THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT

Peace and Prosperity. 

This chance photograph showing General Emilio Aguinaldo as he isto-day, standing with Director of Education Frank L. Crone, beside afield of corn raised by Emilio Aguinaldo, Jr. , in a school contest, typifies the peace, prosperity, and enlightenment which have beenbrought about in the Philippine Islands under American rule. 

The Philippines Past and Present

By

Dean C. Worcester

Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands 1901-1913; Memberof the Philippine Commission, 1900-1913

Author of "The Philippine Islands and Their People"

In Two Volumes -- With 128 PlatesVolume I1914

Contents

VOL. I

ChapterI. View Point and Subject-MatterII. Was Independence Promised?III. Insurgent "Coöperation"IV. The Premeditated Insurgent AttackV. Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent ReportVI. Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan ValleyVII. Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and ElsewhereVIII. Did We Destroy a Republic?IX. The Conduct of the WarX. Mr. Bryan and IndependenceXI. The First Philippine CommissionXII. The Establishment of Civil GovernmentXIII. The Philippine Civil ServiceXIV. The Constabulary and Public OrderXV. The Administration of JusticeXVI. Health ConditionsXVII. Baguio and the Benguet RoadXVIII. The Coördination of Scientific Work

List of Illustrations

VOL. I

Peace and ProsperityFort San Antonio Abad, showing the Effect of the Fire from Dewey'sFleetFelipe BuencaminoThe San Juan BridgeInsurgent PrisonersTypical Insurgent TrenchesInside View of Insurgent Trenches at the Bagbag RiverGeneral Henry W. LawtonFeeding Filipino RefugeesThe First Philippine CommissionThe Second Philippine CommissionThe Return of Mr. TaftGovernor-general James F. Smith with a Bontoc Igorot EscortGovernor-general Forbes in the Wild Man's CountryThe Philippine Supreme CourtAn Unsanitary WellA Flowing Artesian WellAn Unimproved Street in the Filipino Quarter of ManilaAn Improved Street in the Filipino Quarter of ManilaDisinfecting by the AcreAn Old-style Provincial JailRetreat at Bilibid Prison, ManilaBilibid Prison HospitalModern Contagious Disease Ward, San Lazaro HospitalFilipina Trained NursesStaff of the Bontoc HospitalA Victim of Yaws before and after Treatment with SalvarsanThe Culion Leper ColonyBuilding the Benguet RoadFreight Autos on the Benguet RoadThe Famous Zig-zag on the Benguet RoadA Typical Baguio RoadOne of the First Benguet Government CottagesTypical Cottages at BaguioA Baguio HomeThe Baguio HospitalGovernment Centre at BaguioA Scene in the Baguio Teachers' CampThe Baguio Country ClubThe Bureau of Science Building, ManilaThe Philippine General HospitalThe College of Medicine and Surgery, ManilaAn Old-style Schoolhouse, with Teachers and PupilsA Modern Primary School BuildingOld-style Central School BuildingModern Central School BuildingTypical Scene in a Trade SchoolAn Embroidery ClassPhilippine EmbroideryFilipino Trained NursesA School Athletic TeamFilipina Girls playing Basket-ballUniversity Hall, ManilaBakídanIn Hostile CountryTravel under DifficultiesDangerous NavigationA Negrito Family and their "House"A Typical NegritoTypical KalingasSettling a Head-hunting FeudEntertaining the KalingasAn Ifugao FamilyIfugao DancersAn Ifugao DancerIfugao Rice Terraces

THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT

CHAPTER I

View Point and Subject-Matter

It is customary in Latin countries for a would-be author or orator toendeavour, at the beginning of his book or his speech, to establishhis status. Possibly I have become partially Latinized as the resultof some eighteen years of residence in the Philippines. At all eventsit is my purpose to state at the outset facts which will tend tomake clear my view point and at the same time briefly to outline thesubject-matter which I hereinafter discuss. 

As a boy I went through several of the successive stages of collector'sfever from which the young commonly suffer. First it was postagestamps; then birds' nests, obtained during the winter season when nolonger of use to their builders. Later I was allowed to collect eggs, and finally the birds themselves. At one time my great ambition was tobecome a taxidermist. My family did not actively oppose this desirebut suggested that a few preliminary years in school and collegemight prove useful. 

I eventually lost my ambition to be a taxidermist but did not lose myinterest in zoölogy and botany. While a student at the University ofMichigan I specialized in these subjects. I was fortunate in havingas one of my instructors Professor Joseph B. Steere, then at thehead of the Department of Zoölogy. Professor Steere, who had been agreat traveller, at times entertained his classes with wonderfullyinteresting tales of adventure on the Amazon and in the Andes, Peru, Formosa, the Philippines and the Dutch Moluccas. My ambition wasfired by his stories and when in the spring of 1886 he announced hisintention of returning to the Philippines the following year to takeup and prosecute anew zoölogical work which he had begun there in1874, offering to take with him a limited number of his students whowere to have the benefit of his knowledge of Spanish and of his wideexperience as a traveller and collector, and were in turn to allow himto work up their collections after their return to the United States, I made up my mind to go. 

I was then endeavouring to get through the University on an allowanceof $375 per year and was in consequence not overburdened with surplusfunds. I however managed to get my life insured for $1500 and toborrow $1200 on the policy, and with this rather limited sum uponwhich to draw purchased an outfit for a year's collecting and sailedwith Doctor Steere for Manila. Two other young Americans accompaniedhim. One of these, Doctor Frank S. Bourns, was like myself afterwardsdestined to play a part in Philippine affairs which was not thendreamed of by either of us. 

We spent approximately a year in the islands. Unfortunately we hadneglected to provide ourselves with proper official credentials andas a result we had some embarrassing experiences. We were arrested bysuspicious Spanish officials shortly after our arrival and were triedon trumped-up charges. On several subsequent occasions we narrowlyescaped arrest and imprisonment. 

The unfriendly attitude of certain of our Spanish acquaintanceswas hardly to be wondered at. They could not believe that sensible, civilized human beings would shoot tiny birds, pay for eggs the sizeof the tip of one's little finger more than hens' eggs were worth, undergo not a few hardships and run many risks while living in thesimplest of native houses on very inadequate food, unless actuated bysome hidden purpose. At different times they suspected us of lookingfor gold deposits, of designing to stir up trouble among the natives, or of being political spies. 

When Doctor Bourns came back with the American troops in 1908 andI returned as a member of the first Philippine Commission in 1909, this last supposition became a fixed belief with many of our formerSpanish acquaintances who still remained in the islands, and theyfrankly expressed their regret that they had not shot us while theyhad the chance. 

Over against certain unpleasant experiences with those who couldnot understand us or our work I must set much kind and invaluableassistance rendered by others who could, and did. 

All in all we spent a most interesting year, visiting eighteen ofthe more important islands. [1]

Throughout this trip we lived in very close contact with the Filipinos, either occupying the _tribunales_, the municipal buildings of theirtowns, where they felt at liberty to call and observe us at all hoursof the day and night, or actually living in their houses, which insome instances were not vacated by the owners during our occupancy. 

Incidentally we saw something of several of the wild tribes, includingthe Tagbanuas of Palawan, the Moros of Joló, Basilan and Mindanao, and the Mangyans of Mindoro. 

We experienced many very real hardships, ran not a few serious risksand ended our sojourn with six weeks of fever and starvation in theinterior of Mindoro. While we would not have cut short our appointedstay by a day, we were nevertheless delighted when we could turn ourfaces homeward, and Doctor Bourns and I agreed that we had had quiteenough of life in the Philippines. 

Upon my arrival at my home in Vermont a competent physician told myfamily that I might not live a week. I however recuperated so rapidlythat I was able to return to the University of Michigan that falland to complete the work of my senior year. I became a member of theteaching staff of the institution before my graduation. 

Little as I suspected it at the time, the tropics had fixed theirstrangely firm grip on me during that fateful first trip to the FarEast which was destined to modify my whole subsequent life. I hadfirmly believed that if fortunate enough to get home I should havesense enough to stay there, but before six months had elapsed I wasfinding life at Ann Arbor, Michigan, decidedly prosaic, and longingto return to the Philippines and finish a piece of zoölogical workwhich I knew was as yet only begun. 

Doctor Bourns, like myself, was eager to go back, and we set out toraise $10, 000 to pay the expenses of a two-years collecting tour, inthe course of which we hoped to visit regions not hitherto penetratedby any zoölogist. 

Times were then getting hard, and good Doctor Angell, the presidentof the university, thought it a great joke that two young fellowslike ourselves should attempt to raise so considerable a sum to bespent largely for our own benefit. Whenever he met me on the street heused to ask whether we had obtained that $10, 000 yet, and then shakewith laughter. One of the great satisfactions of my life came when, on a beautiful May morning in 1890, I was able to answer his inquiryin the affirmative. 

He fairly staggered with amazement, but promptly recovering himselfwarmly congratulated me, and with that kindly interest which he hasalways shown in the affairs of young men, asked how he could helpus. Through his kindly offices and the intervention of the StateDepartment we were able to obtain a royal order from the Spanishgovernment which assured us a very different reception on our returnto the Philippines in August from that which had been accorded us onthe occasion of our first visit to the islands. 

There was now revealed to us a pleasing side of Spanish characterwhich we had largely missed during our first visit. Satisfiedas to our identity and as to the motives which actuated us, theSpanish officials, practically without exception, did everythingin their power to assist us and to render our sojourn pleasant andprofitable. Our mail was delivered to us at points fifty miles distantfrom provincial capitals. When our remittances failed to reach uson time, as they not infrequently did, money was loaned to us freelywithout security. Troops were urged upon us for our protection when wedesired to penetrate regions considered to be dangerous. Our Spanishfriends constantly offered us the hospitality of their homes andwith many of them the offer was more than _pro forma_. Indeed, inseveral instances it was insisted upon so strongly that we acceptedit, to our great pleasure and profit. 

Officials were quite frank in discussing before us the affairs oftheir several provinces, and we gained a very clear insight intoexisting political methods and conditions. 

During this trip we lived in even closer contact with the Filipino[2] population than on the occasion of our first visit. Our rapidlygrowing knowledge of Spanish, and of Visayan, one of the more importantnative dialects, rendered it increasingly easy for us to communicatewith them, gain their confidence and learn to look at things fromtheir view point. They talked with us most frankly and fully abouttheir political troubles. 

During this our second sojourn in the Philippines, which lengthened totwo years and six months, we revisited the islands with which we hadbecome more or less familiar on our first trip and added six othersto the list. [3] We lived for a time among the wild Bukidnons andNegritos of the Negros mountains. 

After my companion had gone to Borneo I had the misfortune to contracttyphoid fever when alone in Busuanga, and being ignorant of the natureof the malady from which I was suffering, kept on my feet until Icould no longer stand, with the natural result that I came uncommonlynear paying for my foolishness with my life, and have ever sincesuffered from resulting physical disabilities. When able to travel, I left the islands upon the urgent recommendation of my physician, feeling that the task which had led me to return there was almostaccomplished and sure that my wanderings in the Far East were over. 

Shortly after my return to the United States I was offered a positionas a member of the zoölogical staff of the University of Michigan, accepted it, received speedy promotion, and hoped and expected toend my days as a college professor. 

In 1898 the prospect of war with Spain awakened old memories. I fancythat the knowledge then possessed by the average American citizenrelative to the Philippines was fairly well typified by that of agood old lady at my Vermont birthplace who had spanked me when I was asmall boy, and who, after my first return from the Philippine Islands, said to me, "Deanie, are them Philippians you have been a visitin'the people that Paul wrote the Epistle to?"

I endeavoured to do my part toward dispelling this ignorance. Myknowledge of Philippine affairs led me strongly to favour armedintervention in Cuba, where similar political conditions seemed toprevail to a considerable extent, and I fear that I was consideredby many of my university colleagues something of a "jingo. " Indeed, a member of the University Board of Regents said that I ought to becompelled to enlist. As a matter of fact, compulsion would have beenquite unnecessary had it not been for physical disability. 

My life-long friend and former travelling companion, Doctor Bourns, was not similarly hampered. He promptly joined the army as a medicalofficer with the rank of major, and sailed for the islands on thesecond steamer which carried United States troops there. As a naturalresult of his familiarity with Spanish and his wide acquaintanceshipamong the Filipinos, he was ordered from the outset to devote histime more largely to political matters than to the practice of hisprofession. He did all that he could to prevent misunderstandingsbetween Filipinos and Americans. He assisted as an interpreter atthe negotiations for the surrender of Manila on August 13, 1898, after taking part in the attack on the city. Later he was giventhe rather difficult task of suppressing a bad outbreak of smallpoxamong the Spanish prisoners of war, which he performed with greatsuccess. He was finally made chief health officer of Manila, althoughhe continued to devote himself largely to political matters, gotnumberless deserving Filipinos out of trouble, and rapidly increasedhis already wide circle of Filipino friends. Through his letters Iwas kept quite closely in touch with the situation. 

Meanwhile I decided that the Philippines were not for me, asked forand obtained leave for study in Europe, and in December 1898 setout for New York to engage passage for myself and my family. I wentby way of Washington in order to communicate to President McKinleycertain facts relative to the Philippine situation which it seemedto me ought to be brought to his attention. 

I believed that there was serious danger of an outbreak of hostilitiesbetween Filipinos and Americans, and that such a catastrophe, resultingfrom mutual misunderstanding, might be avoided if seasonable actionwere taken. I have since learned how wrong was this latter belief. Myprevious experience had been almost exclusively with the Visayans andthe wild tribes, and the revolution against the United States was atthe outset a strictly Tagálog affair, and hence beyond my ken. 

President McKinley very kindly gave me all the time I wanted, displayeda most earnest desire to learn the truth, and showed the deepest andmost friendly interest in the Filipinos. Let no man believe that thenor later he had the slightest idea of bringing about the exploitationof their country. On the contrary, he evinced a most earnest desireto learn what was best for them and then to do it if it lay withinhis power. 

To my amazement, at the end of our interview he asked me whether Iwould be willing to go to the islands as his personal representative. 

I could not immediately decide to make such a radical change in myplans as this would involve, and asked for a week's time to thinkthe matter over, which was granted. I decided to go. 

Meanwhile, the President had evolved the idea of sending out acommission and asked me if I would serve on it. I told him that I wouldand left for my home to make preparations for an early departure. Afew days later he announced the names of the commissioners. They wereJacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University; Major-GeneralElwell S. Otis, then the ranking army officer in the Philippines;Rear-Admiral George Dewey, then in command of the United States fleetin Philippine waters; Colonel Charles Denby, who had for fourteenyears served as United States Minister to China, and myself. 

Colonel Denby was delayed in Washington by publicbusiness. Mr. Schurman and I reached Yokohama on the morning ofFebruary 13, and on arrival there learned, to our deep regret, thathostilities had broken out on the fourth instant. We reached Manila onthe evening of March 4, but Colonel Denby was unable to join us untilApril 2. Meanwhile, as we could not begin our work in his absence, I had an exceptional opportunity to observe conditions in the field, of which I availed myself. 

I served with the first Philippine Commission until it had completedits work, and was then appointed to the second Philippine Commissionwithout a day's break in my period of service. 

The members of this latter body were William H. Taft of Ohio; LukeE. Wright of Tennessee; Henry C. Ide of Vermont; Bernard Moses ofCalifornia, and myself. Briefly stated, the task before us was toestablish civil government in the Philippine Islands. After a periodof ninety days, to be spent in observation, the commission was tobecome the legislative body, while executive power continued to bevested for a time in the military. 

This condition endured until the 4th of July, 1901, on whichday Mr. Taft was appointed civil governor. On September 1, 1901, each of the remaining original members of the commission becamean executive officer as well. Mr. Wright was appointed secretaryof commerce and police; Mr. Ide, secretary of finance and justice;Mr. Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I myself, Secretaryof the Interior. On the same day three Filipino members were addedto the commission: Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Sr. Benito Legarda andSr. José R. De Luzuriaga. 

Until the 16th of October, 1907, the Commission continued to serve asthe sole legislative body. It is at the present time the upper houseof the Philippine Legislature, the Philippine Assembly, composed ofeighty-one elective members, constituting the lower house. 

I have therefore had a hand in the enactment of all legislation putin force in the Philippine Islands since the American occupation, withthe exception of certain laws passed during my few and brief absences. 

As secretary of the interior it fell to my lot to organize anddirect the operations of a Bureau of Health, a Bureau of GovermnentLaboratories, a Bureau of Forestry, a Bureau of Public Lands, a Bureauof Agriculture, a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, a Mining Bureauand a Weather Bureau. Ultimately, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribesand the Mining Bureau were incorporated with the Bureau of GovernmentLaboratories to form the Bureau of Science, which continued under myexecutive control. The Bureau of Agriculture was transferred to theDepartment of Public Instruction in 1909. 

I was at the outset given administrative control of all matterspertaining to the non-Christian tribes, which constitute, roughlyspeaking, an eighth of the population of the Philippines, and untilmy resignation retained such control throughout the islands, exceptin the Moro Province, which at an early day was put directly underthe governor-general. 

I participated in the organization of civil government in the severalprovinces of the archipelago, and myself drafted the Municipal Codefor the government of the towns inhabited by Filipinos, as well asthe Special Provincial Government Act and the Township GovernmentAct for that of the provinces and settlements inhabited chiefly bythe non-Christian tribes. 

At the outset we did not so much as know with certainty the namesof the several wild and savage tribes inhabiting the more remote andinaccessible portions of the archipelago. As I was unable to obtainreliable information concerning them on which to base legislationfor their control and uplifting, I proceeded to get such informationfor myself by visiting their territory, much of which was then quiteunexplored. 

After this territory was organized into five so-called "SpecialGovernment Provinces, " some of my Filipino friends, I fear notmoved solely by anxiety for the public good, favoured and secured alegislative enactment which made it my official duty to visit andinspect these provinces at least once during each fiscal year. Ishall always feel indebted to them for giving me this opportunity tobecome intimately acquainted with some of the most interesting, mostprogressive, and potentially most important peoples of the Philippines. 

When in 1901 I received the news that a central government was soon tobe established, I was in the Sub-province of Lepanto on my first tripthrough the wilder and less-known portions of northern Luzon. Duringeach succeeding year I have spent from two to four months in travelthrough the archipelago, familiarizing myself at first hand withlocal conditions. 

I have frequently taken with me on these inspection tripsrepresentatives of the Bureaus of Forestry, Agriculture, Scienceand Health to carry on practical investigations, and have made it mybusiness to visit and explore little known and unknown regions. Thereare very few islands worthy of the name which it has not been myprivilege to visit. 

The organization of an effective campaign against diseases like bubonicplague, smallpox, Asiatic cholera and leprosy in a country where nosimilar work had ever previously been undertaken, inhabited by peopleprofoundly ignorant of the benefits to be derived from modern methodsof sanitation, and superstitious to a degree, promptly brought meinto violent conflict with the beliefs and prejudices of a largeportion of the Filipino population. 

A similar result followed the inauguration of an active campaign forthe suppression of surra, foot and mouth disease, and rinderpest, which were rapidly destroying the horses and cattle. 

From the outset I was held responsible for the enforcement of marineand land quarantine regulations, which were at first very obnoxiousto the general public. 

When the Pure Food and Drugs Act adopted by Congress for the UnitedStates was made applicable to the Philippines without any provision forits enforcement, this not altogether pleasant duty was assigned to me. 

I did not seek appointment to the Philippine service in the firstinstance. The political influence at my command has never extendedbeyond my own vote. During a period of twelve years my removal wasloudly and frequently demanded, yet I saw President Schurman, ColonelDenby, General Otis, Admiral Dewey, Commissioner Moses, Governor Taft, Governor Wright, Governor Ide, Governor Smith, Secretary Shuster, Commissioner Tavera, Commissioner Legarda and Governor Forbes, all mycolleagues on one or the other of the Philippine commissions, leavethe service, before my own voluntary retirement on September 15, 1913. 

I had long expected a request for my resignation at any time, andhad often wished that it might come. Indeed I once before tenderedit voluntarily, only to have President Taft say that he thought Ishould withdraw it, which I did. I am absolutely without politicalambition save an earnest desire to earn the political epitaph, "He did what he could. "

During my brief and infrequent visits to the United States I havediscovered there widespread and radical misapprehension as toconditions in the Philippines, but have failed to find that lack ofinterest in them which is commonly said to exist. On the contrary, I have found the American public keenly desirous of getting at thereal facts whenever there was an opportunity to do so. 

The extraordinary extent to which untrue statements have been acceptedat their face value has surprised and deeply disturbed me. I haveconversed with three college presidents, each of whom believed thatthe current expenses of the Philippine government were paid from theUnited States Treasury. 

The preponderance of false and misleading statements about thePhilippines is due, it seems to me, primarily to the fact that it isthose persons with whom the climate disagrees and who in consequenceare invalided home, and those who are separated from the service inthe interest of the public good, who return to the United States andget an audience there; while those who successfully adapt themselves tolocal conditions, display interest in their work and become proficientin it, remain in the islands for long periods during which they aretoo busy, and too far from home, to make themselves heard. 

Incidentally it must be remembered that if such persons do attempt toset forth facts which years of practical experience have taught them, they are promptly accused of endeavouring to save their own bread andbutter by seeking to perpetuate conditions which insure them fat jobs. 

When I think of the splendid men who have uncomplainingly laid downtheir lives in the military and in the civil service of their countryin these islands, and of the larger number who have given freely oftheir best years to unselfish, efficient work for others, this chargefills me with indignation. 

The only thing that kept me in the Philippine service for so longa time was my interest in the work for the non-Christian tribes andmy fear that while my successor was gaining knowledge concerning itwhich can be had only through experience, matters might temporarilygo to the bad. It has been my ambition to bring this work to such apoint that it would move on, for a time at least, by its own momentum. 

I am now setting forth my views relative to the past and presentsituation in the islands because I believe that their inhabitantsare confronted by a danger graver than any which they have beforefaced since the time when their fate wavered in the balance, while thequestion whether the United States should acquire sovereignty over themor should allow Spain to continue to rule them was under consideration. 

It is my purpose to tell the plain, hard truth regardless of the effectof such conduct upon my future career. It has been alleged that myviews on Philippine problems were coloured by a desire to retain myofficial position. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, no man who has not served for long and sometimes very weary yearsas a public official, and has not been a target for numerous moreor less irresponsible individuals whose hands were filled with mudand who were actuated by a fixed desire to throw it at something, can appreciate as keenly as I do the manifold blessings which attendthe life of a private citizen. 

I trust that I have said enough to make clear my view point, andnow a word as to subject-matter. It is my intention to correct someof the very numerous misstatements which have been made concerningpast and present conditions in the Philippines. I shall quote, fromtime to time, such statements, both verbal and written, and moreespecially some of those which have recently appeared in a bookentitled "The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912, "by James H. Blount, who signs himself "Officer of the United StatesVolunteers in the Philippines, 1899-1901; United States DistrictJudge in the Philippines, 1901-1905. "

Judge Blount has indulged so freely in obvious hyperbole, and has madeso very evident the bitter personal animosities which inspire manyof his statements, that it has been a genuine surprise to his formerassociates and acquaintances that his book has been taken seriously. 

It should be sufficiently evident to any unprejudiced reader that inwriting it he has played the part of the special pleader rather thanthat of the historian. He has used government records freely, and asis usually the case when a special pleader quotes from such records, the nature of the matter which he has omitted is worthy of more thanpassing attention. I shall hope to be able to fill some of the gapsthat he has left in the documentary history of the events which hediscusses and by so doing, very materially to change its purport. 

As public documents have been so misused, and as a new administrationis bestowing on Filipinos political offices, and giving themopportunities, for which they are as yet utterly unprepared, thusendangering the results of years of hard, patient, self-sacrificingwork performed by experienced and competent men, it becomes necessaryto strike home by revealing unpleasant facts which are of recordbut have not heretofore been disclosed because of the injury toreputations and the wounding of feelings which would result from theirpublication. In doing this I feel that I am only discharging a duty tothe people of the United States, who are entitled to know the truth ifthe present possibility of Philippine independence is to be seriouslyconsidered, and to the several Filipino peoples who are to-day indanger of rushing headlong to their own utter and final destruction. 

At the outset I shall discuss the oft-asserted claim that the Filipinoleaders were deceived and betrayed by American officials whom theyassisted, and that this unpardonable conduct led to the outbreak ofactive hostilities which occurred just prior to the arrival at Manilaof the first Philippine Commission. 

I shall then show that these leaders never established agovernment which adequately protected life and property, or gaveto their people peace, happiness or justice, but on the contraryinaugurated a veritable reign of terror under which murder became agovernmental institution, while rape, inhuman torture, burying aliveand other ghastly crimes were of common occurrence, and usually wentunpunished. The data which I use in establishing these contentionsare for the most part taken directly from the Insurgent records, in referring to which I employ the war department abbreviation"P. I. R. " followed by a number. 

I next take up some of the more important subsequent historical events, describing the work of the first Philippine Commission, and showingin what manner the government established by the second PhilippineCommission has discharged its stewardship, subsequently discussingcertain as yet unsolved problems which confront the present government, such as that presented by the existence of slavery and peonage, andthat of the non-Christian tribes. For the benefit of those who, likeJudge Blount, consider the Philippines "a vast straggly archipelago ofjungle-covered islands in the south seas which have been a nuisance toevery government that ever owned them, " I give some facts as to theislands, their climate, their natural resources and their commercialpossibilities, and close by setting forth my views as to the presentability of the civilized Cagayans, Ilocanos, Pampangans, Zambals, Pangasináns, Tagálogs, Bicols and Visayans, commonly and correctlycalled _Filipinos_, to establish, or to maintain when established, a stable government throughout Filipino territory, to say nothingof bringing under just and effective control, and of protecting andcivilizing, the people of some twenty-seven non-Christian tribes whichconstitute an eighth of the population, and occupy approximately halfof the territory, of the Philippine Islands. 

I wish here to acknowledge my very great indebtedness to MajorJ. R. M. Taylor, who has translated and compiled the Insurgent [4]records, thereby making available a very large mass of reliableand most valuable information without which a number of chapters ofthis book would have remained unwritten. Surely no man who bases hisstatements concerning Filipino rule on the facts set forth in theserecords can be accused of deriving his information from hostile orprejudiced sources. 

Of them, Major Taylor says:--

"No one reading the Insurgent records can fail to be impressed withthe difference between the Spanish and the Tagálog documents. Many ofthe former are doubtless written with a view to their coming into thehands of the Americans, or with deliberate purpose to have them do so, and are framed accordingly. All Tagálog documents, intended only forFilipinos, say much that is not said in the Spanish documents. Theorders of the Dictator [5] to his subjects were conveyed in the latterseries of documents. "

CHAPTER II

Was Independence Promised?

It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to allege, or toinsinuate, that American consuls and naval officers promised theInsurgent leaders that the independence of the Philippines would berecognized by the United States. It has been claimed by some thatthe coöperation of the Insurgents in the military operations againstManila was sought for and secured. Others say that they were at least_de facto_ allies of the United States, and that they were in theend shamelessly betrayed and wantonly attacked. 

These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly by the Insurgentrecords, that each of them is false. I ask the forbearance of myreaders if, in the three chapters which I devote to these matters, I quote documentary evidence at length. When original documentsor extracts from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story, I sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other cases I give myown version of the facts which they set forth, but give the full textin foot-notes. In nearly all instances references are given to sourcesof documentary information. I greatly regret that Taylor's narrative, with its very numerous supporting documents, is not readily accessibleto the student of history. It ought to have been published, but nevergot beyond the galley-proof stage. In referring to it, I am thereforeobliged to use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figuresdesignating the page of this galley proof on which the passage referredto is found. Whenever possible I give the War Department numbers [6]of Insurgent documents, but in a few cases can give only the exhibitnumbers assigned by Taylor in printing the documents. 

As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find any one ofthem. Copies of his work may be found in the War Department and inthe office of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary. 

Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were deceived, even haddeceit been practised as claimed, Aguinaldo would have had no justground for complaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated itsuse, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the Americans, as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited. [7] However, mostAmericans hold to a standard very different from his. Was it departedfrom in this instance?

Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that Pratt and Deweypromised him the recognition of the independence of the Philippinesby the United States. [8]

Judge Blount has referred to the "_de facto_ alliance between theAmericans and Aguinaldo, " and has dwelt at length on "promises, both expressed and implied, " which were subsequently repudiatedby Consul Pratt, Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt, constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically charge, bad faith on the part of these officers of the United States. [9]

On analyzing his statements we find that he is disereetly non-committalas to exactly what were the expressed promises, nor does he make it soplain as might be desired what legitimate inferences were deduciblefrom the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes an allegedstatement of General Anderson to the effect that:--

"Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, [10] and Williams[11] did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Philippinogovernment would be recognized, the Phillippinos certainly thoughtso, judging from their acts rather than from their words. AdmiralDewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at hisrequest. " [12]

Before discussing these charges I will briefly review certainhistorical facts, knowledge of which will be useful in consideringthem. 

In August, 1896, an insurrection against Spain had broken out in thePhilippines under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident ofCavite Viejo, who had been a school teacher, and was, at that time, _gobernadorcillo_ [13] of his town. 

It had been terminated by the so-called "Treaty of Biacnabató, "signed in Manila on December 15, 1897. 

This document provided for the surrender of "Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in arms, " and Don Marciano Llaneraand Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his subordinates, together with theirsoldiers and arms. 

"The Excellent Señor General in Chief" of the Spanish forces was to"provide the necessary means for supporting the lives" of those whosurrendered before a certain fixed date. 

In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay them $800, 000[14] in three instalments, the first of $400, 000, the second andthird of $200, 000 each. 

Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up their residenceoutside the islands. Their deportation was duly provided for, andAguinaldo and twenty-six of his companions were taken to Hongkong, on the Spanish steamer _Uranus_; arriving there on December 31, 1897. 

On January 2, 1898, $400, 000 were deposited in the Hongkong Bank, to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co. 

The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabató had a meeting under thepresidency of Isabelo Artacho, an Ilocano [15] who was the rankingofficer in the absence of Aguinaldo, and requested that the secondinstalment, of $200, 000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-general, Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and they divided the money, although Aguinaldo denied their right to do so, claiming that itshould have been sent to Hongkong. 

The third payment of $200, 000 was apparently never made. Primo deRivera says that he turned over a check for $200, 000 to his successor, General Augustin, in April, 1898; giving as his reason for refusing topay it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no prospect ofits being equitably divided among those who were entitled to receiveit under the agreement. 

Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain reforms were promisedby the Spanish government at the time the treaty of Biacnabatówas negotiated, and as these measures were not put into effect, they organized a junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. Itincluded in its membership a number of Filipino political exiles, then residing at that place. 

The men who composed this organization soon fell to quarrelling andit became necessary to come to a definite understanding as to itsaims. Under the arrangement finally reached, the junta, as a whole, was charged with the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago;with all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; andwith the preparation and shipment of such articles as were neededto carry on the revolution in the Philippines. It was to be allowedvoice by Aguinaldo's government in any serious question which mightarise abroad, and would aid that government in bringing the civiladministration of the Philippines to the level of that of the mostadvanced nations. 

Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders over the divisionof the funds deposited at Hongkong. 

Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the events of thisperiod, and as it is of historic interest, and makes clear justhow Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, meet Pratt, and enter intonegotiations with him, I quote extensive extracts from it. [16]

"From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the banks 5786. 46pesos in part interest on the money he had deposited. This was usedto pay the expenses of himself and his companions in Hongkong. Theseexpenses were kept at a minimum; the money was drawn and spentby him. If one of the men with him needed a new pair of shoes, Aguinaldo paid for them; if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldobought it. Minute accounts were kept, which are on file among hispapers, and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceedinghis income, which could only be 12, 000 pesos a year, while he wasliving at the rate of 22, 000, with constant demands being made uponhim by men who came from the Philippines. Life was not easy underthese conditions. Aguinaldo's companions were entirely dependentupon him. Their most trivial expenses had to be approved by him, and he held them down with a strong hand. They were men living ina strange land, among a people whose language they did not speak, having nothing to do but quarrel among themselves, exiles waitingfor a chance to return to their own country, which they watched withweary eyes while they guarded the embers by which they hoped to lightthe fires of a new insurrection. 

"The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong were not the onlyFilipinos domiciled there; a number of men had taken refuge in thatBritish colony after the events of 1872, and some of them at leasthad prospered. Some of them, like the members of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost no relations with the followers of Aguinaldo;some, like J. M. Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetingsof the governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their fullconfidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate following wanted and wereworking for independence and independence alone, while the Filipinoswho had long lived in Hongkong wanted to see the archipelago lost toSpain, but had no confidence in the ability of the country to standalone or in the fitness of Aguinaldo and his following to directthe councils of a state. The character of the new refugees did notinspire confidence in these older men, who hoped for a protectorateby or annexation to the United States. 

"On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there informedthe State Department that D. Cortés, M. Cortés, A. Rosario, GracioGonzaga, and José Maria Basa (50), all very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and lawyers of Manila, desired to tender their allegianceand the allegiance of their powerful families in Manila to theUnited States, and that they had instructed all their connectionsto render every aid to the United States forces in Manila. On May14 he forwarded statements of other Filipinos domiciled in Hongkong, not members of the junta, that they desired to submit their allegianceand the allegiance of their families in the Philippine Islands to theUnited States. One of Aguinaldo's followers, writing somewhat later, spoke with bitterness of the rich old men who went about callingtheir companions 'beggarly rebels, ' but these men were rich, andtheir names and their apparent adhesion to the cause represented byAguinaldo would inspire confidence in him among men of property inthe Philippines. They were, accordingly, not to be lightly alienated;therefore, at first, at least, no open break took place with them, but their attitude toward the leaders of the insurrection is shownby the fact that after the early summer of 1898 they took no, or verylittle, part in the insurgent movement, although they were living inHongkong, the seat of the junta, which conducted the propaganda forthe insurgent government of the Philippines. 

 * * * * *

"But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the conditions andof the opportunities which were about to open before the Hongkongjunta, for although war between Spain and the United States wasimminent and a United States squadron was in Hongkong threateningManila, Aguinaldo was chiefly concerned in finding how to avoidlosing the money which had been received from the Spanish governmentas the price of his surrender. The importance of his presence near thePhilippines in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did occur tohim anything which he could obtain there from the aid of the UnitedStates probably seemed for the moment of little consequence comparedwith escaping from his wrangling companions with enough money to liveon in Paris. 

"Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the secondpayment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded 200, 000 pesosof the insurgent funds, probably under the agreement that he shouldestablish a company in Hongkong for the benefit of the former leadersand not merely of those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leadersin Hongkong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. Hethen entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong, calling uponAguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds deposited in his handsfor the benefit of Artacho and others, and asked for an injunctionrestraining Aguinaldo or any member of the junta from handling ordisposing of any part of said funds. He filed as evidence copies ofthe Biacnabató agreement and of the agreement made by the leaders onDecember 19. This suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho, but in that of all the exiles who were described as living in exilein Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made with the SpanishGovernment. Artacho probably had adherents among these men, some atleast of whom were utterly weary of waiting in Hongkong and of livingupon what was doled out to them. Some at least saw no chance of anyother fate than indefinite exile spent in dependence upon the innergroup for even the means of existence. 

"The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the trustfunds which the complainant recognized were legally in the hands ofAguinaldo. It could be carried on only with great difficulty withouthis presence and without his account books. Meetings were held, andArtacho was denounced as attempting to extort blackmail, but he refusedto yield, and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of theHongkong junta before a British court, prepared for flight. A summonswas issued for his appearance before the supreme court of Hongkongon April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond its jurisdiction. 

"He drew out the 50, 000 pesos from the Chartered Bank, which had becomedue according to the terms of the deposit, and perhaps such othersums as could be drawn upon by check, engaged passage for Europe byway of Singapore for G. H. Del Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself underassumed names, appointed V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks signed in blank to draw the interest of the sumson deposit to provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as hisreason for departure that he was going to remain under cover untilArtacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield for thispurpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and the United States. 

"Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hongkong on April8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after stopping inSaigon. War between the United States and Spain had been renderedinevitable by the resolution of Congress demanding that Spain shouldwithdraw her forces from Cuba, and was declared on April 21. AlthoughAguinaldo and his followers did not appreciate the influence whichconditions on the other side of the world might have upon the future ofthe Philippines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there wasan Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of the civilservice in India, and had lived for some years in the Philippines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged in writing lettersto the Singapore _Free Press_ upon the Philippines, and in retailingsuch information as was in his possession concerning them to theUnited States consul-general in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, fortransmittal to Commodore Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldoand realized what could be done with him, and that if the matter werewell handled it might be to his own advantage. He went at once to seeAguinaldo and informed him that the United States consul-general wasanxious to see him. He went to the consul-general and informed him ofthe importance of Aguinaldo, and that he was in Singapore. Aguinaldohad to be persuaded to agree to a meeting. The consul-generalwas anxious for it, and it took place, according to Aguinaldo, onthe night of April 22 (according to Pratt, on the morning of April24). The statement made by Aguinaldo is probably correct. Accordingto his account book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a telegramto the Hongkong junta concerning the negotiations 'with America. '

"Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so intheir interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter who isinterested in the subject of the discussion may be a dangerous man. Itis impossible to say what he told Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did notknow; but whatever was said during these conversations it is withinthe limits of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say bythe interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements ofwhat would probably be granted by the United States Government andhis expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independencemay have been translated as assurances and as promises. Bray, who, according to his Filipino former friends, was apt to talk too much, mayhave talked too much on this occasion, and so the myth of the formalagreement between Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgentsand Pratt on behalf of the United States grew up, a fiction whichBray himself, with a natural desire to add to his own importance, did his best to circulate. 

"Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably reckonedupon making himself indispensable as an adviser, so that later he couldmake his own terms. For a time he wrote letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which may have had some influence upon the line of conduct which headopted, and later was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news tovarious newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. Hiscablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between theUnited States and the insurgents were more picturesque than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective, as Aguinaldo orderedthat he should be given $5000. He wanted more, but the Hongkong juntadid not trust him, and he ceased to be in their employment. " [17]

As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting at Singapore, and we shall be able to determine with some accuracy what actuallytranspired there. 

We can now consider understandingly the charges made against Prattand Dewey. 

It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt promised Aguinaldorecognition of tile independence of the Philippines if he and hispeople would cooperate with the United States forces against Spain. 

Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his "Reseña Verídica" [18]in the following words:--

"In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the Spaniardshad not complied with the agreement of Biac-na-bató, the Filipinos hada right to renew their interrupted revolution and advised me to takeup arms anew against Spain, assuring me that America would give theFilipinos the greatest advantages (mayores ventajas). Then I askedthe Consul what advantages the United States would concede to thePhilippines, suggesting, when I had the proper opening, the proprietyof making an agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered thathe would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey, who wasthe chief of the expedition against the Philippines, and who hadample powers from President McKinley. 

"On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we again tookup the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral had answered myinquiry by saying that the United States would at least recognize theindependence of the Philippine government under a naval protectorate, but that there was no necessity to put it in writing, as the wordsof the admiral and the American consul were sacred and would befulfilled, not being like those of the Spaniards, and finally, thatthe Government of North America was a very honourable Government, a very just and very powerful one. " [19]

On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of State asfollows:--

"General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Deweycoöperation insurgents Manila. 

"_Pratt_. "

On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how he had come tomeet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he had done. He said:--

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the stateof an object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionarymovement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was stilldirecting, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had noauthority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger ofcontinuing independent action at this stage; and, having convincedhim of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither andconfer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through ourconsul-general at Hongkong:--

"'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrangewith Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila ifdesired. Telegraph. 

"'_Pratt_. '"

The Commodore's reply read thus:--

"'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. 

"'_Dewey_. '"

Pratt adds:--

"I received it late at night, and at once communicated to GeneralAguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, allunder assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British Steamer_Malacca_, which left here on Tuesday the 26th. 

"Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interviewwith General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you bynext mail. 

"The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, andcourage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed in him. 

"I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with thecommander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict ofaction and facilitated the work of occupying and administering thePhilippines. 

"If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval, asI trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due some special recognition for most valuableservices rendered. 

"How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide. 

"I have, etc. " [20]

It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that he had noauthority to speak for the government; that there was no mention inthe cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of independence or indeed ofany conditions on which Aguinaldo was to coöperate, these detailsbeing left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thoughtthat he had prevented possible conflict of action and facilitatedthe work of occupying and administering the Philippines. 

The particulars as to the second and last interview between Aguinaldoand Pratt were embodied in the following letter:--

"No. 213. _Consulate-General of the United States. _

"_Singapore_, April 30, 1898. 

"_Sir_: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, Ihave the honor to report that in the second and last interview I hadwith Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as noexcesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Government, the President having declared that the present hostilities withSpain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principlesof civilized warfare. 

"To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intendedand was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should direct. 

"The general stated that he hoped the United States would assumeprotection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow theinhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organizationof which he would desire American advice and assistance. 

"These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss. 

"I have, etc. , "_E. Spencer Pratt_, "_United States Consul-General_. "

In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt madethe following statement:--

"I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of thefuture policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines, thatI held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the government in noway whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted uponthe assumption that the Government would cooperate with him--GeneralAguinaldo--for the furtherance of any plans of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledgedto recognize any political claims which he might put forward. " [21]

What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this allegation?

I will give in full Blount's statement as to what occurred at ameeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early successes of Deweyand Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his nearest approach to a directclaim, that any one at any time promised independence:--

"First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal readingand presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, representing theFilipino community of Singapore. The address pledged the 'eternalgratitude' of the Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the honoredaddressee; alluded to the glories of independence, and to how Aguinaldohad been enabled; by the arrangement so happily effected with AdmiralDewey by Consul Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take uparms 'in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of whichyour country is the foremost champion' and trusted 'that the UnitedStates... Will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure tous our independence under the protection of the United States. '

"Mr. Pratt arose and 'proceeded, speaking in French, ' says thenewspaper--it does not say Alabama French, but that is doubtlesswhat it was--'to state his belief that the Filipinos would proveand were now proving themselves fit for self-government. ' Thegentleman from Alabama then went on to review the mighty events anddevelopments of the preceding six weeks, Dewey's victory of May Ist, 'the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, GeneralEmilio Aguinaldo, _cooperating on land with the Americans at sea_, 'etc. 'You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is beingaccomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen underhis command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo hadarrived _incognito_ in Singapore, I immediately _sought him out_. Anhour's interview convinced me that he _was the man for the occasion_;and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arrangedfor him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest youknow. '" [22]

Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his speech, andhis version of Pratt's reply thereto, in a letter to Aguinaldo, datedSingapore, June 9, 1898. As he served as interpreter, he, if any one, should know what Pratt said. After describing the change in tone ofthe Singapore _Free Press_, with which strained relations had formerlyexisted, and the subsequent friendliness of the editor of this paperand that of the _Straits Times_, he says that on the previous afternoonhe went with the other Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues:--

"This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours havingbeen victorious and immediately after the cry of our worthy chiefwhich found an echo in this colony. For this purpose 30 or moreFilipinos--9 of the higher class, 15 musicians and the remainder of themiddle class--went to greet Consul A. , here, and on the invitation ofMr. Bray we ascended. He received us in his private office, and it wasimposing to see that the only decoration was the American flag whichcovered the desk, and in its centre, a carved wooden frame holdingthe portrait of our worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I introduced them all. We found there also, and were introducedto, the Editor of the _Straits Times_ and the _Free Press_ of here, and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection, I readthe following speech in French:--

"'_His Excellency, The Consul General of the United States of Americain Singapore_:

"'_Your Excellency_: The Filipinos of all social classes residingin this port, have come to greet Your Excellency as the genuinerepresentative of the great and powerful American Republic inorder to express to you our eternal gratitude for the moral andmaterial support given by Admiral Dewey to our General Aguinaldoin his campaign for the liberty of eight million Filipinos. Thelatter and we ourselves hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humanitarian policy, will without cessation and(with) decided energy continue to support the programme agreed uponin Singapore between Your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that isto say, the Independence of the Philippine Islands, under an Americanprotectorate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and congratulationson being the first one in accepting and supporting this idea whichtime and events have well developed to the great satisfaction of ournation. Finally, we request you, Most Excellent Sir, to express to yourworthy President and the American Republic, our sincere acknowledgmentsand our fervent wishes for their prosperity. I have concluded. '

"The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the followingterms:--

"'You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only faithfullyfollowed the instructions received from my Government; the fact ofthe sudden departure of your General will permit you to infer thatI have done so. I shall in any case inform my Government of yourgood wishes and I thank you in its name. You know that your wishesare mine also, and for this reason at the last interview I had withMr. Aguinaldo, I repeated to him that he should observe the greatesthumanity possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers, our nation and all the other nations may see that you are humane andnot savages, as has erroneously been believed. '

"After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul; heoffered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and lemonadefor the musicians and the majority. The toasts were offered with thesherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon, Enríquez, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the _Free Press_, _Straits Times_ andMr. Bray. We drank to America and her humanitarian work of redemption;to the Philippines with America; we gave thanks to the Consul, toMr. Bray as an important defender; we drank to the _Free Press_ fortaking such an interest in our affairs, and to the _Straits Times_(sarcastically); but I was very careful not to propose a toast to ourgeneral, which was done at the proper time by 'Flaco' [23] when wegave three cheers; for the sake of courtesy we cheered for England, which had been so hospitable to us, and when everybody had becomequiet, the Editor of the _Straits Times_ took his glass in his handand cried in a loud voice, 'The Philippine Republic, ' to which weall responded. 'Flaco' disappeared a moment, and when he returnedhe brought with him the American flag, and formally presented it tous in French, which I interpreted to all in Spanish, as follows:'Gentlemen: The American Consul, with his deep affection for us, presents us this flag as the greatest and most expressive remembrancewhich he can give us. The red stripes stand for the generous blood ofher sons, shed to obtain her liberty; the white stripes stand for hervirginity and purity as our country; the blue background indicatesthe sky and each star represents a free and independent State; thisis America, and the Consul is desirous that we also should have soglorious a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant as couldbe wished, securing peace with respect, and may God be our help andguide in securing liberty. Viva and with it our most sincere thanksfor so signal a courtesy. ' Hereupon, to the surprise of everybodyas no one expected it, the Consul requested that some Filipino airsbe played which seemed to please him very much. Finally, about 6. 15, we left, very well satisfied with the reception accorded us and thekindness of the Consul. Mr. Bray asked me for the text of my speech, which I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French text, which I enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything further forthe present, awaiting your reply and your opinion as to the above, as also orders and instructions for the future, I am, "Yours, etc. 

(Signed) "_Isidoro de los Santos_. "

To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following note:--

"(_Note by Compiler. _--In a letter written in Tagalog to Aguinaldo onJune 6 by Santos he describes the American consul general as havingcried out 'Hurrah for General Aguinaldo, hurrah for the Republic ofthe Philippines' and then, having apparently taken several drinks, he passed up and down the room waving the American flag before givingit to the assembled Filipinos (P. I. R. , 406. 7). )" [24]

This final statement does not present the representative of the UnitedStates government at Singapore in a very favourable light, but I takethe facts as I find them. If now we compare the speech actually madeby Dr. Santos with Blount's version of it, we shall find that withthe exception of the words "eternal gratitude" the passages whichhe encloses in quotation marks are not in the original at all. Theglories of independence are not alluded to, nor is there so much asa suggestion that Aguinaldo had been enabled to arouse eight millionsof Filipinos to take up arms, which he certainly had not done. 

Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped Filipino procedureso very commonly employed that those of us who have dealt much withhis people have learned to meet it almost automatically. It consistsin referring to one's having said just exactly what one did not say, and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming thatbecause one did not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth. 

Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this procedure in hisdealings with Dewey and others. 

In the present instance Santos employed it rather cleverly when heexpressed the hope that the United States would "continue to supportthe programme agreed upon in Singapore, between your Excellency andGeneral Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the PhilippineIslands under an American protectorate. "

Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly violated hispart of the agreement, for we shall see that he stated over andover again, in correspondence with members of the junta and others, that a protectorate would be considered only if absolute independencefinally proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe thatany such agreement was made. 

Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. Blount implies, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, that Pratt's knowledgeof French was poor. At all events Pratt in his reply made not theslightest reference to the hope expressed by Santos that the UnitedStates would continue to support the programme which Santos saidhad been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and claim of apromise of independence based on these speeches must obviously beabandoned. There is no doubt that Pratt personally sympathized withthe ambitions of the Filipino leaders, and openly expressed hissympathy on this and other occasions, but to do this was one thingand to have attempted to compromise his government would have beenanother and very different one. The shrewd Filipinos with whom hewas dealing understood this difference perfectly well. 

It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason to believe thathis sympathy was not purely disinterested. Aguinaldo claims that Prattwished to be appointed "representative of the Philippines in the UnitedStates to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence"and that he promised him "a high post in the customs service. " [25]

It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in Blount'sstatement are enclosed in quotation marks. From what were theyquoted? The next paragraph in his book tells us:--

"Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration:At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, refreshments were served, and as the Filipinos, _being Christians, drink alcohol_, there wasno difficulty in arranging as to refreshments. " [26]

The use of this clipping from the Singapore _Free Press_ illustratesadmirably Blount's methods. The _Free Press_ had at first displayeda marked coldness toward the insurgent cause, but its editor, Mr. St. Clair, was opportunely "seen" by Bray, who reported that as aresult of his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter befriendly, and they were. In other words, the _Free Press_ became theSingapore organ of the insurrection, and its editor, according to Bray, "a true and loyal friend" of Aguinaldo. 

Blount claims to have made "an exhaustive examination of the recordsof that period. " [27] Why then did he use as evidence a newspaperclipping from an Insurgent organ, instead of Santos's letter?

Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that Pratt forwardedto the State Department a proclamation which he says was gotten upby the Insurgent leaders at Hongkong and sent to the Philippines inadvance of Aguinaldo's coming. He says that it was headed "America'sAllies" and quotes from it as follows:--

"Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence withinour reach.... The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for thesake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune, etc. [Here follows a reference toCuba. ] At the present moment an American squadron is preparing to sailfor the Philippines.... The Americans will attack by sea and preventany reënforcements coming from Spain; ... We insurgents must attack byland. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms, because theAmericans have arms and will find means to assist us. _There whereyou see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are ourredeemers!_" [28]

The translation that he used is that given in Senate Document No. 62, L. 60, and is none too accurate. He allows it to be inferred thatthis proclamation was actually issued. It was not. Its history isas follows:--

On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had lived in Hongkongsince 1872, on account of his connection with the troubles of thatyear, wrote letters [29] to a number of friends recommending thewidest possible circulation of a proclamation enclosed therewith, asan aid to the American policy in the Philippines "in the war againstthe tyrannical friars and the Spaniards. "

With these letters there were sent two different proclamations, each beginning with the words "Fellow Countrymen. " The first, whichis the one referred to by Blount, continues:--

"Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our independence, and this under the freest form to which all individuals, all people, all countries, may aspire. 

"The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest, attentiveto the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos, find it opportuneto extend to our Philippines their protective mantle, now that theyfind themselves obliged to break their friendship with the Spanishpeople, because of the tyranny they have exercised in Cuba, causingall Americans, with whom they have great commercial relations, enormous damages. 

"At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the Philippines. 

"We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of your armsto fire upon the Americans. No, brothers; do not make such a mistake;rather (shoot) kill yourselves than treat our liberators as enemies. 

"Do not pay attention to the decree of Primo de Rivera, calling onyou to enlist for the war, for that will cost you your lives: ratherdie than act as ingrates toward our redeemers, the Americans. 

 * * * * *

"Note well that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the sametime avoiding reinforcements which may come from Spain; thereforethe insurrection must attack by land. Perhaps you will have more thansufficient arms, as the Americans have arms, and will find the meansto aid you. 

"Whenever you see the American flag, bear in mind that they are ourredeemers. " [30]

On the margin is written: "Viva, for America with the Philippines!"

Apparently what Basa here means by independenee is independence fromSpain, for it is known that he was in favour of annexation to theUnited States, and in the second proclamation we find the following:--

"This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for eontrivingthat our country (all the Philippine Archipelago) may be countedas another Star in the Great Republic of the United States, greatbecause of its wisdom, its wealth, and its constitutional laws. 

"Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation. With Americawe shall have development in the broadest sense (of advancement)in civilization. 

"With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy. 

"Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have alreadybeen given. Explain to all our fellow eountrymen the benefits of thischange, which will be blessed by Heaven, by men and by our children. 

"Viva America with the Philippines!!!" [31]

The letters were undoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for delivery on hisarrival. They were never delivered, and it is reasonable to suppose, espeeially as Basa, who was a man of importance and means, was amember of the group who desired annexation to the United States, thatAguinaldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture with himand then quietly suppressed them. Obviously, however, he sent or gavea copy of the first one to Pratt, presumably without the written words:"Viva, for America with the Philippines!"

And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred at Singaporewhich I consider incontrovertible. 

Aguinaldo returned promptly to Hongkong and on May 4, 1898, a meetingof the junta was held. The minutes of this meeting, [32] signed byeach of the several Filipinos present, form a part of the Insurgentrecords which have come into the possession of the United StatesGovernment. They state among other things that:--

"The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preceding meeting, which were approved. The temporary President reported that D. EmilioAguinaldo had just arrived from Singapore and it became necessaryfor him to take possession of the office to which he has been elected. "

After the transaction of some further business Aguinaldo was summoned, appeared at the meeting, and was duly installed as President. Then:--

"The President described the negotiations which took place duringhis absence in Singapore with the American Consul of that Englishcolony. Both agreed that the President should confer with the Admiralcommanding the American squadron in Mirs Bay, and if the lattershould accept his propositions, advantageous, in his judgment, tothe Philippines, he would go to said country in one of the cruiserswhich form the fleet for the purpose of taking part in the presentevents. And as he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well tohave an interview with the American Consul of this colony on the dayof his arrival, but was not satisfied with such interview. 

"Considering the critical conditions in the Philippines at present, he begged the committee to discuss the advisability of his going tosaid islands with all the leaders of prominence in the last rebellionresiding in this colony, in case the Admiral gave them an opportunityto do so. "

Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any promiseof independence made to Aguinaldo by Pratt or any one else. Is itconceivable that Aguinaldo in describing "the negotiations whichtook place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consulof the English Colony" would, by any chance, have failed to informhis associates in Hongkong of such an extraordinary and fortunateoccurrence as the promising by Mr. Pratt and Admiral Dewey that theUnited States would recognize Philippine independence?

Sandico [33] thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for--

"From conferences which he had with the Admiral of the American fleetand with the American Consul in this colony, he believed that underpresent conditions it was absolutely necessary for the Presidentto go to the Philippines, since, according to the American Consul, Manila had been taken by said fleet, and a provisional government wasnow being formed in that capital. The intervention of the Presidentin the formation of that government is undoubtedly essential, sincehis prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently preventdissensions among the sons of the country, and it would be possiblethereby to obtain a perfect organization both for the military andcivil evolution of that country. 

"Srs. Garchitorena [34] and Apacible [35] expressed themselves insimilar terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks, the Presidentinsisted that he considered it reckless for him to go to thePhilippines without first making a written agreement with the Admiral, as it might happen, if he placed himself at his orders, that he mightmake him subscribe to or sign a document containing proposals highlyprejudicial to the interests of the country, from which might arisethe following two very grave contingencies:

"1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit anunpatriotic act, and his name would justly be eternally cursed bythe Filipinos. 

"2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two wouldbe evident. 

"And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the committee thatthe four parties (?) of the insurgents now here, under charge ofthe competent chiefs authorized in writing by him, should go tothe Philippines to intervene, after a conference with the Admiral, in these important questions; such means, in his opinion, shouldbe first employed to ascertain in an authentic manner what theintentions of the United States in regard to that country are; andif his intervention is absolutely necessary, he would not object togo at once to the Philippines, endeavouring by all the means in hispower to remedy the critical condition of the country, to which hehad offered, and always would willingly offer, to sacrifice his life. "

Why adopt means to learn from the admiral what the intentions of theUnited States were in regard to the Philippines if both he and Pratthad already promised recognition of independence?

"Srs. Sandico, Garchitorena, Gonzaga [36] and Apacible replied thatthey were fully convinced the Admiral of the American squadronwould furnish the President all the arms which he might desire, since the former was convinced that the fleet could do nothingin the Philippines unless it were used in conjunction with theinsurgents in the development of their plans of war against the Spanishgovernment.... The authority to treat which the President desired togive to the other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personalqualifications, they did not believe would be as efficacious as hispersonal intervention which is necessary in grave affairs, such asthose the subject of discussion; there would be no better occasionthan that afforded them to insure the landing of the expeditionaryforces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of theAmericans and to assure the situation of the Philippines in regardto our legitimate aspirations against those very people. The Filipinopeople, unprovided with arms, would be the victims of the demands andexactions of the United States; but, provided with arms, would be ableto oppose themselves to them, struggling for independence, in whichconsists the true happiness of the Philippines. And they finishedby saying that it made no difference if the Spanish government diddemand the return of the P400, 000, and if the demand were allowedin an action, since the object of the sum would be obtained by theAdmiral furnishing the Filipinos the arms which they required forthe struggle for their legitimate aspirations. "

Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the Americans tobe used if necessary "against those very people" later. 

"The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would beable to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the UnitedStates, if they colonized that country, and would drive them, ifcircumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for theirindependence, even if they should succumb in shaking off the yoke ofa new oppressor. If Washington proposed to carry out the fundamentalprinciples of its constitution, there was no doubt that it would notattempt to colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them. It wasprobable then that it would give them independence and guaranteeit; in such case the presence of the President was necessary, as he would prevent dissensions among the sons of the country whosought office, who might cause the intervention of European powers, an intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highlyprejudicial to the interests of the country.... What injury couldcome to the Philippines, even if we admitted that the Admiral wouldnot give arms to the President on account of his refusal to sign adocument prejudicial to the country, after he had taken all meansto provide for her defence? None. Such an act of the President couldnot be censured, but, on the other hand, would be most meritorious, because it would be one proof more of his undoubted patriotism. "

Not one word of any promise of independence do we find in thisremarkable document. On the contrary it furnishes conclusive proofthat no such promise had been made and that the future relationsbetween Filipinos and Americans were still completely uncertain. 

And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and St. Clair, the latterthe editor of the Insurgent organ in Singapore, were present onthe occasion when independence was said to have been promised byPratt. Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms that itwas promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking him roundly to taskfor this claim, in the following very interesting terms:--

"I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold thatyou and Santos have evidence that will controvert his, (and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he (is) quite aware ofwhat took place in Spanish, and as to turning of his conversationinto a pretense of agreement he knows nothing. He says very truly:'My own party, the Democrats, will say if they read this book--If thisman takes it upon himself to be a Plenipotentiary without authority, we had better not employ him any more--I frankly cannot understandyour action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all. '

"Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the President onNaval and Colonial Affairs, he knows exactly what did take place andwhat did not, and I should know if he had any ground to think that theslightest promise was made by Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare itunauthorized and decline to sanction it. I am certain Pratt reportedwhat he supposed took place accurately; he had no surety on what youmight have said, naturally. 

"And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of the agreementas having taken place then, nor in the paper you communicated to mewas there any mention of one, nor did Pratt know of any. It is onlymore recently that the fiction took shape. 'The wish father to thethought, ' or the statement repeated till it has become believed bythe--, [37] this is common. 

"Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point of view, todrop any such foolishness. The vital thing, and nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when he at last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the thing, all else is empty wind. 

"Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of paper with'Clauses' and put on a ton of sealing wax as consular seals, what, pray, to any common sense mind would all that have beenworth? Nothing!! Nothing!! And yet, where is the agreement, where isthe seal? Where are there any signatures? And if you had them--wastepaper--believe me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman isenergy misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the publicin America would be the chaining of Dewey and Aguinaldo together asparticipants in common action; you surely comprehend this means! Thinkand think again; it means success as far as it is possible. The otherwork is not only lost, but does not gain much sympathy, especiallythis criticism of the conduct of American troops; things may be truethat are not expedient to say. Sink everything into Dewey-Aguinaldocoöperation, that was on both sides honest even if it did not implyany actual arrangement, which, of course, Dewey himself could notmake. That here you have the facts, --undenied--incontrovertible. " [38]

The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated January 12, 1899, seems to me to throw much light on the question of how these claimsrelative to the promised recognition of Filipino independence sometimesoriginated and were bolstered up:--

"With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump card tobe played. Did you not say that the basis of any negotiation inSingapore was the Independence of the Philippines under an Americanprotectorate? This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed and to which Deweyand Washington agreed; as I figured up the 'price' of the telegram, I know very well what occurred, and I am ready to state it and toswear to it when the proper time comes. There are five of us againstone in the event of Consul Pratt receiving instructions to denyit. Furthermore, Mr. St. Clair knows what happened and I am certainthat he also would testify. St. Clair still has the rough draft as anhisterical relic, and St. Clair is a true and loyal friend of yours, as is your humble servant. " [39]

The utter unscrupulousness of Bray is shown by his claim that St. Clairwould confirm his false statements, made as it was after receivingSt. Clair's letter above quoted. 

But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump card. He triedto play it himself by cabling Senator Hoar, on the same day, that asthe man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American governmentthrough the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that theconditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Deweywere independence under a protectorate. [40]

Let us now trace Aguinaldo's subsequent movements, and see whatpromises, if any, were made to him by Wildman and Dewey. He hadreturned to Hongkong with two companions, all travelling under assumednames. Only his most trusted friends among the members of the juntawere at first allowed to know where he was living. 

His situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for him to cometo some sort of a temporary arrangement with Artacho, if he was toavoid legal difficulties, and to reëstablish himself with some ofhis companions, who had accused him of deserting with the intentionof going to Europe to live on money which belonged to them. Whenharmony had been temporarily restored through the good offices ofSandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with Consul General Wildman. Hehas since claimed that Wildman, too, promised him independence, butthe truth seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to becomean American citizen. This being impossible, he wanted to return tothe Philippines and place himself under Dewey's orders. He wanted tohelp throw off the yoke of Spain, and this done, would abide by thedecision of the United States as to the fate of the Philippines. [41]

Any claim that Aguinaldo had been promised independence by Wildman, or, indeed, that the latter had been allowed to know that the Filipinosdesired it, seems to me to be negatived, not only by Wildman's ownstatements, but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written onAugust 5, 1908, in which he says:--

"The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o'clock, as I hadrequested an interview with him before his departure, and I was unableto go to the Consulate on account of the swelling of my feet. From ourconversation I infer that independence will be given to us. I did not, however, disclose to him our true desires.... Said consul approved mytelegram to McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him, a copyof which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our representative inthe commission, we may arrive at a friendly understanding, and it willenable us to prepare for the fight in case they refuse to listen toour request. On the other hand, if at the very beginning they refuseto admit our representative, we will at once be in a position to knowwhat should be done, _i. E. _ to prepare for war. " [42]

On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that Aguinaldo ought to goto the Philippines, and go he did. It would seem that he at first gaveup the idea of joining Dewey, for on May 11 he wrote a cipher letter, giving minute directions for the preparation of signals to assisthis ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan Bay on theeast coast of Luzon; directing the capture of the town of San Antonio, just back of Capones Islands, in Zambales, and ending with the words:"We will surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned, so you must be prepared. "

Something led him again to change his mind, and he finally sailed onthe _McCulloch_. 

In his "Reseña Verídica" written later for political purposes, Aguinaldo has definitely claimed that Dewey promised him thatthe United States would recognize the independence of the Filipinopeople. I will let him tell his own story, confronting his statementswith those of the admiral. 

"May 19, 1898. 

"The _McCulloch_ started at eleven o'clock on the morning of the17th of May for the Philippines; we anchored, between twelve andone o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th, in the waters of Cavite, and immediately the launch of the Admiral--with his aid and privatesecretary--came to convey me to the _Olympia_, where I was received, with my aid, Sr. Leyva, with the honors of a general, by a sectionof marine guards. " [43]

Relative to this matter, Admiral Dewey has testified: [44]

"_The Chairman_. You, of course, never saluted the flag?

_Admiral Dewey_. Certainly not; and I do not think I ever calledAguinaldo anything but Don Emilio; I don't think I ever called him'General. '

_The Chairman_. And when he came on board ship was he received withany special honors at the side?

_Admiral Dewey_. Never. "

The "Reseña Verídica" continues:--

"The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings of courtesyI asked him 'if all the telegrams relative to myself which he hadaddressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, were true. ' Hereplied in the affirmative, and added, 'that the United States hadcome to the Philippines to protect its natives and free them fromthe yoke of Spain. '

"He said, moreover, that 'America was rich in territory and money, and needed no colonies, ' concluding by assuring me, 'to have nodoubt whatever about the recognition of Philippine independence bythe United States. ' Thereupon he asked me if I could get the peopleto arise against the Spaniards and carry on a rapid campaign. " [45]

As we have seen, Dewey sent only one telegram to Pratt aboutAguinaldo. It merely directed that the latter be sent. 

"I then expressed to him my profound acknowledgement for thegenerous help which the United States was giving the Filipino people, as well as my admiration for the magnificence and goodness of theAmerican people. I also stated to him that 'before leaving Hongkong, the Filipino Colony had held a meeting, at which was discussed andconsidered the possibility that--after defeating the Spaniards--theFilipinos might have a war with the Americans, if they should refuseto recognize our independence, who were sure to defeat us becausethey should find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out inthe war against the Spaniards, ' requesting that he pardon my frankness. 

"The Admiral replied that he 'was delighted at my sincerity, andbelieved that both Filipinos and Americans should treat each otheras allies and friends, clearly explaining all doubts for the betterunderstanding between both parties, ' and added that, 'so he hadbeen informed, the United States would recognize the independenceof the Filipino people, guaranteed by the word of honor of theAmericans, --more binding than documents which may remain unfulfilledwhen it is desired to fail in them as happened with the compactssigned by the Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipinonational flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and protectit before the other nations, which were represented by the varioussquadrons then in the Bay; although he said we should conquer thepower from the Spaniards before floating said flag, so that the actshould be more honourable in the sight of the whole world, and, aboveall, before the United States, in order that when the Filipino shipswith their national flag would pass before the foreign squadrons theyshould inspire respect and esteem. '

"Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and generous offers, informing him that if the sacrifice of my life was necessary to honorthe Admiral before the United States, I was then ready to sacrifice it. 

"I added that under such conditions I could assure him that all theFilipino people would unite in the revolution to shake off the yokeof Spain; that it was not strange that some few were not yet on hisside on account of lack of arms or because of personal expediency. 

"Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to whom Iannounced that I would take up my residence at the Naval Headquartersin the Cavite Arsenal. " [46]

Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances the claim thaton the occasion of the visit of General Anderson and Admiral Deweythe latter again promised him independence. 

He says:--

"In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by GeneralAnderson, presented himself, and after greetings of courtesy saidto me: 'You have seen confirmed all of what I promised and said toyou. How pretty your flag is. It has a triangle, and it looks likeCuba's. Will you give me one as a reminder when I return to America?'

"I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of honour and thatthere was no necessity whatever to draw up in documentary form hisagreements, and as for the flag, that he could count on it, even atthat very moment. 

"Dewey continued: 'Documents are not complied with when there isno honour, as has happened with your agreement with the Spaniards, who have failed in what was written and signed. Trust in my word forI hold myself responsible that the United States will recognize theindependence of the country. But I recommend to you [plural. --TR. ] tokeep everything which we have talked about and agreed upon with agreat deal of secrecy for the present. And, moreover, I entreatyou [plural. --TR. ] to be patient if our soldiers should insultsome Filipino, because, as volunteers, they are yet lacking indiscipline. '" [47]

Admiral Dewey has testified as follows, concerning the recognitionof Philippine independence by him:--

"_The Chairman_. You remember the question of your recognizing hisrepublic was a good deal discussed and you wrote me a letter, whichI read in the senate. Of course, I am only asking now about what yousaid in the letter. There was no recognition of the republic?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Never. I did not think I had any authority to doit and it never occurred to me to do it. There was a sort of a reignof terror; there was no government. These people had got power forthe first time in their lives and they were riding roughshod overthe community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to my noticewere hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treathis prisoners kindly, and he said he would. "

He has further testified that he never as much as heard of independenceuntil the appearance of Aguinaldo's proclamation of June 15, 1898:--

"_Admiral Dewey_.... Then when I heard that our troops were comingI asked him to withdraw his troops from Cavite and make room forour men. He demurred at this, but finally withdrew and establishedheadquarters across the bay at a place called Bacoor, from whichplace on the 15th of June he sent me a proclamation declaring theindependence of the Philippines. 

"_The Chairman_. Was that the first?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That was the first intimation; the first I had everheard of independence of the Philippines. 

"_The Chairman_. He had said something to you--

"_Admiral Dewey_. Not a word. He had done what I told him. He wasmost obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I attached so littleimportance to this proclamation that I did not even cable its contentsto Washington, but forwarded it through the mails. I never dreamedthat they wanted independence. "

Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not being interrogated as to thestatements of the "Reseña Veridica, " it will be seen that he has, nevertheless, covered them fully. 

It was my good fortune to be long and intimately associated withAdmiral Dewey while serving on the first Philippine commission. Healways grew indignant when the subject of any promises relative toindependence said to have been made by him was so much as mentioned, and gave to the commission in writing the following:--

"The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, under date of Sept. 23, publishedin the _Springfield Republican_, so far as it relates to reportedconversations with me, or actions of mine, is a tissue of falsehood. Inever, directly or indirectly, promised the Filipinos independence. Inever received Aguinaldo with military honors, or recognized orsaluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never considered him as anally, although I did make use of him and the natives to assist me inmy operations against the Spaniards. " [48]

As Dewey's allegations flatly contradict those of Aguinaldo, wemust choose between the two. While I have no doubt as to wherethe choice will fall, I will now submit some additional matter ofinterest. Let us first consider the history of the "Reseña Verídica"in which Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On September 12, 1899, Buencamino wrote of it to Apacible in Hongkong, saying:--

"This work is entitled 'Reseña Verídica de la Revolución Filipina' inwhich Don Emilio relates in detail his acts with Admiral Dewey. It hasbeen distributed to the Consuls and you are ordered to reprint it theretranslated into English and send some copies to the United States, even though only a thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send copiesalso to Europe, Señor Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. Ifthe Agent you may have selected for the United States should still bethere, it would be advisable for him to take a copy of the pamphletwith him for its publication. 

"This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure intransmitting to you for due execution. " [49]

But there was a change of heart about giving the pamphlet to theconsuls, for under date of September 30 Buencamino wrote:--

"We have not distributed them here in order that Otis may notcounteract the effects that we desire to produce with this publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we believe it advisable tomake this pamphlet public in those colonies before your arrival inthe United States. " [50]

To this letter he added in cipher the following postscript to PabloOcampo, in charge of Aguinaldo's correspondence in Manila:--

"At last moment--Nota bene:

"Don't deliver any copy of the 'Reseña Verídica' to the Consuls, even though it was so directed in the beginning of the letter. Allexcept one, which is for you, will be sent to Hong-kong, Don Pedro dela Viña being bearer of the same, as also of the other documents. Thecopy intended for you is neither to be divulged nor published, forstrict reserve is required until those which are being sent arriveat their destination. " [51]

The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this documentuntil it could reach its destination and work its harm is of courseobvious. Its statements were so outrageously false that they wouldhave been instantly and authoritatively contradicted had it beenissued seasonably at Manila. 

The truth is that Aguinaldo's claim that he had been promisedindependence was a gradual growth. Let us trace it. 

On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to "My dear brother, " invitingthe recipients and their companions to meet him at once, and arrangethe best way to entrap all the enemy in their homes. 

In this he says that he has promised the American admiral that theywill "carry on modern war" and adds: "Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated well, and then you will see thatour reputation will be very good in all Europe, which will declarefor our independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves thus, theAmericans will decide to sell us or else divide up our territory. Asthey will hold us incapable of governing our land, we shall not secureour liberty, rather the contrary; our own soil will be delivered overto other hands. " [52]

In this letter, written on the very day of the interview at which hesubsequently claimed that Admiral Dewey had promised independence, does he make any claim that this had occurred? No, he very distinctlyimplies the contrary. Is it believable that if he could truly havesaid "The United States, through its representatives Dewey and Pratt, has promised to recognize our independence" he would have failed todo so when this would instantly have secured him the vigorous supportwhich he was then uncertain of obtaining? I think not. 

In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit be employedand that Spanish officers be treacherously attacked. The practising ofdeceit was a carefully considered part of the insurgent policy. In aletter from Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, Agoncillo writes as followsto Mabini: [53]--

* * * * *

"the time will come when disguises must be set aside and we will seewho is deceiving whom. The statements made by some of the commandersof the fleet here to Don Emilio and myself were to the effect thatthe exclusive purpose of the Government at Washington with regard tothe Filipinos, is to grant this country independence, without anyconditions, although I said to myself that such a purpose was toophilanthropical. Don Emilio knew what I thought then, and I stillthink the same; that is to say that we are the ones who must securethe independence of our country by means of unheard of sacrificesand thus work out its happiness. " [54]

Aguinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of deceit. He practisedwhat he preached. Simeon Villa, one of his companions on hissubsequent flight through Northern Luzon, before he finally tookrefuge at Palanan, kept a diary, which constitutes an official recordof this long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history ofother days, of which none is more interesting than his account of thebeginning of hostilities against the Spaniards, in August, 1896. Fromit we learn that Aguinaldo, who was known to the friar of his town tobe both a mason and a chief of the Katipúnan, was in danger duringAugust, and on the night of the 29th of that month called a meetingof all the compromised persons of the place, who agreed that on thefollowing day he should "make representations to the governor of theprovince. " Villa says that he was greatly beloved by the governor andhis wife. Early on the following morning, he "presented himself to thegovernor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo, offered himtheir respects and their loyalty to Spain, " at the same time askinga garrison of a hundred men for his town, which the governor promisedto send at once if the captain-general approved. 

That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts to hisfellow-conspirators, "and told them that then was the opportune momentfor rising against the Spaniards. " He initiated the uprising himselfthe next morning. [55]

Could deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery more franklyemployed?

I have indulged in this digression to show that Aguinaldo couldhardly have complained had the methods which he used against othersbeen employed against him. He was never deceived by the Americans, but his claims relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was soondeceiving his own people. 

On May 24th, he issued no less than four proclamations. One ofthese, doubtless intended to be seen by Americans, made no mentionof Independence, but said: [56]--

"The great powerful North American nation has offered its disinterestedprotection to secure the liberty of this country. "

In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a different use, he made the statement that the great North American nation had cometo give decisive and disinterested protection, "considering us assufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves. " [57]

On June 5, having practically gained control of Cavite Province, hefelt strong enough to announce that independence would be proclaimedon June 12, and on that date he did proclaim it in a decree. 

The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the commanders and officersof his command, was invited to the ceremonies, but none of themwent. As it was important for Aguinaldo to have some one there topose as a representative of the United States, he utilized for thispurpose a certain "Colonel" Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai, who was running a cinematograph show. He appeared as Aguinaldo's chiefof artillery and the representative of the North American nation. [58]

Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memorandum addressed toPresident McKinley did not claim that independence had been promised, but said:--

"As soon as the Spanish-American war began, the Americanrepresentatives and officials in Singapore, Hongkong and Manila, invited the natives of the Philippines to assist the American arms, which they did gladly and loyally, as allies, with the conviction thattheir personality would be recognized, as well as their political, autonomous and sovereign rights. " [59]

In it he does, however, claim that the organization of a governmentindependent of America and Spain was accomplished with the tacitconsent of the admiral commanding the fleet and with that of thegeneral and military and political commanders of the United Statesof North America in the Philippines. 

"Who, knowing these facts, not only did not object but accepted themas a consummated legal act, and maintained official relations withthe new organization, making use thereof in its subsequent actions andfor the subsequent development of the campaign, which was consequentlybrought to such a happy end. " [60]

This is a second illustration of the stereotyped insurgent procedureof announcing a policy and then claiming that failure to attack itmeant acquiescence in it. Admiral Dewey says that he did not even readthis proclamation. There was no reason why he should have done so, as it did not deal with matters which he was authorized to settle. Hehad no instructions relative to the recognition of new governments, and he sent this document to Washington without comment, as he shouldhave done. [61]

Apropos of this claim that American officers tacitly recognizedthe Insurgent government, certain passages from an unsigneddocument in the handwriting of Mabini, prepared about July 15, 1898, are of interest. Mabini, speaking of the attitude of theAmericans, says, "Notwithstanding all this and in spite of theirprotestations of friendship, they have always refused to recognizethat government. " Also, "If they persist in refusing to recognize ourgovernment, we shall see ourselves compelled to come to an agreementwith any other government that will consent to recognize us on friendlyterms. " [62]

This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to whetherAmericans had recognized the Insurgent government on or before thedate when it was written. 

Let us now consider the relations between Aguinaldo and GeneralAnderson. 

Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by the latter, inwhich, after describing the Filipinos, he adds, "The people expectindependence. " Blount says:--

"That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the commandinggeneral of our forces in the Philippines advises the WashingtonGovernment, 'The people expect independence' is the hardest thing inthe public archives of our government covering that momentous periodfor those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley to get around. Afterthe war with the Filipinos broke out, McKinley said repeatedly inpublic speeches, 'I never dreamed they would turn against us. '" [63]

If there is nothing harder than this to get around the memory ofPresident McKinley will not suffer, as the important thing is notwhat Aguinaldo had led his people to expect, but what the Americanofficials had promised him. The President was certainly not bound tobelieve that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they didthen expect independence. Blount has seen fit to leave unmentionedcertain other facts which are very pertinent in this connection. 

Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico made the followingstatement in a letter to Aguinaldo:--

"I also have to inform you that Señores Basa, Cortés and Co. Havecongratulated the Government of the United States upon the captureof Manila, stating at the same time that now that Filipino soil hadbeen soaked with American blood, the Islands must remain American. Ibelieve that a telegram should be sent immediately, to counteractthat sent by them. " [64]

Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15, 1898, Agoncillohad transmitted another telegram to President McKinley throughConsul-General Wildman, reading as follows:--

"Agoncillo, my Commissioner and Ambassador-Extraordinary, representingthe provisional government of the Philippine Islands, in its nameand the name of its President, Emilio Aguinaldo, congratulates you onthe successful termination of the war, and commends the occupancy ofManila. I assure the United States of the allegiance and unquestioningsupport of our people, and petition that we be granted one or morerepresentatives on the commission that is to decide the future ofour Islands. " [65]

It would appear, therefore, that the President had more informationon this subject than was transmitted by General Anderson!

Not only did the latter passively refrain from recognizing Aguinaldo'spretensions, but on July 22, 1898, he wrote to him as follows:--

"I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself Dictator andproclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such an assumption. I have no ordersfrom my government on the subject. " [66]

The effort to keep Americans in ignorance of the true state of affairswas kept up until further deception was useless. Consul Williams, for instance, wrote on June 16, 1898:--

"For future advantage, I am maintaining cordial relations with GeneralAguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces when treatingfor their return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council toform provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought bestto decline. A form of government was adopted, but General Aguinaldotold me today that his friends all hoped that the Philippines wouldbe held as a colony of the United States of America. " [67]

Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality proclaimed theindependence of the Philippines. Few Americans at this time knew anySpanish and none understood Tagalog, so that it was comparativelyeasy to deceive them. What Consul Williams reported was what Aguinaldoconsidered it expedient to have him believe. 

The following undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini, supposed to havebeen sent at this time, is of especial interest in this connection:--

"My dear Brother: I do not want to go there [where the addressee is]until after the visit of the American Consul, because I do not wishthe negotiations to end in an ultimatum, and in order that you maytell him all that is favourable for the cause of our Nation. I chargeyou with the task of giving him a reply, and if he should ask aboutme tell him that since the time of his last visit there I have notrecovered from my illness. If anything important should happen wecan communicate with each other by telegraph, using a code in mattersthat require secrecy. " [68]

In a letter supposed to have been written during November, 1898, prepared for Aguinaldo's signature and addressed to Señor McKinley, President of the Republic of the United States of North America, butapparently never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge [69] previouslymade in his "Reseñia Verídica, " that Pratt and Dewey promisedindependence. It need not be further discussed. 

The climax was finally reached in an official protest against theParis Treaty written by Agoncillo in Paris on the 12th of December, 1898, in which occurs the following:--

"The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege a betterright to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to the future ofthe Philippines. 

"On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith impose on themthe explicit recognition of the political status of the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted ally of their forces in themoments of danger and strife. The noble general Emilio Aguinaldo andthe other Filipino chiefs were solicited to place themselves at thehead of the suffering and heroic sons of that country, to fight againstSpain and to second the action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey. 

"At the time of employing their armed coöperation, both the Commanderof the _Petrel_ and Captain Wood in Hongkong, before the declaration ofwar, the American Consuls-General Mr. Pratt in Singapore, Mr. Wildman, in Hongkong, and Mr. Williams in Cavite, acting as internationalagents of the great American nation, at a moment of great anxietyoffered to recognize the independence of the Filipino nation, as soonas triumph was obtained. 

"Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war, the_McCulloch_ was placed at the disposal of the said leaders andwhich took them to their native shores; and Admiral Dewey himself, by sending the man-of-war; by not denying to General Aguinaldo andhis companions the exacting of his promises, when they were presentedto him on board his flag-ship in the Bay of Manila; by receiving thesaid General Aguinaldo before and after his victories and notabledeeds of arms, with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of anallied army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting theefficacious coöperation of that Army and of those Generals; byrecognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be hoisted onsea and land, consenting that their ships should sail with the saidflag within the places which were blockaded; by receiving a solemnnotification of the formal proclamation of the Philippine nation, without protesting against it, nor opposing in any way its existence;by entering into relations with those Generals and with the nationalFilipino authorities recently established, recognized without questionthe corporated body and autonomous sovereignty of the people who hadjust succeeded in breaking their fetters and freeing themselves bythe impulse of their own force. " [70]

It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The commander ofthe _Petrel_ Captain Wood, Consul Wildman and Consul Williams arenow included among those alleged to have promised independence, andit is claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours due thechief of an independent state when he visited Admiral Dewey, whereashis own original claim was that he was received with the honours duea general, which is quite a different matter. 

As a matter of fact, American officers usually addressed and treatedAguinaldo as a general. The extent to which they were able to usehis organization to further the ends of their government will be setforth later. 

In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo admits thatthere is no agreement, but says that he cannot tell the peoples thatit does not exist, "fearing that I may not be able to restrain thepopular excitement. " [71] He begs Wildman to use his influence on hisgovernment so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding thefate of the people "without considering their will duly represented bymy government. " Is it conceivable that, if there had been any groundfor claiming a promise of independence, Aguinaldo would have failedto mention it at this time?

We may summarize the well-established facts as follows:--

Consul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty sympathywith the ambition of the Filipino leaders to obtain independence, andwould personally have profited from such a result, but he refrainedfrom compromising his government and made no promises in its behalf. 

Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo the possibilityof independence. 

There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of the Admiralever discussed independence with any Filipino, much less made anypromise concerning it. 

Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised it, and bothwere kept in ignorance of the fact that it was desired up to the lastpossible moment. 

It is not claimed that either General Anderson or General Merrittmade any promise concerning it. 

The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by any of thesemen is fully justified by well-established facts. 

Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset from saying, in any document which Americans could read, that independencehad been promised, and advanced this claim only when the growingstrength of his land force had given him confidence. He repeated it, with increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ultimatelyopenly threatening war if his pretensions were not recognized. Indoing this, he was merely carrying out a carefully prearranged plan, agreed upon by the Hongkong junta. 

And now let us examine the claim that the insurgents were our "faithfulallies" and "coöperated" with us in the taking of Manila. We shallfind that this subject richly repays investigation. 

CHAPTER III

Insurgent "Coöperation"

I have previously [72] called attention to the minutes of a sessionof the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898, from which it indirectlyappears that the Filipino leaders at that time hoped to secure armsat the expense of the Americans and purposed to attack them later ifit seemed advisable. 

The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed from byAguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for Manila with their eyeswide open, knowing full well that they had been promised nothing;prepared to match their wits against those of Admiral Dewey, andintent on deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be usedfirst against the Spaniards and later against the Americans, afterthey had been employed to help bring about the downfall of Spain. 

There exists a significant circular signed "J. M. B. " [73] believedto have been an outright forgery, both from its tenor and from thefact that the signature "J. M. B. " is not in the handwriting of Basa'sletter hereinbefore quoted. 

It contains the following statements:--

"The true patriots have organized a committee to which I belong, naming Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as Vice-President. Thelatter and three others have commenced diplomatic negotiationswith the Admiral and American Consul, and we infer that they aretrying to make colonies of us, although they said they would give usindependence. The Committee deemed it advisable to simulate belief, at the same time equipping ourselves with arms. 

"We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will be disembarkedin the Philippines by the squadron. 

"A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with themin order to conceal our real intentions, and part will be held inreserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony, we shall rejectsuch offer and rise in arms. 

"A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point may beconsidered suitable. 

"José Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron in order togive secret instructions to the Chiefs. 

"Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point; you willcommunicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who will recognizethe gravity of the subject. " [74]

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials were forgedin order to gain the prestige of his name for this treacherous plan, we have definitely set forth the purpose of the Filipinos to deceivethe Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight withthem, and then to attack them. 

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo's advice to Aguinaldo, given under date of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendlyrelations should be maintained with the Americans until the diplomaticnegotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be madeto find out the future status of the islands "by deceitful means, "and that confidence should never be put in the Americans. 

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a postscript to thisletter, saying:--

"You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs shouldemploy a policy of friendship toward the Americans until our statusis defined; but said order should be confidentially given. Try tomislead them. " [75]

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Parisconference. [76]

Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Pariswould leave their country to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans, [77] and adds that having helped us take the city of Manila, they"felt that they had been 'given the double cross, '" "believed thatthe Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian, and that was the cause of the war. " [78]

The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainlythat the principal thing for which the Filipinos were waiting wasthe ousting of Spain from the Philippines by the United States; thosewhich follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a result ofa a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question ofwhether a United States protectorate, or even annexation to the UnitedStates, might be considered, was left open to a very late date. [79]

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniardswithout our assistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanishsovereignty had practically disappeared from the islands at the timeManila surrendered. It has further been alleged that "decrepit"Spain "could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to thePhilippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up. '" [80]

But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no meanssanguine. Their more intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresawthat they could not win unaided. Señor Antonio Regidor was at thetime residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence andexceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation, and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:--

"In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send atelegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to abandon theislands, after having fought as brothers for a common cause. Pledgehim our unconditional adhesion, especially of well-to-do people. Toreturn to Spain, in whatever form, would mean annihilation, perpetualanarchy. Filipinos en masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore. London commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo toaccept American flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them toremain. " [81]

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views, but Agoncillodid not share them. He replied on July 29:--

"Provisional government's aspiration is independence. Make thiscampaign. " [82]

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows, addressing his communication to Basa:

"America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with nativesinternational question other difficulties necessary to encourageher all of you submit united unconditionally raising American flaggreat demonstrations necessary to influence outside opinion showislands resolved united America high circles advise in view presentcircumstances only feasible programme is protectorate. " [83]

Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, foron August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statementsand inquiries:--

"If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions which willarise are these: Have we sufficient arms to maintain the war againstSpain in order to secure our independence? If the other nations areopposed to our independence and wish that we should continue underthe Spanish sovereignty, have we sufficient strength to wage a warand obtain victory over Spain and over them in the future? If youthink that we have not sufficient strength to fight against them, should we accept independence under the American protectorate? Andif so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the UnitedStates? You should carefully consider the preceding questions, andI suggest that you should, in a confidential manner, consult themwith your cabinet-in-banc, as well as with your private secretaryand military chiefs of rank; and your decision be notified to ourrepresentatives abroad in order that they may know what they mustdo in their negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressedto me by Regidor that he suggests to me to send a message toMacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit to them[the U. S. ] unconditionally. As I do not agree with him and asI cannot take any action which is against the instructions of thegovernment, I replied to him that the only desire of our government isindependence. This may be seen from the enclosed telegram. On accountof this reply, he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwardssent a telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter, upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful patriots, andthey adopted a resolution to send a message to MacKinley requestingannexation. Fortunately, in the meeting there was present Dr. JustoLucban, who protested against such measure. In view of this protest, they again agreed that I should be present in the meeting, since Iam the representative of our government. At the meeting where I waspresent, I pointed out the inadvisability of their resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, that we should await your instructions in regardto the matter before sending any message of that character. So themessage was not sent; but I was later informed that Basa had, afterall, sent it yesterday, because he believed that it would not injureour cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion and wentso far as to say to Basa the following: 'Many of us, especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being so; politicians for whatwe hear from others; we claim to be patriots, but we are only so inwords; we wish to be chiefs, but none of us act in a way worthy ofa chief. ' To this he did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accusedhim of an act of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to awaityour letter. What union can you expect from this people?" [84]

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials wereforged on the letter quoted on page 67. 

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back oncemore to the question of independence under a protectorate and madeit very clear that at this late day he did not know whether this wasor was not what the Filipinos desired. [85]

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be aneasy matter to escape from Spanish domination, much less that theislands were already rid of it, for he wrote to Mabini that the UnitedStates were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands ofSpain. He said that "if events will be what their telegrams indicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the handsof Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whetherthe end will be favourable to us... Spain free from Cuba and herother colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send herethe 150, 000 men she has in Cuba. " [86] Apacible thought that the bestthing was independence under an American protectorate. 

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United Stateshe should "not accept any contracts or give any promises respectingprotection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtainindependence. " [87]

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldofrom the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy ofthe Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:--

"The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle forthe independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our strength and ourmeans will permit. Protection or annexation will be acceptable onlywhen it can be clearly seen that the recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or diplomacy, is impossible. " [88]

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexationif necessary. [89] He was apparently not sanguine at this time asto the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events, he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come, and desired to know on what terms it could be had. [90]

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation madethemselves heard. 

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:--

"I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of themoneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite of all statements tothe contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to theUnited States first, and for independence secondly, if the UnitedStates decides to decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact, I have had the most prominent leaders call on me and say they wouldnot raise one finger unless I could assure them that the UnitedStates intended to give them United States citizenship if they wishedit. " [91]

We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family whoinsisted that the Islands must remain American, [92] and that ofAgoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and hisown, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending theoccupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United Statesof the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos, [93]but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was onlyone more move in the Insurgent game of deceit. 

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong. [94]Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinosthere were in favour of it. 

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:--

"In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano [95] addressed to DonFelipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a letterwritten from the town of Pagsanján, province of Laguna, in replyto one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In this letter DonCayetano outlined the idea of union with the United States and said:'Avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stableorder of affairs, then it will be time enough to make laws. ' Mabini, whose influence at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo'sgovernment, paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and beforecongress had promulgated a Philippine constitution, Messrs. Arellanoand Pardo [96] still more earnestly advocated union with America, the first as secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chiefdiplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the United States toacknowledge the independence of the country under a protectoratethrough the mediation of General Otis, and this plan was accepted ata cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following daySandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference withthe Japanese consul and had been told by him: 'that if Aguinaldowould support absolute independence the Japanese Government wouldhelp. ' Aguinaldo believed Sandico's story (which turned out to beabsolutely false) and did not carry out the resolution adopted by thecabinet. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separatedthemselves from the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwardsthat he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Washington, assuring him that a majority of the American people were inclined toacknowledge the independence of the Philippines and of Cuba. " [97]

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to thevicinity of Manila. 

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation fromfour thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also representedsouthern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty toannexation. [98]

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: Allwere agreed that the assistance of the United States was necessaryin getting rid of Spanish sovereignty. 

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations wereto be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spainwas ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to "showtheir teeth, " and see "who was deceiving whom, " resorting to "force ofarms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted onlywhen it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence, won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible. 

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to theUnited States or a United States protectorate, but their views werein the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latterhad the guns their ideas prevailed. 

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in thePhilippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important tobear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent recordsrelative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attackingthe American troops. 

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the coöperation allegedto have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The followingpoints are not in dispute:--

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to coöperate with Dewey. 

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he woulddo so. 

Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; bybringing him and his associates back to the Philippines; by furnishingthem arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safedistance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported bythe Insurgents. 

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provincesand used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove largenumbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the positionof the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possiblebombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to theprovinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shiftfor itself. 

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault. 

It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have been possiblefor the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at firsthave garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought ofattempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose. 

