Theodicy

Essays onthe Goodness of Godthe Freedom of Man andthe Origin of Evil

G. W. LEIBNIZ

Edited with an Introduction by Austin Farrer, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford

Translated by E. M. Huggard from C. J. Gerhardt's Edition of the CollectedPhilosophical Works, 1875-90

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 Published 1985 by Open Court Publishing Company, Peru, Illinois 61354. This edition first published 1951 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, London. Second printing 1988 Third printing 1990 Fourth printing 1993 Fifth printing 1996

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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716. Theodicy: essays on the goodness of God, the freedom of man, and the origin of evil. 

 Translation of: Essais de Théodicée. Includes index. 1. Theodicy--Early works to 1800. I. Title. B2590. E5 1985 231'. 8 85-8833 ISBN O-87548-437-9

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CONTENTS

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION page 7PREFACE 49PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH 73REASONESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE 123, 182, 276ORIGIN OF EVIL, IN THREE PARTS APPENDICESSUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY, REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS 377EXCURSUS ON THEODICY, § 392 389REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN 393ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND CHANCE'OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL', 405PUBLISHED RECENTLY IN LONDONCAUSA DEI ASSERTA 443INDEX 445

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

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I

Leibniz was above all things a metaphysician. That does not mean that hishead was in the clouds, or that the particular sciences lacked interest forhim. Not at all--he felt a lively concern for theological debate, he was amathematician of the first rank, he made original contributions to physics, he gave a realistic attention to moral psychology. But he was incapable oflooking at the objects of any special enquiry without seeing them asaspects or parts of one intelligible universe. He strove constantly aftersystem, and the instrument on which his effort relied was the speculativereason. He embodied in an extreme form the spirit of his age. Nothing couldbe less like the spirit of ours. To many people now alive metaphysics meansa body of wild and meaningless assertions resting on spurious argument. Aprofessor of metaphysics may nowadays be held to deal handsomely with theduties of his chair if he is prepared to handle metaphysical statements atall, though it be only for the purpose of getting rid of them, by showingthem up as confused forms of something else. A chair in metaphysicalphilosophy becomes analogous to a chair in tropical diseases: what istaught from it is not the propagation but the cure. 

Confidence in metaphysical construction has ebbed and flowed throughphilosophical history; periods of speculation have been followed by periodsof criticism. The tide will flow again, but it has not turned yet, and [8]such metaphysicians as survive scarcely venture further than to argue acase for the possibility of their art. It would be an embarrassing task toopen an approach to Leibnitian metaphysics from the present metaphysicalposition, if there is a present position. If we want an agreedstarting-point, it will have to be historical. 

The historical importance of Leibniz's ideas is anyhow unmistakable. Ifmetaphysical thinking is nonsensical, its empire over the human imaginationmust still be confessed; if it is as chimerical a science as alchemy, it isno less fertile in by-products of importance. And if we are to considerLeibniz historically, we cannot do better than take up his _Theodicy_, fortwo reasons. It was the only one of his main philosophical works to bepublished in his lifetime, so that it was a principal means of his directinfluence; the Leibniz his own age knew was the Leibniz of the _Theodicy_. Then in the second place, the _Theodicy_ itself is peculiarly rich inhistorical material. It reflects the world of men and books which Leibnizknew; it expresses the theological setting of metaphysical speculationwhich still predominated in the first years of the eighteenth century. 

Leibniz is remembered for his philosophy; he was not a professionalphilosopher. He was offered academic chairs, but he declined them. He was agentleman, a person of means, librarian to a reigning prince, andfrequently employed in state affairs of trust and importance. The librarianmight at any moment become the political secretary, and offer his owncontributions to policy. Leibniz was for the greater part of his activelife the learned and confidential servant of the House of Brunswick; whenthe Duke had nothing better to do with him, he set him to research intoducal history. If Leibniz had a profession in literature, it was historyrather than philosophy. He was even more closely bound to the interests ofhis prince than John Locke was to those of the Prince of Orange. The Housesof Orange and of Brunswick were on the same side in the principal contestwhich divided Europe, the battle between Louis XIV and his enemies. It wasa turning-point of the struggle when the Prince of Orange supplantedLouis's Stuart friends on the English throne. It was a continuation of thesame movement, when Leibniz's master, George I, succeeded to the samethrone, and frustrated the restoration of the Stuart heir. Locke returnedto England in the wake of the Prince of Orange, and became the [9]representative thinker of the régime. Leibniz wished to come to the Englishcourt of George I, but was unkindly ordered to attend to the duties of hislibrarianship. So he remained in Hanover. He was then an old man, andbefore the tide of favour had turned, he died. 

Posterity has reckoned Locke and Leibniz the heads of rival sects, butpolitically they were on the same side. As against Louis's politicalabsolutism and enforced religious uniformity, both championed religioustoleration and the freedom of the mind. Their theological liberalism waspolitical prudence; it was not necessarily for that reason the lesspersonally sincere. They had too much wisdom to meet bigotry with bigotry, or set Protestant intolerance against Catholic absolutism. But they had toomuch sympathy with the spirit of Europe to react into free thinking or tomake a frontal attack on revealed truth. They took their stand on afundamental Christian theism, the common religion of all good men; theyrepudiated the negative enormities of Hobbes and Spinoza. 

The Christian was to hold a position covered by three lines of defences. The base line was to be the substance of Christian theism and of Christianmorals, and it was to be held by the forces of sheer reason, without aidfrom scriptural revelation. The middle line was laid down by the generalsense of Scripture, and the defence of it was this. 'Scriptural doctrine isreconcilable with the findings of sheer reason, but it goes beyond them. Webelieve the Scriptures, because they are authenticated by marks ofsupernatural intervention in the circumstances of their origin. We believethem, but reason controls our interpretation of them. ' There remained themost forward and the most hazardous line: the special positions which aChurch, a sect, or an individual might found upon the scripturalrevelation. A prudent man would not hold his advance positions in the sameforce or defend them with the same obstinacy as either of the lines behindthem. He could argue for them, but he could not require assent to them. 

One cannot help feeling, indeed, the readiness of these writers to fallback, not only from the front line to the middle line, but from the middleline itself to the base line. Leibniz, for example, writes with perfectseriousness and decency about the Christian scheme of redemption, but ithardly looks like being for him a crucial deliverance from perdition. It isnot the intervention of Mercy, by which alone He possesses himself of [10]us: it is one of the ways in which supreme Benevolence carries out a cosmicpolicy; and God's benevolence is known by pure reason, and apart fromChristian revelation. 

In one politically important particular the theological attitude of Leibnizdiffered from that of Locke. Both stood for toleration and for theminimizing of the differences between the sects. This was a serious enoughmatter in England, but it was an even more serious matter in Germany. ForGermany was divided between Catholics and Protestants; effective tolerationmust embrace them both. English toleration might indulge a harmlessCatholic minority, while rejecting the Catholic régime as the embodiment ofintolerance. But this was not practical politics on the Continent; you musttolerate Catholicism on an equal footing, and come to terms with Catholicrégimes. Leibniz was not going to damn the Pope with true Protestantfervour. It was his consistent aim to show that his theological principleswere as serviceable to Catholic thinkers as to the doctors of his ownchurch. On some points, indeed, he found his most solid support fromCatholics; in other places there are hints of a joint Catholic-Lutheranfront against Calvinism. But on the whole Leibniz's writings suggest thatthe important decisions cut across all the Churches, and not between them. 

Leibniz was impelled to a compromise with 'popery', not only by thereligious divisions of Germany, but (at one stage) by the politicalweakness of the German Protestant States. At the point of Louis XIV'shighest success, the Protestant princes had no hope but in CatholicAustria, and Austria was distracted by Turkish pressure in the rear. Leibniz hoped to relieve the situation by preaching a crusade. Could notthe Christian princes sink their differences and unite against the infidel?And could not the Christian alliance be cemented by theological agreement?Hence Leibniz's famous negotiation with Bossuet for a basis ofCatholic-Lutheran concord. It was plainly destined to fail; and it wasbound to recoil upon its author. How could he be a true Protestant whotreated the differences with the Catholics as non-essentials? How could hehave touched pitch and taken no defilement? Leibniz was generally admired, but he was not widely trusted. As a mere politician, he may be judged tohave over-reached himself. 

It has been the object of the preceding paragraphs to show that Leibniz[11]the politician and Leibniz the theologian were one and the same person; notat all to suggest that his rational theology was just political expediency. We may apply to him a parody of his own doctrine, the pre-establishedharmony between nature and grace. Everything happens as though Leibniz werea liberal politician, and his theology expressed his politics. Yes, butequally, everything happens as though Leibniz were a philosophicaltheologian, and his politics expressed his theology. His appreciation ofCatholic speculation was natural and sincere; his dogmatic ancestry is tobe looked for in Thomism and Catholic humanism as much as anywhere. Aboveall, he had himself a liberal and generous mind. It gave him pleasure toappreciate good wherever he could see it, and to discover a soul of truthin every opinion. 

From the moment when Leibniz became aware of himself as an independentthinker, he was the man of a doctrine. Sometimes he called it 'myprinciples', sometimes 'the new system', sometimes 'pre-establishedharmony'. It could be quite briefly expressed; he was always ready tooblige his friends with a summary statement, either in a letter or anenclosed memorandum, and several such have come down to us. The doctrinemay have been in Leibniz's view simple, but it was applicable to everydepartment of human speculation or enquiry. It provided a new alphabet ofphilosophical ideas, and everything in heaven and earth could be expressedin it; not only could be, but ought to be, and Leibniz showed tirelessenergy in working out restatements of standing problems. 

As a man with an idea, with a philosophical nostrum, Leibniz may becompared to Bishop Berkeley. There was never any more doubt that Leibnizwas a Leibnitian than that Berkeley was a Berkeleian. But there is nocomparison between the two men in the width of their range. About manythings Berkeley never took the trouble to Berkeleianize. To take the mostsurprising instance of his neglect--he assured the world that his wholedoctrine pointed to, and hung upon, theology. But what sort of a theology?He scarcely took the first steps in the formulation of it. He preferred tokeep on defending and explaining his _esse est percipi_. With Leibniz it iswholly different; he carries his new torch into every corner, to illuminatethe dark questions. 

The wide applicability of pre-established harmony might come home to itsinventor as a rich surprise. The reflective historian will find it less[12]surprising, for he will suspect that the applications were in view from thestart. What was Leibniz thinking of when the new principle flashed uponhim? What was he _not_ thinking of? He had a many-sided mind. If theorigins of the principle were complex, little wonder that its applicationswere manifold. Every expositor of Leibniz who does not wish to be endlesslytedious must concentrate attention on one aspect of Leibniz's principle, and one source of its origin. We will here give an account of the matterwhich, we trust, will go most directly to the heart of it, but we will makeno claims to sufficient interpretation of Leibniz's thought-processes. 

Leibniz, then, like all the philosophers of the seventeenth century, wasreforming scholasticism in the light of a new physical science. The sciencewas mathematical in its form, mechanistical in its doctrine, andunanswerable in its evidence--it got results. But it was metaphysicallyintractable, and the doctrines of infinite and finite substance which itgenerated furnish a gallery of metaphysical grotesques; unless we are toexcept Leibniz; his system is, if nothing else, a miracle of ingenuity, andthere are moments when we are in danger of believing it. 

It is a natural mistake for the student of seventeenth-century thought tounderestimate the tenacity of scholastic Aristotelianism. Descartes, we allknow, was reared in it, but then Descartes overthrew it; and he had donehis work and died by the time that Leibniz was of an age to philosophize atall. We expect to see Leibniz starting on his shoulders and climbing onfrom there. We are disappointed. Leibniz himself tells us that he wasraised in the scholastic teaching. His acquaintance with Descartes'sopinions was second-hand, and they were retailed to him only that theymight be derided. He agreed, like an amiable youth, with his preceptors. 

The next phase of his development gave him a direct knowledge of Cartesianwritings, and of other modern books beside, such as those of the atomistGassendi. He was delighted with what he read, because of its fertility inthe field of physics and mathematics; and for a short time he was anenthusiastic modern. But presently he became dissatisfied. The new systemsdid not go far enough, they were still scientifically inadequate. At thesame time they went too far, and carried metaphysical paradox beyond thelimits of human credulity. 

 [13]There is no mystery about Leibniz's scientific objections to the newphilosophers. If he condemned them here, it was on the basis of scientificthought and observation. Descartes's formulation of the laws of motioncould, for example, be refuted by physical experiment; and if his generalview of physical nature was bound up with it, then so much the worse forthe Cartesian philosophy. But whence came Leibniz's more strictlymetaphysical objections? Where had he learned that standard of metaphysicaladequacy which showed up the inadequacy of the new metaphysicians? His owndisciples might be satisfied to reply, that he learnt it from Reasonherself; but the answer will not pass with us. Leibniz reasoned, indeed, but he did not reason from nowhere, nor would he have got anywhere if hehad. His conception of metaphysical reason was what his early scholastictraining had made it. 

There are certain absurd opinions which we are sure we have been taught, although, when put to it, we find it hard to name the teacher. Among themis something of this sort. 'Leibniz was a scholarly and sympatheticthinker. He had more sense of history than his contemporaries, and he wasinstinctively eclectic. He believed he could learn something from each ofhis great predecessors. We see him reaching back to cull a notion fromPlato or from Aristotle; he even found something of use in the scholastics. In particular, he picked out the Aristotelian "entelechy" to stop a gap inthe philosophy of his own age. ' What this form of statement ignores is thatLeibniz _was_ a scholastic: a scholastic endeavouring, like Descartesbefore him, to revolutionize scholasticism. The word 'entelechy' was, indeed, a piece of antiquity which Leibniz revived, but the thing for whichit stood was the most familiar of current scholastic conceptions. 'Entelechy' means active principle of wholeness or completion in anindividual thing. Scholasticism was content to talk about it under the nameof 'substantial form' or 'formal cause'. But the scholastic interpretationof the idea was hopelessly discredited by the new science, and thescholastic terms shared the discredit of scholastic doctrine. Leibnizwanted a term with a more general sound. 'There is an _X_', he wanted tosay, 'which scholasticism has defined as substantial form, but I am goingto give a new definition of it. ' Entelechy was a useful name for _X_, themore so as it had the authority of Aristotle, the master of scholasticism. 

Under the name of entelechy Leibniz was upholding the soul of [14]scholastic doctrine, while retrenching the limbs and outward flourishes. The doctrine of substantial form which he learnt in his youth had had_something_ in it; he could not settle down in the principles of Descartesor of Gassendi, because both ignored this vital _something_. Since therequirements of a new science would not allow a return to sheerscholasticism, it was necessary to find a fresh philosophy, in whichentelechy and mechanism might be accommodated side by side. 

If one had asked any 'modern' of the seventeenth century to name the'ancient' doctrine he most abominated, he would most likely have replied, 'Substantial form'. Let us recall what was rejected under this name, andwhy. 

The medieval account of physical nature had been dominated by what we maycall common-sense biology. Biology, indeed, is the science of the living, and the medievals were no more inclined than we are to endow all physicalbodies with life. What they did do was to take living bodies as typical, and to treat other bodies as imperfectly analogous to them. Such anapproach was _a priori_ reasonable enough. For we may be expected to knowbest the physical being closest to our own; and we, at any rate, are alive. Why not argue from the better known to the less known, from the nearer tothe more remote, interpreting other things by the formula of our own being, and allowing whatever discount is necessary for their degree of unlikenessto us?

Common-sense biology reasons as follows. In a living body there is acertain pattern of organized parts, a certain rhythm of successive motions, and a certain range of characteristic activities. The pattern, the sheeranatomy, is basic; but it cannot long continue to exist (outside arefrigerator) without accompanying vital rhythms in heart, respiration anddigestion. Nor do these perform their parts without the intermittentsupport of variable but still characteristic activities: dogs not onlybreathe and digest, they run about, hunt their food, look for mates, barkat cats, and so on. The anatomical pattern, the vital rhythm, and thecharacteristic acts together express dogginess; they reveal the specificform of the dog. They _reveal_ it; exactly what the specific form_consisted in_ was the subject of much medieval speculation. It need notconcern us here. 

Taking the form of the species for granted, common-sense biology proceedsto ask how it comes to be in a given instance, say in the dog Toby. [15]Before this dog was born or thought of, his form or species was displayedin each of his parents. And now it looks as though the form of dog haddetached itself from them through the generative act, and set up anew onits own account. How does it do that? By getting hold of some materials inwhich to express itself. At first it takes them from the body of themother, afterwards it collects them from a wider environment, and what thedog eats becomes the dog. 

What, then, is the relation of the assimilated materials to the dog-formwhich assimilates them? Before assimilation, they have their own form. Before the dog eats the leg of mutton, it has the form given to it by itsplace in the body of a sheep. What happens to the mutton? Is it withoutremainder transubstantiated from sheep into dog? It loses all itsdistinctively sheep-like characteristicsm but there may be some morebasically material characteristics which it preserves. They underlay thestructure of the mutton, and they continue to underlie the structure of thedog's flesh which supplants it. Whatever these characteristics may be, letus call them common material characteristics, and let us say that theybelong to or compose a common material nature. 

The common material nature has its own way of existing, and perhaps its ownprinciples of physical action. We may suppose that we know much or that weknow little about it. This one thing at least we know, that it is capableof becoming alternatively either mutton or dog's flesh. It is not essentialto it to be mutton, or mutton it would always be; nor dog's flesh, or itwould always be dog's flesh. It is capable of becoming either, according asit is captured by one or other system of formal organization. So the voterswho are to go to the polls are, by their common nature, Englishmen; theyare essentially neither Socialist curs nor Conservative sheep, butintrinsically capable of becoming either, if they become captured by eithersystem of party organization. 

According to this way of thinking, there is a certain _looseness_ about therelation of the common material nature to the higher forms of organizationcapable of capturing it. Considered in itself alone, it is perhaps to beseen as governed by absolutely determined laws of its own. It is heavy, then it will fall unless obstructed; it is solid, then it will resistintrusions. But considered as material for organization by higher forms, itis indeterminate. It acts in one sort of way under the persuasion of thesheep-form, and in another sort of way under the persuasion of the [16]dog-form, and we cannot tell how it will act until we know which form isgoing to capture it. No amount of study bestowed on the common materialnature will enable us to judge how it will behave under the persuasion ofthe higher organizing form. The only way to discover that is to examine thehigher form itself. 

Every form, then, will really be the object of a distinct science. The formof the sheep and the form of the dog have much in common, but that merelyhappens to be so; we cannot depend upon it, or risk inferences from sheepto dog: we must examine each in itself; we shall really need a science ofprobatology about sheep, and cynology about dogs. Again, the commonmaterial nature has its own principles of being and action, so it will needa science of itself, which we may call hylology. Each of these sciences ismistress in her own province; but how many there are, and how puzzlinglythey overlap! So long as we remain within the province of a single science, we may be able to think rigorously, everything will be 'tight'. But as soonas we consider border-issues between one province and another, farewell toexactitude: everything will be 'loose'. We can think out hylology till weare blue in the face, but we shall never discover anything about the entryof material elements into higher organizations, or how they behave whenthey get there. We may form perfect definitions and descriptions of theform of the dog as such, and still derive no rules for telling whatelements of matter will enter into the body of a given dog or how they willbe placed when they do. All we can be sure of is, that the dog-form willkeep itself going in, and by means of, the material it embodies--unless thedog dies. But what happens to the matter in the body of the dog is'accidental' to the nature of the matter; and the use of this matter, rather than of some other equally suitable, is accidental to the nature ofthe dog. 

No account of material events can dispense with accidental relationsaltogether. We must at least recognize that there are accidental relationsbetween particular things. Accident in the sense of brute fact had to beacknowledged even by the tidiest and most dogmatic atomism of the lastcentury. That atomism must allow it to be accidental, in this sense, thatthe space surrounding any given atom was occupied by other atoms in a givenmanner. It belonged neither to the nature of space to be occupied by justthose atoms in just those places, nor to the nature of the atoms to be [17]distributed just like that over space; and so in a certain sense theenvironment of any atom was an accidental environment. That is, theparticular arrangement of the environment was accidental. The nature of theenvironment was not accidental at all. It was proper to the nature of theatom to be in interaction with other atoms over a spatial field, and itnever encountered in the fellow-denizens of space any other nature but itsown. It was not subject to the accident of meeting strange natures, nor ofbecoming suddenly subject to strange or unequal laws of interaction. Allinteractions, being with its own kind, were reciprocal and obedient to asingle set of calculable laws. 

But the medieval philosophy had asserted accidental relations betweendistinct sorts of _natures_, the form of living dog and the form of deadmatter, for example. No one could know _a priori_ what effect an accidentalrelation would produce, and all accidental relations between differentpairs of natures were different: at the most there was analogy betweenthem. Every different nature had to be separately observed, and when youhad observed them all, you could still simply write an inventory of them, you could not hope to rationalize your body of knowledge. Let us narrow thefield and consider what this doctrine allows us to know about the wood of acertain kind of tree. We shall begin by observing the impressions it makeson our several senses, and we shall attribute to it a substantial form suchas naturally to give rise to these impressions, without, perhaps, being sorash as to claim a knowledge of what this substantial form is. Still we donot know what its capacities of physical action and passion may be. Weshall find them out by observing it in relation to different 'natures'. Itturns out to be combustible by fire, resistant to water, tractable to thecarpenter's tools, intractable to his digestive organs, harmless toostriches, nourishing to wood-beetles. Each of these capacities of the woodis distinct; we cannot relate them intelligibly to one another, nor deducethem from the assumed fundamental 'woodiness'. 

We can now see why 'substantial forms' were the _bêtes noires_ of theseventeenth-century philosophers. It was because they turned nature into anunmanageable jungle, in which trees, bushes, and parasites of a thousandkinds wildly interlaced. There was nothing for it, if science was toproceed, but to clear the ground and replant with spruce in rows: topostulate a single uniform nature, of which there should be a singlescience. Now neither probatology nor cynology could hope to be [18]universal--the world is not all sheep nor all dog: it would have to behylology; for the world is, in its spatial aspect, all material. Let ussay, then, that there is one uniform material nature of things, and thateverything else consists in the arrangements of the basic material nature;as the show of towers and mountains in the sunset results simply from anarrangement of vapours. And let us suppose that the interactions of theparts of matter are all like those which we can observe in dead manipulablebodies--in mechanism, in fact. Such was the postulate of the newphilosophers, and it yielded them results. 

It yielded them results, and that was highly gratifying. But what, meanwhile, had happened to those palpable facts of common experience fromwhich the whole philosophy of substantial forms had taken its rise? Is thewholeness of a living thing the mere resultant of the orderly operations ofits parts? Is a bee no more essentially one than a swarm is? Is the life ofa living animal indistinguishable from the rhythm of a going watch, exceptin degree of complication and subtlety of contrivance? And if an animal'sbody, say my own, is simply an agglomerate of minute interacting materialunits, and its wholeness is merely accidental and apparent, how is myconscious mind to be adjusted to it? For my consciousness appears toidentify itself with that whole vital pattern which used to be called thesubstantial form. We are now told that the pattern is nothing real oractive, but the mere accidental resultant of distinct interacting forces:it does no work, it exercises no influence or control, it _is_ nothing. Howthen can it be the vehicle and instrument of my conscious soul? It cannot. Then is my soul homeless? Or is it to be identified with the activity andfortunes of a single atomic constituent of my body, a single cog in theanimal clockwork? If so, how irrational! For the soul does not experienceitself as the soul of one minute part, but as the soul of the body. 

Such questions rose thick and fast in the minds of the seventeenth-centuryphilosophers. It will cause us no great surprise that Leibniz should havequickly felt that the Formal Principle of Aristotle and of the Scholasticphilosophy must be by hook or by crook reintroduced--not as the detested_substantial form_, but under a name by which it might hope to smell moresweet, _entelechy_. 

Nothing so tellingly revealed the difficulties of the new philosophy in[19]dealing with living bodies as the insufficiency of the solutions Descarteshad proposed. He had boldly declared the unity of animal life to be purelymechanical, and denied that brutes had souls at all, or any sensation. Hehad to admit soul in man, but he still denied the substantial unity of thehuman body. It was put together like a watch, it was many things, not one:if Descartes had lived in our time, he would have been delighted to compareit with a telephone system, the nerves taking the place of the wires, andbeing so arranged that all currents of 'animal spirit' flowing in themconverged upon a single unit, a gland at the base of the brain. In thisunit, or in the convergence of all the motions upon it, the 'unity' of thebody virtually consisted; and the soul was incarnate, not in the pluralityof members (for how could it, being one, indwell many things?), but in thesingle gland. 

Even so, the relation between the soul and the gland was absolutelyunintelligible, as Descartes disarmingly confessed. Incarnation was allvery well in the old philosophy: those who had allowed the interaction ofdisparate natures throughout the physical world need find no particulardifficulty about the special case of it provided by incarnation. Why shouldnot a form of conscious life so interact with what would otherwise be deadmatter as to 'indwell' it? But the very principle of the new philosophydisallowed the interaction of disparate natures, because such aninteraction did not allow of exact formulation, it was a 'loose' and not a'tight' relation. 

From a purely practical point of view the much derided pineal gland theorywould serve. If we could be content to view Descartes as a man who wantedto make the world safe for physical science, then there would be a gooddeal to be said for his doctrine. In the old philosophy exact science hadbeen frustrated by the hypothesis of loose relations all over the field ofnature. Descartes had cleared them from as much of the field as science wasthen in a position to investigate; he allowed only one such relation tosubsist, the one which experience appeared unmistakably to force uponus--that between our own mind and its bodily vehicle. He had exorcized thespirits from the rest of nature; and though there was a spirit here whichcould not be exorcized, the philosophic conjurer had nevertheless confinedit and its unaccountable pranks within a minutely narrow magic circle: allmind could do was to turn the one tiny switch at the centre of its [20]animal telephone system. It could create no energy--it could merelyredirect the currents actually flowing. 

Practically this might do, but speculatively it was most disturbing. For ifthe 'loose relation' had to be admitted in one instance, it was admitted inprinciple; and one could not get rid of the suspicion that it would turn upelsewhere, and that the banishment of it from every other field representeda convenient pragmatic postulate rather than a solid metaphysical truth. Moreover, the correlation of the unitary soul with the unitary gland mightdo justice to a mechanistical philosophy, but it did not do justice to thesoul's own consciousness of itself. The soul's consciousness is the 'idea'or 'representation' of the life of the whole body, certainly not of thelife of the pineal gland nor, as the unreflective nowadays would say, ofthe brain. I am not conscious in, or of, my brain except when I have aheadache; consciousness is in my eyes and finger-tips and so on. It isphysically true, no doubt, that consciousness in and of my finger-tips isnot possible without the functioning of my brain; but that is a poor reasonfor locating the consciousness in the brain. The filament of the electricbulb will not be incandescent apart from the functioning of the dynamo; butthat is a poor reason for saying that the incandescence is in the dynamo. 

Certainly the area of representation in our mind is not simply equivalentto the area of our body. But in so far as the confines of mentalrepresentation part company with the confines of the body, it is not thatthey may contract and fall back upon the pineal gland, but that they mayexpand and advance over the surrounding world. The mind does not representits own body merely, it represents the world in so far as the world affectsthat body or is physically reproduced in it. The mind has no observablenatural relation to the pineal gland. It has only two natural relations: toits body as a whole and to its effective environment. What Descartes hadreally done was to pretend that the soul was related to the pineal gland asit is in fact related to its whole body; and then that it was related tothe bodily members as in fact it is related to outer environment. Themembers became an inner environment, known only in so far as they affectedthe pineal gland; just as the outer environment in its turn was to be knownonly in so far as it affected the members. 

 [21]This doctrine of a double environment was wholly artificial. It was forcedon Descartes by the requirements of mechanistical science: if the memberswere simply a plurality of things, they must really be parts ofenvironment; the body which the soul indwelt must be _a_ body; presumably, then, the pineal gland. An untenable compromise, surely, between admittingand denying the reality of the soul's incarnation. 

What, then, was to be done? Descartes's rivals and successors attemptedseveral solutions, which it would be too long to examine here. Theydissatisfied Leibniz and they have certainly no less dissatisfiedposterity. It will be enough for us here to consider what Leibniz did. Headmitted, to begin with, the psychological fact. The unity of consciousnessis the representation of a plurality--the plurality of the members, andthrough them the plurality of the world. Here, surely, was the veryprinciple the new philosophy needed for the reconciliation of substantialunity with mechanical plurality of parts. For it is directly evident to usthat consciousness focuses the plurality of environing things in a unity ofrepresentation. This is no philosophical theory, it is a simple fact. Ourbody, then, as a physical system is a mechanical plurality; as focused inconsciousness it is a unity of 'idea'. 

Very well: but we have not got far yet. For the old difficulty stillremains--it is purely arbitrary, after all, that a unitary consciousnessshould be attached to, and represent, a mechanical collection of thingswhich happen to interact in a sort of pattern. If there is a consciousnessattached to human bodies, then why not to systems of clockwork? If the bodyis _represented_ as unity, it must surely be because it _is_ unity, as theold philosophy had held. But how can we reintroduce unity into the bodywithout reintroducing substantial form, and destroying the mechanisticalplurality which the new science demanded?

It is at this point that Leibniz produces the speculative postulate of hissystem. Why not reverse the relation, and make the members represent themind as the mind represents the members? For then the unity of personrepresented in the mind will become something actual in the members also. 

Representation appears to common sense to be a one-way sort of traffic. Ifmy mind represents my bodily members, something happens to my mind, for itbecomes a representation of such members in such a state; but nothinghappens to the members by their being so represented in the mind. The [22]mental representation obeys the bodily facts; the bodily facts do not obeythe mental representation. It seems nonsense to say that my members obey mymind _because_ they are mirrored in it. And yet my members do obey my mind, or at least common sense supposes so. Sometimes my mind, instead ofrepresenting the state my members are in, represents a state which itintends that they shall be in, for example, that my hand should go throughthe motion of writing these words. And my hand obeys; its action becomesthe moving diagram of my thought, my thought is represented or expressed inthe manual act. Here the relation of mind and members appears to bereversed: instead of its representing them, they represent it. With thisrepresentation it is the opposite of what it was with the other. By themembers' being represented in the mind, something happened to the mind, andnothing to the members; by the mind's being represented in the memberssomething happens to the members and nothing to the mind. 

Why should not we take this seriously? Why not allow that there is two-waytraffic--by one relation the mind represents the members, by another themembers represent the mind? But then again, how can we take it seriously?For representation, in the required sense, is a mental act; brute mattercan represent nothing, only mind can represent. And the members are brutematter. But are they? How do we know that? By brute matter we understandextended lumps of stuff, interacting with one another mechanically, as do, for example, two cogs in a piece of clockwork. But this is a large-scaleview. The cogs are themselves composed of interrelated parts and thoseparts of others, and so on _ad infinitum_. Who knows what the ultimateconstituents really are? The 'modern' philosophers, certainly, haveproposed no hypothesis about them which even looks like making sense. Theyhave supposed that the apparently inert lumps, the cogs, are composed ofparts themselves equally inert, and that by subdivision we shall stillreach nothing but the inert. But this supposition is in flat contradictionwith what physical theory demands. We have to allow the reality of _force_in physics. Now the force which large-scale bodies display may easily bethe block-effect of activity in their minute real constituents. If not, where does it come from? Let it be supposed, then, that these minute realconstituents are active because they are alive, because they are minds; forindeed we have no notion of activity other than the perception we have [23]of our own. We have no notion of it except as something mental. On thehypothesis that the constituents of active body are also mental, thislimitation in our conception of activity need cause us neither sorrow norsurprise. 

The mind-units which make up body will not of course be developed and fullyconscious minds like yours or mine, and it is only for want of a betterword that we call them minds at all. They will be mere unselfconsciousrepresentations of their physical environment, as it might be seen from thephysical point to which they belong by a human mind paying no attention atall to its own seeing. How many of these rudimentary 'minds' will there bein my body? As many as you like--as many as it is possible there shouldbe--say an infinite number and have done with it. 

We may now observe how this hypothesis introduces real formal unity withoutprejudicing mechanical plurality. Each of the mind-units in my body isitself and substantially distinct. But since each, in its own way andaccording to its own position, represents the superior and more developedmind which I call 'me', they will order themselves according to a commonform. The order is real, not accidental: it is like the order of troops ona parade-ground. Each man is a distinct active unit, but each is reallyexpressing by his action the mind of the officer in command. He isexpressing no less his relation to the other men in the ranks--to obey theofficer is to keep in step with them. So the metaphysical units of thebody, being all minds, represent one another as well as the dominant mind:one another co-ordinately, the dominant mind subordinately. 

But if the metaphysically real units of the body are of the nature of mind, then _the_ mind is a mind among minds, a spirit-atom among spirit-atoms. What then constitutes its superiority or dominance, and makes it a mind_par excellence_? Well, what constitutes the officer an officer? Twothings: a more developed mentality and the fact of being obeyed. Inmilitary life these two factors are not always perfectly proportioned toone another, but in the order of Leibniz's universe they are. A fullerpower to represent the universe is necessarily combined with dominance overan organized troop of members; for the mind knows the universe only in sofar as the universe is expressed in its body. That is what the [24]_finitude_ of the mind means. Only an infinite mind appreciates the wholeplurality of things in themselves; a finite mind perceives them in so faras mirrored in the physical being of an organized body of members. The moreadequate the mirror, the more adequate the representation: the more highlyorganized the body, the more developed the mind. 

The developed mind has an elaborate body; but the least developed mind hasstill some body, or it would lack any mirror whatever through which torepresent the world. This means, in effect, that Leibniz's system is not anunmitigated spiritual atomism. For though the spiritual atoms, or monads, are the ultimate constituents out of which nature is composed, they standcomposed together from the beginning in a minimal order which cannot bebroken up. Each monad, if it is to be anything at all, must be a continuingfinite representation of the universe, and to be that it must have a body, that is to say, it must have other monads in a permanent relation of mutualcorrespondence with it. And if you said to Leibniz, 'But surely anyphysical body can be broken up, and this must mean the dissolution of theorganic relation between its monadical constituents, ' he would take refugein the infinitesimal. The wonders revealed by that new miracle, themicroscope, suggested what the intrinsic divisibility of space itselfsuggests--whatever organization is broken up, there will still be a minuteorganization within each of the fragments which remains unbroken--and so_ad infinitum_. You will never come down to loose monads, monads out of allorganization. You will never disembody the monads, and so remove theirrepresentative power; you will only reduce their bodies and so impoverishtheir representative power. In this sense no animal dies and no animal isgenerated. Death is the reduction and generation the enrichment of someexisting monad's body; and, by being that, is the enrichment or thereduction of the monad's mental life. 

'But, ' our common sense protests, 'it is too great a strain on ourcredulity to make the real nature of things so utterly different from whatsense and science make of them. If the real universe is what you say it is, why do our minds represent it to us as they do?' The philosopher's answeris, 'Because they _represent_ it. According to the truth of things, eachmonad is simply its own mental life, its own world-view, its own thoughtsand desires. To know things as they are would be simultaneously to liveover, as though from within and by a miracle of sympathy, the [25]biographies of an infinite number of distinct monads. This is absolutelyimpossible. Our senses represent the coexistent families of monads _in thegross_, and therefore conventionally; what is in fact the mutualrepresentation of monads in ordered systems, is represented as themechanical interaction of spatially extended and material parts. ' This doesnot mean that science is overthrown. The physical world-view is in terms ofthe convention of representation, but it is not, for all that, illusory. Itcan, ideally, be made as true as it is capable of being. There is no reasonwhatever for confusing the 'well-grounded seemings' of the apparentphysical world with the fantastic seemings of dream and hallucination. 

So far the argument seems to draw whatever cogency it has from thesimplicity and naturalness of the notion of representation. The nature ofidea, it is assumed, is to represent plurality in a unified view. If ideadid not represent, it would not be idea. And since there _is_ idea (for ourminds at least exist and are made up of idea) there is representation. Itbelongs to idea to represent, and since the whole world has now beeninterpreted as a system of mutually representing ideations, or ideators, itmight seem that all their mutual relations are perfectly natural, a harmonyof agreement which could not be other than it is. But if so, why doesLeibniz keep saying that the harmony is _pre-established_, by special andinfinitely elaborate divine decrees?

Leibniz himself says that the very nature of representation excludesinteraction. By representing environment a mind does not do anything toenvironment, that is plain. But it is no less plain that environment doesnothing to it, either. The act of representing is simply the act of themind; it represents _in view of_ environment, of course, but not under thecausal influence of environment. Representation is a business carried on bythe mind on its own account, and in virtue of its innate power torepresent. 

Very well; but does this consideration really drive us into theology? Isnot Leibniz the victim of a familiar fallacy, that of incompletely statedalternatives? '_Either_ finite beings interact _or else_ they do notdirectly condition one another. Monads do not interact, therefore they donot directly condition one another. How then explain the actual conformityof their mutual representation, without recourse to divine fore-ordaining?'It seems sufficient to introduce a further alternative in the first line ofthe argument, and we are rid of the theology. Things may condition the [26]action of a further thing, without acting upon it. It acts of itself, butit acts in view of what they are. We are tempted to conclude that Leibnizhas introduced the _Deus ex machina_ with the fatal facility of his age. 'Where a little further meditation on the characters in the play wouldfurnish a natural _dénouement_, he swings divine intervention on to thescene by wires from the ceiling. It is easy for us to reconstruct for himthe end of the piece without recourse to stage-machines. '

Is it? No, I fear it is not. There is really no avoiding thepre-established harmony. And so we shall discover, if we pursue our trainof reflexion a little further. It is natural, we were saying, than an ideashould represent an environment; indeed, it _is_ the representation of one. Given no environment to represent, it would be empty, a mere capacity forrepresentation. Then every idea or ideator, taken merely in itself, _is_ anempty capacity. But of what is the environment of each made up? Accordingto the Leibnitian theory, of further ideas or ideators: of emptycapacities, therefore. Then no idea will either be anything in itself, orfind anything in its neighbours to represent. An unhappy predicament, likethat of a literary clique in which all the members are adepts at discussingone another's ideas--only that unfortunately none of them are provided withany; or like the shaky economics of the fabled Irish village where they alllived by taking in one another's washing. 

It is useless, then, to conceive representations as simply coming intoexistence in response to environment, and modelling themselves onenvironment. They must all mutually reflect environment or they would notbe representations; but they must also exist as themselves and in their ownright or there would be no environment for them mutually to represent. Since the world is infinitely various, each representor must have its owndistinct character or nature, as our minds have: that is to say, it mustrepresent in its own individual way; and all these endlessly variousrepresentations must be so constituted as to form a mutually reflectingharmony. Considered as a representation, each monadical existence simplyreflects the universe after its own manner. But considered as something tobe represented by the others, it is a self-existent mental life, or worldof ideas. Now when we are considering the fact of representation, thatwhich is to be represented comes first and the representation follows uponit. Thus in considering the Leibnitian universe, we must begin with the[27]monads as self-existent mental lives, or worlds of ideas; theirrepresentation of one another comes second. Nothing surely, then, butomnipotent creative wisdom could have pre-established between so manydistinct given mental worlds that harmony which constitutes their mutualrepresentation. 

Our common-sense pluralistic thinking escapes from the need of thepre-established harmony by distinguishing what we are from what we do. Letthe world be made up of a plurality of agents in a 'loose' order, with roomto manoeuvre and to adjust themselves to one another. Then, by good luck orgood management, through friction and disaster, by trial and error, byaccident or invention, they may work out for themselves a harmony of_action_. There is no need for divine preordaining here. But on Leibniz'sview what the monads do is to represent, and what they are isrepresentation; there is no ultimate distinction between what they are andwhat they do: all that they do belongs to what they are. The whole systemof action in each monad, which fits with such infinite complexity thesystem of action in each other monad, is precisely the existence of thatmonad, and apart from it the monad is not. The monads do not _achieve_ aharmony, they _are_ a harmony, and therefore they are pre-established inharmony. 

Leibniz denied that he invoked God to intervene in nature, or that therewas anything arbitrary or artificial about his physical theology. He wassimply analysing nature and finding it to be a system of mutualrepresentation; he was analysing mutual representation and finding it to beof its nature intrinsically pre-established, and therefore God-dependent. He was not adding anything to mutual representation, he was just showingwhat it necessarily contained or implied. At least he was doing nothingworse than recognized scholastic practice. Scholastic Aristotelianismexplained all natural causality as response to stimulus, and then had topostulate a stimulus which stimulated without being stimulated, and thiswas God. Apart from this supreme and first stimulus nothing would in factbe moving. The Aristotelians claimed simply to be analysing the nature ofphysical motion as they perceived it, and to find the necessity ofperpetually applied divine stimulation implicit in it. No violence wasthereby done to the system of physical motion nor was anything brought infrom without to patch it up; it was simply found to be of its own [28]nature God-dependent. 

It seems as though the reproachful description _'Deus ex machina'_ shouldbe reserved for more arbitrary expedients than Aristotle's or Leibniz's, say for the occasionalist theory. Occasionalism appeared to introduce Godthat he might make physical matter do what it had no natural tendency todo, viz. To obey the volitions of finite mind. Ideas, on the other hand, have a natural tendency to represent one another, for to be an idea is tobe a representation; God is not introduced by Leibniz to make themcorrespond, he is introduced to work a system in which they shallcorrespond. This may not be _Deus-ex-machina philosophy_, but it is_physical theology_; that is to say, it treats divine action as one factoramong the factors which together constitute the working of the naturalsystem. And this appears to be perhaps unscientific, certainly blasphemous:God's action cannot be a factor among factors; the Creator works throughand in all creaturely action equally; we can never say 'This is thecreature, and that is God' of distinguishable causalities in the naturalworld. The creature is, in its creaturely action, self-sufficient: butbecause a creature, insufficient to itself throughout, and sustained by itsCreator both in existence and in action. 

The only acceptable argument for theism is that which corresponds to thereligious consciousness, and builds upon the insufficiency of finiteexistence throughout, because it is finite. All arguments to God'sexistence from a particular gap in our account of the world of finites areto be rejected. They do not indicate God, they indicate the failure of ourpower to analyse the world-order. When Leibniz discovered that his systemof mutual representations needed to be pre-established, he ought to haveseen that he had come up a cul-de-sac and backed out; he ought not to havesaid, 'With the help of God I will leap over the wall. '

If we condemn Leibniz for writing physical theology, we condemn not him buthis age. No contemporary practice was any better, and much of it a gooddeal worse, as Leibniz liked somewhat complacently to point out. Andbecause he comes to theology through physical theology, that does not meanthat all his theology was physical theology and as such to be written off. On the contrary, Leibniz is led to wrestle with many problems which besetany philosophical theism of the Christian type. This is particularly so[29]in the _Theodicy_, as its many citations of theologians suggest. Hisdiscussions never lack ingenuity, and the system of creation and providencein which they result has much of that luminous serenity which colours thebest works of the Age of Reason. 

Every theistic philosopher is bound, with whatever cautions, to conceiveGod by the analogy of the human mind. When Leibniz declares the harmony ofmonads to be pre-established by God, he is invoking the image ofintelligent human pre-arrangement. Nor is he content simply to leave it atthat: he endeavours as well as he may to conceive the sort of act by whichGod pre-arranges; and this involves the detailed adaptation for theologicalpurposes of Leibnitian doctrine about the human mind. 

The human mind, as we have seen, is the mind predominant in a certainsystem of 'minds', viz. In those which constitute the members of the humanbody. If we call it predominant, we mean that its system of ideas is moredeveloped than theirs, so that there are more points in which each of themconforms to it than in which it conforms to any one of them. The conceptionof a divine pre-establishing mind will be analogous. It will be theconception of a mind _absolutely_ dominant, to whose ideas, that is to say, the whole system simply corresponds, without any reciprocatingcorrespondence on his side. In a certain sense this is to make God the'Mind of the World'; and yet the associations of the phrase are misleading. It suggests that the world is an organism or body in which the divine mindis incarnate, and on which he relies for his representations. But that isnonsense; the world is not _a_ body, nor is it organic to God. Absolutedominance involves absolute transcendence: if everything in the worldwithout remainder simply obeys the divine thoughts, that is only anotherway of saying that the world is the creature of God; the whole system ispre-established by him who is absolute Being and perfectly independent ofthe world. 

Of createdness, or pre-establishedness, there is no more to be said: we canthink of it as nothing but the pure or absolute case of subjection todominant mind. It is no use asking further _how_ God's thoughts are obeyedin the existence and action of things. What we can and must enquire intofurther, is the nature of the divine thoughts which are thus obeyed. Theymust be understood to be volitions or decrees. There are indeed two ways inwhich things obey the divine thought, and correspondingly two sorts ofdivine thoughts that they obey. In so far as created things conform to [30]the mere universal principles of reason, they obey a reasonableness whichis an inherent characteristic of the divine mind itself. If God wills theexistence of any creature, that creature's existence must observe thelimits prescribed by eternal reason: it cannot, for example, both have andlack a certain characteristic in the same sense and at the same time; norcan it contain two parts and two parts which are not also countable as onepart and three parts. Finite things, if they exist at all, must thusconform to the reasonableness of the divine nature, but what the divinereasonableness thus prescribes is highly general: we can deduce from itonly certain laws which any finite things must obey, we can never deducefrom it which finite things there are to be, nor indeed that there are tobe any. Finite things are particular and individual: each of them mighthave been other than it is or, to speak more properly, instead of any oneof them there might have existed something else; it was, according to themere principles of eternal reason, equally possible. But if so, the wholeuniverse, being made up of things each of which might be otherwise, mightas a whole be otherwise. Therefore the divine thoughts which it obeys byexisting have the nature of _choices_ or _decrees_. 

What material does the finite mind supply for an analogical picture of theinfinite mind making choices or decrees? If we use such language of God, weare using language which has its first and natural application toourselves. We all of us choose, and those of us who are in authority makedecrees. What is to choose? It involves a real freedom in the mind. Afinite mind, let us remember, is nothing but a self-operating succession ofperceptions, ideas, or representations. With regard to some of our ideas wehave no freedom, those, for example, which represent to us our body. Wethink of them as constituting our given substance. They are sheer datum forus, and so are those reflexions of our environment which they mediate tous. They make up a closely packed and confused mass; they persevere intheir being with an obstinate innate force, the spiritual counterpart ofthe force which we have to recognize in things as physically interpreted. Being real spiritual force, it is quasi-voluntary, and indeed do we notlove our own existence and, in a sense, will it in all its necessarycircumstances? But if we can be said to will to be ourselves and to enactwith native force what our body and its environment makes us, we are [31]merely willing to conform to the conditions of our existence; we are makingno choice. When, however, we think freely or perform deliberate acts, thereis not only force but choice in our activity. Choice between what? Betweenalternative possibilities arising out of our situation. And choice invirtue of what? In virtue of the appeal exercised by one alternative asseemingly better. 

Can we adapt our scheme of choice to the description of God's creativedecrees? We will take the second point in it first: our choice is in virtueof the appeal of the seeming best. Surely the only corrective necessary inapplying this to God is the omission of the word 'seeming'. His choice isin virtue of the appeal of the simply best. The other point causes moretrouble. We choose between possibilities which arise for us out of oursituation in the system of the existing world. But as the world does notexist before God's creative choices, he is in no world-situation, and noalternative possibilities can arise out of it, between which he should haveto choose. But if God does not choose between intrinsic possibilities ofsome kind, his choice becomes something absolutely meaningless to us--it isnot a choice at all, it is an arbitrary and unintelligible _fiat_. 

Leibniz's solution is this: what are mere possibilities of thought for usare possibilities of action for God. For a human subject, possibilities ofaction are limited to what arises out of his actual situation, butpossibilities for thought are not so limited. I can conceive a worlddifferent in many respects from this world, in which, for example, vegetables should be gifted with thought and speech; but I can do nothingtowards bringing it about. My imaginary world is practically impossible butspeculatively possible, in the sense that it contradicts no singleprinciple of necessary and immutable reason. I, indeed, can explore only avery little way into the region of sheer speculative possibility; God doesnot explore it, he simply possesses it all: the whole region of thepossible is but a part of the content of his infinite mind. So among allpossible creatures he chooses the best and creates it. 

But the whole realm of the possible is an actual infinity of ideas. Out ofthe consideration of an infinity of ideas, how can God arrive at a choice?Why not? His mind is not, of course, discursive; he does not successivelyturn over the leaves of an infinite book of sample worlds, for then hewould never come to the end of it. Embracing infinite possibility in [32]the single act of his mind, he settles his will with intuitive immediacyupon the best. The inferior, the monstrous, the absurd is not a wildernessthrough which he painfully threads his way, it is that from which heimmediately turns; his wisdom is his elimination of it. 

But in so applying the scheme of choice to God's act, have we notinvalidated its application to our own? For if God has chosen the wholeform and fabric of the world, he has chosen everything in it, including thechoices we shall make. And if our choices have already been chosen for usby God, it would seem to follow that they are not real open choices on ourpart at all, but are pre-determined. And if they are pre-determined, itwould seem that they are not really even choices, for a determined choiceis not a choice. But if we do not ourselves exercise real choice in anydegree, then we have no clue to what any choice would be: and if so, wehave no power of conceiving divine choice, either; and so the wholeargument cuts its own throat. 

There are two possible lines of escape from this predicament. One is todefine human choice in such a sense that it allows of pre-determinationwithout ceasing to be choice; and this is Leibniz's method, and it can bestudied at length in the _Theodicy_. He certainly makes the very best hecan of it, and it hardly seems that any of those contemporaries whose viewshe criticizes was in a position to answer him. The alternative method is tomake the most of the negative element involved in all theology. After all, we do not positively or adequately understand the nature of infinitecreative will. Perhaps it is precisely the transcendent glory of divinefreedom to be able to work infallibly through free instruments. But somystical a paradox is not the sort of thing we can expect to appeal to alate-seventeenth-century philosopher. 

One criticism of Leibniz's argument we cannot refrain from making. Heallows himself too easy a triumph when he says that the only alternative toa choice determined by a prevailing inclination towards one proposal is achoice of mere caprice. There is a sort of choice Leibniz never so much asconsiders and which appears at least to fall quite outside his categories, and that is the sort of choice exercised in artistic creativity. In suchchoice we freely feel after the shaping of a scheme, we do not arbitratesimply between shaped and given possible schemes. And perhaps some suchelement enters into all our choices, since our life is to some extent [33]freely designed by ourselves. If so, our minds are even more akin to thedivine mind than Leibniz realized. For the sort of choice we are nowreferring to seems to be an intuitive turning away from an infinite, or atleast indefinite, range of less attractive possibility. And such is thenature of the divine creative choice. The consequence of such a line ofspeculation would be, that the divine mind designs more through us, andless simply for us, than Leibniz allowed: the 'harmony' into which we enterwould be no longer simply 'pre-established'. Leibniz, in fact, could havenothing to do with such a suggestion, and he would have found it easy to beironical about it if his contemporaries had proposed it. 

II

Leibniz wrote two books; a considerable number of articles in learnedperiodicals; and an enormous number of unpublished notes, papers andletters, preserved in the archives of the Electors of Hanover not becauseof the philosophical significance of some of them, but because of thepolitical importance of most of them. From among this great mass variousexcerpts of philosophical interest have been made by successive editors ofLeibniz's works. It may be that the most profound understanding of his mindis to be derived from some of these pieces, but if we wish to consider thepublic history of Leibniz, we may set them aside. 

Of the two books, one was published, and the other never was. The _NewEssays_ remained in Leibniz's desk, the _Theodicy_ saw the light. And so, to his own and the succeeding generation, Leibniz was known as the authorof the _Theodicy_. 

The articles in journals form the immediate background to the two books. In1696 Leibniz heard that a French translation of Locke's _Essay concerningHuman Understanding_ was being prepared at Amsterdam. He wrote some politecomments on Locke's great work, and published them. He also sent them toLocke, hoping that Locke would write a reply, and that Leibniz's reflexionsand Locke's reply might be appended to the projected French translation. But Locke set Leibniz's comments aside. Leibniz, not to be defeated, set towork upon the _New Essays_, in which the whole substance of Locke's book issystematically discussed in dialogue. The _New Essays_ were written in1703. But meanwhile a painful dispute had broken out between Leibniz [34]and the disciples of Locke and Newton, in which the English, and perhapsNewton himself, were much to blame, and Leibniz thought it impolitic topublish his book. It was not issued until long after his death, in themiddle of the century. 

The discussion with Locke was a failure: Locke would not play, and the bookin which the whole controversy was to be systematized never appeared. Thediscussion with Bayle, on the other hand, was a model of what a discussionshould be. Bayle played up tirelessly, and was never embarrassinglyprofound; he provided just the sort of objections most useful for drawingforth illuminating expositions; he was as good as a fictitious character ina philosophical dialogue. And the book in which the controversy wassystematized duly appeared with great éclat. 

Here is the history of the controversy. In 1695 Leibniz was forty-nineyears old. He had just emerged from a period of close employment under hisprince's commands, and he thought fit to try his metaphysical principlesupon the polite world and see what would come of it. He therefore publishedan article in the _Journal des Savants_ under the title: 'New System ofNature and of the Communication of Substances, as well as of the Unionbetween Soul and Body'. In the same year Foucher published an article inthe _Journal_ controverting Leibniz; and in the next year Leibniz repliedwith an 'Explanation'. A second explanation in the same year appeared inBasnage's _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, in answer to reflexions bythe editor. M. Pierre Bayle had all these articles before him when heinserted a note on Leibniz's doctrine in his article on 'Rorarius', in thefirst edition of his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_. The point ofconnexion between Rorarius and Leibniz was no more than this, that bothheld views about the souls of beasts. 

Pierre Bayle was the son of a Calvinist pastor, early converted toCatholicism, but recovered to his old faith after a short time. He heldacademic employments in Switzerland and Holland; he promoted and edited the_Nouvelles de la République des Lettres_, and he produced thatextraordinary work the _Historical and Critical Dictionary. _ The notices itcontains of authors and thinkers are little more than pegs upon which Baylecould hang his philosophical reflexions. He could write an intelligentdiscussion on any opinion; what he could not do was to reconcile the pointsof view from which he felt impelled to write upon this author and that. [35]His was not a systematic mind. So far as he had a philosophical opinion, hewas a Cartesian; in theology he was an orthodox Calvinist. He could notreconcile his theology with his Cartesianism and he did not try to. He madea merit of the oppositions of faith to reason and reason to itself, so thathe could throw himself upon a meritorious and voluntary faith. 

There is nothing original in this position. It was characteristic ofdecadent scholasticism, it squared with Luther's exaggerations about theimpotence of reason in fallen man, and Pascal had given his own highlypersonal twist to it. Bayle has been hailed as a forerunner of Voltaireanscepticism. It would be truer to say that a Voltairean sceptic could readBayle's discussions in his own sense and for his own purposes if he wished. But Bayle was not a sceptic. It is hard to say what he was; his wholeposition as between faith and reason is hopelessly confused. He was ascholar, a wit, and a philosophical sparring-partner of so perfectlyconvenient a kind that if we had not evidence of his historical reality, wemight have suspected Leibniz of inventing him. 

In the first edition of his _Dictionary_, under the article 'Rorarius', Bayle gave a very fair account of Leibniz's doctrine concerning the soulsof animals, as it could be collected from his article in the _Journal desSavants_, 27 June 1695. He then proceeded to comment upon it in thefollowing terms:

'There are some things in Mr. Leibniz's hypothesis that are liable to somedifficulties, though they show the great extent of his genius. He will haveit, for example, that the soul of a dog acts independently of outwardbodies; that _it stands upon its own bottom, by a perfect _spontaneity_with respect to itself, and yet with a perfect _conformity_ to outwardthings_. . . . That _its internal perceptions arise from its originalconstitution, that is to say, the representative constitution (capable ofexpressing beings outside itself in relation to its organs) which wasbestowed upon it from the time of its creation, and makes its individualcharacter_ (_Journal des Savants_, 4 July 1695). From whence it resultsthat it would feel hunger and thirst at such and such an hour, though therewere not any one body in the universe, and _though nothing should exist butGod and that soul_. He has explained (_Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, Feb. 1696) his thought by the example of two pendulums that shouldperfectly agree: that is, he supposes that according to the particular lawswhich put the soul upon action, it must feel hunger at such an hour; [36]and that according to the particular laws which direct the motion ofmatter, the body which is united to that soul must be modified at that samehour as it is modified when the soul is hungry. I will forbear preferringthis system to that of occasional causes till the learned author hasperfected it. I cannot apprehend the connexion of internal and spontaneousactions which would have this effect, that the soul of a dog would feelpain immediately after having felt joy, though it were alone in theuniverse. I understand why a dog passes immediately from pleasure to painwhen, being very hungry and eating a piece of bread, he is suddenly struckwith a cudgel. But I cannot apprehend that his soul should be so framedthat at the very moment of his being beaten he should feel pain though hewere not beaten, and though he should continue to eat bread without anytrouble or hindrance. Nor do I see how the spontaneity of that soul shouldbe consistent with the sense of pain, and in general with any unpleasingperceptions. 

'Besides, the reason why this learned man does not like the Cartesiansystem seems to me to be a false supposition; for it cannot be said thatthe system of occasional causes brings in God acting by a miracle (ibid. ), _Deum ex machina_, in the mutual dependency of the body and soul: for sinceGod does only intervene according to general laws, he cannot be said to actin an extraordinary manner. Does the internal and active virtuecommunicated to the forms of bodies according to M. Leibniz know the trainof actions which it is to produce? By no means; for we know by experiencethat we are ignorant whether we shall have such and such perceptions in anhour's time. It were therefore necessary that the forms should be directedby some internal principle in the production of their acts. But this wouldbe _Deus ex machina, _ as much as in the system of occasional causes. Infine, as he supposes with great reason that all souls are simple andindivisible, it cannot be apprehended how they can be compared with apendulum, that is, how by their original constitution they can diversifytheir operations by using the spontaneous activity bestowed upon them bytheir Creator. It may clearly be conceived that a simple being will alwaysact in a uniform manner, if no external cause hinders it. If it werecomposed of several pieces, as a machine, it would act different ways, because the peculiar activity of each piece might change every moment theprogress of others; but how will you find in a simple substance the [37]cause of a change of operation?'

Leibniz published a reply to Bayle in the _Histoire des Ouvrages desSavants_ for July 1698. As in all his references to Bayle, he is studiouslypolite and repays compliment for compliment. The following are perhaps theprincipal points of his answer. 

1. On the example of the dog:

(_a_) How should it of itself change its sentiment, since everything leftto itself continues in the state in which it is? Because the state may be astate of _change_, as in a moving body which, unless hindered, continues tomove. And such is the nature of simple substances--they continue to evolvesteadily. 

(_b_) Would it really feel as though beaten if it were not beaten, sinceLeibniz says that the action of every substance takes place as thoughnothing existed but God and itself? Leibniz replies that his remark refersto the causality behind an action, not to the reasons for it. Thespontaneous action of the dog, which leads to the feeling of pain, is onlydecreed to be what it is, for the reason that the dog is part of a world ofmutually reflecting substances, a world which also includes the cudgel. 

(_c_) Why should the dog ever be displeased _spontaneously_? Leibnizdistinguishes the spontaneous from the voluntary: many things occur in themind, of itself, but not chosen by it. 

2. On Cartesianism and miracle:

Cartesianism in the form of occasionalism _does_ involve miracle, forthough God is said by it to act according to laws in conforming body andmind to one another, he thereby causes them to act beyond their naturalcapacities. 

3. On the problem, how can the simple act otherwise than uniformly?

Leibniz distinguishes: some uniform action is monotonous, but some is not. A point moves uniformly in describing a parabola, for it constantly fulfilsthe formula of the curve. But it does not move monotonously, for the curveconstantly varies. Such is the uniformity of the action of simplesubstances. 

Bayle read this reply, and was pleased but not satisfied with it. In thesecond edition of the dictionary, under the same article 'Rorarius', headded the following note:

'I declare first of all that I am very glad I have proposed some smalldifficulties against the system of that great philosopher, since they [38]have occasioned some answers whereby that subject has been made clearer tome, and which have given me a more distinct notion of what is most to beadmired in it. I look now upon that new system as an important conquest, which enlarges the bounds of philosophy. We had only two hypotheses, thatof the Schools and that of the Cartesians: the one was a _way of influence_of the body upon the soul and of the soul upon the body; the other was a_way of assistance_ or occasional causality. But here is a new acquisition, a new hypothesis, which may be called, as Fr. Lami styles it, a _way ofpre-established harmony_. We are beholden for it to M. Leibniz, and it isimpossible to conceive anything that gives us a nobler idea of the powerand wisdom of the Author of all things. This, together with the advantageof setting aside all notions of a miraculous conduct, would engage me toprefer this new system to that of the Cartesians, if I could conceive anypossibility in the _way of pre-established harmony_. 

'I desire the reader to take notice that though I confess that this wayremoves all notions of a miraculous conduct, yet I do not retract what Ihave said formerly, that the system of occasional causes does not bring inGod acting miraculously. (See M. Leibniz's article in _Histoire desOuvrages des Savants_, July 1698. ) I am as much persuaded as ever I wasthat an action cannot be said to be miraculous, unless God produces it asan exception to the general laws; and that everything of which he isimmediately the author according to those laws is distinct from a miracleproperly so called. But being willing to cut off from this dispute as manythings as I possibly can, I consent it should be said that the surest wayof removing all notions that include a miracle is to suppose that allcreated substances are actively the immediate causes of the effects ofnature. I will therefore lay aside what I might reply to that part of M. Leibniz's answer. 

'I will also omit all objections which are not more contrary to his opinionthan to that of some other philosophers. I will not therefore propose thedifficulties that may be raised against the supposition that a creature canreceive from God the power of moving itself. They are strong and almostunanswerable, but M. Leibniz's system does not lie more open to them thanthat of the Aristotelians; nay, I do not know whether the Cartesians wouldpresume to say that God cannot communicate to our souls a power of acting. If they say so, how can they own that Adam sinned? And if they dare not[39]say so they weaken the arguments whereby they endeavour to prove thatmatter is not capable of any activity. Nor do I believe that it is moredifficult for M. Leibniz than for the Cartesians or other philosophers, tofree himself from the objection of a fatal mechanism which destroys humanliberty. Wherefore, waiving this, I shall only speak of what is peculiar tothe system of the _pre-established harmony_. 

'I. My first observation shall be, that it raises the power and wisdom ofthe divine art above everything that can be conceived. Fancy to yourself aship which, without having any sense or knowledge, and without beingdirected by any created or uncreated being, has the power of moving itselfso seasonably as to have always the wind favourable, to avoid currents androcks, to cast anchor where it ought to be done, and to retire into aharbour precisely when it is necessary. Suppose such a ship sails in thatmanner for several years successively, being always turned and situated asit ought to be, according to the several changes of the air and thedifferent situations of seas and lands; you will acknowledge that God, notwithstanding his infinite power, cannot communicate such a faculty to aship; or rather you will say that the nature of a ship is not capable ofreceiving it from God. And yet what M. Leibniz supposes about the machineof a human body is more admirable and more surprising than all this. Let usapply his system concerning the union of the soul with the body to theperson of Julius Caesar. 

'II. We must say according to this system that the body of Julius Caesardid so exercise its moving faculty that from its birth to its death it wentthrough continual changes which did most exactly answer the perpetualchanges of a certain soul which it did not know and which made noimpression on it. We must say that the rule according to which that facultyof Caesar's body performed such actions was such, that he would have goneto the Senate upon such a day and at such an hour, that he would havespoken there such and such words, etc. , though God had willed to annihilatehis soul the next day after it was created. We must say that this movingpower did change and modify itself exactly according to the volubility ofthe thoughts of that ambitious man, and that it was affected precisely in acertain manner rather than in another, because the soul of Caesar passedfrom a certain thought to another. Can a blind power modify itself soexactly by virtue of an impression communicated thirty or forty years [40]before and never renewed since, but left to itself, without ever knowingwhat it is to do? Is not this much more incomprehensible than thenavigation I spoke of in the foregoing paragraph?

'III. The difficulty will be greater still, if it be considered that thehuman machine contains an almost infinite number of organs, and that it iscontinually exposed to the shock of the bodies that surround it, [1] andwhich by an innumerable variety of shakings produce in it a thousand sortsof modifications. How is it possible to conceive that this _pre-establishedharmony_ should never be disordered, but go on still during the longestlife of a man, notwithstanding the infinite varieties of the reciprocalaction of so many organs upon one another, which are surrounded on allsides with infinite corpuscles, sometimes hot and sometimes cold, sometimesdry and sometimes moist, and always acting, and pricking the nerves athousand different ways? Suppose that the multiplicity of organs and ofexternal agents be a necessary instrument of the almost infinite variety ofchanges in a human body: will that variety have the exactness hererequired? Will it never disturb the correspondence of those changes withthe changes of the soul? This seems to be altogether impossible. 

[1] 'According to M. Leibniz what is active in every substance ought to bereduced to a true unity. Since therefore the body of every man is composedof several substances, each of them ought to have a principle of actionreally distinct from the principle of each of the others. He will have theaction of every principle to be spontaneous. Now this must vary the effects_ad infinitum_, and confound them. For the impression of the neighbouringbodies must needs put some constraint upon the natural spontaneity of everyone of them. '

'IV. It is in vain to have recourse to the power of God, in order tomaintain that brutes are mere machines; it is in vain to say that God wasable to make machines so artfully contrived that the voice of a man, thereflected light of an object, etc. , will strike them exactly where it isnecessary, that they may move in a given manner. This supposition isrejected by everybody except some Cartesians; and no Cartesian would admitit if it were to be extended to man; that is, if anyone were to assert thatGod was able to form such bodies as would mechanically do whatever we seeother men do. By denying this we do not pretend to limit the power andknowledge of God: we only mean that the nature of things does not permitthat the faculties imparted to a creature should not be necessarilyconfined within certain bounds. The actions of creatures must be [41]necessarily proportioned to their essential state, and performed accordingto the character belonging to each machine; for according to the maxim ofthe philosophers, whatever is received is proportionate to the capacity ofthe subject that receives it. We may therefore reject M. Leibniz'shypothesis as being impossible, since it is liable to greater difficultiesthan that of the Cartesians, which makes beasts to be mere machines. Itputs a perpetual harmony between two beings, which do not act one uponanother; whereas if servants were mere machines, and should punctually obeytheir masters' command, it could not be said that they do it without a realaction of their masters upon them; for their masters would speak words andmake signs which would really shake and move the organs of the servants. 

'V. Now let us consider the soul of Julius Caesar, and we shall find thething more impossible still. That soul was in the world without beingexposed to the influence of any spirit. The power it received from God wasthe only principle of the actions it produced at every moment: and if thoseactions were different one from another, it was not because some of themwere produced by the united influence of some springs which did notcontribute to the production of others, for the soul of man is simple, indivisible and immaterial. M. Leibniz owns it; and if he did notacknowledge it, but if, on the contrary, he should suppose with mostphilosophers and some of the most excellent metaphysicians of our age (Mr. Locke, for instance) that a compound of several material parts placed anddisposed in a certain manner, is capable of thinking, his hypothesis wouldappear to be on that very ground absolutely impossible, and I could refuteit several other ways; which I need not mention since he acknowledges theimmateriality of our soul and builds upon it. 

'Let us return to the soul of Julius Caesar, and call it an immaterialautomaton (M. Leibniz's own phrase), and compare it with an atom ofEpicurus; I mean an atom surrounded with a vacuum on all sides, and whichwill never meet any other atom. This is a very just comparison: for thisatom, on the one hand, has a natural power of moving itself and exerts itwithout any assistance, and without being retarded or hindered by anything:and, on the other hand, the soul of Caesar is a spirit which has receivedthe faculty of producing thoughts, and exerts it without the influence [42]of any other spirit or of any body. It is neither assisted nor thwarted byanything whatsoever. If you consult the common notions and the ideas oforder, you will find that this atom can never stop, and that having been inmotion in the foregoing moment, it will continue in it at the presentmoment and in all the moments that shall follow, and that it will alwaysmove in the same manner. This is the consequence of an axiom approved by M. Leibniz: _since a thing does always remain in the same state wherein ithappens to be, unless it receives some alteration from some other thing . . . We conclude_, says he, _not only that a body which is at rest will alwaysbe at rest, but that a body in motion will always keep that motion orchange, that is, the same swiftness and the same direction, unlesssomething happens to hinder it_. (M. Leibniz, ibid. )

'Everyone clearly sees that this atom, whether it moves by an innate power, as Democritus and Epicurus would have it, or by a power received from theCreator, will always move in the same line equally and after a uniformmanner, without ever turning or going back. Epicurus was laughed at, whenhe invented the motion of declination; it was a needless supposition, whichhe wanted in order to get out of the labyrinth of a fatal necessity; and hecould give no reason for this new part of his system. It was inconsistentwith the clearest notions of our minds: for it is evident that an atomwhich describes a straight line for the space of two days cannot turn awayat the beginning of a third, unless it meets with some obstacle, or has amind all of a sudden to go out of its road, or contains some spring whichbegins to play at that very moment. The first of these reasons cannot beadmitted in a vacuum. The second is impossible, since an atom has not thefaculty of thinking. And the third is likewise impossible in a corpusclethat is a perfect unity. I must make some use of all this. 

'VI. Caesar's soul is a being to which unity belongs in a strict sense. Thefaculty of producing thoughts is a property of its nature (so M. Leibniz), which it has received from God, both as to possession and exercise. If thefirst thought it produces is a sense of pleasure, there is no reason whythe second should not likewise be a sense of pleasure; for when the totalcause of an effect remains the same, the effect cannot be altered. Now thissoul, at the second moment of its existence, does not receive a new facultyof thinking; it only preserves the faculty it had at the first moment, andit is as independent of the concourse of any other cause at the second [43]moment as it was at the first. It must therefore produce again at thesecond moment the same thought it had produced just before. If it beobjected that it ought to be in a state of change, and that it would not bein such a state, in the case that I have supposed; I answer that its changewill be like the change of the atom; for an atom which continually moves inthe same line acquires a new situation at every moment, but it is like thepreceding situation. A soul may therefore continue in its state of change, if it does but produce a new thought like the preceding. 

'But suppose it to be not confined within such narrow bounds; it must begranted at least that its going from one thought to another implies somereason of affinity. If I suppose that in a certain moment the soul ofCaesar sees a tree with leaves and blossoms, I can conceive that it doesimmediately desire to see one that has only leaves, and then one that hasonly blossoms, and that it will thus successively produce several imagesarising from one another; but one cannot conceive the odd change ofthoughts, which have no affinity with, but are even contrary to, oneanother, and which are so common in men's souls. One cannot apprehend howGod could place in the soul of Julius Caesar the principle of what I amgoing to say. He was without doubt pricked with a pin more than once, whenhe was sucking; and therefore according to M. Leibniz's hypothesis which Iam here considering, his soul must have produced in itself a sense of painimmediately after the pleasant sensations of the sweetness of the milk, which it had enjoyed for the space of two or three minutes. By what springswas it determined to interrupt its pleasures and to give itself all of asudden a sense of pain, without receiving any intimation of preparingitself to change, and without any new alteration in its substance? If yourun over the life of that Roman emperor, every page will afford you matterfor a stronger objection than this is. 

'VII. The thing would be less incomprehensible if it were supposed that thesoul of man is not one spirit but rather a multitude of spirits, each ofwhich has its functions, that begin and end precisely as the changes madein a human body require. By virtue of this supposition it should be saidthat something analogous to a great number of wheels and springs, or ofmatters that ferment, disposed according to the changes of our machine, awakens or lulls asleep for a certain time the action of each of thosespirits. But then the soul of man would be no longer a single substance[44]but an _ens per aggregationem_, a collection and heap of substances justlike all material beings. We are here in quest of a single being, whichproduces in itself sometimes joy, sometimes pain, etc. , and not of manybeings, one of which produces hope, another despair, etc. 

'In these observations I have merely cleared and unfolded those which M. Leibniz has done me the honour to examine: and now I shall make somereflexions upon his answers. 

'VIII. He says (ibid. , p. 332) that _the law of the change which happens inthe substance of the animal transports him from pleasure to pain at thevery moment that a solution of continuity is made in his body; because thelaw of the indivisible substance of that animal is to represent what isdone in his body as we experience it, and even to represent in some manner, and with respect to that body, whatever is done in the world_. These wordsare a very good explication of the grounds of this system; they are, as itwere, the unfolding and key of it; but at the same time they are the verythings at which the objections of those who take this system to beimpossible are levelled. The law M. Leibniz speaks of supposes a decree ofGod, and shows wherein this system agrees with that of occasional causes. Those two systems agree in this point, that there are laws according towhich the soul of man is _to represent what is done in the body of man, aswe experience it_. But they disagree as to the manner of executing thoselaws. The Cartesians say that God executes them; M. Leibniz will have it, that the soul itself does it; which appears to me impossible, because thesoul has not the necessary instruments for such an execution. Now howeverinfinite the power and knowledge of God be, he cannot perform with amachine deprived of a certain piece, what requires the concourse of such apiece. He must supply that defect; but then the effect would be produced byhim and not by the machine. I shall show that the soul has not theinstruments requisite for the divine law we speak of, and in order to do itI shall make use of a comparison. 

'Fancy to yourself an animal created by God and designed to singcontinually. It will always sing, that is most certain; but if God designshim a certain tablature, he must necessarily either put it before his eyesor imprint it upon his memory or dispose his muscles in such a manner thataccording to the laws of mechanism one certain note will always come afteranother, agreeably to the order of the tablature. Without this one cannotapprehend that the animal can always follow the whole set of the notes [45]appointed him by God. Let us apply this to man's soul. M. Leibniz will haveit that it has received not only the power of producing thoughtscontinually, but also the faculty of following always a certain set ofthoughts, which answers the continual changes that happen in the machine ofthe body. This set of thoughts is like the tablature prescribed to thesinging animal above mentioned. Can the soul change its perceptions ormodifications at every moment according to such a set of thoughts, withoutknowing the series of the notes, and actually thinking upon them? Butexperience teaches us that it knows nothing of it. Were it not at leastnecessary that in default of such a knowledge, there should be in the soula set of particular instruments, each of which would be a necessary causeof such and such a thought? Must they not be so placed and disposed as tooperate precisely one after another, according to the correspondence_pre-established_ between the changes of the body and the thoughts of thesoul? but it is most certain that an immaterial simple and indivisiblesubstance cannot be made up of such an innumerable multitude of particularinstruments placed one before another, according to the order of thetablature in question. It is not therefore possible that a human soulshould execute that law. 

'M. Leibniz supposes that the soul does not distinctly know its futureperceptions, _but that it perceives them confusedly_, and that _there arein each substance traces of whatever hath happened, or shall happen to it:but that an infinite multitude of perceptions hinders us fromdistinguishing them. The present state of each substance is a naturalconsequence of its preceding state. The soul, though never so simple, hasalways a sentiment composed of several perceptions at one time: whichanswers our end as well as though it were composed of pieces, like amachine. For each foregoing perception has an influence on those thatfollow agreeably to a law of order, which is in perceptions as well as inmotions. . . The perceptions that are together in one and the same soul at thesame time, including an infinite multitude of little and indistinguishablesentiments that are to be unfolded, we need not wonder at the infinitevariety of what is to result from it in time. This is only a consequence ofthe representative nature of the soul, which is, to express what happensand what will happen in its body, by the connexion and correspondence ofall the parts of the world_. I have but little to say in answer to this: Ishall only observe that this supposition when sufficiently cleared is theright way of solving all the difficulties. M. Leibniz, through the [46]penetration of his great genius, has very well conceived the extent andstrength of this objection, and what remedy ought to be applied to the maininconveniency. I do not doubt but that he will smooth the rough parts ofhis system, and teach us some excellent things about the nature of spirits. Nobody can travel more usefully or more safely than he in the intellectualworld. I hope that his curious explanations will remove all theimpossibilities which I have hitherto found in his system, and that he willsolidly remove my difficulties, as well as those of Father Lami. And thesehopes made me say before, without designing to pass a compliment upon thatlearned man, that his system ought to be looked upon as an importantconquest. 

'He will not be much embarrassed by this, viz. That whereas according tothe supposition of the Cartesians there is but one general law for theunion of spirits and bodies, he will have it that God gives a particularlaw to each spirit; from whence it seems to result that the primitiveconstitution of each spirit is specifically different from all others. Donot the Thomists say, that there are as many species as individuals inangelic nature?'

Leibniz acknowledged Bayle's note in a further reply, which is written asthough for publication. It was communicated to Bayle, but it was not infact published. It is dated 1702. It may be found in the standardcollections of Leibniz's philosophical works. It reads almost like a sketchfor the _Theodicy_. 

The principal point developed by Leibniz is the richness of content which, according to him, is to be found in each 'simple substance'. Its simplicityis more like the infinitely rich simplicity of the divine Being, than likethe simplicity of the atom of Epicurus, with which Bayle had chosen tocompare it. It contains a condensation in confused idea of the wholeuniverse: and its essence is from the first defined by the part it is toplay in the total harmony. 

As to the musical score ('tablature of notes') which the individual soulplays from, in order to perform its ordained part in the universal harmony, this 'score' is to be found in the confused or implicit ideas at any momentpresent, from which an omniscient observer could always deduce what is tohappen next. To the objection 'But the created soul is not an omniscientobserver, and if it cannot read the score, the score is useless to it', [47]Leibniz replies by affirming that much spontaneous action arises fromsubjective and yet unperceived reasons, as we are all perfectly aware, oncewe attend to the relevant facts. All he claims to be doing is to generalizethis observation. All events whatsoever arise from the 'interpretation ofthe score' by monads, but very little of this 'interpretation' is in theleast conscious. 

Leibniz passes from the remarks about his own doctrine under the article'Rorarius' to other articles of Bayle's dictionary, and touches thequestion of the origin of evil, and other matters which receive theirfuller treatment in the _Theodicy_. 

In the same year Leibniz wrote a very friendly letter to Bayle himself, offering further explanations of disputed points. He concluded it with aparagraph of some personal interest, comparing himself thehistorian-philosopher with Bayle the philosophic lexicographer, andrevealing by the way his attitude to philosophy, science and history:

'We have good reason to admire, Sir, the way in which your strikingreflexions on the deepest questions of philosophy remain unhindered by yourboundless researches into matters of fact. I too am not always able toexcuse myself from discussions of the sort, and have even been obliged todescend to questions of genealogy, which would be still more trifling, wereit not that the interests of States frequently depend upon them. I haveworked much on the history of Germany in so far as it bears upon thesecountries, a study which has furnished me with some observations belongingto general history. So I have learnt not to neglect the knowledge of sheerfacts. But if the choice were open to me, I should prefer natural historyto political, and the customs and laws God has established in nature, towhat is observed among mankind. '

Leibniz now conceived the idea of putting together all the passages inBayle's works which interested him, and writing a systematic answer tothem. Before he had leisure to finish the task, Bayle died. The worknevertheless appeared in 1710 as the Essays in _Theodicy_. 

 [49] * * * * *

PREFACE

 * * * * *

It has ever been seen that men in general have resorted to outward formsfor the expression of their religion: sound piety, that is to say, lightand virtue, has never been the portion of the many. One should not wonderat this, nothing is so much in accord with human weakness. We are impressedby what is outward, while the inner essence of things requiresconsideration of such a kind as few persons are fitted to give. As truepiety consists in principles and practice, the outward forms of religionimitate these, and are of two kinds: the one kind consists in ceremonialpractices, and the other in the formularies of belief. Ceremonies resemblevirtuous actions, and formularies are like shadows of the truth andapproach, more or less, the true light. All these outward forms would becommendable if those who invented them had rendered them appropriate tomaintain and to express that which they imitate--if religious ceremonies, ecclesiastical discipline, the rules of communities, human laws were alwayslike a hedge round the divine law, to withdraw us from any approach tovice, to inure us to the good and to make us familiar with virtue. That wasthe aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of the wise men who foundedreligious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of thepurest and most enlightened religion. It is just the same with theformularies of belief: they would be valid provided there were nothing [50]in them inconsistent with truth unto salvation, even though the full truthconcerned were not there. But it happens only too often that religion ischoked in ceremonial, and that the divine light is obscured by the opinionsof men. 

The pagans, who inhabited the earth before Christianity was founded, hadonly one kind of outward form: they had ceremonies in their worship, butthey had no articles of faith and had never dreamed of drawing upformularies for their dogmatic theology. They knew not whether their godswere real persons or symbols of the forces of Nature, as the sun, theplanets, the elements. Their mysteries consisted not in difficult dogmasbut in certain secret observances, whence the profane, namely those whowere not initiated, were excluded. These observances were very oftenridiculous and absurd, and it was necessary to conceal them in order toguard them against contempt. The pagans had their superstitions: theyboasted of miracles, everything with them was full of oracles, auguries, portents, divinations; the priests invented signs of the anger or of thegoodness of the gods, whose interpreters they claimed to be. This tended tosway minds through fear and hope concerning human events; but the greatfuture of another life was scarce envisaged; one did not trouble to impartto men true notions of God and of the soul. 

Of all ancient peoples, it appears that the Hebrews alone had public dogmasfor their religion. Abraham and Moses established the belief in one God, source of all good, author of all things. The Hebrews speak of him in amanner worthy of the Supreme Substance; and one wonders at seeing theinhabitants of one small region of the earth more enlightened than the restof the human race. Peradventure the wise men of other nations havesometimes said the same, but they have not had the good fortune to find asufficient following and to convert the dogma into law. Nevertheless Moseshad not inserted in his laws the doctrine of the immortality of souls: itwas consistent with his ideas, it was taught by oral tradition; but it wasnot proclaimed for popular acceptance until Jesus Christ lifted the veil, and, without having force in his hand, taught with all the force of alawgiver that immortal souls pass into another life, wherein they shallreceive the wages of their deeds. Moses had already expressed the beautifulconceptions of the greatness and the goodness of God, whereto manycivilized peoples to-day assent; but Jesus Christ demonstrated fully [51]the results of these ideas, proclaiming that divine goodness and justiceare shown forth to perfection in God's designs for the souls of men. 

I refrain from considering here the other points of the Christian doctrine, and I will show only how Jesus Christ brought about the conversion ofnatural religion into law, and gained for it the authority of a publicdogma. He alone did that which so many philosophers had endeavoured in vainto do; and Christians having at last gained the upper hand in the RomanEmpire, the master of the greater part of the known earth, the religion ofthe wise men became that of the nations. Later also Mahomet showed nodivergence from the great dogmas of natural theology: his followers spreadthem abroad even among the most remote races of Asia and of Africa, whitherChristianity had not been carried; and they abolished in many countriesheathen superstitions which were contrary to the true doctrine of the unityof God and the immortality of souls. 

It is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished thatthe Divinity should be the object not only of our fear and veneration butalso of our love and devotion. Thus he made men happy by anticipation, andgave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity. For there isnothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love. Love is thatmental state which makes us take pleasure in the perfections of the objectof our love, and there is nothing more perfect than God, nor any greaterdelight than in him. To love him it suffices to contemplate hisperfections, a thing easy indeed, because we find the ideas of these withinourselves. The perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possessesthem in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, whereof to us only drops havebeen granted; there is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness, butin God they are all in their entirety. Order, proportions, harmony delightus; painting and music are samples of these: God is all order; he alwayskeeps truth of proportions, he makes universal harmony; all beauty is aneffusion of his rays. 

It follows manifestly that true piety and even true felicity consist in thelove of God, but a love so enlightened that its fervour is attended byinsight. This kind of love begets that pleasure in good actions which givesrelief to virtue, and, relating all to God as to the centre, transports thehuman to the divine. For in doing one's duty, in obeying reason, one [52]carries out the orders of Supreme Reason. One directs all one's intentionsto the common good, which is no other than the glory of God. Thus one findsthat there is no greater individual interest than to espouse that of thecommunity, and one gains satisfaction for oneself by taking pleasure in theacquisition of true benefits for men. Whether one succeeds therein or not, one is content with what comes to pass, being once resigned to the will ofGod and knowing that what he wills is best. But before he declares his willby the event one endeavours to find it out by doing that which appears mostin accord with his commands. When we are in this state of mind, we are notdisheartened by ill success, we regret only our faults; and the ungratefulways of men cause no relaxation in the exercise of our kindly disposition. Our charity is humble and full of moderation, it presumes not to domineer;attentive alike to our own faults and to the talents of others, we areinclined to criticize our own actions and to excuse and vindicate those ofothers. We must work out our own perfection and do wrong to no man. Thereis no piety where there is not charity; and without being kindly andbeneficent one cannot show sincere religion. 

Good disposition, favourable upbringing, association with pious andvirtuous persons may contribute much towards such a propitious conditionfor our souls; but most securely are they grounded therein by goodprinciples. I have already said that insight must be joined to fervour, that the perfecting of our understanding must accomplish the perfecting ofour will. The practices of virtue, as well as those of vice, may be theeffect of a mere habit, one may acquire a taste for them; but when virtueis reasonable, when it is related to God, who is the supreme reason ofthings, it is founded on knowledge. One cannot love God without knowing hisperfections, and this knowledge contains the principles of true piety. Thepurpose of religion should be to imprint these principles upon our souls:but in some strange way it has happened all too often that men, thatteachers of religion have strayed far from this purpose. Contrary to theintention of our divine Master, devotion has been reduced to ceremonies anddoctrine has been cumbered with formulae. All too often these ceremonieshave not been well fitted to maintain the exercise of virtue, and theformulae sometimes have not been lucid. Can one believe it? Some Christianshave imagined that they could be devout without loving their neighbour, [53]and pious without loving God; or else people have thought that they couldlove their neighbour without serving him and could love God without knowinghim. Many centuries have passed without recognition of this defect by thepeople at large; and there are still great traces of the reign of darkness. There are divers persons who speak much of piety, of devotion, of religion, who are even busied with the teaching of such things, and who yet prove tobe by no means versed in the divine perfections. They ill understand thegoodness and the justice of the Sovereign of the universe; they imagine aGod who deserves neither to be imitated nor to be loved. This indeed seemedto me dangerous in its effect, since it is of serious moment that the verysource of piety should be preserved from infection. The old errors of thosewho arraigned the Divinity or who made thereof an evil principle have beenrenewed sometimes in our own days: people have pleaded the irresistiblepower of God when it was a question rather of presenting his supremegoodness; and they have assumed a despotic power when they should ratherhave conceived of a power ordered by the most perfect wisdom. I haveobserved that these opinions, apt to do harm, rested especially on confusednotions which had been formed concerning freedom, necessity and destiny;and I have taken up my pen more than once on such an occasion to giveexplanations on these important matters. But finally I have been compelledto gather up my thoughts on all these connected questions, and to impartthem to the public. It is this that I have undertaken in the Essays which Ioffer here, on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin ofEvil. 

There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray:one concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all inthe production and the origin of Evil; the other consists in the discussionof continuity and of the indivisibles which appear to be the elementsthereof, and where the consideration of the infinite must enter in. Thefirst perplexes almost all the human race, the other exercises philosophersonly. I shall have perchance at another time an opportunity to declaremyself on the second, and to point out that, for lack of a true conceptionof the nature of substance and matter, people have taken up false positionsleading to insurmountable difficulties, difficulties which should properlybe applied to the overthrow of these very positions. But if the [54]knowledge of continuity is important for speculative enquiry, that ofnecessity is none the less so for practical application; and it, togetherwith the questions therewith connected, to wit, the freedom of man and thejustice of God, forms the object of this treatise. 

Men have been perplexed in well-nigh every age by a sophism which theancients called the 'Lazy Reason', because it tended towards doing nothing, or at least towards being careful for nothing and only followinginclination for the pleasure of the moment. For, they said, if the futureis necessary, that which must happen will happen, whatever I may do. Nowthe future (so they said) is necessary, whether because the Divinityforesees everything, and even pre-establishes it by the control of allthings in the universe; or because everything happens of necessity, throughthe concatenation of causes; or finally, through the very nature of truth, which is determinate in the assertions that can be made on future events, as it is in all assertions, since the assertion must always be true orfalse in itself, even though we know not always which it is. And all thesereasons for determination which appear different converge finally likelines upon one and the same centre; for there is a truth in the futureevent which is predetermined by the causes, and God pre-establishes it inestablishing the causes. 

The false conception of necessity, being applied in practice, has givenrise to what I call _Fatum Mahometanum_, fate after the Turkish fashion, because it is said of the Turks that they do not shun danger or evenabandon places infected with plague, owing to their use of such reasoningas that just recorded. For what is called _Fatum Stoicum_ was not so blackas it is painted: it did not divert men from the care of their affairs, butit tended to give them tranquillity in regard to events, through theconsideration of necessity, which renders our anxieties and our vexationsneedless. In which respect these philosophers were not far removed from theteaching of our Lord, who deprecates these anxieties in regard to themorrow, comparing them with the needless trouble a man would give himselfin labouring to increase his stature. 

It is true that the teachings of the Stoics (and perhaps also of somefamous philosophers of our time), confining themselves to this allegednecessity, can only impart a forced patience; whereas our Lord inspiresthoughts more sublime, and even instructs us in the means of gainingcontentment by assuring us that since God, being altogether good and [55]wise, has care for everything, even so far as not to neglect one hair ofour head, our confidence in him ought to be entire. And thus we should see, if we were capable of understanding him, that it is not even possible towish for anything better (as much in general as for ourselves) than what hedoes. It is as if one said to men: Do your duty and be content with thatwhich shall come of it, not only because you cannot resist divineprovidence, or the nature of things (which may suffice for tranquillity, but not for contentment), but also because you have to do with a goodmaster. And that is what may be called _Fatum Christianum_. 

Nevertheless it happens that most men, and even Christians, introduce intotheir dealings some mixture of fate after the Turkish fashion, althoughthey do not sufficiently acknowledge it. It is true that they are notinactive or negligent when obvious perils or great and manifest hopespresent themselves; for they will not fail to abandon a house that is aboutto fall and to turn aside from a precipice they see in their path; and theywill burrow in the earth to dig up a treasure half uncovered, withoutwaiting for fate to finish dislodging it. But when the good or the evil isremote and uncertain and the remedy painful or little to our taste, thelazy reason seems to us to be valid. For example, when it is a question ofpreserving one's health and even one's life by good diet, people to whomone gives advice thereupon very often answer that our days are numbered andthat it avails nothing to try to struggle against that which God destinesfor us. But these same persons run to even the most absurd remedies whenthe evil they had neglected draws near. One reasons in somewhat the sameway when the question for consideration is somewhat thorny, as for instancewhen one asks oneself, _quod vitae sectabor iter_? what profession one mustchoose; when it is a question of a marriage being arranged, of a war beingundertaken, of a battle being fought; for in these cases many will beinclined to evade the difficulty of consideration and abandon themselves tofate or to inclination, as if reason should not be employed except in easycases. One will then all too often reason in the Turkish fashion (althoughthis way is wrongly termed trusting in providence, a thing that in realityoccurs only when one has done one's duty) and one will employ the lazyreason, derived from the idea of inevitable fate, to relieve oneself of theneed to reason properly. One will thus overlook the fact that if this [56]argument contrary to the practice of reason were valid, it would alwayshold good, whether the consideration were easy or not. This laziness is tosome extent the source of the superstitious practices of fortune-tellers, which meet with just such credulity as men show towards the philosopher'sstone, because they would fain have short cuts to the attainment ofhappiness without trouble. 

I do not speak here of those who throw themselves upon fortune because theyhave been happy before, as if there were something permanent therein. Theirargument from the past to the future has just as slight a foundation as theprinciples of astrology and of other kinds of divination. They overlook thefact that there is usually an ebb and flow in fortune, _una marea_, asItalians playing basset are wont to call it. With regard to this they maketheir own particular observations, which I would, nevertheless, counselnone to trust too much. Yet this confidence that people have in theirfortune serves often to give courage to men, and above all to soldiers, andcauses them to have indeed that good fortune they ascribe to themselves. Even so do predictions often cause that to happen which has been foretold, as it is supposed that the opinion the Mahometans hold on fate makes themresolute. Thus even errors have their use at times, but generally asproviding a remedy for other errors: and truth is unquestionably better. 

But it is taking an unfair advantage of this alleged necessity of fate toemploy it in excuse for our vices and our libertinism. I have often heardit said by smart young persons, who wished to play the freethinker, that itis useless to preach virtue, to censure vice, to create hopes of reward andfears of punishment, since it may be said of the book of destiny, that whatis written is written, and that our behaviour can change nothing therein. Thus, they would say, it were best to follow one's inclination, dwellingonly upon such things as may content us in the present. They did notreflect upon the strange consequences of this argument, which would provetoo much, since it would prove (for instance) that one should take apleasant beverage even though one knows it is poisoned. For the same reason(if it were valid) I could say: if it is written in the records of theParcae that poison will kill me now or will do me harm, this will happeneven though I were not to take this beverage; and if this is not written, it will not happen even though I should take this same beverage;consequently I shall be able to follow with impunity my inclination to [57]take what is pleasing, however injurious it may be; the result of whichreasoning is an obvious absurdity. This objection disconcerted them alittle, but they always reverted to their argument, phrased in differentways, until they were brought to understand where the fault of the sophismlies. It is untrue that the event happens whatever one may do: it willhappen because one does what leads thereto; and if the event is writtenbeforehand, the cause that will make it happen is written also. Thus theconnexion of effects and causes, so far from establishing the doctrine of anecessity detrimental to conduct, serves to overthrow it. 

Yet, without having evil intentions inclined towards libertinism, one mayenvisage differently the strange consequences of an inevitable necessity, considering that it would destroy the freedom of the will, so essential tothe morality of action: for justice and injustice, praise and blame, punishment and reward cannot attach to necessary actions, and nobody willbe under obligation to do the impossible or to abstain from doing what isabsolutely necessary. Without any intention of abusing this considerationin order to favour irregularity, one will nevertheless not escapeembarrassment sometimes, when it comes to a question of judging the actionsof others, or rather of answering objections, amongst which there are someeven concerned with the actions of God, whereof I will speak presently. Andas an insuperable necessity would open the door to impiety, whether throughthe impunity one could thence infer or the hopelessness of any attempt toresist a torrent that sweeps everything along with it, it is important tonote the different degrees of necessity, and to show that there are somewhich cannot do harm, as there are others which cannot be admitted withoutgiving rise to evil consequences. 

Some go even further: not content with using the pretext of necessity toprove that virtue and vice do neither good nor ill, they have the hardihoodto make the Divinity accessary to their licentious way of life, and theyimitate the pagans of old, who ascribed to the gods the cause of theircrimes, as if a divinity drove them to do evil. The philosophy ofChristians, which recognizes better than that of the ancients thedependence of things upon the first Author and his co-operation with allthe actions of creatures, appears to have increased this difficulty. Someable men in our own time have gone so far as to deny all action to [58]creatures, and M. Bayle, who tended a little towards this extraordinaryopinion, made use of it to restore the lapsed dogma of the two principles, or two gods, the one good, the other evil, as if this dogma were a bettersolution to the difficulties over the origin of evil. Yet again heacknowledges that it is an indefensible opinion and that the oneness of thePrinciple is incontestably founded on _a priori_ reasons; but he wishes toinfer that our Reason is confounded and cannot meet her own objections, andthat one should disregard them and hold fast the revealed dogmas, whichteach us the existence of one God altogether good, altogether powerful andaltogether wise. But many readers, convinced of the irrefutable nature ofhis objections and believing them to be at least as strong as the proofsfor the truth of religion, would draw dangerous conclusions. 

Even though there were no co-operation by God in evil actions, one couldnot help finding difficulty in the fact that he foresees them and that, being able to prevent them through his omnipotence, he yet permits them. This is why some philosophers and even some theologians have rather chosento deny to God any knowledge of the detail of things and, above all, offuture events, than to admit what they believed repellent to his goodness. The Socinians and Conrad Vorstius lean towards that side; and ThomasBonartes, an English Jesuit disguised under a pseudonym but exceedinglylearned, who wrote a book _De Concordia Scientiae cum Fide_, of which Iwill speak later, appears to hint at this also. 

They are doubtless much mistaken; but others are not less so who, convincedthat nothing comes to pass save by the will and the power of God, ascribeto him intentions and actions so unworthy of the greatest and the best ofall beings that one would say these authors have indeed renounced the dogmawhich recognizes God's justice and goodness. They thought that, beingsupreme Master of the universe, he could without any detriment to hisholiness cause sins to be committed, simply at his will and pleasure, or inorder that he might have the pleasure of punishing; and even that he couldtake pleasure in eternally afflicting innocent people without doing anyinjustice, because no one has the right or the power to control hisactions. Some even have gone so far as to say that God acts thus indeed;and on the plea that we are as nothing in comparison with him, they likenus to earthworms which men crush without heeding as they walk, or ingeneral to animals that are not of our species and which we do not [59]scruple to ill-treat. 

I believe that many persons otherwise of good intentions are misled bythese ideas, because they have not sufficient knowledge of theirconsequences. They do not see that, properly speaking, God's justice isthus overthrown. For what idea shall we form of such a justice as has onlywill for its rule, that is to say, where the will is not guided by therules of good and even tends directly towards evil? Unless it be the ideacontained in that tyrannical definition by Thrasymachus in Plato, whichdesignated as _just_ that which pleases the stronger. Such indeed is theposition taken up, albeit unwittingly, by those who rest all obligationupon constraint, and in consequence take power as the gauge of right. Butone will soon abandon maxims so strange and so unfit to make men good andcharitable through the imitation of God. For one will reflect that a Godwho would take pleasure in the misfortune of others cannot be distinguishedfrom the evil principle of the Manichaeans, assuming that this principlehad become sole master of the universe; and that in consequence one mustattribute to the true God sentiments that render him worthy to be calledthe good Principle. 

Happily these extravagant dogmas scarce obtain any longer amongtheologians. Nevertheless some astute persons, who are pleased to makedifficulties, revive them: they seek to increase our perplexity by unitingthe controversies aroused by Christian theology to the disputes ofphilosophy. Philosophers have considered the questions of necessity, offreedom and of the origin of evil; theologians have added thereto those oforiginal sin, of grace and of predestination. The original corruption ofthe human race, coming from the first sin, appears to us to have imposed anatural necessity to sin without the succour of divine grace: but necessitybeing incompatible with punishment, it will be inferred that a sufficientgrace ought to have been given to all men; which does not seem to be inconformity with experience. 

But the difficulty is great, above all, in relation to God's dispositionsfor the salvation of men. There are few saved or chosen; therefore thechoice of many is not God's decreed will. And since it is admitted thatthose whom he has chosen deserve it no more than the rest, and are not evenfundamentally less evil, the goodness which they have coming only from thegift of God, the difficulty is increased. Where is, then, his justice [60](people will say), or at the least, where is his goodness? Partiality, orrespect of persons, goes against justice, and he who without cause setsbounds to his goodness cannot have it in sufficient measure. It is truethat those who are not chosen are lost by their own fault: they lack goodwill or living faith; but it rested with God alone to grant it them. Weknow that besides inward grace there are usually outward circumstanceswhich distinguish men, and that training, conversation, example oftencorrect or corrupt natural disposition. Now that God should call forthcircumstances favourable to some and abandon others to experiences whichcontribute to their misfortune, will not that give us cause forastonishment? And it is not enough (so it seems) to say with some thatinward grace is universal and equal for all. For these same authors areobliged to resort to the exclamations of St. Paul, and to say: 'O thedepth!' when they consider how men are distinguished by what we may calloutward graces, that is, by graces appearing in the diversity ofcircumstances which God calls forth, whereof men are not the masters, andwhich have nevertheless so great an influence upon all that concerns theirsalvation. 

Nor will it help us to say with St. Augustine that, all men being involvedin the damnation caused by the sin of Adam, God might have left them all intheir misery; and that thus his goodness alone induces him to deliver someof them. For not only is it strange that the sin of another should condemnanyone, but there still remains the question why God does not deliverall--why he delivers the lesser number and why some in preference toothers. He is in truth their master, but he is a good and just master; hispower is absolute, but his wisdom permits not that he exercise that powerin an arbitrary and despotic way, which would be tyrannous indeed. 

Moreover, the fall of the first man having happened only with God'spermission, and God having resolved to permit it only when once he hadconsidered its consequences, which are the corruption of the mass of thehuman race and the choice of a small number of elect, with the abandonmentof all the rest, it is useless to conceal the difficulty by limiting one'sview to the mass already corrupt. One must, in spite of oneself, go back tothe knowledge of the consequences of the first sin, preceding the decreewhereby God permitted it, and whereby he permitted simultaneously that [61]the damned should be involved in the mass of perdition and should not bedelivered: for God and the sage make no resolve without considering itsconsequences. 

I hope to remove all these difficulties. I will point out that absolutenecessity, which is called also logical and metaphysical and sometimesgeometrical, and which would alone be formidable in this connexion, doesnot exist in free actions, and that thus freedom is exempt not only fromconstraint but also from real necessity. I will show that God himself, although he always chooses the best, does not act by an absolute necessity, and that the laws of nature laid down by God, founded upon the fitness ofthings, keep the mean between geometrical truths, absolutely necessary, andarbitrary decrees; which M. Bayle and other modern philosophers have notsufficiently understood. Further I will show that there is an indifferencein freedom, because there is no absolute necessity for one course or theother; but yet that there is never an indifference of perfect equipoise. And I will demonstrate that there is in free actions a perfect spontaneitybeyond all that has been conceived hitherto. Finally I will make it plainthat the hypothetical and the moral necessity which subsist in free actionsare open to no objection, and that the 'Lazy Reason' is a pure sophism. 

Likewise concerning the origin of evil in its relation to God, I offer avindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness, hisjustice and his goodness than his greatness, his power and hisindependence. I show how it is possible for everything to depend upon God, for him to co-operate in all the actions of creatures, even, if you will, to create these creatures continually, and nevertheless not to be theauthor of sin. Here also it is demonstrated how the privative nature ofevil should be understood. Much more than that, I explain how evil has asource other than the will of God, and that one is right therefore to sayof moral evil that God wills it not, but simply permits it. Most importantof all, however, I show that it has been possible for God to permit sin andmisery, and even to co-operate therein and promote it, without detriment tohis holiness and his supreme goodness: although, generally speaking, hecould have avoided all these evils. 

Concerning grace and predestination, I justify the most debatableassertions, as for instance: that we are converted only through the [62]prevenient grace of God and that we cannot do good except with his aid;that God wills the salvation of all men and that he condemns only thosewhose will is evil; that he gives to all a sufficient grace provided theywish to use it; that, Jesus Christ being the source and the centre ofelection, God destined the elect for salvation, because he foresaw thatthey would cling with a lively faith to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Yetit is true that this reason for election is not the final reason, and thatthis very pre-vision is still a consequence of God's anterior decree. Faithlikewise is a gift of God, who has predestinated the faith of the elect, for reasons lying in a superior decree which dispenses grace andcircumstance in accordance with God's supreme wisdom. 

Now, as one of the most gifted men of our time, whose eloquence was asgreat as his acumen and who gave great proofs of his vast erudition, hadapplied himself with a strange predilection to call attention to all thedifficulties on this subject which I have just touched in general, I founda fine field for exercise in considering the question with him in detail. Iacknowledge that M. Bayle (for it is easy to see that I speak of him) hason his side all the advantages except that of the root of the matter, but Ihope that truth (which he acknowledges himself to be on our side) by itsvery plainness, and provided it be fittingly set forth, will prevail overall the ornaments of eloquence and erudition. My hope for success thereinis all the greater because it is the cause of God I plead, and because oneof the maxims here upheld states that God's help is never lacking for thosethat lack not good will. The author of this discourse believes that he hasgiven proof of this good will in the attention he has brought to bear uponthis subject. He has meditated upon it since his youth; he has conferredwith some of the foremost men of the time; and he has schooled himself bythe reading of good authors. And the success which God has given him(according to the opinion of sundry competent judges) in certain otherprofound meditations, of which some have much influence on this subject, gives him peradventure some right to claim the attention of readers wholove truth and are fitted to search after it. 

