, by the Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, vol. Ii, p. 62. 

[10] _The Times_, June 16th, 1892. 

[11] He expressed this conviction to the author in 1911. 

CHAPTER IV

THE PARLIAMENT ACT: CRAIGAVON

A good many months were to elapse before the Unionist rank and file inUlster were brought into close personal touch with the new leader of theIrish Unionist Parliamentary Party. The work to be done in 1910 laychiefly in London, where the constitutional struggle arising out of therejection of the "People's Budget" was raging. But shortly before theGeneral Election of December a demonstration was held in the Ulster Hallin Belfast, in the hope of opening the eyes of the English and Scottishelectors to the danger of Home Rule. Mr. Walter Long was the principalspeaker, and Sir Edward Carson, in supporting the resolution, ended hisspeech by quoting Lord Randolph Churchill's famous jingling phrase, "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right. "

On the 31st of January, 1911, when the elections were over, he went overfrom London to preside at an important meeting of the Ulster UnionistCouncil. The Annual Report of the Standing Committee, in welcoming hissuccession to Mr. Long in the leadership, spoke of his requiring nointroduction to Ulstermen; and it is true that he had occasionallyspoken at meetings in Belfast, and that his recent speech in the UlsterHall had made an excellent impression. But he was not yet a reallyfamiliar figure even in Belfast, while outside the city he waspractically unknown, except of course by repute. That a man of hissagacity would quickly make his weight felt was never in doubt; but fewat that time can have anticipated the extent to which a stranger--withan accent proclaiming an origin south of the Boyne--was in a short timeto captivate the hearts, and become literally the idolised leader, ofthe Ulster democracy. 

For the latter are a people who certainly do not wear their hearts ontheir sleeves for daws to peck at. In the eyes of the more volatilesouthern Celts they seem a "dour" people. They are naturally reserved, laconic of speech, without "gush, " far from lavish in compliment, slowto commit themselves or to give their confidence without good and provedreason. 

Opportunity for the populace to get into closer touch with the leaderdid not, however, come till the autumn. He was unable to attend theOrange celebration on the 12th of July, when the anniversary, whichpreceded by less than a month the "removal of the last obstacle to HomeRule" by the passing of the Parliament Act, was kept with more than theusual fervour, and the speeches proved that the gravity of the situationwas fully appreciated. The Marquis of Londonderry, addressing an immenseconcourse of Belfast Lodges, stated that it was the first time anEx-Viceroy had been present at an Orange gathering, but that he haddeliberately created the precedent owing to his sense of the dangerthreatening the Loyalist cause. 

It was the first of innumerable similar actions by which LordLondonderry identified himself whole-heartedly with the popularmovement, throwing aside all the conventional restraints of rank andwealth, and thereby endearing himself to every man and woman inProtestant Ulster. There was no more familiar figure in the streets ofBelfast. Barefooted street urchins, catching sight of him on the stepsof the Ulster Club, would gather round and, with free-and-easyfamiliarity, shout "Three cheers for Londonderry. " He knew everybody andwas everybody's friend. There was no aristocratic hauteur or aloofnessabout his genial personality. He was in the habit of entertaining thewhole Unionist Council, some five hundred strong, at luncheon or dinneras the occasion required, when important meetings of the delegates tookplace. Distinguished political visitors from England could always beinvited over without thought for their entertainment, since a welcome atMount Stewart was never wanting. His financial support of the politicalmovement was equally open-handed. 

But, helpful as were his hospitality and his subscriptions, it was thecountenance and support of a man who had held high Cabinet office, andespecially the great position of Viceroy of Ireland, that made LordLondonderry's full participation an asset of incalculable value to thecause he espoused. Moreover, while he was always ready to cross theChannel, even if for a few hours only, when wanted for any conference orpublic meeting, never pleading his innumerable social and politicalengagements in London or the North of England as an excuse for absence, his natural modesty of character made it easy for him to act under theleadership of another. Indeed, he underrated his own abilities; butthere are probably not many men of his prominence and antecedents who, if similarly placed, would have been able to give, without a trace of_amour-propre, _ to a leader who had in former years been his ownofficial subordinate, the consistently loyal backing that LordLondonderry gave to Sir Edward Carson. 

But, although there never was the slightest friction between the twomen, a difference of opinion between them on an important point showeditself within a few months of Carson's acceptance of the leadership. InJuly 1911 the excitement over the Parliament Bill reached its climax. When the Government announced that the King had given his assent to thecreation of whatever number of peerages might be required for carryingthe measure through the Upper House, the party known as "Die Hards" werefor rejecting it and taking the consequences; while against this policywere ranged Lord Lansdowne, Lord Curzon, and other Unionist leaders, whoadvocated the acceptance of the Bill under protest. On the 20th of JulyCarson told Lansdowne that in his judgment "the disgrace and ignominy ofsurrender on the question far outweighed any temporary advantage" to begained by the two years' delay of Home Rule which the Parliament Billwould secure. [12] Lord Londonderry, on the other hand, supported theview taken by Lord Lansdowne, and he voted with the majority who carriedthe Bill on the 10th of August. This step temporarily clouded hispopularity in Ulster, but not many weeks passed before he completelyregained the confidence and affection of the people, and the differenceof opinion never in the smallest degree interrupted the harmony of hisrelations with Sir Edward Carson. 

The true position of affairs in relation to Home Rule had not yet beengrasped by the British public. As explained in a former chapter, it hadnot been in any real sense an issue in the two General Elections of theprevious year, and throughout the spring and summer of 1911 popularinterest in England and Scotland was still wholly occupied with thefight between "Peers and People" and the impending blow to the power ofthe Second Chamber; and the coronation festivities also helped to divertattention from the political consequences to which the authors of theParliament Bill intended it to lead. 

The first real awakening was brought about by an immense demonstrationheld at Craigavon, on the outskirts of Belfast, on the 23rd ofSeptember. The main purpose of this historic gathering was to bring thepopulace of Ulster face to face with their new leader, and to give himan opportunity of making a definite pronouncement of a policy forUlster, in view of the entirely novel situation resulting from thepassing of the Parliament Act. 

For that Act made it possible for the first time for the Liberal HomeRule Party to repeal the Act of Union without an appeal to the country. It enacted that any Bill which in three successive sessions was passedwithout substantial alteration through the House of Commons might bepresented for the Royal Assent without the consent of the Lords; and anamendment to exclude a Home Rule Bill from its operation had beensuccessfully resisted by the Government. It also reduced the maximumlegal duration of a Parliament from seven to five years; but theexisting Parliament was still in its first session, and there wastherefore ample time, under the provisions of the new Constitution, topass a Home Rule Bill before the next General Election, as the coalitionof parties in favour of Home Rule constituted a substantial majority inthe House of Commons. 

The question, therefore, which the Ulster people had now to decide wasno longer simply how they could bring about the rejection of a Home RuleBill by propaganda in the British constituencies, as they had hithertodone with unfailing success, although that object was still kept inview, but what course they should adopt if a Home Rule Act should beplaced on the Statute-book without those constituencies being consulted. Was the day at last approaching when Lord Randolph Churchill'sexhortation must be obeyed? Or were they to be compelled, because theCabinet had coerced the Sovereign and tricked the people by strainingthe royal prerogative in a manner described by Mr. Balfour as "a grossviolation of constitutional liberty, " to submit with resignation to thegovernment of their country by the "rebel party "--the party controlledby clerical influence, and boasting of the identity of its aims withthose of Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmet? This was the real problem in theminds of those who flocked to Craigavon on Saturday, the 23rd ofSeptember, 1911, to hear what proposals Sir Edward Carson had to laybefore his followers. 

Craigavon was the residence of Captain James Craig, Member of Parliamentfor East Down. It is a spacious country house standing on a hill abovethe road leading from Belfast to Holywood, with a fine view of BelfastLough and the distant Antrim coast beyond the estuary. The lawn in frontof the house, sloping steeply to the shore road, forms a sort of naturalamphitheatre offering ideal conditions for out-of-door oratory to anunlimited audience. At the meeting on the 23rd of September the platformwas erected near the crest of the hill, enabling the vast audience tospread out fan-wise over the lower levels, where even the most distanthad the speakers clearly in view, even if many of them, owing to thesize of the gathering, were unable to hear the spoken word. 

It was on this occasion that Captain Craig, by the care with which everyminute detail of the arrangements was thought out and provided for, first gave evidence of his remarkable gift for organisation that was toprove so invaluable to the Ulster cause in the next few years. Thegreater part of the audience arrived in procession, which, startingfrom the centre of the city of Belfast, took over two hours to pass agiven point, at the quick march in fours. All the Belfast Orange Lodges, and representative detachments from the County Grand Lodges, togetherwith Lord Templetown's Unionist Clubs, and other organisations, including the Women's Association, took part in the procession. Butimmense numbers of people attended the meeting independently; it wascalculated that not less than a hundred thousand were present during thedelivery of Sir Edward Carson's speech, and although there must havebeen very many of them who could hear nothing, the complete silencemaintained by all was a remarkable proof--or so it appeared to menexperienced in out-door political demonstrations--of the earnestness ofspirit that prevailed. To some it may appear still more remarkable that, with such a concourse of people within a couple of miles of Belfast, nota single policeman was present, and that none was required; nodisturbance of any sort occurred during the day, nor was a single caseof drunkenness observed. 

It had been intended that the Duke of Abercorn, whose inspiringexhortation as chairman of the Ulster Convention in 1892 had never beenforgotten, should preside over the meeting; but, as he was prevented bya family bereavement from being present, his place was taken by the Earlof Erne, Grand Master of the Orange Order. The scene, when he rose toopen the proceedings, was indescribable in its impressiveness. Somemembers of the Eighty Club happened to be in Ireland at the time, forthe purpose of "seeing for themselves" in the familiar fashion of suchpolitical tourists; but they did not think it worth while to witnesswhat Ulster was doing at Craigavon. If they had, they could have made areport to their political leaders which, had it been truthful, mighthave averted some irreparable blunders; for they could hardly havelooked upon that sea of eager faces, or have observed the enthusiasmthat possessed such a host of earnest and resolute men, without revisingthe opinion, which they had accepted from Mr. Redmond, that there was"no Ulster question. "

The meeting took the form of according a welcome to Sir Edward Carsonas the new leader of Irish Loyalism, and of Ulster in particular. Butbefore he rose to speak a significant note had already been sounded. Lord Erne struck it when he quoted words which were to become veryfamiliar in Ulster--the letter from Gustavus Hamilton, Governor ofEnniskillen in 1689, to "divers of the nobility and gentry in thenorth-east part of Ulster, " in which he declared: "We stand upon ourguard, and do resolve by the blessing of God to meet our danger ratherthan to await it. " And the veteran Liberal, Mr. Thomas Andrews, inmoving the resolution of welcome to the leader, expressed the universalsentiment of the multitude when he exclaimed, "We will never, never bowthe knee to the disloyal factions led by Mr. John Redmond. We will neversubmit to be governed by rebels who acknowledge no law but the laws ofthe Land League and illegal societies. "

A great number of Addresses from representative organisations were thenpresented to Sir Edward Carson, in many of which the determination toresist the jurisdiction of a Dublin Parliament was plainly declared. Butsuch declarations, although they undoubtedly expressed the mind of thepeople, were after all in quite general terms. For a quarter of acentury innumerable variations on the theme "Ulster will fight, andUlster will be right, " had been fiddled on Ulster platforms, so thatthere was some excuse for the belief of those who were wholly ignorantof North Irish character that these utterances were no more than thecommonplaces of Ulster rhetoric. The time had only now come, however, when their reality could be put to the test. Carson's speech atCraigavon crystallised them into practical politics. 

Sir Edward Carson's public speaking has always been entirely free fromrhetorical artifice. He seldom made use of metaphor or imagery, orelaborate periods, or variety of gesture. His language was extremelysimple and straightforward; but his mobile expression--so variable thathis enemies saw in it a suggestion of Mephistopheles, and his friends aresemblance to Dante--his measured diction, and his skilful use of adeep-toned voice, gave a remarkable impressiveness to all he said--even, indeed, to utterances which, if spoken by another, would sometimes havesounded commonplace or obvious. Sarcasm he could use with effect, and atelling point was often made by an epigrammatic phrase which delightedhis hearers. And, more than all else, his meaning was never in doubt. Inlucidity of statement he excelled many much greater orators, and wassurpassed by none; and these qualities, added to his unmistakablesincerity and candour, made him one of the most persuasive of speakerson the platform, as he was also, of course, in the Law Courts. 

The moment he began to speak at Craigavon the immense multitude who hadcome to welcome him felt instinctively the grip of his power. Thecontrast to all the previous scene--the cheering, the enthusiasm, themarching, the singing, the waving of handkerchiefs and flags--was deeplyimpressive, when, after a hushed pause of some length, he calledattention without preface to the realities of the situation in a fewsimple sentences of slow and almost solemn utterance:

 "I know full well what the Resolution you have just passed means; I know what all these Addresses mean; I know the responsibility you are putting upon me to-day. In your presence I cheerfully accept it, grave as it is, and I now enter into a compact with you, and every one of you, and with the help of God you and I joined together--giving you the best I can, and you giving me all your strength behind me--we will yet defeat the most nefarious conspiracy that has ever been hatched against a free people. But I know full well that this Resolution has a still wider meaning. It shows me that you realise the gravity of the situation that is before us, and it shows me that you are here to express your determination to see this fight out to a finish. "

He went on to expose the hollowness of the allegation, then current inLiberal circles, that Ulster's repugnance to Home Rule was lessuncompromising than it formerly had been. On the contrary, he believedthat "there never was a moment at which men were more resolved than atthe present, with all the force and strength that God has given them, to maintain the British connection and their rights as citizens of theUnited Kingdom. " Apart from principle or sentiment, that was anattitude, he maintained, dictated by practical good sense. He showed howIreland had been "advancing in prosperity in an unparalleled measure, "for which he could quote the authority of Mr. Redmond himself, althoughthe Nationalist leader had omitted to notice that this advance had takenplace under the legislative Union, and, as Carson contended, inconsequence of it. He laid special emphasis on the point, neverforgotten, that the danger in which they stood was due to thehoodwinking of the British constituencies by Mr. Asquith's Ministry. 

 "Make no mistake; we are going to fight with men who are prepared to play with loaded dice. They are prepared to destroy their own Constitution, so that they may pass Home Rule, and they are prepared to destroy the very elements of constitutional government by withdrawing the question from the electorate, who on two previous occasions refused to be a party to it. "

He ridiculed the "paper safeguards" which Liberal Ministers tried topersuade them would amply protect Ulster Protestants under a DublinParliament, giving a vivid picture of the plight they would be in undera Nationalist administration, which, he declared, meant "a tyranny towhich we never can and never will submit"; and then, in a pregnantpassage, he summarised the Ulster case:

 "Our demand is a very simple one. We ask for no privileges, but we are determined that no one shall have privileges over us. We ask for no special rights, but we claim the same rights from the same Government as every other part of the United Kingdom. We ask for nothing more; we will take nothing less. It is our inalienable right as citizens of the British Empire, and Heaven help the men who try to take it from us. "

It was all no doubt a mere restatement--though an admirably lucid andforcible restatement--of doctrine with which his hearers had long beenfamiliar. The great question still awaited an answer--how was effect tobe given to this resolve, now that there was no longer hope ofsalvation through the sympathy and support of public opinion in GreatBritain? This was what the eager listeners at Craigavon hoped in hushedexpectancy to hear from their new leader. He did not disappoint them:

 "Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, says that we are not to be allowed to put our case before the British electorate. Very well. By that determination he drives you in the ultimate result to rely upon your own strength, and we must follow all that out to its logical conclusion.... That involves something more than that we do not accept Home Rule. We must be prepared, in the event of a Home Rule Bill passing, with such measures as will carry on for ourselves the government of those districts of which we have control. We must be prepared--and time is precious in these things--the morning Home Rule passes, ourselves to become responsible for the government of the Protestant Province of Ulster. We ask your leave at the meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council, to be held on Monday, there to discuss the matter, and to set to work, to take care that at no time and at no intervening interval shall we lack a Government in Ulster, which shall be a Government either by the Imperial Parliament, or by ourselves. "

Here, then, was the first authoritative declaration of a definite policyto be pursued by Ulster in the circumstances then existing or foreseen, and it was a policy that was followed with undeviating consistency underCarson's leadership for the next nine years. To be left under thegovernment of the Imperial Parliament was the alternative to bepreferred, and was asserted to be an inalienable right; but, if alltheir efforts to that end should be defeated, then "a government byourselves" was the only change that could be tolerated. Rather thansubmit to the jurisdiction of a Nationalist legislature andadministration, they would themselves set up a Government "_in thosedistricts of which they had control_. " It was because, when the first ofthese alternatives had to be sorrowfully abandoned, the second wasoffered in the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 that Ulster did notactively oppose the passing of that statute. 

FOOTNOTES:

[12] _Annual Register_, 1911, p. 175. 

CHAPTER V

THE CRAIGAVON POLICY AND THE U. F. V. 

No time was lost in giving practical shape to the policy outlined atCraigavon, and in taking steps to give effect to it. On the 25th ofSeptember a meeting of four hundred delegates representing the UlsterUnionist Council, the County Grand Orange Lodges, and the UnionistClubs, was held in Belfast, and, after lengthy discussion in private, when the only differences of opinion were as to the most effectivemethods of proceeding, two resolutions were unanimously adopted andpublished. It is noteworthy that, at this early stage in the movement, out of nearly four hundred popularly elected delegates, numbers of whomwere men holding responsible positions or engaged in commercialbusiness, not one raised an objection to the policy itself, although itsgrave possibilities were thoroughly appreciated by all present. BothLord Londonderry, who presided, and Sir Edward Carson left no room fordoubt in that respect; the developments they might be called upon toface were thoroughly searched and explained, and the fullest opportunityto draw back was offered to any present who might shrink from going on. 

The first Resolution registered a "call upon our leaders to take anysteps they may consider necessary to resist the establishment of HomeRule in Ireland, solemnly pledging ourselves that under no conditionsshall we acknowledge any such Government"; and it gave an assurance thatthose whom the delegates represented would give the leaders "theirunwavering support in any danger they may be called upon to face. " Thesecond decided that "the time has now come when we consider it ourimperative duty to make arrangements for the provisional government ofUlster, " and for that purpose it went on to appoint a Commission offive leading local men, namely, Captain James Craig, M. P. , ColonelSharman Crawford, M. P. , the Right Hon. Thomas Sinclair, Colonel R. H. Wallace, C. B. , and Mr. Edward Sclater, Secretary of the Unionist Clubs, whose duties were _(a)_ "to keep Sir Edward Carson in constant and closetouch with the feeling of Unionist Ulster, " and _(b)_ "to take immediatesteps, in consultation with Sir Edward Carson, to frame and submit aConstitution for a Provisional Government of Ulster, having due regardto the interests of the Loyalists in other parts of Ireland: the powersand duration of such Provisional Government to come into operation onthe day of the passage of any Home Rule Bill, to remain in force untilUlster shall again resume unimpaired her citizenship in the UnitedKingdom. "

At the luncheon given by Lord Londonderry after this businessconference, Carson took occasion to refer to a particularly contemptibleslander to which currency had been given some days previously by SirJohn Benn, one of the Eighty Club strolling seekers after truth. It wasperhaps hardly worth while to notice a statement so silly as that theUlster leader had been ready a few weeks previously to betray Ulster inorder to save the House of Lords, but Carson did not yet realise thedegree to which he had already won the confidence of his followers;moreover, the incident proved useful as an opportunity of emphasisingthe uninterrupted mutual confidence between Lord Londonderry andhimself, in spite of their divergence of opinion over the ParliamentBill. It also gave those present a glimpse of their leader's power ofshrivelling meanness with a few caustic drops of scorn. 

The proceedings at Craigavon and at the Conference naturally created asensation on both sides of the Channel. They brought the question ofIreland once more, for the first time since 1895, into the forefront ofBritish politics. The House of Commons might spend the autumn ploughingits way through the intricacies of the National Insurance Bill, buteveryone knew that the last and bitterest battle against Home Rule wasnow approaching. And, now that the Parliament Act was safely on theStatute-book, Ministers had no further interest in concealment. Duringthe elections, from which alone they could procure authority forlegislation of so fundamental a character, Mr. Asquith, as we have seen, regarded any inquiry as to his intentions as "confusing the issue. " Butnow that he had the constituencies in his pocket for five years andnothing further was to be feared from that quarter, his cards wereplaced on the table. 

On the 3rd of October Mr. Winston Churchill told his followers at Dundeethat the Government would introduce a Home Rule Bill next session "andpress it forward with all their strength, " and he added thecharacteristic injunction that "they must not take Sir Edward Carson tooseriously. " But that advice did not prevent Mr. Herbert Samuel, anothermember of the Cabinet, from putting in an appearance in Belfast fourdays later, where he threw himself into a ludicrously unequal combatwith Carson, exerting himself to calm the fears of business men as tothe effect of Home Rule on their prosperity; while, in the same week, Carson himself, at a great Unionist demonstration in Dublin, describedthe growth of Irish prosperity in the last twenty years as "almost afairy tale, " which would be cut short by Home Rule. On the 19th of thesame month Mr. Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, in a speech atIlfracombe, gave some scraps of meagre information in regard to theprovisions that would be included in the coming Home Rule Bill; and onthe 21st Mr. Redmond announced that the drafting of the Bill was almostcompleted, and that the measure would be "satisfactory to Nationalistsboth in principle and detail. "[13]

So the autumn of 1911 wore through--Ministers doling out snippets ofinformation; members of Parliament and the Press urging them to givemore. The people of Ulster, on the other hand, were not worrying overdetails. They did not require to be told that the principle would be"satisfactory to Nationalists, " for they knew that the Government had to"toe the line"; nor were they in doubt that what was satisfactory toNationalists must be unsatisfactory to themselves. What they werethinking about was not what the Bill would or would not contain, but thepreparations they were making to resist its operation. 

A day or two after Craigavon the leader spoke at a great meeting inPortrush, after receiving, at every important station he passed _enroute_ from Belfast, enthusiastic addresses expressing confidence inhimself and approval of the Craigavon declaration; and in this speech heconsiderably amplified what he had said at Craigavon. After explaininghow the whole outlook had been changed by the Parliament Act, which cutthem off from appeal to the sympathies of Englishmen, he pointed out tohis hearers the only course now open to them, namely, that resolved uponat Craigavon. 

 "Some people, " he continued, "say that I am preaching disorder. No, in the course I am advising I am preaching order, because I believe that, unless we are in a position ourselves to take over the government of those places we are able to control, the people of Ulster, if let loose without that organisation, and without that organised determination, might in a foolish moment find themselves in a condition of antagonism and grips with their foes which I believe even the present Government would lament. And therefore I say that the course we recommend--and it has been solemnly adopted by your four hundred representatives, after mature discussion in which every man understood what it was he was voting about--is the only course that I know of that is possible under the circumstances of this Province which is consistent with the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of bloodshed. "

Superficially, these words may appear boldly paradoxical; but in factthey were prophetic, for the closest observers of the events of the nextthree years, familiar with Irish character and conditions, were in nodoubt whatever that it was the disciplined organisation of the UlsterUnionists alone that prevented the outbreak of serious disorders in theNorth. There was, on the contrary, a diminution even of ordinary crime, accompanied by a marked improvement in the general demeanour, andespecially in the sobriety, of the people. 

The speaker then touched upon a question which naturally arose out ofthe Craigavon policy of resistance to Home Rule. He had been asked, hesaid, whether Ulster proposed to fight against the forces of the Crown. He had already contrasted their own methods with those of theNationalists, saying that Ulstermen would never descend to action "frombehind hedges or by maiming cattle, or by boycotting of individuals"; henow added that they were "not going to fight the Army and the Navy ... God forbid that any loyal Irishman should ever shoot or think ofshooting the British soldier or sailor. But, believe me, any Governmentwill ponder long before it dares to shoot a loyal Ulster Protestant, devoted to his country and loyal to his King. "

In newspaper reports of public meetings, sayings of pith and moment areoften attributed to "A Voice" from the audience. On this occasion, whenSir Edward Carson referred to the Army and the Navy, "A Voice" cried"They are on our side. " It was the truth, as subsequent events were toshow. It would indeed have been strange had it been otherwise. Menwearing His Majesty's uniform, who had been quartered at one time inBelfast or Carrickfergus and at another in Cork or Limerick, could beunder no illusion as to where that uniform was held in respect and whereit was scorned. The certainty that the reality of their own loyalty wasunderstood by the men who served the King was a sustaining thought toUlstermen through these years of trial. 

This Portrush speech cleared the air. It made known the _modusoperandi_, as Craigavon had made known the policy. Henceforward UlsterUnionists had a definite idea of what was before them, and they hadalready unbounded confidence both in the sagacity and in the courage ofthe man who had become their leader. 

The Craigavon meeting led, almost by accident as it were, to adevelopment the importance of which was hardly foreseen at the time. Among the processionists who passed through Captain Craig's groundsthere was a contingent of Orangemen from County Tyrone who attractedgeneral attention by their smart appearance and the orderly precision oftheir marching. On inquiry it was learnt that these men had of their ownaccord been learning military drill. The spirit of emulation naturallysuggested to others to follow the example of the Tyrone Lodges. It wassoon followed, not by Orangemen alone, but by members of the UnionistClubs, very many of whom belonged to no Orange Lodge. Within a fewmonths drilling--of an elementary kind, it is true--had become popularin many parts of the country. Colonel R. H. Wallace, C. B. , who had servedwith distinction in the South African War, where he commanded the 5thRoyal Irish Rifles, was a prominent member of the Orange Institution, inwhich he was in 1911 Grand Master of the Belfast Lodges, and GrandSecretary of the Provincial Grand Orange Lodge of Ulster; and, being aman of marked ability and widespread popularity, his influence waspowerful and extensive. He was a devoted adherent of Carson, and therewas no keener spirit among the Ulster Loyalist leaders. Colonel Wallacewas among the first to perceive the importance of this military drillingthat was taking place throughout Ulster, and through his leadingposition in the Orange Institution his encouragement did much to extendthe practice. 

Having been a lawyer by profession before South Africa called him toserve his country in arms, Wallace was careful to ascertain how the lawstood with regard to the drilling that was going on. He consulted Mr. James Campbell (afterwards Lord Chancellor of Ireland), who advised thatany two Justices of the Peace had power to authorise drill and othermilitary exercises within the area of their jurisdiction on certainconditions. The terms of the application made by Colonel Wallace himselfto two Belfast magistrates show what the conditions were, and, under thecircumstances of the time, are not without a flavour of humour. Therequest stated that Wallace and another officer of the Belfast GrandLodge were--

"Authorised on behalf of the members thereof to apply for lawfulauthority to them to hold meetings of the members of the said Lodge andthe Lodges under its jurisdiction for the purpose of training anddrilling themselves and of being trained and drilled to the use of arms, and for the purpose of practising military exercises, movements, andevolutions. And we are authorised, on their behalf, to give theirassurance that they desire this authority as faithful subjects of HisMajesty the King, and their undertaking that such authority is soughtand will be used by them only to make them more efficient citizens forthe purpose of maintaining the constitution of the United Kingdom as nowestablished and protecting their rights and liberties thereunder. "

The _bona fides_ of an application couched in these terms, whichfollowed well-established precedent, could not be questioned by anyloyal subject of His Majesty. The purpose for which the licence wasrequested was stated with literal exactness and without subterfuge. There was nothing seditious or revolutionary in it, and the desire ofmen to make themselves more efficient citizens for maintaining theestablished government of their country, and their rights and libertiesunder it, was surely not merely innocent of offence, but praiseworthy. 

Such, at all events, was the view taken by numbers of strictlyconscientious holders of the Commission of the Peace throughout Ulster, with the result that the Ulster Volunteer Force sprang into existencewithin a few months without the smallest violation of the law. Originating in the Orange Lodges and the Unionist Clubs, it soonenrolled large numbers of men outside both those organisations. Men withmilitary experience interested themselves in training the volunteers intheir districts; the local bodies were before long drawn into a singlecoherent organisation on a territorial basis, which soon gave rise to an_esprit de corps_ leading to friendly rivalry in efficiency between thelocal battalions. 

This Ulster Volunteer Force had as yet no arms in their hands, but, asthe first act of the Liberal Government on coming into power in 1906 hadbeen to drop the "coercion" Act which prohibited the importation offirearms into Ireland, there was no reason why, in the course of time, the U. V. F. Should not be fully armed with as complete an avoidance ofillegality as that with which in the meantime they were acquiring someknowledge of military duties. But for the present they had to be contentwith wooden "dummy" rifles with which to learn their drill, an expedientwhich, as will be seen later on, excited the derisive mirth of theEnglish Radical Press. 

The application to the Belfast Justices for leave to drill the OrangeLodges was dated the 5th of January, 1912. For some months both beforeand after that date the formation of new battalions proceeded rapidly, so that by the summer of 1912 the force was of considerable strength anddecent efficiency; but already in the autumn of 1911 it soon becameapparent that the existence of such a force would give a backing to theCraigavon policy which nothing else could provide. At Craigavon theleader of the movement had foreshadowed the possibility of having totake charge of the government of those districts which the Loyalistscould control. The U. V. F. Made such control a practical proposition, andthe consciousness of this throughout Ulster gave a solid reality to themovement which it must otherwise have lacked. 

The special Commission of Five set to work immediately after theCraigavon meeting to carry out the task entrusted to them by theCouncil. But, as more than two years must elapse before the Home RuleBill could become law under the Parliament Act, there was no immediateurgency in making arrangements for setting up the Provisional Governmentresolved upon by the Council on the 25th of September, 1911, and theoutside public heard nothing about what was being done in the matter formany months to come. 

Meantime the Ulster Loyalists watched with something akin to dismay thedissensions in the Unionist party in England over the question of TariffReform, which made impossible a united front against the revived attackon the Union, and woefully weakened the effective force of theOpposition both in Parliament and the country. Public opinion wasdiverted from the one thing that really mattered--had Englishmen beenable to realise it--from an Imperial standpoint, no less than from thestandpoint of Irish Loyalists. On the 8th of November, 1911, mainly inconsequence of these dissensions, Mr. Balfour resigned the leadership ofthe Unionist Party. This event was regarded in Ulster as a calamity. Mr. Balfour was the ablest and most zealous living defender of the Union, and the great services he had rendered to the country during hismemorable Chief Secretaryship were not forgotten. Ulstermen, in whoseeyes the tariff question was of very subordinate importance, feared thatno one could be found to take command of the Unionist forces comparablewith the Achilles who, as they supposed, was now retiring to his tent. 

What happened in regard to the vacant leadership is well known--how Mr. Walter Long and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, after presenting themselves fora day or two as rival candidates, patriotically agreed to stand asideand give united support to Mr. Bonar Law in order to avoid a division inthe ranks of the party. It is less generally known that Mr. Bonar Law, before consenting to his name being proposed, wrote and asked Sir EdwardCarson if he would accept the leadership, and that it was only when hereceived an emphatic reply in the negative that he assumed theresponsibility himself. If this had been known at the time in Ulsterthere can be little doubt that consternation would have been caused bythe refusal of their own leader to place himself at the head of thewhole Unionist Party. It is quite certain that Sir Edward Carson wouldhave been acceptable to the party meeting at the Carlton Club, for hewas then much better known to the party both in the House of Commons andin the country than was Mr. Bonar Law, whose great qualities asparliamentarian and statesman had not yet been revealed; but it is notless certain that, if his first thought was to be of service to Ulster, Carson acted wisely in maintaining a position of independence, in whichall his powers could continue to be concentrated on a single aim ofstatecraft. 

At all events, the new leader of the Unionist Party was not long inproving that the Ulster cause had suffered no set-back by the change, and his constant and courageous backing of the Ulster leader won himthe unstinted admiration and affection of every Irish Loyalist. Mr. Balfour also soon showed that he was no sulking Achilles; his loyalty tothe Unionist cause was undimmed; he never for a moment acted, as ameaner man might, as if his successor were a supplanter; and within thenext few months he many times rose from beside Mr. Bonar Law in theHouse of Commons to deliver some of the best speeches he ever made onthe question of Irish Government, full of cogent and crushing criticismof the Home Rule proposals of Mr. Asquith. 

FOOTNOTES:

[13] _Annual Register_, 1911, p. 228. 

CHAPTER VI

MR. CHURCHILL IN BELFAST

At the women's meeting at the Ulster Hall on the 18th of January, 1912, [14] Lord Londonderry took occasion to recall once more to thememory of his audience the celebrated speech delivered by Lord RandolphChurchill in the same building twenty-six years before. That clarionwas, indeed, in no danger of being forgotten; but there happened at thatparticular moment to be a very special reason for Ulstermen to rememberit, and the incident which was present in Londonderry's mind--aResolution passed by the Standing Committee of the Ulster UnionistCouncil two days earlier--proved to be so distinct a turning-point inthe history of Ulster's stand for the Union that it claims more than apassing mention. 

"Diligence and vigilance should be your watchword, so that the blow, ifit is coming, may not come upon you as a thief in the night, and may notfind you unready and taken by surprise. " Such had been Lord Randolph'swarning. It was now learnt, with feelings in which disgust andindignation were equally mingled, that Lord Randolph's son was bent oncoming to Belfast, not indeed as a thief in the night, but withchallenging audacity, to give his countenance, encouragement, andsupport to the adherents of disloyalty whom Lord Randolph had toldUlster to resist to the death. And not only was he coming to Belfast; hewas coming to the Ulster Hall--to the very building which his father'soration had, as it were, consecrated to the Unionist cause, and whichhad come to be regarded as almost a loyalist shrine. 

It is no doubt difficult for those who are unfamiliar with thepsychology of the North of Ireland to understand the anger which thisprojected visit of Mr. Winston Churchill aroused in Belfast. His changeof political allegiance from the party which his father had sobrilliantly served and led, to the party which his father had sopitilessly chastised, was of course displeasing to Conservativeseverywhere. Politicians who leave their friends to join their opponentsare never popular with those they abandon, and Mr. Winston Churchill wascertainly no exception. But such desertions, after the first burst ofwrath has evaporated, are generally accepted with a philosophic shrug inwhat journalists call "political circles" in London, where plenty ofprecedents for lapses from party virtue can be quoted. In the provinces, even in England, resentment dies down less easily, and forgiveness is ofslow growth; but in Ulster, where a political creed is held with areligious fervour, or, as a hostile critic might put it, with anintolerance unknown in England, and where the dividing line between"loyalty" and "disloyalty" is regarded almost as a matter of faith, theman who passes from the one to the other arouses the same bitterness ofanger and contempt which soldiers feel for a deserter in face of theenemy. 

To such sentiments there was added, in the case of Mr. WinstonChurchill, a shocked feeling that his appearance in the Ulster Hall asan emissary of Home Rule would be an act not only of political apostasybut of filial impiety. The prevailing sentiment in Belfast at the timewas expressed somewhat brutally, perhaps, in the local Press--"he iscoming to dance on his father's coffin. " It was an outrage on theirfeelings which the people of Belfast could not and would not tolerate. If Mr. Churchill was determined to flaunt the green flag let him find amore suitable site than the very citadel in which they had been exhortedby his father to keep the Union Jack flying to the last. 

If anything could have added to the anger excited by this announcementit would have been the fact that the Cabinet Minister was to beaccompanied on the platform of the Ulster Hall by Mr. Redmond and Mr. Devlin, and that Lord Pirrie was to be his chairman. There was no moreunpopular citizen of Belfast than Lord Pirrie; and the reason was neatlyexplained to English readers by the Special Correspondent of _TheTimes_. "Lord Pirrie, " he wrote, "deserted Unionism about the time theLiberals acceded to power, and soon afterwards was made a Peer; whether_propter hoc_ or only _post hoc_ I am quite unable to say, though noUlster Unionist has any doubts on the subject. "[15] But that was notquite the whole reason. That Lord Pirrie was an example of apostasy"just for a riband to stick in his coat, " was the general belief; but itwas also resented that a man who had amassed, not "a handful of silver, "but an enormous fortune, through a trade created by an eminent Unionistfirm, and under conditions brought about in Belfast by the Union withGreat Britain, should have kicked away the ladder by which he hadclimbed from obscurity to wealth and rank. An additional cause ofoffence, moreover, was that he was at that time trying to persuadecredulous people in England that there was in Ulster a party of Liberalsand Protestant Home Rulers, of which he posed as leader, althougheveryone on the spot knew that the "party" would not fill a tramcar. Ofthis party the same Correspondent of _The Times_ very truly said:

 "Nearly every prominent man in it has received an office or a decoration--and the fact that, with all the power of patronage in their hands for the last six years, the Government had been able to make so small an inroad into the solid square of Ulster Unionism is a remarkable testimony to the strength of the sentiment which gives it cohesion. "

But a score of individuals in possession of an office equipped withstamped stationery, and with a titled chairman of fabulous wealth, haveno difficulty in deluding strangers at a distance into the belief thatthey are an influential and representative body of men. It was infurtherance of the scheme for creating this false impression across theChannel that Lord Pirrie and his so-called "Ulster Liberal Association"invited Mr. Winston Churchill and the two Nationalist leaders to speakin the Ulster Hall on the 8th of February, 1912, and that theannouncement of the fixture was made in the Press some three weeksearlier. 

The Unionist leaders were not long left in ignorance of the publicexcitement which this news created in the city. A specially summonedmeeting of the Standing Committee, with Londonderry in the chair, washeld on the 16th of January to consider what action, if any, should betaken; but it was no simple matter they had to decide, especially in theabsence of their leader, Sir Edward Carson, who was kept in England bygreat Unionist meetings which he was addressing in Lancashire. 

The reasons, on the one hand, for doing nothing were obvious enough. Noone, of course, suggested the possibility of preventing Mr. Churchillcoming to Belfast; but could even the Ulster Hall itself, the Loyalistsanctuary, be preserved from the threatened desecration? It was theproperty of the Corporation, and the Unionist political organisation hadno exclusive title to its use. The meeting could only be frustrated byforce in some form, or by a combination of force and stratagem. TheStanding Committee, all men of solid sense and judgment, several of whomwere Privy Councillors, were very fully alive to the objections to anyresort to force in such a matter. They valued freedom of speech ashighly as any Englishman, and they realised the odium that interferencewith it might bring both on themselves and their cause; and the lastthing they desired at the present crisis was to alienate public sympathyin Great Britain. The force of such considerations was felt strongly byseveral members, indeed by all, of the Committee, and not least by LordLondonderry himself, whose counsel naturally carried great weight. 

But, on the other hand, the danger of a passive attitude was also fullyrecognised. It was perfectly well understood that one of the chiefdesires of the Liberal Government and its followers at this time was tomake the world believe that Ulster's opposition to Home Rule haddeclined in strength in recent years; that there really was aconsiderable body of Protestant opinion in agreement with Lord Pirrie, and prepared to support Home Rule on "Liberal, " if not on avowedly"Nationalist" principles, and that the policy for which Carson, Londonderry, and the Unionist Council stood was a gigantic piece ofbluff which only required to be exposed to disappear in generalderision. 

From this point of view the Churchill meeting could only be regarded asa deliberate challenge and provocation to Ulster. It seemed probablethat the First Lord of the Admiralty had been selected for the missionin preference to any other Minister precisely because he was LordRandolph's son. All this bluster about "fight and be right" wastraceable, so Liberal Ministers doubtless reasoned, to that unhappyspeech of "Winston's father"; let Winston go over to the same place andexplain his father away. If he obtained a hearing in the Ulster Hall inthe company of Redmond, Devlin, and Pirrie the legend of Ulster as animpregnable loyalist stronghold would be wiped out, and Randolph's rantcould be made to appear a foolish joke in comparison with the moremature and discriminating wisdom of Winston. 

It cannot, of course, be definitely asserted that the situation was thusweighed deliberately by the Cabinet, or by Mr. Churchill himself. But, if it was not, they must have been deficient in foresight; for there canbe no doubt, as several writers in the Press perceived, that thetransaction would so have presented itself to the mind of the public;the psychological result would inure to the benefit of the Home Rulers. 

But there was also another consideration which could not be ignored bythe Standing Committee--namely, the attitude of that importantindividual, the "man in the street. " Among the innumerablemisrepresentations levelled at the Ulster Movement none was more commonthan that it was confined to a handful of lords, landlords, and wealthyemployers of labour; and, as a corollary, that all the trouble wascaused by the perversity of a few individuals, of whom the most guiltywas Sir Edward Carson. The truth was very different. Even at the zenithof his influence and popularity Sir Edward himself would have beeninstantly disowned by the Ulster democracy if he had given away anythingfundamental to the Unionist cause. More than to anything else he owedhis power to his pledge, never violated, that he would never commit hisfollowers to any irretraceable step without the consent of the Council, in which they were fully represented on a democratic basis. At theparticular crisis now reached popular feeling could not be safelydisregarded, and it was clearly understood by the Standing Committeethat public excitement over the coming visit of Mr. Churchill was onlybeing kept within bounds by the belief of the public that their leaderswould not "let them down. "

All these considerations were most carefully balanced at the meeting onthe 16th of January, and there were prolonged deliberations before thedecision was arrived at that some action must be taken to prevent theChurchill meeting being held in the Ulster Hall, but that no obstaclecould, of course, be made to his speaking in any other building inBelfast. The further question as to what this action should be was underdiscussion when Colonel R. H. Wallace, C. B. , Grand Master of the BelfastOrangemen, and a man of great influence with all classes in the city aswell as in the neighbouring counties, entered the room and told theCommittee that people outside were expecting the Unionist Council todevise means for stopping the Ulster Hall meeting; that they were quiteresolved to take matters into their own hands if the Council remainedpassive; and that, in his judgment, the result in that event wouldprobably be very serious disorder and bloodshed, and the loss of allcontrol over the Unionist rank and file by their leaders. 

This information arrived too late to influence the decision on the mainquestion, but it confirmed its wisdom and set at rest the doubts whichsome of the Committee had at first entertained. It was reported at thetime that there had been a dissenting minority consisting of LordLondonderry, Mr. Sinclair, and Mr. John Young, the last-mentioned beinga Privy Councillor, a trusted leader of the Presbyterians, and a man ofmoderate views whose great influence throughout the north-easterncounties was due to his high character and the soundness of hisjudgment. There was, however, no truth in this report, whichLondonderry publicly contradicted; but it is probable that theconcurrence of the men mentioned, and perhaps of others, was owing totheir well-founded conviction that the course decided upon, howeverhigh-handed it might appear to onlookers at a distance, was in realitythe only means of averting much more deplorable consequences. 

On the following day, January 17th, an immense sensation was created bythe publication of the Resolution which had been unanimously adopted onthe motion of Captain James Craig, M. P. It was:

 "That the Standing Committee of the Ulster Unionist Council observes with astonishment the deliberate challenge thrown down by Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. John Redmond, Mr. Joseph Devlin, and Lord Pirrie in announcing their intention to hold a Home Rule meeting in the centre of the loyal city of Belfast, and resolves to take steps to prevent its being held. "

There was an immediate outpouring of vituperation by the MinisterialPress in England, as had been anticipated by the Standing Committee. Special Correspondents trooped over to Belfast, whence they filled theirpapers with telegrams, articles, and interviews, ringing the changes onthe audacity of this unwarranted interference with freedom of speech, and speculating as to the manner in which the threat, was likely to becarried out. Scribes of "Open Letters" had a fine opportunity to displaytheir gift of insolent invective. Cartoonists and caricaturists had atime of rare enjoyment, and let their pencils run riot. Writers in theLiberal Press for the most part assumed that Mr. Churchill would biddefiance to the Ulster Unionist Council; others urged him to do so andto fulfil his engagement; some, with more prudence, suggested that hemight be extricated from the difficulty without loss of dignity if theChief Secretary would prohibit the meeting, as likely to produce abreach of peace, and it was pointed out that Dublin Castle wouldcertainly forbid a meeting in Tipperary organised by the Ulster UnionistCouncil, with Sir Edward Carson as principal speaker. 

However, on the 25th of January Mr. Churchill addressed a letter, datedfrom the Admiralty, to Lord Londonderry at Mount Stewart, in which hesaid he was prepared to give up the idea of speaking in the Ulster Hall, and would arrange for his meeting to be held elsewhere in the city, as"it was not a point of any importance to him where he spoke in Belfast. "He did not explain why, if that were the case, he had ever made a planthat so obviously constituted a direct premeditated challenge to Ulster. Lord Londonderry, in his reply, said that the Ulster Unionist Councilhad no intention of interfering with any meeting Mr. Churchill mightarrange "outside the districts which passionately resent your action, "but that, "having regard to the intense state of feeling" which had beenaroused, the Council could accept no responsibility for anything thatmight occur during the visit. Mr. Churchill's prudent change of planrelieved the extreme tension of the situation, and there was muchspeculation as to what influence had produced a result so satisfactoryto the Ulster Unionist Council. The truth seems to be that the Council'sResolution had impaled the Government on the horns of a very awkwarddilemma, completely turning the tables on Ministers, whose design hadbeen to compel the Belfast Unionists either to adopt, on the one hand, an attitude of apparent intolerance which would put them in the wrong inthe eyes of the British public, or, on the other, to submit to theflagrant misrepresentation of their whole position which would be theoutcome of a Nationalist meeting in the Ulster Hall presided over by thePresident of the illusory "Ulster Liberal Association, " and with LordRandolph Churchill's son as the protagonist of Home Rule. The threat tostop the meeting forced the Government to consider how the First Lord ofthe Admiralty and his friends were to be protected and enabled to fulfiltheir programme. The Irish Executive, according to the DublinCorrespondent of _The Times_, objected to the employment of troops forthis purpose; because--

 "If the Belfast Unionists decided to resist the soldiers, bloodshed and disorder on a large scale must have ensued. If, on the other hand, they yielded to the _force majeure_ of British bayonets, and Mr. Churchill was enabled to speak in the Ulster Hall, they would still have carried their point; they would have proved to the English people that Home Rule could only be thrust upon Ulster by an overwhelming employment of military force. The Executive preferred to depend on the services of a large police force. And this meant that Mr. Churchill could not speak in the Ulster Hall; for the Belfast democracy, though it might yield to soldiers, would certainly offer a fierce resistance to the police. It seemed, therefore, that the Government's only safe and prudent course was to prevent Mr. Churchill from trying to speak in that Hall. "[16]

The Government, in fact, had been completely out-manoeuvred. They hadgiven the Ulster Unionist Council an opportunity to show its ownconstituents and the outside world that, where the occasion demandedaction, it could act with decision; and they had failed utterly to drivea wedge between Ulster and the Unionist Party in England and in theSouth of Ireland, as they hoped to do by goading Belfast intoillegality. On the other hand, they had aroused some misgiving in theranks of their own supporters. A political observer in London reportedthat the incident had--

 "Caused a feeling of considerable apprehension in Radical circles. The pretence that Ulster does not mean to fight is now almost abandoned even by the most fanatical Home Rulers. "[17]

Unionist journals in Great Britain, almost without exception, applaudedthe conduct of the Council, and proved by their comments that theyunderstood its motive, and sympathised with the feelings of Ulster. _TheSaturday Review_ expressed the general view when it wrote:

 "With the indignation of the loyal Ulstermen at this proposal we are in complete sympathy. Where there is a question of Home Rule, the Ulster Hall is sacred ground, and to the Ulster mind and, indeed, to the mind of any calm outsider, there is something both impudent and impious in the proposal that this temple of Unionism should be profaned by the son of a man who assisted at its consecration. "[18]

The southern Unionists of Ireland thoroughly appreciated the difficultythat had confronted their friends in the North, and approved the way ithad been met. This was natural enough, since, as the DublinCorrespondent of _The Times_ pointed out--

 "They understand Ulster's position better than it can be understood in England. They realise that the provocation has been extreme. There has been a deliberate conspiracy to persuade the English people, first, that Ulster is weakening in its opposition to Home Rule; and, next, that its declared refusal to accept Home Rule in any form is mere bluff. It became necessary for Ulster to defeat this conspiracy, and the Ulster Council's Resolution has defeated it. "[19]

A few days later a still more valuable token of sympathy and supportfrom across the Channel gave fresh encouragement to Ulster. On the 26thof January Mr. Bonar Law made his first public speech as leader of theUnionist Party, when he addressed an audience of ten thousand people inthe Albert Hall in London. In the course of a masterly analysis of thedangers inseparable from Home Rule, he once more drew attention to "thedishonesty with which the Government hid Home Rule before the election, and now propose to carry it after the election"; but the passage whichgave the greatest satisfaction in Ulster was that in which, speaking forthe whole Unionist Party--which meant at least half, and probably morethan half, the British nation--Mr. Bonar Law, in reference to the recentoccurrence in Belfast, said:

 "We hear a great deal about the intolerance of Ulster. It is easy to be tolerant for other people. We who represent the Unionist Party in England and Scotland have supported, and we mean to support to the end, the loyal minority. We support them not because we are intolerant, but because their claims are just. "

Meanwhile, Mr. Churchill's friends were seeking a building in Belfastwhere the baffled Minister could hold his meeting on the 8th ofFebruary, and in the course of the search the director of the BelfastOpera-house was offered a knighthood as well as a large sum of money forthe use of his theatre, [20] a fact that possibly explains the statementmade by the London Correspondent of _The Freeman's Journal_ on the 28thof January, that the Government's Chief Whip and Patronage Secretary wasbusying himself with the arrangement. [21] Captain Frederick Guest, M. P. , one of the junior whips, arrived in Belfast on the 25th to giveassistance on the spot; but no suitable hall with an auspicious _geniusloci_ could apparently be found, for eventually a marquee was importedfrom Scotland and erected on the Celtic football ground, in theNationalist quarter of the city. 

The question of maintaining order on the day of the meeting was at thesame time engaging the attention both of the Government in Dublin andthe Unionist Council in Belfast. The former decided to strengthen thegarrison of Belfast by five battalions of infantry and two squadrons ofcavalry, while at the Old Town Hall anxious consultations were held asto the best means of securing that the soldiers should have nothing todo. The Unionist leaders had not yet gained the full influence they wereable to exercise later, nor were their followers as disciplined as theyafterwards became. The Orange Lodges were the only section of thepopulation in any sense under discipline; and this section was a muchsmaller proportion of the Unionist rank and file than English Liberalssupposed, who were in the habit of speaking as if "Orangemen" were acorrect cognomen of the whole Protestant population of Ulster. It was, however, only through the Lodges and the Unionist Clubs that theStanding Committee could hope to exert influence in keeping the peace. That Committee, accordingly, passed a Resolution on the 5th of February, moved by Colonel Wallace, the most influential of the BelfastOrangemen, which "strongly urged all Unionists, " in view of the UlsterHall victory, "to abstain from any interference with the meeting at theCeltic football ground, and to do everything in their power to avoid anyaction that might lead to any disturbance. "

The Resolution was circulated to all the Orange Lodges and UnionistClubs in Belfast and the neighbouring districts--for it was expectedthat some 30, 000 or 40, 000 people might come into the city from outsideon the day of the meeting--with urgent injunctions to the officers tobring it to the notice of all members; it was also extensively placardedon all the hoardings of Belfast. Of even greater importance perhaps, inthe interests of peace, was the decision that Carson and Londonderryshould themselves remain in Belfast on the 8th. This, as _The Times_Correspondent in Belfast had the insight to observe, was "the strongestguarantee of order" that could be given, and there is no doubt thattheir appearance, together with Captain Craig, M. P. , and LordTempletown, on the balcony of the Ulster Club had a calming effect onthe excited crowd that surged round Mr. Churchill's hotel, and served asa reminder throughout the day of the advice which these leaders hadissued to their adherents. 

The First Lord of the Admiralty was accompanied to Belfast by Mrs. Churchill, his Secretary, and two Liberal Members of Parliament, Mr. Fiennes and Mr. Hamar Greenwood--for the last-mentioned of whom fate wasreserving a more intimate connection with Irish trouble than could begot from a fleeting flirtation with disloyalty in West Belfast. Theywere greeted at Larne by a large crowd vociferously cheering Carson, andsinging the National Anthem. A still larger concourse of people, thoughit could not be more hostile, awaited Mr. Churchill at the MidlandStation in Belfast and along the route to the Grand Central Hotel. Whenhe started from the hotel early in the afternoon for the football fieldthe crowd in Royal Avenue was densely packed and actively demonstratingits unfavourable opinion of the distinguished visitor; on whom, however, none desired or attempted to inflict any physical injury, although theinvoluntary swaying of so great a mass of men was in danger for amoment of overturning the motor-car in which he and his wife wereseated. 

The way to the meeting took the Minister from the Unionist to theNationalist district and afforded him a practical demonstration of thegulf between the "two nations" which he and his colleagues were bentupon treating as one. The moment he crossed the boundary, the booing andgroaning of one area was succeeded by enthusiastic cheers in the other;grotesque effigies of Redmond and of himself in one street were replacedby equally unflattering effigies of Londonderry and Carson in the next;in Royal Avenue both men and women looked like tearing him in pieces, inFalls Road they thronged so close to shake his hand that "Mr. HamarGreenwood found it necessary" (so the _Times_ Correspondent reported)"to stand on the footboard outside the car and relieve the pressure. "

It was expected that Mr. Churchill would return to his hotel after themeeting, and there had been no shrinkage in the crowd in the interval, nor any change in its sentiments. The police decided that it would bewiser for him to depart by another route. He was therefore taken by backstreets to the Midland terminus, and without waiting for the ordinarytrain by which he had arranged to travel, was as hastily as possibledespatched to Larne by a special train before it was generally knownthat Royal Avenue and York Street were to see him no more. Mr. Churchilltells us in his brilliant biography of his father that when LordRandolph arrived at Larne in 1886 "he was welcomed like a King. " His ownarrival at the same port was anything but regal, and his departure moreresembled that of the "thief in the night, " of whom Lord Randolph hadbidden Ulster beware. 

So this memorable pilgrimage ended. Of the speech itself which Mr. Churchill delivered to some thousands of Nationalists, many of whom werebrought by special train from Dublin, it is unnecessary here to say morethan that Sir Edward Carson described it a few days later as a "speechfull of eloquent platitudes, " and that it certainly did little tosatisfy the demand for information about the Home Rule Bill which was tobe produced in the coming session of Parliament. 

The undoubted importance which this visit of Mr. Churchill to Belfastand its attendant circumstances had in the development of the UlsterMovement is the justification for treating it in what may appear to bedisproportionate detail. From it dates the first clear realisation evenby hostile critics in England, and probably by Ministers themselves, that the policy of Ulster as laid down at Craigavon could not bedismissed with a sneer, although it is true that there were many HomeRulers who never openly abandoned the pretence that it could. Not lessimportant was the effect in Ulster itself. The Unionist Council hadproved itself in earnest; it could, and was prepared to, do more thanorganise imposing political demonstrations; and so the rank and filegained confidence in leaders who could act as well as make speeches, andwho had shown themselves in an emergency to be in thorough accord withpopular sentiment; the belief grew that the men who met in the Old TownHall would know how to handle any crisis that might arise, would nottimidly shrink from acting as occasion might require, and were quiteable to hold their own with the Government in tactical manoeuvres. Thisconfidence improved discipline. The Lodges and the Clubs and the generalbody of shipyard and other workers had less temptation to take mattersinto their own hands; they were content to wait for instructions fromheadquarters now that they could trust their leaders to give thenecessary instructions at the proper time. 

The net result, therefore, of an expedition which was designed to exposethe hollowness and the weakness of the Ulster case was to augment theprestige of the Ulster leaders and the self-confidence of the Ulsterpeople, and to make both leaders and followers understand better thanbefore the strength of the position in which they were entrenched. 

FOOTNOTES:

[14] See _ante_, p. 38. 

[15] _The Times_, January 18th, 1912. 

[16] _The Times_, January 26th, 1912. 

[17] _The Standard_, January 18th, 1912. 

[18] _The Saturday Review_, January 27th, 1912. 

[19] _The Times_, January 20th, 1912. 

[20] See Interview with Mr. F. W. Warden in _The Standard_, February 8th, 1912. 

[21] See Dublin Correspondent's telegram in _The Times_, January 29th, 1912. 

CHAPTER VII

"WHAT ANSWER FROM THE NORTH?"

Public curiosity as to the proposals that the coming Home Rule Billmight contain was not set at rest by Mr. Churchill's oration in Belfast. The constitution-mongers were hard at work with suggestions. Attemptswere made to conciliate hesitating opinion by representing Irish HomeRule as a step in the direction of a general federal system for theUnited Kingdom, and by tracing an analogy with the constitutions alreadygranted to the self-governing Dominions. Closely connected with thefederal idea was the question of finance. There was lively speculationas to what measure of control over taxation the Bill would confer on theIrish Parliament, and especially whether it would be given the power toimpose duties of Customs and Excise. Home Rulers themselves were sharplydivided on the question. At a conference held at the London School ofEconomics on the 10th of January, 1912, Professor T. M. Kettle, Mr. Erskine Childers, and Mr. Thomas Lough, M. P. , declared themselves infavour of Irish fiscal autonomy, while Lord Macdonnell opposed the ideaas irreconcilable with the fiscal policy of Great Britain. [22] Thelatter opinion was very forcibly maintained a few weeks later by amember of the Government with some reputation as an economist. Speakingto a branch of the United Irish League in London, Mr. J. M. Robertson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, summarily rejected fiscalautonomy for Ireland, which, he said, "really meant a claim forseparation. " "To give fiscal autonomy, " he added, "would meandisintegration of the United Kingdom. Fiscal autonomy for Ireland putan end altogether to all talk of Federal Home Rule, and he could see nohope for a Home Rule Bill if it included fiscal autonomy. "[23]

Although the Secretary to the Board of Trade was probably not in theconfidence of the Cabinet, many people took Mr. Robertson's speech as anindication of the limits of financial control that the Bill would giveto Ireland. On the same day that it was delivered the DublinCorrespondent of _The Times_ reported that the demand of theNationalists for control of Customs and Excise was rapidly growing, andthat any Bill which withheld it, even if it could scrape through aNational Convention, "would never survive the two succeeding years ofagitation and criticism"; and he agreed with Mr. Robertson that if, onthe other hand, fiscal autonomy should be conceded, it would destroy allprospect of a settlement on federal lines, and would "establish virtualseparation between Ireland and Great Britain. " He predicted that"Ulster, of course, would resist to the bitter end. "[24]

Ulster, in point of fact, took but a secondary interest in the question. Her people were indeed opposed to anything that would enlarge theseparation from England, or emphasise it, and, as they realised, likethe Secretary to the Board of Trade, that fiscal autonomy would havethis effect, they opposed fiscal autonomy; but they cared little aboutthe thing in itself one way or the other. Nor did they greatly concernthemselves whether Home Rule proceeded on federal lines or any otherlines; nor whether some apt analogy could or could not be found betweenIreland and the Dominions of the Crown thousands of miles oversea. Having made up their minds that no Dublin Parliament should exercisejurisdiction over themselves, they did not worry themselves much aboutthe powers with which such a Parliament might be endowed. It isnoteworthy, however, in view of the importance which the questionafterwards attained, that so early as January 1912 Sir Edward Carson, speaking in Manchester, maintained that without fiscal autonomy HomeRule was impossible, [25] and that some months later Mr. Bonar Law, in aspeech at Glasgow on the 21st of May, said that if the Unionist Partywere in a position where they had to concede Home Rule to Ireland theywould include fiscal autonomy in the grant. [26] These leaders, who, unlike the Liberal Ministers, had some knowledge of the Irishtemperament, realised from the first the absurdity of Mr. Asquith'sattempt to satisfy the demands of "the rebel party" by offeringsomething very different from what that party demanded. The Ulsterleader and the leader of the Unionist Party knew as well as anybody thatfiscal autonomy meant "virtual separation between Ireland and GreatBritain, " but they also knew that separation was the ultimate aim ofNationalist policy, and that there could be no finality in the Liberalcompromise; and they no doubt agreed with the forcible language used byMr. Balfour in the previous autumn, when he said that "the rotten hybridsystem of a Parliament with municipal duties and a national feelingseemed to be the dream of political idiots. "

The ferment of speculation as to the Government's intentions continuedduring the early weeks of the Parliamentary session, which opened on the14th of February, but all inquiries by members of the House of Commonswere met by variations on the theme "Wait and See. " Unionists, however, realised that it was not in Parliament, but outside, that the onlyeffective work could be done, in the hope of forcing a dissolution ofParliament before the Bill could become law. A vigorous campaign wasconducted throughout the country, especially in Lancashire, andarrangements were made for a monster demonstration in Belfast, whichshould serve both as a counter-blast to the Churchill fiasco, and forenabling English and Scottish Unionists to test for themselves thetemper of the Ulster resistance. In the belief that the Home Rule Billwould be introduced before Easter, it was decided to hold this meetingin the Recess, as Mr. Bonar Law had promised to speak, and a number ofEnglish Members of Parliament wished to be present. At the last momentthe Government announced that the Bill would not be presented till the11th of April, after Parliament reassembled, and its provisions weretherefore still unknown when the demonstration took place on the 9th inthe Show Ground of the Royal Agricultural Society at Balmoral, a suburbof Belfast. 