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help? Let us consider histestimony on the subject:--

"_Senator Carmack_. You did want a man there who could organize androuse the people?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I didn't want anybody. I would like to say now thatAguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul Pratt and ConsulWildman; I didn't do anything--

"_Senator Carmack_. Did they have any power to force him upon you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; they had in a way. They had not the officialpower, but one will yield after a while to constant pressure. I didnot expect anything of them; I did not think they would do anything. Iwould not have taken them; I did not want them; I did not believe inthem; because, when I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that thecountry was in a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun, as Mr. Williams put it, there would be a general uprising, and Ithought these half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong would play avery small part in it. " [99]

The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet readyfor battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one hand and byirresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pathetic; but it had itshumorous features, which were not lost on the Admiral himself. Iquote the following:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Was there any communication between you andPratt in which the matter of a written pledge or agreement withAguinaldo was discussed with reference to the Philippine Islands?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No. 

"_Senator Patterson_. What became of the correspondence, Admiral, if you know?

"_Admiral Dewey_. It is all in the Navy Department. When I turnedover my command my official correspondence was all sent to the NavyDepartment. 

"_Senator Patterson_. You retained all of your letters from any UnitedStates officials?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; they went to the Department. 

"_Senator Patterson_. I mean you did not destroy them. 

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; I did not destroy them. 

"_Senator Patterson_. And you turned them over to the Navy Department?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; our regulations require that. I may saythat for my own information I kept copies of certain telegrams andcablegrams. I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He seemed to be a sort ofbusybody there and interfering in other people's business and I don'tthink his letters impressed me. 

"_Senator Patterson_. He was the consul-general?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the attack onManila, you know. 

"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that. 

"_Admiral Dewey_. I received lots of advice, you understand, frommany irresponsible people. 

"_Senator Patterson_. But Pratt was the consul-general of theGovernment there?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he was consul-general. 

"_Senator Patterson_. And he communicated with you, giving you suchinformation as he thought you might be interested in, and among otherinformation he gave you was this concerning Aguinaldo?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I don't remember; no, I really don't remember histelling me anything about Aguinaldo more than that cablegram there, and I said he might come. And you see how much importance I attachedto him; I did not wait for him. 

"_Senator Patterson_. What you said was: 'Tell Aguinaldo to come assoon as possible. '

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for him. 

"_Senator Patterson_. Yes; but there was a reason for that. 

"_Admiral Dewey_. I think more to get rid of him than anything else. 

"_Senator Carmack_. Rid of whom?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were botheringme. I was very busy getting my squadron ready for battle, and theselittle men were coming on board my ship at Hongkong and taking a gooddeal of my time, and I did not attach the slightest importance toanything they could do, and they did nothing; that is, none of themwent with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal oftalk, but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn't gobecause he didn't have any toothbrush. 

"_Senator Burrows_. Did he give that as a reason?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he said, 'I have no toothbrush. '" [100]

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him byPratt and Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates tobe brought to Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistancefrom them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking a commonenemy, in its own way. 

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldoand the naval forces of the United States:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Then, Admiral, until you knew that they weregoing to send land forces to your assistance you thought there wasa necessity to organize the Filipinos into land forces, did you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; not a necessity. 

"_Senator Patterson_. You thought it might prove of value to you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I testified here, I think, in a way that answersthat. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy; now, you go your wayand I will go mine; we had better act independently. ' That was thewisest thing I ever said. 

"_Senator Patterson_. But you stated that you were using these peopleand they were permitted to organize, that you might use them. 

"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us. 

"_Senator Patterson_. Very well, they were to assist you. Did younot either permit them or encourage them--I do not care which termyou use--to organize into an army, such as it was, that they mightrender you such assistance as you needed?

"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us, but incidentally they werefighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy which had beentheir enemy for three hundred years. 

"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that, Admiral. 

"_Admiral Dewey_. While assisting us they were fighting their ownbattles, too. 

"_The Chairman_. You were encouraging insurrection against a commonenemy with which you were at war?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I think so. I had in my mind an illustrationfurnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil war, andthe only friends we had in the South were the negroes, and we madeuse of them; they assisted us on many occasions. I had that in mind;I said these people were our friends, and 'we have come here and theywill help us just exactly as the negroes helped us in the civil war. '

"_Senator Patterson_. The negroes were expecting their freedom--

"_Admiral Dewey_. The Filipinos were slaves, too. 

"_Senator Patterson_. What were the Filipinos expecting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards; I do notthink they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall but I have inmind that the one thing they had in their minds was to get rid ofthe Spaniards and then to accept us, and that would have occurred--Ihave thought that many times--if we had had troops to occupy Manilaon the 1st day of May before the insurrection got started; thesepeople would have accepted us as their friends, and they would havebeen our loyal friends--I don't know for how long, but they wouldhave been our friends then. 

"_Senator Patterson_. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman, or Williams, very early, did you not, that the Filipinos wanted their own countryand to rule their own country; that that is what they were expecting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I heard from Williams that there was an insurrectionthere against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond getting rid of them. Therewas one, Dr. Rizal, who had the idea of independence, but I don'tthink that Aguinaldo had much idea of it. 

"_Senator Carmack_. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino armyserve; why did you want the Filipino army at all?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I did not want them. 

"_Senator Carmack_. Did you not want the Filipino forces?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No, not really. It was their own idea coming overthere. We could have taken the city at any moment we had the troopsto occupy it. "

Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to theimportance of Aguinaldo's military operations:--

"Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfullywell. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, and finally putone of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted to takethis up--wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the city withit. I said, 'Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until our troops come. ' Iknew he could not take the city without the assistance of the navy, without my assistance, and I knew that what he was doing--driving theSpaniards in--was saving our own troops, because our own men perhapswould have had to do that same thing. He and I were always on the mostfriendly terms; we had never had any differences. He considered me ashis liberator, as his friend. I think he had the highest admirationfor us because we had whipped the Spaniards who had been riding themdown for three hundred years. 

 * * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_ (continuing). You sent this short dispatch tothe Secretary of the Navy:--

"'Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the _Olympia_yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt hisability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged. '

"Do you recall that visit?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes. 

"_Senator Patterson_. He came to tell you, did he, that he was goingto make a general attack, and you--

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes. 

"_Senator Patterson_. And you doubted his ability to succeed?

"_Admiral Dewey_. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted me to towone of his guns up into position. I knew he could not take the city;of course he could not. 

"_Senator Patterson_. Did you urge that he should not make the attack?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember that; very likely I did. 

"_Senator Patterson_. And was he not persuaded or restrained by youfrom doing so?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I didnot want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily, because I knewthey could not take that walled city. They had no artillery, and theycould not take it, I knew very well, and I wanted the situation toremain as it was until our troops came to occupy it. 

"_Senator Patterson_. But you found that whenever you expressed astrong objection to anything being done at that time that Aguinaldoyielded to your request?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Up to the time the army came he did everything Irequested. I had not much to do with him after the army came. " [101]

But Dewey's influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to preventhis looting, as the following extracts from his testimony show:--

"_Senator Patterson_. Is that what you mean when you say helooted--that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions andwhatever was necessary? That is what you meant?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one part of it. 

"_Senator Carmack_. This was taking provisions for the use of the army?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one thing he did. 

"_Senator Carmack_. You said you did not object to that at the time?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No. It would have been useless; he got beyond mevery soon--he got out of my hands very soon. [102]

"_Senator Carmack_. You said yesterday you suspected that Aguinaldotook the lion's share of the provisions that were gathered for thearmy. What was the ground upon which you made that accusation?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Because he was living in Malolos like a prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about by his takingthe lion's share. Then, in regard to his looting, I repeat what Isaid yesterday. He began within forty-eight hours after he landed inCavite to capture and take everything he wanted. I know these thingsof my own knowledge, because I saw the loot brought in; and I knowthat every dollar that was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yardwas taken at the threat of death. [103]

 * * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_. Do you believe in this proclamation he wasuttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there forgain--for money--that independence had never up to that time enteredhis head. He was there for loot and money. That is what I believe, since you ask me my belief; I believe that implicitly. [104]

 * * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_. And you found nothing to cause any doubt as tohis loyalty up to the time until after Manila surrendered?

"_Admiral Dewey_. His loyalty to whom?

"_Senator Patterson_. To you and to the cause for which he wasfighting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us about thetime our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving out of Cavite tomake room for our troops. 

"_Senator Patterson_. Do you mean by that that you feared that hewas commencing to think more of independence than the success of theAmerican cause?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes. " [105]

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo coöperated with the marineforces of the United States. Now let us examine the claim that hecooperated with the land forces after their arrival. 

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplishedwas the maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented theentrance of provisions, and produced a very serious food shortage. BothOtis and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn from theInsurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion. [106]

The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila wasnot actively opposed by the Filipinos, but it was narrowly anddistrustfully watched. 

Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimatelyfurnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks'delay, and as a result of threats that it would be seized if notvoluntarily supplied. 

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which tomake the attack on that city were, in part at least, yielded to theAmericans by the Filipinos upon the request of the former. 

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projectedAmerican attacks. 

They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to theplans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated withthe Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the cityto themselves. 

After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, andon the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavouredto push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep outof the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after, the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wallwhile a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killedand wounded American soldiers. 

They demanded for themselves Malacañang palace and other buildingsand a share in "the war booty. " They promptly looted the parts of thecity which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positionswithin the city limits on the evening of their last day of graceafter being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so theywould be driven out. 

I will now quote from the records in support of these statements. 

The following is the programme of "coöperation" outlined to Aguinaldoby Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898:--

"I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of Manilaand I hope that General Augustín will be obliged to turn over his swordto you in person and not to the Americans. You are by right entitledto it and I should like to see it so from a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should declare the independence ofthe Philippines before the arrival of General Merritt, appointedby the President to be Governor with full powers to establish aprovisional government. 

 * * * * *

Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the interiortowns with their troops or any other act which might be construed asa conquest, should meet with resistance. 

 * * * * *

"After having written these lines, I had another conference withMr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding thequestion of independence. He has had a consultation with the SupremeJudge of this place, and he is of opinion that you should proclaimindependence at once, notwithstanding what Admiral Dewey and ConsulWilliams say against it, and this should be done before General Merrittcan arrive. A Government having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would have no right to invade the Philippines withoutcommitting a violation of international law. They are no longerfighting against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. Theadvice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play togain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he is wellaware of the false position said General would find himself in. Thekey to the situation is now in your hands; do not permit any one totake it away from you. The Americans have done nothing but bombard anddestroy the Spanish fleet on the high seas; they have not conquered anyland, but in the meantime the control of the Philippines has passedby conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans haveno right to enter further. Under certain conditions and guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be very careful, they mustnot be permitted to land until they execute an agreement with theduly constituted government of the Philippines, respecting all itsinstitutions, and they must under no pretext whatever be permittedto garrison any place except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebú, and Iloílo, and even therein care should be observed ... You must notpermit a single soldier to land without having these guarantees. " [107]

When General Anderson, with the first United States troops ofoccupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him, as an "ally" might have been expected to do. Later, however, AdmiralDewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without anyof the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying toGeneral Anderson:--

"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on yourblouse. Do not go with any ceremony. " [108]

And they went in that way. 

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requestinghis coöperation in the following words:--

"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations withyou, and to have you and your force coöperate with us in the militaryoperations against the Spanish forces. " [109]

On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the

"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire inthe Great North American nation, " [110]

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinosand treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to coöperation in his reply, andAnderson apparently never renewed his request for coöperation inmilitary operations. 

On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:--

"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by Your Excellencyin your welcome letter received on the 5th instant, to endeavour tocome to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous toboth. Very soon we expect large additional land forces, and it must beapparent to you as a military officer that we will require much moreroom to camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. Forthis I would like to have Your Excellency's advice and coöperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of the country. " [111]

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, GeneralAnderson says of Aguinaldo:--

"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at allfriendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him andhe is much more friendly and seems willing to coöperate. But he hasdeclared himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manilawithout our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effecthis purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our partto establish a provisional government. " [112]

Evidently, however, coöperation, even in the matter of gettingnecessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc. , for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willingto pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the nativepopulation are not willing to give us this assistance as promptlyas required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary wewill be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. Wewould regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend theFilipinos. Our nation has spent millions in money to send forces hereto expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. 

"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are herefor their good, and that they must supply us with labor and materialat the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundredhorses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horseswith each individual owner. "

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Andersoninquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who thenindorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jonesreported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportationexcept upon Aguinaldo's order and that the natives had removed theircart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred thatthe transportation requested had not been furnished. 

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had givenorders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows:--

"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate systemof military government, under his assumed authority as Dictator, andhas prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As Gothis last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the countryfor horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders)must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled. "

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"_General_: When I came here three weeks ago I requested YourExcellency to give what assistance you could to procure means oftransportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the causeof your people. So far we have received no response. 

"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisitionon you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and ox carts. If youcannot secure these I will have to pass you and make requisitiondirectly on the people. 

"I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience. 

"I remain with great respect, etc. " [113]

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:--

"Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest toYour Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which yousay to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt of any response relativeto the assistance that you have asked of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I did reply through the bearer that Iwas disposed to issue proper orders whenever you advised me of thenumber of these, giving me notice in advance. 

"I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that within theshortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot assureYour Excellency that we will have the number of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses in this vicinity, owing to deathsfrom epizoötic diseases in January, February, and March last. 

"Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure to adviseYour Excellency. 

"I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shallplace at your disposition when you need them, provided you give meprevious notice four days in advance. " [114]

General Anderson replied:--

"Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc. , is satisfactory I regret that there should have beenany misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied even forthe hiring of carromatas, etc. , told our people that they had ordersto supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think thatthis was a misapprehension on their part. " [115]

From this series of communications it appears that it took threeweeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bringabout Aguinaldo's promise of assistance in securing it. What helphad he given, meanwhile, in other matters?

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist Americanofficers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, andto favor them with his advice. [116]

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow MajorJ. F. Bell, [117] who was gathering information for General Merritt, to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell's disposal anyavailable information about the force of the enemy and the topographyof the country. [118]

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a LieutenantE. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance. [119]

Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response, if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but GeneralAnderson's original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents tocoöperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898, in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army hemakes the following statement:--

"The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator andself-appointed President. He has declared martial law and promulgateda minute method of rule and administration under it. 

"We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and hisfollowers express great admiration and gratitude to the great Americanrepublic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposesand are using every effort to take Manila without us. 

"I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with theSpanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in Manila. " [120]

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later. 

On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effectwarning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered bythe Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writingthe places to be occupied and the object of the occupation. [121]

Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did notpass unnoticed. On July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-Generalof the army concerning it:--

"His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him knowverbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I didnot recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that Ihave made no formal protest against his proclamation as Dictator, hisdeclaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despoticform of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publishit, at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding thesusceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be knownin every other way that we do not recognize the Dictatorship. Thesepeople only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and althoughinsignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropicalpeople they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do morework in a given time than a regiment of volunteers. "

Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldorefused to attend a parade and review on the 4th of July. This factis, in itself, an answer to his claim that the Americans were tacitlyrecognizing his pretensions. 

After referring to this incident, Blount says:--

"On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines it wasdeemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our declaration beforegatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion. " [122]

This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the followingyear when the declaration was read on the Luneta to a considerablegathering of Filipinos among whom were many school children, and ithas often been read since. 

The landing of American troops at Parañaque and their going intocamp near that town on July 15 caused much excitement, and a livelyinterchange of telegrams between Insurgent officers followed. [123]

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans, [124] andtrouble soon began. 

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of the Armywhom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We did not listento him, awaiting your order. "

On the back of the telegram is written the following:--

"Reply. --You should not obey. What this American Colonel says is alie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should require fromhim proof. Be always vigilant, but upright, also all of the officersand soldiers must be strict and not timid. " [125]

Obviously there was no real coöperation between American and Filipinotroops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo'srequest for information as to places where American troops were toland in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them. 

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. OnJuly 29 Arévalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"In conference with General Greene I asked for an officialletter, a copy of which I send you: 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade, U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th, 1898. _El Señor Noriel, General de Brigade_. Sir: In pursuance of ourconversation of yesterday and the message which Captain Arévalo broughtto me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupythe intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving campfor that purpose at 8. 00 o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if youwill give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thankingyou for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedientservant, _F. V. Greene, Brigadier General_, commanding. '" [126]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is theactual transaction referred to by Blount as "Jockeying the Insurgentsout of their trenches. " He bases his statements concerning the matteron a newspaper report. 

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permissionto occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on thecity could not have been more correct. 

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructionsrelative to the matter:--

"No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask Insurgentgenerals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, butif refused not to use force. "

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, askingpermission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in orderto place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on thefollowing day. 

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoidedconferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabiniwrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statementthat he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts. [127]

The landing of American troops at Parañaque for the assault on Manilaled to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring townof Bacoor. [128]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pío del Pilarthat the Americans were going to attack the next day and that, --

"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes placeto-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, sparingnone, for the way they have deceived us, and will again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this; and when it is done the whole worldwill wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able togive out that the people here are fools spending the time suckingtheir fingers. " [130]

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposedAmerican attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the followingletter:--

"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of theLieutenant-Colonel. Private. )

"_Señor Don Artemio Ricarte_: [131]

"My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving warningof the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interestin me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely, "_Luis Martinez Alcobendas_. 

"_Singalon_, August 10, 1898. " [132]

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of thissort. He says:--

"The officers of the United States Army who believed that theinsurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements wereright. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío del Pilar, dated July30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilarsaid that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attackthe Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards shouldnot give way, but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, thatif the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrenderSanta Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo'sinformation was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers werekilled or wounded by the Spanish fire. " [133]

Taylor continues:--

"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It is notprobable that these were the only two such letters written. Aguinaldohad by this time found out that although he could defeat the scatteredSpanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding thelines of Manila. He did not want the Americans in the Philippines. Theywere in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if theydid not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. Hesaw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should obtainfrom them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among Spaniardsand Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point of view, inure to hisbenefit. The best possible thing for him would be to hold his ownforce intact while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not infront of the Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believingthat the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the Spaniardsshould inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo; but it was decidedly notthe conduct of an ally. " [134]

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shownby a telegram from General Pío del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macation August 10, 1898:--

"Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about to surrenderbecause they want to turn over the place; the Americans want them toleave only the batteries and say that they will station themselvesin said batteries. It appears that they want to deceive us; they donot want to give us arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shallattack them and drive them out. I await your reply. " [135]

This is perhaps not quite the kind of coöperation that Admiral Deweyand Generals Anderson and Merritt had expected. 

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila forthemselves, not only because of the "war booty, " for which they werehungry, but because of the status which they felt that the taking ofthe capital of the Philippines would assure them. The great importancewhich they attached to this plan is shown in communications writtenby Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others. [136]

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:--

"On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleón Garcíato negotiate the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards to him (Exhibit155). On July 5 Pantaleón García was planning to enter Manila by way ofTondo or of Santa Cruz (P. I. R. , 243. 7). On the 9th Aguinaldo orderedthat rice should be gathered from the towns of Manila Province forthe use of his troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which heintended making in a few days (P. I. R. , 1087. 5). 

"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself wasgrowing steadily less, now determined to force himself into the citywith the Americans and demand a consideration for the assistance hehad rendered them during the siege. It is true he had assisted them, but his assistance had not been intentional. It was the result ofthe operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations ofthe Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemyof both; but the operations were not joint operations, and althoughtheir purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August8 Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operationsabout Manila, ordered him to respect the property of all foreigners, and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila theywere to carry their flag and plant it there (P. I. R. , 703. 2). Judgingfrom an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the foreignconsuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protectionof their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refugeon the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops entered the cityno foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would beinjured. The earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners notSpaniards should take steps to identify themselves and their propertyshows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civiliansas fair booty of war. " [137]

There was certmnly no need of Insurgent assistance in the assaulton Manila. 

The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender of Manila hadbeen agreed upon in advance were correct, as is shown by the followingtestimony of Admiral Dewey:

"_Senator Patterson_. When did you reach an understanding with theSpanish commander upon the subject, [138]--how long before the 12thor 13th of August?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Several days before. 

"_Senator Patterson_. To whom did you eommunieate the arrangementthat you had?

"_Admiral Dewey_. General Merritt and, of course, all of my owncaptains--General Merritt, and I think a council of officers on boardof one of the steamers. I think there were several army officerspresent when I told the General that; and I may say here that I donot think General Merritt took much stock in it. 

"_Senator Patterson_. What statement did you make to them, Admiral, in substance?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That the Spaniards were ready to surrender, butbefore doing so I must engage one of the outlying forts. I selected oneat Malate, away from the city. [139] They said I must engage that andfire for a while, and then I was to make a signal by the internationalcode, 'Do you surrender?' Then they were to hoist a white flag ata certain bastion; and I may say now that I was the first one todiscover the white flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while, and then made the signal according to the programme. We could not seethe white flag--it was rather a thick day--but finally I discoveredit on the south bastion; I don't know how long it had been flyingthere when I first saw it. " [140]

On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, Buencamino telegraphedAguinaldo, urging him in the strongest terms to attack that night sothat Americans might be obliged to ask him to stop, with the resultthat the Insurgents would be included in the official negotiations. Hefurther advised Aguinaldo that he must not suspend his attack becausethe Americans suspended theirs. [141]

General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 12, he received an order from General Merritt to notify Aguinaldo toforbid the Insurgents under his command from entering Manila. Thisnotification was delivered to Aguinaldo that night, and was receivedby him with anger. [142]

On the following morning the Insurgents actually made an independentattack of their own, as planned. [143] It promptly led to troublewith the Americans, and at 8 A. M. Aguinaldo received a telegram fromGeneral Anderson sternly warning him not to let his troops enterManila without the consent of the American commander on the southside of the Pasig River. [144]

Aguinaldo apparentiy took no action in response to this request, except to direct General Riego de Dios, who was at Cavite, to gowith Buencamino without losing a moment and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible. [145]

At 10. 50 A. M. He telegraphed General Anderson saying that his troopswere being forced, by threats of violence, to retire from positionswhich they had taken, and asking Anderson to order his troops toavoid difficulty with the Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that hehad directed his men to aid the American forces if the latter areattacked by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the subjectof their entering Manila. [146]

Fifteen minutes later, at 11. 05, he received a reply to his telegramto General Riego de Dios, in which that officer communicated theviews of Araneta [147] and Buencamino, who had been unable to findGeneral Anderson. This important communication follows:--

"Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been consulted in regardto your telegram of to-day, they confirm capitulation, and in regard tothe telegraphic note of General Anderson they are of the opinion, firstthat we should continue hostilities while we ask for an explanation;second, that explanation should be in the following terms: Inquirereason for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manilawithout permission of the American commander; third, in case the(terms of?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that wedo not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation is notfavourable to our independence. General Anderson is not here. GeneralMerritt is probably in Manila. Only Admiral Dewey is in the Bay. Weask authorization to express our explanation in the proposed termsand to have a conference with Admiral Dewey in order to have ourclaims reach General Merritt. " [148]

An endorsement written by Mabini and signed by Aguinaldo on the abovepaper reads:--

"I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we believe thatwe have the right to enter Manila without permission as we have a partin the surrender of the Spaniards. They would not have surrendered ifour troops had not cut off their retreat to the interior. Besides butfor us the landing of troops would have cost them much blood. Obtainan answer as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before theconsuls in case it is necessary. " [149]

Naturally, trouble followed. At 1. 30 P. M. General Ricarte telegraphedto Aguinaldo:--

"Americans wish to put us out. Give directions. " [150]

Apparently about the same hour he wired more at length, as follows:--

"Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches. Mabolo and SanJosé warn us that they will fire on us when the time comes. Impossibleto remain there without disagreeing with them. Since 5 o'clock thismorning we have been furiously attacking. Americans firing incessantly, Spaniards silent. No losses yet. " [151]

At 3. 52 he wired again:--

"General Pío del Pilar informs me of the following: 'Come here, if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of Concepción are notallowed to go out and we are prohibited to move on any farther. Weit was who succeeded in capturing that place. Come here or there willbe trouble, since they are driving me away, and refusing to listen towhat I say. ' I am at this very moment going to aforesaid place. " [152]

At 5 P. M. Another was sent by Ricarte to Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional Exposition, Agricultural College and other buildings are ours. Our flag fliesalready at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Donzón with his troops is in thePérez building, Paco. Colonels Julian Ocampo and Isidoro Tolentinoare in the convent of Ermita. All houses without flag are guarded byour soldiers. " [153]

At 6. 15 P. M. He telegraphed as follows:--

"I inform you that the chiefs of our troops have reported tome that our flag at Singalong church (_visita_) was removed bythe Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing us toapproach thereto. General Pío del Pilar is at present at the barrioof Concepción. Americans prohibited him to move on any farther. Howcan he enter Manila?" [154]

No attention was paid to General Anderson's request that the Insurgenttroops should not enter Manila without permission. They crowded forwardwith and after the American forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive, they found American and Spanish troops confronting each other but notfiring, the former on the drive, the latter on the neighbouring citywall. A flag of truce was waving from the south bastion, neverthelessthe Insurgents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return firewhich killed and wounded American soldiers. Of this incident GeneralGreene has said:--

"At this point the California regiment a short time before had metsome insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the walls, and thelatter, in returning the fire, had caused a loss in the Californiaregiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded. " [155]

Some of these matters must have come to the attention of GeneralAnderson, for he sent Aguinaldo a telegram, received by the latterat 6. 35 P. M. , as follows:--

"Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 toGen. Aguinaldo. Commanding Filipino Forces. --Manila, taken. Serioustrouble threatened between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your troopsshould not force themselves in the city until we have received thefull surrender then we will negotiate with you. 

"_Anderson_, commanding. " [156]

It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb of Santa Ana, and captured Spanish and Filipino officers and men. [157]

In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the following contentionof Aguinaldo, advanced in his "Reseña Verídica:--

"Our own forces could see the American forces land on the beach ofthe Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa Lucía. The Spanish soldiers, who were on the walls of the city, drew the attention of every onebecause they did not fire on the former, a mystery which was explainedat nightfall of that day, by the news of the capitulation of the placeby General Señor Jáudenes [158] to the American General, Mr. Merritt, a capitulation which the American Generals claimed for themselves, an infraction of what had been agreed upon with Admiral Dewey, inregard to the formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manilaby the two armies, American and Filipino, together and in combination. 

"This inexplicable line of conduct on the part of the American officerswas made clearer by the telegrams, which General Anderson addressedto me, from Maytubig on the said 13th day, requesting that I shouldorder our troops not to enter Manila, which request was refused, inasmuch as it was contrary to what was agreed upon, and to the highends of the Revolutionary Government, which, on taking upon itself theimmense work of besieging Manila, during the two months and a half, sacrificing thousands of lives and millions in material interests, could not surely have done so with any object other than that ofcapturing Manila and the Spanish garrison which with firmness andtenacity defended that place. " [159]

On August 14 Aguinaldo telegraphed General Anderson as follows:--

"My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have alwaysbeen promised that they could appear in it, as you know and cannotdeny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices madeof money, and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders tothe contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have givenproofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Parañaque, Pasay, Singálon and Maytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding andavoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe Buencamino and others, who will to-daygo out from our lines and hold a conference with you, and that theywill be safe during the conference. " [160]

Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for jointoccupation. On August 13 Admiral Dewey and General Merritt informedthe government that since the occupation of Manila and its suburbsthe Insurgents outside had been insisting on this, and asked how farthey might proceed in enforcing obedience in the matter. 

They were informed by a telegram dated August 17 that the Presidentof the United States had directed:--

"That there must be no joint occupation with the Insurgents. TheUnited States in the possession of Manila city, Manila bay and harbormust preserve the peace and protect persons and property within theterritory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgentsand all others must recognize the military occupation and authorityof the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed bythe President. Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary tothis end. " [161]

This left the military and naval commanders no option in the premises, and in any event dual occupation was out of the question because ofthe lawlessness of the Insurgent troops. 

At this very time they were looting the portions of the city whichthey occupied, and as is abundantly shown by their own records werenot confining their attacks to Spaniards, but were assaulting theirown people and raiding the property of foreigners as well. [162] Thecontinuation of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible. 

The Insurgents promptly demanded their share in the "war booty, "and asked certain other extraordinary concessions as follows:--

"(4) Our sacrifices in coöperating in the siege and taking of Manilabeing well known, it is just that we should share in the war booty. 

"(5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacañang and the Conventsof Malate, Ermita and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao. 

"(6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled by NorthAmericans and never by Spaniards; but if General Merritt should requiresome Filipinos we should be pleased if he will grant our President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour of recommending select and skilledFilipinos. The jurisdiction of the authorities of Manila shall notbe recognized beyond the municipal radius. 

"(7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate our militarypositions without permission of the respective commanders thereofand shall evacuate all the positions which they occupy at the presenttime beyond the municipal radius; Spaniards who pass our lines withoutpermission of the commander will be considered as spies. 

 * * * * *

"(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and petitions do notsignify on our part that we recognize the sovereignty of North Americain these islands, as they are made necessary by the present war. " [163]

Under the instructions of the President these demands could not beacceded to. Nor could they have been acceded to had there been nosuch instructions. In this connection the following extract fromGeneral Jáudenes's cablegram for June 8th to his home government ishighly significant:--

"Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from fearof outrages of insurgents, preferring to run risks of bombardment, which has not yet begun. " [164]

It would seem that the population of the suburbs did not have a highidea of Insurgent discipline. 

That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown by a passagein a letter sent the following day to Governor-General Augustinby Buencamino:--

"Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope of assistancefrom anywhere, and Señor Aguinaldo being disposed to make use ofthe fleet in order to bombard, if Your Excellency should prolongthe struggle with tenacity, I do not know, frankly, what else todo other than to succumb dying, but Your Excellency knows that theentrance of 100, 000 Indians, [165] inflamed with battle, drunk withtriumph and with blood, will produce the hecatomb from which therewill not be allowed to escape either women, children, or Peninsularfriars, --especially the friars; and, I believe that the rights ofhumanity, imperilled in such a serious way, should be well consideredby Your Excellency, for however dear glory and military duty may be, although worth as much or more than existence itself there is no rightby which they should be won at the cost of the rights of humanity, and the latter outweigh every consideration and all duty. " [166]

Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none better, what theyhad in mind at this time. 

As it was the Insurgent forces made the most of such opportunity asthey had, and their own records show it. 

In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and committed outrages, threatening people with their arms, and this was still going on aweek after the fall of Manila. [167]

General Pío del Pilar was believed to be responsible for much of thismisconduct, and Mabini proposed that as it was necessary for him toleave the vicinity of Manila, and they could not remove him by force, he be promoted. [168]

Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

"The Americans have already heard of the frequent cases of kidnapping(_dukut_) occurring in Tondo, San Sebastián and San Miguel. Last nightsome of ours were surprised in the act of kidnapping a person. I havealso heard that many persons are asking for contributions of war. Itell them [169] that you know nothing of all this and that if somepersons are kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for theSpanish spies and secret police, which is great. " [170]

Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the matter ofpreventing disorder, for on September 24, 1898, he wrote Aguinaldofrom Manila as follows:--

"By authority of General Don Pío del Pilar and accompanied by theWar Auditor, Señor Urbano, we entered a prison where the individualsMariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisóstomo were kept. They were almostprostrated. They had lately been released from Bilibid where theyhad been confined for political crimes. On being asked the reason fortheir imprisonment they began by showing us their bodies from whichblood still issued as the result of the barbarous treatment receivedfrom Major Carmona who, by the way, is the same person of whom Ispoke to you in one of my previous letters; I declared to you thenthat he had assaulted, revolver in hand, a man in the middle of oneof the most frequented streets of the suburb of Paco on pure suspicion. 

"The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the accusationsmade against them it was for fear of greater punishments promisedby said Major. The officer of the guard took the liberty of strikingwith his fist the one who dared to express himself so. 

"Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced to tell themthat brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation for a countrythat wished to be free and that they, the Americans, do not arrestany one without just cause. [171]

"I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter inquestion and other abuses in order that the measures you may thinkfit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are making a targetof ourselves in the sight of all nations, especially so in that ofthe Americans who note any act of ours and judge us secretly now inorder to do so later in public. To make light of this is to planta seed of future injury to us, because many will desire to placethemselves under the protection of the American flag, seeing thatours refuses to defend the citizens' individual rights. 

"I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested together withhis accomplices in the matter so that it may serve as a lesson notonly for him but also for those who think like him. " [172]

Obviously Sandico's protest of September 24 did not produce thedesired result, for on September 28 he wrote Aguinaldo a long lettercomplaining that in Manila personal security did not exist, peoplewere being tortured and murdered, kidnapping and theft were veryfrequent, and these abuses were being committed by Filipino officersand men. Some of the things which had come to his knowledge were ofsuch a nature that he preferred to speak to Aguinaldo privately aboutthem. [173]

Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, theft--theseare not pleasant things, but they continued to occur, and Aguinaldo, who apparently desired to prevent them, was powerless to do so. Hedid not dare discipline General Pío del Pilar, nor remove him fromthe vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer continuedto work their will on their own unfortunate and helpless people. 

Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly Insurgentforces to leave Manila. The American commander showed great forbearanceand negotiations continued. 

On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission (Buencamino and GregorioAraneta) telegraphed Aguinaldo that a clause in a proposed agreementrequiring prior permission of Insurgent officers before Americantroops could pass or approach their lines had greatly displeasedGeneral Anderson who declined to treat until after the withdrawal ofNoriel's troops from Manila. [174]

Aguinaldo's reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that he hadalreadymade up his mind to fight the Americans, for it contains thefollowing significant words: "The conflict is coming sooner or laterand we shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are reallyour rights. " [175]

While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent Major J. F. Bellto Aguinaldo with a letter and also with a memorandum in which werethe words:--

"In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangementswith us, you may communicate to him as follows: ... "

There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of specialimportance. It reads as follows:--

"(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally theGovernment at Washington, which I know is inclined to deal fairly withhim and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Governmentwill be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in theevent of the United States withdrawing from these islands care willbe taken to leave him _in as good condition as he was found by theforces of the Government_. [176]

Relative to the italicized portion of this statement Major Bell says:--

"I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. Meantto convey by the underscored portion of this remark, but I repliedthat I had repeated the language General M. Had used to me, and Ipreferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lestI might unwittingly fall into error if I undertook to explain hismeaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness tocomment upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions andsuspicions. They have been trying ever since to obtain in writingsome definite promise on this subject. " [177]

Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water works be started upat once, a thing which was very necessary as Manila was suffering fromlack of water. I should be glad if I could leave this matter here, but I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further statement:--

"Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise made known toAguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the UnitedStates withdrawing from these islands, care would be taken to leaveAguinaldo in as good condition as he was found by the forces ofthe Government. From a remark the General made to me I inferred heintended to interpret the expression 'forces of the Government' tomean the naval forces, should future contingencies necessitate suchan interpretation. " [178]

Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General Merritt'sintention. If this is not the case, I must say in all frankness thatin my opinion it was General Merritt's intention to indulge in sharppractice. 

Obviously, the American naval forces did not find Aguinaldo in any"condition, " in the sense in which General Merritt uses the term. Onthe contrary, they brought him from Hongkong and assisted him instarting a revolution. The negotiations in question were relativeto the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the negotiationstook place, and General Merritt's promise could not legitimately beinterpreted to refer to anything else. 

Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing situation wouldhave resulted. General Merritt was obviously not authorized to makesuch a proposition in the first instance, and the only honourablecourse left open to him would have been to advise Washington of hisimproper action and beg the Government to support him in it and thussave the honour of the country. 

Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise nor accept theoffer. On the contrary, he promptly and indignantly denied that hewas committed to anything, and sought to impose new conditions whichwere not acceded to. 

Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General Merritt and calledhis attention to the fact that in making this offer he had grosslyexceeded his authority, for in his reply to Aguinaldo's protestGeneral Merritt says:--

"So far as any promises as to what should be done in the eventof a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spainare concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the militaryrepresentative only of the United States to make any promises such asyou request. As you have already been informed, you may depend uponthe good will of the Americans out here and the Government, of whichyou already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in thefuture. " [179]

Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in the memorandumhereinbefore referred to, it must have aroused the suspicions ofAguinaldo and his associates, and in my opinion Merritt's conduct inmaking such a proposal in the first instance was inexcusable. 

Before he could terminate the negotiations which followed he was calledaway, and turned this matter, together with other unfinished business, over to his successor, General E. S. Otis. 

On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Aguinaldo asfollows:--

"_General Aguinaldo, Bacoor_:

"Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to yourletter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that he wasunexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Beingunacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myselfbefore answering, which I will do at the earliest opportunity. 

"_Otis_. "

On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long letter fullydiscussing the whole situation in the light of the complete informationwhich he had meanwhile obtained. Since so much has been made of thisincident by Blount and others, I invite attention to the followingextracts from General Otis's letter, which embody a fair and judicialstatement of the conditions which existed:--

"You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila, to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditionsprecedent: First, protection to your shipping by the United StatesNavy, and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters inUnited States occupation; second, restitution to your forces of allpositions which are now occupied by your troops, in the event thattreaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrenderto the last-named government the territory occupied by the former;and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyondthe lines you name shall retire within the same. 

"A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the UnitedStates Government, the city of Manila, involves consideration of someof the other concessions you desire to be made, and to that I willat once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although, from remarks contained in formercorrespondence, I am of the opinion that you are fully aware howuntenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and arebelligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilizedworld. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then infull possession of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-namedbelligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave theUnited States Government full occupancy of the city and defences ofManila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety ofthe lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best ofits ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedentsthe United States authority over Manila and its defences is full andsupreme, and it cannot escape the obligations which it has assumed. 

 * * * * *

"But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government tohold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and its suburbs(I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondenceand from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), youbase your proposition--a joint occupation--upon supposed equitablegrounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and theassistance they have rendered the American forces in the captureof Manila. It is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgottenthat my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of bothhemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the secure holding ofthe Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its navy has heldthe city of Manila at its mercy, but out of consideration of humanityrefused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is itforgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retentionof Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to youthe ports of the Island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet itsrefractory subjects?

 * * * * *

"Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and thosehaving their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, Iwish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability ofmaintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in thisI know that I shall have the approval of your excellent judgment. Itwould be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respectiveforces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as wemay for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or impertinentaction, might be the means of inciting grave disturbances; and inthis connection I call to your attention the recent shooting affairat Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also ariseconflict of authority between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops, I findthat permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc. , in violation of our instructionsand authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have takenplace. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far aswe can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspectedparties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I knownot) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declinedto accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forceshave issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference withour administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict. 

"... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you haveadvocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city'ssuburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share inthe booty resulting from the conquest of the city, on account ofhardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which youbase your conclusion granted, your conclusion, under the rules ofwar which are binding on my Government, does not follow, for it hasnever recognized the existence of spoils of war, denominated 'booty, 'as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, anyof its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate anyof it for their individual benefit, they would be very severelypunished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred bylaw very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (allthat is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairsin the enemy's territory) must be preserved for final arbitramentor settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nationsconcerned. My troops cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefitby reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individualadvantages which occupation bestows. 

"I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessionsyou ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of yourforces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo. 

"The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation toyour vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of freenavigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not meanprotection on the high seas, or in the ports not in the rightfulpossession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, couldonly be effected by treaty, or guarantee, following internationalrecognition of the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionarygovernment. While the existing armistice continues, the UnitedStates are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable watersof the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the bay of Manilaand its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of tradeand commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sailfreely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailednor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whateverconcessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be extendedto all alike, and discrimination in this regard is neither intendednor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervision over all navalmatters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferredupon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent forgreater latitude of action, for even if disposed to grant specialconcessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authorityof my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same timepreserve its international obligations. 

"The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in thecity of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty of peace remands toSpain the territory surrendered under the late capitulatory articles;and the third and last is a promise to retire our troops within thelines indicated by you, as the lines on which you desire your troopsto remain permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedlyanswered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusionsmade and stated in this communication, concerning the nature of theobligations resting on the United States with regard to the territoryto which they have the legal right of possession under contractingarticles with Spain, it is evident that neither in law or moralscan the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them inany aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carryout the instructions of the executive head of my Government and notbeing vested with discretionary power to determine matters of suchmoment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede toyour request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindfulof its international promises and national honour, which it has neverbroken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of the city andsuburbs of Manila and am directed specially to preserve the peace andprotect persons and property within the territory surrendered underthe terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates must be obeyed. 

"Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity, holding nothingin reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I represent. I have not beeninstructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue inregard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to giveyou any information on the subject. That it will have a care and laborconscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. Itremains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a courseof action which will manifest your good intentions and show to theworld the principles which actuate your proceedings. 

 * * * * *

"It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelledby my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuate theentire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defences, and thatI shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a veryshort space of time should you decline to comply with my Government'sdemands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops arewithdrawn beyond the line of the city's defences before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunateconsequences which may ensue. 

 * * * * *

"In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freelywith Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication and amdelegated by him to state that he fully approves of the same in allrespects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act asherein indicated, and that between our respective forces there willbe unanimity and complete concert of action. "

This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled withthe firm statement of intention with which it closed, produced adecided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the events to which it led, General Otis has made this statement:--

"On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consistingof three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another theattorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purposeof discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me towithdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troopsretire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refusedto do, stating that unless they withdrew as directed we would beobliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw theletter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troopsupon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instantwould stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter mustremain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldoto withdraw to the lines which I designated--something which hecould show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simplyacting upon a request from these headquarters--he would probably beable to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which wouldbe obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note ofrequest, whereupon I furnished them with the following:--

"'_Office U. S. Military Governor in the_

"'_Philippine Islands_, "'_Manila_, P. I. , September 13, 1898. 

"'_The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces_:

"'_Sir_: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have thehonour to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversationwith certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your revolutionarygovernment upon the matters therein contained. We have discussedat length the complications now existing, which will exist, and willdoubtless increase, while our troops continue to occupy jointly certaindistricts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessityof the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relationswhich have always been maintained by and between them and the forcesof the United States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure thatthe gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly reportthem to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report ofour conversation?

"'It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicablerelations be continued; that they be not jeopardized if we can byconsistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, is the desire ofyourself and associates. 

"'May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from Manila?

"'Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in yourability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request. 

"'I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant, (Signed) "'_E. S. Otis_, "'Major-General, U. S. V. , "'United States Military Governor in the Philippines. '

"In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:--

"'_Malolos, Bulacan_, September 16, 1898. 

"'_The Commanding General of the American Forces_:

"'_My Dear Sir_: Referring to your esteemed communication, datedthe 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have givenappropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advancedpositions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire topoints where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order toavoid all occasion for conflict. 

"'I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of myconstant desire to preserve amicable relations with the Americanforces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidenceplaced in my government by the Philippine people. 

"'A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me fornot having answered with the promptness desired. 

"'Your very respectful servant, (Signed) "'_Emilio Aguinaldo_. '

"On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrewfrom the city and all of its suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district. This certain agentsof Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to be permitted to retainfor a short time, on the plea that the general officer in command[180] would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove hismen gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him for hisdisobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly, as the insurgentsmarched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops. " [181]

I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that this is the oneinstance I have found in which a promise was made, fortunately in theform of an offer which was not accepted, and then withdrawn. It hasseemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt should never havemade it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it, should be fully set forth. 

On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington thatAdmiral Dewey and he considered conditions critical, and thatthe number of armed Insurgents in the city was large and rapidlyincreasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notificationto Aguinaldo that unless the latter's troops were withdrawn beyondthe line of the suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would beobliged to resort to forcible action and that the United States wouldhold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate consequences whichmight ensue. 

Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by theUnited States, but did not consider such recognition probable, andpushed preparations to attack if a favorable opportunity should offer. 

Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us brieflyreview the results of our investigations as to Insurgent coöperationwith the American forces up to this time. 

Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:--

"Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory warfare with theSpanish troops in Manila. That none of his attacks were very seriousis shown from the Spanish reports of casualties; but although he hadfailed to secure the surrender of the city to himself, he had keptits garrison occupied and within their works. The American force onland was now strong enough to begin offensive operations. So far therelations between the Americans and Aguinaldo had not been reallyfriendly. They were in his way, and yet he could not break with them, for he hoped to use them for the attainment of the designs whichhe had by this time frankly declared. The Americans had listened tothese declarations, and had not answered them, nor was it possible toanswer them. The American forces were there under the instructionsof the President to make war on Spain and to establish a militarygovernment in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared himself adictator and the Philippines independent. To have recognized him inhis civil capacity, to have dealt with him in his civil capacity, would have meant a recognition of his government by the militarycommander in the field--a thing impossible and unlawful. Officers ofthe United States forces are not empowered to recognize governments;that function is reserved to the President of the United States;and in this case he, in his orders to the Secretary of War, datedMay 19, copies of which were forwarded to General Merritt for hisguidance, informed him that the army of occupation was sent to thePhilippines 'for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction ofthe Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and securityto the islands while in the possession of the United States. ' Theseinstructions contemplated the establishment of a military governmentin the archipelago by military officials of the United States. 

 * * * * *

"it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions GeneralMerritt in San Francisco had received no copy of them on August 28, three days after the departure of General Anderson, and what thatofficer knew of them could only have been what General Merrittremembered of the contents of an unsigned copy of them shown himat the White House, but they were in accordance with the practiceof the United States Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice General Anderson well knew, and his relations withAguinaldo were guided by it. 

 * * * * *

"It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received theimpression at this time from their conversation with American officersthat the United States would undoubtedly recognize the independence ofthe Philippines, and that the cooperation of the insurgents was due tothis impression. There was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain tosecure the surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation. That herefrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally permitted themto be furnished supplies, for which they paid, was not cooperation. Thefact that for a time their plans and his plans were parallel doesnot mean cooperation. Aguinaldo was forced by the exigencies ofthe situation, by the necessity of strengthening his hold upon thepeople, by the necessities of his operations against the Spaniards, to make Spaniards and natives alike believe that all that he did waswith the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported in allhis acts. He needed their support, and if he could not obtain thathe needed the appearance of their support for the attainment of hisends; and this he was forced to purchase by compliance, or apparentcompliance, with their demands. But his compliance with them, asall American officers serving there well knew, was never willing, was never complete, and was never given except under pressure. Itis true that writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidencewhich is born of insufficient and incomplete information, assuretheir readers that any government but that of the United States, anycolonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to obtainthe hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by judiciousconcessions to them at this time. The only concession which would haveobtained that hearty cooperation would have been the recognition ofthe independence of the Philippines under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with the plenitude of the powers of the Katipúnanas dictator, and a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. Thispromise the Government of the United States could not make. Until theratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insurgents of thePhilippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had. 

 * * * * *

"No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered byAguinaldo at this or any other time to any American commander, andno American commander ever rendered such returns to him. At the timeof General Merritt's arrival, and until Manila was occupied by theAmericans, the insurgents and United States troops were united solelyby the fact that they had Manila as a common objective. Conditionswere such that the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had toavoid doing anything which might cause the insurgents to attack themand perhaps make terms with Spain; while Aguinaldo and his followers, in order to accomplish the surrender of Manila to themselves, hadto maintain such relations with the Americans as would induce theSpaniards to believe that their fleet was at his disposal, [182]and also such apparent harmony and cooperation with them in theexecution of their plans that the recalcitrant among the Filipinoswould be forced to believe that the Americans would in all ways usetheir forces to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires. 

"General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately taking suchsteps as would lead to his occupation of Manila. With the arrival ofthe third expedition he was able to pass through the insurgent linesbetween Camp Dewey and Manila, for he had sufficient force to acceptno refusal from Aguinaldo. 

"In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained positionsof investment opposite the Spanish lines along their full extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran within 800 yards of SanAntonio Abad. The approaches to the beach and village of Pasay werein their possession. 

"'This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line ofquasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanishposition, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult todeal with owing to the peculiar conditions of our relations with theinsurgents.... As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrivalnor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as myinstructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation ofthe islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers ofthe military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operateupon the political condition of the inhabitants, " I did not consider itwise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader untilI should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I wouldnot until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforcemy authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with mydesigns. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the citywere pressed and the military operations conducted without referenceto the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this coursewas subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troopsat my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from thesea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under noobligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack, to turn to theright and clear the front still held by the insurgents, but were ableto move forward at once and occupy the city and the suburbs. '" [183]

All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was anenemy. They each fought that enemy in their own way. There was nocoöperation. On the part of the Insurgents there was treachery. Iwill submit further evidence of this fact. 

CHAPTER IV

The Premeditated Insurgent Attack

It will be remembered that the minutes of the session of the HongKong junta at which Aguinaldo reported the result of his negotiationswith Pratt and received his instructions relative to the trip toManila, recorded the fact that there would be no better occasion forthe expeditionary forces "to arm themselves at the expense of theAmericans, " and that provided with arms the Filipino people wouldbe able to oppose themselves to the United States and combat theirdemands if they attempted to colonize the country. [184]

The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attacking theUnited States troops was, it is evident, clearly foreseen from thebeginning. Active preparations for doing this now soon began. 

Although Insurgent officers in full uniform freely visited Manila atall times, Aguinaldo wrote on October 1 to his commander in LagunaProvince that he must not permit Americans there without passes. Hewas to get rid of them civilly, but he was to keep them out and informall authorities there of his instructions. 

On August 24 an American soldier was killed and others were wounded inCavite by Insurgent troops who fired from behind. An Insurgent officerin Cavite at the time reported on his record of services that he--

"took part in the movement against the Americans on the afternoon ofthe 24th of August, under the orders of the commander of the troopsand the adjutant of the post. "

This shows that the movement was ordered, but the Insurgents promptlyrealized that it was ill advised. 

On August 28 General Llanera was reported to be preparing foroperations against the Americans. He was ordered to suspend hispreparations. The same day General P. Mercado Rizal, commanding inLaguna Province, wrote Mabini asking whether they were to considerthe Americans as their allies or their enemies. He wanted to knowwhether the war was to stop or continue becoming more furious. Thisnot because he desired to ask questions about the secrets of thegovernment, but because he wished to prepare the minds of the peoplefor the future. Mabini's answer has not been found. 

We have already noted that on August 8 Fernando Acevedo wrote GeneralPío del Pilar recommending that he attack and annihilate the Americantroops; that on August 10 Pilar wrote Aguinaldo suggesting thatthe Americans be attacked, and that on August 17 Aguinaldo stated""The conflict is coming sooner or later. " [185]

At this time Sandico entered the service of the Americans as aninterpreter and acted as a spy, endeavouring to keep his people fullyinformed relative to the plans and acts of his employers. Incidentallyhe endeavoured to convince the latter that the barbarities reallycommitted by Insurgent officers and troops in Manila were perpetratedby enemies of the Insurgent cause who wished to discredit it. 

In a letter dated September 21, 1898, Apacible says that the conflictwill come sooner or later and asks Aguinaldo if it would not bebetter for them to provoke it before the Americans concentrate theirtroops. [186]

On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo that on theprevious night the Americans had attempted to push back his lineat San Lazaro, and that morning had concentrated and penetrated theInsurgent territory, making a reconnaissance through the fields aboutSampaloc. Aguinaldo put an endorsement on this communication sayingthat he had long since ordered that the Insurgent line should notbe passed. He instructed Garcia to throw troops in front of theAmericans at Sampaloc, and order them to leave, and to warn thebolo men. Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgentattack. [187]

An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo's handwriting dated Malolos, September 13 (?), 1898, [188] shows how tense was the situationwhile the question of withdrawal of the Insurgent forces from thecity of Manila was under consideration. It contains instructionsfor General Pío del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General Noriel orColonel Cailles. Their purpose is hardly open to doubt. 

General Pío del Pilar was directed:--

"To have a detachment posted in the interval from the branch of theriver of Paco in a northerly direction to the bridge and so on upto the Pasig river in the direction of Pandacan, the river servingas a line until the suburb of Panque is reached which will be underour jurisdiction. Proceed to execute this order on its receipt, posting detachments where they are necessary and trenches will bemade without loss of time working day and night. Do not rest for bydoing so we may lose the opportunity; beg of the troops to assistin the formation of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect, weespecially expect something Wednesday and Thursday, the 15th and16th of this month. The danger is imminent on the mentioned days, also in the time that follows. 

"Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive orders toleave that place, do not do so on any account without my orders, happen what may.... 

"Concentrate all your forces in Santa Ana before the day arrives. 

"Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Spaniards did, if possible have them calculate the number of their antagonists andhow much ammunition there is in comparison with the number of theattacking force, in fact, there are occasions when each shot firedkills as many as four men. 

"I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions and thatyou will maintain the honour of the Philippines by your courage andin no way permit your rights to be trampled underfoot. " [189]

General Garcia was instructed as follows:--

"On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post detachments inthe points indicated by lines on the enclosed plan. On receipt of thisand as soon as you learn its contents, proceed secretly to determinethe most suitable places to post detachments and immediately postour troops and have intrenchments made employing day and night inthis work. Beg this of our soldiers. " [190]

The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows:--

"At eight o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th, withdraw yourcommand from the town of Malate as indicated on the enclosed plan, from the bridge in Singalong and in a straight line from there tothe branch of the river in Paco will be the line of our jurisdictioneven though we may not be of one mind in the matter. On receiptof this proceed to determine the most suitable places to post ourtroops even if they are not supplied with batteries; on posting thedetachments give instructions to have intrenchments made immediatelywithout resting, especially on the days of the 15th and 16th. Sinceaffairs have a serious aspect, do not lose vigilance and be on thealert at all times.... 

"Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite so thatall the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night. 

"In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave yourposts, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be prepared leavingthem to give the provocation. Answer them that you have no instructionsgiven you with regard to what they ask. " [191]

Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung by a very slenderthread. On September 14 the governor of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldoas follows:--

"Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of theultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for actionto-morrow. I await a reply. " [192]

But war was not to begin at this time. On September 23 Bray wroteto Aguinaldo advising him to maintain a defensive attitude untilthe result of the negotiations at Paris should become known, givingway to the Americans and not showing his teeth. He could take theoffensive later if advisable and should have little difficulty insettling accounts with the American soldiers. [193]

Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between the American andthe Spanish soldiers if a conflict should arise before the departureof the latter. [194]

Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. During September, Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting the urgent necessity of reorganizingthe "masons" and the Katipúnan, [195] and that all be furnished withknives, to be kept hidden so that they might be "ready for any event. "

In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in hand, feelingamong them ran high, and they wanted to fight. [196] On November 30, 1898, General Mascardo telegraphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldoasking if he might begin firing in order to prevent the Americantroops from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in theaffirmative. [197]

On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that according to a despatchfrom Batangas, American divers were working unceasingly and that asubordinate had ordered that they be fired on if they attempted toland. Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at sea, butthat they must not be allowed to land under any circumstances. [198]

On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with the Americantroops has been adjusted without prejudice. Our preparations oughtto continue. Awaiting orders. " [199]

San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 4, 1899. 

On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of our positionat Singalong. I do not know what they wish; if they enter Pineda Iopen fire. " [200]

By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds that theAmericans, who had been bearing their insults in silence, werecowards. Aguinaldo's indorsement on this telegram reads:--

"Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are few againstmy Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you have more thanthat number. E. A. , Dec. 12, 1898. " [201]

Relative to the insults which were at this time showered uponAmericans, Taylor has made the following statement: [202]--

"Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates in theeight months during which the United States had prevented Spain fromrelieving her beleaguered garrisons in the Philippines, and she mightstill be kind. The men about Aguinaldo who had risen farthest andfastest could not endure the thought of having to accept subordinatepositions in a government not directed by themselves. The halberdiersat the door of the palace of the president saluted them as thehalberdiers at the doorway of his lordship the governor-general inManila had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the comingof the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the streets of Malolos, clashing their swords behind them, and they knew that if they won, the Philippines would be divided into fiefs which they, as dukes andmarquises, would hold in feudal tenure from a Malay potentate. Theywere confident. They held Luzón. They held the people. They had nointention of returning to office stools or to the life of outlaws andhunted men. The United States force in Manila was small and Americawas far. It was true that they might have to fight for the prizewhich they had seized, but the military leaders about Aguinaldo wereconfident of winning in case they fought. They believed the Americanswere afraid of them and would be easily beaten. American soldiers hadbeen seized and had been insulted by the followers of Aguinaldo andno resort had been made to force. The Americans had been ordered toavoid bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It is also probablethat many of the insults to which they had been subjected were notappreciated by them. A tall soldier from western America paid noattention to the insults hurled at him in a language which he did notunderstand. And yet the small excited Filipinos might retire feelingthat the American had tamely submitted to insult worse than a blow. "

By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in position in thevicinity of Manila all of the field guns in his possession. 

The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It provided for thetermination of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. This was whatthe Insurgents had been waiting for, and thereafter things movedrapidly. It is obvious that an attack was definitely planned forat this time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey telegraphedAguinaldo that the second chief of the second zone of Manila haddirected him to assist by entering that city as soon as they openedfire against the American troops. [203]

On the following day Cailles reported that he had occupied blockhouseNo. 12, which was within the American lines, and added the followingsignificant statement:--

"The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots from SantaAna, for my whole force to hurl themselves on the American line oftrenches, and to follow the living to Manila. The dead can lie withthe dead. Yesterday we were content waiting for the arming of theSan Quintin. " [204]

San Quintin's Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian vespers, themassacre of the French in Sicily in 1268. Obviously the Insurgentswere planning something similar for Manila. 

For some reason the attack was not made as planned, but there wasno intention of abandoning it. Within fifteen days of January 1 some40, 000 Filipinos left Manila. Why? On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote toSeñor Benito Legarda at Manila, saying:--

"I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you--I merely wish to warn you foryour satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week. " [205]

Many details of the plan of attack have come into ourpossession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Burgos wrote Aguinaldo during Januaryrelative to a plan for an uprising of the prisoners in Bilibid Prison, saying that it should by all means come "before the movement is begunanywhere else, " and calling attention to the necessity of stationingmen to prevent the American soldiers near by in the Zorilla theatrefrom coming to the rescue. On the back of this letter there is asketch plan showing where bolo men were to be stationed, ready toattack these soldiers. [206]

In his message to Congress dated January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo said:--

"I consider arguments unnecessary in support of the proposedamendments, every one knows that our newborn Republic now has tofight for its existence against giants in ambition and in power. " [207]

An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on January 4, 1899, containsthe following statement:--

"It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminentand inevitable. Several of their vessels with thousands ofsoldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo onDecember 20th last to take that port together with the wholeof Visayas and Mindanao. " [208]

On January 4 the following significant telegram was sent out:--

"Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to ProvincialPresidents, wherever there may be Telegraphic Service, to becommunicated to the Local Chiefs of each Town. 

"_Malolos_, January 4, 1899, 9. 35 A. M. 

"To the Provincial President of the Province of Pangasinán:

"Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose theAmerican invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare their bolosand daggers; also that in each street and barrio national militiais organized, each six of whom should be commanded by a corporal, each thirteen by a sergeant, each twenty-six by a second lieutenant, each fifty-two by a first lieutenant, and each one hundred and fourby a captain, directing that the soldiers of the national militiaelect their own officers, informing all that upon our attitude dependsour salvation. 

_Lingayen_, January 4, 1899. "

There is a note thereon which reads:--

"Communicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the commandinggeneral. "

(Signed by initials which are illegible, but evidently those of theProvincial President. ) [209]

On January 5, 1899, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation which containsthe following statement:--

"The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace andfriendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is, that with risingambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with thepurpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of thatportion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my govermnent. 

 * * * * *

"My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent andaggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which hasarrogated to itself the title, 'champion of oppressed nations. ' Thusit is that my government is ready to open hostilities if the Americantroops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands. Iannounce these rights before the world, in order that the conscienceof mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are thetrue oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind. 

"Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed. " [210]

Three days later this proclamation, which was rather dangerously likea declaration of war, was reissued with a significant change in thelast one of the passages quoted, the words "attempt to take forciblepossession of any part of the territory submitted to its jurisdiction"being substituted for the words "attempt to take forcible possessionof the Visayan Islands. "

On January 8, 1899, at 9. 40 P. M. , Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldoas follows:--

"_Note_. --In consequence of the orders of General Rios to his officers, as soon as the Filipino attack begins the Americans should be driveninto the Intramuros district and the Walled city should be set onfire. " [211]

Preparations for the attack, which was to begin inside the cityof Manila, were now rapidly pushed to conclusion. I quote Taylor'sexcellent summary of them:--

"After Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 5 the number oforganizations charged with an attack within the city increased rapidlyand it is possible that those which had been formed during Spanish rulehad never been disbanded. Sandico's clubs for athletic exercises andmutual improvement formed a nucleus for these bodies and the directingboards of the popular committees took up the work of recruiting, whilesome of the members became officers of the militia or sandatahan. OnJanuary 6 the commander of militia in Trozo, Manila, reported that1130 soldiers had been enrolled by the popular committee. On January7 Bonifacio Arévalo forwarded to the head of the central committee alist of the officers of the battalion which had just been organizedin Sampaloc for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about thesame time J. Limjap submitted to Sandico a project for arming theprisoners in Bilibid Prison with the arms of the American soldiersquartered in the Zorrilla Theatre across the street. He said:--

"'Jacinto Limjap having been proclaimed commander of the volunteersof the penitentiary, I ask you to authorize the creation of adisciplinary battalion and the provisional appointments of officersfor 600 sandatahan, or militia, ready to provide themselves by forcewith the American rifles in the Zorrilla Theatre. '

"He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It was notdifficult for him to obtain volunteers there to rob, to burn, torape and to murder. These were the crimes for which they were servingsentences. The political prisoners had been released.... 

"On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first battalionorganized by the committees of Sampaloc; on January 27 he approvedthose of the second battalion. By January 22 two battalions hadbeen organized in Quiapo. At least one regiment of eight companieswas raised in Binondo, for on January 23 its commander forwarded aroll of the officers to Aguinaldo for his approval.... On January 25T. Sandico, at Malolos, submitted for approval the names of a number ofofficers of the territorial militia in the city of Manila. On January30, 1899, a roll of four companies just organized in Malate wasforwarded approved by T. Sandico, and on the same day the committeeof Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for permission to recruit abody for the defence of the country. The regiment of 'Armas Blancas'had already been raised in Tondo and Binondo. It was in existencethere in December, 1898, and may have been originally organized to actagainst Spain. On February 2 all officers of the territorial militiain Manila reported at Caloocan, in accordance with orders of Sandico, for the purpose of receiving their commissions and taking the oath tothe flag. A man who took part in this ceremony wrote that a multitudeof men were present in uniform, and that the oath was administeredby Gen. Pantaleón García. There is no reason for believing that thisis a complete statement of sandatahan organized in Manila by the endof January, and yet this statement gives a force of at least 6330men. General Otis said that this force had been reported to him asbeing 10, 000 men. It is probably true that only a small number ofthem had rifles; but armed with long knives and daggers they couldhave inflicted much damage in a sudden night attack in the narrowand badly lighted streets of Manila. On January 9, 1899, Aguinaldowrote his instructions for the sandatahan of Manila. Members of thisbody were to enter the houses of the American officers on the pretextof bringing them presents. Once in they were to kill. The sentinelsat the gates of the barracks were to be approached by men dressed aswomen and killed. The gates of the barracks held and as many officersas possible treacherously murdered, the sandatahan were to risethroughout the city, and by attacking in the rear the United Statestroops on the outer line were to aid in opening a way for Aguinaldo'sforce. To further increase the confusion and perhaps to punish thenatives who had not joined them, the sandatahan were to fire the city. 

 * * * * *

"It is a fair deduction from Luna's orders for an uprising in Manila, from Aguinaldo's instructions for the sandatahan, from other documentsamong the papers of the insurgents and from what was done in Manilaon February 22 that Aguinaldo and his advisers about the middle ofJanuary, 1899, drew up a plan of attack upon Manila which would, ifcarried out, have inflicted a severe blow upon the Americans. It wasnot carried out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna. 

"It is true that the instructions were general; but that particularinstructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for the murder of GeneralOtis is shown by his note on the back of a document presented tohim. [212]

"... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo and the menabout him in beginning a war by the murder of the commanding generalon the other side. 

 * * * * *

"... Aguinaldo and all his followers have declared that on February4 the Americans attacked the unsuspecting Filipinos who were usingtheir utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet here in Aguinaldo'sown handwriting is the record of the fact that on January 10, 1899, he ordered the murder of the American commander. 

"The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon and in Manilawas not to be a mere raid such as the bandits of Cavite were in thehabit of making upon the defenceless towns. The plan was a piece ofcalculated savagery in which murder and outrage were considered meansto accomplish a purpose. The servants were to kill their employers;organized bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in thecity of Manila under the government of the Americans, in many casesemployed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the barracksof the American soldiers and massacre the inmates; all Americans inthe streets were to be killed, the city was to be fired and its lootwas to be the reward of loyalty to Aguinaldo. If this plan had beencarried out no white man and no white woman would have escaped. Thereinforcements from the United States would have arrived to findonly the smoking ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned GeneralAugustín what the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde ofIndians drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately plannedfor the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capital not as it hadbeen occupied by the Americans. He planned to take it as Count Tillytook Magdeburg. 

"The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini, Sandico, and Luna, Asiatics educated in European schools, were men of trained and subtleminds. With them cruelty and assassination was not a matter of savageimpulse but of deliberate calculation; with them assassination wasemployed as an effective addition to political propaganda, and murderas an ultimate resource in political manoeuvres. " [213]

Some portions of Aguinaldo's instructions to the _sandatahan_ areparticularly worthy of perpetuation, as they illustrate his ideasas to the conduct which should be observed by cultured, patriotic, honourable and very humane men, who were not cruel:--

"_Art_. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracksshould send in first four men with a good present for the Americancommander. Immediately after will follow four others who will make apretence of looking for the same officer for some reason and a largergroup shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aidthe other groups at the first signal. This wherever it is possibleat the moment of attack. 

"_Art_. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the Americansin a threatening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracksby the sandatahan should be a complete surprise and with decisionand courage. One should go alone in advance in order to kill thesentinel. In order to deceive the sentinel one of them should dressas a woman and must take great care that the sentinel is not ableto discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those in thebarracks. This will enable his companions who are approaching toassist in the general attack. 

"_Art_. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan should notattempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who can injure them, they may takethe rifles in one hand and the ammunition in the other. 

"_Art_. 6. The officers shall take care that on the tops of thehouses along the streets where the American forces shall pass therewill be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil ready to be lightedand thrown down, and any other hard and heavy objects that theycan throw on the passing American troops. At the same time in thelower parts of the houses will be concealed the sandatahan, who willattack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw glass inthe streets, as the greater part of our soldiers go barefooted. Onthese houses there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition tothe objects to be thrown down, a number of the sandatahan, in orderto cover a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy's column, so that we may be sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces. 

"_Art_. 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should liveon the alert to assist simultaneously the inside attack at the verymoment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceedwithout delay to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with theirbrothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decidedagainst the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and Icharge and order that the persons and goods of all foreigners shallbe respected and that the American prisoners shall be treated well. 

 * * * * *

"_Art_. 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph 6, thereshall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling water, tallow, molasses and other liquids, which shall be thrown as bombs on theAmericans who pass in front of their houses, or they can make use ofsyringes or tubes of bamboo. In these houses shall be the sandatahanwho shall hurl the liquids that shall be passed to them by the womenand children. 

"_Art_. 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess thesame, the sandatahan can provide themselves with lances and arrowswith long sharp heads, and these should be shot with great forcein order that they may penetrate well into the bodies of the enemy, and these should be so made that in withdrawal from the body the headwill remain in the flesh. 

 * * * * *

"_Art_. 12.... Neither will you forget your sacred oath and immaculatebanner; nor will you forget the promises made by me to the civilizednations, whom I have assured that we Filipinos are not savages, northieves, nor assassins, nor are we cruel, but on the contrary, that weare men of culture and patriotism, honourable and very humane. " [214]

Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates. [215]

The Filipinos were now ready to assume the offensive, but desired, ifpossible, to provoke the Americans into firing the first shot. Theymade no secret of their desire for conflict, but increased theirhostile demonstrations and pushed their lines forward into forbiddenterritory. Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extractfrom a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on January 10, 1899:--

"Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell me to withdrawour forces in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall not draw back a step, andin place of withdrawing, I shall advance a little farther. He bringsa letter from his general, in which he speaks to me as a friend. Isaid that from the day I knew that Maquinley (McKinley) opposed ourindependence I did not want any dealings with any American. War, war, is what we want. The Americans after this speech went off pale. " [216]

Aguinaldo approved the hostile attitude of Cailles, for there is areply in his handwriting which reads:--

"I approve and applaud what you have done with the Americans, and zeal and valour always, also my beloved officers and soldiersthere. I believe that they are playing us until the arrival of theirreinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum and remain always onthe alert. --E. A. Jan. 10, 1899. " [217]

On this same day Aguinaldo commissioned Feliciano Cruz and SeverinoQuitiongco to assassinate General Otis. [218]

On January 13 Noriel and Cailles telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention in yourtelegram, and we also wish to know what reward our Government isarranging for the forces that will be able first to enter Manila. "

This telegram is endorsed in Aguinaldo's handwriting:

"As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the heroeswill have as their rewards a large quantity of money, extraordinaryrewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bató, Marquis of Malate, Ermita, Count of Manila, etc. , besides the congratulations of ouridolizing country on account of their being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regiments with their generals, and, if possible, the chief of them all who represents our future enemies in Manila, which (lot?) falls to you, or, better said, to General Noriel andColonel Cailles. 

"The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a few days. 

(Signed) "E. A. 

"_Malolos_, Jan. 14, 1899. " [219]

On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted: "Death to theAmericans, " and held a review to celebrate the rupture of friendlyrelations with the United States. [220]

At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious attack uponManila and telegraphed it to some of his officers. General Garcíareplied from Caloocan on January 17 that the dream would come trueas soon as the conflict with the Americans began. [221]

In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite ready, and orderedthat the Filipino soldiers in the walled city keep on good terms withthe Americans, in order to deceive them, "since the hoped-for momenthas not yet arrived. " [222]

The Insurgents grew surer and surer that the Americans were cowards, [223] and openly boasted that when the attack began they would drivethem into the sea. 

On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey that:--

"The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines andhave been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that veryshortly they will give us battle. My best information is that theyhave fully determined to attack both outside and within the citybefore our additional troops arrive, and the least spark may starta conflagration. " [224]

As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work of strengtheningthe Insurgent positions around Manila was pushed with all possiblespeed. [225]

About the middle of January General Otis stationed the First NebraskaRegiment upon the high ground at Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Ofconditions at this time, and of the circumstances leading to theactual outbreak of hostilities Taylor says:--

"During the latter part of January General Otis was informed ongood insurgent authority that the insurgents meditated an attackupon those troops, and he was advised to remove them, as in theirexposed position they would kill them all. General MacArthur, underwhose command the regiment was, placed two guns in position there, as it was fully expected that the insurgents would direct their attackupon that point, as in fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tentsof the regiment covered the ridge, and its outposts extended alongthe San Juan River, a small stream which formed part of the line ofdelimitation between the Americans and the insurgents. 

"For some days before the outbreak of hostilities the pressure of theinsurgents was constant along this position, so constant indeed thatin the light of subsequent events it indicated a premeditated purposeon the part of some one in the insurgent army to force a collision atthat point. On February 2 General MacArthur, commanding the SecondDivision of the Eighth Army Corps, wrote to the commanding generalof the Filipino troops in the third zone in front of him that--

"'An armed party from your command now occupies the village in front ofblockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than a hundred yardson my side of the line, and is very active in exhibiting hostileintentions. This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line atonce. From this date if the line is crossed by your men with arms intheir hands they must be regarded as subject to such action as I maydeem necessary. '

"Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan del Monte, repliedupon the receipt of this communication that the action of his troopswas foreign to his wishes and that he would give immediate ordersfor them to retire. At about half past 8 on the night of February 4 asmall insurgent patrol entered the territory within the American linesat blockhouse No. 7 and advanced to the little village of Santol infront of an outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same pointfrom which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February2. An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent patrolcontinued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the insurgentpatrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from which fire was immediatelyopened upon the Americans. This fire spread rapidly down the Americanand insurgent lines and both forces at once sprang to arms. " [226]

General Otis's account of the opening of active hostilities follows:--

"On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to drawthe fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately infront and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthenedby a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse theentire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom Idirected to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgenttroops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received was all that could be desired. However, theagreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, whichoccupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line whichhad been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picketand refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was thatour picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near SantaMesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed. 

"The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a smalloutpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuityto accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditatedattack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished toopen hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared toassume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfecttheir arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisiswhich anticipated their premeditated action. They could not havedelayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issuebefore American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila. " [227]

Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so carefully plannedfor. We learn from the Insurgent records that the shot of the Americansentry missed its mark. There was no reason why it should have provokeda hot return fire, but it did. 

The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what the Insurgentshad anticipated. The Americans did not drive very well. It was but ashort time before they themselves were routed and driven from theirpositions. 

Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that his troops hadbeen wantonly attacked. The plain fact is that the Insurgent patrol inquestion deliberately drew the fire of the American sentry, and thiswas just as much an act of war as was the firing of the shot. Whetherthe patrol was acting under proper orders from higher authority isnot definitely known. 

In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain Zialcitafrom Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9. 55 P. M. , to Major Gray, San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting:

"I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General Ricarteis not here. I believe (that if the) Americans open fire we shallattack. Will ask instructions (of) Malolos. " [228]

This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something was to be doneto draw the American fire. 

Aguinaldo's first statement relative to the opening of hostilitiesis embodied in a general order dated Malolos, February 4, 1899, and reads in part as follows:--

"Nine o'clock P. M. , this date, I received from Caloocan station amessage communicated to me that the American forces, without priornotification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan delMonte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirtsof Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of thisunexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became generalall along the line. 

"No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. Ihave a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it at allcosts, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the armyof occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and manysacrificed rights. 

 * * * * *

"... I order and command:--

"1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces andthe American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will betreated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war. 

"2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forceswill be treated as prisoners of war. 

"3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consulsof Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspensionof the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration ofwar. " [229]

Aguinaldo's protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilitiesare absurd, in view of his own instructions concerning the attack tobe made simultaneously within and without the city of Manila. 

There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation whichexisted immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. On January25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong:"Recommend you await beginning American aggression, justifying ourconduct nations. " [230]

Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for onJanuary 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate in Washington wouldtake final vote upon the treaty of peace between the United Statesand Spain on February 6, and said:--

"It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately beforethe ratification of the treaty. A conflict after the ratification ofthe treaty would be unfavorable to us in public opinion. " [231]

Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendationthat hostilities begin before February 6 if America did not answermeanwhile. It was evidently well understood in Hongkong thatAguinaldo's receipt of Apacible's letter might cause war to begin, for on February 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hostilitiesof the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Washington as follows:--

"Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here deniedFilipino circles supposed political move influence vote Senate to-dayany ease insignificant skirmish due intentional provocation. 

"_Bray_. " [232]

The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted leave no escapefrom the conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred onFebruary 4, 1899, had been carefully prepared for and was deliberatelyprecipitated by the Filipinos themselves. 

Blount says:--

"It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever expectedto succeed in a war with us. " [233]

It may have been wooden-headed for the Filipinos to expect this, butexpect it they certainly did. We have seen how they held their soldiersin check until after Spain had been ousted from the Philippines bythe Treaty of Paris as they had originally planned to do. It now onlyremained to carry out the balance of their original plan to get ridof the Americans in one way or another. 

General Otis states that "when Aguinaldo had completed his preparationsfor attack he prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, thefull text of which was published at Malolos on the evening, and veryshortly after, hostilities began. This declaration was circulated inManila on the morning of February 5. " [234]

The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the punishment which theyreceived on February 4 and 5. 

Blount has stated [235] that if the resolutions of Senator Baconintroduced on January 11, 1899, had passed, we never should have hadany war with the Filipinos. The resolutions in question concludedthus:--

"That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intentionto exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islandsexcept for the pacification thereof, and assert their determinationwhen an independent government shall have been duly erected thereinentitled to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights securedunder the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the governmentand control of the islands to their people. "

I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which these resolutionsmight have had if passed. The Insurgents felt themselves to be fullycompetent to bring about such pacification of the islands as theydeemed necessary. At the time the resolutions were presented in theSenate their soldiers were straining at the leash, ready to attacktheir American opponents upon the most slender excuse. Aguinaldohimself could not have held them much longer, and it is not impossiblethat they got away from him as it was. They would have interpreted thepassage of the Bacon resolutions as a further evidence of weakness, and hastened their attack. As we have seen, "war, war, war" was whatthey wanted. 

Blount has endeavoured to shift the responsibility for the outbreakof hostilities to the United States by claiming that certain wordsitalicized by him in what he calls the "Benevolent AssimilationProclamation" were necessarily, to the Insurgents, "fightingwords. " The expressions referred to have to do with the establishmentof United States sovereignty and the exercise of governmental controlin the Philippine Islands. 

These words were not "fighting words, " the Insurgent policy being, as I have shown by the records, to consider the acceptance of aprotectorate or of annexation in the event that it did not provepossible to negotiate absolute independence, or probable that theAmerican troops could be driven from the islands. 

The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their ability to whipthe cowardly Americans, rather than any fixed determination on theirpart to push a struggle for independence to the bitter end, led totheir attack. 

CHAPTER V

Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report

The Good Book says, "By their fruits ye shall know them, whetherthey be good or evil, " and it seems proper to apply this test to theInsurgents and their government. 

The extraordinary claim has been advanced that the United Statesdestroyed a republic in the Philippines and erected an oligarchy onits ruins. Various writers and speakers who have not gone so far asthis have yet maintained that Aguinaldo and his associates establisheda real, effective government throughout the archipelago during theinterim between his return and the outbreak of hostilities with theUnited States. 

In summarizing conditions on September 15, 1898, Judge Blount says:[236]--

"Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time, withcomplete machinery of government in each province for all matters ofjustice, taxes, and police, an army of some 30, 000 men at his beck, andhis whole people a unit at his back, Aguinaldo formally inaugurated hispermanent government--permanent as opposed to the previous provisionalgovernment--with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet, patterned afterour own, [237] just as the South American republics had done beforehim when they were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the new capital. "

He refers to our utter failure to understand "what a wonderfullycomplete 'going concern' Aguinaldo's government had becomethroughout the Philippine Archipelago before the Treaty of Paris wassigned. " [238]

He bases his claim as to the excellent state of public order in theInsurgent territory at this time on a report of Paymaster W. E. Wilcoxand Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent of the United States Navy, who betweenOctober 8 and November 20, 1898, made a long, rapid trip throughnorthern Luzon, traversing the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinán, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, Cagayan, South Ilocos and Union, in the order named, thence proceeding toDagupan and down the railroad through Pangasinán, Tarlac, Pampangaand Bulacan to Manila. 

He says that these gentlemen found the authority of Aguinaldo'sgovernment universally acknowledged, the country in a state of perfecttranquillity and public order, [239] with profound peace and freedomfrom brigandage and the like. [240]

Now if it be true that Aguinaldo established complete machinery ofgovernment throughout all of Luzon outside of Manila for all mattersof justice, taxes and police, so that life and property were safeand peace, tranquillity and justice assured, we may well dispensewith quibbling as to whether the proper name was applied to suchgovernment. But did he?

Let us examine with some care the history of the Wilcox-Sargent trip, and see if we can gain further light from other sources relative tothe condition of public order in the territory which they traversed. 

I propose, for the most part, to let the captured Insurgent recordsspeak for themselves, as it is fair to assume that Insurgent officerswere at no pains to represent conditions as worse than they reallywere. In view of the fragmentary character of these records, we mayalso assume that the complete story would be still more interestingand instructive than the one which I have been able to reconstruct. 

Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox were almost everywhere hospitably received, and were entertained with dinners and dances after the inimitablefashion of the hospitable Filipino everywhere. They gained a veryfavourable impression of the state of public order in the provincesthrough which they passed for the reason that from the very starttheir trip was strictly personally conducted. They saw exactly whatit was intended that they should see and very little more. Theirprogress was several times interrupted for longer or shorter periodswithout adequate explanation. We now know that on these occasions thescenery so carefully prepared in advance for them had become a littledisarranged and needed to be straightened up. Facts which I will citeshow that most shocking and horrible events, of which they learnednothing, were occurring in the territory through which they passed. 

For a considerable time before their departure American visitorshad been carefully excluded from the Insurgent territory, but theFilipino leaders decided to let these two men go through it to theend that they might make as favourable a report as possible. Howcarefully the way was prepared for American visitors is shown by thefollowing telegram:--

"_San Pedro, Macati_, "July 30, 1898. 

"To the Local Presidente of Pasig:

"You are hereby informed that the Americans are going to your townand they will ask your opinion [of what the people desire. --Tr. ] Youshould answer them that we want a republican government. The sameanswer must be given throughout your jurisdiction. 

(Signed) "Pío Del Pilar, "General of the Second Zone. " [241]

Now General Pilar had an uncomfortable way of killing people who didnot obey his orders, and under the rules of the Insurgent governmenthe was abundantly justified in so doing. His suggestions as to whatvisiting Americans should be told or shown would be likely to beacceded to. Certainly this seems to have been the case in the presentinstance, for on the same day General Noriel reported as follows: [242]

"President R. G. , Bacoor, from Gen. Noriel, Pineda, July 30, 12. 10P. M. : I inform your excellency that some commissioners of the Americanadmiral are making investigations in the region around Pasay as tothe wishes and opinion of the people as to the government. To-day Ireceived a statement from some, giving the answer: 'Free governmentunder American protectorate [copy mutilated, two or three wordsmissing here] the President. '"

Blount quotes with approval Admiral Dewey's statement made shortlyafter the return of Wilcox and Sargent that in his opinion their report"contains the most complete and reliable information obtainablein regard to the present state of the northern part of LuzonIsland. " [243] This was true. 

The admiral might have gone further and said that it containedpractically the only information then obtainable in regard toconditions in the territory in question, but as I shall conclusivelyshow it was neither complete nor reliable. 

Judge Blount in describing the experiences of Messrs. Wilcox andSargent naïvely makes the statement that:

"The tourists were provided at Rosales by order of Aguinaldo witha military escort, 'which was continued by relays all the way toAparri. '" [244]

It certainly was!

Very little Spanish was then spoken in Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela orCagayan. What opportunity had these two men, ignorant as they wereof the native dialects, to learn the sinister facts as to what hadbeen and was occurring in the territory which they visited?

No one can fail to be delighted with Filipino hospitality, whichwas lavishly bestowed upon them everywhere, and it is only naturalthat they should have reported favourably upon what they saw. Itwas about this time that an order was issued [245] that fronts ofbuildings should be whitewashed, streets cleaned and fences repairedwith a view to showing every one, and especially travellers throughthe territory of the Insurgents, that they were "not opposed to agood such as a refined and civilized people should have. " Doubtlessthe report of the two men from Dewey's fleet was made in the bestof faith. I will now endeavour to show what were some of the actualconditions in the territory through which they passed. 

_Bulacan_

They first visited Bulacan. They do not mention hearing of theactivities of a Chinaman named Ignacio Paua, who had been giventhe rank of colonel by Aguinaldo and assigned the task of extortingcontributions for the revolution from his countrymen. In a letter toAguinaldo written on July 6, 1898, Paua states that he has collectedmore than $1, 000 from the Chinese of these small towns, but asksfor an order "prohibiting the outrages that are being committedagainst such merchants as are not our enemies. " He further says, "When the contributions from the Chinamen of all the pueblos shallhave been completed I wish to publish a proclamation forbidding anyinjury to the Chinamen and any interference with their small businessenterprises, " and adds that "the natives hereabouts themselves arethe people who are committing said abuses. " [246]

Apparently Paua had no objection to the committing of outrages againstmerchants that were the enemies of the cause, nor does he seem to haveobjected to injury to Chinamen before contributions were completed. Hisown methods were none too mild. On August 27, 1898, General Pío delPilar telegraphed Aguinaldo that five Insurgent soldiers, under aleader supposed to be Paua, had entered the store of a Chinaman, and tried to kidnap his wife, but had left on the payment of $10 anda promise to pay $50 later, saying that they would return and hangtheir fellow countryman if the latter amount was not forthcoming. [247]

Paua was later made a general in consideration of his valuableservices!

_Pampanga_

Our travellers next visited Pampanga. Here they apparently overlookedthe fact that Aguinaldo did not have "his whole people a unit athis back. " The citizens of Macabebe seem not to have approved of theAguinaldo regime, for the Insurgent records show that:--

"Representatives of the towns of Pampanga assembled in San Fernandoon June 26, 1898, and under the presidency of General MaximinoHizon agreed to yield him complete 'obedience as military governorof the province and representative of the illustrious dictator ofthese Philippine Islands. ' The town of Macabebe refused to send anydelegates to this gathering. " [248]

It may be incidentally mentioned that Blount has passed somewhatlightly over the fact that he himself during his army days commandedan aggregation of sturdy citizens from this town, known as Macabebescouts, who diligently shot the Insurgents full of holes whenever theygot a chance. He incorrectly refers to them as a "tribe or clan. " [249]It is absurd to call them a tribe. They are merely the inhabitantsof a town which has long been at odds with the neighbouring towns ofthe province. 

Things had come to a bad pass in Pampanga when its head wrote thatthe punishment of beating people in the plaza and tying them up sothat they would be exposed to the full rays of the sun should bestopped. He argued that such methods would not lead the people ofother nations to believe that the reign of liberty, equality andfraternity had begun in the Philippines. [250]

When it is remembered that persons tied up and exposed to the full raysof the sun in the Philippine lowlands soon die, in a most uncomfortablemanner, we shall agree with the head of this province that this customhas its objectionable features!

_Tarlac_

While the failure of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent to learn of therelations between the Tagalogs of Macabebe and their neighbours, or of the fact that people were being publicly tortured in Pampanga, is perhaps not to be wondered at under the circumstances, it is hardto see how they could have failed to hear something of the seriouslydisturbed conditions in Tarlac if they so much as got off the trainthere. 

On August 24 the commissioner in charge of elections in that provinceasked for troops to protect him, in holding them in the town ofUrdaneta, against a party of two thousand men of the place, who weregoing to prevent them. 

On September 22 the secretary of the interior ordered that therequirements of the decree of June 18, establishing municipalgovernments, should be strictly complied with, as in many of the towns"the inhabitants continue to follow the ancient methods by which thefriars exploited us at their pleasure and which showed their greatcontempt for the law. " [251]

The following letter to Aguinaldo, from Juan Nepomuceno, Representativefrom Tarlac, speaks for itself as to conditions in that provinceon December 27, 1898, shortly after the American travellers passedthrough it on their return:--

"I regret exceedingly being compelled to report to you that sinceSunday the 25th instant scandalous acts have been going on in theProvince of Tarlac, which I represent. On the night of the Sundaymentioned the entire family of the Local Chief of Bamban was murdered, and his house and warehouse were burned. Also the Tax Commissionerand the Secretary, Fabian Ignacio, have been murdered. Last nightSeñor Jacinto Vega was kidnapped at the town of Gerona; and seventravellers were murdered at O'Donnel, which town was pillaged, aswell as the barrio of Matayumtayum of the town of La Paz. On that dayvarious suspicious parties were seen in the town of Pañique and in thesame barrio, according to reliable reports which I have just received. 

"All this general demoralization of the province, according tothe information which I have obtained, is due to the fact that theprovince is dissatisfied with the Provincial Chief, Señor AlfonsoRamos, and with Major Manuel de León; for this is substantiated bythe fact that all the events described occurred since last Sunday, when Señor Alfonso Ramos returned, to take charge of the Office ofProvincial President, after having been detained for several days inthis town. Wherefore, I believe that in order to restore tranquillityin the province, consideration be given to various documents that havebeen presented to the Government and to the standing Committee ofJustice; and that there be removed from office Señor Alfonso Ramos, as well as said Señor Manuel de León, who has no prestige whateverin this province. Moreover on the day when fifty-four soldiers of thecommand deserted, he himself left for San Fernando, Pampanga. " [252]

On November 30, 1898, General Macabulos sent Aguinaldo a telegram [253]from which it evidently appears that there was an armed uprising inTarlac which he was endeavouring to quell and that he hoped for earlysuccess. Apparently, however, his efforts to secure tranquillity werenot entirely successful, for on December 18 he telegraphed Aguinaldoas follows:--

"In a telegram dated to-day Lieut. Paraso, commanding a detachmentat Camilin, informs me that last night his detachment was attackedby Tulisanes (robbers). The fire lasted four hours without anycasualties among our men. This afternoon received another fromthe captain commanding said detachment, informing me of the same, and that nothing new has occurred. The people of the town await withanxiety the result of the charges they have made, especially againstthe local president and the justice of the peace, the original ofwhich I sent to your high authority. " [254]

Obviously the police machinery was not working quite smoothly whena detachment of Insurgent troops could be kept under fire for fourhours by a robber band, and perhaps the attacking party were not all"robbers. " Soldiers do not ordinarily carry much to steal. 

We obtain some further information from the following telegram ofDecember 27, 1898, sent by the secretary of the interior to thePresident of the Revolutionary Government:--

"Most urgent. According to reports no excitement except in Bangbang, Tarlac, which at 12 A. M. , 25th, was attacked by Tulisanes [banditsor robbers, --D. C. W. ]. The local presidente with his patrols arrestedsix of them. On continuing the pursuit he met in Talacon a party toolarge to attack. At 7 A. M. Of the 26th the town was again attacked bycriminals, who killed the tax collector, and others who burnt somehouses, among them that of the local presidente, and his stables, in which he lost two horses. I report this for your information. " [255]

Evidently tax collectors were not popular in Tarlac. 

Still further light is shed on the situation by a telegram from thesecretary of the interior to Aguinaldo, dated December 28, 1898:--

"According to my information the excitement in Tarlac increases. Ido not think that the people of the province would have committedsuch barbarities by themselves. For this reason the silence ofGeneral Macabulos is suspicious; to speak frankly, it encouragesthe rebels. Some seven hundred of them, with one hundred and fiftyrifles, entered Pañique, seized the arms of the police, the townfunds, and attacked the houses of the people. I report this for yourinformation. All necessary measures will be taken. " [256]

Note also the following from the secretary of the interior, underdate of December 27, 1898, to Aguinaldo:--

"I have just learned that not only in Bangbang, but also in Gerona, Onell, and other places in Tarlac, men have been assaulted bynumerous Tulisanes, armed with rifles and bolos, who are killingand capturing the inhabitants and attacking travellers, robbingthem of everything they have. The President should declare at oncethat that province is in state of siege, applying martial law to thecriminals. That--(remainder missing). " [257]

The secretary of agriculture took a more cheerful view of thesituation. Under date of December 28 he telegraphed Aguinaldo asfollows:--

"The events in Bangbang, Tarlac Province, according to a witness hereworthy of credit, have arisen from an attempt to procure vengeanceon the local presidente, and robbery of Chinese shops. Hence theyare without political importance. The tax collector killed, anda countryman servant of the local presidente wounded. They burnttwo houses of the local presidente, a stable, and a warehouse forsugar-cane. " [258]

Obviously the robbery of Chinese shops and the killing of a fewindividuals was at first considered by the secretary of agricultureto be without political importance. Evidently he changed his mind, however, for on the same day, December 28, 1898, he telegraphedAguinaldo as follows:--

"I think it necessary to send Aglipay [259] to quiet Tarlac. Send forhim. If you desire, I will go to Tarlac to investigate the causes ofthe disorders, in order to find a remedy for them. " [260]

At this stage of events Aguinaldo was summoned to Malolos by a telegramfrom Mabini under date of December 29, which reads as follows:--

"Most urgent. You must come here immediately. Trías is sick. We cancome to no decision in regard to the Tarlac matter. Cannot constitutea government without you. " [261]

The measures which were actually taken are set forth in anothertelegram of the same date from the secretaries of war and interiorto Aguinaldo, which reads as follows:--

"We have sent civil and military commissioners to Tarlac; among themthe Director of War and persons of much moral influence, in orderto stifle the disturbances. The necessary instructions have beengiven them and full powers for the purpose, and as far as possibleto satisfy the people. Have also sent there six companies of soldierswith explicit instructions to their commander to guard only the towns, and make the people return to a peaceful life, using a policy ofattraction for the purpose. " [262]

Let us hope that the commander was able to attract the people withhis six companies of soldiers, and make them return to a peaceful life. 

Still further light is thrown on the situation in Tarlac by thefollowing extract from "Episodios de la Revolucion Filipina" by PadreJoaquin D. Duran, an Augustinian priest, Manila, 1901, page 71:--

"At that period the Filipinos, loving order, having been deceivedof the emancipation promise, changed by the Katipúnan into crimesand attacks on the municipality of the pueblos, discontent brokeout in all parts, and, although latent in some provinces, in that ofTarlac was materialized in an ex-sergeant of the late Spanish civilguard. A valorous and determined man, he lifted up his flag againstthat of Aguinaldo. One hundred rifles were sufficient to terrorizethe inhabitants of said province, crushing the enthusiastic membersof the revolutionary party.... Having taken possession of four towns, Pecheche would have been everywhere successful if ambition and pridehad not directed his footsteps. In January, 1899, the Aguinaldistacommander of Tarlac province, afraid that his whole province wouldespouse the cause of the sergeant, attempted by every means in hispower to interrupt his career, not hesitating to avail himself ofcrime to destroy the influence of Pecheche with the many peoplewho had been incensed by the Katipúnan and had in turn become firmpartisans of the Guards of Honour. 

