THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM

 BY

 LATHROP STODDARD, A. M. , PH. D. (Harv. )

 AUTHOR OF: THE RISING TIDE OF COLOUR, THE STAKES OF THE WAR, PRESENT DAY EUROPE: ITS NATIONAL STATES OF MIND, THE TRENCH REVOLUTION IN SAN DOMINGO, ETC. 

 WITH MAP

 _SECOND IMPRESSION_

 LONDON

 CHAPMAN AND HALL, LTD. 

 1922 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY RICHARD CLAY & SONS LIMITED. BUNGAY, SUFFOLK

PREFACE

The entire world of Islam is to-day in profound ferment. From Morocco toChina and from Turkestan to the Congo, the 250, 000, 000 followers of theProphet Mohammed are stirring to new ideas, new impulses, newaspirations. A gigantic transformation is taking place whose resultsmust affect all mankind. 

This transformation was greatly stimulated by the late war. But it beganlong before. More than a hundred years ago the seeds were sown, and eversince then it has been evolving; at first slowly and obscurely; latermore rapidly and perceptibly; until to-day, under the stimulus ofArmageddon, it has burst into sudden and startling bloom. 

The story of that strange and dramatic evolution I have endeavoured totell in the following pages. Considering in turn its variousaspects--religious, cultural, political, economic, social--I have triedto portray their genesis and development, to analyse their character, and to appraise their potency. While making due allowance for localdifferentiations, the intimate correlation and underlying unity of thevarious movements have ever been kept in view. 

Although the book deals primarily with the Moslem world, it necessarilyincludes the non-Moslem Hindu elements of India. The field covered isthus virtually the entire Near and Middle East. The Far East has notbeen directly considered, but parallel developments there have beennoted and should always be kept in mind. 

 LOTHROP STODDARD. 

 CONTENTS

CHAP PAGE

INTRODUCTION: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD ISLAMIC WORLD 1

I. THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL 20

II. PAN-ISLAMISM 37

III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST 75

IV. POLITICAL CHANGE 110

V. NATIONALISM 132

VI. NATIONALISM IN INDIA 201

VII. ECONOMIC CHANGE 226

VIII. SOCIAL CHANGE 250

IX. SOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM 273

 CONCLUSION 300

 INDEX 301

 MAP

 THE WORLD OF ISLAM _at end of volume_

THE NEW WORLD OF ISLAM

 "Das Alte stürzt, es ändert sich die Zeit, Und neues Leben blüht aus den Ruinen. "

 SCHILLER, _Wilhelm Tell_. 

INTRODUCTION

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD ISLAMIC WORLD

The rise of Islam is perhaps the most amazing event in human history. Springing from a land and a people alike previously negligible, Islamspread within a century over half the earth, shattering great empires, overthrowing long-established religions, remoulding the souls of races, and building up a whole new world--the world of Islam. 

The closer we examine this development the more extraordinary does itappear. The other great religions won their way slowly, by painfulstruggle, and finally triumphed with the aid of powerful monarchsconverted to the new faith. Christianity had its Constantine, Buddhismits Asoka, and Zoroastrianism its Cyrus, each lending to his chosen cultthe mighty force of secular authority. Not so Islam. Arising in a desertland sparsely inhabited by a nomad race previously undistinguished inhuman annals, Islam sallied forth on its great adventure with theslenderest human backing and against the heaviest material odds. YetIslam triumphed with seemingly miraculous ease, and a couple ofgenerations saw the Fiery Crescent borne victorious from the Pyreneesto the Himalayas and from the deserts of Central Asia to the deserts ofCentral Africa. 

This amazing success was due to a number of contributing factors, chiefamong them being the character of the Arab race, the nature ofMohammed's teaching, and the general state of the contemporary Easternworld. Undistinguished though the Arabs had hitherto been, they were apeople of remarkable potentialities, which were at that moment patentlyseeking self-realization. For several generations before Mohammed, Arabia had been astir with exuberant vitality. The Arabs had outgrowntheir ancestral paganism and were instinctively yearning for betterthings. Athwart this seething ferment of mind and spirit Islam rang likea trumpet-call. Mohammed, an Arab of the Arabs, was the very incarnationof the soul of his race. Preaching a simple, austere monotheism, freefrom priestcraft or elaborate doctrinal trappings, he tapped thewell-springs of religious zeal always present in the Semitic heart. Forgetting the chronic rivalries and blood-feuds which had consumedtheir energies in internecine strife, and welded into a glowing unity bythe fire of their new-found faith, the Arabs poured forth from theirdeserts to conquer the earth for Allah, the One True God. 

Thus Islam, like the resistless breath of the sirocco, the desert wind, swept out of Arabia and encountered--a spiritual vacuum. Thoseneighbouring Byzantine and Persian Empires, so imposing to the casualeye, were mere dried husks, devoid of real vitality. Their religionswere a mockery and a sham. Persia's ancestral cult of Zoroaster haddegenerated into "Magism"--a pompous priestcraft, tyrannical andpersecuting, hated and secretly despised. As for Eastern Christianity, bedizened with the gewgaws of paganism and bedevilled by the maddeningtheological speculations of the decadent Greek mind, it had become arepellent caricature of the teachings of Christ. Both Magism andByzantine Christendom were riven by great heresies which engenderedsavage persecutions and furious hates. Furthermore, both the Byzantineand Persian Empires were harsh despotisms which crushed their subjectsto the dust and killed out all love of country or loyalty to the state. Lastly, the two empires had just fought a terrible war from which theyhad emerged mutually bled white and utterly exhausted. 

Such was the world compelled to face the lava-flood of Islam. The resultwas inevitable. Once the disciplined strength of the East Roman legionsand the Persian cuirassiers had broken before the fiery onslaught of thefanatic sons of the desert, it was all over. There was no patrioticresistance. The down-trodden populations passively accepted new masters, while the numerous heretics actually welcomed the overthrow ofpersecuting co-religionists whom they hated far worse than their alienconquerors. In a short time most of the subject peoples accepted the newfaith, so refreshingly simple compared with their own degenerate cults. The Arabs, in their turn, knew how to consolidate their rule. They wereno bloodthirsty savages, bent solely on loot and destruction. On thecontrary, they were an innately gifted race, eager to learn andappreciative of the cultural gifts which older civilizations had tobestow. Intermarrying freely and professing a common belief, conquerorsand conquered rapidly fused, and from this fusion arose a newcivilization--the Saracenic civilization, in which the ancient culturesof Greece, Rome, and Persia were revitalized by Arab vigour andsynthesized by the Arab genius and the Islamic spirit. For the firstthree centuries of its existence (circ. A. D. 650-1000) the realm ofIslam was the most civilized and progressive portion of the world. Studded with splendid cities, gracious mosques, and quiet universitieswhere the wisdom of the ancient world was preserved and appreciated, theMoslem East offered a striking contrast to the Christian West, then sunkin the night of the Dark Ages. 

However, by the tenth century the Saracenic civilization began todisplay unmistakable symptoms of decline. This decline was at firstgradual. Down to the terrible disasters of the thirteenth century itstill displayed vigour and remained ahead of the Christian West. Still, by the year A. D. 1000 its golden age was over. For this there wereseveral reasons. In the first place, that inveterate spirit of factionwhich has always been the bane of the Arab race soon reappeared oncemore. Rival clans strove for the headship of Islam, and their quarrelsdegenerated into bloody civil wars. In this fratricidal strife thefervour of the first days cooled, and saintly men like Abu Bekr andOmar, Islam's first standard-bearers, gave place to worldly mindedleaders who regarded their position of "Khalifa"[1] as a means todespotic power and self-glorification. The seat of government was movedto Damascus in Syria, and afterward to Bagdad in Mesopotamia. The reasonfor this was obvious. In Mecca despotism was impossible. The fierce, free-born Arabs of the desert would tolerate no master, and their innatedemocracy had been sanctioned by the Prophet, who had explicitlydeclared that all Believers were brothers. The Meccan caliphate was atheocratic democracy. Abu Bekr and Omar were elected by the people, andheld themselves responsible to public opinion, subject to the divine lawas revealed by Mohammed in the Koran. 

But in Damascus, and still more in Bagdad, things were different. Therethe pure-blooded Arabs were only a handful among swarms of Syrian andPersian converts and "Neo-Arab" mixed-bloods. These people were filledwith traditions of despotism and were quite ready to yield the caliphsobsequious obedience. The caliphs, in their turn, leaned more and moreupon these complaisant subjects, drawing from their ranks courtiers, officials, and ultimately soldiers. Shocked and angered, the proud Arabsgradually returned to the desert, while the government fell into thewell-worn ruts of traditional Oriental despotism. When the caliphate wasmoved to Bagdad after the founding of the Abbaside dynasty (A. D. 750), Persian influence became preponderant. The famous CaliphHaroun-al-Rashid, the hero of the _Arabian Nights_, was a typicalPersian monarch, a true successor of Xerxes and Chosroes, and asdifferent from Abu Bekr or Omar as it is possible to conceive. And, inBagdad, as elsewhere, despotic power was fatal to its possessors. Underits blight the "successors" of Mohammed became capricious tyrants ordegenerate harem puppets, whose nerveless hands were wholly incapable ofguiding the great Moslem Empire. 

The empire, in fact, gradually went to pieces. Shaken by the civil wars, bereft of strong leaders, and deprived of the invigorating amalgam ofthe unspoiled desert Arabs, political unity could not endure. Everywherethere occurred revivals of suppressed racial or particularisttendencies. The very rapidity of Islam's expansion turned against it, now that the well-springs of that expansion were dried up. Islam hadmade millions of converts, of many sects and races, but it had digestedthem very imperfectly. Mohammed had really converted the Arabs, becausehe merely voiced ideas which were obscurely germinating in Arab mindsand appealed to impulses innate in the Arab blood. When, however, Islamwas accepted by non-Arab peoples, they instinctively interpreted theProphet's message according to their particular racial tendencies andcultural backgrounds, the result being that primitive Islam wasdistorted or perverted. The most extreme example of this was in Persia, where the austere monotheism of Mohammed was transmuted into theelaborate mystical cult known as Shiism, which presently cut thePersians off from full communion with the orthodox Moslem world. Thesame transmutive tendency appears, in lesser degree, in thesaint-worship of the North African Berbers and in the pantheism of theHindu Moslems--both developments which Mohammed would haveunquestionably execrated. 

These doctrinal fissures in Islam were paralleled by the disruption ofpolitical unity. The first formal split occurred after the accession ofthe Abbasides. A member of the deposed Ommeyyad family fled to Spain, where he set up a rival caliphate at Cordova, recognized as lawful notonly by the Spanish Moslems, but by the Berbers of North Africa. Lateron another caliphate was set up in Egypt--the Fatimite caliphate, resting its title on descent from Mohammed's daughter Fatima. As for theAbbaside caliphs of Bagdad, they gradually declined in power, until theybecame mere puppets in the hands of a new racial element, the Turks. 

Before describing that shift of power from Neo-Arab to Turkish handswhich was so momentous for the history of the Islamic world, let usfirst consider the decline in cultural and intellectual vigour that setin concurrently with the disruption of political and religious unityduring the later stages of the Neo-Arab period. 

The Arabs of Mohammed's day were a fresh, unspoiled people in the fullflush of pristine vigour, eager for adventure and inspired by a highideal. They had their full share of Semitic fanaticism, but, thoughfanatical, they were not bigoted, that is to say, they possessed, notclosed, but open minds. They held firmly to the tenets of theirreligion, but this religion was extremely simple. The core of Mohammed'steaching was theism _plus_ certain practices. A strict belief in theunity of God, an equally strict belief in the divine mission[2] ofMohammed as set forth in the Koran, and certain clearly definedduties--prayer, ablutions, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage--these, and these alone, constituted the Islam of the Arab conquerors of theEastern world. 

So simple a theology could not seriously fetter the Arab mind, alert, curious, eager to learn, and ready to adjust itself to conditions amplerand more complex than those prevailing in the parched environment of thedesert. Now, not only did the Arabs relish the material advantages andluxuries of the more developed societies which they had conquered; theyalso appreciated the art, literature, science, and ideas of the oldercivilizations. The effect of these novel stimuli was the remarkablecultural and intellectual flowering which is the glory of Saraceniccivilization. For a time thought was relatively free and produced awealth of original ideas and daring speculations. These were the worknot only of Arabs but also of subject Christians, Jews, and Persians, many of them being heretics previously depressed under the iron bands ofpersecuting Byzantine orthodoxy and Magism. 

Gradually, however, this enlightened era passed away. Reactionary forcesappeared and gained in strength. The liberals, who are usually knownunder the general title of "Motazelites, " not only clung to thedoctrinal simplicity of primitive Islam, but also contended that thetest of all things should be reason. On the other hand, the conservativeschools of thought asserted that the test should be precedent andauthority. These men, many of them converted Christians imbued with thetraditions of Byzantine orthodoxy, undertook an immense work of Koranicexegesis, combined with an equally elaborate codification andinterpretation of the reputed sayings or "traditions" of Mohammed, ashanded down by his immediate disciples and followers. As the result ofthese labours, there gradually arose a Moslem theology and scholasticphilosophy as rigid, elaborate, and dogmatic as that of the mediævalChristian West. 

Naturally, the struggle between the fundamentally opposed tendencies oftraditionalism and rationalism was long and bitter. Yet the ultimateoutcome was almost a foregone conclusion. Everything conspired to favourthe triumph of dogma over reason. The whole historic tradition of theEast (a tradition largely induced by racial and climatic factors[3]) wastoward absolutism. This tradition had been interrupted by the inrush ofthe wild libertarianism of the desert. But the older tendency presentlyreasserted itself, stimulated as it was by the political transformationof the caliphate from theocratic, democracy to despotism. 

This triumph of absolutism in the field of government in fact assuredits eventual triumph in all other fields as well. For, in the long run, despotism can no more tolerate liberty of thought than it can liberty ofaction. Some of the Damascus caliphs, to be sure, toyed with Motazelism, the Ommeyyads being mainly secular-minded men to whom freethinking wasintellectually attractive. But presently the caliphs became aware ofliberalism's political implications. The Motazelites did not confinethemselves to the realm of pure philosophic speculation. They alsotrespassed on more dangerous ground. Motazelite voices were heardrecalling the democratic days of the Meccan caliphate, when theCommander of the Faithful, instead of being an hereditary monarch, waselected by the people and responsible to public opinion. Some boldspirits even entered into relations with the fierce fanatic sects ofinner Arabia, like the Kharijites, who, upholding the old desertfreedom, refused to recognize the caliphate and proclaimed theories ofadvanced republicanism. 

The upshot was that the caliphs turned more and more toward theconservative theologians as against the liberals, just as they favouredthe monarchist Neo-Arabs in preference to the intractable pure-bloodedArabs of the desert. Under the Abbasides the government came out franklyfor religious absolutism. Standards of dogmatic orthodoxy wereestablished, Motazelites were persecuted and put to death, and by thetwelfth century A. D. The last vestiges of Saracenic liberalism wereextirpated. The canons of Moslem thought were fixed. All creativeactivity ceased. The very memory of the great Motazelite doctors fadedaway. The Moslem mind was closed, not to be re-opened until our own day. 

By the beginning of the eleventh century the decline of Saraceniccivilization had become so pronounced that change was clearly in theair. Having lost their early vigour, the Neo-Arabs were to see theirpolitical power pass into other hands. These political heirs of theNeo-Arabs were the Turks. The Turks were a western branch of thatcongeries of nomadic tribes which, from time immemorial, have roamedover the limitless steppes of eastern and central Asia, and which areknown collectively under the titles of "Uralo-Altaic" or "Turanian"peoples. The Arabs had been in contact with the Turkish nomads eversince the Islamic conquest of Persia, when the Moslem generals found theTurks beating restlessly against Persia's north-eastern frontiers. Inthe caliphate's palmy days the Turks were not feared. In fact, they werepresently found to be very useful. A dull-witted folk with few ideas, the Turks could do two things superlatively well--obey orders and fightlike devils. In other words, they made ideal mercenary soldiers. Thecaliphs were delighted, and enlisted ever larger numbers of them fortheir armies and their body-guards. 

This was all very well while the caliphate was strong, but when it grewweak the situation altered. Rising everywhere to positions of authority, the Turkish mercenaries began to act like masters. Opening the easternfrontiers, they let in fresh swarms of their countrymen, who now came, not as individuals, but in tribes or "hordes" under their hereditarychiefs, wandering about at their own sweet will, settling where theypleased, and despoiling or evicting the local inhabitants. 

The Turks soon renounced their ancestral paganism for Islam, but Islammade little change in their natures. In judging these Turkish newcomerswe must not consider them the same as the present-day Ottoman Turks ofConstantinople and Asia Minor. The modern Osmanli are so saturated withEuropean and Near Eastern blood, and have been so leavened by Westernand Saracenic ideas, they that are a very different people from theirremote immigrant ancestors. Yet, even as it is, the modern Osmanlidisplay enough of those unlovely Turanian traits which characterize theunmodified Turks of central Asia, often called "Turkomans, " todistinguish them from their Ottoman kinsfolk to the west. 

Now, what was the primitive Turkish nature? First and foremost, it wasthat of the professional soldier. Discipline was the Turk's watchword. No originality of thought, and but little curiosity. Few ideas everpenetrated the Turk's slow mind, and the few that did penetrate werereceived as military orders, to be obeyed without question and adheredto without reflection. Such was the being who took over the leadershipof Islam from the Saracen's failing grasp. 

No greater misfortune could have occurred both for Islam and for theworld at large. For Islam it meant the rule of dull-witted bigots underwhich enlightened progress was impossible. Of course Islam did gain agreat accession of warlike strength, but this new power was so wantonlymisused as to bring down disastrous repercussions upon Islam itself. The first notable exploits of the immigrant Turkish hordes were theirconquest of Asia Minor and their capture of Jerusalem, both eventstaking place toward the close of the eleventh century[4]. Up to thistime Asia Minor had remained part of the Christian world. The originalArab flood of the seventh century, after overrunning Syria, had beenstopped by the barrier of the Taurus Mountains; the Byzantine Empire hadpulled itself together; and thenceforth, despite border bickerings, theByzantine-Saracen frontier had remained substantially unaltered. Now, however, the Turks broke the Byzantine barrier, overran Asia Minor, andthreatened even Constantinople, the eastern bulwark of Christendom. Asfor Jerusalem, it had, of course, been in Moslem hands since the Arabconquest of A. D. 637, but the caliph Omar had carefully respected theChristian "Holy Places, " and his successors had neither persecuted thelocal Christians nor maltreated the numerous pilgrims who flockedperennially to Jerusalem from every part of the Christian world. But theTurks changed all this. Avid for loot, and filled with bigoted hatred ofthe "Misbelievers, " they sacked the holy places, persecuted theChristians, and rendered pilgrimage impossible. 

The effect of these twin disasters upon Christendom, occurring as theydid almost simultaneously, was tremendous. The Christian West, then atthe height of its religious fervour, quivered with mingled fear andwrath. Myriads of zealots, like Peter the Hermit, roused all Europe tofrenzy. Fanaticism begat fanaticism, and the Christian West poured uponthe Moslem East vast hosts of warriors in those extraordinaryexpeditions, the Crusades. 

The Turkish conquest of Islam and its counterblast, the Crusades, werean immense misfortune for the world. They permanently worsened therelations between East and West. In the year A. D. 1000 Christian-Moslemrelations were fairly good, and showed every prospect of becomingbetter. The hatreds engendered by Islam's first irruption were dyingaway. The frontiers of Islam and Christendom had become apparentlyfixed, and neither side showed much desire to encroach upon the other. The only serious debatable ground was Spain, where Moslem and Christianwere continually at hand-grips; but, after all, Spain was mutuallyregarded as a frontier episode. Between Islam and Christendom, as awhole, intercourse was becoming steadily more friendly and morefrequent. This friendly intercourse, if continued, might ultimately haveproduced momentous results for human progress. The Moslem world was atthat time still well ahead of western Europe in knowledge and culture, but Saracenic civilization was ossifying, whereas the Christian West, despite its ignorance, rudeness, and barbarism, was bursting with lustylife and patently aspiring to better things. Had the nascent amity ofEast and West in the eleventh century continued to develop, both wouldhave greatly profited. In the West the influence of Saracenic culture, containing, as it did, the ancient learning of Greece and Rome, mighthave awakened our Renaissance much earlier, while in the East theinfluence of the mediæval West, with its abounding vigour, might havesaved Moslem civilization from the creeping paralysis which wasovertaking it. 

But it was not to be. In Islam the refined, easygoing Saracen gave placeto the bigoted, brutal Turk. Islam became once more aggressive--not, asin its early days, for an ideal, but for sheer blood-lust, plunder, anddestruction. Henceforth it was war to the knife between the onlypossible civilization and the most brutal and hopeless barbarism. Furthermore, this war was destined to last for centuries. The Crusadeswere merely Western counter-attacks against a Turkish assault onChristendom which continued for six hundred years and was definitelybroken only under the walls of Vienna in 1683. Naturally, from thesecenturies of unrelenting strife furious hatreds and fanaticisms wereengendered which still envenom the relations of Islam and Christendom. The atrocities of Mustapha Kemal's Turkish "Nationalists" and theatrocities of the Greek troops in Asia Minor, of which we read in ourmorning papers, are in no small degree a "carrying on" of the mutualatrocities of Turks and Crusaders in Palestine eight hundred years ago. 

With the details of those old wars between Turks and Christians thisbook has no direct concern. The wars themselves should simply be notedas a chronic barrier between East and West. As for the Moslem East, withits declining Saracenic civilization bowed beneath the brutal Turkishyoke, it was presently exposed to even more terrible misfortunes. Thesemisfortunes were also of Turanian origin. Toward the close of thetwelfth century the eastern branches of the Turanian race were weldedinto a temporary unity by the genius of a mighty chieftain named JenghizKhan. Taking the sinister title of "The Inflexible Emperor, " thisarch-savage started out to loot the world. He first overran northernChina, which he hideously ravaged, then turned his devastating coursetoward the west. Such was the rise of the terrible "Mongols, " whose namestill stinks in the nostrils of civilized mankind. Carrying with themskilled Chinese engineers using gunpowder for the reduction of fortifiedcities, Jenghiz Khan and his mounted hosts proved everywhereirresistible. The Mongols were the most appalling barbarians whom theworld has ever seen. Their object was not conquest for settlement, noteven loot, but in great part a sheer satanic lust for blood anddestruction. They revelled in butchering whole populations, destroyingcities, laying waste countrysides--and then passing on to fresh fields. 

Jenghiz Khan died after a few years of his westward progress, but hissuccessors continued his work with unabated zeal. Both Christendom andIslam were smitten by the Mongol scourge. All eastern Europe was ravagedand re-barbarized, the Russians showing ugly traces of the Mongolimprint to this day. But the woes of Christendom were as nothing to thewoes of Islam. The Mongols never penetrated beyond Poland, and westernEurope, the seat of Western civilization, was left unscathed. Not soIslam. Pouring down from the north-east, the Mongol hosts whirled like acyclone over the Moslem world from India to Egypt, pillaging, murdering, and destroying. The nascent civilization of mediæval Persia, juststruggling into the light beneath the incubus of Turkish harryings, wasstamped flat under the Mongol hoofs, and the Mongols then proceeded todeal with the Moslem culture-centre--Bagdad. Bagdad had declinedconsiderably from the gorgeous days of Haroun-al-Rashid, with itslegendary million souls. However, it was still a great city, the seat ofthe caliphate and the unquestioned centre of Saracenic civilization. TheMongols stormed it (A. D. 1258), butchered its entire population, andliterally wiped Bagdad off the face of the earth. And even this was notthe worst. Bagdad was the capital of Mesopotamia. This "Land between theRivers" had, in the very dawn of history, been reclaimed from swamp anddesert by the patient labours of half-forgotten peoples who, withinfinite toil, built up a marvellous system of irrigation that madeMesopotamia the perennial garden and granary of the world. Ages hadpassed and Mesopotamia had known many masters, but all these conquerorshad respected, even cherished, the irrigation works which were thesource of all prosperity. These works the Mongols wantonly, methodicallydestroyed. The oldest civilization in the world, the cradle of humanculture, was hopelessly ruined; at least eight thousand years ofcontinuous human effort went for naught, and Mesopotamia became thenoisome land it still remains to-day, parched during the droughts of lowwater, soaked to fever-stricken marsh in the season of river-floods, tenanted only by a few mongrel fellahs inhabiting wretched mud villages, and cowed by nomad Bedouin browsing their flocks on the sites of ancientfields. 

The destruction of Bagdad was a fatal blow to Saracenic civilization, especially in the East. And even before that dreadful disaster it hadreceived a terrible blow in the West. Traversing North Africa in itsearly days, Islam had taken firm root in Spain, and had so flourishedthere that Spanish Moslem culture was fully abreast of that in theMoslem East. The capital of Spanish Islam was Cordova, the seat of theWestern caliphate, a mighty city, perhaps more wonderful than Bagdaditself. For centuries Spanish Islam lived secure, confining theChristians to the mountainous regions of the north. As Saracen vigourdeclined, however, the Christians pressed the Moslems southward. In 1213Spanish Islam was hopelessly broken at the tremendous battle of LasNavas de Tolosa. Thenceforth, for the victorious Christians it was acase of picking up the pieces. Cordova itself soon fell, and with it theglory of Spanish Islam, for the fanatical Christian Spaniards extirpatedSaracenic civilization as effectually as the pagan Mongols were at thattime doing. To be sure, a remnant of the Spanish Moslems held theirground at Granada, in the extreme south, until the year Columbusdiscovered America, but this was merely an episode. The Saracencivilization of the West was virtually destroyed. 

Meanwhile the Moslem East continued to bleed under the Mongol scourge. Wave after wave of Mongol raiders passed over the land, the last notableinvasion being that headed by the famous (or rather infamous) Tamerlane, early in the fifteenth century. By this time the western Mongols hadaccepted Islam, but that made little difference in their conduct. Toshow that Tamerlane was a true scion of his ancestor Jenghiz Khan, itmay be remarked that his foible was pyramids of human skulls, his prizeeffort being one of 70, 000 erected after the storming of the Persiancity of Ispahan. After the cessation of the Mongol incursions, theravaged and depopulated Moslem East fell under the sway of the OttomanTurks. 

The Ottoman Turks, or "Osmanli, " were originally merely one of the manyTurkish hordes which entered Asia Minor after the downfall of Byzantinerule. They owed their greatness mainly to a long line of able sultans, who gradually absorbed the neighbouring Turkish tribes and used thisconsolidated strength for ambitious conquests both to east and west. In1453 the Osmanli extinguished the old Byzantine Empire by takingConstantinople, and within a century thereafter they had conquered theMoslem East from Persia to Morocco, had subjugated the whole BalkanPeninsula, and had advanced through Hungary to the walls of Vienna. Unlike their Mongol cousins, the Ottoman Turks built up a durableempire. It was a barbarous sort of empire, for the Turks understood verylittle about culture. The only things they could appreciate weremilitary improvements. These, however, they thoroughly appreciated andkept fully abreast of the times. In their palmy days the Turks had thebest artillery and the steadiest infantry in the world, and were theterror of Europe. 

Meantime Europe was awakening to true progress and higher civilization. While the Moslem East was sinking under Mongol harryings and Turkishmilitarism, the Christian West was thrilling to the Renaissance and thediscoveries of America and the water route to India. The effect of thesediscoveries simply cannot be over-estimated. When Columbus and Vasco daGama made their memorable voyages at the end of the fifteenth century, Western civilization was pent up closely within the restricted bounds ofwest-central Europe, and was waging a defensive and none-too-hopefulstruggle with the forces of Turanian barbarism. Russia lay under theheel of the Mongol Tartars, while the Turks, then in the full flush oftheir martial vigour, were marching triumphantly up from the south-eastand threatening Europe's very heart. So strong were these Turanianbarbarians, with Asia, North Africa, and eastern Europe in their grasp, that Western civilization was hard put to it to hold its own. Westerncivilization was, in fact, fighting with its back to the wall--the wallof a boundless ocean. We can hardly conceive how our mediævalforefathers viewed the ocean. To them it was a numbing, constrictingpresence; the abode of darkness and horror. No wonder mediæval Europewas static, since it faced on ruthless, aggressive Asia, and backed onnowhere. Then, in the twinkling of an eye, the sea-wall became ahighway, and dead-end Europe became mistress of the ocean--and therebymistress of the world. 

The greatest strategic shift of fortune in all human history had takenplace. Instead of fronting hopelessly on the fiercest of Asiatics, against whom victory by direct attack seemed impossible, the Europeanscould now flank them at will. Furthermore, the balance of resourcesshifted in Europe's favour. Whole new worlds were unmasked whence Europecould draw limitless wealth to quicken its home life and initiate aprogress that would soon place it immeasurably above its once-dreadedAsiatic assailants. What were the resources of the stagnant Moslem Eastcompared with those of the Americas and the Indies? So Westerncivilization, quickened, energized, progressed with giant strides, shookoff its mediæval fetters, grasped the talisman of science, and strodeinto the light of modern times. 

Yet all this left Islam unmoved. Wrapping itself in the tatters ofSaracenic civilization, the Moslem East continued to fall behind. Evenits military power presently vanished, for the Turk sank into lethargyand ceased to cultivate the art of war. For a time the West, busied withinternal conflicts, hesitated to attack the East, so great was theprestige of the Ottoman name. But the crushing defeat of the Turks intheir rash attack upon Vienna in 1683 showed the West that the OttomanEmpire was far gone in decrepitude. Thenceforth, the empire was harriedmercilessly by Western assaults and was saved from collapse only by themutual jealousies of Western Powers, quarrelling over the Turkishspoils. 

However, not until the nineteenth century did the Moslem world, as awhole, feel the weight of Western attack. Throughout the eighteenthcentury the West assailed the ends of the Moslem battle-line in easternEurope and the Indies, but the bulk of Islam, from Morocco to CentralAsia, remained almost immune. The Moslem world failed to profit by thisrespite. Plunged in lethargy, contemptuous of the European"Misbelievers, " and accepting defeats as the inscrutable will of Allah, Islam continued to live its old life, neither knowing nor caring to knowanything about Western ideas or Western progress. 

Such was the decrepit Moslem world which faced nineteenth-centuryEurope, energized by the Industrial Revolution, armed as never before bymodern science and invention which had unlocked nature's secrets andplaced hitherto-undreamed-of weapons in its aggressive hands. The resultwas a foregone conclusion. One by one, the decrepit Moslem states fellbefore the Western attack, and the whole Islamic world was rapidlypartitioned among the European Powers. England took India and Egypt, Russia crossed the Caucasus and mastered Central Asia, France conqueredNorth Africa, while other European nations grasped minor portions of theMoslem heritage. The Great War witnessed the final stage in this processof subjugation. By the terms of the treaties which marked its close, Turkey was extinguished and not a single Mohammedan state retainedgenuine independence. The subjection of the Moslem world wascomplete--on paper. 

On paper! For, in its very hour of apparent triumph, Western dominationwas challenged as never before. During those hundred years of Westernconquest a mighty internal change had been coming over the Moslemworld. The swelling tide of Western aggression had at last moved the"immovable" East. At last Islam became conscious of its decrepitude, andwith that consciousness a vast ferment, obscure yet profound, began toleaven the 250, 000, 000 followers of the Prophet from Morocco to Chinaand from Turkestan to the Congo. The first spark was fittingly struck inthe Arabian desert, the cradle of Islam. Here at the opening of thenineteenth century, arose the Wahabi movement for the reform of Islam, which presently kindled the far-flung "Mohammedan Revival, " which in itsturn begat the movement known as "Pan-Islamism. " Furthermore, athwartthese essentially internal movements there came pouring a flood ofexternal stimuli from the West--ideas such as parliamentary government, nationalism, scientific education, industrialism, and even ultra-modernconcepts like feminism, socialism, Bolshevism. Stirred by theinteraction of all these novel forces and spurred by the ceaselesspressure of European aggression, the Moslem world roused more and moreto life and action. The Great War was a shock of terrific potency, andto-day Islam is seething with mighty forces fashioning a new Moslemworld. What are those forces moulding the Islam of the future? To theiranalysis and appraisal the body of this book is devoted. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _I. E. _ "Successor"; anglicized into the word "Caliph. "

[2] To be carefully distinguished from divinity. Mohammed not only didnot make any pretensions to divinity, but specifically disclaimed anysuch attributes. He regarded himself as the last of a series of divinelyinspired prophets, beginning with Adam and extending through Moses andJesus to himself, the mouthpiece of God's last and most perfectrevelation. 

[3] The influence of environment and heredity on human evolution ingeneral and on the history of the East in particular, though of greatimportance, cannot be treated in a summary such as this. The influenceof climatic and other environmental factors has been ably treated byProf. Ellsworth Huntington in his various works, such as _The Pulse ofAsia_ (Boston, 1907); _Civilization and Climate_ (Yale Univ. Press, 1915), and _World-Power and Evolution_ (Yale Univ. Press, 1919). Seealso Chap. III. In Arminius Vambéry--_Der Islam im neunzehntenJahrhundert. Eine culturgeschichtliche Studie_ (Leipzig, 1875). For asummary of racial influences in Eastern history, see Madison Grant--_ThePassing of the Great Race_ (N. Y. , 1916). 

[4] The Turkish overrunning of Asia Minor took place after thedestruction of the Byzantine army in the great battle of Manzikert, A. D. 1071. The Turks captured Jerusalem in 1076. 

CHAPTER I

THE MOHAMMEDAN REVIVAL

By the eighteenth century the Moslem world had sunk to the lowest depthof its decrepitude. Nowhere were there any signs of healthy vigour, everywhere were stagnation and decay. Manners and morals were alikeexecrable. The last vestiges of Saracenic culture had vanished in abarbarous luxury of the few and an equally barbarous degradation of themultitude. Learning was virtually dead, the few universities whichsurvived fallen into dreary decay and languishing in poverty andneglect. Government had become despotism tempered by anarchy andassassination. Here and there a major despot like the Sultan of Turkeyor the Indian "Great Mogul" maintained some semblance of stateauthority, albeit provincial pashas were for ever striving to erectindependent governments based, like their masters', on tyranny andextortion. The pashas, in turn, strove ceaselessly against unruly localchiefs and swarms of brigands who infested the countryside. Beneath thissinister hierarchy groaned the people, robbed, bullied, and ground intothe dust. Peasant and townsman had alike lost all incentive to labour orinitiative, and both agriculture and trade had fallen to the lowestlevel compatible with bare survival. 

As for religion, it was as decadent as everything else. The austeremonotheism of Mohammed had become overlaid with a rank growth ofsuperstition and puerile mysticism. The mosques stood unfrequented andruinous, deserted by the ignorant multitude, which, decked out inamulets, charms, and rosaries, listened to squalid fakirs or ecstaticdervishes, and went on pilgrimages to the tombs of "holy men, "worshipped as saints and "intercessors" with that Allah who had becometoo remote a being for the direct devotion of these benighted souls. Asfor the moral precepts of the Koran, they were ignored or defied. Wine-drinking and opium-eating were well-nigh universal, prostitutionwas rampant, and the most degrading vices flaunted naked and unashamed. Even the holy cities, Mecca and Medina, were sink-holes of iniquity, while the "Hajj, " or pilgrimage ordained by the Prophet, had become ascandal through its abuses. In fine: the life had apparently gone out ofIslam, leaving naught but a dry husk of soulless ritual and degradingsuperstition behind. Could Mohammed have returned to earth, he wouldunquestionably have anathematized his followers as apostates andidolaters. 

Yet, in this darkest hour, a voice came crying out of the vast Arabiandesert, the cradle of Islam, calling the faithful back to the true path. This puritan reformer, the famous Abd-el-Wahab, kindled a fire whichpresently spread to the remotest corners of the Moslem world, purgingIslam of its sloth and reviving the fervour of olden days. The greatMohammedan Revival had begun. 

Mahommed ibn Abd-el-Wahab was born about the year A. D. 1700 in the heartof the Arabian desert, the region known as the Nejd. The Nejd was theone clean spot in the decadent Moslem world. We have already seen how, with the transformation of the caliphate from a theocratic democracy toan Oriental despotism, the free-spirited Arabs had returned scornfullyto their deserts. Here they had maintained their wild freedom. Neithercaliph nor sultan dared venture far into those vast solitudes of burningsand and choking thirst, where the rash invader was lured to suddendeath in a whirl of stabbing spears. The Arabs recognized no master, wandering at will with their flocks and camels, or settled here andthere in green oases hidden in the desert's heart. And in the desertthey retained their primitive political and religious virtues. Thenomad Bedouin lived under the sway of patriarchal "sheiks"; the settleddwellers in the oases usually acknowledged the authority of some leadingfamily. But these rulers possessed the slenderest authority, narrowlycircumscribed by well-established custom and a jealous public opinionwhich they transgressed at their peril. The Turks, to be sure, hadmanaged to acquire a precarious authority over the holy cities and theRed Sea littoral, but the Nejd, the vast interior, was free. And, inreligion, as in politics, the desert Arabs kept the faith of theirfathers. Scornfully rejecting the corruptions of decadent Islam, theyheld fast to the simple theology of primitive Islam, so congenial totheir Arab natures. 

Into this atmosphere of an older and better age, Abd-el-Wahab was born. Displaying from the first a studious and religious bent, he soonacquired a reputation for learning and sanctity. Making the Meccanpilgrimage while still a young man, he studied at Medina and travelledas far as Persia, returning ultimately to the Nejd. He returned burningwith holy wrath at what he had seen, and determined to preach a puritanreformation. For years he wandered up and down Arabia, and at last heconverted Mahommed, head of the great clan of Saud, the most powerfulchieftain in all the Nejd. This gave Abd-el-Wahab both moral prestigeand material strength, and he made the most of his opportunities. Gradually, the desert Arabs were welded into a politico-religious unitylike that effected by the Prophet. Abd-el-Wahab was, in truth, afaithful counterpart of the first caliphs, Abu Bekr and Omar. When hedied in 1787 his disciple, Saud, proved a worthy successor. The newWahabi state was a close counterpart of the Meccan caliphate. Thoughpossessing great military power, Saud always considered himselfresponsible to public opinion and never encroached upon the legitimatefreedom of his subjects. Government, though stern, was able and just. The Wahabi judges were competent and honest. Robbery, became almostunknown, so well was the public peace maintained. Education wassedulously fostered. Every oasis had its school, while teachers weresent to the Bedouin tribes. 

Having consolidated the Nejd, Saud was now ready to undertake thegreater task of subduing and purifying the Moslem world. His firstobjective was of course the holy cities. This objective was attained inthe opening years of the nineteenth century. Nothing could stand againstthe rush of the Wahabi hosts burning with fanatic hatred against theTurks, who were loathed both as apostate Moslems and as usurpers of thatsupremacy in Islam which all Arabs believed should rest in Arab hands. When Saud died in 1814 he was preparing to invade Syria. It looked for amoment as though the Wahabis were to sweep the East and puritanize allIslam at a blow. 

But it was not to be. Unable to stem the Wahabi flood, the Sultan ofTurkey called on his powerful vassal, the famous Mehemet Ali. This ableAlbanian adventurer had by that time made himself master of Egypt. Frankly recognizing the superiority of the West, he had called innumerous European officers who rapidly fashioned a formidable army, composed largely of hard-fighting Albanian highlanders, and disciplinedand equipped after European models. Mehemet Ali gladly answered theSultan's summons, and it soon became clear that even Wahabi fanaticismwas no match for European muskets and artillery handled by seasonedveterans. In a short time the holy cities were recaptured and theWahabis were driven back into the desert. The nascent Wahabi empire hadvanished like a mirage. Wahabism's political rôle was ended. [5]

However, Wahabism's spiritual rôle had only just begun. The Nejdremained a focus of puritan zeal whence the new spirit radiated in alldirections. Even in the holy cities Wahabism continued to set thereligious tone, and the numberless "Hajjis, " or pilgrims, who cameannually from every part of the Moslem world returned to their homeszealous reformers. Soon the Wahabi leaven began to produce profounddisturbances in the most distant quarters. For example, in northernIndia a Wahabi fanatic, Seyid Ahmed, [6] so roused the PunjabiMohammedans that he actually built up a theocratic state, and only hischance death prevented a possible Wahabi conquest of northern India. This state was shattered by the Sikhs, about 1830, but when the Englishconquered the country they had infinite trouble with the smoulderingembers of Wahabi feeling, which, in fact, lived on, contributed to theIndian mutiny, and permanently fanaticized Afghanistan and the wildtribes of the Indian North-West Frontier. [7] It was during these yearsthat the famous Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi came from his Algerian hometo Mecca and there imbibed those Wahabi principles which led to thefounding of the great Pan-Islamic fraternity that bears his name. Eventhe Babbist movement in Persia, far removed though it was doctrinallyfrom Wahabi teaching, was indubitably a secondary reflex of the Wahabiurge. [8] In fact, within a generation, the strictly Wahabi movement hadbroadened into the larger development known as the Mohammedan Revival, and this in turn was developing numerous phases, chief among them beingthe movement usually termed Pan-Islamism. That movement, particularly onits political side, I shall treat in the next chapter. At present letus examine the other aspects of the Mohammedan Revival, with specialreference to its religious and cultural phases. 

The Wahabi movement was a strictly puritan reformation. Its aim was thereform of abuses, the abolition of superstitious practices, and a returnto primitive Islam. All later accretions--the writings andinterpretations of the mediæval theologians, ceremonial or mysticalinnovations, saint worship, in fact every sort of change, werecondemned. The austere monotheism of Mohammed was preached in all itsuncompromising simplicity, and the Koran, literally interpreted, wastaken as the sole guide for human action. This doctrinal simplificationwas accompanied by a most rigid code of morals. The prayers, fastings, and other practices enjoined by Mohammed were scrupulously observed. Themost austere manner of living was enforced. Silken clothing, rich food, wine, opium, tobacco, coffee, and all other indulgences were sternlyproscribed. Even religious architecture was practically tabooed, theWahabis pulling down the Prophet's tomb at Medina and demolishing theminarets of mosques as godless innovations. The Wahabis were thus, despite their moral earnestness, excessively narrow-minded, and it wasvery fortunate for Islam that they soon lost their political power andwere compelled thenceforth to confine their efforts to moral teaching. 

Many critics of Islam point to the Wahabi movement as a proof that Islamis essentially retrograde and innately incapable of evolutionarydevelopment. These criticisms, however, appear to be unwarranted. Theinitial stage of every religious reformation is an uncritical return tothe primitive cult. To the religious reformer the only way of salvationis a denial of all subsequent innovations, regardless of theircharacter. Our own Protestant Reformation began in just this way, andHumanists like Erasmus, repelled and disgusted by Protestantism'spuritanical narrowness, could see no good in the movement, declaringthat it menaced all true culture and merely replaced an infallible Popeby an infallible Bible. 

As a matter of fact, the puritan beginnings of the Mohammedan Revivalpresently broadened along more constructive lines, some of thesebecoming tinged with undoubted liberalism. The Moslem reformers of theearly nineteenth century had not dug very deeply into their religiouspast before they discovered--Motazelism. We have already reviewed thegreat struggle which had raged between reason and dogma in Islam's earlydays, in which dogma had triumphed so completely that the very memory ofMotazelism had faded away. Now, however, those memories were revived, and the liberal-minded reformers were delighted to find such strikingconfirmation of their ideas, both in the writings of the Motazelitedoctors and in the sacred texts themselves. The principle that reasonand not blind prescription was to be the test opened the door to thepossibility of all those reforms which they had most at heart. Forexample, the reformers found that in the traditional writings Mohammedwas reported to have said: "I am no more than a man; when I order youanything respecting religion, receive it; when I order you about theaffairs of the world, then I am nothing more than man. " And, again, asthough foreseeing the day when sweeping changes would be necessary. "Yeare in an age in which, if ye abandon one-tenth of that which isordered, ye will be ruined. After this, a time will come when he whoshall observe one-tenth of what is now ordered will be redeemed. "[9]

Before discussing the ideas and efforts of the modern Moslem reformers, it might be well to examine the assertions made by numerous Westerncritics, that Islam is by its very nature incapable of reform andprogressive adaptation to the expansion of human knowledge. Such is thecontention not only of Christian polemicists, [10] but also ofrationalists like Renan and European administrators of Moslempopulations like Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer, in fact, pithily summarizesthis critical attitude in his statement: "Islam cannot be reformed; thatis to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it is something else. "[11]

Now these criticisms, coming as they do from close students of Islamoften possessing intimate personal acquaintance with Moslems, deserverespectful consideration. And yet an historical survey of religions, andespecially a survey of the thoughts and accomplishments of Moslemreformers during the past century, seem to refute these pessimisticcharges. 

In the first place, it should be remembered that Islam to-day standsjust about where Christendom stood in the fifteenth century, at thebeginning of the Reformation. There is the same supremacy of dogma overreason, the same blind adherence to prescription and authority, the samesuspicion and hostility to freedom of thought or scientific knowledge. There is no doubt that a study of the Mohammedan sacred texts, particularly of the "sheriat" or canon law, together with a glance overMoslem history for the last thousand years, reveal an attitude on thewhole quite incompatible with modern progress and civilization. But wasnot precisely the same thing true of Christendom at the beginning of thefifteenth century? Compare the sheriat with the Christian canon law. Thespirit is the same. Take, for example, the sheriat's prohibition on thelending of money at interest; a prohibition which, if obeyed, rendersimpossible anything like business or industry in the modern sense. Thisis the example oftenest cited to prove Islam's innate incompatibilitywith modern civilization. But the Christian canon law equally forbadeinterest, and enforced that prohibition so strictly, that for centuriesthe Jews had a monopoly of business in Europe, while the firstChristians who dared to lend money (the Lombards) were regarded almostas heretics, were universally hated, and were frequently persecuted. Again, take the matter of Moslem hostility to freedom of thought andscientific investigation. Can Islam show anything more revolting thanthat scene in Christian history when, less than three hundred yearsago, [12] the great Galileo was haled before the Papal Inquisition andforced, under threat of torture, to recant the damnable heresy that theearth went round the sun?

As a matter of fact, Mohammed reverenced knowledge. His own words areeloquent testimony to that. Here are some of his sayings:

"Seek knowledge, even, if need be, on the borders of China. "

"Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave. "

"One word of knowledge is of more value than the reciting of a hundredprayers. "

"The ink of sages is more precious than the blood of martyrs. "

"One word of wisdom, learned and communicated to a Moslem brother, outweighs the prayers of a whole year. "

"Wise men are the successors of the Prophet. "

"God has created nothing better than reason. "

"In truth, a man may have prayed, fasted, given alms, made pilgrimage, and all other good works; nevertheless, he shall be rewarded only in themeasure that he has used his common sense. "

These citations (and there are others of the same tenor) prove that themodern Moslem reformers have good scriptural backing for their liberalattitude. Of course I do not imply that the reform movement in Islam, just because it is liberal and progressive, is thereby _ipso facto_assured of success. History reveals too many melancholy instances to thecontrary. Indeed, we have already seen how, in Islam itself, thepromising liberal movement of its early days passed utterly away. Whathistory does show, however, is that when the times favour progress, religions are adapted to that progress by being reformed andliberalized. No human society once fairly on the march was ever turnedback by a creed. Halted it may be, but if the progressive urge persists, the doctrinal barrier is either surmounted, undermined, flanked, orswept aside. Now there is no possibility that the Moslem world willhenceforth lack progressive influences. It is in close contact withWestern civilization, and is being increasingly permeated with Westernideas. Islam cannot break away and isolate itself if it would. Everything therefore portends its profound modification. Of coursecritics like Lord Cromer contend that this modified Islam will be Islamno longer. But why not? If the people continue to call themselvesMohammedans and continue to draw spiritual sustenance from the messageof Mohammed, why should they be denied the name? Modern Christianity iscertainly vastly different from mediæval Christianity, while among thevarious Christian churches there exist the widest doctrinal variations. Yet all who consider themselves Christians are considered Christians byall except bigots out of step with the times. 

Let us now scrutinize the Moslem reformers, judging them, not by textsand chronicles, but by their words and deeds; since, as one of theirnumber, an Algerian, very pertinently remarks, "men should be judged, not by the letter of their sacred books, but by what they actuallydo. "[13]

Modern Moslem liberalism, as we have seen, received its firstencouragement from the discovery of the old Motazelite literature ofnearly a thousand years before. To be sure, Islam had never been quitedestitute of liberal minds. Even in its darkest days a few voices hadbeen raised against the prevailing obscurantism. For example, in thesixteenth century the celebrated El-Gharani had written: "It is not atall impossible that God may hold in reserve for men of the futureperceptions that have not been vouchsafed to the men of the past. Divinemunificence never ceases to pour benefits and enlightenment into thehearts of wise men of every age. "[14] These isolated voices from Islam'sDark Time helped to encourage the modern reformers, and by the middle ofthe nineteenth century every Moslem land had its group offorward-looking men. At first their numbers were, of course, insignificant, and of course they drew down upon themselves theanathemas of the fanatic Mollahs[15] and the hatred of the ignorantmultitude. The first country where the reformers made their influencedefinitely felt was in India. Here a group headed by the famous Sir SyedAhmed Khan started an important liberal movement, founding associations, publishing books and newspapers, and establishing the well-known collegeof Aligarh. Sir Syed Ahmed is a good type of the early liberalreformers. Conservative in temperament and perfectly orthodox in histheology, he yet denounced the current decadence of Islam with trulyWahabi fervour. He also was frankly appreciative of Western ideas andeager to assimilate the many good things which the West had to offer. Ashe wrote in 1867: "We must study European scientific works, even thoughthey are not written by Moslems and though we may find in them thingscontrary to the teachings of the Koran. We should imitate the Arabs ofolden days, who did not fear to shake their faith by studyingPythagoras. "[16]

This nucleus of Indian Moslem liberals rapidly grew in strength, producing able leaders like Moulvie Cheragh Ali and Syed Amir Ali, whosescholarly works in faultless English are known throughout the world. [17]These men called themselves "Neo-Motazelites" and boldly advocatedreforms such as a thorough overhauling of the sheriat and a generalmodernization of Islam. Their view-point is well set forth by another oftheir leading figures, S. Khuda Bukhsh. "Nothing was more distant fromthe Prophet's thought, " he writes, "than to fetter the mind or to laydown fixed, immutable, unchanging laws for his followers. The Quran is abook of guidance to the faithful, and not an obstacle in the path, oftheir social, moral, legal, and intellectual progress. " He lamentsIslam's present backwardness, for he continues: "Modern Islam, with itshierarchy of priesthood, gross fanaticism, appalling ignorance, andsuperstitious practices is, indeed, a discredit to the Islam of theProphet Mohammed. " He concludes with the following liberal confession offaith: "Is Islam hostile to progress? I will emphatically answer thisquestion in the negative. Islam, stripped of its theology, is aperfectly simple religion. Its cardinal principle is belief in one Godand belief in Mohammed as his apostle. The rest is mere accretion, superfluity. "[18]

Meanwhile, the liberals were making themselves felt in other parts ofthe Moslem world. In Turkey liberals actually headed the governmentduring much of the generation between the Crimean War and the despotismof Abdul Hamid, [19] and Turkish liberal ministers like Reshid Pasha andMidhat Pasha made earnest though unavailing efforts to liberalize andmodernize the Ottoman Empire. Even the dreadful Hamidian tyranny couldnot kill Turkish liberalism. It went underground or into exile, and in1908 put through the revolution which deposed the tyrant and brought the"Young Turks" to power. In Egypt liberalism took firm root, representedby men like Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, Rector of El Azhar University andrespected friend of Lord Cromer. Even outlying fragments of Islam likethe Russian Tartars awoke to the new spirit and produced liberal-minded, forward-looking men. [20]

The liberal reformers, whom I have been describing, of course form thepart of evolutionary progress in Islam. They are in the best sense ofthe word conservatives, receptive to healthy change, yet maintainingtheir hereditary poise. Sincerely religious men, they have faith inIslam as a living, moral force, and from it they continue to draw theirspiritual sustenance. 

There are, however, other groups in the Moslem world who have so farsuccumbed to Western influences that they have more or less lost touchwith both their spiritual and cultural pasts. In all the more civilizedportions of the Moslem world, especially in countries long underEuropean control like India, Egypt, and Algeria, there are many Moslems, Western educated and Western culture-veneered, who have drifted into anattitude varying from easygoing religious indifference to avowedagnosticism. From their minds the old Moslem zeal has entirely departed. The Algerian Ismael Hamet well describes the attitude of this class ofhis fellow-countrymen when he writes: "European scepticism is notwithout influence upon the Algerian Moslems, who, if they have keptsome attachment for the external forms of their religion, usually ignorethe unhealthy excesses of the religious sentiment. They do not give uptheir religion, but they no longer dream of converting all those who donot practise it; they want to hand it on to their children, but they donot worry about other men's salvation. This is not belief; it is noteven free thought; but it is lukewarmness. "[21]

Beyond these tepid latitudinarians are still other groups of a verydifferent character. Here we find combined the most contradictorysentiments: young men whose brains are seething with radical Westernideas--atheism, socialism, Bolshevism, and what not. Yet, curiouslyenough, these fanatic radicals tend to join hands with the fanaticreactionaries of Islam in a common hatred of the West. Consideringthemselves the born leaders (and exploiters) of the ignorant masses, theradicals hunger for political power and rage against that Westerndomination which vetoes their ambitious pretensions. Hence, they aremostly extreme "Nationalists, " while they are also deep in Pan-Islamicreactionary schemes. Indeed, we often witness the strange spectacle ofatheists posing as Moslem fanatics and affecting a truly dervish zeal. Mr. Bukhsh well describes this type when he writes: "I know a gentleman, a _Mohammedan by profession_, who owes his success in life to his faith. Though, outwardly, he conforms to all the precepts of Islam andoccasionally stands up in public as the champion and spokesman of hisco-religionists; yet, to my utter horror, I found that he held opinionsabout his religion and its founder which even Voltaire would haverejected with indignation and Gibbon with commiserating contempt. "[22]

Later on we shall examine more fully the activities of these gentry inthe chapters devoted to Pan-Islamism and Nationalism. What I desire toemphasize here is their pernicious influence on the prospects of agenuine Mohammedan reformation as visualized by the true reformers whomI have described. Their malevolent desire to stir up the fanaticpassions of the ignorant masses and their equally malevolent hatred ofeverything Western except military improvements are revealed byoutbursts like the following from the pen of a prominent "Young Turk. ""Yes, the Mohammedan religion is in open hostility to all your world ofprogress. Learn, ye European observers, that a Christian, whatever hisposition, by the mere fact that he is a Christian, is in our eyes abeing devoid of all human dignity. Our reasoning is simple anddefinitive. We say: the man whose judgment is so perverted as to denythe evidence of the One God and to fabricate gods of different kinds, cannot be other than the most ignoble expression of human stupidity. Tospeak to him would be a humiliation to our reason and an offence to thegrandeur of the Master of the Universe. The worshipper of false gods isa monster of ingratitude; he is the execration of the universe; tocombat him, convert him, or annihilate him is the holiest task of theFaithful. These are the eternal commands of our One God. For us thereare in this world only Believers and Misbelievers; love, charity, fraternity to Believers; disgust, hatred, and war to Misbelievers. AmongMisbelievers, the most odious and criminal are those who, whilerecognizing God, create Him of earthly parents, give Him a son, amother; so monstrous an aberration surpasses, in our eyes, all bounds ofiniquity; the presence of such miscreants among us is the bane of ourexistence; their doctrine is a direct insult to the purity of our faith;their contact a pollution for our bodies; any relation with them atorture for our souls. 

"While detesting you, we have been studying your political institutionsand your military organizations. Besides the new arms which Providenceprocures for us by your own means, you yourselves have rekindled theinextinguishable faith of our heroic martyrs. Our Young Turks, ourBabis, our new fraternities, all are sects in their varied forms, areinspired by the same thought, the same purpose. Toward what end?Christian civilization? Never!"[23]

Such harangues unfortunately find ready hearers among the Moslem masses. Although the liberal reformers are a growing power in Islam, it must notbe forgotten that they are as yet only a minority, an élite, below whomlie the ignorant masses, still suffering from the blight of age-longobscurantism, wrapped in admiration of their own world, which theyregard as the highest ideal of human existence, and fanatically hatingeverything outside as wicked, despicable, and deceptive. Even whencompelled to admit the superior power of the West, they hate it none theless. They rebel blindly against the spirit of change which is forcingthem out of their old ruts, and their anger is still further heightenedby that ubiquitous Western domination which is pressing upon them fromall sides. Such persons are as clay in the hands of the Pan-Islamic andNationalist leaders who mould the multitude to their own sinister ends. 

Islam is, in fact, to-day torn between the forces of liberal reform andchauvinistic reaction. The liberals are not only the hope of anevolutionary reformation, they are also favoured by the trend of thetimes, since the Moslem world is being continually permeated by Westernprogress and must continue to be thus permeated unless Westerncivilization itself collapses in ruin. Yet, though the ultimate triumphof the liberals appears probable, what delays, what setbacks, what freshbarriers of warfare and fanaticism may not the chauvinist reactionariesbring about! Neither the reform of Islam nor the relations between Eastand West are free from perils whose ominous possibilities we shall laterdiscuss. 

Meanwhile, there remains the hopeful fact that throughout the Moslemworld a numerous and powerful minority, composed not merely ofWesternized persons but also of orthodox conservatives, are aware ofIslam's decadence and are convinced that a thoroughgoing reformationalong liberal, progressive lines is at once a practical necessity and asacred duty. Exactly how this reformation shall be legally effected hasnot yet been determined, nor is a detailed discussion of technicalmachinery necessary for our consideration. [24] History teaches us thatwhere the will to reform is vitally present, reformation will somehow orother be accomplished. 

One thing is certain: the reforming spirit, in its variousmanifestations, has already produced profound changes throughout Islam. The Moslem world of to-day is vastly different from the Moslem world ofa century ago. The Wahabi leaven has destroyed abuses and has rekindleda purer religious faith. Even its fanatical zeal has not been withoutmoral compensations. The spread of liberal principles and Westernprogress goes on apace. If there is much to fear for the future, thereis also much to hope. 

FOOTNOTES:

[5] On the Wahabi movement, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam audix-neuvième Siècle_ (Paris, 1888); W. G. Palgrave, _Essays on EasternQuestions_ (London, 1872); D. B. Macdonald, _Muslim Theology_ (London, 1903); J. L. Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys_ (2 vols. , London, 1831); A. Chodzko, "Le Déisme des Wahhabis, " _JournalAsiatique_, IV. , Vol. II. , pp. 168 _et seq. _

[6] Not to be confused with Sir Syed Ahmed of Aligarh, the Indian Moslemliberal of the mid-nineteenth century. 

