THE WARS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND AMERICA

BY

T. C. SMITH

PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE, WILLIAMSTOWN MASS. , U. S. A. 

LONDON

WILLIAMS AND NORGATE

[Transcriber's note: Page numbers in this book are indicated by numbersenclosed in curly braces, e. G. {99}. They have been located where pagebreaks occurred in the original book, in accordance with ProjectGutenberg's FAQ-V-99. For its Index, a page number has been placedonly at the start of that section. ]

First printed 1914/15. 

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PREFACE

The purpose of this volume is to show how social, economic, andpolitical causes led to a period of almost continuous antagonismbetween England and the American communities from 1763 to theratification of the Treaty of Ghent in 1815, and how that antagonismwas ended. The war of American Independence, 1775-1783, and the war of1812-1815 give their names to the book, not because of their militaryor naval importance, but because they mark, in each case, the outcomeof successive years of unavailing efforts on the part of each countryto avoid bloodshed. With this aim in view, no more detailed study ofthe internal political history or institutions of either country can beincluded than is necessary to account for different political habits;nor can the events of diplomatic history be developed beyond what iscalled for to explain persistent lines of action or the conclusion of asignificant treaty. 

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CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

 I THE ELEMENTS OF ANTAGONISM, 1763 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 II THE CONTEST OVER PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION, 1763-1773 . . . 28 III THE DISRUPTION OF THE EMPIRE, 1773-1776 . . . . . . . . . 51 IV THE CIVIL WAR IN THE EMPIRE, 1776-1778 . . . . . . . . . 75 V FRENCH INTERVENTION AND BRITISH FAILURE, 1778-1781 . . . 96 VI BRITISH PARTIES AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, 1778-1783 . . 114 VII THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1781-1793 . . . . . . 129 VIII THE FIRST PERIOD OF COMMERCIAL ANTAGONISM, 1783-1795 . . 149 IX THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1795-1805 169 X THE SECOND PERIOD OF COMMERCIAL ANTAGONISM, 1805-1812 . . 189 XI THE WAR FOR "SAILORS' RIGHTS" AND WESTWARD EXPANSION, 1812-1815 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 XII END OF THE ANTAGONISM: A CENTURY OF PEACE . . . . . . . . 236 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

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THE WARS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND AMERICA

CHAPTER I

THE ELEMENTS OF ANTAGONISM, 1763

In 1763, by the Peace of Paris, England won a position of unapproachedsupremacy in colonial possessions and in naval strength. The entireNorth American continent east of the Mississippi River was now underthe British flag, and four West India sugar islands were added to thosealready in English hands. In India, the rivalry of the French wasdefinitely crushed and the control of the revenues and fortunes of thenative potentates was transferred to the East India Company. Guided bythe genius of Pitt, British armies had beaten French in Germany andAmerica, and British fleets had conquered French and Spanish withcomplete ease. The power of the Empire seemed beyond challenge. Yetwithin this Empire itself there lay already the seeds of a discordwhich was soon {10} to develop into an irrepressible contest, leadingto civil war; then, for a generation, to drive the separated parts intorenewed antagonism, and finally to cause a second war. Between theNorth American colonies and the mother country there existed suchmoral, political, and economic divergence that nothing but prudent andpatient statesmanship on both sides of the Atlantic could preventdisaster. 

The fundamental source of antagonism lay in the fact that the thirteencolonies had developed a wholly different social and political lifefrom that of the mother country. Originally, the prevailing ideas andhabits of the colonists and of the Englishmen who remained at home hadbeen substantially the same. In England, as in America, the gentry andmiddle classes played a leading part during the years from 1600 to1660. But by 1763 England, under the Hanoverian kings, had become astate where all political and social power had been gathered into thehands of a landed aristocracy which dominated the government, theChurch, and the professions. In parliament, the House of Commons--oncethe body which reflected the conscious strength of the gentry andcitizens, --had now fallen under the control of the peers, owing to thedecayed condition of scores of ancient parliamentary boroughs. Nearlyone-third of the seats were actually {11} or substantially owned bynoblemen, and of the remainder a majority were venal, the closecorporations of Mayor and Aldermen selling freely their right to returntwo members at each parliamentary election. In addition, the influenceand prestige of the great landowners were so powerful that even in thecounties, and in those boroughs where the number of electors wasconsiderable, none but members of the ruling class sought election. Sofar as the members of the middle class were concerned--the merchants, master weavers, iron producers, and craftsmen, --they were strong inwealth and their wishes counted heavily with the aristocracy in alllegislation of a financial or commercial nature; but of actual part inthe government they had none. As for the lower classes, --thelabourers, tenant farmers, and shopkeepers, --they were able as a ruleto influence government only by rioting and uproar. Without theballot, they had no other way. 

Owing to the personal weakness of successive monarchs since the deathof William III, there had grown up the cabinet system of governmentwhich, in 1763, meant the reduction of the King to the position of anhonorary figurehead and the actual control of officers, perquisites, patronage, and preferment, as well as the direction of public policy, by the leaders of parliamentary groups. The King was {12} obliged toselect his ministers from among the members of noble families in theLords or Commons, who agreed among themselves after elaborate bargainsand negotiations upon the formation of cabinets and the distribution ofhonours. In this way sundry great Whig family "connections, " as theywere called, had come to monopolize political power, excluding Tories, or adherents of the Stuarts, and treating government as solely a matterof aristocratic concern. Into this limited circle, a poor man couldrise only by making himself useful through his talents or his eloquenceto one of the ruling cliques, and the goal of his career was naturallya peerage. 

The weakness of this system of government by family connection lay inits thorough dependence upon customs of patronage and perquisite. Thepublic offices were heavily burdened with lucrative sinecures, whichwere used in the factional contests to buy support in Parliament, aswere also peerages, contracts, and money bribes. When George IIIascended the throne, in 1760, he found the most powerful Minister inthe Cabinet to be the Duke of Newcastle, whose sole qualification, apart from his birth, was his pre-eminent ability to handle patronageand purchase votes. That such a system did not ruin England was due tothe tenacity and personal courage of this aristocracy and to {13} itsuse of parliamentary methods, whereby the orderly conduct oflegislation and taxation and the habit of public attack and defence ofgovernment measures furnished political training for the whole rulingclass. Further, the absence of any sharp caste lines made it possiblefor them to turn, in times of crisis, to such strong-fibred andmasterful commoners as Walpole and Pitt, each of whom, in his way, saved the country from the incompetent hands of titled ministries. 

This system, moreover, rested in 1763 on the aquiescence of practicallyall Englishmen. It was accepted by middle and lower classes alike asnormal and admirable; and only a small body of radicals felt calledupon to criticize the exclusion of the mass of taxpayers from a sharein the government. Pitt, in Parliament, was ready to proclaim anational will as something distinct from the voice of theborough-owners, but he had few followers. Only in London and a fewcounties did sundry advocates of parliamentary reform strive in theyears after 1763 to emphasize these views by organizing the freemen topetition and to "instruct" their representatives in the Commons. Suchdesires evoked nothing but contempt and antipathy in the great majorityof Englishmen. Especially when they became audible in the mouths ofrioters did they appear revolutionary and {14} obnoxious to the loversof peace, good order, and the undisturbed collection of rents andtaxes. Nothing but a genuine social revolution could bring such ideasto victory and that, in 1763, lay very far in the future. For the timeconservatism reigned supreme. 

In the thirteen colonies, on the other hand, the communities ofmiddle-class Englishmen who emigrated in the seventeenth century haddeveloped nothing resembling a real aristocracy. Social distinctions, modelled on those of the old country, remained between the men of largewealth--such as the great landed proprietors in New York and theplanters in the South, or the successful merchants in New England andthe Middle colonies--and the small farmers, shopkeepers, and fishermen, who formed the bulk of the population; while all of these joined inregarding the outlying frontiersmen as elements of society deserving ofsmall consideration. Men of property, education, and "position"exercised a distinct leadership in public and private life. Yet allthis remained purely social; in law no such thing as an aristocracycould be found, and in government the colonies had grown to be verynearly republican. Here lay the fundamental distinction between theEngland and the America of 1763. In America, a title or peerageconferred no political rights {15} whatever; these were founded inevery case on law, on a royal charter or a royal commission whichestablished a frame of government, and were based on moderate propertyqualifications which admitted a majority of adult males to the suffrageand to office. 

In every colony the government consisted of a governor, a council, andan assembly representing the freemen. This body, by charter, or royalinstructions, had the full right to impose taxes and vote laws; and, although its acts were liable to veto by the governor, or by the Crownthrough the Privy Council, it possessed the actual control of politicalpower. This it derived immediately from its constituents and not fromany patrons, lords, or close corporations. Representation and thepopular will were, in fact, indissolubly united. 

The governor in two colonies, Connecticut and Rhode Island, was chosenby the freemen. Elsewhere, he was appointed by an outside authority:in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland by the hereditary proprietor towhom the charter had been granted, in all other colonies by the Crown. The councillors, who commonly exercised judicial functions in additionto their duties as the governor's advisers and as the upper house ofthe legislature, were appointed in all colonies except the three in NewEngland; {16} and they were chosen in all cases from among the sociallyprominent colonists. The judges, also, were appointed by the governor;and they, with governor and council, were supposed to represent thehome government in the colonies. 

But in reality there was no effective imperial control. The Crown, itis true, appeared to have large powers. It granted charters, established provinces by commissions, exercised the right to annul lawsand hear appeals from colonial decisions, exacted reports fromgovernors, sent instructions, and made appointments and removals atwill. But nearly all the colonial officials, except the few customsofficers, were paid out of colonial appropriations, and this one factsufficed to deprive them of any independent position. In nearly everycolony, the assembly, in the course of two-thirds of a century ofincessant petty conflict, of incessant wrangling and bargaining, ofincessant encroachments on the nominal legal powers of the governor, had made itself master of the administration. The colonists resistedall attempts to direct their military or civil policy, laid only suchtaxes as they chose, raised only such troops as they saw fit, passedonly such laws as seemed to them desirable, and tied the governor'shands by every sort of device. They usurped the {17} appointment ofthe colonial treasurer, they appointed committees to oversee theexpenditure of sums voted, they systematically withheld a salary fromthe governor, in order to render him dependent upon annual "presents, "liable to diminution or termination in case he did not satisfy theassembly's wishes. The history of the years from 1689 to 1763 is achronicle of continual defeat for governors who were obliged to see onepower after another wrenched away from them. Under the circumstances, the political life of the thirteen colonies was practically republicanin character, and was as marked for its absence of administrativemachinery as the home government was for its aristocracy andcentralization. 

Another feature of colonial life tended to accentuate this difference. Although religion had ceased to be a political question, and theEnglish Church was no longer regarded, save in New England, asdangerous to liberty, the fact that the great majority of the colonistswere dissenters--Congregational, Presbyterian, or Reformed, with aconsiderable scattering of Baptists and other sects--had an effect onthe attitude of the people toward England. In the home country, thecontrolling social classes accepted the established church as part ofthe constitution; but in the colonies it had small {18} strength, andeven where it was by law established it remained little more than anofficial body, the "Governor's church. " This tended to widen the gapbetween the political views of the individualistic dissenting andPuritan sects in the colonies and the people at home. 

The American of 1763 was thus a different kind of man from theEnglishman. As a result of the divergent development on the two sidesof the Atlantic from a common ancestry, their political habits hadbecome mutually incomprehensible. To the Englishman, the rule of thenobility was normal--the ideal political system. He was content, if acommoner, with the place assigned to him. To the colonist, on theother hand, government in which the majority of adult male inhabitantspossessed the chief power was the only valid form, --all others werevicious. Patriotism meant two contradictory things. The Englishman'spatriotism was sturdy but unenthusiastic, and showed itself almost asmuch in a contempt for foreigners as in complacency over Englishinstitutions. The colonist, on the contrary, had a double allegiance:one conventional and traditional, to the British crown; the other anew, intensely local and narrow attachment to his province. Englandwas still the "old home, " looked to as the source of politicalauthority, of manners and literature. It was for many of {19} theresidents their recent abode and, for all except a few of Dutch, German, or French extraction, their ancestral country. But alreadythis "loyalty" on the part of the colonists was dwindling intosomething more sentimental than real. The genuine local patriotism ofthe colonists was shown by their persistent struggle against therepresentatives of English authority in the governors' chairs. Therehad developed in America a new sort of man, an "American, " who wishedto be as independent of government as possible, and who, whileprofessing and no doubt feeling a general loyalty to England, was infact a patriot of his own colony. 

The colonists entered very slightly into the thoughts of the Englishnoblemen and gentry. They were regarded in a highly practical way, without a trace of any sentiment, as members of the middle and lowerclasses, not without a large criminal admixture, who had been helpedand allowed to build up some unruly and not very admirable communities. Nor did the English middle classes look upon the colonists with muchinterest, or regard them as, on the whole, their equals. Theprevailing colonial political habits, as seen from England, suggestedonly unwarrantable wrangling indicative of political incompetence and aspirit of disobedience. Loyalty, to an {20} Englishman, meantsubmission to the law. To men trained in such different schools, wordsdid not mean the same thing. The time had come when the two peopleswere scarcely able to understand each other. 

A second cause for antagonism, scarcely less fundamental and destinedto cause equal irritation, is to be found in the conflict between theeconomic life of the American communities and the beliefs of the mothercountry concerning commercial and naval policy. Great Britain, in1763, was predominantly a trading country. Its ships carried goods forall the nations of Europe and brought imports to England from alllands. Although the manufacturers were not yet in possession of thenew inventions which were to revolutionize the industries of the world, they were active and prosperous in their domestic production ofhardware and textiles, and they furnished cargoes for the shipowners totransport to all quarters. To these two great interests of the middleclasses, banking and finance were largely subsidiary. Agriculture, themainstay of the nobility and gentry, continued to hold first place inthe interests of the governing classes, but the importance of allsources of wealth was fully recognized. 

In the colonies, on the contrary, manufacture scarcely existed beyondthe domestic {21} production of articles for local use; and theinhabitants relied on importations for nearly all finished commoditiesand for all luxuries. Their products were chiefly things which GreatBritain could not itself raise, such as sugar in the West Indies;tobacco from the islands and the southern mainland colonies; indigo andrice from Carolina; furs, skins, masts, pine products; and, from NewEngland, above all, fish. The natural market for these articles was inEngland or in other colonies; and in return British manufactures foundtheir natural market in the new communities. When the EconomicRevolution transformed industry, and factories, driven by steam, madeEngland the workshop of the world, the existing tendency for her tosupply America with manufactured products was intensified regardless ofthe political separation of the two countries. Not until latereconomic changes supervened was this normal relationship altered. 

The traditional British policy in 1763 was that of the so-calledMercantile System, which involved a thoroughgoing application of theprinciple of protection to the British shipowner, manufacturer, andcorn-grower against any competition. An elaborate tariff, with asystem of prohibitions and bounties, attempted to prevent the landownerfrom being undersold by foreign corn, and the {22} manufacturer frommeeting competition from foreign producers. Navigation Acts shut outforeign-built, -owned, or -manned ships from the carrying trade betweenany region but their home country and England, reserving all othercommerce for British vessels. Into this last restriction there enteredanother purely political consideration, namely, the perpetuation of asupply of mariners for the British navy, whose importance was fullyrecognized. So far as the colonies were concerned, they were broughtwithin the scope of mercantilist ideas by being considered as sourcesof supply for England in products not possible to raise at home, asmarkets which must be reserved for British manufacturers and traders, and as places which must not be allowed to develop any rivalry toBritish producers. Furthermore, they were so situated that by properregulations they might serve to encourage British shipping even if thisinvolved an economic loss. 

The Navigation Acts accordingly, from 1660 to 1763, were designed toput this theory into operation, and excluded all foreign vessels fromtrading with the colonies, prohibited any trade to the colonies exceptfrom British ports and enumerated certain commodities--sugar, cotton, dye woods, indigo, rice, furs--which could be sent only to England. Toensure the carrying out of these {23} laws, an elaborate system ofbonds and local duties was devised, and customs officers wereappointed, resident in the colonies, while governors were obliged totake oath to enforce the Acts. As time revealed defects or unnecessarystringencies, the restrictions were frequently modified. TheCarolinas, for instance, were allowed to ship rice not only to England, but to any place in Europe south of Cape Finisterre. Bounties wereestablished to aid the production of tar and turpentine; but specialActs prohibited the export of hats from the colonies, or themanufacture of rolled iron, in order to check a possible source ofcompetition to British producers. In short, the Board of Trade, theadministrative body charged with the oversight of the plantations, devoted its energies to suggesting devices which should aid thecolonists, benefit the British consumer and producer, and increase"navigation. "

It does not appear that the Acts of Trade were, in general, a source ofloss to the colonies. Their vessels shared in the privileges reservedfor British-built ships. The compulsory sending of the enumeratedcommodities to England may have damaged the tobacco-growers; but inother respects it did little harm. The articles would have gone toEngland in any case. The restriction of importation to goods fromEngland was no {24} great grievance, since British products would, inany case, have supplied the American market. Even the effort, by anAct of 1672, to check intercolonial trade in enumerated commodities wasnot oppressive, for, with one exception noted below, there was no greatdevelopment of such a trade. By 1763, according to the best evidence, the thirteen colonies seem to have adjusted their habits to theNavigation Acts, and to have been carrying on their flourishingcommerce within these restrictions. 

To this general condition, however, there were some slight exceptions, and one serious one. The colonists undoubtedly resented the necessityof purchasing European products from English middlemen, and wereespecially desirous of importing Spanish and Portuguese wines andFrench brandies directly. Smuggling in these articles seems to havebeen steadily carried on. Much more important--and to the Americanship-owners the kernel of the whole matter--was the problem of the WestIndia trade. It was proved, as the eighteenth century progressed, thatthe North American colonies could balance their heavy indebtedness tothe mother country for excess of imports over exports only by sellingto the French, as well as the British West Indies, barrel staves, clapboards, fish and food products. In {25} return, they took sugarand molasses, developing in New England a flourishing rum manufacture, which in turn was used in the African slave trade. By these means thepeople of the New England and Middle colonies built up an activecommerce, using their profits to balance their indebtedness to England. This "triangular trade" disturbed the British West India planters, who, being largely non-residents and very influential in London, inducedParliament, in 1733, to pass an Act imposing prohibitory duties on allsugar and molasses of foreign growth. This law, if enforced, wouldhave struck a damaging blow at the prosperity of the Northern colonies, merely to benefit the West India sugar-growers by giving them amonopoly; but the evidence goes to show that it was systematicallyevaded and that French sugar, together with French and Portuguesewines, was still habitually smuggled into the colonies. Thus theNavigation Acts, in the only points where they would have been actuallyoppressive, were not enforced. The colonial governors saw the seriousconsequences and shrank from arousing discontent. It is significantthat the same colonists who contended with the royal governors did nothesitate to violate a parliamentary law when it ran counter to theirinterests. 

The only reason why the radical difference {26} between the coloniesand the home government did not cause open conflict long before 1763 isto be found in the absorption of the English ministries inparliamentary manoeuvring at home, diplomacy, and European wars. Theweakness of the imperial control was recognized and frequentlycomplained of by governors, Boards of Trade, and other officials; butso long as the colonies continued to supply the sugar, furs, lumber andmasts called for by the Acts, bought largely from English shippers andmanufacturers, and stimulated the growth of British shipping, the Whigand Tory noblemen were content. The rapidly growing republicanism ofthe provincial and proprietary governments was ignored and allowed todevelop unchecked. A half-century of complaints from thwartedgovernors, teeming with suggestions that England ought to take thegovernment of the colonies into its own hands, produced no resultsbeyond creating in official circles an opinion unfavourable to thecolonists. 

In the years of the French war, 1754-1760, the utter incompatibilitybetween imperial theories on the one hand and colonial political habitson the other, could no longer be disregarded. In the midst of thestruggle, the legislatures continued to wrangle with governors overpoints of privilege; they were slow to vote supplies; they were {27}dilatory in raising troops; they hung back from a jealous fear thattheir neighbour colonies might fail to do their share; they were readyto let British soldiers do all the hard fighting. Worse still, thecolonial shipowners persisted in their trade with the French andSpanish West Indies, furnishing their enemies with supplies, and buyingtheir sugar and molasses as usual. When, in Boston, writs ofassistance were employed by the customs officials, in order that by ageneral power of search they might discover such smuggled property, themerchants protested in the courts, and James Otis, a fiery younglawyer, boldly declared the writs an infringement of the rights of thecolonists, unconstitutional, and beyond the power of Parliament toauthorize. To Ministers engaged in a tremendous war for the overthrowof France, the behaviour of the colonies revealed a spirit scarcelyshort of disloyalty, and a weakness of government no longer to betolerated. The Secretaries, the Board of Trade, the customs officials, army officers, naval commanders, colonial governors, and judges allagreed that the time had come for a thorough and drastic reform. Theyapproached the task purely and simply as members of the Englishgoverning classes, ignorant of the colonists' political ideas andtotally indifferent to their views; and their measures were framed inthe spirit {28} of unquestioning acceptance of the principles of theActs of Trade as a fundamental national policy. 

CHAPTER II

THE CONTEST OVER PARLIAMENTARY TAXATION, 1763-1773

The Prime Minister responsible for the new colonial policy was GeorgeGrenville, who assumed his position in May, 1763, shortly after thefinal treaty of Paris. Every other member of his Cabinet was anobleman, Grenville himself was brother of an earl, and most of themhad had places in preceding Ministries. It was a typicaladministration of the period, completely aristocratic in membership andspirit, quite indifferent to colonial views, and incapable ofcomprehending colonial ideals even if they had known them. To them thebusiness in hand was a purely practical one; and with confident energyGrenville pushed through a series of measures, which had been carefullyworked out, of course, by minor officials unknown to fame, during thepreceding months, {29} but which were destined to produce resultsundreamed of by any one in England. 

In the first place, there were a number of measures to strengthen andrevivify the Acts of Trade. Colonists were given new privileges in thewhale fishery, hides and skins were "enumerated, " and steps were takento secure a more rigorous execution of the Acts by the employment ofnaval vessels against smuggling. A new Sugar Act reduced the tariff onforeign sugar to such a point that it would be heavily protectivewithout being prohibitive, and at the same time imposed special dutieson Portuguese wines, while providing additional machinery forcollecting customs. This was clearly aimed at the weak point in theexisting navigation system; but it introduced a new feature, for thesugar duties, unlike previous ones, were intended to raise a revenue, and this, it was provided in the Act, should be used to pay for thedefence of America. 

A second new policy was inaugurated in a proclamation of October, 1763, which made Florida and Canada despotically governed provinces, and setoff all the land west of the head-waters of the rivers running into theAtlantic as an Indian reservation. No further land grants were to bemade in that region, nor was any trade to be permitted with the Indianssave by royal licence. The {30} Imperial government thus assumedcontrol of Indian policy, and endeavoured to check any further growthof the existing communities to the West. Such a scheme necessitatedthe creation of a royal standing army in America on a larger scale thanthe previous garrisons; and this plan led to the third branch of thenew policy, which contemplated the positive interposition of Parliamentto remedy the shortcomings of colonial assemblies. An Act of 1764prohibited the future issue of any paper money by any colony, thusterminating one of the chief grievances of British governors andmerchants. But still more striking was an Act of 1765, which providedwith great elaboration for the collection of a stamp tax in thecolonies upon all legal documents, newspapers, and pamphlets. Theproceeds were to be used to pay about one-third of the cost of the newstanding army, which was to consist of ten thousand men. Taken inconnection with the announced intention of using the revenue from theSugar Act for the same purpose, it is obvious that Grenville's measureswere meant to relieve the Imperial government from the necessity ofdepending in future upon the erratic and unmanageable coloniallegislatures. They were parts of a general political and financialprogramme. There is not the slightest evidence that Grenville or hisassociates dreamed {31} that they were in any way affecting thecolonists' rights or restricting their liberties. Grenville didconsult the colonial agents--individuals authorized to represent thecolonial assemblies in England--but simply with a view to meetingpractical objections. The various proclamations or orders were issuedwithout opposition, and the bills passed Parliament almost unnoticed. The British governing class was but slightly concerned with colonialreform: the Board of Trade, the colonial officials, and the responsibleMinisters were the only people interested. 

To the astonishment of the Cabinet and of the English public, the newmeasures, especially the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act, raised a storm ofopposition in the colonies unlike anything in their history. Thereasons are obvious. If the new Sugar Act was to be enforced, it meantthe end of the flourishing French West India intercourse and the deathof the "triangular" trade. Every distiller, shipowner, and exporter offish, timber, or grain, felt himself threatened with ruin. If theStamp Act were enforced, it meant the collection of a tax fromcommunities already in debt from the French wars, which were in futureto be denied the facile escape from heavy taxes hitherto afforded bybills of credit. But the economic burdens threatened were almost lostsight of in the political {32} dangers. If England meant to imposetaxes by parliamentary vote for military purposes, instead of callingupon the colonists to furnish money and men, it meant a deadly blow tothe importance of the assemblies. They could no longer exercisecomplete control over their property and their finances. They wouldsink to the status of mere municipal bodies. So far as the Americansof 1765 were concerned, the feeling was universal that such a changewas intolerable, that if they ceased to have the full power to give orwithhold taxes at their discretion they were practically slaves. 

In every colony there sprang to the front leaders who voiced thesesentiments in impassioned speeches and pamphlets; for the most partyoung men, many of them lawyers accustomed to look for popular approvalin resisting royal governors. Such men as James Otis and Samuel Adamsin Massachusetts, William Livingston in New York, Patrick Henry inVirginia, Christopher Gadsden in South Carolina denounced the Stamp Actas tyrannous, unconstitutional, and an infringement of the liberties ofthe colonists. Popular anger rose steadily until, in the autumn, whenthe stamps arrived, the people of the thirteen colonies had nervedthemselves to the pitch of refusing to obey the Act. Under pressurefrom crowds of angry men, {33} every distributor was compelled toresign, the stamps were in some cases destroyed, and in Boston thehouses of unpopular officials were mobbed and sacked. Before theexcitement, the governors stood utterly helpless. They could donothing to carry out the Act. 

In October, delegates representing nearly all the colonies met at NewYork, and drafted resolutions expressing their firm belief that no taxcould legally be levied upon them but by their own consent, giventhrough their legislatures. It was the right of Englishmen not to betaxed without their consent. Petitions in respectful but determinedlanguage were sent to the King and to Parliament, praying for therepeal of the Stamp Act and the Sugar Act. For the first time in theirhistory, the colonies stood together in full harmony to denounce andreject an Act passed by Parliament. As a social and political fact, this unanimous demonstration of colonial feeling was of profoundsignificance. The ease and ability with which the lawyers, planters, farmers, or merchants directed the popular excitement into effectivechannels showed the widespread political education of the Americans. Anot dissimilar excitement in London in the same years found no othermeans of expressing itself than bloody rioting. It was American {34}republicanism showing its strongest aspect in political resistance. 

The issue thus presented to the British government was one demandingthe most careful consideration and far-seeing wisdom in its treatment. Grenville's measures, however admirable and reasonable in themselves, had stirred the bitter opposition of all the colonists, and theenforcement or modification of them called for steadiness and courage. Were the English governing noblemen of the day ready to persist in thenew policy? If so, it meant violent controversy and possibly colonialinsurrection; but the exertion of British authority, if coupled withstrong naval pressure, ought to prevail. Angry as the colonists were, their language indicates that revolution was not in their thoughts;and, if there was one quality beyond all others in which the Britisharistocracy excelled, it was an inflexible tenacity when once a policywas definitely embraced. Unfortunately for both sides, the clear-cutissue thus raised was obscured and distorted by the presence on thethrone of an ambitious young prince with a policy which threw Britishdomestic affairs into unexampled confusion. 

George III, obstinate, narrow-minded, and determined to make his ownwill felt in the choice of Ministers and the direction of affairs, hadsucceeded his grandfather in 1760. Too {35} astute to violate thefast-bound tradition of the British constitution that he must governonly through Ministers, he saw that to have his own way he must securepolitical servants who, while acting as Cabinet Ministers, should taketheir orders from him. He also saw that to destroy the hold of theWhig family cliques he must enter politics himself and buy, intimidate, and cajole in order to win a following for his Ministers in parliament. With this ideal in view, he subordinated all other considerations tothe single one of getting subservient Ministers, and fought orintrigued against any Cabinet which did not accept his direction, until, in 1770, he finally triumphed. In the meantime he had keptEngland under a fluctuating succession of Ministries which forbade themaintenance of any coherent or authoritative colonial policy such asalone could have prevented disaster. 

In 1761 George III tried to induce Parliament to accept the leadershipof the Earl of Bute, his former tutor, who had never held publicoffice; but his rapid rise to the Premiership aroused such jealousyamong the nobility and such unpopularity among the people that theunfortunate Scot quailed before the storm of ridicule and abuse. Heresigned in 1763, and was succeeded by Grenville, who instantly showedGeorge III that he would take no dictation. On the contrary, {36} hedrove the King to the point of fury by his masterfulness. Indesperation, George then turned to the Marquis of Rockingham who, ifequally determined to decline royal dictation, was personally lessoffensive to him; and there came in a Ministry of the usual type, allnoblemen but two minor members, and all belonging to "connections"different from those of the Grenville Ministry. Thus it was that, whenthe unanimous defiance of the Americans reached England, the Ministersresponsible for the colonial reforms were out of office, and theRockingham Whigs had assumed control, feeling no obligation to continueanything begun by their predecessors. George III's interposition wasresponsible for this situation. 

When Parliament met in January, 1766, the colonists received powerfulallies, first in the British merchants, who petitioned against the Actas causing the practical stoppage of American purchases, and second inWilliam Pitt, who, in a burning speech, embraced in full the colonists'position, and declared that a parliamentary tax upon the plantationswas absolutely contrary to the rights of Englishmen. He "rejoiced thatAmerica has resisted. " This radical position found few followers; butthe Whig Ministry, after some hesitation, decided to grant the colonialdemands while insisting {37} on the imperial rights of Parliament. This characteristically English action was highly distasteful to themajority in the House of Lords, who voted to execute the law, and toGeorge III, who disliked to yield to mutinous subjects; but they wereforced to give way. The Stamp Act was repealed, and the sugar dutieswere reduced to a low figure. At the same time a Declaratory Act waspassed, asserting that Parliament had full power to bind the colonies"in all cases whatsoever. " Thus the Americans had their way in part, while submitting to seeing their arguments rejected. 

The consequences of this unfortunate affair were to bring into sharpcontrast the British and the American views of the status of thecolonies. The former considered them as parts of the realm, subjectlike any other part to the legislative authority of King, Lords, andCommons. The contention of the colonists, arising naturally from thetrue situation in each colonial government, that the rights ofEnglishmen guaranteed their freedom from taxation withoutrepresentation, was answered by the perfectly sound legal assertionthat the colonists, like all the people of England, were "virtually"represented in the House of Commons. The words, in short, meant onething in England, another thing in America. English speakers {38} andwriters pointed to the scores of statutes affecting the colonies, calling attention especially to the export duties of the Navigation Actof 1672, and the import duties of the Act of 1733, not to mention itsrevision of 1764. Further, Parliament had regulated provincial coinageand money, had set up a postal service, and established rates. Although Parliament had not imposed any such tax as the Stamp Act, ithad, so far as precedent showed, exercised financial powers on manyoccasions. 

To meet the British appeal to history, the colonists developed thetheory that commercial regulation, including the imposition of customsduties, was "external" and hence lay naturally within the scope ofimperial legislation, but that "internal" taxation was necessarily inthe hands of the colonial assemblies. There was sufficientplausibility in this claim to commend it to Pitt, who adopted it in hisspeeches, and to Benjamin Franklin, the agent for Pennsylvania, alreadywell known as a "philosopher, " who expounded it confidently when he wasexamined as an expert on American affairs at the bar of the Commons. It was, however, without any clear legal justification, and, as Englishspeakers kept pointing out, it was wholly incompatible with theexistence of a genuine imperial government. That it was {39} aperfectly practical distinction, in keeping with English customs, wasalso true; but that was not to be realized until three-quarters of acentury later. 