"The Ilocano Tranquilino Pagarigan, local presidente at thattime of Camiling, served as an admirable instrument for thispurpose.... Pecheche was invited to a solemn festivity organizedby Tranquilino, who pretended to recognize him as his chief, andrendering himself a vassal by taking an oath to his flag. He acceptedthe invitation, and after the mass which was celebrated went to ameal at the convent, where, after the meal was over, the members ofthe K. K. K. Surrounded Pecheche and 10 of his officers and killed themwith bolos or tied them and threw them out of the windows and downthe staircase. Some priests were held captive in the building wherethis took place and were informed of what had taken place immediatelyafterwards. "

This extract shows how easy it then was for any man of determinationto acquire a following, especially if he could dispose of a fewrifles. It also gives an excellent idea of the methods employed bythe Insurgents in dealing with those who opposed their rule. 

General Fred D. Grant once told me, with much amusement, of aninteresting experience during a fight on Mt. Arayat in Pampanga. Hismen took a trench and captured some of its occupants. Several of thesewere impressed as guides and required to show the attacking forcesthe locations of other trenches. At first they served unwillingly, but presently became enthusiastic and rushed the works of theirquondam fellow-soldiers in the van of the American attack. Finallythey begged for guns. Grant added that he could start from Bacolorfor San Fernando any morning with a supply of rifles and pick upvolunteers enough to capture the place, and that on the return triphe could get enough more to attack Bacolor!

_Pangasinán_

And now we come to Pangasinán, the most populous province of Luzon, and the third in the Philippines in number of inhabitants. 

"In July, 1898, the officer in Dagupan wrote to the commanding generalof Tarlac Province that he would like to know whom he was requiredto obey, as there were so many officials of all ranks who gave himorders that it was impossible for him to know where he stood. " [263]

In a letter dated August 17, 1898, to Aguinaldo, Benito Legardacomplained that a bad impression had been produced by the news fromDagupan that when the Insurgents entered there, after many outragescommitted upon the inmates of a girls' school, every officer hadcarried off those who suited him. [264]

What should we say if United States troops entered the town ofWellesley and raped numerous students at the college, the officerssubsequently taking away with them the young ladies who happenedto suit them? Yet things of this sort hardly caused a ripple in thecountry then under the Insurgent flag, and I learned of this particularincident by accident, although I have known Legarda for years. 

I quote the following general description of conditions in Pangasinánfrom a letter addressed by Cecilio Apóstol to General Aguinaldo onJuly 6, 1898:--

"You probably know that in the Province of Pangasinán, of one of thetowns in which your humble servant is a resident, the Spanish flagthrough our good fortune has not flown here for the past few months, since the few Spaniards who lived here have concentrated in Dagupan, a place not difficult of attack, as is said. 

"But this is what is going on in this Province" There exist here twoDepartmental Governments, one calling itself that of Northern Luzón andof which Don Vicente del Prado is the President, and the other whichcalls itself that of Northern and Central Luzón, presided over by DonJuliano Paraiso. Besides these two gentlemen, there are two governorsin the province(!) one Civil Political Military, living in Lingayen, named Don Felipe J. Bartolomé, and another living in Real Guerrero, a town of Tayug, named Don Vicente Estrella. And in addition thereare a large number of Administrators, Inspectors, Military Judges, Generals, ... They cannot be counted. It is a pandemonium of which evenChrist, who permits it, cannot make anything. Indeed, the situationis insupportable. It reminds me of the schism in the middle ages whenthere were two Popes, both legitimate, neither true. Things are asclear as thick chocolate, as the Spaniards say. In my poor opinion, good administration is the mother-in-law of disorder, since disorder ischaos and chaos produces nothing but confusion, that is to say, death. 

"I have had an opportunity, through the kindness of a friend, to readthe decree of that Government, dated June 18th, of the present year, and the accompanying 'Instructions for the government of towns andprovinces. ' Article 9 of the said decree says that the SuperiorGovernment will name a commissioner for each province with thespecial duty of establishing there the organization set forth in thedecree. Very well so far: which of the so-called Presidents of Northernor of Northern and Central Luzón is the commissioner appointed by thatgovernment to establish the new organization in that province? Aremilitary commanders named by you for Pangasinán? I would be verymuch surprised if either of them could show his credentials. Asidefrom these, the fact remains that in those instructions no mention ismade of Presidents of Departments, there is a manifest contradictionin their jurisdictions, since while one calls himself president ofa Departmental Government, of Northern Luzón, the other governs theNorthern and Central portion of the Island, according to the sealswhich they use. 

"And, nevertheless, a person calling himself the General Administratorof the Treasury and the said Governor of the Province, both of whomlive in Tayug, came to this town when the Spaniards voluntarilyabandoned it and gathered all the people of means, and drew up an actof election, a copy of which is attached. From it you will see how thisorganization violates the provisions of the decree of the 18th of June. 

"Another item: They got up a contract with the people of means of thistown, and did the same thing in the other towns, in which contractthey exact from us $1250 which they call contributions of war (seedocument No. 2 attached). Among the doubtful powers of these gentlemenis the one to exact these sums included?

Have they express orders from that Government?

"Perhaps these blessed gentlemen--they are high flyers there is nodoubt about that, --have struck the clever idea of calling themselvesgenerals, governors, etc. , in order to enjoy a certain prestige and togive a certain color of legality to their acts--this, although theydon't know an iota of what they are doing. But what I am sure of, and many other men also, is that there is no order, that here thereis not a single person in authority whom to obey. This superfluityof rulers will finally lead to strained relations between them andthe towns of this province will end by paying the piper. 

"But we poor ignorant creatures in so far as the republican form ofgovernment is concerned, in order to avoid worse evils took them attheir word, obeyed them like automatons, hypnotized by the title of'Insurgents' which they applied to themselves. But when I had anopportunity to read the said decree, doubts were forced upon me, Ibegan to suspect--may God and they pardon me--that they were tryingto impose upon us nicely, that, shielded by the motto, 'have faithin and submit to the will of the country' they came to these towns'for business. '

"In order to dissipate this doubt, in order to do away with abuses, if there are abuses, I made up my mind to send you this accountof the condition of things here. I flatter myself that when youlearn of the lamentable situation of this province, you will soondeign to take steps to establish order, because thereon depends thetranquillity of Pangasin~n and in the end a strict compliance withyour superior orders. 

"There will be no limit to the thanks of the people of this provinceif their petitions secure favourable consideration and an immediateresponse from the high patriotism and honourable standpoint of theSupreme Dictator of the Philippines. " [265]

It will be noted that the picture thus drawn by Señor Apóstol differsin certain important particulars from that painted in such engagingcolours by Judge Blount. 

In September, 1898, the civil governor of Pangasinán had to have anescort of troops in passing through his province. [266]

On November 20, 1898, the head of the town of San Manuel wrote theprovincial governor that his people could no longer support the troopsquartered on them, as the adherents of the Katipúnan had burned orstolen all of their property. [267]

The sum total of Blount's description of affairs in this, themost populous province of Luzón, is derived from the narrative ofMessrs. Wilcox and Sargent and reads as follows:--

"In Pangasinán 'the people were all very respectful and polite andoffered the hospitality of their homes. '" [268]

Doubtless true, but as a summary of conditions perhaps a triflesketchy. 

_Nueva Ecija_

Nueva Ecija was the next province visited by Wilcox and Sargent. Theyhave failed to inform us that:--

"In December, 1899, certain men charged with being members of thissociety [Guards of Honour] were interrogated in Nueva Ecija as totheir purposes. One of those questioned said:--

"'That their purpose was one day, the date being unknown to thedeponent, when the Ilocanos of Batac came, to rise up in arms andkill the Tagálos, both private individuals and public employees, excepting those who agreed to the former, for the reason that honourswere granted only to the Tagálos, and but few to the Ilocanos. '" [269]

Blount has assured us that the Filipinos were a unit at Aguinaldo'sback and were and are an united people, and here are the Ilocanos ofNueva Ecija spoiling his theory by remembering that they are Ilocanosand proposing to kill whom? Not certain individual Filipinos, whomight have offended them, but the Tagálogs!

That there were other troubles in Nueva Ecija is shown by the followingstatement:--

"On January 7, 1899, the commissioner of Aguinaldo's treasury sent tocollect contributions of war in Nueva Ecija Province reported that thecompany stationed in San Isidro had become guerillas under commandof its officers and opposed his collections, stating that they wereacting in compliance with orders from higher authority. " [270]

And now, in following the route taken by our tourist friends, wereach Nueva Vizcaya and the Cagayan valley. 

CHAPTER VI

Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley

Nueva Vizcaya is drained by the Magát River, a branch of theCagayan. While the provinces of Isabela and Cagayan constitute theCagayan valley proper, Blount includes Nueva Vizcaya in the territorycovered by this designation, and for the purpose of this discussionI will follow his example. 

Especial interest attaches to the history of Insurgent rule, in theCagayan valley, as above defined, for the reason that Blount himselfserved there as a judge of the court of first instance. He says:[271]--

"The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history of thatCagayan valley as almost any other American. "

He was. For his action in concealing the horrible conditions whicharose there under Insurgent rule, with which he was perfectly familiar, and in foisting on the public the account of Messrs. Wilcox andSargent, as portraying the conditions which actually existed there, I propose to arraign him before the bar of public opinion. In sodoing I shall consider these conditions at some length. We have muchdocumentary evidence concerning them in addition to that furnishedby the Insurgent records, although the latter quite sufficientlydemonstrate many of the more essential facts. 

In describing the adventures of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent in thisregion, Judge Blount says: [272]--

"There [273] they were met by Simeon Villa, military commanderof Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to Aguinaldoafterwards, and was captured by General Funston along with Aguinaldoin the spring of 1901. "

The facts as to Villa's career in the Cagayan valley are especiallyworthy of note as they seem to have entitled him, in the opinion ofhis superiors, to the promotion which was afterward accorded him. Hewas an intimate friend of Aguinaldo and later accompanied him on hislong flight through northern Luzon. 

On August 10, 1898, Colonel Daniel Tirona, a native of Cavite Provinceand one of the intimates of Aguinaldo, was ordered to proceed to Aparriin the Insurgent steamer _Filipinas_ and establish the revolutionarygovernment in northern Luzon. In doing this he was to hold electionsfor office-holders under Aguinaldo's government and was authorizedto approve or disapprove the results, his action being subject tosubsequent revision by Aguinaldo. His forces were composed of fourcompanies armed with rifles. 

Tirona reached Aparri on August 25 and promptly secured the surrenderof the Spaniards there. 

He was accompanied by Simeon Villa, the man under discussion, and byColonel Leyba, who was also very close to Aguinaldo. 

Abuse of the Spanish prisoners began at once. It is claimed that thegovernor of North Ilocos, who was among those captured, was grosslymistreated. 

Taylor briefly summarizes subsequent events as follows: [274]--

"Whatever the treatment of the Spanish governor of Ilocos mayreally have been, there is testimony to show that some of the otherprisoners, especially the priests, were abused and outraged under thedirection of S. Villa and Colonel Leyba, both of whom were very closeto Aguinaldo. Some of the Spanish civil officials were put in stocksand beaten, and one of the officers who had surrendered at Aparri wastortured to death. This was done with the purpose of extorting moneyfrom them, for it was believed that they had hidden funds in placeof turning them over. All the Spaniards were immediately strippedof everything they had. The priests were subjected to a systematicseries of insults and abuse under the direction of Villa in orderto destroy their influence over the people by degrading them intheir eyes. It was for this that they were beaten and exposed nakedin the sun; and other torture, such as pouring tile wax of burningcandles into their eyes, was used to make them disclose where theyhad hidden church vessels and church funds. The testimony of a friarwho suffered these outrages is that the great mass of the people sawsuch treatment of their parish priests with horror, and were presentat it only through fear of the organized force of the Katipúnan. "

Taylor's statement is mildness itself in view of the well-establishedfacts. 

The question of killing the Spanish prisoners, including the friars, had previously been seriously considered, [275] but it was deemed wiserto keep most of the friars alive, extort money from them by torture, and offer to liberate them in return for a large cash indemnity, or forpolitical concessions. Day after day and week after week Villa presidedat, or himself conducted, the torture of ill-fated priests and otherSpaniards who fell into his hands. Even Filipinos whom he suspectedof knowing the where-abouts of hidden friar money did not escape. 

The following information relative to the conduct of the Insurgents inthe Cagayan valley is chiefly taken from manuscript copy of _"Historiade la Conquista de Cagayan por los Tagalos Revolucionarios, "_ inwhich the narratives of certain captured friars are transcribed andcompiled by Father Julian Malumbres of the Dominican Order. 

The formal surrender of Aparri occurred on August 26. Tirona, hisofficers and his soldiers, promptly pillaged the _convento_. [276]The officers left the Bishop of Vigan ten pesos, but the soldierssubsequently took them away from him. Wardrobes and trunks werebroken open; clocks, shoes, money, everything was carried off. Evenpersonal papers and prayer-books were taken from some of the priests, many of whom were left with absolutely nothing save the few remainingclothes in which they stood. 

On the same day Villa, accompanied by Victa and Rafael Perea, [277]went to the _convento_ and told the priests who were imprisonedthere that their last hour had come. He shut all of them except thebishop and five priests in a room near the church, then separatedthe Augustinians, Juan Zallo, Gabino Olaso, Fidel Franco, MarianoRodriguez, and Clemente Hidalgo, from the others and took them intothe lower part of the _convento_ where he told them that he intendedto kill them if they did not give him more money. The priests toldhim that they had given all they had, whereupon he had their armstied behind their backs, kicked them, struck them and whipped themwith rattans. 

Father Zallo was thrown on his face and savagely beaten. Meanwhiletwo shots were fired over the heads of the others and a soldier calledout "One has fallen, " badly frightening the priests who had remainedshut in the room. Villa then returned with soldiers to this room, ordered his men to load, and directed that one priest step forwardto be shot. Father Mariano Ortiz complied with this request, askingthat he be the first victim. Villa, however, contented himself withthreatening him with a revolver and kicking and striking him untilhe fell to the floor. He was then beaten with the butts of guns. 

Father José Vazquez, an old man of sixty years, who had thrown somemoney into a privy to keep it from falling into the hands of theInsurgents, was stripped and compelled to recover it with his barehands, after which he was kicked, and beaten with rattans. 

Father Aquilino García was unmercifully kicked and beaten to makehim give up money, and this sort of thing continued until Villa, tired out with the physical exertion involved in assaulting thesedefenceless men, departed, leaving his uncompleted task to others, who continued it for some time. 

The net result to the Insurgents of the sacking of the _convento_and of the tortures thus inflicted was approximately $20, 000 gold inaddition to the silver, bank notes, letters of credit, jewels, etc. , which they obtained. 

On September 5 Villa had Fathers Juan Recio and Buenaventura Maciagiven fifty blows each, although Father Juan was ill. 

Villa then went to Lalloc, where other priests were imprisoned. OnSeptember 6 he demanded money of them, causing them to be kicked andbeaten. Father Angel was beaten in an especially cruel manner forthe apparent purpose of killing him, after which he was thrust intoa privy. Father Isidro Fernandez was also fearfully abused. Strippedof his habit, and stretched face down on the floor, he was horriblybeaten, and was then kicked, and struck with the butt of a revolveron the forehead. 

A little later the priests were offered their liberty for a milliondollars, which they were of course unable to furnish. Meanwhile thetorture continued from time to time. 

On August 30 Tuguegarao was taken by the Insurgents withoutresistance. Colonel Leyba promptly proceeded to the _convento_and demanded the money of the friars as spoil of war. He found onlyeight hundred pesos in the safe. Father Corujedo was threatened withdeath if he did not give more. Other priests were threatened but nottortured at this time. The prisoners in the jail were liberated, but many of them had promptly to be put back again because of thedisorder which resulted, and that same evening Leyba was obliged topublish a notice threatening robbers with death. 

At midnight on September 3 Father Corujedo was taken from the_convento_ by Captain Diego and was again asked for money. Replyingthat he had no more to give, he was beaten with the hilt of a sabreand stripped of his habit, preparatory to being executed. A mocksentence of death was pronounced on him and he was placed facing tothe west to be shot in the back. Diego ordered his soldiers to load, adding, "When I count three all fire, " but the fatal count was notcompleted. Three priests from Alcala were given similar treatment. 

The troubles of the priests imprisoned at Tuguegarao were sufficientlygreat, but they were augmented a thousand fold when Villa arrived onSeptember 11. He came to the building where they were imprisoned, bearing a revolver, a sabre and a great quantity of rattans. Heordered the priests into the corner of the room in which they wereconfined, and beat those who did not move quickly enough to suithim. He threatened them with a very rigorous examination, at the sametime assuring them that at Aparri he had hung up the bishop untilblood flowed from his mouth and his ears, and that he would do thesame with them if they did not tell him where they had their moneyhidden. There followed the usual rain of kicks and blows, a numberof the priests being obliged to take off their habits in order thatthey might be punished more effectively. 

Fathers Calixto Prieto and Daniel Gonzales, professors in educationalinstitutions, he ordered beaten because they were friars. 

Fathers Corujedo and Caddedila were beaten, kicked and insulted. Bothwere gray-haired old men and the latter was at the time very weak, and suffering from a severe attack of asthma. Father Pedro Vincentewas also brutally beaten. 

The following is the description given by an eye-witness of conditionsat Tuguegarao:--

"Even the Indios of Cagayan complained and were the victims of lootingand robbery on the part of the soldiery. So lacking in discipline andso demoralized was that army that according to the confession of aprominent Filipino it was of imperative necessity to disarm them. [278]On the other hand we saw with real astonishment that instead of warlikesoldiers accustomed to battle they were nearly all raw recruits andapprentices. From an army lacking in discipline, and lawless, onlyoutrages, looting and all sorts of savagery and injustice were tobe expected. Witnesses to their demoralization are, aside from thenatives themselves who were the first to acknowledge it, the Chinesemerchants whose losses were incalculable; not a single store orcommercial establishment remained that was not looted repeatedly. Asto the Spaniards it goes without saying because it is publicly known, that between soldiers and officers they despoiled them to theirheart's content, without any right except that of brute force, ofeverything that struck their fancy, and it was of no avail to complainto the officers and ask for justice, as they turned a deaf ear to suchcomplaints. At Tuguegarao they looted in a manner never seen before, like Vandals, and it was not without reason that a prominent Filipinosaid, in speaking to a priest: 'Vandalism has taken possession of theplace. ' These acts of robbery were generally accompanied by the mostsavage insults; it was anarchy, as we heard an eye-witness affirm, who also stated that no law was recognized except that of danger, and the vanquished were granted nothing but the inevitable duty ofbowing with resignation to the iniquitous demands of that soullessrabble, skilled in crime. "

Villa now set forth for Isabela. Meanwhile the jailer of the priestsproceeded to steal their clothes, including shirts, shoes and evenhandkerchiefs. Isabela was taken without resistance on September12. Dimas Guzman [279] swore to the priests on his life that he wouldwork without rest to the end that all friars and all Spaniards mightbe respected, but he perjured himself. 

On September 12 Villa and others entered the town of Cabagan Viejo, where Villa promptly assaulted Father Segundo Rodriguez, threateninghim with a revolver, beating him unmercifully, insulting him in everypossible way and robbing him of his last cent. After the bloody scenewas over he sacked the _convento_, even taking away the priests'clothes. 

Villa also cruelly beat a Filipino, Quintin Agansi, who was takingcare of money for masses which the priests wished to save from theInsurgents. 

After Father Segundo had suffered torture and abuse for two hours hewas obliged to start at once on a journey to Auitan. The sufferingpriest, after being compelled to march through the street shouting"Vivas!" for the Republic and Aguinaldo, spent the night without amouthful of food or a drink of water. 

Father Deogracias García, a priest of Cabagan Nuevo, was subjected totorture because he had sent to Hongkong during May a letter of creditfor $5000 which belonged to the Church. Villa and Leyba entered his_convento_ and after beating him ordered his hands and feet to betied together, then passed a pole between them and had him liftedfrom the ground, after which two great jars of water were poured downhis nose and throat without interruption. [280] In order to make thewater flow through his nose better, they thrust a piece of wood intothe nasal passages until it came out in his throat. From time to timethe torture was suspended while they asked him whether he would tellthe truth as to where he had concealed his money. This unfortunatepriest was so sure he was going to die that while the torture wasin progress he received absolution from a fellow priest. After thetorture with water there followed a long and cruel beating, and theunhappy victim was finally thrust into a filthy privy. 

Meanwhile Father Calzada was assaulted by a group of soldiers andbadly beaten, after which he was let down into the filth of a privy, first by the feet and afterwards by the head. 

On the 14th a lieutenant with soldiers entered the _convento_ ofTumauini and as usual demanded money of the occupants, who gave him$80, all they had at the time. This quantity not being satisfactory, a rope was sent for and the hands of the two priests were tied whilethey were whipped, kicked and beaten. They were, however, releasedwhen Father Bonet promised to get additional money. They had a shortrespite until the arrival of Villa, who still demanded more money ofFather Blanco, and failing to get it for the reason that the fatherhad no more, leaped upon him and gave him a dreadful beating, hiscompanions joining in with whips, rattans and the butts of guns. Theyat last left their victim stretched on the ground almost dead. Thispriest showed the marks of his ill treatment six months afterward. Notsatisfied with this, Villa gave him the so-called "water cure. "

Meanwhile his followers had also beaten Father Bonet. Villa started todo likewise but was too tired, having exhausted his energies on FatherBlanco. While the tortures were going on, the _convento_ was completelysacked. Father Blanco's library was thrown out of the window. 

Villa entered Ilagan on the 15th of September at 8 o'clock atnight. Hastening to the _convento_, with a company of well-armedsoldiers, he had his men surround the three priests who awaited himthere, then summoned the local priest to a separate room and demandedmoney. The priest gave him all he had. Not satisfied, Villa leapedupon him, kicking him, beating him and pounding him with the butt ofa gun. Many of his associates joined in the disgraceful attack. Theunfortunate victim was then stripped of his habit, obliged to lie downand received more than a hundred lashes. When he was nearly senselesshe was subjected to torture by water, being repeatedly lifted up whenfilled with water, and allowed to fall on the floor. While some werepouring water down his nose and throat, others spilled hot wax on hisface and head. The torment repeatedly rendered the priest senseless, but he was allowed to recover from time to time so that he mightsuffer when it was renewed. 

The torturing of this unhappy man lasted for three hours, andthe horrible scene was immediately succeeded by another quite asbad. Villa called Father Domingo Campo and, after taking from himthe little money that he had, ordered him stripped. He was then givennumberless kicks and blows from the butts of rifles and 150 lashes, after which he was unable to rise. There followed the torture withwater, on the pretext that he had money hidden away. 

Meanwhile the houses of Spaniards and the shops of the Chinese werecompletely sacked, and the men who objected were knocked down or cutdown with bolos. Numerous girls and women were raped. 

On September 15 Leyba received notice of the surrender of NuevaVizcaya. I quote the following from the narrative above referred to:--

"Delfin's soldiers [281] were the most depraved ever seen: theirthieving instincts had no bounds; so they had hardly entered NuevaVizcaya when they started to give themselves up furiously to robbery, looking upon all things as loot; in the very shadow of these soldiersthe province was invaded by a mob of adventurous and ragged personsfrom Nueva Ecija; between the two they picked Nueva Vizcaya clean. Whenthey had grown tired of completely shearing the unfortunate Vizcayanpeople, leaving them poverty-stricken, they flew in small bands to thepueblos of Isabela, going as far as Angadanan, giving themselves upto unbridled pillage of the most unjust and disorderly kind. Some ofthese highwaymen demanded money and arms from the priest of Angadanan, but Father Marciano informed them 'that it could not be, as Leybaalready knew what he had and would be angry. '

"To this very day the people of Nueva Vizcaya have been unable torecover from the stupendous losses suffered by them as regards theirwealth and industries. How many curses did they pour forth and stillcontinue to level against the Katipúnan that brought them naughtbut tribulations!"

Confirmation of these statements is found in the following brief butsignificant passage from the Insurgent records:--

"At the end of December, 1898, when the military commander of NuevaVizcaya called upon the Governor of that province to order the policeof the towns to report to him as volunteers to be incorporated in thearmy which was being prepared for the defence of the country, theGovernor protested against it and informed the government that hisattempt to obtain volunteers was in fact only a means of disarmingthe towns and leaving them without protection against the soldierswho did what they wanted and took what they wished and committedevery outrage without being punished for it by their officers. " [282]

The effect of the surrender of Nueva Vizcaya on Leyba and Villa isthus described by Father Malumbres:--

"Mad with joy and swollen with pride Leyba and company were likemen who travelled flower-strewn paths, crowned with laurels, and wereacclaimed as victors in all the towns on their road, their intoxicationof joy taking a sudden rise when they came to believe themselves kingsof the valley. It was then that their delirium reached its brimfulmeasure and their treatment of those whom they had vanquished beganto be daily more cruel and inhuman. In Cagayan their fear of theforces in Nueva Vizcaya kept them from showing such unqualifiableexcesses of cruelty and nameless barbarities, but the triumph ofthe Katipúnan arms in Nueva Vizcaya completely broke down the wallof restraint which somewhat repressed those sanguinary executionersthirsting to fatten untrammelled on the innocent blood of unarmedand defenceless men. From that melancholy time there began an era ofunheard of outrages and barbarous scenes, unbelievable were they notproved by evidence of every description. The savage acts committedin Isabela by the inhuman Leyba and Villa cannot possibly be paintedtrue to life and in all their tragic details. The blackest hues, themost heartrending accents, the most vigorous language and the mostfulminating anathemas would be a pale image of the truth, and ourpen cannot express with true ardour the terrifying scenes and crueltorments brought about by such fierce chieftains on such indefensivereligious. It seems impossible that a fleshly heart could hold somuch wickedhess, for these petty chiefs were veritable monsters ofcruelty who surpassed a Nero; men who were entire strangers to nobleand humane sentiments and who in appearance having the figure of aman were in reality tigers roaring in desperation, or mad dogs whognashed their teeth in fury. "

On September 18 Leyba continued his march, while Villa remainedbehind at Ilagan to torture the prisoners who might be brought infrom Isabela. 

On arrival at Gamut, Leyba at once entered the _convento_ and as usualimmediately demanded money from the priests. Father Venancio gavehim all he had. He was nevertheless given a frightful whipping, sixpersons holding him while others rained blows upon him. A determinedeffort was made to force the priest to recant, and when this failedLeyba leaped upon him, kicking and beating him. He then ordered himthrown down face uppermost, and asked for a knife with the apparentintention of mutilating him. He did not use the knife, however, butinstead, assisted by his followers, gave the unhappy priest anotherterrific beating, even standing upon him and leaping up and down. Thepriest was left unable to speak, and did not recover for months. 

Later Leyba had torture by water applied to Father Gregorio Cabreroand lay brother Venancio Aguinaco, while Father Sabanda was savagelybeaten. 

On the 19th of September Father Miguel Garcia of Reina Mercedes washorribly beaten in his _convento_ by a captain sent there to get whatmoney he had. 

In Cauayan, on September 20, Fathers Perez and Aguirrezabal werebeaten and compelled to give up money by five emissaries of Leyba, and the latter priest was cut in the face with a sabre. The _convento_was sacked. On the 25th Leyba arrived and after kicking and beatingFather Garcia compelled him to give up $1700. He then informed thepriests that if it were not for Aguinaldo's orders he would kill allthe Spaniards. 

On the afternoon of the 24th three priests and a Spaniard named Sotoarrived at Ilagan. The following is the statement of an eye-witnessas to what happened:--

"They led the priests to the headquarters of the commanding officerwhere the tyrant Villa, always eager to inflict suffering on humanity, awaited them. The scene witnessed by the priests obeisant to thecruel judge was horrifying in the extreme. Four lions whose thirstfor vengeance was extreme in all, threw themselves, blind with fury, without a word and with the look of a basilisk, upon poor Señor Sotogiving him such innumerable and furious blows on head and face thatweary as he was from his past journey, the ill-treatment receivedat Angadanan and weighted down by years, he was soon thrown downby his executioners under the lintel of the door getting a terribleblow on the head as he fell; even this did not satisfy nor tame downthose fierce-hearted men, who on the contrary continued with theirinfamous work more furious than before, and their cruelty did notflag on seeing their victim at their feet. They could have done noworse had they been Silípan savages dancing in triumph around thepalpitating head cut from the body of some enemy. 

"The priests who witnessed this blood-curdling scene trembled likethe weak reed before the gale, waiting their turn to be tortured, but God willed that cruel Villa should be content with the butcheryperpetrated upon unhappy Sr. Soto. Villa dismissed the priests afterdespoiling them of their bags and clothes telling them, to tormentthem: 'Go to the _convento_ until the missing ones turn up so thatI may shoot you all together. '"

Leyba entered Echague on September 22, promptly going to the _convento_as usual and demanding money of the priest, Father Mata. When thelatter had given him all he had, he received three terrific beatingsat the hands of some twelve men armed with whips and sticks, afterwhich Leyba himself struck him with his fist and his sabre. He wasfinally knocked down by a blow with the sabre and left disabled. Ittook six months for him to recover. 

Shortly after Leyba's arrival in Nueva Vizcaya on the afternoon ofthe 25th, five priests were summoned to Solano and there abused inthe usual fashion in an effort to extort money from them. Only oneescaped ill treatment and one was nearly killed. 

Leyba now went to Bayombong to carry out the established programmewith the priests. There he found Governor Perez of Isabela, who hadtaken with him certain government moneys and employed them to paysalaries of soldiers and other employees. He insisted on the returnof the total amount and threatened to shoot Perez if it was notforthcoming. The Spaniards of the vicinity subscribed $700 which theythemselves badly needed and saved him from being shot. The priestsof the place were then summoned to Leyba's quarters and were beatenand tortured. One of them was thrown on the floor and beaten nearlyto death, Leyba standing meanwhile with his foot on the unfortunateman's neck. Another was given six hundred lashes and countless blowsand kicks. Leyba stood on this man's neck also. When the victim's backceased to have any feeling, his legs were beaten. Leyba terminatedthis period of diversion by kicking Father Diez in the solar plexusand then mocking him as he lay gasping on the floor. That afternoonone of the priests, so badly injured that he could not rise unaided, was put on a horse and compelled to ride in the hot sun to Solano. 

Villa and Leyba had their able imitators, as is shown by the followingdescription of the torturing of Father Ceferino by Major Delfin atSolano, Nueva Vizcaya, on September 27:--

"They wished to give brave evidence of their hate for the friar beforeLeyba left, and show him that they were as brave as he when it cameto oppressing and torturing the friar. This tragedy began by Jimenezagain asking Father Ceferino for the money. The priest answered ashe had done before. Then Jimenez started to talk in Tagalog to thecommanding officer and surely it was nothing good that he told him, for suddenly Delfin left the bench and darting fire from his eyes, fell in blind fury upon the defenceless priest; what harsh words heuttered in Tagalog while he vented his fury on his victim, striking himwith his clenched fist, slapping him and kicking him, I do not know, but the religious man fell at the feet of his furious executioner who, being now the prey of the most stupendous rage, could scarcely gethis tongue to stutter and continued to kick the priest, without seeingwhere he kicked him. Getting deeper and deeper in the abyss and perhapsnot knowing what he was about, this petty chief made straight for asabre lying on a table to continue his bloody work. In the meantimethe priest had risen to his feet and awaited with resignation newtorments which certainly were even worse than the first, for he gavehim so many and such hard blows with the sabre that the blade wasbroken close to the hilt. This accident so infuriated Delfin thathe again threw himself upon the priest, kicking him furiously andstriking him repeatedly until he again threw him to the ground, andnot yet satisfied, his vengefulness led him to throw himself upon hisvictim with the fury of a tiger after his prey, beating him on the headwith the hilt of the saber until the blood ran in streams and formedpools upon the pavement. The priest, more dead than alive, shudderedfrom head to foot, and appeared to be struggling in a tremendousfight between life and death; he had hardly enough strength to gethis tongue to ask for God's mercy. At this most critical juncture, and when it seemed as if death were inevitable, the martyr receivedabsolution from Father Diez, who witnessed the blood-curdling picturewith his heart pierced with grief at the sight of the sufferings ofhis innocent brother, feeling as must the condemned man preparing fordeath who sees the hours fly by with vertiginous rapidity. The bloodflowing from the wounds on the priest's head appeared to infuriateand blind the heart of Delfin who, rising from his victim's body, sped away to the armory in the court house, seized a rifle, and cameback furious to brain him with the butt and finish killing the priest;but God willed to free his servant from death at the hands of thosecannibals, so that generous Lieutenant Navarro interfered, took therifle away from him and caught Delfin by the arm, threatening him withsome words spoken in Tagalog. Then Navarro, to appease Delfin's anger, turned the priest over with his face to the ground and gave him afew strokes with the bamboo, and feigning anger and indignation, ordered him away. 

"Those who witnessed the horrible tragedy, the brutality of the tyrantand the prostration of the friar were persuaded that the latter wouldnever survive his martyrdom. The religious man himself holds it asa veritable portent that he outlived such a terrible trial; but eventhis did not satisfy them as subsequently the Secretary again calledFather Ceferino to subject him to a further scrutiny, as ridiculousas it was malicious, though it did not go beyond words or insults. "

Señor Perez, the governor of Isabela, and Father Diez were compelledto go to Ilagan. After they had arrived there on October 2d, Villaproceeded to torture them. At the outset ten soldiers, undoubtedlyinstructed beforehand, beat the governor down to the earth, with thebutts of their guns. Villa himself struck him three times in the chestwith the butt of a gun and Father Diez gave him absolution, thinkinghe was dying. Father Diez was then knocked down repeatedly with thebutts of guns, being made to stand up promptly each time in orderthat he might be knocked down again. Not satisfied with this, Villacompelled the suffering priest to kneel before him and kicked him inthe nose, repeating the operation until he left him stretched on thefloor half-senseless with his nose broken. He next had both victimsput in stocks with their weight supported by their feet alone. Whilein this position soldiers beat them and jumped onto them and one setthe governor's beard on fire with matches. Father Diez was kept inthe stocks four days. He was then sent to Tuguegarao in order thatpersonal enemies there might take vengeance on him, Villa biddinghim good-by with the following words: "Go now to Tuguegarao and seeif they will finish killing you there. " Señor Perez was kept in thestocks eight days and it is a wonder that he did not die. 

Upon the 25th of September Villa went to the _convento_ in Ilaganprepared to torture the priests, but he succeeded in compelling anumber of them to sign indorsements in his favour on various lettersof credit payable by the Tabacalera Company and departed again infairly good humour, having done nothing worse than strike one of them. 

Later, however, on the pretext that Fathers Aguado and Labanda hadmoney hidden away, he determined to torture them with water. The firstto be tortured was Father Labanda. Villa had him taken to the prisonwhere the priest found his two faithful Filipino servants who hadbeen beaten cruelly and were then hanging from a beam, this havingbeen done in order to make them tell where his money was. 

He was tied after the usual fashion and water poured down his noseand throat. During the brief respites necessary in order to preventhis dying outright he was cruelly beaten. They finally dragged himout of the prison by the feet, his head leaving a bloody trail onthe stones. After he had been taken back to his companions, one ofthe men who had tortured him came to beg his pardon, saying that hehad been compelled to do it by Villa. 

Father Aguado was next tortured in one of the rooms of the_convento_. Villa finished the day's work by announcing to the bandof priests that he would have them all shot the next day on the plaza, and ordering them to get ready. 

On the 29th the barbarities practised by this inhuman fiend reachedtheir climax in the torturing to death of Lieutenant Piera. Thefollowing description gives some faint idea of one of the mostdiabolical crimes ever committed in the Philippines:--

"Villa's cruelty and sanguinary jeering grew without let or hindrancefrom day to day; it seemed that this hyena continually cudgelled hisbrains to invent new kinds of torture and to jeer at the friars. Onthe night of the 29th of September the diabolical idea occurred tohim of giving the _coup de grace_ to the prestige of the friars bymaking them pass through the streets of Ilagan conducting and playinga band of music. He carried out his nonsensical purpose by callingupon Father Diograeias to play the big drum, and when this priesthad started playing Villa learned that Father Primo was a musicianand could therefore play the drum and lead the band with all skill, so he called upon Father Primo to come forward, and with one thingand another this ridiculous function was carried on until the latehours of the night. 

 * * * * *

"While these two priests were serenading Villa and his gang, the mostdreadful shrieks were heard from the jail, accompanied by pitifulcries that would melt the coldest heart. The priests hearing theseechoes of sorrow and pain, and who did not know for what purposeFathers Deogracias and Primo had been separated from them, seemedto recognize the voices of these two priests among the groans, believing them to be cruelly tortured; for this reason they beganto say the rosary in order that the Most Holy Virgin might imbuethem with patience and fortitude in their martyrdom. Great was theirsurprise when these priests returned saying that they had contentedthemselves with merely making fun of them by obliging them to playthe big drum and lead the band. 

"Although this somewhat tempered their sorrow, a thorn remained intheir hearts, fearing that the moving lamentations and the mortalgroans came from the lips of some hapless Spaniard. This fatidicalpresentiment turned out unfortunately to be a fact. The victimsacrificed that melancholy night, still remembered with a shudder bythe priests, was Lieutenant Salvador Piera. This brave soldier, who hadmade up his mind to die in the breach rather than surrender the townof Aparri, was persuaded to capitulate only by the prayers and tearsof certain Spanish ladies who had been instructed to do so by a manwho should have been the first one to shoulder a rifle. After havingbeen harassed in Aparri he was taken to Tuguegarao at the request ofEsteban Quinta or Isidoro Maquigat, two artful filibusters thirstingto revenge themselves on the Lieutenant, who during the time of theSpanish government had justly laid his heavy hand upon them. In thelatter part of September they conducted him on foot and without anyconsideration whatever to the capital of Isabela. In this town hewas at once placed in solitary confinement in one of the rooms ofthe _convento_ and allowed no intercourse with any one. The sin forwhich they recriminated Piera was his having charged Dimas [283] withbeing a filibuster, and their revengefulness reached an incrediblelimit. The heartrending moans of this martyr to his duty still resoundin that _convento_ converted into the scene of an orgy of blood. Theunfortunate man was heard to shout: 'For God's sake, for God's sake, have pity, ' and trustworthy persons tell that under the strain oftorture he would challenge them to fight in a fair field by saying:'I will fight alone against twenty of you;' but the cowardly torturers, a reproach to the Filipino race, looked upon it as an amusement toglut their spite on a defenceless man whose hands were tied. Theyhad him strung up all night with but insignificant refreshment andrest, sometimes being suspended by his arms which finally becamedisjointed and useless, and at others he was hung up by his feet, the blood rushing to his head and placing him in imminent dangerof sudden death. It was the intention of these brutes to torturehim as much as possible before killing him, just as a member of thefeline race plays with, tosses in the air and pirouettes around thevictim which falls into his claws. If to the torture of the ropeare added the blows with cudgels and the butts of rifles which werefrequently rained upon the victim it will be no surprise that earlyon the morning of the 30th he was in the throes of death in the midstof which the sufferer had just enough strength to say that he washungry and thirsty; then those cannibals (the heart is filled withfury in setting forth such cruelty) cut a piece of flesh from thecalf of the dying man's leg and conveyed it to his mouth and insteadof water they gave him to drink some of his own urine. What savagery!

"The blood from the wound finished the killing of the faintingPiera. The blood shed served to infuriate more the barbarousexecutioners who in order to give the finishing stroke to the martyr, as an unrivalled expression of their savage ferocity, thrust a red-hotiron into his mouth and eyes. That same night these treacherous andferocious tyrants whose sin made them hate the light, buried thebody in the darkness of the night in a patch of cogon grass adjoiningthe _convento_. "

Piera's torture was by no means confined to this last night of hislife, as the following account of it shows:--

"In the first days of this accursed month, while the padres werebemoaning their fate in jail, a dark drama was being enacted in the_convento_, whose hair-raising scenes would have inspired terror toMontepiu himself. 

"Lieutenant Salvador Piera of the Guardia Civil, commanding officer atAparri, who, realizing that all resistance was useless, gave way to thepersistent solicitations of Spaniards and natives and surrendered thattown on honourable terms, which the Katipúnan forces did not respectafter the capitulation had been signed, was sent for by Villa, themilitary authority of Isabela. Something terrible was going to happenas Piera himself felt confident, for it is said that before leavingAparri he went to confession where he settled the important businessof his conscience in a Christian manner with a representative of God. 

"And so it turned out, for as soon as he arrived in Ilagan hewas taken to the _convento_ and placed incomunicado in one of itsapartments. Soon after, three or four vile fiends, --for they do notdeserve the name of men, --bound him with strong cords and hanged him toa beam. Then they began to charge him with having prosecuted a certainMason, and inflicted upon him the most frightful tortures. The penrefuses to set forth so many atrocities. For three days they had himin that position while his vile assassins made a martyr of him. Ourhair stands on end to think of such crimes. The heart-rending criesof this unfortunate man while prey to such barbarous torments couldbe heard in every part of the town and carried panic to the homes ofall the inhabitants. 

"The late hours of the night were always chosen by those treacherousfiends to give Piera the _trato de cuerda_ (this form of tortureconsists in tying the hands of the victim behind his back and hanginghim by them by a rope passed through a pulley attached to a beam;his body is lifted as high as it will go and then allowed to fallby its own weight without reaching the ground); but this torture wasadministered to him in a form so terrible that all the pictures of thiskind of torment found in the dreadful narratives of the calumniatorsof the Holy Office, pale into insignificance in comparison with theatrocious details of the tortures here recited; at each violent jerkthe unhappy victim feeling that his limbs were being torn asunderwould cry out 'My God! My God!' This terrifying cry reverberatingthrough the jail would freeze the very blood of the poor prieststherein incarcerated. 

"On the third day, when those infuriated hyenas appeared to havespent their diabolical rage; after they had thrust a red-hot ironinto his eyes and left him with sightless sockets; the poor martyr, the prey of delirium, cried out that he was hungry, and one of those_sicarii_ cut a piece of flesh from Piera's thigh and was infamousenough to carry it to his mouth. On the night of the seventh of themonth very late a number of wretches buried in the _convento_ gardena body still dripping warm blood from the lips of which there escapedthe feeble plaints of anguish of a dying man. "

The feeling of the Spaniards relative to this matter is well shownby the following statement of Father Malumbres:--

"This horrible crime cannot be pardoned by God or man, and is stilluninvestigated, crying to Heaven for vengeance with greater reasonthan the blood of the innocent Abel. So long as the criminals remainunpunished it will be a black and indelible stigma and an ugly stainon the race harbouring in its midst the perpetrators of this unheard-ofsin. Words of reprobation are not enough, justice demands exemplary andcomplete reparation, and if the powers of earth do not take justiceinto their own hands, God will send fire from Heaven and will causeto disappear from the face of the earth the criminals and even theirdescendants. A murder so cruel and premeditated can be punished inno other way. 

"If the courts here should wish to punish the guilty persons it wouldnot be a difficult task; the public points its finger at those whodyed their hands in the blood of the heroic soldier, and we shallset them forth here echoing the voice of the people. The soullessinstigator was Dimas Guzman. The executioners were a certain JoséGuzman (alias Pepin, a nephew of Dimas) and Cayetano Pérez. "

The matter was duly taken up in the courts, and Judge Blount himselftried the cases. 

The judge takes a very mild and liberal view of the occurrence. Hesays of it: [284]--

"Villa was accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant Ventura Guzman. Thelatter is an old acquaintance of the author of the present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901, for playing a minor part in themurder of an officer of the Spanish army committed under Villa's ordersjust prior to, or about the time of, the Wilcox-Sargent visit. Hewas found guilty, and sentenced, but later liberated under PresidentRoosevelt's amnesty of 1902. He was guilty, but the deceased, sothe people in the Cagayan Valley used to say, in being tortured todeath, got only the same sort of medicine he had often administeredthereabouts. At any rate, that was the broad theory of the amnestyin wiping out all these old cases. "

He adds:--

"I sentenced both Dimas and Ventura to life imprisonment for beingaccessory to the murder of the Spanish officer above named, LieutenantPiera. Villa officiated as arch-fiend on the grewsome occasion. I amquite sure I would have hung Villa without any compunction at thattime, if I could have gotten hold of him. I tried to get hold ofhim, but Governor Taft's attorney-general, Mr. Wilfley, wrote methat Villa was somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on Britishterritory, and extradition would involve application to the LondonForeign Office. The intimation was that we had trouble enough ofour own without borrowing any from feuds that had existed under ourpredecessors in sovereignty. I have understood that Villa is nowpractising medicine in Manila. More than one officer of the Americanarmy that I know afterwards did things to the Filipinos almostas cruel as Villa did to that unhappy Spanish officer, LieutenantPiera. On the whole, I think President Roosevelt acted wisely andhumanely in wiping the slate. We had new problems to deal with, andwere not bound to handicap ourselves with the old ones left over fromthe Spanish régime. " [285]

But it happens that this was the Filipino régime. Piera's tortureoccurred at the very time when, according to Blount, Aguinaldo had"a wonderfully complete 'going concern' throughout the Philippinearchipelago. "

Furthermore, it occurred in the Cagayan valley where Blount says"perfect tranquillity and public order" were then being maintainedby "the authority of the Aguinaldo government" in a country whichMessrs. Wilcox and Sargent, who arrived on the scene of this barbarousmurder by torture four weeks later, found so "quiet and orderly. "

Not only was Blount perfectly familiar with every detail of thisdamnable crime, but he must of necessity have known of the torturingof friars to extort money, which preceded and followed it. 

The following statement seems to sum up his view of the whole matter:--

"It is true there were cruelties practised by the Filipinos on theSpaniards. But they were ebullitions of revenge for three centuries oftyranny. They do not prove unfitness for self-government. I, for one, prefer to follow the example set by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil over all those matters. " [286]

The judge drew the veil not only over this, but, as we have seen, over numerous other pertinent matters which occurred in this land of"profound peace and tranquillity" just at the time Wilcox and Sargentwere making their trip. My apologies to him for withdrawing theveil and for maintaining that such occurrences as those in questiondemonstrate complete and utter unfitness for self-government on thepart of those who brought them about!

If it be true that Blount knew more than one officer of the Americanarmy who did things to the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa did toLieutenant Piera, why did he not report them and have the criminalsbrought to justice?

Such an attack on the army, in the course of which there is not givena name or a fact which could serve as a basis for an investigation, is cowardly and despicable. 

I do not for a moment believe that Blount speaks the truth, but ifhe does, then his failure to attempt to bring to justice the humanfiends concerned brands him!

It has been the fashion in certain quarters to make vile allegationsof this sort against officers of the United States army, couching themin discreetly general terms. This is a contemptible procedure, forit frees those who make reckless charges from danger of the criminalproceedings which would otherwise doubtless be brought against them. 

On arrival at Ilagan, the town where Piera was tortured to death, Blount says [287] that Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent were

"given a grand _baile_ [ball] and _fiesta_ [feast], a kind ofdinner-dance, we would call it.... From Ilagan they proceeded toAparri, cordially received everywhere, and finding the country infact, as Aguinaldo always claimed in his proclamations of that period, seeking recognition of his government by the Powers, in a state ofprofound peace and tranquillity--free from brigandage and the like. "

Within sight of the banquet hall, within hearing of the music, laya lighter on which were huddled eighty-four priests of the CatholicChurch, many of them gray-haired old men, innocent of any evil conduct, who for weeks had suffered, mentally and physically, the tortures ofthe damned. 

Of the events of this evening and the following day Father Malumbressays:--

"From the river the _convento_ could be seen profusely illuminated andthe strains of music could be heard, an evident sign that they wereengaged in revelry. This gave us a bad start, as we came to fear thatVilla had returned from the expedition undertaken to come up with twoAmericans who had crossed the Caraballo range and were thinking ofcoming down as far as Aparri. It was late to announce to Villa ourarrival at Ilagan, so that we were obliged to pass the night on thelighter. In the morning our boat was anchored in front of the pueblo ofIlagan, where we were credibly informed that Villa had returned. Thisaccursed news made us begin to fear some disagreeable incident. 

"Our Matias went ashore and delivered the official communicationregarding our transfer to Villa, while we waited impatiently forhis decision. Sergeant Matias at length returned with orders forour disembarkation; we put on the best clothes we had and the rowersplaced a broad plank between the lighter and the arsenal and we leftour floating prison two abreast. Matias called the roll and the orderto march, we were eighty-four friars in a long column climbing thesteep ascent to Ilagan. 

"When we had arrived in front of the building used for headquarters, wefaced about in front thereof, and the first thing we saw in one of thewindows were the sinister features of Falaris, who with a thunderingbrow and black look was delighting himself in the contemplation ofso many priests surrounded by bayonets and filled with misery. Anyother person but Villa would have melted on seeing such a spectacle, which could but incite compassion. The two American tourists werealso looking on at this horrible scene as if stupefied, but they soonwithdrew in order, perhaps, not to look upon such a painful picture. Itwas, indeed, heartrending to contemplate therein old gray-haired menwho had passed their lives in apostolic work side by side with youngmen who had just arrived in this ungrateful land, and many sick whorather than men seemed to be marble statues, who had no recourse butto stand in line, without one word of consolation; therein figuredsome who wore religious garb, others in secular dress limited toa pair of rumpled trousers and a cast-off coat, the lack of thisluxurious garment being replaced in some instances by a native shirt. 

"For two long hours we were detained in the middle of the streetunder the rays of a burning sun and to the scandal of the immensecrowd which had been gathered together to witness the denouement ofthe tragedy. The priests had hardly come into the presence of Villawhen Fathers Isidro and Florentino were called out for the purpose ofhaving heaped upon them a flood of insults and affronts. Father Isidrowas ordered by Villa to interview Sr. Sabas Orros, who, Villa supposed, would wreak his revenge blindly upon him, but he was greatly mistaken, as said gentleman treated the priest with great respect; the tyrantremained talking to Father Florentino in the reception room of theheadquarters building, and when it appeared that such talk would cometo blows, the elder of the Americans left one of the rooms towardthe reception room, and the scene suddenly changing, Villa aroseand addressing the priest said: 'I am pleased to introduce to youan American Brigadier-General, Mr. N. ' The latter returned a cordialgreeting in Spanish to the priest who made a courteous acknowledgment;after this exchange of courtesies, Villa resumed his defamatory work, pouring out a string of absurdities and infamous insults upon thefriars, going so far as to say in so many words: 'from the bishop downyou are all thieves and depraved' he added another word which it wouldbe shameful to write down, and so he went on from one abyss to anotherwithout regard to reputations or the respect due to venerated persons. 

"The American let his disgust be seen while Villa was talking, and the latter understood these protests and ordered the priest towithdraw, the comedy coming to an end by the American shaking handswith the priest and offering him assistance. Villa would not shakehands with him, as was natural, but the priest was able to see thathe was confused when he saw the distinction and courtesy with whichan American general had treated a helpless friar. What a narrow ideadid the Americans form of the government of Aguinaldo, representedby men as savage and inhuman as Villa!

"The natives averred that the Americans referred to were spies who hadcome to explore those provinces and were making maps of the strategicpoints and principal roads, so that a very careful watch was kept uponthem and Villa took measures to have them go down the river withoutlanding at any place between Echague and Ilagan. At Ilagan they weregiven an entertainment and dance, Villa being a skilled hand in thissort of thing, and a few days later he accompanied them to Aparri[288] without allowing them to set foot on land. The government ofAguinaldo no longer had everything its own way, and secret ordershad been given to have every step of the explorers followed. Thecommanding and other leading officers of the Valley, supporting theorders of the government, circulated an order throughout the townswhich read as follows:--

"'_To All Local Officers_:

"'You will not permit any maps to be made or notes to be taken ofstrategic points by Americans or foreigners; nor will you allow themto become acquainted with the points of defence; you will endeavourto report immediately to this Government any suspicious persons;you will make your investigations secretly, accompanying suspectedpersons and feigning that their investigations are approved, andfinally when it shall seem to you that such suspected persons havefinished their work, you will advise without loss of time, in orderthat their notes may be seized. '

"Despite this order the Americans were able to inform themselves verythoroughly of the forces in the Valley and its state of defence, and Filipinos were not lacking who for a few pesos would put themabreast of all information regarding the plans and projects ofAguinaldo's government. "

Relative to this Wilcox-Sargent trip Taylor says:--

"In October and November, 1898, Paymaster W. B. Wilcox, U. S. N. , and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, U. S. N. , travelled through NorthernLuzon from which they returned with a favourable impression of thegovernment which had been set up by Aguinaldo's agents. 

"It was realized by the subtle men whom they met that it was highlyexpedient that they should make a favourable report and accordinglythey were well received, and although constant obstacles were thrownin the way of their seeing what it was not considered well for themto see yet the real reasons for the delays in their journey werecarefully kept from them. At least some of their letters to thefleet were taken, translated, and sent to Aguinaldo, who kept them, and constant reports upon them and their movements were made. "

Blount refers to the fact that Mr. Sargent tells a characteristicstory of Villa, [289] whose vengeful feeling toward the Spaniardsshowed on all occasions. 

It would doubtless have interested the travellers to know that the"robbery" consisted in taking the funds out of the province to savethem from falling into Villa's hands, and in paying them to soldiers inNueva Vizcaya to whom money was due. It would further have interestedthem to know that this unfortunate Spaniard had been twice torturedwithin an inch of his life by Villa. 

But let us continue our interrupted narrative:--

"The presence of the Americans in Ilagan soon freed us from certainforms of savagery and barbarous intentions on the part of Villa. Therecan be no doubt that the tyrant was constantly cudgelling his brainsto invent new methods of showing his contempt for the friars; at theunlucky time we write of he conceived the infamous plan of orderinga circular enclosure of cane to be made, put a pig into it--we trustthe reader will pardon the details--with a bell hung to his neck, blindfolded the priests and compelled them to enter the enclosure withsticks in their hands, and in this ridiculous attitude, obliged them tostrike about when the sound of the bell appraised them of the animal'sproximity; it is obvious that the principal purpose of the fiendishVilla was to have the priests lay about them in such a way as todeal each other the blows instead of the pig. The tyrant also had theidea of making us and the other priests in Ilagan parade the streetsof that town dancing and playing the band. The wish to consummatehis plan was not lacking but he was deterred by the presence of theAmericans and the arguments of Sr. Sabas Orros to whom we also owedthe signal favour that Villa did not take us to our prisons at Tumauiniand Gamut on foot and with our clothing in a bundle at our backs. "

On October 2 a banquet was given in Villa's honour at Ilagan and thepleasant idea occurred to him to have four of the friars dance atit for his amusement. The people of the town put their handkerchiefsbefore their faces to shut out the sight, and some wept. Father Campo, one of the priests who was obliged to dance, had great ulcers on hislegs from the wounds caused by the cords with which he had been boundwhen he was tortured with water, and was at first unable to raise hisfeet from the floor; but Villa threatened him with a rattan until hefinally did so. This caused the sores on his legs to burst open sothat the bones showed. 

On the 3d of October a number of the friars were compelled to get up aband and go out and meet Leyba with music on his arrival. The peopleof the towns closed their windows in disgust at the sight. A greatcrowd had gathered to receive Leyba, and the priests were compelledto dance in the middle of the street, but this again only causeddisgust. A couple of priests were then beaten in the usual fashionin a private house. This caused murmuring even among those of thesoldiers who were natives of the Cagayan valley. At the same timetwo other priests were horribly whipped in the prison. 

This has been a long story, but the half has not been told. Thosewho escaped torture had their feelings harrowed by the sight ofthe sufferings of their fellows. They were constantly and grosslyinsulted; were often confined in the most unsanitary quarters; givenpoor and insufficient food and bad water, or none at all; robbed oftheir clothing; compelled to march long distances under a tropicalsun when sick, wounded and suffering; obliged to do servants' workpublicly; forced to make a ridiculous spectacle of themselves in thepublic streets; ordered to recant, and heaven knows what not!

The torments practised on them had two principal objects: tocompel them to give up money, and to discredit them with the commonpeople. They failed to accomplish this latter result. There is abundantevidence that the natives of the Cagayan valley clothed and fedthem when they could, and wept over the painful humiliations and thedreadful sufferings which they were powerless to prevent or relieve. 

The tormentors were men from distant provinces, with no possiblepersonal grievances against the priests whom they martyrized. Theiraction was the result, not of an "ebullition of revenge for threecenturies of tyranny" as stated by Blount, but of insensate greedof gold and damnable viciousness. I believe the American people willhold that such cruelities brand those who practise them as unfit togovern their fellows, or themselves. 

Lest I be accused of basing my conclusions on _ex parte_ statementsI will now return to the Insurgent record of events in the Cagayanvalley. 

At the outset the Spanish officers of the Tabacalera Company [290]fared comparatively well. In a letter dated September 27, 1898, andaddressed to the secretary of war of the revolutionary government, Leyba says of the taking of Tuguegarao that the only terms of thesurrender were to respect life. He therefore felt at liberty to seizeall the money that the friars had hidden, "which was accomplishedby applying the stick. " He adds that they did nothing to the agentsof the great Tabacalera Company, then the most powerful commercialorganization in the Islands, for the significant reason that theyhad found that its stock was largely held by Frenchmen and fearedtrouble. [291]

On December 4, 1898, Leyba, concerning whose ideas as to public orderwe are already informed, wrote a most illuminating letter settingforth the conditions which had existed there. He does not claim thatthere had been Octavian peace!

It should be borne in mind that this letter covers the very timeduring which Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent passed through the Cagayanvalley. It paints a vivid picture of conditions, and as the painterwas the ranking Insurgent officer in the valley during this entireperiod, he cannot be accused of hostile prejudice. I therefore givethe letter in full'--

"_Aparri_, December 4, 1898. 

"_Don Baldomero Aguinaldo_, "_The Secretary of War_:

"_Dear Sir and of My Greatest Esteem_: I take the liberty of addressingthis to you in order to state that owing to the lack of disciplinein the soldiers whom we have brought, since they are all volunteersand whom I am not able to reduce to rigorous subordination, for therevolution would find itself without soldiers with whom to win triumph, they committed many abuses and misdeed which, for the lack of evidence, I was not able to punish, although I knew of these abuses but hadno proof, and as a lover of my country and of the prestige of theRevolutionary Army, I took care not to disclose the secret to any one, in this way avoiding the formation of an atmosphere against the causeof our Independence to the grave injury of us all. But it happenedthat, in spite of the good advice which I have given them and thepunishments which I have given to some of the 3d Company of Cauit, they did not improve their conduct but have gone to the extreme ofcommitting a scandalous robbery of 20, 800 pesos which sum the German, Otto Weber, was taking to the capital, which deed has caused me towork without ceasing, without sleeping entire nights, for I understoodwhat a serious matter it was to take money from a foreigner. Aftermaking many inquiries, it was discovered that a very large part ofthe money which reached the sum of $10, 000, a little more or less, was buried under the quarters which the said company occupied, thiswith the sanction of all the officers, it appears to me, because itis impossible that such a sum could be brought into a house where somany soldiers are living without the knowledge of the officers. 

"Indignant at such shameful behaviour, I reprimanded the officersand preferred charges against the ones I deemed to blame in the matter. 

"Afterwards I found out that they had attempted to murder me for tryingto find out the originators of the crime. On account of this, and inorder to prevent a civil war which would have broken out against thesaid soldiers if precautions had not been taken, I decided to disarmthem, to the great displeasure of the Colonel who was not aware ofmy motives. 

"This bad conduct has been copied by the soldiers of the 4th Companystationed in Ilagan, and I believe the Colonel, guided by my warning, will take the same measures in regard to them. 

"As the officers are the first ones to commit abuses and misdeeds, itis easily seen that the soldiers under their orders, guided by them, will commit worse ones than the chiefs, and as these seem to lackthe moral strength to control and reprimand them, I propose to you, if it meets your approval, that all these soldiers and some of theofficers be returned to their homes by the steamer _Luzon_, if thereshould be sufficient coal, or in another if you order it, since theytell me themselves that because they are far away from their homesthey do not wish to continue in the service in this province. This iseasily arranged as there are now men stationed in this province forinstructing the native volunteers, many of whom have been students, and will therefore make good officers and non-commissioned officers, and in this way a battalion could be formed, well disciplined from thebeginning and disgraceful things would be avoided not only towardsthe natives of this province but also towards foreigners, which isthe most important. Having stated my case, I place myself always atyour disposal, requesting you will attend to this affair. 

"With reference to the 4th Company stationed in the Province ofIsabela, whose captain is Don Antonio Monzon of Panamitan, there aremany complaints of thefts and assaults committed by the soldiers, and in answer to my questions, Don Simeón Adriano y Villa, Majorand Sanitary Inspector and doctor of this battalion, whom I havestationed there for lack of a competent person, tells me that hehas always punished and offered advice to officers and soldiers inorder to prevent the recurrence of thefts and assaults, but he hasnever been able to suppress them completely, because the soldiers areabandoned by their officers, and because of lack of example on thepart of the latter; they do not understand that it is a great blotwhen they commit these abuses, since when they discover the goodsor house of a Spaniard they believe they have a right to appropriateeverything which they encounter. 

"I have learned lately, that some foreigners, residents in thatprovince, among them some employees of the Tobacco Factory, 'ElOriente' and of the firm of Baer Senior & Co. , who have Spanishemployees in various pueblos of that province, have some very seriouscomplaints to make of assaults committed against them prejudicialto their interests; however, I hope that now with the arrival ofGeneral Tirona he will regulate matters, although I believe that thisgentleman is not sufficiently energetic in proceeding against theofficers and soldiers, as I have seen when I reprimanded and punishedthem for faults committed he has pardoned them, and it appears thathe censures energetic acts which we must use in order to subject themto rigorous discipline. The same thing happened when Major Sr. Victawished to discipline them; it appears that the Colonel reprimandedhim when he punished some soldiers for gambling in their quarters, since, as you know, that gentleman believes that he who is right isthe one who comes to him first, and who is best able to flatter him. 

"The Colonel has agreed with me that his first act on arrival at theprovince of Isabela should be to disarm and take all the money hefinds among the soldiers of the 4th Company (Panamitan) in order toserve as indemnity for the property of the foreigners in case theyshould make any claim. 

"I request that you send some leader or officer in order to superintendour actions, and to lift the doubt which hangs over the person whohas worked faithfully and honourably in the sacred cause of ourIndependence. 

"I am filling the position of First Chief in the Port of Aparritemporarily on account of the absence of the Colonel who has conferredon me all his duties and power. After the military operations whichwere carried on as far as the last town in Isabela, being tired andsomewhat sick, I was put in charge of these military headquarters, which I found to be very much mixed up, the town, moreover, beingdesperate on account of the assaults committed by my predecessor, Rafael Perca, who was appointed by the Colonel, and who was formerly2d Captain of the steamer _Filipinas. _ After arriving and takingcharge, having received numerous complaints against him, I had himarrested and I found that he had been guilty of robbery, unlawfuluse of insignia, illegal marriage, rape and attempted rape. I holdhim in custody only awaiting the arrival of the Colonel in order toconvene a court-martial for his trial, in which the Colonel will actas President and I as Judge Advocate. 

"With nothing more to communicate, I hope you will attend to my justclaim and send a special delegate to investigate our acts and seethe truth, for perhaps if a statement comes direct from me you willnot believe it. 

"I am your affectionate and faithful subordinate, who kisses your hand, (Signed) "_J. N. Leyba_. " [292]

Blount states that conditions existed "just like this, all over Luzonand the Visayan Islands. " [293] Unfortunately this was only too true!

The troops complained of by Leyba were made up of Aguinaldo's fellowtownsmen. They never obeyed any one else, and left a trail of murderand rapine behind them. Aguinaldo never punished them, and from thetime when one of them tried to murder their commander until a guardcomposed of them murdered General Antonio Luna in June, 1899, theyare mentioned only with fear and execration. 

Blount describes with enthusiasm the establishment of civil governmentin Cagayan. 

Perhaps Americans will be interested in knowing who was its head andhow it worked. The "elections" were held on December 9, 1898, and DimasGuzman was chosen head of the province. He was the man subsequentlysentenced to life-imprisonment by Blount, for complicity in themurder of Lieutenant Piera. In describing his method of conducting hisgovernment he says that the people doubted the legality of attemptsto collect taxes; that the abuses of heads of towns caused rioting inthe towns, in which only Ilocanos took part; and that he not only didnot report these things but contrived to conceal them from foreignersin the province. [294]

His failure to report these troubles and disorders to his governmentis of interest, as Blount alleges [295] that differences between thelocal authorities were in a number of cases referred to the Malolosgovernment for settlement. 

Blount says [296] that General Otis's reports were full of inexcusableblunders about the Tagálogs taking possession of provinces and makingthe people do things, and cites the relations between Villa and DimasGuzman to illustrate the error of these allegations. 

He has elsewhere [297] referred to Villa as the "arch-fiend" in thematter of torturing the unhappy Spaniards as well as the Filipinos whoincurred his ill-will. We have seen that Guzman proved an apt pupiland did credit to his instructor in connection with the torturingof Lieutenant Piera, but it nevertheless appears from Guzman's ownstatements that his relations with the Insurgent officers and theirsubordinates involved some rather grave difficulties. Of Major Canoy, for instance, he says:--

"I must add that the said Major Canoy is such a remarkable characterthat he saw fit to give my cook a beating for not taking off his hatwhen he met him. He insulted the delegate of rents of Cabagan Viejofor the same reason. He struck the head man of the town of Bagabag inthe face. He put some of the members of the town council of Echaguein the stocks, and he had others whipped. " [298]

It was really incautious for Governor Guzman to complain of theseconditions because Major Canoy and his party won, and the Governorhad to resign. 

But the day of reckoning came. It was in consequence of the atrocitiescommitted by the Tagálog soldiers in the Cagayan valley that CaptainBatchelder was able a little later to march practically unopposedthrough the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Cagayan with onebattalion of American negro troops, for whom he had neither food norextra ammunition, and that Tirona surrendered the Insurgent forcesin the valley without attempting resistance!

CHAPTER VII

Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere

Referring to the conditions alleged to have been found by Sargentand Wilcox in the Cagayan valley, Blount says:--

"Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar trip throughthe provinces of southern Luzón about this same time, under similarfriendly auspices, before we turned friendship to hate and fear andmisery, in the name of Benevolent Assimilation, they would, we nowknow, have found similar conditions. " [299]

So far as concerns the provinces of Mindoro and Palawan, and the greatisland of Mindanao, he dodges the issue, alleging the unimportanceof Mindoro and Palawan, and claiming that "Mohammedan Mindanao"presents a problem by itself. Under such generalities he hides thetruth as to what happened in these regions. 

I agree with him that there was essential identity between actualconditions in the Cagayan valley and those which prevailed underInsurgent rule elsewhere in Luzón and in the Visayas. I will gofurther and say that conditions in the Cagayan valley did not differessentially from those which prevailed throughout all portions ofthe archipelago which fell under Insurgent control, except that inseveral provinces captured friars and other Spaniards were quicklymurdered whereas in the Cagayan valley no friar was quite killedoutright by torture. Those who ultimately died of their injurieslived for some time. 

Let us now consider some of the actual occurrences in these otherprovinces, continuing to follow the route of our tourists until itbrings us back to Manila. 

_South Ilocos_

The first province visited by Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent afterleaving Aparri was South Ilocos. The conditions which had prevailedat Vigan, the capital of the province, shortly before their arrival, are described in a letter signed "Mariano" and addressed under dateof September 25, 1898, to Señor Don Mena Crisólogo, from which Iquote extracts:--

"_Dear Mena_: I read with a happy heart your letter of the 3rd instant, and in answer I have to say:--

"On the 22nd of August a mass meeting was held for the election ofthe local presidente of this town, and I was elected to the office;and on the 1st instant the Colonel appointed me Provisional ProvincialPresident of this province, so that you can imagine the position Iam in and the responsibilities which weigh on me. 

"Your house is occupied by the Colonel, in view of the fact that itis not rented. 

"I have here eleven friar prisoners and the damned priests who escapedfrom here have not as yet been returned, but it is known that theyare prisoners in Cagayan, and as soon as they arrive here I willtreat them as they deserve. 

"It is with great regret that I have to relate the events andmisfortunes which we have been suffering here since the arrival of thetroops, as all the detachments are supported by the towns, and herein the capital where the commissary is established, our resourcesare exhausted, owing to the unreasonable demands of the commissary, because he never asks what is only just and necessary, but if heneeds provisions for 200 men, he always asks enough for 1000. Andnotwithstanding this, the most lamentable and sad occurrences aretaking place almost daily in the different barrios, and often in thetown itself; the soldiers are guilty of many abuses and disorderlyacts, such as rapes and murders, which usually remain unpunished byreason of the real authors thereof not being found, and when they arefound and reported to their commanders, the latter do nothing. Onenight the house and estate of Sario Tinon in Anannam was sacked bysix armed men, who threatened him and took his money, his wife'sjewels and the best horses he had. Thank God that his family was atthe time in the capital, and it appears that now the authors of thisact are being discovered. 

"I am at the present time working with Father Aglipay to havethe forces stationed here replaced by our volunteers which I amrecruiting, in order to prevent in so far as possible the frequentacts of barbarity which the former are committing in the province. 

"When the friars from Lepanto arrived here, they were made to publishthe following proclamation:--

"'_Proclamation_. --We, the friars, declare that all the acts committedby us against the honest Filipinos when we discharged our respectiveoffices, were false and in contravention of the rights of the HolyChurch, because we only wished to deceive and prejudice the honestinhabitants of the Philippines; for which reason we now suffer what weare suffering, as you see, according to the old adage that "he who owesmust pay. " And now we inform all you honest Filipinos that we repentfor the acts above referred to, which are in contravention of the lawsand good customs, and ask your pardon. --_Vigan_, September 13, 1898. '

"All of which I communicate to you in order that you may form anidea of what is taking place here, and take such steps as may beproper for the common good, and especially for the good of this town, hoping that with the aid of your valuable protection the abuses anddisorders suffered by the residents will be stopped. " [300]

The province of Abra, now a subprovince of South Ilocos, was evidentlyno exception to the general rule, for there is on file a letter toAguinaldo with twenty-six signatures, protesting bitterly against theoppression of the poor, in the effort to compel them to contribute wartaxes, complaining against the misuse of supplies gathered ostensiblyfor the soldiers, and stating that the petitioners will be obliged totake refuge with the Igorots and Negritos, if not granted relief. [301]

Apparently the trouble grew, for on December 27, 1898, the "Directorof Diplomacy" telegraphed to Aguinaldo concerning it, saying:--

"Most urgent. The discontent in the provinces of Pangasinán, Tarlac andYloco (Ilocos) is increasing. The town of Bangbang rose in revolt the25th and 26th of this month, and killed all of the civil officials. Itis impossible to describe the abuses committed by the military andcivil authorities of the said provinces. I urge you to send a forceof 100 men and a diplomatic officer to reëstablish order. The matteris urgent. " [302]

I find nothing important in the Insurgent records concerning conditionsin La Union at this time. Pangasinán, Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan, which were now revisited by our tourists, have already been discussed. 

_The Province of Manila_

Conditions in Manila Province, as distinguished from Manila City, left much to be desired. 

Admiral Dewey made a statement applicable to the territory adjacentto the city and bay of Manila in a cablegram to Washington datedOctober 14, 1898, which reads as follows:--

"It is important that the disposition of the Philippine Islands shouldbe decided as soon as possible. . . . General anarchy prevails withoutthe limits of the city and bay of Manila. Natives appear unable togovern. " [303]

Of it Blount says:--

"In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated as true somewild rumours then currently accepted by the Europeans and Americansat Manila which, of course, were impossible of verification. I say'unfortunately' with some earnestness, because it does not appear onthe face of his message that they were mere rumours. And, that theywere wholly erroneous, in point of fact, has already been clearedup in previous chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order, andtranquillity which prevailed throughout Luzón at that time has been, it is believed, put beyond all doubt. " [304]

Blount seems here to have overlooked the fact that the admiralhimself was in Manila Bay and in Manila City at the time he sentthis cablegram. The statements in question were not rumours, theywere deliberate expressions of opinion on the part of a man who hadfirst-hand information and knew what he was saying. 

They were not the Admiral's only allegations on this subject. Whentestifying before the Senate committee he said:--

"_Admiral Dewey_. I knew that there was no government in the whole ofthe Philippines. Our fleet had destroyed the only government therewas, and there was no other government; there was a reign of terrorthroughout the Philippines, looting, robbing, murdering; a reign ofterror throughout the islands. "

_La Laguna_

Having brought our tourist friends safely back to Manila, we mustnow leave them there and strike out by ourselves if we are to seeother provinces. 

La Laguna lies just east of Manila. Of it we learn that:

"Laguna Province was so overrun by bands of robbers that the head ofthe pueblo of San Pablo ordered the people to concentrate in the townto avoid their attacks. " [305]

_Bataan_

The province of Bataan lies just across the bay from Manila. 

"On January 10, 1899, the secretary of the interior directed thegovernor of Bataan Province to ascertain the whereabouts of a numberof men who had just deserted with their rifles from the commandsthere. He was to appeal to their patriotism and tell them that ifthey would but return to their companies their complaints would beattended to and they would be pardoned. " [306]

_Zambales_

Zambales joins Bataan on the west and north. On November 13, 1898, Wenceslao Vinvegra wrote to Aguinaldo describing the state of affairsin this province. From his letter we learn that two brothers namedTeodoro and Doroteo Pansacula, claiming to be governor and brigadiergeneral respectively, who are charged with abandonment of theirposts in the field, disobedience and attempts against the unionof the Insurgents, had been committing all manner of abuses. Theyhad organized a band of cut-throats, armed with rifles and bolos, and were terrorizing the towns, committing robberies and murders andordering that money be furnished for themselves and food for their men. 

They were also encouraging the people to disobey the local authoritiesand refuse to pay taxes, and were promulgating a theory, popular withthe masses, that the time had come for the rich to be poor and thepoor rich. 

They had furthermore induced regular Insurgent troops to rise up inarms. [307]

From this communication it would appear that the Insurgent governmenthad not been entirely effective in Zambales up to November 13th, 1898. 

From other communications we learn that the soldiers at Alaminos wereabout to desert on November 30th, 1898; [308] that it was deemednecessary to restrict travel between Tarlac, Pampanga, Bataan andZambales in order to prevent robberies; [309] and that on January 9, 1899, the governor of the province found it impossible to continuethe inspection of a number of towns, as many of their officials hadfled to escape the abuses of the military. [310] Conditions wereobviously very serious in Zambales at this time. 

_Cavite_

Cavite province lies immediately south of Manila province as thelatter was then constituted. On August 24, 1898, the secretary ofwar wired Aguinaldo that two drunken Americans had been killed byInsurgent soldiers. [311] On the same day General Anderson advisedthe governor of Cavite that one American soldier had been killed andthree wounded by his people, and demanded his immediate withdrawal, with his guard, from the town. [312] The governor asked Aguinaldo forinstructions. Aguinaldo replied instructing the governor to deny thatthe American had been killed by Insurgent soldiers and to claim thathe had met death at the hands of his own companions. The governor wasfurther directed to give up his life before leaving the place. [313]

In view of the definite statement from one of his own officers thatthe soldier in question was killed by Filipino soldiers, Aguinaldo'sinstructions to say that he was killed by Americans are interestingas showing his methods. 

Not only were the Insurgents obviously unable to control their ownsoldiers in Cavite town sufficiently to prevent them from committingmurder, but conditions in the province of the same name left much tobe desired. On December 29, 1898, the governor wired Aguinaldo thatthe town of Marigondong had risen in arms. [314]

It is a well-known fact that land records were destroyed in Cavite. Ofthis matter Taylor says:--

"In Cavite, in Cavite Province, and probably in most of the otherprovinces, one of the first acts of the insurgents who gatheredabout Aguinaldo was to destroy all the land titles which had beenrecorded and filed in the Spanish administrative bureaus. In case theindependence of the Philippines was won, the land of the friars, theland of the Spaniards and of those who still stood by Spain, wouldbe in the gift of Aguinaldo or of any strong man who could imposehis will upon the people. And the men who joined this leader wouldbe rich in the chief riches of the country, and those who refused todo so would be ruined men. " [315]

_Sorsogón_

"The native civil officials who took charge of the government ofSorsogón Province when the Spaniards abandoned it did not think itworth while to hoist the insurgent flag until a force of four companiesarrived there to take station early in November, 1898. The officer incommand promptly ordered the Chinamen in the town of Sorsogón, who areprosperous people, to contribute to the support of his troops. They atonce gave him cloth for uniforms, provisions, and 10, 000 pesos. Thiswas not sufficient, for on November 8 Gen. Ignacio Paua, who seems tohave been the insurgent agent in dealing with the Chinese, complainedthat the troops in Sorsogón were pillaging the Chinamen there. Theyhad killed 13, wounded 19, and ruined a number of others. " [316]

In January, 1899, a correspondent wrote Aguinaldo that it was verydifficult to collect taxes as every one was taking what he could layhis hands on. [317]

_Ambos Camarines_

On September 18, 1898, Elias Angeles, a corporal of the _guardiacivil_, headed an uprising against the Spaniards. The Spanish officerin command, and all of his family, were killed by shooting up throughthe floor of the room which they occupied. Angeles then assumed thetitle of Politico-Military-Governor. 

When the Tagálog Vicente Lucban arrived on his way to Samar, he orderedAngeles to meet him at Magarao, with all his troops and arms, disarmedthe troops, giving their rifles to his own followers, marched intoNueva Caceres and took possession of the entire government. Aguinaldosubsequently made Lucban a general, and sent him on his way to Samar. 

Lucban was succeeded by another Tagálog, "General" Guevara, a veryignorant man, who displayed special ability in making collections, and is reported to have kept a large part of the funds which cameinto his possession. 

Colonel Peña, who called himself "General, " was one of the worst ofthe Tagálog invaders, for they were practically that. He threatenedall who opposed him with death, and summarily shot at least one manin Tigaon. That town subsequently rose against him, and he was badlycut up by the Bicols. [318] On getting out of the hospital he wassent away. 

The daughters of prominent families suffered at the hands of thesevillains. Peña abducted one, a son of Guevara another. Her brotherfollowed young Guevara and killed him. If girls of the best familieswere so treated, how must those of the common people have fared?

Braganza ordered the killing of all Spaniards and Chinese atMinalabag. Some forty-eight Spaniards were murdered. 

Many Chinese were killed at Pasacao; about thirty at Libmanan byorder of Vicente Ursua a Tagálog; more than twenty at Calabanga. 

Conditions became so unbearable that Faustino Santa Ana gatheredaround him all Bicols who were willing to fight the Tag£logs, butthe troubles were finally patched up. 

American troops had little difficulty in occupying Ambos Camarinesand other Bicol provinces, owing to the hatred in which the Tagálogswere held. 

_Mindoro_

Conditions in the important island of Mindoro may be inferred fromthe fact that it became necessary for its governor to issue a decreeon November 10, 1898, which contained the following provisions amongothers:--

"2nd. The local presidentes of the pueblos will not permit any onebelonging to their jurisdiction to pass from one pueblo to another norto another province without the corresponding pass, with a certificateupon its back that the taxes of its holder have been paid. 

"3rd. That from this date no one will be allowed to absent himself fromhis pueblo without previously informing its head who will give him anauthorization on which will be noted the approval of the presidenteof the pueblo. . . . 

"5th. Persons arriving from a neighboring town or province in anypueblo of this province will immediately present themselves before thepresidente of said pueblo with their passes. He will without charge, stamp them with his official seal. " [319]

These are peculiar regulations for a province which is at peace, and as Major Taylor has truly remarked:--

"The form of liberty contemplated by the founders of the PhilippineRepublic was not considered incompatible with a very considerableabsence of personal freedom. " [320]

Later, when travelling through Mindoro, I was told how an unfortunatelegless Spaniard, who had been running a small shop in one of the townsand who was on good terms with his Filipino neighbors, was carriedout into the plaza, seated in a chair, and then cut to pieces withbolos in the presence of his wife and children who were compelled towitness the horrible spectacle!

On this same trip Captain R. G. Offley, then the American Governorof Mindoro, told me while I was at Pinamalayan that the people therewere greatly alarmed because a murderer, liberated under the amnesty, had returned and was prowling about in that vicinity. This man had arather unique record. He had captured one of his enemies, and afterstripping him completely had caused the top of an immense ant-hill tobe dug off. The unfortunate victim was then tied, laid on it, and theearth and ants which had been removed were shovelled back over hisbody until only his head projected. The ants did the rest! Anotherrather unusual achievement of this interesting individual was to tiethe feet of one of his enemies to a tree, fasten a rope around hisneck, hitch a carabao to the rope, and start up the carabao, thuspulling off the head of his victim. Yet this man and others likehim were set at liberty under the amnesty proclamation, in spite ofthe vigorous protests of the Philippine Commission, who thought thatmurderers of this type ought to be hanged. 

And now I wish to discuss briefly an interesting and highlycharacteristic statement of Judge Blount. In referring to conditionsin the Visayan Islands, he says:--

"Of course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But as Luzóngoes, so go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is but the tail tothe Luzón kite. Luzón contains 4, 000, 000 of the 8, 000, 000 people outthere, and Manila is to the Filipino people what Paris is to the Frenchand to France. Luzón is about the size of Ohio, and the other sixislands that really matter, are in size mere little Connecticuts andRhode Islands, and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos. " [321]

This paragraph is no exception to the general rule that the statementsof this author will not bear analysis. One of the other six islandsthat he says really matters is Samar. Its area is 5031 squaremiles. The area of Rhode Island is 1250 square miles. The smallest ofthe six islands named is Bohol, with an area of 1411 square miles. Itcannot be called a little Rhode Island. 

As regards population, Arizona has 122, 931. It is hardly proper tocall either Panay with a population of 743, 646, Cebu with 592, 247, Negros with 460, 776, Leyte with 357, 641, Bohol with 243, 148 or evenSamar with only 222, 690, a mere Arizona, and New Mexico with 195, 310is also a bit behind. 

Luzón really has an area of 40, 969 square miles and a populationof 3, 798, 507. [322] What Blount is pleased to call "the tail to theLuzón kite, " is made up as follows:--

 Island Area (Square Miles) Population Samar 5, 031 222, 690 Negros 4, 881 460, 776 Panay 4, 611 743, 646 Leyte 2, 722 357, 641 Cebu 1, 762 592, 247 Bohol 1, 411 243, 148 Totals 20, 419 2, 620, 148

Even so, the tail is a trifle long and heavy for the kite, but if weare going to compare Luzón with "the Southern Islands, " by which Blountcan presumably only mean the rest of the archipelago, why not really doit? The process involves nothing more complicated than the subtractionof its area and population from those of the archipelago as a whole. 

 Area (Square Miles) Population Philippines 115, 026 7, 635, 426 Luzón 40, 969 3, 798, 507 Difference 74, 057 3, 836, 919

Performing this operation, we discover that the tail would fly awaywith the kite, as Luzón has less than half of the total populationand only a little more than a third of the total area. 

To compare the area or the population of one large island with those ofindividual small ones, in determining the relative importance of theformer in the country of which it makes up a part, is like comparingthe area and population of a great state with those of the individualcounties going to make up other states. 

Blount resorts to a similar questionable procedure in trying to showthe insignificance of Mindoro and Palawan. There are an island ofMindoro and a province of Mindoro; an island of Palawan and a provinceof Palawan. In each case the province, which includes numerous smallislands, as well as the large one from which it takes its name, ismuch larger and more populous than is the main island, and obviouslyit is the province with which we are concerned. 

Even if Blount wished to limit discussion to the Christian nativescommonly called Filipinos, his procedure is still wholly unfair. Ofthese there are 3, 575, 001 in Luzón and 3, 412, 685 in the otherislands. In other words, the Filipino population is almost equallydivided between the two regions. 

As he would not have found it convenient to discuss the conditionswhich arose in Mindanao under Insurgent rule, he attempts to showthat no political importance attaches to them. In the passage abovequoted he does not so much as mention either Mindoro or Palawan(Paragua). Elsewhere, however, he attempts to justify his action bymaking the following statements:--

"The political or governmental problem being now reduced from 3141islands to eleven, the last three [323] of the nine contained in theabove table may also be eliminated as follows: [324]--

"Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of Luzón, pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, isthick with densely wooded mountains and jungle over a large partof its area, has a reputation of being very unhealthy (malarious), is also very sparsely settled, and does not now, nor has it ever, cut any figure politically as a disturbing factor. " [325]

Apart from the fact that the political problem involved in thegovernment of the important islands which Blount would thus leaveout of consideration, is not solved by ignoring it, certain of hisfurther statements cannot be allowed to go uncorrected. 

The allegation that the island has never "cut any figure politicallyas a disturbing factor" is absurd. In the Spanish days its forestsfurnished a safe refuge for evildoers who were from time to timedriven out of Cavite and Batangas. A large proportion of itsFilipino inhabitants were criminals who not infrequently organizedregular piratical expeditions and raided towns in Masbate, Romblonand Palawan. The people of the Cuyos and Calamianes groups livedin constant terror of the Mindoro pirates, and _tulisanes_, [326]who paid them frequent visits. I myself have been at Calapan, thecapital of the province, when the Spanish officials did not dare togo without armed escort as far as the outskirts of the town for fearof being captured and held for ransom. During considerable periodsthey did not really pretend to exercise control over the criminalFilipinos inhabiting the west coast of the island. Conditions asto public order were worse in Mindoro than anywhere else in thearchipelago north of Mindanao and Joló. 

No less absurd are Blount's suggestions as to the generalworthlessness of the island. There are high mountains in itsinterior, and there are great stretches of the most fertile land inthe world along its coast. Its northern and eastern portions havea very heavy and evenly distributed rainfall, and are admirablysuited to the growing of cocoanuts, hemp, cacao, rubber and similartropical products. In this region rice flourishes wonderfully withoutirrigation. There was a time in the past when Mindoro was known as"the granary of the Philippines. " Later its population was decimatedby constant Moro attacks, and cattle disease destroyed its draftanimals, with the result that the cultivated lands were abandonedto a considerable extent and again grew up to jungle, from which, however, it is easy to redeem them. The west coast has strongly markedwet and dry seasons similar to those at Manila. There is abundantwater available for irrigation, furnished by streams which never rundry. Much of the soil is rich, and will grow the best of sugar inlarge quantity. The forests, which now cover extensive areas, aboundin fine woods, and produce rubber and other valuable gums. There areoutcroppings of lignite at numerous points on the island, and in thevicinity of Mt. Halcon is found the finest marble yet discovered inthis part of the world. Gold is also present in some quantity atvarious places. In short, Mindoro is naturally one of the richestislands in the Archipelago. If its tillable lands were under highcultivation, it would support half the population of the Philippines. 

_Palawan_

In endeavouring to show that Palawan is without political importanceBlount has followed precisely the procedure which he adopted in thecase of Mindoro. First, he gives the area and the population of theisland, when he should concern himself with the province. The area ofthe island is 4027 square miles; that of the province, 5238 squaremiles. According to the 1903 census, the population of the islandwas 10, 918, while that of the province, which contains such thicklysettled and fertile islands as Cuyo and Agutaya, was 39, 582. Of course, if one wishes to emphasize the unimportance of Palawan, it is moreconvenient to take the figures for the island. 

Blount says:--

"Paragua, [327] the long narrow island seen at the extreme lowerleft of any map of the archipelago, extending northeast-southwestat an angle of about 45°, is practically worthless, being fit fornothing much except a penal colony, for which purpose it is in factnow used. " [328]

I must deny the truthfulness of his statements, even if we limitour consideration to the island of Palawan. Only 159 of its 4027square miles are utilized for a penal colony. Its natural wealthis simply enormous. It is covered throughout the greater part ofits extent with virgin forest containing magnificent stands of thebest timber. Damar, a very valuable varnish gum, is abundant in itsmountains. Much of the so-called "Singapore cane, " so highly prized bymakers of rattan and wicker furniture, comes from its west coast. Itis a well-watered island, and its level plains, which receive thewash from its heavily forested mountains, have a soil of unsurpassedfertility in which cocoanuts come to bearing in five years or evenless. Incidentally, the greater part of the island lies south ofthe typhoon belt. Malampaya Sound, situated near its northwesternextremity, is one of the world's great harbors. But should we wish torid ourselves of this wonderful island, I may say, without violatingany official confidences, that there was a time when Germany wouldhave been more than pleased to take it off our hands; and indeed ourBritish friends, who were sufficiently interested in it to survey itsome decades ago, might possibly be prevailed upon to accept it!

There are good reasons why Blount thought it convenient to make itappear that Palawan was politically unimportant. Shortly after theoutbreak of hostilities with Spain the Filipino garrison at PuertoPrincesa mutinied, and the things which they did were not nice. Amongothers, they liberated the convicts, Puerto Princesa being at the timea penal colony, and the latter, together with some of the soldiers, started up the east coast of the island, leaving a trail of devastationin their wake. The prosperous town of Tinitian was abandoned as theyapproached it, and was so thoroughly cleaned out by them that it hasnever since been reoccupied except by a few stragglers. Other towns, including Tay-Tay, were raided. 

On November 27, 1899, Aguinaldo's representative in this province wrotehim that the inhabitants were preparing to kill all the Tagálogs andrevolt against Insurgent rule. [329] Later when some of the latterwere anxious to get the people of one of the northern settlements totake them on a short boat journey, these Visayans consented to givethem a lift only on condition that they first allow themselves to bebound, and then took them out to sea and threw them overboard. 

Another thing which Blount would have found it inconvenient to discussis the conduct of the people of Cuyo, at one time the capital ofthe province. On this island, which contains but twenty-one squaremiles, there were in 1903 no less than 7545 inhabitants. They hatedand feared the people of Mindoro and sent messengers to Iloilo, after the Americans had occupied that place, to beg for a garrison ofAmerican troops, and to say that if furnished with an American flagthey themselves would defend it. For some reason they were not giventhe flag, and the sending of a garrison was long delayed. Having grownweary of waiting, they made an American flag of their own, hoistedit, and when the Insurgents from Mindoro came intrenched themselvesand defended it. They were actually being besieged when the Americangarrison finally arrived. Here is one more fact inconsistent withthe theory that the Filipino people were a unit at Aguinaldo's back, and of course the easiest way to get around such an occurrence is toforget to mention it!

_Mindanao_

And now we come to the great island of Mindanao, which all but equalsLuzón in size, having an area of 36, 292 square miles as against the40, 969 of Luzón. Blount's first mention of it is peculiar. 

In connection with the words "the other six islands that reallymatter, " in the passage above cited on page 116 of his book, he hasinserted a foot-note reading as follows:--

"The six main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is always dealtwith in this book as a separate and distinct problem. " [330]

But it was hardly possible for him to dismiss this great island, whichis a little continent by itself, quite so cavalierly and I will quotethe more important of his further and later statements regarding it:--

"While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo, with its36, 000 square miles of area, requires that the Philippine archipelagobe described as stretching over more than one thousand miles fromnorth to south, still, inasmuch as Mindanao only contains about 500, 000people all told, half of them semi-civilized, the governmental problemit presents has no more to do with the main problem of whether, ifever, we are to grant independence to the 7, 000, 000 Christians of theother islands, than the questions that have to be passed on by ourCommissioner of Indian Affairs have to do with the tariff. Mindanao's36, 000 square miles constitute nearly a third of the total area ofthe Philippine archipelago, and more than that fraction of the 97, 500square miles of territory to a consideration of which our attentionis reduced by the process of elimination above indicated. Turningover Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan semi-civilized Moros wouldindeed be 'like granting self-government to an Apache reservationunder some local chief, ' as Mr. Roosevelt, in the campaign of 1900, ignorantly declared it would be to grant self-government to Luzónunder Aguinaldo. Furthermore, the Moros, so far as they can think, would prefer to owe allegiance to, and be entitled to recognition assubjects of, some great nation. Again, because the Filipinos have nomoral right to control the Moros, and could not if they would, thelatter being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the thought ofpossible ultimate domination by the Filipinos, the most uncompromisingadvocate of the consent of the governed principles has not a leg tostand on with regard to Mohammedan Mindanao. Hence I affirm that asto it, we have a distinct separate problem, which cannot be solved inthe lifetime of anybody now living. But it is a problem which need notin the least delay the advent of independence for the other fourteenfifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago--all Christians livingon islands north of Mindanao. It is true that there are some ChristianFilipinos on Mindanao, but in policing the Moros, our governmentwould of course protect them from the Moros. If they did not like ourgovernment, they could move to such parts of the islands as we mightpermit to be incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuchas the 300, 000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao andthe adjacent islets called Jolo (the 'Sulu archipelago, ' so called, 'reigned over' by the sultan of comic opera fame) originallypresented, as they will always present, a distinct and separateproblem, and never did have anything more to do with the Philippineinsurrection against us than their cousins and co-religionists overin near-by Borneo, the task which confronted Mr. Root in the fall of1899, to wit, the suppression of the Philippine insurrection, meantpractically the subjugation of one big island, Luzón, containing halfthe population and one third of the total area of the archipelago, and six neighbouring small ones, the Visayan Islands. " [331]

Now as a matter of fact Mindanao is by no means Mohammedan. TheMohammedan Malays, called Moros, are found here and there along thewestern coast of the Zamboanga peninsula and along the southern coastof the island as far as Davao. They also extend far up the CotabatoRiver and occupy the Lake Lanao region, but that is all. The interiorof the island is for the most part occupied by the members of anumber of non-Christian, non-Mohammedan tribes, while its northernand eastern coasts are inhabited by Visayan Filipinos, of whom thereare many in Zamboanga itself. 

