THE TATTVA-MUKTAVĀLĪ by Pūr. Nānanda Chakravartin JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY. [New Series, Volume XV] [London, Trübner and Company] [1883] {Scanned and edited by Christopher M. Weimer, April 2002} ART. IV. --__The Tattva-muktavālī of Gau. Da-pūr. Nānanda-chakra-vartin__. Edited and Translated by Prof. E. B. COWELL. The following poem was written by a native of Bengal, namedPūr. Nānanda Chakravartin. Nothing is known as to his date; ifthe work were identical with the poem of the same name mentionedin the account of the Rāmānuja system in Mādhava'sSarvadaršanasa. Mgraha, it would be, of course, older than thefourteenth century, but this is very uncertain; I should beinclined to assign it to a later date. The chief interest of thepoem consists in its being a vigorous attack on the Vedāntasystem by a follower of the Pūr. Naprajńa school, which wasfounded by Madhva (or Ānandatīrtha) in the thirteenth century inthe South of India. Some account of his system (which in manyrespects agrees with that of Rāmānuja) is given in Wilson's"Hindu Sects;" [Footnote: Works, vol. I. Pp. 139-150. See alsoProf. Monier Williams, J. R. A. S. Vol. XIV. N. S. P. 304. ] but thefullest account is to be found in the fifth chapter of theSarvadaršanasa. Mgraha. Both the Rāmānujas and the Pūr. Naprajńashold in opposition to the Vedānta [Footnote: As the differentsystems are arranged in the Sarva D. S. According to theirrespective relation to the Vedānta, we can easily understand whyMādhava there places these two systems so low down in the scale, and only just above the atheistic schools of the Chārvākas, Buddhists, and Jainas. ] that individual souls are distinct fromBrahman; but they differ as to the sense in which they are thusdistinct. The former maintain that "unity" and "plurality" areequally true from different points of view; the latter hold thatthe relation between the individual soul and Brahman is that of amaster and a servant, and consequently that they are absolutelyseparate. It need not surprise us, therefore, to see that, although Rāmānuja is praised in the fifty-third sloka of thispoem as "the foremost of the learned, " some of his tenets areattacked in the eightieth. The Sanskrit text of this poem was published in the BenaresPa. N. Dit for Sept. 1871, by Pa. N. Dit Vechārāma Šarman. An edition, with a Bengali translation, was also published some years ago inCalcutta, by Jagadānanda Goswāmin; [Footnote: No date is given. ]but the text is so full of false readings of every kind, and thetranslation in consequence goes so often astray, that I have notfound much help from it. I have collated the text in the BenaresPa. N. Dit (A. ) with a MS. (B. ) sent to me by my friend, Pa. N. DitMahešachandra Nyāyaratna, the Principal of the Calcutta SanskritCollege. He has also sent me the readings in certain passages fromtwo MSS. In the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library (C. D. ); and Ihave to thank him for his help in explaining some obscure allusions. The poem itself seems to me an interesting contribution to thehistory of Hindu philosophical controversy, [Footnote: Dr. Banerjeahas quoted and translated several stanzas in his 'Dialogues on HinduPhilosophy. '] and so I have subjoined a literal English translation. I would venture to remind my readers of the words of the manager inthe prologue of the Mālavikāgnimitra, "Every old poem is not goodbecause it is old, nor is every modern poem to be blamed simplybecause it is modern. " TRANSLATION. 1. Victorious is the garland-wearing foster-son of Nanda, --theprotector of his devotees, --the destroyer of the cruel king, --dark-blue like the delicate tamāla blossoms, --formidable with hismany outspread rays, --mighty with all his attendant powers, [Footnote: The Bengali translation explains these as the internalpowers (__antara"ngā__) Hlādinī, etc. , and the external(__bahira"ngā__) Prahvā, etc. ]--and having his forehead radiantlike the moon. 2. This follower of the Purā. Nas, who holds by his own belief, reads to his heart's content the Purā. Na in the morning, and helistens devotedly with profound meditation, his whole mind intenton the meaning of the book. 3. Having abandoned the doctrine of the oneness of the individualand the Supreme Soul, he establishes by argument their mutualdifference; having used Šruti and Šm. Riti as a manifold proof, heemploys Inference in many ways in the controversy. 4. This individual soul must be different from Brahman because itis always circumscribed, --many are the similar arguments which areto be acknowledged in the course of our reasonings. 5. "Might we not say that a jar and a web could be called identicalbecause both are cognizable?" [Footnote: There is a favouriteNaiyāyik example of a __kevalānvayi__ middle term, "a jar isnameable because it is cognizable as a web is. "] But we cannot sayso in regard to these two things in question, for Brahman alone isthat which cannot be cognized. 6. The sentence "Thou art That" (__tat tvam asi__) which isunderstood in its primary meaning as referring to the object of theVeda, [Footnote: Or __vedavishaye__ may perhaps simply mean __vede__, cf. šl. 112. ]--the author thus explains its meaning, as he knows hisown doctrine, and has fixed his mind on the system of Duality; sincethe word 'that' (__tat__) is here indeclinable and implies adifference, and the word 'thou' (__tvam__) means that which is to bedifferentiated, the sign of the genitive case has been elided;[Footnote: The author here explains the sentence __tat tvam asi__, asreally meaning __tasya tvam asi__ "thou art Its. "] "thou only, " suchis not the meaning of the sentence [Footnote: In "Thou art that, "'thou' and 'that' would refer to the same subject(__sāmānādhikara. Nya__)]. 