With the repeal of the objectionable law the uproar in America ceased, and, amid profuse expressions of gratitude to Pitt, the Ministry, andthe King, the colonists returned to their normal activities. The otherparts of the Grenville programme were not altered, and it was nowpossible for English Ministers, by a wise and steady policy, to improvethe weak spots in the colonial system without giving undue offence to apopulation whose sensitiveness and obstinate devotion to entireself-government had been so powerfully shown. Unfortunately, the Kingagain interposed his influence in such wise as to prevent any rationalcolonial policy. In the summer of 1766, tiring of the RockinghamMinistry, he managed to bring together an odd coalition of politicalgroups under the nominal headship of the Duke of Grafton. Pitt, whodisliked the family cliques, accepted office and the title of Earl ofChatham, hoping to lead a national Ministry. The other elements werein part Whig, and in part representatives of the so-called "King'sFriends"--a growing body of more or less venal politicians who clung toGeorge's support for the sake of the patronage to be {40} gained--andseveral genuine Tories who looked to a revived royal power to end theWhig monopoly. From such a Cabinet no consistent policy was to beexpected, save under leadership of a man like Pitt. Unfortunately thelatter was immediately taken with an illness which kept him out ofpublic life for two years; and Grafton, the nominal Prime Minister, wasutterly unable to hold his own against the influence and intrigues ofthe King. From the start, accordingly, the Ministry proved weak andunstable, and it allowed a new set of colonial quarrels to develop. 

Charles Townshend, Chancellor of the Exchequer, one of the originatorsof the new colonial policy under the Bute Ministry, was so ill-advisedas to renew the attempt to raise a colonial revenue by parliamentarytaxation. His manner of proposing the measure gave the impression thatit was a piece of sheer bravado on his part, intended to regain theprestige which he had lost by failing to carry all of his first budget;but the nature of the scheme indicates its close connection with theGrenville ideals. Avoiding the appearance of a direct internal tax, hecaused the imposition of duties on glass, painters' colours, paper, andtea, without any pretence of regulating commerce, but for the announcedpurpose of defraying the expenses {41} of governors and judges in thecolonies. Another measure established an American Board ofCommissioners for customs. Still another punished the province of NewYork for failing to comply with an Act of 1765 authorizing quarteringof troops in the colonies. The assembly was forbidden to pass any lawuntil it should make provision for the soldiers in question. Ex-governor Pownall of Massachusetts, now in Parliament, did not failto warn the House of the danger into which it was running; but hiswords were unheeded, and the Bills passed promptly. 

The result of these measures was inevitable. Every political leader inthe colonies--nay, every voter--saw that the Townshend duties, while inform "external, " were pure revenue measures, unconnected with the Actsof Trade, and intended to strike at colonial independence in a vitalpoint. If Great Britain undertook henceforward to pay the salaries ofroyal officials, one of the principal sources of power would be takenaway from the assemblies. Instantly the distinction of "external" and"internal" taxation was abandoned; and from end to end of the Atlanticseaboard a cry went up that the duties were an insidious attack on theliberties of the Americans, an outrageous taking of their propertywithout their consent, and a wanton interference with their {42}governments. Not merely agitators such as the shrewd Samuel Adams andthe eloquent Patrick Henry uttered these views, but men of far moreconsiderable property and station--such as John Jay and New Yorklandowners and importers, John Dickinson and the Philadelphiamerchants, George Washington and the Virginia planters. While nogeneral Congress was summoned, the legislatures of the colonies adoptedelaborate resolutions, pamphleteers issued a stream of denunciations, and, most important of all, a concerted effort was made to break downthe Acts by abstaining from any importations, not only of the taxedcommodities, but, so far as possible, of any British products. Commercial boycott, it was hoped, would have the same effect as at thetime of the Stamp Act. 

By this time the colonial argument had come to assume a much broadercharacter, for, in order to deny the validity of the New York AssemblyAct and the Townshend duties, it became necessary to assert thatParliament, according to "natural rights, " had no legislative authorityover the internal affairs of a colony. This was vested, by theconstitution of each province or chartered colony, in the Crown and thecolonial legislature. Such a theory reduced the imperial tie to littlemore than a personal union through the monarch, coupled with the {43}admitted power of Parliament to regulate commerce and navigation. Evidently, as in all such cases, the theory was framed to justify aparticular desire, namely, to keep things where they had been prior to1763. The sole question at issue was, in reality, one of power, not ofabstract or legal right. Once more it was clear to men of penetratingvision that the American colonies needed extremely careful handling. Whether their arguments were sound or fallacious, loyal or seditious, it was significant that the whole continent spoke with one voice andfelt but one desire--to be allowed to exercise complete financialdiscretion and to retain full control over governors and judges. Unfortunately the condition of things in England was such that a coolor steady treatment of the question was becoming impossible. In thefirst place, the Grafton Ministry was reconstituted in 1768, the"Pittite" elements withdrawing, and being replaced by more King'sFriends and Tories, while George III's influence grew predominant. Townshend died in September, 1767, but his place was taken by LordNorth, a Tory and especially subservient to the King. A newsecretaryship for the colonies was given to Lord Hillsborough, who hadbeen in the Board of Trade in the Grenville Ministry, and representedhis views. Neither of these {44} men was inclined to consider colonialclamour in any other light than as unpardonable impudence and sedition. In the second place, the old Whig family groups were fast assuming anattitude of bitter opposition to the new Tories, and by 1768 wereprepared to use the American question as a convenient weapon todiscredit the Ministry. They were quite as aristocratic in temper asthe ministerial party, but advocated forbearance, conciliation, andcalmness in dealing with the Americans, in speeches as remarkable fortheir political good sense as for their ferocity toward North, Hillsborough, and the rest. While the Ministry drew its views of theAmerican situation from royal governors and officials, the Whigshabitually consulted with Franklin and the other colonial agents, whooccupied a quasi-diplomatic position. Thus the American questionbecame a partisan battleground. The Tories, attacked by the Whigs, developed a stubborn obstinacy in holding to a "firm" colonial policy, and exhibited a steady contempt and anger toward their Americanadversaries which was in no small degree due to the English partyantagonism. 

Still further to confuse the situation, there occurred at this time thecontest of John Wilkes, backed by the London mob, against the GraftonMinistry. This demagogue, able {45} and profligate, had already comeinto conflict with the Grenville Ministry in 1765, and had been driveninto exile. Now, in 1768, he returned and was repeatedly elected tothe Commons, and as often unseated by the vindictive ministerialmajority. Riots and bloodshed accompanied the agitation; and Wilkesand his supporters, backed by the parliamentary Whigs, habituallyproclaimed the same doctrines of natural rights which were universallyasserted in America. To the King and his Cabinet, Wilkes and theAmerican leaders appeared indistinguishable. They were all brawling, disorderly, and dangerous demagogues, deserving of no consideration. 

Under these circumstances, the complaints of the colonists, althoughsupported by the Whigs and by Chatham, received scant courtesy inEngland. The Grafton Ministry showed nothing but an irritatedintention to maintain imperial supremacy by insisting on the taxes anddemanding submissiveness on the part of the assemblies. A series of"firm" instructions was sent out by Hillsborough, typical of which wasan order that the Massachusetts legislature must rescind its circularletter of protest under threat of dissolution, and that the otherassemblies must repudiate the letter under a similar menace. The soleresult was a series of embittered wrangles, dissolutions, protests, {46} and quarrels which left the colonists still more inflamed. Then, at the suggestion of the Commissioners of Customs, two regiments oftroops were sent to Boston to over-awe that particularly defiantcolony. There being no legislature in session, the Massachusetts townssent delegates to a voluntary convention which drafted a protest. Immediately, this action was denounced by Hillsborough as seditious andwas censured by Parliament; while the Duke of Bedford moved that an oldstatute of Henry VIII, by which offenders outside the realm could bebrought to England for trial, should be put into operation against thecolonial agitators. When the Virginia legislature protested againstthis step, it was dissolved. Hillsborough and North acted as thoughthey believed that a policy of scolding and nagging, if madesufficiently disagreeable, would bring the colonists to their senses. That the Whigs did not cease to pour contempt and ridicule on the follyof such behaviour was probably one reason why the government persistedin its course. The American question was coming to be beyond the reachof reason. 

Yet in 1769 the Ministry could not avoid recognizing that as financialmeasures the Townshend duties were a hopeless failure, since their netproceeds were less than 300 pounds and the increased military expenseswere {47} declared by Pownall to be over 170, 000 pounds. On May 1, 1769, the Cabinet voted to repeal the taxes on glass, colours, andpaper, but by a majority of one determined to keep the tea duty. Thisdecision was due to the complaisance of Lord North, who saw theunwisdom of the step, but yielded to the King's wish to retain one taxin order to assert the principle of parliamentary supremacy. A yearlater, the Grafton Ministry finally broke up; and Lord North assumedcontrol, with a Cabinet composed wholly of Tories and supported byGeorge III to the full extent of his power, through patronage, bribes, social pressure, and political proscription. North himself wasinclined to moderation in colonial matters. He carried the promisedrepeal of all the duties but the tea tax, and in 1772 replaced thearrogant and quarrelsome Hillsborough with the more amiable LordDartmouth. It looked for a while as though the political skies mightclear, for the American merchants, tired of their self-imposedhardships, began to weaken in opposition. In 1769 the New Yorkassembly voted to accept the parliamentary terms; and in 1770 themerchants of that colony voted to abandon general non-importation, keeping only the boycott on tea. This led to the general collapse ofthe non-importation agreements; but the colonial temper continued to bedefiant and {48} suspicious, and wrangling with governors was incessant. 

Occasional cases of violence confirmed the English Tories in their lowview of the Americans. In March, 1770, a riot in Boston between townrowdies and the soldiers brought on a shooting affray in which fivecitizens were killed. This created intense indignation throughout thecolonies, regardless of the provocation received by the soldiers, andled to an annual commemoration of the "Boston Massacre, " marked byinflammatory speeches. The soldiers, however, when tried for murder inthe local courts, were defended by prominent counsel, notably JohnAdams, and were acquitted. Two years later, on June 9, 1772, the_Gaspee_, a naval schooner, which had been very active in chasingsmugglers in Rhode Island waters, was burned by a mob, and its captaintaken prisoner. The utmost efforts of the home government failed tosecure the detection or punishment of any one of the perpetrators. 

Finally, in December, 1773, a still more serious explosion occurred. The North Ministry, desirous of assisting the East India Company, whichwas burdened with debt, removed practically all restrictions on theexportation of tea to America in hopes of increasing the sale byreducing the price. To the colonial leaders, now in a state of {49}chronic irritation, this measure seemed an insulting and insidiousattempt to induce the Americans to forget their principles and buy thetea because it was cheap. It was denounced from end to end of thecountry in burning rhetoric; and when the cargoes of tea arrived theirsale was completely prevented by the overwhelming pressure of publicopinion. Consignees, waited on by great crowds, hastened to resign;and the tea was either seized for nonpayment of duties and allowed tospoil, or was sent back. In Boston, however, the Governor, Hutchinson, stiffly refused to let the tea ships depart without landing the tea, whereat the exasperated citizens watched an organized mob of disguisedmen board the ships and throw the tea into the harbour. Once more theunanimous voice of the colonies defied a parliamentary Act. 

Such was the situation in 1773. Thirteen groups of British colonists, obstinately local in their interests, narrowly insistent onself-government, habituated to an antagonistic attitude toward royalgovernors, but, after all has been said, unquestionably loyal to theCrown and the home country, had been transformed into communities onthe verge of permanent insubordination. Incapable of changing alltheir political habits, they could see in the British policy only apurpose {50} to deprive them of that self-government which wasinseparable from liberty. The Crown Ministers, on the other hand, unable to discover anything illegal, oppressive, or unreasonable in anyof their measures, found no explanation of the extravagantdenunciations of the colonial radicals other than a determination tofoment every possible difficulty with a view to throwing off allobedience. While Adams, Dickinson, Henry, Gadsden and the restdemanded their "rights, " and protested against "incroachments" on theirliberties, Bedford, Hillsborough, North, and Dartmouth insisted on the"indecency, " "insolence, " and "disloyalty" shown by the Americans. Thecolonial republicans and the British noblemen were unable to speak thesame language. Yet the time had come to face the situation, and it wasthe duty of the Ministers to assume the task with something moreserious than reproofs and legal formulae. The contest for power nowbegun must lead, unless terminated, straight to a disruption of theEmpire. 

{51}

CHAPTER III

THE DISRUPTION OF THE EMPIRE, 1773-1776

When the news reached England that the people of the town of Boston hadthrown the tea of the East India Company into the harbour, the patienceof the North ministry, already severely strained, reached an end. Itsmembers felt--and most of the English people felt with them--that tosubmit to such an act of violence was impossible. Every considerationof national dignity demanded that Boston and its rioters should bepunished, and that the outrage done to the East India Company shouldreceive atonement. Hitherto, they said, the contumacious colonists hadbeen dealt with chiefly by arguments, reproofs, and, as it seemed tomost Englishmen, with concessions and kindnesses which had won onlyinsult and violence. 

It was resolved to make an example of the delinquent community; and thefirst step was to humiliate its representative, Benjamin Franklin. Ever since 1765 he had been residing in England, respected as aphilosopher and admired as a wit, bearing a sort of diplomaticcharacter through his position as agent for the assemblies ofMassachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Georgia. In close {52} associationwith the Whig opposition, he was undoubtedly the best-known American, and among the most influential. Now, in 1774, having to present apetition from Massachusetts to the Privy Council for the removal ofLieutenant-Governor Hutchinson, Franklin found it an awkward feature ofthe case that the colony's charges were based on private letters whichhe himself had in some way acquired and sent to Boston. The Courtparty determined to crush him, and at the hearing put forwardWedderburn, the Solicitor-General--a typical King's Friend--who passedover the subject of the petition to brand Franklin in virulentinvective as a thief and scoundrel. Amidst general applause, thepetition was rejected as false and scandalous, and Franklin wasdismissed from his position of colonial Postmaster-General. 

When Parliament met, it was instantly made clear that the sole ideacontrolling King, Cabinet, and the majority of Members was to bring theMassachusetts colonists to their senses by severe punitive legislation. The Whig opposition did not attempt to defend the destruction of thetea; but it spared no effort to make the Ministers see the folly ofstriking at effects and ignoring causes. In a masterly speech of April19, 1774, Burke showed that the insistence on submission regardless ofthe grievances and of the nature {53} of the colonists was a dangerousand absurd policy, and Pownall and Chatham repeated his arguments, butwithout avail. The Ministerial party saw no danger, and felt nothingbut the contempt of an irritated aristocracy. The original ideals of ageneral colonial reform were now lost sight of; the men responsible forthem had all passed off the stage; Grenville, Townshend, and Halifaxwere dead, and North, careless and subservient to George III, Hillsborough, Suffolk, Sandwich, and Rochford--all noblemen, and inmany cases inefficient--did not see beyond the problem of coercingnoisy and troublesome rioters, indistinguishable from the followers ofWilkes. Over and over again they reiterated that the colonists'resentment was not to be feared, that they would submit to genuinefirmness, that they were all cowardly and dared not resist a fewregular troops. Lord George Germaine earned the thanks of Lord Northby declaring that the colonists were only "a tumultuous and noisyrabble, " men who ought to be "following their mercantile employment andnot attempting to govern. " Not a gleam of any other statesmanshipappears in any of the Ministerial speeches than that displayed in thedetermination to exact complete submission. 

There were passed, accordingly, by the full Ministerial majority, fivemeasures known as {54} the Coercive Acts, or, in America, as the FiveIntolerable Acts. The first one punished Boston by closing the port toall trade until the offending town should recompense the East IndiaCompany for the tea destroyed. The next altered the government ofMassachusetts Bay by making the councillors appointive instead ofelective, by placing the appointment and removal of all judicialofficers entirely in the hands of the governor, by placing theselection of jurors in the hands of the sheriffs and prohibitingtown-meetings--apart from the annual one to elect officers--without thegovernor's permission. A third Act authorized the transfer to Englandfor trial of British officers charged with murder committed while indischarge of their duties. A fourth Act re-established the system ofquartering troops. 

The fifth Act reorganized the province of Quebec, whose government, under the Proclamation of 1763, had proved defective in severalrespects. The legal institutions of the new colony were not welladapted to the mixed French and British inhabitants, and the religioussituation needed definition. The Quebec Act altered the government ofthe province by the creation of an appointive council, authorized theCatholic Church to collect tithes, and allow the French to substitutean oath of allegiance for the oath of {55} supremacy. Moreover, Frenchcivil law was permitted to exist. At the same time the boundaries ofthe province were extended into the region west of the mountains so asto include the lands north of the Ohio River. 

With the passage of these Acts, the original causes for antagonism weresuperseded. The commissioners of customs might have enforced theNavigation Acts indefinitely; the objectionable Tea Act might havestood permanently on the statute-book; but, without a more tangiblegrievance, it is not easy to conceive of the colonists actuallybeginning a revolution. The time had now come when a more seriousissue was raised than the right of Parliament to collect a revenue by atariff in the colonies. If Parliament was to be allowed to crush theprosperity of a colonial seaport, to centralize a hitherto democraticgovernment created by a royal charter, and to remove royal officersfrom the scope of colonial juries, it was clear that the end of all thepowers and privileges wrung from royal or proprietary governors bygenerations of struggle was at hand. Yet the striking feature in thispunitive legislation was that the North Ministry expected it to meet noresistance, although its execution, so far as the government ofMassachusetts was concerned, rested on the consent of the colonists. There was, under the British {56} system, no administrative bodycapable of carrying out these laws, no military force except the fewregiments in Boston, and no naval force beyond a few frigates andcruisers. The mere passage of the laws, according to North and to LordMansfield, was sufficient to bring submission. 

Nothing more clearly shows the profound ignorance of the Tory Ministrythan this expectation, for it was instantly disappointed. At the newsof the Acts, the response from America was unanimous. Already thecolonial Whigs were well organized in committees of correspondence, andnow they acted not merely in Massachusetts but in every colony. Thetown of Boston refused to vote compensation, and was immediately closedunder the terms of the Port Act. Expressions of sympathy and gifts ofprovisions came pouring into the doomed community; while publicmeetings, legislatures, political leaders and clergymen, in chorusdenounced the Acts as unconstitutional, cruel, and tyrannous. TheQuebec Act, extending the Catholic religion and French law into theinterior valley under despotic government, was regarded as scarcelyless sinister than the Regulating Act itself. 

Under the efficient organization of the leaders a Continental Congressmet in Philadelphia in October, 1774, to make united {57} protest. This body, comprising without exception the most influential men in thecolonies, presented a clear contrast to Parliament in that every manwas the representative of a community of freemen, self-governing andequal before the law. The leaders did not regard themselves in anysense as revolutionaries. They were simply delegates from the separatecolonies, met to confer on their common dangers. Their actionconsisted in the preparation of a petition to the King, addresses tothe people of England, the people of Quebec, and the people of thecolonies, but not to Parliament, since they denied its right to passany such laws as those under complaint. The Congress further drew up adeclaration of rights which stated sharply the colonial claims, namely, that Parliament had no right to legislate for the internal affairs ofthe separate colonies. It also adopted a plan for putting commercialpressure on England by forming an Association whose members pledgedthemselves to consume no English products, and organize committees inevery colony to enforce this boycott. The leaders in the body weredestined to long careers of public prominence--such men as GeorgeWashington, Lee, and Patrick Henry of Virginia, Rutledge of SouthCarolina, Dickinson of Pennsylvania, Jay of New York, Samuel and JohnAdams of {58} Massachusetts. They differed considerably in theirtemper, the Massachusetts men being far more ready for drastic wordsand deeds than the others; but they held together admirably. If suchprotests as theirs could not win a hearing in England, it was hardlyconceivable that any could. 

Meanwhile the situation gave signs of being more explosive in realitythan the respectful words of the Congress implied. In Massachusetts, the town of Boston showed no sign of submitting, and endured distressand actual starvation, although much cheered by gifts of food from allparts of the continent. The new government under the Regulating Actproved impossible to put into operation, for the popular detestationwas visited in such insulting and menacing forms that the newcouncillors and judges dared not serve. More radical action followed. When Gage, having caused the election of a legislature, prorogued itbefore it had assembled, the members none the less gathered. Declaringthat the Regulating Act was invalid, they elected a council, appointeda committee of safety, and named a receiver of taxes. On February 1, 1775, a second Provincial Congress was chosen by the towns, which hadnot even a nominal sanction by the governor. The colony was, in fact, in peaceful revolution, for Gage found himself unable to collect {59}taxes or to make his authority respected as governor beyond the rangeof his bayonets. Equally significant was it that in several othercolonies, where the governors failed to call the legislatures, provincial congresses or conventions were spontaneously elected tosupervise the situation and choose delegates to the ContinentalCongress. 

So deep was the popular anger in Massachusetts Bay that the collectionof arms and powder and the organization of militia were rapidly begun. Clearly, the Massachusetts leaders were preparing to persist to theverge of civil war. But by this time there began to be felt in thecolonies a countercurrent of protest. As the situation grew darker, and men talked openly of possible separation unless the intolerablewrongs were redressed, all those whose interests or whose loyaltyrevolted at the idea of civil war became alarmed at the danger. Soonmen of such minds began to print pamphlets, according to the fashion ofthe time, and to attempt to prevent the radicals from pushing thecolonies into seditious courses. But the position of theseconservatives was exceedingly difficult, for they were obliged toapologize for the home country at a time when every act on the part ofthat country indicated a complete indifference to colonial prejudices. Their arguments against {60} revolution or independence left, afterall, no alternative except submission. Denounced as Tories by thehotter radicals, they found themselves at once more and more alarmed bythe daring actions of the Whigs, and more detested by the excitedpeople of their communities. 

The action of the British government after these events showed nocomprehension of the critical situation into which they were rushing. George III and North secured in the election of 1774 a triumphantmajority of the Commons, and felt themselves beyond reach of danger athome. The arguments of the colonists, the protests of the ContinentalCongress, fell upon indifferent ears. Although Burke and Chathamexerted themselves with astonishing eloquence in the session ofParliament which began in November 1774, the Whig motions forconciliation were voted down by the full Ministerial majority. Petitions from merchants, who felt the pressure of the Non-importationAssociation, were shelved. So far as the policy of the Ministry may bedescribed, it consisted of legislation to increase the punishment ofMassachusetts Bay and extend it to other colonies, and to offer aconditional exemption from Parliamentary taxation. Both houses ofParliament declared Massachusetts Bay to be in rebellion, and voted to{61} crush all resistance. An Act was passed on March 30, to restrainthe trade of New England, shutting off all colonial vessels from thefisheries, and forbidding them to trade with any country but England orIreland. By a second Act, in April, this restriction was extended toall the colonies except New York and Georgia. The only purpose of thisAct was punitive. Every step was fought by the Whig opposition, nowthoroughly committed to the cause of the colonists, but their argumentshad the inherent weakness of offering only a surrender to thecolonists' position which the parliamentary majority was in no mood toconsider. In fact it was only with great difficulty and after a stormyscene that North induced his party to vote a so-called conciliatoryproposition offering to abstain from taxing any colony which shouldmake such a fixed provision for civil and judicial officers as wouldsatisfy Parliament. 

It was only a few days after the passage of the restraining Acts byParliament that the long-threatened civil war actually broke out inMassachusetts. General Gage, aware of the steady gathering of powderand war material by the revolutionary committee of safety, finally cameto the conclusion that his position required him to break up thesethreatening bases of supplies. On April 19, 1775, he sent out a forceof 800 men to {62} Lexington and Concord--towns a few miles fromBoston--with orders to seize or destroy provisions and arms. Theyaccomplished their purpose, after dispersing with musketry a squad offarmers at Lexington, but were hunted back to Boston by many timestheir number of excited "minute men, " who from behind fences and atevery crossroad harassed their retreat. A reinforcement of 1500 menenabled the raiding party to escape, but they lost over 800 men, andinflicted a total loss of only 90 in their flight. 

Thus began the American Revolution, for the news of this day of bloodyskirmishing, as it spread, started into flame the excitement of thecolonial Whigs. From the other New England colonies men sprang toarms, and companies marched to Boston, where they remained in rudeblockade outside the town, unprovided with artillery or militaryorganization, but unwilling to return to their homes. From thehill-towns, a band of men surprised Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain, taking the cannon for use around Boston. In every other colony militiawere organized, officers chosen and arms collected, and almosteverywhere, except in Quaker Pennsylvania and in proprietary Maryland, the governors and royal officials fled to the seacoast to take refugein royal ships of war, or resigned their positions at the command {63}of crowds of armed "minute men. " Conventions and congresses, summonedby committees of safety, were elected by the Whigs and assumed controlof the colonies, following the example of Massachusetts. The Britishcolonial government, in short, crumbled to nothing in the spring of1775. Only Gage's force of a few regiments, shut up in Boston, and afew naval vessels, represented the authority of England in America. 

Again there met a Continental Congress at Philadelphia, whose duty itwas to unify colonial action and to give the colonial answer to thelate parliamentary acts. Once more the ablest men of the colonies werepresent, now gravely perturbed over the situation, and divided into twocamps. On the one hand, most of the New Englanders, led by SamuelAdams and John Adams, his cousin, felt that the time for parley was atan end, that nothing was to be hoped for from the North Ministry, andthat the only reasonable step was to declare independence. Othersstill hoped that George III would realize the extent of the crisis andbe moved to concessions, while yet others, who hoped little, thoughtthat one more effort should be made to avoid revolution. But nonedreamed of surrender. Of the growing number of Americans who recoiledin horror from {64} the possibility of independence, and were beginningto show their dread in every way, not one was in this body. Itrepresented only the radicals in the several colonies. 

The Congress has been charged with inconsistency, for some of itsmeasures were impelled by the most radical members, others by theconservatives. On the one hand, it declined to adopt a form offederation suggested by Franklin, and authorized Dickinson to draw up afinal, respectful, almost obsequious petition to the King to avoidwar--a document called the "Olive Branch"; but, on the other hand, itappointed Washington to command the troops near Boston as a Continentalcommander, adopted a report censuring the conciliatory proposition inbold language, and issued an address justifying with extravagantrhetoric the taking up of arms. Still more daring, it went so far asto arrange to pay the so-called "Continental army" by means of bills ofcredit, redeemable by the united colonies. Later, in 1775, itappointed a secret committee to correspond with friends abroad, andundertook extensive measures for raising troops and accumulatingmilitary stores. To the revolted colonies, who found themselves withno legal authorities, it gave the advice to form such governments aswould secure peace and good order during the continuance {65} of theexisting dispute, a step which was promptly taken by several. 

Fighting meanwhile went on. General Gage, on June 17, undertook todrive from Charlestown, across the harbour from Boston, a body of about1, 500 provincial troops who had intrenched themselves on Breed's Hill. In all, about 3, 000 British were brought to the attack, while gunboatsraked the peninsula between Charlestown and the mainland, hindering thearrival of reinforcements. With true British contempt for theiradversaries, the lines of red-uniformed troops marched under the hotsun up the hill, to be met with a merciless fire at short range fromthe rifles, muskets, and fowling pieces of the defenders. Two frontalattacks were thus repelled with murderous slaughter; but a thirdattack, delivered over the same ground, was pushed home, and thedefenders were driven from their redoubt. Never was a victory morehandsomely won or more dearly bought. The assailants lost not lessthan 1, 000 out of 3, 000 engaged, including 92 officers. The Americanslost only 450, but that was almost as large a proportion. It wasobvious to any intelligent officer that the Americans might have beencut off from behind and compelled to surrender without being attacked;but Gage and his subordinates were anxious to teach the rebels alesson. The {66} result of this action, known in history as "BunkerHill, " was to render him and nearly all the officers who served againstAmericans unwilling ever again to storm intrenchments. They discoveredthat, as Putnam, who commanded part of the forces, observed, themilitia would fight well if their legs were covered. They were laterto discover the converse, that with no protection militia were almostuseless. 

From this time the British force remained quietly in Boston, fed andsupplied from England at immense cost, and making no effort to attackthe miscellaneous levies which General Washington undertook to forminto an army during the summer and autumn. Nothing but the inaction ofthe British made it possible for Washington's command to remain, forthey lacked powder, bayonets, horses and, most serious of all, theylacked all military conceptions. The elementary idea of obedience wasinconceivable to them. Washington's irritation over the perfectlyunconcerned democracy of the New Englanders was extreme; but he showeda wonderful patience and tenacity, and by sheer persistence began tocreate something like a military organization. Yet, even after monthsof drill and work the army remained little more than an armed mob. Atlength, in March, 1776, Washington managed to {67} place a force onDorchester heights, which commanded the harbour from the south. Atfirst Gage had some idea of attacking, but storms intervened; andfinally, without another blow, he evacuated the city and sailed withall his force to Halifax. So ended a siege which ought never to havelasted a month had the British generals been seriously minded to breakit up. 

Other military events consisted of a few skirmishes in Virginia andNorth Carolina, where the governors managed to raise small forces ofloyalists, who were thoroughly defeated by the Whig militia, and of agallant but hopeless attempt by the rebels to capture Canada. Aftersome futile efforts on the part of Congress to induce the French torevolt, two bodies of men, in the autumn of 1775, made their way acrossthe border. One, entering Canada by way of Lake Champlain, occupiedMontreal, and then advanced against Quebec, where it was joined by theother, which, with great hardships, had penetrated through thewilderness of northern Maine. The commanders, Richard Montgomery, Benedict Arnold, and Daniel Morgan of Virginia, were men of daring, buttheir force, numbering not more than 1, 000, was inadequate; and, afterthe failure of an effort to carry the place by surprise on the night ofDecember 31--in which Montgomery was {68} killed and Morgancaptured--they were unable to do more than maintain a blockade outsidethe fortress. 

The action of the North Ministry during these months showed nodeviation from its policy of enforcing submission. The Olive Branchpetition was refused a reception, and a proclamation was issueddeclaring the colonies in rebellion and warning all subjects againsttraitorous correspondence. When Parliament met in November, 1775, theopposition, led as usual by Burke, made one more effort to avoid civilwar; but the Ministerial party rejected all proposals for conciliation, and devoted itself to preparing to crush the rebellion. On December22, an Act became law which, if enforced, would have been a sentence ofdeath to all colonial economic life. It superseded the Boston Port Actand the restraining Acts, absolutely prohibited all commerce with therevolted colonies, and authorized the impressment into the navy of allseamen found on vessels captured under the Act. 

Military and naval preparations were slow and costly. The Admiraltyand War Office, unprepared for a general war, had insufficient troopsand sailors, and had to collect or create supplies and equipment. TheEarl of Sandwich showed activity but slight capacity as First Lord ofthe Admiralty. Viscount {69} Barrington had been Secretary at Warunder Pitt during the French war, but he lacked force and influence. Hence, although Parliament voted 50, 000 troops, there was confusion anddelay. To secure a prompt supply of men, the Ministry took the step ofhiring German mercenaries from the lesser Rhine princes--Hesse, Waldeck, and others, --at a rate per head with a fixed sum for deaths. This practice was customary in wars when England was obliged to protectHanover from the French; but to use the same method against their ownkindred in America was looked upon with aversion by many English, andaroused ungovernable indignation in all Americans. It seemed to show acallousness toward all ties of blood and speech which rendered any hopeof reconciliation futile. The war was not, in fact, popular inEngland. The task of conquering rebels was not relished by many, andofficers and noblemen of Whig connections in some cases resigned theircommissions rather than serve. The parliamentary opposition denouncedthe war with fiery zeal as an iniquity and a scandal. Nevertheless, the general opinion in England supported the Ministry in itsdetermination to assert the national strength; for the colonialbehaviour seemed to the average Englishman as nothing more or less thanimpudent sedition, to yield to which would be disgrace. 

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To the Americans, the British action in 1776 showed that the onlyalternatives were submission or fighting; and, if the latter must bechosen, then it was the feeling of a growing number that independencewas the only outcome. There now went on a contest betweenconservatives, including on one side those who opposed all civil war, those who were willing to fight to defend rights but who were unwillingto abandon hopes of forcing England to surrender its claims, and thosewhose businesses and connections were closely interwoven with themother country and all the radicals on the other. Unfortunately forthe conservatives they had only fear, or sentiment, for arguments, since the North Ministry gave them nothing to urge upon doubtful men. Still more unfortunately, they were, as a rule, outside therevolutionary organizations of conventions and committees, and werethemselves without means of co-operating. 

In the excitement and tension of the time, the ruder and rougherclasses tended to regard all reluctance to join in the revolution asequivalent to upholding the North policy, and to attack as Tories allwho did not heartily support the revolutionary cause. Violence andintimidation rapidly made themselves felt. Loyalists were threatened, forced by mobs to sign the Association; their houses {71} were defiled, their movements watched. Then [Transcriber's note: Their?] arms weretaken from them, and if they showed anger or temper they wereoccasionally whipped or even tarred and feathered. In this way adetermined minority backed by the poorer and rougher classes, overrodeall opposition and swelled a rising cry for independence. 