While, as Blount says, the Moros took no part in the insurrectionagainst the United States, the Visayans of Mindanao did, and we hadsome lively tussles with them in Misamis and in Surigao. 

It is indeed unthinkable that we should turn Mindanao over to theMoros. Abandonment of it by us would in the end result in this, as they would take possession of the entire island in the course oftime. Neither the other wild tribes nor the Filipinos could standagainst them. I heartily agree with the conclusion that we must retainthis island for many years before we can settle the problems which itpresents. It is further true that we might retain it and still grantindependence to the remainder of the Philippine Archipelago, but ifwe are to eliminate Mindanao from consideration because the Filipinoshave no right to control the Moros, of whom there are in realityonly about a hundred and fifty-four thousand [332] on the island, and could not if they would, what about Luzón, where there are inreality no less than four hundred and sixty thousand non-Christians, [333] many of whom, like the Ifugaos, Bontoc Igorots, Kalingas andwild Tingians, are fierce fighters and practically all of whom arebitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination byFilipinos, while most of them welcome American rule?

Have the Filipinos any more moral right to control them than theyhave to control the Moros? Could they control them if they would? Andhas the most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governedprinciple "a leg to stand on" in the one case if he lacks it inthe other?

The Filipino politicians are not ready to admit that Filipinos couldnot satisfactorily govern Moros and have even alleged that they didso govern them during the period now under discussion. Let us examinethe facts. 

Aguinaldo attempted to enter into negotiations with the Sultan of Joló, addressing him as his "great and powerful brother, " [334] but thisbrother does not seem to have received his advances with enthusiasm, and the other brothers proceeded to do things to the Filipinos atthe first opportunity. 

José Roa in writing Aguinaldo on January 26, 1899, of conditions inthe province of Misamis says: [335]--

"Hardly had said evacuation of Iligan taken place on the 28th oflast month, when the Moros or Mohammedans of the interior, our mortalenemies since times immemorial on account of their religious fanaticismwhich they carry to extremes, as do their co-religionists in Europeand Asia, and on account of their objection to leading a civilizedlife, began to harry the town of Iligan which is the nearest townto the lake around which is the densest Moro population. Due to theprestige of the local president of that town, Señor Carloto Sariol, and the energy that he showed, after some days of constant firingagainst groups who descended upon the suburbs of the town, he wassuccessful in having them abandon their hostile attitude and promiseto live in peace and harmony with said towns, this verbal agreementbeing participated in by the Dattos of some settlements who did notwish to treat with the Spanish Government. 

"Being acquainted nevertheless with these people, we know by experiencethat the more friendly they appear, the more we must watch againstthem, because as soon as they find a good opportunity they do notfail to take advantage of it to enter the towns for the purpose ofsacking them and kidnapping as many of their inhabitants as possiblein order to reduce them to slavery. "

Immediately after the abandonment of Cotabato by the Spaniards theFilipino residents set up a government there. A few days later the Morodatos, Piang, Ali and Djimbangan, dropped in with their followers, cut off the head of the Filipino _presidente_, served a few otherleading officials and citizens in the same manner, and proceeded toset up a government of their own which was the only government thatthe place had prior to the arrival of the American troops. 

Dato Djimbangan promptly caused the Filipina women of the place tobe stripped and compelled to march before him on the public plaza ina state of nudity. 

At Zamboanga the Moros could have taken the town at any time afterthe Spaniards left had they desired to do so. On the arrival of theAmericans Dato Mandi offered to take it and turn it over to them, but his proposition was declined. 

He subsequently swore to an affidavit relative to conditions underInsurgent rule. It reads as follows:--

"We always had peace in Zamboanga District; except during therevolution of the Filipinos in the year 1899, when for seven or eightmonths there was in existence the so-called Filipino Republic. Duringthat time there was much robbing and killing; the life of a man wasworth no more than that of a chicken; men killed one another forpersonal gain; enemies fought one another with the bolo instead ofsettling their differences before the law. It was a time of bloodshedand terror. There was no justice. Because of this the Moros wereopposed to the Filipinos. There was conflict between the better classof Filipinos and the revolutionists, who had gained control of thelocal government. " [336]

Elsewhere throughout the Moro territory those Filipinos who didnot promptly make their escape were murdered or enslaved. In short, the lion and the lamb lay down together, with the lamb inside as usual. 

Thus it will be seen that this first and last attempt of Filipinosto govern Moros did not result in complete success. 

Baldomero Aguinaldo made a subsequent attempt to open communicationwith the Sultan of Joló, authorizing him to establish in all the_rancherias_ of Mindanao and Joló a government in accordance with adecree duly transmitted. The Sultan was requested to report the resultof his efforts and to give the number of his forces with their arms, and was advised that, "if in this war, which I consider to be the last, we secure our independence and with the opposition of our brothersin that region, with yourself at their head, we are successful inpreventing the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country willalways render a tribute of homage and gratitude to your memory. " [337]Curiously, the Sultan seems to have remained unmoved by the appeal. 

_Masbate_

This tight little island of 1236 square miles had in 1903 a Visayanpopulation of 29, 451. Its people are all Filipinos, and are on thewhole rather an unusually orderly and worthy set. There is no reasonwhy it should have been excluded in considering "the human problemin its broader governmental aspect, " whatever that may be, nor can Iunderstand why Blount should have desired to exclude it except thathe seems to have been endeavouring to exclude everything possibleoutside of Luzón, in order to increase the apparent importance ofthe Christian provinces of that island. Masbate should of course betaken into account in connection with the Visayan Islands, of whichit is one. 

The islands ordinarily included in the group known as "The Visayas"from the ancient tribal name of the civilized Filipino people whoinhabit them, who are called Visayans, are Samar, Panay, Negros, Leyte, Cebú, Bohol, Masbate, Tablas, Romblon, Ticao, Burias, Siquijorand numerous smaller islands adjacent to those named. Although theirinhabitants are all rated as one people, they speak a number of more orless distinct dialects. Only Panay, Negros, Samar, Tablas and Sibuyanhave non-Christian inhabitants, and in the three islands last namedtheir number is so small as to be negligible. In the mountains of Panayand Negros, however, Negritos are to be found in considerable numbers, as are the representatives of a tribe sometimes called _Monteses_ [338]and sometimes Bukidnon. The latter tribal designation I have thoughtit best to reserve for certain inhabitants of northern Mindanao. 

In the Visayas, Palawan and Mindanao the government of Aguinaldowas established at various places and different times, withoutconsulting or considering the will of the people. The men who went ashis delegates were supported by armed forces, hence their authoritywas not at first questioned, but soon there arose murmurings whichmight easily have grown into a war cry. 

The attitude of the Visayan Filipinos is clearly foreshadowed in thefollowing extract from a letter dated January 14, 1899, in which Mabinidiscussed the advisability of putting the constitution in force:--

"And even if this change is made, I fear that Negros and Iloílo willform a federal Republic and not one in conformity with the centralizedRepublic provided for by the Constitution. " [339]

The action later taken by Negros shows that there was abundant reasonfor this fear. 

As late as February 26, 1899, the Insurgent government was stillignorant as to the real conditions in Negros and Mindanao. [340]

From a letter written on March 18, 1899, to Apacible at Hongkong, welearn that Aguinaldo and his followers were even then still uninformedas to events in the Visayan Islands. [341] In view of these facts, how ridiculous become the contentions of those who claim that theMalolos government represented the archipelago as a whole. And whatshall we say of the following statement, remembering that the Treatyof Paris was signed December 10, 1899?

"When the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in possessionof Cavite and Manila, with less than twenty thousand men under hiscommand, and Aguinaldo was in possession of practically all of therest of the archipelago with between 35, 000 and 40, 000 men under hiscommand, armed with guns, and the whole Filipino population were insympathy with the army of their country. " [342]

Ultimately, by one means or another, and chiefly by the use of armedemissaries, the Visayan Islands, with the exception of Negros, werebrought into the Insurgent fold. 

Mabini's fear that Negros and Iloilo would form a federal republicwas not realized, but Negros set up its own government, applied to thelocal commander of the United States forces for help, endeavoured withalmost complete success to keep out Tagálog invaders, and presentlysettled down contentedly under American rule, facts of which Blountmakes no mention. On the contrary, without just cause, he includesthis great island, with its 4881 square miles of territory and its560, 776 inhabitants, in the area over which he claims that Aguinaldoexercised complete control. 

At Iloilo the American troops encountered opposition when they plannedto land. Negotiations had been entered into with the local Filipinoofficers, but the latter, under the influence of representativeswhom Aguinaldo had sent from Luzón, announced themselves as adherentsof his government, and when the American troops finally disembarkedfired the town ahead of them. It has been claimed that in doing thisthey were inspired by pure patriotism, but the facts shown by theirown records present a very different picture. 

In writing to Aguinaldo on April 8, 1899, Mabini says:

"We have received a communication forwarded from Iloílo, from GeneralMartin Delgado and Francisco Soriano, your commissioner. Soriano statesthat the troops of Diocno have done nothing except commit excessesand steal money during the attack by the Americans upon the town ofIloílo, even going so far as to break their guns by using them aspoles to carry the stolen money which they took to Cápiz. It is saidthat these forces, besides being unwilling to fight the Americans, refuse to give their guns to those who do wish to fight and do not wantCápiz to aid the people of Iloílo, who are the ones who support theentire forces, including the troops of Diocno who went there. " [343]

This same letter contains the following brief reference to conditionsin Cebu and Leyte:--

"Also a native priest, Señor Pascual Reyes, has arrived here fromCebú, and says that in Leyte General Lucban is committing many abusesand that Colonel Mójica is only a mere figurehead. In Cebú, he says, things are also in a chaotic condition, because the military chief, Magsilum [Maxilom, --TR. ], and the people are not in harmony. "

Further details as to conditions in Cebu are given in a letter toAguinaldo from the commissioner whom he put in charge of electionsin that island, who on February 19, 1899, writes: [344]--

"Having arrived in this province the 8th of last month, I left on the11th for the northern pueblos of this Island to hold the electionsfor the offices ordered by the Superior Decree of June 18, last. 

 * * * * *

"The news spread like an electric spark, as in all the pueblos Ivisited later I found that almost all of the residents were in theirhomes, so that when the elections were held in the town hall, all theprincipal residents attended, requesting me to inform you that theywere disposed to sacrifice even their dearest affections whenevernecessary for our sacred cause; they only asked me to inform thosewho hold the reins of government at the present time in this province, that some steps be taken to put a stop to the arbitrary acts which hadbeen and still are being committed by the so-called Captains, Majors, Colonels, Generals and Captains General, who abusing in the mostbarefaced manner the positions they claimed to hold, were deprivingthem of their horses and their carabaos, or cattle. I promised themthat I would do this, as I do now, by sending a communication at onceto Sres. Flores and Maxilom, who are at the head of the provincialgovernment, impressing upon them the fact that if they continue togrant ranks and titles to persons of this character, as they have done, it would end in the utter ruin of this wealthy province. "

He adds that these men did not remedy the evils complained of. Itwould be possible to cover in detail all of this and the remainingInsurgent territory, and to show that Judge Blount was quite right instating that conditions similar to those encountered in Luzón arosethere, but the limitations of time and space forbid, and I must askmy readers to accept on faith the statements of Blount and myselfthat such was the case!

Taylor thus summarizes the conditions which ultimately arose:--

"The Insurgent soldiers lived in their own land as they would havelived in a conquered country. They were quartered on the towns andthe towns had to feed them whether they would or not. 

"Peace there was where Aguinaldo's soldiers had not penetrated, but there does not seem to have been progress. Life went very wellin a long siesta in the shady villages under the palm trees, but notonly the structure of the State, its very foundations were fallingapart. When Aguinaldo's soldiers came they brought cruelty and licensewith them. Proud of their victories and confident in themselves theyfelt that the labourers in the fields, the merchants in the towns, were for the purpose of administering to their necessities andtheir desires. Aguinaldo, having seen this force gather about him, was forced to entreat it, to appeal to it; he was never strong enoughto enforce discipline, even if he cared to do it. "

Aguinaldo himself finally became disheartened over his inability tomaintain a decent state of public order in the territory which heclaimed to govern, and in December, 1898, tendered his resignation, giving among other reasons odious favouritism on the part of some ofthe military chiefs, together with a desire to enrich themselves byimproper means, such as accepting bribes, making prisoners a sourceof gain, and decreasing the allowance of the soldiers. He said thatmany soldiers had received sums of money as their share of booty, and intimated that officers must have done the same. He made chargesagainst civil as well as military officers and ended by saying thathe retained the evidence for presentation when called on. [345]

Aguinaldo was later persuaded to withdraw his resignation. No wonderthat he wished to tender it!

In referring to the report of Wilcox and Sargent, Blount has said:--

"This report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey under date ofNovember 23, 1898, and by him forwarded to the Navy Department forits information, with the comment that it 'in my opinion contains themost complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to thepresent state of the northern part of Luzon Island. ' The Admiral'sindorsement was not sent to the Senate along with the report. " [346]

He thus gives it to be understood that the admiral believed that thereport truthfully set forth the conditions which actually existed inthese provinces, and that his indorsement was suppressed. Not only wasit true that this report when rendered contained the most completeand reliable information then available in regard to the existingstate of the northern part of Luzon Island, but it contained the onlyfirst-hand information available. The facts ultimately leaked out andled the admiral radically to change his opinion as to the conditionswhich arose under Insurgent rule. Of them he later said:--

"There was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no government. Thesepeople had got power for the first time in their lives and they wereriding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty which werebrought to my notice were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldothat he must treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he would. "

I believe that I have fully demonstrated the truth of thesestatements. Blount was thoroughly familiar with Dewey's testimonybefore the Senate Committee, in which they occur, but he did notmention them. 

I cannot close this discussion of Insurgent rule without quotingextracts from a remarkable document written by Isabelo Artachoin October, [347] 1899. It was entitled "Declaration Letter andProclamation" and was addressed to the Filipino people. While it isprobable that Artacho was impelled to tell the truth by his hatred forAguinaldo, tell the truth he did, and his rank and standing entitlehis statements to consideration:--

"Study the work of the insurrection; see if it is, as is said, thefaithful interpretation of your wishes and desires. 

"Go through your towns, fields, and mountains. Wherever you see aninsurgent gun or bolo you will find girls and faithful wives violated, parents and brothers crying for the murder of a son or of a brother;honest families robbed and in misery; villages burned and plunderedfor the benefit of a chief or a General; you will see fresh and livingsigns yet of those horrible crimes perpetrated with the greatestcynicism by those who call themselves your liberators! Liberatorsbecause they wear red pants, or a red shirt, or carry on their hatsa piece of red cloth or a triangular figure!

"Here, a president stabs a man, perhaps the most honest of the village, simply for having implored mercy for a creature arbitrarily inflictedwith the _cepo_ [an oblong square piece of heavy wood divided into twoparts, with a lock at each end and six or more holes in the middleto confine the feet of prisoners]; there, a dying man, suspendedby the feet in a _cepo_, raised from the level of the ground, byanother president who has charged him with an unproved crime; therea poor woman falsely charged and driven by petty officers with theirbayonets for having objected to their invasion into her house, or shop, they being supposed to be, each, Justice itself, '_Justicia_, ' and tobe obeyed as images of the Gods; there, generals who murder withoutfear, for an insignificant motive, creatures whose members are beingmutilated, or their flesh cut in slices and afterwards roasted andgiven them to eat; there, officers braining a girl who has refusedto accede to their sensual wishes, the lifeless body of the victim, pierced with shots, after having been made use of, is thrown into theriver. It is not unusual to witness officers burying people alivein a tomb prepared by the victim, by order of the murderer; it isnot unusual to see a _Puisne_-Judge pointing a revolver at a man whois about to give evidence, and threatening to brain him for havingdared to ask: 'Why and to whom am I to declare?' And finally, on histottering throne, you will see the Magistrate of the Philippines, socalled by his worshippers, with his mephistophelian smile, disposingand directing the execution of a murder, of a plunder, of a robbery, orthe execution of some other crimes against those who are indifferent ordo not care to worship him, such indifference being considered a crime. 

"Putting aside the many other murders, I may mention that one recentlycommitted on the person of the renowned and by many called the worthyGeneral, Antonio Luna, which took place just at the entrance of thepalace of the Republic Presidency, and also the assassination at Kaviteof the ever remembered martyr, Andrés Bonifacio, the founder of the'Katipúnan' Society, and the one who initiated the Revolution of 1896;against the memory of whom it has been committed, in the proclamationof that falsely called Republic, the criminal and unjust omission torender the smallest manifestation of Filipinos' feelings towards him, to prevent that same might dislike his murderers!

"Study the ordinances and constitution of this so-called democraticGovernment of the Republic, that grand work of the wise Filipinos;admire with me that beautiful monument erected on a sheet of paperand consecrated to the conquest of reason and labour, especially inconnection with human rights and property, the basis for the well-beingof social life; but, lament and deplore with me its palpable nullitywhen brought to practice and you will again see that the laws weremade for the people and not the people for the laws!

"Under this republic called democratic it is a crime to think, to wish, to say, anything which does not agree with what the said Gods think, wish and say. Nobody and nothing is attended to, whilst those whohave your lives in their hands must be respected. 

"Under this Goverment there cannot be the slightest notice taken offamily, property, morality and iustice, but confusion and disorderappear everywhere like a dreadful shadow, produced by the ignorance ofthe subordinate officers, and of the powers that be in the villagesand provinces, who are supported by a special committee, or specialcommissioners empowered to impoverish and to ruin all and with theright of disposing, at their own accord, life, family and individualproperty without responsibility whatsoever on their part. 

 * * * * *

"Let the peaceful annexation of the whole of the Southern Islands ofJoló, Mindanao, Iloílo, Negros, Cebú and others where now the Americanflag is hoisted and under whose shadow tranquillity and well-beingare experienced, speak for itself. 

"Let it speak for itself, the proceeding observed by the whole peopleof Imus, who were asking protection when the American troops tookpossession of the town of Bacoor, whilst the insurgent troops therelocated were hostile. 

"Let them speak for themselves, the protests against the war made bythe numerous persons of S. Francisco de Malabón, Sta. Cruz de Malabón, Perez Dasmariñias and other towns, before the Worthy Chief MarianoTrías, who ultimately refused, with dignity, the high position ofSecretary of War, for which rank he was promoted for reasons whichare not worth publishing here. In fine, let it speak for itself, thenon-resistance shown by the people of Old Kavite [Kawit], Noveleta, and Rozario of the heroic province of Kavite, notwithstanding themany intrenchments and troops there located, as well as the identicalbehaviour observed by other towns of Luzon provinces who are readyto follow when the American troops are in them. 

 * * * * * * *

"In fact no one would believe it, and the Philippine people aretired of waiting for the day when Haring Gavino will shake a napkinto produce suddenly horses vomiting fire and lightning and troops ofdangerous insects; that day in which they will witness the realizationof that famous telegraphed dream to the effect that two hours afterthe commencement of the war the insurgents will take their breakfastin the Palace of 'Malacañang, ' their tiffin in the Senate House, andtheir dinner on board the _Olympia_ or in Kavite; that day in whichthe celebrated _Pequenines_ army, with their invisible Chief-leader, will exterminate the American troops by means of handfuls of dustand sand thrown at them, which process, it is said, has caused thesmallpox to the Americans; that day in which the _Colorum_ army willcapture the American fleet with the cords their troops are providedwith, in combination with a grand intrenchment of Tayabas made ofhusks of paddy, by a Nazarene, who will then, by merely touching, convert each husk into a Bee with a deadly sting; that day in whichthe insurgents, like their leaders, provided with hosts of flour, or of paper, pieces of candles of the holy-week matins, holy water, pieces of consecrated stones; of vestments belonging to a miraculousSaint or with some other Anting-Anting or talisman or _amuletos_, will make themselves invulnerable to bullets; also have power toconvert into any of the four elements, like those personages of thePhilippine legends and comedies, --Ygmidio, Teñoso, Florante, Barnardo, Carpio, etc. 

"Yes, the people of the Philippines are quite tired of waiting forthe predicted European conflict, which it is said would give themtheir independence; if not, perhaps, divide the Islands as they arenow amongst cousins, brothers, nephews, uncles and godfathers. 

"In the near future, when we have acquired the necessary political andsocial education and the habit of behaving justly towards ourselvesand towards our fellow-brothers; when free from all superstition, healthy, strong and vigorous, we find ourselves capable of governingourselves, without there being the possibility of the preponderanceof our passions in the consideration, direction, and administrationof the interests of our country, then, and only then, we will befree! we will be independent! [348]

"_Hongkong_, 1st October, 1899. "

Most of the men who perpetrated the outrages I have detailed are aliveto-day, and are powers in their respective communities. Simeon Villawas recently elected a member of the municipal board from the southdistrict of Manila, but fortunately an American governor-generalprevented him from taking his seat. Just prior to my departure fromManila he was appointed, by Speaker Osmeña, a member of a committeeon reception for Governor-General Harrison. 

The kind of independent "government" these men established is thekind that they would again establish if they had the chance, [349]but among the persons to be tortured and murdered would now be thoseAmericans who failed to escape seasonably. I do not mean to saythat such a state of affairs would come about immediately, but itwould certainly arise within a comparatively short time. Sooner yet"the united Filipino people" would split up on old tribal lines, and fly at each other's throats. 

CHAPTER VIII

Did We Destroy a Republic?

The claim has frequently been made that the United States governmentdestroyed a republic in the Philippine Islands, [350] but some ofthe critics seem to entertain peculiar ideas as to what a republicis. Blount states [351] that Aguinaldo declined to hear our declarationof independence read "because we would not recognize his right toassert the same truths, " and then apparently forgetting the Insurgentchief's alleged adherence to the principles of this dacument, helets the cat out of the bag by saying that "the war satisfied us allthat Aguinaldo would have been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz, "and would himself have been "The Republic. " [352]

He would doubtless have set up just this sort of a government, ifnot assassinated too soon, but it would hardly have accorded with theprinciples of the declaration of independence, nor would it have beenexactly "a government of the people, by the people, for the people. "

Blount truly says [353] that the educated Filipinos, admittedlyvery few in number, absolutely control the masses. He adds [354]that _presidentes_ of pueblos are as absolute bosses as is Murphyin Tammany Hall, and that the towns taken collectively constitutethe provinces. The first statement is true, and the second, whichis tantamount to a declaration that the _presidentes_ control everysquare foot of the provinces and every man in them, is not so farfrom the truth as it might be. I have been old-fashioned enough toretain the idea that a republic is "a state in which the sovereignpower resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised byrepresentatives elected by them. "

Blount labored under no delusion as to the fitness of the commonpeople to govern. [355]

Not only did the Filipinos themselves understand perfectly well thatthey had no republic, but there were many of them who were fullyaware of the fact that they could establish none. Fernando Acevedo, in writing to General Pío del Pilar on August 8, 1898, said: [356]--

"There could be no republic here, even though the Americans shouldconsent, because, according to the treaties, the Filipinos are not incondition for a republic. Besides this, all Europe will oppose it, and if it should be that they divide our country as though it werea round cake, what would become of us and what would belong to us?"

I will now trace the evolution of the government which Aguinaldo didset up. In doing so I follow Taylor's argument very closely, drawingon his unpublished Ms. , not only for ideas, but in some instances forthe words in which they are clothed. I change his words in many cases, and do not mean to unload on him any responsibility for my statements, but do wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to him and at the sametime to avoid the necessity for the continual use of quotation marks. 

Aguinaldo's methods in establishing his republic are shown by his order[357] that "any person who fights for his country has absolute powerto kill any one not friendly to our cause" and the further order[358] prescribing that twelve lashes should be given to a soldierwho lost even a single cartridge, while if he continued to wasteammunition he should be severely punished. In March, 1899, workmenwho had abandoned their work in the arsenal at Malolos were arrested, returned, given twenty-five lashes each and then ordered to work. [359]

The news that an American expedition was about to sail for thePhilippines made him realize that he had not much more than a monthin which to place himself in a position in which he would have to beconsulted and assisted, and this he tried to do. The arms he receivedfrom Hongkong on May 23 enabled him to begin an insurrection, notas an ally of the United States, but on his own account. From May 21to May 24 he issued orders for the uprising against Spain. On May 24he declared himself Dictator of the Philippines in a proclamation inwhich he promised to resign his power into the hands of a presidentand cabinet, to be appointed when a constitutional assembly wasconvened, which would be as soon as the islands had passed intohis control. He further announced that the North American nationhad given its disinterested protection in order that the liberty ofthe Philippines should be gained. [360] On May 25, 1898, the firstAmerican troops sailed from San Francisco for the Philippines. 

Aguinaldo still had a month in which to seize enough Spanish territoryto erect thereon what would appear to the Americans on their arrival tobe a government of Luzón, of which he was the head. The Hongkong juntaand Aguinaldo himself intended to ask for the recognition of theirgovernment, but they had first to create it. To obtain recognitionit was necessary that the American commander on land should be ableto report that wherever he or his troops had gone the country wasruled by Aguinaldo according to laws which showed that the peoplewere capable of governing themselves. 

As the United States is a republic it was natural that the directinggroup of insurgent leaders should decide upon a republican form ofgovernment. That form would appeal to the people of the United States;the first "Christian Asiatic Republic" was a description which wouldinevitably awaken sympathy in that mother of republics. The idea was awise and subtle one; but Aguinaldo's republic was merely an elaboratestage-setting, arranged for the contemplation of the people of theUnited States. 

By June 5, 1898, the success of the insurgent arms had been such thatAguinaldo felt that he could throw down the mask. He would stillbe glad of American assistance, but he felt himself strong enoughto do without it. He saw that "there can now be proclaimed beforethe Filipino people and the civilized nations its only aspiration, namely, the independence of this country, which proclamation shouldnot be delayed for any ulterior object of this government" [361] andordered that the independence of the Philippines should be proclaimedat his birthplace, Cavite Viejo, on June 12, 1898. On that date heformally proclaimed it. The provinces of Cavite, Bataan, Pampanga, Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Morong were about to fall into his hands, the Spanish troops in them being besieged, and about to surrender. 

From the same place on June 18, 1898, Aguinaldo promulgated his decreefor the creation and administration of municipalities. [362] In brief, this provided that as soon as the territory of the archipelago, or anyportion thereof, had passed from the possession of Spanish forces, thepeople in the towns who were most conspicuous for their intelligence, social position and upright conduct were to meet and elect a towngovernment. The heads of the towns in every province were to electa head for the province and his three counsellors. The provincialcouncil, composed of these four officials, with the presidente of thecapital of the province, were to see to the execution in that provinceof the decrees of the central government and to advise and suggest. 

This provincial council was to elect representatives for therevolutionary congress, which was to be charged with submittingsuggestions to the central government upon interior and exterioraffairs, and was to be heard by the government upon serious matterswhich admitted of delay and discussion. 

Before any person elected to office was permitted to dischargehis functions, his election was to be approved by the centralgovernment. The military commanders, except in time of war, wereto have no jurisdiction over the civil authorities. They could, however, demand such supplies as they might need, and these couldnot be refused. The government was to appoint commissioners to carrythese regulations into effect. 

On June 20 Aguinaldo issued his regulations for the government ofprovinces and municipalities [363] as supplemental to the decreeof two days before. It went into the details of government, underthe following heads: police, justice, taxation and registrationof property. 

On June 23 he proclaimed the establishment of a revolutionarygovernment, with himself as "president. " In this capacity he had allthe powers of the Spanish governor-general, unhampered by any ordersfrom Spain. It is true that the scheme provided for the eventualformation of a republic, but it is doubtful if the people who drew itup really knew what that word meant. What was provided for in practicewas a strong and highly centralized military dictatorship, in which, under the form of election, provision was made for the filling ofall offices by men devoted to the group which had seized control. 

According to this decree the dictatorial government was in future tobe entitled the revolutionary government. Its duty was to strugglefor the independence of the Philippines in order to estabish atrue republic. The dictator was to be known as the president of therevolutionary government. There were to be four secretaries--one offoreign affairs, commerce and marine; one of war and public works;one of police and interior order, justice, education and hygiene;one of the treasury, agriculture and manufactures. The governmentcould increase the number of secretaries if necessary. They were toassist the president in the despatch of business coming under theirdepartments. 

In addition to the president and his secretaries, there was to be arevolutionary congress composed of representatives from the provincesof the Philippine Archipelago, elected as provided by the decree ofJune 18. In case a province was not able to elect representatives, the government would appoint them for such province. The congresswas to discuss and advise, to approve treaties and loans, and toexamine and approve the accounts of the secretary of the treasury. Ifimportant matters admitted of delay, the congress would be heardconcerning them; but if they did not admit of delay, the president ofthe government was to act at once. Projects of law could be presentedby any representative, and by the secretaries of the government. 

A permanent committee of congress presided over by the vice-presidentwas to be chosen by that body. This was to serve as a court of appealin criminal cases and as a court of final jurisdiction in casesarising between the secretaries of the government and provincialofficials. The acts of congress were not to go into effect until thepresident of the government ordered their execution. He was also tohave the right of veto. 

This was a well-devised plan to secure control for the centralgroup about Aguinaldo. His commissioners, under a form of electionin which the electors were carefully selected men, establishedmunicipal governments devoted to the cause of the revolution. Thesewere to choose provincial officials and members of the congress. Allelections were subject to Aguinaldo's approval, and every provincewas under the command of a military representative of his, who couldand did call upon the civil authorities for such supplies as he deemedfit. All real power was vested in the central group, and the centralgroup was composed of Emilio Aguinaldo and his public and privateadvisers. By this time he had gathered about him men who were trainedin the law, some of whom had served the Spanish government in variouscapacities. They were accustomed to the methods that had previouslyprevailed under the Spanish régime, and were now ready to draw upconstitutions and regulations for the new government. Mabini wrotethe three organic decrees. Copies of them were sent to the foreignconsuls in Manila, and on July 15, 1898 to Admiral Dewey. 

Although the title of "president" was assumed by Aguinaldo, asmore likely to be favourably considered in the United States than"dictator, " the tendency of his followers who had not been educatedin Europe was to speak of and to regard him not as a president, but as an overlord holding all power in his hands. The people didnot feel themselves citizens of a republic, copartners in an estate;they considered themselves subject to a ruler who sometimes calledhimself president, and sometimes dictator. Indeed, there is much toshow that if Aguinaldo and his followers had succeeded in their plans, even the name "republic" would not have been long continued as thetitle of his government. [364]

Aguinaldo's claim as to the effectiveness of his government on August6, 1898, was as follows: [365] "The government of the revolutionactually rules in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Infanta andbesieges the capital, Manila. The most perfect order and tranquillityreign in these provinces, governed by authorities elected by theinhabitants in conformity with the organic decrees dated June 18 and23 last. Moreover, the revolution has about nine thousand prisoners ofwar who are treated humanely and according to the rules of civilizedwarfare. We can muster more than thirty thousand men organized as aregular army. "

It may have been that in the majority of these provinces municipalgovernments, formed in accordance with the provisions of the decree ofJune 18, had been established; but provincial governments had not beenestablished in all of them, and tranquillity did not reign in any ofthem, as they were the scene of operations against the Spaniards. Therecould not well have been nine thousand prisoners in his hands at thistime, as that was claimed later when a large additional number ofSpaniards had surrendered. As for the thirty thousand men organized asa regular army, there may be a certain difference of opinion as to whatconstitutes a regular army; the men who saw Aguinaldo's force then, and who have read the papers of its leaders, must be of the opinionthat that force was not a regular army. Probably only Manila Provincehad a provincial government on August 6. Its local presidentes met atCavite Viejo on August 3 and elected three members of congress fromthe province, and also the members of the provincial government. Theelection took place under the supervision of Colonel Teodoro Gonzales, whom Aguinaldo had appointed governor of Manila Province on August1. He remained governor after the election was held. Not until August17 did the local presidentes of Bulacan assemble under the presidencyof the secretary of the interior and proceed to elect two members tocongress and the members of the provincial government. Not until August20 was there an election for the members of the provincial governmentof Cavite Province. This was held in the town of Cavite. Isaac FernandoRios, who was afterwards a member of the Filipino junta in Madrid, was chosen a representative of the province; but as he wrote that hewas in favour of coming to some agreement with Spain which would permitthe development of the Philippines, without abandoning the sovereigntyof that country, Aguinaldo promptly disapproved his election [366]and ordered a new one held for the office thus left vacant. On October2, 1899, Aguinaldo approved the result of a new election held therebecause four of the five high officials of the province had absentedthemselves, while one of them had died. Of the men who had so absentedthemselves one had gone abroad, while the other three had remainedin Manila or Cavite under the government of the United States. [367]

The people of the provinces obeyed the men who had arms in theirhands. It is not probable that many of them had any convictionconcerning the form of government which would be best for thePhilippines. There were no signs of a spontaneous desire for arepublic. Orders came from the group about Aguinaldo, and the peopleaccepted a dictator and a republic as they accepted a president anda republic, without knowing, and probably without caring very much, what it all meant, except that they hoped that taxes would cease withthe departure of the friars. A determined and well-organized minorityhad succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized, heterogeneous, and leaderless majority. 

As soon as a province was occupied by the Insurgents it was dividedinto territorial zones within which command was exerted by militaryofficers. On July 20, 1898, Cavite had been divided into four zones, and next day Brigadier-General Artemio Ricarte was placed in commandof the province and the first zone. 

By July 7 Bulacan Province had been divided into six zones, and NuevaEcija into four zones, with a separate commander for each zone. Thesemen established the government prescribed by Aguinaldo's decrees ofthe middle of June. Probably by the end of July Aguinaldo's municipalgovernments had been established in the greater part of the townsof Luzón. These governments were not established by the mass of thepeople. The mass of the people were not consulted, but they were notin the habit of being consulted in such matters and probably saw nonecessity for it in this case. As an evidence of this we have the factthat from the beginning the acts of election were almost always drawnup in Spanish, although by far the greater portion of the people ofthe archipelago spoke only the native dialects. 

The method of establishing these municipal governments employed inCavite in June, 1898, was continued to the end of Aguinaldo's rule. Itwas the same in different places and at different times. Data obtainedfrom reports and documents written in towns far removed from eachother follow. They must be considered together in order to obtain anidea of what this method really was. 

When the Insurgent movement had progressed sufficiently far, theleaders collected their adherents and obtained recognition as theheads of their provinces or districts. For example, representativesof the towns of Pampanga assembled at San Fernando on June 26, 1898, and under the presidency of General Maximo Hizon agreed toyield him "complete obedience as military governor of the provinceand representative of the illustrious dictator of these PhilippineIslands. " [368] The town of Macabebe refused to send any delegatesto this gathering. Commissioners, in almost every case officers ofAguinaldo's army, were empowered by him to establish the so-calledrepublican government. They appointed delegates who proceeded tothe smaller towns and held elections; but whenever possible thecommissioner of Aguinaldo presided. In many cases these delegates werelieutenants of the army. The commissioners selected the electors, for they had all to be "marked out by their good conduct, theirwealth, and their social position, " and they had all to be in favourof independence. They then presided at the elections, which were_viva voce_. They apparently selected the people to be elected, andforwarded a record of the proceedings to the central government. Theelection had to be approved by the dictator or president before thesuccessful candidates could assume the duties of their offices. Lateron, the military commanders remote from the seat of government wereauthorized to approve elections and install the successful candidates, but the records of election had even then to be forwarded to thecapital for approval, the action of the commissioner not being final. 

The commissioners do not seem to have been able to find many menwho had the necessary requisites for electors. In the town of Lipa, Batangas Province, with a population of forty thousand seven hundredforty-three, at the election held July 3, 1898, a presidente was chosenfor whom twenty-five votes were cast. On November 23, 1898, an electionwas held at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, for a presidente to succeed one who hadbeen elected representative in congress. One hundred and sixteen voteswere cast. The population of Vigan is nineteen thousand. On October 5, 1898, at Echague, Isabela Province, a presidente was elected for whomfifty-four votes were cast. The population of Echague is fifty-fourthousand. On October 2, 1898, at Cabagan Nuevo, Isabela, one hundredand eleven men voted out of a population of sixty-two hundred andforty. On January 29, 1899, the town of Hernani, in Samar, elected itsmunicipal officials under the supervision of V. Lukban. Fifty-four menvoted. The town has a population of twenty-five hundred and fifty-five. 

The elections, so-called, were not always held without protest. Forexample, the town of San José, Batangas, protested unavailinglyto Aguinaldo against the result of an election held at 10 P. M. , in a storm of rain. Men who had been on friendly terms with theSpaniards were usually excluded from all participation. If in spiteof the precautions taken men were elected who were disliked by thecommissioner or his supporters, the election could be set aside on theground that the person elected was not an adherent of the revolution. 

The elections were often held in a singular manner, as in the followingcase: [369]--

"On August 20, 1898, four men of Tondo appeared before Aguinaldo onBacoor and announced that they were representatives of the peopleof the district, who loved liberty. Then in accordance with thedirections of the president of the republic under the supervision ofthe secretary of the interior, they drew lots from a hat to decide howthe offices of the head of the district, delegate of police, delegateof the treasury and delegate of justice were to be distributed. Thedecision having been made in this simple fashion, Aguinaldo gravelyapproved the election as expressing the will of the people. Perhapsit did, for they seem to have continued, at least for a time, to obeythem. On November 14, 1898, Aguinaldo again approved an election forlocal officials in Tondo which since August 13 had been within theAmerican lines. "

On August 23 San Carlos, in Pangasinán Province, a town of twenty-threethousand people, elected its officials under the new form ofgovernment. The presidente chosen was a well-known member of theKatipúnan, and before the election was held announced his intentionof killing any one who was chosen for the position for which he was acandidate. [370] He was accordingly elected. In spite of this graveinformality, an informality which formed one ground for a proteston the part of some of the people of the town, Aguinaldo approvedthe election. 

On October 21, 1898, an election was held under the supervision ofthe military commander in Camarines for the municipal officials of thetown of Yriga. [371] The voting was oral, and a secretary wrote downthe votes for the two candidates under direction of the commissioner, who finally announced that the candidate whose friend he was had beenelected, but without stating how many votes he had received. Thisnewly elected head of the town had the town crier on the followingnight publish through the streets an address to the people, in whichhe thanked those who had voted for him and warned those who had notthat it would be well for them to beware. The Spanish law known asthe Maura Law, which regulated the elections in the municipalitiesunder the Spanish government, provided for a limited electoral body, composed largely of ex-officials of the municipalities. The choosing ofan electoral body by the military commander of a district probably didnot seem strange to the people. The provincial and municipal officialswere established in office by armed men, and they were obeyed becausethey had been installed by armed men; but it was a form of electionto which people, as a rule, saw no reason to object. There were, however, in many cases bitter complaints of the abuses committed bythe officers thus "elected. "

This form of government spread with the advance of Aguinaldo'sarms. Municipal elections were held in Tarlac in July, in IlocosNorte and Tayabas in August, in Benguet and the Batanes Islands inSeptember, 1898, in Panay in December, 1898, and in Leyte and Samarin January, 1899. 

On December 27 Antonio Luna wrote that all the provinces of Luzón, Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate, and Ticao, Romblón, part of Panay, the Batanes, and Babuyanes Islands were under the jurisdiction ofthe insurgent government. [372]

By October 7, 1898, 14 of the 36 provinces and districts intowhich Luzón had been divided by the Spanish government had civilgovernors. [373] These 14 were Tagálog provinces or provinces whichthe Tagálogs controlled. The other provinces were still under militaryrule, and, indeed, even the provinces under civilians were dominatedby their military commanders. With the manner of holding electionswhich prevailed, the governors must have been men who were in favourof the military party in force, for otherwise they would not havebeen elected. [374]

It is not probable that the number of provinces under civilgovernors much increased. If in Pangasinán Province, where thereare many Tagálogs, organizations opposed to the rule of Aguinaldocould cause serious disorders, as was the case, it must have beenconsidered expedient for the success of the attempt of the Tagálogs, who form only a fifth of the population, to dominate the archipelago, that all provinces in which an effective majority of the people werenot of that tribe, should be kept under military rule. The municipalgovernments which had been established in Luzón were in the hands ofAguinaldo's adherents, or of men who it was hoped would prove loyalto him. They were men of the Spanish-speaking group, which has alwaysdominated the people of the islands. They were probably not as a rulemen of means. Many of them, perhaps most of them, had been clerksand employees under the Spanish government, and they saw no reasonfor changing the methods of town administration which had then beenfollowed. The municipal taxes, the estimates for expenditures, andthe regulations for town government, were but little modified fromthose they found in force. In many ways such changes as were madewere for the worse. 

Once installed in power, Aguinaldo's officials were required toexercise over the mass of the people about the same control thathad always been exercised over them. The governing group consideredthat they were perfectly capable of providing for the welfare ofthe islands, and that it was the duty of the people to obey themwithout question. 

When the insurgent force was increased in preparation for war withthe Americans a large number of municipal officials resigned, orattempted to do so. It was not easy for a municipal official underAguinaldo's government to resign. A resignation, to be accepted, hadto be accompanied by the certificate of a physician that the personconcerned was unfit to perform the duties of his office. Judging bythe record, [375] an epidemic seems to have attacked the municipalofficials in January, 1899. It is probable that they saw that warwas inevitable and that they did not wish to remain in charge ofthe towns and be responsible for providing for the necessities of"the liberating army. " In Pangasinán in that month men could notleave their barrios without obtaining the permission of the headman, and in one town men who had attempted to sell their property for thepurpose of going to Manila were, on January 17, ordered to be arrestedand their conduct investigated. [376]

Aguinaldo, having established himself at Malolos, ordered the congressprovided for in his decree of June 23, 1898, to assemble at thecapital on September 15, 1898, and appointed a number of provisionalrepresentatives for provinces and islands not under his control. [377]It has often been claimed that Aguinaldo's government controlled atthis time the whole archipelago, except the bay and city of Manilaand the town of Cavite. [378]

Blount quotes the following statement from the report of the FirstPhilippine Commission:--

"While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila, the Filipinoforces made themselves masters of the entire island except thatcity. " [379]

I signed that statement, and signed it in good faith; nevertheless, it is untrue. The Filipino forces never controlled the territorynow known as Ifugao, Bontoc, Kalinga or Apayao, much less thatoccupied by the Negritos on the east coast of Luzón, but this isnot all. There exists among the Insurgent records a very importantdocument, prepared by Mabini, showing that when the call for thefirst session of the Filipino congress was issued, there were no lessthan sixty-one provinces and _commandancias_, which the Insurgents, when talking among themselves, did not even claim to control, andtwenty-one of these were in or immediately adjacent to Luzón. [380]

The men who composed this congress were among the ablest natives ofthe archipelago; but representative institutions mean nothing unlessthey represent the people; if they do not, they are a conscious liedevised either to deceive the people of the country or foreign nations, and it is not possible for any system founded upon a lie to endure. Areal republic must be founded not upon a few brilliant men to composethe governing group but upon a people trained in self-restraint andaccustomed to govern by compromise and concession, not by force. Toendure it must be based upon a solid foundation of self-control, ofself-respect and of respect for the rights of others upon the part ofthe great majority of the common people. If it is not, the governmentwhich follows a period of tumult, confusion and civil war will be agovernment of the sword. The record the Philippine republic has leftbehind it contains nothing to confirm the belief that it would haveendured, even in name, if the destinies of the islands had been leftin the hands of the men who set it up. 

The national assembly met on the appointed day in the parish churchof Barasoain, Malolos, which had been set aside for the meetingsof congress. This body probably had then more elected members thanat its subsequent meetings, but even so it contained a large numberof men who were appointed by Aguinaldo after consultation with hiscouncil to represent provinces which they had never even seen. 

From a "list of representatives of the provinces and districts, selected by election and appointment by the government up to July7, 1899, with incomplete list of October 6, 1899" [381] I findthat there were 193 members, of whom forty-two were elected and onehundred fifty-one were appointed. This congress was therefore not anelective body. Was it in any sense representative? The following table, showing the distribution of delegates between the several peoples, will enable us to answer this question. 

In considering this table it must be remembered that the relationshipgiven between the number of delegates assigned to a given peopleand the number of individuals composing it is only approximate, asno one of these peoples is strictly limited to the provinces whereit predominates. 

I have classified the provinces as Tagálog, Visayan, etc. , accordingto census returns showing the people who form a majority of theirinhabitants in each case. [382]

 People Number Elected Appointed Delegates Delegates Visayans 3, 219, 030 0 68 Tagálogs 1, 460, 695 18 19 Ilocanos 803, 942 7 11 Bicols 566, 365 4 7 Pangasináns 343, 686 2 2 Pampangans 280, 984 2 2 Cagayans 159, 648 4 6 Zambalans 48, 823 1 2 Non-Christians 647, 740 4 34 42 151

It will be noted that the Tagálog provinces had eighteen out of atotal of forty-two elected delegates. The Visayans, by far the mostnumerous people in the islands, did not have one. The non-Christianprovinces had a very disproportionately large total of delegates, ofwhom four are put down as elected, but on examination we find that oneof these is from Lepanto, the capital of which was an Ilocano town; oneis from Nueva Vizcaya, where there is a considerable Cagayan-Ilocanopopulation; one is from Benguet, the capital of which was an Ilocanotown, and one from Tiagan, which was an Iloeano settlement. Thesedelegates should therefore really be credited to the Ilocanos. 

If the individual relationships of the several members are considered, the result is even more striking. Of the thirty-eight delegatesassigned to the non-Christian provinces, one only, good old LinoAbaya of Tiagan, was a non-Christian. Many of the non-Christian_comandancias_ were given a number of delegates wholly disproportionateto their population, and in this way the congress was stuffed fullof Tagálogs. 

Think of Filipe Buencamino, of Aguinaldo's cabinet, representing theMoros of Zamboanga; of the mild, scholarly botanist Leon Guerrerorepresenting the Moros, Bagobos, Mandayas and Manobos of Davao; ofJosé M. Lerma, the unscrupulous politician of the province of Bataan, just across the bay from Manila, representing the wild Moros ofCotabato; of Juan Tuason, a timid Chinese _mestizo_ Manila businessman, representing the Yacan and Samal Moros of Basilan; of my goodfriend Benito Legarda, since a member of the Philippine Commission, and a resident delegate from the Philippines to the congress of theUnited States, representing the bloody Moros of Jolo! Yet they appearas representatives of these several regions. 

Few, indeed, of the delegates from non-Christian territory had everset foot in the provinces or _comandancias_ from which they wereappointed, or would have been able to so much as name the wild tribeor tribes inhabiting them. 

I have been furnished a list, made up with all possible care bycompetent persons, from which it appears that there were eighty-fivedelegates actually present at the opening of congress, of whomfifty-nine were Tagálogs, five Bicols, three Pampangans, two Visayans, and one a Zambalan. For the others there are no data available. Yetit has been claimed that this was a representative body! It was aTagálog body, without enough representatives of any other one of thenumerous Philippine peoples to be worth mentioning. 

With a congress thus organized, Aguinaldo should have had no difficultyin obtaining any legislation he desired. 

The committee of congress appointed to draw up a constitution setto work promptly, and by October 16, 1898, had proceeded so farwith their work that Buencamino was able to write to Aguinaldo thatwhile he had been of the opinion that it would have been best forhim to continue as a dictator aided by a committee of able men, yet it would now be a blow to the prestige of congress to suspendits sessions. Aguinaldo noted upon this letter the fact that he didnot approve of a constitution. [383]

Apparently early in December the committee submitted their project. Inpresenting it to congress they said [384] that--

"The work whose results the commission has the honour to present forthe consideration of congress has been largely a matter of selection;in executing it not only has the French constitution been used, but also those of Belgium, Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, as we have considered those nations as most resemblingthe Filipino people. "

The most important difference between this project and the actualconstitution adopted was that, although the project provided thatthe Dominican, Recollect, Franciscan and Augustinian friars shouldbe expelled from the country and that their estates should becomethe property of the state, yet it recognized the Catholic religionas that of the state and forbade state contribution to the supportof any other, although it permitted the practice in private of anyreligion not opposed to morality, which did not threaten the safety ofthe country. The government was authorized to negotiate a concordatwith the Pope for the regulation of the relations between church andstate. A strong party was in favour of this recognition, but it finallyfailed of adoption, and the constitution as promulgated providedfor the freedom and equality of religion and for free and compulsoryeducation which had not been provided for in the original project. Theconstitution as approved forbade the granting of titles of nobility, decorations or honorary titles by the state to any Filipino. Thisparagraph did not exist in the original project, which merely forbadeany Filipino to accept them without the consent of the government. 

Mabini, the ablest of all Aguinaldo's advisers, did not approve of theconstitution. He himself had drawn up a project for a constitutionduring June, 1898, but it was not accepted by the committee, thegreater part of whom were Catholics and for that reason opposed toMabini, who was a bitter antagonist of that church. And yet whenseparation of church and state was finally provided for it did notplease Mabini, who, although he was opposed to church control, wroteto Aguinaldo [385] that the constitution as passed by congress was notacceptable and should not be promulgated because the constitutionalguarantees of individual liberty could not be maintained, as thearmy had to be in control for the time being, and furthermore it wasnot expedient to separate church and state, as this separation wouldalienate many of their adherents. Indeed, there was not much in theconstitution which he thought ought to take immediate effect, [386]and he wrote that congress was ill-disposed toward him because he hadrefused to agree to its promulgation. Existing conditions were suchthat he believed that all powers should be vested in one person. Hewarned Aguinaldo that if the constitution were put in force, he wouldbe at the mercy of his secretaries. On January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo, probably at the suggestion of Mabini, proposed certain changes init. [387]

Evidently the provisions of the constitution did not worry Aguinaldomuch, as is shown by his reply to the request by some of his officersfor information as to what reward those who were first in the attackon Manila should receive. He promised them such titles as marquis, duke, etc. [388]

On January 2, 1899, Aguinaldo announced the formation of a new cabinetmade up as follows: Apolinario Mabini president and secretary offoreign affairs; Teodoro Sandico, secretary of the interior; MarianoTrias, secretary of the treasury; Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretaryof war and navy, and Gracio Gonzaga, secretary of _fomento_. [389]On January 4 Mabini took the oath of office as the president of thecouncil of government. This body met twice a week at Malolos on setdays, and at the close of its deliberations forwarded to Aguinaldoa statement of the subjects discussed and the conclusions reachedfor his decision. The president of the republic did not preside at, or take part in, its deliberations. 

On January 4, 1899, General Otis issued a proclamation in whichhe announced that the United States had obtained possession of thePhilippines and that its government would beextended over the islandsof the archipelago. Aguinaldo replied next day with one which, ifnot intended to be a declaration of war, was at least a warning thathostilities were imminent. This proclamation was carried into Manilaby his emissaries and posted up over the one issued by the Americancommander. It was a challenge to a trial of strength, and Aguinaldoand his advisers hastened their preparations for the coming combat. 

The secretary of the interior on the same day sent an order to theheads of all provinces directing the organization of territorialmilitia to resist the American invasion, and ordering the heads of thetowns to hold meetings of the people to protest against the aggressionof the United States. They were held in accordance with these orders, and records of the proceedings were sent to Malolos and published inthe official organ of the government as evidence of the feeling of thepeople. It was, however, not considered necessary in publishing themto mention the fact that they had been held in compliance with orders. 

On January 14, 1899, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo [390] recommendingchanges in the proposed constitution, which he still liked as littleas ever. He was afraid that Negros and Panay would refuse to acceptthe form of government it prescribed. The worst thing about it wasthat the Americans would be less disposed to recognize Aguinaldo'sgovernment; for when they saw the constitution they would know, as itmade no mention of them, that the Filipinos wanted independence. Mabinithought that it was possible that the wording of the constitutionmight have been deliberately planned by members of the congress infavour of annexation to the United States, so that that country wouldbe warned, would become more mistrustful, and would refuse to recognizeAguinaldo's government. Whatever the president of the council may havethought about the theoretical advisability of a congress to representthe people, he found one much in the way when he had obtained it. 

Buencamino advised that the constitution should be approved andpromulgated; one argument was that the congress had been consulted inthe matter of a national loan, and if it was dissolved, there couldbe no loan. This was apparently the only matter upon which it hadbeen consulted. [391]

The constitution of the Philippine Republic was ratified at a sessionof the congress on January 20, 1899. 

On January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo sanctioned it and ordered that it shouldbe "kept, complied with and executed in all its parts because it isthe sovereign will of the Philippine people. " [392] The constitutionprovided for a government of three coördinate powers, executive, legislative and judicial. Whether it provided for a form of governmentwhich would have succeeded in the Philippines was not determined byactual experience. It was never really put in force for war with theUnited States began in two weeks and the constitution must stand as theexpression of the ideas of a certain group of educated natives ratherthan as the working formula for the actual conduct of the politicallife of a nation. One proof of this is the fact that not until June 8, 1899, were Aguinaldo's decrees upon the registration of marriages andupon civil marriage, dated June 20, 1898, revoked, and the provisionsof the constitution concerning marriage put in effect. [393]

Aguinaldo had approved the constitution; he had informed the foreignconsuls and General Otis that it had been promulgated and become thelaw of the land. It was not promulgated. It had not become the law ofthe land. It served one important purpose. It passed into the handsof the Americans and showed them the ability and the aspirations ofcertain individuals of the archipelago, but Mabini and his followersdid not believe in its form or in its provisions, and Mabini at leastwas emphatic in his declarations that the time had not yet come for itto be put into effect. On January 24, 1899, he wrote to Aguinaldo thatif it should be promulgated it would be absolutely necessary to givethe president the veto power, and replace the elected representativesby others appointed by the government. If this were not done thepresident would be at the mercy of congress, and the people, seeingthat disagreement between the executive government and the congresswas the cause of its misfortunes, would start another revolutionarymovement to destroy both of them. [394]

As long as Mabini remained in power the constitution was merepaper. Its adoption was not indicative of the capacity of the people tomaintain self-government. It expressed only the academic aspirationsof the men who drafted it. There is not the slightest evidence fromany previous or subsequent experience of the people that it would haveworked in practice. It was enacted for the misleading of Americansrather than for the benefit of the Filipinos. 

While the government of Aguinaldo was called a republic, it was infact a Tagálog military oligarchy in which the great mass of thepeople had no share. Their duty was only to give soldiers for thearmy and labourers for the fields, and to obey without question theorders they received from the military heads of their provinces. 

There is no cause for vain regrets. We did not destroy a republic inthe Philippines. There never was anything there to destroy which evenremotely resembled a republic. 

CHAPTER IX

The Conduct of the War

It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war whichbegan on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its severalcampaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditionsunder which it was conducted, and a description of the two periodsinto which it may be divided. 

From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with markedseverity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an orderto the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that asoldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes fora first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and"severely punished" for a third. [395]

On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowinghis soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should beliable to capital punishment, [396] which in practice was frequentlyinflicted on soldiers for very minor offences. 

Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from serviceon the payment of cash. 

The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endlessabuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. Theygrew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed. 

"The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops drivenfrom the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouringtowns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lostall control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It wasnot for some days that control was regained. " [397]

Endless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgentofficers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there wasgrave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeedit was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, whoremoved their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple. [398]

Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands atanother. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimescoöperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptlyand fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders, [399]and armed bandits appeared and plundered them. 

There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressedbrigandage with a heavy hand, [400] but many of them were indifferent, even if not in alliance with the evil doers. 

The Visayas

Feeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantlymore bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killingeach other. The highest officers of the "Regional RevolutionaryGovernment of the Visayas" protested vigorously to Aguinaldo, [401]but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control. 

On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells asignificant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealingwith them. [402]

In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizensof his province of committing "robberies, assaults, kidnappings andcrimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes. " [403]

That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusivelyshown by the record of Aguinaldo's government for February 24, 1899, when it decided--

"that the president of the council shall study such measures as willput an end to the continual discord and friction between the civiland military authorities of every province, in order that fatalconsequences may be avoided. "

With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it wasto be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated andthat American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated withbarbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated. [404] Americansoldiers were trapped, poisoned [405] and murdered in other ways. [406]

It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldierswere committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales. 

I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgentprisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity andkindness. 

A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of themost shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by Americansoldiers. I have elsewhere described [407] the fate that overtookColonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humanetreatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded. 

Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, butnewspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civilofficers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned, robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their allegedwholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence ofthe women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they wereno better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committedrape. [408]

These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of theresponsible Insurgent officers in remote regions, [409] but all suchmen soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them fromthe start. 

In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for thereason that Americans did not search them. [410] More significantyet, when conditions became bad in the provinces, Insurgent officerssent their women and children to seek American protection in Manilaor elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himselffollowed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts fromVilla's famous diary: [411]--

"_December 22. _--It was 7 A. M. When we arrived in Ambayuan. Herewe found the women worn out from the painful journey they hadsuffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observedindications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being underthe dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the dutiesof every patriot who loves his country. 

"We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied. 

"The honorable president had already decided some days before to sendall the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motivein hurrying his family forward with him. 

 * * * * *

"_December 24. _--We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o'clockthis morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distantfrom it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. Thehonourable president told his family and the other women that theyshould remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught bythe Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as thearrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himselffor the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and forhis family. 

"The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o'clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemencharged with conducting them to Manila. " [412]

In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treatedand safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellowsknew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown bya later entry:--

"_February 6. _--We have been informed that the mother and son of thehonourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don BenitoLegarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife andsister of the honourable president. We have also learned that SeñorBuencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the Americanauthorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of thehonourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that theywent to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila. " [413]

The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselvesto be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader whowould turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiersfor safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers, and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgentleaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded theirwounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to GeneralMoxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to whatshould be done with wounded men:--

"If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once andcarry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured bythe enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhereor retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is betterto save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill upthe ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle;and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good careof them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore, I repeat, theymust endeavour to save the arms rather than the men. " [414]

There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinoswere treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by Americansoldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the"water cure" in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compelpersons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms totell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horriblebarbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those whohad sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usuallythe sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tellthe truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruelacts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts toexplain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to themen who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptionsto the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americanswere concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented undersimilar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilizedwarfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens' clothesnot only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properlyhave been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not tooffend again. 

The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no meanslimited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they werepromptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage wasbolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that many times moreAmericans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actuallykilled in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen andcolonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fightingnorth of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In realityonly fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón duringthe entire month. 

On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the followingremarkable news items among others:--

"_Pavia_, April 6th, 1899. 

"The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidentsof the towns shown on the margin:

"_Towns:_ Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, BatacViejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate. 

 * * * * *

"Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing toRosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death Generaland officers and many soldiers. 

 * * * * *

"At 3 P. M. Of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners whoare to be taken to Malolos. 

"At 9. 45 P. M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans deadand 600 prisoners. 

"Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tellsthem to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing. 

"To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought. 

"Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7. 15 Pasigin our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila. 

"General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas. 

"According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced andall at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig. 

"American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken. 

"General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped bytruce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war. 

"Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officersdead. " [415]

Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the mainbusiness streets of the city. 

Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were asnumerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand ofthem killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for goodmeasure. [416]

We learn from the _Filipino Herald_ for February 23, 1899, that on thatday the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan. [417]

But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippineswas too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by thesoldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said tobe refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed inorder properly to punish them. 

General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on thatdate. [418]

And what of conditions in the United States during this troubledperiod? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15, 1900, "the Union Army" had met with a new disaster, as a result ofwhich President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeededby Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed onFebruary 4, 1899. On January 20, "General Otis's successor, JohnWaterly, of the democratic party, " arrived at Manila with papers andinstructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic. [419]Things now went from bad to worse. The trouble between democratsand republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about strained relations betweenGermany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinatethe German Emperor. [420] Before September 15, 1901, he had beenkilled by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos couldacclaim their independence. [421]

The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organizedarmed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed thesecond period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part ofthe Insurgents. 

On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Píodel Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked toremove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tacticswere duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forceseverywhere before the end of November. 

Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:--

"If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion tobarbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. Theman who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the peoplewhose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destructionwhich this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderlyhabits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, iseven more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson followin its wake. 

Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has beenemployed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people whohave chosen it. " [422]

The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule. 

Such semblance of discipline as had previously existed among theInsurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been verybad under the "Republic" and worse during the first period of thewar. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable inmany regions, and the common people were driven into the arms ofthe Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried outby Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. Ihave described at some length the conditions which now arose in thechapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader isreferred for details. [423]

In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly, the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. OnMarch 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred twostations. By December of the same year the number had increasedto six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty mento a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of thehumane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantlyincreasing numbers. 

It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, whilecontinuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Furthersubdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardlypossible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after anotherthe Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Mostofficers of importance issued explanatory statements to the peopleshortly after giving up active field operations, whether theysurrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himselfwas captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost pointon the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No placein the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issuedan address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognizedthe fact that they wanted peace. He said:--

"_Manila_, April 19, 1901. 

"To the Filipino People:--

"I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fateto which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to thosewho have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. Thelessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to myknowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the completetermination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirablebut absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines. 

"The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor havethey faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitudeand courage. The time has come, however, in which they find theiradvance along the path impeded by an irresistible force--a forcewhich, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opensanother course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This causehas been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner ofthe United States. In this banner they repose their trust in thebelief that under its protection our people will attain all thepromised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy. 

"The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so beit. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wishcannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by noother desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearlymanifested its will. 

"So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, andafter mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that Icannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, northe lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dearones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity ofthe great American nation. 

"By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United Statesthroughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservationwhatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. Mayhappiness be theirs. 

"_Emilio Aguinaldo_. [424]

"_Manila_, April 19, 1901. "

This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog andEnglish, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not leadto immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:--

"A force like Aguinaldo's could not be surrendered. It had been torn byinternal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been verylax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation ofthe advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope haddisappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and propertyeach in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces overwhich their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beatendo not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages ofguerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groupsof thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort topetty larceny. " [425]

Aguinaldo's forces now passed through these several stages. Some ofhis more important subordinates had previously been captured or hadsurrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on hisadvice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field onlya very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar inBatangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable numberof bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forcesof the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men whohad been Insurgent officers or soldiers and while serving in thiscapacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were nowunwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferringto continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever. 

The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In myopinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence comparedin intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to whyit failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:--

"The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its headconquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believingthat the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his ownpersonal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by theircapacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendshipand relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have hisfavorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showedhimself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he hadto fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbidthat we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost ofunspeakable sufferings. " [426]

These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure. 

The surrender or capture of the more respectable military elementleft the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whomwere ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whomwere irresponsible and unscrupulous. 

Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against themwas threatened, but not actually resorted to. 

The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bellwas put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactorysolution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration--not thekind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, buta measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its resultshave been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:--

"General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoidmaking war against those who really wanted the termination ofhostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeanceof others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible forinsurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, inorder to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity toescape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply forthemselves and their families, it was determined to establish zonesof protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable thesmall garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zonesefficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. Heaccordingly, 'in order to put an end to enforced contributionsnow levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settledand outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation andassassination, ' ordered the commanding officers of all towns inthe provinces of Batangas and Laguna to 'immediately specify andestablish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zonewithin which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection toinhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation ofarmed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which existsufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervisionby the garrison, and should include some ground on which livestock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled andwatched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troopsbecome available. 

"'Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given anddistributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of townsover which they exercise supervision, informing them of the dangerof remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move byDecember 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movablefood supplies, including rice, _palay_, [427] chickens, live stock, etc. , to within the limits of the zone established at their own ornearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at saiddate) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The peoplewill be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should theydesire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselveson any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no ownerwill be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. Inthe discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities ofexistence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seekingprotection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished inthe brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable. '

"It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones;but they were warned that unless they accepted that protectiontheir property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because itmight be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostileor peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferredby General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circulartelegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by theexecution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated byinsurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to dothis. Assassinations stopped at once. 

"As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent thata large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for thepower of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had losttheir power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection affordedin such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision andattitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. Thesentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteeredassistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When thesevolunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into themountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, andhundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, releasedfrom the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zonesof protection. 

"The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within theseareas was caused to the _mestizo_ ruling group, whose members bitterlyresented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every oneelse. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obeythem blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had alwaysbeen the lord of his _barrio_, [428] the possibility of having tocultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalousthing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not theirbodies which suffered--it was their pride. 

"Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turnedagainst their once highly respected chief, and toward the end severalthousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determinedhunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the peoplewere against him materially aided in forcing his surrender. 

"General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to10, 000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in theinsurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they hadtaken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no politicalprisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes. 

"The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones anddestroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrillabands was not new. There had been precedents even in the UnitedStates. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, byBrigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, withheadquarters at Kansas City, Mo. , in which he ordered the inhabitantsof a large part of three counties of that State to remove from theirresidences within fifteen days to the protection of the militarystations which he had established. All grain and hay in that districtwas ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was notconvenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders inthe Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealingwith war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one. 

"The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had spreadlike a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The firehad been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped outthe embers in the Tagálog provinces. 

"On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrectionagainst the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippineshaving come to an end, and provincial civil governments having beenestablished throughout the entire territory of the archipelago notinhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in thearchipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of theUnited States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, withcertain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to allpersons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in theinsurrection. "

General Bell's motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitantsof this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and hehimself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, andthe plan which he adopted resulted in the reëstablishment of law andorder at a minimum cost of human suffering. 

Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received theretheir first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctantto leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditionsagain prevailed. 

The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign wasvery small. [429] Blount has sought to make it appear that partly asan indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, gave the population of Batangas as 312, 192, while the census of 1903gave it as 257, 715. [430]

The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903gives the population of Manila as 221, 000, while in 1900 it had been260, 000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Notat all. It means only that the thousands of Filipinos who had soughtthe protection of the American forces there during the period whenthey feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returnedto their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbersof people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some ofthem returned later; others did not. 

Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the ProvincialSecretary of Batangas to the effect that:

"The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such asmalaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200, 000 the morethan 300, 000 inhabitants which in former years the province had. " [431]

Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of ahundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with thosequoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longerperiod of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it isnot apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malariaor dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these illshad ever previously been made, and the very thing which then preventedthe adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forthto this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As asimple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortalityfrom these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially badin this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the periodin question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths. 

In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake. 

This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity ofthe armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts ofthe first and second Philippine Commissions. [432]

CHAPTER X

Mr. Bryan and Independence

In order to bring home to some of my Democratic and Anti-Imperialistfriends the unreliable character of the testimony of even the veryhigh officers of the so-called Philippine Republic, I here quotecertain extracts from the Insurgent records, showing the importantpart played, doubtless unwittingly, by Mr. William Jennings Bryan inPhilippine politics during the war. The first of these might properlyhave been considered in the chapter entitled "Was IndependencePromised?" Others are instructive in that they show the use madeof false news in bolstering up the Insurgent cause, and might withpropriety have been included in the chapter on "The Conduct of theWar. " I have thought it best to keep them by themselves. Furthercomment on them would seem to be superfluous. 

"On May 1, 1900 (P. I. R. , 516. 6), I. De los Santos wrote a longletter in Tagálog and cipher to Aguinaldo, in which he reported uponthe progress of what he would have probably called the diplomaticcampaign. If this letter is to be believed, the agents in the UnitedStates of the junta had been able to form relations which might beof great value to them. Santos said in part:--

"'Commissioners... Señores Kant (G. Apacible) and Raff (Sixto López)duly carried out your last instructions given at Tárlac. Señor Del Pan, sailing by way of Japan, about the middle of October, and Señor Caney(G. Apacible), sailing by way of Europe about the 1st of November, met in Toronto about the middle of February following. But before thearrival of Kant, Raff had already come from Hayti (United States) andwas able to pry in upon our political friends and enemies. When theymet each other they continued the voyage incognito, as Raft had donepreviously, making themselves known to a very few people; but lateron, and according to the instructions carried by Caney, they madethemselves known to a greater number of people, and have succeeded ininterviewing Bryan who happened to be in New York. Señor Raff said thatBryan feared being present at a conference, lest he might be called atraitor by members of his own party, and also by those of the oppositeor "imperialist" party, who are quite proud over the victories theyhave gained against our people over there. Nevertheless, Raff wasable to be present and talk at some of the anti-imperialist meetings, our political friends introducing him as a friend from the committee(at Hongkong) and as an advocate of the cessation of the war overthere in order that our sacred rights may be given consideration bythem. And as Bryan could not personally take part in the conference, he sent a most trusted person, his right-hand man, Dr. Gardner. Theresults of the conference between Señor Raff and Dr. Gardner, thelatter acting in the name of Mr. Bryan, are as follows:--

"'1st. That we may fight on, and Bryan will never cease to defend oursacred rights. 2nd. That we must never mention Bryan's name in ourmanifestos and proclamations, lest the opposite party might say heis a traitor. 3rd. That we are in the right; and hence he promisedin the name of Bryan that if this Señor Bryan is victorious in thepresidential campaign, he will recognize our independence withoutdelay. Your honored self can easily conclude from all the foregoingthat Señor Del Pan, after the receipt of these promises, concurredwith him; and he returned to inform Señor Apacible about the resultsof the conference. So these two studied over the plan of the policyto be adopted and carried out. I write you what their opinions are, viz. : 1st, that they will reside there, pending the outcome of thepresidential contest, aiding the propaganda and enlivening it untilNovember, the date set for the desired thing. Owing to what Dr. Gardnersaid and promised in the name of Bryan, some one ought to stay therein order that Bryan may be approached, if he is elected, so he cansign the recognition of our independence; and this should be done atonce, lest in his excitement over the victory he should forget hispromise. 3rd. For carrying out the two propositions just mentioned, they request 2000 pounds sterling, that is $20, 000 in silver, tobe used for the propaganda, for paying newspapers and for bribingsenators--this last clause is somewhat dangerous and impossible. And4th, that the money must be sent immediately, and that you shouldbe informed not to mention the name of Bryan in the manifestos andproclamations. 

"'In order to answer quickly and decisively that proposition, andas I did not have the desired money here, I answered as follows:"Plan approved; for the sake of economy we have decided that oneof the two retire, but before doing so make arrangements, establishcommunications with leaders of Bryan's party, and he who remains shouldthus cultivate the relations; he who is to retire will locate himselfin Paris near Señor Katipalad (Agoncillo) with whom he will secretlydiscuss political problems that may arise. So he will watch for theopportune moment of Bryan's election, in order to go immediately toHayti and formally arrange the contract with Bryan. " [433]

* * * * *

"'By the end of 1899, by the time guerrilla warfare was well under way, by the time that any Filipino government, unless an expression of theunfettered will of the nearest bandit who can muster a dozen riflesmay be called a government, had ceased to exist, a strong opposition tothe policy of the administration had arisen in the United States and ademand for the recognition of the independence of the Philippines. Thejunta in Hongkong were assured that the Democratic party wouldcome into power in the next elections and that this would mean thesuccess of the patriotic efforts of Aguinaldo and his followers. Thenews was good and was forthwith spread abroad in "Extracts from ourcorrespondence with America, " "News from our foreign agents, " "Newsfrom America, " and "Translations from the foreign press"--circularsand handbills printed on thin paper which were smuggled into thePhilippines and passed into the hands of the guerrilla leaders whocould read Spanish. They gathered their followers about them and toldthem that a powerful party had arisen in America which was going togive them all they had ever asked for. They had only to fight on, for success was certain. In America the "Anti-imperialists" werehanging the "Imperialists, " and they should continue to harry theAmerican adherents among the natives of the Philippines. 

"'There are a number of these publications among the papers capturedfrom the insurgents, and the adoption of this method of propagandaseems to have been nearly coincident with Aguinaldo's orders declaringguerrilla warfare. It does not seem likely that the matter containedin them was supplied by a Filipino, for if it was he assumed a generalacquaintance among the people with American politics and Americanmethods which they were far from possessing. 

"'In these publications the Filipinos were assured that theImperialists were kept in power only by the lavish contributionsof the "truts, " whatever they may have been; but the people of theUnited States were growing weary of their domination and were aboutto return to the true principles of Washington and Jefferson. Theillustrious Americans "Crosvy Sticcney, and Vartridge" were alllaboring for the cause of Philippine independence. Long lists ofAmerican cities were given in which the illustrious orators Mr. Croshyand Mr. Schurts had addressed applauding crowds upon the necessity ofthrottling the "truts" because they opposed recognition of the rightsof the Filipinos. In August, 1900, "News from our agents in America"informed its readers that--

"'"W. J. Bryan has stated in a speech that his first act uponbeing elected President will be to declare the independence of thePhilippines. "

"'On June 16, 1900, Gen. Riego de Dios, acting head of the Hongkongjunta, wrote to Gen. I. Torres (P. I. R. , 530), the guerrilla commanderin Bulacán Province, and assured him that a little more endurance, a little more constancy, was all that was needed to secure theattainment of their ends. According to their advices the Democraticparty would win in the approaching elections in the United States, and--"it is certain that Bryan is the incarnation of our independence. "

"'The number of men opposed to the policy of the administration wassaid to be continually increasing. 

"'The attitude of those who protect us cannot be moremanly and resolute: "Continue the struggle until you conqueror die. " Mr. Beecher of the League in Cincinnati writes us:"I shall always be the champion of the cause of justice and oftruth, " says Mr. Winslow of the Boston League. "Not eventhreats of imprisonment will make me cease in my undertaking, "Doctor Denziger assures us. "I shall accept every riskand responsibility, " says Doctor Leverson. "If it is necessary, I shall go so far as to provoke a revolution in my own country, "repeats Mr. Udell. "It is necessary to save the Republic anddemocracy from the abyss of imperialism and save the worthyFilipinos from oppression and extermination" is cried by all, and the sound of this cry is ever rising louder and louder. '" [434]

Extract from a letter of Papa Isio [435] dated March 4, 1901:--

"I have received from Luzón an order to proceed more rapidly with myoperations this month, as Bryan ordered Emilío to keep the war goingvigorously until April, and he also said that if independence wasnot given the Philippines by that time, he, Bryan, and his followerswould rise in arms against the oppressors. " [436]

"_Tarlac_, Oct. 26, 1899. 

"To the Military Governor of This City, and To the Secretary ofthe Interior. 

"As a meeting shall be held on the morning of Sunday next in thePresidential Palace of this Republic in return for that held in theUnited States by Mr. Bryan, who drank to the name of our HonourablePresident as one of the heroes of the world, and for the purposeof celebrating it with more pomp and contributing to it the greatersplendor with your personnel, I will be obliged to you if you willplease call at this office to confer with me on the matter. 

"God preserve you, etc. 

(Signed) "_F. Buencamino_. " [437]

In a letter written by A. Flores, acting secretary of war, to themilitary governor of Tarlac on October 27, 1899, there occurs thefollowing:--

"In the United States meetings and banquets have been held in honorof our Honourable President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, who was pronouncedone of the heroes of the world by Mr. Bryan, future president ofthe United States. The Masonic Society, therefore, interpretingthe unanimous desires of the people, and with the approval of thegovernment, will on Sunday the 29th instant, organize a meetingor popular assembly in the interest of national independence andin honor of Mr. Bryan of the anti-imperialist party, the defendersof our cause in the United States. The meeting will consist of twofunctions; first--at nine A. M. Of the 29th the assembly will convenein a suitable place, a national hymn will inaugurate the exercises, after which appropriate addresses will be delivered; and second--atfour P. M. A popular demonstration will take place throughout the town, with bands of music parading the streets; residents will decorateand illuminate their houses. 

"Which I have the pleasure of transmitting to you for your informationand guidance and for that of the troops under your command. " [438]

CHAPTER XI

The First Philippine Commission

I have elsewhere mentioned the appointment of the First PhilippineCommission. 

On January 18, 1899, its civilian members met at Washington andreceived the President's instructions. 

We were to aid in "the most humane, pacific and effective extensionof authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the leastpossible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection oflife and property to the inhabitants. "

We were directed to meet at the earliest possible day in the cityof Manila and to announce by a public proclamation our presenceand the mission intrusted to us, carefully setting forth that whilethe established military government would be continued as long asnecessity might require, efforts would be made to alleviate the burdenof taxation, to establish industrial and commercial prosperity andto provide for the safety of persons and property by such means asmight be found conducive to those ends. 

We were to endeavour, without interfering with the militaryauthorities, to ascertain what amelioration in the condition of theinhabitants and what improvements in public order were practicable, and for this purpose were to study attentively the existing social andpolitical state of the several populations, particularly as regardedthe forms of local government, the administration of justice, thecollection of customs and other taxes, the means of transportation andthe need of public improvements, reporting through the Department ofState the results of our observations and reflections, and recommendingsuch executive action as might, from time to time, seem to us wiseand useful. 

We were authorized to recommend suitable persons for appointmentto offices, made necessary by personal changes in the existingcivil administration, from among the inhabitants who had previouslyacknowledged their allegiance to the American government. 

We were to "ever use due respect for all the ideals, customs andinstitutions of the tribes which compose the population, emphasizingupon all occasions the just and beneficent intentions of the UnitedStates, " and were commissioned on account of our "knowledge, skill, andintegrity as bearers of the good-will, the protection and the richestblessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation. " [439]

Nothing could be more false than Blount's insinuation that we weresent out to help Otis run the war. [440] There was no war whenwe started, and we were expressly enjoined from interfering withthe military government or its officers. We were sent to deliver amessage of good-will, to investigate, and to recommend, and thereour powers ended. 

Mr. Schurman and I, with a small clerical force, sailed from Vancouver, January 31, 1899. On our arrival at Yokohama we learned with keenregret of the outbreak of hostilities at Manila. 

Blount has incorrectly stated that President McKinley had sent thecommission out when the dogs of war were already let loose. [441] Thedogs of war had not been loosed when we started, and one of the mainpurposes in sending us was to keep them in their kennels if possible. 

Aguinaldo has made the following statements in his "Reseña Verídica":--

"... We, the Filipinos, would have received said commission, ashonourable agents of the great America, with demonstrations of truekindness and entire adhesion. The commissioners would have touredover all our provinces, seeing and observing at close range order andtranquillity, in the whole of our territory. They would have seen thefields tilled and planted. They would have examined our Constitutionand public administration, in perfect peace, and they would haveexperienced and enjoyed that ineffable charm of our Oriental manner, a mixture of abandon and solicitude, of warmth and of frigidity, of confidence and of suspiciousness, which makes our relations withforeigners change into a thousand colours, agreeable to the utmost. 

"Ah! but this landscape suited neither General Otis nor theImperialists! For their criminal intention it was better thatthe American commissioners should find war and desolation in thePhilippines, perceiving from the day of their arrival the fetid stenchemitted by the mingled corpses of Americans and Filipinos. For theirpurposes it was better that that gentleman, Mr. Schurman, Presidentof the Commission, could not leave Manila, limiting himself to listento the few Filipinos, who, having yielded to the reasonings of gold, were partisans of the Imperialists. It was better that the commissionshould contemplate the Philippine problem through conflagrations, to the whiz of bullets, on the transverse light of all the unchainedpassions, in order that it might not form any exact or complete opinionof the natural and proper limits of said problem. Ah! it was better, in short, that the commission should leave defeated in not havingsecured peace, and would blame me and the other Filipinos, when I andthe whole Filipino people anxiously desired that peace should havebeen secured before rather than now, but an honourable and worthypeace for the United States and for the Philippine Republic. " [442]

These statements, made to deceive the public, make interesting readingin the light of our present knowledge as to the purposes and plansof Aguinaldo and his associates. 

On our arrival at Yokohama we were promptly informed by a secretaryfrom the United States Legation that no less a personage than MarquisIto had been in frequent communication with the Filipinos since 1894, that they had been looking to him for advice and support, and thathe had interested himself in the present situation sufficiently tocome to the American minister and offer to go to the Philippines, not in any sense as an agent of the United States, but as a privateindividual, and to use his influence in our behalf. His contentionwas that the then existing conditions resulted from misunderstandings. 

He said that Americans did not understand Asiatics, but he was anAsiatic himself and did understand the Filipinos, and thought that heeould settle the whole affair. The minister had cabled to Washingtonfor instructions. Naturally the offer was not accepted. 

I was reminded, by this extraordinary incident, of a previousoccurrence. I spent the month of March, 1893, in Tokio when returningfrom my second visit to the Philippines, and was kindly invited toinspect the zoölogical work at the Imperial University. When I visitedthe institution for that purpose, I was questioned very closely onthe islands, their people and their resources. The gentlemen whointerrogated me may have been connected with the university, but Idoubt it. 

We reached Hongkong on February 22. Here I had an interview withDr. Apacible of the junta, while Mr. Schurman visited Canton. Apacibletold me that the Filipinos wanted an independent republic under anAmerican protectorate. Pressed for the details of their desires, hesaid that "the function of a protector is to protect. " Further thanthat he could not go. I tried to convince him of the hopelessnessof the course the Filipinos were then pursuing and of the kindlyintentions of my government, but felt that I made no impression on him. 

We arrived at Manila on March 4, 1899, too late to land. Firebugs wereabroad. We watched a number of houses burn, and heard the occasionalcrackle of rifle fire along the line of the defences around thecity. The next morning there was artillery fire for a time at SanPedro Macáti. Everywhere were abundant evidences that the war was on. 

This left little for us to do at the moment except to inform ourselvesas to conditions, especially as Colonel Denby had not yet arrived, and General Otis was overwhelmed with work and anxiety. 

I renewed my acquaintance with many old Filipino and Spanish friendsand improved the opportunity, not likely to recur in my experience, to see as much as possible of the fighting in the field. 

One day when I was at San Pedro Macáti, Captain Dyer, who commandeda battery of 3. 2-inch guns there, suggested that if I wished toinvestigate the effect of shrapnel fire I could do so by visitinga place on a neighbouring hillside which he indicated. Acting uponhis suggestion, I set out, accompanied by my private secretary, who, like myself, was clad in white duck. The Insurgent sharpshooters onthe other side of the river devoted some attention to us, but we knewthat so long as they aimed at us we were quite safe. Few of theirbullets came within hearing distance. 

We were hunting about on the hillside for the place indicated byCaptain Dyer, when suddenly we heard ourselves cursed loudly andfluently in extremely plain American, and there emerged from aneighbouring thicket a very angry infantry officer. On venturing toinquire the cause of his most uncomplimentary remarks, I found that hewas in command of skirmishers who were going through the brush to seewhether there was anything left there which needed shooting up. Asmany of the Insurgent soldiers dressed in white, and as Americancivilians were not commonly to be met in Insurgent territory, thesemen had been just about to fire on us when they discovered theirmistake. We went back to Manila and bought some khaki clothes. 

At first my interest in military matters was not appreciated by my armyfriends, who could not see what business I had to be wandering aroundwithout a gun in places where guns were in use. I had, however, longsince discovered that reliable first-hand information on any subjectis likely to be useful sooner or later, and so it proved in this case. 

For several weeks after we reached Manila there was no active militarymovement; then came the inauguration of the short, sharp campaignwhich ended for the moment with the taking of Malolos. For long, tedious weeks our soldiers had sweltered in muddy trenches, shot atby an always invisible foe whom they were not allowed to attack. Itwas anticipated that when the forward movement began, it would beactive. Close secrecy was maintained with regard to it. CaptainHedworth Lambton, of the British cruiser _Powerful_, then lyingin Manila Bay, exacted a promise from me that I would tell him ifI found out when the advance was to begin, so that we might go toCaloocan together and watch the fighting from the church tower, which commanded a magnificent view of the field of operations. 

I finally heard a fairly definite statement that our troops wouldmove the following morning. I rushed to General Otis's office andafter some parleying had it confirmed by him. It was then too late toadvise Lambton, and in fact I could not properly have done so, as theinformation had been given me under pledge of secrecy. Accompaniedby my private secretary, Dr. P. L. Sherman, I hastened to Caloocan, where we arrived just at dusk, having had to run the gantlet ofnumerous inquisitive sentries _en route_. 

We spent the night in the church, where General Wheaton and his staffhad their headquarters, and long before daylight were perched ina convenient opening in its galvanized iron roof, made on a formeroccasion by a shell from Dewey's fleet. 

From this vantage point we could see the entire length of the lineof battle. The attack began shortly after daylight. Near Caloocanthe Insurgent works were close in, but further off toward La Lomathey were in some places distant a mile or more from the trenches ofthe Americans. 

The general plan of attack was that the whole American line shouldrotate to the north and west on Caloocan as a pivot, driving theInsurgents in toward Malabon if possible. The latter began to fireas soon as the American troops showed themselves, regardless of thefact that their enemies were quite out of range. As most of them wereusing black-powder cartridges, their four or five miles of trencheswere instantly outlined. The ground was very dry so that the bulletsthrew up puffs of dust where they struck, and it was possible tojudge the accuracy of the fire of each of the opposing forces. 

Rather heavy resistance was encountered on the extreme right, andthe turning movement did not materialize as rapidly as had beenhoped. General Wheaton, who was in command of the forces aboutthe church, finally moved to the front, and as we were directly inthe rear of his line and the Insurgents, as usual, overshot badly, we found ourselves in an uncomfortably hot corner. Bullets rattledon the church roof like hail, and presently one passed through theopening through which Major Bourns, Colonel Potter, of the engineercorps, and I were sticking our heads. Immediately thereafter wewere observed by Dr. Sherman making record time on all fours alongone of the framing timbers of the church toward its tower. There wetook up our station, and thereafter observed the fighting by peepingthrough windows partially closed with blocks of volcanic tuff. Wehad a beautiful opportunity to see the artillery fire. The guns weredirectly in front of and below us and we could watch the laying ofthe several pieces and then turn our field-glasses on the particularportions of the Insurgent trenches where the projectiles were likely tostrike. Again and again we caught bursting shells in the fields of ourglasses and could thus see their effect as accurately as if we had beenstanding close by, without any danger of being perforated by shrapnel. 

After the Insurgent position had been carried we walked forwardto their line of trenches and followed it east to a point beyondthe La Loma Church, counting the dead and wounded, as I had heardwild stories of tremendous slaughter and wanted to see just howmuch damage the fire of our troops had really done. On our way wepassed the Caloocan railroad station which had been converted intoa temporary field hospital. Here I saw good Father McKinnon, thechamplain of the First California Volunteers, assisting a surgeonand soaked with the blood of wounded men. He was one chaplain in athousand. It was always easy to find him. One had only to look wheretrouble threatened and help was needed. He was sure to be there. 

On my way from the railway station to the trenches I met a very muchexcited officer returning from the front. He had evidently had a longand recent interview with Cyrus Noble, [443] and was determined totell me all about the fighting. I escaped from him after some delay, and with much difficulty. Later he remembered having met me, butmade a grievous mistake as to the scene of our encounter, insistingthat we had been together in "Wheaton's Hole, " an uncommonly hotposition where numerous people got hurt. He persisted in giving agraphic account of our experiences, and in paying high tribute tomy coolness and courage under heavy fire. My efforts to persuade himthat I had not been with him there proved futile, and I finally gaveup the attempt. I wonder how many other military reputations restupon so slender a foundation! This experience was unique. I neversaw another officer under the influence of liquor when in the field. 

At the time that we visited the Insurgent trenches, not all of ourown killed and wounded had been removed, yet every wounded Insurgentwhom we found had a United States army canteen of water at his side, obviously left by some kindly American soldier. Not a few of theinjured had been furnished hardtack as well. All were ultimatelytaken to Manila and there given the best of care by army surgeons. 

Sometime later a most extraordinary account of this fight, written by asoldier, was published in the _Springfield Republican_. It was chargedthat our men had murdered prisoners in cold blood, and had committedall manner of barbarities, the writer saying among other things:--

"We first bombarded a town called Malabon and then entered it andkilled every man, woman and child in the place. "

The facts were briefly as follows: There was an Insurgent regiment inand near a mangrove swamp to the right of this town. When it becameobstreperous it was shelled for a short time until it quieted downagain. None of the shells entered the town. Indeed, most of themstruck in the water. Our troops did not enter Malabon that day, but passed to the northward, leaving behind a small guard to keepthe Insurgents from coming out of Malabon in their rear. Had theythen entered the town, they would not have found any women, childrenor non-combatant men to kill for the reason that all such personshad been sent away some time before. The town was burned, in part, but by the Insurgents themselves. They fired the church and a greatorphan asylum, and did much other wanton damage. 

Being able to speak from personal observation as to the occurrences ofthat day, I sent a long cablegram direct to the _Chicago Times-Herald_stating the facts. After my return to the United States, PresidentMcKinley was kind enough to say to me that if there had been noother result from the visit of the first Philippine Commission to theislands than the sending of that cablegram, he should have consideredthe expense involved more than justified. He added that the countrywas being flooded at the time with false and slanderous rumours, and people at home did not know what to believe. The statements ofarmy officers were discounted in advance, and other testimony fromsome unprejudiced source was badly needed. 

On April 2, 1899, Colonel Denby arrived, and our serious workbegan. The fighting continued and there was little that we coulddo save earnestly to strive to promote friendly relations with theconservative element among the Filipinos, and to gather the informationwe had been instructed to obtain. 

On April 4, 1899, we issued a proclamation setting forth in clear andsimple language the purposes of the American government. [444] It wastranslated into Tagálog and other dialects and widely circulated. TheInsurgent leaders were alert to keep the common people and the soldiersfrom learning of the kindly purposes of the United States. They wereforbidden to read the document and we were reliably informed thatthe imposition of the death penalty was threatened if this order wasviolated. In Manila crowds of Filipinos gathered about copies of theproclamation which were posted in public places. Many of them weresoon effaced by Insurgent agents or sympathizers. 

This document unquestionably served a very useful purpose. [445]For one thing, it promptly brought us into much closer touch withthe more conservative Filipinos. 

We soon established relations of friendliness and confidence with menlike Arellano, Torres, Legarda and Tavera, who had left the Malolosgovernment when it demonstrated its futility, and were ready to turnto the United States for help. Insurgent sympathizers also conferredfreely with us. We were invited to a beautiful function given in ourhonour at the home of a wealthy family, and were impressed, as no onecan fail to be, with the dignified bearing of our Filipino hosts, a thing which is always in evidence on such occasions. We gave areturn function which was largely attended and greatly aided in theestablishment of relations of confidence and friendship with leadingFilipino residents of Manila. 

The Filipinos were much impressed with Colonel Denby. He was a handsomeman, of imposing presence, with one of the kindest hearts that everbeat. They felt instinctively that they could have confidence in him, and showed it on all occasions. 

Meanwhile we lost no opportunity to inform ourselves as toconditions and events, conferring with Filipinos from various partsof the archipelago and with Chinese, Germans, Frenchmen, Belgians, Austrians, Englishmen, Spaniards and Americans. Among the witnesseswho came before us were farmers, bankers, brokers, merchants, lawyers, physicians, railroad men, shipowners, educators and publicofficials. Certainly all classes of opinion were represented, andwhen we were called upon by the President, a little later, for astatement of the situation we felt fully prepared to make it. 

Blount has charged that the commission attempted to interfere with theconduct of the war, and cites a cablegram from General Otis statingthat conferences with Insurgents cost soldiers' lives in support ofthis contention. No conference with Insurgent leaders was ever heldwithout the previous knowledge and approval of the general, who washimself a member of the commission. 

Late in April General Luna sent Colonel Arguelles of his staff to askfor a fifteen days' suspension of hostilities under the pretext ofenabling the Insurgent congress to meet at San Fernando, Pampanga, on May 1, to discuss the situation and decide what it wanted todo. He called on the commission and urged us to ask Otis to grantthis request, but we declined to intervene, and General Otis refusedto grant it. 

