_Thoughts on Religion_

BY THE LATE

GEORGE JOHN ROMANESM. A. , LL. D. , F. R. S. 

EDITED BY

CHARLES GORE, D. D. BISHOP OF WORCESTER

Twelfth Impression

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDONAND BOMBAY

1904

CONTENTS

 PAGE

EDITOR'S PREFACE 5

PART I. 

THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION. 

ESSAY I 37

ESSAY II 56

PART II. 

NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION. 

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE EDITOR 91

§ 1. INTRODUCTORY 98

§ 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE 104

§ 3. CAUSALITY 116

§ 4. FAITH 131

§ 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY 154

CONCLUDING NOTE BY THE EDITOR 184

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The present edition of Romanes' _Thoughts on Religion_ is issued inresponse to a request which has been made with some frequency of latefor very cheap reprints of standard religious and theological works. 

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, _January, 1904. _

EDITOR'S PREFACE

The late Mr. George John Romanes--the author within the last few yearsof _Darwin and After Darwin_, and of the _Examination ofWeismannism_--occupied a distinguished place in contemporary biology. But his mind was also continuously and increasingly active on theproblems of metaphysics and theology. And at his death in the earlysummer of this year (1894), he left among his papers some notes, mademostly in the previous winter, for a work which he was intending towrite on the fundamental questions of religion. He had desired thatthese notes should be given to me and that I should do with them as Ithought best. His literary executors accordingly handed them over to me, in company with some unpublished essays, two of which form the firstpart of the present volume. 

After reading the notes myself, and obtaining the judgement of others inwhom I feel confidence upon them, I have no hesitation either inpublishing by far the greater part of them, or in publishing them withthe author's name in spite of the fact that the book as originallyprojected was to have been anonymous. From the few words which GeorgeRomanes said to me on the subject, I have no doubt that he realized thatthe notes if published after his death must be published with his name. 

I have said that after reading these notes I feel no doubt that theyought to be published. They claim it both by their intrinsic value andby the light they throw on the religious thought of a scientific man whowas not only remarkably able and clear-headed, but also many-sided, asfew men are, in his capacities, and singularly candid and open-hearted. To all these qualities the notes which are now offered to the publicwill bear unmistakeable witness. 

With more hesitation it has been decided to print also the unpublishedessays already referred to. These, as representing an earlier stage ofthought than is represented in the notes, naturally appear first. 

Both Essays and Notes however represent the same tendency of a mind froma position of unbelief in the Christian Revelation toward one of beliefin it. They represent, I say, a tendency of one 'seeking after God ifhaply he might feel after Him and find Him, ' and not a position ofsettled orthodoxy. Even the Notes contain in fact many things whichcould not come from a settled believer. This being so it is natural thatI should say a word as to the way in which I have understood my functionas an editor. I have decided the question of publishing each Note solelyby the consideration whether or no it was sufficiently finished to beintelligible. I have rigidly excluded any question of my own agreementor disagreement with it. In the case of one Note in particular, I doubtwhether I should have published it, had it not been that my decideddisagreement with its contents made me fear that I might be prejudicedin withholding it. 

The Notes, with the papers which precede them, will, I think, be betterunderstood if I give some preliminary account of their antecedents, thatis of Romanes' previous publications on the subject of religion. 

In 1873 an essay of George Romanes gained the Burney Prize at Cambridge, the subject being _Christian Prayer considered in relation to the beliefthat the Almighty governs the world by general laws_. This was publishedin 1874, with an appendix on _The Physical Efficacy of Prayer_. In thisessay, written when he was twenty-five years old, Romanes shows thecharacteristic qualities of his mind and style already developed. Thesympathy with the scientific point of view is there, as might beexpected perhaps in a Cambridge 'Scholar in Natural Science': thelogical acumen and love of exact distinctions is there: there too thenatural piety and spiritual appreciation of the nature of Christianprayer--a piety and appreciation which later intellectual habits ofthought could never eradicate. The essay, as judged by the standard ofprize compositions, is of remarkable ability, and strictly proceedswithin the limits of the thesis. On the one side, for the purpose of theargument, the existence of a Personal God is assumed[1], and also thereality of the Christian Revelation which assures us that we have reasonto expect real answers, even though conditionally and within restrictedlimits, to prayers for _physical_ goods[2]. On the other side, there istaken for granted the belief that general laws pervade the observabledomain of physical nature. Then the question is considered--how is thephysical efficacy of prayer which the Christian accepts on the authorityof revelation compatible with the scientifically known fact that Godgoverns the world by general laws? The answer is mainly found inemphasizing the limited sphere within which scientific inquiry can beconducted and scientific knowledge can obtain. Special divine acts ofresponse to prayer, even in the physical sphere, _may_ occur--force_may_ be even originated in response to prayer--and still not produceany phenomenon such as science must take cognizance of and regard asmiraculous or contrary to the known order. 

On one occasion the Notes refer back to this essay[3], and morefrequently, as we shall have occasion to notice, they reproduce thoughtswhich had already been expressed in the earlier work but had beenobscured or repudiated in the interval. I have no grounds for knowingwhether in the main Romanes remained satisfied with the reasoning andconclusion of his earliest essay, granted the theistic hypothesis onwhich it rests[4]. But this hypothesis itself, very shortly afterpublishing this essay, he was led to repudiate. In other words, his mindmoved rapidly and sharply into a position of reasoned scepticism aboutthe existence of God at all. The Burney Essay was published in 1874. Already in 1876 at least he had written an anonymous work with a whollysceptical conclusion, entitled 'A Candid Examination of Theism' by_Physicus_[5]. As the Notes were written with direct reference to thiswork, some detailed account of its argument seems necessary; and this isto be found in the last chapter of the work itself, where the authorsummarizes his arguments and draws his conclusions. I venture thereforeto reproduce this chapter at length[6]. 

'§ 1. Our analysis is now at an end, and a very few words will heresuffice to convey an epitomized recollection of the numerous facts andconclusions which we have found it necessary to contemplate. We firstdisposed of the conspicuously absurd supposition that the origin ofthings, or the mystery of existence [i. E. The fact that anything existsat all], admits of being explained by the theory of Theism in anyfurther degree than by the theory of Atheism. Next it was shown that theargument "Our heart requires a God" is invalid, seeing that such asubjective necessity, even if made out, could not be sufficient toprove--or even to render probable--an objective existence. And withregard to the further argument that the fact of our theistic aspirationspoints to God as to their explanatory cause, it became necessary toobserve that the argument could only be admissible after the possibilityof the operation of natural causes [in the production of our theisticaspirations] had been excluded. Similarly the argument from the supposedintuitive necessity of individual thought [i. E. The alleged fact thatmen find it impossible to rid themselves of the persuasion that Godexists] was found to be untenable, first, because, even if the supposednecessity were a real one, it would only possess an individualapplicability; and second, that, as a matter of fact, it is extremelyimprobable that the supposed necessity is a real necessity even for theindividual who asserts it, while it is absolutely certain that it is notsuch to the vast majority of the race. The argument from the generalconsent of mankind, being so obviously fallacious both as to facts andprinciples, was passed over without comment; while the argument from afirst cause was found to involve a logical suicide. Lastly, the argumentthat, as human volition is a cause in nature, therefore all causation isprobably volitional in character, was shown to consist in a stretch ofinference so outrageous that the argument had to be pronouncedworthless. 

'§ 2. Proceeding next to examine the less superficial arguments infavour of Theism, it was first shown that the syllogism, All known mindsare caused by an unknown mind; our mind is a known mind; therefore ourmind is caused by an unknown mind, --is a syllogism that is inadmissiblefor two reasons. In the first place, it does not account for mind (inthe abstract) to refer it to a prior mind for its origin; and therefore, although the hypothesis, if admitted, would be _an_ explanation of_known_ mind, it is useless as an argument for the existence of theunknown mind, the assumption of which forms the basis of thatexplanation. Again, in the next place, if it be said that mind is so faran entity _sui generis_ that it must be either self-existing or causedby another mind, there is no assignable warrant for the assertion. Andthis is the second objection to the above syllogism; for anything withinthe whole range of the possible may, for aught that we can tell, becompetent to produce a self-conscious intelligence. Thus an objector tothe above syllogism need not hold any theory of things at all; but evenas opposed to the definite theory of materialism, the above syllogismhas not so valid an argumentative basis to stand upon. We know that whatwe call matter and force are to all appearance eternal, while we have nocorresponding evidence of a mind that is even apparently eternal. Further, within experience mind is invariably associated with highlydifferentiated collocations of matter and distributions of force, andmany facts go to prove, and none to negative, the conclusion that thegrade of intelligence invariably depends upon, or at least is associatedwith, a corresponding grade of cerebral development. There is thus botha qualitative and a quantitative relation between intelligence andcerebral organisation. And if it is said that matter and motion cannotproduce consciousness because it is inconceivable that they should, wehave seen at some length that this is no conclusive consideration asapplied to a subject of a confessedly transcendental nature, and that inthe present case it is particularly inconclusive, because, as it isspeculatively certain that the substance of mind must be unknowable, itseems _à priori_ probable that, whatever is the cause of the unknowablereality, this cause should be more difficult to render into thought inthat relation than would some other hypothetical substance which isimagined as more akin to mind. And if it is said that the _more_conceivable cause is the _more_ probable cause, we have seen that it isin this case impossible to estimate the validity of the remark. Lastly, the statement that the cause must contain actually all that its effectscan contain, was seen to be inadmissible in logic and contradicted byeveryday experience; while the argument from the supposed freedom of thewill and the existence of the moral sense was negatived both deductivelyby the theory of evolution, and inductively by the doctrine ofutilitarianism. ' The theory of the freedom of the will is indeed at thisstage of thought utterly untenable[7]; the evidence is overwhelming thatthe moral sense is the result of a purely natural evolution[8], and thisresult, arrived at on general grounds, is confirmed with irresistibleforce by the account of our human conscience which is supplied by thetheory of utilitarianism, a theory based on the widest and mostunexceptionable of inductions[9]. 'On the whole, then, with regard tothe argument from the existence of the human mind, we were compelled todecide that it is destitute of any assignable weight, there beingnothing more to lead to the conclusion that our mind has been caused byanother mind, than to the conclusion that it has been caused by anythingelse whatsoever. 

'§ 3. With regard to the argument from Design, it was observed thatMill's presentation of it [in his _Essay on Theism_] is merely aresuscitation of the argument as presented by Paley, Bell, and Chalmers. And indeed we saw that the first-named writer treated this whole subjectwith a feebleness and inaccuracy very surprising in him; for while hehas failed to assign anything like due weight to the inductive evidenceof organic evolution, he did not hesitate to rush into a supernaturalexplanation of biological phenomena. Moreover, he has failed signally inhis _analysis_ of the Design argument, seeing that, in common with allprevious writers, he failed to observe that it is utterly impossible forus to know the relations in which the supposed Designer stands to theDesigned, --much less to argue from the fact that the Supreme Mind, evensupposing it to exist, caused the observable products by any particularintellectual _process_. In other words, all advocates of the Designargument have failed to perceive that, even if we grant nature to be dueto a creating Mind, still we have no shadow of a right to conclude thatthis Mind can only have exerted its creative power by means of such andsuch cogitative operations. How absurd, therefore, must it be to raisethe supposed evidence of such cogitative operations into evidences ofthe existence of a creating Mind! If a theist retorts that it is, afterall, of very little importance whether or not we are able to divine the_methods_ of creation, so long as the _facts_ are there to attest that, _in some way or other_, the observable phenomena of nature must be dueto Intelligence of some kind as their ultimate cause, then I am thefirst to endorse this remark. It has always appeared to me one of themost unaccountable things in the history of speculation that so manycompetent writers can have insisted upon _Design_ as an argument forTheism, when they must all have known perfectly well that they have nomeans of ascertaining the subjective psychology of that Supreme Mindwhose existence the argument is adduced to demonstrate. The truth is, that the argument from teleology must, and can only, rest upon theobservable _facts_ of nature, without reference to the intellectual_processes_ by which these facts may be supposed to have beenaccomplished. But, looking to the "present state of our knowledge, " thisis merely to change the teleological argument in its gross Paleyianform, into the argument from the ubiquitous operation of general laws. '

'§ 4. This argument was thus[10] stated in contrast with the argumentfrom design. 'The argument from design says, there must be a God, because such and such an organic structure must have been due to suchand such an intellectual _process_. The argument from general laws says, There must be a God, because such and such an organic structure must _insome way or other have been ultimately due to_ intelligence. ' Everystructure exhibits with more or less of complexity the principle oforder; it is related to all other things in a universal order. Thisuniversality of order renders irrational the hypothesis of chance inaccounting for the universe. 'Let us think of the supreme causality aswe may, the fact remains that from it there emanates a directiveinfluence of uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendousmagnitude and exact precision worthy of our highest conceptions ofdeity[11]. ' The argument was developed in the words of Professor BadenPowell. 'That which requires reason and thought to understand must beitself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate orexpress must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained isbut partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mindand reason of the student. If the more it is studied the more vast andcomplex is the necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the moreevident is the vast extent and compass of the reason thus partiallymanifested and its reality _as existing in the immutably connected orderof objects examined_, independently of the mind of the investigator. 'This argument from the universal _Kosmos_ has the advantage of beingwholly independent of the method by which things came to be what theyare. It is unaffected by the acceptance of evolution. Till quiterecently it seemed irrefutable[12]. 

'But nevertheless we are constrained to acknowledge that its apparentpower dwindles to nothing in view of the indisputable fact that, ifforce and matter have been eternal, all and every natural law must haveresulted by way of necessary consequence. .. . It does not admit of onemoment's questioning that it is as certainly true that all the exquisitebeauty and melodious harmony of nature follows necessarily as inevitablyfrom the persistence of force and the primary qualities of matter as itis certainly true that force is persistent or that matter is extended orimpenetrable[13]. .. . It will be remembered that I dwelt at considerablelength and with much earnestness upon this truth, not only because ofits enormous importance in its bearing upon our subject, but alsobecause no one has hitherto considered it in that relation. ' It was alsopointed out that the coherence and correspondence of the macrocosm ofthe universe with the microcosm of the human mind can be accounted forby the fact that the human mind is only one of the products of generalevolution, its subjective relations necessarily reflecting thoseexternal relations of which they themselves are the product[14]. 

'§ 5. The next step, however, was to mitigate the severity of theconclusion that was liable to be formed upon the utter and hopelesscollapse of all the possible arguments in favour of Theism. Having fullydemonstrated that there is no shadow of a positive argument in supportof the theistic theory, there arose the danger that some persons mighterroneously conclude that for this reason the theistic theory must beuntrue. It therefore became necessary to point out, that although, asfar as we can see, nature does not require an Intelligent Cause toaccount for any of her phenomena, yet it is possible that, if we couldsee farther, we should see that nature could not be what she is unlessshe had owed her existence to an Intelligent Cause. Or, in other words, the probability there is that an Intelligent Cause is unnecessary toexplain any of the phenomena of nature, is only equal to the probabilitythere is that the doctrine of the persistence of force is everywhere andeternally true. 

'As a final step in our analysis, therefore, we altogether quitted theregion of experience, and ignoring even the very foundations of science, and so all the most certain of relative truths, we carried thediscussion into the transcendental region of purely formalconsiderations. And here we laid down the canon, "that the value of anyprobability, in its last analysis, is determined by the number, theimportance, and the definiteness of the relations known, as comparedwith those of the relations unknown;" and, consequently, that in caseswhere the unknown relations are more numerous, more important, or moreindefinite than are the known relations, the value of our inferencevaries inversely as the difference in these respects between therelations compared. From which canon it followed, that as the problem ofTheism is the most ultimate of all problems, and so contains in itsunknown relations all that is to man unknown and unknowable, theserelations must be pronounced the most indefinite of all relations thatit is possible for man to contemplate; and, consequently, that althoughwe have here the entire range of experience from which to argue, we areunable to estimate the real value of any argument whatsoever. Theunknown relations in our attempted induction being wholly indefinite, both in respect of their number and importance, as compared with theknown relations, it is impossible for us to determine any definiteprobability either for or against the being of a God. Therefore, although it is true that, so far as human science can penetrate or humanthought infer, we can perceive no evidence of God, yet we have no righton this account to conclude that there is no God. The probability, therefore, that nature is devoid of Deity, while it is of the strongestkind if regarded scientifically--amounting, in fact, to a scientificdemonstration, --is nevertheless wholly worthless if regarded logically. Although it is as true as is the fundamental basis of all science and ofall experience that, if there is a God, His existence, considered as acause of the universe, is superfluous, it may nevertheless be true that, if there had never been a God, the universe could never have existed. 

'Hence these formal considerations proved conclusively that, no matterhow great the probability of Atheism might appear to be in a relativesense, we have no means of estimating such probability in an absolutesense. From which position there emerged the possibility of anotherargument in favour of Theism--or rather let us say, of a reappearance ofthe teleological argument in another form. For it may be said, seeingthat these formal considerations exclude legitimate reasoning either foror against Deity in an absolute sense, while they do not exclude suchreasoning in a relative sense, if there yet remain any theisticdeductions which may properly be drawn from experience, these may now beadduced to balance the atheistic deductions from the persistence offorce. For although the latter deductions have clearly shown theexistence of Deity to be superfluous in a scientific sense, the formalconsiderations in question have no less clearly opened up beyond thesphere of science a possible _locus_ for the existence of Deity; so thatif there are any facts supplied by experience for which the atheisticdeductions appear insufficient to account, we are still free to accountfor them in a relative sense by the hypothesis of Theism. And, it may beurged, we do find such an unexplained residuum in the correlation ofgeneral laws in the production of cosmic harmony. It signifies nothing, the argument may run, that we are unable to conceive the methods wherebythe supposed Mind operates in producing cosmic harmony; nor does itsignify that its operation must now be relegated to a super-scientificprovince. What does signify is that, taking a general view of nature, we find it impossible to conceive of the extent and variety of herharmonious processes as other than products of intelligent causation. Now this sublimated form of the teleological argument, it will beremembered, I denoted a metaphysical teleology, in order sharply todistinguish it from all previous forms of that argument, which, incontradistinction I denoted scientific teleologies. And the distinction, it will be remembered, consisted in this--that while all previous formsof teleology, by resting on a basis which was not beyond the possiblereach of science, laid themselves open to the possibility of scientificrefutation, the metaphysical system of teleology, by resting on a basiswhich is clearly beyond the possible reach of science, can never besusceptible of scientific refutation. And that this metaphysical systemof teleology does rest on such a basis is indisputable; for while itaccepts the most ultimate truths of which science can ever becognizant--viz. The persistence of force and the consequently necessarygenesis of natural law, --it nevertheless maintains that the necessity ofregarding Mind as the ultimate cause of things is not on this accountremoved; and, therefore, that if science now requires the operation of aSupreme Mind to be posited in a super-scientific sphere, then in asuper-scientific sphere it ought to be posited. No doubt this hypothesisat first sight seems gratuitous, seeing that, so far as science canpenetrate, there is no need of any such hypothesis at all--cosmicharmony resulting as a physically necessary consequence from thecombined action of natural laws, which in turn result as a physicallynecessary consequence of the persistence of force and the primaryqualities of matter. But although it is thus indisputably true thatmetaphysical teleology is wholly gratuitous if consideredscientifically, it may not be true that it is wholly gratuitous ifconsidered psychologically. In other words, if it is more conceivablethat Mind should be the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony than that thepersistence of force should be so, then it is not irrational to acceptthe more conceivable hypothesis in preference to the less conceivableone, provided that the choice is made with the diffidence which isrequired by the considerations adduced in Chapter V [especially the_Canon of probability_ laid down in the second paragraph of thissection, § 5]. 

'I conclude, therefore, that the hypothesis of metaphysical teleology, although in a physical sense gratuitous, may be in a psychological senselegitimate. But as against the fundamental position on which alone thisargument can rest--viz. The position that the fundamental postulate ofAtheism is more _inconceivable_ than is the fundamental postulate ofTheism--we have seen two important objections to lie. 

'For, in the first place, the sense in which the word "inconceivable" ishere used is that of the impossibility of framing _realizable_ relationsin the thought; not that of the impossibility of framing _abstract_relations in thought. In the same sense, though in a lower degree, it istrue that the complexity of the human organization and its functions isinconceivable; but in this sense the word "inconceivable" has much lessweight in an argument than it has in its true sense. And, withoutwaiting again to dispute (as we did in the case of the speculativestanding of Materialism) how far even the genuine test ofinconceivability ought to be allowed to make against an inference whichthere is a body of scientific evidence to substantiate, we went on tothe second objection against this fundamental position of metaphysicalteleology. This objection, it will be remembered, was, that it is asimpossible to conceive of cosmic harmony as an effect of Mind [i. E. Mindbeing what we know it in experience to be], as it is to conceive of itas an effect of mindless evolution. The argument from inconceivability, therefore, admits of being turned with quite as terrible an effect onTheism, as it can possibly be made to exert on Atheism. 

'Hence this more refined form of teleology which we are considering, andwhich we saw to be the last of the possible arguments in favour ofTheism, is met on its own ground by a very crushing opposition: by itsmetaphysical character it has escaped the opposition of physicalscience, only to encounter a new opposition in the region of purepsychology to which it fled. As a conclusion to our whole inquiry, therefore, it devolved on us to determine the relative magnitudes ofthese opposing forces. And in doing this we first observed that, if thesupporters of metaphysical teleology objected _à priori_ to the methodwhereby the genesis of natural law was deduced from the datum of thepersistence of force, in that this method involved an unrestricted useof illegitimate symbolic conceptions; then it is no less open to anatheist to object _à priori_ to the method whereby a directing Mind wasinferred from the datum of cosmic harmony, in that this method involvedthe postulation of an unknowable cause, --and this of a character whichthe whole history of human thought has proved the human mind to exhibitan overweening tendency to postulate as the cause of natural phenomena. On these grounds, therefore, I concluded that, so far as theirrespective standing _à priori_ is concerned, both theories may beregarded as about equally suspicious. And similarly with regard to theirstanding _à posteriori_; for as both theories require to embody at leastone infinite term, they must each alike be pronounced absolutelyinconceivable. But, finally, if the question were put to me which of thetwo theories I regarded as the more rational, I observed that this is aquestion which no one man can answer for another. For as the test ofabsolute inconceivability is equally destructive of both theories, if aman wishes to choose between them, his choice can only be determined bywhat I have designated relative inconceivability--i. E. In accordancewith the verdict given by his individual sense of probability asdetermined by his previous habit of thought. And forasmuch as the testof relative inconceivability may be held in this matter legitimately tovary with the character of the mind which applies it, the strictlyrational probability of the question to which it is applied varies inlike manner. Or otherwise presented, the only alternative for any man inthis matter is either to discipline himself into an attitude of purescepticism, and thus to refuse in thought to entertain either aprobability or an improbability concerning the existence of a God; orelse to incline in thought towards an affirmation or a negation of God, according as his previous habits of thought have rendered such aninclination more facile in the one direction than in the other. Andalthough, under such circumstances, I should consider that man the morerational who carefully suspended his judgement, I conclude that if thiscourse is departed from, neither the metaphysical teleologist nor thescientific atheist has any perceptible advantage over the other inrespect of rationality. For as the formal conditions of a metaphysicalteleology are undoubtedly present on the one hand, and the formalconditions of a speculative atheism are as undoubtedly present on theother, there is thus in both cases a logical vacuum supplied wherein thependulum of thought is free to swing in whichever direction it may bemade to swing by the momentum of preconceived ideas. 