[7] For English alarm at the latent fanaticism of the North IndianMoslems, down through the middle of the nineteenth century, see Sir W. W. Hunter, _The Indian Musalmans_ (London, 1872). 

[8] For the Babbist movement, see Clément Huart, _La Réligion de Bab_(Paris, 1889); Comte Arthur de Gobineau, _Trois Ans en Perse_ (Paris, 1867). A good summary of all these early movements of the Mohammedanrevival is found in Le Chatelier, _op. Cit. _

[9] _Mishkat-el-Masabih_, I. , 46, 51. 

[10] The best recent examples of this polemical literature are thewritings of the Rev. S. M. Zwemer, the well known missionary to theArabs; especially his _Arabia, the Cradle of Islam_ (Edinburgh, 1900), and _The Reproach of Islam_ (London, 1915). Also see volume entitled_The Mohammedan World of To-day_, being a collection of the papers readat the Protestant Missionary Conference held at Cairo, Egypt, in 1906. 

[11] Cromer, _Modern Egypt_, Vol. II. , p. 229 (London, 1908). ForRenan's attitude, see his _L'Islamisme et la Science_ (Paris, 1883). 

[12] In the year 1633. 

[13] Ismael Hamet, _Les Musulmans français du Nord de l'Afrique_ (Paris, 1906). 

[14] Quoted by Dr. Perron in his work _L'Islamisme_ (Paris, 1877). 

[15] The Mollahs are the Moslem clergy, though they do not exactlycorrespond to the clergy of Christendom. Mohammed was averse to anythinglike a priesthood, and Islam makes no legal provision for an ordainedpriestly class or caste, as is the case in Christianity, Judaism, Brahmanism, and other religions. Theoretically any Moslem can conductreligious services. As time passed, however, a class of men developedwho were learned in Moslem theology and law. These ultimately becamepractically priests, though theoretically they should be regarded astheological lawyers. There also developed religious orders of dervishes, etc. ; but primitive Islam knew nothing of them. 

[16] From the article by Léon Cahun in Lavisse et Rambeaud, _HistoireGénérale_, Vol. XII. , p. 498. This article gives an excellent generalsurvey of the intellectual development of the Moslem world in thenineteenth century. 

[17] Especially his best-known book, _The Spirit of Islam_ (London, 1891). 

[18] S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 20, 24, 284. (London, 1912). 

[19] 1856 to 1878. 

[20] For the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars, see ArminiusVambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_ (London, 1906). 

[21] Ismael Hamet, _Les Musulmans français du Nord de l'Afrique_, p. 268(Paris, 1906). 

[22] S. Khuda Bukhsh, _op. Cit. _, p. 241. 

[23] Sheikh Abd-ul-Haak, in Sherif Pasha's organ, _Mecheroutiette_, ofAugust, 1921. Quoted from A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, Constantine, Algeria, 1913. 

[24] For such discussion of legal methods, see W. S. Blunt, _The Futureof Islam_ (London, 1882); A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvièmeSiècle_ (Paris, 1888); Dr. Perron, _L'Islamisme_ (Paris, 1877); H. N. Brailsford "Modernism in Islam, " _The Fortnightly Review_, September, 1908; Sir Theodore Morison, "Can Islam be Reformed?" _The NineteenthCentury and After_, October, 1908; M. Pickthall, "La Morale islamique, "_Revue Politique Internationale_, July, 1916; XX, "L'Islam après laGuerre, " _Revue de Paris_, 15 January, 1916. 

CHAPTER II

PAN-ISLAMISM

Like all great movements, the Mohammedan Revival is highly complex. Starting with the simple, puritan protest of Wahabism, it has developedmany phases, widely diverse and sometimes almost antithetical. In theprevious chapter we examined the phase looking toward an evolutionaryreformation of Islam and a genuine assimilation of the progressivespirit as well as the external forms of Western civilization. At thesame time we saw that these liberal reformers are as yet only aminority, an élite; while the Moslem masses, still plunged in ignoranceand imperfectly awakened from their age-long torpor, are influenced byother leaders of a very different character--men inclined to militantrather than pacific courses, and hostile rather than receptive to theWest. These militant forces are, in their turn, complex. They may begrouped roughly under the general concepts known as "Pan-Islamism" and"Nationalism. " It is to a consideration of the first of these twoconcepts, to Pan-Islamism, that this chapter is devoted. 

Pan-Islamism, which in its broadest sense is the feeling of solidaritybetween all "True Believers, " is as old as the Prophet, when Mohammedand his few followers were bound together by the tie of faith againsttheir pagan compatriots who sought their destruction. To Mohammed theprinciple of fraternal solidarity among Moslems was of transcendentimportance, and he succeeded in implanting this so deeply in Moslemhearts that thirteen centuries have not sensibly weakened it. The bondbetween Moslem and Moslem is to-day much stronger than that betweenChristian and Christian. Of course Moslems fight bitterly amongthemselves, but these conflicts never quite lose the aspect of familyquarrels and tend to be adjourned in presence of infidel aggression. Islam's profound sense of solidarity probably explains in large part itsextraordinary hold upon its followers. No other religion has such a gripon its votaries. Islam has won vast territories from Christianity andBrahmanism, [25] and has driven Magism from the face of the earth;[26]yet there has been no single instance where a people, once becomeMoslem, has ever abandoned the faith. Extirpated they may have been, like the Moors of Spain, but extirpation is not apostasy. 

Islam's solidarity is powerfully buttressed by two of its fundamentalinstitutions: the "Hajj, " or pilgrimage to Mecca, and the caliphate. Contrary to the general opinion in the West, it is the Hajj rather thanthe caliphate which has exerted the more consistently unifyinginfluence. Mohammed ordained the Hajj as a supreme act of faith, andevery year fully 100, 000 pilgrims arrive, drawn from every quarter ofthe Moslem world. There, before the sacred Kaaba of Mecca, men of allraces, tongues, and cultures meet and mingle in an ecstasy of commondevotion, returning to their homes bearing the proud title of "Hajjis, "or Pilgrims--a title which insures them the reverent homage of theirfellow Moslems for all the rest of their days. The politicalimplications of the Hajj are obvious. It is in reality a perennialPan-Islamic congress, where all the interests of the faith are discussedby delegates from every part of the Mohammedan world, and where plansare elaborated for Islam's defence and propagation. Here nearly all themilitant leaders of the Mohammedan Revival (Abd-el-Wahab, Mahommed benSennussi, Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani, and many more) felt the imperioussummons to their task. [27]

As for the caliphate, it has played a great historic rôle, especially inits early days, and we have already studied its varying fortunes. Reduced to a mere shadow after the Mongol destruction of Bagdad, it wasrevived by the Turkish sultans, who assumed the title and wererecognized as caliphs by the orthodox Moslem world. [28] However, thesesultan-caliphs of Stambul[29] never succeeded in winning the religioushomage accorded their predecessors of Mecca and Bagdad. In Arab eyes, especially, the spectacle of Turkish caliphs was an anachronism to whichthey could never be truly reconciled. Sultan Abdul Hamid, to be sure, made an ambitious attempt to revive the caliphate's pristine greatness, but such success as he attained was due more to the general tide ofPan-Islamic feeling than to the inherent potency of the caliphal name. The real leaders of modern Pan-Islamism either gave Abdul Hamid a merelyqualified allegiance or were, like El Sennussi, definitely hostile. Thiswas not realized in Europe, which came to fear Abdul Hamid as a sort ofMohammedan pope. Even to-day most Western observers seem to think thatPan-Islamism centres in the caliphate, and we see European publicistshopefully discussing whether the caliphate's retention by thediscredited Turkish sultans, its transference to the Shereef of Mecca, or its total suppression, will best clip Pan-Islam's wings. This, however, is a distinctly short-sighted view. The caliphal institution isstill undoubtedly venerated in Islam. But the shrewd leaders of themodern Pan-Islamic movement have long been working on a much broaderbasis. They realize that Pan-Islamism's real driving-power to-day liesnot in the caliphate but in institutions like the Hajj and the greatPan-Islamic fraternities such as the Sennussiya, of which I shallpresently speak. [30]

Let us now trace the fortunes of modern Pan-Islamism. Its first stagewas of course the Wahabi movement. The Wahabi state founded byAbd-el-Wahab in the Nejd was modelled on the theocratic democracy of theMeccan caliphs, and when Abd-el-Wahab's princely disciple, Saud, loosedhis fanatic hosts upon the holy cities, he dreamed that this was but thefirst step in a puritan conquest and consolidation of the whole Moslemworld. Foiled in this grandiose design, Wahabism, nevertheless, soonproduced profound political disturbances in distant regions likenorthern India and Afghanistan, as I have already narrated. They were, however, all integral parts of the Wahabi phase, being essentiallyprotests against the political decadence of Moslem states and the moraldecadence of Moslem rulers. These outbreaks were not inspired by anyspecial fear or hatred of the West, since Europe was not yet seriouslyassailing Islam except in outlying regions like European Turkey or theIndies, and the impending peril was consequently not appreciated. 

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the situation hadradically altered. The French conquest of Algeria, the Russianacquisition of Transcaucasia, and the English mastery of virtually allIndia, convinced thoughtful Moslems everywhere that Islam was in deadlyperil of falling under Western domination. It was at this time thatPan-Islamism assumed that essentially anti-Western character which ithas ever since retained. At first resistance to Western encroachment wassporadic and unco-ordinated. Here and there heroic figures likeAbd-el-Kader in Algeria and Shamyl in the Caucasus fought brilliantlyagainst the European invaders. But though these paladins of the faithwere accorded widespread sympathy from Moslems, they received notangible assistance and, unaided, fell. 

Fear and hatred of the West, however, steadily grew in intensity, andthe seventies saw the Moslem world swept from end to end by a wave ofmilitant fanaticism. In Algeria there was the Kabyle insurrection of1871, while all over North Africa arose fanatical "Holy Men" preachingholy wars, the greatest of these being the Mahdist insurrection in theEgyptian Sudan, which maintained itself against England's best effortsdown to Kitchener's capture of Khartum at the very end of the century. In Afghanistan there was an intense exacerbation of fanaticism awakeningsympathetic echoes among the Indian Moslems, both of which gave theBritish much trouble. In Central Asia there was a similar access offanaticism, centring in the powerful Nakechabendiya fraternity, spreading eastward into Chinese territory and culminating in the greatrevolts of the Chinese Mohammedans both in Chinese Turkestan and Yunnan. In the Dutch East Indies there was a whole series of revolts, the mostserious of these being the Atchin War, which dragged on interminably, not being quite stamped out even to-day. 

The salient characteristic of this period of militant unrest is its lackof co-ordination. These risings were all spontaneous outbursts of localpopulations; animated, to be sure, by the same spirit of fear andhatred, and inflamed by the same fanatical hopes, but with no evidenceof a central authority laying settled plans and moving in accordancewith a definite programme. The risings were inspired largely by themystical doctrine known as "Mahdism. " Mahdism was unknown to primitiveIslam, no trace of it occurring in the Koran. But in the "traditions, "or reputed sayings of Mohammed, there occurs the statement that theProphet predicted the coming of one bearing the title of "El Mahdi"[31]who would fill the earth with equity and justice. From this arose thewidespread mystical hope in the appearance of a divinely inspiredpersonage who would effect the universal triumph of Islam, purge theworld of infidels, and assure the lasting happiness of all Moslems. Thisdoctrine has profoundly influenced Moslem history. At various timesfanatic leaders have arisen claiming to be El Mahdi, "The Master of theHour, " and have won the frenzied devotion of the Moslem masses; just ascertain "Messiahs" have similarly excited the Jews. It was thus naturalthat, in their growing apprehension and impotent rage at Westernaggression, the Moslem masses should turn to the messianic hope ofMahdism. Yet Mahdism, by its very nature, could effect nothingconstructive or permanent. It was a mere straw fire; flaring up fiercelyhere and there, then dying down, leaving the disillusioned masses morediscouraged and apathetic than before. 

Now all this was recognized by the wiser supporters of the Pan-Islamicidea. The impotence of the wildest outbursts of local fanaticism againstthe methodical might of Europe convinced thinking Moslems that longpreparation and complete co-ordination of effort were necessary if Islamwas to have any chance of throwing off the European yoke. Such men alsorealized that they must study Western methods and adopt much of theWestern technique of power. Above all, they felt that the politicalliberation of Islam from Western domination must be preceded by aprofound spiritual regeneration, thereby engendering the moral forcesnecessary both for the war of liberation and for the fruitfulreconstruction which should follow thereafter. At this point the idealsof Pan-Islamists and liberals approach each other. Both recognizeIslam's present decadence; both desire its spiritual regeneration. It ison the nature of that regeneration that the two parties are opposed. Theliberals believe that Islam should really assimilate Western ideas. ThePan-Islamists, on the other hand, believe that primitive Islam containsall that is necessary for regeneration, and contend that only Westernmethods and material achievements should be adopted by the Moslem world. 

The beginnings of self-conscious, systematic Pan-Islamism date fromabout the middle of the nineteenth century. The movement crystallizesabout two foci: the new-type religious fraternities like the Sennussiya, and the propaganda of the group of thinkers headed by Djemal-ed-Din. Letus first consider the fraternities. 

Religious fraternities have existed in Islam for centuries. They allpossess the same general type of organization, being divided into lodges("Zawias") headed by Masters known as "Mokaddem, " who exercise a more orless extensive authority over the "Khouan" or Brethren. Until thefoundation of the new-type organizations like the Sennussi, however, thefraternities exerted little practical influence upon mundane affairs. Their interests were almost wholly religious, of a mystical, devotionalnature, often characterized by great austerities or by fanaticalexcesses like those practised by the whirling and howling dervishes. Such political influence as they did exert was casual and local. Anything like joint action was impossible, owing to their mutualrivalries and jealousies. These old-type fraternities still exist ingreat numbers, but they are without political importance except as theyhave been leavened by the new-type fraternities. 

The new-type organizations date from about the middle of the nineteenthcentury, the most important in every way being the Sennussiya. Itsfounder, Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, was born near Mostaganem, Algeria, about the year 1800. As his title "Seyid" indicates, he was a descendantof the Prophet, and was thus born to a position of honour andimportance. [32] He early displayed a strong bent for learning and piety, studying theology at the Moorish University of Fez and afterwardstravelling widely over North Africa preaching a reform of the prevailingreligious abuses. He then made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and there hisreformist zeal was still further quickened by the Wahabi teachers. Itwas at that time that he appears to have definitely formulated his planof a great puritan order, and in 1843 he returned to North Africa, settling in Tripoli, where he built his first Zawia, known as the "ZawiaBaida, " or White Monastery, in the mountains near Derna. So impressivewas his personality and so great his organizing ability that convertsflocked to him from all over North Africa. Indeed, his power soonalarmed the Turkish authorities in Tripoli, and relations became sostrained that Seyid Mahommed presently moved his headquarters to theoasis of Jarabub, far to the south in the Lybian desert. When he died in1859, his organization had spread over the greater part of North Africa. 

Seyid Mahommed's work was carried on uninterruptedly by his son, usuallyknown as Sennussi-el-Mahdi. The manner in which this son gained hissuccession typifies the Sennussi spirit. Seyid Mahommed had two sons, ElMahdi being the younger. While they were still mere lads, their fatherdetermined to put them to a test, to discover which of them had thestronger faith. In presence of the entire Zawia he bade both sons climba tall palm-tree, and then adjured them by Allah and his Prophet to leapto the ground. The younger lad leaped at once and reached the groundunharmed; the elder boy refused to spring. To El Mahdi, "who feared notto commit himself to the will of God, " passed the right to rule. Throughout his long life Sennussi-el-Mahdi justified his father'schoice, displaying wisdom and piety of a high order, and furtherextending the power of the fraternity. During the latter part of hisreign he removed his headquarters to the oasis of Jowf, still fartherinto the Lybian desert, where he died in 1902, and was succeeded by hisnephew, Ahmed-el-Sherif, the present head of the Order, who also appearsto possess marked ability. 

With nearly eighty years of successful activity behind it, the SennussiOrder is to-day one of the vital factors in Islam. It counts itsadherents in every quarter of the Moslem world. In Arabia its followersare very numerous, and it profoundly influences the spiritual life ofthe holy cities, Mecca and Medina. North Africa, however, still remainsthe focus of Sennussism. The whole of northern Africa, from Morocco toSomaliland, is dotted with its Zawias, or lodges, all absolutelydependent upon the Grand Lodge, headed by The Master, El Sennussi. TheSennussi stronghold of Jowf lies in the very heart of the Lybian Sahara. Only one European eye[33] has ever seen this mysterious spot. Surroundedby absolute desert, with wells many leagues apart, and the routes ofapproach known only to experienced Sennussi guides, every one of whomwould suffer a thousand deaths rather than betray him, El Sennussi, TheMaster, sits serenely apart, sending his orders throughout North Africa. 

The influence exerted by the Sennussiya is profound. The local Zawiasare more than mere "lodges. " Besides the Mokaddem, or Master, there isalso a "Wekil, " or civil governor, and these officers have discretionaryauthority not merely over the Zawia members but also over the communityat large--at least, so great is the awe inspired by the Sennussiyathroughout North Africa, that a word from Wekil or Mokaddem is alwayslistened to and obeyed. Thus, besides the various European colonialauthorities, British, French, or Italian, as the case may be, thereexists an occult government with which the colonial authorities arecareful not to come into conflict. 

On their part, the Sennussi are equally careful to avoid a downrightbreach with the European Powers. Their long-headed, cautious policy istruly astonishing. For more than half a century the order has been agreat force, yet it has never risked the supreme adventure. In many ofthe fanatic risings which have occurred in various parts of Africa, local Sennussi have undoubtedly taken part, and the same was true duringthe Italian campaign in Tripoli and in the late war, but the orderitself has never officially entered the lists. 

In fact, this attitude of mingled cautious reserve and haughty aloofnessis maintained not only towards Christians but also towards the otherpowers that be in Islam. The Sennussiya has always kept its absolutefreedom of action. Its relations with the Turks have never been cordial. Even the wily Abdul Hamid, at the height of his prestige as the championof Pan-Islamism, could never get from El Sennussi more than coldlyplatonic expressions of approval, and one of Sennussi-el-Mahdi'sfavourite remarks was said to have been: "Turks and Christians: I willbreak both of them with one and the same stroke. " Equally characteristicwas his attitude toward Mahommed Ahmed, the leader of the "Mahdist"uprising in the Egyptian Sudan. Flushed with victory, Mahommed Ahmedsent emissaries to El Sennussi, asking his aid. El Sennussi refused, remarking haughtily: "What have I to do with this fakir from Dongola? AmI not myself Mahdi if I choose?"

These Fabian tactics do not mean that the Sennussi are idle. Far fromit. On the contrary, they are ceaselessly at work with the spiritualarms of teaching, discipline, and conversion. The Sennussi programme isthe welding, first, of Moslem Africa and, later, of the whole Moslemworld into the revived "Imâmât" of Islam's early days; into a greattheocracy, embracing all True Believers--in other words, Pan-Islamism. But they believe that the political liberation of Islam from Christiandomination must be preceded by a profound spiritual regeneration. Towardthis end they strive ceaselessly to improve the manners and morals ofthe populations under their influence, while they also strive to improvematerial conditions by encouraging the better cultivation of oases, digging new wells, building rest-houses along the caravan routes, andpromoting trade. The slaughter and rapine practised by the SudaneseMahdists disgusted the Sennussi and drew from their chief words ofscathing condemnation. 

All this explains the Order's unprecedented self-restraint. This is thereason why, year after year and decade after decade, the Sennussiadvance slowly, calmly, coldly; gathering great latent power, butavoiding the temptation to expend it one instant before the proper time. Meanwhile they are covering North Africa with their lodges and schools, disciplining the people to the voice of their Mokaddems and Wekils; and, to the southward, converting millions of pagan negroes to the faith ofIslam. [34]

Nothing better shows modern Islam's quickened vitality than the revivalof missionary fervour during the past hundred years. Of course Islam hasalways displayed strong proselytizing power. Its missionary successes inits early days were extraordinary, and even in its period of decline itnever wholly lost its propagating vigour. Throughout the Middle AgesIslam continued to gain ground in India and China; the Turks planted itfirmly in the Balkans; while between the fourteenth and sixteenthcenturies Moslem missionaries won notable triumphs in such distantregions as West Africa, the Dutch Indies, and the Philippines. Nevertheless, taking the Moslem world as a whole, religious zealundoubtedly declined, reaching low-water mark during the eighteenthcentury. 

The first breath of the Mohammedan Revival, however, blew thesmouldering embers of proselytism into a new flame, and everywhereexcept in Europe Islam began once more advancing portentously along allits far-flung frontiers. Every Moslem is, to some extent, a bornmissionary and instinctively propagates his faith among his non-Moslemneighbours, so the work was carried on not only by priestly specialistsbut also by multitudes of travellers, traders, and humble migratoryworkers. [35] Of course numerous zealots consecrated their lives to thetask. This was particularly true of the religious fraternities. TheSennussi have especially distinguished themselves by their apostolicfervour, and from those natural monasteries, the oases of the Sahara, thousands of "Marabouts" have gone forth with flashing eyes and swellingbreasts to preach the marvels of Islam, devoured with a zeal like thatof the Christian mendicant friars of the Middle Ages. Islam'smissionary triumphs among the negroes of West and Central Africa duringthe past century have been extraordinary. Every candid European observertells the same story. As an Englishman very justly remarked some twentyyears ago: "Mohammedanism is making marvellous progress in the interiorof Africa. It is crushing paganism out. Against it the Christianpropaganda is a myth. "[36] And a French Protestant missionary remarks insimilar vein: "We see Islam on its march, sometimes slowed down butnever stopped, towards the heart of Africa. Despite all obstaclesencountered, it tirelessly pursues its way. It fears nothing. EvenChristianity, its most serious rival, Islam regards without hate, sosure is it of victory. While Christians dream of the conquest of Africa, the Mohammedans do it. "[37]

The way in which Islam is marching southward is dramatically shown by arecent incident. A few years ago the British authorities suddenlydiscovered that Mohammedanism was pervading Nyassaland. An investigationbrought out the fact that it was the work of Zanzibar Arabs. They begantheir propaganda about 1900. Ten years later almost every village insouthern Nyassaland had its Moslem teacher and its mosque hut. Althoughthe movement was frankly anti-European, the British authorities did notdare to check it for fear of repercussions elsewhere. Many Europeanobservers fear that it is only a question of time when Islam will crossthe Zambezi and enter South Africa. 

And these gains are not made solely against paganism. They are being wonat the expense of African Christianity as well. In West Africa theEuropean missions lose many of their converts to Islam, while acrossthe continent the ancient Abyssinian Church, so long an outpost againstIslam, seems in danger of submersion by the rising Moslem tide. Not bywarlike incursions, but by peaceful penetration, the Abyssinians arebeing Islamized. "Tribes which, fifty or sixty years ago, counted hardlya Mohammedan among them, to-day live partly or wholly according to theprecepts of Islam. "[38]

Islam's triumphs in Africa are perhaps its most noteworthy missionaryvictories, but they by no means tell the whole story, as a few instancesdrawn from other quarters of the Moslem world will show. In the previouschapter I mentioned the liberal movement among the Russian Tartars. That, however, was only one phase of the Mohammedan Revival in thatregion, another phase being a marked resurgence of proselyting zeal. These Tartars had long been under Russian rule, and the Orthodox Churchhad made persistent efforts to convert them, in some instances withapparent success. But when the Mohammedan Revival reached the Tartarsearly in the nineteenth century, they immediately began labouring withtheir christianized brethren, and in a short time most of these revertedto Islam despite the best efforts of the Orthodox Church and thepunitive measures of the Russian governmental authorities. Tartarmissionaries also began converting the heathen Turko-Finnish tribes tothe northward, in defiance of every hindrance from their Russianmasters. [39]

In China, likewise, the nineteenth century witnessed an extraordinarydevelopment of Moslem energy. Islam had reached China in very earlytimes, brought in by Arab traders and bands of Arab mercenary soldiers. Despite centuries of intermarriage with Chinese women, their descendantsstill differ perceptibly from the general Chinese population, andregard themselves as a separate and superior people. The ChineseMohammedans are mainly concentrated in the southern province of Yunnanand the inland provinces beyond. Besides these racially Chinese Moslems, another centre of Mohammedan population is found in the Chinesedependency of Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, inhabited by Turkish stocksand conquered by the Chinese only in the eighteenth century. Untilcomparatively recent times the Chinese Moslems were well treated, butgradually their proud-spirited attitude alarmed the Chinese Government, which withdrew their privileges and persecuted them. Early in thenineteenth century the breath of the Mohammedan Revival reached China, as it did every other part of the Moslem world, and the ChineseMohammedans, inflamed by resurgent fanaticism, began a series of revoltsculminating in the great rebellions which took place about the year1870, both in Yunnan and in Eastern Turkestan. As usual, thesefanaticized Moslems displayed fierce fighting power. The Turkestanrebels found an able leader, one Yakub Beg, and for some years bothTurkestan and Yunnan were virtually independent. To many Europeanobservers at that time it looked as though the rebels might join hands, erect a permanent Mohammedan state in western China, and even overrunthe whole empire. The fame of Yakub Beg spread through the Moslem world, the Sultan of Turkey honouring him with the high title of Commander ofthe Faithful. After years of bitter fighting, accompanied by frightfulmassacres, the Chinese Government subdued the rebels. The ChineseMoslems, greatly reduced in numbers, have not yet recovered their formerstrength; but their spirit is still unbroken, and to-day they numberfully 10, 000, 000. Thus, Chinese Islam, despite its setbacks, is a factorto be reckoned with in the future. [40]

The above instances do not exhaust the list of Islam's activities duringthe past century. In India, for example, Islam has continued to gainground rapidly, while in the Dutch Indies it is the same story. [41]European domination actually favours rather than retards the spread ofIslam, for the Moslem finds in Western improvements, like the railroad, the post-office, and the printing-press, useful adjuncts to Islamicpropaganda. 

Let us now consider the second originating centre of modernPan-Islamism--the movement especially associated with the personality ofDjemal-ed-Din. 

Seyid Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani was born early in the nineteenth centuryat Asadabad, near Hamadan, in Persia, albeit, as his name shows, he wasof Afghan rather than Iranian descent, while his title "Seyid, " meaningdescendant of the Prophet, implies a strain of Arab blood. Endowed witha keen intelligence, great personal magnetism, and abounding vigour, Djemal-ed-Din had a stormy and chequered career. He was a greattraveller, knowing intimately not only most of the Moslem world butwestern Europe as well. From these travels, supplemented by widereading, he gained a notable fund of information which he employedeffectively in his manifold activities. A born propagandist, Djemal-ed-Din attracted wide attention, and wherever he went in Islamhis strong personality started an intellectual ferment. Unlike ElSennussi, he concerned himself very little with theology, devotinghimself to politics. Djemal-ed-Din was the first Mohammedan who fullygrasped the impending peril of Western domination, and he devoted hislife to warning the Islamic world of the danger and attempting toelaborate measures of defence. By European colonial authorities he wassoon singled out as a dangerous agitator. The English, in particular, feared and persecuted him. Imprisoned for a while in India, he went toEgypt about 1880, and had a hand in the anti-European movement of ArabiPasha. When the English occupied Egypt in 1882 they promptly expelledDjemal, who continued his wanderings, finally reaching Constantinople. Here he found a generous patron in Abdul-Hamid, then evolving hisPan-Islamic policy. Naturally, the Sultan was enchanted with Djemal, andpromptly made him the head of his Pan-Islamic propaganda bureau. Infact, it is probable that the success of the Sultan's Pan-Islamic policywas largely due to Djemal's ability and zeal. Djemal died in 1896 at anadvanced age, active to the last. 

Djemal-ed-Din's teachings may be summarized as follows:

"The Christian world, despite its internal differences of race andnationality, is, as against the East and especially as against Islam, united for the destruction of all Mohammedan states. 

"The Crusades still subsist, as well as the fanatical spirit of Peterthe Hermit. At heart, Christendom still regards Islam with fanaticalhatred and contempt. This is shown in many ways, as in internationallaw, before which Moslem nations are not treated as the equals ofChristian nations. 

"Christian governments excuse the attacks and humiliations inflictedupon Moslem states by citing the latter's backward and barbarouscondition; yet these same governments stifle by a thousand means, evenby war, every attempted effort of reform and revival in Moslem lands. 

"Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peoples, not merely to someof them, and the result of this spirit is a tacit, persistent effort forIslam's destruction. 

"Every Moslem feeling and aspiration is caricatured and calumniated byChristendom. 'The Europeans call in the Orient "fanaticism" what at homethey call "nationalism" and "patriotism. " And what in the West they call"self-respect, " "pride, " "national honour, " in the East they call"chauvinism. " What in the West they esteem as national sentiment, in theEast they consider xenophobia. '[42]

"From all this, it is plain that the whole Moslem world must unite in agreat defensive alliance, to preserve itself from destruction; and, todo this, it must acquire the technique of Western progress and learn thesecrets of European power. "

Such, in brief, are the teachings of Djemal-ed-Din, propagated witheloquence and authority for many years. Given the state of mingled fearand hatred of Western encroachment that was steadily spreadingthroughout the Moslem world, it is easy to see how great Djemal'sinfluence must have been. And of course Djemal was not alone in hispreaching. Other influential Moslems were agitating along much the samelines as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. One of thesepioneers was the Turkish notable Aali Pasha, who was said to remark:"What we want is rather an increase of fanaticism than a diminution ofit. "[43] Arminius Vambéry, the eminent Hungarian Oriental scholar, states that shortly after the Crimean War he was present at a militantPan-Islamic gathering, attended by emissaries from far parts of theMoslem world, held at Aali Pasha's palace. [44]

Such were the foundations upon which Sultan Abdul Hamid built hisambitious Pan-Islamic structure. Abdul Hamid is one of the strangestpersonalities of modern times. A man of unusual intelligence, his mindwas yet warped by strange twists which went to the verge of insanity. Nursing ambitious, grandiose projects, he tried to carry them out bydark and tortuous methods which, though often cleverly Macchiavellian, were sometimes absurdly puerile. An autocrat by nature, he strove tokeep the smallest decisions dependent on his arbitrary will, albeit hewas frequently guided by clever sycophants who knew how to play upon hissuperstitions and his prejudices. 

Abdul Hamid ascended the throne in 1876 under very difficultcircumstances. The country was on the verge of a disastrous Russian war, while the government was in the hands of statesmen who were endeavouringto transform Turkey into a modern state and who had introduced all sortsof Western political innovations, including a parliament. Abdul Hamid, however, soon changed all this. Taking advantage of the confusion whichmarked the close of the Russian war, he abolished parliament and madehimself as absolute a despot as any of his ancestors had ever been. Secure in his autocratic power, Abdul Hamid now began to evolve his ownpeculiar policy, which, from the first, had a distinctly Pan-Islamictrend[45]. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Abdul Hamid determined touse his position as caliph for far-reaching political ends. Emphasizinghis spiritual headship of the Mohammedan world rather than his politicalheadship of the Turkish state, he endeavoured to win the active supportof all Moslems and, by that support, to intimidate European Powers whomight be formulating aggressive measures against the Ottoman Empire. Before long Abdul Hamid had built up an elaborate Pan-Islamic propagandaorganization, working mainly by secretive, tortuous methods. Constantinople became the Mecca of all the fanatics and anti-Westernagitators like Djemal-ed-Din. And from Constantinople there went forthswarms of picked emissaries, bearing to the most distant parts of Islamthe Caliph's message of hope and impending deliverance from the menaceof infidel rule. 

Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda went on uninterruptedly for nearlythirty years. Precisely what this propaganda accomplished is verydifficult to estimate. In the first place, it was cut short, and to someextent reversed, by the Young-Turk resolution of 1908 which drove AbdulHamid from the throne. It certainly was never put to the test of a warbetween Turkey and a first-class European Power. This is what rendersany theoretical appraisal so inconclusive. Abdul Hamid did succeed ingaining the respectful acknowledgment of his spiritual authority by mostMoslem princes and notables, and he certainly won the pious venerationof the Moslem masses. In the most distant regions men came to regard themighty Caliph in Stambul as, in very truth, the Defender of the Faith, and to consider his empire as the bulwark of Islam. On the other hand, it is a far cry from pious enthusiasm to practical performance. Furthermore, Abdul Hamid did not succeed in winning over powerfulPan-Islamic leaders like El Sennussi, who suspected his motives andquestioned his judgment; while Moslem liberals everywhere disliked himfor his despotic, reactionary, inefficient rule. It is thus a verydebatable question whether, if Abdul Hamid had ever called upon theMoslem world for armed assistance in a "holy war, " he would have beengenerally supported. 

Yet Abdul Hamid undoubtedly furthered the general spread of Pan-Islamicsentiment throughout the Moslem world. In this larger sense hesucceeded; albeit not so much from his position as caliph as because heincarnated the growing fear and hatred of the West. Thus we may concludethat Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propaganda did produce profound andlasting effects which will have to be seriously reckoned with. 

The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 greatly complicated the situation. Itwas soon followed by the Persian revolution and by kindred symptoms inother parts of the East. These events brought into sudden prominence newforces, such as constitutionalism, nationalism, and even social unrest, which had long been obscurely germinating in Islam but which had beenpreviously denied expression. We shall later consider these new forcesin detail. The point to be here noted is their complicating effect onthe Pan-Islamic movement. Pan-Islamism was, in fact, cross-cut anddeflected from its previous course, and a period of confusion and mentaluncertainty supervened. 

This interim period was short. By 1912 Pan-Islamism had recovered itspoise and was moving forward once more. The reason was renewed pressurefrom the West. In 1911 came Italy's barefaced raid on Turkey's Africandependency of Tripoli, while in 1912 the allied Christian Balkan statesattacked Turkey in the Balkan War, which sheared away Turkey's Europeanprovinces to the very walls of Constantinople and left her crippled anddiscredited. Moreover, in those same fateful years Russia and Englandstrangled the Persian revolution, while France, as a result of theAgadir crisis, closed her grip on Morocco. Thus, in a scant two years, the Moslem world had suffered at European hands assaults not onlyunprecedented in gravity but, in Moslem eyes, quite without provocation. 

The effect upon Islam was tremendous. A flood of mingled despair andrage swept the Moslem world from end to end. And, of course, thePan-Islamic implication was obvious. This was precisely what Pan-Islam'sagitators had been preaching for fifty years--the Crusade of the Westfor Islam's destruction. What could be better confirmation of thewarnings of Djemal-ed-Din?

The results were soon seen. In Tripoli, where Turks and Arabs had beenon the worst of terms, both races clasped hands in a sudden access ofPan-Islamic fervour, and the Italian invaders were met with a fanaticalfury that roused Islam to wild applause and inspired Western observerswith grave disquietude. "Why has Italy found 'defenceless' Tripoli sucha hornets' nest?" queried Gabriel Hanotaux, a former French minister offoreign affairs. "It is because she has to do, not merely with Turkey, but with Islam as well. Italy has set the ball rolling--so much theworse for her--and for us all. "[46] The Anglo-Russian man-handling ofPersia likewise roused much wrathful comment throughout Islam, [47] whilethe impending extinction of Moroccan independence at French hands wasdiscussed with mournful indignation. 

But with the coming of the Balkan War the wrath of Islam knew no bounds. From China to the Congo, pious Moslems watched with bated breath theswaying battle-lines in the far-off Balkans, and when the news ofTurkish disaster came, Islam's cry of wrathful anguish rose hoarse andhigh. A prominent Indian Mohammedan well expressed the feelings of hisco-religionists everywhere when he wrote: "The King of Greece orders anew Crusade. From the London Chancelleries rise calls to Christianfanaticism, and Saint Petersburg already speaks of the planting of theCross on the dome of Sant' Sophia. To-day they speak thus; to-morrowthey will thus speak of Jerusalem and the Mosque of Omar. Brothers! Beye of one mind, that it is the duty of every True Believer to hastenbeneath the Khalifa's banner and to sacrifice his life for the safety ofthe faith. "[48] And another Indian Moslem leader thus adjured theBritish authorities: "I appeal to the present government to change itsanti-Turkish attitude before the fury of millions of Moslemfellow-subjects is kindled to a blaze and brings disaster. "[49]

Most significant of all were the appeals made at this time by Moslems tonon-Mohammedan Asiatics for sympathy and solidarity against the hatedWest. This was a development as unprecedented as it was startling. Mohammed, revering as he did the Old and New Testaments, and regardinghimself as the successor of the divinely inspired prophets Moses andJesus, had enjoined upon his followers relative respect for Christiansand Jews ("Peoples of the Book") in contrast with other non-Moslems, whom he stigmatized as "Idolaters. " These injunctions of the Prophet hadalways been heeded, and down to our own days the hatred of Moslems forChristians, however bitter, had been as nothing compared with theirloathing and contempt for "Idolaters" like the Brahmanist Hindus or theBuddhists and Confucianists of the Far East. 

The first symptom of a change in attitude appeared during theRusso-Japanese War of 1904. So great had Islam's fear and hatred of theChristian West then become, that the triumph of an Asiatic people overEuropeans was enthusiastically hailed by many Moslems, even though thevictors were "Idolaters. " It was quite in keeping with Pan-Islamism'sstrong missionary bent that many pious Moslems should have dreamed ofbringing these heroes within the Islamic fold. Efforts to get in touchwith Japan were made. Propagandist papers were founded, missionarieswere selected, and the Sultan sent a warship to Japan with a Pan-Islamicdelegation aboard. Throughout Islam the projected conversion of Japanwas widely discussed. Said an Egyptian journal in the year 1906:"England, with her sixty million Indian Moslems, dreads this conversion. With a Mohammedan Japan, Mussulman policy would change entirely. "[50]And, at the other end of the Moslem world, a Chinese Mohammedan sheikhwrote: "If Japan thinks of becoming some day a very great power andmaking Asia the dominator of the other continents, it will be only byadopting the blessed religion of Islam. "[51]

Of course it soon became plain to these enthusiasts that while Japanreceived Islam's emissaries with smiling courtesy, she had not thefaintest intention of turning Mohammedan. Nevertheless, the first stephad been taken towards friendly relations with non-Moslem Asia, and theBalkan War drove Moslems much further in this direction. The change inMoslem sentiment can be gauged by the numerous appeals made by theIndian Mohammedans at this time to Hindus, as may be seen from thefollowing sample entitled significantly "The Message of the East. ""Spirit of the East, " reads this noteworthy document, "arise and repelthe swelling flood of Western aggression! Children of Hindustan, aid uswith your wisdom, culture, and wealth; lend us your power, thebirthright and heritage of the Hindu! Let the Spirit Powers hidden inthe Himalayan mountain-peaks arise. Let prayers to the god of battlesfloat upward; prayers that right may triumph over might; and call toyour myriad gods to annihilate the armies of the foe!"[52]

To any one who realizes the traditional Moslem attitude towards"Idolaters" such words are simply amazing. They betoken a veritablerevolution in outlook. And such sentiments were not confined to IndianMoslems; they were equally evident among Chinese Moslems as well. Said aMohammedan newspaper of Chinese Turkestan, advocating a fraternal unionof all Chinese against Western aggression: "Europe has grown toopresumptuous. It will deprive us of our liberty; it will destroy usaltogether if we do not bestir ourselves promptly and prepare for apowerful resistance. "[53] During the troublous first stages of theChinese revolution, the Mohammedans, emerging from their sulkyaloofness, co-operated so loyally with their Buddhist and Confucianfellow-patriots that Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen, the Republican leader, announcedgratefully: "The Chinese will never forget the assistance which theirMoslem fellow-countrymen have rendered in the interest of order andliberty. "[54]

The Great War thus found Islam everywhere deeply stirred againstEuropean aggression, keenly conscious of its own solidarity, and franklyreaching out for Asiatic allies in the projected struggle againstEuropean domination. 

Under these circumstances it may at first sight appear strange that nogeneral Islamic explosion occurred when Turkey entered the lists at theclose of 1914 and the Sultan Caliph issued a formal summons to the HolyWar. Of course this summons was not the flat failure which Alliedreports led the West to believe at the time. As a matter of fact, therewas trouble in practically every Mohammedan land under Allied control. To name only a few of many instances: Egypt broke into a tumultsmothered only by overwhelming British reinforcements, Tripoli burstinto a flame of insurrection that drove the Italians headlong to thecoast, Persia was prevented from joining Turkey only by promptRusso-British intervention, while the Indian North-West Frontier was thescene of fighting that required the presence of a quarter of a millionAnglo-Indian troops. The British Government has officially admitted thatduring 1915 the Allies' Asiatic and African possessions stood within ahand's breadth of a cataclysmic insurrection. 

That insurrection would certainly have taken place if Islam's leadershad everywhere spoken the fateful word. But the word was not spoken. Instead, influential Moslems outside of Turkey generally condemned thelatter's action and did all in their power to calm the passions of thefanatic multitude. 

The attitude of these leaders does credit to their discernment. Theyrecognized that this was neither the time nor the occasion for adecisive struggle with the West. They were not yet materially prepared, and they had not perfected their understandings either among themselvesor with their prospective non-Moslem allies. Above all, the moral urgewas lacking. They knew that athwart the Khalifa's writ was stencilled"Made in Germany. " They knew that the "Young-Turk" clique which hadengineered the coup was made up of Europeanized renegades, many of themnot even nominal Moslems, but atheistic Jews. Far-sighted Moslems had nointention of pulling Germany's chestnuts out of the fire, nor did theywish to further Prussian schemes of world-dominion which for themselveswould have meant a mere change of masters. Far better to let the Westfight out its desperate feud, weaken itself, and reveal fully its futureintentions. Meanwhile Islam could bide its time, grow in strength, andawait the morrow. 

The Versailles peace conference was just such a revelation of Europeanintentions as the Pan-Islamic leaders had been waiting for in order toperfect their programmes and enlist the moral solidarity of theirfollowers. At Versailles the European Powers showed unequivocally thatthey had no intention of relaxing their hold upon the Near and MiddleEast. By a number of secret treaties negotiated during the war, theOttoman Empire had been virtually partitioned between the victoriousAllies, and these secret treaties formed the basis of the Versaillessettlement. Furthermore, Egypt had been declared a British protectorateat the very beginning of the war, while the Versailles conference hadscarcely adjourned before England announced an "agreement" with Persiawhich made that country another British protectorate in fact if not inname. The upshot was, as already stated, that the Near and Middle Eastwere subjected to European political domination as never before. 

But there was another side to the shield. During the war years theAllied statesmen had officially proclaimed times without number that thewar was being fought to establish a new world-order based on suchprinciples as the rights of small nations and the liberty of allpeoples. These pronouncements had been treasured and memorizedthroughout the East. When, therefore, the East saw a peace settlementbased, not upon these high professions, but upon the imperialisticsecret treaties, it was fired with a moral indignation and sense ofoutraged justice never known before. A tide of impassioned determinationbegan rising which has set already the entire East in tumultuousferment, and which seems merely the premonitory ground-swell of agreater storm. So ominous were the portents that even before theVersailles conference had adjourned many European students of Easternaffairs expressed grave alarm. Here, for example, is the judgment ofLeone Caetani, Duke of Sermoneta, an Italian authority on Mohammedanquestions. Speaking in the spring of 1919 on the war's effect on theEast, he said: "The convulsion has shaken Islamic and Orientalcivilization to its foundations. The entire Oriental world, from Chinato the Mediterranean, is in ferment. Everywhere the hidden fire ofanti-European hatred is burning. Riots in Morocco, risings in Algiers, discontent in Tripoli, so-called Nationalist attempts in Egypt, Arabia, and Lybia are all different manifestations of the same deep sentiment, and have as their object the rebellion of the Oriental world againstEuropean civilization. "[55]

Those words are a prophetic forecast of what has since occurred in theMoslem world. Because recent events are perhaps even more involved withthe nationalistic aspirations of the Moslem peoples than they are withthe strictly Pan-Islamic movement, I propose to defer their detaileddiscussion till the chapter on Nationalism. We should, however, rememberthat Moslem nationalism and Pan-Islamism, whatever their internaldifferences, tend to unite against the external pressure of Europeandomination and equally desire Islam's liberation from Europeanpolitical control. Remembering these facts, let us survey the presentcondition of the Pan-Islamic movement. 

Pan-Islamism has been tremendously stimulated by Western pressure, especially by the late war and the recent peace settlements. However, Pan-Islamism must not be considered as merely a defensive politicalreaction against external aggression. It springs primarily from thatdeep sentiment of unity which links Moslem to Moslem by bonds muchstronger than those which unite the members of the Christian world. These bonds are not merely religious, in the technical sense; they aresocial and cultural as well. Throughout the Moslem world, despite widedifferences in local customs and regulations, the basic laws of familyand social conduct are everywhere the same. "The truth is that Islam ismore than a creed, it is a complete social system; it is a civilizationwith a philosophy, a culture, and an art of its own; in its longstruggle against the rival civilization of Christendom it has become anorganic unit conscious of itself. "[56]

To this Islamic civilization all Moslems are deeply attached. In thislarger sense, Pan-Islamism is universal. Even the most liberal-mindedMoslems, however much they may welcome Western ideas, and howeverstrongly they may condemn the fanatical, reactionary aspects of thepolitical Pan-Islamic movement, believe fervently in Islam's essentialsolidarity. As a leading Indian Moslem liberal, The Aga Khan, remarks:"There is a right and legitimate Pan-Islamism to which every sincere andbelieving Mohammedan belongs--that is, the theory of the spiritualbrotherhood and unity of the children of the Prophet. The real spiritualand cultural unity of Islam must ever grow, for to the follower of theProphet it is the foundation of the life and the soul. "[57]

If such is the attitude of Moslem liberals, thoroughly conversant withWestern culture and receptive to Western progress, what must be thefeelings of the Moslem masses, ignorant, reactionary, and fanatical?Besides perfectly understandable fear and hatred due to Westernaggression, there is, among the Moslem masses, a great deal of genuinefanaticism caused, not by European political domination, but byreligious bigotry and blind hatred of Western civilization. [58] But thisfanaticism has, of course, been greatly inflamed by the political eventsof the past decade, until to-day religious, cultural, and politicalhatred of the West have coalesced in a state of mind decidedly ominousfor the peace of the world. We should not delude ourselves intominimizing the dangerous possibilities of the present situation. Justbecause the fake "Holy War" proclaimed by the Young-Turks at Germaninstigation in 1914 did not come off is no reason for believing that areal holy war is impossible. As a German staff-officer in Turkishservice during the late struggle very candidly says: "The Holy War wasan absolute fiasco just because it was not a Holy War. "[59] I havealready explained how most Moslems saw through the trick and refused tobudge. 

However, the long series of European aggressions, culminating in therecent peace settlements which subjected virtually the entire Moslemworld to European domination, have been steadily rousing in Moslemhearts a spirit of despairing rage that may have disastrousconsequences. Certainly, the materials for a holy war have long beenheaping high. More than twenty years ago Arminius Vambéry, who knew theMoslem world as few Europeans have ever known it, warned the West of theperils engendered by recklessly imperialistic policies. "As timepasses, " he wrote in 1898, "the danger of a general war becomes evergreater. We should not forget that time has considerably augmented theadversary's force of resistance. I mean by this the sentiment ofsolidarity which is becoming livelier of late years among the peoples ofIslam, and which in our age of rapid communication is no longer anegligible quantity, as it was even ten or twenty years ago. 

"It may not be superfluous to draw the attention of ournineteenth-century Crusaders to the importance of the Moslem press, whose ramifications extend all over Asia and Africa, and whoseexhortations sink more profoundly than they do with us into the souls oftheir readers. In Turkey, India, Persia, Central Asia, Java, Egypt, andAlgeria, native organs, daily and periodical, begin to exert a profoundinfluence. Everything that Europe thinks, decides, and executes againstIslam spreads through those countries with the rapidity of lightning. Caravans carry the news to the heart of China and to the equator, wherethe tidings are commented upon in very singular fashion. Certain sparksstruck at our meetings and banquets kindle, little by little, menacingflames. Hence, it would be an unpardonable legerity to close our eyes tothe dangers lurking beneath an apparent passivity. What the _Terdjuman_of Crimea says between the lines is repeated by the Constantinople_Ikdam_, and is commented on and exaggerated at Calcutta by _The MoslemChronicle_. 

"Of course, at present, the bond of Pan-Islamism is composed of tenuousand dispersed strands. But Western aggression might easily unite thosestrands into a solid whole, bringing about a general war". [60]

In the decades which have elapsed since Vambéry wrote those lines thesituation has become much more tense. Moslem resentment at Europeandominance has increased, has been reinforced by nationalisticaspirations almost unknown during the last century, and possessesmethods of highly efficient propaganda. For example, the Pan-Islamicpress, to which Vambéry refers, has developed in truly extraordinaryfashion. In 1900 there were in the whole Islamic world not more than 200propagandist journals. By 1906 there were 500, while in 1914 there werewell over 1000. [61] Moslems fully appreciate the post-office, therailroad, and other modern methods of rapidly interchanging ideas. "Every Moslem country is in communication with every other Moslemcountry: directly, by means of special emissaries, pilgrims, travellers, traders, and postal exchanges; indirectly, by means of Mohammedannewspapers, books, pamphlets, leaflets, and periodicals. I have met withCairo newspapers in Bagdad, Teheran, and Peshawar; Constantinoplenewspapers in Basra and Bombay; Calcutta newspapers in Mohammerah, Kerbela, and Port Said. "[62] As for the professional Pan-Islamicpropagandists, more particularly those of the religious fraternities, they swarm everywhere, rousing the fanaticism of the people: "Travellingunder a thousand disguises--as merchants, preachers, students, doctors, workmen, beggars, fakirs, mountebanks, pretended fools or rhapsodists, these emissaries are everywhere well received by the Faithful and areefficaciously protected against the suspicious investigations of theEuropean colonial authorities. "[63]

Furthermore, there is to-day in the Moslem world a widespreadconviction, held by liberals and chauvinists alike (albeit for verydifferent reasons), that Islam is entering on a period of Renaissanceand renewed glory. Says Sir Theodore Morison: "No Mohammedan believesthat Islamic civilization is dead or incapable of further development. They recognize that it has fallen on evil days; that it has sufferedfrom an excessive veneration of the past, from prejudice and bigotry andnarrow scholasticism not unlike that which obscured European thought inthe Middle Ages; but they believe that Islam too is about to have itsRenaissance, that it is receiving from Western learning a stimulus whichwill quicken it into fresh activity, and that the evidences of this newlife are everywhere manifest. "[64]

Sir Theodore Morison describes the attitude of Moslem liberals. HowPan-Islamists with anti-Western sentiments feel is well set forth by anEgyptian, Yahya Siddyk, in his well-known book, _The Awakening of theIslamic Peoples in the Fourteenth Century of the Hegira_. [65] The bookis doubly interesting because the author has a thorough Westerneducation, holding a law degree from the French university of Toulouse, and is a judge on the Egyptian bench. Although, writing nearly a decadebefore the cataclysm, Yahya Siddyk clearly foresaw the imminence of theEuropean War. "Behold, " he writes, "these Great Powers ruiningthemselves in terrifying armaments; measuring each other's strength withdefiant glances; menacing each other; contracting alliances whichcontinually break and which presage those terrible shocks which overturnthe world and cover it with ruins, fire, and blood! The future is God's, and nothing is lasting save His Will. "

Yahya Siddyk considers the Western world degenerate. "Does this mean, "he asks, "that Europe, our 'enlightened guide, ' has already reached thesummit of its evolution? Has it already exhausted its vital force by twoor three centuries of hyperexertion? In other words: is it alreadystricken with senility, and will it see itself soon obliged to yield itscivilizing rôle to other peoples less degenerate, less neurasthenic, that is to say, younger, more robust, more healthy, than itself? In myopinion, the present marks Europe's apogee, and its immoderate colonialexpansion means, not strength, but weakness. Despite the aureole of somuch grandeur, power, and glory, Europe is to-day more divided and morefragile than ever, and ill conceals its malaise, its sufferings, and itsanguish. Its destiny is inexorably working out!. . . 

"The contact of Europe on the East has caused us both much good and muchevil: good, in the material and intellectual sense; evil, from the moraland political point of view. Exhausted by long struggles, enervated by abrilliant civilization, the Moslem peoples inevitably fell into amalaise; but they are not stricken, they are not dead! These peoples, conquered by the force of cannon, have not in the least lost theirunity, even under the oppressive régimes to which the Europeans havelong subjected them. . . . 

"I have said that the European contact has been salutary to us from boththe material and intellectual point of view. What reforming Moslemprinces wished to impose by force on their Moslem subjects is to-dayrealized a hundredfold. So great has been our progress in the lasttwenty-five years in science, letters, and art that we may well hope tobe in all these things the equals of Europe in less than half acentury. . . . 

"A new era opens for us with the fourteenth century of the Hegira, andthis happy century will mark our Renaissance and our great future! A newbreath animates the Mohammedan peoples of all races; all Moslems arepenetrated with the necessity of work and instruction! We all wish totravel, do business, tempt fortune, brave dangers. There is in the East, among the Mohammedans, a surprising activity, an animation, unknowntwenty-five years ago. There is to-day a real public opinion throughoutthe East. "

The author concludes: "Let us hold firm, each for all, and let us hope, hope, hope! We are fairly launched on the path of progress: let usprofit by it! It is Europe's very tyranny which has wrought ourtransformation! It is our continued contact with Europe that favours ourevolution and inevitably hastens our revival! It is simply historyrepeating itself; the Will of God fulfilling itself despite allopposition and all resistance. . . . Europe's tutelage over Asiatics isbecoming more and more nominal--the gates of Asia are closing againstthe European! Surely we glimpse before us a revolution without parallelin the world's annals. A new age is at hand!"

If this was the way Pan-Islamists were thinking in the opening years ofthe century, it is clear that their views must have been confirmed andintensified by the Great War. [66] The material power of the West wasthereby greatly reduced, while its prestige was equally sapped by thecharacter of the peace settlement and by the attendant disputes whichbroke out among the victors. The mutual rivalries and jealousies ofEngland, France, Italy, and their satellites in the East have givenMoslems much food for hopeful thought, and have caused correspondingdisquietude in European minds. A French publicist recently admonishedhis fellow Europeans that "Islam does not recognize our colonialfrontiers, " and added warningly, "the great movement of Islamic unioninaugurated by Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani is going on. "[67]

The menacing temper of Islam is shown by the furious agitation which hasbeen going on for the last three years among India's 70, 000, 000 Moslemsagainst the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. This agitation is notconfined to India. It is general throughout Islam, and Sir TheodoreMorison does not overstate the case when he says: "It is time theBritish public realized the gravity of what is happening in the East. The Mohammedan world is ablaze with anger from end to end at thepartition of Turkey. The outbreaks of violence in centres so far remoteas Kabul and Cairo are symptoms only of this widespread resentment. Ihave been in close touch with Mohammedans of India for close upon thirtyyears and I think it is my duty to warn the British public of thepassionate resentment which Moslems feel at the proposed dismembermentof the Turkish Empire. The diplomats at Versailles apparently thoughtthat outside the Turkish homelands there is no sympathy for Turkey. Thisis a disastrous blunder. You have but to meet the Mohammedan now inLondon to realize the white heat to which their anger is rising. InIndia itself the whole of the Mohammedan community from Peshawar toArcot is seething with passion upon this subject. Women inside theZenanas are weeping over it. Merchants who usually take no interest inpublic affairs are leaving their shops and counting-houses to organizeremonstrances and petitions; even the mediæval theologians of Deobandand the Nadwatul-Ulama, whose detachment from the modern world isproverbial, are coming from their cloisters to protest against thedestruction of Islam. "[68]

Possibly the most serious aspect of the situation is that the Moslemliberals are being driven into the camp of political Pan-Islamism. Receptive though the liberals are to Western ideas, and averse thoughthey are to Pan-Islamism's chauvinistic, reactionary tendencies, Europe's intransigeance is forcing them to make at least a temporaryalliance with the Pan-Islamic and Nationalist groups, even though theliberals know that anything like a holy war would dig a gulf betweenEast and West, stop the influx of Western stimuli, favour reactionaryfanaticism, and perhaps postpone for generations a modernist reformationof Islam. 

Perhaps it is symptomatic of a more bellicose temper in Islam that thelast few years have witnessed the rapid spread of two new puritan, fanatic movements--the Ikhwan and the Salafîya. The Ikhwan movementbegan obscurely about ten years ago in inner Arabia--the Nejd. It is adirect outgrowth of Wahabism, from which it differs in no essentialrespect. So rapid has been Ikhwanism's progress that it to-dayabsolutely dominates the entire Nejd, and it is headed by desertArabia's most powerful chieftain, Bin Saud, a descendant of the Saud whoheaded the Wahabi movement a hundred years ago. The fanaticism of theIkhwans is said to be extraordinary, while their programme is the oldWahabi dream of a puritan conversion of the whole Islamic world. [69] Asfor the Salafî movement, it started in India even more obscurely thanIkhwanism did in Arabia, but during the past few years it has spreadwidely through Islam. Like Ikhwanism, it is puritanical and fanatical inspirit, its adherents being found especially among dervishorganizations. [70] Such phenomena, taken with everything else, do notaugur well for the peace of the East. 

So much for Pan-Islamism's religious and political sides. Now let usglance at its commercial and industrial aspects--at what may be calledeconomic Pan-Islamism. 

Economic Pan-Islamism is the direct result of the permeation of Westernideas. Half a century ago the Moslem world was economically still in theMiddle Ages. The provisions of the sheriat, or Moslem canon law, such asthe prohibition of interest rendered economic life in the modern senseimpossible. What little trade and industry did exist was largely in thehands of native Christians or Jews. Furthermore, the whole economic lifeof the East was being disorganized by the aggressive competition of theWest. Europe's political conquest of the Moslem world was, in fact, paralleled by an economic conquest even more complete. Everywherepercolated the flood of cheap, abundant European machine-made goods, while close behind came European capital, temptingly offering itself inreturn for loans and concessions which, once granted, paved the way forEuropean political domination. 

Yet in economics as in politics the very completeness of Europe'striumph provoked resistance. Angered and alarmed by Westernexploitation, Islam frankly recognized its economic inferiority andsought to escape from its subjection. Far-sighted Moslems began castingabout for a _modus vivendi_ with modern life that would put Islameconomically abreast of the times. Western methods were studied andcopied. The prohibitions of the sheriat were evaded or quietly ignored. 