7. He is all-knowing, all-seeing, Himself the three worlds, in whosebelly thou art thyself contained, --He causes at once by a movement ofthe brow the creation, preservation, and absorption of all beings!Thou art ignorant, and only seest relatively, He is the adorable, theone Witness of all worlds; thou art changing, He is One; thou art alldull and stained, not such is He. 8. As for the text "I am Brahman, " you must take the nominative caseas only used there for the genitive by the licence of an inspiredspeaker. How, if it were otherwise, would there be a genitive in theillustration, [Footnote: This is often used as an illustration inVedānta works, as __e. G. __ B. Rihad Āra. Ny. Up. Ii. 1. 20, "as thespider proceeds with his web, as the little sparks proceed from fire, so from this Soul proceed all vital airs, all worlds, all gods, allbeings. "] as in the sentence "as the sparks of the fire"? 9. The poets call a lad fire (from his hot temper), the face the orbof a full moon, the eye a blue lotus, the bosom mount Meru, and thehand a young shoot; by a confusion of the superimposed appearance wemay thus have the idea of identity where there is still a realdifference; and so too must we deal with those words of Šruti "I amBrahman. " [Footnote: This is another suggested method of interpretingthe words "I am Brahman. " It may be only a common case of "qualifiedsuperimponent indication, " as "the man of the Panjāb is an ox" (cf. Kāvya Prakāša, ii. 10-12). Cf. The definition of upachāra in theSāhitya Darpa. Na: __upachāro hi nāmātyanta. M višakalitayohšād. Rišyātišayamahimnā bhedapratītisthaganamātram__]. 10. As there are many waves in the sea, so are we many individualsouls in Brahman; the wave can never become the sea; how then wiltthou, the individual soul, become Brahman? 11. In the depths of all Šāstras the two things are both recognized, knowledge and ignorance; so too virtue and vice; and thus alsoscience, and next to it closely clinging behind, but other than it, appears false science; thus everywhere there are opposite pairs, andsimilar is the notorious pair, Brahman and the soul. How can thesetwo have oneness? Let the good answer with an upright mind. 12. Thou, O Soul, art the reflection of the Supreme Being, whopossesses the power of illusion and is the substratum of all, whileHe, the adorable, shines forth as Himself the original; the one moonin the sky is seen manifold in water and the like; therefore thereis a difference between thee and Brahman as between the reflectionand its original. 13. Yonder Brahman is described by the words of the sacred texts asnot to be known, nor to be reasoned about, and as devoid of alldesire; but thou art within the range of speech and of thought; howshall there be oneness of thee and Brahman? 14. Thou art verily bereft of thy understanding, O individual Soul, by the darkness of this doctrine of Māyā, while thou constantlyproclaimest like a madman "I am Brahman"; where is thy sovereignty, where thy empire, where thy omniscience? There is as vast adifference between Brahman and thee as between mount Meru and amustard-seed! 15. Thou art a finite soul, He is indeed all-pervading; thoustandest only on one spot, while He is everywhere always; thou, being of a moment, art happy and unhappy; He is happy at all times;how canst thou say "I am He"? Fie! art thou not ashamed? 16. Glass is glass, and a gem is a gem; a shell is but a shell, and silver is silver; there is never seen a transposition[Footnote: Dr. Banerjea (__Dialogues__, p. 379) reads __kadāpyatyayajńānam, i. E. __ vyabhichāra; but all the MSS. Which I havecompared read __na kadā vyatyaya__ (or __vyatyaya. M__) __jńānam;kadā__ seems irregularly used for __kadāpi__, as it is also inšl. 113, __c. __] among them. But wherever other things areimagined, to be found in something else, it is through an error;and so it is when the soul utters such words as "that art thou!" 17. The meaning of the word "__that__" (__tat__) is an ocean ofimmortality, filled with manifest and supreme felicity; themeaning of the word "__thou__" is a most miserable being, bewildered in mind through the burden of the fear of existence;these two can never be one, they are divided by the nature ofthings; the doctrine of Non-unity is the truth for all worlds, thou art but His slave. 18. If Brahman were meant by these words, the power employedwould not be Denotation, for their literal meaning does not apply;[Footnote: In such sentences as "That art thou, " "I am Brahman, "etc. , the primary power of the words, __i. E. __ " Denotation"(__abhidhā__), could not express the unconditioned Brahmandestitute of all attributes; for Denotation rests upon the ordinaryconventional meaning, and how could this take in an idea so farremoved from ordinary experience? Nor could it be the secondarypower "Indication" (__laksha. Nā__), as in the well- known instanceof "the herd-station on the Ganges, " where the Ganges, by"indication, " means the shore and not the stream. For "indication"must be based on some connexion between the primary and theindicated secondary meaning; but how can that which is "without asecond" be connected with anything?] consequently it must be thesecond power of a word, Indication. 19. Yet if so, why should it be Indication? for this arises fromsome association with the primary meaning; but with what can thatsubstance be associated which is disconnected with everything andwithout a second? 20. That power of a word is Indication, by which, when the primarymeaning is precluded, some other meaning is indicated in connexiontherewith, through some motive or through common currency; and itscauses are thus three [Footnote: I suppose that these are (1) theincompatibility of the primary sense; (2) the common currency of thesecondary meaning, __e. G. __ when "Europe" is used to imply itsinhabitants in the phrase "Europe makes war:" (3) a motive, as in"a herd-station on the Ganges, " where "Ganges" is used instead of"the bank of the Ganges, " in order to imply the coolness and purityof the spot]. 