The author had, moreover, particular and weighty reasons inducing him totake pen in hand for discussion of this subject. Conversations which he hadconcerning the same with literary and court personages, in Germany and inFrance, and especially with one of the greatest and most accomplished [63]of princesses, have repeatedly prompted him to this course. He had had thehonour of expressing his opinions to this Princess upon divers passages ofthe admirable _Dictionary_ of M. Bayle, wherein religion and reason appearas adversaries, and where M. Bayle wishes to silence reason after havingmade it speak too loud: which he calls the triumph of faith. The presentauthor declared there and then that he was of a different opinion, but thathe was nevertheless well pleased that a man of such great genius hadbrought about an occasion for going deeply into these subjects, subjects asimportant as they are difficult. He admitted having examined them also forsome long time already, and having sometimes been minded to publish uponthis matter some reflexions whose chief aim should be such knowledge of Godas is needed to awaken piety and to foster virtue. This Princess exhortedand urged him to carry out his long-cherished intention, and some friendsadded their persuasions. He was all the more tempted to accede to theirrequests since he had reason to hope that in the sequel to hisinvestigation M. Bayle's genius would greatly aid him to give the subjectsuch illumination as it might receive with his support. But diversobstacles intervened, and the death of the incomparable Queen was not theleast. It happened, however, that M. Bayle was attacked by excellent menwho set themselves to examine the same subject; he answered them fully andalways ingeniously. I followed their dispute, and was even on the point ofbeing involved therein. This is how it came about. 

I had published a new system, which seemed well adapted to explain theunion of the soul and the body: it met with considerable applause even fromthose who were not in agreement with it, and certain competent personstestified that they had already been of my opinion, without having reachedso distinct an explanation, before they saw what I had written on thematter. M. Bayle examined it in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, article 'Rorarius'. He thought that my expositions were worthy of furtherdevelopment; he drew attention to their usefulness in various connexions, and he laid stress upon what might still cause difficulty. I could not butreply in a suitable way to expressions so civil and to reflexions soinstructive as his. In order to turn them to greater account, I publishedsome elucidations in the _Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants_, July 1698. M. Bayle replied to them in the second edition of his _Dictionary_. I sent[64]him a rejoinder which has not yet been published; I know not whether heever made a further reply. 

Meanwhile it happened that M. Le Clerc had inserted in his _Select Library_an extract from the _Intellectual System_ of the late Mr. Cudworth, and hadexplained therein certain 'plastic natures' which this admirable authorapplied to the formation of animals. M. Bayle believed (see thecontinuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, ch. 21, art. 11) that, these natures being without cognition, in establishing them one weakenedthe argument which proves, through the marvellous formation of things, thatthe universe must have an intelligent Cause. M. Le Clerc replied (4th art. Of the 5th vol. Of his _Select Library_) that these natures required to bedirected by divine wisdom. M. Bayle insisted (7th article of the _Histoiredes Ouvrages des Savants_, August 1704) that direction alone was notsufficient for a cause devoid of cognition, unless one took the cause to bea mere instrument of God, in which case direction would be needless. Mysystem was touched upon in passing; and that gave me an opportunity to senda short essay to the illustrious author of the _Histoire des Ouvrages desSavants_, which he inserted in the month of May 1705, art. 9. In this Iendeavoured to make clear that in reality mechanism is sufficient toproduce the organic bodies of animals, without any need of other plasticnatures, provided there be added thereto the _preformation_ alreadycompletely organic in the seeds of the bodies that come into existence, contained in those of the bodies whence they spring, right back to theprimary seeds. This could only proceed from the Author of things, infinitely powerful and infinitely wise, who, creating all in the beginningin due order, had _pre-established_ there all order and artifice that wasto be. There is no chaos in the inward nature of things, and there isorganism everywhere in a matter whose disposition proceeds from God. Moreand more of it would come to light if we pressed closer our examination ofthe anatomy of bodies; and we should continue to observe it even if wecould go on to infinity, like Nature, and make subdivision as continuous inour knowledge as Nature has made it in fact. 

In order to explain this marvel of the formation of animals, I made use ofa Pre-established Harmony, that is to say, of the same means I had used toexplain another marvel, namely the correspondence of soul with body, [65]wherein I proved the uniformity and the fecundity of the principles I hademployed. It seems that this reminded M. Bayle of my system of accountingfor this correspondence, which he had examined formerly. He declared (inchapter 180 of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p. 1253) that he did not believe God could give to matter or to any othercause the faculty of becoming organic without communicating to it the ideaand the knowledge of organic nature. Also he was not yet disposed tobelieve that God, with all his power over Nature and with all theforeknowledge which he has of the contingencies that may arrive, could haveso disposed things that by the laws of mechanics alone a vessel (forinstance) should go to its port of destination without being steered duringits passage by some intelligent guide. I was surprised to see that limitswere placed on the power of God, without the adduction of any proof andwithout indication that there was any contradiction to be feared on theside of the object or any imperfection on God's side. Whereas I had shownbefore in my Rejoinder that even men often produce through automatasomething like the movements that come from reason, and that even a finitemind (but one far above ours) could accomplish what M. Bayle thinksimpossible to the Divinity. Moreover, as God orders all things at oncebeforehand, the accuracy of the path of this vessel would be no morestrange than that of a fuse passing along a cord in fireworks, since thewhole disposition of things preserves a perfect harmony between them bymeans of their influence one upon the other. 

This declaration of M. Bayle pledged me to an answer. I therefore purposedto point out to him, that unless it be said that God forms organic bodieshimself by a perpetual miracle, or that he has entrusted this care tointelligences whose power and knowledge are almost divine, we must hold theopinion that God _preformed_ things in such sort that new organisms areonly a mechanical consequence of a preceding organic constitution. Even sodo butterflies come out of silkworms, an instance where M. Swammerdam hasshown that there is nothing but development. And I would have added thatnothing is better qualified than the preformation of plants and of animalsto confirm my System of Pre-established Harmony between the soul and thebody. For in this the body is prompted by its original constitution tocarry out with the help of external things all that it does in accordancewith the will of the soul. So the seeds by their original constitution [66]carry out naturally the intentions of God, by an artifice greater stillthan that which causes our body to perform everything in conformity withour will. And since M. Bayle himself deems with reason that there is moreartifice in the organism of animals than in the most beautiful poem in theworld or in the most admirable invention whereof the human mind is capable, it follows that my system of the connexion between the body and the soul isas intelligible as the general opinion on the formation of animals. Forthis opinion (which appears to me true) states in effect that the wisdom ofGod has so made Nature that it is competent in virtue of its laws to formanimals; I explain this opinion and throw more light upon the possibilityof it through the system of preformation. Whereafter there will be no causefor surprise that God has so made the body that by virtue of its own lawsit can carry out the intentions of the reasoning soul: for all that thereasoning soul can demand of the body is less difficult than theorganization which God has demanded of the seeds. M. Bayle says (_Reply tothe Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 182, p. 1294) that it is only veryrecently there have been people who have understood that the formation ofliving bodies cannot be a natural process. This he could say also (inaccordance with his principles) of the communication between the soul andthe body, since God effects this whole communication in the system ofoccasional causes to which this author subscribes. But I admit thesupernatural here only in the beginning of things, in respect of the firstformation of animals or in respect of the original constitution ofpre-established harmony between the soul and the body. Once that has cometo pass, I hold that the formation of animals and the relation between thesoul and the body are something as natural now as the other most ordinaryoperations of Nature. A close parallel is afforded by people's ordinarythinking about the instinct and the marvellous behaviour of brutes. Onerecognizes reason there not in the brutes but in him who created them. Iam, then, of the general opinion in this respect; but I hope that myexplanation will have added clearness and lucidity, and even a more amplerange, to that opinion. 

Now when preparing to justify my system in face of the new difficulties ofM. Bayle, I purposed at the same time to communicate to him the ideas whichI had had for some time already, on the difficulties put forward by him[67]in opposition to those who endeavour to reconcile reason with faith inregard to the existence of evil. Indeed, there are perhaps few persons whohave toiled more than I in this matter. Hardly had I gained some tolerableunderstanding of Latin writings when I had an opportunity of turning overbooks in a library. I flitted from book to book, and since subjects formeditation pleased me as much as histories and fables, I was charmed by thework of Laurentius Valla against Boethius and by that of Luther againstErasmus, although I was well aware that they had need of some mitigation. Idid not omit books of controversy, and amongst other writings of thisnature the records of the Montbéliard Conversation, which had revived thedispute, appeared to me instructive. Nor did I neglect the teachings of ourtheologians: and the study of their opponents, far from disturbing me, served to strengthen me in the moderate opinions of the Churches of theAugsburg Confession. I had opportunity on my journeys to confer with someexcellent men of different parties, for instance with Bishop Peter vonWallenburg, Suffragan of Mainz, with Herr Johann Ludwig Fabricius, premiertheologian of Heidelberg, and finally with the celebrated M. Arnauld. Tohim I even tendered a Latin Dialogue of my own composition upon thissubject, about the year 1673, wherein already I laid it down that God, having chosen the most perfect of all possible worlds, had been prompted byhis wisdom to permit the evil which was bound up with it, but which stilldid not prevent this world from being, all things considered, the best thatcould be chosen. I have also since read many and various good authors onthese subjects, and I have endeavoured to make progress in the knowledgethat seems to me proper for banishing all that could have obscured the ideaof supreme perfection which must be acknowledged in God. I have notneglected to examine the most rigorous authors, who have extended furthestthe doctrine of the necessity of things, as for instance Hobbes andSpinoza, of whom the former advocated this absolute necessity not only inhis _Physical Elements_ and elsewhere, but also in a special book againstBishop Bramhall. And Spinoza insists more or less (like an ancientPeripatetic philosopher named Strato) that all has come from the firstcause or from primitive Nature by a blind and geometrical necessity, withcomplete absence of capacity for choice, for goodness and for understandingin this first source of things. 

 [68]I have found the means, so it seems to me, of demonstrating the contrary ina way that gives one a clear insight into the inward essence of the matter. For having made new discoveries on the nature of active force and the lawsof motion, I have shown that they have no geometrical necessity, as Spinozaappears to have believed they had. Neither, as I have made plain, are theypurely arbitrary, even though this be the opinion of M. Bayle and of somemodern philosophers: but they are dependent upon the fitness of things as Ihave already pointed out above, or upon that which I call the 'principle ofthe best'. Moreover one recognizes therein, as in every other thing, themarks of the first substance, whose productions bear the stamp of a supremewisdom and make the most perfect of harmonies. I have shown also that thisharmony connects both the future with the past and the present with theabsent. The first kind of connexion unites times, and the other places. This second connexion is displayed in the union of the soul with the body, and in general in the communication of true substances with one another andwith material phenomena. But the first takes place in the preformation oforganic bodies, or rather of all bodies, since there is organismeverywhere, although all masses do not compose organic bodies. So a pondmay very well be full of fish or of other organic bodies, although it isnot itself an animal or organic body, but only a mass that contains them. Thus I had endeavoured to build upon such foundations, established in aconclusive manner, a complete body of the main articles of knowledge thatreason pure and simple can impart to us, a body whereof all the parts wereproperly connected and capable of meeting the most important difficultiesof the ancients and the moderns. I had also in consequence formed formyself a certain system concerning the freedom of man and the cooperationof God. This system appeared to me to be such as would in no wise offendreason and faith; and I desired to submit it to the scrutiny of M. Bayle, as well as of those who are in controversy with him. Now he has departedfrom us, and such a loss is no small one, a writer whose learning andacumen few have equalled. But since the subject is under consideration andmen of talent are still occupied with it, while the public also follows itattentively, I take this to be a fitting moment for the publication ofcertain of my ideas. 

It will perhaps be well to add the observation, before finishing thispreface, that in denying the physical influence of the soul upon the [69]body or of the body upon the soul, that is, an influence causing the one todisturb the laws of the other, I by no means deny the union of the one withthe other which forms of them a suppositum; but this union is somethingmetaphysical, which changes nothing in the phenomena. This is what I havealready said in reply to the objection raised against me, in the _Mémoiresde Trévoux_, by the Reverend Father de Tournemine, whose wit and learningare of no ordinary mould. And for this reason one may say also in ametaphysical sense that the soul acts upon the body and the body upon thesoul. Moreover, it is true that the soul is the Entelechy or the activeprinciple, whereas the corporeal alone or the mere material contains onlythe passive. Consequently the principle of action is in the soul, as I haveexplained more than once in the _Leipzig Journal_. More especially doesthis appear in my answer to the late Herr Sturm, philosopher andmathematician of Altorf, where I have even demonstrated that, if bodiescontained only the passive, their different conditions would beindistinguishable. Also I take this opportunity to say that, having heardof some objections made by the gifted author of the book on_Self-knowledge_, in that same book, to my System of Pre-establishedHarmony, I sent a reply to Paris, showing that he has attributed to meopinions I am far from holding. On another matter recently I met with liketreatment at the hands of an anonymous Doctor of the Sorbonne. And thesemisconceptions would have become plain to the reader at the outset if myown words, which were being taken in evidence, had been quoted. 

This tendency of men to make mistakes in presenting the opinions of othersleads me to observe also, that when I said somewhere that man helps himselfin conversion through the succour of grace, I mean only that he derivesadvantage from it through the cessation of the resistance overcome, butwithout any cooperation on his part: just as there is no co-operation inice when it is broken. For conversion is purely the work of God's grace, wherein man co-operates only by resisting it; but human resistance is moreor less great according to the persons and the occasions. Circumstancesalso contribute more or less to our attention and to the motions that arisein the soul; and the co-operation of all these things, together with thestrength of the impression and the condition of the will, determines theoperation of grace, although not rendering it necessary. I have expoundedsufficiently elsewhere that in relation to matters of salvation [70]unregenerate man is to be considered as dead; and I greatly approve themanner wherein the theologians of the Augsburg Confession declarethemselves on this subject. Yet this corruption of unregenerate man is, itmust be added, no hindrance to his possession of true moral virtues and hisperformance of good actions in his civic life, actions which spring from agood principle, without any evil intention and without mixture of actualsin. Wherein I hope I shall be forgiven, if I have dared to diverge fromthe opinion of St. Augustine: he was doubtless a great man, of admirableintelligence, but inclined sometimes, as it seems, to exaggerate things, above all in the heat of his controversies. I greatly esteem some personswho profess to be disciples of St. Augustine, amongst others the ReverendFather Quênel, a worthy successor of the great Arnauld in the pursuit ofcontroversies that have embroiled them with the most famous of Societies. But I have found that usually in disputes between people of conspicuousmerit (of whom there are doubtless some here in both parties) there isright on both sides, although in different points, and it is rather in thematter of defence than attack, although the natural malevolence of thehuman heart generally renders attack more agreeable to the reader thandefence. I hope that the Reverend Father Ptolemei, who does his Societycredit and is occupied in filling the gaps left by the famous Bellarmine, will give us, concerning all of that, some explanations worthy of hisacumen and his knowledge, and I even dare to add, his moderation. And onemust believe that among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession therewill arise some new Chemnitz or some new Callixtus; even as one isjustified in thinking that men like Usserius or Daillé will again appearamong the Reformed, and that all will work more and more to remove themisconceptions wherewith this matter is charged. For the rest I shall bewell pleased that those who shall wish to examine it closely read theobjections with the answers I have given thereto, formulated in the smalltreatise I have placed at the end of the work by way of summary. I haveendeavoured to forestall some new objections. I have explained, forinstance, why I have taken the antecedent and consequent will aspreliminary and final, after the example of Thomas, of Scotus and others;how it is possible that there be incomparably more good in the glory of allthe saved than there is evil in the misery of all the damned, despite [71]that there are more of the latter; how, in saying that evil has beenpermitted as a _conditio sine qua non_ of good, I mean not according to theprinciple of necessity, but according to the principle of the fitness ofthings. Furthermore I show that the predetermination I admit is such asalways to predispose, but never to necessitate, and that God will notrefuse the requisite new light to those who have made a good use of thatwhich they had. Other elucidations besides I have endeavoured to give onsome difficulties which have been put before me of late. I have, moreover, followed the advice of some friends who thought it fitting that I shouldadd two appendices: the one treats of the controversy carried on betweenMr. Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall touching Freedom and Necessity, the other ofthe learned work on _The Origin of Evil_, published a short time ago inEngland. 

Finally I have endeavoured in all things to consider edification: and if Ihave conceded something to curiosity, it is because I thought it necessaryto relieve a subject whose seriousness may cause discouragement. It is withthat in view that I have introduced into this dissertation the pleasingchimera of a certain astronomical theology, having no ground forapprehension that it will ensnare anyone and deeming that to tell it andrefute it is the same thing. Fiction for fiction, instead of imagining thatthe planets were suns, one might conceive that they were masses melted inthe sun and thrown out, and that would destroy the foundation of thishypothetical theology. The ancient error of the two principles, which theOrientals distinguished by the names Oromasdes and Arimanius, caused me toexplain a conjecture on the primitive history of peoples. It appears indeedprobable that these were the names of two great contemporary princes, theone monarch of a part of upper Asia, where there have since been others ofthis name, the other king of the Scythian Celts who made incursions intothe states of the former, and who was also named amongst the divinities ofGermania. It seems, indeed, that Zoroaster used the names of these princesas symbols of the invisible powers which their exploits made them resemblein the ideas of Asiatics. Yet elsewhere, according to the accounts of Arabauthors, who in this might well be better informed than the Greeks, itappears from detailed records of ancient oriental history, that thisZerdust or Zoroaster, whom they make contemporary with the great Darius, did not look upon these two principles as completely primitive and [72]independent, but as dependent upon one supreme and single principle. Theyrelate that he believed, in conformity with the cosmogony of Moses, thatGod, who is without an equal, created all and separated the light from thedarkness; that the light conformed with his original design, but that thedarkness came as a consequence, even as the shadow follows the body, andthat this is nothing but privation. Such a thesis would clear this ancientauthor of the errors the Greeks imputed to him. His great learning causedthe Orientals to compare him with the Mercury or Hermes of the Egyptiansand Greeks; just as the northern peoples compared their Wodan or Odin tothis same Mercury. That is why Mercredi (Wednesday), or the day of Mercury, was called Wodansdag by the northern peoples, but day of Zerdust by theAsiatics, since it is named Zarschamba or Dsearschambe by the Turks and thePersians, Zerda by the Hungarians from the north-east, and Sreda by theSlavs from the heart of Great Russia, as far as the Wends of the Luneburgregion, the Slavs having learnt the name also from the Orientals. Theseobservations will perhaps not be displeasing to the curious. And I flattermyself that the small dialogue ending the Essays written to oppose M. Baylewill give some satisfaction to those who are well pleased to see difficultbut important truths set forth in an easy and familiar way. I have writtenin a foreign language at the risk of making many errors in it, because thatlanguage has been recently used by others in treating of my subject, andbecause it is more generally read by those whom one would wish to benefitby this small work. It is to be hoped that the language errors will bepardoned: they are to be attributed not only to the printer and thecopyist, but also to the haste of the author, who has been much distractedfrom his task. If, moreover, any error has crept into the ideas expressed, the author will be the first to correct it, once he has been betterinformed: he has given elsewhere such indications of his love of truth thathe hopes this declaration will not be regarded as merely an empty phrase. 

 [73] * * * * *

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH REASON

 * * * * *

1. I begin with the preliminary question of the _conformity of faith withreason_, and the use of philosophy in theology, because it has muchinfluence on the main subject of my treatise, and because M. Bayleintroduces it everywhere. I assume that two truths cannot contradict eachother; that the object of faith is the truth God has revealed in anextraordinary way; and that reason is the linking together of truths, butespecially (when it is compared with faith) of those whereto the human mindcan attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith. Thisdefinition of reason (that is to say of strict and true reason) hassurprised some persons accustomed to inveigh against reason taken in avague sense. They gave me the answer that they had never heard of any suchexplanation of it: the truth is that they have never conferred with peoplewho expressed themselves clearly on these subjects. They have confessed tome, nevertheless, that one could not find fault with reason, understood inthe sense which I gave to it. It is in the same sense that sometimes reasonis contrasted with experience. Reason, since it consists in the linkingtogether of truths, is entitled to connect also those wherewith experiencehas furnished it, in order thence to draw mixed conclusions; but reasonpure and simple, as distinct from experience, only has to do with truthsindependent of the senses. And one may compare faith with experience, sincefaith (in respect of the motives that give it justification) depends [74]upon the experience of those who have seen the miracles whereon revelationis founded, and upon the trustworthy tradition which has handed them downto us, whether through the Scriptures or by the account of those who havepreserved them. It is rather as we rely upon the experience of those whohave seen China and on the credibility of their account when we givecredence to the wonders that are told us of that distant country. Yet Iwould also take into account the inward motion of the Holy Spirit, whotakes possession of souls and persuades them and prompts them to good, thatis, to faith and to charity, without always having need of motives. 

2. Now the truths of reason are of two kinds: the one kind is of thosecalled the 'Eternal Verities', which are altogether necessary, so that theopposite implies contradiction. Such are the truths whose necessity islogical, metaphysical or geometrical, which one cannot deny without beingled into absurdities. There are others which may be called _positive_, because they are the laws which it has pleased God to give to Nature, orbecause they depend upon those. We learn them either by experience, thatis, _a posteriori_, or by reason and _a priori_, that is, by considerationsof the fitness of things which have caused their choice. This fitness ofthings has also its rules and reasons, but it is the free choice of God, and not a geometrical necessity, which causes preference for what isfitting and brings it into existence. Thus one may say that physicalnecessity is founded on moral necessity, that is, on the wise one's choicewhich is worthy of his wisdom; and that both of these ought to bedistinguished from geometrical necessity. It is this physical necessitythat makes order in Nature and lies in the rules of motion and in someother general laws which it pleased God to lay down for things when he gavethem being. It is therefore true that God gave such laws not withoutreason, for he chooses nothing from caprice and as though by chance or inpure indifference; but the general reasons of good and of order, which haveprompted him to the choice, may be overcome in some cases by strongerreasons of a superior order. 

3. Thus it is made clear that God can exempt creatures from the laws he hasprescribed for them, and produce in them that which their nature does notbear by performing a miracle. When they have risen to perfections andfaculties nobler than those whereto they can by their nature attain, theSchoolmen call this faculty an 'Obediential Power', that is to say, a [75]power which the thing acquires by obeying the command of him who can givethat which the thing has not. The Schoolmen, however, usually giveinstances of this power which to me appear impossible: they maintain, forexample, that God can give the creature the faculty to create. It may bethat there are miracles which God performs through the ministry of angels, where the laws of Nature are not violated, any more than when men assistNature by art, the skill of angels differing from ours only by degree ofperfection. Nevertheless it still remains true that the laws of Nature aresubject to be dispensed from by the Law-giver; whereas the eternalverities, as for instance those of geometry, admit no dispensation, andfaith cannot contradict them. Thus it is that there cannot be anyinvincible objection to truth. For if it is a question of proof which isfounded upon principles or incontestable facts and formed by a linkingtogether of eternal verities, the conclusion is certain and essential, andthat which is contrary to it must be false; otherwise two contradictoriesmight be true at the same time. If the objection is not conclusive, it canonly form a probable argument, which has no force against faith, since itis agreed that the Mysteries of religion are contrary to appearances. NowM. Bayle declares, in his posthumous Reply to M. Le Clerc, that he does notclaim that there are demonstrations contrary to the truths of faith: and asa result all these insuperable difficulties, these so-called wars betweenreason and faith, vanish away. 

 _Hi motus animorum atque haec discrimina tanta, _ _Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt. _

4. Protestant theologians as well as those of the Roman confession admitthe maxims which I have just laid down, when they handle the matter withattention; and all that is said against reason has no force save against akind of counterfeit reason, corrupted and deluded by false appearances. Itis the same with our notions of the justice and the goodness of God, whichare spoken of sometimes as if we had neither any idea nor any definition oftheir nature. But in that case we should have no ground for ascribing theseattributes to him, or lauding him for them. His goodness and his justice aswell as his wisdom differ from ours only because they are infinitely moreperfect. Thus the simple notions, the necessary truths and the conclusiveresults of philosophy cannot be contrary to revelation. And when some [76]philosophical maxims are rejected in theology, the reason is that they areconsidered to have only a physical or moral necessity, which speaks only ofthat which takes place usually, and is consequently founded on appearances, but which may be withheld if God so pleases. 

5. It seems, according to what I have just said, that there is often someconfusion in the expressions of those who set at variance philosophy andtheology, or faith and reason: they confuse the terms 'explain', 'comprehend', 'prove', 'uphold'. And I find that M. Bayle, shrewd as he is, is not always free from this confusion. Mysteries may be _explained_sufficiently to justify belief in them; but one cannot _comprehend_ them, nor give understanding of how they come to pass. Thus even in naturalphilosophy we explain up to a certain point sundry perceptible qualities, but in an imperfect manner, for we do not comprehend them. Nor is itpossible for us, either, to prove Mysteries by reason; for all that whichcan be proved _a priori_, or by pure reason, can be comprehended. All thatremains for us then, after having believed in the Mysteries by reason ofthe proofs of the truth of religion (which are called 'motives ofcredibility') is to be able to _uphold_ them against objections. Withoutthat our belief in them would have no firm foundation; for all that whichcan be refuted in a sound and conclusive manner cannot but be false. Andsuch proofs of the truth of religion as can give only a _moral certainty_would be balanced and even outweighed by such objections as would give an_absolute certainty_, provided they were convincing and altogetherconclusive. This little might suffice me to remove the difficultiesconcerning the use of reason and philosophy in relation to religion if onehad not to deal all too often with prejudiced persons. But as the subjectis important and it has fallen into a state of confusion, it will be wellto take it in greater detail. 

6. The question of the _conformity of faith with reason_ has always been agreat problem. In the primitive Church the ablest Christian authors adaptedthemselves to the ideas of the Platonists, which were the most acceptableto them, and were at that time most generally in favour. Little by littleAristotle took the place of Plato, when the taste for systems began toprevail, and when theology itself became more systematic, owing to thedecisions of the General Councils, which provided precise and positiveformularies. St. Augustine, Boethius and Cassiodorus in the West, and [77]St. John of Damascus in the East contributed most towards reducing theologyto scientific form, not to mention Bede, Alcuin, St. Anselm and some othertheologians versed in philosophy. Finally came the Schoolmen. The leisureof the cloisters giving full scope for speculation, which was assisted byAristotle's philosophy translated from the Arabic, there was formed at lasta compound of theology and philosophy wherein most of the questions arosefrom the trouble that was taken to reconcile faith with reason. But thishad not met with the full success hoped for, because theology had been muchcorrupted by the unhappiness of the times, by ignorance and obstinacy. Moreover, philosophy, in addition to its own faults, which were very great, found itself burdened with those of theology, which in its turn wassuffering from association with a philosophy that was very obscure and veryimperfect. One must confess, notwithstanding, with the incomparableGrotius, that there is sometimes gold hidden under the rubbish of themonks' barbarous Latin. I have therefore oft-times wished that a man oftalent, whose office had necessitated his learning the language of theSchoolmen, had chosen to extract thence whatever is of worth, and thatanother Petau or Thomasius had done in respect of the Schoolmen what thesetwo learned men have done in respect of the Fathers. It would be a verycurious work, and very important for ecclesiastical history, and it wouldcontinue the History of Dogmas up to the time of the Revival of Letters(owing to which the aspect of things has changed) and even beyond thatpoint. For sundry dogmas, such as those of physical predetermination, ofmediate knowledge, philosophical sin, objective precisions, and many otherdogmas in speculative theology and even in the practical theology of casesof conscience, came into currency even after the Council of Trent. 

7. A little before these changes, and before the great schism in the Westthat still endures, there was in Italy a sect of philosophers whichdisputed this conformity of faith with reason which I maintain. They weredubbed 'Averroists' because they were adherents of a famous Arab author, who was called the Commentator by pre-eminence, and who appeared to be theone of all his race that penetrated furthest into Aristotle's meaning. ThisCommentator, extending what Greek expositors had already taught, maintainedthat according to Aristotle, and even according to reason (and at that timethe two were considered almost identical) there was no case for the [78]immortality of the soul. Here is his reasoning. The human kind is eternal, according to Aristotle, therefore if individual souls die not, one mustresort to the metempsychosis rejected by that philosopher. Or, if there arealways new souls, one must admit the infinity of these souls existing fromall eternity; but actual infinity is impossible, according to the doctrineof the same Aristotle. Therefore it is a necessary conclusion that thesouls, that is, the forms of organic bodies, must perish with the bodies, or at least this must happen to the passive understanding that belongs toeach one individually. Thus there will only remain the active understandingcommon to all men, which according to Aristotle comes from outside, andwhich must work wheresoever the organs are suitably disposed; even as thewind produces a kind of music when it is blown into properly adjusted organpipes. 

8. Nothing could have been weaker than this would-be proof. It is not truethat Aristotle refuted metempsychosis, or that he proved the eternity ofthe human kind; and after all, it is quite untrue that an actual infinityis impossible. Yet this proof passed as irresistible amongst Aristotelians, and induced in them the belief that there was a certain sublunaryintelligence and that our active intellect was produced by participation init. But others who adhered less to Aristotle went so far as to advocate auniversal soul forming the ocean of all individual souls, and believed thisuniversal soul alone capable of subsisting, whilst individual souls areborn and die. According to this opinion the souls of animals are born bybeing separated like drops from their ocean, when they find a body whichthey can animate; and they die by being reunited to the ocean of souls whenthe body is destroyed, as streams are lost in the sea. Many even went sofar as to believe that God is that universal soul, although others thoughtthat this soul was subordinate and created. This bad doctrine is veryancient and apt to dazzle the common herd. It is expressed in thesebeautiful lines of Vergil (_Aen. _, VI, v. 724):

 _Principio coelum ac terram camposque liquentes, _ _Lucentemque globum Lunae Titaniaque astra, _ _Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus_ _Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. _ _Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum. _

 [79]And again elsewhere (_Georg. _, IV, v. 221):

 _Deum namque ire per omnes_ _Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum:_ _Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum, _ _Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas. _ _Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri. _

9. Plato's Soul of the World has been taken in this sense by some, butthere is more indication that the Stoics succumbed to that universal soulwhich swallows all the rest. Those who are of this opinion might be called'Monopsychites', since according to them there is in reality only one soulthat subsists. M. Bernier observes that this is an opinion almostuniversally accepted amongst scholars in Persia and in the States of theGrand Mogul; it appears even that it has gained a footing with theCabalists and with the mystics. A certain German of Swabian birth, converted to Judaism some years ago, who taught under the name MosesGermanus, having adopted the dogmas of Spinoza, believed that Spinozarevived the ancient Cabala of the Hebrews. And a learned man who confutedthis proselyte Jew appears to be of the same opinion. It is known thatSpinoza recognizes only substance in the world, whereof individual soulsare but transient modifications. Valentin Weigel, Pastor of Zschopau inSaxony, a man of wit, even of excessive wit, although people would have itthat he was a visionary, was perhaps to some extent of that opinion; as wasalso a man known as Johann Angelus Silesius, author of certain quitepleasing little devotional verses in German, in the form of epigrams, whichhave just been reprinted. In general, the mystics' doctrine of deificationwas liable to such a sinister interpretation. Gerson already has writtenopposing Ruysbroek, a mystical writer, whose intention was evidently goodand whose expressions are excusable. But it would be better to write in amanner that has no need of excuses: although I confess that oft-timesexpressions which are extravagant, and as it were poetical, have greaterforce to move and to persuade than correct forms of statement. 

10. The annihilation of all that belongs to us in our own right, carried togreat lengths by the Quietists, might equally well be veiled irreligion incertain minds, as is related, for example, concerning the Quietism of Foë, originator of a great Chinese sect. After having preached his religion [80]for forty years, when he felt death was approaching, he declared to hisdisciples that he had hidden the truth from them under the veil ofmetaphors, and that all reduced itself to Nothingness, which he said wasthe first source of all things. That was still worse, so it would seem, than the opinion of the Averroists. Both of these doctrines areindefensible and even extravagant; nevertheless some moderns have made nodifficulty about adopting this one and universal Soul that engulfs therest. It has met with only too much applause amongst the so-calledfreethinkers, and M. De Preissac, a soldier and man of wit, who dabbled inphilosophy, at one time aired it publicly in his discourses. The System ofPre-established Harmony is the one best qualified to cure this evil. For itshows that there are of necessity substances which are simple and withoutextension, scattered throughout all Nature; that these substances mustsubsist independently of every other except God; and that they are neverwholly separated from organic body. Those who believe that souls capable offeeling but incapable of reason are mortal, or who maintain that none butreasoning souls can have feeling, offer a handle to the Monopsychites. Forit will ever be difficult to persuade men that beasts feel nothing; andonce the admission has been made that that which is capable of feeling candie, it is difficult to found upon reason a proof of the immortality of oursouls. 

11. I have made this short digression because it appeared to me seasonableat a time when there is only too much tendency to overthrow naturalreligion to its very foundations. I return then to the Averroists, who werepersuaded that their dogma was proved conclusively in accordance withreason. As a result they declared that man's soul is, according tophilosophy, mortal, while they protested their acquiescence in Christiantheology, which declares the soul's immortality. But this distinction washeld suspect, and this divorce between faith and reason was vehementlyrejected by the prelates and the doctors of that time, and condemned in thelast Lateran Council under Leo X. On that occasion also, scholars wereurged to work for the removal of the difficulties that appeared to settheology and philosophy at variance. The doctrine of their incompatibilitycontinued to hold its ground _incognito_. Pomponazzi was suspected of it, although he declared himself otherwise; and that very sect of theAverroists survived as a school. It is thought that Caesar Cremoninus, [81]a philosopher famous in his time, was one of its mainstays. AndreasCisalpinus, a physician (and an author of merit who came nearest afterMichael Servetus to the discovery of the circulation of the blood), wasaccused by Nicolas Taurel (in a book entitled _Alpes Caesae_) of belongingto these anti-religious Peripatetics. Traces of this doctrine are foundalso in the _Circulus Pisanus Claudii Berigardi_, an author of Frenchnationality who migrated to Italy and taught philosophy at Pisa: butespecially the writings and the letters of Gabriel Naudé, as well as the_Naudaeana_, show that Averroism still lived on when this learned physicianwas in Italy. Corpuscular philosophy, introduced shortly after, appears tohave extinguished this excessively Peripatetic sect, or perhaps to havebeen intermixed with its teaching. It may be indeed that there have beenAtomists who would be inclined to teach dogmas like those of theAverroists, if circumstances so permitted: but this abuse cannot harm suchgood as there is in Corpuscular philosophy, which can very well be combinedwith all that is sound in Plato and in Aristotle, and bring them both intoharmony with true theology. 

12. The Reformers, and especially Luther, as I have already observed, spokesometimes as if they rejected philosophy, and deemed it inimical to faith. But, properly speaking, Luther understood by philosophy only that which isin conformity with the ordinary course of Nature, or perhaps evenphilosophy as it was taught in the schools. Thus for example he says thatit is impossible in philosophy, that is, in the order of Nature, that theword be made flesh; and he goes so far as to maintain that what is true innatural philosophy might be false in ethics. Aristotle was the object ofhis anger; and so far back as the year 1516 he contemplated the purging ofphilosophy, when he perhaps had as yet no thoughts of reforming the Church. But at last he curbed his vehemence and in the _Apology for the AugsburgConfession_ allowed a favourable mention of Aristotle and his _Ethics_. Melanchthon, a man of sound and moderate ideas, made little systems fromthe several parts of philosophy, adapted to the truths of revelation anduseful in civic life, which deserve to be read even now. After him, Pierrede la Ramée entered the lists. His philosophy was much in favour: the sectof the Ramists was powerful in Germany, gaining many adherents among theProtestants, and even concerning itself with theology, until the revival ofCorpuscular philosophy, which caused that of Ramée to fall into [82]oblivion and weakened the authority of the Peripatetics. 

13. Meanwhile sundry Protestant theologians, deviating as far as they couldfrom Scholastic philosophy, which prevailed in the opposite party, went sofar as to despise philosophy itself, which to them was suspect. Thecontroversy blazed up finally owing to the rancour of Daniel Hoffmann. Hewas an able theologian, who had previously gained a reputation at theConference of Quedlinburg, when Tilemann Heshusius and he had supportedDuke Julius of Brunswick in his refusal to accept the Formula of Concord. For some reason or other Dr. Hoffmann flew into a passion with philosophy, instead of being content to find fault with the wrong uses made thereof byphilosophers. He was, however, aiming at the famous Caselius, a manesteemed by the princes and scholars of his time; and Henry Julius, Duke ofBrunswick (son of Julius, founder of the University), having taken thetrouble himself to investigate the matter, condemned the theologian. Therehave been some small disputes of the kind since, but it has always beenfound that they were misunderstandings. Paul Slevogt, a famous Professor atJena in Thuringia, whose still extant treatises prove how well versed hewas in Scholastic philosophy, as also in Hebrew literature, had publishedin his youth under the title of _Pervigilium_ a little book 'de dissidioTheologi et Philosophi in utriusque principiis fundato', bearing on thequestion whether God is accidentally the cause of sin. But it was easy tosee that his aim was to demonstrate that theologians sometimes misusephilosophical terms. 

14. To come now to the events of my own time, I remember that when in 1666Louis Meyer, a physician of Amsterdam, published anonymously the bookentitled _Philosophia Scripturae Interpres_ (by many persons wronglyattributed to Spinoza, his friend) the theologians of Holland bestirredthemselves, and their written attacks upon this book gave rise to greatdisputes among them. Divers of them held the opinion that the Cartesians, in confuting the anonymous philosopher, had conceded too much tophilosophy. Jean de Labadie (before he had seceded from the ReformedChurch, his pretext being some abuses which he said had crept into publicobservance and which he considered intolerable) attacked the book by Herrvon Wollzogen, and called it pernicious. On the other hand Herr Vogelsang, Herr van der Weye and some other anti-Cocceïans also assailed the same [83]book with much acrimony. But the accused won his case in a Synod. Afterwards in Holland people spoke of 'rational' and 'non-rational'theologians, a party distinction often mentioned by M. Bayle, who finallydeclared himself against the former. But there is no indication that anyprecise rules have yet been defined which the rival parties accept orreject with regard to the use of reason in the interpretation of HolyScripture. 

15. A like dispute has threatened of late to disturb the peace in theChurches of the Augsburg Confession. Some Masters of Arts in the Universityof Leipzig gave private lessons at their homes, to students who sought themout in order to learn what is called 'Sacra Philologia', according to thepractice of this university and of some others where this kind of study isnot restricted to the Faculty of Theology. These masters pressed the studyof the Holy Scriptures and the practice of piety further than their fellowshad been wont to do. It is alleged that they had carried certain things toexcess, and aroused suspicions of certain doctrinal innovations. Thiscaused them to be dubbed 'Pietists', as though they were a new sect; andthis name is one which has since caused a great stir in Germany. It hasbeen applied somehow or other to those whom one suspected, or pretended tosuspect, of fanaticism, or even of hypocrisy, concealed under somesemblance of reform. Now some of the students attending these masters hadbecome conspicuous for behaviour which gave general offence, and amongstother things for their scorn of philosophy, even, so it was said, burningtheir notebooks. In consequence the belief arose that their mastersrejected philosophy: but they justified themselves very well; nor couldthey be convicted either of this error or of the heresies that were beingimputed to them. 

16. The question of the use of philosophy in theology was debated muchamongst Christians, and difficulty was experienced over settling the limitsof its use when it came to detailed consideration. The Mysteries of theTrinity, of the Incarnation and of the Holy Communion gave most occasionfor dispute. The new Photinians, disputing the first two Mysteries, madeuse of certain philosophic maxims which Andreas Kessler, a theologian ofthe Augsburg Confession, summarized in the various treatises that hepublished on the parts of the Socinian philosophy. But as to theirmetaphysics, one might instruct oneself better therein by reading the [84]work of Christopher Stegmann the Socinian. It is not yet in print; but Isaw it in my youth and it has been recently again in my hands. 

17. Calovius and Scherzer, authors well versed in Scholastic philosophy, and sundry other able theologians answered the Socinians at great length, and often with success: for they would not content themselves with thegeneral and somewhat cavalier answers that were commonly used against thatsect. The drift of such answers was: that their maxims were good inphilosophy and not in theology; that it was the fault of heterogeneousnesscalled [Greek: metábasis eis állo génos] to apply those maxims to a mattertranscending reason; and that philosophy should be treated as a servant andnot a mistress in relation to theology, according to the title of the bookby a Scot named Robert Baronius, _Philosophia Theologiae ancillans_. Infine, philosophy was a Hagar beside Sara and must be driven from the housewith her Ishmael when she was refractory. There is something good in theseanswers: but one might abuse them, and set natural truths and truths ofrevelation at variance. Scholars therefore applied themselves todistinguishing between what is necessary and indispensable in natural orphilosophic truths and that which is not so. 

18. The two Protestant parties are tolerably in agreement when it is aquestion of making war on the Socinians; and as the philosophy of thesesectaries is not of the most exact, in most cases the attack succeeded inreducing it. But the Protestants themselves had dissensions on the matterof the Eucharistic Sacrament. A section of those who are called Reformed(namely those who on that point follow rather Zwingli than Calvin) seemedto reduce the participation in the body of Jesus Christ in the HolyCommunion to a mere figurative representation, employing the maxim of thephilosophers which states that a body can only be in one place at a time. Contrariwise the Evangelicals (who name themselves thus in a particularsense to distinguish themselves from the Reformed), being more attached tothe literal sense of Scripture, opined with Luther that this participationwas real, and that here there lay a supernatural Mystery. They reject, intruth, the dogma of Transubstantiation, which they believe to be withoutfoundation in the Text; neither do they approve that of Consubstantiationor of Impanation, which one could only impute to them if one wereill-informed on their opinion. For they admit no inclusion of the body [85]of Jesus Christ in the bread, nor do they even require any union of the onewith the other: but they demand at least a concomitance, so that these twosubstances be received both at the same time. They believe that theordinary sense of the words of Jesus Christ on an occasion so important asthat which concerned the expression of his last wishes ought to bepreserved. Thus in order to show that this sense is free from all absurditywhich could make it repugnant to us, they maintain that the philosophicmaxim restricting the existence of, and partaking in, bodies to one placealone is simply a consequence of the ordinary course of Nature. They makethat no obstacle to the presence, in the ordinary sense of the word, of thebody of our Saviour in such form as may be in keeping with the mostglorified body. They do not resort to a vague diffusion of ubiquity, whichwould disperse the body and leave it nowhere in particular; nor do theyadmit the multiple-reduplication theory of some Schoolmen, as if to say oneand the same body could be at the same time seated here and standingelsewhere. In fine, they so express themselves that many consider theopinion of Calvin, authorized by sundry confessions of faith from theChurches that have accepted his teaching, to be not so far removed from theAugsburg Confession as one might think: for he affirmed a partaking in thesubstance. The divergence rests perhaps only upon the fact that Calvindemands true faith in addition to the oral reception of the symbols, andconsequently excludes the unworthy. 

19. Thence we see that the dogma of real and substantial participation canbe supported (without resorting to the strange opinions of some Schoolmen)by a properly understood analogy between _immediate operation_ and_presence_. Many philosophers have deemed that, even in the order ofNature, a body may operate from a distance immediately on many remotebodies at the same time. So do they believe, all the more, that nothing canprevent divine Omnipotence from causing one body to be present in manybodies together, since the transition from immediate operation to presenceis but slight, the one perhaps depending upon the other. It is true thatmodern philosophers for some time now have denied the immediate naturaloperation of one body upon another remote from it, and I confess that I amof their opinion. Meanwhile remote operation has just been revived inEngland by the admirable Mr. Newton, who maintains that it is the nature ofbodies to be attracted and gravitate one towards another, in proportion[86]to the mass of each one, and the rays of attraction it receives. Accordingly the famous Mr. Locke, in his answer to Bishop Stillingfleet, declares that having seen Mr. Newton's book he retracts what he himselfsaid, following the opinion of the moderns, in his _Essay concerning HumanUnderstanding_, to wit, that a body cannot operate immediately upon anotherexcept by touching it upon its surface and driving it by its motion. Heacknowledges that God can put properties into matter which cause it tooperate from a distance. Thus the theologians of the Augsburg Confessionclaim that God may ordain not only that a body operate immediately ondivers bodies remote from one another, but that it even exist in theirneighbourhood and be received by them in a way with which distances ofplace and dimensions of space have nothing to do. Although this effecttranscends the forces of Nature, they do not think it possible to show thatit surpasses the power of the Author of Nature. For him it is easy to annulthe laws that he has given or to dispense with them as seems good to him, in the same way as he was able to make iron float upon water and to staythe operation of fire upon the human body. 

20. I found in comparing the _Rationale Theologicum_ of Nicolaus Vedeliuswith the refutation by Johann Musaeus that these two authors, of whom onedied while a Professor at Franecker after having taught at Geneva and theother finally became the foremost theologian at Jena, are more or less inagreement on the principal rules for the use of reason, but that it is inthe application of these rules they disagree. For they both agree thatrevelation cannot be contrary to the truths whose necessity is called byphilosophers 'logical' or 'metaphysical', that is to say, whose oppositeimplies contradiction. They both admit also that revelation will be able tocombat maxims whose necessity is called 'physical' and is founded only uponthe laws that the will of God has prescribed for Nature. Thus the questionwhether the presence of one and the same body in divers places is possiblein the supernatural order only touches the application of the rule; and inorder to decide this question conclusively by reason, one must needsexplain exactly wherein the essence of body consists. Even the Reformeddisagree thereon amongst themselves; the Cartesians confine it toextension, but their adversaries oppose that; and I think I have evenobserved that Gisbertus Voëtius, a famous theologian of Utrecht, [87]doubted the alleged impossibility of plurality of locations. 

21. Furthermore, although the two Protestant parties agree that one mustdistinguish these two necessities which I have just indicated, namelymetaphysical necessity and physical necessity, and that the first excludesexceptions even in the case of Mysteries, they are not yet sufficientlyagreed upon the rules of interpretation, which serve to determine in whatcases it is permitted to desert the letter of Scripture when one is notcertain that it is contrary to strictly universal truths. It is agreed thatthere are cases where one must reject a literal interpretation that is notabsolutely impossible, when it is otherwise unsuitable. For instance, allcommentators agree that when our Lord said that Herod was a fox he meant itmetaphorically; and one must accept that, unless one imagine with somefanatics that for the time the words of our Lord lasted Herod was actuallychanged into a fox. But it is not the same with the texts on whichMysteries are founded, where the theologians of the Augsburg Confessiondeem that one must keep to the literal sense. Since, moreover, thisdiscussion belongs to the art of interpretation and not to that which isthe proper sphere of logic, we will not here enter thereon, especially asit has nothing in common with the disputes that have arisen recently uponthe conformity of faith with reason. 

22. Theologians of all parties, I believe (fanatics alone excepted), agreeat least that no article of faith must imply contradiction or contraveneproofs as exact as those of mathematics, where the opposite of theconclusion can be reduced _ad absurdum_, that is, to contradiction. St. Athanasius with good reason made sport of the preposterous ideas of somewriters of his time, who maintained that God had suffered without anysuffering. _'Passus est impassibiliter. O ludicram doctrinam aedificantemsimul et demolientem!'_ It follows thence that certain writers have beentoo ready to grant that the Holy Trinity is contrary to that greatprinciple which states that two things which are the same as a third arealso the same as each other: that is to say, if A is the same as B, and ifC is the same as B, then A and C must also be the same as each other. Forthis principle is a direct consequence of that of contradiction, and formsthe basis of all logic; and if it ceases, we can no longer reason withcertainty. Thus when one says that the Father is God, that the Son is Godand that the Holy Spirit is God, and that nevertheless there is only [88]one God, although these three Persons differ from one another, one mustconsider that this word _God_ has not the same sense at the beginning as atthe end of this statement. Indeed it signifies now the Divine Substance andnow a Person of the Godhead. In general, one must take care never toabandon the necessary and eternal truths for the sake of upholdingMysteries, lest the enemies of religion seize upon such an occasion fordecrying both religion and Mysteries. 

23. The distinction which is generally drawn between that which is _above_reason and that which is _against_ reason is tolerably in accord with thedistinction which has just been made between the two kinds of necessity. For what is contrary to reason is contrary to the absolutely certain andinevitable truths; and what is above reason is in opposition only to whatone is wont to experience or to understand. That is why I am surprised thatthere are people of intelligence who dispute this distinction, and that M. Bayle should be of this number. The distinction is assuredly very wellfounded. A truth is above reason when our mind (or even every created mind)cannot comprehend it. Such is, as it seems to me, the Holy Trinity; suchare the miracles reserved for God alone, as for instance Creation; such isthe choice of the order of the universe, which depends upon universalharmony, and upon the clear knowledge of an infinity of things at once. Buta truth can never be contrary to reason, and once a dogma has been disputedand refuted by reason, instead of its being incomprehensible, one may saythat nothing is easier to understand, nor more obvious, than its absurdity. For I observed at the beginning that by REASON here I do not mean theopinions and discourses of men, nor even the habit they have formed ofjudging things according to the usual course of Nature, but rather theinviolable linking together of truths. 

24. I must come now to the great question which M. Bayle brought uprecently, to wit, whether a truth, and especially a truth of faith, canprove to be subject to irrefutable objections. This excellent authorappears to answer with a bold affirmative: he quotes theologians of reputein his party, and even in the Church of Rome, who appear to say the same ashe affirms; and he cites philosophers who have believed that there are evenphilosophical truths whose champions cannot answer the objections that arebrought up against them. He believes that the theological doctrine of [89]predestination is of this nature, and in philosophy that of the compositionof the _Continuum_. These are, indeed, the two labyrinths which have everexercised theologians and philosophers. Libertus Fromondus, a theologian ofLouvain (a great friend of Jansenius, whose posthumous book entitled_Augustinus_ he in fact published), who also wrote a book entitledexplicitly _Labyrinthus de Compositione Continui_, experienced in fullmeasure the difficulties inherent in both doctrines; and the renownedOchino admirably presented what he calls 'the labyrinths ofpredestination'. 

25. But these writers have not denied the possibility of finding thread inthe labyrinth; they have recognized the difficulty, but they have surelynot turned difficulty into sheer impossibility. As for me, I confess that Icannot agree with those who maintain that a truth can admit of irrefutableobjections: for is an _objection_ anything but an argument whose conclusioncontradicts our thesis? And is not an irrefutable argument a_demonstration_? And how can one know the certainty of demonstrationsexcept by examining the argument in detail, the form and the matter, inorder to see if the form is good, and then if each premiss is eitheradmitted or proved by another argument of like force, until one is able tomake do with admitted premisses alone? Now if there is such an objectionagainst our thesis we must say that the falsity of this thesis isdemonstrated, and that it is impossible for us to have reasons sufficientto prove it; otherwise two contradictories would be true at once. One mustalways yield to proofs, whether they be proposed in positive form oradvanced in the shape of objections. And it is wrong and fruitless to tryto weaken opponents' proofs, under the pretext that they are onlyobjections, since the opponent can play the same game and can reverse thedenominations, exalting his arguments by naming them 'proofs' and sinkingours under the blighting title of 'objections'. 

26. It is another question whether we are always obliged to examine theobjections we may have to face, and to retain some doubt in respect of ourown opinion, or what is called _formido oppositi_, until this examinationhas been made. I would venture to say no, for otherwise one would neverattain to certainty and our conclusion would be always provisional. Ibelieve that able geometricians will scarce be troubled by the objectionsof Joseph Scaliger against Archimedes, or by those of Mr. Hobbes [90]against Euclid; but that is because they have fully understood and are sureof the proofs. Nevertheless it is sometimes well to show oneself ready toexamine certain objections. On the one hand it may serve to rescue peoplefrom their error, while on the other we ourselves may profit by it; forspecious fallacies often contain some useful solution and bring about theremoval of considerable difficulties. That is why I have always likedingenious objections made against my own opinions, and I have neverexamined them without profit: witness those which M. Bayle formerly madeagainst my System of Pre-established Harmony, not to mention those which M. Arnauld, M. L'Abbé Foucher and Father Lami, O. S. B. , made to me on the samesubject. But to return to the principal question, I conclude from reasons Ihave just set forth that when an objection is put forward against sometruth, it is always possible to answer it satisfactorily. 

27. It may be also that M. Bayle does not mean 'insoluble objections' inthe sense that I have just explained. I observe that he varies, at least inhis expressions: for in his posthumous Reply to M. Le Clerc he does notadmit that one can bring demonstrations against the truths of faith. Itappears therefore that he takes the objections to be insoluble only inrespect of our present degree of enlightenment; and in this Reply, p. 35, he even does not despair of the possibility that one day a solutionhitherto unknown may be found by someone. Concerning that more will be saidlater. I hold an opinion, however, that will perchance cause surprise, namely that this solution has been discovered entire, and is not evenparticularly difficult. Indeed a mediocre intelligence capable ofsufficient care, and using correctly the rules of common logic, is in aposition to answer the most embarrassing objection made against truth, whenthe objection is only taken from reason, and when it is claimed to be a'demonstration'. Whatever scorn the generality of moderns have to-day forthe logic of Aristotle, one must acknowledge that it teaches infallibleways of resisting error in these conjunctures. For one has only to examinethe argument according to the rules and it will always be possible to seewhether it is lacking in form or whether there are premisses such as arenot yet proved by a good argument. 

28. It is quite another matter when there is only a question of_probabilities_, for the art of judging from probable reasons is not yetwell established; so that our logic in this connexion is still very [91]imperfect, and to this very day we have little beyond the art of judgingfrom demonstrations. But this art is sufficient here: for when it is aquestion of opposing reason to an article of our faith, one is notdisturbed by objections that only attain probability. Everyone agrees thatappearances are against Mysteries, and that they are by no means probablewhen regarded only from the standpoint of reason; but it suffices that theyhave in them nothing of absurdity. Thus demonstrations are required if theyare to be refuted. 

29. And doubtless we are so to understand it when Holy Scripture warns usthat the wisdom of God is foolishness before men, and when St. Paulobserved that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is foolishness unto the Greeks, aswell as unto the Jews a stumbling-block. For, after all, one truth cannotcontradict another, and the light of reason is no less a gift of God thanthat of revelation. Also it is a matter of no difficulty among theologianswho are expert in their profession, that the motives of credibilityjustify, once for all, the authority of Holy Scripture before the tribunalof reason, so that reason in consequence gives way before it, as before anew light, and sacrifices thereto all its probabilities. It is more or lessas if a new president sent by the prince must show his letters patent inthe assembly where he is afterwards to preside. That is the tendency ofsundry good books that we have on the truth of religion, such as those ofAugustinus Steuchus, of Du Plessis-Mornay or of Grotius: for the truereligion must needs have marks that the false religions have not, elsewould Zoroaster, Brahma, Somonacodom and Mahomet be as worthy of belief asMoses and Jesus Christ. Nevertheless divine faith itself, when it iskindled in the soul, is something more than an opinion, and depends notupon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth; it advancesbeyond the intellect, and takes possession of the will and of the heart, tomake us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of God commands. Then we haveno further need to think of reasons or to pause over the difficulties ofargument which the mind may anticipate. 

30. Thus what we have just said of human reason, which is extolled anddecried by turns, and often without rule or measure, may show our lack ofexactitude and how much we are accessary to our own errors. Nothing wouldbe so easy to terminate as these disputes on the rights of faith and ofreason if men would make use of the commonest rules of logic and reason[92]with even a modicum of attention. Instead of that, they become involved inoblique and ambiguous phrases, which give them a fine field fordeclamation, to make the most of their wit and their learning. It wouldseem, indeed, that they have no wish to see the naked truth, peradventurebecause they fear that it may be more disagreeable than error: for theyknow not the beauty of the Author of all things, who is the source oftruth. 

31. This negligence is a general defect of humanity, and one not to be laidto the charge of any particular person. _Abundamus dulcibus vitiis_, asQuintilian said of the style of Seneca, and we take pleasure in goingastray. Exactitude incommodes us and rules we regard as puerilities. Thusit is that common logic (although it is more or less sufficient for theexamination of arguments that tend towards certainty) is relegated toschoolboys; and there is not even a thought for a kind of logic whichshould determine the balance between probabilities, and would be sonecessary in deliberations of importance. So true is it that our mistakesfor the most part come from scorn or lack of the art of thinking: fornothing is more imperfect than our logic when we pass beyond necessaryarguments. The most excellent philosophers of our time, such as the authorsof _The Art of Thinking_, of _The Search for Truth_ and of the _Essayconcerning Human Understanding_, have been very far from indicating to usthe true means fitted to assist the faculty whose business it is to make usweigh the probabilities of the true and the false: not to mention the artof discovery, in which success is still more difficult of attainment, andwhereof we have nothing beyond very imperfect samples in mathematics. 

32. One thing which might have contributed most towards M. Bayle's beliefthat the difficulties of reason in opposition to faith cannot be obviatedis that he seems to demand that God be justified in some such manner asthat commonly used for pleading the cause of a man accused before hisjudge. But he has not remembered that in the tribunals of men, which cannotalways penetrate to the truth, one is often compelled to be guided by signsand probabilities, and above all by presumptions or prejudices; whereas itis agreed, as we have already observed, that Mysteries are not probable. For instance, M. Bayle will not have it that one can justify the goodnessof God in the permission of sin, because probability would be against a manthat should happen to be in circumstances comparable in our eyes to [93]this permission. God foresees that Eve will be deceived by the serpent ifhe places her in the circumstances wherein she later found herself; andnevertheless he placed her there. Now if a father or a guardian did thesame in regard to his child or his ward, if a friend did so in regard to ayoung person whose behaviour was his concern, the judge would not besatisfied by the excuses of an advocate who said that the man onlypermitted the evil, without doing it or willing it: he would rather takethis permission as a sign of ill intention, and would regard it as a sin ofomission, which would render the one convicted thereof accessary inanother's sin of commission. 

33. But it must be borne in mind that when one has foreseen the evil andhas not prevented it although it seems as if one could have done so withease, and one has even done things that have facilitated it, it does notfollow on that account _necessarily_ that one is accessary thereto. It isonly a very strong presumption, such as commonly replaces truth in humanaffairs, but which would be destroyed by an exact consideration of thefacts, supposing we were capable of that in relation to God. For amongstlawyers that is called 'presumption' which must provisionally pass fortruth in case the contrary is not proved; and it says more than'conjecture', although the _Dictionary_ of the Academy has not sifted thedifference. Now there is every reason to conclude unquestionably that onewould find through this consideration, if only it were attainable, thatreasons most just, and stronger than those which appear contrary to them, have compelled the All-Wise to permit the evil, and even to do things whichhave facilitated it. Of this some instances will be given later. 

34. It is none too easy, I confess, for a father, a guardian, a friend tohave such reasons in the case under consideration. Yet the thing is notabsolutely impossible, and a skilled writer of fiction might perchance findan extraordinary case that would even justify a man in the circumstances Ihave just indicated. But in reference to God there is no need to suppose orto establish particular reasons such as may have induced him to permit theevil; general reasons suffice. One knows that he takes care of the wholeuniverse, whereof all the parts are connected; and one must thence inferthat he has had innumerable considerations whose result made him deem itinadvisable to prevent certain evils. 

35. It should even be concluded that there must have been great or [94]rather invincible reasons which prompted the divine Wisdom to thepermission of the evil that surprises us, from the mere fact that thispermission has occurred: for nothing can come from God that is notaltogether consistent with goodness, justice and holiness. Thus we canjudge by the event (or _a posteriori_) that the permission wasindispensable, although it be not possible for us to show this (_a priori_)by the detailed reasons that God can have had therefor; as it is notnecessary either that we show this to justify him. M. Bayle himself aptlysays concerning that (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 165, p. 1067): Sin made its way into the world; God therefore was ableto permit it without detriment to his perfections; _ab actu ad potentiamvalet consequentia. _ In God this conclusion holds good: he did this, therefore he did it well. It is not, then, that we have no notion ofjustice in general fit to be applied also to God's justice; nor is it thatGod's justice has other rules than the justice known of men, but that thecase in question is quite different from those which are common among men. Universal right is the same for God and for men; but the question of factis quite different in their case and his. 

36. We may even assume or pretend (as I have already observed) that thereis something similar among men to this circumstance in God's actions. A manmight give such great and strong proofs of his virtue and his holiness thatall the most apparent reasons one could put forward against him to chargehim with an alleged crime, for instance a larceny or murder, would deserveto be rejected as the calumnies of false witnesses or as an extraordinaryplay of chance which sometimes throws suspicion on the most innocent. Thusin a case where every other would run the risk of being condemned or put tothe torture (according to the laws of the country), this man would beabsolved by his judges unanimously. Now in this case, which indeed is rare, but which is not impossible, one might say in a sense (_sano sensu_) thatthere is a conflict between reason and faith, and that the rules of law areother in respect of this person than they are in respect of the remainderof mankind. But that, when explained, will signify only that appearances ofreason here give way before the faith that is due to the word and theintegrity of this great and holy man, and that he is privileged above othermen; not indeed as if there were one law for others and another for him, nor as if one had no understanding of what justice is in relation to him. It is rather because the rules of universal justice do not find here [95]the application that they receive elsewhere, or because they favour himinstead of accusing him, since there are in this personage qualities soadmirable, that by virtue of a good logic of probabilities one should placemore faith in his word than in that of many others. 

37. Since it is permitted here to imagine possible cases, may one notsuppose this incomparable man to be the Adept or the Possessor of

 _'that blessed Stone_ _Able to enrich all earthly Kings alone'_

and that he spends every day prodigious sums in order to feed and to rescuefrom distress countless numbers of poor men? Be there never so manywitnesses or appearances of every kind tending to prove that this greatbenefactor of the human race has just committed some larceny, is it nottrue that the whole earth would make mock of the accusation, howeverspecious it might be? Now God is infinitely above the goodness and thepower of this man, and consequently there are no reasons at all, howeverapparent they be, that can hold good against faith, that is, against theassurance or the confidence in God wherewith we can and ought to say thatGod has done all things well. The objections are therefore not insoluble. They only involve prejudices and probabilities, which are, however, overthrown by reasons incomparably stronger. One must not say either thatwhat we call _justice_ is nothing in relation to God, that he is theabsolute Master of all things even to the point of being able to condemnthe innocent without violating his justice, or finally that justice issomething arbitrary where he is concerned. Those are rash and dangerousexpressions, whereunto some have been led astray to the discredit of theattributes of God. For if such were the case there would be no reason forpraising his goodness and his justice: rather would it be as if the mostwicked spirit, the Prince of evil genii, the evil principle of theManichaeans, were the sole master of the universe, just as I observedbefore. What means would there be of distinguishing the true God from thefalse God of Zoroaster if all things depended upon the caprice of anarbitrary power and there were neither rule nor consideration for anythingwhatever?

38. It is therefore more than evident that nothing compels us to commitourselves to a doctrine so strange, since it suffices to say that we [96]have not enough knowledge of the facts when there is a question ofanswering probabilities which appear to throw doubt upon the justice andthe goodness of God, and which would vanish away if the facts were wellknown to us. We need neither renounce reason in order to listen to faithnor blind ourselves in order to see clearly, as Queen Christine used tosay: it is enough to reject ordinary appearances when they are contrary toMysteries; and this is not contrary to reason, since even in natural thingswe are very often undeceived about appearances either by experience or bysuperior reasons. All that has been set down here in advance, only with theobject of showing more plainly wherein the fault of the objections and theabuse of reason consists in the present case, where the claim is made thatreason has greatest force against faith: we shall come afterwards to a moreexact discussion of that which concerns the origin of evil and thepermission of sin with its consequences. 

39. For now, it will be well to continue our examination of the importantquestion of the use of reason in theology, and to make reflexions upon whatM. Bayle has said thereon in divers passages of his works. As he paidparticular attention in his _Historical and Critical Dictionary_ toexpounding the objections of the Manichaeans and those of the Pyrrhonians, and as this procedure had been criticized by some persons zealous forreligion, he placed a dissertation at the end of the second edition of this_Dictionary_, which aimed at showing, by examples, by authorities and byreasons, the innocence and usefulness of his course of action. I ampersuaded (as I have said above) that the specious objections one can urgeagainst truth are very useful, and that they serve to confirm and toillumine it, giving opportunity to intelligent persons to find new openingsor to turn the old to better account. But M. Bayle seeks therein ausefulness quite the reverse of this: it would be that of displaying thepower of faith by showing that the truths it teaches cannot sustain theattacks of reason and that it nevertheless holds its own in the heart ofthe faithful. M. Nicole seems to call that 'the triumph of God's authorityover human reason', in the words of his quoted by M. Bayle in the thirdvolume of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (ch. 177, p. 120). But since reason is a gift of God, even as faith is, contention betweenthem would cause God to contend against God; and if the objections ofreason against any article of faith are insoluble, then it must be saidthat this alleged article will be false and not revealed: this will be [97]a chimera of the human mind, and the triumph of this faith will be capableof comparison with bonfires lighted after a defeat. Such is the doctrine ofthe damnation of unbaptized children, which M. Nicole would have us assumeto be a consequence of original sin; such would be the eternal damnation ofadults lacking the light that is necessary for the attainment of salvation. 

40. Yet everyone need not enter into theological discussions; and personswhose condition allows not of exact researches should be content withinstruction on faith, without being disturbed by the objections; and ifsome exceeding great difficulty should happen to strike them, it ispermitted to them to avert the mind from it, offering to God a sacrifice oftheir curiosity: for when one is assured of a truth one has no need tolisten to the objections. As there are many people whose faith is rathersmall and shallow to withstand such dangerous tests, I think one must notpresent them with that which might be poisonous for them; or, if one cannothide from them what is only too public, the antidote must be added to it;that is to say, one must try to add the answer to the objection, certainlynot withhold it as unobtainable. 

41. The passages from the excellent theologians who speak of this triumphof faith can and should receive a meaning appropriate to the principles Ihave just affirmed. There appear in some objects of faith two greatqualities capable of making it triumph over reason, the one is_incomprehensibility_, the other is _the lack of probability_. But one mustbeware of adding thereto the third quality whereof M. Bayle speaks, and ofsaying that what one believes is _indefensible_: for that would be to causereason in its turn to triumph in a manner that would destroy faith. Incomprehensibility does not prevent us from believing even natural truths. For instance (as I have already pointed out) we do not comprehend thenature of odours and savours, and yet we are persuaded, by a kind of faithwhich we owe to the evidence of the senses, that these perceptiblequalities are founded upon the nature of things and that they are notillusions. 

42. There are also things contrary to appearances, which we admit when theyare sufficiently verified. There is a little romance of Spanish origin, whose title states that one must not always believe what one sees. What wasthere more specious than the lie of the false Martin Guerre, who wasacknowledged as the true Martin by the true Martin's wife and [98]relatives, and caused the judges and the relatives to waver for a long timeeven after the arrival of the other? Nevertheless the truth was known inthe end. It is the same with faith. I have already observed that all onecan oppose to the goodness and the justice of God is nothing butappearances, which would be strong against a man, but which are nullifiedwhen they are applied to God and when they are weighed against the proofsthat assure us of the infinite perfection of his attributes. Thus faithtriumphs over false reasons by means of sound and superior reasons thathave made us embrace it; but it would not triumph if the contrary opinionhad for it reasons as strong as or even stronger than those which form thefoundation of faith, that is, if there were invincible and conclusiveobjections against faith. 

43. It is well also to observe here that what M. Bayle calls a 'triumph offaith' is in part a triumph of demonstrative reason against apparent anddeceptive reasons which are improperly set against the demonstrations. Forit must be taken into consideration that the objections of the Manichaeansare hardly less contrary to natural theology than to revealed theology. Andsupposing one surrendered to them Holy Scripture, original sin, the graceof God in Jesus Christ, the pains of hell and the other articles of ourreligion, one would not even so be delivered from their objections: for onecannot deny that there is in the world physical evil (that is, suffering)and moral evil (that is, crime) and even that physical evil is not alwaysdistributed here on earth according to the proportion of moral evil, as itseems that justice demands. There remains, then, this question of naturaltheology, how a sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, hasbeen able to admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it couldresolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy?

44. Now we have no need of revealed faith to know that there is such a solePrinciple of all things, entirely good and wise. Reason teaches us this byinfallible proofs; and in consequence all the objections taken from thecourse of things, in which we observe imperfections, are only based onfalse appearances. For, if we were capable of understanding the universalharmony, we should see that what we are tempted to find fault with isconnected with the plan most worthy of being chosen; in a word, we _shouldsee_, and should not _believe_ only, that what God has done is the best. Icall 'seeing' here what one knows _a priori_ by the causes; and [99]'believing' what one only judges by the effects, even though the one be ascertainly known as the other. And one can apply here too the saying of St. Paul (2 Cor. V. 7), that we walk by _faith_ and not by _sight_. For theinfinite wisdom of God being known to us, we conclude that the evils weexperience had to be permitted, and this we conclude from the effect or _aposteriori_, that is to say, because they exist. It is what M. Bayleacknowledges; and he ought to content himself with that, and not claim thatone must put an end to the false appearances which are contrary thereto. Itis as if one asked that there should be no more dreams or opticalillusions. 

45. And it is not to be doubted that this faith and this confidence in God, who gives us insight into his infinite goodness and prepares us for hislove, in spite of the appearances of harshness that may repel us, are anadmirable exercise for the virtues of Christian theology, when the divinegrace in Jesus Christ arouses these motions within us. That is what Lutheraptly observed in opposition to Erasmus, saying that it is love in thehighest degree to love him who to flesh and blood appears so unlovable, soharsh toward the unfortunate and so ready to condemn, and to condemn forevils in which he appears to be the cause or accessary, at least in theeyes of those who allow themselves to be dazzled by false reasons. One maytherefore say that the triumph of true reason illumined by divine grace isat the same time the triumph of faith and love. 

46. M. Bayle appears to have taken the matter quite otherwise: he declareshimself against reason, when he might have been content to censure itsabuse. He quotes the words of Cotta in Cicero, where he goes so far as tosay that if reason were a gift of the gods providence would be to blame forhaving given it, since it tends to our harm. M. Bayle also thinks thathuman reason is a source of destruction and not of edification (_Historicaland Critical Dictionary_, p. 2026, col. 2), that it is a runner who knowsnot where to stop, and who, like another Penelope, herself destroys her ownwork. 

 _Destruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis. _

(_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p. 725). But he takespains especially to pile up many authorities one upon the other, in orderto show that theologians of all parties reject the use of reason just as hedoes, and that they call attention to such gleams of reason as opposereligion only that they may sacrifice them to faith by a mere [100]repudiation, answering nothing but the conclusion of the argument that isbrought against them. He begins with the New Testament. Jesus Christ wascontent to say: 'Follow Me' (Luke v. 27; ix. 59). The Apostles said:'Believe, and thou shalt be saved' (Acts xvi. 3). St. Paul acknowledgesthat his 'doctrine is obscure' (1 Cor. Xiii. 12), that 'one can comprehendnothing therein' unless God impart a spiritual discernment, and withoutthat it only passes for foolishness (1 Cor. Ii. 14). He exhorts thefaithful 'to beware of philosophy' (Col. Ii. 8) and to avoid disputationsin that science, which had caused many persons to lose faith. 

47. As for the Fathers of the Church, M. Bayle refers us to the collectionof passages from them against the use of philosophy and of reason which M. De Launoy made (_De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna, _ cap. 2) and especially tothe passages from St. Augustine collected by M. Arnauld (against Mallet), which state: that the judgements of God are inscrutable; that they are notany the less just for that they are unknown to us; that it is a deep abyss, which one cannot fathom without running the risk of falling down theprecipice; that one cannot without temerity try to elucidate that which Godwilled to keep hidden; that his will cannot but be just; that many men, having tried to explain this incomprehensible depth, have fallen into vainimaginations and opinions full of error and bewilderment. 

48. The Schoolmen have spoken in like manner. M. Bayle quotes a beautifulpassage from Cardinal Cajetan (Part I, _Summ. _, qu. 22, art. 4) to thiseffect: 'Our mind', he says, 'rests not upon the evidence of known truthbut upon the impenetrable depth of hidden truth. And as St. Gregory says:He who believes touching the Divinity only that which he can gauge with hismind belittles the idea of God. Yet I do not surmise that it is necessaryto deny any of the things which we know, or which we see as appertaining tothe immutability, the actuality, the certainty, the universality, etc. , ofGod: but I think that there is here some secret, either in regard to therelation which exists between God and the event, or in respect of whatconnects the event itself with his prevision. Thus, reflecting that theunderstanding of our soul is the eye of the owl, I find the soul's reposeonly in ignorance. For it is better both for the Catholic Faith and forPhilosophic Faith to confess our blindness, than to affirm as evident whatdoes not afford our mind the contentment which self-evidence gives. I donot accuse of presumption, on that account, all the learned men who [101]stammeringly have endeavoured to suggest, as far as in them lay, theimmobility and the sovereign and eternal efficacy of the understanding, ofthe will and of the power of God, through the infallibility of divineelection and divine relation to all events. Nothing of all that interfereswith my surmise that there is some depth which is hidden from us. ' Thispassage of Cajetan is all the more notable since he was an author competentto reach the heart of the matter. 

49. Luther's book against Erasmus is full of vigorous comments hostile tothose who desire to submit revealed truths to the tribunal of our reason. Calvin often speaks in the same tone, against the inquisitive daring ofthose who seek to penetrate into the counsels of God. He declares in histreatise on predestination that God had just causes for damning some men, but causes unknown to us. Finally M. Bayle quotes sundry modern writers whohave spoken to the same effect (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 161 et seq. ). 

50. But all these expressions and innumerable others like them do not provethat the objections opposed to faith are so insoluble as M. Bayle supposes. It is true that the counsels of God are inscrutable, but there is noinvincible objection which tends to the conclusion that they are unjust. What appears injustice on the part of God, and foolishness in our faith, only appears so. The famous passage of Tertullian (_De Carne Christi_), 'mortuus est Dei filius, credibile est, quia ineptum est; et sepultusrevixit, certum est, quia impossibile', is a sally that can only be meantto concern appearances of absurdity. There are others like them in Luther'sbook on _Freewill in Bondage_, as when he says (ch. 174): 'Si placet tibiDeus indignos coronans, non debet displicere immeritos damnans. ' Whichbeing reduced to more temperate phrasing, means: If you approve that Godgive eternal glory to those who are not better than the rest, you shouldnot disapprove that he abandon those who are not worse than the rest. Andto judge that he speaks only of appearances of injustice, one only has toweigh these words of the same author taken from the same book: 'In all therest', he says, 'we recognize in God a supreme majesty; there is onlyjustice that we dare to question: and we will not believe provisionally[tantisper] that he is just, albeit he has promised us that the time shallcome when his glory being revealed all men shall see clearly that he hasbeen and that he is just. '

 [102]51. It will be found also that when the Fathers entered into a discussionthey did not simply reject reason. And, in disputations with the pagans, they endeavour usually to show how paganism is contrary to reason, and howthe Christian religion has the better of it on that side also. Origenshowed Celsus how reasonable Christianity is and why, notwithstanding, themajority of Christians should believe without examination. Celsus hadjeered at the behaviour of Christians, 'who, willing', he said, 'neither tolisten to your reasons nor to give you any for what they believe, arecontent to say to you: Examine not, only believe, or: Your faith will saveyou; and they hold this as a maxim, that the wisdom of the world is anevil. '

52. Origen gives the answer of a wise man, and in conformity with theprinciples we have established in the matter. For reason, far from beingcontrary to Christianity, serves as a foundation for this religion, andwill bring about its acceptance by those who can achieve the examination ofit. But, as few people are capable of this, the heavenly gift of plainfaith tending towards good suffices for men in general. 'If it werepossible', he says, 'for all men, neglecting the affairs of life, to applythemselves to study and meditation, one need seek no other way to make themaccept the Christian religion. For, to say nothing likely to offend anyone'(he insinuates that the pagan religion is absurd, but he will not say soexplicitly), 'there will be found therein no less exactitude thanelsewhere, whether in the discussion of its dogmas, or in the elucidationof the enigmatical expressions of its prophets, or in the interpretation ofthe parables of its gospels and of countless other things happening orordained symbolically. But since neither the necessities of life nor theinfirmities of men permit of this application to study, save for a verysmall number of persons, what means could one find more qualified tobenefit everyone else in the world than those Jesus Christ wished to beused for the conversion of the nations? And I would fain ask with regard tothe great number of those who believe, and who thereby have withdrawnthemselves from the quagmire of vices wherein before they were plunged, which would be the better: to have thus changed one's morals and reformedone's life, believing without examination that there are punishments forsin and rewards for good actions; or to have waited for one's conversionuntil one not only believed but had examined with care the foundations ofthese dogmas? It is certain that, were this method to be followed, few[103]indeed would reach that point whither they are led by their plain andsimple faith, but the majority would remain in their corruption. '

53. M. Bayle (in his explanation concerning the objections of theManichaeans, placed at the end of the second edition of the _Dictionary_)takes those words where Origen points out that religion can stand the testof having her dogmas discussed, as if it were not meant in relation tophilosophy, but only in relation to the accuracy wherewith the authorityand the true meaning of Holy Scripture is established. But there is nothingto indicate this restriction. Origen wrote against a philosopher whom sucha restriction would not have suited. And it appears that this Father wishedto point out that among Christians there was no less exactitude than amongthe Stoics and some other philosophers, who established their doctrine asmuch by reason as by authorities, as, for example, Chrysippus did, whofound his philosophy even in the symbols of pagan antiquity. 

54. Celsus brings up still another objection to the Christians, in the sameplace. 'If they withdraw', he says, 'regularly into their "Examine not, only believe", they must tell me at least what are the things they wish meto believe. ' Therein he is doubtless right, and that tells against thosewho would say that God is good and just, and who yet would maintain that wehave no notion of goodness and of justice when we attribute theseperfections to him. But one must not always demand what I call 'adequatenotions', involving nothing that is not explained, since even perceptiblequalities, like heat, light, sweetness, cannot give us such notions. Thuswe agreed that Mysteries should receive an explanation, but thisexplanation is imperfect. It suffices for us to have some analogicalunderstanding of a Mystery such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, to theend that in accepting them we pronounce not words altogether devoid ofmeaning: but it is not necessary that the explanation go as far as we wouldwish, that is, to the extent of comprehension and to the _how_. 

55. It appears strange therefore that M. Bayle rejects the tribunal of_common notions_ (in the third volume of his _Reply to the Questions of aProvincial_, pp. 1062 and 1140) as if one should not consult the idea ofgoodness in answering the Manichaeans; whereas he had declared himselfquite differently in his _Dictionary_. Of necessity there must be agreementupon the meaning of _good_ and _bad_, amongst those who are in dispute[104]over the question whether there is only one principle, altogether good, orwhether there are two, the one good and the other bad. We understandsomething by union when we are told of the union of one body with anotheror of a substance with its accident, of a subject with its adjunct, of theplace with the moving body, of the act with the potency; we also meansomething when we speak of the union of the soul with the body to makethereof one single person. For albeit I do not hold that the soul changesthe laws of the body, or that the body changes the laws of the soul, and Ihave introduced the Pre-established Harmony to avoid this derangement, Inevertheless admit a true union between the soul and the body, which makesthereof a suppositum. This union belongs to the metaphysical, whereas aunion of influence would belong to the physical. But when we speak of theunion of the Word of God with human nature we should be content with ananalogical knowledge, such as the comparison of the union of the soul withthe body is capable of giving us. We should, moreover, be content to saythat the Incarnation is the closest union that can exist between theCreator and the creature; and further we should not want to go. 

56. It is the same with the other Mysteries, where moderate minds will everfind an explanation sufficient for belief, but never such as would benecessary for understanding. A certain _what it is_ ([Greek: ti esti]) isenough for us, but the _how_ ([Greek: pôs]) is beyond us, and is notnecessary for us. One may say concerning the explanations of Mysterieswhich are given out here and there, what the Queen of Sweden inscribed upona medal concerning the crown she had abandoned, 'Non mi bisogna, e non mibasta. ' Nor have we any need either (as I have already observed) to provethe Mysteries _a priori_, or to give a reason for them; it suffices us_that the thing is thus_ ([Greek: to hoti]) even though we know not the_why_ ([Greek: to dioti]), which God has reserved for himself. These lines, written on that theme by Joseph Scaliger, are beautiful and renowned:

 _Ne curiosus quaere causas omnium, _ _Quaecumque libris vis Prophetarum indidit_ _Afflata caelo, plena veraci Deo:_ _Nec operta sacri supparo silentii_ _Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter praeteri. _ [Page 105] _Nescire velle, quae Magister optimus_ _Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est. _

M. Bayle, who quotes them (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, p. 1055), holds the likely opinion that Scaliger made them upon thedisputes between Arminius and Gomarus. I think M. Bayle repeated them frommemory, for he put _sacrata_ instead of _afflata_. But it is apparently theprinter's fault that _prudenter_ stands in place of _pudenter_ (that is, modestly) which the metre requires. 

57. Nothing can be more judicious than the warning these lines contain; andM. Bayle is right in saying (p. 729) that those who claim that thebehaviour of God with respect to sin and the consequences of sin containsnothing but what they can account for, deliver themselves up to the mercyof their adversary. But he is not right in combining here two verydifferent things, 'to account for a thing', and 'to uphold it againstobjections'; as he does when he presently adds: 'They are obliged to followhim [their adversary] everywhere whither he shall wish to lead them, and itwould be to retire ignominiously and ask for quarter, if they were to admitthat our intelligence is too weak to remove completely all the objectionsadvanced by a philosopher. '

58. It seems here that, according to M. Bayle, 'accounting for' comes shortof 'answering objections', since he threatens one who should undertake thefirst with the resulting obligation to pass on to the second. But it isquite the opposite: he who maintains a thesis (the _respondens_) is notbound to account for it, but he is bound to meet the objections of anopponent. A defendant in law is not bound (as a general rule) to prove hisright or to produce his title to possession; but he is obliged to reply tothe arguments of the plaintiff. I have marvelled many times that a writerso precise and so shrewd as M. Bayle so often here confuses things where somuch difference exists as between these three acts of reason: tocomprehend, to prove, and to answer objections; as if when it is a questionof the use of reason in theology one term were as good as another. Thus hesays in his posthumous Conversations, p. 73: 'There is no principle whichM. Bayle has more often inculcated than this, that the incomprehensibilityof a dogma and the insolubility of the objections that oppose it provide nolegitimate reason for rejecting it. ' This is true as regards theincomprehensibility, but it is not the same with the insolubility. And itis indeed just as if one said that an invincible reason against a [106]thesis was not a legitimate reason for rejecting it. For what otherlegitimate reason for rejecting an opinion can one find, if an invincibleopposing argument is not such an one? And what means shall one havethereafter of demonstrating the falsity, and even the absurdity, of anyopinion?

59. It is well to observe also that he who proves a thing _a priori_accounts for it through the efficient cause; and whosoever can thus accountfor it in a precise and adequate manner is also in a position to comprehendthe thing. Therefore it was that the Scholastic theologians had alreadycensured Raymond Lully for having undertaken to demonstrate the Trinity byphilosophy. This so-called demonstration is to be found in his _Works_; andBartholomaeus Keckermann, a writer renowned in the Reformed party, havingmade an attempt of just the same kind upon the same Mystery, has been noless censured for it by some modern theologians. Therefore censure willfall upon those who shall wish to account for this Mystery and make itcomprehensible, but praise will be given to those who shall toil to upholdit against the objections of adversaries. 

60. I have said already that theologians usually distinguish between whatis above reason and what is against reason. They place _above_ reason thatwhich one cannot comprehend and which one cannot account for. But _against_reason will be all opinion that is opposed by invincible reasons, or thecontrary of which can be proved in a precise and sound manner. They avow, therefore, that the Mysteries are above reason, but they do not admit thatthey are contrary to it. The English author of a book which is ingenious, but has met with disapproval, entitled _Christianity not Mysterious_, wished to combat this distinction; but it does not seem to me that he hasat all weakened it. M. Bayle also is not quite satisfied with this accepteddistinction. This is what he says on the matter (vol. III of the _Reply tothe Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 158). Firstly (p. 998) hedistinguishes, together with M. Saurin, between these two theses: the one, _all the dogmas of Christianity are in conformity with reason_; the other, _human reason knows that they are in conformity with reason_. He affirmsthe first and denies the second. I am of the same opinion, if in saying'that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that it is possible to accountfor it or to explain its _how_ by reason; for God could doubtless do so, and we cannot. But I think that one must affirm both theses if by [107]'knowing that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that we candemonstrate, if need be, that there is no contradiction between this dogmaand reason, repudiating the objections of those who maintain that thisdogma is an absurdity. 

61. M. Bayle explains himself here in a manner not at all convincing. Heacknowledges fully that our Mysteries are in accordance with the supremeand universal reason that is in the divine understanding, or with reason ingeneral; yet he denies that they are in accordance with that part of reasonwhich man employs to judge things. But this portion of reason which wepossess is a gift of God, and consists in the natural light that hasremained with us in the midst of corruption; thus it is in accordance withthe whole, and it differs from that which is in God only as a drop of waterdiffers from the ocean or rather as the finite from the infinite. ThereforeMysteries may transcend it, but they cannot be contrary to it. One cannotbe contrary to one part without being contrary to the whole. That whichcontradicts a proposition of Euclid is contrary to the _Elements_ ofEuclid. That which in us is contrary to the Mysteries is not reason nor isit the natural light or the linking together of truths; it is corruption, or error, or prejudice, or darkness. 

62. M. Bayle (p. 1002) is not satisfied with the opinion of Josua Stegmanand of M. Turretin, Protestant theologians who teach that the Mysteries arecontrary only to corrupt reason. He asks, mockingly, whether by rightreason is meant perchance that of an orthodox theologian and by corruptreason that of an heretic; and he urges the objection that the evidence ofthe Mystery of the Trinity was no greater in the soul of Luther than in thesoul of Socinius. But as M. Descartes has well observed, good sense isdistributed to all: thus one must believe that both the orthodox andheretics are endowed therewith. Right reason is a linking together oftruths, corrupt reason is mixed with prejudices and passions. And in orderto discriminate between the two, one need but proceed in good order, admitno thesis without proof, and admit no proof unless it be in proper form, according to the commonest rules of logic. One needs neither any othercriterion nor other arbitrator in questions of reason. It is only throughlack of this consideration that a handle has been given to the sceptics, and that even in theology François Véron and some others, who [108]exacerbated the dispute with the Protestants, even to the point ofdishonesty, plunged headlong into scepticism in order to prove thenecessity of accepting an infallible external judge. Their course meetswith no approval from the most expert, even in their own party: Calixtusand Daillé derided it as it deserved, and Bellarmine argued quiteotherwise. 

63. Now let us come to what M. Bayle says (p. 999) on the distinction weare concerned with. 'It seems to me', he says, 'that an ambiguity has creptinto the celebrated distinction drawn between things that are above reasonand things that are against reason. The Mysteries of the Gospel are abovereason, so it is usually said, but they are not contrary to reason. I thinkthat the same sense is not given to the word reason in the first part ofthis axiom as in the second: by the first is understood rather the reasonof man, or reason _in concreto_ and by the second reason in general, orreason _in abstracto_. For supposing that it is understood always as reasonin general or the supreme reason, the universal reason that is in God, itis equally true that the Mysteries of the Gospels are not above reason andthat they are not against reason. But if in both parts of the axiom humanreason is meant, I do not clearly see the soundness of the distinction: forthe most orthodox confess that we know not how our Mysteries can conform tothe maxims of philosophy. It seems to us, therefore, that they are not inconformity with our reason. Now that which appears to us not to be inconformity with our reason appears contrary to our reason, just as thatwhich appears to us not in conformity with truth appears contrary to truth. Thus why should not one say, equally, that the Mysteries are against ourfeeble reason, and that they are above our feeble reason?' I answer, as Ihave done already, that 'reason' here is the linking together of the truthsthat we know by the light of nature, and in this sense the axiom is trueand without any ambiguity. The Mysteries transcend our reason, since theycontain truths that are not comprised in this sequence; but they are notcontrary to our reason, and they do not contradict any of the truthswhereto this sequence can lead us. Accordingly there is no question here ofthe universal reason that is in God, but of our reason. As for the questionwhether we know the Mysteries to conform with our reason, I answer that atleast we never know of any non-conformity or any opposition between theMysteries and reason. Moreover, we can always abolish such alleged [109]opposition, and so, if this can be called reconciling or harmonizing faithwith reason, or recognizing the conformity between them, it must be saidthat we can recognize this conformity and this harmony. But if theconformity consists in a reasonable explanation of the _how_, we cannotrecognize it. 

64. M. Bayle makes one more ingenious objection, which he draws from theexample of the sense of sight. 'When a square tower', he says, 'from adistance appears to us round, our eyes testify very clearly not only thatthey perceive nothing square in this tower, but also that they discoverthere a round shape, incompatible with the square shape. One may thereforesay that the truth which is the square shape is not only above, but evenagainst, the witness of our feeble sight. ' It must be admitted that thisobservation is correct, and although it be true that the appearance ofroundness comes simply from the effacement of the angles, which distancecauses to disappear, it is true, notwithstanding, that the round and thesquare are opposites. Therefore my answer to this objection is that therepresentation of the senses, even when they do all that in them lies, isoften contrary to the truth; but it is not the same with the faculty ofreasoning, when it does its duty, since a strictly reasoned argument isnothing but a linking together of truths. And as for the sense of sight inparticular, it is well to consider that there are yet other falseappearances which come not from the 'feebleness of our eyes' nor from theloss of visibility brought about by distance, but from the very _nature ofvision_, however perfect it be. It is thus, for instance, that the circleseen sideways is changed into that kind of oval which among geometriciansis known as an ellipse, and sometimes even into a parabola or a hyperbola, or actually into a straight line, witness the ring of Saturn. 

65. The _external_ senses, properly speaking, do not deceive us. It is ourinner sense which often makes us go too fast. That occurs also in brutebeasts, as when a dog barks at his reflexion in the mirror: for beasts have_consecutions_ of perception which resemble reasoning, and which occur alsoin the inner sense of men, when their actions have only an empiricalquality. But beasts do nothing which compels us to believe that they havewhat deserves to be properly called a _reasoning_ sense, as I have shownelsewhere. Now when the understanding uses and follows the false decisionof the inner sense (as when the famous Galileo thought that Saturn had[110]two handles) it is deceived by the judgement it makes upon the effect ofappearances, and it infers from them more than they imply. For theappearances of the senses do not promise us absolutely the truth of things, any more than dreams do. It is we who deceive ourselves by the use we makeof them, that is, by our consecutions. Indeed we allow ourselves to bedeluded by probable arguments, and we are inclined to think that phenomenasuch as we have found linked together often are so always. Thus, as ithappens usually that that which appears without angles has none, we readilybelieve it to be always thus. Such an error is pardonable, and sometimesinevitable, when it is necessary to act promptly and choose that whichappearances recommend; but when we have the leisure and the time to collectour thoughts, we are in fault if we take for certain that which is not so. It is therefore true that appearances are often contrary to truth, but ourreasoning never is when it proceeds strictly in accordance with the rulesof the art of reasoning. If by _reason_ one meant generally the faculty ofreasoning whether well or ill, I confess that it might deceive us, and doesindeed deceive us, and the appearances of our understanding are often asdeceptive as those of the senses: but here it is a question of the linkingtogether of truths and of objections in due form, and in this sense it isimpossible for reason to deceive us. 

66. Thus it may be seen from all I have just said that M. Bayle carries toofar _the being above reason_, as if it included the insoluble nature ofobjections: for according to him (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 130, p. 651) 'once a dogma is above reason, philosophy canneither explain it nor comprehend it, nor meet the difficulties that areurged against it'. I agree with regard to comprehension, but I have alreadyshown that the Mysteries receive a necessary verbal explanation, to the endthat the terms employed be not _sine mente soni_, words signifying nothing. I have shown also that it is necessary for one to be capable of answeringthe objections, and that otherwise one must needs reject the thesis. 

67. He adduces the authority of theologians, who appear to recognize theinsoluble nature of the objections against the Mysteries. Luther is one ofthe chief of these; but I have already replied, in § 12, to the passagewhere he seems to say that philosophy contradicts theology. There isanother passage (_De Servo Arbitrio_, ch. 246) where he says that theapparent injustice of God is proved by arguments taken from the [111]adversity of good people and the prosperity of the wicked, an argumentirresistible both for all reason and for natural intelligence ('Argumentistalibus traducta, quibus nulla ratio aut lumen naturae potest resistere'). But soon afterwards he shows that he means it only of those who knownothing of the life to come, since he adds that an expression in the Gospeldissipates this difficulty, teaching us that there is another life, wherethat which has not been punished and rewarded in this life shall receiveits due. The objection is then far from being insuperable, and even withoutthe aid of the Gospel one could bethink oneself of this answer. There isalso quoted (_Reply_, vol. III, p. 652) a passage from Martin Chemnitz, criticized by Vedelius and defended by Johann Musaeus, where this famoustheologian seems to say clearly that there are truths in the word of Godwhich are not only above reason but also against reason. But this passagemust be taken as referring only to the principles of reason that are inaccordance with the order of Nature, as Musaeus also interprets it. 

68. It is true nevertheless that M. Bayle finds some authorities who aremore favourable to him, M. Descartes being one of the chief. This great mansays positively (Part I of his _Principles_, art. 41) 'that we shall havenot the slightest trouble in ridding ourselves of the difficulty' (whichone may have in harmonizing the freedom of our will with the order of theeternal providence of God) 'if we observe that our thought is finite, andthat the Knowledge and the Omnipotence of God, whereby he has not onlyknown from all eternity all that which is or which can be, but also haswilled it, is infinite. We have therefore quite enough intelligence torecognize clearly and distinctly that this knowledge and this power are inGod; but we have not enough so to comprehend their scope that we can knowhow they leave the actions of men entirely free and undetermined. Yet thePower and the Knowledge of God must not prevent us from believing that wehave a free will; for we should be wrong to doubt of that whereof we areinwardly conscious, and which we know by experience to be within us, simplybecause we do not comprehend some other thing which we know to beincomprehensible in its nature. '

69. This passage from M. Descartes, followed by his adherents (who rarelythink of doubting what he asserts), has always appeared strange to me. Notcontent with saying that, as for him, he sees no way of reconciling [112]the two dogmas, he puts the whole human race, and even all rationalcreatures, in the same case. Yet could he have been unaware that there isno possibility of an insuperable objection against truth? For such anobjection could only be a necessary linking together of other truths whoseresult would be contrary to the truth that one maintains; and consequentlythere would be contradiction between the truths, which would be an utterabsurdity. Moreover, albeit our mind is finite and cannot comprehend theinfinite, of the infinite nevertheless it has proofs whose strength orweakness it comprehends; why then should it not have the same comprehensionin regard to the objections? And since the power and the wisdom of God areinfinite and comprehend everything, there is no pretext for doubting theirscope. Further, M. Descartes demands a freedom which is not needed, by hisinsistence that the actions of the will of man are altogether undetermined, a thing which never happens. Finally, M. Bayle himself maintains that thisexperience or this inward sense of our independence, upon which M. Descartes founds the proof of our freedom, does not prove it: for from thefact that we are not conscious of the causes whereon we depend, it does notfollow, according to M. Bayle, that we are independent. But that issomething we will speak of in its proper place. 

70. It seems that M. Descartes confesses also, in a passage of his_Principles_, that it is impossible to find an answer to the difficultieson the division of matter to infinity, which he nevertheless recognizes asactual. Arriaga and other Schoolmen make well-nigh the same confession: butif they took the trouble to give to the objections the form these ought tohave, they would see that there are faults in the reasoning, and sometimesfalse assumptions which cause confusion. Here is an example. A man of partsone day brought up to me an objection in the following form: Let thestraight line BA be cut in two equal parts at the point C, and the part CAat the point D, and the part DA at the point E, and so on to infinity; allthe halves, BC, CD, DE, etc. , together make the whole BA; therefore theremust be a last half, since the straight line BA finishes at A. But thislast half is absurd: for since it is a line, it will be possible again tocut it in two. Therefore division to infinity cannot be admitted. But Ipointed out to him that one is not justified in the inference that theremust be a last half, although there be a last point A, for this last pointbelongs to all the halves of its side. And my friend acknowledged it [113]himself when he endeavoured to prove this deduction by a formal argument;on the contrary, just because the division goes on to infinity, there is nolast half. And although the straight line AB be finite, it does not followthat the process of dividing it has any final end. The same confusionarises with the series of numbers going on to infinity. One imagines afinal end, a number that is infinite, or infinitely small; but that is allsimple fiction. Every number is finite and specific; every line is solikewise, and the infinite or infinitely small signify only magnitudes thatone may take as great or as small as one wishes, to show that an error issmaller than that which has been specified, that is to say, that there isno error; or else by the infinitely small is meant the state of a magnitudeat its vanishing point or its beginning, conceived after the pattern ofmagnitudes already actualized. 

71. It will, however, be well to consider the argument that M. Bayle putsforward to show that one cannot refute the objections which reason opposesto the Mysteries. It is in his comment on the Manichaeans (p. 3140 of thesecond edition of his _Dictionary_). 'It is enough for me', he says, 'thatit be unanimously acknowledged that the Mysteries of the Gospel are abovereason. For thence comes the necessary conclusion that it is impossible tosettle the difficulties raised by the philosophers, and in consequence thata dispute where only the light of Nature is followed will always endunfavourably for the theologians, and that they will see themselves forcedto give way and to take refuge in the canon of the supernatural light. ' Iam surprised that M. Bayle speaks in such general terms, since he hasacknowledged himself that the light of Nature is against the Manichaeans, and for the oneness of the Principle, and that the goodness of God isproved incontrovertibly by reason. Yet this is how he continues:

72. 'It is evident that reason can never attain to that which is above it. Now if it could supply answers to the objections which are opposed to thedogma of the Trinity and that of hypostatic union, it would attain to thosetwo Mysteries, it would have them in subjection and submit them to thestrictest examination by comparison with its first principles, or with theaphorisms that spring from common notions, and proceed until finally it haddrawn the conclusion that they are in accordance with natural light. Itwould therefore do what exceeds its powers, it would soar above its [114]confines, and that is a formal contradiction. One must therefore say thatit cannot provide answers to its own objections, and that thus they remainvictorious, so long as one does not have recourse to the authority of Godand to the necessity of subjugating one's understanding to the obedience offaith. ' I do not find that there is any force in this reasoning. We canattain to that which is above us not by penetrating it but by maintainingit; as we can attain to the sky by sight, and not by touch. Nor is itnecessary that, in order to answer the objections which are made againstthe Mysteries, one should have them in subjection to oneself, and submitthem to examination by comparison with the first principles that springfrom common notions. For if he who answers the objections had to go so far, he who proposes the objections needs must do it first. It is the part ofthe objection to open up the subject, and it is enough for him who answersto say Yes or No. He is not obliged to counter with a distinction: it willdo, in case of need, if he denies the universality of some proposition inthe objection or criticizes its form, and one may do both these thingswithout penetrating beyond the objection. When someone offers me a proofwhich he maintains is invincible, I can keep silence while I compel himmerely to prove in due form all the enunciations that he brings forward, and such as appear to me in the slightest degree doubtful. For the purposeof doubting only, I need not at all probe to the heart of the matter; onthe contrary, the more ignorant I am the more shall I be justified indoubting. M. Bayle continues thus:

73. 'Let us endeavour to clarify that. If some doctrines are above reasonthey are beyond its reach, it cannot attain to them; if it cannot attain tothem, it cannot comprehend them. ' (He could have begun here with the'comprehend', saying that reason cannot comprehend that which is above it. )'If it cannot comprehend them, it can find in them no idea' (_Non valetconsequentia_: for, to 'comprehend' something, it is not enough that onehave some ideas thereof; one must have all the ideas of everything thatgoes to make it up, and all these ideas must be clear, distinct, _adequate_. There are a thousand objects in Nature in which we understandsomething, but which we do not therefore necessarily comprehend. We havesome ideas on the rays of light, we demonstrate upon them up to a certainpoint; but there ever remains something which makes us confess that we donot yet comprehend the whole nature of light. ) 'nor any principle such[115]as may give rise to a solution;' (Why should not evident principles befound mingled with obscure and confused knowledge?) 'and consequently theobjections that reason has made will remain unanswered;' (By no means; thedifficulty is rather on the side of the opposer. It is for him to seek anevident principle such as may give rise to some objection; and the moreobscure the subject, the more trouble he will have in finding such aprinciple. Moreover, when he has found it he will have still more troublein demonstrating an opposition between the principle and the Mystery: for, if it happened that the Mystery was evidently contrary to an evidentprinciple, it would not be an obscure Mystery, it would be a manifestabsurdity. ) 'or what is the same thing, answer will be made with somedistinction as obscure as the very thesis that will have been attacked. '(One can do without distinctions, if need be, by denying either somepremiss or some conclusion; and when one is doubtful of the meaning of someterm used by the opposer one may demand of him its definition. Thus thedefender has no need to incommode himself when it is a question ofanswering an adversary who claims that he is offering us an invincibleproof. But even supposing that the defender, perchance being kindlydisposed, or for the sake of brevity, or because he feels himself strongenough, should himself vouchsafe to show the ambiguity concealed in theobjection, and to remove it by making some distinction, this distinctionneed not of necessity lead to anything clearer than the first thesis, sincethe defender is not obliged to elucidate the Mystery itself. )

74. 'Now it is certain', so M. Bayle continues, 'that an objection which isfounded on distinct notions remains equally victorious, whether you give toit no answer, or you make an answer where none can comprehend anything. Canthe contest be equal between a man who alleges in objection to you thatwhich you and he very clearly conceive, and you, who can only defendyourself by answers wherein neither of you understands anything?' (It isnot enough that the objection be founded on quite distinct notions, it isnecessary also that one apply it in contradiction of the thesis. And when Ianswer someone by denying some premiss, in order to compel him to prove it, or some conclusion, to compel him to put it in good form, it cannot be saidthat I answer nothing or that I answer nothing intelligible. For as it isthe doubtful premiss of the adversary that I deny, my denial will be [116]as intelligible as his affirmation. Finally, when I am so obliging as toexplain myself by means of some distinction, it suffices that the terms Iemploy have some meaning, as in the Mystery itself. Thus something in myanswer will be comprehended: but one need not of necessity comprehend allthat it involves; otherwise one would comprehend the Mystery also. )

75. M. Bayle continues thus: 'Every philosophical dispute assumes that thedisputant parties agree on certain definitions' (This would be desirable, but usually it is only in the dispute itself that one reaches such a point, if the necessity arises. ) 'and that they admit the rules of Syllogisms, andthe signs for the recognition of bad arguments. After that everything liesin the investigation as to whether a thesis conforms mediately orimmediately to the principles one is agreed upon' (which is done by meansof the syllogisms of him who makes objections); 'whether the premisses of aproof (advanced by the opposer) 'are true; whether the conclusion isproperly drawn; whether a four-term Syllogism has been employed; whethersome aphorism of the chapter _de oppositis_ or _de sophisticis elenchis_, etc. , has not been violated. ' (It is enough, putting it briefly, to denysome premiss or some conclusion, or finally to explain or get explainedsome ambiguous term. ) 'One comes off victorious either by showing that thesubject of dispute has no connexion with the principles which had beenagreed upon' (that is to say, by showing that the objection proves nothing, and then the defender wins the case), 'or by reducing the defender toabsurdity' (when all the premisses and all the conclusions are wellproved). 'Now one can reduce him to that point either by showing him thatthe conclusions of his thesis are "yes" and "no" at once, or byconstraining him to say only intelligible things in answer. ' (This lastembarrassment he can always avoid, because he has no need to advance newtheses. ) 'The aim in disputes of this kind is to throw light uponobscurities and to arrive at self-evidence. ' (It is the aim of the opposer, for he wishes to demonstrate that the Mystery is false; but this cannothere be the aim of the defender, for in admitting Mystery he agrees thatone cannot demonstrate it. ) 'This leads to the opinion that during thecourse of the proceedings victory sides more or less with the defender orwith the opposer, according to whether there is more or less clarity in thepropositions of the one than in the propositions of the other. ' (That [117]is speaking as if the defender and the opposer were equally unprotected;but the defender is like a besieged commander, covered by his defenceworks, and it is for the attacker to destroy them. The defender has no needhere of self-evidence, and he seeks it not: but it is for the opposer tofind it against him, and to break through with his batteries in order thatthe defender may be no longer protected. )

76. 'Finally, it is judged that victory goes against him whose answers aresuch that one comprehends nothing in them, ' (It is a very equivocal sign ofvictory: for then one must needs ask the audience if they comprehendanything in what has been said, and often their opinions would be divided. The order of formal disputes is to proceed by arguments in due form and toanswer them by denying or making a distinction. ) 'and who confesses thatthey are incomprehensible. ' (It is permitted to him who maintains the truthof a Mystery to confess that this mystery is incomprehensible; and if thisconfession were sufficient for declaring him vanquished there would be noneed of objection. It will be possible for a truth to be incomprehensible, but never so far as to justify the statement that one comprehends nothingat all therein. It would be in that case what the ancient Schools called_Scindapsus_ or _Blityri_ (Clem. Alex. , _Stromateis_, 8), that is, wordsdevoid of meaning. ) 'He is condemned thenceforth by the rules for awardingvictory; and even when he cannot be pursued in the mist wherewith he hascovered himself, and which forms a kind of abyss between him and hisantagonists, he is believed to be utterly defeated, and is compared to anarmy which, having lost the battle, steals away from the pursuit of thevictor only under cover of night. ' (Matching allegory with allegory, I willsay that the defender is not vanquished so long as he remains protected byhis entrenchments; and if he risks some sortie beyond his need, it ispermitted to him to withdraw within his fort, without being open to blamefor that. )

77. I was especially at pains to analyse this long passage where M. Baylehas put down his strongest and most skilfully reasoned statements insupport of his opinion: and I hope that I have shown clearly how thisexcellent man has been misled. That happens all too easily to the ablestand shrewdest persons when they give free rein to their wit withoutexercising the patience necessary for delving down to the very foundationsof their systems. The details we have entered into here will serve as [118]answer to some other arguments upon the subject which are dispersed throughthe works of M. Bayle, as for instance when he says in his _Reply to theQuestions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 133, p. 685): 'To prove that onehas brought reason and religion into harmony one must show not only thatone has philosophic maxims favourable to our faith, but also that theparticular maxims cast up against us as not being consistent with ourCatechism are in reality consistent with it in a clearly conceived way. ' Ido not see that one has need of all that, unless one aspire to pressreasoning as far as the _how_ of the Mystery. When one is content to upholdits truth, without attempting to render it comprehensible, one has no needto resort to philosophic maxims, general or particular, for the proof; andwhen another brings up some philosophic maxims against us, it is not for usto prove clearly and distinctly that these maxims are consistent with ourdogma, but it is for our opponent to prove that they are contrary thereto. 