The Congress was slow, for it felt the need of unanimity; and suchcolonies as New York and Pennsylvania were controlled by moderates. But at length, in June, 1776, spurred on by the Virginia delegates andby the tireless urgings of the Massachusetts leaders, the body acted. Already some of the colonies had adopted constitutions whose languageindicated their independence. Now the Continental Congress, after afinal debate, adopted a Declaration of Independence, drafted byJefferson of Virginia and supported by the eloquence of John Adams andthe influence of Franklin. Basing their position on the doctrines ofthe natural right of men to exercise full self-government and to changetheir form of government when it became oppressive, the colonies, inthis famous document, imitated the English Declaration of Rights of1689 in drawing up a bill of indictment against George III'sgovernment. In this can be discovered every cause of resentment andevery variety of {72} complaint which the thirteen colonies were readyto put forward. Practically all were political. There were allusionsin plenty to the wrangles between governors and assemblies, denunciations of the parliamentary taxes and the coercing Acts, but noreference to the Acts of Trade. To the end, the colonists, even in theact of declaring independence, found their grievances in the field ofgovernment and not in economic regulation. What they wanted was theunrestricted power to legislate for themselves and to tax or refrainfrom taxing themselves. When these powers were diminished, their wholepolitical ideal was ruined, and they preferred independence to whatthey considered servitude. Such ideas were beyond the comprehension ofmost Englishmen, to whom the whole thing was plain disloyalty, howevercloaked in specious words and glittering generalities. 

It has been said that the rupture was due to a spirit of independencein America which, in spite of all disclaimers, was determined to beentirely free from the mother country. Such was the assertion of theTories and officials of the time, and the same idea is not infrequentlyrepeated at the present day. But the truth is that the colonists wouldhave been contented to remain indefinitely in union with England, subjects of the British {73} crown, sharers of the British commercialempire, provided they could have been sure of complete localself-government. The independence they demanded was far less than thatnow enjoyed by the great colonial unions of Canada, Australia, andSouth Africa. It may be assumed, of course, that unless Parliamentexercised complete authority over internal as well as externalmatters--to employ the then customary distinction--there was no realimperial bond. Such was the position unanimously taken by the NorthMinistry and the Tories in 1776. But in view of the subsequent historyof the English colonies it seems hardly deniable that some relationshipsimilar to the existing colonial one might have been perpetuated hadthe Whig policy advocated by Burke been adopted, and the right ofParliament "to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever" been allowedto drop, in practice. The obstinate localism of the colonies was suchthat not until a generation after the Revolution did a genuine Americannational sentiment appear. The colonies were driven to act together in1774-1776, but not to fuse, by a danger not to national but to localindependence. This fact indicates how sharply defined was the fieldwhich the Americans insisted on having free from parliamentaryinvasion. Had it been possible for England {74} to recognize thisfact, there would have been no revolution. 

It is, of course, obvious that the traditional American view of theRevolution as caused by tyranny and oppression is symbolical, if notfictitious. The British government, in all its measures, from 1763 to1774, was moderate, hesitating, and at worst irritating. Its actionthreatened to destroy the practical independence of the colonialassemblies; but the danger was political. Even the five "intolerableActs" inflicted hardship on the town of Boston alone. It was not untilthe year 1775, when Parliament imposed severe commercial restrictions, that anything resembling actual oppression began; but by that time thecolonies were in open revolt. 

This fact only emphasizes, as Burke pointed out, the criminal folly ofthe North Ministry in allowing the situation to become dangerous. Itwas the misfortune of the British people in the eighteenth centurythat, in the critical years after 1767, George III and his Ministerswere unable to conceive of any value in colonies which were not in thefull sense dependencies, and were narrowly limited by the economicideas of their time and the social conventions of their class. Sincethe colonies had developed, unchecked, their own political life underBritish government, it was not their duty humbly to {75} surrender allthat had come to be identical with liberty in their eyes. It was theduty of British statesmen to recognize the situation and deal with it. This they failed to do, and the result was revolution. 

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CHAPTER IV

THE CIVIL WAR IN THE EMPIRE, 1776-1778

In the war which now began, the military situation was such thatneither side could look forward to an easy victory. Great Britainoutweighed the colonies in population by three or four to one, and inevery element of military strength to a much greater degree. There wasa standing army, an ample sufficiency of professional officers, themost powerful navy in the world, the full machinery of financialadministration, abundant credit, and wealthy manufacturing andagricultural classes which has already shown their power to carry theburdens of a world contest without flinching. With a powerful partyMinistry endowed with full discretion in the ordering of militaryaffairs, there was little danger of divided {76} councils or ofinability to secure responsible direction. North, Sandwich at theAdmiralty, Barrington as Secretary at War, Germaine as Secretary forthe Colonies, could command the active support of the King, theParliament, and, it appeared, of the people. 

On the other hand, it was necessary to carry on war at 3, 000 milesdistance from the base of supplies, and to feed and clothe the armiesentirely from home. The cost was certain to be extremely heavy, andthe practical difficulties of management arising from the distance weresure to be great, unless a competent commander were to be givencomplete authority in the colonies. Then, too, the problem was not oneof conquering cities or single strategic points, or of defeating arival state, but of so thoroughly beating down resistance as to leadthe Americans to abandon their revolution and submit to the extinctionof their new-formed confederation. Armies must operate inland from aseacoast where landing was easy in hundreds of places, but where almostevery step took them into a rough country, ill-provided with roads andlacking in easily collected supplies. In spite of all advantages ofmilitary power, the problem before the British government was onecalling for the highest forms of military capacity, and this, by anunexplained ill-fortune, was conspicuously {77} lacking. Not a Britishgeneral who commanded in America failed to show fighting ability andtactical sense, but not one of them possessed the kind of genius whichgrasps the true military ends of any campaign and ignores minor pointsfor the sake of winning decisive advantages. Perhaps it would beunjust to apply to the British forces in this war the designation wonin 1774--"armies of lions led by asses"; but the analogy is at leastsuggested. 

Still more serious was the fact that the North Ministry was chosenmainly on the basis of the willingness of its members to execute theKing's orders and use their influence and parliamentary power andconnections in his behalf. North himself, able as a parliamentarian, was irresolute in policy, ignorant of war, and careless inadministration; Weymouth and Suffolk, the Secretaries, were of slightability; Lord George Germaine, Secretary for the Colonies, wasarrogant, careless, and lacking in military insight; Barrington, Secretary at War, possessed administrative ability, but was withoutpersonal weight in the cabinet; Sandwich at the Admiralty was grosslyinefficient. There was not a single member of the Cabinet fitted tocarry on war, or able to influence George III. For such a body of mento undertake to direct the operations in America {78} at the distanceof 3, 000 miles was a worse blunder than it would have been to committhe conduct of the war to any one of the generals in the field, howevercommonplace his abilities. 

On the side of the colonists, the problem of fighting the full power ofEngland was apparently a desperate one. The militia, with superiornumbers, had chased the British from Concord, and had made a stubborndefence at Bunker Hill; but the British were about to move withoverwhelming strength. To raise, equip, clothe, and feed armies wasthe task of a strong administration, and there was nothing of the kindin America. The ex-colonists not only had never known efficientadministration; they had fought against any and all administration forgenerations, and their leaders had won their fame as opponents of allexecutive power. To thunder against royal oppression won applause, butindicated no ability at raising money and organizing such things ascommissariat, artillery, or a navy; and it may be said of such men asSamuel Adams, Robert Morris, Roger Sherman, John Rutledge, PatrickHenry, and Thomas Jefferson that their administrative training was asfar below that of their enemies in the North Ministry as theirpolitical capacity was, in general, superior. 

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The Continental Congress, moreover, which assumed responsibility forthe army, could only recommend measures to the States, and call uponthem to furnish troops and money. In contrast to the States, whichderived their powers unquestionably from the voters within theirboundaries and could command their obedience, the Congress had no legalor constitutional basis, and was nothing more than the meeting place ofdelegates from voluntary allies. Such military authority as itexercised rested entirely upon the general agreement of the States. National government, in short, did not exist. Still more serious wasthe fact that there were very few trained officers in America. TheAmerican military leaders, such as Washington, Greene, Wayne, Sullivan, were distinctly inferior in soldiership to their antagonists, althoughWashington and Greene developed greater strategic ability after manyblunders. It was only through sundry military adventurers, someEnglish--such as Montgomery, Gates, Lee, Conway, --others European--suchas De Kalb, Steuben, Pulaski--that something of the military art couldbe acquired. 

Most serious of all, there were no troops in America who comprehendedthe nature of military discipline. The conception of obedience toorders, of military duty, of the {80} absolute necessity of holdingsteady, was beyond the range of most Americans. They regarded war assomething to be carried on in their own neighbourhoods, and resistedobstinately being drawn outside their own States. They refused toenlist for longer than a few months, since they felt it imperative toreturn to look after their farms. They had little regard for men fromdifferent districts, distrusted commanders from any State but theirown, and had no loyalty of any description to the Continental Congress. They were, in short, still colonists, such as generations of traininghad made them; very angry with Great Britain, infuriated at Tories, andglad to be independent, but unable to realize the meaning of it alleven under the terrible stress of war. 

Under the circumstances, the task of the men to whose lot it fell tolead the American forces was such as to tax to the utmost not onlytheir military skill, but their ability to control, inspire, andpersuade the most refractory and unreliable of material. When to thiswere added the facts that the colonies were almost wholly lacking inmanufactures except of the most rudimentary sort, that they had littlecapital except in the form of land, buildings, vessels, and crops, andthat whatever revenue they had been in the habit of deriving fromcommerce was {81} liable to be destroyed by the British navalsupremacy, it is easily seen that the disadvantages of the home countrywere actually counterbalanced by the still more crushing disadvantagesof the revolting colonies. 

In the summer of 1776, the British advanced from two quarters. In thenorth, as soon as navigation opened, men-of-war sailed up the St. Lawrence and brought reinforcements to Quebec. The relics of theAmerican force, unable to maintain themselves in Canada, abandonedtheir conquests without a blow, and retreated into the Lake Champlainregion, there intending to hold the forts at Crown Point andTiconderoga. Col. Guy Carleton, the new commander, was soon able tomove southward with overwhelming numbers; but, after reaching thenorthern end of Lake Champlain, he found that body of water commandedby a small squadron of gunboats under Benedict Arnold, and, deeming itimpossible to advance, delayed all summer in order to construct a rivalfleet. Meanwhile, all operations came to a standstill in that region. Eleven thousand men, chiefly regular troops, were thus kept inactivefor months. 

The principal British force gathered at Halifax, and sailed directlyagainst New York. It was there joined by the remains of a navalexpedition which had endeavoured in June, {82} 1776, to captureCharleston, South Carolina, but had suffered severely in an attempt tobombard Fort Moultrie and been compelled to withdraw. This success, which raised the spirits of the rebels, was, however, the last theywere to enjoy for many months. The main British expedition wasexpected to overpower all colonial resistance, for it comprised a fleetof men-of-war, and an army of no less than 81, 000 men, including Germanmercenaries, fully equipped, drilled, and provisioned. The admiral incommand, Lord Howe, a Whig, was authorized to issue pardons in returnfor submission, and evidently expected the mere presence of so powerfulan armament to cause the collapse of all resistance. His brother, SirWilliam Howe, who commanded the army, was a good officer in actualfighting, but a man of little energy or activity, and unwilling, apparently, to cause the revolted colonies any more suffering than wasnecessary. He was, moreover, quite without military insight of thelarger kind, failing to recognize the peculiar character of the warupon which he was entering and acting, when pushing on a campaign, precisely as though he were operating against a European army in westGermany. 

In spite of all deficiencies, it seemed as though Howe could not failto crush the {83} undisciplined collection of 17, 000 militia and minutemen with which Washington endeavoured to meet him at New York. Controlling the harbour and the rivers with his fleet, he could moveanywhere and direct superior numbers against any American position. The first blow, struck after futile efforts at negotiation, was aimedat an American force which held Brooklyn Heights on Long Island. About20, 000 British and Hessian troops were landed on August 22; and fivedays later they outflanked and crushed a body of Americans placed toobstruct their advance. There remained the American intrenchments, which were weak and ill-defended; but Howe refused to attack, probablywith memories of Bunker Hill in his mind. Washington managed, owing tofavourable rainy weather, to remove his beaten force by night on August29, but only the inaction of Howe enabled them to escape capture. 

There followed a delay of two weeks, during which Admiral Howetried to secure an interview with American leaders, in hopes ofinducing the rebels to submit; but, finding Franklin, Adams andRutledge--commissioners named by Congress--immovably committed toindependence, he was compelled to renew hostilities. There ensued aslow campaign in which General Howe easily {84} forced Washington toevacuate New York, to retreat northward, and after various skirmishesto withdraw over the Hudson River into New Jersey. At no time didWashington risk a general engagement; at no time did he inflict anysignificant loss upon his antagonist or hinder his advance. Themilitia were, in fact, almost useless in the open field, and only daredlinger before the oncoming redcoats when intrenched or when behindwalls and fences. Many of them from New England grew discouraged andhomesick, and left the moment their short enlistments expired; so thatwithout any serious battles Washington's so-called army dwindled weekby week. On November 16, a severe loss was incurred through the effortof General Greene to hold Fort Washington, which commanded the HudsonRiver from the heights at the northern end of Manhattan Island. Thisstronghold, besieged by Howe, made a fair defence, but was taken bystorm, and the whole garrison captured. The American army then, in twodetachments under Washington and Lee respectively, was obliged toretreat across New Jersey, followed by the British under Cornwallis, until, by December 8, the remnant was at Philadelphia in a state ofgreat discouragement and demoralization. The Continental Congress, fearing capture, fled to Baltimore and, moved to {85} desperatemeasures, passed a resolution, giving Washington for six monthsunlimited authority to raise recruits, appoint and dismiss officers, impress provisions, and arrest loyalists. Howe felt that the rebellionwas at an end. On November 30 he issued a proclamation offering pardonto all who would take the oath of allegiance within sixty days; andfarmers in New Jersey took it by hundreds, securing in return acertificate of loyalty. The rebels' cause seemed lost. But at themoment when, if ever, it was worth while to push pursuit to theuttermost, with the prospect of reducing three colonies and breaking upall show of resistance, Howe, satisfied with his campaign, began toprepare winter quarters. 

To the northward, a similar fatality seemed to prevent full Britishsuccess. During the summer, General Guy Carleton waited at thenorthern end of Lake Champlain while his carpenters built gunboats. Month after month went by until, on October 11, the British vesselsengaged Arnold's inferior flotilla. Two days of hot fighting withmusketry and cannon resulted in the destruction of the Americansquadron, so that the way seemed clear for Carleton to advance; but theseason was late, the difficulties of getting provisions from Canadaseemed excessive, and on November 2 the British {86} withdrew. Hereagain only extreme caution and slowness permitted the colonial army tohold its ground. Yet it seemed doubtful whether the American causemight not collapse even without further pressure, for the "armies" werealmost gone by sheer disintegration. General Schuyler had a scanty3, 000 near Lake Champlain; Washington could not muster over 6, 000 atPhiladelphia, and these were on the points of going home. The attemptto carry on the war by voluntary militia fighting was a visible failure. 

At this stage, the darkest hour, Washington, who had never dared torisk a battle, took the bold step of re-crossing the Delaware with partof his half-starved and shivering troops, and captured nearly all of aHessian encampment at Trenton on December 25. Further, he drew onCornwallis to advance against him, skirmished successfully on January2, and then, moving by a night march to the British rear, defeated aregiment at Princeton. Cornwallis, with 7, 000 men, was out-generalledby Washington in this affair, which was the first really aggressiveblow struck by the Americans. The result was to lead Howe to abandonthe effort to hold all of New Jersey; while Washington was able to posthis men in winter quarters at Morristown, where he could watch everyBritish move. This masterly {87} little campaign, carried on underevery disadvantage, made Washington's fame secure, and undoubtedlysaved the American revolution from breaking down. It revived thefighting spirit, encouraged the Congress and the people, and created afaith in Washington on the part of the soldiers and farmers which wasdestined to grow steadily into love and veneration. With no particularmilitary insight beyond common sense and the comprehension of militaryvirtues, he was a man of iron will, extreme personal courage, and apatience and tenacity which had no limit. 

Congress now showed that its members realized in part the militarylesson, for it authorized a standing regular army, and gave Washingtonpower to establish it and appoint lower officers. It was a hard taskto induce any Americans to enlist in such an organization; but littleby little there were collected "Continental troops" who did not rushback to their family duties at the end of three months, but stayed andgrew in discipline and steadiness. Yet Washington could never count onmore than a few thousand such; Americans in general simply would notfight except under pressure of invasion and in defence of their homes. 

During 1776-7, the revolted communities assumed something of theappearance of settled governments. The States replaced {88} theirrevolutionary conventions with constitutions closely modelled upontheir provincial institutions, but with elective governors, and, tosafeguard liberty, full control over legislation, taxation, and mostoffices placed in the hands of the legislatures. Executive power wasconfined mainly to military matters. The Continental Congresscontinued to act as a grand committee of safety, framingrecommendations and requests to the States, and issuing paper money onthe credit of its constituents. Military administration proved a taskbeyond the capacity of the new governments, even for such diminutivearmies as those which guarded the northern frontier and New Jersey, andthe forces suffered from lack of food, covering, and powder. Thecountry had few sources of supplies and wretched roads. 

In 1777, when spring opened, the British armies slowly prepared to pushmatters to a definite conclusion. The North Cabinet, especially LordGeorge Germaine, had no single coherent plan of operations beyondcontinuing the lines laid down in 1776. It was early planned to havethe Canadian force march southward and join Howe, collecting suppliesand gathering recruits as it traversed New York. Howe was told that hewas expected to co-operate, but was not prevented from substituting aplan of his {89} own which involved capturing Philadelphia, the chiefAmerican town and, as the seat of the Continental Congress, the "rebelcapital. " Germaine merely intimated that Howe ought to make suchspeedy work as to return in time to meet the Canadian force, but didnot give him any positive order, so Howe considered his plan approved. In leisurely fashion he tried twice to march across New Jersey in June;but, although he had 17, 000 to Washington's 8, 000, he would not riskleaving the latter in his rear and withdrew. He next determined tomove by water, and began the sea journey on July 5. This processoccupied not less than six weeks, since he first tried to sail up theDelaware, only to withdraw from before the American forts; and it wasnot until August 22 that he finally landed his men at the head ofChesapeake Bay. 

Meanwhile, General Burgoyne, a man of fashion as well as an officer, had begun his march southward from Lake Champlain with 7, 500 men andsome Indian allies, forced the Americans to evacuate Fort Ticonderogawithout a blow, and chased the garrison to the southward and eastward. Pushing forward in spite of blocked roads and burned bridges, hereached the Hudson River on August 1 without mishap, and there haltedto collect provisions and await {90} reinforcements from Tories andfrom a converging expedition under St. Leger, which was to join him byway of Lake Ontario and the Mohawk Valley. Up to this time theAmerican defence had been futile. It seemed as though nothing couldstop Burgoyne's advance. Congress now appointed a new general, Gates, to whom Washington sent General Morgan with some of his best troops. While Burgoyne waited, the militia of New England began collecting, andpresently, on August 15 and 16, two detachments of the British sent toseize stores at Bennington were surrounded and captured. St. Leger, unable to manage his Indian allies, or force the surrender of theAmerican Fort Stanwix, was obliged, on August 22, to retreat. Burgoyne, with diminishing numbers and no hope of reinforcement, foundhimself confronted by rapidly growing swarms of enemies. At the momentwhen his need of co-operation from Howe became acute, the lattergeneral was two hundred miles away in Pennsylvania. 

Under the circumstances, the two campaigns worked themselves out toindependent conclusions. In Pennsylvania, Washington boldly marchedhis summer army with its nucleous of veterans out to meet the British, and challenged a battle along the banks of the Brandywine creek. OnSeptember 11, Howe, with 18, 000 men, methodically attacked {91}Washington, who had not over 11, 000, sent a flanking column around hisright wing, and after a stiff resistance pushed the Americans from thefield. There was no pursuit; and four days later Washington wasprevented only by bad weather from risking another fight. He did notfeel able to prevent Howe from entering Philadelphia on September 27;but on October 3, taking advantage of a division of the British army, he assumed the offensive at Germantown and brought his unsteady forcesinto action, only to suffer another defeat. With this Washington wasforced to abandon operations in the field and to go into winterquarters at Valley Forge, not far from the city; while Howe besiegedand on November 2 took the American forts on the Delaware. The Britishcampaign was successful; Philadelphia was theirs, and they had wonevery engagement. But nothing shows more clearly Washington's abilityas a fighter and leader than his stubborn contest against odds in thissummer. 

Meanwhile, the Northern campaign came to its conclusion. By September, Gates, the new commander, found himself at the head of nearly 20, 000men, and Burgoyne's case grew desperate. He made two efforts to breakthrough to the southward, at Freeman's Farm, and again at BemisHeights, but was {92} met by superior numbers and overwhelmed, in spiteof the gallantry of his troops. Forced back to Saratoga on the HudsonRiver, he was surrounded and at length compelled to surrender, onOctober 17. Sir Henry Clinton, who commanded the British garrison ofNew York in Howe's absence, sent a small expedition up the Hudson; butit did not penetrate nearer than sixty miles from the spot whereBurgoyne stood at bay, and it achieved nothing more than a raid. Sothe northern British force, sent to perform an impossible task, wasdestroyed solely because neither Howe nor his superiors realized thenecessity of providing for certain co-operation from the southward. The prisoners, according to the terms of the surrender, were to bereturned to England; but Congress, owing in part to some complaints ofBurgoyne, chose to violate the agreement, and the captive British andHessians were retained. Burgoyne himself returned to England, burningwith anger against Howe and the North Ministry. 

The winter of 1777-8 found the two British armies comfortably housed inNew York and Philadelphia, and Washington, with his handful ofmiserably equipped men, presenting the skeleton of an army at ValleyForge. Congress, now manned by less able leaders than at first, wasalmost won over to {93} displacing the unsuccessful commander by Gates, the victor of Saratoga; and it did go so far as to commit theadministration of the army to a cabal of Gates's friends, who carriedon a campaign of depreciation and backbiting against Washington. Butthe whole unworthy plot broke down under a few vigorous words from thelatter, the would-be rival quailing before the Virginian's personalauthority. He was not a safe man to bait. The military headshipremained securely with the one general capable of holding thingstogether. 

In the winter of 1778, however, a new element entered the game, namely, the possibility of French intervention. From the outbreak of theRevolution, very many Americans saw that their former deadly enemy, France, would be likely to prove an ally against England; and as earlyas 1776 American emissaries began to sound the court of Versailles. InMarch, 1776, Silas Deane was regularly commissioned by the ContinentalCongress, and in the autumn he was followed by no less a person thanBenjamin Franklin. It was the duty of these men to get whatever aidthey could, especially to seek an alliance. The young king, Louis XVI, was not a man of any independent statecraft; but his ministers, aboveall Vergennes, in charge of foreign affairs, were anxious to securerevenge {94} upon England for the damage done by Pitt, and the tone ofthe French court was emphatically warlike. The financial weakness ofthe French government, destined shortly to pave the way for theRevolution, was clearly visible to Turgot, the Minister of Finances, and he with a few others protested against the expense of a foreignwar; but Vergennes carried the day. 

As early as the summer of 1776, French arms and munitions were beingsecretly supplied, while the Foreign Minister solemnly assured thewatchful Lord Stormont, the English Ambassador, of his government'sperfect neutrality. Thousands of muskets, hundreds of cannon, andquantities of clothes were thus shipped, and sums of money were alsoturned over to Franklin. Beaumarchais, the playwright and adventurer, acted with gusto the part of intermediary; and the lords and ladies ofthe French court, amusing themselves with "philosophy" and speculativeliberalism, made a pet of the witty and sagacious Franklin. Hispopularity actually rivalled that of Voltaire when the latter, in 1778, returned to see Paris and die. But not until the colonies had provedthat they could meet the English in battle with some prospect ofsuccess would the French commit themselves openly; and during 1776 and1777 the tide ran too steadily against {95} the insurgents. Finally, in December, when the anxieties of Franklin and his associates werealmost unendurable, the news of Burgoyne's surrender was brought toParis. The turning-point was reached. Vergennes immediately led theFrench King to make two treaties, one for commercial reciprocity, theother a treaty of military alliance, recognizing the independence ofthe United States, and pledging the countries to make no separatepeace. In the spring of 1778 the news reached America; and the war nowentered upon a second stage. 

There can be little doubt that under abler commanders the Britisharmies might have crushed out all armed resistance in the middlecolonies. In spite of all drawbacks, the trained British soldiers andofficers were so superior in the field to the American levies on everyoccasion where the forces were not overwhelmingly unequal that it isimpossible for any but the most bigoted American partisan to deny thispossibility. Had there been a blockade, so that French and Dutch goodswould have been excluded; had General Howe possessed the faintest sparkof energy in following up his successes; had the North Cabinet notfailed to compel Howe to co-operate with Burgoyne, the condition ofthings in 1778 might well have been so serious for the colonists' causethat {96} Vergennes would have felt a French intervention to befruitless. In that case, it is hard to see how the rebellion couldhave failed to be crushed in the next year. As it was, the Americans, by luck and by the tenacity of Washington and a few other leaders, hadwon the first victory. 

CHAPTER V

FRENCH INTERVENTION AND BRITISH FAILURE, 1778-1781

During the two years of fighting, the party situation in England hadgrown increasingly bitter. The Whigs, joined now by young Charles Fox, unremittingly denounced the war as a crime, sympathized with therebels, and execrated the cruelty of the Ministers while deriding theirabilities. Parliament rang with vituperation; personal insults flewback and forth. From time to time Chatham took part in the attack, joining Burke and Fox in an opposition never surpassed for oratoricalpower. But the Ministerial party, secure in its strength, pushed onits way. The King now regarded the war as the issue {97} upon which hehad staked his personal honour, and would tolerate no faltering. Yetin the winter of 1778 the rumours of a French alliance thickened; and, when the probability seemed to be a certainty, North made a desperateeffort to end the war through a policy of granting everything exceptindependence. In a speech of incredible assurance, he observed that hehad never favoured trying to tax America, and brought in a Bill bywhich every parliamentary measure complained of by the Americans wasrepealed, and the right of internal taxation was expressly renounced. Amid the dejection of the Tories and the sneers of the Whigs, thismeasure became law, March 2, 1778; and commissioners, empowered togrant general amnesty, were sent with it to the United States. 

At no other time in English history would it have been possible for aMinistry thus utterly to reverse its policy and remain in office; butNorth's tenure depended on influences outside the House of Commons, andhe continued in his place. So severe was the crisis that an effort wasmade to arrange a coalition Ministry, with the aged Chatham at itshead; George III, however, positively refused to permit North tosurrender the first place. He would consent to Whigs entering theCabinet only in subordinate positions. This {98} obstinacy and thesudden death of Chatham blocked all coalition proposals, and left thewar to continue as a party measure, not national in its character--the"King's war. "

In America, the task of the commissioners proved hopeless. The men nowin control of the Continental Congress and the State governments werepledged to independence from the bottom of their souls; and in thecourse of months of appeals, and attempts at negotiations, thecommissioners failed to secure even a hearing. Congress ratified theFrench treaties with enthusiasm. That their proposal if made beforethe Declaration would have been successful can scarcely be doubted. Itmight even have produced an effect after 1776 had it been made by aWhig Ministry, headed by Chatham. But coming in 1778, after threeyears of war, when every vestige of the former sentiment of loyalty wasdead, and offered by the same North Ministry which had brought on therevolution, it was foredoomed to defeat. 

The war now entered upon a second phase, in which England found itselfharder pressed than at any time in its history. It had not an ally inthe world, and could count on no Rhine campaigns to exhaust Frenchresources. For the first time England engaged France in a purely navalwar; and for the only time France was sufficiently strong insail-of-the-line {99} to meet England on equal terms. The Frenchfleet, rebuilt since 1763, was in excellent condition; the Britishnavy, on the contrary, under the slack administration of Lord Sandwich, was worse off in equipment, repairs, number of sailors, and _esprit decorps_ than at any time in the century. The French were able to sendfleets unhindered wherever they wished; and when Spain entered as anally, in 1779, their combined navies swept the Channel, driving thehumiliated British fleet into port. England was called upon to makedefensive war at home, at Gibraltar, in the West Indies, and finally inIndia, at a time when the full strength of the country was alreadyoccupied with the rebellion. 

This led to an alteration of military methods in America. The policyof moving heavy armies was abandoned; and the British, forced towithdraw troops to garrison the West Indies and Florida, began thepractice of wearing down the revolted colonies by raids and destructionof property. George III especially approved this punitive policy. Asa first step, the army in Philadelphia marched back to New York, attacked on its retreat by Washington at Monmouth on June 27, 1778. The American advance was badly handled by General Lee, and fell backbefore the British; but Washington in person rallied his men, resumedthe attack, and held his position. {100} Clinton, who succeeded Howe, continued his march, and the British army now settled down in New York, not to depart from its safe protection except on raids. 

Washington accordingly posted his forces, as in 1777, outside the city, and awaited events. He could assume the offensive only in case aFrench fleet should assist him, and this happened but twice, in 1778, and not again for three years. The first time, Admiral D'Estaing witha strong fleet menaced New York and then Newport, the latter inconjunction with an American land force. But before each port he wasfoiled by the superior skill of Admiral Howe; and he finally withdrewwithout risking a battle, to the intense disgust of the Americans. Forthe rest, the war in the northern States dwindled to raids by theBritish along the Connecticut coast and into New Jersey, and outpostaffairs on the Hudson, in some of which Washington's Continental troopsshowed real brilliancy in attack. But with the British in command ofthe sea little could be done to meet the raids, and southernConnecticut was ravaged with fire and sword. 

At the same time, the States suffered the horrors of Indian war, sincethe Tories and British from Canada utilized the Iroquois and the OhioValley Indians as allies. The New York frontier was in continualdistress; {101} and the Pennsylvania and Maryland and Virginiasettlements felt the scalping knife and torch. Hamilton, the Britishcommander at the post of Detroit, paid a fixed price for scalps, andwas known as "the hair buyer. " Against the Iroquois, Sullivan led anexpedition in 1779 which could not bring the savages to a decisivebattle, although he ravaged their lands and crippled their resources. Against the north-western Indians, a daring Virginian, George RogersClark, led a counter-raid which captured several posts in the territorynorth of the Ohio River, and finally took Hamilton himself prisoner atVincennes. In every such war the sufferings of the settlersoutnumbered a hundred-fold all that they could inflict in return, andthis consciousness burned into their souls a lasting hatred of England, the ally of the murdering, torturing devils from the forests. 

While the British fleets fought indecisive actions in European waters, or near the West Indies, the British raiding policy was transferred toa new region, namely, the southern States, which thus far had knownlittle of the severities of war. In December, 1778, an expeditionunder Prevost easily occupied Savannah, driving the Georgia militiaaway. The next year an effort was made by an American force, incombination with the French fleet under D'Estaing, who returned from{102} the West Indies, to recapture the place. The siege was formed, and there appeared some prospects of a successful outcome, but theFrench admiral, too restless to wait until the completion of siegeoperations, insisted on trying to take the city by storm on October 9. The result was a complete repulse, after which D'Estaing sailed away, and the American besiegers were obliged to withdraw. The realinterests of the French were, in fact, in the West Indies, where theywere gradually capturing English islands; their contributions so far tothe American cause consisted in gifts of munitions and loans of money, together with numerous adventurous officers who aspired to lead theAmerican armies. The most amiable and attractive of these was theyoung Marquis de Lafayette, owing largely to whose influence a force ofFrench soldiers under de Rochambeau was sent in 1780 to America. Butfor months this force was able to do no more than remain in camp atNewport, Rhode Island, blockaded by the English fleet. 

In 1780, the British raiding policy was resumed in the southern Statesand achieved a startling success. In January, Clinton sailed from NewYork with a force of 8, 000 men, and after driving the American leviesinto the city of Charleston, South Carolina, besieged and took it onMay 12, with all its {103} defenders. He then returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis with a few troops to complete the conquest ofthe State. Congress now sent General Gates southward to repeat thetriumph of Saratoga. At Camden, on August 16, 1780, the issue wasdecided. The American commander, with only 3, 000 men, encounteredCornwallis, who had about 2, 200, and, as usual, the militia, whenattacked by British in the open field, fled for their lives at thefirst charge of the redcoats, leaving the few continentals to beoutnumbered and crushed. 