Feeling ran high as the date of the double event approached, and theindignant sense of wrong that prevailed in Ulster was finely voiced in apoem, entitled "Ulster 1912, " written by Mr. Kipling for the occasionwhich appeared in _The Morning Post_ on the day of the Balmoraldemonstration, of which the first and last stanzas were:

 "The dark eleventh hour Draws on, and sees us sold To every evil Power We fought against of old. Rebellion, rapine, hate, Oppression, wrong, and greed Are loosed to rule our fate, By England's act and deed. 

 "Believe, we dare not boast, Believe, we do not fear-- We stand to pay the cost In all that men hold dear. What answer from the North? One Law, One Land, One Throne. If England drive us forth We shall not fall alone!"

The preparations for the Unionist leader's coming visit to Belfast hadexcited the keenest interest throughout England and Scotland. Coincidingas it did with the introduction of the Government's Bill, it wasrecognised to be the formal countersigning by the whole Unionist Partyof Great Britain of Ulster's proclamation of her determination to resisther forcible degradation in constitutional status. The same note ofmingled reproach and defiance which sounded in Kipling's verses washeard in the grave warning addressed by _The Times_ to the country in aleading article on the morning of the meeting:

 "Nobody of common judgment and common knowledge of political movements can honestly doubt the exceptional gravity of the occasion, and least of all can any such doubt be felt by any who know the men of Ulster. To make light of the deep-rooted convictions which fill the minds of those who will listen to Mr. Bonar Law to-day is a shallow and an idle affectation, or a token of levity and of ignorance. Enlightened Liberalism may smile at the beliefs and the passions of the Ulster Protestants, but it was those same beliefs and passions, in the forefathers of the men who will gather in Belfast to-day, which saved Ireland for the British Crown, and freed the cause of civil and religious liberty in these islands from its last dangerous foes.... It is useless to argue that they are mistaken. They have reasons, never answered yet, for believing that they are not mistaken.... Their temper is an ultimate fact which British statesmen and British citizens have to face. These men cannot be persuaded to submit to Home Rule. Are Englishmen and Scotchmen prepared to fasten it upon them by military force? That is the real Ulster question. "

Other great English newspapers wrote in similar strain, and the supportthus given was of the greatest possible encouragement to the Ulsterpeople, who were thereby assured that their standpoint was notmisunderstood and that the justice of their "loyalist" claims wasappreciated across the Channel. 

Among the numberless popular demonstrations which marked the history ofUlster's stand against Home Rule, four stand out pre-eminent in theimpressiveness of their size and character. Those who attended theUlster Convention of 1892 were persuaded that no political meeting couldever be more inspiring; but many of them lived to acknowledge that itwas far surpassed at Craigavon in 1911. The Craigavon meeting, though insome respects as important as any of the series, was, from a spectacularpoint of view, much less imposing than the assemblage which listened toMr. Bonar Law at Balmoral on Easter Tuesday, 1912; and the latteroccasion, though never surpassed in splendour and magnitude by anysingle gathering, was in significance but a prelude to the magnificentclimax reached in the following September on the day when the Covenantwas signed throughout Ulster. 

The Balmoral demonstration had, however, one distinctive feature. At itthe Unionist Party of Great Britain met and grasped the hand of UlsterLoyalism. It gave the leader and a large number of his followers anopportunity to judge for themselves the strength and sincerity ofUlster, and at the same time it served to show the Ulstermen the weightof British opinion ready to back them. Mr. Bonar Law was accompanied toBelfast by no less than seventy Members of Parliament, representingEnglish, Scottish, and Welsh constituencies, not a few of whom hadalready attained, or afterwards rose to, political distinction. Amongthem were Mr. Walter Long, Lord Hugh Cecil, Sir Robert Finlay, LordCharles Beresford, Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Amery, Mr. J. D. Baird, SirArthur Griffith-Boscawen, Mr. Ian Malcolm, Lord Claud Hamilton, Mr. J. G. Butcher, Mr. Ernest Pollock, Mr. George Cave, Mr. Felix Cassel, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Mr. Scott Dickson, Mr. W. Peel, Captain Gilmour, Mr. GeorgeLloyd, Mr. J. W. Hills, Mr. George Lane-Fox, Mr. Stuart-Wortley, Mr. J. F. P. Rawlinson, Mr. H. J. Mackinder, and Mr. Herbert Nield. 

The reception of the Unionist Leader at Larne on Easter Monday waswonderful, even to those who knew what a Larne welcome to loyalistleaders could be, and who recalled the scenes there during the historicvisits of Lord Randolph Churchill, Lord Salisbury, and Mr. Balfour. "Ifthis is how you treat your friends, " said Mr. Bonar Law simply, in replyto one of the innumerable addresses presented to him, "I am glad I amnot an enemy. " Before reaching Belfast he had ample opportunity at everystopping-place of his train to note the fervour of the populace. "Areall these people landlords?" he asked (in humorous allusion to theLiberal legend that Ulster Unionism was manufactured by a fewaristocratic landowners), as he saw every platform thronged withenthusiastic crowds of men and women, the majority of whom wereevidently of the poorer classes. In Belfast the concourse of people wasso dense in the streets that the motor-car in which Mr. Bonar Law andSir Edward Carson sat side by side found it difficult to make its wayto the Reform Club, the headquarters of what had once been UlsterLiberalism, where an address was presented in which it was stated thatthe conduct of the Government "will justify loyal Ulster in resorting tothe most extreme measures in resisting Home Rule. " In his reply Mr. Bonar Law gave them "on behalf of the Unionist Party thismessage--though the brunt of the battle will be yours, there will not bewanting help from 'across the Channel. '" At Comber, where a stop wasmade on the way to Mount Stewart, he asked himself how Radical Scotsmenwould like to be treated as the Government were treating ProtestantUlster. "I know Scotland well, " he replied to his own question, "and Ibelieve that, rather than submit to such fate, the Scottish people wouldface a second Bannockburn or a second Flodden. "

These few quotations from the first utterances of Mr. Bonar Law on hisarrival are sufficient to show how complete was the understandingbetween him and the Ulster people even before the great demonstration ofthe following day. He had, as _The Times_ Correspondent noted, "alreadyfound favour with the Belfast crowd. All the way from Larne by train toBelfast and through Belfast by motor-car to Newtownards and MountStewart, his progress was a triumph. "

The remarks of the same experienced observer on the eve of the Balmoralmeeting are worth recording, especially as his anticipations were amplyfulfilled. 

 "To-morrow's demonstration, " he telegraphed from Belfast, "both in numbers and enthusiasm, promises to be the most remarkable ever seen in Ireland. If expectations are realised the assemblage of men will be twice as numerous as the whole white population of the Witwatersrand, whose grievances led to the South African War, and they will represent a community greater in numbers than the white population of South Africa as a whole. Unless all the signs are misleading, it will be the demonstration of a community in the deadliest earnest. By the Protestant community of Ulster, Home Rule is regarded as a menace to their faith, to their material well-being and prosperity, and to their freedom and national traditions, and thus all the most potent motives which in history have stirred men to their greatest efforts are here in operation. "

No written description, unless by the pen of some gifted imaginativewriter, could convey any true impression of the scenes that werewitnessed the following day in the Show Ground at Balmoral and the roadsleading to it from the heart of the city. The photographs published atthe time give some idea of the apparently unbounded ocean of earnest, upturned faces, closely packed round the several platforms, andstretching away far into a dim and distant background; but even theycould not record the impressive stillness of the vast multitude, itsorderliness, which required the presence of not a single policeman, itsspirit of almost religious solemnity which struck every observantonlooker. No profusion of superlative adjectives can avail to reproducesuch scenes, any more than words, no matter how skilfully chosen, canconvey the tone of a violin in the hands of a master. Even the merenumber of those who took part in the demonstration cannot be guessedwith any real accuracy. There was a procession of men, whose finephysique and military smartness were noticed by visitors from England, which was reported to have taken three hours to pass a given pointmarching in fours, and was estimated to be not less than 100, 000 strong, while those who went independently to the ground or crowded the routewere reckoned to be at least as many more. The Correspondent of _TheTimes_ declared that "it was hardly by hyperbole that Sir Edward Carsonclaimed that it was one of the largest assemblies in the history of theworld. "

But the moral effect of such gatherings is not to be gauged by numbersalone. The demeanour of the people, which no organisation or stagemanagement could influence, impressed the English journalists andMembers of Parliament even more than the gigantic scale of thedemonstration. There was not a trace of the picnic spirit. There was nodrunkenness, no noisy buffoonery, no unseemly behaviour. The Ulsterhabit of combining politics and prayer--which was not departed from atBalmoral, where the proceedings were opened by the Primate of AllIreland and the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church--was jeered at bypeople who never witnessed an Ulster loyalist meeting; but the Editor of_The Observer_, himself a Roman Catholic, remarked with more insightthat "the Protestant mind does not use prayer simply as part of aparade;" and _The Times_ Correspondent, who has already been more thanonce quoted, was struck by the fervour with which at Balmoral "the wholeof the vast gathering joined in singing the 90th Psalm, " and he addedthe very just comment that "it is the custom in Ulster to mark in thissolemn manner the serious nature of the issue when the Union is thequestion, as something different from a question of mere partypolitics. "

The spectacular aspect of the demonstration was admirably managed. Asaluting point was so arranged that the procession, on entering theenclosure, could divide into two columns, one passing each side of asmall pavilion where Mr. Bonar Law, Sir Edward Carson, Lord Londonderry, and Mr. Walter Long stood to take the salute before proceeding to thestand which held the principal platform for the delivery of thespeeches. In the centre of the ground was a signalling-tower with aflagstaff 90 feet high, on which a Union Jack measuring 48 feet by 25and said to be the largest ever woven, was broken at the moment when theResolution against Home Rule was put to the meeting. 

Mr. Bonar Law, visibly moved by the scene before him, made a speech thatprofoundly affected his audience, although it was characteristicallyfree from rhetorical display. A recent incident in Dublin, where thesight of the British Flag flying within view of a Nationalist meetinghad been denounced as "an intolerable insult, " supplied him, when hecompared it with the spectacle presented by the meeting, with an aptillustration of the contrast between "the two nations" in Ireland--theloyal and the disloyal. He told the Ulstermen that he had come to themas the leader of the Unionist Party to give them the assurance that"that party regard your cause, not as yours alone, nor as ours alone, but as the cause of the Empire"; the meeting, which he had expected tobe a great gathering but which far exceeded his expectation, provedthat Ulster's hostility to Home Rule, far from having slackened, asenemies had alleged, had increased and solidified with the passingyears; they were men "animated by a unity of purpose, by a fixity ofresolution which nothing can shake and which must prove irresistible, "to whom he would apply Cromwell's words to his Ironsides: "You are menwho know what you are fighting for, and love what you know. " Then, afteran analysis of the practical evils that Home Rule would engender and thebenefits which legislative union secured, he again emphasised the lackof mandate for the Government policy. His hearers, he said, "knew theshameful story": how the Radicals had twice failed to obtain thesanction of the British people for Home Rule, "and now for the thirdtime they were trying to carry it not only without the sanction, butagainst the will, of the British people. "

The peroration which followed made an irresistible appeal to a peoplealways mindful of the glories of the relief of Derry. Mr. Bonar Lawwarned them that the Ministerial majority in the House of Commons, "nowcemented by £400 a year, " could not be broken up, but would have theirown way. He therefore said to them:

 "With all solemnity--you must trust in yourselves. Once again you hold the pass--the pass for the Empire. You are a besieged city. The timid have left you; your Lundys have betrayed you; but you have closed your gates. The Government have erected by their Parliament Act a boom against you to shut you off from the help of the British people. You will burst that boom. That help will come, and when the crisis is over men will say to you in words not unlike those used by Pitt--you have saved yourselves by your exertions and you will save the Empire by your example. "

The overwhelming ovation with which Sir Edward Carson was received upontaking the president's chair at the chief platform, in the absencethrough illness of the Duke of Abercorn, proved that he had already wonthe confidence and the affection of the Ulster people to a degree thatseemed to leave little room for growth, although every subsequentappearance he made among them in the years that lay ahead seemed to addintensity to their demonstrations of personal devotion. The mostdramatic moment at Balmoral--if for once the word so hackneyed andmisused by journalists may be given its true signification--the mostdramatic moment was when the Ulster leader and the leader of the wholeUnionist Party each grasped the other's hand in view of the assembledmultitude, as though formally ratifying a compact made thus publicly onthe eve of battle. It was the consummation of the purpose of thisassembly of the Unionist hosts on Ulster soil, and gave assurance ofunity of aim and undivided command in the coming struggle. 

Of the other speeches delivered, many of them of a high quality, especially, perhaps, those of Lord Hugh Cecil, Sir Robert Finlay, andMr. Scott Dickson, it is enough to say that they all conveyed the samemessage of encouragement to Ulster, the same promise of undeviatingsupport. One detail, however, deserves mention, because it shows thedirection in which men's thoughts were then moving. Mr. Walter Long, whose great services to the cause of the Union procured him a welcomesecond in warmth to that of no other leader, after thanking Londonderryand Carson "for the great lead they have given us in recent difficultweeks "--an allusion to the Churchill incident that was not lost on theaudience--added with a blunt directness characteristic of the speaker:"If they are going to put Lord Londonderry and Sir Edward Carson intothe dock, they will have to find one large enough to hold the wholeUnionist Party. "

The Balmoral demonstration was recognised on all sides as one of thechief landmarks in the Ulster Movement. The Craigavon policy was notonly reaffirmed with greater emphasis than before by the people ofUlster themselves, but it received the deliberate endorsement of theUnionist Party in England and Scotland. Moreover, as Mr. Long's speechexplicitly promised, and Mr. Bonar Law's speech unmistakably implied, British support was not to be dependent on Ulster's opposition to HomeRule being kept within strictly legal limits. Indeed, it had becomeincreasingly evident that opposition so limited must be impotent, since, as Mr. Bonar Law pointed out, Ministers and their majority in the Houseof Commons were in Mr. Redmond's pocket, and had no choice but to "toethe line, " while the "boom" which they had erected by the Parliament Actcut off Ulster from access to the British constituencies, unless thatboom could be burst as the boom across the Foyle was broken by the_Mountjoy_ in 1689. The Unionist leader had warned the Ulstermen thatin these circumstances they must expect nothing from Parliament, butmust trust in themselves. They did not mistake his meaning, and theywere quite ready to take his advice. 

Coming, as it did, two days before the introduction of the Government'sBill, the Balmoral demonstration profoundly influenced opinion in thecountry. The average Englishman, when his political party is in aminority, damns the Government, shrugs his shoulders, and goes on hisway, not rejoicing indeed, but with apathetic resignation till thependulum swings again. He now awoke to the fact that the Ulstermen meantbusiness. He realised that a political crisis of the first magnitude wasvisible on the horizon. The vague talk about "civil war" began to lookas if it might have something in it, and it was evident that theprovisions of the forthcoming Bill, about which there had been so mucheager anticipation, would be of quite secondary importance since neitherthe Cabinet nor the House of Commons would have the last word. 

Supporters of the Government in the Press could think of nothing betterto do in these circumstances than to pour out abuse, occasionally variedby ridicule, on the Unionist leaders, of which Sir Edward Carson came infor the most generous portion. He was by turns everything that was bad, dangerous, and absurd, from Mephistopheles to a madman. "F. C. G. "summarised the Balmoral meeting pictorially in a _Westminster Gazette_cartoon as a costermonger's donkey-cart in which Carson, Londonderry, and Bonar Law, refreshed by "Orangeade, " took "an Easter Jaunt inUlster, " and other caricaturists used their pencils with less humour andmore malice with the same object of belittling the demonstration withridicule. But ridicule is not so potent a weapon in England or in Ulsteras it is said to be in France. It did nothing to weaken the Ulstercause; it even strengthened it in some ways. It was about this time thathostile writers began to refer to "King Carson, " and to represent him asexercising regal sway over his "subjects" in Ulster. Those "subjects"were delighted; they took it as a compliment to their leader's positionand power, and did not in the least resent the role assigned tothemselves. 

On the other hand, they did resent very hotly the vulgar insolence oftenlevelled at their "Sir Edward. " He himself was always quite indifferentto it, sometimes even amused by it. On one occasion, when somethingparticularly outrageous had appeared with reference to him in someRadical paper, he delighted a public meeting by solemnly reading thepassage, and when the angry cries of "Shame, shame" had subsided, sayingwith a smile: "This sort of thing is only the manure that fertilises myreputation with you who know me. "

And that was true. If Home Rulers, whether in Ireland or in GreatBritain, ever seriously thought of conciliating Ulster, as Mr. Redmondprofessed to desire, they never made a greater mistake than in sayingand writing insulting things about Carson. It only endeared him more andmore to his followers, and it intensified the bitterness of theirfeeling against the Nationalists and all their works. An almost equallyshort-sighted error on the part of hostile critics was the idea that theattitude of Ulster as exhibited at Craigavon and Balmoral should berepresented as mere bluster and bluff, to which the only proper replywas contempt. There never was anything further removed from the truth, as anyone ought to have known who had the smallest acquaintance withIrish history or with the character of the race that had supplied thebackbone of Washington's army; but, if there had been at any time anelement of bluff in their attitude, their contemptuous critics took thesurest means of converting it into grim earnestness of purpose. Mr. Redmond himself was ill-advised enough to set an example in thisrespect. In an article published by _Reynold's Newspaper_ in January hehad scoffed at the "stupid, hollow, and unpatriotic bellowings" of theLoyalists in Belfast. Some few opponents had enough sense to take adifferent line in their comments on Balmoral. One article in particularwhich appeared in _The Star_ on the day of the demonstration attractedmuch attention for this reason. 

 "We have never yielded, " it said, "to the temptation to deride or to belittle the resistance of Ulster to Home Rule.... The subjugation of Protestant Ulster by force is one of those things that do not happen in our politics.... It is, we know, a popular delusion that Ulster is a braggart whose words are empty bluff. We are convinced that Ulster means what she says, and that she will make good every one of her warnings. "

_The Star_ went on to implore Liberals not to be driven "into anattitude of bitter hostility to the Ulster Protestants, " with whom itdeclared they had much in common. 

After Balmoral there was certainly more disposition than before on thepart of Liberal Home Rulers to acknowledge the sincerity of Ulster andthe gravity of the position created by her opposition, and thisdisposition showed itself in the debates on the Bill; but, speakinggenerally, the warning of _The Star_ was disregarded by its politicaladherents, and its neglect contributed not a little to the embittermentof the controversy. 

FOOTNOTES:

[22] _Annual Register_, 1912, p. 3. 

[23] _The Times_, February 3rd, 1912. 

[24] Ibid. 

[25] _Annual Register_, 1912, p. 7. 

[26] Ibid. , p. 126. 

CHAPTER VIII

THE EXCLUSION OF ULSTER

Within forty-eight hours of the Balmoral meeting the Prime Ministermoved for leave to introduce the third Home Rule Bill in the House ofCommons. Carson immediately stated the Ulster case in a powerful speechwhich left no room for doubt that, while every clause in the Bill wouldbe contested, it was the setting up of an executive administrationresponsible to a Parliament in Dublin--that is to say, the centralprinciple of the measure--that would be most strenuously opposed. 

There is no occasion here to explain in detail the proposals containedin Mr. Asquith's Home Rule Bill. They form part of the general historyof the period, and are accessible to all who care to examine them. Ourconcern is with the endeavour of Ulster to prevent, if possible, thepassage of the Bill to the Statute-book, and, if that should proveimpracticable, to prevent its enforcement "in those districts of whichthey had control. " But one or two points that were made in the course ofthe debates which occupied Parliament for the rest of the year 1912claim a moment's notice in their bearing on the subject in hand. 

Mr. Bonar Law lost no time in fully redeeming the promises he made atBalmoral. Challenged to repeat in Parliament the charges he had madeagainst the Government in Ulster, he not only repeated them withemphasis, but by closely-knit reasoning justified them with chapter andverse. As to Balmoral, "it really was not like a politicaldemonstration; it was the expression of the soul of a people. " Hedeclared that "the gulf between the two peoples in Ireland was reallyfar wider than the gulf between Ireland and Great Britain. " He thendealt specifically with the threatened resistance of Ulster. "Thesepeople in Ulster, " he said, "are under no illusion. They know theycannot fight the British Army. The people of Ulster know that, if thesoldiers receive orders to shoot, it will be their duty to obey. Theywill have no ill-will against them for obeying. But they are ready, inwhat they believe to be the cause of justice and liberty, to lay downtheir lives. How are you going to overcome that resistance? DoHonourable Members believe that any Prime Minister could give orders toshoot down men whose only crime is that they refuse to be driven out ofour community and be deprived of the privilege of British citizenship?The thing is impossible. All your talk about details, the union ofhearts and the rest of it, is a sham. This is a reality. It is a rock, and on that rock this Bill will inevitably make shipwreck. "

The Unionist leader then made a searching exposure of the traffic andbargaining between the Cabinet and the Nationalists by which the supportof the latter had been bought for a Budget which they hated, the pricepaid being the Premier's improper advice to the Crown, leading to themutilation of the Constitution; the acknowledgment in the preamble tothe Parliament Act that an immediate reform of the Second Chamber was a"debt of honour"; the omission to redeem that debt, which had provided anew proverb--"Lying as a preamble"; and, finally, the determination tocarry Home Rule after deliberately keeping it out of sight during theelections. The Prime Minister's "debt of honour must wait until he haspaid his debt of shame"; and the latter debt was being paid by theproposals they were then debating. If those proposals had been submittedto the electors, "there would be a difference, " said Mr. Bonar Law, "between the Unionists in England and the Unionists in Ireland. Nowthere is none. We can imagine nothing which the Unionists in Ireland cando which will not be justified against a trick of this kind. "

Dissatisfaction with the financial clauses of the Bill was expressed atonce by the General Council of County Councils in Ireland, a purelyNationalist body; but on the 23rd of April a Nationalist Convention inDublin, under the influence of Mr. Redmond's oratory, accepted the wholeof the Government's proposals with enthusiasm. The first and secondreadings of the Bill were duly carried by the normal Government majorityof about a hundred Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist votes, and thecommittee stage opened on the 11th of June. On that day an amendment wasdown for debate which required the most careful consideration by therepresentatives of Ulster, since their attitude now might have animportant bearing on their future policy, and a false step at this stagemight easily prove embarrassing later on. The author of this amendmentwas Mr. Agar-Robartes, a Cornish Liberal Member, whose proposal was toexclude the four counties of Antrim, Derry, Down, and Armagh from thejurisdiction of the proposed Irish Parliament, a gratifying proof thatCraigavon and Balmoral were bearing fruit. 

A conference of Ulster Members and Peers, and some English Membersclosely identified with Irish affairs, of whom Mr. Walter Long was one, met at Londonderry House before the sitting of the House on the 11th ofJune to decide what course to take on this proposal. 

It was not surprising to find that there were sharp differences ofopinion among those present, for there were obvious objections tosupporting the amendment and equally obvious objections to votingagainst it. The opposition of Ulster for more than a quarter of acentury had been directed against Home Rule for any part of Ireland andin any shape or form. No suggestion had ever been made by any of herspokesmen that the Protestant North, or any part of it, should be dealtwith separately from the rest of the island, although Carson and othershad pointed out that all the arguments in support of Home Rule wereequally valid for treating Ulster as a unit. There were both economicand administrative difficulties in such a scheme which were sufficientlyobvious, though by no means insuperable; but what weighed far moreheavily in the minds of the Ulster members was the anticipation thattheir acceptance of the proposal would probably be represented byenemies as a desertion of all the Irish Loyalists outside the fourcounties named in the amendment, with whom there was in every part ofUlster the most powerful sentiment of solidarity. The idea of taking anyaction apart from these friends and associates, and of adopting a policythat might seem to imply the abandonment of their opposition to the mainprinciple of the Bill, was one that could not be entertained exceptunder the most compelling necessity. 

But, had not that necessity now arisen? The Ulster members had to keepin view the ultimate policy to which they were already committed. Thatpolicy, as laid down at Craigavon, was to take over, in the event of theHome Rule Bill being carried, the government "of those districts whichthey could control" in trust for the Imperial Parliament, and to resistby force if necessary the establishment of the Dublin jurisdiction overthose districts. The policy of resistance was always recognised as beingstrictly limited in area; no one ever supposed that Ulster couldforcibly resist Home Rule being set up in the south and west. Thelikelihood of failure to bring about a dissolution before the Billbecame law had to be faced, and if no General Election took place therewould be no alternative to resistance. If, then, it were decided to voteagainst an amendment offering salvation to the four most loyalistcounties, what would be their position if ultimately driven to take uparms? Except as to a matter of detail concerning the precise areaproposed to be excluded from the Bill, would they not be told that theywere fighting for what they might have had by legislation, and what theyhad deliberately refused to accept? And if they so acted, could theyexpect not to forfeit the support of the great and growing volume ofpublic opinion which now sympathised with Ulster? They could not, ofcourse, secure themselves against malicious misrepresentation of theirmotives, but the Ulster members sincerely believed, and many in theSouth shared the opinion, that if it came to the worst they could be ofmore use to the Southern Unionists outside a Dublin Parliament than asmembers of it, where they would be an impotent minority. Moreover, itwas perfectly understood that Ulster was resolved in any case not toenter a legislature in College Green, and there would, therefore, be nomore "desertion" of Unionists outside the excluded area if the exclusionwere effected by an amendment to the Bill, than if it were the result ofwhat Mr. Bonar Law had called "trusting to themselves. "

The considerations thus briefly summarised were thoroughly discussed inall their bearings at the conference at Londonderry House. It was one ofmany occasions when Sir Edward Carson's colleagues had an opportunity ofperceiving how his penetrating intellect explored the intricate windingsof a complicated political problem, weighing all the alternatives ofprocedure with a clear insight into the appearance that any line ofconduct would present to other and perhaps hostile minds, calculatinglike a chess-master move and counter-move far ahead of the present, and, while adhering undeviatingly to principle, using the judgment of aconsummate strategist to decide upon the action to be taken at any givenmoment. He had an astonishing faculty of discarding everything that wasunessential and fastening on the thing that really mattered in anysituation. His strength in counsel lay in the rare combination of thesequalities of the trained lawyer with the gift of intuition, which womenclaim as their distinguishing characteristic; and it often extorted fromNationalists the melancholy admission that if Carson had been on theirside their cause would have triumphed long ago. 

His advice now was that the Agar-Robartes amendment should be supported;and, although some of those present required a good deal of persuasion, it was ultimately decided unanimously that this course should befollowed. The wisdom of the decision was never afterwards questioned, and, indeed, was abundantly confirmed by subsequent events. 

Mr. Agar-Robartes moved his amendment the same afternoon, summarisinghis argument in the dictum, denied by Mr. William Redmond, that "Orangebitters will not mix with Irish whisky. " The debate, which lasted threedays, was the most important that took place in committee on the Bill, for in the course of it the whole Ulster question was exhaustivelydiscussed. Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Churchill had thrown out hints in thesecond reading debate that the Government might do something to meet theUlster case. The Prime Minister was now pressed to say what these hintsmeant. Had the Government any policy in regard to Ulster? Had theyconsidered how they could deal with the threatened resistance? Mr. BonarLaw told the Government that they must know that, if they employedtroops to coerce the Ulster Loyalists, Ministers who gave the order"would run a greater risk of being lynched in London than the Loyalistsof Ulster would run of being shot in Belfast. " Every argument in favourof Home Rule was, he said, equally cogent against subjecting Ulster toHome Rule contrary to her own desire. If the South of Ireland objectedto being governed from Westminster, the North of Ireland quite asstrongly objected to being ruled from Dublin. If England, as wasalleged, was incapable of governing Ireland according to Irish ideas, the Nationalists were fully as incapable of governing the northerncounties according to Ulster ideas. If Ireland, with only one-fifteenthof the population of the United Kingdom, had a right to choose its ownform of government, by what equity could the same right be denied toUlster, with one-fourth of the population of Ireland?

As had been anticipated at Londonderry House, Mr. Asquith and some ofhis followers did their best to drive a wedge between the Ulstermen andthe Southern Unionists, by contending that the former, in supporting theamendment, were deserting their friends. Mr. Balfour declared in answerto this that "nothing could relieve Unionists in the rest of Irelandexcept the defeat of the measure as a whole"; and a crushing reply wasgiven by Mr. J. H. Campbell and Mr. Walter Guinness, both of whom wereUnionists from the South of Ireland. Mr. Guinness frankly acknowledgedthat "it was the duty of Ulster members to take this opportunity oftrying to secure for their constituents freedom from this iniquitousmeasure. It would be merely a dog-in-the-manger policy for those wholived outside Ulster to grudge relief to their co-religionists merelybecause they could not share it. Such self-denial on Ulster's part wouldin no way help them (the Southerners) and it would only injure theircompatriots in the North. "

Sir Edward Carson, in supporting the amendment, insisted that "Ulsterwas not asking for anything" except to be left within the ImperialConstitution; she "had not demanded any separate Parliament. " Heaccepted the "basic principle" of the amendment, but would not becontent with the four counties which alone it proposed to exclude fromthe Bill. He only accepted it, however, on two assumptions--first, thatthe Bill was to become law; and, second, that it was to be, as Mr. Asquith had assured them, part of a federal system for the UnitedKingdom. If the first steps were being taken to construct a federalsystem, there was no precedent for coercing Ulster to form part of afederal unit which she refused to join. He had been Solicitor-Generalwhen the Act establishing the Commonwealth of Australia was beingdiscussed, and it never would have passed, he declared, "if every singleclause had not been agreed to by every single one of the communitiesconcerned. " Ministers were always basing their Irish policy on Dominionanalogies, but could anyone, Carson asked, imagine the ImperialGovernment sending troops to compel the Transvaal or New South Wales tocome into a federal system against their will?

The arguments in favour of the amendment were also stated withuncompromising force by Mr. William Moore, Mr. Charles Craig, and hisbrother Captain James Craig, the last-mentioned taking up a challengethrown down by Mr. Birrell in a maladroit speech which had expresseddoubt as to the reality of the danger to be apprehended in Ulster. Captain Craig said they would immediately take steps in Ulster toconvince the Chief Secretary of their sincerity. Lord Hugh Cecil, in anoutspoken speech, greatly to the taste of English Unionists, "had nohesitation in saying that Ulster would be perfectly right in resisting, and he hoped she would be successful. "

In the division on Mr. Agar-Robartes's amendment the Governmentmajority fell to sixty-nine, both the "Tellers" being usual supportersof the Ministry. Mr. F. E. Smith, in a vigorous speech to the BelfastOrangemen on the 12th of July, declared that "on the part of theGovernment the discussion (on Mr. Agar-Robartes's amendment) was a trap.... The Government hoped that Ulster would decline the amendment inorder that the Coalition might protest to the constituencies: 'Weoffered Ulster exclusion and Ulster refused exclusion--where is thegrievance of Ulster? where her justification for armed revolt?'" Thesnare was avoided; but the debate was a landmark in the movement, for itwas then that the spokesmen of Ulster for the first time publiclyaccepted the idea of separate treatment for themselves as a possiblealternative policy to the integral maintenance of the Union. 

The Government, for their part, made no response to the demand of BonarLaw and Carson that they should declare their intentions for dealingwith resistance in Ulster. It was clearly more than ever necessary forthe Ulstermen to "trust in themselves. " The debates on the Bill occupiedParliament till the end of the year, and beyond it, and great blocks ofclauses were carried under the guillotine closure without a word ofdiscussion, although they were packed with constitutional points, manyof which were of the highest moment. Over in Ulster, at the same time, those preparations were industriously carried forward which CaptainCraig told the House of Commons would be necessary to cure thescepticism of the Chief Secretary. 

In England and Scotland, also, Unionists did their utmost to make publicopinion realise the gravity of the crisis towards which the country wasdrifting under the Wait-and-See Ministry. Never before, probably, had somany great political meetings been held in any year as were held inevery part of the country in 1912. With the exception of those that tookplace in Ireland, the most striking was a monster gathering at Blenheimon the 27th of July, which was attended by delegates from every UnionistAssociation in the United Kingdom. 

A notable defeat of the Government in a by-election at Crewe, news ofwhich reached the meeting while the audience of some fifteen thousandpeople was assembling, was an encouraging sign of the trend of opinionin the country, and added confidence to the note of defiance thatsounded in the speeches of Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. F. E. Smith, and Sir EdwardCarson. 

The Unionist leader repeated, with added emphasis, what he had alreadysaid in the House of Commons, that he could imagine no length ofresistance to which Ulster might go in which he and the overwhelmingmajority of the British people would not be ready to give support. Heagain said that resistance would be justified only because the peoplehad not been consulted, and the Government's policy was "part of acorrupt parliamentary bargain. " He refused to acknowledge the right ofthe Government "to carry such a Revolution by such means, " and as theyappeared to be resolved to do so, Mr. Bonar Law and the party he led"would use any means to deprive them of the power they had usurped, andto compel them to face the people they had deceived. " Mr. F. E. Smithexpressed the same thought in a more epigrammatic antithesis: "We havecome to a clear issue between the party which says 'We will judge forthe democracy, ' and the party which says 'The democracy shall judgeyou. '"

The tremendous enthusiasm evoked by Mr. Bonar Law's pledge of support toUlster, and by Sir Edward Carson's announcement that they in Ulster"would shortly challenge the Government to interfere with them if theydared, and would with equanimity await the result, " was a sufficientproof, if proof were needed, that the intention of the Ulstermen tooffer forcible resistance to Home Rule had the whole-hearted sympathyand approval of the entire Unionist party in Great Britain, whoserepresentatives from every corner of the country were assembled atBlenheim. 

Liberals hoped and believed that this promise of support for the"rebellious" attitude of Ulster would alienate British opinion from theUnionist party. The supporters of the Government in the Press dailyproclaimed that it was doing so. When Parliament adjourned for thesummer recess, at the beginning of what journalists call "the sillyseason, " Mr. Churchill published two letters to a constituent inScotland which were intended to be a crushing indictment both of Ulsterand of her sympathisers in Great Britain. The Ulster menace was in hiseyes nothing but "melodramatic stuff, " and he sneeringly suggested thatthe Unionist leaders would be "unspeakably shocked and frightened" ifanything came of their "foolish and wicked words. " The letter waslengthy, and contained some telling phrases such as Mr. Churchill hasalways been skilful in coining; but the "turgid homily--a mixture ofsophistry, insult, and menace, " as _The Times_ not unfairly describedit, was less effective than the terse and simple rejoinder in which Mr. Bonar Law pointed out that Mr. Churchill's onslaught wounded hisfather's memory more deeply than it touched his living opponents, sinceLord Randolph's "incitement" of Ulster was at a time when Ulster couldnot be cast out from the Union without the consent of the Britishelectors. 

Mr. Churchill's epistles to Scottish Liberals started a correspondencewhich reverberated through the Press for weeks, breaking the monotony ofthe holiday season; but they entirely failed in their purpose, which wasto break the sympathy for Ulster in England and Scotland. In March theUnionists had won a seat at a by-election in South Manchester; thevictory at Crewe in July, which so cheered the gathering at Blenheim, was followed by still more striking victories in North-west Manchesterin August, and in Midlothian--Gladstone's old constituency--inSeptember; and perhaps a not less significant indication of the trend ofopinion so far as the Unionist party was concerned, was given by thelocal Unionist Association at Rochdale, which promptly repudiated itsselected candidate who had ventured to protest against the Blenheimspeech of the Unionist leader. In an analysis of electoral statisticspublished by _The Times_ on the 24th of August it was shown that, inthirty-eight contests since the General Election in December 1910, theUnionists had gained an advantage of more than 32, 000 votes overLiberals. And shortly afterwards, at a dinner in London to three newlyelected Unionists, Mr. Bonar Law pointed out that the results ofby-elections, if realised in the same proportion all over the country, would have given a substantial Unionist majority in the House ofCommons. 

The Ulster people had, therefore, much to encourage them at a time whenthey were preparing the most significant forward step in the movement, and the most solemn pronouncement of their unfaltering resolution neverto submit to the Dublin Parliament--the signing of the Ulster Covenant. Their policy of resistance, first propounded at Craigavon, reiterated atBalmoral, endorsed by British sympathisers at Blenheim, and specificallydefended in Parliament both by Unionist leaders like Mr. Bonar Law andMr. Long and by prominent members of the Unionist rank and file likeLord Hugh Cecil, had won the approval and support of great popularconstituencies in Lancashire and in Scotland, and had alienated nosection of Unionist opinion or of the Unionist Press. It was in nomerely satirical spirit that Carson wrote in August that he was gratefulto Mr. Churchill "for having twice within a few weeks done something tofocus public opinion on the stern realities of the situation inUlster. "[27] For that was the actual result of the "turgid homily. " Itproved of real service to the Ulster cause by bringing to light thecomplete solidarity of Unionist opinion in its support. That meant, inthe light of the electoral returns, that certainly more than half thenation sympathised with the measures that were being taken in Ulster, and that Ulster could well afford to smile at the mockery which EnglishHome Rulers deemed a sufficient weapon to demolish the "wooden guns" andthe "military play-acting of King Carson's Army. "

FOOTNOTES:

[27] See _The Times_, August 19th, 1912. 

CHAPTER IX

THE EVE OF THE COVENANT

There was one Liberal statesman, formerly the favourite lieutenant ofGladstone and the closest political ally of Asquith, who was under noillusion as to the character of the men with whom Asquith was nowprovoking a conflict. Speaking in Edinburgh on the 1st of November, 1911, that is, shortly after the Craigavon meeting, Lord Rosebery toldhis Scottish audience that "he loved Highlanders and he lovedLowlanders, but when he came to the branch of their race which had beengrafted on to the Ulster stem he took off his hat with reverence andawe. They were without exception the toughest, the most dominant, themost irresistible race that existed in the universe. "[28]

The kinship of this tough people with the Lowlanders of Scotland, incharacter as in blood, was never more signally demonstrated than whenthey decided, in one of the most intense crises of their history, toemulate the example of their Scottish forefathers in binding themselvestogether by a solemn League and Covenant to resist what they deemed tobe a tyrannical encroachment on their liberties and rights. 

The most impressive moment at the Balmoral meeting at Easter 1912 waswhen the vast assemblage, with uncovered heads, raised their hands andrepeated after Sir Edward Carson words abjuring Home Rule. The incidentsuggested to some of the local Unionist leaders that the spirit ofenthusiastic solidarity and determination thus manifested should not beallowed to evaporate, and the people so animated to disperse to the fourcorners of Ulster without any bond of mutual obligation. The idea of anoath of fidelity to the cause and to each other was mooted, andappeared to be favoured by many. The leader was consulted. He gave deep, anxious, and prolonged consideration to the proposal, calculating allthe consequences which, in various possible eventualities, might followits adoption. He was not only profoundly conscious of the moralresponsibility which he personally, and his colleagues, would beundertaking by the contemplated measure; he realised the numerouspractical difficulties there might be in honouring the bond, and hewould have nothing to do with a device which, under the guise of asolemn covenant, would be nothing more than a verbal manifesto. If thepeople were to be invited to sign anything of the sort, it must be areality, and he, as leader, must first see his way to make it a reality, whatever might happen. 

For, although Carson never shrank from responsibility, he never assumedit with levity, or without full consideration of all that it mightinvolve. Many a time, especially before he had fully tested for himselfthe temper of the Ulster people, he expressed to his intimates hiswonder whether the bulk of his followers sufficiently appreciated theseriousness of the course they had set out upon. Sometimes in private heseemed to be hypersensitive as to whether in any particular he wasmisleading those who trusted him; he was scrupulously anxious that theyshould not be carried away by unreflecting enthusiasm, or by personaldevotion to himself. About the only criticism of his leadership that wasever made directly to himself by one of the rank and file in Ulster wasthat it erred on the side of patience and caution; and this criticismelicited the sharpest reproof he was ever heard to administer to any ofhis followers. [29] His expressions of regard, almost amounting toaffection, for the men and women who thronged round him for a touch ofhis hand wherever he appeared in the streets might have been ignorantlyset down as the arts of a demagogue had they ever been spoken in public, but were capable of no such misconstruction when reserved, as theyinvariably were, for the ears of his closest associates. The truth isthat no popular leader was ever less of a demagogue than Sir EdwardCarson. He had no "arts" at all--unless indeed complete simplicity isthe highest of all "arts" in one whom great masses of men implicitlytrust. He never sought to gain or augment the confidence of hisfollowers by concealing facts, minimising difficulties, or overcolouringexpectations. 

It is not surprising, then, that the decision to invite the Ulsterpeople to bind themselves together by some form of written bond or oathwas one which Carson did not come to hastily. While the matter was stillonly being talked about by a few intimate friends, and had not been inany way formally proposed, Captain James Craig happened to be occupyinghimself one day at the Constitutional Club in London with pencil andpaper, making experimental drafts that might do for the proposedpurpose, when he was joined by Mr. B. W. D. Montgomery, Secretary of theUlster Club in Belfast, who asked what he was doing. "Trying to draft anoath for our people at home, " replied Craig, "and it's no easy matter toget at what will suit. " "You couldn't do better, " said Montgomery, "thantake the old Scotch Covenant. It is a fine old document, full of grandphrases, and thoroughly characteristic of the Ulster tone of mind atthis day. " Thereupon the two men went to the library, where, with thehelp of the club librarian, they found a History of Scotland containingthe full text of the celebrated bond of the Covenanters (first drawn up, by a curious coincidence of names, by John Craig, in 1581), a verbatimcopy of which was made from the book. 

The first idea was to adapt this famous manifesto of militantProtestantism by making only such abbreviations and alterations as wouldrender it suitable for the purpose in view. But when it was ultimatelydecided to go forward with the proposal, and the task of preparing thedocument was entrusted to the Special Commission, [30] it was at oncerealised that, however strongly the fine old Jacobean language and thehistorical associations of the Solemn League and Covenant might appealto the imagination of a few, it was far too involved and long-winded, no matter how drastically revised, to serve as an actual workingagreement between men of to-day, or as a rallying-point for a moderndemocratic community. What was needed was something quite short andeasily intelligible, setting forth in as few words as possible a purposewhich the least learned could grasp at a glance, and which all who sodesired could sign with full comprehension of what they were doing. 

Mr. Thomas Sinclair, one of the Special Commission, was himself adraughtsman of exceptional skill, and in a matter of this kind hisadvice was always invaluable, and it was under his hand that the UlsterCovenant, after frequent amendment, took what was, with one importantexception, its final shape. The last revision cut down the draft by morethan one-half; but the portion discarded from the Covenant itself, inthe interest of brevity, was retained as a Resolution of the UlsterUnionist Council which accompanied the Covenant and served as a sort ofdeclaratory preamble to it[31]. The exception referred to was anamendment made to meet an objection raised by prominent representativesof the Presbyterian Church. The Special Commission, realising that theproposed Covenant ought not to be promulgated without the consent andapproval of the Protestant Churches, submitted the agreed draft to theauthorities of the Church of Ireland and of the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational Churches. The Moderator, and other leaders of thePresbyterians, including Mr. (afterwards Sir Alexander) McDowell, a manendowed with much of the wisdom of the serpent, while supporting withoutdemur the policy of the Covenant, took exception to its terms in asingle particular. They pointed out that the obligation to be acceptedby the signatories would be, as the text then stood, of unlimitedduration. They objected to undertaking such a responsibility without thepossibility of modifying it to meet the changes which time andcircumstance might bring about; and they insisted that, before theycould advise their congregations to contract so solemn an engagement, the text of the Covenant must be amended by the introduction of wordslimiting its validity to the crisis which then confronted them. 

This was accordingly done. Words were introduced which declared thepledge to be binding "throughout this our time of threatened calamity, "and its purpose to be the defeat of "the present conspiracy. " Thelanguage was as precise, and was as carefully chosen, as the language ofa legal deed; but in an unhappy crisis which arose in 1916, incircumstances which no one in the world could have foreseen in 1912, there were some in Ulster who were not only tempted to strain theinterpretation which the Covenant as a whole could legitimately bear, but who failed to appreciate the significance of the amendments that hadbeen made in its text at the instance of the Presbyterian Church. [32]

When these amendments had been incorporated in the Covenant by theSpecial Commission, a meeting of the Standing Committee was convened atCraigavon on the 19th of September to adopt it for recommendation to theCouncil. The Committee, standing in a group outside the door leadingfrom the arcade at Craigavon to the tennis-lawn, listened while SirEdward Carson read the Covenant aloud from a stone step which now bearsan inscription recording the event. Those present showed by theirdemeanour that they realised the historic character of the transactionin which they were taking part, and the weight of responsibility theywere about to assume. But no voice expressed dissent or hesitation. TheCovenant was adopted unanimously and without amendment. Its terms wereas follows:

 "ULSTER'S SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT

 "Being convinced in our consciences that Home Rule would be disastrous to the material well-being of Ulster as well as of the whole of Ireland, subversive of our civil and religious freedom, destructive of our citizenship, and perilous to the unity of the Empire, we, whose names are underwritten, men of Ulster, loyal subjects of His Gracious Majesty King George V, humbly relying on the God whom our fathers in days of stress and trial confidently trusted, do hereby pledge ourselves in solemn Covenant throughout this our time of threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending for ourselves and our children our cherished position of equal citizenship in the United Kingdom, and in using all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland. And in the event of such a Parliament being forced upon us we further solemnly and mutually pledge ourselves to refuse to recognise its authority. In sure confidence that God will defend the right we hereto subscribe our names. And further, we individually declare that we have not already signed this Covenant. God save the King. "

On Monday, the 23rd of September, the Ulster Unionist Council, the bodyrepresenting the whole loyalist community on an elective and thoroughlydemocratic basis, held its annual meeting in the Ulster Hall, the chiefbusiness being the ratification of the Covenant prior to its beingpresented for general signature throughout the province on Ulster Day. Upwards of five hundred delegates attended the meeting, and unanimouslyapproved the terms of the document recommended for their acceptance bytheir Standing Committee. They then adopted, on the motion of LordLondonderry, the Resolution which, as already mentioned, had originallyformed part of the draft of the Covenant itself. This Resolution, aswell as the Covenant, was the subject of extensive comment in theEnglish and Scottish Press. Some opponents of Ulster directed against itthe flippant ridicule which appeared to be their only weapon against amovement the gravity of which was admitted by Ministers of the Crown;but, on the whole, the British Press acknowledged the importantenunciation of political principle which it contained. It placed onrecord that:

 "Inasmuch as we, the duly elected delegates and members of the Ulster Unionist Council, representing all parts of Ulster, are firmly persuaded that by no law can the right to govern those whom we represent be bartered away without their consent; that although the present Government, the services and sacrifices of our race having been forgotten, may drive us forth from a Constitution which we have ever loyally upheld, they may not deliver us bound into the hands of our enemies; and that it is incompetent for any authority, party, or people to appoint as our rulers a Government dominated by men disloyal to the Empire and to whom our faith and traditions are hateful; and inasmuch as we reverently believe that, as in times past it was given our fathers to save themselves from a like calamity, so now it may be ordered that our deliverance shall be by our own hands, to which end it is needful that we be knit together as one man, each strengthening the other, and none holding back or counting the cost--therefore we, Loyalists of Ulster, ratify and confirm the steps so far taken by the Special Commission this day submitted and explained to us, and we reappoint the Commission to carry on its work on our behalf as in the past. 

 "We enter into the Solemn Covenant appended hereto, and, knowing the greatness of the issues depending on our faithfulness, we promise each to the others that, to the uttermost of the strength and means given us, and not regarding any selfish or private interest, our substance or our lives, we will make good the said Covenant; and we now bind ourselves in the steadfast determination that, whatever may befall, no such domination shall be thrust upon us, and in the hope that by the blessing of God our Union with Great Britain, upon which are fixed our affections and trust, may yet be maintained, and that for ourselves and for our children, for this Province and for the whole of Ireland, peace, prosperity, and civil and religious liberty may be secured under the Parliament of the United Kingdom and of the King whose faithful subjects we are and will continue all our days. "

It had been known for some weeks that it was the intention of the UlsterLoyalists to dedicate the 28th of September as "Ulster Day, " by holdingspecial religious services, after which they were to "pledge themselvesto a solemn Covenant, " the terms of which were not yet published or, indeed, finally settled. This announcement, which appeared in the Presson the 17th of August, was hailed in England as an effective reply tothe recent "turgid homily" of Mr. Churchill, but there was really noconnection between them in the intentions of Ulstermen, who had been toomuch occupied with their own affairs to pay much attention to the attackupon them in the Dundee letters. The Ulster Day celebration was to bepreceded by a series of demonstrations in many of the chief centres ofUlster, at which the purpose of the Covenant was to be explained to thepeople by the leader and his colleagues, and a number of English Peersand Members of Parliament arranged to show their sympathy with thepolicy embodied in the Covenant by taking part in the meetings. 

It would not be true to say that the enthusiasm displayed at this greatseries of meetings in September eclipsed all that had gone before, forit would not be possible for human beings greatly to exceed in thatemotion what had been seen at Craigavon and Balmoral; but they exhibitedan equally grave sense of responsibility, and they proved that the sameexaltation of mind, the same determined spirit, that had been displayedby Loyalists collected in the populous capital of their province, equally animated the country towns and rural districts. 

The campaign opened at Enniskillen on the 18th of September, where theleader was escorted by two squadrons of mounted and well-equipped yeomenfrom the station to Portora Gate, at which point 40, 000 members ofUnionist Clubs drawn from the surrounding agricultural districts marchedpast him in military order. During the following nine daysdemonstrations were held at Lisburn, Derry, Coleraine, Ballymena, Dromore, Portadown, Crumlin, Newtownards, and Ballyroney, culminatingwith a meeting in the Ulster Hall--loyalist headquarters--on the eve ofthe signing of the Covenant on Ulster Day. At six of these meetings, including, of course, the last, Sir Edward Carson was the principalspeaker, while all the Ulster Unionist Members of Parliament took partin their several constituencies. Lord Londonderry was naturallyprominent among the speakers, and presided as usual, when the Duke ofAbercorn was prevented by illness from being present, in the UlsterHall. Mr. F. E. Smith, who had closely identified himself with theUlster Movement, delighting with his fresh and vigorous eloquence themeetings at Balmoral and Blenheim, as well as the Orange Lodges whom hehad addressed on the 12th of July, crossed the Channel to lend a helpinghand, and spoke at five meetings on the tour. Others who took part--inaddition to local men like Mr. Thomas Sinclair and Mr. John Young, whosehigh character always made their appearance on political platforms ofvalue to the cause they supported--were Lord Charles Beresford, LordSalisbury, Mr. James Campbell, Lord Hugh Cecil, Lord Willoughby deBroke, and Mr. Harold Smith; while the Marquis of Hamilton and LordCastlereagh, by the part which they took in the programme, showed theirdesire to carry on the traditions which identified the two leadingUlster families with loyalist principles. 

A single resolution, identical in the simplicity of its terms, wascarried without a dissenting voice at every one of these meetings: "Wehereby reaffirm the resolve of the great Ulster Convention of 1892: 'Wewill not have Home Rule. '" These words became so familiar that thelaconic phrase "We won't have it, " was on everybody's lips as the Alphaand Omega of Ulster's attitude, and was sometimes heard with unexpectedabruptness in no very precise context. A ticket-collector, when clippingthe tickets of the party who were starting from Belfast in a saloon forEnniskillen, made no remark and no sign of recognition till he reachedCarson, when he said almost in a whisper and without a glimmer of asmile, as he took a clip out of the leader's ticket: "Tell thestation-master at Clones, Sir Edward, that we won't have it. " Hedoubtless knew that the political views of that misguided official wereof the wrong colour. A conversation overheard in the crowd atEnniskillen before the speaking began was a curious example of the habitso characteristic of Ulster--and indeed of other parts of Irelandalso--of thinking of

 "Old, unhappy, far-off things, and battles long ago"

as if they had occurred last week, and were a factor to be taken intoaccount in the conduct of to-day. The demonstration was in the open air, and the sunshine was gleaming on the grass of a hill close at hand. "It'ud be a quare thing, " said a peasant to his neighbour in the crowd, "ifthe rebels would come out and hould a meetin' agin us on yon hill. ""What matter if they would, " was the reply, "wouldn't we let on that wewon't have it? an' if that wouldn't do them, isn't there hundreds o'King James's men at the bottom o' the lough, an' there's plenty o' roomyet. " It was not spoken in jest, but in grim conviction that the issueof 1689 was the issue of 1912, and that another Newtown Butler mighthave to be fought. 

This series of meetings in preparation for the Covenant brought Carsonmuch more closely in touch with the Loyalists in outlying districts thanhe had been hitherto, and when it was over their wild devotion to himpersonally equalled what it was in Belfast itself. The appeal made tothe hearts of men as quick as any living to detect and resent humbug orboastfulness, by the simplicity, uncompromising directness, and courageof his character was irresistible. He never spoke better than duringthis tour of the Province. The Special Correspondent of _The Times_, whosent to his paper vivid descriptive articles on each meeting, said inhis account of the meeting at Coleraine that "Sir Edward Carson wasvigorous, fresh, and picturesque. His command over the feelings of hisUlster audiences is unquestionable, and never a phrase passes his lipswhich does not tell. " And when the proceedings of the meeting were over, the same observer "was at the station to witness the 'send-off' of theleaders, and for ten minutes before the train for Belfast came in thetumult of the cheers, the thanks, and the farewells never faltered foran instant. "[33] Two days later another English commentator declaredthat "The Ulster campaign has been conducted up to the present with acombination of wisdom, ability, and restraint which has delighted allthe Unionists of the province, and exasperated their Radical andNationalist enemies. From its opening at Enniskillen not a speech hasbeen delivered unworthy of a great movement in defence of civil andreligious liberty. "[34]

It was characteristic of Sir Edward Carson that neither at thesemeetings nor at any time did he use his unmatched power of persuasion toinduce his followers to come forward and sign the Covenant. On thecontrary, he rather warned them only to do so after mature reflectionand with full comprehension of the responsibility which signature wouldentail. He told the Unionist Council a few days before the memorable28th of September: "How often have I thought over this Covenant--howmany hours have I spent, before it was published that we would have one, in counting the cost that may result! How many times have I thought ofwhat it may mean to all that we care about up here! Does any man believethat I lightly took this matter in hand without considering with mycolleagues all that it may mean either in the distant or the not toodistant future? No, it is the gravest matter in all the grave matters inthe various offices I have held that I have ever had to consider. " Andhe went on to advise the delegates, "responsible men from every districtin Ulster, that it is your duty, when you go back to your variousdistricts, to warn your people who trust you that, in entering into thissolemn obligation, they are entering into a matter which, whatever mayhappen in the future, is the most serious matter that has everconfronted them in the course of their lives. "[35]

A political campaign such as that of September 1912 could not be asuccess, however spontaneous the enthusiasm of the people, howevereffective the oratory, unless the arrangements were based on goodorganisation. It was by general consent a triumph of organisation, thecredit for which was very largely due to Mr. Richard Dawson Bates, theSecretary of the Ulster Unionist Council. Sir Edward Carson himself verywisely paid little attention to detail; happily there was no need forhim to do so, for he had beside him in Captain James Craig and Mr. Batestwo men with real genius for organisation, and indefatigable inrelieving "the chief" of all unnecessary work and worry. Mr. Bates hadall the threads of a complex network of organisation in his hands; hekept in close touch with leading Unionists in every district; he alwaysknew what was going on in out-of-the-way corners, and where to turn forthe right man for any particular piece of work. Anyone whose duty it hasbeen to manage even a single political demonstration on a large scaleknows what numerous details have to be carefully foreseen and providedfor. In Ulster a succession of both outdoor and indoor demonstrations, seldom if ever equalled in this country in magnitude and complexity ofarrangement, besides an amazing quantity of other miscellaneous workinseparable from the conduct of a political movement in which crisisfollowed crisis with bewildering rapidity, were managed year after yearfrom Mr. Bates's office in the Old Town Hall with a quiet, unostentatious efficiency which only those could appreciate who saw themachine at work and knew the master mechanic behind it. Of thisefficiency the September demonstrations in 1912 were a conspicuousillustration. 

Nor did the Loyalist women of Ulster lag an inch behind the men eitherin organisation or in zeal for the Unionist cause, and their keenness atevery town visited in this September tour was exuberantly displayed. Women had not yet been enfranchised, of course, and the Ulster women hadshown but little interest in the suffragette agitation which was ragingat this time in England; but they had organised themselves in defence ofthe Union very effectively on parallel lines to the men, and if thelatter had needed any stimulus to their enthusiasm they would certainlyhave got it from their mothers, sisters, and wives. The Marchioness ofLondonderry threw herself whole-heartedly into the movement. Havingalways ably seconded her husband's many political and social activities, she made no exception in regard to his devotion to Ulster. LordLondonderry, she was fond of saying, was an Ulsterman born and bred, andshe was an Ulsterwoman "by adoption and grace. " Her energy wasinexhaustible, and her enthusiasm contagious; she used her influence andher wonderful social gifts unsparingly in the Unionist cause. 