Mabini continued Luna's effort, sending Arguelles back with letters toOtis and to the commission. In the latter he asked for "an armisticeand a suspension of hostilities as an indispensable means of arrivingat peace, " stating explicitly that the Philippine government "does notsolicit the armistice to gain a space of time in which to reënforceitself. "

The commission again referred Arguelles to General Otis on the matterof armistice and suspension of hostilities. We suspected that thestatement that these things were not asked for in order to gain timewas false, and this has since been definitely established. 

Taylor says:--

"On April 11 Mabini wrote to General Luna (Exhibit 719) thatAguinaldo's council was of the opinion that no negotiations for therelease of the Spanish prisoners should be considered unless theAmerican Commission agreed to a suspension of hostilities for thepurpose of treating, not only in regard to the prisoners, but forthe purpose of opening negotiations between Aguinaldo's governmentand the American authorities. 

"'In arriving at this decision we have been actuated by the desireto gain time for our arsenals to produce sufficient cartridges, if, as would seem to be probable, they persist in not even recognizingour belligerency, as means for furthering the recognition of ourindependence. '" [446]

Arguelles, on his return, was instructed to ask Otis for a--

"general armistice and suspension of hostilities in all the archipelagofor the short space of three months, in order to enable it to consultthe opinion of the people concerning the government which would be themost advantageous, and the intervention in it which should be givento the North American Government, and to appoint an extraordinarycommission with full powers, to act in the name of the Philippinepeople. " [447]

General Otis naturally again declined to grant the request for asuspension of hostilities. 

Little came of the conference between Arguelles and the commission, except that we really succeeded in convincing him of the goodintentions of our government, and this promptly got him into veryserious trouble, as we shall soon see. I took him to a tent hospitalon the First Reserve Hospital grounds where wounded Insurgents werereceiving the best of treatment at the hands of American surgeons, and he was amazed. He had been taught to believe that the Americansmurdered prisoners, raped women, and committed similar barbaritieswhenever they got a chance. As we have seen, stories of this sortwere industriously spread by many of the Insurgent leaders amongtheir soldiers, and among the common people as well. They servedto arouse the passions of the former, and stirred them up to actsof devilish brutality which they might perhaps not otherwise haveperpetrated. Arguelles told the truth upon his return, and this, together with his suggestion that it might be well to consider theacceptance of the form of government offered by the United States, nearly cost him his life. Relative to this matter Taylor says:--

"When Arguelles returned to the insurgent lines, it must have beenconsidered that he had said too much in Manila. While he had beensent there to persuade the Americans to agree to a suspension ofhostilities to be consumed in endless discussion under cover of whichLuna's army could be reorganized, he had not only failed to securethe desired armistice, but had come back with the opinion that itmight after all be advisable to accept the government proposed by theUnited States. On May 22 General Luna ordered his arrest and trial forbeing in favour of the autonomy of the United States in the PhilippineIslands. He was tried promptly, the prosecuting witness being anotherofficer of Luna's staff who had accompanied him to Manila and actedas a spy upon his movements (P. I. R. , 285. 2). The court sentenced himto dismissal and confinement at hard labor for twelve years. Thisdid not satisfy Luna's thirst for vengeance, and he was imprisonedin Bautista on the first floor of a building whose second story wasoccupied by that officer. One night Luna came alone into the roomwhere he was confined and told him that although he was a traitor, yet he had done good service to the cause; and it was not proper thata man who had been a colonel in the army should be seen working onthe roads under a guard. He told him that the proper thing for him todo was to blow his brains out, and that if he did not do it within areasonable time the sentinel at his door would shoot him. He gave hima pistol and left the room. Arguelles decided not to kill himself, butfully expected that the guard would kill him. Shortly afterwards Lunawas summoned to meet Aguinaldo, and never returned. On September 29, 1899, his sentence was declared null and void and he was reinstatedin his former rank (P. I. R. , 285. 3, and 2030. 2). " [448]

Colonel Arguelles has told me exactly the same story. For a time itseemed as if the views expressed by him might prevail. 

"According to Felipe Buencamino and some others, the majority of themembers of congress had been in favour of absolute independence untilthey saw the demoralization of the officers and soldiers which resultedin the American occupation of Malolos. In the middle of April, 1899, they remembered Arellano's advice, and all of the intelligent menin Aguinaldo's government, except Antonio Luna and the officers whohad no desire to lay down their military rank, decided to accept thesovereignty of the United States. At about the same time copies ofthe proclamation issued by the American Commission in Manila reachedthem and still further influenced them toward the adoption of thispurpose. By the time congress met in San Isidro on May 1, 1899, allof the members had accepted it except a few partisans of Mabini, then president of the council of government. At its first meetingthe congress resolved to change the policy of war with the UnitedStates to one of peace, and this change of policy in congress led tothe fall of Mabini and his succession by Paterno. The first act ofthe new council was the appointment of a commission headed by FelipeBuencamino which was to go to Manila and there negotiate with theAmerican authorities for an honourable surrender. " [449]

"Although Mabini had fallen from power, Luna and his powerful factionhad still to be reckoned with. He was less moderate than Mabini, andhad armed adherents, which Mabini did not, and when Paterno declaredhis policy of moderation and diplomacy he answered it on the daythe new council of government was proclaimed by an order that allforeigners living in the Philippines except Chinese and Spaniards, should leave for Manila within forty-eight hours. " [450]

Unfortunately Luna intercepted the Buencamino commission. Its headhe kicked, cuffed and threatened with a revolver. One of its memberswas General Gregorio del Pilar. He was allowed to proceed, as hecommanded a brigade of troops which might have deserted had he beenbadly treated, but Luna named three other men to go with him in placeof those who had been originally appointed. [451] They were GracioGonzaga, Captain Zialcita, and Alberto Baretto. They reached Manilaon May 19, 1899, and during their stay there had two long interviewswith the commission. 

They said that they had come, with larger powers than had beenconferred on Arguelles, to discuss the possibility of peace, theform of ultimate government which might be proposed in future, andthe attitude of the United States government toward needed reforms. 

Meanwhile, on May 4, we had laid before the President a plan ofgovernment informally discussed with Arguelles, and had received thefollowing reply, authorizing, in substance, what we had suggested:--

"Washington, May 5, 1899, 10. 20 P. M. 

"Schurman, Manila:

"Yours 4th received. You are authorized to propose thatunder the military power of the President, pending action ofCongress, government of the Philippine Islands shall consist of agovernor-general, appointed by the President; cabinet, appointed by thegovernor-general; a general advisory council elected by the people; thequalifications of electors to be carefully considered and determined;the governor-general to have absolute veto. Judiciary strong andindependent; principal judges appointed by the President. The cabinetand judges to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both, havingregard to fitness. The President earnestly desires the cessationof bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippine Islands at anearly date shall have the largest measure of local self-governmentconsistent with peace and good order. 

"_Hay_. " [452]

Our proclamation of April 4, 1899, was also taken up at their requestand was gone over minutely, sentence by sentence. We were asked toexplain certain expressions which they did not fully understand. 

They told us that it would be hard for their army to lay down itsarms when it had accomplished nothing, and asked if it could be takeninto the service of the United States. We answered that some of theregiments might be taken over and employment on public works be foundfor the soldiers of others. 

We endeavoured to arrange for an interview with Aguinaldo, eithergoing to meet him or assuring him safe conduct should he desire toconfer with us at Manila. 

They left, promising to return in three weeks when they had had timeto consider the matters under discussion, but they never came back. 

Shortly thereafter there was an odd occurrence. Soon after ourarrival we had learned that Mr. Schurman was a man of very variableopinions. He was rather readily convinced by plausible arguments, but sometimes very suddenly reversed his views on an important subject. 

At the outset Archbishop Nozaleda made a great impression uponhim. The Archbishop was a thoroughgoing Spaniard of the old school, and entertained somewhat radical opinions as to what should be doneto end the distressing situation which existed. After talking withhim Mr. Schurman seemed to be convinced that we ought to adopt astern and bloody policy, a conclusion to which Colonel Denby and Idecidedly objected. 

A little later he made a trip up the Pasig River with Admiral Deweyand others and had a chance to see something of the aftermath ofwar. It was not at all pretty. It never is. I was waiting for himwith a carriage at the river landing on his return and had hard workto keep him away from the cable office. His feelings had undergone acomplete revulsion. He insisted that if the American people knew whatwe were doing they would demand that the war be terminated immediatelyat any cost and by whatsoever means, and he wanted to tell them allabout it at once. By the next morning, however, things fortunatelylooked rather differently to him. 

Mr. Schurman acquired a working knowledge of the Spanish languagewith extraordinary promptness. Shortly thereafter Colonel Denby andI discovered that when Filipinos came to see the commission in orderto impart information or to seek it, he was conferring with themprivately and sending them away without our seeing them at all. 

Soon after we had made our formal statement of the situation to thePresident, Mr. Schurman had an interview with an Englishman who hadbeen living in Insurgent territory north of Manila, from which he hadjust been ejected, in accordance with Luna's order. This man toldhim all about the mistakes of the Americans and evidently greatlyimpressed him, for shortly thereafter he read to us at a commissionmeeting a draft of a proposed cablegram which he said he hoped we wouldapprove. It would have stultified us, had we signed it, as it involvedin effect the abandonment of the position we had so recently takenand a radical change in the policy we had recommended. Mr. Schurmantold us that if we did not care to sign it, he would send it as anexpression of his personal opinion. Colonel Denby asked him if hispersonal opinion differed from his official opinion, and received anaffirmative reply. We declined to approve the proposed cablegram, whereupon he informed us that if his policy were adopted, he andGeneral Aguinaldo would settle things without assistance from us, and that otherwise he would resign. He inquired whether we, too, would send a cable, and we told him certainly not, unless furtherinformation from us was requested. He sent his proposed message, in somewhat modified form, and received a prompt reply instructinghim to submit it to the full commission and cable their views. 

He did submit it to Colonel Denby and myself at a regularly calledcommission meeting, argued that in doing this he had obeyed thePresident's instructions, and vowed that he would not show it toGeneral Otis. I showed it to the General myself, allowing him tobelieve that I did so with Mr. Schurman's approval, and thus avoidedserious trouble, as he had been personally advised from Washingtonof the instructions to Mr. Schurman. The General then joined withColonel Denby and myself in a cablegram setting forth our views, and so this incident ended. 

Mr. Schurman did not resign, but thereafter we saw very little ofhim. He made a hasty trip to the Visayas and the Southern Islandsand sailed for the United States shortly after his return to Manila, being anxious to get back in time for the opening of the college yearat Cornell. 

Colonel Denby and I were instructed to remain at Manila, where werendered such assistance as we could give, and continued to gatherinformation relative to the situation, the country and the people. Inthis latter work we were given invaluable help by Jesuit priests, who prepared for us a comprehensive monograph embodying a very largeamount of valuable information, and furnished us a series of new mapsas well. The latter were subsequently published by the United StatesCoast and Geodetic Survey in the form of an Atlas of the Philippines. 

Early in September we had a most interesting interview with Sr. José deLuzuriaga, a distinguished and patriotic Filipino from western Negros, where American sovereignty had been accepted without resistance. Upto that time it had been possible for the people of Negros to keepout Tagálog invaders. Sr. Luzuriaga assured us that so long as thiscondition continued, there would be no trouble, and he was quite right. 

Aguinaldo's agents eventually gained a foothold there for a short time, and did some mischief, but it did not result very seriously. 

We felt an especial interest in this island, as General Otis hadasked us carefully to study and to criticise a scheme for itsgovernment which had been drafted by General James F. Smith, whoafterward became justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, secretary of public instruction and governor-general of the islands, and was then in command of the troops in Negros. 

General Lawton arrived in the Philippines during our stay. Hiscoming had been eagerly looked forward to by the army. He had sailedwith the understanding that he was to be put in charge of fieldoperations. While he was at sea, influences were brought to bearwhich changed this plan. 

It is my firm conviction that if Lawton had been put in command, thewar would have ended promptly. He was a wonderful man in the field. Hepossessed the faculty of instilling his own tremendous energy intohis officers and men, whose privations and dangers he shared, therebyarousing an unfaltering loyalty which stood him in good stead in timeof need. If there was fighting to be done, he promptly and thoroughlywhipped everything in sight. He punished looting and disorder witha heavy hand, treated prisoners and noncombatants with the utmostkindness, and won the good-will of all Filipinos with whom he camein contact. 

General MacArthur was always declaring that the Filipinos were a unitagainst us and that he could never get information from them. GeneralLawton never lacked for such information as he needed, and constantlyand successfully used the Filipinos themselves as messengers and forother purposes. I came to know him intimately, and learned to admireand love him as did all those who had that great privilege. 

For some time I had charge of his spies. Never have men taken longerchances than did the faithful few who at this time furnished us withinformation as to events in Insurgent territory. Discovery meant promptand cruel death. For a long time Major F. S. Bourns had performed theuncongenial task of directing the spies. He was then the chief healthofficer of Manila, and as all sorts of people were compelled to consulthim on sanitary matters, visits to his office aroused no suspicion. Hespoke Spanish, and this was imperatively necessary. Our spies simplywould not communicate results through interpreters. The facts revealedby the Insurgent records show how right they were in refusing to do so. 

Major Bourns eventually returned to the United States. His work wastaken over by an army officer, with the result that two of our bestmen died very suddenly in that gentleman's back yard. As I spokeSpanish, and as all sorts of people came to see the commission, I was the logical candidate for this job, which I thereupon inherited. 

Each morning, if there was news, I myself laboriously thumped outmy notes on the typewriter, making an original and one copy. Thecopy I took at once to General Lawton. The original I took, later, to General Otis. 

General Lawton was firmly convinced that most army officers wereunfitted by their training to perform civil functions. He organizedmunicipal governments with all possible promptness in the townsoccupied by his troops, and in this work he requested my assistance, which I was of course glad to give. Sr. Felipe Calderon drafted asimple provisional scheme of municipal government which I submittedfor criticism to that most distinguished and able of Filipinos, Sr. Cayetano Arellano. [453] When the final changes in it had beenmade, I accompanied General Lawton on a trip to try putting it intoeffect. We held elections and established municipal governments in anumber of the towns just south of Manila, and in some of those alongthe Pasig River. 

General Otis watched our operations and their results narrowly, andwas sufficiently well pleased with the latter to order General Kobbéto follow a similar course in various towns on or near the railroadnorth of Manila. Kobbé did not profess to know much about municipalgovernment, and asked me to go with him and help until he got thehang of the thing, which I did. 

Thus it happened that the first Philippine Commission had a sort ofleft-handed interest in the first municipal governments establishedin the islands under American rule. 

In his endeavour to show that the Commission interfered with militaryoperations, Blount has ascribed certain statements to Major Starr. Hesays: " ... At San Isidro on or about November 8, Major Starr said:'We took this town last spring, ' stating how much our loss had been inso doing, 'but partly as a result of the Schurman commission parleyingwith the Insurgents, General Otis had us fall back. We have just hadto take it again. '" [454]

If Major Starr ever made such a statement he was sadlymisinformed. General Lawton was the best friend I ever had in theUnited States Army. I saw him almost daily when he was in Manila, and he showed me the whole telegraphic correspondence which passedbetween him and General Otis on the subject of the withdrawal fromSan Isidro and Nueva Ecija, which was certainly one of the mostill advised moves that any military commander was ever compelled tomake. General Lawton's unremitting attacks had absolutely demoralizedthe Insurgent force, and my information is that when he finallyturned back, Aguinaldo and several members of his cabinet werewaiting, ten miles away, to surrender to him when he next advanced, believing that they could never escape from him. I have not thetelegraphic correspondence before me, but I remember its salientfeatures. Otis ordered Lawton to withdraw, and Lawton, convinced ofthe inadvisability of the measure, objected. Otis replied that, withthe rainy season coming on, he could neither provision him nor furnishhim ammunition. Lawton answered that he had provisions enough to lastthree weeks and ammunition enough to finish the war, whereupon Otisperemptorily ordered him to withdraw. The Philippine Commission hadno more to do with this matter than they had to do with the similarorder against advancing which Otis sent Lawton on the day the latterwon the Zapote River fight, when the Insurgents were running all overthe Province of Cavite. Lawton wanted to push forward and clean thewhole place up. The reply to his request to be allowed to do so ran, if memory serves me well, as follows:--

"Do nothing. You have accomplished all that was expected of you. "

Later on, Lawton and his devoted officers and men had to duplicate thefierce campaign which had resulted in the taking of San Isidro. Thismade possible the movement that Lawton had had in mind in thefirst instance, which was made with the result that organized armedresistance to the authority of the United States promptly ceased innorthern Luzón. 

While on this subject I wish to record the fact that shortly afterhis return from the San Isidro campaign General Lawton asked me toaccompany him on a visit to General Otis and act as a witness. Idid so. In my presence Lawton said to Otis that if the latter wouldgive him two regiments, would allow him to arm, equip and provisionthem to suit himself, and would turn him loose, he would stake hisreputation as a soldier, and his position in the United States Army, on the claim that within sixty days he would end the insurrectionand would deliver to General Otis one Emilio Aguinaldo, dead oralive. The general laughed at his offer. General Lawton asked mesome day to make these facts public. As life is an uncertain thing, I deem it proper to do so now. Personally I am convinced that if hisoffer had been accepted he would have kept his promise. 

On September 15, 1899, Colonel Denby and I sailed for the UnitedStates, having been recalled to Washington. Shortly after our arrivalthere the commission issued a brief preliminary report. The winterwas spent in the preparation of our final report, which constituteda full and authoritative treatise on the islands, the people andtheir resources. Father José Algué, the distinguished head of thePhilippine Weather Bureau, was called to Washington to help us, and gave us invaluable assistance. 

Our preliminary report, dated November 2, 1899, and the first volumeof our final report, published on January 31, 1900, contained ourobservations and recommendations relative to political matters. 

Mr. Schurman has been credited with saying in an address made onJanuary 11, 1902: "Any decent kind of government of Filipinos byFilipinos is better than the best possible government of Filipinosby Americans. " [455]

On November 2, 1900, he signed the following statement: [456]--

"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commissionbelieve that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapseinto anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, theintervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islandsamong them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the ideaof a free, self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth atall conceivable. And the indispensable need from the Filipino pointof view of maintaining American sovereignty over the archipelago isrecognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgentswho desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, wouldtake the revenues and leave us the responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipinos cannot standalone. Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictatesof national honour in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. Wecannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of governmentwhich our sovereignty entails; and the commission is strongly persuadedthat the performance of our national duty will prove the greatestblessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands. "

More than fourteen years' experience in governmental work in thePhilippines has profoundly impressed me with the fundamental soundnessof these conclusions of the first Philippine Commission. Everystatement then made still holds true. 

CHAPTER XII

The Establishment of Civil Government

The first Philippine Commission did not complete its work until March, 1900. By this time conditions had so far improved in the archipelagothat President McKinley was prepared to initiate a movement lookingtoward the establishment of civil government there. With this end inview he appointed the following commission of five civilians; WilliamH. Taft of Ohio, Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, Luke E. Wright ofTennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont and Bernard Moses of California. Ourappointments were dated March 16, 1900. Our instructions which werefull, are given in the appendix. [457] I was the only member of thefirst commission to be reappointed. Neither General Otis nor AdmiralDewey cared to serve, and indeed the professional duties of eachof them rendered his appointment to the new commission difficult, if not impossible. Mr. Schurman had at one time expressed himselfas vigorously opposed to the idea of a new commission, maintainingthat the best results could be obtained by the appointment of a civilgovernor with wide powers. It was therefore taken for granted that hewould not desire reappointment. Colonel Denby was keenly interestedin the work and would have been glad to continue it, but he was pastseventy and with his good wife had then spent some fifteen yearsin the Far East. He doubted whether his strength would be adequateto bear the strain of the arduous task which obviously lay beforethe new commission, and Mrs. Denby desired to remain in the UnitedStates where she could be near her children from whom she had beenlong separated, so her husband felt constrained to say that he didnot wish to return to the Philippines. 

I separated from him with the keenest regret. He was an amiable, tactful man of commanding ability and unimpeachable integrity, actuatedby the best of motives and loyal to the highest ideals. He constantlysought to avoid not only evil but the appearance of evil. I count itone of the great privileges of my life to have been associated withhim. The one thing in the book written by James H. Blount which arousedmy ire was his characterization of Colonel Denby as a hypocrite. Nofalser, meaner, more utterly contemptible statement was ever made, and when I read it the temptation rose hot within me to make publicBlount's personal Philippine record, but after the first heat ofanger had passed I remembered what the good old Colonel would havewished me to do in such a case, and forbore. 

The second Philippine commission, hereinafter referred to as "thecommission, " received its instructions on April 7, 1900. 

They covered a most delicate and complicated subject, namely, thegradual transfer of control from military to civil authority in acountry extensive regions of which were still in open rebellion. 

In the opinion of President McKinley there was no reason why stepsshould not be taken, from time to time, to inaugurate governmentsessentially popular in their form as fast as territory came underthe permanent control of our troops, and indeed, as we have seen, this had already been done by the army. It was provided that weshould continue and perfect the work of organizing and establishingcivil governments already commenced by the military authorities. Indoing this we were to act as a board of which Mr. Taft was designatedpresident. It was contemplated that the transfer of authority frommilitary commanders to civil officers would be gradual, and full andcomplete coöperation between these authorities was enjoined. Havingfamiliarized ourselves with the conditions then prevailing in theislands, we were to devote our attention first to the establishmentof municipal governments, in which the natives should be given theopportunity to manage their local affairs to the fullest extent andwith the least supervision and control found to be practicable. We werethen to consider the organization of larger administrative divisions, and when of the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islandswas such that the central administration could safely be transferredfrom military to civil control were to report this conclusion to thesecretary of war with our recommendations as to the form of centralgovernment which should be established. 

Beginning with September 1, 1900, we were authorized to exercise, subject to the approval of the President and the secretary of war, thelegislative power, which was then to be transferred from the militarygovernor to us until the establishment of civil central government, or until Congress should otherwise provide. We were authorized duringa like period to appoint to office such officers under the judicial, educational, and civil service systems, and in the municipal anddepartmental governments, as were duly provided for. Until thecomplete transfer of control the military governor was to remain thechief executive head of the government and to exercise the executiveauthority previously possessed by him and not expressly assigned tothe commission by the president in his instructions. In establishingmunicipal governments we were to take as the basis of our work thoseestablished by the military governor, under the order of August 8, 1899, which I had helped to set up, as well as those establishedunder the report of a board constituted by the military governor byhis order of January 29, 1900, of which Señor Cayetano Arellano wasthe president. 

In the establishment of departmental or provincial governments wewere to give special attention to the then-existing government of theisland of Negros, established with the approval of the people of thatisland under the order of the military governor of July 22, 1899. 

We were instructed to investigate troubles growing out of large landholdings, including those of the religious orders, and to promote, extend and improve the system of education already inaugurated bythe military authorities, giving first importance to the extensionof a system of primary education free to all, which would tend to fitthe people for the duties of citizenship and the ordinary avocationsof a civilized community. Instruction was to be given at first inthe native dialects, but full opportunity for all of the people toacquire English was to be provided as soon as possible. If necessitydemanded, we were authorized to make changes in the existing systemof taxation and in the body of the laws under which the people weregoverned, although such changes were to be relegated to the civilgovernment which we were to establish later, so far as might be. Ourinstructions contained the following important passages:--

"In all the forms of government and administrative provisions whichthey are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear inmind that the government which they are establishing is designednot for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoreticalviews, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people ofthe Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made toconform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of theindispensable requisites of just and effective government. 

"At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the peopleof the islands should be made plainly to understand, that there arecertain great principles of government which have been made the basisof our governmental system which we deem essential to the rule of lawand the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that thereare also certain practical rules of government which we have found tobe essential to the preservation of these great principles of libertyand law, and that these principles and these rules of governmentmust be established and maintained in their islands for the sake oftheir liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with thecustoms or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. 

"It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the PhilippineIslands fully appreciates the importance of these principles andrules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universalassent. Upon every division and branch of the government of thePhilippines, therefore, must be imposed these inviolable rules:--

"That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or propertywithout due process of law; that private property shall not betaken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminalprosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and publictrial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to beconfronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory processfor obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance ofcounsel for his defence; that excessive bail shall not be required, norexcessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted;that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence, or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizuresshall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitudeshall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainderor ex-post-facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passedabridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the rights ofthe people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government fora redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting theestablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession andworship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. "

It has been the fashion in some quarters to sneer at the last of theseparagraphs, and to insinuate, if not to charge, that President McKinleyin his policy toward the Philippine Islands was actuated by unworthymotives. Nothing could be further from the truth. From the beginningto the end the real good of the several peoples of the archipelagocame first with him, and no one who had the privilege of knowing himwell doubts it. Thoroughly imbued with the lofty sentiments expressedby him in our instructions, we set forth on our long pilgrimage to acountry where we were to undertake a heavy task essentially differentfrom that which had ever before fallen to the lot of any five citizensof the United States. 

On April 17, 1900, we sailed from San Francisco on the UnitedStates army transport _Hancock_. We were forty-five strong. Ofthis goodly company only four remain in the Philippines to-day, [458]--Mr. And Mrs. Branagan, Mrs. Worcester and myself. Singularlyenough, with two exceptions, all of the others are still aliveand at work. Arthur W. Ferguson, prince of interpreters, who waslater appointed Executive Secretary, died in the service after morethan six years of extraordinarily faithful and efficient work. JamesA. LeRoy, my faithful, able and efficient private secretary, contractedtuberculosis, and fell a victim to it after a long and gallant fight. 

At Honolulu we met with a severe disappointment. It was of courseour duty to call on Governor Dole. We were advised that silk hatsand frock coats must be donned for this visit, and it was perishinghot. We reached the palace in a reeking perspiration and had a longwait in a suffocating room. When Mr. Dole appeared, he was closelyfollowed by an attendant bearing a large and most attractive-lookingbottle carefully wrapped in a napkin, and our spirits rose. But, alas! It contained Poland water. 

At Tokio we had an audience with the Emperor and were received by theEmpress as well. In the high official who had charge of the palacewhere these events took place, I discovered an old University ofMichigan graduate who made the occasion especially pleasant for me. 

We finally reached Manila on the morning of June 3. Although thethermometer was in the nineties, a certain frigidity pervaded theatmosphere on our arrival, which General MacArthur, the militarygovernor, seemed to regard in the light of an intrusion. 

He had been directed to provide suitable office quarters for us. Toour amazement and amusement we found desks for five commissionersand five private secretaries placed in one little room in theAyuntamiento. [459] While it was possible to get through the roomwithout scrambling over them, it would have been equally possibleto circle it, walking on them, without stepping on the floor. Inthe course of our first long official interview with the General, he informed us that we were "an injection into an otherwise normalsituation. "

He added that we had already mediatized the volume of work that flowedover his desk. At the moment none of us were quite sure what he meant, but we found the word in the dictionary. How often in the wearyyears that were to follow I wished that some one would materiallymediatize the task which fell to my lot! It was General MacArthur'shonestly held and frankly expressed opinion that what the Filipinosneeded was "military government pinned to their backs for ten yearswith bayonets. " He later changed that view very radically, and whencivil provincial governments were finally established it was withhis approval, and, in many instances, upon his specific recommendation. 

At the outset some effort was made to keep the public away fromus. Word was passed that we had no authority, which was true enough, as our legislative activities were not to begin until September1. The ninety days which intervened were very advantageously spent ingaining familiarity with the situation, which we had no difficultyin doing. Plenty of people were already weary of military rule andflocked to us. None of my companions had ever before set foot in thePhilippines, and although I had spent more than four years there, I still had plenty to learn. 

In this connection I am reminded of an event which occurred somewhatlater. While the commission was en route from Iloilo to Catbaloganwhen we were establishing civil provincial governments, General Hughesand Mr. Taft became involved in a somewhat animated discussion. TheGeneral displayed an accurate knowledge of facts which were of sucha nature that one would hardly have expected an army officer to befamiliar with them. Mr. Taft said: "General, how do you do it? Youhave always been a busy man, devoted to your profession. How have youmanaged to accumulate such a remarkable fund of information?" TheGeneral smiled his rare smile and replied: "Governor, I will tellyou. I always try to go to bed at night knowing a little more thanI did when I got up in the morning. " It is a wise plan to follow. 

On September 1 we assumed the legislative power, our first officialact being to appropriate $2, 000, 000 Mexican for the construction andrepair of highways and bridges. 

We were impressed with the fundamental necessity of promptly opening uplines of land communication in a country which almost completely lackedthem, and there were many poor people in dire need of employment whowould be relieved by the opportunity to earn an honest living whichthe inauguration of road construction would afford them. 

Our second act appropriated $5000 Mexican for the purpose of makinga survey to ascertain the most advantageous route for a railroad intothe mountains of Benguet, where we wished to establish a much-neededhealth resort for the people of the archipelago. 

Seven days later we passed an act for the establishment andmaintenance of an efficient and honest civil service in the PhilippineIslands. This measure was of basic importance. We had stipulated beforeleaving Washington that no political appointees should be forced uponus under any circumstances. The members of the second commission, liketheir predecessors of the first, were firm in the belief that nationalpolitics should, if possible, be kept out of the administration ofPhilippine affairs, and we endeavoured to insure this result. 

Our tenth act appropriated $1500 Mexican to be paid to the widowof Salvador Reyes, vice-president of Santa Cruz in Laguna Province, assassinated because of his loyalty to the established government. 

Our fifteenth act increased the monthly salaries of Filipino publicschool teachers in Manila. 

Our sixteenth and seventeenth acts reorganized the Forestry Bureauand the Mining Bureau. 

On October 15 we appropriated $1, 000, 000 United States currency, for improving the port of Manila, where there was urgent need ofprotection for shipping during the typhoon season. 

On December 12 we passed an act authorizing the establishment of localpolice in cities and towns in the Philippine Islands and appropriating$150, 000 United States currency for their maintenance. 

Two days later we passed a much-needed act regulating the sale ofintoxicating liquors within the city of Manila and its attachedbarrios. 

On December 21, we appropriated $75, 000 United States currency forthe construction of the Benguet Road, little dreaming how much timewould elapse and how many more dollars would be appropriated, beforea vehicle passed over it. 

It will be sufficiently evident that I cannot here give an accountof the several acts which we passed when I say that they number fourhundred forty-nine during the first year. We created the administrativebureaus of a well-organized government, established civil rule innumerous municipalities and provinces, provided for the necessaryexpenses of government, organized courts and reformed the judiciary. Soimportant were the results following the establishment of the CivilService Act and the act providing for the organization of courts forthe Philippine Islands that I have devoted a chapter to each. 

Although there were no limits on our power to enact legislation otherthan those imposed by our instructions hereinbefore referred to, nothing was further from our desire than to exercise too arbitrarilythe authority conferred upon us. 

Taylor has correctly described our method of procedure in thefollowing words:--

"On September 1, 1900, the Commission began its legislative andexecutive duties. In performing them it adopted the policy of passingno laws, except in cases of emergency, without publishing them in thedaily press, nor until after they had passed a second reading and thepublic had been given an opportunity to come before the Commission andsuggest objections or amendments to the bills. Before enacting themthey were submitted to the military governor for his considerationand comment. " [460]

The other especially important events of our first legislativeyear were the establishment of civil rule in the municipalitiesas well as in thirty-eight provinces and the substitution of themilitary central government by the gradual creation of bureaus andthe ultimate appointment of a civil governor and of five heads ofexecutive departments. 

On November 23, 1900, we passed an act providing for the establishmentof a civil government in the province of Benguet, and thus it happenedthat a province practically all of whose inhabitants were members ofa non-Christian tribe was the first to enjoy the benefits of civilrule. This action grew out of investigations by General Wright andmyself made when visiting Baguio during the latter part of July, whichled us to the conclusion that civil government could be established inBenguet at any time and should be established as soon as possible. Inview of the rather primitive state of civilization of the people forwhom we were legislating, a special act adapted to local conditionswas passed providing for a provincial government and fixing a formof government for the several settlements. 

On January 31, 1901, we passed an act for the organization of municipalgovernments in the Philippine Islands which, with various amendments, is still in effect and has been made applicable to all municipalcorporations of the Philippines inhabited chiefly by Filipinos, exceptthe city of Manila, the city of Baguio and a few small settlementsin the so-called special government provinces. [461]

On February 6, 1901, we passed a general act for the organization ofprovincial governments in the Philippine Islands. A special act wasrequired to make it applicable to any given province. 

Having thus prepared for the serious work of establishing civilgovernment throughout the archipelago so fast and so far as conditionsmight seem to justify, we determined to visit the several provincesand to familiarize ourselves with conditions on the ground in eachcase before taking action. We invariably sought the opinion ofthe military authorities as to the fitness of the provinces underconsideration for civil rule, and never established it except withtheir approval. Indeed, in several cases we yielded to their judgmentand organized provinces which we ourselves thought might better waitfor a time. 

Our first trip was to the northward along the line of theManila-Dagupan railway, and in the course of it we organized theprovinces of Bulaean, Pampanga, Tarlac and Pangasinán. 

On the 2d of March we crossed Manila Bay to Bataan and establisheda civil provincial government there. 

The first provincial officers were necessarily appointed, notelected. I well remember the consternation which Mr. Taft createdon this trip, when in announcing the appointment of a man of strongcharacter who was much disliked by some of the people present, hesaid that if the appointee did not behave well his official headwould be promptly removed. Surprise showed on almost every face inthe audience. They had become sufficiently accustomed to the idea ofbeing beheaded or otherwise sent out of the world by their own people, but had been led to believe that the Americans were a humane nation, and it took Mr. Taft at least five minutes to explain his joke. 

During the second week in March the commission transferred its officersbodily to the United States Army Transport _Sumner_ and started ona long journey in the course of which it visited and establishedprovincial governments in eighteen provinces, [462] returning toManila on the 3d of May. 

This trip was most interesting but dreadfully wearing. Everywherewe were overwhelmed by the hospitality of our Filipino friends. Wearrived at some new place nearly every morning, and the programme ineach was much the same. After an early breakfast we hurried ashore, drove or walked about for a short time to see what the town was like, and then attended a popular meeting in its largest building, wherewe held long and frank converse with the people on local conditions, giving them every opportunity to air their views, with the result thatthe local orators, of whom there were usually more than a sufficiency, had an opportunity to bring their heavy guns into action. Then followeda recess in the course of which we partook of a very elaborate lunch, and when possible conferred privately with influential men, oftenlearning things which they did not care to tell us in public. Then cameanother open meeting at which the actual organization of the provincewas effected and the officials were appointed and sworn in. Afterthis there was a long formal dinner, with the endless courses whichcharacterize such functions in the Philippines, and then came a ballwhich lasted till the wee small hours. When at last we got on board, tired out, our steamer sailed, and often brought us to some new placeby sunrise. 

In several instances we did not pass the act organizing a givenprovince at the time of our visit, but for one reason or anotherpostponed action until a later date. We visited a number of placeslike Joló, Basilan, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Davao and Samar, where wehad no intention of establishing civil government, in order to observelocal conditions. 

We touched at Marinduque on our trip south, and found that nothingcould then be done there, but the better element were anxious for achange, and we promised them that if they would bring about certainspecified results before our return we would give them a provincialgovernment. They undertook to do so, and kept their word. Needlessto say we also kept ours. 

We had grave doubts as to the advisability of establishing civilgovernments in Cebú, Bohol and Batangas. In the first of theseplaces the people were sullen and ugly. In the second there wasa marked disinclination on the part of leading citizens to acceptpublic office. There had been a little scattering rifle fire on theoutskirts of the capital of the third very shortly before our arrivalthere, but the organization of all these provinces was recommended bythe military authorities, and we decided to try an experiment whichcould do little harm, as we could return any one of them to militarycontrol in short order should such a course seem necessary. 

An effort has been made to make it appear that in organizing Cebú, Bohol and Batangas, we acted prematurely and upon our own initiative, thus complicating the situation for the military authorities. I willlet Blount voice this complaint. He says in part:--

"In his report for 1901 Governor Taft says that the four principalprovinces, including Batangas, which gave trouble shortly afterthe civil government was set up in that year, and had to bereturned to military control, were organized under civil rule 'onthe recommendation' of the then commanding general (MacArthur). Itcertainly seems unlikely that the haste to change from military rule tocivil rule came on the motion of the military. If the Commission evergot, _in writing, _ from General MacArthur, a 'recommendation' that anyprovinces be placed under civil rule while still in insurrection, thetext of the writing will show a mere soldierly acquiescence in the willof Mr. McKinley, the commander-in-chief. Parol [463] contemporaneousevidence will show that General MacArthur told them, substantially, that they were 'riding for a fall. ' In fact, whenever an insurrectionwould break out in a province after Governor Taft's inauguration asgovernor, the whole attitude of the army in the Philippines, fromthe commanding general down was 'I told you so. ' They did not saythis where Governor Taft could hear it, but it was common knowledgethat they were much addicted to damning 'politics' as the cause ofall the trouble. " [464]

Prophecy is always dangerous and when unnecessary seems ratherinexcusable. I submit the essential portions of the record toshow exactly what we did get from General MacArthur, and add thesuggestion that it was really hardly essential that he should makehis recommendations in writing, as he did, for the reason that hewas a gentleman and would not have repudiated a verbal recommendationonce made. 

On February 5, 1901, Governor Taft wrote General MacArthur a letterclosingwith the following paragraph:--

"As already communicated to you the purpose of the Commission is tomake a Southern trip on the 23rd of February, or as soon thereafteras practicable, with the idea of arranging for provincial governmentsthere, and I am directed by the Commission to request your opinionas to the provinces in which provincial governments may be safelyestablished. It is understood that Panay, Romblon, Tayabas, andpossibly one or two of the Camarines are ready for this. What hasbeen said with reference to the Northern provinces applies to these, but we shall communicate with you further as to the Southern provinceswhen we have been advised as to the possibility of securing a steamer. "

On February 9, General MacArthur gave the following instructions tothe Commanding General, Department of the Visayas:--

"The Military Governor desires that you report to this office atthe earliest date practicable the provinces in your department thatmay be considered ready for the establishment of civil governmentstherein and in this connection directs me to say that it should notbe considered as necessary that complete pacification has been broughtabout in a province before reporting it as ready for such government;that the provincial civil governments to be established will doubtlessprove useful agents in the further work of pacification. "

On February 27, that officer reported that in his opinion Iloilo, Capiz, Oriental Negros and Occidental Negros were ready; that Antiquemight be in a few days, and that Cebú, Bohol and Leyte were not. Thesefacts were reported to Governor Taft by General MacArthur on March 4, and on the same day Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder wrote to the commandinggeneral of the Visayas:--

"The Military Governor directs me to say that he regards the initiationof provincial civil government as an aid in the work of pacification, in which view it is not necessary that a province should be completelypacified as a condition to the initiation of such government. He hasexpressed to the Commission the opinion that you may be able, upontheir arrival at Iloilo, to submit a supplementary list of provincesin which it would be advisable to establish at once these governments. "

Meanwhile General MacArthur wrote on February 13, to Governor Taft:--

"In partial reply to your letter of the 5th instant I have the honorto inform you that the Commanding General, Department of SouthernLuzon, reports but one province, Tayabas, as ready at the presenttime for civil government. I add the provinces of Laguna, Batangasand Cavite, believing that the institution of civil government in allthese provinces will be in assistance of the military authorities inthe work of pacification. "

General MacArthur's communications seem to me to show something morethan "a mere soldierly acquiescence in the will of Mr. McKinley, "especially as the President had no knowledge of these provinces, andnever made any recommendation whatsoever relative to the establishmentof civil government there. 

Similarly, in establishing civil government in Cebu and Bohol, thecommission acted on the specific recommendation of the military, andrather against its own judgment. There seemed no very good reason forrefusing to try civil government, if the commanding general wantedit tried, and when it failed, as it promptly did, in Cebu, Bohol andBatangas, these provinces were immediately returned to the full controlof the military, and left there until conditions became satisfactory. 

Having escaped the perils of the deep, and the much graver perils ofthe dinner table, during our southern trip, we returned to Manila, wearier, wiser and sadder men than when we started, for we had learnedmuch of the superstitions, the ignorance and the obsessions whichprevailed among the Filipinos, and we knew that many of the men whofrom love of country had accepted office under us had done so at theperil of their lives. We had all had an excellent opportunity to cometo know the Filipinos. Their dignity of bearing, their courtesy, their friendly hospitality, their love of imposing functions, andof _fiestas_ and display, their childishness and irresponsibilityin many matters, their passion for gambling, for litigation and forpolitical intrigue, even the loves and the hatreds of some of them, had been spread before us like an open book. It is a fact that exceptfor the inhabitants of Cebu, Bohol and Batangas, the people wantedwhat we had to give them and were grateful for it. Never before hadthey had their day in court, and they appreciated it. 

The establishment of civil government throughout so large a proportionof the provinces in the islands would have been impossible at thistime had it not been for the helpful activities of the FederalParty organized on December 23, 1900, by many of the best and mostinfluential Filipinos in the archipelago for the purpose of aidingin the establishment of peace and order. Its members were tireless intheir activities. They succeeded in persuading many Insurgent leadersto lay down their arms, so that a normal condition could be restored interritory which the latter had previously harried. They convinced manyof the common people of the true purposes of the American government, and in numerous other ways rendered invaluable services. 

The officers and many of the members and agents of this party werepromptly sentenced to death by Aguinaldo, and many of them wereassassinated; [465] but the party persisted in its efforts untilsuccess was attained. 

During June of 1901 Professor Moses and I made a horseback trip throughPangasinán, La Union, Benguet, Lepanto and Ilocos Sur, accompanied byour private secretaries. Professor Moses was in wretched health as theresult of overwork and confinement, and needed out-of-door exercise. 

I had been intrusted with the drafting of legislation for thegovernment of the non-Christian tribes, and wanted to learn as muchabout them as possible, so that I could act intelligently. 

We started from Dagupan mounted on horses kindly furnished us by thearmy, and escorted by four mounted infantrymen. None of us had riddenfor years, and army officers were offering wagers that we would notget as far as Baguio. At Mangaldan a cavalry outfit replaced ourmounted infantrymen, and while the members of our new escort wereresting under the shade of a tree in the cemetery, I heard themvoicing joyful anticipations of the easy time they were to havetravelling with tenderfeet. I made up ray mind to give them somehealthful exercise on the trip. 

Having first visited the work at the lower end of the Benguet Road andthen travelled across country in a driving storm over wretched trails, we reached Bauang, our point of departure for the interior. Here Icalled the sergeant in charge and asked him where were the extra shoesfor our horses. In some confusion he confessed that he had broughtnone, whereupon I read him a homily on the duties of a cavalryman, and sent the whole outfit to San Fernando to get the horses reshodand provided with extra shoes for the trip. 

We arrived at Baguio in a howling typhoon. When we emerged from thehills into the open, and our horses got the full sweep of the storm, they at first refused to face it. We forced them into it, however, and a few moments later had found refuge in the house of Mr. OttoScheerer, a hospitable German. The cavalrymen and the horses got inunder the building. It gave me great joy to hear through the floorthe voice of the sergeant remarking, with much emphasis of the sortbest represented in print by dashes, that if he had known the sortof a trip he was starting on he would have been on sick report themorning of his departure. 

We waited in vain three days for the storm to end and then rodeon. Mr. Scheerer, who accompanied us, had sent ahead to arrange forlunch at the house of a rich Igorot named Acop, but when we arrived atthis man's place, soaked, cold, and hungry, we found it shut up. Hehad not received the message and was away from home. Investigationshowed that our only resource in the commissary line were somewads of sticky, unsalted, boiled rice which our Igorot carriers hadinside their hats, in contact with their frowsy hair. We bolted asmuch of this as the Igorots could spare, killing its rather highflavour with cayenne peppers picked beside the trail, and continuedour journey. In descending a steep hill my horse stumbled and whileattempting to recover himself drove a sharp stone into his hoof andturned a complete somersault, throwing me over his head on to therocks. When I got him up he was dead lame, and I walked the rest ofthe way to Ambuklao, where we arrived just at sunset. 

This once prosperous little Igorot hamlet had been burned by theSpaniards, for no apparent reason, during their flight from theprovince in 1906, and we found only two houses standing. They werenaturally crowded. I was so dead with fatigue that I threw my saddle onthe ground, and using it as a pillow, lay down in a couple of inchesof water and fell sound asleep. Later the Igorots vacated one of thehouses, and placed it at our disposal. I spent the greater part of thenight in a contest with an old Igorot woman, who for the commendablepurpose of keeping us warm tended a smoky pitch-pine fire, and shutthe door, which afforded our only means of ventilation, every time Idropped asleep. Awakened by the stifling smoke I would open it again, but as soon as I dozed she would shut it. I finally solved the problemby lying down with my head sticking out of the door. 

The next day was bright and clear. We rested until noon, dryingout our belongings meanwhile, and then continued our journey, visiting the Igorot settlements on the Agno River and those insouthern Lepanto and finally reaching Cervantes, the capital of thatsub-province. The Igorots of Benguet and Lepanto received us withthe utmost friendliness, and when not in danger of breaking our necksby falling over the edges of the wretched trails, we greatly enjoyedour trip. 

At Cervantes we were met by a delegation of Bontoc Igorots, who beggedus to visit their country, and we were just preparing to do so whenwe received a telegram recalling us to Manila to be present at theinauguration of Mr. Taft as civil governor. During our absence thecommission had established provincial governments in Rizal, Cavite andNueva Ecija. Mr. Taft was inaugurated on July 4, 1901. Thenceforthhe exercised control over the provinces where civil government hadbeen established, while the military governor continued in chargeof each of the remaining provinces until it was duly organized andtransferred to civil control. 

In August, 1901, the commission sailed on a tour of the remainingnorthern provinces, visiting La Union, Ilocos Sur, Abra, Ilocos Norte, Cagayan, Isabela and Zambales in the order named, and establishinga government in each. On the trip to Abra those members of theeommission not previously accustomed to roughing it in the islandswere given a novel experience, for we went up the Abra River onbamboo rafts. However, a veritable ship of state had been preparedfor Governor Taft, and no one suffered any great discomfort. 

At Vigan, the capital of Ilocos, we narrowly escaped drowning in thesurf when returning to our steamer. For a time our good _viray_ [466]with some twenty oarsmen was unable to make headway through the rollingwaves. It broached to, nearly filled with water, and struck the bottomheavily several times. Some of the men quit rowing and began to pray, whereupon General J. F. Bell, who was sitting in the stern, rose to hisfeet, and shouted at them until they became more afraid of him than ofthe sea, and pulled for dear life until we were out of danger. Uponarrival at the ship we watched with interest the progress of otherboats through the surf, and were alarmed to see the men in one madlydivesting themselves of their clothing. When it finally came alongsideits occupants made flying leaps for the gangway, and we discoveredthat a great hole had been knocked in its bottom, and that raincoats, ordinary coats, and trousers had been jammed into this opening inorder to keep the rapidly sinking craft afloat for a few moments. 

In the Cagayan valley we had a taste of real tropical heat. Neverhave I seen a man suffer more than did Mr. Taft at Ilagan on the daywhen we established a provincial government for Isabela, and the nightthat followed still lingers in my memory. The air was suffocating. Mybed was in a corner. I dragged it out between a window and a doorand threw both wide open. Still I could not sleep. Slipping offmy pajamas, I seated myself on the broad window sill. The heat wasintolerable. I poured water over myself and resumed my seat in thewindow. The water would not evaporate. I sat there until morning, as I could not endure the heat lying down. 

Such conditions are unknown throughout the greater part of thearchipelago, where cool sea breezes temper the heat at all times. Inthe Cagayan valley an immense plain is bordered by ranges of highmountains to the east and the west. They seem to shut off bothmonsoons to a considerable extent, and there very trying heat is byno means unusual. 

On September 1, 1901, the first day of the second year of actualservice of the commission, a complete central civil government wasestablished. Commissioner Wright was appointed secretary of commerceand police; Commissioner Ide, secretary of finance and justice;Commissioner Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I myselfsecretary of the interior. The commission was strengthened by theaddition of three Filipino members: Señor Benito Legarda, Señor JoséR. De Luzuriaga, and Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, all of whom were menof exceptional ability and had rendered distinguished service in theestablishment of peace and order. 

Except for the addition of one more Filipino on July 6, 1908, theorganization of the commission has remained unchanged up to the presenttime, although there have been numerous changes in its personnel. Thetask which lay before it was to enact a code of laws adapted to thepeculiar conditions existing in the Philippines, and this was indeeda herculean undertaking. Its members laboured unremittingly. GovernorTaft and General Wright were towers of strength in the early days. Therest of us did what we could, and I, for one, am very proud of theresult. Certainly no one can ever claim that the commission was notindustrious. Before it finally ceased to be the legislative body ofthe islands it had passed some eighteen hundred acts. Obviously, as it is not my purpose to write an encyclopedia of law, I cannotdiscuss them in detail, and must content myself with here barelymentioning a few of the more important results obtained, leaving themore detailed discussion of some of them for later chapters. 

In general, it may be said that the additional bureaus necessaryfor the work of the Insular government were created, and givenproper powers. Civil government was gradually extended to the entirearchipelago. [467] The criminal code was amended and supplementedby the passage of new laws. The administration of justice wasreorganized and reformed. [468] An efficient native insular policeforce was organized, and an admirable state of public order broughtabout. [469] The health service was extended to the provinces, andhealth conditions were greatly improved throughout the islands. [470]Baguio was made accessible and became both the summer capital anda health resort for the people of the islands. [471] The scientificwork of the government was cordinated, and efficiency and economy inits performance were insured. [472]

Primary and secondary schools were established throughout the islands, supplemented by trade schools, and a normal school at Manila. [473]Legislation was enacted, and submitted to the President and toCongress, covering the disposition of public lands. [474] The purchaseof extensive estates belonging to certain religious orders, and thesale of their holdings therein to tenants, was provided for. [475]Fairly adequate legislation for the protection and developmentof the forest resources of the islands was enacted. [476] Meansof communication by land and sea were greatly improved, and thedevelopment of commerce was thus stimulated. [477]

It is a noteworthy fact that all of these things were done with aper capita taxation of about $2. 24!

Another fundamentally important aid to the commercial development ofthe islands was afforded by a radical reformation of the currency. 

The islands under the sovereignty of Spain had their own distinctsilver coinage in peso, media peso, peseta and media peseta pieces. 

In 1878 the Spanish government, hoping to check the heavy exportationof gold currency from the Philippines, passed a law prohibiting theimportation of Mexican dollars, but allowed the Mexican dollars thenin the islands to continue to circulate as legal tender. 

When the American troops arrived, there were in circulation theSpanish-Philippine peso and subsidiary silver coins; Spanish pesosof different mintings; Mexican pesos of different mintings; Hongkongdollars, fractional silver coins from different Chinese countries, and copper coins from nearly every country in the Orient. Although alaw had been passed prohibiting the introduction of Mexican dollarsinto the islands, they were being constantly smuggled in. Fluctuationsin the price of silver affected the value of the silver coins, and themoney in common use was in reality a commodity, worth on any given daywhat one could get for it. These conditions affected most disastrouslythe business interests of the islands. Merchants were forced to allowvery wide margins in commercial transactions, because they did notknow what their goods would actually cost them in local currency uponarrival. The most important business of the local banks was in realitythat of exchange brokers and note shavers. They hammered the exchangerate down and bought silver, then boosted the rate skyward and sold. 

The American army brought in a large amount of gold, but this didnot remain in circulation long, as it was exported by the differentbusiness concerns, or hoarded. 

United States silver money had a limited circulation during theearly days of American occupation, but it passed at less than itstrue value. An effort was made under the military administration tokeep the ratio of exchange at two to one by the purchase from thepublic of all United States currency offered at that rate to the banks. 

For a long time the banks refused to carry private accounts in UnitedStates currency, but when it was offered for deposit it was changedinto Mexicans with a heavy charge for the transaction, and an accountopened in Mexican currency to the credit of the depositor. If thedepositor afterward desired to get United States currency, he gave acheck for it at the then existing rate of exchange. Such conditionswere intolerable, and the commission passed an act making it an offenceto refuse to accept for deposit the currency of the sovereign power, but this did not remedy the fundamental difficulty. There came aheavy slump in the price of silver. The Insular government lost avery large sum because of the decrease in value of its silver coin. 

Mr. Charles A. Conant had been brought from the United States to makea report on the feasibility of providing an American coinage for theislands. He recommended that the unit of value should be a peso, equivalent to fifty cents United States currency. Congress, by anact passed July 1, 1902, vested general authority over the coinagein the Philippine government, but the commission decided not to takeaction until more specific authority could be obtained from Congress, as the proposed reform was radical, and it was very important that thenew currency should at the outset command the confidence so essentialto its success. 

After long discussion, Congress authorized, by an act passed March2, 1903, a new currency system based on a theoretical peso of 12. 9grains of gold 900 fine, equivalent to one-half of a United Statesgold dollar. The circulating medium was to be the Philippine silverpeso, which was to be legal tender for all debts, public and private, and its value was to be maintained on a parity with the theoreticalgold peso. For this purpose the creation of a gold standard, or goldreserve fund, was provided for, and this fund was to be maintainedand could be used for no other purpose. 

Considerable difficulty was experienced in introducing the new currencyinto the islands. The banks at first failed to give any assistance tothe government. The business men of Manila, and especially the Chinese, discounted the new Philippine peso, because it did not contain asmuch silver as did the Mexican dollar. They were quickly brought totime, and given to understand where they stood if they discreditedthe currency of the country. 

The Spanish Philippine coins and the Mexican coins in circulation werecollected by the treasury and exported to the San Francisco mint, where they were reminted into new coins of the weight and finenessprescribed by law. 

The establishment of a gold standard fund to maintain the paritybetween the gold and silver dollar was quickly effected by the sale ofexchange on the United States in accordance with the established law, at a cost estimated to be the same as the transportation of the goldcoin itself. 

The army, by direction of the secretary of war, ceased to payin United States money, and its paymasters were given credit atthe Insular Treasury, where they obtained the necessary funds inPhilippine currency. 

The government also authorized, in addition to the coinage of silver, the issuance of paper money in two, five, and ten peso notes. All ofthe coins and bills were readily interchangeable with the United Statescoins in common use, the dollar being worth two pesos, the half dollarone peso, the twenty-five cent piece a half peso, the ten-cent piecea peseta, the five-cent piece a media peseta and the cent two centavos. 

Unfortunately the silver value of the new peso was such that when theprice of silver again rose, its bullion value was greater than itsmoney value, and in consequence coins of this denomination were hoardedand exported. It proved necessary to prohibit their exportation, and to issue new coins of less bullion value, but this was the onlyreally serious difficulty attending a fundamental reform which putthe currency on a sound basis. The original pesos were recoined anda handsome profit made on the transaction. 

No one who has not lived in a country where the circulating mediumis constantly fluctuating in value can fully appreciate the enormousbenefit conferred on the Philippine Islands by this important reform. 

Another reform of far-reaching importance was the readjustment of theburden of taxation so that it should bear lightly on the necessitiesof life, and heavily on its luxuries. This was a complete reversalof the scheme which we found in force, under which wheat flour andkerosene oil paid very heavy import duties while cigars and champagnewere lightly taxed. 

We imposed export taxes on certain products of the country. Such taxesare objected to by many political economists, but were approved of bythe Filipinos, who strongly opposed the imposition of a logical andvery necessary personal tax to provide funds for the constructionand maintenance of highways and bridges. It is usually wise, whenpracticable, to obtain funds for necessary governmental purposes bythe imposition of taxes which are willingly paid. 

Mr. Taft resigned the governorship of the Philippines to becomesecretary of war, his resignation taking effect January 31, 1904. Hehad performed a monumental work for the Filipinos, and for humanity atlarge, during his years of service in the islands, and carried withhim the good will of most of the people whom he had so faithfully, efficiently and self-sacrificingly served. He had at one time verygravely impaired his health by hard work, and when the opportunitycame to satisfy a lifelong ambition by accepting appointment as aJustice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he had passedit by, in order to perform his duty to the people of the PhilippineIslands. As secretary of war, and as President of the United States, he availed himself of every opportunity which these high officesafforded to help the Filipinos, and to increase the prosperity oftheir country. They have had no better friend, and no other friendwhom they have ever had has been so useful to them. One more proofof his real greatness is afforded by the fact that to-day, afterbeing reviled by many Filipino politicians whom he befriended, whohave succeeded to a large degree in making the common people of thePhilippines consider him their enemy, his interest in the people ofthe Islands is as keen, and his eagerness to help them is as great, as in the early days when they acclaimed him their deliverer. 

General Luke E. Wright, a democrat of Memphis, Tennessee, wasappointed by President Roosevelt civil governor in Mr. Taft'splace. He rendered his country and the Filipinos most distinguishedservice. It is one thing to build up a great government, with numerouspolitical appointments at one's disposal, and another to stand by andkeep it running smoothly and efficiently, when a lot of disappointedpoliticians, who have seen their last hope of political preferment goa-glimmering, are throwing sand into the bearings of the machine. Thislatter class had begun to plot against Governor Taft before hisresignation took effect, but their machinations were rendered fruitlessby the wave of regret raised by his coming departure. 

They now devoted themselves, with a good deal of success, to injuringGovernor Wright, who declined to be dictated to, in the matter ofappointments, by the Federal Party, and aroused the ire of manypoliticians by occasionally telling the Filipinos unpalatable butwholesome and necessary truths relative to their fitness for immediateindependence. 

General Wright, whose title had been changed from governor togovernor-general on February 6, 1905, went on leave during the latterpart of that year, fully expecting to return and resume his workin the Philippines, but the islands were not to see him again. Heresigned, effective April 1, 1906, to become United States Ambassadorto Japan. In my opinion, the acceptance of his resignation at this timewas one of the gravest mistakes ever made in the Philippine policy ofthe United States. The islands were deprived of the services of a veryable and distinguished man, thoroughly conversant with their needs, who had the courage of his convictions, and whose convictions werethoroughly sound. 

Certain Filipino politicians openly boasted that they had secured hisremoval, and they and their ilk were encouraged to put forth new andpernicious efforts. Had General Wright returned to the islands much ofthe political unrest from which they have since suffered would havebeen avoided. He was beloved by his associates, who felt a sense ofpersonal loss when they learned that the places which had known himin The Philippines would know him no more. 

He was succeeded for the brief period of five and a half months byJudge Henry C. Ide, vice-governor and secretary of finance and justice, who had performed his duties while he was on leave. Judge Ide was arepublican, from Vermont. He resigned on September 19, 1906. 

He was succeeded by General James F. Smith, a democrat from California, who had come to the islands as a colonel of volunteers, and had wonpromotion because of his valuable services in the Visayas, and moreespecially in the island of Negros, where he had earned the goodwill of the Filipinos by his tact and kindness. Later he had served, unwillingly, as head of the Manila custom house. 

He was subsequently made a justice of the supreme court of thePhilippines. A lawyer by profession, he had resigned this positionwith regret to accept appointment, on January 1, 1903, as secretaryof public instruction. He did not desire the governor-generalship andmade a strong but unsuccessful effort to avoid accepting the position, which he finally took from a sense of duty. He was a good lawyer, with a big heart, and a keen insight into human nature. He thoroughlyunderstood the Filipinos, and he made an excellent governor-general. Itwas during his term of office that the Philippine Legislature, composed of an upper appointive house, the Philippine Commission, and a lower elective house, the Philippine Assembly, met for thefirst time on October 16, 1907. 

I devote a separate chapter [478] to the Philippine Legislature andits work, so need not discuss it here. Suffice it to say that suchsuccess as attended the work of this body during its inaugural, firstand special sessions, was very largely due to the tactful influenceof Governor-General Smith, who gave the speaker of the assemblymuch valuable, friendly counsel, and kept the two houses working incomparative harmony. Having struggled through one session of thelegislature, Governor-General Smith felt at liberty to resign. Hegreatly desired to leave the Philippine government service and returnto the practice of his profession. His resignation was reluctantlyaccepted, about a year after he had tendered it, and he left theservice on November 10, 1909. 

He was succeeded by Vice-Governor W. Cameron Forbes, a republicanfrom Massachusetts, who had accepted appointment as secretary ofcommerce and police on June 15, 1904. A man of independent means, Mr. Forbes entered the public service only because of the opportunityfor greater usefulness which was thus afforded him. He brought tobear on the problems which confronted him as secretary of commerceand police intelligence and ability of a very high order. Widepractical experience in the management of large business interestshad admirably fitted him to improve the organization and increase theefficiency of the insular police force, and to mature and carry outplans for bettering means of communication and otherwise facilitatingand stimulating the normal, healthful commercial development of theislands. I have devoted several chapters to the discussion of theresults accomplished along these lines, [479] and will not attempthere to enumerate them. 

Like all of his predecessors, he brought to the office ofgovernor-general mature experience gained on the ground, having beenin the service more than five years at the time of his promotion. 

As governor-general, he not only retained his keen interest in thelarge problems which had previously engaged his attention, and labouredunceasingly and most successfully in the performance of the duties ofhis new office, but took an especial interest in the development ofthe summer capital, and in the work for the non-Christian peoples ofthe islands, devoting a much greater amount of time and attention tofamiliarizing himself with the needs of this portion of the populationthan had ever previously been given to it by any governor-general. Hevisited the Moros and the Bukidnons in the south, and the Negritos, the Benguet Igorots, the Lepanto Igorots, the Bontoc Igorots, the Ilongots, the Ifugaos, the Kalingas, and both the wild and thecivilized Tingians, in the north, repeatedly inspecting the severalsub-provinces of the Mountain Province. 

Through his generosity in making proper grounds available, publicinterest in outdoor sports was greatly stimulated at Manila andat Baguio, while his own participation in polo, baseball and golfwas a good example to Americans and Filipinos alike, in a countrywhere vigorous outdoor exercise is very necessary to the physicaldevelopment of the young and the preservation of the health of themature. He was a true friend of the Filipinos, whom he genuinely likedand was always ready to assist. His personal influence was a powerfulfactor in the success of the very important work carried on at thePhilippine Normal School and the Philippine Training School for Nurses. 

During his term of office the prosperity of the islands increasedby leaps and bounds, public order became better than ever beforein their history, and the efficiency of the civil service reachedits maximum. No other governor-general ever drew so heavily on hisprivate means in promoting the public good, and it was the ironyof fate that he should have been accused, by certain irresponsibleanti-imperialists, of using his public office to promote his privateinterests. Near the end of his administration grossly and absurdlyfalse charges were made against him on the floor of the House byRepresentative William A. Jones. As their falsity has been conclusivelyand finally shown, [480] I will not here lend importance to themby repeating them. No official has ever given any country a cleaneradministration than Governor-General Forbes gave the Philippines. 

It was his fortune to be in office at the time of the change in thenational administration of the United States. After continuing to servefor months with no sign from Washington as to whether his resignationwas desired, he was advised by the Chief of the bureau of insularaffairs that the appointment of Mr. Francis Burton Harrison, who is aTammany Hall democrat, as his successor had been sent to the Senate, [481] and three days after its confirmation received a curt requestfor his resignation to be effected in a week and a day. He was alsorequested to employ servants for Mr. Harrison. Spaniards who readon the public streets newspapers which printed this message wereseen to tear them up and stamp on the pieces! Our Spanish friendsare accustomed to expect courtesy in connection with the removal offaithful and efficient public servants. 

All other governors-general had taken the oath of office atManila. Mr. Harrison took it at Washington on September 2, 1913. Heis the first American governor of the islands who has entered upon hishigh duties without previous experience in the country which he is togovern, and he has as yet displayed little inclination to profit bythe experience of either Filipino or American administrative insularofficials of high rank. It is too soon to discuss any feature of hisadministration other than his attitude toward the civil service, which I take up elsewhere, [482] and I can only express the hopethat when he has gained that knowledge which can come only throughpersonal observation on the ground, he will grow to be a wise, strong, conservative official. 

The establishment of civil government in the Philippine Islands underAmerican rule was a gradual evolution up to the time of the assumptionof control by Governor-General Harrison. 

I will not attempt to follow in detail all of its successive stages, but in closing this chapter will endeavour briefly to summarize theresults obtained up to that time. 

The Philippines now have two delegates to the Congress of the UnitedStates appointed by the legislature in accordance with the provision ofSection 8 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Both are Filipinos. 

The ranking executive officials of the insular government are agovernor-general, a secretary of the interior, a secretary of financeand justice, a secretary of commerce and police and a secretaryof public instruction. All of these officers are appointed by thePresident, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The secretary offinance and justice is a Filipino; the other secretaries of departmentsare Americans. 

There is a legislature composed of two houses known respectively asthe Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The PhilippineCommission is composed of nine members; five are the governor-generaland the four secretaries of department _ex officio_, and four areappointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate. Fourof the members are Filipinos and five are Americans. [483]

The Philippine Assembly is composed of eighty-one elected members, all of whom are Filipinos. They represent thirty-four of thethirty-nine provinces into which the archipelago is divided. The twohouses of the legislature have equal powers. Neither has any specialprivilege in the matter of initiating legislation, and affirmativeaction by both is required in order to pass it. The Moro Province, the Mountain Province and the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Agusanare not represented in the assembly, nor are they subject to thejurisdiction of the Philippine Legislature. The Philippine Commissionalone has legislative jurisdiction over them, their population beinglargely composed of Moros, or members of other non-Christian tribes. 

The provinces may be divided into regularly organized provincesgoverned under the provincial government act, and specially organizedprovinces, which include the Moro Province, the Mountain Provinceand the provinces of Mindoro, Palawan, Agusan and Nueva Vizcaya, ofwhich the first is governed under a special law and the remaining fourare governed under a different one known as "The Special ProvincialGovernment Act. "

Regularly organized provinces have a governor and a treasurer. Thegovernor is elected, and the treasurer is appointed by thegovernor-general with the approval of the commission. These twoofficials, with another known as the third member, constitutea provincial board. The third member is elected. As the Filipinosusually elect to office men from among their own people, practicallyall of the elective provincial officers are Filipinos, as are tenof the appointive officers, it having been the policy to appointFilipinos whenever possible. 

Regularly organized provinces are divided into municipalitieswhich elect their own officers and control their own affairs forthe most part. Provincial treasurers have intervention in municipalexpenditures, which are approved in advance for each fiscal year, and municipal officers may be removed for misconduct by thegovernor-general. 

All officers of the six special government provinces are appointedby the governor-general with the approval of the commission. 

There are four regularly organized municipalities in these provinces, but the remainder of their territory is divided into townships, which elect their own officers, except their secretary-treasurers, who are appointed by the provincial governor; and into _rancherias_ orsettlements, with all of their officials appointed by the provincialgovernor. This latter form of local government is confined to themore primitive wild people. 

The judiciary is independent. The details of its organization willbe found in Chapter XV. 

Three of the seven justices of the supreme court, including the chiefjustice, are Filipinos, as are approximately half of the judges ofthe courts of first instance and practically all justices of the peace. 

At the close of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1913, 71 per centof the employees in the classified civil service of the islands wereFilipinos painstakingly trained for the positions to which they hadbeen appointed. 

Prior to the American occupation, the Filipinos had practically nointervention in the government of their country. 

The changes introduced in the twelve years since the establishmentof civil government began are of a sweeping and radical nature. Forreasons hereinafter fully set forth, I believe they have been somewhattoo sweeping, and too radical. At all events, it is now certainly thepart of wisdom carefully to analyze their results before going further. 

I deem the subject of the establishment of civil governmental controlover the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines worthy of specialconsideration. [484]

CHAPTER XIII

The Philippine Civil Service

Before the Philippine Commission left Washington, a clear understandingwas reached with the President and secretary of war to the effect thatno political appointee whatsoever should under any circumstances beforced upon us. After arrival at Manila early attention was given tothe drafting of a civil service act by Mr. Taft, who was fortunate inhaving the assistance of Mr. Frank M. Kiggins, chief of the examiningdivision of the United States Civil Service Commission. The passageof this act and its strict enforcement led to very favourable commentin the United States. In his first annual message President Rooseveltsaid:--

"It is important to have this system obtain at home, but it iseven more important to have it rigidly applied in our insularpossessions.... 

"The merit system is simply one method of securing honest andefficient administration of the government, and in the long run thesole justification of any type of government lies in its provingitself both honest and efficient. "

Secretary Root also gave us his fullest support, calling attention tothe fact that the law which we had passed was of a very advanced type, and that under such circumstances as confronted us, the securing ofthe best men available should outweigh, and indeed practically exclude, all other considerations. 

Our action met with the unqualified approval of organizationswhich especially interest themselves in the maintenance of cleanand efficient public service, such as the Cambridge (Massachusetts)Civil Service Reform Association [485] and the National Civil ServiceReform League, whose committee on civil service in dependencies spokein very high terms of existing conditions in the Philippines. [486]

In its first annual report the Civil Service Board called attentionto some of the more important provisions of the Act in the followingwords:--

"Competitive examinations must, whenever practicable, be held fororiginal entrance to the service, and promotions of employeesmust also be based upon competitive examinations, in which theprevious experience and efficiency of employees shall be given dueconsideration. The examinations for entrance to the service must beheld in the United States and in the Philippine Islands, and applicantsare required to be tested in both English and Spanish. 

"Disloyalty to the United States of America as the supreme authorityin the Islands is made a complete disqualification for holding office, and every applicant for admission to the service must, before beingadmitted to examination, take the oath of loyalty. By an amendmentto the Civil Service Act on January 26, 1901, it is further declaredthat all persons in arms against the authority of the United Statesin the Philippine Islands, and all persons aiding or abetting them, on the first day of April, 1901, shall be ineligible to hold office. 

"A minimum age limit of eighteen years and a maximum age limit offorty years are fixed for those who enter the lowest grades in theservice. This avoids the difficulty and embarrassment that would resultfrom the admission of men advanced in years to positions where theduties can be better performed by younger and more energetic persons. 

"The Board is given authority to investigate matters relative to theenforcement of the act and the rules, and is empowered to administeroaths, to summon witnesses, and to require the production of officebooks and records in making such investigations. Without such aprovision it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to conductsatisfactory investigations, but with the authority conferred by theact, the Board can make a rigid inquiry into the facts of every casearising under the act and the rules. 

"The act provides for the ultimate classification of all positionsin the service, from laborers to heads of bureaus and offices, andthe Board may, in its discretion, determine the efficiency of thosenow in the service as well as those who may enter hereafter throughits examinations. This authority will enable the Board to ascertainthe fitness of all employees so that only the most competent will beretained in the service. 

"As a check upon the illegal payment of salaries the act provides thatwhenever the Board finds that a person has been appointed in violationof its provisions or of the rules of the Board, and so certifies tothe disbursing and auditing officers, such payments shall be illegal, and if payment is continued the disbursing officer shall not receivecredit for the same and the auditing officer who authorizes the paymentshall be liable on his official bond for the loss to the government. "

In its third annual report the Civil Service Board mentioned thefollowing among its distinctive duties:--

"All appointments to classified positions are required to be made on aform prescribed by the Board, and the Board's attestation is requiredin each case before the Civil Governor or Secretary of Departmentwill approve the appointment and before the disbursing officer willpay any salary. 

"The papers in all cases of reduction, removal and enforced resignationare required to be submitted to the Board for recommendation beforetransmission to the Civil Governor or Secretary of Department forfinal action. 

"The Board is required to keep a record of all unclassified as wellas classified employees in the Philippine civil service, showingamong other things date of appointment, original position and salary, place of employment, all changes in status and grade, and all accruedand sick leave granted. 

"From its service records the Board is required to compile annually, for publication on January 1, a roster of the officers and employeesunder the Philippine Government. 

"Applications from employees, classified and unclassified, for accruedand sick leave for more than two days must be made on a form prescribedby the Board and forwarded to it for verification of service recordand previous leave granted and for recommendation before final actionis taken by the Civil Governor or Secretary of Department. "

These extracts from official reports clearly show that the act wasindeed of a very advanced type, and if honestly enforced would ofnecessity lead to the establishment and maintenance of "an efficientand honest civil service, " for which purpose it was enacted. 

In 1905 the insular government dispensed with boards as administrativeagencies, and in accordance with this general policy, a bureau ofcivil service with a director at its head was substituted for theCivil Service Board, thus securing greater administrative efficiencyand increased economy. 

At first the Civil Service Act applied to comparatively few positions, as only a few bureaus and offices had been created, but as thegovernment was organized and grew, the different bureaus and officeswere placed in the classified service, the acts organizing them leavingin the unclassified service positions to which in the judgment ofthe commission the examination requirements of the act should notapply. Ultimately these requirements were made applicable to thetreasurers of all municipalities and to all positions, includingteachers, in the executive and judicial branches of the centralgovernment, the provincial governments, and the governments of thecities of Manila and Baguio, except a few specifically excepted bylaw, which for the most part are unclassified or exempt in almostall governments, national, state and municipal, having civil servicelaws. None of the states of the Union has such a widely extendedclassification of its civil service. 

With the exception of the positions specifically placed inthe unclassified service by law and of appointments made by thePhilippine Commission, all positions in the Philippine civil serviceare classified and must be filled by appointees who have passed civilservice examinations. Neither the governor-general nor the Bureau ofCivil Service can, by the promulgation of civil service rules, or inany other manner whatever, transfer any position from the classifiedto the unclassified service or except from examination any positionin the classified service. Under most of the civil service laws ofthe United States the President or the governor of the state hasauthority to transfer positions from the non-classified or exemptedclass to the competitive classified civil service or _vice versa_, these powers sometimes leading to manipulation of the civil servicerules for political purposes. 

In the Philippines, where emergencies, such as cholera epidemics, sometimes lead to the employment of large bodies of temporaryemployees without examination, when the emergency has passed thetemporary employees have always been discharged; and no employeehas ever received classification without examination on account oftemporary service. This is in marked contrast to the practice in theUnited States, where large bodies of employees taken on for temporaryservice due to emergencies, such as the war with Spain, are notinfrequently blanketed into the classified service without examination. 

In its last annual report the board recommended that a number ofofficial positions in the unclassified service be placed in theclassified service, and gave as a reason therefor that such actionwould "add to the attractiveness of the classified service byincreasing the opportunities therein for promotion to responsiblepositions. " This recommendation was adopted by providing that allvacancies in the positions of heads and assistant heads of bureaus oroffices and of superintendents shall be filled by promotion, with orwithout examination, in the discretion of the civil governor or properhead of a department, of persons in the classified civil service, if competent persons are found therein. 

This provision is an important and distinguishing feature of thePhilippine Civil Service Act. The federal civil service has nonecomparable with it. It is of special value in that it induces youngmen of exceptional ability and training to enter the lower grades, for they have the certainty that faithful and efficient work will inthe end earn for them the highest positions. 

On February 25, 1909, the director of civil service made the followingstatement with respect to the observance of the law:--

"A careful study of Act 5 and all acts amendatory thereof willshow that there has been no change in the policy adopted by theCommission at the outset to extend the classified service as widelyas possible and to fill by promotion all the higher positions so faras practicable. The provision requiring the higher positions to befilled by promotion so far as practicable has always been regarded bythe Philippine Commission, by this Bureau, and by others interested inobtaining the best possible government service in the Philippines asone of the most important provisions of the Civil Service Act. It hasbeen faithfully observed by all Governors-General.... With the exceptionof the positions of Governor-General and Secretaries of Departments, the Philippine Civil Service Act requires the highest positions inthe executive civil service, namely, chiefs and assistant chiefs ofBureaus and Offices, to be filled by promotion from the entire servicein all cases except when in the opinion of the appointing power thereis no person competent and available who possesses the qualificationsrequired, and this provision has been faithfully observed heretofore. "

The enforcement of the law by the commission has received thefollowing commendation from the executive committee of the NationalCivil Service Reform League:--

"We have further to note with satisfaction the course of the PhilippineCommission, by which, if it be persevered in, the merit system will beestablished in the Islands of that archipelago at least as thoroughlyand consistently as in any department of government, Federal, State, or Municipal, in the Union. This must be, in any case, regarded asa gratifying recognition of sound principles of administration onthe part of the Commission, and justifies the hope that, within thelimits of their jurisdiction at least, no repetition of the scandalsof post-bellum days will be tolerated. "

Up to the time of the appointment of Governor-General Harrison theprovisions of the Civil Service Act and rules were firmly supportedby all of the governors-general and secretaries of departments, and the annual reports of the governor-general uniformly expressedsatisfaction with their practical operation. Mr. Taft was always anenthusiastic supporter of the merit system. 

Governor-General Forbes in his inaugural address made the followingstatements:--

"It is necessary that the civil service should be rigidly maintainedand its rules carefully observed. One very distinguished Filipinohas recently been appointed to administrative control of one of themost important departments of the Government, equal in rank to anyexecutive position in the Islands with the exception of the Executivehead. In the executive branch of the Government, the Filipinizationof the service must steadily continue. As vacancies occur Filipinoswill be gradually substituted for Americans as rapidly as can bedone without positive detriment to the service. At the same time, care will be taken to provide a suitable career for honest and capableAmericans who have come out here in good faith. They should know thatduring good behavior and efficient performance of their duty theyare secure in their positions, and that when they desire to return tothe United States an effort will be made to place them in the civilservice at home. 

"I want no better men than the present officers and employees ofthe Government, Americans and Filipinos. They compare favorably withany set of men I have ever seen both as regards ability and fidelityto duty. "

Under the operation of the Civil Service Act the proportion ofFilipinos employed has increased from 49 per cent, in 1903, to 71per cent in 1913, as is shown by the following table:--

 Comparison of Percentages of Americans and Filipinos in the Service

 ============================================= | NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES YEAR |----------------------------- | Americans | Filipinos --------------------------------------------- 1903 ......... | 51% | 49% 1904 ......... | 49 | 51 1905 ......... | 45 | 55 1906 [487] ... | - | - 1907 ......... | 40 | 60 1908 ......... | 38 | 62 1909 ......... | 38 | 62 1910 ......... | 36 | 64 1911 ......... | 35 | 65 1912 ......... | 31 | 69 1913 ......... | 29 | 71 =============================================

For the first few years after the establishment of the governmentlarge numbers of Americans were appointed, as there werecomparatively few Filipino candidates with the necessary educationalqualifications. During the last two years, 89 per cent of the personsappointed in the islands have been Filipinos. 

There has been a great increase in the number of Filipinos enteringthe civil service examinations in English. Ten years ago 97 per centof those examined took their examinations in Spanish, while duringlast year 89 per cent of those examined took examinations in English, the total number so examined being 7755. Almost all appointeesfor ordinary clerical work are now Filipinos, but the supply ofbookkeepers, stenographers, civil engineers, physicians, veterinarians, surveyors, chemists, bacteriologists, agriculturists, horticulturists, constabulary officers, nurses, electricians, mechanical engineers, and other scientific employees is still insufficient to meet thedemands of the service. Only one Filipino has passed the stenographerexamination in English since the organization of the government, and itis necessary each year to bring many American stenographers from theUnited States. A few Filipinos pass each year the junior stenographerexamination [488] and are able to fill some of the positions whichwould formerly have required the appointment of Americans. 

The salaries paid to executive officials, chiefs of bureaus andoffices, chief clerks, and chiefs of divisions equal in many instancesthose paid to officials occupying similar positions in the serviceof the United States government. 

In the legislative branch the speaker receives $8000 per annum. Membersof the Philippine Commission without portfolios receive $7500 perannum. Members of the Philippine Assembly receive $15 a day for eachday in which the assembly is in session. 

In the executive branch secretaries of departments receive $15, 500per annum each, including $5000 received by them as members of thePhilippine Commission. The executive secretary receives $9000 perannum. The salaries of other bureau chiefs range from $2500 per annumto $7500. 

The justices of the Philippine Supreme Court receive $10, 000 perannum. Judges of courts of first instance receive from $4500 to $5500. 

The following extracts from an article by the chairman of thePhilippine Civil Service Board give information with respect tosalaries in the Philippine Islands, as compared with salaries paidin surrounding British and Dutch colonies:--

"The salaries paid officials in all branches of the service ofthe Straits Settlements are generally lower than those paid in thePhilippine civil service. In this connection, however, it is onlyjust to state that the population and extent of the territory underBritish control, and the expenses of living, are less than in thePhilippines, while the difficulty of the problems to be solved isnot so great. The salaries paid to natives who fill the lower gradepositions in the civil service of the Philippine Islands are threeand four times as great as the salaries paid to natives in similarclasses of work in the civil service of the British Malay colonies. 

"A study of the colonial civil service of the Dutch in the islandsof Java and Madura gives us somewhat different results.... 

"The matter of salaries is peculiarly interesting. The comparison madeabove of the compensations received by the high officials in the civilservice of the English colonies and by those in the Philippines doesnot hold good when applied to the Dutch in Java. In fact, the salaryof the Governor-General of Java is somewhat remarkable in contrastwith that of the Civil Governor of the Philippines. As is well known, the latter receives $20, 000, while the salary of the Governor-Generalof Java amounts to 132, 000 gulden or something over $53, 000. TheAmerican official is given, in addition, free transportation on allofficial investigations and free use of the governor's palace, butnot the cost of maintenance. On the other hand, the Dutch governoris granted 51, 000 gulden (about $21, 500) as personal and householdexpenses and travel pay. 

"The general secretary of the government receives 24, 000 gulden($9648), as compared with the executive secretary of the Philippinegovernment, whose salary is $7500. [489] The seven heads of departmentsin the Javanese service each receive a like compensation of 24000gulden. The Raad, or Council, of the Dutch colonial governmentis composed of a vice-president and four members--the formerreceiving about $14, 500, the latter slightly over $11, 500 each. Inthe Philippine government the executive functions of heads ofdepartments are exercised by four members of the legislative body, each of whom receives $10, 500 for his executive services and $5000for his legislative duties. Without going further into detail, theconclusion is evident that all officials of high rank are much betterpaid in the Dutch service. When a comparison is made between the chiefclerks and other office employees of middle grades--not natives--thesalaries are seen to be about the same in the two countries. 

"All natives in positions of lower grades, however, in the PhilippineIslands fare better than their Malay brethren, either in the StraitsSettlements or in the East Indies. "--(Second Annual Report of thePhilippine Civil Service Board, pp. 60, 61. )

"Difference in salaries for subordinate positions in the British andDutch colonial services and the Philippine service are distinctlyin favour of subordinate employees in the Philippine service; onlythe higher officials, after long experience, in the British colonialservice receive larger salaries than corresponding officials in thePhilippine service; the leave of absence and other privileges forthe Philippine service are not less liberal than for other colonialservices. "--(Report of the Philippine Commission for 1905, p. 74. )

The entrance salaries of Americans brought to the islands areconsiderably in excess of the entrance salaries received on appointmentto the civil service in the United States. 

The following table shows the minimum entrance salaries given toAmericans appointed in the United States to the United States civilservice, as shown by the manual of examinations of the United StatesCivil Service Commission for the fall of 1913, and to Americansappointed in the United States to the Philippine Civil Service:--

==================================================================== | Philippines | United States-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |Aid (Surveyor) | $1400 | $ 900Civil Engineer | 1400 | 1200Forester, assistant | 1400 | 1200Scientific Assistant, | |(Agricultural Inspector) | 1400 | 600Physician | 1600 | 1320Printer | 2000 | . 50 per hourStenographer | 1200 | 700Trained Nurse | 600 Board, | 600 and laundry | quarters and laundry |Teacher | 1000 | 540Veterinarian | 1600 | 1200 | |====================================================================

The following cases taken from the official rosters show somepromotions to the higher positions in the service of employees whoentered the lower ranks of the classified service:--

A clerk who entered the service in 1899 at $1800 per annum wasappointed in 1903 an assistant chief of bureau at $3000 per annum andin 1908 executive secretary at $9000 per annum. A teacher appointed in1899 at $720 per annum was appointed a chief of an office at $4000 perannum and in 1912 a judge at $4500 per annum. A teacher who enteredthe service in 1901 at $1200 per annum was in 1909 appointed a chiefof a bureau at $6000 per annum. A teacher who entered the service in1904 at $1000 per annum was appointed in 1911 an assistant chief ofa bureau at $6000 per annum. A clerk who entered the service in 1901at $1200 per annum was appointed in 1909 an assistant chief of theexecutive bureau at $3750 per annum and in 1912 a chief of a bureauat $6000 per annum. A stenographer who entered the service in 1902at $1400 per annum was in 1908 appointed an assistant chief of abureau at $5000 per annum. A transitman who entered the service in1905 at $1400 per annum was in 1913 appointed an assistant chief of abureau at $4500 per annum. An accountant who entered the service in1901 at $1800 per annum was in 1907 appointed an assistant chief ofa bureau at $3750 per annum and in 1909 a chief of a bureau at $6000per annum. A law clerk who entered the service in 1904 at $1800 perannum was in 1913 appointed judge at $4500 per annum. In no serviceanywhere has promotion depended more directly on demonstrated ability, and in many instances it has been rapid. 

Young men living two in a room may obtain room and board in boardinghouses in Manila at a rate as low as $35 per month each. In the YoungMen's Christian Association building, a large reënforced concretestructure with reading room, gymnasium, and a good restaurant, thecharge for two in a room is $10. 25 each. Board costs $27. 50, a total of$37. 75. The expenses for clothing in Manila are less than in the UnitedStates, as white clothing is worn the whole year and white duck suitsmay be obtained for about $3 each. The expenses for laundry amountto about $5 a month. The necessity of employing a _muchacho_ [490] is_nil_, in the case of an unmarried employee who boards. Servants arefar cheaper and better in the Philippines than in the United States. 

In a discussion of the salaries paid in the Philippine civil servicethe question of the leave allowed should be considered. Classifiedemployees who receive an annual salary of $1000 or more per annum maybe granted twenty-eight days' leave per annum to cover absences fromduty due to illness or other causes. If not taken during the calendaryear in which it is earned or in January or February of the succeedingyear, it is forfeited. Employees taking vacation leave during themonths of December, January, February and March may take fifty-sixdays, corresponding to two years of service, at one time, and may thusget time to visit Australia, Japan, China, and neighbouring countries. 

In addition to vacation leave an employee whose salary is $1000 ormore but less than $1800 per annum is entitled to thirty days' accruedleave per annum, and an employee whose salary is $1800 per annum ormore is entitled to thirty-five days' accrued leave per annum. Accruedleave may accumulate for not more than five years of service. 

All classified employees are entitled to visit the United States orforeign countries once in every three years, receiving in addition totheir accrued leave, one year's vacation leave, allowance of actualtravel time at half pay not to exceed sixty days, and return travelexpenses from place of residence in the United States, or from portof embarkation in a foreign country to Manila, on the completion oftwo years of service after date of return. An employee entitled tothirty-five days' accrued leave per annum who visits the United Statesafter having rendered three years of service receives a total of twohundred thirteen days' accrued leave, vacation leave, and half-paytravel time. If he postpones his visit till he has completed fiveyears of service, he receives a total of two hundred ninety-one days'accrued leave, vacation leave and travel time. An employee entitled tothirty days' accrued leave per annum who visits the United States afterthree years of service receives a total of one hundred ninety-fourdays' leave and half-pay travel time, and if he postpones his visituntil he has rendered five years of service, he receives a total oftwo hundred fifty-nine days' leave and travel time. 

It will be seen that these are very liberal allowances. An employeereceiving $1200 at the end of two years of service may spend eightweeks of vacation leave visiting Japan or other surrounding countries, and at the end of an additional year's service he may visit his homein the United States with six and a third months' absence on full andhalf pay and with his expenses from his home to Manila payable twoyears after his return, and during every three years of his servicehe may have the same privileges. 

The law also provides that if an employee is wounded or injured inthe performance of duty, he may have a total of six months' leave onfull pay in addition to any accrued leave to his credit. 

Employees who have rendered satisfactory service and resign afterthree or more years receive in a lump sum all accrued leave due andthirty days' half salary. For example, an employee who has received$1800 per annum and has served five years without taking any leavein excess of the four weeks' vacation leave allowable annually woulddraw $1025 were he to resign. 

The school sessions amount to forty weeks per annum and the schoolvacations to twelve weeks per annum. [491] Teachers receive an annualsalary and draw full pay during vacations as well as during schoolsessions. Every third year they are allowed to visit the United Statesor foreign countries with an allowance of sixty days' half-pay traveltime in addition to the ten weeks' long vacation, and on completingtwo years of service after return to the islands they are entitled totheir travelling expenses from place of residence in the United Statesto Manila or from port of embarkation in a foreign country to Manila. 

It is interesting to compare these provisions with the regulationsgoverning leave of absence in the British colonial service:--

(1) There is no distinction between sick leave and ordinary leave, the leave of absence on account of sickness being charged againstthe ordinary leave allowable. 

(2) There are two classes of leave: vacation leave on full pay andhalf-pay leave. 

(3) The vacation leave amounts to three months every two years, and must be taken during the two years, as it does not accumulate. 

(4) The half-pay leave amounts to two months for each year of service, but cannot be taken until after a period of six years' resident servicein the Colony, except in cases of serious indisposition supported bymedical certificate, or of "urgent private affairs, " the nature ofwhich must be stated to the governor. In either case, the governorand council must be satisfied that the indulgence is indispensable. 

Half pay in African and Asiatic colonies may accumulate for twelveyears' service--_i. E. _ twenty-four months' half-pay leave. 

(5) After the exhaustion of all vacation leave and half-pay leave, an advance of six months' half-pay leave may be made on specialgrounds ("urgent private affairs" or illness supported by a medicalcertificate), the advance being charged against leave accruingsubsequently. 

(6) For the purpose of visiting home, an officer may be grantedthe vacation leave due him (which is never more than three months)on full pay, and his accumulated half-pay leave, to commence at theexpiration of his vacation leave. 

(7) Judicial and education officers do not receive the vacation leavedescribed in paragraph 3 above, the vacation of courts and schoolsbeing considered equal to this, but they do receive the half-pay leavedescribed in paragraph 4, and may, when visiting home on half-payleave, receive full pay during any ordinary vacation of the courtor school. 

It will be noted that although officers in the British colonial serviceare allowed much longer periods of absence, the greater part of theirabsence is on half pay and the total money value of the leave allowablein the British colonial service and in the Philippine civil serviceis about the same. As officers naturally prefer to be on full payinstead of half pay while on leave, the provision of the Philippinelaw is in their interest; it is also in the interest of the service, as the periods of the absence from duty are not so prolonged. 

The Philippine Civil Service Law is now about to be put to itsfirst really severe test as a result of the change in the nationaladministration. Heretofore those whose duty and privilege it has beento enforce it have been in the most full and hearty sympathy with itspurposes. President McKinley was from the outset definitely committedto the widest application of the merit system to appointments in thePhilippines. Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft firmly supported that system, as has each succeeding governor-general up to, but not including, Mr. Harrison, who is as yet an unknown quantity. 

It is interesting, however, to note that on the day following hisarrival there was a demand for the instant resignation of Mr. ThomasCary Welch, a faithful and efficient employee of the government, who had been for nearly ten years in the service, whose positionwas desired for, and immediately given to, Mr. Stephen Bonsal. Thatgentleman had been appointed at Washington a member of the MunicipalBoard of Manila immediately after Mr. Harrison's confirmation asgovernor-general. It is not recorded that Mr. Bonsal rendered anyvaluable service to the city on the voyage, or during the twenty-fourhours of his occupancy of his municipal post subsequent to hisarrival! Nor does it appear that he passed any examination beforehis early promotion. 

Following closely upon the removal of Mr. Welch came a demand forthe resignation of Captain Charles H. Sleeper, Director of Lands, who was unquestionably one of the ablest and most efficient of thebureau chiefs. 

He had earned the ill-will of the _politicos_ by insisting that personsauthorized to make public land surveys, or other surveys on whichclaims of title as against the government were to be based, shouldknow enough about surveying to make one correct survey when givenan opportunity practically to demonstrate their abilities under veryfavourable conditions. He had also incurred the dislike of influential_caciques_ by defending the occupants of small holdings on friarestates from the rapacity of their rich neighbours, and by protectingfree-patent applicants and homesteaders when large landowners opposedtheir applications in order to prevent their securing land, so thatthey might the more easily be held as peon labourers. 

He had started in his bureau a practical school for Filipino surveyorswhich was training really well-qualified candidates for positionsdesired by the politicians for themselves or their incompetent friends. 

Last, but not least, he had helped to upset the plans of the menprimarily responsible for the so-called "friar lands investigation"conducted by the House Committee on Insular Affairs, which costthe United States government a very large sum, and resulted indemonstrating his uprightness and the efficiency of his administration. 

Mr. John R. Wilson, the assistant director of lands, was absent at themoment, but his resignation was demanded on the day of his return. Hetoo was an active, efficient, upright man. 