For a period of several weeks all organized American resistancedisappeared. Only bands of guerillas, or "partisans, " as they werecalled, kept the field. Clinton had issued a proclamation calling allloyalists to join the ranks; and Cornwallis made a systematic effort tocompel the enrolment of Tory militia. The plan bore fruit in anapparent large increase of British numbers, but also in the outbreak ofa murderous civil war. Raiding parties on both sides took toambuscades, nocturnal house-burning, hanging of prisoners, anddownright massacres. Pre-eminent for his success was the BritishColonel Tarleton, who with a body of light troops swept tirelesslyaround, breaking up rebel bands, riding down militia, and rendering hiscommand a terror to the {104} State. Marion, Sumter, and otherAmericans struggled vainly to equal his exploits. 

Occasional American successes could not turn back the tide. On October18, 1780, a band of Tories under General Ferguson ventured too far tothe westward, and at King's Mountain were surrounded and shot or takenprisoners by a general uprising of the frontiersmen. General Greene, who replaced Gates in December, managed to rally a few men, but darednot meet Cornwallis in the field. His lieutenant, Morgan, when pursuedby Tarleton, turned on him at the Cowpens, and on January 17 managed toinflict a severe defeat. The forces were diminutive--less than athousand on each side--but the battle was skilfully fought. After it, however, both Morgan and Greene were forced to fly northward, and didnot escape Cornwallis's pursuit until they were driven out of NorthCarolina. The State seemed lost, and on February 23, Cornwallis issueda proclamation calling upon all loyalists to join the royal forces. Meanwhile, encouraged by the striking successes in the Carolinas, Clinton sent a force under Arnold to Virginia, which marched unopposedthrough the seaboard counties of that State in the winter of 1781. Itseemed as though the new British policy were on the verge of a greattriumph. 

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By this time it was becoming a grave question whether the Americanrevolution was not going to collapse from sheer weakness. Theconfederation, as a general government, seemed to be on the verge ofbreaking down. The State governments, although badly hampered whereverBritish raids took place, were operating regularly and steadily, butthe only common government continued to be the voluntary ContinentalCongress, whose powers were entirely undefined, and rested, in fact, onsufferance. In 1776 a committee, headed by John Dickinson, draftedArticles of Confederation which, if adopted promptly, would haveprovided a regular form of government; but, although these weresubmitted in 1777 for ratification, inter-state jealousy sufficed toblock their acceptance. It was discovered that all those States which, by their original charters, were given no definite western boundaries, were disposed to claim an extension of their territory to theMississippi River. Virginia, through her general, Clark, actuallyoccupied part of the region claimed by her, and assumed to grant landsthere. The representatives of Maryland in Congress declared suchinequality a danger to the union, and refused to sign the Articlesunless the land claims west of the mountains were surrendered to thegeneral government. {106} This determination was formally approved bythe Maryland legislature in February, 1779, and matters remained at astandstill. At last, in 1780, Congress offered to hold any lands whichmight be granted to it, with the pledge to form them into States, and, following this, New York, and Virginia intimated a willingness to makethe required cessions. Then Maryland yielded and ratified theArticles, so that they came into operation on March 2, 1781. 

The self-styled "United States" had now travelled so far on the road tobankruptcy that the adoption of the "Articles of Perpetual Union"seemed scarcely more than an empty form. In the first place, thefederal finances were prostrate. The device of issuing paper money hadproved fatal, for, after a brief period, in 1775, the excessive issuesdepreciated in spite of every effort to hinder their decline byproclamations, price conventions, and political pressure. The only wayof sustaining such notes, namely, the furnishing by the States of afull and sufficient revenue, was never attempted; for the Statesthemselves preferred to issue notes, rather than to tax, and whencalled upon by the Continental Congress for requisitions they turnedover such amounts of paper as they saw fit. By 1780, the "continentalcurrency" was {107} practically worthless. Congress could rely onlyupon such small sums of money as it could raise by foreign loansthrough Franklin and by the contributions of a few patriotic people, notably Robert Morris. 

The maintenance of the army exhausted the resources of Congress, andevery winter saw the story of Valley Forge repeated. To securesupplies, Congress was driven to authorize seizure and impressment offood and payment in certificates of indebtedness. It was for thisreason, as well as from the unwillingness of the Americans to enlistfor the war, that the Continental forces dwindled to diminutive numbersin 1781. Nothing but Washington's tireless tenacity and loyalty heldthe army together, and kept the officers from resigning in disgust. Yet it seemed impossible that Washington himself could carry the burdenmuch longer. The general government appeared to be on the point ofdisintegrating, leaving to the separate States the task of defendingthemselves. Everywhere lassitude, preoccupation with local matters, adisposition to leave the war to the French, a willingness to let otherStates bear the burdens, replaced the fervour of 1776. In other words, the old colonial habits were reasserting themselves, and the separateStates, reverting to their former accustomed negative politics, were{108} behaving toward the Continental Congress precisely as they haddone toward England itself during the French wars. With hundreds ofthousands of men of fighting age in America it was impossible, in 1781, to collect more than a handful for service away from their homes. Theessentially unmilitary nature of the Americans was not to be changed. 

Fortunately for the rebels, the policy of Great Britain was such as togive them a lease of hope. In spite of the great British naval powerduring the first two years of the war, no blockade had been attempted;and after 1778 the British fleets were thoroughly occupied in followingand foiling the French. The result was that commerce of a sortcontinued throughout the war, armed privateers and merchantmenventuring from the New England and other ports, and trading withFrance, Spain and the West Indies. Hundreds were taken by Britishcruisers, but hundreds more continued their dangerous trade, and soAmerica continued to receive imports. The Dutch, especially, suppliedthe revolted colonies with some of the commodities which theirexclusion from British ports rendered scarce. So, except for papermoney, there was no economic distress. 

In 1781, when if ever the British might hope to reduce the colonies, the Empire was itself in sore straits for men to fill its ships and{109} garrison its forts. This made it difficult for England to sendany reinforcements to America, and left Clinton and Cornwallis withabout 27, 000 men to complete their raiding campaign. The task provedexcessive. In March, 1781, Greene, having assembled a small force, gave battle to Cornwallis at Guilford Court House. The little army ofBritish veterans, only 2, 219 in all, drove Greene from the field aftera stiff fight, but were so reduced in numbers that Cornwallis feltobliged to retreat to Wilmington on the coast, where he was entirelyout of the field of campaign. On April 25 he marched northward intoVirginia to join the force which had been there for several months, took command, and continued the policy of marching and destroying. Before his arrival, Washington had tried to use the French force atNewport against the Virginia raiders; but the French squadron, althoughit ventured from port in March, 1781, and had a successful encounterwith a British fleet, declined to push on into the Chesapeake, and theplan was abandoned. Cornwallis was able to march unhindered by anyFrench danger during the summer of 1781. 

But while the British were terrifying Virginia and chasing militia, theforces left in the Carolinas were being worn down by {110} Greene andhis "partisan" allies. On April 25, at Hobkirk's Hill, Rawdon, theBritish commander defeated Greene, and then, with reduced ranks, retreated. During the summer, further sieges and raids recapturedBritish posts, and on September 8 another battle took place at EutawSprings. This resulted, as usual, in a British success on thebattlefield and a retreat afterwards. By October, the slender Britishforces in the southernmost States were cooped up in Charleston andSavannah, and a war of extermination was stamping out all organizedTory resistance. The raiding policy had failed through weakness ofnumbers. The superior fighting ability and tactical skill ofCornwallis, Rawdon, Stuart, and Tarleton were as obvious as the courageand steadiness of their troops; but their means were pitifullyinadequate to the task assigned them. 

Further north, a still greater failure took place. Washington was notdeterred by the futile outcome of his previous attempts to use Frenchco-operation from making a patient and urgent effort to induce DeGrasse, the French admiral in the West Indies, to come north and joinwith him and Rochambeau in an attack on Cornwallis in Virginia. He wasat last successful; and on August 28 the wished-for fleet, {111} apowerful collection of twenty-eight sail-of-the-line, with frigates, reached Chesapeake Bay. Already the French troops from Newport, andpart of the American army from outside New York, had begun theirsouthward march, carefully concealing their purposes from Clinton, andwere moving through Pennsylvania. As a third part of the combination, the French squadron from Newport put to sea, bringing eight moresail-of-the-line, which, added to De Grasse's, would overmatch anyBritish fleet on the western side of the Atlantic. 

The one disturbing possibility was that the British West India fleet, which very properly had sailed in pursuit, might defeat the two Frenchfleets singly. This chance was put to the test on September 5. Onthat day Admiral Graves, with nineteen men-of-war, attacked De Grasse, who brought twenty-four into line outside Chesapeake Bay; and thedecisive action of the Revolution took place. Seldom has a greaterstake been played for by a British fleet, and seldom has a naval battlebeen less successfully managed. Graves may have intended toconcentrate upon part of the French line, but his subordinatescertainly failed to understand any such purpose; and the outcome wasthat the head of the British column, approaching the French line at{112} an angle, was severely handled, while the rear took no part inthe battle. The fleets separated without decisive result, and theBritish, after cruising a few days irresolutely, gave up and returnedto New York. The other French squadron had meanwhile arrived, and theallied troops had come down the Chesapeake. Cornwallis, shut up inYorktown by overwhelming forces, defended himself until October 17, andthen surrendered with 8, 000 men to the man who had beaten him yearsbefore at Trenton and Princeton. Clinton, aware at last of his danger, sailed with every vessel he could scrape together, and approached thebay on October 24 with twenty-five sail-of-the-line and 7, 000 men; butit was too late. He could only retreat to New York, where he remainedin the sole British foothold north of Charleston and Savannah. 

Washington would have been glad to retain De Grasse and undertakefurther combined manoeuvres; but the French admiral was anxious toreturn to the West Indies, and so the military operations of the yearended. More was in reality unnecessary, for the collapse of theBritish military policy was manifest, and the surrender of Cornwalliswas a sufficiently striking event to bring the war to a close. Washington had not won the last fight with his own {113} Continentals. The co-operation not only of the French fleet but of the French troopsunder Rochambeau had played the decisive part. Yet it was hisplanning, his tenacity, his personal authority with French andAmericans that determined the combined operation and made itsuccessful. In the midst of a half-starved, ill-equipped army, adisintegrating, bankrupt government, and a people whose fighting spiritwas rapidly dwindling, it was he with his officers who had saved theRevolution at the last gasp. 

It was no less the British mismanagement which made this possible, forhad not Howe, by delays, thrown away his chances; had not Howe andBurgoyne and Clinton and Cornwallis, by their failures to co-operate, made it possible for their armies to be taken separately; had not thenavy omitted to apply a blockade; had not the Ministry, in prescribinga raiding policy, failed to strain every nerve to furnish an adequatesupply of men, the outcome would have been different. As it was, theBritish defeat could no longer be concealed by the end of 1781. Theattempt to conquer America had failed. 

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CHAPTER VI

BRITISH PARTIES AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, 1778-1783

When the news of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown reachedEngland, it was recognized by Whigs and Tories alike that the time hadcome to admit the failure of the war. The loss of 7, 000 troops was notin itself a severe blow, at a time when England had over 200, 000 menunder arms in various parts of the world; but it actually marked thebreakdown of the American campaign, and, what was still moresignificant, the political bankruptcy of the North Ministry. Eversince 1778, the tide had been rising against the royal policy. Atfirst, when the French war began, the nation rallied against theancient foe and there was some enthusiasm displayed in recruiting andfurnishing supplies; but, as general after general returned fromAmerica--first Burgoyne, then Howe and his brother, the admiral, --torise in Parliament and denounce the administrative incompetence whichhad foiled their efforts; as month after month passed and no victoryeither in America or Europe came to cheer the public; worst of all, when, in 1779, and again in 1780, combined French and Spanish fleetsswept the Channel {115} in overpowering numbers, driving the Englishfleet into Torbay harbour--the war spirit dwindled, and bittercriticism took its place. 

The Whig Opposition, no longer hampered by having the defence of therevolted colonists as their sole issue, denounced in unmeasuredlanguage the incompetence, corruption, and despotism of the NorthMinistry, singling out Sandwich, at the Admiralty, and Germaine, Secretary for the Colonies, as objects for especial invective. Partyhatred festered in army and navy, Whig and Tory admirals distrustingeach other and engaging in bitter quarrels, Whig and Tory generalscriticizing one another's plans and motives. On his part, Lord Northfelt, as early as 1779, that his task was hopeless, and soughtrepeatedly to resign; but in spite of secessions from the Ministry, inspite of defeats and humiliations such as the control by the allies ofthe Channel, nothing could shake George's determination. He wouldnever consent to abandon the colonies or permit North to surrender tothe detested Whigs. 

In 1780, the Opposition, led by Fox and Burke, began to direct its fireat the King himself; and finally, in March of that year, they had thesatisfaction of carrying in the Commons, by votes of men who once hadbeen on the administration side, a resolution to the effect that "thepower of the Crown {116} has increased, is increasing, and ought to bediminished. " This was carried, by 283 votes to 215, in a House wherefour years before the total Opposition mustered only a hundred. Measures to cut down sinecures, to limit the secret service fund, totake away opportunities for royal corruption, were introduced by Burkeand, although defeated, drew large votes. 

The tenacious politician who wore the crown was not yet beaten. In thesummer of 1780, the disgraceful Gordon riots broke out in London; andthe King, by his courageous personal bearing and bold direction ofaffairs, won momentary prestige. The news from America, moreover, wasbrighter than for a long time, and the British defence of Gibraltar wasunshaken. Suddenly dissolving Parliament, the King employed everyresource of influence or pressure, and managed to secure once more amajority in the House of Commons. During the year 1781, the NorthMinistry breathed more freely, and was able to repel Whig attacks bysafe majorities. But the respite was short. 

In the winter session of 1782, the news of Yorktown shook the Ministryto its centre, and on top of that came the reports of the surrender ofMinorca, St. Kitts, and Nevis. Held together only by the inflexibledetermination of George III never to yield American {117} independenceor "stoop to opposition, " the Ministers fought bitterly thoughdespairingly against a succession of Whig motions, censuring theAdmiralty, demanding the withdrawal of the troops, and finallycensuring the Ministry. Majorities dwindled as rats began to leave thesinking ship. On March 8, North escaped censure by ten votes only. The King made repeated efforts to induce members of the Opposition tocome into some sort of coalition, but the hatred was too fierce, thedivergence of principle too wide. Rockingham would accept onlyabsolute surrender. On March 15, a resolution of want of confidencewas lost by nine only. 

Five days later, in face of a renewed motion of the same kind, Northannounced his resignation. The end had come. The system of George IIIhad broken down, ruined by the weaknesses of the Tory Cabinet inadministration, in war, and in diplomacy, the most disastrous Ministryin the history of England. There was no possible doubt as to thesignificance of the collapse, for Lord Rockingham took office with aWhig Cabinet, containing Shelburne and Fox, steadfast friends ofAmerica, as Secretaries of State, and with the avowed purpose ofconceding independence to the former colonies, while maintaining thecontest with Spain and France. 

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Interest now shifted from the battlefield to the regions of diplomacy, where the situation was complicated and delicate, owing to the unusualrelations of the parties involved. The United States and France werein alliance, each pledged not to make a separate peace. Spain was inalliance with France for the purpose of recovering Gibraltar, Minorca, and Florida, but was not in any alliance with the United States. TheFrench government, tied thus to two allies, recognized the possiblecontingency of diverging interests between Spain and the United States, and exerted all the influence it could to keep diplomatic control inits own hands. This it accomplished through its representatives inAmerica, especially de la Luzerne, who wielded an immense prestige withthe members of the Continental Congress, not only through his positionas representative of the power whose military, naval, and financial aidwas absolutely indispensable, but also by means of personal intriguesof a type hitherto more familiar in European courts than in simpleAmerica. Under his direction, Congress authorized its Europeanrepresentatives, Franklin, Jay, and Adams, accredited to France, Spain, and the Netherlands respectively, to act as peace commissioners and tobe guided in all things by the advice and consent of the FrenchMinister, {119} Vergennes. Their instructions designated boundaries, indemnity for ravages and for the taking of slaves, and a possiblecession of Canada, but all were made subject to French approval. When, accordingly, in 1781, both Shelburne and Fox of the Rockingham Ministrysought to open negotiations with the American representatives, whilepushing on vigorously the war against France and Spain, theyinterjected an embarrassing element into the situation. Vergennescould not prohibit American negotiation, but he relied upon theinstructions of the commissioners to enable him to prevent the makingof any separate peace, contrary to the treaty of 1778. 

The first steps were taken by Franklin and Shelburne, who openedunofficial negotiations through Richard Oswald, a friend of America. It seems to have been Shelburne's plan to avoid the preliminaryconcession of independence, hoping to retain some form of connectionbetween America and England, or at least to use independence as amake-weight in the negotiations. Hence Oswald, his agent, was notcommissioned to deal with the United States as such. Fox, Secretaryfor Foreign Affairs, felt, on the other hand, that the negotiationbelonged to his field, and he sent Thomas Grenville to Paris, authorized to deal with France {120} and, indirectly, with the UnitedStates. Over this difference in the Cabinet, and over other matters, an acute personal rivalry developed between Fox and Shelburne, whichculminated when Rockingham died in July, 1782. George III, who muchpreferred Shelburne to Fox, asked him to form a Ministry, and upon hisacceptance Fox, absolutely refusing to serve under him, withdrew fromthe Cabinet, carrying his friends with him. Thus the triumphant Whigparty was split within a few months after its victory. The wholeresponsibility now rested on Shelburne. 

Meanwhile, a new situation had developed in Paris, for Jay and Adams, the other two commissioners, had brought about a change in the Americanpolicy. Franklin, deeply indebted to the French court and on the bestof terms with Vergennes, was willing to credit him with good intentionsand was ready to accept his advice to negotiate with England under thevague terms of Oswald's commission; but Jay, who had had a mortifyingexperience in Spain, suspected treachery and insisted that Englandmust, in opening negotiations, fully recognize American independence. He was sure that Spain would gladly see the United States shut in tothe Atlantic coast away from Spanish territory, and he felt certain{121} that Vergennes was under Spanish influence. Adams, who knewnothing of Spain, but distrusted the French on general principles, sided with Jay; and Franklin, submitting to his colleagues, agreed to acurious diplomatic manoeuvre. Jay sent to Shelburne a secret message, urging him to deal separately with the United States under a propercommission and not seek to play into the hands of Spain and France. Heknew that a French emissary had visited Shelburne, and he dreadedFrench double-dealing, especially on the question of boundaries andfishery rights. 

The British Prime Minister was in the odd position of being appealed toby one of the three hostile powers to save it from the other two; butunderlying the situation was the fact that Shelburne, as a Whig sincethe beginning of the American quarrel, was committed to a friendlypolicy toward America. He knew, moreover, that when Parliament shouldmeet he must expect trouble from Fox and the dissatisfied Whigs, aswell as the Tories, and he was anxious to secure a treaty as soon aspossible. So yielding, on September 27, he gave Oswald the requiredcommission, but, suspecting that he was rather too complaisant, sentHenry Strachey to assist him. During the summer, Franklin and Oswald, in informal {122} discussions, had already eliminated various matters, so that when negotiations formally opened it took not over five weeksto agree upon a draft treaty. 

During all this time the Americans violated their instructions byfailing to consult Vergennes. Here Franklin was again overruled by Jayand Adams, whose antipathy to French and Spanish influence wasinsuperable. It does not appear that Vergennes had any definiteintention to work against American boundaries or fishery rights; butthere can be no doubt that Rayneval and Marbois, two of his agents, committed themselves openly in a sense unfavourable to American claims, and it is likely that, had the negotiations taken place under hiscontrol, the outcome would have been delayed in every way in order toallow France to keep its contract with Spain, whose attacks onGibraltar were pushed all through the summer. As it was, thenegotiators managed to agree on a treaty of peace which reflected theWhig principles of Shelburne and the skill and pertinacity of the threeAmericans. Little trouble was encountered over boundaries, Shelburneceding everything east of the Mississippi and north of Florida, anddesignating as a boundary between the United States and Canada in partthe same line as that in the Proclamation of 1763, from the {123} St. Croix River to the eastward of Maine, to the Great Lakes and thencewestward by a system of waterways to the headwaters of the Mississippi. At the especial urgence of Adams, whose Massachusetts constituents drewmuch of their wealth from the Newfoundland fisheries, the right ofcontinuing this pursuit was comprised in the treaty, together with theright to land and dry fish on unoccupied territories in Labrador andNova Scotia. As a possible make-weight, the navigation of theMississippi was guaranteed to citizens of both the United States andGreat Britain. 

The chief difficulty arose over the question of the treatment ofAmerican loyalists and the payment of British debts which had beenconfiscated in every colony. Shelburne insisted that there must berestoration of civil rights, compensation for damages, and a pledgeagainst any future confiscations or disfranchisements for loyalists, and also demanded a provision for the payment of all debts due toBritish creditors. Here the negotiation hung in a long deadlock, forFranklin, Adams, and Jay were unanimously determined to concede nocompensation for individuals whom they hated as traitors; while theBritish negotiators felt bound in honour not to abandon the men who hadlost all and suffered every indignity and {124} humiliation as apenalty for their loyalty. At length, progress was made when Adamssuggested that the question of British debts be separated from that ofTory compensation; so a clause was agreed upon guaranteeing the fullpayment of bona fide debts heretofore contracted. 

Finally, after Franklin had raised a counter-claim for damages due towhat he called the "inhuman burnings" of the British raids since 1778, it was agreed to insert a clause against any future confiscations orprosecutions of loyalists and to add that Congress should "earnestlyrecommend" to the States the restoration of loyalists' estates and therepealing of all laws against them. At the time the commissioners drewup this article, they must have known that the Congress of the UnitedStates had no power to enforce the treaty, and that any suchrecommendations, however "earnest, " would carry no weight with thethirteen communities controlled by embittered rebels, who rememberedevery Tory, alive or dead, with execration. Nevertheless, it offered away of escape, and the British representative signed, on November 30, 1782. The great contest was at an end. 

When Franklin revealed to Vergennes that, unknown to the French court, the American commissioners had agreed on a {125} draft treaty, theFrench minister was somewhat indignant at the trick, and communicatedhis displeasure to his agent in America. This induced the easilyworried Congress to instruct Livingston, the Secretary for ForeignAffairs, to write a letter censuring the commissioners; but, althoughJay and Adams were hotly indignant at such servility, the matter endedthen and there. Vergennes's displeasure was momentary, and the Frenchpolicy continued as before. The European war was, in fact, wearing toits end. Already, in April, 1782, Admiral Rodney had inflicted a sharpdefeat on De Grasse, capturing five of his vessels, including theflagship with the admiral himself. This, together with the extremeinefficiency of the Spanish fleet, put an end to the hope of furtherFrench gains in the West Indies. Before Gibraltar, also, the alliedfleet of forty-eight vessels did not dare to risk a general engagementwith a British relieving fleet of thirty, and when in September, 1782, a final bombardment was attempted, the batteries from the fort provedtoo strong for their assailants. The allies felt that they hadaccomplished all they could hope to, and agreed to terms of peace onJanuary 20, 1783. France gained little beyond sundry West IndiaIslands, but Spain profited to the extent of {126} regaining Minorcaand also Florida. It was at best a defeat for England, and the WhigMinistry, which carried it through, was unable to prevent such anoutcome. 

The American peace was made the pretext for Shelburne's fall, since acoalition of dissatisfied Whigs and Tories united in March, 1783, tocensure it, thereby turning out the Ministry. But, although Foxregained control of diplomatic matters and made some slight movestoward reopening negotiations, he had no serious intention ofdisturbing Shelburne's work, and the provisional treaty was madedefinitive on September 3, 1783--the day on which the French treaty wassigned. Thus the Americans technically kept to the terms of theiralliance with France in agreeing not to make a separate peace, but as amatter of fact hostilities had entirely ceased in America sinceJanuary, 1783, and practically since the fall of the North Ministry. The British had remained quietly in New York and Charleston, withdrawing from all other points, and Washington with his small armystood at Newburg-on-the-Hudson. In October, 1783, the last Britishwithdrew, taking with them into exile thousands of Tories who did notdare to remain to test the value of the clauses in the treaty of peaceintended to protect them. So the last traces of the long contestdisappeared, {127} and the United States entered upon its career. 

The treaty, as must have been foreseen by the commissioners themselves, remained a dead letter so far as the Tories were concerned. Congressperformed its part and gave the promised recommendation, but the Statespaid no heed. The loyalists were not restored to civil or propertyrights. The plain provision of the treaty prohibiting furtherlegislation against loyalists was defied in several States, andadditional disqualifications were placed upon those who dared to remainin the country. The provision regarding the payment of debts remainedunfulfilled, since there was no mechanism provided in the treatythrough which the article could be enforced. Only from the Britishgovernment could the Tories receive any recompense for theirsufferings, and there they were in part relieved. Very many receivedgrants of land in Canada, where they formed a considerable part of thepopulation in several districts. More went to New Brunswick and NovaScotia to receive similar grants. Others spent their days in Englandas unhappy pensioners, forgotten victims of a war which all Englishmensought to bury in oblivion. Those who remained in the United Statesultimately regained standing and fared better than the exiles, but notuntil new {128} domestic issues had arisen to obliterate the memory ofrevolutionary antagonisms. 

With the Treaty of 1782, the mother country and the former coloniesdefinitely started on separate paths, recognizing the fundamentaldifferences which for fifty years had made harmonious co-operationimpossible. England remained as before, aristocratic in socialstructure, oligarchic in government, military and naval in temper--aland of strongly fixed standards of religious and political life, acountry where society looked to a narrow circle for leadership. Itscommercial and economic ideals, unaltered by defeat, persisted to guidenational policy in peace and war for two more generations. The soleresult of the war for England was to render impossible in future anysuch perversion of Cabinet government as that which George III, byintimidation, fraud, and political management, had succeeded for adecade in establishing. Never again would the country tolerate royaldictation of policies and leaders. England became what it had beenbefore 1770, a country where parliamentary groups and leaders bore theresponsibility and gained the glory or discredit, while the outsidepublic approved or protested without seeking in any other manner tocontrol the destinies of the State. While the English thus sullenlyfell back into their {129} accustomed habits, the former Colonies, nowrelieved from the old-time subordination, were turned adrift to solveproblems of a wholly different sort. 

CHAPTER VII

THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1781-1798

The British colonists, who assumed independent legal existence with theadoption of Articles of Confederation in 1781, had managed to carrythrough a revolution and emerge into the light of peace. They were nowrequired to learn, in the hard school of experience, those necessaryfacts of government which they had hitherto ignored, and which, even inthe agonies of civil war, they had refused to recognize. 

Probably with three-quarters of the American people, the prevailingpolitical sentiment was that of aversion to any governmental control, coupled with a deep-rooted jealousy and distrust of all officials, eventhose chosen by and dependent upon themselves. Their political idealscontemplated {130} the government of each colony chiefly by the electedrepresentatives of the voters, who should meet annually to legislateand tax, and then, having defined the duties of the few permanentofficers in such a way as to leave them little or no discretion, shoulddissolve, leaving the community to run itself until the next annualsession. Authority of any kind was to them an object of traditionaldread, even when exercised by their own agents. The early Stateconstitutions concentrated all power in the legislature, leaving theexecutive and judicial officials little to do but execute the laws. The only discretionary powers enjoyed by governors were in connectionwith military affairs. 

In establishing the Articles of Confederation the statesmen of theContinental Congress had no intention of creating in any sense agoverning body. All that the Congress could do was to decide upon warand peace, make treaties, decide upon a common military establishment, and determine the sums to be contributed to the common treasury. Thesematters, moreover, called for an affirmative vote of nine States ineach case. There was no federal executive or judiciary, nor anyprovision for enforcing the votes of the Congress. To carry out anysingle thing committed by the Articles to the Congress, and duly voted, required the {131} positive co-operation of the State legislatures, whowere under no other compulsion than their sense of what the situationcalled for and of what they could afford to do. 

Things were, in short, just where the colonists would have been glad tohave them before the Revolution--with the objectionable provincialexecutives removed, all coercive authority in the central governmentabolished, and the legislatures left to their own absolute discretion. In other words, the average American farmer or trader of the day feltthat the Revolution had been fought to get rid of all government butone directly under the control of the individual voters of the States. Typical of such were men like Samuel Adams of Massachusetts and PatrickHenry of Virginia. They had learned their politics in the periodbefore the Revolution, and clung to the old colonial spirit, whichregarded normal politics as essentially defensive and anti-governmental. 

On the other hand, there were a good many individuals in the countrywho recognized that the triumph of the colonial ideal was responsiblefor undeniable disasters. Such men were found, especially, among thearmy officers and among those who had tried to aid the cause indiplomatic or civil office during the Revolution. Experience made themrealize that the practical abolition of all {132} executive authorityand the absence of any real central government had been responsible forchronic inefficiency. The financial collapse, the lack of any power onthe part of Congress to enforce its laws or resolutions, the visibledanger that State legislatures might consult their own convenience insupporting the common enterprises or obligations--all theseshortcomings led men like Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Webster, apamphleteer of New England, to urge even before 1781 that a genuinegovernment should be set up to replace the mere league. Theirsupporters were, however, few, and confined mainly to those merchantsor capitalists who realized the necessity of general laws and a generalauthority. It is scarcely conceivable that the inherited prejudices ofmost Americans in favour of local independence could have beenoverborne had not the Revolution been followed by a series of publicdistresses, which drove to the side of the strong-governmentadvocates--temporarily, as it proved--a great number of American voters. 

When hostilities ended, the people of the United States entered upon aperiod of economic confusion. In the first place, trade wasdisorganized, since the old West India markets were lost and theprivileges formerly enjoyed under the Navigation Acts were terminatedby the separation of the {133} countries. American shippers could notat once discover in French or other ports an equivalent for the formertriangular trade. In the second place, British manufacturers andexporters rushed to recover their American market, and promptly put outof competition the American industries which had begun to developduring the war. Specie, plentiful for a few months, now flowed rapidlyout of the country, since American merchants were no longer able to buyBritish goods by drawing on West India credits. At the same time, withthe arrival of peace, the State courts resumed their functions, andgeneral liquidation began; while the State legislatures, in the effortto adjust war finances, imposed what were felt to be high taxes. Theresult was a general complaint of hard times, poverty, and insufficientmoney. Some States made efforts to retaliate against Great Britain bytariffs and navigation laws, but this only damaged their own ports bydriving British Trade to their neighbours'. Congress could afford nohelp, since it had no power of commercial regulation. 

The effect upon the working of the Confederation showed that a majorityof Americans had learned nothing from all their experiences, for theState legislatures declined to furnish to the central government any{134} more money than they felt to be convenient, regardless of thefact that without their regular support the United States was certainto become bankrupt. Robert Morris was appointed Financier in 1871, andtook energetic steps to introduce order into the mass of loancertificates, foreign loans, certificates of indebtedness, andmountains of paper currency; but one unescapable fact stood in his way, that the States felt under no obligation to pay their quotas ofexpenses. In spite of his urgent appeals, backed by resolutions ofCongress, the government revenues remained too scanty to pay even theinterest on the debt. Morris resigned in disgust in 1784; and hissuccessors, a committee of Congress, found themselves able to donothing more than confess bankruptcy. The people of the States felttoo poor to support their federal government, and, what was more, feltno responsibility for its fate. 

Without revenue, it naturally followed that the Congress of theConfederation accomplished practically nothing. As will be shownlater, it could secure no treaties of any importance, since itsimpotence to enforce them was patent. It managed to disband theremaining troops with great difficulty and only under the danger ofmutiny, a danger so great that it took all of {135} Washington'spersonal influence to prevent an uprising at Newburg in March, 1783. For the rest, its leaders, men often of high ability--Hamilton, Madison, King of Massachusetts, Sherman of Connecticut--foundthemselves helpless. Naturally they appealed to the States foradditional powers and submitted no less than three amendments: first, in 1781, a proposal to permit Congress to levy and collect a five percent. Duty on imports; then, in 1783, a plan by which certain specificduties were to be collected by State officers and turned over to thegovernment; and finally, in 1784, a request that Congress be givenpower to exclude vessels of nations which would not make commercialtreaties. No one of these succeeded, although the first plan failed ofunanimous acceptance by one State only. The legislatures recognizedthe need, but dreaded to give any outside power whatever authoritywithin their respective boundaries. While those who advocated theseamendments kept reiterating the positive necessity for some means toavert national disgrace and bankruptcy, their opponents, reverting tothe language of 1775, declared it incompatible with "liberty" that anyauthority other than the State's should be exercised in a State'sterritory. By 1787, it was clear that any hope of specific amendmentswas vain. Unanimity from {136} thirteen legislatures was not to belooked for. 