21. Now if there is no Denotation in a phrase, how can there ariseany Indication? First there should be some primary meaningprecluded, and then there may be the Indication of something else. 22. Where there is no accepted Denotation, how can you there haveIndication? If there is no village, how can there be a boundary?--there is no child without a father [Footnote: Cf. The Bengali proverb__māthā nāi tār māthābyathā__, "he has no head and yet he has aheadache. "] 23. "The lances enter, the swords, the bows and arrows, "--here wehave Indication; for the sentence must suggest something else tocomplete itself, as there cannot be "entrance" in the case of aninanimate subject. 24. "A herd-station on the Ganges, "--here we have the self-sacrificeof the primary to another meaning, since the Ganges, as being in theform of water, cannot be the site of a herd-station. 25. In the example "ghī is life" there is produced the idea ofsameness of form; in the example "this is life" there arises theidea of identity [Footnote: In the first ex. There is __šuddha-sāropa-laksha. Nā__ or "pure superimponent indication, " in the secondthere is __šuddha-sādhyavasāna-l. __ or "pure introspeceptiveindication, " where the ghī is swallowed up in the "life. " Mostwriters, however, disallow __upachāra__ in __šuddha-laksha. Nā__];but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences will be producedby a metaphor, --there is not brought about a real oneness. 26. The doctrine of Identity is established with a desperate effort, and men have recourse to the power "Indication"; but there are threethings which should rise to our view, --the primary meaning, theindicated meaning, and their connexion [Footnote: He seems to implythat each of these three requisites fails in the present case, --there is no primary meaning, and still less a secondary, and there isno connexion with any other object. ]. 27. There is here no Denotation from the absence of conventionalagreement; there is no Indication from the absence of any reason [toestablish it]; by what reason, on the theory of Māyā, can Brahman beever made known? 28. He is described [Footnote: He now proceeds to declare his ownopinions] in the Veda by the primary power of words [Denotation] asthe Maker of the Universe; and by Inference we establish theconclusion that all these things have a Maker. 29. The Vedas are a proof, the Šm. Ritis are a proof; there is a beingto be proved and known there in many passages; it is the greatPersonality which is to be made known by all the Vedas, --therefore itis this which the Veda takes as its subject. 30. True verbal testimony produces knowledge even in regard to thatwhich is absolutely non-existent, --then how much more in regard toBrahman the Lord, the maker of all that moves or is motionless! 31. It is said, [Footnote: Taitt. Upanish. Ii. 4. ] "Speech retirestherefrom together with the Mind, "--but this is its explanation, --give ear: Together with the Mind Speech makes Him its object, andthen retires, because His nature is not to be fathomed. 32. "Brahman is not to be made the object of mind or of words, "[Footnote: Cf. The Ka. Tha Up. Vi. 12, "The soul is not to be reachedby speech nor by the mind nor by the eye. "]--from this saying it isunderstood that he is only to be declared by Revelation, Revelationhas no faltering action [Footnote: For __skhaladgati__, cf. __Kāvyaprakāša__, ii. 16. ]. 33. "He who is versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the highestBrahman, " [Footnote: This line is quoted from Šruti in the MaitriUpanishad, vi. 22. ]--surely such words of inspired sages are notmistaken babble. 34. Assuredly the conventional meaning of the words "existent, ""thought, " and "joy" applies to Brahman, just as the words "pot, ""cloth, " etc. , refer to those particular objects. 35. The perception of the conventional meaning of words is arousedby the dialogue of the orderer and the ordered; and afterwards byinsertion and omission the child becomes thoroughly skilled in theuse of the words. [Footnote: Cf. Sāhityadarpa. Na, ii. "On the oldman's saying, when giving directions to the middle-aged man, " etc. The Sāhitya D. Uses the terms __āvāpoddhārau__, theSiddhāntamuktāvalī (p. 80) uses __āvāpodvāpan__]. 36. So through hearing the words of the teacher and repeated studyof the šāstras the conventional meaning of such words as Brahman, etc. , is assuredly produced in the pupil. 37. This earth must surely have had a maker; for its having thenature of an effect is a sign, just as we see to be the case inpots, etc. 38. If it is established that the supreme Lord is the maker, thenhis having a body follows as a matter of course [Footnote: This isone of the tenets of Rāmānujas as well as Pūr. Naprajńas. ]; for inall effects, as pots and the like, the maker is seen to have a bodyand not to be bodiless. 39. [The objector urges] "If the supreme Lord has a body, then hewill be like to beings such as we are; there cannot be a makerwithout an intermediate agency [Footnote: The __vyāpāra__ orintermediate agency is defined as __taj-janyatve sati taj-janya-janako hi vyāpāra. H__], --I see no difference whatever. " 40. But great is the difference which is declared to exist betweenthe Adorable Lord and men working with spades, sickles, ploughshares, and hands; these are helpless in the six waves [Footnote: Comparethe memorial line, __Šokamohau jarām. Rityū kshutpipāsesha. Dūrmaya. H__. ] (of human infirmity, ) and wearied with the burdenof labour, --He effects everything by a mere motion of his brow. 41. The Master can make, not make [Footnote: With this curious useof __akartum__ (extending the analogy of such forms as __akurvan, ak. Ritvā__, etc. ) cf. Theognis, 621: {Greek: __pas tis plośsionįndpa tķei atķei dč penixrón__}. Cf. Shilleto, Cambridge Journ. OfPhilology, 1876, p. 161. ], and alter; hence one may learn that vastis the interval between the two. 42. If the body is called the site of enjoyment, it is well knownthat this definition will hold good (even in this highest case[Footnote: Could __loke__ mean that it will hold good "of the world"as his body?]), --there is nothing deficient but everything is presentin the Lord's body [Footnote: Cf. "Whose body nature is and God thesoul. "], since He is the husband of Lakshmī. 