The upshot has been a marked evolution toward Western economicstandards. This evolution is of course still in its early stages, and ismost noticeable in lands most exposed to Western influences like India, Egypt, and Algeria. Yet everywhere in the Moslem world the trend is thesame. The details of this economic transformation will be discussed inthe chapter devoted to economic change. What we are here concerned withis its Pan-Islamic aspect. And that aspect is very strong. Nowhere doesIslam's innate solidarity come out better than in the economic field. The religious, cultural, and customary ties which bind Moslem to Moslemenable Mohammedans to feel more or less at home in every part of theIslamic world, while Western methods of transit and communication enableMohammedans to travel and keep in touch as they never could before. Newtypes of Moslems--wholesale merchants, steamship owners, business men, bankers, even factory industrialists and brokers--are rapidly evolving;types which would have been simply unthinkable a century, or even half acentury, ago. 

And these new men understand each other perfectly. Bound together bothby the ties of Islamic fraternity and by the pressure of Westerncompetition, they co-ordinate their efforts much more easily thanpoliticals have succeeded in doing. Here liberals, Pan-Islamists, andnationalists can meet on common ground. Here is no question of politicalconspiracies, revolts, or holy wars, challenging the armed might ofEurope and risking bloody repression or blind reaction. On the contrary, here is merely a working together of fellow Moslems for economic endsby business methods which the West cannot declare unlawful and dare notrepress. 

What, then, is the specific programme of economic Pan-Islamism? It iseasily stated: the wealth of Islam for Moslems. The profits of trade andindustry for Moslem instead of Christian hands. The eviction of Westerncapital by Moslem capital. Above all, the breaking of Europe's grip onIslam's natural resources by the termination of concessions in lands, mines, forests, railways, custom-houses, by which the wealth of Islamiclands is to-day drained away to foreign shores. 

Such are the aspirations of economic Pan-Islamism. They are whollymodern concepts, the outgrowth of those Western ideas whose influenceupon the Moslem world I shall now discuss. [71]

FOOTNOTES:

[25] Islam has not only won much ground in India, Brahmanism's homeland, but has also converted virtually the entire populations of thegreat islands of Java and Sumatra, where Brahmanism was formerlyascendant. 

[26] The small Parsi communities of India, centring in Bombay, are thesole surviving representatives of Zoroastrianism. They were founded byZoroastrian refugees after the Mohammedan conquest of Persia in theseventh century A. D. 

[27] Though Mecca is forbidden to non-Moslems, a few Europeans havemanaged to make the Hajj in disguise, and have written theirimpressions. Of these, Snouck Hurgronje's _Mekka_ (2 vols. , The Hague, 1888) and _Het Mekkaansche Feest_ (Leiden, 1889) are the most recentgood works. Also see Burton and Burckhardt. A recent account of valuefrom the pen of a Mohammedan liberal is: Gazanfar Ali Khan, _With thePilgrims to Mecca; The Great Pilgrimage of A. H. 1319 (A. D. 1902)_, withan Introduction by Arminius Vambéry (London, 1905). 

[28] The Shiite Persians of course refused to recognize any Sunnite ororthodox caliphate; while the Moors pay spiritual allegiance to theirown Shereefian sultans. 

[29] The Turkish name for Constantinople. 

[30] On the caliphate, see Sir W. Muir, _The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline, and Fall_ (Edinburgh, 1915); Sir Mark Sykes, _The Caliph's LastHeritage_ (London, 1915); XX, "L'Islam après la Guerre, " _Revue deParis_, 15 January, 1916; "The Indian Khilafat Delegation, " _ForeignAffairs_, July, 1920 (Special Supplement). 

[31] Literally, "he who is guided aright. "

[32] "Seyid" means "Lord. " This title is borne only by descendants ofthe Prophet. 

[33] The explorer Dr. Nachtigal. 

[34] On the Islamic fraternities in general and the Sennussiya inparticular see W. S. Blunt, _The Future of Islam_ (London, 1882); O. Depont and X. Coppolani, _Les Confréries réligieuses musulmanes_ (Paris, 1897); H. Duveyrier, _La Confrérie musulmane de Sidi Mohammed ben Ali esSénoussi_ (Paris, 1884); A. Le Chatelier, _Les Confréries musulmanes duHedjaz_ (Paris, 1887); L. Petit, _Confréries musulmanes_ (Paris, 1899);L. Rinn, _Marabouts et Khouan_ (Algiers, 1884); A. Servier, _LeNationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); Simian, _LesConfréries islamiques en Algérie_ (Algiers, 1910); Achmed Abdullah(himself a Sennussi), "The Sennussiyehs, " _The Forum_, May, 1914; A. R. Colquhoun, "Pan-Islam, " _North American Review_, June, 1906; T. R. Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War, " _Nineteenth Century_, March, 1900; Captain H. A. Wilson, "The Moslem Menace, " _NineteenthCentury and After_, September, 1907; . . . "La Puissance de l'Islam: SesConfréries Réligieuses, " _Le Correspondant_, 25 November and 10December, 1909. The above judgments, particularly regarding theSennussiya, vary greatly, some being highly alarmist, others minimizingits importance. A full balancing of the entire subject is that ofCommandant Binger, "Le Péril de l'Islam, " _Bulletin du Comité del'Afrique française_, 1902. Personal interviews of educated Moslems withEl Sennussi are Si Mohammed el Hechaish, "Chez les Senoussia et lesTouareg, " _L'Expansion Coloniale française_, 1900; Muhammad ibn Utman, _Voyage au Pays des Sénoussia à travers la Tripolitaine_ (translatedfrom the Arabic), Paris, 1903. 

[35] On Moslem missionary activity in general, see Jansen, _Verbreitungdes Islams_ (Berlin, 1897); M. Townsend, _Asia and Europe_, pp. 46-49, 60-61, 81; A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvième Siècle_ (Paris, 1888); various papers in _The Mohammedan World To-day_ (London, 1906). 

[36] T. R. Threlfall, "Senussi and His Threatened Holy War, " _NineteenthCentury_, March, 1900. 

[37] D. A. Forget, _L'Islam et le Christianisme dans l'Afriquecentrale_, p. 65 (Paris, 1900). For other statements regarding Moslemmissionary activity in Africa, see G. Bonet-Maury, _L'Islamisme et leChristianisme en Afrique_ (Paris, 1906); E. W. Blyden, _Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race_ (London, 1887); Forget, _op. Cit. _

[38] A. Guérinot, "L'Islam et l'Abyssinie, " _Revue du Monde musulman_, 1918. Also see similar opinion of the Protestant missionary K. Cederquist, "Islam and Christianity in Abyssinia, " _The Moslem World_, April, 1921. 

[39] S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia, " _The Moslem World_, January, 1911. 

[40] Broomhall, _Islam in China_ (London, 1910); Nigârèndé, "Notes surles Musulmans Chinois, " _Revue du Monde musulman_, January, 1907; paperon Islam in China in _The Mohammedan World To-day_ (London, 1906). 

[41] See papers on Islam in Java and Sumatra in _The Mohammedan WorldTo-day_ (London, 1906); A. Cabaton, _Java, Sumatra, and the Dutch EastIndies_ (translated from the Dutch), New York, 1916. 

[42] Quoted from article by "X, " "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme, "_Revue du Monde musulman_, March, 1913. This authoritative article is, so the editor informs us, from the pen of an eminent Mohammedan--"unhomme d'étât musulman. " For other activities of Djemal-ed-Din, see A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, pp. 10-13. 

[43] Quoted from W. G. Palgrave, _Essays on Eastern Questions_, p. 111(London, 1872). 

[44] A. Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, p. 351 (London, 1906). 

[45] Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic schemes were first clearly discerned bythe French publicist Gabriel Charmes as early as 1881, and his warningswere published in his prophetic book _L'Avenir de la Turquie--LePanislamisme_ (Paris, 1883). 

[46] Gabriel Hanotaux, "La Crise méditerranéenne et l'Islam, " _RevueHebdomadaire_, April 13, 1912. 

[47] See "X, " "La Situation politique de la Perse, " _Revue du Mondemusulman_, June, 1914; B. Temple, "The Place of Persia inWorld-Politics, " _Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, May 4, 1910; W. M. Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, 1912). 

[48] Quoted from A. Vambéry, "Die türkische Katastrophe und dieIslamwelt, " _Deutsche Revue_, July, 1913. 

[49] Shah Mohammed Naimatullah, "Recent Turkish Events and MoslemIndia, " _Asiatic Review_, October, 1913. 

[50] Quoted by F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'Islam, " _Revue du Mondemusulman_, November, 1906. 

[51] Farjanel, _supra_. 

[52] Quoted by Vambéry, _supra_. 

[53] Vambéry, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists, " _NineteenthCentury and After_, April, 1912. 

[54] Vambéry, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists, " _NineteenthCentury and After_, April, 1912. 

[55] Special cable to the New York _Times_, dated Rome, May 28, 1919. 

[56] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam, " _Nineteenth Century andAfter_, July, 1919. 

[57] H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_, p. 158 (London, 1918). 

[58] This hatred of Western civilization, as such, will be discussed inthe next chapter. 

[59] Ernst Paraquin, formerly Ottoman lieutenant-colonel and chief ofgeneral staff, in the _Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920. 

[60] A. Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp. 71, 72 (Paris, 1898). 

[61] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 182. 

[62] B. Temple, "The Place of Persia in World-Politics, " _Proceedings ofthe Central Asian Society_, May, 1910. 

[63] L. Rinn, _Marabouts et Khouan_, p. Vi. 

[64] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam, " _op. Cit. _

[65] Yahya Siddyk, _Le Reveil des Peuples islamiques au quatorzièmeSiècle de l'Hégire_ (Cairo, 1907). Also published in Arabic. 

[66] For a full discussion of the effect of the Great War upon Asiaticand African peoples, see my book _The Rising Tide of Colour againstWhite World-Supremacy_ (New York and London, 1920). 

[67] L. Massignon, "L'Islam et la Politique des Alliés, " _Revue desSciences politiques_, June, 1920. 

[68] Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam, " _op. Cit. _

[69] For the Ikhwan movement, see P. W. Harrison, "The Situation inArabia, " _Atlantic Monthly_, December, 1920; S. Mylrea, "ThePolitico-Religious Situation in Arabia, " _The Moslem World_, July, 1919. 

[70] For the Salafî movement, see "Wahhabisme--Son Avenir sociale et leMouvement salafî, " _Revue du Monde musulman_, 1919. 

[71] On the general subject of economic Pan-Islamism, see A. LeChatelier, "Le Reveil de l'Islam--Sa Situation économique, " _RevueÉconomique internationale_, July, 1910; also his article "Politiquemusulmane, " _Revue du Monde musulman_, September, 1910; M. Pickthall, "La Morale islamique, " _Revue Politique internationale_, July, 1916; S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_ (London, 1912). 

CHAPTER III

THE INFLUENCE OF THE WEST

The influence of the West is the great dynamic in the moderntransformation of the East. The ubiquitous impact of Westernism ismodifying not merely the Islamic world but all non-Moslem Asia andAfrica, [72] and in subsequent pages we shall examine the effects ofWestern influence upon the non-Moslem elements of India. Of courseWestern influence does not entirely account for Islam's recentevolution. We have already seen that, for the last hundred years, Islamitself has been engendering forces which, however quickened by externalWestern stimuli, are essentially internal in their nature, arisingspontaneously and working toward distinctive, original goals. It is nota mere copying of the West that is to-day going on in the Moslem world, but an attempt at a new synthesis--an assimilation of Western methods toEastern ends. We must always remember that the Asiatic stocks whichconstitute the bulk of Islam's followers are not primitive savages likethe African negroes or the Australoids, but are mainly peoples withgenuine civilizations built up by their own efforts from the remotepast. In view of their historic achievements, therefore, it seems safeto conclude that in the great ferment now stirring the Moslem world webehold a real _Renaissance_, whose genuineness is best attested by thefact that there have been similar movements in former times. 

The modern influence of the West on the East is quite unprecedented inboth intensity and scope. The far more local, partial influence ofGreece and Rome cannot be compared to it. Another point to be noted isthat this modern influence of the West upon the East is a very recentthing. The full impact of Westernism upon the Orient as a whole datesonly from about the middle of the nineteenth century. Since then, however, the process has been going on by leaps and bounds. Roads andrailways, posts and telegraphs, books and papers, methods and ideas, have penetrated, or are in process of penetrating, every nook and crannyof the East. Steamships sail the remotest seas. Commerce drives forthand scatters the multitudinous products of Western industry among theremotest peoples. Nations which only half a century ago lived the lifeof thirty centuries ago, to-day read newspapers and go to business inelectric tram-cars. Both the habits and thoughts of Orientals are beingrevolutionized. To a discussion of the influence of the West upon theMoslem world the remainder of this book will be devoted. The chiefelements will be separately analysed in subsequent chapters, the presentchapter being a general survey of an introductory character. 

The permeation of Westernism is naturally most advanced in those partsof Islam which have been longest under Western political control. Thepenetration of the British "Raj" into the remotest Indian jungles, forexample, is an extraordinary phenomenon. By the coinage, thepost-office, the railroads, the administration of justice, theencouragement of education, the relief of famine, and a thousand otherways, the great organization has penetrated all India. But even inregions where European control is still nominal, the permeation ofWesternism has gone on apace. The customs and habits of the people havebeen distinctly modified. Western material improvements and comfortslike the kerosene-oil lamp and the sewing-machine are to-day part andparcel of the daily life of the people. New economic wants have beencreated; standards of living have been raised; canons of taste have beenaltered. [73]

In the intellectual and spiritual fields, likewise, the leaven ofWesternism is clearly apparent. We have already seen how profoundlyMoslem liberal reformers have been influenced by Western ideas and thespirit of Western progress. Of course in these fields Westernism hasprogressed more slowly and has awakened much stronger opposition than ithas on the material plane. Material innovations, especially mechanicalimprovements, comforts, and luxuries, make their way much faster thannovel customs or ideas, which usually shock established beliefs orancestral prejudices. Tobacco was taken up with extraordinary rapidityby every race and clime, and the kerosene-lamp has in half a centurypenetrated the recesses of Central Asia and of China; whereas customslike Western dress and ideas like Western education encounter manysetbacks and are often adopted with such modifications that theiroriginal spirit is denatured or perverted. The superior strength andskill of the West are to-day generally admitted throughout the East, butin many quarters the first receptivity to Western progress and zeal forWestern ideas have cooled or have actually given place to a reactionaryhatred of the very spirit of Western civilization. [74]

Western influences are most apparent in the upper and middle classes, especially in the Western-educated _intelligentsia_ which to-day existsin every Eastern land. These élites of course vary greatly in numbersand influence, but they all possess a more or less definite grasp ofWestern ideas. In their reactions to Westernism they are sharplydifferentiated. Some, while retaining the fundamentals of theirancestral philosophy of life, attempt a genuine assimilation of Westernideals and envisage a higher synthesis of the spirits of East and West. Others break with their traditional pasts, steep themselves inWesternism, and become more or less genuinely Westernized. Still othersconceal behind their Western veneer disillusionment and detestation. [75]

Of course it is in externals that Westernization is most pronounced. TheIndian or Turkish "intellectual, " holding Western university degrees andspeaking fluently several European languages, and the wealthy prince orpasha, with his motor-cars, his racing-stables, and his annual "cure" atEuropean watering-places, appear very Occidental to the casual eye. Suchmen wear European clothes, eat European food, and live in houses partlyor wholly furnished in European style. Behind this façade exists everypossible variation of inner life, from earnest enthusiasm for Westernideals to inveterate reaction. 

These varied attitudes toward Westernism are not parked off by groups orlocalities, they co-exist among the individuals of every class and everyland in the East. The entire Orient is, in fact, undergoing a prodigioustransformation, far more sudden and intense than anything the West hasever known. Our civilization is mainly self-evolved; a natural growthdeveloping by normal, logical, and relatively gradual stages. The East, on the contrary, is undergoing a concentrated process of adaptationwhich, with us, was spread over centuries, and the result is not so muchevolution as revolution--political, economic, social, idealistic, religious, and much more besides. The upshot is confusion, uncertainty, grotesque anachronism, and glaring contradiction. Single generationsare sundered by unbridgeable mental and spiritual gulfs. Fathers do notunderstand sons; sons despise their fathers. Everywhere the old and thenew struggle fiercely, often within the brain or spirit of the sameindividual. The infinite complexity of this struggle as it appears inIndia is well summarized by Sir Valentine Chirol when he speaks of themany "currents and cross-currents of the confused movement which isstirring the stagnant waters of Indian life--the steady impact of alienideas on an ancient and obsolescent civilization; the more or lessimperfect assimilation of those ideas by the few; the dread andresentment of them by those whose traditional ascendancy they threaten;the disintegration of old beliefs, and then again their aggressiverevival; the careless diffusion of an artificial system of education, based none too firmly on mere intellectualism, and bereft of all moralor religious sanction; the application of Western theories ofadministration and of jurisprudence to a social formation stratified onlines of singular rigidity; the play of modern economic forces uponprimitive conditions of industry and trade; the constant and unconsciousbut inevitable friction between subject races and their alien rulers;the reverberation of distant wars and distant racial conflicts; theexaltation of an Oriental people in the Far East. "[76] These lines, though written about India, apply with fair exactitude to every otherportion of the Near and Middle East to-day. As a French writer remarkswith special reference to the Levant: "The truth is that the Orient isin transformation, and the Mohammedan mentality as well--though notperhaps exactly as we might wish. It is undergoing a period of crisis, wherein the past struggles everywhere against the present; where ancientcustoms, impaired by modern innovations, present a hybrid anddisconcerting spectacle. "[77]

To this is largely due the unlovely traits displayed by most of theso-called "Westernized" Orientals; the "stucco civilization"[78] of theIndian Babu, and the boulevardier "culture" of the Turkish"Effendi"--syphilized rather than civilized. Any profound transformationmust engender many worthless by-products, and the contemporaryWesternization of the Orient has its dark as well as its bright side. The very process of reform, however necessary and inevitable, lendsfresh virulence to old ills and imports new evils previously unknown. AsLord Cromer says: "It is doubtful whether the price which is being paidfor introducing European civilization into these backward Easternsocieties is always recognized as fully as it should be. The materialbenefits derived from European civilization are unquestionably great, but as regards the ultimate effect on public and private morality thefuture is altogether uncertain. "[79]

The good and the evil of Westernization are alike mostly clearly evidentamong the ranks of the educated élites. Some of these men show thehappiest effects of the Western spirit, but an even larger number fallinto the gulf between old and new, and there miserably perish. LordCromer characterized many of the "Europeanized" Egyptians as "at thesame time de-Moslemized Moslems and invertebrate Europeans";[80] whileanother British writer thus pessimistically describes the superficialEuropeanism prevalent in India: "Beautiful Mogul palaces furnished withcracked furniture from Tottenham Court Road. That is what we have doneto the Indian mind. We have not only made it despise its own culture andthrow it out; we have asked it to fill up the vacant spaces withfurniture which will not stand the climate. The mental Eurasianism ofIndia is appalling. Such minds are nomad. They belong to nocivilization, no country, and no history. They create a craving thatcannot be satisfied, and ideals that are unreal. They falsify life. They deprive men of the nourishment of their cultural past, and thesubstitutes they supply are unsubstantial. . . . We sought to give theEastern mind a Western content and environment; we have succeeded toowell in establishing intellectual and moral anarchy in both. "[81]

These patent evils of Westernization are a prime cause of thatimplacable hatred of everything Western which animates so manyOrientals, including some well acquainted with the West. Such personsare precious auxiliaries to the ignorant reactionaries and to the rebelsagainst Western political domination. 

The political predominance of the West over the East is, indeed, theoutstanding factor in the whole question of Western influence upon theOrient. We have already surveyed Europe's conquest of the Near andMiddle East during the past century, and we have seen how helpless thebackward, decrepit Moslem world was in face of the twofold tide ofpolitical and economic subjugation. In fact, the economic phase wasperhaps the more important factor in the rapidity and completeness ofEurope's success. To be sure, some Eastern lands were subjugated at astroke by naked military force, as in the French expedition to Algiers, the Russian conquest of central Asia, and the Italian descent uponTripoli. Much oftener, however, subjection began by the essentiallyeconomic process known as "pacific penetration"--the acquirement of afinancial grip upon a hitherto independent Oriental country by Westerncapital in the form of loans and concessions, until the assumption ofWestern political control became little more than a formal registrationof what already existed in fact. Such is the story of the subjection ofEgypt, Morocco, and Persia, while England's Indian Empire started in apurely trading venture--the East India Company. The tremendous potencyof "pacific penetration" is often not fully appreciated. Take thesignificance of one item alone--railway concessions. Says that keenstudent of _Weltpolitik_, Doctor Dillon: "Railways are the irontentacles of latter-day expanding Powers. They are stretched outcaressingly at first. But once the iron has, so to say, entered the soulof the weaker nation, the tentacles swell to the dimensions of brawnyarms, and the embrace tightens to a crushing grip. "[82]

On the question of the abstract rightness or wrongness of thissubjection of the East by the West, I do not propose to enter. It hasbeen exhaustively discussed, pro and con, and every reader of thesepages is undoubtedly familiar with the stock arguments on both sides. The one thing certain is that this process of subjugation was, broadlyspeaking, inevitable. Given two worlds at such different levels as Eastand West at the beginning of the nineteenth century--the Westoverflowing with vitality and striding at the forefront of humanprogress, the East sunk in lethargy and decrepitude--and it was aforegone conclusion that the former would encroach upon the latter. 

What does concern us in our present discussion is the effect of Europeanpolitical control upon the general process of Westernization in Easternlands. And there can be no doubt that such Westernization was therebygreatly furthered. Once in control of an Oriental country, the Europeanrulers were bound to favour its Westernization for a variety of reasons. Mere self-interest impelled them to make the country peaceful andprosperous, in order to extract profit for themselves and reconcile theinhabitants to their rule. This meant the replacement of inefficient andsanguinary native despotisms inhibiting progress and engendering anarchyby stable colonial governments, maintaining order, encouragingindustry, and introducing improvements like the railway, the post, sanitation, and much more besides. In addition to these materialinnovations, practically all the Western governments endeavoured tobetter the social, intellectual, and spiritual condition of the peoplesthat had come under their control. The European Powers who built upcolonial empires during the nineteenth century were actuated by a spiritfar more enlightened than that of former times, when the early colonialempires of Spain, Portugal, Holland, and the English East India Companyhad been run on the brutal and short-sighted doctrine of sheerexploitation. In the nineteenth century all Western rule in the Orientwas more or less impregnated with the ideal of "The White Man's Burden. "The great empire-builders of the nineteenth century, actuated as theywere not merely by self-interest and patriotic ambition but also by aprofound sense of obligation to improve the populations which they hadbrought under their country's sway, felt themselves bearers of Westernenlightenment and laboured to diffuse all the benefits of Westerncivilization. They honestly believed that the extension of Westernpolitical control was the best and quickest, perhaps the only, means ofmodernizing the backward portions of the world. 

That standpoint is ably presented by a British "liberal imperialist, "Professor Ramsay Muir, who writes: "It is an undeniable fact that theimperialism of the European peoples has been the means whereby Europeancivilization has been in some degree extended to the whole world, sothat to-day the whole world has become a single economic unit, and allits members are parts of a single political system. And this achievementbrings us in sight of the creation of a world-order such as the wildestdreamers of the past could never have anticipated. Without theimperialism of the European peoples North and South America, Australia, South Africa, must have remained wildernesses, peopled by scatteredbands of savages. Without it India and other lands of ancientcivilization must have remained, for all we can see, externally subjectto that endless succession of wars and arbitrary despotisms which haveformed the substance of their history through untold centuries, andunder which neither rational and equal law nor political liberty, as weconceive them, were practicable conceptions. Without it the backwardpeoples of the earth must have continued to stagnate under the dominanceof an unchanging primitive customary régime, which has been their statethroughout recorded time. If to-day the most fruitful political ideas ofthe West--the ideas of nationality and self-government--which are purelyproducts of Western civilization, are beginning to produce a healthyfermentation in many parts of the non-European world, that result is dueto European Imperialism. "[83]

The ethics of modern imperialism have nowhere been better formulatedthan in an essay by Lord Cromer. "An imperial policy, " he writes, "must, of course, be carried out with reasonable prudence, and the principlesof government which guide our relations with whatsoever races arebrought under our control must be politically and economically sound andmorally defensible. This is, in fact, the keystone of the imperial arch. The main justification of imperialism is to be found in the use which ismade of imperial power. If we make good use of our power, we may facethe future without fear that we shall be overtaken by the Nemesis whichattended Roman misrule. If the reverse is the case, the British Empirewill deserve to fall, and of a surety it will ultimately fall. "[84]

Such are the basic sanctions of Western imperialism as evolved duringthe nineteenth century. Whether or not it is destined to endure, therecan be no question that this prodigious extension of European politicalcontrol greatly favoured the spread of Western influences of every kind. It is, of course, arguable that the East would have voluntarily adoptedWestern methods and ideas even if no sort of Western pressure had beenapplied. But they would have been adopted much more slowly, and thisvital element of time renders such arguments mere academic speculation. For the vital, expanding nineteenth-century West to have deliberatelyrestrained itself while the backward East blunderingly experimented withWesternism, accepting and rejecting, buying goods and refusing to payfor them, negotiating loans and then squandering and repudiating them, inviting in Europeans and then expelling or massacring them, would havebeen against all history and human nature. 

As a matter of fact, Western pressure was applied, as it was bound to beapplied; and this constant, ubiquitous, unrelenting pressure, broke downthe barriers of Oriental conservatism and inertia as nothing else couldhave done, forced the East out of its old ruts, and compelled it to takestock of things as they are in a world of hard facts instead ofreminiscent dreams. In subsequent chapters we shall examine the manifoldresults of this process which has so profoundly transformed the Orientduring the past hundred years. Here we will continue our general surveyby examining the more recent aspects of Western control over the Eastand the reactions of the East thereto. 

In my opinion, the chief fallacy involved in criticisms of Westerncontrol over Eastern lands arises from failure to discriminate betweennineteenth-century and twentieth-century imperialism. Nineteenth-centuryimperialism was certainly inevitable, and was apparently beneficial inthe main. Twentieth-century imperialism cannot be so favourably judged. By the year 1900 the Oriental peoples were no longer mere fanaticalobscurantists neither knowing nor caring to know anything outside theclosed circle of their ossified, decadent civilizations. The East hadbeen going to school, and wanted to begin to apply what it had beentaught by the West. It should have been obvious that these peoples, whose past history proved them capable of achievement and who were nowshowing an apparently genuine desire for new progress, needed to betreated differently from what they had been. In other words, a moreliberal attitude on the part of the West had become advisable. 

But no such change was made. On the contrary, in the West itself, theliberal idealism which had prevailed during most of the nineteenthcentury was giving way to that spirit of fierce political and economicrivalry which culminated in the Great War. [85] Never had Europe been soavid for colonies, for "spheres of influence, " for concessions andpreferential markets; in fine, so "imperialistic, " in the unfavourablesense of the term. The result was that with the beginning of thetwentieth century Western pressure on the East, instead of beingrelaxed, was redoubled; and the awakening Orient, far from being metwith sympathetic consideration, was treated more ruthlessly than it hadbeen for two hundred years. The way in which Eastern countries likeTurkey and Persia, striving to reform themselves and protect theirindependence, were treated by Europe's new _Realpolitik_ would havescandalized the liberal imperialists of a generation before. Itcertainly scandalized present-day liberals, as witness these scathinglines written in 1912 by the well-known British publicist Sidney Low:

"The conduct of the Most Christian Powers during the past few years hasborne a striking resemblance to that of robber-bands descending upon anunarmed and helpless population of peasants. So far from respecting therights of other nations, they have exhibited the most complete andcynical disregard for them. They have, in fact, asserted the claim ofthe strong to prey upon the weak, and the utter impotence of all ethicalconsiderations in the face of armed force, with a crude nakedness whichfew Eastern military conquerors could well have surpassed. 

"The great cosmic event in the history of the last quarter of a centuryhas been the awakening of Asia after centuries of somnolence. The Easthas suddenly sprung to life, and endeavoured to throw itself vigorouslyinto the full current of Western progress. Japan started the enterprise;and, fortunately for herself, she entered upon it before the new Westernpolicy had fully developed itself, and while certain archaic idealsabout the rights of peoples and the sanctity of treaties stillprevailed. When the new era was inaugurated by the great Japanesestatesmen of the nineteenth century, Europe did not feel called upon tointerfere. We regarded the Japanese renaissance with interest andadmiration, and left the people of Nippon to work out the difficultiesof their own salvation, unobstructed. If that revolution had taken placethirty years later, there would probably have been a different story totell; and New Japan, in the throes of her travail, would have found thearmed Great Powers at her bedside, each stretching forth a mailed fistto grab something worth taking. Other Eastern countries which haveendeavoured to follow the example of Japan during the present centuryhave had worse luck. During the past ten years a wave of sheermaterialism and absolute contempt for international morality has sweptacross the Foreign Offices of Europe, and has reacted disastrously uponthe various Eastern nations in their desperate struggles to reform aconstitutional system. They have been attempting to carry out thesuggestions made to them for generations by benevolent advisers inChristendom. 

"Now, when they take these counsels to heart, and endeavour, withhalting steps, and in the face of immense obstacles, to pursue the pathof reform, one might suppose that their efforts would be regarded withsympathetic attention by the Governments of the West; and that, even ifthese offered no direct aid, they would at least allow a fair trial. "But, on the contrary, "one Great Power after another has used theopportunity presented by the internal difficulties of the Easterncountries to set out upon a career of annexation. "[86]

We have already seen how rapid was this career of annexation, extinguishing the independence of the last remaining Mohammedan statesat the close of the Great War. We have also seen how it exacerbatedMoslem fear and hatred of the West. And the West was already feared andhated for many reasons. In the preceding chapter we traced the growth ofthe Pan-Islamic movement, and in subsequent chapters we shall trace thedevelopment of Oriental nationalism. These politico-religious movements, however, by no means exhaust the list of Oriental reactions toWesternism. There are others, economic, social, racial in character. Inview of the complex nature of the Orient's reaction against Westernism, let us briefly analyse the problem in its various constituent elements. 

Anti-Western feeling has been waning in some quarters and waxing inothers during the past hundred years. By temperamental reactionaries andfanatics things Western have, of course, always been abhorred. But, leaving aside this intransigeant minority, the attitude of othercategories of Orientals has varied greatly according to times andcircumstances. By liberal-minded persons Western influences were atfirst hailed with cordiality and even with enthusiasm. In the openingchapter we saw how the liberal reformers welcomed the Western concept ofprogress and made it one of the bases of their projected religiousreformation. And the liberals displayed the same attitude in secularmatters. The liberal statesmen who governed Turkey during the thirdquarter of the nineteenth century made earnest efforts to reform theOttoman State, and it was the same in other parts of the Moslem world. An interesting example is the attempt made by General Kheir-ed-Din tomodernize Tunis. This man, a Circassian by birth, had won the confidenceof his master, the Bey, who made him vizier. In 1860 he toured Europeand returned greatly impressed with its civilization. Convinced ofEurope's infinite superiority, he desired passionately to transplantWestern ideas and methods to Tunis. This he believed quite feasible, andthe result would, so he thought, be Tunis's rapid regeneration. Kheir-ed-Din was not in the least a hater of the West. He merelyrecognized clearly the Moslem world's peril of speedy subjection to theWest if it did not set its house rapidly in order, and he thereforedesired, in a perfectly legitimate feeling of patriotism, to press hiscountry along the road of progress, that it might be able to stand aloneand preserve its independence. 

So greatly was the Bey impressed by Kheir-ed-Din's report that he gavehim a free hand in his reforming endeavours. For a short timeKheir-ed-Din displayed great activity, though he encountered stubbornopposition from reactionary officials. His work was cut short by hisuntimely death, and Tunis, still unmodernized, fell twenty years laterunder the power of France. Kheir-ed-Din, however, worked for posterity. In order to rouse his compatriots to the realities of their situation hepublished a remarkable book, _The Surest Means of Knowing the State ofNations_. This book has profoundly influenced both liberals andnationalists throughout the Near East, especially in North Africa, whereit has become the bible of Tunisian and Algerian nationalism. In hisbook Kheir-ed-Din shows his co-religionists the necessity of breakingwith their attitude of blind admiration for the past and proudindifference to everything else, and of studying what is going on in theouter world. Europe's present prosperity is due, he asserts, not tonatural advantages or to religion, but "to progress in the arts andsciences, which facilitate the circulation of wealth and exploit thetreasures of the earth by an enlightened protection constantly given toagriculture, industry, and commerce: all natural consequences of justiceand liberty--two things which, for Europeans, have become secondnature. " In past ages the Moslem world was great and progressive, because it was then liberal and open to progress. It declined throughbigotry and obscurantism. But it can revive by reviving the spirit ofits early days. 

I have stressed the example of the Tunisian Kheir-ed-Din rather than thebetter-known Turkish instances because it illustrates the generalreceptivity of mid-nineteenth-century Moslem liberals to Western ideasand their freedom from anti-Western feeling. [87] As time passed, however, many of these erstwhile liberals, disillusioned with the Westfor various reasons, notably European aggression, became the bitterestenemies of the West, hating the very spirit of Western civilization. [88]

This anti-Western feeling has, of course, been greatly exacerbated sincethe beginning of the present century. As an influential Mohammedan wrotejust before the Great War: "The events of these last ten years and thedisasters which have stricken the Mohammedan world have awakened in itsbosom a sentiment of mutual cordiality and devotion hitherto unknown, and a unanimous hatred against all its oppressors has been the fermentwhich to-day stirs the hearts of all Moslems. "[89] The bitter rancourseething in many Moslem hearts shows in outbursts like the following, from the pen of a popular Turkish writer at the close of the BalkanWars: "We have been defeated, we have been shown hostility by theoutside world, because we have become too deliberative, too cultured, too refined in our conceptions of right and wrong, of humanity andcivilization. The example of the Bulgarian army has taught us that everysoldier facing the enemy must return to the days of barbarism, must havea thirst of blood, must be merciless in slaughtering children and women, old and weak, must disregard others' property, life, and honour. Let usspread blood, suffering, wrong, and mourning. Thus only may we becomethe favourites of the civilized world like King Ferdinand's army. "[90]

The Great War itself was hailed by multitudes of Moslems as awell-merited Nemesis on Western arrogance and greed. Here is how aleading Turkish newspaper characterized the European Powers: "They wouldnot look at the evils in their own countries or elsewhere, butinterfered at the slightest incident in our borders; every day theywould gnaw at some part of our rights and our sovereignty; they wouldperform vivisection on our quivering flesh and cut off great pieces ofit. And we, with a forcibly controlled spirit of rebellion in our heartsand with clinched but powerless fists, silent and depressed, wouldmurmur as the fire burned within: 'Oh, that they might fall out with oneanother! Oh, that they might eat one another up!' And lo! to-day theyare eating each other up, just as the Turk wished they would. "[91]

Such anti-Western sentiments are not confined to journalists orpoliticians, they are shared by all classes, from princes to peasants. Each class has its special reasons for hating European politicalcontrol. The native princes, even when maintained upon their thrones andconfirmed in their dignities and emoluments, bitterly resent their stateof vassalage and their loss of limitless, despotic power. "Do you know, I can hardly buy a pen or a sword for myself without asking the Residentfor permission?" remarked an Indian rajah bitterly. His attitude wasprecisely that of Khedive Tewfik Pasha, who, in the early days of theBritish occupation of Egypt, while watching a review of British troops, said to one of his ministers: "Do you suppose I like this? I tell you, Inever see an English sentinel in my streets without longing to jump outof my carriage and strangle him with my own hands. "[92] The upperclasses feel much the same as their sovereigns. They regret their formermonopoly of privilege and office. This is especially true of theWestern-educated _intelligentsia_, who believe that they should hold allgovernment posts and resent bitterly the reservation of high-salarieddirective positions for Europeans. Of course many intelligent liberalsrealize so fully the educative effect of European control that theyacquiesce in a temporary loss of independence in order to complete theirmodernization and ultimately be able to stand alone without fear ofreaction or anarchy. However, these liberals are only a small minority, hated by their upper-class fellows as time-servers and renegades, andsundered by an immense gulf from the ignorant masses. 

At first sight we might think that the masses would, on the whole, befavourably disposed toward European political control. Despite certaineconomic disadvantages that Westernization has imposed, the masses haveunquestionably gained most by European rule. Formerly exploitedruthlessly by both princes and upper classes, the peasants and townworkers are to-day assured peace, order, justice, and security fortheir landholdings and the fruits of their toil. Now it would be amistake to think that the masses are insensible to all this. The factis, they do recognize the benefits of European rule. Nevertheless, thenew rulers, while tolerated and even respected, are never beloved. Furthermore, as the generation which knew the old régime dies off, itsevils are forgotten, and the younger generation, taking present benefitsfor granted, murmurs at the flaws in the existing order, and lends areadier ear to native agitators extolling the glories of independenceand idealizing the "good old times. "

The truth of the matter is that, despite all its shortcomings, theaverage Oriental hankers after the old way of life. Even when herecognizes the good points of the new, he nevertheless yearnsirrationally for the old. "A Moslem ruler though he oppress me and not a_kafir_[93] though he work me weal" is a Moslem proverb of longstanding. Every colonial administration, no matter how enlightened, runscounter to this ineradicable aversion of Moslems for Christian rule. ARussian administrator in Central Asia voices the sentiments of Europeanofficials generally when he states: "Pious Moslems cannot accommodatethemselves to the government of _Giaours_. "[94]

Furthermore, it must be remembered that most Orientals either do notrecognize much benefit in European rule, or, even though they dorecognize considerable benefits, consider these more than offset by manypoints which, in their eyes, are maddening annoyances or burdens. Thevery things which we most pride ourselves on having given to theOrient--peace, order, justice, security--are not valued by the Orientalanywhere near as highly as we might expect. Of course he likes thesethings, but he would prefer to get less of them if what he did get wasgiven by native rulers, sharing his prejudices and point of view. Takethe single factor of justice. As an English writer remarks: "The Asiaticis not delighted with justice _per se_; indeed, the Asiatic really caresbut little about it if he can get _sympathy_ in the sense in which heunderstands that misunderstood word. . . . This is the real reason whyevery Asiatic in his heart of hearts prefers the rule of his ownnationality, bad though it be, to the most ideal rule of aliens. Forwhen he is ruled by his own countrymen, he is dealt with by people whounderstand his frailties, and who, though they may savagely punish him, are at least in sympathy with the motives which prompt hisdelinquencies. "[95]

Take again the matter of order. The average Oriental not only does notappreciate, but detests, our well-regulated, systematic manner of life. Accustomed as he has been for centuries to a slipshod, easygoingexistence, in which, if there was much injustice, there was also muchfavouritism, he instinctively hates things like sanitary measures andpolice regulations. Accustomed to a wide "personal liberty" in theanarchic sense, he is not willing to limit this liberty for the commonweal. He wants his own way, even though it involves possible dangers tohimself--dangers which may always be averted by bribery, favouritism, orviolence. Said an American who had listened to a Filipino's glowingwords on independence: "What could you do, if you were independent, thatyou cannot do now?" "I could build my house there in the middle of thestreet, if I wanted to. " "But suppose your neighbour objected andinterfered?" "I would 'get' him. " "But suppose he 'got' you?" A shrug ofthe shoulders was the only answer. [96]

The fact is that the majority of Orientals, despite the considerablepenetration of Western ideas and methods that has been going on for thelast century, still love their old ruts and hate to be budged out ofthem. They realize that Western rule furthers more than anything elsethe Westernization of their social system, their traditional manner oflife, and they therefore tend to react fanatically against it. Everyinnovation imposed by the colonial authorities is apt to rouse the mostpurblind resistance. For example, compulsory vaccination was bitterlyopposed for years by the natives of Algeria. The French officialspointed out that smallpox, hitherto rampant, was being rapidlyextirpated. The natives replied that, in their opinion, it was merely acrafty scheme for sterilizing them sexually and thus make room forFrench colonists. The officials thereupon pointed to the census figures, which showed that the natives were increasing at an unprecedented rate. The natives merely shrugged their shoulders and continued to inveighagainst the innovation. 

This whole matter has been well summarized by a French writer with awide knowledge of Mohammedan lands. Says Louis Bertrand:

"In reality, all these peoples, indisposed as they are by theirtraditions, customs, and climates to live according to our social ideal, hate to endure the constraint of our police, of our administration--in aword, of any sort of _regulated_ government, no matter how just andhonest. Delivered from the most anarchic and vexatious of tyrannies, they remain in spirit more or less like our vagabonds, always hoping toescape from the gendarmes. In vain do we point out to the Arabs of NorthAfrica that, thanks to the protection of France, they are no longerpillaged by Turkish despots nor massacred and tortured by rival tribes. They see only one thing: the necessity of paying taxes for matters thatthey do not understand. We shall never realize the rage, the fury, aroused in our Algerian towns by the simple health department ordinancerequiring the emptying of a garbage-can at a fixed hour. At Cairo andelsewhere I have observed the same rebellious feelings among thedonkey-boys and cab-drivers subjected to the regulations of the Englishpoliceman. 

"But it is not merely our municipal and administrative regulations whichthey find insupportable; it is all our habits, taken _en bloc_--in aword, the _order_ which regulates our civilized life. For instance: onthe railway-line from Jaffa to Jerusalem the train stops at a stationbeside which stands the tomb of a holy man. The schedule calls for astop of a minute at most. But no sooner had we arrived than what was mystupefaction to see all the Mohammedans on the train get off, spreadtheir prayer-rugs, and tranquilly begin their devotions. Thestation-master blew his whistle, the conductor yelled at them that hewas going to leave them behind; nobody budged. A squad of railwayemployees had to be mobilized, who, with blows and curses, finallybundled these pious persons back into the train again. The businesslasted a good quarter of an hour, and was not easy. The more vigorous ofthe worshippers put up an energetic resistance. 

"The above is only a casual instance, chosen at random. What is certainis that these peoples do not yet understand what we mean by exactitude, and that the concept of a well-regulated existence has not yetpenetrated their heads. "[97]

What has just been written of course applies primarily to the ignorantmasses. But this attitude of mind is more or less common to all classesof Oriental peoples. The habits of centuries are not easily transformed. In fact, it must not be forgotten that the upper classes were able toenjoy most fully the capricious personal liberty of the unmodified East, and that, therefore, though they may be better able to understand thevalue of Westernization, they have in one sense the most to lose. [98]

In fact, for all Orientals, high and low alike, the "good old times"had charms which they mournfully regret. For the prince, the pasha, thecourtier, existence was truly an Oriental paradise. To be sure, theprince might at any moment be defeated and slain by a rival monarch; thepasha strangled at his master's order; the courtier tortured through asuperior's whim. But, meanwhile, it was "life, " rich and full. "Each ofthese men had his own character and his own renown among his countrymen, and each enjoyed a position such as is now unattainable in Europe, inwhich he was released from laws, could indulge his own fancies, bad orgood, and was fed every day and all day with the special flattery ofAsia--that willing submissiveness to mere volition which is so likeadoration, and which is to its recipients the most intoxicating ofdelights. Each, too, had his court of followers, and every courtiershared in the power, the luxury, and the adulation accruing to his lord. The power was that of life and death; the luxury included possession ofevery woman he desired; the adulation was, as I have said, almostreligious worship. "[99]

But, it may be asked, what about the poor man, exploited by thishierarchy of capricious despots? What had he to gain from all this?Well, in most cases, he got nothing at all; but he _might_ gain a greatdeal. Life in the old Orient was a gigantic lottery. Any one, howeverhumble, who chanced to please a great man, might rise to fame andfortune at a bound. And this is just what pleases the Easterntemperament; for in the East, "luck" and caprice are more prized thanthe "security" cherished in the West. In the Orient the favouritestories are those narrating sudden and amazing shifts offortune--beggars become viziers or viziers become beggars, and all in asingle night. To the majority of Orientals it is still the uncertaintiesof life, and the capricious favour of the powerful, which make it mostworth living; not the sure reward of honesty and well-regulated labour. All these things made the life of the Orient infinitely _interesting_to _all_. And it is precisely this gambler's interest whichWesternization has more or less destroyed. As an English writer veryjustly remarks _à propos_ of modern Egypt: "Our rule may be perfect, butthe East finds it dull. The old order was a ragged garment, but it wasgay. Its very vicissitude had a charm. 'Ah! yes, ' said an Egyptian to achampion of English rule, 'but in the old days a beggar might sit at thegate, and if he were found pleasing in the eyes of a great lady, hemight be a great man on the morrow. ' There is a natural and inevitableregret for the gorgeous and perilous past, when favour took the place ofjustice, and life had great heights and depths--for the Egypt of Joseph, Haroun-al-Rashid, and Ismail Pasha. We have spread the coat ofbroadcloth over the radiant garment. "[100]

Saddened and irritated by the threatened loss of so much that they holddear, it is not strange that many Eastern conservatives glorify the pastas a sort of Golden Age, infinitely superior to anything the West canproduce, and in this they are joined by many quondam liberals, disillusioned with Westernism and flying into the arms of reaction. Theresult is a spirit of hatred against everything Western, which sometimesassumes the most extravagant forms. Says Louis Bertrand: "During alecture that I attended at Cairo the speaker contended that France owedIslam (1) its civilization and sciences; (2) half of its vocabulary; (3)all that was best in the character and mentality of its population, seeing that, from the Middle Ages to the Revolution of 1789, all thereformers who laboured for its enfranchisement--Albigensians, Vaudois, Calvinists, and Camisards--were probably descendants of the Saracens. Itwas nothing less than the total annexation of France to Morocco. "Meanwhile, "it has become the fashion for fervent (Egyptian)nationalists to go to Spain and meditate in the gardens of the Alcazarof Seville or in the patios of the Alhambra of Granada on the defunctsplendours of western Islam. "[101]

Even more grotesque are the rhapsodies of the Hindu wing of this GoldenAge school. These Hindu enthusiasts far outdo the wildest flights oftheir Moslem fellows. They solemnly assert that Hindustan is the nurseryand home of all true religion, philosophy, culture, civilization, science, invention, and everything else; and they aver that when India'spresent regrettable eclipse is past (an eclipse of course causedentirely by English rule) she is again to shine forth in her glory forthe salvation of the whole world. Employing to the full the old adagethat there is nothing new under the sun, they have "discovered" in theVedas and other Hindu sacred texts "irrefutable" evidence that theancient Hindu sages anticipated all our modern ideas, including suchup-to-date matters as bomb-dropping aeroplanes and the League ofNations. [102]

All this rhapsodical laudation of the past will, in the long run, provefutile. The East, like the West, has its peculiar virtues; but the Eastalso has its special faults, and it is the faults which, for the lastthousand years, have been gaining on the virtues, resulting inbackwardness, stagnation, and inferiority. To-day the East is beingpenetrated--and quickened--by the West. The outcome will never becomplete Westernization in the sense of a mere wholesale copying andabsolute transformation; the East will always remain fundamentallyitself. But it will be a new self, the result of a true assimilation ofWestern ideas. The reactionaries can only delay this process, andthereby prolong the Orient's inferiority and weakness. 

Nevertheless, the reactionary attitude, though unintelligent, isintelligible. Westernization hurts too many cherished prejudices andvested interests not to arouse chronic resistance. This resistance wouldoccur even if Western influences were all good and Westerners all angelsof light. But of course Westernization has its dark side, while ourWestern culture-bearers are animated not merely by altruism, but also byfar less worthy motives. This strengthens the hand of the Orientalreactionaries and lends them the cover of moral sanctions. In additionto the extremely painful nature of any transformative process, especially in economic and social matters, there are many incidentalfactors of an extremely irritating nature. 

To begin with, the mere presence of the European, with his patentsuperiority of power and progress, is a constant annoyance andhumiliation. This physical presence of the European is probably asnecessary to the Orient's regeneration as it is inevitable in view ofthe Orient's present inferiority. But, however beneficial, it is nonethe less a source of profound irritation. These Europeans disturbeverything, modify customs, raise living standards, erect separate"quarters" in the cities, where they form "extraterritorial" coloniesexempt from native law and customary regulation. An English town risesin the heart of Cairo, a "Little Paris" eats into Arabesque Algiers, while European Pera flaunts itself opposite Turkish Stambul. 

As for India, it is dotted with British "enclaves". "The greatPresidency towns, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, are European cities plantedon Indian soil. All the prominent buildings are European, though in someof the more recent ones an endeavour has been made to adopt what isknown as the 'Indo-Saracenic' style of architecture. For the rest, thestreets are called by English names, generally the names of bygoneviceroys and governors, or of the soldiers who conquered the land andquelled the mutiny--heroes whose effigies meet you at every turn. Theshops are English shops, where English or Eurasian assistants traffic inEnglish goods. English carriages and motors bowl along the macadamizedor tarred roads of Old England. On every hand there is evidence of theinstinctive effort to reproduce, as nearly as the climate will permit, English conditions of life. . . . Almost the whole life of the people ofIndia is relegated to the back streets, not to say the slums--franklycalled in Madras the Black Town. There are a few points--clubs andgymkhanas specially established to that end--where Englishmen, and evenwomen, meet Indian men, and even women, of the wealthier classes, on abasis of social equality. But few indeed are the points of contactbetween the Asian town and the European city which has been superimposedupon it. The missionary, the Salvation Army outpost, perhaps thecuriosity-hunting tourist, may go forth into the bazaars; but theEuropean community as a whole cares no more for the swarming brownmultitudes around it than the dwellers on an island care for the fishesin the circumambient sea. "[103] And what is true of the great townsholds good for scores of provincial centres, "stations, " andcantonments. The scale may be smaller, but the type is the same. 

The European in the Orient is thus everywhere profoundly an alien, living apart from the native life. And the European is not merely analoof alien; he is a ruling alien as well. Always his attitude is thatof the superior, the master. This attitude is not due to brutality orsnobbery; it is inherent in the very essence of the situation. Of coursemany Europeans have bad manners, but that does not change the basicreality of the case. And this reality is that, whatever the future maybring, the European first established himself in the Orient because theWest was then infinitely ahead of the East; and he is still there to-daybecause, despite all recent changes, the East is still behind the West. Therefore the European in the Orient is still the ruler, and so long ashe stays there _must_ continue to rule--justly, temperately, withpolitic regard for Eastern progress and liberal devolution of power asthe East becomes ripe for its liberal exercise--but, nevertheless, _rule_. Wherever the Occidental has established his political control, there are but two alternatives: govern or go. Furthermore, in hisgoverning, the Occidental must rule according to his own lights; despiteall concessions to local feeling, he must, in the last analysis, act asa Western, not as an Eastern, ruler. Lord Cromer voices the heart of alltrue colonial government when he says: "In governing Oriental races thefirst thought must be what is good for them, but not necessarily whatthey think is good for them. "[104]

Now all this is inevitable, and should be self-evident. Nevertheless, the fact remains that even the most enlightened Oriental can hardlyregard it as other than a bitter though salutary medicine, while mostOrientals feel it to be humiliating or intolerable. The very virtues ofthe European are prime causes of his unpopularity. For, as MeredithTownsend well says: "The European is, in Asia, the man who will insiston his neighbour doing business just after dinner, and being exact whenhe is half-asleep, and being 'prompt' just when he wants to enjoy, --andhe rules in Asia and is loved in Asia accordingly. "[105]

Furthermore, the European in the Orient is disliked not merely as aruler and a disturber, but also as a man of widely different race. Thismatter of race is very complicated, [106] but it cuts deep and is offundamental importance. Most of the peoples of the Near and Middle Eastwith which our present discussion is concerned belong to what is knownas the "brown" category of the human species. Of course, in strictanthropology, the term is inexact. Anthropologically, we cannot set offa sharply differentiated group of "brown" types as a "brown race, " as wecan set off the "white" types of Europe as a "white race" or the"yellow" Mongoloid types of the Far East as a "yellow race. " This isbecause the Near and Middle East have been racially a vast melting-pot, or series of melting-pots, wherein conquest and migration havecontinually poured new heterogeneous elements, producing the mostdiverse ethnic amalgamations. Thus to-day some of the Near and MiddleEastern peoples are largely white, like the Persians and Ottoman Turks;others, like the southern Indians and Yemenite Arabs, are largely black;while still others, like the Himalayan and Central Asian peoples, havemuch yellow blood. Again, as there is no brown racial type-norm, asthere are white and yellow type-norms, so there is no generalized brownculture like those possessed by yellows and whites. The great brownspiritual bond is Islam, yet in India, the chief seat of brownpopulation, Islam is professed by only one-fifth of the inhabitants. Lastly, while the spiritual frontiers of the Moslem world coincidemainly with the ethnic frontiers of the brown world, Islam overlaps atseveral points, including some pure whites in eastern Europe, many trueyellows in the Far East, and multitudes of negroes in Africa. 

Nevertheless, despite these partial modifications, the terms "brownrace" and "brown world" do connote genuine realities which science andpolitics alike recognize to be essentially true. There certainly is afundamental comity between the brown peoples. This comity is subtle andintangible in character; yet it exists, and under certain circumstancesit is capable of momentous manifestations. Its salient feature is theinstinctive recognition by all Near and Middle Eastern peoples that theyare fellow "Asiatics, " however bitter may be their internecine feuds. This instinctive "Asiatic" feeling has been noted by historians formore than two thousand years, and it is true to-day as in the past. 

The great racial divisions of mankind are the most fundamental, the mostpermanent, the most ineradicable things in human experience. They arenot mere diverse colorations of skin. Matters like complexion, stature, and hair-formation are merely the outward, visible symbols ofcorrelative mental and spiritual differences which reveal themselves insharply contrasted temperaments and view-points, and which translatethemselves into the infinite phenomena of divergent group-life. 

Now it is one of these basic racial lines of cleavage which runs between"East" and "West. " Broadly speaking, the Near and Middle East is the"brown world, " and this differentiates it from the "white world" of theWest in a way which never can be really obliterated. Indeed, to attemptto obliterate the difference by racial fusion would be the maddest offollies. East and West can mutually quicken each other by a mutualexchange of ideas and ideals. They can only harm each other bytransfusions of blood. To unite physically would be the greatest ofdisasters. East and West have both given much to the world in the past, and promise to give more in the future. But whatever of true value theyare to give can be given only on condition that they remain essentiallythemselves. Ethnic fusion would destroy both their race-souls and wouldresult in a dreary mongrelization from which would issue nothing butdegeneration and decay. 

Both East and West instinctively recognize the truth of this, and showit by their common contempt for the "Eurasian"--the mongrel offspring ofunions between the two races. As Meredith Townsend well says: "The chasmbetween the brown man and the white is unfathomable, has existed in allages, and exists still everywhere. No white man marries a brown wife, nobrown man marries a white wife, without an inner sense of having beenfalse to some unintelligible but irresistible command. "[107]

The above summary of the political, economic, social, and racialdifferences between East and West gives us a fair idea of the numerouscross-currents which complicate the relations of the two worlds andwhich hinder Westernization. The Westernizing process is assuredly goingon, and in subsequent chapters we shall see how far-reaching is itsscope. But the factors just considered will indicate the possibilitiesof reaction and will roughly assign the limits to which Westernizationmay ultimately extend. 

One thing is certain: Western political control in the Orient, howeverprolonged and however imposing in appearance, must ever rest onessentially fragile foundations. The Western rulers will always remainan alien caste; tolerated, even respected, perhaps, but never loved andnever regarded as anything but foreigners. Furthermore, Western rulemust necessarily become more precarious with the increasingenlightenment of the subject peoples, so that the acquiescence of onegeneration may be followed by the hostile protest of the next. It isindeed an unstable equilibrium, hard to maintain and easily upset. 

The latent instability of European political control over the Near andMiddle East was dramatically shown by the moral effect of theRusso-Japanese War. Down to that time the Orient had been so helpless inface of European aggression that most Orientals had come to regardWestern supremacy with fatalistic resignation. But the defeat of afirst-class European Power by an Asiatic people instantly broke thespell, and all Asia and Africa thrilled with a wild intoxication whichwe can scarcely conceive. A Scotch missionary thus describes the effectof the Japanese victories on northern India, where he was stationed atthe time: "A stir of excitement passed over the north of India. Even theremote villagers talked over the victories of Japan as they sat intheir circles and passed round the huqqa at night. One of the older mensaid to me, 'There has been nothing like it since the mutiny'. A Turkishconsul of long experience in Western Asia told me that in the interioryou could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tingling' with thenews. Asia was moved from end to end, and the sleep of the centuries wasfinally broken. It was a time when it was 'good to be alive, ' for a newchapter was being written in the book of the world's history. "[108]

Of course the Russo-Japanese War did not create this new spirit, whoseroots lay in the previous epoch of subtle changes that had been goingon. The Russo-Japanese War was thus rather the occasion than the causeof the wave of exultant self-confidence which swept over Asia and Africain the year 1904. But it did dramatize and clarify ideas that had beengerminating half-unconsciously in millions of Oriental minds, and wasthus the sign manual of the whole nexus of forces making for arevivified Orient. 

Furthermore, this new temper profoundly influenced the Orient'sattitude toward the series of fresh European aggressions which thenbegan. It is a curious fact that just when the Far East hadsuccessfully resisted European encroachment, the Near and Middle Eastshould have been subjected to European aggressions of unparalleledseverity. We have already noted the furious protests and the unwontedmoral solidarity of the Moslem world at these manifestations of Western_Realpolitik_. It would be interesting to know exactly how much of thisdefiant temper was due to the heartening example of Japan. Certainlyour ultra-imperialists of the West were playing a dangerous game duringthe decade between 1904 and 1914. As Arminius Vambéry remarked afterthe Italian raid on Tripoli: "The more the power and authority of theWest gains ground in the Old World, the stronger becomes the bond ofunity and mutual interest between the separate factions of Asiatics, and the deeper burns the fanatical hatred of Europe. Is it wise orexpedient by useless provocation and unnecessary attacks to increasethe feeling of animosity, to hurry on the struggle between the twoworlds, and to nip in the bud the work of modern culture which is nowgoing on in Asia?"[109]

The Great War of course immensely aggravated an already criticalsituation. The Orient suddenly saw the European peoples, who, in racialmatters, had hitherto maintained something like solidarity, locked in aninternecine death-grapple of unparalleled ferocity; it saw those samepeoples put one another furiously to the ban as irreconcilable foes; itsaw white race-unity cleft by moral and political gulfs which white menthemselves continuously iterated would never be filled. The oneredeeming feature of the struggle, in Oriental eyes, was the liberalprogramme which the Allied statesmen inscribed upon their banners. Butwhen the war was over and the Allies had won, it promptly leaked outthat at the very time when the Allied leaders were making their liberalspeeches they had been negotiating a series of secret treatiespartitioning the Near East between them in a spirit of the most cynicalimperialism; and in the peace conferences that closed the war it wasthese secret treaties, not the liberal speeches, which determined theOriental settlement, resulting (on paper at least) in the totalsubjugation of the Near and Middle East to European political control. 