On the other hand, where the States chose to act they producedimportant results. The cessions of western lands, which had beenexacted by Maryland as her price for ratifying the Articles, werecarried out by New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia untilthe title to all territory west of Pennsylvania and north of the Ohiowas with the Confederation. Then, although nothing in the Articlesauthorized such action, Congress, in 1787, adopted an Ordinanceestablishing a plan for settling the new lands. After a period ofprovincial government, substantially identical with that of thecolonies, the region was to be divided into States and admitted intothe union, under the terms of an annexed "compact" which prohibitedslavery and guaranteed civil rights. But where the States did notco-operate, confusion reigned. Legislatures imposed such tariffs asthey saw fit, which led to actual inter-State commercialdiscriminations between New York and its neighbours. Connecticut andPennsylvania wrangled over land claims. The inhabitants of theterritory west of New Hampshire set up a State government under thename of Vermont, and successfully maintained themselves against theState of New York, {137} which had a legal title to the soil, while thefrontier settlers in North Carolina were prevented only by inferiornumbers from carrying through a similar secession. 

Finally, in the years 1785-7, the number of those who found theunrestrained self-government of the separate States another name foranarchy was enormously increased by a sudden craze for paper money, "tender" laws, and "stay" laws which swept the country. The poorerclasses, especially the farmers, denounced the courts as agents of therich, clamoured for more money to permit the easy payment ofobligations, and succeeded in compelling more than half of the Statesto pass laws hindering the collection of debts and emitting bills ofcredit, which promptly depreciated. Worse remained. In New Hampshire, armed bands tried to intimidate the legislature; and in Massachusettsthe rejection of such laws brought on actual insurrection. Farmersassembled under arms, courts were broken up, and a sharp little civilwar, known as Shays' Rebellion, was necessary before the Stategovernment could re-establish order. 

In these circumstances, a sudden strong reaction against mob rule anduntrammelled democracy ran through the country, swinging all men ofproperty and law-abiding habits powerfully in favour of the demand{138} for a new, genuinely authoritative, national government, able tocompel peace and good order. So the leaders of the reform partystruck; and at a meeting of Annapolis in October, 1786, summonedoriginally to discuss the problem of navigating the Potomac River, theyissued a call for a convention of delegates from all the States to meetat Philadelphia in May, 1787, for the purpose of recommendingprovisions "intended to render the federal government adequate to theexigencies of the Union. " This movement, reversing the current ofAmerican history, gained impetus in the winter of 1787. Congressseconded the call; and, after Virginia had shown the way by nominatingits foremost men as delegates, the other States fell into line and sentrepresentatives--all but Rhode Island, which was the scene of an orgyof paper-money tyranny, and would take no part in any such meeting. 

Of the fifty-five men present at the Philadelphia convention, not morethan half-a-dozen were of the old colonial type, which clung toindividual State independence as the palladium of liberty. All theothers felt that the time had come to lay the most thoroughgoinglimitations upon the States, with the express purpose of preventing anyfuture repetition of the existing inter-State wrangles, and especiallyof the financial {139} abuses of the time; and they were ready to gainthis end by entrusting large powers to the central government. Theydivided sharply, however, on one important point, namely, whether theincreased powers were to be exercised by a government similar to theexisting one, or by something wholly new and far more centralized; andover this question the convention ran grave danger of breaking up. 

Discussion began in June, 1787, behind closed doors, with a draft planagreed upon by the Virginia members as the working project. This was abold scheme, calling for the creation of a single great State, relyingon the people for its authority, superior to the existing States, andable, if necessary, to coerce them; in reality, a fusion of the UnitedStates into a single commonwealth. In opposition to this, therepresentatives of the smaller States--Delaware, New Jersey, Marylandand Connecticut--aided by the conservative members from New York, announced that they would never consent to any plan which did notsafeguard the individuality and equality of their States; and, althoughthe Virginia plan commanded a majority of those present, its supporterswere obliged to permit a compromise in order to prevent an angrydissolution of the convention. In keeping with a suggestion of the{140} Connecticut members, it was agreed that one House of the proposedlegislature should contain an equal representation of the States, whilethe other should be based on population. 

The adoption of this compromise put an end to the danger of disruption, for all but a few irreconcilables were now ready to co-operate; and inthe course of a laborious session a final draft was hammered out, withpatchings, changes, and additional compromises to safeguard theinterests of the plantation States in the institution of slavery. 

When the convention adjourned, it placed before the people of America adocument which was a novelty in the field of government. In part, itaimed to establish a great State, on the model of the American States, which in turn derived their features from the colonial governments. Ithad a Congress of two Houses, an executive with independent powers, anda judiciary authorized to enforce the laws of the United States. Congress was given full and exclusive power over commerce, currency, war and peace, and a long list of enumerated activities involvinginter-State questions, and was authorized to pass all laws necessaryand proper to the carrying out of any of the powers named in theconstitution. Further, the constitution, the federal laws, andtreaties were declared to be the supreme {141} law of the land, anything in a State law or constitution notwithstanding. In addition, the States were expressly forbidden to enter the fields reserved to thefederal government, and were prohibited from infringing the rights ofproperty. On the other hand, the new government could not existwithout the co-operation of the States in providing for the election ofelectors, --to choose a president--of senators, and of congressmen. Itwas a new creation, a federal State. 

There now followed a sharp and decisive contest to gain the necessaryratification by nine commonwealths. At first, the advocates of stronggovernment, by a rapid campaign, secured the favourable votes ofhalf-a-dozen States in quick succession; but when it came the turn ofNew York, Massachusetts, and Virginia, the conservative, localisticinstincts of the farmers and older people were roused to make astrenuous resistance. The "Federalists, " as the advocates of the newgovernment termed themselves, had to meet charges that the proposedscheme would crush the liberties of the State, reduce them to ciphers, and set up an imitation of the British monarchy. But, by the eagerurging of the foremost lawyers and most influential men of the day, thetide was turned and ratification carried, although with the utmostdifficulty, and usually with {142} the recommendation of amendments toperfect the constitution. In June, 1788, the contest ended; and, although Rhode Island and North Carolina remained unreconciled, theother eleven States proceeded to set up the new government. 

In the winter of 1789, in accordance with a vote of the Congress of theConfederation, the States chose electors and senators, and the peoplevoted for representatives. But one possible candidate existed for thepresidency, namely, the hero of the Revolutionary War; and accordinglyWashington received the unanimous vote of the whole electoral college. With him, John Adams was chosen vice-president, by a much smallermajority. The Congress, which slowly assembled, was finally able tocount and declare the votes, the two officers were inaugurated, and thenew government was ready to assume its functions. 

There followed a period of rapid and fundamental legislation. In thenew Congress were a body of able men, by far the greater number of themzealous to establish a strong authoritative government, and to completethe victory of the Federalists. The defeated States' Rights men nowstood aside, watching their conquerors carry their plan to itsconclusion. Led for the most part by James Madison of the House, {143}Congress passed Acts creating executive departments with federalofficials; establishing a full independent federal judiciary, residentin every State, with a supreme court above all; imposing a tariff forrevenue and for protection to American industries, and appropriatingmoney to settle the debts of the late confederation. In addition, itframed and submitted to the States a series of constitutionalamendments whose object was to meet Anti-federalist criticisms bysecuring the individual against oppression from the federal government. When Congress adjourned in September, 1789, after its first session, ithad completed a thoroughgoing political revolution. In place of aloose league of entirely independent States, there now existed agenuine national government, able to enforce its will upon individualsand to perform all the functions of any State. 

That the American people, with their political inheritance, should haveconsented even by a small majority to abandon their traditional laxgovernment, remains one of the most remarkable political decisions inhistory. It depended upon the concurrence of circumstances which, forthe moment, forced all persons of property and law-abiding instincts tojoin together in all the States to remedy an intolerable situation. {144} The leaders, as might be expected, were a different race ofstatesmen, on the whole, from those who had directed events prior to1776. Washington and Franklin favoured the change; but Richard HenryLee and Patrick Henry were eager opponents, Samuel Adams wasunfriendly, and Thomas Jefferson, in Paris, was unenthusiastic. Themain work was done by Hamilton, Madison, John Marshall, GouverneurMorris, Fisher Ames--men who were children in the days of the StampAct. The old agitators and revolutionists were superseded by a newtype of politicians, whose interests lay in government, not opposition. 

But the fundamental American instincts were not in reality changed;they had only ebbed for the moment. No sooner did Congress meet in itssecond session in January, 1790, and undertake the task of reorganizingthe chaotic finances of the country, than political unanimity vanished, and new sectional and class antagonisms came rapidly to the front inwhich could be traced the return of the old-time colonial habits. Thecentral figure was no longer Madison, but Hamilton, Secretary of theTreasury, who aspired to be a second William Pitt, and submitted anelaborate scheme for refunding the entire American debt. In addition, he called for an excise tax, and {145} later recommended the charteringof a National Bank to serve the same function in America that the Bankof England performed in Great Britain. 

Daring, far-sighted, based on the methods of English financiers, Hamilton's plans bristled with points certain to arouse antagonism. Heproposed to refund and pay the debt at its face value to actualholders, regardless of the fact that the nearly worthless federal stockand certificates of indebtedness had fallen into the hands ofspeculators; he recommended that the United States should assume, fund, and pay the war debt of the States, disregarding the fact that, whilesome States were heavily burdened, others had discharged theirobligations. He urged an excise tax on liquors, although such aninternal tax was an innovation in America and was certain to stirintense opposition; he suggested the chartering of a powerful bank, inspite of the absence of any clause in the constitution authorizing suchaction. Hamilton was, in fact, a great admirer of the Englishconstitution and political system, and he definitely intended tostrengthen the new government by making it the supreme financial powerand enlisting in its support all the moneyed interests of the country. Property, as in England, must be the basis of government. 

{146}

Against his schemes, there immediately developed a rising oppositionwhich made itself felt in Congress, in State legislatures, in thenewspapers, and finally in Washington's own Cabinet. All the farmerand debtor elements in the country disliked and dreaded the financialmanipulations of the brilliant secretary; and the Virginian planters, universally borrowers, who had been the strongest single power inestablishing the new constitution, now swung into opposition to theadministration. Madison led the fight in the House against Hamilton'smeasures; and Jefferson, in the Cabinet, laid down, in a memorandum ofprotest against the proposed bank, the doctrine of "strictconstruction" of the constitution according to which the powers grantedto the federal government ought to be narrowly construed in order topreserve the State governments, the source of liberty, fromencroachment. He denounced the bank, accordingly, as unwarranted bythe constitution, corrupt, and dangerous to the safety of the country. In the congressional contest Hamilton was successful, for all hisrecommendations were adopted, but at the cost of creating a lastingantagonism in the southern States and in the western regions. 

In 1791, Jefferson and Madison co-operated to establish a newspaper atPhiladelphia whose sole occupation consisted in denouncing {147} thecorrupt and monarchical Secretary of the Treasury. Hamilton retortedby publishing letters charging Jefferson with responsibility for it;and Washington, who steadily approved Hamilton's policies, found hisCabinet splitting into two factions. By the year 1792, when the secondpresidential election took place, the opposition, styling itself"Republican, " was sufficiently well organized to run George Clinton, formerly the Anti-federalist leader of New York, for theVice-Presidency against the "monarchical" Adams. Washington was notopposed, but no other one of the Hamiltonian supporters escaped attack. There was, in short, the beginning of the definite formation ofpolitical parties on lines akin to those which existed in the periodbefore 1787. Behind Jefferson and Madison were rallying all thecolonial-minded voters, to whom government was at best an evil and towhom, under any circumstances, strong authority and elaborate financewere utterly abhorrent. Around Hamilton gathered the men whoseinterests lay in building up a genuine, powerful, nationalgovernment--the merchants, shipowners, moneyed men and creditorsgenerally in the northern States--and, of course, all Tories. 

Up to 1793, the Federalist administration successfully maintained itsground; and, when {148} the Virginian group tried in the House to provelaxity and mismanagement against Hamilton, he was triumphantlyvindicated. Had the United States been allowed to develop intranquillity and prosperity for a generation, it is not unlikely thatthe Federalist party might have struck its roots so deeply as to beimpervious to attacks. But it needed time, for in contrast to theJeffersonian party, whose origin is manifestly in the old-time colonialpolitical habits of democracy, local independence, and love of laxfinance, the Federalist party was a new creation, with no traditions tofall back upon. Reflecting in some respects British views, notably inits distrust of the masses and its respect for property and wealth, itfar surpassed any English party of the period, except the small groupled by William Pitt, in its demand for progressive and vigorouslegislation. In 1793, when matters were in this situation, the stateof European and British politics suddenly brought the United Statesinto the current of world politics, and subjected the newadministration to difficulties, which were ultimately to cause itsdownfall. 

{149}

CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST PERIOD OF COMMERCIAL ANTAGONISM, 1783-1795

While the United States had been undergoing the important changes ofthe period, 1783-1793, England had passed through an almost equallysignificant political transformation, in course of which the twocountries entered upon a long history of difficult and unfriendlydiplomatic relations. The treaty of peace ended the political union ofthe two communities, but it left the nature of their commercialrelations to be settled; and this, for the United States, was a problemsecond only in importance to that of federal government. If theprosperity of the thirteen States was to be restored, the old-timetrade routes of the colonial days must be re-established. The WestIndia market for fish, grain, and lumber, the British or Europeanmarket for plantation products must be replaced on a profitable basis, and the United States must be prepared to purchase these privileges bywhatever concessions lay in its power to grant. It rested chiefly withEngland to decide whether to permit the former colonies to resume theirearlier commercial system or begin a new policy, for it was withBritain and the British colonies {150} that seven-eighths of Americancommerce naturally was carried on. 

Unfortunately for the people of the United States, and unfortunatelyfor the harmony of the two countries, the prevailing beliefs of Englishmerchants, shipowners, naval authorities, and, in general, the officialclasses were such as to render a complete resumption of the formertrade relations almost impossible. According to the political andeconomic doctrines underlying the Acts of Trade, the moment that thetwo countries became separated their interests automatically becameantagonistic. American shipping, formerly fostered when under theflag, now assumed the aspect of a formidable rival to the Britishmerchant marine and, as such, ought to be prevented from taking anyprofit which by any device could be turned toward British ships. 

The treaty of peace had scarcely been signed when there appeared apamphlet by Lord Sheffield, early in 1783, which won instant success, passing through several editions. This announced that henceforward itwas the duty of the British government to discourage and crush Americannavigation to the extent of its power in order to check a dangerousrival, taking especial care to reserve the West Indies for exclusiveBritish control. At the possibility of losing the {151} profitableAmerican market through retaliatory measures, Sheffield laughed inscorn. "We might as reasonably dread the effect of combinations amongthe German as among the American States, " he sneered, "and deprecatethe resolves of the Diet as those of Congress. " There were elements, of course, to whom these arguments of Sheffield were unwelcome, particularly the West India planters themselves, and to a degree theBritish manufacturers, who would gladly have resumed the trade of theyears before 1776; but, so far as the great majority of Englishmen wasconcerned, it seems impossible to doubt that Lord Sheffield was a truespokesman of their convictions. 

In addition to the economic theories of the time, the temper of theBritish people was sullen, hostile, and contemptuous toward the formercolonies. The bulk of the nation had come to condemn the policy of theNorth Ministry which had led to the loss of the plantations, but theydid not love the Americans any the more for that. The sharp socialdistinctions, which prior to 1776 had rendered the nobility, thegentry, the clergy, and the professions contemptuous toward thecolonists, still reigned unchecked; and the Tories and most of theruling classes, regarding the Americans as a set of ungrateful andspiteful people, whom it was well {152} to have lost as subjects, ceased to take any interest in their existence. The United States wasdropped, as an unpleasant subject is banished from conversation; andthe relations of the two countries became a matter of national concernonly when the interests of shipowners, merchants, or naval authoritieswere sufficiently strong to compel attention from the governing classes. 

The Whig leaders should, of course, be excepted from this generalstatement, for they and their followers--both their parliamentarycoterie and their middle-class adherents outside--retained a friendlyattitude, and tried to treat the United States with a considerationwhich usually had no place in Tory manners. But Whigs as well asTories held the prevailing conceptions of naval and economicnecessities, and only scattered individuals, like William Pitt, wereaffected by the new doctrines of Adam Smith. Their commercial policytended to differ only in degree from that of the more rigid Tories. 

To make it certain that the United States should fail to securefavourable commercial rights, the ascendancy of the Whigs came to asudden end within a year from its beginning. The Shelburne Ministry, which made the peace, had to meet the opposition not only of the Toriesbut of the group led by Fox. In the session of 1783, the Whig party{153} was thus openly split, and presently all England was scandalizedto see Fox enter into a coalition with no less a person than Lord Northfor the purpose of obtaining office. Shelburne resigned on February24, after the passage of a resolution of censure on the Peace; andGeorge III, after trying every expedient to avoid what he considered apersonal disgrace, was forced, on April 2, to admit Fox and North asMinisters under the nominal headship of the Duke of Portland. SoTories were restored to a share in the government, since nearly half ofthe coalition majority depended upon Tory votes. In December, 1783, the King, by a direct exercise of his influence, caused the Lords tothrow out a Ministerial bill for the government of India and, dismissing the coalition Ministers, he appealed to William Pitt. Thatyouthful politician, who had first entered office as Chancellor of theExchequer under Shelburne, succeeded, after a sharp parliamentarycontest, in breaking down the opposition majority in the House, and ina general election in March, 1784, won a great victory. Then, at thehead of a mixed Cabinet, supported by Tories and King's Friends as wellas by his own followers from among the Whigs, Pitt maintained himself, secure in the support of George III, but in no sense his agent or tool. In the {154} next few years, he made his hold secure by his skill inparliamentary leadership and his success in carrying financial andadministrative reforms. This was the first peace Ministry since thatof Pelham, 1746-1754, which won prestige through efficient government. It was, however, mainly Tory in temper, and as such distinctly cold andunfriendly toward America. Pitt himself was undoubtedly in favour ofliberal commercial relations; but in that respect, as in the questionof parliamentary reform, he followed the opinions of his supporters andof the nation. 

The British policy toward the United States, under the circumstances, was dictated by a strict adherence to the principles set forth by LordSheffield. Pitt, while Chancellor of the Exchequer under Shelburne, introduced a very liberal Bill, which, if enacted, would have securedfull commercial reciprocity, including the West India trade. Thisfailed to pass, however, and was abandoned when Pitt left office inApril, 1783. The Fox-North Ministry followed a different plan bycausing Parliament to pass a Bill authorizing the Crown to regulate thetrade with the West Indies. They then, by proclamation, allowed theislands to import certain articles from the United States, notincluding fish or lumber, and {155} only in British bottoms. It washoped that Canada would take the place of the United States insupplying the West India colonies, and that British vessels wouldmonopolize the carrying. In 1787 this action was ratified byParliament, and the process of discouraging American shipping wasadopted as a national policy. American vessels henceforward came underthe terms of the Navigation Acts, and could take part only in thedirect trade between their own country and England. When John Adams, in 1785, arrived at London as Minister, and tried to open the subjectof a commercial treaty, he was unable to secure the slightest attentionto the American requests and felt himself to be in an atmosphere ofhostility and social contempt. The British policy proved in a fewyears fairly successful. It reduced American shipping trading withEngland, it drove American vessels from the British West Indies, and, owing to the impossibility of the States retaliating separately, it didnot diminish the British market in America. Up to 1789, when the firstCongress of the United States passed a navigation act and adopteddiscriminating duties, America remained commercially helpless. Theprofit went to British shipowners and merchants. 

The American government naturally {156} turned to the other powershaving American possessions, France and Spain, hoping to secure fromthem compensating advantages. So far as France was concerned, thegovernment of Louis XVI was friendly; but its finances were in suchconfusion and its administration so unsteady after 1783 that Jefferson, Minister to France, could secure no important concessions save one. In1784, as though to step into the place left vacant by the English, theFrench crown, by royal order, permitted direct trade between the UnitedStates and the French West Indies in vessels of less than sixty tonsburden. The result was striking. In a few years the American molassestrade, driven from the British islands, took refuge at San Domingo, building up a tremendous sugar export and more than filling the placeof the British trade. In 1790 the commerce of San Domingo surpassedthat of all the British Islands together. Here again, Frenchfriendship shone in contrast to English antagonism. Every Americanshipowner felt the difference, and remembered it. 

With Spain the United States was less successful. Jay, Secretary forForeign Affairs, undertook negotiations through Diego Gardoqui, aSpaniard who, during the Revolution, had furnished many cargoes ofsupplies. He {157} found that country sharply dissatisfied over theboundary assigned to the United States. The British, in ceding Floridato Spain, had not turned over all of their province of 1763, but hadhanded that part of it north of thirty-two degrees to the UnitedStates, and, further, had granted the latter the free navigation of theMississippi, through Spanish territory. Gardoqui offered in substanceto make a commercial treaty provided the United States would surrenderthe claim to navigate the Mississippi for twenty years. Jay, to whosemind the interests of the seaboard shipowners and producers faroutweighed the desires of the few settlers of the interior waters, waswilling to make the agreement. But an angry protest went up from thesouthern States, whose land claims stretched to the Mississippi, and hecould secure, in 1787, a vote of only seven States to five in Congress. Since all treaties required the consent of nine States, this votekilled the negotiations. Spain remained unfriendly, and continued tointrigue with the Indian tribes in the south-western United States witha view to retaining their support. 

Further north, the United States found itself mortified and helplessbefore British antagonism. After 1783 the country had Canada on itsnorthern border as a small but actively hostile neighbour, for there{158} thousands of proscribed and ruined Tories had taken refuge. Thegovernors of Canada, Carlton and Simcoe, as well as the men commandingthe frontier posts, had served against the Americans and regarded themas rivals. To secure the western fur trade and to retain a hold overthe western Indians was recognized as the correct and necessary policyfor Canada; and the British government, in response to Canadiansuggestions, decided to retain their military posts along the GreatLakes within the boundaries of the United States. To justify them inso doing, they pointed with unanswerable truth to the fact that theUnited States had not carried out the provisions of the Treaty of 1783regarding British debts, and that Tories, contrary to the letter andspirit of that treaty, were still proscribed by law. The State courtsfelt in no way bound to enforce the treaty, nor did State legislatureschoose to carry it out. British debts remained uncollectible, and theBritish therefore retained their western posts and through them plied alucrative trade with the Indians to the south of the Great Lakes. 

In the years after the war, a steady flow of settlers entered the Ohiovalley, resuming the movement begun before the Revolution, and took upland in Kentucky and the Northwest territory. By 1792 Kentucky {159}was ready to be admitted as a State, and Tennessee and Ohio wereorganized as territories. These settlers naturally found the Indiansopposing their advance, and the years 1783-1794 are a chronicle ofsmouldering border warfare, broken by intermittent truces. During allthis time it was the firm belief of the frontiersmen that the Indianhostility was stimulated by the British posts, and hatred of Englandand the English grew into an article of faith on their part. Ultimately, the new government under Washington undertook a decisivecampaign. At first, in 1791, General St. Clair, invading Ohio with rawtroops, was fearfully defeated, with butchery and mutilation of morethan two-thirds of his force; but in 1794 General Wayne, with a morecarefully drilled body, compelled the Indians to retreat. Yet with theBritish posts still there, a full control was impossible. 

The new constitution, which gave the United States ample powers ofenforcing treaties and making commercial discriminations, did not atonce produce any alteration in the existing unsatisfactory situation. Spain remained steadily indifferent and unfriendly. France, undergoingthe earlier stages of her own revolution, was incapable of carrying outany consistent action. The Pitt Ministry, absorbed in the game ofEuropean politics and in internal {160} legislation, sent a Minister, Hammond, but was content to let its commercial and frontier policiescontinue. But when, in 1792, the French Revolution took a gravercharacter, with the overthrow of the monarchy, and when in 1793 Englandjoined the European powers in the war against France, while all Europewatched with horror and panic the progress of the Reign of Terror inthe French Republic, the situation of the United States was suddenlychanged. 

In the spring of 1793 there came the news of the war between Englandand France, and, following it by a few days only, an emissary from theFrench Republic, One and Indivisible, "Citizen Edmond Genet, " arrivedat Charleston, South Carolina, April 15. There now exploded a suddenoverwhelming outburst of sympathy and enthusiasm for the French nationand the French cause. All the remembered help of the days of Yorktown, all the tradition of British oppression and ravages, all the recentirritation at the British trade discrimination and Indian policycoupled with appreciation of French concessions, swept crowds in everyState and every town into a tempest of welcome to Genet. Shipownersrushed to apply for privateers' commissions, crowds adopted Frenchdemocratic jargon and manners. Democratic clubs were formed on themodel of the Jacobin {161} society, and "Civic Feasts, " at which Genetwas present, made the country resound. It looked as though the UnitedStates were certain to enter the European war as an ally of France outof sheer gratitude, democratic sympathy, and hatred for England. TheFrench Minister, feeling the people behind him, hastened to send outprivateers and acted as though the United States were already in openalliance. 

It now fell to the Washington administration to decide a momentousquestion. Regardless of the past, regardless of the British policysince the peace, was it worth while to allow the country to becomeinvolved in war at this juncture? Decidedly not. Before Genet hadpresented his credentials, Washington and Jefferson had framed andissued a declaration of neutrality forbidding American citizens toviolate the law of nations by giving aid to either side. It was notmerely caution which led to this step. The Federalist leaders and mostof their followers--men of property, standing, and law-abidinghabits--were distinctly shocked at the horrors of the Reign of Terror, and felt with Burke, their old friend and defender in Revolutionarydays, that such liberty as the French demanded was something altogetheralien to that known in the United States or in England. And as the{162} news became more and more ghastly, the Federalists grew rapidlyto regard England, with all its unfriendliness, with all its commercialselfishness, as the saving power of civilization, and France as thechief enemy on earth of God and man. The result was to precipitate theUnited States into a new contest, a struggle on the part of theFederalist administration, led by Hamilton and Washington, to hold backthe country from being hurled into alliance with France or into warwith England. In this, they had to meet the attack of the alreadyorganizing Republican party, and of many new adherents who flocked toit during the years of excitement. 

The first contest was a short one. Genet, his head turned by hisreception, resented the strict neutrality enforced by theadministration, tried to compel it to recede, endeavoured to secure theexit of privateersmen in spite of their prohibition, and ultimately infury appealed to the people against their government. This conductlost him the support of even the most sanguine democrats, and, when theadministration asked for his recall, he fell from his prominenceunregretted. But his successor, Fauchet, a less extreme man, waswarmly welcomed by the opposition leaders, including Madison andRandolph, Jefferson's {163} successor as Secretary of State, and wasadmitted into the inmost councils of the party. 

Hardly was Genet disposed of when a more dangerous crisis arose, causedby the naval policy of England. When war broke out, the Britishcruisers, as was their custom, fell upon French commerce, andespecially upon such neutral commerce as could, under the thenannounced principles of international law, be held liable to capture. Consequently, American vessels, plying their lucrative trade with theFrench West Indies, were seized and condemned by British West Indiaprize courts. It was a British dogma, known as the Rule of 1756, thatif trade by a neutral with enemies' colonies had been prohibited inpeace, it became contraband in time of war, otherwise belligerents, bysimply opening their ports, could employ neutrals to do their tradingfor them. In this case, the trade between the French West Indies andAmerica had not been prohibited in peace, but the seizures were madenone the less, causing a roar of indignation from the entire Americanseacoast. Late in 1793, the British Ministry added fresh fuel to thefire by declaring provisions taken to French territory to be contrabandof war. If an intention to force the United States into alliance withFrance had been guiding the {164} Pitt Ministry, no better steps couldhave been devised to accomplish the end. As a matter of fact, the PittMinistry thought very little about it in the press of the tremendousEuropean cataclysm. 

When Congress met in December, 1793, the old questions of Hamilton'smeasures and the "monarchism" of the administration were forgotten inthe new crisis. Apparently a large majority in the House, led byMadison, were ready to sequester British debts, declare an embargo, build a navy, and in general prepare for a bitter contest; but by greatexertions the administration managed to stave off these drastic stepsby promising to send a special diplomatic mission to prevent war. During the summer the excitement grew, for it was in this year thatWayne's campaign against the western Indians took place, which wasgenerally believed to be rendered necessary by the British retention ofthe posts; and also in this same summer the inhabitants of westernPennsylvania broke into insurrection against the hated excise tax. This lawlessness was attributed by the Federalists, includingWashington himself, to the demoralizing influence of the FrenchRevolution, and was therefore suppressed by no less than 15, 000militia, an action denounced by the Republicans--as Randolph confidedto the French Minister--as an example of {165} despotic brutality. Menwere fast coming to be incapable of cool thought on party questions. 

The special mission to England was undertaken by the Chief Justice, Jay, the most experienced diplomat in America since the death ofFranklin. Upon arriving in England, he found the country wild withexcitement and horror over the French Revolution, and with all itsinterest concentrated upon the effort to carry on war by land and sea. The Pitt Ministry was now supported by all Tories, representing theland-holding classes, the clergy, and the professions, and by nearlyall the aristocratic Whigs. Burke, one-time defender of the AmericanRevolution, was exhausting his energies in eloquent and extravagantdenunciations of the French. Only a handful of radicals, led by Fox, Sheridan, and Camden, and representing a few constituents, still daredto proclaim liberal principles. In all other classes of society, democracy was regarded as synonymous with bestial anarchy andinfidelity. Clearly the United States, from its very nature as arepublic, could hope for no favour, in spite of the noticeably Englishprepossessions of Hamilton's party. 

Jay dealt directly and informally with William Grenville, the Secretaryfor Foreign Affairs, and seems rapidly to have come to {166} theconclusion that it was for the interest of the United States to getwhatever it could, rather than to endeavour to haggle over details withan immovable and indifferent Ministry, thereby hazarding all success. On his part, Grenville clearly did his best to establish a practicableworking arrangement, agreeing with Jay in so framing the treaty as towaive "principles" and "claims" and to include precise provisions. Theup-shot was that when Jay finished his negotiations he had secured atreaty which for the first time established a definite basis forcommercial dealings and removed most of the dangerous outstandingdifficulties. British debts were to be adjusted by a mixed commission, and American claims for unjust seizures in the West Indies were to bedealt with in similar fashion. The British were to evacuate thenorth-western military posts, and, while they did not withdraw ormodify the so-called "rule of 1756, " they agreed to a clear definitionof contraband of war. They were also ready to admit American vesselsof less than seventy tons to the British West Indies, provided theUnited States agreed not to export West India products for ten years. Here Jay, as in his dealings with Gardoqui, showed a willingness tomake a considerable sacrifice in order to gain a definite small point. On the whole, the treaty {167} comprised all that the Pitt Ministry, engaged in a desperate war with the French Republic, was likely toconcede. 

The treaty left England in the winter of 1795 and reached America afterthe adjournment of Congress. Although it fell far short of what washoped for, it still seemed to Washington wholly advisable to accept itunder the circumstances as an alternative to further wrangling andprobable war. Sent under seal of secrecy to the Senate, in specialsession, its contents were none the less revealed by an oppositionsenator, and a tempest of disappointment and anger swept the country. In every seaport Jay was execrated as a fool and traitor and burned ineffigy. Washington watched unmoved. The Senate voted ratification bya bare two-thirds, but struck out the West India article, preferring toretain the power of re-exporting French West India produce rather thanto acquire the direct trade with the English islands. Washington addedhis signature, the British government accepted the amendment, and thetreaty came into effect. The West India privilege was, in fact, granted by the Pitt Ministry, as in the treaty, owing to the demands ofthe West India planters. In America the storm blew itself out in a fewweeks of noise and anger, and the country settled down to make the bestof the privileges {168} gained, which, however incomplete, were wellworth the effort. 

So the Federalist administration kept the United States neutral, andgave it at last a definite commercial status with England. It didmore, for in August, 1795, the north-western Indians, beaten in battleand deprived of the presence of their protectors, made a treatyabandoning all claims to the region south of Lake Erie. The Spanishgovernment, on hearing of the Jay treaty, came to terms in October, 1795, agreeing to the boundaries of 1783, granting a "right of deposit"to American trades down the Mississippi at or near New Orleans, andpromising to abandon Indian intrigues. The diplomatic campaign of theFederalists seemed to be crowned with general success. 