78. M. Bayle continues thus in the same passage: 'For this result we needan answer as clearly evident as the objection. ' I have already shown thatit is obtained when one denies the premisses, but that for the rest it isnot necessary for him who maintains the truth of the Mystery always toadvance evident propositions, since the principal thesis concerning theMystery itself is not evident. He adds further: 'If we must make reply andrejoinder, we must never rest in our positions, nor claim that we haveaccomplished our design, so long as our opponent shall make answer withthings as evident as our reasons can be. ' But it is not for the defender toadduce reasons; it is enough for him to answer those of his opponent. 

79. Finally the author draws the conclusion: 'If it were claimed that, onmaking an evident objection, a man has to be satisfied with an answer whichwe can only state as a thing possible though incomprehensible to us, thatwould be unfair. ' He repeats this in the posthumous Dialogues, against M. Jacquelot, p. 69. I am not of this opinion. If the objection werecompletely evident, it would triumph, and the thesis would be overthrown. But when the objection is only founded on appearances or on instances ofthe most frequent occurrence, and when he who makes it desires to draw fromit a universal and certain conclusion, he who upholds the Mystery mayanswer with the instance of a bare possibility. For such an instance [119]suffices to show that what one wished to infer from the premisses, isneither certain nor general; and it suffices for him who upholds theMystery to maintain that it is possible, without having to maintain that itis probable. For, as I have often said, it is agreed that the Mysteries areagainst appearances. He who upholds the Mystery need not even adduce suchan instance; and should he adduce it, it were indeed a work ofsupererogation, or else an instrument of greater confusion to theadversary. 

80. There are passages of M. Bayle in the posthumous reply that he made toM. Jacquelot which seem to me still worthy of scrutiny. 'M. Bayle'(according to pp. 36, 37) 'constantly asserts in his _Dictionary_, wheneverthe subject allows, that our reason is more capable of refuting anddestroying than of proving and building; that there is scarcely anyphilosophical or theological matter in respect of which it does not creategreat difficulties. Thus', he says, 'if one desired to follow it in adisputatious spirit, as far as it can go, one would often be reduced to astate of troublesome perplexity; and in fine, there are doctrines certainlytrue, which it disputes with insoluble objections. ' I think that what issaid here in reproach of reason is to its advantage. When it overthrowssome thesis, it builds up the opposing thesis. And when it seems to beoverthrowing the two opposing theses at the same time, it is then that itpromises us something profound, provided that we follow it _as far as itcan go_, not in a disputatious spirit but with an ardent desire to searchout and discover the truth, which will always be recompensed with a greatmeasure of success. 

81. M. Bayle continues: 'that one must then ridicule these objections, recognizing the narrow bounds of the human mind. ' And I think, on the otherhand, that one must recognize the signs of the force of the human mind, which causes it to penetrate into the heart of things. These are newopenings and, as it were, rays of the dawn which promises us a greaterlight: I mean in philosophical subjects or those of natural theology. Butwhen these objections are made against revealed faith it is enough that onebe able to repel them, provided that one do so in a submissive and zealousspirit, with intent to sustain and exalt the glory of God. And when wesucceed in respect of his justice, we shall likewise be impressed by hisgreatness and charmed by his goodness, which will show themselves throughthe clouds of a seeming reason that is deceived by outward [120]appearances, in proportion as the mind is elevated by true reason to thatwhich to us is invisible, but none the less sure. 

82. 'Thus' (to continue with M. Bayle) 'reason will be compelled to laydown its arms, and to subjugate itself to the obedience of the faith, whichit can and ought to do, in virtue of some of its most incontestable maxims. Thus also in renouncing some of its other maxims it acts nevertheless inaccordance with that which it is, that is to say, in reason. ' But one mustknow 'that such maxims of reason as must be renounced in this case are onlythose which make us judge by appearances or according to the ordinarycourse of things. ' This reason enjoins upon us even in philosophicalsubjects, when there are invincible proofs to the contrary. It is thusthat, being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and thejustice of God, we disregard the appearances of harshness and injusticewhich we see in this small portion of his Kingdom that is exposed to ourgaze. Hitherto we have been illumined by the _light of Nature_ and by thatof _grace_, but not yet by that of _glory_. Here on earth we see apparentinjustice, and we believe and even know the truth of the hidden justice ofGod; but we shall see that justice when at last the Sun of Justice shallshow himself as he is. 

83. It is certain that M. Bayle can only be understood as meaning thoseostensible maxims which must give way before the eternal verities; for heacknowledges that reason is not in reality contrary to faith. In theseposthumous Dialogues he complains (p. 73, against M. Jacquelot) of beingaccused of the belief that our Mysteries are in reality against reason, and(p. 9, against M. Le Clerc) of the assertion made that he who acknowledgesthat a doctrine is exposed to irrefutable objections acknowledges also by anecessary consequence the falsity of this doctrine. Nevertheless one wouldbe justified in the assertion if the irrefutability were more than anoutward appearance. 

84. It may be, therefore, that having long contended thus against M. Bayleon the matter of the use of reason I shall find after all that his opinionswere not fundamentally so remote from mine as his expressions, which haveprovided matter for our considerations, have led one to believe. It is truethat frequently he appears to deny absolutely that one can ever answer theobjections of reason against faith, and that he asserts the necessity ofcomprehending, in order to achieve such an end, how the Mystery comes [121]to be or exists. Yet there are passages where he becomes milder, andcontents himself with saying that the answers to these objections areunknown to him. Here is a very precise passage, taken from the excursus onthe Manichaeans, which is found at the end of the second edition of his_Dictionary_: 'For the greater satisfaction of the most punctiliousreaders, I desire to declare here' (he says, p. 3148) 'that wherever thestatement is to be met with in my _Dictionary_ that such and such argumentsare irrefutable I do not wish it to be taken that they are so in actuality. I mean naught else than that they appear to me irrefutable. That is of noconsequence: each one will be able to imagine, if he pleases, that if Ideem thus of a matter it is owing to my lack of acumen. ' I do not imaginesuch a thing; his great acumen is too well known to me: but I think that, after having applied his whole mind to magnifying the objections, he hadnot enough attention left over for the purpose of answering them. 

85. M. Bayle confesses, moreover, in his posthumous work against M. LeClerc, that the objections against faith have not the force of proofs. Itis therefore _ad hominem_ only, or rather _ad homines_, that is, inrelation to the existing state of the human race, that he deems theseobjections irrefutable and the subject unexplainable. There is even apassage where he implies that he despairs not of the possibility that theanswer or the explanation may be found, and even in our time. For here iswhat he says in his posthumous Reply to M. Le Clerc (p. 35): 'M. Bayledared to hope that his toil would put on their mettle some of those greatmen of genius who create new systems, and that they could discover asolution hitherto unknown. ' It seems that by this 'solution' he means suchan explanation of Mystery as would penetrate to the _how_: but that is notnecessary for replying to the objections. 

86. Many have undertaken to render this _how_ comprehensible, and to provethe possibility of Mysteries. A certain writer named Thomas BonartesNordtanus Anglus, in his _Concordia Scientiae cum Fide, _ claimed to do so. This work seemed to me ingenious and learned, but crabbed and involved, andit even contains indefensible opinions. I learned from the _ApologiaCyriacorum_ of the Dominican Father Vincent Baron that that book wascensured in Rome, that the author was a Jesuit, and that he suffered forhaving published it. The Reverend Father des Bosses, who now teachesTheology in the Jesuit College of Hildesheim, and who has combined [122]rare erudition with great acumen, which he displays in philosophy andtheology, has informed me that the real name of Bonartes was Thomas Barton, and that after leaving the Society he retired to Ireland, where the mannerof his death brought about a favourable verdict on his last opinions. Ipity the men of talent who bring trouble upon themselves by their toil andtheir zeal. Something of like nature happened in time past to PierreAbelard, to Gilbert de la Porree, to John Wyclif, and in our day to theEnglishman Thomas Albius, as well as to some others who plunged too farinto the explanation of the Mysteries. 

87. St. Augustine, however (as well as M. Bayle), does not despair of thepossibility that the desired solution may be found upon earth; but thisFather believes it to be reserved for some holy man illumined by a peculiargrace: 'Est aliqua causa fortassis occultior, quae melioribussanctioribusque reservatur, illius gratia potius quam meritis illorum' (in_De Genesi ad Literam_, lib. 11, c. 4). Luther reserves the knowledge ofthe Mystery of Election for the academy of heaven (lib. _De ServoArbitrio_, c. 174): 'Illic [Deus] gratiam et misericordiam spargit inindignos, his iram et severitatem spargit in immeritos; utrobique nimius etiniquus apud homines, sed justus et verax apud se ipsum. Nam quomodo hocjustum sit ut indignos coronet, incomprehensibile est modo, videbimusautem, cum illuc venerimus, ubi jam non credetur, sed revelata facievidebitur. Ita quomodo hoc justum sit, ut immeritos damnet, incomprehensibile est modo, creditur tamen, donec revelabitur filiushominis. ' It is to be hoped that M. Bayle now finds himself surrounded bythat light which is lacking to us here below, since there is reason tosuppose that he was not lacking in good will. 

 VIRGIL _Candidus insueti miratur limen Olympi, _ _Sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis. _

 LUCAN _. . . Illic postquam se lumine vero_ _Implevit, stellasque vagas miratur et astra_ _Fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte jaceret_ _Nostra dies. _

 [123] * * * * *

ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL

 * * * * *

PART ONE

1. Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to placereason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall see howthey exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light ofnature and the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in relationto evil. The _difficulties_ are distinguishable into two classes. The onekind springs from man's freedom, which appears incompatible with the divinenature; and nevertheless freedom is deemed necessary, in order that man maybe deemed guilty and open to punishment. The other kind concerns theconduct of God, and seems to make him participate too much in the existenceof evil, even though man be free and participate also therein. And thisconduct appears contrary to the goodness, the holiness and the justice ofGod, since God co-operates in evil as well physical as moral, andco-operates in each of them both morally and physically; and since it seemsthat these evils are manifested in the order of nature as well as in thatof grace, and in the future and eternal life as well as, nay, more than, inthis transitory life. 

2. To present these difficulties in brief, it must be observed that freedomis opposed, to all appearance, by determination or certainty of any kindwhatever; and nevertheless the common dogma of our philosophers states thatthe truth of contingent futurities is determined. The foreknowledge of[124]God renders all the future certain and determined, but his providence andhis foreordinance, whereon foreknowledge itself appears founded, do muchmore: for God is not as a man, able to look upon events with unconcern andto suspend his judgement, since nothing exists save as a result of thedecrees of his will and through the action of his power. And even thoughone leave out of account the co-operation of God, all is perfectlyconnected in the order of things, since nothing can come to pass unlessthere be a cause so disposed as to produce the effect, this taking place noless in voluntary than in all other actions. According to which it appearsthat man is compelled to do the good and evil that he does, and inconsequence that he deserves therefor neither recompense nor chastisement:thus is the morality of actions destroyed and all justice, divine andhuman, shaken. 

3. But even though one should grant to man this freedom wherewith he arrayshimself to his own hurt, the conduct of God could not but provide matterfor a criticism supported by the presumptuous ignorance of men, who wouldwish to exculpate themselves wholly or in part at the expense of God. It isobjected that all the reality and what is termed the substance of the actin sin itself is a production of God, since all creatures and all theiractions derive from him that reality they have. Whence one could infer notonly that he is the physical cause of sin, but also that he is its moralcause, since he acts with perfect freedom and does nothing without acomplete knowledge of the thing and the consequences that it may have. Noris it enough to say that God has made for himself a law to co-operate withthe wills or resolutions of man, whether we express ourselves in terms ofthe common opinion or in terms of the system of occasional causes. Not onlywill it be found strange that he should have made such a law for himself, of whose results he was not ignorant, but the principal difficulty is thatit seems the evil will itself cannot exist without co-operation, and evenwithout some predetermination, on his part, which contributes towardsbegetting this will in man or in some other rational creature. For anaction is not, for being evil, the less dependent on God. Whence one willcome at last to the conclusion that God does all, the good and the evil, indifferently; unless one pretend with the Manichaeans that there are twoprinciples, the one good and the other evil. Moreover, according to thegeneral opinion of theologians and philosophers, conservation being a [125]perpetual creation, it will be said that man is perpetually created corruptand erring. There are, furthermore, modern Cartesians who claim that God isthe sole agent, of whom created beings are only the purely passive organs;and M. Bayle builds not a little upon that idea. 

4. But even granting that God should co-operate in actions only with ageneral co-operation, or even not at all, at least in those that are bad, it suffices, so it is said, to inculpate him and to render him the moralcause that nothing comes to pass without his permission. To say nothing ofthe fall of the angels, he knows all that which will come to pass, if, having created man, he places him in such and such circumstances; and heplaces him there notwithstanding. Man is exposed to a temptation to whichit is known that he will succumb, thereby causing an infinitude offrightful evils, by which the whole human race will be infected and broughtas it were into a necessity of sinning, a state which is named 'originalsin'. Thus the world will be brought into a strange confusion, by thismeans death and diseases being introduced, with a thousand othermisfortunes and miseries that in general afflict the good and the bad;wickedness will even hold sway and virtue will be oppressed on earth, sothat it will scarce appear that a providence governs affairs. But it ismuch worse when one considers the life to come, since but a small number ofmen will be saved and since all the rest will perish eternally. Furthermorethese men destined for salvation will have been withdrawn from the corruptmass through an unreasoning election, whether it be said that God inchoosing them has had regard to their future actions, to their faith or totheir works, or one claim that he has been pleased to give them these goodqualities and these actions because he has predestined them to salvation. For though it be said in the most lenient system that God wished to saveall men, and though in the other systems commonly accepted it be granted, that he has made his Son take human nature upon him to expiate their sins, so that all they who shall believe in him with a lively and final faithshall be saved, it still remains true that this lively faith is a gift ofGod; that we are dead to all good works; that even our will itself must bearoused by a prevenient grace, and that God gives us the power to will andto do. And whether that be done through a grace efficacious of itself, thatis to say, through a divine inward motion which wholly determines our [126]will to the good that it does; or whether there be only a sufficient grace, but such as does not fail to attain its end, and to become efficacious inthe inward and outward circumstances wherein the man is and has been placedby God: one must return to the same conclusion that God is the final reasonof salvation, of grace, of faith and of election in Jesus Christ. And bethe election the cause or the result of God's design to give faith, itstill remains true that he gives faith or salvation to whom he pleases, without any discernible reason for his choice, which falls upon but fewmen. 

5. So it is a terrible judgement that God, giving his only Son for thewhole human race and being the sole author and master of the salvation ofmen, yet saves so few of them and abandons all others to the devil hisenemy, who torments them eternally and makes them curse their Creator, though they have all been created to diffuse and show forth his goodness, his justice and his other perfections. And this outcome inspires all themore horror, as the sole cause why all these men are wretched to alleternity is God's having exposed their parents to a temptation that he knewthey would not resist; as this sin is inherent and imputed to men beforetheir will has participated in it; as this hereditary vice impels theirwill to commit actual sins; and as countless men, in childhood or maturity, that have never heard or have not heard enough of Jesus Christ, Saviour ofthe human race, die before receiving the necessary succour for theirwithdrawal from this abyss of sin. These men too are condemned to be forever rebellious against God and plunged in the most horrible miseries, withthe wickedest of all creatures, though in essence they have not been morewicked than others, and several among them have perchance been less guiltythan some of that little number of elect, who were saved by a grace withoutreason, and who thereby enjoy an eternal felicity which they had notdeserved. Such in brief are the difficulties touched upon by sundrypersons; but M. Bayle was one who insisted on them the most, as will appearsubsequently when we examine his passages. I think that now I have recordedthe main essence of these difficulties: but I have deemed it fitting torefrain from some expressions and exaggerations which might have causedoffence, while not rendering the objections any stronger. 

6. Let us now turn the medal and let us also point out what can be said inanswer to those objections; and here a course of explanation through [127]fuller dissertation will be necessary: for many difficulties can be openedup in few words, but for their discussion one must dilate upon them. Ourend is to banish from men the false ideas that represent God to them as anabsolute prince employing a despotic power, unfitted to be loved andunworthy of being loved. These notions are the more evil in relation to Godinasmuch as the essence of piety is not only to fear him but also to lovehim above all things: and that cannot come about unless there be knowledgeof his perfections capable of arousing the love which he deserves, andwhich makes the felicity of those that love him. Feeling ourselves animatedby a zeal such as cannot fail to please him, we have cause to hope that hewill enlighten us, and that he will himself aid us in the execution of aproject undertaken for his glory and for the good of men. A cause so goodgives confidence: if there are plausible appearances against us there areproofs on our side, and I would dare to say to an adversary:

 _Aspice, quam mage sit nostrum penetrabile telum. _

7. _God is the first reason of things_: for such things as are bounded, asall that which we see and experience, are contingent and have nothing inthem to render their existence necessary, it being plain that time, spaceand matter, united and uniform in themselves and indifferent to everything, might have received entirely other motions and shapes, and in anotherorder. Therefore one must seek the reason for the existence of the world, which is the whole assemblage of _contingent_ things, and seek it in thesubstance which carries with it the reason for its existence, and which inconsequence is _necessary_ and eternal. Moreover, this cause must beintelligent: for this existing world being contingent and an infinity ofother worlds being equally possible, and holding, so to say, equal claim toexistence with it, the cause of the world must needs have had regard orreference to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them. This regard or relation of an existent substance to simple possibilitiescan be nothing other than the _understanding_ which has the ideas of them, while to fix upon one of them can be nothing other than the act of the_will_ which chooses. It is the _power_ of this substance that renders itswill efficacious. Power relates to _being_, wisdom or understanding to_truth_, and will to _good_. And this intelligent cause ought to beinfinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in _power_, in _wisdom_ and in_goodness_, since it relates to all that which is possible. [128]Furthermore, since all is connected together, there is no ground foradmitting more than _one_. Its understanding is the source of _essences_, and its will is the origin of _existences_. There in few words is the proofof one only God with his perfections, and through him of the origin ofthings. 

8. Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of agreater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of Godif it were possible to do better. As in mathematics, when there is nomaximum nor minimum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is doneequally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it may besaid likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly thanmathematics, that if there were not the best (_optimum_) among all possibleworlds, God would not have produced any. I call 'World' the wholesuccession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it besaid that several worlds could have existed in different times anddifferent places. For they must needs be reckoned all together as one worldor, if you will, as one Universe. And even though one should fill all timesand all places, it still remains true that one might have filled them ininnumerable ways, and that there is an infinitude of possible worlds amongwhich God must needs have chosen the best, since he does nothing withoutacting in accordance with supreme reason. 

9. Some adversary not being able to answer this argument will perchanceanswer the conclusion by a counter-argument, saying that the world couldhave been without sin and without sufferings; but I deny that then it wouldhave been _better_. For it must be known that all things are _connected_ ineach one of the possible worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, is allof one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effect there toany distance whatsoever, even though this effect become less perceptible inproportion to the distance. Therein God has ordered all things beforehandonce for all, having foreseen prayers, good and bad actions, and all therest; and each thing _as an idea_ has contributed, before its existence, tothe resolution that has been made upon the existence of all things; so thatnothing can be changed in the universe (any more than in a number) save itsessence or, if you will, save its _numerical individuality_. Thus, if thesmallest evil that comes to pass in the world were missing in it, it [129]would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and allallowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it. 

10. It is true that one may imagine possible worlds without sin and withoutunhappiness, and one could make some like Utopian or Sevarambian romances:but these same worlds again would be very inferior to ours in goodness. Icannot show you this in detail. For can I know and can I present infinitiesto you and compare them together? But you must judge with me _ab effectu_, since God has chosen this world as it is. We know, moreover, that often anevil brings forth a good whereto one would not have attained without thatevil. Often indeed two evils have made one great good:

 _Et si fata volunt, bina venena juvant_. 

Even so two liquids sometimes produce a solid, witness the spirit of wineand spirit of urine mixed by Van Helmont; or so do two cold and dark bodiesproduce a great fire, witness an acid solution and an aromatic oil combinedby Herr Hoffmann. A general makes sometimes a fortunate mistake whichbrings about the winning of a great battle; and do they not sing on the eveof Easter, in the churches of the Roman rite:

 _O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est!_ _O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!_

11. The illustrious prelates of the Gallican church who wrote to PopeInnocent XII against Cardinal Sfondrati's book on predestination, being ofthe principles of St. Augustine, have said things well fitted to elucidatethis great point. The cardinal appears to prefer even to the Kingdom ofHeaven the state of children dying without baptism, because sin is thegreatest of evils, and they have died innocent of all actual sin. More willbe said of that below. The prelates have observed that this opinion is illfounded. The apostle, they say (Rom. Iii. 8), is right to disapprove of thedoing of evil that good may come, but one cannot disapprove that God, through his exceeding power, derive from the permitting of sins greatergoods than such as occurred before the sins. It is not that we ought totake pleasure in sin, God forbid! but that we believe the same apostle whenhe says (Rom. V. 20) that where sin abounded, grace did much more [130]abound; and we remember that we have gained Jesus Christ himself by reasonof sin. Thus we see that the opinion of these prelates tends to maintainthat a sequence of things where sin enters in may have been and has been, in effect, better than another sequence without sin. 

12. Use has ever been made of comparisons taken from the pleasures of thesenses when these are mingled with that which borders on pain, to provethat there is something of like nature in intellectual pleasures. A littleacid, sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar; shadowsenhance colours; and even a dissonance in the right place gives relief toharmony. We wish to be terrified by rope-dancers on the point of fallingand we wish that tragedies shall well-nigh cause us to weep. Do men relishhealth enough, or thank God enough for it, without having ever been sick?And is it not most often necessary that a little evil render the good morediscernible, that is to say, greater?

13. But it will be said that evils are great and many in number incomparison with the good: that is erroneous. It is only want of attentionthat diminishes our good, and this attention must be given to us throughsome admixture of evils. If we were usually sick and seldom in good health, we should be wonderfully sensible of that great good and we should be lesssensible of our evils. But is it not better, notwithstanding, that healthshould be usual and sickness the exception? Let us then by our reflexionsupply what is lacking in our perception, in order to make the good ofhealth more discernible. Had we not the knowledge of the life to come, Ibelieve there would be few persons who, being at the point of death, werenot content to take up life again, on condition of passing through the sameamount of good and evil, provided always that it were not the same kind:one would be content with variety, without requiring a better conditionthan that wherein one had been. 

14. When one considers also the fragility of the human body, one looks inwonder at the wisdom and the goodness of the Author of Nature, who has madethe body so enduring and its condition so tolerable. That has often made mesay that I am not astonished men are sometimes sick, but that I amastonished they are sick so little and not always. This also ought to makeus the more esteem the divine contrivance of the mechanism of animals, whose Author has made machines so fragile and so subject to corruption[131]and yet so capable of maintaining themselves: for it is Nature which curesus rather than medicine. Now this very fragility is a consequence of thenature of things, unless we are to will that this kind of creature, reasoning and clothed in flesh and bones, be not in the world. But that, toall appearance, would be a defect which some philosophers of old would havecalled _vacuum formarum_, a gap in the order of species. 

15. Those whose humour it is to be well satisfied with Nature and withfortune and not to complain about them, even though they should not be thebest endowed, appear to me preferable to the other sort; for besides thatthese complaints are ill founded, it is in effect murmuring against theorders of providence. One must not readily be among the malcontents in theState where one is, and one must not be so at all in the city of God, wherein one can only wrongfully be of their number. The books of humanmisery, such as that of Pope Innocent III, to me seem not of the mostserviceable: evils are doubled by being given an attention that ought to beaverted from them, to be turned towards the good which by farpreponderates. Even less do I approve books such as that of Abbé Esprit, _On the Falsity of Human Virtues_, of which we have lately been given asummary: for such a book serves to turn everything wrong side out, andcause men to be such as it represents them. 

16. It must be confessed, however, that there are disorders in this life, which appear especially in the prosperity of sundry evil men and in themisfortune of many good people. There is a German proverb which even grantsthe advantage to the evil ones, as if they were commonly the mostfortunate:

 _Je krümmer Holz, je bessre Krücke:_ _Je ärger Schalck, je grösser Glücke. _

And it were to be desired that this saying of Horace should be true in oureyes:

 _Raro antecedentem scelestum_ _Deseruit pede poena claudo. _

Yet it often comes to pass also, though this perchance not the most often, [132] _That in the world's eyes Heaven is justified, _

and that one may say with Claudian:

 _Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini poena tumultum, _ _Absolvitque deos. . . _

17. But even though that should not happen here, the remedy is all preparedin the other life: religion and reason itself teach us that, and we mustnot murmur against a respite which the supreme wisdom has thought fit togrant to men for repentance. Yet there objections multiply on another side, when one considers salvation and damnation: for it appears strange that, even in the great future of eternity, evil should have the advantage overgood, under the supreme authority of him who is the sovereign good, sincethere will be many that are called and few that are chosen or are saved. Itis true that one sees from some lines of Prudentius (Hymn. Ante Somnum), _Idem tamen benignus_ _Ultor retundit iram, _ _Paucosque non piorum_ _Patitur perire in aevum, _

that divers men believed in his time that the number of those wicked enoughto be damned would be very small. To some indeed it seems that men believedat that time in a sphere between Hell and Paradise; that this samePrudentius speaks as if he were satisfied with this sphere; that St. Gregory of Nyssa also inclines in that direction, and that St. Jerome leanstowards the opinion according whereunto all Christians would finally betaken into grace. A saying of St. Paul which he himself gives out asmysterious, stating that all Israel will be saved, has provided much foodfor reflexion. Sundry pious persons, learned also, but daring, have revivedthe opinion of Origen, who maintains that good will predominate in duetime, in all and everywhere, and that all rational creatures, even the badangels, will become at last holy and blessed. The book of the eternalGospel, published lately in German and supported by a great and learnedwork entitled [Greek: 'Apokatástasis pántôn], has caused much stir overthis great paradox. M. Le Clerc also has ingeniously pleaded the cause ofthe Origenists, but without declaring himself for them. 

 [133]18. There is a man of wit who, pushing my principle of harmony even toarbitrary suppositions that I in no wise approve, has created for himself atheology well-nigh astronomical. He believes that the present confusion inthis world below began when the Presiding Angel of the globe of the earth, which was still a sun (that is, a star that was fixed and luminous ofitself) committed a sin with some lesser angels of his department, perhapsrising inopportunely against an angel of a greater sun; thatsimultaneously, by the Pre-established Harmony of the Realms of Nature andof Grace, and consequently by natural causes occurring at the appointedtime, our globe was covered with stains, rendered opaque and driven fromits place; which has made it become a wandering star or planet, that is, aSatellite of another sun, and even perhaps of that one whose superiorityits angel refused to recognize; and that therein consists the fall ofLucifer. Now the chief of the bad angels, who in Holy Scripture is namedthe prince, and even the god of this world, being, with the angels of histrain, envious of that rational animal which walks on the surface of thisglobe, and which God has set up there perhaps to compensate himself fortheir fall, strives to render it accessary in their crimes and aparticipator in their misfortunes. Whereupon Jesus Christ came to save men. He is the eternal Son of God, even as he is his only Son; but (according tosome ancient Christians, and according to the author of this hypothesis)having taken upon him at first, from the beginning of things, the mostexcellent nature among created beings, to bring them all to perfection, heset himself amongst them: and this is the second filiation, whereby he isthe first-born of all creatures. This is he whom the Cabalists called AdamKadmon. Haply he had planted his tabernacle in that great sun whichillumines us; but he came at last into this globe where we are, he was bornof the Virgin, and took human nature upon him to save mankind from thehands of their enemy and his. And when the time of judgement shall drawnear, when the present face of our globe shall be about to perish, he willreturn to it in visible form, thence to withdraw the good, transplantingthem, it may be, into the sun, and to punish here the wicked with thedemons that have allured them; then the globe of the earth will begin toburn and will be perhaps a comet. This fire will last for aeons upon aeons. The tail of the comet is intended by the smoke which will rise incessantly, according to the Apocalypse, and this fire will be hell, or the second[134]death whereof Holy Scripture speaks. But at last hell will render up itsdead, death itself will be destroyed; reason and peace will begin to holdsway again in the spirits that had been perverted; they will be sensible oftheir error, they will adore their Creator, and will even begin to love himall the more for seeing the greatness of the abyss whence they emerge. Simultaneously (by virtue of the _harmonic parallelism_ of the Realms ofNature and of Grace) this long and great conflagration will have purged theearth's globe of its stains. It will become again a sun; its PresidingAngel will resume his place with the angels of his train; humans that weredamned shall be with them numbered amongst the good angels; this chief ofour globe shall render homage to the Messiah, chief of created beings. Theglory of this angel reconciled shall be greater than it was before hisfall. 

 _Inque Deos iterum factorum lege receptus_ _Aureus aeternum noster regnabit Apollo. _

The vision seemed to me pleasing, and worthy of a follower of Origen: butwe have no need of such hypothesis or fictions, where Wit plays a greaterpart than Revelation, and which even Reason cannot turn to account. For itdoes not appear that there is one principal place in the known universedeserving in preference to the rest to be the seat of the eldest of createdbeings; and the sun of our system at least is not it. 

19. Holding then to the established doctrine that the number of men damnedeternally will be incomparably greater than that of the saved, we must saythat the evil could not but seem to be almost as nothing in comparison withthe good, when one contemplates the true vastness of the city of God. Coelius Secundus Curio wrote a little book, _De Amplitudine RegniCoelestis_, which was reprinted not long since; but he is indeed far fromhaving apprehended the compass of the kingdom of heaven. The ancients hadpuny ideas on the works of God, and St. Augustine, for want of knowingmodern discoveries, was at a loss when there was question of explaining theprevalence of evil. It seemed to the ancients that there was only one earthinhabited, and even of that men held the antipodes in dread: the remainderof the world was, according to them, a few shining globes and a fewcrystalline spheres. To-day, whatever bounds are given or not given to theuniverse, it must be acknowledged that there is an infinite number ofglobes, as great as and greater than ours, which have as much right as[135]it to hold rational inhabitants, though it follows not at all that they arehuman. It is only one planet, that is to say one of the six principalsatellites of our sun; and as all fixed stars are suns also, we see howsmall a thing our earth is in relation to visible things, since it is onlyan appendix of one amongst them. It may be that all suns are peopled onlyby blessed creatures, and nothing constrains us to think that many aredamned, for few instances or few samples suffice to show the advantagewhich good extracts from evil. Moreover, since there is no reason for thebelief that there are stars everywhere, is it not possible that there maybe a great space beyond the region of the stars? Whether it be the EmpyreanHeaven, or not, this immense space encircling all this region may in anycase be filled with happiness and glory. It can be imagined as like theOcean, whither flow the rivers of all blessed creatures, when they shallhave reached their perfection in the system of the stars. What will becomeof the consideration of our globe and its inhabitants? Will it not besomething incomparably less than a physical point, since our earth is as apoint in comparison with the distance of some fixed stars? Thus since theproportion of that part of the universe which we know is almost lost innothingness compared with that which is unknown, and which we yet havecause to assume, and since all the evils that may be raised in objectionbefore us are in this near nothingness, haply it may be that all evils arealmost nothingness in comparison with the good things which are in theuniverse. 

20. But it is necessary also to meet the more speculative and metaphysicaldifficulties which have been mentioned, and which concern the cause ofevil. The question is asked first of all, whence does evil come? _Si Deusest, unde malum? Si non est, unde bonum?_ The ancients attributed the causeof evil to _matter_, which they believed uncreate and independent of God:but we, who derive all being from God, where shall we find the source ofevil? The answer is, that it must be sought in the ideal nature of thecreature, in so far as this nature is contained in the eternal veritieswhich are in the understanding of God, independently of his will. For wemust consider that there is an _original imperfection in the creature_before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence; whence ensuesthat it cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself and commit othererrors. Plato said in _Timaeus_ that the world originated in [136]Understanding united to Necessity. Others have united God and Nature. Thiscan be given a reasonable meaning. God will be the Understanding; and theNecessity, that is, the essential nature of things, will be the object ofthe understanding, in so far as this object consists in the eternalverities. But this object is inward and abides in the divine understanding. And therein is found not only the primitive form of good, but also theorigin of evil: the Region of the Eternal Verities must be substituted formatter when we are concerned with seeking out the source of things. 

This region is the ideal cause of evil (as it were) as well as of good:but, properly speaking, the formal character of evil has no _efficient_cause, for it consists in privation, as we shall see, namely, in that whichthe efficient cause does not bring about. That is why the Schoolmen arewont to call the cause of evil _deficient_. 

21. Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally. _Metaphysicalevil_ consists in mere imperfection, _physical evil_ in suffering, and_moral evil_ in sin. Now although physical evil and moral evil be notnecessary, it is enough that by virtue of the eternal verities they bepossible. And as this vast Region of Verities contains all possibilities itis necessary that there be an infinitude of possible worlds, that evilenter into divers of them, and that even the best of all contain a measurethereof. Thus has God been induced to permit evil. 

22. But someone will say to me: why speak you to us of 'permitting'? Is itnot God that doeth the evil and that willeth it? Here it will be necessaryto explain what 'permission' is, so that it may be seen how this term isnot employed without reason. But before that one must explain the nature ofwill, which has its own degrees. Taking it in the general sense, one maysay that _will_ consists in the inclination to do something in proportionto the good it contains. This will is called _antecedent_ when it isdetached, and considers each good separately in the capacity of a good. Inthis sense it may be said that God tends to all good, as good, _adperfectionem simpliciter simplicem_, to speak like the Schoolmen, and thatby an antecedent will. He is earnestly disposed to sanctify and to save allmen, to exclude sin, and to prevent damnation. It may even be said thatthis will is efficacious _of itself (per se)_, that is, in such sort thatthe effect would ensue if there were not some stronger reason to preventit: for this will does not pass into final exercise (_ad summum conatum_), else it would never fail to produce its full effect, God being the [137]master of all things. Success entire and infallible belongs only to the_consequent will_, as it is called. This it is which is complete; and inregard to it this rule obtains, that one never fails to do what one wills, when one has the power. Now this consequent will, final and decisive, results from the conflict of all the antecedent wills, of those which tendtowards good, even as of those which repel evil; and from the concurrenceof all these particular wills comes the total will. So in mechanicscompound movement results from all the tendencies that concur in one andthe same moving body, and satisfies each one equally, in so far as it ispossible to do all at one time. It is as if the moving body took equalaccount of these tendencies, as I once showed in one of the Paris Journals(7 Sept. 1693), when giving the general law of the compositions ofmovement. In this sense also it may be said that the antecedent will isefficacious in a sense and even effective with success. 

23. Thence it follows that God wills _antecedently_ the good and_consequently_ the best. And as for evil, God wills moral evil not at all, and physical evil or suffering he does not will absolutely. Thus it is thatthere is no absolute predestination to damnation; and one may say ofphysical evil, that God wills it often as a penalty owing to guilt, andoften also as a means to an end, that is, to prevent greater evils or toobtain greater good. The penalty serves also for amendment and example. Evil often serves to make us savour good the more; sometimes too itcontributes to a greater perfection in him who suffers it, as the seed thatone sows is subject to a kind of corruption before it can germinate: thisis a beautiful similitude, which Jesus Christ himself used. 

24. Concerning sin or moral evil, although it happens very often that itmay serve as a means of obtaining good or of preventing another evil, it isnot this that renders it a sufficient object of the divine will or alegitimate object of a created will. It must only be admitted or_permitted_ in so far as it is considered to be a certain consequence of anindispensable duty: as for instance if a man who was determined not topermit another's sin were to fail of his own duty, or as if an officer onguard at an important post were to leave it, especially in time of danger, in order to prevent a quarrel in the town between two soldiers of thegarrison who wanted to kill each other. 

25. The rule which states, _non esse facienda mala, ut eveniant bona_, andwhich even forbids the permission of a moral evil with the end of [138]obtaining a physical good, far from being violated, is here proved, and itssource and its reason are demonstrated. One will not approve the action ofa queen who, under the pretext of saving the State, commits or even permitsa crime. The crime is certain and the evil for the State is open toquestion. Moreover, this manner of giving sanction to crimes, if it wereaccepted, would be worse than a disruption of some one country, which isliable enough to happen in any case, and would perchance happen all themore by reason of such means chosen to prevent it. But in relation to Godnothing is open to question, nothing can be opposed to _the rule of thebest_, which suffers neither exception nor dispensation. It is in thissense that God permits sin: for he would fail in what he owes to himself, in what he owes to his wisdom, his goodness, his perfection, if he followednot the grand result of all his tendencies to good, and if he chose notthat which is absolutely the best, notwithstanding the evil of guilt, whichis involved therein by the supreme necessity of the eternal verities. Hencethe conclusion that God wills all good _in himself antecedently_, that hewills the best _consequently_ as an _end_, that he wills what isindifferent, and physical evil, sometimes as a _means_, but that he willonly permit moral evil as the _sine quo non_ or as a hypothetical necessitywhich connects it with the best. Therefore the _consequent will_ of God, which has sin for its object, is only _permissive_. 

26. It is again well to consider that moral evil is an evil so great onlybecause it is a source of physical evils, a source existing in one of themost powerful of creatures, who is also most capable of causing thoseevils. For an evil will is in its department what the evil principle of theManichaeans would be in the universe; and reason, which is an image of theDivinity, provides for evil souls great means of causing much evil. Onesingle Caligula, one Nero, has caused more evil than an earthquake. An evilman takes pleasure in causing suffering and destruction, and for that thereare only too many opportunities. But God being inclined to produce as muchgood as possible, and having all the knowledge and all the power necessaryfor that, it is impossible that in him there be fault, or guilt, or sin;and when he permits sin, it is wisdom, it is virtue. 

27. It is indeed beyond question that we must refrain from preventing thesin of others when we cannot prevent their sin without sinning ourselves. But someone will perhaps bring up the objection that it is God himself[139]who acts and who effects all that is real in the sin of the creature. Thisobjection leads us to consider the _physical co-operation_ of God with thecreature, after we have examined the _moral co-operation_, which was themore perplexing. Some have believed, with the celebrated Durand deSaint-Pourçain and Cardinal Aureolus, the famous Schoolman, that theco-operation of God with the creature (I mean the physical cooperation) isonly general and mediate, and that God creates substances and gives themthe force they need; and that thereafter he leaves them to themselves, anddoes naught but conserve them, without aiding them in their actions. Thisopinion has been refuted by the greater number of Scholastic theologians, and it appears that in the past it met with disapproval in the writings ofPelagius. Nevertheless a Capuchin named Louis Pereir of Dole, about theyear 1630, wrote a book expressly to revive it, at least in relation tofree actions. Some moderns incline thereto, and M. Bernier supports it in alittle book on freedom and freewill. But one cannot say in relation to Godwhat 'to conserve' is, without reverting to the general opinion. Also itmust be taken into account that the action of God in conserving should havesome reference to that which is conserved, according to what it is and tothe state wherein it is; thus his action cannot be general orindeterminate. These generalities are abstractions not to be found in thetruth of individual things, and the conservation of a man standing isdifferent from the conservation of a man seated. This would not be so ifconservation consisted only in the act of preventing and warding off someforeign cause which could destroy that which one wishes to conserve; asoften happens when men conserve something. But apart from the fact that weare obliged ourselves sometimes to maintain that which we conserve, we mustbear in mind that conservation by God consists in the perpetual immediateinfluence which the dependence of creatures demands. This dependenceattaches not only to the substance but also to the action, and one canperhaps not explain it better than by saying, with theologians andphilosophers in general, that it is a continued creation. 

28. The objection will be made that God therefore now creates man a sinner, he that in the beginning created him innocent. But here it must be said, with regard to the moral aspect, that God being supremely wise cannot failto observe certain laws, and to act according to the rules, as well [140]physical as moral, that wisdom has made him choose. And the same reasonthat has made him create man innocent, but liable to fall, makes himre-create man when he falls; for God's knowledge causes the future to befor him as the present, and prevents him from rescinding the resolutionsmade. 

29. As for physical co-operation, here one must consider the truth whichhas made already so much stir in the Schools since St. Augustine declaredit, that evil is a privation of being, whereas the action of God tends tothe positive. This answer is accounted a quibble, and even somethingchimerical in the minds of many people. But here is an instance somewhatsimilar, which will serve to disabuse them. 

30. The celebrated Kepler and M. Descartes (in his letters) after him havespoken of the 'natural inertia of bodies'; and it is something which may beregarded as a perfect image and even as a sample of the original limitationof creatures, to show that privation constitutes the formal character ofthe imperfections and disadvantages that are in substance as well as in itsactions. Let us suppose that the current of one and the same river carriedalong with it various boats, which differ among themselves only in thecargo, some being laden with wood, others with stone, and some more, theothers less. That being so, it will come about that the boats most heavilyladen will go more slowly than the others, provided it be assumed that thewind or the oar, or some other similar means, assist them not at all. It isnot, properly speaking, weight which is the cause of this retardation, since the boats are going down and not upwards; but it is the same causewhich also increases the weight in bodies that have greater density, whichare, that is to say, less porous and more charged with matter that isproper to them: for the matter which passes through the pores, notreceiving the same movement, must not be taken into account. It istherefore matter itself which originally is inclined to slowness orprivation of speed; not indeed of itself to lessen this speed, having oncereceived it, since that would be action, but to moderate by its receptivitythe effect of the impression when it is to receive it. Consequently, sincemore matter is moved by the same force of the current when the boat is moreladen, it is necessary that it go more slowly; and experiments on theimpact of bodies, as well as reason, show that twice as much force [141]must be employed to give equal speed to a body of the same matter but oftwice the size. But that indeed would not be necessary if the matter wereabsolutely indifferent to repose and to movement, and if it had not thisnatural inertia whereof we have just spoken to give it a kind of repugnanceto being moved. Let us now compare the force which the current exercises onboats, and communicates to them, with the action of God, who produces andconserves whatever is positive in creatures, and gives them perfection, being and force: let us compare, I say, the inertia of matter with thenatural imperfection of creatures, and the slowness of the laden boat withthe defects to be found in the qualities and the action of the creature;and we shall find that there is nothing so just as this comparison. Thecurrent is the cause of the boat's movement, but not of its retardation;God is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of thecreature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is thecause of the defects there are in its action. Thus the Platonists, St. Augustine and the Schoolmen were right to say that God is the cause of thematerial element of evil which lies in the positive, and not of the formalelement, which lies in privation. Even so one may say that the current isthe cause of the material element of the retardation, but not of theformal: that is, it is the cause of the boat's speed without being thecause of the limits to this speed. And God is no more the cause of sin thanthe river's current is the cause of the retardation of the boat. Force alsoin relation to matter is as the spirit in relation to the flesh; the spiritis willing and the flesh is weak, and spirits act. . . 

 _quantum non noxia corpora tardant. _

31. There is, then, a wholly similar relation between such and such anaction of God, and such and such a passion or reception of the creature, which in the ordinary course of things is perfected only in proportion toits 'receptivity', such is the term used. And when it is said that thecreature depends upon God in so far as it exists and in so far as it acts, and even that conservation is a continual creation, this is true in thatGod gives ever to the creature and produces continually all that in it ispositive, good and perfect, every perfect gift coming from the Father oflights. The imperfections, on the other hand, and the defects in operationsspring from the original limitation that the creature could not but [142]receive with the first beginning of its being, through the ideal reasonswhich restrict it. For God could not give the creature all without makingof it a God; therefore there must needs be different degrees in theperfection of things, and limitations also of every kind. 

32. This consideration will serve also to satisfy some modern philosopherswho go so far as to say that God is the only agent. It is true that God isthe only one whose action is pure and without admixture of what is termed'to suffer': but that does not preclude the creature's participation inactions, since _the action of the creature_ is a modification of thesubstance, flowing naturally from it and containing a variation not only inthe perfections that God has communicated to the creature, but also in thelimitations that the creature, being what it is, brings with it. Thus wesee that there is an actual distinction between the substance and itsmodification or accidents, contrary to the opinion of some moderns and inparticular of the late Duke of Buckingham, who spoke of that in a little_Discourse on Religion_ recently reprinted. Evil is therefore likedarkness, and not only ignorance but also error and malice consist formallyin a certain kind of privation. Here is an example of error which we havealready employed. I see a tower which from a distance appears roundalthough it is square. The thought that the tower is what it appears to beflows naturally from that which I see; and when I dwell on this thought itis an affirmation, it is a false judgement; but if I pursue theexamination, if some reflexion causes me to perceive that appearancesdeceive me, lo and behold, I abandon my error. To abide in a certain place, or not to go further, not to espy some landmark, these are privations. 

33. It is the same in respect of malice or ill will. The will tends towardsgood in general, it must strive after the perfection that befits us, andthe supreme perfection is in God. All pleasures have within themselves somefeeling of perfection. But when one is limited to the pleasures of thesenses, or to other pleasures to the detriment of greater good, as ofhealth, of virtue, of union with God, of felicity, it is in this privationof a further aspiration that the defect consists. In general perfection ispositive, it is an absolute reality; defect is privative, it comes fromlimitation and tends towards new privations. This saying is therefore astrue as it is ancient: _bonum ex causa integra, malum ex quolibet defectu_;as also that which states: _malum causam habet non efficientem, sed [143]deficientem_. And I hope that the meaning of these axioms will be betterapprehended after what I have just said. 

34. The physical co-operation of God and of creatures with the willcontributes also to the difficulties existing in regard to freedom. I am ofopinion that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also fromnecessity. Aristotle has already observed that there are two things infreedom, to wit, spontaneity and choice, and therein lies our mastery overour actions. When we act freely we are not being forced, as would happen ifwe were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; and we arenot prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate, as would happenif we were given a draught to deprive us of discernment. There is_contingency_ in a thousand actions of Nature; but when there is nojudgement in him who acts there is no _freedom_. And if we had judgementnot accompanied by any inclination to act, our soul would be anunderstanding without will. 

35. It is not to be imagined, however, that our freedom consists in anindetermination or an indifference of equipoise, as if one must needs beinclined equally to the side of yes and of no and in the direction ofdifferent courses, when there are several of them to take. This equipoisein all directions is impossible: for if we were equally inclined towardsthe courses A, B and C, we could not be equally inclined towards A andtowards not A. This equipoise is also absolutely contrary to experience, and in scrutinizing oneself one will find that there has always been somecause or reason inclining us towards the course taken, although very oftenwe be not aware of that which prompts us: just in the same way one ishardly aware why, on issuing from a door, one has placed the right footbefore the left or the left before the right. 

36. But let us pass to the difficulties. Philosophers agree to-day that thetruth of contingent futurities is determinate, that is to say thatcontingent futurities are future, or that they will be, that they willhappen: for it is as sure that the future will be, as it is sure that thepast has been. It was true already a hundred years ago that I should writeto-day, as it will be true after a hundred years that I have written. Thusthe contingent is not, because it is future, any the less contingent; and_determination_, which would be called certainty if it were known, is notincompatible with contingency. Often the certain and the determinate aretaken as one thing, because a determinate truth is capable of being [144]known: thus it may be said that determination is an objective certainty. 

37. This determination comes from the very nature of truth, and cannotinjure freedom: but there are other determinations taken from elsewhere, and in the first place from the foreknowledge of God, which many have heldto be contrary to freedom. They say that what is foreseen cannot fail toexist, and they say so truly; but it follows not that what is foreseen isnecessary, for _necessary truth_ is that whereof the contrary is impossibleor implies contradiction. Now this truth which states that I shall writetomorrow is not of that nature, it is not necessary. Yet supposing that Godforesees it, it is necessary that it come to pass; that is, the consequenceis necessary, namely, that it exist, since it has been foreseen; for God isinfallible. This is what is termed a _hypothetical necessity_. But ourconcern is not this necessity: it is an _absolute necessity_ that isrequired, to be able to say that an action is necessary, that it is notcontingent, that it is not the effect of a free choice. Besides it is veryeasily seen that foreknowledge in itself adds nothing to the determinationof the truth of contingent futurities, save that this determination isknown: and this does not augment the determination or the 'futurition' (asit is termed) of these events, that whereon we agreed at the outset. 

38. This answer is doubtless very correct. It is agreed that foreknowledgein itself does not make truth more determinate; truth is foreseen becauseit is determinate, because it is true; but it is not true because it isforeseen: and therein the knowledge of the future has nothing that is notalso in the knowledge of the past or of the present. But here is what anopponent will be able to say: I grant you that foreknowledge in itself doesnot make truth more determinate, but it is the cause of the foreknowledgethat makes it so. For it needs must be that the foreknowledge of God haveits foundation in the nature of things, and this foundation, making thetruth _predeterminate_, will prevent it from being contingent and free. 

39. It is this difficulty that has caused two parties to spring up, one ofthe _predeterminators_, the other of the supporters of _mediate knowledge_. The Dominicans and the Augustinians are for predetermination, theFranciscans and the modern Jesuits on the other hand are for mediateknowledge. These two parties appeared towards the middle of the sixteenthcentury and a little later. Molina himself, who is perhaps one of the [145]first, with Fonseca, to have systematized this point, and from whom theothers derived their name of Molinists, says in the book that he wrote onthe reconciliation of freewill with grace, about the year 1570, that theSpanish doctors (he means principally the Thomists), who had been writingthen for twenty years, finding no other way to explain how God could have acertain knowledge of contingent futurities, had introduced predeterminationas being necessary to free actions. 

40. As for himself, he thought to have found another way. He considers thatthere are three objects of divine knowledge, the possibles, the actualevents and the conditional events that would happen in consequence of acertain condition if it were translated into action. The knowledge ofpossibilities is what is called the 'knowledge of mere intelligence'; thatof events occurring actually in the progress of the universe is called the'knowledge of intuition'. And as there is a kind of mean between the merelypossible and the pure and absolute event, to wit, the conditional event, itcan be said also, according to Molina, that there is a mediate knowledgebetween that of intuition and that of intelligence. Instance is given ofthe famous example of David asking the divine oracle whether theinhabitants of the town of Keilah, where he designed to shut himself in, would deliver him to Saul, supposing that Saul should besiege the town. Godanswered yes; whereupon David took a different course. Now some advocatesof this mediate knowledge are of opinion that God, foreseeing what menwould do of their own accord, supposing they were placed in such and suchcircumstances, and knowing that they would make ill use of their free will, decrees to refuse them grace and favourable circumstances. And he mayjustly so decree, since in any case these circumstances and these aidswould not have served them aught. But Molina contents himself with findingtherein generally a reason for the decrees of God, founded on what the freecreature would do in such and such circumstances. 

41. I will not enter into all the detail of this controversy; it willsuffice for me to give one instance. Certain older writers, not acceptableto St. Augustine and his first disciples, appear to have had ideas somewhatapproaching those of Molina. The Thomists and those who call themselvesdisciples of St. Augustine (but whom their opponents call Jansenists)combat this doctrine on philosophical and theological grounds. Some [146]maintain that mediate knowledge must be included in the knowledge of mereintelligence. But the principal objection is aimed at the foundation ofthis knowledge. For what foundation can God have for seeing what the peopleof Keilah would do? A simple contingent and free act has nothing in itselfto yield a principle of certainty, unless one look upon it as predeterminedby the decrees of God, and by the causes that are dependent upon them. Consequently the difficulty existing in actual free actions will exist alsoin conditional free actions, that is to say, God will know them only underthe condition of their causes and of his decrees, which are the firstcauses of things: and it will not be possible to separate such actions fromthose causes so as to know a contingent event in a way that is independentof the knowledge of its causes. Therefore all must of necessity be tracedback to the predetermination of God's decrees, and this mediate knowledge(so it will be said) will offer no remedy. The theologians who profess tobe adherents of St. Augustine claim also that the system of the Molinistswould discover the source of God's grace in the good qualities of man, andthis they deem an infringement of God's honour and contrary to St. Paul'steaching. 

42. It would be long and wearisome to enter here into the replies andrejoinders coming from one side and the other, and it will suffice for meto explain how I conceive that there is truth on both sides. For thisresult I resort to my principle of an infinitude of possible worlds, represented in the region of eternal verities, that is, in the object ofthe divine intelligence, where all conditional futurities must becomprised. For the case of the siege of Keilah forms part of a possibleworld, _which differs from ours only in all that is connected with thishypothesis_, and the idea of this possible world represents that whichwould happen in this case. Thus we have a principle for the certainknowledge of contingent futurities, whether they happen actually or musthappen in a certain case. For in the region of the possibles they arerepresented as they are, namely, as free contingencies. Therefore neitherthe foreknowledge of contingent futurities nor the foundation for thecertainty of this foreknowledge should cause us perplexity or seem toprejudice freedom. And though it were true and possible that contingentfuturities consisting in free actions of reasonable creatures were entirelyindependent of the decrees of God and of external causes, there would [147]still be means of foreseeing them; for God would see them as they are inthe region of the possibles, before he decrees to admit them intoexistence. 

43. But if the foreknowledge of God has nothing to do with the dependenceor independence of our free actions, it is not so with the foreordinance ofGod, his decrees, and the sequence of causes which, as I believe, alwayscontribute to the determination of the will. And if I am for the Molinistsin the first point, I am for the predeterminators in the second, providedalways that predetermination be taken as not necessitating. In a word, I amof opinion that the will is always more inclined towards the course itadopts, but that it is never bound by the necessity to adopt it. That itwill adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary. The casecorresponds to that of the famous saying, _Astra inclinant, nonnecessitant_, although here the similarity is not complete. For the eventtowards which the stars tend (to speak with the common herd, as if therewere some foundation for astrology) does not always come to pass, whereasthe course towards which the will is more inclined never fails to beadopted. Moreover the stars would form only a part of the inclinations thatco-operate in the event, but when one speaks of the greater inclination ofthe will, one speaks of the result of all the inclinations. It is almost aswe have spoken above of the consequent will in God, which results from allthe antecedent wills. 

44. Nevertheless, objective certainty or determination does not bring aboutthe necessity of the determinate truth. All philosophers acknowledge this, asserting that the truth of contingent futurities is determinate, and thatnevertheless they remain contingent. The thing indeed would imply nocontradiction in itself if the effect did not follow; and therein liescontingency. The better to understand this point, we must take into accountthat there are two great principles of our arguments. The one is theprinciple of _contradiction_, stating that of two contradictorypropositions the one is true, the other false; the other principle is thatof the _determinant reason_: it states that nothing ever comes to passwithout there being a cause or at least a reason determining it, that is, something to give an _a priori_ reason why it is existent rather thannon-existent, and in this wise rather than in any other. This greatprinciple holds for all events, and a contrary instance will never besupplied: and although more often than not we are insufficiently [148]acquainted with these determinant reasons, we perceive nevertheless thatthere are such. Were it not for this great principle we could never provethe existence of God, and we should lose an infinitude of very just andvery profitable arguments whereof it is the foundation; moreover, itsuffers no exception, for otherwise its force would be weakened. Besides, nothing is so weak as those systems where all is unsteady and full ofexceptions. That fault cannot be laid to the charge of the system Iapprove, where everything happens in accordance with general rules that atmost are mutually restrictive. 

45. We must therefore not imagine with some Schoolmen, whose ideas tendtowards the chimerical, that free contingent futurities have the privilegeof exemption from this general rule of the nature of things. There isalways a prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice, and forthe maintenance of freedom for the will it suffices that this reason shouldincline without necessitating. That is also the opinion of all theancients, of Plato, of Aristotle, of St. Augustine. The will is neverprompted to action save by the representation of the good, which prevailsover the opposite representations. This is admitted even in relation toGod, the good angels and the souls in bliss: and it is acknowledged thatthey are none the less free in consequence of that. God fails not to choosethe best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is nonecessity in the object of God's choice, for another sequence of things isequally possible. For that very reason the choice is free and independentof necessity, because it is made between several possibles, and the will isdetermined only by the preponderating goodness of the object. This istherefore not a defect where God and the saints are concerned: on thecontrary, it would be a great defect, or rather a manifest absurdity, wereit otherwise, even in men here on earth, and if they were capable of actingwithout any inclining reason. Of such absurdity no example will ever befound; and even supposing one takes a certain course out of caprice, todemonstrate one's freedom, the pleasure or advantage one thinks to find inthis conceit is one of the reasons tending towards it. 

46. There is therefore a freedom of contingency or, in a way, ofindifference, provided that by 'indifference' is understood that nothingnecessitates us to one course or the other; but there is never any_indifference of equipoise_, that is, where all is completely even on [149]both sides, without any inclination towards either. Innumerable great andsmall movements, internal and external, co-operate with us, for the mostpart unperceived by us. And I have already said that when one leaves a roomthere are such and such reasons determining us to put the one foot first, without pausing to reflect. For there is not everywhere a slave, as inTrimalchio's house in Petronius, to cry to us: the right foot first. Allthat we have just said agrees entirely also with the maxims of thephilosophers, who teach that a cause cannot act without having adisposition towards action. It is this disposition which contains apredetermination, whether the doer have received it from without, or havehad it in consequence of his own antecedent character. 

47. Thus we have no need to resort, in company with some new Thomists, to anew immediate predetermination by God, such as may cause the free creatureto abandon his indifference, and to a decree of God for predetermining thecreature, making it possible for God to know what the creature will do: forit suffices that the creature be predetermined by its preceding state, which inclines it to one course more than to the other. Moreover, all theseconnexions of the actions of the creature and of all creatures wererepresented in the divine understanding, and known to God through theknowledge of mere intelligence, before he had decreed to give themexistence. Thus we see that, in order to account for the foreknowledge ofGod, one may dispense with both the mediate knowledge of the Molinists andthe predetermination which a Bañez or an Alvarez (writers otherwise ofgreat profundity) have taught. 

48. By this false idea of an indifference of equipoise the Molinists weremuch embarrassed. They were asked not only how it was possible to know inwhat direction a cause absolutely indeterminate would be determined, butalso how it was possible that there should finally result therefrom adetermination for which there is no source: to say with Molina that it isthe privilege of the free cause is to say nothing, but simply to grant thatcause the privilege of being chimerical. It is pleasing to see theirharassed efforts to emerge from a labyrinth whence there is absolutely nomeans of egress. Some teach that the will, before it is determinedformally, must be determined virtually, in order to emerge from its stateof equipoise; and Father Louis of Dole, in his book on the _Co-operation ofGod_, quotes Molinists who attempt to take refuge in this expedient: [150]for they are compelled to acknowledge that the cause must needs be disposedto act. But they gain nothing, they only defer the difficulty: for theywill still be asked how the free cause comes to be determined virtually. They will therefore never extricate themselves without acknowledging thatthere is a predetermination in the preceding state of the free creature, which inclines it to be determined. 

49. In consequence of this, the case also of Buridan's ass between twomeadows, impelled equally towards both of them, is a fiction that cannotoccur in the universe, in the order of Nature, although M. Bayle be ofanother opinion. It is true that, if the case were possible, one must saythat the ass would starve himself to death: but fundamentally the questiondeals in the impossible, unless it be that God bring the thing aboutexpressly. For the universe cannot be halved by a plane drawn through themiddle of the ass, which is cut vertically through its length, so that allis equal and alike on both sides, in the manner wherein an ellipse, andevery plane figure of the number of those I term 'ambidexter', can be thushalved, by any straight line passing through its centre. Neither the partsof the universe nor the viscera of the animal are alike nor are they evenlyplaced on both sides of this vertical plane. There will therefore always bemany things in the ass and outside the ass, although they be not apparentto us, which will determine him to go on one side rather than the other. And although man is free, and the ass is not, nevertheless for the samereason it must be true that in man likewise the case of a perfect equipoisebetween two courses is impossible. Furthermore it is true that an angel, orGod certainly, could always account for the course man has adopted, byassigning a cause or a predisposing reason which has actually induced himto adopt it: yet this reason would often be complex and incomprehensible toourselves, because the concatenation of causes linked together is verylong. 

50. Hence it is that the reason M. Descartes has advanced to prove theindependence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inwardsensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of ourindependence, and we are not aware always of the causes, oftenimperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the magneticneedle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would think thatit was turning independently of any other cause, not being aware of theimperceptible movements of the magnetic matter. Nevertheless we shall [151]see later in what sense it is quite true that the human soul is altogetherits own natural principle in relation to its actions, dependent upon itselfand independent of all other creatures. 

51. As for _volition_ itself, to say that it is an object of free will isincorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will;else we could still say that we will to have the will to will, and thatwould go on to infinity. Besides, we do not always follow the latestjudgement of practical understanding when we resolve to will; but we alwaysfollow, in our willing, the result of all the inclinations that come fromthe direction both of reasons and passions, and this often happens withoutan express judgement of the understanding. 

52. All is therefore certain and determined beforehand in man, aseverywhere else, and the human soul is a kind of _spiritual automaton_, although contingent actions in general and free action in particular arenot on that account necessary with an absolute necessity, which would betruly incompatible with contingency. Thus neither futurition in itself, certain as it is, nor the infallible prevision of God, nor thepredetermination either of causes or of God's decrees destroys thiscontingency and this freedom. That is acknowledged in respect of futuritionand prevision, as has already been set forth. Since, moreover, God's decreeconsists solely in the resolution he forms, after having compared allpossible worlds, to choose that one which is the best, and bring it intoexistence together with all that this world contains, by means of theall-powerful word _Fiat_, it is plain to see that this decree changesnothing in the constitution of things: God leaves them just as they were inthe state of mere possibility, that is, changing nothing either in theiressence or nature, or even in their accidents, which are representedperfectly already in the idea of this possible world. Thus that which iscontingent and free remains no less so under the decrees of God than underhis prevision. 

53. But could God himself (it will be said) then change nothing in theworld? Assuredly he could not now change it, without derogation to hiswisdom, since he has foreseen the existence of this world and of what itcontains, and since, likewise, he has formed this resolution to bring itinto existence: for he cannot be mistaken nor repent, and it did not behovehim to from an imperfect resolution applying to one part and not the [152]whole. Thus, all being ordered from the beginning, it is only because ofthis hypothetical necessity, recognized by everyone, that after God'sprevision or after his resolution nothing can be changed: and yet theevents in themselves remain contingent. For (setting aside this suppositionof the futurition of the thing and of the prevision or of the resolution ofGod, a supposition which already lays it down as a fact that the thing willhappen, and in accordance with which one must say, 'Unumquodque, quandoest, oportet esse, aut unumquodque, siquidem erit, oportet futurum esse'), the event has nothing in it to render it necessary and to suggest that noother thing might have happened in its stead. And as for the connexionbetween causes and effects, it only inclined, without necessitating, thefree agency, as I have just explained; thus it does not produce even ahypothetical necessity, save in conjunction with something from outside, towit, this very maxim, that the prevailing inclination always triumphs. 

54. It will be said also that, if all is ordered, God cannot then performmiracles. But one must bear in mind that the miracles which happen in theworld were also enfolded and represented as possible in this same worldconsidered in the state of mere possibility; and God, who has sinceperformed them, when he chose this world had even then decreed to performthem. Again the objection will be made that vows and prayers, merits anddemerits, good and bad actions avail nothing, since nothing can be changed. This objection causes most perplexity to people in general, and yet it ispurely a sophism. These prayers, these vows, these good or bad actions thatoccur to-day were already before God when he formed the resolution to orderthings. Those things which happen in this existing world were represented, with their effects and their consequences, in the idea of this same world, while it was still possible only; they were represented therein, attractingGod's grace whether natural or supernatural, requiring punishments orrewards, just as it has happened actually in this world since God chose it. The prayer or the good action were even then an _ideal cause_ or_condition_, that is, an inclining reason able to contribute to the graceof God, or to the reward, as it now does in reality. Since, moreover, allis wisely connected together in the world, it is clear that God, foreseeingthat which would happen freely, ordered all other things on that basisbeforehand, or (what is the same) he chose that possible world in [153]which everything was ordered in this fashion. 

55. This consideration demolishes at the same time what the ancients calledthe 'Lazy Sophism' ([Greek: logos argos]) which ended in a decision to donothing: for (people would say) if what I ask is to happen it will happeneven though I should do nothing; and if it is not to happen it will neverhappen, no matter what trouble I take to achieve it. This necessity, supposedly existent in events, and detached from their causes, might betermed _Fatum Mahometanum_, as I have already observed above, because asimilar line of reasoning, so it is said, causes the Turks not to shunplaces ravaged by plague. But the answer is quite ready: the effect beingcertain, the cause that shall produce it is certain also; and if the effectcomes about it will be by virtue of a proportionate cause. Thus yourlaziness perchance will bring it about that you will obtain naught of whatyou desire, and that you will fall into those misfortunes which you wouldby acting with care have avoided. We see, therefore, that the _connexion ofcauses with effects_, far from causing an unendurable fatality, providesrather a means of obviating it. There is a German proverb which says thatdeath will ever have a cause; and nothing is so true. You will die on thatday (let us presume it is so, and that God foresees it): yes, withoutdoubt; but it will be because you will do what shall lead you thither. Itis likewise with the chastisements of God, which also depend upon theircauses. And it will be apposite in this connexion to quote this famouspassage from St. Ambrose (in cap. I _Lucae_), 'Novit Dominus mutaresententiam, si tu noveris mutare delictum', which is not to be understoodas of reprobation, but of denunciation, such as that which Jonah dealt outfor God to the Ninevites. This common saying: 'Si non es praedestinatus, fac ut praedestineris', must not be taken literally, its true sense beingthat he who has doubts of his predestination need only do what is requiredfor him to obtain it by the grace of God. The sophism which ends in adecision to trouble oneself over nothing will haply be useful sometimes toinduce certain people to face danger fearlessly. It has been applied inparticular to Turkish soldiers: but it seems that hashish is a moreimportant factor than this sophism, not to mention the fact that thisresolute spirit in the Turks has greatly belied itself in our days. 

56. A learned physician of Holland named Johan van Beverwyck took thetrouble to write _De Termino Vitae_ and to collect sundry answers, [154]letters and discourses of some learned men of his time on this subject. This collection has been printed, and it is astonishing to see there howoften people are misled, and how they have confused a problem which, properly speaking, is the easiest in the world. After that it is no wonderthat there are very many doubts which the human race cannot abandon. Thetruth is that people love to lose themselves, and this is a kind of rambleof the mind, which is unwilling to subject itself to attention, to order, to rules. It seems as though we are so accustomed to games and jesting thatwe play the fool even in the most serious occupations, and when we leastthink to do so. 

57. I fear that in the recent dispute between the theologians of theAugsburg Confession, _De Termino Paenitentiae Peremptorio_, which hascalled forth so many treatises in Germany, some misunderstanding, though ofa different nature, has slipped in. The terms prescribed by the laws areamongst lawyers known as _fatalia_. It may be said, in a sense, that the_peremptory term_, prescribed to man for his repentance and amendment, iscertain in the sight of God, with whom all is certain. God knows when asinner will be so hardened that thereafter nothing can be done for him: notindeed that it would be impossible for him to do penance or that sufficientgrace needs must be refused to him after a certain term, a grace that neverfails; but because there will be a time whereafter he will no more approachthe ways of salvation. But we never have certain marks for recognizing thisterm, and we are never justified in considering a man utterly abandoned:that would be to pass a rash judgement. It were better always to have roomfor hope; and this is an occasion, with a thousand others, where ourignorance is beneficial. 

 _Prudens futuri temporis exitum_ _Caliginosa nocte premit Deus_. 

58. The whole future is doubtless determined: but since we know not what itis, nor what is foreseen or resolved, we must do our duty, according to thereason that God has given us and according to the rules that he hasprescribed for us; and thereafter we must have a quiet mind, and leave toGod himself the care for the outcome. For he will never fail to do thatwhich shall be the best, not only in general but also in particular, forthose who have true confidence in him, that is, a confidence composed [155]of true piety, a lively faith and fervent charity, by virtue of which wewill, as far as in us lies, neglect nothing appertaining to our duty andhis service. It is true that we cannot 'render service' to him, for he hasneed of nothing: but it is 'serving him', in our parlance, when we striveto carry out his presumptive will, co-operating in the good as it is knownto us, wherever we can contribute thereto. For we must always presume thatGod is prompted towards the good we know, until the event shows us that hehad stronger reasons, although perhaps unknown to us, which have made himsubordinate this good that we sought to some other greater good of his owndesigning, which he has not failed or will not fail to effect. 

59. I have just shown how the action of the will depends upon its causes;that there is nothing so appropriate to human nature as this dependence ofour actions; and that otherwise one would slip into a preposterous andunendurable fatality, namely into the _Fatum Mahometanum_, which is theworst of all because it overthrows foresight and good counsel. It is wellto show, notwithstanding, how this dependence of voluntary actions does notfundamentally preclude the existence within us of a wonderful_spontaneity_, which in a certain sense makes the soul in its resolvesindependent of the physical influence of all other creatures. Thisspontaneity, hitherto little recognized, which exalts our command over ouractions to the highest pitch, is a consequence of the System ofPre-established Harmony, of which I must give some explanation here. TheScholastic philosophers believed that there was a reciprocal physicalinfluence between body and soul: but since it has been recognized thatthought and dimensional mass have no mutual connexion, and that they arecreatures differing _toto genere_, many moderns have acknowledged thatthere is no _physical communication_ between soul and body, despite the_metaphysical communication_ always subsisting, which causes soul and bodyto compose one and the same _suppositum_, or what is called a person. Thisphysical communication, if there were such, would cause the soul to changethe degree of speed and the directional line of some motions that are inthe body, and _vice versa_ the body to change the sequence of the thoughtsthat are in the soul. But this effect cannot be inferred from any notionconceived in the body and in the soul; though nothing be better known to usthan the soul, since it is inmost to us, that is to say inmost to itself. 

 [156]60. M. Descartes wished to compromise and to make a part of the body'saction dependent upon the soul. He believed in the existence of a rule ofNature to the effect, according to him, that the same quantity of movementis conserved in bodies. He deemed it not possible that the influence of thesoul should violate this law of bodies, but he believed that the soulnotwithstanding might have power to change the direction of the movementsthat are made in the body; much as a rider, though giving no force to thehorse he mounts, nevertheless controls it by guiding that force in anydirection he pleases. But as that is done by means of the bridle, the bit, the spurs and other material aids, it is conceivable how that can be; thereare, however, no instruments such as the soul may employ for this result, nothing indeed either in the soul or in the body, that is, either inthought or in the mass, which may serve to explain this change of the oneby the other. In a word, that the soul should change the quantity of forceand that it should change the line of direction, both these things areequally inexplicable. 

61. Moreover, two important truths on this subject have been discoveredsince M. Descartes' day. The first is that the quantity of absolute forcewhich is in fact conserved is different from the quantity of movement, as Ihave demonstrated elsewhere. The second discovery is that the samedirection is still conserved in all bodies together that are assumed asinteracting, in whatever way they come into collision. If this rule hadbeen known to M. Descartes, he would have taken the direction of bodies tobe as independent of the soul as their force; and I believe that that wouldhave led direct to the Hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony, whither thesesame rules have led me. For apart from the fact that the physical influenceof one of these substances on the other is inexplicable, I recognized thatwithout a complete derangement of the laws of Nature the soul could not actphysically upon the body. And I did not believe that one could here listento philosophers, competent in other respects, who produce a God, as itwere, _ex machina_, to bring about the final solution of the piece, maintaining that God exerts himself deliberately to move bodies as the soulpleases, and to give perceptions to the soul as the body requires. For thissystem, which is called that of _occasional causes_ (because it teachesthat God acts on the body at the instance of the soul, and _vice versa_), besides introducing perpetual miracles to establish communication [157]between these two substances, does not obviate the derangement of thenatural laws obtaining in each of these same substances, which, in thegeneral opinion, their mutual influence would cause. 

62. Being on other considerations already convinced of the principle ofHarmony in general, I was in consequence convinced likewise of the_preformation_ and the Pre-established Harmony of all things amongstthemselves, of that between nature and grace, between the decrees of Godand our actions foreseen, between all parts of matter, and even between thefuture and the past, the whole in conformity with the sovereign wisdom ofGod, whose works are the most harmonious it is possible to conceive. Thus Icould not fail to arrive at the system which declares that God created thesoul in the beginning in such a fashion that it must produce and representto itself successively that which takes place within the body, and the bodyalso in such a fashion that it must do of itself that which the soulordains. Consequently the laws that connect the thoughts of the soul in theorder of final causes and in accordance with the evolution of perceptionsmust produce pictures that meet and harmonize with the impressions ofbodies on our organs; and likewise the laws of movements in the body, whichfollow one another in the order of efficient causes, meet and so harmonizewith the thoughts of the soul that the body is induced to act at the timewhen the soul wills it. 

63. Far from its being prejudicial, nothing can be more favourable tofreedom than that system. And M. Jacquelot has demonstrated well in hisbook on the _Conformity of Faith with Reason_, that it is just as if he whoknows all that I shall order a servant to do the whole day long on themorrow made an automaton entirely resembling this servant, to carry outto-morrow at the right moment all that I should order; and yet that wouldnot prevent me from ordering freely all that I should please, although theaction of the automaton that would serve me would not be in the least free. 

64. Moreover, since all that passes in the soul depends, according to thissystem, only upon the soul, and its subsequent state is derived only fromit and from its present state, how can one give it a greater_independence_? It is true that there still remains some imperfection inthe constitution of the soul. All that happens to the soul depends upon it, but depends not always upon its will; that were too much. Nor are such[158]happenings even recognized always by its understanding or perceived withdistinctness. For there is in the soul not only an order of distinctperceptions, forming its dominion, but also a series of confusedperceptions or passions, forming its bondage: and there is no need forastonishment at that; the soul would be a Divinity if it had none butdistinct perceptions. It has nevertheless some power over these confusedperceptions also, even if in an indirect manner. For although it cannotchange its passions forthwith, it can work from afar towards that end withenough success, and endue itself with new passions and even habits. It evenhas a like power over the more distinct perceptions, being able to endueitself indirectly with opinions and intentions, and to hinder itself fromhaving this one or that, and stay or hasten its judgement. For we can seekmeans beforehand to arrest ourselves, when occasion arises, on the slidingstep of a rash judgement; we can find some incident to justify postponementof our resolution even at the moment when the matter appears ready to bejudged. Although our opinion and our act of willing be not directly objectsof our will (as I have already observed), one sometimes, takes measuresnevertheless, to will and even to believe in due time, that which one doesnot will, or believe, now. So great is the profundity of the spirit of man. 

65. And now, to bring to a conclusion this question of _spontaneity_, itmust be said that, on a rigorous definition, the soul has within it theprinciple of all its actions, and even of all its passions, and that thesame is true in all the simple substances scattered throughout Nature, although there be freedom only in those that are intelligent. In thepopular sense notwithstanding, speaking in accordance with appearances, wemust say that the soul depends in some way upon the body and upon theimpressions of the senses: much as we speak with Ptolemy and Tycho ineveryday converse, and think with Copernicus, when it is a question of therising and the setting of the sun. 

66. One may however give a true and philosophic sense to this _mutualdependence_ which we suppose between the soul and the body. It is that theone of these two substances depends upon the other ideally, in so far asthe reason of that which is done in the one can be furnished by that whichis in the other. This had already happened when God ordered beforehand theharmony that there would be between them. Even so would that [159]automaton, that should fulfil the servant's function, depend upon me_ideally_, in virtue of the knowledge of him who, foreseeing my futureorders, would have rendered it capable of serving me at the right momentall through the morrow. The knowledge of my future intentions would haveactuated this great craftsman, who would accordingly have fashioned theautomaton: my influence would be objective, and his physical. For in so faras the soul has perfection and distinct thoughts, God has accommodated thebody to the soul, and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled toexecute its orders. And in so far as the soul is imperfect and as itsperceptions are confused, God has accommodated the soul to the body, insuch sort that the soul is swayed by the passions arising out of corporealrepresentations. This produces the same effect and the same appearance asif the one depended immediately upon the other, and by the agency of aphysical influence. Properly speaking, it is by its confused thoughts thatthe soul represents the bodies which encompass it. The same thing mustapply to all that we understand by the actions of simple substances oneupon another. For each one is assumed to act upon the other in proportionto its perfection, although this be only ideally, and in the reasons ofthings, as God in the beginning ordered one substance to accord withanother in proportion to the perfection or imperfection that there is ineach. (Withal action and passion are always reciprocal in creatures, because one part of the reasons which serve to explain clearly what isdone, and which have served to bring it into existence, is in the one ofthese substances, and another part of these reasons is in the other, perfections and imperfections being always mingled and shared. ) Thus it iswe attribute _action_ to the one, and _passion_ to the other. 

67. But after all, whatsoever dependence be conceived in voluntary actions, and even though there were an absolute and mathematical necessity (whichthere is not) it would not follow that there would not be a sufficientdegree of freedom to render rewards and punishments just and reasonable. Itis true that generally we speak as though the necessity of the action putan end to all merit and all demerit, all justification for praise andblame, for reward and punishment: but it must be admitted that thisconclusion is not entirely correct. I am very far from sharing the opinionsof Bradwardine, Wyclif, Hobbes and Spinoza, who advocate, so it seems, [160]this entirely mathematical necessity, which I think I have adequatelyrefuted, and perhaps more clearly than is customary. Yet one must alwaysbear testimony to the truth and not impute to a dogma anything that doesnot result from it. Moreover, these arguments prove too much, since theywould prove just as much against hypothetical necessity, and would justifythe lazy sophism. For the absolute necessity of the sequence of causeswould in this matter add nothing to the infallible certainty of ahypothetical necessity. 

68. In the first place, therefore, it must be agreed that it is permittedto kill a madman when one cannot by other means defend oneself. It will begranted also that it is permitted, and often even necessary, to destroyvenomous or very noxious animals, although they be not so by their ownfault. 

69. Secondly, one inflicts punishments upon a beast, despite its lack ofreason and freedom, when one deems that this may serve to correct it: thusone punishes dogs and horses, and indeed with much success. Rewards serveus no less in the managing of animals: when an animal is hungry, the foodthat is given to him causes him to do what otherwise would never beobtained from him. 

70. Thirdly, one would inflict even on beasts capital punishments (where itis no longer a question of correcting the beast that is punished) if thispunishment could serve as an example, or inspire terror in others, to makethem cease from evil doing. Rorarius, in his book on reason in beasts, saysthat in Africa they crucified lions, in order to drive away other lionsfrom the towns and frequented places, and that he had observed in passingthrough the province of Jülich that they hanged wolves there in order toensure greater safety for the sheepfolds. There are people in the villagesalso who nail birds of prey to the doors of houses, with the idea thatother birds of the same kind will then not so readily appear. Thesemeasures would always be justified if they were of any avail. 

71. Then, in the fourth place, since experience proves that the fear ofchastisements and the hope of rewards serves to make men abstain from eviland strive to do good, one would have good reason to avail oneself of such, even though men were acting under necessity, whatever the necessity mightbe. The objection will be raised that if good or evil is necessary it isuseless to avail oneself of means to obtain it or to hinder it: but theanswer has already been given above in the passage combating the lazy [161]sophism. If good or evil were a necessity without these means, then suchmeans would be unavailing; but it is not so. These goods and evils comeonly with the aid of these means, and if these results were necessary themeans would be a part of the causes rendering them necessary, sinceexperience teaches us that often fear or hope hinders evil or advancesgood. This objection, then, differs hardly at all from the lazy sophism, which we raise against the certainty as well as the necessity of futureevents. Thus one may say that these objections are directed equally againsthypothetical necessity and absolute necessity, and that they prove as muchagainst the one as against the other, that is to say, nothing at all. 

72. There was a great dispute between Bishop Bramhall and Mr. Hobbes, whichbegan when they were both in Paris, and which was continued after theirreturn to England; all the parts of it are to be found collected in aquarto volume published in London in the year 1656. They are all inEnglish, and have not been translated as far as I know, nor inserted in theCollection of Works in Latin by Mr. Hobbes. I had already read thesewritings, and have obtained them again since. And I had observed at theoutset that he had not at all proved the absolute necessity of all things, but had shown sufficiently that necessity would not overthrow all the rulesof divine or human justice, and would not prevent altogether the exerciseof this virtue. 

73. There is, however, a kind of justice and a certain sort of rewards andof punishments which appear not so applicable to those who should act by anabsolute necessity, supposing such necessity existed. It is that kind ofjustice which has for its goal neither improvement nor example, nor evenredress of the evil. This justice has its foundation only in the fitness ofthings, which demands a certain satisfaction for the expiation of an evilaction. The Socinians, Hobbes and some others do not admit this punitivejustice, which properly speaking is avenging justice. God reserves it forhimself in many cases; but he does not fail to grant it to those who areentitled to govern others, and he exercises it through their agency, provided that they act under the influence of reason and not of passion. The Socinians believe it to be without foundation, but it always has somefoundation in that fitness of things which gives satisfaction not only tothe injured but also to the wise who see it; even as a beautiful piece ofmusic, or again a good piece of architecture, satisfies cultivated [162]minds. And the wise lawgiver having threatened, and having, so to speak, promised a chastisement, it befits his consistency not to leave the actioncompletely unpunished, even though the punishment would no longer avail tocorrect anyone. But even though he should have promised nothing, it isenough that there is a fitness of things which could have prompted him tomake this promise, since the wise man likewise promises only that which isfitting. And one may even say that there is here a certain compensation ofthe mind, which would be scandalized by disorder if the chastisement didnot contribute towards restoring order. One can also consult what Grotiuswrote against the Socinians, of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, and theanswer of Crellius thereto. 

74. Thus it is that the pains of the damned continue, even when they nolonger serve to turn them away from evil, and that likewise the rewards ofthe blessed continue, even when they no longer serve for strengthening themin good. One may say nevertheless that the damned ever bring uponthemselves new pains through new sins, and that the blessed ever bring uponthemselves new joys by new progress in goodness: for both are founded onthe _principle of the fitness of things_, which has seen to it that affairswere so ordered that the evil action must bring upon itself a chastisement. There is good reason to believe, following the parallelism of the tworealms, that of final causes and that of efficient causes, that God hasestablished in the universe a connexion between punishment or reward andbad or good action, in accordance wherewith the first should always beattracted by the second, and virtue and vice obtain their reward and theirpunishment in consequence of the natural sequence of things, which containsstill another kind of pre-established harmony than that which appears inthe communication between the soul and the body. For, in a word, all thatGod does, as I have said already, is harmonious to perfection. Perhaps thenthis principle of the fitness of things would no longer apply to beingsacting without true freedom or exemption from absolute necessity; and inthat case corrective justice alone would be administered, and not punitivejustice. That is the opinion of the famous Conringius, in a dissertation hepublished on what is just. And indeed, the reasons Pomponazzi employed inhis book on fate, to prove the usefulness of chastisements and rewards, even though all should come about in our actions by a fatal necessity, [163]concern only amendment and not satisfaction, [Greek: kolasin ou timôrian]. Moreover, it is only for the sake of outward appearances that one destroysanimals accessary to certain crimes, as one razes the houses of rebels, that is, to inspire terror. Thus it is an act of corrective justice, wherein punitive justice has no part at all. 

75. But we will not amuse ourselves now by discussing a question morecurious than necessary, since we have shown sufficiently that there is nosuch necessity in voluntary actions. Nevertheless it was well to show that_imperfect freedom_ alone, that is, freedom which is exempt only fromconstraint, would suffice as foundation for chastisements and rewards ofthe kind conducive to the avoidance of evil, and to amendment. One seesalso from this that some persons of intelligence, who persuade themselvesthat everything is necessary, are wrong in saying that none must be praisedor blamed, rewarded or punished. Apparently they say so only to exercisetheir wit: the pretext is that all being necessary nothing would be in ourpower. But this pretext is ill founded: necessary actions would be still inour power, at least in so far as we could perform them or omit them, whenthe hope or the fear of praise or blame, of pleasure or pain prompted ourwill thereto, whether they prompted it of necessity, or in prompting itthey left spontaneity, contingency and freedom all alike unimpaired. Thuspraise and blame, rewards and punishments would preserve always a largepart of their use, even though there were a true necessity in our actions. We can praise and blame also natural good and bad qualities, where the willhas no part--in a horse, in a diamond, in a man; and he who said of Cato ofUtica that he acted virtuously through the goodness of his nature, and thatit was impossible for him to behave otherwise, thought to praise him themore. 

76. The difficulties which I have endeavoured up to now to remove have beenalmost all common to natural and revealed theology. Now it will benecessary to come to a question of revealed theology, concerning theelection or the reprobation of men, with the dispensation or use of divinegrace in connexion with these acts of the mercy or the justice of God. Butwhen I answered the preceding objections, I opened up a way to meet thosethat remain. This confirms the observation I made thereon (_PreliminaryDissertation, _ 43) that there is rather a conflict between the true [164]reasons of natural theology and the false reasons of human appearances, than between revealed faith and reason. For on this subject scarcely anydifficulty arises that is new, and not deriving its origin from those whichcan be placed in the way of the truths discerned by reason. 

77. Now as theologians of all parties are divided among themselves on thissubject of predestination and grace, and often give different answers tothe same objections, according to their various principles, one cannotavoid touching on the differences which prevail among them. One may say ingeneral that some look upon God more metaphysically and others moremorally: and it has already been stated on other occasions that theCounter-Remonstrants took the first course and the Remonstrants the second. But to act rightly we must affirm alike on one side the independence of Godand the dependence of creatures, and on the other side the justice andgoodness of God, which makes him dependent upon himself, his will upon hisunderstanding or his wisdom. 

78. Some gifted and well-intentioned authors, desiring to show the force ofthe reasons advocated by the two principal parties, in order to persuadethem to a mutual tolerance, deem that the whole controversy is reduced tothis essential point, namely: What was God's principal aim in making hisdecrees with regard to man? Did he make them solely in order to show forthhis glory by manifesting his attributes, and forming, to that end, thegreat plan of creation and providence? Or has he had regard rather to thevoluntary movements of intelligent substances which he designed to create, considering what they would will and do in the different circumstances andsituations wherein he might place them, so as to form a fitting resolvethereupon? It appears to me that the two answers to this great questionthus given as opposites to one another are easy to reconcile, and that inconsequence the two parties would be agreed in principle, without any needof tolerance, if all were reduced to this point. In truth God, in designingto create the world, purposed solely to manifest and communicate hisperfections in the way that was most efficacious, and most worthy of hisgreatness, his wisdom and his goodness. But that very purpose pledged himto consider all the actions of creatures while still in the state of purepossibility, that he might form the most fitting plan. He is like a greatarchitect whose aim in view is the satisfaction or the glory of having[165]built a beautiful palace, and who considers all that is to enter into thisconstruction: the form and the materials, the place, the situation, themeans, the workmen, the expense, before he forms a complete resolve. For awise person in laying his plans cannot separate the end from the means; hedoes not contemplate any end without knowing if there are means ofattaining thereto. 

79. I know not whether there are also perchance persons who imagine that, God being the absolute master of all things, one can thence infer thateverything outside him is indifferent to him, that he considers himselfalone, without concern for others, and that thus he has made some happy andothers unhappy without any cause, without choice, without reason. But toteach so about God were to deprive him of wisdom and of goodness. We needonly observe that he considers himself and neglects nothing of what he owesto himself, to conclude that he considers his creatures also, and that heuses them in the manner most consistent with order. For the more a greatand good prince is mindful of his glory, the more he will think of makinghis subjects happy, even though he were the most absolute of all monarchs, and though his subjects were slaves from birth, bondsmen (in lawyers'parlance), people entirely in subjection to arbitrary power. Calvin himselfand some others of the greatest defenders of the absolute decree rightlymaintained that God had _great and just reasons_ for his election and thedispensation of his grace, although these reasons be unknown to us indetail: and we must judge charitably that the most rigid predestinatorshave too much reason and too much piety to depart from this opinion. 

80. There will therefore be no argument for debate on that point (as Ihope) with people who are at all reasonable. But there will always beargument among those who are called Universalists and Particularists, according to what they teach of the grace and the will of God. Yet I amsomewhat inclined to believe that the heated dispute between them on thewill of God to save all men, and on that which depends upon it (when onekeeps separate the doctrine _de Auxiliis_, or of the assistance of grace), rests rather in expressions than in things. For it is sufficient toconsider that God, as well as every wise and beneficent mind, is inclinedtowards all possible good, and that this inclination is proportionate tothe excellence of the good. Moreover, this results (if we take the [166]matter precisely and in itself) from an 'antecedent will', as it is termed, which, however, is not always followed by its complete effect, because thiswise mind must have many other inclinations besides. Thus it is the resultof all the inclinations together that makes his will complete anddecretory, as I have already explained. One may therefore very well saywith ancient writers that God wills to save all men according to hisantecedent will, but not according to his consequent will, which neverfails to be followed by its effect. And if those who deny this universalwill do not allow that the antecedent inclination be called a will, theyare only troubling themselves about a question of name. 

81. But there is a question more serious in regard to predestination toeternal life and to all other destination by God, to wit, whether thisdestination is absolute or respective. There is destination to good anddestination to evil; and as evil is moral or physical, theologians of allparties agree that there is no destination to moral evil, that is to say, that none is destined to sin. As for the greatest physical evil, which isdamnation, one can distinguish between destination and predestination: forpredestination appears to contain within itself an absolute destination, which is anterior to the consideration of the good or evil actions of thosewhom it concerns. Thus one may say that the reprobate are _destined_ to becondemned, because they are known to be impenitent. But it cannot so wellbe said that the reprobate are _predestined_ to damnation: for there is no_absolute_ reprobation, its foundation being final foreseen impenitence. 

82. It is true that there are writers who maintain that God, wishing tomanifest his mercy and his justice in accordance with reasons worthy ofhim, but unknown to us, chose the elect, and in consequence rejected thedamned, prior to all thought of sin, even of Adam, that after this resolvehe thought fit to permit sin in order to be able to exercise these twovirtues, and that he has bestowed grace in Jesus Christ to some in order tosave them, while he has refused it to others in order to be able to punishthem. Hence these writers are named 'Supralapsarians', because the decreeto punish precedes, according to them, the knowledge of the futureexistence of sin. But the opinion most common to-day amongst those who arecalled Reformed, and one that is favoured by the Synod of Dordrecht, isthat of the 'Infralapsarians', corresponding somewhat to the conception ofSt. Augustine. For he asserts that God having resolved to permit the [167]sin of Adam and the corruption of the human race, for reasons just buthidden, his mercy made him choose some of the corrupt mass to be freelysaved by the merit of Jesus Christ, and his justice made him resolve topunish the others by the damnation that they deserved. That is why, withthe Schoolmen, only the saved were called _Praedestinati_ and the damnedwere called _Praesciti_. It must be admitted that some Infralapsarians andothers speak sometimes of predestination to damnation, following theexample of Fulgentius and of St. Augustine himself: but that signifies thesame as destination to them, and it avails nothing to wrangle about words. That pretext, notwithstanding, was in time past used for maltreating thatGodescalc who caused a stir about the middle of the ninth century, and whotook the name of Fulgentius to indicate that he followed that author. 

83. As for the destination of the elect to eternal life, the Protestants, as well as those of the Roman Church, dispute much among themselves as towhether election is absolute or is founded on the prevision of final livingfaith. Those who are called Evangelicals, that is, those of the AugsburgConfession, hold the latter opinion: they believe that one need not go intothe hidden causes of election while one may find a manifest cause of itshown in Holy Scripture, which is faith in Jesus Christ; and it appears tothem that the prevision of the cause is also the cause of the prevision ofthe effect. Those who are called Reformed are of a different opinion: theyadmit that salvation comes from faith in Jesus Christ, but they observethat often the cause anterior to the effect in execution is posterior inintention, as when the cause is the means and the effect is the end. Thusthe question is, whether faith or salvation is anterior in the intention ofGod, that is, whether God's design is rather to save man than to make him abeliever. 

84. Hence we see that the question between the Supralapsarians and theInfralapsarians in part, and again between them and the Evangelicals, comesback to a right conception of the order that is in God's decrees. Perhapsone might put an end to this dispute at once by saying that, properlyspeaking, all the decrees of God that are here concerned are simultaneous, not only in respect of time, as everyone agrees, but also _in signorationis_, or in the order of nature. And indeed, the Formula of Concord, building upon some passages of St. Augustine, comprised in the same [168]Decree of Election salvation and the means that conduce to it. Todemonstrate this synchronism of destinations or of decrees with which weare concerned, we must revert to the expedient that I have employed morethan once, which states that God, before decreeing anything, consideredamong other possible sequences of things that one which he afterwardsapproved. In the idea of this is represented how the first parents sin andcorrupt their posterity; how Jesus Christ redeems the human race; how some, aided by such and such graces, attain to final faith and to salvation; andhow others, with or without such or other graces, do not attain thereto, continue in sin, and are damned. God grants his sanction to this sequenceonly after having entered into all its detail, and thus pronounces nothingfinal as to those who shall be saved or damned without having pondered uponeverything and compared it with other possible sequences. Thus God'spronouncement concerns the whole sequence at the same time; he simplydecrees its existence. In order to save other men, or in a different way, he must needs choose an altogether different sequence, seeing that all isconnected in each sequence. In this conception of the matter, which is thatmost worthy of the All-wise, all whose actions are connected together tothe highest possible degree, there would be only one total decree, which isto create such a world. This total decree comprises equally all theparticular decrees, without setting one of them before or after another. Yet one may say also that each particular act of antecedent will enteringinto the total result has its value and order, in proportion to the goodwhereto this act inclines. But these acts of antecedent will are not calleddecrees, since they are not yet inevitable, the outcome depending upon thetotal result. According to this conception of things, all the difficultiesthat can here be made amount to the same as those I have already stated andremoved in my inquiry concerning the origin of evil. 

85. There remains only one important matter of discussion, which has itspeculiar difficulties. It is that of the dispensation of the means andcircumstances contributing to salvation and to damnation. This comprisesamongst others the subject of the Aids of Grace (_de auxiliis gratiae_), onwhich Rome (since the Congregation _de Auxiliis_ under Clement VIII, when adebate took place between the Dominicans and the Jesuits) does not readilypermit books to be published. Everyone must agree that God is [169]altogether good and just, that his goodness makes him contribute the leastpossible to that which can render men guilty, and the most possible to thatwhich serves to save them (possible, I say, subject to the general order ofthings); that his justice prevents him from condemning innocent men, andfrom leaving good actions without reward; and that he even keeps an exactproportion in punishments and rewards. Nevertheless, this idea that oneshould have of the goodness and the justice of God does not appear enoughin what we know of his actions with regard to the salvation and thedamnation of men: and it is that which makes difficulties concerning sinand its remedies. 

86. The first difficulty is how the soul could be infected with originalsin, which is the root of actual sins, without injustice on God's part inexposing the soul thereto. This difficulty has given rise to three opinionson the origin of the soul itself. The first is that of the _pre-existenceof human souls_ in another world or in another life, where they had sinnedand on that account had been condemned to this prison of the human body, anopinion of the Platonists which is attributed to Origen and which evento-day finds adherents. Henry More, an English scholar, advocated somethinglike this dogma in a book written with that express purpose. Some of thosewho affirm this pre-existence have gone as far as metempsychosis. Theyounger van Helmont held this opinion, and the ingenious author of somemetaphysical _Meditations_, published in 1678 under the name of WilliamWander, appears to have some leaning towards it. The second opinion is thatof _Traduction_, as if the soul of children were engendered (_pertraducem_) from the soul or souls of those from whom the body isengendered. St. Augustine inclined to this judgement the better to explainoriginal sin. This doctrine is taught also by most of the theologians ofthe Augsburg Confession. Nevertheless it is not completely establishedamong them, since the Universities of Jena and Helmstedt, and othersbesides, have long been opposed to it. The third opinion, and that mostwidely accepted to-day, is that of _Creation_: it is taught in the majorityof the Christian Schools, but it is fraught with the greatest difficulty inrespect of original sin. 

87. Into this controversy of theologians on the origin of the human soulhas entered the philosophic dispute on _the origin of forms. _ Aristotle andscholastic philosophy after him called _Form_ that which is a [170]principle of action and is found in that which acts. This inward principleis either substantial, being then termed 'Soul', when it is in an organicbody, or accidental, and customarily termed 'Quality'. The same philosophergave to the soul the generic name of 'Entelechy' or _Act_. This word'Entelechy' apparently takes its origin from the Greek word signifying'perfect', and hence the celebrated Ermolao Barbaro expressed it literallyin Latin by _perfectihabia_: for Act is a realization of potency. And hehad no need to consult the Devil, as men say he did, in order to learnthat. Now the Philosopher of Stagira supposes that there are two kinds ofAct, the permanent act and the successive act. The permanent or lasting actis nothing but the Substantial or Accidental Form: the substantial form (asfor example the soul) is altogether permanent, at least according to myjudgement, and the accidental is only so for a time. But the altogethermomentary act, whose nature is transitory, consists in action itself. Ihave shown elsewhere that the notion of Entelechy is not altogether to bescorned, and that, being permanent, it carries with it not only a merefaculty for action, but also that which is called 'force', 'effort', 'conatus', from which action itself must follow if nothing prevents it. Faculty is only an _attribute_, or rather sometimes a mode; but force, whenit is not an ingredient of substance itself (that is, force which is notprimitive but derivative), is a _quality_, which is distinct and separablefrom substance. I have shown also how one may suppose that the soul is aprimitive force which is modified and varied by derivative forces orqualities, and exercised in actions. 

88. Now philosophers have troubled themselves exceedingly on the questionof the origin of substantial forms. For to say that the compound of formand matter is produced and that the form is only _comproduced_ meansnothing. The common opinion was that forms were derived from the potency ofmatter, this being called _Eduction_. That also meant in fact nothing, butit was explained in a sense by a comparison with shapes: for that of astatue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble. Thiscomparison might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation, as in thecase of shape. Some have thought that forms were sent from heaven, and evencreated expressly, when bodies were produced. Julius Scaliger hinted thatit was possible that forms were rather derived from the active potency ofthe efficient cause (that is to say, either from that of God in the [171]case of Creation or from that of other forms in the case of generation), than from the passive potency of matter. And that, in the case ofgeneration, meant a return to traduction. Daniel Sennert, a famous doctorand physicist at Wittenberg, cherished this opinion, particularly inrelation to animate bodies which are multiplied through seed. A certainJulius Caesar della Galla, an Italian living in the Low Countries, and adoctor of Groningen named Johan Freitag wrote with much vehemence inopposition to Sennert. Johann Sperling, a professor at Wittenberg, made adefence of his master, and finally came into conflict with Johann Zeisold, a professor at Jena, who upheld the belief that the human soul is created. 

89. But traduction and eduction are equally inexplicable when it is aquestion of finding the origin of the soul. It is not the same withaccidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, andtheir origin may be explained by eduction, that is, by variation oflimitations, in the same way as the origin of shapes. But it is quiteanother matter when we are concerned with the origin of a substance, whosebeginning and destruction are equally difficult to explain. Sennert andSperling did not venture to admit the subsistence and the indestructibilityof the souls of beasts or of other primitive forms, although they allowedthat they were indivisible and immaterial. But the fact is that theyconfused indestructibility with immortality, whereby is understood in thecase of man that not only the soul but also the personality subsists. Insaying that the soul of man is immortal one implies the subsistence of whatmakes the identity of the person, something which retains its moralqualities, conserving the _consciousness_, or the reflective inwardfeeling, of what it is: thus it is rendered susceptible to chastisement orreward. But this conservation of personality does not occur in the souls ofbeasts: that is why I prefer to say that they are imperishable rather thanto call them immortal. Yet this misapprehension appears to have been thecause of a great inconsistency in the doctrine of the Thomists and of othergood philosophers: they recognized the immateriality or indivisibility ofall souls, without being willing to admit their indestructibility, greatlyto the prejudice of the immortality of the human soul. John Scot, that is, the Scotsman (which formerly signified Hibernian or Erigena), a famouswriter of the time of Louis the Debonair and of his sons, was for theconservation of all souls: and I see not why there should be less [172]objection to making the atoms of Epicurus or of Gassendi endure, than toaffirming the subsistence of all truly simple and indivisible substances, which are the sole and true atoms of Nature. And Pythagoras was right insaying generally, as Ovid makes him say:

 _Morte carent animae_. 