The wave of wrath which thereupon rolled over the East was not confinedto furious remonstrance like the protests of pre-war days. There was anote of immediate resistance and rebellion not audible before. Thisrebellious temper has translated itself into warlike action which hasalready forced the European Powers to abate some of their extremepretensions and which will undoubtedly make them abate others in thenear future. The details of this post-war unrest will be discussed inlater chapters. Suffice it to say here that the Great War has shatteredEuropean prestige in the East and has opened the eyes of Orientals tothe weaknesses of the West. To the Orient the war was a gigantic courseof education. For one thing, millions of Orientals and negroes weretaken from the remotest jungles of Asia and Africa to serve as soldiersand labourers in the White Man's War. Though the bulk of theseauxiliaries were used in colonial operations, more than a million ofthem were brought to Europe itself. Here they killed white men, rapedwhite women, tasted white luxuries, learned white weaknesses--and wenthome to tell their people the whole story. [110] Asia and Africa to-dayknow Europe as they never knew it before, and we may be sure that theywill make use of their knowledge. The most serious factor in thesituation is that the Orient realizes that the famous Versailles "Peace"which purports to have pacified Europe is no peace, but rather anunconstructive, unstatesmanlike futility that left old sores unhealedand even dealt fresh wounds. Europe to-day lies debilitated and uncured, while Asia and Africa see in this a standing incitement to rash dreamsand violent action. 

Such is the situation to-day: an East, torn by the conflict between newand old, facing a West riven with dissension and sick from its madfollies. Probably never before have the relations between the twoworlds contained so many incalculable, even cataclysmic, possibilities. The point to be here noted is that this strange new East which now facesus is mainly the result of Western influences permeating it inunprecedented fashion for the past hundred years. To the chief elementsin that permeation let us now turn. 

FOOTNOTES:

[72] For the larger aspects, see my book _The Rising Tide of Colouragainst White World-Supremacy_ (New York and London, 1920). 

[73] On these points, see Arminius Vambéry, _Western Culture in EasternLands_ (London, 1906); also his _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avantQuarante Ans_ (Paris, 1898); C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of theOrient_ (New York, 1914); S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_(London, 1912); A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia, " _The Century_, March, 1904. 

[74] For the effect of the West intellectually and spiritually, seeVambéry, _op. Cit. _; Sir Valentine Chirol, _Indian Unrest_ (London, 1910); J. N. Farquhar, _Modern Religious Movements in India_ (New York, 1915); Rev. J. Morrison, _New Ideas in India: A Study of Social, Political, and Religious Developments_ (Edinburgh, 1906); the Earl ofCromer, _Modern Egypt_, especially Vol. II. , pp. 228-243 (London, 1908). 

[75] For the Westernised élites, see L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage Orientale_(Paris, 1910); Cromer, _op. Cit. _; A. Métin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui:Étude Sociale_ (Paris, 1918); A. Le Chatelier, "Politique musulmane, "_Revue du Monde musulman_, September, 1910. 

[76] Chirol, _op. Cit. _, pp 321-322. 

[77] Bertrand, _op. Cit. _, p 39. See also Bukhsh, _op. Cit. _; Farquhar, _op. Cit. _; Morrison, _op. Cit. _; R. Mukerjee, _The Foundations ofIndian Economics_ (London, 1916); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition inIndia, " _Economic Journal_, December, 1910. 

[78] W. S. Lilly, _India and Its Problems_, p. 243 (London, 1902). 

[79] Cromer, _op. Cit. _, Vol. II. , p. 231. 

[80] _Ibid. _, p. 228. 

[81] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, pp. 171-172(London, 1920). On the evils of Westernization, see further: Bukhsh, Cromer, Dodwell, Mukerjee, already cited; Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The TurkishPeasantry of Anatolia, " _Quarterly Review_, January, 1918; H. M. Hyndman, _The Awakening of Asia_ (New York, 1919); T. Rothstein, _Egypt's Ruin_ (London, 1910); Captain P. Azan, _Recherche d'uneSolution de la Question indigène en Algérie_ (Paris, 1903). 

[82] E. J. Dillon, "Persia, " _Contemporary Review_, June, 1910. 

[83] Ramsay Muir, "Europe and the Non-European World, " _The New Europe_, June 28, 1917. 

[84] The Earl of Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, p. 5 (London, 1913). 

[85] For a full discussion of these changes in Western ideas, see my_Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, especially chaps. Vi. And vii. 

[86] Sidney Low, "The Most Christian Powers, " _Fortnightly Review_, March, 1912. 

[87] On this point see also A. Vambéry, _Western Culture in EasternLands_ (London, 1906); W. S. Blunt, _The Future of Islam_ (London, 1882); also the two articles by Léon Cahun on intellectual and socialdevelopments in the Islamic world during the nineteenth century inLavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Générale_, Vol. XI. , chap. Xv. ; Vol. XII. , chap. Xiv. 

[88] See A. Vambéry, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_, chap. Vi. (Leipzig, 1875). 

[89] "X, " "La Situation politique de la Perse, " _Revue du Mondemusulman_, June, 1914. As already stated, the editor vouches for thisanonymous writer as a distinguished Mohammedan official--"un hommed'étât musulman. "

[90] Ahmed Emin, _The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by ItsPress_, p. 108 (Columbia University Ph. D. Thesis, New York, 1914). 

[91] The Constantinople _Tanine_. Quoted from _The Literary Digest_, October 24, 1914, p. 784. This attitude toward the Great War and theEuropean Powers was not confined to Mohammedan peoples; it was common tonon-white peoples everywhere. For a survey of this feeling throughoutthe world, see my _Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, pp. 13-16. 

[92] Both the above instances are taken from C. S. Cooper, _TheModernizing of the Orient_, pp. 339-340 (New York, 1914). 

[93] An "Unbeliever"--in other words, a Christian. 

[94] Quoted by A. Woeikof, _Le Turkestan russe_ (Paris, 1914). 

[95] B. L. Putnam Weale, _The Conflict of Colour_, p. 193 (London, 1910). 

[96] Quoted from H. H. Powers, _The Great Peace_, p. 82 (New York, 1918). 

[97] L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp. 441-442 (Paris, 1910). 

[98] On this point see the very interesting essay by Meredith Townsendentitled "The Charm of Asia for Asiatics, " in his book _Asia andEurope_, pp. 120-128. 

[99] Townsend, _op. Cit. _, p. 104. 

[100] H. Spender, "England, Egypt, and Turkey, " _Contemporary Review_, October, 1906. 

[101] Bertrand, pp. 209, 210. 

[102] For discussion of this Hindu attitude see W. Archer, _India andthe Future_ (London, 1918); Young and Ferrers, _India in Conflict_(London, 1920). Also see Hindu writings of this nature: H. Maitra, _Hinduism: The World-Ideal_ (London, 1916); A. Coomaraswamy, _The Danceof Siva_ (New York, 1918); M. N. Chatterjee, "The World and the NextWar, " _Journal of Race Development_, April, 1916. 

[103] Archer, pp. 11, 12. 

[104] Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, p. 25. 

[105] Townsend, _Asia and Europe_, p. 128. 

[106] I have dealt with it at length in my _Rising Tide of Colouragainst White World-Supremacy_. 

[107] Townsend, p. 97. 

[108] Rev. C. F. Andrews, _The Renaissance in India_, p. 4 (London, 1911). For other similar accounts of the effect of the Russo-JapaneseWar upon Oriental peoples generally, see A. M. Low, "Egyptian Unrest, "_The Forum_, October, 1906; F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'Islam, " _Revuedu Monde musulman_, November, 1906; "Oriental Ideals as Affected by theRusso-Japanese War, " _American Review of Reviews_, February, 1905; A. Vambéry, "Japan and the Mahometan World, " _Nineteenth Century andAfter_, April, 1905; Yahya Siddyk, _op. Cit. _, p. 42. 

[109] A. Vambéry, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists, "_Nineteenth Century and After_, April, 1912. 

[110] For the effect of the war on Asia and Africa, see A. Demangeon, _Le Déclin de l'Europe_ (Paris, 1920); H. M. Hyndman, _The Awakening ofAsia_ (New York, 1919); E. D. Morel, _The Black Man's Burden_ (New York, 1920); F. B. Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_ (New York, 1919); also, my _Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy_. 

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL CHANGE

The Orient's chief handicap has been its vicious political tradition. From earliest times the typical form of government in the East has beendespotism--the arbitrary rule of an absolute monarch, whose subjects areslaves, holding their goods, their honours, their very lives, at hiswill and pleasure. The sole consistent check upon Oriental despotism hasbeen religion. Some critics may add "custom"; but it amounts to the samething, for in the East custom always acquires a religious sanction. Themantle of religion of course covers its ministers, the priests forming aprivileged caste. But, with these exceptions, Oriental despotism hasusually known no bounds; and the despot, so long as he respectedreligion and the priesthood, has been able to act pretty much as hechose. In the very dawn of history we see Pharaoh exhausting all Egyptto gratify his whim for a colossal pyramid tomb, and throughout historyOriental life has been cursed by this fatal political simplicity. 

Now manifold human experience has conclusively proved that despotism isa bad form of government in the long run. Of course there is thelegendary "benevolent despot"--the "father of his people, " surrounded bywise counsellors and abolishing evils by a nod or a stroke of the pen. That is all very well in a fairy-tale. But in real life the "benevolentdespot" rarely happens and still more rarely succeeds himself. The"father of his people" usually has a pompous son and a vicious grandson, who bring the people to ruin. The melancholy trinity--David, Solomon, Rehoboam--has reappeared with depressing regularity throughout history. 

Furthermore, even the benevolent despot has his limitations. The troublewith all despots, good or bad, is that their rule is entirely_personal_. Everything, in the last analysis, depends on the despot'spersonal will. Nothing is fixed or certain. The benevolent despothimself may discard his benevolence overnight, and the fate of an empiremay be jeopardized by the monarch's infatuation for a woman or by anupset in his digestion. 

We Occidentals have, in fact, never known "despotism, " in its SimonPure, Oriental sense; not even under the Roman Empire. Indeed, we canhardly conceive what it means. When we speak of a benevolent despot weusually think of the "enlightened autocrats" of eighteenth-centuryEurope, such as Frederick the Great. But these monarchs were not"despots" as Orientals understand it. Take Frederick, for example. Hewas regarded as absolute. But his subjects were not slaves. Those proudPrussian officers, starched bureaucrats, stiff-necked burghers, andstubborn peasants each had his sense of personal dignity and legalstatus. The unquestioning obedience which they gave Frederick was givennot merely because he was their king, but also because they knew that hewas the hardest-working man in Prussia and tireless in his devotion tothe state. If Frederick had suddenly changed into a lazy, depraved, capricious tyrant, his "obedient" Prussians would have soon showed himthat there were limits to his power. 

In the Orient it is quite otherwise. In the East "there lies upon theeyes and foreheads of all men a law which is not found in the Europeandecalogue; and this law runs: 'Thou shalt honour and worship the manwhom God shall set above thee for thy King: if he cherish thee, thoushalt love him; and if he plunder and oppress thee thou shalt still lovehim, for thou art his slave and his chattel. '"[111] The Eastern monarchmay immure himself in his harem, casting the burdens of state upon theshoulders of a grand vizier. This vizier has thenceforth limitlesspower; the life of every subject is in his hands. Yet, any evening, atthe pout of a dancing-girl, the monarch may send from his harem to thevizier's palace a negro "mute, " armed with the bowstring. And when thatblack mute arrives, the vizier, doffing his robe of office, and withneither question nor remonstrance, will bare his neck to be strangled. That is real despotism--the despotism that the East has known. 

Such is the political tradition of the Orient. And it is surely obviousthat under such a tradition neither ordered government nor consistentprogress is possible. Eastern history is, in fact, largely a record ofsudden flowerings and equally sudden declines. A strong, able man cutshis way to power in a period of confusion and decay. He must be strongand able, or he would not win over other men of similar naturestruggling for the coveted prize. His energy and ability soon workwonders. He knows the rough-and-ready way of getting things done. Hisvigour and resolution supply the driving-power required to compel hissubordinates to act with reasonable efficiency, especially sinceincompetence or dishonesty are punished with the terrible severity ofthe Persian king who flayed an unjust satrap alive and made the skininto the seat of the official chair on which the new satrap sat toadminister justice. 

While the master lives, things may go well. But the master dies, and issucceeded by his son. This son, even assuming that he has inherited muchof his father's ability, has had the worst possible upbringing. Raisedin the harem, surrounded by obsequious slaves and designing women, neither his pride nor his passions have been effectively restrained, andhe grows up a pompous tyrant and probably precociously depraved. Such aman will not be apt to look after things as his father did. And as soonas the master's eye shifts, things begin to go to pieces. How can it beotherwise? His father built up no governmental machine, functioningalmost automatically, as in the West. His officers worked from fear orpersonal loyalty; not out of a patriotic sense of duty or impersonal_esprit de corps_. Under the grandson, matters get even worse, powerslips from his incompetent hands and is parcelled out among many localdespots, of whom the strongest cuts his way to power, assuming that thedecadent state is not overrun by some foreign conqueror. In eithereventuality, the old cycle--David, Solomon, Rehoboam--is finished, and anew cycle begins--with the same destined end. 

That, in a nutshell, is the political history of the East. It has, however, been modified or temporarily interrupted by the impact of moreliberal political influences, exerted sometimes from special Easternregions and sometimes from the West. Not all the Orient has been givenover to unrelieved despotism. Here and there have been peoples (mostlymountain or pastoral peoples) who abhorred despotism. Such a people havealways been the Arabs. We have already seen how the Arabs, fired byIslam, established a mighty caliphate which, in its early days, was atheocratic democracy. Of course we have also seen how the oldertradition of despotism reasserted itself over most of the Moslem world, how the democratic caliphate turned into a despotic sultanate, and howthe liberty-loving Arabs retired sullenly to their deserts. Politicalliberalism, like religious liberalism, was crushed and almost forgotten. Almost--not quite; for memories of the Meccan caliphate, like memoriesof Motazelism, remained in the back of men's minds, ready to come forthagain with better days. After all, free Arabia still stood, with everyArab tribesman armed to the teeth to see that it kept free. And then, there was Islam. No court theologian could entirely explain away thefact that Mohammed had said things like "All Believers are brothers" and"All Moslems are free. " No court chronicler could entirely expunge fromMoslem annals the story of Islam's early days, known as theWakti-Seadet, or "Age of Blessedness. " Even in the darkest timesMoslems of liberal tendencies must have been greatly interested to readthat the first caliph, Abu Bekr, after his election by the people, said:"Oh nation! you have chosen me, the most unworthy among you, for yourcaliph. Support me as long as my actions are just. If otherwise, admonish me, rouse me to a sense of my duty. Truth alone is desirable, and lies are despicable. . . . As I am the guardian of the weak, obey meonly so long as I obey the Sheriat [Divine Law]. But if you see that Ideviate but in the minutest details from this law, you need obey me nomore. "[112]

In fine, no subsequent distortions could entirely obliterate the factthat primitive Islam was the supreme expression of a freedom-loving folkwhose religion must necessarily contain many liberal tendencies. Eventhe sheriat, or canon law, is, as Professor Lybyer states, "fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to absolutism. "[113]Vambéry well summarizes this matter when he writes: "It is not Islam andits doctrines which have devastated the western portion of Asia andbrought about the present sad state of things; but it is the tyranny ofthe Moslem princes, who have wilfully perverted the doctrines of theProphet, and sought and found maxims in the Koran as a basis for theirdespotic rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of doubt inmatters of religion, and, efficaciously distorting and crushing allliberal principles, they have prevented the dawn of a MoslemRenaissance. "[114]

In the opening chapter we saw how Oriental despotism reached its evilmaximum in the eighteenth century, and how the Mohammedan Revival wasnot merely a puritan reformation of religion, but was also in part apolitical protest against the vicious and contemptible tyrants whomisruled the Moslem world. This internal movement of politicalliberalism was soon cross-cut by another political current coming infrom the West. Comparing the miserable decrepitude of the Moslem Eastwith Europe's prosperity and vigour, thinking Moslems were beginning torecognize their shortcomings, and they could not avoid the conclusionthat their woes were in large part due to their wretched governments. Indeed, a few even of the Moslem princes came to realize that there mustbe some adoption of Western political methods if their countries were tobe saved from destruction. The most notable examples of this new type ofOriental sovereign were Sultan Mahmud II of Turkey and Mehemet Ali ofEgypt, both of whom came to power about the beginning of the nineteenthcentury. 

Of course none of these reforming princes had the slightest idea ofgranting their subjects constitutional liberties or of transformingthemselves into limited monarchs. They intended to remain absolute, butabsolute more in the sense of the "enlightened autocrat" of Europe andless in the sense of the purely Oriental despot. What they wanted weretrue organs of government--army, civil service, judiciary, etc. --whichwould function efficiently and semi-automatically as governmentalmachinery, and not as mere amorphous masses of individuals who had to becontinuously prodded and punished by the sovereign in order to getanything done. 

Mahmud II, Mehemet Ali, and their princely colleagues persisted in theirnew policies, but the outcome of these "reforms from above" was, on thewhole, disappointing. The monarchs might build barracks and bureaux onEuropean models and fill them with soldiers and bureaucrats in Europeanclothes, but they did not get European results. Most of these"Western-type" officials knew almost nothing about the West, and weretherefore incapable of doing things in Western fashion. In fact, theyhad small heart for the business. Devoid of any sort of enthusiasm forideas and institutions which they did not comprehend, they appliedthemselves to the work of reform with secret ill-will and repugnance, moved only by blind obedience to their sovereign's command. As timepassed, the military branches did gain some modern efficiency, but thecivil services made little progress, adopting many Western bureaucraticvices but few or none of the virtues. 

Meanwhile reformers of quite a different sort began to appear: mendemanding Western innovations like constitutions, parliaments, and otherphenomena of modern political life. Their numbers were constantlyrecruited from the widening circles of men acquainted with Western ideasthrough the books, pamphlets, and newspapers which were beingincreasingly published, and through the education given by schools onthe Western model which were springing up. The third quarter of thenineteenth century saw the formation of genuine political parties inTurkey, and in 1876 the liberal groups actually wrung from a weak sultanthe grant of a parliament. 

These early successes of Moslem political liberalism were, however, followed by a period of reaction. The Moslem princes had becomeincreasingly alarmed at the growth of liberal agitation among theirsubjects and were determined to maintain their despotic authority. Thenew Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, promptly suppressed his parliament, savagely persecuted the liberals, and restored the most uncompromisingdespotism. In Persia the Shah repressed a nascent liberal movement withequal severity, while in Egypt the spendthrift rule of Khedive Ismailended all native political life by provoking European intervention andthe imposition of British rule. Down to the Young-Turk revolution of1908 there were few overt signs of liberal agitation in those Moslemcountries which still retained their independence. Nevertheless, theagitation was there, working underground. Hundreds of youthful patriotsfled abroad, both to obtain an education and to conduct their liberalpropaganda, and from havens of refuge like Switzerland these"Young-Turks, " "Young-Persians, " and others issued manifestoes andpublished revolutionary literature which was smuggled into theirhomelands and eagerly read by their oppressed brethren. [115]

As the years passed, the cry for liberty grew steadily in strength. Ayoung Turkish poet wrote at this time: "All that we admire in Europeanculture as the fruit of science and art is simply the outcome ofliberty. Everything derives its light from the bright star of liberty. Without liberty a nation has no power, no prosperity; without libertythere is no happiness; and without happiness, existence, true life, eternal life, is impossible. Everlasting praise and glory to the shininglight of freedom!"[116] By the close of the nineteenth centurykeen-sighted European observers noted the working of the liberal fermentunder the surface calm of absolutist repression. Thus, Arminius Vambéry, revisiting Constantinople in 1896, was astounded by the liberalevolution that had taken place since his first sojourn in Turkey fortyyears before. Although Constantinople was subjected to the severestphase of Hamidian despotism, Vambéry wrote, "The old attachment ofTurkey for the absolute régime is done for. We hear much in Europe ofthe 'Young-Turk' Party; we hear even of a constitutional movement, political emigrés, revolutionary pamphlets. But what we do not realizeis the ferment which exists in the different social classes, and whichgives us the conviction that the Turk is in progress and is no longerclay in the hands of his despotic potter. In Turkey, therefore, it isnot a question of a Young-Turk Party, because every civilized Ottomanbelongs to this party. "[117]

In this connection we should note the stirrings of unrest that were nowrapidly developing in the Eastern lands subject to European politicalcontrol. By the close of the nineteenth century only four considerableMoslem states--Turkey, Persia, Morocco, and Afghanistan--retainedanything like independence from European domination. Since Afghanistanand Morocco were so backward that they could hardly be reckoned ascivilized countries, it was only in Turkey and Persia that genuineliberal movements against native despotism could arise. But inEuropean-ruled countries like India, Egypt, and Algeria, the culturallevel of the inhabitants was high enough to engender liberal politicalaspirations as well as that mere dislike of foreign rule which may befelt by savages as well as by civilized peoples. 

These liberal aspirations were of course stimulated by the movementsagainst native despotism in Turkey and Persia. Nevertheless, the twosets of phenomena must be sharply distinguished from each other. TheTurkish and Persian agitations were essentially movements of liberalreform. The Indian, Egyptian, Algerian, and kindred agitations wereessentially movements for independence, with no settled programme as tohow that independence should be used after it had been attained. Theselatter movements are, in fact, "nationalist" rather than liberal incharacter, and it is in the chapters devoted to nationalism that theywill be discussed. The point to be noted here is that they are reallycoalitions, against the foreign ruler, of men holding very diversepolitical ideas, embracing as these "nationalist" coalitions do notmerely genuine liberals but also self-seeking demagogues and even starkreactionaries who would like to fasten upon their liberated countriesthe yoke of the blackest despotism. Of course all the nationalist groupsuse the familiar slogans "freedom" and "liberty"; nevertheless, whatmany of them mean is merely freedom and liberty _from foreigntutelage_--in other words, independence. We must always remember thatpatriotism has no essential connection with liberalism. The Spanishpeasants, who shouted "liberty" as they rose against Napoleon's armies, greeted their contemptible tyrant-king with delirious enthusiasm andwelcomed his glorification of absolutism with cries of "Long livechains!"

The period of despotic reaction which had afflicted Turkey and Persiasince the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century camedramatically to an end in the year 1908. Both countries exploded intorevolution, the Turks deposing the tyrant Abdul Hamid, the Persiansrising against their infamous ruler Muhammad Ali Shah, "perhaps the mostperverted, cowardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced thethrone of Persia in many generations. "[118] These revolutions releasedthe pent-up liberal forces which had been slowly gathering strengthunder the repression of the previous generation, and the upshot was thatTurkey and Persia alike blossomed out with constitutions, parliaments, and all the other political machinery of the West. 

How the new régimes would have worked in normal times it is profitlessto speculate, because, as a matter of fact, the times were abnormal tothe highest degree. Unfortunately for the Turks and Persians, they hadmade their revolutions just when the world was entering that profound_malaise_ which culminated in the Great War. Neither Turkey nor Persiawere allowed time to attempt the difficult process of politicaltransformation. Lynx-eyed Western chancelleries noted every blunder and, in the inevitable weakness of transition, pounced upon them to theirundoing. The Great War merely completed a process of Western aggressionand intervention which had begun some years before. 

This virtual absence of specific fact-data renders largely academic anydiscussion of the much-debated question whether or not the peoples ofthe Near and Middle East are capable of "self-government"; that is, ofestablishing and maintaining ordered, constitutional political life. Opinions on this point are at absolute variance. Personally, I have notbeen able to make up my mind on the matter, so I shall content myselfwith stating the various arguments without attempting to draw anygeneral conclusion. Before stating these contrasted view-points, however, I would draw attention to the distinction which should be madebetween the Mohammedan peoples and the non-Mohammedan Hindus of India. Moslems everywhere possess the democratic political example of Arabia aswell as a religion which, as regards its own followers at least, contains many liberal tendencies. The Hindus have nothing like this. Their political tradition has been practically that of unrelievedOriental despotism, the only exceptions being a few primitiveself-governing communities in very early times, which never exerted anywidespread influence and quickly faded away. As for Brahminism, theHindu religion, it is perhaps the most illiberal cult which everafflicted mankind, dividing society as it does into an infinity of rigidcastes between which no real intercourse is possible; each casteregarding all those of lesser rank as unclean, polluting creatures, scarcely to be distinguished from animals. It is obvious that with suchhandicaps the establishment of true self-government will be apt to bemore difficult for Hindus than for Mohammedans, and the reader shouldkeep this point in mind in the discussion which follows. 

Considering first the attitude of those who do not believe the peoplesof the Near and Middle East capable of real self-government in theWestern sense either now or in the immediate future, we find thisthesis both ably and emphatically stated by Lord Cromer. Lord Cromerbelieved that the ancient tradition of despotism was far too strong tobe overcome, at least in our time. "From the dawn of history, " heasserts, "Eastern politics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity. Do not let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple idea ofdespotic rule will readily give way to the far more complex conceptionof ordered liberty. The transformation, if it ever takes place at all, will probably be the work, not of generations, but of centuries. . . . Ourprimary duty, therefore, is, not to introduce a system which, under thespecious cloak of free institutions, will enable a small minority ofnatives to misgovern their countrymen, but to establish one which willenable the mass of the population to be governed according to the codeof Christian morality. A freely elected Egyptian parliament, supposingsuch a thing to be possible, would not improbably legislate for theprotection of the slave-owner, if not the slave-dealer, and no assurancecan be felt that the electors of Rajputana, if they had their own way, would not re-establish suttee. Good government has the merit ofpresenting a more or less attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attainanything approaching to the British ideal of self-government, they willhave to undergo very numerous transmigrations of political thought. " AndLord Cromer concludes pessimistically: "It will probably never bepossible to make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear. "[119]

In similar vein, the veteran English publicist Doctor Dillon, writingafter the Turkish and Persian revolutions, had little hope in theirsuccess, and ridiculed the current "faith in the sacramental virtue ofconstitutional government. " For, he continues: "No parchment yetmanufactured, and no constitution drafted by the sons of men, can doaway with the foundations of national character. Flashy phrases andelegant declamations may persuade people that they have been transmuted;but they alter no facts, and in Persia's case the facts point to utterincapacity for self-government. " Referring to the Persian revolution, Doctor Dillon continues: "At bottom, only names of persons and thingshave been altered; men may come and men may go, but anarchy goes on forever. . . . Financial support of the new government is impossible. Forforeign capitalists will not give money to be squandered by filibustersand irresponsible agitators who, like bubbles in boiling water, appearon the surface and disappear at once. "[120]

A high French colonial official thus characterizes the Algerians andother Moslem populations of French North Africa: "Our natives need to begoverned. They are big children, incapable of going alone. We shouldguide them firmly, stand no nonsense from them, and crush intriguers andagents of sedition. At the same time, we should protect them, directthem paternally, and especially obtain influence over them by theconstant example of our moral superiority. Above all: no vainhumanitarian illusions, both in the interest of France and of thenatives themselves. "[121]

Many observers, particularly colonial officials, have been disappointedwith the way Orientals have used experimental first steps inself-government like Advisory Councils granted by the European rulers;have used them, that is, to play politics and grasp for more power, instead of devoting themselves to the duties assigned. As Lord Kitchenersaid in his 1913 report on the state of Egypt: "Representative bodiescan only be safely developed when it is shown that they are capable ofperforming adequately their present functions, and that there is goodhope that they could undertake still more important and arduousresponsibilities. If representative government, in its simplest form, is found to be unworkable, there is little prospect of its becoming moreuseful when its scope is extended. No government would be insane enoughto consider that, because an Advisory Council had proved itself unableto carry out its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner, itshould therefore be given a larger measure of power and control. "[122]

These nationalist agitations arise primarily among the native upperclasses and Western-educated élites, however successful they may be ininflaming the ignorant masses, who are often quite contented with thematerial benefits of enlightened European rule. This point is wellbrought out by a leading American missionary in India, with a lifetimeof experience in that country, who wrote some years ago: "The commonpeople of India are, now, on the whole, more contented with theirgovernment than they ever were before. It is the classes, rather, whoreveal the real spirit of discontent. . . . If the common people were letalone by the agitators, there would not be a more loyal people on earththan the people of India. But the educated classes are certainlypossessed of a new ambition, politically, and will no longer remainsatisfied with inferior places of responsibility and lower posts ofemolument. . . . These people have little or no sympathy with the kind ofgovernment which is gradually being extended to them. Ultimately they donot ask for representative institutions, which will give them a share inthe government of their own land. What they really seek is absolutecontrol. The Brahmin (only five per cent. Of the community) believes thathe has been divinely appointed to rule the country and would withholdthe franchise from all others. The Sudra--the Bourgeois of India--wouldno more think of giving the ballot to the fifty million Pariahs of theland than he would give it to his dog. It is the British power that hasintroduced, and now maintains, the equality of rights and privilegesfor all the people of the land. "[123]

The apprehension that India, if liberated from British control, might beexploited by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy is shared not only byWestern observers but also by multitudes of low-caste Hindus, knowncollectively as the "Depressed Classes". These people oppose the Indiannationalist agitation for fear of losing their present protection underthe British "Raj. " They believe that India still needs generations ofeducation and social reform before it is fit for "home rule, " much lessindependence, and they have organized into a powerful association the"Namasudra, " which is loyalist and anti-nationalist in character. 

The Namasudra view-point is well expressed by its leader, Doctor Nair. "Democracy as a catchword, " he says, "has already reached India and iswidely used. But the spirit of democracy still pauses east of Suez, andwill find it hard to secure a footing in a country where caste isstrongly intrenched. . . . I do not want to lay the charge of oppressingthe lower castes at the door of any particular caste. All the highercastes take a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all thenon-Brahmin castes. The high-caste non-Brahmin oppresses all the castesbelow him. . . . We want a real democracy and not an oligarchy, howevercamouflaged by many high-sounding words. Moreover, if an oligarchy isestablished now, it will be a perpetual oligarchy. We further say thatwe should prefer a delayed democracy to an immediate oligarchy, havingmore trust in a sympathetic British bureaucracy than in an unsympatheticoligarchy of the so-called high castes who have been oppressing us inthe past and will do so again but for the British Government. Ourattitude is based, not on 'faith' alone, but on the instinct ofself-preservation. "[124]

Many Mohammedans as well as Hindus feel that India is not ripe forself-government, and that the relaxing of British authority now, or inthe immediate future, would be a grave disaster for India itself. TheMoslem loyalists reprobate the nationalist agitation for the reasonsexpressed by one of their representative men, S. Khuda Bukhsh, whoremarks: "Rightly or wrongly, I have always kept aloof from modernIndian politics, and I have always held that we should devote moreattention to social problems and intellectual advancement and less topolitics, which, in our present condition, is an unmixed evil. I amfirmly persuaded that we would consult our interest better by leavingpolitics severely alone. . . . It is not a handful of men armed with thelearning and culture of the West, but it is the masses that must feel, understand, and take an intelligent interest in their own affairs. Theinfinitesimal educated minority do not constitute the population ofIndia. It is the masses, therefore, that must be trained, educated, brought to the level of unassailable uprightness and devotion to theircountry. This goal is yet far beyond measurable reach, but until weattain it our hopes will be a chimera, and our efforts futile andillusory. Even the educated minority have scarcely cast off theswaddling-clothes of political infancy, or have risen above theillusions of power and the ambitions of fortune. We have yet to learnausterity of principle and rectitude of conduct. Nor can we hope toraise the standard of private and public morality so long as we continueto subordinate the interest of our community and country to ourown. "[125]

Such pronouncements as these from considerable portions of the nativepopulation give pause even to those liberal English students of Indianaffairs who are convinced of the theoretical desirability of Indian homerule. As one of these, Edwyn Bevan, says: "When Indian Nationalists askfor freedom, they mean autonomy; they want to get rid of the foreigner. Our answer as given in the reforms is:[126] 'Yes, autonomy you shallhave, but on one condition--that you have democracy as well. We willgive up the control as soon as there is an Indian people which cancontrol its native rulers; we will not give up the control to an Indianoligarchy. ' This is the root of the disagreement between those who saythat India might have self-government immediately and those who say thatIndia can only become capable of self-government with time. For theformer, by 'self-government', mean autonomy, and it is perfectly truethat India might be made autonomous immediately. If the foreign controlwere withdrawn to-day, some sort of indigenous government or group ofgovernments would, no doubt, after a period of confusion, come intobeing in India. But it would not be democratic government; it would bethe despotic rule of the stronger or more cunning. "[127]

The citations just quoted portray the standpoint of those critics, bothWestern and Oriental, who maintain that the peoples of the Near andMiddle East are incapable of self-government in our sense, at leastto-day or in the immediate future. Let us now examine the views of thosewho hold a more optimistic attitude. Some observers stress stronglyIslam's liberal tendencies as a foundation on which to erect politicalstructures in the modern sense. Vambéry says, "Islam is still the mostdemocratic religion in the world, a religion favouring both liberty andequality. If there ever was a constitutional government, it was that ofthe first Caliphs. "[128] A close English student of the Near Eastdeclares: "Tribal Arabia has the only true form of democratic government, and the Arab tribesman goes armed to make sure that it continuesdemocratic--as many a would-be despot knows to his cost. "[129]Regarding the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Professor Lybyer remarks:"Turkey was not so unprepared for parliamentary institutions as might atfirst sight appear. There lay hidden some precedent, much preparation, and a strong desire, for parliamentary government. Both the religiousand the secular institutions of Turkey involve precedents for aparliament. Mohammed himself conferred with the wisest of hiscompanions. The Ulema[130] have taken counsel together up to the presenttime. The Sacred Law (Sheriat) is fundamentally democratic and opposedin essence to absolutism. The habit of regarding it as fundamental lawenables even the most ignorant of Mohammedans to grasp the idea of aConstitution. " He points out that the early sultans had their "Divan, "or assemblage of high officials, meeting regularly to give the sultaninformation and advice, while more recently there have been a Council ofState and a Council of Ministers. Also, there were the parliaments of1877 and 1878. Abortive though these were and followed by Hamidianabsolutism, they were legal precedents, never forgotten. From all thisProfessor Lybyer concludes: "The Turkish Parliament may therefore beregarded, not as a complete innovation, but as an enlargement andimprovement of familiar institutions. "[131]

Regarding Persia, the American W. Morgan Shuster, whom the PersianRevolutionary Government called in to organize the country's finances, and who was ousted in less than a year by Russo-British pressure, expresses an optimistic regard for the political capacities of thePersian people. 

"I believe, " he says, "that there has never been in the history of theworld an instance where a people changed suddenly from an absolutemonarchy to a constitutional or representative form of government and atonce succeeded in displaying a high standard of political wisdom andknowledge of legislative procedure. Such a thing is inconceivable andnot to be expected by any reasonable person. The members of the firstMedjlis[132] were compelled to fight for their very existence from theday that the Parliament was constituted. . . . They had no time for seriouslegislative work, and but little hope that any measures which they mightenact would be put into effect. 

"The second and last Medjlis, practically all of whose members I knewpersonally, was doubtless incompetent if it were to be judged by thestandards of the British Parliament or the American Congress. It wouldbe strange indeed if an absolutely new and untried government in a landfilled with the decay of ages should, from the outset, be able toconduct its business as well as governments with generations and evencenturies of experience behind them. We should make allowances for lackof technical knowledge; for the important question, of course, is thatthe Medjlis in the main represented the new and just ideals andaspirations of the Persian people. Its members were men of more thanaverage education; some displayed remarkable talent, character, andcourage. . . . They responded enthusiastically to any patriotic suggestionwhich was put before them. They themselves lacked any great knowledge ofgovernmental finances, but they realized the situation and were bothwilling and anxious to put their full confidence in any foreign adviserswho showed themselves capable of resisting political intrigues andbribery and working for the welfare of the Persian people. 

"No Parliament can rightly be termed incompetent when it has the supportof an entire people, when it recognizes its own limitations, and whenits members are willing to undergo great sacrifices for their nation'sdignity and sovereign rights. . . . 

"As to the Persian people themselves, it is difficult to generalize. Thegreat mass of the population is composed of peasants and tribesmen, alldensely ignorant. On the other hand, many thousands have been educatedabroad, or have travelled after completing their education at home. They, or at least certain elements among them which had had the supportof the masses, proved their capacity to assimilate Western civilizationand ideals. They changed despotism into democracy in the face of untoldobstacles. Opportunities were equalized to such a degree that any man ofability could occupy the highest official posts. As a race they showedduring the past five years an unparalleled eagerness for education. Hundreds of schools were established during the Constitutional régime. Aremarkable free press sprang up overnight, and fearless writers cameforward to denounce injustice and tyranny whether from within theircountry or without. The Persians were anxious to adopt wholesale thepolitical, ethical, and business codes of the most modern andprogressive nations. They burned with that same spirit of Asiatic unrestwhich pervades India, which produced the 'Young-Turk' movement, andwhich has more recently manifested itself in the establishment of theChinese Republic. "[133]

Mr. Shuster concludes: "Kipling has intimated that you cannot hustle theEast. This includes a warning and a reflection. Western men and Westernideals _can_ hustle the East, provided the Orientals realize that theyare being carried along lines reasonably beneficial to themselves. As amatter of fact, the moral appeal and the appeal of race-pride andpatriotism, are as strong in the East as in the West, though it does notlie so near the surface, and naturally the Oriental displays no greatdesire to be hustled when it is along lines beneficial only to theWesterner. "[134]

Indeed, many Western liberals believe that European rule, howeverbenevolent and efficient, will never prepare the Eastern peoples fortrue self-government; and that the only way they will learn is by tryingit out themselves. This view-point is admirably stated by the well-knownBritish publicist Lionel Curtis. Speaking of India, Mr. Curtis says thateducation and kindred benefits conferred by British rule will not, ofthemselves, "avail to prepare Indians for the task of responsiblegovernment. On the contrary, education will prove a danger and positivemischief, unless accompanied by a definite instalment of politicalresponsibility. It is in the workshops of actual experience alone thatelectorates will acquire the art of self-government, however highlyeducated they may be. 

"There must, I urge, be a devolution of definite powers on electorates. The officers of Government[135] must give every possible help and adviceto the new authorities, for which those authorities may ask. They mustact as their foster-mothers, not as stepmothers. But if the newauthorities are to learn the art of responsible government, they must befree from control from above. Not otherwise will they learn to feelthemselves responsible to the electorate below. Nor will the electoratesthemselves learn that the remedy for their sufferings rests in their ownhands. Suffering there will be, and it is only by suffering, self-inflicted and perhaps long endured, that a people will learn thefaculty of self-help, and genuine electorates be brought into being. . . . 

"I am proud to think that England has conferred immeasurable good onIndia by creating order and showing Indians what orderly governmentmeans. But, this having been done, I do not believe the system can nowbe continued as it is, without positive damage to the character of thepeople. The burden of trusteeship must be transferred, piece by piece, from the shoulders of Englishmen to those of Indians in some sort ableto bear it. Their strength and numbers must be developed. But that canbe done by the exercise of actual responsibility steadily increased asthey can bear it. It cannot be done by any system of school-teaching, though such teaching is an essential concomitant of the process. 

"The goal now set by the recent announcement of the Secretary ofState[136] will only be reached through trouble. Yet troublous as thetimes before us may be, we have at last reached that stage of our workin India which is truly consonant with our own traditions. The task isone worthy of this epoch in our history, if only because it calls forthe effacement of ourselves. "[137]

Mr. Curtis's concluding words foreshadow a process which is to-dayactually going on, not only in India but in other parts of the East aswell. The Great War has so strengthened Eastern nationalist aspirationsand has so weakened European power and prestige that a widespreadrelaxing of Europe's hold over the Orient is taking place. This processmay make for good or for ill, but it is apparently inevitable; and ageneration (perhaps a decade) hence may see most of the Near and MiddleEast autonomous or even independent. Whether the liberated peoples willmisuse their opportunities and fall into despotism or anarchy, orwhether they succeed in establishing orderly, progressive, constitutional governments, remains to be seen. We have examined thefactors, pro and con. Let us leave the problem in the only way in whichto-day it can scientifically be left--on a note of interrogation. 

FOOTNOTES:

[111] T. Morison, _Imperial Rule in India_, p. 43 (London, 1899). 

[112] Quoted from Arminius Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, pp. 305-306 (London, 1906). 

[113] A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament, " _Proceedings of theAmerican Political Science Association_, Vol. VII. , p. 67 (1910). 

[114] Vambéry, _op. Cit. _, p. 307. 

[115] A good account of these liberal movements during the nineteenthcentury is found in Vambéry, "Freiheitliche Bestrebungen im moslimischenAsien, " _Deutsche Rundschau_, October, 1893; a shorter summaryof Vambéry's views is found in his _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, especially chap. V. Also, see articles by Léon Cahun, previously noted, in Lavisse et Rambaud, _Histoire Générale_, Vols. XI. And XII. 

[116] Vambéry, _supra_, p. 332. 

[117] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 22(Paris, 1898). 

[118] W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, p. Xxi (New York, 1912). 

[119] Cromer, _Political and Literary Essays_, pp. 25-28. 

[120] E. J. Dillon, "Persia not Ripe for Self-Government, " _ContemporaryReview_, April, 1910. 

[121] E. Mercier, _La Question indigène_, p. 220 (Paris, 1901). 

[122] "Egypt, " No. 1 (1914), p. 6. 

[123] Rev. J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India, " _Journal ofRace Development_, July, 1910. 

[124] Dr. T. Madavan Nair, "Caste and Democracy, " _Edinburgh Review_, October, 1918. 

[125] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 213-214 (London, 1912). 

[126] _I. E. _, the increase of self-government granted India by Britainas a result of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. 

[127] E. Bevan, "The Reforms in India, " _The New Europe_, January 29, 1920. 

[128] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 58. 

[129] G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_, pp. 202-203 (London, 1919). 

[130] The assembly of religious notables. 

[131] A. H. Lybyer, "The Turkish Parliament, " _Proceedings of theAmerican Political Science Association_, Vol. VII. , pp. 66-67 (1910). 

[132] The name of the Persian Parliament. 

[133] Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_, pp. 240-246. 

[134] _Ibid. _, p. 333. 

[135] _I. E. _, the British Government of India. 

[136] _I. E. _, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, previously noted. 

[137] Lionel Curtis, _Letters to the People of India on ResponsibleGovernment_, pp. 159-160 (London, 1918). 

CHAPTER V

NATIONALISM

The spirit of nationality is one of the great dynamics of modern times. In Europe, where it first attained self-conscious maturity, it radicallyaltered the face of things during the nineteenth century, so that thatcentury is often called the Age of Nationalities. But nationalism is notmerely a European phenomenon. It has spread to the remotest corners ofthe earth, and is apparently still destined to effect momentoustransformations. 

Given a phenomenon of so vital a character, the question at once arises:What is nationalism? Curiously enough, this question has been endlesslydebated. Many theories have been advanced, seeking variously to identifynationalism with language, culture, race, politics, geography, economics, or religion. Now these, and even other, matters may befactors predisposing or contributing to the formation of nationalconsciousness. But, in the last analysis, nationalism is something overand above all its constituent elements, which it works into a new andhigher synthesis. There is really nothing recondite or mysterious aboutnationalism, despite all the arguments that have raged concerning itsexact meaning. As a matter of fact, nationalism is _a state of mind_. Nationalism is a _belief_, held by a fairly large number of individuals, that they constitute a "Nationality"; it is a sense of _belongingtogether_ as a "Nation. " This "Nation, " as visualized in the minds ofits believers, is a people or community associated together andorganized under one government, and dwelling together in a distinctterritory. When the nationalist ideal is realized, we have what is knownas a body-politic or "State. " But we must not forget that this "State"is the material manifestation of an ideal, which may have pre-existedfor generations as a mere pious aspiration with no tangible attributeslike state sovereignty or physical frontiers. Conversely, we mustremember that a state need not be a nation. Witness the defunct HapsburgEmpire of Austria-Hungary, an assemblage of discordant nationalitieswhich flew to pieces under the shock of war. 

The late war was a liberal education regarding nationalistic phenomena, especially as applied to Europe, and most of the fallacies regardingnationality were vividly disclosed. It is enough to cite Switzerland--acountry whose very existence flagrantly violates "tests" like language, culture, religion, or geography, and where nevertheless a lively senseof nationality emerged triumphant from the ordeal of Armageddon. 

So familiar are these matters to the general public that only one pointneed here be stressed: the difference between nationality and race. Unfortunately the two terms have been used very loosely, if notinterchangeably, and are still much confused in current thinking. As amatter of fact, they connote utterly different things. Nationality is apsychological concept or state of mind. Race is a physiological fact, which may be accurately determined by scientific tests such asskull-measurement, hair-formation, and colour of eyes and skin. In otherwords, race is what people anthropologically _really_ are; nationalityis what people politically _think_ they are. 

Right here we encounter a most curious paradox. There can be no questionthat, as between race and nationality, race is the more fundamental, and, in the long run, the more important. A man's innate capacity isobviously dependent upon his heredity, and no matter how stimulating maybe his environment, the potential limits of his reaction to thatenvironment are fixed at his birth. Nevertheless, the fact remains thatmen pay scant attention to race, while nationalism stirs them to theirvery souls. The main reason for this seems to be because it is onlyabout half a century since even savants realized the true nature andimportance of race. Even after an idea is scientifically established, ittakes a long time for it to be genuinely accepted by the public, andonly after it has been thus accepted will it form the basis of practicalconduct. Meanwhile the far older idea of nationality has permeated thepopular consciousness, and has thereby been able to produce tangibleeffects. In fine, our political life is still dominated by nationalismrather than race, and practical politics are thus conditioned, not bywhat men really are, but by what they think they are. 

The late war is a striking case in point. That war is very generallyregarded as having been one of "race. " The idea certainly lent to thestruggle much of its bitterness and uncompromising fury. And yet, fromthe genuine racial standpoint, it was nothing of the kind. Ethnologistshave proved conclusively that, apart from certain palæolithic survivalsand a few historically recent Asiatic intruders, Europe is inhabited byonly three stocks: (1) The blond, long-headed "Nordic" race, (2) themedium-complexioned, round-headed "Alpine" race, (3) the _brunet_, long-headed "Mediterranean" race. These races are so dispersed andintermingled that every European nation is built of at least two ofthese stocks, while most are compounded of all three. Strictly speaking, therefore, the European War was not a race-war at all, but a domesticstruggle between closely knit blood-relatives. 

Now all this was known to most well-educated Europeans long before 1914. And yet it did not make the slightest difference. The reason is that, inspite of everything, the vast majority of Europeans still believe thatthey fit into an entirely different race-category. They think theybelong to the "Teutonic" race, the "Latin" race, the "Slav" race, or the"Anglo-Saxon" race. The fact that these so-called "races" simply do notexist but are really historical differentiations, based on language andculture, which cut sublimely across genuine race-lines--all that isquite beside the point. Your European may apprehend this intellectually, but so long as it remains an intellectual novelty it will have noappreciable effect upon his conduct. In his heart of hearts he willstill believe himself a Latin, a Teuton, an Anglo-Saxon, or a Slav. Forhis blood-race he will not stir; for his thought-race he will die. Forthe glory of the dolichocephalic "Nordic" or the brachycephalic "Alpine"he will not prick his finger or wager a groat; for the triumph of the"Teuton" or the "Slav" he will give his last farthing and shed hisheart's blood. In other words: Not what men really are, but what theythink they are. 

At first it may seem strange that in contemporary Europe thought-raceshould be all-powerful while blood-race is impotent. Yet there are verygood reasons. Not only has modern Europe's great dynamic been nationalism, but also nationalism has seized upon the nascent racial concept and hasperverted it to its own ends. Until quite recent times "Nationality" was adistinctly intensive concept, connoting approximate identity of culture, language, and historic past. It was the logical product of a relativelynarrow European outlook. Indeed, it grew out of a still narrower outlookwhich had contented itself with the regional, feudal, and dialecticloyalties of the Middle Ages. But the first half of the nineteenth centurysaw a still further widening of the European outlook to a continental oreven to a world horizon. At once the early concept of nationality ceasedto satisfy. Nationalism became extensive. It tended to embrace all thoseof kindred speech, culture, and historic tradition, however distant suchpersons might be. Obviously a new terminology was required. The keywordwas presently discovered--"Race. " Hence we get that whole series of_pseudo_ "race" phrases--"Pan-Germanism, " "Pan-Slavism, " "Pan-Angleism, ""Pan-Latinism, " and the rest. Of course these are not racial at all. Theymerely signify nationalism brought up to date. But the European peoples, with all the fervour of the nationalist faith that is in them, believe andproclaim them to be racial. Hence, so far as practical politics areconcerned, they _are_ racial and will so continue while the nationalistdynamic endures. 

This new development of nationalism (the "racial" stage, as we may callit) was at first confined to the older centres of European civilization, but with the spread of Western ideas it presently appeared in the mostunexpected quarters. Its advent in the Balkans, for example, quicklyengendered those fanatical propagandas, "Pan-Hellenism, " "Pan-Serbism, "etc. , which turned that unhappy region first into a bear-garden andlatterly into a witches' sabbath. 

Meanwhile, by the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the firstphase of nationalism had patently passed into Asia. The "Young-Turk" and"Young-Egyptian" movements, and the "Nationalist" stirrings in regionsso far remote from each other as Algeria, Persia, and India, wereunmistakable signs that Asia was gripped by the initial throes ofnationalist self-consciousness. Furthermore, with the opening years ofthe twentieth century, numerous symptoms proclaimed the fact that inAsia, as in the Balkans, the second or "racial" stage of nationalism hadbegun. These years saw the definite emergence of far-flung "Pan-"movements: "Pan-Turanism, " "Pan-Arabism, " and (most amazing of apparentparadoxes) "Pan-Islamic Nationalism. "

 I

Let us now trace the genesis and growth of nationalism in the Near andMiddle East, devoting the present chapter to nationalist developments inthe Moslem world with the exception of India. India requires specialtreatment, because there nationalist activity has been mainly the workof the non-Moslem Hindu element. Indian nationalism has followed acourse differing distinctly from that of Islam, and will therefore beconsidered in the following chapter. 

Before it received the Western impact of the nineteenth century, theIslamic world was virtually devoid of self-conscious nationalism. Therewere, to be sure, strong local and tribal loyalties. There was intensedynastic sentiment like the Turks' devotion to their "Padishas, " theOttoman sultans. There was also marked pride of race such as the Arabs'conviction that they were the "Chosen People. " Here, obviously, werepotential nationalist elements. But these elements were as yet dispersedand unco-ordinated. They were not yet fused into the new synthesis ofself-conscious nationalism. The only Moslem people which could be saidto possess anything like true nationalist feeling were the Persians, with their traditional devotion to their plateau-land of "Iran. " Thevarious peoples of the Moslem world had thus, at most, a rudimentary, inchoate nationalist consciousness: a dull, inert unitary spirit;capable of development, perhaps, but as yet scarcely perceptible even tooutsiders and certainly unperceived by themselves. 

Furthermore, Islam itself was in many respects hostile to nationalism. Islam's insistence upon the brotherhood of all True Believers, and theIslamic political ideal of the "Imâmât, " or universal theocraticdemocracy, naturally tended to inhibit the formation of sovereign, mutually exclusive national units; just as the nascent nationalities ofRenaissance Europe conflicted with the mediæval ideals of universalpapacy and "Holy Roman Empire. "

Given such an unfavourable environment, it is not strange to see Moslemnationalist tendencies germinating obscurely and confusedly throughoutthe first half of the nineteenth century. Not until the second half ofthe century is there any clear conception of "Nationalism" in theWestern sense. There are distinct nationalist tendencies in theteachings of Djemal-ed-Din el-Afghani (who is philosophically theconnecting link between Pan-Islamism and Moslem nationalism), while theTurkish reformers of the mid-nineteenth century were patently influencedby nationalism as they were by other Western ideas. It was, in fact, inTurkey that a true nationalist consciousness first appeared. Workingupon the Turks' traditional devotion to their dynasty and pride inthemselves as a ruling race lording it over many subject peoples bothChristian and Moslem, the Turkish nationalist movement made rapidprogress. 

Precisely as in Europe, the nationalist movement in Turkey began with arevival of historic memories and a purification of the language. Half acentury ago the Ottoman Turks knew almost nothing about their origins ortheir history. The martial deeds of their ancestors and the stirringannals of their empire were remembered only in a vague, legendaryfashion, the study of the national history being completely neglected. Religious discussions and details of the life of Mohammed or the earlydays of Islam interested men more than the spread of Ottoman power inthree continents. The nationalist pioneers taught theirfellow-countrymen their historic glories and awakened both pride of pastand confidence in the future. 

Similarly with the Turkish language; the early nationalists found itvirtually cleft in twain. On the one hand was "official" Turkish--aclumsy hotchpotch, overloaded with flowers of rhetoric and crypticexpressions borrowed from Arabic and Persian. This extraordinary jargon, couched in a bombastic style, was virtually unintelligible to themasses. The masses, on the other hand, spoke "popular" Turkish--aprimitive, limited idiom, divided into many dialects and despised asuncouth and boorish by "educated" persons. The nationalists changed allthis. Appreciating the simple, direct strength of the Turkish tongue, nationalist enthusiasts trained in European principles of grammar andphilology proceeded to build up a real Turkish language in the Westernsense. So well did they succeed that in less than a generation theyproduced a simplified, flexible Turkish which was used effectively byboth journalists and men of letters, was intelligible to all classes, and became the unquestioned vehicle for thought and the canon ofstyle. [138]

Of course the chief stimulus to Turkish nationalism was Westernpolitical pressure. The more men came to love their country and aspireto its future, the more European assaults on Turkish territorialintegrity spurred them to defend their threatened independence. Thenationalist ideal was "Ottomanism"--the welding of a real "nation" inwhich all citizens, whatever their origin or creed, should be"Ottomans, " speaking the Turkish language and inspired by Ottomanpatriotism. This, however, conflicted sharply with the rival (and prior)nationalisms of the Christian peoples of the empire, to say nothing ofthe new Arab nationalism which was taking shape at just this same time. Turkish nationalism was also frowned on by Sultan Abdul Hamid. AbdulHamid had an instinctive aversion to all nationalist movements, both aslimitations to his personal absolutism and as conflicting with thatuniversal Pan-Islamic ideal on which he based his policy. Accordingly, even those Turkish nationalists who proclaimed complete loyalty weresuspect, while those with liberal tendencies were persecuted and driveninto exile. 

The revolution of 1908, however, brought nationalism to power. Whatevertheir differences on other matters, the Young-Turks were all ardentnationalists. In fact, the very ardour of their nationalism was a primecause of their subsequent misfortunes. With the rashness of fanatics theYoung-Turks tried to "Ottomanize" the whole empire at once. This enragedall the other nationalities, alienated them from the revolution, andgave the Christian Balkan states their opportunity to attackdisorganized Turkey in 1912. 

The truth of the matter was that Turkish nationalism was evolving in adirection which could only mean heightened antagonism between theTurkish element on the one side and the non-Turkish elements, Christianor Moslem, on the other. Turkish nationalism had, in fact, now reachedthe second or "racial" stage. Passing the bounds of the limited, mainlyterritorial, idea connoted by the term "Ottomanism, " it had embraced thefar-flung and essentially racial concepts known as "Pan-Turkism" and"Pan-Turanism. " These wider developments we shall consider later on inthis chapter. Before so doing let us examine the beginnings ofnationalism's "first stage" in other portions of the Moslem world. 

Shortly after the Ottoman Turks showed signs of a nationalisticawakening, kindred symptoms began to appear among the Arabs. As in allself-conscious nationalist movements, it was largely a protest _against_some other group. In the case of the Arabs this protest was naturallydirected against their Turkish rulers. We have already seen how DesertArabia (the Nejd) had always maintained its freedom, and we have alsoseen how those Arab lands like Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hedjaz whichfell under Turkish control nevertheless continued to feel anineradicable repugnance at seeing themselves, Islam's "Chosen People, "beneath the yoke of a folk which, in Arab eyes, were mere upstartbarbarians. Despite a thousand years of Turkish domination the two racesnever got on well together, their racial temperaments being tooincompatible for really cordial relations. The profound temperamentalincompatibility of Turk and Arab has been well summarized by a Frenchwriter. Says Victor Bérard: "Such are the two languages and such the twopeoples: in the latitude of Rome and in the latitude of Algiers, theTurk of Adrianople, like the Turk of Adalia, remains a man of the northand of the extreme north; in all climates the Arab remains a man of thesouth and of the extreme south. To the Arab's suppleness, mobility, imagination, artistic feeling, democratic tendencies, and anarchicindividualism, the Turk opposes his slowness, gravity, sense ofdiscipline and regularity, innate militarism. The Turkish master hasalways felt disdain for the 'artistic canaille, ' whose pose, gesticulations, and indiscipline, shock him profoundly. On their side, the Arabs see in the Turk only a blockhead; in his placidity andtaciturnity only stupidity and ignorance; in his respect for law onlyslavishness; and in his love of material well-being only grossbestiality. Especially do the Arabs jeer at the Turk's artisticincapacity: after having gone to school to the Chinese, Persians, Arabs, and Greeks, the Turk remains, in Arab eyes, just a big booby of barrackand barnyard. "[139]

Add to this the fact that the Arabs regard the Turks as perverters ofthe Islamic faith, and we need not be surprised to find that Turkey'sArab subjects have ever displayed symptoms of rebellious unrest. We haveseen how the Wahabi movement was specifically directed against Turkishcontrol of the holy cities, and despite the Wahabi defeat, Arabdiscontent lived on. About 1820 the German explorer Burckhardt wrote ofArabia: "When Turkish power in the Hedjaz declines, the Arabs willavenge themselves for their subjection. "[140] And some twenty yearslater the Shereef of Mecca remarked to a French traveller: "We, thedirect descendants of the Prophet, have to bow our heads beforemiserable Pashas, most of them former Christian slaves come to power bythe most shameful courses. "[141] Throughout the nineteenth century everyTurkish defeat in Europe was followed by a seditious outburst in itsArab provinces. 