43. "Every body is influenced by deserts, "--if this universal law isaccepted, then He who is the Maker of all must be impelled [to createthe world] by the deserts which dominate over beings like us[Footnote: __I. E. __ he creates the world to give their deserts to thedifferent souls. ] 44. "Every body must be non-eternal, "--this is a general law, yetstill Īšvara's body may be eternal; for earth is everywhere seen tobe non-eternal, while in the form of its atoms it is eternal. 45. One must not say, "why should the desert of one attach itself toanother?" For it was in consequence of the respective merits anddemerits of the elephant and the crocodile that the holder of thediscus made all haste to interfere in the battle [Footnote: Theobjector urges "why should our good or evil deserts oblige God toact in a certain way?" He answers by referring to the well-knownlegend given in the Bhāgavata Purā. Na, viii. Ch. 2-4. A certainking, named Indradyumna, became an elephant through Agastya's curse. One day, while drinking in a lake, he was seized by a crocodile, andthe struggle lasted for a thousand years. At last, in despair, heprayed to Vish. Nu, who came down mounted on Garu. Da and killed thecrocodile. Thus we see that, although in one sense the deserts of onebeing cannot attach themselves to another, still they must causecertain actions in another being, or it would be impossible that eachshould receive its due reward or punishment. ] 46. It has been heard of old that all this universe proceeded fromthe lotus of the navel of the Lord; hence is it established that behas a body, for how can there be a navel without a body? 47. The body of God is very pure, --to be enjoyed by all the senses, as being richly endowed with the six qualities [Footnote: These sixqualities, according to the Commentator on the Bhāgavata P. I. 3. 36, are sovereignty, knowledge, glory, prosperity, dispassion, andvirtue; a different list is given in the Sarva Darš. S. P. 54, l. 22(but cf. P. 69, l. 18). See also __infra__ in šl. 95. ], --and to bediscovered by means of all the Vedas, --Gangā verily is the waterwherewith he washes his feet. 48. Whenever by the influence of time there comes the increase of eviland the diminution of right, then the adorable Lord accomplishes thepreservation of the good and the destruction of the wicked. 49. The Lord is said to be twofold, as the Incarnation and He whobecomes incarnate; so too the souls are twofold, as divided intofaithful and faithless. 50. Now some say that the personal soul is only the reflection of theSupreme; but their opinion does not at all hold, since it cannot beestablished. 51. For how could there arise a reflection of that Infinite andstainless one? and how could an insentient [reflection] enjoy the painand pleasure arising from the merit and demerit declared in the Veda? 52. There may indeed be a reflection of that which is limited; but howshall there be one of Him whose attribute is infinity? 53. Rāmānuja, the foremost of the learned, condemned this theory of anoriginal and its reflection; the fact that this doctrine is notaccepted by the learned, will not make it seem more plausible. 54. There is an eternal division between the two, from the words ofthe Veda, "two birds;" [Footnote: Rig V. I. 164, 20, "Two birdsassociated together, two friends, take refuge in the same tree; oneof them eats the sweet fig; the other, abstaining from food, merelylooks on. "] from the mention there of "two friends, " how can therebe identity between them? 55. I become Brahman, that is, I cease to have mundane existencethrough beholding the soul in Brahman; the result of this would bethe abolition of sorrow, etc. , but in no way absolute Oneness. 56. I become Brahman also through beholding Brahman in the soul[Footnote: Another reading is __brahma. Ny ātmanirīksha. Nāt__]; theresult would be the abolition of His being out of sight [Footnote:__I. E. __ it would be always __videre videntem__], but in no wayOneness. 57. It must not be said that by continued meditation with intentthought a man becomes Brahman; there will only enter into him alittle merit; as we see indeed in the case of worms, bees, and thelike [Footnote: Cf. Hitopadeša, Introd. šl. 45. ]; 58. By devotedly worshipping Brāhmans without ceasing, a Šūdra willnever become a Brāhman; there may enter into him a little merit, butone of the Šūdra caste will never become a Brāhman. 59. The venerable author of the Aphorisms himself established aduality when he spoke of the application of the terms "object" and"agent" [Footnote: In Vedānta S. I. 2. 4, it is shown that certainpassages in the Upanishads refer to Brahman and not the embodiedsoul, "because of the application therein of the terms objectand agent;" as __e. G. __ in the passage of the Chhāndogya Upan. Iii. 14, "I shall attain it when I have departed from hence. " Thesewords imply an agent who attains and also an object which isattained, __i. E. __ Brahman. Ša"nkara in his comment on i. 2. 