But in the process the passions of the American people had becomedeeply stirred, and by the end of 1795 the Federalist party could nolonger, as at the outset, count on the support of all the mercantileelements and all the townspeople, for, by their policy toward Franceand England, Washington, Hamilton, and their associates had setthemselves against the underlying prejudices and beliefs of the voters. The years of the strong government reaction were at an end. The timehad come to fight for party existence. 

{169}

CHAPTER IX

THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1795-1805

With the temporary shelving of British antagonism, the Federalistadministration passed its second great crisis; but it was immediatelycalled upon to face new and equally serious differences with Francewhich were ultimately to prove the cause of its downfall. Thefundamental difficulty in the political situation in America was thatthe two parties were now so bitterly opposed as to render everygovernmental act a test of party strength. The Republicans, whoaccepted the leadership of Jefferson or of Clinton of New York, comprised all who favoured democracy in any sense--whether that ofhuman equality, or local self-government, or freedom from taxes, orsympathy with France--and all who had any grievance against theadministration, from frontiersmen whose cabins had not been protectedagainst Indians or who had been forced to pay a whisky tax, to seamenwhose ships had not been protected by the Jay treaty. In short, all inwhom still persisted the deep-rooted colonial traditions of oppositionto strong government and dislike of any but local authorities were{170} summoned to oppose an administration on the familiar ground thatit was working against their liberties by corruption, usurpation, financial burdens, and gross partisanship for England and againstFrance. 

On the other side, the Federalists were rapidly acquiring a state ofmind substantially Tory in character. They were coming to dread anddetest "democracy" as dangerous to the family and to society as well asto government, and to identify it with the guillotine and theblasphemies of the Worship of Reason. In the furious attacks which, after the fashion of the day, the opposition papers hurled againstevery act of the Federalist leaders, and which aimed as much to defiletheir characters as to discredit their policies, they saw a pit ofanarchy yawning. Between parties so constituted, no alternativeremained but a fight to a finish; and, from the moment the Federalistsbecame genuinely anti-democratic, they were doomed. Only accident orconspicuous success on the part of their leaders could delay theirdestruction. A single false step on their part meant ruin. 

With the ratification of the Jay treaty, a long period of peacefulrelations began between England and the United States. The Americanshipowners quickly adapted themselves to the situation, and were soon{171} prosperously occupied in neutral commerce. In England, Americanaffairs dropped wholly out of public notice during the exciting andanxious years of the war of the second coalition. The Pitt Ministryended, leaving the country under the grip of a rigid repression of allliberal thought or utterance, and was followed by the commonplaceToryism of Addington and his colleagues. Then came the Treaty ofAmiens with France, the year of peace, the renewed war in 1803, and, after an interval of confused parliamentary wranglings, the return topower of Pitt in 1804, called by the voice of the nation to meet thecrisis of the threatened French invasion. The United States wasforgotten, diplomatic relations sank to mere routine. Such were theunquestionable benefits of the execrated treaty made by Jay andGrenville. 

With France, however, American relations became suddenly strained, as aresult of the same treaty. The French Republic, in the year 1795, wasfinally reorganized under a definite constitution as a Directorate--arepublic with a plural executive of five. This government, ceasing tobe merely a revolutionary body, undertook to play the game of grandpolitics and compelled all the neighbouring smaller States to submit todemocratic revolutions, accept a constitution on the French model, andbecome {172} dependent allies of the French Republic. The localdemocratic faction, large or small, was in each case utilized to carrythrough this programme, which was always accompanied with corruptionand plunder to swell the revenues of France and fill the pockets of thedirectors and their agents. Such a policy the Directorate nowendeavoured, as a matter of course, to carry out with the UnitedStates, expecting to ally themselves with the Jeffersonian party and tobribe or bully the American Republic into a lucrative alliance. Theway was prepared by the infatuation with which Randolph, Jefferson, Madison, and other Republican leaders had unbosomed themselves toFauchet, and also by an unfortunate blunder which had led Washington tosend James Monroe as Minister to France in 1794. This man was known tobe an active sympathizer with France, and it was hoped that hisinfluence would assist in keeping friendly relations; but his conductwas calculated to do nothing but harm. When the news of the Jay treatycame to France, the Directorate chose to regard it as an unfriendlyact, and Monroe, sharing their feelings, exerted himself rather tomollify their resentment than to justify his country. 

In 1796 a new Minister, Adet, was sent to the United States to remainonly in case {173} the government should adopt a just policy towardFrance. This precipitated a party contest squarely on the issue ofFrench relations. In the first place Congress, after a bitter struggleand by a bare majority, voted to appropriate the money to carry the Jaytreaty into effect. This was a defeat for the French party. In thesecond place, in spite of a manifesto issued by Adet, threateningFrench displeasure, the presidential electors gave a majority of threevotes for Adams over Jefferson to succeed Washington. The election hadbeen a sharp party struggle, the whole theory of a deliberate choice byelectors vanishing in the stress of partisan excitement. After thissecond defeat, the French Minister withdrew, severing diplomaticrelations; and French vessels began to capture American merchantmen, toimpress the country with the serious results of French irritation. TheWashington administration now recalled Monroe and sent C. C. Pinckneyto replace him, but the Directory, while showering compliments uponMonroe, refused to receive Pinckney at all and virtually expelled himfrom the country. In the midst of these annoying events, Washington'sterm closed, and the sorely tried man, disgusted with party abuse andwhat he felt to be national ingratitude, retired to his Virginiaestates, no longer {174} the president of the whole country, but theleader of a faction. His Farewell Address showed, under its statelyphrases, his detestation of party controversy and his fears for thefuture. 

Washington's successor, Adams, was a man of less calmness andsteadiness of soul; independent, but with a somewhat petulant habit ofmind, and nervously afraid of ceasing to be independent; a man of soundsense, yet of a too great personal vanity. His treatment of the Frenchsituation showed national pride and dignity as well as an adherence tothe traditional Federalist policy of avoiding war. Unfortunately, hishandling of the party leaders was so deficient in tact as to assist inbringing quick and final defeat upon himself and upon them. 

The relations with France rapidly developed into an internationalscandal. Adams, supported by his party, determined to send a missionof three, including Pinckney, in order to restore friendly relations, as well as to protest against depredations and seizures which the fewFrench cruisers at sea were now beginning to make. In the spring of1798, however, the commission reported that its efforts had failed, andAdams was obliged to lay its correspondence before Congress. Thisshowed that the great obstacle in the way of carrying on {175}negotiations with the French had been the persistent demands on thepart of Talleyrand--the French Minister of Foreign Affairs--for apreliminary money payment, either under the form of a so-called "loan"or as a bribe outright. Such a revelation of venality struck dumb theRepublican leaders who had kept asserting their distrust of Adams'ssincerity and accusing the administration of injustice toward France. It took all heart out of the opposition members of Congress, andencouraged the Federalists to commit the government to actualhostilities with the hated Democrats and Jacobins. Declaring thetreaties of 1778 to be abrogated, Congress authorized naval reprisals, voted money and a loan, and so began what was called a "quasi-war, "since neither side made a formal declaration. Adams, riding on thecrest of a brief wave of popularity, declared in a message to Congressthat he would never send another Minister to France without receivingassurances that he would be received as "befitted the representative ofa great, free, powerful, and independent nation. " "Millions fordefence, but not a cent for tribute!" became the Federalist watch-word;and, when the little navy of a few frigates and sloops began to bringin French men-of-war and privateers as prizes, the country actuallyfelt a thrill of pride and {176} manhood. For the moment, the UnitedStates stood side by side with England in fighting the dangerous enemyof civilization. American Federalist and British Tory were at one;Adams and Pitt were carrying on the same war. 

Unfortunately for the Federalists, they failed to appreciate thefundamental differences between the situation in England and in theUnited States, for they went on to imitate the mother country notmerely in fighting the French, but in seeking to suppress what theyfelt to be dangerous "Jacobinical" features of American politics. Inthe summer of 1798, three laws were enacted which have becomesynonymous with party folly. Two--the Alien Acts--authorized thePresident at his discretion to imprison or deport any alien, friend orenemy; the third--the Sedition Act--punished by fine and imprisonmentany utterance or publication tending to cause opposition to a federallaw or to bring into contempt the federal government or any of itsofficers. Such statutes had stood in England since 1793 and were usedto suppress democratic assailants of the monarchy; but such a law inthe United States could mean nothing more than the suppression byFederalist courts of criticisms upon the administration made byRepublican newspapers. {177} It furnished every opposition agitatorwith a deadly weapon for use against the administration; and when theSedition Law was actually enforced, and a half-dozen Republican editorswere subjected to fine or imprisonment for scurrilous but scarcelydangerous utterances, the demonstration of the inherently tyrannicalnature of the Federalists seemed to be complete. It was anunpardonable political blunder. 

Equally damaging to the prosperity of the Federalist party was the factthat the French Republic, instead of accepting the issue, showed acomplete unwillingness to fight, and protested in public that it washaving a war forced upon it. Talleyrand showered upon the UnitedStates, through every channel, official or unofficial, assurances ofkindly feelings, and, so soon as he learned of Adams's demand for asuitable reception for an American Minister, gave the requiredassurance in his exact words. Under the circumstances, the warpreparations of the Federalists became visibly superfluous, especiallya provisional army which Congress had authorized under Hamilton asactive commander. The opposition press and speakers denounced this asa Federalist army destined to act against the liberties of the people;and the administration could point to no real danger to justify itsexistence. 

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So high ran party spirit that the Virginian leaders thought or affectedto think it necessary to prepare for armed resistance to Federalistoppression; and Madison and Jefferson, acting through the Statelegislatures of Virginia and Kentucky respectively, caused the adoptionof two striking series of resolutions stating the crisis in Republicanphraseology. In each case, after denouncing the Alien and Seditionlaws as unconstitutional, the legislatures declared that theconstitution was nothing more than a compact between sovereign States;that the Federal government, the creature of the compact, was not thefinal judge of its powers, and that in case of a palpable usurpation ofpowers by the Federal government it was the duty of the States to"interpose, " in the words of Madison, or to "nullify" the Federal law, as Jefferson phrased it. Such language seemed to Washington, Adams, and their party to signify that the time was coming when they mustfight for national existence; but to the opposition it seemed no morethan a restatement of time-hallowed American principles of government, necessary to save liberty from a reactionary faction. Party hatred nowrivalled that between revolutionary Whigs and Tories. 

Under these circumstances the election of 1800 took place. TheFederalist party {179} leaders, feeling the ground quaking under them, clung the more desperately to the continuance of the French "quasi-war"as their sole means for rallying popular support. But at this stagePresident Adams, seeing the folly of perpetuating a sham war for mereparty advantage, determined to reopen negotiations. This precipitateda bitter quarrel, for the members of his Cabinet and the leadingcongressmen still regarded Hamilton, now a private citizen in New York, as the real leader, and followed him in urging the continuance ofhostilities. Adams, unable to manage his party opponents openly, tookrefuge in sudden, secret, and, as they felt, treacherous conduct andsent nominations for a new French mission without consulting hisadvisers. The Federalist Senate, raging at Adams's stupidity, couldnot refuse to ratify the appointments, and so in 1799 the new missionsailed, was respectfully received by Bonaparte, and was promptlyadmitted to negotiations. 

The Federalist party now ran straight toward defeat; for, while theleaders could not avoid supporting Adams for a second term, they hatedhim as a blunderer and marplot. On his part, his patience exhausted, Adams dismissed two of his secretaries, in a passion, in 1800. Later, through the wiles of Aaron Burr, Republican leader in New {180} York, apamphlet, written by Hamilton to prove Adams's utter unfitness for thePresidency, was brought to light and circulated. Against thisdiscredited and disorganized party, the Republicans, supportingJefferson again for the Presidency and thundering against the SeditionLaw, triumphantly carried a clear majority of electoral votes in theautumn; but by a sheer oversight they gave an equal number forJefferson and for Burr, who was only intended for Vice-president. Hence under the terms of the constitution it became necessary for theHouse of Representatives to make the final selection, voting by States. It fell thus to the lot of the Federalist House of 1800-1801 to choosethe next President, and for a while the members showed an inclinationto support Burr, as at least a Northerner, rather than Jefferson. Butbetter judgments ruled, and finally Jefferson was awarded the placewhich he had in fairness won. The last weeks of Federalist rule wasfilled with a discreditable effort to save what was possible from thewreck. New offices were established, including a whole system ofcircuit judgeships; and Adams spent his time up to the last hour of histerm in signing commissions, stealing away in the early morning inorder not to see the inauguration of his rival. 

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So fell the Federalist party from power. It had a brilliant record inlegislation and administration; it had created a new United States; ithad shown a statesmanship never equalled before or since on theAmerican continent; but it ruined itself by endeavouring openly toestablish a system of government founded on distrust of the people, andmodelled after British precedents. For a few years, England and theUnited States approached nearer in government and policy than at anyother time. But, while in England a large part of society--thenobility, gentry, middle classes, the professions, the church, and allstrong political elements--supported Pitt in suppressing free speechand individual liberty, the Federalists represented only a minority, and their social principles were abhorrent to the vast majority of theinhabitants of the United States. 

The Republican party, which conquered by what Jefferson considered tobe a revolution no less important than that of 1776, represented areaction to the old ideals of government traditional in colonialtimes, --namely as little taxation as possible, as much localindependence as could exist, and the minimum of Federal authority. Jefferson professed to believe that the conduct of foreign relationswas the only important function of the central government, {182} allelse properly belonging to the States. So complete was the Republicanvictory that the party had full power to put its principles intoeffect. It controlled both Houses of Congress, and was blessed withfour years of peace and prosperity. Thomas Jefferson, for all hisradicalism in language, was a shrewd party leader, whose actions wereuniformly cautious and whose entire habit of mind favoured avoidance ofany violent change. "Scientific" with the general interests of aFrench eighteenth-century "philosopher, " he was limited in his views ofpublic policy by his education as a Virginia planter, wholly out ofsympathy with finance, commerce, or business. Under his guidance, accordingly, the United States government was subjected to what hecalled "a chaste reformation, " rather than to a general overturning. 

All expenses were cut down, chiefly at the cost of the army and navy;all appropriations were rigorously diminished, and all internal taxeswere swept away. Since commerce continued active, there still remaineda surplus revenue, and this Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, applied to extinguishing the debt. A few of the more important Federaloffices were taken from embittered Federalists and given toRepublicans, but there was no general {183} proscription ofoffice-holders. The only action at all radical in character was therepeal of the law establishing new circuit judgeships, a step whichlegislated a number of Federalists out of office. The repeal wasdenounced by fervid Federalist orators as a violation of theconstitution and a death-blow to the Union; but the appointments underthe law itself had been so grossly partisan that the country wasunalarmed. With these steps the Republican reaction ended. Jeffersonand his party carried through no alteration of the central departments;they abandoned no Federal power except that of imposing an excise; theydid not even repeal the charter of the National Bank. The real changelay in the more strictly economical finances and in the general spiritof government. The Federalist opposition, criticizing every act withbitterness and continually predicting ruin, found that under the"Jacobins" the country remained contented and prosperous and was in nomore danger of atheism or the guillotine than it had been under Adams. So matters went on, year after year, the Federal government playing itspart quietly and the American people carrying on their vocations inpeace and prosperity. 

Jefferson's general theory of foreign affairs was based on the ideathat diplomacy was {184} mainly a matter of bargain and sale, withnational commerce as the deciding factor. He believed so firmly thatnational self-interest would lead all European powers to make suitabletreaties with the United States that he considered the navy as whollysuperfluous, and would have been glad to sell it. But whencircumstances arose calling for a different sort of diplomacy, he wasready to modify his methods; and he so far recognized the unsuitabilityof peaceful measures in dealing with the Barbary corsairs as to permitthe small American navy to carry on extensive operations during 1801-3, which ended in the submission of Tripoli and Algiers. 

Simultaneously, Jefferson was brought face to face with a diplomaticcrisis, arising from the peculiar actions of his old ally, France. Atthe outset of his administration, he found the treaty made by Adams'scommissioners in 1800 ready for ratification, and thus began his careerwith all questions settled, thanks to his predecessor. But he had beenin office only a few months when the behaviour of the Spanish officialsat New Orleans gave cause for alarm; for they suddenly terminated theright of deposit, granted in 1795. It was quickly rumoured that thereason was to be found in the fact that France, now under the FirstConsul, Napoleon, {185} had regained Louisiana. It was, in fact, true. Bonaparte overthrew the Directory in 1799 and established himself, under the thin disguise of "First Consul, " as practical military despotin France. He had immediately embraced the idea of establishing awestern colonial empire, which should be based on San Domingo, nowcontrolled by insurgent negroes, and which should include Louisiana. By a treaty of October 1, 1800, he compelled Spain to retrocede theformer French province in return for a promise to establish a kingdomof "Etruria" for a Spanish prince. During 1802 large armaments sailedto San Domingo and began the process of reconquest. It needed only thecompletion of that task for Napoleon to be ready to take overLouisiana, and thereby to gain absolute control over the one outletfrom the interior territories of the United States. 

Jefferson at once recognized the extreme gravity of the situation. During the years after the English, Spanish, and Indian treaties, emigrants had steadily worked their way into the inner river valleys. Western New York and Pennsylvania were rapidly filling, Ohio wassettled up to the Indian treaty line, Kentucky and Tennessee weredoubling in population, and fringes of pioneer communities stretchedalong the Ohio and {186} Mississippi rivers. In 1796 Tennessee wasadmitted as a State, and Ohio was now, in 1801, on the point of askingadmission. For France to shut the only possible outlet for thesecommunities would be a sentence of economic death; and Jefferson was sodeeply moved as to write to Livingston, his Minister to France, that ifthe rumour of the cession were true, "We must marry ourselves to theBritish fleet and nation. " The United States must fight rather thansubmit. He sent Monroe to France, instructed to buy an outlet, but thelatter only arrived in time to join with Livingston in signing a treatyfor the purchase of the whole of Louisiana. 

This startling event was the result of the failure of Napoleon's forcesto reconquer San Domingo. Foreseeing the loss of Louisiana in case ofthe probable renewal of war with England, and desirous of money forimmediate use, the Corsican adventurer suddenly threw Louisiana intothe astonished hands of Livingston and Monroe. He had never, it istrue, given Spain the promised compensation; he had never takenpossession, and he had promised not to sell it; but such trifles neverimpeded Napoleon, nor, in this case, did they hinder Jefferson. Whenthe treaty came to America, Congress was quickly convened, the Senatevoted to ratify, the money was appropriated, and the whole {187} vastregion was bought for the sum of sixty million francs. Jeffersonhimself, the apostle of a strict construction of the constitution, could not discover any clause authorizing such a purchase; but hisparty was undisturbed, and the great annexation was carried through, Jefferson acquiescing in the inconsistency. 

The chagrin of the Federalists at this enormous south-westwardextension of the country was exceeded only by their alarm when anattempt was made to eject certain extremely partisan judges from theiroffices in Pennsylvania and on the Federal bench by the process ofimpeachment. In the first two cases the effort was successful, onePennsylvania judge and one Federal district judge being ejected; butwhen, in 1805, the attack was aimed at the Pennsylvania supremejustices and at Justice Chase of the United States Supreme Court, theprocess broke down. The defence of the accused judges was legally toostrong to be overcome, and each impeachment failed. With this the lastecho of the party contest seemed to end, for by this time theFederalists were too discredited and too weak to make a politicalstruggle. Their membership in Congress had shrunk to small figures, they had lost State after State, and in 1804 they practically letJefferson's re-election go by default. He received all but fourteen{188} electoral votes, out of 176. Some of the New England leadersplotted secession, but they were not strong enough for that. The partyseemed dead. In 1804 its ablest mind, Hamilton, was killed in a duelwith Burr, the Vice-president, and nobody remained capable of nationalleadership. 

So the year 1805 opened in humdrum prosperity and nationalself-satisfaction. Jefferson could look upon a country in which heheld a position rivalled only by that of a European monarch or anEnglish prime minister. The principles of Republican equality, ofStates' rights, of economy and retrenchment, of peace and localself-government seemed triumphant beyond reach of attack. While Europeresounded with battles and marches, America lived in contentedisolation, free from the cares of unhappy nations living under theancient ideals. 

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CHAPTER X

THE SECOND PERIOD OF COMMERCIAL ANTAGONISM, 1805-1812

In the year 1805, the happy era of Republican prosperity and complacencycame suddenly and violently to an end, for by this time forces were inoperation which drew the United States, in utter disregard of Jefferson'stheories, into the sweep of the tremendous political cyclone raging inEurope. In 1803, Napoleon forced England into renewed war, and for twoyears endeavoured by elaborate naval manoeuvres to secure control of theChannel for a sufficient time to permit him to transport his "Grand Army"to the British shore. In 1805, however, these plans broke down; and thecrushing defeat of the allied French and Spanish navies at Trafalgarmarked the end of any attempt to challenge British maritime supremacy. The great military machine of the French army was then turned eastwardagainst the armies of the coalition which England, under Pitt, wasforming; and in a series of astonishing campaigns it was used to beatdown the Austrians in 1805 at Austerlitz; to overwhelm the Prussians in1806 at Jena and Auerstadt; and to force the Russians, after {190} asevere winter campaign in East Prussia, to come to terms in 1807. Napoleon and the Tsar, Alexander, meeting on the bridge at Tilsit, July7, divided Europe between them by agreeing upon a policy of spheres ofinterest, which left Turkey and the Orient for Russian expansion and allthe beaten western monarchies for French domination. The Corsicancaptain, trampling on the ruins both of the French monarchy and theFrench Republic, stood as the most terrible and astounding figure in theworld, invincible by land, the master of Europe. 

But the withdrawal of the French from any attempt to contest the sea leftEngland the equally undisputed master of all oceans, and rendered theFrench wholly dependent upon neutral nations for commerce. As Frenchconquests led to annexations of territory in Italy and in Germany, theseregions also found themselves unable to import with their own vessels, and so neutral commerce found ever-increasing markets dependent upon itsactivity. Now the most energetic maritime neutral power was the UnitedStates, whose merchantmen hastened to occupy the field left vacant by thepractical extinction of the French carrying trade. Until 1807 theyshared this with the Scandinavian countries; but after that yearNapoleon, by threats and the terror {191} of his name, forced anunwelcome alliance upon all the States of Europe, and the United Statesbecame the sole important neutral. 

In these circumstances, the merchant shipping of the United Statesflourished enormously, the more especially since, by importing andimmediately re-exporting West India products from the French islands, Yankee skippers were able to avoid the dangerous "Rule of 1756, " and tosend sugar and cocoa from French colonies to Europe and England under theguise of American produce. By 1805, the whole supply of European sugarwas carried in American bottoms, to the enormous profit of the UnitedStates. American ships also shared largely in the coasting trade ofEurope, carrying goods between ports where British ships were naturallyexcluded. In fact, the great prosperity and high customs receipts towhich the financial success of the Jeffersonians was due depended to agreat extent on the fortunate neutral situation of the United States. 

By 1805, the British shipowners felt that flesh and blood could notendure the situation. Here were France and her allies easily escapingthe hardships of British naval pressure by employing neutrals to carry ontheir trade. Worse still, the Americans, by the device of entering andclearing {192} French sugar at an American port, were now able calmly totake it to England and undersell the West Indian planters in their ownhome markets. Pamphleteers began to criticize the government forpermitting such unfair competition, Lord Sheffield, as in 1783, leadingthe way. In October, 1805, James Stephen, a far abler writer, summed upthe anger of the British ship-owners and naval officers in a pamphletentitled, "War in disguise, or the Frauds of the Neutral Trade. " Heasserted that the whole American neutral commerce was nothing more orless than an evasion of the Rule of 1756 for the joint benefit of Franceand the United States, and he called upon the government to put a stop tothis practical alliance of America with Napoleon. This utterance seemsto have made a profound impression; for a time Stephen's views became thefixed beliefs of influential public men as well as of the naval andshipowning interests. 

The first steps indicating British restlessness were taken by the PittMinistry, which began, in 1804, a policy of rigid naval search forcontraband cargoes, largely carried on off American ports. Whateverfriendly views Pitt may once have entertained toward the Americans, hisMinistry now had for its sole object the contest with {193} France andthe protection of British interests. In July, 1805, a severe blow wassuddenly struck by Sir William Scott, who as chief Admiralty judgerendered a decision to the effect that French sugar, entered at anAmerican custom-house and re-exported with a rebate of the duty, was goodprize under the Rule of 1756. This placed all American re-exportation ofFrench West Indian produce at the mercy of British cruisers; and thesummer of 1805 saw a sudden descent of naval officers upon their prey, causing an outcry of anger from every seaport between Maine and Maryland. The day of reckoning had come, and Jefferson and Madison, his Secretaryof State, were compelled to meet the crisis. Fortunately, as itappeared, for the United States, the Pitt Ministry ended with the deathof its leader on January 23, 1806, and was succeeded by a coalition inwhich Lord Grenville, author of the Jay treaty, was prime Minister, andFox, an avowed friend of America, was Foreign Secretary. While it wasnot reasonably to be expected that any British Ministry would throw overthe traditional naval policy of impressments or venture to run directlycounter to shipping interests, it was open to anticipation that some suchcompromise as the Jay treaty might be agreed upon, which would relievethe United {194} States from arbitrary exactions during the European war. The Grenville Ministry showed its good intentions by abandoning thepolicy of captures authorized by Scott, and substituting, on May 16, 1806, a blockade of the French coast from Ostend to the Seine. Thisanswered the purpose of hindering trade with France without raisingtroublesome questions, and actually allowed American vessels to takesugar to Northern Europe. 

Between 1804 and 1806, Jefferson had brought the United States to theverge of war with Spain through insisting that Napoleon's cession ofLouisiana had included West Florida. At the moment when British seizuresbegan, he was attempting at once to frighten Spain by warlike words and, by a payment of two million dollars, to induce France to compel Spain toacknowledge the American title to the disputed territory. For a numberof years, therefore, and until the scheme fell through, Jeffersoncultivated especially friendly relations with the government of Napoleon, not from any of the former Republican enthusiasm, but solely ondiplomatic grounds. Hence, although nominally neutral in the great war, he bore the appearance of a French partisan. 

Jefferson felt that he had in his possession a thoroughly adequate meansto secure {195} favourable treatment from England, by simply threateningcommercial retaliation. The American trade, he believed, was sonecessary to the prosperity of England that for the sake of retaining itthat country would make any reasonable concession. That there was abasis of truth in this belief it would be impossible to deny; for Englandconsumed American cotton and exported largely to American markets. Withthis trade cut off, manufacturers and exporters would suffer, as they hadsuffered in the revolutionary period. But Jefferson ignored what everyAmerican merchant knew, that military and naval considerations weighedfully as heavily with England as mercantile needs, and that a countrywhich had neither a ship-of-the-line, nor a single army corps inexistence, commanded, in an age of world warfare, very slight respect. Jefferson's prejudice against professional armed forces and his ideal ofwar as a purely voluntary matter, carried on as in colonial times, wassufficiently proclaimed by him to be well understood across the Atlantic. Openly disbelieving in war, avowedly determined not to fight, heapproached a nation struggling for life with the greatest military poweron earth, and called upon it to come to terms for business reasons. 

His first effort was made by causing {196} Congress to pass aNon-importation Act, excluding certain British goods, which was not to gointo effect until the end of 1806. With this as his sole weapon, he sentMonroe to make a new treaty, demanding free commerce and the cessation ofthe impressment of seamen from American vessels in return for thecontinued non-enforcement of the Non-importation Act. Such a task wasmore difficult than that laid upon Jay twelve years before; and Monroe, in spite of the fact that he was dealing with the same Minister, failedto accomplish even so much as his predecessor. From August to Decemberhe negotiated, first with Lord Holland, then, after Fox's death, withLord Howick; but the treaty which he signed on December 1, 1806, contained not one of the points named in his instructions. Monroe foundthe British willing to make only an agreement like the Jay treaty which, while containing special provisions to render the situation tolerable, should refuse to yield any British contentions. That was the Whig policyas much in 1806 as it had been in 1766. The concessions were slight; andthe chief one, regarding the re-exportation of French West Indianproduce, permitted it only on condition that the goods were bona fide ofAmerican ownership, and had paid in the United States a duty of at leasttwo per cent. Jefferson {197} did not even submit the treaty to theSenate. 

After this failure, the situation grew graver. Napoleon, in December, 1806, issued from Berlin a decree declaring that, in retaliation for theaggressions of England upon neutral commerce, the British Isles were inblockade and all trade with them was forbidden. British goods were to beabsolutely excluded from the continent. The reply of the GrenvilleMinistry to this was an Order in Council, January, 1807, prohibitingneutral vessels from trading between the ports of France or her allies;but this was denounced as utterly weak by Perceval and Canning inopposition. In April, 1807, the Grenville Ministry, turned out of officeby the half insane George III, was replaced by a thoroughly Tory cabinet, under the Duke of Portland, whose chief members in the Commons wereGeorge Canning and Spencer Perceval, Foreign Secretary and Chancellor ofthe Exchequer respectively. The United States was now to undergotreatment of a new kind at the hands of Tories who despised itsinstitutions, felt only contempt for the courage of its government, andwere guided as regards American commerce by the doctrines of LordSheffield and James Stephen. 

An Order in Council of November 11, {198} 1807, drafted by Perceval andendorsed by all the rest of the Cabinet, declared that no commerce withFrance or her allies was henceforward to be permitted unless it hadpassed through English ports. To this Napoleon retorted by the MilanDecree of December, 1807, proclaiming that all vessels which had beensearched by British, or which came by way of England, were good prize. Henceforth, then, neutral commerce was positively prohibited. Themerchantmen of the United States could continue to trade at all only bydefinitely siding with one power or the other. The object of the Britishorder was declared to be retaliation on Napoleon. Its actual effect wasto place American trade once more under the rule of the Navigation Acts. As in the days before 1776, American vessels must make England their"staple" or "entrepôt, " and could go only where permitted to by Britishorders under penalty of forfeiture. This measure was sharply attacked inParliament by the Whigs, especially by Grenville and Howick, of the lateMinistry, but was triumphantly sustained by the Tories. 

At this time the chronic grievance of the impressment of seamen fromAmerican vessels grew suddenly acute. In the years of the great war, theAmerican merchant marine, {199} with its safe voyages and good pay, offered a highly attractive prospect for English sailors, who dreaded thedanger, the monotony, and the severe discipline of British men-of-war. They swarmed by thousands into American service, securing as rapidly aspossible, not infrequently by fraudulent means, the naturalization papersby which they hoped to escape the press-gang. Ever since 1793 Britishnaval officers, recognizing no right of expatriation, had systematicallyimpressed British seamen found on American ships and, owing to thedifficulty in distinguishing the two peoples, numerous natives of NewEngland and the middle States found themselves imprisoned on the"floating hell" of a British ship-of-the-line in an epoch when brutalitycharacterized naval discipline. In August, 1807, the United States wasstirred to fury over the forcible seizure by the British _Leopard_ ofthree Englishmen from the U. S. S. _Chesapeake_, which, unprepared fordefence, had to suffer unresisting. So hot was the general anger thatJefferson could easily have led Congress into hostile measures, if not anactual declaration of war, over the multiplied seizures and this lastinsult. 

But Jefferson clung to peace, and satisfied himself by ordering Britishmen-of-war out of American ports and sending a {200} demand forreparation, with which he linked a renunciation of the right ofimpressment. When Congress met in December, he induced it to pass ageneral embargo, positively prohibiting the departure of American vesselsto foreign ports. Since at the same time the Non-importation Act cameinto effect, all imports and exports were practically suspended. Hisidea was that the total cessation of American commerce would inflict suchdiscomfort upon British and French consumers that each country would beforced to abandon its oppressive measures. 

Rarely has a country, at the instance of one man, inflicted a severerstrain upon its citizens. The ravages of French and English together, since the outbreak of war in 1793, did not do so much damage as theembargo did in one year, for it threatened ruin to every shipowner, importer, and exporter in the United States. Undoubtedly Jefferson andhis party had in mind the success of the non-importation agreementsagainst the Stamp Act and the Townshend duties, but what was then thevoluntary action of a great majority was now a burden imposed by one partof the country upon another. The people of New York and New Englandsimply would not obey the Act. To enforce it against Canada became animpossibility, and to prevent vessels from escaping a {201} matter ofgreat difficulty. Jefferson persisted doggedly, and induced Congress topass laws giving revenue collectors extraordinary powers of search andseizure, but without results. 