Both of these removals were political acts, pure and simple. Sr. ManuelTinio was appointed Director of Lands. He is a bright young Ilocanoof good character, who had become a "general" in the Insurgent armyat twenty-one years of age. He is unfit to hold the place, because, as he has himself frankly said, he knows nothing about the work. Heis charged with the duty of administering $7, 000, 000 worth of friarlands, and the whole public domain of the Philippine Islands, and withsuch minor duties as the checkmating of the machinations of numerouswealthy Filipinos who seek fraudulently to acquire great tracts throughfraudulent claims to unperfected titles and by other improper means. 

While in Honolulu, _en route_ to Manila, Mr. Harrison gave out aninterview, which I am credibly informed he has since confirmed insubstance. It contained the following statement:--

"For years I have been of the minority in Congress and have seenthe Democrats kicked about, trampled upon, and otherwise manhandledby Republicans, so that I must confess it now gives me a saturninepleasure to see the Democrats in a position to do the same thing tothe Republicans. "

His early official acts after arrival at Manila confirmed the beliefthat this was indeed the spirit in which he was facing the graveresponsibilities which there confronted him. 

It is beyond doubt or cavil that high ideals heretofore have prevailedin the Philippine Civil Service. Are they now to be substituted bythe methods of the ward politician?

In its report for 1901 the Philippine Commission said:--

"The civil service law has been in operation since our last report, and we see no reason to change our conclusion as to the absolutenecessity for its existence, and strict enforcement. Without this lawAmerican government in these Islands is, in our opinion, foredoomedto humiliating failure. "

I signed that report. I have not since seen any reason to changemy mind. 

CHAPTER XIV

The Philippine Constabulary and Public Order

During the last thirty years of Spanish rule in the Philippinesevil-doers were pursued and apprehended and public order was maintainedchiefly by the _guardia civil_. At the time of its organization in1868 this body had a single division. By 1880 the number had beenincreased to three, two for Luzón and one for the Visayan Islands. 

The _guardia civil_ was organized upon a military basis, its officersand soldiers being drawn from the regular army of Spain by selectionor upon recommendation. Detachments were distributed throughout theprovinces and were commanded according to their size by commissionedor non-commissioned officers. Central offices were located in districtcapitals; company headquarters were stationed in provincial capitals, and detachments were sent to places where they were deemed to benecessary. 

Under ordinary conditions they rendered service as patrols of two meneach, but for the purpose of attacking large bands of outlaws one orseveral companies were employed as occasion required. 

The _guardia civil_ had jurisdiction over all sorts of violations oflaws and municipal ordinances. They made reports upon which were basedthe appointments of municipal officers, the granting of licenses tocarry firearms, and the determination of the loyalty or the disloyaltyof individuals. 

They were vested with extraordinary powers. Offences against themwere tried by courts-martial, and were construed as offences againstsentinels on duty. Penalties were therefore extremely severe. 

Officers of the _guardia civil_ on leave could by their own initiativeassume a status of duty with the full powers and responsibilitiesthat go with command. This is contrary to American practice, underwhich only dire emergency justifies an officer in assuming an officialstatus unless he is duly assigned thereto by competent authority. 

The _guardia civil_ could arrest on suspicion, and while the SpanishGovernment did not directly authorize or sanction the use of force toextort confessions, it was not scrupulous in the matter of acceptingconfessions so obtained as evidence of crime, nor was it quick topunish members of the _guardia civil_ charged with mistreatmentof prisoners. 

Reports made by the _guardia civil_ were not questioned, but wereaccepted without support even in cases of the killing of prisonersalleged to have attempted to escape, or of men evading arrest. 

This method of eliminating without trial citizens deemed to beundesirable was applied with especial frequency in the suppressionof active brigandage, and latterly during the revolution againstSpain. Prisoners in charge of the _guardia civil_ were always tiedelbow to elbow. They knew full well that resistance or flight wasan invitation to their guards to kill them, and that this invitationwas likely to be promptly accepted. 

In the investigation of crime the members of this organization arrestedpersons on suspicion and compelled them to make revelations, true orfalse. Eye-witnesses to the commission of crime were not needed inthe Spanish courts of that day. The confession of an accused personsecured his conviction, even though not made in the presence of ajudge. Indirect and hearsay evidence were accepted, and such thingsas writs of habeas corpus and the plea of double jeopardy were unknownin Spanish procedure. 

The _guardia civil_ could rearrest individuals and again charge themwith crimes of which they had already been acquitted. I have beenassured by reliable Filipino witnesses that it was common during thelatter days of Spanish sovereignty for persons who had made themselvesobnoxious to the government to be invited by non-commissionedofficers to take a walk, which was followed either by their completedisappearance or by the subsequent discovery of their dead bodies. 

It naturally resulted that the members of the _guardia civil_ wereregarded with detestation and terror by the people, but their powerwas so absolute that protest rarely became public. The one notableexception was furnished by Dr. Rizal's book entitled "Noli Me Tangere, "which voiced the complaints of the Filipinos against them. There isnot a vestige of doubt that hatred of them was one of the principalcauses of the insurrection against Spain. 

In 1901 the American government organized a rural police force inthe Philippines. It was called the Philippine constabulary. Theinsurrection was then drawing to a close, but there were left in thefield many guerilla bands armed and uniformed. Their members sought toexcuse their lawless acts under the plea of patriotism and oppositionto the forces of the United States. In many provinces they combinedwith professional bandits or with religious fanatics. Various "popes"arose, like Papa Isio in Negros. The Filipinos had become accustomedto a state of war which had continued for nearly six years. Habitsof peace had been abandoned. The once prosperous haciendas were inruins. War and pestilence had destroyed many of the work animals, and those which remained continued to perish from disease. Asiaticcholera was sweeping through the archipelago, and consternation anddisorder followed in its wake. 

Under such circumstances the organization of a rural police force wasimperatively necessary. Unfortunately the most critical situation whichit was to be called upon to meet had to be faced at the very outset, when both officers and men were inexperienced and before adequatediscipline could be established. 

The law providing for its establishment was drawn by the HonourableLuke E. Wright, at that time secretary of commerce and police andlater destined to become governor-general of the Philippines andsecretary of war of the United States. 

It was intended that the constabulary should accomplish its ends byforce when necessary but by sympathetic supervision when possible, suppressing brigandage and turning the people towards habits ofpeace. The fact was clearly borne in mind that the abuses of the_guardia civil_ had not been forgotten and the new force was designedto meet existing conditions, to allay as rapidly as possible theexisting just rancour against the similar organization establishedunder the Spanish régime, and to avoid the evils which had contributedso much toward causing the downfall of Spanish sovereignty. The lawwas admirably framed to achieve these ends. 

The officers of the constabulary were selected chiefly from Americanvolunteers recently mustered out and from honourably dischargedsoldiers of the United States army. Some few Filipinos, whose loyaltywas above suspicion, were appointed to the lower grades. This numberhas since been materially augumented, and some of the original Filipinoappointees have risen to the rank of captain. 

It was inevitable that at the outset there should be abuses. Theorganization was necessarily born at work; there was no time toinstruct, to formulate regulations, to wait until a satisfactorystate of discipline had been brought about. There were not barracksfor housing the soldiers; there were neither uniforms, nor arms, nor ammunition. There was no system for rationing the men. All ofthese things had to be provided, and they were provided through anatural evolution of practical processes, crystallizing into form, tested by the duties of the day. The organization which grew up was atrue survival of the fittest, both in personnel and in methods. Thewonder is not that some abuses occurred, but that they were so few;not that there were occasional evidences of lack of efficiency, but that efficiency was on the whole so high from the beginning. 

The several provinces were made administrative units, the commandingofficer in each being designated as "senior inspector. " The men whowere to serve in a given province were by preference recruited there, and a departure was thus made from the usual foreign colonial practice. 

In 1905 the total force was fixed at one hundred companies with anominal strength of two officers and fifty men each. Under specialconditions this rule may be departed from, and the size of thecompanies or the number of officers increased. 

Each province is divided by the senior inspector into sections, and theresponsibility for patrol work and general policing rests on the seniorcompany officer in each station. The provinces are grouped into fivedistricts, each commanded by an assistant chief who exercises thereinthe authority, and performs the duties appropriate to the chief forthe entire Philippines. The higher administrative positions have alwaysbeen filled by detailing regular officers of the United States army. 

The constabulary soldiers are now neatly uniformed, armed with Kragcarbines and well disciplined. They show the effect of good and regularfood and of systematic exercise, their physical condition being vastlysuperior to that of the average Filipino. They are given regularinstruction in their military duties. It is conducted in English. 

The Philippine constabulary may be defined as a body of armed menwith a military organization, recruited from among the people of theislands, officered in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos, andemployed primarily for police duty in connection with the establishmentand maintenance of public order. 

Blount's chapters on the administrations of Taft, Wright and Smithembody one prolonged plaint to the effect that the organization ofthe constabulary was premature, and that after the war proper ended, the last smouldering embers of armed and organized insurrection shouldhave been stamped out, and the brigandage which had existed in thePhilippines for centuries should have been dealt with, by the UnitedStates army rather than by the constabulary. 

Even if it were true that the army could have rendered more effectiveservice to this end than could have been expected at the outset froma newly organized body of Filipino soldiers, the argument against theorganization and use of the constabulary would in my opinion havebeen by no means conclusive. It is our declared policy to preparethe Filipinos to establish and maintain a stable government of theirown. The proper exercise of police powers is obviously necessary tosuch an end. 

From the outset we have sacrificed efficiency in order that our wardsmight gain practical experience, and might demonstrate their ability, or lack of ability, to perform necessary governmental functions. Doesany one cognizant of the situation doubt for a moment that provincialand municipal affairs in the Philippine Islands would to-day be moreefficiently administered if provincial and municipal officers wereappointed instead of being elected? Is any one so foolish as to imaginethat the sanitary regeneration of the islands would not have progressedmuch more rapidly had highly trained American health officers been usedin place of many of the badly educated and comparatively inexperiencedFilipino physicians whose services have been utilized?

Nevertheless, in the concrete case under discussion I dissent fromthe claim that more satisfactory results could have been obtained bythe use of American troops. 

The army had long been supreme in the Philippines. Every function ofgovernment had been performed by its officers and men, if performed atall. Our troops had been combating an elusive and cruel enemy. If theywere human it is to be presumed that they still harbored animosities, born of these conditions, toward the people with whom they hadso recently been fighting. Had the work of pacification been thenturned over to them it would have meant that often in the localitiesin which they had been fighting, and in dealing with the men to whomthey had very recently been actively opposed in armed conflict, theywould have been called upon to perform tasks and to entertain feelingsradically different from those of the preceding two or three years. 

A detachment, marching through Leyte, found an American who haddisappeared a short time before crucified, head down. His abdominalwall had been carefully opened so that his intestines might hang downin his face. 

Another American prisoner, found on the same trip, had been buried inthe ground with only his head projecting. His mouth had been proppedopen with a stick, a trail of sugar laid to it through the forest, and a handful thrown into it. 

Millions of ants had done the rest. 

Officers and men who saw such things were thereby fitted for war, rather than for ordinary police duty. 

The truth is that they had seen so many of them that they continued tosee them in imagination when they no longer existed. I well rememberwhen a general officer, directed by his superior to attend a banquetat Manila in which Americans and Filipinos joined, came to it wearinga big revolver!

Long after Manila was quiet I was obliged to get out of my carriagein the rain and darkness half a dozen times while driving the lengthof Calle Real, and "approach to be recognized" by raw "rookies, "each of whom pointed a loaded rifle at me while I did it. I knowthat this did not tend to make me feel peaceable or happy. In myopinion it was wholly unnecessary, and yet I did not blame the armyfor thinking otherwise. 

After the war was over, when my private secretary, Mr. James H. LeRoy, was one day approaching Malolos, he was sternly commanded by a sentryto halt, the command being emphasized as usual by presenting to hisattention a most unattractive view down the muzzle of a Krag. He wasnext ordered to "salute the flag, " which he finally discovered withdifficulty in the distance, after being told where to look. The armyway is right and necessary in war, but it makes a lot of bother intime of peace!

This was not the only reason for failing to make more extensive useof American soldiers in police duty. A veteran colonel of UnitedStates cavalry who had just read Judge Blount's book was asked whathe thought of the claim therein made that the army should have donethe police and pacification work of the Philippines. His reply was:--

"How long would it take a regiment of Filipinos to catch an Americanoutlaw in the United States? Impossible!"

Another army officer said:--

"Catching Filipino outlaws with the Army is like catching a flea ina twenty-acre field with a traction engine. "

There is perhaps nothing so demoralizing to regular troops asemployment on police duty which requires them to work singly or insmall squads. Discipline speedily goes to the dogs and instructionbecomes impossible. 

Successful prosecution of the work of chasing _ladrones_ in thePhilippines requires a thorough knowledge of local topography andof local native dialects. Spanish is of use, but only in dealingwith educated Filipinos. A knowledge of the Filipino himself; of hishabits of thought; of his attitude toward the white man; and towardthe _illustrado_, or educated man, of his own race; ability to enter atown and speedily to determine the relative importance of its leadingcitizens, finally centring on the one man, always to be found, whoruns it, whether he holds political office or not, and also to enlistthe sympathy and coöperation of its people; all of these things areessential to the successful handling of brigandage in the Philippines, whether such brigandage has, or lacks, political significance. 

The following parallel will make clear some of the reasons why it wasdetermined to use constabulary instead of American soldiers in policingthe Philippines from the time the insurrection officially ended:--

United States Army Philippine Constabulary

Soldier costs per annum $1400. Soldier costs per annum $363. 50. (Authority: Adjutant GeneralHeistand in 1910. )

American soldiers come from Constabulary soldiers areAmerica. Enlisted in the province where they are to serve. 

Few American soldiers speak All constabulary soldiersthe local dialects. Speak local dialects. 

Few American soldiers speak All educated constabularyany Spanish. Soldiers speak Spanish. 

American soldiers usually have Constabulary soldiers, native tobut a slight knowledge of local the country, know the geographygeography and topography. And topography of their respective provinces. 

Few American soldiers have had The Filipino soldier certainlyenough contact with Filipinos knows his own kind better thanto understand them. The American does. 

The American soldier uses a The constabulary soldier isration of certain fixed components rationed in cash and buys theimported over sea. (A ration is food of the country where hethe day's allowance of food for happens to be. One soldier. )

The American ration costs The constabulary cash ration is24. 3 cents United States currency 10. 5 cents United States currency. (exclusive of cost of (No freight or handling charges. )transportation and handling). The constabulary soldier knows notFresh meat requiring ice to keep ice. His food grows in the islands. It is a principal part of the He buys it on the ground and needsAmerican ration. To supply it no transportation to bring it to him. Requires a regular system oftransport from the United Statesto Manila and from thence to localports, and wagon transportationfrom ports to inland stations. 

The American soldier is at no The idea of enlisting the sympathypains to enlist the sympathy and and coöperation of the localcoöperation of the people; and population is the strongest tenethis methods of discipline habits in the constabulary creed. Of life, etc. , make it practicallyimpossible for him to gain them. 

Before preparing the foregoing statement relative to the reasons forusing Philippine constabulary soldiers instead of soldiers of theUnited States army for police work during the period in question, Iasked Colonel J. G. Harbord, assistant director of the constabulary, who has served with that body nine years, has been its acting directorand is an officer of the United States army, to give me a memorandumon the subject. It is only fair to him to say that I have not onlyfollowed very closely the line of argument embodied in the memorandumwhich he was good enough to prepare for me, but have in many instancesused his very words. The parallel columns are his. 

The constabulary soldier, thoroughly familiar with the topographyof the country in which he operates; speaking the local dialect andacquainted with the persons most likely to be able and willing tofurnish accurate information; familiar with the characteristics ofhis own people; able to live off the country and keep well, is underall ordinary circumstances a more efficient and vastly less expensivepolice officer than the American soldier, no matter how brave andenergetic the latter may be. Furthermore, his activities are muchless likely to arouse animosity. 

Incidentally, the army is pretty consistently unwilling to take thefield unless the constitutional guarantees are temporarily suspended, and it particularly objects to writs of habeas corpus. The suspensionof such guarantees is obviously undesirable unless really verynecessary. 

Let us now consider some of the specific instances of allegedinefficiency of the constabulary in suppressing public disorder, cited by Blount. 

On page 403 of his book he says, speaking of Governor Taft and disorderin the province of Albay which arose in 1902-1903:--

"He did not want to order out the military again if he couldhelp it, and this relegated him to his native municipal police andconstabulary, experimental outfits of doubtful loyalty, and, at best, wholly inadequate, as it afterwards turned out, for the maintenance ofpublic order and for affording to the peaceably inclined people thatsort of security for life and property, and that protection againstsemi-political as well as unmitigated brigandage, which would comportwith the dignity of this nation. "

The facts as to these disorders are briefly as follows:--

In 1902 an outlaw in Tayabas Province who made his living byorganizing political conspiracies and collecting contributions inthe name of patriotism, who was known as José Roldan when operatingin adjoining provinces, but had an alias in Tayabas, found his lifemade so uncomfortable by the constabulary of that province that hetransferred his operations to Albay. There he affiliated himselfwith a few ex-Insurgent officers who had turned outlaws insteadof surrendering, and with oath violators, and began the same kindof political operations which he had carried out in Tayabas, theprincipal feature of his work being the collection of "contributions. "

The troubles in Albay were encouraged by wealthy Filipinos who saw inthem a probable opportunity to acquire valuable hemp lands at bottomprices, for people dependent on their hemp fields, if prevented fromworking them, might in the end be forced to sell them. Roldan soonlost standing with his new organization because it was found that hewas using for his personal benefit the money which he collected. 

About this time one Simeon Ola joined his organization. Ola wasa native of Albay, where he had been an Insurgent major under thecommand of the Tagálog general, Belarmino. His temporary rank hadgone to his head, and he is reported to have shown considerableseverity and hauteur in his treatment of his former neighboursin Guinobatan, to which place he had returned at the close of theinsurrection. Meanwhile, a wealthy Chinese _mestizo_ named Don CircilioJaucian, on whom Ola, during his brief career as an Insurgent officer, had laid a heavy hand, had become _presidente_ of the town. 

Smarting under the indignities which he had suffered, Jaucian made itvery uncomfortable for the former major, and in ways well understoodin Malay countries brought it home to the latter that their positionshad been reversed. Ola's house was mysteriously burned, and his lifein Guinobatan was made so unbearable that he took to the hills. 

Ola had held higher military rank than had any of his outlawassociates, and he became their dominating spirit. He had no grievanceagainst the Americans, but took every opportunity to avenge himselfon the _caciques_ of Guinobatan, his native town. 

Three assistant chiefs of constabulary, Garwood, Baker and Bandholtz, were successively sent to Albay to deal with this situation. Bakerand Bandholtz were regular army officers. The latter ended thedisturbances, employing first and last some twelve companies ofPhilippine scouts, armed, officered, paid, equipped and disciplinedas are the regular soldiers of the United States army, and a similarnumber of constabulary soldiers. Eleven stations in the restrictedfield of operations of this outlaw were occupied by scouts. There werefew armed conflicts in force between Ola's men and these troops. Infact, it was only with the greatest difficulty that this band, whichfrom time to time dissolved into the population only to reappearagain, could be located even by the native soldiers. It would havebeen impracticable successfully to use American troops for such work. 

Referring to the statement made by Blount [492] that Vice-GovernorWright made a visit to Albay in 1903 in the interest "of thepeace-at-any-price policy that the Manila Government was bent on, "and the implication that he went there to conduct peace negotiations, General Bandholtz, who suppressed outlawry in Albay, has said thatVice-Governor Wright and Commissioner Pardo de Tavera came thereat his request to look into conditions with reference to certainallegations which had been made. 

Colonel Bandholtz and the then chief of constabulary, General Allen, were supported by the civil governor and the commission in theirrecommendations that no terms should be made with the outlaws. Thefollowing statement occurs in a letter from General Bandholtz datedSeptember 21, 1903:--

"No one is more anxious to terminate this business than I am, nevertheless I think it would be a mistake to offer any suchinducements, and that more lasting benefits would result by hammeringaway as we have been doing. "

And General Allen said in an indorsement to the PhilippineCommission:--

"... In my opinion the judgment of Colonel Bandholtz in mattersconnected with the pacification of Albay should receive favourableconsideration. Halfway measures are always misinterpreted and usedto the detriment of the Government among the ignorant followers ofthe outlaws. "

These views prevailed. 

Blount has claimed that the death rate in the Albay jail at thistime was very excessive, and cites it as an instance of the resultof American maladministration. 

Assuming that his tabulation [493] of the dead who died in the Albayjail between May 30 and September, 1903, amounting to 120, is correct, the following statements should be made:--

Only recently has it been demonstrated that beri-beri is due to theuse of polished rice, which was up to the time of this discoveryregarded as far superior to unpolished rice as an article of food, and is still much better liked by the Filipinos than is the unpolishedarticle. Many of these deaths were from beri-beri, and were due toa misguided effort to give the prisoners the best possible food. 

Cholera was raging in the province of Albay throughout the periodin question, and the people outside of the jail suffered no lessthan did those within it. The same is true of malarial infection. Inother words, conditions inside the jail were quite similar to thosethen prevailing outside, except that the prisoners got polished ricewhich was given them with the best intentions in the world, and wasby them considered a superior article of food. 

With the present knowledge of the methods of dissemination ofAsiatic cholera gained as a result of the American occupation ofthe Philippines, we should probably be able to exclude it from ajail under such circumstances, as the part played by "germ carriers"who show no outward manifestations of infection is now understood, but it was not then dreamed of. One of the greatest reforms effectedby Americans in the Philippines is the sanitation of the jails andpenitentiaries, and we cannot be fairly blamed for not knowing in1903 what nobody then knew. 

The troubles in Albay ended with the surrender of Ola on September25, 1903. Blount gives the impression that he had a knowledge of themwhich was gained by personal observation. He arrived in the provincein the middle of November, seven weeks after normal conditions hadbeen reëstablished. 

On October 5, 1903, General Bandholtz telegraphed with reference tothe final surrender of Ola's band:--

"The towns are splitting themselves wide open celebrating pacificationand Ramon Santos (later elected governor) is going to give arecord-breaking fiesta at Ligao. Everybody invited. Scouts andConstabulary have done superb work. "

Blount makes much of disorders in Samar and Leyte. Let us considerthe facts. 

In all countries feuds between highlanders and lowlanders have beencommon. Although the inhabitants of the hills and those of the lowlandsin the two islands under discussion are probably of identical bloodand origin, they long since became separated in thought and feeling, and grew to be mutually antagonistic. The ignorant people of theinterior have always been oppressed by their supposedly more highlycivilized brethren living on or near the coast. 

The killing of Otoy by the constabulary in 1911 markedthe passing of the last of a series of mountain chiefs whohad exercised a very powerful influence over the hill peopleand had claimed for themselves supernatural powers. 

Manila hemp is the principal product upon which these mountaineersdepend in bartering for cloth and other supplies. The cleaning ofhemp involves very severe exertion, and when it is cleaned it mustusually, in Samar, be carried to the seashore on the backs of themen who raise it. Under the most favourable circumstances, it may betransported thither in small _bancas_ [494] down the streams. 

The lowland people of Samar and Leyte had long been holding up thehill people when they brought in their hemp for sale in precisely theway that Filipinos in other islands are accustomed to hold up membersof the non-Christian tribes. They played the part of middlemen, purchasing the hemp of the ignorant hill people at low prices andoften reselling it, without giving it even a day's storage, at a verymuch higher figure. This system was carried so far that conditionsbecame unbearable and finally resulted in so-called _pulájanism_which began in the year 1904. 

The term _pulájan_ is derived from a native word meaning "red" andwas given to the mountain people because in their attacks upon thelowlanders they wore, as a distinguishing mark, red trousers or adash of red colour elsewhere about their sparse clothing. They raidedcoast towns and did immense damage before they were finally broughtunder control. It should be remembered that these conditions wereallowed to arise by a Filipino provincial governor, and by Filipinomunicipal officials. It is altogether probable that a good Americangovernor would have prevented them, but as it was, neither their causenor their importance were understood at the outset. The _pulájan_movement was directed primarily against Filipinos. 

The first outbreak occurred on July 10, 1904, in the Gandara Rivervalley where a settlement of the lowlanders was burned and some of itsinhabitants were killed. Eventually disorder spread to many places onthe coast, and one scout garrison of a single company was surprisedand overwhelmed by superior numbers. Officers and men were massacredand their rifles taken. 

In point of area Samar is the third island in the Philippines. Inits interior are many rugged peaks and heavily forested mountains. Itwas here that a detachment of United States marines under the commandof Major Waller, while attempting to cross the island, were lost fornearly two weeks, going without food for days and enduring terriblehardships. 

At the time in question there were not five miles of road on theisland passable for a vehicle, nor were there trails through themountains over which horses could be ridden. The only interior linesof communication were a few footpaths over which the natives wereaccustomed to make their way from the mountains to the coast. 

Troops have perhaps never attempted a campaign in a country moredifficult than the interior of Samar. The traditional needle in thehaystack would be easy to find compared with an outlaw, or band ofoutlaws, in such a rugged wilderness. 

Upon the outbreak of trouble troops were hurried to Samar, and byDecember, 1904, according to Blount himself, there were some 1800native soldiers on the island who were left free for active operationsin the field by the garrisoning of various coast towns with sixteencompanies of United States infantry. 

If the nature of the feuds between the Samar lowlanders and highlandershad then been better understood, the ensuing troubles, which weremore or less continuous for nearly two years, might perhaps havebeen avoided. As soon as it became evident that the situation wassuch as to demand the use of the army it was employed to supplementthe operations of the constabulary. 

About the time that trouble ended in Samar it began in Leyte. Therewas no real connection between the disorders in the two islands. Noleader on either island is known to have communicated with any leaderon the other; no fanatical follower ever left Samar for Leyte orLeyte for Samar so far as we are informed. 

For convenience of administration the two islands were grouped in asingle command after the army was requested to take over the handlingof the disturbances there, in coöperation with the constabulary. Thetrouble ended in 1907 and both islands have remained quiet eversince. The same causes would again produce the same results now orat any time in the future, and they would be then, as in the past, the outcome of the oppression of the weak by the strong and withoutother political significance. Under a good government they shouldnever recur. 

Many circumstances which did not exist in 1902 and 1904 made itfeasible to use the army in Samar and Leyte during 1905 and 1906. Thehigh officers who had exercised such sweeping powers during theinsurrection had meanwhile given way to other commanders. Indeed, a practically new Philippine army had come into existence. Thepolicy of the insular government as to the treatment of individualFilipinos had been recognized and indorsed by Americans generally, but many of the objections to the use of the troops, including theheavy expense involved, still existed and I affirm without fear ofsuccessful contradiction that had it been possible to place in Samarand Leyte a number of constabulary soldiers equal to that of thescouts and American troops actually employed, disorder would havebeen terminated much more quickly and at very greatly less cost. 

With the final breaking up of organized brigandage in 1905 law andorder may be said to have been established throughout the islands. Ithas since been the business of the constabulary to maintain it. Thevalue of the coöperation of the law-abiding portion of the populationhas been fully recognized. The newly appointed constabulary officerhas impressed upon him the necessity of manifesting an interest in thepeople with whom he comes in contact; of cultivating the acquaintanceof Filipinos of all social grades, and of assisting to settle theirdisagreements and harmonize their differences whenever possible. Heis taught a native dialect. 

The constabulary have to a high degree merited and securedthe confidence and good-will of the people, whose rights theyrespect. There is a complete absence of the old arbitrary procedurefollowed by the _guardia civil_ and as a result there are frequentrequests from Filipino officials for additional detachments, whilethe removal of a company from a given community is almost invariablyfollowed by vigorous protests. The power of human sympathy is verygreat, and as the attitude of constabulary officers and men is usuallyone of sympathy, conciliation and affection, that body has earnedand deserved popularity. 

The success of the constabulary in apprehending criminals has beenboth praiseworthy and noteworthy. The courage and efficiency whichhave often been displayed by its officers and men in hard-foughtengagements with Moro outlaws or with organized bands of thievesand brigands have been beyond praise. Many of its officers haverendered invaluable service in bringing the people of the moreunruly non-Christian tribes under governmental control, not onlybravely and efficiently performing their duty as police officers, but assisting in trail construction or discharging, in effect, theduties of lieutenant-governors in very remote places which could bevisited by the actual lieutenant-governors only infrequently. I latertake occasion to mention the valuable work done by Lieutenant Casein the early days of Ifugao, and to dwell at length on the splendidservice rendered there by Lieutenant Jeff D. Gallman, who was formany years lieutenant-governor of the subprovince while continuingto serve as a constabulary officer. Lieutenant Maimban at Quiangan, and Lieutenant Dosser at Mayoyao, have been and are most useful, though they do not hold official positions under the Mountain Provinceor receive any additional compensation for the special services whichthey render. Captain Guy O. Fort served most acceptably as governor ofthe province of Agusan during the interim between the resignation ofGovernor Lewis and the appointment of Governor Bryant and LieutenantsAtkins and Zapanta have also rendered valuable service as assistants tothe provincial governor. Lieutenant Turnbull is now assistant to thegovernor of Nueva Vizcaya for work among the Ilongots on the Pacificcoast of northern Luzón. Other constabulary officers, who have notbeen called upon for special service of this kind, have performedtheir ordinary duties in such a way as to demonstrate that they wereactuated by the spirit of coöperation and have been of great help. 

But the work of the constabulary has not been confined to policeduty. They have been of the greatest assistance to the Director ofHealth in effectively maintaining quarantine, and making possible theisolation of victims of dangerous communicable diseases like choleraand smallpox, when inefficient municipal policemen have utterly failedto do their duty. They have given similar assistance to the Directorof Agriculture in the maintenance of quarantine in connection withefforts to combat diseases of domestic animals. In great emergenciessuch as those presented by the recent eruption of Taal volcano, andthe devastation caused by great typhoons, they have been quick torespond to the call of duty and have rendered efficient and heroicservice. They assist internal revenue officers. Except in a few ofthe largest cities they are the firemen of the islands and by theireffective work have repeatedly checked conflagrations, which are offrequent occurrence and tend to be very destructive in this country, where most of the houses are built of bamboo and nipa palm, andwhere roofs become dry as tinder during the long period when thereis little or no rain. They have aided in combating pests of locusts, and, in short, have been ready to meet almost any kind of an emergencywhich has arisen. 

The importance of having such a body of alert, industrious, disciplined, efficient men inspired by a high sense of duty, andphysically so well developed that they can continue to performthat duty in the face of long-continued privations and hardships, is beyond dispute. The results which have been obtained by thePhilippine constabulary have abundantly justified the policy whichled to its organization. 

Its task has been no sinecure. Eleven officers and one hundredninety-seven enlisted men have been killed in action. Forty-eightofficers and nine hundred ninety-one men have died ofdisease. Forty-six officers have been wounded in action. Seven hundredsixty-eight men have been discharged for disability. Seven thousandfour hundred twenty-four firearms and 45, 018 rounds of ammunition havebeen captured by, or surrendered to, the constabulary. Four thousandeight hundred sixty-two outlaws have been killed and 11, 977 takenprisoners. Twelve thousand two hundred sixty-two stolen animals havebeen recovered. 

There are many things which are not brought home to the readerby such statistics. The weary days and nights on tropical trails;the weakness and pain of dysentery; the freezing and the burning ofpernicious malaria; the heavy weight of responsibility when one mustact, in matters of life and death, with no superior to consult; thedisappointment when carefully laid plans go wrong; the discouragementcaused by indifference; the danger of infection with loathsomediseases; ingratitude; deadly peril; aching wounds; sudden death, and, worse yet, death after suffering long drawn out, when one meetsone's end knowing that it is coming and that one's family will beleft without means or resources, --these are some of the things thatthe officers and men of this gallant corps have faced unflinchingly. 

The work of the constabulary and of the Philippine scouts hasconclusively demonstrated the courage and efficiency of the Filipinoas a soldier when well disciplined and well led. 

The establishment and maintenance of order in the Philippines haveafforded opportunity for some of the bravest deeds in the annals ofany race, and the opportunity has been nobly met. The head-huntersof the Mountain Province, the Mohammedan Moros of Mindanao, Jolóand Palawan, the bloody _pulájanes_ of Samar and Leyte, the wily_tulisanes_ of Luzón, all unrestrained by any regard for the rulesof civilized warfare, have for twelve years matched their fanaticalbravery against the gallantry of the khaki-clad Filipino soldiers. Timeand again a single officer and a handful of men have taken chancesthat in almost any other land would have won them the Victoria cross, the legion of honor, or some similar decoration. Here their onlyreward has been the sense of duty well done. 

The force known as the Philippine constabulary was organized for thepurpose of establishing and maintaining order. It has establishedand is maintaining a condition of order never before equalled orapproached in the history of the islands. The policy which led toits organization has been a thousand times justified. 

CHAPTER XV

The Administration of Justice

In no branch of the public administration have there been morenumerous or more beneficial reforms than in the administration ofjustice. They have resulted in simplifying organization, in decreasingthe possibility of corruption and partiality, and in diminishing thecost of litigation and the time which it requires. 

For the benefit of those especially interested I give in the appendixthe past and present organization of the courts. [495] The subjectis too technical to interest the average layman. 

The slender salaries paid to judges, the fact that in the majorityof cases their appointment and promotion were due to influence andsuggestion, their liability to be transferred from one court to anotheror from the Philippines to the Antilles, as frequently happened, andthe further fact that the subordinate personnel of the courts was nota salaried one, caused the administration of justice in the PhilippineIslands to be looked upon askance. There was a general belief, wellfounded in many instances, that lawsuits were won through influenceor bribery. Clerks and the subordinate personnel of the courts werereadily bribed. Indeed, they frequently demanded bribes from litigants, or from defendants in criminal cases, under promise to expedite thetrials if paid to do so, or under threat to commit some injusticeif payment was not forthcoming. For many years after the Americanoccupation justices of the peace received no salaries and had to lookto fees for their compensation. This system worked wretchedly. Thepositions were only too often filled by very incompetent and unworthymen, who stimulated litigation in order to make more money. Now alljustices of the peace receive reasonable salaries. 

The paying of regular salaries and the furnishing of necessaryoffices and supplies have done much to improve the work of justiceof the peace courts, which are now presided over by men who averagefar better than even their immediate predecessors. 

Until they were put on a salary basis the work of the Filipinojustices of the peace left much more to be desired than is lackingat present. In many instances they allowed gross brutalities, perpetrated by the rich on the poor, or by the strong on the weak, to go unpunished. The following case furnished me by an Americanteacher is typical of what has occurred only too often:--

"On another occasion, I met the brother of my house _muchacha_, [496]a boy about eight. He had a sort of protuberance on one side caused bybroken ribs which had not been set. I questioned my _muchacha_. Shesaid her step-father had kicked the child across the room some weeksbefore and broken his ribs. The next day, I took the child togetherwith Señora Bayot, the wife of the Governor's secretary, before thelocal Justice of the Peace. Señora Bayot translated and the child toldthe same story as had his sister. The Justice of the Peace issued anorder for the step-father to report to him on the next day. That nightmy _muchacha_ told me that her step-father had threatened to kill thechild if he did not tell the Justice that he got the hurt by fallingout of an orange tree. The child did as ordered, and the step-fatherwas dismissed. When I questioned the Justice of the Peace as to whyhe credited the second tale, he said the child was under oath then, and was not under oath in the first statements. "

It was not deemed wise at the outset to appoint a Filipino judge forthe city of Manila, as it was feared that there would be a lack ofconfidence in a Filipino who had occasion to decide cases involvinglarge sums of money in which Americans or foreigners on the one handand Filipinos on the other were interested; but a few years afterthe establishment of the new judicial system Filipino judges had wonsuch a reputation for justice and fairness as to gain the confidenceof Americans and foreigners and the appointment of a Filipino judgefor the court of the city of Manila did not arouse any opposition. 

Filipino judges of courts of first instance seem usually to havebeen actuated by a desire to do full justice. The instances in whichcomplaints have been made against them because of partiality to partyor to race are few. Some of them have been justly criticised fortardiness in cleaning up their dockets, and it is undoubtedly truethat their capacity for turning out work is on the average below thatof their Americans associates. 

The fact must not be forgotten that Americans are in the majorityin the Supreme Court, which reviews the decisions of courts of firstinstance, and this undoubtedly exercises a restraining influence. Itis not possible accurately to judge what would be the actions of abody of men now subject to such control if it did not exist. It isfurthermore true that the Filipinos are more inclined to be suspiciousof their own countrymen than of Americans, and there have been fromtime to time specific requests from them that judges in certainprovinces be Americans. 

Under the Spanish régime the fees paid by litigants were excessiveand the use of stamped paper was compulsory. Its value ranged fromtwenty-five centavos to two pesos for a folio of two sheets accordingto the amount involved in the suit. Now there are fixed fees of $8in civil suits, except in probate matters, where the fee is $12. 

It was in the power of an unscrupulous litigant to make a lawsuitalmost eternal. In matters involving an amount exceeding $250 it waslawful to institute proceedings in the action whereby the decision ofthe main issue was suspended pending decision of the proceedings, andas a decision was appealable to the _audiencia_, this was often doneby attorneys who had an interest in delaying the suit. By institutingone proceeding after another a suit could be indefinitely prolonged. 

Another method of securing delay was to object to the judge. Incase the judge denied the ground of the objection, a proceeding wasinstituted against him and the trial of the main issue was turned overto another judge; although the proceeding arising out of the objectiondid not suspend the trial of the main issue, when the time came todecide the latter the decision was withheld until the proceedingarising out of the objection was settled, and as this latter was onein connection with which other proceedings could be instituted whichmight delay the decision and consequently the decision of the mainissue, there was no end to the matter. 

To-day all this has been stopped by the procedure in court. Thechallenging of judges is not allowed, although they must refrainfrom the trial of any matter when they are disqualified in any wayas regards it. Proceedings which suspend the trial of the main issuecannot be instituted. The procedure itself is more expeditious, the time allowances and formalities have been reduced, and all thelong Spanish civil procedure regarding the presentation of evidencehas been shortened. Suits are settled with a speediness previouslyunknown. In order to avoid delay on the part of judges in renderingdecisions, an act has been passed prohibiting the payment of theirsalaries without a certificate that they have no matter which hasbeen awaiting decision for more than three months. 

Owing to the inquisitorial procedure which obtained under Spanishrule, the disposition of criminal cases was even slower than thatof civil cases. The cause would be commenced, either _de officio_, by the judge who had a knowledge of the crime, or by the prosecutingattorney, or by virtue of private accusation on the part of the personaggrieved. The case once started, the investigations made during theperiod known as the _sumario_ were conducted in the absence of theaccused. The latter had no hand in the case, as it was thought thatthe reserve and secrecy of the procedure ought not to be violatedto the end that the accused might not frustrate the evidence ofthe prosecution by preparing his defence. Owing many times to theinactivity of the judge or of the prosecuting attorney, to the greatamount of work which weighed down the courts--for actions were begunwhen there was knowledge of the commission of the crime, although theperpetrators were not known--and by the manipulations at other timesof the private accuser to whose interest it was to harm the accusedby delaying the _sumario_, this period was often made to extend overyears and years. Meanwhile the defendant was confined in prison, as no bail was allowed in any case in which the penalty was that of_presidio correccional_ (from six months and one day to six years'imprisonment) or greater. In addition to this the circumstance that allcriminal causes in the islands had to be sent for review to the proper_audiencia_, caused a large accumulation of old cases in these highercourts, and this alone made their disposition a matter of some years. 

To-day the procedure is rapid. Information having been brought againstthe defendant, the trial is had in the same term or at most duringthe next term of court. Sometimes the trial is suspended owing to thenon-appearance of witnesses, but it can be said that cases are rarewhere causes are pending in the docket of the court for a longer periodthan two terms. Causes appealed to the Supreme Court are disposed ofpromptly, and as a general rule it does not take over six months toget a decision. 

Defendants in criminal cases have now been granted by the PhilippineBill certain fundamentally important rights which they did not formerlyenjoy; namely, to appear and defend in person or by counsel at everystage of the proceedings; to be informed of the nature and cause of theaccusation; to testify as witnesses in their own behalf; to be exemptfrom testifying against themselves; to be confronted at the trial by, and to cross-examine, the witnesses against them; to have compulsoryprocess issue for obtaining witnesses in their own favour; to havespeedy and public trials; to be admitted to bail with sufficientsureties in all cases, except for capital offences. None of theserights were enjoyed under the procedure in effect during the Spanishrégime. A man was prosecuted without being notified of the chargesagainst him, and he was only made aware of the case against him afterthe _sumario_. When all of the evidence of the prosecution had beentaken the accused was heard in his own defence. He was compelledto testify, and was subjected to a very inquisitorial examination, including questions which incriminated him. Although he had the rightto compel witnesses for the prosecution to ratify over their signaturesthe evidence against him given during the _sumario_, as the defence ofthe majority of the accused was in the hands of attorneys _de officio_they nearly always renounced this privilege of the defendant, and, as has already been said, bail was not admitted in any grave offenceduring the trial. 

No sentence of acquittal in a criminal case can now be appealed fromby the government. Under the Spanish system sentences of acquittal ofcourts of first instance had to be referred for review to the proper_audiencia_ and the fiscal of the latter could appeal from a sentenceof acquittal by it. 

The Philippine Bill grants to the inhabitants of the islands otherimportant individual rights which they did not formerly possess. 

The Spanish constitution was not in force here, and although thePenal Code contained provisions for punishing, in a way, officials whoviolated certain rights granted by the Spanish constitution, citizenshad no expeditious method of securing their punishment. Now the Code ofCivil Procedure grants them certain special remedies by which theirrights can be made good. To illustrate: Under the Spanish régimethe only remedy for a man illegally detained was to bring a criminalaction against the person illegally detaining him. He did not havethe remedy of the writ of habeas corpus nor the writ of prohibitionagainst an official who attempted to make him the victim of someunlawful act. His only remedy was to bring a criminal action againstsuch official, or to sue him for damages. He could not compel publicofficials to perform their ministerial duties by mandamus proceedings. 

The individual rights conferred by the Philippine Bill, and thespecial remedies granted by the Code of Civil Procedure, assure to theinhabitants of the islands liberties and privileges entirely unknownto them during the days of Spanish sovereignty, and these libertiesand privileges are adequately safeguarded. 

Two things still greatly complicate the administration of justice inthe Philippines. 

The first is the dense ignorance of the people of the working classwho for the most part have failed to learn of their new rights, and even if they know them are afraid to attempt to assert them inopposition to the will of the _caciques_, whose power for evil theyknow only too well. 

The other is the unreliability of many witnesses and theirshocking readiness to perjure themselves. It is always possible tomanufacture testimony at small expense. While the criminal libelsuit brought against certain members of the staff of the newspaper_El Renacimiento_, which libelled me, was in progress the judgeshowed me the opinion of the two Filipino assessors [497] in oneof the cases and told me that it was written by an attorney for thedefence. I could not believe this, but a few days later an assessorin another of the cases called at my house, bringing a draft of theopinion of himself and his associate which he sought to submit tome for criticism or modification, saying that I knew much more aboutthe case than they did! He was nonplussed at my refusal to read thedocument, and left saying "_acqui tiene V. Nuevo servidor_. " [498]Had I redrafted the opinion, as I might have done, my "new servant"would have called later for a _quid pro quo_. 

Some of the Filipino judges of first instance have proved weak inmatters affecting the integrity of public domain and the protectionof the public forests, but on the whole these officers have donerather surprisingly well. It must be remembered that the best menin the islands have now been appointed, and that another generationmust come on before there will be available any considerable numberof new candidates who are up to the standard of the present appointees. 

CHAPTER XVI

Health Conditions

I had abundant opportunity to observe health conditions in thePhilippines during the Spanish régime and they were shocking in theextreme. There were no provisions for the sanitary disposal of humanwaste even in Manila. If one had occasion to be out on foot at night, it was wise to keep in the middle of the street and still wiser tocarry a raised umbrella. 

Immediately after the American occupation some five hundred barrelsof caked excrement were taken from a single tower in one of the oldManila monasteries. The moat around the city wall, and the _esteros_, or tidal creeks, reeked with filth, and the smells which assailedone's nostrils, especially, at night, were disgusting. 

Distilled water was not to be had for drinking purposes. Thecity water supply came from the Mariquina River, and some fifteenthousand Filipinos lived on or near the banks of that stream above theintake. The water was often so thick with sediment that one could notsee through a glass of it, and it was out of the question to attemptto get it boiled unless one had facilities of one's own. 

Conditions in the provinces were proportionately worse. As a rule, there was no evidence of any effort to put provincial towns intodecent sanitary conditions. I must, however, note one strikingexception. Brigadier General Juan Arolas, long the governor of Joló, had a thorough knowledge of modern sanitary methods and a keenappreciation of the benefits derivable from their application. Whenhe was sent to Joló, practically in banishment, the town was a plaguespot to which were assigned Spaniards whose early demise would havebeen looked upon with favour by those in power. He converted it intoa healthy place the death rate of which compared favourably with thatof European cities, thereby demonstrating conclusively what couldbe done even under very unfavourable conditions. No troops in theislands were kept in anything like such physical condition as werethe regiments assigned to him, and he bore a lasting grudge againstany one inconsiderate enough to die in Joló. 

Everywhere I saw people dying of curable ailments. Malaria wasprevalent in many regions in which it was impossible to secure goodquinine. The stuff on sale usually consisted largely of cornstarch, or plaster of Paris. Fortunately we had brought with us from theUnited States a great quantity of quinine and we made friends withthe Filipinos in many a town by giving this drug gratis to their sick. 

Smallpox was generally regarded as a necessary ailment of childhood. Itwas a common thing to see children covered with the eruption ofthis disease watching, or joining in, the play of groups of healthylittle ones. 

The clothing of people who had died of smallpox was handed on to othermembers of the family, sometimes without even being washed. The victimsof the disease often immersed themselves in cold water when their feverwas high, and paid the penalty for their ignorance with their lives. 

The average Spaniard was a firm believer in the noxiousness of nightair, which he said produced _paludismo_. [499] Most Filipinos wereafraid of an imaginary spirit, devil or mythical creature known as_asuáng_, and closed their windows and doors after dark as a protectionagainst it. Thus it came about that in a country where fresh air isespecially necessary at night no one got it. 

Tuberculosis was dreadfully common, and its victims were conveyingit to others without let or hindrance. 

A distressingly large percentage of native-born infants died beforereaching one year of age on account of infection at birth, insufficientclothing, or improper food. I have many times seen a native motherthrust boiled rice into the mouth of a child only a few days old, and I have seen babies taught to smoke tobacco before they could walk. 

Before our party left the islands in 1888, cholera had broken outat a remote and isolated place. A little later it spead over aconsiderable part of the archipelago. On my return in 1890 I heardthe most shocking stories of what had occurred. Victims of thisdisease were regarded with such fear and horror by their friendsthat they were not infrequently carried out while in a state ofcoma, and buried alive. It became necessary to issue orders to haveshelters prepared in cemeteries under which bodies were required tobe deposited and left for a certain number of hours before burial, in order to prevent this result. 

In Siquijor an unfortunate, carried to the cemetery after he hadlost consciousness, came to himself, crawled out from under a massof corpses which had been piled on top of him, got up and walkedhome. When he entered his house, his assembled friends and relativesvacated it through the windows, believing him to be his own ghost. Theydid not return until morning, when they found him dead on the floor. 

I heard a well-authenticated story of a case in which all the membersof a family died except a creeping infant who subsisted for some timeby sucking a breeding sow which was being kept in the kitchen. 

During the great cholera epidemic in 1882 it is said that theapproaches to the Manila cemeteries were blocked with vehicles ofevery description loaded with corpses, and that the stench fromunburied bodies in the San Lazaro district was so dreadful that onecould hardly go through it. 

Beri-beri was common among the occupants of jails, lighthouses andother government institutions, as well as in certain garrisoned townslike Balabac. 

In 1892 I found the wife of a very dear Spanish friend dying froman ailment which in the United States could have been promptly andcertainly remedied by a surgical operation. I begged him to take herto Manila, telling him of the ease with which any fairly good surgeonwould relieve her, and promising to interest myself in her case onmy arrival there. To my utter amazement I found that there was not asurgeon in the Philippine Islands who would venture to open the humanabdomen. The one man who had sometimes done this in Spain stated thatit would be impossible for him to undertake it in Manila, on accountof the lack of a suitable operating room, of instruments and of thenecessary anaesthetist and other professional assistants. In fact, atthe time of the American occupation there was not a modern operatingroom, much less a modern hospital, in the Philippines. Thousands uponthousands of people were perishing needlessly every year for the lackof surgical intervention. A common procedure in dealing with woundswas to cover them with poultices of chewed tobacco, ashes, and leaves. 

In many provinces the people were without medical assistance ofany sort, and fell into the hands of native quacks who were little, if at all, better than witch doctors. 

The most fantastic views were entertained relative to the causationof disease. In some towns it was vigorously asserted that after apeculiar looking black dog ran down the street cholera appeared. Inother places cholera was generally ascribed to the poisoning of wellsby Spaniards or foreigners. 

Cemeteries were not infrequently situated in the very midst of towns, or near the local supplies of drinking water. Conditions withintheir walls were often shocking from an aesthetic view point. As thearea available for burials was limited, and the graves were usuallyunmarked, parts of decomposed bodies were constantly being dug up. Itwas the custom to throw such remains about the foot of the cross atthe centre of the cemetery. 

Military sanitation was also very bad. I was at Zamboanga whenthe wreck of General Weyler's expedition to Lake Lanoa began toreturn. There had been no adequate provision for the medical care ofthe force in the field, and the condition of many of the soldiers waspitiable in the extreme. Disabled men were brought in by the shipload, and the hospitals at Zamboanga, Isabela de Basilan and Joló were soonfilled to overflowing. 

The lack of adequate sanitary measures was equally in evidence indealing with cattle disease. Rinderpest, a highly contagious andvery destructive disease of horned cattle, was introduced in 1888 andspread like fire in prairie grass. No real effort was made to checkit prior to the American occupation, and it caused enormous losses, both directly by killing large numbers of beef cattle and indirectlyby depriving farmers of draft animals. 

When I first visited the islands every member of our party fellill within a few weeks. All of us suffered intensely from tropicalulcers. Two had malaria; one had dysentery; one, acute inflammationof the liver, possibly of amoebic origin; and so on to the end ofthe chapter. I myself got so loaded up with malaria in Mindoro thatit took me fifteen years to get rid of it. 

Fortunately the American army of occupation brought with it numerouscompetent physicians and surgeons, and abundant hospital equipmentand supplies, for the soldiers promptly contracted about all thedifferent ailments to be acquired in the islands. 

When I arrived in Manila on the 5th of March, 1899, I found that agreat army hospital, called the "First Reserve, " had been establishedin the old rice market. There was another sizable one on the Bagumbayandrive. A third occupied a large building belonging to French sistersof charity which was ordinarily used for school purposes. 

In immediate connection with the First Reserve Hospital was a tenthospital where sick and wounded Insurgents were being given the bestof care. 

Field hospitals were promptly established as the troops moved outfrom Manila, and in connection with many of these Filipinos were givenmuch needed medical and surgical help. The recipients of such kindlytreatment were, however, prohibited by Insurgent officers from tellingothers of their experiences lest the hatred of Americans diminish asa result. 

Smallpox had broken out among the Spanish soldiers in the walledcity and was spreading badly when my friend, Major Frank S. Bournsof the army medical corps, was given the task of eradicating it, which he promptly accomplished. A little later the use of the SantaAna church as a smallpox hospital was authorized, and sick Filipinoswere carefully tended there. 

The army promptly set about cleaning up Manila and waging warupon the more serious ailments which threatened the health of thesoldiers and that of the public. The work was at the outset put underthe direction of Major Edie, a very capable and efficient medicalofficer. Subsequently it was turned over to Major Bourns, who, onaccount of his intimate knowledge of Spanish, and his wide acquaintancewith the Filipinos, was able to carry out many much-needed reforms, and in doing so aroused a minimum of public antagonism. 

Upon the establishment of civil government Governor Taft was verydesirous of retaining Major Bourns's services, but this did not provepracticable, as he desired to give up government work and engage inprivate business. 

There was promptly created an efficient board of health made up of menof recognized ability and large practical experience. Its chairman wasMajor Louis M. Maus, commissioner of public health. The other memberswere Mr. H. D. Osgood, sanitary engineer; Dr. Franklin H. Meacham, chief sanitary inspector; Dr. Paul C. Freer, superintendent ofgovernment laboratories; and Dr. Manuel Gomez, secretary. 

This board was promptly put upon its mettle. It had inherited fromthe army an incipient epidemic of bubonic plague in Manila, andthe disease soon spread to Cavite and also to Cebú, then the secondport of the Philippines in commercial importance. It also appeared inseveral provincial towns near Cavite. An effective campaign against it, inaugurated at this time, was never abandoned until it was completelyeradicated in 1906, --a noteworthy result to achieve in a country likethe Philippines. 

On March 21, 1902, I was advised that two patients at San Juan deDios hospital were developing symptoms of Asiatic cholera, and on thefollowing day a positive laboratory diagnosis was made. Other casesfollowed in quick succession, and we soon found ourselves facing avirulent epidemic of this highly dangerous disease. At the outsetthe mortality was practically 100 per cent. Unfortunately, there wasno one connected with the medical service of the islands who had hadpractical experience in dealing with cholera, and we had to get thisas we went along. 

At the time of the outbreak, Governor Taft was in the United States, Acting Governor Wright was in Leyte, the secretary of finance andjustice was in Japan, and there were present in Manila only thesecretary of public instruction and the secretary of the interior. Asthe executive head of the government was absent, and there was noquorum of the legislative body, I of necessity arrogated to myselfpowers which I did not lawfully possess, appointing employees andincurring expenses without the usual formalities. 

On the morning of March 22 I informed General Chaffee that four casesof cholera had occurred in Manila, and requested that an adequatemilitary force be despatched to the valley of the Mariquina River toprotect the city water supply from possible contamination. 

This request was promptly acceded to, and the guard thereaftermaintained proved adequate to prevent infection of the city water, although there are three towns on the river above the intake, and itwas the custom of their people to bathe and wash their clothing inthis stream. Many of the filthy surface wells of the city were filledas rapidly as possible, and those that could not be filled were closed. 

The people, entirely unaccustomed as they were to any sanitaryrestrictions, believing that the disease was not cholera, and firm intheir conviction that they had a right to do whatever they liked solong as they kept on their own premises, bitterly resented the burningor disinfection of their houses and effects, and the restriction oftheir liberty to go and come as they pleased, and in spite of thefact that the number of cases was kept down in a manner never beforedreamed of at Manila, there arose an increasingly bitter feeling ofhostility toward the work of the board of health. In fact, the verysuccess of the campaign proved an obstacle, and we were assured thatthe disease could not be cholera, as, if it were, there would be athousand deaths a day!

An educational campaign was immediately begun, and simpledirections for avoiding infection were published and scatteredbroadcast. Distilled water was furnished gratis to all who would drinkit, stations for its distribution being established through the cityand supplemented by large water wagons driven through the streets. Thesale of foods likely to convey the disease was prohibited. Largenumbers of emergency sanitary inspectors were immediately appointed, and every effort was made to detect all cases as soon as possible. Aland quarantine was established around the city, to protect theprovinces. 

In anticipation of a possible extensive outbreak of contagious diseasea detention camp capable of accommodating some twenty-five hundredpeople had been established previously on the San Lazaro grounds, andto this place were taken the cholera "contacts. " A cholera hospitalwas opened near this camp, and the stricken were removed to it fromtheir homes as speedily as possible, the buildings which they hadoccupied being thoroughly disinfected, or burned if disinfectionwas impracticable. 

The bodies of the dead were at the outset either buried in hermeticallysealed coffins or cremated. When the detention camp and hospital atSan Lazaro threatened to become crowded, a second camp and hospitalwere established at Santa Mesa. At this latter place both "contacts"and the sick were obliged to live in tents. 

The Spanish residents were allowed to establish a private cholerahospital in a large and well-ventilated _convento_ on Calle Herran. Asthe number of sick Spaniards was nothing like sufficient to fill thisbuilding, they were asked to turn over the unoccupied space in it tothe board of health, which they most generously did. 

In response to popular clamour a hospital under strictly Filipinomanagement was opened in a nipa building in Tondo. Interest in itsoon flagged, and the government found itself with this institutionon its hands. 

The epidemic came soon after the close of a long-continued war, and there were at that time in Manila not a few evil-intentionedpersons, both foreign and native, who welcomed every opportunityto make trouble. The difficulties arising from the claim advancedby a number of reputable but ignorant medical men that the diseasewas not cholera at all were sufficiently great. They were enormouslyincreased by false and malicious stories to the effect that "contacts"were killed at the detention camp; that patients on arrival at thecholera hospital were given a drink of poisoned _vino_ [500] andinstantly dropped dead; that the distilled water distributed free ofcharge was poisoned, and that the Americans were poisoning the wells. 

The necessary use of strychnine as a heart stimulant at the cholerahospital was made the basis for a story that the sick were beingpoisoned with this drug. 

These silly tales were widely circulated and quite generally believed, and as a result of the fear thus engendered, and of the desire onthe part of relatives and neighbours of stricken persons to escapedisinfection and quarantine, strong efforts were often made to concealthe sick and the dead, and when this was not possible the "contacts"usually ran away. There were not wanting instances of the driving ofcholera victims into the streets. 

In spite of the generally hostile attitude of the public and somegrave mistakes in policy, the measures adopted sufficed at the outsetto hold the disease in check to an extent which surprised even thehealth officers themselves. 

On May 15 there began a rapid and quite steady decline in the numberof cases. 

In June, however, it increased. During July it grew steadily larger, and on the 25th of that month there were ninety-one cases, thelargest number which has ever occurred in Manila on any day sincethe American occupation. 

Throughout the early months of the epidemic Major Maus had labouredunceasingly to check it, displaying an energy and an indifference tofatigue and personal discomfort which were highly commendable. Thelong-continued strain ultimately began to tell on him severely. OnMay 17 orders were received from the Adjutant-General's Officeproviding for his relief on or about July 30, and stating that MajorE. C. Carter, of the United States Army Medical Corps, would beavailable for detail as commissioner of public health on that date, if his services were desired. Arrangements were accordingly made tohave Major Carter proceed to the Philippines. Major Maus's resignationwas accepted, effective July 31. Dr. Frank S. Bourns was urged totake temporary charge of the situation, and consented to do so. 

On the 8th of August Major Carter arrived and announced his readinessto assume his duties, but it was suggested to him that he ought firstto have some time to familiarize himself with them, and Dr. Bournswas left free to carry out the special work for which he had beenappointed. 

This he did with promptness and despatch, the number of cases forAugust being but seven hundred twenty as against thirteen hundredsixty-eight for the previous month. On the 8th of September, havingbrought the disease under control at Manila, he insisted on resigningin order to attend to his private affairs, which were suffering fromneglect, and his resignation was reluctantly accepted. 

Dr. Bourns's remarkable success in dealing with a very difficultsituation was largely due to his ability to devise measures which, while thoroughly effective, were less irritating to the public thanwere those which had been previously employed. 

The policy which he had inaugurated was followed by his successorwith the result that the cases fell to two hundred seventy-fivein September and eighty-eight in October. In November there wasa slight recrudescence, but the disease did not again threaten toescape control and in February practically disappeared, there beingbut two cases during the entire month. 

The return of hot, damp weather again produced a slight recrudescence, and scattering cases continued to occur until March, when the epidemicof 1902-1904 ended in Manila. 

In view of the conditions which then prevailed and of the extremerisk of a general infection of the city water supply, which, had itoccurred, would doubtless have resulted in the death of a third ofthe population, this is a record of which the Bureau of Health maywell be proud. 

The effort to prevent the spread of infection by maintaining a landquarantine around Manila proved entirely ineffective. The diseasepromptly appeared in the provinces where the campaign against itwas from the outset in charge of newly appointed Filipino presidentsof provincial boards of health, aided, when practicable, by medicalinspectors from Manila. 

Before it was finally checked in Manila there were 5581 cases with4386 deaths; while in the provinces, in many of which it necessarilylong ran its course practically unhindered, there were 160, 671 cases, with 105, 075 deaths. 

On the 27th of April, 1904, the Board of Health passed the followingresolutions:--

"Whereas cases of Asiatic cholera have occurred in but three provincialtowns of the Philippine Islands since February 8, 1904; and

"Whereas only one case of Asiatic cholera has been reported asoccurring any place in the Philippine Islands since March 8, 1904; and

"Whereas the city of Manila was declared on March 23 to be free fromthe infection of Asiatic cholera; On motion

"_Resolved_, That the islands composing the Philippine Archipelagoare, and are hereby declared to be, free from the infection of Asiaticcholera; and

"_Be it further resolved_, That the Commissioner of Public Health bedirected to send a copy of these resolutions to the honourable theSecretary of the Interior, the Municipal Board, the United StatesMarine-Hospital Service, and the Collector of Customs. "

As a matter of fact, however, it later proved that cholera was endemicin certain swampy regions near Manila, and in 1905 we found ourselveswith a new epidemic on our hands. 

At the end of the second week, beginning August 23, there had been onehundred thirty-seven cases, as compared with one hundred twenty-fivefor the same period during the epidemic of 1902-1904. 

However, the conditions for combating cholera were now far morefavourable than in 1902. Major E. C. Carter had at his own request beenrelieved from duty as commissioner of public health, and Dr. VictorG. Heiser, passed assistant surgeon of the United States publichealth and marine hospital service, had been appointed to succeedhim on April 5, 1905. Dr. Heiser was a highly trained officer of oneof the most efficient services which has ever been organized for thecombating of contagious and infectious diseases. 

He had under him in the city of Manila a small but thoroughly trainedbody of twenty-four medical inspectors, of whom nineteen were Americansand five Filipinos. Profiting by his previous experience and that ofhis predecessors in the Philippine service, he inaugurated a campaignwhich practically terminated the epidemic in Manila on February 21, 1906, [501] with a total of two hundred eighty-three cases and twohundred forty-three deaths. 

This brief and decisive campaign reflects the greatest credit on allconcerned with it. 

The board of health had one great advantage in the fact that the SanLazaro contagious disease hospital had been completed. This building, with its cool wards and attractive surroundings, made it possible togive cholera victims the best of care. 

There was at the outset little or no fear of this hospital, butapparently this condition of things was not satisfactory to thatsmall but dangerous element of the Manila public which from the timeof the American occupation has never let pass any opportunity to maketrouble. As usual, the medium of attack was the local press. _SoberaníaNacional_ published a most extraordinary article painting in vividcolours the alleged horrors of the San Lazaro Hospital, and statingamong other things that the naked bodies of the dead, tagged and withtheir feet tied together, lay about the entrance of that institution. Amore false statement was never published. 

Within twenty-four hours after its appearance terror reigned amongthe lower classes, and living and dead cholera victims were beingsmuggled out of the city to neighbouring towns. 

Feeling that the vicious attitude of a certain section of the presshad cost lives enough, I sent the editor of this paper a courteousinvitation to call at my office. He made no response. I then wrotehim, demanding a retraction, and sending him a correct statement topublish. [502]

He was at first disposed to argue the matter, but finding that Imeant business published the article which I sent to him and madethe following retraction:--

"We are exceedingly glad to affirm in the honour of truth and justice, that the news given by us on the seventh instant under the title'Painful Scenes, ' and 'Naked Dead, ' is absolutely absurd, false andunreasonable. 

"We have investigated the truth of the said notice, and can affirmto our readers that it is entirely inaccurate, as in the courtyardof the said hospital the naked dead that we have spoken of are notnow exposed, nor have they ever been so exposed. 

"The truth is above all things, and to rectify a baseless piece ofnews should not be a doubtful action on the part of the person whogave the news, but rather something in his favour that the publicshould appreciate it at its full value. 

"To conclude, we must record our gratitude to the Secretary of theInterior, the Hon. Dean C. Worcester, for the investigations made inthe premises with the purpose of ascertaining the truth of the allegedfacts, and for the courteous way in which he received us this morningwhen interviewed by one of our reporters. "

In the provinces the results of the campaign against cholera werefar less satisfactory than in Manila as was to be anticipated, owingto lack of adequate personnel, but the cases, which numbered 34, 238and deaths which numbered 22, 938, were far fewer than during theprevious epidemic. 

I shall not attempt here to trace the course of the subsequentepidemics which have occurred from time to time, but shall contentmyself with giving the deaths by years. In 1908, they numbered 18, 811;in 1909, 7306; in 1910, 6940; in 1911, 203. In 1912, there were none, and thus far in 1913 there have been none. [503]

The superstitious practices which were formerly employed by theFilipinos to combat this scourge have given way to simple andinexpensive hygienic measures, and we can safely count on sufficientcoöperation from the people to make an effective campaign possiblewhen it next appears. 

Never shall I forget the strain of the early days of the firstepidemic. Two of my best men, Dr. Meacham and Mr. Mudge, literallyworked themselves to death, remaining on duty when they knew thatthey were in imminent danger, and in the end laying down their liveswillingly for an alien and hostile people. Such things make one proudof being an American. 

At times the situation was not devoid of amusing features. I hadoccasion to visit one of the northern provinces, where the epidemic wasespecially severe, in an effort to calm the panic-stricken populace. Istayed with the governor, a very intelligent Filipino. For obviousreasons I investigated his domestic arrangements, finding that hewas boiling drinking water, thoroughly cooking all food, and takingall usual and necessary precautions to prevent infection. 

On returning to his house the first evening, after a short absence, Ifound the grounds decorated with lighted Japanese lanterns. Supposingthat the proverbial Filipino hospitality had risen above even suchuntoward circumstances as those which then existed, I asked thegovernor what the entertainment was to be. In evident perplexity hereplied that he had not planned to have any entertainment, and onmy inquiring what the lanterns were for, said he had heard that theywere good to keep away cholera germs!

I have referred to the fact that the civil government inherited afairly well developed epidemic of bubonic plague. In 1901 this diseasecaused four hundred twenty-seven deaths, in 1902 it caused ten only, but the demands made on the sanitary force by the cholera epidemicwhich began in that year rendered it impossible to give to plaguethe attention which it otherwise would have had, with the resultthat in 1903 we had one hundred seventy-four deaths. In 1904 therewere seventy-eight; in 1905, forty-three; in 1906, seven; in 1907, none; and from 1907 until 1912, none. In the latter year the diseasewas reintroduced. 

Rats become infected with it, and fleas transmit it from them to humanbeings. It was probably brought in by pestiferous rodents hiddeninside packages of vegetables, as it appeared in a district wherecrates of vegetables are opened in large numbers, and did not appearin the vicinity of the piers, although shore rats are abundant there, and if diseased rodents had landed from shipping, would promptly havebecome infected, --a thing which did not occur. 

At about the same time plague also appeared at Iloilo, where it waseradicated with a total of nine deaths. At Manila there have beenup to the present time [504] fifty-nine deaths, and scattering casescontinue to occur at considerable intervals. 

Had plague not been promptly and effectively combated, it wouldunquestionably have spread rapidly, causing untold misery and heavyproperty losses. 

As I have previously stated, at the time of the American occupationsmallpox was by many people regarded as an almost inevitable ailmentof childhood. It proved necessary to secure the passage of legislationforbidding the inoculation of human beings with it to prevent misguidedFilipinos from deliberately communicating it to their children, notbecause they did not dearly love them, but because they regardedinfection with it as a calamity sure to come sooner or later, anddesired to have it over with once for all. 

We have performed more than ten million vaccinations, with the resultthat the annual deaths from this disease have decreased from fortythousand at the outset to seven hundred for the year just ended. Thereis now less smallpox in Manila than in Washington. 

In the six provinces nearest Manila it was killing, on the average, six thousand persons annually. For a year after we finished vaccinatingthe inhabitants of these provinces it did not cause a death among them;nor has it since caused such a death except among new-born childrenor newly arrived unvaccinated persons. 

These extraordinary results have been achieved without the loss ofa life or a limb so far as we know. The vaccine used was prepared byour own Bureau of Science with extraordinary care, and has proved tobe remarkably pure and active. 

We at first endeavoured to have vaccinations performed by localFilipino health officers, but, after spending large sums withoutobtaining satisfactory results, gave up this plan and substitutedtherefor a method of procedure by which the work was carried on underthe very immediate supervision of the director of health. We then madesubstantial progress. However, under the law as it at present stands, succeeding annual vaccination, intended to insure the immunizationof children soon after they are born and of unvaccinated persons whomay come into a given territory, are intrusted to the local Filipinoauthorities, with the result that in very many cases they are notattended to. We get elaborate returns showing the number of personsvaccinated. Then comes an outbreak of smallpox, and on investigationwe learn that the vaccinations so fully reported were made on paperonly! In other words, the continuance of this work, of such vitalimportance to the Filipino people, is still directly dependent uponcontinued control by American health officers. 

Another great problem now in a fair way to final solution is theeradication of leprosy. At the outset we were told by the churchauthorities that there were thirty thousand lepers in the islands. In1905 we began to isolate and care for all supposed victims of thisdisease, only to find that many outcasts believed to be sufferingfrom it were really afflicted with curable ailments. We were able torestore a very large number of them to society, to their great joyand that of their friends. 

A few hundreds of true lepers were being humanely cared for inManila and elsewhere. Many others had been driven out of the townsinto forests or waste places on the larger islands, where they wereperishing miserably from fever and other diseases. Still others hadbeen isolated on sand quays, where they were in danger of dying fromthirst during the dry season. Not a few wandered through the townsat will, spreading the disease broadcast. 

All known lepers are now cared for at Culion, a healthful, sanitarytown with good streets, excellent water and sewer systems, many modernconcrete buildings and a first-class hospital. 

They are not confined to the limits of the town, but wander at will, except that they are excluded from the immediate vicinity of thehouses of the officers and employees of the colony. 

They may have their little farms, and raise pigs, chickens, vegetables, etc. , if they wish. They may, and do, float about over the waters ofthe neighbouring bay in boats or on rafts, and fish to their hearts'content. They are well fed and well cared for, and their physicalcondition improves to a marked degree promptly after their arrival atthe colony. The only hardship which they suffer is that necessarilyinvolved in separation from their relatives and friends, and this ismitigated by occasional visits which the latter may make them. 

Since we began to isolate lepers, their number has decreased toapproximately three thousand, and with a continuance of the presentpolicy the disease should soon disappear from the Philippines. 

During the period immediately subsequent to the American occupation, amoebic dysentery wrought sad havoc both among our soldiers and amongcivil government officers and employees. Four of my own family of fivehad it, and one had it twice, in spite of the fact that we took allknown precautions; and the experience of my family was by no meansexceptional. This disease then annually cost the lives of a largenumber of American men and women, and a considerable additionalnumber went home invalids for life as a result of infection withit. We seemed to hear almost daily of some new case. 

Careful scientific investigation carried on at the bureau of sciencetaught us the best methods of combating this type of dysentery, and the proper disposal of human feces, the regulation of methodsused in fertilizing vegetables, improvement in supplies of drinkingwater, and other simple, hygienic measures have reduced the deathsfrom it among Americans to an almost negligible minimum. Such casesas occur are almost without exception detected early, and readilyyield to treatment. 

The belief that Filipinos do not suffer from this disease has provedto be without foundation. It kills thousands of them every year. Thosewho are willing to adopt the simple precautions which experience hasshown to be necessary may enjoy the large degree of immunity from itwhich Americans now have. 

The chief cause of amoebic dysentery in the Philippines has undoubtedlybeen infected drinking water. From time immemorial the people havebeen obtaining their water for drinking purposes from flowing streams, open springs or shallow surface wells. 

The wells were especially dangerous, as it was the common customto wash clothing around them so that water containing disease germsfrequently seeped into wells used by whole villages. The results ofsuch conditions during a cholera epidemic can readily be imagined. 

The drinking supplies of many provincial towns have now been radicallyimproved by the sinking of 853 successful artesian wells. 

In many places there has been a resulting reduction of more thanfifty per cent in the annual death rate. Large sums are spent yearlyby the government in drilling additional wells, --a policy which iswarmly approved by the common people. The recent appropriations forthis purpose have been $255, 000 for the fiscal year 1912, $60, 000for 1913 and $200, 000 for 1914. 

When we came to the islands, malaria was killing as many personsas was smallpox. The mortality caused by it is now being greatlyreduced by giving away annually millions of doses of quinine, and bydraining or spraying with petroleum places where mosquitoes breed, as well as by teaching the people the importance of sleeping undermosquito nets and the necessity of keeping patients suffering fromactive attacks of malaria where mosquitoes cannot get at them. Onlyquinine of established quality is allowed in the market. 

The results obtained in combating malaria are often verystriking. Calapan, the capital of Mindoro, was in Spanish days known as"the white man's grave" on account of the prevalence of "perniciousfever" there. To-day it is an exceptionally healthy provincial town. 

At Iwahig, in Palawan, the Spaniards attempted to conduct apenal colony. They were compelled to abandon it on account ofpernicious malaria, which caused continued serious mortality whenthe American government attempted to establish a similar institutionthere. Application of the usual sanitary measures has made it ahealthful place. 

Old jails throughout the islands have been rendered sanitary, or replaced by new ones. The loathsome skin diseases from whichprisoners formerly suffered have in consequence disappeared. Thepractical results obtained in Bilibid, the insular penitentiary, areworthy of special note. The annual death rate at this institution was78. 25 per thousand for the calendar year 1904. It increased steadilyeach month from January, 1904, to September, 1905, when it reachedits maximum, deaths occurring at the rate of 241. 15 per thousand peryear. At this time the director of health was given charge of thesanitation of this prison. 

By remedying overcrowding, improving drainage, installing sewers andregulating diet along scientific lines, the rate was reduced in sixmonths to 70 per 1000, and there it stuck. 

A systematic examination of the stools of prisoners was thenmade. Eighty-four per cent were found to be afflicted with at leastone intestinal parasite. Fifty per cent had two or more, and twentyper cent had three or more. Fifty-two per cent of the total hadhookworm. Active treatment for the elimination of these parasites wasbegun in one barrack, and after the work was completed it was notedthat there was much less disease there than in the remainder. Allof the thirty-five hundred prisoners were ultimately examined, and intestinal parasites eradicated if present. The death rate thendropped to thirteen to the thousand, and has remained at or near thisfigure up to the present time. 

I have already referred to the discovery of the cause of beri-beri, and to the effect of the governor-general's order forbidding theuse of polished rice in government institutions or by governmentorganizations. 

I subsequently made a strong effort to secure legislation imposinga heavy internal revenue tax on polished rice, thus penalizing itsuse. I failed, but such effort will be renewed by some one, let ushope with ultimate success. 

In Spanish days cholera, leprosy, smallpox and other dangerouscommunicable diseases were constantly reintroduced from without. Thisis no longer the case. The United States public health and marinehospital service has stretched an effective defensive line around thearchipelago and has sent its outposts to Hongkong, Shanghai and Amoy, to prevent, so far as possible, the embarkation for Manila of personssuffering from such ailments. We now have the most effective quarantinesystem in the tropics, and one of the best in the world. At Marivelesthere is a very large and complete disinfecting plant, and vesselsmay also be satisfactorily disinfected at Cebú and Iloilo. 

This quarantine service kept the Philippines free from bubonic plaguefor seven years, and has repeatedly prevented the entry of pneumonicplague, that most deadly of all known diseases. 

A peculiar and shockingly disfiguring disease known as yaws occurssomewhat infrequently in the Philippine lowlands and is very prevalentin a number of places in the highlands. In many ways it resemblessyphilis, and indeed at one time was considered to be syphiliticin its origin. Doctor Richard P. Strong, of the Bureau of Science, made the very important discovery that salvarsan is an absolutespecific for it. The effect of an injection of this remedy closelyapproaches a miracle in medicine. In five or six days the conditionof the patient begins to improve rapidly. By the end of the secondweek his horrible sores have healed. 

It was with this remedy that we began our health work among some ofthe wilder head-hunters of northern Luzón. Think of the advantage ofbeing absolutely certain of curing such an ailment in every case, andthink of the gratitude of poor wretches, undergoing untold suffering, when they were almost immediately relieved!

Soon after this use for salvarsan was discovered, I caused a liberalsupply of it to be sent to the Bontoc Hospital. For some time wewere unable to persuade any victims of yaws to undergo treatment, but finally we found one at Barlig who was guilty of a minor criminaloffence, arrested him, and took him to Bontoc. Instead of puttinghim in jail there, we sent him to the hospital for treatment. 

At first he complained bitterly that we were putting no medicineon his sores. Then the remedy began to work and he decided it was"strong medicine. " By the tenth day he was running around townjoyfully exhibiting his rapidly healing body to every one who wouldlook at it. On the fourteenth day he suddenly disappeared, to thedeep regret of the medical men, who had hoped that they might keephim as an example of what could be done, and thus persuade othersto undergo treatment. A few days later, however, he reappeared withthirteen victims of yaws from his home town, having meanwhile twicecovered on foot the great distance which separates Barlig from Bontoc, and assembled and brought in his fellow-sufferers. 

As we have seen, the people of Manila were formerly supplied withimpure drinking water from the Mariquina River, and were therefore inconstant danger of infection with cholera and other deadly diseases. Ata cost of some $1, 500, 000 we have given the city a modern water system, the intake of which is far up in the hills above the last village. Theannual deaths from ordinary water-borne diseases exclusive of cholerahave fallen from 3558--the average number at the time the new systemwas introduced--to 1195. Recently a leak in the dam, which necessitatedtemporary resumption of the use of the Mariquina River water, wasimmediately followed by a marked increase in the number of deathsfrom such diseases, thus conclusively demonstrating the fact that wewere right in ascribing the previous reduction in deaths to a betterwater supply. 

This annual saving of lives is an important result, but more importantyet is the fact that when Asiatic cholera reappears in the Mariquinavalley, as it inevitably will sooner or later, we shall not live inconstant fear of a general infection of the Manila water supply, which, judging from the experience of other cities where modernsanitary methods have been introduced, might result in the death ofa third of the population. In every country a very considerable partof the population always fails to boil its drinking water, no matterhow great the resulting danger may be. 

Manila lacked any facilities for the proper disposal of human waste, and the conditions which resulted were unspeakable, especially inthe little _barrios_, or groups of houses, placed close together, helter-skelter, on wet, swampy ground and reached by means of runwaysnot worthy even of the name of alleys, as one often had to crouch topass along them. 

A modern sewer system costing $2, 000, 000, supplemented by a pailsystem, has very effectively solved this problem, while thousands ofhomes closely crowded on disease-infected, mosquito-breeding groundhave been removed to high, dry, sanitary sites. The regions thusvacated have in many instances been drained, filled, provided withcity water and good streets, and made fit for human occupancy. 

The old moat around the city walls was a veritable incubator ofdisease. It has been converted into an athletic field where crowdsof people take healthful exercise. The _esteros_, or tidal creeks, reeked with filth. More than twenty miles of such creeks have beencleaned out, although much still remains to be done to put them inreally satisfactory condition. 

There were no regulations covering the construction of buildings, andit was not unusual to find six or eight persons sleeping in a closedand unventilated room 10 × 8 × 8 feet. Manila now has an excellentsanitary code, and such conditions have been made unlawful. 

The previous woeful lack of hospital facilities has been effectivelyremedied. At a cost of approximately a million and quarter pesos wehave built and equipped the great Philippine General Hospital, one ofthe most modern institutions of its kind in the world, and by far thebest in the Far East. In it we have very satisfactorily solved thequestion of getting sufficient light and air in the tropics withoutgetting excessive heat. Its buildings are certainly among the verycoolest in the city of Manila, and "the hospital smell" is everywhereconspicuously absent. 

It is called a three-hundred-bed institution, but as a matter of factthe ventilation is so admirable that nearly two hundred additionalbeds can safely be put in as an emergency measure. 

Two hundred and twenty of its beds are free. In them a very largenumber of persons are annually given the best of medical and surgicalcare. At its free clinic some eighty thousand patients find reliefin the course of a year. 

The increase in private hospital facilities has also beennoteworthy. Among the new institutions doing admirable work should bementioned the University Hospital, an Episcopal institution; the MaryJ. Johnston Hospital, a Methodist institution; and St. Paul's Hospital, a Catholic institution. Patients are admitted to all of them withoutregard to their religious belief, a policy the liberality of whichmust commend itself to all broadminded persons. 

In enumerating the hospitals of Manila, the old Spanish institution, San Juan de Dios, should not be forgotten, for it has been improvedand modernized until it offers good facilities for the treatment ofthe sick and the injured. 

All of the above mentioned institutions are in effect acute-casehospitals designed for the treatment of curable ailments. Casesof dangerous communicable disease are excluded from them, but areadequately provided for at San Lazaro where the insular governmenthas established modern and adequate hospitals for plague, smallpox, cholera, diphtheria, scarlet fever, measles, etc. , as well as adetention hospital for lepers, pending their departure for Culion. 

An insane hospital capable of comfortably accommodating 300 inmateshas also been provided. A few years since the insane were commonlychained to floors, or tied to stakes under houses or in yards, and were not infrequently burned alive during conflagrations. Suchconditions no longer exist, but the government is not yet able toprovide for nearly all of the insane who need institutional care. 

The several institutions above mentioned have a very importantfunction apart from the relief of human suffering, in that they affordunexcelled opportunities for giving practical instruction in nursingand in the practice of medicine and surgery. 

A few years ago there was not such a thing as a Filipina trainednurse in the islands. I was firmly convinced that the Filipinas ofthis country could learn to be good nurses, and made earnest effortsto have included among the first students sent at government expenseto the United States several young women of good family who shouldattend nurses' training schools and then return to assist in ourhospital work. 

I failed to secure the adoption of this plan, but later the trainingof nurses was inaugurated in connection with hospital work at theold Civil Hospital, St. Paul's, the University Hospital, the MaryJ. Johnston Hospital and the Philippine General Hospital. At the latterinstitution there is now conducted an admirable school where more thantwo hundred young men and women are being trained. Three classes havealready graduated from it, and Filipina nurses have long since provedthemselves to be exceptionally efficient, capable and faithful. Itwill be some time before we can educate as many as are needed in thegovernment hospitals, and after that has been accomplished a vastfield opens before others in the provincial towns, where the need oftrained assistants in caring for the sick is very great. 

We found exceedingly few competent Filipino physicians or surgeonsin the islands. This condition was due not to natural incompetenceon the part of the Filipinos but to the previous lack of adequateeducational facilities. The government has established a thoroughlymodern college of medicine and surgery, well housed, and providedwith all necessary laboratory facilities. It furnishes the best oftheoretical instruction, while its students have every opportunityfor practical work at the bedsides of patients in the governmenthospitals, all patients in free beds being admitted subject to thecondition that they will allow their cases to be studied. 

While there is still an evident tendency on the part of graduates ofthis school to feel that they know enough, and to desire to get tomaking money without delay, we are nevertheless managing to attract anincreasingly large number of the more competent to the intern serviceof the Philippine General Hospital, where as the result of additionalyears of practical experience they become exceptionally proficient. 

This institution, with its great free clinic, offers very exceptionalfacilities for practical instruction, and we have already trainedsome extremely competent Filipino physicians and surgeons. 

As funds permit, hospital work is being extended to the provinces. AtCebú a thoroughly up-to-date sixty-bed institution is now open. Asmaller one was established years ago at Baguio, where surgical workmay be performed with great advantage on account of the rapidity withwhich convalescence occurs in the cool, pure mountain air, which alsoexpedites the recovery of persons recuperating from wasting diseases. 

A little more than a year ago a hospital was opened at Bontoc, thedemand for accommedations being so great from the start that we didnot even await the arrival of beds. Sick Igorots were only too gladto lie on the floor if their needs could be ministered to. 

It had previously been the custom of the wild men to kill chickens, pigs or carabaos in case of illness, in order to propitiate evilspirits, the kind and number of animals killed being of coursedetermined by the wealth of the patients. They have now satisfiedthemselves that quinine for malaria, salvarsan for yaws, and othereffective remedies for common ailments are more useful and morereadily obtained than was the helpful intervention of the _anítos, _or spirits of the dead, while the methods and results of modernsurgery are a source of unending amazement and satisfaction to them. 

The first surgeon to anesthetize a Kalinga became promptly and widelyknown as "the man who kills people and brings them to life again, "and the individual on whom he operated successfully, who chanced tobe the most influential chief of the tribe, became his friend forlife. Indeed, the results of medical and surgical work for the wildmen have been an important factor in bringing about and maintainingfriendly relations with them. 

Their gratitude is at times very touching. At Atok, in Benguet, therelives an Igorot chief named Palasi. When he was already old a son wasborn to him. This boy, who was the delight of his declining years, became deathly ill with confluent smallpox, and the Igorots consideredhim as good as dead. At this time Sanitary Inspector Baron appearedon the scene. He promptly turned every one else out of the house andhimself nursed the boy, saving his life. Palasi wished to pay himfor his services, but was informed by Mr. Baron that the governmentpaid him, and he could not accept additional compensation. Palasipromptly made the long journey to Baguio to ascertain whether Baronhad told him the truth, and was informed by Governor Pack that thiswas the case. The old man retired to Atok, quite disgusted with thestrange ways of Americans. 

Six months later he again appeared at Baguio to ask the governor abouta _fiesta_ which he had just heard it was customary to celebrateon the 25th of December. He had been told that Americans were inthe habit of giving presents to each other at this time, and askedif this was the ease. Governor Pack said yes. Palasi then inquiredif the feast was a _good_ feast, and the custom a _good_ custom, and was assured that both of these things were true. He next askedif it would be a good feast for Igorots as well as for Americans, and receiving an affirmative reply from the unsuspecting governor, triumphantly declared that he was going to give Baron his besthorse. Under the circumstances the governor allowed him to do so. 

In connection with the Bontoc Hospital we use two men, one of whomtravels from settlement to settlement, relieving minor ailments onthe spot and sending to the hospital only those patients who needto go there, while the other stays at home and receives them. Fromtime to time these two doctors "change works. " Pages from their dailyjournals, written in the field, often read like romance. 

Were I a young man, and possessed of adequate knowledge of medicineand surgery, I would ask nothing better than to minister to the wantsof these people. One might not, and indeed would not, acquire greatwealth, but he would be rich in friends. Here lies a great field forpractical missionary work. 

In connection with the health work there have been many occurrenceswhich were both amusing and sad. At one time there was great excitementover a sacred spring which had appeared in Manila Bay off the districtof Tondo. It was duly blessed by Aglipay, the head of the so-calledAglipayano church. Coincidently with its discovery there was a sharplittle outbreak of Asiatic cholera. Investigation revealed the factthat the "spring" had its origin in a broken sewer pipe. We wereobliged to prevent the faithful from further partaking of its waters, and thus insuring themselves a speedy trip to the better world. 

At one time cases of cholera appeared scattered generally throughoutthe Mariquina valley and without apparent connection. For some days wewere unable to make a guess as to their origin. Then we heard that a"Queen" had arisen at the town of Taytay near the Laguna de Bay. Aninvestigation of the Queen and her activities resulted in ratherastonishing revelations. She was a very ordinary looking Tagálog girlwho had secured the body of an old bull-cart, stopped the cracks withclay, partially filled it with water and decaying vegetable matter, and at rather frequent intervals had bathed in the fermenting massthus concocted. In due time she announced herself a healer of allthe ills to which flesh is heir, and the sick flocked to her. Cholerawas then prevalent in some of the towns near Taytay, and there werepersons suffering from it among those seeking relief. Some of themwere directed to wash their hands in the extemporized tank, whileothers bathed their bodies in it. As a result it soon contained acholera culture of unprecedented richness. This was given to patientsapplying for treatment, and was bottled and sent to those who weretoo ill to come in person. Hence numerous scattering cases of cholerawhich did not bear any relationship to other known cases. 

It proved quite an undertaking to put the Queen of Taytay out ofbusiness. We first asked the local authorities to have her sent toManila, but the presidente and the police declined to act. We thenapplied for a warrant to the Filipino judge of the court of firstinstance having jurisdiction over Taytay, but that worthy officialfound it convenient to be suddenly called out of the province. Atlast we prevailed upon soldiers of the Philippine constabulary toarrest the queen and bring her to Manila. 

We had anticipated that she might prove insane, but she showed herselfto be a very keen-witted young woman. We employed her at the San LazaroHospital to look after cholera patients. The people of Taytay werenot satisfied, and a few days later a large delegation of them cameto Manila and demanded the Queen. I was at my wits' end to know whatto do, but old Spanish law can usually be relied upon in emergencies, and the attorney-general discovered a provision couched in very generalterms, which provided against disobedience to the authorities. It wasonly necessary for an "authority" to have read to an ordinary person astatement setting forth what that person must not do; then if the orderwas violated, such person could be made to suffer pains and penalties. 

I accordingly prepared a most impressive order prohibiting the Queenof Taytay from further engaging in the practice of medicine, had herfollowers drawn up in battalion formation, placed myself at the frontand centre, caused the Queen to be brought before me, and read her mycommunication, at the same time charging the good people of Taytaynot to tempt her again to try her hand at healing, for the reasonthat if they did she would surely get into serious trouble. Theymarched away with the Queen and I have not heard of her since. 

Hardly a year goes by that some similar miraculous healer does notset up in business, and the supply of dupes seems to be unending. 

While it is comparatively easy to combat disease in a place likeManila, what of the provinces, where in many cases there is not onephysician to two hundred thousand inhabitants?

To meet this difficulty we have an organization of district andmunicipal health officers. A district may include a single provinceor several provinces. A district health officer is invariably aphysician who has had reasonably thorough practical training in thework of public sanitation, usually at Manila. 

He is supposed to spend his time in sanitary work rather than intreating sick individuals, but it is, of course, impossible for himalways to refuse to treat such persons, and we encourage gratuitouswork for the poor when it can be carried on without interfering tooseriously with more important duties. 

Presidents of municipal boards of health may exercise jurisdiction overa single municipality or over several. They are supposed to maintaingood sanitary conditions in their respective towns, under the generalsupervision of district health officers, and to instruct their peoplein sanitary methods and their results, as well as to devote a certainamount of their time to the relief of the suffering poor. 

On the whole it must be admitted that while this system hasaccomplished much, it has fallen far short of accomplishing whatit should. 

Men like Dr. Arlington Pond of Cebú have wrought marvels, and haveconclusively demonstrated the fact that it is not the system thatis at fault. Of our thirteen district health officers, ten areFilipinos. They are, with few exceptions, letter-perfect. They knowwhat they ought to do, but as a rule lack the initiative and thecourage to do it. 

Recently after discovering exceptionally bad sanitary conditions inseveral towns of the province of Misamis, I demanded an explanationof the district health officer, an exceptionally well-educated andintelligent Filipino physician. I found, as I had anticipated, thatthe sanitary regulations of his towns left little to be desired, but that they were absolutely ignored. 

I asked him what sense there was in paying his salary if he failedto remedy such conditions as I had discovered. He replied that if hewere really going to compel people to clean up, it would be necessaryto begin with the provincial governor, whose premises were in a badstate. When I suggested that in my opinion the provincial governorwould be the best possible man to begin with, the doctor evidentlythought me crazy!

It is as yet impossible for the average intelligent Filipino tounderstand that the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak, should be treated alike. 

It often happens that a province asks for an American health officer, or a Filipino demands the services of an American physician. Myinvariable procedure in such cases has been to request that theapplication be made in writing. For some mysterious reason thepetitioners are seldom willing to go on record. 

A short time since we had a strong demand from Iloilo for an Americandistrict health officer. I made the usual suggestion and got a writtenrequest that there be sent to Iloilo a district health officer "afterthe style of the district health officer of Cebú. " If Dr. Pond'snationality may be considered a part of his style, then this was arequest for an American, otherwise not!

With rather shocking frequency, Filipinos who must be examined forleprosy or some other dangerous communicable disease strongly insistthat the examination be made by an American bacteriologist ratherthan by one of their own countrymen. 

In connection with recent election troubles two men were wrongfullydenounced as lepers. In several instances perfectly sound peoplehave been thrust among lepers who were being taken on board steamerfor transfer to Culion. This grievous wrong was committed by theirenemies under cover of darkness, and in the confusion which attendsthe embarking of a number of people in a heavy sea. The reason whythe services of Americans are often specially requested for diagnosticwork is not far to seek!

It is a significant fact that our greatest success in establishingsatisfactory provincial sanitary conditions has been achieved incertain of the "special government provinces, " where the people areunder the very direct control of American officials. 

There is not a regularly organized province in the Philippines inwhich the towns are as clean as are those of Mindoro, where, untilrecently, we have never had a resident district health officer. 

I believe that nowhere in the tropics can there be found nativetowns which are cleaner or more healthful than are those of Bukidnon, inhabited in some instances by people who have literally been broughtdown out of the tree-tops within the last two or three years. We havenever had a resident health officer in this subprovince. 

I mention these facts not as an argument against health officers, butas a proof of what can be done without them by intelligent Americansvested with proper authority. 