'§ 6. Such is the outcome of our investigation, and considering theabstract nature of the subject, the immense divergence of opinion whichat the present time is manifested with regard to it, as well as theconfusing amount of good, bad and indifferent literature on both sidesof the controversy which is extant;--considering these things, I do notthink that the result of our inquiry can be justly complained of on thescore of its lacking precision. At a time like the present, whentraditional beliefs respecting Theism are so generally accepted, and socommonly concluded as a matter of course to have a large and valid basisof induction whereon to rest, I cannot but feel that a perusal of thisshort essay, by showing how very concise the scientific _status_ of thesubject really is, will do more to settle the minds of most readers asto the exact standing at the present time of all the probabilities ofthe question, than could a perusal of all the rest of the literatureupon this subject. And, looking to the present condition of speculativephilosophy, I regard it as of the utmost importance to have clearlyshown that the advance of science has now entitled us to assert, withoutthe least hesitation, that the hypothesis of Mind in nature is ascertainly superfluous to account for any of the phenomena of nature, asthe scientific doctrine of the persistence of force and theindestructibility of matter is certainly true. 

'On the other hand, if any one is inclined to complain that the logicalaspect of the question has not proved itself so unequivocally definiteas has the scientific, I must ask him to consider that, in any matterwhich does not admit of actual demonstration, some margin must ofnecessity be left for variations of individual opinion. And, if he bearsthis consideration in mind, I feel sure that he cannot properlycomplain of my not having done my utmost in this case to define assharply as possible the character and the limits of this margin. 

'§ 7. And now, in conclusion, I feel it is desirable to state that anyantecedent bias with regard to Theism which I individually possess isunquestionably on the side of traditional beliefs. It is therefore withthe utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusionshere worked out; and nothing would have induced me to publish them, savethe strength of my conviction that it is the duty of every member ofsociety to give his fellows the benefit of his labours for whatever theymay be worth. Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be themost profitable for the race, so I am persuaded that every individualendeavour to attain it, provided only that such endeavour is unbiassedand sincere, ought without hesitation to be made the common property ofall men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation mayappear to tend. And so far as the ruination of individual happiness isconcerned, no one can have a more lively perception than myself of thepossibly disastrous tendency of my work. So far as I am individuallyconcerned, the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether Iregard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relativeprobability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, itequally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which Iconceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect with regardto this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And forasmuchas I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that thetwilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable substitute for thewaning splendour of "the old, " I am not ashamed to confess that withthis virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul ofloveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work while itis day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terriblyintensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no man canwork, " yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of theappalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which oncewas mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it, --at suchtimes I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang ofwhich my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligencenot being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, orwhether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to meat least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel thatfor me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth inthose words of Hamilton, --Philosophy having become a meditation, notmerely of death, but of annihilation, the precept _know thyself_ hasbecome transformed into the terrific oracle to OEdipus--

 "Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art. "'

This analysis will have been at least sufficient to give a clear ideaof the general argument of the _Candid Examination_ and of itsmelancholy conclusions. What will most strike a somewhat critical readeris perhaps (1) the tone of certainty, and (2) the belief in the almostexclusive right of the scientific method in the court of reason. 

As evidence of (1) I would adduce the following brief quotations:--

 P. Xi. 'Possible errors in reasoning apart, the rational position of Theism as here defined must remain without material modification as long as our intelligence remains human. '

 P. 24. 'I am quite unable to understand how any one at the present day, and with the most moderate powers of abstract thinking, can possibly bring himself to embrace the theory of Free-will. '

 P. 64. 'Undoubtedly we have no alternative but to conclude that the hypothesis of mind in nature is now logically proved to be as certainly superfluous as the very basis of all science is certainly true. There can no longer be any more doubt that the existence of a God is wholly unnecessary to explain any of the phenomena of the universe, than there is doubt that if I leave go of my pen it will fall upon the table. '

As evidence of (2) I would adduce from the preface--

 'To my mind, therefore, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, looking to this undoubted pre-eminence of the scientific methods as ways to truth, whether or not there is a God, the question as to his existence is both more morally and more reverently contemplated if we regard it purely as a problem for methodical analysis to solve, than if we regard it in any other light. '

It is in respect both of (1) and (2) that the change in Romanes' thoughtas exhibited in his later Notes is most conspicuous[15]. 

At what date George Romanes' mind began to react from the conclusions ofthe _Candid Examination_ I cannot say. But after a period of tenyears--in his Rede lecture of 1885[16]--we find his frame of mind verymuch changed. This lecture, on _Mind and Motion_, consists of a severecriticism of the materialistic account of mind. On the other hand'spiritualism'--or the theory which would suppose that mind is the causeof motion--is pronounced from the point of view of science notimpossible indeed but 'unsatisfactory, ' and the more probable conclusionis found in a 'monism' like Bruno's--according to which mind and motionare co-ordinate and probably co-extensive aspects of the same universalfact--a monism which may be called Pantheism, but may also be regardedas an extension of contracted views of Theism[17]. The positionrepresented by this lecture may be seen sufficiently from itsconclusion:--

'If the advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to theconclusion that there is no motion without mind, must we not see how theindependent conclusion of mental science is thus independentlyconfirmed--the conclusion, I mean, that there is no being withoutknowing? To me, at least, it does appear that the time has come when wemay begin, as it were in a dawning light, to see that the study ofNature and the study of Mind are meeting upon this greatest of possibletruths. And if this is the case--if there is no motion without mind, nobeing without knowing--shall we infer, with Clifford, that universalbeing is mindless, or answer with a dogmatic negative that moststupendous of questions, --Is there knowledge with the Most High? Ifthere is no motion without mind, no being without knowing, may we notrather infer, with Bruno, that it is in the medium of mind, and in themedium of knowledge, we live, and move, and have our being?

'This, I think, is the direction in which the inference points, if weare careful to set out the logical conditions with completeimpartiality. But the ulterior question remains, whether, so far asscience is concerned, it is here possible to point any inference at all:the whole orbit of human knowledge may be too narrow to afford aparallax for measurements so vast. Yet even here, if it be true that thevoice of science must thus of necessity speak the language ofagnosticism, at least let us see to it that the language is pure[18];let us not tolerate any barbarisms introduced from the side ofaggressive dogma. So shall we find that this new grammar of thought doesnot admit of any constructions radically opposed to more venerable waysof thinking; even if we do not find that the often-quoted words of itsearliest formulator apply with special force to its latestdialects--that if a little knowledge of physiology and a littleknowledge of psychology dispose men to atheism, a deeper knowledge ofboth, and, still more, a deeper thought upon their relations to oneanother, will lead men back to some form of religion, which if it bemore vague, may also be more worthy than that of earlier days. '

Some time before 1889 three articles were written for the _NineteenthCentury_ on the _Influence of Science upon Religion_. They were neverpublished, for what reason I am not able to ascertain. But I havethought it worth while to print the first two of them as a 'first part'of this volume, both because they contain--written in George Romanes'own name--an important criticism upon the _Candid Examination_ which hehad published anonymously, and also because, with their entirelysceptical result, they exhibit very clearly a stage in the mentalhistory of their author. The antecedents of these papers those who haveread this Introduction will now be in a position to understand. Whatremains to be said by way of further introduction to the Notes hadbetter be reserved till later. 

 C. G. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] p. 7. 

[2] p. 173. 

[3] See p. 110. 

[4] But see an interesting note in Romanes' _Mind and Motion and Monism_(Longmans, 1895) p. 111. 

[5] Published in Trübner's _English and Foreign Philosophical Library_in 1878, but written 'several years ago' (preface). 'I have refrainedfrom publishing it, ' the author explains, 'lest, after having done so, Ishould find that more mature thought had modified the conclusions whichthe author sets forth. '

[6] At times I have sought to make the argument of the chapter moreintelligible by introducing references to earlier parts of the book orexplanations in my own words. These latter I have inserted in squarebrackets. 

[7] p. 24. 

[8] p. 28. 

[9] p. 28. 

[10] p. 45. 

[11] p. 47. 

[12] p. 50. 

[13] p. 63. 

[14] pp. 58 ff. 

[15] With reference to the views and arguments of the _CandidExamination_, it may be interesting to notice here in detail that GeorgeRomanes (1) came to attach much more importance to the subjectivereligious needs and intuitions of the human spirit (pp. 131 ff. ); (2)perceived that the subjective religious consciousness can be regardedobjectively as a broad human phenomenon (pp. 147 f. ); (3) criticized hisearlier theory of causation and returned _towards_ the theory that allcausation is volitional (pp. 102, 118); (4) definitely repudiated thematerialistic account of the origin of mind (pp. 30, 31); (5) returnedto the use of the expression 'the argument from design, ' and thereforepresumably abandoned his strong objection to it; (6) 'saw through'Herbert Spencer's refutation of the wider teleology expressed by BadenPowell, and felt the force of the teleology again (p. 72); (7)recognized that the scientific objections to the doctrine of the freedomof the will are not finally valid (p. 128). 

[16] See _Mind and Motion and Monism_, pp. 36 ff. 

[17] In some 'Notes' of the Summer of 1893 I find the statement, 'Theresult (of philosophical inquiry) has been that in his millennialcontemplation and experience man has attained certainty with regard tocertain aspects of the world problem, no less secure than that which hehas gained in the domain of physical science, e. G. 

Logical priority of mind over matter. 

Consequent untenability of materialism. 

Relativity of knowledge. 

The order of nature, conservation of energy and indestructibility ofmatter within human experience, the principle of evolution and survivalof the fittest. '

[18] For the meaning of 'pure' agnosticism see below, pp. 107 ff. 

PART I. 

THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE UPON RELIGION. 

I. 

I propose to consider, in a series of three papers, the influence ofScience upon Religion. In doing this I shall seek to confine myself tothe strictly rational aspect of the subject, without travelling into anymatters of sentiment. Moreover, I shall aim at estimating in the firstinstance the kind and degree of influence which has been exerted byScience upon Religion in the past, and then go on to estimate theprobable extent of this influence in the future. The first two paperswill be devoted to the past and prospective influence of Science uponNatural Religion, while the third will be devoted to the past andprospective influence of Science upon Revealed Religion[19]. 

Few subjects have excited so much interest of late years as that which Ithus mark out for discussion. This can scarcely be considered a matterof surprise, seeing that the influence in question is not only verydirect, but also extremely important from every point of view. Forgenerations and for centuries in succession Religion maintained anundisputed sway over men's minds--if not always as a practical guide inmatters of conduct, at least as a regulator of belief. Even among thecomparatively few who in previous centuries professedly rejectedChristianity, there can be no doubt that their intellectual conceptionswere largely determined by it: for Christianity being then the onlycourt of appeal with reference to all these conceptions, even the fewminds which were professedly without its jurisdiction could scarcelyescape its indirect influence through the minds of others. But as sideby side with the venerable institution a new court of appeal wasgradually formed, we cannot wonder that it should have come to beregarded in the light of a rival to the old--more especially as thesearching methods of its inquiry and the certain character of itsjudgements were much more in consonance with the requirements of an agedisposed to scepticism. And this spirit of rivalry is still furtherfostered by the fact that Science has unquestionably exerted uponReligion what Mr. Fiske terms a 'purifying influence. ' That is to say, not only are the scientific methods of inquiry after truth morecongenial to sceptical minds than are the religious methods (which maybroadly be defined as accepting truth on authority), but the results ofthe former have more than once directly contradicted those of thelatter: science has in several cases incontestably demonstrated thatreligious teaching has been wrong as to matters of fact. Further still, the great advance of natural knowledge which has characterized thepresent century, has caused our ideas upon many subjects connected withphilosophy to undergo a complete metamorphosis. A well-educated man ofthe present day is absolutely precluded from regarding some of theChristian dogmas from the same intellectual standpoint as hisforefathers, even though he may still continue to accept them in someother sense. In short, our whole key of thinking or tone of thoughthaving been in certain respects changed, we can no longer anticipatethat in these respects it should continue to harmonize with theunalterable system of theology. 

Such I conceive to be the ways in which Science has exerted herinfluence upon Religion, and it is needless to dwell upon the potency oftheir united effect. No one can read even a newspaper without perceivinghow great this effect has been. On the one hand, sceptics aretriumphantly confident that the light of dawning knowledge has begunfinally to dispel the darkness of superstition, while religious persons, on the other hand, tremble to think what the future, if judged by thepast, is likely to bring forth. On both sides we have free discussion, strong language, and earnest canvassing. Year by year stock is taken, and year by year the balance is found to preponderate in favour ofScience. 

This being the state of things of the present time, I think that withthe experience of the kind and degree of influence which Science hasexerted upon Religion in the past, we have material enough whereby toestimate the probable extent of such influence in the future. This, therefore, I shall endeavour to do by seeking to define, on generalprinciples, the limits within which it is antecedently possible that theinfluence in question can be exercised. But in order to do this, it isnecessary to begin by estimating the kind and degree of the influencewhich has been exerted by Science upon Religion in the past. 

Thus much premised, we have in the first place to define the essentialnature both of Science and of Religion: for this is clearly the firststep in an analysis which has for its object an estimation of the actualand possible effects of one of these departments of thought upon theother. 

Science, then, is essentially a department of thought having exclusivereference to the Proximate. More particularly, it is a department ofthought having for its object the explanation of natural phenomena bythe discovery of natural (or proximate) causes. In so far as Scienceventures to trespass beyond this her only legitimate domain, and seeksto interpret natural phenomena by the immediate agency of supernaturalor ultimate causes, in that degree has she ceased to be physicalscience, and become ontological speculation. The truth of this statementhas now been practically recognized by all scientific workers; and termsdescribing final causes have been banished from their vocabulary inastronomy, chemistry, geology, biology, and even in psychology. 

Religion, on the other hand, is a department of thought having no lessexclusive reference to the Ultimate. More particularly, it is adepartment of thought having for its object a self-conscious andintelligent Being, which it regards as a Personal God, and thefountain-head of all causation. I am, of course, aware that the termReligion has been of late years frequently used in senses which thisdefinition would not cover; but I conceive that this only shows howfrequently the term in question has been abused. To call any theory ofthings a Religion which does not present any belief in any form ofDeity, is to apply the word to the very opposite of that which it hashitherto been used to denote. To speak of the Religion of theUnknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and soforth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is asunmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or therationality of the equator. That is to say, if any meaning is to beextracted from the terms at all, it is only to be so by using them insome metaphorical sense. We may, for instance, say that there is such athing as a Religion of Humanity, because we may begin by deifyingHumanity in our own estimation, and then go on to worship our ideal. Butby thus giving Humanity the name of Deity we are not really creating anew religion: we are merely using a metaphor, which may or may not besuccessful as a matter of poetic diction, but which most assuredlypresents no shred of value as a matter of philosophical statement. Indeed, in this relation it is worse than valueless: it is misleading. Variations or reversals in the meanings of words are not of uncommonoccurrence in the ordinary growth of languages; but it is not often thatwe find, as in this case, the whole meaning of a term intentionally andgratuitously changed by the leaders of philosophical thought. Humanity, for example, is an abstract idea of our own making: it is not an objectany more than the equator is an object. Therefore, if it were possibleto construct a religion by this curious device of metaphoricallyascribing to Humanity the attributes of Deity, it ought to be aslogically possible to construct, let us say, a theory of brotherlyregard towards the equator, by metaphorically ascribing to it theattributes of man. The distinguishing features of any theory which canproperly be termed a Religion, is that it should refer to the ultimatesource, or sources, of things: and that it should suppose this source tobe of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the termReligion to any other theory is merely to abuse it. 

From these definitions, then, it appears that the aims and methods ofScience are exclusively concerned with the ascertaining and the proof ofthe proximate How of things and processes physical: her problem is, asMill states it, to discover what are the fewest number of (phenomenal)data which, being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience. Onthe other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation, further than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimatelydue to intelligent personality. Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says, 'an _à priori_ theory of the universe'--to which, however, we must add, 'and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originatingsource of the universe. ' Without this needful addition, a religion wouldbe in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy. 

From these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purestforms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact. Only if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, ofphenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then couldScience be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion. But obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science. In soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aetherof noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in suchan atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement. Out of time, outof place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer existas such. 

On the other hand, Religion in its purest form is equally incompetent toaffect Science. For, as we have already seen, Religion as such is notconcerned with the phenomenal sphere: her theory of ontology cannot haveany reference to the How of phenomenal causation. Hence it is evidentthat, as in their purest or most ideal forms they move in differentmental planes, Science and Religion cannot exhibit interference. 

Thus far the remarks which I have made apply equally to all forms ofReligion, as such, whether actual or possible, and in so far as theReligion is _pure_. But it is notorious that until quite recentlyReligion did exercise upon Science, not only an influence, but anoverpowering influence. Belief in divine agency being all but universal, while the methods of scientific research had not as yet been distinctlyformulated, it was in previous generations the usual habit of mind torefer any natural phenomenon, the physical causation of which had notbeen ascertained, to the more or less immediate causal action of theDeity. But we now see that this habit of mind arose from a failure todistinguish between the essentially distinct characters of Science andReligion as departments of thought, and therefore that it was only sofar as the Religion of former times was impure--or mixed with theingredients of thought which belong to Science--that the balefulinfluence in question was exerted. The gradual, successive, and now allbut total abolition of final causes from the thoughts of scientific men, to which allusion has already been made, is merely an expression of thefact that scientific men as a body have come fully to recognize thefundamental distinction between Science and Religion which I havestated. 

Or, to put the matter in another way, scientific men as a body--and, indeed, all persons whose ideas on such matters are abreast of thetimes--perceive plainly enough that a religious explanation of anynatural phenomenon is, from a scientific point of view, no explanationat all. For a religious explanation consists in referring the observedphenomenon to the First Cause--i. E. To merge that particular phenomenonin the general or final mystery of things. A scientific explanation, onthe other hand, consists in referring the observed phenomenon to itsphysical causes, and in no case can such an explanation entertain thehypothesis of a final cause without abandoning its character as ascientific explanation. For example, if a child brings me a flower andasks why it has such a curious form, bright colour, sweet perfume, andso on, and if I answer, Because God made it so, I am not reallyanswering the child's question: I am merely concealing my ignorance ofNature under a guise of piety, and excusing my indolence in the study ofbotany. It was the appreciation of this fact that led Mr. Darwin toobserve in his _Origin of Species_ that the theory of creation does notserve to explain any of the facts with which it is concerned, but merelyre-states these facts as they are observed to occur. That is to say, bythus merging the facts as observed into the final mystery of things, weare not even attempting to explain them in any scientific sense: for itwould be obviously possible to get rid of the necessity of thusexplaining any natural phenomenon whatsoever by referring it to theimmediate causal action of the Deity. If any phenomenon were actuallyto occur which did proceed from the immediate causal action of theDeity, then _ex hypothesi_, there would be no physical causes toinvestigate, and the occupation of Othello, in the person of a man ofscience, would be gone. Such a phenomenon would be miraculous, andtherefore from its very nature beyond the reach of scientificinvestigation. 

Properly speaking, then, the religious theory of final causes does notexplain any of the phenomena of Nature: it merely re-states thephenomena as observed--or, if we prefer so to say, it is itself anultimate and universal explanation of all possible phenomena takencollectively. For it must be admitted that behind all possibleexplanations of a scientific kind, there lies a great inexplicable, which just because of its ultimate character, cannot be merged intoanything further--that is to say, cannot be explained. 'It is what itis, ' is all that we can say of it: 'I am that I am' is all that it couldsay of itself. And it is in referring phenomena to this inexplicablesource of physical causation that the theory of Religion essentiallyconsists. The theory of Science, on the other hand, consists in theassumption that there is always a practically endless chain of physicalcausation to investigate--i. E. An endless series of phenomena to beexplained. So that, if we define the process of explanation as theprocess of referring observed phenomena to their adequate causes, we maysay that Religion, by the aid of a general theory of things in thepostulation of an intelligent First Cause, furnishes to her ownsatisfaction an ultimate explanation of the universe as a whole, andtherefore is not concerned with any of those proximate explanations ordiscovery of second causes, which form the exclusive subject-matter ofScience. In other words, we recur to the definitions already stated, tothe effect that Religion is a department of thought having, as such, exclusive reference to the Ultimate, while Science is a department ofthought having, as such, no less exclusive reference to the Proximate. When these two departments of thought overlap, interference results, andwe find confusion. Therefore it was that when the religious theory offinal causes intruded upon the field of scientific inquiry, it waspassing beyond its logical domain; and seeking to arrogate the functionof explaining this or that phenomenon _in detail_, it ceased to be apurely religious theory, while at the same time and for the same reasonit blocked the way of scientific progress[20]. 

This remark serves to introduce one of the chief topics with which Ihave to deal--viz. The doctrine of Design in Nature, and thus the wholequestion of Natural Religion in its relation to Natural Science. Inhandling this topic I shall endeavour to take as broad and deep a viewas I can of the present standing of Natural Religion, without waiting toshow step by step the ways and means by which it has been brought intothis position, by the influence of Science. 

In the earliest dawn of recorded thought, teleology in some form oranother has been the most generally accepted theory whereby the order ofNature is explained. It is not, however, my object in this paper totrace the history of this theory from its first rude beginnings inFetishism to its final development in Theism. I intend to devote myselfexclusively to the question as to the present standing of this theory, and I allude to its past history only in order to examine the statementwhich is frequently made, to the effect that its general prevalence inall ages and among all peoples of the world lends to it a certain degreeof 'antecedent credibility. ' With reference to this point, I should say, that, whether or not the order of Nature is due to a disposing Mind, thehypothesis of mental agency in Nature--or, as the Duke of Argyll termsit, the hypothesis of 'anthropopsychism'--must necessarily have been theearliest hypothesis. What we find in Nature is the universal prevalenceof causation, and long before the no less universal equivalency betweencauses and effects--i. E. The universal prevalence of natural law--becamea matter of even the [vaguest] appreciation, the general fact thatnothing happens without a cause of some kind was fully recognized. Indeed, the recognition of this fact is not only presented by thelowest races of the present day, but, as I have myself given evidence toshow, likewise by animals and infants[21]. And therefore, it appears tome probable that those psychologists are right who argue that the ideaof cause is intuitive, in the same sense that the ideas of space andtime are intuitive--i. E. The instinctive or [inherited] effect ofancestral experience. 

Now if it is thus a matter of certainty that the recognition ofcausality in Nature is co-extensive with, and even anterior to, thehuman mind, it appears to me no less certain that the first attempt atassigning a cause of this or that observed event in Nature--i. E. Thefirst attempts at a rational explanation of the phenomena ofNature--must have been of an anthropopsychic kind. No other explanationwas, as it were, so ready to hand as that of projecting into externalNature the agency of volition, which was known to each individual as theapparent fountain-head of causal activity so far as he and hisneighbours were concerned. To reach this most obvious explanation ofcausality in Nature, it did not require that primitive man should know, as we know, that the very conception of causality arises out of oursense of effort in voluntary action; it only required that this shouldbe the fact, and then it must needs follow that when any naturalphenomenon was thought about at all with reference to its causality, thecause inferred should be one of a psychical kind. I need not wait totrace the gradual integration of this anthropopsychic hypothesis fromits earliest and most diffused form of what we may term polypsychism(wherein the causes inferred were almost as personally numerous as theeffects contemplated), through polytheism (wherein many effects of alike kind were referred to one deity, who, as it were, took specialcharge over that class), up to monotheism (wherein all causation isgathered up into the monopsychism of a single personality): it is enoughthus briefly to show that from first to last the hypothesis ofanthropopsychism is a necessary phase of mental evolution under existingconditions, and this whether or not the hypothesis is true. 

Thus viewed, I do not think that 'the general consent of mankind' is afact of any argumentative weight in favour of the anthropopsychictheory--so far, I mean, as the matter of causation is concerned--whetherthis be in fetishism or in the teleology of our own day: the generalconsent of mankind in the larger question of theism (where sundry othermatters besides causation fail to be considered) does not here concernus. Indeed, it appears to me that if we are to go back to the savagesfor any guarantee of our anthropopsychic theory, the pledge which wereceive is of worse than no value. As well might we conclude that amatch is a living organism, because this is to the mind of a savage themost obvious explanation of its movements, as conclude on preciselysimilar grounds that our belief in teleology derives any real supportfrom any of the more primitive phases of anthropopsychism. 

It seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to estimate the evidence ofdesign in Nature, we must as it were start _de novo_, without referenceto anterior beliefs upon the subject. The question is essentially one tobe considered in the light of all the latest knowledge that we possess, and by the best faculties of thinking that we (the heirs of all theages) are able to bring to bear upon it. I shall, therefore, only alludeto the history of anthropopsychism in so far as I may find it necessaryto do so for the sake of elucidating my argument. 

And here it is needful to consider first what Paley called 'the state ofthe argument' before the Darwinian epoch. This is clearly and terselypresented by Paley in his classical illustration of finding a watch upona heath--an illustration so well known that I need not here re-state it. I will merely observe, therefore, that it conveys, as it were in one'swatch-pocket, the whole of the argument from design; and that it is notin my opinion open to the stricture which was passed upon it by Millwhere he says, --'The inference would not be from marks of design, butbecause I already know by direct experience that watches are made bymen. ' This appears to me to miss the whole point of Paley's meaning, forthere would be obviously no argument at all unless he be understood tomean that the evidence of design which is supposed to be afforded byexamination of the watch, is supposed to be afforded by this examinationonly, and not from any of the direct knowledge alluded to by Mill. Forthe purposes of the illustration, it must clearly be assumed that thefinder of the watch has no previous or direct knowledge touching themanufacture of watches. Apart from this curious misunderstanding, Millwas at one with Paley upon the whole subject. 

Again, it is no real objection to the argument or illustration to say, as we often have said, that it does not account for the watchmaker. Theobject of the argument from design is to _prove_ the existence of adesigner: not to _explain_ that existence. Indeed, it would be suicidalto the whole argument in its relation to Theism, if the possibility ofany such explanation were entertained; for such a possibility could onlybe entertained on the supposition that the being of the Deity admits ofbeing explained--i. E. That the Deity is not ultimate. 

Lastly, the argument is precisely the same as that which occurs innumerous passages of Scripture and in theological writings all over theworld down to the present time. That is to say, everywhere in organicnature we meet with innumerable adaptations of means to ends, which invery many cases present a degree of refinement and complexity incomparison with which the adaptations of means to ends in a watch arebut miserable and rudimentary attempts at mechanism. No one can know sowell as the modern biologist in what an immeasurable degree themechanisms which occur in such profusion in nature surpass, in everyform of excellence, the highest triumphs of human invention. Hence atfirst sight it does unquestionably appear that we could have no strongeror better evidence of purpose than is thus afforded. In the words ofPaley: 'arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to anend, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence ofintelligence and mind. '

But next the question arises, Although such things certainly [may][22]imply the presence of mind as their explanatory cause, are we entitledto assume that there can be in nature no other cause competent toproduce these effects? This is a question which never seems to haveoccurred to Paley, Bell, Chalmers, or indeed to any of the naturaltheologians up to the time of Darwin. This, I think, is a remarkablefact, because the question is one which, as a mere matter of logicalform, appears to lie so much upon the surface. But nevertheless the factremains that natural theologians, so far as I know without exception, were satisfied to assume as an axiom that mechanism could have no causeother than that of a designing mind; and therefore their work wasrestricted to tracing out in detail the number and the excellency of themechanisms which were to be met with in nature. It is, however, obviousthat the mere accumulation of such cases can have no real, or logical, effect upon the argument. The mechanisms which we encounter in natureare so amazing in their perfections, that the attentive study of any oneof them would (as Paley in his illustration virtually, though notexpressly, contends) be sufficient to carry the whole position, if theassumption be conceded that mechanism can only be due to mind. Thereforethe argument is not really, or logically, strengthened by the mereaccumulation of any number of special cases of mechanism in nature, allas mechanisms similar in kind. Let us now consider this argument. 

If we are disposed to wonder why natural theologians prior to the daysof Darwin were content to assume that mind is the only possible cause ofmechanism, I think we have a ready answer in the universal prevalence oftheir belief in special creation. For I think it is unquestionable that, upon the basis of this belief, the assumption is legitimate. That is tosay, if we start with the belief that all species of plants and animalswere originally introduced to the complex conditions of their severalenvironments suddenly and ready made (in some such manner as watches areturned out from a manufactory), then I think we are reasonably entitledto assume that no conceivable cause, other than that of intelligentpurpose, could possibly be assigned in explanation of the effects. Itis, of course, needless to observe that in so far as this previousbelief in special creation was thus allowed to affect the argument fromdesign, that argument became an instance of circular reasoning. And itis, perhaps, equally needless to observe that the mere fact ofevolution, as distinguished from special creation--or of the gradualdevelopment of living mechanisms, as distinguished from their suddenand ready-made apparition--would not in any way affect the argument fromdesign, unless it could be shown that the process of evolution admitsthe possibility of some other cause which is not admitted by thehypothesis of special creation. But this is precisely what is shown bythe theory of evolution as propounded by Darwin. That is to say, thetheory of the gradual development of living mechanisms propounded byDarwin, is something more than a theory of gradual development asdistinguished from sudden creation. It is this, but it is also a theoryof a purely scientific kind which seeks to explain the purely physicalcauses of that development. And this is the point where natural sciencebegins to exert her influence upon natural theology--or the point wherethe theory of evolution begins to affect the theory of design. As thisis a most important part of our subject, and one upon which anextraordinary amount of confusion at the present time prevails, I shallin my next paper carefully consider it in all its bearings. 

FOOTNOTES:

[19] [The third paper is not published because Romanes' views on therelation between science and faith in Revealed Religion are better andmore maturely expressed in the Notes. --ED. ]

[20] To avoid misunderstanding I may observe that in the abovedefinitions I am considering Religion and Science under the conditionsin which they actually exist. It is conceivable that under otherconditions these two departments of thought might not be so sharplyseparated. Thus, for instance, if a Religion were to appear carrying arevelation to Science upon matters of physical causation, such aReligion (supposing the revelation were found by experiment to be true)ought to be held to exercise upon Science a strictly legitimateinfluence. 

[21] _Mental Evolution in Animals_, pp. 155-8. 

[22] [I have put 'may' in place of 'do' for the sake of argument. --ED. ]

II. 

Suppose the man who found the watch upon a heath to continue his walktill he comes down to the sea-shore, and suppose further that he is asignorant of physical geography as he is of watch-making. He soon beginsto observe a number of adaptations of means to ends, which, if lessrefined and delicate than those that formed the object of his study inthe watch, are on the other hand much more impressive from the greatlylarger scale on which they are displayed. First, he observes that thereis a beautiful basin hollowed out in the land for the reception of abay; that the sides of this basin, which from being near its opening aremost exposed to the action of large rolling billows, are composed ofrocky cliffs, evidently in order to prevent the further encroachment ofthe sea, and the consequent destruction of the entire bay; that thesides of the basin, which from being successively situated more inlandare successively less and less exposed to the action of large waves, areconstituted successively of smaller rocks, passing into shingle, andeventually into the finest sand: that as the tides rise and fall with asgreat a regularity as was exhibited by the movements of the watch, thestones are carefully separated out from the sand to be arranged insloping layers by themselves, and this always with a most beautifulreference to the places round the margin of the basin which are most indanger of being damaged by the action of the waves. He would furtherobserve, upon closer inspection, that this process of selectivearrangement goes into matters of the most minute detail. Here, forinstance, he would observe a mile or two of a particular kind of seaweedartistically arranged in one long sinuous line upon the beach; there hewould see a wonderful deposit of shells; in another place a lovelylittle purple heap of garnet sand, the minute particles of which haveall been carefully picked out from the surrounding acres of yellow sand. Again, he would notice that the streams which come down to the bay areall flowing in channels admirably dug out for the purpose; and, beingled by curiosity to investigate the teleology of these various streams, he would find that they serve to supply the water which the sea loses byevaporation, and also, by a wonderful piece of adjustment, to furnishfresh water to those animals and plants which thrive best in freshwater, and yet by their combined action to carry down sufficient mineralconstituents to give that precise degree of saltness to the sea as awhole which is required for the maintenance of pelagic life. Lastly, continuing his investigations along this line of inquiry, he would findthat a thousand different habitats were all thoughtfully adapted to theneeds of a hundred thousand different forms of life, none of whichcould survive if these habitats were reversed. Now, I think that ourimaginary inquirer would be a dull man if, as the result of all thisstudy, he failed to conclude that the evidence of Design furnished bythe marine bay was at least as cogent as that which he had previouslyfound in his study of the watch. 

But there is this great difference between the two cases. Whereas bysubsequent inquiry he could ascertain as a matter of fact that the watchwas due to intelligent contrivance, he could make no such discovery withreference to the marine bay: in the one case intelligent contrivance asa cause is independently demonstrable, while in the other case it canonly be inferred. What, then, is the value of the inference?

If, after the studies of our imaginary teleologist had been completed, he were introduced to the library of the Royal Society, and if he werethen to spend a year or two in making himself acquainted with theleading results of modern science, I fancy that he would end by beingboth a wiser and a sadder man. At least I am certain that in learningmore he would feel that he is understanding less--that the archaicsimplicity of his earlier explanations must give place to a maturedperplexity upon the whole subject. To begin with, he would now find thatevery one of the adjustments of means to ends which excited hisadmiration on the sea-coast were due to physical causes which areperfectly well understood. The cliffs stood at the opening of the baybecause the sea in past ages had encroached upon the coast-line untilit met with these cliffs, which then opposed its further progress; thebay was a depression in the land which happened to be there when the seaarrived, and into which the sea consequently flowed; the successiveoccurrence of rocks, shingle, and sand was due to the actions of thewaves themselves; the segregation of sea-weeds, shells, pebbles, anddifferent kinds of sand, was due to their different degrees of specificgravity; the fresh-water streams ran in channels because they hadthemselves been the means of excavating them; and the multitudinousforms of life were all adapted to their several habitats simply becausethe unsuited forms were not able to live in them. In all these cases, therefore, our teleologist in the light of fuller knowledge would becompelled to conclude at least this much--that the adaptations which hehad so greatly admired when he supposed that they were all due tocontrivance in anticipation of the existing phenomena, cease to furnishthe same evidence of intelligent design when it is found that no one ofthem was prepared beforehand by any independent or external cause. 

He would therefore be led to conclude that if the teleologicalinterpretation of the facts were to be saved at all, it could only be soby taking a much wider view of the subject than was afforded by theparticular cases of apparent design which at first appeared so cogent. That is to say, he would feel that he must abandon the supposition ofany _special_ design in the construction of that particular bay, andfall back upon the theory of a much more _general_ design in theconstruction of one great scheme of Nature as a whole. In short he wouldrequire to dislodge his argument from the special adjustments which inthe first instance appeared to him so suggestive, to those general lawsof Nature which by their united operation give rise to a cosmos asdistinguished from a chaos. 

Now I have been careful thus to present in all its more importantdetails an imaginary argument drawn from inorganic nature, because itfurnishes a complete analogy to the actual argument which is drawn fromorganic nature. Without any question, the instances of apparent design, or of the apparently intentional adaptation of means to ends, which wemeet with in organic nature, are incomparably more numerous andsuggestive than anything with which we meet in inorganic nature. But ifonce we find good reason to conclude that the former, like the latter, are all due, not to the immediate, special and prospective action of acontriving intelligence (as in watch-making or creation), but to theagency of secondary or physical causes acting under the influence ofwhat we call general laws, then it seems to me that no matter hownumerous or how wonderful the adaptations of means to ends in organicnature may be, they furnish one no other or better evidence of designthan is furnished by any of the facts of inorganic nature. 

For the sake of clearness let us take any special case. Paley says, 'Iknow of no better method of introducing so large a subject than that ofcomparing a single thing with a single thing; an eye, for example, witha telescope. ' He then goes on to point out the analogies between thesetwo pieces of apparatus, and ends by asking, 'How is it possible, undercircumstances of such close affinity, and under the operation of equalevidence, to exclude contrivance in the case of the eye, yet toacknowledge the proof of contrivance having been employed, as theplainest and clearest of all propositions in the case of the telescope?'

Well, the answer to be made is that only upon the hypothesis of specialcreation can this analogy hold: on the hypothesis of evolution byphysical causes the evidence in the two cases is _not_ equal. For, uponthis hypothesis we have the eye beginning, not as a ready-made structureprepared beforehand for the purposes of seeing, but as a meredifferentiation of the ends of nerves in the skin, probably in the firstinstance to enable them better to discriminate changes of temperature. Pigment having been laid down in these places the better to secure thispurpose (I use teleological terms for the sake of brevity), thenerve-ending begins to distinguish between light and darkness. Thebetter to secure this further purpose, the simplest conceivable form oflens begins to appear in the shape of small refractive bodies. Behindthese sensory cells are developed, forming the earliest indication of aretina presenting a single layer. And so on, step by step, till wereach the eye of an eagle. 

Of course the teleologist will here answer--'The fact of such a gradualbuilding up is no argument against design: whether the structureappeared on a sudden or was the result of a slow elaboration, the marksof design in either case occur in the structure as it stands. ' All ofwhich is very true; but I am not maintaining that the fact of a gradualdevelopment _in itself_ does affect the argument from design. I ammaintaining that it only does so because it reveals the possibility(excluded by the hypothesis of sudden or special creation) of thestructure having been proximately due to the operation of physicalcauses. Thus, for the value of argument, let us assume that naturalselection has been satisfactorily established as a cause adequate toaccount for all these effects. Given the facts of heredity, variation, struggle for existence, and the consequent survival of the fittest, whatfollows? Why that each step in the prolonged and gradual development ofthe eye was brought about by the elimination of all the less adaptedstructures in any given generation, i. E. The selection of all the betteradapted to perpetuate the improvement by heredity. Will the teleologistmaintain that this selective process is itself indicative of specialdesign? If so, it appears to me that he is logically bound to maintainthat the long line of seaweed, the shells, the stones and the littleheap of garnet sand upon the sea-coast are all equally indicative ofspecial design. The general laws relating to specific gravity are atleast of as much importance in the economy of nature as are the generallaws relating to specific differentiation; and in each illustrationalike we find the result of the operation of known physical causes to bethat of selection. If it should be argued in reply that the selection inthe one case is obviously purposeless, while in the other it is asobviously purposive, I answer that this is pure assumption. It isperhaps not too much to say that every geological formation on the faceof the globe is either wholly or in part due to the selective influenceof specific gravity, and who shall say that the construction of theearth's crust is a less important matter in the general scheme of things(if there is such a scheme) than is the evolution of an eye? Or whoshall say that because we see an apparently intentional adaptation ofmeans to ends as the result of selection in the case of the eye, thereis no intention served by the result of selection in the case of thesea-weeds, stones, sand, mud? For anything that we can know to thecontrary, the supposed intelligence may take a greater delight in thelatter than in the former process. 

For the sake of clearness I have assumed that the physical causes withwhich we are already acquainted are sufficient to explain the observedphenomena of organic nature. But it clearly makes no difference whetheror not this assumption is conceded, provided we allow that the observedphenomena are all due to physical causes of some kind, be they known orunknown. That is to say, in whatever measure we exclude the hypothesisof the direct or immediate intervention of the Deity in organic nature(miracle), in that measure we are reducing the evidence of design inorganic nature to precisely the same logical position as that which isoccupied by the evidence of design in inorganic nature. Hence I conceivethat Mill has shown a singular want of penetration where, afterobserving with reference to natural selection, 'creative forethought isnot absolutely the only link by which the origin of the wonderfulmechanism of the eye may be connected with the fact of sight, ' he goeson to say, 'leaving this remarkable speculation (i. E. That of naturalselection) to whatever fate the progress of discovery may have in storefor it, in the present state of knowledge the adaptations in natureafford a large balance of probability in favour of creation byintelligence. ' I say this passage seems to me to show a singular want ofpenetration, and I say so because it appears to argue that the issuelies between the hypothesis of special design and the hypothesis ofnatural selection. But it does not do so. The issue really lies betweenspecial design and natural causes. Survival of the fittest is one ofthese causes which has been suggested, and shown by a large accumulationof evidence to be probably a true cause. But even if it were to bedisproved as a cause, the real argumentative position of teleology wouldnot thereby be effected, unless we were to conclude that there can be noother causes of a secondary or physical kind concerned in theproduction of the observed adaptations. 

I trust that I have now made it sufficiently clear why I hold that if webelieve the reign of natural law, or the operation of physical causes, to extend throughout organic nature in the same universal manner as webelieve this in the case of inorganic nature, then we can find no betterevidence of design in the one province than in the other. The mere factthat we meet with more numerous and apparently more complete instancesof design in the one province than in the other is, _ex hypothesi_, merely due to our ignorance of the natural causation in the moreintricate province. In studying biological phenomena we are all atpresent in the intellectual position of our imaginary teleologist whenstudying the marine bay: we do not know the natural causes which haveproduced the observed results. But if, after having obtained a partialkey in the theory of natural selection, we trust to the large analogywhich is afforded by the simpler provinces of Nature, and conclude thatphysical causes are everywhere concerned in the production of organicstructures, then we have concluded that any evidence of design whichthese structures present is of just the same logical value as that whichwe may attach to the evidence of design in inorganic nature. If itshould still be urged that the adaptations met with in organic natureare from their number and unity much more suggestive of design thananything met with in inorganic nature, I must protest that this is tochange the ground of argument and to evade the only point in dispute. No one denies the obvious fact stated: the only question is whether anynumber and any quantity of adaptations in any one department of natureafford other or better evidence of design than is afforded byadaptations in other departments, when all departments alike aresupposed to be equally the outcome of physical causation. And thisquestion I answer in the negative, because we have no means ofascertaining the extent to which the process of natural selection, orany other physical cause, is competent to produce adaptations of thekind observed. 

Thus, to take another instance of apparent design from inorganic nature, it has been argued that the constitution of the atmosphere is clearlydesigned for the support of vegetable and animal life. But before thisconclusion can be established upon the facts, it must be shown that lifecould exist under no other material conditions than those which arefurnished to it by the elementary constituents of the atmosphere. This, however, it is clearly impossible to show. For anything that we can knowto the contrary, life may actually be existing upon some of the otherheavenly bodies under totally different conditions as to atmosphere; andthe fact that on this planet all life has come to be dependent upon thegases which occur in our atmosphere, may be due simply to the fact thatit was only the forms of life which were able to adapt themselves(through natural selection or other physical causes) to these particulargases which could possibly be expected to occur--just as in matters ofstill smaller detail, it was only those forms of life that were suitedto their several habitats in the marine bay, which could possibly beexpected to be found in these several situations. Now, if a set ofadjustments so numerous and so delicate as those on which the relationsof every known form of life to the constituent gases of the atmosphereare seen to depend, can thus be shown not necessarily to imply theaction of any disposing intelligence, how is it possible to concludethat any less general exhibitions of adjustment imply this, so long asevery case of adjustment, whether or not ultimately due to design, isregarded as proximately due to physical causes?

In view of these considerations, therefore, I think it is perfectlyclear that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it canonly be so by shifting it from the narrow basis of special adaptations, to the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to mymind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentivelyconsidered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For, although this andthat particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately dueto physical causes, and although we are prepared on the grounds of thelargest possible analogy to infer that all other such particular casesare likewise due to physical causes, the more ultimate question arises, How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, tothe production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogyto suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such meansas those, in the way of mere chance or 'the fortuitous concourse ofatoms. ' We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason toconclude that there must be some cause for this co-operation of causes. I know that from Lucretius' time this has been denied; but it has beendenied only on grounds of _feeling_. No possible _reason_ can be givenfor the denial which does not run counter to the law of causationitself. I am therefore perfectly clear that the only question which, from a purely rational point of view, here stands to be answered isthis--Of what nature are we to suppose the _causa causarum_ to be?

On this point only two hypotheses have ever been advanced, and I thinkit is impossible to conceive that any third one is open. Of these twohypotheses the earliest, and of course the most obvious, is that ofmental purpose. The other hypothesis is one which we owe to thefar-reaching thought of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In Chapter VII of his_First Principles_ he argues that all causation arises immediately outof existence as such, or, as he states it, that 'uniformity of lawinevitably follows from the persistence of force. ' For 'if in any twocases there is exact likeness not only between those most conspicuousantecedents which we distinguish as the causes, but also between thoseaccompanying antecedents which we call the conditions, we cannot affirmthat the effects will differ, without affirming either that some forcehas come into existence or that some force has ceased to exist. If theco-operative forces in the one case are equal to those in the other, each to each, in distribution and amount; then it is impossible toconceive the product of their joint action in the one case as unlikethat in the other, without conceiving one or more of the forces to haveincreased or diminished in quantity; and this is conceiving that forceis not persistent. '

Now this interpretation of causality as the immediate outcome ofexistence must be considered first as a theory of causation, and next asa theory in relation to Theism. As a theory of causation it has not metwith the approval of mathematicians, physicists, or logicians, leadingrepresentatives of all these departments of thought having expresslyopposed it, while, so far as I am aware, no representative of any one ofthem has spoken in its favour[23]. But with this point I am not atpresent concerned, for even if the theory were admitted to furnish afull and complete explanation of causality, it would still fail toaccount for the harmonious relation of causes, or the fact with which weare now alone concerned. This distinction is not perceived by theanonymous author 'Physicus, ' who, in his _Candid Examination of Theism_, lays great stress upon Mr. Spencer's theory of causation as subversiveof Theism, or at least as superseding the necessity of theistichypothesis by furnishing a full explanation of the order of Nature onpurely physical grounds. But he fails to perceive that even if Mr. Spencer's theory were conceded fully to explain all the facts ofcausality, it would in no wise tend to explain the cosmos in which thesefacts occur. It may be true that causation depends upon the 'persistenceof force': it does not follow that all manifestations of force should onthis account have been directed to occur as they do occur. For, if wefollow back any sequence of physical causation, we soon find that itspreads out on all sides into a network of physical relations which areliterally infinite both in space (conditions) and in time (antecedentcauses). Now, even if we suppose that the persistence of force is asufficient explanation of the occurrence of the particular sequencecontemplated so far as the exhibition of force is there concerned, weare thus as far as ever from explaining the _determination_ of thisforce into the particular channel through which it flows. It may bequite true that the resultant is determined as to magnitude anddirection by the components; but what about the magnitude and directionof the components? If it is said that they in turn were determined bythe outcome of previous systems, how about these systems? And so on tillwe spread away into the infinite network already mentioned. Only if weknew the origin of all series of all such systems could we be in aposition to say that an adequate intelligence might determine beforehandby calculation the state of any one part of the universe at any giveninstant of time. But, as the series are infinite both in number andextent, this knowledge is clearly out of the question. Moreover, even ifit could be imagined as possible, it could only be so imagined at theexpense of supposing an origin of physical causation in time; and thisamounts to supposing a state of things prior to such causation, and outof which it arose. But to suppose this is to suppose some extra-physicalsource of physical causation; and whether this supposition is made withreference to a physical event occurring under immediate observation(miracle), or to a physical event in past time, or to the origin of allphysical events, it is alike incompatible with any theory that seeks togive a purely physical explanation of the physical universe as a whole. It is, in short, the old story about a stream not being able to riseabove its source. Physical causation cannot be made to supply its ownexplanation, and the mere persistence of force, even if it were concededto account for particular cases of physical sequence, can give noaccount of the ubiquitous and eternal direction of force in theconstruction and maintenance of universal order. 

We are thus, as it were, driven upon the theory of Theism as furnishingthe only nameable explanation of this universal order. That is to say, by no logical artifice can we escape from the conclusion that, as faras we can see, this universal order must be regarded as due to some oneintegrating principle; and that this, so far as we can see, is mostprobably of the nature of mind. At least it must be allowed that we canconceive of it under no other aspect; and that if any particularadaptation in organic nature is held to be suggestive of such an agency, the sum total of all adaptations in the universe must be held to beincomparably more so. I shall not, however, dwell upon this theme sinceit has been well treated by several modern writers, and with specialcogency by the Rev. Baden Powell. I will merely observe that I do notconsider it necessary to the display of this argument in favour ofTheism that we should speak of 'natural laws. ' It is enough to take ourstand upon the [broadest] general fact that Nature is a system, and thatthe order observable in this system is absolutely universal, eternallyenduring, and infinitely exact; while only upon the supposition of itsbeing such is our experience conceived as possible, or our knowledgeconceived as attainable. 