A meeting of the Ulster Women's Unionist Council, of which the DowagerMarchioness of Dufferin and Ava, widow of the great diplomat, waspresident, was held on the 17th of September, the day before thedemonstration at Enniskillen, when a resolution proposed by LadyLondonderry declaring the determination of Ulster women to stand bytheir men in the policy to be embodied in the Covenant, was carried withimmense enthusiasm and without dissent. No women were so vehement intheir support of the Loyalist cause as the factory workers, who werevery numerous in Belfast. Indeed, their zeal, and their manner ofdisplaying it, seemed sometimes to illustrate a well-known line ofKipling's, considered by some to be anything but complimentary to thefemale sex. Anyhow, there was no divergence of opinion or sympathybetween the two sexes in Ulster on the question of Union or Home Rule;and the women who everywhere attended the meetings in large numbers wereno idle sightseers--though they were certainly hero-worshippers of theUlster leader--but a genuine political force to be taken into account. 

It was during the September campaign that the "wooden guns" and "dummyrifles" appeared, which excited so much derision in the English RadicalPress, whose editors little dreamed that the day was not far distantwhen Mr. Asquith's Government would be glad enough to borrow those samedummy rifles for training the new levies of Kitchener's Army to fightthe Germans. So far as the Ulstermen were concerned the ridicule oftheir quasi-military display and equipment never had any sting in it. They were conscious of the strength given to their cause by thediscipline and military organisation of the volunteers, even if theweapons with which they drilled should never be replaced by the realthing; and many of them had an instinctive belief that their leaderswould see to it that they were effectively armed all in good time. Andso with grim earnestness they recruited the various battalions ofvolunteers, gave up their evenings to drilling, provided cyclist corps, signalling corps, ambulances and nurses; they were proud to receivetheir leader with guards of honour at the station, and bodyguards whilehe drove through their town or district to the meetings where he spoke. Few of them probably ever so much as heard of the gibes of _The IrishNews_, _The Daily News_, or _The Westminster Gazette_ at the "royalprogresses" of "King Carson"; but they would have been in no way upsetby them if they had, for they were far too much in earnest themselves topay heed to the cheap sneers of others. At each one of the Septembermeetings there was a military setting to the business of the day. AtEnniskillen Carson was conducted by a cavalry escort to the ground wherehe was to address the people; at Coleraine, Portadown, and other placesvolunteers lined the route and marched in column to and from themeeting. They were, it is true, but "half-baked" levies, with more zealthan knowledge of military duties. But competent critics--and there weremany such amongst the visitors--praised their bearing and physique andthe creditable measure of discipline they had already acquired. And itmust be remembered that in September 1912 the Ulster Volunteer Force wasstill in its infancy. In the following two years its improvement inefficiency was very marked; and within three years of the time when itsbattalions paraded before Sir Edward Carson, with dummy rifles, andmarched before him to his meetings in Lisburn, Newtownards, Enniskillen, and Belfast on the eve of the Covenant, those same men had gloriouslyfought against the flower of the Prussian Army, and many of them hadfallen in the battle of the Somme. 

The final meeting in the Ulster Hall on Friday the 27th of September wasan impressive climax to the tour. Many English journalists and othervisitors were present, and some of them admitted that, in spite of allthey had heard of what an Ulster Hall meeting was like, they wereastonished by the soul-stirring fervour they witnessed, and especiallyby the wonderful spectacle presented at the overflow meeting in thestreet outside, which was packed as far as the eye could reach in eitherdirection with upturned faces, eager to catch the words addressed tothem from a platform erected for the speakers outside an upper window ofthe building. [36]

Messages of sympathy and approval at this supreme moment were read fromMr. Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Long, Mr. Balfour, and Mr. AustenChamberlain. Then, after brief speeches by four local Belfast men, oneof whom was a representative of Labour, and while the audience werewaiting eagerly for the speech of their leader, there occurred what _TheTimes_ next day described as "two entirely delightful, and, as far asthe crowd was concerned, two entirely unexpected episodes. " The firstwas the presentation to Sir Edward Carson of a faded yellow silk bannerby Colonel Wallace, Grand Master of the Belfast Orangemen, who explainedthat it was the identical banner that had been carried before KingWilliam III at the battle of the Boyne, and was now lent by its owner, alineal descendant of the original standard-bearer, to be carried beforeCarson to the signing of the Covenant; the second was the presentationto the leader of a silver key, symbolic of Ulster as "the key of thesituation, " and a silver pen wherewith to sign the Covenant on themorrow, by Captain James Craig. "The two incidents, " continued theCorrespondent of _The Times_, "were followed by the audience withbreathless excitement, and made a remarkably effective prelude to SirEdward Carson's speech. Premeditated, no doubt, that incident of thebanner--yet entirely graceful, entirely fitting to the spirit of theoccasion--a plan carried through with the sense of ceremony whichUlstermen seem to have always at their command in moments of emotion. "

And if ever there was a "moment of emotion" for the Loyalists ofUlster--those descendants of the Plantation men who had beendeliberately sent to Ireland with a commission from the first sovereignof a united Britain to uphold British interests, British honour, and theReformed Faith across the narrow sea--Loyalists who were conscious thatthroughout the generations they had honestly striven to be faithful totheir mission--if ever in their long and stormy history they experienceda "moment of emotion, " it was assuredly on this evening before thesigning of their Covenant. 

The speeches delivered by their leader and others were merely a vent forthat emotion. There was nothing that could be said about their causethat they did not know already; but all felt that the heart of thematter was touched--the whole situation, so far as they were concerned, summed up in a single sentence of Carson's speech: "We will takedeliberately a step forward, not in defiance but in defence; and theCovenant which we will most willingly sign to-morrow will be a greatstep forward, in no spirit of aggression, in no spirit of ascendancy, but with a full knowledge that, if necessary, you and I--you trustingme, and I trusting you--will follow out everything that this Covenantmeans to the very end, whatever the consequences. " Every man and womanwho heard these words was filled with an exalted sense of the solemnityof the occasion. The mental atmosphere was not that of a politicalmeeting, but of a religious service--and, in fact, the proceedings hadbeen opened by prayer, as had become the invariable custom on suchoccasions in Ulster. It was felt to be a time of individual preparationfor the _Sacramentum_ of the following day, which Protestant Ulster hadset apart as a day of self-dedication to a cause for which they werewilling to make any sacrifice. 

FOOTNOTES:

[28] _The Scotsman_, November 2nd, 1911. 

[29] See Sir B. Carson's speech in _Belfast Newsletter_, September 24th, 1912. 

[30] See _ante_, p. 53. 

[31] See p. 106. 

[32] See p. 248. 

[33] _The Times_, September 23rd, 1912. 

[34] _The Daily Telegraph_, September 25th, 1912. 

[35] _Belfast Newsletter_, September 24th, 1912. 

[36] The article which appeared on the following Sunday in _TheObserver_, showed how profoundly a distinguished London editor andwriter had been moved by what he saw in Belfast. 

CHAPTER X

THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT

Ulster Day, Saturday the 28th of September, 1912, was kept as a day ofreligious observance by the Northern Loyalists. So far as theProtestants of all denominations were concerned, Ulster was a provinceat prayer on that memorable Saturday morning. In Belfast, not only theservices which had more or less of an official character--those held inthe Cathedral, in the Ulster Hall, in the Assembly Hall--but those heldin nearly all the places of worship in the city, were crowded withreverent worshippers. It was the same throughout the country towns andrural districts--there was hardly a village or hamlet where the parishchurch and the Presbyterian and Methodist meeting-houses were notattended by congregations of unwonted numbers and fervour. Not thatthere was any of the religious excitement such as accompanies revivalistmeetings; it was simply that a population, naturally religious-minded, turned instinctively to divine worship as the fitting expression ofcommon emotion at a moment of critical gravity in their history. "Onenoteworthy feature, " commented upon by one of the English newspapercorrespondents in a despatch telegraphed during the day, "is the silenceof the great shipyards. In these vast industrial establishments on bothsides of the river, 25, 000 men were at work yesterday performing theirtask at the highest possible pressure, for the order-books of both firmsare full of orders. Now there is not the sound of a hammer; all is assilent as the grave. The splendid craftsmen who build the largest shipsin the world have donned their Sunday clothes, and, with Unionistbuttons on the lapels of their coats, or Orange sashes on theirshoulders, are about to engage on what to them is an even more importanttask. " He also noticed that although the streets were crowded there wasno excitement, for "the average Ulsterman performs his religious andpolitical duties with calm sobriety. He has no time to-day for mirth ormerriment, for every minute is devoted to proving that he is still thesame man--devoted to the Empire, to the King, and Constitution. "[37]

There is at all times in Ulster far less sectarian enmity between theEpiscopal and other Reformed Churches than in England; on Ulster Day thecomplete harmony and co-operation between them was a marked feature ofthe observances. At the Cathedral in Belfast the preacher was the Bishopof Down, [38] while a Presbyterian minister representing the Moderator ofthe General Assembly, and the President of the Methodist College tookpart in the conduct of the service. At the Ulster Hall the same unitywas evidenced by a similar co-operation between clergy of the threedenominations, and also at the Assembly Hall (a Presbyterian place ofworship), where Dr. Montgomery, the Moderator, was assisted by aclergyman of the Church of Ireland representing the Bishop. 

The service in the Ulster Hall was attended by Sir Edward Carson, theLord Mayor of Belfast (Mr. McMordie, M. P. ), most of the distinguishedvisitors from England, and by those Ulster members whose constituencieswere in or near the city; those representing country seats went thitherto attend local services and to sign the Covenant with their ownconstituents. 

One small but significant detail in the day's proceedings was muchnoticed as a striking indication of the instinctive realisation by thecrowd of the exceptional character of the occasion. Bedford Street, where the Ulster Hall is, was densely packed with spectators, but whenthe leader arrived, instead of the hurricane of cheers that invariablygreeted his appearance in the streets, there was nothing but a generaluncovering of heads and respectful silence. It is true that the peopleabundantly compensated themselves for this moment of self-restraintlater on, until in the evening one wondered how human throats couldsurvive so many hours of continuous strain; but the contrast only madethe more remarkable that almost startling silence before the religiousservice began. 

The "sense of ceremony" which _The Times_ Correspondent on anotheroccasion had declared to be characteristic of Ulstermen "in moments ofemotion, " was certainly displayed conspicuously on Ulster Day. Ceremonyat large public functions is naturally cast in a militarymould--marching men, bands of music, display of flags, guards of honour, and so forth--and although on this occasion there was, it is true, morethan mere decorative significance in the military frame to the picture, it was an admirably designed and effective spectacle. It is but a fewhundred yards from the Ulster Hall to the City Hall, where the signingof the Covenant was to take place. When the religious service ended, about noon, Sir Edward Carson and his colleagues proceeded from one hallto the other on foot. The Boyne standard, which had been presented tothe leader the previous evening, was borne before him to the City Hall. He was escorted by a guard consisting of a hundred men from the OrangeLodges of Belfast and a like number representing the Unionist clubs ofthe city. These clubs had also provided a force of 2, 500 men, whoseduty, admirably performed throughout the day, was to protect the gardensand statuary surrounding the City Hall from injury by the crowd, and tokeep a clear way to the Hall for the endless stream of men entering tosign the Covenant. 

The City Hall in Belfast is a building of which Ulster is justly proud. It is, indeed, one of the few modern public buildings in the BritishIslands in which the most exacting critic of architecture finds nothingto condemn. Standing in the central site of the city with ample gardenspace in front, its noble proportions and beautiful façade and dome fillthe view from the broad thoroughfare of Donegal Place. The main entrancehall, leading to a fine marble stairway, is circular in shape, surrounded by a marble colonnade carrying the dome, to which the hall isopen through the full height of the building. It was in this centralspace beneath the dome that a round table covered with the Union Jackwas placed for the signing of the Covenant by the Ulster leaders and themost prominent of their supporters. 

To those Englishmen who have never been able to grasp the Ulster pointof view, and who have, therefore, persisted in regarding the UlsterMovement as a phase of party politics in the ordinary sense, it mustappear strange and even improper that the City Hall, the officialquarters of the Corporation, should have been put to the use for whichit was lent on Ulster Day, 1912. The vast majority of the citizens, whose property it was, thought it could be used for no better purposethan to witness their signatures to a deed securing to them theirbirthright in the British Empire. 

At the entrance to the City Hall Sir Edward Carson was received by theLord Mayor and members of the Corporation wearing their robes of office, and by the Harbour Commissioners, the Water Board, and the Poor LawGuardians, by whom he was accompanied into the hall. The text ofUlster's Solemn League and Covenant had been printed on sheets withplaces for ten signatures on each; the first sheet lay on the table forEdward Carson to sign. 

No man but a dullard without a spark of imagination could have witnessedthe scene presented at that moment without experiencing a thrill whichhe would have found it difficult to describe. The sunshine, sending abeam through the stained glass of the great window on the stairway, threw warm tints of colour on the marbles of the columns and thetesselated floor of the hall, sparkled on the Lord Mayor's chain, lent arich glow to the scarlet gowns of the City Fathers, and lit up the redand the blue and the white of the Imperial flag which draped the tableand which was the symbol of so much that they revered to those who stoodlooking on. They were grouped in a semicircle behind the leader as hestepped forward to sign his name--men of substance, leaders in thecommercial life of a great industrial city, elderly men many of them, lovers of peace and order; men of mark who had served the Crown, likeLondonderry and Campbell and Beresford; Doctors of Divinity, guides andteachers of religion, like the Bishop and the Moderator of the GeneralAssembly; Privy Councillors; members of the Imperial Parliament;barristers and solicitors, shopkeepers and merchants, --there they allstood, silent witnesses of what all felt to be one of the deeds thatmake history, assembled to set their hands, each in his turn, to anInstrument which, for good or evil, would influence the destiny of theirrace; while behind them through the open door could be seen a vastforest of human heads, endless as far as eye could reach, every one ofwhom was in eager accord with the work in hand, and whose blendedvoices, while they waited to perform their own part in the greattransaction, were carried to the ears of those in the hall like theinarticulate noise of moving waters. 

When Carson had signed the Covenant he handed the silver pen toLondonderry, and the latter's name was followed in order by thesignatures of the Moderator of the General Assembly, the Lord Bishop ofDown, Connor, and Dromore (afterwards Primate of All Ireland), the Deanof Belfast (afterwards Bishop of Down), the General Secretary of thePresbyterian Church, the President of the Methodist Conference, theex-Chairman of the Congregational Union, Viscount Castlereagh, and Mr. James Chambers, M. P. For South Belfast; and the rest of the company, including the Right Hon. Thomas Sinclair and the veteran Sir WilliamEwart, as well as the members of the Corporation and other publicauthorities and boards, having attached their signatures to othersheets, the general public waiting outside were then admitted. 

The arrangements for signature by the general public had fully taxed theorganising ability of the specially appointed Ulster Day Committee, andtheir three hon. Secretaries, Mr. Dawson Bates, Mr. McCammon, and Mr. Frank Hall. They made provision for signatures to be received in manyhundreds of localities throughout Ulster, but it was impossible toestimate closely the numbers that would require accommodation at theCity Hall. Lines of desks, giving a total desk-space of more than athird of a mile, were placed along both sides of the corridors on theupper and lower floors of the building, which enabled 540 persons tosign the Covenant simultaneously. It all worked wonderfully smoothly, largely because every individual in the multitude outside was anxious tohelp in maintaining orderly procedure, and behaved with the greatestpatience and willingness to follow directions. The people were admittedto the Hall in batches of 400 or 500 at a time, and as there was noconfusion there was no waste of time. All through the afternoon and upto 11 p. M. , when the Hall was closed, there was an unceasing flow of meneager to become Covenanters. Immense numbers who belonged to the OrangeLodges, Unionist clubs, or other organised bodies, marched to the Hallin procession, and those whose route lay through Royal Avenue had anopportunity, of which they took the fullest advantage, of cheeringCarson, who watched the memorable scene from the balcony of the ReformClub, the quondam headquarters of Ulster Liberalism. 

Prominent and influential men in the country districts refrained fromcoming to Belfast, preferring to sign the Covenant with their neighboursin their own localities. The Duke of Abercorn, who had been prevented byfailing health from taking an active part in the movement of late, andwhose life unhappily was drawing to a close, signed the Covenant atBarons Court; his son, the Marquis of Hamilton, M. P. For Derry, attachedhis signature in the Maiden City together with the Bishop; anotherprelate, the Bishop of Clogher, signed at Enniskillen with the GrandMaster of the Orangemen, Lord Erne; at Armagh, the Primate of AllIreland, the Dean, and Sir John Lonsdale, M. P. (afterwards LordArmaghdale), headed the list of signatures; the Provost of TrinityCollege signed in Dublin; and at Ballymena the veteran PresbyterianPrivy Councillor, Mr. John Young, and his son Mr. William Robert Young, Hon. Secretary of the Ulster Unionist Council, and for thirty years oneof the most zealous and active workers for the Loyalist cause, were thefirst to sign. But a more notable Covenanter than any of these localleaders was Lord Macnaghten, one of the most illustrious of EnglishJudges, whose great position as Lord of Appeal did not deter him fromwholly identifying himself with his native Ulster, by accepting the fullresponsibility of the signatories of the Covenant. 

Ulstermen living in other parts of Ireland, and in Great Britain, werenot forgotten. Arrangements were made enabling such to sign the Covenantin Dublin, London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, and York. Two curious details may be added, which no reader who is aliveto the picturesqueness of historical associations will deem too trivialto be worth recording. In Edinburgh a number of Ulstermen signed theCovenant in the old Greyfriars' Churchyard on the "Covenanters' Stone, "the well-known memorial of the Scottish Covenant of the seventeenthcentury; and the other incident was that, among some twenty men whosigned the Covenant in Belfast with their own blood, Major Crawford wasable to claim that he was following a family tradition, inasmuch as alineal ancestor had in the same grim fashion emphasised his adherence tothe Solemn League and Covenant in 1638. 

The most careful precautions were taken to ensure that all who signedwere properly entitled to do so, by requiring evidence to be furnishedof their Ulster birth or domicile, and references able to corroborateit. The declaration in the Covenant itself that the person signing hadnot already done so was in order to make sure that none of thesignatures should be duplicates. When the lists were closed--they werekept open for some days after Ulster Day--they were very carefullyscrutinised by a competent staff at the Old Town Hall, and it is certainthat the numbers as eventually published included no duplicate signatureand none that was not genuine. Precisely the same care was taken in thecase of the Declaration by which, in words similar to the Covenant butwithout its pledge for definite action, the women of Ulster associatedthemselves with the men "in their uncompromising opposition to the HomeRule Bill now before Parliament. "

It was not until the 22nd of November that the scrutiny and verificationof the signatures was completed, and the actual numbers published. Theywere as follows: In Ulster itself 218, 206 men had registered themselvesas Covenanters, and 228, 991 women had signed the Declaration; in therest of Ireland and in Great Britain 19, 162 men and 5, 055 women hadsigned. Thus, a grand total of 471, 414 Ulster men and women gave theiradherence to the policy of which the Ulster Covenant was the solemnpledge. To every one of these was given a copy of the document printedon parchment, to be retained as a memento, and in thousands of cottagesthroughout Ulster the framed Covenant hangs to-day in an honoured place, and is the householder's most treasured possession. 

Although the main business of the day was over, so far as Carson and theother leaders were concerned, when they had signed the Covenant in theCity Hall at noon, every hour, and every minute in the hour, until theytook their departure in the Liverpool packet in the evening, was full ofincident and excitement. The multitude in the streets leading to theCity Hall was so densely packed that they had great difficulty in makingtheir way to the Reform Club, where they were to be entertained atlunch. And, as every man and woman in the crowd was desperately anxiousthe moment they saw him to get near enough to Carson to shake him by thehand, the pressure of the swaying mass of humanity was a positivedanger. Happily the behaviour of the people was as exemplary as it wastumultuously enthusiastic. _The Times_ Special Correspondent thus summedup his impressions of the scene:

 "Belfast did all that a city could do for such an occasion. I do not well see how its behaviour could have been more impressive. The tirelessness of the crowd--it was that perhaps which struck me most; and, secondly, the good conduct of the crowd. Belfast had one of the lowest of its Saturday records for drunkenness and disorderliness yesterday. I was in the Reform Club between one and three o'clock. Again and again I went out on the balcony and watched the streets. I saw the procession of thousands upon thousands come down Royal Avenue. But this was not the only line of march, for all Belfast was now converging upon the City Hall, the arrangements in which must have been elaborate. It was a procession a description of which would have been familiar to the Belfast public, but the like of which is only seen in Ulster. "

The tribute here paid to the conduct of the Belfast crowd was wellmerited. But in this respect the day of the Covenant was not soexceptional as it would have been before the beginning of the UlsterMovement. Before that period neither Belfast nor any part of Ulstercould have been truthfully described as remarkable for its sobriety. Butby the universal testimony of those qualified to judge in suchmatters--police, clergy of all denominations, and workers for socialwelfare--the political movement had a sobering and steadying influenceon the people, which became more and more noticeable as the movementdeveloped, and especially as the volunteers grew in numbers anddiscipline. The "man in the street" gained a sense of responsibilityfrom the feeling that he formed one of a great company whom it was hiswish not to discredit, and he found occupation for mind and body whichdiminished the temptations of idle hours. 

From the Reform Club Carson, Londonderry, Beresford, and F. E. Smith wentto the Ulster Club, just across the street, where they dined as theguests of Lord Mayor McMordie before leaving for Liverpool; and it wasoutside that dingy building that the enthusiasm of the people reached aclimax. None who witnessed it can ever forget the scene, which theEnglish newspaper correspondents required all their superlatives todescribe for London readers next day. Those superlatives need not beserved up again here. One or two bald facts will perhaps give to anyonepossessing any faculty of visualisation as clear an idea as they couldget from any number of dithyrambic pages. The distance from the UlsterClub to the quay where the Liverpool steamer is berthed is ordinarilyless than a ten minutes' walk. The wagonette in which the Ulster leaderand his friends were drawn by human muscles took three minutes short ofan hour to traverse it. It was estimated that into that short space ofstreet some 70, 000 to 100, 000 people had managed to jam themselves. Movement was almost out of the question, yet everyone within reachtried to press near enough to grasp hands with the occupants of thecarriage. When at last the shed was reached the people could not bear tolet Carson disappear through the gates. _The Times_ Correspondent heardthem shout, "Don't leave us, " "You mustn't leave us, " and, he added, "Itwas seriously meant; it was only when someone pointed out that SirEdward Carson had work to do in England for Ulster, that the crowdfinally gave way and made an opening for their hero. "[39] There had beenspeeches from the balcony of the Reform Club in the afternoon; speechesfrom the window of the Ulster Club in the evening; speeches outside thedock gates; speeches from the deck of the steamer before departure;speeches by Carson, by Londonderry, by F. E. Smith, by Lord CharlesBeresford--and the purport of one and all of them could be summed up inthe familiar phrase, "We won't have it. " But this simple theme, elaborated through all the modulations of varied oratory, was one ofwhich the Belfast populace was no more capable of becoming weary than isthe music lover of tiring of a recurrent _leitmotif_ in a Wagner opera. 

At last the ship moved off, and speech was no longer possible. It wasreplaced by song, "Rule Britannia"; then, as the space to the shorewidened, "Auld Lang Syne"; and finally, when the figures lining the quaywere growing invisible in the darkness, those on board heard thousandsof Loyalists fervently singing "God save the King. "

FOOTNOTES:

[37] _The Standard_, September 30th, 1912. 

[38] Dr. D'Arcy, now (1922) Primate of All Ireland. 

[39] _The Times_, September 30th, 1912. 

CHAPTER XI

PASSING THE BILL

No part of Great Britain displayed a more constant and whole-heartedsympathy with the attitude of Ulster than the city of Liverpool. Therewas much in common between Belfast and the great commercial port on theMersey. Both were the home of a robust Protestantism, which perhaps wasreinforced by the presence in both of a quarter where Irish Nationalistspredominated. Just as West Belfast gave a seat in Parliament to the mostforceful of the younger Nationalist generation, Mr. Devlin, the ScotlandDivision of Liverpool had for a generation been represented by Mr. T. P. O'Connor, one of the veteran leaders of the Parnellite period. In eachcase the whole of the rest of the city was uncompromisinglyConservative, and among the members for Liverpool at the time was Mr. F. E. Smith, unquestionably the most brilliant of the rising generationof Conservatives, who had already conspicuously identified himself withthe Ulster Movement, and was a close friend as well as a politicaladherent of Carson. Among local leaders of opinion in Liverpool AldermanSalvidge exercised a wide and powerful influence on the Unionist side. 

It was in accordance with the fitness of things, therefore, thatLiverpool should have wished to associate itself in no doubtful mannerwith the men who had just subscribed to the Covenant on the other sideof the Channel. Having left Belfast amid the wonderful scenes describedin the last chapter, Carson, Londonderry, F. E. Smith, Beresford, and therest of the distinguished visitors awoke next morning--if the rollers ofthe Irish Sea permitted sleep--in the oily waters of the Mersey, to findat the landing-stage a crowd that in dimensions and demeanour seemed tobe a duplicate of the one they had left outside the dock gates atBelfast. Except that the point round which everything had centred inBelfast, the signing of the Covenant, was of course missing inLiverpool, the Unionists of Liverpool were not to be outdone by theUlstermen themselves in their demonstration of loyalty to the Union. 

The packet that carried the group of leaders across the Channel happenedto be, appropriately enough, the R. M. S. _Patriotic_. As she steamedslowly up the river towards Prince's Landing-stage in the chillyatmosphere of early morning it was at once evident that more than themembers of the deputation who had arranged to present addresses toCarson were out to welcome him to Liverpool, and when the workers whothronged the river bank started singing "O God, our help in ages past, "the sound was strangely familiar in ears fresh from Ulster. 

An address from the Unionist working men of Liverpool and district, presented by Alderman Salvidge, thanked Carson for his "magnificentefforts to preserve the integrity of the Empire, " and assured him thatthey, "Unionist workers of the port which is connected with Belfast inso many ways, stand by Ulster in this great struggle. " Scenes of intenseenthusiasm in the streets culminated in a monster demonstration in ShielPark, at which it was estimated that close on 200, 000 people werepresent. In all the speeches delivered and the resolutions adoptedduring this memorable Liverpool visit the same note was sounded, of fullapproval of the Covenanters and of determination to support themwhatever might befall. 

The events of the last three months, and especially the signing of theCovenant, had concentrated on Ulster the attention of the whole UnitedKingdom, not to speak of America and the British oversea Dominions. Thiswas not of unmixed advantage to the cause for which Ulster was making sodetermined a stand. There was a tendency more and more to regard theopposition to Irish Home Rule as an Ulster question, and nothing else. The Unionist protagonists of the earlier, the Gladstonian, period of thestruggle, men like Salisbury, Randolph Churchill, Devonshire, Chamberlain, and Goschen, had treated it mainly as an Imperial question, which it certainly was. In their eyes the Irish Loyalists, of whom theUlstermen were the most important merely because they happened to begeographically concentrated, were valuable allies in a contest vital tothe safety and prosperity of the British Empire; but, although theparticular interests of these Loyalists were recognised as possessing apowerful claim on British sympathy and support, this was a considerationquite secondary in comparison with the larger aspects of Imperial policyraised by the demand for Home Rule. It was an unfortunate result of theprominence into which Ulster was forced after the introduction of Mr. Asquith's measure that these larger aspects gradually dropped away, andthe defence of the Union came to be identified almost completely inEngland and Scotland with support of the Ulster Loyalists. It was tothis aspect of the case that Mr. Kipling gave prominence in the poempublished on the day of the Balmoral meeting, [40] although no one wasless prone than he to magnify a "side-show" in Imperial policy; and itwas the same note that again was sounded on the eve of the Covenant byanother distinguished English poet. The general feeling of bewildermentand indignation that the only part of Ireland which had consistentlyupheld the British connection should now be not only thrown over by theBritish Government but denounced for its obstinate refusal to co-operatein a separatist movement, was finely expressed in Mr. William Watson'schallenging poem, "Ulster's Reward, " which appeared in _The Times_ a fewdays before the signing of the Covenant in Belfast:

 "What is the wage the faithful earn? What is a recompense fair and meet? Trample their fealty under your feet-- That, is a fitting and just return. Flout them, buffet them, over them ride, Fling them aside!

 "Ulster is ours to mock and spurn, Ours to spit upon, ours to deride. And let it be known and blazoned wide That this is the wage the faithful earn: Did she uphold us when others defied? Then fling her aside. 

 "Where on the Earth was the like of it done In the gaze of the sun? She had pleaded and prayed to be counted still As one of our household through good and ill, And with scorn they replied; Jeered at her loyalty, trod on her pride, Spurned her, repulsed her, Great-hearted Ulster; Flung her aside. "

Appreciating to the full the sympathy and support which their causereceived from leading men of letters in England, it was not the fault ofthe Ulstermen themselves that the larger Imperial aspects of thequestion thus dropped into the background. They continually strove tomake Englishmen realise that far more was involved than loyal support ofEngland's only friends in Ireland; they quoted such pronouncements asAdmiral Mahan's that "it is impossible for a military man, or astatesman with appreciation of military conditions, to look at a map andnot perceive that if the ambition of the Irish Separatists wererealised, it would be even more threatening to the national life ofBritain than the secession of the South was to that of the AmericanRepublic.... An independent Parliament could not safely be trusted evento avowed friends"; and they showed over and over again, quoting chapterand verse from Nationalist utterances, and appealing to acknowledgedfacts in recent and contemporary history, that it was not to "avowedfriends, " but to avowed enemies, that Mr. Asquith was prepared toconcede an independent Parliament. 

But those were the days before the rude awakening from the dream thatthe world was to repose for ever in the soft wrappings of universalpeace. Questions of national defence bored Englishmen. The judgment ofthe greatest strategical authority of the age weighed less than one ofLord Haldane's verbose platitudes, and the urgent warnings of LordRoberts less than the impudent snub administered to him by anUnder-Secretary. Speakers on public platforms found that sympathy withUlster carried a more potent appeal to their audience than any otherthey could make on the Irish question, and they naturally thereforeconcentrated attention upon it. Liberals, excited alternately to furyand to ridicule by the proceedings in Belfast, heaped denunciation onCarson and the Covenant, thereby impelling their opponents to vehementdefence of both; and the result of all this was that before the end of1912 the sun of Imperial policy which had drawn the homage of earlierdefenders of the Union was almost totally eclipsed by the moon ofUlster. 

When Parliament reassembled for the autumn session in October the PrimeMinister immediately moved a "guillotine" resolution for allotting timefor the remaining stages of the Home Rule Bill, and, in resisting thismotion, Mr. Bonar Law made one of the most convincing of his manyconvincing speeches against the whole policy of the Bill. It stands forall time as the complete demonstration of a proposition which he arguedover and over again--that Home Rule had never been submitted to theBritish electorate, and that that fact alone was full justification forUlster's resolve to resist it. It was impossible for any democraticMinister to refute the contention that even if the principle of theGovernment's policy had been as frankly submitted to the electorate asit had in fact been carefully withheld, it would still remain true thatthe intensity of the Ulster opposition was itself a new factor in thesituation upon Which the people were entitled to be consulted. There wasa limit, said Mr. Bonar Law, to the obligation to submit to legallyconstituted authority, and that limit was reached "in a free countrywhen a body of men, whether they call themselves a Cabinet or not, propose to make a great change like this for which they have neverreceived the sanction of the people. "

It was, however, thoroughly understood by every member of the House ofCommons that argument, no matter how irrefutable, had no effect on thesituation, which was governed by the simple fact that the life of theMinistry depended on the good-will of the Nationalist section of theCoalition, which rigorously demanded the passage of the Bill in thecurrent session, and feared nothing so much as the judgment of theEnglish people upon it. Consequently, under the guillotine, great blocksof the Bill, containing the most far-reaching constitutional issues, and matters vital to the political and economic structure of the centreof the British Empire, were passed through the House of Commons by theringing of the division bells without a word of discussion, exactly asthey had come from the pen of the official draftsman, and destined underthe exigencies of the Parliament Act procedure to be forced through theLegislature in the same raw condition in the two following sessions. 

This last-mentioned fact suggested a consideration which weighed heavilyon the minds of the Ulster leaders as the year 1912 drew to a close, andwith it the debates on the Bill in Committee. Had the time come whenthey ought to put forward in Parliament an alternative policy to theabsolute rejection of the Bill? They had not yet completely abandonedhope that Ministers, however reluctantly, might still find it impossibleto stave off an appeal to the country; but the opposite hypothesis wasthe more probable. If the Bill became law in its present form they wouldhave to fall back on the policy disclosed at Craigavon and embodied inthe Covenant. But, although it is true that they had supported Mr. Agar-Robartes's amendment to exclude certain Ulster counties from thejurisdiction to be set up in Dublin, the Ulster representatives werereluctant to make proposals of their own which might be misrepresentedas a desire to compromise their hostility to the principle of Home Rule. Under the Parliament Act procedure, however, they realised that nomaterial change would be allowed to be made in the Bill after it firstleft the House of Commons, although two years would have to elapsebefore it could reach the Statute-book; if they were to propound anyalternative to "No Home Rule" it was, therefore, a case of now or never. 

Having regard to the extreme gravity of the course to be followed inUlster in the event of the measure passing into law, it was decided thatthe most honest and straightforward thing to do was to put forward atthe juncture now reached a policy for dealing with Ulster separatelyfrom the rest of Ireland. But in fulfilment of the promise, from whichhe never deviated, to take no important step without first consultinghis supporters in Ulster, Carson went over to attend a meeting of theStanding Committee in Belfast on the 13th of December, where heexplained fully the reasons why this policy was recommended by himselfand all his parliamentary colleagues. It was not accepted by theStanding Committee without considerable discussion, but in the end thedecision was unanimous, and the resolution adopting it laid it down that"in taking this course the Standing Committee firmly believes theinterests of Unionists in the three other provinces of Ireland will bebest conserved. " In order to emphasise that the course resolved uponimplied no compromise of their opposition to the Bill as a whole, SirEdward Carson wrote a letter to the Prime Minister during the Christmasrecess, which was published in the Press, and which made this pointclear; and he pressed it home in the House of Commons on the 1st ofJanuary, 1913, when he moved to exclude "the Province of Ulster" fromthe operation of the Bill in a speech of wonderfully persuasiveeloquence which deeply impressed the House, and which was trulydescribed by Mr. Asquith as "very powerful and moving, " and by Mr. Redmond as "serious and solemn. "

Carson's proposal was altogether different from what was subsequentlyenacted in 1920. It was consistent with the uninterrupted demand ofUlster to be let alone, it asked for no special privilege, except theprivilege, which was also claimed as an inalienable right, to remain apart of the United Kingdom with full representation at Westminster andnowhere else; it required the creation of no fresh subordinateconstitution raising the difficult question as to the precise area whichits jurisdiction could effectively administer. 

Carson's amendment was, of course, rejected by the Government'sinvariably docile majority, and on the 16th of January the Home RuleBill passed the third reading in the House of Commons, without thesmallest concession having been made to the Ulster opposition, or theslightest indication as to how the Government intended to meet theopposition of a different character which was being organised in theNorth of Ireland. 

When the Bill went to the Upper House at the end of January the wholesubject was threshed out in a series of exceedingly able speeches; butthe impotence of the Second Chamber under the Parliament Act gave an airof pathetic unreality to the proceedings, which was neatly epitomised byLord Londonderry in the sentence: "The position is, that while the Houseof Commons can vote but not speak, the Lords can speak but not vote. "Nevertheless, such speeches as those of the Archbishop of York, EarlGrey, the Duke of Devonshire, and Lord Londonderry, were not withouteffect on opinion outside. Earl Grey, an admitted authority on federalconstitutions, urged that if, as the Government were continuallyassuring the country, Home Rule was the first step in the federalisationof the United Kingdom, there was every reason why Ulster should be adistinct unit in the federal system. The Archbishop dealt more fullywith the Ulster question. Admitting that he had formerly believed "thatthis attitude of Ulster was something of a scarecrow made up out of oldand outworn prejudices, " he had now to acknowledge that the men ofUlster were "of all men the least likely to be 'drugged with the wine ofwords, ' and were men who of all other men mean and do what they say. "Behind all the glowing eloquence of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Redmond, hediscerned "this figure of Ulster, grim, determined, menacing, which noeloquence can exorcise and no live statesmanship can ignore. " If theresult of this legislation should be actual bloodshed, then, onwhomsoever might rest the responsibility for it, it would mean theshattering of all the hopes of a united and contented Ireland which itwas the aim of the Bill to create. If Ulster made good her threat offorcible resistance there was, said the Archbishop, one condition, andone condition only, on which her coercion could be justified, and thatwas that the Government "should have received from the people of thiscountry an authority clear and explicit" to carry it out. 

But among the numerous striking passages in the debate which occupiedthe Peers for four days, none was more telling than Lord Curzon'spicturesque description of how Ulster was to be treated. "You arecompelling Ulster, " he said, "to divorce her present husband, to whomshe is not unfaithful, and you compel her to marry someone else whom shecordially dislikes, with whom she does not want to live; and you do itbecause she happens to be rich, and because her new partner has a largeand ravenous offspring to provide for. You are asking rather too much ofhuman nature. "

That the Home Rule Bill would be rejected on second reading by the Lordswas a foregone conclusion, and it was so rejected by a majority of 257on the 31st of January, 1913. The Bill then entered into its period ofgestation under the Parliament Act. The session did not come to an enduntil the 7th of March, and the new session began three days afterwards. It is unnecessary to follow the fortunes of the Bill in Parliament in1913, for the process was purely mechanical, in order to satisfy therequirements of the Parliament Act. The preparations for dealing withthe mischief it would work went forward with unflagging energyelsewhere. 

FOOTNOTES:

[40] See _ante_, p. 79. 

CHAPTER XII

WAS RESISTANCE JUSTIFIABLE?

A story is told of Queen Victoria that in her youthful days, whenstudying constitutional history, she once asked Lord Melbourne whetherunder any circumstances citizens were justified in resisting legalauthority; to which the old courtier replied: "When asked that questionby a Sovereign of the House of Hanover I feel bound to answer in theaffirmative. " If one can imagine a similar question being asked of anUlsterman by Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, or Sir Edward Grey, in 1912, the reply would surely have been that such a question asked by astatesman claiming to be a guardian of Liberal principles and of theWhig tradition could only be answered in the affirmative. This, at allevents, was the view of the late Duke of Devonshire, who more than anyother statesman of our time could claim to be a representative in hisown person of the Whig tradition handed down from 1688. [41] Passiveobedience has, indeed, been preached as a political dogma in the courseof English history, but never by apostles of Liberalism. Forcibleresistance to legally constituted authority, even when it involvedrepudiation of existing allegiance, has often, both in our own and inforeign countries, won the approval and sympathy of English Liberals. Along line of illustrious names, from Cromwell and Lord Halifax inEngland to Kossuth and Mazzini on the Continent, might be quoted insupport of such a proposition if anyone were likely to challenge it. 

When, then, Liberals professed to be unutterably shocked by Ulster'sdeclared intention to resist Home Rule both actively and passively, theycould not have based their attitude on the principle that under nocircumstances could such resistance be morally justified. Indeed, inthe case in question, there were circumstances that would have made thecondemnation of Ulster by the English Liberal Party not a littlehypocritical if referred to any general ethical principle. For thatparty had itself been for a generation in the closest political alliancewith Irishmen whose leader had boasted that they were as much rebels astheir fathers were in 1798, and whose power in Ireland had been built upby long-sustained and systematic defiance of the law. Yet the samepoliticians who had excused, if they had not applauded, the "Plan ofCampaign, " and the organised boycotting and cattle-driving which had foryears characterised the agitation for Home Rule, were unspeakablyshocked when Ulster formed a disciplined Volunteer force which nevercommitted an outrage, and prepared to set up a Provisional Governmentrather than be ruled by an assembly of cattle-drivers in Dublin. Moreover, many of Mr. Asquith's supporters, and one at least of his mostdistinguished colleagues in the Cabinet of 1912, had themselvesorganised resistance to an Education Act which they disliked but hadbeen unable to defeat in Parliament. 

Nevertheless, it must, of course, be freely admitted that the questionas to what conditions justify resistance to the legal authority in theState--or rebellion, if the more blunt expression be preferred--is anexceedingly difficult one to answer. It would sound cynical to say, though Carlyle hardly shrinks from maintaining, that success, andsuccess alone, redeems rebellion from wickedness and folly. Yet it wouldbe difficult to explain on any other principle why posterity hasapplauded the Parliamentarians of 1643 and the Whigs of 1688, whilecondemning Monmouth and Charles Edward; or why Mr. Gladstone sympathisedwith Jefferson Davis when he looked like winning and withdrew thatsympathy when he had lost. But if success is not the test, what is? Isit the aim of the men who resist? The aim that appears honourable andheroic to one onlooker appears quite the opposite to another, and so thetest resolves itself into a matter of personal partisanship. 

That is probably as near as one can get to a solution of the question. Those who happen to agree with the purpose for which a rebellion takesplace think the rebels in the right; those who disagree think them inthe wrong. As Mr. Winston Churchill succinctly puts it when commentingon the strictures passed on his father for "inciting" Ulster to resistHome Rule, "Constitutional authorities will measure their censuresaccording to their political opinions. " He reminds us, moreover, thatwhen Lord Randolph was denounced as a "rebel in the skin of a Tory, " thelatter "was able to cite the authority of Lord Althorp, Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Morley, and the Prime Minister (Gladstone) himself, in support ofthe contention that circumstances might justify morally, if nottechnically, violent resistance and even civil war. "[42]

To this distinguished catalogue of authorities an Ulster apologist mighthave added the name of the Chief Secretary for Ireland in Mr. Asquith'sown Cabinet, who admitted in 1912 that "if the religion of theProtestants were oppressed or their property despoiled they would beright to fight[43];" which meant that Mr. Birrell did not condemnfighting in itself, provided he were allowed to decide when the occasionfor it had arisen. Greater authorities than Mr. Birrell held that theUlster case for resistance was a good and valid one as it stood. NoEnglish statesman of the last half-century has deservedly enjoyed ahigher reputation for political probity, combined with sound commonsense, than the eighth Duke of Devonshire. As long ago as 1893, whenthis same issue had already been raised in circumstances much lessfavourable to Ulster than after the passing of the Parliament Act in1911, the Duke of Devonshire said:

 "The people of Ulster believe, rightly or wrongly, that under a Government responsible to an Imperial Parliament they possess at present the fullest security which they can possess of their personal freedom, their liberties, and their right to transact their own business in their own way. You have no right to offer them any inferior security to that; and if, after weighing the character of the Government which it is sought to impose upon them, they resolve that they are no longer bound to obey a law which does not give them equal and just protection with their fellow subjects, who can say--how at all events can the descendants of those who resisted King James II say, that they have not a right, if they think fit, to resist, if they think they have the power, the imposition of a Government put upon them by force?"[44]

All the same, there never was a community on the face of the earth towhom "rebellion" in any real sense of the word was more hateful than tothe people of Ulster. They traditionally were the champions of "law andorder" in Ireland; they prided themselves above all things on their"loyalty" to their King and to the British flag. And they neverentertained the idea that the movement which they started at Craigavonin 1911, and to which they solemnly pledged themselves by their Covenantin the following year, was in the slightest degree a departure fromtheir cherished "loyalty"--on the contrary, it was an emphatic assertionof it. They held firmly, as Mr. Bonar Law and the whole Unionist partyin Great Britain held also, that Mr. Asquith and his Government wereforcing Home Rule upon them by unconstitutional methods. They did notbelieve that loyalty in the best sense--loyalty to the Sovereign, to theEmpire, to the majesty of the law--required of them passive obedience toan Act of Parliament placed by such means on the Statute-book, whichthey were convinced, moreover, was wholly repugnant to the greatmajority of the British people. 

This aspect of the matter was admirably and soberly presented by _TheTimes_ in one of the many weighty articles in which that great journalgave undeviating support to the Ulster cause. 

 "A free community cannot justly, or even constitutionally, be deprived of its privileges or its position in the realm by any measure that is not stamped with the considered and unquestionable approval of the great body of electors of the United Kingdom. Any attempt so to deprive them is a fraud upon their fundamental rights, which they are justified in resisting, as an act of violence, by any means in their power. This is elementary doctrine, borne out by the whole course of English history. "[45]

That the position was paradoxical calls for no denial; but the pith ofthe paradox lay in the fact that a movement denounced as "rebellious" byits political opponents was warmly supported not only by large masses, probably by the majority, of the people of this country, but by numbersof individuals of the highest character, occupying stations of greatresponsibility. Whatever may be thought of men engaged in actualpolitical conflict, whom some people appear to think capable of anywickedness, no one can seriously suggest that men like Lord Macnaghten, like the late and present Primates of Ireland, like the late Provost ofTrinity, like many other sober thinkers who supported Ulster, were menwho would lightly lend themselves to "rebellion, " or any other wild andirresponsible adventure. As _The Times_ very truly observed in a leadingarticle in 1912:

 "We remember no precedent in our domestic history since the Revolution of 1688 for a movement among citizens, law-abiding by temperament and habit, which resembles the present movement of the Ulster Protestants. It is no rabble who have undertaken it. It is the work of orderly, prosperous, and deeply religious men. "[46]

Nor did the paradox end there. If the Ulster Movement was "rebellious, "its purpose was as paradoxical as its circumstances. It had in it nosubversive element. In this respect it stands (so far as the writer'sknowledge goes) without precedent, a solitary instance in the history ofmankind. The world has witnessed rebellions without number, designed tobring about many different results--to emancipate a people fromoppression, to upset an obnoxious form of Government, to expel or torestore a rival dynasty, to transfer allegiance from one Sovereign orone State to another. But has there ever been a "rebellion" the objectof which was to maintain the _status quo_? Yet that was the sole purposeof the Ulstermen in all they did from 1911 to 1914. That fact, whichdistinguished their movement from every rebellion or revolution inhistory, placed them on a far more solid ground of reasonablejustification than the excuse offered by Mr. Churchill for theirbellicose attitude in his father's day. Although he is no doubt right insaying that "When men are sufficiently in earnest they will back theirwords with more than votes, " it is a plea that would cover alike theconduct of Halifax and the other Whigs who resisted the legal authorityof James II, of the Jacobites who fought for his grandson, and of thecontrivers of many another bloody or bloodless Revolution. But there wasnothing revolutionary in the Ulster Movement. It was resistance to thetransfer of a people's allegiance without their consent; to theirforcible expulsion from a Constitution with which they were content andtheir forcible inclusion in a Constitution which they detested. This wasthe very antithesis of Revolution. English Radical writers andpoliticians might argue that no "transfer of allegiance" wascontemplated; but Ulstermen thought they knew better, and the laterdevelopment of the Irish question proved how right they were. Even hadthey been proved wrong instead of right in their conviction that thetrue aim of Irish Nationalism (a term in which Sinn Fein is included)was essentially separatist, they knew better than Englishmen how littlereality there was in the theory that under the proposed Home Rule theirallegiance would be unaffected and their political _status_ suffer nodegradation. They claimed to occupy a position similar to that of theNorth in the American Civil War--with this difference, which, so far asit went, told in their favour, that whereas Lincoln took up arms toresist secession, they were prepared to do so to resist expulsion, thepurpose in both cases, however, being to preserve union. The practicalview of the question, as it would appear in the eyes of ordinary men, was well expressed by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords, when he said:

 "The people of this country will be very loth to condemn those whose only disloyalty it will be to have been excessive in their loyalty to the King. Do not suppose that the people of this country will call those 'rebels' whose only form of rebellion is to insist on remaining under the Imperial Parliament. "[47]

Of course, men like Sir Edward Carson, Lord Londonderry, Mr. ThomasSinclair, and other Ulster leaders were too far-seeing not to realisethat the course they were taking would expose them to the accusation ofhaving set a bad example which others without the same grounds ofjustification might follow in very different circumstances. But this wasa risk they had to shoulder, as have all who are not prepared tosubscribe to the dogma of Passive Obedience without limit. They acceptedit as the less of two evils. But there was something humorous in thepretence put forward in 1916 and afterwards that the violence to whichthe adherents of Sinn Fein had recourse was merely copying Ulster. As ifIrish Nationalism in its extreme form required precedent forinsurrection! Even the leader of "Constitutional Nationalism" himselfhad traced his political pedigree to convicted rebels like Tone andEmmet, and since the date of those heroes there had been at least twoarmed risings in Ireland against the British Crown and Government. Ifthe taunt flung at Ulstermen had been that they had at last thrownoverboard law and order and had stolen the Nationalist policy of activeresistance, there would at least have been superficial plausibility init. But when it was suggested or implied that the Ulster example wasactually responsible in any degree whatever for violent outbreaks in theother provinces, a supercilious smile was the only possible retort fromthe lips of representatives of Ulster. 

But what caused them some perplexity was the disposition manifested incertain quarters in England to look upon the two parties in Ireland inregard to "rebellion" as "six of one and half a dozen of the other. " Ithas always, unhappily, been characteristic of a certain type ofEnglishman to see no difference between the friends and the enemies ofhis country, and, if he has a preference at all, to give it to thelatter. Apart from all other circumstances which in the eyes ofUlstermen justified them up to the hilt in the policy they pursued, apart from everything that distinguished them historically and morallyfrom Irish "rebels, " there was the patent and all-important fact thatthe motive of their opponents was hostility to England, whereas theirown motive was friendliness and loyalty to England. In that respect theynever wavered. If the course of events had ever led to the employment ofBritish troops to crush the resistance of Ulster to Home Rule, theextraordinary spectacle would have been presented to the wondering worldof the King's soldiers shooting down men marching under the British flagand singing "God save the King. "

It was no doubt because this was very generally understood in Englandthat the sympathies of large masses of law-loving people were never fora moment alienated from the men of Ulster by all the striving of theirenemies to brand them as rebels. Constitutional authorities may, as Mr. Churchill says, "measure their censures according to their politicalopinions, " but the generality of men, who are not constitutionalauthorities, whose political opinions, if they have any, arefluctuating, and who care little for "juridical niceties, " will measuretheir censures according to their instinctive sympathies. And the soundinstinct of Englishmen forbade them to blame men who, if rebels in law, were their firm friends in fact, for taking exceptional and even illegalmeasures, when all others failed, to preserve the full unity which theyregarded as the fruit of that friendship. 

FOOTNOTES:

[41] See _Life of the Eighth Duke of Devonshire, _ by Bernard Holland, ii, pp. 249-51. 

[42] _Life of Lord Randolph Churchill_, vol. Ii, p. 65. 

[43] _Annual Register_, 1912, p. 82. 

[44] Bernard Holland's _Life of the Eighth Duke of Devonshire_, ii, 250. 

[45] _The Times_, July 14th, 1913. 

[46] Ibid. , August 22nd, 1912. 

[47] _Parliamentary Debates_ (House of Lords), July 15th, 1913. 

CHAPTER XIII

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PROPAGANDA

By the death of the Duke of Abercorn on the 3rd of January, 1913, theUlster Loyalists lost a leader who had for many years occupied a veryspecial place in their affection and confidence. Owing to failing healthhe had been unable to take an active part in the exciting events of thepast two years, but the messages of encouragement and support which wereread from him at Craigavon, Balmoral, and other meetings for organisingresistance, were always received with an enthusiasm which showed, andwas intended to show, that the great part he had played in former years, and especially his inspiring leadership as Chairman of the UlsterConvention in 1893, had never been forgotten. 

His death inflicted also, indirectly, another blow which at thisparticular moment was galling to loyalists out of all proportion to itsintrinsic importance. The removal to the House of Lords of the Marquisof Hamilton, the member for Derry city, created a vacancy which wasfilled at the ensuing by-election by a Liberal Home Ruler. To lose aseat anywhere in the north-eastern counties at such a critical time inthe movement was bad enough, but the unfading halo of the historic siegerested on Derry as on a sanctuary of Protestantism and loyalty, so thatthe capture of the "Maiden City" by the enemy wounded loyalist sentimentfar more deeply than the loss of any other constituency. The two partieshad been for some time very nearly evenly balanced there, and everyelectioneering art and device, including that of bringing to the pollvoters who had long rested in the cemetery, was practised in Derry withunfailing zeal and zest by party managers. For some time past trade, especially ship-building, had been in a state of depression in Derry, with the result that a good many of the better class of artisans, whowere uniformly Unionist, had gone to Belfast and elsewhere to find work, leaving the political fortunes of the city at the mercy of the casuallabourer who drifted in from the wilds of Donegal, and who at thiselection managed to place the Home Rule candidate in a majority offifty-seven. 

It was a matter of course that the late Duke's place as President of theUlster Unionist Council should be taken by Lord Londonderry, and ithappened that the annual meeting at which he was formally elected washeld on the same day that witnessed the rejection of the Home Rule Billby the House of Lords. 

It was also at this annual meeting (31st January, 1913) that the specialCommission who had been charged to prepare a scheme for the ProvisionalGovernment, presented their draft Report. The work had been done withgreat thoroughness and was adopted without substantial alteration by theCouncil, but was not made public for several months. The Council itselfwas, in the event of the Provisional Government being set up, toconstitute a "Central Authority, " and provision was made, with completeelaboration of detail, for carrying on all the necessary departments ofadministration by different Committees and Boards, whose respectivefunctions were clearly defined. Among those who consented to serve inthese departmental Committees, in addition to the recognised localleaders in the Ulster Movement, were Dr. Crozier, Archbishop of Armagh, the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church inIreland, Lord Charles Beresford, Major-General Montgomery, ColonelThomas Hickman, M. P. , Lord Claud Hamilton, M. P. , Sir Robert Kennedy, K. C. M. G. , and Sir Charles Macnaghten, K. C. , son of Lord Macnaghten, thedistinguished Lord of Appeal. Ulster at this time gave a lead on thequestion of admitting women to political power, at a time when theirclaim to enfranchisement was being strenuously resisted in England, byincluding several women in the Provisional Government. 

A most carefully drawn scheme for a separate judiciary in Ulster hadbeen prepared with the assistance of some of the ablest lawyers inIreland. It was in three parts, dealing respectively with (a) theSupreme Court, (b) the Land Commission, and (c) County Courts; it wasdrawn up as an Ordinance, in the usual form of a Parliamentary Bill, andit is an indication of the spirit in which Ulster was preparing toresist an Act of Parliament that the Ordinance bore the introductoryheading: "_It is Hereby Enacted by the Central Authority in the name ofthe King's Most Excellent Majesty that_------" Similarly, the form of"Oath or Declaration of Adherence" to be taken by Judges, Magistrates, Coroners, and other officers of the Courts, set out in a Schedule to theOrdinance, was: "I ... Of ... Being about to serve in the Courts of theProvisional Government as the Central Authority for His Majesty theKing, etc. "

It will be remembered that the original resolution by which the Councildecided to set up a Provisional Government limited its duration untilUlster should "again resume unimpaired her citizenship in the UnitedKingdom, "[48] and at a later date it was explicitly stated that it wasto act as trustee for the Imperial Parliament. All the forms preparedfor use while it remained in being purported to be issued in the name ofthe King. And the Resolution adopted by the Unionist Council immediatelyafter constituting itself the Central Authority of the ProvisionalGovernment, in which the reasons for that policy were recorded, concluded with the statement that "we, for our part, in the course wehave determined to pursue, are inspired not alone by regard to the truewelfare of our own country, but by devotion to the interests of ourworld-wide Empire and loyalty to our beloved King. " If this was thelanguage of rebels, it struck a note that can never before have beenheard in a chorus of disaffection. 

The demonstrations against the Government's policy which had been heldduring the last eighteen months, of which some account has been given, were so impressive that those which followed were inevitably lessremarkable by comparison. They were, too, necessarily to a largeextent, repetitions of what had gone before. There might be, and therewere, plenty of variations on the old theme, but there was no new themeto introduce. Propaganda to the extent possible with the resources atthe disposal of the Ulster Unionist Council was carried on in theBritish constituencies in 1913, the cost being defrayed chiefly throughgenerous subscriptions collected by the energy and influence of Mr. Walter Long; but many were beginning to share the opinion of Mr. CharlesCraig, M. P. , who scandalised the Radicals by saying at Antrim in Marchthat, while it was incumbent on Ulstermen to do their best to educatethe electorate, "he believed that, as an argument, ten thousand poundsspent on rifles would be a thousand times stronger than the same amountspent on meetings, speeches, and pamphlets. "

On the 27th of March a letter appeared in the London newspapersannouncing the formation of a "British League for the support of Ulsterand the Union, " with an office in London. It was signed by a hundredPeers and 120 Unionist Members of the House of Commons. The manifestoemphasised the Imperial aspect of the great struggle that was going on, asserting that it was "quite clear that the men of Ulster are notfighting only for their own liberties. Ulster will be the field on whichthe privileges of the whole nation will be lost or won. " A smallexecutive Committee was appointed, with the Duke of Bedford as Chairman, and within a few weeks large numbers of people in all parts of thecountry joined the new organisation. A conference attended by upwards of150 honorary agents from all parts of the country was held atLondonderry House on the 4th of June, where the work of the League wasdiscussed, and its future policy arranged. Its operations were notostentatious, but they were far from being negligible, especially inconnection with later developments of the movement in the followingyear. This proof of British support was most encouraging to the peopleof Ulster, and the Dublin correspondent of _The Times_ reported that itgave no less satisfaction to loyalists in other parts of Ireland, amongwhom, as the position became more desperate every day, there was "notthe least sign of giving way, of accepting the inevitable. "

Every month that passed in uncertainty as to what fate was reserved forUlster, and especially every visit of the leader to Belfast, endearedhim more intensely to his followers, who had long since learnt to givehim their unquestioning trust; and his bereavement by the death of hiswife in April 1913 brought him the profound and affectionate sympathy ofa warm-hearted people, which manifested itself in most moving fashion ata great meeting a month later on the 16th of May, when, at the openingof a new drill hall in the most industrial district of Belfast, SirEdward exclaimed, in response to a tumultuous reception, "Heaven knows, my one affection left me is my love of Ireland. "

He took occasion at the same meeting to impress upon his followers thespirit by which all their actions should be guided, and which alwaysguided his own. With a significant reference to the purposes for whichthe new drill hall might be used, he added, "Always remember--this isessential--always remember you have no quarrel with individuals. Wewelcome and we love every individual Irishman, even though he may beopposed to us. Our quarrel is with the Government. " When the feelings ofmasses of men are deeply stirred in political conflict such exhortationsare never superfluous; and there never was a leader who could give themwith better grace than Sir Edward Carson, who himself combined to anextraordinary degree strength of conviction with entire freedom frombitterness towards individual opponents. [49]

In this same speech he showed that there was no slackening ofdetermination to pursue to the end the policy of the Covenant. There hadbeen rumours that the Government were making secret inquiries with aview to taking legal proceedings, and in allusion to them Carson movedhis audience to one of the most wonderful demonstrations of personaldevotion that even he ever evoked, by saying: "If they want to test thelegality of anything we are doing, let them not attack humble men--I amresponsible for everything, and they know where to find me. "

The Bill was running its course for the second time through Parliament, a course that was now farcically perfunctory, and Carson returned toLondon to repeat in the House of Commons on the 10th of June his defiantacceptance of responsibility for the Ulster preparations. He was back inBelfast for the 12th of July celebrations, when 150, 000 Orangemenassembled at Craigavon to hear another speech from their leader full ofconfident challenge, and to receive another message of encouragementfrom Mr. Bonar Law, who assured them that "whatever steps they mightfeel compelled to take, whether they were constitutional, or whether inthe long run they were unconstitutional, they had the whole of theUnionist Party under his leadership behind them. "

The leader of the Unionist Party had good reason to know that hismessage to Ulster was endorsed by his followers. That had beendemonstrated beyond all possibility of doubt during the preceding month. The Ulster Unionist Members of the House of Commons, with Carson attheir head, had during June made a tour of some of the principal townsof Scotland and the North of England, receiving a resounding welcomewherever they went. The usual custom of political meetings, where one ortwo prominent speakers have the platform to themselves, was departedfrom; the whole parliamentary contingent kept together throughout thetour as a deputation from Ulster to the constituencies visited, takingin turn the duty of supporting Carson, who was everywhere the principalspeaker. 