It has given me especial pleasure to see the fundamental change whichhas come about in public sentiment relative to medical, surgicaland sanitary work. At the outset sanitary inspectors and vaccinatorscarried on their work at serious risk of personal violence. Indeed, several of them were killed. Incredible tales were believed by thepopulace, with the result that cholera victims sometimes had to betaken to the hospital by force. In later years it has been by nomeans unusual for them to come in voluntarily and request treatment. 

General hospitals were in the old days regarded as places where peopleso unfortunate as to have no homes to die in might go to end theirdays. It was almost impossible to get any other class of personsinto them. 

Now we constantly turn away deserving patients from the PhilippineGeneral Hospital because of lack of room. The common people areflocking to it in rapidly increasing numbers. We even have "repeaters, "and persons who drop in just to get a comfortable bed and a bath whilewaiting for an examination which will inevitably show that there isnothing wrong with them. 

Our difficulties were increased at the outset by the fact that manyforeign medical men working in the Far East good-naturedly ridiculedour efforts to better conditions, claiming that in tropical colonies itwas customary to take only such steps as would safeguard the health ofEuropean residents, and that it was really best to let the masses liveas they would, since orientals were incapable of sanitary reform, andthe attempt to bring it about involved a waste of effort that mightbe more profitably directed elsewhere. Furthermore these men were, in their several countries, practising what they preached. 

It has been very interesting to note the reaction of American methodsupon those previously in vogue in neighbouring colonies. At firstour efforts to make Asiatics clean up, and to eliminate diseaseslike leprosy, cholera and plague, were viewed with mild amusement, not unmixed with contempt; but the results which we obtained soonaroused lively interest. 

Foreign governments began to send representatives to the annualmeetings of the "Philippine Island Medical Association, " [505] inorder to learn more of our methods. From these small beginnings sprang"The Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine, " the biennialmeetings of which bring together the most experienced, skilful andwidely known physicians and sanitarians in the East for an interchangeof views and experiences which is invaluable, and greatly facilitatesconcerted action between the various governments concerned in dealingwith what may be termed "international health problems. "

The first meeting of this Association was held at Manila, the secondat Hongkong. The third will take place at Saigon. 

The results of a rigid enforcement of the "Pure Food and Drugs Act"are worthy of more than passing notice. Such enforcement has beencomparatively easy as the officials concerned are not hamperedby politics. The Philippines were at one time a dumping-ground forproducts that could not be sold elsewhere, but it is now possible forFilipinos to obtain wholesome preserved foods and unadulterated drugs, except in very remote places where none of any sort are available. 

The cost of our medical and sanitary work has been comparativelysmall. The per capita rate of taxation here is lower than in anyother civilized country. What we have done has been accomplishedwithout spending vast sums of money or resorting to military measures. 

The results obtained are very largely due to the faithfulnessand efficiency of Dr. Victor G. Heiser, who was chief quarantineofficer of the Philippines when he succeeded Major E. C. Carter ascommissioner of public health on April 5, 1905, and was later madedirector of health when the original board of health was abolishedas an administrative entity. He has continued to hold the office ofchief quarantine officer, and thus has been in complete executivecontrol of the health situation for eight years. 

Through good report and ill, mostly ill, he has given unsparingly ofhis time, his skill and his wisdom, always treating the governmentmoney as if it were his own. 

His tenure of office has been long enough to enable him to inaugurateand carry out policies, and thus get results. 

Seldom, if ever, have health officials been more viciously andpersistently attacked than have Dr. Heiser and myself. The assaultson us have been the direct result of a firm stand for a new sanitaryorder of things, established in the interest of the whole body ofinhabitants of these islands, civilized and uncivilized. We bothwelcome the profound change in public sentiment, which has slowlybut surely come about as a result of practical accomplishment. 

Many very grave health problems still confront the insularadministration. Of these the most serious are the eradication oftuberculosis and the reduction of the very high infant mortality rate. 

It is believed that about one Filipino in five suffers fromtuberculosis in some form during his life and the work we have thusfar accomplished in many fields must be considered as in a way aclearing of the decks for action against this, the greatest enemy ofall. However, the Philippines do not differ essentially from othercivilized countries, in all of which tuberculosis is a very seriousfactor in the death rate. 

As regards infant mortality the situation is different. More thanfifty per cent of the babes die before completing their first year oflife. The causes which lead to this appalling result have been madethe subject of careful investigation which still continues. Popularinterest has been aroused, but it is undoubtedly true that manyyears of patient work will be necessary before anything approachingsatisfactory results can be brought about. 

The physical condition of the average Filipino is undoubtedlybad. Of one hundred seventy-eight university students recentlyexamined sixty-nine were found to be suffering from seriousorganic troubles. Unquestionably the great mass of the people areunderfed. This is largely due to the poor quality of the rice whichthey consume, and to the fact that rice forms too large a part oftheir diet. I am firmly convinced that much of the so-called lazinessof the Filipinos is the direct result of physical weakness due toimproper and insufficient food. 

Since the American occupation a large amount of time has beensuccessfully devoted to the working out of a good all-around diet madeup of local products the cost of which comes within the means of thepoor. The next thing will be to get them to adopt it, and there comesthe rub. Incalculable good would result, if we could only persuade thepeople of these islands to sleep with their windows open. Thousandsupon thousands of infant lives would be saved annually, if motherscould be persuaded not to give solid food to their little ones duringthe early months of their existence. 

In the educational campaign which we have thus far conducted with someconsiderable degree of success, two agencies have proved invaluable, namely the Catholic Church and the public schools. Again and again Ihave begged Apostolic Delegate Monsignor Agius and Archbishop Harty tobring to bear the influence of the Church in favour of simple sanitaryregulations, the general adoption of which was imperatively necessaryin combating some epidemic of disease. They have invariably given meinvaluable assistance. 

Through the public schools we reach more than half a million children, and they take the information which we convey to them home totheir parents. Simple rules for the prevention of cholera have beenuniversally taught in the schools. When the use of English has becomegeneralized the difficulty now encountered in reaching the commonpeople will largely disappear. The truth is that they are singularlytractable and docile when their reason can be effectively appealedto. The readiness with which they have submitted to the rigorousmeasures necessary for the elimination of leprosy is a lasting honourto them. 

Would the sanitary campaign so vitally important to the people ofthe Philippines be effectively continued if American authority werewithdrawn at this time? With regret I must answer this questionemphatically in the negative. We have succeeded in training a fewgood physicians and surgeons. We have thus far failed to trainreally efficient sanitary officers. What is lacking is not so muchknowledge as to what should be done as initiative and courage to doit. Until this condition changes radically for the better, Filipinoscannot safely be intrusted with the sanitary regeneration of theircountry. Under American control the population of the islands issteadily and rapidly increasing. It is my firm conviction that ifFilipinos were at this time placed in control of the health work, the population would steadily and rapidly decrease. 

The present attitude of the Filipino press toward sanitary work isboth interesting and important. I quote the following editorial fromthe March 27, 1913, issue of _El Ideal_, a paper generally believedto be controlled by Speaker Osmeña:--

"Some persons, who, because of being ignorant of many things, do notsympathize with the Filipino people, who are in the habit of frequentlythrowing up to them the violent opposition of our masses to strictsanitary measures in cases of epidemics, and the lively protests whichare provoked here on some occasions by other provisions tending toend some public calamity, thinking they see in this disposition ofmind an indication of our incapacity to govern ourselves.... 

"To be more expressive, we shall say that the sanitary agents andveterinarians of the government, swollen with power and overly zealousof their prestige, quickly become, when an occasion like those citedby us presents itself, cunning czars, whose sphere of influence is indirect ratio to the peaceful character and ignorance of the peopleintrusted to their care, and whose excesses and abuses recognizeno limits but the natural ones established by the greater or lesserhonour of those public servants, their greater or lesser cynicism, and their greater or lesser degree of temerity. 

"This, and nothing else, is the logical and natural explanation ofthe hostility of our people toward those measures of good governmentwhich are sincerely esteemed for what they are worth, but for whichthey have veritable terror because of the nameless abuses to whichthey give rise. 

"These comments are of palpitating current interest at this moment, when reports are made almost daily to the press and the properauthorities of misbehaviour and excesses befitting soulless peoplewho live without the law committed by persons who should be examplesof prudence, honesty and good manners, for it is in this concept thatthe people are compelled to furnish them their daily bread. "

It is deeply to be regretted that the public press of the islandshas not yet become sufficiently enlightened to join in the greatsanitary campaign which has already relieved an enormous amount ofhuman suffering and has greatly increased the expectancy of life ofthe people of the Philippines. 

The Philippine Assembly has repeatedly passed acts providing for thecreation of a sort of sanitary council of numerous members authorizedto pass on public health measures proposed by the director of healthand instructed to disapprove them if not in accordance with thebeliefs and customs of the Filipinos. 

In protecting the public health in the Philippine Islands emergenciesconstantly arise which must be instantly and effectively met. It wouldbe as logical to place a commanding general directing a battle underthe control of an advisory board as it would thus to tie the hands ofthe director of health, and it is difficult to see how any competentand self-respecting sanitarian could be willing to continue to holdthis position if so hampered. 

The Philippine Commission has heretofore invariably tabled theacts designed to accomplish this end, but that body has now been"Filipinized" and its future attitude on this very importantquestion is therefore in doubt. Hardly had the legislative sessionopened in October, 1913, when the assembly again passed the sameold bill. Should it become a law, there will be occasion to watch, with especial interest, the death rate of Manila and that of thearchipelago as a whole. 

CHAPTER XVII

Baguio and the Benguet Road

In June, 1892, when sitting in a native house on a hill overlookingNaujan Lake in Mindoro, and anxiously awaiting the boats which wereto make it possible for my party to return to the coast, I saw asmall flotilla approaching. 

To my surprise and regret I found that it was not coming for us, butbrought a number of Spanish officers who had heard that we had somemysterious procedure for killing the tamarau, an extraordinarily wildand vicious little buffalo peculiar to this island. They had come toget us to tell them how we did it, if possible, and if not to watchus and find out for themselves. 

We described to them our method, which was easily understood. Itconsisted in picking up a likely trail along some water course, following it until the tamarau was overtaken, and then shootinghim. This looked suspiciously simple to our Spanish friends before theyhad tried it, and they shook their heads. After trying it they becameconvinced that more than a few days of experience would be necessarybefore satisfactory results could be obtained. They profited littleby the best information we could give them, and by the services ofthe expert tracker whom we loaned to them. Meanwhile I obtained fromone of them, Señor Domingo Sanchez, information destined to becomeof great importance in the development of the Philippines. 

Señor Sanchez, who was an employee of the Spanish forestry bureau, told me that in the highlands of Northern Luzón at an elevationof about five thousand feet, there was a region of pines and oaksblessed with a perpetually temperate climate and even with occasionalfrosts. I confess that I did not believe all of his statements. Iwas then experienced in climbing Philippine mountains, and at fivethousand feet had invariably found a hopeless tangle of the rankesttropical vegetation, with humidity so high that trees were draped withferns, orchids, and thick moss, and dripping with moisture. However, I knew that the mere presence of pine and oak trees would mean theoccurrence of special bird species feeding upon their seeds, and sodetermined to investigate. 

A severe attack of typhoid fever necessitated my leaving the islandsbefore I could carry out this plan, but upon my return with the firstPhilippine Commission in 1899 I remembered Señor Sanchez's story. Inview of the probability that American occupation would continuefor a long period, the existence or non-existence near Manila of anextensive highland region with a temperate climate became a questionof great practical importance. I therefore caused search to be madein the Spanish archives to see what, if any, reliable information wasavailable, and to my great satisfaction unearthed a detailed reportmade by a committee of three distinguished and competent Spanishofficers who had spent some weeks at Baguio in the _comandancia_ ofBenguet, during which period they had made six temperature observationsdaily, had tramped over the neighbouring country very thoroughly, had located a number of springs of potable water and determined theirapproximate flow, and in short had gathered a large series of veryvaluable data which more than bore out the statements of Señor Sanchez. 

I found, furthermore, that Spanish engineers had made a survey fora carriage road into this country, and had prepared a profile of itwith estimates of the amount and cost of the necessary excavationand other work. 

While in Washington during the winter of 1899-1900, I broughtthis matter to the attention of Secretary Root. Just as the secondPhilippine Commission was filing out of his office, after receivingits instructions, he called out to us directing that we look intothat Benguet matter, and if the facts proved to be as stated open upthe country. 

Mindful of these instructions the commission delegated General LukeE. Wright and myself to visit Benguet and familiarize ourselves withconditions by investigation on the ground. General MacArthur wasdubious when we expressed a desire to carry out the instructions ofthe secretary of war. He told us that the country was very dangerous, doubtless confusing it with Bangued, the capital of Abra, near whichthere was at that time a strong and active Insurgent force. 

We insisted on going, so he said that he would send a troop ofcavalry with us, and he kept his word. During the last week of Julywe finally sailed from Manila on a naval vessel for San Fernando inthe province of Union. From this place we expected to go by road asfar as Naguilian, in the same province, and thence on horseback toTrinidad and Baguio, in Benguet. 

In order to expedite investigations as much as possible we tookwith us Mr. Horace L. Higgins, president of the Manila and DagupanRailway Company, who was an engineer of experience, to report onthe practicability of constructing a railway to Baguio. We also tookMajor L. M. Maus, of the army medical corps, and Dr. Frank S. Bourns, who then held the volunteer rank of major in the same corps, to reporton the possibilities of the place as a health resort. Two young navalofficers went along just for the trip. 

Major Maus accompanied us only because requested to do so. Takingthe latitude and altitude as a basis for his calculations, he hadalready determined with a lead pencil and piece of paper just whatthe climate of Baguio must be, and had demonstrated to his owncomplete satisfaction that the statements of the members of theSpanish committee above referred to were necessarily false. 

His first rude shock came when we were met at San Fernando by a youngaide to Colonel [506] Duval, who was in command of the local garrisonat that place. This lieutenant told us that some negro soldiers werestationed at Trinidad and were being kept supplied by an army packtrain. I asked him how they were getting on. He said very well, except that they could not keep warm. They had called for all thespare blankets available, but still complained of the cold!

The trail proved to be in execrable condition. No repair work had beendone on it since 1896, and its constant use during the then-existingrainy season by a pack train had completed its destruction. Much ofthe way it was a mere V in the earth, with deep mud at the bottom. 

We left Naguilian early in the morning and stopped for lunch ata little place properly called Sablán, but unofficially known as"The Bells. " Aguinaldo had thought at one time of establishing hisheadquarters in Benguet and had planned to have a gun foundry atSablán. His troops accordingly stole most of the church bells inthe neighbouring lowland towns, meaning to use them for gun metal, and compelled the unfortunate Benguet Igorots to carry them up thesteep trail. Boiler pipes, which had been used in lieu of carryingpoles, had in several instances been badly bent out of shape. Therewas even an old vertical boiler which had been lugged up entire forsome unknown reason. 

The labour involved must have been enormous, and we were assuredthat when the Igorot bearers, prostrated with fatigue, had refusedto continue their titanic task without rest, they had been drivento it at the muzzles of Insurgent rifles, and that some of them hadbeen shot as a lesson to the others. At all events, the boiler andthe bells were there, and there the boiler and the larger bells haveremained ever since!

It was still steaming hot at Sablán, and the whole countrysidewas buried in the densest tropical vegetation. Major Maus wastriumphant. Things were working out just as he had predicted. However, as we were already halfway up, we thought that we might as wellcontinue the journey. I had expected to find pines and oaks, buthad anticipated that they would grow amidst a dense tangle of damptropical vegetation. 

We were all literally dumfounded when within the space of a hundredyards we suddenly left the tropics behind us and came out into awonderful region of pine parks. Trees stood on the rounded knolls atcomparatively wide intervals, and there were scores of places where, in order to have a beautiful house lot, one needed only to constructdriveways and go to work with a lawn-mower. At the same moment, a delightful cold breeze swept down from the heights above us. 

Just at sunset we experienced a second surprise, coming out on theknife-sharp crest of a ridge, and seeing spread before us the TrinidadValley, which is shaped like a huge wash-basin. Its floor was vividlygreen with growing rice, Igorot houses were dotted here and there overits surface, and the whole peaceful, beautiful scene was illuminatedby the rays of the setting sun. The air had been washed clean bythe heavy rain which had poured down on us throughout the afternoon, and the sight was one never to be forgotten. 

Just at dusk we reached the little settlement of Trinidad, which hadbeen the capital of the Spanish _comandancia_ of Benguet, findingthat its inhabitants were in part Ilocanos and in part Igorots. 

Here we were hospitably entertained by the officers of the militarypost. It was so cold that one's breath showed. Major Maus improvedthe opportunity to indulge in a severe chill. Finding him buriedunder blankets, we asked his views as to the Benguet climate. Theywere radical! It is only fair to the Major to say that the reportwhich he ultimately made set forth the facts fully and fairly. Itdid not suit General MacArthur. Years afterward, when discussing theclimate of Benguet with Surgeon-General Sternberg, I referred to thisreport and found to my amazement that he had never seen it. He causedan investigation to be made, and it was at last resurrected from adusty pigeonhole. 

On our arrival at Trinidad we received a letter from Mr. Otto Scheerer, the one white resident of Benguet, inviting us to make our headquartersat his house when we visited Baguio. Bright and early the next morningMr. Scheerer himself appeared on the scene and guided us to his home, where he entertained us most hospitably during our entire stay. Thetrip from Trinidad, a distance of four miles, was made over a wretchedpony trail. 

We found conditions exactly as described in the Spanish report. Thecountry was gently rolling, its elevation ranging from forty-fivehundred to fifty-two hundred feet. The hills were covered with short, thick grass, and with magnificent pine trees, which for the mostpart grew at considerable distance from each other, while along thestreams there were wonderful tree ferns and luxuriant tangles ofbeautiful tropical vegetation. It took us but a short time to decidethat here was an ideal site for a future city, if water could befound in sufficient quantity. 

We revisited each of the several springs discovered and describedby the Spanish committee, but decided that they would be inadequateto supply a town of any great size. Mr. Scheerer now came to thefront and guided us to the very thing that we were looking for, but had hardly dared hope to find; namely, a magnificent spring ofcrystal-clear water. At that time it was flowing nearly a milliongallons per day. It burst forth from a hillside in such a manner asto make its protection from surface drainage easy, and we decidedthat there was nothing lacking to make Baguio an admirable site forthe future summer capital and health resort of the Philippines. 

It was obvious that the construction of a highway from San Fernando, in Union, to Baguio would involve considerable expense, and we askedMr. Scheerer about other possible lines of communication. A studyof the Spanish maps had led us to consider two: one up the valley ofthe Agno River, and the other up that of the Bued River. The latterroute had the great advantage of affording direct communication withthe end of the railway line at Dagupan. 

Mr. Scheerer took us to a point which commanded a view for somedistance down the Bued River valley, and conditions looked ratherfavourable. Mr. Higgins undertook to make a trip down this valley tothe plains of Pangasinán, reporting to us on his arrival at Manila, so we returned to that place and awaited advices from him. He wasfurnished with a guard of soldiers from Trinidad, and attempted togo down the river bed, but encountered unexpected difficulties, andhis progress was finally checked by a box cañon from which he escapedwith difficulty, spending a night without food or water on a chillymountain top known as "Thumb Peak. " The following morning he managedto cross to a high mountain called Santo Tomás, whence he returnedto Baguio. He was, however, of the opinion that the trip down thecañon could be made without special difficulty by a party suitablyprovided with food and tentage. 

Convinced by our report that active measures should be taken toestablish communication with this wonderful region, the commission, on September 12, 1900, appropriated $5000 Mexican, "for the purposeof making a survey to ascertain the most advantageous route fora railway into the mountains of Benguet, Island of Luzon, and theprobable cost thereof. "

Captain Charles W. Meade, then serving as city engineer of Manila, was selected to make the survey. There was every theoretical reason tobelieve him competent, and we did not question either his integrityor his ability. After being absent from Manila for some time, hereported in favour of the Bued River valley route, saying that itwas entirely feasible to build a railway along it. 

He suggested that, as the construction of a wagon road would benecessary in building the railroad, we might as well undertake thatfirst, and so be able to go to Baguio in wheeled vehicles before therailroad was completed. He asked for $75, 000 United States currency, with which to build this road, stating that he expected to be ableto do it for $65, 000, but would like $10, 000 as a margin of safety. 

On December 21, 1901, the commission passed an act authorizing theconstruction of a highway from Pozorubio, in Pangasinán, to Baguio, "the same to be built under the general supervision of the militarygovernor and the immediate direction of Captain Charles W. Meade, Thirty-sixth Infantry, United States Volunteers, who has been detailedby the military governor for that purpose, along the general lineof survey recently made by Captain Meade for a railway between saidtowns. " The $75, 000 asked for were appropriated by this act. 

Work began promptly at both ends of the line. In June, 1901, I set out on my first trip through the wild man's territory innorthern Luzón. Incidentally, and for my personal satisfaction only, I inspected the work on the road. We had been rather disappointed byCaptain Meade's failure to make more rapid progress. At the lower endI found that delay was being caused by a huge cliff necessitating avery heavy rock cut. I was assured by Captain Meade that from thispoint on the line ran through dirt most of the way, so that the roadcould be completed very rapidly. This statement proved to be grosslyin error. It took years of hard work to open up the road. 

Its cost when finally ready for traffic was $1, 961, 847. 05. Its lengthwas forty-five kilometers eight hundred ninety-one meters, [507] ofwhich thirty-four kilometers were in non-Christian territory. Someten kilometers of the remainder have since been incorporated in thefirst-class road system of the province of Pangasinán, as this partis chiefly used by the people of that province in shipping theiragricultural products to Benguet, and in maintaining communicationbetween their towns. 

The additional cost of the road to date [508] since it was firstopened is $792, 434, making its total cost to date $2, 754, 281. 05. Thisincludes not only the actual cost of maintenance, but very extensiveimprovements, such as the metalling of the road from the so-calledzigzag to Baguio, the construction of five steel bridges, and thereplacing of all the original bridges on the road and of all theoriginal culverts except those made of concrete or masonry. 

On my arrival in Benguet in 1901, I found that good progress had beenmade on the upper end of the road, which had penetrated for a shortdistance into the cañon proper without encountering any considerableobstacles. 

On October 15, 1901, the commission stated in its annual report to thesecretary of war, "He [509] has been much delayed by the difficulty ofprocuring the labour necessary for its early completion, and severalmonths will yet elapse before it is finished!" They did!

On August 20, 1901, Captain Meade was relieved, and Mr. N. M. Holmeswas made engineer of the road. 

On February 3, 1902, a little sanitarium was opened in a small nativehouse at Baguio. During the following July I was sent to it as apatient, and while in Benguet again inspected the road which had beencontinued high up on the cañon wall to a point where, on a very steepmountain side, a peculiar rock formation had been encountered at thevery grass roots. This rock disintegrated rapidly under the actionof the sun when exposed to it. Comparatively solid in the morning, it would crack to pieces and slide down the mountain side beforenight. A sixty-foot cut had already been made into the precipitousmountain side, and the result was an unstable road-bed, hardly fourfeet in width, which threatened to go out at any moment. 

My trip to Baguio promptly relieved a severe attack of acute intestinaltrouble from which I had been suffering, and when Governor Taft fellill the following year with a similar ailment, and his physiciansrecommended his return to the United States, I did my best to persuadehim to try Baguio instead. He decided to do so. 

Five rough cottages had meanwhile been constructed for the use ofthe commissioners, the lumber for them being sawed by hand on theground. Boards had been nailed to frames as rapidly as they fellfrom the logs, and had shrunk to such an extent that a reasonablyexpert marksman might almost have thrown a cat by the tail throughany one of the houses. At night they looked like the old-fashionedperforated tin lanterns, leaking light in a thousand places. Thesewere the luxurious homes provided for the high officials of thegovernment of which so much has been said!

We paid for them an annual rental amounting to ten per cent of theircost, which had of course been excessively high on account of thenecessity of packing everything used in them, except the lumber, up the Naguilian trail. 

However, we were in no frame of mind to be critical. We had put inthree years of killing hard work, labouring seven days in the week, and keeping hours such as to arouse a feeling little short of horroramong old British and other foreign residents. We were all completelyexhausted, and Mr. Taft was ill. For my part, I would gladly have paidalmost any sum for a tent under the pine trees and the privilege ofoccupying it for a few weeks. 

On the trip up Mr. Taft had ridden a magnificent saddle horse whichhad been given to him by General Chaffee. At the time he left, Manilahad been burning hot. When he was at last seated on the porch of thelittle house which was to be his home for weeks, with a cool breezesighing through the needles of a spreading pine tree close at hand, his satisfaction knew no bounds. Already his magnificent constitutionhad begun to respond to the stimulation of the wonderful mountain air, and filled with enthusiasm he summoned a stenographer and dictatedthe following cablegram to the secretary of war:--

"April 15, 1903. 

"_Secwar_, "_Washington_. 

"Stood trip well, rode horseback 25 miles to 5000 feet altitude. Hopeamoebic dysentery cured. Great province this, only 150 miles fromManila with air as bracing as Adirondacks or Murray Bay. Only pinesand grass lands. Temperature this hottest month in the Philippinesin my cottage porch at three in the afternoon 68. Fires are necessarynight and morning. 

"_Taft_. "

As quick as the wires could bring it, he received the following reply:

"_Washington_, D. C. , April 16, 1903. 

"_Taft_, "_Manila_. 

"Referring to telegram from your office of 15th inst. , how is horse?

"_Root_. "

When he read it his shouts of laughter, rolling over the hills ofBaguio, must have been audible half a mile away!

Mr. Taft's sojourn in the hills put him again in fine condition andmade it possible for him to return to Manila and resume the heavyburden of work which there awaited him. The other members of thecommission also greatly benefited by their stay in the hills. 

While there we heard disquieting rumours as to the practicabilityof completing the road. There was a difference of opinion betweenthe engineer in charge and one of his immediate subordinates as tothe route which should be followed. The consulting engineer of thecommission was accordingly requested to make a survey to determine apracticable route for the unfinished portion of the road and estimatethe cost of completing it. In due time he advised us that it waspracticable to complete it, but that the cost would be at least$1, 000, 000. Warned by our experience with Meade, we wished additionalexpert advice, so summoned to Baguio Colonel L. W. V. Kennon, a manof great energy and executive ability, who had had large experiencein engineering work in mountainous country, and requested him to godown the Bued River valley and report on the progress of the work, and the practicability of completing the road on the route which hadbeen determined upon. 

Being the youngest and most active member of the commission, I wasdetailed to accompany him. On this trip I became convinced thatall of the engineers interested, except the consulting engineer, had grossly understated the difficulties which must be overcomebefore the road could be completed. Colonel Kennon decided that itwas entirely feasible to build the road, but that the comparativelyshort stretch already completed from Baguio into the upper end ofthe cañon must be abandoned and a new line adopted. Furthermore, he gave us some very definite and extremely unpleasant informationas to the probable cost of completing the work, his statements onthis subject confirming those of the consulting engineer. 

The commission was thus put face to face with the hard facts but didnot flinch. On the contrary, it passed the following resolution onJune 1, 1903:--

"On Motion, _Resolved_, That it be declared the policy of theCommission to make the town of Baguio, in the Province of Benguet, thesummer capital of the Archipelago and to construct suitable buildings, to secure suitable transportation, to secure proper water supply, and to make residence in Baguio possible for all of the officers andemployees of the Insular Government for four months during the year, that in pursuance of this purpose the Secretary of the Interior, the Consulting Engineer to the Commission, the Chief of the Bureauof Architecture, and Major [510] L. W. V. Kennon, United States Army, whom it is the intention of the Commission to put in actual charge ofthe improvements in Benguet Province, including the construction ofthe Benguet Road, the erection of the buildings and the constructionof a wagon road from Naguilian, be appointed a Committee to reportplans and estimates to the Commission for the proposed improvementsin the Province of Benguet and to submit same to the Commission foraction and necessary appropriation, and

"_Be it further resolved_, That steps should be immediately takenlooking to the increase of the capacity of the Sanitarium by at leasttwenty rooms, to the construction of seven more cottages on the groundsof the Sanitarium, to the construction of a Governor's residence on thesite overlooking the big spring which is the source of the Bued Riverimmediately south of the Sanitarium proper, to the construction of anAdministration building sufficient for the Commission, the Commission'sstaff and the Executive Bureau, of at least twenty-five rooms, and tothe making of a plan for a town site for the municipality of Baguio;but that the details of construction and improvements, with suchvariations from the indicated plan as may seem wise, shall be leftto the committee appointed under the previous resolution. "

In his annual report dated November 15, 1903, Governor Taft said:--

"In connection with the subject of health, reference should bemade to the province of Benguet and to Baguio, the capital of thatprovince. The secretary of commerce and police will refer to thework now being done in the construction of the Benguet road fromPozorrubio, through Twin Peaks, to Baguio. There have been seriousengineering mistakes made in the road, and it is proving to be muchmore costly than was expected; but when completed its importance inthe development of these islands can hardly be overestimated. Oneof the things essential to progress in the islands is the comingof more Americans and Europeans who shall make this their businesshome. If there can be brought within twelve hours' travel of Manilaa place with a climate not unlike that of the Adirondacks, or ofWyoming in summer, it will add greatly to the possibility of livingin Manila for ten months of the year without risk. It will take awaythe necessity for long vacations spent in America; will reduce thenumber who go invalided home, and will be a saving to the insulargovernment of many thousands of dollars a year. It will lengthen theperiod during which the American soldiers who are stationed here mayremain without injury to their health and will thus reduce largely theexpense of transportation of troops between the islands and the UnitedStates. More than this, Filipinos of the wealthier class frequentlyvisit Japan or China for the purpose of recuperating. People ofthis class are much interested in the establishment of Baguio as asummer capital, and when the road is completed a town will spring up, made up of comfortable residences, of a fine, extensive army post, and sanitariums for the relief of persons suffering from diseasesprevalent in the lowlands. It is the hope of the government thatthe Roman Catholic Church will send American priests as it has sentAmerican bishops to the islands, to assist in the moral elevationof the people. The fear of the effect of the climate has kept manyfrom coming. The Roman Catholic Church authorities have announcedtheir intention of erecting rest houses at Baguio for the purpose ofthe recuperation of their ministers and agents. The Methodists andEpiscopalians have already secured building lots in Baguio for thispurpose. It is the settled purpose of the Commission to see thisimprovement through, no matter what the cost, because eventuallythe expenditures must redound to the benefit of the government andpeople of the islands. We have already stated, in the report on thepublic land act, that it is proposed, under that act, which allows theorganizing of town sites, to sell the public land in suitable lotsat auction so that every one interested shall have the opportunityto obtain a good lot upon which to build a suitable house. " [511]

Mr. Taft would be delighted could he see to-day how completely hisanticipations have been fulfilled. 

Colonel Kennon was put in charge of construction work, and things beganto move. They kept moving until the road was finished. From this timeon we knew that the expense involved would be out of all proportionto the original estimate, but we were determined to push the workthrough, having reached the decision that it was worth while to openup communication with Baguio at any cost within reason, because of itsfuture certain value to the people of the islands as a health resort. 

On April 1, 1904, I rode over the road in a vehicle nearly to CampFour, and came the rest of the way to Baguio on horseback over a newtrail which zigzagged up a mountain side near Camp Four and followedthe crest of the range from there in. A little later the Commissioncame by the same route, and spent the hot season in the cool Benguethills. 

On January 29, 1905, Colonel Kennon drove into Baguio in the firstwagon to arrive there over the Benguet Road, which was opened forregular service on March 27th of the same year. The cost of the roadon November 1, 1905, had, as previously stated, been $1, 966, 847. 05, and the cost of the heavy work in the cañon had been approximately$75, 000 per mile, which is not excessive when compared with the costof similar work in the United States, especially as this sum includedmaintenance of the portions constructed during previous years. 

The fact that a certain amount of congressional relief funds wasexpended on the construction of this road has been made the subjectof very unjust criticism. A large number of poor Filipinos, who werein dire straits, were thus given an opportunity for remunerativeemployment, and the distribution of a portion of the congressionalrelief fund in this way was in entire harmony with the fixed policyof the commission to avoid pauperizing the people by giving moneyor food outright to able-bodied persons, and to afford them reliefby furnishing them opportunity to work for a good wage. A furtherreason why the expenditure of money from this fund on the BenguetRoad was appropriate is found in the fact that the region opened upis destined to play a very important part in the cure of tuberculosis, which is the principal cause of death among the people of the lowlands, but is practically unknown among the Igorots of the hills. 

During the earlier years after the road was open owners of bull cartsin Pangasinán made large sums transporting freight over it. This isnot the case at the present time, as the growing volume of freightrequiring to be moved led to the blocking of the road with bull cartsand necessitated the installation of an automobile truck line so thatit might be more expeditiously handled. 

In December, 1904, the great landscape architect, Mr. D. H. Burnham, visited Baguio, and made a plan for its future development. He wasenthusiastic over its possibilities, and gave his services free ofcharge. His plan is being closely adhered to, and although funds arenot now available for going far toward carrying it out, we have atleast avoided anything which would interfere with it. 

The next important event in the history of Baguio was the first saleof residence and building lots, which took place on May 28, 1906, and was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the PublicLand Act relative to town sites. 

Although a howling typhoon was sweeping Benguet at the time, 91residence lots and 15 business lots were disposed of at this firstsale, and at a subsequent one held in Manila a few weeks later allthe remaining lots then surveyed were sold. 

The town site includes two hundred sixteen square miles, and new lotsare surveyed as required. All sums derived from the sale of lots areused for the improvement of the town site, and thus Baguio is madeto help build itself. 

In the spring of 1900 the Baguio Country Club was organized. Becauseof the extraordinary false statements made concerning it by certainunscrupulous politicians, I give its history somewhat fully. Itspurpose was to afford a meeting place for the people of the townand to give them an opportunity for outdoor sports. It purchased ahundred acres of land on which a low assessment had been placed inview of the semipublic purpose which it was to serve. 

At the outset the "club house" was a rude, grass-roofed shed made ofpine slabs. Its doors and windows were mere openings which could not beclosed. It was erected in about a week. Three holes of a golf courseand a croquet ground had been prepared. These decidedly primitiveclub facilities nevertheless served to bring the people of Baguiotogether and give them an opportunity for a good time out of doors. 

In February, 1907, a Country Club Corporation was organizedwith a capital stock of $5000, of which $3000 have thus far beensubscribed. The shares cost $50. No single subscriber owns more thanthree, with the sole exception of Mr. Forbes, who took ten to helpthe club get started. Ownership of stock brings no emoluments, but, on the contrary, indirectly involves expense which the present ownershave been willing to bear for the public good. 

From these small beginnings the Baguio country club has grown intoan important institution. As funds became available from the saleof stock, the payment of dues and tile generous donations of afew members, an excellent nine-hole golf course was completed, andtennis courts and facilities for trap-shooting were installed. InMarch and April, 1908, a modest club house was built at a cost ofsome $5000. It has two small locker rooms, a large living room, a tiny office, a little bath, a kitchen, and nine single sleepingrooms. Three very small cottages, costing $375 each, were erectedon the club grounds for the use of the members. Five larger cottageshave since been constructed. 

Any person of good character is eligible to membership. The entrancefee is $25, but officers of the army, navy and marine corps stationedat Baguio are admitted without the payment of this fee, and personstemporarily there may secure the privileges of the club by paying atthe rate of $5 per month. The annual dues are $20. The families ofmembers are entitled to the privileges of the club. Among its membersare the highest officials of the insular government and teachers, clerks, stenographers and other employees drawing small salaries, as well as numerous permanent residents of Baguio. 

It knows no race or creed, and Filipinos take advantage of itsprivileges quite as freely as do Americans. Representatives ofevery nationality in the islands may be found on its golf course ona pleasant afternoon. It is the common meeting place of Baguio, andhardly a day passes without the giving of some pleasant luncheon ordinner in its little living room or in the outdoor space covered byan overhanging roof at its eastern end. No more democratic institutionever existed. 

Congressman Jones, in his attacks on the Philippine administration, isfond of stating that "there is a club for officials at Baguio. " Thestatement is true, but reminds one of that other statement of aship's first mate who came on board intoxicated just before the vesselsailed. The following morning, happening to look at the ship's log forthe previous day, he saw the entry "The mate drunk to-day. " It was hisfirst offence, and he begged the captain to erase this record, but thecaptain said "It is true, is it not?" and insisted that it must stand. 

A little later the captain was taken ill. Upon resumption of duty hefound an entry in the log reading: "The captain sober to-day. " Whenhe furiously insisted that it be erased, the mate said "It is true, isit not?" Now, it is true that there is a club for government officersat Baguio, but in making this statement Mr. Jones and his ilk haveneglected to say that there is also at Baguio a club for employees; aclub for private citizens; a club for Americans; a club for Filipinos;a club for foreign consuls and other foreign residents of the islands;a club for business men; a club for clerks; and that all of theseinstitutions are one and the same, namely, the Baguio Country Club, which is now strictly self-supporting and meets its obligations fromthe funds derived from the dues of its members. These dues are absurdlylow in view of the privileges which it affords. 

Although Mr. Forbes does not like to have it known, I cannot refrainfrom stating that the club has not always been self-supporting, andthat he has repeatedly made up deficits from his private funds. Thecost involved in getting the golf course into shape was out of allproportion to the resources of the organization. Sufficient fundswere not available to pay for the club house and cottages when theywere constructed, and had it not been for the generosity of Mr. Forbesthe club would not exist to-day in anything like its present form. 

The polo field at Baguio has been referred to as another evidence ofextravagant governmental expenditure. It is true enough that it wasin the first instance an expensive luxury, as an immense amount ofearthwork had to be done in order to make a level piece of ground ofsufficient size. The field is administered by the Country Club, and isopen to the use of the public for any form of amusement which will notinterfere with its use for polo. The detractors of the government haveneglected to mention that the cost of its construction and maintenancehave been met from the private funds of Mr. Forbes. 

Returning now to the story of the growth of Baguio, the nextstep forward was the construction of an official residence for thegovernor-general, for which $15, 000 were appropriated. Mr. Forbes hadnot the slightest personal interest in this appropriation. When itwas made he had no knowledge of the fact that he was later to becomegovernor-general, and his private Baguio residence was decidedly morecomfortable and commodious than this official one. His subsequentoccupancy of the latter building involved a real personal sacrifice. 

In 1908 a modern hospital and the governor-general's residence werecompleted. No other government official is furnished a free house. Allhave to rent government cottages or stay at hotels, unless they chooseto build for themselves. The policy of giving the governor-generalan official residence in Baguio is in accord with that which giveshim one at Manila. 

In April, 1908, there was opened a "Teachers' Camp, " to which cameAmerican school teachers from all over the islands. They were housedin a hundred and fifty tents, which were set up under the shade of thepine trees. Larger tents served as kitchen, dining room, storehouseand recitation rooms, while a structure of bamboo and nipa palm, erected at a total cost of $150, was utilized for general assemblypurposes. Four talented lecturers were employed to instruct andentertain the teachers. At one time there were a hundred and ninetypersons in the camp. 

The credit for initiating this very important move is due chiefly toWilliam F. Pack, at that time governor of the province of Benguet, whostrongly advocated bringing the teachers to Baguio, and did everythingin his power to make the first assembly the great success which it was. 

It has now become a fixed institution, and has accomplisheduntold good. Americans who spend too many years in out-of-the-waymunicipalities of the Philippines without coming in contact with theirkind are apt to lose their sense of perspective, and there is dangerthat they will grow careless, or even slovenly, in their habits. Itis of the utmost benefit for school teachers to get together once ayear, learn of each other's failures and successes, and profit by eachother's experiences, forget their troubles while engaging in healthfulathletic sports, listen to inspiring and instructive discourses, and above all else benefit by open-air life in a temperate region. 

The Teachers' Camp is now a beautiful and attractive place. A finesystem of walks and drives make every part of it readily accessible. Ithas an excellent athletic field. The teachers live in tents, butgood permanent buildings have been provided in which are located themess, a social hall, recitation rooms, etc. , and several comfortablecottages have been constructed for the use of visiting lecturersand others. An outdoor amphitheatre which seats a thousand personshas been built at small expense by taking advantage of peculiarlyfavorable natural conditions. Filipino teachers share the pleasuresand benefits of the camp with their American associates, and the"assembly" certainly does great good. 

During the hot season of 1908 the Bureau of Lands transferred a numberof its employees to Baguio, quartering them in tents. This was donein order to ascertain the practical effect of sending American andFilipino employees to this mountain resort. The conclusion was reachedthat the small additional expense involved was more than justifiedby the larger quantity and higher quality of the work performed as aresult of the greatly improved physical condition of the workers. EveryFilipino sent to Baguio gained in weight, with the single exceptionof a messenger who had to run his legs off! Other bureaus subsequentlyfollowed the example of the Bureau of Lands, with similar results. 

During the 1909 season, the railroad having reached Camp One, fivelarge Stanley steam automobiles were operated by the government intransporting passengers from this place to Baguio, and more than twothousand persons were thus moved over the road. 

Meanwhile, the unexpectedly heavy expense involved in completing theroad had been made the subject of severe criticism by the public pressof Manila. Most of the critics were entirely honest, having no ideaof the character of the country opened up, or of the importance ofmaking it readily accessible. 

Just at the time when the commission should have crowded its programmethrough to conclusion, it faltered. The only government constructionwork performed at the summer capital that year, in addition to whathas been mentioned, was the erection of a small office building and ofa barrack building for labourers, the enlarging of five governmentcottages, the addition of out-buildings, and the enlarging of abuilding which served as a combination sanatorium and hotel. 

This policy of inaction was a mistaken one. It made the Benguet Roadseem like the city avenue which ran into a street, the street intoa lane, the lane into a cow path, the cow path into a squirrel trackand the squirrel track up a tree, for while one could get to Baguio, there was very little there after one arrived. The accommodationsat the sanatorium were strictly limited, and there was some apparentjustification for the charge freely made that the Philippine Commissionhad voted to spend very large sums of money to open up a health resortfrom which only its members and its staff derived benefit. 

The government had at the outset been obliged to construct itsbuildings on a piece of private land purchased from Mr. Otto Scheerer, as prior to the passage of the Public Land Act and its approval by thePresident and Congress, building on public land was impossible. Now, however, a town site had been surveyed, and plans for the futuredevelopment of Baguio had been made by one of the world's mostcompetent experts. The time had arrived for action. Mr. Forbes, thensecretary of commerce and police, argued vigorously for the carryingout of the original plan of the commission by the construction ofadequate public buildings. To help the development of the place, he purchased two adjacent building lots and on the tract of land sosecured built a handsome and expensive home, where he subsequentlyentertained not only his personal friends, but guests of thegovernment, as well as various persons who had no other claim on himthan the fact that they were officers or employees of the governmentwho were in need of a change of climate and could ill afford to seek itat their own expense. Among his house guests were General Aguinaldo, Speaker Osmeña and many other Filipinos. It was Mr. Forbes's idea, and mine as well, that members of the commission ought to set theexample by building at Baguio. I followed his example to the extentof buying a lot and constructing on it a simple and inexpensive house, thus obtaining the first and only home that I have ever owned. 

Ultimately Mr. Forbes formulated a plan for the construction of a groupof government buildings, a mess hall and a large number of small andinexpensive cottages for rental to government officers and employeesso that the executive offices of the government might be transferredto Baguio during the heated term and it might become the true summercapital of the Philippines. This plan was adopted in substance, andit was decided to transfer the bureaus of the government to Baguiofor the coming hot season, so far as practicable. 

Funds were appropriated for the carrying out of Mr. Forbes's plan, but before the construction work had fairly begun there occurred, on October 17, 1909, a destructive typhoon. Eighteen inches of rainfell in nine hours, and twenty-six inches in twenty-four hours. TheBued River quickly rose fifty feet, carrying away trees and rockswhich obstructed its course, and seriously injuring the road formiles. Four of the largest bridges were swept away and the work ofconstructing government buildings, which was just about to begin, was greatly retarded. It was not thought possible to transfer thebureaus of the government to Baguio for the coming hot season asplanned. Indeed, there were not lacking those who insisted that noone would be able to get there. Mr. Haubé, the energetic and capableyoung engineer in charge, had the road open on the twentieth day ofDecember, and the projected buildings ready for occupancy in February, a noteworthy and highly creditable achievement. 

It was then thought that the storm which had done such serious damageto the road was of unprecedented violence, but there was worse tocome. On July 14 and 15, 1911, a terrific typhoon swept across northernLuzón, bringing down one of the world's record rainfalls. Betweennoon of the 14th and noon of the 15th, forty-five and ninety-ninehundredths inches of rain fell at Baguio. A mountain forming a partof the wall of the Bued cañon split from the top and the detachedportion toppled over into the river, damming it to a depth of abouta hundred and fifty feet at a time when it was carrying an enormousvolume of water. When this dam burst, an avalanche of earth and rock, swept onward by a huge wave, rushed down the cañon, leaving completedestruction in its wake. Every bridge in its course was carried away, and the road was left in such condition that it would have cost$300, 000 to open it for traffic. Then Providence, having apparentlydone its worst, relented and sent another typhoon which washed awaymost of the débris left by the first one, uncovering the road-bedand making it possible to reopen communication for $50, 000. 

The cost of maintaining the Benguet Road has provedexcessive. Mountains tower above it on both sides to a height of fourto seven thousand feet and the drainage basin which finds its outletdown the narrow gorge through which the road runs is enormous. Evenso, under ordinary climatic conditions its maintenance does not offervery exceptional difficulties, as much of it is blasted out of rock;but during extraordinarily heavy storms the danger of destruction byoverwhelming floods is great. 

While a century may pass before there is another storm like the onewhich brought down the terrific slide above described, there may beone at any time, and when the railroad has once reached Baguio, it ishardly probable that such extensive repairs as were necessary after thelast destructive typhoon will ever again be made, especially as thehorse trail built on a carriage road grade from Baguio to Naguilianin the lowlands has been widened little by little, until it is nowsafe for small automobiles. The maintenance of the bridges alone, on the Benguet Road, is a very formidable item, while there is onlyone short bridge on the Naguilian Road before the province of Unionis reached. As it runs on or near the crests of ridges all the way, there are no extensive watersheds above it, and it is not liableto serious injury during the most violent storms. The total costof the Benguet portion of this road to date [512] has been only$33, 405. This stretch is seventeen and a half miles in length anddoes not include that portion of the road which lies within the cityof Baguio. The total distance from the centre of Baguio to Bauang, the nearest railroad station on the coast, is thirty-four miles. 

With the completion of the new government buildings and the transferof the several bureaus to Baguio for the season of 1910 a real boombegan. The old sanatorium building had long been leased to a privateindividual who used it for hotel purposes, adding to it from time totime. A second hotel had been built. The railroad had been extendedto Camp One and a regular automobile service established for theconvenience of the public between Camp One and Baguio. The Jesuitshad constructed a great rest house and meteorological observatory ona commanding hill. The Dominicans had purchased a neighbouring hilltop and prepared to erect thereon a very large reënforced concretebuilding to serve for college purposes and as a rest house for membersof the order who required a change of climate. 

Development began early at Camp John Hay, an extensive and beautifulmilitary reservation set aside within the Baguio town site. Someprogress had been made in this direction prior to the coming ofMajor-General Leonard Wood. That highly efficient and far-seeingofficer gave a tremendous impetus to the work. He had been somethingof a sceptic on the subject of Baguio before visiting the place, but, like all other responsible persons who take the trouble to see it, promptly became an enthusiast when he had an opportunity to observeconditions for himself. Many army officers and their families whocould not obtain accommodations in the limited number of buildingson the reservation were glad to take tents for the season, and theCamp promptly began to serve useful ends. It has steadily grownand developed ever since, and is now a well-organized army post. Itsremarkable progress has been due in large measure to the initiative andingenuity of Captain M. R. Hilgard, who has been its commander sinceOctober, 1905. Great progress has been made in erecting buildings, but they are still far short of the needs of the service. At thepresent writing [513] there are many tents in use by officers andtheir families. These serve very well during the dry months, but withthe oncoming of the heavy showers, which usher in the rainy season, become damp and uncomfortable and make it necessary for the occupantsto return to the lowlands just at the time when Baguio is growingmost attractive and the heat of Manila is becoming most oppressive. 

The ground set aside in the military reservation is adequate for abrigade post, and such a post should be established as soon as therailroad reaches Baguio. The different commands in the islands couldthen be ordered there in succession, and officers and men given thebenefits of one of the best climates in the world. 

Baguio has continued steadily to develop, and the Benguet Roadno longer ends by running up a tree. The government has not onlyerected a residence for the governor-general, but has establishedoffices for the chief executive, the secretaries of departments, the Philippine Commission, the Executive Bureau, and the Bureaus ofAgriculture, Civil Service, Education, Forestry, Health, Public Worksand Constabulary. There are also a hospital, a series of tuberculosiscottages for the treatment of patients from the lowlands, cottagesand dormitories for government officers and employees, a great messhall where meals may be had at moderate cost, an automobile station, a garage, storehouses, a pumping plant, and labourers' quarters. Atthe Teachers' Camp there are a separate mess hall, an assembly halland a fine athletic field. 

The city of Baguio has a city hall, a storehouse, a corral and marketbuildings. Lot owners who have built summer homes for themselves havebrought up friends to show them what Baguio was like. Curiously it hasnever seemed possible to convey any adequate idea of its attractionsand advantages by word of mouth. Again and again I have urged scepticsto come and see for themselves. When after the lapse of years theyfinally did so, they have invariably asked me why I had not told themabout it before, forgetting that I had exhausted my vocabulary withoutbeing able to make them understand. Practically without exception, the persons who actually visit Baguio become "boosters. "

It is fortunate in a way that the boom did not come quicker, forthe hard truth is that up to date the rapidity of the growth of thesummer capital has been determined absolutely by the local lumbersupply. The original Filipino hand-sawyers were ultimately replacedby small portable mills, and these in turn by large modern millsto which logs are brought by skidding engines or overhead cables, yet it is true to-day, as it has always been true, that no sawmillhas ever been able to furnish dry lumber, for the simple reason thatthe green output is purchased as fast as it can be sawed. 

For a time the lumbermen took advantage of the necessities of thepublic, but when timber on the government concessions first grantedthem had been exhausted and they applied for new cutting areas, my turn came. I fixed maximum prices on lumber which they might notexceed without forfeiting their concessions. I also fixed a minimumannual cut which they were compelled to make, and imposed a regulationproviding that at least half of the total cut should be offered forsale to the public. 

There is no justification for the claim that Baguio is a richman's city. The town site is very large and can be indefinitelyextended. Good lots may be had at extremely moderate prices, and thecost of houses is strictly a matter of individual means and taste. Alarge section is given up to small dwellings for Filipinos. Theman who earns his living with a bull cart has no more difficultyin establishing a home there than does the Filipino millionnaire, and rich and poor are building in constantly increasing numbers. 

While experience has taught me that I cannot convey by words aloneany adequate conception of what Baguio is like, I must neverthelesshere make the attempt. 

Twenty-one miles of well surfaced roads wind among its pine-coveredhills and afford beautiful glimpses of the luxuriant vegetationalong its numerous small streams. There are building sites to suitall tastes, and each house owner is convinced that his particularlocation is better than that of any one else. One spring suppliesexceptionally pure water sufficient for the needs of at least tenthousand people, and an abundant additional supply can be obtainedwhen needed. The scenery is everywhere beautiful, and in many sectionstruly magnificent. 

Gently rolling hills enclose valleys with sides sometimes steep andprecipitous and sometimes gently sloping. The country is watered bynumerous streams bordered by magnificent tree-ferns, and by trees, shrubs, and plants requiring a large amount of water, while the dryhillsides bear noble pines standing at wide intervals and oftenarranged as if grouped by a skilled landscape artist. During therainy season they are covered with ferns and orchids, while exquisitewhite lilies, larger than Easter lilies, dot the hillsides. The dense_cógon_ of the Philippine lowlands is absent. Bamboo grass or _runo_occurs sparingly in the immediate vicinity of streams and springs, butthe hills are covered with a short grass seldom more than knee high, so that one may ride or walk over them in almost any direction withcomfort. A system of excellent horse trails affords communicationwith neighbouring provinces where one may see wonderful tropicalvegetation, magnificent scenery, strange wild peoples, and the mostremarkable terraced mountainsides in the world. These regions maybe visited with safety and comfort, as public order is well-nighperfect and rest houses have been provided at reasonable intervalson all important main trails. 

The delightfully cool climate of Baguio makes active outdoor exerciseenjoyable, and insures the speedy restoration to health and vigorof persons suffering ill effects from tropical heat, or recuperationfrom wasting diseases. Open fires are comfortable morning and eveningthroughout the year, and the pitch pine wood burns beautifully. Exceptduring typhoons the rainy season weather is delightful. When onewakens in the morning the atmosphere and the landscape have beenwashed clean. The air is clear as crystal, and mountain peaks fiftyor seventy-five miles away stand out with cameo-like sharpness. Theneedles of the pines fairly glisten and their delightful odoris constantly in one's nostrils. The whole country is green as alawn. Roses, violets, azaleas, "jacks-in-the-pulpit, " and several kindsof raspberries and huckleberries, all growing wild, make one feel asif back in America. One may visit the neighbouring Trinidad valleyand see cabbages and coffee, bananas and Irish potatoes, flourishingon one piece of land. Strawberry plants imported from America bearcontinuously from December to May. Fresh vegetables of all sorts ticklepalates which have grown weary of the eanned goods of the lowlands. 

Anywhere from twelve to three o'clock, the clouds begin to roll in andheavy showers fall, usually lasting until nine or ten at night. Thenthe stars come out. The next day is like its predecessor. 

After the first rains, which usually come about the middle of April, there is as a rule a month of beautiful weather with very littleprecipitation. Then the rains begin to come steadily again, and keepit up until the end of the wet season, falling in the manner alreadydescribed so that one can get one's outdoor exercise in the morning, while the afternoon showers are conducive to industry. 

The following table shows the average maximum, minimum and meantemperatures for each month of the year, the figures covering theperiod January, 1902, to January, 1908:--

 Month Average Average Mean Maximum Minimum °F. °F. °F. January 75. 1 50. 2 63. 3 February 75. 4 45. 8 61. 6 March 77. 5 49. 4 64. 1 April 78. 2 51. 9 65. 7 May 77. 7 54 66. 2 June 77 56. 8 66. 2 July 75. 9 55. 9 65. 4 August 76 54. 9 65. 1 September 75. 2 56 65. 2 October 76. 4 53. 8 65. 1 November 76. 4 49. 8 64. 1 December 76. 1 50. 3 64. 1

All of the above figures are for temperatures at a height of sixfeet above the ground. Temperatures nearer the ground are decidedlylower. It has been found that in the Baguio plateau the lowesttemperatures correspond to the deepest valleys. In such places whitefrost is not rare during the months of January, February, and March, while on the tops of hills the temperature is milder, frost beingalmost unknown. During typhoons conditions do not differ essentiallyfrom those experienced elsewhere in the islands, except that therainfall is exceptionally heavy. 

Major-General J. Franklin Bell, who has given special attention tomountain resorts the world over, vigorously asserts that Baguio hasno equal on the globe. Certainly the climate is more nearly perfectthan any other of which I have personal knowledge, and the delightfulcoolness and the bracing air afford heavenly relief to jangling nervesand exhausted bodies, worn out by overwork and by a too prolongedsojourn in tropical lowlands. 

One of the very important things about the Baguio climate is itsmarvellous effect upon victims of tuberculosis. 

Persons suffering from this disease in its earlier stages mayconfidently look forward to restored health if willing to liveout of doors under the pine trees, and there have been a number ofextraordinary recoveries among those in advanced stages. 

A series of little cottages which can be thrown wide open have beenoperated for some time in connection with the government hospital, in order practically to demonstrate the effect of the climate ontuberculosis victims. 

The results are conclusive, and whenever funds are available thereshould be established a settlement of such cottages on some one ofthe numerous good sites sufficiently removed from the town to avoidany possible danger of infecting healthy persons. There should alsobe a large mess hall from which good nourishing food can be served, and plenty of level ground on which tents can be erected during thedry season. Baguio's potential importance as a resort for victims ofthe great white plague justifies every cent of expenditure necessaryto make it readily accessible. 

The Sisters of the Assumption have erected a handsome building whichserves as a rest house and a girls' school. The sisters known as the"Belgian Canonist Missionaries" are erecting a building which willafford them a place to come for recuperation when wearied by strenuouswork in the lowlands, and will make it possible for them to open aschool for Igorot girls, which they are planning to do. 

Bishop Brent has established an excellent school for American boys, situated on a sunny hilltop. The instruction is very good, the foodexcellent, and a healthier, heartier-looking lot of youngsters thanthose who enjoy the privileges of this institution cannot be foundanywhere. There is abundant opportunity for them to play basket-ball, tennis and golf. Some of them indulge in polo, playing on Filipinoponies. 

Bishop Brent also has a mission school for Igorot girls, and plansto open a boarding school for American girls in the near future. 

The Belgian missionary priests, locally known as the "MissionaryPriests of the Church of San Patricio, " have their headquarters atBaguio, where the chief of their order resides and where they comeoccasionally for rest and recuperation. Archbishop Harry has a modesthome on one of the numerous hilltops. 

The building of a school for constabulary officers, to which youngmen arriving from the United States are sent before entering uponactive service, crowns another hill and commands a magnificent viewof the surrounding country. 

Several business concerns, such as the Compañia General de Tabacos deFilipinas, have erected rest houses for their officers and employees, while the number of attractive private homes increases as rapidly asthe supply of building materials will permit. Filipino residents ofManila have recently invested more than a hundred thousand dollarsin Baguio homes. 

But this is not all. No description would be anything like completewithout mention of a unique structure which is certain to become famousthe world over. It has been built under the immediate supervision ofMajor-General Bell, who has given freely of his time and thought tomake it the extraordinary success which it is. I refer to the wonderfulamphitheatre which stands at the side of the official residence of themajor-general commanding the Division of the Philippines. Advantage hasbeen taken of the existence of a natural amphitheatre with remarkableacoustic properties. Man has added what Nature left undone, and theresult is an imposing and beautiful auditorium capable of seatingfour thousand people, throughout which a whisper can be heard. Itis utilized for religious services, concerts, lectures, theatricalperformances and other public entertainments. No charge is exacted forits use, but if an admission fee is collected, a liberal percentageof the proceeds must go to some worthy charity. It has been terracedin stone by Igorot labourers; the trees originally standing in ithave been protected, and tree ferns, shrubs and flowering plantshave been added. The result beggars description, and photographs doit scant justice. 

Igorots from Bontoc, and even Ifugaos, now visit Baguio with increasingfrequency, attracted by a large market established especially for thebenefit of the hill people, where they may sell their manufacturedarticles or agricultural products, and may purchase at moderate costthe commodities which they need. The Benguet Igorots do not raise riceenough for their own use. Formerly they had to make up the shortageby eating _camotes_, but they have now become so prosperous that theycan afford to buy rice, which is carted in over the Benguet Road. 

There are promising gold mines close at hand. Their development wouldhave been impossible had not the construction of the Benguet Roadmade it feasible to bring in the necessary heavy machinery. 

Some of the fruits, many of the flowers and practically all of thevegetables of the temperate zone can be advantageously produced inBenguet. They are being shipped to Manila in steadily increasingquantities. 

One would gather from the criticisms of the enemies of the Philippinegovernment that the Benguet Road was a pleasure boulevard. Thegovernment motor trucks transported over it during the last fiscalyear 22, 390 passengers and 7696. 24 metric tons of freight. 

Railroad corporations are inclined to be a bit soulless. The ManilaRailway Company is extending its line to Baguio by means of a branchleaving the main line at Aringay. The building of this extension is now[514] fifty-five per cent completed, and the company is bound underthe terms of its agreement to finish the road by August, 1914. In theevent of its failure to do so, it must pay a monthly penalty amplysufficient in amount to cover the cost of maintaining the BenguetRoad. Baguio will continue to develop steadily until the railroadis opened and then will go ahead by leaps and bounds. It is sure toprosper because it meets a very real and very imperative need. 

In this connection the following extracts from a letter of August 7, 1913, from the director of medical services in India to the departmentsurgeon of the Philippines are of interest:--

"In reply to your letter of June 31st I attach a statement showing thenumber and location of the hill stations in India with the approximatecapacity of each, and their height above sea-level. 

"With regard to your inquiry regarding the number of cases treated inthese sanitaria we use these hill stations not only for the treatmentof convalescents, but also for giving healthy men an opportunity ofspending the Indian hot weather under the best climatic conditionsprocurable. To this end, so far as is practicable, all units are sentto the hills for the first hot weather after their arrival in India, and they are thus able to settle down to their new conditions oflife without being immediately exposed to the trying and enervatingenvironment of a plains station in the summer months. We also sendas many soldiers as we can of the older residents from hot stationsto summer in the hills. 

 * * * * *

"Practically all soldiers' wives and families are given an opportunityof a change from the more unhealthy stations to the hills during thehot weather. 

 * * * * *

"Our experience shows that the following cases are most benefited bya change to the hills:--

"1. All cases of malarial fever and malarial cachexia. 

"2. Patients recovering from acute diseases. 

"3. Convalescents after surgical operations. 

"4. Cases of anaemia and debility. 

"5. Cases of chronic venereal diseases. 

"6. Neurasthenics. "

Not only are all such cases greatly benefited at Baguio, but patientssuffering from dysentery and chronic diarrhoea are also greatlybenefited and often cured by a sufficiently long sojourn there. Thisis the experience of the civil government at its hospital and ofthe military authorities at the Camp John Hay hospital, according toGeneral Bell. 

Continuing the quotations from the letter of the director of medicalservices in India:--

"We have found that by the judicious use of hill stations forconvalescents both the invaliding and death rate of the Britishtroops in Indian have been enormously reduced and the efficiency ofthe Army has been increased with a considerable financial saving tothe Government. 

"It is advisable that all troops and families should be accommodatedin huts, especially during the rainy season in the hills, but thereis no doubt that they are benefited by the change even if they haveto live in tents and are thereby exposed to considerable discomfort. "

The importance attached by the British to hill stations is shown bythe fact that there are no less than 29 in India, their height abovesea-level varying from 2000 to 7936 feet. Of these eleven have nopermanent accommodations and are used for men only. 

I add the following extracts from a letter of Major P. M. Ashburn, Medical Corps, U. S. A. , president of the army board for the study oftropical diseases:--

"A man can remain in the tropics indefinitely without being actuallysick, if infectious diseases are avoided. This is fast leading tothe fallacy that we can advantageously remain many years in theselatitudes. The fact that while a man may never be sick, he yet may havehis physical and mental vigour greatly impaired by prolonged exposureto heat is thus lost sight of. No man can do his best work, eitherphysical or mental, if he is hot and uncomfortable. The same feelingof lassitude and indisposition to exertion is experienced at homeduring the hot summer, which after a few years here becomes chronic. "

"It is a matter of official recognition that government employeesneed to get away from the heat of Manila each year, hence the removalto Baguio. 

"It is likewise commonly recognized that many women and childrenbecome so run down and debilitated as to need to go to Japan, Baguioor the United States. 

"It is often true that monotony and discomfort are the cause ofnervous and mental breakdown, witness the often-mentioned insanityamong farmers' wives and the nervous breakdowns attributable topain and strain, even though it be, as in many cases of eyestrain, so slight as not to be recognized by the patient. "

In short, it is the monotony of a tropical lowland climate which makesan occasional change so imperatively necessary. Shall residents ofthe Philippines be forced to seek that change, at great expense oftime and money, in Japan, the United States or Europe, or shall wemake and keep available for them a region which admirably answersthe purpose, distant only half a day's travel from Manila?

I give extracts from a memorandum of Col. William H. Arthur, DepartmentSurgeon of the Philippines, which are important in this connection:--

"3. Experience has shown that long residence in the Philippines hasa marked effect on the mental and physical vigour of people notborn and raised in the tropics. This is manifested in many ways, and men, women and children who are not actually ill, seem to losetheir energy, become listless, irritable, and forgetful, and find theleast exertion burdensome. This is much aggravated in the hot season, and very few individuals manage, without permanent mental and physicaldeterioration, to live through many hot seasons in the plains. 

"4. There are in the Philippine Islands two places where relief fromthese conditions can be found:--(1) Camp John Hay, near Baguio, in themountain province of Benguet, Island of Luzón; and (2) Camp Keithley, in the Lake Lanao District of the Island of Mindanao. Camp John Hay, in the province of Benguet, is in the mountains at an elevation ofapproximately 5000 feet and is 175 miles from Manila, most of whichdistance is covered by railroad. Within 18 months it is expected thatthe railroad all the way to Baguio will be completed. 

"5. Experience has shown that a large number of cases of disease orinjury, or patients convalescing from surgical operations, recovermuch more rapidly in the cool mountain climate of Baguio than in thedepressing heat and humidity of the plains. Before the establishmentof this mountain refuge from the heat of the plains, many cases ofthis class were transferred to the United States that are now broughtback to health at Camp John Hay and Camp Keithley. The beneficialeffect of the change in climate is particularly noticeable in peoplewho have become run down after one or more hot seasons spent at thelower levels. 

"6. The great value of a refuge in the mountains from the effect ofprolonged heat is shown in enclosed reports, which indicate the classesof cases especially benefited, but there are a great many others notreported and not actually sick but whose vitality and resistance aremore or less diminished and who find great benefit from an occasionalsojourn in the mountains of Benguet or the highlands of Mindanao, especially during the hottest part of the year. "

I have quoted thus at length from communications of a distinguishedBritish medical officer, of a well-known and able special studentof tropical diseases, and of the ranking United States army surgeonin the islands to show the consensus of opinion among experiencedexperts as to the necessity of hill stations in the tropics. I mightgive numerous additional similar opinions of equally competent menbut will only add two more statements of Major Ashburn, the latterof which seems to me admirably to sum up the situation:--

So firm is my belief in the efficacy of the place that I have atconsiderable expense kept my two sons in school there, instead ofkeeping them at home in Manila at no expense for schooling, and sosatisfactory has been the result in normal, vigorous growth and robusthealth for both boys, that I consider the money so spent about thebest investment I have ever made. 

 * * * * *

I state all this to show the faith that is in me. To experience Baguioand to see the rapid improvement of visitors there is to be convincedthat it is a delightful and beneficial climate. To appreciate the fulldegree of its delights it is only necessary to compare in one's ownexperience (not in weather reports) a hot season in Manila and onethere. To appreciate its benefits it is necessary to compare in one'sown experience (not in statistics) the appearance of health of thepeople seen at the two times and places. As recent work on beri-berihas clearly shown the vast importance in diet of substances formerlynot known to have any importance, so, I think, are the factors inclimate not to be recorded by wind gauges, thermometers or othermeteorological instruments, and factors in health and efficiency notrecorded in books on physiology, bacteriology, pathology or healthstatistics. "

Let no one think that the summer capital of the Philippines has beenbuilt solely for the benefit of Americans. The Filipinos need italmost as much as we do, and many of them profit by the change withextraordinary promptness. 

It is really almost incredible that such a place should existwithin eight hours' travel of Manila, and every possible victim oftuberculosis in the islands, which means every inhabitant of thelowlands, has a right to demand that it should be made, and kept, readily accessible. Existing accommodations are nothing like adequatefor the crowds which desire to take advantage of them during theseason. Hotels are filled to overflowing. There are always severaldifferent applicants for each government cottage. Many persons whowould be glad to spend the hot months in the Benguet mountains findit impossible to do so, because they cannot obtain accommodation, and at present many more are obliged to shorten their stay in orderto give others a chance. 

In the early days, when we were facing unforeseen difficulties anddiscouragements, I was for a time the one member of the PhilippineCommission who was really enthusiastically in favour of carryingout the original plans for the summer capital. It was then thefashion to charge me with responsibility for the policy of openingup communication with the place and for the mistakes made in theconstruction of the Benguet Road, although I had never had any controlover the road work and had been one of five at first, and later oneof nine, to vote for every appropriation found necessary in order tocomplete it. 

It was the enthusiasm of Mr. Forbes which at a critical time finallysaved the situation, and now that Baguio has arrived, and the wisdom ofthe policy so long pursued in the face of manifold discouragements hasbeen demonstrated, my one fear is that he will get all the glory andthat I shall be denied credit for the part which I actually did playin bringing about the determination to establish quick communicationwith one of the most wonderful mountain health resorts to be found inany tropical country, and in giving that determination effect. But Ihave had a more than abundant reward of another sort. My wife, my sonand I myself, when seriously ill, have been restored to vigorous healthby brief sojourns at this one of the world's great health resorts. 

It has been very much the fashion for Filipino politicians to rail atBaguio, and now that the dangerous experiment of giving them controlof both houses of the legislature is being made, they may refuse toappropriate the sums necessary to make possible the annual transferof the insular government to that place. The result of such a bit ofpolitics would be a marked increase in the present extraordinarilylow death rate among government officers and employees, American andFilipino, [515] beginning in about two years, when the cumulativeeffect of long residence in the lowlands makes itself felt. 

Meanwhile, Baguio can stand on its own feet, and if, as the politicianssuggest, the government buildings there be sold at auction, purchasersfor all dwelling houses should readily be found. Too many Filipinoshave learned by happy experience the delights of this wonderful region, to let such an opportunity pass. Baguio has come to stay. 

CHAPTER XVIII

The Coördination of Scientific Work

When Americans landed at Manila, they found no government institutionsfor the training of physicians and surgeons and no hospital in anysense modern or indeed worthy of the name. 

There did exist the equipment of what had been called a municipallaboratory, outfitted for a limited amount of chemical work only. 

When the Philippine Commission arrived on the scene, it fell to mylot to draft the necessary legislation for placing scientific workon a firm foundation, and, later, as secretary of the interior, toexercise ultimate executive control over practically all such workcarried on under the insular government. 

The complete initial lack of adequate hospital facilities and ofmeans for making chemical and bacteriological investigations had beenpromptly remedied by the establishment of army hospitals and an armylaboratory. Although these could not be placed fully at the service ofthe public, they nevertheless bridged the gap for the time being, andin formulating laws and making plans for the future I was inclined tosay, "Blessed be nothing, " as we were not hampered by useless employeesor archaic equipment, but were left free to make a clean start. 

I had thoroughly learned one lesson at the University of Michigan whilea member of its zoölogical staff. We had a zoölogical laboratory inwhich were conducted the zoölogical half of a course in general biologyand numerous other courses in animal morphology, mammalian anatomy, comparative anatomy and embryology. There was also a botanicallaboratory in which all of the botanical work of the institutionwas carried on. This did not involve any overlapping, but there wasoverlapping of the work of the zoölogical laboratory and that of themedical department, which had an anatomical laboratory, a histologicallaboratory, a pathological laboratory and a so-called hygieniclaboratory. The professor of anatomy thought that his students wouldunderstand human anatomy better if they knew something of comparativeanatomy, and instead of sending them to us wished to start his owncourses. The histologist dabbled in embryology and was soon duplicatingour course in the embryology of the chick. He was constantly at warwith the pathologist over the question of where histology left offand pathology began, and both of them were inclined to differ withthe man in charge of the hygienic laboratory over similar questions ofjurisdiction. Furthermore, we had a chemical laboratory split up intovarious more or less independent subdivisions, and a psychologicallaboratory. In these several institutions for scientific researchthere was much duplication of instruction and of books, apparatusand laboratory equipment. Great economies might have been effectedby the establishment of a central purchasing agency, which could haveobtained wholesale rates on supplies ordered in large quantity. Nothingof the sort existed. One laboratory chief would order from the cornerdrug store, while another bought in Germany. 

There was danger that a similar condition of things might arise inthe Philippines. The Bureau of Health would want its chemical and itsbiological laboratories; the Bureau of Agriculture would need to dochemical work covering a wide range of subjects, and botanical andentomological work as well. The Bureau of Forestry would of courserequire a large amount of botanical work, and would also need tohave chemical work done on gums, resins and other forest products, to say nothing of investigating insects injurious to trees and moreespecially to timber after cutting. The latter class of destroyersdo enormous damage in the Philippines. Much chemical work wouldbe required by the Bureau of Customs, which as a matter of factlater insisted upon the necessity of a "microscopical laboratory"to provide facilities for the examination of fibres, etc. Obviouslythere would be a large amount of work for the general government inconnection with investigation of the mineral resources of the country, and the testing of coals, cements and road materials. 

Smallpox was decimating the population. There was need of themanufacture of great quantities of virus with which to combat it, and of other common and necessary serums and prophylactics as well. 

Here then was a golden opportunity to start right. In imagination I sawa Bureau of Science for scientific research and for routine scientificwork, a great General Hospital, and a modern and up-to-date College ofMedicine and Surgery, standing side by side and working in full andharmonious relationship. The medical school would give to the youthof the land the best possible facilities for theoretical trainingin medicine and surgery, while access to the wards of the hospitalwould make possible for them a large amount of practical bedsidework. Its operating amphitheatres would increase the opportunityfor clinical instruction, as would a great free outpatient clinic, conducted primarily for the benefit of the poor. Professors in thecollege would hold positions on the hospital staff, not only in orderto give to them and to their students every facility for clinicaldemonstration work, but to enable them constantly to "keep theirhands in. " Promising Filipino graduates would be given internshipsand other positions on the house staff of the hospital. Patientswould be admitted to its free beds subject to the condition that theyallow their cases to be studied by the faculty and students of thecollege. The necessary biological and chemical examinations for thehospital would be made in the laboratories of the Bureau of Science, which would at the same time afford every facility for the carrying onof scientific investigation by advanced students, by members of thefaculty of the college and by members of the hospital staff. Membersof the staff of the biological laboratory would have the use of thegreat volume of pathological material from the hospital, and withfree access to its rooms and wards, would have an almost unparalleledopportunity for the study of tropical diseases, while some of theofficers and employees of the Bureau of Science and of the Bureau ofHealth might be made members of the faculty of the college and theirservices utilized as instructors. 

As we had neither laboratories, hospital nor college at the time, the realization of this somewhat comprehensive scheme seemed ratherremote. It was commonly referred to as "Worcester's dream, " and oneof my friends in the army medical corps probably quite correctlyvoiced public sentiment when he said, "Poor Worcester has bats in hisbelfry. " However, he laughs best who laughs last! After the lapse ofa good many years my dream came true. The three great institutionswhich I hoped might sometime be established are to-day in existence, and are doing the work which I hoped that they might perform. Nowlet us consider how they came to be. 

In the early days I drafted an act providing for the establishment ofa Bureau of Government Laboratories which should perform all of thebiological and chemical work of the government under the directionof one chief, and on July 1, 1901 the commission passed it. 

I was more than fortunate in securing as the director of thisbureau Dr. Paul C. Freer, then professor of general chemistry at theUniversity of Michigan. 

Dr. Freer obtained leave of absence for a year, in order to help usget started. This leave was twice extended for additional periods ofone year each, and in the end he decided to sever his connection withthe university and throw in his lot with the Philippine government. 

He remained in charge of the Bureau of Government Laboratories andof its successor, the Bureau of Science, until his death on April17, 1912. 

Himself a chemist and investigator of note, he had a wide andcatholic knowledge of science in general, and no better man couldhave been found for this important piece of constructive work. Fornearly a year the two of us laboured over plans for the laboratorybuilding and lists of the necessary books, instruments, apparatus, glassware, chemicals and other supplies. At the end of this time wesubmitted to the commission what I do not hesitate to say was themost complete estimate for a large project which ever came beforeit. Much forethought was necessary in order to time the orders forbooks, instruments and apparatus so that it would be possible tohouse them properly when they arrived, and the estimated expense wasdistributed over a period of two and one-half years. 

Meanwhile work had begun in cramped temporary quarters in ahot little "shack, " for it deserved no better name, back of theCivil Hospital. Here under almost impossible conditions there wereperformed a large volume of routine biological and chemical work, and a considerable amount of research, the results of which provedto be of far-reaching importance. 

With the employment of the first chemists and bacteriologists therearose a class of questions which I determined to settle once forall. There is a regrettable tendency among some scientific men to tryto build barbed-wire fences around particular fields of research inwhich they happen to be interested, and to shoo every one else away. 

At the outset I gave all employees clearly to understand that suchan unscientific and ungenerous spirit would not be tolerated in theBureau of Government Laboratories. The field which opened before uswas enormous. There was work enough and more than enough for all, andwe should at the outset adopt a spirit of friendliness and helpfulnesstoward every scientific man who desired to lend a hand. 

This rule of conduct has been steadfastly adhered to. Numerouswell-known scientists have visited the Philippines and to each we haveextended all possible assistance, furnishing laboratory quarters, instruments, apparatus and reagents, and, whenever practicable, material as well. Indeed, many of our scientific guests have beenmade employees of the bureau without pay, so that there might be noquestioning of their right to use government equipment. 

Two important results have followed this policy. One is that we haveestablished the friendliest and most helpful relations with numerousresearch institutions. The other is that we have been able to assistin the performance of much valuable work which has borne importantresults, and which would perhaps have remained undone had it not beenpossible for us to aid those who undertook it. 

In due course of time came our fine new building, with good facilitiesfor performing all kinds of laboratory work. When it was equippedand occupied, we were able to say that the opportunities offered atManila for investigating tropical diseases were probably unequalledelsewhere, and there was a deal of such investigation urgently needingto be made. Our equipment for chemical research was also very completeand the vast undeveloped natural resources of the islands presenteda practically virgin field for such investigation. 

At the outset absurd rumours spread as to the cost of buildings andequipment, and there was much popular outcry against the supposedwastefulness of the government. A simple statement of the factsserved to kill these foolish tales, and people soon began to see thatthe creation of the Bureau of Government Laboratories was merely theapplication of common-sense to existing conditions and had resulted ingreatly increased economy and efficiency. Indeed, at the suggestionof a committee appointed to make a study of the government serviceand suggest measures for its betterment, the principle which I hadadopted was carried still further. Not only was all zoölogical andbotanical work transferred to this bureau, but the Bureau of Ethnologyand the Bureau of Mines were abolished as separate entities and weremade divisions of it, and its title was changed to "The Bureau ofScience. " Little by little the scope of the work has steadily widened. 

The scientific books and periodicals of the government were scatteredamong half a dozen different bureaus and were not being well caredfor. I arranged to have them all temporarily transferred to thelibrary of the Bureau of Science and catalogued there. Those saidto be really needed for frequent reference were then returned tothe several bureaus but were kept under observation by the bureau ofscience librarian, who took particular pains to look after the bindingof serial publications as rapidly as the volumes were completed. 

The list of books requested by the several bureau chiefs forreference was suspiciously long. I gave orders that each set of bureaubookshelves be provided with cards and a box into which to drop them, and each time a book was used a card was made out for it and placedin the box. After six months I quietly gathered up the cards and hadthem checked against the lists of books for which the several bureauchiefs had asked, and was then able to order a large proportion of themback to the library for the reason that they had not been used at all. 

The result of this policy is that we have to-day a centralscientific library in which are catalogued all the scientific booksof the government. Books needed by the several bureaus for frequentreference are placed where they can be used conveniently, and thecard catalogue indicates where they are, so that they can readily befound. In this way it has been possible to avoid much needless andexpensive duplication. The library now contains 26, 652 bound volumes. 

We were extremely fortunate in the men whose services we securedin the early days, and the volume of research work turned out wasunexpectedly large. The question of how best to arrange for theprompt publication of our results became urgent, and in the end weanswered it by publishing the _Philippine Journal of Science_, nowin its eighth year and with an assured and enviable position amongthe scientific journals of the world. 

In the early days before we knew what we now know about thepreservation of health in tropical countries there was a deal ofsickness among government officers and employees. While the army wasmore than liberal in helping us meet the conditions which arose, it was of course very necessary that we should establish our ownhospital as soon as possible. 

On October 12, 1901, the so-called "Civil Hospital" was openedin a large private dwelling, obtained, as we then fondly imagined, merely as a temporary expedient. Together with two adjoining and evensmaller buildings it continued to be our only place for the treatmentof ordinary medical and surgical cases until September 1, 1910! Ican here only very briefly outline the causes of this long delay. 

At the outset the building was large enough to meet immediate needs. Atthe time when it began to grow inadequate there was a plan on footfor a large private institution, in which the government was to secureaccommodations for its patients, and a hospital building was actuallyerected, but interest in this project waned, the private backing whichwas believed to have been assured for it failed, and the whole schemewent by the board. Then plans for a great general hospital were calledfor. A very large amount of time was consumed in their preparation andwhen they were finished the expense involved in carrying them out wasfound to be far beyond the means of the government. Ultimately I wascharged with the duty of securing other plans involving a more moderateexpenditure. Again long delay necessarily ensued. When semi-finalplans were submitted, the consulting architect insisted on a seriesof arches along the sides of the several ward pavilions which weredoubtless most satisfying from an artistic point of view, but wouldhave shut off light and fresh air to an extent which I could nottolerate. A three months' deadlock was finally broken by his accedingto my wishes, but in October, 1906, just as the completed plans werefinally ready to submit to the commission, I was compelled by severeillness to return to the United States. There remained three Americanand three Filipino members of the commission. One of the former wasMr. W. Morgan Shuster, then secretary of public instruction. Priorto the time when he became a candidate for a secretaryship he hadbeen bitter in his criticism of the Filipinos. Coincidently with thedevelopment of this ambition he became almost more pro-Filipino thansome of the Filipino politicians themselves. For a time he seemed tocontrol the Filipino vote on the commission and largely as a result ofhis activities every important matter which I left pending, includingthat of the establishment of the great general hospital so vitallyneeded by the people of the islands, was laid on the table. I wasinformed that Mr. Shuster had announced that we could have $125, 000for the hospital and no more! We needed $400, 000. 

Beginning on the day after my return the following April these severalprojects, including that for the Baguio Hospital and that for thePhilippine General Hospital. Were taken from the table and passed. 

Construction work goes slowly in the tropics. One ward pavilion of thePhilippine General Hospital was occupied on September 1, 1910. Soonafterward the four others came into use. 

On June 10, 1907, a medical college was opened. It was called "ThePhilippine Medical School. " Its creation at this time was made possibleby the existence of the Bureaus of Science and Health. Its staff wasat the outset recruited very largely from these two bureaus. Thedirector of the Bureau of Science was made its dean and continuedto hold this position until his death. To his unselfish efforts andto those of the director of health is due the well-organized moderncollege which we have to-day. In lieu of better quarters the firstclasses were held in an old Spanish government building which wasaltered and added to until it answered the purpose reasonably well. 

The preparation of the act which provided for the establishment ofthis college was intrusted to me. I called for the assistance of acommittee of technical experts and asked that they submit a draftfor my consideration, which they did. It contained a provision to theeffect that the college should be under the administrative control ofthe secretary of the interior. I struck out the words "secretary of theinterior" and inserted in lieu thereof the words "secretary of publicinstruction" for two reasons. First, the school theoretically belongsunder that official, in spite of its necessarily close relationshipwith the Bureau of Science and the Bureau of Health. Second, I wantedthe support of the secretary of public instruction for the measure, as it involved considerable expenditure and I was not sure how thebill might fare in the commission. It happened that the incumbentof that position was very much inclined to take a liberal view ofbills which extended his jurisdiction. Mr. Taft, when he visitedthe Philippines in 1909, reached the conclusion that I was guiltyof an error of judgment in doing this, and a little later expressedthe view that the Medical College ought to be under the control ofthe secretary of the interior, because of its intimate relationshipwith the bureaus above mentioned. I might perhaps even then have hadthis change made, but refrained from attempting to do so, believingthat all would go well under the existing arrangement. So long asDr. Freer lived this was the case. 

He was a man of absolute honesty and sincerity of purpose, andwas far-seeing enough fully to realize that the interests of thegovernment, and of individuals as well, would best be served bycarrying out the broad and liberal policy which was then in effect. 

The next event of importance was the establishment of the Universityof the Philippines, which was provided for by an Act passed on June18, 1908. 

The Philippine Medical School was in due time incorporated with theuniversity as its College of Medicine and Surgery, passing under theexecutive control of the university board of regents. 

At this time the plan of which I had dreamed so many years beforewas in full force and effect and was working admirably. Members ofthe Bureau of Science staff served on the college faculty and heldappointments in the Philippine General Hospital as well, one of thembeing the chief of a division there. Members of the college facultycarried on research work at the Bureau of Science. The great workinglibrary installed in the building of the latter bureau served as themedical library. Members of the college faculty also rendered importantservice in the Philippine General Hospital, where two of them werechiefs of divisions, two held important positions on the house staffand numerous others served as interns. Officers of the Bureau of Healthwere appointed to the faculty of the college and carried on researchwork at the Bureau of Science. The staff of the latter bureau madethe chemical and biological examinations needed in connection withthe work of the hospital as well as those required by the Bureau ofHealth. The Bureau of Science manufactured the sera and prophylacticsrequired by the Bureau of Health in its work. The two large operatingamphitheatres in the Philippine General Hospital were planned withespecial reference to the accommodation of students, who could passalong a gallery from one to the other. The work of the free clinic, attended daily by hundreds of Filipinos seeking relief, was largelyturned over to the college faculty, and increased opportunities werethus given for medical students to study actual cases. 

The arrangement was an ideal one. It excited the admiration of numerousvisiting European and American experts, who were competent to judgeof its merits, and its continued success was dependent only upon thehonesty of purpose, loyalty and good faith of the several partiesto it. 

Then came the untimely death of Dr. Freer. A few months later anattempt was made by certain university officers to secure control ofthe professional work of the hospital for that institution, leavingthe director of health and the secretary of the interior in chargeof the nurses, servants, accounts and property, and burdened withthe responsibility for the results of work involving life and death, but without voice in the choice of the men who were to perform it. 

Those who were responsible for this effort evidently had not takenthe trouble to read the law, and I had only to call attention to itsprovisions in order to end for the time this first effort to disturbthe existing logical distribution of work between the two institutions. 

Before I left Manila in October, 1913, a second attempt was being madeto secure control of the professional work of the hospital for theuniversity, but this time the plan was more far-reaching, in that itcontemplated the transfer to the university of control of the Bureau ofScience as well; and more logical, in that a bill accomplishing theseends had been drafted for consideration by the Filipinized legislature. 

The original plan for the coördination of the scientific work ofthe Philippine government was sound in principle and will, I trust, eventually be carried out, whatever may be done temporarily to upsetit during a period of disturbed political conditions. There is muchconsolation to be derived from contemplating the fact that pendulumsswing. 

NOTES

[1] Cuyo, Palawan, Balabac, Cagayan de Joló, Joló proper, Basilan, Mindanao, Panay, Guimaras, Negros, Siquijor, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Leyte, Masbate, Marinduque and Mindoro. 

[2] I employ the noun Filipinos to designate collectively the eightcivilized, Christianized peoples, called respectively the Cagayans, Ilocanos, Pangasináns, Zambalans, Pampangans, Tagálogs, Bicols andVisayans, or any of them; the adjective Filipino to designate anythingpertaining to these peoples, or any of them; the noun Philippinesto designate the country, and the adjective Philippine to designateanything pertaining to the country as distinguished from its people. 

[3] Busuanga, Culion, Tawi Tawi, Tablas, Romblon and Sibuyan. 

[4] I use the word "Insurgents" as a proper noun, to designate theFilipinos who took up arms against the United States, hence capitalizeit, and the adjective derived from it. 

[5] General Aguinaldo. 

[6] Beginning with the letters "P. I. R. "

[7] See pp. 53, 55, 68. 

[8] See pp. 27, 47, 49, 63 of this book for repetitions and variationsof this charge of Aguinaldo. 

[9] See p. 31 of his book, "The American Occupation of thePhilippines, " in referring to which I will hereafter use the wordBlount, followed by a page number. 

[10] U. S. Consul General Rounseville Wildman of Hongkong. 

[11] U. S. Consul O. F. Williams of Manila. 

[12] Blount, p. 43. 

[13] A term, more or less corresponding to mayor, then applied tothe ranking municipal officer of a _pueblo_ or town. 

[14] Eight hundred thousand Mexican dollars, the actual value ofwhich constantly fluctuated. 

[15] The Ilocanos are one of the eight civilized peoples whocollectively make up the Filipinos. They number 803, 942, and inhabitcertain provinces in northern Luzon. 

[16] I have not felt at liberty to correct spelling, capitalization, punctuation or grammar in quotations, except in the case of perfectlyevident printer's errors. It should be remembered that the resultsof Taylor's work were left in the form of galley proof. 

[17] Taylor, 42 F Z-43 F Z. 

[18] For the history of this document, see p. 51. 

[19] P. I. R. , 1300. 2. 

[20] Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session, P. P. 341 _et seq_. 

[21] Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session;also P. I. R. , 496. 

[22] Blount, pp. 11-12. 

[23] Pratt. 

[24] P. I. R. , 516. 4. 

[25] "The Consul--after telling me that, before arriving in Hongkongharbor, a launch would be sent by the Admiral to secretly take us tothe North American squadron, a secrecy which pleased me also, as itwould avoid giving publicity to my acts--then advised me that I shouldappoint him the representative of the Philippines in the United Statesto promptly secure the official recognition of our independence. Ianswered that whenever the Philippine government should be formed, I would nominate him for the office he desired, although I consideredthat but small recompense for his aid, and that in case of our havingthe good fortune to secure our independence I would bestow upon hima high post in the customs service besides granting the commercialadvantages and the participation in the expenses of the war which theConsul asked for his Government in Washington, since the Filipinosagreed in advance to what is here stated, considering it a propertestimonial of gratitude. "--P. I. R. , 1300. 2. 

[26] Blount, p. 12

[27] Blount, pp. 8-9. 

[28] Ibid. , p. 9. 

[29] The following is one of them:--

"_H. Kong_, May 16, 1898. 

"Señor Don Jose Enrique Basa:

"My Dear Enrique: As an aid to the American policy in thePhilippines, --America being the most liberal and humanitarian nationin the world, --I earnestly recommend the widest possible circulationof the proclamation which I send herewith in order that the Americansmay be supported in the war against the tyrannical friars and theSpaniards who have connived with them, and that public order, sonecessary under the present conditions, be preserved. 

"Thy relative, twenty-six years an emigrant. 

(Signed) "_J. M. Basa_. "

--P. I. R. , 1204-10. 

[30] P. I. R. , 1204-10. 

[31] Ibid. , 1204-10. 

[32] P. I. R. , 53-2. 

[33] Teodoro Sandico, an influential Tagálog leader, who spoke Englishwell and afterward served as a spy while employed by the Americansas an interpreter. 

[34] Señor Garchitorena was a wealthy Tagálog of Manila, and, atthis time, a prominent member of the Hongkong junta. 

[35] Dr. Galicano Apacible, a very intelligent and rather conservativeTagálog physician. After Aguinaldo left Hongkong, he was the leadingmember of the junta. 

[36] Sr. Graco Gonzaga, a prominent Filipino lawyer of the provinceof Cagayan. 

[37] There is an illegible word in the original. 

[38] P. I. R. , 406-5. 

[39] P. I. R. , 398. 9. 

[40] "_Hongkong_, 12 Jan. 1899, --2 P. M. 

"_Senator Hoar_, Washington. 

"As the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the Americangovernment through the consul at Singapore, I frankly state that theconditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Deweywere independence under a protectorate. I am prepared to swear tothis. The military party suborned correspondents are deceiving theAmerican nation by means of malevolent lying statements. If yourpowerful influence does not change this insensate policy there willbe a hopeless conflict with the inevitable results disastrous forthe Americans. 

"_Bray_. "

--P. I. R. , 853-4. 

[41] "Then Aguinaldo had an interview with the United States consulin Hongkong, in which he told him that he was anxious to become anAmerican citizen, but this being impossible, he desired to be allowedto return to the Philippines and place himself under the orders ofCommodore Dewey. According to the brother of that Consul, who certainlymust have had opportunities for knowing the facts in the case, hemade no demands for independence, but said that he hoped that theAmericans would not leave the Filipinos to their fate, but would annexthe Philippines and protect them against the Spaniards. He promisedthe Consul that he would fight with the Americans and not attempt tofoment a revolution against the United States. His highest expressedaim was to throw off the Spanish yoke, and, that once accomplished, he would abide by the decision of the United States as to the ultimatedisposition of the Philippines. If Aguinaldo had expressed his realintentions of obtaining arms and using them only for his own purposes, and, if he found it expedient, against the United States, it is notto be thought that he would have been returned to the Philippines ona United States vessel. "--Taylor, 44 F Z. 

[42] P. I. R. , 471. 7. 

[43] P. I. R. , 1300. 2. 

[44] Admiral Dewey's testimony, from which I quote extracts, willbe found in Senate Documents, Vol. 25. 57 Congress, 1st session, pp. 2928, 2941. 

[45] P. I. R. , 1300. 2. 