Having thus stated as emphatically as I can that in my opinion noexplanation of natural order can be either conceived or named other thanthat of intelligence as the supreme directing cause, I shall proceed totwo other questions which arise immediately out of this conclusion. Thefirst of these questions is as to the presumable character of thissupreme Intelligence so far as any data of inference upon this point aresupplied by our observation of Nature; and the other question is as tothe strictly formal cogency of any conclusions either with reference tothe existence or the character of such an intelligence[24]. I shallconsider these two points separately. 

No sooner have we reached the conclusion that the only hypothesiswhereby the general order of Nature admits of being in any degreeaccounted for is that it is due to a cause of a mental kind, than weconfront the fact that this cause must be widely different from anythingthat we know of Mind in ourselves. And we soon discover that thisdifference must be conceived as not merely of degree, however great, butof kind. In other words, although we may conclude that the nearestanalogue of the _causa causarum_ given in experience is the human mind, we are bound to acknowledge that in all fundamental points the analogyis so remote that it becomes a question whether we are really very muchnearer the truth by entertaining it. Thus, for instance, as Mr. Spencerhas pointed out, our only conception of that which we know as Mind inourselves is the conception of a series of states of consciousness. But, he continues, 'Put a series of states of consciousness as cause and theevolving universe as effect, and then endeavour to see the last asflowing from the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way aseries of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any one ofthe movements I see going on; for my own states of consciousness areoften indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But how if I attemptto think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions throughout theuniverse . .. ? If to account for this infinitude of physical changeseverywhere going on, "Mind must be conceived as there, " "under the guiseof simple-dynamics, " then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mindmust be divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; andthat, when thus divested of its distinguishing attributes the conceptiondisappears--the word Mind stands for a blank. '

Moreover, 'How is the "originating Mind" to be thought of as havingstates produced by things objective to it, as discriminating among thesestates, and classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring oneobjective result to another?'[25]

Hence, without continuing this line of argument, which it would not bedifficult to trace through every constituent branch of human psychology, we may take it as unquestionable that, if there is a Divine Mind, itmust differ so essentially from the human mind, that it becomesillogical to designate the two by the same name: the attributes ofeternity and ubiquity are in themselves enough to place such a Mind in acategory _sui generis_, wholly different from anything which the analogyfurnished by our own mind enables us even dimly to conceive. And this, of course, is no more than theologians admit. God's thoughts are aboveour thoughts, and a God who would be comprehensible to our intelligencewould be no God at all, they say. Which may be true enough, only we mustremember that in whatever measure we are thus precluded fromunderstanding the Divine Mind, in that measure are we precluded fromfounding any conclusions as to its nature upon analogies furnished bythe human mind. The theory ceases to be anthropomorphic: it ceases to beeven 'anthropopsychic': it is affiliated with the conception of mindonly in virtue of the one fact that it serves to give the bestprovisional account of the order of Nature, by supposing an infiniteextension of some of the faculties of the human mind, with a concurrentobliteration of all the essential conditions under which alone thesefaculties are known to exist. Obviously of such a Mind as this nopredication is logically possible. If such a Mind exists, it is notconceivable as existing, and we are precluded from assigning to it anyattributes. 

Thus much on general grounds. Descending now to matters of more detail, let us assume with the natural theologians that such a Mind does exist, that it so far resembles the human mind as to be a conscious, personalintelligence, and that the care of such a Mind is over all its works. Even upon the grounds of this supposition we meet with a number of largeand general facts which indicate that this Mind ought still to beregarded as apparently very unlike its 'image' in the mind of man. Iwill not here dwell upon the argument of seeming waste and purposelessaction in Nature, because I think that this may be fairly met by theulterior argument already drawn from Nature as a whole--viz. That as awhole, Nature is a cosmos, and therefore that what to us appearswasteful and purposeless in matters of detail may not be so in relationto the scheme of things as a whole. But I am doubtful whether thisulterior argument can fairly be adduced to meet the apparent absence inNature of that which in man we term morality. For in the human mind thesense of right and wrong--with all its accompanying or constitutingemotions of love, sympathy, justice, &c. --is so important a factor, thathowever greatly we may imagine the intellectual side of the human mindto be extended, we can scarcely imagine that the moral side could everbecome so apparently eclipsed as to end in the authorship of such a workas we find in terrestrial nature. It is useless to hide our eyes to thestate of matters which meets us here. Most of the instances of specialdesign which are relied upon by the natural theologian to prove theintelligent nature of the First Cause, have as their end or object theinfliction of painful death or the escape from remorseless enemies; andso far the argument in favour of the intelligent nature of the FirstCause is an argument against its morality. Again, even if we quit thenarrower basis on which teleological argument has rested in the past, and stand that argument upon the broader ground of Nature as a whole, itscarcely becomes less incompatible with any inference to the moralityof that Cause, seeing that the facts to which I have alluded are notmerely occasional and, as it were, outweighed by contrary facts of amore general kind, but manifestly constitute the leading feature of thescheme of organic nature as a whole: or, if this were held to bequestionable, it could only follow that we are not entitled to inferthat there is any such scheme at all. 

Nature, as red in tooth and claw with ravin, is thus without question alarge and general fact that must be considered by any theory ofteleology which can be propounded. I do not think that this aspect ofthe matter could be conveyed in stronger terms than it is by'Physicus[26], ' whom I shall therefore quote:--

'Supposing the Deity to be, what Professor Flint maintains that heis--viz. Omnipotent, and there can be no inference more transparent thanthat such wholesale suffering, for whatever ends designed, exhibits anincalculably greater deficiency of beneficence in the divine characterthan that which we know in any, the very worst, of human characters. Forlet us pause for one moment to think of what suffering in Nature means. Some hundreds of millions of years ago some millions of millions ofanimals must be supposed to have become sentient. Since that time tillthe present, there must have been millions and millions of generationsof millions and millions of individuals. And throughout all this periodof incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organismshave been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. Looking tothe outcome, we find that more than one half of the species which havesurvived the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in their habits, lower andinsentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we findteeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded fortorment--everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, sickness, with oozingblood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocencethat dimly close in deaths of cruel torture! Is it said that there arecompensating enjoyments? I care not to strike the balance; theenjoyments I plainly perceive to be as physically necessary as thepains, and this whether or not evolution is due to design. .. . Am I toldthat I am not competent to judge the purposes of the Almighty? I answerthat if there are _purposes_, I _am_ able to judge of them so far as Ican see; and if I am expected to judge of His purposes when they appearto be beneficent, I am in consistency obliged also to judge of them whenthey appear to be malevolent. And it can be no possible extenuation ofthe latter to point to the "final result" as "order and beauty, " so longas the means adopted by the "_Omnipotent Designer_" are known to havebeen so [terrible]. All that we could legitimately assert in this casewould be that, so far as observation can extend, "He cares for animalperfection" _to the exclusion of_ "animal enjoyment, " and even to the_total disregard_ of animal suffering. But to assert this would merelybe to deny beneficence as an attribute of God[27]. '

The reasoning here appears as unassailable as it is obvious. If, as thewriter goes on to say, we see a rabbit panting in the iron jaws of aspring trap, and in consequence abhor the devilish nature of the beingwho, with full powers of realizing what pain means, can deliberatelyemploy his whole faculties of invention in contriving a thing sohideously cruel; what are we to think of a Being who, with yet higherfaculties of thought and knowledge, and with an unlimited choice ofmeans to secure His ends, has contrived untold thousands of mechanismsno less diabolical? In short, so far as Nature can teach us, or'observation can extend, ' it does appear that the scheme, if it is ascheme, is the product of a Mind which differs from the more highlyevolved type of human mind in that it is immensely more intellectualwithout being nearly so moral. And the same thing is indicated by therough and indiscriminate manner in which justice is allotted--even if itcan be said to be allotted at all. When we contrast the certainty andrigour with which any offence against 'physical law' is punished byNature (no matter though the sin be but one of ignorance), with theextreme uncertainty and laxity with which she meets any offence against'moral law, ' we are constrained to feel that the system of legislation(if we may so term it) is conspicuously different from that which wouldhave been devised by any intelligence which in any sense could be called'anthropopsychic. '

The only answer to these difficulties open to the natural theologian isthat which is drawn from the constitution of the human mind. It isargued that the fact of this mind having so large an ingredient ofmorality in its constitution may be taken as proof that its originatingsource is likewise of a moral character. This argument, however, appearsto me of a questionable character, seeing that, for anything we can tellto the contrary, the moral sense may have been given to, or developedin, man simply on account of its utility to the species--just in thesame way as teeth in the shark or poison in the snake. If so, theoccurrence of the moral sense in man would merely furnish one otherinstance of the intellectual, as distinguished from the moral, nature ofGod; and there seems to be in itself no reason why we should take anyother view. The mere fact that to _us_ the moral sense seems such agreat and holy thing, is doubtless (under any view) owing to itsimportance to the well-being of our species. In itself, or as it appearsto other possible beings intellectual like ourselves, but existing underunlike conditions, the moral sense of man may be regarded as of no moresignificance than the social instincts of bees. More particularly maythis consideration apply to the case of a Mind existing, according tothe theological theory of things, wholly beyond the pale of anythinganalogous to those social relations out of which, according to thescientific theory of evolution, the moral sense has been developed inourselves[28]. 

The truth is that in this matter natural theologians begin by assumingthat the First Cause, if intelligent, _must_ be moral; and then they areblinded to the strictly logical weakness of the argument whereby theyendeavour to sustain their assumption. For aught that we can tell to thecontrary, it may be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion to attributemorality to God as it would be to attribute those capacities forsensuous enjoyment with which the Greeks endowed their divinities. TheDeity may be as high above the one as the other--or rather perhaps wemay say as much external to the one as to the other. Without beingsupra-moral, and still less immoral, He may be un-moral: our ideas ofmorality may have no meaning as applied to Him. 

But if we go thus far in one direction, I think, _per contra_, it mustin consistency be allowed that the argument from the constitution of thehuman mind acquires more weight when it is shifted from the moral senseto the religious instincts. For, on the one hand, these instincts arenot of such obvious use to the species as are those of morality; and, on the other hand, while they are unquestionably very general, verypersistent, and very powerful, they do not appear to serve any 'end' or'purpose' in the scheme of things, unless we accept the theory which isgiven of them by those in whom they are most strongly developed. Here Ithink we have an argument of legitimate force, although it does notappear that such was the opinion entertained of it by Mill. I think theargument is of legitimate force, because if the religious instincts ofthe human race point to no reality as their object, they are out ofanalogy with all other instinctive endowments. Elsewhere in the animalkingdom we never meet with such a thing as an instinct pointingaimlessly, and therefore the fact of man being, as it is said, 'areligious animal'--i. E. Presenting a class of feelings of a peculiarnature directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identicalwith, true instinct--is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument infavour of the reality of some object towards which the religious side ofthis animal's nature is directed. And I do not think that this argumentis invalidated by such facts as that widely different intellectualconceptions touching the character of this object are entertained bydifferent races of mankind; that the force of the religious instinctsdiffers greatly in different individuals even of the same race; thatthese instincts admit of being greatly modified by education; that theywould probably fail to be developed in any individual without at leastso much education as is required to furnish the needful intellectualconceptions on which they are founded; or that we may not improbablytrace their origin, as Mr. Spencer traces it, to a primitive mode ofinterpreting dreams. For even in view of all these considerations thefact remains that these instincts _exist_, and therefore, like all otherinstincts, may be supposed to have a _definite_ meaning, even though, like all other instincts, they may be supposed to have had a _naturalcause_, which both in the individual and in the race requires, as in thenatural development of all other instincts, the natural conditions forits occurrence to be supplied. In a word, if animal instincts generally, like organic structures or inorganic systems, are held to betokenpurpose, the religious nature of man would stand out as an anomaly inthe general scheme of things if it alone were purposeless. Hence we havehere what seems to me a valid inference, so far as it goes, to theeffect that, if the general order of Nature is due to Mind, thecharacter of that Mind is such as it is conceived to be by the mosthighly developed form of religion. A conclusion which is no doubt theopposite of that which we reached by contemplating the phenomena ofbiology; and a contradiction which can only be overcome by supposing, either that Nature conceals God, while man reveals Him, or that Naturereveals God while man misrepresents Him. 

There is still one other fact of a very wide and general kind presentedby Nature, which, if the order of Nature is taken to be the expressionof intelligent purpose, ought in my opinion to be regarded as of greatweight in furnishing evidence upon the ethical quality of that purpose. It is a fact which, so far as I know, has not been considered by anyother writer; but from its being one of the most general of all thefacts relating to the sentient creation, and from its admitting of noone single exception, I feel that I am not able too strongly toemphasize its argumentative importance. This fact is, as I have statedit on a former occasion, 'that amid all the millions of mechanisms andinstincts in the animal kingdom, there is no one instance of a mechanismor instinct occurring in one species for the exclusive benefit ofanother species, although there are a few cases in which a mechanism orinstinct that is of benefit to its possessor has come also to beutilized by other species. Now, on the beneficent design theory it isimpossible to explain why, when all the mechanisms in the same speciesare invariably correlated for the benefit of that species, there shouldnever be any such correlation between mechanisms in different species, or why the same remark should apply to instincts. For how magnificent adisplay of Divine beneficence would organic nature have afforded, ifall, or even some, species had been so inter-related as to minister toeach other's necessities. Organic species might then have been likenedto a countless multitude of voices all singing in one harmonious psalmof praise. But, as it is, we see no vestige of such co-ordination; everyspecies is for itself, and for itself alone--an outcome of the alwaysand everywhere fiercely raging struggle for life[29]. '

The large and general fact thus stated constitutes, in my opinion, thestrongest of all arguments in favour of Mr. Darwin's theory of naturalselection, and therefore we can see the probable reason why it is whatit is, so far as the question of its physical causation is concerned. But where the question is, Supposing the physical causation ultimatelydue to Mind, what are we to infer concerning the character of the Mindwhich has adopted this method of causation?--then we again reach theanswer that, so far as we can judge from a conscientious examination ofthese facts, this Mind does not show that it is of a nature which in manwe should call moral. Of course behind the physical appearances theremay be a moral justification, so that from these appearances we are notentitled to say more than that from the fact of its having chosen amethod of physical causation leading to these results, it has presentedto us the appearance, as before observed, of caring for animalperfection to the exclusion of animal enjoyment, and even to the totaldisregard of animal suffering. 

In conclusion, it is of importance to insist upon a truth which indiscussions of this kind is too often disregarded--viz. That all ourreasonings being of a character relative to our knowledge, ourinferences are uncertain in a degree proportionate to the extent of ourignorance; and that as with reference to the topics which we have beenconsidering our ignorance is of immeasurable extent, any conclusionsthat we may have formed are, as Bishop Butler would say, 'infinitelyprecarious. ' Or, as I have previously presented this formal aspect ofthe matter while discussing the teleological argument with Professor AsaGray, --'I suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inferencedepends upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of thethings or ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, anddefiniteness of the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, weshould be logically cautious in drawing inferences from the natural tothe supernatural: for although we have the entire sphere of experiencefrom which to draw an inference, we are unable to gauge the probabilityof the inference when drawn--the unknown ratios being confessedly ofunknown number, importance, and degree of definiteness: the whole orbitof human knowledge is insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby toinstitute the required measurements or to determine the proportionbetween the terms known and the terms unknown. Otherwise phrased, we maysay--as our knowledge of a part is to our knowledge of a whole, so isour inference from that part to the reality of that whole. Who, therefore, can say, even upon the hypothesis of Theism, that ourinferences or "idea of design" would have any meaning if applied to the"All-Upholder, " whose thoughts are not as our thoughts?'[30] And ofcourse, _mutatis mutandis_, the same remarks apply to all inferenceshaving a negative tendency. 

As an outcome of the whole of this discussion, then, I think it appearsthat the influence of Science upon Natural Religion has been uniformlyof a destructive character. Step by step it has driven back the apparentevidence of direct or special design in Nature, until now this evidenceresides exclusively in the one great and general fact that Nature as awhole is a Cosmos. Further than this it is obviously impossible that thedestructive influence of Science can extend, because Science can onlyexist upon the basis of this fact. But when we allow that this great anduniversal fact--which but for the effects of unremitting familiaritycould scarcely fail to be intellectually overwhelming--does betokenmental agency in Nature, we immediately find it impossible to determinethe probable character of such a mind, even supposing that it exists. Wecannot conceive of it as presenting any one of the qualities whichessentially characterize what we know as mind in ourselves; andtherefore the word Mind, as applied to the supposed agency, stands for ablank. Further, even if we disregard this difficulty, and assume that insome way or other incomprehensible to us a Mind does exist as fartranscending the human mind as the human mind transcends mechanicalmotion; still we are met by some very large and general facts in Naturewhich seem strongly to indicate that this Mind, if it exists, is eitherdeficient in, or wholly destitute of, that class of feelings which inman we term moral; while, on the other hand, the religious aspirationsof man himself may be taken to indicate the opposite conclusion. And, lastly, with reference to the whole course of such reasonings, we haveseen that any degree of measurable probability, as attaching to theconclusions, is unattainable. From all which it appears that NaturalReligion at the present time can only be regarded as a system full ofintellectual contradictions and moral perplexities; so that if we go toher with these greatest of all questions: 'Is there knowledge with theMost High?' 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' the onlyclear answer which we receive is the one that comes back to us from thedepths of our own heart--'When I thought upon this it was too painfulfor me. '

FOOTNOTES:

[23] A note (of 1893) contains the following: 'Being, considered in theabstract, is logically equivalent to Not-Being or Nothing. For if bysuccessive stages of abstraction, we divest the conception of Being ofattribute and relation we reach the conception of that which cannot be, i. E. A logical contradiction, or the logical correlative of Being whichis Nothing. (All this is well expressed in Caird's _Evolution ofReligion_. ) The failure to perceive this fact constitutes a groundfallacy in my _Candid Examination of Theism_, where I represent Being asbeing a sufficient explanation of the Order of Nature or the law ofCausation. '

[24] This promise is only partially fulfilled in the penultimateparagraph of the essay. --ED. 

[25] _Essays_, vol. Iii. P. 246 et seq. The whole passage ought to beconsulted, being too long to quote here. 

[26] In an essay on Prof. Flint's _Theism_, appended to the _CandidExamination_. 

[27] _A Candid Examination of Theism_, pp. 171-2. 

[28] [I have, as Editor, resisted a temptation to intervene in the aboveargument. But I think I may intervene on a matter of fact, and point outthat 'according to the theological theory of things, ' i. E. According tothe Trinitarian doctrine, God's Nature consists in what is strictly'analogous to social relations, ' and He not merely exhibits in Hiscreation, but Himself _is_ Love. See, on the subject, especially, R. H. Hutton's essay on the Incarnation, in his _Theological Essays_(Macmillan). --ED. ]

[29] _Scientific Evidences of Organic Evolution_, pp. 76-7. 

[30] _Nature_, April 5, 1883. 

PART II. 

+Introductory Note by the Editor+. 

Little more requires to be said by way of introduction to the Noteswhich are all that George Romanes was able to write of a work that wasto have been entitled _A Candid Examination of Religion_. What littledoes require to be said must be by way of bridging the interval ofthought which exists between the Essays which have just preceded and theNotes which represent more nearly his final phase of mind. 

The most anti-theistic feature in the Essays is the stress laid in themon the evidence which Nature supplies, or is supposed to supply, antagonistic to the belief in the goodness of God. 

On this mysterious and perplexing subject George Romanes appears to havehad more to say but did not live to say it[31]. We may notice howeverthat in 1889, in a paper read before the Aristotelian Society, on 'theEvidence of Design in Nature[32], ' he appears to allow more weight thanbefore to the argument that the method of physical development must bejudged in the light of its result. This paper was part of a _Symposium_. Mr. S. Alexander has argued in a previous paper against the hypothesisof 'design' in Nature on the ground that 'the fair order of Nature isonly acquired by a wholesale waste and sacrifice. ' This argument wasdeveloped by pointing to the obvious 'mal-adjustments, ' 'aimlessdestructions, ' &c. , which characterize the processes of Nature. Butthese, Romanes replies, necessarily belong to the process considered asone of 'natural selection. ' The question is only: Is such a process _perse_ incompatible with the hypothesis of design? And he replies in thenegative. 

'"The fair order of Nature is only acquired by a wholesale waste andsacrifice. " Granted. But if the "wholesale waste and sacrifice, " asantecedent, leads to a "fair order of Nature" as its consequent, how canit be said that the "wholesale waste and sacrifice" has been a failure?Or how can it be said that, in point of fact, there _has_ been a waste, or _has_ been a sacrifice? Clearly such things can only be said whenour point of view is restricted to the means (i. E. The wholesaledestruction of the less fit); not when we extend our view to what, evenwithin the limits of human observation, is unquestionably the _end_(i. E. The causal result in an ever improving world of types). Acandidate who is plucked in a Civil Service examination because hehappens to be one of the less fitted to pass, is no doubt an instance offailure so far as his own career is concerned; but it does not thereforefollow that the system of examination is a failure in its final end ofsecuring the best men for the Civil Service. And the fact that thegeneral outcome of all the individual failures in Nature is that ofsecuring what Mr. Alexander calls "the fair order of Nature, " isassuredly evidence that the _modus operandi_ has not been a failure inrelation to what, if there be any Design in Nature at all, must beregarded as the higher purpose of such Design. Therefore, cases ofindividual or otherwise relative failure cannot be quoted as evidenceagainst the hypothesis of there being such Design. The fact that thegeneral system of natural causation has for its eventual result "a fairorder of Nature, " cannot of itself be a fact inimical to the hypothesisof Design in Nature, even though it be true that such causation entailsthe continual elimination of the less efficient types. 

'To the best of my judgement, then, this argument from failure, randomtrial, blind blundering, or in whatever other terminology the argumentmay be presented, is only valid as against the theory of what Mr. Alexander alludes to as a "Carpenter-God, " i. E. That if there be Designin Nature at all, it must everywhere be _special_ Design; so that theevidence of it may as well be tested by any given minute fragment ofNature--such as one individual organism or class of organisms--as byhaving regard to the whole Cosmos. The evidence of Design in this senseI fully allow has been totally destroyed by the proof of naturalselection. But such destruction has only brought into clearer relief themuch larger question that rises behind, viz. As before phrased, Is thereanything about the method of natural causation, considered as a whole, that is inimical to the theory of Design in Nature, considered as awhole?'

It is true that this argument does not bear directly upon the_character_ of the God whose 'design' Nature exhibits: but indirectly itdoes[33]. For instance, such an argument as that found above (on p. 79:'we see a rabbit, &c. ') seems to be only valid on the postulate heredescribed as that of the 'Carpenter-God. '

It is also probable that Romanes felt the difficulty arising from thecruelty of nature less, as he was led to dwell more on humanity as themost important part of nature, and perceived the function of sufferingin the economy of human life (pp. 142, 154): and also as he became moreimpressed with the positive evidences for Christianity as at once thereligion of sorrow and the revelation of God as Love (pp. 163, ff. ). TheChristian Faith supplies believers not only with an argument againstpessimism from general results, but also with such an insight into theDivine character and method as enables them at least to bear hopefullythe awful perplexities which arise from the spectacle of individualssuffering. 