There were wonderful demonstrations at Glasgow and Edinburgh, both inthe streets and the principal halls, proving, as was aptly said by _TheYorkshire Post_, that "the cry of the new Covenanters is not unheeded bythe descendants of the old"; and thence they went south, drawing greatcheering crowds to welcome them and to present encouraging addresses atthe railway stations at Berwick, Newcastle, Darlington, and York, toLeeds, where the two largest buildings in the city were packed tooverflowing with Yorkshiremen eager to see and hear the Ulster leader, and to show their sympathy with the loyalist cause. Similar scenes werewitnessed at Norwich and Bristol, and the tour left no doubt in theminds of those who followed it, and who studied the comments of thePress upon it, that not only was the whole Unionist Party in GreatBritain solidly behind the Ulstermen in their resolve to resist beingsubjected to a Parliament in Dublin, but that the general drift ofopinion detached from party was increasingly on the same side. 

FOOTNOTES:

[48] See _ante_, p. 53. 

[49] But he could be moved to stern indignation by the treachery offormer friends, as he showed in December 1921. 

CHAPTER XIV

LORD LOREBURN'S LETTER

Whatever might be the state of public opinion in England, it wasrealised that the Government, if they chose, were in a position todisregard it; and in Ulster the tension was becoming almost unbearable. The leaders were apprehensive lest outbreaks of violence should occur, which they knew would gravely prejudice the movement; and there is nodoubt that it was only the discipline which the rank and file had nowgained, and the extraordinary restraining influence which Carsonexercised, that prevented serious rioting in many places. Incidents likethe attack by Nationalist roughs in Belfast on a carriage conveyingcrippled children to a holiday outing on the 31st of May because it wasdecorated with Union Jacks might at any moment lead to trouble. Therewas some disorder in Belfast in the early hours of the 12th of July; andan outbreak occurred in August in Derry, always a storm centre, when aprocession was attacked, and a Protestant was shot while watching itfrom his own upper window. The incident started rioting, which continuedfor several days, and a battalion of troops had to be called in torestore order. 

Meantime, throughout the summer, while the Government were complacentlycarrying their Bill through Parliament for the second time, the Presswas packed with suggestions for averting the crisis which everybodyexcept the Cabinet recognised as impending. 

It began to be whispered in the clubs and lobbies that the King mightexercise the prerogative of veto, and even men like Lord St. Aldwyn andthe veteran Earl of Halsbury, both of them ex-Cabinet Ministers, encouraged the idea; but there was no widespread acceptance of thenotion that even in so exceptional a case His Majesty would reject theadvice of his responsible Ministers. But in a letter to _The Times_ onthe 4th of September, Mr. George Cave, K. C. , M. P. (afterwards HomeSecretary, and ultimately Lord of Appeal), suggested that the King might"exercise his undoubted right" to dissolve Parliament before thebeginning of the next session, in order to inform himself as to whetherthe policy of his Ministers was endorsed by the people. 

But a much greater sensation was created a few days later by a letterwhich appeared in _The Times_ on the 11th of the same month over thesignature of Lord Loreburn. Lord Loreburn had been Lord Chancellor atthe time the Home Rule Bill was first introduced, but had retired fromthe Government in June 1912, being replaced on the Woolsack by LordHaldane. When the first draft of the Home Rule Bill was under discussionin the Cabinet in preparation for its introduction in the House ofCommons, two of the younger Ministers, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. WinstonChurchill, proposed that an attempt should be made to avert the sternopposition to be expected from Ulster, by treating the northernProvince, or a portion of it, separately from the rest of Ireland. Thisproposal was not acceptable to the Cabinet as a whole, and its authorswere roundly rated by Lord Loreburn for so unprincipled a lapse fromorthodox Gladstonian doctrine. What, therefore, must have been theastonishment of the heretics when they found their mentor, less than twoyears later, publicly reproving the Government which he had left forhaving got into such a sad mess over the Ulster difficulty! They mightbe forgiven some indignation at finding themselves reproved by LordLoreburn for faulty statesmanship of which Lord Loreburn was theprincipal author. 

Those, however, who had not the same ground for exasperation as Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill thought Lord Loreburn's letter very soundsense. He pointed out that if the Bill were to become law in 1914, as itstood in September 1913, there would be, if not civil war, at any ratevery serious rioting in the North of Ireland, and when the riots hadbeen quelled by the Government the spirit that prompted them wouldremain. Everybody concerned would suffer from fighting it out to afinish. The Ex-Chancellor felt bound to assume that "up to the last, Ministers, who assuredly have not taken leave of their senses, would bewilling to consider proposals for accommodation, " and he thereforesuggested that a Conference should be held behind closed doors with aview to a settlement by consent. If Lord Loreburn had perceived at thetime the draft Bill was before the Cabinet that it was not the Ministerswho proposed separate treatment for Ulster who had "taken leave of theirsenses, " but those, including himself, who had resisted that proposal, his wisdom would have been more timely; but it was better late thannever, and his unexpected intervention had a decided influence onopinion in the country. 

The comment of _The Times_ was very much to the point:

 "On the eve of a great political crisis, it may be of national disaster, a distinguished Liberal statesman makes public confession of his belief that, as a permanent solution, the Irish policy of the Government is indefensible. "

This letter of the ex-Lord Chancellor gave rise to prolonged discussionin the Press and on the platform. At Durham, on the 13th of September, Carson declared that he would welcome a Conference if the question washow to provide a genuine expansion of self-government, but that, ifUlster was to be not only expelled from the Union but placed under aParliament in Dublin, then "they were going to make Home Rule impossibleby steady and persistent opposition. " The Government seemed unable toagree whether a conciliatory or a defiant attitude was their wiserpolicy, though it is true that the latter recommended itself mostly tothe least prominent of its members, such as Mr. J. M. Robertson, Secretary of the Board of Trade, who in a speech at Newcastle on the25th of September announced scornfully that Ministers were not going toturn "King Carson" into "Saint Carson" by prosecuting him, and that "theGovernment would know how to deal with him. "[50] But more importantMinisters were beginning to perceive the unwisdom of this sort ofbluster. Lord Morley, in the House of Lords, denied that he had everunderrated the Ulster difficulty, and said that for twenty-five years hehad never thought that Ulster was guilty of bluff. Mr. Churchill, atDundee, on the 9th of October, no longer talked as he had the previousyear about "not taking Sir Edward Carson too seriously, " though he stillappeared to be ignorant of the fact that there was in Ulster anybodyexcept Orangemen. "The Orange Leaders, " he said, "used violent language, but Liberals should try to understand their position. Their claim forspecial consideration, if put forward with sincerity, could not beignored by a Government depending on the existing House. "[51]

The Prime Minister, less assured than his subordinate at the Board ofTrade that "King Carson" was negligible, also displayed a somewhatchastened spirit at Ladybank on the 25th of October, when heacknowledged that it was "of supreme importance to the future well-beingof Ireland that the new system should not start with the apparenttriumph of one section over another, " and he invited a "free and frankexchange of views. "[52] Sir Edward Grey held out another little twig ofolive two days later at Berwick. 

To these overtures, if they deserve the name, Mr. Bonar Law replied inan address to a gathering of fifteen thousand people at Wallsend on the29th, in the presence of Sir Edward Carson. Having repeated the Blenheimpledge, he praised the discipline and restraint shown by the Ulsterpeople and their leaders, but warned his hearers that the nation wasdrifting towards the tragedy of civil war, the responsibility for whichwould rest on the Government. He expressed his readiness to respond toMr. Asquith's invitation, but pointed out that there were only threealternatives open to the Government. They must either (1) go on as theywere doing and provoke Ulster to resist--that was madness; (2) theycould consult the electorate, whose decision would be accepted by theUnionist Party as a whole; or (3) they could try to arrange a settlementwhich would at least avert civil war. 

There had been during the past six or eight months an unusual dearth ofby-elections to test public opinion in regard to the Irish policy of theGovernment, and it must be borne in mind that the Unionist Party inGreat Britain was still distracted by disputes over the Tariff question, which in January 1913 had very nearly led to the retirement of Mr. BonarLaw from the leadership. Nevertheless, in May the Unionists won twosignal victories, one in Cambridgeshire, and one in Cheshire, where theAltrincham Division sent a staunch friend of Ulster to Parliament in theperson of Mr. George C. Hamilton, who in his maiden speech declared thathe had won the contest entirely on the Ulster Question. Even moresignificant, perhaps, were two elections which were fought while theinterchange of party strokes over the Loreburn letter was in progress, and the results of both were declared on the 8th of November. AtReading, where the Unionists retained the seat, the Liberal candidatewas constrained by pressure of opinion in the constituency to promisesupport for a policy of "separate and generous treatment for Ulster. " AtLinlithgow, a Liberal stronghold, where no such promise was forthcoming, the Liberal majority, in spite of a large Nationalist vote, was reducedby 1, 500 votes as compared with the General Election. There were signsthat Nonconformists, whose great leaders like Spurgeon and Dale had beenhostile to Home Rule in Gladstone's time, were again becoming uneasyabout handing over the Ulster Presbyterians and Methodists to the Romanhierarchy. A memorial against Home Rule, signed by 131, 000 people, whichhad been presented to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church inJune, had no doubt had some effect on Nonconformist opinion in England, and it was just about the time when these elections took place thatCarson was described at a large gathering of Nonconformists in London as"the best embodiment at this moment of the ancient spirit ofNonconformity. "[53]

Meanwhile the people in Ulster were steadily maturing their plans. Thearrangements already mentioned for setting up a Provisional Governmentwere confirmed and finally adopted by the Unionist Council in Belfast onthe 24th of September, and the Council by resolution delegated itspowers to the Standing Committee, while the Commission of Five was atthe same time appointed to act as an Executive. Carson, in accepting thechairmanship of the Central Authority, used the striking phrase, whichprecisely epitomised the situation, that "Ulster might be coerced intosubmission, but in that case would have to be governed as a conqueredcountry. " The Nationalist retort that the rest of Ireland was now beingso treated, appeared forcible to those Englishmen only who could see nodifference between controlling a disaffected population and chastising aloyal one. 

At the same meeting of the Ulster Unionist Council on the 24th ofSeptember a guarantee fund was established for providing means tocompensate members of the U. V. F. For any loss or disability they mightsuffer as a result of their service, and the widows and dependents ofany who might lose their lives. This was a matter that had caused Carsonanxiety for some time. He was extremely sensitive to the moralresponsibility he would incur towards those who so eagerly followed hislead, in the event of their suffering loss of life or limb in theservice of Ulster. His proposal that a guarantee fund of a millionsterling should be started, met with a ready response from the Council, and from the wealthier classes in and about Belfast. The form of"Indemnity Guarantee" provided for the payment to those entitled tobenefit under it of sums not less than they would have been entitled tounder the Fatal Accidents Act, the Employers' Liability Act, and theWorkman's Compensation Act, as the circumstances of the case might be. The list was headed by Sir Edward Carson, Lord Londonderry, CaptainCraig, Sir John Lonsdale, Sir George Clark, and Lord Dunleath, with asubscription of £10, 000 each, and their example was followed by Mr. KerrSmiley, M. P. , Mr. R. M. Liddell, Mr. George Preston, Mr. Henry Musgrave, Mr. C. E. Allen, and Mr. Frank Workman, who entered their namesseverally for the same amount. A quarter of a million sterling wasguaranteed in the room before the Council separated; by the end of aweek it had grown to £387, 000; and before the 1st of January, 1914, thetotal amount of the Indemnity Guarantee Fund was £1, 043, 816. 

It gave Carson and the other leaders the greatest possible satisfactionthat the response to this appeal was so prompt and adequate. Not onlywas their anxiety relieved in regard to their responsibility to loyalfollowers of the rank and file who might become "casualties" in themovement, but they had been given a striking proof that the businesscommunity of Belfast did not consider its pocket more sacred than itsprinciples. Moreover, if there had been doubt on that score in anyone'smind, it was set at rest by a memorable meeting for business men onlyheld in Belfast on the 3rd of November. Between three and four thousandleaders of industry and commerce, the majority of whom had neverhitherto taken any active share in political affairs, presided over byMr. G. H. Ewart, President of the Belfast Chamber of Commerce, gave anenthusiastic reception to Carson, who told them that he had come more toconsult them as to the commercial aspects of the great politicalcontroversy than to impress his own views on the gathering. It was saidthat the men in the hall represented a capital of not less than£145, 000, 000 sterling, [54] and there can be no doubt that, even if thatwere an exaggerated estimate, they were not of a class to whomrevolution, rebellion, or political upheaval could offer an attractiveprospect. Nevertheless, the meeting passed with complete unanimity aresolution expressing confidence in Carson and approval of everything hehad done, including the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force, anddeclaring that they would refuse to pay "all taxes which they couldcontrol" to an Irish Parliament in Dublin. This meeting was verysatisfactory, for it proved that the "captains of industry" wereentirely in accord with the working classes, whose support of themovement had never been in doubt. It showed that Ulster was solidbehind Carson; and the unanimity was emphasised rather than disturbed bya little handful of cranks, calling themselves "Protestant Home Rulers, "who met on the 24th of October at the village of Ballymoney "to protestagainst the lawless policy of Carsonism. " The principal stickler forpropriety of conduct in public life on this occasion was Sir RogerCasement. 

While the unity and steadfastness--which enemies called obstinacy--ofthe Ulster people were being thus made manifest, the public in Englandwere hearing a good deal about the growth of the Ulster Volunteer Forcein numbers and efficiency. As will be seen later, the anniversary of theCovenant was celebrated with great military display at the very timewhen the newspapers across the Channel were busy discussing LordLoreburn's letter, and at a parade service in the Ulster Hall, CanonHarding, after pronouncing the Benediction, called on the congregationto raise their right hands and pledge themselves thereby "to followwherever Sir Edward Carson shall lead us. "

The events of September 1913--the setting up of the ProvisionalGovernment, the wonderful and instantaneous response to the appeal foran Indemnity Guarantee Fund, the rapid formation of an effectivevolunteer army--were given the fullest publicity in the English Press. Every newspaper of importance had its special correspondent in Belfast, whose telegrams filled columns every day, adorned with all the varietiesof sensational headline type. The Radicals were becoming restive. Theidea that Carson was "not to be taken too seriously, " had apparentlymissed fire. It was the Ministerial affectation of contempt that no onewas taking seriously; in fact, to borrow an expression from currentslang, the "King Carson" stunt was a "wash-out. "

_The Nation_ suggested that, instead of being laughed at, the Ulsterleader should be prosecuted, or, at any rate, removed from the PrivyCouncil, and other Liberal papers feverishly took up the suggestion, debating whether the indictment should be under the Treason Felony Actof 1848, the Crimes Act of 1887, or the Unlawful Drilling Act of 1819. One of them, however, which succeeded in keeping its head, did notbelieve that a prosecution would succeed; and, as to the Privy Council, if Carson's name were removed, what about Londonderry and F. E. Smith, Walter Long, and Bonar Law? In fact, "it would be difficult to knowwhere to stop. "[55] It would have been. The Privy Council would have hadto be reduced to a committee of Radical politicians; and, if Carson hadbeen prosecuted, room would have had to be found in the dock, not onlyfor the whole Unionist Party, but for the proprietors and editors ofmost of the leading journals. The Government stopped short of thatsupreme folly; but their impotence was the measure of the prevailingsympathy with Ulster. 

FOOTNOTES:

[50] _Annual Register_, 1913, p. 205. 

[51] Ibid. , p. 209. 

[52] Ibid. , p. 220. 

[53] _Annual Register_, 1913, p. 225. 

[54] _Annual Register_, 1913, p. 225. 

[55] _Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury_, September 22nd, 1913. 

CHAPTER XV

PREPARATIONS AND PROPOSALS

We have seen in a former chapter how the Ulster Volunteer Forceoriginated. It was never formally established by the act of anyrecognised authority, but rather grew spontaneously from the zeal of theUnionist Clubs and the Orange Lodges to present an effective andformidable appearance at the demonstrations which marked the progress ofthe movement after the meeting at Craigavon in 1911. By the followingsummer it had attained considerable numbers and respectable efficiency, and was becoming organised, without violation of the law, on aterritorial basis under local officers, many of whom had served in theArmy. Early in 1913 the Standing Committee resolved that these unitsshould be combined into a single force, to be called The UlsterVolunteer Force, which was to be raised and limited to a strength of100, 000 men, all of whom should be men who had signed the Covenant. Whenthis organisation took place it became obvious that a serious defect wasthe want of a Commander-in-Chief of the whole force, to give it unityand cohesion. This defect was pressed on the attention of the leaders ofthe movement, who then began to look about for a suitable officer ofrank and military experience to take command of the U. V. F. Among EnglishMembers of the House of Commons there was no firmer friend of Ulsterthan Colonel Thomas Hickman, C. B. , D. S. O. , who has been mentioned as oneof those who consented to serve in the Provisional Government. Hickmanhad seen a lot of active service, having served with great distinctionin Egypt and the Soudan under Kitchener, and in the South African War. It was natural to take him into confidence in the search for a general;and, when he was approached, it was decided that he should consult LordRoberts, whose warm sympathy with the Ulster cause was well known to theleaders of the movement, and whose knowledge of army officers of highrank was, of course, unequalled. Moreover, the illustrious Field-Marshalhad dropped hints which led those concerned to conjecture that in thelast resort he might not himself be unwilling to lend his matchlessprestige and genius to the loyalist cause in Ireland. The contingencywhich might bring about such an accession had not, however, yet arisen, and might never arise; in the meantime, Lord Roberts gave a ready ear toHickman's application, which, after some weeks of delay, he answered inthe following letter, which was at once communicated to Carson and thosein his immediate confidence:

 "ENGLEMERE, ASCOT, BERKS. 

 "_4th June_, 1913. 

 "DEAR HICKMAN, "I have been a long time finding a Senior Officer to help in the Ulster business, but I think I have got one now. His name is Lieut. -General Sir George Richardson, K. C. B. , c/o Messrs. Henry S. King & Co. , Pall Mall, S. W. He is a retired Indian officer, active and in good health. He is not an Irishman, but has settled in Ireland.... Richardson will be in London for about a month, and is ready to meet you at any time. 

 "I am sorry to read about the capture of rifles. 

 "Believe me, "Yours sincerely, "ROBERTS. "

The matter was quickly arranged, and within a few weeks Sir GeorgeRichardson had taken up his residence in Belfast, and his duties asG. O. C. The Ulster Volunteer Force. 

He was a distinguished soldier. He served under Roberts in the AfghanCampaign of 1879-80; he took part in the Waziri Expedition of 1881, andthe Zhob Valley Field Force operations of 1890. He was in command of aFlying Column in the Tirah Expedition of 1897-8, and of a CavalryBrigade in the China Expeditionary Force in 1900, and had commanded aDivision at Poona for three years before retiring in 1907. He had beenthree times mentioned in despatches, besides receiving a brevet and manymedals and clasps. He was at this time sixty-six years of age, but, likethe great soldier who recommended him to Ulster, he was an active littleman both in body and mind, with no symptom of approaching old age. 

General Richardson was not long in making himself popular, not only withthe force under his command, but with all classes in Ulster. There wereunavoidable difficulties in handling troops whose officers had nostatutory powers of discipline, who had inherited no militarytraditions, and who formed part of a population conspicuouslyindependent in character. But Sir George Richardson was as full of tactas of good humour, and he soon found that the keenness of the officersand men, to whom dismissal from the U. V. F. Would have been the severestof punishments, more than counterbalanced the difficulties referred to. 

When the new G. O. C. Went to Belfast in July, 1913, he found his commandbetween fifty and sixty thousand strong, with recruits joining everyday. In September a number of parades were held in different localities, at which the General was accompanied by Sir Edward Carson, Mr. F. E. Smith, Captain James Craig, and other Members of Parliament. The localbattalions were in many cases commanded by retired or half-pay officersof the regular army. At all these inspections Carson addressed the men, many of whom were now seeing their Commander-in-Chief for the firsttime, and pointed out that the U. V. F. , being now under a single command, was no longer a mere collection of unrelated units, but an army. At aninspection at Antrim on the 21st of September, he made a disclosurewhich startled the country not a little next day when it appeared in theheadlines of English newspapers. "I tell the Government, " he said, "thatwe have pledges and promises from some of the greatest generals in thearmy, who have given their word that, when the time comes, if it isnecessary, they will come over and help us to keep the old flag flying. "These promises were entirely spontaneous and unsolicited. More than oneof those who made them did fine service to the Empire in the impendingtime of trial which none of them foresaw in 1913. 

Of the men inspected on that day, numbering about 5, 000, it was said bythe Special Correspondent of _The Yorkshire Post_, who was present--

 "As far as I could detect in a very careful observation, there were not half a dozen of them unqualified by physique or age to play a manly part. They reminded me more than anything else--except that but few of them were beyond the best fighting age--of the finest class of our National Reserve. There was certainly nothing of the mock soldier about them. Led by keen, smart-looking officers, they marched past in quarter column with fine, swinging steps, as if they had been in training for years. Officers who have had the teaching of them tell me that the rapidity with which they have become efficient is greater than has ever come within their experience in training recruits for either the Territorials or the Regular Service. "[56]

The 24th of September, it will be remembered, was the day when theformation of the Provisional Government and the Indemnity Fund (with thesubscription of a quarter of a million sterling in two hours) was madepublic; on Saturday the 27th, the country parades of Volunteers of thepreceding weeks reached a climax in a grand review in Belfast itself, when some 15, 000 men were drawn up on the same ground where the Balmoralmeeting had been held eighteen months before. They were reviewed by SirGeorge Richardson, G. O. C. , and it was on this occasion that Mr. F. E. Smith became famous as "galloper" to the General. The Commanders of thefour regiments on parade--one from each parliamentary division of thecity--comprising fourteen battalions, were: Colonel Wallace, Major F. H. Crawford, Major McCalmont, M. P. , and Captain the Hon. A. C. Chichester. More than 30, 000 sympathetic spectators watched the arrival and thereview of the troops. 

Among these spectators were a large number of special militarycorrespondents of English newspapers, whose impressions of thismemorable event were studied in every part of the United Kingdom on thefollowing Monday morning. That which appeared in a great Lancashirejournal may be quoted as a fair and dispassionate account of the scene:

 "It is quite certain that the review of Volunteers at Balmoral to-day will go down into history as one of the most extraordinary events in the annals of these islands. Not since the marshalling of Cromwell's Puritan army have we had anything approaching a parallel; but, whereas the Puritans took up arms against a king of whom they disapproved, the men of Ulster strongly protest their loyalty to the British Throne. The great crowd which lined the enclosure was eager, earnest, and sympathetic. It was not a boisterous crowd. On the contrary, beyond the demonstration following the call for cheers for the Union there was comparatively little cheering. The crowd seemed burdened with a heavy sense of the importance of the occasion. The conduct of the gathering was serious to the point of positive solemnity. 

 "The Volunteers from their own ranks policed the grounds, not a solitary member of the Royal Irish Constabulary being seen in the enclosure. The sun shone brilliantly as Colonel Wallace led the men of the North division into the enclosure. Amidst subdued cheers he marched them across the field in fours, forming up in quarter column by the right, facing left. For an hour and a quarter the procession filed through the gates, the men taking up their positions with perfect movement and not the faintest suggestion of confusion. As the men from the West took up their position the crowd broke into a great cheer. They mustered only two battalions, but they had come from Mr. Devlin's constituency!

 "As a body the men were magnificent. The hardy sons of toil from shipyards and factories marched shoulder to shoulder with clergy and doctors, professional men and clerks. From the saluting base General Richardson took command, and almost immediately Sir Edward Carson took up his position on the platform, with Lord Londonderry and Captain Craig in attendance. Then followed a scene that will live long in the memories of that vast concourse of people. With the men standing to 'Attention, ' the bands struck up the 'British Grenadiers, ' and the whole division advanced in review order, in perfect lines and unison. 

 "The supreme moment had arrived. The men took off their hats, and the G. O. C. Shouted, 'I call upon the men to give three cheers for the Union, taking their time from me. Hip, hip----'

 "Well, people who were not there must imagine the rest. Out of the deafening cheers came the strains of 'Rule, Britannia!' from the bands; the monster Union Jack was unfurled in the centre of the ground, and the mighty gathering stood bare-headed to 'God save the King. ' It was solemn, impressive, thrilling. "[57]

The following day, Sunday, was "Ulster Day, " the first anniversary ofthe signing of the Covenant, and it was celebrated in Belfast and manyother places in Ulster by holding special services in all places ofworship, which had the effect of sustaining that spirit of highseriousness which struck all observers as remarkable in the behaviour ofthe people. 

This week, in which occurred the proclamation of the ProvisionalGovernment, the great review of the Belfast Volunteers, and the secondcelebration of Ulster Day, was a notable landmark in the movement. ThePress in England and Scotland gave the widest publicity to everypicturesque and impressive detail, and there can be little doubt thatthe idea of attempting to arrive at some agreed settlement, started byLord Loreburn's letter to _The Times_, was greatly stimulated by thesefresh and convincing proofs of the grim determination of the Ulsterpeople. 

At all events, the autumn produced more than the usual plethora ofpolitical meetings addressed by "front bench" politicians on both sides, each answering each like an antiphonal choir; scraps of olive-branchwere timidly held out, only to be snatched back next day in panic lestsomeone had blundered in saying too much; while day by day a clamorousLiberal Press, to whom Ulster's loyalty to King and Empire was anunforgivable offence, alternated between execration of Ulster wickednessand affected ridicule of Ulster bluff. But it was evident that genuinemisgiving was beginning to be felt in responsible Liberal quarters. ACorrespondent of _The Manchester Guardian_ on the 25th of November madea proposal for special treatment of Ulster; on the 1st of December Mr. Massingham, in _The Daily News_, urged that an effort should be made toconciliate the northern Protestants; and on the 6th Mr. Asquithdisplayed a more conciliatory spirit than usual in a speech atManchester. A most active campaign of propaganda in England and Scotlandwas also carried on during the autumn by Ulster speakers, among whomwomen bore their full share. The Ulster Women's Unionist Associationemployed 93 voluntary workers, who visited over 90 constituencies inGreat Britain, addressing 230 important meetings. It was reckoned thatnot less than 100, 000 electors heard the Ulster case from the lips ofearnest Ulster women. 

On the 5th of December two Royal Proclamations were issued by theGovernment, prohibiting the importation of arms and ammunition intoIreland. But during the Christmas holidays the impression gained groundthat the Government contemplated making concessions to Ulster, andcommunications in private between the Prime Minister and Sir EdwardCarson did in fact take place at this time. The truth, however, was thatthe Government were not their own masters, and, as Mr. Bonar Law bluntlydeclared at Bristol on the 15th of January, 1914, they were compelled bythe Nationalists, on whom they depended for existence, to refuse anygenuine concession. In the same speech Mr. Bonar Law replied to theallegation that Ulster was crying out before she was hurt, by sayingthat the American colonies had done the same thing--they had revolted ona question of principle while suffering was still distant, and for acause that in itself was trivial in comparison with that of Ulster. [58]

Most of the leaders on both sides were speaking on various platforms inJanuary. On the 17th Carson, at an inspection of the East BelfastU. V. F. , said he had lately visited Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, and that thedying statesman, clear-sighted and valiant as ever, had said to him atparting, "I would fight it out. " In the same spirit Mr. AustenChamberlain, in a speech at Skipton a fortnight later, ridiculed anyconcession that fell short of the exclusion of Ulster from the IrishParliament, and asserted that what the policy of the Government amountedto was that England was to conquer a province and hold it down at theexpense of her friends for the benefit of her enemies. [59]

Public attention was, however, not allowed to concentrate wholly onIreland. The Radicals, instigated by Sir John Brunner, President of theNational Liberal Federation, were doing their best to prevent thestrengthening of the Navy, the time being opportune for parsimony in Mr. Lloyd George's opinion because our relations with Germany were "far morefriendly than for years past. "[60] The militant women suffragists werecarrying on a lively campaign of arson and assault all over the country. Labour unrest was in a condition of ferment. Land agitation was excitingthe "single-taxers" and other fanatics; and the Tariff question had notceased to be a cause of division in the Unionist Party. But, while thesematters were sharing with the Irish problem the attention of the Pressand the public, "conversations" were being held behind the scenes with aview to averting what everyone now agreed would be a dangerous crisis ifUlster proved implacable. 

When Parliament met on the 10th of February, 1914, Mr. Asquith referredto these conversations; but while he congratulated everyone concerned onthe fact that the Press had been successfully kept in the dark formonths regarding them, he had to admit that they had produced no result. But there were, he said, "schemes and suggestions of settlement in theair, " among them the exclusion of Ulster from the Bill, a proposal onwhich he would not at that moment "pronounce, or attempt to pronounce, any final judgment", and he then announced that, as soon as thefinancial business of the year was disposed of, he would bring forwardproposals for the purpose of arriving at an agreement "which willconsult not only the interests but the susceptibilities of allconcerned. "

This appeared to be a notable change of attitude on the part of theGovernment; but it was received with not a little suspicion by theUnionist leaders. Whether or not the change was due, as Mr. WilliamMoore bluntly asserted, to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force, which had now reached its full strength of 100, 000 men, the question ofinterest was whether the promised proposals would render that forceunnecessary. Mr. Austen Chamberlain asked why the Government's proposalsshould be kept bottled up until a date suspiciously near All Fools' Day;and Sir Edward Carson, in one of the most impressive speeches he evermade in Parliament, which wrung from Mr. Lloyd George the acknowledgmentthat it had "entranced the House, " joined Chamberlain in demanding thatthe country should not be kept in anxious suspense. The only proper wayof making the proposals known was, he said, by embodying them at once ina Bill to amend the Home Rule Bill. He confirmed Chamberlain's statementthat nothing short of the exclusion of Ulster would be of the slightestuse. The Covenanters were not men who would have acted as they had donefor the sake of minor details that could be adjusted by "papersafeguards, " they were "fighting for a great principle and a greatideal, " and if their determination to resist was not morally justifiedhe "did not see how resistance could ever be justified in history atall. " But if the exclusion of Ulster was to be offered, he wouldimmediately go to Belfast and lay the proposal before his followers. Hedid not intend "that Ulster should be a pawn in any political game, " andwould not allow himself to be manoeuvred into a position where it couldafterwards be said that Ulster had resorted to arms to secure somethingthat had been rejected when offered by legislation. The sympathy ofUlstermen with Loyalists in other parts of Ireland was as deep andsincere as ever, but no one had ever supposed that Ulster could by forceof arms do more than preserve her own territory from subjection toDublin. As for the Nationalists, they would never succeed in coercingUlster, but "by showing that good government can come under Home Rulethey might try and win her over to the case of the rest of Ireland. "That was a plan that had never yet been tried. 

The significance of the announcement which Mr. Asquith had now made layin the fact that it was an acknowledgment by the Government for thefirst time that there was an "Ulster Question" to be dealt with--thatUlster was not, as had hitherto been the Liberal theory, like any otherminority who must submit to the will of the majority opposed to it, buta distinct community, conditioned by special circumstances entitling itto special treatment. The Prime Minister had thus, as Mr. Bonar Lawinsisted, "destroyed utterly the whole foundation on which for the lasttwo years the treatment extended to Ulster in this Bill has beenjustified. " From that day it became impossible ever again to contendthat Ulster was merely a recalcitrant minority in a larger unity, without rights of her own. 

The speeches of the Unionist leaders in the House of Commons showedclearly enough how little faith they had that the Government intended todo anything that could lead to an agreed settlement. The interval thatpassed before the nature of the Government's proposals was made knownincreased rather than diminished this distrust. The air was full ofsuggestions, the most notable of which was put forward by the veteranconstitutional lawyer, Mr. Frederic Harrison, who proposed that Ulstershould be governed by a separate committee elected by its ownconstituencies, with full legislative, administrative, and financialpowers, subject only to the Crown and the Imperial Parliament. [61]Unionists did not believe that the Liberal Cabinet would be allowed bytheir Nationalist masters to offer anything so liberal to Ulster; nordid that Province desire autonomy for itself. They believed that thechief desire of the Government was not to appease Ulster, but to put herin a tactically indefensible position. This fear had been expressed byLord Lansdowne as long before as the previous October, when he wroteprivately to Carson in reference to Lord Loreburn's suggested Conferencethat he suspected the intention of the Government to be "to offer usterms which they know we cannot accept, and then throw on us the odiumof having obstructed a settlement. " Mr. Walter Long had the sameapprehension in March 1914 as to the purpose of Mr. Asquith's unknownproposals. Both these leaders herein showed insight and prescience, fornot only Mr. Asquith's Government, but also that which succeeded it, hadresort on many subsequent occasions to the manoeuvre suspected by LordLansdowne. 

On the other hand, there were encouraging signs in the country. To theintense satisfaction of Unionists, Mr. C. F. G. Masterman, who had justbeen promoted to the Cabinet, lost his seat in East London when hesought re-election in February, and a day or two later the Governmentsuffered another defeat in Scotland. On the 27th of February LordMilner, a fearless supporter of the Ulster cause, wrote to Carson that aBritish Covenant had been drawn up in support of the Ulster Covenanters, and that the first signatures, in addition to his own, were those ofField-Marshal Lord Roberts, Admiral of the Fleet Sir E. Seymour, theDuke of Portland, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, Lord Desborough, Lord Lovat, Mr. Rudyard Kipling, Sir W. Ramsay, F. R. S. , the Dean of Canterbury, Professors Dicey and Goudy, Sir George Hayter Chubb, and Mr. Salvidge, the influential alderman of Liverpool. On the 6th of March Mr. WalterLong, writing from the office of the Union Defence League, of which hewas President, was able to inform Carson that there was "a rush to signthe Covenant--we are really almost overpowered. " This was supplementedby a women's Covenant, which, like the men's, "had been numerously andinfluentially signed, about 3 or 4 per cent, of the signatories, it wassaid, being Liberals. "[62] Long believed from this and other evidencethat had reached him that "public opinion was now really aroused in thecountry, " and that the steadfast policy of Ulster had the undoubtedsupport of the electorate. 

Only those who were in the confidence of Mr. Asquith and his colleaguesat the beginning of 1914 can know whether the "proposals" they then madewere ever seriously put forward as an effort towards appeasement. Ifthey were sincerely meant for such, it implied a degree of ignorance ofthe chief factor in the problem with which it is difficult to creditable Ministers who had been face to face with that problem for years. They must have supposed that their leading opponents were capable ofsaying emphatically one thing and meaning quite another. For theUnionist leaders had stated over and over again in the most unmistakableterms, both in the recent debate on the Address, and on innumerableformer occasions, that nothing except the "exclusion of Ulster" couldfurnish a basis for negotiation towards settlement. 

And yet, when the Prime Minister at last put his cards on the table onthe 9th of March, in moving the second reading of the Home RuleBill--which now entered on its third and last lap under the ParliamentAct--it was found that his much-trumpeted proposals were derisory to thelast degree. The scheme was that which came to be known as county optionwith a time limit. Any county in Ulster, including the cities of Belfastand Derry, was to be given the right to vote itself out of the Home Rulejurisdiction, on a requisition signed by a specified proportion of itsparliamentary electorate, for a period of six years. 

Mr. Bonar Law said at once, on behalf of the Unionist Party, that apartfrom all other objections to the Government scheme, and they were many, the time limit for exclusion made the whole proposal a mockery. All thatit meant was that when the preparations in Ulster for resistance to HomeRule had been got rid of--for it would be practically impossible to keepthem in full swing for six years--Ulster should then be compelled tosubmit to the very thing to which she refused to submit now. Carsondescribed the proposal as a "sentence of death with a stay of executionfor six years. " He noted with satisfaction indeed the admission of theprinciple of exclusion, but expressed his conviction that the time limithad been introduced merely in order to make it impossible for Ulster toaccept. Ulster wanted the question settled once for all, so that shemight turn her attention from politics to her ordinary business. Thetime limit would keep the fever of political agitation at a hightemperature for six years, and at the end of that period forcibleresistance would be as necessary as ever, while in the interval alladministration would be paralysed by the unworkable nature of the systemto be introduced for six years. Although there were other gross blots onthe scheme outlined by the Prime Minister, yet, if the time limit weredropped, Carson said he would submit it to a convention in Belfast; buthe utterly declined to do so if the time limit was to be retained. 

The debate was adjourned indefinitely, and before it could be resumedthe whole situation was rendered still more grave by the events to benarrated in the next chapter, and by a menacing speech delivered by Mr. Churchill at Bradford on the 14th of March. He hinted that, if Ulsterpersisted in refusing the offer made by the Prime Minister, which wasthe Government's last word, the forces of the Crown would have to beemployed against her; there were, he said, "worse things than bloodshedeven on an extended scale"; and he ended by saying, "Let us go forwardtogether and put these grave matters to the proof. "[63] Two days laterMr. Asquith, in answer to questions in the House of Commons, announcedthat no particulars of the Government scheme would be given unless theprinciple of the proposals were accepted as a basis of agreement. 

The leader of the Unionist Party replied by moving a vote of censure onthe Government on the 19th of March. Mr. Churchill's Bradford speech, and one no less defiant by Mr. Devlin the day following it, had chargedwith inflammable material the atmosphere in which the debate wasconducted. Sir Edward Carson began his speech by saying that, afterthese recent events, "I feel that I ought not to be here, but inBelfast. " There were some sharp passages between him and Churchill, whomhe accused of being anxious to provoke the Ulster people to make anattack on the soldiers. A highly provocative speech by Mr. Devlinfollowed, at the end of which Carson rose and left the House, sayingaudibly, "I am off to Belfast. " He was accompanied out of the Chamber byeight Ulster members, and was followed by ringing and sustained cheersof encouragement and approval from the crowded Unionist benches. It wasa scene which those who witnessed it are not likely to forget. 

The idea of accommodation between the combatant parties was at an end. 

FOOTNOTES:

[56] _The Yorkshire Post_, September 22nd, 1913. 

[57] _The Liverpool Daily Courier_, September 29th, 1913. 

[58] _Annual Register_, 1914, p. 6. 

[59] _Annual Register_, 1914, p. 12. 

[60] Ibid. , p. 1. 

[61] _The Annual Register_, 1914, p. 33. 

[62] _Annual Register_, 1914, pp. 51-2. 

[63] _The Times_, March 16th, 1914. 

CHAPTER XVI

THE CURRAGH INCIDENT

When Mr. Bonar Law moved the vote of censure on the Government on the19th of March he had no idea that the Cabinet had secretly taken in handan enterprise which, had it been known, would have furnished infinitelystronger grounds for their impeachment than anything relating to their"proposals" for amending the Home Rule Bill. It was an enterprise that, when it did become known, very nearly brought about their fall frompower. 

The whole truth about the famous "Curragh Incident" has never beenascertained, and the answers given by the Ministers chiefly concerned, under cross-examination in the House of Commons, were so evasive and inseveral instances so contradictory as to make it certain that they wereexceedingly anxious that the truth should be concealed. But when theavailable evidence is pieced together it leads almost irresistibly tothe conclusion that in March 1914 the Cabinet, or at any rate some ofthe most prominent members of it, decided to make an imposingdemonstration of military force against Ulster, and that they expected, if they did not hope, that this operation would goad the Ulstermen intoa clash with the forces of the Crown, which, by putting them morally inthe wrong, would deprive them of the popular sympathy they enjoyed in solarge and increasing a measure. 

When Mr. Churchill spoke at Bradford on the 14th of March of "puttingthese grave matters to the proof" he was already deeply involved in whatcame to be known as "the plot against Ulster, " to which his words weredoubtless an allusion. That plot may perhaps have originated at Mr. Lloyd George's breakfast-table on the 11th, when he entertained Mr. Redmond, Mr. Dillon, Mr. Devlin, Mr. O'Connor, and the Chief Secretaryfor Ireland, Mr. Birrell; for on the same day it was decided to send asquadron of battleships with attendant cruisers and destroyers from thecoast of Spain to Lamlash, in the Isle of Arran, opposite Belfast Lough;and a sub-committee of the Cabinet, consisting of Lord Crewe, Mr. Churchill, Colonel Seely, Mr. Birrell, and Sir John Simon, was appointedto deal with affairs connected with Ulster. This sub-committee held itsfirst meeting the following day, and the next was the date of Mr. Churchill's threatening speech at Bradford, with its reference to theprospect of bloodshed and of putting grave matters to the proof. Bearingin mind this sequence of events, it is not easy to credit the contentionof the Government, after the plot had been discovered, that the despatchof the fleet to the neighbourhood of the Ulster coast had no connectionwith the other naval and military operations which immediately followed. 

For on the 14th, while Churchill was travelling in the train toBradford, Seely, the Secretary of State for War, was drafting a letterto Sir Arthur Paget, the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, informing him ofreports (it was never discovered where the reports, which were withoutthe smallest foundation, came from) that attempts might be made "invarious parts of Ireland by evil-disposed persons" to raid Governmentstores of arms and ammunition, and instructing the General to "takespecial precautions" to safeguard the military depots. It was added that"information shows that Armagh, Omagh, Carrickfergus, and Enniskillenare insufficiently guarded. "[64] It is permissible to wonder, if therewas danger from evil-disposed persons "in various parts of Ireland, "from whom came the information that the places particularly needingreinforcements were a ring of strategically important towns round theoutskirts of the loyalist counties of Ulster. 

Whatever the source of the alleged "information"--whether it originatedat Mr. Lloyd George's breakfast-table or elsewhere--Seely evidentlythought it alarmingly urgent, for within forty-eight hours hetelegraphed to Paget asking for a reply before 8 a. M. Next morning as towhat steps he had taken, and ordering the General to come at once toLondon, bringing with him detailed plans. On the 16th Sir A. Pagettelegraphed that he "had taken all available steps"; but, on secondthoughts, he wrote on the 17th saying that there were sufficient troopsat Enniskillen to guard the depot, that he was making a small increaseto the detachment at Carrickfergus, and that, instead of strengtheningthe garrisons of Omagh and Armagh, the stores there were beingremoved--an operation that would take eight days. He explained hisreason for this departure from instructions to be that such a movementof troops as had been ordered by the War Office would, "in the presentstate of the country, create intense excitement in Ulster and possiblyprecipitate a crisis. "[65]

As soon as this communication reached the War Office orders were sentthat the arms and ammunition at Omagh and Armagh, for the safety ofwhich from evil-disposed persons Seely had been so apprehensive, werenot to be removed, although they had already been packed for transport. This order was sent on the 18th of March, and on the same day Sir ArthurPaget arrived in London from Ireland and had a consultation with theUlster sub-committee of the Cabinet, and with Sir John French and othermembers of the Army Council at the War Office. 

News of this meeting reached the ears of Sir Edward Carson, who was alsoaware that a false report was being spread of attempts by Unionists toinfluence the Army, and in his speech on the vote of censure on the 19thhe said: "I have never suggested that the Army should not be sent toUlster. I have never suggested that it should not do its duty when sentthere. I hope and expect it will. " At the same time reports werecirculating in Dublin--did they come from Downing Street?--that theGovernment were preparing to take strong measures against the UlsterUnionist Council, and to arrest the leaders. In allusion to thesereports the Dublin Correspondent of _The Times_ telegraphed on the 18thof March: "Any man or Government that increases the danger by blunderingor hasty action will accept a terrible responsibility. "

What passed at the interviews which Sir Arthur Paget had with Ministerson the 18th and 19th has never been disclosed. But it is clear, from theevents which followed, either that an entirely new plan on a much largerscale was now inaugurated, or that a development now took place whichChurchill and Seely, and perhaps other Ministers also, had contemplatedfrom the beginning and had concealed behind the pretended insignificanceof precautions to guard depots. It is noteworthy, at all events, thatthe measures contemplated happened to be the stationing of troops inconsiderable strength in important strategical positions round Ulster, simultaneously with the despatch of a powerful fleet to within a fewhours of Belfast. 

The orders issued by the War Office, at any rate, indicated something ona far bigger scale than the original pretext could justify. Paget's fearof precipitating a crisis was brushed aside, and General Friend, who wasacting for him in Dublin during his absence, was instructed by telegramto send to the four Ulster towns more than double the number of men thatPaget had deemed would be sufficient to protect the Government stores. But still more significant was another order given to Friend on the18th. The Dorset Regiment, quartered in the Victoria Barracks inBelfast, were to be moved four miles out to Holywood, taking with themtheir stores and ammunition, amounting to some thirty tons; and such wasthe anxiety of the Government to get the troops out of the city thatthey were told to leave their rifles behind, if necessary, afterrendering them useless by removing the bolts. [66] The Government hadvetoed Paget's plan of removing the stores from Omagh and Armagh, because their real object was to increase the garrisons at those places;but, as they had no scruple about moving the much larger supply from theVictoria Barracks through the most intensely Orange quarter of Belfast, it could hardly be wondered at if such an order, under thecircumstances, was held to give colour to the idea that Ministers wishedto provoke violent opposition to the troops. Not less inconsistent withthe original pretext was the despatch of a battalion to Newry andDundalk. At the latter place there was already a brigade of artillery, with eighteen guns, which would prove a tough nut for "evil-disposedpersons" to crack; and although both towns would be important points tohold with an army making war on Ulster, they were both in Nationalistterritory where there could be no fear of raids by Unionists. Yet theurgency was considered so great at the War Office to occupy these placesin strength not later than the 20th that two cruisers were ordered toKingstown to take the troops to Dundalk by sea, if there should bedifficulty about land transport. 

Whatever may have been the actual design of Mr. Churchill and ColonelSeely, who appear to have practically taken the whole management of theaffair into their own hands, the dispositions must have suggested toanyone with elementary knowledge of military matters that nothing lessthan an overpowering attack on Belfast was in contemplation. Thetransfer of the troops from Victoria Barracks, where they would havebeen useful to support the civil power in case of rioting, to Holywood, where they would be less serviceable for that purpose but where theywould be in rapid communication by water with the garrison ofCarrickfergus on the opposite shore of the Lough; the ordering of H. M. S. _Pathfinder_ and _Attentive_ to Belfast Lough, where they were to arrive"at daybreak on Saturday the 21st instant" with instructions to supportthe soldiers if necessary "by guns and search-lights from theships[67]"; the secret and rapid garrisoning of strategic points on allthe railways leading to Belfast, --all this pointed, not to thesafeguarding of stores of army boots and rifles, but to operations of anoffensive campaign. 

It was in this light that the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland himselfinterpreted his instructions, and, seeing that he had taken theresponsibility of not fully obeying the much more modest orders he hadreceived in Ireland on the 14th, it is easy to understand that hethought the steps now to be taken would lead to serious consequences. Healso foresaw that he might have trouble with some of the officers underhis command, for before leaving London he persuaded the Secretary ofState and Sir John French to give the following permission: "Officersactually domiciled in Ulster would be exempted from taking part in anyoperation that might take place. They would be permitted to 'disappear'[that being the exact phrase used by the War Office], and when all wasover would be allowed to resume their places without their career orposition being affected. "[68]

Having obtained this concession, Sir Arthur Paget returned the samenight to Dublin, where he arrived on the 20th and had a conference withhis general officers. 

He told them of the instructions he had received, which the Governmentcalled "precautionary" and believed "would be carried out withoutresistance. " The Commander-in-Chief did not share the Government'soptimism. He thought "that the moves would create intense excitement, "that by next day "the country would be ablaze, " and that the resultmight be "active operations against organised bodies of the UlsterVolunteer Force under their responsible leaders. " With regard to thepermission for officers domiciled in Ulster to "disappear, " he informedhis generals that any other officers who were not prepared to carry outtheir duty would be dismissed the Service. 

There was, apparently, some misunderstanding as to whether officerswithout an Ulster domicile who objected to fight against Ulster were tosay so at once and accept dismissal, or were to wait until they receivedsome specific order which they felt unable to obey. Many of the officersunderstood the General to mean the former of these two alternatives, andthe Colonel of one line regiment gave his officers half an hour to makeup their minds on a question affecting their whole future career; everyone of them objected to going against Ulster, and "nine or ten refusedunder any condition" to do so. [69] Another regimental commanding officertold his subordinates that "steps have been taken in Ulster so that anyaggression must come from the Ulsterites, and they will have to shed thefirst blood, " on which his comment was: "The idea of provoking Ulster ishellish. "[70]

In consequence of what he learnt at the conference with his generals onthe morning of the 20th Sir Arthur Paget telegraphed to the War Office:"Officer Commanding 5th Lancers states that all officers except two, andone doubtful, are resigning their commissions to-day. I much fear sameconditions in the 16th Lancers. Fear men will refuse to move[71]"; andlater in the day he reported that the "Brigadier and 57 officers, 3rdCavalry Brigade, prefer to accept dismissal if ordered north. "[72] Nextday he had to add that the Colonel and all the officers of the 4thHussars had taken up the same attitude. [73]

This was very disconcerting news for the War Office, where it had beentaken for granted that very few, if any, officers, except perhaps a fewnatives of Ulster, would elect to wreck their careers, if suddenlyconfronted with so terrible a choice, rather than take part inoperations against the Ulster Loyalists. Instructions were immediatelywired to Paget in Dublin to "suspend any senior officers who havetendered their resignations"; to refuse to accept the resignation ofjunior officers; and to send General Gough, the Brigadier in command ofthe 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and the commanding officers of the two Lancerregiments and the 4th Hussars, to report themselves promptly at the WarOffice after relieving them of their commands. 

Had the War Office made up its mind what to do with General Gough andthe other cavalry officers when they arrived in London? The inference tobe drawn from the correspondence published by the Government makes itappear probable that the first intention was to punish these officersseverely _pour encourager les autres_. An officer to replace Gough hadactually been appointed and sent to Ireland, though Mr. Asquith deniedin the House of Commons that the offending generals had been dismissed. But, if that was the intention, it was abandoned. The reason is notplain; but the probability is that it had been discovered that sympathywith Gough was widespread in the Army, and that his dismissal wouldbring about very numerous resignations. It was said that a large part ofthe Staff of the War Office itself would have laid down theircommissions, and that Aldershot would have been denuded of officers. [74]Colonel Seely himself described it as a "situation of grave peril to theArmy. "[75]

Anyhow, no disciplinary action of any kind was taken. It was decided totreat the matter as one of "misunderstanding, " and when Gough and hisbrother officers appeared at the War Office on Monday the 23rd they weretold that it was all a mistake to suppose that the Government had everintended warlike operations against Ulster (the orders to the fleet hadbeen cancelled by wireless on the 21st), and that they might return atonce to their commands, with the assurance that they would not berequired to serve against Ulster Loyalists. General Gough, who beforeleaving Ireland had asked Sir A. Paget for a clear definition in writingof the duties that officers would be expected to perform if they went toUlster, [76] thought that in view of the "misunderstanding" it would bewise to have Colonel Seely's assurance also in black and white. Seelyhad to hurry off to a Cabinet Meeting, and in his absence theAdjutant-General reduced to writing the verbal statement of theSecretary of State. A very confused story about the subsequent fortunesof this piece of paper made it the central mystery round which ragedangry debates. This much, however, is not doubtful. Seely went from theCabinet to Buckingham Palace; when he returned to Downing Street thepaper was there, but the Cabinet had broken up. He looked at the paper, saw that it did not accurately reproduce the assurance he had verballygiven to Gough, and with the help of Lord Morley he thereupon added twoparagraphs (which Mr. Balfour designated "the peccant paragraphs") tomake it conform to his promise. The addition so made was the only partof the document that gave the assurance that the officers would not becalled upon "to crush political opposition to the policy or principlesof the Home Rule Bill. " With this paper in his pocket General Goughreturned to his command at the Curragh. 

There the matter might have ended had not some of the facts becomeknown to Unionist members of the House of Commons, and to the Press. OnSunday, the 22nd, Mr. Asquith sent a communication to _The Times_(published on the 23rd) in which he minimised the whole matter, puttingforward the original pretext of movements of troops solely to protectGovernment property--an account at variance with a statement two dayslater by Churchill in regard to the reason for naval movements--and onthe 23rd Seely also made a statement in the House of Commons on the samelines as the Prime Minister's, which ended by saying that all themovements of troops were completed "and all orders issued have beenpunctually and implicitly obeyed. " This was an hour or two after hisinterview with the generals who had been summoned from Ireland to bedismissed for refusal to obey orders. 

But Mr. Bonar Law had his own information, which was much fuller thanthe Government imagined. A long and heated debate followed ColonelSeely's statement, and was continued on the two following days, gradually dragging to light the facts with a much greater profusion ofdetail than is necessary for this narrative. On the 24th Mr. L. S. Amerymade a speech which infuriated the Radicals and Labour members, but thespeaker, as was his intention, made them quite as angry with theGovernment as with himself. The cause of offence was that the Governmentwas thought to have allowed itself to be coerced by the soldiers, whilethe latter had been allowed to make their obedience to orders contingenton a bargain struck with the Government. This aspect of the case wasforcibly argued by Mr. J. Ward, the Labour member for Stoke, in a speechgreatly admired by enthusiasts for "democratic" principles. Although Mr. Ward's invective was mainly directed against the Unionist Opposition, the latter listened to it with secret pleasure, perceiving that it wasin reality more damaging to the Government than to themselves, sinceMinisters were forced into an attitude of defence against their ownusually docile supporters. It may here be mentioned that at a much laterdate, when Mr. John Ward, in the light of experience gained by his owndistinguished service as an officer in the Great War, had come to theconviction that "the possibility of forcing Ulster within the ambit of aDublin Parliament has now become unthinkable, " he acknowledged that in1914 the only way by which Mr. Asquith's Home Rule Act could have beenenforced was through and by the power of the Army. [77]

So much shaken were the Government by these attacks that on the nextday, the 25th of March, Colonel Seely, at the end of a long narrative ofthe transaction, announced his resignation from the Government. He had, he said, unintentionally misled his colleagues by adding without theirknowledge to the paper given to General Gough; the Cabinet as a wholewas quite innocent of the great offence given to democratic sentiment. This announcement having had the desired effect of relieving theMinistry as a whole from responsibility for the "peccant paragraphs, "and averting Radical wrath from their heads, the Prime Minister later inthe debate said he was not going to accept Seely's resignation. Yet Mr. Churchill exhibited a fine frenzy of indignation against Mr. AustenChamberlain for describing it as a "put-up job. "

Only a fairly fertile imagination could suggest a transaction to whichthe phrase would be more justly applicable. The idea that Seely, inadding the paragraphs, was tampering in any way with the consideredpolicy of the Cabinet was absurd, although it served the purpose ofaverting a crisis in the House of Commons. He had been in constant andclose communication with Churchill, who had himself been present at theWar Office Conference with Gough, and who had seen the Prime Ministerearlier in company with Sir John French. The whole business had beendiscussed at the Cabinet Meeting, and when Seely returned from hisaudience of the King he found the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, andLord Morley still in the Cabinet room. Mr. Asquith said on the 25th inthe House of Commons that no Minister except Seely had seen the addedparagraphs, and almost at the same moment in the House of Lords LordMorley was saying that he had helped Seely to draft them. Moreover, Lord Morley actually took a copy of them, which he read in the House ofLords, and he included the substance of them in his exposition of theGovernment policy in the Upper House. 

Furthermore, General Gough was on his way to Ireland that night, and ifit had been true that the Prime Minister, or any other Minister, disapproved of what Seely had done, there was no reason why Gough shouldnot have found a telegram waiting for him at the Curragh in the morningcancelling Seely's paragraphs and withdrawing the assurance theycontained. No step of that kind was taken, and the Government, whilerepudiating in the House of Commons the action for which Seely wasallowed to take the sole responsibility, permitted Gough to retain inhis despatch-box the document signed by the Army Council. 

For it was not only the Secretary of State for War who was involved. Thememorandum had been written by the Adjutant-General, and it bore theinitials of Sir John French and Sir Spencer Ewart as well as ColonelSeely's. These members of the Army Council knew that the verbalassurance given by the Secretary of State to Gough had not beencompletely embodied in the written memorandum without the paragraphwhich had been repudiated after the debate in the Commons on the 24th, and they were not prepared to go back on their written word, or to besatisfied by the "put-up job" resignation of their civilian Chief. Theyboth sent in their resignations; and, as they refused even underpressure to withdraw them, the Secretary of State had no choice but todo the same on the 30th of March, this time beyond recall. Mr. Asquithannounced on the same day that he had himself become Secretary of Statefor War, and would have to go to Scotland for re-election. 

The facts as here related were only extracted by the most persistent andlaborious cross-examination of the Government, who employed all thefamiliar arts of official evasion in order to conceal the truth from thecountry. Day after day Ministers were bombarded by batteries ofquestions in the House of Commons, in addition to the lengthy debatesthat occupied the House for several consecutive days. This pressurecompelled the Prime Minister to produce a White Paper, entitled"Correspondence relating to Recent Events in the Irish Command. "[78] Itwas published on the 25th of March, the third day of the continuousdebates, and, although Mr. Asquith said it contained "all the materialdocuments, " it was immediately apparent to members who had closelystudied the admissions that had been dragged from the Ministers chieflyconcerned, that it was very far from doing so. Much the most importantdocuments had, in fact, been withheld. Suspicion as to the good faith ofthe Government was increased when it was found that the Lord Chancellor, Lord Haldane, had interpolated into the official Report of his speech inthe House of Lords a significant word which transformed his definitepledge that Ulster would not be coerced, into a mere statement that no"immediate" coercion was contemplated. 

In the face of such evasion and prevarication it was out of the questionto let the matter drop. On the 22nd of April the Government was forcedto publish a second White Paper, [79] which contained a large number ofhighly important documents omitted from the first. But it was evidentthat much was still being kept back, and, in particular, that what hadpassed between Sir Arthur Paget and his officers at a conferencementioned in the published correspondence was being carefully concealed. Mr. Bonar Law demanded a judicial inquiry, where evidence could be takenon oath. Mr. Asquith refused, saying that an insinuation against thehonour of Ministers could only be properly investigated by the House ofCommons itself, and that a day would be given for a vote of censure ifthe leader of the Opposition meant that he could not trust the word ofMinisters of the Crown. Mr. Bonar Law sharply retorted that he "hadalready accused the Prime Minister of making a statement which wasfalse. "[80] But even this did not suffice to drive the Government toface the ordeal of having their own account of the affair at the Curraghsifted by the sworn evidence of others who knew the facts. Theypreferred to take cover under the dutiful cheers of their parliamentarymajority when they repeated their explanations, which had already beenproved to be untrue. 

But the Ulster Unionist Council had, meantime, been making inquiries ontheir own account. There was nothing in the least improper, although thesupporters of the Government tried to make out that there was, in theofficers at the Curragh revealing what the Commander-in-Chief had saidto them, so long as they did not communicate anything to the Press. Theywere not, and could not be, pledged to secrecy. It thus happened that itwas possible for the Old Town Hall in Belfast to put together a morecomplete account of the whole affair than it suited the Government toreveal to Parliament. On the 17th of April the Standing Committee issuedto the Press a statement giving the main additional facts which a sworninquiry would have elicited. It bore the signatures of Lord Londonderryand Sir Edward Carson, and there can have been few foolhardy enough tosuggest that these were men who would be likely to take such a stepwithout first satisfying themselves as to the trustworthiness of theevidence, a point on which the judgment of one of them at all events wasadmittedly unrivalled. 