[46] P. I. R. , 1300. 2. 

[47] Taylor, 4 MG. , E. 

[48] Report of the Philippine commission to the President. January 31, 1900. Vol. I, p. 121. 

[49] P. I. R. , 396. 3. 

[50] Ibid. , 396. 3. 

[51] P. I. R. , 461. 4. 

[52] "My Dear Brother: I inform you that we arrived here in Caviteat eleven o'clock and disembarked at four o'clock in the afternoonafter our conference with the American Admiral. Everything appearsto be favourable for obtaining our independence. I cannot say moreon that subject as it would take too long. 

"I have no other object in writing this except to ask you and yourcompanions to meet at once and arrange the best way to entrap all theenemy in your town, employing deceit, for instance, make a presentof whatever you think best to the chiefs successively and thenat once enter the houses and attack them, or if not this, do whatyou think best. Show valor and resolution, brothers, the hour hasarrived for the Philippines to belong to her sons and not to them, only one step and we shall reach Independence; be constant, brothers, and be united in feelings, do not imitate those who show two faces, whatever such people do sooner or later they will be slaves. Respectforeigners and their property, also enemies who surrender. 

"I want you to know that in respect toour conduct I have promisedthe American Admiral and other nations, that we shall carry on modernwar. Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treatedwell and then you will see that our reputation will be very good inall Europe which will declare for our Independence; but if we do notconduct ourselves thus the Americans will decide to sell us or elsedivide up our territory as they will hold us incapable of governingour land, we shall not secure our liberty; rather the contrary;our own soil will be delivered over to other hands. 

"Therefore, my brethren, I urge that we strive to unite our efforts, and let us fire our hearts with the idea of vindicating ourcountry. Many nations are on our side. "--P. I. R. , 12. 1. 

[53] Mabini was a Tagálog paralytic of exceptional ability. In myopinion he was the strongest man whom the revolution produced. 

[54] P. I. R. , 451. 1. 

[55] Extract from the Journal of Simeon Villa. 

"The memorable month of August, 1896, arrived. Aguinaldo was 'master'of the Cavite Lodge. Moreover, he was a member of the 'Katipúnan'Society and the chief of the many members who were in the pueblo ofCavite Viejo. What was to be done? Aguinaldo, not knowing what to do, and mindful of the fact that the curate there knew positively thathe was not only a mason, but also the chief of the Katipúnans of hispueblo, considered it expedient on the night of August 29 to at oncecall a meeting of all the compromised persons in his town. Aguinaldomade clear to them their grave situation. 

"They all agreed that on the following day Aguinaldo, their chief, should make representations to the Governor of Cavite; so he went awayvery early the following morning, presented himself to the governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo offered him theirrespects and their loyalty to Spain, at the same time requestinghim to condescend to send to his town a garrison of 100 men forits security. The governor replied that he would first consult thecaptain-general, and if the proposition was approved he would sendthe garrison at once. 

"As Aguinaldo was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife, theyoffered him wine and sweetmeats. As soon as this was over he tookhis leave and returned happy to his town. On arrival in the townhe assembled all the compromised persons and informed them of thebrilliant result of his efforts. Continuing, he told them that then wasthe opportune moment for rising in arms against the Spaniards. To thisthey unanimously replied by saying it was terrible, because no armswere available, and that for this reason it would certainly prove tobe a disaster for them. 

"But Aguinaldo, in company with his godfather, the lamented CandidoTirona, insisted on convincing them with their strong arguments. Theymade them understand that Spanish cruelty would annihilate themwithout fail, and for no other reason than that they were members ofthe Katipúnan. 

"As it happened, at that very time there were two 'Guardia Civil'soldiers in the court-house. So at about 2 o'clock in the morning, Aguinaldo and Tirona went directly to the court-house. Arriving there, these two determined insurgent chiefs intimated to the guards thatthey should surrender their equipments. These replied that it wasimpossible, and said they would die first. Instantly a struggle ensuedbetween the four men, which lasted nearly an hour. But it resulted infavor of the insurgent chiefs who succeeded in taking the guns andcartridges. Once in possession of these armaments, the two chiefs, accompanied by a number of the town people, directed themselves tothe convent in order to capture the curate. Very unfortunately forthem, the curate was no longer there when they arrived; he had madehis escape. While the struggle was going on with the guards in thecourt-house, he received the news and fled at once by embarking ina native boat. 

"The insurgent chiefs then returned to the court-house and immediatelyprepared a communication to all the municipal captains in the provincesof Cavite, Batangas and Laguna, inviting them to at once rise againstSpain, and stating that their own town of Cavite Viejo was alreadyfreed from slavery. 

"Each one of these communications was sent out by a mounted courier, so that before the expiration of many hours all the towns in CaviteProvince were informed of what had taken place in Cavite Viejo. 

"On the following day some of the towns took up arms. At the sametime Aguinaldo, in company with many people from his town, marched onImus in order to attack the Spanish troops who were there. When hearrived in Imus the people of this town at once joined him and theyall went to the convent, in which were the friars and the soldiersof the 'Guardia Civil. ' Just as he arrived at the atrium of theChurch his companions did not wish to follow him, for fear that thesoldiers were occupying the church tower. So Aguinaldo advanced aloneuntil he reached the door of the convent. Once here, he called hiscompanions to aid him. But these were not so determined as he was, and only about five responded. When these got to where Aguinaldo was, he commenced breaking in the door which was soon open. They wentupstairs, but they found nobody, since the friars and soldiers hadcrossed over to the treasury building. 

"Aguinaldo's companions were now numerous, because the others followedhim when they saw that nothing happened to those who went up intothe convent; and all of these went immediately to the treasurybuilding, in which were the friars and soldiers whom they werehunting. When they reached it they found the doors closed, so theycould not pass. Aguinaldo ordered the house burned. Those in hidinginside the house were without any other remedy and had to surrender;but meanwhile some of them had been burned to death, among these alieutenant of the 'Guardia Civil. ' By this victory Aguinaldo succeededin taking 17 rifles and two 2 1/2 pounder guns. "--P. I. R. , 869. 

[56] "My Beloved Countrymen: I accepted the agreement of peaceproposed by Don Pedro A. Paterno after his consultation with theCaptain-General of the islands (Philippines), agreeing in consequencethereof to surrender our arms and disband the troops under my immediatecommand under certain conditions, as I believed it more advantageousfor the country than to continue the insurrection, for which I had butlimited resources, but as some of the said conditions were not compliedwith, some of the bands are discontented and have not surrenderedtheir arms. Five months have elapsed without the inauguration ofany of the reforms which I asked in order to place our country ona level with civilized people--for instance, our neighbor, Japan, which in the short space of twenty years has reached a point whereshe has no reason to envy any one, her strength and ascendency beingshown in the last war with China. I see the impotence of the SpanishGovernment to contend with certain elements which oppose constantobstacles to the progress of the country itself and whose destructiveinfluence has been one of the causes of the uprising of the masses, and as the great and powerful North American nation has offered itsdisinterested protection to secure the liberty of this country, I againassume command of all the troops in the struggle for the attainmentof our lofty aspirations, inaugurating a dictatorial government to beadministered by decrees promulgated under my sole responsibility andwith the advice of distinguished persons until the time when theseislands, being under our complete control, may form a constitutionalrepublican assembly and appoint a president and cabinet, into whosehands I shall then resign the command of the islands. 

"_Emilio Aguinaldo_. 

Given at Cavite, May 24, 1898. "--P. I. R. 206. 6. 

[57] "The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine libertyand therefore the friend of our people oppressed and enslaved bythe tyranny and despotism of its ruler, has come to us manifesting aprotection as decisive as it is undoubtedly disinterested toward ourinhabitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable ofgoverning ourselves and our unfortunate country. In order to maintainthis high estimate granted us by the generous North American nationwe should abominate all those deeds which tend to lower this opinion, which are pillage, theft, and all sorts of crimes relating to personsor property, with the purpose of avoiding international conflictduring the period of our campaign. "--P. I. R. , 43. 3. 

[58] Of this extraordinary occurrence Taylor says:--

"Invitations to the ceremony of the declaration of independencewere sent to Admiral Dewey; but neither he nor any of his officerswere present. It was, however, important to Aguinaldo that someAmerican should be there whom the assembled people would consider arepresentative of the United States. 'Colonel' Johnson, ex-hotel keeperof Shanghai, who was in the Philippines exhibiting a cinematograph, kindly consented to appear on this occasion as Aguinaldo's Chief ofArtillery and the representative of the North American nation. Hisname does not appear subsequently among the papers of Aguinaldo. Itis possible that his position as colonel and chief of artillery was amerely temporary one which enabled him to appear in a uniform whichwould befit the character of the representative of a great peopleupon so solemn an occasion!"--Taylor, 26 A J. 

[59] P. I. R. , 451. 4. 

[60] P. I. R. , 451. 4. 

[61] See p. 50. 

[62] "They are aware that a Government has been established here fromthe beginning: first the Dictatorial, and afterwards, when severalprovinces had been freed from Spanish domination, there was implantedin the same a proper organization, and thus a new Government wasestablished in the form best adapted to the principles of liberty;but notwithstanding all this and in spite of their protestations offriendship, they have always refused to recognize that government. 

"The things they request involve the recognition of a right which wecannot and ought not to grant, unless they recognize our Governmentand unless the limits of the powers of both sides be defined. If theywish us to recognize them in Cavite, let them recognize our rightsin Parañaque. 

"The United States are our creditors more than any other nation;not only are they due the gratitude of the Filipino people, butalso they should be allowed to profit by the advantages this peoplecan grant them without loss of our legitimate right to a free andindependent life. Therefore we are disposed to make a treaty orconvention with them. They will be no longer able to allege thelack of national character, for in the near future there is to beassembled the Revolutionary Congress composed of the Representativesof the provinces. 

"They should understand that they have come to make war on theSpaniards; that the Filipinos have risen in arms against the same enemyto achieve their liberty and independence; and that in consequence theycannot exercise dominion over us without violation of internationallaw. If they persist in refusing to recognize our Government, we shallsee ourselves obliged to come to an agreement with any other governmentthat will consent to recognize us on friendly terms. "--P. I. R. , 58. 

[63] Blount, p. 24. 

[64] P. I. R. , 416. 1. 

[65] _Ibid. _, 102. 5. 

[66] Senate Document 208, 1900, p. 9. 

[67] Taylor, 26 A J. 

[68] P. I. R. , 5. 10. 

[69] "Going to Singapore, I had several interviews with the Consul ofthe United States, Mr. Spencer Pratt, who informed me that the war wasdirected against Spain only and that in addition your action in thePhilippines had as an object the independence of my beloved country. 

"The Commander of the _MacCulloch_ telegraphed me also from Hongkong, offering in the name of Commodore Dewey, to take me to Cavite, inorder to raise the Filipinos against Spain. 

"Without any written treaty, counting only upon the sacred word ofAmerican citizens, I went to Hongkong, embarked on the _MacCulloch_and a few days later had the honor to make the acquaintance of thevictorious Commodore Dewey, who likewise informed me that he hadcome to make war against Spain, that he had annihilated the fleetof Admiral Montojo and that the United States desired to give thePhilippines their independence. "--P. I. R. , 441. 2. 

[70] P. I. R. , 102. 1. 

[71] P. I. R. , Books C-1. 

[72] P. 39. 

[73] For J. M. Basa. 

[74] P. I. R. , 507-7. 

[75] P. I. R. , 477. 1. 

[76] "Until the Philippine question is finally decided, you would dowell in not having any controversy with the Americans. After havingsecured the extinction of Spanish control for good, you may thenliquidate accounts with the United States in the event that they wishto control in the interior; but in the meantime, let what will occur, do not allow yourself to have any controversy with them. Matters arein a very delicate state at the present time. "--P. I. R. , 398. 3. 

In a postscript to the same letter Bray says:--

"America is a great nation and does not wish that conditions bedictated to her. I am more than ever convinced that you must bepatient and await what they propose, without opposing their wishesand insanities, before the questions before the Paris Congress aredefinitely settled and the islands ceded by Spain; then there wouldstill be time to show your teeth if they try to govern the country. Iwould not object at present to them taking up their residence thereand acting in the capacity of guard for good government, placingour trust for the future in Providence which will never abandon thePhilippines. "--P. I. R. 

[77] Blount, p. 283. 

[78] _Ibid_. , p. 283. 

[79] See p. 74. 

[80] "Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but oneleft to protect her own coast cities. The death knell of her onceproud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could notpossibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up. '"--Blount, p. 127. 

[81] P. I. R. , 471. 4. 

[82] _Ibid_. , 471. 4. 

[83] _Ibid_. , 450. 2. 

[84] P. I. R. , 471. 4. 

[85] "You should not forget what I have stated at the beginning of thisletter; because I am of the opinion that those questions should be wellconsidered by all of you. If our people desire independence under theAmerican protectorate, it is necessary that our representatives tothe United States be given instructions as to the conditions whichwe should grant to the United States. The peace negotiations are infull blast, and it is probable that we will be rather late in sendingour representatives. Therefore, if you agree to independence under aprotectorate, you should recommend it at once. I leave it, however, to your care, as you are better qualified than myself concerning theconditions of our country. "--P. I. R. , 471. 4. 

[86] "My Dear Friend: ... The last telegrams from Europe whichFelipe will send you by this mail are alarming for our future. Thepreliminaries of peace are announced. The demand of America is, annexation of Porto Rico and the Ladrone Islands, independence ofCuba under an American protectorate and an American coaling stationin the Philippines. That is, they will again deliver us into the handsof Spain. On the other hand, all the powers will unite to prevent theannexation of the Philippines, according to the telegrams of Regidor;the American cabinet hesitates about including us in the negotiationsfor peace from fear of a conflict with us and the Filipinos in Europeadvise us to send a message to America giving our unconditionaladhesion. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we have adark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spainwill mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the endwill be favourable to us. The treaty of peace sanctioned by the otherpowers will assure the dominion of Spain. Spain free from Cuba andher other colonies will employ all her energy to crush us and willsend here the 150, 000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think that theFilipinos will again submit to their tyrants and there will be a longand bloody war. And on account of the treaty the other powers willaid Spain to completely dominate us and place all possible obstaclesin our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of revolutionarylabours. In view of all this and bearing in mind the present urgencyof the matter, it is necessary for that government to establish andpublish its policy. We believe that the best for us and the onlyfeasible one, if we want to establish negotiations with America, is independence under an American protectorate. "--P. I. R. , 453. 3. 

[87] "The policy which you will pursue in the United States is thefollowing one:--

"Make them understand that whatever may be their intention towards us, it is not possible for them to overrule the sentiments of the peoplerepresented by the government, and they must first recognize it ifwe are to come to an agreement. Still do not accept any contractsor give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because wewill see first if we can obtain independence. This is what we shallendeavour to secure; meanwhile, if it should be possible to do so, still give them to understand in a way that you are unable to bindyourself but that once we are independent, we will be able to makearrangements with them. "--P. I. R. , Books C-1. 

[88] P. I. R. , 5. 7. 

[89] In a letter written on that date to Agoncillo he says:--

"Notwithstanding, I enclose you the credentials as requested; therebyyou will see that in addition to your representing us at Washington, you may assist the commission they have formed for the purpose ofdetermining the future condition of the Philippines. 

"But you must act in such manner that they may not be able to saythat we have accepted the said commission, because it is my wish toprotect [protest? D. C. W. ] at all times against their being chargedwith determining our destiny. You must bear in mind that the policy ofthe government is to obtain absolute independence, and if perchancewe should know by the course of events that such cannot be the case, we will then think of protection or annexation. "--P. I. R. , Books C-1. 

[90] On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote Agoncillo:--

"It is said that General Merritt is going away to take part in thework of the Commission. On this account it is important that youproceed as quickly as possible to America, in order to know whattakes place. If perchance we should go back to Spanish control, askthem to help us as the French helped them during their own revolutionand ask also the terms. "--P. I. R. , Books C--1. 

[91] Taylor, 18 AJ. 

[92] See p. 61. 

[93] _Ibid_. 

[94] Some time during August, 1898, Sandico wrote a letter to Aguinaldoof which the postscript reads as follows:--

"P. S. --If you think of appointing me as Delegate to Manila, pleasesend me my credentials. There are also annexationists here [_i. E. _, in Manila. --D. C. W. ]. "--P. I. R. , 416. 3. 

[95] Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the PhilippineIslands. He is a man of excellent character, high attainments andgreat ability. He held important legal positions under the Spanishgovernment. In October, 1898, he was appointed Secretary of ForeignRelations of the "Philippine Republic, " but never served as suchofficer. He was given the degree of Doctor of Law by Yale Universityin 1904. 

[96] Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, one of the most brilliant livingFilipinos. He had spent many years in Paris, was a talented physician, and under American rule served for more than seven years as a memberof the Philippine Commission. 

[97] Taylor, 55 AJ. 

[98] Taylor, 26 AJ. 

[99] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, p. 2969. 

[100] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2931-2932. 

[101] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2956. 

[102] _Ibid_. , p. 2966. 

[103] _Ibid_. , p. 2966. 

[104] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2955. 

[105] _Ibid. _, p. 2952. 

[106] The following passage is an extract from an unsigned orderdated July 22, 1898:--

"For the preservation of peace and good order in the community andto put an end to the acts of those who within and without the cityof Manila and in the neighboring provinces not under the controlof the Spanish Government, are evading the orders issued by theseHeadquarters, and in view of the large number of those who arestoring and monopolizing food and other most necessary articles, under the pretence of desiring to sell them to the Americans, butwhose real intention is to ship them secretly to Manila where theyreceive higher prices for their merchandise, without regard for theinjury they are doing the cause of our independence, I have seen fitto decree the following: ... " P. I. R. , 45. 5 and 125. 3. 

Relative to this matter, Taylor says:--

"The defection of Buencamino and Pilar had opened the road toAguinaldo, but at first the blockade was not effective. There were toomany natives there with friends and relations in Aguinaldo's camp tomake him desire to subject the city to the hardships of an effectivesiege. And, furthermore, he did not have the force, nor did his menhave the necessary discipline, to prevent the ingress of supplies. Itwas not until the first part of July that the price of provisionsincreased. It was at no time found necessary by the authorities to takeover all the stores of provisions in the city. Indeed, there seems tohave been a fairly steady traffic in supplies between Manila and thecountry to the north. It was a traffic in which it has been chargedthat certain Spanish officers of rank made large sums. Aguinaldopermitted it, and on July 26, 1898, signed an order directing thatfood should be sent into Manila from the north to prevent starvationin the city, and ordered the heads of the towns in the vicinity notto interfere with this traffic (P. I. R. , 1087-4). The entrance of foodsupplies was confined to the northern line, for then it would not beknown to the Americans who, after July 30, occupied the entrenchmentsin front of San Antonio Abad. It was not expedient for them to seetoo much of Aguinaldo's methods. "--Taylor, 14 AJ. 

[107] P. I. R. , 398. 2. 

[108] Senate Document 331, p. 2976, 1902. 

[109] P. I. R. , 102-10. 

[110] P. I. R. , Books C-1. 

[111] P. I. R. , 102-10. 

[112] _Ibid. _

[113] P. I. R. , 102. 10. 

[114] _Ibid_. , Books C-1. 

[115] _Ibid_. , 102-10. 

[116] P. I. R. , 102-10. 

[117] Now a major-general. 

[118] P. I. R. , 102-10. 

[119] _Ibid. _

[120] _Ibid. _

[121] "Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to thefavors we have received through Admiral Dewey and (being) more desirousthan any other person of preventing any conflict which would have asa result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation, but also to that of Your Excellency, I considerit my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking NorthAmerican troops in the places conquered by tho Filipinos from theSpanish, without previous notice to this government, because as noformal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippinepeople might consider the occupation of its territories by NorthAmerican troops as a violation of its rights. 

"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron thePhilippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidily. Becauseof this I take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency thenecessity that before disembarking, you should communicate in writingto this government the places that are to be occupied and also theobject of the occupation, that the people may be advised in dueform and (thus) prevent the commission of any transgression againstfriendship. "--P. I. R. , Books C-1. 

[122] Blount, p. 59. 

[123] On July 15 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Urgent. Received a telegram from the captain adjutant, who is inParañaque, of the following tenor: 'I inform your excellency thattwo cascos of armed Americans have arrived at this point. I awaitorders from Your Excellency. ' Which I hasten to communicate to YourExcellency for the proper action. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

Later on the same day Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce with three hundred men waiting for moretroops from Cavite, and also orders, but not to attack. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[124] Captain Torres telegraphed Aguinaldo on July 15 as follows:--

"I have read all your telegrams and carried out the same, and Iincidentally questioned them about their purposes, [they] replying thatthey will aid; let time demonstrate it. They also intend to encamp overhere at Parañaque. I will report to you any occurrence. "--P. I. R. , 69. 6. 

[125] P. I. R. , 69. 5. 

[126] Ibid. , 849. 

[127] "Admiral Dewey's Aide was here to-day. I told him I was ignorantof your whereabouts and, if he had no objection, he might talk withme as I am your representative; but he said that he could not do so, as he had orders to speak with you personally, about something veryimportant. He then departed. "--P. I. R. , 1179. 5. 

[128] The following telegram was addressed to the President or theSecretary of War by Sulpicio at Bacoor, on August 8, 1898:--

"Last night I received a telegram from General Noriel, askingfor 100 cavanes of rice which he needs immediately, since he hasordered to send him all the troops here on account of the landing ofAmericans in Parañaque. General Mascardo will send him the troopswhich are here. There are 56 bundles [of rice. --TR. ] deposited inthis storehouse. "--P. I. R. , 1179. 5. 

[129] This man's record is not known to me. Apparently he was anofficer in the Spanish army, for he is later reported as surrenderingto the Insurgents at Santa Ana on August 13, 1898. See footnote 4, p. 104. 

[130] Taylor, 33 AJ. 

[131] Artemio Ricarte was one of the ranking Insurgent generalsdirecting operations against Manila. 

[132] P. I. R. , 1087. 5. 

[133] Taylor, 30 AJ. 

[134] Taylor, 30 AJ. 

[135] P. I. R. , 849. 

[136] On August 2, 1899, Agoncillo wrote Mabini:--

"I send Don Emilio the information I have been able to obtain here, in order that in view thereof you [plural] may consider the bestsolution of our present political problem, which is an exceptionalcase in history. In my opinion, the most critical moment, which Icall agonizing, whether correctly or not I know not, is the capture ofManila, where General Merritt will constitute a provisional government, in compliance with the instructions from his Government. It isunnecessary to recommend that you observe great tact, great prudence, when this event occurs. Ascertain the real wishes of the people inthis conflict and the war resources at our disposal and those whichyou may count on during the struggle until its termination. "

--P. I. R. , 451. 3. 

In his document entitled "Means for Attaining Filipino Independence"Aguinaldo had written:--

"VIII. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutionists must occupyall Manila including the Walled City with the object and purpose thatthe nation possessing the Philippines according to the decision of thePowers will be forced to come to an understanding with the Filipinosto avoid the shedding of blood. "--P. I. R. , 457. 5. 

[137] Taylor, 29 AJ. 

[138] That is, the surrender of Manila. 

[139] Fort San Antonio A'bad. 

[140] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2943. 

[141] "I must tell you that I feel as you should feel in regard toour government not having officially participated in the capitulationof Manila. Accordingly the war must be continued with Spain, because, if we attack to-night, the Americans, acting upon the request of theSpaniards and foreigners in addition to those who took part in thecapitulation, will have to ask us to suspend operations; hence we shallbe included in the negotiations and this will work to our advantage. 

"To-night at 2 A. M. You will attack without fail in order that we maybe included in the capitulation which the Americans made to-day. Youmust not stop the attacks because they do, and this is also the opinionof our partisans among the foreigners. "--P. I. R. , 1179. 5 & 427. 5. 

[142] "Our Rule in the Philippines, " The _North American Review_, 1900, No. 170. 

[143] General Ricarte to Aguinaldo, August 12, 1898, 11. 15 P. M. :

"Have received the telegram from your honourable person regardingattack at four o'clock in the morning, although we will make theattack anyway. I have directed Gen. Pío Del Pilar begin firing cannonat the hour set. At the present time we are making preparations andwill also give orders to the chiefs of the columns. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[144] "August 13, 1898. 

"Dated. Camp Dewey 13. To General Aguinaldo. Commanding PhilippineForces, Bacoor: Do not let your troops enter Manila without thepermission of the American commander on this side of Pasig river. Youwill be under our fire. 

"_Anderson_, Brig. General. "

--P. I. R. , 102-10. 

[145] "Copy: Gen. Riego, Cavite: Have just received a note fromGen. Anderson saying to me he does not permit my troops to enter Manilawithout permission from the American commander on this side of thePasig River. They will be under his fire. Go with Señor Buencaminoand ask for an explanation, in writing if possible, as to the motivefor said note, without losing a moment. August 13, '98. E. A. "

--P. I. R. , 849. 

[146] "I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. Inconsequence of this I have not answered until now. My troops areforced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire frompositions taken. It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I shouldlament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty withmine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to takeManila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preservestrict respect to American forces and to aid them in ease they areattacked by a common enemy. "

[147] Gregorio Araneta, later a member of the Philippine Commissionand Secretary of Finance and Justice. He was Secretary of Justiceunder the Malolos government, and was also secretary of the InsurgentCongress. He was at this time a bright young lawyer of good abilityand character. 

[148] P. I. R. , 849. 

[149] _Ibid_. 

[150] P. I. R. , 849. 

[151] _Ibid_. , 849. 

[152] _Ibid_. , 1179. 5. 

[153] _Ibid_. 

[154] _Ibid_. 

[155] Report of War Dept. , 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 69. 

[156] Taylor, Exhibit 739. 

[157] The following two telegrams were sent by General Pio del Pilarto Aguinaldo at 9. 30 P. M. :--

"I inform you that the Bayambang troops who have presented themselvesbefore me when we entered Santa Ana this afternoon, are: 4 lieutenants, 171 soldiers with their respective rifles and ammunitions, MajorFernando Acevedo, Captain Licerio Geronimo, 1 Spanish lieutenant, and 1 prisoner by the name of Enrique Flores. All of them I put underyour orders. "--P. I. R. , 1179. 5. 

"Very urgent. I inform you of the capture made by my soldiers:2 lieutenants of the Marine Corps, 2 lieutenants of the SpanishInfantry, 52 soldiers. Rifles about 400. I put them under your ordersand await your instructions. "--P. I. R. , 1179. 5. 

[158] The Spanish Governor-General. 

[159] P. I. R. , 1300. 2. 

[160] Taylor, 58 HJ. 

[161] _Ibid_. , 59. 

[162] See footnote 2, p. 108. 

[163] P. I. R. , Books C-1. 

[164] Taylor, 15 AJ. 

[165] The word Indios, here translated "Indians, " means MalayanFilipinos of pure blood as distinguished from _mestizos_ or peopleof mixed blood. 

[166] P. I. R. , 918. 2. 

[167] The following telegram was sent by Colonel José to Aguinaldo:--

"Urgent. August 20, 1898: Colonel López reports that our troops arestill sacking and committing outrages in Malate, Paco and Ermita, even menacing people with their arms. Urge you to take proper measuresto stop these abuses. "--P. I. R. , 1167. 3. 

[168] Extract from a letter of August 20, 1899, from Mabini toAguinaldo:

"Señor López, your adjutant, arrived and told me of many complaintsregarding the behaviour of the soldiers. He says that our officerscarry off many horses, some of them belonging to foreigners. If theforeigners should enter a protest against such doings, I do not knowwhat will be thought of our government. 

"It is also absolutely necessary that a stop should be put to thepasses, and that the tax on merchandise entering Manila, should nolonger be exacted. It is absolutely necessary, if you think wellof it, for us to promote General Pío, and make him your second incommand. It is necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, as we cannot remove him by force; and do not reprimand him. 

"If you approve, I will write a Decree, but I reflect that nothingwill succeed, if our commanders are not obliged to comply. "

--P. I. R. , 472. 13. 

[169] _I. E. _ the Americans. 

[170] P. I. R. , 458. 8. 

[171] Major J. F. Bell accompanied Sandico on this trip. 

[172] P. I. R. , 1166. 12. 

[173] "I regret very much to have to inform you that as long aspersonal property is not respected here in Manila especially, by someof our men, as long as personal security does not exist and as longas prisoners are tortured, we cannot hope to deserve the confidenceof the other governments. Murders, thefts of carriages and horses, are very frequent here, as is kidnapping, ... 

"Sergeant Barcena, of the Fifth Company of the Second Zone, thatis the zone of General Pío del Pilar, informed me that the cruelofficers of that Zone, were Major Carmona and a lieutenant who wasformerly a barber. 

"I know that the Government has ordered that private persons andproperty be respected and has withdrawn from the military the power oftrying civilians; but in view of the fact that notwithstanding thisrestriction some of them continue to discharge powers of which theyhave been divested, I find it necessary to call your attention thereto, in order that more energetic measures may be adopted so that othernations may not be led to believe that our government is very weak. 

"In the jurisdiction of the Americans, I have surprised small groupsof officers, who devote themselves to summoning persons before themand arresting them. These groups can be found in Binondo, Tondo andTrozo. I have used all friendly measures to secure their dissolution, but if they continue their conduct, I shall be obliged to turn themover to the American authorities, although I inform you that I shallnot make use of such measures, until diplomatic means are exhausted. 

"I understand very well that in endeavouring to stop the abusescommitted by our officers and by the Filipinos who claim to belong tous, in Manila, I expose myself to becoming a victim of their vengeance;nevertheless, this does not terrify me, because my duty to the countryrequires it. 

"I beg of you that if you take any steps against Major Carmona and thebarber lieutenant, to be very careful and call General Pío del Pilarand come to an understanding with him as to the mode of punishmentof these officers .... 

"I have discovered grave cases which are occurring in the Presidio ofManila, which I propose to relate to you when I shall have the honorto see you personally. The Americans are already aware of these cases, and are working in their own interest untiringly. 

"I could tell you a good many other things, but I do not do so onaccount of lack of time, and because I wish to reserve them until I canspeak to you privately. In the meantime, order me as you will, etc. "

--P. I. R. , 416. 7. 

[174] "General Anderson received us very well, but in the proposedagreement the clauses requiring the prior permission of our commandersbefore American troops could pass or approach our lines displeased himvery much. Gen. Anderson refuses to treat until after the withdrawalof Noriel's troops. I think it prudent to yield. This telegram is inamplification of another which, at the request of Gen. Anderson, wesent through his telegraph station to your excellency. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[175] "It is impossible to order General Noriel to fall back becauseif we order it they will ask the same thing from General Pío andwe shall get nothing ourselves. And the worst is that after we haveevacuated Manila and its environs they will follow us up to our newpositions to take them too without our being able to obtain fromthem any formal statement of the concession signed in duo form. Thoconflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by askingas favours of them what are really our rights. We shall maintain themas long as we are able, confiding in Providence and in Justice. Iconfirm my last telegram. Tell General Anderson that we shall holda meeting of the council of Government in order to decide. Pleasereturn here soon with your companions. I inclose the map which I hopeyou will return. "--P. I. R. , 427. 1. 

[176] Senate Document No. 208, p. 22. 

[177] _Ibid_. , p. 23. 

[178] _Ibid_. , p. 26. 

[179] Senate Document No. 208, p. 24. 

[180] Pío del Pilar. 

[181] Report of the War Department, 1899, Vol. I, part IV, pp. 5-10. 

[182] See Buencamino's letter to Jáudines, p. 108. 

[183] Taylor 36 AJ. _et seq_. 

[184] See p. 41. 

[185] P. I. R. , 427. 1. 

[186] "The insolent commentary of the American Consul here, if it istrue, clearly shows the intention of America to impose her will upon usby force. In this case, the conflict will come sooner or later. Wouldit not be better for us to provoke the conflict while the Americanshave not as yet concentrated their troops there? Or would it be betterto wait for the results of the Congress of Paris? This question shouldbe answered immediately by the committee on foreign relations of theCongress of representatives and the decision should be sent at onceto us so that we can proceed according to your instructions. "--P. I. R. , 453. 11. 

[187] "I gave an order long ago not to permit our line to be passed, and to say frankly that it was by my order. To be prepared to defendour rights you are ordered to place troops in front of Americanposition at Sampaloc and to tell them plainly to leave, to warnthe Sandatahan [bolo men. --D. C. W. ] and get everything ready; youmust warn the commanders of the zones about Manila. Do not forget, whenever in doubt. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[188] P. I. R. , 88. 9. 

[189] P. I. R. , 88. 9. 

[190] _Ibid. _

[191] P. I. R. , 88. 9. 

[192] _Ibid_. , 849. 

[193] "Until the decision of the Paris Congress is known, all of ushere are of the opinion that you should maintain a defensive attituderegarding the Americans, giving way to them with regard to Manila andits suburbs or in anything they may wish, although apparently only, and not show them your teeth. After the decision of the Congressis known, you may take the offensive if advisable, and according tothe information we may have of the American soldiers it should not bedifficult for you and your army to settle accounts with them. "--P. I. R. , 398. 6. 

[194] "If you and the Americans should happen to come in conflictbefore the departure of the Spanish soldiers, it might happen thatthe Yankees would enter into an alliance with them to combat theFilipinos. Think well over this. "--P. I. R. , 398. 6. 

[195] "It is also of urgent necessity, Señor President, to reëstablishcommittees in all the suburbs and that the masons and the Katipúnan bereorganized, and it is advisable that all be provided with knives readyfor any event, but it is proper that these arms be hidden. "--P. I. R. , 466. 9. 

[196] "Our soldiers are always desirous of fighting in order tobring affairs to an end, as they are very resentful with regard tothe evacuation of the suburbs mentioned. "--P. I. R. , Books C-1. 

[197] "Most urgent. Have received telegraphic order from War Dept. , which says: 'Prevent American troops from disembarking. ' In case theyinsist what am I to do? May I begin firing?"

This telegram was indorsed by Aguinaldo:--

"Answered affirmatively December 1, 1898. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[198] "Most urgent. According to despatch from Captain detached atBatangas, American divers are working unceasingly. He says that heordered them to be fired on in case they try to land. Await yourreply. "

Aguinaldo's reply ran as follows:--

"I do not mind their working at sea, but you must under no conditionsallow them to land troops; be brave for the sake of your Tagálogheart. Approve your action. "--P. I. R. , 1179. 2. 

[199] P. I. R. , 849. 

[200] _Ibid_. 

[201] _Ibid_. 

[202] 56 AJ. 

[203] "We are constantly alarmed here by American troops who wishto come within the military line. To-day received word from secondchief, second zone, Manila, that as soon as they opened fire againstthe American troops I assist by entering Manila. I have no orders inthis matter; I await your directions. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[204] P. I. R. , 849. 

[205] Taylor, 70 AJ. 

[206] "It is absolutely necessary that an order be received herepermitting the uprising of those in prison before the movement isbegun anywhere else; in the prison the word shall be given at themoment the bugle sounds retreat; it is indispensable that some of ourparty be prepared in the vicinity of the Iris bridge, San Pedro streetand Dulumbrayan bridge, in order to prevent the Americans quarteredin the Pennsylvania barracks (Zorilla theatre) from aiding those inthe prison. "--P. I. R. , 73. 3. 

[207] P. I. R. , 40. 8. 

[208] _Ibid_. , Books C-1. 

[209] _Ibid_. , 1141. 3. 

[210] P. I. R. , 1186. 10. 

[211] _Ibid_. , 849. 

[212] See p. 733. 

[213] Taylor, 68-69 AJ. 

[214] P. I. R. , 206-207. 

[215] "Above all I expect that you will respect the persons and goodsof private persons of all nationalities, including the Chinese; thatyou will treat well the prisoners and grant life to those of theenemy who surrender. And that you be on the sharp lookout for thosetraitors and enemies who, by robbery, will seek to mar our victory. "

[216] P. I. R. , 849. 

[217] _Ibid_. 

[218] For the document on which this statement is based see p. 733. 

[219] P. I. R. , 849. 

[220] Taylor, 81 AJ. 

[221] "In reply to your telegram concerning your dream of enteringManila after four hours of combat. I have the honour to inform youfor myself and the officers and soldiers under my command that yourdream will come true as soon as the conflict with the Americans begins, since we shall advance at any cost. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[222] On January 21, 1899, the commander of the fourth zone, Caloocan, wired Aguinaldo that:

"Julian Santo, commander of the territorial militia of Trozo, informsme that 400 native soldiers of the Spanish army to-day incorporatedin his militia. He lives in the walled city, and he wants to knowyour opinion upon the present situation, since the Americans want tohold them as prisoners or confine them in Bilibid prison. "

(Indorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "Tell the Filipino soldiersin the walled city affiliated to our cause that they must keepon good terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, andprevent their confining them, since the hoped-for moment has not yetarrived. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[223] On January 20, 1899, a correspondent wrote to one of theInsurgents abroad:

"In some places (in Manila) there have been fights with bolos betweenFilipinos and Americans who wanted to tear down the proclamation ofour president while the people defended it with their bolos. Theysay that it amuses them to see the Americans run when they draw theirknives. It is said that some 10, 000 servants have gone on strike. SomeAmericans have already disappeared by the method of 'dukut' but itwill not be proper to publish this in my opinion. "--P. I. R. , 980. 82. 

[224] Taylor, AJ. 73. 

[225] (Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo:)

"To the President of the Republic, Malolos, from the ProvincialGovernor of Manila, San Juan del Monte, Jan. 29, 1899, 10. 25 A. M. :I yesterday visited the military road in process of construction, Santa Ana to Pineda. Tomorrow it will be sufficiently completed topermit passage, and in two days after it will be finished. Consideringopening another military road direct from Caloocan to San Juan. Desireauthority. 

(Endorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "Telegram received. I am verymuch satisfied, and in the name of the government I congratulate youand the presidents of Santa Ana and Pineda with their inhabitantsfor their efforts for the public good. You are authorized to openanother military road from Caloocan to San Juan del Monte, and Iwant you to endeavor to finish it this week, as I am certain youwill. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

(Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo:)

"To the Secretary of the Interior, Malolos, from Sah Juan delMonte--Received Feb. 3, 1899 from the Provincial Governor Manila:Road marked out; work began Wednesday. I shall put forth every effortto finish by middle of the coming week. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[226] Taylor, 73 AJ. 

[227] Taylor, 73 AJ. 

[228] P. I. R. , 2018. 

[229] _Ibid_. , 1090. 5. 

[230] P. I. R. , 453. 4. 

[231] P. I. R. , 453. 2. 

[232] P. I. R. , 493. 12. 

[233] Blount, p. 190. 

[234] Taylor, 86 AJ. 

[235] Blount, p. 175. 

[236] Blount, p. 98. 

[237] The constitution used was most certainly not patterned afterour own. See p. 265. 

[238] Blount, p. 111. 

[239] "The light Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox throw on the then universalacknowledgment of the authority of the Aguinaldo government and theperfect tranquillity and public order maintained under it, in theCagayan valley. "--Blount, pp. 114-115. 

[240] "The country in fact, as Aguinaldo always claimed in hisproclamations of that period seeking recognition of his governmentby the Powers, in a state of profound peace and tranquillity--freefrom brigandage and the like. "--Blount, p. 115. 

[241] P. I. R. , 958. 11. 

[242] P. I. R. , 849. 

[243] Blount, p. 108. 

[244] _Ibid_. , p. 109. 

[245] "With a view to showing every one and especially foreignerstravelling through the territory of the Republic, that we are notopposed to a good such as a refined and civilized people should have, the fronts of buildings should be whitewashed, streets should becleaned and fences repaired. "--P. I. R. , 292. 3. 

[246] "It would be a great satisfaction to me to aid you with allmy strength; and the only thing that I see to object to is that theCommanders and Generals in this province are getting pretty abusivetoward our brethren and allow themselves to be bribed by the Tagálogmerchants so as to allow them to enter Manila with their goods, which is of great assistance to our enemies. 

"Concerning the contributions which I have collected from the Chinamen, it amounts to more than P2, 000 here in Tambobong, Meycauayan andPolo alone; and those from the other pueblos have not yet come tosee me. Furthermore, I would like an order from you prohibiting theoutrages that are being committed against such merchants as are notour enemies; and when the contributions from the Chinamen of all thepueblos shall have been completed, I wish to publish a proclamationforbidding any injury to the Chinamen and any interference with theirsmall business enterprises; since this is a disgrace to our governmentand to your name; for the natives of hereabouts themselves are thepeople who are committing said abuses, and in hopes of putting astop to them, I await your decision at the earliest possible momentconcerning the proclamation referred to. "--P. I. R. , 355. 11. 

[247] "Last night in the place known as Santo Cristo (Manila?) thestore of J. Ricafort, a Chinaman, was entered by five soldiers of ourarmy under an unknown commander supposed to be Colonel Paua. Theytried to kidnap the wife of Ricafort. At the request of P. Garcíathey desisted upon payment of 20 pesos and the agreement that 100pesos would be paid later. If this was not done they would returnand hang them. To quiet these people I gave them a pass to assuretheir personal safety, and exacted at the same time a promise thatthey should not report the matter to the Americans. Pauline Garcíais now at Pedro Macati. "--P. I. R. , 1187. 4. 

[248] P. I. R. , 223. 

[249] "Early in the war we had availed ourselves of a certain tribe, or clan, known as the Maccabebes, who look nowise different from allother Filipinos, but who had, under the Spanish government, by reasonof long-standing feuds with their more rebellious neighbours, cometo be absolutely loyal to the Spanish authorities. When we came theyhad transferred that loyalty to us, and had now become a recognizedand valuable part of our military force. "--Blount, pp. 333-334. 

[250] "On July 28, 1898, the head of the province of Pampanga wrotethat the punishment of beating people in the plaza and tying themup so that they would be exposed to the full rays of the sun shouldbe stopped. He complained that these methods had been carried so farthat even people of good social position had been so punished. It wasespecially undesirable to employ such punishments, as the people ofother nations weeing them would not believe that the reign of liberty, equality, and fraternity had begun in the Philippines. "--P. I. R. , 196. 3. 

[251] Taylor, 47 AJ. 

[252] P. I. R. , 944. 

[253] "I have the honour to inform you that I have been in this townsince yesterday afternoon issuing, in a proclamation, conciliatoryorders to the populace that the people comprised in the uprisingmust present themselves and express aversion and repudiation ofit, promising them consideration and pardon as long as they layaside arms. In compliance with and following the earlier publishedproclamation, they presented two guns and innumerable bolos. I hopesoon for tranquillity among the people there through these efforts. Iask dispense with assembly of the Junta. _Camilin_, November 30, 1898. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[254] P. I. R. , 849. 

[255] _Ibid. _

[256] P. I. R. 849. 

[257] _Ibid. _

[258] _Ibid. _

[259] Gregorio Aglipay, an Ilocano Catholic priest who became anactive Insurgent leader. Later he abandoned the Catholic faith andset up a new church which gained many adherents in the Philippines. 

[260] P. I. R. , 849. 

[261] _Ibid. _

[262] _Ibid. _

[263] P. I. R. , 1231. 2. 

[264] Taylor, 62 AJ. 

[265] P. I. R. , 77. 

[266] P. I. R. , 47. 7. 

[267] _Ibid_. , 951. 3. 

[268] Blount, p. 109. 

[269] P. I. R. , 1006. 

[270] P. I. R. , 870. 4. 

[271] Blount, p. 113. 

[272] _Ibid_. , p. 111

[273] At Carig, Isabela. 

[274] Taylor, 43 AJ. 

[275] See p. 731. 

[276] The parsonage, or residence of the priest. 

[277] Insurgent officers. 

[278] Their on commander so reported. See p. 202. 

[279] Shortly afterward "elected" governor. 

[280] This form of torture is commonly referred to in the Philippinesas the "water cure. "

[281] Major Delfin commanded the expedition which took Nueva Vizcaya. 

[282] P. I. R. , 246. 3. 

[283] Dimas Guzman. 

[284] Blount, p. 112. 

[285] Blount, p. 114. 

[286] Blount, p. 113

[287] Blount, p. 114. 

[288] A distance of 120 miles. 

[289] "The former Spanish Governor of the Province was of course aprisoner in Villa's custody. Villa had the ex-Governor brought in, for the travellers to see him, and remarked, in his presence to them, 'This is the man who robbed this province of twenty-five thousanddollars during the last year of his office. '"--Blount, p. 115. 

[290] _La Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas_, a very strongcommercial organization. 

[291] "I call your attention to the fact that the only terms tothe surrender were to respect life, and it was for this reason thatI seized all the money they [i. E. The friars, --D. C. W. ] had hiddenaway, which was accomplished by applying the stick. In this capitalI found thirty-four thousand dollars in silver and a draft on theCompañia General de Tabacos for twenty thousand dollars which can becollected here... 

"The bearer can give you more details concerning the abusescommitted in this province of Vizcayana by the forces of Mayor DuflinEsquizel. Also, I wish to inform you that we have done nothing to theCompañia General de Tabacos, for we have learned from their recordsthat much of their stock is held by Frenchmen, and consequently we feara conflict. For this reason we await your orders on this matter. Wetook all the arms we found in their possession, however. "--P. I. R. , 271. 2. 

[292] P. I. R. 192. 4. 

[293] "I was in that town, for a similar purpose, with Governor Taft in1901, after a bloody war which almost certainly would not have occurredhad the Paris Peace Commission known the conditions then existing, justlike this, all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands. "--Blount, p. 116. 

[294] "On account of this the vulgar people doubted the legality ofour actions in the collection of taxes, and accordingly it becamedifficult; and this, coupled with the inveterate abuses of the headsof the towns, which the head of the province was not able to perceivein time to check, caused a tumult in Echague, which, owing to wisecouncils and efforts at pacification, was appeased without it beingfollowed by serious consequences; but I have no doubt that this tumultwas due only to the suggestions of ungovernable and passionate personsanimated by the spirit of faction, since those who took part in itwere all Ilocanos, no native of Echague having any hand in it. Thesame thing occurred in Naguilian, where the disorders were alsoquieted. Not only did I make no report of all this to the government ofthe republic on account of the abnormality of the present conditions, but I also succeeded in concealing them from the foreigners here sothat they should not succeed in discovering the truth, which wouldbe to the prejudice of our cause. "--Taylor, 42 AJ. 

[295] "I may add that as judge of that district in 1901-2 there camebefore me a number of cases in the trial of which the fact would bebrought out of this or that difference among the local authoritieshaving been referred to the Malolos Government for settlement. Andthey always awaited until they heard from it, "--Blount, p 112. 

[296] "General Otis's reports are full of the most inexcusableblounders about how 'the Tagals' took possession of the variousprovinces and just about those of a New Yorker or a Bostonian sent upto Vermont in the days of the American Revolution to help organizethe resistance there, in conjunction with one of the local leadersof the patriot cause in the Green Mountain State. "--Blount, p. 112. 

[297] Blount, p. 114. 

[298] Taylor, 42 AJ. 

[299] Blount, p. 111. 

[300] P. I. R. , 974. 3. 

[301] "December 20, 1898. 

"_To the Honorable President of the Revolutionary Government_. 

"The undersigned residents of the _barangay_ of D. Francisco Querubínand D. Melchor Balueg, of Bucay, of the province of Abra, appeal toyou with the utmost subjection from their place of residence and state:That their heads or representatives, D. Francisco Querubín and MelchorBalueg, respectively, force them to pay two _pesos_ each as a war tax, your humble vassals above cited being hardly able to earn their ownlivelihood and support their families, and, notwithstanding theirlabor, some of them cannot get anything to eat without appealing tothe charity of their richer neighbours; but notwithstanding this sadsituation, they offer a _peseta_ each as a mark of gratitude to themother country, Filipinas, but said gentlemen, the representativesmentioned, have not the slightest pity and worry us to the extentof having kept us in our houses a day and a night without anythingto eat, not even permitting us to go out to get a drink. 

"We must inform you that the head of the _barangay_, D. Melchor Balueg, when he gathers the supplies for the troops stationed in his town, saidsupplies consisting of rice, pigs, chickens and eggs, uses one-halfof what is gathered, and then again orders his assistants to save. "

"In fact, the undersigned request you to direct that the _peseta_which they offer be accepted and that the said Don Francisco Querubínand Don Melchor Balueg be relieved of their duties, in order to puta stop to the abuses constantly committed by them; and if this benot done, the petitioners will be obliged to leave their homes andproperty in the town and take up their residences in the mountainswith the Negritos and Igorots, in order that the others may remainin the town and live tranquilly. 

"This is a grace which we do not doubt we will receive from you, whose life may God preserve for many years. 

"_Bucay_, November 12, 1898. " (26 signatures)

(In blue pencil in the handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "It will be approved. 

"Dec. 20, 1898. 

"E. A. "

--P. I. R. , 991. 4. 

[302] P. I. R. , 849. 

[303] Blount, p. 130. 

[304] _Ibid_. , pp. 130-131. 

[305] P. I. R. , 1142. 4. 

[306] _Ibid_. , 2002. 3. 

[307] P. I. R. , 964. 3. 

[308] On November 30, 1898, the commander in Alaminos, ZambalesProvince, telegraphed that his soldiers were all about to desert asthe head of the town would not furnish rations or pay without ordersfrom the governor. "--P. I. R. , 2002. 3. 

[309] "On December 22, Aguinaldo, in accordance with a request fromthe governor of Zambales Province, ordered the heads of the provincesof Pangasinán, Tarlac, Bataan, and Pampanga to prohibit the peopleof their provinces from going to Zambales without passports signed bythem, stating the route they were to take in going and returning andthe length of time to be spent in the journey. The governor of Zambaleshad asked for this regulation in order to prevent the commission ofrobberies in Zambales and to distinguish persons justly subject tosuspicion from those of good conduct. "--P. I. R. , 266. 3. 

[310] "On January 9, the governor of Zambales found it impossibleto continue the inspection of certain towns of his province and tocontinue holding elections, as many of the officials had fled to escapethe exactions and abuses of the military commanders. "--P. I. R. , 988. 2. 

[311] "The Governor of Cavite reports two drunken Americans have beenkilled by our soldiers. I tell him to have an investigation immediatelyand report the fact to the American commander. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[312] "Most urgent. Gen. Anderson informs me in a letter that, 'in order to avoid the very serious misfortune of an encounterbetween our troops, I demand your immediate withdrawal with yourguard from Cavite. One of my men has been killed and three woundedby your people. ' This is positive and does not admit of explanationor delay. I ask you to inform me of your decision. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[313] "_Gen. Riego de Dios, Cavite_: Telegram received. Do notleave the post, and say that you cannot abandon the city withoutmy orders, and say that he was not killed by our soldiers, but bythem themselves [the Americans. --D. C. W. ], since they were drunk, according to your telegram. Give up your life before abandoning thatplace, and investigate matters. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[314] "Urgent. Gen. Alvarez telegraphed that Riego de Dios informed himthat the town of Maragondong had risen in arms on account of abusescommitted by the local President against Salvador Riego. This is thereason the town took up arms. Will go there to-morrow. "--P. I. R. , 849. 

[315] Taylor, 19 AJ. 

[316] P. I. R. , 1057. 4. 

[317] Taylor, 95 HS. 

[318] The name applied to the Filipinos of Ambos Camarines, Albayand Sorsogón. 

[319] P. I. R. , 262. 3. 

[320] Taylor, 48 AJ. 

[321] Blount, p. 116. 

[322] Accepting the 1903 census figures. 

[323] Aguinaldo considered Mindanao important enough to form one of thethree federal states into which he proposed to divide the Philippines. 

[324] Blount, p. 228. 

[325] _Ibid_. , p. 229. 

[326] Bandits, or organized robbers. 

[327] The old Spanish name for Palawan. 

[328] Blount, p. 228. 

[329] P. I. R. , 944. 10. 

[330] Blount, p. 116. 

[331] Blount, p. 229. 

[332] According to the census of 1903, 154, 706. 

[333] See table on p. 651. 

[334] (Contemporary copy in Spanish. --P. I. R. , Books C-L:)

"January 19, 1899. 

"The President of the Philippine Republic very cordially greets hisgreat and powerful brother, the Sultan of Jolo, and makes known:--

"That the Filipinos, after having thrown off the yoke of foreigndomination cannot forget their brothers of Jolo to whom they arebound by the ties of race, interests, security and defense in thisregion of the Far East. 

"The Philippine Republic has resolved to respect absolutely thebeliefs and traditions of each island in order to establish on solidbases the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual interests. 

"I therefore in the name of all the Filipinos very gladly offer tothe powerful Sultan of Jolo and to all brothers who acknowledge hisgreat authority, the highest assurance of friendship, considerationand esteem. 

"_Malolos_, January 18, 1899. "

(No signature. )

[335] P. I. R. , 76. 1. 

[336] From an official document on file at Manila. 

[337] "Being brothers, the descendants of the same race and of onesoul, the same sun shines upon us and we breathe the same air, sothat our sentiments are also one, and we aspire to the independenceand liberty of our country in order to secure its progress and placeit on a level with other civilized nations; and with this assurance Ihave taken the liberty to address you this letter, begging of you toaccept the commission which in the name of our government I have thehonour to confer upon you. You are authorized thereunder to establishin all the 'Rancherias' of Mindanao and Jolo, a civil and militaryeconomic-administrative organization, in accordance with the decreeswhich I enclose herewith, and after having established the same, I request that you make a report to our Honourable President of thePhilippine Republic, Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo, of the result thereofand of the number of the force with their arms and ammunition, inorder to ascertain whether they would be sufficient to prevent theinvasion of the enemy and whether there is any necessity of sendingreinforcements of arms to said Islands for this purpose. If in thiswar, which I consider to be the last, we secure our independence, andwith the opposition of our brothers in that region, with yourself attheir head, we are successful in preventing the enemy from gaining afoothold, the grateful country will always render a tribute of homageand gratitude to your memory. 

"God preserve you many years. 

"May 31, 1899. "_Baldomero Aguinaldo_, "Lieut. Gen. Superior P. M. Commander of Southern Region. 

"To _The Honourable Sultan Raha Halon_"

--P. I. R. , 810-4. 

[338] Spanish for "mountain people. "

[339] P. I. R. , 512. A 5. 

[340] Extract from a letter to Apacible of the Hongkong junta datedFebruary 26, 1899:--

"It is also said that the Cantonal Government of Negros has wishedto make a treaty with the Americans, some members of that governmenthaving come in American transports to confer with General Otis. Weare not aware of the conditions of the arrangement, because the Negrospeople have thus far not wished to put themselves in communication withus; we only know by news more or loss reliable that the capital of thatisland has been occupied by the American forces without opposition. 

"Of Mindanao we know absolutely nothing; we also are ignorant of whathas been the lot of our agents in America. "

[341] "Of the Visayas and Mindanao we know nothing positive as yet, itis whispered that the Americans have succeeded in occupying Negros andCebú against the will of the inhabitants. Iloílo continues the struggleenergetically. It does not matter that they occupy temporarily thosebeautiful islands, because Luzón will know how to fight for herselfand the rest of the islands, and will not lay down arms without theindependence of the Philippine Archipelago. "

[342] Blount, p. 140. 

[343] P. I. R. , 62. 2. 

[344] _Ibid_. , 144. 1. 

[345] "The second reason for my resignation is the pain caused me byhaving still to read among the reports of our military associates thatin some of the chiefs, besides odious favouritism, is clearly seen adesire to enrich themselves, accepting bribes, making even prisonersa means of gain, and others there are, above all the commissaries, who dare to decrease the allowance of the soldier, little enoughalready;--I throw the blame of all this upon those who taught us sucha custom; consequently I have reason to hope that they will changetheir methods. 

"The same cause of complaint I have concerning some companions whoare discharging civil offices, especially those who are far fromthe oversight of the government, who put their own welfare beforethe common good, and devise a thousand means to further their ownends, even to the extent of gambling. Where are the police? Are they, perchance, also bribed? Pity money is so ill spent! However, every oneis obliged to know that falsehood will never prevail against truth, and as evidence hereof many soldiers have confessed to the governmentas to having received certain sums in the share of the booty, andif we consider that the latter who receive their share have told thetruth, why should those who are present during the partition of themoney and receive nothing, not do so? In this way the eyes of somethat were blinded are gradually opened; I confess, moreover, thatthe latter are to be blamed less than those in authority who are soattached to the methods of the past administration, who, we may hope, will change their mode of conduct and exhibit true patriotism. 

 * * * * *

"I certify to the truth of all the above-mentioned evils, which mustbe eradicated. I retain the evidence for presentation when called on, so that if any of the readers hereof should consider themselvesreferredto and should resent it, I am ready to beg their pardon. "--P. I. R. , 8. 2. 

[346] Blount, p. 108. 

[347] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2928-2941. 

[348] P. I. R. , 838-2. 

[349] In this connection note Blount's statement:--

"But we are considering how much of a government the Filipinos hadin 1898, because the answer is pertinent to what sort of a governmentthey could run if permitted now or at any time in the future. "--Blount, p. 73. 

[350] Blount refers to

"The death-warrant of the Philippine republic signed by Mr. McKinleyon September 16th. "--Blount, p. 99. 

Speaking of Mr. Roosevelt's opinion of the practicability of grantingindependence to the Filipinos, he says--

"Yet it represented then one of the many current misapprehensionsabout the Filipinos which moved this great nation to destroy a youngrepublic set up in a spirit of intelligent and generous emulation ofour own. "--Blount, p. 230. 

[351] "Here was a man claiming to be President of a newly establishedrepublic based on the principles set forth in our Declaration ofIndependence, which republic had just issued a like Declaration, and hewas invited to come and hear our declaration read, and declined becausewe would not recognize his right to assert the same truths. "--Blount, p. 59. 

[352] "The war satisfied us all that Aguinaldo would havebeen a small edition of Porfirio Diaz, and that the Filipinorepublic-that-might-have-been would have been, very decidedly, 'a going concern, ' although Aguinaldo probably would have been ableto say with a degree of accuracy, as Diaz might have said in Mexicofor so many years, 'The Republic? I am the Republic. '"--Blount, p. 292. 

[353] "The war demonstrated to the army, to a Q. E. D. , that theFilipinos are 'capable of self-government, ' unless the kind whichhappens to suit the genius of the American people is the only kind ofgovernment on earth that is respectable, and the one panacea for allthe ills of government among men without regard to their temperament orhistorical antecedents. The educated patriotic Filipinos can controlthe masses of the people in their several districts as completely asa captain ever controlled a company. "--Blount, p. 292. 

[354] "Even to-day the presidente of a pueblo is as absolute bossof his town as Charles F. Murphy is in Tammany Hall. And a town orpueblo in the Philippines is more than an area covered by more orless contiguous buildings and grounds. It is more like a townshipin Massachusetts, so that when you account governmentally for thepueblos of a given province, you account for every square foot ofthat province and for every man in it. "

[355] "In there reviewing the Samar and other insurrections of 1905in the Philippines, you find him (_i. E. _ Roosevelt) dealing withthe real root of the evil with perfect honesty, though adopting theview that the Filipino people were to blame therefor, because wehad placed too much power in the hands of an ignorant electorate, which had elected rascally officials. "--Blount, p. 297. 

Also:--

"But we proceeded to ram down their throats a preconceived theory thatthe only road to self-government was for an alien people to step inand make the ignorant masses the _sine qua non_. "--Blount, p. 546. 

Also:--

"Of course the ignorant elecorate we perpetrated on Samar as an'expression of our theoretical views' proved that we had 'gone toofast' in conferring self-government, or to quote Mr. Roosevelt, hadbeen 'reposing too much confidence in the self-governing power ofa people, ' if to begin with the rankest material for constructing agovernment that there was at hand was to offer a fair test of capacityfor self-government. "--Blount, p. 546. 

[356] P. I. R. , 499. 1 Ex. 134. 

[357] Ibid. , 206. 1. 

[358] Ibid. , 1124. 2. 

[359] Ibid. , 204. 6. 

[360] P. I. R. , 206. 6. 

[361] P. I. R. , 674. 1. 

[362] _Ibid. _, 206. 3. 

[363] P. I. R. , 206. 3. 

[364] On July 7, 1898, the secretary of the revolutionary juntain Mindanao, in writing to Aguinaldo, closed his letter with thefollowing formula: "Command this, your vassal, at all hours at theorders of his respected chief, on whom he will never turn his back, and whom he will never forswear. God preserve you, Captain General, many years. " P. I. R. , 1080. 1. Every now and then we find a queer useof the term "royal family. " This seems to have been common among themass of the people. Heads of towns and men of position often usedthe expression "royal orders" in speaking of the orders and decreesissued by Aguinaldo. For example, the officials of Tayug, a town of19, 000 people in Pangasinán Province, certified, on October 9, 1898, that they had carried out the instructions for "the establishment ofthe popular government in accordance with the royal decree of June 18, 1898. "--P. I. R. , 1188. 1. 

In October certain of Aguinaldo's adherents in Tondo wrote to him andprotested against the acts of the local presidente, who, they held, had not been duly elected in accordance with the provisions of the"royal order" of June 18, 1898. They closed their respectful protestby requesting that said royal order should be obeyed. --Taylor, AJ. , 63. 

In 1899 an officer of the army in Union Province wrote: "In accordancewith the orders of the secretary of war of our republican governmentof these islands, issued in compliance with royal decree, article 5, published on March 8. " On September 1, 1898, the local presidenteof the town of Mangatarem, writing to the head of the province, said that he had not furnished the estimates required because theelections provided for in "article 7 of the royal decree of thesuperior government, dated June 18 last, " had not been approved. Ayoung son of a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet, writing to his father inSeptember, 1899, spoke of the "royal decree of June 18, 1898. "--P. I. R. , 1188. 3. In Romblon, in August, 1898, elections were held in compliancewith the prescription of the "royal decree of June 18, 1898, " andAguinaldo approved them, apparently without considering that thiswas an anomalous way of describing a decree of the dictator of theso-called republic. On March 7, 1899, a general in the revolutionaryservice stated that an officer had been released from arrest by a"royal order. " The attitude of mind which made men speak of Aguinaldo's"royal orders" in 1898 did not change when he fled before the advanceof the United States army. His orders remained royal orders. Theywere again and again referred to in this way. 

[365] P. I. R. , Books C-1. 

[366] P. I. R. , 1216. 1. 

[367] P. I. R. , 1216. 1. 

[368] P. I. R. , 223. 

[369] P. I. R. 1133. 1. 

[370] P. I. R. , 1137. 4. 

[371] _Ibid. , _ R. , 1165. 2. 

[372] P. I. R. , 319. 1. 

[373] _Ibid. , _ 3. 33. 

[374] _Ibid. , _ 1022. 3. 

[375] P. I. R. , 1200. 

[376] P. I. R. , 907. 6. 

[377] P. I. R. , 39. 7. 

[378] The following memorandum to accompany a letter from Señor DonSixto Lopez, Secretary of Señor Don Felipe Agoncillo, to the Honorablethe Secretary of State, written January 5, 1899, clearly sets forththis claim:--

"Pursuant to the action of said congress a detailed system ofgovernment has been provided for and is actually maintained in all theportions of the Philippine Islands, except so much of the provinces ofManila and Cavite as is now in the actual possession of the AmericanArmy, such excepted part containing only about 3 per cent. Of thepopulation of the entire islands and an infinitely smaller proportionof their area. 

"From the foregoing it will appear that the Philippine government isnow, as it has been practically ever since the 16th of June, 1898, in substantially full possession of the territory of the people itrepresents. "--Taylor Ex. 530 57 KU. , Congressional Record, June 3, 1902, Vol. 35, part 6, p. 6217. 

[379] Blount, p. 70. 

[380] "September, 1898. 

"_Decree_

"Although article 11, Chapter 2, of the Organic Decree of June23 (1898) last, prescribes that the appointment of provisionalrepresentatives of Congress be given to persons who have been bornor have resided in the provinces which they are to represent; takinginto consideration the urgent necessity that said body enter uponits functions immediately, I hereby decree the following:--

"1. The following are appointed provisional Representatives ... 

"2. A meeting of Congress is called for the 15th instant, to be heldin the town of Malolos, province of Bulacán. 

"3. The Secretary of the Interior shall take steps to notify thepersons appointed and those elected by the popular commanders in theprovinces already occupied by the Revolution, of the call as soonas possible. 

"Giv .... "

(Attached hereto is the following, with the names written in Mabini'shandwriting:)

"September, 1898. 

"Provinces not subject to the Revolutionary Government of thePhilippines. 

Names ClassesAlbay Highest class 2. Salvador V. Del Rosario and FelipeBuencaminoIlocos Norte do 2. José, Antonio LunaIlocos Sur do 2. Ignacio Villamor, José AlejiIsabela de Luzón Third class 1. Aristón BautistaSorsogón do 1. José AlbertCagayán do 1. Pablo Tecson

Abra Pol. -Mil. Govt. 1. Isidro ParedesNueva Viscaya do 1. Enrique MendiolaCorregidor doCatanduanes doBatanes doMasbate and Ticao Pol. -Mil. 1. Alberto Barreto ComandanciaAmburayan doApayaos doBenguet do 1. Joaquín LunaBinatanga doBontoc do 1. Fernando CanonBurias doCayapa doItaves doLepanto do 1. León ApaciblePríncipe do 1. Mariano OcampoQuiangan doTiagan doCabugauan doIsland of Cebú Pol. -Mil. Govt. 2. Cayetano Arellano and of highest Pardo de Tavera classIloilo, Panay do 2. Gregorio Araneta and MelecioFigueroaIsland of Leyte do 1. León GuerreroNegros Occidental do 1. José María de la ViñaIsland of Samar do Pablo OcampoAntique, Island of Panay do 1. Hipólito MagsalinCápiz Lowest class 1. Miguel ZaragozaNegros Oriental do 1. Aguedo VelardeIsland of Bohol do 1. Juan Manday GabrielRomblón Pol. -Mil. 1. Vicente González Maninang ComandanciaConcepión do 1. Mariano V. Del RosarioZamboanga 1st Dist. 1. Pedro A. Paterno Pol. -Mil. Govt. Misamis 2d Dist. Do 1. Maximino PaternoSurigao 3d Dist. Do 1. Benito ValdésDavao 4th Dist. Do 1. Telesforo ChuidianCotabato 5th Dist. Do 1. Enrique MercaidaBasilan 6th Dist. Do 1. Juan Tuason

Lanao 7th Dist. Do 1. Gonzalo TuasonDapitan Pol. -Mil. 1. Gonzalo Tuason ComandanciaButúan doBarás is under Pol. -Mil. Govt. Of Bahia IllanaLevac is under Pol. -Mil. Comandancia of CottabattoMatti Pol. -Mil. ComandanciaMalabang. This Comandancia is under the Military Comandancia of Bahia Illana. Reina Regente. This Comandancia is under the Pol. -Mil. Govt. Of CottabatoBay of Sarangani Pol. -Mil. Comandancia and adjacent islandsTucuran Pol. -Mil. Govt. Island of Joló do 1. Benito LegardaSiassi Pol. -Mil. Com. Tataan doBongao doIsland of Paragua Pol. -Mil. Govt. 1. Felipe Calderón. Balabac do 1. Manuel JérezCalamianes do 1. Manuel GenatoMarianas Islands doOriental Carolines doCamarines, North and South Don Tomás del Rosario and Don Cecilio Hilario

Exhibit 226, 76 MG, E, Extract from original in Spanish, A. L. S. , P. I. R. , 416. 1. "

[381] P. I. R. , 38. 3. 

[382] The 1903 census returns are here used for each of the severalpeoples. 

[383] P. I. R. , 485. 1. 

[384] P. I. R. , 40. 1. 

[385] P. I. R. , 377. 13. 

[386] _Ibid_. , 472. 9. 

[387] _Ibid_. , 40. 8. 

[388] _Ibid_. , 849. See p. 143. 

[389] A general term covering education, public works, agricultureand commerce. 

[390] P. I. R. , 512. A 5. 

[391] P. I. R. , 485. 5. 

[392] Senate Document 138, Fifty-sixth Congress, First Session. 

[393] P. I. R. , Books B-6. 

[394] P. I. R. , 472. 8. 

[395] "To the Military Chiefs of the towns mentioned in the margin

[there is nothing in the margin. --TR. ]:--

"As there are still many soldiers paying no notice to the orderforbidding the waste of cartridges, you are required to give a certainamount of ammunition to each soldier and to see every day if thereis any cartridge missing, and if so, inquire into the reason. Inorder that this may be successfully carried out, I have deemed itproper to prescribe the punishment for such offence, of which youwill inform the soldiers under your command, and post this circularin a prominent place. Said punishments are as follows:--

"_Art_. 1. A soldier found wasting ammunition shall be punished with 12lashes; in case he commits the same offence again he shall be punishedwith 24 lashes; and on a further offence of like character by thesame soldier, he shall be court-martialled and severely punished. 

"_Art_. 2. A soldier who has been found short of even one cartridge outof the ammunition assigned to him, shall be punished with 12 lashes, provided that he has not previously been in any engagement. 

"_Art_. 3. A soldier who has been found with no cartridges by reasonof throwing them away during an engagement, shall be court-martialled, and severely punished. 

"I most earnestly recommend you to carefully look after your soldiersand see that every one is complying with the foregoing order. 

"This order should be transmitted from one town to another mentioned inthe margin, and the last one should return it to this office with theinformation that the same has been received and complied with by all. 

"May God guard you many years. 

"_E. Aguinaldo_, Dictator. 

"_Cavite_, June 17th, 1898. "

--P. I. R. , 1124. 2. 

[396] "November 16, 1900. 

(Stamp) "_Lacuna Brigade. Headquarters_. 

"_Major Thomas Tagunton_: Advise all officers of this brigade thathe who allows his soldiers to load their rifles without being beforethe enemy, shall be liable to capital punishment. If the soldiersintentionally or otherwise fire their pieces, whether in the airor at any determined or undetermined person, said soldiers and theofficers to whose command they belong shall also be liable to the samepunishment as above, without further proceedings, for the reason thatwe are almost in front of the enemy, and all the more if the shotstake effect upon any of the soldiers or chiefs. 

"Sergeants and corporals shall also take heed of the present warnings, as they will also be given the same punishment if they by abandoningtheir squads allow them to commit certain outrages. 

"You will report receipt of and compliance with this order. 

"God preserve you many years. 

"General Headquarters, November 16, 1900. 

(Signed) "_Lacuna_, General, Political-Military Governor and Chiefof Operations. "--P. I. R. , 643. 1. 

[397] Taylor, AJ. 85. 

[398] "_Kabatúan_, Oct. 14th, 1899. 

"_Edict_

"_Martín F. Delgado, General and Politico-Military Governor of theProvince of Iloílo_. 

"As a consequence of the frequent assaults and robberies committedby persons wearing military uniforms, and with the determination tocorrect, with a firm hand, such scandalous conduct, which, besidescausing such deeds to be laid at the door of the military, alsomakes it easier for evil-doers to commit their misdeeds, I have, at the suggestion of the Councillor of Police, ordered the following:--

"1. From this date forward all private citizens are absolutelyprohibited from wearing military uniforms. 

"2. All authorities, both civil and military, under this Government, are obliged to see to the strict enforcements of this edict. 

"3. All persons who, not being in the military service, are, afterthe publication of this edict, found wearing military uniforms, and who cannot show that they are in the military service, will besuspected as evil-doers and will be sent to this Government to besubjected to the corresponding corrective measures. 

 * * * * *

(Signed) " _Martín Delgado_, "_Governor-General-President_. "

--P. I. R. , 881. 4. 

[399] "On April 10, 1899, General Delgado wrote that, benignity havingfailed, rigorous methods would be used to enforce collections andthat if the people did not pay--

"'I shall, with great pain, see myself under the necessity ofwithdrawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them [thepueblos] to the fate which God will decide upon, ' which of coursemeant that he would leave them to the mercy of the bandits who stoodready to descend upon them. "--P. I. R. , B. , 4. 

"This threat was not an idle one. "--Taylor, 67 HS. E-L. 

[400] "_Santa Cruz, Laguna_, July, 1899. 

"_Hon. Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo_.... 

"There was a notorious bandit here who was the terror of theprovince with his gang; I had him arrested and shot and the robberiesceased. Murders were being committed; I had the murderers caught, shotone of them, and there were no more murders; officers of the reservewould consider themselves kings in their towns, they would shootthe local _presidentes_ and commit other unlawful acts; I disarmedthem, and tried the most celebrated one, called Arcadio Castillo, alias Bancucane, who attempted to escape and was killed. With thedeath of these persons order has been completely reëstablished inthis province. Several had rifles that were used only for robberyand after two or three trials all turned over their rifles, and thearming of the battalion was completed. 

 * * * * *

(Signed) "_Juan Cailles_. "

--P. I. R. , 7 & 8. 

[401] "_Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas_. 

"_Office of the President_. 

"_Kabatúan_, March 16, 1899. 

"_To the Honourable President of the Philippine Republic_, "_Señor Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy_, "_Most Distinguished President_:

 * * * * *

"In order to avoid the distress which the knowledge of the abuseswhich are already unbearable, daily committed by the troops of SeñorDiocno, will cause you, this government has hesitated to communicatethem to you, but, as there is almost a reign of terror here, it feelsthat it must inform you of them in order to remedy them. The deathof private individuals and assaults committed in the towns are dailyreported as having been committed by the troops of General Diocno. Ofthe numerous companies of Señor Diocno, only two under the orders ofGeneral Araneta fight against the enemy, the remainder are the terrorof the town and it is a week since Sr. Diocno went to Capiz withouttelling any one what he was going to do. 

"In view of the facts pointed out, the soldiers of this Generalconstituting a constant danger to the town, this government asks you toorder General Diocno to turn over his rifles to us to kill Americanswith and to enable the towns to recover their former tranquillity;this government asks this of you, relying upon the well-known justicewith which you act and it wishes for you many years of life for ourliberty and our independence. 

"_Kabatúan_, March 16, 1899. 

(Signed) "_Jovito Yusay_, "_Temporary President. _

(Signed) "_Francisco Soriano_, "_General Secretary. _"

--P. I. R. , 52. 5. 

[402] "Martin Delgado y Bermejo, lieutenant general and general inchief of the republican army of the Visayan Islands. 

"_General Headquarters of Santa Barbara_, "April 20, 1899. 

"The existence of a state of war, and the trying circumstances throughwhich the country is now passing have brought about a completechange in the order of nearly all the pueblos; and I have noticedwith profound regret that sacking, robbery, sequestrations, andother crimes highly dishonourable to our noble cause, are of dailyoccurrence. With a view to preventing such conduct in the future, and in order to guarantee to the inhabitants of the military districtunder my command the most complete tranquillity, I hereby decree:

"1. That any person or persons who commit acts of brigandage, sequestration, incendiarism, rape, or other disturbances of a publicnature calculated to excite the public, or which infringe individualor property rights, shall be severely punished in accordance withmilitary law. 

"2. That all offenders who present themselves to the Local or MilitaryAuthorities within the 30 days immediately following this date, andwho turn over their arms and join our forces and help to fight otheroutlaws and to defend the nation, will be pardoned for the crimesthey have committed. 

"3. That when the period of 30 days above mentioned has passed, anyperson taken in the act of committing robbery, or who attempts to robwith an organized band of outlaws, or who steals, rapes, or performsacts of incendiarism, or any other criminal act, will be summarilycondemned to death by a military tribunal. 

"The Local Juntas of the various towns in conjunction with citizensof standing and the military authorities will organize a vigilanceservice to maintain public order and the authority of the law. 

"_M. Delgado_. "

--P. I. R. , Books B 4. 

[403] "February 13, 1899. 

(In the margin: A stamp which says:) "Philippine Republic--Headquartersof operations of the provinces of Southern Luzón. 

"It is with great regret that I have learned that robberies, assaults, kidnapping, and other crimes which are committed only by barbarousand savage tribes, are taking place in our towns, without takinginto consideration that the purpose of the insurrection which hasgiven origin to our social regeneration is true justice, for thereëstablishment of which the lives and property are being sacrificedof all who are proud of being called Filipinos. These acts are beingcommitted without restriction by civilians as well as soldiers perhapswith the coöperation of their respective chiefs, to the shame ofthe authority vested in them and to the prejudice of the society towhich they unworthily belong, and even to the integrity itself ofthe Republic. And in order that these barbarous and savage acts maydisappear and that rigorous and exemplary punishment be meted out, I have deemed it proper to forward to you for general informationthe proclamation of these Headquarters of February 12th last, whichis as follows":

 * * * * *

(Signed) "_Mariano Trias_. 

"_Lieutenant-General_. 

"_To the Politico-Military Chief of Infanta_. "--P. I. R. , 896-9. 

[404] "There does not seem to have been the faintest conception thatthere was any reason for not using the white flag to deceive peoplewho were foolish enough to believe that Aguinaldo was going to adhereto the rules prescribed for its use. The writer in the early springof 1899 once watched an insurgent party advance under a white flagupon an American line of trenches. When an officer and a bugler wentforward to receive them they threw down the flag and immediatelyopened fire with the rifles which they were then seen to be draggingbehind them. "--_Taylor_, 48 HS. 

[405] "Such ammunition was not effective unless fired from veryclose quarters, but even its possession made the guerrillas strongerthan the people of the country and undoubtedly had much to do withsecuring their coöperation, not only as bolomen but also in thedigging of the pits which were placed in the trails and also setabout the towns. These were required to be constructed by the localauthorities. In the bottom was set a sharp spike of bamboo, sometimespoisoned; and the pit was covered with leaves and soil upon a fragileframework; so that if a man stood upon it he would fall through uponthe spike. Bows were set in the jungle with a string set across thetrail so that any one stumbling over it would discharge a sharp bambooshaft with a poisoned head. On September 18, 1900, Lukban congratulatedthe people of the town of Katubig upon the efficient use they had madeof arrows with the heads dipped in 'dita, ' a native poison. (P. I. R. , 502. 8. )"

--_Taylor_, 83 HS. 

[406] See also the chapter entitled "Murder as a GovernmentalInstitution. "

[407] See p. 313. 

[408] The following newspaper supplement printed in Tagálog for thebenefit of the common people, is typical of this class of literature, with which the country was kept flooded:

(Circular printed in Tagálog. P. I. R. , 17-6. Supplement to _HeraldoFilipino_. 

"Friday, 24th February, 1899. 

"_Countrymen_:

"We must consider ourselves fortunate that the bad intentions ofNorth America were found out early. If we had not found them out bythis time we should have been entrapped. And we should thank God thatthey commenced the war. 

"You ought to know by this time that these people can teach usnothing good. What we can learn from them is all evil. You mustadmit the truth of what they are reported to do to our brothers inManila where they rob the houses when the dwellers in them are outor busy. Their evil inclinations prevail over them to such an extentthat the houses most worthy of consideration are not safe. They areworse than the wild people who live in the woods, they have not theslightest idea of looking at things from the point of view of a manof honour nor have they the slightest respect for reason, for thisdoes not control their actions in the least. Without the slightestattention to civility they rush into houses and if they find thepeople eating, without saying a word, they take what they want fromthe table, put it into their mouths and go as they came. 

"If they find people sleeping or resting, taking the siesta, it makesno difference to them; they go into the most private parts of thehouse as though they were walking in the street. 

"In the shops they take what pleases them and if the owner wantspayment they threaten him with their rifles. 

"One can hardly believe and my pen refuses to write all of theperversity, and evil and bad habits of these people. 

"Their habits and manners are a disgrace to the country where theywere born. In no history have such customs and manners been describedeven in that of the most ignorant people. 

"They search women who pass, feeling all over their bodies, takingfrom them money and whatever else they carry and if they come on themin a lonely place they strip them naked after violating them and donot leave a rag on them. 

"Are these those honest men of whom we have heard? Are these thepeople who were going to teach us good habits? Are these the people whowere going to guide us? The race which does these things is the mosthated one in the world, it is the race which commits most cruelties, it is the race which does not treat its mother with respect; in thisrace there is not the slightest idea of personal dignity, it is arace which does not know what honour is, which does not possess theslightest vestige of regard for good manners. Are these the peoplewho are going to protect us? It is better for us to die at once thanfall into the power of these unequalled malefactors. 

"¡Down with the bad men!

"¡Kill the Americans!!

"¡Let the people of the United States be exterminated!!!

"¡Notice. --This sheet is distributed gratis. "

[409] "A light upon the treatment of women by these people is givenby the fact that after an American detachment had captured Lukban'spapers and family on August 18, and came so close to taking him thathe was able to recognize their guide, one of his correspondents wroteto him that to their surprise the women, who had fully expected tobe abused, had been treated with respect and given a house to livein. (P. I. R. , 1143. 4. )"--_Taylor_, 84 HS. 

[410] In a letter to General Ambrosio Moxica from ------ dated March 2, 1900, occurs the following:--

"The guerillas quartered in the neighbourhood must render mutualassistance and keep up communication, so as to get the news as to wherethe enemy comes or goes, and the time at which they will pass certainpoints, endeavouring also to arrange that all the guerilla bands shouldhave regular couriers, with you or with general headquarters, givingadvice daily of any occurrence and carrying correspondence. They mustselect trustworthy women to carry correspondence, charging them tohide the letters underneath their skirts, bearing in mind that theAmericans do not search them; and in sending to the towns for armsor food, the orders must be sent by women and for small quantities, so as not to attract attention. "--P. I. R. , 2035. 3. 

[411] Simeon Villa, who accompanied Aguinaldo on his long flight, kept a somowhat detailed account of events in the form of a diary. 

[412] P. I. R. , 869. 

[413] _Ibid. _

[414] P. I. R. , 2035. 3. 

[415] P. I. R. , 886. 13. 

[416] Exhibit 1233

(Original in Spanish. Contemporary copy. P. I. R. , Books B. 4. )

"_General Headquarters, Santa Barbara_, Feb. 28th, 1899. "

(Literal copy of telegram. )

 * * * * *

"Casualties, Americans, on 6th, 2000 Colonels dead, one General;all churches converted into hospitals full American wounded; totalAmerican casualties 7000 confirmed by General Fullón just arrivedfrom Malolos; says also Iloílo quiet and not taken. 

 * * * * *

"A true copy

"By order of Chief of Staff. 

"_Juan Beloso_. "

[417] (Supplement to the _Filipino Herald_. )

"Thursday, Feb. 23rd, 1899. --4 P. M. 

"The Filipino Army occupies the suburbs of Manila. 

 * * * * *

"The three columns commanded by Generals Pío del Pilar and Licerioand Col. Hizon now occupy the suburbs of Sampaloc, San Miguel, SanSebastian, Binondo, San Nicholas and Tondo. 

"The Cavite battalion has possession of the Cuartel de Meisic andour flag is now flying there. 

"_Six Thousand Americans Besieged!!!_

"The American troops now in Caloocan and La Loma to the number of oversix thousand are besieged by the columns commanded by Generals Luna, Llanera and García. 

"_The Honourable President_

"This very moment the special train carrying the Honourable Presidenthas left for Caloocan. 

"Viva the independent Philippines!!!

"Viva the unconquerable Philippine Army!!!

"Notice. This sheet is distributed gratis. "--P. I. R. , 70-6. 

[418] (News. ) The American General, MacArthur, with his entire staff, was taken prisoner by our troops in Northern Luzón. Another Americangeneral died on the 5th of January last in the North, who was seriouslywounded in an ambush or fight. When shot he was a colonel, but onaccount of said fight he was promoted to the rank of a general, so thatlater when he died, he had the benefit of that rank. "--P. I. R. , 2035. 3. 

[419] (Telegrams)

"_Washington_, January 15, 1900, 10 A. M. 

"(Received, Cebú, January 16, 1900, 11 A. M. )

"Owing to a new disaster of the Union Army, MacKinley has tenderedhis resignation as President, Mr. Bryan succeeding him. 

"Peace promulgated in the Philippines. Basis of the protectorate isbeing discussed. 

"Philippine independence will be proclaimed February the 4th. 

"Remark. --The basis of a protectorate has been published inEnglish. "

"_Manila_, January 20, 1900, 10 A. M. 

"(Received at Cebú on the same day, at 11 A. M. )

"Otis' successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party, has justarrived. He brings with him papers and instructions in regard toproclamation of the Philippine Republic. 

"It is believed that Rev. Martin, Bishop of Cebú, will be transferredto the Archbishopric of Manila, and Rev. Nozaleda to Spain. "--P. I. R. , Books B-10. 

[420] P. I. R. , 1193. 2. 

[421] _Ibid. , _ 2025. 

[422] Taylor, 47 HS. 

[423] Beginning on page 730. 

[424] Taylor, 36 GV, Exhibit 1017. 

[425] Taylor, 28 HS. 

[426] P. I. R. , 1021. 6. 

[427] Unhusked rice. 

[428] Village. 

[429] 153, according to Blount himself. 

[430] "Nor can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of historyfor the awful fact that, according to the United States Coast andGeodetic Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population ofBatangas province was 312, 192, and according to the American Censusof the Philippines of 1903, it was 257, 715, rest entirely on militaryshoulders. "--Blount, pp. 383-384. 

[431] Blount, p. 597. 

[432] See Chapters XI and XII. 

[433] Taylor, 13 KK, E. 

[434] Taylor, 15 and 16 KK, E. 

[435] "Pope" Isio was the last of a series of bandit leaders, claimingfor themselves miraculous powers, who long infested the mountainsof Negros. 

[436] P. I. R. , 970. 7. 

[437] P. I. R. , 1134-1. 

[438] P. I. R. , 17. 9. 

[439] For the full text of these instructions, see appendix. 

[440] "Mr. McKinley sent Mr. Taft out, in the spring precedingthe election of 1900, to help General MacArthur run thewar. "--_Blount_. The Taft Commission was sent out, to 'aid'General MacArthur, as the Schurman Commission had 'aided' GeneralOtis. "--Blount. 

[441] "In February, 1899, the dogs of war being already let loose, President McKinley had resumed his now wholly impossible BenevolentAssimilation programme, by sending out the Schurman Commission, which was the prototype of the Taft Commission, to yearninglyexplain our intentions to the insurgents, and to make clear to themhow unqualifiedly benevolent those intentions were. The scheme waslike trying to put salt on a bird's tail after you have flushedhim. "--Blount. 

[442] P. I. R. , 1300. 2. 

[443] A brand of whiskey then much in use. 

[444] For the text of this document see the Appendix, p. 977. 

[445] In view of the alleged attitude of General Otis toward the workof the Commission, the following statement by him as to the effectof this proclamation is of interest:--

General Otis said: "It was unanimously decided to print, publish, post, and disseminate as much as possible among the inhabitants underinsurgent domination this address, printing the same in the English, Spanish, and Tagálog languages. This was done, but scarcely had it beenposted in Manila twenty-four hours before it was so torn and mutilatedas to be unrecognizable. It suffered the same fate as the proclamationof January 4, set out in pages 113 and 114 of this report, but itproduced a marked beneficial influence on the people, especially thoseoutside our lines, as it carried with it a conviction of the UnitedStates' intentions, on account of the source from which it emanated, it being an expression from a committee of gentlemen especiallyappointed to proclaim the policy which the United States would pursue. "

--_Taylor_, 90 AJ. 

Taylor adds: "The commander of one of the regiments of sandatahan inManila reported that he had forced the people of the city to destroythe proclamations issued by the commission (P. I. R. , 73. 9). As hefound this necessary, the action of the people could hardly havereflected their real feelings in the matter. "

[446] Taylor, 96 AJ. 

[447] _Ibid. _

[448] Taylor, 97 AJ. 

[449] Taylor, 97 AJ. 

[450] _Ibid. _

[451] Nominally they were named by Aguinaldo. 

[452] Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, Vol. I, 1900, p. 9. 

[453] Now chief justice of the Philippine Supreme Court. 

[454] Blount, p. 235. 

[455] Blount, p. 105. 

[456] Report Philippine Commission, Vol. I, p. 183. 

[457] P. 981. 

[458] September 15, 1913. 

[459] The building where the executive offices of the insulargovernment have been located since the American occupation. 

[460] Taylor, 18 HS. 

[461] This name is applied to certain provinces organizedunder special acts because the majority of their inhabitants arenon-Christians. 

[462] Tayabas, Romblon, Masbate, Iloilo, Antique, Capiz, Cebú, Bohol, Occidental Negros, Oriental Negros, Leyte, Albay, Ambos, Camarines, Sorsogon, Marinduque, Batangas, Surigao, and Misamis. 

[463] Obviously a misprint, perhaps, for "perusal of. "

[464] Blount, p. 380. 

[465] For further details see pp. 746; 753. 

[466] A native surf boat. 

[467] See Chapters XXI-XXIV. 

[468] Chap. XV. 

[469] Chap. XIV. 

[470] Chap. XVI. 

[471] Chap. XVII. 

[472] Chap. XVIII. 

[473] See Chapter XIX. 

[474] Chap. XXX. 

[475] Chap. XXX. 

[476] Chap. XXXI. 

[477] Chap. XXXII. 

[478] Chapter XXVII. 

[479] Chapters XIV, XXII, XXIII and XXIV. 

[480] Reply to Jones, Pamphlet, Manila, 1913. 

[481] See pp. 375-77. 

[482] See pp. 357-77. 

[483] Under the new regime these figures have been reversed. 

[484] See Chapters XX-XXIV. 

[485] "The merit system has received renewed support from PresidentRoosevelt in his administration, and by the extension of civilservice throughout the nation, as well as in our new possessions. ThePhilippine service is reported to be very satisfactory, and effortsare being made for the extension and larger development of regulationsin Porto Rico. "

[486] "From the President down, every official charged with aduty touching the government of our dependencies is imbued with aprofound sense of duty, and adequate realization of the situationand the imperative necessity of an unselfish, patriotic execution ofthe laws and regulations in the interest of the highest welfare ofthe inhabitants of the dependencies. With this state of affairs, theestablishment of the merit system in them on an enduring basis shouldfollow as a matter of course. It will be the aim of this Committee toaid in every possible way in extending and improving the system, andto that end to give to the whole subject careful and detailed study. "

[487] No data for 1906 available. 

[488] Eight passed last year. 

[489] He now receives $9000. 

[490] Male servant. 

[491] Two weeks at Christmas and ten weeks in April, May and June. 

[492] Blount, p. 425. 

[493] Blount, p. 430. 

[494] Native dugouts. 

[495] See p. 998. 

[496] Female servant. 

[497] Men appointed to assist the judge in deciding questions offact. Their decision is not binding on him. 

[498] Here [_i. E. _ in me] you have a new servant. 

[499] Malaria. 

[500] A strong alcoholic drink commonly made by diluting low-gradealcohol with water and flavouring it. 

[501] There was one stray case in March. 

[502] "To the Editor of El Soberanía Nacional, Manila, P. I. 

"_Sir_: In your issue of the 7th of July there appeared a paragraphembodying a shameful libel of the administration of the San LazaroHospital, which reads as follows:

"'_Un cuadro verdaderamente aterrador es el que prezenta el patio delHospital de San Lazaro. Los fallecidos por la enfermedad del colera, son expuestos desnudos en el atrio de dicho Hospital con un cartelatado en los pies con la inscripción de sus respectivos nombres. _'

"This statement was so grossly and ridiculously false and at the sametime so extremely harmful in its effect as to bring you fairly andsquarely within the reach of the law. 

"Yesterday morning I sent you a courteous letter requesting you tocome to my office, purposing to discuss the affair with you in afriendly manner, and hoping to find that the statement referred tohad been prepared by some irresponsible subordinate and publishedthrough oversight. 

"As, however, you have neither acceded to my request for a conferencenor had the courtesy to reply to my letter, I now have the honourto forward you herewith a communication which embodies a reply tothe false statement above referred to and at the same time conveysinformation as to what is actually being done at the San LazaroHospital. I request that you give this letter immediate publicitythrough your paper, and in the editorial columns or elsewhere insome conspicuous place retract immediately and fully the libellousstatement relative to the exposure of the dead, above referred to. 

"Kindly advise me of your intention in the matter. The bearer ofthis communication has instructions to wait for your reply. I shallinterpret failure to hear from you by return messenger as refusalto retract this slander and to publish the enclosed communication, and shall act accordingly. 

"Very respectfully, "Dean C. Worcester, "_Secretary of the Interior. _"

[503] Just before I left Manila in October, 1913, cholera reappearedthere. 

[504] Sept. 15, 1913. 

[505] The first organization of American physicians in the Philippineswas the Manila Medical Association, from which the Philippine IslandMedical Association ultimately developed. 

[506] Now a major-general. 

[507] About 28. 7 miles. 

[508] May 1, 1913. 

[509] Captain Meade. 

[510] He had the volunteer rank of colonel, but was a major in theregular army. 

[511] Report of the Philippine Commission, Part 1, 1903, p. 58. 

[512] May 1, 1913. 

[513] April 15, 1913. 

[514] May 1, 1913. 

[515] This rate, for the fiscal year 1913, was 3. 33 per thousand forFilipinos and 2. 49 per thousand for Americans.