Down to the middle of the nineteenth century these seditious stirringsremained sporadic, unco-ordinated outbursts of religious, regional, ortribal feeling, with no genuinely "Nationalistic" programme of action orideal. But in the later sixties a real nationalist agitation appeared. Its birthplace was Syria. That was what might have been expected, sinceSyria was the part of Turkey's Arab dominions most open to Westerninfluences. This first Arab nationalist movement, however, did notamount to much. Directed by a small group of noisy agitators devoid ofreal ability, the Turkish Government suppressed it without muchdifficulty. 

The disastrous Russian war of 1877, however, blew the scattered embersinto a fresh flame. For several years Turkey's Arab provinces were infull ferment. The nationalists spoke openly of throwing off the Turkishyoke and welding the Arab lands into a loose-knit confederation headedby a religious potentate, probably the Shereef of Mecca. This wasobviously an adaptation of Western nationalism to the traditional Arabideal of a theocratic democracy already realized in the Meccan caliphateand the Wahabi government of the Nejd. 

This second stirring of Arab nationalism was likewise of short duration. Turkey was now ruled by Sultan Abdul Hamid, and Abdul Hamid'sPan-Islamic policy looked toward good relations with his Arab subjects. Accordingly, Arabs were welcomed at Constantinople, favours were heapedupon Arab chiefs and notables, while efforts were made to promote thecontentment of the empire's Arab populations. At the same time theconstruction of strategic railways in Syria and the Hedjaz gave theTurkish Government a stronger grip over its Arab provinces than everbefore, and conversely rendered successful Arab revolts a far moreremote possibility. Furthermore, Abdul Hamid's Pan-Islamic propagandawas specially directed toward awakening a sense of Moslem solidaritybetween Arabs and Turks as against the Christian West. These effortsachieved a measure of success. Certainly, every European aggression inthe Near East was an object-lesson to Turks and Arabs to forget, or atleast adjourn, their domestic quarrels in face of the common foe. 

Despite the partial successes of Abdul Hamid's efforts, a considerablesection of his Arab subjects remained unreconciled, and toward the closeof the nineteenth century a fresh stirring of Arab nationalistdiscontent made its appearance. Relentlessly persecuted by the Turkishauthorities, the Arab nationalist agitators, mostly Syrians, went intoexile. Gathering in near-by Egypt (now of course under Britishgovernance) and in western Europe, these exiles organized arevolutionary propaganda. Their formal organization dates from the year1895, when the "Arabian National Committee" was created at Paris. For adecade their propaganda went on obscurely, but evidently with effect, for in 1905 the Arab provinces of Hedjaz and Yemen burst into armedinsurrection. This insurrection, despite the best efforts of the TurkishGovernment, was never wholly suppressed, but dragged on year after year, draining Turkey of troops and treasure, and contributing materially toher Tripolitan and Balkan disasters in 1911-12. 

The Arab revolt of 1905 focussed the world's attention upon "The ArabQuestion, " and the nationalist exiles made the most of their opportunityby redoubling their propaganda, not only at home but in the West aswell. Europe was fully informed of "Young Arabia's" wrongs andaspirations, notably by an extremely clever book by one of thenationalist leaders, entitled _The Awakening of the Arab Nation_, [142]which made a distinct sensation. The aims of the Arab nationalists areclearly set forth in the manifesto of the Arabian National Committee, addressed to the Great Powers and published early in 1906. Says thismanifesto: "A great pacific change is on the eve of occurring in Turkey. The Arabs, whom the Turks tyrannized over only by keeping them dividedon insignificant questions of ritual and religion, have become consciousof their national, historic, and racial homogeneity, and wish to detachthemselves from the worm-eaten Ottoman trunk in order to form themselvesinto an independent state. This new Arab Empire will extend to itsnatural frontiers, from the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates to theIsthmus of Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Oman. It willbe governed by the constitutional and liberal monarchy of an Arabiansultan. The present Vilayet of the Hedjaz, together with the territoryof Medina, will form an independent empire whose sovereign will be atthe same time the religious Khalif of all the Mohammedans. Thus, onegreat difficulty, the separation of the civil and the religious powersin Islam, will have been solved for the greater good of all. "

To their fellow Arabs the committee issued the following proclamation:"Dear Compatriots! All of us know how vile and despicable the gloriousand illustrious title of Arabian Citizen has become in the mouths of allforeigners, especially Turks. All of us see to what depths of misery andignorance we have fallen under the tyranny of these barbarians sprungfrom Central Asia. Our land, the richest and finest on earth, is to-dayan arid waste. When we were free, we conquered the world in a hundredyears; we spread everywhere sciences, arts, and letters; for centurieswe led world-civilization. But, since the spawn of Ertogrul[143] usurpedthe caliphate of Islam, they have brutalized us so as to exploit us tosuch a degree that we have become the poorest people on earth. " Theproclamation then goes on to declare Arabia's independence. [144]

Of course "Young Arabia" did not then attain its independence. Therevolt was kept localized and Turkey maintained its hold over most ofits Arab dominions. Nevertheless, there was constant unrest. During theremainder of Abdul Hamid's reign his Arab provinces were in a sort ofunstable equilibrium, torn between the forces of nationalist sedition onthe one hand and Pan-Islamic, anti-European feeling on the other. 

The Young-Turk revolution of 1908 caused a new shift in the situation. The Arab provinces, like the other parts of the empire, rejoiced in thedownfall of despotism and hoped great things for the future. In theTurkish Parliament the Arab provinces were well represented, and theirdeputies asked for a measure of federal autonomy. This the Young-Turks, bent upon "Ottomanization, " curtly refused. The result was profounddisillusionment in the Arab provinces and a revival of separatistagitation. It is interesting to note that the new independence agitationhad a much more ambitious programme than that of a few years before. TheArab nationalists of Turkey were by this time definitely linking up withthe nationalists of Egypt and French North Africa--Arabic-speaking landswhere the populations were at least partly Arab in blood. Arabnationalism was beginning to speak aloud what it had previouslywhispered--the programme of a great "Pan-Arab" empire stretching rightacross North Africa and southern Asia from the Atlantic to the IndianOceans. Thus, Arab nationalism, like Turkish nationalism, was evolvinginto the "second, " or racial, stage. 

Deferring discussion of this broader development, let us follow a triflefurther the course of the more restricted Arab nationalism within theTurkish Empire. Despite the Pan-Islamic sentiment evoked by theEuropean aggressions of 1911-12, nationalist feeling was continuallyaroused by the Ottomanizing measures of the Young-Turk government, andthe independence agitation was presently in full swing once more. In1913 an Arabian nationalist congress convened in Paris and revolutionarypropaganda was inaugurated on an increased scale. When the Great Warbroke out next year, Turkey's Arab provinces were seething withseditious unrest. [145] The Turkish authorities took stern measuresagainst possible trouble, imprisoning and executing all prominentnationalists upon whom they could lay their hands, while theproclamation of the "Holy War" rallied a certain portion of Arab publicopinion to the Turkish side, especially since the conquest of Egypt wasa possibility. But as the war dragged on the forces of discontent oncemore raised their heads. In 1916 the revolt of the Shereef of Mecca gavethe signal for the downfall of Turkish rule. This revolt, liberallybacked by England, gained the active or passive support of the Arabelements throughout the Turkish Empire. Inspired by Allied promises ofnational independence of a most alluring character, the Arabs foughtstrenuously against the Turks and were a prime factor in the _débâcle_of Ottoman military power in the autumn of 1918. [146]

Before discussing the momentous events which have occurred in the Arabprovinces of the former Ottoman Empire since 1918, let us considernationalist developments in the Arabized regions of North Africa lyingto the westward. Of these developments the most important is that ofEgypt. The mass of the Egyptian people is to-day, as in Pharaoh's time, of the old "Nilotic" stock. A slow, self-contained peasant folk, theEgyptian "fellaheen" have submitted passively to a long series ofconquerors, albeit this passivity has been occasionally broken byoutbursts of volcanic fury presently dying away into passivity oncemore. Above the Nilotic masses stands a relatively small upper classdescended chiefly from Egypt's more recent Asiatic conquerors--Arabs, Kurds, Circassians, Albanians, and Turks. In addition to this upperclass, which until the English occupation monopolized all politicalpower, there are large European "colonies" with "extraterritorial"rights, while a further complication is added by the persistence of aconsiderable native Christian element, the "Copts, " who refused to turnMohammedan at the Arab conquest and who to-day number fully one-tenth ofthe total population. 

With such a medley of races, creeds, and cultures, and with so prolongeda tradition of foreign domination, Egypt might seem a most unlikely_milieu_ for the growth of nationalism. On the other hand, Egypt hasbeen more exposed to Western influences than any other part of the NearEast. Bonaparte's invasion at the close of the eighteenth centuryprofoundly affected Egyptian life, and though the French were soonexpelled, European influences continued to permeate the valley of theNile. Mehemet Ali, the able Albanian adventurer who made himself masterof Egypt after the downfall of French rule, realized the superiority ofEuropean methods and fostered a process of Europeanization which, however superficial, resulted in a wide dissemination of Western ideas. Mehemet Ali's policy was continued by his successors. That magnificentspendthrift Khedive Ismail, whose reckless contraction of European loanswas the primary cause of European intervention, prided himself on his"Europeanism" and surrounded himself with Europeans. 

Indeed, the first stirrings of Egyptian nationalism took the form of aprotest against the noxious, parasitical "Europeanism" of Khedive Ismailand his courtiers. Sober-minded Egyptians became increasingly alarmed atthe way Ismail was mortgaging Egypt's independence by huge Europeanloans and sucking its life-blood by merciless taxation. Inspiredconsciously or unconsciously by the Western concepts of "nation" and"patriotism, " these men desired to stay Ismail's destructive course andto safeguard Egypt's future. In fact, their efforts were directed notmerely against the motley crew of European adventurers andconcessionaires who were luring the Khedive into fresh extravagances, but also against the complaisant Turkish and Circassian pashas, and theArmenian and Syrian usurers, who were the instruments of Ismail's will. The nascent movement was thus basically a "patriotic" protest againstall those, both foreigners and native-born, who were endangering thecountry. This showed clearly in the motto adopted by the agitators--thehitherto unheard-of slogan: "Egypt for the Egyptians!"

Into this incipient ferment there was presently injected the dynamicpersonality of Djemal-ed-Din. Nowhere else did this extraordinary manexert so profound and lasting an influence as in Egypt. It is not toomuch to say that he is the father of every shade of Egyptiannationalism. He influenced not merely violent agitators like Arabi Pashabut also conservative reformers like Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, who realizedEgypt's weakness and were content to labour patiently by evolutionarymethods for distant goals. 

For the moment the apostles of violent action had the stage. In 1882 arevolutionary agitation broke out headed by Arabi Pasha, an armyofficer, who, significantly enough, was of fellah origin, the first manof Nilotic stock to sway Egypt's destinies in modern times. Raisingtheir slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians, " the revolutionists sought todrive all "foreigners, " both Europeans and Asiatics, from the country. Their attempt was of course foredoomed to failure. A massacre ofEuropeans in the port-city of Alexandria at once precipitated Europeanintervention. An English army crushed the revolutionists at the battleof Tel-el-Kebir, and after this one battle, disorganized, bankrupt Egyptsubmitted to British rule, personified by Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer. The khedivial dynasty was, to be sure, retained, and the native forms ofgovernment respected, but all real power centred in the hands of theBritish "Financial Adviser, " the representative of Britain's imperialwill. 

For twenty-five years Lord Cromer ruled Egypt, and the record of thisable proconsul will place him for ever in the front rank of the world'sgreat administrators. His strong hand drew Egypt from hopelessbankruptcy into abounding prosperity. Material well-being, however, didnot kill Egyptian nationalism. Scattered to the winds before the Britishbayonet charges, the seeds of unrest slowly germinated beneath thefertile Nilotic soil. Almost imperceptible at first under the numbingshock of Tel-el-Kebir, nationalist sentiment grew steadily as the yearswore on, and by the closing decade of the nineteenth century it hadbecome distinctly perceptible to keen-sighted European observers. Passing through Egypt in 1895, the well-known African explorerSchweinfurth was struck with the psychological change which had occurredsince his earlier visits to the valley of the Nile. "A true nationalself-consciousness is slowly beginning to awaken, " he wrote. "TheEgyptians are still very far from being a true Nationality, but thebeginning has been made. "[147]

With the opening years of the twentieth century what had previously beenvisible only to discerning eyes burst into sudden and startling bloom. This resurgent Egyptian nationalism had, to be sure, its moderate wing, represented by conservative-minded men like Mohammed Abdou, Rector of ElAzhar University and respected friend of Lord Cromer, who sought toteach his fellow-countrymen that the surest road to freedom was alongthe path of enlightenment and progress. In the main, however, themovement was an impatient and violent protest against British rule andan intransigeant demand for immediate independence. Perhaps the mostsignificant point was that virtually all Egyptians were nationalists atheart, conservatives as well as radicals declining to consider Egypt asa permanent part of the British Empire. The nationalists had a soundlegal basis for this attitude, owing to the fact that British rulerested upon insecure diplomatic foundations. England had intervened inEgypt as a self-constituted "Mandatory" of European financial interests. Its action had roused much opposition in Europe, particularly in France, and to allay this opposition the British Government had repeatedlyannounced that its occupation of Egypt was of a temporary nature. Infact, Egyptian discontent was deliberately fanned by France right downto the conclusion of the _Entente Cordiale_ in 1904. This Frenchsympathy for Egyptian aspirations was of capital importance in thedevelopment of the nationalist movement. In Egypt, France's culturalprestige was predominant. In Egyptian eyes a European education wassynonymous with a French education, so the rising generation inevitablysat under French teachers, either in Egypt or in France, and theseFrench preceptors, being usually Anglophobes, rarely lost an opportunityfor instilling dislike of England and aversion to British rule. 

The radical nationalists were headed by a young man named MustaphaKamel. He was a very prince of agitators; ardent, magnetic, enthusiastic, and possessed of a fiery eloquence which fairly swept awayboth his hearers and his readers. An indefatigable propagandist, heedited a whole chain of newspapers and periodicals, and as fast as oneorgan was suppressed by the British authorities he started another. Hisuncompromising nationalism may be gauged from the following examplesfrom his writings. Taking for his motto the phrase "The Egyptians forEgypt; Egypt for the Egyptians, " he wrote as early as 1896: "Egyptiancivilization cannot endure in the future unless it is founded by thepeople itself; unless the fellah, the merchant, the teacher, the pupil, in fine, every single Egyptian, knows that man has sacred, intangiblerights; that he is not created to be a tool, but to lead an intelligentand worthy life; that love of country is the most beautiful sentimentwhich can ennoble a soul; and that a nation without independence is anation without existence! It is by patriotism that backward peoples comequickly to civilization, to greatness, and to power. It is patriotismthat forms the blood which courses in the veins of virile nations, andit is patriotism that gives life to every living being. "

The English, of course, were bitterly denounced. Here is a typicaleditorial from his organ _El Lewa_: "We are the despoiled. The Englishare the despoilers. We demand a sacred right. The English are theusurpers of that right. This is why we are sure of success sooner orlater. When one is in the right, it is only a question of time. "

Despite his ardent aspirations, Mustapha Kamel had a sense of realities, and recognized that, for the moment at least, British power could not beforcibly overthrown. He did not, therefore, attempt any open violencewhich he knew would merely ruin himself and his followers. Early in 1908he died, only thirty-four years of age. His mantle fell upon his leadingdisciple, Mohammed Farid Bey. This man, who was not of equal calibre, tried to make up for his deficiency in true eloquence by the violence ofhis invective. The difference between the two leaders can be gauged bythe editorial columns of _El Lewa_. Here is an editorial of September, 1909: "This land was polluted by the English, putrefied with theiratrocities as they suppressed our beloved _dustour_ [constitution], tiedour tongues, burned our people alive and hanged our innocent relatives, and perpetrated other horrors at which the heavens are about to tremble, the earth to split, and the mountains to fall down. Let us take a newstep. Let our lives be cheap while we seek our independence. Death isfar better than life for you if you remain in your present condition. "

Mohammed Farid's fanatical impatience of all opposition led him intotactical blunders like alienating the native Christian Copts, whomMustapha Kamel had been careful to conciliate. The following diatribe(which, by the way, reveals a grotesque jumble of Western and Easternideas) is an answer to Coptic protests at the increasing violence of hispropaganda: "The Copts should be kicked to death. They still have facesand bodies similar to those of demons and monkeys, which is a proof thatthey hide poisonous spirits within their souls. The fact that they existin the world confirms Darwin's theory that human beings are generatedfrom monkeys. You sons of adulterous women! You descendants of thebearers of trays! You tails of camels with your monkey faces! You bonesof bodies!"

In this more violent attitude the nationalists were encouraged byseveral reasons. For one thing, Lord Cromer had laid down hisproconsulate in 1907 and had been succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst. The newruler represented the ideas of British Liberalism, now in power, whichwished to appease Egyptian unrest by conciliation instead of by LordCromer's autocratic indifference. In the second place, the Young-Turkrevolution of 1908 gave an enormous impetus to the Egyptian cry forconstitutional self-government. Lastly, France's growing intimacy withEngland dashed the nationalist's cherished hope that Britain would beforced by outside pressure to redeem her diplomatic pledges andevacuate the Nile valley, thus driving the nationalists to rely more ontheir own exertions. 

Given this nationalist temper, conciliatory attempt was foredoomed tofailure. For, however conciliatory Sir Eldon Gorst might be in details, he could not promise the one thing which the nationalists supremelydesired--independence. This demand England refused even to consider. Practically all Englishmen had become convinced that Egypt with the SuezCanal was a vital link between the eastern and western halves of theBritish Empire, and that permanent control of Egypt was thus an absolutenecessity. There was thus a fundamental deadlock between Britishimperial and Egyptian national convictions. Accordingly, the BritishLiberal policy of conciliation proved a fiasco. Even Sir Eldon Gorstadmitted in his official reports that concessions were simply regardedas signs of weakness. 

Before long seditious agitation and attendant violence grew to suchproportions that the British Government became convinced that onlystrong measures would save the situation. Therefore, in 1911, Sir EldonGorst was replaced by Lord Kitchener--a patent warning to thenationalists that sedition would be given short shrift by the iron handwhich had crushed the Khalifa and his Dervish hordes at Omdurman. Kitchener arrived in Egypt with the express mandate to restore order, and this he did with thoroughness and exactitude. The Egyptians weretold plainly that England neither intended to evacuate the Nile valleynor considered its inhabitants fit for self-government within anydiscernible future. They were admonished to turn their thoughts frompolitics, at which they were so bad, to agriculture, at which they wereso good. As for seditious propaganda, new legislation enabled LordKitchener to deal with it in summary fashion. Practically all thenationalist papers were suppressed, while the nationalist leaders wereimprisoned, interned, or exiled. In fact, the British Government did itsbest to distract attention everywhere from Egypt, the British pressco-operating loyally by labelling the subject taboo. The upshot was thatEgypt became quieter than it had been for a generation. 

However, it was only a surface calm. Driven underground, Egyptian unresteven attained new virulence which alarmed close observers. In 1913 thewell-known English publicist Sidney Low, after a careful investigationof the Egyptian situation, wrote: "We are not popular in Egypt. Fearedwe may be by some; respected I doubt not by many others; but reallyliked, I am sure, by very few. "[148] Still more outspoken was an articlesignificantly entitled "The Darkness over Egypt, " which appeared on theeve of the Great War. [149] Its publication in a semi-scientificperiodical for specialists in Oriental problems rendered it worthy ofserious attention. "The long-continued absence of practically alldiscussion or even mention of Egyptian internal affairs from the Britishpress, " asserted this article, "is not indicative of a healthycondition. In Egypt the superficial quiet is that of suppresseddiscontent--of a sullen, hopeless mistrust toward the Government of theOccupation. Certain recent happenings have strengthened in Egyptianminds the conviction that the Government is making preparations for thecomplete annexation of the country. . . . We are not concerned to questionhow far the motives attributed to the Government are true. The essentialfact is that the Government of the Occupation has not yet succeeded inendearing, or even recommending, itself to the Egyptian people, but is, on the contrary, an object of suspicion, an occasion of enmity. " Thearticle expresses grave doubt whether Lord Kitchener's repressivemeasures have done more than drive discontent underground, and shows"how strong is the Nationalist feeling in Egypt to-day in spite of thedetermined attempts to stamp out all freedom of political opinion. Asmight be expected, this wholesale muzzling of the press has not onlyreduced the Mohammedan majority to a condition of internal ferment, buthas seriously alienated the hitherto loyal Copts. It may be that theGovernment can discover no better means of recommending itself to theconfidence and good-will of the Egyptian people; it may be that only bythe instant repression of every outward sign of discontent can it feelsecure in its occupation; but if such be the case, it is an admission ofextreme weakness, or recognized insecurity of tenure. " The articleconcludes with the following warning as to the problem's widerimplications: "Egypt, though a subject of profound indifference to theEnglish voter, is being feverishly watched by the Indian Mohammedans, and by the whole of our West and Central African subjects--themselvesstrongly Moslem in sympathy, and at the present time jealouslysuspicious of the political activities of Christian Imperialism. "

Such being the state of Egyptian feeling in 1914, the outbreak of theGreat War was bound to produce intensified unrest. England's position inEgypt was, in truth, very difficult. Although in fact England exercisedcomplete control, in law Egypt was still a dependency of the OttomanEmpire, Britain merely exercising a temporary occupation. Now it soonbecame evident that Turkey was going to join England's enemies, theTeutonic empires, while it was equally evident that the Egyptianssympathized with the Turks, even the Khedive Abbas Hilmi making nosecret of his pro-Turkish views. During the first months of the EuropeanWar, while Turkey was still nominally neutral, the Egyptian nativepress, despite the British censorship, was full of veiled seditiousstatements, while the unruly attitude of the Egyptian populace and thestirrings among the Egyptian native regiments left no doubt as to howthe wind was blowing. England was seriously alarmed. Accordingly, whenTurkey entered the war in November, 1914, England took the decisiveplunge, deposed Abbas Hilmi, nominated his cousin Hussein Kamel"Sultan, " and declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire. 

This stung the nationalists to fury. Anything like formal rebellion wasrendered impossible by the heavy masses of British and colonial troopswhich had been poured into the country. Nevertheless, there was a gooddeal of sporadic violence, suppressed only by a stern application of the"State of Siege. " A French observer thus vividly describes thesecritical days: "The Jehadd is rousing the anti-Christian fanaticismwhich always stirs in the soul of every good Moslem. Since the end ofOctober one could read in the eyes of the low-class Mohammedan nativestheir hope--the massacre of the Christians. In the streets of Cairo theystared insolently at the European passers-by. Some even danced for joyon learning that the Sultan had declared the Holy War. Denounced to thepolice for this, they were incontinently bastinadoed at the nearestpolice-station. The same state of mind reigned at El Azhar, and I amtold that Europeans who visit the celebrated Mohammedan University havetheir ears filled with the strongest epithets of the Arabrepertory--that best-furnished language in the world. "[150]

The nationalist exiles vehemently expressed abroad what their fellowscould not say at home. Their leader, Mohammed Farid Bey, issued fromGeneva an official protest against "the new illegal régime proclaimed byEngland the 18th of last December. England, which pretends to make waron Germany to defend Belgium, ought not to trample underfoot the rightsof Egypt, nor consider the treaties relative thereto as 'scraps ofpaper. '"[151] These exiles threw themselves vehemently into the arms ofGermany, as may be gauged from the following remarks of Abd-el-MalekHamsa, secretary of the nationalist party, in a German periodical:"There is hardly an Egyptian who does not pray that England may bebeaten and her Empire fall in ruins. During the early days of the war, while I was still in Egypt, I was a witness of this popular feeling. Incities and villages, from sage to simple peasant, all are convinced inthe Kaiser's love for Islam and friendship for its caliph, and they arehoping and praying for Germany's victory. "[152]

Of course, in face of the overwhelming British garrison in Egypt, suchpronouncements were as idle as the wind. The hoped-for Turkish attackswere beaten back from the Suez Canal, the "State of Siege" functionedwith stern efficiency, and Egypt, flooded with British troops, lapsedinto sullen silence, not to be broken until the end of the war. 

Turning back at this point to consider nationalist developments in therest of North Africa, we do not, as in Egypt, find a well-markedterritorial patriotism. Anti-European hatred there is in plenty, butsuch "patriotic" sentiments as exist belong rather to those morediffused types of nationalist feeling known as "Pan-Arabism" and"Pan-Islamic Nationalism, " which we shall presently discuss. 

The basic reason for this North African lack of national feeling, in itsrestricted sense, is that nowhere outside of Egypt is there a land whichever has been, or which shows distinct signs of becoming, a true"nation. " The mass of the populations inhabiting the vast band ofterritory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara desert are"Berbers"--an ancient stock, racially European rather than Asiatic ornegroid, and closely akin to the "Latin" peoples across theMediterranean. The Berbers remind one of the Balkan Albanians: they areextremely tenacious of their language and customs, and they have aninstinctive racial feeling; but they are inveterate particularists, having always been split up into many tribes, sometimes combining intopartial confederations but never developing true nationalpatriotism. [153]

Alongside the Berbers we find everywhere a varying proportion of Arabs. The Arabs have colonized North Africa ever since the Moslem conquesttwelve centuries ago. They converted the Berbers to Islam and Arabculture, but they never made North Africa part of the Arab world as theydid Syria and Mesopotamia, and in somewhat lesser degree Egypt. The tworaces have never really fused. Despite more than a thousand years ofArab tutelage, the Berbers' manner of life remains distinct. They havelargely kept their language, and there has been comparatively littleintermarriage. Pure-blooded Arabs abound, often in large tribal groups, but they are still, in a way, foreigners. [154]

With such elements of discord, North Africa's political life has alwaysbeen troubled. The most stable region has been Morocco, though eventhere the sultan's authority has never really extended to the mountaintribes. As for the so-called "Barbary States" (Algiers, Tunis, andTripoli), they were little more than port-cities along the coast, thehinterland enjoying practically complete tribal independence. Over thisconfused turmoil spread the tide of French conquest, beginning withAlgiers in 1830 and ending with Morocco to-day. [155] France broughtpeace, order, and material prosperity, but here, as in other Easternlands, these very benefits of European tutelage created a new sort ofunity among the natives in their common dislike of the Europeanconqueror and their common aspiration toward independence. Accordingly, the past generation has witnessed the appearance of "Young Algerian" and"Young Tunisian" political groups, led by French-educated men who haveimbibed Western ideas of "self-government" and "liberty. "[156] However, as we have already remarked, their goal is not so much the erection ofdistinct Algerian and Tunisian "Nations" as it is creation of a largerNorth African, perhaps Pan-Islamic, unity. It must not be forgotten thatthey are in close touch with the Sennussi and kindred influences whichwe have already examined in the chapter on Pan-Islamism. 

So much for "first-stage" nationalist developments in the Arab orArabized lands. There is, however, one more important centre ofnationalist sentiment in the Moslem world to be considered--Persia. Persia is, in fact, the land where a genuine nationalist movement wouldhave been most logically expected, because the Persians have for agespossessed a stronger feeling of "country" than any other Near Easternpeople. 

In the nineteenth century Persia had sunk into such deep decrepitudethat its patent weakness excited the imperialistic appetites of CzaristRussia and, in somewhat lesser degree, of England. Persia's decadenceand external perils were, however, appreciated by thinking Persians, anda series of reformist agitations took place, beginning with thereligious movement of the Bab early in the nineteenth century andculminating with the revolution of 1908. [157] That revolution waslargely precipitated by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 by whichEngland and Russia virtually partitioned Persia; the country beingdivided into a Russian "sphere of influence" in the north and a British"sphere of influence" in the south, with a "neutral zone" between. Therevolution was thus in great part a desperate attempt of the Persianpatriots to set their house in order and avert, at the eleventh hour, the shadow of European domination which was creeping over the land. Butthe revolution was not merely a protest against European aggression. Itwas also aimed at the alien Khadjar dynasty which had so long misruledPersia. These Khadjar sovereigns were of Turkoman origin. They had neverbecome really Persianized, as shown by the fact that the intimate courtlanguage was Turki, not Persian. They occupied a position somewhatanalogous to that of the Manchus before the Chinese revolution. ThePersian revolution was thus basically an _Iranian_ patriotic outburstagainst all alien influences, whether from East or West. 

We have already seen how this patriotic movement was crushed by theforcible intervention of European imperialism. [158] By 1912 Russia andEngland were in full control of the situation, the patriots wereproscribed and persecuted, and Persia sank into despairing silence. As aBritish writer then remarked: "For such broken spirit and shatteredhopes, as for the 'anarchy' now existing in Persia, Russia and GreatBritain are directly responsible, and if there be a Reckoning, will oneday be held to account. It is idle to talk of any improvement in thesituation, when the only Government in Persia consists of a Cabinetwhich does not command the confidence of the people, terrorized byRussia, financially starved by both Russia and England, allowed onlymiserable doles of money on usurious terms, and forbidden to employhonest and efficient foreign experts like Mr. Shuster; when the King isa boy, the Regent an absentee, the Parliament permanently suspended, andthe best, bravest, and most honest patriots either killed or driveninto exile, while the wolf-pack of financiers, concession-hunters andland-grabbers presses ever harder on the exhausted victim, whosestruggles grow fainter and fainter. Little less than a miracle can nowsave Persia. "[159]

So ends our survey of the main "first-stage" nationalist movements inthe Moslem world. We should of course remember that a nationalistmovement was developing concurrently in India, albeit following aneccentric orbit of its own. We should also remember that, in addition tothe main movements just discussed, there were minor nationaliststirrings among other Moslem peoples such as the Russian Tartars, theChinese Mohammedans, and even the Javanese of the Dutch Indies. Lastly, we should remember that these nationalist movements were more or lessinterwoven with the non-national movement of Pan-Islamism, and withthose "second-stage, " "racial" nationalist movements which we shall nowconsider. 

 II

Earlier in this chapter we have already remarked that the opening yearsof the twentieth century witnessed the appearance in Asia ofnationalism's second or racial stage, especially among the Turkish andArab peoples. This wider stage of nationalism has attained its highestdevelopment among the Turks; where, indeed, it has gone through twodistinct phases, describable respectively by the terms "Pan-Turkism" and"Pan-Turanism. " We have described the primary phase of Turkishnationalism in its restricted "Ottoman" sense down to the close of theBalkan wars of 1912-13. It is at that time that the secondary or"racial" aspects of Turkish nationalism first come prominently to thefore. 

By this time the Ottoman Turks had begun to realize that they did notstand alone in the world; that they were, in fact, the westernmostbranch of a vast band of peoples extending right across eastern Europeand Asia, from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Mediterranean tothe Arctic Ocean, to whom ethnologists have assigned the name of"Uralo-Altaic race, " but who are more generally termed "Turanians. " Thisgroup embraces the most widely scattered folk--the Ottoman Turks ofConstantinople and Anatolia, the Turkomans of Persia and Central Asia, the Tartars of South Russia and Transcaucasia, the Magyars of Hungary, the Finns of Finland and the Baltic provinces, the aboriginal tribes ofSiberia, and even the distant Mongols and Manchus. Diverse though theyare in culture, tradition, and even personal appearance, these peoplenevertheless possess certain well-marked traits in common. Theirlanguages are all similar, while their physical and mental make-updisplays undoubted affinities. They are all noted for great physicalvitality combined with unusual toughness of nerve-fibre. Though somewhatdeficient in imagination and creative artistic sense, they are richlyendowed with patience, tenacity, and dogged energy. Above all, they haveusually displayed extraordinary military capacity, together with a noless remarkable aptitude for the masterful handling of subject peoples. The Turanians have certainly been the greatest conquerors that the worldhas ever seen. Attila and his Huns, Arpad and his Magyars, Isperich andhis Bulgars, Alp Arslan and his Seljuks, Ertogrul and his Ottomans, Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane with their "inflexible" Mongol hordes, Baberin India, even Kubilai Khan and Nurhachu in far-off Cathay: the type isever the same. The hoof-print of the Turanian "man on horseback" isstamped deep all over the palimpsest of history. 

Glorious or sinister according to the point of view, Turan's iscertainly a stirring past. Of course one may query whether these diversepeoples actually do form one genuine race. But, as we have already seen, so far as practical politics go, that makes no difference. Possessed ofkindred tongues and temperaments, and dowered with such a wealth ofsoul-stirring tradition, it would suffice for them to _think_ themselvesracially one to form a nationalist dynamic of truly appalling potency. 

Until about a generation ago, to be sure, no signs of such a movementwere visible. Not only were distant stocks like Finns and Manchus quiteunaware of any common Turanian bond, but even obvious kindred likeOttoman Turks and Central Asian Turkomans regarded one another withindifference or contempt. Certainly the Ottoman Turks were almost asdevoid of racial as they were of national feeling. Arminius Vambérytells how, when he first visited Constantinople in 1856, "the word_Turkluk_ (_i. E. _, 'Turk') was considered an opprobrious synonym ofgrossness and savagery, and when I used to call people's attention tothe racial importance of the Turkish stock (stretching from Adrianopleto the Pacific) they answered: 'But you are surely not classing us withKirghiz and with the gross nomads of Tartary. ' . . . With a fewexceptions, I found no one in Constantinople who was seriouslyinterested in the questions of Turkish nationality or language. "[160]

It was, in fact, the labours of Western ethnologists like the HungarianVambéry and the Frenchman Léon Cahun that first cleared away the mistswhich enshrouded Turan. These labours disclosed the unexpected vastnessof the Turanian world. And this presently acquired a most unacademicsignificance. The writings of Vambéry and his colleagues spread far andwide through Turan and were there devoured by receptive minds alreadystirring to the obscure promptings of a new time. The normality of theTuranian movement is shown by its simultaneous appearance at such widelysundered points as Turkish Constantinople and the Tartar centres alongthe Russian Volga. Indeed, if anything, the leaven began its working onthe Volga sooner than on the Bosphorus. This Tartar revival, thoughlittle known, is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in allnationalist history. The Tartars, once masters of Russia, though longsince fallen from their high estate, have never vanished in the Slavocean. Although many of them have been for four centuries under Russianrule, they have stubbornly maintained their religious, racial, andcultural identity. Clustered thickly along the Volga, especially atKazan and Astrakhan, retaining much of the Crimea, and forming aconsiderable minority in Transcaucasia, the Tartars remained distinct"enclaves" in the Slav Empire, widely scattered but indomitable. 

The first stirrings of nationalist self-consciousness among the RussianTartars appeared as far back as 1895, and from then on the movement grewwith astonishing rapidity. The removal of governmental restrictions atthe time of the Russian revolution of 1904 was followed by a regularliterary florescence. Streams of books and pamphlets, numerousnewspapers, and a solid periodical press, all attested the vigour andfecundity of the Tartar revival. The high economic level of the RussianTartars assured the material sinews of war. The Tartar oil millionairesof Baku here played a conspicuous rôle, freely opening their capaciouspurses for the good of the cause. The Russian Tartars also showeddistinct political ability and soon gained the confidence of theirTurkoman cousins of Russian Central Asia, who were also stirring to thebreath of nationalism. The first Russian Duma contained a largeMohammedan group so enterprising in spirit and so skilfully led thatRussian public opinion became genuinely uneasy and encouraged thegovernment to diminish Tartar influence in Russian parliamentary life bysummary curtailments of Mohammedan representation. [161]

Of course the Russian Mohammedans were careful to proclaim theirpolitical loyalty to the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, many earnestspirits revealed their secret aspirations by seeking a freer and morefruitful field of labour in Turkish Stambul, where the Russian Tartarsplayed a prominent part in the Pan-Turk and Pan-Turanian movementswithin the Ottoman Empire. In fact, it was a Volga Tartar, Yusuf BeyAkchura Oglu, who was the real founder of the first Pan-Turanian societyat Constantinople, and his well-known book, _Three Political Systems_, became the text on which most subsequent Pan-Turanian writings have beenbased. [162]

Down to the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Pan-Turanism was somewhatunder a cloud at Stambul. Sultan Abdul Hamid, as already remarked, was aPan-Islamist and had a rooted aversion to all nationalist movements. Accordingly, the Pan-Turanians, while not actually persecuted, werenever in the Sultan's favour. With the advent of Young-Turk nationalismto power, however, all was changed. The "Ottomanizing" leaders of thenew government listened eagerly to Pan-Turanian preaching, and most ofthem became affiliated with the movement. It is interesting to note thatRussian Tartars continued to play a prominent part. The chiefPan-Turanian propagandist was the able publicist Ahmed Bey Agayeff, aVolga Tartar. His well-edited organ, _Turk Yurdu_ (_Turkish Home_), penetrated to every corner of the Turko-Tartar world and exercised greatinfluence on the development of its public opinion. 

Although leaders like Ahmed Bey Agayeff clearly visualized the entireTuranian world from Finland to Manchuria as a potential whole, and werethus full-fledged "Pan-Turanians, " their practical efforts were at firstconfined to the closely related Turko-Tartar segment; that is, to theOttomans of Turkey, the Tartars of Russia, and the Turkomans of centralAsia and Persia. Since all these peoples were also Mohammedans, itfollows that this propaganda had a religious as well as a racialcomplexion, trending in many respects toward Pan-Islamism. Indeed, evendisregarding the religious factor, we may say that, though Pan-Turanianin theory, the movement was at that time in practice little more than"Pan-Turkism. "

It was the Balkan wars of 1912-13 which really precipitated full-fledgedPan-Turanism. Those wars not merely expelled the Turks from the Balkansand turned their eyes increasingly toward Asia, but also roused suchhatred of the victorious Serbs in the breasts of Hungarians andBulgarians that both these peoples proclaimed their "Turanian" originsand toyed with ideas of "Pan-Turanian" solidarity against the menace ofSerbo-Russian "Pan-Slavism. "[163] The Pan-Turanian thinkers wereassuredly evolving a body of doctrine grandiose enough to satisfy themost ambitious hopes. Emphasizing the great virility and nerve-forceeverywhere patent in the Turanian stocks, these thinkers saw in Turanthe dominant race of the morrow. Zealous students of Westernevolutionism and ethnology, they were evolving their own special theoryof race grandeur and decadence. According to Pan-Turanian teaching, thehistoric peoples of southern Asia--Arabs, Persians, and Hindus--arehopelessly degenerate. As for the Europeans, they have recently passedtheir apogee, and, exhausted by the consuming fires of modernindustrialism, are already entering upon their decline. It is theTuranians, with their inherent virility and steady nerves unspoiled bythe wear and tear of Western civilization, who must be the great dynamicof the future. Indeed, some Pan-Turanian thinkers go so far as toproclaim that it is the sacred mission of their race to revitalize awhole senescent, worn-out world by the saving infusion of regenerativeTuranian blood. [164]

Of course the Pan-Turanians recognized that anything like a realizationof their ambitious dreams was dependent upon the virtual destruction ofthe Russian Empire. In fact, Russia, with its Tartars, Turkomans, Kirghiz, Finns, and numerous kindred tribes, was in Pan-Turanian eyesmerely a Slav alluvium laid with varying thickness over a Turaniansubsoil. This turning of Russia into a vast "Turania irredenta" wascertainly an ambitious order. Nevertheless, the Pan-Turanians counted onpowerful Western backing. They realized that Germany and Austria-Hungarywere fast drifting toward war with Russia, and they felt that such acataclysm, however perilous, would also offer most gloriouspossibilities. 

These Pan-Turanian aspirations undoubtedly had a great deal to do withdriving Turkey into the Great War on the side of the Central Empires. Certainly, Enver Pasha and most of the other leaders of the governinggroup had long been more or less affiliated with the Pan-Turanianmovement. Of course the Turkish Government had more than one string toits bow. It tried to drive Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism in doubleharness, using the "Holy War" agitation for pious Moslems everywhere, while it redoubled Pan-Turanian propaganda among the Turko-Tartarpeoples. A good statement of Pan-Turanian ambitions in the early yearsof the war is that of the publicist Tekin Alp in his book, _The Turkishand Pan-Turkish Ideal_, published in 1915. Says Tekin Alp: "With thecrushing of Russian despotism by the brave German, Austrian, and Turkisharmies, 30, 000, 000 to 40, 000, 000 Turanians will receive theirindependence. With the 10, 000, 000 Ottoman Turks, this will form a nationof 50, 000, 000, advancing toward a great civilization which may perhapsbe compared with that of Germany, in that it will have the strength andenergy to rise even higher. In some ways it will be superior to thedegenerate French and English civilizations. "

With the collapse of Russia after the Bolshevik revolution at the end of1917, Pan-Turanian hopes knew no bounds. So certain were they of triumphthat they began to flout even their German allies, thus revealing thathatred of all Europeans which had always lurked at the back of theirminds. A German staff-officer thus describes the table-talk of HalilPasha, the Turkish commander of the Mesopotamian front and uncle ofEnver: "First of all, every tribe with a Turkish mother-tongue must beforged into a single nation. The national principle was supreme; so itwas the design to conquer Turkestan, the cradle of Turkish power andglory. That was the first task. From that base connections must beestablished with the Yakutes of Siberia, who were considered, on accountof their linguistic kinship, the remotest outposts of the Turkish bloodto the eastward. The closely related Tartar tribes of the Caucasus mustnaturally join this union. Armenians and Georgians, who form minoritynationalities in that territory, must either submit voluntarily or besubjugated. . . . Such a great compact Turkish Empire, exercising hegemonyover all the Islamic world, would exert a powerful attraction uponAfghanistan and Persia. . . . In December, 1917, when the Turkish front inMesopotamia threatened to yield, Halil Pasha said to me, half vexed, halfjokingly: 'Supposing we let the English have this cursed desert hole andgo to Turkestan, where I will erect a new empire for my little boy. ' Hehad named his youngest son after the great conqueror and destroyer, Jenghiz Khan. "[165]

As a matter of fact, the summer of 1918 saw Transcaucasia and northernPersia overrun by Turkish armies headed for Central Asia. Then came theGerman collapse in the West and the end of the war, apparently doomingTurkey to destruction. For the moment the Pan-Turanians were stunned. Nevertheless, their hopes were soon destined to revive, as we shallpresently see. 

Before describing the course of events in the Near East since 1918, which need to be treated as a unit, let us go back to consider theearlier developments of the other "second-stage" nationalist movementsin the Moslem world. We have already seen how, concurrently with Turkishnationalism, Arab nationalism was likewise evolving into the "racial"stage, the ideal being a great "Pan-Arab" empire, embracing not merelythe ethnically Arab peninsula-homeland, Syria, and Mesopotamia, but alsothe Arabized regions of Egypt, Tripoli, French North Africa, and theSudan. 

Pan-Arabism has not been as intellectually developed as Pan-Turanism, though its general trend is so similar that its doctrines need not bediscussed in detail. One important difference between the two movementsis that Pan-Arabism is much more religious and Pan-Islamic in character, the Arabs regarding themselves as "The Chosen People" divinelypredestined to dominate the whole Islamic world. Pan-Arabism also lacksPan-Turanism's unity of direction. There have been two distinctintellectual centres--Syria and Egypt. In fact, it is in Egypt thatPan-Arab schemes have been most concretely elaborated, the Egyptianprogramme looking toward a reunion of the Arab-speaking lands under theKhedive--perhaps at first subject to British tutelage, though ultimatelythrowing off British control by concerted Pan-Arab action. The lateKhedive Abbas Hilmi, deposed by the British in 1914, is supposed to haveencouraged this movement. [166]

The Great War undoubtedly stimulated Pan-Arabism, especially by itscreation of an independent Arab kingdom in the Hedjaz with claims onSyria and Mesopotamia. However, the various Arab peoples are soengrossed with local independence agitations looking toward theelimination of British, French, and Italian control from specificregions like Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Tripoli, that the largerconcept of Pan-Arabism, while undoubtedly an underlying factor, is notto-day in the foreground of Arab nationalist programmes. 

Furthermore, as I have already said, Pan-Arabism is interwoven with thenon-racial concepts of Pan-Islamism and "Pan-Islamic Nationalism. " Thislatter concept may seem a rather grotesque contradiction of terms. So itmay be to us Westerners. But it is not necessarily so to Eastern minds. However eagerly the East may have seized upon our ideas of nationalityand patriotism, those ideas have entered minds already full of conceptslike Islamic solidarity and the brotherhood of all True Believers. Theresult has been a subtle coloration of the new by the old, so that evenwhen Moslems use our exact words, "nationality, " "race, " etc. , theirconception of what those words mean is distinctly different from ours. These differences in fact extend to all political concepts. Take theword "State, " for example. The typical Mohammedan state is not, likethe typical Western state, a sharply defined unit, with fixed boundariesand full sovereignty exercised everywhere within its frontiers. It ismore or less an amorphous mass, with a central nucleus, the seat of anauthority which shades off into ill-defined, anarchic independence. Ofcourse, in the past half-century, most Mohammedan states have tried toremodel themselves on Western lines, but the traditional tendency istypified by Afghanistan, where the tribes of the Indian north-westfrontier, though nominally Afghan, enjoy practical independence and havefrequently conducted private wars of their own against the British whichthe Ameer has disavowed and for which the British have not held himresponsible. 

Similarly with the term "Nationality. " In Moslem eyes, a man need notbe born or formally naturalized to be a member of a certain Moslem"Nationality. " Every Moslem is more or less at home in every part ofIslam, so a man may just happen into a particular country and therebybecome at once, if he wishes, a national in good standing. Forexample: "Egypt for the Egyptians" does not mean precisely what wethink. Let a Mohammedan of Algiers or Damascus settle in Cairo. Nothing prevents him from acting, and being considered as, an"Egyptian Nationalist" in the full sense of the term. This is becauseIslam has always had a distinct idea of territorial as well asspiritual unity. All predominantly Mohammedan lands are believed byMoslems to constitute "Dar-ul-Islam, "[167] which is in a sense thejoint possession of all Moslems and which all Moslems are jointlyobligated to defend. That is the reason why alien encroachments on anyMoslem land are instantly resented by Moslems at the opposite end ofthe Moslem world, who could have no possible material interest in thematter. 

We are now better able to understand how many Moslem thinkers, combiningthe Western concept of nationality with the traditional idea ofDar-ul-Islam, have evolved a new synthesis of the two, expressed by theterm "Pan-Islamic Nationalism. " This trend of thought is well set forthby an Indian Moslem, who writes: "In the West, the whole science ofgovernment rests on the axiom that the essential divisions of humanityare determined by considerations of race and geography; but forOrientals these ideas are very far from being axioms. For them, humanitydivides according to religious beliefs. The unity is no longer thenation or the State, but the 'Millah. '[168] Europeans see in this acounterpart to their Middle Ages--a stage which Islam should passthrough on its way to modernity in the Western sense. How badly theyunderstand how religion looks to a Mohammedan! They forget that Islam isnot only a religion, but also a social organization, a form of culture, and a nationality. . . . The principle of Islamic fraternity--ofPan-Islamism, if you prefer the word--is analogous to patriotism, butwith this difference: this Islamic fraternity, though resulting inidentity of laws and customs, has not (like Western Nationality) beenbrought about by community of race, country, or history, but has beenreceived, as we believe, directly from God. "[169]

Pan-Islamic nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon and has notbeen doctrinally worked out. Nevertheless it is visible throughout theMoslem world and is gaining in strength, particularly in regions likeNorth Africa and India, where strong territorial patriotism has, for onereason or another, not developed. As a French writer remarks:"Mohammedan Nationalism is not an isolated or sporadic agitation. It isa broad tide, which is flowing over the whole Islamic world of Asia, India, and Africa. Nationalism is a new form of the Mohammedan faith, which, far from being undermined by contact with European civilization, seems to have discovered a surplus of religious fervour, and which, inits desire for expansion and proselytism, tends to realize its unity byrousing the fanaticism of the masses, by directing the politicaltendencies of the élites, and by sowing everywhere the seeds of adangerous agitation. "[170] Pan-Islamic nationalism may thus, in thefuture, become a major factor which will have to be seriously reckonedwith. [171]

 III

So ends our survey of nationalist movements in the Moslem world. Givensuch a tangled complex of aspirations, enormously stimulated byArmageddon, it was only natural that the close of the Great War shouldhave left the Orient a veritable welter of unrest. Obviously, anythinglike a constructive settlement could have been effected only by theexercise of true statesmanship of the highest order. Unfortunately, theVersailles peace conference was devoid of true statesmanship, and theresulting "settlement" not only failed to give peace to Europe butdisclosed an attitude toward the East inspired by the pre-war spirit ofpredatory imperialism and cynical _Realpolitik_. Apparently oblivious ofthe mighty psychological changes which the war had wrought, and of theconsequent changes of attitude and policy required, the victoriousAllies proceeded to treat the Orient as though Armageddon were askirmish and Asia the sleeping giant of a century ago. 

In fact, disregarding both the general pronouncements of liberalprinciples and the specific promises of self-determination for NearEastern peoples which they had made during the war, the Allies nowparaded a series of secret treaties (negotiated between themselvesduring those same war-years when they had been so unctuously orating), and these secret treaties clearly divided up the Ottoman Empire amongthe victors, in absolute disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants. Thepurposes of the Allies were further revealed by the way in which theVersailles conference refused to receive the representatives of Persia(theoretically still independent), but kept them cooling their heels inParis while British pressure at Teheran forced the Shah's government toenter into an "agreement" that made Persia a virtual protectorate of theBritish Empire. As for the Egyptians, who had always protested againstthe protectorate proclaimed by England solely on its own initiative in1914, the conference refused to pay any attention to their delegates, and they were given to understand that the conference regarded theBritish protectorate over Egypt as a _fait accompli_. The upshot wasthat, as a result of the war, European domination over the Near andMiddle East was riveted rather than relaxed. 

But the strangest feature of this strange business remains to be told. One might imagine that the Allied leaders would have realized that theywere playing a dangerous game, which could succeed only by closeteam-work and quick action. As a matter of fact, the very reverse wasthe case. After showing their hand, and thereby filling the East withdisillusionment, despair, and fury, the Allies proceeded to quarrel overthe spoils. Nearly two years passed before England, France, and Italywere able to come to an even superficial agreement as to the partitionof the Ottoman Empire, and meanwhile they had been bickering andintriguing against each other all over the Near East. This was sheermadness. The destined victims were thereby informed that Europeandomination rested not only on disregard of the moral "imponderables" buton diplomatic bankruptcy as well. The obvious reflection was that adomination resting on such rotten foundations might well be overthrown. 

That, at any rate, is the way multitudes of Orientals read thesituation, and their rebellious feelings were stimulated not merely byconsciousness of their own strength and Western disunion, but also bythe active encouragement of a new ally--Bolshevik Russia. RussianBolshevism had thrown down the gauntlet to Western civilization, and inthe desperate struggle which was now on, the Bolshevik leaders saw withterrible glee the golden opportunities vouchsafed them in the East. Thedetails of Bolshevik activity in the Orient will be considered in thechapter on Social Unrest. Suffice it to remember here that Bolshevikpropaganda is an important element in that profound ferment whichextends over the whole Near and Middle East; a ferment which has reducedsome regions to the verge of chaos and which threatens to increaserather than diminish in the immediate future. 

To relate all the details of contemporary Eastern unrest would fill abook in itself. Let us here content ourselves with considering the chiefcentres of this unrest, remembering always that it exists throughout theMoslem world from French North Africa to Central Asia and the DutchIndies. The centres to be here surveyed will be Egypt, Persia, and theTurkish and Arab regions of the former Ottoman Empire. A fifth maincentre of unrest--India--will be discussed in the next chapter. 

The gathering storm first broke in Egypt. During the war Egypt, floodedwith British troops and subjected to the most stringent martial law, hadremained quiet, but it was the quiet of repression, not of passivity. We have seen how, with the opening years of the twentieth century, virtually all educated Egyptians had become more or less impregnatedwith nationalist ideas, albeit a large proportion of them believed inevolutionary rather than revolutionary methods. The chief hope of themoderates had been the provisional character of English rule. So long asEngland declared herself merely in "temporary occupation" of Egypt, anything was possible. But the proclamation of the protectorate in 1914, which declared Egypt part of the British Empire, entirely changed thesituation. Even the most moderate nationalists felt that the future wasdefinitely prejudged against them and that the door had been irrevocablyclosed upon their ultimate aspirations. The result was that themoderates were driven over to the extremists and were ready to join thelatter in violent action as soon as opportunity might offer. 

The extreme nationalists had of course protested bitterly against theprotectorate from the first, and the close of the war saw a delegationcomposed of both nationalist wings proceed to Paris to lay their claimsbefore the Versailles conference. Rebuffed by the conference, whichrecognized the British protectorate over Egypt as part of the peacesettlement, the Egyptian delegation issued a formal protest warning oftrouble. This protest read:

"We have knocked at door after door, but have received no answer. Inspite of the definite pledges given by the statesmen at the head of thenations which won the war, to the effect that their victory would meanthe triumph of Right over Might and the establishment of the principleof self-determination for small nations, the British protectorate overEgypt was written into the treaties of Versailles and Saint Germainwithout the people of Egypt being consulted as to their politicalstatus. 

"This crime against our nation, a breach of good faith on the part ofthe Powers who have declared that they are forming in the same Treaty aSociety of Nations, will not be consummated without a solemn warningthat the people of Egypt consider the decision taken at Paris null andvoid. . . . If our voice is not heard, it will be only because the bloodalready shed has not been enough to overthrow the old world-order andgive birth to a new world-order. "[172]

Before these lines had appeared in type, trouble in Egypt had begun. Simultaneously with the arrival of the Egyptian delegation at Paris, thenationalists in Egypt laid their demands before the British authorities. The nationalist programme demanded complete self-government for Egypt, leaving England only a right of supervision over the public debt and theSuez Canal. The nationalists' strength was shown by the fact that theseproposals were indorsed by the Egyptian cabinet recently appointed bythe Khedive at British suggestion. In fact, the Egyptian Premier, Roushdi Pasha, asked to be allowed to go to London with some of hiscolleagues for a hearing. This placed the British authorities in Egyptin a distinctly trying position. However, they determined to stand firm, and accordingly answered that England could not abandon itsresponsibility for the continuance of order and good government inEgypt, now a British protectorate and an integral part of the empire, and that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the Egyptianleaders to go to London and there advance immoderate demands which couldnot possibly be entertained. 

The English attitude was firm. The Egyptian attitude was no less firm. The cabinet at once resigned, no new cabinet could be formed, and theBritish High Commissioner, General Allenby, was forced to assumeunveiled control. Meanwhile the nationalists announced that they weregoing to hold a plebiscite to determine the attitude of the Egyptianpeople. Forbidden by the British authorities, the plebiscite wasnevertheless illegally held, and resulted, according to thenationalists, in an overwhelming popular indorsement of their demands. This defiant attitude determined the British on strong action. Accordingly, in the spring of 1919, most of the nationalist leaders wereseized and deported to Malta. 

Egypt's answer was an explosion. From one end of the country to theother, Egypt flamed into rebellion. Everywhere it was the same story. Railways and telegraph lines were systematically cut. Trains werestalled and looted. Isolated British officers and soldiers weremurdered. In Cairo alone, thousands of houses were sacked by the mob. Soon the danger was rendered more acute by the irruption out of thedesert of swarms of Bedouin Arabs bent on plunder. For a few days Egypttrembled on the verge of anarchy, and the British Government admitted inParliament that all Egypt was in a state of insurrection. 

The British authorities met the crisis with vigour and determination. The number of British troops in Egypt was large, trusty black regimentswere hurried up from the Sudan, and the well-disciplined Egyptian nativepolice generally obeyed orders. After several weeks of sharp fightingand heavy loss of life, Egypt was again gotten under control. 

Order was restored, but the outlook was ominous in the extreme. Only thepresence of massed British and Sudanese troops enabled order to bemaintained. Even the application of stern martial law could not preventcontinuous nationalist demonstrations, sometimes ending in riots, fighting, and heavy loss of life. The most serious aspect of thesituation was that not only were the upper classes solidly nationalist, but they had behind them the hitherto passive fellah millions. Thewar-years had borne hard on the fellaheen. Military exigencies hadcompelled Britain to conscript fully a million of them for forcedlabour in the Near East and even in Europe, while there had also beenwholesale requisitions of grain, fodder, and other supplies. Thesethings had caused profound discontent and had roused among the fellaheennot merely passive dislike but active hatred of British rule. Authoritative English experts on Egypt were seriously alarmed. Shortlyafter the riots Sir William Willcocks, the noted engineer, said in apublic statement: "The keystone of the British occupation of Egypt wasthe fact that the fellaheen were for it. The Sheikhs, Omdehs, governingclasses, and high religious heads might or might not be hostile, butnothing counted for much while the millions of fellaheen were solid forthe occupation. The British have undoubtedly to-day lost the friendshipand confidence of the fellaheen. " And Sir Valentine Chirol stated in theLondon _Times_: "We are now admittedly face to face with the ominousfact that for the first time since the British occupation large numbersof the Egyptian fellaheen, who owe far more to us than does any otherclass of Egyptians, have been worked up into a fever of bitterdiscontent and hatred. Very few people at home, even in responsiblequarters, have, I think, the slightest conception of the very dangerousdegree of tension which has now been reached out here. "

All foreign observers were impressed by the nationalist feeling whichunited all creeds and classes. Regarding the monster demonstrations heldduring the summer of 1919, an Italian publicist wrote: "For the firsttime in history, the banners flown showed the Crescent interwoven withthe Cross. Until a short time ago the two elements were as distinct fromeach other as each of them was from the Jews. To-day, precisely as hashappened in India among the Mussulmans and the Hindus, every trace ofreligious division has departed. All Egyptians are enrolled under asingle banner. Every one behind his mask of silence is burning with thesame faith, and confident that his cause will ultimately triumph. "[173]And a Frenchwoman, a lifelong resident of Egypt, wrote: "We have seensurprising things in this country, so often divided by party andreligious struggles: Coptic priests preaching in mosques, ulemaspreaching in Christian churches; Syrian, Maronite, or Mohammedanstudents; women, whether of Turkish or Egyptian blood, united in thesame fervour, the same ardent desire to see break over their ancientland the radiant dawn of independence. For those who, like myself, haveknown the Egypt of Tewfik, the attitude of the women these last fewyears is the most surprising transformation that has happened in thevalley of the Nile. One should have seen the nonchalant life, the almostcomplete indifference to anything savouring of politics, to appreciatethe enormous steps taken in the last few months. For example: lastsummer a procession of women demonstrators was surrounded by Britishsoldiers with fixed bayonets. One of the women, threatened by a soldier, turned on him, baring her breast, and cried: 'Kill me, then, so thatthere may be another Miss Cavell. '"[174]

Faced by this unprecedented nationalist fervour, Englishmen on the spotwere of two opinions. Some, like Sir William Willcocks and Sir ValentineChirol, stated that extensive concessions must be made. [175] Otherqualified observers asserted that concessions would be weakness andwould spell disaster. Said Sir M. McIlwraith: "Five years of aNationalist régime would lead to hopeless chaos and disorder. . . . IfEgypt is not to fall back into the morass of bankruptcy and anarchy fromwhich we rescued her in 1882, with the still greater horrors ofBolshevism, of which there are already sinister indications, superadded, Britain must not loosen her control. "[176] In England theEgyptian situation caused grave disquietude, and in the summer of 1919the British Government announced the appointment of a commission ofinquiry headed by Lord Milner to investigate fully into Egyptianaffairs. 