11illustrates this by the passage in the Katha Upanishad iii. 1, "Thetwo, drinking the due reward from their works, in this worldentered the cave, in the highest place of the supreme soul" (sc. The heart)]; and thus has it been explained by the author of thecommentary by quoting passages of the Veda which imply duality, asthat which says "the two entered the cave. " 60. The soul is also shown to be different [from Brahman] by theevidence of Šm. Riti [Footnote: Cf. Vedānta Sūtras i. 2. 6, whereŠa"nkara quotes the passage from the Bhagavad Gītā (xviii. 61), "The Lord of all beings abides in the region of the heart, --causingall beings to revolve by his illusion as though mounted on amachine. "]; thus their difference is proved to be essential. If itwere not so, how could the Commentator have used such an expressionas "the worshipper" and "the worshipped" [Footnote: He uses thisvery expression __upāsyopāsakabhāva__ in his Comment. On i. 2. 4. ]? 61. I am sometimes happy, sometimes miserable; He, the supreme Soul, is always essentially happy. Such is the difference, --then how canthere be identity between these two different substances? 62. He is eternally self-luminous and unobscured, -- intensely pure, the one witness of the world; not so is the individual soul, --thusa thunderbolt falls on the tree of the theory of Identity. 63. For those who maintain the identity of the individual and supremesoul, the hypothesis of a __dvandva compound__ [Footnote: __I. E. __ inthe word __jīvātmānau__] is precluded; or they bring forward suchwords as __d. Rishadupala__ as parallel cases [Footnote: I suppose thatthis means that the __dvandva__ compound __d. Rishadupala__ has someanalogy to one like __jīvātmānau__, which involves identity, as theupper and lower millstone form one instrument; but there (inaccordance with Pā. N. 2. 2. 34, __vārtt. __) the less important wordmeaning the upper and smaller stone (__upalā__) is placed last(cf. 2. 2. 31)]; the __dvandva__ is only consistent with "difference, "but in no way with "identity. " 64. Where identity is the meaning, there arises the __karmadhāraya__compound, --for [such a __karmadhāraya__ as] __nīlotpala__ "theblue-lotus" is used as implying that the two members of the compoundrefer to the same subject [Footnote: But __jīvātmānau__ is a__dvandva__, not a __karmadhāraya__ compound. ] 65. As there are many passages in Šruti such as that which says"food is Brahman, " [Footnote: Brihad Āra. Nyaka Upan. V. 12. 1. ] sotoo this passage "I am Brahman" is to be understood as meaningworship [Footnote: __I. E. __ this is one of the modes of worshippingBrahman by meditating on him in some lower visible form, not asreally expressing his real nature. ] 66. The doctrine of Identity is not true; wherever it appears to bedeclared in Šruti, all those passages are to be taken as onlymeaning worship. 67. There are many sentences in the ancient Veda which speak fornon-identity as also for identity; having expelled envy and discussedthe truth, let the wise declare that which each thinks wholesome. 68. O soul, bewildered by a deceived opinion, drive far from thymouth these words "I am Brahman"; how canst thou be That, O thou whoart utterly at the mercy of fate, plunged as thou art in the greatocean of mundane existence hard to be crossed! 69. He who is the beloved of Lakshmi, the ambrosia-ocean, full ofmanifest supreme joy; the water of whose feet is Gangā, worthy to beworshipped by Rudra and the other gods; who before creation createdall instantaneously by a movement of his brow, --how canst thou say, O soul, "I am He, "--thou who art a poor beggar, not a king. 70. O slow of mind, how canst thou say, I am He with whom are filledall the vast stores of this universe in its entirety? Collect thyfaculties calmly in thy heart and consider thine own power; can ahost of fierce world-supporting elephants enter into the belly of agnat? 71. Whose art thou? whence art thou come? how is the course of thismundane bondage? Ponder this matter in thy heart and forsake thepath of the erring. Say not "I am He"; but worship Hari continuallyin the relation of adorer and adored; by this thou mayst attain thehappy journey, but otherwise thou wilt assuredly fall. 72. Great is the misery which thou hast experienced, O Soul, whiledwelling in the womb in various births, and thou hast wandered againand again in heaven or in hell; this theory "I am He" is an error ofthine, --worship thou Hari's lotus feet; thou art His worshipper, Heis the adorable, for He is the lord of the three worlds. 73. Renouncing the so-called theory of identity, forthwith devotethyself to duality, if there now dwells in thy heart a supremefeeling of faith in Hari; and, having learned the doctrine inNārada's Pańcharātra and everywhere else, let all the hymns of theVaish. Nava sacred books be thoroughly examined, as is truly for thygood. 74. By what foolish teacher hast thou been instructed, that thouutterest these words "I am Brahman"? How art thou that being who iscontinually worshipped by Rudra and all the gods? O fool, considerit and see aright. 75. The wicked cannot understand the difference between the embodiedand the Supreme Souls; the great reason for this is a mind possessedby an evil obstinacy in favour of the doctrine of Illusion; just asthe tongue of those who suffer from excess of bile cannot taste thesweetness of molasses, nor the eyes of those afflicted with guttaserena or jaundice see the whiteness of a shell. 76. He by a particle of whose intellect thou, O Soul, hast beenproduced the foremost of intelligent beings--say not, O knave, thatthou art __He__; for who but the ingrate desires to seize the seatof his Master? 77. A particle of intelligence has been deposited in thee by thesupreme Lord in His mercy, --it becomes thee not, O knave, to saythat therefore thou art God; just as if some evil-minded man hadreceived elephants, horses, and infantry from the king and then sethis heart on seizing his kingdom. 