From this statement it appeared that Sir Arthur Paget, so far fromindicating that mere "precautionary measures" for the protection ofGovernment stores were in contemplation, told his generals thatpreparations had been made for the employment of some 25, 000 troops inUlster, in conjunction with naval operations. The gravity of the planwas revealed by the General's use of the words "battles" and "theenemy, " and his statement that he would himself be "in the firing line"at the first "battle. " He said that, when some casualties had beensuffered by the troops, he intended to approach "the enemy" with a flagof truce and demand their surrender, and if this should be refused hewould order an assault on their position. The cavalry, whose pro-Ulstersentiments must have been well known to the Commander-in-Chief, weretold that they would only be required to prevent the infantry "bumpinginto the enemy, " or in other words to act as a cavalry screen; that theywould not be called upon to fire on "the enemy"; and that as soon asthe infantry became engaged, they would be withdrawn and sent to Cork, where "a disturbance would be arranged" to provide a pretext for themovement. A Military Governor of Belfast was to be appointed, and thegeneral purpose of the operations was to blockade Ulster by land andsea, and to provoke the Ulster men to shed the first blood. 

The publication of this statement with the authority of the two Ulsterleaders created a tremendous sensation. But it probably strengthened theresolution of the Government to refuse at all costs a judicial inquiry, which they knew would only supply sworn corroboration of the UlsterUnionist Council's story. In this they were assisted in an unexpectedway. Just when the pressure was at its highest, relief came by thediversion of attention and interest caused by another startling event inUlster, which will be described in the following chapters. 

This Curragh Incident, which caused intense and prolonged excitement inMarch 1914, and nearly upset the Asquith Government, had more thanmomentary importance in connection with the Ulster Movement. It provedto demonstration the intense sympathy with the loyalist cause thatpervaded the Army. That sympathy was not, as Radical politicians likeMr. John Ward believed, an aristocratic sentiment only to be found inthe mess-rooms of smart cavalry regiments. It existed in all branches ofthe Service, and among the rank and file as well as the commissionedranks. Sir Arthur Paget's telegram reporting to the War Office thefeeling in the 5th and 16th Lancers, said, "Fear men will refuse tomove. "[81] The men had not the same facility as the officers in makingtheir sentiments known at headquarters, but their sympathies were thesame. 

The Government had no excuse for being ignorant of this feeling in theArmy. It had been a matter of notoriety for a long time. Its existenceand its danger had been reported by Lord Wolseley to the Duke ofCambridge, back in the old days of Gladstonian Home Rule, in a letterthat had been since published. In July 1913 _The Times_ gave thewarning in a leading article that "the crisis, the approach of whichMinisters affect to treat with unconcern, is already causing uneasinessand apprehension in the public Services, and especially in the Army.... It is notorious that some officers have already begun to speak ofsending in their papers. " Lord Roberts had uttered a significant warningin the House of Lords not long before the incident at the Curragh. Colonel Seely himself had been made aware of it in the previous Decemberwhen he signed a War Office Memorandum on the subject[82]; and, indeed, no officer could fail to be aware of it who had ever been quartered inIreland. 

Nor was it surprising that this sympathy should manifest itself. No oneis quicker to appreciate the difference between loyalty and disloyaltythan the soldier. There were few regiments in the Army that had notlearnt by experience that the King's uniform was constantly insulted inNationalist Ireland, and as invariably welcomed and honoured in Ulster. In the vote of censure debate on the 19th of March Mr. Cave quoted anIrish newspaper, which had described the British Army as "the mostimmoral and degraded force in Europe, " and warned Irishmen that, byjoining it, all they would get was "a red coat, a dishonoured name, abesmirched character. " On the other hand, the very troops who were sentNorth from the Curragh against the advice of Sir Arthur Paget, toprovoke "the Ulsterites to shed the first blood, " had, as theCommander-in-Chief reported, "everywhere a good reception. "[83]

The welcoming cheers at Holywood and Carrickfergus and Armagh wereprobably a pleasant novelty to men fresh from the Curragh or Fermoy. Even in Belfast itself the contrast was brought home to troops quarteredin Victoria Barracks, all of whom were well aware that on the death of acomrade his coffin would have to be borne by a roundabout route to thecemetery, to avoid the Nationalist quarter of the city where a militaryfuneral would be exposed to insult. 

Such experiences, as they harden into traditions, sink deep into theconsciousness of an Army and breed sentiments that are not easilyeradicated. Soldiers ought, of course, to have no politics; but when itappeared that they might be called upon to open fire on those whom theyhad always counted "on our side, " in order to subject them forcibly tomen who hated the sight of a British flag and were always ready to spitupon it, human nature asserted itself. And the incident taught theGovernment something as to the difficulty they would have in enforcingthe Home Rule Bill in Ulster. 

FOOTNOTES:

[64] See White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. II. 

[65] See White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. VI. 

[66] See White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. VII. 

[67] White Paper (Cd. 7329), Part II, No. II. 

[68] White Paper (Cd. 7329), Part III. 

[69] See _Parliamentary Debates_, vol. Lx, p. 73. 

[70] Ibid. , p. 426. 

[71] Cd. 7329, No. XVII. 

[72] Ibid. , Nos. XVIII, XX. 

[73] Ibid. , Nos. XXII, XXIII. 

[74] See _Parliamentary Debates_, vol. Lx, p. 246. 

[75] Ibid. , p. 400. 

[76] White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. XX. 

[77] _The Nineteenth Century and After_, January 1921, art. "The Armyand Ireland, " by Lieut. -Colonel John Ward, C. B. , C. M. G. , M. P. 

[78] Cd. 7318. 

[79] Cd. 7329. 

[80] _Parliamentary Debate_, vol. Lxi, p. 765. 

[81] White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. XVII. See _ante_, p. 180. 

[82] White Paper (Cd. 7329), No. I. 

[83] Ibid. , No. XXVII. 

CHAPTER XVII

ARMING THE U. V. F. 

If the "evil-disposed persons" who so excited the fancy of Colonel Seelywere supposed to be Ulster Loyalists, the whole story was an absurditythat did no credit to the Government's Intelligence in Ireland; and ifthere ever was any "information, " such as the War Office alleged, itmust have come from a source totally ignorant of Ulster psychology. Raids on Government stores were never part of the Ulster programme. Theexcitement of the Curragh Incident passed off without causing any sortof disturbance, and, as we have seen, the troops who were sent Northreceived everywhere in Ulster a loyal welcome. This was a fine tributeto the discipline and restraint of the people, and was a further proofof their confidence in their leaders. 

Those leaders, it happened, were at that very moment taking measures toplace arms in the hands of the U. V. F. Without robbing Government depotsor any one else. That method was left to their opponents in Ireland at alater date, who adopted it on an extensive scale accompanied bysystematic terrorism. The Ulster plan was quite different. All the armsthey obtained were paid for, and their only crime was that theysuccessfully hoodwinked Mr. Asquith's colleagues and agents. 

Every movement has its Fabius, and also its Hotspur. Both areneeded--the men of prudence and caution, anxious to avoid extremecourses, slow to commit themselves too far or to burn their boats withthe river behind them; and the impetuous spirits, who chafe athalf-measures, cannot endure temporising, and are impatient for theorder to advance against any odds. Major F. H. Crawford had more of thetemperament of a Hotspur than of a Fabius, but he nevertheless possessedqualities of patience, reticence, discretion, and coolness whichenabled him to render invaluable service to the Ulster cause in anenterprise that would certainly have miscarried in the hands of a manendowed only with impetuosity and reckless courage. If the story of hisadventures in procuring arms for the U. V. F. Be ever told in minutedetail, it will present all the features of an exciting novel by Mr. John Buchan. 

Fred Crawford, the man who followed a family tradition when he signedthe Covenant with his own blood, [84] began life as a premium apprenticein Harland and Wolf's great ship-building yard, after which he servedfor a year as an engineer in the White Star Line, before settling downto his father's manufacturing business in Belfast. Like so many ardentLoyalists in Ulster, he came of Liberal stock. He was for years honorarySecretary of the Reform Club in Belfast. The more staid members of thishighly respectable establishment were not a little startled andperplexed when it was brought to their attention in 1907 thatadvertisements in the name of one "Hugh Matthews, " giving the BelfastReform Club as his address, had appeared in a number of foreignnewspapers--French, Belgian, Italian, German, and Austrian--inquiringfor "10, 000 rifles and one million rounds of small-arm ammunition. " Themembership of the Club included no Hugh Matthews; but inquiry showedthat the name covered the identity of the Hon. Secretary; and Crawford, who sought no concealment in the matter, justified the advertisements bypointing out that the Liberal Government which had lately come intopower had begun its rule in Ireland by repealing the Act prohibiting theimportation of arms, and that there was therefore nothing illegal inwhat he was doing. But he resigned his secretaryship, which he feltmight hamper future transactions of the same kind. The advertisement wasno doubt half bravado and half practical joke; he wanted to see whetherit would attract notice, and if anything would come of it. But it hadalso an element of serious purpose. 

Crawford regarded the advent to power of the Liberal Party as ominous, as indeed all Ulster did, for the Liberal Party was a Home Rule Party;and he had from his youth been convinced that the day would come whenUlster would have to carry out Lord Randolph Churchill's injunction. That being so, he was not the man to tarry till solemn assemblies ofmerchants, lawyers, and divines should propound a policy; if there wasto be fighting, Crawford was going to be ready for it, and thought thatpreparation for such a contingency could not begin too soon. And theadvertisements were not barren of practical result. There was anastonishing number of replies; Crawford purchased a few rifles, andobtained samples of others; and, what was more important, he gainedknowledge of the Continental trade in second-hand firearms, which hadits centre in the free port of Hamburg, and of the men engaged in thattrade. This knowledge he turned to account in 1912 and the two followingyears. 

He had been for nearly twenty years an officer of Artillery Militia, andwhen the U. V. F. Was organised in 1912 he became its Director of Ordnanceon the headquarters staff. He was also a member of the StandingCommittee of the Ulster Unionist Council, where he persistentlyadvocated preparation for armed resistance long before most of hiscolleagues thought such a policy necessary. But early in 1912 heobtained leave to get samples of procurable firearms, and hispromptitude in acting on it, and in presenting before certain members ofthe Committee a collection of gleaming rifles with bayonets fixed, tookaway the breath of the more cautious of his colleagues. 

From this time forward Crawford was frequently engaged in this business. He got into communication with the dealers in arms whose acquaintance hehad made six years before. He went himself to Hamburg, and, afterlearning something of the chicanery prevalent in the trade, which ittook all his resourcefulness to overcome, he fell in with an honest Jewby whose help he succeeded in sending a thousand rifles safely toBelfast. Other consignments followed from time to time in larger orsmaller quantities, in the transport of which all the devices ofold-time smuggling were put to the test. Crawford bought a schooner, which for a year or more proved very useful, and, while employing her inbringing arms to Ulster, he made acquaintance with a skipper of one ofthe Antrim Iron Ore Company's coasting steamers, whose name was Agnew, afine seaman of the best type produced by the British Mercantile Marine, who afterwards proved an invaluable ally, to whose loyalty and abilityCrawford and Ulster owed a deep debt of gratitude, as they also did toMr. Robert Browne, Managing Director of the Antrim Iron Ore Company, forplacing at their disposal both vessels and seamen from time to time. 

Now and then the goods fell a victim to Custom House vigilance; foralthough there was at this time nothing illegal in importing firearms, it was not considered prudent to carry on the trade openly, which wouldcertainly have led to prohibition being introduced and enforced; and, consequently, infringements of shipping regulations had to be risked, which gave the authorities the right to interfere if they discoveredrifles where zinc plates or musical instruments ought to have been. 

On one occasion a case of arms was shipped on a small steamer fromGlasgow to Portrush, but was not entered in the manifest, so that theskipper (being a worthy man) knew nothing--officially--of this box whichlay on deck instead of descending into the hold. But two Customsofficials, who noticed it with unsatisfied curiosity, decided, just asthe boat cast off, to make the trip to Portrush. Happily it was a dirtynight, and they, being bad sailors, were constrained to take refuge fromthe elements in the Captain's cabin. But when Portrush was reachedsearch and research proved unavailing to find the mysterious box; theskipper could find no mention of it in the manifest and thought theCustoms House gentlemen must have been dreaming; they, on the otherhand, threatened to seize the ship if the box did not materialise, andwere told to do so at their peril. But exactly off Ballycastle, whichhad been passed while the officials were poorly, there was a float inthe sea attached to a line, which in due course led to the recovery of acase of valuable property that was none the worse for a few hours' reston the bottom of the Moyle. 

Qualities of a different sort were called into play in negotiating thepurchase of machine-guns from Messrs. Vickers & Co. , at Woolwich. Here astrong American accent, combined with the providential circumstance thatMexico happened to be in the grip of revolutionary civil war, overcameall difficulties, and Mr. John Washington Graham, U. S. A. (otherwise FredH. Crawford of Belfast) played his part so effectively that he did notfail to finish the deal by extracting a handsome commission for himself, which found its way subsequently to the coffers of the Ulster UnionistCouncil. But he compensated the Company by making a suggestion forimproving the mechanism of the Maxim-gun which the great ordnancemanufacturers permanently adopted without having to pay for any patentrights. 

Major Crawford was, however, by no means the only person who was at thistime bringing arms and ammunition into Ulster, which, as alreadyexplained, although not illegal, could not be safely done openly on alarge scale. Ammunition in small quantities dribbled into Belfast prettyconstantly, many amateur importers deriving pleasurable excitement fromfeeling themselves conspirators, and affording amusement to others bythe tales told of the ingenious expedients resorted to by the smugglers. 

There was a dock porter at Belfast, an intense admirer of Sir EdwardCarson, who was the retailer of one of the best of these stories. He wasalways on the look-out for the leader arriving by the Liverpool steamer, and would allow no one else, if he could help it, to handle the greatman's hand-baggage; and when Carson was not a passenger, any of hissatellites who happened to be travelling came in for vicariousattention. Thus, it happened on one occasion that the writer, arrivingalone from Liverpool, was hailed from the shore before the boat was madefast. "Is Sir Edward on board?" A shake of the head brought a look ofpathetic disappointment to the face of the hero-worshipper; but he wason board before the gangway was down and busy collecting the belongingsof the leader's unworthy substitute. When laden with these and half-waydown the gangway he stopped, and, entirely careless of the fact that hewas obstructing a number of passengers impatient to land, he turned andwhispered--a whisper that might be heard thirty yards off--with aknowing wink of the eye:

"We're getting in plenty of stuff now. "

"Yes, yes, " was the reply. "Never mind about that now; put those thingson a car. "

But he continued, without budging from the gangway, "Och aye, we'regetting in plenty; but my God, didn't Mrs. Blank o' Dungannon bate all?Did ye hear about her?"

"No, I never heard of Mrs. Blank of Dungannon. But do hurry along, mygood man; you're keeping back all the passengers. "

"What! ye never heard o' Mrs. Blank o' Dungannon? Wait now till I tellye. Mrs. Blank came off this boat not a fortnight ago, an' as she camedown this gangway I declare to God you'd ha' swore she was within a weekof her time--and divil a ha'porth the matter with her, only cartridges. An' the fun was that the Custom House boys knowed rightly what it was, but they dursn't lay a hand on her nor search her, for fear they werewrong. "

This admiring tribute to the heroic matron of Dungannon--whose real namewas not concealed by the porter--was heard by a number of people, andprobably most of them thought themselves compensated by the story forthe delay it caused them in leaving the steamer. 

By the summer of 1913 several thousands of rifles had been brought intoUlster; but in May of that year the mishap occurred to which LordRoberts referred in his letter to Colonel Hickman on the 4th of June, when he wrote: "I am sorry to read about the capture of rifles. "[85]Crawford had been obliged to find some place in London for storing thearms which he was procuring from his friends in Hamburg, and with thehelp of Sir William Bull, M. P. For Hammersmith, the yard of anold-fashioned inn in that district was found where it was believed theywould be safe until means of transporting them to the North of Irelandcould be devised. The inn was taken by a firm calling itself JohnFerguson & Co. , the active member of which was Sir William Bull'sbrother-in-law, Captain Budden; and the business appeared to consist ofdealing in second-hand scientific instruments and machinery, curiosities, antique armour and weapons, old furniture, and so forth, which were brought in very heavy cases and deposited in the yard. For atime it proved useful, and the Maxims from Woolwich passed safelythrough the Hammersmith store. But the London police got wind of theHammersmith Armoury, and seized a consignment of between six and seventhousand excellent Italian rifles. A rusty and little-known Act ofParliament had to be dug up to provide legal authority for the seizure. Many sportsmen and others then learnt for the first time that, under theGun-barrel Proof Act, 1868, every gun-barrel in England must bear theGun-makers' Company's proof-mark showing that its strength has beentested and approved. As the penalty for being in possession of guns notso marked was a fine of £2 per barrel, to have put in a claim for theItalian rifles seized at Hammersmith would have involved a payment ofmore than £12, 000, and would have given the Government information as tothe channel through which they had been imported. No move was made, therefore, so far as the firearms were concerned, but the bayonetsattached to them, for the seizure of which there was no legaljustification, were claimed by Crawford's agent in Hamburg, andeventually reached Ulster safely by another route. About the same time aconsignment of half a million rounds of small-arm ammunition, which wasdiscovered by the authorities through faulty packing in cement-bags, wasalso confiscated in another part of the country. 

These losses convinced Crawford that a complete change of method must beadopted if faith was to be kept with the Ulster Volunteers, who wereimplicitly trusting their leaders to provide them with weapons to enablethem to make good the Covenant. More than a year before this time he hadtold the special Committee dealing with arms, to which he wasimmediately responsible, that, in his judgment, the only way of dealingeffectively with the problem was not by getting small quantitiessmuggled from time to time by various devices and through disguisedordinary trade channels, but by bringing off a grand _coup_, as ifrunning a blockade in time of war. He had crossed the Channel on purposeto submit this view to Sir Edward Carson and Captain Craig early in1912, but at that time nothing was done to give effect to it. 

But the seizure of so large a number as six thousand rifles at a timewhen the political situation looked like moving towards a crisis in thenear future, made necessary a bolder attempt to procure the necessaryarms. When General Sir George Richardson took command of the U. V. F. InJuly 1913 he placed Captain (afterwards Lieut. -Colonel) Wilfrid BlissSpender on his staff, and soon afterwards appointed him A. Q. M. G. Of theForces. Captain Spender's duties comprised the supply of equipment, arms, and ammunition, the organisation of transport, and the supervisionof communications. He was now requested to confer with Major FredCrawford with a view to preparing a scheme for procuring arms andammunition, to be submitted to a special sub-committee appointed to dealwith this matter, of which Captain James Craig was chairman. Spendergave his attention mainly to the difficulties that would attend thelanding and distribution of arms if they reached Ulster in safety;Crawford said he could undertake to purchase and bring them from aforeign port. Crawford's proposed _modus operandi_ may be given in hisown words:

 "I would immediately go to Hamburg and see B. S. [the Hebrew dealer in firearms with whom he had been in communication for some six or seven years, and whom he had found perfectly honest, and not at all grasping], and consult him as to what he had to offer. I would purchase 25, 000 to 30, 000 rifles, modern weapons if possible, and not the Italian Vetteli rifles we had been getting, all to take the same ammunition and fitted with bayonets. I would purchase a suitable steamer of 600 tons in some foreign port and load her up with the arms, and either bring her in direct or transfer the cargo to a local steamer in some estuary or bay on the Scottish coast. I felt confident, though I knew the difficulties in front of me, that I could carry it through all right. "[86]

The sub-committee accepted Crawford's proposal, and, when it had beenconfirmed by Headquarters Council, he was commissioned to go to Hamburgto see how the land lay. On arriving there he found that B. S. Had stillin store ten thousand Vetteli rifles and a million rounds of ammunitionfor them, which he had been holding for Crawford for two years. After aday or two the dealer laid three alternative proposals before his Ulstercustomer: (a) Twenty thousand Vetteli rifles, with bayonets (ammunitionwould have to be specially manufactured). (6) Thirty thousand Russianrifles with bayonets (lacking scabbards) and ammunition, (c) Fifteenthousand new Austrian, and five thousand German army rifles withbayonets, both to take standard Mannlicher cartridges. 

The last mentioned of these alternatives was much the most costly, beingdouble the price of the first and nearly treble that of the second; butit had great advantages over the other two. Ammunition for the Italianweapons was only manufactured in Italy, and, if further supplies shouldbe required, could only be got from that country. The Russian rifleswere perfectly new and unused, but were of an obsolete pattern; theywere single-loaders, and fresh supplies of cartridges would be nearly asdifficult to procure for them as for the Italian. The Austrian andGerman patterns were both first-rate; the rifles were up-to-dateclip-loaders, and, what was the most important consideration, ammunitionfor them would be easily procurable in the United Kingdom or fromAmerica or Canada. 

But the difference in cost was so great that Crawford returned toBelfast to explain matters to his Committee, calling in London on hisway to inform Carson and Craig. He strongly urged the acceptance of thethird alternative offer, laying stress, among other considerations, onthe moral effect on men who knew they had in their hands the most modernweapon with all latest improvements. Carson was content to be guided ona technical matter of this sort by the judgment of a man whom he knewto be an expert, and as James Craig, who was in control of the fundear-marked for the purchase of arms, also agreed, Crawford had not muchdifficulty in persuading the Committee when he reached Belfast, althoughat first they were rather staggered by the difference in cost betweenthe various proposals. 

It was not until the beginning of February 1914 that Crawford returnedto Hamburg to accept this offer, and to make arrangements with B. S. Forcarrying out the rest of his scheme for transporting his precious butdangerous cargo to Ulster. On his way through London he called again onCarson. 

 "I pointed out to Sir Edward, my dear old Chief, " says Crawford in a written account of the interview, "that some of my Committee had no idea of the seriousness of the undertaking, and, when they did realise what they were in for, might want to back out of it. I said, 'Once I cross this time to Hamburg there is no turning back with me, no matter what the circumstances are so far as my personal safety is concerned; and no contrary orders from the Committee to cancel what they have agreed to with me will I obey. I shall carry out the _coup_ if I lose my life in the attempt. Now, Sir Edward, you know what I am about to undertake, and the risks those who back me up must run. Are you willing to back me to the finish in this undertaking? If you are not, I don't go. But, if you are, I would go even if I knew I should not return; it is for Ulster and her freedom I am working, and this alone. ' I so well remember that scene. We were alone; Sir Edward was sitting opposite to me. When I had finished, his face was stern and grim, and there was a glint in his eye. He rose to his full height, looking me in the eye; he advanced to where I was sitting and stared down at me, and shook his clenched fist in my face, and said in a steady, determined voice, which thrilled me and which I shall never forget: 'Crawford, I'll see you through this business, if I should have to go to prison for it. ' I rose from my chair; I held out my hand and said, 'Sir Edward, that is all I want. I leave to-night; good-bye. '"

Next day Crawford was in Hamburg. He immediately concluded hisagreement with B. S. , and began making arrangements for carrying out theplan he had outlined to the Committee in Belfast. As will be seen in thenext chapter, he was actually in the middle of this adventure at thevery time when Seely and Churchill were worrying lest "evil-disposedpersons" should raid and rob the scantily stocked Government Stores atOmagh and Enniskillen. 

FOOTNOTES:

[84] _Ante_, p. 123. 

[85] _Ante_, p. 161. 

[86] From a manuscript narrative by Colonel F. H. Crawford. 

CHAPTER XVIII

A VOYAGE OF ADVENTURE

Although Mr. Lloyd George's message to mankind on New Year's Day, 1914, was that "Anglo-German relations were far more friendly than for yearspast, "[87] and that there was therefore no need to strengthen theBritish Navy, it may be doubted, with the knowledge we now possess, whether the German Government would have been greatly incensed at theidea of a cargo of firearms finding its way from Hamburg to Ireland inthe spring of that year without the knowledge of the British Government. But if that were the case Fred Crawford had no reason to suspect it. German surveillance was always both efficient and obtrusive, and he hadto make his preparations under a vigilance by the authorities whichshowed no signs of laxity. Those preparations involved the assemblingand the packing of 20, 000 modern rifles, 15, 000 of which had to bebrought from a factory in Austria; 10, 000 Italian rifles previouslypurchased, which B. S. Had in store; bayonets for all the firearms; andupwards of 3, 000, 000 rounds of small-arm ammunition. The packing of thearms was a matter to which Crawford gave particular attention. He keptin mind the circumstances under which he expected them to be landed inUlster. Avoidance of confusion and rapidity of handling were of thefirst importance. Rifles, bayonets, and ammunition must be not separatedin bulk, requiring to be laboriously reassembled at their destination. He therefore insisted that parcels should be made up containing fiverifles in each, with bayonets to match, and 100 rounds of ammunition perrifle, each parcel weighing about 75 lbs. He attached so much importanceto this system of packing that he adhered to it even after discoveringthat it would cost about £2, 000, and would take more than a month tocomplete. 

While the work of packing was going on, Crawford, who found he wasexciting the curiosity of the Hamburg police, kept out of sight as muchas possible, and he paid more than one visit to the Committee inBelfast, leaving the supervision to the skipper and packer, whom he hadfound he could trust. In the meantime, by advertisements in theScandinavian countries, he was looking out for a suitable steamer tocarry the cargo. For a crew his thoughts turned to his old friend, Andrew Agnew, skipper in the employment of the Antrim Iron Ore Company. Happily he was not only able to secure the services of Agnew himself, but Agnew brought with him his mate and his chief and second engineers. This was a great gain; for they were not only splendid men at their job, but were men willing to risk their liberty or their lives for the Ulstercause. Deck-hands and firemen would be procurable at whatever port asteamer was to be bought. 

Several vessels were offered in response to Crawford's advertisements, and on the 16th of March, when the packing of the arms was welladvanced, Crawford, Agnew, and his chief engineer went to Norway toinspect these steamers. Eventually they selected the s. S. _Fanny_, whichhad just returned to Bergen with a cargo of coal from Newcastle. She wasonly an eight-knot vessel, but her skipper, a Norwegian, gave afavourable report of her sea-going qualities and coal consumption, andAgnew and his engineer were satisfied by their inspection of her. Thedeal was quickly completed, and the Captain and his Norwegian crewwillingly consented to remain in charge of the _Fanny_; and, in order toenable her to sail under the Norwegian flag, as a precaution againstpossible confiscation in British waters, it was arranged that theCaptain should be the nominal purchaser, giving Crawford a mortgage forher full value. 

Then, leaving Agnew to get sufficient stores on board the _Fanny_ for athree-months' cruise, Crawford returned to Hamburg on the 20th, andthence to Belfast to report progress. Agnew's orders were to bring the_Fanny_ in three weeks' time to a rendezvous marked on the chartbetween the Danish islands of Langeland and Fünen, where he was to pickup the cargo of arms, which Crawford would bring in lighters fromHamburg through the Kiel Canal. 

While Crawford was in Belfast arrangements were made to enable him tokeep in communication with Spender, so that in case of necessity hecould be warned not to approach the Irish coast, but to cruise in theBaltic till a more favourable opportunity. He was to let Spender knowlater where he could be reached with final instructions as to landingthe arms; the rendezvous so agreed upon subsequently was Lough Laxford, a wild and inaccessible spot on the west coast of Sutherlandshire. Crawford was warned by B. S. That he was far from confident of asuccessful end to their labours at Hamburg. He had never before shippedanything like so large a number of firearms; and the long process ofpacking, and Crawford's own mysterious coming and going, would becertain to excite suspicion, which would reach the secret agents of theBritish Government, and lead either to a protest addressed to the Germanauthorities, followed by a prohibition on shipping the arms, or toconfiscation by the British authorities when the cargo entered Britishterritorial waters. 

These fears must have been present to the mind of B. S. When he metCrawford at the station in Hamburg on the 27th on his return fromBelfast, for the precautions taken to avoid being followed gave theirmovements the character of an adventure by one of Stanley Weyman'sheroes of romance. Whether any suspicion had in fact been arousedremains unknown. Anyhow, the barges were ready laden, with a tug waitingtill the tide should serve about midnight for making a start down theElbe, and through the canal to Kiel. The modest sum of £10 procured anorder authorising the tug and barges to proceed through the canalwithout stopping, and requiring other shipping to let them pass. A blackflag was the signal of this privileged position, which suggested the"Jolly Roger" to Crawford's thoughts, and gave a sense of insolentaudacity when great liners of ten or fifteen thousand tons were seenmaking way for a tug-boat towing a couple of lighters. 

For the success of the enterprise up to this point Crawford was greatlyindebted to the Jew, B. S. From first to last this gentleman "played thegame" with sterling honesty and straightforward dealing that won hiscustomers' warm admiration. Several times he accepted Crawford's word assufficient security when cash was not immediately forthcoming, and in noinstance did he bear out the character traditionally attributed to hisrace. 

On arrival at Kiel, Crawford, after a short absence from the tug, wasinformed that three men had been inquiring from the lightermen and thetug's skipper about the nature and destination of the cargo. All suchevidences of curiosity on the subject were rather alarming, but itturned out that the visitors were probably Mexicans--of what politicalparty there it would be impossible to guess--whose interest had beenaroused by the rumour, which Crawford had encouraged, that guns werebeing shipped to that distracted Republic. Still more alarming was thearrival on board the tug of a German official in resplendent uniform, who insisted that he must inspect the cargo. Crawford knew no German, but the shipping agent who accompanied him produced papers showing thatall formalities had been complied with, and all requisite authorisationobtained. Neither official papers, however, nor arguments made anyimpression on the officer until it occurred to Crawford to produce a100-marks note, which proved much more persuasive, and sent the officialon his way rejoicing, with expressions of civility on both sides. 

The relief of the Ulsterman when the last of the Kiel forts was leftbehind, and he knew that his cargo was clear of Germany, may beimagined. A night was spent crossing Kiel Bay, and in the morning of the29th they were close to Langeland, and approaching the rendezvous withthe _Fanny_. She was there waiting, and Agnew, in obedience to orders, had already painted out her name on bows and stern. The next thing wasto transfer the arms from the lighters to the _Fanny_. Crawford wasapprehensive lest the Danish authorities should take an interest in theproceedings if the work was carried out in the narrow channel betweenthe islands, and he proposed, as it was quite calm, to defer operationstill they were further from the shore. But the Norwegian Captaindeclared that he had often transhipped cargo at this spot, and thatthere was no danger whatever. Nevertheless, Crawford's fears wererealised. Before the work was half finished a Danish Port Officer cameon board, asked what the cargo comprised, and demanded to see the ship'spapers. According to the manifest the _Fanny_ was bound for Iceland witha general cargo, part of which was to be shipped at Bergen. The Danishofficer then spent half an hour examining the bales, and, although hedid not open any of them, Crawford felt no doubt he knew perfectly thenature of their contents. Finally he insisted on carrying off thepapers, both of the _Fanny_ and the tug-boat, saying that all theinformation must be forwarded to Copenhagen to be dealt with by theGovernment authorities, but that the papers would be returned early nextmorning. 

One can well believe Crawford when he says that he suffered "mentalagony" that night. After all that he had planned, and all that he hadaccomplished by many months of personal energy and resource, he sawcomplete and ignominious failure staring him in the face. He realisedthe heavy financial loss to the Ulster Loyalists, for his cargorepresented about £70, 000 of their money; and he realised the bitterdisappointment of their hopes, which was far worse than any loss ofmoney. He pictured to himself what must happen in the morning--"to haveto follow a torpedo-boat into the naval base and lie there till thewhole Ulster scheme was unravelled and known to the world as a ghastlyfailure, and the Province and Sir Edward and all the leaders thelaughing stock of the world"--and the thought of it all plunged himalmost into despair. 

Almost, but not quite. He was not the man to give way to despair. If itcame to the worst he would "put all the foreign crew and theirbelongings into the boats and send them off; Agnew and I would armourselves with a bundle of rifles, and cut it open and have 500 roundsto fight any attempt to board us, and if we slipped this by any chance, he and I would bring her to England together, he on deck and I in theengine-room. He knew all about navigation and I knew all about engines, having been a marine engineer in my youth. "

But a less desperate job called for immediate attention. The men engagedin transferring the cargo from the barges to the steamer wanted to knockoff work for the night; but the offer of double pay persuaded them tostick to it, and they worked with such good will that by midnight everybale was safely below hatches in the _Fanny_. Crawford then instructedthe shipping agent to be off in the tug at break of day, giving himletters to post which would apprise the Committee in Belfast of what hadhappened, and give them the means of communicating with himselfaccording to previously concerted plans. 

Before morning a change occurred in the weather, which Crawford regardedas providential. He was gladdened by the sight of a sea churned white byhalf a gale, while a mist lay on the water, reducing visibility to about300 yards. It would be impossible for the Port Officer's motor-boat toface such a sea, or, if it did, to find the _Fanny_, unless guided byher fog-whistle. As soon as eight o'clock had passed--the hour by whichthe return of the ship's papers had been promised--Crawford weighedanchor, and crept out of the narrow channel under cover of the fog, onlynarrowly escaping going aground on the way among the banks and shallowsthat made it impossible to sail before daylight, but eventually the opensea was safely reached. But the _Fanny_ was now without papers, and inlaw was a pirate ship. It was therefore desirable for her to change hercostume. As many hands as possible were turned to the task of giving anew colour to the funnel and making some other effective alterations inher appearance, including a new name on her bows and stern. Thusrenovated, and after a delay of some days, caused by trifling mishaps, she left the Cattegat behind and steered a course for British waters. 

The original plan had been to set a course for Iceland, and, when northof the Shetlands, to turn to the southward to Lough Laxford, the agreedrendezvous with Spender. But the incident at Langeland, which had madethe Danish authorities suspect illegal traffic with Iceland, made achange of plan imperative. Before leaving Danish waters Crawford triedto communicate this change to Belfast. But, meantime, information hadreached Belfast of certain measures being taken by the Government, andSpender, hoping to catch Crawford before he left Kiel, went to Dublin totelegraph from there. In Dublin he was dismayed to read in thenewspapers that a mysterious vessel called the _Fanny_, said to becarrying arms for Ulster, had been captured by the Danish authorities inthe Baltic. For several days no further news reached Belfast, where itwas assumed that the whole enterprise had failed; and then a codemessage informed the Committee that Crawford was in London. 

Spender at once went over to see him, in order to warn him not to bringthe arms to Ireland for the present. He was to take them back toHamburg, or throw them overboard, or sink the _Fanny_ and take to herboats, according to circumstances. But in London, instead of Crawford, Spender found the Hamburg skipper and packer, who told him of Crawford'sescape from Langeland with the loss of the ship's papers. Spender, knowing nothing of Crawford's change of plan, and anxious to convey tohim the latest instructions, went off on a wild-goose chase to theHighlands of Scotland, where he spent the best part of an unhappy weekwatching the waves tumbling in Lough Laxford, and looking as anxiouslyas Tristan for the expected ship. 

Meantime the _Fanny_ had crossed the North Sea, and Crawford sent Agnewashore at Yarmouth on the 7th of April with orders to hurry to Belfast, where he was to procure another steamer and bring it to a rendezvous atLundy Island, in the Bristol Channel. Crawford himself, havingrechristened the _Fanny_ for the second time (this time the _Doreen_), proceeded down the English Channel, where he had a rather adventurouscruise in a gale of wind. He kept close to the French coast, to avoidany unwelcome attentions in British waters, but on the way had an attackof malaria, which the Captain thought so grave that, no doubt with themost humane motives, he declared his intention of putting Crawfordashore at Dunkirk to save his life, a design which no persuasion shortof Crawford's handling of his revolver in true pirate fashion would makethe Norwegian abandon. 

In the heavy seas of the Channel the _Doreen_ could not make more thanfour knots, and she was consequently twenty-four hours late for therendezvous with Agnew at Lundy, where she arrived on the 11th of April. The Bristol Channel seemed to swarm with pilot boats eager to be ofservice, whose inquisitive and expert eyes were anything but welcome tothe custodian of Ulster's rifles; and to his highly strung imaginationevery movement of every trawler appeared to betoken suspicion. And, indeed, they were not without excuse for curiosity; for, a foreignsteamer whose course seemed indeterminate, now making for Cardiff andnow for St. Ives, observed at one time north-east of Lundy and a fewhours later south of the island--a tramp, in fact, that was obviously"loitering" with no ascertainable destination, was enough to keeptelescopes to the eyes of Devon pilots and fisher-folk, and to set theirtongues wagging. But there was no help for it. Crawford could not leavethe rendezvous till Agnew arrived, and was forced to wander round Lundyand up and down the Bristol Channel for two days and nights, until, at 5a. M. On Monday morning, the 13th of April, a signal from a passingsteamer, the _Balmerino_, gave the welcome tidings that Agnew was onboard and was proceeding to sea. 

When the two steamers were sufficiently far from Lundy lighthouse andother prying eyes to make friendly intercourse safe, Agnew came on boardthe _Doreen_, bringing with him another North Irish seaman whom heintroduced to Crawford. This man handed to Crawford a paper he hadbrought from Belfast. It was typewritten; it bore no address and nosignature; it was no doubt a duplicate of what Spender had taken to theHighlands, for its purport, as given by Crawford from memory, was to thefollowing effect: "Owing to great changes since you left, and alteredcircumstances, the Committee think it would be unwise to bring thecargo here at present, and instruct you to proceed to the Baltic andcruise there for three months, keeping in touch with the Committee, orelse to store the goods at Hamburg till required. "

The "great changes" referred to were the operations that led to theCurragh incident, the story of which Crawford now learnt from Agnew. Thepresence of the fleet at Lamlash, and of destroyers off Carrickfergus, was enough to make the Committee deem it an inopportune moment forCrawford to bring his goods to Belfast Lough. But the latter was hardlyin a condition to appreciate the gravity of the situation, and theindignation which the missive aroused in him is intelligible. After allhe had come through, the ups and downs, dangers and escapes--far morevaried than have been here recorded--the disappointment at being orderedback was cruel; and in his eyes such instructions were despicablypusillanimous. The caution that had prompted his instructors to leavethe order unsigned moved him to contempt, and in his wrath he wasconfident that "the Chief at any rate had nothing to do with it. " Hetold the messenger that he did not know who had sent the paper, and didnot want to know, and instructed him to take it back and inform thesenders that, as it bore no signature, no date, no address, and noofficial stamp, he declined to recognise it and refused to obey it; and, further, that unless he received within six days properly authenticatedinstructions for delivering his cargo, he would run his ship ashore athigh water in the County Down, and let the Ulstermen salve as much asthey could when the tide ebbed. 

But Crawford determined to make another effort first to accomplish histask by less desperate methods. He therefore decided to accompany themessenger back to Belfast. The _Doreen_, late _Fanny_, was tooforeign-looking to pass unchallenged up Belfast Lough, but he believedthat if the cargo could be transhipped to a vessel known to all watcherson the North Irish coast, a policy of audacity would have a good chanceof success. The s. S. _Balmerino_, which had brought Agnew and themessenger to Lundy, was such a vessel; her owner, Mr. Sam Kelly, was anintimate friend of Crawford's; and if he could see Kelly the matter, hehoped, might be quickly arranged. The reliance which Crawford placed inMr. Sam Kelly was fully justified, for the assistance rendered by thisgentleman was essential to the success of the enterprise. He it was whofreely supplied two steamers, with crews and stevedores, therebyenabling the last part of this adventurous voyage to be carried through;and the willingness with which Mr. Kelly risked financial loss, and muchbesides, placed Ulster under an obligation to him for which he sought norecompense. 

Crawford accordingly went off in the _Balmerino_, landed in South Waleson Tuesday, the 14th of April, and hastened by the quickest route toBelfast. Agnew took charge of the _Doreen_, with instructions to be atthe Tuskar Light, on the Wexford coast, on the following Friday night, the 17th, and to return there every night until Crawford rejoined him. Afriend of Crawford's, Mr. Richard Cowser, with whom he had aconversation on the telephone from Dublin, met him at the railwaystation in Belfast and told him that he had a motor waiting to take himto Craigavon, where the Council was expecting him, and that he would seeMr. Sam Kelly, the owner of the _Balmerino_, there also. This news madeCrawford very angry. He accused his friend of breach of confidence inletting anyone know that he was coming to Belfast; he declared he wouldhave nothing to do with the Council after the unsigned orders he hadreceived at Lundy; and he besought his friend to take his car toCraigavon and bring back Kelly, repeating his determination to bring inhis cargo, even if he had to run his ship ashore to do so. Mr. Cowserreplied that this would be very disappointing to Sir Edward Carson, whowas waiting for Crawford at Craigavon, having come from London onpurpose for this Council Meeting. "What!" exclaimed Crawford, "is SirEdward there? Why did you not say so at once? Where is your car? Let uswaste no time till I see the Chief and report to him. "

That evening of the 14th of April, at Craigavon, was a memorable one forall who were present at the meeting. Carson invited Crawford to relateall he had done, and to explain how he proposed to proceed. The latterdid not mince matters in saying what he thought of the Lundyinstructions, which he again declared angrily he intended to disobey. When he had finished his narrative and his protestations against what heconsidered a cowardly policy--a policy that would deprive Ulster ofsuccour as sorely needed as Derry needed the _Mountjoy_ to break theboom--Carson put a few questions to him in regard to the feasibility ofhis plans. Crawford explained the advantage it would be to transfer thecargo from the _Fanny_ to a local steamer, which he felt confident hecould bring into Larne, and after the transhipment he would send the_Fanny_ straight back to the Baltic, where she could settle her accountwith the Danish authorities and recover her papers. 

Some members of the Council were sceptical about the possibility oftranshipping the cargo at sea, but Crawford, who had fully discussed itwith Agnew, believed that if favoured by calm weather it could be done. When Carson, after hearing all that was to be said on both sides in thelong debate between Fabius and Hotspur, finally supported the latter, the question was decided. There was no split--there never was in thesedeliberations in Ulster; those whose judgment was overruled alwayssupported loyally the policy decided upon. 

Immediate measures were then taken to give effect to the decision. Kellyknew of a suitable craft, the s. S. _Clydevalley_, for sale at thatmoment in Glasgow, which would be in Belfast next morning with a cargoof coal. This was providential. A collier familiar to every longshoremanin Belfast Lough, carrying on her usual trade this week, could hardly besuspected of carrying rifles when she returned next week ostensibly inthe same line of business. It was settled that Crawford should cross toGlasgow at once and buy her; the steamer, when bought, was to go fromBelfast to Llandudno, where she would pick up Crawford on the sands, andproceed to keep the rendezvous with Agnew at the Tuskar Light on Friday;and, after taking over the _Fanny's_ cargo, would then steam boldly upBelfast Lough and through the Musgrave Channel to the Belfast docks, where he undertook to arrive on the Friday week, the 24th of April, thevarious proposals which named Larne, Bangor, and Donaghadee as ports ofdischarge having all been rejected after full discussion. This lastdecision was not approved by Crawford, for he and Spender had longbefore this time agreed that Larne harbour was the proper place to landthe arms, both because the large number of country roads leading to itwould facilitate rapid distribution, and because it would be moredifficult for the authorities to interfere with the disembarkation therethan at any of the other ports. 

Before parting from the Council Crawford made it quite clear that duringthe remainder of the adventure he would recognise no orders of any kindunless they bore the autograph signature of Sir Edward Carson. On thisunderstanding he set out for Glasgow, bought the _Clydevalley_, and wentby train to Llandudno to await her arrival. These affairs had left verylittle margin of time to spare. The _Clydevalley_ could not be atLlandudno before the morning of the 17th, and Agnew would be looking forher at the Tuskar the same evening. As it actually turned out she onlyarrived at the Welsh watering-place late that night, and, after pickingup Crawford, who had spent an anxious day on the beach, arrived off theWexford coast at daybreak on Saturday, the 18th. Not a sign of the_Fanny_ was to be seen all that day, or the following night; and whenthe skipper of the _Clydevalley_, who had been on the _Balmerino_ andwas privy to the arrangements with Agnew, gave Crawford reason to thinkthere might have been a misunderstanding as to the rendezvous, Yarmouthhaving been also mentioned in that connection, Crawford was in acondition almost of desperation. 

It was, indeed, a situation to test the nerves, to say nothing of thetemper, of even the most resolute. It was Sunday, and Crawford hadundertaken to be at Copeland Island, at the mouth of Belfast Lough, onFriday evening for final landing instructions. The precious cargo, whichhad passed safely through so many hazards, had vanished and was he knewnot where. He had heard nothing of the _Fanny_ (or _Doreen_) since helanded at Tenby five days previously. Had she been captured by adestroyer from Pembroke, or overhauled, pirate as she was withoutpapers, by Customs officials from Rosslare? Or had Agnew mistaken hisinstructions, and risked all the dangers of the English Channel in afruitless voyage to Yarmouth, where, even if still undetected, the_Fanny_ would be too far away to reach Copeland by Friday, unless Agnewcould be communicated with at once?

There was only one way in which such communication could be managed, andthat way Crawford now took with characteristic promptitude and energy. The _Clydevalley_ crossed the Irish Sea to Fishguard, where he tooktrain on Sunday night to London and Yarmouth, having first madearrangements with the skipper for keeping in touch. But there was notrace of the _Fanny_ at Yarmouth, and no word from Agnew at the PostOffice. There appeared to be no solution of the problem, and everyprecious hour that slipped away made ultimate failure more menacing. Butat two o'clock the outlook entirely changed. A second visit to the PostOffice was rewarded by a telegram in code from Agnew saying all waswell, and that he would be at Holyhead to pick up Crawford on Tuesdayevening. There was just time to catch a London train that arrived intime for the Irish mail from Euston. On Tuesday morning Crawford waspacing the breakwater at Holyhead, and a few hours later he wasdiscussing matters with Agnew in the little cabin of the _Clydevalley_. 

The latter had amply made up for the loss of time caused by somemisunderstanding as to the rendezvous at the Tuskar, for he was able toshow Crawford, to his intense delight, that the cargo had all beensafely and successfully transferred to the hold of the _Clydevalley_ ina bay on the Welsh coast, mainly at night. Some sixteen transportlabourers from Belfast, willing Ulster hands, had shifted the stuff inless than half the time taken by Germans at Langeland over the same job. There was, therefore, nothing more to be done except to steam leisurelyto Copeland, for which there was ample time before Friday evening. The_Fanny_ had departed to an appointed rendezvous on the Baltic coast ofDenmark. 

It was now the turn of the _Clydevalley_ to yield up her obscureidentity, and to assume an historic name appropriate to the adventureshe was bringing to a triumphant climax--a name of good omen in Ulsterears. Strips of canvas, 6 feet long, were cut and painted with whiteletters on a black ground, and affixed to bows and stern, so that themen waiting at Copeland might hail the arrival of the _Mountjoy II_. 

Off Copeland Island a small vessel was waiting, which Agnew recognisedas a tender belonging to Messrs. Workman & Clark. The men on board, assoon as they could make out the name of the approaching vessel, understood at once, and raised a ringing cheer. Two of them were seengesticulating and hailing the _Mountjoy_. Crawford, suspecting freshorders to retreat, paid no attention, and told Agnew to hold on hiscourse; and even when presently he was able to recognise Mr. Cowser andMr. Dawson Bates on board the tender, and to hear them shouting thatthey had important instructions for him, he still refused to let themcome on board. "If the orders are not signed by Sir Edward Carson, " heshouted back, "you can take them back to where they came from. " But theorders they brought had been signed by the leader, a special messengerhaving been sent to London to obtain his signature, and the change ofplan they indicated was, in fact, just what Crawford desired. The bulkof the arms were to be landed at Larne, the port he had always favoured, and lesser quantities were to be taken to Bangor and Donaghadee. 

It was 10. 30 that night, the 24th of April 1914, when the _Mountjoy II_steamed alongside the landing-stage at Larne, where she had been eagerlyawaited for a couple of hours. The voyage of adventure was over. FredCrawford, with the able and zealous help of Andrew Agnew, hadaccomplished the difficult and dangerous task he had undertaken, and aservice had been rendered to Ulster not unworthy to rank beside thebreaking of the boom across the Foyle by the first and more renowned_Mountjoy_. 

FOOTNOTES:

[87] _Annual Register_, 1914, p. 1. 

CHAPTER XIX

ON THE BRINK OF CIVIL WAR

The arrangements that had been made for the landing and disposal of thearms when they arrived in port were the work of an extremely efficientand complete organisation. In the previous summer Captain Spender, itwill be remembered, had been appointed to a position on Sir GeorgeRichardson's staff which included in its duties that of the organisationof transport. A railway board, a supply board, and a transport board hadbeen formed, on which leading business men willingly served; everyU. V. F. Unit had its horse transport, and in addition a special motorcorps, organised in squadrons, and a special corps of motor-lorries wereformed. 

More than half the owners of motor-cars in Ulster placed their cars atthe disposal of the motor corps, to be used as and when required. Thecorps was organised in sections of four cars each, and in squadrons ofseventeen cars each, with motor cyclist despatch-riders; a signallingcorps of despatch-riders and signallers completed the organisation. Thelively interest aroused by the practice and displays of thelast-mentioned corps did much to promote the high standard ofproficiency attained by its "flag-waggers, " many of whom were women andgirls. In particular the signalling-station at Bangor gained areputation which attracted many English sympathisers with Ulster to payit a visit when they came to Belfast for the great Unionistdemonstrations. 

The despatch-riders on motor-cycles made the Ulster Council independentof the Post Office, which for very good reasons they used as little aspossible. Post-houses were opened at all the most important centres inUlster, between which messages were transmitted by despatch-rider orsignal according to the nature of the intervening country. Along thecoast of Down and Antrim the organisation of signals was complete andeffective. The usefulness of the despatch-riders' corps was fully testedand proved during the Curragh Incident, when news of all that was takingplace at the Curragh was received by this means two or three times a dayat the Old Town Hall in Belfast, where there was much information ofwhat was going on that was unknown at the Irish Office in London. 

All this organisation was at the disposal of the leaders for handlingthe arms brought in the hold of the _Mountjoy II_. The perfection of thearrangements for the immediate distribution of the rifles and ammunitionamong the loyalist population, and the almost miraculous precision withwhich they were carried out on that memorable Friday night, extorted theadmiration even of the most inveterate political enemies of Ulster. Thesmoothness with which the machinery of organisation worked was onlypossible on account of the hearty willingness of all the workers, combined with the discipline to which they gladly submitted themselves. 

The whole U. V. F. Was warned for a trial mobilisation on the evening ofthe 24th of April, and the owners of all motor-cars and lorries wererequested to co-operate. Very few either of the Volunteers or the motorowners knew that anything more than manoeuvres by night for practicepurposes was to take place. All motors from certain specified districtswere ordered to be at Larne by 8 o'clock in the evening; from otherdistricts the vehicles were to assemble at Bangor and Donaghadeerespectively, at a later hour. All the roads leading to these ports werepatrolled by volunteers, and at every cross-roads over the greater partof nine counties men of the local battalions were stationed to givedirections to motor-drivers who might not be familiar with the roads. Atcertain points these men were provided with reserve supplies of petrol, and with repairing tools that might be needed in case of breakdown. Itis a remarkable testimony to the zeal of these men for the cause that, although none of them knew he was taking part in an exciting adventure, not one, so far as is known, left his post throughout a cold and wetnight, having received orders not to go home till daybreak. And thesewere men, it must be remembered, who before putting on the felt hats, puttees, and bandoliers which constituted their uniform, had alreadydone a full day's work, and were not to receive a sixpence for theirnight's job. 

At the three ports of discharge large forces of volunteers wereconcentrated. Sir George Richardson, G. O. C. In C. , remained in Belfastthrough the night, being kept fully and constantly informed of theprogress of events by signal and motor-cyclist despatch-riders. CaptainJames Craig was in charge of the operations at Bangor; at Larne GeneralSir William Adair was in command, with Captain Spender as Staff officer. 

The attention of the Customs authorities in Belfast was diverted by aclever stratagem. A tramp steamer was brought up the Musgrave Channelafter dark, her conduct being as furtive and suspicious as it waspossible to make it appear. At the same time a large wagon was broughtto the docks as if awaiting a load. The skipper of the tramp took anunconscionable time, by skilful blundering, in bringing his craft to hermoorings. The suspicions of the authorities were successfully aroused;but every possible hindrance was put in their way when they began toinvestigate. The hour was too late: could they not wait till daylight?No? Well, then, what was their authority? When that was settled, itappeared that the skipper had mislaid his keys and could not produce theship's papers--and so on. By these devices the belief of the officersthat they had caught the offender they were after was increasinglyconfirmed every minute, while several hours passed before they wereallowed to realise that they had discovered a mare's-nest. For when atlast they "would stand no more nonsense, " and had the hatches opened andthe papers produced, the latter were quite in order, and thecargo--which they wasted a little additional time in turningover--contained nothing but coal. 

Meantime the real business was proceeding twenty miles away. Allcommunications by wire from the three ports were blocked by "earthing"the wires, so as to cause short circuit. The police and coast-guardswere "peacefully picketed, " as trade unionists would call it, in theirvarious barracks--they were shut in and strongly guarded. No conflicttook place anywhere between the authorities and the volunteers, and theonly casualty of any kind was the unfortunate death of onecoast-guardsman from heart disease at Donaghadee. 

At Larne, where much the largest portion of the _Mountjoy's_ cargo waslanded, a triple cordon of Volunteers surrounded the town and harbour, and no one without a pass was allowed through. The motors arrived with apunctuality that was wonderful, considering that many of them had comefrom long distances. As the drivers arrived near the town and foundthemselves in an apparently endless procession of similar vehicles, their astonishment and excitement became intense. Only when close to theharbour did they learn what they were there for, and receivedinstructions how to proceed. They had more than two hours to wait indrizzling rain before the _Mountjoy_ appeared round the point ofIslandmagee, although her approach had been made known to Spender bysignal at dusk. There were about five hundred motor vehicles assembledat Larne alone, and such an invasion of flaring head-lights gave theinhabitants of the little town unwonted excitement. Practically all theable-bodied men of the place were either on duty as Volunteers or werewilling workers in the landing of the arms. The women stood at theirdoors and gave encouraging greeting to the drivers; many of them ranimprovised canteens, which supplied the workers with welcomerefreshments during the night. 

There was a not unnatural tendency at first on the part of some of themotor-drivers to look upon the event more in the light of a meet ofhounds than of the gravest possible business, and to hang aboutdiscussing the adventure with the other "sportsmen. " But the use ofvigorous language brought them back to recognition of the seriousness ofthe work before them, and the discharge of the cargo proceeded hourafter hour with the utmost rapidity and with the regularity of awell-oiled machine. The cars drew up beside the _Mountjoy_ in an endless_queue_; each received its quota of bales according to its carryingcapacity, and was despatched on its homeward journey without a moment'sdelay. 

The wisdom of Crawford's system of packing was fully vindicated. Therewas no confusion, no waiting to bring ammunition from one part of theship's hold to match with rifles brought from another, and bayonets froma third. The packages, as they were carried from the steamer or thecranes, were counted by checking clerks, and their destination noted aseach car received its load. But even the large number of vehiclesavailable would have been insufficient for the purpose on hand if eachhad been limited to a single load; dumps had therefore been formed at anumber of selected places in the surrounding districts, where the armswere temporarily deposited so as to allow the cars to return and performthe same duty several times during the night. 

While the _Mountjoy_ was discharging the Larne consignment on to thequay, she was at the same time transhipping a smaller quantity into amotor-boat, moored against her side, which when laden hurried off toDonaghadee; and she left Larne at 5 in the morning to discharge the lastportion of her cargo at Bangor, which was successfully accomplished inbroad daylight after her arrival there about 7. 30. 

Crawford refused to leave the ship at either Larne or Bangor, feelinghimself bound in honour to remain with the crew until they were safefrom arrest by the naval authorities. It was well known in Belfast thata look-out was being kept for the _Fanny_, which had figured in thePress as "the mystery ship" ever since the affair at Langeland, and hadseveral times been reported to have been viewed at all sorts of oddplaces on the map, from the Orkneys to Tory Island. Just as Agnew wascasting off from Bangor, when the last bale of arms had gone ashore, amessage from U. V. F. Headquarters informed him that a thirty-knot cruiserwas out looking for the _Fanny_. To mislead the coast-guards on shore acourse was immediately set for the Clyde--the very quarter from which acruiser coming from Lamlash was to be expected--and when some way out tosea Crawford cut the cords holding the canvas sheets that bore the nameof the _Mountjoy_, so that within five minutes the filibustering piratehad again become the staid old collier _Clydevalley_, which for monthspast had carried her regular weekly cargo of coal from Scotland toBelfast. As before at Langeland, so now at Copeland, fog providentiallycovered retreat, and through it the _Clydevalley_ made her wayundetected down the Irish Sea. At daybreak next morning Crawford landedat Rosslare; and Agnew then proceeded along the French and Danish coaststo the Baltic to the rendezvous with the _Fanny_, in order to bring backthe Ulstermen members of her crew, after which "the mystery ship" wasfinally disposed of at Hamburg. 

Sir Edward Carson and Lord Londonderry were both in London on the 24thof April. At an early hour next morning a telegram was delivered to eachof them, containing the single word "Lion. " It was a code messagesignifying that the landing of the arms had been carried out without ahitch. Before long special editions of the newspapers proclaimed thenews to all the world, and as fresh details appeared in every successiveissue during the day the public excitement grew in intensity. Wherevertwo or three Unionists were gathered together exultation was theprevailing mood, and eagerness to send congratulations to friends inUlster. 

Soon after breakfast a visitor to Sir Edward Carson found a motorbrougham standing at his door, and on being admitted was told that "LordRoberts is with Sir Edward. " The great little Field-Marshal, on learningthe news, had lost not a moment in coming to offer his congratulationsto the Ulster leader. "Magnificent!" he exclaimed, on entering the roomand holding out his hand, "magnificent! nothing could have been betterdone; it was a piece of organisation that any army in Europe might beproud of. "

But it was not to be expected that the Government and its supporterswould relish the news. The Radical Press, of course, rang all thechanges of angry vituperation, especially those papers which had beenprominent in ridiculing "Ulster bluff" and "King Carson's wooden guns";and they now speculated as to whether Carson could be "convicted ofcomplicity" in what Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons described as"this grave and unprecedented outrage. " Carson soon set that question atrest by quietly rising in his place in the House and saying that he tookfull responsibility for everything that had been done. The PrimeMinister, amid the frenzied cheers of his followers, assured the Housethat "His Majesty's Government will take, without delay, appropriatesteps to vindicate the authority of the law. " For a short time there wassome curiosity as to what the appropriate steps would be. None, however, of any sort were taken; the Government contented itself with sending afew destroyers to patrol for a short time the coasts of Antrim and Down, where they were saluted by the Ulster Signalling Stations, and theirofficers hospitably entertained on shore by loyalist residents. 