The appointment was a wise one. Lord Milner was one of the ablestfigures in British political life, a man of long experience withimperial problems, including that of Egypt, and possessed of atemperament equally remote from the doctrinaire liberal or the hideboundconservative. In short, Lord Milner was a _realist_, in the true senseof the word, as his action soon proved. Arriving in Egypt at thebeginning of 1920, Lord Milner and his colleagues found themselvesconfronted with a most difficult situation. In Egypt the word had goneforth to boycott the commission, and not merely nationalist politiciansbut also religious leaders like the Grand Mufti refused even to discussmatters unless the commissioners would first agree to Egyptianindependence. This looked like a deadlock. Nevertheless, by infinitetact and patience, Lord Milner finally got into free and frankdiscussion with Zagloul Pasha and the other responsible nationalistleaders. 

His efforts were undoubtedly helped by certain developments within Egyptitself. In Egypt, as elsewhere in the East, there were appearingsymptoms not merely of political but also of social unrest. New types ofagitators were springing up, preaching to the populace the most extremerevolutionary doctrines. These youthful agitators disquieted the regularnationalist leaders, who felt themselves threatened both as party chiefsand as men of social standing and property. The upshot was that, by theautumn of 1920, Lord Milner and Zagloul Pasha had agreed upon the basisof what looked like a genuine compromise. According to the intimationsthen given out to the press, and later confirmed by the nature of LordMilner's official report, the lines of the tentative agreement ran asfollows: England was to withdraw her protectorate and was to declareEgypt independent. This independence was qualified to about the sameextent that Cuba's is toward the United States. Egypt was to havecomplete self-government, both the British garrison and British civilianofficials being withdrawn. Egypt was, however, to make a perpetualtreaty of alliance with Great Britain, was to agree not to make treatieswith other Powers save with Britain's consent, and was to grant Britaina military and naval station for the protection of the Suez Canal and ofEgypt itself in case of sudden attack by foreign enemies. The vexedquestion of the Sudan was left temporarily open. 

These proposals bore the earmarks of genuinely constructive compromise. Unfortunately, they were not at once acted upon. [177] Both in Englandand in Egypt they roused strong opposition. In England adverse officialinfluences held up the commission's report till February, 1921. In Egyptthe extreme nationalists denounced Zagloul Pasha as a traitor, thoughmoderate opinion seemed substantially satisfied. The commission'sreport, as finally published, declared that the grant of self-governmentto Egypt could not be safely postponed; that the nationalist spiritcould not be extinguished; that an attempt to govern Egypt in the teethof a hostile people would be "a difficult and disgraceful task"; andthat it would be a great misfortune if the present opportunity for asettlement were lost. However, the report was not indorsed by theBritish Government in its entirety, and Lord Milner forthwith resigned. As for Zagloul Pasha, he still maintains his position as nationalistleader, but his authority has been gravely shaken. Such is thesituation of Egypt at this present writing: a situation frankly not soencouraging as it was last year. 

Meanwhile the storm which had begun in Egypt had long since spread toother parts of the Near East. In fact, by the opening months of 1920, the storm-centre had shifted to the Ottoman Empire. For this the Alliesthemselves were largely to blame. Of course a constructive settlement ofthese troubled regions would have been very difficult. Still, it mightnot have proved impossible if Allied policy had been fair andabove-board. The close of the war found the various peoples of theOttoman Empire hopeful that the liberal war-aims professed by the Alliedspokesmen would be redeemed. The Arab elements were notably hopeful, because they had been given a whole series of Allied promises (shortlyto be repudiated, as we shall presently see), while even the beatenTurks were not entirely bereft of hope in the future. Besides thegeneral pronouncements of liberal treatment as formulated in the"Fourteen Points" programme of President Wilson and indorsed by theAllies, the Turks had pledges of a more specific character, notably byPremier Lloyd George, who, on January 5, 1918, had said: "Nor are wefighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renownedlands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish inrace. " In other words, the Turks were given unequivocally to understandthat, while their rule over non-Turkish regions like the Arab provincesmust cease, the Turkish regions of the empire were not to pass underalien rule, but were to form a Turkish national state. The Turks did notknow about a series of secret treaties between the Allies, begun in1915, which partitioned practically the whole of Asia Minor between theAllied Powers. These were to come out a little later. For the moment theTurks might hope. 

In the case of the Arabs there were far brighter grounds fornationalist hopes--and far darker depths of Allied duplicity. We havealready mentioned the Arab revolt of 1916, which, beginning in theHedjaz under the leadership of the Shereef of Mecca, presently spreadthrough all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and contributed solargely to the collapse of Turkish resistance. This revolt was, however, not a sudden, unpremeditated thing. It had been carefully planned, andwas due largely to Allied backing--and Allied promises. From the verybeginning of the war Arab nationalist malcontents had been in touch withthe British authorities in Egypt. They were warmly welcomed andencouraged in their separatist schemes, because an Arab rebellion wouldobviously be of invaluable assistance to the British in safeguardingEgypt and the Suez Canal, to say nothing of an advance into Turkishterritory. 

The Arabs, however, asked not merely material aid but also definitepromises that their rebellion should be rewarded by the formation of anArab state embracing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately for Arab nationalist aspirations, the British and FrenchGovernments had their own ideas as to the future of Turkey's Arabprovinces. Both England and France had long possessed "spheres ofinfluence" in those regions. The English sphere was in southernMesopotamia at the head of the Persian Gulf. The French sphere was theLebanon, a mountainous district in northern Syria just inland from theMediterranean coast, where the population, known as Maronites, wereRoman Catholics, over whom France had long extended her diplomaticprotection. Of course both these districts were legally Turkishterritory. Also, both were small in area. But "spheres of influence" areelastic things. Under favourable circumstances they are capable ofsudden expansion to an extraordinary degree. Such a circumstance was theGreat War. Accordingly the British and French Foreign Offices put theirheads together and on March 5, 1915, the two governments signed asecret treaty by the terms of which France was given a "predominantposition" in Syria and Britain a predominant position in Mesopotamia. Nodefinite boundaries were then assigned, but the intent was to stake outclaims which would partition Turkey's Arab provinces between England andFrance. 

Naturally the existence of this secret treaty was an embarrassment tothe British officials in Egypt in their negotiations with the Arabs. However, an Arab rebellion was too valuable an asset to be lost, and theBritish negotiators finally evolved a formula which satisfied the Arableaders. On October 25, 1915, the Shereef of Mecca's representative atCairo was given a document by the Governor-General of Egypt, Sir HenryMcMahon, in which Great Britain undertook, conditional upon an Arabrevolt, to recognize the independence of the Arabs of the Ottoman Empireexcept in southern Mesopotamia, where British interests required specialmeasures of administrative control, and also except areas where GreatBritain was "not free to act without detriment to the interests ofFrance. " This last clause was of course a "joker. " However, it achievedits purpose. The Arabs, knowing nothing about the secret treaty, supposed it referred merely to the restricted district of the Lebanon. They went home jubilant, to prepare the revolt which broke out nextyear. 

The revolt began in November, 1916. It might not have begun at all hadthe Arabs known what had happened the preceding May. In that monthEngland and France signed another secret treaty, the celebratedSykes-Picot Agreement. This agreement definitely partitioned Turkey'sArab provinces along the lines suggested in the initial secret treaty ofthe year before. By the Sykes-Picot Agreement most of Mesopotamia was tobe definitely British, while the Syrian coast from Tyre to Alexandrettawas to be definitely French, together with extensive Armenian and AsiaMinor regions to the northward. Palestine was to be "international, "albeit its chief seaport, Haifa, was to be British, and the implicationwas that Palestine fell within the English sphere. As to the greathinterland lying between Mesopotamia and the Syrian coast, it was to be"independent Arab under two spheres of influence, " British and French;the French sphere embracing all the rest of Syria from Aleppo toDamascus, the English sphere embracing all the rest of Mesopotamia--theregion about Mosul. In other words, the independence promised the Arabsby Sir Henry McMahon had vanished into thin air. 

This little shift behind the scenes was of course not communicated tothe Arabs. On the contrary, the British did everything possible tostimulate Arab nationalist hopes--this being the best way to extracttheir fighting zeal against the Turks. The British Government sent theArabs a number of picked intelligence officers, notably a certainColonel Lawrence, an extraordinary young man who soon gained unboundedinfluence over the Arab chiefs and became known as "The Soul of theArabian Revolution. "[178] These men, chosen for their knowledge of, andsympathy for, the Arabs, were not informed about the secret treaties, sothat their encouragement of Arab zeal might not be marred by any lack ofsincerity. Similarly, the British generals were prodigal of promises intheir proclamations. [179] The climax of this blessed comedy occurred atthe very close of the war, when the British and French Governmentsissued the following joint declaration which was posted throughout theArab provinces: "The aim which France and Great Britain have in view inwaging in the East the war let loose upon the world by German ambition, is to insure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples, so long oppressed by Turks, and to establish national governments andadministrations which shall derive their authority from the initiativeand free will of the people themselves. "

This climax was, however, followed by a swift _dénouement_. The war wasover, the enemy was beaten, the comedy was ended, the curtain was rungdown, and on that curtain the Arabs read--the inner truth of things. French troops appeared to occupy the Syrian coast, the secret treatiescame out, and the Arabs learned how they had been tricked. Black andbitter was their wrath. Probably they would have exploded at once had itnot been for their cool-headed chiefs, especially Prince Feisal, the sonof the Shereef of Mecca, who had proved himself a real leader of menduring the war and who had now attained a position of unquestionedauthority. Feisal knew the Allies' military strength and realized howhazardous war would be, especially at that time. Feeling the moralstrength of the Arab position, he besought his countrymen to let himplead Arabia's cause before the impending peace conference, and he hadhis way. During the year 1919 the Arab lands were quiet, though it wasthe quiet of suspense. 

Prince Feisal pleaded his case before the peace conference witheloquence and dignity. But Feisal failed. The covenant of the League ofNations might contain the benevolent statement that "certain communitiesformerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage ofdevelopment where their existence as independent nations can beprovisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrativeadvice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able tostand alone. "[180] The Arabs knew what "mandatories" meant. Lloyd Georgemight utter felicitous phrases such as "Arab forces have redeemed thepledges given to Great Britain, and we should redeem our pledges. "[181]The Arabs had read the secret treaties. "In vain is the net spread inthe sight of any bird. " The game no longer worked. The Arabs knew thatthey must rely on their own efforts, either in diplomacy or war. 

Feisal still counselled peace. He was probably influenced to this notmerely by the risks of armed resistance but also by the fact that theAllies were now quarrelling among themselves. These quarrels of courseextended all over the Near East, but there was none more bitter than thequarrel which had broken out between England and France over thedivision of the Arab spoils. This dispute originated in Frenchdissatisfaction with the secret treaties. No sooner had the Sykes-PicotAgreement been published than large and influential sections of Frenchopinion began shouting that they had been duped. For generations Frenchimperialists had had their eye on Syria, [182] and since the beginning ofthe war the imperialist press had been conducting an ardent propagandafor wholesale annexations in the Near East. "La Syrie intégrale!" "AllSyria!" was the cry. And this "all" included not merely the coast-stripassigned France by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but also Palestine and thevast Aleppo-Damascus hinterland right across to the rich oil-fields ofMosul. To this entire region, often termed in French expansionistcircles "La France du Levant, " the imperialists asserted that France had"imprescriptible historic rights running back to the Crusades and evento Charlemagne. " Syria was a "second Alsace, " which held out its arms toFrance and would not be denied. It was also the indispensable fulcrum ofFrench world-policy. These imperialist aspirations had powerful backingin French Government circles. For example, early in 1915, M. Leygues hadsaid in the Chamber of Deputies: "The axis of French policy is in theMediterranean. One of its poles is in the West, at Algiers, Tunis, andMorocco. The other must lie in the East, with Syria, Lebanon, Palestine. "[183]

After such high hopes, the effect of the Sykes-Picot Agreement on Frenchimperialists can be imagined. Their anger turned naturally upon theEnglish, who were roundly denounced and blamed for everything that washappening in the East, Arab nationalist aspirations being stigmatized asnothing but British propaganda. Cried one French writer: "Somepsychiatrist ought to write a study of these British colonial officials, implacable imperialists, megalomaniacs, who, night and day, work fortheir country without even asking counsel from London, and whoseconstant care is to annihilate in Syria, as they once annihilated inEgypt, the supremacy of France. "[184] In answer to such fulminations, English writers scored French "greed" and "folly" which was compromisingEngland's prestige and threatening to set the whole East on fire. [185]In fine, there was a very pretty row on between people who, less than ayear before, had been pledging their "sacred union" for all eternity. The Arabs were certainly much edified, and the other Eastern peoples aswell. 

Largely owing to these bickerings, Allied action in the Near East wasdelayed through 1919. But by the spring of 1920 the Allies came to ameasure of agreement. The meeting of the Allied Premiers at San Remoelaborated the terms of the treaty to be imposed on Turkey, dividingAsia Minor into spheres of influence and exploitation, while the Arabprovinces were assigned England and France according to the terms of theSykes-Picot Agreement--properly camouflaged, of course, as "mandates" ofthe League of Nations. England, France, and their satellite, Greece, prepared for action. British reinforcements were sent to Mesopotamia andPalestine; French reinforcements were sent to Syria; anAnglo-Franco-Greek force prepared to occupy Constantinople, and PremierVenizelos promised a Greek army for Asia Minor contingencies. The onerift in the lute was Italy. Italy saw big trouble brewing and determinednot to be directly involved. Said Premier Nitti to an English journalistafter the San Remo conference: "You will have war in Asia Minor, andItaly will not send a single soldier nor pay a single lira. You havetaken from the Turks their sacred city of Adrianople; you have placedtheir capital city under foreign control; you have taken from them everyport and the larger part of their territory; and the five Turkishdelegates whom you will select will sign a treaty which will not havethe sanction of the Turkish people or the Turkish Parliament. "

Premier Nitti was a true prophet. For months past the Turkishnationalists, knowing what was in store for them, had been building up acentre of resistance in the interior of Asia Minor. Of course the formernationalist leaders such as Enver Pasha had long since fled to distanthavens like Transcaucasia or Bolshevik Russia, but new leaders appeared, notably a young officer of marked military talent, Mustapha Kemal Pasha. With great energy Mustapha Kemal built up a really creditable army, andfrom his "capital, " the city of Angora in the heart of Asia Minor, henow defied the Allies, emphasizing his defiance by attacking the Frenchgarrisons in Cilicia (a coast district in Asia Minor just north ofSyria), inflicting heavy losses. 

The Arabs also were preparing for action. In March a "Pan-SyrianCongress" met at Damascus, unanimously declared the independence ofSyria, and elected Feisal king. This announcement electrified all theArab provinces. In the French-occupied coastal zone riots broke outagainst the French; in Palestine there were "pogroms" against the Jews, whom the Arabs, both Moslem and Christian, hated for their "Zionist"plans; while in Mesopotamia there were sporadic uprisings of tribesmen. 

Faced by this ominous situation, the "mandatories" took militarycounter-measures. The French took especially vigorous action. France nowhad nearly 100, 000 men in Syria and Cilicia, headed by General Gouraud, a veteran of many colonial wars and a believer in "strong-arm" methods. On July 15 Gouraud sent Feisal an ultimatum requiring completesubmission. Feisal, diplomatic to the last, actually accepted theultimatum, but Gouraud ignored this acceptance on a technicality andstruck for Damascus with 60, 000 men. Feisal attempted no realresistance, fighting only a rearguard action and withdrawing into thedesert. On July 25 the French entered Damascus, the Arab capital, deposed Feisal, and set up thoroughgoing French rule. Opposition waspunished with the greatest severity. Damascus was mulcted of awar-contribution of 10, 000, 000 francs, after the German fashion inBelgium, many nationalist leaders were imprisoned or shot, while Gouraudannounced that the death of "one French subject or one Christian" wouldbe followed by wholesale "most terrible reprisals" by bombingaeroplanes. [186]

Before this Napoleonic "thunder-stroke" Syria bent for the moment, apparently terrorized. In Mesopotamia, however, the British were not sofortunate. For some months trouble had patently been brewing, and inMarch the British commander had expressed himself as "much struck withthe volcanic possibilities of the country. " In July all Mesopotamiaflamed into insurrection, and though Britain had fully 100, 000 troops inthe province, they were hard put to it to stem the rebellion. 

Meanwhile, the Allies had occupied Constantinople, to force acceptanceof the draft treaty of peace. Naturally, there was no resistance, Constantinople being entirely at the mercy of the Allied fleet. But thesilence of the vast throngs gathered to watch the incoming troops filledsome Allied observers with disquietude. A French journalist wrote: "Thesilence of the multitude was more impressive than boisterous protests. Their eyes glowed with sullen hatred. Scattered through this throng ofmute, prostrated, hopeless people circulated watchful and sinuousemissaries, who were to carry word of this misfortune to the remotestconfines of Islam. In a few hours they would be in Anatolia. A couple ofdays later the news would have spread to Konia, Angora, and Sivas. In abrief space of time it would be heralded throughout the regions ofBolshevist influence, extending to the Caucasus and beyond. In a fewweeks all these centres of agitation will be preparing theircounter-attack. Asia and Africa will again cement their union of faith. Intelligent agents will record in the retentive minds of people who donot read, the history of our blunders. These missionaries ofinsurrection and fanaticism come from every race and class of society. Educated and refined men disguise themselves as beggars and outcasts, inorder to spread the news apace and to prepare for bittervengeance. "[187]

Events in Turkey now proceeded precisely as the Italian Premier Nittihad foretold. The Allied masters of Constantinople compelled the Sultanto appoint a "friendly" cabinet which solemnly denounced Mustapha Kemaland his "rebels, " and sent a hand-picked delegation to Sèvres, France, where they dutifully "signed on the dotted line" the treaty that theAllies had prepared. The Allies had thus "imposed their will"--on paper. For every sensible man knew that the whole business was a roaring farce;knew that the "friendly" government, from Sultan to meanest clerk, wasas nationalist as Mustapha Kemal himself; knew that the real Turkishcapital was not Constantinople but Angora, and that the Allies' powerwas measured by the range of their guns. As for Mustapha Kemal, hiscomment on the Sèvres Treaty was: "I will fight to the end of theworld. "

The Allies were thus in a decidedly embarrassing situation, especiallysince "The Allies" now meant only England and France. Italy was out ofthe game. As Nitti had warned at San Remo, she would "not send a singlesoldier nor pay a single lira. " With 200, 000 soldiers holding down theArabs, and plenty of trouble elsewhere, neither France nor Britain hadthe troops to crush Mustapha Kemal--a job which the French staffestimated would take 300, 000 men. One weapon, however, they stillpossessed--Greece. In return for large territorial concessions, PremierVenizelos offered to bring the Turks to reason. His offer was accepted, and 100, 000 Greek troops landed at Smyrna. But the Greek campaign wasnot a success. Even 100, 000 men soon wore thin when spread out over thevast Asia Minor plateau. Mustapha Kemal avoided decisive battle, harassing the Greeks by guerilla warfare just as he was harassing theFrench in Cilicia at the other end of the line. The Greeks "dug in, " anda deadlock ensued which threatened to continue indefinitely. This sooncaused a new complication. Venizelos might be willing to "carry on" asthe Allies' submandatory, but the Greek people were not. Kept virtuallyon a war-footing since 1912, the Greeks kicked over the traces. In theNovember elections they repudiated Venizelos by a vote of 990, 000 to10, 000, and recalled King Constantine, who had been deposed by theAllies three years before. This meant that Greece, like Italy, was outof the game. To be sure, King Constantine presently started hostilitieswith the Turks on his own account. This was, however, something verydifferent from Greece's attitude under the Venizelist régime. TheAllies' weapon had thus broken in their hands. 

Meanwhile Mustapha Kemal was not merely consolidating his authority inAsia Minor but was gaining allies of his own. In the first place, he wasestablishing close relations with the Arabs. It may appear strange tofind such bitter foes become friends; nevertheless, Franco-Britishpolicy had achieved even this seeming miracle. The reason was clearlyexplained by no less a person than Lawrence ("The Soul of the ArabRevolution"), who had returned to civil life and was thus free to speakhis mind on the Eastern situation, which he did in no uncertain fashion. In one of several statements given to the British press, Lawrence said:"The Arabs rebelled against the Turks during the war, not because theTurkish Government was notably bad, but because they wantedindependence. They did not risk their lives in battle to change masters, to become British subjects or French citizens, but to win a State oftheir own. " The matter was put even more pointedly by an Arabnationalist leader in the columns of a French radical paper opposed tothe Syrian adventure. Said this leader: "Both the French and the Englishshould know once for all that the Arabs are joined by a common religionwith the Turks, and have been politically identified with them forcenturies, and therefore do not wish to separate themselves from theirfellow believers and brothers-in-arms merely to submit to the dominationof a European nation, no matter what form the latter's suzerainty mayassume. . . . It is no use for M. Millerand to say: 'We have never thoughtof trespassing in any respect upon the independence of these people. ' Noone is deceived by such statements as that. The armistice was signed inaccordance with the conditions proclaimed by Mr. Wilson, but as soon asGermany and its allies were helpless, the promises of the armistice weretrodden underfoot, as well as the Fourteen Points. Such a violation ofthe promises of complete independence, so prodigally made to the Arabson so many occasions, has resulted in re-uniting closer than ever theArabs and the Turks. It has taken but a few months to restore thatintimacy. . . . It is probable that France, by maintaining an army of150, 000 men in Syria, and by spending billions of francs, will be ableto subdue the Syrian Arabs. But that will not finish the task. Theinterior of that country borders upon other lands inhabited by Arabs, Kurds, and Turks, and by the immense desert. In starting a conflict with4, 000, 000 Syrians, France will be making enemies of 15, 000, 000 Arabs inthe Levant, most of whom are armed tribes, without including the otherMohammedan peoples, who are speedily acquiring solidarity andorganization under the blows that are being dealt them by the Entente. If you believe I am exaggerating, all you have to do is to investigatethe facts yourself. But what good will it do to confirm the truth toolate, and after floods of blood have flowed?"[188]

In fact, signs of Turco-Arab co-operation became everywhere apparent. Tobe sure, this co-operation was not openly avowed either by MustaphaKemal or by the deposed King Feisal who, fleeing to Italy, continued hisdiplomatic manoeuvres. But Arabs fought beside Turks against theFrench in Cilicia; Turks and Kurds joined the Syrian Arabs in theircontinual local risings; while Kemal's hand was clearly apparent in therebellion against the British in Mesopotamia. 

This Arab _entente_ was not the whole of Mustapha Kemal's foreignpolicy. He was also reaching out north-eastward to the Tartars ofTranscaucasia and the Turkomans of Persian Azerbaidjan. The Caucasus wasby this time the scene of a highly complicated struggle between MoslemTartars and Turkomans, Christian Armenians and Georgians, and variousRussian factions, which was fast reducing that unhappy region to chaos. Among the Tartar-Turkomans, long leavened by Pan-Turanian propaganda, Mustapha Kemal found enthusiastic adherents; and his efforts weresupported by a third ally--Bolshevik Russia. Bolshevik policy, which, aswe have already stated, was seeking to stir up trouble against theWestern Powers throughout the East, had watched Kemal's rise with greatsatisfaction. At first the Bolsheviki could do very little for theTurkish nationalists because they were not in direct touch, but thecollapse of Wrangel's "White" army in November, 1920, and the consequentoverrunning of all south Russia by the Red armies, opened a direct linefrom Moscow to Angora via the Caucasus, and henceforth Mustapha Kemalwas supplied with money, arms, and a few men. 

Furthermore, Kemal and the Bolsheviki were starting trouble in Persia. That country was in a most deplorable condition. During the war Persia, despite her technical neutrality, had been a battle-ground between theAnglo-Russians on the one hand and the Turco-Germans on the other. Russia's collapse in 1917 had led to her military withdrawal fromPersia, and England, profiting by the situation, had made herselfsupreme, legalizing her position by the famous "Agreement" "negotiated"with the Shah's government in August, 1919. [189] This treaty, thoughsigned and sealed in due form, was bitterly resented by the Persianpeople. Here was obviously another ripe field for Bolshevik propaganda. Accordingly, the Bolshevik government renounced all rights in Persiaacquired by the Czarist régime and proclaimed themselves the friends ofthe Persian people against Western imperialism. Naturally the gameworked, and Persia soon became honeycombed with militant unrest. In theearly summer of 1920 a Bolshevist force actually crossed the Caspian Seaand landed on the Persian shore. They did not penetrate far into thecountry. They did not need to, for the country simply effervesced in away which made the British position increasingly untenable. For manymonths a confused situation ensued. In fact, at this writing thesituation is still obscure. But there can be no doubt that Britain'shold on Persia is gravely shaken, and she may soon be compelled toevacuate the country, with the possible exception of the extreme south. 

Turning back to the autumn of 1920: the position of England and Francein the Near East had become far from bright. Deserted by Italy andGreece, defied by the Turks, harried by the Arabs, worried by theEgyptians and Persians, and everywhere menaced by the subtle workings ofBolshevism, the situation was not a happy one. The burden of empire wasproving heavy. In Mesopotamia alone the bill was already 100, 000, 000sterling, with no relief in sight. 

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in both England andFrance Near Eastern policies were subjected to a growing flood ofcriticism. In England especially the tide ran very strong. TheMesopotamian imbroglio was denounced as both a crime and a blunder. Forexample, Colonel Lawrence stated: "We are to-day not far from disaster. Our government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept 14, 000local conscripts in the ranks and killed yearly an average of 200 Arabsin maintaining peace. We keep 90, 000 men, with aeroplanes, armouredcars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about 10, 000 Arabsin the rising this summer. "[190] Influenced by such criticisms and bythe general trend of events, the British Government modified itsattitude, sending out Sir Percy Cox to negotiate with the Arabs. SirPercy Cox was a man of the Milner type, with a firm grip on realitiesand an intimate experience with Eastern affairs. Authorized to discusslarge concessions, he met the nationalist leaders frankly and made agood impression upon them. At this writing matters have not beendefinitely settled, but it looks as though England was planning to limither direct control to the extreme south of Mesopotamia at the head ofthe Persian Gulf--practically her old sphere of influence before 1914. 

Meanwhile, in Syria, France has thus far succeeded in maintainingrelative order by strong-arm methods. But the situation is highlyunstable. All classes of the population have been alienated. Even theCatholic Maronites, traditionally pro-French, have begun agitating. General Gouraud promptly squelched the agitation by deporting theleaders to Corsica; nevertheless, the fact remains that France's onlyreal friends in Syria are dissatisfied. Up to the present these thingshave not changed France's attitude. A short time ago ex-Premier Leyguesremarked of Syria, "France will occupy all of it, and always"; whilestill more recently General Gouraud stated: "France must remain inSyria, both for political and economic reasons. The politicalconsequences of our abandonment of the country would be disastrous. Ourprestige and influence in the Levant and the Mediterranean would bedoomed. The economic interests of France also compel us to remain there. When fully developed, Syria and Cilicia will have an economic valuefully equal to that of Egypt. "

However, despite the French Government's firmness, there is anincreasing public criticism of the "Syrian adventure, " not merely fromradical anti-imperialist quarters, but from unimpeachably conservativecircles as well. The editor of one of the most conservative Frenchpolitical periodicals has stated: "Jealous of its autonomy, the Arabpeople, liberated from the Ottoman yoke, do not desire a new foreigndomination. To say that Syria demands our protection is a lie. Syriawishes to be entirely independent. "[191] And recently Senator VictorBérard, one of France's recognized authorities on Eastern affairs made aspeech in the French Senate strongly criticising the Government's Syrianpolicy from the very start and declaring that a "free Syria" was "aquestion of both interest and honour. "

Certainly, the French Government, still so unyielding toward the Arabs, has reversed its attitude toward the Turks. Side-stepping the SèvresTreaty, it has lately agreed on provisional peace terms with the Turkishnationalists, actually agreeing to evacuate Cilicia. In fact, bothFrance and England know that the Sèvres Treaty is unworkable, and thatTurkish possession of virtually the whole of Asia Minor will have to berecognized. 

In negotiating with Mustapha Kemal, France undoubtedly hopes to get himto throw over the Arabs. But this is scarcely thinkable. The whole trendof events betokens an increasing solidarity of the Near Eastern peoplesagainst Western political control. A most remarkable portent in thisdirection is the Pan-Islamic conference held at Sivas early in 1921. This conference, called to draw up a definite scheme for effectiveMoslem co-operation the world over, was attended not merely by the highorthodox Moslem dignitaries and political leaders, but also by heterodoxchiefs like the Shiah Emir of Kerbela, the Imam Yahya, and the ZaiditeEmir of Yemen--leaders of heretical sects between whom and the orthodoxSunnis co-operation had previously been impossible. Most notable of all, the press reports state that the conference was presided over by noless a personage than El Sennussi. This may well be so, for we havealready seen how the Sennussi have always worked for a close union ofall Islam against Western domination. 

Such is the situation in the Near East--a situation very grave and fullof trouble. The most hopeful portent is the apparent awakening of theBritish Government to the growing perils of the hour, and its consequentmodifications of attitude. The labours of men like Lord Milner and SirPercy Cox, however hampered by purblind influences, can scarcely bewholly barren of results. Such men are the diplomatic descendants ofChatham and of Durham; the upholders of that great political traditionwhich has steered the British Empire safely through crises that appearedhopeless. 

On the other hand, the darkest portent in the Near East is the continuedintransigeance of France. Steeped in its old traditions, French policyapparently refuses to face realities. If an explosion comes, as come itmust unless France modifies her attitude; if, some dark day, thirty orforty French battalions are caught in a simoom of Arab fury blowing outof the desert and are annihilated in a new Adowa; the regretful verdictof many versed in Eastern affairs can only be: "French policy hasdeserved it. "

Leaving the Near Eastern problem at this critical juncture to theinscrutable solution of the future, let us now turn to the greatpolitical problem of the Middle East--the nationalist movement inIndia. 

FOOTNOTES:

[138] For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, seeVambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_; and his_Western Culture in Eastern Lands_. Also the articles by Léon Cahun in_Lavisse et Rambaud_, previously cited; and L. Rousseau, _L'EffortOttoman_ (Paris, 1907). 

[139] Bérard, _Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances_, p. 16 (Paris, 1907). 

[140] Cited by Bérard, p. 19. 

[141] Cited by Bérard, p. 20. 

[142] _Le Revéil de la Nation arabe_, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905). 

[143] The semi-legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire. 

[144] The texts of both the above documents can be most convenientlyfound in E. Jung, _Les Puissances devant la Révolte arabe: La Crisemondiale de Demain_, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906). 

[145] A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War isthat of the Moslem publicist "X, " "Les Courants politiques dans le Mondearabe, " _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1913. Also see G. W. Bury, _Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen_ (London, 1915). 

[146] For Arab affairs during the Great War, see E. Jung, "L'Indépendance arabe et la Révolte actuelle, " _La Revue_, 1 August, 1916; I. D. Levine, "Arabs versus Turks, " _American Review of Reviews_, November, 1916; A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien_ (Leipzig, 1918); G. W. Bury, _Pan-Islam_ (London, 1919); S. Mylrea, "ThePolitico-Religious Situation in Arabia, " _The Moslem World_, July, 1919;L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution, " _Asia_, April, May, June, 1920. 

[147] Georg Schweinfurth, _Die Wiedergeburt Ägyptens im Lichte einesaufgeklärten Islam_ (Berlin, 1895). 

[148] Low, _Egypt in Transition_, p. 260 (London, 1914). 

[149] _The Asiatic Review_, April, 1914. 

[150] "L'Égypte et les Débuts du Protectorat, " _Revue des SciencesPolitiques_, 15 June, 1915. 

[151] Mohammed Farid Bey, "L'Égypte et la Guerre, " _Revue PolitiqueInternationale_, May, 1915. 

[152] Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, "Die ägyptische Frage, " _Asien_, November, 1916. 

[153] A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber, _Les Blancsd'Afrique_ (Paris, 1910). 

[154] For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix deSaint-Aymour, _Arabes et Kabyles_ (Paris, 1891); A. Bel, _Coup d'Oeilsur l'Islam en Berbérie_ (Paris, 1917). 

[155] For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, "The EuropeanReconquest of North Africa, " _American Historical Review_, July, 1912. 

[156] For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_ (Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P. Lapie, _Les Civilisations tunisiennes_ (Paris, 1898); P. Millet, "LesJeunes-Algériens, " _Revue de Paris_, 1 November, 1913. 

[157] A good analysis of the pre-revolutionary reformist movements isfound in "X, " "La Situation politique de la Perse, " _Revue du Mondemusulman_, June, 1914. See also Vambéry, _Western Culture in EasternLands_; General Sir T. E. Gordon, "The Reform Movement in Persia, "_Proceedings of the Central Asian Society_, 13 March, 1907. 

[158] See W. Morgan Shuster, _The Strangling of Persia_ (New York, 1912). Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne, _TheRevolution in Persia_ (London, 1910). 

[159] E. G. Browne, "The Present Situation in Persia, " _ContemporaryReview_, November, 1912. 

[160] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, pp. 11-12. 

[161] For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia, "_The Moslem World_, January, 1911; Févret, "Les Tatars de Crimée, "_Revue du Monde musulman_, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, "Les Musulmansrusses, " _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1906; Fr. Von Mackay, "DieErweckung Russlands asiatischen Völkerschaften, " _Deutsche Rundschau_, March, 1918; Arminius Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_; H. Williams, "The Russian Mohammedans, " _Russian Review_, February, 1914;"X, " "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme, " _Revue du Monde musulman_, March, 1913. 

[162] For these activities, see article by "X, " quoted above; also AhmedEmin, _The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press_ (NewYork, 1914). 

[163] For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see myarticle "Pan-Turanism, " _American Political Science Review_, February, 1917. 

[164] See article by "X, " quoted above; also his article "Les Courantspolitiques dans la Turquie contemporaine, " _Revue du Monde musulman_, December, 1912. 

[165] Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in the_Berliner Tageblatt_, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalistactivities and attitudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199--_AManual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. Compiled by theGeographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty_ (London, 1919); E. F. Benson, _Crescent and Iron Cross_(London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka, _The Turks of Central Asia: An Inquiryinto the Pan-Turanian Problem_ (Oxford, 1918); H. Morgenthau, _Ambassador Morgenthau's Story_ (New York, 1918); Dr. Harry Stürmer, _Two War-Years in Constantinople_ (New York, 1917); A. Mandelstam, "TheTurkish Spirit, " _New Europe_, April 22, 1920. 

[166] For Pan-Arab developments, see A. Musil, _Zur Zeitgeschichte vonArabien_ (Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, "Turkey, England, and thePresent Crisis, " _Asiatic Review_, October 1, 1914; A. Servier, _LeNationalisme musulman_; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauisch, "Das Machtgebietder arabischen Sprache, " _Preussische Jahrbücher_, September, 1916. 

[167] Literally "House of Islam. " All non-Moslem lands are collectivelyknown as "Dar-ul-Harb" or "House of War. "

[168] _I. E. _, the organized group of followers of a particularreligion. 

[169] Mohammed Ali, "Le Mouvement musulman dans l'Inde, " _RevuePolitique Internationale_, January, 1914. He headed the so-called"Khilafat Delegation" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 toprotest against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peacetreaties. 

[170] A. Servier, _Le Nationalisme musulman_, p. 181. 

[171] For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali, quoted above, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam au dix-neuvième Siècle_(Paris, 1888); same author, "Politique musulmane, " _Revue du MondeMusulman_, September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam, "_Nineteenth Century and After_, July, 1919; G. Démorgny, _La QuestionPersane_, pp. 23-31 (Paris, 1916); W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Pastand Present, " _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920. 

[172] _Egyptian White Book_: Collection of Official Correspondence ofthe Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919). 

[173] G. Civimini, in the _Corriere della Sera_, December 30, 1919. 

[174] Madame Jehan d'Ivray, "En Égypte, " _Revue de Paris_, September 15, 1920. Madame d'Ivray cites other picturesque incidents of a likecharacter. See also Annexes to _Egyptian White Book_, previously quoted. These Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied byphotographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops. 

[175] Contained in the press statements previously mentioned. 

[176] Sir M. McIlwraith, "Egyptian Nationalism, " _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "The Future in Egypt, " _NewEurope_, November 6, 1919. 

[177] For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting Policies in the East, " _New Europe_, July 1, 1920. 

[178] For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series ofarticles by L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution, "_Asia_, April, May, June, July, 1920. 

[179] A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to theMesopotamian Arabs in March, 1917. 

[180] Article xxii. 

[181] From a speech delivered September 19, 1919. 

[182] For examples of this pre-war imperialist propaganda, see G. Poignant, "Les Intérêts français en Syrie, " _Questions diplomatiques etcoloniales_, March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the authorcites Premier Poincaré's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies, December 21, 1912: "I need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syriaparticularly we have traditional interests and that we intend to makethem respected. " See also J. Atalla, "Les Trois Solutions de la Questionsyrienne, " _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, October 16, 1913; L. Le Fur, _Le Protectorat de la France sur les Catholiques d'Orient_(Paris, 1914). 

[183] Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article "Nos Droits en Syrieet en Palestine, " _Revue Hebdomadaire_, June 5, 1915. For otherexamples of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article, C. G. Bassim, _La Question du Liban_ (Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, "LaSyrie: Champ de Bataille politique, " _La Revue Mondiale_, February 1-15, 1920; Comte Cressaty, _La Syrie française_ (Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, "LaFrance du Levant, " _Revue Hebdomadaire_, March 1, 1919. 

[184] Baudouin, _supra_. For other violent anti-British comment, seeLaudet, _supra_. 

[185] For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, seeBeckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure, " _National Review_, September, 1920; W. Urinowski, "The Arab Cause, " _Balkan Review_, September, 1920. Both of these writers were officers in the Britishforces in the Arab area. See also strong articles by "Taira" in the_Balkan Review_, August and October, 1920. 

[186] For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted. 

[187] B. G. Gaulis in _L'Opinion_, April 24, 1920. 

[188] _Le Populaire_, February 16, 1920. 

[189] For the details of these events, see my article on Persia in _TheCentury_, January, 1920. 

[190] Statement given to the press in August, 1920. 

[191] Henri de Chambon, editor of _La Revue Parlementaire_. Quoted byBeckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure, " _National Review_, September, 1920. 

CHAPTER VI

NATIONALISM IN INDIA

India is a land of paradox. Possessing a fundamental geographical unity, India has never known real political union save that recently imposedexternally by the British "Raj. " Full of warlike stocks, India has neverbeen able to repel invaders. Occupied by many races, these races havenever really fused, but have remained distinct and mutually hostile, sundered by barriers of blood, speech, culture, and creed. Thus India, large and populous as Europe or China, has neither, like China, evolveda generalized national unity; nor, like Europe, has developed aspecialized national diversity; but has remained an amorphous, unstableindeterminate, with tendencies in both directions which were nevercarried to their logical conclusion. 

India's history has been influenced mainly by three great invasions: theAryan invasion, commencing about 1500 B. C. ; the Mohammedan invasion, extending roughly from A. D. 1000 to 1700, and the English invasion, beginning about A. D. 1750 and culminating a century later in a completeconquest which has lasted to the present day. 

The Aryans were a fair-skinned people, unquestionably of the samegeneral stock as ourselves. Pressing down from Central Asia throughthose north-western passes where alone land-access is possible to India, elsewhere impregnably guarded by the mountain wall of the Himalayas, theAryans subdued the dark-skinned Dravidian aborigines, and settled downas masters. This conquest was, however, superficial and partial. Thebulk of the Aryans remained in the north-west, the more adventurousspirits scattering thinly over the rest of the vast peninsula. Even inthe north large areas of hill-country and jungle remained in theexclusive possession of the aborigines, while very few Aryans everpenetrated the south. Over most of India, therefore, the Aryans weremerely a small ruling class superimposed upon a much more numeroussubject population. Fearing to be swallowed up in the Dravidian ocean, the Aryans attempted to preserve their political ascendancy and racialpurity by the institution of "caste, " which has ever since remained thebasis of Indian social life. Caste was originally a "colour line. " Butit was enforced not so much by civil law as by religion. Society wasdivided into three castes: Brahmins, or priests; Kshatriyas, orwarriors; and Sudras, or workers. The Aryans monopolized the two uppercastes, the Sudras being the Dravidian subject population. These casteswere kept apart by a rigorous series of religious taboos. Intermarriage, partaking of food and drink, even physical propinquity, entailedceremonial defilement sometimes inexpiable. Disobedience to these tabooswas punished with the terrible penalty of "outcasting, " whereby theoffender did not merely fall to a lower rank in the caste hierarchy butsank even below the Sudra and became a "Pariah, " or man of no-caste, condemned to the most menial and revolting occupations, and with norights which even the Sudra was bound to respect. Thus Indian societywas governed, not by civil, but by ceremonially religious law; while, conversely, the nascent Indian religion ("Brahminism") became notethical but social in character. 

These things produced the most momentous consequences. As a "colourline, " caste worked very imperfectly. Despite its prohibitions, even theBrahmins became more or less impregnated with Dravidian blood. [192] Butas a social system caste continued to function in ways peculiar toitself. The three original castes gradually subdivided into hundreds andeven thousands of sub-castes. These sub-castes had little or nothing ofthe original racial significance. But they were all just as exclusive asthe primal trio, and the outcome was a shattering of Indian society intoa chaos of rigid social atoms, between which co-operation or evenunderstanding was impossible. The results upon Indian history areobvious. Says a British authority: "The effect of this permanentmaintenance of human types is that the population is heterogeneous tothe last degree. It is no question of rich and poor, of town andcountry, of employer and employed: the differences lie far deeper. Thepopulation of a district or a town is a collection of differentnationalities--almost different species--of mankind that will not eat ordrink or intermarry with one another, and that are governed in the moreimportant affairs of life by committees of their own. It is hardly toomuch to say that by the caste system the inhabitants of India aredifferentiated into over two thousand species, which, in the intimatephysical relations of life, have as little in common as the inmates of azoological garden. "[193]

Obviously, a land socially atomized and politically split into manyprincipalities was destined to fall before the first strong invader. This invader was Islam. The Mohammedans attacked India soon after theirconquest of Persia, but these early attacks were mere border raidswithout lasting significance. The first real Mohammedan invasion wasthat of Mahmud of Ghazni, an Afghan prince, in A. D. 1001. Following theroad taken by the Aryans ages before, Mahmud conquered north-westernIndia, the region known as the Punjab. Islam had thus obtained a firmfoothold in India, and subsequent Moslem leaders spread graduallyeastward until most of northern India was under Moslem rule. Theinvaders had two notable advantages: they were fanatically unitedagainst the despised "Idolaters, " and they drew many converts from thenative population. The very antithesis of Brahminism, Islam, with itsdoctrine that all Believers are brothers, could not fail to attractmultitudes of low-castes and out-castes, who by conversion might rise tothe status of the conquerors. This is the main reason why theMohammedans in India to-day number more than 70, 000, 000--over one-fifthof the total population. These Indian Moslems are descended, not merelyfrom Afghan, Turkish, Arab, and Persian invaders, but even more from themillions of Hindu converts who embraced Islam. 

For many generations the Moslem hold on India was confined to the north. Then, early in the sixteenth century, the great Turko-Mongol leaderBaber entered India and founded the "Mogul" Empire. Baber and hissuccessors overran even the south, and united India politically as ithad never been united before. But even this conquest was superficial. The Brahmins, threatened with destruction, preached a Hindu revival; theMogul dynasty petered out; and at the beginning of the eighteenthcentury the Mogul Empire collapsed, leaving India a welter of warringprincipalities, Mohammedan and Hindu, fighting each other for religion, for politics, or for sheer lust of plunder. 

Out of this anarchy the British rose to power. The British were at firstmerely one of several other European elements--Portuguese, Dutch, andFrench--who established small settlements along the Indian coasts. TheEuropeans never dreamed of conquering India while the Mogul powerendured. In fact, the British connection with India began as a purelytrading venture--the East India Company. But when India collapsed intoanarchy the Europeans were first obliged to acquire local authority toprotect their "factories, " and later were lured into more ambitiousschemes by the impotence of petty rulers. Gradually the British oustedtheir European rivals and established a solid political foothold inIndia. The one stable element in a seething chaos, the Britishinevitably extended their authority. At first they did so reluctantly. The East India Company long remained primarily a trading venture, aimingat dividends rather than dominion. However, it later evolved into a realgovernment with an ambitious policy of annexation. This in turn awakenedthe fears of many Indians and brought on the "Mutiny" of 1857. Themutiny was quelled, the East India Company abolished, and India camedirectly under the British Crown, Queen Victoria being later proclaimedEmpress of India. These events in turn resulted not only in astrengthening of British political authority but also in an increasedpenetration of Western influences of every description. Roads, railways, and canals opened up and unified India as never before; the piercing ofthe Isthmus of Suez facilitated communication with Europe; whileeducation on European lines spread Western ideas. 

Over this rapidly changing India stood the British "Raj"--a system ofgovernment unique in the world's history. It was the government of a fewhundred highly skilled administrative experts backed by a smallprofessional army, ruling a vast agglomeration of subject peoples. Itwas frankly an absolute paternalism, governing as it saw fit, with nomore responsibility to the governed than the native despots whom it haddisplaced. But it governed well. In efficiency, honesty, and sense ofduty, the government of India is probably the best example ofbenevolent absolutism that the world has ever seen. It gave Indiaprofound peace. It played no favourites, holding the scales even betweenrival races, creeds, and castes. Lastly, it made India a real politicalentity--something which India had never been before. For the first timein its history, India was firmly united under one rule--the rule of the_Pax Britannica_. 

Yet the very virtues of British rule sowed the seeds of future trouble. Generations grew up, peacefully united in unprecedentedacquaintanceship, forgetful of past ills, seeing only Europeanshortcomings, and, above all, familiar with Western ideas ofself-government, liberty, and nationality. In India, as elsewhere in theEast, there was bound to arise a growing movement of discontent againstWestern rule--a discontent varying from moderate demands for increasingautonomy to radical demands for immediate independence. 

Down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, organized politicalagitation against the British "Raj" was virtually unknown. Here andthere isolated individuals uttered half-audible protests, but thesevoices found no popular echo. The Indian masses, pre-occupied with theever-present problem of getting a living, accepted passively agovernment no more absolute, and infinitely more efficient, than itspredecessors. Of anything like self-conscious Indian "Nationalism" therewas virtually no trace. 

The first symptom of organized discontent was the formation of the"Indian National Congress" in the year 1885. The very name showed thatthe British Raj, covering all India, was itself evoking among India'sdiverse elements a certain common point of view and aspiration. However, the early congresses were very far from representing Indian publicopinion, in the general sense of the term. On the contrary, thesecongresses represented merely a small class of professional men, journalists, and politicians, all of them trained in Western ideas. TheEuropean methods of education which the British had introduced hadturned out an Indian _intelligentsia_, conversant with the Englishlanguage and saturated with Westernism. 

This new _intelligentsia_, convinced as it was of the value of Westernideals and achievements, could not fail to be dissatisfied with manyaspects of Indian life. In fact, its first efforts were directed, not somuch to politics, as to social and economic reforms like the suppressionof child-marriage, the remarriage of widows, and wider education. But, as time passed, matters of political reform came steadily to the fore. Saturated with English history and political philosophy as they were, the Indian intellectuals felt more and more keenly their total lack ofself-government, and aspired to endow India with those blessings ofliberty so highly prized by their English rulers. Soon a vigorous nativepress developed, preaching the new gospel, welding the intellectualsinto a self-conscious unity, and moulding a genuine public opinion. Bythe close of the nineteenth century the Indian _intelligentsia_ wasfrankly agitating for sweeping political innovations like representativecouncils, increasing control over taxation and the executive, and theopening of the public services to Indians all the way up the scale. 

Down to the closing years of the nineteenth century Indian discontentwas, as already said, confined to a small class of more or lessEuropeanized intellectuals who, despite their assumption of the title, could hardly be termed "Nationalists" in the ordinary sense of the word. With a few exceptions, their goal was neither independence nor theelimination of effective British oversight, but rather the reforming ofIndian life along Western lines, including a growing degree ofself-government under British paramount authority. 

But by the close of the nineteenth century there came a change in thesituation. India, like the rest of the Orient, was stirring to a newspirit of political and racial self-consciousness. True nationalistsymptoms began to appear. Indian scholars delved into their mustychronicles and sacred texts, and proclaimed the glories of India'shistoric past. Reformed Hindu sects like the Arya Somaj lent religioussanctions. The little band of Europeanized intellectuals was joined byother elements, thinking, not in terms of piecemeal reforms on Westernmodels, but of a new India, rejuvenated from its own vital forces, andfree to work out its own destiny in its own way. From the nationalistranks now arose the challenging slogan: "Bandemataram!" ("Hail, Motherland!")[194]

The outstanding feature about this early Indian nationalism was that itwas a distinctively Hindu movement. The Mohammedans regarded it withsuspicion or hostility. And for this they had good reasons. The ideal ofthe new nationalists was Aryan India, the India of the "Golden Age. ""Back to the Vedas!" was a nationalist watchword, and this implied aveneration for the past, including a revival of aggressive Brahminism. An extraordinary change came over the _intelligentsia_. Men who, a fewyears before, had proclaimed the superiority of Western ideas and hadopenly flouted "superstitions" like idol-worship, now denouncedeverything Western and reverently sacrificed to the Hindu gods. The"sacred soil" of India must be purged of the foreigner. [195] But the"foreigner, " as these nationalists conceived him, was not merely theEnglishman; he was the Mohammedan as well. This was stirring up the pastwith a vengeance. For centuries the great Hindu-Mohammedan division hadrun like a chasm athwart India. It had never been closed, but it hadbeen somewhat veiled by the neutral overlordship of the British Raj. Nowthe veil was torn aside, and the Mohammedans saw themselves menaced by arecrudescence of militant Hinduism like that which had shattered theMogul Empire after the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb two hundred yearsbefore. The Mohammedans were not merely alarmed; they were infuriated aswell. Remembering the glories of the Mogul Empire just as the Hindus didthe glories of Aryan India, they considered themselves the rightfullords of the land, and had no mind to fall under the sway of despised"Idolaters. " The Mohammedans had no love for the British, but they hatedthe Hindus, and they saw in the British Raj a bulwark against thepotential menace of hereditary enemies who outnumbered them nearly fiveto one. Thus the Mohammedans denounced Hindu nationalism and proclaimedtheir loyalty to the Raj. To be sure, the Indian Moslems were alsoaffected by the general spirit of unrest which was sweeping over theEast. They too felt a quickened sense of self-consciousness. But, beinga minority in India, their feelings took the form, not of territorial"patriotism, " but of those more diffused sentiments, Pan-Islamism andPan-Islamic nationalism, which we have already discussed. [196]

Early Indian nationalism was not merely Hindu in character; it wasdistinctly "Brahminical" as well. More and more the Brahmins became thedriving-power of the movement, seeking to perpetuate their supremacy inthe India of the morrow as they had enjoyed it in the India of the past. But this aroused apprehension in certain sections of Hindu society. Manylow-castes and Pariahs began to fear that an independent or evenautonomous India might be ruled by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy whichwould deny them the benefits they now enjoyed under British rule. [197]Also, many of the Hindu princes disliked the thought of a theocraticrégime which might reduce them to shadows. [198] Thus the nationalistmovement stood out as an alliance between the Brahmins and theWestern-educated _intelligentsia_, who had pooled their ambitions in aprogramme for jointly ruling India. 

Quickened by this ambition and fired by religious zeal, the nationalistmovement rapidly acquired a fanatical temper characterized by a mysticalabhorrence of everything Western and a ferocious hatred of allEuropeans. The Russo-Japanese War greatly inflamed this spirit, and thevery next year (1905) an act of the Indian Government precipitated thegathering storm. This act was the famous Partition of Bengal. Thepartition was a mere administrative measure, with no political intent. But the nationalists made it a "vital issue, " and about this grievancethey started an intense propaganda that soon filled India with seditiousunrest. The leading spirit in this agitation was Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who has been called "the father of Indian unrest. " Tilak typified thenationalist movement. A Brahmin with an excellent Western education, hewas the sworn foe of English rule and Western civilization. An ablepropagandist, his speeches roused his hearers to frenzy, while hisnewspaper, the _Yugantar_, of Calcutta, preached a campaign of hate, assassination, and rebellion. Tilak's incitements soon produced tangibleresults, numerous riots, "dacoities, " and murders of Englishmen takingplace. And of course the _Yugantar_ was merely one of a large number ofnationalist organs, some printed in the vernacular and others inEnglish, which vied with one another in seditious invective. 

The violence of the nationalist press may be judged by a few quotations. "Revolution, " asserted the _Yugantar_, "is the only way in which aslavish society can save itself. If you cannot prove yourself a man inlife, play the man in death. Foreigners have come and decided how youare to live. But how you are to die depends entirely upon yourself. ""Let preparations be made for a general revolution in every household!The handful of police and soldiers will never be able to withstand thisocean of revolutionists. Revolutionists may be made prisoners and maydie, but thousands of others will spring into their places. Do not beafraid! With the blood of heroes the soil of Hindustan is ever fertile. Do not be downhearted. There is no dearth of heroes. There is no dearthof money; glory awaits you! A single frown (a few bombs) from your eyeshas struck terror into the heart of the foe! The uproar of panic hasfilled the sky. Swim with renewed energy in the ocean of bloodshed!" Theassassination note was vehemently stressed. Said S. Krishnavarma in _TheIndian Sociologist_: "Political assassination is not murder, and therightful employment of physical force connotes 'force used defensivelyagainst force used aggressively. '" "The only subscription required, "stated the _Yugantar_, "is that every reader shall bring the head of aEuropean. " Not even women and children were spared. Commenting on themurder of an English lady and her daughter, the _Yugantar_ exclaimedexultantly: "Many a female demon must be killed in course of time, inorder to extirpate the race of Asuras from the breast of the earth. " Thefanaticism of the men (usually very young men) who committed theseassassinations may be judged by the statement of the murderer of a highEnglish official, Sir Curzon-Wyllie, made shortly before his execution:"I believe that a nation held down by foreign bayonets is in a perpetualstate of war. Since open battle is rendered impossible to a disarmedrace, I attacked by surprise; since guns were denied to me, I drew mypistol and fired. As a Hindu I feel that wrong to my country is aninsult to the gods. Her cause is the cause of Shri Ram; her service isthe service of Shri Krishna. Poor in wealth and intellect, a son likemyself has nothing else to offer the Mother but his own blood, and so Ihave sacrificed the same on Her altar. The only lesson required in Indiaat present is to learn how to die, and the only way to teach it is todie ourselves; therefore I die and glory in my martyrdom. This war willcontinue between England and India so long as the Hindee and Englishraces last, if the present unnatural relation does not cease. "[199]

The government's answer to this campaign of sedition and assassinationwas of course stern repression. The native press was muzzled, theagitators imprisoned or executed, and the hands of the authorities werestrengthened by punitive legislation. In fact, so infuriated was theEuropean community by the murders and outrages committed by thenationalists that many Englishmen urged the withdrawal of such politicalprivileges as did exist, the limiting of Western education, and theestablishment of extreme autocratic rule. These angry counsels were atonce caught up by the nationalists, resulted in fresh outrages, and wereanswered by more punishment and fresh menaces. Thus the extremists onboth sides lashed each other to hotter fury and worsened the situation. For several years India seethed with an unrest which jailings, hangings, and deportations did little to allay. 

Presently, however, things took at least a temporary turn for thebetter. The extremists were, after all, a small minority, and coolheads, both British and Indian, were seeking a way out of the _impasse_. Conservative Indian leaders like Mr. Gokhale condemned terrorism, andbesought their countrymen to seek the realization of their aspirationsby peaceful means. On the other hand, liberal-minded Englishmen, whilerefusing to be stampeded, sought a programme of conciliation. Indianaffairs were then in the hands of the eminent Liberal statesman JohnMorley, and the fruit of his labours was the Indian Councils Act of1909. The act was a distinct departure from the hitherto almostunlimited absolutism of British rule in India. It gave the Indianopposition greatly increased opportunities for advice, criticism, anddebate, and it initiated a restricted scheme of elections to thelegislative bodies which it established. The salutary effect of theseconcessions was soon apparent. The moderate nationalist elements, whilenot wholly satisfied, accepted the act as an earnest of subsequentconcessions and as a proof of British good-will. The terrorism andseditious plottings of the extremists, while not stamped out, were heldin check and driven underground. King George's visit to India in 1911evoked a wave of loyal enthusiasm which swept the peninsula and auguredwell for the future. 

The year 1911 was the high-water mark of this era of appeasementfollowing the storms of 1905-9. The years after 1911 witnessed a gradualrecrudescence of discontent as the first effect of the Councils Act woreoff and the sense of unfulfilled aspiration sharpened the appetite formore. In fact, during these years, Indian nationalism was steadilybroadening its base. In one sense this made for stability, for thenationalist movement ceased to be a small minority of extremists andcame more under the influence of moderate leaders like Mr. Gokhale, whowere content to work for distant goals by evolutionary methods. It did, however, mean an increasing pressure on the government for freshdevolutions of authority. The most noteworthy symptom of nationalistgrowth was the rallying of a certain section of Mohammedan opinion tothe nationalist cause. The Mohammedans had by this time formed their ownorganization, the "All-India Moslem League. " The league was the reverseof nationalist in complexion, having been formed primarily to protectMoslem interests against possible Hindu ascendancy. Nevertheless, astime passed, some Mohammedans, reassured by the friendly attitude andpromises of the Hindu moderates, abandoned the league's anti-Hinduattitude and joined the moderate nationalists, though refraining fromseditious agitation. Indeed, the nationalists presently split into twodistinct groups, moderates and extremists. The extremists, condemned bytheir fellows, kept up a desultory campaign of violence, largelydirected by exiled leaders who from the shelter of foreign countriesincited their followers at home to seditious agitation and violentaction. 