In the last year or two of his life he read very attentively a greatnumber of books on 'Christian Evidences, ' from Pascal's _Pensées_downwards, and studied carefully the appearance of 'plan' in theBiblical Revelation considered as a whole. The _fact_ of this studyappears in fragmentary remarks, indices and references, which GeorgeRomanes left behind him in note-books. The _results_ of it will not beunapparent in the following Notes, which, I need to remind my readers, are, in spite of their small bulk, the sole reason for the existence ofthis volume. 

In reading these I can hardly conceive any one not being possessed witha profound regret that the author was not allowed to complete his work. And it is only fair to ask every reader of the following pages toremember that he is reading, in the main, incomplete notes and notfinished work. This will account for a great deal that may seem sketchyand unsatisfactory in the treatment of different points, and also forrepetitions and traces of inconsistency. But I can hardly think any onecan read these notes to the end without agreeing with me that if I hadwithheld them from publication, the world would have lost the witness ofa mind, both able and profoundly sincere, feeling after God and findingHim. 

 C. G. 

FOOTNOTES:

[31] See below p. 142, and note. I find also the following note of adate subsequent to 1889. 'It is a fact that pessimism is illogical, simply because we are inadequate judges of the world, and pessimismwould therefore be opposed to agnosticism. We may know that there issomething out of joint between the world and ourselves; but we cannotknow how far this is the fault of the world or of ourselves. '

[32] _Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society_ (Williams & Norgate), vol. I. No. 3, pp. 72, 73. 

[33] I ought also to mention that Romanes on the Sunday before his deathexpressed to me verbally his entire agreement with the argument ofProfessor Knight's _Aspects of Theism_ (Macmillan, 1893); in which onthis subject see pp. 184-186, 'A larger good is evolved through thewinnowing process by which physical nature casts its weaker productsaside, ' &c. 

NOTES FOR A WORK ON A CANDID EXAMINATION OF RELIGION. 

BY METAPHYSICUS. 

_Proposed Mottoes_. 

 'I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by this purified and re-illumined; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons, one class who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class who have no understanding of them and to whom they will naturally be as idle tales. 

 'And you had better decide at once with which of the two you are arguing; or, perhaps, you will say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time not grudging to either any benefit which they may derive. '--PLATO. 

 'If we would reprove with success, and show another his mistake, we must see from what side he views the matter, for on that side it is generally true: and, admitting this truth, show him the side on which it is false. '--PASCAL. 

§ 1. INTRODUCTORY. 

Many years ago I published in Messrs. Trübner's 'Philosophical Series, 'a short treatise entitled _A Candid Examination of Theism_ by'Physicus. ' Although the book made some stir at the time, and has sinceexhibited a vitality never anticipated by its author, the secret of itsauthorship has been well preserved[34]. This secret it is my intention, if possible, still to preserve; but as it is desirable (on severalaccounts which will become apparent in the following pages) to avowidentity of authorship, the present essay appears under the samepseudonym[35] as its predecessor. The reason why the first essayappeared anonymously is truthfully stated in the preface thereof, viz. In order that the reasoning should be judged on its own merits, withoutthe bias which is apt to arise on the part of a reader from a knowledgeof the authority--or absence of authority--on the part of a writer. Thisreason, in my opinion, still holds good as regards _A Candid Examinationof Theism_, and applies in equal measure to the present sequel in _ACandid Examination of Religion_. 

It will be shown that in many respects the negative conclusions reachedin the former essay have been greatly modified by the results of maturerthought as now presented in the second. Therefore it seems desirable tostate at the outset that, as far as I am capable of judging, themodifications in question have not been due in any measure to influencefrom without. They appear to have been due exclusively to the results ofmy own further thought, as briefly set out in the following pages, withno indebtedness to private friends and but little to publishedutterances in the form of books, &c. Nevertheless, no very originalideas are here presented. Indeed, I suppose it would nowadays beimpossible to present any idea touching religion, which has not at sometime or another been presented previously. Still much may be done in thefurthering of one's thought by changing points of view, selecting andarranging ideas already more or less familiar, so that they may be builtinto new combinations; and this, I think, I have in no small degreeaccomplished as regards the microcosm of my own mind. But I state thismuch only for the sake of adding a confession that, as far asintrospection can carry one, it does not appear to me that themodifications which my views have undergone since the publication of myprevious _Candid Examination_ are due so much to purely logicalprocesses of the intellect, as to the sub-conscious (and therefore moreor less unanalyzable) influences due to the ripening experience of life. The extent to which this is true [i. E. The extent to which experiencemodifies logic][36] is seldom, if ever, realized, although it ispractically exemplified every day by the sobering caution whichadvancing age exercises upon the mind. Not so much by any above-boardplay of syllogism as by some underhand cheating of consciousness, do theaccumulating experiences of life and of thought slowly enrich thejudgement. And this, one need hardly say, is especially true in suchregions of thought as present the most tenuous media for the progress ofthought by the comparatively clumsy means of syllogistic locomotion. Forthe further we ascend from the solid ground of verification, the lessconfidence should we place in our wings of speculation, while the moredo we find the practical wisdom of such intellectual caution, ordistrust of ratiocination, as can be given only by experience. Therefore, most of all is this the case in those departments of thoughtwhich are furthest from the region of our sensuous life--viz. Metaphysics and religion. And, as a matter of fact, it is just in thesedepartments of thought that we find the rashness of youth most amenableto the discipline in question by the experience of age. 

However, in spite of this confession, I have no doubt that even in thematter of pure and conscious reason further thought has enabled me todetect serious errors, or rather oversights, in the very foundations ofmy _Candid Examination of Theism_. I still think, indeed, that from thepremises there laid down the conclusions result in due logical sequence, so that, as a matter of mere ratiocination, I am not likely ever todetect any serious flaws, especially as this has not been done byanybody else during the many years of its existence. But I now clearlyperceive two wellnigh fatal oversights which I then committed. The firstwas undue confidence in merely syllogistic conclusions, even whenderived from sound premises, in regions of such high abstraction. Thesecond was, in not being sufficiently careful in examining thefoundations of my criticism, i. E. The validity of its premises. I willhere briefly consider these two points separately. 

As regards the first point, never was any one more arrogant in hisclaims for pure reason than I was--more arrogant in spirit though not inletter, this being due to contact with science; without ever consideringhow opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlierargument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physicalproblem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to hisother and higher faculties[37]. 

The second point is of still more importance, because so seldom, ifever, recognized. 

At the time of writing the _Candid Examination_ I perceived clearly howthe whole question of Theism from the side of reason turned on thequestion as to the nature of natural causation. My theory of naturalcausation obeyed the Law of Parsimony, resolving all into Being as such;but, on the other hand, it erred in not considering whether 'highercauses' are not 'necessary' to account for spiritual facts--i. E. Whetherthe ultimate Being must not be at least as high as the intellectual andspiritual nature of man, i. E. Higher than anything merely physical ormechanical. The supposition that it must does not violate the Law ofParsimony. 

Pure agnostics ought to investigate the religious consciousness ofChristians as a phenomenon which may possibly be what Christiansthemselves believe it to be, i. E. Of Divine origin. And this may be donewithout entering into any question as to the objective validity ofChristian dogmas. The metaphysics of Christianity may be all false infact, and yet the spirit of Christianity may be true in substance--i. E. It may be the highest 'good gift from above' as yet given to man. 

My present object, then, like that of Socrates, is not to impart anyphilosophical system, or even positive knowledge, but a frame of mind, what I may term, pure agnosticism, as distinguished from what iscommonly so called. 

FOOTNOTES:

[34] The first edition, which was published in 1878, was rapidlyexhausted, but, as my object in publishing was solely that of solicitingcriticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publishers not toissue any further edition. The work has therefore been out of print formany years. 

[This 'arrangement' was however not actually made, or at least wasunknown to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner &Co. Thus a new edition of the book was published in 1892, to theauthor's surprise. --ED. ]

[35] [Or rather it was intended that it should appear under thepseudonym of 'Metaphysicus. '--ED. ]

[36] [Words in square brackets have been added by me. But I have notintroduced the brackets when I have simply inserted single unimportantwords obviously necessary for the sense. --ED. ]

[37] [See p. 29, quotation from Preface of 'Physicus. ' The state of mindexpressed in the above Note is a return to the earlier frame of mind ofthe Burney Essay, e. G. P. 20. That essay was full of the thought thatChristian evidences are very manifold and largely'extra-scientific. '--ED. ]

§ 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE. 

[To understand George Romanes' mind close attention must be paid to thefollowing section. Also to the fact, not explicitly noticed by him, thathe uses the word 'reason' (see p. 112) in a sense closely resemblingthat in which Mr. Kidd has recently used it in his _Social Evolution_. He uses it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to _the processof scientific ratiocination_. His main position is therefore this:Scientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God. But the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himselfby other means than that of scientific ratiocination. As religion is forthe whole man, so all human faculties may be required to seek after Godand find Him--emotions and experiences of an extra-'rational' kind. The'pure agnostic' must be prepared to welcome evidence of allsorts. --ED. ]

It is desirable to be clear at the outset as to the meaning which Ishall throughout attach to certain terms and phrases. 

_Theism. _

It will frequently be said, 'on the theory of Theism, ' 'supposing Theismtrue, ' &c. By such phrase my meaning will always be equivalentto--'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approachwhich the human mind can make to a true notion of the _ens realissimum_, is that of an inconceivably magnified image of itself at its best. '

_Christianity. _

Similarly, when it is said, 'supposing Christianity true, ' what will bemeant is--'supposing for the sake of argument, that the Christian systemas a whole, from its earliest dawn in Judaism, to the phase of itsdevelopment at the present time, is the highest revelation of Himselfwhich a personal Deity has vouchsafed to mankind. ' This I intend tosignify an attitude of pure agnosticism as regards any particular dogmaof Christianity--even that of the Incarnation. 

Should it be said that by holding in suspense any distinctive dogma ofChristianity, I am not considering Christianity at all, I reply, Not so;I am not writing a theological, but a philosophical treatise, and shallconsider Christianity merely as one of many religions, though, ofcourse, the latest, &c. Thus considered, Christianity takes its place asthe highest manifestation of evolution in this department of the humanmind; but I am not concerned even with so important an ecclesiasticaldogma as that of the Incarnation of God in Christ. As far as thistreatise has to go, that dogma may or may not be true. The importantquestion for us is, Has God spoken through the medium of our religiousinstincts? And although this will necessarily involve the questionwhether or how far in the case of Christianity there is objectiveevidence of His having spoken by the mouth of holy men [of the OldTestament] which have been since the world began, such will be the caseonly because it is a question of objective evidence whether or how farthe religious instincts of these men, or this race of men, have been somuch superior to those of other men, or races of men, as to have enabledthem to predict future events of a religious character. And whether ornot in these latter days God has spoken by His own Son is not a questionfor us, further than to investigate the higher class of religiousphenomena which unquestionably have been present in the advent andperson of Jesus. The question whether Jesus was the Son of God, is, logically speaking, a question of ontology, which, _quâ_ pure agnostics, we are logically forbidden to touch. 

But elsewhere I ought to show that, from my point of view as to thefundamental question being whether God has spoken at all through thereligious instincts of mankind, it may very well be that Christ was notGod, and yet that He gave the highest revelation of God. If the 'firstMan' was allegorical, why not the 'second'? It is, indeed, an historicalfact that the 'second Man' existed, but so likewise may the 'first. 'And, as regards the 'personal claims' of Christ, all that He said is notincompatible with His having been Gabriel, and His Holy Ghost, Michael[38]. Or He may have been a man deceived as to His ownpersonality, and yet the vehicle of highest inspiration. 

_Religion. _

By the term 'religion, ' I shall mean any theory of personal agency inthe universe, belief in which is strong enough in any degree toinfluence conduct. No term has been used more loosely of late years, orin a greater variety of meanings. Of course anybody may use it in anysense he pleases, provided he defines exactly in what sense he does so. The above seems to be most in accordance with traditional usage. 

_Agnosticism 'pure' and 'impure'. _

The modern and highly convenient term 'Agnosticism, ' is used in two verydifferent senses. By its originator, Professor Huxley, it was coined tosignify an attitude of reasoned ignorance touching everything that liesbeyond the sphere of sense-perception--a professed inability to foundvalid belief on any other basis. It is in this its original sense--andalso, in my opinion, its only philosophically justifiable sense--that Ishall understand the term. But the other, and perhaps more popular sensein which the word is now employed, is as the correlative of Mr. H. Spencer's doctrine of the Unknowable. 

This latter term is philosophically erroneous, implying importantnegative knowledge that if there be a God we know this much aboutHim--that He _cannot_ reveal Himself to man[39]. _Pure_ agnosticism isas defined by Huxley. 

Of all the many scientific men whom I have known, the most pure in hisagnosticism--not only in profession but in spirit and conduct--wasDarwin. (What he says in his autobiography about Christianity[40] showsno profundity of thought in the direction of philosophy or religion. Hismind was too purely inductive for this. But, on this very account, it isthe more remarkable that his rejection of Christianity was due, not toany _a priori_ bias against the creed on grounds of reason as absurd, but solely on the ground of an apparent moral objection _aposteriori_[41]. ) Faraday and many other first-rate originators inscience were like Darwin. 

As an illustration of impure agnosticism take Hume's _a priori_ argumentagainst miracles, leading on to the analogous case of the attitude ofscientific men towards modern spiritualism. Notwithstanding that theyhave the close analogy of mesmerism as an object-lesson to warn them, scientific men as a class are here quite as dogmatic as the straightestsect of theologians. I may give examples which can cause no offence, inasmuch as the men in question have themselves made the facts public, viz. ---- refusing to go to [a famous spiritualist]; ---- refusing totry ---- in thought-reading[42]. These men all _professed_ to beagnostics at the very time when thus so egregiously violating theirphilosophy by their conduct. 

Of course I do not mean to say that, even to a pure agnostic, reasonshould not be guided in part by antecedent presumption--e. G. In ordinarylife, the _prima facie_ case, motive, &c. , counts for evidence in acourt of law--and where there is a strong antecedent improbability aproportionately greater weight of evidence _a posteriori_ is needed tocounterbalance it: so that, e. G. Better evidence would be needed toconvict the Archbishop of Canterbury than a vagabond of pocket-picking. And so it is with speculative philosophy. But in both cases our onlyguide is known analogy; therefore, the further we are removed frompossible experience--i. E. The more remote from experience the spherecontemplated--the less value attaches to antecedent presumptions[43]. _Maximum_ remoteness from possible experience is reached in the sphereof the final mystery of things with which religion has to do; so thathere all presumption has faded away into a vanishing point, and pureagnosticism is our only rational attitude. In other words, here weshould all alike be pure agnostics as far as reason is concerned; and, if any of us are to attain to any information, it can only be by meansof some super-added faculty of our minds. The questions as to whetherthere are any such super-added faculties; if so, whether they everappear to have been acted upon from without; if they have, in whatmanner they have; what is their report; how far they are trustworthy inthat report, and so on--these are the questions with which this treatiseis to be mainly concerned. 

My own attitude may be here stated. I do not claim any [religious]certainty of an intuitive kind myself; but am nevertheless able toinvestigate the abstract logic of the matter. And, although this mayseem but barren dialectic, it may, I hope, be of practical service if itsecures a fair hearing to the reports given by the vast majority ofmankind who unquestionably believe them to emanate from some suchsuper-added faculties--numerous and diverse though their religions be. Besides, in my youth I published an essay (the _Candid Examination_)which excited a good deal of interest at the time, and has been long outof print. In that treatise I have since come to see that I was wrongtouching what I constituted the basal argument for my negativeconclusion. Therefore I now feel it obligatory on me to publish thefollowing results of my maturer thought, from the same stand-point ofpure reason. Even though I have obtained no further light from the sideof intuition, I have from that of intellect. So that, if there be intruth any such intuition, I occupy with regard to the organ of it thesame position as that of the blind lecturer on optics. But on this veryaccount I cannot be accused of partiality towards it. 

It is generally assumed that when a man has clearly perceivedagnosticism to be the only legitimate attitude of reason to rest in withregard to religion (as I will subsequently show that it is), he hasthereby finished with the matter; he can go no further. The main objectof this treatise is to show that such is by no means the case. He hasthen only begun his enquiry into the grounds and justification ofreligious belief. For reason is not the only attribute of man, nor is itthe only faculty which he habitually employs for the ascertainment oftruth. Moral and spiritual faculties are of no less importance in theirrespective spheres even of everyday life; faith, trust, taste, &c. , areas needful in ascertaining truth as to character, beauty, &c. , as isreason. Indeed we may take it that reason is concerned in ascertainingtruth only where _causation_ is concerned; the appropriate organs forits ascertainment where anything else is concerned belong to the moraland spiritual region. 

As Herbert Spencer says, 'men of science may be divided into twoclasses, of which the one, well exemplified by Faraday, keeping theirreligion and their science absolutely separate, are unperplexed by anyincongruities between them, and the other of which, occupying themselvesexclusively with the facts of science, never ask what implications theyhave. Be it trilobite or be it double star, their thought about it ismuch like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose[44]. ' Now, boththese classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt anattitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice. What, however, have we to say of the third class, which Spencer doesnot mention, although it is, I think, the largest, viz. Of thosescientific men who expressly abstain from drawing a line of divisionbetween science and religion [and then judge of religion purely on theprinciples and by the method of science[45]]?

There are two opposite casts of mind--the mechanical (scientific, &c. )and the spiritual (artistic, religious, &c. ). These may alternate evenin the same individual. An 'agnostic' has no hesitation--even though hehimself keenly experience the latter--that the former only is worthy oftrust. But a _pure_ agnostic must know better, as he will perceive thatthere is nothing to choose between the two in point of trustworthiness. Indeed, if choice has to be made the mystic might claim higher authorityfor his direct intuitions. 

Mr. Herbert Spencer has well said, in the opening section of hisSynthetic Philosophy, that wherever human thought appears to beradically divided, [there must be truth on both sides and that the]'reconciliation' of opposing views is to be found by emphasizing thatultimate element of truth which on each side underlies manifolddifferences. More than is generally supposed depends on points of view, especially where first principles of a subject are in dispute. Oppositesides of the same shield may present wholly different aspects[46]. Spencer alludes to this with special reference to the conflict betweenscience and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I alsoallude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon thesubject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much furtherthan it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to theextent of showing that religion arises from the recognition offundamental mystery--which it may be proved that science also recognizesin all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little morethan a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i. E. Ultimategrounds of experience) are inexplicable, is a proposition which isself-evident since the dawn of human thought. My aim is to carry the'reconciliation' into much more detail and yet without quitting thegrounds of pure reason. I intend to take science and religion in theirpresent highly developed states as such, and show that on a systematicexamination of the latter by the methods of the former, the 'conflict'between the two may be not merely 'reconciled' as regards the highestgeneralities of each, but entirely abolished in all matters of detailwhich can be regarded as of any great importance. 

In any methodical enquiry the first object should be to ascertain thefundamental principles with which the enquiry is concerned. In actualresearch, however, it is by no means always the case that the enquirerknows, or is able at first to ascertain what those principles are. Infact, it is often only at the end of a research, that they arediscovered to be the fundamental principles. Such has been my ownexperience with regard to the subject of the present enquiry. Althoughall my thinking life has been concerned, off and on, in contemplatingthe problem of our religious instincts, the sundry attempts which havebeen made by mankind for securing their gratification, and the importantquestion as to their objective justification, it is only in advancedyears that I have clearly perceived wherein the first principles of sucha research must consist. And I doubt whether any one has hithertoclearly defined this point. The principles in question are the nature ofcausation and the nature of faith. 

My objects then in this treatise are, mainly, three: 1st, to purifyagnosticism; 2nd, to consider more fully than heretofore, and from thestand-point of pure agnosticism, the nature of natural causation, or, more correctly, the relation of what we know on the subject of suchcausation to the question of Theism; and, 3rd, again starting from thesame stand-point, to consider the religious consciousnesses of men asphenomena of experience (i. E. As regarded by us from without), andespecially in their highest phase of development as exhibited inChristianity. 

FOOTNOTES:

[38] [I. E. Supernatural but not strictly Divine Persons. Surely, however, the proposition is not maintainable. --ED. ]

[39] [This is another instance of recurrence to an earlier thought; seeBurney Essay, p. 25, and cf. _Mind and Motion and Monism_, p. 117, note1. --ED. ]

[40] _Life and Letters of Charles Darwin_, i. 308. 

[41] [See further, p. 182. --ED. ]

[42] [On the whole I have thought it best to omit the names. --ED. ]

[43] [The MS. Note here continues: 'Here introduce all that I say on thesubject in my Burney Prize. ' I have not, however, introduced anyquotation into the text because (1) I think Romanes makes his meaningplain in the text as it stands; (2) I cannot find in the essay inquestion any exactly appropriate passage of reasonable length to quote. The greater part of the essay is, however, directed to meet thescientific objection to the doctrine that prayer is answered in thephysical region, by showing that this objection consists in an argumentfrom the known to the unknown, i. E. From the known sphere of invariablephysical laws to the unknown sphere of God's relation to all such laws;and is, therefore, weak in proportion as the unknown sphere is remotefrom possible experience of a scientific kind, and admits of anindefinite number of possibilities, more or less conceivable to ourimagination, which would or might prevent the scientific argument fromhaving legitimate application to the question in hand. --ED. ]

[44] _Fortnightly Review_, Feb. 1894. 

[45] [Some such phrase is necessary to complete the sentence. --ED. ]

[46] _First Principles_, Part I, ch. 1. 

§ 3. CAUSALITY. 

Only because we are so familiar with the great phenomenon of causalitydo we take it for granted, and think that we reach an ultimateexplanation of anything when we have succeeded in finding the 'cause'thereof: when, in point of fact, we have only succeeded in merging it inthe mystery of mysteries. I often wish we could have come into theworld, like the young of some other mammals, with all the powers ofintellect that we shall ever subsequently attain already developed, butwithout any individual experience, and so without any of the bluntingeffects of custom. Could we have done so, surely nothing in the worldwould more acutely excite our intelligent astonishment than the oneuniversal fact of causation. That everything which happens should have acause, that this should invariably be proportioned to its effect, sothat, no matter how complex the interaction of causes, the sameinteraction should always produce the same result; that this rigidlyexact system of energizing should be found to present all theappearances of universality and of eternity, so that, e. G. , the motionof the solar system in space is being determined by some causes beyondhuman ken, and that we are indebted to billions of cellular unions, eachinvolving billions of separate causes, for our hereditary passage froman invertebrate ancestry, --that such things should be, would surelystrike us as the most wonderful fact in this wonderful universe. 

Now, although familiarity with this fact has made us forget its wonderto the extent of virtually assuming that we know all about it, philosophical enquiry shows that, besides empirically knowing it to be afact, we only know one other thing about it, viz. --that our knowledge ofit is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. Noresult of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this[47]. If it were not for our own volitions, we should be ignorant of what wecan now not doubt, on pain of suicidal scepticism, to be the mostgeneral fact of nature. Such, at least, seems to me by far the mostreasonable theory of our idea of causality, and is the one now mostgenerally entertained by philosophers of every school. 

Now, to the plain man it will always seem that if our very notion ofcausality is derived from our own volition--as our very notion of energyis derived from our sense of effort in overcoming resistance by ourvolition--presumably the truest notion we can form of that in whichcausation objectively consists is the notion derived from that knownmode of existence which alone gives us the notion of causality at all. Hence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the natureof will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective. Nor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepestphilosophical thinkers have arrived at substantially the same opinion, e. G. Hegel, Schopenhauer. So that the direct and most naturalinterpretation of causality in external nature which is drawn byprimitive thought in savages and young children, seems destined tobecome also the ultimate deliverance of human thought in the highestlevels of its culture[48]. 

But, be this as it may, we are not concerned with any such questions ofabstract philosophical speculation. As pure agnostics they lie beyondour sphere. Therefore, I allude to them only for the sake of showingthat there is nothing either in the science or philosophy of mankindinimical to the theory of natural causation being the energizing of awill objective to us. And we can plainly see that if such be the case, and if that will be self-consistent, its operations, as revealed innatural causation, must appear to us when considered _en bloc_ (or notpiece-meal as by savages), non-volitional, or mechanical. 