90. Now as I like maxims which hold good and admit of the fewest exceptionspossible, here is what has appeared to me most reasonable in every sense onthis important question. I consider that souls and simple substancesaltogether cannot begin except by creation, or end except by annihilation. Moreover, as the formation of organic animate bodies appears explicable inthe order of nature only when one assumes a _preformation_ already organic, I have thence inferred that what we call generation of an animal is only atransformation and augmentation. Thus, since the same body was alreadyfurnished with organs, it is to be supposed that it was already animate, and that it had the same soul: so I assume _vice versa_, from theconservation of the soul when once it is created, that the animal is alsoconserved, and that apparent death is only an envelopment, there being nolikelihood that in the order of nature souls exist entirely separated fromall body, or that what does not begin naturally can cease through naturalforces. 

91. Considering that so admirable an order and rules so general areestablished in regard to animals, it does not appear reasonable that manshould be completely excluded from that order, and that everything inrelation to his soul should come about in him by miracle. Besides I havepointed out repeatedly that it is of the essence of God's wisdom that allshould be harmonious in his works, and that nature should be parallel withgrace. It is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be humansouls, like those of other species, have been in the seed, and in theprogenitors as far back as Adam, and have consequently existed since thebeginning of things, always in a kind of organic body. On this point itseems that M. Swammerdam, Father Malebranche, M. Bayle, Mr. Pitcairne, M. Hartsoeker and numerous other very able persons share my opinion. Thisdoctrine is also sufficiently confirmed by the microscope observations ofM. Leeuwenhoek and other good observers. But it also for divers reasonsappears likely to me that they existed then as sentient or animal [173]souls only, endowed with perception and feeling, and devoid of reason. Further I believe that they remained in this state up to the time of thegeneration of the man to whom they were to belong, but that then theyreceived reason, whether there be a natural means of raising a sentientsoul to the degree of a reasoning soul (a thing I find it difficult toimagine) or whether God may have given reason to this soul through somespecial operation, or (if you will) by a kind of _transcreation_. Thislatter is easier to admit, inasmuch as revelation teaches much about otherforms of immediate operation by God upon our souls. This explanationappears to remove the obstacles that beset this matter in philosophy ortheology. For the difficulty of the origin of forms thus disappearscompletely; and besides it is much more appropriate to divine justice togive the soul, already corrupted _physically_ or on the animal side by thesin of Adam, a new perfection which is reason, than to put a reasoningsoul, by creation or otherwise, in a body wherein it is to be corrupted_morally_. 

92. Now the soul being once under the domination of sin, and ready tocommit sin in actual fact as soon as the man is fit to exercise reason, anew question arises, to wit: whether this tendency in a man who has notbeen regenerated by baptism suffices to damn him, even though he shouldnever come to commit sin, as may happen, and happens often, whether he diebefore reaching years of discretion or he become dull of sense before hehas made use of his reason. St. Gregory of Nazianzos is supposed to havedenied this (_Orat. De Baptismo_); but St. Augustine is for theaffirmative, and maintains that original sin of itself is sufficient toearn the flames of hell, although this opinion is, to say the least, veryharsh. When I speak here of damnation or of hell, I mean pains, and notmere deprivation of supreme felicity; I mean _poenam sensus, non damni_. Gregory of Rimini, General of the Augustinians, with a few others followedSt. Augustine in opposition to the accepted opinion of the Schools of histime, and for that reason he was called the torturer of children, _tortorinfantum_. The Schoolmen, instead of sending them into the flames of hell, have assigned to them a special Limbo, where they do not suffer, and areonly punished by privation of the beatific vision. The Revelations of St. Birgitta (as they are called), much esteemed in Rome, also uphold thisdogma. Salmeron and Molina, and before them Ambrose Catharin and [174]others, grant them a certain natural bliss; and Cardinal Sfondrati, a manof learning and piety, who approves this, latterly went so far as to preferin a sense their state, which is the state of happy innocence, to that of asinner saved, as we may see in his _Nodus Praedestinationis Solutus_. That, however, seems to go too far. Certainly a soul truly enlightened would notwish to sin, even though it could by this means obtain all imaginablepleasures. But the case of choosing between sin and true bliss is simplychimerical, and it is better to obtain bliss (even after repentance) thanto be deprived of it for ever. 

93. Many prelates and theologians of France who are well pleased to differfrom Molina, and to join with St. Augustine, seem to incline towards theopinion of this great doctor, who condemns to eternal flames children thatdie in the age of innocence before having received baptism. This is whatappears from the letter mentioned above, written by five distinguishedprelates of France to Pope Innocent XII, against that posthumous book byCardinal Sfondrati. But therein they did not venture to condemn thedoctrine of the purely privative punishment of children dying withoutbaptism, seeing it approved by the venerable Thomas Aquinas, and by othergreat men. I do not speak of those who are called on one side Jansenistsand on the other disciples of St. Augustine, for they declare themselvesentirely and firmly for the opinion of this Father. But it must beconfessed that this opinion has not sufficient foundation either in reasonor in Scripture, and that it is outrageously harsh. M. Nicole makes rathera poor apology for it in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, written tooppose M. Jurieu, although M. Bayle takes his side in chapter 178 of the_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III. M. Nicole makes use ofthis pretext, that there are also other dogmas in the Christian religionwhich appear harsh. On the one hand, however, that does not lead to theconclusion that these instances of harshness may be multiplied withoutproof; and on the other we must take into account that the other dogmasmentioned by M. Nicole, namely original sin and eternity of punishment, areonly harsh and unjust to outward appearance, while the damnation ofchildren dying without actual sin and without regeneration would in truthbe harsh, since it would be in effect the damning of innocents. For thatreason I believe that the party which advocates this opinion will neveraltogether have the upper hand in the Roman Church itself. Evangelical[175]theologians are accustomed to speak with fair moderation on this question, and to surrender these souls to the judgement and the clemency of theirCreator. Nor do we know all the wonderful ways that God may choose toemploy for the illumination of souls. 

94. One may say that those who condemn for original sin alone, and whoconsequently condemn children dying unbaptized or outside the Covenant, fall, in a sense, without being aware of it, into a certain attitude toman's inclination and God's foreknowledge which they disapprove in others. They will not have it that God should refuse his grace to those whoseresistance to it he foresees, nor that this expectation and this tendencyshould cause the damnation of these persons: and yet they claim that thetendency which constitutes original sin, and in which God foresees that thechild will sin as soon as he shall reach years of discretion, suffices todamn this child beforehand. Those who maintain the one and reject the otherdo not preserve enough uniformity and connexion in their dogmas. 

95. There is scarcely less difficulty in the matter of those who reachyears of discretion and plunge into sin, following the inclination ofcorrupt nature, if they receive not the succour of the grace necessary forthem to stop on the edge of the precipice, or to drag themselves from theabyss wherein they have fallen. For it seems hard to damn them eternallyfor having done that which they had no power to prevent themselves fromdoing. Those that damn even children, who are without discretion, troublethemselves even less about adults, and one would say that they have becomecallous through the very expectation of seeing people suffer. But it is notthe same with other theologians, and I would be rather on the side of thosewho grant to all men a grace sufficient to draw them away from evil, provided they have a sufficient tendency to profit by this succour, and notto reject it voluntarily. The objection is made that there has been andstill is a countless multitude of men, among civilized peoples and amongbarbarians, who have never had this knowledge of God and of Jesus Christwhich is necessary for those who would tread the wonted paths to salvation. But without excusing them on the plea of a sin purely philosophical, andwithout stopping at a mere penalty of privation, things for which there isno opportunity of discussion here, one may doubt the fact: for how do weknow whether they do not receive ordinary or extraordinary succour of [176]kinds unknown to us? This maxim, _Quod facienti, quod in se est, nondenegatur gratia necessaria_, appears to me to have eternal truth. ThomasAquinas, Archbishop Bradwardine and others have hinted that, in regard tothis, something comes to pass of which we are not aware. (Thom. Quest. XIV, _De Veritate_, artic. XI, ad I et alibi. Bradwardine, _De Causa Dei_, nonprocul ab initio. ) And sundry theologians of great authority in the RomanChurch itself have taught that a sincere act of the love of God above allthings, when the grace of Jesus Christ arouses it, suffices for salvation. Father Francis Xavier answered the Japanese that if their ancestors hadused well their natural light God would have given them the grace necessaryfor salvation; and the Bishop of Geneva, Francis of Sales, gives fullapproval to this answer (Book 4, _On the Love of God, _ ch. 5). 

96. This I pointed out some time ago to the excellent M Pélisson, to showhim that the Roman Church, going further than the Protestants, does notdamn utterly those who are outside its communion, and even outsideChristianity, by using as its only criterion explicit faith. Nor did herefute it, properly speaking, in the very kind answer he gave me, and whichhe published in the fourth part of his _Reflexions_, also doing me thehonour of adding to it my letter. I offered him then for consideration whata famous Portuguese theologian, by name Jacques Payva Andradius, envoy tothe Council of Trent, wrote concerning this, in opposition to Chemnitz, during this same Council. And now, without citing many other authors ofeminence, I will content myself with naming Father Friedrich Spee, theJesuit, one of the most excellent in his Society, who also held this commonopinion upon the efficacy of the love of God, as is apparent in the prefaceto the admirable book which he wrote in Germany on the Christian virtues. He speaks of this observation as of a highly important secret of piety, andexpatiates with great clearness upon the power of divine love to blot outsin, even without the intervention of the Sacraments of the CatholicChurch, provided one scorn them not, for that would not at all becompatible with this love. And a very great personage, whose character wasone of the most lofty to be found in the Roman Church, was the first tomake me acquainted with it. Father Spee was of a noble family of Westphalia(it may be said in passing) and he died in the odour of sanctity, accordingto the testimony of him who published this book in Cologne with the [177]approval of the Superiors. 

97. The memory of this excellent man ought to be still precious to personsof knowledge and good sense, because he is the author of the book entitled:_Cautio Criminalis circa Processus contra Sagas_, which has caused muchstir, and has been translated into several languages. I learnt from theGrand Elector of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schonborn, uncle of His Highnessthe present Elector, who walks gloriously in the footsteps of that worthypredecessor, the story that follows. That Father was in Franconia whenthere was a frenzy there for burning alleged sorcerers. He accompanied evento the pyre many of them, all of whom he recognized as being innocent, fromtheir confessions and the researches that he had made thereon. Therefore inspite of the danger incurred at that time by one telling the truth in thismatter, he resolved to compile this work, without however naming himself. It bore great fruit and on this matter converted that Elector, at that timestill a simple canon and afterwards Bishop of Würzburg, finally alsoArchbishop of Mainz, who, as soon as he came to power, put an end to theseburnings. Therein he was followed by the Dukes of Brunswick, and finally bythe majority of the other princes and states of Germany. 

98. This digression appeared to me to be seasonable, because that writerdeserves to be more widely known. Returning now to the subject I make afurther observation. Supposing that to-day a knowledge of Jesus Christaccording to the flesh is absolutely necessary to salvation, as indeed itis safest to teach, it will be possible to say that God will give thatknowledge to all those who do, humanly speaking, that which in them lies, even though God must needs give it by a miracle. Moreover, we cannot knowwhat passes in souls at the point of death; and if sundry learned andserious theologians claim that children receive in baptism a kind of faith, although they do not remember it afterwards when they are questioned aboutit, why should one maintain that nothing of a like nature, or even moredefinite, could come about in the dying, whom we cannot interrogate aftertheir death? Thus there are countless paths open to God, giving him meansof satisfying his justice and his goodness: and the only thing one mayallege against this is that we know not what way he employs; which is farfrom being a valid objection. 

 [178]99. Let us pass on to those who lack not power to amend, but good will. They are doubtless not to be excused; but there always remains a greatdifficulty concerning God, since it rested with him to give them this samegood will. He is the master of wills, the hearts of kings and those of allother men are in his hand. Holy Scripture goes so far as to say that God attimes hardened the wicked in order to display his power by punishing them. This hardening is not to be taken as meaning that God inspires men with akind of anti-grace, that is, a kind of repugnance to good, or even aninclination towards evil, just as the grace that he gives is an inclinationtowards good. It is rather that God, having considered the sequence ofthings that he established, found it fitting, for superior reasons, topermit that Pharaoh, for example, should be in such _circumstances_ asshould increase his wickedness, and divine wisdom willed to derive a goodfrom this evil. 

100. Thus it all often comes down to _circumstances_, which form a part ofthe combination of things. There are countless examples of smallcircumstances serving to convert or to pervert. Nothing is more widelyknown than the _Tolle, lege_ (Take and read) cry which St. Augustine heardin a neighbouring house, when he was pondering on what side he should takeamong the Christians divided into sects, and saying to himself, _Quod vitae sectabor iter?_

This brought him to open at random the book of the Holy Scriptures which hehad before him, and to read what came before his eyes: and these were wordswhich finally induced him to give up Manichaeism. The good Steno, a Dane, who was titular Bishop of Titianopolis, Vicar Apostolic (as they say) ofHanover and the region around, when there was a Duke Regent of hisreligion, told us that something of that kind had happened to him. He was agreat anatomist and deeply versed in natural science; but he unfortunatelygave up research therein, and from being a great physicist he became amediocre theologian. He would almost listen to nothing more about themarvels of Nature, and an express order from the Pope _in virtute sanctaeobedientiae_ was needed to extract from him the observations M. Thévenotasked of him. He told us then that what had greatly helped towards inducinghim to place himself on the side of the Roman Church had been the voice ofa lady in Florence, who had cried out to him from a window: 'Go not on[179]the side where you are about to go, sir, go on the other side. ' 'That voicestruck me, ' he told us, 'because I was just meditating upon religion. ' Thislady knew that he was seeking a man in the house where she was, and, whenshe saw him making his way to the other house, wished to point out wherehis friend's room was. 

101. Father John Davidius, the Jesuit, wrote a book entitled _VeridicusChristianus_, which is like a kind of _Bibliomancy_, where one takespassages at random, after the pattern of the _Tolle, lege_ of St. Augustine, and it is like a devotional game. But the chances to which, inspite of ourselves, we are subject, play only too large a part in whatbrings salvation to men, or removes it from them. Let us imagine twinPolish children, the one taken by the Tartars, sold to the Turks, broughtto apostasy, plunged in impiety, dying in despair; the other saved by somechance, falling then into good hands to be educated properly, permeated bythe soundest truths of religion, exercised in the virtues that it commendsto us, dying with all the feelings of a good Christian. One will lament themisfortune of the former, prevented perhaps by a slight circumstance frombeing saved like his brother, and one will marvel that this slight chanceshould have decided his fate for eternity. 

102. Someone will perchance say that God foresaw by mediate knowledge thatthe former would have been wicked and damned even if he had remained inPoland. There are perhaps conjunctures wherein something of the kind takesplace. But will it therefore be said that this is a general rule, and thatnot one of those who were damned amongst the pagans would have been savedif he had been amongst Christians? Would that not be to contradict ourLord, who said that Tyre and Sidon would have profited better by hispreaching, if they had had the good fortune to hear it, than Capernaum?

103. But were one to admit even here this use of mediate knowledge againstall appearances, this knowledge still implies that God considers what a manwould do in such and such circumstances; and it always remains true thatGod could have placed him in other circumstances more favourable, and givenhim inward or outward succour capable of vanquishing the most abysmalwickedness existing in any soul. I shall be told that God is not bound todo so, but that is not enough; it must be added that greater reasonsprevent him from making all his goodness felt by all. Thus there must [180]needs be choice; but I do not think one must seek the reason altogether inthe good or bad nature of men. For if with some people one assume that God, choosing the plan which produces the most good, but which involves sin anddamnation, has been prompted by his wisdom to choose the best natures inorder to make them objects of his grace, this grace would not sufficientlyappear to be a free gift. Accordingly man will be distinguishable by a kindof inborn merit, and this assumption seems remote from the principles ofSt. Paul, and even from those of Supreme Reason. 

104. It is true that there are reasons for God's choice, and theconsideration of the object, that is, the nature of man, must needs entertherein; but it does not seem that this choice can be subjected to a rulesuch as we are capable of conceiving, and such as may flatter the pride ofmen. Some famous theologians believe that God offers more grace, and in amore favourable way, to those whose resistance he foresees will be less, and that he abandons the rest to their self-will. We may readily supposethat this is often the case, and this expedient, among those which make mandistinguishable by anything favourable in his nature, is the farthestremoved from Pelagianism. But I would not venture, notwithstanding, to makeof it a universal rule. Moreover, that we may not have cause to vauntourselves, it is necessary that we be ignorant of the reasons for God'schoice. Those reasons are too diverse to become known to us; and it may bethat God at times shows the power of his grace by overcoming the mostobstinate resistance, to the end that none may have cause either to despairor to be puffed up. St. Paul, as it would seem, had this in mind when heoffered himself as an example. God, he said, has had mercy upon me, to givea great example of his patience. 

105. It may be that fundamentally all men are equally bad, and consequentlyincapable of being distinguished the one from the other through their goodor less bad natural qualities; but they are not bad all in the same way:for there is an inherent individual difference between souls, as thePre-established Harmony proves. Some are more or less inclined towards aparticular good or a particular evil, or towards their opposites, all inaccordance with their natural dispositions. But since the general plan ofthe universe, chosen by God for superior reasons, causes men to be indifferent circumstances, those who meet with such as are more [181]favourable to their nature will become more readily the least wicked, themost virtuous, the most happy; yet it will be always by aid of theinfluence of that inward grace which God unites with the circumstances. Sometimes it even comes to pass, in the progress of human life, that a moreexcellent nature succeeds less, for lack of cultivation or opportunities. One may say that men are chosen and ranged not so much according to theirexcellence as according to their conformity with God's plan. Even so it mayoccur that a stone of lesser quality is made use of in a building or in agroup because it proves to be the particular one for filling a certain gap. 

106. But, in fine, all these attempts to find reasons, where there is noneed to adhere altogether to certain hypotheses, serve only to make clearto us that there are a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of God. Allthe disadvantages we see, all the obstacles we meet with, all thedifficulties one may raise for oneself, are no hindrance to a belieffounded on reason, even when it cannot stand on conclusive proof, as hasbeen shown and will later become more apparent, that there is nothing soexalted as the wisdom of God, nothing so just as his judgements, nothing sopure as his holiness, and nothing more vast than his goodness. 

 [182] * * * * *

ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL

 * * * * *

PART TWO

107. Hitherto I have devoted myself to giving a full and clear expositionof this whole subject: and although I have not yet spoken of M. Bayle'sobjections in particular, I have endeavoured to anticipate them, and tosuggest ways of answering them. But as I have taken upon myself the task ofmeeting them in detail, not only because there will perhaps still bepassages calling for elucidation, but also because his arguments areusually full of wit and erudition, and serve to throw greater light on thiscontroversy, it will be well to give an account of the chief objectionsthat are dispersed through his works, and to add my answers. At thebeginning I observed 'that God co-operates in moral evil, and in physicalevil, and in each of them both morally and physically; and that manco-operates therein also morally and physically in a free and active way, becoming in consequence subject to blame and punishment'. I have shown alsothat each point has its own difficulty; but the greatest of these lies inmaintaining that God co-operates morally in moral evil, that is, in sin, without being the originator of the sin, and even without being accessarythereto. 

108. He does this by _permitting_ it justly, and by _directing_ it wiselytowards the good, as I have shown in a manner that appears tolerablyintelligible. But as it is here principally that M. Bayle undertakes [183]to discomfit those who maintain that there is nothing in faith which cannotbe harmonized with reason, it is also here especially I must show that mydogmas are fortified (to make use of his own allegory) with a rampart, evenof reasons, which is able to resist the fire of his strongest batteries. Hehas ranged them against me in chapter 144 of his _Reply to the Questions ofa Provincial_ (vol. III, p. 812), where he includes the theologicaldoctrine in seven propositions and opposes thereto nineteen philosophicmaxims, like so many large cannon capable of breaching my rampart. Let usbegin with the theological propositions. 

109. I. 'God, ' he says, 'the Being eternal and necessary, infinitely good, holy, wise and powerful, possesses from all eternity a glory and a blissthat can never either increase or diminish. ' This proposition of M. Bayle'sis no less philosophical than theological. To say that God possesses a'glory' when he is alone, that depends upon the meaning of the term. Onemay say, with some, that glory is the satisfaction one finds in being awareof one's own perfections; and in this sense God possesses it always. Butwhen glory signifies that others become aware of these perfections, one maysay that God acquires it only when he reveals himself to intelligentcreatures; even though it be true that God thereby gains no new good, andit is rather the rational creatures who thence derive advantage, when theyapprehend aright the glory of God. 

110. II. 'He resolved freely upon the production of creatures, and he chosefrom among an infinite number of possible beings those whom it pleased himto choose, to give them existence, and to compose the universe of them, while he left all the rest in nothingness. ' This proposition is also, justlike the preceding one, in close conformity with that part of philosophywhich is called natural theology. One must dwell a little on what is saidhere, that he chose the possible beings 'whom it pleased him to choose'. For it must be borne in mind that when I say, 'that pleases me', it is asthough I were saying, 'I find it good'. Thus it is the ideal goodness ofthe object which pleases, and which makes me choose it among many otherswhich do not please or which please less, that is to say, which containless of that goodness which moves me. Now it is only the genuinely goodthat is capable of pleasing God: and consequently that which pleases Godmost, and which meets his choice, is the best. 

 [184]111. III. 'Human nature having been among the Beings that he willed toproduce, he created a man and a woman, and granted them amongst otherfavours free will, so that they had the power to obey him; but hethreatened them with death if they should disobey the order that he gavethem to abstain from a certain fruit. ' This proposition is in partrevealed, and should be admitted without difficulty, provided that _freewill_ be understood properly, according to the explanation I have given. 

112. IV. 'They ate thereof nevertheless, and thenceforth they werecondemned, they and all their posterity, to the miseries of this life, totemporal death and eternal damnation, and made subject to such a tendencyto sin that they abandoned themselves thereto endlessly and withoutceasing. ' There is reason to suppose that the forbidden action by itselfentailed these evil results in accordance with a natural effect, and thatit was for that very reason, and not by a purely arbitrary decree, that Godhad forbidden it: much as one forbids knives to children. The famous Fluddeor de Fluctibus, an Englishman, once wrote a book _De Vita, Morte etResurrectione_ under the name of R. Otreb, wherein he maintained that thefruit of the forbidden tree was a poison: but we cannot enter into thisdetail. It suffices that God forbade a harmful thing; one must nottherefore suppose that God acted here simply in the character of alegislator who enacts a purely positive law, or of a judge who imposes andinflicts a punishment by an order of his will, without any connexionbetween the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment. And it is notnecessary to suppose that God in justifiable annoyance deliberately put acorruption in the soul and the body of man, by an extraordinary action, inorder to punish him: much as the Athenians gave hemlock-juice to theircriminals. M. Bayle takes the matter thus: he speaks as if the originalcorruption had been put in the soul of the first man by an order andoperation of God. It is that which calls forth his objection (_Reply to theQuestions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 178, p. 1218) 'that reason wouldnot commend the monarch who, in order to chastise a rebel, condemned himand his descendants to have a tendency towards rebellion'. But thischastisement happens naturally to the wicked, without any ordinance of alegislator, and they become addicted to evil. If drunkards begot childreninclined to the same vice, by a natural consequence of what takes place inbodies, that would be a punishment of their progenitors, but it would [185]not be a penalty of law. There is something comparable to this in theconsequences of the first man's sin. For the contemplation of divine wisdomleads us to believe that the realm of nature serves that of grace; and thatGod as an Architect has done all in a manner befitting God considered as aMonarch. We do not sufficiently know the nature of the forbidden fruit, orthat of the action, or its effects, to judge of the details of this matter:nevertheless we must do God justice so far as to believe that it comprisedsomething other than what painters depict for us. 

113. V. 'It has pleased him by his infinite mercy to deliver a very few menfrom this condemnation; and, leaving them exposed during this life to thecorruption of sin and misery, he has given them aids which enable them toobtain the never-ending bliss of paradise. ' Many in the past have doubted, as I have already observed, whether the number of the damned is so great asis generally supposed; and it appears that they believed in the existenceof some intermediate state between eternal damnation and perfect bliss. Butwe have no need of these opinions, and it is enough to keep to the ideasaccepted in the Church. In this connexion it is well to observe that thisproposition of M. Bayle's is conceived in accordance with the principles ofsufficient grace, given to all men, and sufficing them provided that theyhave good will. Although M. Bayle holds the opposite opinion, he wished (ashe states in the margin) to avoid the terms that would not agree with asystem of decrees subsequent to the prevision of contingent events. 

114. VI. 'He foresaw from eternity all that which should happen, he orderedall things and placed them each one in its own place, and he guides andcontrols them continually, according to his pleasure. Thus nothing is donewithout his permission or against his will, and he can prevent, as seemsgood to him, as much and as often as seems good to him, all that does notplease him, and in consequence sin, which is the thing in the world thatmost offends him and that he most detests; and he can produce in each humansoul all the thoughts that he approves. ' This thesis is also purelyphilosophic, that is, recognizable by the light of natural reason. It isopportune also, as one has dwelt in thesis II on _that which pleases_, todwell here upon _that which seems good_, that is, upon that which God findsgood to do. He can avoid or put away as 'seems good to him' all 'that doesnot please him'. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that some objects ofhis aversion, such as certain evils, and especially sin, which his [186]antecedent will repelled, could only have been rejected by his consequentor decretory will, in so far as it was prompted by the rule of the best, which the All-wise must choose after having taken all into account. Whenone says 'that sin offends God most, and that he detests it most', theseare human ways of speaking. God cannot, properly speaking, be _offended_, that is, injured, disturbed, disquieted or angered; and he _detests_nothing of that which exists, in the sense that to detest something is tolook upon it with abomination and in a way that causes us disgust, thatgreatly pains and distresses us; for God cannot suffer either vexation, orgrief or discomfort; he is always altogether content and at ease. Yet theseexpressions in their true sense are justified. The supreme goodness of Godcauses his antecedent will to repel all evil, but moral evil more than anyother: it only admits evil at all for irresistible superior reasons, andwith great correctives which repair its ill effects to good advantage. Itis true also that God could produce in each human soul all the thoughtsthat he approves: but this would be to act by miracles, more than his mostperfectly conceived plan admits. 

115. VII. 'He offers grace to people that he knows are destined not toaccept it, and so destined by this refusal to make themselves more criminalthan they would be if he had not offered them that grace; he assures themthat it is his ardent wish that they accept it, and he does not give themthe grace which he knows they would accept. ' It is true that these peoplebecome more criminal through their refusal than if one had offered themnothing, and that God knows this. Yet it is better to permit their crimethan to act in a way which would render God himself blameworthy, andprovide the criminals with some justification for the complaint that it wasnot possible for them to do better, even though they had or might havewished it. God desires that they receive such grace from him as they arefit to receive, and that they accept it; and he desires to give them inparticular that grace whose acceptance by them he foresees: but it isalways by a will antecedent, detached or particular, which cannot always becarried out in the general plan of things. This thesis also is among thenumber of those which philosophy establishes no less than revelation, likethree others of the seven that we have just stated here, the third, fourthand fifth being the only ones where revelation is necessary. 

 [187]116. Here now are the nineteen philosophic maxims which M. Bayle opposes tothe seven theological propositions. 

I. 'As the infinitely perfect Being finds in himself a glory and a blissthat can never either diminish or increase, his goodness alone hasdetermined him to create this universe: neither the ambition to be praised, nor any interested motive of preserving or augmenting his bliss and hisglory, has had any part therein. ' This maxim is very good: praises of Goddo him no service, but they are of service to the men who praise him, andhe desired their good. Nevertheless, when one says that _goodness_ alonedetermined God to create this universe, it is well to add that his GOODNESSprompted him _antecedently_ to create and to produce all possible good; butthat his WISDOM made the choice and caused him to select the best_consequently_; and finally that his POWER gave him the means to carry out_actually_ the great design which he had formed. 

117. II. 'The goodness of the infinitely perfect Being is infinite, andwould not be infinite if one could conceive of a goodness greater thanthis. This characteristic of infinity is proper also to all his otherperfections, to love of virtue, hatred of vice, etc. , they must be thegreatest one can imagine. (See M. Jurieu in the first three sections of the_Judgement on Methods_, where he argues constantly upon this principle, asupon a primary notion. See also in Wittich, _De Providentia Dei_, n. 12, these words of St. Augustine, lib. I, _De Doctrina Christiana_, c. 7: "Cumcogitatur Deus, ita cogitatur, ut aliquid, quo nihil melius sit atquesublimius. Et paulo post: Nec quisquam inveniri potest, qui hoc Deum credatesse, quo melius aliquid est. ")'

This maxim is altogether to my liking, and I draw from it this conclusion, that God does the very best possible: otherwise the exercise of hisgoodness would be restricted, and that would be restricting his _goodness_itself, if it did not prompt him to the best, if he were lacking in goodwill. Or again it would be restricting his _wisdom_ and his _power_, if helacked the knowledge necessary for discerning the best and for finding themeans to obtain it, or if he lacked the strength necessary for employingthese means. There is, however, ambiguity in the assertion that love ofvirtue and hatred of vice are infinite in God: if that were absolutely andunreservedly true, in practice there would be no vice in the world. Butalthough each one of God's perfections is infinite in itself, it isexercised only in proportion to the object and as the nature of thingsprompts it. Thus love of the best in the whole carries the day over [188]all other individual inclinations or hatreds; it is the only impulse whosevery exercise is absolutely infinite, nothing having power to prevent Godfrom declaring himself for the best; and some vice being combined with thebest possible plan, God permits it. 

118. III. 'An infinite goodness having guided the Creator in the productionof the world, all the characteristics of knowledge, skill, power andgreatness that are displayed in his work are destined for the happiness ofintelligent creatures. He wished to show forth his perfections only to theend that creatures of this kind should find their felicity in theknowledge, the admiration and the love of the Supreme Being. '

This maxim appears to me not sufficiently exact. I grant that the happinessof intelligent creatures is the principal part of God's design, for theyare most like him; but nevertheless I do not see how one can prove that tobe his sole aim. It is true that the realm of nature must serve the realmof grace: but, since all is connected in God's great design, we mustbelieve that the realm of grace is also in some way adapted to that ofnature, so that nature preserves the utmost order and beauty, to render thecombination of the two the most perfect that can be. And there is no reasonto suppose that God, for the sake of some lessening of moral evil, wouldreverse the whole order of nature. Each perfection or imperfection in thecreature has its value, but there is none that has an infinite value. Thusthe moral or physical good and evil of rational creatures does notinfinitely exceed the good and evil which is simply metaphysical, namelythat which lies in the perfection of the other creatures; and yet one wouldbe bound to say this if the present maxim were strictly true. When Godjustified to the Prophet Jonah the pardon that he had granted to theinhabitants of Nineveh, he even touched upon the interest of the beasts whowould have been involved in the ruin of this great city. No substance isabsolutely contemptible or absolutely precious before God. And the abuse orthe exaggerated extension of the present maxim appears to be in part thesource of the difficulties that M. Bayle puts forward. It is certain thatGod sets greater store by a man than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly besaid with certainty that God prefers a single man in all respects to thewhole of lion-kind. Even should that be so, it would by no means followthat the interest of a certain number of men would prevail over the [189]consideration of a general disorder diffused through an infinite number ofcreatures. This opinion would be a remnant of the old and somewhatdiscredited maxim, that all is made solely for man. 

119. IV. 'The benefits he imparts to the creatures that are capable offelicity tend only to their happiness. He therefore does not permit thatthese should serve to make them unhappy, and, if the wrong use that theymade of them were capable of destroying them, he would give them sure meansof always using them well. Otherwise they would not be true benefits, andhis goodness would be smaller than that we can conceive of in anotherbenefactor. (I mean, in a Cause that united with its gifts the sure skillto make good use of them. )'

There already is the abuse or the ill effect of the preceding maxim. It isnot strictly true (though it appear plausible) that the benefits Godimparts to the creatures who are capable of felicity tend solely to theirhappiness. All is connected in Nature; and if a skilled artisan, anengineer, an architect, a wise politician often makes one and the samething serve several ends, if he makes a double hit with a single throw, when that can be done conveniently, one may say that God, whose wisdom andpower are perfect, does so always. That is husbanding the ground, the time, the place, the material, which make up as it were his outlay. Thus God hasmore than one purpose in his projects. The felicity of all rationalcreatures is one of the aims he has in view; but it is not his whole aim, nor even his final aim. Therefore it happens that the unhappiness of someof these creatures may come about _by concomitance_, and as a result ofother greater goods: this I have already explained, and M. Bayle has tosome extent acknowledged it. The goods as such, considered in themselves, are the object of the antecedent will of God. God will produce as muchreason and knowledge in the universe as his plan can admit. One canconceive of a mean between an antecedent will altogether pure andprimitive, and a consequent and final will. The _primitive antecedent will_has as its object each good and each evil in itself, detached from allcombination, and tends to advance the good and prevent the evil. The_mediate will_ relates to combinations, as when one attaches a good to anevil: then the will will have some tendency towards this combination whenthe good exceeds the evil therein. But the _final and decisive will_results from consideration of all the goods and all the evils that enterinto our deliberation, it results from a total combination. This shows[190]that a mediate will, although it may in a sense pass as consequent inrelation to a pure and primitive antecedent will, must be consideredantecedent in relation to the final and decretory will. God gives reason tothe human race; misfortunes arise thence by concomitance. His pureantecedent will tends towards giving reason, as a great good, andpreventing the evils in question. But when it is a question of the evilsthat accompany this gift which God has made to us of reason, the compound, made up of the combination of reason and of these evils, will be the objectof a mediate will of God, which will tend towards producing or preventingthis compound, according as the good or the evil prevails therein. But eventhough it should prove that reason did more harm than good to men (which, however, I do not admit), whereupon the mediate will of God would discardit with all its concomitants, it might still be the case that it was morein accordance with the perfection of the universe to give reason to men, notwithstanding all the evil consequences which it might have withreference to them. Consequently, the final will or the decree of God, resulting from all the considerations he can have, would be to give it tothem. And, far from being subject to blame for this, he would beblameworthy if he did not so. Thus the evil, or the mixture of goods andevils wherein the evil prevails, happens only _by concomitance_, because itis connected with greater goods that are outside this mixture. Thismixture, therefore, or this compound, is not to be conceived as a grace oras a gift from God to us; but the good that is found mingled therein willnevertheless be good. Such is God's gift of reason to those who make illuse thereof. It is always a good in itself; but the combination of thisgood with the evils that proceed from its abuse is not a good with regardto those who in consequence thereof become unhappy. Yet it comes to be byconcomitance, because it serves a greater good in relation to the universe. And it is doubtless that which prompted God to give reason to those whohave made it an instrument of their unhappiness. Or, to put it moreprecisely, in accordance with my system God, having found among thepossible beings some rational creatures who misuse their reason, gaveexistence to those who are included in the best possible plan of theuniverse. Thus nothing prevents us from admitting that God grants goodswhich turn into evil by the fault of men, this often happening to men injust punishment of the misuse they had made of God's grace. Aloysius [191]Novarinus wrote a book _De Occultis Dei Beneficiis_: one could write one_De Occultis Dei Poenis_. This saying of Claudian would be in place herewith regard to some persons:

 _Tolluntur in altum, _ _Ut lapsu graviore ruant_. 

But to say that God should not give a good which he knows an evil will willabuse, when the general plan of things demands that he give it; or again tosay that he should give certain means for preventing it, contrary to thissame general order: that is to wish (as I have observed already) that Godhimself become blameworthy in order to prevent man from being so. Toobject, as people do here, that the goodness of God would be smaller thanthat of another benefactor who would give a more useful gift, is tooverlook the fact that the goodness of a benefactor is not measured by asingle benefit. It may well be that a gift from a private person is greaterthan one from a prince, but the gifts of this private person all takentogether will be much inferior to the prince's gifts all together. Thus onecan esteem fittingly the good things done by God only when one considerstheir whole extent by relating them to the entire universe. Moreover, onemay say that the gifts given in the expectation that they will harm are thegifts of an enemy, [Greek: hechthrôn dôra adôra], _Hostibus eveniant talia dona meis. _

But that applies to when there is malice or guilt in him who gives them, asthere was in that Eutrapelus of whom Horace speaks, who did good to peoplein order to give them the means of destroying themselves. His design wasevil, but God's design cannot be better than it is. Must God spoil hissystem, must there be less beauty, perfection and reason in the universe, because there are people who misuse reason? The common sayings are in placehere: _Abusus non tollit usum_; there is _scandalum datum et scandalumacceptum_. 

120. V. 'A maleficent being is very capable of heaping magnificent giftsupon his enemies, when he knows that they will make thereof a use that willdestroy them. It therefore does not beseem the infinitely good Being togive to creatures a free will, whereof, as he knows for certain, they wouldmake a use that would render them unhappy. Therefore if he gives them freewill he combines with it the art of using it always opportunely, andpermits not that they neglect the practice of this art in any [192]conjuncture; and if there were no sure means of determining the good use ofthis free will, he would rather take from them this faculty, than allow itto be the cause of their unhappiness. That is the more manifest, as freewill is a grace which he has given them of his own choice and without theirasking for it; so that he would be more answerable for the unhappiness itwould bring upon them than if he had only granted it in response to theirimportunate prayers. '

What was said at the end of the remark on the preceding maxim ought to berepeated here, and is sufficient to counter the present maxim. Moreover, the author is still presupposing that false maxim advanced as the third, stating that the happiness of rational creatures is the sole aim of God. Ifthat were so, perhaps neither sin nor unhappiness would ever occur, even byconcomitance. God would have chosen a sequence of possibles where all theseevils would be excluded. But God would fail in what is due to the universe, that is, in what he owes to himself. If there were only spirits they wouldbe without the required connexion, without the order of time and place. This order demands matter, movement and its laws; to adjust these tospirits in the best possible way means to return to our world. When onelooks at things only in the mass, one imagines to be practicable a thousandthings that cannot properly take place. To wish that God should not givefree will to rational creatures is to wish that there be none of thesecreatures; and to wish that God should prevent them from misusing it is towish that there be none but these creatures alone, together with what wasmade for them only. If God had none but these creatures in view, he woulddoubtless prevent them from destroying themselves. One may say in a sense, however, that God has given to these creatures the art of always makinggood use of their free will, for the natural light of reason is this art. But it would be necessary always to have the will to do good, and oftencreatures lack the means of giving themselves the will they ought to have;often they even lack the will to use those means which indirectly give agood will. Of this I have already spoken more than once. This fault must beadmitted, and one must even acknowledge that God would perhaps have beenable to exempt creatures from that fault, since there is nothing toprevent, so it seems, the existence of some whose nature it would be alwaysto have good will. But I reply that it is not necessary, and that it wasnot feasible for all rational creatures to have so great a perfection, [193]and such as would bring them so close to the Divinity. It may even be thatthat can only be made possible by a special divine grace. But in this case, would it be proper for God to grant it to all, that is, always to actmiraculously in respect of all rational creatures? Nothing would be lessrational than these perpetual miracles. There are degrees among creatures:the general order requires it. And it appears quite consistent with theorder of divine government that the great privilege of strengthening in thegood should be granted more easily to those who had a good will when theywere in a more imperfect state, in the state of struggle and of pilgrimage, _in Ecclesia militante, in statu viatorum_. The good angels themselves werenot created incapable of sin. Nevertheless I would not dare to assert thatthere are no blessed creatures born, or such as are sinless and holy bytheir nature. There are perhaps people who give this privilege to theBlessed Virgin, since, moreover, the Roman Church to-day places her abovethe angels. But it suffices us that the universe is very great and veryvaried: to wish to limit it is to have little knowledge thereof. 'But', M. Bayle goes on, 'God has given free will to creatures capable of sinning, without their having asked him for this grace. And he who gave such a giftwould be more answerable for the unhappiness that it brought upon those whomade use of it, than if he had granted it only in response to theirimportunate prayers. ' But importunity in prayers makes no difference toGod; he knows better than we what we need, and he only grants what servesthe interest of the whole. It seems that M. Bayle here makes free willconsist in the faculty for sinning; yet he acknowledges elsewhere that Godand the Saints are free, without having this faculty. However that may be, I have already shown fully that God, doing what his wisdom and his goodnesscombined ordain, is not answerable for the evil that he permits. Even men, when they do their duty, are not answerable for consequences, whether theyforesee them or not. 

121. VI. 'It is as sure a means of taking a man's life to give him a silkcord that one knows certainly he will make use of freely to stranglehimself, as to plant a few dagger thrusts in his body. One desires hisdeath not less when one makes use of the first way, than when one employsthe second: it even seems as though one desires it with a more maliciousintention, since one tends to leave to him the whole trouble and the wholeblame of his destruction. '

 [194]Those who write treatises on Duties (De Officiis) as, for instance, Cicero, St. Ambrose, Grotius, Opalenius, Sharrok, Rachelius, Pufendorf, as well asthe Casuists, teach that there are cases where one is not obliged to returnto its owner a thing deposited: for example, one will not give back adagger when one knows that he who has deposited it is about to stabsomeone. Let us pretend that I have in my hands the fatal draught thatMeleager's mother will make use of to kill him; the magic javelin thatCephalus will unwittingly employ to kill his Procris; the horses of Theseusthat will tear to pieces Hippolytus, his son: these things are demandedback from me, and I am right in refusing them, knowing the use that will bemade of them. But how will it be if a competent judge orders me to restorethem, when I cannot prove to him what I know of the evil consequences thatrestitution will have, Apollo perchance having given to me, as toCassandra, the gift of prophecy under the condition that I shall not bebelieved? I should then be compelled to make restitution, having noalternative other than my own destruction: thus I cannot escape fromcontributing towards the evil. Another comparison: Jupiter promises Semele, the Sun Phaeton, Cupid Psyche to grant whatever favour the other shall ask. They swear by the Styx, _Di cujus jurare timent et fallere Numen_. 

One would gladly stop, but too late, the request half heard, _Voluit Deus ora loquentis_ _Opprimere; exierat jam vox properata sub auras_. 

One would gladly draw back after the request was made, making vainremonstrances; but they press you, they say to you: 'Do you make oaths thatyou will not keep?' The law of the Styx is inviolable, one must needssubmit to it; if one has erred in making the oath, one would err more innot keeping it; the promise must be fulfilled, however harmful it may be tohim who exacts it. It would be ruinous to you if you did not fulfil it. Itseems as though the moral of these fables implies that a supreme necessitymay constrain one to comply with evil. God, in truth, knows no other judgethat can compel him to give what may turn to evil, he is not like Jupiterwho fears the Styx. But his own wisdom is the greatest judge that he canfind, there is no appeal from its judgements: they are the decrees ofdestiny. The eternal verities, objects of his wisdom, are more [195]inviolable than the Styx. These laws and this judge do not constrain: theyare stronger, for they persuade. Wisdom only shows God the best possibleexercise of his goodness: after that, the evil that occurs is an inevitableresult of the best. I will add something stronger: To permit the evil, asGod permits it, is the greatest goodness. 

 _Si mala sustulerat, non erat ille bonus. _

One would need to have a bent towards perversity to say after this that itis more malicious to leave to someone the whole trouble and the whole blameof his destruction. When God does leave it to a man, it has belonged to himsince before his existence; it was already in the idea of him as stillmerely possible, before the decree of God which makes him to exist. Canone, then, leave it or give it to another? There is the whole matter. 

122. VII. 'A true benefactor gives promptly, and does not wait to giveuntil those he loves have suffered long miseries from the privation of whathe could have imparted to them at first very easily, and without causingany inconvenience to himself. If the limitation of his forces does notpermit him to do good without inflicting pain or some other inconvenience, he acquiesces in this, but only regretfully, and he never employs this wayof rendering service when he can render it without mingling any kind ofevil in his favours. If the profit one could derive from the evils heinflicted could spring as easily from an unalloyed good as from thoseevils, he would take the straight road of unalloyed good, and not theindirect road that would lead from the evil to the good. If he showersriches and honours, it is not to the end that those who have enjoyed them, when they come to lose them, should be all the more deeply afflicted inproportion to their previous experience of pleasure, and that thus theyshould become more unhappy than the persons who have always been deprivedof these advantages. A malicious being would shower good things at such aprice upon the people for whom he had the most hatred. '

(Compare this passage of Aristotle, _Rhetor. _, 1. 2, c. 23, p. M. 446:[Greek: hoion ei doiê an tis tini hina aphelomenos leipêsêi; hothen kaitout' eirêtai, ]

 [Greek: pollois ho daimôn ou kat' eunoian pherôn] [Greek: Megala didôsin eutychêmat', all' hina] [Greek: tas symphoras labôsin epiphanesteras. ]

 [196]Id est: Veluti si quis alicui aliquid det, ut (postea) hoc (ipsi) erepto(ipsum) afficiat dolore. Unde etiam illud est dictum:

 _Bona magna multis non amicus dat Deus, _ _Insigniore ut rursus his privet malo. _)

All these objections depend almost on the same sophism; they change andmutilate the fact, they only half record things: God has care for men, heloves the human race, he wishes it well, nothing so true. Yet he allows mento fall, he often allows them to perish, he gives them goods that tendtowards their destruction; and when he makes someone happy, it is aftermany sufferings: where is his affection, where is his goodness or againwhere is his power? Vain objections, which suppress the main point, whichignore the fact that it is of God one speaks. It is as though one werespeaking of a mother, a guardian, a tutor, whose well-nigh only care isconcerned with the upbringing, the preservation, the happiness of theperson in question, and who neglect their duty. God takes care of theuniverse, he neglects nothing, he chooses what is best on the whole. If inspite of all that someone is wicked and unhappy, it behoved him to be so. God (so they say) could have given happiness to all, he could have given itpromptly and easily, and without causing himself any inconvenience, for hecan do all. But should he? Since he does not so, it is a sign that he hadto act altogether differently. If we infer from this either that God onlyregretfully, and owing to lack of power, fails to make men happy and togive the good first of all and without admixture of evil, or else that helacks the good will to give it unreservedly and for good and all, then weare comparing our true God with the God of Herodotus, full of envy, or withthe demon of the poet whose iambics Aristotle quotes, and I have justtranslated into Latin, who gives good things in order that he may causemore affliction by taking them away. That would be trifling with God inperpetual anthropomorphisms, representing him as a man who must givehimself up completely to one particular business, whose goodness must bechiefly exercised upon those objects alone which are known to us, and wholacks either aptitude or good will. God is not lacking therein, he could dothe good that we would desire; he even wishes it, taking it separately, buthe must not do it in preference to other greater goods which are opposed toit. Moreover, one has no cause to complain of the fact that usually [197]one attains salvation only through many sufferings, and by bearing thecross of Jesus Christ. These evils serve to make the elect imitators oftheir master, and to increase their happiness. 

123. VIII. 'The greatest and the most substantial glory that he who is themaster of others can gain is to maintain amongst them virtue, order, peace, contentment of mind. The glory that he would derive from their unhappinesscan be nothing but a false glory. '

If we knew the city of God just as it is, we should see that it is the mostperfect state which can be devised; that virtue and happiness reign there, as far as is possible, in accordance with the laws of the best; that sinand unhappiness (whose entire exclusion from the nature of things reasonsof the supreme order did not permit), are well-nigh nothing there incomparison with the good, and even are of service for greater good. Nowsince these evils were to exist, there must needs be some appointed to besubject to them, and we are those people. If it were others, would therenot be the same appearance of evil? Or rather, would not these others bethose known as We? When God derives some glory from the evil through havingmade it serve a greater good, it was proper that he should derive thatglory. It is not therefore a false glory, as would be that of a prince whooverthrew his state in order to have the honour of setting it up again. 

124. IX. 'The way whereby that master can give proof of greatest love forvirtue is to cause it, if he can, to be always practised without anymixture of vice. If it is easy for him to procure for his subjects thisadvantage, and nevertheless he permits vice to raise its head, save that hepunishes it finally after having long tolerated it, his affection forvirtue is not the greatest one can conceive; it is therefore not infinite. '

I am not yet half way through the nineteen maxims, and already I am wearyof refuting, and making the same answer always. M. Bayle multipliesunnecessarily his so-called maxims in opposition to my dogmas. If thingsconnected together may be separated, the parts from their whole, the humankind from the universe, God's attributes the one from the other, power fromwisdom, it may be said that God _can cause_ virtue to be in the worldwithout any mixture of vice, and even that he can do so _easily_. But, since he has permitted vice, it must be that that order of the universewhich was found preferable to every other plan required it. One mustbelieve that it is not permitted to do otherwise, since it is not [198]possible to do better. It is a hypothetical necessity, a moral necessity, which, far from being contrary to freedom, is the effect of its choice. _Quae rationi contraria sunt, ea nec fieri a Sapiente posse credendum est_. The objection is made here, that God's affection for virtue is thereforenot the greatest which can be conceived, that it is not _infinite_. To thatan answer has already been given on the second maxim, in the assertion thatGod's affection for any created thing whatsoever is proportionate to thevalue of the thing. Virtue is the noblest quality of created things, but itis not the only good quality of creatures. There are innumerable otherswhich attract the inclination of God: from all these inclinations thereresults the most possible good, and it turns out that if there were onlyvirtue, if there were only rational creatures, there would be less good. Midas proved to be less rich when he had only gold. And besides, wisdommust vary. To multiply one and the same thing only would be superfluity, and poverty too. To have a thousand well-bound Vergils in one's library, always to sing the airs from the opera of Cadmus and Hermione, to break allthe china in order only to have cups of gold, to have only diamond buttons, to eat nothing but partridges, to drink only Hungarian or Shirazwine--would one call that reason? Nature had need of animals, plants, inanimate bodies; there are in these creatures, devoid of reason, marvelswhich serve for exercise of the reason. What would an intelligent creaturedo if there were no unintelligent things? What would it think of, if therewere neither movement, nor matter, nor sense? If it had only distinctthoughts it would be a God, its wisdom would be without bounds: that is oneof the results of my meditations. As soon as there is a mixture of confusedthoughts, there is sense, there is matter. For these confused thoughts comefrom the relation of all things one to the other by way of duration andextent. Thus it is that in my philosophy there is no rational creaturewithout some organic body, and there is no created spirit entirely detachedfrom matter. But these organic bodies vary no less in perfection than thespirits to which they belong. Therefore, since God's wisdom must have aworld of bodies, a world of substances capable of perception and incapableof reason; since, in short, it was necessary to choose from all the thingspossible what produced the best effect together, and since vice entered inby this door, God would not have been altogether good, altogether wise ifhe had excluded it. 

 [199]125. X. 'The way to evince the greatest hatred for vice is not indeed toallow it to prevail for a long time and then chastise it, but to crush itbefore its birth, that is, prevent it from showing itself anywhere. A king, for example, who put his finances in such good order that no malversationwas ever committed, would thus display more hatred for the wrong done byfactionaries than if, after having suffered them to batten on the blood ofthe people, he had them hanged. '

It is always the same song, it is anthropomorphism pure and simple. A kingshould generally have nothing so much at heart as to keep his subjects freefrom oppression. One of his greatest interests is to bring good order intohis finances. Nevertheless there are times when he is obliged to toleratevice and disorders. He has a great war on his hands, he is in a state ofexhaustion, he has no choice of generals, it is necessary to humour thosehe has, those possessed of great authority with the soldiers: a Braccio, aSforza, a Wallenstein. He lacks money for the most pressing needs, it isnecessary to turn to great financiers, who have an established credit, andhe must at the same time connive at their malversations. It is true thatthis unfortunate necessity arises most often from previous errors. It isnot the same with God: he has need of no man, he commits no error, healways does the best. One cannot even wish that things may go better, whenone understands them: and it would be a vice in the Author of things if hewished to change anything whatsoever in them, if he wished to exclude thevice that was found there. Is this State with perfect government, wheregood is willed and performed as far as it is possible, where evil evenserves the greatest good, comparable with the State of a prince whoseaffairs are in ruin and who escapes as best he can? Or with that of aprince who encourages oppression in order to punish it, and who delights tosee the little men with begging bowls and the great on scaffolds?

126. XI. 'A ruler devoted to the interests of virtue, and to the good ofhis subjects, takes the utmost care to ensure that they never disobey hislaws; and if he must needs chastise them for their disobedience, he sees toit that the penalty cures them of the inclination to evil, and restores intheir soul a strong and constant tendency towards good: so far is he fromany desire that the penalty for the error should incline them more and moretowards evil. '

 [200]To make men better, God does all that is due, and even all that can be doneon his side without detriment to what is due. The most usual aim ofpunishment is amendment; but it is not the sole aim, nor that which Godalways intends. I have said a word on that above. Original sin, whichdisposes men towards evil, is not merely a penalty for the first sin; it isa natural consequence thereof. On that too a word has been said, in thecourse of an observation on the fourth theological proposition. It is likedrunkenness, which is a penalty for excess in drinking and is at the sametime a natural consequence that easily leads to new sins. 

127. XII. 'To permit the evil that one could prevent is not to care whetherit be committed or not, or is even to wish that it be committed. '

By no means. How many times do men permit evils which they could prevent ifthey turned all their efforts in that direction? But other more importantcares prevent them from doing so. One will rarely resolve upon adjustingirregularities in the coinage while one is involved in a great war. And theaction of an English Parliament in this direction a little before the Peaceof Ryswyck will be rather praised than imitated. Can one conclude from thisthat the State has no anxiety about this irregularity, or even that itdesires it? God has a far stronger reason, and one far more worthy of him, for tolerating evils. Not only does he derive from them greater goods, buthe finds them connected with the greatest goods of all those that arepossible: so that it would be a fault not to permit them. 

128. XIII. 'It is a very great fault in those who govern, if they do notcare whether there be disorder in their States or not. The fault is stillgreater if they wish and even desire disorder there. If by hidden andindirect, but infallible, ways they stirred up a sedition in their Statesto bring them to the brink of ruin, in order to gain for themselves theglory of showing that they have the courage and the prudence necessary forsaving a great kingdom on the point of perishing, they would be mostdeserving of condemnation. But if they stirred up this sedition becausethere were no other means than that, of averting the total ruin of theirsubjects and of strengthening on new foundations, and for severalcenturies, the happiness of nations, one must needs lament the unfortunatenecessity (see above, pp. 146, 147, what has been said of the force of[201]necessity) to which they were reduced, and praise them for the use thatthey made thereof. '

This maxim, with divers others set forth here, is not applicable to thegovernment of God. Not to mention the fact that it is only the disorders ofa very small part of his kingdom which are brought up in objection, it isuntrue that he has no anxiety about evils, that he desires them, that hebrings them into being, to have the glory of allaying them. God wills orderand good; but it happens sometimes that what is disorder in the part isorder in the whole. I have already stated this legal axiom: _Incivile estnisi tota lege inspecta judicare_. The permission of evils comes from akind of moral necessity: God is constrained to this by his wisdom and byhis goodness; _this necessity is happy_, whereas that of the prince spokenof in the maxim is _unhappy_. His State is one of the most corrupt; and thegovernment of God is the best State possible. 

129. XIV. 'The permission of a certain evil is only excusable when onecannot remedy it without introducing a greater evil; but it cannot beexcusable in those who have in hand a remedy more efficacious against thisevil, and against all the other evils that could spring from thesuppression of this one. '

The maxim is true, but it cannot be brought forward against the governmentof God. Supreme reason constrains him to permit the evil. If God chose whatwould not be the best absolutely and in all, that would be a greater evilthan all the individual evils which he could prevent by this means. Thiswrong choice would destroy his wisdom and his goodness. 

130. XV. 'The Being infinitely powerful, Creator of matter and of spirits, makes whatever he wills of this matter and these spirits. There is nosituation or shape that he cannot communicate to spirits. If he thenpermitted a physical or a moral evil, this would not be for the reason thatotherwise some other still greater physical or moral evil would bealtogether inevitable. None of those reasons for the mixture of good andevil which are founded on the limitation of the forces of benefactors canapply to him. '

It is true that God makes of matter and of spirits whatever he wills; buthe is like a good sculptor, who will make from his block of marble onlythat which he judges to be the best, and who judges well. God makes ofmatter the most excellent of all possible machines; he makes of spirits themost excellent of all governments conceivable; and over and above all that, he establishes for their union the most perfect of all harmonies, [202]according to the system I have proposed. Now since physical evil and moralevil occur in this perfect work, one must conclude (contrary to M. Bayle'sassurance here) that _otherwise a still greater evil would have beenaltogether inevitable_. This great evil would be that God would have chosenill if he had chosen otherwise than he has chosen. It is true that God isinfinitely powerful; but his power is indeterminate, goodness and wisdomcombined determine him to produce the best. M. Bayle makes elsewhere anobjection which is peculiar to him, which he derives from the opinions ofthe modern Cartesians. They say that God could have given to souls whatthoughts he would, without making them depend upon any relation to thebody: by this means souls would be spared a great number of evils whichonly spring from derangement of the body. More will be said of this later;now it is sufficient to bear in mind that God cannot establish a systemill-connected and full of dissonances. It is to some extent the nature ofsouls to represent bodies. 

131. XVI. 'One is just as much the cause of an event when one brings itabout in moral ways, as when one brings it about in physical ways. AMinister of State, who, without going out of his study, and simply byutilizing the passions of the leaders of a faction, overthrew all theirplots, would thus be bringing about the ruin of this faction, no less thanif he destroyed it by a surprise attack. '

I have nothing to say against this maxim. Evil is always attributed tomoral causes, and not always to physical causes. Here I observe simply thatif I could not prevent the sin of others except by committing a sin myself, I should be justified in permitting it, and I should not be accessarythereto, or its moral cause. In God, every fault would represent a sin; itwould be even more than sin, for it would destroy Divinity. And it would bea great fault in him not to choose the best. I have said so many times. Hewould then prevent sin by something worse than all sins. 

132. XVII. 'It is all the same whether one employ a necessary cause, oremploy a free cause while choosing the moments when one knows it to bedetermined. If I imagine that gunpowder has the power to ignite or not toignite when fire touches it, and if I know for certain that it will bedisposed to ignite at eight o'clock in the morning, I shall be just as muchthe cause of its effects if I apply the fire to it at that hour, as Ishould be in assuming, as is the case, that it is a necessary cause. [203]For where I am concerned it would no longer be a free cause. I should becatching it at the moment when I knew it to be necessitated by its ownchoice. It is impossible for a being to be free or indifferent with regardto that to which it is already determined, and at the time when it isdetermined thereto. All that which exists exists of necessity while itexists. [Greek: To einai to on hotan êi, kai to mê einai hotan mê êi, anankê. ] "Necesse est id quod est, quando est, esse; et id quod non est, quando non est, non esse": Arist. , _De Interpret. _, cap. 9. The Nominalistshave adopted this maxim of Aristotle. Scotus and sundry other Schoolmenappear to reject it, but fundamentally their distinctions come to the samething. See the Jesuits of Coimbra on this passage from Aristotle, p. 380_et seq. _)'

This maxim may pass also; I would wish only to change something in thephraseology. I would not take 'free' and 'indifferent' for one and the samething, and would not place 'free' and 'determined' in antithesis. One isnever altogether indifferent with an indifference of equipoise; one isalways more inclined and consequently more determined on one side than onanother: but one is never necessitated to the choice that one makes. I meanhere a _necessity_ absolute and metaphysical; for it must be admitted thatGod, that wisdom, is prompted to the best by a _moral_ necessity. It mustbe admitted also that one is necessitated to the choice by a hypotheticalnecessity, when one actually makes the choice; and even before one isnecessitated thereto by the very truth of the futurition, since one will doit. These hypothetical necessities do no harm. I have spoken sufficientlyon this point already. 

133. XVIII. 'When a whole great people has become guilty of rebellion, itis not showing clemency to pardon the hundred thousandth part, and to killall the rest, not excepting even babes and sucklings. '

It seems to be assumed here that there are a hundred thousand times moredamned than saved, and that children dying unbaptized are included amongthe former. Both these points are disputed, and especially the damnation ofthese children. I have spoken of this above. M. Bayle urges the sameobjection elsewhere (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 178, p. 1223): 'We see clearly', he says, 'that the Sovereign whowishes to exercise both justice and clemency when a city has revolted mustbe content with the punishment of a small number of mutineers, and [204]pardon all the rest. For if the number of those who are chastised is as athousand to one, in comparison with those whom he freely pardons, he cannotbe accounted mild, but, on the contrary, cruel. He would assuredly beaccounted an abominable tyrant if he chose punishments of long duration, and if he eschewed bloodshed only because he was convinced that men wouldprefer death to a miserable life; and if, finally, the desire to takerevenge were more responsible for his severities than the desire to turn tothe service of the common weal the penalty that he would inflict on almostall the rebels. Criminals who are executed are considered to expiate theircrimes so completely by the loss of their life, that the public requiresnothing more, and is indignant when executioners are clumsy. These would bestoned if they were known deliberately to give repeated strokes of the axe;and the judges who are present at the execution would not be immune fromdanger if they were thought to take pleasure in this evil sport of theexecutioners, and to have surreptitiously urged them to practise it. ' (Notethat this is not to be understood as strictly universal. There are caseswhere the people approve of the slow killing of certain criminals, as whenFrancis I thus put to death some persons accused of heresy after thenotorious Placards of 1534. No pity was shown to Ravaillac, who wastortured in divers horrible ways. See the _French Mercury_, vol. I, fol. M. , 455 _et seq. _ See also Pierre Matthieu in his _History of the Death ofHenry IV_; and do not forget what he says on page m. 99 concerning thediscussion by the judges with regard to the torture of this parricide. )'Finally it is an exceptionally notorious fact that Rulers who should beguided by St. Paul, I mean who should condemn to the extreme penalty allthose whom he condemns to eternal death, would be accounted enemies of thehuman kind and destroyers of their communities. It is incontestable thattheir laws, far from being fitted, in accordance with the aim oflegislators, to uphold society, would be its complete ruin. (Apply herethese words of Pliny the Younger, _Epist. _, 22, lib. 8: Mandemus memoriaequod vir mitissimus, et ob hoc quoque maximus, Thrasea crebro diceresolebat, Qui vitia odit, homines odit. )' He adds that it was said of thelaws of Draco, an Athenian lawgiver, that they had not been written withink, but with blood, because they punished all sins with the extremepenalty, and because damnation is a penalty even worse than death. But itmust be borne in mind that damnation is a consequence of sin. Thus I [205]once answered a friend, who raised as an objection the disproportionexisting between an eternal punishment and a limited crime, that there isno injustice when the continuation of the punishment is only a result ofthe continuation of the sin. I will speak further on this point later. Asfor the number of the damned, even though it should be incomparably greateramong men than the number of the saved, that would not preclude thepossibility that in the universe the happy creatures infinitely outnumberthose who are unhappy. Such examples as that of a prince who punishes onlythe leaders of rebels or of a general who has a regiment decimated, are ofno importance here. Self-interest compels the prince and the general topardon the guilty, even though they should remain wicked. God only pardonsthose who become better: he can distinguish them; and this severity is moreconsistent with perfect justice. But if anyone asks why God gives not toall the grace of conversion, the question is of a different nature, havingno relation to the present maxim. I have already answered it in a sense, not in order to find God's reasons, but to show that he cannot lack such, and that there are no opposing reasons of any validity. Moreover, we knowthat sometimes whole cities are destroyed and the inhabitants put to thesword, to inspire terror in the rest. That may serve to shorten a great waror a rebellion, and would mean a saving of blood through the shedding ofit: there is no decimation there. We cannot assert, indeed, that the wickedof our globe are punished so severely in order to intimidate theinhabitants of the other globes and to make them better. Yet an abundanceof reasons in the universal harmony which are unknown to us, because weknow not sufficiently the extent of the city of God, nor the form of thegeneral republic of spirits, nor even the whole architecture of bodies, mayproduce the same effect. 

134. XIX. 'Those physicians who chose, among many remedies capable ofcuring a sick man, whereof divers were such as they well knew he would takewith enjoyment, precisely that one which they knew he would refuse to take, would vainly urge and pray him not to refuse it; we should still have justcause for thinking that they had no desire to cure him: for if they wishedto do so, they would choose for him among those good medicines one whichthey knew he would willingly swallow. If, moreover, they knew thatrejection of the remedy they offered him would augment his sickness to[206]the point of making it fatal, one could not help saying that, despite alltheir exhortations, they must certainly be desirous of the sick man'sdeath. '

God wishes to save all men: that means that he would save them if menthemselves did not prevent it, and did not refuse to receive his grace; andhe is not bound or prompted by reason always to overcome their evil will. He does so sometimes nevertheless, when superior reasons allow of it, andwhen his consequent and decretory will, which results from all his reasons, makes him resolve upon the election of a certain number of men. He givesaids to all for their conversion and for perseverance, and these aidssuffice in those who have good will, but they do not always suffice to givegood will. Men obtain this good will either through particular aids orthrough circumstances which cause the success of the general aids. Godcannot refrain from offering other remedies which he knows men will reject, bringing upon themselves all the greater guilt: but shall one wish that Godbe unjust in order that man may be less criminal? Moreover, the grace thatdoes not serve the one may serve the other, and indeed always serves thetotality of God's plan, which is the best possible in conception. Shall Godnot give the rain, because there are low-lying places which will be therebyincommoded? Shall the sun not shine as much as it should for the world ingeneral, because there are places which will be too much dried up inconsequence? In short, all these comparisons, spoken of in these maximsthat M. Bayle has just given, of a physician, a benefactor, a minister ofState, a prince, are exceedingly lame, because it is well known what theirduties are and what can and ought to be the object of their cares: theyhave scarce more than the one affair, and they often fail therein throughnegligence or malice. God's object has in it something infinite, his caresembrace the universe: what we know thereof is almost nothing, and we desireto gauge his wisdom and his goodness by our knowledge. What temerity, orrather what absurdity! The objections are on false assumptions; it issenseless to pass judgement on the point of law when one does not know thematter of fact. To say with St. Paul, _O altitudo divitiarum etsapientiae, _ is not renouncing reason, it is rather employing the reasonsthat we know, for they teach us that immensity of God whereof the Apostlespeaks. But therein we confess our ignorance of the facts, and weacknowledge, moreover, before we see it, that God does all the best [207]possible, in accordance with the infinite wisdom which guides his actions. It is true that we have already before our eyes proofs and tests of this, when we see something entire, some whole complete in itself, and isolated, so to speak, among the works of God. Such a whole, shaped as it were by thehand of God, is a plant, an animal, a man. We cannot wonder enough at thebeauty and the contrivance of its structure. But when we see some brokenbone, some piece of animal's flesh, some sprig of a plant, there appears tobe nothing but confusion, unless an excellent anatomist observe it: andeven he would recognize nothing therein if he had not before seen likepieces attached to their whole. It is the same with the government of God:that which we have been able to see hitherto is not a large enough piecefor recognition of the beauty and the order of the whole. Thus the verynature of things implies that this order in the Divine City, which we seenot yet here on earth, should be an object of our faith, of our hope, ofour confidence in God. If there are any who think otherwise, so much theworse for them, they are malcontents in the State of the greatest and thebest of all monarchs; and they are wrong not to take advantage of theexamples he has given them of his wisdom and his infinite goodness, wherebyhe reveals himself as being not only wonderful, but also worthy of lovebeyond all things. 

135. I hope it will be found that nothing of what is comprised in thenineteen maxims of M. Bayle, which we have just considered, has been leftwithout a necessary answer. It is likely that, having often beforemeditated on this subject, he will have put there all his strongestconvictions touching the moral cause of moral evil. There are, however, still sundry passages here and there in his works which it will be well notto pass over in silence. Very often he exaggerates the difficulty which heassumes with regard to freeing God from the imputation of sin. He observes_(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 161, p. 1024) that Molina, if he reconciled free will with foreknowledge, did not reconcile thegoodness and the holiness of God with sin. He praises the sincerity ofthose who bluntly declare (as he claims Piscator did) that everything is tobe traced back to the will of God, and who maintain that God could not butbe just, even though he were the author of sin, even though he condemnedinnocence. And on the other side, or in other passages, he seems to showmore approval of the opinions of those who preserve God's goodness at [208]the expense of his greatness, as Plutarch does in his book against theStoics. 'It was more reasonable', he says, 'to say' (with the Epicureans)'that innumerable parts' (or atoms flying about at haphazard through aninfinite space) 'by their force prevailed over the weakness of Jupiter and, in spite of him and against his nature and will, did many bad andirrational things, than to agree that there is neither confusion norwickedness but he is the author thereof. ' What may be said for both theseparties, Stoics and Epicureans, appears to have led M. Bayle to the [Greek:epechein] of the Pyrrhonians, the suspension of his judgement in respect ofreason, so long as faith is set apart; and to that he professes sinceresubmission. 

136. Pursuing his arguments, however, he has gone as far as attemptingalmost to revive and reinforce those of the disciples of Manes, a Persianheretic of the third century after Christ, or of a certain Paul, chief ofthe Manichaeans in Armenia in the seventh century, from whom they werenamed Paulicians. All these heretics renewed what an ancient philosopher ofUpper Asia, known under the name of Zoroaster, had taught, so it is said, of two intelligent principles of all things, the one good, the other bad, adogma that had perhaps come from the Indians. Among them numbers of peoplestill cling to their error, one that is exceedingly prone to overtake humanignorance and superstition, since very many barbarous peoples, even inAmerica, have been deluded by it, without having had need of philosophy. The Slavs (according to Helmold) had their Zernebog or black God. TheGreeks and Romans, wise as they seem to be, had a Vejovis or Anti-Jupiter, otherwise called Pluto, and numerous other maleficent divinities. TheGoddess Nemesis took pleasure in abasing those who were too fortunate; andHerodotus in some passages hints at his belief that all Divinity isenvious; which, however, is not in harmony with the doctrine of the twoprinciples. 

137. Plutarch, in his treatise _On Isis and Osiris_, knows of no writermore ancient than Zoroaster the magician, as he calls him, that is likelyto have taught the two principles. Trogus or Justin makes him a King of theBactrians, who was conquered by Ninus or Semiramis; he attributes to himthe knowledge of astronomy and the invention of magic. But this magic wasapparently the religion of the fire-worshippers: and it appears that helooked upon light and heat as the good principle, while he added the [209]evil, that is to say, opacity, darkness, cold. Pliny cites the testimony ofa certain Hermippus, an interpreter of Zoroaster's books, according to whomZoroaster was a disciple in the art of magic to one named Azonacus; unlessindeed this be a corruption of Oromases, of whom I shall speak presently, and whom Plato in the _Alcibiades_ names as the father of Zoroaster. ModernOrientals give the name Zerdust to him whom the Greeks named Zoroaster; heis regarded as corresponding to Mercury, because with some nationsWednesday _(mercredi)_ takes its name from him. It is difficult todisentangle the story of Zoroaster and know exactly when he lived. Suidasputs him five hundred years before the taking of Troy. Some Ancients citedby Pliny and Plutarch took it to be ten times as far back. But Xanthus theLydian (in the preface to Diogenes Laertius) put him only six hundred yearsbefore the expedition of Xerxes. Plato declares in the same passage, as M. Bayle observes, that the magic of Zoroaster was nothing but the study ofreligion. Mr. Hyde in his book on the religion of the ancient Persianstries to justify this magic, and to clear it not only of the crime ofimpiety but also of idolatry. Fire-worship prevailed among the Persians andthe Chaldaeans also; it is thought that Abraham left it when he departedfrom Ur of the Chaldees. Mithras was the sun and he was also the God of thePersians; and according to Ovid's account horses were offered in sacrificeto him, _Placat equo Persis radiis Hyperiona cinctum, _ _Ne detur celeri victima tarda Deo. _

But Mr. Hyde believes that they only made use of the sun and fire in theirworship as symbols of the Divinity. It may be necessary to distinguish, aselsewhere, between the Wise and the Multitude. There are in the splendidruins of Persepolis or of Tschelminaar (which means forty columns)sculptured representations of their ceremonies. An ambassador of Hollandhad had them sketched at very great cost by a painter, who had devoted aconsiderable time to the task: but by some chance or other these sketchesfell into the hands of a well-known traveller, M. Chardin, according towhat he tells us himself. It would be a pity if they were lost. These ruinsare one of the most ancient and most beautiful monuments of the earth; andin this respect I wonder at such lack of curiosity in a century so curiousas ours. 

 [210]138. The ancient Greeks and the modern Orientals agree in saying thatZoroaster called the good God Oromazes, or rather Oromasdes, and the evilGod Arimanius. When I pondered on the fact that great princes of Upper Asiahad the name of Hormisdas and that Irminius or Herminius was the name of agod or ancient hero of the Scythian Celts, that is, of the Germani, itoccurred to me that this Arimanius or Irminius might have been a greatconqueror of very ancient time coming from the west, just as Genghis Khanand Tamburlaine were later, coming from the east. Arimanius would thereforehave come from the north-west, that is, from Germania and Sarmatia, throughthe territory of the Alani and Massagetae, to raid the dominions of oneOrmisdas, a great king in Upper Asia, just as other Scythians did in thedays of Cyaxares, King of the Medes, according to the account given byHerodotus. The monarch governing civilized peoples, and working to defendthem against the barbarians, would have gone down to posterity, amongst thesame peoples, as the good god; but the chief of these devastators will havebecome the symbol of the evil principle: that is altogether reasonable. Itappears from this same mythology that these two princes contended for long, but that neither of them was victorious. Thus they both held their own, just as the two principles shared the empire of the world according to thehypothesis attributed to Zoroaster. 

139. It remains to be proved that an ancient god or hero of the Germani wascalled Herman, Arimanius or Irminius. Tacitus relates that the three tribeswhich composed Germania, the Ingaevones, the Istaevones and the Herminonesor Hermiones, were thus named from the three sons of Mannus. Whether thatbe true or not, he wished in any case to indicate that there was a heronamed Herminius, from whom he was told the Herminones were named. Herminones, Hermenner, Hermunduri all mean the same, that is, Soldiers. Even in the Dark Ages Arimanni were _viri militares, _ and there is _feudumArimandiae_ in Lombard law. 

140. I have shown elsewhere that apparently the name of one part ofGermania was given to the whole, and that from these Herminones orHermunduri all the Teutonic peoples were named _Hermanni_ or _Germani_. Thedifference between these two words is only in the force of the aspiration:there is the same difference of initial letter between the _Germani_ of theLatins and _Hermanos_ of the Spaniards, or in the _Gammarus_ of the Latinsand the _Hummer_ (that is, marine crayfish) of the Low Germans. [211]Besides it is very usual for one part of a nation to give the name to thewhole: so all the Germani were called Alemanni by the French, and yet this, according to the old nomenclature, only applied to the Suabians and theSwiss. Although Tacitus did not actually know the origin of the name of theGermani, he said something which supports my opinion, when he observed thatit was a name which inspired terror, taken or given _ob metum_. In fact itsignifies a warrior: _Heer_, _Hari_ is army, whence comes _Hariban_, or'call to Haro', that is, a general order to be with the army, sincecorrupted into _Arrièreban_. Thus Hariman or Ariman, German _Guerre-man_, is a soldier. For as _Hari_, _Heer_ means army, so _Wehr_ signifies arms, _Wehren_ to fight, to make war, the word _Guerre_, _Guerra_ comingdoubtless from the same source. I have already spoken of the _feudumArimandiae_: not only did Herminones or Germani signify the same, but alsothat ancient Herman, so-called son of Mannus, appears to have been giventhis name as being pre-eminently a warrior. 

141. Now it is not the passage in Tacitus only which indicates for us thisgod or hero: we cannot doubt the existence of one of this name among thesepeoples, since Charlemagne found and destroyed near the Weser the columncalled _Irminsäule_, erected in honour of this god. And that combined withthe passage in Tacitus leaves us with the conclusion that it was not thatfamous Arminius who was an enemy of the Romans, but a much greater and moreancient hero, that this cult concerned. Arminius bore the same name asthose who are called Hermann to-day. Arminius was not great enough, norfortunate enough, nor well enough known throughout Germania to attain tothe honour of a public cult, even at the hands of remote tribes, like theSaxons, who came long after him into the country of the Cherusci. And ourArminius, taken by the Asiatics for the evil God, provides ampleconfirmation of my opinion. For in these matters conjectures confirm oneanother without any logical circle, when their foundations tend towards oneand the same end. 

142. It is not beyond belief that the Hermes (that is, Mercury) of theGreeks is the same Herminius or Arimanius. He may have been an inventor orpromoter of the arts and of a slightly more civilized life among his ownpeople and in the countries where he held supremacy, while amongst hisenemies he was looked upon as the author of confusion. Who knows but thathe may have penetrated even into Egypt, like the Scythians who in [212]pursuit of Sesostris came nearly so far. Theut, Menes and Hermes were knownand revered in Egypt. They might have been Tuiscon, his son Mannus andHerman, son of Mannus, according to the genealogy of Tacitus. Menes is heldto be the most ancient king of the Egyptians; 'Theut' was with them a namefor Mercury. At least Theut or Tuiscon, from whom Tacitus derives thedescent of the Germani, and from whom the Teutons, _Tuitsche_ (that is, Germani) even to-day have their name, is the same as that _Teutates_ whoaccording to Lucan was worshipped by the Gauls, and whom Caesar took _proDite Patre_, for Pluto, because of the resemblance between his Latin nameand that of _Teut_ or _Thiet_, _Titan_, _Theodon_; this in ancient timessignified men, people, and also an excellent man (like the word 'baron'), in short, a prince. There are authorities for all these significations: butone must not delay over this point. Herr Otto Sperling, who is well knownfor various learned writings, but has many more in readiness to appear, ina special dissertation has treated the question of this Teutates, God ofthe Celts. Some observations which I imparted to him on that subject havebeen published, with his reply, in the _Literary News of the Baltic Sea_. He interprets this passage from Lucan somewhat otherwise than I do:

 _Teutates, pollensque feris altaribus Hesus, _ _Et Tamaris Scythicae non mitior ara Dianae. _

Hesus was, it appears, the God of War, who was called Ares by the Greeksand Erich by the ancient Germani, whence still remains _Erichtag_, Tuesday. The letters R and S, which are produced by the same organ, are easilyinterchanged, for instance: _Moor_ and _Moos_, _Geren_ and _Gesen_, _Erwar_ and _Er was_, _Fer_, _Hierro_, _Eiron_, _Eisen_. Likewise _Papisius_, _Valesius_, _Fusius_, instead of _Papirius_, _Valerius_, _Furius_, with theancient Romans. As for Taramis or perhaps Taranis, one knows that _Taran_was the thunder, or the God of Thunder, with the ancient Celts, called_Thor_ by the Germani of the north; whence the English have preserved thename 'Thursday', _jeudi_, _diem Jovis_. And the passage from Lucan meansthat the altar of Taran, God of the Celts, was not less cruel than that ofDiana in Tauris: _Taranis aram non mitiorem ara Dianae Scythicae fuisse_. 

143. It is also not impossible that there was a time when the western [213]or Celtic princes made themselves masters of Greece, of Egypt and a goodpart of Asia, and that their cult remained in those countries. When oneconsiders with what rapidity the Huns, the Saracens and the Tartars gainedpossession of a great part of our continent one will be the less surprisedat this; and it is confirmed by the great number of words in the Greek andGerman tongues which correspond so closely. Callimachus, in a hymn inhonour of Apollo, seems to imply that the Celts who attacked the Temple atDelphi, under their Brennus, or chief, were descendants of the ancientTitans and Giants who made war on Jupiter and the other gods, that is tosay, on the Princes of Asia and of Greece. It may be that Jupiter ishimself descended from the Titans or Theodons, that is, from the earlierCelto-Scythian princes; and the material collected by the late Abbé de laCharmoye in his _Celtic Origins_ conforms to that possibility. Yet thereare opinions on other matters in this work by this learned writer which tome do not appear probable, especially when he excludes the Germani from thenumber of the Celts, not having recalled sufficiently the facts given byancient writers and not being sufficiently aware of the relation betweenthe ancient Gallic and Germanic tongues. Now the so-called Giants, whowished to scale the heavens, were new Celts who followed the path of theirancestors; and Jupiter, although of their kindred, as it were, wasconstrained to resist them. Just so did the Visigoths established in Gallicterritory resist, together with the Romans, other peoples of Germania andScythia, who succeeded them under Attila their leader, he being at thattime in control of the Scythian, Sarmatic and Germanic tribes from thefrontiers of Persia up to the Rhine. But the pleasure one feels when onethinks to find in the mythologies of the gods some trace of the old historyof fabulous times has perhaps carried me too far, and I know not whether Ishall have been any more successful than Goropius Becanus, Schrieckius, Herr Rudbeck and the Abbe de la Charmoye. 

144. Let us return to Zoroaster, who led us to Oromasdes and Arimanius, thesources of good and evil, and let us assume that he looked upon them as twoeternal principles opposed to each other, although there is reason to doubtthis assumption. It is thought that Marcion, disciple of Cerdon, was ofthis opinion before Manes. M. Bayle acknowledges that these men usedlamentable arguments; but he thinks that they did not sufficiently [214]recognize their advantages or know how to apply their principal instrument, which was the difficulty over the origin of evil. He believes that an ableman on their side would have thoroughly embarrassed the orthodox, and itseems as though he himself, failing any other, wished to undertake a taskso unnecessary in the opinion of many people. 'All the hypotheses' (hesays, _Dictionary_, v. , 'Marcion', p. 2039) 'that Christians haveestablished parry but poorly the blows aimed at them: they all triumph whenthey act on the offensive; but they lose their whole advantage when theyhave to sustain the attack. ' He confesses that the 'Dualists' (as with Mr. Hyde he calls them), that is, the champions of two principles, would soonhave been routed by _a priori_ reasons, taken from the nature of God; buthe thinks that they triumph in their turn when one comes to the _aposteriori_ reasons, which are taken from the existence of evil. 

145. He treats of the matter with abundant detail in his _Dictionary_, article 'Manichaeans', p. 2025, which we must examine a little, in order tothrow greater light upon this subject: 'The surest and clearest ideas oforder teach us', he says, 'that a Being who exists through himself, who isnecessary, who is eternal, must be single, infinite, all powerful, andendowed with all kinds of perfections. ' This argument deserves to have beendeveloped more completely. 'Now it is necessary to see', he goes on, 'ifthe phenomena of nature can be conveniently explained by the hypothesis ofone single principle. ' I have explained it sufficiently by showing thatthere are cases where some disorder in the part is necessary for producingthe greatest order in the whole. But it appears that M. Bayle asks a littletoo much: he wishes for a detailed exposition of how evil is connected withthe best possible scheme for the universe. That would be a completeexplanation of the phenomena: but I do not undertake to give it; nor am Ibound to do so, for there is no obligation to do that which is impossiblefor us in our existing state. It is sufficient for me to point out thatthere is nothing to prevent the connexion of a certain individual evil withwhat is the best on the whole. This incomplete explanation, leavingsomething to be discovered in the life to come, is sufficient for answeringthe objections, though not for a comprehension of the matter. 

146. 'The heavens and all the rest of the universe', adds M. Bayle, 'preachthe glory, the power, the oneness of God. ' Thence the conclusion [215]should have been drawn that this is the case (as I have already observedabove) because there is seen in these objects something entire andisolated, so to speak. Every time we see such a work of God, we find it soperfect that we must wonder at the contrivance and the beauty thereof: butwhen we do not see an entire work, when we only look upon scraps andfragments, it is no wonder if the good order is not evident there. Ourplanetary system composes such an isolated work, which is complete alsowhen it is taken by itself; each plant, each animal, each man furnishes onesuch work, to a certain point of perfection: one recognizes therein thewonderful contrivance of the author. But the human kind, so far as it isknown to us, is only a fragment, only a small portion of the City of God orof the republic of Spirits, which has an extent too great for us, andwhereof we know too little, to be able to observe the wonderful ordertherein. 'Man alone, ' says M. Bayle, 'that masterpiece of his Creator amongthings visible, man alone, I say, gives rise to great objections withregard to the oneness of God. ' Claudian made the same observation, unburdening his heart in these well-known lines:

 _Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem_, etc. 

But the harmony existing in all the rest allows of a strong presumptionthat it would exist also in the government of men, and generally in that ofSpirits, if the whole were known to us. One must judge the works of God aswisely as Socrates judged those of Heraclitus in these words: What I haveunderstood thereof pleases me; I think that the rest would please me noless if I understood it. 

147. Here is another particular reason for the disorder apparent in thatwhich concerns man. It is that God, in giving him intelligence, haspresented him with an image of the Divinity. He leaves him to himself, in asense, in his small department, _ut Spartam quam nactus est ornet_. Heenters there only in a secret way, for he supplies being, force, life, reason, without showing himself. It is there that free will plays its game:and God makes game (so to speak) of these little Gods that he has thoughtgood to produce, as we make game of children who follow pursuits which wesecretly encourage or hinder according as it pleases us. Thus man is therelike a little god in his own world or _Microcosm_, which he governs [216]after his own fashion: he sometimes performs wonders therein, and his artoften imitates nature. 

 _Jupiter in parvo cum cerneret aethera vitro, _ _Risit et ad Superos talia dicta dedit:_ _Huccine mortalis progressa potentia, Divi?_ _Jam meus in fragili luditur orbe labor. _ _Jura poli rerumque fidem legesque Deorum_ _Cuncta Syracusius transtulit arte Senex. _ _Quid falso insontem tonitru Salmonea miror?_ _Aemula Naturae est parva reperta manus. _

But he also commits great errors, because he abandons himself to thepassions, and because God abandons him to his own way. God punishes himalso for such errors, now like a father or tutor, training or chastisingchildren, now like a just judge, punishing those who forsake him: and evilcomes to pass most frequently when these intelligences or their smallworlds come into collision. Man finds himself the worse for this, inproportion to his fault; but God, by a wonderful art, turns all the errorsof these little worlds to the greater adornment of his great world. It isas in those devices of perspective, where certain beautiful designs looklike mere confusion until one restores them to the right angle of vision orone views them by means of a certain glass or mirror. It is by placing andusing them properly that one makes them serve as adornment for a room. Thusthe apparent deformities of our little worlds combine to become beauties inthe great world, and have nothing in them which is opposed to the onenessof an infinitely perfect universal principle: on the contrary, theyincrease our wonder at the wisdom of him who makes evil serve the greatergood. 

148. M. Bayle continues: 'that man is wicked and miserable; that there areeverywhere prisons and hospitals; that history is simply a collection ofthe crimes and calamities of the human race. ' I think that there isexaggeration in that: there is incomparably more good than evil in the lifeof men, as there are incomparably more houses than prisons. With regard tovirtue and vice, a certain mediocrity prevails. Machiavelli has alreadyobserved that there are few very wicked and very good men, and that thiscauses the failure of many great enterprises. I find it a great fault inhistorians that they keep their mind on the evil more than on the [217]good. The chief end of history, as also of poetry, should be to teachprudence and virtue by examples, and then to display vice in such a way asto create aversion to it and to prompt men to avoid it, or serve towardsthat end. 

149. M. Bayle avows: 'that one finds everywhere both moral good andphysical good, some examples of virtue, some examples of happiness, andthat this is what makes the difficulty. For if there were only wicked andunhappy people', he says, 'there would be no need to resort to thehypothesis of the two principles. ' I wonder that this admirable man couldhave evinced so great an inclination towards this opinion of the twoprinciples; and I am surprised at his not having taken into account thatthis romance of human life, which makes the universal history of the humanrace, lay fully devised in the divine understanding, with innumerableothers, and that the will of God only decreed its existence because thissequence of events was to be most in keeping with the rest of things, tobring forth the best result. And these apparent faults in the whole world, these spots on a Sun whereof ours is but a ray, rather enhance its beautythan diminish it, contributing towards that end by obtaining a greatergood. There are in truth two principles, but they are both in God, to wit, his understanding and his will. The understanding furnishes the principleof evil, without being sullied by it, without being evil; it representsnatures as they exist in the eternal verities; it contains within it thereason wherefore evil is permitted: but the will tends only towards good. Let us add a third principle, namely power; it precedes even understandingand will, but it operates as the one displays it and as the other requiresit. 

150. Some (like Campanella) have called these three perfections of God thethree primordialities. Many have even believed that there was therein asecret connexion with the Holy Trinity: that power relates to the Father, that is, to the source of Divinity, wisdom to the Eternal Word, which iscalled _logos_ by the most sublime of the Evangelists, and will or Love tothe Holy Spirit. Well-nigh all the expressions or comparisons derived fromthe nature of the intelligent substance tend that way. 

151. It seems to me that if M. Bayle had taken into account what I havejust said of the principles of things, he would have answered his ownquestions, or at the least he would not have continued to ask, as he doesin these which follow: 'If man is the work of a single principle [218]supremely good, supremely holy, supremely powerful, can he be subject todiseases, to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, pain, grief? Can he have so manyevil tendencies? Can he commit so many crimes? Can supreme goodness producean unhappy creature? Shall not supreme power, united to an infinitegoodness, shower blessings upon its work, and shall it not banish all thatmight offend or grieve?' Prudentius in his _Hamartigenia_ presented thesame difficulty:

 _Si non vult Deus esse malum, cur non vetat? inquit. _ _Non refert auctor fuerit, factorve malorum. _ _Anne opera in vitium sceleris pulcherrima verti, _ _Cum possit prohibere, sinat; quod si velit omnes_ _Innocuos agere Omnipotens, ne sancta voluntas_ _Degeneret, facto nec se manus inquinet ullo?_ _Condidit ergo malum Dominus, quod spectat ab alto, _ _Et patitur fierique probat, tanquam ipse crearit. _ _Ipse creavit enim, quod si discludere possit, _ _Non abolet, longoque sinit grassarier usu. _

But I have already answered that sufficiently. Man is himself the source ofhis evils: just as he is, he was in the divine idea. God, prompted byessential reasons of wisdom, decreed that he should pass into existencejust as he is. M. Bayle would perchance have perceived this origin of evilin the form in which I demonstrate it here, if he had herein combined thewisdom of God with his power, his goodness and his holiness. I will add, inpassing, that his _holiness_ is nothing other than the highest degree ofgoodness, just as the crime which is its opposite is the worst of all evil. 

152. M. Bayle places the Greek philosopher Melissus, champion of theoneness of the first principle (and perhaps even of the oneness ofsubstance) in conflict with Zoroaster, as with the first originator ofduality. Zoroaster admits that the hypothesis of Melissus is moreconsistent with order and _a priori_ reasons, but he denies its conformitywith experience and _a posteriori_ reasons. 'I surpass you', he said, 'inthe explanation of phenomena, which is the principal mark of a goodsystem. ' But, in my opinion, it is not a very good explanation of aphenomenon to assign to it an _ad hoc_ principle: to evil, a _principiummaleficum_, to cold, a _primum frigidum_; there is nothing so easy andnothing so dull. It is well-nigh as if someone were to say that the [219]Peripatetics surpass the new mathematicians in the explanation of thephenomena of the stars, by giving them _ad hoc_ intelligences to guidethem. According to that, it is quite easy to conceive why the planets maketheir way with such precision; whereas there is need of much geometry andreflexion to understand how from the gravity of the planets, which bearsthem towards the sun, combined with some whirlwind which carries themalong, or with their own motive force, can spring the elliptic movement ofKepler, which satisfies appearances so well. A man incapable of relishingdeep speculations will at first applaud the Peripatetics and will treat ourmathematicians as dreamers. Some old Galenist will do the same with regardto the faculties of the Schoolmen: he will admit a chylific, a chymific anda sanguific, and he will assign one of these _ad hoc_ to each operation; hewill think he has worked wonders, and will laugh at what he will call thechimeras of the moderns, who claim to explain through mechanical structurewhat passes in the body of an animal. 

153. The explanation of the cause of evil by a particular principle, _perprincipium maleficum_, is of the same nature. Evil needs no suchexplanation, any more than do cold and darkness: there is neither _primumfrigidum_ nor principle of darkness. Evil itself comes only from privation;the positive enters therein only by concomitance, as the active enters byconcomitance into cold. We see that water in freezing is capable ofbreaking a gun-barrel wherein it is confined; and yet cold is a certainprivation of force, it only comes from the diminution of a movement whichseparates the particles of fluids. When this separating motion becomesweakened in the water by the cold, the particles of compressed airconcealed in the water collect; and, becoming larger, they become morecapable of acting outwards through their buoyancy. The resistance which thesurfaces of the proportions of air meet in the water, and which opposes theforce exerted by these portions towards dilation, is far less, andconsequently the effect of the air greater, in large air-bubbles than insmall, even though these small bubbles combined should form as great a massas the large. For the resistances, that is, the surfaces, increase by the_square_, and the forces, that is, the contents or the volumes of thespheres of compressed air, increase by the _cube_, of their diameters. Thusit is _by accident_ that privation involves action and force. I havealready shown how privation is enough to cause error and malice, and [220]how God is prompted to permit them, despite that there be no malignity inhim. Evil comes from privation; the positive and action spring from it byaccident, as force springs from cold. 

154. The statement that M. Bayle attributes to the Paulicians, p. 2323, isnot conclusive, to wit, that free will must come from two principles, tothe end that it may have power to turn towards good and towards evil: for, being simple in itself, it should rather have come from a neutral principleif this argument held good. But free will tends towards good, and if itmeets with evil it is by accident, for the reason that this evil isconcealed beneath the good, and masked, as it were. These words which Ovidascribes to Medea, _Video meliora proboque, _ _Deteriora sequor_, imply that the morally good is mastered by the agreeably good, which makesmore impression on souls when they are disturbed by the passions. 

155. Furthermore, M. Bayle himself supplies Melissus with a good answer;but a little later he disputes it. Here are his words, p. 2025: 'IfMelissus consults the notions of order, he will answer that man was notwicked when God made him; he will say that man received from God a happystate, but that not having followed the light of conscience, which inaccordance with the intention of its author should have guided him alongthe path of virtue, he has become wicked, and has deserved that God thesupremely good should make him feel the effects of his anger. It istherefore not God who is the cause of moral evil: but he is the cause ofphysical evil, that is, of the punishment of moral evil. And thispunishment, far from being incompatible with the supremely good principle, of necessity emanates from that one of its attributes, I mean its justice, which is not less essential to it than its goodness. This answer, the mostreasonable that Melissus can give, is fundamentally good and sound, but itmay be disputed by something more specious and more dazzling. For indeedZoroaster objects that the infinitely good principle ought to have createdman not only without actual evil, but also without the inclination towardsevil; that God, having foreseen sin with all its consequences, ought tohave prevented it; that he ought to have impelled man to moral good, andnot to have allowed him any force for tending towards crime. ' That is quiteeasy to say, but it is not practicable if one follows the principles [221]of order: it could not have been accomplished without perpetual miracles. Ignorance, error and malice follow one another naturally in animals made aswe are: should this species, then, have been missing in the universe? Ihave no doubt but that it is too important there, despite all itsweaknesses, for God to have consented to its abolition. 

156. M. Bayle, in the article entitled 'Paulicians' inserted by him in his_Dictionary_, follows up the pronouncements he made in the article on theManichaeans. According to him (p. 2330, lit. H) the orthodox seem to admittwo first principles, in making the devil the originator of sin. M. Becker, a former minister of Amsterdam, author of the book entitled _The WorldBewitched_, has made use of this idea in order to demonstrate that oneshould not assign such power and authority to the Devil as would allow ofhis comparison with God. Therein he is right: but he pushes the conclusionstoo far. And the author of the book entitled [Greek: Apokatastasis Pantôn]believes that if the Devil had never been vanquished and despoiled, if hehad always kept his prey, if the title of invincible had belonged to him, that would have done injury to the glory of God. But it is a poor advantageto keep those whom one has led astray in order to share their punishmentfor ever. And as for the cause of evil, it is true that the Devil is theauthor of sin. But the origin of sin comes from farther away, its source isin the original imperfection of creatures: that renders them capable ofsinning, and there are circumstances in the sequence of things which causethis power to evince itself in action. 

157. The devils were angels like the rest before their fall, and it isthought that their leader was one of the chief among angels; but Scriptureis not explicit enough on that point. The passage of the Apocalypse thatspeaks of the struggle with the Dragon, as of a vision, leaves much indoubt, and does not sufficiently develop a subject which by the othersacred writers is hardly mentioned. It is not in place here to enter intothis discussion, and one must still admit that the common opinion agreesbest with the sacred text. M. Bayle examines some replies of St. Basil, ofLactantius and others on the origin of evil. As, however, they areconcerned with physical evil, I postpone discussion thereof, and I willproceed with the examination of the difficulties over the moral cause ofmoral evil, which arise in several passages of the works of our giftedauthor. 

 [222]158. He disputes the _permission_ of this evil, he would wish one to admitthat God _wills_ it. He quotes these words of Calvin (on Genesis, ch. 3):'The ears of some are offended when one says that God willed it. But I askyou, what else is the permission of him who is entitled to forbid, orrather who has the thing in his own hands, but an act of will?' M. Bayleexplains these words of Calvin, and those which precede them, as if headmitted that God willed the fall of Adam, not in so far as it was a crime, but under some other conception that is unknown to us. He quotes casuistswho are somewhat lax, who say that a son can desire the death of hisfather, not in so far as it is an evil for himself but in so far as it is agood for his heirs _(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 147, p. 850). It seems to me that Calvin only says that God willed man's fall forsome reason unknown to us. In the main, when it is a question of a decisivewill, that is, of a decree, these distinctions are useless: one wills theaction with all its qualities, if it is true that one wills it. But when itis a crime, God can only will the permission of it: the crime is neither anend nor a means, it is only a _conditio sine qua non_; thus it is not theobject of a direct will, as I have already demonstrated above. God cannotprevent it without acting against what he owes to himself, without doingsomething that would be worse than the crime of man, without violating therule of the best; and that would be to destroy divinity, as I have alreadyobserved. God is therefore bound by a moral necessity, which is in himself, to permit moral evil in creatures. There is precisely the case wherein thewill of a wise mind is only permissive. I have already said this: he isbound to permit the crime of others when he cannot prevent it withouthimself failing in that which he owes to himself. 

159. 'But among all these infinite combinations', says M. Bayle (p. 853), 'it pleased God to choose one wherein Adam was to sin, and by his decree hemade it, in preference to all the others, the plan that should come topass. ' Very good; that is speaking my language; so long as one applies itto the combinations which compose the whole universe. 'You will thereforenever make us understand', he adds, 'how God did not will that Eve and Adamshould sin, since he rejected all the combinations wherein they would nothave sinned. ' But the thing is in general very easy to understand, from allthat I have just said. This combination that makes the whole universe isthe best; God therefore could not refrain from choosing it without [223]incurring a lapse, and rather than incur such, a thing altogetherinappropriate to him, he permits the lapse or the sin of man which isinvolved in this combination. 

160. M. Jacquelot, with other able men, does not differ in opinion from me, when for example he says, p. 186 of his treatise on the _Conformity ofFaith with Reason_: 'Those who are puzzled by these difficulties seem to betoo limited in their outlook, and to wish to reduce all God's designs totheir own interests. When God formed the universe, his whole prospect washimself and his own glory, so that if we had knowledge of all creatures, oftheir diverse combinations and of their different relations, we shouldunderstand without difficulty that the universe corresponds perfectly tothe infinite wisdom of the Almighty. ' He says elsewhere (p. 232):'Supposing the impossible, that God could not prevent the wrong use of freewill without destroying it, it will be agreed that since his wisdom and hisglory determined him to form free creatures this powerful reason must haveprevailed over the grievous consequences which their freedom might have. ' Ihave endeavoured to develop this still further through _the reason of thebest and the moral necessity_ which led God to make this choice, despitethe sin of some creatures which is involved therein. I think that I havecut down to the root of the difficulty; nevertheless I am well pleased, forthe sake of throwing more light on the matter, to apply my principle ofsolution to the peculiar difficulties of M. Bayle. 

161. Here is one, set forth in these terms (ch. 148, p. 856): 'Would it ina prince be a mark of his kindness: 1. To give to a hundred messengers asmuch money as is needed for a journey of two hundred leagues? 2. To promisea recompense to all those who should finish the journey without havingborrowed anything, and to threaten with imprisonment all those whom theirmoney should not have sufficed? 3. To make choice of a hundred persons, ofwhom he would know for certain that there were but two who should earn therecompense, the ninety-eight others being destined to find on the wayeither a mistress or a gamester or some other thing which would make themincur expenses, and which he would himself have been at pains to dispose incertain places along their path? 4. To imprison actually ninety-eight ofthese messengers on the moment of their return? Is it not abundantlyevident that he would have no kindness for them, and that on the contraryhe would intend for them, not the proposed recompense, but prison? [224]They would deserve it, certainly; but he who had wished them to deserve itand placed them in the sure way towards deserving it, should he be worthyof being called kind, on the pretext that he had recompensed the twoothers?' It would doubtless not be on that account that he earned the titleof 'kind'. Yet other circumstances may contribute, which would avail torender him worthy of praise for having employed this artifice in order toknow those people, and to make trial of them; just as Gideon made use ofsome extraordinary means of choosing the most valiant and the leastsqueamish among his soldiers. And even if the prince were to know alreadythe disposition of all these messengers, may he not put them to this testin order to make them known also to the others? Even though these reasonsbe not applicable to God, they make it clear, nevertheless, that an actionlike that of this prince may appear preposterous when it is detached fromthe circumstances indicating its cause. All the more must one deem that Godhas acted well, and that we should see this if we fully knew of all that hehas done. 

162. M. Descartes, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth (vol. 1, letter10) has made use of another comparison to reconcile human freedom with theomnipotence of God. 'He imagines a monarch who has forbidden duels, andwho, knowing for certain that two noblemen, if they meet, will fight, takessure steps to bring about their meeting. They meet indeed, they fight:their disobedience of the law is an effect of their free will, they arepunishable. What a king can do in such a case (he adds) concerning somefree actions of his subjects, God, who has infinite foreknowledge andpower, certainly does concerning all those of men. Before he sent us intothis world he knew exactly what all the tendencies of our will would be: hehas endued us therewith, he also has disposed all other things that areoutside us, to cause such and such objects to present themselves to oursenses at such and such a time. He knew that as a result of this our freewill would determine us toward some particular thing, and he has willed itthus; but he has not for that willed to constrain our free will thereto. Inthis king one may distinguish two different degrees of will, the onewhereby he willed that these noblemen should fight, since he brought abouttheir meeting, and the other whereby he did not will it, since he forbadeduels. Even so theologians distinguish in God an absolute and independentwill, whereby he wills that all things be done just as they are done, [225]and another which is relative, and which concerns the merit or demerit ofmen, whereby he wills that his Laws be obeyed' (Descartes, letter 10 ofvol. 1, pp. 51, 52. Compare with that the quotation made by M. Arnauld, vol. 2, p. 288 _et seqq_. Of his _Reflexions on the System of Malebranche_, from Thomas Aquinas, on the antecedent and consequent will of God). 