Such was the situation in India on the outbreak of the Great War; asituation by no means free from difficulty, yet far less troubled thanit had been a few years before. Of course, the war produced an increaseof unrest and a certain amount of terrorism. Yet India, as a whole, remained quiet. Throughout the war India contributed men and moneyunstintedly to the imperial cause, and Indian troops figured notably onEuropean, Asiatic, and African battlefields. 

However, though the war-years passed without any serious outbreak ofrevolutionary violence, it must not be thought that the far morewidespread movement for increasing self-government had been eitherquenched or stilled. On the contrary, the war gave this movement freshimpetus. Louder and louder swelled the cry for not merely goodgovernment but government acceptable to Indian patriots becauseresponsible to them. The very fact that India had proved her loyalty tothe Empire and had given generously of her blood and treasure were somany fresh arguments adduced for the grant of a larger measure ofself-direction. Numerous were the memoranda presented to the Britishauthorities by various sections of Indian public opinion. Thesememoranda were an accurate reflection of the different shades of Indiannationalism. The ultimate goal of all was emancipation from Britishtutelage, but they differed widely among themselves as to how and whenthis emancipation was to be attained. The most conservative contentedthemselves with asking for modified self-government under Britishguidance, while the more ambitious asked for the full status of adominion of the British Empire like Australia and Canada. Therevolutionary element naturally held aloof, recognizing that onlyviolence could serve their aim--immediate and unqualified independence. 

Of course even the more moderate nationalist demands implied greatchanges in the existing governmental system and a diminution of Britishcontrol such as the Government of India was not prepared at present toconcede. Nevertheless, the government met these demands by aconciliatory attitude foreshadowing fresh concessions in the nearfuture. In 1916 the Viceroy, Lord Harding, said: "I do not for a momentwish to discountenance self-government for India as a national ideal. Itis a perfectly legitimate aspiration and has the sympathy of allmoderate men, but in the present position of India it is not idealismthat is needed but practical politics. We should do our utmost tograpple with realities, and lightly to raise extravagant hopes andencourage unrealizable demands can only tend to delay and will notaccelerate political progress. I know this is the sentiment of wise andthoughtful Indians. Nobody is more anxious than I am to see the earlyrealization of the legitimate aspirations of India, but I am equallydesirous of avoiding all danger of reaction from the birth ofinstitutions which experience might prove to be premature. "

As a matter of fact, toward the close of 1917, Mr. Montagu, Secretary ofState for India, came out from England with the object of thoroughlycanvassing Indian public opinion on the question of constitutionalreform. For months the problem was carefully weighed, conferences beingheld with the representatives of all races, classes, and creeds. Theresult of these researches was a monumental report signed by Mr. Montaguand by the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and published in July, 1918. 

The report recommended concessions far beyond any which Great Britainhad hitherto made. It frankly envisaged the gift of home rule for India"as soon as possible, " and went on to state that the gift was to beconferred not because of Indian agitation, but because of "the faiththat is in us. " There followed these memorable words: "We believeprofoundly that the time has come when the sheltered existence which wehave given India cannot be prolonged without damage to her nationallife; that we have a richer gift for her people than any that we haveyet bestowed on them; that nationhood within the Empire representssomething better than anything India has hitherto attained; that theplacid, pathetic contentment of the masses is not the soil on which suchIndian nationhood will grow, and that in deliberately disturbing it weare working for her highest good. "

The essence of the report was its recommendation of the principle of"diarchy, " or division of governmental responsibility betweencouncillors nominated by the British executive and ministers chosenfrom elective legislative bodies. This diarchy was to hold for both thecentral and provincial governments. The legislatures were to be electedby a much more extensive franchise than had previously prevailed andwere to have greatly enlarged powers. Previously they had been littlemore than advisory bodies; now they were to become "legislatures" in theWestern sense, though their powers were still limited, many powers, particularly that of the purse, being still "reserved" to the executive. The British executive thus retained ultimate control and had the lastword; thus no true "balance of power" was to exist, the scales beingfrankly weighted in favour of the British Raj. But the report went on tostate that this scheme of government was not intended to be permanent;that it was frankly a transitional measure, a school in which the Indianpeople was to serve its apprenticeship, and that when these firstlessons in self-government had been learned, India would be given athoroughly representative government which would not only initiate andlegislate, but which would also control the executive officials. 

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was exhaustively discussed both in Indiaand in England, and from these frank discussions an excellent idea ofthe Indian problem in all its challenging complexity can be obtained. The nationalists split sharply on the issue, the moderates welcoming thereport and agreeing to give the proposed scheme of government theirloyal co-operation, the extremists condemning the proposals as a snareand a sham. The moderate attitude was stated in a manifesto signed bytheir leaders, headed by the eminent Indian economist Sir Dinshaw Wacha, which stated: "The proposed scheme forms a complicated structure capableof improvement in some particulars, especially at the top, but isnevertheless a progressive measure. The reforms are calculated to makethe provinces of India reach the goal of complete responsiblegovernment. On the whole, the proposals are evolved with greatforesight and conceived in a spirit of genuine sympathy with Indianpolitical aspirations, for which the distinguished authors are entitledto the country's gratitude. " The condemnation of the radicals was voicedby leaders like Mr. Tilak, who urged "standing fast by the IndianNational Congress ideal, " and Mr. Bepin Chander Pal, who asserted: "Itis my deliberate opinion that if the scheme is accepted, the Governmentwill be more powerful and more autocratic than it is to-day. "

Extremely interesting was the protest of the anti-nationalist groups, particularly the Mohammedans and the low-caste Hindus. For it is a factsignificant of the complexity of the Indian problem that many millionsof Indians fear the nationalist movement and look upon the autocracy ofthe British Raj as a shield against nationalist oppression anddiscrimination. The Mohammedans of India are, on the question ofself-government for India, sharply divided among themselves. Themajority still dislike and fear the nationalist movement, owing to its"Hindu" character. A minority, however, as already stated, have ralliedto the nationalist cause. This minority grew greatly in numbers duringthe war-years, their increased friendliness being due not merely todesire for self-government but also to anger at the Allies' policy ofdismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and kindred policies in the Near andMiddle East. [200] The Hindu nationalists were quick to sympathize withthe Mohammedans on these external matters, and the result was acordiality between the two elements never known before. 

The predominance of high-caste Brahmins in the nationalist movementexplains the opposition of many low-caste Hindus to Indian home rule. Sogreat is the low-caste fear of losing their present protection under theBritish Raj and of being subjected to the domination of a high-casteBrahmin oligarchy that in recent years they have formed an associationknown as the "Namasudra, " led by well-known persons like DoctorNair. [201] The Namasudra points out what might happen by citing theBrahminic pressure which occurs even in such political activity asalready exists. For example: in many elections the Brahmins haveterrorized low-caste voters by threatening to "out-caste" all who shouldnot vote the Brahmin ticket, thus making them "Pariahs"--untouchables, with no rights in Hindu society. 

Such protests against home rule from large sections of the Indianpopulation gave pause even to many English students of the problem whohad become convinced of home rule's theoretical desirability. And ofcourse they greatly strengthened the arguments of those numerousEnglishmen, particularly Anglo-Indians, who asserted that India was asyet unfit for self-government. Said one of these objectors in _The RoundTable_: "The masses care not one whit for politics; Home Rule they donot understand. They prefer the English District Magistrate. They onlyask to remain in eternal and bovine quiescence. They feel confidence inthe Englishman because he has always shown himself the 'Protector of thePoor, ' and because he is neither Hindu nor Mussulman, and has areputation for honesty. " And Lord Sydenham, in a detailed criticism ofthe Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, stated: "There are many defects in oursystem of government in India. Reforms are needed; but they must bebased solely upon considerations of the welfare of the masses of Indiaas a whole. If the policy of 'deliberately' disturbing their'contentment' which the Viceroy and the Secretary of State haveannounced is carried out; if, through the 'whispering galleries of theEast, ' the word is passed that the only authority that can maintain lawand order and secure the gradual building-up of an Indian nation isweakening; if, as is proposed, the great public services areemasculated; then the fierce old animosities will break out afresh, and, assisted by a recrudescence of the reactionary forces of Brahminism, they will within a few years bring to nought the noblest work which theBritish race has ever accomplished. "[202]

Yet other English authorities on Indian affairs asserted that theMontagu-Chelmsford proposals were sound and must be enacted into law ifthe gravest perils were to be averted. Such were the opinions of menlike Lionel Curtis[203] and Sir Valentine Chirol, who stated: "It is ofthe utmost importance that there should be no unnecessary delay. We havehad object-lessons enough as to the danger of procrastination, and inIndia as elsewhere time is on the side of the troublemakers. . . . Wecannot hope to reconcile Indian Extremism. What we can hope to do is tofree from its insidious influence all that is best in Indian public lifeby opening up a larger field of useful activity. "[204]

As a matter of fact, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was accepted as thebasis of discussion by the British Parliament, and at the close of theyear 1919 its recommendations were formally embodied in law. Unfortunately, during the eighteen months which elapsed between thepublication of the report and its legal enactment, the situation inIndia had darkened. Militant unrest had again raised its head, and Indiawas more disturbed than it had been since 1909. 

For this there were several reasons. In the first place, all thosenationalist elements who were dissatisfied with the report begancoquetting with the revolutionary irreconcilables and encouraging themto fresh terrorism, perhaps in the hope of stampeding the BritishParliament into wider concessions than the report had contemplated. Butthere were other causes of a more general nature. The year 1918 was ablack one for India. The world-wide influenza epidemic hit Indiaparticularly hard, millions of persons being carried off by the grimplague. Furthermore, India was cursed with drought, the crops failed, and the spectre of famine stalked through the land. The year 1919 saw aneven worse drought, involving an almost record famine. By the latesummer it was estimated that millions of persons had died of hunger, with millions more on the verge of starvation. And on top of all came anAfghan war, throwing the north-west border into tumult and furtherunsettling the already restless Mohammedan element. 

The upshot was a wave of unrest revealing itself in an epidemic ofriots, terrorism, and seditious activity which gave the Britishauthorities serious concern. So critical appeared the situation that aspecial commission was appointed to investigate conditions, and thereport handed in by its chairman, Justice Rowlatt, painted a depressingpicture of the strength of revolutionary unrest. The report stated thatnot only had a considerable number of young men of the educated upperclasses become involved in the promotion of anarchical movements, butthat the ranks were filled with men belonging to other social orders, including the military, and that there was clear evidence of successfultampering with the loyalty of the native troops. To combat this growingdisaffection, the Rowlatt committee recommended fresh repressivelegislation. 

Impressed with the gravity of the committee's report, the Government ofIndia formulated a project of law officially known as the Anarchical andRevolutionary Crimes Act, though generally known as the Rowlatt Bill. Byits provisions the authorities were endowed with greatly increasedpowers, such as the right to search premises and arrest persons on meresuspicion of seditious activity, without definite evidence of the same. 

The Rowlatt Bill at once aroused bitter nationalist opposition. Notmerely extremists, but many moderates, condemned it as a backward stepand as a provoker of fresh trouble. When the bill came up for debate inthe Indian legislative body, the Imperial Legislative Council, all thenative members save one opposed it, and the bill was finally passed onstrictly racial lines by the votes of the appointed English majority. However, the government considered the bill an absolute pre-requisite tothe successful maintenance of order, and it was passed into law in thespring of 1919. 

This brought matters to a head. The nationalists, stigmatizing theRowlatt law as the "Black Cobra Act, " were unmeasured in theircondemnation. The extremists engineered a campaign of militant protestand decreed the date of the bill's enactment, April 6, 1919, as anational "Humiliation Day. " On that day monster mass-meetings were held, at which nationalist orators made seditious speeches and inflamed thepassions of the multitude. "Humiliation Day" was in fact the beginningof the worst wave of unrest since the mutiny. For the next three monthsa veritable epidemic of rioting and terrorism swept India, particularlythe northern provinces. Officials were assassinated, English civilianswere murdered, and there was wholesale destruction of property. At somemoments it looked as though India were on the verge of revolution andanarchy. 

However, the government stood firm. Violence was countered with sternrepression. Riotous mobs were mowed down wholesale by rifle andmachine-gun fire or were scattered by bombs dropped from low-flyingaeroplanes. The most noted of these occurrences was the so-called"Amritsar Massacre, " where British troops fired into a seditiousmass-meeting, killing 500 and wounding 1500 persons. In the end thegovernment mastered the situation. Order was restored, the seditiousleaders were swept into custody, and the revolutionary agitation wasonce more driven underground. The enactment of the Montagu-Chelmsfordreform bill by the British Parliament toward the close of the year didmuch to relax the tension and assuage discontent, though the situationof India was still far from normal. The deplorable events of the earlierpart of 1919 had roused animosities which were by no means allayed. Therevolutionary elements, though driven underground, were more bitter anduncompromising than ever, while opponents of home rule were confirmed intheir conviction that India could not be trusted and that any relaxationof autocracy must spell anarchy. 

This was obviously not the best mental atmosphere in which to apply thecompromises of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. In fact, the extremistswere determined that they should not be given a fair trial, regardingthe reforms as a snare which must be avoided at all costs. Recognizingthat armed rebellion was still impossible, at least for the present, theextremists evolved the idea known as "non-co-operation. " This was, infact, a gigantic boycott of everything British. Not merely were the newvoters urged to stay away from the polls and thus elect no members tothe proposed legislative bodies, but lawyers and litigants were to avoidthe courts, taxpayers refuse to pay imposts, workmen to go on strike, shopkeepers to refuse to buy or sell British-made goods, and even pupilsto leave the schools and colleges. This wholesale "out-casting" ofeverything British would make the English in India a new sort ofPariah--"untouchables"; the British Government and the British communityin India would be left in absolute isolation, and the Raj, renderedunworkable, would have to capitulate to the extremist demands forcomplete self-government. 

Such was the non-co-operation idea. And the idea soon found an ableexponent: a certain M. K. Gandhi, who had long possessed a reputationfor personal sanctity and thus inspired the Hindu masses with thatpeculiar religious fervour which certain types of Indian ascetics havealways known how to arouse. Gandhi's propaganda can be judged by thefollowing extract from one of his speeches: "It is as amazing as it ishumiliating that less than 100, 000 white men should be able to rule315, 000, 000 Indians. They do so somewhat, undoubtedly, by force, butmore by securing our co-operation in a thousand ways and making us moreand more helpless and dependent on them, as time goes forward. Let usnot mistake reformed councils (legislatures), more law-courts, and evengovernorships for real freedom or power. They are but subtler methods ofemasculation. The British cannot rule us by mere force. And so theyresort to all means, honourable and dishonourable, in order to retaintheir hold on India. They want India's billions and they want India'sman-power for their imperialistic greed. If we refuse to supply themwith men and money, we achieve our goal: namely, _Swaraj_, [205]equality, manliness. "

The extreme hopes of the non-co-operation movement have not beenrealized. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms have been put in operation, andthe first elections under them were held at the beginning of 1921. Butthe outlook is far from bright. The very light vote cast at theelections revealed the effect of the non-co-operation movement, whichshowed itself in countless other ways, from strikes in factories tostrikes of school-children. India to-day is in a turmoil of unrest. Andthis unrest is not merely political; it is social as well. The vasteconomic changes which have been going on in India for the pasthalf-century have profoundly disorganized Indian society. These changeswill be discussed in later chapters. The point to be here noted is thatthe extremist leaders are capitalizing social discontent and areunquestionably in touch with Bolshevik Russia. Meanwhile the olderfactors of disturbance are by no means eliminated. The recent atrociousmassacre of dissident Sikh pilgrims by orthodox Sikh fanatics, and thethree-cornered riots between Hindus, Mohammedans, and native Christianswhich broke out about the same time in southern India, reveal the hiddenfires of religious and racial fanaticism that smoulder beneath thesurface of Indian life. 

The truth of the matter is that India is to-day a battle-ground betweenthe forces of evolutionary and revolutionary change. It is an anxiousand a troubled time. The old order is obviously passing, and the neworder is not yet fairly in sight. The hour is big with possibilities ofboth good and evil, and no one can confidently predict the outcome. 

FOOTNOTES:

[192] According to some historians, this race-mixture occurred almost atonce. The theory is that the Aryan conquerors, who outside thenorth-western region had very few of their own women with them, tookDravidian women as wives or concubines, and legitimatized theirhalf-breed children, the offspring of the conquerors, both pure-bloodsand mixed-bloods, coalescing into a closed caste. Further infiltrationof Dravidian blood was thus prevented, but Aryan race-purity had beendestroyed. 

[193] Sir Bampfylde Fuller, _Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment_, p. 40 (London, 1910). For other discussions of caste and its effects, seeW. Archer, _India and the Future_ (London, 1918); Sir V. Chirol, _IndianUnrest_ (London, 1910); Rev. J. Morrison, _New Ideas in India: A Studyof Social, Political and Religious Developments_ (Edinburgh, 1906); SirH. Risley, _The People of India_ (London, 1908); also writings of the"Namasudra" leader, Dr. Nair, previously quoted, and S. Nihal Singh, "India's Untouchables, " _Contemporary Review_, March, 1913. 

[194] For the nationalist movement, see Archer, Chirol, and Morrison, _supra_. Also Sir H. J. S. Cotton, _India in Transition_ (London, 1904);J. N. Farquhar, _Modern Religious Movements in India_ (New York, 1915);Sir W. W. Hunter, _The India of the Queen and Other Essays_ (London, 1903); W. S. Lilly, _India and Its Problems_ (London, 1902); Sir V. Lovett, _A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement_ (London, 1920);J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_ (London, 1920); Sir T. Morison, _Imperial Rule in India_ (London, 1899); J. D. Rees, _The RealIndia_ (London, 1908); Sir J. Strachey, _India: Its Administration andProgress_ (Fourth Edition--London, 1911); K. Vyasa Rao, _The FutureGovernment of India_ (London, 1918). 

[195] I have already discussed this "Golden Age" tendency in ChapterIII. For more or less Extremist Indian view-points, see A. Coomaraswamy, _The Dance of Siva_ (New York, 1918); H. Maitra, _Hinduism: TheWorld-Ideal_ (London, 1916); Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind theUnrest in India, " _Contemporary Review_, February, 1910; also variouswritings of Lajpat Rai, especially _The Arya Samaj_ (London, 1915) and_Young India_ (New York, 1916). 

[196] For Indian Mohammedan points of view, mostly anti-Hindu, see H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_ (London, 1918); S. Khuda Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_ (London, 1912); Sir Syed Ahmed, _ThePresent State of Indian Politics_ (Allahabad, 1888); Syed Sirdar AliKhan, _The Unrest in India_ (Bombay, 1907); also his _India of To-day_(Bombay, 1908). 

[197] This attitude of the "Depressed Classes, " especially as revealedin the "Namasudra Association, " has already been discussed in ChapterIII, and will be further touched upon later in this present chapter. 

[198] Regarding the Indian native princes, see Archer and Chirol, _supra_. Also J. Pollen, "Native States and Indian Home Rule, " _AsiaticReview_, January 1, 1917; The Maharajah of Bobbili, _Advice to theIndian Aristocracy_ (Madras, 1905); articles by Sir D. Barr and Sir F. Younghusband in _The Empire and the Century_ (London, 1905). 

[199] A good symposium of extremist comment is contained in Chirol, _supra_. Also see J. D. Rees, _The Real India_ (London, 1908); series ofextremist articles in _The Open Court_, March, 1917. A good sample ofextremist literature is the fairly well-known pamphlet _India's"Loyalty" to England_ (1915). 

[200] Discussed in the preceding chapter. 

[201] Quoted in Chapter IV. 

[202] Lord Sydenham, "India, " _Contemporary Review_, November, 1918. Forsimilar criticisms of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, see G. M. Chesney, _India under Experiment_ (London, 1918); "The First Stagetowards Indian Anarchy, " _Spectator_, December 20, 1919. 

[203] Lionel Curtis, _Letters to the People of India on ResponsibleGovernment_, already quoted at the end of Chapter IV. 

[204] Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail, " _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1918. 

[205] _I. E. _, self-government, in the extremist sense--practicallyindependence. 

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIC CHANGE

One of the most interesting phenomena of modern world-history is thetwofold conquest of the East by the West. The word "conquest" is usuallyemployed in a political sense, and calls up visions of embattled armiessubduing foreign lands and lording it over distant peoples. Suchpolitical conquests in the Orient did of course occur, and we havealready seen how, during the past century, the decrepit states of theNear and Middle East fell an easy prey to the armed might of theEuropean Powers. 

But what is not so generally realized is the fact that this politicalconquest was paralleled by an economic conquest perhaps even morecomplete and probably destined to produce changes of an even moreprofound and enduring character. 

The root-cause of this economic conquest was the Industrial Revolution. Just as the voyages of Columbus and Da Gama gave Europe the strategicmastery of the ocean and thereby the political mastery of the world, sothe technical inventions of the later eighteenth century whichinaugurated the Industrial Revolution gave Europe the economic masteryof the world. These inventions in fact heralded a new Age of Discovery, this time into the realms of science. The results were, if possible, more momentous even than those of the age of geographical discoverythree centuries before. They gave our race such increased mastery overthe resources of nature that the ensuing transformation of economic lifeswiftly and utterly transformed the face of things. 

This transformation was, indeed, unprecedented in the world's history. Hitherto man's material progress had been a gradual evolution. With theexception of gunpowder, he had tapped no new sources of material energysince very ancient times. The horse-drawn mail-coach of ourgreat-grandfathers was merely a logical elaboration of the horse-drawnEgyptian chariot; the wind-driven clipper-ship traced its line unbrokento Ulysses's lateen bark before Troy; while industry still relied on thebrawn of man and beast or upon the simple action of wind and waterfall. Suddenly all was changed. Steam, electricity, petrol, the Hertzian wave, harnessed nature's hidden powers, conquered distance, and shrunk theterrestrial globe to the measure of human hands. Man entered a newmaterial world, differing not merely in degree but in kind from that ofprevious generations. 

When I say "Man, " I mean, so far as the nineteenth century wasconcerned, the white man of Europe and its racial settlements overseas. It was the white man's brain which had conceived all this, and it wasthe white man alone who at first reaped the benefits. The twooutstanding features of the new order were the rise of machine-industrywith its incalculable acceleration of mass-production, and thecorrelative development of cheap and rapid transportation. Both thesefactors favoured a prodigious increase in economic power and wealth inEurope, since Europe became the workshop of the world. In fact, duringthe nineteenth century, Europe was transformed from a semi-ruralcontinent into a swarming hive of industry, gorged with goods, capital, and men, pouring forth its wares to the remotest corners of the earth, and drawing thence fresh stores of raw material for new fabrication andexchange. 

Such was the industrially revolutionized West which confronted an Eastas backward and stagnant in economics as it was in politics and the artof war. In fact, the East was virtually devoid of either industry orbusiness, as we understand these terms to-day. Economically, the Eastwas on an agricultural basis, the economic unit being theself-supporting, semi-isolated village. Oriental "industries" werehandicrafts, carried on by relatively small numbers of artisans, usuallyworking by and for themselves. Their products, while often exquisite inquality, were largely luxuries, and were always produced by such slow, antiquated methods that their quantity was limited and their marketprice relatively high. Despite very low wages, therefore, Asiaticproducts not only could not compete in the world-market with Europeanand American machine-made, mass-produced articles, but were hard hit intheir home-markets as well. 

This Oriental inability to compete with Western industry arose notmerely from methods of production but also from other factors such asthe mentality of the workers and the scarcity of capital. Throughout theNear and Middle East economic life rested on the principle of status. The Western economic principles of contract and competition werevirtually unknown. Agriculturalists and artisans followed blindly in thefootsteps of their fathers. There was no competition, no stimulus forimprovement, no change in customary wages, no desire for a better andmore comfortable living. The industries were stereotyped; the apprenticemerely imitated his master, and rarely thought of introducing newimplements or new methods of manufacture. Instead of working for profitand advancement, men followed an hereditary "calling, " usually hallowedby religious sanctions, handed down from father to son through manygenerations, each calling possessing its own unchanging ideals, itszealously guarded craft-secrets. 

The few bolder, more enterprising spirits who might have ventured tobreak the iron bands of custom and tradition were estopped by lack ofcapital. Fluid "investment" capital, easily mobilized and ready to pourinto an enterprise of demonstrable utility and profit, simply did notexist. To the Oriental, whether prince or peasant, money was regarded, not as a source of profit or a medium of exchange, but as a store ofvalue, to be hoarded intact against a "rainy day. " The East has beenknown for ages as a "sink of the precious metals. " In India alone, thevalue of the gold, silver, and jewels hidden in strong-boxes, buried inthe earth, or hanging about the necks of women must run into billions. Says a recent writer on India: "I had the privilege of being takenthrough the treasure-vaults of one of the wealthiest Maharajahs. I couldhave plunged my arm to the shoulder in great silver caskets filled withdiamonds, pearls, emeralds, rubies. The walls were studded with hooksand on each pair of hooks rested gold bars three to four feet long andtwo inches across. I stood by a great cask of diamonds, and picking up ahandful let them drop slowly from between my fingers, sparkling andglistening like drops of water in sunlight. There are some seven hundrednative states, and the rulers of every one has his treasure-vaults on amore or less elaborate scale. Besides these, every zamindar and everyIndian of high or low degree who can save anything, wants to have it byhim in actual metal; he distrusts this new-fangled paper currency thatthey try to pass off on him. Sometimes he beats his coins into banglesfor his wives, and sometimes he hides money behind a loose brick orunder a flat stone in the bottom of the oven, or he goes out and digs alittle hole and buries it. "[206]

Remember that this description is of present-day India, after more thana century of British rule and notwithstanding a permeation of Westernideas which, as we shall presently see, has produced momentousmodifications in the native point of view. Remember also that thishoarding propensity is not peculiar to India but is shared by the entireOrient. We can then realize the utter lack of capital for investmentpurposes in the East of a hundred years ago, especially when we rememberthat political insecurity and religious prohibitions of the lending ofmoney at interest stood in the way of such far-sighted individuals asmight have been inclined to employ their hoarded wealth for productivepurposes. There was, indeed, one outlet for financial activity--usury, and therein virtually all the scant fluid capital of the old Orient wasemployed. But such capital, lent not for productive enterprise, but forluxury, profligacy, or incompetence, was a destructive rather than acreative force and merely intensified the prejudice against capital ofany kind. 

Such was the economic life of the Orient a hundred years ago. It isobvious that this archaic order was utterly unable to face thetremendous competition of the industrialized West. Everywhere the floodof cheap Western machine-made, mass-produced goods began invadingEastern lands, driving the native wares before them. The way in which anancient Oriental handicraft like the Indian textiles was literallyannihilated by the destructive competition of Lancashire cottons is onlyone of many similar instances. To be sure, some Oriental writers contendthat this triumph of Western manufactures was due to political ratherthan economic reasons, and Indian nationalists cite British governmentalactivity in favour of the Lancashire cottons above mentioned as the solecause for the destruction of the Indian textile handicrafts. But sucharguments appear to be fallacious. British official action may havehastened the triumph of British industry in India, but that triumph wasinevitable in the long run. The best proof is the way in which thetextile crafts of independent Oriental countries like Turkey and Persiawere similarly ruined by Western competition. 

A further proof is the undoubted fact that Oriental peoples, taken as awhole, have bought Western-manufactured products in preference to theirown hand-made wares. To many Westerners this has been a mystery. Suchpersons cannot understand how the Orientals could buy the cheap, shoddyproducts of the West, manufactured especially for the Eastern market, inpreference to their native wares of better quality and vastly greaterbeauty. The answer, however, is that the average Oriental is not an artconnoisseur but a poor man living perilously close to the margin ofstarvation. He not only wants but must buy things cheap, and the wideprice-margin is the deciding factor. Of course there is also the elementof novelty. Besides goods which merely replace articles he has alwaysused, the West has introduced many new articles whose utility or charmare irresistible. I have already mentioned the way in which thesewing-machine and the kerosene-lamp have swept the Orient from end toend, and there are many other instances of a similar nature. Thepermeation of Western industry has, in fact, profoundly modified everyphase of Oriental economic life. New economic wants have been created;standards of living have been raised; canons of taste have been altered. Says a lifelong American student of the Orient: "The knowledge of moderninventions and of other foods and articles has created new wants. TheChinese peasant is no longer content to burn bean-oil; he wantskerosene. The desire of the Asiatic to possess foreign lamps is equalledonly by his passion for foreign clocks. The ambitious Syrian scorns themud roof of his ancestors, and will be satisfied only with the brightred tiles imported from France. Everywhere articles of foreignmanufacture are in demand. . . . Knowledge increases wants, and theOriental is acquiring knowledge. He demands a hundred things to-day thathis grandfather never heard of. "[207]

Everywhere it is the same story. An Indian economic writer, though abitter enemy of Western industrialism, bemoans the fact that "theartisans are losing their occupations and are turning to agriculture. The cheap kerosene-oil from Baku or New York threatens the oilman's[208]existence. Brass and copper which have been used for vessels from timeimmemorial are threatened by cheap enamelled ironware imported fromEurope. . . . There is also, _pari passu_, a transformation of the tastesof the consumers. They abandon _gur_ for crystal sugar. Home-wovencloths are now replaced by manufactured cloths for being too coarse. Alllocal industries are attacked and many have been destroyed. Villagesthat for centuries followed customary practices are brought into contactwith the world's markets all on a sudden. For steamships and railwayswhich have established the connection have been built in so short aninterval as hardly to allow breathing-time to the village whichslumbered so long under the dominion of custom. Thus the suddenintroduction of competition into an economic unit which had from timeimmemorial followed custom has wrought a mighty change. "[209]

This "mighty change" was due not merely to the influx of Western goodsbut also to an equally momentous influx of Western capital. Theopportunities for profitable investment were so numerous that Westerncapital soon poured in streams into Eastern lands. Virtually devoid offluid capital of its own, the Orient was bound to have recourse toWestern capital for the initiation of all economic activity in themodern sense. Railways, mines, large-scale agriculture of the"plantation" type, and many other undertakings thus came into being. Most notable of all was the founding of numerous manufacturingestablishments from North Africa to China and the consequent growth ofgenuine "factory towns" where the whir of machinery and the smoke oftall chimneys proclaimed that the East was adopting the industrial lifeof the West. 

The momentous social consequences of this industrialization of theOrient will be treated in subsequent chapters. In the present chapter wewill confine ourselves to a consideration of its economic side. Furthermore, this book, limited as it is to the Near and Middle East, cannot deal with industrial developments in China and Japan. The readershould, however, always bear in mind Far Eastern developments, which, inthe main, run parallel to those which we shall here discuss. 

These industrial innovations were at first pure Western transplantingsset in Eastern soil. Initiated by Western capital, they were whollycontrolled and managed by Western brains. Western capital could notventure to entrust itself to Orientals, with their lack of the modernindustrial spirit, their habits of "squeeze" and nepotism, their lustfor quick returns, and their incapacity for sustained businessteam-play. As time passed, however, the success of Western undertakingsso impressed Orientals that the more forward-looking among them wereready to risk their money and to acquire the technique necessary forsuccess. At the close of Chapter II, I described the development ofmodern business types in the Moslem world, and the same is true of thenon-Moslem populations of India. In India there were several elementssuch as the Parsis and the Hindu "banyas, " or money-lenders, whoseprevious activities in commerce or usury predisposed them to financialand industrial activity in the modern sense. From their ranks havechiefly sprung the present-day native business communities of India, exemplified by the jute and textile factories of Calcutta and Bombay, and the great Tata iron-works of Bengal--undertakings financed by nativecapital and wholly under native control. Of course, beside thesesuccesses there have been many lamentable failures. Nevertheless, thereseems to be no doubt that Western industrialism is ceasing to be anexotic and is rooting itself firmly in Eastern soil. [210]

The combined result of Western and Eastern enterprise has been, asalready stated, the rise of important industrial centres at variouspoints in the Orient. In Egypt a French writer remarks: "Both banks ofthe Nile are lined with factories, sugar-refineries and cotton-mills, whose belching chimneys tower above the mud huts of the fellahs. "[211]And Sir Theodore Morison says of India: "In the city of Bombay theindustrial revolution has already been accomplished. Bombay is a modernmanufacturing city, where both the dark and the bright side of modernindustrialism strike the eye. Bombay has insanitary slums whereovercrowding is as great an evil as in any European city; she has aproletariat which works long hours amid the din and whir of machinery;she also has her millionaires, whose princely charities have adorned herstreets with beautiful buildings. Signs of lavish wealth and, let meadd, culture and taste in Bombay astonish the visitor from the inlanddistricts. The brown villages and never-ending fields with which he hashitherto been familiar are the India which is passing away; Bombay isthe presage of the future. "[212]

The juxtaposition of vast natural resources and a limitless supply ofcheap labour has encouraged the most ambitious hopes in Oriental minds. Some Orientals look to a combination of Western money and Easternman-power, expressed by an Indian economic writer in the formula:"English money and Indian labour are the two cheapest things in theworld. "[213] Others more ambitiously dream of industrializing the Eastentirely by native effort, to the exclusion and even to the detrimentof the West. This view was well set forth some years ago by a Hindu, whowrote in a leading Indian periodical:[214] "In one sense the Orient isreally menacing the West, and so earnest and open-minded is Asia that nopretence or apology whatever is made about it. The Easterner has throwndown the industrial gauntlet, and from now on Asia is destined towitness a progressively intense trade warfare, the Occidental scramblingto retain his hold on the markets of the East, and the Orientalendeavouring to beat him in a battle in which heretofore he has been aneasy victor. . . . In competing with the Occidental commercialists, theOriental has awakened to a dynamic realization of the futility ofpitting unimproved machinery and methods against modern methods andappliances. Casting aside his former sense of self-complacency, he isstudying the sciences and arts that have given the West its materialprosperity. He is putting the results of his investigations to practicaluse, as a rule, recasting the Occidental methods to suit his peculiarneeds, and in some instances improving upon them. "

This statement of the spirit of the Orient's industrial awakening isconfirmed by many white observers. At the very moment when the abovearticle was penned, an American economic writer was making a study tourof the Orient, of which he reported: "The real cause of Asia's povertylies in just two things: the failure of Asiatic governments to educatetheir people, and the failure of the people to increase their productivecapacity by the use of machinery. Ignorance and lack of machinery areresponsible for Asia's poverty; knowledge and modern tools areresponsible for America's prosperity. " But, continues this writer, wemust watch out. Asia now realizes these facts and is doing much to remedythe situation. Hence, "we must face in ever-increasing degree the rivalryof awakening peoples who are strong with the strength that comes fromstruggle with poverty and hardship, and who have set themselves to masterand apply all our secrets in the coming world-struggle for industrialsupremacy and for racial readjustment. "[215] Another American observer ofAsiatic economic conditions reports: "All Asia is being permeated withmodern industry and present-day mechanical progress. "[216] And SirTheodore Morison concludes regarding India's economic future: "India'sindustrial transformation is near at hand; the obstacles which havehitherto prevented the adoption of modern methods of manufacture havebeen removed; means of transport have been spread over the face of thewhole country, capital for the purchase of machinery and erection offactories may now be borrowed on easy terms; mechanics, engineers, andbusiness managers may be hired from Europe to train the future captainsof Indian industry; in English a common language has been found in whichto transact business with all the provinces of India and with a greatpart of the Western world; security from foreign invasion and internalcommotion justifies the inception of large enterprises. All theconditions are favourable for a great reorganization of industry which, when successfully accomplished, will bring about an increase hithertoundreamed of in India's annual output of wealth. "[217]

The factor usually relied upon to overcome the Orient's handicaps ofinexperience and inexpertness in industrialism is its cheap labour. ToWestern observers the low wages and long hours of Eastern industry areliterally astounding. Take Egypt and India as examples of industrialconditions in the Near and Middle East. Writing of Egypt in 1908, theEnglish economist H. N. Brailsford says: "There was then no Factory Actin Egypt. There are all over the country ginning-mills, which employcasual labour to prepare raw cotton for export during four or fivemonths of the year. The wages were low, from 7-1/2_d. _ to 10_d. _ (15 to20 cents) a day for an adult, and 6_d. _ (12 cents) for a child. Childrenand adults alike worked sometimes for twelve, usually for fifteen, andon occasion even for sixteen or eighteen hours a day. In the height ofthe season even the children were put on night shifts of twelvehours. "[218]

In India conditions are about the same. The first thorough investigationof Indian industry was made in 1907 by a factory labour commission, andthe following are some of the data published in its report: In thecotton-mills of Bombay the hours regularly worked ran from thirteen tofourteen hours. In the jute-mills of Calcutta the operatives usuallyworked fifteen hours. Cotton-ginning factories required their employeesto work seventeen and eighteen hours a day, rice and flour mills twentyto twenty-two hours, and an extreme case was found in a printing workswhere the men had to work twenty-two hours a day for seven consecutivedays. As to wages, an adult male operative, working from thirteen tofifteen hours a day, received from 15 to 20 rupees a month ($5 to$6. 35). Child labour was very prevalent, children six and seven yearsold working "half-time"--in many cases eight hours a day. As a result ofthis report legislation was passed by the Indian Government betteringworking conditions somewhat, especially for women and children. But in1914 the French economist Albert Métin, after a careful study, reportedfactory conditions not greatly changed, the Factory Acts systematicallyevaded, hours very long, and wages extremely low. In Bombay men wereearning from 10 cents to 20 cents per day, the highest wages being 30cents. For women and children the maximum was 10 cents per day. [219]

With such extraordinarily low wages and long hours of labour it might atfirst sight seem as though, given adequate capital and up-to-datemachinery, the Orient could not only drive Occidental products fromEastern markets but might invade Western markets as well. This, indeed, has been the fear of many Western writers. Nearly three-quarters of acentury ago Gobineau prophesied an industrial invasion of Europe fromAsia, [220] and of late years economists like H. N. Brailsford havewarned against an emigration of Western capital to the tempting lure offactory conditions in Eastern lands. [221] Nevertheless, so far as theNear and Middle East is concerned, nothing like this has as yetmaterialized. China, to be sure, may yet have unpleasant surprises instore for the West, [222] but neither the Moslem world nor India havedeveloped factory labour with the skill, stamina, and assiduitysufficient to undercut the industrial workers of Europe and America. InIndia, for example, despite a swarming and poverty-stricken population, the factories are unable to recruit an adequate or dependablelabour-supply. Says M. Métin: "With such long hours and low wages itmight be thought that Indian industry would be a formidable competitorof the West. This is not so. The reason is the bad quality of the work. The poorly paid coolies are so badly fed and so weak that it takes atleast three of them to do the work of one European. Also, the Indianworkers lack not only strength but also skill, attention, and liking fortheir work. . . . An Indian of the people will do anything else inpreference to becoming a factory operative. The factories thus get onlythe dregs of the working class. The workers come to the factories andmines as a last resort; they leave as soon as they can return to theirprior occupations or find a more remunerative employment. Thus thefactories can never count on a regular labour-supply. Would higher wagesremedy this? Many employers say no--as soon as the workers got a littleahead they would quit, either temporarily till their money was spent, orpermanently for some more congenial calling. "[223] These statements arefully confirmed by an Indian economic writer, who says: "One of thegreatest drawbacks to the establishment of large industries in India isthe scarcity and inefficiency of labour. Cheap labour, where there is nophysical stamina, mental discipline, and skill behind it, tends to becostly in the end. The Indian labourer is mostly uneducated. He is notin touch with his employers or with his work. The labouring populationof the towns is a flitting, dilettante population. "[224]

Thus Indian industry, despite its very considerable growth, has not comeup to early expectations. As the official Year-Book very frankly states:"India, in short, is a country rich in raw materials and in industrialpossibilities, but poor in manufacturing accomplishments. "[225] In fact, to some observers, India's industrial future seems far from bright. As acompetent English student of Indian conditions recently wrote: "Someyears ago it seemed possible that India might, by a rapid assimilationof Western knowledge and technical skill, adapt for her own conditionsthe methods of modern industry, and so reach an approximate economiclevel. Some even now threaten the Western world with a vision of thevast populations of China and India rising up with skilled organization, vast resources, and comparatively cheap labour to impoverish the West. To the present writer this is a mere bogey. The peril is of a verydifferent kind. Instead of a growing approximation, he sees a growingdisparity. For every step India takes toward mechanical efficiency, theWest takes two. When India is beginning to use bicycles and motor-cars(not to make them), the West is perfecting the aeroplane. That is merelysymbolic. The war, as we know, has speeded up mechanical invention andproduced a population of mechanics; but India has stood comparativelystill. It is, up to now, overwhelmingly mediæval, a country of domesticindustry and handicrafts. Mechanical power, even of the simplest, hasnot yet been applied to its chief industry--agriculture. Yet the periodof age-long isolation is over, and India can never go back to it;nevertheless, the gap between East and West is widening. What is to bethe outcome for her 300 millions? We are in danger in the East of seeingthe worst evils of commercialism developed on an enormous scale, withthe vast population of India the victims--of seeing the East become aworld slum. "[226]

Whether or not this pessimistic outlook is justified, certain it is thatnot merely India but the entire Orient is in a stage of profoundtransition; and transition periods are always painful times. We havebeen considering the new industrial proletariat of the towns. But theolder social classes are affected in very similar fashion. The old-typehandicraftsman and small merchant are obviously menaced by modernindustrial and business methods, and the peasant masses are in littlebetter shape. It is not merely a change in technique but a fundamentaldifference in outlook on life that is involved. The life of the oldOrient, while there was much want and hardship, was an easygoing life, with virtually no thought of such matters as time, efficiency, output, and "turnover. " The merchant sat cross-legged in his little booth amidhis small stock of wares, passively waiting for trade, chafferinginterminably with his customers, annoyed rather than pleased if briskbusiness came his way. The artisan usually worked by and for himself, keeping his own hours and knocking off whenever he chose. The peasantarose with the dawn, but around noon he and his animals lay down for along nap and slept until, in the cool of afternoon, they awoke, stretched themselves, and, comfortably and casually, went to work again. 

To such people the speed, system, and discipline of our economic lifeare painfully repugnant, and adaptation can at best be effected onlyvery slowly and under the compulsion of the direst necessity. Meanwhilethey suffer from the competition of those better equipped in theeconomic battle. Sir William Ramsay paints a striking picture of the wayin which the Turkish population of Asia Minor, from landlords andmerchants to simple peasants, have been going down-hill for the lasthalf-century under the economic pressure not merely of Westerners but ofthe native Christian elements, Armenians and Greeks, who had partiallyassimilated Western business ideas and methods. Under the old state ofthings, he says, there was in Asia Minor "no economic progress and nomercantile development; things went on in the old fashion, year afteryear. Such simple business as was carried on was inconsistent with thehighly developed Western business system and Western civilization; butit was not oppressive to the people. There were no large fortunes; therewas no opportunity for making a great fortune; it was impossible for oneman to force into his service the minds and the work of a large numberof people, and so to create a great organization out of which he mightmake big profits. There was a very large number of small men doingbusiness on a small scale. "[227] Sir William Ramsay then goes on todescribe the shattering of this archaic economic life by modern businessmethods, to the consequent impoverishment of all classes of theunadaptable Turkish population. 

How the agricultural classes, peasants and landlords alike, aresuffering from changing economic conditions is well exemplified by therecent history of India. Says the French writer Chailley, anauthoritative student of Indian problems: "For the last half-centurylarge fractions of the agricultural classes are being entirely despoiledof their lands or reduced to onerous tenancies. On the other hand, newclasses are rising and taking their place. . . . Both ryots andzamindars[228] are involved. The old-type nobility has not advanced withthe times. It remains idle and prodigal, while the peasant proprietors, burdened by the traditions of many centuries, are likewise improvidentand ignorant. On the other hand, the economic conditions of BritishIndia are producing capitalists who seek employment for their wealth. Aconflict between them and the old landholders was predestined, and theresult was inevitable. Wealth goes to the cleverest, and the land mustpass into the hands of new masters, to the great indignation of theagricultural classes, a portion of whom will be reduced to the positionof farm-labourers. "[229]

The Hindu economist Mukerjee thus depicts the disintegration and decayof the Indian village: "New economic ideas have now begun to influencethe minds of the villagers. Some are compelled to leave theiroccupations on account of foreign competition, but more are leavingtheir hereditary occupations of their own accord. The Brahmins go to thecities to seek government posts or professional careers. The middleclasses also leave their villages and get scattered all over the countryto earn a living. The peasants also leave their ancestral acres and forma class of landless agricultural labourers. The villages, drained oftheir best blood, stagnate and decay. The movement from the village tothe city is in fact not only working a complete revolution in thehabits and ideals of our people, but its economic consequences are farmore serious than are ordinarily supposed. It has made our middleclasses helplessly subservient to employment and service, and has alsokilled the independence of our peasant proprietors. It has jeopardizedour food-supply, and is fraught with the gravest peril not only to ourhandicrafts but also to our national industry--agriculture. "[230]

Happily there are signs that, in Indian agriculture at least, thetransition period is working itself out and that conditions may soon beon the mend. Both the British Government and the native princes havevied with one another in spreading Western agricultural ideas andmethods, and since the Indian peasant has proved much more receptivethan has the Indian artisan, a more intelligent type of farmer isdeveloping, better able to keep step with the times. A good instance isthe growth of rural co-operative credit societies. First introduced bythe British Government in 1904, there were in 1915 more than 17, 000 suchassociations, with a total of 825, 000 members and a working capital ofnearly $30, 000, 000. These agricultural societies make loans for thepurchase of stock, fodder, seed, manure, sinking of wells, purchase ofWestern agricultural machinery, and, in emergencies, personalmaintenance. In the districts where they have established themselvesthey have greatly diminished the plague of usury practised by the"banyas, " or village money-lenders, lowering the rate of interest fromits former crushing range of 20 to 75 per cent. To a range averagingfrom 9 to 18 per cent. Of course such phenomena are as yet merelyexceptions to a very dreary rule. Nevertheless, they all point toward abrighter morrow. [231]

But this brighter agricultural morrow is obviously far off, and inindustry it seems to be farther still. Meanwhile the changing Orient isfull of suffering and discontent. What wonder that many Orientalsascribe their troubles, not to the process of economic transition, butto the political control of European governments and the economicexploitation of Western capital. The result is agitation foremancipation from Western economic as well as Western political control. At the end of Chapter II we examined the movement among the Mohammedanpeoples known as "Economic Pan-Islamism. " A similar movement has arisenamong the Hindus of India--the so-called "Swadeshi" movement. TheSwadeshists declare that India's economic ills are almost entirely dueto the "drain" of India's wealth to England and other Western lands. They therefore advocate a boycott of English goods until Britain grantsIndia self-government, whereupon they propose to erect protectivetariffs for Indian products, curb the activities of British capital, replace high-salaried English officials by natives, and thereby keepIndia's wealth at home. [232]

An analysis of these Swadeshist arguments, however, reveals them asinadequate to account for India's ills, which are due far more to thegeneral economic trend of the times than to any specific defects of theBritish connection. British governance and British capital do costmoney, but their undoubted efficiency in producing peace, order, security, and development must be considered as offsets to the highercosts which native rule and native capital would impose. As Sir TheodoreMorison well says: "The advantages which the British Navy and Britishcredit confer on India are a liberal offset to her expenditure onpensions and gratuities to her English servants. . . . India derives apecuniary advantage from her connection with the British Empire. Theanswer, then, which I give to the question 'What economic equivalentdoes India get for foreign payments?' is this: India gets the equipmentof modern industry, and she gets an administration favourable toeconomic evolution cheaper than she could provide it herself. "[233] Acomparison with Japan's much more costly defence budgets, inferiorcredit, and higher interest charges on both public and private loans isenlightening on this point. 

In fact, some Indians themselves admit the fallacy of Swadeshistarguments. As one of them remarks: "The so-called economic 'drain' isnonsense. Most of the misery of late years is due to the rising cost ofliving--a world-wide phenomenon. " And in proof of this he citesconditions in other Oriental countries, especially Japan. [234] As warm afriend of the Indian people as the British labour leader, RamsayMacdonald, states: "One thing is quite evident, a tariff will notre-establish the old hand-industry of India nor help to revive villagehandicrafts. Factory and machine production, native to India itself, will throttle them as effectively as that of Lancashire and Birminghamhas done in the past. "[235]

Even more trenchant are the criticisms formulated by the Hindu writerPramatha Nath Bose. [236] The "drain, " says Mr. Bose, is ruining India. But would the Home Rule programme, as envisaged by most Swadeshists, cure India's economic ills? Under Home Rule these people would do thefollowing things: (1) Substitute Englishmen for Indians in theAdministration; (2) levy protective duties on Indian products; (3) grantState encouragement to Indian industries; (4) disseminate technicaleducation. Now, how would these matters work out? The substitution ofIndian for British officials would not lessen the "drain" as much asmost Home Rulers think. The high-placed Indian officials who alreadyexist have acquired European standards of living, so the new officialcorps would cost almost as much as the old. Also, "the influence of theexample set by the well-to-do Indian officials would permeate Indiansociety more largely than at present, and the demand for Westernarticles would rise in proportion. So commercial exploitation byforeigners would not only continue almost as if they were Europeans, butmight even increase. " As to a protective tariff, it would attractEuropean capital to India which would exploit labour and skim theprofits. India has shown relatively little capacity for indigenousindustrial development. Of course, even at low wages, many Indians mightbenefit, yet such persons would form only a tithe of the millions nowstarving--besides the fact that this industrialization would bring inmany new social evils. As to State encouragement of industries, thiswould bring in Western capital even more than a protective tariff, withthe results already stated. As for technical education, it is a worthyproject, but, says Mr. Bose, "I am afraid the movement is too late, now. Within the last thirty years the Westerners and the Japanese have goneso far ahead of us industrially that it has been yearly becoming moreand more difficult to compete with them. "

In fact, Mr. Bose goes on to criticize the whole system of Westerneducation, as applied to India. Neither higher nor lower education haveproven panaceas. "Higher education has led to the material prosperityof a small section of our community, comprising a few thousands ofwell-to-do lawyers, doctors, and State servants. But their occupationsbeing of a more or less unproductive or parasitic character, theirwell-being does not solve the problem of the improvement of India as awhole. On the contrary, as their taste for imported articles develops inproportion to their prosperity, they help to swell rather than diminishthe economic drain from the country which is one of the chief causes ofour impoverishment. " Neither has elementary education "on the wholefurthered the well-being of the multitude. It has not enabled thecultivators to 'grow two blades where one grew before. ' On the contrary, it has distinctly diminished their efficiency by inculcating in theliterate proletariat, who constitute the cream of their class, a strongdistaste for their hereditary mode of living and their hereditarycallings, and an equally strong taste for shoddy superfluities andbrummagem fineries, and for occupations of a more or less parasiticcharacter. They have, directly or indirectly, accelerated rather thanretarded the decadence of indigenous industries, and have thus helped toaggravate their own economic difficulties and those of the entirecommunity. What they want is more food--and New India vies with theGovernment in giving them what is called 'education' that does notincrease their food-earning capacity, but on the contrary fosters inthem tastes and habits which make them despise indigenous products andrender them fit subjects for the exploitation of scheming capitalists, mostly foreign. Political and economic causes could not have led to theextinction of indigenous industry if they had not been aided by changeof taste fostered by the Western environment of which the so-called'education' is a powerful factor. "

From all this Mr. Bose concludes that none of the reforms advocated bythe Home Rulers would cure India's ills. "In fact, the chances are, shewould be more inextricably entangled in the toils of Westerncivilization, without any adequate compensating advantage, and the gripof the West would close on her to crush her more effectively. "Therefore, according to Mr. Bose, the only thing for India to do is toturn her back on everything Western and plunge resolutely into thetraditional past. As he expresses it: "India's salvation lies, not inthe region of politics, but outside it; not in aspiring to be one of the'great' nations of the present day, but in retiring to her humbleposition--a position, to my mind, of solitary grandeur and glory; not ingoing forward on the path of Western civilization, but in going backfrom it so far as practicable; not in getting more and more entangled inthe silken meshes of its finely knit, widespread net, but in escapingfrom it as far as possible. "

Such are the drastic conclusions of Mr. Bose; conclusions shared to acertain extent by other Indian idealists like Rabindranath Tagore. Butsurely such projects, however idealistic, are the vainest fantasies. Whole peoples cannot arbitrarily cut themselves off from the rest of theworld, like isolated individuals forswearing society and setting up asanchorites in the jungle. The time for "hermit nations" has passed, especially for a vast country like India, set at the cross-roads of theEast, open to the sea, and already profoundly penetrated by Westernideas. 

Nevertheless, such criticisms, appealing as they do to the strong strainof asceticism latent in the Indian nature, have affected many Indianswho, while unable to concur in the conclusions, still try to evolve a"middle term, " retaining everything congenial in the old system andgrafting on a select set of Western innovations. Accordingly, thesepersons have elaborated programmes for a "new order" built on a blend ofHindu mysticism, caste, Western industry, and socialism. [237]

Now these schemes are highly ingenious. But they are not convincing. Their authors should remember the old adage that you cannot eat yourcake and have it too. When we realize the abysmal antithesis between theeconomic systems of the old East and the modern West, any attempt tocombine the most congenial points of both while eschewing their defectsseems an attempt to reconcile irreconcilables and about as profitable astrying to square the circle. As Lowes Dickinson wisely observes:"Civilization is a whole. Its art, its religion, its way of life, allhang together with its economic and technical development. I doubtwhether a nation can pick and choose; whether, for instance, the Eastcan say, 'We will take from the West its battleships, its factories, itsmedical science; we will not take its social confusion, its hurry andfatigue, its ugliness, its over-emphasis on activity. '. . . So I expectthe East to follow us, whether it like it or no, into all theseexcesses, and to go right through, not round, all that we have beenthrough on its way to a higher phase of civilization. "[238]

This seems to be substantially true. Judged by the overwhelming body ofevidence, the East, in its contemporary process of transformation, willfollow the West--avoiding some of our more patent mistakes, perhaps, but, in the main, proceeding along similar lines. And, as alreadystated, this transformation is modifying every phase of Eastern life. Wehave already examined the process at work in the religious, political, and economic phases. To the social phase let us now turn. 

FOOTNOTES:

[206] F. B. Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, p. 53 (New York, 1920). 

[207] Rev. A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia, " _The Century_, March, 1904. 

[208] _I. E. _ the purveyor of the native vegetable-oils. 

[209] R. Mukerjee, _The Foundations of Indian Economics_, p. 5 (London, 1916). 

[210] On these points, see Fisher, _op. Cit. _; Sir T. Morison, _TheEconomic Transition in India_ (London, 1911); Sir Valentine Chirol, _Indian Unrest_ (London, 1910); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition inIndia, " _Economic Journal_, December, 1910; J. P. Jones, "The PresentSituation in India, " _Journal of Race Development_, July, 1910. 

[211] L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp. 20-21 (Paris, 1910). 

[212] Sir T. Morison, _The Economic Transition in India_, p. 181. 

[213] Quoted by Jones, _supra_. 

[214] _The Indian Review_ (Madras), 1910. 

[215] Clarence Poe, "What the Orient can Teach Us, " _World's Work_, July, 1911. 

[216] C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of the Orient_, p. 5 (New York, 1914). 

[217] Morison, _op. Cit. _, p. 242. 

[218] H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, p. 114 (London, 1915). 

[219] A. Métin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Étude sociale_, p. 336 (Paris, 1918). 

[220] In his book, _Trois Ans en Perse_ (Paris, 1858). 

[221] Brailsford, _op. Cit. _, pp. 83, 114-115. 

[222] Regarding conditions in China, especially the extraordinarydiscipline and working ability of the Chinaman, see my _Rising Tide ofColour against White World-Supremacy_, pp. 28-30, 243-251. 

[223] Métin, _op. Cit. _, p. 337. 

[224] A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour in India_, p. 183 (London, 1907). 

[225] "India in the Years 1917-1918" (official publication--Calcutta). 

[226] Young and Ferrers, _India in Conflict_, pp. 15-17 (London, 1920). 

[227] Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia, " _QuarterlyReview_, January, 1918. 

[228] _I. E. _ peasants and landlords. 

[229] J. Chailley _Administrative Problems of British India_, p. 339(London, 1910--English translation). 

[230] Mukerjee, _op. Cit. _, p. 9. 

[231] On the co-operative movement in India, see Fisher, _India's SilentRevolution_, pp. 54-58; R. B. Ewebank, "The Co-operative Movement inIndia, " _Quarterly Review_, April, 1916. India's economic problems, bothagricultural and industrial, have been carefully studied by a largenumber of Indian economists, some of whose writings are extremelyinteresting. Some of the most noteworthy books, besides those ofMukerjee and Yusuf Ali, already quoted, are: Dadabhai Naoroji, _Povertyand Un-British Rule in India_ (London, 1901); Romesh Dutt, _The EconomicHistory of India in the Victorian Age_ (London, 1906); H. H. Gosh, _TheAdvancement of Industry_ (Calcutta, 1910); P. C. Ray, _The PovertyProblem in India_ (Calcutta, 1895); M. G. Ranade, _Essays on IndianEconomics_ (Madras, 1920); Jadunath Sarkar, _Economics of British India_(Calcutta, 1911). 

[232] The best compendium of Swadeshist opinion is the volume containingpronouncements from all the Swadeshi leaders, entitled, _The SwadeshiMovement: A Symposium_ (Madras, 1910). See also writings of theeconomists Gosh, Mukerjee, Ray, and Sarkar, above quoted, as well as thevarious writings of the nationalist agitator Lajpat Rai. A good summaryinterpretation is found in M. Glotz, "Le Mouvement 'Swadeshi' dansl'Inde, " _Revue du Mois_, July, 1913. 

[233] Sir T. Morison, _The Economic Transition in India_, pp. 240-241. Also see Sir Valentine Chirol, _Indian Unrest_, pp. 255-279; WilliamArcher, _India and the Future_, pp. 131-157. 

[234] Syed Sirdar Ali Khan, _India of To-day_, p. 19 (Bombay, 1908). 