Of all philosophical theories of causality the most repugnant to reasonmust be those of Hume, Kant and Mill, which while differing from oneanother agree in this--that they attribute the principle of causality toa creation of our own minds, or in other words deny that there isanything objective in the relation of cause and effect--i. E. In the verything which all physical science is engaged in discovering in particularcases of it. 

The conflict of Science and Religion has always arisen from one commonground of agreement, or fundamental postulate of both parties--withoutwhich, indeed, it would plainly have been impossible that any conflictcould have arisen, inasmuch as there would then have been no field forbattle. Every thesis must rest on some hypothesis; therefore, in caseswhere two or more rival theses rest on a common hypothesis, the disputesmust needs collapse so soon as the common hypothesis is provederroneous. And proportionably, in whatever degree the previously commonhypothesis is shown to be dubious, in that degree are the disputationsshown to be possibly unreal. Now, it is one of the main objects of thistreatise to show that the common hypothesis on which all the disputesbetween Science and Religion have arisen, is highly dubious. And notonly so, but that quite apart from modern science all the difficultieson the side of intellect (or reason) which religious belief has everencountered in the past, or can ever encounter in the future, whetherin the individual or the race, arise, and arise exclusively, from theself-same ground of this highly dubious hypothesis. 

The hypothesis, or fundamental postulate, in question is, _If there be apersonal God, He is not immediately concerned with natural causation_. It is assumed that _qua_ 'first cause, ' He can in no way be concernedwith 'second causes, ' further than by having started them in the firstinstance as a great machinery of 'natural causation, ' working under'general laws. ' True the theory of Deism, which entertains more or lessexpressly this hypothesis of 'Deus ex machina, ' has during the presentcentury been more and more superseded by that of Theism, whichentertains also in some indefinable measure the doctrine of 'immanence';as well as by that of Pantheism, which expressly holds this doctrine tothe exclusion _in toto_ of its rival. But Theism has never yetentertained it sufficiently or up to the degree required by the purelogic of the case, while Pantheism has but rarely considered the rivaldoctrine of personality--or the possible union of immanence withpersonality. [49]

Now it is the object of this book to go much further than any one hashitherto gone in proving the possibility of this union. For I purpose toshow that, provided only we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, &c. , and follow to its logical termination the guidance of pure reason, thereare no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (_A_) That ifthere be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not beimmanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediateexpression of His will. (_B_) That every available reason points to theinference that He probably is so. (_C_) That if He is so, and if Hiswill is self-consistent, all natural causation must needs appear to us'mechanical. ' Therefore (_D_) that it is no argument against the divineorigin of a thing, event, &c. , to prove it due to natural causation. 

After having dealt briefly with (_A_), (_B_) and (_C_), I would showthat (_D_) is the most practically important of these four conclusions. For the fundamental hypothesis which I began by mentioning is just theopposite of this. Whether tacitly or expressly, it has always beenassumed by both sides in the controversy between Science and Religion, that as soon as this that and the other phenomenon has been explained bymeans of natural causation, it has thereupon ceased to be ascribable[directly] to God. The distinction between the natural and thesupernatural has always been regarded by both sides as indisputablysound, and this fundamental agreement as to ground of battle hasfurnished the only possible condition to fighting. It has also furnishedthe condition of all the past, and may possibly furnish the condition ofall the future, discomfitures of religion. True religion is indeedlearning her lesson that something is wrong in her method of fighting, and many of her soldiers are now waking up to the fact that it is herethat her error lies--as in past times they woke up to see the error ofdenying the movement of the earth, the antiquity of the earth, theorigin of species by evolution, &c. But no one, even of her captains andgenerals, has so far followed up their advantage to its ultimateconsequences. And this is what I want to do. The logical advantage isclearly on their side; and it is their own fault if they do not gain theultimate victory, --not only as against science, but as againstintellectual dogmatism in every form. This can be routed all along theline. For science is only the organized study of natural causation, andthe experience of every human being, in so far as it leads to dogmatismon purely intellectual grounds, does so on account of entertaining thefundamental postulate in question. The influence of custom and want ofimagination is here very great. But the answer always should be to movethe ulterior question--what is the nature of natural causation?

Now I propose to push to its full logical conclusion the consequence ofthis answer. For no one, even the most orthodox, has as yet learnt thislesson of religion to anything like fullness. God is still grudged Hisown universe, so to speak, as far and as often as He can possibly be. Asexamples we may take the natural growth of Christianity out of previousreligions; the natural spread of it; the natural conversion of St. Paul, or of anybody else. It is still assumed on both sides that there mustbe something inexplicable or miraculous about a phenomenon in order toits being divine. 

What else have science and religion ever had to fight about save on thebasis of this common hypothesis, and hence as to whether the causationof such and such a phenomenon has been 'natural' or 'super-natural. ' Foreven the disputes as to science contradicting scripture, ultimately turnon the assumption of inspiration (supposing it genuine) being'super-natural' as to its causation. Once grant that it is 'natural' andall possible ground of dispute is removed. 

I can well understand why infidelity should make the basal assumption inquestion, because its whole case must rest thereon. But surely it istime for theists to abandon this assumption. 

The assumed distinction between causation as natural and super-naturalno doubt began in superstition in prehistoric time, and throughout thehistorical period has continued from a vague feeling that the action ofGod must be mysterious, and hence that the province of religion must bewithin the super-sensuous. Now, it is true enough that the finite cannotcomprehend the infinite, and hence the feeling in question is logicallysound. But under the influence of this feeling, men have alwayscommitted the fallacy of concluding that if a phenomenon has beenexplained in terms of natural causation, it has thereby been explained_in toto_--forgetting that it has only been explained up to the pointwhere such causation is concerned, and that the real question ofultimate causation has merely been thus postponed. And assuredly beyondthis point there is an infinitude of mystery sufficient to satisfy themost exacting mystic. For even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimateanalysis all natural causation is inexplicable. 

Logically regarded the advance of science, far from having weakenedreligion, has immeasurably strengthened it. For it has proved theuniformity of natural causation. The so-called natural sphere hasincreased at the expense of the 'super-natural. ' Unquestionably. Butalthough to lower grades of culture this always seems a fact inimical toreligion, we may now perceive it is quite the reverse, since it merelygoes to abolish the primitive or uncultured distinction in question. 

It is indeed most extraordinary how long this distinction has held sway, or how it is the ablest men of all generations have quietly assumed thatwhen once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we thereforeknow all about it--or, as it were, have removed it from the sphere ofmystery altogether, when, in point of fact, we have only merged it in amuch greater mystery than ever. 

But the answer to our astonishment how this distinction has managed tosurvive so long lies in the extraordinary effect of custom, which hereseems to slay reason altogether; and the more a man busies himself withnatural causes (e. G. In scientific research) the greater does thisslavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable toperceive the real state of the case--regarding any rational thinkingthereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical, ' even in itsetymological sense as super-sensuous or beyond physical causation, becomes a term of rational reproach. Obviously such a man has writtenhimself down, if not an ass, at all events a creature wholly incapableof rationally treating any of the highest problems presented either bynature or by man. 

On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theoryall causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw anydistinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate, ' we can onlymean this as valid in relation to mankind--i. E. In relation to ourexperience. For, obviously, it would be wholly incompatible with pureagnosticism to suppose that we are capable of drawing any suchdistinction in relation to the Divine activity itself. Even apart fromthe theory of Theism, pure agnosticism must take it that the realdistinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between theexplicable and the inexplicable--meaning by those terms that which isand that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within therange of human observation. Or, in other words, the distinction isreally between the observable and the unobservable causal processes ofthe universe. 

Although science is essentially engaged in explaining, her work isnecessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation; beyond thatsphere (i. E. The sensuous) she can explain nothing. In other words, even if she were able to explain the natural causation of everything, she would be unable to assign the ultimate _raison d'être_ of anything. 

It is not my intention to write an essay on the nature of causality, oreven to attempt a survey of the sundry theories which have beenpropounded on this subject by philosophers. Indeed, to attempt thiswould be little less than to write a history of philosophy itself. Nevertheless it is necessary for my purpose to make a few remarkstouching the main branches of thought upon the matter[50]. 

_The remarkable nature of the facts. _ These are remarkable, since theyare common to all human experience. Everything that _happens_ has acause. The same happening has always the same cause--or the sameconsequent the same antecedent. It is only familiarity with this greatfact that prevents universal wonder at it, for, notwithstanding all thetheories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. That thesame causes always produce the same effects is a proposition whichexpresses a fundamental fact of our knowledge, but the knowledge of thisfact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact. Doubtless, if it were not a fact, there could be no so-called 'Order ofNature, ' and consequently no science, no philosophy, or perhaps (if theirregularity were sufficiently frequent) no possibility of humanexperience. But although this is easy enough to show, it in no wisetends to show why the same causes should always produce the sameeffects. 

So manifest is it that our knowledge of the fact in question is onlyempirical, that some of our ablest thinkers, such as Hume and Mill, havefailed to perceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of lookingbeyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation ofthe fact itself. Therefore they give to the world the wholly vacuous, ormerely tautological theory of causation--viz. That of constancy ofsequence within human observation[51]. 

If it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizingor materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodoxpersons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to beat least as susceptible of the opposite view--viz. That it is subsumingthe natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: anda pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as againsteither of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matterthus: in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter, she ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing thematerial, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing aboutnatural causation--even so much as its existence--but for our ownvolitions. 

_Free Will_[52]. 

Having read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Willcontroversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logicalconclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:--

1. A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all, should be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinctionbetween responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise hecannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No onequestions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only questionis touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal bulk ofliterature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on bothsides failing to perceive this basal distinction. Even such able writersas Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position. 

2. The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused. For however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundantfoliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derivesfrom the former. 

3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to thewill, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrenderingtheir position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the moreultimate question as to the nature of natural causation. Now it can beproved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically]unanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation_x_--an unknown quantity. 

4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolveitself into this--is or is not the will determined by _x_? And, if thisseems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny thefact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining--viz. Is the will self-determining, or is it determined--i. E. _from without_?

5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in thesense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And Ithink the answer to this must be an unconditional negative. 

6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the willentirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined bynatural causation (_x_)? For the unknown quantity _x_ may very wellinclude _x'_, if by _x'_ we understand all the unknown ingredients ofpersonality. 

7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by anypossible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due tonatural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, andthat it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught weat present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required, even though all its acts are due to _x_. 

8. In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to_x'_, i. E. All causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, manysystems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human willis of the nature of a First Cause. In support of which possibility itmay be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a _causacausarum_ as regards _x_. 

9. To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes--eachthe _fons et origo_ of a new and never-ending stream of causality--thecosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection ofthe streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism[53]. 

10. Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted inmy essay on the 'World as an Eject[54]. ' But this, again, is merged inthe mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, andseemingly ultimate, fact. 

11. So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be--pureagnosticism. 

FOOTNOTES:

[47] [Here it was intended to insert further explanation 'showing thatmere observation of causality in external nature would not have yieldedidea of anything further than time and space relations. '--ED. ]

[48] [This theory was suggested in the Burney Essay, p. 136, andridiculed in the _Candid Examination_; see above, p. 11. Romanesintended at this point to consider at greater length his old views 'oncausation as due to being _qua_ being. '--ED. ]

[49] See, however, Aubrey Moore in _Lux Mundi_, pp. 94-96, and Le Conte, _Evolution in its Relation to Religious Thought_, pp. 335, ff. [N. B. Thereferences not enclosed in brackets are the author's, not mine. --ED. ]

[50] [Nothing more however was written than what followsimmediately. --ED. ]

[51] [The author intended further to show the vacuity of this theory andpoint out how Mill himself appears to perceive it by his introductionafter the term 'invariably' of the term 'unconditionally'; he refersalso to Martineau, _Study of Religion_, i. Pp. 152, 3. --ED. ]

[52] [Romanes' thoughts about Free Will are more lucidly expressed in anessay published subsequently to these Notes in _Mind and Motion andMonism_, pp. 129 ff. --ED. ]

[53] [See above, p. 31. --ED. ]

[54] _Contemporary Review_, July 1886. [But the 'ultimate difficulty'referred to above would seem to be the relation of manifold dependenthuman wills to the One Ultimate and All-embracing Will. --ED. ]

§ 4. FAITH. 

Faith in its religious sense is distinguished not only from opinion (orbelief founded on reason alone), in that it contains a spiritualelement: it is further distinguished from belief founded on theaffections, by needing an active co-operation of the will. Thus allparts of the human mind have to be involved in faith--intellect, emotions, will. We 'believe' in the theory of evolution on grounds ofreason alone; we 'believe' in the affection of our parents, children, &c. , almost (or it may be exclusively) on what I have called spiritualgrounds--i. E. On grounds of spiritual experience; for this we need noexercise either of reason or of will. But no one can 'believe' in God, or _a fortiori_ in Christ, without also a severe effort of will. This Ihold to be a matter of fact, whether or not there be a God or a Christ. 

Observe will is to be distinguished from desire. It matters not whatpsychologists may have to say upon this subject. Whether desire differsfrom will in kind or only in degree--whether will is desire in action, so to speak, and desire but incipient will--are questions with which weneed not trouble ourselves. For it is certain that there are agnosticswho would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give allthey possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion bypurchase--i. E. By one single act of will. But yet the desire is notstrong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make thecontinual sacrifices which Christianity entails. Perhaps the hardest ofthese sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect. Atleast I am certain that this is so in my own case. I have been so longaccustomed to constitute my reason my sole judge of truth, that evenwhile reason itself tells me it is not unreasonable to expect that theheart and the will should be required to join with reason in seeking God(for religion is for the _whole_ man), I am too jealous of my reason toexercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires. Forassuredly the strongest desire of my nature is to find that that natureis not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself somuch as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance, regarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough thatChristianity should have enjoined the _doing_ of the doctrine as anecessary condition to ascertaining (i. E. 'believing') its truth. Butfrom another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost anaffront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'--just as to somescientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them toinvestigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even thesimplest act of will in regard to religion--that of prayer--has not beenperformed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because ithas seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that muchas I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt. To justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to beessentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief ofthem has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposingthat after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to havesatisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace, ' or directillumination from God, --even then would not my reason turn round andrevenge herself upon me? For surely even then my habitual scepticismwould make me say to myself--'this is all very sublime and verycomforting; but what evidence have you to give me that the wholebusiness is anything more than self-delusion? The wish was probablyfather to the thought, and you might much better have performed your"act of will" by going in for a course of Indian hemp. ' Of course aChristian would answer to this that the internal light would not admitof such doubt, any more than seeing the sun does--that God knows us wellenough to prevent that, &c. , and also that it is unreasonable not to tryan experiment lest the result should prove too good to be credible, andso on. And I do not dispute that the Christian would be justified in soanswering, but I only adduce the matter as an illustration of thedifficulty which is experienced in conforming to all the conditions ofattaining to Christian faith--even supposing it to be sound. Others havedoubtless other difficulties, but mine is chiefly, I think, that of anundue regard to reason, as against heart and will--undue, I mean, if soit be that Christianity is true, and the conditions to faith in it havebeen of divine ordination. 

This influence of will on belief, even in matters secular, is the morepronounced the further removed these matters may be from demonstration(as already remarked); but this is most of all the case where ourpersonal interests are affected--whether these be material orintellectual, such as credit for consistency, &c. See, for example, howclosely, in the respects we are considering, political beliefs resemblereligious. Unless the points of difference are such that truth isvirtually demonstrable on one side, so that adhesion to the opposite isdue to _conscious_ sacrifice of integrity to expediency, we always findthat party-spectacles so colour the view as to leave reason at the mercyof will, custom, interest, and all the other circumstances whichsimilarly operate on religious beliefs. It seems to make but littledifference in either case what level of general education, mental power, special training, &c. , is brought to bear upon the question underjudgement. From the Premier to the peasant we find the same differenceof opinion in politics as we do in religion. And in each case theexplanation is the same. Beliefs are so little dependent on reason alonethat in such regions of thought--i. E. Where personal interests areaffected and the evidences of truth are not in their naturedemonstrable--it really seems as if reason ceases to be a judge ofevidence or guide to truth, and becomes a mere advocate of opinionalready formed on quite other grounds. Now these other grounds are, aswe have seen, mainly the accidents of habit or custom, wish being fatherto the thought, &c. 

Now this may be all deplorable enough in politics, and in all otherbeliefs secular; but who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to bein the matter of beliefs religious? For, unless we beg the question of afuture life in the negative, we must entertain at least the possibilityof our being in a state of probation in respect of an honest use notonly of our reason, but probably still more of those other ingredientsof human nature which go to determine our beliefs touching this mostimportant of all matters. 

It is remarkable how even in politics it is the moral and spiritualelements of character which lead to success in the long run, even morethan intellectual ability--supposing, of course, that the latter is notbelow the somewhat high level of our Parliamentary assemblies. 

As regards the part that is played by will in the determining of belief, one can show how unconsciously large this is even in matters of secularinterest. Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide ofjudgement that it is usually taken to be--so far, indeed, that, save inmatters approaching down-right demonstration (where of course there isno room for any other ingredient) it is usually hampered by custom, prejudice, dislike, &c. , to a degree that would astonish the most soberphilosopher could he lay bare to himself all the mental processeswhereby the complex act of assent or dissent is eventuallydetermined[55]. 

As showing how little reason alone has to do with the determining ofreligious belief, let us take the case of mathematicians. This I thinkis the fairest case we can take, seeing that of all intellectualpursuits that of mathematical research is the most exact, as well as themost exclusive in its demand upon the powers of reason, and hence that, as a class, the men who have achieved highest eminence in that pursuitmay be fairly taken as the fittest representatives of our species inrespect of the faculty of pure reason. Yet whenever they have turnedtheir exceptional powers in this respect upon the problems of religion, how suggestively well balanced are their opposite conclusions--so muchso indeed that we can only conclude that reason counts for very littlein the complex of mental processes which here determine judgement. 

Thus, if we look to the greatest mathematicians in the world's history, we find Kepler and Newton as Christians; La Place, on the other hand, aninfidel. Or, coming to our own times, and confining our attention to theprincipal seat of mathematical study:--when I was at Cambridge, therewas a galaxy of genius in that department emanating from that place suchas had never before been equalled. And the curious thing in our presentconnexion is that all the most illustrious names were ranged on the sideof orthodoxy. Sir W. Thomson, Sir George Stokes, Professors Tait, Adams, Clerk-Maxwell, and Cayley--not to mention a number of lesser lights, such as Routh, Todhunter, Ferrers, &c. --were all avowed Christians. Clifford had only just moved at a bound from the extreme of asceticismto that of infidelity--an individual instance which I deem of particularinterest in the present connexion, as showing the dominating influenceof a forcedly emotional character even on so powerful an intellectualone, for the _rationality_ of the whole structure of Christian beliefcannot have so reversed its poles within a few months. 

Now it would doubtless be easy to find elsewhere than in Cambridgemathematicians of the first order who in our own generation are, or havebeen, professedly anti-Christian in their beliefs, --although certainlynot so great an array of such extraordinary powers. But, be this as itmay, the case of Cambridge in my own time seems to me of itself enoughto prove that Christian belief is neither made nor marred by the highestpowers of reasoning, apart from other and still more potent factors. 

_Faith and Superstition. _

Whether or not Christianity is true, there is a great distinctionbetween these two things. For while the main ingredient of Christianfaith is the moral element, this has no part in superstition. In pointof fact, the only point of resemblance is that both present the mentalstate called _belief_. It is on this account they are so oftenconfounded by anti-Christians, and even by non-Christians; the much moreimportant point of difference is not noted, viz. That belief in the onecase is purely intellectual, while in the other it is chiefly moral. _Qua_ purely intellectual, belief may indicate nothing but sheercredulity in absence of evidence; but where a moral basis is added, thecase is clearly different; for even if it appears to be sheer credulityto an outsider, that may be because he does not take into account theadditional evidence supplied by the moral facts. 

Faith and superstition are often confounded, or even identified. And, unquestionably, they are identical up to a certain point--viz. They bothpresent the mental state of _belief_. All people can see this; but notall people can see further, or define the _differentiae_. These are asfollows: First, supposing Christianity true, there is the spiritualverification. Second, supposing Christianity false, there is still themoral ingredient, which _ex hypothesi_ is absent in superstition. Inother words, both faith and superstition rest on an intellectual basis(which may be pure credulity); but faith rests also on a moral, even ifnot likewise on a spiritual. Even in human relations there is a widedifference between 'belief' in a scientific theory and 'faith' in apersonal character. And the difference is in the latter comprising amoral element. 

'Faith-healing, ' therefore, has no real point of resemblance with 'thyfaith hath saved thee' of the New Testament, unless we sink the personaldifferences between a modern faith-healer and Jesus Christ as objects offaith. 

Belief is not exclusively founded on objective evidence appealing toreason (opinion), but mainly on subjective evidence appealing to somealtogether different faculty (faith). Now, whether Christians are rightor wrong in what they believe, I hold it as certain as anything can bethat the distinction which I have just drawn, and which they allimplicitly draw for themselves, is logically valid. For no one isentitled to deny the possibility of what may be termed an organ ofspiritual discernment. In fact to do so would be to vacate the positionof pure agnosticism _in toto_--and this even if there were no objective, or strictly scientific, evidences in favour of such an organ, such as wehave in the lives of the saints, and, in a lower degree, in theuniversality of the religious sentiment. Now, if there be such an organ, it follows from preceding paragraphs, that not only will the mainevidences for Christianity be subjective, but that they ought to be so:they ought to be so, I mean, on the Christian supposition of the objectof Christianity being moral probation, and 'faith' both the test and thereward. 

From this many practical considerations ensue. E. G. The duty of parentsto educate their children in what they _believe_ as distinguished fromwhat they _know_. This would be unjustifiable if faith were the same asopinion. But it is fully justifiable if a man not only knows that hebelieves (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or notthe Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organof cognition, provided he honestly believes such is the case, it wouldbe immoral in him not to proceed in accordance with what he thusbelieves to be his knowledge. This obligation is recognized in educationin every other case. He is morally right even if mentally deluded. 

Huxley, in _Lay Sermons_, says that faith has been proved a 'cardinalsin' by science. Now, this is true enough of credulity, superstition, &c. , and science has done no end of good in developing our ideas ofmethod, evidence, &c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith'is not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hellscience would have made of the world, if she had abolished the 'spiritof faith' even in human relations. The fact is, Huxley falls into thecommon error of identifying 'faith' with opinion. 

Supposing Christianity true, it is very reasonable that faith in thesense already explained should be constituted the test of divineacceptance. If there be such a thing as Christ's winnowing fan, thequality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adaptedcannot be conceived as anything other than this moral quality. No onecould suppose a revelation appealing to the mere intellect of man, sinceacceptance would thus become a mere matter of prudence in subscribing toa demonstration made by higher intellects. 

It is also a matter of fact that if Christianity is truthful inrepresenting this world as a school of moral probation, we cannotconceive a system better adapted to this end than is the world, or abetter schoolmaster than Christianity. This is proved not only bygeneral reasoning, but also by the work of Christianity in the world, its adaptation to individual needs, &c. Consider also the extraordinarydiversity of human characters in respect both of morality andspirituality though all are living in the same world. Out of the sameexternal material or environment such astonishingly diverse productsarise according to the use made of it. Even human suffering in its worstforms can be welcome if justified by faith in such an object. 'Ills haveno weight, and tears no bitterness, ' but are rather to be 'gloriedin[56]. '

It is a further fact that only by means of this theory of probation isit possible to give any meaning to the world, i. E. Any _raison d'être_of human existence. 