78. He under whose control is that mighty illusion which deceivesthe three worlds, He is to be recognized as the Supreme Lord, theadorable, essentially thought, existence and joy; but he who ishimself always under her control like a camel drawn by a stringthrough his nostrils, is to be recognized as the individual soul, --vast indeed is the difference between the two! 79. Having studied the doctrines of the Sā"nkhya, Ka. Nāda, andGautama, and the doctrine of Patańjali, the doctrines of theMīmā. Msā and Bha. T. Tabhāskara [Footnote: Colebrooke's Essays, vol i. P. 359. ], --amidst all the six current systems, --let the wisetell the final conclusion if they can as to the real nature of thesupreme and the individual soul, --is it duality, or is it oneness, or is it again a oneness in duality? 80. In five of the systems I have only heard peremptorily assertedin many places the difference between the supreme and the individualsouls; what is this that I hear asserted in the Vedānta system?"Plurality, unity, both, "--this is a threefold marvel! [Footnote:This is an attack on Rāmānuja's system, as opposed to that ofPūr. Naprajńa or Madhva, cf. Sarva-daršana S. P. 52, l. 20, "What isthe real truth? The real truth is plurality, unity, and both. Thusunity is admitted in saying that Brahman alone subsists in all formsas all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in sayingthat one only Brahman subsists under a plurality of forms, diverseas soul and non-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that theessential natures of soul, non-soul, and the Lord are different andnot to be confounded. " This doctrine is opposed by the followers ofMadhva, see __ibid. __, Pūr. Naprajńa-darš. P. 61, l. 11. ] 81. He who is the maker of all and the Lord of the world isindependent by reason of his essential independence; the individualsoul is notoriously dependent; how can they say then that these twoare identical? 82. There are various flavours in honey [existing distinct] throughthe difference of the trees [from whose flowers it is produced];how else could it remove the three-fold disorders? [Footnote:__I. E. __ those affecting the three "humours" of the body, __i. E. Vāyu__ 'wind, ' __pitta__ 'bile, ' and __kapha__ 'phlegm. ' Certainflavours of the honey counteract one disorder and others another. The Sušruta thus describes honey (vol. I. P. 185): "When cooked itremoves the three-fold disorders, but when raw or sour it causesthem; when used in various applications it cures many disorders;and since it is composed of many different things it is anexcellent medium for mixing. But as it consists of the juices offlowers which are mutually contrary in the action, potency, andqualities of their various ingredients, and it may happen thatpoisonous insects may be included, it is only good as a remedy forcold diseases. "] So the individual souls at the world'sdissolution are absorbed in the Lord; but they do not becomeidentified with Him, for they are again separated at the nextcreation. 83. There is a difference between rivers and the sea, with theirrespective sweet and salt water; so too God and the soul aredifferent and possessed of distinct attributes [Footnote: Inallusion to Mu. N. D. Upan. Iii. 2. 8. ]. 84. Rivers, when joined to the sea from all sides, are notidentified with it nor yet do they appear to be separate; but fromthe difference between salt water and sweet water [Footnote: Mostof the MSS. And the Benares Pa. N. Dit read __kshī roda__; but theCalcutta ed. And one of the two MSS. In the Library of the CalcuttaSanskrit College read __kshāroda__, which seems preferable. If weread __kshīroda__, the line would require to be rendered, "but fromthe difference between milk mixed with water and pure water, " orperhaps "from the difference between the milk-ocean and the water-ocean. "] there must be a real difference between them. 85. Others see not the difference when water is mixed with milk, butthe swan at once separates the milk and the water [Footnote: Cf. Šakunt. šl. 155. ]; so too when the souls are absorbed in the supremeBrahman, the Lord, --the faithful, who have received the Guru's words, can at once draw a difference between them. 86. Even when milk is mixed with milk and water with water, they donot become absolutely identified, for they still retain their fixedmeasure as before; so, when the souls through intense contemplationare absorbed in the Supreme Spirit, they do not become identifiedwith Him; thus say the pure-minded saints. 87. There are certain disputants, sunk in a sea of false logic, addicted to an evil way, filled with a hundred imaginations of idlebabble, deceived themselves and deceiving the world, --all that theysay, "I am Brahman and all this visible universe also is Brahman, "--is now shown clearly to be an empty desire. 88. If I and all this universe were Brahman, then there would be anidentity between thee and me; then thy wealth, sons, and wife wouldbe mine, and mine would be thine, for there would be no distinctionbetween us. 89. And how then could there be injunction or prohibition, since allare one, and there is no distinction of caste? If the doctrine ofnon-duality be thus held to be established, then what offence hasthe Buddhist committed? 90. "The Soul is different from the elements, the senses, theinternal organ, and primary matter, and also from that which iscalled the individual, "--thus has it been declared of old by Kapilato his mother in the third book of the Bhāgavata [Footnote: Bhāg. Pūr. Iii. 28. 41. ] (Purā. Na). 91. Those who study the path pointed out by the teacher, restingupon a foundation of naught, and maintain with an emptyunderstanding that all is void and that all the recognized deitiesare naught, --how can many words be uttered about them, for languagefails in a topic of naught; naught indeed is their wisdom, andtheir fruit shall be also mostly naught. 