163. Here is M. Bayle's reply to that (_Reply to the Questions of aProvincial_, ch. 154, p. 943): 'This great philosopher is much mistaken, itseems to me. There would not be in this monarch any degree of will, eithersmall or great, that these two noblemen should obey the law, and not fight. He would will entirely and solely that they should fight. That would notexculpate them, they would only follow their passion, they would be unawarethat they conformed to the will of their sovereign: but he would be intruth the moral cause of their encounter, and he would not more entirelywish it supposing he were to inspire them with the desire or to give themthe order for it. Imagine to yourself two princes each of whom wishes hiseldest son to poison himself. One employs constraint, the other contentshimself with secretly causing a grief that he knows will be sufficient toinduce his son to poison himself. Will you be doubtful whether the will ofthe latter is less complete than the will of the former? M. Descartes istherefore assuming an unreal fact and does not at all solve thedifficulty. '

164. One must confess that M. Descartes speaks somewhat crudely of the willof God in regard to evil in saying not only that God knew that our freewill would determine us toward some particular thing, but also _that healso wished it_, albeit he did not will to constrain the will thereto. Hespeaks no less harshly in the eighth letter of the same volume, saying thatnot the slightest thought enters into the mind of a man which God does not_will_, and has not willed from all eternity, to enter there. Calvin neversaid anything harsher; and all that can only be excused if it is to beunderstood of a permissive will. M. Descartes' solution amounts to thedistinction between the will expressed in the sign and the will expressiveof the good pleasure (_inter voluntatem signi et beneplaciti_) which themoderns have taken from the Schoolmen as regards the terms, but to whichthey have given a meaning not usual among the ancients. It is true that Godmay command something and yet not will that it be done, as when hecommanded Abraham to sacrifice his son: he willed the obedience, and he didnot will the action. But when God commands the virtuous action and [226]forbids the sin, he wills indeed that which he ordains, but it is only byan antecedent will, as I have explained more than once. 

165. M. Descartes' comparison is therefore not satisfactory; but it may bemade so. One must make some change in the facts, inventing some reason tooblige the prince to cause or permit the two enemies to meet. They must, for instance, be together in the army or in other obligatory functions, acircumstance the prince himself cannot hinder without endangering hisState. For example, the absence of either of them might be responsible forthe disappearance of innumerable persons of his party from the army orcause grumbling among the soldiers and give rise to some great disturbance. In this case, therefore, one may say that the prince does not will theduel: he knows of it, but he permits it notwithstanding, for he preferspermitting the sin of others to committing one himself. Thus this correctedcomparison may serve, provided that one observe the difference between Godand the prince. The prince is forced into this permission by hispowerlessness; a more powerful monarch would have no need of all theseconsiderations; but God, who has power to do all that is possible, onlypermits sin because it is absolutely impossible to anyone at all to dobetter. The prince's action is peradventure not free from sorrow andregret. This regret is due to his imperfection, of which he is sensible;therein lies displeasure. God is incapable of such a feeling and finds, moreover, no cause therefor; he is infinitely conscious of his ownperfection, and it may even be said that the imperfection in creaturestaken individually changes for him into perfection in relation to thewhole, and that it is an added glory for the Creator. What more can onewish, when one possesses a boundless wisdom and when one is as powerful asone is wise; when one can do all and when one has the best?

166. Having once understood these things, we are hardened sufficiently, soit seems to me, against the strongest and most spirited objections. I havenot concealed them: but there are some we shall merely touch upon, becausethey are too odious. The Remonstrants and M. Bayle (_Reply to the Questionsof a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 152, end page 919) quote St. Augustine, saying, '_crudelem esse misericordiam velle aliquem miserum esse ut eiusmiserearis_': in the same sense is cited Seneca _De Benef. _, L. 6, c. 36, 37. I confess that one would have some reason to urge that against thosewho believed that God has no other cause for permitting sin than the [227]design to have something wherewith to exercise punitive justice against themajority of men, and his mercy towards a small number of elect. But it mustbe considered that God had reasons for his permission of sin, more worthyof him and more profound in relation to us. Someone has dared to compareGod's course of action with that of a Caligula, who has his edicts writtenin so small a hand and has them placarded in so high a place that it is notpossible to read them; with that of a mother who neglects her daughter'shonour in order to attain her own selfish ends; with that of QueenCatherine de Medicis, who is said to have abetted the love-affairs of herladies in order to learn of the intrigues of the great; and even with thatof Tiberius, who arranged, through the extraordinary services of theexecutioner, that the law forbidding the subjection of a virgin to capitalpunishment should no longer apply to the case of Sejanus's daughter. Thislast comparison was proposed by Peter Bertius, then an Armenian, butfinally a member of the Roman communion. And a scandalous comparison hasbeen made between God and Tiberius, which is related at length by AndreasCaroli in his _Memorabilia Ecclesiastica_ of the last century, as M. Bayleobserves. Bertius used it against the Gomarists. I think that arguments ofthis kind are only valid against those who maintain that justice is anarbitrary thing in relation to God; or that he has a despotic power whichcan go so far as being able to condemn innocents; or, in short, that goodis not the motive of his actions. 

167. At that same time an ingenious satire was composed against theGomarists, entitled _Fur praedestinatus, de gepredestineerdedief_, whereinthere is introduced a thief condemned to be hanged, who attributes to Godall the evil he has done; who believes himself predestined to salvationnotwithstanding his wicked actions; who imagines that this belief issufficient for him, and who defeats by arguments _ad hominem_ aCounter-remonstrant minister called to prepare him for death: but thisthief is finally converted by an old pastor who had been dismissed for hisArminianism, whom the gaoler, in pity for the criminal and for the weaknessof the minister, had brought to him secretly. Replies were made to thislampoon, but replies to satires never please as much as the satiresthemselves. M. Bayle (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 154, p. 938) says that this book was printed in England in the [228]time of Cromwell, and he appears not to have been informed that it was onlya translation of the much older original Flemish. He adds that Dr. GeorgeKendal wrote a confutation of it at Oxford in the year 1657, under thetitle of _Fur pro Tribunali_, and that the dialogue is there inserted. Thisdialogue presupposes, contrary to the truth, that the Counter-remonstrantsmake God the cause of evil, and teach a kind of predestination in theMahometan manner according to which it does not matter whether one doesgood or evil, and the assumption that one is predestined assures the fact. They by no means go so far. Nevertheless it is true that there are amongthem some Supralapsarians and others who find it hard to declare themselvesin clear terms upon the justice of God and the principles of piety andmorals in man. For they imagine despotism in God, and demand that man beconvinced, without reason, of the absolute certainty of his election, acourse that is liable to have dangerous consequences. But all those whoacknowledge that God produces the best plan, having chosen it from amongall possible ideas of the universe; that he there finds man inclined by theoriginal imperfection of creatures to misuse his free will and to plungeinto misery; that God prevents the sin and the misery in so far as theperfection of the universe, which is an emanation from his, may permit it:those, I say, show forth more clearly that God's intention is the one mostright and holy in the world; that the creature alone is guilty, that hisoriginal limitation or imperfection is the source of his wickedness, thathis evil will is the sole cause of his misery; that one cannot be destinedto salvation without also being destined to the holiness of the children ofGod, and that all hope of election one can have can only be founded uponthe good will infused into one's heart by the grace of God. 

168. _Metaphysical considerations_ also are brought up against myexplanation of the moral cause of moral evil; but they will trouble me lesssince I have dismissed the objections derived from moral reasons, whichwere more impressive. These metaphysical considerations concern the natureof the _possible_ and of the _necessary_; they go against my fundamentalassumption that God has chosen the best of all possible worlds. There arephilosophers who have maintained that there is nothing possible except thatwhich actually happens. These are those same people who thought or couldhave thought that all is necessary unconditionally. Some were of this [229]opinion because they admitted a brute and blind necessity in the cause ofthe existence of things: and it is these I have most reason for opposing. But there are others who are mistaken only because they misuse terms. Theyconfuse moral necessity with metaphysical necessity: they imagine thatsince God cannot help acting for the best he is thus deprived of freedom, and things are endued with that necessity which philosophers andtheologians endeavour to avoid. With these writers my dispute is only oneof words, provided they admit in very deed that God chooses and does thebest. But there are others who go further, they think that God could havedone better. This is an opinion which must be rejected: for although itdoes not altogether deprive God of wisdom and goodness, as do the advocatesof blind necessity, it sets bounds thereto, thus derogating from God'ssupreme perfection. 

169. The question of the _possibility of things that do not happen_ hasalready been examined by the ancients. It appears that Epicurus, topreserve freedom and to avoid an absolute necessity, maintained, afterAristotle, that contingent futurities were not susceptible of determinatetruth. For if it was true yesterday that I should write to-day, it couldtherefore not fail to happen, it was already necessary; and, for the samereason, it was from all eternity. Thus all that which happens is necessary, and it is impossible for anything different to come to pass. But since thatis not so it would follow, according to him, that contingent futuritieshave no determinate truth. To uphold this opinion, Epicurus went so far asto deny the first and the greatest principle of the truths of reason, hedenied that every assertion was either true or false. Here is the way theyconfounded him: 'You deny that it was true yesterday that I should writeto-day; it was therefore false. ' The good man, not being able to admit thisconclusion, was obliged to say that it was neither true nor false. Afterthat, he needs no refutation, and Chrysippus might have spared himself thetrouble he took to prove the great principle of contradictories, followingthe account by Cicero in his book _De Fato_: 'Contendit omnes nervosChrysippus ut persuadeat omne [Greek: Axiôma] aut verum esse aut falsum. Utenim Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit, fato fieriquaecunque fiant; si enim alterum ex aeternitate verum sit, esse id etiamcertum; si certum, etiam necessarium; ita et necessitatem et fatumconfirmari putat; sic Chrysippus metuit ne non, si non obtinuerit omne[230]quod enuncietur aut verum esse aut falsum, omnia fato fieri possint excausis aeternis rerum futurarum. ' M. Bayle observes (_Dictionary_, article'Epicurus', let. T, p. 1141) 'that neither of these two great philosophers[Epicurus and Chrysippus] understood that the truth of this maxim, everyproposition is true or false, is independent of what is called _fatum_: itcould not therefore serve as proof of the existence of the _fatum_, asChrysippus maintained and as Epicurus feared. Chrysippus could not haveconceded, without damaging his own position, that there are propositionswhich are neither true nor false. But he gained nothing by asserting thecontrary: for, whether there be free causes or not, it is equally true thatthis proposition, The Grand Mogul will go hunting to-morrow, is true orfalse. Men rightly regarded as ridiculous this speech of Tiresias: All thatI shall say will happen or not, for great Apollo confers on me the facultyof prophesying. If, assuming the impossible, there were no God, it wouldyet be certain that everything the greatest fool in the world shouldpredict would happen or would not happen. That is what neither Chrysippusnor Epicurus has taken into consideration. ' Cicero, lib. I, _De Nat. Deorum_, with regard to the evasions of the Epicureans expressed the soundopinion (as M. Bayle observes towards the end of the same page) that itwould be much less shameful to admit that one cannot answer one's opponent, than to have recourse to such answers. Yet we shall see that M. Baylehimself confused the certain with the necessary, when he maintained thatthe choice of the best rendered things necessary. 

170. Let us come now to the possibility of things that do not happen, and Iwill give the very words of M. Bayle, albeit they are somewhat discursive. This is what he says on the matter in his _Dictionary_ (article'Chrysippus', let. S, p. 929): 'The celebrated dispute on things possibleand things impossible owed its origin to the doctrine of the Stoicsconcerning fate. The question was to know whether, among the things whichhave never been and never will be, there are some possible; or whether allthat is not, all that has never been, all that will never be, wasimpossible. A famous dialectician of the Megaric Sect, named Diodorus, gavea negative answer to the first of these two questions and an affirmative tothe second; but Chrysippus vehemently opposed him. Here are two passages ofCicero (epist. 4, lib. 9, _Ad Familiar. _): "[Greek: peri dynatôn] me scito[Greek: kata Diodôron krinein]. Quapropter si venturus es, scito [231]necesse esse te venire. Sin autem non es, [Greek: tôn adynatôn] est tevenire. Nunc vide utra te [Greek: krisis] magis delectet, [Greek:Chrysippeia] ne, an haec; quam noster Diodorus [a Stoic who for a long timehad lived in Cicero's house] non concoquebat. " This is quoted from a letterthat Cicero wrote to Varro. He sets forth more comprehensively the wholestate of the question, in the little book _De Fato_. I am going to quote afew pieces (Cic. , _De Fato_, p. M. 65): "Vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam causam, in qua tibi cum Diodoro valente Dialectico magna luctatio est, deseras . . . Omne ergo quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri non potest. At hoc, Chrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro certamen est. Ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum, aut futurum sitverum; et quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse esse; et quicquidnon sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. Tu etiam quae non sint futura, possefieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id nunquam futurum sit: nequenecesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quamquam id millesimo ante annoApollinis Oraculo editum esset. . . . Placet Diodoro, id solum fieri posse, quod aut verum sit, aut verum futurum sit: qui locus attingit hancquaestionem, nihil fieri, quod non necesse fuerit; et quicquid fieripossit, id aut esse jam, aut futurum esse: nec magis commutari ex veris infalsa ea posse quae futura sunt, quam ea quae facta sunt: sed in factisimmutabilitatem apparere; in futuris quibusdam, quia non apparent, neinesse quidem videri: ut in eo qui mortifero morbo urgeatur, verum sit, hicmorietur hoc morbo: at hoc idem si vere dicatur in eo, in quo tanta vismorbi non appareat, nihilominus futurum sit. Ita fit ut commutatio ex veroin falsum, ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri possit. " Cicero makes it clearenough that Chrysippus often found himself in difficulties in this dispute, and that is no matter for astonishment: for the course he had chosen wasnot bound up with his dogma of fate, and, if he had known how, or haddared, to reason consistently, he would readily have adopted the wholehypothesis of Diodorus. We have seen already that the freedom he assignedto the soul, and his comparison of the cylinder, did not preclude thepossibility that in reality all the acts of the human will were unavoidableconsequences of fate. Hence it follows that everything which does nothappen is impossible, and that there is nothing possible but that whichactually comes to pass. Plutarch (_De Stoicor. Repugn. _, pp. 1053, 1054)discomfits him completely, on that point as well as on the dispute [232]with Diodorus, and maintains that his opinion on possibility is altogethercontrary to the doctrine of _fatum_. Observe that the most eminent Stoicshad written on this matter without following the same path. Arrian (in_Epict. _, lib. 2, c. 29, p. M. 166) named four of them, who are Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Archidemus and Antipater. He evinces great scorn for thisdispute; and M. Menage need not have cited him as a writer who had spokenin commendation of the work of Chrysippus [Greek: peri dynatôn] ("citaturhonorifice apud Arrianum", Menag. In _Laert. _, I, 7, 341) for assuredlythese words, "[Greek: gegraphe de kai Chrysippos thaumastôs], etc. , de hisrebus mira scripsit Chrysippus", etc. , are not in that connexion a eulogy. That is shown by the passages immediately before and after it. Dionysius ofHalicarnassus (_De Collocat. Verbor. _, c. 17, p. M. 11) mentions twotreatises by Chrysippus, wherein, under a title that promised somethingdifferent, much of the logicians' territory had been explored. The work wasentitled "[Greek: peri tês syntaxeôs tôn tou logou merôn], de partiumorationis collocatione", and treated only of propositions true and false, possible and impossible, contingent and equivocal, etc. , matter that ourSchoolmen have pounded down and reduced to its essence. Take note thatChrysippus recognized that past things were necessarily true, whichCleanthes had not been willing to admit. (Arrian, _ubi supra_, p. M. 165. )"[Greek: Ou pan de parelêlythos alêthes anankaion esti, kathaper hoi periKleanthên pheresthai dokousi]. Non omne praeteritum ex necessitate verumest, ut illi qui Cleanthem sequuntur sentiunt. " We have already seen (p. 562, col. 2) that Abélard is alleged to have taught a doctrine whichresembles that of Diodorus. I think that the Stoics pledged themselves togive a wider range to possible things than to future things, for thepurpose of mitigating the odious and frightful conclusions which were drawnfrom their dogma of fatality. '

It is sufficiently evident that Cicero when writing to Varro the words thathave just been quoted (lib. 9, Ep. 4, _Ad Familiar. _) had not enoughcomprehension of the effect of Diodorus's opinion, since he found itpreferable. He presents tolerably well in his book _De Fato_ the opinionsof those writers, but it is a pity that he has not always added the reasonswhich they employed. Plutarch in his treatise on the contradictions of theStoics and M. Bayle are both surprised that Chrysippus was not of the sameopinion as Diodorus, since he favours fatality. But Chrysippus and even hismaster Cleanthes were on that point more reasonable than is supposed. [233]That will be seen as we proceed. It is open to question whether the past ismore necessary than the future. Cleanthes held the opinion that it is. Theobjection is raised that it is necessary _ex hypothesi_ for the future tohappen, as it is necessary _ex hypothesi_ for the past to have happened. But there is this difference, that it is not possible to act on the paststate, that would be a contradiction; but it is possible to produce someeffect on the future. Yet the hypothetical necessity of both is the same:the one cannot be changed, the other will not be; and once that is past, itwill not be possible for it to be changed either. 

171. The famous Pierre Abélard expressed an opinion resembling that ofDiodorus in the statement that God can do only that which he does. It wasthe third of the fourteen propositions taken from his works which werecensured at the Council of Sens. It had been taken from the third book ofhis _Introduction to Theology_, where he treats especially of the power ofGod. The reason he gave for his statement was that God can do only thatwhich he wills. Now God cannot will to do anything other than that which hedoes, because, of necessity, he must will whatever is fitting. Hence itfollows that all that which he does not, is not fitting, that he cannotwill to do it, and consequently that he cannot do it. Abélard admitshimself that this opinion is peculiar to him, that hardly anyone shares init, that it seems contrary to the doctrine of the saints and to reason andderogatory to the greatness of God. It appears that this author was alittle too much inclined to speak and to think differently from others: forin reality this was only a dispute about words: he was changing the use ofterms. Power and will are different faculties, whose objects also aredifferent; it is confusing them to say that God can do only that which hewills. On the contrary, among various possibles, he wills only that whichhe finds the best. For all possibles are regarded as objects of power, butactual and existing things are regarded as the objects of his decretorywill. Abélard himself acknowledged it. He raises this objection forhimself: a reprobate can be saved; but he can only be saved if God saveshim. God can therefore save him, and consequently do something that he doesnot. Abélard answers that it may indeed be said that this man can be savedin respect of the possibility of human nature, which is capable ofsalvation: but that it may not be said that God can save him in respect ofGod himself, because it is impossible that God should do that which he[234]must not do. But Abélard admits that it may very well be said in a sense, speaking absolutely and setting aside the assumption of reprobation, thatsuch an one who is reprobate can be saved, and that thus often that whichGod does not can be done. He could therefore have spoken like the rest, whomean nothing different when they say that God can save this man, and thathe can do that which he does not. 

172. The so-called necessity of Wyclif, which was condemned by the Councilof Constance, seems to arise simply from this same misunderstanding. Ithink that men of talent do wrong to truth and to themselves when, withoutreason, they bring into use new and displeasing expressions. In our owntime the celebrated Mr. Hobbes supported this same opinion, that what doesnot happen is impossible. He proves it by the statement that all theconditions requisite for a thing that shall not exist (_omnia rei nonfuturae requisita_) are never found together, and that the thing cannotexist otherwise. But who does not see that that only proves a hypotheticalimpossibility? It is true that a thing cannot exist when a requisitecondition for it is lacking. But as we claim to be able to say that thething can exist although it does not exist, we claim in the same way to beable to say that the requisite conditions can exist although they do notexist. Thus Mr. Hobbes's argument leaves the matter where it is. Theopinion which was held concerning Mr. Hobbes, that he taught an absolutenecessity of all things, brought upon him much discredit, and would havedone him harm even had it been his only error. 

173. Spinoza went further: he appears to have explicitly taught a blindnecessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and will, and assuming that good and perfection relate to us only, and not to him. Itis true that Spinoza's opinion on this subject is somewhat obscure: for hegrants God thought, after having divested him of understanding, _cogitationem, non intellectum concedit Deo_. There are even passages wherehe relents on the question of necessity. Nevertheless, as far as one canunderstand him, he acknowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, andhe teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divinenature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste time here inrefuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion isfounded on the nature of the possibles, that is, of things that imply [235]no contradiction. I do not think that a Spinozist will say that all theromances one can imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will stillexist in some place in the universe. Yet one cannot deny that romances suchas those of Mademoiselle de Scudéry, or as _Octavia_, are possible. Let ustherefore bring up against him these words of M. Bayle, which please mewell, on page 390, 'It is to-day', he says, 'a great embarrassment for theSpinozists to see that, according to their hypothesis, it was as impossiblefrom all eternity that Spinoza, for instance, should not die at The Hague, as it is impossible for two and two to make six. They are well aware thatit is a necessary conclusion from their doctrine, and a conclusion whichdisheartens, affrights, and stirs the mind to revolt, because of theabsurdity it involves, diametrically opposed to common sense. They are notwell pleased that one should know they are subverting a maxim so universaland so evident as this one: All that which implies contradiction isimpossible, and all that which implies no contradiction is possible. '

174. One may say of M. Bayle, 'ubi bene, nemo melius', although one cannotsay of him what was said of Origen, 'ubi male, nemo pejus'. I will only addthat what has just been indicated as a maxim is in fact the definition ofthe _possible_ and the _impossible_. M. Bayle, however, adds here towardsthe end a remark which somewhat spoils his eminently reasonable statement. 'Now what contradiction would there be if Spinoza had died in Leyden? WouldNature then have been less perfect, less wise, less powerful?' He confuseshere what is impossible because it implies contradiction with what cannothappen because it is not meet to be chosen. It is true that there wouldhave been no contradiction in the supposition that Spinoza died in Leydenand not at The Hague; there would have been nothing so possible: the matterwas therefore indifferent in respect of the power of God. But one must notsuppose that any event, however small it be, can be regarded as indifferentin respect of his wisdom and his goodness. Jesus Christ has said divinelywell that everything is numbered, even to the hairs of our head. Thus thewisdom of God did not permit that this event whereof M. Bayle speaks shouldhappen otherwise than it happened, not as if by itself it would have beenmore deserving of choice, but on account of its connexion with that entiresequence of the universe which deserved to be given preference. To say thatwhat has already happened was of no interest to the wisdom of God, and[236]thence to infer that it is therefore not necessary, is to make a falseassumption and argue incorrectly to a true conclusion. It is confusing whatis necessary by moral necessity, that is, according to the principle ofWisdom and Goodness, with what is so by metaphysical and brute necessity, which occurs when the contrary implies contradiction. Spinoza, moreover, sought a metaphysical necessity in events. He did not think that God wasdetermined by his goodness and by his perfection (which this author treatedas chimeras in relation to the universe), but by the necessity of hisnature; just as the semicircle is bound to enclose only right angles, without either knowing or willing this. For Euclid demonstrated that allangles enclosed between two straight lines drawn from the extremities ofthe diameter towards a point on the circumference of the circle are ofnecessity right angles, and that the contrary implies contradiction. 

175. There are people who have gone to the other extreme: under the pretextof freeing the divine nature from the yoke of necessity they wished toregard it as altogether indifferent, with an indifference of equipoise. They did not take into account that just as metaphysical necessity ispreposterous in relation to God's actions _ad extra_, so moral necessity isworthy of him. It is a happy necessity which obliges wisdom to do good, whereas indifference with regard to good and evil would indicate a lack ofgoodness or of wisdom. And besides, the indifference which would keep thewill in a perfect equipoise would itself be a chimera, as has been alreadyshown: it would offend against the great principle of the determinantreason. 

176. Those who believe that God established good and evil by an arbitrarydecree are adopting that strange idea of mere indifference, and otherabsurdities still stranger. They deprive God of the designation _good_: forwhat cause could one have to praise him for what he does, if in doingsomething quite different he would have done equally well? And I have veryoften been surprised that divers Supralapsarian theologians, as forinstance Samuel Rutherford, a Professor of Theology in Scotland, who wrotewhen the controversies with the Remonstrants were at their height, couldhave been deluded by so strange an idea. Rutherford (in his _ExercitationesApologeticae pro Gratia_) says positively that nothing is unjust or morallybad in God's eyes before he has forbidden it: thus without this prohibitionit would be a matter of indifference whether one murdered or saved a [237]man, loved God or hated him, praised or blasphemed him. Nothing is sounreasonable as that. One may teach that God established good and evil by apositive law, or one may assert that there was something good and justbefore his decree, but that he is not required to conform to it, and thatnothing prevents him from acting unjustly and from perhaps condemninginnocence: but it all comes to the same thing, offering almost equaldishonour to God. For if justice was established arbitrarily and withoutany cause, if God came upon it by a kind of hazard, as when one draws lots, his goodness and his wisdom are not manifested in it, and there is nothingat all to attach him to it. If it is by a purely arbitrary decree, withoutany reason, that he has established or created what we call justice andgoodness, then he can annul them or change their nature. Thus one wouldhave no reason to assume that he will observe them always, as it would bepossible to say he will observe them on the assumption that they arefounded on reasons. The same would hold good more or less if his justicewere different from ours, if (for example) it were written in his code thatit is just to make the innocent eternally unhappy. According to theseprinciples also, nothing would compel God to keep his word or would assureus of its fulfilment. For why should the law of justice, which states thatreasonable promises must be kept, be more inviolable for him than any otherlaws?

177. All these three dogmas, albeit a little different from one another, namely, (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) that it is fixed, but it is not certain that God will observe it, and finally (3) that thejustice we know is not that which he observes, destroy the confidence inGod that gives us tranquillity, and the love of God that makes ourhappiness. There is nothing to prevent such a God from behaving as a tyrantand an enemy of honest folk, and from taking pleasure in that which we callevil. Why should he not, then, just as well be the evil principle of theManichaeans as the single good principle of the orthodox? At least he wouldbe neutral and, as it were, suspended between the two, or even sometimesthe one and sometimes the other. That would be as if someone were to saythat Oromasdes and Arimanius reign in turns, according to which of the twois the stronger or the more adroit. It is like the saying of a certainMoghul woman. She, so it seems, having heard it said that formerly underGenghis Khan and his successors her nation had had dominion over most [238]of the North and East, told the Muscovites recently, when M. Isbrand wentto China on behalf of the Czar, through the country of those Tartars, thatthe god of the Moghuls had been driven from Heaven, but that one day hewould take his own place again. The true God is always the same: naturalreligion itself demands that he be essentially as good and wise as he ispowerful. It is scarcely more contrary to reason and piety to say that Godacts without cognition, than to maintain that he has cognition which doesnot find the eternal rules of goodness and of justice among its objects, oragain to say that he has a will such as heeds not these rules. 

178. Some theologians who have written of God's right over creatures appearto have conceded to him an unrestricted right, an arbitrary and despoticpower. They thought that would be placing divinity on the most exaltedlevel that may be imagined for it, and that it would abase the creaturebefore the Creator to such an extent that the Creator is bound by no lawsof any kind with respect to the creature. There are passages from Twiss, Rutherford and some other Supralapsarians which imply that God cannot sinwhatever he may do, because he is subject to no law. M. Bayle himselfconsiders that this doctrine is monstrous and contrary to the holiness ofGod (_Dictionary_, v. 'Paulicians', p. 2332 _in initio_); but I supposethat the intention of some of these writers was less bad than it seems tobe. Apparently they meant by the term right, [Greek: anypeuthynian], astate wherein one is responsible to none for one's actions. But they willnot have denied that God owes to himself what goodness and justice demandof him. On that matter one may see M. Amyraut's _Apology for Calvin_: it istrue that Calvin appears orthodox on this subject, and that he is by nomeans one of the extreme Supralapsarians. 

179. Thus, when M. Bayle says somewhere that St. Paul extricates himselffrom predestination only through the consideration of God's absolute right, and the incomprehensibility of his ways, it is implied that, if oneunderstood them, one would find them consistent with justice, God not beingable to use his power otherwise. St. Paul himself says that it is a_depth_, but a depth of wisdom (_altitudo sapientiae_), and _justice_ isincluded in _the goodness of the All-wise_. I find that M. Bayle speaksvery well elsewhere on the application of our notions of goodness to theactions of God (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 81, p. 139):'One must not assert here', he says, 'that the goodness of the [239]infinite Being is not subject to the same rules as the goodness of thecreature. For if there is in God an attribute that can be called goodness, the marks of goodness in general must apply to him. Now when we reducegoodness to the most general abstraction, we find therein the will to dogood. Divide and subdivide into as many kinds as you shall please thisgeneral goodness, into infinite goodness, finite goodness, kingly goodness, goodness of a father, goodness of a husband, goodness of a master, you willfind in each, as an inseparable attribute, the will to do good. '

180. I find also that M. Bayle combats admirably the opinion of those whoassert that goodness and justice depend solely upon the arbitrary choice ofGod; who suppose, moreover, that if God had been determined by the goodnessof things themselves to act, he would be entirely subjected to necessity inhis actions, a state incompatible with freedom. That is confusingmetaphysical necessity with moral necessity. Here is what M. Bayle says inobjection to this error (_Reply_, ch. 89, p. 203): 'The consequence of thisdoctrine will be, that before God resolved upon creating the world he sawnothing better in virtue than in vice, and that his ideas did not show himthat virtue was more worthy of his love than vice. That leaves nodistinction between natural right and positive right; there will no longerbe anything unalterable or inevitable in morals; it will have been just aspossible for God to command people to be vicious as to command them to bevirtuous; and one will have no certainty that the moral laws will not oneday be abrogated, as the ceremonial laws of the Jews were. This, in a word, leads us straight to the belief that God was the free author, not only ofgoodness and of virtue, but also of truth and of the essence of things. That is what certain of the Cartesians assert, and I confess that theiropinion (see the Continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, p. 554)might be of some avail in certain circumstances. Yet it is open to disputefor so many reasons, and subject to consequences so troublesome (seechapter 152 of the same Continuation) that there are scarcely any extremesit were not better to suffer rather than plunge into that one. It opens thedoor to the most exaggerated Pyrrhonism: for it leads to the assertion thatthis proposition, three and three make six, is only true where and duringthe time when it pleases God; that it is perhaps false in some parts of theuniverse; and that perhaps it will be so among men in the coming year. [240]All that depends on the free will of God could have been limited to certainplaces and certain times, like the Judaic ceremonies. This conclusion willbe extended to all the laws of the Decalogue, if the actions they commandare in their nature divested of all goodness to the same degree as theactions they forbid. '

181. To say that God, having resolved to create man just as he is, couldnot but have required of him piety, sobriety, justice and chastity, becauseit is impossible that the disorders capable of overthrowing or disturbinghis work can please him, that is to revert in effect to the common opinion. Virtues are virtues only because they serve perfection or prevent theimperfection of those who are virtuous, or even of those who have to dowith them. And they have that power by their nature and by the nature ofrational creatures, before God decrees to create them. To hold a differentopinion would be as if someone were to say that the rules of proportion andharmony are arbitrary with regard to musicians because they occur in musiconly when one has resolved to sing or to play some instrument. But that isexactly what is meant by being essential to good music: for those rulesbelong to it already in the ideal state, even when none yet thinks ofsinging, since it is known that they must of necessity belong to it as soonas one shall sing. In the same way virtues belong to the ideal state of therational creature before God decrees to create it; and it is for that veryreason we maintain that virtues are good by their nature. 

182. M. Bayle has inserted a special chapter in his Continuation of _DiversThoughts on the Comet_ (it is chapter 152) where he shows 'that theChristian Doctors teach that there are things which are just antecedentlyto God's decrees'. Some theologians of the Augsburg Confession censuredsome of the Reformed who appeared to be of a different opinion; and thiserror was regarded as if it were a consequence of the absolute decree, which doctrine seems to exempt the will of God from any kind of reason, _ubi stat pro ratione voluntas_. But, as I have observed already on variousoccasions, Calvin himself acknowledged that the decrees of God are inconformity with justice and wisdom, although the reasons that might provethis conformity in detail are unknown to us. Thus, according to him, therules of goodness and of justice are anterior to the decrees of God. M. Bayle, in the same place, quotes a passage from the celebrated M. Turretinwhich draws a distinction between natural divine laws and positive [241]divine laws. Moral laws are of the first kind and ceremonial of the second. Samuel Desmarests, a celebrated theologian formerly at Groningen, and HerrStrinesius, who is still at Frankfort on the Oder, advocated this samedistinction; and I think that it is the opinion most widely accepted evenamong the Reformed. Thomas Aquinas and all the Thomists were of the sameopinion, with the bulk of the Schoolmen and the theologians of the RomanChurch. The Casuists also held to that idea: I count Grotius among the mosteminent of them, and he was followed in this point by his commentators. Herr Pufendorf appeared to be of a different opinion, which he insisted onmaintaining in the face of censure from some theologians; but he need notbe taken into account, not having advanced far enough in subjects of thiskind. He makes a vigorous protest against the absolute decree, in his_Fecialis divinus_, and yet he approves what is worst in the opinions ofthe champions of this decree, and without which this decree (as others ofthe Reformed explain) becomes endurable. Aristotle was very orthodox onthis matter of justice, and the Schoolmen followed him: they distinguish, just as Cicero and the Jurists do, between perpetual right, which isbinding on all and everywhere, and positive right, which is only forcertain times and certain peoples. I once read with enjoyment the_Euthyphro_ of Plato, who makes Socrates uphold the truth on that point, and M. Bayle has called attention to the same passage. 

183. M. Bayle himself upholds this truth with considerable force in acertain passage, which it will be well to quote here in its entirety, longas it is (vol. II of the Continuation of _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, ch. 152, p. 771 _seqq. _): 'According to the teaching of countless writersof importance', he says, 'there is in nature and in the essence of certainthings a moral good or evil that precedes the divine decree. They provethis doctrine principally through the frightful consequences that attendthe opposite dogma. Thus from the proposition that to do wrong to no manwould be a good action, not in itself but by an arbitrary dispensation ofGod's will, it would follow that God could have given to man a law directlyopposed at all points to the commandments of the Decalogue. That ishorrifying. But here is a more direct proof, one derived from metaphysics. One thing is certain, that the existence of God is not an effect of hiswill. He exists not because he wills his existence, but through the [242]necessity of his infinite nature. His power and his knowledge exist throughthe same necessity. He is all-powerful, he knows all things, not because hewills it thus, but because these are attributes necessarily identified withhim. The dominion of his will relates only to the exercise of his power, hegives effect outside himself only to that which he wills, and he leaves allthe rest in the state of mere possibility. Thence it comes that thisdominion extends only over the existence of creatures, and not over theiressential being. God was able to create matter, a man, a circle, or leavethem in nothingness, but he was not able to produce them without givingthem their essential properties. He had of necessity to make man a rationalanimal and to give the round shape to a circle, since, according to hiseternal ideas, independent of the free decrees of his will, the essence ofman lay in the properties of being animal and rational, and since theessence of the circle lay in having a circumference equally distant fromthe centre as to all its parts. This is what has caused the Christianphilosophers to acknowledge that the essences of things are eternal, andthat there are propositions of eternal truth; consequently that theessences of things and the truth of the first principles are immutable. That is to be understood not only of theoretical but also of practicalfirst principles, and of all the propositions that contain the truedefinition of creatures. These essences and these truths emanate from thesame necessity of nature as the knowledge of God. Since therefore it is bythe nature of things that God exists, that he is all-powerful, and that hehas perfect knowledge of all things, it is also by the nature of thingsthat matter, the triangle, man and certain actions of man, etc. , have suchand such properties essentially. God saw from all eternity and in allnecessity the essential relations of numbers, and the identity of thesubject and predicate in the propositions that contain the essence of eachthing. He saw likewise that the term just is included in thesepropositions: to esteem what is estimable, be grateful to one's benefactor, fulfil the conditions of a contract, and so on, with many others relatingto morals. One is therefore justified in saying that the precepts ofnatural law assume the reasonableness and justice of that which isenjoined, and that it would be man's duty to practise what they containeven though God should have been so indulgent as to ordain nothing in thatrespect. Pray observe that in going back with our visionary thoughts tothat ideal moment when God has yet decreed nothing, we find in the [243]ideas of God the principles of morals under terms that imply an obligation. We understand these maxims as certain, and derived from the eternal andimmutable order: it beseems the rational creature to conform to reason; arational creature conforming to reason is to be commended, but notconforming thereto is blameworthy. You would not dare to deny that thesetruths impose upon man a duty in relation to all acts which are inconformity with strict reason, such as these: one must esteem all that isestimable; render good for good; do wrong to no man; honour one's father;render to every man that which is his due, etc. Now since by the verynature of things, and before the divine laws, the truths of morality imposeupon man certain duties, Thomas Aquinas and Grotius were justified insaying that if there were no God we should nevertheless be obliged toconform to natural law. Others have said that even supposing all rationalbeings in existence were to perish, true propositions would remain true. Cajetan maintained that if he remained alone in the universe, all otherthings without any exception having been destroyed, the knowledge that hehad of the nature of a rose would nevertheless subsist. '

184. The late Jacob Thomasius, a celebrated Professor at Leipzig, made theapt observation in his elucidations of the philosophic rules of DanielStahl, a Jena professor, that it is not advisable to go altogether beyondGod, and that one must not say, with some Scotists, that the eternalverities would exist even though there were no understanding, not even thatof God. For it is, in my judgement, the divine understanding which givesreality to the eternal verities, albeit God's will have no part therein. All reality must be founded on something existent. It is true that anatheist may be a geometrician: but if there were no God, geometry wouldhave no object. And without God, not only would there be nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible. That, however, does not hinder thosewho do not see the connexion of all things one with another and with Godfrom being able to understand certain sciences, without knowing their firstsource, which is in God. Aristotle, although he also scarcely knew thatsource, nevertheless said something of the same kind which was veryapposite. He acknowledged that the principles of individual forms ofknowledge depend on a superior knowledge which gives the reason for them;and this superior knowledge must have being, and consequently God, the[244]source of being, for its object. Herr Dreier of Königsberg has aptlyobserved that the true metaphysics which Aristotle sought, and which hecalled [Greek: tên zêtoumenên], his _desideratum_, was theology. 

185. Yet the same M. Bayle, who says so much that is admirable in order toprove that the rules of goodness and justice, and the eternal verities ingeneral, exist by their nature, and not by an arbitrary choice of God, hasspoken very hesitatingly about them in another passage (Continuation of_Divers Thoughts on the Comet_, vol. II, ch. 114, towards the end). Afterhaving given an account of the opinion of M. Descartes and a section of hisfollowers, who maintain that God is the free cause of truths and ofessences, he adds (p. 554): 'I have done all that I could to gain trueunderstanding of this dogma and to find the solution of the difficultiessurrounding it. I confess to you quite simply that I still cannot properlyfathom it. That does not discourage me; I suppose, as other philosophers inother cases have supposed, that time will unfold the meaning of this nobleparadox. I wish that Father Malebranche had thought fit to defend it, buthe took other measures. ' Is it possible that the enjoyment of doubt canhave such influence upon a gifted man as to make him wish and hope for thepower to believe that two contradictories never exist together for the solereason that God forbade them to, and, moreover, that God could have issuedthem an order to ensure that they always walked together? There is indeed anoble paradox! Father Malebranche showed great wisdom in taking othermeasures. 

186. I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite seriouslyof this opinion, although he had adherents who found this easy to believe, and would in all simplicity follow him where he only made pretence to go. It was apparently one of his tricks, one of his philosophic feints: heprepared for himself some loophole, as when for instance he discovered atrick for denying the movement of the earth, while he was a Copernican inthe strictest sense. I suspect that he had in mind here anotherextraordinary manner of speaking, of his own invention, which was to saythat affirmations and negations, and acts of inner judgement in general, are operations of the will. Through this artifice the eternal verities, which until the time of Descartes had been named an object of the divineunderstanding, suddenly became an object of God's will. Now the acts of hiswill are free, therefore God is the free cause of the verities. That [245]is the outcome of the matter. _Spectatum admissi. _ A slight change in themeaning of terms has caused all this commotion. But if the affirmations ofnecessary truths were actions of the will of the most perfect mind, theseactions would be anything but free, for there is nothing to choose. Itseems that M. Descartes did not declare himself sufficiently on the natureof freedom, and that his conception of it was somewhat unusual: for heextended it so far that he even held the affirmations of necessary truthsto be free in God. That was preserving only the name of freedom. 

187. M. Bayle, who with others conceives this to be a freedom ofindifference, that God had had to establish (for instance) the truths ofnumbers, and to ordain that three times three made nine, whereas he couldhave commanded them to make ten, imagines in this strange opinion, supposing it were possible to defend it, some kind of advantage gainedagainst the Stratonists. Strato was one of the leaders of the School ofAristotle, and the successor of Theophrastus; he maintained (according toCicero's account) that this world had been formed such as it is by Natureor by a necessary cause devoid of cognition. I admit that that might be so, if God had so preformed matter as to cause such an effect by the laws ofmotion alone. But without God there would not even have been any reason forexistence, and still less for any particular existence of things: thusStrato's system is not to be feared. 

188. Nevertheless M. Bayle is in difficulties over this: he will not admitplastic natures devoid of cognition, which Mr. Cudworth and others hadintroduced, for fear that the modern Stratonists, that is, the Spinozists, take advantage of it. This has involved him in disputes with M. Le Clerc. Under the influence of this error, that a non-intelligent cause can producenothing where contrivance appears, he is far from conceding to me that_preformation_ which produces naturally the organs of animals, and _thesystem of a harmony pre-established by God_ in bodies, to make them respondin accordance with their own laws to the thoughts and the wills of souls. But it ought to have been taken into account that this non-intelligentcause, which produces such beautiful things in the grains and seeds ofplants and animals, and effects the actions of bodies as the will ordainsthem, was formed by the hand of God: and God is infinitely more skilfulthan a watchmaker, who himself makes machines and automata that are [246]capable of producing as wonderful effects as if they possessedintelligence. 

189. Now to come to M. Bayle's apprehensions concerning the Stratonists, incase one should admit truths that are not dependent upon the will of God:he seems to fear lest they may take advantage against us of the perfectregularity of the eternal verities. Since this regularity springs only fromthe nature and necessity of things, without being directed by anycognition, M. Bayle fears that one might with Strato thence infer that theworld also could have become regular through a blind necessity. But it iseasy to answer that. In the region of the eternal verities are found allthe possibles, and consequently the regular as well as the irregular: theremust be a reason accounting for the preference for order and regularity, and this reason can only be found in understanding. Moreover these verytruths can have no existence without an understanding to take cognizance ofthem; for they would not exist if there were no divine understandingwherein they are realized, so to speak. Hence Strato does not attain hisend, which is to exclude cognition from that which enters into the originof things. 

190. The difficulty that M. Bayle has imagined in connexion with Stratoseems a little too subtle and far-fetched. That is termed: _timere, ubi nonest timor_. He makes another difficulty, which has just as slight afoundation, namely, that God would be subjected to a kind of _fatum_. Hereare his words (p. 555): 'If they are propositions of eternal truth, whichare such by their nature and not by God's institution, if they are not trueby a free decree of his will, but if on the contrary he has recognized themas true of necessity, because such was their nature, there is a kind of_fatum_ to which he is subjected; there is an absolutely insurmountablenatural necessity. Thence comes also the result that the divineunderstanding in the infinity of its ideas has always and at the outset hitupon their perfect conformity with their objects, without the guidance ofany cognition; for it would be a contradiction to say that any exemplarycause had served as a plan for the acts of God's understanding. One wouldnever that way find eternal ideas or any first intelligence. One must say, then, that a nature which exists of necessity always finds its way, withoutany need for it to be shown. How then shall we overcome the obstinacy of aStratonist?'

191. But again it is easy to answer. This so-called _fatum_, which [247]binds even the Divinity, is nothing but God's own nature, his ownunderstanding, which furnishes the rules for his wisdom and his goodness;it is a happy necessity, without which he would be neither good nor wise. Is it to be desired that God should not be bound to be perfect and happy?Is our condition, which renders us liable to fail, worth envying? Andshould we not be well pleased to exchange it for sinlessness, if thatdepended upon us? One must be indeed weary of life to desire the freedom todestroy oneself and to pity the Divinity for not having that freedom. M. Bayle himself reasons thus elsewhere against those who laud to the skies anextravagant freedom which they assume in the will, when they would make thewill independent of reason. 

192. Moreover, M. Bayle wonders 'that the divine understanding in theinfinity of its ideas always and at the outset hits upon their perfectconformity with their objects, without the guidance of any cognition'. Thisobjection is null and void. Every distinct idea is, through itsdistinctness, in conformity with its object, and in God there are distinctideas only. At first, moreover, the object exists nowhere; but when itcomes into existence, it will be formed according to this idea. Besides, M. Bayle knows very well that the divine understanding has no need of time forseeing the connexion of things. All trains of reasoning are in God in atranscendent form, and they preserve an order amongst them in hisunderstanding, as well as in ours: but with him it is only an order and a_priority of nature_, whereas with us there is a _priority of time_. It istherefore not to be wondered at that he who penetrates all things at onestroke should always strike true at the outset; and it must not be saidthat he succeeds without the guidance of any cognition. On the contrary, itis because his knowledge is perfect that his voluntary actions are alsoperfect. 

193. Up to now I have shown that the Will of God is not independent of therules of Wisdom, although indeed it is a matter for surprise that oneshould have been constrained to argue about it, and to do battle for atruth so great and so well established. But it is hardly less surprisingthat there should be people who believe that God only half observes theserules, and does not choose the best, although his wisdom causes him torecognize it; and, in a word, that there should be writers who hold thatGod could have done better. That is more or less the error of the famousAlfonso, King of Castile, who was elected King of the Romans by [248]certain Electors, and originated the astronomical tables that bear hisname. This prince is reported to have said that if God in making the worldhad consulted him he would have given God good advice. Apparently thePtolemaic system, which prevailed at that time, was displeasing to him. Hebelieved therefore that something better planned could have been made, andhe was right. But if he had known the system of Copernicus, with thediscoveries of Kepler, now extended by knowledge of the gravity of theplanets, he would indeed have confessed that the contrivance of the truesystem is marvellous. We see, therefore, that here the question concernedthe more or less only; Alfonso maintained that better could have been done, and his opinion was censured by everyone. 

194. Yet philosophers and theologians dare to support dogmatically such abelief; and I have many times wondered that gifted and pious persons shouldhave been capable of setting bounds to the goodness and the perfection ofGod. For to assert that he knows what is best, that he can do it and thathe does it not, is to avow that it rested with his will only to make theworld better than it is; but that is what one calls lacking goodness. It isacting against that axiom already quoted: _Minus bonum habet rationemmali_. If some adduce experience to prove that God could have done better, they set themselves up as ridiculous critics of his works. To such will begiven the answer given to all those who criticize God's course of action, and who from this same assumption, that is, the alleged defects of theworld, would infer that there is an evil God, or at least a God neutralbetween good and evil. And if we hold the same opinion as King Alfonso, weshall, I say, receive this answer: You have known the world only since theday before yesterday, you see scarce farther than your nose, and you carpat the world. Wait until you know more of the world and consider thereinespecially the parts which present a complete whole (as do organic bodies);and you will find there a contrivance and a beauty transcending allimagination. Let us thence draw conclusions as to the wisdom and thegoodness of the author of things, even in things that we know not. We findin the universe some things which are not pleasing to us; but let us beaware that it is not made for us alone. It is nevertheless made for us ifwe are wise: it will serve us if we use it for our service; we shall behappy in it if we wish to be. 

 [249]195. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, becausethere is no perfect creature, and that it is always possible to produce onewhich would be more perfect. I answer that what can be said of a creatureor of a particular substance, which can always be surpassed by another, isnot to be applied to the universe, which, since it must extend through allfuture eternity, is an infinity. Moreover, there is an infinite number ofcreatures in the smallest particle of matter, because of the actualdivision of the _continuum_ to infinity. And infinity, that is to say, theaccumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, properly speaking, not a whole any more than the infinite number itself, whereof one cannotsay whether it is even or uneven. That is just what serves to confute thosewho make of the world a God, or who think of God as the Soul of the world;for the world or the universe cannot be regarded as an animal or as asubstance. 

196. It is therefore not a question of a creature, but of the universe; andthe adversary will be obliged to maintain that one possible universe may bebetter than the other, to infinity; but there he would be mistaken, and itis that which he cannot prove. If this opinion were true, it would followthat God had not produced any universe at all: for he is incapable ofacting without reason, and that would be even acting against reason. It isas if one were to suppose that God had decreed to make a material sphere, with no reason for making it of any particular size. This decree would beuseless, it would carry with it that which would prevent its effect. Itwould be quite another matter if God decreed to draw from a given point onestraight line to another given straight line, without any determination ofthe angle, either in the decree or in its circumstances. For in this casethe determination would spring from the nature of the thing, the line wouldbe perpendicular, and the angle would be right, since that is all that isdetermined and distinguishable. It is thus one must think of the creationof the best of all possible universes, all the more since God not onlydecrees to create a universe, but decrees also to create the best of all. For God decrees nothing without knowledge, and he makes no separatedecrees, which would be nothing but antecedent acts of will: and these wehave sufficiently explained, distinguishing them from genuine decrees. 

197. M. Diroys, whom I knew in Rome, theologian to Cardinal d'Estrées, wrote a book entitled _Proofs and Assumptions in Favour of_ _the [250]Christian Religion_, published in Paris in the year 1683. M. Bayle (_Replyto the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 165, p. 1058) recountsthis objection brought up by M. Diroys: 'There is one more difficulty', hesays, 'which it is no less important to meet than those given earlier, since it causes more trouble to those who judge goods and evils byconsiderations founded on the purest and most lofty maxims. This is thatGod being the supreme wisdom and goodness, it seems to them that he oughtto do all things as wise and virtuous persons would wish them to be done, following the rules of wisdom and of goodness which God has imprinted inthem, and as they would be obliged themselves to do these things if theydepended upon them. Thus, seeing that the affairs of the world do not go sowell as, in their opinion, they might go, and as they would go if theyinterfered themselves, they conclude that God, who is infinitely better andwiser than they, or rather wisdom and goodness itself, does not concernhimself with these affairs. '

198. M. Diroys makes some apt remarks concerning this, which I will notrepeat, since I have sufficiently answered the objection in more than onepassage, and that has been the chief end of all my discourse. But he makesone assertion with which I cannot agree. He claims that the objectionproves too much. One must again quote his own words with M. Bayle, p. 1059:'If it does not behove the supreme Wisdom and Goodness to fail to do whatis best and most perfect, it follows that all Beings are eternally, immutably and essentially as perfect and as good as they can be, sincenothing can change except by passing either from a state less good to abetter, or from a better to a less good. Now that cannot happen if it doesnot behove God to fail to do that which is best and most perfect, when hecan do it. It will therefore be necessary that all beings be eternally andessentially filled with a knowledge and a virtue as perfect as God can givethem. Now all that which is eternally and essentially as perfect as God canmake it proceeds essentially from him; in a word, is eternally andessentially good as he is, and consequently it is God, as he is. That isthe bearing of this maxim, that it is repugnant to supreme justice andgoodness not to make things as good and perfect as they can be. For it isessential to essential wisdom and goodness to banish all that is repugnantto it altogether. One must therefore assert as a primary truth concerningthe conduct of God in relation to creatures that there is nothing repugnantto this goodness and this wisdom in making things less perfect than [251]they could be, or in permitting the goods that it has produced eithercompletely to cease to be or to change and deteriorate. For it causes nooffence to God that there should be other Beings than he, that is beingswho can be not what they are, and do not what they do or do what they donot. '

199. M. Bayle calls this answer paltry, but I find his counter-objectioninvolved. M. Bayle will have those who are for the two principles to taketheir stand chiefly on the assumption of the supreme freedom of God: for ifhe were compelled to produce all that which he can, he would produce alsosins and sorrows. Thus the Dualists could from the existence of evilconclude nothing contrary to the oneness of the principle, if thisprinciple were as much inclined to evil as to good. There M. Bayle carriesthe notion of freedom too far: for even though God be supremely free, itdoes not follow that he maintains an indifference of equipoise: and eventhough he be inclined to act, it does not follow that he is compelled bythis inclination to produce all that which he can. He will produce onlythat which he wills, for his inclination prompts him to good. I admit thesupreme freedom of God, but I do not confuse it with indifference ofequipoise, as if he could act without reason. M. Diroys therefore imaginesthat the Dualists, in their insistence that the single good principleproduce no evil, ask too much; for by the same reason, according to M. Diroys, they ought also to ask that he should produce the greatest good, the less good being a kind of evil. I hold that the Dualists are wrong inrespect of the first point, and that they would be right in respect of thesecond, where M. Diroys blames them without cause; or rather that one canreconcile the evil, or the less good, in some parts with the best in thewhole. If the Dualists demanded that God should do the best, they would notbe demanding too much. They are mistaken rather in claiming that the bestin the whole should be free from evil in the parts, and that therefore whatGod has made is not the best. 

200. But M. Diroys maintains that if God always produces the best he willproduce other Gods; otherwise each substance that he produced would not bethe best nor the most perfect. But he is mistaken, through not taking intoaccount the order and connexion of things. If each substance takenseparately were perfect, all would be alike; which is neither fitting norpossible. If they were Gods, it would not have been possible to [252]produce them. The best system of things will therefore not contain Gods; itwill always be a system of bodies (that is, things arranged according totime and place) and of souls which represent and are aware of bodies, andin accordance with which bodies are in great measure directed. So, as thedesign of a building may be the best of all in respect of its purpose, ofexpense and of circumstances; and as an arrangement of some figuredrepresentations of bodies which is given to you may be the best that onecan find, it is easy to imagine likewise that a structure of the universemay be the best of all, without becoming a god. The connexion and order ofthings brings it about that the body of every animal and of every plant iscomposed of other animals and of other plants, or of other living andorganic beings; consequently there is subordination, and one body, onesubstance serves the other: thus their perfection cannot be equal. 

201. M. Bayle thinks (p. 1063) that M. Diroys has confused two differentpropositions. According to the one, God must do all things as wise andvirtuous persons would wish that they should be done, by the rules ofwisdom and of goodness that God has imprinted in them, and as they would beobliged themselves to do them if those things depended upon them. The otheris that it is not consistent with supreme wisdom and goodness to fail to dowhat is best and most perfect. M. Diroys (in M. Bayle's opinion) sets upthe first proposition as an objection for himself, and replies to thesecond. But therein he is justified, as it seems to me. For these twopropositions are connected, the second is a result of the first: to do lessgood than one could is to be lacking in wisdom or in goodness. To be thebest, and to be desired by those who are most virtuous and wise, comes tothe same thing. And it may be said that, if we could understand thestructure and the economy of the universe, we should find that it is madeand directed as the wisest and most virtuous could wish it, since Godcannot fail to do thus. This necessity nevertheless is only of a moralnature: and I admit that if God were forced by a metaphysical necessity toproduce that which he makes, he would produce all the possibles, ornothing; and in this sense M. Bayle's conclusion would be fully correct. But as all the possibles are not compatible together in one and the sameworld-sequence, for that very reason all the possibles cannot be produced, and it must be said that God is not forced, metaphysically speaking, [253]into the creation of this world. One may say that as soon as God hasdecreed to create something there is a struggle between all the possibles, all of them laying claim to existence, and that those which, being united, produce most reality, most perfection, most significance carry the day. Itis true that all this struggle can only be ideal, that is to say, it canonly be a conflict of reasons in the most perfect understanding, whichcannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently to choose thebest. Yet God is bound by a moral necessity, to make things in such amanner that there can be nothing better: otherwise not only would othershave cause to criticize what he makes, but, more than that, he would nothimself be satisfied with his work, he would blame himself for itsimperfection; and that conflicts with the supreme felicity of the divinenature. This perpetual sense of his own fault or imperfection would be tohim an inevitable source of grief, as M. Bayle says on another occasion(p. 953). 

202. M. Diroys' argument contains a false assumption, in his statement thatnothing can change except by passing from a state less good to a better orfrom a better to a less good; and that thus, if God makes the best, what hehas produced cannot be changed: it would be an eternal substance, a god. But I do not see why a thing cannot change its kind in relation to good orevil, without changing its degree. In the transition from enjoyment ofmusic to enjoyment of painting, or _vice versa_ from the pleasure of theeyes to that of the ears, the degree of enjoyment may remain the same, thelatter gaining no advantage over the former save that of novelty. If thequadrature of the circle should come to pass or (what is the same thing)the circulature of the square, that is, if the circle were changed into asquare of the same size, or the square into a circle, it would be difficultto say, on the whole, without having regard to some special use, whetherone would have gained or lost. Thus the best may be changed into anotherwhich neither yields to it nor surpasses it: but there will always be anorder among them, and that the best order possible. Taking the wholesequence of things, the best has no equal; but one part of the sequence maybe equalled by another part of the same sequence. Besides it might be saidthat the whole sequence of things to infinity may be the best possible, although what exists all through the universe in each portion of time benot the best. It might be therefore that the universe became even [254]better and better, if the nature of things were such that it was notpermitted to attain to the best all at once. But these are problems ofwhich it is hard for us to judge. 

203. M. Bayle says (p. 1064) that the question whether God could have madethings more perfect than he made them is also very difficult, and that thereasons for and against are very strong. But it is, so it seems to me, asif one were to question whether God's actions are consistent with the mostperfect wisdom and the greatest goodness. It is a very strange thing, thatby changing the terms a little one throws doubt upon what is, if properlyunderstood, as clear as anything can be. The reasons to the contrary haveno force, being founded only on the semblance of defects; and M. Bayle'sobjection, which tends to prove that the law of the best would impose uponGod a true metaphysical necessity, is only an illusion that springs fromthe misuse of terms. M. Bayle formerly held a different opinion, when hecommended that of Father Malebranche, which was akin to mine on thissubject. But M. Arnauld having written in opposition to Father Malebranche, M. Bayle altered his opinion; and I suppose that his tendency towardsdoubt, which increased in him with the years, was conducive to that result. M. Arnauld was doubtless a great man, and his authority has great weight:he made sundry good observations in his writings against FatherMalebranche, but he was not justified in contesting those of his statementsthat were akin to mine on the rule of the best. 

204. The excellent author of _The Search for Truth_, having passed fromphilosophy to theology, published finally an admirable treatise on Natureand Grace. Here he showed in his way (as M. Bayle explained in his _DiversThoughts on the Comet_, ch. 234) that the events which spring from theenforcement of general laws are not the object of a particular will of God. It is true that when one wills a thing one wills also in a sense everythingthat is necessarily attached to it, and in consequence God cannot willgeneral laws without also willing in a sense all the particular effectsthat must of necessity be derived from them. But it is always true thatthese particular events are not willed for their own sake, and that is whatis meant by the expression that they are not willed by a _particular_ anddirect _will_. There is no doubt that when God resolved to act outsidehimself, he made choice of a manner of action which should be worthy [255]of the supremely perfect Being, that is, which should be infinitely simpleand uniform, but yet of an infinite productivity. One may even suppose thatthis manner of action by _general acts of will_ appeared to himpreferable--although there must thence result some superfluous events (andeven bad if they are taken separately, that is my own addition)--to anothermanner more composed and more regular; such is Father Malebranche'sopinion. Nothing is more appropriate than this assumption (according to theopinion of M. Bayle, when he wrote his _Divers Thoughts on the Comet_) tosolve a thousand difficulties which are brought up against divineprovidence: 'To ask God', he says, 'why he has made things which serve torender men more wicked, that would be to ask why God has carried out hisplan (which can only be of infinite beauty) by the simplest and mostuniform methods, and why, by a complexity of decrees that would unceasinglycut across one another, he has not prevented the wrong use of man's freewill. ' He adds 'that miracles being particular acts of will must have anend worthy of God'. 

205. On these foundations he makes some good reflexions (ch. 231)concerning the injustice of those who complain of the prosperity of thewicked. 'I shall have no scruples', he says, 'about saying that all thosewho are surprised at the prosperity of the wicked have pondered very littleupon the nature of God, and that they have reduced the obligations of acause which directs all things, to the scope of a providence altogethersubordinate; and that is small-minded. What then! Should God, after havingmade free causes and necessary causes, in a mixture infinitely well fittedto show forth the wonders of his infinite wisdom, have established lawsconsistent with the nature of free causes, but so lacking in firmness thatthe slightest trouble that came upon a man would overthrow them entirely, to the ruin of human freedom? A mere city governor will become an object ofridicule if he changes his regulations and orders as often as someone ispleased to murmur against him. And shall God, whose laws concern a good souniversal that all of the world that is visible to us perchance enters intoit as no more than a trifling accessary, be bound to depart from his laws, because they to-day displease the one and to-morrow the other? Or againbecause a superstitious person, deeming wrongly that a monstrosity presagessomething deadly, proceeds from his error to a criminal sacrifice? Orbecause a good soul, who yet does not value virtue highly enough to [256]believe that to have none is punishment enough in itself, is shocked that awicked man should become rich and enjoy vigorous health? Can one form anyfalser notions of a universal providence? Everyone agrees that this law ofnature, the strong prevails over the weak, has been very wisely laid down, and that it would be absurd to maintain that when a stone falls on afragile vase which is the delight of its owner, God should depart from thislaw in order to spare that owner vexation. Should one then not confess thatit is just as absurd to maintain that God must depart from the same law toprevent a wicked man from growing rich at the expense of a good man? Themore the wicked man sets himself above the promptings of conscience and ofhonour, the more does he exceed the good man in strength, so that if hecomes to grips with the good man he must, according to the course ofnature, ruin him. If, moreover, they are both engaged in the business offinance, the wicked man must, according to the same course of nature, growricher than the good man, just as a fierce fire consumes more wood than afire of straw. Those who would wish sickness for a wicked man are sometimesas unfair as those who would wish that a stone falling on a glass shouldnot break it: for his organs being arranged as they are, neither the foodthat he takes nor the air that he breathes can, according to natural laws, be detrimental to his health. Therefore those who complain about his healthcomplain of God's failure to violate the laws which he has established. Andin this they are all the more unfair because, through combinations andconcatenations which were in the power of God alone, it happens oftenenough that the course of nature brings about the punishment of sin. '

206. It is a thousand pities that M. Bayle so soon quitted the way he hadso auspiciously begun, of reasoning on behalf of providence: for his workwould have been fruitful, and in saying fine things he would have said goodthings as well. I agree with Father Malebranche that God does things in theway most worthy of him. But I go a little further than he, with regard to'general and particular acts of will'. As God can do nothing withoutreasons, even when he acts miraculously, it follows that he has no willabout individual events but what results from some general truth or will. Thus I would say that God never has a _particular will_ such as this Fatherimplies, that is to say, _a particular primitive will_. 

 [257]207. I think even that miracles have nothing to distinguish them from otherevents in this regard: for reasons of an order superior to that of Natureprompt God to perform them. Thus I would not say, with this Father, thatGod departs from general laws whenever order requires it: he departs fromone law only for another law more applicable, and what order requirescannot fail to be in conformity with the rule of order, which is one of thegeneral laws. The distinguishing mark of miracles (taken in the strictestsense) is that they cannot be accounted for by the natures of createdthings. That is why, should God make a general law causing bodies to beattracted the one to the other, he could only achieve its operation byperpetual miracles. And likewise, if God willed that the organs of humanbodies should conform to the will of the soul, according to the _system ofoccasional causes_, this law also would come into operation only throughperpetual miracles. 

208. Thus one must suppose that, among the general rules which are notabsolutely necessary, God chooses those which are the most natural, whichit is easiest to explain, and which also are of greatest service for theexplanation of other things. That is doubtless the conclusion mostexcellent and most pleasing; and even though the System of Pre-establishedHarmony were not necessary otherwise, because it banishes superfluousmiracles, God would have chosen it as being the most harmonious. The waysof God are those most simple and uniform: for he chooses rules that leastrestrict one another. They are also the most _productive_ in proportion tothe _simplicity of ways and means_. It is as if one said that a certainhouse was the best that could have been constructed at a certain cost. Onemay, indeed, reduce these two conditions, simplicity and productivity, to asingle advantage, which is to produce as much perfection as is possible:thus Father Malebranche's system in this point amounts to the same as mine. Even if the effect were assumed to be greater, but the process less simple, I think one might say that, when all is said and done, the effect itselfwould be less great, taking into account not only the final effect but alsothe mediate effect. For the wisest mind so acts, as far as it is possible, that the _means_ are also in a sense _ends_, that is, they are desirablenot only on account of what they do, but on account of what they are. Themore intricate processes take up too much ground, too much space, too muchplace, too much time that might have been better employed. 

 [258]209. Now since everything resolves itself into this greatest perfection, wereturn to my law of the best. For perfection includes not only the _moralgood_ and the _physical good_ of intelligent creatures, but also the goodwhich is purely _metaphysical_, and concerns also creatures devoid ofreason. It follows that the evil that is in rational creatures happens onlyby concomitance, not by antecedent will but by a consequent will, as beinginvolved in the best possible plan; and the metaphysical good whichincludes everything makes it necessary sometimes to admit physical evil andmoral evil, as I have already explained more than once. It so happens thatthe ancient Stoics were not far removed from this system. M. Bayle remarkedupon this himself in his _Dictionary_ in the article on 'Chrysippus', rem. T. It is of importance to give his own words, in order sometimes to facehim with his own objections and to bring him back to the fine sentimentsthat he had formerly pronounced: 'Chrysippus', he says (p. 930), 'in hiswork on Providence examined amongst other questions this one: Did thenature of things, or the providence that made the world and the human kind, make also the diseases to which men are subject? He answers that the chiefdesign of Nature was not to make them sickly, that would not be in keepingwith the cause of all good; but Nature, in preparing and producing manygreat things excellently ordered and of great usefulness, found that somedrawbacks came as a result, and thus these were not in conformity with theoriginal design and purpose; they came about as a sequel to the work, theyexisted only as consequences. For the formation of the human body, Chrysippus said, the finest idea as well as the very utility of the workdemanded that the head should be composed of a tissue of thin, fine bones;but because of that it was bound to have the disadvantage of not being ableto resist blows. Nature made health, and at the same time it was necessaryby a kind of concomitance that the source of diseases should be opened up. The same thing applies with regard to virtue; the direct action of Nature, which brought it forth, produced by a counter stroke the brood of vices. Ihave not translated literally, for which reason I give here the actualLatin of Aulus Gellius, for the benefit of those who understand thatlanguage (Aul. Gellius, lib. 6, cap. 1): "Idem Chrysippus in eod. Lib. (quarto, [Greek: peri pronoias]) tractat consideratque, dignumque esse idquaeri putat, [Greek: ei hai tôn anthrôpôn nosoi kata physin gignontai]. Idest, naturane ipsa rerum, vel providentia quae compagem hanc mundi et [259]genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum, quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principalenaturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios. Nunquam enim hocconvenisse naturae auctori parentique rerum omnium bonarum. Sed quum multa, inquit, atque magna gigneret, pareretque aptissima et utilissima, aliaquoque simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia:eaque non per naturam, sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat [Greek: kata parakolouthêsin]. Sicut, inquit, quumcorpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operispostulavit ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret. Sed hancutilitatem rei majoris alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est, ut fieret caput tenuiter munitum et ictibus offensionibusque parvisfragile. Proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt, dum salusparitur. Sic Hercle, inquit, dum virtus hominibus per consilium naturaegignitur, vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt. " I do notthink that a pagan could have said anything more reasonable, consideringhis ignorance of the first man's fall, the knowledge of which has onlyreached us through revelation, and which indeed is the true cause of ourmiseries. If we had sundry like extracts from the works of Chrysippus, orrather if we had his works, we should have a more favourable idea than wehave of the beauty of his genius. '

210. Let us now see the reverse of the medal in the altered M. Bayle. Afterhaving quoted in his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 155, p. 962) these words of M. Jacquelot, which are much to my liking:'To change the order of the universe is something of infinitely greaterconsequence than the prosperity of a good man, ' he adds: 'This thought hassomething dazzling about it: Father Malebranche has placed it in the bestpossible light; and he has persuaded some of his readers that a systemwhich is simple and very productive is more consistent with God's wisdomthan a system more composite and less productive in proportion, but morecapable of averting irregularities. M. Bayle was one of those who believedthat Father Malebranche in that way gave a wonderful solution. ' (It is M. Bayle himself speaking. ) 'But it is almost impossible to be satisfied withit after having read M. Arnauld's books against this system, and afterhaving contemplated the vast and boundless idea of the supremely [260]perfect Being. This idea shows us that nothing is easier for God than tofollow a plan which is simple, productive, regular and opportune for allcreatures simultaneously. '

211. While I was in France I showed to M. Arnauld a dialogue I had composedin Latin on the cause of evil and the justice of God; it was not onlybefore his disputes with Father Malebranche, but even before the book on_The Search for Truth_ appeared. That principle which I uphold here, namelythat sin had been permitted because it had been involved in the best planfor the universe, was already applied there; and M. Arnauld did not seem tobe startled by it. But the slight contentions which he has since had withFather Malebranche have given him cause to examine this subject with closerattention, and to be more severe in his judgement thereof. Yet I am notaltogether pleased with M. Bayle's manner of expression here on thissubject, and I am not of the opinion 'that a more composite and lessproductive plan might be more capable of averting irregularities'. Rulesare the expression of general will: the more one observes rules, the moreregularity there is; simplicity and productivity are the aim of rules. Ishall be met with the objection that a uniform system will be free fromirregularities. I answer that it would be an irregularity to be toouniform, that would offend against the rules of harmony. _Et citharoedusRidetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem_. I believe therefore that God canfollow a simple, productive, regular plan; but I do not believe that thebest and the most regular is always opportune for all creaturessimultaneously; and I judge _a posteriori_, for the plan chosen by God isnot so. I have, however, also shown this _a priori_ in examples taken frommathematics, and I will presently give another here. An Origenist whomaintains that all rational creatures become happy in the end will be stilleasier to satisfy. He will say, in imitation of St. Paul's saying about thesufferings of this life, that those which are finite are not worthy to becompared with eternal bliss. 

212. What is deceptive in this subject, as I have already observed, is thatone feels an inclination to believe that what is the best in the whole isalso the best possible in each part. One reasons thus in geometry, when itis a question _de maximis et minimis_. If the road from A to B that oneproposes to take is the shortest possible, and if this road passes by C, then the road from A to C, part of the first, must also be the shortestpossible. But the inference from _quantity_ to _quality_ is not always[261]right, any more than that which is drawn from equals to similars. For_equals_ are those whose quantity is the same, and _similars_ are those notdiffering according to qualities. The late Herr Sturm, a famousmathematician in Altorf, while in Holland in his youth published there asmall book under the title of _Euclides Catholicus_. Here he endeavoured togive exact and general rules in subjects not mathematical, being encouragedin the task by the late Herr Erhard Weigel, who had been his tutor. In thisbook he transfers to similars what Euclid had said of equals, and heformulates this axiom: _Si similibus addas similia, tota sunt similia_. Butso many limitations were necessary to justify this new rule, that it wouldhave been better, in my opinion, to enounce it at the outset with areservation, by saying, _Si similibus similia addas similiter, tota suntsimilia_. Moreover, geometricians often require _non tantum similia, sed etsimiliter posita_. 

213. This difference between quantity and quality appears also in our case. The part of the shortest way between two extreme points is also theshortest way between the extreme points of this part; but the part of thebest Whole is not of necessity the best that one could have made of thispart. For the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful, since itcan be extracted from the whole, or marked out within the whole, in anirregular manner. If goodness and beauty always lay in something absoluteand uniform, such as extension, matter, gold, water, and other bodiesassumed to be homogeneous or similar, one must say that the part of thegood and the beautiful would be beautiful and good like the whole, since itwould always have resemblance to the whole: but this is not the case inthings that have mutual relations. An example taken from geometry will beappropriate to explain my idea. 

214. There is a kind of geometry which Herr Jung of Hamburg, one of themost admirable men of his time, called 'empiric'. It makes use ofconclusive experiments and proves various propositions of Euclid, butespecially those which concern the equality of two figures, by cutting theone in pieces, and putting the pieces together again to make the other. Inthis manner, by cutting carefully in parts the squares on the two sides ofthe right-angled triangle, and arranging these parts carefully, one makesfrom them the square on the hypotenuse; that is demonstrating empiricallythe 47th proposition of the first book of Euclid. Now supposing that someof these pieces taken from the two smaller squares are lost, something[262]will be lacking in the large square that is to be formed from them; andthis defective combination, far from pleasing, will be disagreeably ugly. If then the pieces that remained, composing the faulty combination, weretaken separately without any regard to the large square to whose formationthey ought to contribute, one would group them together quite differentlyto make a tolerably good combination. But as soon as the lost pieces areretrieved and the gap in the faulty combination is filled, there will ensuea beautiful and regular thing, the complete large square: this perfectcombination will be far more beautiful than the tolerably good combinationwhich had been made from the pieces one had not mislaid alone. The perfectcombination corresponds to the universe in its entirety, and the faultycombination that is a part of the perfect one corresponds to some part ofthe universe, where we find defects which the Author of things has allowed, because otherwise, if he had wished to re-shape this faulty part and makethereof a tolerably good combination, the whole would not then have been sobeautiful. For the parts of the faulty combination, grouped better to makea tolerably good combination, could not have been used properly to form thewhole and perfect combination. Thomas Aquinas had an inkling of thesethings when he said: _ad prudentem gubernatorem pertinet, negligere aliquemdefectum bonitatis in parte, ut faciat augmentum bonitatis in toto_ (Thom. , _Contra Gentiles_, lib. 2, c. 71). Thomas Gatacre, in his Notes on the bookof Marcus Aurelius (lib. 5, cap. 8, with M. Bayle), cites also passagesfrom authors who say that the evil of the parts is often the good of thewhole. 

215. Let us return to M. Bayle's illustrations. He imagines a prince (p. 963) who is having a city built, and who, in bad taste, aims rather at airsof magnificence therein, and a bold and unusual style of architecture, thanat the provision of conveniences of all kinds for the inhabitants. But ifthis prince has true magnanimity he will prefer the convenient to themagnificent architecture. That is M. Bayle's judgement. I consider, however, that there are cases where one will justifiably prefer beauty ofconstruction in a palace to the convenience of a few domestics. But I admitthat the construction would be bad, however beautiful it might be, if itwere a cause of diseases to the inhabitants; provided it was possible tomake one that would be better, taking into account beauty, convenience andhealth all together. It may be, indeed, that one cannot have all these[263]advantages at once. Thus, supposing one wished to build on the northern andmore bracing side of the mountain, if the castle were then bound to be ofan unendurable construction, one would prefer to make it face southward. 

216. M. Bayle raises the further objection, that it is true that ourlegislators can never invent regulations such as are convenient for allindividuals, 'Nulla lex satis commoda omnibus est; id modo quaeritur, simajori parti et in summam prodest. (Cato apud Livium, L. 34, circa init. )'But the reason is that the limited condition of their knowledge compelsthem to cling to laws which, when all is taken into account, are moreadvantageous than harmful. Nothing of all that can apply to God, who is asinfinite in power and understanding as in goodness and true greatness. Ianswer that since God chooses the best possible, one cannot tax him withany limitation of his perfections; and in the universe not only does thegood exceed the evil, but also the evil serves to augment the good. 

217. He observes also that the Stoics derived a blasphemy from thisprinciple, saying that evils must be endured with patience, or that theywere necessary, not only to the well-being and completeness of theuniverse, but also to the felicity, perfection and conservation of God, whodirects it. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius gave expression to that in theeighth chapter of the fifth book of his _Meditations_. 'Duplici ratione', he says, 'diligas oportet, quidquid evenerit tibi; altera quod tibi natumet tibi coordinatum et ad te quodammodo affectum est; altera quod universigubernatori prosperitatis et consummationis atque adeo permansionis ipsiusprocurandae ([Greek: tês euodias kai tês synteleias kai tês symmonêsautês]) ex parte causa est. ' This precept is not the most reasonable ofthose stated by that great emperor. A _diligas oportet_ ([Greek: stergeinchrê]) is of no avail; a thing does not become pleasing just because it isnecessary, and because it is destined for or attached to someone: and whatfor me would be an evil would not cease to be such because it would be mymaster's good, unless this good reflected back on me. One good thing amongothers in the universe is that the general good becomes in reality theindividual good of those who love the Author of all good. But the principalerror of this emperor and of the Stoics was their assumption that the goodof the universe must please God himself, because they imagined God as thesoul of the world. This error has nothing in common with my dogma, [264]according to which God is _Intelligentia extramundana_, as MartianusCapella calls him, or rather _supramundana_. Further, he acts to do good, and not to receive it. _Melius est dare quam accipere_; his bliss is everperfect and can receive no increase, either from within or from without. 

218. I come now to the principal objection M. Bayle, after M. Arnauld, brings up against me. It is complicated: they maintain that God would beunder compulsion, that he would act of necessity, if he were bound tocreate the best; or at least that he would have been lacking in power if hecould not have found a better expedient for excluding sins and other evils. That is in effect denying that this universe is the best, and that God isbound to insist upon the best. I have met this objection adequately in morethan one passage: I have proved that God cannot fail to produce the best;and from that assumption it follows that the evils we experience could nothave been reasonably excluded from the universe, since they are there. Letus see, however, what these two excellent men bring up, or rather let ussee what M. Bayle's objection is, for he professes to have profited by thearguments of M. Arnauld. 

219. 'Would it be possible', he says, _Reply to the Questions of aProvincial_, vol. III, ch. 158, p. 890, 'that a nature whose goodness, holiness, wisdom, knowledge and power are infinite, who loves virtuesupremely, and hates vice supremely, as our clear and distinct idea of himshows us, and as well-nigh every page of Scripture assures us, could havefound in virtue no means fitting and suited for his ends? Would it bepossible that vice alone had offered him this means? One would have thoughton the contrary that nothing beseemed this nature more than to establishvirtue in his work to the exclusion of all vice. ' M. Bayle here exaggeratesthings. I agree that some vice was connected with the best plan of theuniverse, but I do not agree with him that God could not find in virtue anymeans suited for his ends. This objection would have been valid if therewere no virtue, if vice took its place everywhere. He will say it sufficesthat vice prevails and that virtue is trifling in comparison. But I am farfrom agreeing with him there, and I think that in reality, properlyspeaking, there is incomparably more moral good than moral evil in rationalcreatures; and of these we have knowledge of but few. 

220. This evil is not even so great in men as it is declared to be. It[265]is only people of a malicious disposition or those who have become somewhatmisanthropic through misfortunes, like Lucian's Timon, who find wickednesseverywhere, and who poison the best actions by the interpretations theygive to them. I speak of those who do it in all seriousness, to draw thenceevil conclusions, by which their conduct is tainted; for there are some whoonly do it to show off their own acumen. People have found that fault inTacitus, and that again is the criticism M. Descartes (in one of hisletters) makes of Mr. Hobbes's book _De Cive_, of which only a few copieshad at that time been printed for distribution among friends, but to whichsome notes by the author were added in the second edition which we have. For although M. Descartes acknowledges that this book is by a man oftalent, he observes therein some very dangerous principles and maxims, inthe assumption there made that all men are wicked, or the provision of themwith motives for being so. The late Herr Jacob Thomasius said in hisadmirable _Tables of Practical Philosophy_ that the [Greek: prôtonpseudos], the primary cause of errors in this book by Mr. Hobbes, was thathe took _statum legalem pro naturali_, that is to say that the corruptstate served him as a gauge and rule, whereas it is the state mostbefitting human nature which Aristotle had had in view. For according toAristotle, that is termed _natural_ which conforms most closely to theperfection of the nature of the thing; but Mr. Hobbes applies the term_natural state_ to that which has least art, perhaps not taking intoaccount that human nature in its perfection carries art with it. But thequestion of name, that is to say, of what may be called natural, would notbe of great importance were it not that Aristotle and Hobbes fastened uponit the notion of natural right, each one following his own signification. Ihave said here already that I found in the book on the Falsity of humanVirtues the same defect as M. Descartes found in Mr. Hobbes's _De Cive_. 

221. But even if we assume that vice exceeds virtue in the human kind, asit is assumed the number of the damned exceeds that of the elect, it by nomeans follows that vice and misery exceed virtue and happiness in theuniverse: one should rather believe the opposite, because the City of Godmust be the most perfect of all possible states, since it was formed and isperpetually governed by the greatest and best of all Monarchs. This answerconfirms the observation I made earlier, when speaking of the conformity offaith with reason, namely, that one of the greatest sources of fallacy[266]in the objections is the confusion of the apparent with the real. And hereby the apparent I mean not simply such as would result from an exactdiscussion of facts, but that which has been derived from the small extentof our experiences. It would be senseless to try to bring up appearances soimperfect, and having such slight foundation, in opposition to the proofsof reason and the revelations of faith. 

222. Finally, I have already observed that love of virtue and hatred ofvice, which tend in an undefined way to bring virtue into existence and toprevent the existence of vice, are only antecedent acts of will, such as isthe will to bring about the happiness of all men and to save them frommisery. These acts of antecedent will make up only a portion of all theantecedent will of God taken together, whose result forms the consequentwill, or the decree to create the best. Through this decree it is that lovefor virtue and for the happiness of rational creatures, which is undefinedin itself and goes as far as is possible, receives some slight limitations, on account of the heed that must be paid to good in general. Thus one mustunderstand that God loves virtue supremely and hates vice supremely, andthat nevertheless some vice is to be permitted. 

223. M. Arnauld and M. Bayle appear to maintain that this method ofexplaining things and of establishing a best among all the plans for theuniverse, one such as may not be surpassed by any other, sets a limit toGod's power. 'Have you considered', says M. Arnauld to Father Malebranche(in his _Reflexions on the New System of Nature and Grace_, vol. II, p. 385), 'that in making such assumptions you take it upon yourself to subvertthe first article of the creed, whereby we make profession of believing inGod the Father Almighty?' He had said already (p. 362): 'Can one maintain, without trying to blind oneself, that a course of action which could notfail to have this grievous result, namely, that the majority of men perish, bears the stamp of God's goodness more than a different course of action, which would have caused, if God had followed it, the salvation of all men?'And, as M. Jacquelot does not differ from the principles I have just laiddown, M. Bayle raises like objections in his case (_Reply to the Questionsof a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 151, p. 900): 'If one adopts suchexplanations', he says, 'one sees oneself constrained to renounce the mostobvious notions on the nature of the supremely perfect Being. These teachus that all things not implying contradiction are possible for him, [267]that consequently it is possible for him to save people whom he does notsave: for what contradiction would result supposing the number of the electwere greater than it is? They teach us besides that, since he is supremelyhappy, he has no will which he cannot carry out. How, then, shall weunderstand that he wills to save all men and that he cannot do so? Wesought some light to help us out of the perplexities we feel in comparingthe idea of God with the state of the human kind, and lo! we are givenelucidations that cast us into darkness more dense. '

224. All these obstacles vanish before the exposition I have just given. Iagree with M. Bayle's principle, and it is also mine, that everythingimplying no contradiction is possible. But as for me, holding as I do thatGod did the best that was possible, or that he could not have done betterthan he has done, deeming also that to pass any other judgement upon hiswork in its entirety would be to wrong his goodness or his wisdom, I mustsay that to make something which surpasses in goodness the best itself, that indeed would imply contradiction. That would be as if someonemaintained that God could draw from one point to another a line shorterthan the straight line, and accused those who deny this of subverting thearticle of faith whereby we believe in God the Father Almighty. 

225. The infinity of possibles, however great it may be, is no greater thanthat of the wisdom of God, who knows all possibles. One may even say thatif this wisdom does not exceed the possibles extensively, since the objectsof the understanding cannot go beyond the possible, which in a sense isalone intelligible, it exceeds them intensively, by reason of theinfinitely infinite combinations it makes thereof, and its manydeliberations concerning them. The wisdom of God, not content withembracing all the possibles, penetrates them, compares them, weighs themone against the other, to estimate their degrees of perfection orimperfection, the strong and the weak, the good and the evil. It goes evenbeyond the finite combinations, it makes of them an infinity of infinites, that is to say, an infinity of possible sequences of the universe, each ofwhich contains an infinity of creatures. By this means the divine Wisdomdistributes all the possibles it had already contemplated separately, intoso many universal systems which it further compares the one with the other. The result of all these comparisons and deliberations is the choice of thebest from among all these possible systems, which wisdom makes in [268]order to satisfy goodness completely; and such is precisely the plan of theuniverse as it is. Moreover, all these operations of the divineunderstanding, although they have among them an order and a priority ofnature, always take place together, no priority of time existing amongthem. 

226. The careful consideration of these things will, I hope, induce adifferent idea of the greatness of the divine perfections, and especiallyof the wisdom and goodness of God, from any that can exist in the minds ofthose who make God act at random, without cause or reason. And I do not seehow they could avoid falling into an opinion so strange, unless theyacknowledged that there are reasons for God's choice, and that thesereasons are derived from his goodness: whence it follows of necessity thatwhat was chosen had the advantage of goodness over what was not chosen, andconsequently that it is the best of all the possibles. The best cannot besurpassed in goodness, and it is no restriction of the power of God to saythat he cannot do the impossible. Is it possible, said M. Bayle, that thereis no better plan than that one which God carried out? One answers that itis very possible and indeed necessary, namely that there is none: otherwiseGod would have preferred it. 

227. It seems to me that I have proved sufficiently that among all thepossible plans of the universe there is one better than all the rest, andthat God has not failed to choose it. But M. Bayle claims to infer thencethat God is therefore not free. This is how he speaks on that question(_ubi supra_, ch. 151, p. 899): 'I thought to argue with a man who assumedas I do that the goodness and the power of God are infinite, as well as hiswisdom; and now I see that in reality this man assumes that God's goodnessand power are enclosed within rather narrow bounds. ' As to that, theobjection has already been met: I set no bounds to God's power, since Irecognize that it extends _ad maximum, ad omnia_, to all that implies nocontradiction; and I set none to his goodness, since it attains to thebest, _ad optimum_. But M. Bayle goes on: 'There is therefore no freedom inGod; he is compelled by his wisdom to create, and then to create preciselysuch a work, and finally to create it precisely in such ways. These arethree servitudes which form a more than Stoic _fatum_, and which renderimpossible all that is not within their sphere. It seems that, according tothis system, God could have said, even before shaping his decrees: I [269]cannot save such and such a man, nor condemn such and such another, _quippevetor fatis_, my wisdom permits it not. '

228. I answer that it is goodness which prompts God to create with thepurpose of communicating himself; and this same goodness combined withwisdom prompts him to create the best: a best that includes the wholesequence, the effect and the process. It prompts him thereto withoutcompelling him, for it does not render impossible that which it does notcause him to choose. To call that _fatum_ is taking it in a good sense, which is not contrary to freedom: _fatum_ comes from _fari_, to speak, topronounce; it signifies a judgement, a decree of God, the award of hiswisdom. To say that one cannot do a thing, simply because one does not willit, is to misuse terms. The wise mind wills only the good: is it then aservitude when the will acts in accordance with wisdom? And can one be lessa slave than to act by one's own choice in accordance with the most perfectreason? Aristotle used to say that that man is in a natural servitude(_natura servus_) who lacks guidance, who has need of being directed. Slavery comes from without, it leads to that which offends, and especiallyto that which offends with reason: the force of others and our own passionsenslave us. God is never moved by anything outside himself, nor is hesubject to inward passions, and he is never led to that which can cause himoffence. It appears, therefore, that M. Bayle gives odious names to thebest things in the world, and turns our ideas upside-down, applying theterm slavery to the state of the greatest and most perfect freedom. 

229. He had also said not long before (ch. 151, p. 891): 'If virtue, or anyother good at all, had been as appropriate as vice for the Creator's ends, vice would not have been given preference; it must therefore have been theonly means that the Creator could have used; it was therefore employedpurely of necessity. As therefore he loves his glory, not with a freedom ofindifference, but by necessity, he must by necessity love all the meanswithout which he could not manifest his glory. Now if vice, as vice, wasthe only means of attaining to this end, it will follow that God ofnecessity loves vice as vice, a thought which can only inspire us withhorror; and he has revealed quite the contrary to us. ' He observes at thesame time that certain doctors among the Supralapsarians (like Rutherford, for example) denied that God wills sin as sin, whilst they admitted [270]that he wills sin permissively in so far as it is punishable andpardonable. But he urges in objection, that an action is only punishableand pardonable in so far as it is vicious. 

230. M. Bayle makes a false assumption in these words that we have justread, and draws from them false conclusions. It is not true that God loveshis glory by necessity, if thereby it is understood that he is led bynecessity to acquire his glory through his creatures. For if that were so, he would acquire his glory always and everywhere. The decree to create isfree: God is prompted to all good; the good, and even the best, inclineshim to act; but it does not compel him, for his choice creates noimpossibility in that which is distinct from the best; it causes noimplication of contradiction in that which God refrains from doing. Thereis therefore in God a freedom that is exempt not only from constraint butalso from necessity. I mean this in respect of metaphysical necessity; forit is a moral necessity that the wisest should be bound to choose the best. It is the same with the means which God chooses to attain his glory. And asfor vice, it has been shown in preceding pages that it is not an object ofGod's decree as _means_, but as _conditio sine qua non_, and that for thatreason alone it is permitted. One is even less justified in saying thatvice is _the only means_; it would be at most one of the means, but one ofthe least among innumerable others. 

231. 'Another frightful consequence, ' M. Bayle goes on, 'the fatality ofall things, ensues: God will not have been free to arrange events in adifferent way, since the means he chose to show forth his glory was theonly means befitting his wisdom. ' This so-called fatality or necessity isonly moral, as I have just shown: it does not affect freedom; on thecontrary, it assumes the best use thereof; it does not render impossiblethe objects set aside by God's choice. 'What, then, will become', he adds, 'of man's free will? Will there not have been necessity and fatality forAdam to sin? For if he had not sinned, he would have overthrown the soleplan that God had of necessity created. ' That is again a misuse of terms. Adam sinning freely was seen of God among the ideas of the possibles, andGod decreed to admit him into existence as he saw him. This decree does notchange the nature of the objects: it does not render necessary that whichwas contingent in itself, or impossible that which was possible. 

 [271]232. M. Bayle goes on (p. 892): 'The subtle Scotus asserts with muchdiscernment that if God had no freedom of indifference no creature couldhave this kind of freedom. ' I agree provided it is not meant as anindifference of equipoise, where there is no reason inclining more to oneside than the other. M. Bayle acknowledges (farther on in chapter 168, p. 1111) that what is termed indifference does not exclude prevenientinclinations and pleasures. It suffices therefore that there be nometaphysical necessity in the action which is termed free, that is to say, it suffices that a choice be made between several courses possible. 

233. He goes on again in the said chapter 157, p. 893: 'If God is notdetermined to create the world by a free motion of his goodness, but by theinterests of his glory, which he loves by necessity, and which is the onlything he loves, for it is not different from his substance; and if the lovethat he has for himself has compelled him to show forth his glory throughthe most fitting means, and if the fall of man was this same means, it isevident that this fall happened entirely by necessity and that theobedience of Eve and Adam to God's commands was impossible. ' Still the sameerror. The love that God bears to himself is essential to him, but the lovefor his glory, or the will to acquire his glory, is not so by any means:the love he has for himself did not impel him by necessity to actionswithout; they were free; and since there were possible plans whereby thefirst parents should not sin, their sin was therefore not necessary. Finally, I say in effect what M. Bayle acknowledges here, 'that Godresolved to create the world by a free motion of his goodness'; and I addthat this same motion prompted him to the best. 

234. The same answer holds good against this statement of M. Bayle's (ch. 165, p. 1071): 'The means most appropriate for attaining an end is ofnecessity one alone' (that is very well said, at least for the cases whereGod has chosen). 'Therefore if God was prompted irresistibly to employ thismeans, he employed it by necessity. ' (He was certainly prompted thereto, hewas determined, or rather he determined himself thereto: but that which iscertain is not always necessary, or altogether irresistible; the thingmight have gone otherwise, but that did not happen, and with good reason. God chose between different courses all possible: thus, metaphysicallyspeaking, he could have chosen or done what was not the best; but he couldnot morally speaking have done so. Let us make use of a comparison [272]from geometry. The best way from one point to another (leaving out ofaccount obstacles and other considerations accidental to the medium) is onealone: it is that one which passes by the shortest line, which is thestraight line. Yet there are innumerable ways from one point to another. There is therefore no necessity which binds me to go by the straight line;but as soon as I choose the best, I am determined to go that way, althoughthis is only a moral necessity in the wise. That is why the followingconclusions fail. ) 'Therefore he could only do that which he did. Thereforethat which has not happened or will never happen is absolutely impossible. '(These conclusions fail, I say: for since there are many things which havenever happened and never will happen, and which nevertheless are clearlyconceivable, and imply no contradiction, how can one say they arealtogether impossible? M. Bayle has refuted that himself in a passageopposing the Spinozists, which I have already quoted here, and he hasfrequently acknowledged that there is nothing impossible except that whichimplies contradiction: now he changes style and terminology. ) 'ThereforeAdam's perseverance in innocence was always impossible; therefore his fallwas altogether inevitable, and even antecedently to God's decree, for itimplied contradiction that God should be able to will a thing opposed tohis wisdom: it is, after all, the same thing to say, that it is impossiblefor God, as to say, God could do it, if he so willed, but he cannot willit. ' (It is misusing terms in a sense to say here: one can will, one willwill; 'can' here concerns the actions that one does will. Nevertheless itimplies no contradiction that God should will--directly or permissively--athing not implying contradiction, and in this sense it is permitted to saythat God can will it. )

235. In a word, when one speaks of the _possibility_ of a thing it is not aquestion of the causes that can bring about or prevent its actualexistence: otherwise one would change the nature of the terms, and renderuseless the distinction between the possible and the actual. This Abelarddid, and Wyclif appears to have done after him, in consequence of whichthey fell needlessly into unsuitable and disagreeable expressions. That iswhy, when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary, and brings in theconsideration of what God wills or chooses, one alters the issue. For Godchooses among the possibles, and for that very reason he chooses [273]freely, and is not compelled; there would be neither choice nor freedom ifthere were but one course possible. 

236. One must also answer M. Bayle's syllogisms, so as to neglect none ofthe objections of a man so gifted: they occur in Chapter 151 of his _Replyto the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, pp. 900, 901). 

FIRST SYLLOGISM

'God can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he hasfor his wisdom. 

'Now the salvation of all men is opposed to the necessary love which Godhas for his wisdom. 

'Therefore God cannot will the salvation of all men. '

The major is self-evident, for one can do nothing whereof the opposite isnecessary. But the minor cannot be accepted, for, albeit God loves hiswisdom of necessity, the actions whereto his wisdom prompts him cannot butbe free, and the objects whereto his wisdom does not prompt him do notcease to be possible. Moreover, his wisdom has prompted him to will thesalvation of all men, but not by a consequent and decretory will. Yet thisconsequent will, being only a result of free antecedent acts of will, cannot fail to be free also. 

SECOND SYLLOGISM

'The work most worthy of God's wisdom involves amongst other things the sinof all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men. 

'Now God wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom. 

'He wills therefore of necessity the work that involves amongst otherthings the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority ofmen. '

The major holds good, but the minor I deny. The decrees of God are alwaysfree, even though God be always prompted thereto by reasons which lie inthe intention towards good: for to be morally compelled by wisdom, to bebound by the consideration of good, is to be free; it is not compulsion inthe metaphysical sense. And metaphysical necessity alone, as I haveobserved so many times, is opposed to freedom. 

238. I shall not examine the syllogisms that M. Bayle urges in objection inthe following chapter (Ch. 152), against the system of the Supralapsarians, and particularly against the oration made by Theodore de Bèze at the [274]Conference of Montbéliard in the year 1586. This conference also onlyserved to increase the acrimony of the parties. 'God created the World tohis glory: his glory is not known (according to Bèze), if his mercy and hisjustice are not declared; for this cause simply by his grace he decreed forsome men life eternal, and for others by a just judgement eternaldamnation. Mercy presupposes misery, justice presupposes guilt. ' (He mighthave added that misery also supposes guilt. ) 'Nevertheless God being good, indeed goodness itself, he created man good and righteous, but unstable, and capable of sinning of his own free will. Man did not fall at random orrashly, or through causes ordained by some other God, as the Manichaeanshold, but by the providence of God; in such a way notwithstanding, that Godwas not involved in the fault, inasmuch as man was not constrained to sin. '

239. This system is not of the best conceived: it is not well fitted toshow forth the wisdom, the goodness and the justice of God; and happily itis almost abandoned to-day. If there were not other more profound reasonscapable of inducing God to permit guilt, the source of misery, there wouldbe neither guilt nor misery in the world, for the reasons alleged here donot suffice. He would declare his mercy better in preventing misery, and hewould declare his justice better in preventing guilt, in advancing virtue, in recompensing it. Besides, one does not see how he who not only causes aman to be capable of falling, but who so disposes circumstances that theycontribute towards causing his fall, is not culpable, if there are no otherreasons compelling him thereto. But when one considers that God, altogethergood and wise, must have produced all the virtue, goodness, happinesswhereof the best plan of the universe is capable, and that often an evil insome parts may serve the greater good of the whole, one readily concludesthat God may have given room for unhappiness, and even permitted guilt, ashe has done, without deserving to be blamed. It is the only remedy thatsupplies what all systems lack, however they arrange the decrees. Thesethoughts have already been favoured by St. Augustine, and one may say ofEve what the poet said of the hand of Mucius Scaevola:

 _Si non errasset, fecerat illa minus_. 

240. I find that the famous English prelate who wrote an ingenious book onthe origin of evil, some passages of which were disputed by M. Bayle [275]in the second volume of his _Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, whiledisagreeing with some of the opinions that I have upheld here and appearingto resort sometimes to a despotic power, as if the will of God did notfollow the rules of wisdom in relation to good or evil, but decreedarbitrarily that such and such a thing must be considered good or evil; andas if even the will of the creature, in so far as it is free, did notchoose because the object appears good to him, but by a purely arbitrarydetermination, independent of the representation of the object; thisbishop, I say, in other passages nevertheless says things which seem morein favour of my doctrine than of what appears contrary thereto in his own. He says that what an infinitely wise and free cause has chosen is betterthan what it has not chosen. Is not that recognizing that goodness is theobject and the reason of his choice? In this sense one will here aptly say:

 _Sic placuit superis; quaerere plura, nefas_. 

 [276] * * * * *

ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL

 * * * * *

PART THREE

241. Now at last I have disposed of the cause of moral evil; _physicalevil_, that is, sorrows, sufferings, miseries, will be less troublesome toexplain, since these are results of moral evil. _Poena est malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis_, according to Grotius. One suffersbecause one has acted; one suffers evil because one does evil. 

 _Nostrorum causa malorum_ _Nos sumus_. 

It is true that one often suffers through the evil actions of others; butwhen one has no part in the offence one must look upon it as a certaintythat these sufferings prepare for us a greater happiness. The question of_physical evil_, that is, of the origin of sufferings, has difficulties incommon with that of the origin of _metaphysical evil_, examples whereof arefurnished by the monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of theuniverse. But one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities arepart of order; and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was betterto admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate generallaws, as Father Malebranche sometimes argues, but also that these verymonstrosities are in the rules, and are in conformity with general acts ofwill, though we be not capable of discerning this conformity. It is [277]just as sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematicswhich issue finally in a great order when one has finally got to the bottomof them: that is why I have already in this work observed that according tomy principles all individual events, without exception, are consequences ofgeneral acts of will. 

242. It should be no cause for astonishment that I endeavour to elucidatethese things by comparisons taken from pure mathematics, where everythingproceeds in order, and where it is possible to fathom them by a closecontemplation which grants us an enjoyment, so to speak, of the vision ofthe ideas of God. One may propose a succession or series of numbersperfectly irregular to all appearance, where the numbers increase anddiminish variably without the emergence of any order; and yet he who knowsthe key to the formula, and who understands the origin and the structure ofthis succession of numbers, will be able to give a rule which, beingproperly understood, will show that the series is perfectly regular, andthat it even has excellent properties. One may make this still more evidentin lines. A line may have twists and turns, ups and downs, points ofreflexion and points of inflexion, interruptions and other variations, sothat one sees neither rhyme nor reason therein, especially when taking intoaccount only a portion of the line; and yet it may be that one can give itsequation and construction, wherein a geometrician would find the reason andthe fittingness of all these so-called irregularities. That is how we mustlook upon the irregularities constituted by monstrosities and otherso-called defects in the universe. 

243. In this sense one may apply that fine adage of St. Bernard (Ep. 276, Ad Eugen. , III): 'Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinate fierialiquid. ' It belongs to the great order that there should be some smalldisorder. One may even say that this small disorder is apparent only in thewhole, and it is not even apparent when one considers the happiness ofthose who walk in the ways of order. 

244. When I mention monstrosities I include numerous other apparent defectsbesides. We are acquainted with hardly anything but the surface of ourglobe; we scarce penetrate into its interior beyond a few hundred fathoms. That which we find in this crust of the globe appears to be the effect ofsome great upheavals. It seems that this globe was once on fire, and thatthe rocks forming the base of this crust of the earth are scoria remainingfrom a great fusion. In their entrails are found metal and mineral [278]products, which closely resemble those emanating from our furnaces: and theentire sea may be a kind of _oleum per deliquium_, just as tartaric oilforms in a damp place. For when the earth's surface cooled after the greatconflagration the moisture that the fire had driven into the air fell backupon the earth, washed its surface and dissolved and absorbed the solidsalt that was left in the cinders, finally filling up this great cavity inthe surface of our globe, to form the ocean filled with salt water. 

245. But, after the fire, one must conclude that earth and water maderavages no less. It may be that the crust formed by the cooling, havingbelow it great cavities, fell in, so that we live only on ruins, as amongothers Thomas Burnet, Chaplain to the late King of Great Britain, aptlyobserved. Sundry deluges and inundations have left deposits, whereof tracesand remains are found which show that the sea was in places that to-day aremost remote from it. But these upheavals ceased at last, and the globeassumed the shape that we see. Moses hints at these changes in few words:the separation of light from darkness indicates the melting caused by thefire; and the separation of the moist from the dry marks the effects ofinundations. But who does not see that these disorders have served to bringthings to the point where they now are, that we owe to them our riches andour comforts, and that through their agency this globe became fit forcultivation by us. These disorders passed into order. The disorders, realor apparent, that we see from afar are sunspots and comets; but we do notknow what uses they supply, nor the rules prevailing therein. Time was whenthe planets were held to be wandering stars: now their motion is found tobe regular. Peradventure it is the same with the comets: posterity willknow. 

246. One does not include among the disorders inequality of conditions, andM. Jacquelot is justified in asking those who would have everything equallyperfect, why rocks are not crowned with leaves and flowers? why ants arenot peacocks? And if there must needs be equality everywhere, the poor manwould serve notice of appeal against the rich, the servant against themaster. The pipes of an organ must not be of equal size. M. Bayle will saythat there is a difference between a privation of good and a disorder;between a disorder in inanimate things, which is purely metaphysical, and adisorder in rational creatures, which is composed of crime and [279]sufferings. He is right in making a distinction between them, and I amright in combining them. God does not neglect inanimate things: they do notfeel, but God feels for them. He does not neglect animals: they have notintelligence, but God has it for them. He would reproach himself for theslightest actual defect there were in the universe, even though it wereperceived of none. 

247. It seems M. Bayle does not approve any comparison between thedisorders which may exist in inanimate things and those which trouble thepeace and happiness of rational creatures; nor would he agree to ourjustifying the permission of vice on the pretext of the care that must betaken to avoid disturbing the laws of motion. One might thence conclude, according to him (posthumous Reply to M. Jacquelot, p. 183), 'that Godcreated the world only to display his infinite skill in architecture andmechanics, whilst his property of goodness and love of virtue took no partin the construction of this great work. This God would pride himself onlyon skill; he would prefer to let the whole human kind perish rather thansuffer some atoms to go faster or more slowly than general laws require. 'M. Bayle would not have made this antithesis if he had been informed on thesystem of general harmony which I assume, which states that the realm ofefficient causes and that of final causes are parallel to each other; thatGod has no less the quality of the best monarch than that of the greatestarchitect; that matter is so disposed that the laws of motion serve as thebest guidance for spirits; and that consequently it will prove that he hasattained the utmost good possible, provided one reckon the metaphysical, physical and moral goods together. 