Supposing Christianity true, every man must stand or fall by the resultsof his own conduct, as developed through his own moral character. (Thiscould not be so if the test were intellectual ability. ) Yet this doesnot hinder that the exercise of will in the direction of religion shouldneed help in order to attain belief. Nor does it hinder that some menshould need more help and others less. Indeed, it may well be that somemen are intentionally precluded from receiving any help, so as not toincrease their responsibility, or receive but little, so as toconstitute intellectual difficulties a moral trial. But clearly, if suchthings are so, we are inadequate judges. 

It is a fact that we all feel the intellectual part of man to be'higher' than the animal, whatever our theory of his origin. It is afact that we all feel the moral part of man to be 'higher' than theintellectual, whatever our theory of either may be. It is also a factthat we all similarly feel the spiritual to be 'higher' than the moral, whatever our theory of religion may be. It is what we understand byman's moral, and still more his spiritual, qualities that go toconstitute 'character. ' And it is astonishing how in all walks of lifeit is character that tells in the long run. 

It is a fact that these distinctions are all well marked and universallyrecognized--viz. 

 {Animality. {Intellectuality. Human {Morality. {Spirituality. 

Morality and spirituality are to be distinguished as two very differentthings. A man may be highly moral in his conduct without being in anydegree spiritual in his nature, and, though to a lesser extent, viceversa. And, objectively, we see the same distinction between morals andreligion. By spirituality I mean the religious temperament, whether ornot associated with any particular creed or dogma. 

There is no doubt that intellectual pleasures are more satisfying andenduring than sensual--or even sensuous. And, to those who haveexperienced them, so it is with spiritual over intellectual, artistic, &c. This is an objective fact, abundantly testified to by every one whohas had experience: and it seems to indicate that the spiritual natureof man is the highest part of man--the [culminating] point of his being. 

It is probably true, as Renan says in his posthumous work, that therewill always be materialists and spiritualists, inasmuch as it willalways be observable on the one hand that there is no thought withoutbrain, while, on the other hand, instincts of man will always aspire tohigher beliefs. But this is just what ought to be if religion is true, and we are in a state of probation. And is it not probable that thematerialistic position (discredited even by philosophy) is due simply tocustom and want of imagination? Else why the inextinguishable instincts?

It is much more easy to disbelieve than to believe. This is obvious onthe side of reason, but it is also true on that of spirit, for todisbelieve is in accordance with environment or custom, while to believenecessitates a spiritual use of the imagination. For both thesereasons, very few unbelievers have any justification, eitherintellectual or spiritual, for their own unbelief. 

Unbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice, and never athing to be proud of. 

'Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God shouldraise the dead?' Clearly no answer can be given by the pure agnostic. But he will naturally say in reply, 'the question rather is, why shouldit be thought credible with you that there is a God, or, if there is, that he should raise the dead?' And I think the wise Christian willanswer, 'I believe in the resurrection of the dead, partly on grounds ofreason, partly on those of intuition, but chiefly on both combined; soto speak, it is my whole character which accepts the whole system ofwhich the doctrine of personal immortality forms an essential part. ' Andto this it may be fairly added that the Christian doctrine of theresurrection of our bodily form cannot have been arrived at for thepurpose of meeting modern materialistic objections to the doctrine ofpersonal immortality; hence it is certainly a strange doctrine to havebeen propounded at that time, together with its companion, and scarcelyless distinctive, doctrine of the vileness of the body. Why was it notsaid that the 'soul' alone should survive as a disembodied 'spirit'? Orif form were supposed necessary for man as distinguished from God, thathe was to be an angel? But, be this as it may, the doctrine of theresurrection seems to have fully met beforehand the materialisticobjection to a future life, and so to have raised the ulterior questionwith which this paragraph opens. 

We have seen in the Introduction that all first principles even ofscientific facts are known by intuition and not by reason. No one candeny this. Now, if there be a God, the fact is certainly of the natureof a first principle; for it must be the first of all first principles. No one can dispute this. No one can therefore dispute the necessaryconclusion, that, if there be a God, He is knowable, (if knowable atall) by intuition and not by reason. 

Indeed a little thought is enough to show that from its very nature assuch, reason must be incapable of adjudicating on the subject, for it isa process of inferring from the known to the unknown. 

Or thus. It would be against reason itself to suppose that God, even ifHe exists, can be known by reason; He must be known, if knowable at all, by intuition[57]. 

Observe, although God might give an objective revelation of Himself, e. G. As Christians believe He has, even this would not give knowledgeof Him save to those who believe the revelations genuine; and I doubtwhether it is logically possible for any form of objective revelation ofitself to compel belief in it. Assuredly one rising from the dead totestify thereto would not, nor would letters of fire across the sky doso. But, even if it were logically possible, we need not consider theabstract possibility, seeing that, as a matter of fact, no suchdemonstrative revelation has been given. 

Hence, the only legitimate attitude of pure reason is pure agnosticism. No one can deny this. But, it will be said, there is this vastdifference between our intuitive knowledge of all other first principlesand that alleged of the 'first of all first principles, ' viz. That thelatter is confessedly _not_ known to all men. Now, assuredly, there ishere a vast difference. But so there ought to be, if we are here in astate of probation, as before explained. And that we are in such a stateis not only the hypothesis of religion, but the sole rationalexplanation as well as moral justification of our existence as rationalbeings and moral agents[58]. 

It is not necessarily true, as J. S. Mill and all other agnostics think, that even if internal intuition be of divine origin, the illuminationthus furnished can only be of evidential value to the individual subjectthereof. On the contrary, it may be studied objectively, even if notexperienced subjectively; and ought to be so studied by a pure agnosticdesirous of light from any quarter. Even if he does not know it as anoumenon he can investigate it as a phenomenon. And, supposing it to beof divine origin, as its subjects believe and he has no reason to doubt, he may gain much evidence against its being a mere psychologicalillusion from identical reports of it in all ages. Thus, if any largesection of the race were to see flames issuing from magnets, there wouldbe no doubt as to their objective reality. 

The testimony given by Socrates to the occurrence in himself of aninternal Voice, having all the definiteness of an auditoryhallucination, has given rise to much speculation by subsequentphilosophers. 

Many explanations are suggested, but if we remember the critical natureof Socrates' own mind, the literal nature of his mode of teaching, andthe high authority which attaches to Plato's opinion on the subject, theprobability seems to incline towards the 'Demon' having been, inSocrates' own consciousness, an actual auditory sensation. Be thishowever as it may, I suppose there is no question that we may adopt thisview of the matter at least to the extent of classifying Socrates withLuther, Pascal, &c. , not to mention all the line of Hebrew and otherprophets, who agree in speaking of a Divine Voice. 

If so, the further question arises whether we are to classify all thesewith lunatics in whom the phenomena of auditory hallucination arehabitual. 

Without doubt this hypothesis is most in accordance with the temper ofour age, partly because it obeys the law of parsimony, and partlybecause it [negatives] _a priori_ the possibility of revelation. 

But if we look at the matter from the point of view of pure agnosticism, we are not entitled to adopt so rough and ready an interpretation. 

Suppose then that not only Socrates and all great religious reformersand founders of religious systems both before and after him weresimilarly stricken with mental disease, but that similar phenomena hadoccurred in the case of all scientific discoverers such as Galileo, Newton, Darwin, &c. --supposing all these men to have declared that theirmain ideas had been communicated by subjective sensations as of spokenlanguage, so that all the progress of the world's scientific thought hadresembled that of the world's religious thought, and had been attributedby the promoters thereof to direct inspirations of this kind--would itbe possible to deny that the testimony thus afforded to the fact ofsubjective revelation would have been overwhelming? Or could it anylonger have been maintained that supposing a revelation to becommunicated subjectively the fact thereof could only be of anyevidential value to the recipient himself? To this it will no doubt beanswered, 'No, but in the case supposed the evidence arises not from thefact of their subjective intuition but from that of its objectiveverification in the results of science. ' Quite so; but this is exactlythe test appealed to by the Hebrew prophets--the test of true and lyingprophets being in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of their propheciesand 'By their fruits ye shall know them. '

Therefore it is as absurd to say that the religious consciousness ofminds other than our own can be barred antecedently as evidence, as itis to say that testimony to the miraculous is similarly barred. The pureagnostic must always carefully avoid the 'high _priori_ road. ' But, onthe other hand, he must be all the more assiduous in estimating fairlythe character, both as to quantity and quality, of evidence _aposteriori_. Now this evidence in the present case is twofold, positiveand negative. It will be convenient to consider the negative first. 

The negative evidence is furnished by the nature of man without God. Itis thoroughly miserable, as is well shown by Pascal, who has devoted thewhole of the first part of his treatise to this subject. I need not goover the ground which he has already so well traversed. 

Some men are not conscious of the cause of this misery: this, however, does not prevent the fact of their being miserable. For the most partthey conceal the fact as well as possible from themselves, by occupyingtheir minds with society, sport, frivolity of all kinds, or, ifintellectually disposed, with science, art, literature, business, &c. This however is but to fill the starving belly with husks. I know fromexperience the intellectual distractions of scientific research, philosophical speculation, and artistic pleasures; but am also wellaware that even when all are taken together and well sweetened to taste, in respect of consequent reputation, means, social position, &c. , thewhole concoction is but as high confectionery to a starving man. He maycheat himself for a time--especially if he be a strong man--into thebelief that he is nourishing himself by denying his natural appetite;but soon finds he was made for some altogether different kind of food, even though of much less tastefulness as far as the palate is concerned. 

Some men indeed never acknowledge this articulately or distinctly evento themselves, yet always show it plainly enough to others. Take, e. G. , 'that last infirmity of noble minds. ' I suppose the most exalted andleast 'carnal' of worldly joys consists in the adequate recognition bythe world of high achievement by ourselves. Yet it is notorious that--

 "It is by God decreed Fame shall not satisfy the highest need. "

It has been my lot to know not a few of the famous men of ourgeneration, and I have always observed that this is profoundly true. Like all other 'moral' satisfactions, this soon palls by custom, and assoon as one end of distinction is reached, another is pined for. Thereis no finality to rest in, while disease and death are always standingin the background. Custom may even blind men to their own misery, so faras not to make them realize what is wanting; yet the want is there. 

I take it then as unquestionably true that this whole negative side ofthe subject proves a vacuum in the soul of man which nothing can fillsave faith in God. 

Now take the positive side. Consider the happiness of religious--andchiefly of the highest religious, i. E. Christian--belief. It is a matterof fact that besides being most intense, it is most enduring, growing, and never staled by custom. In short, according to the universaltestimony of those who have it, it differs from all other happiness notonly in degree but in kind. Those who have it can usually testify towhat they used to be without it. It has no relation to intellectualstatus. It is a thing by itself and supreme. 

So much for the individual. But positive evidence does not end here. Look at the effects of Christian belief as exercised on humansociety--1st, by individual Christians on the family, &c. ; and, 2nd, bythe Christian Church on the world. 

All this may lead on to an argument from the adaptation of Christianityto human higher needs. All men must feel these needs more or less inproportion as their higher natures, moral and spiritual, are developed. Now Christianity is the only religion which is adapted to meet them, and, according to those who are alone able to testify, does so mostabundantly. All these men, of every sect, nationality, &c. , agree intheir account of their subjective experience; so as to this there can beno question. The only question is as to whether they are all deceived. 

PEU DE CHOSE. 

 'La vie est vaine: Un peu d'amour, Un peu de haine . .. Et puis--bon jour!

 La vie est brève: Un peu d'espoir, Un peu de rêve . .. Et puis--bon soir!'

The above is a terse and true criticism of this life without hope of afuture one. Is it satisfactory? But Christian faith, as a matter offact, changes it entirely. 

 'The night has a thousand eyes, And the day but one; Yet the light of a whole world dies With the setting sun. 

 The mind has a thousand eyes, And the heart but one; Yet the light of a whole life dies When love is done. '

Love is known to be all this. How great, then, is Christianity, as beingthe religion of love, and causing men to believe both in the cause oflove's supremacy and the infinity of God's love to man. 

FOOTNOTES:

[55] Cf. Pascal, _Pensées_. 'For we must not mistake ourselves, we haveas much that is automatic in us as intellectual, and hence it comes thatthe instrument by which persuasion is brought about is not demonstrationalone. How few things are demonstrated! Proofs can only convince themind; custom makes our strongest proofs and those which we hold mostfirmly, it sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious intellectafter it. .. . It is then custom that makes so many men Christians, customthat makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers, &c. Lastly, we mustresort to custom when once the mind has seen where truth is, in order toslake our thirst and steep ourselves in that belief which escapes us atevery hour, for to have proofs always at hand were too onerous. We mustacquire a more easy belief, that of custom, which without violence, without art, without argument, causes our assent and inclines all ourpowers to this belief, so that our soul naturally falls into it. .. . 

'It is not enough to believe only by force of conviction if theautomaton is inclined to believe the contrary. Both parts of us thenmust be obliged to believe, the intellect by arguments which it isenough to have admitted once in our lives, the automaton by custom, andby not allowing it to incline in the contrary direction. _Inclina cormeum Deus_. ' See also Newman's _Grammar of Assent_, chap. Vi. AndChurch's _Human Life and its Conditions_, pp. 67-9. 

[56] [The author has added, "For suffering in brutes see further on, "but nothing further on the subject appears to have been written. --ED. ]

[57] [In this connexion I may again notice that two days before hisdeath George Romanes expressed his cordial approval of ProfessorKnight's _Aspects of Theism_--a work in which great stress is laid onthe argument from intuition in different forms. --ED. ]

[58] On this subject see Pascal, _Pensées_ (Kegan Paul's trans. ) p. 103. 

§ 5. FAITH IN CHRISTIANITY. 

Christianity comes up for serious investigation in the present treatise, because this _Examination of Religion_ [i. E. Of the validity of thereligious consciousness] has to do with the evidences of Theismpresented by man, and not only by nature _minus_ man. Now of thereligious consciousness Christianity is unquestionably the highestproduct. 

When I wrote the preceding treatise [the _Candid Examination_], I didnot sufficiently appreciate the immense importance of _human_ nature, asdistinguished from physical nature, in any enquiry touching Theism. Butsince then I have seriously studied anthropology (including the scienceof comparative religions), psychology and metaphysics, with the resultof clearly seeing that human nature is the most important part of natureas a whole whereby to investigate the theory of Theism. This I ought tohave anticipated on merely _a priori_ grounds, and no doubt should haveperceived, had I not been too much immersed in merely physical research. 

Moreover, in those days, I took it for granted that Christianity wasplayed out, and never considered it at all as having any rationalbearing on the question of Theism. And, though this was doubtlessinexcusable, I still think that the rational standing of Christianityhas materially improved since then. For then it seemed that Christianitywas destined to succumb as a rational system before the double assaultof Darwin from without and the negative school of criticism from within. Not only the book of organic nature, but likewise its own sacreddocuments, seemed to be declaring against it. But now all this has beenvery materially changed. We have all more or less grown to see thatDarwinism is like Copernicanism, &c. , in this respect[59]; while theoutcome of the great textual battle[60] is impartially considered asignal victory for Christianity. Prior to the new [Biblical] science, there was really no rational basis in thoughtful minds, either for thedate of any one of the New Testament books, or, consequently, for thehistorical truth of any one of the events narrated in them. Gospels, Acts and Epistles were all alike shrouded in this uncertainty. Hence thevalidity of the eighteenth-century scepticism. But now all this kind ofscepticism has been rendered obsolete, and for ever impossible; whilethe certainty of enough of St. Paul's writings for the practical purposeof displaying the belief of the apostles has been established, as wellas the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the firstcentury. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidencesof Christianity. It is most important that the expert investigatorshould be exact, and, as in any other science, the lay public must takeon authority as trustworthy only what both sides are agreed upon. But, as in any other science, experts are apt to lose sight of the importanceof the main results agreed upon, in their fighting over lesser pointsstill in dispute. Now it is enough for us that the Epistles to theRomans, Galatians, and Corinthians, have been agreed upon as genuine, and that the same is true of the Synoptics so far as concerns the maindoctrine of Christ Himself. 

The extraordinary candour of Christ's biographers must not beforgotten[61]. Notice also such sentences as 'but some doubted, ' and (inthe account of Pentecost) 'these men are full of new wine[62]. ' Suchobservations are wonderfully true to human nature; but no lesswonderfully opposed to any 'accretion' theory. 

Observe, when we become honestly pure agnostics the whole scene changesby the change in our point of view. We may then read the recordsimpartially, or on their own merits, without any antecedent convictionthat they must be false. It is then an open question whether they arenot true as history. 

There is so much to be said in objective evidence for Christianity thatwere the central doctrines thus testified to anything short ofmiraculous, no one would doubt. But we are not competent judges _apriori_ of what a revelation should be. If our agnosticism be _pure_, wehave no right to pre-judge the case on _prima facie_ grounds. 

One of the strongest pieces of objective evidence in favour ofChristianity is not sufficiently enforced by apologists. Indeed, I amnot aware that I have ever seen it mentioned. It is the absence from thebiography of Christ of any doctrines which the subsequent growth ofhuman knowledge--whether in natural science, ethics, political economy, or elsewhere--has had to discount. This negative argument is reallyalmost as strong as is the positive one from what Christ did teach. Forwhen we consider what a large number of sayings are recorded of--or atleast attributed to--Him, it becomes most remarkable that in literaltruth there is no reason why any of His words should ever pass away inthe sense of becoming obsolete. 'Not even now could it be easy, ' saysJohn Stuart Mill, 'even for an unbeliever, to find a better translationof the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete, than toendeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life[63]. ' ContrastJesus Christ in this respect with other thinkers of like antiquity. EvenPlato, who, though some 400 years B. C. In point of time, was greatly inadvance of Him in respect of philosophic thought--not only becauseAthens then presented the extraordinary phenomenon which it did ofgenius in all directions never since equalled, but also because he, following Socrates, was, so to speak, the greatest representative ofhuman reason in the direction of spirituality--even Plato, I say, isnowhere in this respect as compared with Christ. Read the dialogues, andsee how enormous is the contrast with the Gospels in respect of errorsof all kinds--reaching even to absurdity in respect of reason, and tosayings shocking to the moral sense. Yet this is confessedly the highestlevel of human reason on the lines of spirituality, when unaided byalleged revelation. 

Two things may be said in reply. First, that the Jews (Rabbis) ofChrist's period had enunciated most of Christ's ethical sayings. But, even so far as this is true, the sayings were confessedly extracted ordeduced from the Old Testament, and so _ex hypothesi_ due to originalinspiration. Again, it is not very far true, because, as _Ecce Homo_says, the ethical sayings of Christ, even when anticipated by Rabbis andthe Old Testament, were _selected_ by Him. 

It is a general, if not a universal, rule that those who rejectChristianity with contempt are those who care not for religion of anykind. 'Depart from us' has always been the sentiment of such. On theother hand, those in whom the religious sentiment is intact, but whohave rejected Christianity on intellectual grounds, still almost deifyChrist. These facts are remarkable. 

If we estimate the greatness of a man by the influence which he hasexerted on mankind, there can be no question, even from the secularpoint of view, that Christ is much the greatest man who has ever lived. 

It is on all sides worth considering (blatant ignorance or basevulgarity alone excepted) that the revolution effected by Christianityin human life is immeasurable and unparalleled by any other movement inhistory; though most nearly approached by that of the Jewish religion, of which, however, it is a development, so that it may be regarded as ofa piece with it. If thus regarded, this whole system of religion is soimmeasurably in advance of all others, that it may fairly be said, if ithad not been for the Jews, the human race would not have had anyreligion worth our serious attention as such. The whole of that side ofhuman nature would never have been developed in civilized life. Andalthough there are numberless individuals who are not conscious of itsdevelopment in themselves, yet even these have been influenced to anenormous extent by the atmosphere of religion around them. 

But not only is Christianity thus so immeasurably in advance of allother religions. It is no less so of every other system of thought thathas ever been promulgated in regard to all that is moral and spiritual. Whether it be true or false, it is certain that neither philosophy, science, nor poetry has ever produced results in thought, conduct, orbeauty in any degree to be compared with it. This I think will be on allhands allowed as regards conduct. As regards thought and beauty it maybe disputed. But, consider, what has all the science or all thephilosophy of the world done for the thought of mankind to be comparedwith the one doctrine, 'God is love'? Whether or not true, conceive whatbelief in it has been to thousands of millions of our race--i. E. Itsinfluence on human thought, and thence on human conduct. Thus to admitits incomparable influence in conduct is indirectly to admit it asregards thought. Again, as regards beauty, the man who fails to see itsincomparable excellence in this respect merely shows his own deficiencyin the appreciation of all that is noblest in man. True or not true, theentire Story of the Cross, from its commencement in prophetic aspirationto its culmination in the Gospel, is by far the most magnificent[presentation] in literature. And surely the fact of its having all beenlived does not detract from its poetic value. Nor does the fact of itsbeing capable of appropriation by the individual Christian of to-day asstill a vital religion detract from its sublimity. Only to a man whollydestitute of spiritual perception can it be that Christianity shouldfail to appear the greatest exhibition of the beautiful, the sublime, and of all else that appeals to our spiritual nature, which has everbeen known upon our earth. 

Yet this side of its adaptation is turned only towards men of highestculture. The most remarkable thing about Christianity is its adaptationto all sorts and conditions of men. Are you highly intellectual? Thereis in its problems, historical and philosophical, such worlds ofmaterial as you may spend your life upon with the same interminableinterest as is open to the students of natural science. Or are you but apeasant in your parish church, with knowledge of little else than yourBible? Still are you . .. [64]

_Regeneration_. 

How remarkable is the doctrine of Regeneration _per se_, as it is statedin the New Testament[65], and how completely it fits in with thenon-demonstrative character of Revelation to reason alone, with thehypothesis of moral probation, &c. Now this doctrine is one of thedistinctive notes of Christianity. That is, Christ foretold repeatedlyand distinctly--as did also His apostles after Him--that while those whoreceived the Holy Ghost, who came to the Father through faith in theSon, who were born again of the Spirit, (and many other synonymousphrases, ) would be absolutely certain of Christian truth as it were bydirect vision or intuition, the carnally minded on the other hand wouldnot be affected by any amount of direct evidence, even though one rosefrom the dead--as indeed Christ shortly afterwards did, with fulfilmentof this prediction. Thus scepticism may be taken by Christians ascorroborating Christianity. 

By all means let us retain our independence of judgement; but this ispre-eminently a matter in which pure agnostics must abstain fromarrogance and consider the facts impartially as unquestionable phenomenaof experience. 

Shortly after the death of Christ, this phenomenon which had beenforetold by Him occurred, and appears to have done so for the firsttime. It has certainly continued to manifest itself ever since, and hasbeen attributed by professed historians to that particular moment intime called Pentecost, producing much popular excitement and a largenumber of Christian believers. 

But, whether or not we accept this account, it is unquestionable thatthe apostles were filled with faith in the person and office of theirMaster, which is enough to justify His doctrine of regeneration. 

_Conversions. _

St. Augustine after thirty years of age, and other Fathers, beartestimony to a sudden, enduring and extraordinary change in themselves, called _conversion_[66]. 

Now this experience has been repeated and testified to by countlessmillions of civilized men and women in all nations and all degrees ofculture. It signifies not whether the conversion be sudden or gradual, though, as a psychological phenomenon, it is more remarkable when suddenand there is no symptom of mental aberration otherwise. But even as agradual growth in mature age, its evidential value is not less. (Cf. Bunyan, &c. )

In all cases it is not a mere change of belief or opinion; this is by nomeans the point; the point is that it is a modification of character, more or less profound. 

Seeing what a complex thing is character, this change therefore cannotbe simple. That it may all be due to so-called natural causes is noevidence against its so-called supernatural source, unless we beg thewhole question of the Divine in Nature. To pure agnostics the evidencefrom conversions and regeneration lies in the bulk of thesepsychological phenomena, shortly after the death of Christ, with theircontinuance ever since, their general similarity all over the world, &c. , &c. 