Under this intolerable grievance, the people of the oppressed regionsrapidly lost their enthusiasm for the Democratic administration. Turningonce more to the Federalist party, which had seemed practically extinct, they threw State after State into its hands, and actually threatened theRepublican control in the Presidential election of 1808. Had a coalitionbeen arranged between the disgusted Republican factions of New York andPennsylvania and the Federalists of New England, Delaware, and Maryland, James Madison might well have been beaten for successor to Jefferson. But worse remained behind. The outraged New Englanders, led by TimothyPickering and others, began to use again, in town-meetings andlegislatures, the old-time language of 1774, once employed against theFive Intolerable Acts, and to threaten secession. As Jefferson saidlater, "I felt the foundations of the government shaken under my feet bythe New England townships. "

By this time, it was definitely proved that as a means of coercion theembargo was worthless. English manufacturers and their {202} workmencomplained, but English ship-owners profited, and crowds of Britishseamen returned perforce to their home, even at times into the royalnavy. Canning, for the Portland Ministry, sarcastically declined to bemoved, observing that the embargo, whatever its motives, was practicallythe same as Napoleon's system, and England could not submit to beingdriven to surrender to France even to regain the American market orrelieve the Americans from their self-inflicted sufferings. Napoleon nowgave an interesting taste of his peculiar methods, for on April 17, 1808, he issued the Bayonne Decree, ordering the confiscation of all Americanvessels found in French ports, on the ground that, since the embargoprohibited the exit of American ships, these must, in reality, beEnglish! Thus he gathered in about eight million dollars' worth. Thepolicy had to be abandoned, and in the utmost ill-humour Congressrepealed the embargo, on March 1, 1809, substituting non-intercourse withEngland and France. Thus Jefferson left office under the shadow of amonumental failure. His theory of commercial coercion had completelybroken down; and he had damaged his own and his party's prestige to suchan extent that the moribund Federalist organization had sprung to lifeand threatened the existence of the Union. 

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From this time onward, the New Englanders assumed the character ofultra-admirers of Great Britain. True, their vessels suffered fromBritish seizures; but no British confiscations had done them such harm asthe embargo, or taken such discreditable advantage of a transparentpretext as the Bayonne Decree. Belonging to the wealthy classes, theyadmired and respected England as defender of the world's civilizationagainst Napoleon, and they detested Jefferson and Madison as tools of theenemy of mankind. They justified impressments, spoke respectfully of theBritish doctrines of trade, and corresponded freely with British publicmen. They stood, in short, exactly where the Republicans had stood in1793, supporters of a foreign power with which the Federal administrationwas in controversy. In Congress and outside, they made steady, bittermenacing attacks on the integrity and honesty of the Republicans. 

Under Jefferson's successor, the policy of commercial pressure wascarried to its impotent conclusion. At first the action of the Britishgovernment seemed to crown Madison with triumph. In the winter of 1809, the majority in Congress had talked freely of substituting war for theembargo; and at the same time the Whigs in Parliament, led by Grenville, had attacked Canning for his {204} insolence toward the United States aslikely to cause war. Whitbread called attention to the similaritybetween the conditions in 1809 and 1774, when "the same infatuationseemed to prevail, " the same certainty existed that the Americans wouldnot fight, and the same confident assertions were made that they couldnot do without England. The comparison possessed much truth, for theTories of 1809 were as indifferent to American feelings as those of 1774, and pushed their commercial policy just as North had done his politicalsystem, in the same contemptuous certainty that the Americans would neverfight. Yet Canning showed sufficient deference to his assailants toinstruct Erskine, British Minister at Washington, to notify Madison thatthe Orders would be withdrawn in case the United States kept itsnon-intercourse with France, recognized the Rule of 1756, and authorizedBritish men-of-war to enforce the Non-intercourse Act. 

The immediate result was surprising, for Erskine, eager to restoreharmony, did not disclose or carry out his instructions, but accepted thecontinuance by the United States of non-intercourse against France as asufficient concession. He announced that the Orders in Council would bewithdrawn on June 10; Madison in turn promptly issued a proclamationreopening trade, and {205} swarms of American vessels rushed across theAtlantic. But Canning, in harsh language, repudiated the arrangement ofhis over-sanguine agent, and Madison was forced to the mortifying step ofreimposing non-intercourse by a second proclamation. Still worseremained, for when F. J. Jackson, the next British Minister, arrived, thePresident had to undergo the insult of being told that he had connivedwith Erskine in violating his instructions. The refusal to hold furtherrelations with the blunt emissary was a poor satisfaction. All thistime, moreover, reparation for the _Chesapeake_ affair was blocked, sinceit had been coupled with a demand for the renunciation of impressments, something that no British Ministry would have dared to yield. 

On the part of Napoleon, the Non-intercourse Act offered anotheropportunity for plunder. When he first heard of Erskine's concessions, he was on the point of meeting them, but on learning of their failure hechanged about, commanded the sequestration of all American vesselsentering European ports, and in May, 1810, by the Rambouillet Decree, heordered their confiscation and sale. The ground assigned was that theNon-intercourse Act forbade any French or English vessel to enterAmerican ports under penalty of confiscation. {206} None had beenconfiscated, but they might be. Hence he acted. Incidentally he helpedto fill his treasury, and seized about ten millions of American property. 

By this time it was clear to most Americans that, however unfriendly theBritish policy, it was honesty itself compared to that of the Emperor, whose sole aim seemed to be to ensnare American vessels for the purposeof seizing them. The Federalists in Congress expatiated on his perfidyand bare-faced plunder, but nothing could shake the intention of Madisonto stick to commercial bargaining. Congress now passed another Act, destined to be the last effort at peaceful coercion. Trade was opened, but the President was authorized to reimpose non-intercourse with eithernation if the other would withdraw its decrees. This Act, known alwaysas the Macon Bill No. 2, became law in May, 1810, and Napoleonimmediately seized the occasion for further sharp practice. He caused anunofficial, unsigned letter to be shown to the American Minister at Parisstating that the French decrees would be withdrawn on November 2, 1810, "it being understood that the English should withdraw theirs by that timeor the United States should cause its rights to be respected by England. "Madison accordingly reimposed non-intercourse with {207} England on thedate named, and considered the French decrees withdrawn. The situationwas regarded by him as though he had entered into a contract withNapoleon, which compelled him to assert that the decrees were at an end, although he had no other evidence than the existence of the situationarising from the Macon Bill. 

There followed a period during which the American Minister at London, William Pinkney, endeavoured without success to convince the Britishgovernment that the decrees actually were withdrawn. The PortlandMinistry had fallen in 1809, and the sharp-tongued Canning was replacedin the Foreign Office by the courteous Marquess Wellesley; but SpencerPerceval, author of the Orders in Council, was Prime Minister and stifflydetermined to adhere to his policy. James Stephen and George Rose, inParliament, stood ready to defend them, and the Tory party as a wholeaccepted their necessity. When, therefore, Pinkney presented his requestto Wellesley, the latter naturally demanded something official fromNapoleon, which neither Pinkney nor Madison could supply. Finally, inFebruary, 1811, Pinkney broke off diplomatic relations and returned home, having played his difficult part with dignity. To aggravate thesituation Napoleon's cruisers continued, {208} whenever they had achance, to seize and burn American vessels bound for England, and hisport authorities to sequester vessels arriving from England. The decreeswere not in fact repealed. 

Madison had committed himself, however, to upholding the honour ofNapoleon--a task from which any other man would have recoiled--and theUnited States continued to insist on a fiction. Madison's conduct inthis affair was that of a shrewd lawyer-like man who tried to carry ondiplomacy between two nations fighting to the death as though it were amatter of contracts, words and phrases of legal meaning. To Napoleon, legality was an incomprehensible idea. To the Tory ministries, struggling to maintain their country against severe economic pressure, facts, not words, counted, and facts based on naval force. Upon theJeffersonian and Madisonian attempts at peaceful coercion they lookedwith mingled annoyance and contempt, believing, as they did, that thewhole American policy was that of a weak and cowardly nation trying bypettifogging means to secure favourable trade conditions. The situationhad reached a point where the United States had nothing to hope fromeither contestant, by continuing this policy. 

At this juncture a new political force {209} appeared. By 1811 theold-time Republican leaders, trained in the school of Jeffersonianideals, were practically bankrupt. Faction paralyzed government, andCongress seemed, by its timid attitude, to justify the taunt of Quincy ofMassachusetts that the Republican party could not be kicked into a war. But there appeared on the stage a new sort of Republican. In the westerncounties of the older States and in the new territories beyond themountains, the frontier element, once of small account in the country andwholly disregarded under the Federalists, was multiplying, formingcommunities and governments, where the pioneer habits had created ademocracy that was distinctly pugnacious. Years of danger from Indians, of rivalry with white neighbours over land titles, of struggle with thewilderness, had produced a half-lawless and wholly self-assertive type ofman, as democratic as Jefferson himself, but with a perfect willingnessto fight and with a great respect for fighters. To these men, thetameness with which the United States had submitted to insults andplundering was growing to be unendurable. Plain masculine anger began toobscure other considerations. 

These Western men, moreover, had a special cause for indignation withEngland, {210} which was ignored by the sea-coast communities, in theclose connection which they firmly believed to exist between the Britishadministration of upper Canada and the north-western Indians. In theyears after 1809, the Indian question again began to assume a dangerousform. Settlers were coming close to the treaty lines, and, to satisfytheir demands for the bottom lands along the Wabash River, GovernorHarrison of Indiana Territory made an extensive series of land purchasesfrom the small tribes on the coveted territory. 

But there now appeared two remarkable Indians, Tecumseh and his brother, the Prophet, of the Shawnee tribe, who saw in the occupation of the redmen's hunting lands and the inroads of frontier corn whiskey the death ofall their race. These leaders began to hold their own tribe togetheragainst the purchase of whiskey or the sale of lands; then, with widervision, they tried to organize an alliance of all the north-westernIndians to prevent further white advance. They even went so far as tovisit the south-western Indians, Creeks and Cherokees, to induce them tojoin in the grand league. The very statesmanship involved in this vastscheme rendered it dangerous in the eyes of all Westerners, who werefirmly convinced that the backing of {211} this plan came from theBritish posts in Canada. There was, in reality, a good understandingbetween the Canadian officers and the Shawnee chiefs. In 1811hostilities broke out at Tippecanoe, where Governor Harrison had a sharpbattle with the Shawnees; but Tecumseh exerted himself to restorepeaceful relations, although the frontier was in great excitement. 

From the States of Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, and from the innercounties of the southern States there came to the first session of theEleventh Congress, in December, 1811, a group of young politicians--HenryClay, John Calhoun, Langdon Cheves, Felix Grundy--who felt that the timefor talk was at an end. Unless England immediately revoked its decrees, ceased impressing seamen, and refrained from instigating Indian plotsthere must be war. Assuming control of the House, with Clay in theSpeaker's chair, they transformed the Republican party and the policy ofthe country. They pushed through measures for raising troops, armingships, and borrowing money. Congress rang with fiery speeches, as monthafter month went by and the Perceval Ministry obstinately refused to stirfrom its commercial policy. 

Yet the feeling of the English public was already undergoing a change. By 1812 the {212} pretence that the Orders in Council were maintained forthe purpose of starving out France was growing transparent when thousandsof licences, granted freely to British vessels, permitted a vast fleet tocarry on the supposedly forbidden trade. Although Perceval and Canningstill insisted in Parliament that the Orders were retaliatory, the factwas patent that their only serious effect was to cause the loss of theAmerican trade and the American market. At the threat of war, theexporters of England, suffering severely from glutted markets, began avigorous agitation against Perceval's policy and bombarded the Ministry, through Henry Brougham, with petitions, memorials, and motions which putthe Tories on the defensive. Speakers like Alexander Baring held up thesystem of Orders in Council as riddled with corruption, and only thepersonal authority of Perceval and Castlereagh kept the majority firm. At the height of this contest, Perceval was assassinated, on May 11, 1812; and it was not until June 8 that hope of a new coalition wasabandoned, and the Tory Cabinet was definitely reorganized under LordLiverpool. Almost the first act of that Ministry was to bow before thestorm of petitions, criticisms, and complaints, and to announce on June16 that they had decided to suspend the Orders. {213} Thus the verycontingency upon which Jefferson and Madison had counted came to pass. The British government, at the instance of the importing andmanufacturing classes, yielded to the pressure of American commercialrestrictions. It was true that the danger of war weighed far more, apparently, than the Non-intercourse Act; but had there been an Atlanticcable, or even a steam transit, at that time, or had the LiverpoolMinistry been formed a little earlier, the years 1807-1812 might havepassed into history as a triumphant vindication of Jefferson's theories. 

But it was too late. Madison, seeing, apparently, that his plans were afailure, fell in with the new majority, and after deliberate preparationsent a message to Congress in June, 1812, which was practically aninvitation to declare war. In spite of the bitter opposition of allFederalists and many eastern Republicans, Congress, by the votes of thesouthern and western members, adopted a declaration of war on June 18, committing the United States to a contest with the greatest naval powerin the world on the grounds of the Orders in Council, the impressment ofseamen, and the intrigues with the north-western Indians. At the momentwhen Napoleon, invading Russia, began his last stroke for universalempire, the United {214} States entered the game as his virtual ally. This was something the Federalists could not forgive. They returned totheir homes, execrating the war as waged in behalf of the arch-enemy ofGod and man, as the result of a pettifogging bit of trickery on the partof Napoleon. They denounced the ambitions of Clay and the Westerners, who predicted an easy conquest of Canada, as merely an expression of apirate's desire to plunder England of its colonies, and they announcedtheir purpose to do nothing to assist the unrighteous conflict. In theiranger at Madison, they were even willing to vote for De Witt Clinton ofNew York, who ran for President in 1812 as an Independent Republican; andthe coalition carried the electoral vote of every State north of Marylandexcept Pennsylvania and Vermont. 

When the news of the repeal of the Orders in Council crossed theAtlantic, some efforts were made by the governor-general of Canada toarrange an armistice, hoping to prevent hostilities. But Madison doesnot seem to have seriously considered abandoning the war, even though theoriginal cause had been removed. Feeling the irresistible pressure ofthe southern and western Democrats behind him, he announced that thecontest must go on until England should {215} abandon the practice ofimpressment. So the last hope of peace disappeared. 

The war thus begun need never have taken place, had the Tory Ministriesof Portland or Perceval cared to avert it. The United States only lasheditself into a war-like mood after repeated efforts to secure concessions, and after years of submission to British rough handling. During all thistime, either Madison or Jefferson would gladly have accepted any sort ofcompromise which did not shut American vessels wholly out from some formof independent trade. But the enmity of the British shipowners and navalleaders and the traditional British commercial policy joined withcontempt for the spiritless nation to prevent any such action until thefitting time had gone by. 

CHAPTER XI

THE WAR FOR "SAILORS' RIGHTS" AND WESTWARD EXPANSION, 1812-1815

The second war between the United States and the mother country, unlikethe first, was scarcely more than a minor {216} annoyance to thestronger party. In the years 1812-1814, England was engaged inmaintaining an army in Spain, in preying on French commerce by blockadeand cruising, and was spending immense sums to subsidize the Europeannations in their final struggle against Napoleon. The whole militaryand financial strength of the country, the whole political anddiplomatic interest were absorbed in the tremendous European contest. Whig and Tory, landowner, manufacturer, and labourer were united inunbending determination to destroy the power of the Corsican. TheLiverpool Ministry contained little of talent, and no genius, but themembers possessed certain traits which sufficed to render othersunnecessary, namely, an unshakable tenacity and steady hatred of theFrench. The whole country stood behind them on that score. 

In these circumstances, the English, when obliged to fight the UnitedStates, were at liberty to send an overwhelming naval force to blockadeor destroy American commerce, but were in great straits to provide mento defend Canada. It was not until a full year after the declarationof war that any considerable force of regular troops could be collectedand sent there, and not for two years that anything approaching agenuine army could be directed against America. {217} The defence ofCanada had to be left to the efforts of some few officers and men andsuch local levies as could be assembled. 

On the side of the United States, the war was bound to take the form ofan effort to capture all or part of Canada, for that was the onlyvulnerable British possession. On the sea the United States could hopeat most to damage British commerce by means of the few nationalcruisers and such privateers as the shipowners of the country couldsend out. Without a single ship-of-the-line and with only fivefrigates, there existed no possibility of actually fighting the Britishnavy. But on land it seemed as though a country with a population ofover seven millions ought to be able to raise armies of such size as tooverrun, by mere numbers, the slender resources of Canada; and it wasthe confident expectation of most of the western leaders that within ashort time the whole region would be in American hands. "Theacquisition of Canada this year, " wrote Jefferson, "as far as theneighbourhood of Quebec, will be a mere matter of marching, and willgive us experience for the attack on Halifax, the next and the finalexpulsion of England from the American continent. "

Unfortunately for the success of these dreams, the policy of theRepublican administrations had been such as to set up {218} insuperabledifficulties. The regular army, reduced under Jefferson's "passion forpeace" to a bare minimum, was scattered in a few posts; the WarDepartment was without means for equipping, feeding, and transportingbodies of troops; the whole mechanism of war administration had to becreated. Further, the Secretary of the Army and nearly all thegenerals were elderly men, veterans of the Revolutionary Army, who hadlost whatever energy they once possessed. The problem of war financeswas rendered serious by the fact that revenue from the tariff, the soleimportant source of income, was sure to be cut off by the British navalpower. The National Bank had been refused a new charter in 1811, andthe government, democratic in its finances as in other matters, reliedupon a hundred odd State banks of every degree of solvency for aid incarrying on financial operations. 

The temper of the American people was exactly what it had been incolonial days. They regarded war as a matter to be carried on at theconvenience of farmers and others, who were willing to serve in defenceof their homes, but strongly objected to enlisting for any length oftime. On the more pugnacious frontier, the prevailing military idealwas that of the armed mob or crowd--a body of fighters following achosen leader against Indians. {219} Everywhere the elementaryconceptions of obedience and duty were unknown. The very men whowished for war were unwilling to fight except on their own terms. 

Still more fatal to military efficiency was the fact that theFederalists, and many of the northern Republicans, inhabiting theregions abutting on Canada, were violently opposed to the war, wishedto see it fail, and were firmly resolved to do nothing to aid theadministration. The utmost the Federalists would do was to defendthemselves if attacked, but they would do that on their ownresponsibility and not under federal orders. 

The only exception to this prevailing unmilitary condition was to befound in the navy, where, through cruising and through actual serviceagainst the Barbary corsairs, a genuinely trained body of officers andmen had been created. Unable to do more than give a good account ofthemselves on the ocean in single combats, these officers found achance on the northern lakes to display a fighting power and skillwhich is one of the few redeeming features of the war on the Americanside. 

In 1812 hostilities began with a feeble attempt on the part of theUnited States to invade Canada, an effort whose details are of interestonly in showing how impossible {220} it is for an essentiallyunmilitary people to improvise warfare. Congress had authorized aloan, the construction of vessels, and the enlistment of an army of36, 000 men; but the officers appointed to assemble a military forcefound themselves unable, after months of recruiting and working, togather more than half that number of raw troops, with a fluctuatingbody of State militia. With these rudiments of a military force, attempts to "invade" Canada were made in three directions--fromDetroit, from the Niagara River, and from the northern end of LakeChamplain. 

To meet these movements, there were actually less than 2, 800 Britishsoldiers west of Montreal; but fortunately they were commanded by IsaacBrock, an officer of daring and an aggressive temper. He at onceentered into alliance with Tecumseh and the western Indians, and thusbrought to the British assistance a force of hundreds of warriors alongthe Ohio and Kentucky frontier. While General Hull, with about 2, 000troops, mainly volunteers from the West, marched under orders toDetroit and then, in July, invaded upper Canada, the outlying Americanposts at Chicago and Mackinac were either captured or destroyed by theIndians. Brock, gathering a handful of men, marched against Hull, terrified him for the safety of {221} his communications with theUnited States, forced the old man to retreat to Detroit, and finally, by advancing boldly against the slight fortifications of the post, frightened him into surrender. Hull had been set an impossible task, to conquer upper Canada with no sure means of getting reinforcements orsupplies through a region swarming with Indians; but his conductindicated no spark of pugnacity, and his surrender caused the loss ofthe entire north-west. Tecumseh and his warriors now advanced againstthe Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio frontiers; and the nameless horrors ofIndian massacre and torture surged along the line of settlements. Thefrontiersmen flew to arms. General Harrison, with a commission fromKentucky, headed a large expedition to regain lost ground; but he onlysucceeded in building forts in north-western Ohio and waging adefensive war against the raids of Tecumseh and the British general, Proctor, Brock's successor. 

At Niagara, no move was made until the late autumn, when two Americangenerals in succession--Van Rensselaer and Smyth--tried to lead amotley array of militia and regulars across the river. Brock met thefirst detachment and was killed in a skirmish, but his men were able toannihilate the main attack, on the brink of the river, while severalthousand American militia, {222} refusing, on constitutional grounds, to serve outside the jurisdiction of their state, watched safely fromthe eastern bank. The second effort in November, under General Smyth, proved an even worse fiasco. Meanwhile General Dearborn, the supremecommander, tried to invade near Lake Champlain; but, after he hadmarched his troops to the Canadian border, the militia refused to leavethe soil of the United States, and so the campaign had to be abandoned. The military efforts of the United States were, as the Canadianhistorian phrases it, "beneath criticism. "

The only redeeming feature of the year was the record of the littleAmerican navy and the success of the privateers, who rushed to preyupon British commerce. Upwards of two hundred British vessels werecaptured, while all but about seventy American ships reached homesafely. The British sent squadrons of cruisers, but were unable tobegin a blockade. Their aim was to capture American men-of-war asrapidly as possible, to prevent their doing damage, so theyunhesitatingly attacked American vessels whenever they met them, regardless of slight differences in size or gun-power. The Britishsea-captain of the day had a hearty contempt for Americans, and neverdreamed that their navy could be any more dangerous than the {223}French. To the unlimited delight of the American public, and thestupefaction of England, five American cruisers in succession capturedor sank five British in the autumn of 1812, utilizing superior weightof broadside and more accurate gunnery with merciless severity. Theseblows did no actual damage to a navy which comprised several hundredfrigates and sloops, but the moral effect was great. It had beenproved that Americans, after all, could fight. 

In 1813 there was a change in administrative officers. Doctor Eustiswas replaced in the War Department by John Armstrong, who had served inthe Revolution, and William Jones of Philadelphia succeeded PaulHamilton as Secretary of the Navy. Congress authorized more men, tothe number of 58, 000, and more ships, and voted more loans. Finally, in the summer it was actually driven to impose internal taxes likethose which, when imposed by Federalists, had savoured of tyranny. 

On the northern frontier, renewed efforts were made to collect a realarmy, and, with late comprehension of the necessities of the case, naval officers were sent to build flotillas to control Erie, Ontario, and Champlain. On their part, the British Ministry sent out a fewtroops and officers to Canada, but {224} relied this year chiefly upona strict blockade, which was proclaimed first in December, 1812, andwas extended, before the end of the year, to cover the entire coast, except New England. Ships-of-the-line, frigates, and sloops patrolledthe entrances to all the seaports, terminating not only foreign butcoastwise commerce. 

Things went little if any better for the United States. The army wason paper 58, 000 men; but the people of the north and west would notenlist. The utmost efforts at recruiting did not succeed in bringingone-half the nominal force into the field. The people would not takethe war seriously, and the administration was helpless. To makematters worse, not only did the north-western frontier agonize underIndian warfare, but the south-west became involved, when, in August, 1813, the Creek Indians, affected by Tecumseh's influence, rose andbegan a war in Tennessee and Georgia. For months Andrew Jackson, General of Tennessee militia, with other local commanders, carried onan exhausting and murderous conflict in the swamps and woods of thesouth-west. The war was now assuming the character of the last standof the Indians before the oncoming whites. 

In the north-west, decisive blows were struck in this year by GeneralHarrison and {225} Commander Perry. The latter built a small fleet ofboats, carrying in all fifty-four guns, and sailed out to contest thecontrol of Lake Erie. Captain Barclay, the British commander, withscantier resources, constructed a weaker fleet, with sixty-threelighter guns, and gallantly awaited the Americans on September 9. In adesperately fought battle, Perry's sloop, the _Lawrence_, waspractically destroyed by the concentrated fire of the British; but thegreater gun-power of the Americans told, and the entire Britishflotilla was compelled to surrender. This enabled Harrison, who hadbeen waiting for months in his fortifications, to advance and pursueProctor into upper Canada. On October 5 he brought him to action nearthe river Thames, winning a complete victory and killing Tecumseh. TheAmericans then returned to Detroit, and the Indian war graduallysimmered down, until in August, 1814, the leading tribes made peace. To the eastward no such decisive action took place. Sir James Yeo andCommodore Chauncey, commanding the British and American vesselsrespectively on Lake Ontario, were each unwilling to risk a battlewithout a decisive superiority; and the result was that no seriousengagement occurred. This rendered it impossible for either side toattain any military success in that region; and so the year 1813 {226}shows only a succession of raids, a species of activity in which theBritish proved much the more daring and efficient. During one of theseaffairs, General Dearborn occupied the Canadian town of York, nowToronto, and burned the public buildings--an act of needlessdestruction for which the United States was destined to pay heavily. Further eastward, General Wilkinson and General Hampton began a jointinvasion of lower Canada, Wilkinson leading a force of over 6, 000 mendown the St. Lawrence, Hampton advancing with 4, 000 from Lake Champlaintoward the same goal, Montreal. But at Chrystler's Farm, on November11, the rearguard of Wilkinson's army suffered a thorough defeat at thehands of a small pursuing force; and Hampton underwent a similarrepulse from an inferior body of French-Canadians under Colonel deSalaberry, at Chateauguy, on October 25. Finally, Hampton, suspectingthat Armstrong and Wilkinson intended in case of any failure to throwthe blame on him, decided to withdraw, November 11, and Wilkinsonfollowed. The whole invasion came to an inglorious conclusion. 

At sea the uniform success of American cruisers came to a stop, for, out of four naval duels, two were British victories, notably the takingof the unlucky _Chesapeake_ by the {227} _Shannon_. Only whereprivateers and sloops swept West Indian waters and hung about Britishconvoys was there much to satisfy American feelings; and all the whilethe blockading squadrons cruised at their ease in Chesapeake andDelaware bays and Long Island Sound. The country was now subjected toincreasing distress from the stoppage of all commerce; not only was theFederal government sorely pinched from loss of tariff revenue, but theNew England towns suffered from starvation prices for food products, while in the middle and southern States grain was used to feed thecattle or allowed to rot. 

For the season of 1814, it was necessary again to try to build uparmies; and now the time was growing short during which the UnitedStates could hope to draw advantage from the preoccupation of Englandin the European struggle. During the winter of 1814, the finalcrushing of Napoleon took place, ending with his abdication and therestoration of the Bourbons. Simultaneously, the British campaign inSpain was carried to its triumphant conclusion, and after April Britisharmies had no further European occupation. Unless peace were made, orunless the United States gained such advantages in Canada as to renderthe British ready to treat, it was practically certain that the {228}summer would find the full power of the British army, as well as thenavy, in a position to be directed against the American frontier andthe American sea-coast. 

Congress, however, did nothing new. It authorized a loan, raised thebounty for enlistments, voted a further increase of the army, andadjourned. Armstrong, the Secretary of War, succeeded in replacing theworn-out veterans who had mismanaged the campaigns of 1812-1813 withfighting generals, younger men, such as Jacob Brown, Scott, Ripley, andJackson, the Indian fighter; but he could not induce men to enlist anymore freely, nor did he show any ability in planning operations. Soevents dragged on much as before. 

On Lake Ontario, Chauncey and Yeo continued their cautious policy, building vessels continually and never venturing out of port unless forthe moment in overwhelming force. The result was that first one thenthe other controlled the lake; but they never met. The only seriousfighting took place near Niagara, where General Brown, with a littleforce of 2, 600 men, tried to invade Canada, and was met first byGeneral Riall, and later by General Drummond, with practically equalforces. Here the Americans actually fought, and fought hard, winning aslight success at Chippawa on July 5, and engaging {229} in a drawnbattle at Lundy's Lane on July 25. Later forced to take refuge in FortErie, Brown made a successful defence against Drummond, and obliged himto abandon an effort at siege. Here, as in the naval combats, themilitary showing of the Americans was at last creditable; but thecampaign was on too trivial a scale to produce any results. In thesouth-west this year, Jackson pushed through his attack on the Creeksto a triumphant conclusion, and in spite of mutinous militia anddifficult forests compelled the Indians on August 9, 1814, to purchasepeace by large cessions of land. 

By the middle of the summer, however, the British were ready to lay aheavy hand on the United States and punish the insolent country for itsannoying attack in the rear. New England was now subjected to theblockade, and troops from Wellington's irresistible army were sentacross, some to the squadron in the Chesapeake, others to Canada, andlater still others in a well-equipped expedition to New Orleans toconquer the mouth of the Mississippi. 

The Chesapeake squadron, after raiding and provisioning itself at theexpense of the Virginia and Maryland farmers, made a dash atWashington, sending boats up the Patuxent and Potomac rivers, andlanding a body of about 2, 000 men. On August 24, with absurd {230}ease, this force scattered in swift panic a hasty collection ofmilitia, and entered Washington, sending the President and Cabinetflying into the country. In retaliation for the damage done at York, the British officers set fire to the capital and other publicbuildings, before retreating swiftly to their ships. A similar attackon Baltimore, September 11, was better met, and, although the Britishrouted a force of militia, the attempt to take the city was abandoned. The humiliation of the capture of Washington led to the downfall ofArmstrong as Secretary of State, although not until after he had almostruined another campaign. 

While the British were threatening Washington, another force wasgathering north of Lake Champlain, and a large frigate was being builtto secure command of that lake. By the end of August, nearly 16, 000men, most of them from Wellington's regiments, were assembled to invadeNew York, probably with the intention of securing the permanentoccupation of the northern part. In the face of this, Armstrong sentmost of the American troops at Plattsburg on a useless march across NewYork State, leaving a bare handful under General McComb to meet theinvasion. When Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, advanced to Plattsburg on September 6, he found nothing {231} butmilitia and volunteers before him. Fortunately for the United States, Prevost was no fighter, and he declined to advance or attack unless hehad a naval control of the lake. On September 11 the decisive contesttook place. McDonough, the American commander, with a small squadron, entirely defeated and captured the British flotilla under Downie. Itwas Lake Erie over again, with the difference that in this battle theAmerican fleet was not superior to the British. It was a victory dueto better planning and better gunnery, and it led to the immediateretreat of Prevost, who tamely abandoned the whole campaign, to theintense mortification of his officers and men. The remainingexpedition, under General Pakenham, comprising 16, 000 Peninsularveterans, under convoy of a strong fleet, sailed to the Gulf of Mexicoand advanced to capture New Orleans. General Andrew Jackson was athand, and with him a mass of militia and frontiersmen. Driven by thefurious energy of the Indian fighter, the Americans showedaggressiveness and courage in skirmishes and night attacks, and finallywon an astounding victory on January 8, 1815. On that day the Britishforce tried to storm, by frontal attack, a line of intrenchments armedwith cannon and packed with riflemen. In twenty-five minutes theircolumns were so badly cut up by {232} grapeshot and musketry that thewhole attack was abandoned, after Pakenham himself had been killed. The expedition withdrew, and sailing to Mobile, a town in Spanishterritory, occupied by the Americans, retook it on February 11; but themain purpose of their invasion was foiled. 

In this year, while American land forces struggled to escapedestruction, the naval vessels were for the most part shut in by theblockade. Occasional captures were still made in single combat; butBritish frigates were now under orders to refuse battle with the largerAmerican vessels, and the captures by sloops were counterbalanced bythe British capture of the frigate _Essex_ by two antagonists in March, 1814. Practically the only extensive operations carried on were byAmerican privateers, who now haunted the British Channel and capturedmerchantmen within sight of the English coasts. The irritation causedby these privateers was excessive, and made British shipowners andmerchants anxious for peace; but it had no effect on the militarysituation. England was not to be subdued by mere annoyance. 