On the 28th of April a further debate on the Curragh Incident took placein the House of Commons, which was a curious example of the rapidchanges of mood that characterise that Assembly. Most of the speechesboth from the front and back benches were, if possible, even morebitter, angry, and defiant than usual. But at the close of one of thebitterest of them all Mr. Churchill read a typewritten passage that wasrecognised as a tiny olive-branch held out to Ulster. Carson respondednext day in a conciliatory tone, and the Prime Minister was thought tosuggest a renewal of negotiations in private. For some time nothing cameof this hint; but on the 12th of May Mr. Asquith announced that thethird reading of the Home Rule Bill (for the third successive year, asrequired by the Parliament Act before being presented for the signatureof the King) would be taken before Whitsuntide, but that the Governmentintended to make another attempt to appease Ulster by introducing "anamending proposal, in the hope that a settlement by agreement may bearrived at"; and that the two Bills--the Home Rule Bill and the Bill toamend it--might become law practically at the same time. But he gave nohint as to what the "amending proposal" was to be, and the reception ofthe announcement by the Opposition did not seem to presage agreement. 

Mr. Bonar Law insisted that the House of Commons ought to be told whatthe Amending Bill would propose, before it was asked finally to pass theHome Rule Bill. But the real fact was, as every member of the House ofCommons fully realised, that Mr. Asquith was not a free agent in thismatter. The Nationalists were not at all pleased at the attempts alreadymade, trivial as they were, to satisfy Ulster, and Mr. Redmond protestedagainst the promise of an Amending Bill of any kind. Mr. Asquith couldmake no proposal sufficient to allay the hostility of Ulster that wouldnot alienate the Nationalists, whose support was essential to thecontinuance of his Government in office. 

On the same day as this debate in Parliament the result of a by-electionat Grimsby was announced in which the Unionist candidate retained theseat; a week later the Unionists won a seat in Derbyshire; and two daysafterwards crowned these successes with a resounding victory at Ipswich. The last-mentioned contest was considered so important that Mr. LloydGeorge and Sir Edward Carson went down to speak the evening before thepoll for their respective sides. Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of theExchequer, made his appeal to the cupidity of the constituency, whichwas informed that it would gain £15, 000 a year from his new Budget, inaddition to large sums, of which he gave the figure, for old agepensions and under the Government's Health Insurance Act. [88] Sir EdwardCarson laid stress on Ulster's determination to resist Home Rule byforce. The Unionist candidate won the seat next day in this essentiallyworking-class constituency by a substantial majority, although hisLiberal opponent, Mr. Masterman, was a Cabinet Minister trying for thesecond time to return to Parliament. Out of seven elections since thebeginning of the session the Government had lost four. 

It happened that the two latest new members took their seats on the 25thof May, on which date the Home Rule Bill was passed by the House ofCommons on third reading for the last time. The occasion was celebratedby the Nationalists, not unnaturally, by a great demonstration oftriumph, both in the House itself and outside in Palace Yard. Men on theother side reflected that the tragedy of civil war had been brought onestage nearer. 

The reply of Ulster to the passing of the Bill was a series of reviewsof the U. V. F. During the Whitsuntide recess. Carson, Londonderry, Craig, and most of the other Ulster members attended these parades, whichexcited intense enthusiasm through the country, more especially as thearms brought by the _Mountjoy_ were now seen for the first time in thehands of the Volunteers. Several battalions were presented with Colourswhich had been provided by Lady Londonderry, Lady Massereene, Mrs. Craig, and other local ladies, and the ceremony included the dedicationof these Colours by the Bishop of Down and the Moderator of thePresbyterian Church. Many visitors from England witnessed thesedisplays, and among them were several deputations of Liberal and Labourworking men, who reported on their return that what they had seen hadconverted them to sympathy with Ulster. [89]

After the recess the promised Amending Bill was introduced in the Houseof Lords on the 23rd of June by the Marquis of Crewe, who explained thatit embodied Mr. Asquith's proposals of the 9th of March, and that heinvited amendments. Lord Lansdowne at once declared that theseproposals, which had been rejected as inadequate three months ago, weredoubly insufficient now. But the invitation to amend the Bill wasaccepted, Lord Londonderry asking the pertinent question whether theGovernment would tell Mr. Redmond that they would insist on acceptanceof any amendments made in response to Lord Crewe's invitation--aquestion to which no answer was forthcoming. Lord Milner, in the courseof the debate, said the Bill would have to be entirely remodelled, andhe laid stress on the point that if Ulster were coerced to join the restof Ireland it would make a united Ireland for ever impossible, and thatthe employment of the Army and Navy for the purpose of coercion wouldgive a shock to the Empire which it would not long survive; to whichLord Roberts added that such a policy would mean the utter destructionof the Army, as he had warned the Prime Minister before the incident atthe Curragh. 

On the 8th of July the Bill was amended by substituting the permanentexclusion of the whole province of Ulster--which Mr. Balfour had named"the clean cut"--for the proposed county option with a time limit; andseveral other alterations of minor importance were also made. The Billas amended passed the third reading on the 14th, when Lord Lansdownepredicted that, whatever might be the fate of the measure and of theHome Rule Bill which it modified, the one thing certain was that theidea of coercing Ulster was dead. 

In Ulster itself, meanwhile, the people were bent on making LordLansdowne's certainty doubly sure. Carson went over for the Boynecelebration on the 12th of July. The frequency of his visits did nothingto damp the ardour with which his arrival was always hailed by hisfollowers. The same wonderful scenes, whether at Larne or at the Belfastdocks, were repeated time after time without appearing to grow stale byrepetition. They gave colour to the Radical jeer at "King Carson, " forno royal personage could have been given a more regal reception than wasaccorded to "Sir Edward" (as everybody affectionately called him inBelfast) half a dozen times within a few months. 

This occasion, when he arrived on the 10th by the Liverpool steamer, accompanied by Mr. Walter Long, was no exception. His route had beenannounced in the Press. Countless Union Jacks were displayed in everyvillage along both shores of the Lough. Every vessel at anchor, including the gigantic White Star Liner _Britannic_, was dressed; everyfog-horn bellowed a welcome; the multitude of men at work in the greatship-yards crowded to places commanding a view of the incoming packet, and waved handkerchiefs and raised cheers for Sir Edward; fellowpassengers jostled each other to get sight of him as he went down thegangway and to give him a parting cheer from the deck; the dock shedswere packed with people, many of them bare-headed and bare-footedwomen, who pressed close in the hope of touching his hand, or hearingone of his kindly and humorous greetings. It was the same in the streetsall the way from the docks to the centre of the city, and out throughthe working-class district of Ballymacarret to the country beyond, andin every hamlet on the road to Newtownards and Mount Stewart--peoplecongregating to give him a cheer as he passed in Lord Londonderry'smotor-car, or pausing in their work on the land to wave a greeting fromfields bordering the road. 

Radical newspapers in England believed--or at any rate tried to maketheir readers believe--that the "Northcliffe Press, " particularly _TheTimes_ and _Daily Mail_, gave an exaggerated account of theseextraordinary demonstrations of welcome to Carson, and of theimpressiveness of the great meetings which he addressed. But theaccounts in Lord Northcliffe's papers did not differ materially fromthose in other journals like _The Daily Telegraph, The Daily Express, The Standard, The Morning Post, The Observer, The Scotsman_, and _TheSpectator_. There was no exaggeration. The special correspondents gavefaithful accounts of what they saw and heard, and no more. Editorialsupport was a different matter. Lord Northcliffe's papers were unfailingin their support of the Ulster cause, as were many other great Britishjournals; and even when at a later period Lord Northcliffe's attitude onthe general question of Irish government underwent a change that wasprofoundly disappointing to Ulstermen, his papers never countenanced theidea of applying coercion to Ulster. In the years 1911 to 1914 _TheTimes_ remained true to the tradition started by John Walter, who, himself a Liberal, went personally to Belfast in 1886 to inform himselfon the question, then for the first time raised by Gladstone; and, having done so, supported the loyalist cause in Ireland till his death. A series of weighty articles in 1913 and 1914 approved and encouragedthe resistance threatened by Ulster to Home Rule, and justified themeasures taken in preparation for it. Whatever may have been the reasonfor a different attitude at a later date, Ulster owed a debt ofgratitude to _The Times_ in those troubled years. 

The long-expected crisis appeared to be very close when Carson arrivedin Belfast on the 10th of July, 1914. He had come to attend a meeting ofthe Ulster Unionist Council--sitting for the first time as theProvisional Government. Craig communicated to the Press the previous daythe Preamble and some of the articles of the Constitution of theProvisional Government, hitherto kept strictly secret, one article beingthat the administration would be taken over "in trust for theConstitution of the United Kingdom, " and that "upon the restoration ofdirect Imperial Government, the Provisional Government shall cease toexist. "

At this session on the 10th, the proceedings of which were private, Carson explained the extreme gravity of the situation now reached. TheHome Rule Bill would become law probably in a few weeks. It was prettycertain that the Nationalists would not permit the Government to acceptthe Amending Bill in the altered form in which it had left the UpperHouse. In that case, nothing remained for them in Ulster but to carryout the policy they had resolved upon long ago, and to make good theCovenant. After his forty minutes' speech a quiet and business-likediscussion followed. Plenary authority to take any action necessary inemergency was conferred unanimously on the executive. The course to befollowed in assuming the administration was explained and agreed to, andwhen they separated all the members felt that the crisis for which theyhad been preparing so long had at last come upon them. There was noflinching. 

Next day there was a parade of 3, 000 U. V. F. At Larne. A distinguishedAmerican who was present said after the march past, "You could destroythese Volunteers, but you could not conquer them. " Carson spoke withexceptional solemnity to the men, telling them candidly that, "unlesssomething happens the evidence of which is not visible at present, " hecould discern nothing but darkness ahead, and no hope of peace. He endedby exhorting his followers throughout Ulster to preserve theirself-control and to "commit no act against any individual or against anyman's property which would sully the great name you have already won. "

As usual, his influence was powerful enough to prevent disturbance. TheGovernment had made extensive military preparations to maintain order onthe 12th of July; but, as a well-known "character" in Belfast expressedit, "Sir Edward was worth twenty battalions in keeping order. " Theanniversary was celebrated everywhere by enormous masses of men in astate of tense excitement. Lord Londonderry addressed an immensegathering at Enniskillen; seventy thousand Orangemen marched fromBelfast to Drumbeg to hear Carson, who sounded the same warning note asat Larne two days before. But nowhere throughout the Province was asingle occurrence reported that called for action by the police. 

When the Ulster leaders returned to London on the 14th they were met byreports of differences in the Cabinet over the Amending Bill, which wasto be brought before the House of Commons on the following Monday. Nationalist pressure no doubt dictated the deletion of the amendmentsmade by the Peers and the restoration of the Bill to its original shape. A minority of the Cabinet was said to be opposed to this course. Whetherthat was true or false, the Prime Minister must by this time haverealised that he had allowed the country to drift to the brink of civilwar, and that some genuine effort must be made to arrive at a peaceablesolution. 

Accordingly on Monday, the 20th, instead of introducing the AmendingBill, Mr. Asquith announced in the House of Commons that His Majesty theKing, "in view of the grave situation which has arisen, has thought itright to summon representatives of parties, both British and Irish, to aconference at Buckingham Palace, with the object of discussingoutstanding issues in relation to the problem of Irish Government. " ThePrime Minister added that at the King's suggestion the Speaker, Mr. James Lowther, would preside over the Conference, which would begin itsproceedings the following day. 

The Liberals, the British Unionists, the Nationalists, and the Ulstermenwere respectively represented at the Buckingham Palace Conference by Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Redmond and Mr. Dillon, Sir Edward Carson and Captain James Craig. TheKing opened the Conference in person on the 21st with a speechrecognising the extreme gravity of the situation, and making animpressive appeal for a peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Majesty then withdrew. The Conference deliberated for four days, butwere unable to agree as to what area in Ulster should be excluded fromthe jurisdiction of the Parliament in Dublin. On the 24th Mr. Asquithannounced the breakdown of the Conference, and said that in consequencethe Amending Bill would be introduced in the House of Commons onThursday, the 30th of July. 

Here was the old deadlock. The last glimmer of hope that civil war mightbe averted seemed to be extinguished. Only ten days had elapsed sinceCarson had gloomily predicted at Larne that peace was impossible "unlesssomething happens, the evidence of which is not visible at present. " Butthat "something" did happen--though it was something infinitely moredreadful, infinitely more devastating in its consequences, even thoughless dishonouring to the nation, than the alternative from which itsaved us. Balanced, as it seemed, on the brink of civil war, GreatBritain and Ireland together toppled over on the other side into themaelstrom of world-wide war. 

On the 30th of July, when the Amending Bill was to be discussed, thePrime Minister said that, with the concurrence of Mr. Bonar Law and SirEdward Carson, it would be indefinitely postponed, in order that thecountry at this grave crisis in the history of the world "should presenta united front and be able to speak and act with the authority of anundivided nation. " To achieve this, all domestic quarrels must be laidaside, and he promised that "no business of a controversial character"would be undertaken. 

Thus it happened that the Amending Bill was never seen by the House ofCommons. Four days later the United Kingdom was at war with the greatestmilitary Empire in the world. The opportunity had come for Ulster toprove whether her cherished loyalty was a reality or a sham. 

FOOTNOTES:

[88] _Annual Register_, 1914, p. 110. 

[89] _Annual Register_, 1914, p. 114. 

CHAPTER XX

ULSTER IN THE WAR

More than a year before the outbreak of the Great War a writer in _TheMorning Post_, describing the Ulster Volunteers who were then beginningto attract attention in England, used language which was more accuratelyprophetic than he can have realised in May 1913:

 "What these men have been preparing for in Ulster, " he wrote, "may be of value as a military asset in time of national emergency. I have seen the men at drill, I have seen them on parade, and experts assure me that in the matter of discipline, physique, and all things which go to the making of a military force they are worthy to rank with our regular soldiers. It is an open secret that, once assured of the maintenance unimpaired of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland under the Imperial Parliament alone, a vast proportion of the citizen army of Ulster would cheerfully hold itself at the disposal of the Imperial Government and volunteer for service either at home or abroad!"[90]

The only error in the prediction was that the writer underestimated thesacrifice Ulster would be willing to make for the Empire. When thetesting time came fifteen months after this appreciation was publishedall hope of unimpaired maintenance of the Union had to be sorrowfullygiven up, and only those who were in a position to comprehend, withsympathy, the depth and intensity of the feeling in Ulster on thesubject could realise all that this meant to the people there. Yet, allthe same, their "citizen army" did not hesitate to "hold itself at thedisposal of the Imperial Government, and volunteer for service at homeor abroad. "

In August 1914 the U. V. F. , of 100. 000 men, was without question themost efficient force of infantry in the United Kingdom outside theRegular Army. The medical comb did not seriously thin its ranks; andalthough the age test considerably reduced its number, it still left abody of fine material for the British Army. Some of the best of itsofficers, like Captain Arthur O'Neill, M. P. , of the Life Guards, andLord Castlereagh of the Blues, had to leave the U. V. F. To rejoin theregiments to which they belonged, or to take up staff appointments atthe front. In spite of such losses there was a strong desire in theforce, which was shared by the political leaders, that it should be keptintact as far as possible and form a distinct unit for active service, and efforts were at once made to get the War Office to arrange for thisto be done. Pressure of work at the War Office, and Lord Kitchener'saversion from anything that he thought savoured of politicalconsiderations in the organisation of the Army, imposed a delay ofseveral weeks before this was satisfactorily arranged; and theconsequence was that in the first few weeks of the war a large number ofthe keenest young men in Ulster enlisted in various regiments before itwas known that an Ulster Division was to be formed out of the U. V. F. 

It was the beginning of September before Carson was in a position to goto Belfast to announce that such an arrangement had been made with LordKitchener. And when he went he had also the painful duty of telling thepeople of Ulster that the Government was going to give them the meanestrecompense for the promptitude with which they had thrown aside allparty purposes in order to assist the Empire. 

When war broke out a "party truce" had been proclaimed. The Unionistleaders promised their support to the Government in carrying on the war, and Mr. Asquith pledged the Government to drop all controversiallegislation. The consideration of the Amending Bill had been shelved byagreement, Mr. Asquith stating that the postponement "must be withoutprejudice to the domestic and political position of any party. " On thisunderstanding the Unionist Party supported, almost without so much as aword of criticism, all the emergency measures proposed by theGovernment. Yet on the 10th of August Mr. Asquith astonished theUnionists by announcing that the promise to take no controversialbusiness was not to prevent him advising the King to sign the Home RuleBill, which had been hung up in the House of Lords by the introductionof the Amending Bill, and had never been either rejected or passed bythat House. 

Mr. Balfour immediately protested against this conduct as a breach offaith; but Mr. Redmond's speech on that occasion contained theexplanation of the Government's conduct. The Nationalist leader gave astrong hint that any help in the war from the southern provinces ofIreland would depend on whether or not the Home Rule Bill was to becomelaw at once. Although the personal loyalty of Mr. Redmond was beyondquestion, and although he was no doubt sincere when he subsequentlydenied that his speech was so intended, it was in reality an applicationof the old maxim that England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity. Inany case, the Cabinet knew that, however unjustly Ulster might betreated, she could be relied upon to do everything in her power tofurther the successful prosecution of the war, and they cynically cameto the conclusion that the best thing to do was to placate those whoseloyalty was less assured. 

This was the unpleasant tale that Sir Edward Carson had to unfold to theUlster Unionist Council on the 3rd of September. After explaining howand why he had consented to the indefinite postponement of the AmendingBill, he continued:

 "And so, without any condition of any kind, we agreed that the Bill should be postponed without prejudice to the position of either party. England's difficulty is not Ulster's opportunity. England's difficulty is our difficulty; and England's sorrows have always been, and always will be, our sorrows. I have seen it stated that the Germans thought they had hit on an opportune moment, owing to our domestic difficulties, to make their bullying demand against our country. They little understood for what we were fighting. We were not fighting to get away from England; we were fighting to stay with England, and the Power that attempted to lay a hand upon England, whatever might be our domestic quarrels, would at once bring us together--as it has brought us together--as one man. "

In order to avoid controversy at such a time, Carson declared he wouldsay nothing about their opponents. He insisted that, however unworthilythe Government might act in a great national emergency, Ulstermen mustdistinguish between the Prime Minister as a party leader and the PrimeMinister as the representative of the whole nation. Their duty was to"think not of him or his party, but of our country, " and they must showthat "we do not seek to purchase terms by selling our patriotism. " Hethen referred to the pride they all felt in the U. V. F. ; how he had"watched them grow from infancy, " through self-sacrificing toil to theirpresent high efficiency, with the purpose of "allowing us to be put intono degraded position in the United Kingdom. " But under the alteredconditions their duty was clear:

 "Our country and our Empire are in danger. And under these circumstances, knowing that the very basis of our political faith is our belief in the greatness of the United Kingdom and of the Empire, I say to our Volunteers without hesitation, go and help to save your country. Go and win honour for Ulster and for Ireland. To every man that goes, or has gone, and not to them only, but to every Irishman, you and I say, from the bottom of our hearts, 'God bless you and bring you home safe and victorious. '"

The arrangements with the War Office for forming a Division from theUlster Volunteers were then explained, which would enable the men "to goas old comrades accustomed to do their military training together. "Carson touched lightly on fears that had been expressed lest politicaladvantage should be taken by the Government or by the Nationalists ofthe conversion of the U. V. F. Into a Division of the British Army, whichwould leave Ulster defenceless. "We are quite strong enough, " he said, "to take care of ourselves, and so I say to men, so far as they haveconfidence and trust in me, that I advise them to go and do their dutyto the country, and we will take care of politics hereafter. " Heconcluded by moving a resolution, which was unanimously carried by theCouncil, urging "all Loyalists who owe allegiance to our cause" to jointhe Army at once if qualified for military service. 

From beginning to end of this splendidly patriotic oration no allusionwas made to the Nationalist attitude to the war. Few people in Ulsterhad any belief that the spots on the leopard were going to disappear, even when the Home Rule Bill had been placed on the Statute-book. The"difficulty" and the "opportunity" would continue in their oldrelations. People in Belfast, as elsewhere, did justice to the patriotictone of Mr. Redmond's speech in the House of Commons on the 3rd ofAugust, which made so deep an impression in England; but they believedhim mistaken in attributing to "the democracy of Ireland" a completechange of sentiment towards England, and their scepticism was more thanjustified by subsequent events. 

But they also scrutinised more carefully than Englishmen the precisewords used by the Nationalist leader. Englishmen, both in the House ofCommons and in the country, were carried off their feet in an ecstasy ofjoy and wonder at Mr. Redmond's confident offer of loyal help fromIreland to the Empire in the mighty world conflict. Ireland was to be"the one bright spot. " Ulstermen, on the other hand, did not fail toobserve that the offer was limited to service at home. "I say to theGovernment, " said Mr. Redmond, "that they may to-morrow withdraw everyone of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland willbe defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for thispurpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too gladto join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. "

These sentences were rapturously applauded in the House of Commons. Whenthey were read in Ulster the shrewd men of the North asked what dangerthreatened the "coast of Ireland"; and whether, supposing there were adanger, the British Navy would not be a surer defence than the "armedsons" of Ireland whether from South or North. It was not on the coastof Ireland but the coast of Flanders that men were needed, and it wasthither that the "armed Protestant Ulstermen" were preparing to go inthousands. They would not be behind the Catholics of the South in thespirit of comradeship invoked by Mr. Redmond if they were to standshoulder to shoulder under the fire of Prussian batteries; but theycould not wax enthusiastic over the suggestion that, while they went toFrance, Mr. Redmond's Nationalist Volunteers should be trained and armedby the Government to defend the Irish coast--and possibly, later, toimpose their will upon Ulster. 

The organisation and the training of the Ulster Division forms no partof the present narrative, but it must be stated that after Carson'sspeech on the 3rd of September, recruiting went on uninterruptedly andrapidly, and the whole energies of the local leaders and of the rank andfile were thrown into the work of preparation. Captain James Craig, promoted to be Lieutenant-Colonel, was appointed Q. M. G. Of the Division;but the arduous duties of this post, in which he tried to do the work ofhalf a dozen men, brought about a complete breakdown of health somemonths later, with the result that, to his deep disappointment, he wasforbidden to go with the Division to France. No one displayed a finerspirit than his brother, Mr. Charles Craig, M. P. For South Antrim. Hehad never done any soldiering, as his brother had in South Africa, andhe was over military age in 1914; but he did not allow either his age, his military inexperience, or his membership of the House of Commons toserve as excuse for separating himself from the men with whom he hadlearnt the elements of drill in the U. V. F. He obtained a commission asCaptain in the Ulster Division, and went with it to France, where he waswounded and taken prisoner in the great engagement at Thiepval in thebattle of the Somme, and had to endure all the rigours of captivity inGermany till the end of the war. There was afterwards not a littlepungent comment among his friends on the fact that, when honours weredescending in showers on the heads of the just and the unjust alike, afull share of which reached members of Parliament, sometimes for no veryconspicuous merit, no recognition of any kind was awarded to thisgallant Ulster officer, who had set so fine an example andunostentatiously done so much more than his duty. 

The Government's act of treachery in regard to "controversial business"was consummated on the 18th of September, when the Home Rule Billreceived the Royal Assent. On the 15th Mr. Asquith put forward hisdefence in the House of Commons. In a sentence of mellifluous optimismthat was to be woefully falsified in a not-distant future, he declaredhis confidence that the action his Ministry was taking would bring "forthe first time for a hundred years Irish opinion, Irish sentiment, Irishloyalty, flowing with a strong and a continuous and ever-increasingstream into the great reservoir of Imperial resources and Imperialunity. " He acknowledged, however, that the Government had pledged itselfnot to put the Home Rule Bill on the Statute-book until the AmendingBill had been disposed of. That promise was not now to be kept; insteadhe gave another, which, when the time came, was equally violated, namely, to introduce the Amending Bill "in the next session ofParliament, before the Irish Government Bill can possibly come intooperation. " Meantime, there was to be a Suspensory Bill to provide thatthe Home Rule Bill should remain in abeyance till the end of the war, and he gave an assurance "which would be in spirit and in substancecompletely fulfilled, that the Home Rule Bill will not and cannot comeinto operation until Parliament has had the fullest opportunity, by anAmending Bill, of altering, modifying, or qualifying its provisions insuch a way as to secure the general consent both of Ireland and of theUnited Kingdom. " The Prime Minister, further, paid a tribute to "thepatriotic and public spirit which had been shown by the UlsterVolunteers, " whose conduct has made "the employment of force, any kindof force, for what you call the coercion of Ulster, an absolutelyunthinkable thing. "

But a verbal acknowledgment of the public spirit shown by the U. V. F. Inthe first month of the war was a paltry recompense for the Government'sbreach of faith, as Mr. Bonar Law immediately pointed out in a stingingrejoinder. The leader of the Opposition concluded his powerfulindictment by saying that such conduct by the Government could not beallowed to pass without protest, but that at such a moment of nationaldanger debate in Parliament on this domestic quarrel, forced upon themby Ministers, was indecent; and that, having made his protest, neitherhe nor his party would take further part in that indecency. Thereuponthe whole Unionist Party followed Mr. Bonar Law out of the Chamber. 

But that was not the end of the incident. It had been decided, with SirEdward Carson's approval, that "Ulster Day, " the second anniversary ofthe Covenant, should be celebrated in Ulster by special religiousservices. The intention had been to focus attention on the largeraspects of Imperial instead of local patriotism; but what had justoccurred in Parliament could not be ignored, and it necessitated areaffirmation of Ulster's unchanged attitude in the domestic quarrel. Mr. Bonar Law now determined to accompany Sir Edward Carson to Belfastto renew and to amplify under these circumstances the pledges of BritishUnionists to Ulster. 

The occasion was a memorable one in several respects. On the 17th ofSeptember Sir Edward Carson had been quietly married in the country toMiss Frewen, and he was accompanied to Belfast a few days later by thenew Lady Carson, who then made acquaintance with Ulster and herhusband's followers for the first time. The scenes that invariablymarked the leader's arrival from England have been already described;but the presence of his wife led to a more exuberant welcome than everon this occasion; and the recent Parliamentary storm, with its sequel inthe visit of the leader of the Unionist Party, contributed further tothe unbounded enthusiasm of the populace. 

There was a meeting of the Council on the morning of the 28th, UlsterDay, at which Carson told the whole story of the conferences, negotiations, conversations, and what not, that had been going on up to, and even since, the outbreak of war, in the course of which he observedthat, if he had committed any fault, "it was that he believed the PrimeMinister. " He paid a just tribute to Mr. Bonar Law, whose constancy, patience, and "resolution to be no party even under these difficultcircumstances to anything that would be throwing over Ulster, werematters which would be photographed upon his mind to the very end of hislife. "

But while, naturally, resentment at the conduct of the Government foundforcible expression, and the policy that would be pursued "after thewar" was outlined, the keynote of the speeches at this Council Meeting, and also at the overwhelming demonstration addressed by Mr. Bonar Law inthe Ulster Hall in the evening, was "country before party. " As theUnionist leader truly said: "This is not an anti-Home Rule meeting. Thatcan wait, and you are strong enough to let it wait with quietconfidence. " But before passing to the great issues raised by the war, introduced by a telling allusion to the idea that Germany had calculatedon Ulster being a thorn in England's side, Mr. Bonar Law gave themessage to Ulster which he had specially crossed the Channel to deliverin person. 

He reminded the audience that hitherto the promise of support to Ulsterby the Unionists of Great Britain, given long before at Blenheim, hadbeen coupled with the condition that, if an appeal were made to theelectorate, the Unionist Party would bow to the verdict of the country. "But now, " he went on, "after the way in which advantage has been takenof your patriotism, I say to you, and I say it with the full authorityof our party, we give the pledge without any condition. "

During the two days which he spent in Belfast Mr. Bonar Law, and othervisitors from England, paid visits to the training camps at Newcastleand Ballykinler, where the 1st Brigade of the Ulster Division wasundergoing training for the front. Both now, and for some time to come, there was a good deal of unworthy political jealousy of the Division, which showed itself in a tendency to belittle the recruiting figuresfrom Ulster, and in sneers in the Nationalist Press at the delay insending to the front a body of troops whose friends had advertised theirsupposed efficiency before the war. These troops were themselvesfretting to get to France; and they believed, rightly or wrongly, thatpolitical intrigue was at work to keep them ingloriously at home, whileother Divisions, lacking their preliminary training, were receivingpreference in the supply of equipment. 

One small circumstance, arising out of the conditions in which"Kitchener's Army" had to be raised, afforded genuine enjoyment inUlster. Men were enlisting far more rapidly than the factories couldprovide arms, uniforms, and other equipment. Rifles for teaching therecruits to drill and manoeuvre were a long way short of requirements. It was a great joy to the Ulstermen when the War Office borrowed theirmuch-ridiculed "dummy rifles" and "wooden guns, " and took them toEnglish training camps for use by the "New Army. "

But this volume is not concerned with the conduct of the Great War, noris it necessary to enter in detail into the controversy that arose as tothe efforts of the rest of Ireland, in comparison with those of Ulster, to serve the Empire in the hour of need. It will be sufficient to citethe testimony of two authorities, neither of whom can be suspected ofbias on the side of Ulster. The chronicler of the _Annual Register_records that:

 "In Ulster, as in England, the flow of recruits outran the provision made for them by the War Office, and by about the middle of October the Protestant districts had furnished some 21, 000, of which Belfast alone had contributed 7, 581, or 305 per 10, 000 of the population--the highest proportion of all the towns in the United Kingdom. "[91]

The second witness is the democratic orator who took a foremost part inthe House of Commons in denouncing the Curragh officers who resignedtheir Commissions rather than march against Ulster. Colonel John Ward, M. P. , writing two years after the war, in which he had not kept his eyesshut, said:

 "It would be presumptuous for a mere Englishman to praise the gallantry and patriotism of Scotland, Wales, and Ulster; their record stands second to none in the annals of the war. The case of the South of Ireland, her most ardent admirer will admit, is not as any other in the whole British Empire. To the everlasting credit of the great leader of the Irish Nationalists, Mr. John Redmond, his gallant son, and his very lovable brother--together with many real, great-souled Irish soldiers whose loss we so deeply deplore--saw the light and followed the only course open to good men and true. But the patriotism and devotion of the few only show up in greater and more exaggerated contrast the sullen indifference of the majority, and the active hostility of the minority, who would have seen our country and its people overrun and defeated not only without regret, but with fiendish delight. "[92]

No generous-minded Ulsterman would wish to detract a word from thetribute paid by Colonel Ward to the Redmond family and other gallantCatholic Nationalists who stood manfully for the Empire in the day oftrial; but the concluding sentence in the above quotation cannot begainsaid. And the pathetic thing was that Mr. Redmond himself neverseems to have understood the true sentiments of the majority of thosewho had been his followers before the war. In a speech in the House onthe 15th of September he referred contemptuously to a "little group ofmen who never belonged to the National Constitutional party, who werecirculating anti-recruiting handbills and were publishing littlewretched rags once a week or once a month, " which were not worth amoment's notice. 

The near future was to show that these adherents of Sinn Fein were notso negligible as Mr. Redmond sincerely believed. The real fact was thathis own patriotic attitude at the outbreak of war undermined hisleadership in Ireland. The "separatism" which had always been, as Ulsternever ceased to believe, the true underlying, though not always theacknowledged, motive power of Irish Nationalism, was beginning again toassert itself, and to find expression in "handbills" and "wretchedrags. " It was discovering other leaders and spokesmen than Mr. Redmondand his party, whom it was destined before long to sweep utterly away. 

FOOTNOTES:

[90] _Morning Post_, May 19th, 1913. 

[91] _The Annual Register_, 1914, p. 259. 

[92] "The Army and Ireland, " _Nineteenth Century and After_, January1921, by Lieut. -Colonel John Ward, C. B. , C. M. G. , M. P. 

CHAPTER XXI

NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT

The position in which Ulster was now placed was, from the politicalpoint of view, a very anxious one. Had the war not broken out when itdid, there was a very prevalent belief that the Government could nothave avoided a general election either before, or immediately after, theplacing of Home Rule on the Statute-book; and as to the result of suchan election no Unionist had any misgiving. Even if the Government hadremained content to disregard the electorate, it would have beenimpossible for them to subject Ulster to a Dublin Parliament. Theorganisation there was powerful enough to prevent it, by force ifnecessary, and the Curragh Incident had proved that the Army could notbe employed against the Loyalists. 

But the whole outlook had now changed. The war had put off all thoughtof a General Election till an indefinite future; the Ulster Volunteers, and every other wheel in the very effective machinery prepared forresistance to Home Rule, were now diverted to a wholly differentpurpose; and at the same time the hated Bill had become an Act, and theonly alleviation was the promise, for what it might be worth, of anAmending Bill the scope of which remained undefined. While, therefore, the Ulster leaders and people threw themselves with all their energyinto the patriotic work to which the war gave the call, the situation socreated at home caused them much uneasiness. 

No one felt it more than Lord Londonderry. Indeed, as the autumn of 1914wore on, the despondency he fell into was so marked that his friendscould not avoid disquietude on his personal account in addition to allthe other grounds for anxiety. He and Lady Londonderry, it is true, tooka leading part in all the activities to which the war gave rise--encouraging recruiting, organising hospitals, and making provision ofevery kind for soldiers and their dependents, in Ulster and in theCounty of Durham. But when in London in November, Lord Londonderry wouldsit moodily at the Carlton Club, speaking to few except intimatefriends, and apparently overcome by depression. He was pessimistic aboutthe war. His only son was at the front, and he seemed persuaded he wouldnever return. The affairs of Ulster, to which he had given his wholeheart, looked black; and he went about as if all his purpose in life wasgone. He went with Lady Londonderry to Mount Stewart for Christmas, andone or two intimate friends who visited him there in January 1915 weregreatly disturbed in mind on his account. But the public in Belfast, whosaw him going in and out of the Ulster Club as usual, did not knowanything was amiss, and were terribly shocked as well as grieved whenthey heard of his sudden death at Wynyard on the 8th of February. 

The death of Lord Londonderry was felt by many thousands in Ulster as apersonal bereavement. If he did not arouse the unbounded, and almostdelirious, devotion which none but Sir Edward Carson ever evoked in theNorth of Ireland, the deep respect and warm affection felt towards himby all who knew him, and by great numbers who did not, was a tributewhich his modesty and integrity of character and genial friendliness ofdisposition richly deserved. He was faithfully described by Carsonhimself to the Ulster Unionist Council several months after his death as"a great leader, a great and devoted public servant, a great patriot, agreat gentleman, and above all the greatest of great friends. "

Ulster, meantime, had already had a foretaste of the sacrifices the warwas to demand when the Division should go to the front. In November 1914Captain the Hon. Arthur O'Neill, M. P. For Mid Antrim, who had gone tothe front with the first expeditionary force, was killed in action inFrance. There was a certain sense of sad pride in the reflection thatthe first member of the House of Commons to give his life for King andcountry was a representative of Ulster; and the constituency whichsuffered the loss of a promising young member by the death of thisgallant Life Guardsman consoled itself by electing in his place hisyounger brother, Major Hugh O'Neill, then serving in the UlsterDivision, who afterwards proved himself a most valuable member of theUlster Parliamentary Party, and eventually became the first Speaker ofthe Ulster Parliament created by the Act of 1920. 

Notwithstanding the bitter outbreak of party passion caused by theGovernment's action in putting the Home Rule Bill on the Statute-book inSeptember, the party truce was well maintained throughout the autumn andwinter. And the most striking proof of the transformation wrought by thewar was seen when Mr. Asquith, when constrained to form a truly nationalAdministration in May 1915, included Sir Edward Carson in his Cabinetwith the office of Attorney-General. Mr. Redmond was at the same timeinvited to join the Government, and his refusal to do so when theBritish Unionists, the Labour leaders, and the Ulster leaders allresponded to the Prime Minister's appeal to their patriotism, did notappear in the eyes of Ulstermen to confirm the Nationalist leader'sprofession of loyalty to the Empire; though they did him the justice ofbelieving that he would have accepted office if he had felt free tofollow his own inclination. His inability to do so, and the complaintsof his followers, including Mr. Dillon, at the admission of Carson tothe Cabinet, revealed the incapacity of the Nationalists to rise to alevel above party. 

Carson, however, did not remain very long in the Government. Disapproving of the policy pursued in relation to our Allies in theBalkans, he resigned on the 20th of October, 1915. But he had remainedlong enough to prove his value in council to the most energetic of hiscolleagues in the Cabinet. Men like Mr. Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George, although they had been the bitterest of Carson's opponents eighteenmonths previously, seldom omitted from this time forward to seek hisadvice in times of difficulty; and the latter of these two, when thingswere going badly with the Allies more than a year later, endeavoured topersuade Mr. Asquith to include Carson in a Committee of four to becharged with the entire conduct of the war. 

It was, perhaps, fortunate that the Ulster leader was not a member ofthe Government when the rebellion broke out in the South of Ireland atEaster 1916. For this event suddenly brought to the front again thewhole Home Rule question, which everybody had hoped might be allowed tosleep till the end of the war; and it would have been a misfortune ifCarson had not then been in a position of independence to play his partin this new act of the Irish drama. 

The Government had many warnings of what was brewing. But Mr. Birrell, the Chief Secretary, who in frivolity seemed a contemporary embodimentof Nero, deemed cheap wit a sufficient reply to all remonstrances, andhad to confess afterwards that he had utterly miscalculated the forceswith which he had to deal. He was completely taken by surprise when, onthe 20th of April, an attempt to land weapons from a German vessel, escorted by a submarine from which Sir Roger Casement landed in the Westof Ireland, proved that the Irish rebels were in league with the enemy;and even after this ominous event, he did nothing to provide against theoutbreak that occurred in Dublin four days later. The rising in thecapital, and in several other places in the South of Ireland, was notgot under for a week, during which time more than 170 houses had beenburnt, £2, 000, 000 sterling worth of property destroyed or damaged, and1, 315 casualties had been suffered, of which 304 were fatal. 

The aims of the insurgents were disclosed in a proclamation whichreferred to the administration in Ireland as a "long usurpation by aforeign people and government. " It declared that the Irish RepublicanBrotherhood--the same organisation that planned and carried out thePhoenix Park murders in 1882--had now seized the right moment for"reviving the old traditions of Irish nationhood, " and announced thatthe new Irish Republic was a sovereign independent State, which wasentitled to claim the allegiance of every Irish man and woman. 

The rebellion was the subject of debates in both Houses of Parliament onthe 10th and 11th of May--Mr. Birrell having in the interval, to use aphrase of Carlyle's, "taken himself and his incompetenceelsewhere"--when Mr. Dillon, speaking for the Nationalist Party, pouredforth a flood of passionate sympathy with the rebels, declaring that hewas proud of youths who could boast of having slaughtered Britishsoldiers, and he denounced the Government for suppressing the rising in"a sea of blood. " The actual fact was, that out of a large number ofprisoners taken red-handed in the act of armed rebellion who werecondemned to death after trial by court-martial, the great majority werereprieved, and thirteen in all were executed. Whether such measuresdeserved the frightful description coined by Mr. Dillon's flamboyantrhetoric everybody can judge for himself, after considering whether inany other country or at any other period of the world's history, activeassistance of a foreign enemy--for that is what it amounted to--has beenvisited with a more lenient retribution. 

On the same day that Mr. Dillon thus justified the whole basis ofUlster's unchanging attitude towards Nationalism by blurting out hissympathy with England's enemies, Mr. Asquith announced that he washimself going to Ireland to investigate matters on the spot. These twoevents, Mr. Dillon's speech and the Prime Minister's visit toDublin--where he certainly exhibited no stern anger against the rebels, even if the stories were exaggerated which reported him to have shownthem ostentatious friendliness--went far to transform what had been awretched fiasco into a success. Cowed at first by their completefailure, the rebels found encouragement in the complacency of the PrimeMinister, and the fear or sympathy, whichever it was, of the NationalistParty. From that moment they rapidly increased in influence, until theyproved two years later that they had become the predominant power allover Ireland except in Ulster. 

In Ulster the rebellion was regarded with mixed feelings. The strongestsentiment was one of horror at the treacherous blow dealt to the Empirewhile engaged in a life-and-death struggle with a foreign enemy. But, was it unpardonably Pharisaic if there was also some self-glorificationin the thought that Ulstermen in this respect were not as other menwere? There was also a prevalent feeling that after what had occurredthey would hear no more of Home Rule, at any rate during the war. Itappeared inconceivable that any sane Government could think of handingover the control of Ireland in time of war to people who had just provedtheir active hostility to Great Britain in so unmistakable a fashion. 

But they were soon undeceived. Mr. Asquith, on his return, told theHouse of Commons what he had learnt during his few days' sojourn inIreland. His first proposition was that the existing machinery ofGovernment in Ireland had completely broken down. That was undeniable. It was the natural fruit of the Birrell regime. Mr. Asquith was himselfresponsible for it. But no more strange or illogical conclusion could bedrawn from it than that which Mr. Asquith proceeded to propound. Thiswas that there was now "a unique opportunity for a new departure for thesettlement of outstanding problems "--which, when translated fromAsquithian into plain English, meant that now was the time for HomeRule. The pledge to postpone the question till after the war was to beswept aside, and, instead of building up by sound and sensibleadministration what Mr. Birrel's abnegation of government had allowed tocrumble into "breakdown, " the rebels were to be rewarded for trafficwith the enemy and destruction of the central parts of Dublin, withgreat loss of life, by being allowed to point to the triumphant successof their activity, which was certain to prove the most effective of allpossible propaganda for their political ideals in Ireland. 

Some regard, however, was still to be paid to the promise of an AmendingBill. The Prime Minister repeated that no one contemplated the coercionof Ulster; that an attempt must be made to come to agreement about theterms on which the Home Rule Act could be brought into immediateoperation; and that the Cabinet had deputed to Mr. Lloyd George the taskof negotiating to this end with both parties in Ireland. Accordingly, Mr. Lloyd George, then Secretary of State for War, interviewed SirEdward Carson on the one hand and Mr. Redmond and Mr. Devlin on theother, and submitted to them separately the proposals which he said theCabinet were prepared to make. [93]

On the 6th of June Carson explained the Cabinet's proposals at a specialmeeting of the Ulster Unionist Council held in private. His task was anextremely difficult one, for the advice he had to offer was utterlydetestable to himself, and he knew it would be no less so to hishearers. And the latter, profound as was their trust in him as theirleader, were men of singularly independent judgment and quite capable ofrespectfully declining to take any course they did not themselvesapprove. Indeed, Carson emphasised the fact that he could not, and hadnot attempted to, bind the Council to take the same view of thesituation as himself. At the same time he clearly and frankly statedwhat his own opinion was, saying: "I would indeed be a poor leader of agreat movement if I hesitated to express my own views of any propositionput before you. "[94]

His speech, which took nearly two hours in delivery, was a perfect modelof lucid exposition and convincing argument. He reviewed in close detailthe course of events that had led to the present situation. Hemaintained from first to last the highest ground of patriotism. Mentioning that numerous correspondents had asked why he did notchallenge the Nationalist professions of loyalty two years before at thebeginning of the war, which had since then been so signally falsified, he answered:

 "Because I had no desire to show a dissentient Ireland to the Germans. I am glad, even with what has happened, that we played the game, and if we had to do it again we would play the game. And then suddenly came the rebellion in Dublin. I cannot find words to describe my own horror when I heard of it. For I am bound to admit to you that I was not thinking merely of Ulster; I was thinking of the war; I was thinking, as I am always thinking, of what will happen if we are beaten in the war. I was thinking of the sacrifice of human lives at the front, and in Gallipoli, and at Kut, when suddenly I heard that the whole thing was interrupted by, forsooth, an Irish rebellion--by what Mr. Dillon in the House of Commons called a clean fight! It is not Ulster or Ireland that is now at stake: it is the British Empire. We have therefore to consider not merely a local problem, but a great Imperial problem--how to win the war. "

He then outlined the representations that had been made to him by theCabinet as to the injury to the Allied cause resulting from theunsettled Irish question--the disturbance of good relations with theUnited States, whence we were obtaining vast quantities of munitions;the bad effect of our local differences on opinion in Allied and neutralcountries. He admitted that these evil effects were largely due to falseand hostile propaganda to which the British Government weakly neglectedto provide an antidote; he believed they were grossly exaggerated. Butin time of war they could not contend with their own Government nor bedeaf to its appeals, especially when that Government contained all theirown party leaders, on whose support they had hitherto leaned. 

One of Carson's chief difficulties was to make men grasp thesignificance of the fact that Home Rule was now actually established byAct of Parliament. The point that the Act was on the Statute-book wasconstantly lost sight of, with all that it implied. He drove home theunwelcome truth that simple repeal of that Act was not practicalpolitics. The only hope for Ulster to escape going under a Parliament inDublin lay in the promised Amending Bill. But they had no assurance howmuch that Bill, when produced, would do for them. Was it likely, heasked, to do more than was now offered by the Government?

He then told the Council what Mr. Lloyd George's proposals were. TheCabinet offered on the one hand a "clean cut, " not indeed of the wholeof Ulster, but of the six most Protestant counties, and on the other tobring the Home Rule Act, so modified, into immediate operation. Hepointed out that none of them could contemplate using the U. V. F. Forfighting purposes at home after the war; and that, even if such a thingwere thinkable, they could not expect to get more by forcible resistanceto the Act than what was now offered by legislation. 

But to Carson himself, and to all who listened to him that day, theheartrending question was whether they could suffer a separation to bemade between the Loyalists in the six counties and those in the otherthree counties of the Province. It could only be done, Carson declared, if, after considering all the circumstances of the case as he unfoldedit to them, the delegates from Cavan, Monaghan, and Donegal could makethe self-sacrifice of releasing the other counties from the obligationto stand or fall together. Carson ended by saying that he did not intendto take a vote--he "could be no party to having Ulstermen vote oneagainst the other. " What was to be done must be done by agreement, ornot at all. He offered to confer separately with the delegates from thethree omitted counties, and the Council adjourned till the 12th of Juneto enable this conference to be held. 

In the interval a large number of the delegates held meetings of theirlocal associations, most of which passed resolutions in favour ofaccepting the Government's proposals. But there was undoubtedly awidespread feeling that it would be a betrayal of the Loyalists ofCavan, Monaghan, and Donegal, and even a positive breach of theCovenant, to accept exclusion from the Home Rule Act for only a portionof Ulster. This was, it is true, a misunderstanding of the strictmeaning of the Covenant, which had been expressly conditioned so as notto extend to such unforeseen circumstances as the war had broughtabout[95]; but there was a general desire to avoid if possible takingtechnical points, and both Carson himself and the Council were ready tosacrifice the opportunity for a tolerable settlement should therepresentatives of the three counties not freely consent to what wasproposed. 

In a spirit of self-sacrifice which deeply touched every member of theCouncil, this consent was given. Carson had obtained leave for LordFarnham to return from the Army in France to be present at the meeting. Lord Farnham, as a delegate from Cavan, made a speech at the adjournedmeeting on the 12th which filled his hearers with admiration. That hewas almost heart-broken by the turn events had taken he made no attemptto conceal; and his distress was shared by those who heard his movingwords. But he showed that he possessed the instinct of statesmanshipwhich compelled him to recognise, in spite of the powerful pull ofsentiment and self-interest in the opposite direction, that the courserecommended by Carson was the path of wisdom. With breaking voice hethanked the latter "for the clearness, and the fairness, and themanliness with which he has put the deplorable situation that has arisenbefore us, and for his manly advice as leader "; and he then read aresolution that had been passed earlier in the day by the delegates ofthe three counties, which, after recording a protest against anysettlement excluding them from Ulster, expressed sorrowful acquiescence, on grounds of the larger patriotism, in whatever decision might be cometo in the matter by their colleagues from the six counties. 

It was the saddest hour the Ulster Unionist Council ever spent. Men notprone to emotion shed tears. It was the most poignant ordeal the Ulsterleader ever passed through. But it was just one of those occasions whenfar-seeing statesmanship demands the ruthless silencing of promptingsthat spring from emotion. Many of those who on that terrible 12th ofJune were most torn by doubt as to the necessity for the decisionarrived at, realised before long that their leader had never been guidedby surer insight than in the counsel he gave them that day. 

The Resolution adopted by the Council was a lengthy one. After recitingthe unaltered attachment of Ulster to the Union, it placed on record theappeal that had been made by the Government on patriotic grounds for asettlement of the Irish difficulty, which the Council did not think itright at such a time of national emergency to resist; but it was carefulto reserve, in case the negotiations should break down from any othercause, complete freedom to revert to "opposition to the whole policy ofHome Rule for Ireland. "

Meantime the Nationalist leaders had been submitting Mr. Lloyd George'sproposals to their own people, and on the 10th of June Mr. Redmond madea speech in Dublin from which it appeared that he was submitting a verydifferent proposal to that explained by Carson in Belfast. For Mr. Redmond told his Dublin audience that, while the Home Rule Act was tocome into operation at once, the exclusion of the six counties was to beonly for the period of the war and twelve months afterwards. That would, of course, have been even less favourable to Ulster than the termsoffered by Mr. Asquith and rejected by Carson in March 1914. Exclusionfor the period of the war meant nothing; it would have been useless toUlster; it was no concession whatever; and Carson would have refused, ashe did in 1914, even to submit it to the Unionist Council in Belfast. Mr. Lloyd George, who must have known this, had told him quite clearlythat there was to be a "definite clean cut, " with no suggestion of atime limit. There was, however, an idea that after the war an ImperialConference would be held, at which the whole constitutional relations ofthe component nations of the British Empire would be reviewed, and thatthe permanent status of Ireland would then come under reconsiderationwith the rest. In this sense the arrangement now proposed was spoken ofas "provisional"; but both Mr. Lloyd George and the Prime Minister madeit perfectly plain that the proposed exclusion of the six Ulstercounties from Home Rule could never be reversed except by a fresh Act ofParliament. 

But when the question was raised by Mr. Redmond in the House of Commonson the 24th of July, in a speech of marked moderation, he explained thathe had understood the exclusion, like all the rest of the scheme, to bestrictly "provisional, " with the consequence that it would come to anend automatically at the end of the specified period unless prolonged bynew legislation; and he refused to respond to an earnest appeal by Mr. Asquith not to let slip this opportunity of obtaining, with the consentof the Unionist Party, immediate Home Rule for the greater part ofIreland, more especially as Mr. Redmond himself had disclaimed anydesire to bring Ulster within the Home Rule jurisdiction without her ownconsent. 

The negotiations for settlement thus fell to the ground, and the bittersacrifice which Ulster had brought herself to offer, in response to theGovernment's urgent appeal, bore no fruit, unless it was to afford onemore proof of her loyalty to England and the Empire. She was to findthat such proofs were for the most part thrown away, and merely wereused by her enemies, and by some who professed to be her friends, as astarting-point for demands on her for further concessions. But, althoughall British parties in turn did their best to impress upon Ulster thatloyalty did not pay, she never succeeded in learning the lessonsufficiently to be guided by it in her political conduct. 

FOOTNOTES:

[93] Mr. Lloyd George's memory was at fault when he said in the House ofCommons on the 7th of February, 1922, that on the occasion referred toin the text he had seen Sir Edward Carson and Mr. Redmond together. 

[94] The quotations from this speech, which was never published, arefrom a report privately taken by the Ulster Unionist Council. 

[95] See _ante_, p. 105. 

CHAPTER XXII

THE IRISH CONVENTION

After the failure of Mr. Lloyd George's negotiations for settlement inthe summer of 1916 the Nationalists practically dropped all pretence ofhelping the Government to carry on the war. They were, no doubt, beginning to realise how completely they were losing hold of the peopleof Southern Ireland, and that the only chance of regaining theirvanishing popularity was by an attitude of hostility to the BritishGovernment. 

Frequently during the autumn and winter they raised debates inParliament on the demand that the Home Rule Act should immediately comeinto operation, and threatened that if this were not done recruits fromIreland would not be forthcoming, although the need for men was now amatter of great national urgency. They ignored the fact that Mr. Redmondwas a consenting party to Mr. Asquith's policy of holding Home Rule inabeyance till after the war, and attempted to explain away their ownloss of influence in Ireland by alleging that the exasperation of theIrish people at the delay in obtaining "self-government" was the causeof their alienation from England, and of the growth of Sinn Fein. 

In December 1916 the Asquith Government came to an end, and Mr. LloydGeorge became Prime Minister. He had shown his estimate of Sir EdwardCarson's statesmanship by pressing Mr. Asquith to entrust the entireconduct of the war to a Committee of four, of whom the Ulster leadershould be one; and, having failed in this attempt to infuse energy anddecision into the counsels of his Chief, he turned him out and formed aMinistry with Carson in the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, atthat time one of the most vital in the Government. Colonel James Craigalso joined the Ministry as Treasurer of the Household. 

The change of Government did nothing to alter the attitude of theNationalists, unless, indeed, the return of Carson to high office addedto the fierceness of their attacks. On the 26th of February 1917--justwhen "unrestricted submarine warfare" was bringing the country into itsgreatest peril--Mr. Dillon called upon the Government to releasetwenty-eight men who had been deported from Ireland, and who weredeclared by Mr. Duke, the Chief Secretary, to have been deeplyimplicated in the Easter rebellion of the previous year; and a weeklater Mr. T. P. O'Connor returned to the charge with another demand forHome Rule without further ado. 

The debate on Mr. O'Connor's motion on the 7th of March was madememorable by the speech of Major William Redmond, home on leave from thetrenches in France, whose sincere and impassioned appeal for oblivion ofold historic quarrels between Irish Catholics and Protestants, who wereat that moment fighting and dying side by side in France, made a deepimpression on the House of Commons and the country. And when thisgallant officer fell in action not long afterwards and was carried outof the firing line by Ulster soldiers, his speech on the 7th of Marchwas recalled and made the peg on which to hang many adjurations toUlster to come into line with their Nationalist fellow-countrymen of theSouth. 

Such appeals revealed a curious inability to grasp the realities of thesituation. Men spoke and wrote as if it were something new and wonderfulfor Irishmen of the "two nations" to be found fighting side by side inthe British Army--as if the same thing had not been seen in thePeninsula, in the Crimea, on the Indian frontier, in South Africa, andin many another fight. Ulstermen, like everybody else who knew MajorRedmond, deplored the loss of a very gallant officer and a very lovableman. But they could not understand why his death should be made a reasonfor a change in their political convictions. When Major Arthur O'Neill, an Ulster member, was killed in action in 1914, no one had suggestedthat Nationalists should on that account turn Unionists. Why, theywondered, should Unionists any more turn Nationalists because aNationalist M. P. Had made the same supreme sacrifice? All thissentimental talk of that time was founded on the misconception thatUlster's attachment to the Union was the result of personal prejudiceagainst Catholics of the South, instead of being, as it was, adeliberate and reasoned conviction as to the best government forIreland. 

This distinction was clearly brought out in the same debate by Sir JohnLonsdale, who, when Carson became a member of the Cabinet, had beenelected leader of the Ulster Party in the House of Commons; and anemphatic pronouncement, which went to the root of the controversy, wasmade in reply to the Nationalists by the Prime Minister. In thenorth-eastern portion of Ireland, he said:

 "You have a population as hostile to Irish rule as the rest of Ireland is to British rule, yea, and as ready to rebel against it as the rest of Ireland is against British rule--as alien in blood, in religious faith, in traditions, in outlook--as alien from the rest of Ireland in this respect as the inhabitants of Fife or Aberdeen. To place them under National rule against their will would be as glaring an outrage on the principles of liberty and self-government as the denial of self-government would be for the rest of Ireland. "

The Government were, therefore, prepared, said Mr. Lloyd George, tobring in Home Rule immediately for that part of Ireland that wanted it, but not for the Northern part which did not want it. Mr. Redmond made afine display of indignation at this refusal to coerce Ulster; and, inimitation of the Unionists in 1914, marched out of the House at the headof his party. Next day he issued a manifesto to men of Irish blood inthe United States and in the Dominions, calling on them to use all meansin their power to exert pressure on the British Government. It was clearthat this sort of thing could not be tolerated in the middle of a war inwhich Great Britain was fighting for her life, and at a crisis in itwhen her fortunes were far from prosperous. Accordingly, on the 16th ofMarch Mr. Bonar Law warned the Nationalists that their conduct mightmake it necessary to appeal to the country on the ground that they wereobstructing the prosecution of the war. But he also announced that theCabinet intended to make one more attempt to arrive at a settlement ofthe apparently insoluble problem of Irish government. 

Two months passed before it was made known how this attempt was to bemade. On the 16th of May the Prime Minister addressed a letter induplicate to Mr. Redmond and Sir John Lonsdale, representing the twoIrish parties respectively, in which he put forward for theirconsideration two alternative methods of procedure, after premising thatthe Government felt precluded from proposing during the war any measuresexcept such as "would be substantially accepted by both sides. "

These alternatives were: _(a)_ a "Bill for the immediate application ofthe Home Rule Act to Ireland, but excluding therefrom the six countiesof North-East Ulster, " or, _(b)_ a Convention of Irishmen "for thepurpose of drafting a Constitution ... Which should secure a justbalance of all the opposing interests. " Sir John Lonsdale replied to thePrime Minister that he would take the Government's first proposal toBelfast for consideration by the Council; but as Mr. Redmond, on theother hand, peremptorily refused to have anything to say to it, itbecame necessary to fall back on the other alternative, namely theassembling of an Irish Convention. 

The members chosen to sit in the Convention were to be "representativemen" in Emerson's meaning of the words, but not in the democratic senseas deriving their authority from direct popular election. Certainpolitical organisations and parties were each invited to nominate acertain number; the Churches were represented by their leading clergy;men occupying public positions, such as chairmen of local authorities, were given _ex-officio_ seats; and a certain number were nominated bythe Government. The total membership of this variegated assembly wasninety-five. The Sinn Fein party were invited to join, but refused tohave anything to do with it, declaring that they would consider nothingshort of complete independence for Ireland. The majority of the Irishpeople thus stood aloof from the Convention altogether. 

As the purpose for which the Convention was called was quickly lostsight of by many, and by none more than its Chairman, it is well toremember what that purpose was. If it had not been for the opposition ofUlster, the Home Rule Act of 1914 would have been in force for years, and none of the many attempts at settlement would have been necessary. The one and only thing required was to reconcile, if possible, theaspirations of Ulster with those of the rest of Ireland. That was thepurpose, and the only purpose, of the Convention; and in the letteraddressed to Sir John Lonsdale equally with Mr. Redmond, the PrimeMinister distinctly laid it down that unless its conclusions wereaccepted "by both sides, " nothing could come of it. To leave no shadowof doubt on this point Mr. Bonar Law, in reply to a specific question, said that there could be no "substantial agreement" to which Ulster wasnot a party. 

It is necessary to emphasise this point, because for such a purpose theheterogeneous conglomeration of Nationalists of all shades that formedthe great majority of the Convention was worse than useless. TheConvention was in reality a bi-lateral conference, in which one of thetwo sides was four times as numerous as the other. Yet much partycapital was subsequently made of the fact that the Nationalist membersagreed upon a scheme of Home Rule--an achievement which had no elementof the miraculous or even of the unexpected about it. 