_Christianity and Pain_. 

Christianity, from its foundation in Judaism, has throughout been areligion of sacrifice and sorrow. It has been a religion of blood andtears, and yet of profoundest happiness to its votaries. The apparentparadox is due to its depth, and to the union of these seemingly diverseroots in Love. It has been throughout and growingly a religion--orrather let us say _the_ religion--of Love, with these apparentlyopposite qualities. Probably it is only those whose characters have beendeepened by experiences gained in this religion itself who are so muchas capable of intelligently resolving this paradox. 

Fakirs hang on hooks, Pagans cut themselves and even their children, sacrifice captives, &c. , for the sake of propitiating diabolicaldeities. The Jewish and Christian idea of sacrifice is doubtless asurvival of this idea of God by way of natural causation, yet this is noevidence against the completed idea of the Godhead being [such as theChristian belief represents it], for supposing the completed idea to betrue, the earlier ideals would have been due to the earlierinspirations, in accordance with the developmental method of Revelationhereafter to be discussed[67]. 

But Christianity, with its roots in Judaism, is, as I have said, _parexcellence_ the religion of sorrow, because it reaches to truer anddeeper levels of our spiritual nature, and therefore has capabilitiesboth of sorrow and joy which are presumably non-existent except incivilized man. I mean the sorrows and the joys of a fully evolvedspiritual life--such as were attained wonderfully early, historicallyspeaking, in the case of the Jews, and are now universally diffusedthroughout Christendom. In short, the sorrows and the joys in questionare those which arise from the fully developed consciousness of sinagainst a God of Love, as distinguished from propitiation of malignantspirits. These joys and sorrows are wholly spiritual, not merelyphysical, and culminate in the cry, 'Thou desirest no sacrifice. .. . Thesacrifice of God is a troubled spirit[68]. '

I agree with Pascal[69] that there is virtually nothing to be gained bybeing a theist as distinguished from a Christian. Unitarianism is onlyan affair of the reason--a merely abstract theory of the mind, havingnothing to do with the heart, or the real needs of mankind. It is onlywhen it takes the New Testament, tears out a few of its leaves relatingto the divinity of Christ, and appropriates all the rest, that itssystem becomes in any degree possible as a basis for personal religion. 

If there is a Deity it seems to be in some indefinite degree moreprobable that He should impart a Revelation than that He should not. 

Women, as a class, are in all countries much more disposed toChristianity than men. I think the scientific explanation of this is tobe found in the causes assigned in my essay on _Mental differencesbetween Men and Women_[70]. But, if Christianity be supposed true, therewould, of course, be a more ultimate explanation of a religiouskind--as in all other cases where causation is concerned. And, in thatcase I have no doubt that the largest part of the explanation wouldconsist in the passions of women being less ardent than those of men, and also much more kept under restraint by social conditions of life. This applies not only to purity, but likewise to most of the otherpsychological _differentiae_ between the sexes, such as ambition, selfishness, pride of power, and so forth. In short, the whole ideal ofChristian ethics is of a feminine as distinguished from a masculinetype[71]. Now nothing is so inimical to Christian belief as un-Christianconduct. This is especially the case as regards impurity; for whetherthe fact be explained on religious or non-religious grounds, it has moreto do with unbelief than has the speculative reason. Consequently, womanis, for all these reasons, the 'fitter' type for receiving and retainingChristian belief. 

Modern agnosticism is performing this great service to Christian faith;it is silencing all rational scepticism of the _a priori_ kind. And thisit is bound to do more and more the purer it becomes. In everygeneration it must henceforth become more and more recognized bylogical thinking, that all antecedent objections to Christianity foundedon reason alone are _ipso facto_ nugatory. Now, all the strongestobjections to Christianity have ever been those of the antecedent kind;hence the effect of modern thinking is that of more and more diminishingthe purely speculative difficulties, such as that of the Incarnation, &c. In other words the force of Butler's argument about our beingincompetent judges[72] is being more and more increased. 

And the logical development of this lies in the view already statedabout natural causation. For, just as pure agnosticism must allow thatreason is incompetent to adjudicate _a priori_ for or against Christianmiracles, including the Incarnation, so it must further allow that, ifthey ever took place, reason can have nothing to say against their beingall of one piece with causation in general. Hence, so far as reason isconcerned, pure agnosticism must allow that it is only the event whichcan ultimately prove whether Christianity is true or false. 'If it be ofGod we cannot overthrow it, lest haply we be found even to fight againstGod. ' But the individual cannot wait for this empirical determination. What then is he to do? The unbiassed answer of pure agnosticism oughtreasonably to be, in the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try. ' Thatis, in this case, try the only experiment available--the experiment offaith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verificationwill come, not indeed mediately through any course of speculativereason, but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faithenough to make this venture honestly, will he be in a just position fordeciding the issue. Thus viewed it would seem that the experiment offaith is not a 'fool's experiment'; but, on the contrary, so that thereis enough _prima facie_ evidence to arrest serious attention, such anexperimental trial would seem to be the rational duty of a pureagnostic. 

It is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than tothinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. 'If any man will doHis will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God' (St. Johnvii. 17). And surely, even on grounds of reason itself, it should beallowed that, supposing Christianity to be 'of God, ' it _ought_ toappeal to the spiritual rather than to the rational side of our nature. 

Even within the region of pure reason (or the '_prima facie_ case')modern science, as directed on the New Testament criticism, has surelydone more for Christianity than against it. For, after half a century ofbattle over the text by the best scholars, the dates of the Gospels havebeen fixed within the first century, and at least four of St. Paul'sepistles have had their authenticity proved beyond doubt. Now this isenough to destroy all eighteenth-century criticism as to thedoubtfulness of the historical existence of Christ and His apostles, 'inventions of priests, ' &c. , which was the most formidable kind ofcriticism of all. There is no longer any question as to historicalfacts, save the miraculous, which, however, are ruled out by negativecriticism on merely _a priori_ grounds. This remaining--and, _exhypothesi_, necessary--doubt is of very different importance from theother. 

Again, the Pauline epistles of proved authenticity are enough for allthat is wanted to show the belief of Christ's contemporaries. 

These are facts of the first order of importance to have proved. OldTestament criticism is as yet too immature to consider. 

_Plan in Revelation_. 

The views which I entertained on this subject when an undergraduate[i. E. The ordinary orthodox views] were abandoned in presence of thetheory of Evolution--i. E. The theory of natural causation as probablyfurnishing a scientific explanation [of the religious phenomena ofJudaism] or, which is the same thing, an explanation in terms ofascertainable causes up to some certain point; which however in thisparticular case cannot be determined within wide limits, so that thehistory of Israel will always embody an element of 'mystery' much morethan any other history. 

It was not until twenty-five years later that I saw clearly the fullimplications of my present views on natural causation. As applied tothis particular case these views show that to a theist, at all events(i. E. To any one who on independent grounds has accepted the theory ofTheism), it ought not to make much difference to the evidential value ofthe Divine Plan of Revelation as exhibited in the Old and NewTestaments, even if it be granted that the whole has been due toso-called natural causes only. I say, 'not much difference, ' for that itought to make some difference I do not deny. Take a precisely analogouscase. The theory of evolution by natural causes is often said to make nological difference in the evidence of plan or design manifested inorganic nature--it being only a question of _modus operandi_ whether allpieces of organic machinery were produced suddenly or by degrees; theevidence of design is equally there in either case. Now I have shownelsewhere that this is wrong[73]. It may not make much difference to aman who is already a theist, for then it is but a question of _modus_, but it makes a great difference to the evidence of Theism. 

So it is in evidence of plan in proof of a revelation. If there had beenno alleged revelation up to the present time, and if Christ were now toappear suddenly in His first advent in all the power and glory whichChristians expect for His second, the proof of His revelation would bedemonstrative. So that, as a mere matter of evidence, a suddenrevelation might be much more convincing than a gradual one. But itwould be quite out of analogy with causation in nature[74]. Besides, even a gradual revelation might be given easily, which would be ofdemonstrative value--as by making prophecies of historical events, scientific discoveries, &c. , so clear as to be unmistakeable. But, asbefore shown, a demonstrative revelation has not been made, and theremay well be good reasons why it should not. Now, if there are suchreasons (e. G. Our state of probation), we can well see that the gradualunfolding of a plan of revelation, from earliest dawn of history to theend of the world ('I speak as a fool') is much preferable to a suddenmanifestation sufficiently late in the world's history to behistorically attested for all subsequent time. For

 1st. Gradual evolution is in analogy with God's other work. 

 2nd. It does not leave Him without witness at any time during the historical period. 

 3rd. It gives ample scope for persevering research at all times--i. E. A moral test, and not merely an intellectual assent to some one _(ex hypothesi)_ unequivocally attested event in history. 

The _appearance_ of plan in revelation is, in fact, certainly remarkableenough to arrest serious attention. 

If revelation has been of a progressive character, then it follows thatit must have been so, not only historically, but likewiseintellectually, morally, and spiritually. For thus only could it bealways adapted to the advancing conditions of the human race. Thisreflection destroys all those numerous objections against Scripture onaccount of the absurdity or immorality of its statements or precepts, unless it can be shown that the modifications suggested by criticism asrequisite to bring the statements or precepts into harmony with modernadvancement would have been as well adapted to the requirements of theworld at the date in question, as were the actual statements or preceptsbefore us. 

Supposing Christianity true, it is certain that the revelation which itconveys has been predetermined at least since the dawn of the historicalperiod. This is certain because the objective evidences of Christianityas a revelation have their origin in that dawn. And these objectiveevidences are throughout [evidence] of a scheme, in which the end can beseen from the beginning. And the very methods whereby this scheme isitself revealed are such (still supposing that it is a scheme) aspresent remarkable evidences of design. These methods are, broadlyspeaking, miracles, prophecy and the results of the teaching, &c. , uponmankind. Now one may show that no better methods could conceivably havebeen designed for the purpose of latter-day evidence, combined withmoral and religious teaching throughout. The mere fact of it being solargely incorporated with secular history renders the Christian religionunique: so to speak, the world, throughout its entire historical period, has been constituted the canvas on which this divine revelation has beenpainted--and painted so gradually that not until the process had beengoing on for a couple of thousand years was it possible to perceive thesubject thereof. 

_Christian Dogmas_. 

Whether or not Christ was Himself divine would make no difference so faras the consideration of Christianity as the highest phase of evolutionis concerned, or from the purely secular [scientific] point of view. From the religious point of view, or that touching the relation of Godto man, it would of course make a great difference; but the differencebelongs to the same region of thought as that which applies to all theprevious moments of evolution. Thus the passage from the non-moral tothe moral appears, from the secular or scientific point of view, to bedue, as far as we can see, to mechanical causes in natural selection orwhat not. But, just as in the case of the passage from the non-mental tothe mental, &c. , this passage may have been _ultimately_ due to divinevolition, and _must have been so due_ on the theory of Theism. Therefore, I say, it makes no difference from a secular or scientificpoint of view whether or not Christ was Himself divine; since, in eithercase, the movement which He inaugurated was the proximate or phenomenalcause of the observable results. 

Thus, even the question of the divinity of Christ ultimately resolvesitself into the question of all questions--viz. Is or is not mechanicalcausation 'the outward and visible form of an inward and spiritualgrace'? Is it phenomenal or ontological; ultimate or derivative?

Similarly as regards the redemption. Whether or not Christ was reallydivine, in as far as a belief in His divinity has been a necessary causeof the moral and religious evolution which has resulted from His life onearth, it has equally and so far 'saved His people from their sins';that is, of course, it has saved them from their own sense of sin as anabiding curse. Whether or not He has effected any corresponding changeof an objective character in the ontological sphere, again depends onthe 'question of questions' just stated. 

_Reasonableness of the Doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity. _

Pure agnostics and those who search for God in Christianity should havenothing to do with metaphysical theology. _That_ is a department ofenquiry which, _ex hypothesi_, is transcendental, and is only to beconsidered after Christianity has been accepted. The doctrines of theIncarnation and the Trinity seemed to me most absurd in my agnosticdays. But now, as a _pure_ agnostic, I see in them no rationaldifficulty at all. As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons isnecessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. Sothat at best there is here but one difficulty, since, duality beingpostulated in the doctrine of the Incarnation, there is no furtherdifficulty for pure agnosticism in the doctrine of plurality. Now at onetime it seemed to me impossible that any proposition, verballyintelligible as such, could be more violently absurd than that of thedoctrine [of the Incarnation]. Now I see that this standpoint is whollyirrational, due only to the blindness of reason itself promoted by[purely] scientific habits of thought. 'But it is opposed to commonsense. ' No doubt, utterly so; but so it _ought_ to be if true. Commonsense is merely a [rough] register of common experience; but theIncarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, atall events cannot have been a common event. 'But it is derogatory to Godto become man. ' How do you know? Besides, Christ was not an ordinaryman. Both negative criticism and the historical effects of His lifeprove this; while, if we for a moment adopt the Christian point of viewfor the sake of argument, the whole _raison d'être_ of mankind is boundup in Him. Lastly, there are considerations _per contra_, rendering anincarnation antecedently probable[75]. On antecedent grounds there_must_ be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God, &c. , supposing a revelation to be made at all. Therefore theiroccurrence in Christianity _is_ no proper objection to Christianity. Why, again, stumble _a priori_ over the doctrine of theTrinity--especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind(i. E. Reason), and spirit (i. E. Moral, aesthetic, religious faculties)?The unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct ordersof being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is asunintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the allegedtriunity of God. 

_Adam, the Fall, the Origin of Evil_. 

These, all taken together as Christian dogmas, are undoubtedly hard hitby the scientific proof of evolution (but are the _only_ dogmas whichcan fairly be said to be so), and, as constituting the logical basis ofthe whole plan, they certainly do appear at first sight necessarily toinvolve in their destruction that of the entire superstructure. But thequestion is whether, after all, they have been destroyed for a pureagnostic. In other words, whether my principles are not as applicable inturning the flank of infidelity here as everywhere else. 

First, as regards Adam and Eve, observe, to begin with, that long beforeDarwin the story of man in Paradise was recognized by thoughtfultheologians as allegorical. Indeed, read with unprejudiced eyes, thefirst chapters of Genesis ought always to have been seen to be a poem asdistinguished from a history: nor could it ever have been mistaken fora history, but for preconceived ideas on the matter of inspiration. Butto pure agnostics there should be no such preconceived ideas; so thatnowadays no presumption should be raised against it as inspired, merelybecause it has been proved not to be a history--and this even though wecannot see of what it is allegorical. For, supposing it inspired, it hascertainly done good service in the past and can do so likewise in thepresent, by giving an allegorical, though not a literal, starting-pointfor the Divine Plan of Redemption. 

_The evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion compared_. 

It is often said that evolution of organic forms gives as good evidenceof design as would their special creation, inasmuch as all the facts ofadaptation, in which the evidence consists, are there in either case. But here it is overlooked that the very question at issue is thusbegged. The question is, Are these facts of adaptation _per se_sufficient evidence of design as their cause? But if it be allowed, asit must be, that under hypothesis of evolution by natural causes thefacts of adaptation belong to the same category as all the other factsof nature, no more special argument for design can be founded on thesefacts than on any others in nature. So that the facts of adaptation, like all other facts, are only available as arguments for design whenit is assumed that all natural causation is of a mental character: whichassumption merely begs the question of design anywhere. Or, in otherwords, on the supposition of their having been due to natural causes, the facts of adaptation are only then available as _per se_ goodevidence of design, when it has already been assumed that, _qua_ due tonatural causes, they are due to design. 

Natural religion resembles Revealed religion in this. Supposing bothdivine, both have been arranged so that, as far as reason can lead us, there is only enough evidence of design to arouse serious attention tothe question of it. In other words, as regards both, the attitude ofpure reason ought to be that of pure agnosticism. (Observe that theinadequacy of teleology, or design in nature, to prove Theism has beenexpressly recognized by all the more intellectual Christians of allages, although such recognition has become more general since Darwin. Onthis point I may refer to Pascal especially[76], and many otherauthors. ) This is another striking analogy between Nature andRevelation, supposing both to have emanated from the same author--i. E. Quite as much so as identity of developmental method in both. 

_Supposing the hypothesis of design in both to be true_, it follows thatin both this hypothesis can be alike verified only by the organ ofimmediate intuition--i. E. That other mode of human apprehension which issupplementary to the rational. Here again we note the analogy. And if aman has this supplementary mode of apprehending the highest truth (byhypothesis such), it will be his duty to exercise his spiritual eyesightin searching for God in nature as in revelation, when (still on ourpresent hypothesis that 'God is, and is the rewarder of them who seekHim diligently') he will find that his subjective evidence of God inNature and in Revelation will mutually corroborate one another--soyielding additional evidence to his reason. 

The teleology of Revelation supplements that of Nature, and so, to thespiritually minded man, they logically and mutually corroborate oneanother. 

Paley's writings form an excellent illustration of the identity of theteleological argument from Nature and from Revelation; though a veryimperfect illustration of the latter taken by itself, inasmuch as hetreats only of the New Testament, and even of that verypartially--ignoring all that went before Christ, and much of whathappened after the apostles. Yet Paley himself does not seem to haveobserved the similarity of the argument, as developed in his _NaturalTheology_ and _Evidences of Christianity_ respectively. But no one hasdeveloped the argument better in both cases. His great defect was in notperceiving that this teleological argument, _per se_, is not in eithercase enough to convince, but only to arouse serious attention. Paleyeverywhere represents that such an appeal to reason alone ought to besufficient. He fails to see that if it were, there could be no room forfaith. In other words, he fails to recognize the spiritual organ inman, and its complementary object, grace in God. So far he fails to be aChristian. And, whether Theism and Christianity be true or false, it iscertain that the teleological argument alone _ought_ to result, not inconviction, but in agnosticism. 

The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a manwithout a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being doneby God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably great;the latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism--i. E. _nil_. 

_Christian Demonology_[77]. 

It will be said, 'However you may seek to explain away _a priori_objections to miracles on _a priori_ grounds, there remains the factthat Christ accepted the current superstition in regard to diabolicpossession. Now the devils damn the doctrine. For you must choose thehorn of your dilemma, either the current theory was true or it was not. If you say true, you must allow that the same theory is true for allsimilar stages of culture, [but not for the later stages, ] and thereforethat the most successful exorcist is Science, albeit Science works notby faith in the theory, but by rejection of it. Observe, the diseasesare so well described by the record, that there is no possibility ofmistaking them. Hence you must suppose that they were due to devils inA. D. 30, and to nervous disorders in A. D. 1894. On the other hand, ifyou choose the other horn, you must accept either the hypothesis of theignorance or that of the mendacity of Christ. '

The answer is, that either hypothesis may be accepted by Christianity. For the sake of argument we may exclude the question whether theacceptance of the devil theory by Christ was really historical, ormerely attributed to Him by His biographers after His death. If Christknew that the facts were not due to devils, He may also have known itwas best to fall in with current theory, rather than to puzzle thepeople with a lecture on pathology. If He did not know, why should He, if He had previously 'emptied Himself' of omniscience? In either case, if He had denied the current theory, He would have been giving evidenceof scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture ofHis time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordancewith His method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, hasnowhere proved His divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science. 

The particular question of Christ and demonology is but part of a muchlarger one. 

_Darwin's Difficulty_[78]. 

The answer to Darwin's objection about so small a proportion of mankindhaving ever heard of Christ, is manifold:--

1. Supposing Christianity true, it is the highest and final revelation;i. E. The scheme of revelation has been developmental. Therefore, itfollows from the very method that the larger proportion of mankindshould never hear of Christ, i. E. All who live before His advent. 

2. But these were not left 'without witness. ' They all had theirreligion and their moral sense, each at its appropriate stage ofdevelopment. Therefore 'the times of ignorance God winked at' (Actsxvii. 30). 

3. Moreover these men were not devoid of benefit from Christ, because itis represented that He died for all men--i. E. But for Him [i. E. Apartfrom the knowledge of what was to come] God would not have 'winked atthe times of ignorance. ' The efficacy of atonement is represented astranscendental, and not dependent on the accident of hearing about theAtoner. 

4. It is remarkable that of all men Darwin should have been worsted bythis fallacious argument. For it has received its death-blow from thetheory of evolution: i. E. If it be true that evolution has been themethod of natural causation, and if it be true that the method ofnatural causation is due to a Divinity, then it follows that thelateness of Christ's appearance on earth must have been designed. For itis certain that He could not have appeared at any earlier date withouthaving violated the method of evolution. Therefore, on the theory ofTheism, He _ought_ to have appeared when He did--i. E. At the earliestpossible moment in history. 

So as to the suitability of the moment of Christ's appearance in otherrespects. Even secular historians are agreed as to the suitability ofthe combinations, and deduce the success of His system of morals andreligion from this fact. So with students of comparative religions. 

FOOTNOTES:

[59] [I. E. A theory which comes at first as a shock to the currentteaching of Christianity, but is finally seen to be in no antagonism toits necessary principles. --ED. ]

[60] [I. E. The battle in regard to the Christian texts ordocuments. --ED. ]

[61] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, pp. 74 ff. 

[62] Matt, xxviii. 17; Acts ii. 13. 

[63] _Three Essays on Theism_, p. 255. 

[64] [Note unfinished. --ED. ]

[65] [George Romanes began to make a collection of N. T. Texts bearing onthe subject. --ED. ]

[66] See Pascal, _Pensées_, p. 245. 

[67] [The notes on this subject were often too fragmentary forpublication. --ED. ]

[68] Ps. Li. 

[69] _Pensées_, pp. 91-93. 

[70] See _Nineteenth Century_, May 1887. 

[71] [The essay mentioned above should be read in explanation of thisexpression. George Romanes' meaning would be more accurately expressed, I think, had he said: 'The ideal of Christian character holds inprominence the elements which we regard as characteristically feminine, e. G. Development of affections, readiness of trust, love of service, readiness to suffer, &c. '--ED. ]

[72] See _Analogy_, part i. Ch. 7; part ii. Ch. 3, 4, &c. 

[73] See Conclusion of _Darwin and After Darwin_, part I. 

[74] I should somewhere show how much better a treatise Butler mighthave written had he known about evolution as the general law of nature. 

[75] See Gore's _Bampton Lectures_, lect. Ii. 

[76] _Pensées_, pp. 205 ff. 

[77] [Romanes' line of argument in this note seems to me impossible tomaintain. The emphasis which Jesus Christ lays on diabolic agency is sogreat that, if it is not a reality, He must be regarded either asseriously misled about realities which concern the spiritual life, orelse as seriously misleading others. And in neither case could He beeven the perfect Prophet. I think I am justified in explaining mydisagreement with Romanes' argument at this point particularly. --ED. ]

[78] [There is nothing in Darwin's _writings_ which seems to me tojustify Romanes in attributing this difficulty to him specially. But heknew Darwin so intimately and reverenced him so profoundly that he isnot likely to have been in error on the subject. --ED. ]

+Concluding Note by the Editor:--+

The intellectual attitude towards Christianity expressed in these notesmay be described as--(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of thescientific 'reason, ' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of thespiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of itsintuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historicaland spiritual evidences of Christianity. 

George Romanes came to recognize, as in these written notes so also inconversation, that it was 'reasonable to be a Christian believer' beforethe activity or habit of faith had been recovered. His life was cutshort very soon after this point was reached; but it will surprise noone to learn that the writer of these 'Thoughts' returned before hisdeath to that full, deliberate communion with the Church of Jesus Christwhich he had for so many years been conscientiously compelled to forego. In his case the 'pure in heart' was after a long period of darknessallowed, in a measure before his death, to 'see God. '

 _Fecisti nos ad te, Domine; et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te_. 

OXFORD: HORACE HARTPRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

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+THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER+. By the Rev. LEIGHTON PULLAN, M. A. , Fellow of St. John Baptist's College, Oxford, [_Third Edition_. 

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