By the end of 1814, the time seemed to be at hand when the UnitedStates must submit to peace on such terms as England chose to dictate, or risk disruption and ruin. The administrative weaknesses of thecountry {233} culminated in actual financial bankruptcy, which was duein no small part to the fact that Federalist financiers and bankers, determining to do all the damage possible, steadily refused tosubscribe to the loans or to give any assistance. The powerful NewEngland capital was entirely withheld. The result was that the strainon the rest of the banks became too great; and after the capture ofWashington they all suspended specie payment, leaving the Governmentonly the notes of suspended banks, or its own depreciated treasurynotes for currency. All the coin in the country steadily flowed intothe vaults of New England banks, while the Federal Treasury wascompelled, on November 9, 1814, to admit its inability to pay intereston its loans. Congress met in the autumn and endeavoured to remedy thesituation by chartering a bank; but under the general suspension ofspecie payments it was impossible to start one solvent from thebeginning. When Congress authorized one without power to suspendspecie payments, Madison vetoed it as useless. All that could be donewas to issue more treasury notes. As for the army, a Bill forcompulsory service was brought in, showing the enormous change inRepublican ideals; but it failed to pass. Congress seemed helpless. The American people would neither enlist for the war nor {234}authorize their representatives to pass genuine war measures. 

The Federalists, controlling most of the New England States, now feltthat the time had come to insist on a termination of their grievances. Their governors had refused to allow militia to assist, theirlegislatures had done nothing to aid the war; their capitalists haddeclined to subscribe, and their farmers habitually sold provisions tothe British over the Canadian boundary, actually supplying Sir GeorgePrevost's army by contract. There met, at Hartford, on December 14, 1814, a convention of leading men, officially or unofficiallyrepresenting the five New England States, who agreed upon a documentwhich was intended to secure the special rights of their region. Theydemanded amendments to the Constitution abolishing the reckoning ofslaves as basis for congressional representation, providing for thepartial distribution of government revenues among the States, prohibiting embargoes or commercial warfare, or the election ofsuccessive Presidents from the same State, and requiring a two-thirdsvote of Congress to admit new States or declare war. This was meantfor an ultimatum; and it was generally understood that, if the Federalgovernment did not submit to these terms, the New England States wouldsecede to {235} rid themselves of what they considered the intolerableoppression of Virginian misgovernment. 

Such was the state of things in the winter of 1815. The administrationof Madison had utterly failed to secure any of the ends of the war, toinflict punishment on Great Britain, or to conquer Canada. It had alsoutterly failed to maintain financial solvency, to enlist an army, tocreate a navy capable of keeping the sea, or to prevent a movement inNew England which seemed to be on the verge of breaking the countryinto pieces. But to lay this miserable failure--for such only can itbe called--to the personal discredit of Jefferson and Madison isunfair, for it was only the repetition under new governmentalconditions of the old traditional colonial method of carrying on war asa local matter. The French and Indian War, the Revolution, and the Warof 1812, repeated in different generations the same tale of amateurwarfare, of the occasional success and usual worthlessness of themilitia, the same administrative inefficiency, and the same financialbreakdown. Without authority and obedience, there can be carried on noreal war; and authority and obedience were no more known and no betterappreciated in 1812 than they had been in the days of Washington. Jefferson, Madison, {236} and their party had gone with the current ofAmerican tradition; that was their only fault. 

CHAPTER XII

END OF THE ANTAGONISM: A CENTURY OF PEACE

When the American war began, the English showed a tendency to blame theTory administration for permitting it to take place; but the chieffeeling, after all, was one of annoyance at Madison and his party forhaving decided to give their assistance to Napoleon at the crisis ofhis career. The intercourse between Englishmen and New EnglandFederalists had given British society its understanding of Americanpolitics and coloured its natural irritation toward the Republicanadministration with something of the deeper venom of the outraged NewEnglanders, who saw in Jefferson and his successors a race ofhalf-Jacobins. During 1812 and 1813, accordingly, newspapers andministerial speakers, when they referred to the contest, generallyspoke of the necessity of {237} chastising an impudent and presumptuousantagonist. A friendly party such as had defended the colonists duringthe Revolution no longer existed, for the Whigs, however antagonisticto the Liverpool Ministry, were fully as firmly committed tomaintaining British naval and commercial supremacy. 

England's chief continental ally, however, the Tsar Alexander, considered the American war an unfortunate blunder; and, as early asSeptember, 1812, he offered his mediation through young John QuincyAdams, Minister at St. Petersburg. The news reached America in March, 1813, and Madison revealed his willingness to withdraw from a contestalready shown to be unprofitable by immediately accepting andnominating Adams, with Bayard and Gallatin, to serve as peacecommissioners. Without waiting to hear from England, these envoysstarted for Russia, but reached there only to meet an official refusalon the part of England, dated July 5, 1813. The Liverpool Ministry didnot wish to have the American war brought within the range of Europeanconsideration, since its settlement under such circumstances mightraise questions of neutral rights which would be safer out of the handsof a Tsar whose predecessors had framed armed neutralities in 1780 and1801. Accordingly, the British government intimated politely that{238} it would be willing to deal directly with the United States, andthus waved the unwelcome Russian mediation aside. Madison acceptedthis offer in March, 1814; but, although the American commissionersendeavoured through Alexander Baring, their friend and defender inParliament, to get the British government to appoint a time and placefor meeting, they encountered continued delays. 

A considerable element in the Tory party felt that the time had come toinflict a severe punishment upon the United States, and newspapers andspeakers of that connection announced freely that only by largeconcessions of territory could the contemptible republic purchasepeace. When the Ministry finally sent commissioners to Ghent, onAugust 8, 1814, it was not with any expectation of coming to a promptagreement, but merely to engage the Americans while the variousexpeditions then under way took Washington and Baltimore, occupiednorthern New York, and captured New Orleans. It was generally expectedthat a few months would find large portions of the United States inBritish possession, as was in fact the sea-coast of Maine, east ofPenobscot Bay, after September first. 

The instructions to the British peace commissioners were based on the_uti possedetis_, {239} as the British government intended it to be bythe end of the year, when they expected to hold half of Maine, thenorthern parts of New York, New Hampshire and Vermont, thenorth-western post of Mackinnac, and possibly New Orleans and Mobile. In addition, there was to be an Indian territory established underBritish guarantee west of the old treaty line of 1795, and all Americanfishing rights were to be terminated. On the other side, the Americaninstructions, while hinting that England would do well to cede Canada, made the abandonment of the alleged right of impressments by England a_sine quâ non_. Clearly no agreement between such points of view waspossible; and the outcome of the negotiation was bound to depend on thecourse of events in the United States. The first interviews resultedin revealing that part of the British instructions related to theIndian territory with intimations of coming demands for territorialcessions. This the Americans instantly rejected on August 25, and thenegotiation came to a standstill for several weeks. 

The three British negotiators, Admiral Gambier, Henry Goulburn, andDoctor Adams were men of slight political or personal authority, andtheir part consisted chiefly in repeating their instructions andreferring American replies back to Lord Castlereagh, {240} the ForeignSecretary, or to Lord Bathurst, who acted as his substitute while heattended the Congress of Vienna. The American commissioners, includingthe three original ones, Adams, Bayard, and Gallatin, to whom Clay andRussell of Massachusetts were now added, clearly understood thesituation, and had already warned Madison that an insistence on theabandonment of impressments would result in the failure to secure anytreaty. In October, 1814, a despatch yielded this point and left thenegotiators to make the best fight they could, unhampered by positiveinstructions. Undoubtedly they would have been compelled to submit tohard terms, in spite of their personal ability, which stood exceedinglyhigh, had not news of the repulse at Baltimore, of the treaty of July, 1814, by which the north-western Indians agreed to fight the English, and, on October 17, of the retreat of Sir George Prevost after thedefeat of Plattsburg, come in to change the situation. 

Between August and October little had been accomplished, during a slowinterchange of notes, beyond a withdrawal by the British of theirdemand for an Indian territory, and an acceptance in its place of anagreement to include the Indians in a general peace. Then the Cabinet, seeing that after Prevost's retreat they could no longer claim the{241} territory outlined in the first instructions, authorized thenegotiators to demand only Mackinac and Niagara, with a right of wayacross Maine. The Americans, encouraged by the news from Plattsburg, replied on October 23, refusing to treat on the _uti possedetis_, or onany terms but the _status quo ante_. This brought the Tory governmentface to face with the question whether the war was to be continued foranother year for the purpose of conquering a frontier for Canada; and, before the prospect of continued war taxation, annoyance fromprivateers, and a doubtful outcome, they hesitated. Turning toWellington for a decision, they asked him whether he would accept thecommand in America for the purpose of conquering a peace. His replyshowed little interest or desire to go, although he seemed confident ofsuccess; but he observed that, on the basis of the military situation, they had no right to demand any territorial cession. 

The Ministry then, on November 18, definitely abandoned the claim forcompensation, and accepted as a basis for discussion a plan submittedby the American commissioners. In the preparation of this a sharpquarrel had broken out between Clay, who insisted on terminating theBritish right to navigate the Mississippi, and Adams, who {242}demanded the retention of the American right to fish in Canadianwaters. Gallatin pointed out that the two privileges stood together, and with great difficulty he induced the two men to agree to theomission of both matters from the treaty, although Clay refused untilthe last to sign. So the commission presented a united front inoffering to renew both rights or postpone them for discussion; and theBritish commissioners finally accepted the latter alternative. Thetreaty was then signed in the old Carthusian Convent at Ghent, onDecember 24, 1814, as a simple cessation of hostilities and return tothe _status quo ante_ as regards conquests. Not a word related to anyof the numerous causes of the war. Impressments, blockades, Orders inCouncil, the Indian relations, the West Indian trade rights, --all wereabandoned. So far as the United States was concerned the treaty was anacknowledgment of defeat, a recognition that the war was a failure. 

In view of the hopes of Canadian gains, the treaty was denounced inEngland by the Opposition journals and many of those most antagonisticto America as a cowardly surrender. But it was none the less heartilyaccepted by both peoples and both governments. It reached the UnitedStates on February 11, was sent to the Senate on February 15, andratified unanimously the next day. There {243} still remained variousvessels at sea, and so the winter of 1815 saw not only the amazingvictory of Jackson at New Orleans, but also several naval actions, inwhich the United States frigate _President_ was taken by a squadron ofBritish blockades, two American sloops in duels took two Britishsmaller vessels, and the American _Constitution_, in a night action, captured, together, two British sloops. Then the news spread, andpeace finally arrived in fact. 

In England, the whole affair was quickly forgotten in the tremendousexcitement caused by the return of Napoleon from Elba, the uprising ofEurope, and the dramatic meeting of the two great captains, Wellingtonand Napoleon, in the Waterloo campaign. By the time the NapoleonicEmpire had finally collapsed, the story of the American war, with itsmaritime losses and scanty land triumphs, was an old one, and theBritish exporters, rushing to regain their former markets, were happyin the prospect of the reopening of American ports. By October, traderelations were re-established and the solid intercourse of the twocountries was under way. 

In America all disgraces and defeats were forgotten in the memories ofNew Orleans, Plattsburg, and Chippawa, and the people at large, willingto forgive all its failures to the {244} Republican administration, resumed with entire contentment the occupations of peace. The warfabric melted like a cloud; armies were disbanded, vessels were calledhome, credit rose, prices sprang upward, importations swelled, exportation began. 

In truth, the time of antagonism was at an end, for, with the Europeanpeace of 1814, the immediate cause for irritation was removed, never toreturn. The whole structure of blockades, Orders in Council, seizures, and restrictions upon neutrals vanished; the necessity for Britishimpressments ceased to exist; and, since France never again came intohostility with England, none of these grievances were revived. But ina broader way the year 1815 and the decades following marked the end ofnational hostility, for the fundamental antagonisms which, since 1763, had repeatedly brought about irritation and conflict, began after thistime to die out. 

In the first place, the defeat of the Indians in the war allowed thepeople of the United States to advance unchecked into the north-westand south-west, filling the old Indian lands, and rendering anycontinuation of the restrictive diplomacy on the part of England forthe benefit of Canadian fur traders patently futile. The war was nosooner ended than roads, trails, and rivers swarmed {245} withwestward-moving emigrants; and within a year the territory of Indiana, which the British commissioners at Ghent had wished to establish as anIndian reserve, was framing a State constitution. In 1819 Illinoisfollowed. 

The revulsion of temper was illustrated in the commencement at thistime of the organized movement for settled international peace, whichmay be dated from the establishment of the New York and MassachusettsPeace Societies in 1815, and the London Peace Society in the followingyear. But its most signal expression came in the remarkable agreementby which the Canadian-American frontier has been, for nearly a century, unfortified, and yet completely peaceful. On November 16, 1815, StateSecretary Monroe instructed Adams to propose to the British Governmentthat--as, "if each party augments its force there with a view toobtaining the ascendancy over the other, vast expense will be incurredand the danger of collision augmented in like degree"--such militarypreparations should be suspended on both sides. The smaller the numberof the armed forces agreed upon, he said, the better; "or to abstainaltogether from an armed force beyond that used for the revenue. "After some suspicious hesitation, Lord Castlereagh accepted this novelproposal; and it was {246} given effect to by an exchange of notes, signed by Mr. Bagot, British Minister at Washington, and Mr. Rush(Monroe's successor) on April 28 and 29, 1817, approved by the Senate ayear later, and proclaimed by the President on April 28, 1818. ByRush-Bagot Agreement, the naval force of each Government was limited toone small gun-boat of each power on Champlain and Ontario, and two onthe upper lakes, an arrangement of immense value to both Canada and theUnited States. 

The old-time commercial antagonism was also destined to disappear in afew years after the close of the war. At first England clung to thetime-honoured West Indian policy, and, when in 1815 the two countriesadjusted their commercial relations, American vessels were stillexcluded, although given the right to trade directly with the EastIndies. But already the new economic thought, which regardedcompetition and reciprocal trade as the ideal, instead of legaldiscriminations and universal protectionism, was gaining ground, asEngland became more and more the manufacturing centre of the world. Under Huskisson, in 1825, reciprocity was definitely substituted forexclusion; and a few years later, under Peel and Russell, and withinthe lifetime of men who had maintained the Orders in Council, the whole{247} elaborate system of laws backed by the logic of Lord Sheffieldand James Stephen was cast away and fell into disrepute and oblivion. 

In America, it should be added, the rush of settlers into the West andthe starting of manufactures served, within a few years from the end ofthe War of 1812, to alter largely the former dependence of the UnitedStates upon foreign commerce. By the time that England was ready toabandon its restrictive policy, the United States was beginning to be amanufacturing nation with its chief wealth in its great internal trade, and the ancient interest in the West Indies was fast falling intoinsignificance. The same men who raged against the Jay treaty and theOrders in Council lived to forget that they had ever considered theWest India trade important. So, on both sides, the end of commercialantagonism was soon to follow on the Treaty of Ghent. 

Finally, and more slowly, the original political and social antagonismceased to be active, and ultimately died out. So far as the UnitedStates was concerned, the change was scarcely visible untilthree-quarters of a century after the Treaty of Ghent. The temper ofthe American people, formed by Revolutionary traditions and nourishedon memories of battle and injuries, remained {248} steadilyantagonistic toward England; and the triumph of western social idealsserved to emphasize the distinction between the American democrat andthe British aristocrat, until dislike became a tradition and apolitical and literary convention. But the emptiness of this normalnational hatred of John Bull was shown in 1898, when, at the firstdistinct sign of friendliness on the part of the British government andpeople, the whole American anglophobia vanished, and the people of thecontinent realized that the time had come for a recognition of theessential and normal harmony of the ancient enemies. 

In England, the change began somewhat earlier, for within less than ageneration after the Treaty of Ghent the exclusive Tory controlcollapsed, and the Revolution of 1832 gave the middle classes a shareof political power. A few years later the Radicals, representing theworking-men, became a distinct force in Parliament, and to middle classand Radicals there was nothing abhorrent in the American Republic. Aristocratic society continued, of course, as in the eighteenthcentury, to regard the United States with scant respect, and thosemembers of the upper middle classes who took their social tone from thearistocracy commonly reflected their prejudices. But the masses of{249} the British people--whose relatives emigrated steadily to thewestern land of promise--felt a genuine sympathy and interest in thesuccess of the great democratic experiment, a sympathy which was fardeeper and more effective than had been that of the eighteenth-centuryWhigs. From the moment that these classes made their weight felt ingovernment, the time was at hand when the old social antagonism was todie out, and with it the deep political antipathy which, since the daysof 1793, had tinged the official British opinion of a democratic state. The last evidence of the Tory point of view came when, in 1861, theAmerican Civil War brought out the unconcealed aversion of the Britishnobility and aristocracy for the northern democracy; but on theoccasion the equally unconcealed sense of political and social sympathymanifested by the British middle and working classes served to preventany danger to the United States, and to keep England from aiding in thedisruption of the Union. 

Thus the Treaty of Ghent, marking the removal of immediate causes ofirritation, was the beginning of a period in which the under-lyingelements of antagonism between England and the United States weredefinitely to cease. When every discount is made, the celebration, heartily supported by the national leaders on {250} both sides, of acentury of peace between the British, Canadian, and American peoples, does exhibit, in Sir Wilfred Laurier's words, "a spectacle to astoundthe world by its novelty and grandeur. "

{251}

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The references to the epoch covered in this volume may be rathersharply divided into those which deal with the years before 1783, andthose which relate to the subsequent period. In the first group, thereare both British and American works of high excellence, but in thesecond there are practically none but American authorities, owing tothe preoccupation of British writers with the more dramatic andimportant French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, of the events ofparliamentary politics. 

For the years 1763-1783 the best American history is E. CHANNING, _History of the United States_, vol. Iii (1912), distinctlyindependent, thorough, and impartial. S. G. FISHER, _The Struggle forAmerican Independence_, 2 vols. (1908), is cynically critical andunconventional. Three volumes of the _American Nation_ series, --G. E. HOWARD, _Preliminaries of the Revolution_; C. H. VAN TYNE, _TheAmerican Revolution_; and A. C. McLAUGHLIN, _The Confederation and theConstitution_ (1905), are equally scholarly and less detailed. Theolder American works, exhibiting the traditional "patriotic" view, arebest represented by J. FISKE, _American Revolution_, 2 vols. (1891);and G. BANCROFT, _History of the United States_, 6 vols. (ed. 1883-1885). 

On the English side the most valuable study is in W. E. H. LECKY, _England in the Eighteenth Century_, vols. Iii, iv (1878), apenetrating and impartial analysis. The Whig view appears in SIR G. O. TREVELYAN, _The American Revolution_, 3 vols. (1899-1907); LORD MAHON, _England in the Eighteenth Century_, vols. V-vii (1853-1854); and M. MARKS, _England and America_, 2 vols. (1907), while W. HUNT, _PoliticalHistory_, 1760-1801 (1905), alone of recent writers, presents a Toryversion of events. 

Special works of value are C. STEDMAN, _The American War_, 2 vols. (1794), the authoritative English contemporary account of militaryevents, and, among recent studies, J. W. FORTESCUE, _History of theBritish Army_, vol. Iii (1902), which should be compared with H. B. CARRINGTON, _Battles of the Revolution_ (1876); E. MCCRADY, _SouthCarolina in the Revolution_, 2 vols. (1901-2); E. J. LOWELL, _TheHessians in the {252} Revolution_ (1884); J. B. PERKINS, _France in theAmerican Revolution_ (1911); C. H. VAN TYNE, _The Loyalists_ (1902), and W. HERTZ, _The Old Colonial System_ (1905). Of especial value arethe destructive criticisms in C. F. ADAMS, _Studies Military andDiplomatic_ (1911). The authoritative treatment of naval history isfound in A. T. MAHAN, _Influence of Sea Power_ (1890), and in thechapter by the same writer in W. L. CLOWES, _History of the RoyalNavy_, vols. Iii, iv (1898-1899). 

Among leading biographies are those of Washington by H. C. LODGE (2vols. 1890), by W. C. FORD (2 vols. 1900), and by GEN. B. T. JOHNSON(1894); of Franklin by J. PARTON (2 vols. 1864), by J. BIGELOW (3 vols. 1874), and by J. T. MORSE (1889); of Henry by M. C. TYLER (1887); ofSamuel Adams by J. K. HOSMER (1885); of Robert Morris by E. P. OBERHOLZER (1903), and of Steuben by F. KAPP (1869). On the Englishside the _Memoirs of Horace Walpole_ (1848); the _Correspondence ofGeorge III with Lord North_, ed. By W. B. DONNE (1867), are valuableand interesting, and some material may be found in the lives of Burkeby T. McNIGHT (2 vols. 1858); of Shelburne by E. G. FITZMAURICE (2vols. 1875); of Chatham by F. HARRISON (1905) and A. VON RUVILLE (3vols. 1907); and of Fox by LORD JOHN RUSSELL (3 vols. 1859). Thebiographies of two governors of Massachusetts, C. A. POWNALL, _ThomasPownall_ (1908), and J. K. HOSMER, _Thomas Hutchinson_ (1896), are ofvalue as presenting the colonial Tory point of view. 

For the period after 1783, the best reference book and the only onewhich attempts to trace in detail the motives of British as well asAmerican statesmen is HENRY ADAMS, _History of the United States_, 9vols. (1891). It is impartially critical, in a style of sustained andcaustic vivacity. Almost equally valuable is A. T. MAHAN, _Sea Powerin Relation to the War of 1812_, 2 vols. (1905), which contains theonly sympathetic analysis of British naval and commercial policy, 1783-1812, beside being the authoritative work on naval events. Thestandard American works are J. SCHOULER, _History of the UnitedStates_, vols. I, ii (1882); J. B. MCMASTER, _History of the People ofthe United States_, vols. I-iv (1883-1895); R. HILDRETH, _History ofthe United States_, vols. Ii-vi (1849-1862), and three volumes of the_American Nation Series_, J. S. BASSETT, _The Federalist System_; E. CHANNING, _The Jeffersonian System_, and K. C. BABCOCK, _Rise ofAmerican Nationality_ (1906). On the English side there is little inthe general histories beyond a chapter on American relations in A. ALISON, _Modern Europe_, vol. Iv (1848), which accurately representsthe extreme Tory contempt for the United States, but has no othermerit. Works on Canadian history fill this {253} gap to a certainextent, such as W. KINGSFORD, _History of Canada_, vol. Viii (1895). 

Beside the work of Mahan (as above) the War of 1812 is dealt with by W. JAMES, _Naval History of Great Britain_, vols. V-vi (1823), a work ofaccuracy as to British facts, but of violent anti-American temper; andon the other side by J. F. COOPER, _Naval History_ (1856), and T. ROOSEVELT, _Naval War of 1812_ (1883). Sundry special works dealingwith economic and social questions involved in international relationsare T. ROOSEVELT, _Winning of the West_, 4 vols. (1899-1902); W. CUNNINGHAM, _Growth of English Industry and Commerce_, vol. Iii (1893), and W. SMART, _Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century_ (1910). Biographical material is to be found, in the lives of Washington (asabove); of Jefferson by J. SCHOULER, (1897), and by J. T. MORSE (1883);of Hamilton by J. T. MORSE (1882), and F. S. OLIVER (1907); of Gallatinby H. ADAMS (1879); of Madison by G. HUNT (1903); of Josiah Quincy byE. QUINCY (1869). There is some biographical material to be found inBROUGHAM'S _Life and Times of Lord Brougham_, vol. Iii (1872), and inS. WALPOLE, _Life of Spencer Perceval_, 2 vols. (1874), but for themost part the British version of relations with America after 1783 isstill to be discovered only in the contemporary sources such as the_Parliamentary History_ and _Debates_, the _Annual Register_, and thepartly published papers of such leaders as Pitt, Fox, Grenville, Canning, Castlereagh and Perceval. 

A useful sketch, giving prominence to the Treaty of Ghent and theRush-Bagot Agreement, and summarizing earlier and later events, is _AShort History of Anglo-American Relations and of the Hundred Years'Peace_, by H. S. PERRIS. 

Documents and other contemporary material for the whole period may beconveniently found in W. MACDONALD, _Select Charters_ (1904) and_Select Documents_ (1898); in G. CALLENDER, _Economic History of theUnited States_ (1909), and A. B. HART, _American History told byContemporaries_, vols. Ii, iii (1898, 1901). 

 {254}

 INDEX

 Adams, John, in Revolution, 48, 57, 63, 71, 118-125; after 1783, 142, 147, 155, 173-180 Adams, John Quincy, 237-241 Adams, Samuel, 32, 42, 50, 57, 63, 78, 131, 144 Adet, P. A. , 172, 173 Alexander I, 190, 237 Alien and Sedition Acts, 176-180 Anti-Federalists, 143, 147 Armstrong, John, 223-230 Arnold, Benedict, 67, 81, 85, 104

 Baltimore, 84, 230, 238, 240 Bank of the United States, 145, 146, 183, 218 Banks, State, 218, 233 Baring, Alexander, 212, 238 Bayard, James A. , 237, 240 Beaumarchais, Caron de, 94 Bedford, Duke of, 40 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 179, 184-186, 189-198, 202-208, 213-216, 227, 236, 243 Brock, General Isaac, 220, 221 Brougham, Henry, 212 Brown, General Jacob, 228, 229 Bunker Hill, Battle of, 65, 66, 78, 83 Burgoyne, General John, 89-95, 113, 114 Burke, Edmund, 52, 60, 68, 73, 74, 96, 115, 116, 161, 165 Burr, Aaron, 179, 180

 Camden, Battle of, 103 Canada, British policy in, 29, 54, 67, 73, 81, 85, 100, 119, 122, 127, 155, 158, 200, 210, 211; defence of, 214-229, 239, 241, 244, 245 Canning, George, 197, 202, 204, 205, 207, 212 Carleton, General Guy, 81, 85, 158 Chauncey, Commodore Isaac, 225, 228 Clark, George Rogers, 101, 105 Clay, Henry, 211, 214, 240, 241 Clinton, De Witt, 214 Clinton, George, 147, 169 Clinton, Sir Henry, 82, 100-103, 109-113 Concord, Battle of, 62, 78 Confederation, Articles of, 105, 129-136 Congress, Continental, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 71, 79, 80, 84, 88-93, 98, 105, 118, 130 Congress of the Confederation, 107, 124, 125, 127, 130-138, 142, 157 Congress, United States, under Federalists, 140-146, 155, 164, 173, 175, 177; under Republicans, 182, 186, 187, 195, 199-209, 211, 213, 220, 223, 228, 233, 234 Constitution, United States, 139-141, 159, 180, 183, 234 Cornwallis, Lord, 86, 103-114

 Dartmouth, Earl of, 47, 50 Declaration of Independence, 71, 98 De Grasse, Admiral, 110-112, 125 D'Estaing, Admiral, 100-102 Dickinson, John, 42, 50, 57, 64, 105

 Elections, Presidential, 142, 147, 178, 178-180, 187, 201, 214 Erie, Lake, Battle of, 225 Erskine, David M. , 204, 205

 Fauchet, J. A. , 163, 172 Finances, of Revolution, 16, 64, 106, 123, 124, 133-135, 144-146, 182, 191, 218-220, 228, 233 Fox, Charles James, 96, 115-121, 152, 153, 165, 193 Franklin, Benjamin, in England, 38, 44, 51, 52, 64; in France, 71, 83, 93-95, 107, 118-124

 Cage, General Thomas, 58, 61, 65 Gallatin, Albert, 182, 237, 240, 242 Gates, General Horatio, 79, 90, 91, 93, 103 Genet, Edmond C. , 161-163 Germaine, Lord George, 53, 76, 77, 88, 115 Governors, Colonial, 15-17, 26, 27, 44, 62, 72 Grafton, Duke of, 39, 40, 47 Greene, General Nathaniel, 79, 84, 104, 109 Grenville, George, 28, 30, 31, 35, 45, 53 Grenville, William, Lord, 165, 166, 171, 193, 194, 198, 203

 Hamilton, Alexander, 132, 135, 144-148, 162, 164, 168, 177, 179, 180, 188 Harrison, General W. H. , 210, 211, 221-225 Hartford Convention, 234 Henry, Patrick, 32, 42, 50, 57, 78, 131, 144 Hillsborough, Lord, 43-53 Howe, Admiral, 82, 83, 100, 114 Howe, General Sir William, 82-92, 95, 113, 114 Hull, General William, 220 Hutchinson, Governor Thomas, 49, 52

 Indians, of Northwest, 29, 100, 157-159, 164, 168, 209-213, 218-225, 239, 244, 245 Indians, Southwestern, 157, 210, 224, 229

 Jackson, Andrew, 224, 228, 229, 231, 243 Jay, John, 42, 57, 118, 120-125, 156, 157, 165-167, 171 Jefferson, Thomas, 71, 78, 144, 146, 147, 156, 161, 169, 172, 178, 180, 181-188, 193-196, 199-203, 209, 213, 215, 217, 235, 236

 King's Mountain, Battle of, 104

 Lafayette, Marquis de, 102 Lee, General Charles, 79, 84, 99 Lee, Richard Henry, 57, 144 Livingston, Robert R. , 125, 186 Long Island, Battle of, 83 Louis XVI, 93, 95, 156

 Madison, James, 132, 135, 142, 144, 146, 147, 163, 164, 172, 178, 193, 201-208, 213-215, 230, 233-238, 240 Ministries, British, Bute, 35, 40; Grenville, 28, 35, 43; First Rockingham, 36, 39; Grafton, 39-45, North, 47-56, 60, 68-77, 88, 95-98, 114-117, 151; Second Rockingham, 117, 120; Shelburne, 120-123, 126, 152-154; Coalition, 126, 153, 154; Pitt, 152-154, 159, 162-167, 171; Addington, 171; Second Pitt, 171, 192, 193; Lord Grenville, 193, 196, 197; Portland, 197, 202, 207; Perceval, 207, 211-215; Liverpool, 212, 213, 237-241 Monroe, James, 172, 173, 186, 196 Montgomery, General Richard, 67, 79 Morgan, Daniel, 67, 68, 90, 104 Morris, Robert, 78, 107, 134

 Navigation Acts, 22-25, 29, 38, 55, 72, 132, 150, 155 Non-importation Act, 196-200 Non-intercourse Act, 202, 206, 213 North, Lord, Tory leader, 43-56, 60, 61, 73-76; in Revolutionary war, 77, 97, 115-117, 153

 Oswald, Richard, 119-121 Otis, James, 27, 32

 Perceval, Spencer, 197, 207, 212 Perry, Commander O. H. , 225 Pinckney, C. C. , 173, 174 Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 9, 36, 38-40, 53, 60, 96-98 Pitt, William, 144, 148, 152-154, 171, 176, 189, 192 Pownall, Thomas, 41, 47, 53 Prevost, Sir George, 230, 231, 234 Proclamation of 1763, 29, 122 Proctor, Colonel Henry, 221, 225

 Quebec Act, 54, 56

 Randolph, Edmund, 163, 164, 172 Representatives, House of, 164, 180, 211 Rochambeau, Comte de, 102, 110, 113 Rockingham, Marquis of, 117, 120 Rutledge, John, 57, 78, 83

 St. Clair, General Arthur, 159 St. Leger, Colonel B. , 90 Sandwich, Earl of, 53, 68, 76, 77, 99, 115 Saratoga, Surrender at, 92 Scott, Sir William, 193 Secession, 188, 201, 234, 235 Sedition Act, 176-178, 180 Shays' Rebellion, 137 Sheffield, Lord, 150, 151, 154, 192, 197, 247 Shelburne, Earl of, 117, 119-123, 152-154 Sherman, Roger, 78, 135 Stamp Act, 30-33, 200 States Rights, 146, 178, 234 Stephen, James, 192, 197, 207, 247 Sugar Act, 25, 29, 31

 Talleyrand, 175, 177 Tarleton, Colonel B. , 103, 110 Tecumseh, 210, 211, 220, 221, 224, 225 Townshend, Charles, 40-43 Townshend Duties, 40-47, 210 Treaties, 1763, 9, 28; 1778, 95, 98; 1783, 117-127, 149-152, 158; 1794, 165-172, 193, 196; 1795, 168, 184; 1803, 186; 1814, 242; 1818, 244 Trenton, Battle of, 86, 112

 Vergennes, Comte de, 93-96, 119-125

 Washington, George, Commander, 42, 57, 64, 66, 79, 83-93, 99, 100, 107-112, 126; in retirement, 132, 134; President, 142, 144, 146, 147, 159, 162, 164, 167, 172-174, 178 Wayne, General Anthony, 79, 159, 164 Wellington, Duke of, 241, 243 West Indies, British, before 1783, 9, 21-27, 99, 102, 108, 110, 112, 125; after 1783, 132, 149-151, 166, 167, 246, 247 West Indies, French, trade with, 25, 27, 31, 156, 163, 167, 191-193, 196 Wilkes, John, 44, 45 Wilkinson, General James, 226

 X. Y. Z. Affair, 174, 175

 Yorktown, Surrender at, 112, 160, 160