92. There are words uttered by Vyāsa in the Bhārata condemning thisdoctrine of the nothingness of all things [Footnote: The name__šūnyavāda__ is generally applied to Buddhism; here it is applied byway of reproach to the Vedānta, which is called in the Padma-purā. Na"secret Buddhism" (__prachchhanna. M Bauddham__)]; "their bodies arecomposed of the quality of darkness, and verily darkness shall betheir end;" [Footnote: Mahābh. Xii. 9690. ] 93. These words which were uttered of old by Kapila in the presenceof the sage Syūmarašmi [Footnote: This dialogue occurs in Mahābh. Xii. 9604, ff. ], were afterwards recounted by Vyāsa in the Bhā. Rata. 94. This theory of theirs concerning a void of qualities in Him whois the ocean of qualities [Footnote: The Rāmānujas and the Mādhvasdeny that the Supreme Being is __nirgu. Na__, --thus there is aquotation in the Sarva Daršana S. P. 64. "Vāsudeva is the supremeBrahman, endowed with auspicious attributes" (cf. P. 69, l. 18;p. 73, l. 2)], --it is but like the blind hurrying of sheep afterthe ewe that leads them! Having made a separate commentary of theirown on the Sūtras they deceive those who follow their doctrine. 95. All these qualities, sovereignty, creation, and the like, eternally belong to the Supreme Lord; how then can He be "withoutqualities" who is thus "possessed of qualities"? he theory of a voidof qualities is mere disputation. 96. The adorable one possesses knowledge, volition, and creativepower; how then can he be destitute of qualities? or, if he isdestitute of qualities, how can he be set forth by the Vedas? Howcan the absence of qualities be predicated of the sea of qualities, and yet all remonstrance be silent? Ponder it well in thine ownmind, and then determine what is right. 97. A substance without attributes, like the sky-flower, is notadmitted either in the Veda or in the world; if the knowledge of sucha thing were derived from the Veda, the Veda itself would then ceaseto be an authority. 98. [The Vedāntin may reply] "The bunch of Darbha grass [Footnote:This is the __prastara__ or bundle of sacred grass, which plays animportant part in the sacrificial ritual, cf. Taittirīya S. I. 7. 4, "__yajamāna. H prastara. H, __" where Sāya. Na remarks, "__yajamānavadyāgasādhanatvāt prastare yajamānatvopachāra. H. __" This descriptionof the grass as the sacrificer is really only meant as metaphoricalpraise, since the actual attributes of the sacrificer are evidentlyabsent from the grass. (Cf. Mīmā. Msā Sūtras, i. 4. 23. )] is said tobe the sacrificer, as it is the means of performing the sacrifice;[as the Darbha grass is understood by this description, ] even thoughthe attributes thus ascribed are not found in it, so is Brahmanunderstood when we ascribe certain qualities [as 'truth, ' etc. , eventhough these qualities are precluded in a being without qualities]. " 99. [I answer] A thorough Vedāntin like thee does not accept anywhere the existence of qualities or that which possesses qualities;but if imagined qualities are done away with [by deeper insight], real qualities are nowhere done away with [Footnote: Clearer insightabolishes imagined attributes, as __e. G. __ the supposed snake inthe rope; but real attributes remain untouched, and we holdBrahman's attributes to be real. --I read __abādha. H__ in I. 2. ]. 100. If Brahman is understood to be destitute of qualities, then"truth, " etc. , will not be applicable to Him; but, if so, therearises a contradiction in such passages [of Šruti] as "he is thetruthful, " etc. [Footnote: I do not know where this passage occurs, but the kindred word __satyadharman__ is applied to several deitiesin the Rigveda. ] 101. When the existence of such a thing as a quality is admitted, we can imagine it in something else [Footnote: The Vedāntins holdthat nothing exists besides Brahman; and yet, although they thusdeny the existence of any other thing or quality, they hold thatcertain qualities are imagined to exist in him, forgetting thatonly one who has seen silver can imagine __rajatatva__ in nacre. ];but to imagine that nacre is silver, we must first know clearlywhat silver is. 102. This universe is based on the soul as its site, being imaginedin it by ignorance; some teachers would describe it as an illusoryemanation [Footnote: It is a favourite doctrine of the Vedānta thatignorance, as being imagined by ignorance, is itself false. ]; butthis is not a pleasing doctrine to me. 103. It cannot be said that all this universe is false; since it isreally the plaything of Hari, who is eternally engaged in sport[Footnote: Manu, i. 80, "There are numberless Manvantaras, creations and destructions numberless; the being supremely exaltedperforms all this, as in sport, again and again. "] 104. The external world is not like a dream; for in dreams there issleep and a host of imperfections; what we eat or drink in dreamsgives us no enjoyment, but these things are enjoyable in our wakingstate. 105. If all that is seen were false, then how could it produceeffects? The carrying of water in a jar is not false; all we cansay is that it is transient. 106. The idea that all this world is false, is opposed toexperience; for of what use would be all the expiations for sin, prescribed in the law-books? Why are these thieves to be punishedeven by the king? The upholder of the doctrine of Māyā can assertanything on his oath, but all is false. 107. Thou canst not say that the visible world is only like thetransitory enjoyment of one who smells a wreath of flowers; howeverclosely it is scanned, there is no overpowering evidence of itsunreality [to preclude the presumption founded on experience]; itcontinually manifests itself to us as eternal in its stream ofsuccessive events. 