Notwithstanding that the Sinn Fein party had displayed their contemptfor the Convention, and under the delusion that it would "create anatmosphere of good-will" for its meeting, the Government releasedwithout condition or reservation all the prisoners concerned in theEaster rebellion of 1916. It was like playing a penny whistle toconciliate a cobra. The prisoners, from whose minds nothing was furtherthan any thought of good-will to England, were received by the populacein Dublin with a rapturous ovation, their triumphal procession beingheaded by Mr. De Valera, who was soon afterwards elected member for EastClare by a majority of nearly thirty thousand. Four months later, theChief Secretary told Parliament that the young men of Southern Ireland, who had refused to serve in the Army, were being enrolled in preparationfor another rebellion. 

It was only after some hesitation that the Ulster Unionist Councildecided not to hold aloof from the Convention, as the Sinn Feiners did. Carson accompanied Sir John Lonsdale to Belfast and explained theexplicit pledges by Ministers that participation would not commit themto anything, that they would not be bound by any majority vote, and thatwithout their concurrence no legislation was to be founded on anyagreement between the other groups in the Convention; he also urged thatUlster could not refuse to do what the Government held would be helpfulin the prosecution of the war. 

The invitation to nominate five delegates was therefore accepted; andwhen the membership of the Convention was complete there were nineteenout of ninety-five who could be reckoned as supporters in general of theUlster point of view. Among them were the Primate, the Moderator of theGeneral Assembly, the Duke of Abercorn, the Marquis of Londonderry, Mr. H. M. Pollock, Chairman of the Belfast Chamber of Commerce, one Labourrepresentative, Mr J. Hanna, and the Lord Mayors of Belfast and Derry. It was agreed that Mr. H. T. Barrie, member for North Derry, should actas chairman and leader of the Ulster group, and he discharged thisdifficult duty with unfailing tact and ability. 

There was some difficulty in finding a suitable Chairman, for no partywas willing to accept any strong man opposed to their own views, whilean impartial man was not to be found in Ireland. Eventually the choicefell on Sir Horace Plunkett as a gentleman who, if eagerly supported bynone, was accepted by each group as preferable to a more formidableopponent. Sir Horace made no pretence of impartiality. Whateverinfluence he possessed was used as a partisan of the Nationalists. Hewas not, like the Speaker of the House of Commons, a silent guardian oforder; he often harangued the assembly, which, on one occasion at least, he addressed for over an hour; and he issued manifestos, _questionnaires_, and letters to members, one of which was sharplycensured as misleading both by Mr. Barrie and the Bishop of Raphoe. 

The procedure adopted was described by the Chairman himself as"unprecedented. " It was not only that, but was unsuitable in the lastdegree for the purpose in view. When it is borne in mind what thatpurpose was, it is clear that the only business-like method would havebeen to invite the Ulster delegates at the outset to formulate theirobjections to coming under the Home Rule Act of 1914, and then to seewhether Mr. Redmond could make any concessions which would persuadeUlster to accept something less than the permanent exclusion of sixcounties, which had been their _minimum_ hitherto. 

The procedure actually followed was ludicrously different. The object, as stated by the chairman, was "to avoid raising contentious issues insuch a way as to divide the Convention on party lines, "[96] which, tosay the least, was a curious method of handling the most contentiousproblem in British politics. A fine opportunity was offered to amateurconstitution-mongers. Anyone was allowed to propound a scheme for thefuture government of Ireland, which, of course, was an encouragement toendless wide-ranging debate, with the least conceivable likelihood ofarriving at definite decisions. Neither of the leaders of the twoparties whose agreement was essential if the Convention was to have anyresult took the initiative in bringing forward proposals. Mr. Redmondwas invited to do so, but declined. Mr. Barrie had no reason to do so, because the Ulster scheme for the government of Ireland was thelegislative union. So it was left to individuals with no officialresponsibility to set forth their ideas, which became the subject ofprotracted debates of a general character. 

It was further arranged that while contentious issues--the only onesthat mattered--should be avoided, any conclusions reached on minormatters should be purely provisional, and contingent on agreement beingcome to ultimately on fundamentals. Month after month was spent in thusdiscussing such questions as the powers which an Irish Parliament oughtto wield, while the question whether Ulster was to come into thatParliament was left to stand over. Committees and sub-committees wereappointed to thresh out these details, and some of them relieved thetedium by wandering into such interesting by-ways of irrelevancy ashousing and land purchase, all of which, in Gilbertian phrase, "hadnothing to do with the case. "

The Ulster group raised no objection to all this expenditure of time andenergy. For they saw that it was not time wasted. From the standpoint ofthe highest national interest it was, indeed, more useful than anythingthe Convention could have accomplished by business-like methods. Thesummer and autumn of 1917, and the early months of 1918, covered aterribly critical period of the war. The country was never in greaterperil, and the attitude of the Nationalists in the House of Commonsadded to the difficulties of the Government, as Mr. Bonar Law hadcomplained in March. It was to placate them that the Convention had beensummoned. It was a bone thrown to a snarling dog, and the longer therewas anything to gnaw the longer would the dog keep quiet. The Ulsterdelegates understood this perfectly, and, as their chief desire was tohelp the Government to get on with the war, they had no wish to curtailthe proceedings of the Convention, although they were never under thedelusion that it could lead to anything in Ireland. 

Having regard to the origin of this strange assembly of Irishmen itmight have been supposed that its ingenuity would be directed to findingsome modification of Mr. Asquith's Home Rule Act which Ulster couldaccept. That Act was the point of departure for its investigation, andthe quest was _ex hypothesi_ for some amendment that would not be anenlargement of the authority to be delegated to the subordinateParliament, or any further loosening of the tie with Great Britain. Anyproposal of the latter sort would be in the opposite direction from thatin which the Convention was intended to travel. Yet this is preciselywhat was done from the very outset. The Act of 1914 was brushed aside asbeneath contempt; and the Ulster delegates had to listen with amazementweek after week to proposals for giving to the whole of Ireland, including their own Province, a constitution practically as independentof Great Britain as that of the Dominions. 

But what astonished the Ulstermen above everything was to find theseextravagant demands of the Nationalists supported by those who weresupposed to be representatives of Southern Unionism, with Lord Midleton, a prominent member of the Unionist Party in England, at their head. Theonly material point on which Lord Midleton differed from the extremistsled by the Bishop of Raphoe was that he wished to limit complete fiscalautonomy for Ireland by reserving the control of Customs duties to theImperial Parliament. Save in this single particular he joined forceswith the Nationalists, and shocked the Unionists of the North by givinghis support to a scheme of Home Rule going beyond anything eversuggested at Westminster by any Radical from Gladstone to Asquith. 

This question of the financial powers to be exercised by thehypothetical Irish Parliament occupied the Convention and its committeesfor the greater part of its eight months of existence. In January 1918Lord Midleton and Mr. Redmond came to an agreement on the subject whichproved the undoing of them both, and produced the only really impressivescene in the Convention. 

For some time Mr. Redmond had given the impression of being a tired manwho had lost his wonted driving-force. He took little or no part in thelobbying and canvassing that was constantly going on behind the scenesin the Convention; he appeared to be losing grip as a leader. But hecannot be blamed for his anxiety to come to terms with Lord Midleton;and when he found, no doubt greatly to his surprise, that a Unionistleader was ready to abandon Unionist principles and to accept DominionHome Rule for Ireland, subject to a single reservation on the subject ofCustoms, he naturally jumped at it, and assumed that his followers woulddo the same. 

But, while Mr. Redmond had been losing ground, the influence of theCatholic Bishop of Raphoe had been on the increase, and that able andastute prelate was entirely opposed to the compromise on which Mr. Redmond and Lord Midleton were agreed. On the evening of the 14th ofJanuary it came to the knowledge of Mr. Redmond that when the questioncame up for decision next day, he would find Mr. Devlin, his principallieutenant, in league with the ecclesiastics against him. He waspersonally too far committed to retrace his steps; to go forward meantdisaster, for it would produce a deep cleavage in the Nationalist ranks;and, as the state of affairs was generally known to members of theConvention, the sitting of the following day was anticipated withunusual interest. 

There was an atmosphere of suppressed excitement when the Chairman tookhis seat on the 15th. Mr. Redmond entered a few seconds later and tookhis usual place without betraying the slightest sign of disturbedequanimity. The Bishop of Raphoe strode past him, casting to left andright swift, challenging glances. Mr. Devlin slipped quietly into hisseat beside the leader he had thrown over, without a word or gesture ofgreeting. All over the room small groups of members engaged in whisperedconversation; an air of mysterious expectancy prevailed. The Ulstermembers had been threatened that it was to be for them a day of disasterand dismay--a little isolated group, about to be deserted by friends andcrushed by enemies. The Chairman, in an agitated voice, openedproceedings by inviting questions. There was no response. A minute or soof tense pause ensued. Then Mr. Redmond rose, and in a perfectly evenvoice and his usual measured diction, stated that he was aware that hisproposal was repudiated by many of his usual followers; that the bishopswere against him, and some leading Nationalists, including Mr. Devlin;that, while he believed if he persisted he would have a majority, theresult would be to split his party, a thing he wished to avoid; and thathe had therefore decided not to proceed with his amendment, and underthese circumstances felt he could be of no further use to the Conventionin the matter. 

For a minute or two the assembly could not grasp the full significanceof what had happened. Then it broke upon them that this was the fall ofa notable leader, although they did not yet know that it was also theclose of a distinguished career. Mr. Redmond's demeanour throughoutwhat must have been a painful ordeal was beyond all praise. There wasnot a quiver in his voice, nor a hesitation for word or phrase. Hisself-possession and dignity and high-bred bearing won the respect andsympathy of the most strenuous of political opponents, even while theyrecognised that the defeat of the Nationalist leader meant relief frompressure on themselves. Mr. Redmond took no further part in the work ofthe Convention; his health was failing, and the members were startled bythe news of his death on the 6th of March. 

Not a single vote was taken in the Convention until the 12th of March, 1918, when it had been sitting for nearly seven months, and two dayslater the question which it had been summoned to consider, namely, therelation of Ulster to the rest of Ireland, was touched for the firsttime. The first clause in the Bishop of Raphoe's scheme, establishing aHome Rule constitution for all Ireland, having been carried with LordMidleton's help against the vote of the nineteen representatives ofUlster, the latter proposed an amendment for the exclusion of theProvince, and were, of course, defeated by the combined forces ofNationalism and Southern Unionism. 

Thus, on the only issue that really mattered, there was no such"substantial agreement" as the Government had postulated as essentialbefore legislation could be undertaken; and on the 5th of April theConvention came to an end without having achieved any useful result, except that it gave the Government a breathing space from the Irishquestion to get on with the war. 

It served, however, to bring prominently forward two of the Ulsterrepresentatives whose full worth had not till then been sufficientlyappreciated. Mr. H. M. Pollock had, it is true, been a valued adviser ofSir Edward Carson on questions touching the trade and commerce ofBelfast. But in the Convention he made more than one speech which provedhim to be a financier with a comprehensive grasp of principle, and anextensive knowledge of the history and the intricate details of thefinancial relations between Great Britain and Ireland. 

Lord Londonderry (the 7th Marquis), who during his father's lifetimehad represented an English constituency in the House of Commons andnaturally took no very prominent part in Ulster affairs, although hemade many excellent speeches on Home Rule both in Parliament and onEnglish platforms, and was Colonel of a regiment of U. V. F. , gave proofat once, on succeeding to the peerage in 1915, that he was desirous ofdoing everything in his power to fill his father's place in the UlsterMovement. He displayed the same readiness to subordinate personalconvenience, and other claims on his time and energy, to the cause soclosely associated historically with his family. But it was his work inthe Convention that first convinced Ulstermen of his capacity as well ashis zeal. Several of Lord Londonderry's speeches, and especially one inwhich he made an impromptu reply to Mr. Redmond, impressed theConvention with his debating power and his general ability; and it gavethe greatest satisfaction in Ulster when it was realised that the son ofthe leader whose loss they mourned so deeply was as able as he waswilling to carry on the hereditary tradition of service to the loyalistcause. 

In another respect, too, the Convention had an indirect influence on theposition in Ulster. When it appeared likely, in January 1918, that adeadlock would be reached in the Convention, the Prime Minister himselfintervened. A letter to the Chairman was drafted and discussed in theCabinet; but the policy which appeared to commend itself to hiscolleagues was one that Sir Edward Carson was unable to support, and heaccordingly resigned office on the 21st, and was accompanied intoretirement by Colonel Craig, the other Ulster member of the Ministry. Sir John Lonsdale, who for many years had been the very efficientHonorary Secretary and "Whip" of the Ulster Parliamentary Party, and itsleader while Carson was in office, had been raised to the peerage at theNew Year, with the title of Lord Armaghdale, so that the Ulsterleadership was vacant for Carson to resume when he left the Government, and he was formally re-elected to the position on the 28th of January. It was fortunate for Ulster that the old helmsman was again free totake his place at the wheel, for there was still some rough weatherahead. 

The official Report of the Convention which was issued on the 10th ofApril was one of the most extraordinary documents ever published in aGovernment Blue Book. [97] It consisted for the most part of a confusedbundle of separate Notes and Reports by a number of different groups andindividuals, and numerous appendices comprising a mass of miscellaneousmemoranda bristling with cross-references. The Chairman was restrictedto providing a bald narrative of the proceedings without any of theusual critical estimate of the general results attained; but he made upfor this by setting forth his personal opinions in a letter to the PrimeMinister, which, without the sanction of the Convention, he prefixed tothe Report. As it was no easy matter to gain any clear idea from theReport as to what the Convention had done, its proceedings while insession having been screened from publicity by drastic censorship of thePress, many people contented themselves with reading Sir HoracePlunkett's unauthorised letter to Mr. Lloyd George; and, as it was insome important respects gravely misleading, it is not surprising thatthe truth in regard to the Convention was never properly understood, andthe Ulster Unionist Council had solid justification for its resolutioncensuring the Chairman's conduct as "unprecedented and unconstitutional. "

In this personal letter, as was to be expected of a partisan of theNationalists, Sir Horace Plunkett laid stress on the fact that LordMidleton had "accepted self-government for Ireland "--by which wasmeant, of course, not self-government such as Ireland always enjoyedthrough her representation, and indeed over-representation, in theImperial Parliament, but through separate institutions. But if it hadnot been for this support of separate institutions by the SouthernUnionists there would not have been even a colourable pretext for theassertion of Sir Horace Plunkett that "a larger measure of agreement hasbeen reached upon the principles and details of Irish self-governmentthan has ever yet been attained. " The really surprising thing was howlittle agreement was displayed even among the Nationalists themselves, who on several important issues were nearly equally divided. 

It was soon seen how little the policy of Lord Midleton was approved bythose whom he was supposed to represent. Although it was exceedinglydifficult to obtain accurate information about what was going on in theConvention, enough became known in Dublin to cause serious misgiving toSouthern Unionists. The Council of the Irish Unionist Alliance, who hadnominated Lord Midleton as a delegate, asked him to confer with them onthe subject; but he refused. On the 4th of March, 1918, a "Call toUnionists, " a manifesto signed by twenty-four influential SouthernUnionists, appeared in the Press. A Southern Unionist Committee wasformed which before the end of May was able to publish the names of 350well-known men in all walks of life who were in accord with the "Call, "and to announce that the supporters of their protest against LordMidleton's proceedings numbered upwards of fourteen thousand, of whommore than two thousand were farmers in the South and West. 

This Committee then took steps to purge the Irish Unionist Alliance bymaking it more truly representative of Southern Unionist opinion. Aspecial meeting of the Council of the organisation on the 24th ofJanuary, 1919, brought on a general engagement between Lord Midleton andhis opponents. The general trend of opinion was disclosed when, afterthe defeat of a motion by Lord Midleton for excluding Ulster Unionistsfrom full membership of the Alliance, Sir Edward Carson was elected oneof its Presidents, and Lord Farnham was chosen Chairman of the ExecutiveCommittee. The Executive Committee was then entirely reconstituted, bythe rejection of every one of Lord Midleton's supporters; and the newbody issued a statement explaining the grounds of dissatisfaction withLord Midleton's action in the Convention, and declaring that he had"lost the confidence of the general body of Southern Unionists. "Thereupon Lord Midleton and a small aristocratic clique associated withhim seceded from the Alliance, and set up a little organisation of theirown. 

FOOTNOTES:

[96] _Report of the Proceedings of the Irish Convention_ (Cd. 9019), p. 10. 

[97] Cd. 9019. 

CHAPTER XXIII

NATIONALISTS AND CONSCRIPTION

While the Irish Convention was toilfully bringing to a close its eightmonths' career of futility, the British Empire was in the grip of themost terrible ordeal through which it has ever passed. On the 21st ofMarch, 1918, the assembled Irishmen in Dublin were discussing whether ornot proportional representation should form part of the hypotheticalconstitution of Ireland, and on the same day the Germans well-nighoverwhelmed the 5th Army at the opening of the great offensive campaignwhich threatened to break irretrievably the Allied line by the captureof Amiens. The world held its breath. Englishmen hardly dared to thinkof the fate that seemed impending over their country. Irishmen continuedcomplacently debating the paltry details of the Bishop of Raphoe'sclauses. Irishmen and Englishmen together were being killed or maimed byscores of thousands in a supreme effort to stay the advance of the Bocheto Paris and the sea. 

It happened that on the very day when the Report of the Convention waslaid on the table of the House of Commons, the Prime Minister made astatement of profound gravity, beginning with words such as the BritishParliament can never before have been compelled to hear from the lips ofthe head of the Government. For the moment, said Mr. Lloyd George, therewas a lull in the storm; but more attacks were to come, and--

 The "fate of the Empire, the fate of Europe, and the fate of liberty throughout the world may depend on the success with which the very last of these attacks is resisted and countered. "

Mr. Asquith struck the same note, urging the House--

 "With all the earnestness and with all the solemnity of which I am capable, to realise that never before in the experience of any man within these walls, or of his fathers and his forefathers, has this country and all the great traditions and ideals which are embodied in our history--never has this, the most splendid inheritance ever bequeathed to a people, been in greater peril, or in more need of united safeguarding than at this present time. "

Not Demosthenes himself, in his most impassioned appeal to theAthenians, more fitly matched moving words to urgent occasion than thesetwo statesmen in the simple, restrained sentences, in which they warnedthe Commons of the peril hanging over England. 

But was eloquent persuasion really required at such a moment to stillthe voice of faction in the British House of Commons? Let those whowould assume the negative study the official Parliamentary Report of thedebate on the 9th of April, 1918. They will find a record which no loyalIrishman will ever be able to read without a tingling sense of shame. The whole body of members, with one exception, listened to the PrimeMinister's grave words in silence touched with awe, feeling that perhapsthey were sitting there on the eve of the greatest tragedy in theircountry's history. The single exception was the Nationalist Party. Fromthose same benches whence arose nineteen years back the never-forgottencheers that greeted the tale of British disaster in South Africa, nowcame a shower of snarling interruptions that broke persistently into thePrime Minister's speech, and with angry menace impeded his unfolding ofthe Government's proposals for meeting the supreme ordeal of the war. 

What was the reason? It was because Ireland, the greater part of whichhad till now successfully shirked its share of privation and sacrifice, was at last to be asked to take up its corner of the burden. The needfor men to replace casualties at the front was pressing, urgent, imperative. Many indeed blamed the Government for having delayed toolong in filling the depleted ranks of our splendid armies in France; themoment had come when another day's delay would have been criminal. AsMr. Lloyd George pointed out, the battle that was being waged in frontof Amiens "proves that the enemy has definitely decided to seek amilitary decision this year, whatever the consequences to himself. " TheGermans had just called up a fresh class of recruits calculated to placemore than half a million of efficient young men in the line. Thecollapse of Russia had released the vast German armies of the East foruse against England and France. It was under such circumstances that thePrime Minister proposed

 "to submit to Parliament to-day certain recommendations in order to assist this country and the Allies to weather the storm. They will involve, " continued Mr. Lloyd George, "extreme sacrifices on the part of large classes of the population, and nothing would justify them but the most extreme necessity, and the fact that we are fighting for all that is essential and most sacred in the national life. "

The age limit for compulsory military service was to be raised fromforty-two to fifty, and Ireland was to be included under the newMilitary Service Bill now introduced. England, Scotland, and Wales hadcheerfully submitted to conscription when first enacted by Mr. Asquithin 1916, and to all the additional combings of industry and extension ofobligation that had been required in the past two years. Agriculture andother essential industries were being starved for want of labour, andmen had actually been brought back from the sorely pressed armies toproduce supplies imperatively needed at home. 

But from all this Ireland had hitherto been exempt. To escape the callof the country a man had only to prove that he was "ordinarily residentin Ireland"; for conscription did not cross the Irish Sea. From most ofthe privations cheerfully borne in Great Britain the Irishman had beenequally free. Food rationing did not trouble him, and, lest he should goshort of accustomed plenty, it was even forbidden to carry a parcel ofbutter across the Channel from Ireland. Horse-racing went on as usual. Emigration had been suspended during the war, so that Ireland wasunusually full of young men who, owing to the unwonted prosperity of thecountry resulting from war prices for its produce, were "having thetime of their lives. " Mr. Bonar Law, in the debates on the MilitaryService Bill, gave reasons for the calculation that there were not farshort of 400, 000 young men of military age, and of "Al" physique, inIreland available for the Army. 

No wonder that Mr. Lloyd George said it would be impossible to leavethis reservoir of man-power untouched when men of fifty, whose sons werealready with the colours, were to be called up in Great Britain! But thebare suggestion of doing such a thing raised a hurricane of angryvituperation and menace from the Nationalists in the House of Commons. When Mr. Lloyd George, in conciliatory accents, observed that he had nowish to raise unnecessary controversy, as Heaven knew they had troubleenough already, "You will get more of it, " shouted Mr. Flavin. "You willhave another battle front in Ireland, " interjected Mr. Byrne. Mr. Flavin, getting more and more excited, called out, with reference to themachinery for enrolment explained by the Prime Minister--"It will neverbegin. Ireland will not have it at any price"; and again, a momentlater, "You come across and try to take them. " Mr. Devlin was fully asfierce as these less prominent members of his party, and after manywrathful interruptions he turned aside the debate into a discussionabout a trumpery report of one of the sub-committees of the IrishConvention. 

It was truly a sad and shameful scene to be witnessed in the House ofCommons at such a moment. It would have been so even if the contentionof the Nationalists had been reasonably tenable. But it was not. Theymaintained that only an Irish Parliament had the right to enforceconscription in Ireland. But at the beginning of the war they hadaccepted the proviso that it should run its course before Home Rule cameinto operation. And even if it had been in operation, and a Parliamenthad been sitting in Dublin under Mr. Asquith's Act, which theNationalists had accepted as a settlement of their demands, thatParliament would have had nothing to do with the raising of militaryforces by conscription or otherwise, this being a duty reserved, as inevery federal or quasi-federal constitution, for the centrallegislative authority alone. 

But it was useless to point this out to the infuriated Nationalistmembers. Mr. William O'Brien denounced the idea of compelling Irishmento bear the same burden as their British fellow-subjects as "adeclaration of war against Ireland"; and he and Mr. Healy joined Mr. Dillon and his followers in opposing with all their parliamentary skill, and all their voting power, the extension to Ireland of compulsoryservice. Mr. Healy, whose vindictive memory had not forgotten theCurragh Incident before the war, could not forbear from having anungenerous fling at General Gough, who had just been driven back by theoverwhelming numerical superiority of the German attack, and who, at themoment when Mr. Healy was taunting him in the House of Commons, wasre-forming his gallant 5th Army to resist the enemy's further advance. 

In comparison with this Mr. Healy's stale gibe at "Carson's Army, "however inappropriate to the occasion, was a venial offence. Carsonhimself replied in a gentle and conciliatory tone to Mr. Healy's coarsediatribe. 

 "My honourable friend, " he said, "talked of Carson's Army. You may, if you like, call it with contempt Carson's Army. But it has just gone into action for the fourth time, and many of them have paid the supreme sacrifice. They have covered themselves with glory, and, what is more, they have covered Ireland with glory, and they have left behind sad homes throughout the small hamlets of Ulster, as I well know, losing three or four sons in many a home. "

On behalf of Ulster Carson gave unhesitating support to the Government. He and his colleagues from Ulster had always voted against the exemptionof Ireland from the Military Service Acts. It was true, no doubt, as theNationalists jeeringly maintained, that conscription was no more desiredin Ulster than in any other part of the United Kingdom. Of course it wasnot; it was liked nowhere. But Carson declared that "equality ofsacrifice" was the principle to be acted upon, and Ulster accepted it. He "would go about hanging his head in shame, " if his own part of theUnited Kingdom were absolved from sacrifice which the national necessityimposed on the inhabitants of Great Britain. 

The Bill was carried through by the 16th of April in the teeth ofNationalist opposition maintained through all its stages. Mr. Bonar Lawannounced emphatically that the Government intended to enforce thecompulsory powers in Ireland; but he also said that yet another attemptwas to be made to settle the constitutional question by bringing in "atan early date" a measure of Home Rule which the Government hoped mightbe carried at once and "without violent controversy. "

After the experience of the past this seemed an amazingly sanguineestimate of the prospects of any proposals that ingenuity could devise. But what the nature of the measure was to have been was never madeknown; for the Bill was still in the hands of a drafting committee whena dangerous German intrigue in Ireland was discovered; and theLord-Lieutenant made a proclamation on the 18th of May announcing thatthe Government had information "that certain of the King's subjects inIreland had entered into a treasonable communication with the Germanenemy, and that strict measures must be taken to put down this Germanplot. "[98] On the same day one hundred and fifty Sinn Feiners werearrested, including Mr. De Valera and Mr. Arthur Griffith, and on the25th a statement was published indicating the connection between thisconspiracy and Casement's designs in 1916. The Government had definitelyascertained some weeks earlier, and must have known at the very timewhen they were promising a new Home Rule Bill, that a plan for landingarms in Ireland was ripe for execution. [99] Indeed, on the 12th of Aprila German agent who had landed in Ireland was arrested, with papers inhis possession showing that De Valera had worked out a detailedorganisation of the rebel army, and expected to be in a position tomuster half a million of trained men. [100]

Such was the fruit of the Government's infatuation which, under thedelusion of "creating an atmosphere of good-will" for the Convention, had released a few months previously a number of dangerous men who hadbeen proved to be in league with the Germans, and who now took advantageof this clemency to conspire afresh with the foreign enemy. It was notsurprising that Mr. Bonar Law said it was impossible for the Government, under these circumstances, to proceed with their proposals for a newHome Rule Bill. 

On the other hand, no sooner was the Military Service Act on theStatute-book than the Government began to recede from Mr. Bonar Law'sdeclaration that they would at all costs enforce it in Ireland. Theyintimated that if voluntary recruiting improved it might be possible todispense with compulsion. But although Mr. Shortt--who succeeded Mr. Duke as Chief Secretary in May, at the same time as Lord Wimborne wasreplaced in the Lord-Lieutenancy by Field-Marshal Lord French--complainedon the 29th of July that the Nationalists had given no help to theGovernment in obtaining voluntary recruits in Ireland, and, "instead oftaking Sinn Fein by the throat, had tried to go one better, "[101] thecompulsory powers of the Military Service Act remained a dead letter. 

The fact was that the Nationalists had followed up their fierceopposition to the Bill by raising a still more fierce agitation inIreland against conscription. In this they joined hands with Sinn Fein, and the whole weight of the Catholic Church was thrown into the samescale. From the altars of that Church the thunderbolts of ecclesiasticalanathema were loosed against the Government, and--what was moreeffective--against any who should obey the call to arms. The Governmentgave way before the violence of the storm, and the lesson to be learntfrom their defeat was not thrown away on the rebel party in Ireland. There was, naturally, widespread indignation in England at the spectacleof the youth of Ireland taking its ease at home and earningextravagantly high war-time wages while middle-aged bread-winners inEngland were compulsorily called to the colours; but the marvellouslyeasy-going disposition of Englishmen submitted to the injustice with nomore than a legitimate grumble. 

In June 1918, while this agitation against conscription was at itsheight, the hostility of the Nationalists took a new turn. A manifesto, intended as a justification of their resistance to conscription, wasissued in the form of a letter to Mr. Wilson, President of the UnitedStates, signed by Mr. Dillon, Mr. Devlin, Mr. William O'Brien, Mr. Healy, the Lord Mayor of Dublin, and some others, including leaders ofSinn Fein. It was a remarkable document, the authorship of which waspopularly attributed to Mr. T. M. Healy. If it ever came under the eye ofMr. Wilson, a man of literary taste and judgment, it must have affordedhim a momentary diversion from the cares of his exalted office. A longerexperience than his of diplomatic correspondence would fail to producefrom the pigeon-holes of all the Chanceries a rival to thisextraordinary composition, the ill-arranged paragraphs of which formedan inextricable jumble of irrelevant material, in which bad logic, badhistory, and barren invective were confusedly intermingled in a torrentof turgid rhetoric. The extent of its range may be judged from the factthat Shakespeare's allusions to Joan of Arc were not deemed too remotefrom the subject of conscription in Ireland during the Great War to finda place in this amazing despatch. For the amusement of anyone who maycare to examine so rare a curiosity of English prose, it will be foundin full in the Appendix to this volume, where it may be compared by wayof contrast with the restrained rejoinder sent also to President Wilsonby Sir Edward Carson, the Lord Mayor of Belfast, the Mayor of Derry, andseveral loyalist representatives of Labour in Ulster. 

In the Nationalist letter to President Wilson reference was made morethan once to the sympathy that prevailed in Ireland in the eighteenthcentury with the American colonists in the War of Independence. The usemade of it was a good example of the way in which a half-truth may, forargumentative purposes, be more misleading than a complete falsehood. "To-day, as in the days of George Washington"--so Mr. Wilson wasinformed--"nearly half the American forces have been furnished from thedescendants of our banished race. " No mention was made of the fact thatthe members of the "banished race" in Washington's army werePresbyterian emigrants from Ulster, who formed almost the entirepopulation of great districts in the American Colonies at thattime. [102] The late Mr. Whitelaw Reid told an Edinburgh audience in 1911that more than half the Presbyterian population of Ulster emigrated toAmerica between 1730 and 1770, and that at the date of the Revolutionthey made more than one-sixth of the population of the Colonies. TheDeclaration of Independence itself, he added--

 "Is sacredly preserved in the handwriting of an Ulsterman, who was Secretary of Congress. It was publicly read by an Ulsterman, and first printed by another. Washington's first Cabinet had four members, of whom one was an Ulsterman. "[103]

It is, of course, true that not all Ulster Presbyterians of that periodwere the firm and loyal friends of Great Britain that their descendantsbecame after a century's experience of the legislative Union. But it isthe latter who best in Ireland can trace kinship with the founders ofthe United States, and who are entitled--if any Irishmen are--to base onthat kinship a claim to the sympathy and support of the American people. 

FOOTNOTES:

[98] _Annual Register_, 1918, p, 87. 

[99] Ibid. , p. 88

[100] Ibid. 

[101] _Annual Register_, 1918, p. 90. 

[102] See Lecky's _History of England in the Eighteenth Century_, vol. Iv, p. 430. 

[103] See Lecture to the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution by WhitelawReid, reported in _The Scotsman_, November 2nd, 1911. 

CHAPTER XXIV

THE ULSTER PARLIAMENT

ON the 25th of November, 1918, the Parliament elected in December 1910was at last dissolved, a few days after the Armistice with Germany. Thenew House of Commons was very different from the old. Seventy-two SinnFein members were returned from Ireland, sweeping away all but half adozen of the old Nationalist party; but, in accordance with their fixedpolicy, the Sinn Fein members never presented themselves at Westminsterto take the oath and their seats. That quarter of the House of Commonswhich for thirty years had been packed with the most fierce anddisciplined of the political parties was therefore now given over tomild supporters of the Coalition Government, the only remnant ofso-called "constitutional Nationalism" being Mr. T. P. O'Connor, Mr. Devlin, Captain Redmond, and two or three less prominent companions, whosurvived like monuments of a bygone age. 

Ulster Unionists, on the other hand, were greatly strengthened by therecent Redistribution Act. Sir Edward Carson was elected member for thegreat working-class constituency of the Duncairn Division of Belfast, instead of for Dublin University, which he had so long represented, andtwenty-two ardent supporters accompanied him from Ulster to Westminster. In the reconstruction of the Government which followed the election, Carson was pressed to return to office, but declined. Colonel JamesCraig, whose war services in connection with the Ulster Division wererewarded by a baronetcy, became Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministryof Pensions, and the Marquis of Londonderry accepted office asParliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Air Ministry. 

Although the termination of hostilities by the Armistice was not in thelegal sense the "end of the war, " it brought it within sight. No one inJanuary 1919 dreamt that the process of making peace and ratifying thenecessary treaties would drag on for a seemingly interminable length oftime, and it was realised, with grave misgiving in Ulster, that the HomeRule Act of 1914 would necessarily come into force as soon as peace wasfinally declared, while as yet nothing had been done to redeem thepromise of an Amending Bill given by Mr. Asquith, and reiterated by Mr. Lloyd George. The compact between the latter and the Unionist Party, onwhich the Coalition had swept the country, had made it clear that freshIrish legislation was to be expected, and the general lines on which itwould be based were laid down; but there was also an intimation that asettlement must wait till the condition of Ireland should warrantit. [104]

The state of Ireland was certainly not such as to make it appearprobable that any sane Government would take the risk of handing overcontrol of the country immediately to the Sinn Feiners, whom the recentelections had proved to be in an overwhelming majority in the threesouthern provinces. By the law, not of England alone, but of everycivilised State, that party was tainted through and through with hightreason. It had attempted to "succour the King's enemies" in every wayin its power. The Government had in its possession evidence of twoconspiracies, in which, during the late frightful war, these Irishmenhad been in league with the Germans to bring defeat and disaster uponEngland and her Allies, and the second of these plots was only madepossible by the misconceived clemency of the Government in releasingfrom custody the ring-leaders in the first. 

And these Sinn Fein rebels left the Government no excuse for anyillusion as to their being either chastened or contrite in spirit. Contemptuously ignoring their election as members of the ImperialParliament, where they never put in an appearance because it wouldrequire them to take an oath of allegiance to the Crown, they openlyheld a Congress in Dublin in January 1919 where a Declaration ofIndependence was read, and a demand made for the evacuation of Irelandby the forces of the Crown. A "Ministry" was also appointed, whichpurported to make itself responsible for administration in Ireland. Outrages of a daring character became more and more frequent, and gaveevidence of being the work of efficient organisation. 

President Wilson's coinage of the unfortunate and ambiguous expression"self-determination" made it a catch-penny cry in relation to Ireland;but, in reply to Mr. Devlin's demand for a recognition of that"principle, " Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that it had been tried in theConvention, with the result that both Nationalists and Unionists hadbeen divided among themselves, and he said he despaired of anysettlement in Ireland until Irishmen could agree. Nevertheless, inOctober 1919 he appointed a Cabinet Committee, with Mr. Walter Long asChairman, to make recommendations for dealing with the question of IrishGovernment. 

But murders of soldiers and police had now become so scandalouslyfrequent that in November a Proclamation was issued suppressing SinnFein and kindred organisations. It did nothing to improve the state ofthe country, which grew worse than ever in the last few weeks of theyear. On the 19th of December a carefully planned attempt on the life ofthe Lord-Lieutenant, Lord French, proved how complete was the impunityrelied upon by the organised assassins who, calling themselves an IrishRepublican Army, terrorised the country. 

It was in such conditions that, just before the close of theparliamentary session, the Prime Minister disclosed the intentions ofthe Government. He laid down three "basic facts, " which he said governedthe situation: (1) Three-fourths of the Irish people were bitterlyhostile, and were at heart rebels against the Crown and Government. (2)Ulster was a complete contrast, which would make it an outrage to placeher people under the rest of Ireland. [105] (3) No separation from theEmpire could be tolerated, and any attempt to force it would be foughtas the United States had fought against secession. On theseconsiderations he based the proposals which were to be embodied inlegislation in the next session. Sir Edward Carson, who in the light ofpast experience was too wary to take all Mr. Lloyd George's declarationsat their face value, said at once that he could give no support to thepolicy outlined by the Prime Minister until he was convinced that thelatter intended to go through with it to the end. 

The Bill to give effect to these proposals (which became the Governmentof Ireland Act, 1920) was formally introduced on the 25th of February, 1920, and Carson then went over to Belfast to consult with the UnionistCouncil as to the action to be taken by the Ulster members. 

The measure was a long and complicated one of seventy clauses and sixschedules. Its effect, stated briefly, was to set up two Parliaments inIreland, one for the six Protestant counties of Ulster and the other forthe rest of Ireland. In principle it was the "clean cut" which had beenseveral times proposed, except that, instead of retaining Ulster inlegislative union with Great Britain, she was to be endowed with localinstitutions of her own in every respect similar to, and commensuratewith, those given to the Parliament in Dublin. In addition, a Council ofIreland was created, composed of an equal number of members from each ofthe two legislatures. This Council was given powers in regard to privatebill legislation, and matters of minor importance affecting both partsof the island which the two Parliaments might mutually agree to committo its administration. Power was given to the two Parliaments toestablish by identical Acts at any time a Parliament for all Ireland tosupersede the Council, and to form a single autonomous constitution forthe whole of Ireland. 

The Council of Ireland occupied a prominent place in the debates on theBill. It was held up as a symbol of the "unity of Ireland, " and theauthors of the measure were able to point to it as supplying machineryby which "partition" could be terminated as soon as Irishmen agreedamong themselves in wishing to have a single national Government. It wasnot a feature of the Bill that found favour in Ulster; but, as it coulddo no harm and provided an argument against those who denounced"partition, " the Ulster members did not think it worth while to opposeit. 

But when Carson met the Ulster Unionist Council on the 6th of March themost difficult point he had to deal with was the same that had given somuch trouble in the negotiations of 1916. The Bill defined the areasubject to the "Parliament of Northern Ireland" as the six countieswhich the Ulster Council had agreed four years earlier to accept as thearea to be excluded from the Home Rule Act. The question now to bedecided was whether this same area should still be accepted, or anamendment moved for including in Northern Ireland the other threecounties of the Province of Ulster. The same harrowing experience whichthe Council had undergone in 1916 was repeated in an aggravatedform. [106] To separate themselves from fellow loyalists in Monaghan, Cavan, and Donegal was hateful to every delegate from the other sixcounties, and it was heartrending to be compelled to resist anothermoving appeal by so valued a friend as Lord Farnham. But the inexorableindex of statistics demonstrated that, although Unionists were in amajority when geographical Ulster was considered as a unit, yet thedistribution of population made it certain that a separate Parliamentfor the whole Province would have a precarious existence, while itsadministration of purely Nationalist districts would mean unendingconflict. 

It was, therefore, decided that no proposal for extending the areashould be made by the Ulster members. Carson made it clear in thedebates on the Bill that Ulster had not moved from her old position ofdesiring nothing except the Union; that he was still convinced there was"no alternative to the Union unless separation"; but that, while hewould take no responsibility for a Bill which Ulster did not want, heand his colleagues would not actively oppose its progress to theStatute-book. 

It did not, however, receive the Royal Assent until two days beforeChristmas, and during all these months the condition of Ireland was oneof increasing anarchy. The Act provided that, if the people of SouthernIreland refused to work the new Constitution, the administration shouldbe carried on by a system similar to Crown Colony government. Carsongave an assurance that in Ulster they would do their best to make theAct a success, and immediate steps were taken in Belfast to make goodthis undertaking. 

To the people of Ulster the Act of 1920, though it involved thesacrifice of much that they had ardently hoped to preserve, came as arelief to their worst fears. It was represented as a final settlement, and finality was what they chiefly desired, if they could get it withoutbeing forced to submit to a Dublin Parliament. The disloyal conduct ofNationalist Ireland during the war, and the treason and terrorismorganised by Sinn Fein after the war, had widened the already broad gulfbetween North and South. The determination never to submit to anall-Ireland Parliament was more firmly fixed than ever. The Act of 1920, which repealed Mr. Asquith's Act of 1914, gave Ulster what she hadprepared to fight for, if necessary, before the war. It was thefulfilment of the Craigavon resolution--to take over the government "ofthose districts which they could control. "[107] The Parliament ofNorthern Ireland established by the Act was in fact the legalisation ofthe Ulster Provisional Government of 1913. It placed Ulster in aposition of equality with the South, both politically and economically. The two Legislatures in Ireland possessed the same powers, and weresubject to an equal reservation of authority to the Imperial Parliament. 

But with the passing of the Act the long and consummate leadership ofSir Edward Carson came to an end. If he had not succeeded in bringingthe Ulster people into a Promised Land, he had at least conducted anorderly retreat to a position of safety. The almost miraculous skillwith which he had directed all the operations of a protracted andharassing campaign, avoiding traps and pitfalls at every step, foreseeing and providing against countless crises, frustrating withunfailing adroitness the manoeuvres both of implacable enemies andtreacherous "friends, " was fully appreciated by his grateful followers, who had for years past regarded him with an intensity of personaldevotion seldom given even to the greatest of political leaders. But hefelt that the task of opening a new chapter in the history of Ulster, and of inaugurating the new institutions now established, was work foryounger hands. Hard as he was pressed to accept the position of firstPrime Minister of Ulster, he firmly persisted in his refusal; and on hisrecommendation the man who had been his able and faithful lieutenantthroughout the long Ulster Movement was unanimously chosen to succeedhim in the leadership. 

Sir James Craig did not hesitate to respond to the call, although to doso he had to resign an important post in the British Government, that ofParliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, with excellent prospects offurther promotion. As soon as the elections in "Northern Ireland, "conducted under the system of Proportional Representation, as providedby the Act of 1920, were complete, Sir James, whose followers numberedforty as against a Nationalist and Sinn Fein minority of twelve, wassent for by the Viceroy and commissioned to form a Ministry. Heimmediately set himself to his new and exceedingly difficult duties withcharacteristic thoroughness. The whole apparatus of governmentadministration had to be built up from the foundation. Departments, forwhich there was no existing office accommodation or personnel, had tobe called into existence and efficiently organised, and all thispreliminary work had to be undertaken at a time when the territorysubject to the new Government was beset by open and concealed enemiesworking havoc with bombs and revolvers, with which the Government hadnot yet legal power to cope. 

But Sir James Craig pressed on with the work, undismayed by thedifficulties, and resolved that the Parliament in Belfast should beopened at the earliest possible date. The Marquis of Londonderry gave afresh proof of his Ulster patriotism by resigning his office in theImperial Government and accepting the portfolio of Education in SirJames Craig's Cabinet, and with it the leadership of the Ulster Senate;in which the Duke of Abercorn also, to the great satisfaction of theUlster people, consented to take a seat. Mr. Dawson Bates, theindefatigable Secretary of the Ulster Unionist Council during the wholeof the Ulster Movement, was appointed Minister for Home Affairs, and Mr. E. M. Archdale became Minister for Agriculture. The first act of theHouse of Commons of Northern Ireland was to choose Major Hugh O'Neill astheir Speaker, while the important position of Chairman of Committeeswas entrusted to Mr. Thomas Moles, one of the ablest recruits of theUlster Parliamentary Party, whom the General Election of 1918 had sentto Westminster as one of the members for Belfast, and who had givenample evidence of his capacity both in the Imperial Parliament and onthe Secretarial Staff of the Irish Convention of 1917. 

Meantime, in the South the Act of 1920 was treated with absolutecontempt; no step was taken to hold elections or to form anAdministration, although it must be remembered that the flouted Actconferred a larger measure of Home Rule than had ever been offered byprevious Bills. Thus by one of those curious ironies that havecontinually marked the history of Ireland, the only part of the islandwhere Home Rule operated was the part that had never desired it, whilethe provinces that had demanded Home Rule for generations refused to useit when it was granted them. 

In Ulster the new order of things was accepted with acquiescence ratherthan with enthusiasm. But the warmer emotion was immediately calledforth when it became known that His Majesty the King had decided to openthe Ulster Parliament in person on the 22nd of June, 1921, especially asit was fully realised that, owing to the anarchical condition of thecountry, the King's presence in Belfast would be a characteristicdisregard of personal danger in the discharge of public duty. And when, on the eve of the royal visit, it was intimated that the Queen had beengraciously pleased to accede to Sir James Craig's request that sheshould accompany the King to Belfast, the enthusiasm of the loyal peopleof the North rose to fever heat. 

At any time, and under any circumstances, the reigning Sovereign andhis Consort would have been received by a population so noted for itssentiment of loyalty to the Throne as that of Ulster with demonstrationsof devotion exceeding the ordinary. But the present occasion was felt tohave a very special significance. The opening of Parliament by the Kingin State is one of the most ancient and splendid of ceremonial pageantsillustrating the history of British institutions. It was felt in Ulsterthat the association of this time-honoured ceremonial with the baptism, so to speak, of the latest offspring of the Mother of Parliamentsstamped the Royal Seal upon the achievement of Ulster, and gave it adignity, prestige, and promise of permanence which might otherwise havebeen lacking. No city in the United Kingdom had witnessed so manyextraordinary displays of popular enthusiasm in the last ten years asBelfast, some of which had left on the minds of observers a firm beliefthat such intensity of emotion in a great concourse of people could notbe exceeded. The scene in the streets when the King and Queen drove fromthe quay, on the arrival of the royal yacht, to the City Hall, was heldby general consent to equal, since it could not surpass, any of thosegreat demonstrations of the past in popular fervour. At any rate, persons of long experience in attendance on the Royal Family gave it astheir opinion in the evening that they had never before seen soimpressive a display of public devotion to the person of the Sovereign. 

Two buildings in Belfast inseparably associated with Ulster's stand forunion, the City Hall and the Ulster Hall, were the scenes of the chiefevents of the King's visit. The former, described by one of the Englishcorrespondents as "easily the most magnificent municipal building in thethree Kingdoms, "[108] was placed at the disposal of the UlsterGovernment by the Corporation for temporary use as a Parliament House. The Council Chamber, a fine hall of dignified proportions with a daisand canopied chair at the upper end, made an appropriate frame for theceremony of opening Parliament, and the arrangements both of theChamber itself and of the approaches and entrances to it made it asimple matter to model the procedure as closely as possible on thatfollowed at Westminster. 

Among the many distinguished people who assembled in the Ulster Capitalfor the occasion, there was one notable absentee. Lord Carson ofDuncairn--for this was the title that Sir Edward Carson had assumed onbeing appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary a few weeks previously--wasdetained in London by judicial duty in the House of Lords; and possiblyreasons of delicacy not difficult to understand restrained him frommaking arrangements for absence. But the marked ovation given to LadyCarson wherever she was recognised in the streets of Belfast showed thatthe great leader was not absent from the popular mind at this moment ofvindication of his statesmanship. 

Such an event as that which brought His Majesty to Belfast was naturallyan occasion for bestowing marks of distinction for public service. SirJames Craig wisely made it also an occasion for letting bygones bebygones by recommending Lord Pirrie for a step in the Peerage. Amongthose who received honours were several whose names have appeared in thepreceding chapters of this book. Mr. William Robert Young, for thirtyyears one of the most indefatigable workers for the Unionist cause inUlster, and Colonel Wallace, one of the most influential of Carson'slocal lieutenants, were made Privy Councillors, as was also ColonelPercival-Maxwell, who raised and commanded a battalion of the UlsterDivision in the war. Colonel F. H. Crawford and Colonel Spender wereawarded the C. B. E. For services to the nation during the war; butUlstermen did not forget services of another sort to the Ulster causebefore the Germans came on the scene. [109] A knighthood was given to Mr. Dawson Bates, who had exchanged the Secretaryship of the Ulster UnionistCouncil for the portfolio of a Cabinet Minister. 

These honours were bestowed by the King in person at an investiture heldin the Ulster Hall in the afternoon. There must have been many presentwhose minds went back to some of the most stirring events of Ulster'sdomestic history which had been transacted in the same building withinrecent years. Did Sir Hamar Greenwood, the Chief Secretary, as he stoodin attendance on the Sovereign in the resplendent uniform of a PrivyCouncillor, look in curiosity round the walls which he and Mr. Churchillhad been prohibited from entering on a memorable occasion when they hadto content themselves with an imported tent in a football field instead?Did Colonel Wallace's thoughts wander back to the scene of wildenthusiasm in that hall on the evening before the Covenant, when hepresented the ancient Boyne flag to the Ulster leader? Did those whospontaneously started the National Anthem in the presence of the Kingwithout warrant from the prearranged programme, and made the Queen smileat the emphasis with which they "confounded politics" and "frustratedknavish tricks, " remember the fervour with which on many a past occasionthe same strains testified to Ulster's loyalty in the midst ofperplexity and apprehension? If these memories crowded in, they musthave added to the sense of relief arising from the conviction that theceremony they were now witnessing was the realisation of the policypropounded by Carson, when he declared that Ulster must always be ruledeither by the Imperial Parliament or by a Government of her own. 

But the moment of all others on that memorable day that must have beensuggestive of such reflections was when the King formally opened thefirst Parliament of Northern Ireland in the same building that hadwitnessed the signing of the Ulster Covenant. Without the earlier eventthe later could not have been. If 1921 could have been fully foreseen in1912 it might have appeared to many Covenanters as the disappointment ofa cherished ideal. But those who lived to listen to the King's Speech inthe City Hall realised that it was the dissipation of foreboding. However regarded, it was, as King George himself pronounced, "aprofoundly moving occasion in Irish history. "

The Speech from the Throne in which these words occurred made a deepimpression all over the world, and nowhere more than in Ulster itself. No people more ardently shared the touchingly expressed desire of theKing that his coming to Ireland might "prove to be the first steptowards an end of strife amongst her people, whatever their race orcreed. " So, too, when His Majesty told the Ulster Parliament that he"felt assured they would do their utmost to make it an instrument ofhappiness and good government for all parts of the community which theyrepresented, " the Ulster people believed that the King's confidence inthem would not prove to have been misplaced. 

Happily, no prophetic vision of those things that were shortly to cometo pass broke in to disturb the sense of satisfaction with the haventhat had been reached. The future, with its treachery, its alarms, itsfresh causes of uncertainty and of conflict, was mercifully hidden fromthe eyes of the Ulster people when they acclaimed the inauguration oftheir Parliament by their King. They accepted responsibility for theefficient working of institutions thus placed in their keeping by thehighest constitutional Authority in the British Empire, although theyhad never asked for them, and still believed that the system they hadbeen driven to abandon was better than the new; and they opened thisfresh chapter in their history in firm faith that what had received sostriking a token of the Sovereign's sympathy and approval would never betaken from them except with their own consent. 

FOOTNOTES:

[104] See Letter from Mr. Lloyd George to Mr. Bonar Law, published inthe Press on November 18th, 1918. 

[105] Precisely twenty-four months later this outrage was committed byMr. Lloyd George himself, with the concurrence of Mr. AustenChamberlain. 

[106] _Ante_, p. 248. 

[107] See _ante_, p. 51. 

[108] _The Morning Post_, June 23rd, 1921. 

[109] See _ante_, Chapter XVIII. 

APPENDIX A

NATIONALIST LETTER TO PRESIDENT WILSON

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SIR, When, a century and a half ago, the American Colonies dared to assertthe ancient principle that the subject should not be taxed without theconsent of his representatives, England strove to crush them. To-dayEngland threatens to crush the people of Ireland if they do not accept atax, not in money but in blood, against the protest of theirrepresentatives. 

During the American Revolution the champions of your liberties appealedto the Irish Parliament against British aggression, and asked for asympathetic judgment on their action. What the verdict was, historyrecords. 

To-day it is our turn to appeal to the people of America. We seek nomore fitting prelude to that appeal than the terms in which yourforefathers greeted ours:

 "We are desirous of possessing the good opinion of the virtuous and humane. We are peculiarly desirous of furnishing you with the true state of our motives and objects, the better to enable you to judge of our conduct with accuracy, and determine the merits of the controversy with impartiality and precision. "

If the Irish race had been conscriptable by England in the war againstthe United Colonies is it certain that your Republic would to-dayflourish in the enjoyment of its noble Constitution?

Since then the Irish Parliament has been destroyed, by methods describedby the greatest of British statesmen as those of "black-guardism andbaseness. " Ireland, deprived of its protection and overborne by morethan six to one in the British Lower House, and by more than a hundredto one in the Upper House, is summoned by England to submit to ahitherto-unheard-of decree against her liberties. 

In the fourth year of a war ostensibly begun for the defence of smallnations, a law conscribing the manhood of Ireland has been passed, indefiance of the wishes of our people. The British Parliament, whichenacted it, had long outrun its course, being in the eighth year of anexistence constitutionally limited to five. To warrant the coercivestatute, no recourse was had to the electorate of Britain, much less tothat of Ireland. Yet the measure was forced through within a week, despite the votes of Irish representatives, and under a system ofclosure never applied to the debates which established conscription forGreat Britain on a milder basis. 

To repel the calumnies invented to becloud our action, we venture toaddress the successors of the belligerents who once appealed to Ireland. The feelings which inspire America deeply concern our race; so, in theforefront of our remonstrance, we feel bound to set forth that thisConscription Act involves for Irishmen questions far larger than anyaffecting mere internal politics. They raise a sovereign principlebetween a nation that has never abandoned her independent rights, and anadjacent nation that has persistently sought to strangle them. 

Were Ireland to surrender that principle, she must submit to a usurpedpower, condone the fraudulent prostration of her Parliament in 1800, andabandon all claim to distinct nationality. Deep-seated and far-reachingare the problems remorselessly aroused by the unthinking and violentcourses taken at Westminster. 

Thus the sudden and unlooked-for departure of British politicians fromtheir past military procedure towards this island provokes acutely thefundamental issue of Self-determination. That issue will decide whetherour whole economic, social, and political life must lie at theuncontrolled disposition of another race whose title to legislate for usrests on force and fraud alone. 

Ireland is a nation more ancient than England, and is one of the oldestin Christendom. Its geographical boundaries are clearly defined. Itcherishes its own traditions, history, language, music, and culture. Itthrobs with a national consciousness sharpened not only by religiouspersecution, but by the violation of its territorial, juristic, andlegislative rights. The authority of which its invaders boasted restssolely on an alleged Papal Bull. The symbols of attempted conquest areroofless castles, ruined abbeys, and confiscated cathedrals. 

The title of King of Ireland was first conferred on the English monarchby a statute of the Parliament held in Ireland in 1542, when only fourof our counties lay under English sway. That title originated in noEnglish enactment. Neither did the Irish Parliament so originate. Everymilitary aid granted by that Parliament to English kings was purelyvoluntary. Even when the Penal Code denied representation to themajority of the Irish population, military service was never enforcedagainst them. 

For generations England claimed control over both legislative andjudicial functions in Ireland, but in 1783 these pretensions werealtogether renounced, and the sovereignty of the Irish Legislature wassolemnly recognised. A memorable British statute declared it--

 "Established and ascertained for ever, and shall at no time hereafter be questioned or questionable. "

For this, the spirit evoked by the successful revolt of the UnitedStates of America is to be thanked, and Ireland won no mean return forthe sympathy invited by your Congress. Yet scarcely had George IIIsignified his Royal Assent to that "scrap of paper, " when his Ministersbegan to debauch the Irish Parliament. No Catholic had, for over acentury, been allowed to sit within its walls; and only a handful of thepopulation enjoyed the franchise. In 1800, by shameless bribery, amajority of corrupt Colonists was procured to embrace the Londonsubjugation and vote away the existence of their Legislature forpensions, pelf, and titles. 

The authors of the Act of Union, however, sought to soften its shacklesby limiting the future jurisdiction of the British Parliament. Imposedon "a reluctant and protesting nation, " it was tempered by articlesguaranteeing Ireland against the coarser and more obvious forms ofinjustice. To guard against undue taxation, "exemptions and abatements"were stipulated for; but the "predominant partner" has long sincedishonoured that part of the contract, and the weaker side has no powerto enforce it. No military burdens were provided for, although Britainframed the terms of the treaty to her own liking. That an obligation toyield enforced service was thereby undertaken has never hitherto beenasserted. We therefore cannot neglect to support this protest by citinga main proviso of the Treaty of Union. Before the destruction of theIrish Parliament no standing army or navy was raised, nor was anycontribution made, except by way of gift, to the British Army or Navy. No Irish law for the levying of drafts existed; and such a proposal wasdeemed unconstitutional. Hence the 8th Article of the Treaty providesthat--

 "All laws in force at the time of the Union shall remain as now by law established, subject only to such alterations and regulations from time to time as circumstances may appear to the Parliament of the United Kingdom to require. "

Where there was no law establishing military service for Ireland, what"alteration or regulation" respecting such a law can legally bind? Canan enactment such as Conscription, affecting the legal and moral rightsof an entire people, be described as an "alteration" or "regulation"springing from a pre-existing law? Is the Treaty to be construed asBritain pleases, and always to the prejudice of the weaker side?

British military statecraft has hitherto rigidly held by a separatetradition for Ireland. The Territorial military system, created in 1907for Great Britain, was not set up in Ireland. The Irish Militia was thenactually disbanded, and the War Office insisted that no Territorialforce to replace it should be embodied. Stranger still, the VolunteerActs (Naval or Military) from 1804 to 1900 (some twenty in all) werenever extended to Ireland. In 1880, when a Conservative House of Commonsagreed to tolerate volunteering, the measure was thrown out by the Houseof Lords on the plea that Irishmen must not be allowed to learn the useof arms. 

For, despite the Bill of Rights, the privilege of free citizens to beararms in self-defence has been refused to us. The Constitution of Americaaffirms that right as appertaining to the common people, but the men ofIreland are forbidden to bear arms in their own defence. Where, then, lies the basis of the claim that they can be forced to take them up forthe defence of others?

It will suffice to present such considerations in outline withoutdisinterring the details of the past misgovernment of our country. Mr. Gladstone avowed that these were marked by "every horror and every shamethat could disgrace the relations between a strong country and a weakone. " After an orgy of Martial Law the Scottish General, Abercromby, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, wrote: "Every crime, every cruelty thatcould be committed by Cossacks or Calmucks has been transacted here.... The abuses of all kinds I found can scarcely be believed or enumerated. "Lord Holland recalls that many people "were sold at so much a head tothe Prussians. "

We shall, therefore, pass by the story of the destruction of ourmanufactures, of artificial famines, of the fomentation of uprisings, ofa hundred Coercion Acts, culminating in the perpetual "Act ofRepression" obtained by forgery, which graced Queen Victoria's JubileeYear in 1887. In our island the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, therepression of free speech, gibbetings, shootings, and bayonetings, arecommonplace events. The effects of forced emigration and famine Americangenerosity has softened; and we do not seek a verdict on the generalmerits of a system which enjoys the commendation of no foreigner exceptAlbert, Prince Consort, who declared that the Irish "were no more worthyof sympathy than the Poles. "

It is known to you how our population shrank to its present fallenstate. Grants of money for emigration, "especially of families, " wereprovided even by the Land Act of 1881. Previous Poor Law Acts hadstimulated this "remedy. " So late as 1891 a "Congested District" Boardwas empowered to "aid emigration, " although millions of Irishmen had inthe nineteenth century been evicted from their homes or driven abroad. 

Seventy years ago our population stood at 8, 000, 000, and, in the normalratio of increase, it should to-day amount to 16, 000, 000. Instead, ithas dwindled to 4, 500, 000; and it is from this residuum that our manhoodbetween the ages of eighteen and fifty-one is to be delivered up in suchmeasure as the strategists of the English War Cabinet may demand. 