248. But (M. Bayle will say) God having power to avert innumerable evils byone small miracle, why did he not employ it? He gives so much extraordinaryhelp to fallen men; but slight help of such a kind given to Eve would haveprevented her fall and rendered the temptation of the serpent ineffective. I have sufficiently met objections of this sort with this general answer, that God ought not to make choice of another universe since he has chosenthe best, and has only made use of the miracles necessary thereto. I hadanswered M. Bayle that miracles change the natural order of the universe. He replies, that that is an illusion, and that the miracle of the weddingat Cana (for instance) made no change in the air of the room, except thatinstead of receiving into its pores some corpuscles of water, it [280]received corpuscles of wine. But one must bear in mind that once the bestplan of things has been chosen nothing can be changed therein. 

249. As for miracles (concerning which I have already said something inthis work), they are perhaps not all of one and the same kind: there aremany, to all appearances, which God brings about through the ministry ofinvisible substances, such as the angels, as Father Malebranche alsobelieves. These angels or these substances act according to the ordinarylaws of their nature, being combined with bodies more rarefied and morevigorous than those we have at our command. And such miracles are only soby comparison, and in relation to us; just as our works would be consideredmiraculous amongst animals if they were capable of remarking upon them. Thechanging of water into wine might be a miracle of this kind. But theCreation, the Incarnation and some other actions of God exceed all thepower of creatures and are truly miracles, or indeed Mysteries. If, nevertheless, the changing of water into wine at Cana was a miracle of thehighest kind, God would have thereby changed the whole course of theuniverse, because of the connexion of bodies; or else he would have beenbound to prevent this connexion miraculously also, and cause the bodies notconcerned in the miracle to act as if no miracle had happened. After themiracle was over, it would have been necessary to restore all things inthose very bodies concerned to the state they would have reached withoutthe miracle: whereafter all would have returned to its original course. Thus this miracle demanded more than at first appears. 

250. As for physical evil in creatures, to wit their sufferings, M. Baylecontends vigorously against those who endeavour to justify by means ofparticular reasons the course of action pursued by God in regard to this. Here I set aside the sufferings of animals, and I see that M. Bayle insistschiefly on those of men, perhaps because he thinks that brute beasts haveno feeling. It is on account of the injustice there would be in thesufferings of beasts that divers Cartesians wished to prove that they areonly machines, _quoniam sub Deo justo nemo innocens miser est_: it isimpossible that an innocent creature should be unhappy under such a masteras God. The principle is good, but I do not think it warrants the inferencethat beasts have no feeling, because I think that, properly speaking, perception is not sufficient to cause misery if it is not accompanied [281]by reflexion. It is the same with happiness: without reflexion there isnone. 

 _O fortunatos nimium, sua qui bona norint!_

One cannot reasonably doubt the existence of pain among animals; but itseems as if their pleasures and their pains are not so keen as they are inman: for animals, since they do not reflect, are susceptible neither to thegrief that accompanies pain, nor to the joy that accompanies pleasure. Menare sometimes in a state approaching that of the beasts, when they actalmost on instinct alone and simply on the impressions made by theexperience of the senses: and, in this state, their pleasures and theirpains are very slight. 

251. But let us pass from the beasts and return to rational creatures. Itis with regard to them that M. Bayle discusses this question: whether thereis more physical evil than physical good in the world? (_Reply to theQuestions of a Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 75. ) To settle it aright, one mustexplain wherein these goods and evils lie. We are agreed that physical evilis simply displeasure and under that heading I include pain, grief, andevery other kind of discomfort. But does physical good lie solely inpleasure? M. Bayle appears to be of this opinion; but I consider that itlies also in a middle state, such as that of health. One is well enoughwhen one has no ill; it is a degree of wisdom to have no folly:

 _Sapientia prima est, _ _Stultitia caruisse_. 

In the same way one is worthy of praise when one cannot with justice beblamed:

 _Si non culpabor, sat mihi laudis erit_. 

That being the case, all the sensations not unpleasing to us, all theexercises of our powers that do not incommode us, and whose preventionwould incommode us, are physical goods, even when they cause us nopleasure; for privation of them is a physical evil. Besides we onlyperceive the good of health, and other like goods, when we are deprived ofthem. On those terms I would dare to maintain that even in this life goodsexceed evils, that our comforts exceed our discomforts, and that M. Descartes was justified in writing (vol. I, Letter 9) 'that natural reasonteaches us that we have more goods than evils in this life'. 

 [282]252. It must be added that pleasures enjoyed too often and to excess wouldbe a very great evil. There are some which Hippocrates compared to thefalling sickness, and Scioppius doubtless only made pretence of envying thesparrows in order to be agreeably playful in a learned and far from playfulwork. Highly seasoned foods are injurious to health and impair the nicenessof a delicate sense; and in general bodily pleasures are a kind ofexpenditure of the spirit, though they be made good in some better than inothers. 

253. As proof, however, that the evil exceeds the good is quoted theinstance of M. De la Motte le Vayer (Letter 134), who would not have beenwilling to return to the world, supposing he had had to play the same partas providence had already assigned to him. But I have already said that Ithink one would accept the proposal of him who could re-knot the thread ofFate if a new part were promised to us, even though it should not be betterthan the first. Thus from M. De la Motte le Vayer's saying it does notfollow that he would not have wished for the part he had already played, provided it had been new, as M. Bayle seems to take it. 

254. The pleasures of the mind are the purest, and of greatest service inmaking joy endure. Cardan, when already an old man, was so content with hisstate that he protested solemnly that he would not exchange it for thestate of the richest of young men who at the same time was ignorant. M. Dela Motte le Vayer quotes the saying himself without criticizing it. Knowledge has doubtless charms which cannot be conceived by those who havenot tasted them. I do not mean a mere knowledge of facts without that ofreasons, but knowledge like that of Cardan, who with all his faults was agreat man, and would have been incomparable without those faults. 

 _Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas!_ _Ille metus omnes et inexorabile fatum_ _Subjecit pedibus. _

It is no small thing to be content with God and with the universe, not tofear what destiny has in store for us, nor to complain of what befalls us. Acquaintance with true principles gives us this advantage, quite other thanthat the Stoics and the Epicureans derived from their philosophy. There isas much difference between true morality and theirs as there is [283]between joy and patience: for their tranquillity was founded only onnecessity, while ours must rest upon the perfection and beauty of things, upon our own happiness. 

255. What, then, shall we say of bodily sufferings? May they not besufficiently acute to disturb the sage's tranquillity? Aristotle assents;the Stoics were of a different opinion, and even the Epicureans likewise. M. Descartes revived the doctrine of these philosophers; he says in theletter just quoted: 'that even amid the worst misfortunes and the mostoverwhelming sufferings one may always be content, if only one knows how toexercise reason'. M. Bayle says concerning this (_Reply to the Questions ofa Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 157, p. 991) 'that it is saying nothing, thatit is prescribing for us a remedy whose preparation hardly anyoneunderstands'. I hold that the thing is not impossible, and that men couldattain it by dint of meditation and practice. For apart from the truemartyrs and those who have been aided in wonderful wise from on high, therehave been counterfeits who imitated them. That Spanish slave who killed theCarthaginian governor in order to avenge his master and who evinced greatjoy in his deed, even in the greatest tortures, may shame the philosophers. Why should not one go as far as he? One may say of an advantage, as of adisadvantage:

 _Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest_. 

256. But even to-day entire tribes, such as the Hurons, the Iroquois, theGalibis and other peoples of America teach us a great lesson on thismatter: one cannot read without astonishment of the intrepidity andwell-nigh insensibility wherewith they brave their enemies, who roast themover a slow fire and eat them by slices. If such people could retain theirphysical superiority and their courage, and combine them with ouracquirements, they would surpass us in every way, _Extat ut in mediis turris aprica casis_. 

They would be, in comparison with us, as a giant to a dwarf, a mountain toa hill:

 _Quantus Eryx, et quantus Athos, gaudetque nivali_ _Vertice se attollens pater Apenninus ad auras. _

 [284]257. All that which is effected by a wonderful vigour of body and mind inthese savages, who persist obstinately in the strangest point of honour, might be acquired in our case by training, by well-seasoned mortifications, by an overmastering joy founded on reason, by great practice in preservinga certain presence of mind in the midst of the distractions and impressionsmost liable to disturb it. Something of this kind is related of the ancientAssassins, subjects and pupils of the Old Man or rather the Seigneur(_Senior_) of the Mountain. Such a school (for a better purpose) would begood for missionaries who would wish to return to Japan. The Gymnosophistsof the ancient Indians had perhaps something resembling this, and thatCalanus, who provided for Alexander the Great the spectacle of his burningalive, had doubtless been encouraged by the great examples of his mastersand trained by great sufferings not to fear pain. The wives of these sameIndians, who even to-day ask to be burned with the bodies of theirhusbands, seem still to keep something of the courage of those ancientphilosophers of their country. I do not expect that there shouldstraightway be founded a religious order whose purpose would be to exaltman to that high pitch of perfection: such people would be too much abovethe rest, and too formidable for the authorities. As it rarely happens thatpeople are exposed to extremes where such great strength of mind would beneeded, one will scarce think of providing for it at the expense of ourusual comforts, albeit incomparably more would be gained than lost thereby. 

258. Nevertheless the very fact that one has no need of that great remedyis a proof that the good already exceeds the evil. Euripides also said:

 [Greek: pleiô ta chrêsta tôn kakôn einai brotois]. _Mala nostra longe judico vinci a bonis. _

Homer and divers other poets were of another mind, and men in general agreewith them. The reason for this is that the evil arouses our attentionrather than the good: but this same reason proves that the evil is morerare. One must therefore not credit the petulant expressions of Pliny, whowould have it that Nature is a stepmother, and who maintains that man isthe most unhappy and most vain of all creatures. These two epithets do notagree: one is not so very unhappy, when one is full of oneself. It is [285]true that men hold human nature only too much in contempt, apparentlybecause they see no other creatures capable of arousing their emulation;but they have all too much self-esteem, and individually are but too easilysatisfied. I therefore agree with Meric Casaubon, who in his notes on theXenophanes of Diogenes Laertius praises exceedingly the admirablesentiments of Euripides, going so far as to credit him with having saidthings _quae spirant_ [Greek: theopneuston] _pectus_. Seneca (Lib. 4, c. 5, _De Benefic. _) speaks eloquently of the blessings Nature has heaped uponus. M. Bayle in his _Dictionary_, article 'Xenophanes', brings up sundryauthorities against this, and among others that of the poet Diphilus in theCollections of Stobaeus, whose Greek might be thus expressed in Latin:

 _Fortuna cyathis bibere nos datis jubens, _ _Infundit uno terna pro bono mala. _

259. M. Bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil ofguilt, or of moral evil among men, the case would soon be terminated to theadvantage of Pliny, and Euripides would lose his action. To that I am notopposed; our vices doubtless exceed our virtues, and this is the effect oforiginal sin. It is nevertheless true that also on that point men ingeneral exaggerate things, and that even some theologians disparage man somuch that they wrong the providence of the Author of mankind. That is why Iam not in favour of those who thought to do great honour to our religion bysaying that the virtues of the pagans were only _splendida peccata_, splendid vices. It is a sally of St. Augustine's which has no foundation inholy Scripture, and which offends reason. But here we are only discussing aphysical good and evil, and one must compare in detail the prosperities andthe adversities of this life. M. Bayle would wish almost to set aside theconsideration of health; he likens it to the rarefied bodies, which arescarcely felt, like air, for example; but he likens pain to the bodies thathave much density and much weight in slight volume. But pain itself makesus aware of the importance of health when we are bereft of it. I havealready observed that excess of physical pleasures would be a real evil, and the matter ought not to be otherwise; it is too important for thespirit to be free. Lactantius (_Divin. Instit. _, lib. 3, cap. 18) had saidthat men are so squeamish that they complain of the slightest ill, as if itswallowed up all the goods they have enjoyed. M. Bayle says, concerningthis, that the very fact that men have this feeling warrants the [286]judgement that they are in evil case, since it is feeling which measuresthe extent of good or evil. But I answer that present feeling is anythingrather than the true measure of good and evil past and future. I grant thatone is in evil case while one makes these peevish reflexions; but that doesnot exclude a previous state of well-being, nor imply that, everythingreckoned in and all allowance made, the good does not exceed the evil. 

260. I do not wonder that the pagans, dissatisfied with their gods, madecomplaints against Prometheus and Epimetheus for having forged so weak ananimal as man. Nor do I wonder that they acclaimed the fable of oldSilenus, foster-father of Bacchus, who was seized by King Midas, and as theprice of his deliverance taught him that ostensibly fine maxim that thefirst and the greatest of goods was not to be born, and the second, todepart from this life with dispatch (Cic. , _Tuscul. _, lib. 1). Platobelieved that souls had been in a happier state, and many of the ancients, amongst others Cicero in his Consolation (according to the account ofLactantius), believed that for their sins they were confined in bodies asin a prison. They rendered thus a reason for our ills, and asserted theirprejudices against human life: for there is no such thing as a beautifulprison. But quite apart from the consideration that, even according tothese same pagans, the evils of this life would be counterbalanced andexceeded by the goods of past and future lives, I make bold to say that weshall find, upon unbiassed scrutiny of the facts, that taking all in allhuman life is in general tolerable. And adding thereto the motives ofreligion, we shall be content with the order God has set therein. Moreover, for a better judgement of our goods and our evils, it will be well to readCardan, _De Utilitate ex Adversis Capienda_, and Novarini, _De Occultis DeiBeneficiis_. 

261. M. Bayle dilates upon the misfortunes of the great, who are thought tobe the most fortunate: the constant experience of the fair aspect of theircondition renders them unaware of good, but greatly aware of evil. Someonewill say: so much the worse for them; if they know not how to enjoy theadvantages of nature and fortune, is that the fault of either? There arenevertheless great men possessed of more wisdom, who know how to profit bythe favours God has shown them, who are easily consoled for theirmisfortunes, and who even turn their own faults to account. M. Bayle [287]pays no heed to that: he prefers to listen to Pliny, who thinks thatAugustus, one of the princes most favoured by fortune, experienced at leastas much evil as good. I admit that he found great causes of trouble in hisfamily and that remorse for having crushed the Republic may have tormentedhim; but I think that he was too wise to grieve over the former, and thatMaecenas apparently made him understand that Rome had need of a master. Hadnot Augustus been converted on this point, Vergil would never have said ofa lost soul:

 _Vendidit hic auro patriam Dominumque potentem_ _Imposuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit. _

Augustus would have thought that he and Caesar were alluded to in theselines, which speak of a master given to a free state. But there is everyindication that he applied it just as little to his dominion, which heregarded as compatible with liberty and as a necessary remedy for publicevils, as the princes of to-day apply to themselves the words used of thekings censured in M. De Cambray's _Telemachus_. Each one considers himselfwithin his rights. Tacitus, an unbiassed writer, justifies Augustus in twowords, at the beginning of his _Annals_. But Augustus was better able thananyone to judge of his good fortune. He appears to have died content, asmay be inferred from a proof he gave of contentedness with his life: for indying he repeated to his friends a line in Greek, which has thesignification of that _Plaudite_ that was wont to be spoken at theconclusion of a well-acted play. Suetonius quotes it:

 [Greek: Dote kroton kai pantes hymeis meta charas ktypêsate. ]

262. But even though there should have fallen to the lot of the human kindmore evil than good, it is enough where God is concerned that there isincomparably more good than evil in the universe. Rabbi Maimonides (whosemerit is not sufficiently recognized in the statement that he is the firstof the Rabbis to have ceased talking nonsense) also gave wise judgement onthis question of the predominance of good over evil in the world. Here iswhat he says in his _Doctor Perplexorum_ (cap. 12, p. 3): 'There ariseoften in the hearts of ill-instructed persons thoughts which persuade themthere is more evil than good in the world: and one often finds in the poemsand songs of the pagans that it is as it were a miracle when something goodcomes to pass, whereas evils are usual and constant. This error has [288]taken hold not of the common herd only, those very persons who wish to beconsidered wise have been beguiled thereby. A celebrated writer namedAlrasi, in his _Sepher Elohuth_, or Theosophy, amongst other absurditieshas stated that there are more evils than goods, and that upon comparisonof the recreations and the pleasures man enjoys in times of tranquillitywith the pains, the torments, the troubles, faults, cares, griefs andafflictions whereby he is overwhelmed our life would prove to be a greatevil, and an actual penalty inflicted upon us to punish us. ' Maimonidesadds that the cause of their extravagant error is their supposition thatNature was made for them only, and that they hold of no account what isseparate from their person; whence they infer that when somethingunpleasing to them occurs all goes ill in the universe. 

263. M. Bayle says that this observation of Maimonides is not to the point, because the question is whether among men evil exceeds good. But, uponconsideration of the Rabbi's words, I find that the question he formulatesis general, and that he wished to refute those who decide it on oneparticular motive derived from the evils of the human race, as if all hadbeen made for man; and it seems as though the author whom he refutes spokealso of good and evil in general. Maimonides is right in saying that if onetook into account the littleness of man in relation to the universe onewould comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil, even though itprevailed among men, need not on that account occur among the angels, noramong the heavenly bodies, nor among the elements and inanimate compounds, nor among many kinds of animals. I have shown elsewhere that in supposingthat the number of the damned exceeds that of the saved (a suppositionwhich is nevertheless not altogether certain) one might admit that there ismore evil than good in respect of the human kind known to us. But I pointedout that that neither precludes the existence of incomparably more goodthan evil, both moral and physical, in rational creatures in general, norprevents the city of God, which contains all creatures, from being the mostperfect state. So also on consideration of the metaphysical good and evilwhich is in all substances, whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence, and which taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good, one must say that the universe, such as it actually is, must be the best ofall systems. 

 [289]264. Moreover, M. Bayle will not have it that our transgression should haveanything to do with the consideration of our sufferings. He is right whenit is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings; but the case is notthe same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to God, this indeedbeing the principal cause of M. Bayle's difficulties when he places reasonor experience in opposition to religion. I know that he is wont to say thatit is of no avail to resort to our free will, since his objections tendalso to prove that the misuse of free will must no less be laid to theaccount of God, who has permitted it and who has co-operated therein. Hestates it as a maxim that for one difficulty more or less one must notabandon a system. This he advances especially in favour of the methods ofthe strict and the dogma of the Supralapsarians. For he supposes that onecan subscribe to their opinion, although he leaves all the difficulties intheir entirety, because the other systems, albeit they put an end to someof the difficulties, cannot meet them all. I hold that the true system Ihave expounded satisfies all. Nevertheless, even were that not so, Iconfess that I cannot relish this maxim of M. Bayle's, and I should prefera system which would remove a great portion of the difficulties, to onewhich would meet none of them. And the consideration of the wickedness ofmen, which brings upon them well-nigh all their misfortunes, shows at leastthat they have no right to complain. No justice need trouble itself overthe origin of a scoundrel's wickedness when it is only a question ofpunishing him: it is quite another matter when it is a question ofprevention. One knows well that disposition, upbringing, conversation, andoften chance itself, have much share in that origin: is the man any theless deserving of punishment?

265. I confess that there still remains another difficulty. If God is notbound to account to the wicked for their wickedness, it seems as if he owesto himself, and to those who honour him and love him, justification for hiscourse of action with regard to the permission of vice and crime. But Godhas already given that satisfaction, as far as it is needed here on earth:by granting us the light of reason he has bestowed upon us the meanswhereby we may meet all difficulties. I hope that I have made it plain inthis discourse, and have elucidated the matter in the preceding portion ofthese Essays, almost as far as it can be done through general arguments. Thereafter, the permission of sin being justified, the other evils [290]that are a consequence thereof present no further difficulty. Thus also Iam justified in restricting myself here to the evil of guilt to account forthe evil of punishment, as Holy Scripture does, and likewise well-nigh allthe Fathers of the Church and the Preachers. And, to the end that none maysay that is only good _per la predica_, it is enough to consider that, after the solutions I have given, nothing must seem more right or moreexact than this method. For God, having found already among thingspossible, before his actual decrees, man misusing his freedom and bringingupon himself his misfortune, yet could not avoid admitting him intoexistence, because the general plan required this. Wherefore it will nolonger be necessary to say with M. Jurieu that one must dogmatize like St. Augustine and preach like Pelagius. 

266. This method, deriving the evil of punishment from the evil of guilt, cannot be open to censure, and serves especially to account for thegreatest physical evil, which is damnation. Ernst Sonner, sometimeProfessor of Philosophy at Altorf (a university established in theterritory of the free city of Nuremberg), who was considered an excellentAristotelian, but was finally recognized as being secretly a Socinian, hadcomposed a little discourse entitled: _Demonstration against the Eternityof Punishment_. It was founded on this somewhat trite principle, that thereis no proportion between an infinite punishment and a finite guilt. It wasconveyed to me, printed (so it seemed) in Holland; and I replied that therewas one thing to be considered which had escaped the late Herr Sonner:namely that it was enough to say that the duration of the guilt caused theduration of the penalty. Since the damned remained wicked they could not bewithdrawn from their misery; and thus one need not, in order to justify thecontinuation of their sufferings, assume that sin has become of infiniteweight through the infinite nature of the object offended, who is God. Thisthesis I had not explored enough to pass judgement thereon. I know that thegeneral opinion of the Schoolmen, according to the Master of the Sentences, is that in the other life there is neither merit nor demerit; but I do notthink that, taken literally, it can pass for an article of faith. HerrFecht, a famous theologian at Rostock, well refuted that in his book on_The State of the Damned_. It is quite wrong, he says (§ 59); God cannotchange his nature; justice is essential to him; death has closed the doorof grace, but not that of justice. 

 [291]267. I have observed that sundry able theologians have accounted for theduration of the pains of the damned as I have just done. Johann Gerhard, afamous theologian of the Augsburg Confession (in _Locis Theol. _, loco deInferno, § 60), brings forward amongst other arguments that the damned havestill an evil will and lack the grace that could render it good. ZachariasUrsinus, a theologian of Heidelberg, who follows Calvin, having formulatedthis question (in his treatise _De Fide_) why sin merits an eternalpunishment, advances first the common reason, that the person offended isinfinite, and then also this second reason, _quod non cessante peccato nonpotest cessare poena_. And the Jesuit Father Drexler says in his bookentitled _Nicetas, or Incontinence Overcome_ (book 2, ch. 11, § 9): 'Necmirum damnatos semper torqueri, continue blasphemant, et sic quasi semperpeccant, semper ergo plectuntur. ' He declares and approves the same reasonin his work on _Eternity_ (book 2, ch. 15) saying: 'Sunt qui dicant, necdisplicet responsum: scelerati in locis infernis semper peccant, ideosemper puniuntur. ' And he indicates thereby that this opinion is verycommon among learned men in the Roman Church. He alleges, it is true, another more subtle reason, derived from Pope Gregory the Great (lib. 4, Dial. C. 44), that the damned are punished eternally because God foresaw bya kind of _mediate knowledge_ that they would always have sinned if theyhad always lived upon earth. But it is a hypothesis very much open toquestion. Herr Fecht quotes also various eminent Protestant theologians forHerr Gerhard's opinion, although he mentions also some who thinkdifferently. 

268. M. Bayle himself in various places has supplied me with passages fromtwo able theologians of his party, which have some reference to thesestatements of mine. M. Jurieu in his book on the _Unity of the Church_, inopposition to that written by M. Nicole on the same subject, gives theopinion (p. 379) 'that reason tells us that a creature which cannot ceaseto be criminal can also not cease to be miserable'. M. Jacquelot in hisbook on _The Conformity of Faith with Reason_ (p. 220) is of opinion 'thatthe damned must remain eternally deprived of the glory of the blessed, andthat this deprivation might well be the origin and the cause of all theirpains, through the reflexions these unhappy creatures make upon theircrimes which have deprived them of an eternal bliss. One knows what burningregrets, what pain envy causes to those who see themselves deprived of agood, of a notable honour which had been offered to them, and which [292]they rejected, especially when they see others invested with it. ' Thisposition is a little different from that of M. Jurieu, but both agree inthis sentiment, that the damned are themselves the cause of thecontinuation of their torments. M. Le Clerc's Origenist does not entirelydiffer from this opinion when he says in the _Select Library_ (vol. 7, p. 341): 'God, who foresaw that man would fall, does not condemn him on thataccount, but only because, although he has the power to recover himself, heyet does not do so, that is, he freely retains his evil ways to the end ofhis life. ' If he carries this reasoning on beyond this life, he willascribe the continuation of the pains of the wicked to the continuation oftheir guilt. 

269. M. Bayle says (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 175, p. 1188) 'that this dogma of the Origenist is heretical, in that it teachesthat damnation is not founded simply on sin, but on voluntary impenitence':but is not this voluntary impenitence a continuation of sin? I would notsimply say, however, that it is because man, having the power to recoverhimself, does not; and would wish to add that it is because man does nottake advantage of the succour of grace to aid him to recover himself. Butafter this life, though one assume that the succour ceases, there is alwaysin the man who sins, even when he is damned, a freedom which renders himculpable, and a power, albeit remote, of recovering himself, even though itshould never pass into action. And there is no reason why one may not saythat this degree of freedom, exempt from necessity, but not exempt fromcertainty, remains in the damned as well as in the blessed. Moreover, thedamned have no need of a succour that is needed in this life, for they knowonly too well what one must believe here. 

270. The illustrious prelate of the Anglican Church who published recentlya book on the origin of evil, concerning which M. Bayle made someobservations in the second volume of his _Reply_, speaks with much subtletyabout the pains of the damned. This prelate's opinion is presented(according to the author of the _Nouvelles de la République des Lettres_, June 1703) as if he made 'of the damned just so many madmen who will feeltheir miseries acutely, but who will nevertheless congratulate themselveson their own behaviour, and who will rather choose to be, and to be thatwhich they are, than not to be at all. They will love their state, unhappyas it will be, even as angry people, lovers, the ambitious, the [293]envious take pleasure in the very things that only augment their misery. Furthermore the ungodly will have so accustomed their mind to wrongjudgements that they will henceforth never make any other kind, and willperpetually pass from one error into another. They will not be able torefrain from desiring perpetually things whose enjoyment will be deniedthem, and, being deprived of which, they will fall into inconceivabledespair, while experience can never make them wiser for the future. For bytheir own fault they will have altogether corrupted their understanding, and will have rendered it incapable of passing a sound judgement on anymatter. '

271. The ancients already imagined that the Devil dwells remote from Godvoluntarily, in the midst of his torments, and that he is unwilling toredeem himself by an act of submission. They invented a tale that ananchorite in a vision received a promise from God that he would receiveinto grace the Prince of the bad angels if he would acknowledge his fault;but that the devil rebuffed this mediator in a strange manner. At theleast, the theologians usually agree that the devils and the damned hateGod and blaspheme him; and such a state cannot but be followed bycontinuation of misery. Concerning that, one may read the learned treatiseof Herr Fecht on the _State of the Damned_. 

272. There were times when the belief was held that it was not impossiblefor a lost soul to be delivered. The story told of Pope Gregory the Greatis well known, how by his prayers he had withdrawn from hell the soul ofthe Emperor Trajan, whose goodness was so renowned that to new emperors thewish was offered that they should surpass Augustus in good fortune andTrajan in goodness. It was this that won for the latter the pity of theHoly Father. God acceded to his prayers (it is said), but he forbade him tomake the like prayers in future. According to this fable, the prayers ofSt. Gregory had the force of the remedies of Aesculapius, who recalledHippolytus from Hades; and, if he had continued to make such prayers, Godwould have waxed wroth, like Jupiter in Vergil:

 _At pater omnipotens aliquem indignatus ab umbris_ _Mortalem infernis ad lumina surgere vitae, _ _Ipse repertorem medicinae talis et artis_ _Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas. _

 [294]Godescalc, a monk of the ninth century, who set at variance the theologiansof his day, and even those of our day, maintained that the reprobate shouldpray God to render their pains more bearable; but one is never justified inbelieving oneself reprobate so long as one is alive. The passage in theMass for the dead is more reasonable: it asks for the abatement of thetorments of the damned, and, according to the hypothesis that I have juststated, one must wish for them _meliorem mentem_. Origen having applied thepassage from Psalm lxxvii, verse 10: God will not forget to be gracious, neither will he shut up his loving-kindness in displeasure, St. Augustinereplies _(Enchirid. _, c. 112) that it is possible that the pains of thedamned last eternally, and that they may nevertheless be mitigated. If thetext implied that, the abatement would, as regards its duration, go on toinfinity; and yet that abatement would, as regards its extent, have a _nonplus ultra_. Even so there are asymptote figures in geometry where aninfinite length makes only a finite progress in breadth. If the parable ofthe wicked rich man represented the state of a definitely lost soul, thehypothesis which makes these souls so mad and so wicked would begroundless. But the charity towards his brothers attributed to him in theparable does not seem to be consistent with that degree of wickedness whichis ascribed to the damned. St. Gregory the Great (IX _Mor. _, 39) thinksthat the rich man was afraid lest their damnation should increase his: butit seems as though this fear is not sufficiently consistent with thedisposition of a perfectly wicked will. Bonaventura, on the Master of theSentences, says that the wicked rich man would have desired to see everyonedamned; but since that was not to be, he desired the salvation of hisbrothers rather than that of the rest. This reply is by no means sound. Onthe contrary, the mission of Lazarus that he desired would have served tosave many people; and he who takes so much pleasure in the damnation ofothers that he desires it for everyone will perhaps desire that damnationfor some more than others; but, generally speaking, he will have noinclination to gain salvation for anyone. However that may be, one mustadmit that all this detail is problematical, God having revealed to us allthat is needed to put us in fear of the greatest of misfortunes, and notwhat is needed for our understanding thereof. 

273. Now since it is henceforth permitted to have recourse to the misuse offree will, and to evil will, in order to account for other evils, [295]since the divine permission of this misuse is plainly enough justified, theordinary system of the theologians meets with justification at the sametime. Now we can seek with confidence _the origin of evil in the freedom ofcreatures_. The first wickedness is well known to us, it is that of theDevil and his angels: the Devil sinneth from the beginning, and for thispurpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works ofthe Devil (1 John iii. 8). The Devil is the father of wickedness, he was amurderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth (John viii. 44). And therefore God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down toHell, and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved untojudgement (2 Pet. Ii. 4). And the angels which kept not their ownhabitation, he hath reserved in _eternal_ (that is to say everlasting)chains under darkness unto the judgement of the great day (Jude i. 6). Whence it is easy to observe that one of these two letters must have beenseen by the author of the other. 

274. It seems as if the author of the Apocalypse wished to throw light uponwhat the other canonical writers had left obscure: he gives us an accountof a battle that took place in Heaven. Michael and his angels foughtagainst the Dragon, and the Dragon fought and his angels. 'But theyprevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. And thegreat Dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world: and he was cast out into the earth, andhis angels were cast out with him' (Rev. Xii. 7, 8, 9). For although thisaccount is placed after the flight of the woman into the wilderness, and itmay have been intended to indicate thereby some revulsion favourable to theChurch, it appears as though the author's design was to show simultaneouslythe old fall of the first enemy and a new fall of a new enemy. 

275. Lying or wickedness springs from the Devil's own nature, [Greek: ektôn idiôn] from his will, because it was written in the book of the eternalverities, which contains the things possible before any decree of God, thatthis creature would freely turn toward evil if it were created. It is thesame with Eve and Adam; they sinned freely, albeit the Devil tempted them. God gives the wicked over to a reprobate mind (Rom. I. 28), abandoning themto themselves and denying them a grace which he owes them not, and indeedought to deny to them. 

276. It is said in the Scriptures that God hardeneth (Exod. Iv. 21 and[296]vii. 3; Isa. Lxiii. 17); that God sendeth a lying spirit (1 Kings xxii. 23); strong delusion that they should believe a lie (2 Thess. Ii. 11); thathe deceived the prophet (Ezek. Xiv. 9); that he commanded Shimei to curse(2 Sam xvi. 10); that the children of Eli hearkened not unto the voice oftheir father, because the Lord would slay them (1 Sam. Ii. 25); that theLord took away Job's substance, even although that was done through themalice of brigands (Job i. 21); that he raised up Pharaoh, to show hispower in him (Exod. Ix. 19; Rom. Ix. 17) that he is like a potter whomaketh a vessel unto dishonour (Rom. Ix. 21); that he hideth the truth fromthe wise and prudent (Matt. Xi. 25); that he speaketh in parables unto themthat are without, that seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearingthey may hear and not understand, lest at any time they might be converted, and their sins might be forgiven them (Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10); thatJesus was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God(Acts ii. 23); that Pontius Pilate and Herod with the Gentiles and thepeople of Israel did that which the hand and the counsel of God haddetermined before to be done (Acts iv. 27, 28); that it was of the Lord toharden the hearts of the enemy, that they should come against Israel inbattle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have nofavour (Joshua xi. 20); that the Lord mingled a perverse spirit in themidst of Egypt, and caused it to err in all its works, like a drunken man(Isa. Xix. 14); that Rehoboam hearkened not unto the word of the people, for the cause was from the Lord (1 Kings xii. 15); that he turned thehearts of the Egyptians to hate his people (Ps. Cv. 25). But all these andother like expressions suggest only that the things God has done are usedas occasion for ignorance, error, malice and evil deeds, and contributethereto, God indeed foreseeing this, and intending to use it for his ends, since superior reasons of perfect wisdom have determined him to permitthese evils, and even to co-operate therein. 'Sed non sineret bonus fierimale, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo posset facere bene', in St. Augustine'swords. But this has been expounded more fully in the preceding part. 

277. God made man in his image (Gen. I. 26); he made him upright (Eccles. Vii. 29). But also he made him free. Man has behaved badly, he has fallen;but there remains still a certain freedom after the fall. Moses said asfrom God: 'I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that Ihave set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore [297]choose life' (Deut. Xxx. 19). 'Thus saith the Lord: Behold, I set beforeyou the way of life, and the way of death' (Jer. Xxi. 8). He has left manin the power of his counsel, giving him his ordinances and hiscommandments. 'If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments' (or theyshall keep thee). 'He hath set before thee fire and water, to stretch forththine hand to whichever thou wilt' (Sirach xv. 14, 15, 16). Fallen andunregenerate man is under the domination of sin and of Satan, because itpleases him so to be; he is a voluntary slave through his evil lust. Thusit is that free will and will in bondage are one and the same thing. 

278. 'Let no man say, I am tempted of God'; 'but every man is tempted, whenhe is drawn away of his own lust and enticed' (Jas. I. 13, 14). And Satancontributes thereto. He 'blindeth the minds of them which believe not' (2Cor. Iv. 4). But man is delivered up to the Devil by his covetous desire:the pleasure he finds in evil is the bait that hooks him. Plato has said soalready, and Cicero repeats it: 'Plato voluptatem dicebat escam malorum. 'Grace sets over against it a greater pleasure, as St. Augustine observed. All _pleasure_ is a feeling of some perfection; one _loves_ an object inproportion as one feels its perfections; nothing surpasses the divineperfections. Whence it follows that charity and love of God give thegreatest pleasure that can be conceived, in that proportion in which one ispenetrated by these feelings, which are not common among men, busied andtaken up as men are with the objects that are concerned with theirpassions. 

279. Now as our corruption is not altogether invincible and as we do notnecessarily sin even when we are under the bondage of sin, it must likewisebe said that we are not aided invincibly; and, however efficacious divinegrace may be, there is justification for saying that one can resist it. Butwhen it indeed proves victorious, it is certain and infallible beforehandthat one will yield to its allurements, whether it have its strength ofitself or whether it find a way to triumph through the congruity ofcircumstances. Thus one must always distinguish between the infallible andthe necessary. 

280. The system of those who call themselves Disciples of St. Augustine isnot far removed from this, provided one exclude certain obnoxious things, whether in the expressions or in the dogmas themselves. In the_expressions_ I find that it is principally the use of terms like [298]'necessary' or 'contingent', 'possible' or 'impossible', which sometimesgives a handle and causes much ado. That is why, as Herr Löscher theyounger aptly observed in a learned dissertation on the _Paroxysms of theAbsolute Decree_, Luther desired, in his book _On the Will in Bondage_, tofind a word more fitting for that which he wished to express than the wordnecessity. Speaking generally, it appears more reasonable and more fittingto say that obedience to God's precepts is always _possible_, even for theunregenerate; that the grace of God is always _resistible_, even in thosemost holy, and that _freedom_ is exempt not only from _constraint_ but alsofrom _necessity_, although it be never without infallible _certainty_ orwithout inclining _determination_. 

281. Nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would bepermitted to say, in certain conjunctures, that the _power_ to do good isoften lacking, even in the just; that sins are often _necessary_, even inthe regenerate; that it is _impossible_ sometimes for one not to sin; thatgrace is _irresistible_; that freedom is not exempt from _necessity_. Butthese expressions are less exact and less pleasing in the circumstancesthat prevail about us to-day. They are also in general more open to misuse;and moreover they savour somewhat of the speech of the people, where termsare employed with great latitude. There are, however, circumstances whichrender them acceptable and even serviceable. It is the case that sacred andorthodox writers, and even the holy Scriptures, have made use ofexpressions on both sides, and no real contradiction has arisen, any morethan between St. Paul and St. James, or any error on either side that mightbe attributable to the ambiguity of the terms. One is so well accustomed tothese various ways of speaking that often one is put to it to say preciselywhich sense is the more ordinary and the more natural, and even that moreintended by the author (_quis sensus magis naturalis, obvius, intentus_). For the same writer has different aims in different passages, and the sameways of speaking are more or less accepted or acceptable before or afterthe decision of some great man or of some authority that one respects andfollows. As a result of this one may well authorize or ban, as opportunityarises and at certain times, certain expressions; but it makes nodifference to the sense, or to the content of faith, if sufficientexplanations of the terms are not added. 

282. It is therefore only necessary to understand fully some distinctions, such as that I have very often urged between the necessary and the [299]certain, and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity. It is thesame with possibility and impossibility, since the event whose opposite ispossible is contingent, even as that whose opposite is impossible isnecessary. A distinction is rightly drawn also between a proximate potencyand a remote potency; and, according to these different senses, one saysnow that a thing may be and now that it may not be. It may be said in acertain sense that it is necessary that the blessed should not sin; thatthe devils and the damned should sin; that God himself should choose thebest; that man should follow the course which after all attracts him most. But this necessity is not opposed to contingency; it is not of the kindcalled logical, geometrical or metaphysical, whose opposite impliescontradiction. M. Nicole has made use somewhere of a comparison which isnot amiss. It is considered impossible that a wise and serious magistrate, who has not taken leave of his senses, should publicly commit someoutrageous action, as it would be, for instance, to run about the streetsnaked in order to make people laugh. It is the same, in a sense, with theblessed; they are still less capable of sinning, and the necessity thatforbids them to sin is of the same kind. Finally I also hold that 'will' isa term as equivocal as potency and necessity. For I have already observedthat those who employ this axiom, that one does not fail to do what onewills when one can, and who thence infer that God therefore does not willthe salvation of all, imply a _decretory will_. Only in that sense can onesupport this proposition, that wisdom never wills what it knows to be amongthe things that shall not happen. On the other hand, one may say, takingwill in a sense more general and more in conformity with customary use, that the wise will is _inclined_ antecedently to all good, although it_decrees_ finally to do that which is most fitting. Thus one would be verywrong to deny to God the serious and strong inclination to save all men, which Holy Scripture attributes to him; or even to attribute to him anoriginal distaste which diverts him from the salvation of a number ofpersons, _odium antecedaneum_. One should rather maintain that the wisemind tends towards all good, as good, in proportion to his knowledge andhis power, but that he only produces the best that can be achieved. Thosewho admit that, and yet deny to God the antecedent will to save all men, are wrong only in their misuse of the term, provided that they acknowledge, besides, that God gives to all help sufficient to enable them to win [300]salvation if only they have the will to avail themselves thereof. 

283. In the _dogmas_ themselves held by the Disciples of St. Augustine Icannot approve the damnation of unregenerate children, nor in generaldamnation resulting from original sin alone. Nor can I believe that Godcondemns those who are without the necessary light. One may believe, withmany theologians, that men receive more aid than we are aware of, were itonly when they are at the point of death. It does not appear necessaryeither that all those who are saved should always be saved through a graceefficacious of itself, independently of circumstances. Also I consider itunnecessary to say that all the virtues of the pagans were false or thatall their actions were sins; though it be true that what does not springfrom faith, or from the uprightness of the soul before God, is infectedwith sin, at least virtually. Finally I hold that God cannot act as if atrandom by an absolutely absolute decree, or by a will independent ofreasonable motives. And I am persuaded that he is always actuated, in thedispensation of his grace, by reasons wherein the nature of the objectsparticipates. Otherwise he would not act in accordance with wisdom. I grantnevertheless that these reasons are not of necessity bound up with the goodor the less evil natural qualities of men, as if God gave his grace onlyaccording to these good qualities. Yet I hold, as I have explained alreadyhere, that these qualities are taken into consideration like all the othercircumstances, since nothing can be neglected in the designs of supremewisdom. 

284. Save for these points, and some few others, where St. Augustineappears obscure or even repellent, it seems as though one can conform tohis system. He states that from the substance of God only a God canproceed, and that thus the creature is derived from nothingness (Augustine_De Lib. Arb. _, lib. 1, c. 2). That is what makes the creature imperfect, faulty and corruptible (_De Genesi ad Lit. _, c. 15, _Contra EpistolamManichaei_, c. 36). Evil comes not from nature, but from evil will(Augustine, in the whole book _On the Nature of Good_). God can commandnothing that would be impossible. 'Firmissime creditur Deum justum et bonumimpossibilia non potuisse praecipere' (_Lib. De Nat. Et Grat. _, c. 43, p. 69). Nemo peccat in eo, quod caveri non potest (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb. _, c. 16, 17, _lib. _ 1 _Retract. _ c. 11, 13, 15). Under a just God, none can beunhappy who deserves not so to be, 'neque sub Deo justo miser esse [301]quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest' (lib. 1, c. 39). Free will cannot carryout God's commands without the aid of grace (_Ep. Ad Hilar. Caesaraugustan. _). We know that grace is not given according to deserts(Ep. 106, 107, 120). Man in the state of innocence had the aid necessary toenable him to do good if he wished; but the wish depended on free will, 'habebat adjutorium, per quod posset, et sine quo non vellet, sed nonadjutorium quo vellet' (_Lib. De Corrept. _, c. 11 et c. 10, 12). God letangels and men try what they could do by their free will, and after thatwhat his grace and his justice could achieve (ibid. , c. 10, 11, 12). Sinturned man away from God, to turn him towards creatures (lib. 1, qu. 2, _AdSimplicium_). To take pleasure in sinning is the freedom of a slave(_Enchirid. _, c. 103). 'Liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore nonperiit, ut per illud peccent maxime omnes, qui cum delectatione peccant'(lib. 1, _Ad Bonifac. _, c. 2, 3). 

285. God said to Moses: 'I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, andwill shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy' (Exod. Xxxiii. 19). 'So then itis not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God thatsheweth mercy' (Rom. Ix. 15, 16). That does not prevent all those who havegood will, and who persevere therein, from being saved. But God gives themthe willing and the doing. 'Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will havemercy, and whom he will he hardeneth' (Rom. Ix. 18). And yet the sameApostle says that God willeth that all men should be saved, and come to theknowledge of the truth; which I would not interpret in accordance with somepassages of St. Augustine, as if it signified that no men are saved exceptthose whose salvation he wills, or as if he would save _non singulosgenerum, sed genera singulorum_. But I would rather say that there is nonewhose salvation he willeth not, in so far as this is permitted by greaterreasons. For these bring it about that God only saves those who accept thefaith he has offered to them and who surrender themselves thereto by thegrace he has given them, in accordance with what was consistent with theplan of his works in its entirety, than which none can be better conceived. 

286. As for predestination to salvation, it includes also, according to St. Augustine, the ordinance of the means that shall lead to salvation. 'Praedestinatio sanctorum nihil aliud est, quam praescientia et praeparatiobeneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur' (_Lib. De Persev. _, c. 14). He does not then understand it there as an [302]absolute decree; he maintains that there is a grace which is not rejectedby any hardened heart, because it is given in order to remove especiallythe hardness of hearts (_Lib. De Praedest. _, c. 8; _Lib. De Grat. _, c. 13, 14). I do not find, however, that St. Augustine conveys sufficiently thatthis grace, which subdues the heart, is always efficacious of itself. Andone might perhaps have asserted without offence to him that the same degreeof inward grace is victorious in the one, where it is aided by outwardcircumstances, but not in the other. 

287. Will is proportionate to the sense we have of the good, and followsthe sense which prevails. 'Si utrumque tantundem diligimus, nihil horumdabimus. Item: Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est'(in c. 5, _Ad Gal. _). I have explained already how, despite all that, wehave indeed a great power over our will. St. Augustine takes it somewhatdifferently, and in a way that does not go far, when he says that nothingis so much within our power as the action of our will. And he gives areason which is almost tautological: for (he says) this action is ready atthe moment when we will. 'Nihil tam in nostra potestate est, quam ipsavoluntas, ea enim mox ut volumus praesto est' (lib. 3, _De Lib. Arb. _, c. 3; lib. 5, _De Civ. Dei_, c. 10). But that only means that we will when wewill, and not that we will that which we wish to will. There is more reasonfor saying with him: '_aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda est_' (d. 1, 3, c. 3); and that what inclines the will towards good infallibly, orcertainly, does not prevent it from being free. 'Perquam absurdum est, utideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem [libertatem] nostram, quod beatiesse volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus, nescio qua bonaconstrictione naturae. Nec dicere audemus ideo Deum non voluntatem[libertatem], sed necessitatem habere justitiae, quia non potest vellepeccare. Certe Deus ipse numquid quia peccare non potest, ideo liberumarbitrium habere negandus est?' (_De Nat. Et Grat. _, c. 46, 47, 48, 49). Healso says aptly, that God gives the first good impulse, but that afterwardsman acts also. 'Aguntur ut agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant' (_De Corrept. _, c. 2). 

288. I have proved that free will is the proximate cause of the evil ofguilt, and consequently of the evil of punishment; although it is true thatthe original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented in theeternal ideas, is the first and most remote cause. M. Bayle [303]nevertheless always disputes this use of the notion of free will; he willnot have the cause of evil ascribed to it. One must listen to hisobjections, but first it will be well to throw further light on the natureof freedom. I have shown that freedom, according to the definition requiredin the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves aclear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby wedetermine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical ormetaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom, and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance isself-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by theunderstanding, which inclines it without compelling it: and all theconditions of freedom are comprised in these few words. It is neverthelesswell to point out that the imperfection present in our knowledge and ourspontaneity, and the infallible determination that is involved in ourcontingency, destroy neither freedom nor contingency. 

289. Our knowledge is of two kinds, distinct or confused. Distinctknowledge, or _intelligence_, occurs in the actual use of reason; but thesenses supply us with confused thoughts. And we may say that we are immunefrom bondage in so far as we act with a distinct knowledge, but that we arethe slaves of passion in so far as our perceptions are confused. In thissense we have not all the freedom of spirit that were to be desired, and wemay say with St. Augustine that being subject to sin we have the freedom ofa slave. Yet a slave, slave as he is, nevertheless has freedom to chooseaccording to the state wherein he is, although more often than not he isunder the stern necessity of choosing between two evils, because a superiorforce prevents him from attaining the goods whereto he aspires. That whichin a slave is effected by bonds and constraint in us is effected bypassions, whose violence is sweet, but none the less pernicious. In truthwe will only that which pleases us: but unhappily what pleases us now isoften a real evil, which would displease us if we had the eyes of theunderstanding open. Nevertheless that evil state of the slave, which isalso our own, does not prevent us, any more than him, from making a freechoice of that which pleases us most, in the state to which we are reduced, in proportion to our present strength and knowledge. 

290. As for spontaneity, it belongs to us in so far as we have within usthe source of our actions, as Aristotle rightly conceived. The [304]impressions of external things often, indeed, divert us from our path, andit was commonly believed that, at least in this respect, some of thesources of our actions were outside ourselves. I admit that one is bound tospeak thus, adapting oneself to the popular mode of expression, as one may, in a certain sense, without doing violence to truth. But when it is aquestion of expressing oneself accurately I maintain that our spontaneitysuffers no exception and that external things have no physical influenceupon us, I mean in the strictly philosophical sense. 

291. For better understanding of this point, one must know that truespontaneity is common to us and all simple substances, and that in theintelligent or free substance this becomes a mastery over its actions. Thatcannot be better explained than by the System of Pre-established Harmony, which I indeed propounded some years ago. There I pointed out that bynature every simple substance has perception, and that its individualityconsists in the perpetual law which brings about the sequence ofperceptions that are assigned to it, springing naturally from one another, to represent the body that is allotted to it, and through itsinstrumentality the entire universe, in accordance with the point of viewproper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive anyphysical influence from the body. Even so the body also for its part adaptsitself to the wishes of the soul by its own laws, and consequently onlyobeys it according to the promptings of these laws. Whence it follows thatthe soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity, so that it depends only uponGod and upon itself in its actions. 

292. As this system was not known formerly, other ways were sought foremerging from this labyrinth, and the Cartesians themselves were indifficulties over the subject of free will. They were no longer satisfiedby the 'faculties' of the Schoolmen, and they considered that all theactions of the soul appear to be determined by what comes from without, according to the impressions of the senses, and that, ultimately, all iscontrolled in the universe by the providence of God. Thence arose naturallythe objection that there is therefore no freedom. To that M. Descartesreplied that we are assured of God's providence by reason; but that we arelikewise assured of our freedom by experience thereof within ourselves; andthat we must believe in both, even though we see not how it is possible toreconcile them. 

 [305]293. That was cutting the Gordian knot, and answering the conclusion of anargument not by refuting it but by opposing thereto a contrary argument. Which procedure does not conform to the laws for philosophical disputes. Notwithstanding, most of the Cartesians contented themselves with this, albeit the inward experience they adduce does not prove their assertion, asM. Bayle has clearly shown. M. Regis (_Philos. _, vol. 1, Metaph. , book 2, part 2, c. 22) thus paraphrases M. Descartes' doctrine: 'Mostphilosophers', he says, 'have fallen into error. Some, not being able tounderstand the relation existing between free actions and the providence ofGod, have denied that God was the first efficient cause of free will: butthat is sacrilegious. The others, not being able to apprehend the relationbetween God's efficacy and free actions, have denied that man was endowedwith freedom: and that is a blasphemy. The mean to be found between thesetwo extremes is to say' (id. Ibid. , p. 485) 'that, even though we were notable to understand all the relations existing between freedom and God'sprovidence, we should nevertheless be bound to acknowledge that we are freeand dependent upon God. For both these truths are equally known, the onethrough experience, and the other through reason; and prudence forbids oneto abandon truths whereof one is assured, under the pretext that one cannotapprehend all the relations existing between them and other truths wellknown. '

294. M. Bayle here remarks pertinently in the margin, 'that theseexpressions of M. Regis fail to point out that we are aware of relationsbetween man's actions and God's providence, such as appear to us to beincompatible with our freedom. ' He adds that these expressions areover-circumspect, weakening the statement of the problem. 'Authors assume', he says, 'that the difficulty arises solely from our lack of enlightenment;whereas they ought to say that it arises in the main from the enlightenmentwhich we have, and cannot reconcile' (in M. Bayle's opinion) 'with ourMysteries. ' That is exactly what I said at the beginning of this work, thatif the Mysteries were irreconcilable with reason, and if there wereunanswerable objections, far from finding the mystery incomprehensible, weshould comprehend that it was false. It is true that here there is noquestion of a mystery, but only of natural religion. 

295. This is how M. Bayle combats those inward experiences, whereon [306]the Cartesians make freedom rest: but he begins by reflexions with which Icannot agree. 'Those who do not make profound examination', he says(_Dictionary_, art. 'Helen. ', lit. [Greek: TD]), 'of that which passeswithin them easily persuade themselves that they are free, and that, iftheir will prompts them to evil, it is their fault, it is through a choicewhereof they are the masters. Those who judge otherwise are persons whohave studied with care the springs and the circumstances of their actions, and who have thought over the progress of their soul's impulses. Thosepersons usually have doubts about their free will, and even come topersuade themselves that their reason and mind are slaves, without power toresist the force that carries them along where they would not go. It wasprincipally persons of this kind who ascribed to the gods the cause oftheir evil deeds. '

296. These words remind me of those of Chancellor Bacon, who says that alittle philosophy inclineth us away from God, but that depth in philosophybringeth men's minds about to him. It is the same with those who reflectupon their actions: it appears to them at first that all we do is onlyimpulsion from others, and that all we apprehend comes from without throughthe senses, and is traced upon the void of our mind _tanquam in tabularasa_. But more profound meditation shows us that all (even perceptions andpassions) comes to us from our own inner being, with complete spontaneity. 

297. Yet M. Bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying theblame upon the gods. Medea in Ovid speaks thus:

 _Frustra, Medea, repugnas, _ _Nescio quid Deus obstat, ait. _

And a little later Ovid makes her add:

 _Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido, _ _Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque, _ _Deteriora sequor_. 

But one could set against that a passage from Vergil, who makes Nisus saywith far more reason:

 _Di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt, _ _Euryale, an sua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?_

298. Herr Wittich seems to have thought that in reality our independence isonly apparent. For in his _Diss. De providentia Dei actuali_ (n. 61) [307]he makes free will consist in our being inclined towards the objects thatpresent themselves to our soul for affirmation or denial, love or hate, insuch a way that we _do not feel_ we are being determined by any outwardforce. He adds that it is when God himself causes our volitions that we actwith most freedom; and that the more efficacious and powerful God's actionis upon us, the more we are masters of our actions. 'Quia enim Deusoperatur ipsum velle, quo efficacius operatur, eo magis volumus; quodautem, cum volumus, facimus, id maxime habemus in nostra potestate. ' It istrue that when God causes a volition in us he causes a free action. But itseems to me that the question here is not of the universal cause or of thatproduction of our will which is proper to it in so far as it is a createdeffect, whose positive elements are actually created continually throughGod's co-operation, like all other absolute reality of things. We areconcerned here with the reasons for willing, and the means God uses when hegives us a good will or permits us to have an evil will. It is always wewho produce it, good or evil, for it is our action: but there are alwaysreasons that make us act, without impairing either our spontaneity or ourfreedom. Grace does no more than give impressions which are conducive tomaking will operate through fitting motives, such as would be an attention, _a dic cur hic_, a prevenient pleasure. And it is quite evident that thatdoes not interfere with freedom, any more than could a friend who givescounsel and furnishes motives. Thus Herr Wittich has not supplied an answerto the question, any more than M. Bayle, and recourse to God is of no availhere. 

299. But let me give another much more reasonable passage from the same M. Bayle, where he disputes with greater force the so-called lively sense offreedom, which according to the Cartesians is a proof of freedom. His wordsare indeed full of wit, and worthy of consideration, and occur in the_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, ch. 140, p. 761_seqq. _). Here they are: 'By the clear and distinct sense we have of ourexistence we do not discern whether we exist through ourselves or deriveour being from another. We discern that only by reflexion, that is, throughmeditation upon our powerlessness in the matter of conserving ourselves asmuch as we would, and of freeing ourselves from dependence upon the beingsthat surround us, etc. It is indeed certain that the pagans (the same mustbe said of the Socinians, since they deny the creation) never attained[308]to the knowledge of that true dogma that we were created from nothing, andthat we are derived from nothingness at every moment of our continuance. They therefore thought erroneously that all substances in the universeexist of themselves and can never be reduced to nothing, and that thus theydepend upon no other thing save in respect of their modifications, whichare liable to be destroyed by the action of an external cause. Does notthis error spring from the fact that we are unconscious of the creativeaction which conserves us, and that we are only conscious of our existence?That we are conscious of it, I say, in such a way that we should for everremain ignorant of the cause of our being if other knowledge did not aidus? Let us say also, that the clear and distinct sense we have of the actsof our will cannot make us discern whether we give them ourselves toourselves or receive them from that same cause which gives us existence. Wemust have recourse to reflexion or to meditation in order to effect thisdiscrimination. Now I assert that one can never by purely philosophicalmeditations arrive at an established certainty that we are the efficientcause of our volitions: for every person who makes due investigation willrecognize clearly, that if we were only passive subjects with regard towill we should have the same sensations of experience as we have when wethink that we are free. Assume, for the sake of argument, that God soordered the laws of the union between soul and body that all the modalitiesof the soul, without a single exception, are of necessity linked togetherwith the interposition of the modalities of the brain. You will thenunderstand that nothing will happen to us except that of which we areconscious: there will be in our soul the same sequence of thoughts from theperception of objects of the senses, which is its first step, up to themost definite volitions, which are its final step. There will be in thissequence the consciousness of ideas, that of affirmations, that ofirresolutions, that of velleities and that of volitions. For whether theact of willing be impressed upon us by an external cause or we bring itabout ourselves, it will be equally true that we will, and that we feelthat we will. Moreover, as this external cause can blend as much pleasureas it will with the volition which it impresses upon us, we shall be ableto feel at times that the acts of our will please us infinitely, and thatthey lead us according to the bent of our strongest inclinations. We shallfeel no constraint; you know the maxim: _voluntas non potest cogi_. Do[309]you not clearly understand that a weather-vane, always having communicatedto it simultaneously (in such a way, however, that priority of nature or, if one will, a real momentary priority, should attach to the desire formotion) movement towards a certain point on the horizon, and the wish toturn in that direction, would be persuaded that it moved of itself tofulfil the desires which it conceived? I assume that it would not know thatthere were winds, or that an external cause changed everythingsimultaneously, both its situation and its desires. That is the state weare in by our nature: we know not whether an invisible cause makes us passsufficiently from one thought to another. It is therefore natural that menare persuaded that they determine their own acts. But it remains to bediscovered whether they are mistaken in that, as in countless other thingsthey affirm by a kind of instinct and without having made use ofphilosophic meditation. Since therefore there are two hypotheses as to whattakes place in man: the one that he is only a passive subject, the otherthat he has active virtues, one cannot in reason prefer the second to thefirst, so long as one can only adduce proofs of feeling. For we should feelwith an equal force that we wish this or that, whether all our volitionswere imprinted upon our soul by an exterior and invisible cause, or weformed them ourselves. '

300. There are here excellent arguments, which are valid against the usualsystems; but they fail in respect of the System of Pre-established Harmony, which takes us further than we were able to go formerly. M. Bayle asserts, for instance, 'that by purely philosophical meditations one can neverattain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause of ourvolitions'. But this is a point which I do not concede to him: for theestablishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the courseof nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that itis free of all physical influence from every other substance, save thecustomary co-operation of God. And this system shows that our spontaneityis real, and not only apparent, as Herr Wittich believed it to be. M. Bayleasserts also on the same reasons (ch. 170, p. 1132) that if there were a_fatum Astrologicum_ this would not destroy freedom; and I would concedethat to him, if freedom consisted only in an apparent spontaneity. 

301. The spontaneity of our actions can therefore no longer be questioned;and Aristotle has defined it well, saying that an action is [310]_spontaneous_ when its source is in him who acts. 'Spontaneum est, cujusprincipium est in agente. ' Thus it is that our actions and our wills dependentirely upon us. It is true that we are not directly the masters of ourwill, although we be its cause; for we do not choose volitions, as wechoose our actions by our volitions. Yet we have a certain power also overour will, because we can contribute indirectly towards willing another timethat which we would fain will now, as I have here already shown: that, however, is no _velleity_, properly speaking. There also we have a mastery, individual and even perceptible, over our actions and our wills, resultingfrom a combination of spontaneity with intelligence. 

302. Up to this point I have expounded the two conditions of freedommentioned by Aristotle, that is, _spontaneity_ and _intelligence_, whichare found united in us in deliberation, whereas beasts lack the secondcondition. But the Schoolmen demand yet a third, which they call_indifference_. And indeed one must admit it, if indifference signifies asmuch as 'contingency'; for I have already said here that freedom mustexclude an absolute and metaphysical or logical necessity. But, as I havedeclared more than once, this indifference, this contingency, thisnon-necessity, if I may venture so to speak, which is a characteristicattribute of freedom, does not prevent one from having strongerinclinations towards the course one chooses; nor does it by any meansrequire that one be absolutely and equally indifferent towards the twoopposing courses. 

303. I therefore admit indifference only in the one sense, implying thesame as contingency, or non-necessity. But, as I have declared more thanonce, I do not admit an indifference of equipoise, and I do not think thatone ever chooses when one is absolutely indifferent. Such a choice wouldbe, as it were, mere chance, without determining reason, whether apparentor hidden. But such a chance, such an absolute and actual fortuity, is achimera which never occurs in nature. All wise men are agreed that chanceis only an apparent thing, like fortune: only ignorance of causes givesrise to it. But if there were such a vague indifference, or rather if wewere to choose without having anything to prompt us to the choice, chancewould then be something actual, resembling what, according to Epicurus, took place in that little deviation of the atoms, occurring without causeor reason. Epicurus had introduced it in order to evade necessity, and[311]Cicero with good reason ridiculed it. 

304. This deviation had a final cause in the mind of Epicurus, his aimbeing to free us from fate; but it can have no efficient cause in thenature of things, it is one of the most impossible of chimeras. M. Baylehimself refutes it admirably, as we shall see presently. And yet it issurprising that he appears to admit elsewhere himself something of likenature with this supposed deviation: here is what he says, when speaking ofBuridan's ass (_Dictionary_, art. 'Buridan', lit. 13): 'Those who advocatefree will properly so called admit in man a power of determining, either tothe right hand or the left, even when the motives are perfectly uniform onthe side of each of the two opposing objects. For they maintain that oursoul can say, without having any reason other than that of using itsfreedom: "I prefer this to that, although I see nothing more worthy of mychoice in the one than the other". '

305. All those who admit a free will properly so called will not for thatreason concede to M. Bayle this determination springing from anindeterminate cause. St. Augustine and the Thomists believe that all isdetermined. And one sees that their opponents resort also to thecircumstances which contribute to our choice. Experience by no meansapproves the chimera of an indifference of equipoise; and one can employhere the argument that M. Bayle himself employed against the Cartesians'manner of proving freedom by the lively sense of our independence. Foralthough I do not always see the reason for an inclination which makes mechoose between two apparently uniform courses, there will always be someimpression, however imperceptible, that determines us. The mere desire tomake use of one's freedom has no effect of specifying, or determining us tothe choice of one course or the other. 

306. M. Bayle goes on: 'There are at the very least two ways whereby mancan extricate himself from the snares of equipoise. One, which I havealready mentioned, is for a man to flatter himself with the pleasing fancythat he is master in his own house, and that he does not depend uponobjects. ' This way is blocked: for all that one might wish to play masterin one's own house, that has no determining effect, nor does it favour onecourse more than the other. M. Bayle goes on: 'He would make this Act: Iwill prefer this to that, because it pleases me to behave thus. ' But [312]these words, 'because it pleases me', 'because such is my pleasure', implyalready a leaning towards 'the object that pleases'. 

307. There is therefore no justification for continuing thus: 'And so thatwhich determined him would not be taken from the object; the motive wouldbe derived only from the ideas men have of their own perfections, or oftheir natural faculties. The other way is that of the lot or chance: theshort straw would decide. ' This way has an outlet, but it does not reachthe goal: it would alter the issue, for in such a case it is not man whodecides. Or again if one maintains that it is still the man who decides bylot, man himself is no longer in equipoise, because the lot is not, and theman has attached himself to it. There are always reasons in Nature whichcause that which happens by chance or through the lot. I am somewhatsurprised that a mind so shrewd as M. Bayle's could have allowed itself tobe so misled on this point. I have set out elsewhere the true rejoinder tothe Buridan sophism: it is that the case of perfect equipoise isimpossible, since the universe can never be halved, so as to make allimpressions equivalent on both sides. 

308. Let us see what M. Bayle himself says elsewhere against the chimericalor absolutely undefined indifference. Cicero had said (in his book _DeFato_) that Carneades had found something more subtle than the deviation ofatoms, attributing the cause of a so-called absolutely undefinedindifference to the voluntary motions of souls, because these motions haveno need of an external cause, coming as they do from our nature. But M. Bayle (_Dictionary_, art. 'Epicurus', p. 1143) aptly replies that all thatwhich springs from the nature of a thing is determined: thus determinationalways remains, and Carneades' evasion is of no avail. 

309. He shows elsewhere (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, ch. 90, l. 2, p. 229) 'that a freedom far removed from this so-called equipoise isincomparably more beneficial. I mean', he says, 'a freedom such as mayalways follow the judgements of the mind, and such as cannot resist objectsclearly recognized as good. I know of no people who do not agree that truthclearly recognized necessitates' (determines rather, unless one speak of amoral necessity) 'the assent of the soul; experience teaches us that. Inthe schools they teach constantly that as the true is the object of [313]the understanding, so the good is the object of the will. So likewise theyteach that as the understanding can never affirm anything save that whichis shown to it under the semblance of truth, the will can never loveanything which to it does not appear to be good. One never believes thefalse as such, and one never loves evil as evil. There is in theunderstanding a natural determination towards the true in general, andtowards each individual truth clearly recognized. There is in the will anatural determination towards good in general; whence many philosophersconclude that from the moment when individual goods are clearly recognizedby us we are of necessity compelled to love them. The understandingsuspends its actions only when its objects show themselves obscurely, sothat there is cause for doubt as to whether they are false or true. Thatleads many persons to the conclusion that the will remains in equipoiseonly when the soul is uncertain whether the object presented to it is agood with regard to it; but that also, the moment the soul decides in theaffirmative, it of necessity clings to that object until other judgementsof the mind determine it otherwise. Those who expound freedom in thisfashion think to find therein plentiful enough material for merit ordemerit. For they assume that these judgements of the mind proceed from afree attention of the soul in examining the objects, comparing themtogether, and discriminating between them. I must not forget that there arevery learned men' (such as Bellarmine, lib. 3, _De Gratia et LiberoArbitrio_, c. 8, et 9, and Cameron, in _Responsione ad Epistolam ViriDocti, id est Episcopii_) 'who maintain with very cogent reasons that thewill always of necessity follows the last practical act of theunderstanding. '

310. One must make some observations on this discourse. A very clearrecognition of the best _determines_ the will; but it does not necessitateit, properly speaking. One must always distinguish between the necessaryand the certain or infallible, as I have already observed more than once, and distinguish metaphysical necessity from moral necessity. I think alsothat it is only God's will which always follows the judgements of theunderstanding: all intelligent creatures are subject to some passions, orto perceptions at least, that are not composed entirely of what I call_adequate ideas_. And although in the blessed these passions always tendtowards the true good, by virtue of the laws of Nature and the system ofthings pre-established in relation to them, yet this does not always [314]happen in such a way that they have a perfect knowledge of that good. It isthe same with them as with us, who do not always understand the reason forour instincts. The angels and the blessed are created beings, even as weare, in whom there is always some confused perception mingled with distinctknowledge. Suarez said something similar concerning them. He thinks(_Treatise on Prayer_, book I, ch. 11) that God has so ordered thingsbeforehand that their prayers, when they are made with a full will, alwayssucceed: that is an example of a pre-established harmony. As for us, inaddition to the judgement of the understanding, of which we have an expressknowledge, there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the senses, and these beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations, of which weare not always aware. These movements often thwart the judgement of thepractical understanding. 

311. As for the parallel between the relation of the understanding to thetrue and that of the will to the good, one must know that a clear anddistinct perception of a truth contains within it actually the affirmationof this truth: thus the understanding is necessitated in that direction. But whatever perception one may have of the good, the effort to act inaccordance with the judgement, which in my opinion forms the essence of thewill, is distinct from it. Thus, since there is need of time to raise thiseffort to its climax, it may be suspended, and even changed, by a newperception or inclination which passes athwart it, which diverts the mindfrom it, and which even causes it sometimes to make a contrary judgement. Hence it comes that our soul has so many means of resisting the truth whichit knows, and that the passage from mind to heart is so long. Especially isthis so when the understanding to a great extent proceeds only by faint_thoughts_, which have only slight power to affect, as I have explainedelsewhere. Thus the connexion between judgement and will is not sonecessary as one might think. 

312. M. Bayle goes on to say, with truth (p. 221): 'Indeed, it cannot be afault in man's soul that it has no freedom of indifference as regards goodin general. It would be rather a disorder, an inordinate imperfection, ifone could say truthfully: It is all one to me whether I am happy orunhappy; I have no more determination to love the good than to hate it; Ican do both equally. Now if it is a praiseworthy and advantageous qualityto be determinate as regards good in general, it cannot be a fault if [315]one is necessitated as regards each individual good recognized plainly asfor our good. It seems even as though it were a necessary conclusion, thatif the soul has no freedom of indifference as regards good in general, italso has none in respect of particular goods which after due examination itjudges to be goods in relation to it. What should we think of a soul which, having formed that judgement, had, and prided itself on having, the powernot to love these goods, and even to hate them, and which said: I recognizeclearly that these are goods for me, I have all the enlightenment necessaryon that point; nevertheless I will not love them, I will hate them; mydecision is made, I act upon it; it is not that any reason' (that is, anyother reason than that which is founded upon 'Such is my good pleasure')'urges me thereto, but it pleases me so to behave: what should we think, Isay, of such a soul? Should we not find it more imperfect and more unhappythan if it had not this freedom of indifference?

313. 'Not only does the doctrine that subjects the will to the final actsof the understanding give a more favourable idea of the state of the soul, but it shows also that it is easier to lead man to happiness along thatroad than along the road of indifference. It will suffice to enlighten hismind upon his true interests, and straightway his will will comply with thejudgements that reason shall have pronounced. But if he has a freedomindependent of reason and of the quality of objects clearly recognized, hewill be the most intractable of all animals, and it will never be possibleto rely upon making him choose the right course. All the counsels, all thearguments in the world may prove unavailing; you will give himexplanations, you will convince his mind, and yet his will will play thehaughty madam and remain motionless as a rock. Vergil, _Aen_. , lib. 6, v. 470:

 _Non magis incepto vultum sermone movetur, _ _Quam si dura silex, aut stet Marpesia cautes_. 

A caprice, an empty whim will make her stiffen against reasons of allkinds; it will not please her to love her clearly recognized good, it willplease her to hate it. Do you consider such a faculty, sir, to be therichest present God can have made to man, and the sole instrument of ourhappiness? Is it not rather an obstacle to our felicity? Is there cause forboasting in being able to say: "I have scorned all the judgements of [316]my reason, and I have followed an altogether different path, simply fromconsiderations of my own good pleasure?" With what regrets would one not betorn, in that case, if the determination made had an ill result? Such afreedom would therefore be more harmful than profitable to men, because theunderstanding would not present all the goodness of the objects clearlyenough to deprive the will of the power of rejection. It would be thereforeinfinitely better for man to be always of necessity determined by thejudgement of the understanding, than to permit the will to suspend itsaction. For by this means it would achieve its aim with greater ease andcertainty. '

314. Upon this discourse I make the further observation, that it is verytrue that a freedom of indifference, undefined and without any determiningreason, would be as harmful, and even objectionable, as it is impracticableand chimerical. The man who wished to behave thus, or at the least appearto be acting without due cause, would most certainly be looked upon asirrational. But it is very true also that the thing is impossible, when itis taken strictly in accordance with the assumption. As soon as one triesto give an example of it one misses one's aim and stumbles upon the case ofa man who, while he does not come to a decision without cause, does sorather under the influence of inclination or passion than of judgement. Assoon as one says: 'I scorn the judgements of my reason simply fromconsiderations of my own good pleasure, it pleases me to behave thus', itis as if one were to say: I prefer my inclination to my interest, mypleasure to my profit. 

315. Even so some capricious man, fancying that it is ignominious for himto follow the advice of his friends or his servants, might prefer thesatisfaction of contradicting them to the profit he could derive from theircounsel. It may happen, however, that in a matter of small moment a wiseman acts irregularly and against his own interest in order to thwartanother who tries to restrain him or direct him, or that he may disconcertthose who watch his steps. It is even well at times to imitate Brutus byconcealing one's wit, and even to feign madness, as David did before theKing of the Philistines. 

316. M. Bayle admirably supplements his remarks with the object of showingthat to act against the judgement of the understanding would be a greatimperfection. He observes (p. 225) that, even according to the [317]Molinists, 'the understanding which does its DUTY well indicates that whichis THE BEST'. He introduces God (ch. 91, p. 227) saying to our firstparents in the Garden of Eden: 'I have given you my knowledge, the facultyof judging things, and full power to dispose your wills. I shall give youinstructions and orders; but the free will that I have bestowed upon you isof such a nature that you have equal power (according to circumstances) toobey me and to disobey me. You will be tempted: if you make a good use ofyour freedom you will be happy; and if you use it ill you will be unhappy. It is for you to see if you wish to ask of me, as a new grace, either thatI permit you to abuse your freedom when you shall make resolve to do so, orthat I prevent you from doing so. Consider carefully, I give you four andtwenty hours. Do you not clearly understand' (adds M. Bayle) 'that theirreason, which had not yet been obscured by sin, would have made themconclude that they must ask God, as the crowning point of the favourswherewith he had honoured them, not to permit them to destroy themselves byan ill use of their powers? And must one not admit that if Adam, throughwrongly making it a point of honour to order his own goings, had refused adivine direction that would have safeguarded his happiness, he would havebeen the prototype of all such as Phaeton and Icarus? He would have beenwell-nigh as ungodly as the Ajax of Sophocles, who wished to conquerwithout the aid of the gods, and who said that the most craven would puttheir enemies to flight with such aid. '

317. M. Bayle also shows (ch. 80) that one congratulates oneself no less, or even takes more credit to oneself, for having been aided from above, than for owing one's happiness to one's own choice. And if one does wellthrough having preferred a tumultuous instinct, which arose suddenly, toreasons maturely considered, one feels an extraordinary joy in this; forone assumes that either God, or our Guardian Angel, or something or otherwhich one pictures to oneself under the vague name of _good luck_ hasimpelled us thereto. Indeed, Sulla and Caesar boasted more of their goodluck than of their prudence. The pagans, and particularly the poets (Homerespecially), determined their heroes' acts by divine promptings. The heroof the _Aeneid_ proceeds only under the direction of a God. It was verygreat praise offered to the Emperors if one said that they were victoriousboth through their troops and through their gods whom they lent to [318]their generals: 'Te copias, te consilium et tuos praebente Divos, ' saidHorace. The generals fought under the auspices of the Emperors, as iftrusting to the Emperor's good luck, for subordinate officers had no rightsregarding the auspices. One takes credit to oneself for being a favouriteof heaven, one rates oneself more highly for the possession of good fortunethan of talent. There are no people that think themselves more fortunatethan the mystics, who imagine that they keep still while God acts withinthem. 

318. 'On the other hand', M. Bayle adds (ch. 83), 'a Stoic philosopher, whoattaches to everything an inevitable necessity, is as susceptible asanother man to the pleasure of having chosen well. And every man of sensewill find that, far from taking pleasure in the thought of havingdeliberated long and finally chosen the most honourable course, one feelsincredible satisfaction in persuading oneself that one is so firmly rootedin the love of virtue that without the slightest resistance one would repela temptation. A man to whom is suggested the doing of a deed contrary tohis duty, his honour and his conscience, who answers forthwith that he isincapable of such a crime, and who is certainly not capable of it, is farmore contented with himself than if he asked for time to consider it, andwere for some hours in a state of indecision as to which course to take. One is on many occasions regretful over not being able to make up one'smind between two courses, and one would be well pleased that the counsel ofa good friend, or some succour from above, should impel us to make a goodchoice. ' All that demonstrates for us the advantage a determinate judgementhas over that vague indifference which leaves us in uncertainty. But indeedI have proved sufficiently that only ignorance or passion has power to keepus in doubt, and have thus given the reason why God is never in doubt. Thenearer one comes to him, the more perfect is freedom, and the more it isdetermined by the good and by reason. The character of Cato, of whomVelleius said that it was impossible for him to perform a dishonourableaction, will always be preferred to that of a man who is capable ofwavering. 

319. I have been well pleased to present and to support these arguments ofM. Bayle against vague indifference, as much for the elucidation of thesubject as to confront him with himself, and to demonstrate that he oughttherefore not to complain of the alleged necessity imposed upon God, [319]of choosing the best way that is possible. For either God will act througha vague indifference and at random, or again he will act on caprice orthrough some other passion, or finally he must act through a prevailinginclination of reason which prompts him to the best. But passions, whichcome from the confused perception of an apparent good, cannot occur in God;and vague indifference is something chimerical. It is therefore only thestrongest reason that can regulate God's choice. It is an imperfection inour freedom that makes us capable of choosing evil instead of good, agreater evil instead of the lesser evil, the lesser good instead of thegreater good. That arises from the appearances of good and evil, whichdeceive us; whereas God is always prompted to the true and the greatestgood, that is, to the absolutely true good, which he cannot fail to know. 

320. This false idea of freedom, conceived by those who, not content withexempting it, I do not say from constraint, but from necessity itself, would also exempt it from certainty and determination, that is, from reasonand perfection, nevertheless pleased some Schoolmen, people who oftenbecome entangled in their own subtleties, and take the straw of terms forthe grain of things. They assume some chimerical notion, whence they thinkto derive some use, and which they endeavour to maintain by quibblings. Complete indifference is of this nature: to concede it to the will is togrant it a privilege of the kind that some Cartesians and some mystics findin the divine nature, of being able to do the impossible, to produceabsurdities, to cause two contradictory propositions to be truesimultaneously. To claim that a determination comes from a completeindifference absolutely indeterminate is to claim that it comes naturallyfrom nothing. Let it be assumed that God does not give this determination:it has accordingly no fountainhead in the soul, nor in the body, nor incircumstances, since all is assumed to be indeterminate; and yet there itis, appearing and existing without preparation, nothing making ready forit, no angel, not even God himself, being able to see or to show how itexists. That would be not only the emergence of something from nothing, butits emergence thence _of itself_. This doctrine introduces something aspreposterous as the theory already mentioned, of the deviation of atoms, whereby Epicurus asserted that one of these small bodies, going in astraight line, would turn aside all at once from its path, without any[320]reason, simply because the will so commands. Take note moreover that heresorted to that only to justify this alleged freedom of completeindifference, a chimerical notion which appears to be of very ancientorigin; and one may with good reason say: _Chimaera Chimaeram parit_. 

321. This is the way Signor Marchetti has expressed it in his admirabletranslation of Lucretius into Italian verse, which has not yet beenpublished (Book 2):

 _Mà ch'i principii poi non corran punto_ _Della lor dritta via, chi veder puote?_ _Sì finalmente ogni lor moto sempre_ _Insieme s'aggruppa, e dall' antico_ _Sempre con ordin certo il nuovo nasce;_ _Ne tracciando i primi semi, fanno_ _Di moto un tal principio, il qual poi rompa_ _I decreti del fato, acciò non segua_ _L'una causa dell' altra in infinito;_ _Onde han questa, dich' io_, del fato sciolta Libera voluntà, _per cui ciascuno_ _Va dove più l'agrada? I moti ancora_ _Si declinan sovente, e non in tempo_ _Certo, ne certa region, mà solo_ _Quando e dove commanda il nostro arbitrio;_ _Poiche senz' alcun dubbio à queste cose_ _Dà sol principio il voler proprio, e quindi_ _Van poi scorrendo per le membra i moti. _

It is comical that a man like Epicurus, after having discarded the gods andall incorporeal substances, could have supposed that the will, which hehimself takes as composed of atoms, could have had control over the atoms, and diverted them from their path, without its being possible for one tosay how. 

322. Carneades, not going so far back as to the atoms, claimed to find atonce in the soul of man the reason for the so-called vague indifference, assuming as reason for the thing just that for which Epicurus sought areason. Carneades gained nothing thereby, except that he more easilydeceived careless people, in transferring the absurdity from one subject, where it is somewhat too evident, to another subject where it is easier toconfuse matters, that is to say, from the body to the soul. For mostphilosophers had not very distinct notions of the nature of the soul. [321]Epicurus, who composed it of atoms, was at least right in seeking theorigin of its determination in that which he believed to be the origin ofthe soul itself. That is why Cicero and M. Bayle were wrong to find so muchfault with him, and to be indulgent towards, and even praise, Carneades, who is no less irrational. I do not understand how M. Bayle, who was soclear-sighted, was thus satisfied by a disguised absurdity, even to theextent of calling it the greatest effort the human mind can make on thismatter. It is as if the soul, which is the seat of reason, were morecapable than the body of acting without being determined by some reason orcause, internal or external; or as if the great principle which states thatnothing comes to pass without cause only related to the body. 

323. It is true that the Form or the Soul has this advantage over matter, that it is the source of action, having within itself the principle ofmotion or of change, in a word, [Greek: to autokinêton], as Plato calls it;whereas matter is simply passive, and has need of being impelled to act, _agitur, ut agat_. But if the soul is active of itself (as it indeed is), for that very reason it is not of itself absolutely indifferent to theaction, like matter, and it must find in itself a ground of determination. According to the System of Pre-established Harmony the soul finds initself, and in its ideal nature anterior to existence, the reasons for itsdeterminations, adjusted to all that shall surround it. That way it wasdetermined from all eternity in its state of mere possibility to actfreely, as it does, when it attains to existence. 

324. M. Bayle himself remarks aptly that freedom of indifference (such asmust be admitted) does not exclude inclinations and does not demandequipoise. He demonstrates amply enough (_Reply to the Questions of aProvincial_, ch. 139, p. 748 _seqq_. ) that the soul may be compared to abalance, where reasons and inclinations take the place of weights. According to him, one can explain what passes in our resolutions by thehypothesis that the will of man is like a balance which is at rest when theweights of its two pans are equal, and which always inclines either to oneside or the other according to which of the pans is the more heavily laden. A new reason makes a heavier weight, a new idea shines more brightly thanthe old; the fear of a heavy penalty prevails over some pleasure; when twopassions dispute the ground, it is always the stronger which gains themastery, unless the other be assisted by reason or by some other [322]contributing passion. When one flings away merchandise in order to saveoneself, the action, which the Schoolmen call mixed, is voluntary and free;and yet love of life indubitably prevails over love of possessions. Griefarises from remembrance of lost possessions, and one has all the greaterdifficulty in making one's resolve, the nearer the approach to even weightin the opposing reasons, as also we see that the balance is determined morepromptly when there is a great difference between the weights. 

325. Nevertheless, as very often there are divers courses to choose from, one might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force which putsforth effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at thespot where action is easiest or there is least resistance. For instance, air if it is compressed too firmly in a glass vessel will break it in orderto escape. It puts forth effort at every part, but finally flings itselfupon the weakest. Thus do the inclinations of the soul extend over all thegoods that present themselves: they are antecedent acts of will; but theconsequent will, which is their result, is determined in the direction ofthat which touches most closely. 

326. This ascendancy of inclinations, however, does not prevent man frombeing master in his own domain, provided that he knows how to make use ofhis power. His dominion is that of reason: he has only to prepare himselfin good time to resist the passions, and he will be capable of checking thevehemence of the most furious. Let us assume that Augustus, about to giveorders for putting to death Fabius Maximus, acts, as is his wont, upon theadvice a philosopher had given him, to recite the Greek alphabet beforedoing anything in the first heat of his anger: this reflexion will becapable of saving the life of Fabius and the glory of Augustus. But withoutsome fortunate reflexion, which one owes sometimes to a special divinemercy, or without some skill acquired beforehand, like that of Augustus, calculated to make us reflect fittingly as to time and place, passion willprevail over reason. The driver is master over the horses if he controlsthem as he should, and as he can; but there are occasions when he becomesnegligent, and then for a time he will have to let go the reins:

 _Fertur equis auriga, nec audit currus habenas_. 

327. One must admit that there is always within us enough power over [323]our will, but we do not always bethink ourselves of employing it. Thatshows, as I have observed more than once, that the power of the soul overits inclinations is a control which can only be exercised in an _indirect_manner, almost as Bellarmine would have had the Popes exercise rights overthe temporal power of kings. In truth, the external actions that do notexceed our powers depend absolutely upon our will; but our volitions dependupon our will only through certain artful twists which give us means ofsuspending our resolutions, or of changing them. We are masters in our ownhouse, not as God is in the world, he having but to speak, but as a wiseprince is in his dominions or as a good father of a family is in his home. M. Bayle sometimes takes the matter differently, as though we must have, inorder to boast of a free will, an absolute power over ourselves, independent of reasons and of means. But even God has not such a power, andmust not have in this sense, in relation to his will: he cannot change hisnature, nor act otherwise than according to method; and how could mantransform himself all of a sudden? I have already said God's dominion, thedominion of wisdom, is that of reason. It is only God, however, who alwayswills what is most to be desired, and consequently he has no need of thepower to change his will. 328. If the soul is mistress in its own house(says M. Bayle, p. 753) it has only to will, and straightway that vexationand pain which is attendant upon victory over the passions will vanishaway. For this effect it would suffice, in his opinion, to give oneselfindifference to the objects of the passions (p. 758). Why, then, do men notgive themselves this indifference (he says), if they are masters in theirown house? But this objection is exactly as if I were to ask why a fatherof a family does not give himself gold when he has need thereof? He canacquire some, but through skill, and not, as in the age of the fairies, orof King Midas, through a mere command of the will or by his touch. It wouldnot suffice to be master in one's own house; one must be master of allthings in order to give oneself all that one wishes; for one does not findeverything in one's own house. Working thus upon oneself, one must do as inworking upon something else; one must have knowledge of the constitutionand the qualities of one's object, and adapt one's operations thereto. Itis therefore not in a moment and by a mere act of the will that onecorrects oneself, and that one acquires a better will. 

 [324]329. Nevertheless it is well to observe that the vexations and painsattendant upon victory over the passions in some people turn into pleasure, through the great satisfaction they find in the lively sense of the forceof their mind, and of the divine grace. Ascetics and true mystics can speakof this from experience; and even a true philosopher can say somethingthereof. One can attain to that happy state, and it is one of the principalmeans the soul can use to strengthen its dominion. 

330. If the Scotists and the Molinists appear to favour vague indifference(appear, I say, for I doubt whether they do so in reality, once they havelearnt to know it), the Thomists and the disciples of Augustine are forpredetermination. For one must have either the one or the other. ThomasAquinas is a writer who is accustomed to reason on sound principles, andthe subtle Scotus, seeking to contradict him, often obscures mattersinstead of throwing light upon them. The Thomists as a general rule followtheir master, and do not admit that the soul makes its resolve without theexistence of some predetermination which contributes thereto. But thepredetermination of the new Thomists is not perhaps exactly that which oneneeds. Durand de Saint-Pourçain, who often enough formed a party of hisown, and who opposed the idea of the special co-operation of God, wasnevertheless in favour of a certain predetermination. He believed that Godsaw in the state of the soul, and of its surroundings, the reason for hisdeterminations. 

331. The ancient Stoics were in that almost of the same opinion as theThomists. They were at the same time in favour of determination and againstnecessity, although they have been accused of attaching necessity toeverything. Cicero says in his book _De Fato_ that Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle believed that fate implied necessity; that otherswere opposed to that (he means perhaps Epicurus and the Academicians); andthat Chrysippus sought a middle course. I think that Cicero is mistaken asregards Aristotle, who fully recognized contingency and freedom, and wenteven too far, saying (inadvertently, as I think) that propositions oncontingent futurities had no determinate truth; on which point he wasjustifiably abandoned by most of the Schoolmen. Even Cleanthes, the teacherof Chrysippus, although he upheld the determinate truth of future events, denied their necessity. Had the Schoolmen, so fully convinced of this [325]determination of contingent futurities (as were for instance the Fathers ofCoimbra, authors of a famous Course of Philosophy), seen the connexionbetween things in the form wherein the System of General Harmony proclaimsit, they would have judged that one cannot admit preliminary certainty, ordetermination of futurition, without admitting a predetermination of thething in its causes and in its reasons. 

332. Cicero has endeavoured to expound for us the middle course taken byChrysippus; but Justus Lipsius observed, in his _Stoic Philosophy_, thatthe passage from Cicero was mutilated, and that Aulus Gellius has preservedfor us the whole argument of the Stoic philosopher (_Noct. Att. _, lib. 6, c. 2). Here it is in epitome. Fate is the inevitable and eternal connexionof all events. Against this is urged in objection, that it follows that theacts of the will would be necessary, and that criminals, being coerced intoevil, should not be punished. Chrysippus answers that evil springs from theoriginal constitution of souls, which forms part of the destined sequence;that souls which are of a good natural disposition offer strongerresistance to the impressions of external causes; but that those whosenatural defects had not been corrected by discipline allowed themselves tobe perverted. Next he distinguishes (according to Cicero) between principalcauses and accessary causes, and uses the comparison of a cylinder, whoserotatory force and speed or ease in motion comes chiefly from its shape, whereas it would be retarded by any roughness in formation. Nevertheless ithas need of impulsion, even as the soul needs to be acted upon by theobjects of the senses, and receives this impression according to its ownconstitution. 

333. Cicero considers that Chrysippus becomes so confused that, whether hewill or no, he confirms the necessity of fate. M. Bayle is almost of thesame opinion (_Dictionary_, art. 'Chrysippus', lit. H). He says that thisphilosopher does not get out of the bog, since the cylinder is regular oruneven according to what the craftsman has made it; and thus God, providence, fate will be the causes of evil in such a way as to render itnecessary. Justus Lipsius answers that, according to the Stoics, evil camefrom matter. That is (to my mind) as if he had said that the stone on whichthe craftsman worked was sometimes too rough and too irregular to produce agood cylinder. M. Bayle cites against Chrysippus the fragments of Onomausand Diogenianus that Eusebius has preserved for us in the _Praeparatio[326]Evangelica_ (lib. 6, c. 7, 8); and above all he relies upon Plutarch'srefutation in his book against the Stoics, quoted art. 'Paulicians', lit. G. But this refutation does not amount to very much. Plutarch maintainsthat it would be better to deny power to God than to impute to him thepermission of evils; and he will not admit that evil may serve a greatergood. I have already shown, on the contrary, that God cannot but beall-powerful, even though he can do no better than produce the best, whichincludes the permission of evil. Moreover, I have pointed out repeatedlythat what is to the disadvantage of a part taken separately may serve theperfection of the whole. 

334. Chrysippus had already made an observation to this effect, not only inhis fourth book on Providence, as given by Aulus Gellius (lib. 6, c. 1)where he asserts that evil serves to bring the good to notice (a reasonwhich is not sufficient here), but still better when he applies thecomparison of a stage play, in his second book on Nature (as Plutarchquotes it himself). There he says that there are sometimes portions in acomedy which are of no worth in themselves and which nevertheless lendgrace to the whole poem. He calls these portions epigrams or inscriptions. We have not enough acquaintance with the nature of the ancient comedy forfull understanding of this passage from Chrysippus; but since Plutarchassents to the fact, there is reason to believe that this comparison wasnot a poor one. Plutarch replies in the first place that the world is notlike a play to provide entertainment. But that is a poor answer: thecomparison lies in this point alone, that one bad part may make the wholebetter. He replies secondly that this bad passage is only a small part ofthe comedy, whereas human life swarms with evils. This reply is of no valueeither: for he ought to have taken into account that what we know is also avery small part of the universe. 

335. But let us return to the cylinder of Chrysippus. He is right in sayingthat vice springs from the original constitution of some minds. He was metwith the objection that God formed them, and he could only reply bypointing to the imperfection of matter, which did not permit God to dobetter. This reply is of no value, for matter in itself is indifferent toall forms, and God made it. Evil springs rather from the _Forms_ themselvesin their detached state, that is, from the ideas that God has not producedby an act of his will, any more than he thus produced numbers and [327]figures, and all possible essences which one must regard as eternal andnecessary; for they are in the ideal region of the possibles, that is, inthe divine understanding. God is therefore not the author of essences in sofar as they are only possibilities. But there is nothing actual to which hehas not decreed and given existence; and he has permitted evil because itis involved in the best plan existing in the region of possibles, a planwhich supreme wisdom could not fail to choose. This notion satisfies atonce the wisdom, the power and the goodness of God, and yet leaves a wayopen for the entrance of evil. God gives perfection to creatures in so faras it is possible in the universe. One gives a turn to the cylinder, butany roughness in its shape restricts the swiftness of its motion. Thiscomparison made by Chrysippus does not greatly differ from mine, which wastaken from a laden boat that is carried along by the river current, itspace becoming slower as the load grows heavier. These comparisons tendtowards the same end; and that shows that if we were sufficiently informedconcerning the opinions of ancient philosophers, we should find thereinmore reason than is supposed. 

336. M. Bayle himself commends the passage from Chrysippus (art. 'Chrysippus', lit. T) that Aulus Gellius quotes in the same place, wherethis philosopher maintains that evil has come _by concomitance. _ That alsois made clear by my system. For I have demonstrated that the evil which Godpermitted was not an object of his will, as an end or a means, but simplyas a condition, since it had to be involved in the best. Yet one mustconfess that the cylinder of Chrysippus does not answer the objection ofnecessity. He ought to have added, in the first place, that it is by thefree choice of God that some of the possibles exist; secondly, thatrational creatures act freely also, in accordance with their originalnature, which existed already in the eternal ideas; and lastly, that themotive power of good inclines the will without compelling it. 

337. The advantage of freedom which is in the creature without doubt existsto an eminent degree in God. That must be understood in so far as it isgenuinely an advantage and in so far as it presupposes no imperfection. Forto be able to make a mistake and go astray is a disadvantage, and to havecontrol over the passions is in truth an advantage, but one thatpresupposes an imperfection, namely passion itself, of which God is [328]incapable. Scotus was justified in saying that if God were not free andexempt from necessity, no creature would be so. But God is incapable ofbeing indeterminate in anything whatsoever: he cannot be ignorant, hecannot doubt, he cannot suspend his judgement; his will is always decided, and it can only be decided by the best. God can never have a primitiveparticular will, that is, independent of laws or general acts of will; sucha thing would be unreasonable. He cannot determine upon Adam, Peter, Judasor any individual without the existence of a reason for this determination;and this reason leads of necessity to some general enunciation. The wisemind always acts _according to principles_; always _according to rules_, and never _according to exceptions_, save when the rules come intocollision through opposing tendencies, where the strongest carries the day:or else, either they will stop one another or some third course will emergeas a result. In all these cases one rule serves as an exception to theother, and there are never any _original exceptions_ with one who alwaysacts in a regular way. 

338. If there are people who believe that election and reprobation areaccomplished on God's part by a despotic absolute power, not only withoutany apparent reason but actually without any reason, even a concealed one, they maintain an opinion that destroys alike the nature of things and thedivine perfections. Such an _absolutely absolute decree_ (so to speak)would be without doubt insupportable. But Luther and Calvin were far fromsuch a belief: the former hopes that the life to come will make uscomprehend the just reasons of God's choice; and the latter protestsexplicitly that these reasons are just and holy, although they be unknownto us. I have already in that connexion quoted Calvin's treatise onpredestination, and here are the actual words: 'God before the fall of Adamhad reflected upon what he had to do, and that for causes concealed fromus. . . . It is evident therefore that he had just causes for the reprobationof some of mankind, but causes to us UNKNOWN. '

339. This truth, that all God does is reasonable and cannot be better done, strikes at the outset every man of good sense, and extorts, so to speak, his approbation. And yet the most subtle of philosophers have a fatalpropensity for offending sometimes without observing it, during the courseand in the heat of disputes, against the first principles of good sense, when these are shrouded in terms that disguise them. We have here [329]already seen how the excellent M. Bayle, with all his shrewdness, hasnevertheless combated this principle which I have just indicated, and whichis a sure consequence of the supreme perfection of God. He thought todefend in that way the cause of God and to exempt him from an imaginarynecessity, by leaving him the freedom to choose from among various goodsthe least. I have already spoken of M. Diroys and others who have also beendeluded by this strange opinion, one that is far too commonly accepted. Those who uphold it do not observe that it implies a wish to preserve for, or rather bestow upon, God a false freedom, which is the freedom to actunreasonably. That is rendering his works subject to correction, and makingit impossible for us to say or even to hope that anything reasonable can besaid upon the permission of evil. 

340. This error has much impaired M. Bayle's arguments, and has barred hisway of escape from many perplexities. That appears again in relation to thelaws of the realm of Nature: he believes them to be arbitrary andindifferent, and he objects that God could better have attained his end inthe realm of grace if he had not clung to these laws, if he had more oftendispensed with their observance, or even if he had made others. He believedthis especially with regard to the law of the union between the soul andthe body. For he is persuaded, with the modern Cartesians, that the ideasof the perceptible qualities that God gives (according to them) to thesoul, occasioned by movements of the body, have nothing representing thesemovements or resembling them. Accordingly it was a purely arbitrary act onGod's part to give us the ideas of heat, cold, light and other qualitieswhich we experience, rather than to give us quite different ideasoccasioned in the same way. I have often wondered that people so talentedshould have been capable of relishing notions so unphilosophic and socontrary to the fundamental maxims of reason. For nothing gives clearerindication of the imperfection of a philosophy than the necessityexperienced by the philosopher to confess that something comes to pass, inaccordance with his system, for which there is no reason. That applies tothe idea of Epicurus on the deviation of atoms. Whether it be God or Naturethat operates, the operation will always have its reasons. In theoperations of Nature, these reasons will depend either upon necessarytruths or upon the laws that God has found the most reasonable; and in theoperations of God, they will depend upon the choice of the supreme [330]reason which causes them to act. 

341. M. Regis, a famous Cartesian, had asserted in his 'Metaphysics' (part2, book 2, c. 29) that the faculties God has given to men are the mostexcellent that they were capable of in conformity with the general order ofnature. 'Considering only', he says, 'the power of God and the nature ofman by themselves, it is very easy to conceive that God could have made manmore perfect: but if one will consider man, not in himself and separatelyfrom all other creatures, but as a member of the universe and a portionwhich is subject to the general laws of motions, one will be bound toacknowledge that man is as perfect as he could have been. ' He adds 'that wecannot conceive that God could have employed any other means moreappropriate than pain for the conservation of our bodies'. M. Regis isright in a general way in saying that God cannot do better than he has donein relation to all. And although there be apparently in some places in theuniverse rational animals more perfect than man, one may say that God wasright to create every kind of species, some more perfect than others. It isperhaps not impossible that there be somewhere a species of animals muchresembling man and more perfect than we are. It may be even that the humanrace will attain in time to a greater perfection than that which we can nowenvisage. Thus the laws of motions do not prevent man from being moreperfect: but the place God has assigned to man in space and in time limitsthe perfections he was able to receive. 

342. I also doubt, with M. Bayle, whether pain be necessary in order towarn men of peril. But this writer goes too far (_Reply to the Questions ofa Provincial_, vol. II, ch. 77, p. 104): he seems to think that a feelingof pleasure could have the same effect, and that, in order to prevent achild from going too near the fire, God could give him ideas of pleasure inproportion to the distance he kept from it. This expedient does not appearvery practicable with regard to all evils, unless a miracle were involved. It is more natural that what if it were too near would cause an evil shouldcause some foreboding of evil when it is a little less near. Yet I admitthat it is possible such a foreboding will be something less than pain, andusually this is the case. Thus it indeed appears that pain is not necessaryfor causing one to shun present peril; it is wont rather to serve as apenalty for having actually plunged into evil, and a warning against [331]further lapse. There are also many painful evils the avoidance whereofrests not with us. As a dissolution of the continuity of our body is aconsequence of many accidents that may happen to us, it was natural thatthis imperfection of the body should be represented by some sense ofimperfection in the soul. Nevertheless I would not guarantee that therewere no animals in the universe whose structure was cunning enough to causea sense of indifference as accompaniment to this dissolution of continuity, as for instance when a gangrenous limb is cut off; or even a sense ofpleasure, as if one were only scratching oneself. For the imperfection thatattends the dissolution of the body might lead to the sense of a greaterperfection, which was suspended or checked by the continuity which is nowbroken: and in this respect the body would be as it were a prison. 

343. There is also nothing to preclude the existence in the universe ofanimals resembling that one which Cyrano de Bergerac encountered in thesun. The body of this animal being a sort of fluid composed of innumerablesmall animals, that were capable of ranging themselves in accordance withthe desires of the great animal, by this means it transformed itself in amoment, just as it pleased; and the dissolution of continuity caused it nomore hurt than the stroke of an oar can cause to the sea. But, after all, these animals are not men, they are not in our globe or in our presentcentury; and God's plan ensured that there should not be lacking here onearth a rational animal clothed in flesh and bones, whose structureinvolves susceptibility to pain. 

344. But M. Bayle further opposes this on another principle, one which Ihave already mentioned. It seems that he thinks the ideas which the soulconceives in relation to the feelings of the body are arbitrary. Thus Godmight have caused the dissolution of continuity to give us pleasure. Heeven maintains that the laws of motion are entirely arbitrary. 'I wouldwish to know', he says (vol. III, ch. 166, p. 1080), 'whether Godestablished by an act of his freedom of indifference general laws on thecommunication of movements, and the particular laws on the union of thehuman soul with an organic body? In this case, he could have establishedquite different laws, and adopted a system whose results involved neithermoral evil nor physical evil. But if the answer is given that God wasconstrained by supreme wisdom to establish the laws that he hasestablished, there we have neither more nor less than the _Fatum_ of [332]the Stoics. Wisdom will have marked out a way for God, the abandonmentwhereof will have been as impossible to him as his own self-destruction. 'This objection has been sufficiently overthrown: it is only a moralnecessity; and it is always a happy necessity to be bound to act inaccordance with the rules of perfect wisdom. 

345. Moreover, it appears to me that the reason for the belief held by manythat the laws of motion are arbitrary comes from the fact that few peoplehave properly examined them. It is known now that M. Descartes was muchmistaken in his statement of them. I have proved conclusively thatconservation of the same quantity of motion cannot occur, but I considerthat the same quantity of force is conserved, whether absolute or directiveand respective, whether total or partial. My principles, which carry thissubject as far as it can go, have not yet been published in full; but Ihave communicated them to friends competent to judge of them, who haveapproved them, and have converted some other persons of acknowledgederudition and ability. I discovered at the same time that the laws ofmotion actually existing in Nature, and confirmed by experiments, are notin reality absolutely demonstrable, as a geometrical proposition would be;but neither is it necessary that they be so. They do not spring entirelyfrom the principle of necessity, but rather from the principle ofperfection and order; they are an effect of the choice and the wisdom ofGod. I can demonstrate these laws in divers ways, but must always assumesomething that is not of an absolutely geometrical necessity. Thus theseadmirable laws are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being, asopposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity, advocated by Stratoor Spinoza. 

346. I have found that one may account for these laws by assuming that theeffect is always equal in force to its cause, or, which amounts to the samething, that the same force is conserved always: but this axiom of higherphilosophy cannot be demonstrated geometrically. One may again apply otherprinciples of like nature, for instance the principle that action is alwaysequal to reaction, one which assumes in things a distaste for externalchange, and cannot be derived either from extension or impenetrability; andthat other principle, that a simple movement has the same properties asthose which might belong to a compound movement such as would produce [333]the same phenomena of locomotion. These assumptions are very plausible, andare successful as an explanation of the laws of motion: nothing is soappropriate, all the more since they are in accord with each other. Butthere is to be found in them no absolute necessity, such as may compel usto admit them, in the way one is compelled to admit the rules of logic, ofarithmetic and geometry. 