108. This world is not false but it is rendered true by Vish. Nu'sprotection [Footnote: Or this may mean "since Vish. Nu has acceptedit as the instrument of his sport. "]; thou art made pure by theknowledge of Him, as all minerals shine as gold [when brought incontact with the philosopher's stone]. 109. Dispassion and enjoyment stand equally aloof as disinterestedspectators and are lost in faith; the partaking of the consecratedfood is in no sense to be called an "enjoyment, "--it is itself anact of faith [Footnote: "The __prasāda__ is any article of foodthat has been consecrated by previous presentation to an idol, after which it is distributed among the worshippers on the spot, orsent to persons of consequence at their own houses" (Wilson's Works, vol. 1. P. 116). Cf. Also the legend in p. 134, where "Rām Dās atnoon halted and bathed the god, and prepared his food, and presentedit, and then took the __prasād__, and put it in a vessel, and fedupon what remained. " (The food consecrated at the temple of Puri isespecially called the __Mahāprasāda. __) There is a distich currentamong the Bhāktas:]. 110. By intense devotion to his object the man of the world willbecome the devotee of enjoyment, and by the absence of all enjoymenta man becomes absolutely dispassionate; this is the real truth[Footnote: But the true devotee is neither devoted to enjoyment norto dispassion, is equally apart from and superior to both. /* __jńāna. M nirāk. Ritir, Brahma tyaktvā bhaktyā bhajāchyutam__ | __yatra prasādasevāpi bhaktir anyasya kā kathā__ ||*/ "Knowledge is rejection; abandon Brahman and worship Vish. Nu. Herewhere even the homage paid to the __prasāda__ counts as faith, whatneed to mention anything besides?" Thus the devotee does everythingby faith, and dispassion and enjoyment are to him alike swallowed upin faith]. 111. By association with the good and by repeatedly listening to thestory of K. Rish. Na's sports there has arisen in the lake of the mindthe great wave of pure faith and pure affection; abandoning thedoctrine of unity and without hesitation embracing that of duality, we worship with our whole heart the lotus-feet of the beloved ofLakshmī. 112. There is a rule in the things of the world, that he who is nearthe king may be called the king; so too in the things of Brahman andthe soul must we understand the various sacred texts [which at firstsight appear to identify them]. 113. He in whom the universe, --sun, moon, and the rest, with the threeworlds, --rose into being, --in whom it all abides until it perishes, --and in whom, each in its own time, it is all finally dissolved, --He, the Lord, whom, being beyond all qualities [Footnote: Cf. Sarva D. S. P. 52, l. 8 infr. "The statements that the Supreme Spirit is devoidof qualities, are intended to deny his possession of phenomenalqualities (such as liking, disliking, etc. ). "], even Brahman himselfcannot declare in the Vedas, --why, O teacher, dost thou teach thismiserable me the words "I am He"? 114. He in whom the storehouse of the universe with all its creaturesgreat and small, was all contained like a line of insects drowned ina ripe fruit of the glomerous fig-tree, --in whom it abides until thefinal destruction, --and in whom it is eventually dissolved, --Ah! howcan there come from my mouth, O teacher, these words "I am He"? 115. Him, the Supreme Lord, by whose compassion even the dumb becomeseloquent, the lame in a moment obtains strength to leap mountains, and even the man blind from his birth receives eyes beautiful liketwo lotuses, --or what still greater marvel shall I add?--Him Iworship, the moon-faced son of Nanda, the philosopher's stone of thefaithful. 116. Boundless is time, bounteous the earth, and great is the familyof the devout worshippers of Vish. Nu; somebody will be found at sometime or other on the earth who will appreciate my merits [Footnote:Cf. The šloka in the prologue of the Mālatīmādhava. ] 117. Having studied under my preceptor Nārāya. Na, the best ofteachers, his book, which bears the title of "The Ornament ofFaith, "--having read it with all its supplements and appendices, andby his kindness to his faithful disciples having mastered all itsmysteries, --and having become a receptacle of faith myself, I havenow composed according to my ability this century of stanzas, anecklace of pearls of good doctrine, which have for their subjectthe distinction of the individual Soul and Brahman. 118. If we have uttered through inadvertence what is wrong, may theintelligent, observing it, correct all the errors; the feet of thetraveller do sometimes stumble, and sometimes the speaker speaksthrough bewilderment what is incompatible. 119. In a poem strung of all excellences the mean man hunts forfaults and never an excellence; in a palace all compact of jewelsit is the ant that will see a flaw. 120. Let those who are envious and bereft of sense, detect a faultif they will; but let the connoisseurs count the merits; they whobehold the merits and not the faults, --these are the good, thesegive the highest satisfaction. 121. Let this work of the poet Pūr. Nānanda be read and be heard, which is devoted to proving the difference of the individual soulfrom the Supreme, --which is excellent with its sentences thatdistinguish truth from falsehood, and is approved by the devoteesof Vish. Nu, --based on the doctrine of Madhva, and pleasing with acomposition full of sweet words, --O ye best of the worshippers ofBhagavat, if faith be desired in your minds. 122. On the neck of the faithful may this Tattvamuktāvalī[Footnote: Or "the necklace of the pearls of truth. "] abide forever, --whose beauty is increased by the apt arrangement of sweetand soft words but which is free from rhetorical ornaments, --beautiful with a profusion of sentences sweet like milk, and withits parts all bright and elegant, --a special source of delight tothe intelligent, --charming with a host of excellences and devoidof even the trace of a fault.