To-day, as in the days of George Washington, nearly half the Americanforces have been furnished from the descendants of our banished race. IfEngland could not, during your Revolution, regard that enrolment withsatisfaction, might she not set something now to Ireland's credit fromthe racial composition of your Army or Navy? No other small nation hasbeen so bereft by law of her children, but in vain for Ireland has thebread of exile been thrown upon the waters. 

Yet, while Self-determination is refused, we are required by law tobleed to "make the world safe for democracy "--in every country exceptour own. Surely this cannot be the meaning of America's message tomankind glowing from the pen of her illustrious President?

In the 750 years during which the stranger sway has blighted Ireland herpeople have never had occasion to welcome an unselfish or generous deedat the hands of their rulers. Every so-called "concession" was but theloosening of a fetter. Every benefit sprang from a manipulation of ourown money by a foreign Treasury denying us an honest audit of accounts. None was yielded as an act of grace. All were the offspring ofconstraint, tumult, or political necessity. Reason and arguments fell ondeaf ears. To England the Union has brought enhanced wealth, population, power, and importance; to Ireland increased taxation, stuntedindustries, swollen emigration, and callous officialism. 

Possessing in this land neither moral nor intellectual pre-eminence, norany prestige derived from past merit or present esteem, the BritishExecutive claims to restrain our liberties, control our fortunes, andexercise over our people the power of life and death. To obstruct therecent Home Rule Bill it allowed its favourites to defy its Parliamentwithout punishment, to import arms from suspect regions with impunity, to threaten "to break every law" to effectuate their designs to infectthe Army with mutiny and set up a rival Executive backed by militaryarray to enforce the rule of a caste against the vast majority of thepeople. The highest offices of State became the guerdon of theorganisers of rebellion, boastful of aid from Germany. To-day they arepillars of the Constitution, and the chief instrument of law. The onlylaurels lacking to the leaders of the Mutineers are those transplantedfrom the field of battle!

Are we to fight to maintain a system so repugnant, and must Irishmen becontent to remain slaves themselves after freedom for distant lands hasbeen purchased by their blood?

Heretofore in every clime, whenever the weak called for a defender, wherever the flag of liberty was unfurled, that blood freely flowed. Profiting by Irish sympathy with righteous causes Britain, at theoutbreak of war, attracted to her armies tens of thousands of our youthere even the Western Hemisphere had awakened to the wail of "smallnations. "

Irishmen, in their chivalrous eagerness, laid themselves open to thereproach from some of their brethren of forgetting the woes of their ownland, which had suffered from its rulers, at one time or another, almostevery inhumanity for which Germany is impeached. It was hard to bear thetaunt that the army they were joining was that which held Ireland insubjection; but fresh bitterness has been added to such reproaches bywhat has since taken place. 

Nevertheless, in the face of persistent discouragements, Irish chivalryremained ardent and aflame in the first years of the war. Tens ofthousands of the children of the Gael have perished in the conflict. Their bones bleach upon the soil of Flanders or moulder beneath thewaves of Suvla Bay. The slopes of Gallipoli, the sands of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Judasa afford them sepulture. Mons and Ypres providetheir monuments. Wherever the battle-line extends from the EnglishChannel to the Persian Gulf their ghostly voices whisper a response tothe roll-call of the guardian-spirits of Liberty. What is their reward?

The spot on earth they loved best, and the land to which they owed theirfirst duty, and which they hoped their sacrifices might help to freedom, lies unredeemed under an age-long thraldom. So, too, would it for everlie, were every man and every youth within the shores of Ireland toimmolate himself in England's service, unless the clamour of a dominantcaste be rebuked and stilled. 

Yet proof after proof accumulates that British Cabinets continue to betowards our country as conscienceless as ever. They deceive franklynations throughout the world as to their Irish policy, while withholdingfrom us even the Act of Home Rule which in 1914 was placed on theStatute-book. The recent "Convention, " which they composed to initiatereform, was brought to confusion by a letter from the Prime Ministerdiminishing his original engagements. 

Such insincere manoeuvres have left an indelible sense of wrong ranklingin the hearts of Ireland. 

Capitulations are observed with French Canadians, with the Maltese, withthe Hindoos, with the Mohammedan Arabs, or the African Boers; but neverhas the word of England, in any capital case, been kept towards the"sister" island. 

The Parliaments of Australia and of South Africa--both of which (unlikeour ancient Legislature) were founded by British enactments--refused toadopt conscription. This was well known when the law against Ireland wasresolved on. For opposing the application of that law to Irishmen, andwhile this appeal to you, sir, was being penned, members of ourConference have been arrested and deported without trial. It was evensought to poison the wells of American sympathy by levelling againstthem and others an allegation which its authors have failed to submit tothe investigation of any tribunal. 

To overlay malpractice by imputing to its victims perverse or criminalconduct is the stale but never-failing device of tyranny. 

A claim has also been put forward by the British Foreign Office toprevent you, Mr. President, as the head of a great allied Republic, fromacquiring first-hand information of the reasons why Ireland hasrejected, and will resist, conscription except in so far as the MilitaryGovernor of Ireland, Field-Marshal Lord French, may be pleased to allowyou to peruse his version of our opinions. 

America's present conflict with Germany obstructs no argument that weadvance. "Liberty and ordered peace" we, too, strive for; andconfidently do we look to you, sir, and to America--whose freedomIrishmen risked something to establish--to lend ear and weight to theprayer that another unprovoked wrong against the defenceless may notstain this sorry century. 

We know that America entered the war because her rights as a neutral, inrespect of ocean navigation, were interfered with, and only then. YetAmerica in her strength had a guarantee that in victory she would not becheated of that for which she joined in the struggle. Ireland, having nosuch strength, has no such guarantee; and experience has taught us thatjustice (much less gratitude) is not to be wrung from a hostileGovernment. What Ireland is to give, a free Ireland must determine. 

We are sadly aware, from recent proclamations and deportations, of theefforts of British authorities to inflame prejudice against our country. We therefore crave allowance briefly to notice the insinuation that theIrish coasts, with native connivance, could be made a base for thedestruction of American shipping. 

An official statement asserts that:

 "An important feature in every plan was the establishment of submarine bases in Ireland to menace the shipping of all nations. "

On this it is enough to say that every creek, inlet, or estuary thatindents our shores, and every harbour, mole, or jetty is watchfullypatrolled by British authority. Moreover, Irish vessels, with theircargoes, crews, and passengers, have suffered in this warproportionately to those of Britain. 

Another State Paper palliates the deportations by blazoning the descentof a solitary invader upon a remote island on the 12th of April, heralded by mysterious warnings from the Admiralty to the Irish Command. No discussion is permitted of the tryst of this British soldier with thelocal coast-guards, of his speedy bent towards a police barrack, and hissubsequent confidences with the London authorities. 

Only one instance exists in history of a project to profane our coastsby making them a base to launch attacks on international shipping. Thatplot was framed, not by native wickedness, but by an English Viceroy, and the proofs are piled up under his hand in British State Papers. 

For huge bribes were proffered by Lord Falkland, Lord-Lieutenant ofIreland, to both the Royal Secretary and the Prince of Wales, to obtainconsent for the use of Irish harbours to convenience Turkish andAlgerine pirates in raiding sea-going commerce. The plot is old, but theplea of "increasing his Majesty's revenues" by which it was commended iseverlasting. Nor will age lessen its significance for the citizens ofthat Republic which, amidst the tremors and greed of European diplomacy, extirpated the traffic of Algerine corsairs ninety years ago. Britishexperts cherish Lord Falkland's fame as the sire of their most knightlycavalier, and in their eyes its lustre shines undimmed, though hisExcellency, foiled of marine booty, enriched himself by seizing thelands of his untried prisoners in Dublin Castle. 

Moving are other retrospects evoked by the present outbreak of malignityagainst our nation. The slanders of the hour recall those let loose tocloak previous deportations in days of panic less ignoble. Then it wasthe Primate of All Ireland, Archbishop Oliver Plunkett, who was draggedto London and arraigned for high treason. Poignant memories quicken atevery incident which accompanied his degradation before the Lord ChiefJustice of England. A troop of witnesses was suborned to swear that hisGrace "endeavoured and compassed the King's death, " sought to "levy warin Ireland and introduce a foreign Power, " and conspired "to take a viewof all the several ports and places in Ireland where it would beconvenient to land from France. " An open trial, indeed, was not deniedhim; but with hasty rites he was branded a base and false traitor anddoomed to be hanged, drawn, and quartered at Tyburn. That desperatefelon, after prolonged investigation by the Holy See, has lately beendeclared a martyr worthy of universal veneration. 

The fathers of the American Revolution were likewise pursued in turn bythe venom of Governments. Could they have been snatched from their homesand haled to London, what fate would have befallen them? There yournoblest patriots might also have perished amidst scenes of shame, andtheir effigies would now bedeck a British chamber of horrors. Nor woulddeath itself have shielded their reputations from hatchments ofdishonour. For the greatest of Englishmen reviled even the sacred nameof Joan of Arc, the stainless Maid of France, to belittle a fallen foeand spice a ribald stage-play. 

It is hardly thirty years since every Irish leader was made the victimof a special Statute of Proscription, and was cited to answer vaguecharges before London judges. During 1888 and 1889 a malignant andunprecedented inquisition was maintained to vilify them, backed by allthe resources of British power. No war then raged to breed alarms, yetno weapon that perjury or forgery could fashion was left unemployed todestroy the characters of more than eighty National representatives--someof whom survive to join in this Address. That plot came to an end amidstthe confusion of their persecutors, but fresh accusations may be dailycontrived and buttressed by the chicanery of State. 

In every generation the Irish nation is challenged to plead to a newindictment, and to the present summons answer is made before no narrowforum but to the tribunal of the world. So answering, we commit ourcause, as did America, to "the virtuous and humane, " and also morehumbly to the providence of God. 

Well assured are we that you, Mr. President, whose exhortations haveinspired the Small Nations of the world with fortitude to defend to thelast their liberties against oppressors, will not be found among thosewho would condemn Ireland for a determination which is irrevocable tocontinue steadfastly in the course mapped out for her, no matter whatthe odds, by an unexampled unity of National judgment and Nationalright. 

Given at the Mansion House, Dublin, this 11th day of June, 1918. 

LAURENCE O'NEILL, Lord Mayor of Dublin, Chairman of a Conference of representativeIrishmen whose names stand hereunder. JOSEPH DEVLIN, JOHN DILLON, MICHAEL JOHNSON, WILLIAM O'BRIEN (Lab. ), T. M. HEALY, WILLIAM O'BRIEN, THOMAS KELLY, and JOHN MACNEILL: {Acting in the place E. DE VALERA and A. GRIFFITH, deported 18th of May, 1918, to separate prisons in England, without trial or accusation--communication with whom has been cut off. }

APPENDIX B

UNIONIST LETTER TO PRESIDENT WILSON

CITY HALL, BELFAST, _August 1st_, 1918. 

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SIR, A manifesto signed by the leader of the Irish Nationalist Party andcertain other Irish gentlemen has been widely circulated in the UnitedKingdom, in the form of a letter purporting to have been addressed toyour Excellency. [110]

Its purpose appears to be to offer an explanation of, and an excuse for, the conduct of the Nationalist Party in obstructing the extension toIreland of compulsory military service, which the rest of the UnitedKingdom has felt compelled to adopt as the necessary means of defeatingthe German design to dominate the world. At a time when all the freedemocracies of the world have, with whatever reluctance, accepted theburden of conscription as the only alternative to the destruction offree institutions and of international justice, it is easilyintelligible that those who maintain Ireland's right to solitary andprivileged exemption from the same obligation should betray theirconsciousness that an apologia is required to enable them to escapecondemnation at the bar of civilised, and especially of American, opinion. But, inasmuch as the document referred to would give to anyonenot intimately familiar with British domestic affairs the impressionthat it represents the unanimous opinion of Irishmen, it is importantthat your Excellency and the American people should be assured that thisis very far from being the case. 

There is in Ireland a minority, whom we claim to represent, comprisingone-fourth to one-third of the total population of the island, locatedmainly, but not exclusively, in the province of Ulster, who dissentemphatically from the views of Mr. Dillon and his associates. Thisminority, through their representatives in Parliament, have maintainedthroughout the present war that the same obligations should in allrespects be borne by Ireland as by Great Britain, and it has caused themas Irishmen a keen sense of shame that their country has not submittedto this equality of sacrifice. 

Your Excellency does not need to be informed that this question hasbecome entangled in the ancient controversy concerning theconstitutional status of Ireland in the United Kingdom. This is, indeed, sufficiently clear from the terms of the Nationalist manifestoaddressed to you, every paragraph of which is coloured by allusion tobygone history and threadbare political disputes. 

It is not our intention to traverse the same ground. There is in themanifesto almost no assertion with regard to past events which is noteither a distortion or a misinterpretation of historical fact. But weconsider that this is not the moment for discussing the faults andfollies of the past, still less for rehearsing ancient grievances, whether well or ill founded, in language of extravagant rhetoric. At atime when the very existence of civilisation hangs in the balance, allsmaller issues, whatever their merits or however they may affect ourinternal political problems, should in our judgment have remained inabeyance, while the parties interested in their solution should havejoined in whole-hearted co-operation against the common enemy. 

There is, however, one matter to which reference must be made, in orderto make clear the position of the Irish minority whom we represent. TheNationalist Party have based their claim to American sympathy on thehistoric appeal addressed to Irishmen by the British colonists whofought for independence in America a hundred and fifty years ago. By noIrishmen was that appeal received with a more lively sympathy than bythe Protestants of Ulster, the ancestors of those for whom we speakto-day--a fact that was not surprising in view of the circumstance thatmore than one-sixth part of the entire colonial population in America atthe time of the Declaration of Independence consisted of emigrants fromUlster. 

The Ulstermen of to-day, forming as they do the chief industrialcommunity in Ireland, are as devoted adherents to the cause ofdemocratic freedom as were their forefathers in the eighteenth century. But the experience of a century of social and economic progress underthe legislative Union with Great Britain has convinced them that underno other system of government could more complete liberty be enjoyed bythe Irish people. This, however, is not the occasion for a reasoneddefence of "Unionist" policy. Our sole purpose in referring to thematter is to show, whatever be the merits of the dispute, that a verysubstantial volume of Irish opinion is warmly attached to the existingConstitution of the United Kingdom, and regards as wholly unwarrantedthe theory that our political status affords any sort of parallel tothat of the "small nations" oppressed by alien rule, for whoseemancipation the Allied democracies are fighting in this war. 

The Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament throws a significantsidelight on this prevalent fiction. Whereas England is only representedby one member for every 75, 000 of population, and Scotland by one forevery 65, 000, Ireland has a member for every 42, 000 of her people. Witha population below that of Scotland, Ireland has 31 more members in theHouse of Commons, and 89 more than she could claim on a basis ofrepresentation strictly proportionate to population in the UnitedKingdom. 

Speaking in Dublin on the 1st of July, 1915, the late Mr. John Redmondgave the following description of the present condition of Ireland, which offers a striking contrast to the extravagant declamation thatrepresents that country as downtrodden by a harsh and unsympatheticsystem of government:

 "To-day, " he said, "the people, broadly speaking, own the soil. To-day the labourers live in decent habitations. To-day there is absolute freedom in local government and local taxation of the country. To-day we have the widest parliamentary and municipal franchise. The congested districts, the scene of some of the most awful horrors of the old famine days, have been transformed. The farms have been enlarged, decent dwellings have been provided, and a new spirit of hope and independence is to-day among the people. In towns legislation has been passed facilitating the housing of the working classes--a piece of legislation far in advance of anything obtained for the town tenants of England. We have a system of old-age pensions in Ireland whereby every old man and woman over seventy is safe from the workhouse and free to spend their last days in comparative comfort. "

Such are the conditions which, in the eyes of Nationalist politicians, constitute a tyranny so intolerable as to justify Ireland in repudiatingher fair share in the burden of war against the enemies of civilisation. 

The appeal which the Nationalists make to the principle of"self-determination" strikes Ulster Protestants as singularlyinappropriate. Mr. Dillon and his co-signatories have been careful notto inform your Excellency that it was their own opposition thatprevented the question of Irish Government being settled in accordancewith that principle in 1916. The British Government were prepared atthat time to bring the Home Rule Act of 1914 into immediate operation, if the Nationalists had consented to exclude from its scope thedistinctively Protestant population of the North, who desired to adhereto the Union. This compromise was rejected by the Nationalist leaders, whose policy was thus shown to be one of "self-determination" forthemselves, combined with coercive domination over us. 

It is because the British Government, while prepared to concede theprinciple of self-determination impartially to both divisions inIreland, has declined to drive us forcibly into such subjection that theNationalist Party conceive themselves entitled to resist the law ofconscription. And the method by which this resistance has been madeeffective is, in our view, not less deplorable than the spirit thatdictated it. The most active opponents of conscription in Ireland aremen who have been twice detected during the war in treasonable trafficwith the enemy, and their most powerful support has been that ofecclesiastics, who have not scrupled to employ weapons of spiritualterrorism which have elsewhere in the civilised world fallen out ofpolitical use since the Middle Ages. 

The claim of these men, in league with Germany on the one hand, and withthe forces of clericalism on the other, to resist a law passed byParliament as necessary for national defence is, moreover, inconsistentwith any political status short of independent sovereignty--status whichcould only be attained by Ireland by an act of secession from the UnitedKingdom, such as the American Union averted only by resort to civil war. In every Federal or other Constitution embracing subordinatelegislatures the raising and control of military forces are mattersreserved for the supreme legislative authority alone, and they are soreserved for the Imperial Parliament of the United Kingdom in the HomeRule Act of 1914, the "withholding" of which during the war iscomplained of by the Nationalists who have addressed your Excellency. The contention of these gentlemen that until the internal government ofIreland is changed in accordance with their demands, Ireland isjustified in resisting the law of Conscription, is one that findssupport in no intelligible theory of political science. 

To us as Irishmen--convinced as we are of the righteousness of the causefor which we are fighting, and resolved that no sacrifice can be toogreat to "make the world safe for democracy"--it is a matter of poignantregret that the conduct of the Nationalist leaders in refusing to layaside matters of domestic dispute, in order to put forth the wholestrength of the country against Germany should have cast a stain on thegood name of Ireland. We have done everything in our power to dissociateourselves from their action, and we disclaim responsibility for it atthe bar of posterity and history. 

EDWARD CARSON. JAMES JOHNSTON, Lord Mayor of Belfast. H. M. POLLOCK, President Belfast Chamber of Commerce. R. N. ANDERSON, Mayor of Londonderry, and President Londonderry Chamber of Commerce. JOHN M. ANDREWS, Chairman Ulster Unionist Labour Association. JAMES A. TURKINGTON, Vice-Chairman Ulster Unionist Labour Association, and Secretary Power-loom and Allied Trades Friendly Society, and ex-Secretary Power-loom Tenters' Trade Union of Ireland. THOMPSON DONALD, Hon. Secretary Ulster Unionist Labour Association, and ex-District Secretary Shipwrights' Association. HENRY FLEMING, Hon. Secretary Ulster Unionist Labour Association, Member of Boilermakers' Iron and Steel Shipbuilders' Society. 

FOOTNOTES:

[110] See Appendix A. 

INDEX

Abercorn, James, 2nd Duke of, at the Belfast Convention, 33; President of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35; illness, 47, 85, 108; signs the Covenant, 122; death, 144Abercorn, James, 3rd Duke of, 257, 282Abercorn, Mary, Duchess of, President of the Women's Unionist Council, 37Adair, Gen. Sir Wm. , at Larne, 217Afghan Campaign, 161Africa, South, War, 18Agar-Robartes, Hon. Thomas, amendment on the Home Rule Bill, 92, 94-97, 132Agnew, Capt. Andrew, viii, 193, 202, 210, 213, 214, 220Albert Hall, meetings at, 14, 21, 34, 71Alexander, Dr. , Bishop of Derry, at the Albert Hall, 14Allen, C. E. , 156Allen, W. J. , 35Althorp, Lord, 138Altrincham, election, 155Amending Bill, 221, 223, 227; postponed, 228, 230; _see_ Home RuleAmerica, War of Independence, 273Amery, L. C. S. , at Belfast, 81; on the Curragh Incident, 182Amiens, threatened capture of, 266Anderson, R. N. , Mayor of Londonderry, letter to President Wilson, 273, 296-299Andrews, John M. , letter to President Wilson, 296-299Andrews, Thomas, 33, 35, 48Anglo-German relations, 167, 201_Annual Register_, viii, 18 note, 21, 54 note, 76, 78 note, 138, 154 note, 155 note, 157 note, 166 note, 167 note, 169 note, 170 note, 201 note, 222 note, 223 note, 238, 271 note, 272 noteArchdale, E. M. , 35; Chairman of the Standing Committee, 35; Minister for Agriculture, 282Armagh, military depot, 175, 176Armaghdale, Lord, 263; signs the Covenant, 122: _see_ LonsdaleArmistice, the, 275Army, British, sympathy with Ulster Loyalists, 187-189Arran, Isle of, 175Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H. , on the opposition of Ulster to Home Rule, 1, 2; at the Albert Hall, 21; Hull, 24; Reading, 24; Bury St. Edmunds, 25; opinion of Sir E. Carson's speech, 133; at Ladybank, 154; Manchester, 166; policy on the Ulster Question, 167-170; on the Curragh Incident, 180, 182; Secretary of State for War, 184; promises an Amending Bill, 221; on the landing of arms, 221; at the Buckingham Palace Conference, 227; on the postponement of the Amending Bill, 228, 230; defence of Home Rule Bill, 235; in Dublin, 244; on the settlement of the Irish question, 245; on the national danger, 266_Attentive_, H. M. S. , 178Austrian rifles, 198

Baird, J. D. , at Belfast, 81Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J. , at Belfast, 13, 81; on election tactics, 25; on exclusion of Ulster, 95; resigns leadership of the Unionist Party, 60; how regarded in Ulster, 61; message from, 115; the "peccant paragraphs, " 181Balfour, Lord, of Burleigh, signs the British Covenant, 170Ballycastle, 193Ballykinler, training camp, 237Ballymacarret, 225Ballymena, meeting at, 108Ballymoney, meeting at, 158Ballyroney, meeting at, 108_Balmerino_, s. S. , 208, 209Balmoral, Belfast, meeting at, 79-86, 101Bangor, 214, 219Barrie, H. T. , 257Bates, Richard Dawson, Secretary of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35, 121; organises demonstration, 111; on board a tender, 214; Minister for Home Affairs, 282; knighthood, 284Bedford, Duke of, Chairman of the British League for the support of Ulster, 147Belfast, 46; Convention of 1892, 32-34, 109; meetings at, 52, 78, 157; services on Ulster Day, 117; City Hall, 119, 283; Covenant signed, 119-122; drill hall, opened, 148; riots, 151; review of the Ulster Volunteer Force at, 163; Customs Authorities, stratagem against, 217; reception of the King and Queen, 283Belfast Lough, 46, 175, 211, 212_Belfast Newsletter_, 102 note, 111Benn, Sir John, 53Beresford, Lord Charles, at Belfast, 81, 109; at the Ulster Club, 125; Liverpool, 127; member of a Committee of the Provisional Government, 145Berwick, 149, 154Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine, Chief Secretary for Ireland, on the character of Sinn Feinism, 4; at Ilfracombe, 54; on the Home Rule Bill, 96; the right to fight, 138; member of a sub-committee on Ulster, 175; conduct in the Irish rebellion, 243; character of his administration, 245Blenheim, meeting at, 97Boyne, the, 2; battle of, 115; celebration, 224Bradford, 172, 174, 175Bristol, 150, 166; Channel, 208_Britannic_, H. M. S. , 224British Covenant, signing the, 170British League for the support of Ulster and the Union, formation, 147Browne, Robert, Managing Director of the Antrim Iron Ore Company, 193Brunner, Sir John, President of the National Liberal Federation, 167Buckingham Palace Conference, 227Budden, Captain, 196Budget, 19; "The People's, " 20"Budget League, " formed, 20Bull, Sir William, 195Bury St. Edmunds, 25Butcher, Sir J. G. , at Belfast, 81

Cambridge, H. R. H. Duke of, 187Cambridgeshire, election, 155Campbell, James, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, 57, 95, 109Canterbury, Dean of, signs the British Covenant, 170Carlyle, Thomas, 137Carrickfergus, military depot, 175, 176Carson, Lady, at Belfast, 236, 284Carson, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward, viii; accepts leadership, 39-41; political views, 41; at the Ulster Hall, 42, 108; at the Ulster Unionist Council meetings, 42, 246-248; relations with Lord Londonderry, 44, 53; on the Parliament Bill, 44; at the Craigavon meeting, 48-51, 210; character of his speaking, 48; at the Conference at Belfast, 52; at Dublin, 54; Portrush, 55; refuses leadership of Unionist Party, 60; meetings in Lancashire, 65; popularity, 66, 110, 148; at Belfast, 73, 157, 224-226, 257, 278; criticism of W. Churchill's speech, 74; on fiscal autonomy for Ireland, 77; at the Balmoral meeting, 81, 84; ovation, 85; attacks on, 87; on the Home Rule Bill, 90, 96; at the Londonderry House Conference, 94; on the resistance of Ulster, 98, 100; character of his leadership, 102; reads the Ulster Covenant, 105; tour of the Province, 110, 114; opinion of the Covenant, 111; presentation to, 115; speech on the Covenant, 116; at the service in the Ulster Hall, 118; at the City Hall, 120-124; signs the Covenant, 121; at Liverpool, 127; on the exclusion of Ulster, 133, 168; death of his wife, 148; at opening of drill hall, 148; in Scotland and England, 149; at Durham, 153; Chairman of the Central Authority, 156; Indemnity Guarantee Fund, 156; inspection of the Ulster Volunteer Force, 162, 164, 167, 223, 226; on the time limit for exclusion, 171; leaves the House of Commons, 173; on the plot against Ulster, 176; signs statement on the Curragh Incident, 186; interview with Major F. H. Crawford, 199, 210; congratulations from Lord Roberts, 220; at Ipswich, 222; at the Buckingham Palace Conference, 227; on the patriotism of Ulster, 231-233; tribute to B. Law, 236; second marriage, 236; tribute to Lord Londonderry, 241; appointed Attorney-General, 242; resignation, 242; on the Irish rebellion, 246; appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, 252; resignation, 263; re-elected leader of the Ulster Party, 263; member of the Irish Unionist Alliance, 265; on the Military Service Bill, 270; letter to President Wilson, 273, 296-299; M. P. For Duncairn, 275; declines office, 275; on the Government of Ireland Act, 279; conclusion of his leadership, 280; Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, 284; unable to be present at the opening of the Ulster Parliament, 284Casement, Sir Roger, 7, 158; in league with Germany, 243Cassel, Felix, at Belfast, 81Castlereagh, Viscount, 109, 230; at Belfast, 81; signs the Covenant, 121Cavan, 248, 279Cave, Rt. Hon. George, 188; at Belfast, 81; letter to _The Times_, 152Cecil, Lord Hugh, at Belfast, 81, 109; at the Balmoral meeting, 86; on the resistance of Ulster, 96Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Austen, candidate for the leadership of the Unionist Party, 60; message from, 115; at Skipton, 167; on the policy of the Government, 168Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, at Belfast, 13; views on Home Rule, 16, 128; tariff policy, 18; his advice to Sir E. Carson, 167Chambers, James, signs the Covenant, 121Chichester, Capt. The Hon. A. C. , Commander in the Ulster Volunteer Force, 163Childers, Mr. Erskine, on fiscal autonomy for Ireland, 76China Expeditionary Force, 161Chubb, Sir George Hayter, signs the British Covenant, 170Churchill, Mrs. , at Belfast, 73Churchill, Lord Randolph, at Belfast, 13, 81; at the Ulster Hall meeting, 30, 40, 62; saying of, 31, 42; reception at Larne, 74; views on Home Rule, 128; _Life of, _ 138Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S. , at Manchester, 19; _Life of Lord Randolph Churchill_, 30, 138; at Dundee, 54, 154; views on Home Rule, 62; projected visit to Belfast, 62-69; letter to Lord Londonderry, 69; change of plan, 69; reception at Belfast, 73; departure from, 74; on Home Rule, 95; letters on the Ulster menace, 99; on the resistance of Ulster, 138, 141; the policy of exclusion, 152; at Bradford, 172, 174, 175City Hall, Belfast, 119, 283Clark, Sir George, 156Clogher, Bishop of, signs the Covenant, 122_Clydevalley, s. S. , _ 211-213, 220; renamed, 214Coleraine, meeting at, 108, 114Comber, 82Copeland Island, 212, 214, 220_Correspondence relating to Recent Events in the Irish Command_, 185Covenant, British, signing the, 170Covenant, Ulster, draft, 104; terms, 105-107; series of demonstrations, 108-110; meeting in the Ulster Hall, 114; signing the, 120-124; anniversary, 158, 165, 236Cowser, Richard, 210, 214Craig, Charles, 96, 147; serves in the war, 234; taken prisoner, 234Craig, James, member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35; meeting at Craigavon, 46; gift for organisation, 46; member of the Commission of Five, 53; on the resistance of Ulster, 96; draft of the Covenant, 103; organises the demonstration, 111; presentation of a silver key and pen to Sir E. Carson, 115; Indemnity Guarantee Fund, 156; at the reviews of the U. V. F. , 162, 164, 223; at Bangor, 217; at the Buckingham Palace Conference, 228; appointed Q. M. G. Of the Ulster Division, 234; Treasurer of the Household, 253; resignation, 263; baronetcy, 275; Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions, 275; Secretary to the Admiralty, 281; resignation, 281; Prime Minister of the Northern Parliament, 281Craig, John, 103Craig, Mrs. , presents colours to the U. V. F. , 223Craigavon, meeting at, 45-51, 80, 105, 149, 210Crawford, Colonel F. H. , viii; signs the Covenant, 123, 191; Commander in the U. V. F. , 163;characteristics, 190; career, 191; Secretary of the Reform Club, 191; advertises for rifles, 191; Director of Ordnance, 192; method of procuring arms, 192-200; schooner, 192; agreement with B. S. , 197-200; interview with Sir E. Carson, 199, 210; voyage in s. S. _Fanny_, 202-210; conveys arms from Hamburg, 203-213; attack of malaria, 207; declines to obey unsigned orders, 209; at Belfast, 210; purchases s. S. _Clydevalley_, 211, 212; lands the arms, 214; at Rosslare, 220; awarded the O. B. E. , 284Crewe, election, 98, 99Crewe, Marq. Of, 18, 23, 175; on the Amending Bill, 223Cromwell, Oliver, 136Crozier, Dr. , Archbp. Of Armagh, member of Provisional Government, 145Crumlin, meeting at, 108Curragh Incident, 174-189, 221Curzon, Marq. , on the Parliament Bill, 44; the Home Rule Bill, 134; the loyalty of Ulster, 141

_Daily Express, The_, 225_Daily Mail, The_, 225_Daily News, The_, 114, 166_Daily Telegraph, The_, 111, 225D'Arcy, Dr. , Primate of All Ireland, 118; signs the Covenant, 121Darlington, 149Davis, Jefferson, 137Democracy, axiom of, 15Derbyshire, election, 222Derry, relief of, 13, 85; meeting at, 108; election, 144; riots, 151Desborough, Lord, signs the British Covenant, 170Devlin, Joseph, 6, 127, 172, 174, 275; with Mr. W. Churchill in Belfast, 63, 68; the Irish Convention, 261; on the Military Service Bill, 269; letter to President Wilson, 273, 287-295; demands self-determination, 277Devonshire, 8th Duke of, views on Home Rule, 128, 134; on the resistance of Ulster, 136, 138; _Life of_, 136 note, 139 noteDicey, Prof. , signs the British Covenant, 170Dickson, Scott, at Belfast, 81; at the Balmoral meeting, 86"Die Hards" party, 44Dillon, John, 6, 174; at the Buckingham Palace Conference, 227; on the Irish Rebellion, 244; letter to Pres. Wilson, 273, 287-293Donaghadee, 214, 219Donald, Thompson, letter to Pres. Wilson, 296-299Donegal, 248, 279_Doreen_, s. S. , 207, 210; at Lundy, 208Dorset Regiment, transferred to Holywood, 177, 178Dromore, meeting at, 108Dublin, insurrection, 4, 243; Unionist demonstration at, 54; Nationalist Convention, meeting, 92; Congress in, 276Dufferin and Ava, Dow. Marchioness of, 113Duke, Rt. Hon. H. E. , Chief Secretary for Ireland, 253Duncairn, election, 275Dundalk, 178Dundee, 54, 154Dunleath, Lord, 156Durham, Sir E. Carson at, 153

East Fife, 25Edinburgh, 24, 101; Ulstermen sign the Covenant, 123; meeting at, 149; Philosophical Institution, lecture at the, 274Edward VII, King, death, 23Election, General, of 1886, 16; of 1895, 34; of Jan. 1910, 21, 22, 42; of Dec. 1910, 26; of 1918, 4Elections, result of, 99, 155, 222Emmet, Robert, 7, 46, 142Enniskillen, meeting at, 108, 114; military depot, 175, 176Erne, Earl of, member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35; at the Craigavon meeting, 47; signs the Covenant, 122Ewart, G. H. , President of the Belfast Chamber of Commerce, 157Ewart, Sir William, member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35; signs the Covenant, 121_Fanny_, s. S. , voyage, viii, 202-213; alterations in her appearance, 206; rechristened, 207; transference of the cargo, 213Farnham, Lord, at the Ulster Unionist Council meeting, 248, 279; Irish Unionist Alliance, 265Ferguson, John, & Co. , 196Fiennes, Mr. , at Belfast, 73Finance Bill, rejected, 19Finlay, Sir Robert, at Belfast, 81; at the Balmoral meeting, 86Fishguard, 213Flavin, Mr. , on the Military Service Bill, 269Fleming, Henry, letter to Pres. Wilson, 296-299Flood, Henry, patriotism, 7Foyle, the, 87, 214_Freemason's Journal, The_, 72, 287French, F. M. , Viscount, member of the Army Council, 176; resignation, 184; Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 272; attempt on his life, 277Frewen, Miss, marriage, 236; _see_ CarsonFriend, General, 177

Gambetta, Léon, 9George V, King, Conference at Buckingham Palace, 228; opens the Ulster Parliament, 282, 286; reception in Belfast, 283George, Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Budget, 19; at Edinburgh, 24; on the exclusion of Ulster, 152; Anglo-German relations, 167, 201; opinion of Sir E. Carson's speech, 168; plot against Ulster, 174; at Ipswich, 222; the Buckingham Palace Conference, 227; Secretary of State for War, 245; negotiations for the settlement of the Irish question, 245, 247, 250; Prime Minister, 252; on Home Rule, 254; alternative proposals, 255; statement on the war, 266, 268; Military Service Bill, 268; letter to B. Law, 276 note; basic facts on the Irish Question, 277; Government of Ireland Act, 278German rifles, 198Gibson, T. H. , Sec. Of Ulster Unionist Council, 35; resignation, 35Gilmour, Captain, at Belfast, 81Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E. , 138; on the character of the Nationalists, 5; conversion to Home Rule, 7, 12, 30; Home Rule Bills, 13, 16, 17; personality, 17Glasgow, 22, 78; meeting at, 149Goschen, Viscount, views on Home Rule, 16, 128Goudy, Prof. , signs the British Covenant, 170Gough, General Sir Hugh, commanding the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 180;at the War Office, 181; return to the Curragh, 181; driven back by the Germans, 270Government of Ireland Act, 51, 278Graham, John Washington, 194Grattan, Henry, patriotism, 7Greenwood, Sir Hamar, at Belfast, 73; Chief Secretary for Ireland, 285Grey, Earl, on the Home Rule Bill, 134Grey, Sir Edward, on the Home Rule Bill, 95; at Berwick, 154Griffith, Arthur, arrested, 271; deported, 295Griffith-Boscawen, Sir Arthur, at Belfast, 81Grimsby, election, 222Guest, Capt. Frederick, at Belfast, 72Guinness, Walter, supports exclusion of Ulster, 95Gun-barrel Proof Act, 196

Haldane, Viscount, 130, 185Halifax, Lord, 136, 141Hall, Frank, 121Halsbury, Earl of, 151Hamburg, Col. Crawford at, 198Hamilton, Lord Claud, at Belfast, 81; Provisional Government, 145Hamilton, George C. , M. P. For Altrincham, 155Hamilton, Gustavus, Governor of Enniskillen, 48Hamilton, Marq. Of, interest in the Ulster Movement, 109; signs the Covenant, 122Hammersmith Armoury, 195; seizure of arms at, 196Hanna, J. , 257Harding, Canon, 158Harland and Wolff, Messrs. , 191Harrison, Frederic, on the Ulster Question, 169Hartington, Marq. Of, views on Home Rule, 16Health Insurance Act, 222Healy, T. M. , 18, 22; on the Military Service Bill, 270; letter to Pres. Wilson, 273, 287-295Henry, Denis, member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35Hickman, Colonel Thomas, member of Provisional Government, 145; career, 160; letter from Lord Roberts, 161, 195Hills, J. W. , at Belfast, 81Holland, Bernard, _Life of the Eighth Duke of Devonshire_, 136 note, 139 noteHolywood, 46, 177, 178Home Rule, 23-29; a separatist movement, 7; memorial against, 155Home Rule Bill, 13, 16, 17, 90-97, 131, 133, 149; political meetings, 97; under the "guillotine, " 131; in the House of Lords, 134; rejected, 135; time limit for exclusion, 171; passed, 222, 224; receives the Royal Assent, 235Home Rule Bill, Amending Bill, 221, 223, 227, 228, 230Hull, Mr. Asquith at, 24

Ilfracombe, 54Indemnity Guarantee Fund, subscriptions, 156, 163Ipswich, election, 222Ireland, two nations, 2, 84; rebellions, 6; animosity of rival creeds, 9; condition, 17, 19, 298; insurrection, 27; fiscal autonomy, 76-78; financial clauses of the Home Rule Bill, 91; prohibition of the importation of arms, 166; Easter Rebellion, 243; exemption from conscription, 268; German plot in, 271; agitation against conscription, 272; anarchy, 279Ireland, Council of, 278Ireland, Government of, Act, 2, 278-280Ireland, Northern, Parliament, 280-282Irish Convention, 255-262; members, 255, 257; Report, 264, 266_Irish News, The_, 114Irish Republican Army, system of terrorism, 277Irish Republican Brotherhood, 243Irish Unionist Alliance, 30, 265; co-operation with the Ulster Unionist Council, 37Islandmagee, 218Italian Vetteli rifles, 197, 198, 201

James II, King, 139, 141Johnston, James, Lord Mayor of Belfast, letter to Pres. Wilson, 273, 296-299

Kelly, Sam, 209Kelly, Thomas, letter to Pres. Wilson, 287-295Kennedy, Sir Robert, member of Provisional Government, 143Kettle, Prof. T. M. , on fiscal autonomy for Ireland, 76Kiel, 204Kingstown, cruisers at, 178Kipling, Rudyard, "Ulster 1912, " 79, 129; signs the British Covenant, 170Kitchener, F. M. Earl, 230, 238Kossuth, 136

Labour Party, 22, 26Ladybank, Mr. Asquith at, 154Lamlash, battleships at, 175Lane-Fox, George, at Belfast, 81Langeland, 204Lansdowne, Marq. Of, scheme of reform for the House of Lords, 24; on the Parliament Bill, 44; message from, 115; on the Ulster Question, 169; the Amending Bill, 223; at the Buckingham Palace Conference, 227Larne, 74, 81, 212, 214Law, Rt. Hon. A. Bonar, leader of Unionist Party, 28, 60; on Home Rule, 28, 131; at the Albert Hall, 71; on fiscal autonomy for Ireland, 78; at the Balmoral meeting, 80-86; reception at Larne, 81; his speech, 84; indictment against the Government, 90, 172, 174, 235; on the resistance of Ulster, 91, 95, 98; messages from, 115, 149; at Wallsend, 154; Bristol, 166; on the exclusion of Ulster, 169, 171; demands inquiry into the Curragh Incident, 185; on the Amending Bill, 222; at the Buckingham Palace Conference, 227; at Belfast, 236; tribute to, 236; at the Ulster Hall, 237; warning to the Nationalists, 255; on the Military Service Bill, 269, 271Lecky, W. E. H. , _History of England in the Eighteenth Century_, 274 noteLeeds, meeting at, 149Leo XIII, Pope, 8Leslie, Shane, _Henry Edward Manning_, 8 noteLiberal Party, policy, 16; victory in 1906, 18; majority, 19, 22; tactics, 20; number of votes, 22, 26; defeated in 1895, 34Liddell, R. M. , 156Lincoln, Abraham, 40; saying of, 15Linlithgow, election, 155Lisburn, meeting at, 108, 114Liverpool, 127_Liverpool Daily Courier, The_, extract from, 165_Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, _ 159 noteLlandudno, 212Lloyd, Mr. George, at Belfast, 81Logue, Cardinal, 10London School of Economics, conference at, 76Londonderry House, conference at, 92, 94, 147Londonderry, Marchioness of, member of the Ulster Women's Unionist Council, 37; on the Covenant, 112; presents colours to the U. V. F. , 223; work in the war, 240Londonderry, 6th Marq. Of, viii; on Home Rule, 28; Ulster Unionist Council, 35; popularity, 43; character, 44; relations with Sir E. Carson, 44, 53; on the Parliament Bill, 44; Conference at Belfast, 52; at the Ulster Hall meeting, 62, 106, 108; the Ulster Unionist Council meetings, 65, 67; reply to W. Churchill, 69; at Belfast, 73; at the Balmoral meeting, 84; signs the Covenant, 121; at the Ulster Club, 125; Liverpool, 127; on the House of Lords, 134; President of the Ulster Unionist Council, 145; Indemnity Guarantee Fund, 156; at the reviews of the U. V. F. , 164, 223; on the Curragh Incident, 186; on the Amending Bill, 223; at Enniskillen, 227; despondency, 240; death, 241; tribute to, 241Londonderry, 7th Marq. Of, viii; member of the Irish Convention, 257, 263; Under-Secretary of State in the Air Ministry, 275; resignation, 281; Minister of Education, 281Long, Rt. Hon. Walter, 147; founder of the Union Defence League, 37; leader of the Irish Unionists, 38; at the Ulster Hall, 42; candidate for the leadership of the Unionist Party, 60; at Belfast, 81, 224; at the Balmoral meeting, 84, 86; the Londonderry House conference, 92; message from, 115; on the policy of the Government, 170; signs the British Covenant, 170; chairman of a Cabinet Committee on the Irish Question, 277Lonsdale, Sir John B. , member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35; Hon. Sec. Of the Irish Unionist Party, 39; signs Covenant, 122; Indemnity Guarantee Fund, 156; leader of the Ulster Party, 254; at Belfast, 257; raised to the peerage, 263; _see_ ArmaghdaleLords, House of, rejection of the Home Rule Bill, 17, 135; of the Finance Bill, 19, 21; forced to accept the Parliament Bill, 27; position under the Parliament Act, 134; debates on the Home Rule Bill, 134Loreburn, Lord, letters to _The Times_, 152, 165Lough Laxford, 203, 206, 207Lough, Thomas, on fiscal autonomy for Ireland, 76Lovat, Lord, signs the British Covenant, 170Lowther, Rt. Hon. James, at the Buckingham Palace Conference, 227Loyal Orange Institution, 31Lundy, 208Lyons, W. H. H. , 35

Macdonnell, Lord, on fiscal autonomy for Ireland, 76Mackinder, H. J. , at Belfast, 81Macnaghten, Sir Charles, member Provisional Government, 145Macnaghten, Lord, Lord of Appeal, 140, 145; signs the Covenant, 122MacNeill, John, letter to Pres. Wilson, 287-295Mahan, Admiral, 130Maine, Sir H. , _Popular Government_, extract from, 14Malcolm, Sir Ian, at Belfast, 81Manchester, 77, 166; election, 99_Manchester Guardian, The_, 166Manning, Cardinal, on Home Rule, 8Mary, H. M. , Queen, at the opening of the Ulster Parliament, 282; reception in Belfast, 283Massereene, Lady, presents colours to the Ulster Volunteer Force, 223Massingham, Mr. , 166Masterman, Rt. Hon. C. F. G. , 170, 222Mazzini, 136McCalmont, Col. James, Ulster Unionist Council, 35; Commander of a U. V. F regiment, 163McCammon, Mr. , 121McDowell, Sir Alexander, criticism of the Ulster Covenant, 104McMordie, Mr. , Lord Mayor of Belfast, at the service in the Ulster Hall, 118; receives Sir E. Carson, 120; at the Ulster Club, 125Meath election petition in 1892, 10Melbourne, Lord, 136Mersey, the, 127Midleton, Earl of, at the Irish Convention, 260; supports Home Rule, 262; secedes from the Irish Unionist Alliance, 265Midlothian, election, 99Military Service Act, ii. , 268-272Milner, Viscount, signs the British Covenant, 170; on the Amending Bill, 223Moles, Thomas, viii; Chairman of Committee in the Northern Parliament, 282Molyneux, patriotism, 7Monaghan, 248, 279Montgomery, B. W. D. , Secretary of the Ulster Club, 103Montgomery, Dr. , 118Montgomery, Major-Gen. , member of Provisional Government, 145Moore, William, Ulster Unionist Council, 35; on the amendment to the Home Rule Bill, 96; exclusion of Ulster, 168Morley, Viscount, _Life of Gladstone_, 17; on the resistance of Ulster, 154; helps Colonel Seely to draft the "peccant paragraphs, " 181, 183_Morning Post, The_, 79, 225, 229, 283 note_Motu Proprio_, Vatican decree, 11Mount Stewart, 82, 225_Mountjoy_, the, 87, 214_Mountjoy II_, s. S. , cargo landed at Larne, 214, 218Moyle, the, 193Musgrave Channel, 211, 217Musgrave, Henry, 156

_Nation, The_, 158National Insurance Bill, 53Nationalist Party, in the House of Commons, 22, 26; attitude on the war, 267; opposition to conscription, 269-273Nationalists, the, compared with the Ulster Unionists, 2; disloyalty, 4-6; policy, 6, 78, 141, 142; ancestry, 8; demand dissolution of the Union, 14; attitude on the war, 231, 233, 252; members of the Irish Convention, 256-262; letter to Pres. Wilson, 273, 287-295; demand "self-determination, " 291, 298Nationality, root of, 2; plea of 14, 15Navy, reduction of, 167, 201_Nec Temere_, Vatican decree, 11Neild, Herbert, at Belfast, 81Newcastle, 149, 153; training camp, 237Newman, Cardinal, 5Newry, 177Newtownards, 225; meeting at, 108, 114_Nineteenth Century, The_, 183 note, 239 noteNonconformists, 9; opposition to Home Rule, 155Northcliffe, Viscount, 225Norwich, Ulster members at, 150

O'Brien, William, 22; on the Military Service Bill, 270; letter to Pres. Wilson, 273, 287-295_Observer, The_, 84, 115 note, 225O'Connell, Daniel, 7O'Connor, T. P. , 127, 174, 275; on Home Rule, 253Omagh, military depot, 175, 176Omash, Miss, viiiO'Neill, Capt. Hon. Arthur, 230; killed in the war, 241, 253O'Neill, Major Hugh, serves in the war, 242; Speaker of the Northern Parliament, 282O'Neill, Hugh, Earl of Tyrone, 7O'Neill, Laurence, Lord Mayor of Dublin, letter to Pres. Wilson, 273, 287-295O'Neill, Hon. R. T. , member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35Ormsby-Gore, Capt. The Hon. W. G. A. , at Belfast, 81O'Shea, divorce, 17

Paget, Sir Arthur, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, letter from Colonel Seely, 175; in London, 176; interviews with Ministers, 177; instructions from the War Office, 178, 180; conference with his officers, 179, 185; on the employment of troops in Ulster, 186Parliament, assembled, 23, 131, 167; dissolved, 23, 275; adjourned, 99Parliament Act, 23, 27, 43-45, 53, 91_Parliamentary Debates_, viii, 29 _note, _ 142, 179 note, 181 note, 185 noteParnell, Charles, saying of, 6; leader of the Nationalist Party, 6; downfall, 17_Pathfinder_, H. M. S. , 178_Patriotic_, R. M. S. , 128Peel, Sir Robert, 138Peel, W. , at Belfast, 81"People's Budget, " 20; rejection, 42Percival-Maxwell, Col. , Privy Councillor, 284Phoenix Park murders, 243Pirrie, Lord, unpopularity in Belfast, 63; peerage conferred, 284Pitt, Rt. Hon. William, 15Plunkett, Sir Horace, Chairman of the Irish Convention, 257, 261; letter to Lloyd George, 264Pollock, Sir Ernest, at Belfast, 81Pollock, H. M. , member of the Irish Convention, 257, 262Portadown, meeting at, 108, 114Portland, Duke of, signs the British Covenant, 170Portrush, 55, 193Presbyterian Church, General Assembly of the, 155Presbyterians, political views, 12Preston, George, subscription to the Indemnity Guarantee Fund, 156Prisoners, release of, 256Protestants, Irish, distrust of Roman Catholics, 9; dislike of clerical influence, 10

Ramsay, Sir W. , signs the British Covenant, 170Ranfurly, Earl of, organises the Ulster Loyalist Union, 30, 37; member of the Unionist Council, 35Raphoe, Bishop of, member of the Irish Convention, 258, 260-262Rawlinson, J. F. P. , at Belfast, 81Reade, R. H. , 35Reading, Mr. Asquith at, 24; election, 155Redistribution Act, 275Redmond, Capt. , 275Redmond, John, 174; on the national movement, 7; policy, 22; on Home Rule, 27, 54; with Mr. W. Churchill in Belfast, 63, 68; opinion of Sir E. Carson's speech, 133; protests against Amending Bill, 222; at Buckingham Palace Conference, 227; conditional offer of help in the war, 231, 233; tribute to, 239; patriotism, 239; refuses office, 242; at Dublin, 249; on the exclusion of Ulster, 250; manifesto, 254; at the Irish Convention, 260-262; death, 262; on the condition of Ireland, 298Redmond, Major W. , his speech in the House, 253; killed in the war, 253Reform Club, Belfast, 122, 124, 191Reid, Whitelaw, 274Renan, E. , on the root of nationality, 2_Reynolds's Newspaper_, 89Richardson, Gen. Sir George, Commander-in-Chief of the U. V. F. , 161, 197; career, 161; characteristics, 162; at Belfast, 162, 217; reviews the U. V. F. , 163-165Rifles, seized by Government, 161, 195; purchase of, 198; packing, 201; landed in Ulster, 219Roberts, F. M. Earl, 130, 188; letter to Col. Hickman, 161, 195; signs British Covenant, 170; congratulations to Sir E. Carson, 220; on the result of coercing Ulster, 224Robertson, Rt. Hon. J. M. , Secretary to the Board of Trade, on fiscal autonomy for Ireland, 76; at Newcastle, 153Rochdale, Unionist Association at, 99Roe, Owen, 7Roman Catholics, Irish, disloyalty 9; character of the priest, 10; methods of enforcing obedience, 10-12Rosebery, Earl of, 15, 18; at Glasgow, 22; on the characteristics of the Ulster race, 101Rosslare, 220Royal Irish Rifles, the 5th, 57Russia, collapse of, 268Russian rifles, 198

S. B. , the Hebrew dealer in firearms, 197; agreement with Major F. H. Crawford, 197-200; honesty, 204St. Aldwyn, Viscount, on the King's Prerogative, 151Salisbury, Marq. Of, at Belfast, 13, 81; message from, 109; views on Home Rule, 128Salvidge, Mr. , Alderman of Liverpool, 127, 128; signs the British Covenant, 170Samuel, Mr. Herbert, at Belfast, 54Sanderson, Colonel, Chairman of the Ulster Parliamentary Party, 35, 38_Saturday Review, The_, extract from, 70Sclater, Edward, Secretary of the Unionist Clubs, 53Scotland, the Covenant, 103_Scotsman, The_, 101, 225, 274 noteSeely, Col. Sec. Of State for War, letter to Sir A. Paget, 175; statement to Gen. Gough, 181; adds paragraphs, 181, 183; on the Curragh Incident, 182; resignation, 183, 184Seymour, Adm. Sir E. , signs British Covenant, 170Sharman-Crawford, Col. , member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35; of the Commission of Five, 53Shaw, Lord, _Letters to Isabel_, 18 noteShiel Park, meeting at, 128Shipyards, observance of Ulster Day, 117Shortt, Rt. Hon. E. , Chief Secretary for Ireland, 272Simon, Sir John, 175Sinclair, Rt. Hon. Thomas, at the Ulster Convention, 33; member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35, 67; on Home Rule, 38; member of a Commission, 63; on the Covenant, 104, 109; signs it, 121Sinn Fein party, refuse to join the Convention, 255; in league with Germany, 271, 276; arrests, 271; members of Parliament, 276, 276; treason of, 276; congress in Dublin, 276; outrages, 277Sinn Feinism, spirit of, 4Skipton, 167Smiley, Kerr, 156Smith, Rt. Hon. F. E. (Lord Birkenhead), on the policy of Ulster, 97, 98; on the Covenant, 109; at the Ulster Club, 125; at Liverpool, 127; at the inspection of the U. V. F. , 162; "galloper" to Gen. Sir G. Richardson, 163Smith, Mr. Harold, 109Solemn League and Covenant, 104; _see_ UlsterSomme, battle of the, 234_Spectator, The_, 225Spender, Col. W. Bliss, U. V. F. , 197, 203, 207, 215; awarded the O. B. E. , 284_Standard, The_, 70, 118, 225_Star, The_, extract from, 89Stronge, Sir James, member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35Stuart-Wortley, Mr. , at Belfast, 81Submarine warfare, 253Suffragists' campaign, 167Swift, patriotism, 7

Tariff Reform policy, 18, 19; controversy, 59, 155, 167Templetown, Lord, founds the Unionist Clubs, 30, 31Thiepval, battle at, 234_Times, The_, 32, 64, 69, 71, 77, 79, 82, 84, 99, 110, 115, 124, 126, 139, 140, 153, 172, 182, 187, 225; letters in, 152, 165Tirah Expedition, 161Tone, Wolfe, 7, 46, 142Tramp steamer, diverts suspicion, 217Turkington, James A. , letter to Pres. Wilson, 296-299Tuskar Light, 210, 211Tyrone, contingent of Orangemen, 57

Ulster, use of the term, vii; opposition to Home Rule, 1, 2, 30; loyalty, 2-4, 33, 63, 139-143, 251; ancestry, 8; political views, 12; landlords and tenants, 12; mottoes, 13, 33; reluctant acceptance of a separate constitution, 14; organisations, 30-38; policy, 33, 51, 75, 77, 92, 93-100, 133, 136-143; military drilling, 57; characteristics of the people, 101; time limit for exclusion, 171; plot against, 174; emigrants in America, 274, 297; result of the Government of Ireland Act, 280Ulster, British League for the support of, formed, 147Ulster Club, Belfast, 125Ulster, Convention of 1892, 80, 109Ulster Covenant, draft, 104; terms, 105-107; series of demonstrations, 108-110; meeting in the Ulster Hall, 114; signing the, 120-124; anniversary, 158, 165, 236Ulster Day, 165, 236; religious observance, 107, 117Ulster Division, 1st Brigade, training, 237; recruiting, 238Ulster Hall, 283; meetings, 30, 38, 40, 42, 62, 106, 108, 114, 237; service, 118, 158Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union, 37Ulster Loyalist and Patriotic Union, 30Ulster Movement, vii, 1Ulster Parliament, appointment of Ministers, 281-2; opened, 282-6Ulster Provisional Government, 53, 145, 156, 163; judiciary, 146; constitution, 226Ulster Unionist Clubs, founded, 30-1Ulster Unionist Council, vii, 35; meetings, 27, 42, 52, 62, 65-67, 106, 145, 156, 210, 226, 236, 246-249, 279; members, 35, 36; co-operation with the Irish Unionist Alliance, 37; resolution adopted, 68-71; character, 75; scheme for the Provisional Government, 145; statement on the Curragh Incident, 186Ulster Unionist Members of Parliament, 38; tour in Scotland and England, 149Ulster Unionists, letter to Pres. Wilson, 273, 296-299Ulster Volunteer Force, 58, 113, 137, 160; Indemnity Guarantee Fund, 156, 163; growth, 158, 160; parades, 162, 163-165, 167, 223, 226; strength, 168; arming the, 192-200, 223; organisation, 215; despatch-riders' corps, 215; trial mobilisation, 216; presentation of colours, 223; volunteer for service in the war, 229; organisation and training of the Division, 234Ulster Women's Unionist Association, work of the, 166Ulster Women's Unionist Council, formed, 37; meeting, 113"Ulster 1912, " Rudyard Kipling's, 79, 129"Ulster's Reward, " William Watson's, 129Union Defence League, in London, 37Unionist Associations of Ireland, joint committee, 37Unionist Party, administration, 18, 20; defeated, 18; number of votes, 22, 26, 99; dissensions on Tariff Reform, 69; members at Belfast, 81Unionists, Southern manifesto, 265; Committee formed, 265; result of the Government Act, 282

Valera, E. De, M. P. For East Clare, 256; arrested, 277; deported, 295Vatican decrees, 11Vickers & Co. , Messrs. , 194Victoria, Queen, 136

Wallace, Col. R. H. , member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35; member of a Commission, 53; Grand Master of the Belfast Lodges, 57; popularity, 57; career, 57; applies for leave to drill, 58; at the Ulster Unionist Council meeting, 67, 72; presentation of a banner to Sir E. Carson, 115; Command in the U. V. F. , 163, 164; Privy Councillor, 284Wallsend, 154Walter, Mr. John, 225War, the Great, 27, 228, 266War Office, treatment of Gen. Gough, 181Ward, Lieut. -Col. John, on the Curragh Incident, 182; "The Army and Ireland, " 183 note, 238Warden, F. W. , 72 noteWashington, George, 273, 291Watson, Sir William, "Ulster's Reward, " 129Waziri Expedition, 161_Westminster Gazette_, 114; cartoon, 87Whig Revolution of 1688, 31White Paper, 175 note, 176 note, 177 note, 178 note, 179 note, 180 note, 181 note, 185, 187 note, 188William III, King, banner, 115Willoughby de Broke, Lord, 109Wilson, President, letter from the Nationalists, 273, 287-295; from the Unionists, 273, 296-299; phrase of "self-determination, " 277Wimborne, Lord, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, resignation, 272Wolff, G. , 35Wolseley, Viscount, 187Women's Unionist Council, Ulster, formed, 37; meeting, 113Workman and Clark, Messrs. , 214Workman, Frank, 157Wynyard, Lord Londonderry's death at, 241

Yarmouth, 207York, 149York, Archbp. Of, on the Home Rule Bill, 134_Yorkshire Post, The_, 149, 163Young, Rt. Hon. John, member of the Ulster Unionist Council, 35; at the meeting, 67; takes part in the campaign, 109; signs the Covenant, 122Young, W. R. , organises the Ulster Loyalist and Patriotic Union, 30, 37; signs the Covenant, 122; Privy Councillor, 284

Zhob Valley Field Force, expedition, 161