347. It seems, when one considers the indifference of matter to motion andto rest, that the largest body at rest could be carried along without anyresistance by the smallest body in motion, in which case there would beaction without reaction and an effect greater than its cause. There is alsono necessity to say of the motion of a ball which runs freely on an even, horizontal plane, with a certain degree of speed, termed A, that thismotion must have the properties of that motion which it would have if itwere going with lesser speed in a boat, itself moving in the same directionwith the residue of the speed, to ensure that the ball, seen from the bank, advance with the same degree A. For, although the same appearance of speedand of direction results through this medium of the boat, it is not becauseit is the same thing. Nevertheless it happens that the effects of thecollision of the balls in the boat, the motion in each one separatelycombined with that of the boat giving the appearance of that which goes onoutside the boat, also give the appearance of the effects that these sameballs colliding would have outside the boat. All that is admirable, but onedoes not see its absolute necessity. A movement on the two sides of theright-angled triangle composes a movement on the hypotenuse; but it doesnot follow that a ball moving on the hypotenuse must produce the effect oftwo balls of its own size moving on the two sides: yet that is true. Nothing is so appropriate as this result, and God has chosen the laws thatproduce it: but one sees no geometrical necessity therein. Yet it is thisvery lack of necessity which enhances the beauty of the laws that God haschosen, wherein divers admirable axioms exist in conjunction, and it isimpossible for one to say which of them is the primary. 

348. I have also shown that therein is observed that excellent law ofcontinuity, which I have perhaps been the first to state, and which is akind of touchstone whose test the rules of M. Descartes, of Father Fabry, Father Pardies, Father de Malebranche and others cannot pass. In virtue ofthis law, one must be able to regard rest as a movement vanishing [334]after having continually diminished, and likewise equality as an inequalitythat vanishes also, as would happen through the continual diminution of thegreater of two unequal bodies, while the smaller retains its size. As aconsequence of this consideration, the general rule for unequal bodies, orbodies in motion, must apply also to equal bodies or to bodies one of whichis at rest, as to a particular case of the rule. This does result in thetrue laws of motion, and does not result in certain laws invented by M. Descartes and by some other men of talent, which already on that scorealone prove to be ill-concerted, so that one may predict that experimentwill not favour them. 

349. These considerations make it plain that the laws of Nature regulatingmovements are neither entirely necessary nor entirely arbitrary. The middlecourse to be taken is that they are a choice of the most perfect wisdom. And this great example of the laws of motion shows with the utmost clarityhow much difference there is between these three cases, to wit, firstly _anabsolute necessity_, metaphysical or geometrical, which may be calledblind, and which does not depend upon any but efficient causes; in thesecond place, _a moral necessity_, which comes from the free choice ofwisdom in relation to final causes; and finally in the third place, _something absolutely arbitrary_, depending upon an indifference ofequipoise, which is imagined, but which cannot exist, where there is nosufficient reason either in the efficient or in the final cause. Consequently one must conclude how mistaken it is to confuse either thatwhich is absolutely necessary with that which is determined by the reasonof the best, or the freedom that is determined by reason with a vagueindifference. 

350. This also settles M. Bayle's difficulty, for he fears that, if God isalways determinate, Nature could dispense with him and bring about thatsame effect which is attributed to him, through the necessity of the orderof things. That would be true if the laws of motion for instance, and allthe rest, had their source in a geometrical necessity of efficient causes;but in the last analysis one is obliged to resort to something dependingupon final causes and upon what is fitting. This also utterly destroys themost plausible reasoning of the Naturalists. Dr. Johann Joachim Becher, aGerman physician, well known for his books on chemistry, had composed aprayer which looked like getting him into trouble. It began: 'O sancta[335]mater natura, aeterne rerum ordo'. And it ended by saying that this Naturemust forgive him his errors, since she herself was their cause. But thenature of things, if taken as without intelligence and without choice, hasin it nothing sufficiently determinant. Herr Becher did not sufficientlytake into account that the Author of things (_natura naturans_) must begood and wise, and that we can be evil without complicity on his part inour acts of wickedness. When a wicked man exists, God must have found inthe region of possibles the idea of such a man forming part of thatsequence of things, the choice of which was demanded by the greatestperfection of the universe, and in which errors and sins are not onlypunished but even repaired to greater advantage, so that they contribute tothe greatest good. 

351. M. Bayle, however, has extended the free choice of God a little toofar. Speaking of the Peripatetic Strato (_Reply to the Questions of aProvincial_, vol. III, ch. 180, p. 1239), who asserted that everything hadbeen brought forth by the necessity of a nature devoid of intelligence, hemaintains that this philosopher, on being asked why a tree has not thepower to form bones and veins, might have asked in his turn: Why has matterprecisely three dimensions? why should not two have sufficed for it? whyhas it not four? 'If one had answered that there can be neither more norless than three dimensions he would have demanded the cause of thisimpossibility. ' These words lead one to believe that M. Bayle suspectedthat the number of the dimensions of matter depended upon God's choice, even as it depended upon him to cause or not to cause trees to produceanimals. Indeed, how do we know whether there are not planetary globes orearths situated in some more remote place in the universe where the fableof the Barnacle-geese of Scotland (birds that were said to be born oftrees) proves true, and even whether there are not countries where onecould say:

 _. . . Populos umbrosa creavit_ _Fraxinus, et foeta viridis puer excidit alno?_

But with the dimensions of matter it is not thus: the ternary number isdetermined for it not by the reason of the best, but by a geometricalnecessity, because the geometricians have been able to prove that there areonly three straight lines perpendicular to one another which can intersectat one and the same point. Nothing more appropriate could have been [336]chosen to show the difference there is between the moral necessity thataccounts for the choice of wisdom and the brute necessity of Strato and theadherents of Spinoza, who deny to God understanding and will, than aconsideration of the difference existing between the reason for the laws ofmotion and the reason for the ternary number of the dimensions: for thefirst lies in the choice of the best and the second in a geometrical andblind necessity. 

352. Having spoken of the laws of bodies, that is, of the rules of motion, let us come to the laws of the union between body and soul, where M. Baylebelieves that he finds again some vague indifference, something absolutelyarbitrary. Here is the way he speaks of it in his _Reply_ (vol. II, ch. 84, p. 163): 'It is a puzzling question whether bodies have some naturalproperty of doing harm or good to man's soul. If one answers yes, oneplunges into an insane labyrinth: for, as man's soul is an immaterialsubstance, one will be bound to say that the local movement of certainbodies is an efficient cause of the thoughts in a mind, a statementcontrary to the most obvious notions that philosophy imparts to us. If oneanswers no, one will be constrained to admit that the influence of ourorgans upon our thoughts depends neither upon the internal qualities ofmatter, nor upon the laws of motion, but upon an _arbitrary institution_ ofthe creator. One must then admit that it depended altogether upon God'sfreedom to combine particular thoughts of our soul with particularmodifications of our body, even when he had once established all the lawsfor the action of bodies one upon another. Whence it results that there isin the universe no portion of matter which by its proximity can harm us, save when God wills it; and consequently, that the earth is as capable asany other place of being the abode of the happy man. . . . In short it isevident that there is no need, in order to prevent the wrong choices offreedom, to transport man outside the earth. God could do on earth withregard to all the acts of the will what he does in respect of the goodworks of the predestined when he settles their outcome, whether byefficacious or by sufficient grace: and that grace, without in any wayimpairing freedom, is always followed by the assent of the soul. It wouldbe as easy for him on earth as in heaven to bring about the determinationof our souls to a good choice. '

353. I agree with M. Bayle that God could have so ordered bodies and [337]souls on this globe of earth, whether by ways of nature or by extraordinarygraces, that it would have been a perpetual paradise and a foretaste of thecelestial state of the blessed. There is no reason why there should not beworlds happier than ours; but God had good reasons for willing that oursshould be such as it is. Nevertheless, in order to prove that a betterstate would have been possible here, M. Bayle had no need to resort to thesystem of occasional causes: it abounds in miracles and in hypotheses forwhich their very originators confess there is no justification; and theseare two defects such as will most of all estrange a system from truephilosophy. It is a cause for surprise, in the first place, that M. Bayledid not bethink himself of the System of Pre-established Harmony which hehad examined before, and which for this matter was so opportune. But as inthis system all is connected and harmonious, all following from reasons andnothing being left incomplete or exposed to the rash discretion of perfectindifference, it seems that it was not pleasing to M. Bayle: for he washere somewhat biassed in favour of such indifference, which, notwithstanding, he contested so strongly on other occasions. He was muchgiven to passing from one extreme to the other, not with an ill intentionor against his own conviction, but because there was as yet nothing settledin his mind on the question concerned. He contented himself with whateversuited him for frustrating the opponent he had in mind, his aim being onlyto perplex philosophers, and show the weakness of our reason; and never, inmy opinion, did either Arcesilaus or Carneades argue for and against withmore eloquence and more wit. But, after all, one must not doubt for thesake of doubting: doubts must serve us as a gangway to the truth. That iswhat I often said to the late Abbé Foucher, a few specimens of whose workprove that he designed to do with regard to the Academicians what Lipsiusand Scioppius had done for the Stoics, and M. Gassendi for Epicurus, andwhat M. Dacier has so well begun for Plato. It must not be possible for usto offer true philosophers such a reproach as that implied in thecelebrated Casaubon's answer to those who, in showing him the hall of theSorbonne, told him that debate had been carried on there for somecenturies. What conclusions have been reached? he said to them. 

354. M. Bayle goes on (p. 166): 'It is true that since the laws of motionwere instituted in such forms as we see now in the world, it is aninevitable necessity that a hammer striking a nut should break it, and[338]that a stone falling on a man's foot should cause some bruise or somederangement of its parts. But that is all that can follow the action ofthis stone upon the human body. If you want it in addition to cause afeeling of pain, then one must assume the institution of a code other thanthat one which regulates the action and reaction of bodies one uponanother; one must, I say, have recourse to the particular system of thelaws of union between the soul and certain bodies. Now as this system isnot of necessity connected with the other, the indifference of God does notcease in relation to the one immediately upon his choice of the other. Hetherefore combined these two systems with a complete freedom, like twothings which did not follow naturally the one from the other. Thus it is byan arbitrary institution he has ordained that wounds in the body shouldcause pain in the soul which is united to this body. It therefore onlyrested with him to have chosen another system of union between soul andbody: he was therefore able to choose one in accordance wherewith woundsonly evoke the idea of the remedy and an intense but agreeable desire toapply it. He was able to arrange that all bodies which were on the point ofbreaking a man's head or piercing his heart should evoke a lively sense ofdanger, and that this sense should cause the body to remove itself promptlyout of reach of the blow. All that would have come to pass withoutmiracles, since there would have been general laws on this subject. Thesystem which we know by experience teaches us that the determination of themovement of certain bodies changes in pursuance of our desires. It wastherefore possible for a combination to be effected between our desires andthe movement of certain bodies, whereby the nutritive juices were somodified that the good arrangement of our organs was never affected. '

355. It is evident that M. Bayle believes that everything accomplishedthrough general laws is accomplished without miracles. But I have shownsufficiently that if the law is not founded on reasons and does not serveto explain the event through the nature of things, it can only be put intoexecution by a miracle. If, for example, God had ordained that bodies musthave a circular motion, he would have needed perpetual miracles, or theministry of angels, to put this order into execution: for that is contraryto the nature of motion, whereby the body naturally abandons the circularline to continue in the tangent straight line if nothing holds it [339]back. Therefore it is not enough for God to ordain simply that a woundshould excite an agreeable sensation: natural means must be found for thatpurpose. The real means whereby God causes the soul to be conscious of whathappens in the body have their origin in the nature of the soul, whichrepresents the bodies, and is so made beforehand that the representationswhich are to spring up one from another within it, by a natural sequence ofthoughts, correspond to the changes in the body. 

356. The representation has a natural relation to that which is to berepresented. If God should have the round shape of a body represented bythe idea of a square, that would be an unsuitable representation: for therewould be angles or projections in the representation, while all would beeven and smooth in the original. The representation often suppressessomething in the objects when it is imperfect; but it can add nothing: thatwould render it, not more than perfect, but false. Moreover, thesuppression is never complete in our perceptions, and there is in therepresentation, confused as it is, more than we see there. Thus there isreason for supposing that the ideas of heat, cold, colours, etc. , also onlyrepresent the small movements carried out in the organs, when one isconscious of these qualities, although the multiplicity and the diminutivecharacter of these movements prevents their clear representation. Almost inthe same way it happens that we do not distinguish the blue and the yellowwhich play their part in the representation as well as in the compositionof the green, when the microscope shows that what appears to be green iscomposed of yellow and blue parts. 

357. It is true that the same thing may be represented in different ways;but there must always be an exact relation between the representation andthe thing, and consequently between the different representations of oneand the same thing. The projections in perspective of the conic sections ofthe circle show that one and the same circle may be represented by anellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, and even by another circle, a straightline and a point. Nothing appears so different nor so dissimilar as thesefigures; and yet there is an exact relation between each point and everyother point. Thus one must allow that each soul represents the universe toitself according to its point of view, and through a relation which ispeculiar to it; but a perfect harmony always subsists therein. God, if hewished to effect representation of the dissolution of continuity of [340]the body by an agreeable sensation in the soul, would not have neglected toensure that this very dissolution should serve some perfection in the body, by giving it some new relief, as when one is freed of some burden or loosedfrom some bond. But organic bodies of such kinds, although possible, do notexist upon our globe, which doubtless lacks innumerable inventions that Godmay have put to use elsewhere. Nevertheless it is enough that, dueallowance being made for the place our world holds in the universe, nothingcan be done for it better than what God does. He makes the best possibleuse of the laws of nature which he has established and (as M. Regis alsoacknowledged in the same passage) 'the laws that God has established innature are the most excellent it is possible to conceive'. 

358. I will add to that the remark from the _Journal des Savants_ of the16th March 1705, which M. Bayle has inserted in chapter 162 of the _Replyto the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, p. 1030). The matter inquestion is the extract from a very ingenious modern book on the Origin ofEvil, to which I have already referred here. It is stated: 'that thegeneral solution in respect of physical evil which this book gives is thatthe universe must be regarded as a work composed of various pieces whichform a whole; that, according to the laws established in nature, some partscannot be better unless others become worse, whence would result a systemless perfect as a whole. This principle', the writer goes on, 'is good; butif nothing is added to it, it does not appear sufficient. Why has Godestablished laws that give rise to so many difficulties? philosophers whoare somewhat precise will say. Could he not have established others of akind not subject to any defects? And to cut the matter short, how comes itthat he has prescribed laws for himself? Why does he not act withoutgeneral laws, in accordance with all his power and all his goodness? Thewriter has not carried the difficulty as far as that. By disentangling hisideas one might indeed possibly find means of solving the difficulty, butthere is no development of the subject in his work. '

359. I suppose that the gifted author of this extract, when he thought thedifficulty could be solved, had in mind something akin to my principles onthis matter. If he had vouchsafed to declare himself in this passage, hewould to all appearance have replied, like M. Regis, that the laws Godestablished were the most excellent that could be established. He wouldhave acknowledged, at the same time, that God could not have refrained[341]from establishing laws and following rules, because laws and rules are whatmakes order and beauty; that to act without rules would be to act withoutreason; and that because God _called into action all his goodness_ theexercise of his omnipotence was consistent with the laws of wisdom, tosecure as much good as was possible of attainment. Finally, he would havesaid, the existence of certain particular disadvantages which strike us isa sure indication that the best plan did not permit of their avoidance, andthat they assist in the achievement of the total good, an argumentwherewith M. Bayle in more than one place expresses agreement. 

360. Now that I have proved sufficiently that everything comes to passaccording to determinate reasons, there cannot be any more difficulty overthese principles of God's foreknowledge. Although these determinations donot compel, they cannot but be certain, and they foreshadow what shallhappen. It is true that God sees all at once the whole sequence of thisuniverse, when he chooses it, and that thus he has no need of the connexionof effects and causes in order to foresee these effects. But since hiswisdom causes him to choose a sequence in perfect connexion, he cannot butsee one part of the sequence in the other. It is one of the rules of mysystem of general harmony, _that the present is big with the future_, andthat he who sees all sees in that which is that which shall be. What ismore, I have proved conclusively that God sees in each portion of theuniverse the whole universe, owing to the perfect connexion of things. Heis infinitely more discerning than Pythagoras, who judged the height ofHercules by the size of his footprint. There must therefore be no doubtthat effects follow their causes determinately, in spite of contingency andeven of freedom, which nevertheless exist together with certainty ordetermination. 

361. Durand de Saint-Pourçain, among others, has indicated this clearly insaying that contingent futurities are seen determinately in their causes, and that God, who knows all, seeing all that shall have power to tempt orrepel the will, will see therein the course it shall take. I could citemany other authors who have said the same thing, and reason does not allowthe possibility of thinking otherwise. M. Jacquelot implies also(_Conformity of Faith with Reason_, p. 318 _et seqq. _), as M. Bayleobserves (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 142, p. 796), that the dispositions of the human heart and those of circumstancesacquaint God unerringly with the choice that man shall make. M. Bayle [342]adds that some Molinists say the same, and refers us to those who arequoted in the _Suavis Concordia_ of Pierre de S. Joseph, the Feuillant (pp. 579, 580). 

362. Those who have confused this determination with necessity havefabricated monsters in order to fight them. To avoid a reasonable thingwhich they had disguised under a hideous shape, they have fallen into greatabsurdities. For fear of being obliged to admit an imaginary necessity, orat least one different from that in question, they have admitted somethingwhich happens without the existence of any cause or reason for it. Thisamounts to the same as the absurd deviation of atoms, which according toEpicurus happened without any cause. Cicero, in his book on Divination, sawclearly that if the cause could produce an effect towards which it wasentirely indifferent there would be a true chance, a genuine luck, anactual fortuitous case, that is, one which would be so not merely inrelation to us and our ignorance, according to which one may say:

 _Sed Te_ _Nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam, caeloque locamus, _

but even in relation to God and to the nature of things. Consequently itwould be impossible to foresee events by judging of the future by the past. He adds fittingly in the same passage: 'Qui potest provideri, quicquamfuturum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam, neque notam cur futurum sit?'and soon after: 'Nihil est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae, quamfortuna; ut mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videatur, ut sciat quid casu etfortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet: sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est. ' If the future is certain, there is no such thing asluck. But he wrongly adds: 'Est autum fortuna; rerum igitur fortuitarumnulla praesensio est. ' There is luck, therefore future events cannot beforeseen. He ought rather to have concluded that, events beingpredetermined and foreseen, there is no luck. But he was then speakingagainst the Stoics, in the character of an Academician. 

363. The Stoics already derived from the decrees of God the prevision ofevents. For, as Cicero says in the same book: 'Sequitur porro nihil Deosignorare, quod omnia ab iis sint constituta. ' And, according to my system, God, having seen the possible world that he desired to create, foresaw[343]everything therein. Thus one may say that the _divine knowledge of visiondiffers from the knowledge of simple intelligence_ only in that it adds tothe latter the acquaintance with the actual decree to choose this sequenceof things which simple intelligence had already presented, but only aspossible; and this decree now makes the present universe. 

364. Thus the Socinians cannot be excused for denying to God the certainknowledge of future events, and above all of the future resolves of a freecreature. For even though they had supposed that there is a freedom ofcomplete indifference, so that the will can choose without cause, and thatthus this effect could not be seen in its cause (which is a greatabsurdity), they ought always to take into account that God was able toforesee this event in the idea of the possible world that he resolved tocreate. But the idea which they have of God is unworthy of the Author ofthings, and is not commensurate with the skill and wit which the writers ofthis party often display in certain particular discussions. The author ofthe _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_ was not altogether mistakenin saying that the God of the Socinians would be ignorant and powerless, like the God of Epicurus, every day confounded by events and living fromone day to the next, if he only knows by conjecture what the will of men isto be. 

365. The whole difficulty here has therefore only come from a wrong idea ofcontingency and of freedom, which was thought to have need of a completeindifference or equipoise, an imaginary thing, of which neither a notionnor an example exists, nor ever can exist. Apparently M. Descartes had beenimbued with the idea in his youth, at the College of la Flèche. That causedhim to say (part I of his _Principles_, art. 41): 'Our thought is finite, and the knowledge and omnipotence of God, whereby he has not only knownfrom all eternity everything that is, or that can be, but also has willedit, is infinite. Thus we have enough intelligence to recognize clearly anddistinctly that this power and this knowledge are in God; but we have notenough so to comprehend their extent that we can know how they leave theactions of men entirely free and indeterminate. ' The continuation hasalready been quoted above. 'Entirely free', that is right; but one spoilseverything by adding 'entirely indeterminate'. One has no need of infiniteknowledge in order to see that the foreknowledge and the providence of Godallow freedom to our actions, since God has foreseen those actions in [344]his ideas, just as they are, that is, free. Laurentius Valla indeed, in his_Dialogue against Boethius_ (which I will presently quote in epitome) ablyundertakes to reconcile freedom with foreknowledge, but does not venture tohope that he can reconcile it with providence. Yet there is no moredifficulty in the one than the other, because the decree to give existenceto this action no more changes its nature than does one's mereconsciousness thereof. But there is no knowledge, however infinite it be, which can reconcile the knowledge and providence of God with actions of anindeterminate cause, that is to say, with a chimerical and impossiblebeing. The actions of the will are determined in two ways, by theforeknowledge or providence of God, and also by the dispositions of theparticular immediate cause, which lie in the inclinations of the soul. M. Descartes followed the Thomists on this point; but he wrote with his usualcircumspection, so as not to come into conflict with some othertheologians. 

366. M. Bayle relates (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 142, p. 804) that Father Gibieuf of the Oratory published a Latintreatise on the freedom of God and of the creature, in the year 1639; thathe was met with protests, and was shown a collection of seventycontradictions taken from the first book of his work; and that, twentyyears after, Father Annat, Confessor to the King of France, reproached himin his book _De Incoacta Libertate_ (ed. Rome, 1654, in 4to. ), for thesilence he still maintained. Who would not think (adds M. Bayle), after theuproar of the _de Auxiliis_ Congregations, that the Thomists taught thingstouching the nature of free will which were entirely opposed to the opinionof the Jesuits? When, however, one considers the passages that Father Annatquoted from the works of the Thomists (in a pamphlet entitled: _Jansenius aThomistis, gratiae per se ipsam efficacis defensoribus, condemnatus_, printed in Paris in the year 1654 in 4to. ) one can in reality only seeverbal controversies between the two sects. The grace efficacious ofitself, according to the one side, leaves to free will quite as much powerof resistance as the congruent grace of the others. M. Bayle thinks one cansay almost as much of Jansenius himself. He was (so he says) an able man, of a methodical mind and of great assiduity. He worked for twenty-two yearsat his _Augustinus_. One of his aims was to refute the Jesuits on the dogmaof free will; yet no decision has yet been reached as to whether he rejectsor adopts freedom of indifference. From his work innumerable passages [345]are quoted for and against this opinion, as Father Annat has himself shownin the work that has just been mentioned, _De Incoacta Libertate_. So easyis it to render this subject obscure, as M. Bayle says at the conclusion ofthis discourse. As for Father Gibieuf, it must be admitted that he oftenalters the meaning of his terms, and that consequently he does not answerthe question in the main, albeit he often writes with good sense. 

367. Indeed, confusion springs, more often than not, from ambiguity interms, and from one's failure to take trouble over gaining clear ideasabout them. That gives rise to these eternal, and usually mistaken, contentions on necessity and contingency, on the possible and theimpossible. But provided that it is understood that necessity andpossibility, taken metaphysically and strictly, depend solely upon thisquestion, whether the object in itself or that which is opposed to itimplies contradiction or not; and that one takes into account thatcontingency is consistent with the inclinations, or reasons whichcontribute towards causing determination by the will; provided also thatone knows how to distinguish clearly between necessity and determination orcertainty, between metaphysical necessity, which admits of no choice, presenting only one single object as possible, and moral necessity, whichconstrains the wisest to choose the best; finally, provided that one is ridof the chimera of complete indifference, which can only be found in thebooks of philosophers, and on paper (for they cannot even conceive thenotion in their heads, or prove its reality by an example in things) onewill easily escape from a labyrinth whose unhappy Daedalus was the humanmind. That labyrinth has caused infinite confusion, as much with theancients as with those of later times, even so far as to lead men into theabsurd error of the Lazy Sophism, which closely resembles fate after theTurkish fashion. I do not wonder if in reality the Thomists and theJesuits, and even the Molinists and the Jansenists, agree together on thismatter more than is supposed. A Thomist and even a wise Jansenist willcontent himself with certain determination, without going on to necessity:and if someone goes so far, the error mayhap will lie only in the word. Awise Molinist will be content with an indifference opposed to necessity, but such as shall not exclude prevalent inclinations. 

368. These difficulties, however, have greatly impressed M. Bayle, who[346]was more inclined to dwell on them than to solve them, although he mightperhaps have had better success than anyone if he had thought fit to turnhis mind in that direction. Here is what he says of them in his_Dictionary_, art. 'Jansenius', lit. G, p. 1626: 'Someone has said that thesubject of Grace is an ocean which has neither shore nor bottom. Perhaps hewould have spoken more correctly if he had compared it to the Strait ofMessina, where one is always in danger of striking one reef whileendeavouring to avoid another. 

 _Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis_ _Obsidet. _

Everything comes back in the end to this: Did Adam sin freely? If youanswer yes, then you will be told, his fall was not foreseen. If you answerno, then you will be told, he is not guilty. You may write a hundredvolumes against the one or the other of these conclusions, and yet you willconfess, either that the infallible prevision of a contingent event is amystery impossible to conceive, or that the way in which a creature whichacts without freedom sins nevertheless is altogether incomprehensible. '

369. Either I am greatly mistaken or these two allegedincomprehensibilities are ended altogether by my solutions. Would to God itwere as easy to answer the question how to cure fevers, and how to avoidthe perils of two chronic sicknesses that may originate, the one from notcuring the fever, the other from curing it wrongly. When one asserts that afree event cannot be foreseen, one is confusing freedom withindetermination, or with indifference that is complete and in equipoise;and when one maintains that the lack of freedom would prevent man frombeing guilty, one means a freedom exempt, not from determination or fromcertainty, but from necessity and from constraint. This shows that thedilemma is not well expressed, and that there is a wide passage between thetwo perilous reefs. One will reply, therefore, that Adam sinned freely, andthat God saw him sinning in the possible state of Adam, which became actualin accordance with the decree of the divine permission. It is true thatAdam was determined to sin in consequence of certain prevailinginclinations: but this determination destroys neither contingency norfreedom. Moreover, the certain determination to sin which exists in mandoes not deprive him of the power to avoid sinning (speaking generally) or, since he does sin, prevent him from being guilty and deserving [347]punishment. This is more especially so since the punishment may be ofservice to him or others, to contribute towards determining them anothertime not to sin. There is besides punitive justice, which goes beyondcompensation and amendment, and wherein also there is nothing liable to beshaken by the certain determination of the contingent resolutions of thewill. It may be said, on the contrary, that the penalties and rewards wouldbe to some extent unavailing, and would fail in one of their aims, that ofamendment, if they could not contribute towards determining the will to dobetter another time. 

370. M. Bayle continues: 'Where freedom is concerned there are only twocourses to take: one is to say that all the causes distinct from the soul, and co-operating with it, leave it the power to act or not to act; theother is to say that they so determine it to act that it cannot forbear todo so. The first course is that taken by the Molinists, the other is thatof the Thomists and Jansenists and the Protestants of the GenevaConfession. Yet the Thomists have clamorously maintained that they were notJansenists; and the latter have maintained with equal warmth that wherefreedom was concerned they were not Calvinists. On the other hand, theMolinists have maintained that St. Augustine did not teach Jansenism. Thusthe one side not wishing to admit that they were in conformity with peoplewho were considered heretics, and the other side not wishing to admit thatthey were in opposition to a learned saint whose opinions were alwaysconsidered orthodox, have both performed a hundred feats of contortion, etc. '

371. The two courses which M. Bayle distinguishes here do not exclude athird course, according to which the determination of the soul does notcome solely from the co-operation of all the causes distinct from the soul, but also from the state of the soul itself and its inclinations whichmingle with the impressions of the senses, strengthening or weakening them. Now all the internal and external causes taken together bring it about thatthe soul is determined certainly, but not of necessity: for nocontradiction would be implied if the soul were to be determineddifferently, it being possible for the will to be inclined, but notpossible for it to be compelled by necessity. I will not venture upon adiscussion of the difference existing between the Jansenists and theReformed on this matter. They are not perhaps always fully in accord [348]with themselves as regards things, or as regards expressions, on a matterwhere one often loses one's way in bewildering subtleties. Father TheophileRaynaud, in his book entitled _Calvinismus Religio Bestiarum_, wished tostrike at the Dominicans, without naming them. On the other hand, those whoprofessed to be followers of St. Augustine reproached the Molinists withPelagianism or at the least semi-Pelagianism. Things were carried to excessat times by both sides, whether in their defence of a vague indifferenceand the granting of too much to man, or in their teaching _determinationemad unum secundum qualitatem actus licet non quoad ejus substantiam_, thatis to say, a determination to evil in the non-regenerate, as if they didnothing but sin. After all, I think one must not reproach any but theadherents of Hobbes and Spinoza with destroying freedom and contingency;for they think that that which happens is alone possible, and must happenby a brute geometrical necessity. Hobbes made everything material andsubjected it to mathematical laws alone; Spinoza also divested God ofintelligence and choice, leaving him a blind power, whence all emanates ofnecessity. The theologians of the two Protestant parties are equallyzealous in refuting an unendurable necessity. Although those who follow theSynod of Dordrecht teach sometimes that it suffices for freedom to beexempt from constraint, it seems that the necessity they leave in it isonly hypothetical, or rather that which is more appropriately termedcertainty and infallibility. Thus it results that very often thedifficulties only lie in the terms. I say as much with regard to theJansenists, although I do not wish to make excuse for those people ineverything. 

372. With the Hebrew Cabalists, _Malcuth_ or the Kingdom, the last of theSephiroth, signified that God controls everything irresistibly, but gentlyand without violence, so that man thinks he is following his own will whilehe carries out God's. They said that Adam's sin had been _truncatio Malcutha caeteris plantis_, that is to say, that Adam had cut back the last of theSephiroth, by making a dominion for himself within God's dominion, and byassuming for himself a freedom independent of God, but that his fall hadtaught him that he could not subsist of himself, and that men must needs beredeemed by the Messiah. This doctrine may receive a good interpretation. But Spinoza, who was versed in the Cabala of the writers of his race, andwho says (_Tractatus Politicus_, c. 2, n. 6) that men, conceiving offreedom as they do, establish a dominion within God's dominion, has [349]gone too far. The dominion of God is with Spinoza nothing but the dominionof necessity, and of a blind necessity (as with Strato), whereby everythingemanates from the divine nature, while no choice is left to God, and man'schoice does not exempt him from necessity. He adds that men, in order toestablish what is termed _Imperium in Imperio_, supposed that their soulwas a direct creation of God, something which could not be produced bynatural causes, furthermore that it had an absolute power of determination, a state of things contrary to experience. Spinoza is right in opposing anabsolute power of determination, that is, one without any grounds; it doesnot belong even to God. But he is wrong in thinking that a soul, that asimple substance, can be produced naturally. It seems, indeed, that thesoul to him was only a transient modification; and when he pretends to makeit lasting, and even perpetual, he substitutes for it the idea of the body, which is purely a notion and not a real and actual thing. 

373. The story M. Bayle relates of Johan Bredenburg, a citizen of Rotterdam(_Dictionary_, art. 'Spinoza', lit. H, p. 2774) is curious. He published abook against Spinoza, entitled: _Enervatio Tractatus Theologico-politici, una cum demonstratione geometrico ordine disposita, Naturam non esse Deum, cujus effati contrario praedictus Tractatus unice innititur_. One wassurprised to see that a man who did not follow the profession of letters, and who had but slight education (having written his book in Flemish, andhad it translated into Latin), had been able to penetrate with suchsubtlety all the principles of Spinoza, and succeed in overthrowing them, after having reduced them by a candid analysis to a state wherein theycould appear in their full force. I have been told (adds M. Bayle) thatthis writer after copious reflexion upon his answer, and upon the principleof his opponent, finally found that this principle could be reduced to theform of a demonstration. He undertook therefore to prove that there is nocause of all things other than a nature which exists necessarily, and whichacts according to an immutable, inevitable and irrevocable necessity. Heexamined the whole system of the geometricians, and after havingconstructed his demonstration he scrutinized it from every imaginableangle, he endeavoured to find its weak spot and was never able to discoverany means of destroying it, or even of weakening it. That caused him realdistress: he groaned over it and begged the most talented of his [350]friends to help him in searching out the defects of this demonstration. Forall that, he was not well pleased that copies of the book were made. FranzCuper, a Socinian (who had written _Arcana Atheismi Revelata_ againstSpinoza, Rotterdam, 1676, in 4to. ), having obtained a copy, published itjust as it was, that is, in Flemish, with some reflexions, and accused theauthor of being an atheist. The accused made his defence in the sametongue. Orobio, a very able Jewish physician (that one who was refuted byM. Limbourg, and who replied, so I have heard say, in a work posthumouslycirculated, but unpublished), brought out a book opposing Bredenburg'sdemonstration, entitled: _Certamen Philosophicum Propugnatae VeritatisDivinae ac Naturalis, adversus J. B. Principia, Amsterdam_, 1684. M. Aubertde Versé also wrote in opposition to him the same year under the name ofLatinus Serbattus Sartensis. Bredenburg protested that he was convinced offree will and of religion, and that he wished he might be shown apossibility of refuting his own demonstration. 

374. I would desire to see this alleged demonstration, and to know whetherit tended to prove that primitive Nature, which produces all, acts withoutchoice and without knowledge. In this case, I admit that his proof wasSpinozistic and dangerous. But if he meant perhaps that the divine natureis determined toward that which it produces, by its choice and through themotive of the best, there was no need for him to grieve about thisso-called immutable, inevitable, irrevocable necessity. It is only moral, it is a happy necessity; and instead of destroying religion it shows divineperfection to the best advantage. 

375. I take this opportunity to add that M. Bayle quotes (p. 2773) theopinion of those who believe that the book entitled _Lucii AntistiiConstantis de Jure Ecclesiasticorum Liber Singularis_, published in 1665, is by Spinoza. But I have reason for doubting this, despite that M. Colerus, who has passed on to me an account he wrote of the life of thatfamous Jew, is also of that opinion. The initial letters L. A. C. Lead me tobelieve that the author of this book was M. De la Cour or Van den Hoof, famous for works on the _Interest of Holland, Political Equipoise_, andnumerous other books that he published (some of them under the signatureV. D. H. ) attacking the power of the Governor of Holland, which was at thattime considered a danger to the Republic; for the memory of Prince Williamthe Second's attempt upon the city of Amsterdam was still quite fresh. [351]Most of the ecclesiastics of Holland were on the side of this prince's son, who was then a minor, and they suspected M. De Witt and what was called theLowenstein faction of favouring the Arminians, the Cartesians, and othersects that were feared still more, endeavouring to rouse the populaceagainst them, and not without success, as the event proved. It was thusvery natural that M. De la Cour should publish this book. It is true thatpeople seldom keep to the happy mean in works published to further partyinterests. I will say in passing that a French version of the _Interest ofHolland_ by M. De la Cour has just been published, under the deceptivetitle of _Mémoires de M. Le Grand-Pensionnaire de Witt_; as if the thoughtsof a private individual, who was, to be sure, of de Witt's party, and a manof talent, but who had not enough acquaintance with public affairs orenough ability to write as that great Minister of State might have written, could pass for the production of one of the first men of his time. 

376. I saw M. De la Cour as well as Spinoza on my return from France by wayof England and Holland, and I learnt from them a few good anecdotes on theaffairs of that time. M. Bayle says, p. 2770, that Spinoza studied Latinunder a physician named Franz van den Ende. He tells at the same time, onthe authority of Sebastian Kortholt (who refers to it in the preface to thesecond edition of the book by his late father, _De Tribus Impostoribus, Herberto L. B. De Cherbury, Hobbio et Spinoza_) that a girl instructedSpinoza in Latin, and that she afterwards married M. Kerkering, who was herpupil at the same time as Spinoza. In connexion with that I note that thisyoung lady was a daughter of M. Van den Ende, and that she assisted herfather in the work of teaching. Van den Ende, who was also called A. Finibus, later went to Paris, and there kept a boarding-school in theFaubourg St. Antoine. He was considered excellent as an instructor, and hetold me, when I called upon him there, that he would wager that hisaudiences would always pay attention to his words. He had with him as wellat that time a young girl who also spoke Latin, and worked upon geometricaldemonstrations. He had insinuated himself into M. Arnauld's good graces, and the Jesuits began to be jealous of his reputation. But he disappearedshortly afterwards, having been mixed up in the Chevalier de Rohan'sconspiracy. 

377. I think I have sufficiently proved that neither the foreknowledge northe providence of God can impair either his justice or his goodness, [352]or our freedom. There remains only the difficulty arising from God'sco-operation with the actions of the creature, which seems to concern moreclosely both his goodness, in relation to our evil actions, and ourfreedom, in relation to good actions as well as to others. M. Bayle hasbrought out this also with his usual acuteness. I will endeavour to throwlight upon the difficulties he puts forward, and then I shall be in aposition to conclude this work. I have already proved that the co-operationof God consists in giving us continually all that is real in us and in ouractions, in so far as it involves perfection; but that all that is limitedand imperfect therein is a consequence of the previous limitations whichare originally in the creature. Since, moreover, every action of thecreature is a change of its modifications, it is obvious that action arisesin the creature in relation to the limitations or negations which it haswithin itself, and which are diversified by this change. 

378. I have already pointed out more than once in this work that evil is aconsequence of privation, and I think that I have explained thatintelligibly enough. St. Augustine has already put forward this idea, andSt. Basil said something of the same kind in his _Hexaëmeron_, Homil. 2, 'that vice is not a living and animate substance, but an affection of thesoul contrary to virtue, which arises from one's abandoning the good; andthere is therefore no need to look for an original evil'. M. Bayle, quotingthis passage in his _Dictionary_ (art. 'Paulicians', lit. D, p. 2325)commends a remark by Herr Pfanner (whom he calls a German theologian, buthe is a jurist by profession, Counsellor to the Dukes of Saxony), whocensures St. Basil for not being willing to admit that God is the author ofphysical evil. Doubtless God is its author, when the moral evil is assumedto be already in existence; but speaking generally, one might assert thatGod permitted physical evil by implication, in permitting moral evil whichis its source. It appears that the Stoics knew also how slender is theentity of evil. These words of Epictetus are an indication: 'Sicutaberrandi causa meta non ponitur, sic nec natura mali in mundo existit. '

379. There was therefore no need to have recourse to a principle of evil, as St. Basil aptly observes. Nor is it necessary either to seek the originof evil in matter. Those who believed that there was a chaos before Godlaid his hand upon it sought therein the source of disorder. It was anopinion which Plato introduced into his _Timaeus_. Aristotle found faultwith him for that (in his third book on Heaven, ch. 2) because, [353]according to this doctrine, disorder would be original and natural, andorder would have been introduced against nature. This Anaxagoras avoided bymaking matter remain at rest until it was stirred by God; and Aristotle inthe same passage commends him for it. According to Plutarch (_De Iside etOsiride_, and _Tr. De Animae Procreatione ex Timaeo_) Plato recognized inmatter a certain maleficent soul or force, rebellious against God: it wasan actual blemish, an obstacle to God's plans. The Stoics also believedthat matter was the source of defects, as Justus Lipsius showed in thefirst book of the Physiology of the Stoics. 

380. Aristotle was right in rejecting chaos: but it is not always easy todisentangle the conceptions of Plato, and such a task would be still lesseasy in respect of some ancient authors whose works are lost. Kepler, oneof the most excellent of modern mathematicians, recognized a species ofimperfection in matter, even when there is no irregular motion: he calls itits 'natural inertia', which gives it a resistance to motion, whereby agreater mass receives less speed from one and the same force. There issoundness in this observation, and I have used it to advantage in thiswork, in order to have a comparison such as should illustrate how theoriginal imperfection of the creatures sets bounds to the action of theCreator, which tends towards good. But as matter is itself of God'screation, it only furnishes a comparison and an example, and cannot be thevery source of evil and of imperfection. I have already shown that thissource lies in the forms or ideas of the possibles, for it must be eternal, and matter is not so. Now since God made all positive reality that is noteternal, he would have made the source of evil, if that did not rather liein the possibility of things or forms, that which alone God did not make, since he is not the author of his own understanding. 

381. Yet even though the source of evil lies in the possible forms, anterior to the acts of God's will, it is nevertheless true that Godco-operates in evil in the actual performance of introducing these formsinto matter: and this is what causes the difficulty in question here. Durand de Saint-Pourçain, Cardinal Aureolus, Nicolas Taurel, Father Louisde Dole, M. Bernier and some others, speaking of this co-operation, wouldhave it only general, for fear of impairing the freedom of man and theholiness of God. They seem to maintain that God, having given to creaturesthe power to act, contents himself with conserving this power. On the [354]other hand, M. Bayle, according to some modern writers, carries thecooperation of God too far: he seems to fear lest the creature be notsufficiently dependent upon God. He goes so far as to deny action tocreatures; he does not even acknowledge any real distinction betweenaccident and substance. 

382. He places great reliance especially on that doctrine accepted of theSchoolmen, that conservation is a continued creation. The conclusion to bedrawn from this doctrine would seem to be that the creature never exists, that it is ever newborn and ever dying, like time, movement and othertransient beings. Plato believed this of material and tangible things, saying that they are in a perpetual flux, _semper fluunt, nunquam sunt_. But of immaterial substances he judged quite differently, regarding themalone as real: nor was he in that altogether mistaken. Yet continuedcreation applies to all creatures without distinction. Sundry goodphilosophers have been opposed to this dogma, and M. Bayle tells that Davidde Rodon, a philosopher renowned among those of the French who have adheredto Geneva, deliberately refuted it. The Arminians also do not approve ofit; they are not much in favour of these metaphysical subtleties. I willsay nothing of the Socinians, who relish them even less. 

383. For a proper enquiry as to _whether conservation is a continuedcreation, _ it would be necessary to consider the reasons whereon this dogmais founded. The Cartesians, after the example of their master, employ inorder to prove it a principle which is not conclusive enough. They say that'the moments of time having no necessary connexion with one another, itdoes not follow that because I am at this moment I shall exist at themoment which shall follow, if the same cause which gives me being for thismoment does not also give it to me for the instant following. ' The authorof the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_ has made use of thisargument, and M. Bayle (perhaps the author of this same _Reflexion_) quotesit (_Reply to the Questions of a Provincial_, vol. III, ch. 141, p. 771). One may answer that in fact it does not follow _of necessity_ that, becauseI am, I shall be; but this follows _naturally_, nevertheless, that is, ofitself, _per se_, if nothing prevents it. It is the distinction that can bedrawn between the essential and the natural. For the same movement enduresnaturally unless some new cause prevents it or changes it, because thereason which makes it cease at this instant, if it is no new reason, [355]would have already made it cease sooner. 

384. The late Herr Erhard Weigel, a celebrated mathematician andphilosopher at Jena, well known for his _Analysis Euclidea_, hismathematical philosophy, some neat mechanical inventions, and finally thetrouble he took to induce the Protestant princes of the Empire to undertakethe last reform of the Almanac, whose success, notwithstanding, he did notwitness; Herr Weigel, I say, communicated to his friends a certaindemonstration of the existence of God, which indeed amounted to this ideaof continued creation. As he was wont to draw parallels between reckoningand reasoning--witness his Arithmetical Ethics (_rechenschaftlicheSittenlehre_)--he said that the foundation of the demonstration was thisbeginning of the Pythagorean Table, _once one is one_. These repeatedunities were the moments of the existence of things, each one of themdepending upon God, who resuscitates, as it were, all things outsidehimself at each moment: falling away as they do at each moment, they mustever have one who shall resuscitate them, and that cannot be any other thanGod. But there would be need of a more exact proof if that is to be calleda demonstration. It would be necessary to prove that the creature alwaysemerges from nothingness and relapses thither forthwith. In particular itmust be shown that the privilege of enduring more than a moment by itsnature belongs to the necessary being alone. The difficulties on thecomposition of the _continuum_ enter also into this matter. This dogmaappears to resolve time into moments, whereas others regard moments andpoints as mere modalities of the _continuum_, that is, as extremities ofthe parts that can be assigned to it, and not as constituent parts. Butthis is not the place for entering into that labyrinth. 

385. What can be said for certain on the present subject is that thecreature depends continually upon divine operation, and that it dependsupon that no less after the time of its beginning than when it firstbegins. This dependence implies that it would not continue to exist if Goddid not continue to act; in short, that this action of God is free. For ifit were a necessary emanation, like that of the properties of the circle, which issue from its essence, it must then be said that God in thebeginning produced the creature by necessity; or else it must be shown how, in creating it once, he imposed upon himself the necessity of conservingit. Now there is no reason why this conserving action should not be [356]called production, and even creation, if one will: for the dependence beingas great afterwards as at the beginning, the extrinsic designation of beingnew or not does not change the nature of that action. 

386. Let us then admit in such a sense that conservation is a continuedcreation, and let us see what M. Bayle seems to infer thence (p. 771) afterthe author of the _Reflexion on the Picture of Socinianism_, in oppositionto M. Jurieu. 'It seems to me', this writer says, 'that one must concludethat God does all, and that in all creation there are no first or second oreven occasional causes, as can be easily proved. At this moment when Ispeak, I am such as I am, with all my circumstances, with such thought, such action, whether I sit or stand, that if God creates me in this momentsuch as I am, as one must of necessity say in this system, he creates mewith such thought, such action, such movement and such determination. Onecannot say that God creates me in the first place, and that once I amcreated he produces with me my movements and my determinations. That isindefensible for two reasons. The first is, that when God creates me orconserves me at this instant, he does not conserve me as a being withoutform, like a species, or another of the Universals of Logic. I am anindividual; he creates me and conserves me as such, and as being all that Iam in this instant, with all my attendant circumstances. The second reasonis that if God creates me in this instant, and one says that afterwards heproduces with me my actions, it will be necessary to imagine anotherinstant for action: for before acting one must exist. Now that would be twoinstants where we only assume one. It is therefore certain in thishypothesis that creatures have neither more connexion nor more relationwith their actions than they had with their production at the first momentof the first creation. ' The author of this _Reflexion_ draws thence veryharsh conclusions which one can picture to oneself; and he testifies at theend that one would be deeply indebted to any man that should teach thosewho approve this system how to extricate themselves from these frightfulabsurdities. 

387. M. Bayle carries this still further. 'You know', he says (p. 775), 'that it is demonstrated in the Scholastic writings' (he cites Arriaga, _Disp_. 9, Phys. , sect. 6 et praesertim, sub-sect. 3) 'that the creaturecannot be either the total cause or the partial cause of its conservation:for if it were, it would exist before existing, which is [357]contradictory. You know that the argument proceeds like this: that whichconserves itself acts; now that which acts exists, and nothing can actbefore it has attained complete existence; therefore, if a creatureconserved itself, it would act before being. This argument is not foundedupon probabilities, but upon the first principles of Metaphysics, _nonentis nulla sunt accidentia, operari sequitur esse_, axioms as clear asdaylight. Let us go further. If creatures co-operated with God (here ismeant an active cooperation, and not co-operation by a passive instrument)to conserve themselves they would act before being: that has beendemonstrated. Now if they co-operated with God for the production of anyother thing, they would also act before being; it is therefore asimpossible for them to co-operate with God for the production of any otherthing (such as local movement, an affirmation, volition, entities actuallydistinct from their substance, so it is asserted) as for their ownconservation. Since their conservation is a continued creation, and sinceall human creatures in the world must confess that they cannot co-operatewith God at the first moment of their existence, either to producethemselves or to give themselves any modality, since that would be to actbefore being (observe that Thomas Aquinas and sundry other Schoolmen teachthat if the angels had sinned at the first moment of their creation Godwould be the author of the sin: see the Feuillant Pierre de St. Joseph, p. 318, _et seqq_. , of the _Suavis Concordia Humanae Libertatis_; it is a signthat they acknowledge that at the first instant the creature cannot act inanything whatsoever), it follows manifestly that they cannot co-operatewith God in any one of the subsequent moments, either to produce themselvesor to produce any other thing. If they could co-operate therein at thesecond moment of their existence, nothing would prevent their being able tocooperate at the first moment. '

388. This is the way it will be necessary to answer these arguments. Let usassume that the creature is produced anew at each instant; let us grantalso that the instant excludes all priority of time, being indivisible; butlet us point out that it does not exclude priority of nature, or what iscalled anteriority _in signo rationis, _ and that this is sufficient. Theproduction, or action whereby God produces, is anterior by nature to theexistence of the creature that is produced; the creature taken in itself, with its nature and its necessary properties, is anterior to its accidentalaffections and to its actions; and yet all these things are in being [358]in the same moment. God produces the creature in conformity with theexigency of the preceding instants, according to the laws of his wisdom;and the creature operates in conformity with that nature which God conveysto it in creating it always. The limitations and imperfections arisetherein through the nature of the subject, which sets bounds to God'sproduction; this is the consequence of the original imperfection ofcreatures. Vice and crime, on the other hand, arise there through the freeinward operation of the creature, in so far as this can occur within theinstant, repetition afterwards rendering it discernible. 

389. This anteriority of nature is a commonplace in philosophy: thus onesays that the decrees of God have an order among themselves. When oneascribes to God (and rightly so) understanding of the arguments andconclusions of creatures, in such sort that all their demonstrations andsyllogisms are known to him, and are found in him in a transcendent way, one sees that there is in the propositions or truths a natural order; butthere is no order of time or interval, to cause him to advance in knowledgeand pass from the premisses to the conclusion. 

390. I find in the arguments that have just been quoted nothing which thesereflexions fail to satisfy. When God produces the thing he produces it asan individual and not as a universal of logic (I admit); but he producesits essence before its accidents, its nature before its operations, following the priority of their nature, and _in signo anteriore rationis_. Thus one sees how the creature can be the true cause of the sin, whileconservation by God does not prevent the sin; God disposes in accordancewith the preceding state of the same creature, in order to follow the lawsof his wisdom notwithstanding the sin, which in the first place will beproduced by the creature. But it is true that God would not in thebeginning have created the soul in a state wherein it would have sinnedfrom the first moment, as the Schoolmen have justly observed: for there isnothing in the laws of his wisdom that could have induced him so to do. 

391. This law of wisdom brings it about also that God reproduces the samesubstance, the same soul. Such was the answer that could have been given bythe Abbé whom M. Bayle introduces in his _Dictionary_ (art. 'Pyrrhon. ' lit. B, p. 2432). This wisdom effects the connexion of things. I concedetherefore that the creature does not co-operate with God to conserve [359]himself (in the sense in which I have just explained conservation). But Isee nothing to prevent the creature's co-operation with God for theproduction of any other thing: and especially might this concern its inwardoperation, as in the case of a thought or a volition, things reallydistinct from the substance. 

392. But there I am once more at grips with M. Bayle. He maintains thatthere are no such accidents distinct from the substance. 'The reasons', hesays, 'which our modern philosophers have employed to demonstrate that theaccidents are not beings in reality distinct from the substance are notmere difficulties; they are arguments which overwhelm one, and which cannotbe refuted. Take the trouble', he adds, 'to look for them in the writingsof Father Maignan, or Father Malebranche or M. Calli' (Professor ofPhilosophy at Caen) 'or in the _Accidentia profligata_ of Father Saguens, disciple of Father Maignan, the extract from which is to be found in the_Nouvelles de la République des Lettres_, June 1702. Or if you wish oneauthor only to suffice you, choose Dom François Lami, a Benedictine monk, and one of the strongest Cartesians to be found in France. You will findamong his _Philosophical Letters_, printed at Trévoux in 1703, that onewherein by the geometricians' method he demonstrates "that God is the soletrue cause of all that which is real. " I would wish to see all these books;and as for this last proposition, it may be true in a very good sense: Godis the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or ofperfections. _Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae. _ But when onecomprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may saythat the second causes co-operate in the production of that which islimited; otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole cause. 

393. It is well to beware, moreover, lest in confusing substances withaccidents, in depriving created substances of action, one fall intoSpinozism, which is an exaggerated Cartesianism. That which does not actdoes not merit the name of substance. If the accidents are not distinctfrom the substances; if the created substance is a successive being, likemovement; if it does not endure beyond a moment, and does not remain thesame (during some stated portion of time) any more than its accidents; ifit does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number: whyshall one not say, with Spinoza, that God is the only substance, and [360]that creatures are only accidents or modifications? Hitherto it has beensupposed that the substance remains, and that the accidents change; and Ithink one ought still to abide by this ancient doctrine, for the argumentsI remember having read do not prove the contrary, and prove more than isneeded. 

394. 'One of the absurdities', says M. Bayle (p. 779), 'that arise from theso-called distinction which is alleged to exist between substances andtheir accidents is that creatures, if they produce the accidents, wouldpossess a power of creation and annihilation. Accordingly one could notperform the slightest action without creating an innumerable number of realbeings, and without reducing to nothingness an endless multitude of them. Merely by moving the tongue to cry out or to eat, one creates as manyaccidents as there are movements of the parts of the tongue, and onedestroys as many accidents as there are parts of that which one eats, whichlose their form, which become chyle, blood, etc. ' This argument is only akind of bugbear. What harm would be done, supposing that an infinity ofmovements, an infinity of figures spring up and disappear at every momentin the universe, and even in each part of the universe? It can bedemonstrated, moreover, that that must be so. 

395. As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does not see thatone needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to form asquare or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the movement ofthe soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion a statue by removing afew pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure in relief, bychanging, decreasing or increasing a piece of wax? The production ofmodifications has never been called _creation_, and it is an abuse of termsto scare the world thus. God produces substances from nothing, and thesubstances produce accidents by the changes of their limits. 

396. As for the souls or substantial forms, M. Bayle is right in adding:'that there is nothing more inconvenient for those who admit substantialforms than the objection which is made that they could not be produced saveby an actual creation, and that the Schoolmen are pitiable in theirendeavours to answer this. ' But there is nothing more convenient for me andfor my system than this same objection. For I maintain that all the Souls, Entelechies or primitive forces, substantial forms, simple substances, orMonads, whatever name one may apply to them, can neither spring up [361]naturally nor perish. And the qualities or derivative forces, or what arecalled accidental forms, I take to be modifications of the primitiveEntelechy, even as shapes are modifications of matter. That is why thesemodifications are perpetually changing, while the simple substance remains. 

397. I have shown already (part I, 86 _seqq. _) that souls cannot spring upnaturally, or be derived from one another, and that it is necessary thatours either be created or be pre-existent. I have even pointed out acertain middle way between a creation and an entire pre-existence. I findit appropriate to say that the soul preexisting in the seeds from thebeginning of things was only sentient, but that it was elevated to thesuperior degree, which is that of reason, when the man to whom this soulshould belong was conceived, and when the organic body, always accompanyingthis soul from the beginning, but under many changes, was determined forforming the human body. I considered also that one might attribute thiselevation of the sentient soul (which makes it reach a more sublime degreeof being, namely reason) to the extraordinary operation of God. Nevertheless it will be well to add that I would dispense with miracles inthe generating of man, as in that of the other animals. It will be possibleto explain that, if one imagines that in this great number of souls and ofanimals, or at least of living organic bodies which are in the seeds, thosesouls alone which are destined to attain one day to human nature containthe reason that shall appear therein one day, and the organic bodies ofthese souls alone are preformed and predisposed to assume one day the humanshape, while the other small animals or seminal living beings, in which nosuch thing is pre-established, are essentially different from them andpossessed only of an inferior nature. This production is a kind of_traduction_, but more manageable than that kind which is commonly taught:it does not derive the soul from a soul, but only the animate from ananimate, and it avoids the repeated miracles of a new creation, which wouldcause a new and pure soul to enter a body that must corrupt it. 

398. I am, however, of the same opinion as Father Malebranche, that, ingeneral, creation properly understood is not so difficult to admit as mightbe supposed, and that it is in a sense involved in the notion of thedependence of creatures. 'How stupid and ridiculous are the Philosophers!'(he exclaims, in his _Christian Meditations_, 9, No. 3). 'They assume thatCreation is impossible, because they cannot conceive how God's power [362]is great enough to make something from nothing. But can they any betterconceive how the power of God is capable of stirring a straw?' He adds, again with great truth (No. 5), 'If matter were uncreate, God could notmove it or form anything from it. For God cannot move matter, or arrange itwisely, if he does not know it. Now God cannot know it, if he does not giveit being: he can derive his knowledge only from himself. Nothing can act onhim or enlighten him. '

399. M. Bayle, not content with saying that we are created continually, insists also on this other doctrine which he would fain derive thence: thatour soul cannot act. This is the way he speaks on that matter (ch. 141, p. 765): 'He has too much acquaintance with Cartesianism' (it is of an ableopponent he is speaking) 'not to know with what force it has beenmaintained in our day that there is no creature capable of producingmotion, and that our soul is a purely passive subject in relation tosensations and ideas, and feelings of pain and of pleasure, etc. If thishas not been carried as far as the volitions, that is on account of theexistence of revealed truths; otherwise the acts of the will would havebeen found as passive as those of the understanding. The same reasons whichprove that our soul does not form our ideas, and does not stir our organs, would prove also that it cannot form our acts of love and our volitions, etc' He might add: our vicious actions, our crimes. 

400. The force of these proofs, which he praises, must not be so great ashe thinks, for if it were they would prove too much. They would make Godthe author of sin. I admit that the soul cannot stir the organs by aphysical influence; for I think that the body must have been so formedbeforehand that it would do in time and place that which responds to thevolitions of the soul, although it be true nevertheless that the soul isthe principle of the operation. But if it be said that the soul does notproduce its thoughts, its sensations, its feelings of pain and of pleasure, that is something for which I see no reason. In my system every simplesubstance (that is, every true substance) must be the true immediate causeof all its actions and inward passions; and, speaking strictly in ametaphysical sense, it has none other than those which it produces. Thosewho hold a different opinion, and who make God the sole agent, areneedlessly becoming involved in expressions whence they will only withdifficulty extricate themselves without offence against religion; [363]moreover, they unquestionably offend against reason. 

401. Here is, however, the foundation of M. Bayle's argument. He says thatwe do not do that of which we know not the way it is done. But it is aprinciple which I do not concede to him. Let us listen to his dissertation(p. 767 seqq. ): 'It is an astonishing thing that almost all philosophers(with the exception of those who expounded Aristotle, and who admitted auniversal intelligence distinct from our soul, and cause of ourperceptions: see in the _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, Note E of thearticle "Averroes") have shared the popular belief that we form our ideasactively. Yet where is the man who knows not on the one hand that he is inabsolute ignorance as to how ideas are made, and on the other hand, that hecould not sew two stitches if he were ignorant of how to sew? Is the sewingof two stitches in itself a work more difficult than the painting in one'smind of a rose, the very first time one's eyes rest upon it, and althoughone has never learnt this kind of painting? Does it not appear on thecontrary that this mental portrait is in itself a work more difficult thantracing on canvas the shape of a flower, a thing we cannot do withouthaving learnt it? We are all convinced that a key would be of no use to usfor opening a chest if we were ignorant as to how to use the key, and yetwe imagine that our soul is the efficient cause of the movement of ourarms, despite that it knows neither where the nerves are which must be usedfor this movement, nor whence to obtain the animal spirits that are to flowinto these nerves. We have the experience every day that the ideas we wouldfain recall do not come, and that they appear of themselves when we are nolonger thinking of them. If that does not prevent us from thinking that weare their efficient cause, what reliance shall one place on the proof offeeling, which to M. Jacquelot appears so conclusive? Does our authorityover our ideas more often fall short than our authority over our volitions?If we were to count up carefully, we should find in the course of our lifemore velleities than volitions, that is, more evidences of the servitude ofour will than of its dominion. How many times does one and the same man notexperience an inability to do a certain act of will (for example, an act oflove for a man who had just injured him; an act of scorn for a fine sonnetthat he had composed; an act of hatred for a mistress; an act of approvalof an absurd epigram. Take note that I speak only of inward acts, [364]expressed by an "I will", such as "I will scorn", "approve", etc. ) even ifthere were a hundred pistoles to be gained forthwith, and he ardentlydesired to gain these hundred pistoles, and he were fired with the ambitionto convince himself by an experimental proof that he is master in his owndomain?

402. 'To put together in few words the whole force of what I have just saidto you, I will observe that it is evident to all those who go deeply intothings, that the true efficient cause of an effect must know the effect, and be aware also of the way in which it must be produced. That is notnecessary when one is only the instrument of the cause, or only the passivesubject of its action; but one cannot conceive of it as not necessary to atrue agent. Now if we examine ourselves well we shall be stronglyconvinced, (1) that, independently of experience, our soul is just aslittle aware of what a volition is as of what an idea is; (2) that after along experience it is no more fully aware of how volitions are formed thanit was before having willed anything. What is one to conclude from that, save that the soul cannot be the efficient cause of its volitions, any morethan of its ideas, and of the motion of the spirits which cause our arms tomove? (Take note that no pretence is made of deciding the point hereabsolutely, it is only being considered in relation to the principles ofthe objection. )'

403. That is indeed a strange way of reasoning! What necessity is there forone always to be aware how that which is done is done? Are salts, metals, plants, animals and a thousand other animate or inanimate bodies aware howthat which they do is done, and need they be aware? Must a drop of oil orof fat understand geometry in order to become round on the surface ofwater? Sewing stitches is another matter: one acts for an end, one must beaware of the means. But we do not form our ideas because we will to do so, they form themselves within us, they form themselves through us, not inconsequence of our will, but in accordance with our nature and that ofthings. The foetus forms itself in the animal, and a thousand other wondersof nature are produced by a certain _instinct_ that God has placed there, that is by virtue of _divine preformation_, which has made these admirableautomata, adapted to produce mechanically such beautiful effects. Even soit is easy to believe that the soul is a spiritual automaton still moreadmirable, and that it is through divine preformation that it producesthese beautiful ideas, wherein our will has no part and to which our [365]art cannot attain. The operation of spiritual automata, that is of souls, is not mechanical, but it contains in the highest degree all that isbeautiful in mechanism. The movements which are developed in bodies areconcentrated in the soul by representation as in an ideal world, whichexpresses the laws of the actual world and their consequences, but withthis difference from the perfect ideal world which is in God, that most ofthe perceptions in the other substances are only confused. For it is plainthat every simple substance embraces the whole universe in its confusedperceptions or sensations, and that the succession of these perceptions isregulated by the particular nature of this substance, but in a manner whichalways expresses all the nature in the universe; and every presentperception leads to a new perception, just as every movement that itrepresents leads to another movement. But it is impossible that the soulcan know clearly its whole nature, and perceive how this innumerable numberof small perceptions, piled up or rather concentrated together, shapesitself there: to that end it must needs know completely the whole universewhich is embraced by them, that is, it must needs be a God. 

404. As regards _velleities_, they are only a very imperfect kind ofconditional will. I would, if I could: _liberet si liceret_; and in thecase of a velleity, we do not will, properly speaking, to will, but to beable. That explains why there are none in God; and they must not beconfused with antecedent will. I have explained sufficiently elsewhere thatour control over volitions can be exercised only indirectly, and that onewould be unhappy if one were sufficiently master in one's own domain to beable to will without cause, without rhyme or reason. To complain of nothaving such a control would be to argue like Pliny, who carps at the powerof God because God cannot destroy himself. 

405. I intended to finish here after having met (as it seems to me) all theobjections of M. Bayle on this matter that I could find in his works. Butremembering Laurentius Valla's _Dialogue on Free Will, _ in opposition toBoethius, which I have already mentioned, I thought it would be opportuneto quote it in abstract, retaining the dialogue form, and then to continuefrom where it ends, keeping up the fiction it initiated; and that less withthe purpose of enlivening the subject, than in order to explain myselftowards the end of my dissertation as clearly as I can, and in a way [366]most likely to be generally understood. This Dialogue of Valla and hisbooks on Pleasure and the True Good make it plain that he was no less aphilosopher than a humanist. These four books were opposed to the fourbooks on the _Consolation of Philosophy_ by Boethius, and the Dialogue tothe fifth book. A certain Spaniard named Antonio Glarea requests of himelucidation on the difficulty of free will, whereof little is known as itis worthy to be known, for upon it depend justice and injustice, punishmentand reward in this life and in the life to come. Laurentius Valla answershim that we must console ourselves for an ignorance which we share with thewhole world, just as one consoles oneself for not having the wings ofbirds. 

406. ANTONIO--I know that you can give me those wings, like anotherDaedalus, so that I may emerge from the prison of ignorance, and rise tothe very region of truth, which is the homeland of souls. The books that Ihave seen have not satisfied me, not even the famous Boethius, who meetswith general approval. I know not whether he fully understood himself whathe says of God's understanding, and of eternity superior to time; and I askfor your opinion on his way of reconciling foreknowledge with freedom. LAURENT--I am fearful of giving offence to many people, if I confute thisgreat man; yet I will give preference over this fear to the consideration Ihave for the entreaties of a friend, provided that you make me a promise. ANT. --What? LAUR. --It is, that when you have dined with me you do not askme to give you supper, that is to say, I desire that you be content withthe answer to the question you have put to me, and do not put a furtherquestion. 

407. ANT. --I promise you. Here is the heart of the difficulty. If Godforesaw the treason of Judas, it was necessary that he should betray, itwas impossible for him not to betray. There is no obligation to do theimpossible. He therefore did not sin, he did not deserve to be punished. That destroys justice and religion, and the fear of God. LAUR. --God foresawsin; but he did not compel man to commit it; sin is voluntary. ANT. --Thatwill was necessary, since it was foreseen. LAUR. --If my knowledge does notcause things past or present to exist, neither will my foreknowledge causefuture things to exist. 

408. ANT. --That comparison is deceptive: neither the present nor the pastcan be changed, they are already necessary; but the future, movable initself, becomes fixed and necessary through foreknowledge. Let us [367]pretend that a god of the heathen boasts of knowing the future: I will askhim if he knows which foot I shall put foremost, then I will do theopposite of that which he shall have foretold. LAUR. --This God knows whatyou are about to do. ANT. --How does he know it, since I will do theopposite of what he shall have said, and I suppose that he will say what hethinks? LAUR. --Your supposition is false: God will not answer you; oragain, if he were to answer you, the veneration you would have for himwould make you hasten to do what he had said; his prediction would be toyou an order. But we have changed the question. We are not concerned withwhat God will foretell but with what he foresees. Let us therefore returnto foreknowledge, and distinguish between the necessary and the certain. Itis not impossible for what is foreseen not to happen; but it is infalliblysure that it will happen. I can become a Soldier or Priest, but I shall notbecome one. 

409. ANT. --Here I have you firmly held. The philosophers' rule maintainsthat all that which is possible can be considered as existing. But if thatwhich you affirm to be possible, namely an event different from what hasbeen foreseen, actually happened, God would have been mistaken. LAUR. --Therules of the philosophers are not oracles for me. This one in particular isnot correct. Two contradictories are often both possible. Can they alsoboth exist? But, for your further enlightenment, let us pretend that SextusTarquinius, coming to Delphi to consult the Oracle of Apollo, receives theanswer:

 _Exul inopsque cades irata pulsus ab urbe. _ A beggared outcast of the city's rage, Beside a foreign shore cut short thy age. 

The young man will complain: I have brought you a royal gift, O Apollo, andyou proclaim for me a lot so unhappy? Apollo will say to him: Your gift ispleasing to me, and I will do that which you ask of me, I will tell youwhat will happen. I know the future, but I do not bring it about. Go makeyour complaint to Jupiter and the Parcae. Sextus would be ridiculous if hecontinued thereafter to complain about Apollo. Is not that true? ANT. --Hewill say: I thank you, O holy Apollo, for not having repaid me withsilence, for having revealed to me the Truth. But whence comes it thatJupiter is so cruel towards me, that he prepares so hard a fate for an[368]innocent man, for a devout worshipper of the Gods? LAUR. --You innocent?Apollo will say. Know that you will be proud, that you will commitadulteries, that you will be a traitor to your country. Could Sextus reply:It is you who are the cause, O Apollo; you compel me to do it, byforeseeing it? ANT. --I admit that he would have taken leave of his sensesif he were to make this reply. LAUR. --Therefore neither can the traitorJudas complain of God's foreknowledge. And there is the answer to yourquestion. 

410. ANT. --You have satisfied me beyond my hopes, you have done whatBoethius was not able to do: I shall be beholden to you all my life long. LAUR. --Yet let us carry our tale a little further. Sextus will say: No, Apollo, I will not do what you say. ANT. --What! the God will say, do youmean then that I am a liar? I repeat to you once more, you will do all thatI have just said. LAUR. --Sextus, mayhap, would pray the Gods to alter fate, to give him a better heart. ANT. --He would receive the answer:

 _Desine fata Deum flecti sperare precando_. 

He cannot cause divine foreknowledge to lie. But what then will Sextus say?Will he not break forth into complaints against the Gods? Will he not say?What? I am then not free? It is not in my power to follow virtue?LAUR. --Apollo will say to him perhaps: Know, my poor Sextus, that the Godsmake each one as he is. Jupiter made the wolf ravening, the hare timid, theass stupid, and the lion courageous. He gave you a soul that is wicked andirreclaimable; you will act in conformity with your natural disposition, and Jupiter will treat you as your actions shall deserve; he has sworn itby the Styx. 

411. ANT. --I confess to you, it seems to me that Apollo in excusing himselfaccuses Jupiter more than he accuses Sextus, and Sextus would answer him:Jupiter therefore condemns in me his own crime; it is he who is the onlyguilty one. He could have made me altogether different: but, made as I am, I must act as he has willed. Why then does he punish me? Could I haveresisted his will? LAUR. --I confess that I am brought to a pause here asyou are. I have made the Gods appear on the scene, Apollo and Jupiter, tomake you distinguish between divine foreknowledge and providence. I haveshown that Apollo and foreknowledge do not impair freedom; but I cannotsatisfy you on the decrees of Jupiter's will, that is to say, on the ordersof providence. ANT. --You have dragged me out of one abyss, and you [369]plunge me back into another and greater abyss. LAUR. --Remember ourcontract: I have given you dinner, and you ask me to give you supper also. 

412. ANT. --Now I discover your cunning: You have caught me, this is not anhonest contract. LAUR. --What would you have me do? I have given you wineand meats from my home produce, such as my small estate can provide; as fornectar and ambrosia, you will ask the Gods for them: that divine nurture isnot found among men. Let us hearken to St. Paul, that chosen vessel who wascarried even to the third heaven, who heard there unutterable words: hewill answer you with the comparison of the potter, with theincomprehensibility of the ways of God, and wonder at the depth of hiswisdom. Nevertheless it is well to observe that one does not ask why Godforesees the thing, for that is understood, it is because it will be: butone asks why he ordains thus, why he hardens such an one, why he hascompassion on another. We do not know the reasons which he may have forthis; but _since he is very good and very wise that is enough to make usdeem that his reasons are good_. As he is just also, it follows that hisdecrees and his operation do not destroy our freedom. Some men have soughtsome reason therein. They have said that we are made from a corrupt andimpure mass, indeed of mud. But Adam and the Angels were made of silver andgold, and they sinned notwithstanding. One sometimes becomes hardened againafter regeneration. We must therefore seek another cause for evil, and Idoubt whether even the Angels are aware of it; yet they cease not to behappy and to praise God. Boethius hearkened more to the answer ofphilosophy than to that of St. Paul; that was the cause of his failure. Letus believe in Jesus Christ, he is the virtue and the wisdom of God: heteaches us that God willeth the salvation of all, that he willeth not thedeath of the sinner. Let us therefore put our trust in the divine mercy, and let us not by our vanity and our malice disqualify ourselves to receiveit. 

413. This dialogue of Valla's is excellent, even though one must takeexception to some points in it: but its chief defect is that it cuts theknot and that it seems to condemn providence under the name of Jupiter, making him almost the author of sin. Let us therefore carry the littlefable still further. Sextus, quitting Apollo and Delphi, seeks out Jupiterat Dodona. He makes sacrifices and then he exhibits his complaints. Whyhave you condemned me, O great God, to be wicked and unhappy? Change [370]my lot and my heart, or acknowledge your error. Jupiter answers him: If youwill renounce Rome, the Parcae shall spin for you different fates, youshall become wise, you shall be happy. SEXTUS--Why must I renounce the hopeof a crown? Can I not come to be a good king? JUPITER--No, Sextus; I knowbetter what is needful for you. If you go to Rome, you are lost. Sextus, not being able to resolve upon so great a sacrifice, went forth from thetemple, and abandoned himself to his fate. Theodorus, the High Priest, whohad been present at the dialogue between God and Sextus, addressed thesewords to Jupiter: Your wisdom is to be revered, O great Ruler of the Gods. You have convinced this man of his error; he must henceforth impute hisunhappiness to his evil will; he has not a word to say. But your faithfulworshippers are astonished; they would fain wonder at your goodness as wellas at your greatness: it rested with you to give him a different will. JUPITER--Go to my daughter Pallas, she will inform you what I was bound todo. 

414. Theodorus journeyed to Athens: he was bidden to lie down to sleep inthe temple of the Goddess. Dreaming, he found himself transported into anunknown country. There stood a palace of unimaginable splendour andprodigious size. The Goddess Pallas appeared at the gate, surrounded byrays of dazzling majesty. 

 _Qualisque videri_ _Coelicolis et quanta solet. _

She touched the face of Theodorus with an olive-branch, which she washolding in her hand. And lo! he had become able to confront the divineradiancy of the daughter of Jupiter, and of all that she should show him. Jupiter who loves you (she said to him) has commended you to me to beinstructed. You see here the palace of the fates, where I keep watch andward. Here are representations not only of that which happens but also ofall that which is possible. Jupiter, having surveyed them before thebeginning of the existing world, classified the possibilities into worlds, and chose the best of all. He comes sometimes to visit these places, toenjoy the pleasure of recapitulating things and of renewing his own choice, which cannot fail to please him. I have only to speak, and we shall see awhole world that my father might have produced, wherein will be representedanything that can be asked of him; and in this way one may know also whatwould happen if any particular possibility should attain unto [371]existence. And whenever the conditions are not determinate enough, therewill be as many such worlds differing from one another as one shall wish, which will answer differently the same question, in as many ways aspossible. You learnt geometry in your youth, like all well-instructedGreeks. You know therefore that when the conditions of a required point donot sufficiently determine it, and there is an infinite number of them, they all fall into what the geometricians call a locus, and this locus atleast (which is often a line) will be determinate. Thus you can picture toyourself an ordered succession of worlds, which shall contain each andevery one the case that is in question, and shall vary its circumstancesand its consequences. But if you put a case that differs from the actualworld only in one single definite thing and in its results, a certain oneof those determinate worlds will answer you. These worlds are all here, that is, in ideas. I will show you some, wherein shall be found, notabsolutely the same Sextus as you have seen (that is not possible, hecarries with him always that which he shall be) but several Sextusesresembling him, possessing all that you know already of the true Sextus, but not all that is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence allthat shall yet happen to him. You will find in one world a very happy andnoble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with a mediocre state, a Sextus, indeed, of every kind and endless diversity of forms. 

415. Thereupon the Goddess led Theodorus into one of the halls of thepalace: when he was within, it was no longer a hall, it was a world, _Solemque suum, sua sidera norat_. 

At the command of Pallas there came within view Dodona with the temple ofJupiter, and Sextus issuing thence; he could be heard saying that he wouldobey the God. And lo! he goes to a city lying between two seas, resemblingCorinth. He buys there a small garden; cultivating it, he finds a treasure;he becomes a rich man, enjoying affection and esteem; he dies at a greatage, beloved of the whole city. Theodorus saw the whole life of Sextus asat one glance, and as in a stage presentation. There was a great volume ofwritings in this hall: Theodorus could not refrain from asking what thatmeant. It is the history of this world which we are now visiting, theGoddess told him; it is the book of its fates. You have seen a number [372]on the forehead of Sextus. Look in this book for the place which itindicates. Theodorus looked for it, and found there the history of Sextusin a form more ample than the outline he had seen. Put your finger on anyline you please, Pallas said to him, and you will see represented actuallyin all its detail that which the line broadly indicates. He obeyed, and hesaw coming into view all the characteristics of a portion of the life ofthat Sextus. They passed into another hall, and lo! another world, anotherSextus. Who, issuing from the temple, and having resolved to obey Jupiter, goes to Thrace. There he marries the daughter of the king, who had no otherchildren; he succeeds him, and he is adored by his subjects. They went intoother rooms, and always they saw new scenes. 

416. The halls rose in a pyramid, becoming even more beautiful as onemounted towards the apex, and representing more beautiful worlds. Finallythey reached the highest one which completed the pyramid, and which was themost beautiful of all: for the pyramid had a beginning, but one could notsee its end; it had an apex, but no base; it went on increasing toinfinity. That is (as the Goddess explained) because amongst an endlessnumber of possible worlds there is the best of all, else would God not havedetermined to create any; but there is not any one which has not also lessperfect worlds below it: that is why the pyramid goes on descending toinfinity. Theodorus, entering this highest hall, became entranced inecstasy; he had to receive succour from the Goddess, a drop of a divineliquid placed on his tongue restored him; he was beside himself for joy. Weare in the real true world (said the Goddess) and you are at the source ofhappiness. Behold what Jupiter makes ready for you, if you continue toserve him faithfully. Here is Sextus as he is, and as he will be inreality. He issues from the temple in a rage, he scorns the counsel of theGods. You see him going to Rome, bringing confusion everywhere, violatingthe wife of his friend. There he is driven out with his father, beaten, unhappy. If Jupiter had placed here a Sextus happy at Corinth or King inThrace, it would be no longer this world. And nevertheless he could nothave failed to choose this world, which surpasses in perfection all theothers, and which forms the apex of the pyramid. Else would Jupiter haverenounced his wisdom, he would have banished me, me his daughter. You seethat my father did not make Sextus wicked; he was so from all [373]eternity, he was so always and freely. My father only granted him theexistence which his wisdom could not refuse to the world where he isincluded: he made him pass from the region of the possible to that of theactual beings. The crime of Sextus serves for great things: it renders Romefree; thence will arise a great empire, which will show noble examples tomankind. But that is nothing in comparison with the worth of this wholeworld, at whose beauty you will marvel, when, after a happy passage fromthis mortal state to another and better one, the Gods shall have fitted youto know it. 

417. At this moment Theodorus wakes up, he gives thanks to the Goddess, heowns the justice of Jupiter. His spirit pervaded by what he has seen andheard, he carries on the office of High Priest, with all the zeal of a trueservant of his God, and with all the joy whereof a mortal is capable. Itseems to me that this continuation of the tale may elucidate the difficultywhich Valla did not wish to treat. If Apollo has represented aright God'sknowledge of vision (that which concerns beings in existence), I hope thatPallas will have not discreditably filled the role of what is calledknowledge of simple intelligence (that which embraces all that ispossible), wherein at last the source of things must be sought. 

 [377] * * * * *

APPENDICES

SUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS

 * * * * *

Some persons of discernment have wished me to make this addition. I havethe more readily deferred to their opinion, because of the opportunitythereby gained for meeting certain difficulties, and for makingobservations on certain matters which were not treated in sufficient detailin the work itself. 

OBJECTION I

Whoever does not choose the best course is lacking either in power, orknowledge, or goodness. 

God did not choose the best course in creating this world. 

Therefore God was lacking in power, or knowledge, or goodness. 

ANSWER

I deny the minor, that is to say, the second premiss of this syllogism, andthe opponent proves it by this

PROSYLLOGISM

Whoever makes things in which there is evil, and which could have been madewithout any evil, or need not have been made at all, does not choose thebest course. 

God made a world wherein there is evil; a world, I say, which could havebeen made without any evil or which need not have been made at all. 

 [378]Therefore God did not choose the best course. 

ANSWER

I admit the minor of this prosyllogism: for one must confess that there isevil in this world which God has made, and that it would have been possibleto make a world without evil or even not to create any world, since itscreation depended upon the free will of God. But I deny the major, that is, the first of the two premisses of the prosyllogism, and I might contentmyself with asking for its proof. In order, however, to give a clearerexposition of the matter, I would justify this denial by pointing out thatthe best course is not always that one which tends towards avoiding evil, since it is possible that the evil may be accompanied by a greater good. For example, the general of an army will prefer a great victory with aslight wound to a state of affairs without wound and without victory. Ihave proved this in further detail in this work by pointing out, throughinstances taken from mathematics and elsewhere, that an imperfection in thepart may be required for a greater perfection in the whole. I have followedtherein the opinion of St. Augustine, who said a hundred times that Godpermitted evil in order to derive from it a good, that is to say, a greatergood; and Thomas Aquinas says (in libr. 2, _Sent. Dist. _ 32, qu. 1, art. 1)that the permission of evil tends towards the good of the universe. I haveshown that among older writers the fall of Adam was termed _felix culpa_, afortunate sin, because it had been expiated with immense benefit by theincarnation of the Son of God: for he gave to the universe something morenoble than anything there would otherwise have been amongst created beings. For the better understanding of the matter I added, following the exampleof many good authors, that it was consistent with order and the generalgood for God to grant to certain of his creatures the opportunity toexercise their freedom, even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil:for God could easily correct the evil, and it was not fitting that in orderto prevent sin he should always act in an extraordinary way. It willtherefore sufficiently refute the objection to show that a world with evilmay be better than a world without evil. But I have gone still further inthe work, and have even shown that this universe must be indeed better thanevery other possible universe. 

 [379]OBJECTION II

If there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures, there is moreevil than good in all God's work. 

Now there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures. 

Therefore there is more evil than good in all God's work. 

ANSWER

I deny the major and the minor of this conditional syllogism. As for themajor, I do not admit it because this supposed inference from the part tothe whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, assumes tacitly andwithout proof that creatures devoid of reason cannot be compared or takeninto account with those that have reason. But why might not the surplus ofgood in the non-intelligent creatures that fill the world compensate forand even exceed incomparably the surplus of evil in rational creatures? Itis true that the value of the latter is greater; but by way of compensationthe others are incomparably greater in number; and it may be that theproportion of number and quantity surpasses that of value and quality. 

The minor also I cannot admit, namely, that there is more evil than good inintelligent creatures. One need not even agree that there is more evil thangood in the human kind. For it is possible, and even a very reasonablething, that the glory and the perfection of the blessed may be incomparablygreater than the misery and imperfection of the damned, and that here theexcellence of the total good in the smaller number may exceed the totalevil which is in the greater number. The blessed draw near to divinitythrough a divine Mediator, so far as can belong to these created beings, and make such progress in good as is impossible for the damned to make inevil, even though they should approach as nearly as may be the nature ofdemons. God is infinite, and the Devil is finite; good can and does go on_ad infinitum_, whereas evil has its bounds. It may be therefore, and it isprobable, that there happens in the comparison between the blessed and thedamned the opposite of what I said could happen in the comparison betweenthe happy and the unhappy, namely that in the latter the proportion ofdegrees surpasses that of numbers, while in the comparison betweenintelligent and non-intelligent the proportion of numbers is greater thanthat of values. One is justified in assuming that a thing may be so as longas one does not prove that it is impossible, and indeed what is here [380]put forward goes beyond assumption. 

But secondly, even should one admit that there is more evil than good inthe human kind, one still has every reason for not admitting that there ismore evil than good in all intelligent creatures. For there is aninconceivable number of Spirits, and perhaps of other rational creaturesbesides: and an opponent cannot prove that in the whole City of God, composed as much of Spirits as of rational animals without number and ofendless different kinds, the evil exceeds the good. Although one need not, in order to answer an objection, prove that a thing is, when its merepossibility suffices, I have nevertheless shown in this present work thatit is a result of the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the Universethat the kingdom of God should be the most perfect of all states orgovernments possible, and that in consequence what little evil there isshould be required to provide the full measure of the vast good existingthere. 

OBJECTION III

If it is always impossible not to sin, it is always unjust to punish. 

Now it is always impossible not to sin, or rather all sin is necessary. 

Therefore it is always unjust to punish. 

The minor of this is proved as follows. 

FIRST PROSYLLOGISM

Everything predetermined is necessary. 

Every event is predetermined. 

Therefore every event (and consequently sin also) is necessary. 

Again this second minor is proved thus. 

SECOND PROSYLLOGISM

That which is future, that which is foreseen, that which is involved incauses is predetermined. 

Every event is of this kind. 

Therefore every event is predetermined. 

ANSWER

I admit in a certain sense the conclusion of the second prosyllogism, whichis the minor of the first; but I shall deny the major of the first [381]prosyllogism, namely that everything predetermined is necessary; taking'necessity', say the necessity to sin, or the impossibility of not sinning, or of not doing some action, in the sense relevant to the argument, thatis, as a necessity essential and absolute, which destroys the morality ofaction and the justice of punishment. If anyone meant a different necessityor impossibility (that is, a necessity only moral or hypothetical, whichwill be explained presently) it is plain that we would deny him the majorstated in the objection. We might content ourselves with this answer, anddemand the proof of the proposition denied: but I am well pleased tojustify my manner of procedure in the present work, in order to make thematter clear and to throw more light on this whole subject, by explainingthe necessity that must be rejected and the determination that must beallowed. The truth is that the necessity contrary to morality, which mustbe avoided and which would render punishment unjust, is an insuperablenecessity, which would render all opposition unavailing, even though oneshould wish with all one's heart to avoid the necessary action, and thoughone should make all possible efforts to that end. Now it is plain that thisis not applicable to voluntary actions, since one would not do them if onedid not so desire. Thus their prevision and predetermination is notabsolute, but it presupposes will: if it is certain that one will do them, it is no less certain that one will will to do them. These voluntaryactions and their results will not happen whatever one may do and whetherone will them or not; but they will happen because one will do, and becauseone will will to do, that which leads to them. That is involved inprevision and predetermination, and forms the reason thereof. The necessityof such events is called conditional or hypothetical, or again necessity ofconsequence, because it presupposes the will and the other requisites. Butthe necessity which destroys morality, and renders punishment unjust andreward unavailing, is found in the things that will be whatever one may doand whatever one may will to do: in a word, it exists in that which isessential. This it is which is called an absolute necessity. Thus it availsnothing with regard to what is necessary absolutely to ordain interdicts orcommandments, to propose penalties or prizes, to blame or to praise; itwill come to pass no more and no less. In voluntary actions, on thecontrary, and in what depends upon them, precepts, armed with power to[382]punish and to reward, very often serve, and are included in the order ofcauses that make action exist. Thus it comes about that not only pains andeffort but also prayers are effective, God having had even these prayers inmind before he ordered things, and having made due allowance for them. Thatis why the precept _Ora et labora_ (Pray and work) remains intact. Thus notonly those who (under the empty pretext of the necessity of events)maintain that one can spare oneself the pains demanded by affairs, but alsothose who argue against prayers, fall into that which the ancients even intheir time called 'the Lazy Sophism'. So the predetermination of events bytheir causes is precisely what contributes to morality instead ofdestroying it, and the causes incline the will without necessitating it. For this reason the determination we are concerned with is not anecessitation. It is certain (to him who knows all) that the effect willfollow this inclination; but this effect does not follow thence by aconsequence which is necessary, that is, whose contrary impliescontradiction; and it is also by such an inward inclination that the willis determined, without the presence of necessity. Suppose that one has thegreatest possible passion (for example, a great thirst), you will admitthat the soul can find some reason for resisting it, even if it were onlythat of displaying its power. Thus though one may never have completeindifference of equipoise, and there is always a predominance ofinclination for the course adopted, that predominance does not renderabsolutely necessary the resolution taken. 

OBJECTION IV

Whoever can prevent the sin of others and does not so, but rathercontributes to it, although he be fully apprised of it, is accessarythereto. 

God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures; but he does not so, andhe rather contributes to it by his co-operation and by the opportunities hecauses, although he is fully cognizant of it. 

Therefore, etc. 

ANSWER

I deny the major of this syllogism. It may be that one can prevent the sin, but that one ought not to do so, because one could not do so withoutcommitting a sin oneself, or (when God is concerned) without actingunreasonably. I have given instances of that, and have applied them to[383]God himself. It may be also that one contributes to the evil, and that oneeven opens the way to it sometimes, in doing things one is bound to do. Andwhen one does one's duty, or (speaking of God) when, after fullconsideration, one does that which reason demands, one is not responsiblefor events, even when one foresees them. One does not will these evils; butone is willing to permit them for a greater good, which one cannot inreason help preferring to other considerations. This is a _consequent_will, resulting from acts of _antecedent_ will, in which one wills thegood. I know that some persons, in speaking of the antecedent andconsequent will of God, have meant by the antecedent that which wills thatall men be saved, and by the consequent that which wills, in consequence ofpersistent sin, that there be some damned, damnation being a result of sin. But these are only examples of a more general notion, and one may say withthe same reason, that God wills by his antecedent will that men sin not, and that by his consequent or final and decretory will (which is alwaysfollowed by its effect) he wills to permit that they sin, this permissionbeing a result of superior reasons. One has indeed justification forsaying, in general, that the antecedent will of God tends towards theproduction of good and the prevention of evil, each taken in itself, and asit were detached (_particulariter et secundum quid_: Thom. , I, qu. 19, art. 6) according to the measure of the degree of each good or of each evil. Likewise one may say that the consequent, or final and total, divine willtends towards the production of as many goods as can be put together, whosecombination thereby becomes determined, and involves also the permission ofsome evils and the exclusion of some goods, as the best possible plan ofthe universe demands. Arminius, in his _Antiperkinsus, _ explained very wellthat the will of God can be called consequent not only in relation to theaction of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding, but also in relation to other anterior acts of divine will. But it isenough to consider the passage cited from Thomas Aquinas, and that fromScotus (I, dist. 46, qu. 11), to see that they make this distinction as Ihave made it here. Nevertheless if anyone will not suffer this use of theterms, let him put 'previous' in place of 'antecedent' will, and 'final' or'decretory' in place of 'consequent' will. For I do not wish to wrangleabout words. 

 [384]OBJECTION V

Whoever produces all that is real in a thing is its cause. 

God produces all that is real in sin. 

Therefore God is the cause of sin. 

ANSWER

I might content myself with denying the major or the minor, because theterm 'real' admits of interpretations capable of rendering thesepropositions false. But in order to give a better explanation I will make adistinction. 'Real' either signifies that which is positive only, or elseit includes also privative beings: in the first case, I deny the major andI admit the minor; in the second case, I do the opposite. I might haveconfined myself to that; but I was willing to go further, in order toaccount for this distinction. I have therefore been well pleased to pointout that every purely positive or absolute reality is a perfection, andthat every imperfection comes from limitation, that is, from the privative:for to limit is to withhold extension, or the more beyond. Now God is thecause of all perfections, and consequently of all realities, when they areregarded as purely positive. But limitations or privations result from theoriginal imperfection of creatures which restricts their receptivity. It isas with a laden boat, which the river carries along more slowly or lessslowly in proportion to the weight that it bears: thus the speed comes fromthe river, but the retardation which restricts this speed comes from theload. Also I have shown in the present work how the creature, in causingsin, is a deficient cause; how errors and evil inclinations spring fromprivation; and how privation is efficacious accidentally. And I havejustified the opinion of St. Augustine (lib. I, _Ad. Simpl. _, qu. 2) whoexplains (for example) how God hardens the soul, not in giving it somethingevil, but because the effect of the good he imprints is restricted by theresistance of the soul, and by the circumstances contributing to thisresistance, so that he does not give it all the good that would overcomeits evil. 'Nec _(inquit)_ ab illo erogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior, sed tantum quo fit melior non erogatur. ' But if God had willed to do morehere he must needs have produced either fresh natures in his creatures orfresh miracles to change their natures, and this the best plan did notallow. It is just as if the current of the river must needs be more rapidthan its slope permits or the boats themselves be less laden, if they [385]had to be impelled at a greater speed. So the limitation or originalimperfection of creatures brings it about that even the best plan of theuniverse cannot admit more good, and cannot be exempted from certain evils, these, however, being only of such a kind as may tend towards a greatergood. There are some disorders in the parts which wonderfully enhance thebeauty of the whole, just as certain dissonances, appropriately used, render harmony more beautiful. But that depends upon the answer which Ihave already given to the first objection. 

OBJECTION VI

Whoever punishes those who have done as well as it was in their power to dois unjust. 

God does so. 

Therefore, etc. 

ANSWER

I deny the minor of this argument. And I believe that God always givessufficient aid and grace to those who have good will, that is to say, whodo not reject this grace by a fresh sin. Thus I do not admit the damnationof children dying unbaptized or outside the Church, or the damnation ofadult persons who have acted according to the light that God has giventhem. And I believe that, _if anyone has followed the light he had_, hewill undoubtedly receive thereof in greater measure as he has need, even asthe late Herr Hulsemann, who was celebrated as a profound theologian atLeipzig, has somewhere observed; and if such a man had failed to receivelight during his life, he would receive it at least in the hour of death. 

OBJECTION VII

Whoever gives only to some, and not to all, the means of producingeffectively in them good will and final saving faith has not enoughgoodness. 

God does so. 

Therefore, etc. 

ANSWER

I deny the major. It is true that God could overcome the greatestresistance of the human heart, and indeed he sometimes does so, [386]whether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can greatlyinfluence souls; but he does not always do so. Whence comes thisdistinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to berestricted? The truth is that it would not have been in order always to actin an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things, as I haveobserved already in answering the first objection. The reasons for thisconnexion, whereby the one is placed in more favourable circumstances thanthe other, are hidden in the depths of God's wisdom: they depend upon theuniversal harmony. The best plan of the universe, which God could not failto choose, required this. One concludes thus from the event itself; sinceGod made the universe, it was not possible to do better. Such management, far from being contrary to goodness, has rather been prompted by supremegoodness itself. This objection with its solution might have been inferredfrom what was said with regard to the first objection; but it seemedadvisable to touch upon it separately. 

OBJECTION VIII

Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free. 

God cannot fail to choose the best. 

Therefore God is not free. 

ANSWER

I deny the major of this argument. Rather is it true freedom, and the mostperfect, to be able to make the best use of one's free will, and always toexercise this power, without being turned aside either by outward force orby inward passions, whereof the one enslaves our bodies and the other oursouls. There is nothing less servile and more befitting the highest degreeof freedom than to be always led towards the good, and always by one's owninclination, without any constraint and without any displeasure. And toobject that God therefore had need of external things is only a sophism. Hecreates them freely: but when he had set before him an end, that ofexercising his goodness, his wisdom determined him to choose the means mostappropriate for obtaining this end. To call that a _need_ is to take theterm in a sense not usual, which clears it of all imperfection, somewhat asone does when speaking of the wrath of God. 

Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, but that he obeys[387]always, because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself:_semel jussit, semper paret_. But he had better have said, that God alwayscommands and that he is always obeyed: for in willing he always follows thetendency of his own nature, and all other things always follow his will. And as this will is always the same one cannot say that he obeys that willonly which he formerly had. Nevertheless, although his will is alwaysindefectible and always tends towards the best, the evil or the lesser goodwhich he rejects will still be possible in itself. Otherwise the necessityof good would be geometrical (so to speak) or metaphysical, and altogetherabsolute; the contingency of things would be destroyed, and there would beno choice. But necessity of this kind, which does not destroy thepossibility of the contrary, has the name by analogy only: it becomeseffective not through the mere essence of things, but through that which isoutside them and above them, that is, through the will of God. Thisnecessity is called moral, because for the wise what is necessary and whatis owing are equivalent things; and when it is always followed by itseffect, as it indeed is in the perfectly wise, that is, in God, one can saythat it is a happy necessity. The more nearly creatures approach this, thecloser do they come to perfect felicity. Moreover, necessity of this kindis not the necessity one endeavours to avoid, and which destroys morality, reward and commendation. For that which it brings to pass does not happenwhatever one may do and whatever one may will, but because one desires it. A will to which it is natural to choose well deserves most to be commended;and it carries with it its own reward, which is supreme happiness. And asthis constitution of the divine nature gives an entire satisfaction to himwho possesses it, it is also the best and the most desirable from the pointof view of the creatures who are all dependent upon God. If the will of Godhad not as its rule the principle of the best, it would tend towards evil, which would be worst of all; or else it would be indifferent somehow togood and to evil, and guided by chance. But a will that would always driftalong at random would scarcely be any better for the government of theuniverse than the fortuitous concourse of corpuscles, without the existenceof divinity. And even though God should abandon himself to chance only insome cases, and in a certain way (as he would if he did not always tendentirely towards the best, and if he were capable of preferring a lessergood to a greater good, that is, an evil to a good, since that which [388]prevents a greater good is an evil) he would be no less imperfect than theobject of his choice. Then he would not deserve absolute trust; he wouldact without reason in such a case, and the government of the universe wouldbe like certain games equally divided between reason and luck. This allproves that this objection which is made against the choice of the bestperverts the notions of free and necessary, and represents the best to usactually as evil: but that is either malicious or absurd. 

 [389] * * * * *

EXCURSUS ON THEODICY

 392

published by the author in Mémoires de Trévoux

July 1712

 * * * * *

_February_ 1712

I said in my essays, 392, that I wished to see the demonstrations mentionedby M. Bayle and contained in the sixth letter printed at Trévoux in 1703. Father des Bosses has shown me this letter, in which the writer essays todemonstrate by the geometrical method that God is the sole true cause ofall that is real. My perusal of it has confirmed me in the opinion which Iindicated in the same passage, namely, that this proposition can be true ina very good sense, God being the only cause of pure and absolute realities, or perfections; but when one includes limitations or privations under thename of realities one can say that second causes co-operate in theproduction of what is limited, and that otherwise God would be the cause ofsin, and even its sole cause. And I am somewhat inclined to think that thegifted author of the letter does not greatly differ in opinion from me, although he seems to include all modalities among the realities of which hedeclares God to be the sole cause. For in actual fact I think he will notadmit that God is the cause and the author of sin. Indeed, he explainshimself in a manner which seems to overthrow his thesis and to grant realaction to creatures. For in the proof of the eighth corollary of his secondproposition these words occur: 'The natural motion of the soul, althoughdeterminate in itself, is indeterminate in respect of its objects. For itis love of good in general. It is through the ideas of good appearing [390]in individual objects that this motion becomes individual and determinatein relation to those objects. And thus as the mind has the power of varyingits own ideas it can also change the determinations of its love. And forthat purpose it is not necessary that it overcome the power of God oroppose his action. These determinations of motion towards individualobjects are not invincible. It is this noninvincibility which causes themind to be free and capable of changing them; but after all the mind makesthese changes only through the motion which God gives to it and conservesfor it. ' In my own style I would have said that the perfection which is inthe action of the creature comes from God, but that the limitations to befound there are a consequence of the original limitation and the precedinglimitations that occurred in the creature. Further, this is so not only inminds but also in all other substances, which thereby are causesco-operating in the change which comes to pass in themselves; for thisdetermination of which the author speaks is nothing but a limitation. 

Now if after that one reviews all the demonstrations or corollaries of theletter, one will be able to admit or reject the majority of its assertions, in accordance with the interpretation one may make of them. If by 'reality'one means only perfections or positive realities, God is the only truecause; but if that which involves limitations is included under therealities, one will deny a considerable portion of the theses, and theauthor himself will have shown us the example. It is in order to render thematter more comprehensible that I used in the Essays the example of a ladenboat, which, the more laden it is, is the more slowly carried along by thestream. There one sees clearly that the stream is the cause of what ispositive in this motion, of the perfection, the force, the speed of theboat, but that the load is the cause of the restriction of this force, andthat it brings about the retardation. 

It is praiseworthy in anyone to attempt to apply the geometrical method tometaphysical matters. But it must be admitted that hitherto success hasseldom been attained: and M. Descartes himself, with all that very greatskill which one cannot deny in him, never perhaps had less success thanwhen he essayed to do this in one of his answers to objections. For inmathematics it is easier to succeed, because numbers, figures andcalculations make good the defects concealed in words; but in metaphysics, where one is deprived of this aid (at least in ordinary [391]argumentation), the strictness employed in the form of the argument and inthe exact definitions of the terms must needs supply this lack. But inneither argument nor definition is that strictness here to be seen. 

The author of the letter, who undoubtedly displays much ardour andpenetration, sometimes goes a little too far, as when he claims to provethat there is as much reality and force in rest as in motion, according tothe fifth corollary of the second proposition. He asserts that the will ofGod is no less positive in rest than in motion, and that it is not lessinvincible. Be it so, but does it follow that there is as much reality andforce in each of the two? I do not see this conclusion, and with the sameargument one would prove that there is as much force in a strong motion asin a weak motion. God in willing rest wills that the body be at the placeA, where it was immediately before, and for that it suffices that there beno reason to prompt God to the change. But when God wills that afterwardsthe body be at the place B, there must needs be a new reason, of such akind as to determine God to will that it be in B and not in C or in anyother place, and that it be there more or less promptly. It is upon thesereasons, the volitions of God, that we must assess the force and thereality existent in things. The author speaks much of the will of God, buthe does not speak much in this letter of the reasons which prompt God towill, and upon which all depends. And these reasons are taken from theobjects. 

I observe first, indeed, with regard to the second corollary of the firstproposition, that it is very true, but that it is not very well proven. Thewriter affirms that if God only ceased to will the existence of a being, that being would no longer exist; and here is the proof given word forword:

'Demonstration. That which exists only by the will of God no longer existsonce that will has ceased. ' (But that is what must be proved. The writerendeavours to prove it by adding:) 'Remove the cause, you remove theeffect. ' (This maxim ought to have been placed among the axioms which arestated at the beginning. But unhappily this axiom may be reckoned amongthose rules of philosophy which are subject to many exceptions. ) 'Now bythe preceding proposition and by its first corollary no being exists saveby the will of God. Therefore, etc. ' There is ambiguity in this expression, that nothing exists save by the will of God. If one means that things [392]begin to exist only through this will, one is justified in referring to thepreceding propositions; but if one means that the existence of things is atall times a consequence of the will of God, one assumes more or less whatis in question. Therefore it was necessary to prove first that theexistence of things depends upon the will of God, and that it is not only amere effect of that will, but a dependence, in proportion to the perfectionwhich things contain; and once that is assumed, they will depend upon God'swill no less afterwards than at the beginning. That is the way I have takenthe matter in my Essays. 

Nevertheless I recognize that the letter upon which I have just madeobservations is admirable and well deserving of perusal, and that itcontains noble and true sentiments, provided it be taken in the sense Ihave just indicated. And arguments in this form may serve as anintroduction to meditations somewhat more advanced. 

 [393] * * * * *

REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND CHANCE'

 * * * * *

1. As the question of Necessity and Freedom, with other questions dependingthereon, was at one time debated between the famous Mr. Hobbes and Dr. JohnBramhall, Bishop of Derry, in books published by each of them, I havedeemed it appropriate to give a clear account of them (although I havealready mentioned them more than once); and this all the more since thesewritings of Mr. Hobbes have hitherto only appeared in English, and sincethe works of this author usually contain something good and ingenious. TheBishop of Derry and Mr. Hobbes, having met in Paris at the house of theMarquis, afterwards Duke, of Newcastle in the year 1646, entered into adiscussion on this subject. The dispute was conducted with extremerestraint; but the bishop shortly afterwards sent a note to My LordNewcastle, desiring him to induce Mr. Hobbes to answer it. He answered; butat the same time he expressed a wish that his answer should not bepublished, because he believed it possible for ill-instructed persons toabuse dogmas such as his, however true they might be. It so happened, however, that Mr. Hobbes himself passed it to a French friend, and alloweda young Englishman to translate it into French for the benefit of thisfriend. This young man kept a copy of the English original, and publishedit later in England without the author's knowledge. Thus the bishop wasobliged to reply to it, and Mr. Hobbes to make a rejoinder, and to [394]publish all the pieces together in a book of 348 pages printed in London inthe year 1656, in 4to. , entitled, _Questions concerning Freedom, Necessityand Chance, elucidated and discussed between Doctor Bramhall, Bishop ofDerry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury_. There is a later edition, of theyear 1684, in a work entitled _Hobbes's Tripos_, where are to be found hisbook on human nature, his treatise on the body politic and his treatise onfreedom and necessity; but the latter does not contain the bishop's reply, nor the author's rejoinder. Mr. Hobbes argues on this subject with hisusual wit and subtlety; but it is a pity that in both the one and the otherwe stumble upon petty tricks, such as arise in excitement over the game. The bishop speaks with much vehemence and behaves somewhat arrogantly. Mr. Hobbes for his part is not disposed to spare the other, and manifestsrather too much scorn for theology, and for the terminology of theSchoolmen, which is apparently favoured by the bishop. 

2. One must confess that there is something strange and indefensible in theopinions of Mr. Hobbes. He maintains that doctrines touching the divinitydepend entirely upon the determination of the sovereign, and that God is nomore the cause of the good than of the bad actions of creatures. Hemaintains that all that which God does is just, because there is none abovehim with power to punish and constrain him. Yet he speaks sometimes as ifwhat is said about God were only compliments, that is to say expressionsproper for paying him honour, but not for knowing him. He testifies alsothat it seems to him that the pains of the wicked must end in theirdestruction: this opinion closely approaches that of the Socinians, but itseems that Mr. Hobbes goes much further. His philosophy, which asserts thatbodies alone are substances, hardly appears favourable to the providence ofGod and the immortality of the soul. On other subjects nevertheless he saysvery reasonable things. He shows clearly that nothing comes about bychance, or rather that chance only signifies the ignorance of causes thatproduce the effect, and that for each effect there must be a concurrence ofall the sufficient conditions anterior to the event, not one of which, manifestly, can be lacking when the event is to follow, because they areconditions: the event, moreover, does not fail to follow when theseconditions exist all together, because they are sufficient conditions. Allwhich amounts to the same as I have said so many times, that everythingcomes to pass as a result of determining reasons, the knowledge [395]whereof, if we had it, would make us know at the same time why the thinghas happened and why it did not go otherwise. 

3. But this author's humour, which prompts him to paradoxes and makes himseek to contradict others, has made him draw out exaggerated and odiousconclusions and expressions, as if everything happened through an absolutenecessity. The Bishop of Derry, on the other hand, has aptly observed inthe answer to article 35, page 327, that there results only a hypotheticalnecessity, such as we all grant to events in relation to the foreknowledgeof God, while Mr. Hobbes maintains that even divine foreknowledge alonewould be sufficient to establish an absolute necessity of events. This wasalso the opinion of Wyclif, and even of Luther, when he wrote _De ServoArbitrio_; or at least they spoke so. But it is sufficiently acknowledgedto-day that this kind of necessity which is termed hypothetical, andsprings from foreknowledge or from other anterior reasons, has nothing init to arouse one's alarm: whereas it would be quite otherwise if the thingwere necessary of itself, in such a way that the contrary impliedcontradiction. Mr. Hobbes refuses to listen to anything about a moralnecessity either, on the ground that everything really happens throughphysical causes. But one is nevertheless justified in making a greatdifference between the necessity which constrains the wise to do good, andwhich is termed moral, existing even in relation to God, and that blindnecessity whereby according to Epicurus, Strato, Spinoza, and perhaps Mr. Hobbes, things exist without intelligence and without choice, andconsequently without God. Indeed, there would according to them be no needof God, since in consequence of this necessity all would have existencethrough its own essence, just as necessarily as two and three make five. And this necessity is absolute, because everything it carries with it musthappen, whatever one may do; whereas what happens by a hypotheticalnecessity happens as a result of the supposition that this or that has beenforeseen or resolved, or done beforehand; and moral necessity contains anobligation imposed by reason, which is always followed by its effect in thewise. This kind of necessity is happy and desirable, when one is promptedby good reasons to act as one does; but necessity blind and absolute wouldsubvert piety and morality. 

4. There is more reason in Mr. Hobbes's discourse when he admits that [396]our actions are in our power, so that we do that which we will when we havethe power to do it, and when there is no hindrance. He assertsnotwithstanding that our volitions themselves are not so within our powerthat we can give ourselves, without difficulty and according to our goodpleasure, inclinations and wills which we might desire. The bishop does notappear to have taken notice of this reflexion, which Mr. Hobbes also doesnot develop enough. The truth is that we have some power also over ourvolitions, but obliquely, and not absolutely and indifferently. This hasbeen explained in some passages of this work. Finally Mr. Hobbes shows, like others before him, that the certainty of events, and necessity itself, if there were any in the way our actions depend upon causes, would notprevent us from employing deliberations, exhortations, blame and praise, punishments and rewards: for these are of service and prompt men to produceactions or to refrain from them. Thus, if human actions were necessary, they would be so through these means. But the truth is, that since theseactions are not necessary absolutely whatever one may do, these meanscontribute only to render the actions determinate and certain, as they areindeed; for their nature shows that they are not subject to an absolutenecessity. He gives also a good enough notion of _freedom_, in so far as itis taken in a general sense, common to intelligent and non-intelligentsubstances: he states that a thing is deemed free when the power which ithas is not impeded by an external thing. Thus the water that is dammed by adyke has the power to spread, but not the freedom. On the other hand, ithas not the power to rise above the dyke, although nothing would prevent itthen from spreading, and although nothing from outside prevents it fromrising so high. To that end it would be necessary that the water itselfshould come from a higher point or that the water-level should be raised byan increased flow. Thus a prisoner lacks the freedom, while a sick manlacks the power, to go his way. 

5. There is in Mr. Hobbes's preface an abstract of the disputed points, which I will give here, adding some expression of opinion. _On one side_(he says) the assertion is made, (1) 'that it is not in the present powerof man to choose for himself the will that he should have'. That is _well_said, especially in relation to present will: men choose the objectsthrough will, but they do not choose their present wills, which spring fromreasons and dispositions. It is true, however, that one can seek new [397]reasons for oneself, and with time give oneself new dispositions; and bythis means one can also obtain for oneself a will which one had not andcould not have given oneself forthwith. It is (to use the comparison Mr. Hobbes himself uses) as with hunger or with thirst. At the present it doesnot rest with my will to be hungry or not; but it rests with my will to eator not to eat; yet, for the time to come, it rests with me to be hungry, orto prevent myself from being so at such and such an hour of day, by eatingbeforehand. In this way it is possible often to avoid an evil will. Eventhough Mr. Hobbes states in his reply (No. 14, p. 138) that it is themanner of laws to say, you must do or you must not do this, but that thereis no law saying, you must will, or you must not will it, yet it is clearthat he is mistaken in regard to the Law of God, which says _nonconcupisces_, thou shalt not covet; it is true that this prohibition doesnot concern the first motions, which are involuntary. It is asserted (2)'That hazard' (_chance_ in English, _casus_ in Latin) 'produces nothing', that is, that nothing is produced without cause or reason. Very _right_, Iadmit it, if one thereby intends a real hazard. For fortune and hazard areonly appearances, which spring from ignorance of causes or from disregardof them. (3) 'That all events have their necessary causes. ' _Wrong_: theyhave their determining causes, whereby one can account for them; but theseare not necessary causes. The contrary might have happened, withoutimplying contradiction. (4) 'That the will of God makes the necessity ofall things. ' _Wrong_: the will of God produces only contingent things, which could have gone differently, since time, space and matter areindifferent with regard to all kinds of shape and movement. 

6. _On the other side_ (according to Mr. Hobbes) it is asserted, (1) 'Thatman is free' (absolutely) not only 'to choose what he wills to do, but alsoto choose what he wills to will. ' That is _ill_ said: one is not absolutemaster of one's will, to change it forthwith, without making use of somemeans or skill for that purpose. (2) 'When man wills a good action, thewill of God co-operates with his, otherwise not. ' That is _well_ said, provided one means that God does not will evil actions, although he willsto permit them, to prevent the occurrence of something which would be worsethan these sins. (3) 'That the will can choose whether it wills to will ornot. ' _Wrong_, with regard to present volition. (4) 'That things happenwithout necessity by chance. ' _Wrong_: what happens without necessity [398]does not because of that happen by chance, that is to say, without causesand reasons. (5) 'Notwithstanding that God may foresee that an event willhappen, it is not necessary that it happen, since God foresees things, notas futurities and as in their causes, but as present. ' That begins _well_, and finishes _ill_. One is justified in admitting the necessity of theconsequence, but one has no reason to resort to the question how the futureis present to God: for the necessity of the consequence does not preventthe event or consequent from being contingent in itself. 

7. Our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by Arminius had beenfavoured in England by Archbishop Laud and by the Court, and importantecclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that party, thiscontributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to meet in theirexile in Paris at the house of Lord Newcastle, and to enter into adiscussion. I would not approve all the measures of Archbishop Laud, whohad merit and perhaps also good will, but who appears to have goaded thePresbyterians excessively. Nevertheless one may say that the revolutions, as much in the Low Countries as in Great Britain, in part arose from theextreme intolerance of the strict party. One may say also that thedefenders of the absolute decree were at least as strict as the others, having oppressed their opponents in Holland with the authority of PrinceMaurice and having fomented the revolts in England against King Charles I. But these are the faults of men, and not of dogmas. Their opponents do notspare them either, witness the severity used in Saxony against NicolasKrell and the proceedings of the Jesuits against the Bishop of Ypres'sparty. 

8. Mr. Hobbes observes, after Aristotle, that there are two sources forproofs: reason and authority. As for reason, he says that he admits thereasons derived from the attributes of God, which he calls argumentative, and the notions whereof are conceivable; but he maintains that there areothers wherein one conceives nothing, and which are only expressions bywhich we aspire to honour God. But I do not see how one can honour God byexpressions that have no meaning. It may be that with Mr. Hobbes, as withSpinoza, wisdom, goodness, justice are only fictions in relation to God andthe universe, since the prime cause, according to them, acts through thenecessity of its power, and not by the choice of its wisdom. That is [399]an opinion whose falsity I have sufficiently proved. It appears that Mr. Hobbes did not wish to declare himself enough, for fear of causing offenceto people; on which point he is to be commended. It was also on thataccount, as he says himself, that he had desired that what had passedbetween the bishop and him in Paris should not be published. He adds thatit is not good to say that an action which God does not will happens, sincethat is to say in effect that God is lacking in power. But he adds also atthe same time that it is not good either to say the opposite, and toattribute to God that he wills the evil; because that is not seemly, andwould appear to accuse God of lack of goodness. He believes, therefore, that in these matters telling the truth is not advisable. He would be rightif the truth were in the paradoxical opinions that he maintains. For indeedit appears that according to the opinion of this writer God has nogoodness, or rather that that which he calls God is nothing but the blindnature of the mass of material things, which acts according to mathematicallaws, following an absolute necessity, as the atoms do in the system ofEpicurus. If God were as the great are sometimes here on earth, it wouldnot be fitting to utter all the truths concerning him. But God is not as aman, whose designs and actions often must be concealed; rather it is alwayspermissible and reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of God, because they are always glorious and worthy of praise. Thus it is alwaysright to utter truths concerning the divinity; one need not anyhow refrainfrom fear of giving offence. And I have explained, so it seems to me, in away which satisfies reason, and does not wound piety, how it is to beunderstood that God's will takes effect, and concurs with sin, withoutcompromising his wisdom and his goodness. 

9. As to the authorities derived from Holy Scripture, Mr. Hobbes dividesthem into three kinds; some, he says, are for me, the second kind areneutral, and the third seem to be for my opponent. The passages which hethinks favourable to his opinion are those which ascribe to God the causeof our will. Thus Gen. Xlv. 5, where Joseph says to his brethren, 'Be notgrieved, nor angry with yourselves, that you sold me hither: for God didsend me before you to preserve life'; and verse 8, 'it was not you thatsent me hither, but God. ' And God said (Exod. Vii. 3), 'I will hardenPharaoh's heart. ' And Moses said (Deut. Ii. 30), 'But Sihon King of [400]Heshbon would not let us pass by him: for the Lord thy God hardened hisspirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thyhand. ' And David said of Shimei (2 Sam. Xvi. 10), 'Let him curse, becausethe Lord hath said unto him: Curse David. Who shall then say, whereforehast thou done so?' And (1 Kings xii. 15), 'The King [Rehoboam] hearkenednot unto the people; for the cause was from the Lord. ' Job xii. 16: 'Thedeceived and the deceiver are his. ' v. 17: 'He maketh the judges fools'; v. 24: 'He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, andcauseth them to wander in a wilderness'; v. 25: 'He maketh them to staggerlike a drunken man. ' God said of the King of Assyria (Isa. X. 6), 'Againstthe people will I give him a charge, to take the spoil, and to take theprey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets. ' And Jeremiahsaid (Jer. X. 23), 'O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself:it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps. ' And God said (Ezek. Iii. 20), 'When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, andcommit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling-block before him, he shall die. ' Andthe Saviour said (John vi. 44), 'No man can come to me, except the Fatherwhich hath sent me draw him. ' And St. Peter (Acts ii. 23), 'Jesus havingbeen delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye havetaken. ' And Acts iv. 27, 28, 'Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with theGentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to dowhatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. ' And St. Paul (Rom. Ix. 16), 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him thatrunneth, but of God that showeth mercy. ' And v. 18: 'Therefore hath hemercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth'; v. 19:'Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hathresisted his will?'; v. 20: 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliestagainst God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hastthou made me thus?' And 1 Cor. Iv. 7: 'For who maketh thee to differ fromanother? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?' And 1 Cor. Xii. 6: 'There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God whichworketh all in all. ' And Eph. Ii. 10: 'We are his workmanship, created inChrist Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we shouldwalk in them. ' And Phil. Ii. 13: 'It is God which worketh in you both towill and to do of his good pleasure. ' One may add to these passages allthose which make God the author of all grace and of all good [401]inclinations, and all those which say that we are as dead in sin. 

10. Here now are the neutral passages, according to Mr. Hobbes. These arethose where Holy Scripture says that man has the choice to act if he wills, or not to act if he wills not. For example Deut. Xxx. 19: 'I call heavenand earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you lifeand death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou andthy seed may live. ' And Joshua xxiv. 15: 'Choose you this day whom ye willserve. ' And God said to Gad the prophet (2 Sam. Xxiv. 12), 'Go and say untoDavid: Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things; choose thee one ofthem, that I may do it unto thee. ' And Isa. Vii. 16: 'Until the child shallknow to refuse the evil and choose the good. ' Finally the passages whichMr. Hobbes acknowledges to be apparently contrary to his opinion are allthose where it is indicated that the will of man is not in conformity withthat of God. Thus Isa. V. 4: 'What could have been done more to myvineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that itshould bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?' And Jer. Xix. 5:'They have built also the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with firefor burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neithercame it into my mind. ' And Hos. Xiii. 9: 'O Israel, thou hast destroyedthyself; but in me is thine help. ' And I Tim. Ii. 4: 'God will have all mento be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth. ' He avows that hecould quote very many other passages, such as those which indicate that Godwilleth not iniquity, that he willeth the salvation of the sinner, andgenerally all those which declare that God commands good and forbids evil. 

11. Mr. Hobbes makes answer to these passages that God does not always willthat which he commands, as for example when he commanded Abraham tosacrifice his son, and that God's revealed will is not always his full willor his decree, as when he revealed to Jonah that Nineveh would perish inforty days. He adds also, that when it is said that God wills the salvationof all, that means simply that God commands that all do that which isnecessary for salvation; when, moreover, the Scripture says that God willsnot sin, that means that he wills to punish it. And as for the rest, Mr. Hobbes ascribes it to the forms of expression used among men. But one willanswer him that it would be to God's discredit that his revealed will [402]should be opposed to his real will: that what he bade Jonah say to theNinevites was rather a threat than a prediction, and that thus thecondition of impenitence was implied therein; moreover the Ninevites tookit in this sense. One will say also, that it is quite true that God incommanding Abraham to sacrifice his son willed obedience, but did not willaction, which he prevented after having obtained obedience; for that wasnot an action deserving in itself to be willed. And it is not the same inthe case of actions where he exerts his will positively, and which are infact worthy to be the object of his will. Of such are piety, charity andevery virtuous action that God commands; of such is omission of sin, athing more alien to divine perfection than any other. It is thereforeincomparably better to explain the will of God as I have explained it inthis work. Thus I shall say that God, by virtue of his supreme goodness, has in the beginning a serious inclination to produce, or to see and causeto be produced, all good and every laudable action, and to prevent, or tosee and cause to fail, all evil and every bad action. But he is determinedby this same goodness, united to an infinite wisdom, and by the veryconcourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards eachgood, and towards the preventing of each evil, to produce the best possibledesign of things. This is his final and decretory will. And this design ofthe best being of such a nature that the good must be enhanced therein, aslight is enhanced by shade, by some evil which is incomparably less thanthis good, God could not have excluded this evil, nor introduced certaingoods that were excluded from this plan, without wronging his supremeperfection. So for that reason one must say that he permitted the sins ofothers, because otherwise he would have himself performed an action worsethan all the sin of creatures. 

12. I find that the Bishop of Derry is at least justified in saying, article XV, in his Reply, p. 153, that the opinion of his opponents iscontrary to piety, when they ascribe all to God's power only, and that Mr. Hobbes ought not to have said that honour or worship is only a sign of thepower of him whom one honours: for one may also, and one must, acknowledgeand honour wisdom, goodness, justice and other perfections. _Magnos facilelaudamus, bonos libenter. _ This opinion, which despoils God of all goodnessand of all true justice, which represents him as a Tyrant, wielding anabsolute power, independent of all right and of all equity, and [403]creating millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy, and this withoutany other aim than that of displaying his power, this opinion, I say, iscapable of rendering men very evil; and if it were accepted no other Devilwould be needed in the world to set men at variance among themselves andwith God; as the Serpent did in making Eve believe that God, when heforbade her the fruit of the tree, did not will her good. Mr. Hobbesendeavours to parry this thrust in his Rejoinder (p. 160) by saying thatgoodness is a part of the power of God, that is to say, the power of makinghimself worthy of love. But that is an abuse of terms by an evasion, andconfounds things that must be kept distinct. After all, if God does notintend the good of intelligent creatures, if he has no other principles ofjustice than his power alone, which makes him produce either arbitrarilythat which chance presents to him, or by necessity all that which ispossible, without the intervention of choice founded on good, how can hemake himself worthy of love? It is therefore the doctrine either of blindpower or of arbitrary power, which destroys piety: for the one destroys theintelligent principle or the providence of God, the other attributes to himactions which are appropriate to the evil principle. Justice in God, saysMr. Hobbes (p. 161), is nothing but the power he has, which he exercises indistributing blessings and afflictions. This definition surprises me: it isnot the power to distribute them, but the will to distribute themreasonably, that is, goodness guided by wisdom, which makes the justice ofGod. But, says he, justice is not in God as in a man, who is only justthrough the observance of laws made by his superior. Mr. Hobbes is mistakenalso in that, as well as Herr Pufendorf, who followed him. Justice does notdepend upon arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of wisdomand of goodness, in men as well as in God. Mr. Hobbes asserts in the samepassage that the wisdom which is attributed to God does not lie in alogical consideration of the relation of means to ends, but in anincomprehensible attribute, attributed to an incomprehensible nature tohonour it. It seems as if he means that it is an indescribable somethingattributed to an indescribable something, and even a chimerical qualitygiven to a chimerical substance, to intimidate and to deceive the nationsthrough the worship which they render to it. After all, it is difficult forMr. Hobbes to have a different opinion of God and of wisdom, since headmits only material substances. If Mr. Hobbes were still alive, I wouldbeware of ascribing to him opinions which might do him injury; but it [404]is difficult to exempt him from this. He may have changed his mindsubsequently, for he attained to a great age; thus I hope that his errorsmay not have been deleterious to him. But as they might be so to others, itis expedient to give warnings to those who shall read the writings of onewho otherwise is of great merit, and from whom one may profit in many ways. It is true that God does not reason, properly speaking, using time as wedo, to pass from one truth to the other: but as he understands at one andthe same time all the truths and all their connexions, he knows all theconclusions, and he contains in the highest degree within himself all thereasonings that we can develop. And just because of that his wisdom isperfect. 

 [405] * * * * *

OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL' PUBLISHED RECENTLYIN LONDON

 * * * * *

1. It is a pity that M. Bayle should have seen only the reviews of thisadmirable work, which are to be found in the journals. If he had read ithimself and examined it properly, he would have provided us with a goodopportunity of throwing light on many difficulties, which spring again andagain like the head of the hydra, in a matter where it is easy to becomeconfused when one has not seen the whole system or does not take thetrouble to reason according to a strict plan. For strictness of reasoningperforms in subjects that transcend imagination the same function asfigures do in geometry: there must always be something capable of fixingour attention and forming a connexion between our thoughts. That is whywhen this Latin book, so learned and so elegant of style, printedoriginally in London and then reprinted in Bremen, fell into my hands, Ijudged that the seriousness of the matter and the author's merit requiredan attention which readers might fairly expect of me, since we are agreedonly in regard to half of the subject. Indeed, as the work contains fivechapters, and the fifth with the appendix equals the rest in size, I haveobserved that the first four, where it is a question of evil in general andof physical evil in particular, are in harmony with my principles (save fora few individual passages), and that they sometimes even develop with forceand eloquence some points I had treated but slightly because M. Bayle [406]had not placed emphasis upon them. But the fifth chapter, with its sections(of which some are equal to entire chapters) speaking of freedom and of themoral evil dependent upon it, is constructed upon principles opposed tomine, and often, indeed, to those of M. Bayle; that is, if it were possibleto credit him with any fixed principles. For this fifth chapter tends toshow (if that were possible) that true freedom depends upon an indifferenceof equipoise, vague, complete and absolute; so that, until the will hasdetermined itself, there would be no reason for its determination, eitherin him who chooses or in the object; and one would not choose what pleases, but in choosing without reason one would cause what one chooses to bepleasing. 

2. This principle of choice without cause or reason, of a choice, I say, divested of the aim of wisdom and goodness, is regarded by many as thegreat privilege of God and of intelligent substances, and as the source oftheir freedom, their satisfaction, their morality and their good or evil. The fantasy of a power to declare one's independence, not only ofinclination, but of reason itself within and of good and evil without, issometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it to be themost excellent thing in the world. Nevertheless it is only a hollowfantasy, a suppression of the reasons for the caprice of which one boasts. What is asserted is impossible, but if it came to pass it would be harmful. This fantastic character might be attributed to some Don Juan in a St. Peter's Feast, and a man of romantic disposition might even affect theoutward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it in reality. But in Nature there will never be any choice to which one is not promptedby the previous representation of good or evil, by inclinations or byreasons: and I have always challenged the supporters of this absoluteindifference to show an example thereof. Nevertheless if I call fantasticthis choice whereto one is determined by nothing, I am far from callingvisionaries the supporters of that hypothesis, especially our giftedauthor. The Peripatetics teach some beliefs of this nature; but it would bethe greatest injustice in the world to be ready to despise on that accountan Occam, a Suisset, a Cesalpino, a Conringius, men who still advocatedcertain scholastic opinions which have been improved upon to-day. 

3. One of these opinions, revived, however, and introduced by [407]degenerate scholasticism, and in the Age of Chimeras, is vague indifferenceof choice, or real chance, assumed in our souls; as if nothing gave us anyinclination unless we perceived it distinctly, and as if an effect could bewithout causes, when these causes are imperceptible. It is much as somehave denied the existence of insensible corpuscles because they do not seethem. Modern philosophers have improved upon the opinions of the Schoolmenby showing that, according to the laws of corporeal nature, a body can onlybe set in motion by the movement of another body propelling it. Even so wemust believe that our souls (by virtue of the laws of spiritual nature) canonly be moved by some reason of good or evil: and this even when nodistinct knowledge can be extracted from our mental state, on account of aconcourse of innumerable little perceptions which make us now joyful andnow sad, or again of some other humour, and cause us to like one thing morethan another without its being possible to say why. Plato, Aristotle andeven Thomas Aquinas, Durand and other Schoolmen of the sounder sort reasonon that question like the generality of men, and as unprejudiced peoplealways have reasoned. They assume that freedom lies in the use of reasonand the inclinations, which cause the choice or rejection of objects. Butfinally some rather too subtle philosophers have extracted from theiralembic an inexplicable notion of choice independent of anythingwhatsoever, which is said to do wonders in solving all difficulties. Butthe notion is caught up at the outset in one of the greatest difficulties, by offending against the grand principle of reasoning which makes us alwaysassume that nothing is done without some sufficient cause or reason. As theSchoolmen often forgot to apply this great principle, admitting certainprime occult qualities, one need not wonder if this fiction of vagueindifference met with applause amongst them, and if even most worthy menhave been imbued therewith. Our author, who is otherwise rid of many of theerrors of the ordinary Schoolmen, is still deluded by this fiction: but heis without doubt one of the most skilful of those who have supported it. 

 _Si Pergama dextra_ _Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent. _

He gives it the best possible turn, and only shows it on its good side. Heknows how to strip spontaneity and reason of their advantages, [408]transferring all these to vague indifference: only through thisindifference is one active, resisting the passions, taking pleasure inone's choice, or being happy; it appears indeed that one would be miserableif some happy necessity should oblige us to choose aright. Our author hadsaid admirable things on the origin and reasons of natural evils: he onlyhad to apply the same principles to moral evil; indeed, he believes himselfthat moral evil becomes an evil through the physical evils that it causesor tends to cause. But somehow or other he thinks that it would be adegradation of God and men if they were to be made subject to reason; thatthus they would all be rendered passive to it and would no longer besatisfied with themselves; in short that men would have nothing wherewithto oppose the misfortunes that come to them from without, if they had notwithin them this admirable privilege of rendering things good or tolerableby choosing them, and of changing all into gold by the touch of thiswondrous faculty. 

4. We will examine it in closer detail presently; but it will be well toprofit beforehand by the excellent ideas of our author on the nature ofthings and on natural evils, particularly since there are some points inwhich we shall be able to go a little further: by this means also we shallgain a better understanding of the whole arrangement of his system. Thefirst chapter contains the principles. The writer calls substance a beingthe idea of which does not involve the existence of another. I do not knowif there are any such among created beings, by reason of the connexionexisting between all things; and the example of a wax torch is not theexample of a substance, any more than that of a swarm of bees would be. Butone may take the terms in an extended sense. He observes aptly that afterall the changes of matter and after all the qualities of which it may bedivested, there remain extension, mobility, divisibility and resistance. Heexplains also the nature of notions, and leaves it to be understood that_universals_ indicate only the resemblances which exist between_individuals_; that we understand by _ideas_ only that which is knownthrough an immediate sensation, and that the rest is known to us onlythrough relations with these ideas. But when he admits that we have no ideaof God, of spirit, of substance, he does not appear to have observedsufficiently that we have immediate apperception of substance and of spiritin our apperception of ourselves, and that the idea of God is found in[409]the idea of ourselves through a suppression of the limits of ourperfections, as extension taken in an absolute sense is comprised in theidea of a globe. He is right also in asserting that our simple ideas atleast are innate, and in rejecting the _Tabula rasa_ of Aristotle and ofMr. Locke. But I cannot agree with him that our ideas have scarce any morerelation to things than words uttered into the air or writings traced uponpaper have to our ideas, and that the bearing of our sensations isarbitrary and _ex instituto_, like the signification of words. I havealready indicated elsewhere why I am not in agreement with our Cartesianson that point. 

5. For the purpose of advancing to the first Cause, the author seeks acriterion, a distinguishing mark of truth; and he finds it in the forcewhereby our inward assertions, when they are evident, compel theunderstanding to give them its consent. It is by such a process, he says, that we credit the senses. He points out that the distinguishing mark inthe Cartesian scheme, to wit, a clear and distinct perception, has need ofa new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct, and that the congruityor non-congruity of ideas (or rather of terms, as one spoke formerly) maystill be deceptive, because there are congruities real and apparent. Heappears to recognize even that the inward force which constrains us to giveour assent is still a matter for caution, and may come from deep-rootedprejudices. That is why he confesses that he who should furnish anothercriterion would have found something very advantageous to the human race. Ihave endeavoured to explain this criterion in a little _Discourse on Truthand Ideas_, published in 1684; and although I do not boast of having giventherein a new discovery I hope that I have expounded things which were onlyconfusedly recognized. I distinguish between truths of fact and truths ofreason. Truths of fact can only be verified by confronting them with truthsof reason, and by tracing them back to immediate perceptions within us, such as St. Augustine and M. Descartes very promptly acknowledged to beindubitable; that is to say, we cannot doubt that we think, nor indeed thatwe think this thing or that. But in order to judge whether our inwardnotions have any reality in things, and to pass from thoughts to objects, my opinion is that it is necessary to consider whether our perceptions arefirmly connected among themselves and with others that we have had, in suchfashion as to manifest the rules of mathematics and other truths of [410]reason. In this case one must regard them as real; and I think that it isthe only means of distinguishing them from imaginations, dreams andvisions. Thus the truth of things outside us can be recognized only throughthe connexion of phenomena. The criterion of the truths of reason, or thosewhich spring from conceptions, is found in an exact use of the rules oflogic. As for ideas or notions, I call _real_ all those the possibility ofwhich is certain; and the _definitions_ which do not mark this possibilityare only _nominal_. Geometricians well versed in analysis are aware whatdifference there is in this respect between several properties by whichsome line or figure might be defined. Our gifted author has not gone sofar, perhaps; one may see, however, from the account I have given of himalready, and from what follows, that he is by no means lacking inprofundity or reflexion. 

6. Thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion, matter and spacespring from themselves; and to that end he considers whether it is possibleto conceive that they do not exist. He remarks upon this privilege of God, that as soon as it is assumed that he exists it must be admitted that heexists of necessity. This is a corollary to a remark which I made in thelittle discourse mentioned above, namely that as soon as one admits thatGod is possible, one must admit that he exists of necessity. Now, as soonas one admits that God exists, one admits that he is possible. Therefore assoon as one admits that God exists, one must admit that he exists ofnecessity. Now this privilege does not belong to the three things of whichwe have just spoken. The author believes also especially concerning motion, that it is not sufficient to say, with Mr. Hobbes, that the presentmovement comes from an anterior movement, and this one again from another, and so on to infinity. For, however far back you may go, you will not beone whit nearer to finding the reason which causes the presence of motionin matter. Therefore this reason must be outside the sequence; and even ifthere were an eternal motion, it would require an eternal motive power. Sothe rays of the sun, even though they were eternal with the sun, wouldnevertheless have their eternal cause in the sun. I am well pleased torecount these arguments of our gifted author, that it may be seen howimportant, according to him, is the principle of sufficient reason. For, ifit is permitted to admit something for which it is acknowledged there is noreason, it will be easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument, by [411]saying that it is not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for theexistence of motion. I will not enter into the discussion of the realityand the eternity of space, for fear of straying too far from our subject. It is enough to state that the author believes that space can beannihilated by the divine power, but in entirety and not in portions, andthat we could exist alone with God even if there were neither space normatter, since we do not contain within ourselves the notion of theexistence of external things. He also puts forward the consideration thatin the sensations of sounds, of odours and of savours the idea of space isnot included. But whatever the opinion formed as to space, it suffices thatthere is a God, the cause of matter and of motion, and in short of allthings. The author believes that we can reason about God, as one born blindwould reason about light. But I hold that there is something more in us, for our light is a ray from God's light. After having spoken of someattributes of God, the author acknowledges that God acts for an end, whichis the communication of his goodness, and that his works are orderedaright. Finally he concludes this chapter very properly, by saying that Godin creating the world was at pains to give it the greatest harmony amongstthings, the greatest comfort of beings endowed with reason, and thegreatest compatibility in desires that an infinite power, wisdom andgoodness combined could produce. He adds that, if some evil has remainednotwithstanding, one must believe that these infinite divine perfectionscould not have (I would rather say ought not to have) taken it away. 

7. Chapter II anatomizes evil, dividing it as we do into metaphysical, physical and moral. Metaphysical evil consists in imperfections, physicalevil in suffering and other like troubles, and moral evil in sin. All theseevils exist in God's work; Lucretius thence inferred that there is noprovidence, and he denied that the world can be an effect of divinity:

 _Naturam rerum divinitus esse creatam;_

because there are so many faults in the nature of things, _quoniam tanta stat praedita culpa. _

Others have admitted two principles, the one good, the other evil. Therehave also been people who thought the difficulty insurmountable, and amongthese our author appears to have had M. Bayle in mind. He hopes to [412]show in his work that it is not a Gordian knot, which needs to be cut; andhe says rightly that the power, the wisdom and the goodness of God wouldnot be infinite and perfect in their exercise if these evils had beenbanished. He begins with the evil of imperfection in Chapter III andobserves, as St. Augustine does, that creatures are imperfect, since theyare derived from nothingness, whereas God producing a perfect substancefrom his own essence would have made thereof a God. This gives him occasionfor making a little digression against the Socinians. But someone will say, why did not God refrain from producing things, rather than make imperfectthings? The author answers appositely that the abundance of the goodness ofGod is the cause. He wished to communicate himself at the expense of acertain fastidiousness which we assume in God, imagining that imperfectionsoffend him. Thus he preferred that there should be the imperfect ratherthan nothing. But one might have added that God has produced indeed themost perfect whole that was possible, one wherewith he had full cause forsatisfaction, the imperfections of the parts serving a greater perfectionin the whole. Also the observation is made soon afterwards, that certainthings might have been made better, but not without other new and _perhaps_greater disadvantages. This _perhaps_ could have been omitted: for theauthor also states as a certainty, and rightly so, at the end of thechapter, _that it appertains to infinite goodness to choose the best_; andthus he was able to draw this conclusion a little earlier, that imperfectthings will be added to those more perfect, so long as they do not precludethe existence of the more perfect in as great a number as possible. Thusbodies were created as well as spirits, since the one does not offer anyobstacle to the other; and the creation of matter was not unworthy of thegreat God, as some heretics of old believed, attributing this work to acertain Demogorgon. 

8. Let us now proceed to physical evil, which is treated of in Chapter IV. Our famous author, having observed that metaphysical evil, or imperfection, springs from nothingness, concludes that physical evil, or discomfort, springs from matter, or rather from its movement; for without movementmatter would be useless. Moreover there must be contrariety in thesemovements; otherwise, if all went together in the same direction, therewould be neither variety nor generation. But the movements that cause [413]generations cause also corruptions, since from the variety of movementscomes concussion between bodies, by which they are often dissipated anddestroyed. The Author of Nature however, in order to render bodies moreenduring, distributed them into _systems_, those which we know beingcomposed of luminous and opaque balls, in a manner so excellent and sofitting for the display of that which they contain, and for arousing wonderthereat, that we can conceive of nothing more beautiful. But the crowningpoint of the work was the construction of animals, to the end thateverywhere there should be creatures capable of cognition, _Ne regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba. _

Our sagacious author believes that the air and even the purest aether havetheir denizens as well as the water and the earth. But supposing that therewere places without animals, these places might have uses necessary forother places which are inhabited. So for example the mountains, whichrender the surface of our globe unequal and sometimes desert and barren, are of use for the production of rivers and of winds; and we have no causeto complain of sands and marshes, since there are so many places stillremaining to be cultivated. Moreover, it must not be supposed that all ismade for man alone: and the author is persuaded that there are not onlypure spirits but also immortal animals of a nature akin to these spirits, that is, animals whose souls are united to an ethereal and incorruptiblematter. But it is not the same with animals whose body is terrestrial, composed of tubes and fluids which circulate therein, and whose motion isterminated by the breaking of the vessels. Thence the author is led tobelieve that the immortality granted to Adam, if he had been obedient, would not have been an effect of his nature, but of the grace of God. 

9. Now it was necessary for the conservation of corruptible animals thatthey should have indications causing them to recognize a present danger, and giving them the inclination to avoid it. That is why what is about tocause a great injury must beforehand cause pain such as may force theanimal to efforts capable of repulsing or shunning the cause of thisdiscomfort, and of forestalling a greater evil. The dread of death helpsalso to cause its avoidance: for it if were not so ugly and if thedissolution of continuity were not so painful, very often animals wouldtake no precautions against perishing, or allowing the parts of their [414]body to perish, and the strongest would have difficulty in subsisting for awhole day. 

God has also given hunger and thirst to animals, to compel them to feed andmaintain themselves by replacing that which is used up and which disappearsimperceptibly. These appetites are of use also to prompt them to work, inorder to procure a nourishment meet for their constitution, and which mayavail to invigorate them. It was even found necessary by the Author ofthings that one animal very often should serve as food for another. Thishardly renders the victim more unhappy, since death caused by diseases isgenerally just as painful as a violent death, if not more so; and animalssubject to being preyed upon by others, having neither foresight noranxiety for the future, have a life no less tranquil when they are not indanger. It is the same with inundations, earthquakes, thunderbolts andother disorders, which brute beasts do not fear, and which men haveordinarily no cause to fear, since there are few that suffer thereby. 

10. The Author of Nature has compensated for these evils and others, whichhappen only seldom, with a thousand advantages that are ordinary andconstant. Hunger and thirst augment the pleasure experienced in the takingof nourishment. Moderate work is an agreeable exercise of the animal'spowers; and sleep is also agreeable in an altogether opposite way, restoring the forces through repose. But one of the pleasures most intenseis that which prompts animals to propagation. God, having taken care toensure that the species should be immortal, since the individual cannot beso here on earth, also willed that animals should have a great tendernessfor their little ones, even to the point of endangering themselves fortheir preservation. From pain and from sensual pleasure spring fear, cupidity and the other passions that are ordinarily serviceable, althoughit may accidentally happen that they sometimes turn towards ill: one mustsay as much of poisons, epidemic diseases and other hurtful things, namelythat these are indispensable consequences of a well-conceived system. Asfor ignorance and errors, it must be taken into account that the mostperfect creatures are doubtless ignorant of much, and that knowledge iswont to be proportionate to needs. Nevertheless it is necessary that one beexposed to hazards which cannot be foreseen, and accidents of such kindsare inevitable. One must often be mistaken in one's judgement, because itis not always permitted to suspend it long enough for exact [415]consideration. These disadvantages are inseparable from the system ofthings: for things must very often resemble one another in a certainsituation, the one being taken for the other. But the inevitable errors arenot the most usual, nor the most pernicious. Those which cause us the mostharm are wont to arise through our fault; and consequently one would bewrong to make natural evils a pretext for taking one's own life, since onefinds that those who have done so have generally been prompted to suchaction by voluntary evils. 

11. After all, one finds that all these evils of which we have spoken comeaccidentally from good causes; and there is reason to infer concerning allwe do not know, from all we do know, that one could not have done away withthem without falling into greater troubles. For the better understanding ofthis the author counsels us to picture the world as a great building. Theremust be not only apartments, halls, galleries, gardens, grottoes, but alsothe kitchen, the cellar, the poultry-yard, stables, drainage. Thus it wouldnot have been proper to make only suns in the world, or to make an earthall of gold and of diamonds, but not habitable. If man had been all eye orall ear, he would not have been fitted for feeding himself. If God had madehim without passions, he would have made him stupid; and if he had wishedto make man free from error he would have had to deprive him of senses, orgive him powers of sensation through some other means than organs, that isto say, there would not have been any man. Our learned author remarks hereupon an idea which histories both sacred and profane appear to inculcate, namely that wild beasts, poisonous plants and other natures that areinjurious to us have been armed against us by sin. But as he argues hereonly in accordance with the principles of reason he sets aside whatRevelation can teach. He believes, however, that Adam would have beenexempted from natural evils (if he had been obedient) only by virtue ofdivine grace and of a covenant made with God, and that Moses expresslyindicates only about seven effects of the first sin. These effects are:

1. The revocation of the gracious gift of immortality. 

2. The sterility of the earth, which was no longer to be fertile of itself, save in evil or useless herbs. 

3. The rude toil one must exercise in order to gain sustenance. 

4. The subjection of the woman to the will of the husband. 

 [416]5. The pains of childbirth. 

6. The enmity between man and the serpent. 

7. The banishment of man from the place of delight wherein God had placedhim. 

But our author thinks that many of our evils spring from the necessity ofmatter, especially since the withdrawal of grace. Moreover, it seems to himthat after our banishment immortality would be only a burden to us, andthat it is perhaps more for our good than to punish us that the tree oflife has become inaccessible to us. On one point or another one might havesomething to say in objection, but the body of the discourse by our authoron the origin of evils is full of good and sound reflexions, which I havejudged it advisable to turn to advantage. Now I must pass on to the subjectof our controversy, that is, the explanation of the nature of freedom. 

12. The learned author of this work on the origin of evil, proposing toexplain the origin of moral evil in the fifth chapter, which makes up halfof the whole book, considers that it is altogether different from that ofphysical evil, which lies in the inevitable imperfection of creatures. For, as we shall see presently, it appears to him that moral evil comes ratherfrom that which he calls a perfection, which the creature has in common, according to him, with the Creator, that is to say, in the power ofchoosing without any motive and without any final or impelling cause. It isa very great paradox to assert that the greatest imperfection, namely sin, springs from perfection itself. But it is no less a paradox to present as aperfection the thing which is the least reasonable in the world, theadvantage whereof would consist in being privileged against reason. Andthat, after all, rather than pointing out the source of the evil, would beto contend that it has none. For if the will makes its resolve without theexistence of anything, either in the person who chooses or in the objectwhich is chosen, to prompt it to the choice, there will be neither causenor reason for this election; and as moral evil consists in the wrongchoice, that is admitting that moral evil has no source at all. Thus in therules of good metaphysics there would have to be no moral evil in Nature;and also for the same reason there would be no moral good either, and allmorality would be destroyed. But we must listen to our gifted author, fromwhom the subtlety of an opinion maintained by famous philosophers among theSchoolmen, and the adornments that he has added thereto himself by his[417]wit and his eloquence, have hidden the great disadvantages containedtherein. In setting forth the position reached in the controversy, hedivides the writers into two parties. The one sort, he says, are content tosay that the freedom of the will is exempt from outward constraint; and theother sort maintain that it is also exempt from inward necessity. But thisexposition does not suffice, unless one distinguish the necessity that isabsolute and contrary to morality from hypothetical necessity and moralnecessity, as I have already explained in many places. 

13. The first section of this chapter is to indicate the nature of choice. The author sets forth in the first place the opinion of those who believethat the will is prompted by the judgement of the understanding, or byanterior inclinations of the desires, to resolve upon the course that itadopts. But he confuses these authors with those who assert that the willis prompted to its resolution by an absolute necessity, and who maintainthat the person who wills has no power over his volitions: that is, heconfuses a Thomist with a Spinozist. He makes use of the admissions and theodious declarations of Mr. Hobbes and his like, to lay them to the chargeof those who are infinitely far removed from them, and who take great careto refute them. He lays these things to their charge because they believe, as Mr. Hobbes believes, like everyone else (save for some doctors who areenveloped in their own subtleties), that the will is moved by therepresentation of good and evil. Thence he imputes to them the opinion thatthere is therefore no such thing as contingency, and that all is connectedby an absolute necessity. That is a very speedy manner of reasoning; yet headds also, that properly speaking there will be no evil will, since ifthere were, all one could object to therein would be the evil which it cancause. That, he says, is different from the common notion, since the worldcensures the wicked not because they do harm, but because they do harmwithout necessity. He holds also that the wicked would be only unfortunateand by no means culpable; that there would be no difference betweenphysical evil and moral evil, since man himself would not be the true causeof an action which he could not avoid; that evil-doers would not be eitherblamed or maltreated because they deserve it, but because that action mayserve to turn people away from evil; again, for this reason only one wouldfind fault with a rogue, but not with a sick man, that reproaches and [418]threats can correct the one, and cannot cure the other. And further, according to this doctrine, chastisements would have no object save theprevention of future evil, without which the mere consideration of the evilalready done would not be sufficient for punishment. Likewise gratitudewould have as its sole aim that of procuring a fresh benefit, without whichthe mere consideration of the past benefit would not furnish a sufficientreason. Finally the author thinks that if this doctrine, which derives theresolution of the will from the representation of good and evil, were true, one must despair of human felicity, since it would not be in our power, andwould depend upon things which are outside us. Now as there is no groundfor hoping that things from outside will order themselves and agreetogether in accordance with our wishes, there will always lack something tous, and there will always be something too much. All these conclusionshold, according to him, against those also who think that the will makesits resolve in accordance with the final judgement of the understanding, anopinion which, as he considers, strips the will of its right and rendersthe soul quite passive. This accusation is also directed against countlessserious writers, of accepted authority, who are here placed in the sameclass with Mr. Hobbes and Spinoza, and with some other discredited authors, whose doctrine is considered odious and insupportable. As for me, I do notrequire the will always to follow the judgement of the understanding, because I distinguish this judgement from the motives that spring frominsensible perceptions and inclinations. But I hold that the will alwaysfollows the most advantageous representation, whether distinct or confused, of the good or the evil resulting from reasons, passions and inclinations, although it may also find motives for suspending its judgement. But it isalways upon motives that it acts. 

14. It will be necessary to answer these objections to my opinion beforeproceeding to establish that of our author. The misapprehension of myopponents originates in their confusing a consequence which is necessaryabsolutely, whose contrary implies contradiction, with a consequence whichis founded only upon truths of fitness, and nevertheless has its effect. Toput it otherwise, there is a confusion between what depends upon theprinciple of contradiction, which makes necessary and indispensable truths, and what depends upon the principle of the sufficient reason, which [419]applies also to contingent truths. I have already elsewhere stated thisproposition, which is one of the most important in philosophy, pointing outthat there are two great principles, namely, _that of identicals or ofcontradiction_, which states that of two contradictory enunciations the oneis true and the other false, and _that of the sufficient reason_, whichstates that there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen byone possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding. Both principles must hold not only in necessary but also in contingenttruths; and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reasonshould not exist. For one may say in a sense that these two principles arecontained in the definition of the true and the false. Nevertheless, whenin making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it depending upontruths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it isabsolutely necessary. But when, while pressing the analysis to the furthestextent, one can never attain to such elements of the given truth, one mustsay that it is contingent, and that it originates from a prevailing reasonwhich inclines without necessitating. Once that is granted, it is seen howwe can say with sundry famous philosophers and theologians, that thethinking substance is prompted to its resolution by the prevailingrepresentation of good or of evil, and this certainly and infallibly, butnot necessarily, that is, by reasons which incline it without necessitatingit. That is why contingent futurities, foreseen both in themselves andthrough their reasons, remain contingent. God was led infallibly by hiswisdom and by his goodness to create the world through his power, and togive it the best possible form; but he was not led thereto of necessity, and the whole took place without any diminution of his perfect and supremewisdom. And I do not know if it would be easy, apart from the reflexions wehave just entertained, to untie the Gordian knot of contingency andfreedom. 

15. This explanation dismisses all the objections of our gifted opponent. In the first place, it is seen that contingency exists together withfreedom. Secondly, evil wills are evil not only because they do harm, butalso because they are a source of harmful things, or of physical evils, awicked spirit being, in the sphere of its activity, what the evil principleof the Manichaeans would be in the universe. Moreover, the author hasobserved (ch. 4, sect. 4, § 8) that divine wisdom has usually forbiddenactions which would cause discomforts, that is to say, physical evils. [420]It is agreed that he who causes evil by necessity is not culpable. Butthere is neither legislator nor lawyer who by this necessity means theforce of the considerations of good or evil, real or apparent, that haveprompted man to do ill: else anyone stealing a great sum of money orkilling a powerful man in order to attain to high office would be lessdeserving of punishment than one who should steal a few halfpence for a mugof beer or wantonly kill his neighbour's dog, since these latter weretempted less. But it is quite the opposite in the administration of justicewhich is authorized in the world: for the greater is the temptation to sin, the more does it need to be repressed by the fear of a great chastisement. Besides, the greater the calculation evident in the design of an evil-doer, the more will it be found that the wickedness has been deliberate, and themore readily will one decide that it is great and deserving of punishment. Thus a too artful fraud causes the aggravating crime called _stellionate_, and a cheat becomes a forger when he has the cunning to sap the veryfoundations of our security in written documents. But one will have greaterindulgence for a great passion, because it is nearer to madness. The Romanspunished with the utmost severity the priests of the God Apis, when thesehad prostituted the chastity of a noble lady to a knight who loved her todistraction, making him pass as their god; while it was found enough tosend the lover into exile. But if someone had done evil deeds withoutapparent reason and without appearance of passion the judge would betempted to take him for a madman, especially if it proved that he was givento committing such extravagances often: this might tend towards reductionof the penalty, rather than supplying the true grounds of wickedness andpunishment. So far removed are the principles of our opponents from thepractice of the tribunals and from the general opinion of men. 

16. Thirdly, the distinction between physical evil and moral evil willstill remain, although there be this in common between them, that they havetheir reasons and causes. And why manufacture new difficulties for oneselfconcerning the origin of moral evil, since the principle followed in thesolution of those which natural evils have raised suffices also to accountfor voluntary evils? That is to say, it suffices to show that one could nothave prevented men from being prone to errors, without changing the [421]constitution of the best of systems or without employing miracles at everyturn. It is true that sin makes up a large portion of human wretchedness, and even the largest; but that does not prevent one from being able to saythat men are wicked and deserving of punishment: else one must needs saythat the actual sins of the non-regenerate are excusable, because theyspring from the first cause of our wretchedness, which is original sin. Fourthly, to say that the soul becomes passive and that man is not the truecause of sin, if he is prompted to his voluntary actions by their objects, as our author asserts in many passages, and particularly ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 3, § 18, is to create for oneself new senses for terms. When theancients spoke of that which is [Greek: eph' hêmin], or when we speak ofthat which depends upon us, of spontaneity, of the inward principle of ouractions, we do not exclude the representation of external things; for theserepresentations are in our souls, they are a portion of the modificationsof this active principle which is within us. No agent is capable of actingwithout being _predisposed_ to what the action demands; and the reasons orinclinations derived from good or evil are the dispositions that enable thesoul to decide between various courses. One will have it that the will isalone active and supreme, and one is wont to imagine it to be like a queenseated on her throne, whose minister of state is the understanding, whilethe passions are her courtiers or favourite ladies, who by their influenceoften prevail over the counsel of her ministers. One will have it that theunderstanding speaks only at this queen's order; that she can vacillatebetween the arguments of the minister and the suggestions of thefavourites, even rejecting both, making them keep silence or speak, andgiving them audience or not as seems good to her. But it is apersonification or mythology somewhat ill-conceived. If the will is tojudge, or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which theunderstanding or the senses offer it, it will need another understanding initself, to understand what it is offered. The truth is that the soul, orthe thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations, and decides according to the predominance of the representations modifyingits active force, in order to shape the action. I have no need here toapply my system of Pre-established Harmony, which shows our independence tothe best advantage and frees us from the physical influence of objects. Forwhat I have just said is sufficient to answer the objection. Our [422]author, even though he admits with people in general this physicalinfluence of objects upon us, observes nevertheless with much perspicacitythat the body or the objects of the senses do not even give us our ideas, much less the active force of our soul, and that they serve only to drawout that which is within us. This is much in the spirit of M. Descartes'belief that the soul, not being able to give force to the body, gives it atleast some direction. It is a mean between one side and the other, betweenphysical influence and Pre-established Harmony. 

17. Fifthly, the objection is made that, according to my opinion, sin wouldneither be censured nor punished because of its deserts, but because thecensure and the chastisement serve to prevent it another time; whereas mendemand something more, namely, satisfaction for the crime, even though itshould serve neither for amendment nor for example. So do men with reasondemand that true gratitude should come from a true recognition of the pastbenefit, and not from the interested aim of extorting a fresh benefit. Thisobjection contains noble and sound considerations, but it does not strikeat me. I require a man to be virtuous, grateful, just, not only from themotive of interest, of hope or of fear, but also of the pleasure that heshould find in good actions: else one has not yet reached the degree ofvirtue that one must endeavour to attain. That is what one means by sayingthat justice and virtue must be loved for their own sake; and it is alsowhat I explained in justifying 'disinterested love', shortly before theopening of the controversy which caused so much stir. Likewise I considerthat wickedness is all the greater when its practice becomes a pleasure, aswhen a highwayman, after having killed men because they resist, or becausehe fears their vengeance, finally grows cruel and takes pleasure in killingthem, and even in making them suffer beforehand. Such a degree ofwickedness is taken to be diabolical, even though the man affected with itfinds in this execrable indulgence a stronger reason for his homicides thanhe had when he killed simply under the influence of hope or of fear. I havealso observed in answering the difficulties of M. Bayle that, according tothe celebrated Conringius, justice which punishes by means of _medicinal_penalties, so to speak, that is, in order to correct the criminal or atleast to provide an example for others, might exist in the opinion of thosewho do away with the freedom that is exempt from necessity. True [423]retributive justice, on the other hand, going beyond the medicinal, assumessomething more, namely, intelligence and freedom in him who sins, becausethe harmony of things demands a satisfaction, or evil in the form ofsuffering, to make the mind feel its error after the voluntary active evilwhereto it has consented. Mr. Hobbes also, who does away with freedom, hasrejected retributive justice, as do the Socinians, drawing on themselvesthe condemnation of our theologians; although the writers of the Socinianparty are wont to exaggerate the idea of freedom. 

18. Sixthly, the objection is finally made that men cannot hope forfelicity if the will can only be actuated by the representation of good andevil. But this objection seems to me completely null and void, and I thinkit would be hard to guess how any tolerable interpretation was ever putupon it. Moreover, the line of reasoning adopted to prove it is of a mostastounding nature: it is that our felicity depends upon external things, ifit is true that it depends upon the representation of good or evil. It istherefore not in our own power, so it is said, for we have no ground forhoping that outward things will arrange themselves for our pleasure. Thisargument is halting from every aspect. _There is no force in the inference:one might grant the conclusion: the argument may be retorted upon theauthor_. Let us begin with the retort, which is easy. For are men anyhappier or more independent of the accidents of fortune upon this argument, or because they are credited with the advantage of choosing without reason?Have they less bodily suffering? Have they less tendency toward true orapparent goods, less fear of true or imaginary evils? Are they any lessenslaved by sensual pleasure, by ambition, by avarice? less apprehensive?less envious? Yes, our gifted author will say; I will prove it by a methodof counting or assessment. I would rather he had proved it by experience;but let us see this proof by counting. Suppose that by my choice, whichenables me to give goodness-for-me to that which I choose, I give to theobject chosen six degrees of goodness, when previously there were twodegrees of evil in my condition; I shall become happy all at once, and withperfect ease, for I should have four degrees surplus, or net good. Doubtless that is all very well; but unfortunately it is impossible. Forwhat possibility is there of giving these six degrees of goodness to theobject? To that end we must needs have the power to change our taste, orthe things, as we please. That would be almost as if I could say to [424]lead, Thou shalt be gold, and make it so; to the pebble, Thou shalt bediamond; or at the least, Thou shalt look like it. Or it would be like thecommon explanation of the Mosaical passage which seems to say that thedesert manna assumed any taste the Israelites desired to give to it. Theyonly had to say to their homerful, Thou shalt be a capon, thou shalt be apartridge. But if I am free to give these six degrees of goodness to theobject, am I not permitted to give it more goodness? I think that I am. Butif that is so, why shall we not give to the object all the goodnessconceivable? Why shall we not even go as far as twenty-four carats ofgoodness? By this means behold us completely happy, despite the accidentsof fortune; it may blow, hail or snow, and we shall not mind: by means ofthis splendid secret we shall be always shielded against fortuitous events. The author agrees (in this first section of the fifth chapter, sub-sect. 3, § 12) that this power overcomes all the natural appetites and cannot beovercome by any of them; and he regards it (§§ 20, 21, 22) as the soundestfoundation for happiness. Indeed, since there is nothing capable oflimiting a power so indeterminate as that of choosing without any reason, and of giving goodness to the object through the choice, either thisgoodness must exceed infinitely that which the natural appetites seek inobjects, these appetites and objects being limited while this power isindependent or at the least this goodness, given by the will to the chosenobject, must be arbitrary and of such a kind as the will desires. Forwhence would one derive the reason for limits if the object is possible, ifit is within reach of him who wills, and if the will can give it thegoodness it desires to give, independently of reality and of appearances?It seems to me that may suffice to overthrow a hypothesis so precarious, which contains something of a fairy-tale kind, _optantis ista sunt, noninvenientis_. It therefore remains only too true that this handsome fictioncannot render us more immune from evils. And we shall see presently thatwhen men place themselves above certain desires or certain aversions theydo so through other desires, which always have their foundation in therepresentation of good and evil. I said also 'that one might grant theconclusion of the argument', which states that our happiness does notdepend absolutely upon ourselves, at least in the present state of humanlife: for who would question the fact that we are liable to meet a thousandaccidents which human prudence cannot evade? How, for example, can I [425]avoid being swallowed up, together with a town where I take up my abode, byan earthquake, if such is the order of things? But finally I can also denythe inference in the argument, which states that if the will is onlyactuated by the representation of good and evil our happiness does notdepend upon ourselves. The inference would be valid if there were no God, if everything were ruled by brute causes; but God's ordinance is that forthe attainment of happiness it suffices that one be virtuous. Thus, if thesoul follows reason and the orders that God has given it, it is assured ofits happiness, even though one may not find a sufficiency thereof in thislife. 

19. Having thus endeavoured to point out the disadvantages of myhypothesis, our gifted author sets forth the advantages of his own. Hebelieves that it alone is capable of saving our freedom, that all ourfelicity rests therein, that it increases our goods and lessens our evils, and that an agent possessing this power is so much the more complete. Theseadvantages have almost all been already disproved. We have shown that forthe securing of our freedom it is enough that the representations of goodsand of evils, and other inward or outward dispositions, should incline uswithout constraining us. Moreover one does not see how pure indifferencecan contribute to felicity; on the contrary, the more indifferent one is, the more insensitive and the less capable of enjoying what is good will oneprove to be. Besides the hypothesis proves too much. For if an indifferentpower could give itself the consciousness of good it could also give itselfthe most perfect happiness, as has been already shown. And it is manifestthat there is nothing which would set limits to that power, since limitswould withdraw it from its pure indifference, whence, so our authoralleges, it only emerges of itself, or rather wherein it has never been. Finally one does not see wherein the perfection of pure indifference lies:on the contrary, there is nothing more imperfect; it would render knowledgeand goodness futile, and would reduce everything to chance, with no rules, and no measures that could be taken. There are, however, still someadvantages adduced by our author which have not been discussed. Heconsiders then that by this power alone are we the true cause to which ouractions can be imputed, since otherwise we should be under the compulsionof external objects; likewise that by this power alone can one ascribe tooneself the merit of one's own felicity, and feel pleased with [426]oneself. But the exact opposite is the case: for when one happens upon theaction through an absolutely indifferent movement, and not as a result ofone's good or bad qualities, is it not just as though one were to happenupon it blindly by chance or hazard? Why then should one boast of a goodaction, or why should one be censured for an evil one, if the thanks orblame redounds to fortune or hazard? I think that one is more worthy ofpraise when one owes the action to one's good qualities, and the moreculpable in proportion as one has been impelled to it by one's evilqualities. To attempt to assess actions without weighing the qualitieswhence they spring is to talk at random and to put an imaginary indefinablesomething in the place of causes. Thus, if this chance or this indefinablesomething were the cause of our actions, to the exclusion of our natural oracquired qualities, of our inclinations, of our habits, it would not bepossible to set one's hopes upon anything depending upon the resolve ofothers, since it would not be possible to fix something indefinite, or toconjecture into what roadstead the uncertain weather of an extravagantindifference will drive the vessel of the will. 

20. But setting aside advantages and disadvantages, let us see how ourlearned author will justify the hypothesis from which he promises us somuch good. He imagines that it is only God and the free creatures who areactive in the true sense, and that in order to be active one must bedetermined by oneself only. Now that which is determined by itself must notbe determined by objects, and consequently the free substance, in so far asit is free, must be indifferent with regard to objects, and emerge fromthis indifference only by its own choice, which shall render the objectpleasing to it. But almost all the stages of this argument have theirstumbling-blocks. Not only the free creatures, but also all the othersubstances and natures composed of substances, are active. Beasts are notfree, and yet all the same they have active souls, unless one assume, withthe Cartesians, that they are mere machines. Moreover, it is not necessarythat in order to be active one should be determined only by oneself, sincea thing may receive direction without receiving force. So it is that thehorse is controlled by the rider and the vessel is steered by the helm; andM. Descartes' belief was that our body, having force in itself, receivesonly some direction from the soul. Thus an active thing may receive fromoutside some determination or direction, capable of changing that [427]direction which it would take of itself. Finally, even though an activesubstance is determined only by itself, it does not follow that it is notmoved by objects: for it is the representation of the object within itwhich contributes towards the determination. Now the representation doesnot come from without, and consequently there is complete spontaneity. Objects do not act upon intelligent substances as efficient and physicalcauses, but as final and moral causes. When God acts in accordance with hiswisdom, he is guided by the ideas of the possibles which are his objects, but which have no reality outside him before their actual creation. Thusthis kind of spiritual and moral motion is not contrary to the activity ofthe substance, nor to the spontaneity of its action. Finally, even thoughfree power were not determined by the objects, it can never be indifferentto the action when it is on the point of acting, since the action must haveits origin in a disposition to act: otherwise one will do anything fromanything, _quidvis ex quovis_, and there will be nothing too absurd for usto imagine. But this disposition will have already broken the charm of mereindifference, and if the soul gives itself this disposition there mustneeds be another predisposition for this act of giving it. Consequently, however far back one may go, one will never meet with a mere indifferencein the soul towards the actions which it is to perform. It is true thatthese dispositions incline it without constraining it. They relate usuallyto the objects; but there are some, notwithstanding, which arise variously_a subjecto_ or from the soul itself, and which bring it about that oneobject is more acceptable than the other, or that the same is moreacceptable at one time than at another. 

21. Our author continually assures us that his hypothesis is true, and heundertakes to show that this indifferent power is indeed found in God, andeven that it must be attributed to him of necessity. For (he says) nothingis to God either good or bad in creatures. He has no natural appetite, tobe satisfied by the enjoyment of anything outside him. He is thereforeabsolutely indifferent to all external things, since by them he can neitherbe helped nor hindered; and he must determine himself and create as it werean appetite in making his choice. And having once chosen, he will wish toabide by his choice, just as if he had been prompted thereto by a naturalinclination. Thus will the divine will be the cause of goodness in beings. That is to say, there will be goodness in the objects, not by their [428]nature, but by the will of God: whereas if that will be excluded neithergood nor evil can exist in things. It is difficult to imagine how writersof merit could have been misled by so strange an opinion, for the reasonwhich appears to be advanced here has not the slightest force. It seems tome as though an attempt is being made to justify this opinion by theconsideration that all creatures have their whole being from God, so thatthey cannot act upon him or determine him. But this is clearly an instanceof self-deception. When we say that an intelligent substance is actuated bythe goodness of its object, we do not assert that this object isnecessarily a being existing outside the substance, and it is enough for usthat it be conceivable: for its representation acts in the substance, orrather the substance acts upon itself, in so far as it is disposed andinfluenced by this representation. With God, it is plain that hisunderstanding contains the ideas of all possible things, and that is howeverything is in him in a transcendent manner. These ideas represent to himthe good and evil, the perfection and imperfection, the order and disorder, the congruity and incongruity of possibles; and his superabundant goodnessmakes him choose the most advantageous. God therefore determines himself byhimself; his will acts by virtue of his goodness, but it is particularizedand directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom. And since hisunderstanding is perfect, since his thoughts are always clear, hisinclinations always good, he never fails to do the best; whereas we may bedeceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness. But how is itpossible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideasbefore the operation of God's will? Does the will of God form the ideaswhich are in his understanding? I dare not ascribe to our learned author sostrange a sentiment, which would confuse understanding and will, and wouldsubvert the current use of our notions. Now if ideas are independent ofwill, the perfection or imperfection which is represented in them will beindependent also. Indeed, is it by the will of God, for example, or is itnot rather by the nature of numbers, that certain numbers allow more thanothers of various exact divisions? that some are more fitted than othersfor forming battalions, composing polygons and other regular figures? thatthe number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers thatare called perfect? that in a plane six equal circles may touch a seventh?that of all equal bodies, the sphere has the least surface? that [429]certain lines are incommensurable, and consequently ill-adapted forharmony? Do we not see that all these advantages or disadvantages springfrom the idea of the thing, and that the contrary would implycontradiction? Can it be thought that the pain and discomfort of sentientcreatures, and above all the happiness and unhappiness of intelligentsubstances, are a matter of indifference to God? And what shall be said ofhis justice? Is it also something arbitrary, and would he have acted wiselyand justly if he had resolved to condemn the innocent? I know that therehave been writers so ill-advised as to maintain an opinion so dangerous andso liable to overthrow religion. But I am assured that our illustriousauthor is far from holding it. Nevertheless, it seems as though thishypothesis tends in that direction, if there is nothing in objects savewhat is indifferent to the divine will before its choice. It is true thatGod has need of nothing; but the author has himself shown clearly thatGod's goodness, and not his need, prompted him to produce creatures. Therewas therefore in him a reason anterior to the resolution; and, as I havesaid so many times, it was neither by chance nor without cause, nor even bynecessity, that God created this world, but rather as a result of hisinclination, which always prompts him to the best. Thus it is surprisingthat our author should assert here (ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 4, § 5) thatthere is no reason which could have induced God, absolutely perfect andhappy in himself, to create anything outside him, although, according tothe author's previous declarations (ch. 1, sect. 3, §§ 8, 9), God acts foran end, and his aim is to communicate his goodness. It was therefore notaltogether a matter of indifference to him whether he should create or notcreate, and creation is notwithstanding a free act. Nor was it a matter ofindifference to him either, whether he should create one world rather thananother; a perpetual chaos, or a completely ordered system. Thus thequalities of objects, included in their ideas, formed the reason for God'schoice. 

22. Our author, having already spoken so admirably about the beauty andfittingness of the works of God, has tried to search out phrases that wouldreconcile them with his hypothesis, which appears to deprive God of allconsideration for the good or the advantage of creatures. The indifferenceof God prevails (he says) only in his first elections, but as soon as Godhas chosen something he has virtually chosen, at the same time, all [430]that which is of necessity connected therewith. There were innumerablepossible men equally perfect: the election of some from among them ispurely arbitrary (in the judgement of our author). But God, once havingchosen them, could not have willed in them anything contrary to humannature. Up to this point the author's words are consistent with hishypothesis; but those that follow go further. He advances the propositionthat when God resolved to produce certain creatures he resolved at the sametime, by virtue of his infinite goodness, to give them every possibleadvantage. Nothing, indeed, could be so reasonable, but also nothing couldbe so contrary to the hypothesis he has put forward, and he does right tooverthrow it, rather than prolong the existence of anything so charged withincongruities incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God. Here is theway to see plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has justbeen said. The first question will be: Will God create something or not, and wherefore? The author has answered that he will create something inorder to communicate his goodness. It is therefore no matter ofindifference to him whether he shall create or not. Next the question isasked: Will God create such and such a thing, and wherefore? One must needsanswer (to speak consistently) that the same goodness makes him choose thebest, and indeed the author falls back on that subsequently. But, followinghis own hypothesis, he answers that God will create such a thing, but thatthere is no _wherefore_, because God is absolutely indifferent towardscreatures, who have their goodness only from his choice. It is true thatour author varies somewhat on this point, for he says here (ch. 5, sect. 5, sub-sect. 4, § 12) that God is indifferent to the choice between men ofequal perfection, or between equally perfect kinds of rational creatures. Thus, according to this form of expression, he would choose rather the moreperfect kind: and as kinds that are of equal perfection harmonize more orless with others, God will choose those that agree best together; therewill therefore be no pure and absolute indifference, and the author thuscomes back to my principles. But let us speak, as he speaks, in accordancewith his hypothesis, and let us assume with him that God chooses certaincreatures even though he be absolutely indifferent towards them. He willthen just as soon choose creatures that are irregular, ill-shapen, mischievous, unhappy, chaos everlasting, monsters everywhere, [431]scoundrels as sole inhabitants of the earth, devils filling the wholeuniverse, all this rather than excellent systems, shapely forms, uprightpersons, good angels! No, the author will say, God, when once he hadresolved to create men, resolved at the same time to give them all theadvantages possible in the world, and it is the same with regard tocreatures of other kinds. I answer, that if this advantage were connectedof necessity with their nature, the author would be speaking in accordancewith his hypothesis. That not being so, however, he must admit that God'sresolve to give every possible advantage to men arises from a new electionindependent of that one which prompted God to make men. But whence comesthis new election? Does it also come from mere indifference? If such is thecase, nothing prompts God to seek the good of men, and if he sometimescomes to do it, it will be merely by accident. But the author maintainsthat God was prompted to the choice by his goodness; therefore the good andill of creatures is no matter of indifference to him, and there are in himprimary choices to which the goodness of the object prompts him. He choosesnot only to create men, but also to create men as happy as it is possibleto be in this system. After that not the least vestige of mere indifferencewill be left, for we can reason concerning the entire world just as we havereasoned concerning the human race. God resolved to create a world, but hewas bound by his goodness at the same time to make choice of such a worldas should contain the greatest possible amount of order, regularity, virtue, happiness. For I can see no excuse for saying that whereas God wasprompted by his goodness to make the men he has resolved to create asperfect as is possible within this system, he had not the same goodintention towards the whole universe. There we have come back again to thegoodness of the objects; and pure indifference, where God would act withoutcause, is altogether destroyed by the very procedure of our gifted author, with whom the force of truth, once the heart of the matter was reached, prevailed over a speculative hypothesis, which cannot admit of anyapplication to the reality of things. 

23. Since, therefore, nothing is altogether indifferent to God, who knowsall degrees, all effects, all relations of things, and who penetrates atone and the same time all their possible connexions, let us see whether atleast the ignorance and insensibility of man can make him absolutelyindifferent in his choice. The author regales us with this pure [432]indifference as with a handsome present. Here are the proofs of it which hegives: (1) We feel it within us. (2) We have experience within ourselves ofits marks and its properties. (3) We can show that other causes which mightdetermine our will are insufficient. As for the first point, he assertsthat in feeling freedom within us we feel within us at the same time pureindifference. But I do not agree that we feel such indifference, or thatthis alleged feeling follows upon that of freedom. We feel usually withinus something which inclines us to our choice. At times it happens, however, that we cannot account for all our dispositions. If we give our mind to thequestion, we shall recognize that the constitution of our body and ofbodies in our environment, the present or previous temper of our soul, together with countless small things included under these comprehensiveheadings, may contribute towards our greater or lesser predilection forcertain objects, and the variation of our opinions from one time toanother. At the same time we shall recognize that none would attribute thisto mere indifference, or to some indefinable force of the soul which hasthe same effect upon objects as colours are said to have upon thechameleon. Thus the author has no cause here to appeal to the judgement ofthe people: he does so, saying that in many things the people reason betterthan the philosophers. It is true that certain philosophers have beenmisled by chimeras, and it would seem that mere indifference is numberedamong chimerical notions. But when someone maintains that a thing does notexist because the common herd does not perceive it, here the populacecannot be regarded as a good judge, being, as it is, only guided by thesenses. Many people think that air is nothing when it is not stirred by thewind. The majority do not know of imperceptible bodies, the fluid whichcauses weight or elasticity, magnetic matter, to say nothing of atoms andother indivisible substances. Do we say then that these things are notbecause the common herd does not know of them? If so, we shall be able tosay also that the soul acts sometimes without any disposition orinclination contributing towards the production of its act, because thereare many dispositions and inclinations which are not sufficiently perceivedby the common herd, for lack of attention and thought. Secondly, as to themarks of the power in question, I have already refuted the claim advancedfor it, that it possesses the advantage of making one active, the realcause of one's action, and subject to responsibility and morality: [433]these are not genuine marks of its existence. Here is one the authoradduces, which is not genuine either, namely, that we have within us apower of resisting natural appetites, that is to say of resisting not onlythe senses, but also the reason. But I have already stated this fact: oneresists natural appetites through other natural appetites. One sometimesendures inconveniences, and is happy to do so; but that is on account ofsome hope or of some satisfaction which is combined with the ill andexceeds it: either one anticipates good from it, or one finds good in it. The author asserts that it is through that power to transform appearanceswhich he has introduced on the scene, that we render agreeable what atfirst displeased us. But who cannot see that the true reason is, thatapplication and attention to the object and custom change our dispositionand consequently our natural appetites? Once we become used to a ratherhigh degree of cold or heat, it no longer incommodes us as it formerly did, and yet no one would ascribe this effect to our power of choice. Time isneeded, for instance, to bring about that hardening, or rather thatcallosity, which enables the hands of certain workmen to resist a degree ofheat that would burn our hands. The populace, whom the author invokes, guess correctly the cause of this effect, although they sometimes apply itin a laughable manner. Two serving-maids being close to the fire in thekitchen, one who has burnt herself says to the other: Oh, my dear, who willbe able to endure the fire of purgatory? The other answers: Don't beabsurd, my good woman, one grows used to everything. 

24. But (the author will say) this wonderful power which causes us to beindifferent to everything, or inclined towards everything, simply at ourown free will, prevails over reason itself. And this is his third proof, namely, that one cannot sufficiently explain our actions without havingrecourse to this power. One sees numbers of people despising the entreatiesof their friends, the counsels of their neighbours, the reproaches of theirconscience, discomforts, tortures, death, the wrath of God, hell itself, for the sake of running after follies which have no claim to be good ortolerable, save as being freely chosen by such people. All is well in thisargument, with the exception of the last words only. For when one takes anactual instance one will find that there were reasons or causes which ledthe man to his choice, and that there are very strong bonds to fasten [434]him thereto. A love-affair, for example, will never have arisen from mereindifference: inclination or passion will have played its part; but habitand stubbornness will cause certain natures to face ruin rather thanseparation from the beloved. Here is another example cited by the author:an atheist, a man like Lucilio Vanini (that is what many people call him, whereas he himself adopts the magnificent name of Giulio Cesare Vanini inhis works), will suffer a preposterous martyrdom for his chimera ratherthan renounce his impiety. The author does not name Vanini; and the truthis that this man repudiated his wrong opinions, until he was convicted ofhaving published atheistical dogmas and acted as an apostle of atheism. When he was asked whether there was a God, he plucked some grass, saying:

 _Et levis est cespes qui probet esse Deum. _

But since the Attorney General to the Parliament of Toulouse desired tocause annoyance to the First President (so it is said), to whom Vanini wasgranted considerable access, teaching his children philosophy, if indeed hewas not altogether in the service of that magistrate, the inquisition wascarried through rigorously. Vanini, seeing that there was no chance ofpardon, declared himself, when at the point of death, for what he was, anatheist; and there was nothing very extraordinary in that. But supposingthere were an atheist who gave himself up for torture, vanity might be inhis case a strong enough motive, as in that of the Gymnosophist, Calanus, and of the Sophist who, according to Lucian's account, was burnt to deathof his own will. But the author thinks that that very vanity, thatstubbornness, those other wild intentions of persons who otherwise seem tohave quite good sense, cannot be explained by the appetites that arise fromthe representation of good and evil, and that they compel us to haverecourse to that transcendent power which transforms good into evil, andevil into good, and the indifferent into good or into evil. But we do notneed to go so far, and the causes of our errors are only too visible. Indeed, we can make these transformations, but it is not as with theFairies, by a mere act of this magic power, but by obscuring andsuppressing in one's mind the representations of good or bad qualitieswhich are naturally attached to certain objects, and by contemplating onlysuch representations as conform to our taste or our prejudices; or [435]again, because one attaches to the objects, by dint of thinking of them, certain qualities which are connected with them only accidentally orthrough our habitual contemplation of them. For example, all my life long Idetest a certain kind of good food, because in my childhood I found in itsomething distasteful, which made a strong impression upon me. On the otherhand, a certain natural defect will be pleasing to me, because it willrevive within me to some extent the thought of a person I used to esteem orlove. A young man will have been delighted by the applause which has beenshowered upon him after some successful public action; the impression ofthis great pleasure will have made him remarkably sensitive to reputation;he will think day and night of nothing save what nourishes this passion, and that will cause him to scorn death itself in order to attain his end. For although he may know very well that he will not feel what is said ofhim after his death, the representation he makes of it for himselfbeforehand creates a strong impression on his mind. And there are alwaysmotives of the same kind in actions which appear most useless and absurd tothose who do not enter into these motives. In a word, a strong oroft-repeated impression may alter considerably our organs, our imagination, our memory, and even our reasoning. It happens that a man, by dint ofhaving often related something untrue, which he has perhaps invented, finally comes to believe in it himself. And as one often represents tooneself something pleasing, one makes it easy to imagine, and one thinks italso easy to put into effect, whence it comes that one persuades oneselfeasily of what one wishes. 

 _Et qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt. _

25. Errors are therefore, absolutely speaking, never voluntary, althoughthe will very often contributes towards them indirectly, owing to thepleasure one takes in giving oneself up to certain thoughts, or owing tothe aversion one feels for others. Beautiful print in a book will helptowards making it persuasive to the reader. The air and manner of a speakerwill win the audience for him. One will be inclined to despise doctrinescoming from a man one despises or hates, or from another who resembles himin some point that strikes us. I have already said why one is readilydisposed to believe what is advantageous or agreeable, and I have knownpeople who at first had changed their religion for worldly [436]considerations, but who have been persuaded (and well persuaded) afterwardsthat they had taken the right course. One sees also that stubbornness isnot simply wrong choice persevering, but also a disposition to perseveretherein, which is due to some good supposed to be inherent in the choice, or some evil imagined as arising from a change. The first choice hasperchance been made in mere levity, but the intention to abide by itsprings from certain stronger reasons or impressions. There are even somewriters on ethics who lay it down that one ought to abide by one's choiceso as not to be inconstant or appear so. Yet perseverance is wrong when onedespises the warnings of reason, especially when the subject is importantenough to be examined carefully; but when the thought of change isunpleasant, one readily averts one's attention from it, and that is the waywhich most frequently leads one to stubbornness. The author wished toconnect stubbornness with his so-called pure indifference. He might thenhave taken into account that to make us cling to a choice there would beneed of more than the mere choice itself or a pure indifference, especiallyif this choice has been made lightly, and all the more lightly inproportion to the indifference shown. In such a case we shall be readilyinclined to reverse the choice, unless vanity, habit, interest or someother motive makes us persevere therein. It must not be supposed eitherthat vengeance pleases without cause. Persons of intense feeling ponderupon it day and night, and it is hard for them to efface the impression ofthe wrong or the affront they have sustained. They picture for themselves avery great pleasure in being freed from the thought of scorn which comesupon them every moment, and which causes some to find vengeance sweeterthan life itself. 

 _Quis vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa. _

The author would wish to persuade us that usually, when our desire or ouraversion is for some object which does not sufficiently deserve it, we havegiven to it the surplus of good or evil which has affected us, through thealleged power of choice which makes things appear good or evil as we wish. One has had two degrees of natural evil, one gives oneself six degrees ofartificial good through the power that can choose without cause. Thus onewill have four degrees of net good (ch. 5, sect. 2, § 7). If that could becarried out it would take us far, as I have already said here. The [437]author even thinks that ambition, avarice, the gambling mania and otherfrivolous passions derive all their force from this power (ch. 5, sect. 5, sub-sect. 6). But there are besides so many false appearances in things, somany imaginations capable of enlarging or diminishing objects, so manyunjustified connexions in our arguments, that there is no need of thislittle Fairy, that is, of this inward power operating as it were byenchantment, to whom the author attributes all these disorders. Indeed, Ihave already said repeatedly that when we resolve upon some course contraryto acknowledged reason, we are prompted to it by another reason stronger tooutward appearance, such as, for instance, is the pleasure of appearingindependent and of performing an extraordinary action. There was in dayspast at the Court of Osnabrück a tutor to the pages, who, like a secondMucius Scaevola, held out his arm into the flame and looked like getting agangrene, in order to show that the strength of his mind was greater than avery acute pain. Few people will follow his example; and I do not even knowif a writer could easily be found who, having once affirmed the existenceof a power capable of choosing without cause, or even contrary to reason, would be willing to prove his case by his own example, in renouncing somegood benefice or some high office, simply in order to display thissuperiority of will over reason. But I am sure at the least that anintelligent man would not do so. He would be presently aware that someonewould nullify his sacrifice by pointing out to him that he had simplyimitated Heliodorus, Bishop of Larissa. That man (so it is said) held hisbook on Theagenes and Chariclea dearer than his bishopric; and such a thingmay easily happen when a man has resources enabling him to dispense withhis office and when he is sensitive to reputation. Thus every day peopleare found ready to sacrifice their advantages to their caprices, that is tosay, actual goods to the mere semblance of them. 

26. If I wished to follow step by step the arguments of our gifted author, which often come back to matters previously considered in our inquiry, usually however with some elegant and well-phrased addition, I should beobliged to proceed too far; but I hope that I shall be able to avoid doingso, having, as I think, sufficiently met all his reasons. The best thing isthat with him practice usually corrects and amends theory. After havingadvanced the hypothesis, in the second section of this fifth chapter, [438]that we approach God through the capacity to choose without reason, andthat this power being of the noblest kind its exercise is the most capableof making one happy, things in the highest degree paradoxical, since it isreason which leads us to imitate God and our happiness lies in followingreason: after that, I say, the author provides an excellent corrective, forhe says rightly (§ 5) that in order to be happy we must adapt our choice tothings, since things are scarcely prone to adapt themselves to us, and thatthis is in effect adapting oneself to the divine will. Doubtless that iswell said, but it implies besides that our will must be guided as far aspossible by the reality of the objects, and by true representations of goodand evil. Consequently also the motives of good and evil are not opposed tofreedom, and the power of choosing without cause, far from ministering toour happiness, will be useless and even highly prejudicial. Thus it ishappily the case that this power nowhere exists, and that it is 'a being ofreasoning reason', as some Schoolmen call the fictions that are not evenpossible. As for me, I should have preferred to call them 'beings ofnon-reasoning reason'. Also I think that the third section (on wrongelections) may pass, since it says that one must not choose things that areimpossible, inconsistent, harmful, contrary to the divine will, or alreadytaken by others. Moreover, the author remarks appositely that byprejudicing the happiness of others needlessly one offends the divine will, which desires that all be happy as far as it is possible. I will say asmuch of the fourth section, where there is mention of the source of wrongelections, which are error or ignorance, negligence, fickleness in changingtoo readily, stubbornness in not changing in time, and bad habits; finallythere is the importunity of the appetites, which often drive usinopportunely towards external things. The fifth section is designed toreconcile evil elections or sins with the power and goodness of God; andthis section, as it is diffuse, is divided into sub-sections. The authorhas cumbered himself needlessly with a great objection: for he asserts thatwithout a power to choose that is altogether indifferent in the choicethere would be no sin. Now it was very easy for God to refuse to creaturesa power so irrational. It was sufficient for them to be actuated by therepresentations of goods and evils; it was therefore easy, according to theauthor's hypothesis, for God to prevent sin. To extricate himself from thisdifficulty, he has no other resource than to state that if this power [439]were removed from things the world would be nothing but a purely passivemachine. But that is the very thing which I have disproved. If this powerwere missing in the world (as in fact it is), one would hardly complain ofthe fact. Souls will be well content with the representations of goods andevils for the making of their choice, and the world will remain asbeautiful as it is. The author comes back to what he had already putforward here, that without this power there would be no happiness. But Ihave given a sufficient answer to that, and there is not the slightestprobability in this assertion and in certain other paradoxes he putsforward here to support his principal paradox. 

27. He makes a small digression on prayer (sub-sect. 4), saying that thosewho pray to God hope for some change in the order of nature; but it seemsas though, according to his opinion, they are mistaken. In reality, menwill be content if their prayers are heard, without troubling themselves asto whether the course of nature is changed in their favour, or not. Indeed, if they receive succour from good angels there will be no change in thegeneral order of things. Also this opinion of our author is a veryreasonable one, that there is a system of spiritual substances, just asthere is of corporeal substances, and that the spiritual have communicationwith one another, even as bodies do. God employs the ministry of angels inhis rule of mankind, without any detriment to the order of nature. Nevertheless, it is easier to put forward theories on these matters than toexplain them, unless one have recourse to my system of Harmony. But theauthor goes somewhat further. He believes that the mission of the HolySpirit was a great miracle in the beginning, but that now his operationswithin us are natural. I leave it to him to explain his opinion, and tosettle the matter with other theologians. Yet I observe that he finds thenatural efficacy of prayer in the power it has of making the soul better, of overcoming the passions, and of winning for oneself a certain degree ofnew grace. I can say almost the same things on my hypothesis, whichrepresents the will as acting only in accordance with motives; and I amimmune from the difficulties in which the author has become involved overhis power of choosing without cause. He is in great embarrassment also withregard to the foreknowledge of God. For if the soul is perfectlyindifferent in its choice how is it possible to foresee this choice? andwhat sufficient reason will one be able to find for the knowledge of a[440]thing, if there is no reason for its existence? The author puts off to someother occasion the solution of this difficulty, which would require(according to him) an entire work. For the rest, he sometimes speakspertinently, and in conformity with my principles, on the subject of moralevil. He says, for example (sub-sect. 6), that vices and crimes do notdetract from the beauty of the universe, but rather add to it, just ascertain dissonances would offend the ear by their harshness if they wereheard quite alone, and yet in combination they render the harmony morepleasing. He also points out divers goods involved in evils, for instance, the usefulness of prodigality in the rich and avarice in the poor; indeedit serves to make the arts flourish. We must also bear in mind that we arenot to judge the universe by the small size of our globe and of all that isknown to us. For the stains and defects in it may be found as useful forenhancing the beauty of the rest as patches, which have nothing beautifulin themselves, are by the fair sex found adapted to embellish the wholeface, although they disfigure the part they cover. Cotta, in Cicero's book, had compared providence, in its granting of reason to men, to a physicianwho allows wine to a patient, notwithstanding that he foresees the misusewhich will be made thereof by the patient, at the expense of his life. Theauthor replies that providence does what wisdom and goodness require, andthat the good which accrues is greater than the evil. If God had not givenreason to man there would have been no man at all, and God would be like aphysician who killed someone in order to prevent his falling ill. One mayadd that it is not reason which is harmful in itself, but the absence ofreason; and when reason is ill employed we reason well about means, but notadequately about an end, or about that bad end we have proposed toourselves. Thus it is always for lack of reason that one does an evil deed. The author also puts forward the objection made by Epicurus in the book byLactantius on the wrath of God. The terms of the objection are more or lessas follows. Either God wishes to banish evils and cannot contrive to do so, in which case he would be weak; or he can abolish them, and will not, whichwould be a sign of malignity in him; or again he lacks power and also will, which would make him appear both weak and jealous; or finally he can andwill, but in this case it will be asked why he then does not banish evil, if he exists? The author replies that God cannot banish evil, that he doesnot wish to either, and that notwithstanding he is neither malicious [441]nor weak. I should have preferred to say that he can banish evil, but thathe does not wish to do so absolutely, and rightly so, because he would thenbanish good at the same time, and he would banish more good than evil. Finally our author, having finished his learned work, adds an Appendix, inwhich he speaks of the Divine Laws. He fittingly divides these laws intonatural and positive. He observes that the particular laws of the nature ofanimals must give way to the general laws of bodies, that God is not inreality angered when his laws are violated, but that order demanded that hewho sins should bring an evil upon himself, and that he who does violenceto others should suffer violence in his turn. But he believes that thepositive laws of God rather indicate and forecast the evil than cause itsinfliction. And that gives him occasion to speak of the eternal damnationof the wicked, which no longer serves either for correction or example, andwhich nevertheless satisfies the retributive justice of God, although thewicked bring their unhappiness upon themselves. He suspects, however, thatthese punishments of the wicked bring some advantage to virtuous people. Heis doubtful also whether it is not better to be damned than to be nothing:for it might be that the damned are fools, capable of clinging to theirstate of misery owing to a certain perversity of mind which, he maintains, makes them congratulate themselves on their false judgements in the midstof their misery, and take pleasure in finding fault with the will of God. For every day one sees peevish, malicious, envious people who enjoy thethought of their ills, and seek to bring affliction upon themselves. Theseideas are not worthy of contempt, and I have sometimes had the like myself, but I am far from passing final judgement on them. I related, in 271 of theessays written to oppose M. Bayle, the fable of the Devil's refusal of thepardon a hermit offers him on God's behalf. Baron André Taifel, an Austriannobleman, Knight of the Court of Ferdinand Archduke of Austria who becamethe second emperor of that name, alluding to his name (which appears tomean Devil in German) assumed as his emblem a devil or satyr, with thisSpanish motto, _Mas perdido, y menos arrepentido_, the more lost, the lessrepentant, which indicates a hopeless passion from which one cannot freeoneself. This motto was afterwards repeated by the Spanish Count ofVillamediana when he was said to be in love with the Queen. Coming to thequestion why evil often happens to the good and good to the wicked, [442]our illustrious author thinks that it has been sufficiently answered, andthat hardly any doubt remains on that point. He observes nevertheless thatone may often doubt whether good people who endure affliction have not beenmade good by their very misfortune, and whether the fortunate wicked havenot perhaps been spoilt by prosperity. He adds that we are often badjudges, when it is a question of recognizing not only a virtuous man, butalso a happy man. One often honours a hypocrite, and one despises anotherwhose solid virtue is without pretence. We are poor judges of happinessalso, and often felicity is hidden from sight under the rags of a contentedpoor man, while it is sought in vain in the palaces of certain of thegreat. Finally the author observes, that the greatest felicity here onearth lies in the hope of future happiness, and thus it may be said that tothe wicked nothing happens save what is of service for correction orchastisement, and to the good nothing save what ministers to their greatergood. These conclusions entirely correspond to my opinion, and one can saynothing more appropriate for the conclusion of this work. 

 [443] * * * * *

CAUSA DEI ASSERTAPER JUSTITIAM EJUS

_cum caeteris ejus perfectionibus cunctisque actionibus conciliatam. _

The original edition of the Theodicy contained a fourth appendix under thistitle. It presented in scholastic Latin a formal summary of the positivedoctrine expressed by the French treatise. It satisfied the academicrequirements of its day, but would not, presumably, be of interest to manymodern readers, and is consequently omitted here. 

 [445] * * * * *

INDEX

 Abélard, 122, 232-4, 272 Abraham, 209 Adam, 222, 270-2, 346-7 Adam Kadmon, 133 Albius, Thomas, 122 Alcuin, 77 Alfonso, King of Castile, 247-8 Aloysius Novarinus, 191 Alrasi, 288 Alvarez, 149 Ambrose, St. , 153, 194 Amyraut, 238 Anaxagoras, 353 Andradius, Jacques Payva, 176 Andreas Cisalpinus, 81 Angelus Silesius, Johann, 79 Annat, 344-5 Anselm, St. , 77 Antipater, 232 Aquinas, Thomas, _see_ Thomas Arcesilaus, 337 Archidemus, 232 Aristotelians, 27-8 Aristotle, 13, 76-8, 81, 148, 170, 195, 203, 229, 241, 243-4, 265, 269, 283, 304, 309-10, 324, 352, 353, 409 Arminius, _see_ Irminius Arminius (Jacob Harmensen), 383, 398 Arnauld, 67, 89, 225, 254, 260, 264-6, 351 Arriaga, 112, 356 Arrian, 232 Assassins, 284 Athanasius, St. , 87 Augustine (of Hippo), St. , 60, 100, 122, 134, 148, 166, 173, 187, 226, 274, 285, 294, 296-7, 300-3, 347, 352-3, 378, 384, 409, 412 ----, his disciples, 145, 297, 300, 324, 330, 348 Augustus (Emperor), 287 Aulus Gellius, 258-9, 325, 327 Aureolus, Cardinal, 139, 353 Averroes, Averroists, 77 ff. 

 Bacon, Francis, 306 Bañez, 149 Barbaro, Ermolao, 170 Baron, Vincent, 121 Baronius, Robert, 84 Barton, Thomas, 122 Basil, St. , 221, 352 Bayle, P. , 34 ff. _et passim_ Becher, Johann Joachim, 334-5 Becker, 221 Bede, 77 Bellarmine, St. Robert, 107, 313, 323 Berigardus, Claudius, 81 Berkeley, Bp. , 11 Bernard, St. , 277 Bernier, 139, 353 Bertius, 227 de Bèze, Theodore, 274 _Birgitta, Revelations of St. _, 173 Boethius, 76, 365-6 Bonartes, Thomas, 58, 121-2 Bonaventura, St. , 294 des Bosses, Fr. , 121, 389 Bossuet, 10 Bradwardine, Abp. , 159, 176 Bramhall, Bp. John, 161, 393 Bredenburg, Johan, 349-50 Brunswick, Duke of, 8, 82 Buckingham, Duke of, 142 Buridan's ass, 150, 311, 312 Burnet, Thomas, 278

 Cabalists, 79, 133, 347 Caesar Cremoninus, 81 Cajetan, Cardinal, 100, 243 Calanus, 284, 434 Caligula, 227 Calixtus, 108 Calli, 359 Callimachus, 213 Calovius, 84 Calvin, 84-5, 101, 165, 222, 238, 240, 328 Cameron, 313 Campanella, 217 Capella, Martianus, 264 Cardan, Jerome, 282, 286 Carneades, 312, 320-1, 337 Caroli, Andreas, 227 Casaubon, Meric, 285 Caselius, 82 Cassiodorus, 76 [Page 446] Casuists, 194, 222, 241 Catharin, Ambrose, 173 Catherine de Medicis, 227 Cato, 263, 318 Celsus, 102-3 Chardin, 209 de la Charmoye, Abbé, 213 Chemnitz, Martin, 111, 176 Christine, Queen of Sweden, 96, 104 Chrysippus, 229-32, 258-9, 324-7 Cicero, 99, 194, 229-32, 241, 286, 297, 312, 321, 324-5, 342 Claudian, 132, 191, 215 Cleanthes, 233, 324 Coelius Secundus Curio, 134 Coimbra, Fathers of, 325 Colerus, 350 Conringius, 161, 422 Constance, Council of, 234 de la Cour, 350-1 Crellius, 161 Cudworth, Ralph, 64, 245 Cuper, Franz, 350 Cyrano de Bergerac, 331

 Dacier, 337 Daillé, 70, 107 Davidius, John, 179 _De Auxiliis_, 168 Democritus, 324 Descartes, 12-13, 19-21, 107, 111-12, 140, 150, 156, 224 ff. , 239, 244, 265, 281, 304, 331, 333, 334, 343, 390, 409, 426 Desmarests, Samuel, 241 Diodorus, 230-2 Diogenianus, 325 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 232 Diphilus, 285 Diroys, 249-53, 329 Dominicans, 348 Dreier, 244 Drexler, 291 Dualists, 251 du Plessis-Mornay, 91 Durand de Saint-Pourçain, 139, 324, 341, 353

 Empedocles, 324 Epictetus, 352 Epicureans, 282-3 Epicurus, 229-30, 310-11, 319, 320, 324, 395 Esprit, Abbé, 131 Euclid, 261 Euripides, 284, 285 Eusebius, 326 Eutrapelus, 191

 Fabricius, Johann Ludwig, 67 Fabry, 333 Fecht, 290, 291, 293 Fénelon, 287 Fludde, 184 Fonseca, 145 Foucher, 34, 89, 337 Francis I of France, 204 Francis of Sales, St. , 176 Francis Xavier, St. , 176 Freitag, Johann, 171 Fromondus, Libertus, 89 Fulgentius, 167 _Fur praedestinatus_, 227

 della Galla, Julius Caesar, 171 Gassendi, 12, 337 Gatacre, Thomas, 262 Gerhard, Johann, 291 Gerson, 79 Gibieuf, 344-5 Glarea, Antonio, 366 Godescalc, 167, 294 Gomarists, 227 Gregory, St. , the Great, 100, 291, 293, 294 Gregory, St. , of Nazianzus, 173 Gregory, St. , of Nyssa, 132 Gregory of Rimini, 173 Grotius, 77, 91, 161, 194, 241, 243, 276 Guerre, Martin, 97-8 Gymnosophists, 284

 Hartsoeker, 172 Heliodorus of Larissa, 437 Heraclitus, 324 Herminius, _see_ Irminius Hermippus, 209 Herodotus, 196, 208, 210 Heshusius, Tilemann, 82 Hobbes, Thomas, 67, 89, 159, 161, 234, 265, 348, 393 ff. , 410 Hoffmann, Daniel, 82 Horace, 131, 318 Homer, 284 Hyde, 209

 Innocent III, Pope, 131 Irminius, 209 Isbrand, 238

 Jansenists, 145, 346-7 Jansenius, 344 Jacquelot, 157, 223, 259, 265, 278, 341 Jerome, St. , 132 John of Damascus, St. , 77 [Page 447] John Scot, 171 Jung, 261 Jupiter, 213 Jurieu, 174, 187, 290-2, 356 Justin, 208

 Keckermann, Bartholomaeus, 106 Keilah, siege of, 145-6 Kendal, George, 228 Kepler, 140, 353 Kerkering, 351 Kessler, Andreas, 83 Kortholt, Sebastian, 351 Krell, Nicolas, 398

 de Labadie, Jean, 82 Lactantius, 221, 285, 286, 440 Lami, François, 89, 359 Lateran Council, 80 Laud, Abp. , 398 de Launoy, 100 Lazarus, 294 le Clerc, 64, 121, 132, 245, 292 Leeuwenhoek, 172 Limbourg, 350 Lipsius, Justus, 325, 337, 353 Livy, 263 Locke, John, 8, 9, 33-4, 86, 409 Löscher, 298 Louis of Dole, 149, 353 Lucan, 122, 212 Lucian, 265, 434 Lucretius, 320 Lully, Raymond, 106 Luther, 67, 81, 99, 101, 110-11, 122, 298, 328, 395

 Machiavelli, 216 Maignan, 359 Maimonides, 287-8 Malebranche, 172, 244, 254 ff. , 276, 280, 333, 359, 361 Manichaeans, 59, 98, 113, 124, 208, 274, 419 Marchetti, 320 Marcion, 213 Marcus Aurelius, 263 Mary, Blessed Virgin, 193 Matthieu, Pierre, 204 Maurice, Prince, 398 Melanchthon, 81 Melissus, 218, 220 Ménage, 232 Meyer, Louis, 82 Mithras, 209 Molina, 145, 173, 207 Molinists, 145, 317, 324, 342 More, Henry, 169 Moses Germanus, 79 de la Motte le Vayer, 282 Musaeus, Johann, 86, 111

 Naudé, Gabriel, 81 Newcastle, Duke of, 393 ff. Newton, Isaac, 34, 85-6 Nicole, 96-7, 174, 291, 299 Nominalists, 203 Novarini, 286

 Ochino, Bernardino, 89 Onomaus, 325 Opalenius, 194 Origen, 102-3, 132, 235, 294 Origenists, 260, 292 Orobio, 350 Ovid, 209, 220, 306

 Pardies, 333 Pascal, 35 Paul, St. , 129-30, 238, 260 Paulicians, _see_ Manichaeans Pelagius, 139 Pélisson, 176 Pereir, Louis, 139 Peter Lombard, 290 Pfanner, 352 Pierre de Saint-Joseph, 342, 357 Pietists, Leipzig, 83 Piscator, 207 Pitcairne, 172 Plato, 59, 76, 135, 148, 209, 241, 286, 297, 321, 352-4 Pliny the Younger, 204, 209, 284, 287, 365 Plutarch, 208, 231, 326, 353 Pomponazzi, 80, 161 de la Porrée, Gilbert, 122 de Preissac, 80 Prudentius, 132, 218 Ptolomei, Fr. , 70 Pufendorf, 194, 241, 403 Pythagoras, 172

 Quênel, Fr. , 70 Quietists, 79

 Rachelius, 194 de la Ramée, Pierre, 81 Ravaillac, 204 Regis, 305, 330, 340 Remonstrants, 226 Reynaud, Theophile, 348 [Page 448] Rodon, David de, 354 Rorarius, 160 Rutherford, Samuel, 236, 238, 269 Ruysbroek, 79

 Saguens, 359 Salmeron, 173 Saurin, 106 Scaliger, Joseph, 89, 104-5 Scaliger, Julius, 170 Scherzer, 84 Schoolmen, 75, 77, 100, 241, 290, 310, 354, 407 Scioppius, 337 Scotists, 243, 324 Scotus, Duns, 203, 271, 328, 383 Seneca, 226, 285 Sennert, Daniel, 171 Sentences, Master of the, _see_ Peter Lombard Servetus, Michael, 81 Sfondrati, Cardinal, 129, 173 Sharrok, 194 Silenus, 286 Slevogt, Paul, 82 Socinians, 58, 83-4, 161-2, 307, 343, 394, 412, 423 Sonner, Ernst, 290 Spee, Friedrich, 176-7 Sperling, Johann, 171 Sperling, Otto, 212 Spinoza, 67, 68, 79, 82, 159, 234-6, 331, 348-51, 359, 418 Stahl, Daniel, 243 Stegman, Josua, 107 Stegmann, Christopher, 84 Steno, 178 Steuchus, Augustinus, 91 Stoics, 79, 232, 263, 282-3, 324 ff. , 342 Strato, 67, 245-6, 331, 335, 336, 349, 395 Strinesius, 241 Sturm, 69, 261 Suarez, 314 Suetonius, 287 Supralapsarians, 166, 228, 236, 238, 269, 273-4, 289 Swammerdam, 172

 Tacitus, 210, 211, 265, 287 Taifel, Baron André, 441 Taurel, Nicolas, 81, 353 Tertullian, 101 Thomas Aquinas, St. , 174, 176, 241, 243, 262, 324, 357, 378, 383 Thomasius, Jacob, 243, 265 Thomists, 145, 149, 241, 311, 324, 344, 347 Tiberius, 227 Timon, 265 Tiresias, 230 Toland, John, 106 de Tournemine, Fr. , 69 Trajan, 293 Trogus, 208 Turretin, 240 Twiss, 238

 Ursinus, Zacharias, 291 Usserius, 70

 Valla, Laurentius, 67, 344, 365 ff. Van Beverwyck, Johan, 153-4 van den Ende, Franz, 351 van den Hoof, 350 van der Weye, 82 van Helmont, 169 Vanini, Lucilio, 434 Vedelius, Nicolaus, 86, 111 Velleius Paterculus, 318 Vergil, 78-9, 122, 287, 293, 306, 315 Véron, François, 107 Versé, Aubert de, 350 Voëtius, Gisbertus, 86 Vorstius, Conrad, 58 Vogelsang, 82

 von Wallenberg, Bp. Peter, 67 Wander, William, 169 Weigel, Erhard, 261, 355 Weigel, Valentine, 79 de Witt, 351 Wittich, 187, 306-7, 309 von Wollzogen, 82 Wyclif, John, 122, 159, 234, 272, 395

 Xanthus, 209

 Zeisold, Johann, 171 Zoroaster, 71, 208-10, 218