[235] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, p. 133 (London, 1920). 

[236] In _The Hindustan Review_ (Calcutta), 1917. 

[237] Good examples are found in the writings of Mukerjee and LajpatRai, already quoted. 

[238] G. Lowes Dickinson, _An Essay on the Civilizations of India, China, and Japan_, pp. 84-85 (London, 1914). 

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL CHANGE

The momentous nature of the contemporary transformation of the Orient isnowhere better attested than by the changes effected in the lives of itspeoples. That dynamic influence of the West which is modifyinggovernmental forms, political concepts, religious beliefs, and economicprocesses is proving equally potent in the range of social phenomena. Inthe third chapter of this volume we attempted a general survey ofWestern influence along all the above lines. In the present chapter weshall attempt a detailed consideration of the social changes which areto-day taking place. 

These social changes are very great, albeit many of them may not be soapparent as the changes in other fields. So firm is the hold of customand tradition on individual, family, and group life in the Orient thatsuperficial observers of the East are prone to assert that these mattersare still substantially unaltered, however pronounced may have been thechanges on the external, material side. Yet such is not the opinion ofthe closest students of the Orient, and it is most emphatically not theopinion of Orientals themselves. These generally stress the profoundsocial changes which are going on. 

And it is their judgments which seem to be the more correct. To say thatthe East is advancing "materially" but standing still "socially" is toignore the elemental truth that social systems are altered quite as muchby material things as by abstract ideas. Who that looks below thesurface can deny the social, moral, and civilizing power of railroads, post-offices, and telegraph lines? Does it mean nothing socially as wellas materially that the East is adopting from the West a myriadinnovations, weighty and trivial, important and frivolous, useful andbaneful? Does it mean nothing socially as well as materially that theProphet's tomb at Medina is lit by electricity and that picturepost-cards are sold outside the Holy Kaaba at Mecca? It may seem meregrotesque piquancy that the muezzin should ride to the mosque in atram-car, or that the Moslem business man should emerge from his harem, read his morning paper, motor to an office equipped with a prayer-rug, and turn from his devotions to dictaphone and telephone. Yet why assumethat his life is moulded by mosque, harem, and prayer-rug, and yet denythe things of the West a commensurate share in the shaping of his socialexistence? Now add to these tangible innovations intangible noveltieslike scientific education, Occidental amusements, and the partialemancipation of women, and we begin to get some idea of the depth andscope of the social transformation which is going on. 

In those parts of the Orient most open to Western influences this socialtransformation has attained notable proportions for more than ageneration. When the Hungarian Orientalist Vambéry returned toConstantinople in 1896 after forty years' absence, he stood amazed atthe changes which had taken place, albeit Constantinople was thensubjected to the worst repression of the Hamidian régime. "I had, " hewrites, "continually to ask myself this question: Is it possible thatthese are my Turks of 1856; and how can all these transformations havetaken place? I was astonished at the aspect of the city; at the stonebuildings which had replaced the old wooden ones; at the animation ofthe streets, in which carriages and tram-cars abounded, whereas fortyyears before only saddle-animals were used; and when the strident shriekof the locomotive mingled with the melancholy calls from the minarets, all that I saw and heard seemed to me a living protest against the oldadage: 'La bidaat fil Islam'--'There is nothing to reform in Islam. ' Myastonishment became still greater when I entered the houses and was ableto appreciate the people, not only by their exteriors but still more bytheir manner of thought. The effendi class[239] of Constantinople seemedto me completely transformed in its conduct, outlook, and attitudetoward foreigners. "[240]

Vambéry stresses the inward as well as outward evolution of the Turkisheducated classes, for he says: "Not only in his outward aspect, but alsoin his home-life, the present-day Turk shows a strong inclination to themanners and habits of the West, in such varied matters as furniture, table-manners, sex-relations, and so forth. This is of the very greatestsignificance. For a people may, to be sure, assimilate foreigninfluences in the intellectual field, if it be persuaded of theirutility and advantage; but it gives up with more difficulty customs andhabits which are in the blood. One cannot over-estimate the numeroussacrifices which, despite everything, the Turks have made in this line. I find all Turkish society, even the Mollahs, [241] penetrated with thenecessity of a union with Western civilization. Opinions may differ asto the method of assimilation: some wish to impress on the foreigncivilization a national character; others, on the contrary, arepartisans of our intellectual culture, such as it is, and reprobate anykind of modification. "[242]

Most significant of all, Vambéry found even the secluded women of theharems, "those bulwarks of obscurantism, " notably changed. "Yes, Irepeat, the life of women in Turkey seems to me to have been radicallytransformed in the last forty years, and it cannot be denied that thistransformation has been produced by internal conviction as much as byexternal pressure. " Noting the spread of female education, and theincreasing share of women in reform movements, Vambéry remarks: "This isof vital importance, for when women shall begin to act in the family asa factor of modern progress, real reforms, in society as well as in thestate, cannot fail to appear. "[243]

In India a similar permeation of social life by Westernism is depictedby the Moslem liberal, S. Khuda Bukhsh, albeit Mr. Bukhsh, being aninsider, lays greater emphasis upon the painful aspects of theinevitable transition process from old to new. He is not undulypessimistic, for he recognizes that "the age of transition isnecessarily to a certain extent an age of laxity of morals, indifferenceto religion, superficial culture, and gossiping levity. These arepassing ills which time itself will cure. " Nevertheless, he does notminimize the critical aspects of the present situation, which impliesnothing less than the breakdown of the old social system. "The clearestresult of this breakdown of our old system of domestic life and socialcustoms under the assault of European ideas, " he says, "is to be foundin two directions--in our religious beliefs and in our social life. Theold system, with all its faults, had many redeeming virtues. " To-daythis old system, narrow-minded but God-fearing, has been replaced by a"strange independence of thought and action. Reverence for age, respectfor our elders, deference to the opinions of others, are fastdisappearing. . . . Under the older system the head of the family was thesole guide and friend of its members. His word had the force of law. Hewas, so to speak, the custodian of the honour and prestige of thefamily. From this exalted position he is now dislodged, and the mostjunior member now claims equality with him. "[244]

Mr. Bukhsh deplores the current wave of extravagance, due to thewholesale adoption of European customs and modes of living. "What, " heasks, "has happened here in India? We have adopted European costume, European ways of living, even the European vices of drinking andgambling, but none of their virtues. This must be remedied. We mustlearn at the feet of Europe, but not at the sacrifice of our Easternindividuality. But this is precisely what we have not done. We havedabbled a little in English and European history, and we have commencedto despise our religion, our literature, our history, our traditions. Wehave unlearned the lessons of our history and our civilization, and intheir place we have secured nothing solid and substantial to holdsociety fast in the midst of endless changes. " In fine: "Destruction hasdone its work, but the work of construction has not yet begun. "[245]

Like Vambéry, Bukhsh lays strong emphasis on the increasing emancipationof women. No longer regarded as mere "child-bearing machines, " theMohammedan women of India "are getting educated day by day, and nowassert their rights. Though the purdah system[246] still prevails, it isno longer that severe, stringent, and unreasonable seclusion of womenwhich existed fifty years ago. It is gradually relaxing, and women aregetting, step by step, rights and liberties which must in course of timeend in the complete emancipation of Eastern womanhood. Forty years agowomen meekly submitted to neglect, indifference, and even harshtreatment from their husbands, but such is the case no longer. "[247]

These two descriptions of social conditions in the Near and Middle Eastrespectively enable one to get a fair idea of the process of changewhich is going on. Of course it must not be forgotten that both writersdeal primarily with the educated upper classes of the large towns. Nevertheless, the leaven is working steadily downward, and with everydecade is affecting wider strata of the native populations. 

The spread of Western education in the East during the past few decadeshas been truly astonishing, because it is the exact antithesis of theOriental educational system. The traditional "education" of the entireOrient, from Morocco to China, was a mere memorizing of sacred textscombined with exercises of religious devotion. The Mohammedan or Hindustudent spent long years reciting to his master (a "holy man")interminable passages from books which, being written in classic Arabicor Sanskrit, were unintelligible to him, so that he usually did notunderstand a word of what he was saying. No more deadening system forthe intellect could possibly have been devised. Every part of the brainexcept the memory atrophied, and the wonder is that any intellectualinitiative or original thinking ever appeared. 

Even to-day the old system persists, and millions of young Orientals arestill wasting their time at this mind-petrifying nonsense. But alongsidethe old there has arisen a new system, running the whole educationalgamut from kindergartens to universities, where Oriental youth is beingeducated along Western lines. These new-type educational establishmentsare of every kind. Besides schools and universities giving a liberaleducation and fitting students for government service or theprofessions, there are numerous technical schools turning out skilledagriculturists or engineers, while good normal schools assure a supplyof teachers qualified to instruct coming student-generations. Bothpublic and private effort furthers Western education in the East. Allthe European governments have favoured Western education in the landsunder their control, particularly the British in India and Egypt, whilevarious Christian missionary bodies have covered the East with anetwork of schools and colleges. Also many Oriental governments likeTurkey and the native states of India have made sincere efforts tospread Western education among their peoples. [248]

Of course, as in any new development, the results so far obtained arefar from ideal. The vicious traditions of the past handicap or partiallypervert the efforts of the present. Eastern students are prone to usetheir memories rather than their intellects, and seek to cram their wayquickly through examinations to coveted posts rather than acquireknowledge and thus really fit themselves for their careers. The resultis that many fail, and these unfortunates, half-educated and spoiled forany sort of useful occupation, vegetate miserably, come to hate thatWesternism which they do not understand, and give themselves up toanarchistic revolutionary agitation. Sir Alfred Lyall well describes thedark side of Western education in the East when he says of India:"Ignorance is unquestionably the root of many evils; and it was naturalthat in the last century certain philosophers should have assumededucation to be a certain cure for human delusions; and that statesmenlike Macaulay should have declared education to be the best and surestremedy for political discontent and for law-breaking. In any case, itwas the clear and imperative duty of the British Government to attemptthe intellectual emancipation of India as the best justification ofBritish rule. We have since discovered by experience, that, althougheducation is a sovereign remedy for many ills--is indeed indispensableto healthy progress--yet an indiscriminate or superficial administrationof this potent medicine may engender other disorders. It acts upon theframe of an antique society as a powerful dissolvent, heating weakbrains, stimulating rash ambitions, raising inordinate expectations ofwhich the disappointment is bitterly resented. "[249]

Indeed, some Western observers of the Orient, particularly colonialofficials, have been so much impressed by the political and socialdangers arising from the existence of this "literate proletariat" ofsemi-educated failures that they are tempted to condemn the wholeventure of Western education in the East as a mistake. Lord Cromer, forexample, was decidedly sceptical of the worth of the Western-educatedEgyptian, [250] while a prominent Anglo-Indian official names as thechief cause of Indian unrest, "the system of education, which weourselves introduced--advisedly so far as the limited vision went ofthose responsible; blindly in view of the inevitable consequences. "[251]

Yet these pessimistic judgments do not seem to make due allowance forthe inescapable evils attendant on any transition stage. Other observersof the Orient have made due allowance for this factor. Vambéry, forinstance, notes the high percentage of honest and capable nativeofficials in the British Indian and French North African civil service(the bulk of these officials, of course, Western-educated men), andconcludes: "Strictly conservative Orientals, and also fanaticallyinclined Europeans, think that with the entrance of our culture theprimitive virtues of the Asiatics have been destroyed, and that theuncivilized Oriental was more faithful, more honest, and more reliablethan the Asiatic educated on European principles. This is a gross error. It may be true of the half-educated, but not of the Asiatic in whosecase the intellectual evolution is founded on the solid basis of athorough, systematic education. "[252]

And, whatever may be the ills attendant upon Western education in theEast, is it not the only practicable course to pursue? The impact ofWesternism upon the Orient is too ubiquitous to be confined to books. Granting, therefore, for the sake of argument, that colonial governmentscould have prevented Western education in the formal sense, would notthe Oriental have learned in other ways? Surely it is better that heshould learn through good texts under the supervision of qualifiedteachers, rather than tortuously in perverted--and moredangerous--fashion. 

The importance of Western education in the East is nowhere betterillustrated than in the effects it is producing in ameliorating thestatus of women. The depressed condition of women throughout the Orientis too well known to need elaboration. Bad enough in Mohammedancountries, it is perhaps at its worst among the Hindus of India, withchild-marriage, the virtual enslavement of widows (burned alive tillprohibited by English law), and a seclusion more strict even than thatof the "harem" of Moslem lands. As an English writer well puts it:"'Ladies first, ' we say in the West; in the East it is 'ladies last. 'That sums up succinctly the difference in the domestic ideas of the twocivilizations. "[253]

Under these circumstances it might seem as though no breath of the Westcould yet have reached these jealously secluded creatures. Yet, as amatter of fact, Western influences have already profoundly affected thewomen of the upper classes, and female education, while far behind thatof the males, has attained considerable proportions. In the moreadvanced parts of the Orient like Constantinople, Cairo, and the citiesof India, distinctly "modern" types of women have appeared, theself-supporting, self-respecting--and respected--woman school-teacherbeing especially in evidence. 

The social consequences of this rising status of women, not only towomen themselves but also to the community at large, are very important. In the East the harem is, as Vambéry well says, the "bulwark ofobscurantism. "[254] Ignorant and fanatical herself, the harem womanimplants her ignorance and fanaticism in her sons as well as in herdaughters. What could be a worse handicap for the Eastern "intellectual"than his boyhood years spent "behind the veil"? No wonder thatenlightened Oriental fathers have been in the habit of sending theirboys to school at the earliest possible age in order to get them as soonas possible out of the stultifying atmosphere of harem life. Yet eventhis has proved merely a palliative. Childhood impressions are ever themost lasting, and so long as one-half of the Orient remained untouchedby progressive influences Oriental progress had to be begun again _denovo_ with every succeeding generation. 

The increasing number of enlightened Oriental women is remedying thisfatal defect. As a Western writer well says: "Give the mothers educationand the whole situation is transformed. Girls who are learning otherthings than the unintelligible phrases of the Koran are certain toimpart such knowledge, as daughters, sisters, and mothers, to theirrespective households. Women who learn housewifery, methods of moderncooking, sewing, and sanitation in the domestic-economy schools, arebound to cast about the home upon their return the atmosphere of acivilized community. The old-time picture of the Oriental woman spendingher hours upon divans, eating sweetmeats, and indulging in petty anddegrading gossip with the servants, or with women as ignorant asherself, will be changed. The new woman will be a companion rather thana slave or a toy of her husband. Marriage will advance from the stage ofa paltry trade in bodies to something like a real union, involvingrespect towards the woman by both sons and fathers, while in a new prideof relationship the woman herself will be discovered. "[255]

These men and women of the newer Orient reflect their changing ideas intheir changing standards of living. Although this is most evident amongthe wealthier elements of the towns, it is perceptible in all classes ofthe population. Rich and poor, urban and rural, the Orientals arealtering their living standards towards those of the West. And thisinvolves social changes of the most far-reaching character, because fewantitheses could be sharper than the living conditions prevailingrespectively in the traditional East and in the modern Western world. This basic difference lies, not in wealth (the East, like the West, knows great riches as well as great poverty), but rather in_comfort_--using the word in its broad sense. The wealthy Oriental ofthe old school spends most of his money on Oriental luxuries, like fineraiment, jewels, women, horses, and a great retinue of attendants, andthen hoards the rest. But of "comfort, " in the Western sense, he knowsvirtually nothing, and it is safe to say that he lives under domesticconditions which a Western artisan would despise. [256]

To-day, however, the Oriental is discovering "comfort. " And, high orlow, he likes it very well. All the myriad things which make our liveseasier and more agreeable--lamps, electric light, sewing-machines, clocks, whisky, umbrellas, sanitary plumbing, and a thousand others: allthese things, which to us are more or less matters of course, are to theOriental so many delightful discoveries, of irresistible appeal. Hewants them, and he gets them in ever-increasing quantities. But thisproduces some rather serious complications. His private economy is moreor less thrown out of gear. This opening of a whole vista of new wantsmeans a portentous rise in his standard of living. And where is he goingto find the money to pay for it? If he be poor, he has to skimp on hisbare necessities. If he be rich, he hates to forgo his traditionalluxuries. The upshot is a universal growth of extravagance. And, in thisconnection, it is well to bear in mind that the peoples of the Near andMiddle East, taken as a whole, have never been really thrifty. Poor themasses may have been, and thus obliged to live frugally, but they havealways proved themselves "good spenders" when opportunity offers. Theway in which a Turkish peasant or a Hindu ryot will squander his savingsand run into debt over festivals, marriages, funerals, and other socialevents is astounding to Western observers. [257] Now add to all this thefact that in the Orient, as in the rest of the world, the cost of thebasic necessaries of life--food, clothing, fuel, and shelter, has risengreatly during the past two decades, and we can realize the gravity ofthe problem which higher Oriental living-standards involves. [258]

Certain it is that the struggle for existence is growing keener and thatthe pressure of poverty is getting more severe. With the basicnecessaries rising in price, and with many things considered necessitieswhich were considered luxuries or entirely unheard of a generation ago, the Oriental peasant or town working-man is finding it harder and harderto make both ends meet. As one writer well phrases it: "These alteredeconomic conditions have not as yet brought the ability to meet them. The cost of living has increased faster than the resources of thepeople. "[259]

One of the main (though not sufficiently recognized) causes of theeconomic-social crisis through which the Orient is to-day passing isover-population. The quick breeding tendencies of Oriental peoples havealways been proverbial, and have been due not merely to strong sexualappetites but also to economic reasons like the harsh exploitation ofwomen and children, and perhaps even more to religious doctrinesenjoining early marriage and the begetting of numerous sons. As aresult, Oriental populations have always pressed close upon the limitsof subsistence. In the past, however, this pressure was automaticallylightened by factors like war, misgovernment, pestilence, and famine, which swept off such multitudes of people that, despite highbirth-rates, populations remained at substantially a fixed level. Buthere, as in every other phase of Eastern life, Western influences haveradically altered the situation. The extension of European politicalcontrol over Eastern lands has meant the putting down of internalstrife, the diminution of governmental abuses, the decrease of disease, and the lessening of the blight of famine. In other words, those"natural" checks which previously kept down the population have beendiminished or abolished, and in response to the life-saving activitiesof the West, the enormous death-rate which in the past has kept Orientalpopulations from excessive multiplication is falling to proportionscomparable with the low death-rate of Western nations. But to lower theOrient's prodigious birth-rate is quite another matter. As a matter offact, that birth-rate keeps up with undiminished vigour, and theconsequence has been a portentous increase of population in nearly everyportion of the Orient under Western political control. In fact, eventhose Oriental countries which have maintained their independence havemore or less adopted Western life-conserving methods, and haveexperienced in greater or less degree an accelerated increase ofpopulation. 

The phenomena of over-population are best seen in India. Most of Indiahas been under British control for the greater part of a century. Even acentury ago, India was densely populated, yet in the interveninghundred years the population has increased between two and threefold. [260] Of course, factors like improved agriculture, irrigation, railways, and the introduction of modern industry enable India tosupport a much larger population than it could have done at the time ofthe British Conquest. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear that excessivemultiplication has taken place. Nearly all qualified students of theproblem concur on this point. Forty years ago the Duke of Argyll stated:"Where there is no store, no accumulation, no wealth; where the peoplelive from hand to mouth from season to season on a low diet; and where, nevertheless, they breed and multiply at such a rate; there we can atleast see that this power and force of multiplication is no evidenceeven of safety, far less of comfort. " Towards the close of the lastcentury, Sir William Hunter termed population India's "fundamentalproblem, " and continued: "The result of civilized rule in India has beento produce a strain on the food-producing powers of the country such asit had never before to bear. It has become a truism of Indian statisticsthat the removal of the old cruel checks on population in an Asiaticcountry is by no means an unmixed blessing to an Asiatic people. "[261]Lord Cromer remarks of India's poverty: "Not only cannot it be remediedby mere philanthropy, but it is absolutely certain--cruel andparadoxical though it may appear to say so--that philanthropy enhancesthe evil. In the days of Akhbar or Shah Jehan, cholera, famine, andinternal strife kept down the population. Only the fittest survived. Nowinternal strife is forbidden, and philanthropy steps in and says that nosingle life shall be sacrificed if science and Western energy or skillcan save it. Hence the growth of a highly congested population, vastnumbers of whom are living on a bare margin of subsistence. The factthat one of the greatest difficulties of governing the teeming masses ofthe East is caused by good and humane government should be recognized. It is too often ignored. "[262]

William Archer well states the matter when, in answer to the query whyimproved external conditions have not brought India prosperity, he says:"The reason, in my view, is simple: namely, that the benefit of goodgovernment is, in part at any rate, nullified, when the people takeadvantage of it, not to save and raise their standard of living, but tobreed to the very margin of subsistence. Henry George used to point outthat every mouth that came into the world brought two hands along withit; but though the physiological fact is undeniable, the economicdeduction suggested will not hold good except in conditions that permitof the profitable employment of the two hands. . . . If mouths increase ina greater ratio than food, the tendency must be towards greaterpoverty. "[263]

It is one of the most unfortunate aspects of the situation that very fewOriental thinkers yet realize that over-population is a prime cause ofOriental poverty. Almost without exception they lay the blame topolitical factors, especially to Western political control. In fact, theonly case that I know of where an Eastern thinker has boldly faced theproblem and has courageously advocated birth-control is in the bookpublished five years ago by P. K. Wattal, a native official of theIndian Finance Department, entitled, _The Population Problem ofIndia_. [264] This pioneer volume is written with such ability and is ofsuch apparent significance as an indication of the awakening ofOrientals to a more rational attitude, that it merits special attention. 

Mr. Wattal begins his book by a plea to his fellow-countrymen to look atthe problem rationally and without prejudice. "This essay, " he says, "should not be constituted into an attack on the spiritual civilizationof our country, or even indirectly into a glorification of thematerialism of the West. The object in view is that we should take asomewhat more matter-of-fact view of the main problem of life, viz. , howto live in this world. We are a poor people; the fact is indisputable. Our poverty is, perhaps, due to a great many causes. But I put it toevery one of us whether he has not at some of the most momentous periodsof his life been handicapped by having to support a large family, andwhether this encumbrance has not seriously affected the chances ofadvancement warranted by early promise and exceptional endowment. Thisquestion should be viewed by itself. It is a physical fact, and hasnothing to do with political environment or religious obligation. If wehave suffered from the consequences of that mistake, is it not a dutythat we owe to ourselves and to our progeny that its evil effects shallbe mitigated as far as possible? There is no greater curse thanpoverty--I say this with due respect to our spiritualism. It is not in aspirit of reproach that restraint in married life is urged in thesepages. It is solely from a vivid realization of the hardships caused bylarge families and a profound sympathy with the difficulties under whichlarge numbers of respectable persons struggle through life in thiscountry that I have made bold to speak in plain terms what comes toevery young man, but which he does not care to give utterance to in amanner that would prevent the recurrence of the evil. "[265]

After this appeal to reason in his readers, Mr. Wattal develops histhesis. The first prime cause of over-population in India, he asserts, is early marriage. Contrary to Western lands, where population is keptdown by prudential marriages and by birth-control, "for the Hindusmarriage is a sacrament which must be performed, regardless of thefitness of the parties to bear the responsibilities of a matedexistence. A Hindu male must marry and beget children--sons, if youplease--to perform his funeral rites lest his spirit wander uneasily inthe waste places of the earth. The very name of son, 'putra, ' means onewho saves his father's soul from the hell called Puta. A Hindu maidenunmarried at puberty is a source of social obloquy to her family and ofdamnation to her ancestors. Among the Mohammedans, who are nothandicapped by such penalties, the married state is equally common, partly owing to Hindu example and partly to the general conditions ofprimitive society, where a wife is almost a necessity both as a domesticdrudge and as a helpmate in field work. "[266] The worst of the matter isthat, despite the efforts of social reformers child-marriage seems to beincreasing. The census of 1911 showed that during the decade 1901-10 thenumbers of married females per 1000 of ages 0-5 years rose from 13 to14; of ages 5-10 from 102 to 105; of 10-15 from 423 to 430, and of 15-20from 770 to 800. In other words, in the year 1911, out of every 1000Indian girls, over one-tenth were married before they were 10 years old, nearly one-half before they were 15, and four-fifths before they were20. [267]

The result of all this is a tremendous birth-rate, but this is "nomatter for congratulation. We have heard so often of our high death-rateand the means for combating it, but can it be seriously believed thatwith a birth-rate of 30 per 1000 it is possible to go on as we are doingwith the death-rate brought down to the level of England or Scotland? Isthere room enough in the country for the population to increase so fastas 20 per 1000 every year? We are paying the inevitable penalty ofbringing into this world more persons than can be properly cared for, and therefore if we wish fewer deaths to occur in this country thebirths must be reduced to the level of the countries where thedeath-rate is low. It is, therefore, our high birth-rate that is thesocial danger; the high death-rate, however regrettable, is merely anincident of our high birth-rate. "[268]

Mr. Wattal then describes the cruel items in India's death-rate; thetremendous female mortality, due largely to too early childbirth, andthe equally terrible infant mortality, nearly 50 per cent. Of infantdeaths being due to premature birth or debility at birth. These are theinevitable penalties of early and universal marriage. For, in India, "everybody marries, fit or unfit, and is a parent at the earliestpossible age permitted by nature. " This process is highly disgenic; itis plainly lowering the quality and sapping the vigour of the race. Itis the lower elements of the population, the negroid aboriginal tribesand the Pariahs or Outcastes, who are gaining the fastest. Also thevitality of the whole population seems to be lowering. The censusfigures show that the number of elderly persons is decreasing, and thatthe average statistical expectation of life is falling. "The cominggeneration is severely handicapped at start in life. And the chances ofliving to a good old age are considerably smaller than they were, saythirty or forty years ago. Have we ever paused to consider what it meansto us in the life of the nation as a whole? It means that the people whoalone by weight of experience and wisdom are fitted for the posts ofcommand in the various public activities of the country are snatchedaway by death; and that the guidance and leadership which belongs to ageand mature judgment in the countries of the West fall in India toyounger and consequently to less trustworthy persons. "[269]

After warning his fellow-countrymen that neither improved methods ofagriculture, the growth of industry, nor emigration can afford any realrelief to the growing pressure of population on means of subsistence, henotes a few hopeful signs that, despite the hold of religion andcustom, the people are beginning to realize the situation and that incertain parts of India there are foreshadowings of birth-control. Forexample, he quotes from the census report for 1901 this officialexplanation of a slight drop in the birth-rate of Bengal: "Thepostponement of the age of marriage cannot wholly account for thediminished rate of reproduction. The deliberate avoidance ofchild-bearing must also be partly responsible. . . . It is a matter ofcommon belief that among the tea-garden coolies of Assam means arefrequently taken to prevent conception, or to procure abortion. " And thereport of the Sanitary Commissioner of Assam for 1913 states: "Animportant factor in producing the defective birth-rate appears to be dueto voluntary limitation of birth. "[270]

However, these beginnings of birth-control are too local and partial toafford any immediate relief to India's growing over-population. Widerappreciation of the situation and prompt action are needed. "Theconclusion is irresistible. We can no longer afford to shut our eyes tothe social canker in our midst. In the land of the bullock-cart, themotor has come to stay. The competition is now with the more advancedraces of the West, and we cannot tell them what Diogenes said toAlexander: 'Stand out of my sunshine. ' After the close of this giganticWorld War theories of population will perhaps be revised and a reversionin favour of early marriage and larger families may be counted upon. But, (1) that will be no solution to our own population problem, and (2)this reaction will be only for a time. . . . The law of population may bearrested in its operation, but there is no way of escaping it. "[271]

So concludes this striking little book. Furthermore, we must rememberthat, although India may be the acutest sufferer from over-population, conditions in the entire Orient are basically the same, prudentialchecks and rational birth-control being everywhere virtuallyabsent. [272] Remembering also that, besides over-population, there areother economic and social evils previously discussed, we cannot besurprised to find in all Eastern lands much acute poverty and socialdegradation. 

Both the rural and urban masses usually live on the baremargin of subsistence. The English economist Brailsford thus describesthe condition of the Egyptian peasantry: "The villages exhibited apoverty such as I have never seen even in the mountains of anarchicalMacedonia or among the bogs of Donegal. . . . The villages are crowdedslums of mud hovels, without a tree, a flower, or a garden. The huts, often without a window or a levelled floor, are minute dungeons of bakedmud, usually of two small rooms neither whitewashed nor carpeted. Thosewhich I entered were bare of any visible property, save a few cookingutensils, a mat to serve as a bed, and a jar which held the staple foodof maize. "[273] As for the poorer Indian peasants, a British sanitaryofficial thus depicts their mode of life: "One has actually to see theinterior of the houses, in which each family is often compelled to livein a single small cell, made of mud walls and with a mud floor;containing small yards littered with rubbish, often crowded with cattle;possessing wells permeated by rain soaking through this filthy surface;and frequently jumbled together in inchoate masses called towns andcities. "[274]

In the cities, indeed, conditions are even worse than in the country, the slums of the Orient surpassing the slums of the West. The Frenchpublicist Louis Bertrand paints positively nauseating pictures of thepoorer quarters of the great Levantine towns like Cairo, Constantinople, and Jerusalem. Omitting his more poignant details, here is hisdescription of a Cairo tenement: "In Cairo, as elsewhere in Egypt, thewretchedness and grossness of the poorer-class dwellings are perhapseven more shocking than in the other Eastern lands. Two or three dark, airless rooms usually open on a hall-way not less obscure. The plaster, peeling off from the ceilings and the worm-eaten laths of the walls, falls constantly to the filthy floors. The straw mats and bedding areinfested by innumerable vermin. "[275]

In India it is the same story. Says Fisher: "Even before the growth ofher industries had begun, the cities of India presented a bafflinghousing problem. Into the welter of crooked streets and unsanitaryhabits of an Oriental city these great industrial plants are wedgingtheir thousands of employees. Working from before dawn until after dark, men and women are too exhausted to go far from the plant to sleep, ifthey can help it. When near-by houses are jammed to suffocation, theylive and sleep in the streets. In Calcutta, twenty years ago, [276] landhad reached $200, 000 an acre in the overcrowded tenementdistricts. "[277] Of Calcutta, a Western writer remarks: "Calcutta is ashame even in the East. In its slums, mill hands and dock coolies do notlive; they pig. Houses choke with unwholesome breath; drains andcompounds fester in filth. Wheels compress decaying refuse in the roads;cows drink from wells soaked with sewage, and the floors of bakeries arewashed in the same pollution. "[278] In the other industrial centres ofIndia, conditions are practically the same. A Bombay native sanitaryofficial stated in a report on the state of the tenement district, drawnup in 1904: "In such houses--the breeders of germs and bacilli, thecentres of disease and poverty, vice, and crime--have people of allkinds, the diseased, the dissolute, the drunken, the improvident, beenindiscriminately herded and tightly packed in vast hordes to dwell inclose association with each other. "[279]

Furthermore, urban conditions seem to be getting worse rather thanbetter. The problem of congestion, in particular, is assuming evergraver proportions. Already in the opening years of the present centurythe congestion in the great industrial centres of India like Calcutta, Bombay, and Lucknow averaged three or four times the congestion ofLondon. And the late war has rendered the housing crisis even moreacute. In the East, as in the West, the war caused a rapid drift ofpopulation to the cities and at the same time stopped building owing tothe prohibitive cost of construction. Hence, a prodigious rise in rentsand a plague of landlord profiteering. Says Fisher: "Rents were raisedas much as 300 per cent. , enforced by eviction. Mass-meetings of protestin Bombay resulted in government action, fixing maximum rents for someof the tenements occupied by artisans and labourers. Setting maximumrental does not, however, make more room. "[280]

And, of course, it must not be forgotten that higher rents are only onephase in a general rise in the cost of living that has been going on inthe East for a generation and which has been particularly pronouncedsince 1914. More than a decade ago Bertrand wrote of the Near East:"From one end of the Levant to the other, at Constantinople as atSmyrna, Damascus, Beyrout, and Cairo, I heard the same complaints aboutthe increasing cost of living; and these complaints were uttered byEuropeans as well as by the natives. "[281] To-day the situation is evenmore difficult. Says Sir Valentine Chirol of conditions in Egypt sincethe war: "The rise in wages, considerable as it has been, has ceased tokeep pace with the inordinate rise in prices for the very necessities oflife. This is particularly the case in the urban centres, where thelower classes--workmen, carters, cab-drivers, shopkeepers, and a hostoff minor employees--are hard put to it nowadays to make both endsmeet. "[282] As a result of all these hard conditions various phenomenaof social degradation such as alcoholism, vice, and crime, are becomingincreasingly common. [283] Last--but not least--there are growingsymptoms of social unrest and revolutionary agitation, which we willexamine in the next chapter. 

FOOTNOTES:

[239] _I. E. _ the educated upper class. 

[240] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 13. 

[241] _I. E. _ the priestly class. 

[242] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 15. 

[243] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 51. 

[244] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 221-226. 

[245] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, p. 240. 

[246] The purdah is the curtain separating the women's apartments fromthe rest of the house. 

[247] Bukhsh, _Essays: Indian and Islamic_, pp. 254-255. 

[248] For progress in Western education in the Orient, under bothEuropean and native auspices, see L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage oriental_, pp. 291-392; C. S. Cooper, _The Modernizing of the Orient_, pp. 3-13, 24-64. 

[249] In his Introduction to Sir Valentine Chirol's _Indian Unrest_, p. Xii. 

[250] Cromer, _Modern Egypt_, Vol. II. , pp. 228-243. 

[251] J. D. Rees, _The Real India_, p. 162 (London, 1908). 

[252] Vambéry, _Western Culture in Eastern Lands_, pp. 203-204. 

[253] H. E. Compton, _Indian Life in Town and Country_, p. 98 (London, 1904). 

[254] Vambéry, _La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans_, p. 32. 

[255] Cooper, _op. Cit. _, pp. 48-49. 

[256] On this point of comfort _v. _ luxury, see especially Sir BampfyldeFuller, "East and West: A Study of Differences, " _Nineteenth Century andAfter_, November, 1911. 

[257] L. Bertrand, _op. Cit. _, 145-147; J. Chailley, _AdministrativeProblems of British India_, pp. 138-139. For increased expenditure onWestern products, see A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia, " _TheCentury_, March, 1904; J. P. Jones, "The Present Situation in India, "_Journal of Race Development_, July, 1910; R. Mukerjee, _The Foundationsof Indian Economics_, p. 5. 

[258] For higher cost of living in the East, see Chirol, _IndianUnrest_, pp. 2-3; Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, pp. 46-60; Jones, _op. Cit. _; T. T. Williams, "Inquiry into the Rise of Prices in India, "_Economic Journal_, December, 1915. 

[259] Brown, _op. Cit. _

[260] At the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of Indiais roughly estimated to have been about 100, 000, 000. According to thecensus of 1911 the population was 315, 000, 000. 

[261] Sir W. W. Hunter, _The India of the Queen and Other Essays_, p. 42(London, 1903). 

[262] Cromer, "Some Problems of Government in Europe and Asia, "_Nineteenth Century and After_, May, 1913. 

[263] Archer, _India and the Future_, pp. 157, 162 (London), 1918. 

[264] P. K. Wattal, of the Indian Finance Department, AssistantAccountant-General. The book was published at Bombay, 1916. 

[265] Wattal, pp. I-iii. 

[266] Wattal, p. 3. 

[267] _Ibid. _, p. 12. 

[268] Wattal, p. 14. 

[269] _Ibid. _, pp. 19-21. 

[270] Wattal, p. 28. 

[271] _Ibid. _, p. 82. 

[272] For conditions in the Near East, see Bertrand, pp. 110, 124, 125-128. 

[273] H. N. Brailsford, _The War of Steel and Gold_, pp. 112-113. Seealso T. Rothstein, _Egypt's Ruin_, pp. 298-300 (London, 1910), Sir W. W. Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia, " _Quarterly Review_, January, 1918. 

[274] Dr. D. Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest, " _TheSurvey_, February 18, 1911. 

[275] Bertrand, _op. Cit. _, pp. 111-112. 

[276] _I. E. _, in 1900. 

[277] Fisher, _India's Silent Revolution_, p. 51. 

[278] G. W. Stevens, _In India_. Quoted by Fisher, p. 51. 

[279] Dr. Bhalchandra Krishna. Quoted by A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labourin India_, p. 35 (London, 1907). 

[280] Fisher, pp. 51-52. 

[281] Bertrand, p. 141. 

[282] Sir V. Chirol, "England's Peril in Egypt, " from the London_Times_, 1919. 

[283] See Bertrand and Fisher, _supra_. 

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL UNREST AND BOLSHEVISM

Unrest is the natural concomitant of change--particularly of suddenchange. Every break with past, however normal and inevitable, implies anecessity for readjustment to altered conditions which causes atemporary sense of restless disharmony until the required adjustment hasbeen made. Unrest is not an exceptional phenomenon; it is always latentin every human society which has not fallen into complete stagnation, and a slight amount of unrest should be considered a sign of healthygrowth rather than a symptom of disease. In fact, the minimum degrees ofunrest are usually not called by that name, but are considered mereincidents of normal development. Under normal circumstances, indeed, thesocial organism functions like the human organism: it is beingincessantly destroyed and as incessantly renewed in conformity with thechanging conditions of life. These changes are sometimes veryconsiderable, but they are so gradual that they are effected almostwithout being perceived. A healthy organism well attuned to itsenvironment is always plastic. It instinctively senses environmentalchanges and adapts itself so rapidly that it escapes the injuriousconsequences of disharmony. 

Far different is the character of unrest's acuter manifestations. Theseare infallible symptoms of sweeping changes, sudden breaks with thepast, and profound maladjustments which are not being rapidly rectified. In other words, acute unrest denotes social ill-health and portends thepossibility of one of those violent crises known as "revolutions. "

The history of the Moslem East well exemplifies the abovegeneralizations. The formative period of Saracenic civilization wascharacterized by rapid change and an intense idealistic ferment. Thegreat "Motazelite" movement embraced many shades of thought, its radicalwing professing religious, political, and social doctrines of a violentrevolutionary nature. But this changeful period was superficial andbrief. Arab vigour and the Islamic spirit proved unable permanently toleaven the vast inertia of the ancient East. Soon the old traditionsreasserted themselves--somewhat modified, to be sure, yet basically thesame Saracenic civilization became stereotyped, ossified, and with thisossification changeful unrest died away. Here and there the radicaltradition was preserved and secretly handed down by a few obscure sectslike the Kharidjites of Inner Arabia and the Bettashi dervishes; butthese were mere cryptic episodes, of no general significance. 

With the Mohammedan Revival at the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, symptoms of social unrest appeared once more. Wahabism aimednot merely at a reform of religious abuses but was also a generalprotest against the contemporary decadence of Moslem society. In manycases it took the form of a popular revolt against establishedgovernments. The same was true of the correlative Babbist movement inPersia, which took place about the same time. [284]

And of course these nascent stirrings were greatly stimulated by theflood of Western ideas and methods which, as the nineteenth century woreon, increasingly permeated the East. What, indeed, could be moreprovocative of unrest of every description than the resultingtransformation of the Orient--a transformation so sudden, so intense, and necessitating so concentrated a process of adaptation that it wasbasically revolutionary rather than evolutionary in its nature? Thedetails of these profound changes--political, religious, economic, social--we have already studied, together with the equally profounddisturbance, bewilderment, and suffering afflicting all classes in thiseminently transition period. 

The essentially revolutionary nature of this transition period, asexemplified by India, is well described by a British economist. [285]What, he asks, could be more anachronistic than the contrast betweenrural and urban India? "Rural India is primitive or mediæval; city Indiais modern. " In city India you will find every symbol of Western life, from banks and factories down to the very "sandwichmen that you left inthe London gutters. " Now all this co-exists beside rural India. "And itis surely a fact unique in economic history that they should thus existside by side. The present condition of India does not correspond withany period of European economic history. " Imagine the effect in Europeof setting down modern and mediæval men together, with utterly disparateideas. That has not happened in Europe because "European progress in theeconomic world has been evolutionary"; a process spread over centuries. In India, on the other hand, this economic transformation has been"revolutionary" in character. 

How unevolutionary is India's economic transformation is seen by thecondition of rural India. 

"Rural India, though chiefly characterized by primitive usage, has beeninvaded by ideas that are intensely hostile to the old state of thingsIt is primitive, _but not consistently primitive_. Competitive wages arepaid side by side with customary wages. Prices are sometimes fixed bycustom, but sometimes, too, by free economic causes. From the midst of apopulation deeply rooted in the soil, men are being carried away by thedesire of better wages. In short, economic motives have suddenly andpartially intruded themselves in the realm of primitive morality. And, if we turn to city India, we see a similar, though inverted, state ofthings. . . . In neither case has the mixture been harmonious or the fusioncomplete. Indeed, the two orders are too unrelated, too far apart, tocoalesce with ease. . . . 

"India, then, is in a state of economic revolution throughout all theclasses of an enormous and complex society. The only period in whichEurope offered even faint analogies to modern India was the IndustrialRevolution, from which even now we have not settled down intocomparative stability. We may reckon it as a fortunate circumstance forEurope that the intellectual movement which culminated in the FrenchRevolution did not coincide with the Industrial Revolution. If it had, it is possible that European society might have been hopelessly wrecked. But, as it was, even when the French Revolution had spent its force inthe conquests of Napoleon, the Industrial Revolution stirred up enoughsocial and political discontent. When whole classes of people areobliged by economic revolution to change their mode of life, it isinevitable that many should suffer. Discontent is roused. Political anddestructive movements are certain to ensue. Not only the Revolutions of'48, but also the birth of the Socialist Party sprang from theIndustrial Revolution. 

"But that revolution was not nearly so sweeping as that which is now inoperation in India. The invention of machinery and steam-power was, inEurope, but the crowning event of a long series of years in whichcommerce and industry had been constantly expanding, in which capitalhad been largely accumulated, in which economic principles had beengradually spreading. . . . No, the Indian economic revolution is vastlygreater and more fundamental than our Industrial Revolution, great asthat was. Railways have been built through districts where travel wasalmost impossible, and even roads are unknown. Factories have beenbuilt, and filled by men unused to industrial labour. Capital has beenpoured into the country, which was unprepared for any such development. And what are the consequences? India's social organization is beingdissolved. The Brahmins are no longer priests. The ryot is no longerbound to the soil. The banya is no longer the sole purveyor of capital. The hand-weaver is threatened with extinction, and the brass-worker canno longer ply his craft. Think of the dislocation which this suddenchange has brought about, of the many who can no longer follow theirancestral vocations, of the commotion which a less profound changeproduced in Europe, and you will understand what is the chiefmotive-power of the political unrest. It is small wonder. The wonder isthat the unrest has been no greater than it is. Had India not been anAsiatic country, she would have been in fierce revolution long ago. "

The above lines were of course written in the opening years of thetwentieth century, before the world had been shattered by Armageddon andaggressive social revolution had established itself in semi-AsiaticRussia. But even during those pre-war years, other students of theOrient were predicting social disturbances of increasing gravity. Saidthe Hindu nationalist leader, Bipin Chandra Pal: "This so-called unrestis not really political. It is essentially an intellectual and spiritualupheaval, the forerunner of a mighty social revolution, with a neworganon and a new philosophy of life behind it. "[286] And the Frenchpublicist Chailley wrote of India: "There will be a series of economicrevolutions, which must necessarily produce suffering andstruggle. "[287]

During this pre-war period the increased difficulty of livingconditions, together with the adoption of Western ideas of comfort andkindred higher standards, seem to have been engendering friction betweenthe different strata of the Oriental population. In 1911 a Britishsanitary expert assigned "wretchedness" as the root-cause of India'spolitical unrest. After describing the deplorable living conditions ofthe Indian masses, he wrote: "It will of course be said at once thatthese conditions have existed in India from time immemorial, and are nomore likely to cause unrest now than previously; but in my opinionunrest has always existed there in a subterranean form. Moreover, in theold days, the populace could make scarcely any comparison between theirown condition and that of more fortunate people; now they can comparetheir own slums and terrible 'native quarters' with the much betterordered cantonments, stations, and houses of the British officials andeven of their own wealthier brethren. So far as I can see, such miseryis always the fundamental cause of all popular unrest. . . . Seditiousmeetings, political chatter, and 'aspirations' of babus and demagoguesare only the superficial manifestations of the deeper disturbance. "[288]

This growing social friction was indubitably heightened by the lack ofinterest of Orientals in the sufferings of all persons not bound to themby family, caste, or customary ties. Throughout the East, "socialservice, " in the Western sense, is practically unknown. This fact isnoted by a few Orientals themselves. Says an Indian writer, speaking ofIndian town life: "There is no common measure of social conduct. . . . Hitherto, social reform in India has taken account only of individual orfamily life. As applied to mankind in the mass, and especially to thosesoulless agglomerations of seething humanity which we call cities, it isa gospel yet to be preached. "[289] As an American sociologist remarkedof the growing slum evil throughout the industrialized Orient: "Thegreatest danger is due to the fact that Orientals do not have the highWestern sense of the value of the life of the individual, and are, comparatively speaking, without any restraining influence similar to ourown enlightened public opinion, which has been roused by the strugglesof a century of industrial strife. Unless these elements can besupplied, there is danger of suffering and of abuses worse than any theWest has known. "[290]

All this diffused social unrest was centring about two recently emergedelements: the Western-educated _intelligentsia_ and the industrialproletariat of the factory towns. The revolutionary tendencies of the_intelligentsia_, particularly of its half-educated failures, have beenalready noted, and these latter have undoubtedly played a leading partin all the revolutionary disturbances of the modern Orient, from NorthAfrica to China. [291] Regarding the industrial proletariat, some writersthink that there is little immediate likelihood of their becoming amajor revolutionary factor, because of their traditionalism, ignorance, and apathy, and also because there is no real connection between themand the _intelligentsia_, the other centre of social discontent. 

The French economist Métin states this view-point very well. Speakingprimarily of India, he writes: "The Nationalist movement rises from themiddle classes and manifests no systematic hostility toward thecapitalists and great proprietors; in economic matters it is on theirside. "[292] As for the proletariat: "The coolies do not imagine thattheir lot can be bettered. Like the ryots and the agriculturallabourers, they do not show the least sign of revolt. To whom shouldthey turn? The ranks of traditional society are closed to them. Peoplewithout caste, the coolies are despised even by the old-style artisan, proud of his caste-status, humble though that be. To fall to the job ofa coolie is, for the Hindu, the worst declassment. The factory workersare not yet numerous enough to form a compact and powerful proletariat, able to exert pressure on the old society. Even if they do occasionallystrike, they are as far from the modern Trade-Union as they are from thetraditional working-caste. Neither can they look for leadership to the'intellectual proletariat'; for the Nationalist movement has not emergedfrom the 'bourgeois' phase, and always leans on the capitalists. . . . 

"Thus Indian industry is still in its embryonic stages. In truth, thematerial evolution which translates itself by the construction offactories, and the social evolution which creates a proletariat, haveonly begun to emerge; while the intellectual evolution from which arisethe programmes of social demands has not even begun. "[293]

Other observers of Indian industrial conditions, however, do not shareM. Métin's opinion. Says the British Labour leader, J. Ramsay Macdonald:"To imagine the backward Indian labourers becoming a conscious regimentin the class war, seems to be one of the vainest dreams in which aWestern mind can indulge. But I sometimes wonder if it be so very vainafter all. In the first place, the development of factory industry inIndia has created a landless and homeless proletariat unmatched by thesame economic class in any other capitalist community; and to imaginethat this class is to be kept out, or can be kept out, of Indianpolitics is far more vain than to dream of its developing a politics onWestern lines. Further than that, the wage-earners have shown awillingness to respond to Trades-Union methods; they are formingindustrial associations and have engaged in strikes; some of the socialreform movements conducted by Indian intellectuals definitely try toestablish Trades-Unions and preach ideas familiar to us in connectionwith Trades-Union propaganda. A capitalist fiscal policy will not onlygive this movement a great impetus as it did in Japan, but in India willnot be able to suppress the movement, as was done in Japan, bylegislation. As yet, the true proletarian wage-earner, uprooted from hisnative village and broken away from the organization of Indian society, is but insignificant. It is growing, however, and I believe that it willorganize itself rapidly on the general lines of the proletarian classesof other capitalist countries. So soon as it becomes politicallyconscious, there are no other lines upon which it can organizeitself. "[294]

Turning to the Near East--more than a decade ago a French Socialistwriter, observing the hard living conditions of the Egyptian masses, noted signs of social unrest and predicted grave disturbances. "Agenuine proletariat, " he wrote, "has been created by the multiplicationof industries and the sudden, almost abrupt, progress which hasfollowed. The cost of living has risen to a scale hitherto unknown inEgypt, while wages have risen but slightly. Poverty and want abound. Some day suffering will provoke the people to complaints, perhaps toangry outbursts, throughout this apparently prosperous Delta. It is truethat the influx of foreigners and of money may put off the hour when thecity or country labourer of Egyptian race comes clearly to perceive thewrongs that are being done to him. He may miss the educational influenceof Socialism. Yet such an awakening may come sooner than people expect. It is not only among the successful and prosperous Egyptians thatintelligence is to be found. Those whose wages are growing graduallysmaller and smaller have intelligence of equal keenness, and it hasbecome a real question as to the hour when for the first time in theland of Islam the flame of Mohammedan Socialism shall burst forth. "[295]In Algeria, likewise, a Belgian traveller noted the dawning of aproletarian consciousness among the town working-men just before theGreat War. Speaking of the rapid spread of Western ideas, he wrote:"Islam tears asunder like rotten cloth on the quays of Algiers: thedockers, coal-passers, and engine-tenders, to whatever race they belong, leave their Islam and acquire a genuine proletarian morality, that ofthe proletarians of Europe, and they make common cause with theirEuropean colleagues on the basis of a strictly economic struggle. Ifthere were many big factories in Algeria, orthodox Islam would soondisappear there, as old-fashioned Catholicism has disappeared with usunder the shock of great industry. "[296]

Whatever may be the prospects as to the rapid emergence of organizedlabour movements in the Orient, one thing seems certain: the unrestwhich afflicted so many parts of the East in the years preceding theGreat War, though mainly political, had also its social side. Toward theend of 1913, a leading Anglo-Indian journal remarked pessimistically:"We have already gone so far on the downward path that leads todestruction that there are districts in what were once regarded as themost settled parts of India which are being abandoned by the richbecause their property is not safe. So great is the contempt for the lawthat it is employed by the unscrupulous as a means of offence againstthe innocent. Frontier Pathans commit outrages almost unbelievable intheir daring. Mass-meetings are held and agitation spreads in regard totopics quite outside the business of orderly people. There is no matterof domestic or foreign politics in which crowds of irresponsible peopledo not want to have their passionate way. Great grievances are made oflittle, far-off things. What ought to be the ordered, spacious life ofthe District Officer is intruded upon and disturbed by a hundreddistracting influences due to the want of discipline of the people. Inthe subordinate ranks of the great services themselves, trades-unionshave been formed. Military and police officers have to regret that thenew class of recruits is less subordinate than the old, harder todiscipline, more full of complaints. "[297]

The Great War of course enormously aggravated Oriental unrest. In manyparts of the Near East, especially, acute suffering, balked ambitions, and furious hates combined to reduce society to the verge of chaos. Intothis ominous turmoil there now came the sinister influence of RussianBolshevism, marshalling all this diffused unrest by systematic methodsfor definite ends. Bolshevism was frankly out for a world-revolution andthe destruction of Western civilization. To attain this objective theBolshevist leaders not only launched direct assaults on the West, butalso planned flank attacks in Asia and Africa. They believed that if theEast could be set on fire, not only would Russian Bolshevism gain vastadditional strength but also the economic repercussion on the West, already shaken by the war, would be so terrific that industrial collapsewould ensue, thereby throwing Europe open to revolution. 

Bolshevism's propagandist efforts were nothing short of universal, bothin area and in scope. No part of the world was free from the plottingsof its agents; no possible source of discontent was overlooked. Strictly"Red" doctrines like the dictatorship of the proletariat were very farfrom being the only weapons in Bolshevism's armoury. Since what wasfirst wanted was the overthrow of the existing world-order, any kind ofopposition to that order, no matter how remote doctrinally fromBolshevism, was grist to the Bolshevist mill. Accordingly, in everyquarter of the globe, in Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas, asin Europe, Bolshevik agitators whispered in the ears of the discontentedtheir gospel of hatred and revenge. Every nationalist aspiration, everypolitical grievance, every social injustice, every racialdiscrimination, was fuel for Bolshevism's incitement to violence andwar. [298]

Particularly promising fields for Bolshevist activity were the Near andMiddle East. Besides being a prey to profound disturbances of everydescription, those regions as traditional objectives of the old Czaristimperialism, had long been carefully studied by Russian agents who hadevolved a technique of "pacific penetration" that might be easilyadjusted to Bolshevist ends. To stir up political, religious, and racialpassions in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, especially againstEngland, required no original planning by Trotzky or Lenin. Czarism hadalready done these things for generations, and full information lay bothin the Petrograd archives and in the brains of surviving Czarist agentsready to turn their hands as easily to the new work as the old. 

In all the elaborate network of Bolshevist propaganda which to-dayenmeshes the East we must discriminate between Bolshevism's twoobjectives: one immediate--the destruction of Western political andeconomic supremacy; the other ultimate--the bolshevizing of the Orientalmasses and the consequent extirpation of the native upper and middleclasses, precisely as has been done in Russia and as is planned for thecountries of the West. In the first stage, Bolshevism is quite ready torespect Oriental faiths and customs and to back Oriental nationalistmovements. In the second stage, religions like Islam and nationalistslike Mustapha Kemal are to be branded as "bourgeois" and relentlesslydestroyed. How Bolshevik diplomacy endeavours to work these two schemesin double harness, we shall presently see. 

Russian Bolshevism's Oriental policy was formulated soon after itsaccession to power at the close of 1917. The year 1918 was a time ofbusy preparation. An elaborate propaganda organization was built up fromvarious sources. A number of old Czarist agents and diplomats versed inEastern affairs were cajoled or conscripted into the service. TheRussian Mohammedan populations such as the Tartars of South Russia andthe Turkomans of Central Asia furnished many recruits. Even morevaluable were the exiles who flocked to Russia from Turkey, Persia, India, and elsewhere at the close of the Great War. Practically all theleaders of the Turkish war-government--Enver, Djemal, Talaat, and manymore, fled to Russia for refuge from the vengeance of the victoriousEntente Powers. The same was true of the Hindu terrorist leaders who hadbeen in German pay during the war and who now sought service underLenin. By the end of 1918 Bolshevism's Oriental propaganda departmentwas well organized, divided into three bureaux, for the Islamiccountries, India, and the Far East respectively. With Bolshevism's FarEastern activities this book is not concerned, though the reader shouldbear them in mind and should remember the important part played by theChinese in recent Russian history. As for the Islamic and Indianbureaux, they displayed great zeal, translating tons of Bolshevikliterature into the various Oriental languages, training numerous secretagents and propagandists for "field-work, " and getting in touch with alldisaffected or revolutionary elements. 

With the opening months of 1919 Bolshevist activity throughout the Nearand Middle East became increasingly apparent. The wave of rage anddespair caused by the Entente's denial of Near Eastern nationalistaspirations[299] played splendidly into the Bolshevists' hands, and wehave already seen how Moscow supported Mustapha Kemal and othernationalist leaders in Turkey, Persia, Egypt, and elsewhere. In theMiddle East, also, Bolshevism gained important successes. Not merely wasMoscow's hand visible in the epidemic of rioting and seditious violencewhich swept northern India in the spring of 1919, [300] but an evenshrewder blow was struck at Britain in Afghanistan. This land ofturbulent mountaineers, which lay like a perpetual thundercloud onIndia's north-west frontier, had kept quiet during the Great War, mainlyowing to the Anglophile attitude of its ruler, the Ameer HabibullahKhan. But early in 1919 Habibullah was murdered. Whether the Bolshevikihad a hand in the matter is not known, but they certainly reaped thebenefit, for power passed to one of Habibullah's sons, Amanullah Khan, who was an avowed enemy of England and who had had dealings withTurco-German agents during the late war. Amanullah at once got in touchwith Moscow, and a little later, just when the Punjab was seething withunrest, he declared war on England, and his wild tribesmen, pouringacross the border, set the North-West Frontier on fire. After some hardfighting the British succeeded in repelling the Afghan invasion, andAmanullah was constrained to make peace. But Britain obviously dared notpress Amanullah too hard, for in the peace treaty the Ameer was releasedfrom his previous obligation not to maintain diplomatic relations withother nations than British India. Amanullah promptly aired hisindependence by maintaining ostentatious relations with Moscow. As amatter of fact, the Bolsheviki had by this time established an importantpropagandist subcentre in Russian Turkestan, not far from the Afghanborder, and this bureau's activities of course envisaged not merelyAfghanistan but the wider field of India as well. [301]

During 1920 Bolshevik activities became still more pronounced throughoutthe Near and Middle East. We have already seen how powerfully BolshevikRussia supported the Turkish and Persian nationalist movements. In fact, the reckless short-sightedness of Entente policy was driving intoLenin's arms multitudes of nationalists to whom the internationalisttheories of Moscow were personally abhorrent. For example, the head ofthe Afghan mission to Moscow thus frankly expressed his reasons forfriendship with Soviet Russia, in an interview printed by the officialSoviet organ, _Izvestia_: "I am neither Communist nor Socialist, but mypolitical programme so far is the expulsion of the English from Asia. Iam an irreconcilable enemy of European capitalism in Asia, the chiefrepresentatives of which are the English. On this point I coincide withthe Communists, and in this respect we are your natural allies. . . . Afghanistan, like India, does not represent a capitalist state, and itis very unlikely that even a parliamentary régime will take deep root inthese countries. It is so far difficult to say how subsequent eventswill develop. I only know that the renowned address of the SovietGovernment to all nations, with its appeal to them to combat capitalists(and for us a capitalist is synonymous with the word foreigner, or, tobe more exact, an Englishman), had an enormous effect on us. A stillgreater effect was produced by Russia's annulment of all the secrettreaties enforced by the imperialistic governments, and by theproclaiming of the right of all nations, no matter how small, todetermine their own destiny. This act rallied around Soviet Russia allthe exploited nationalities of Asia, and all parties, even those veryremote from Socialism. " Of course, knowing what we do of Bolshevikpropagandist tactics, we cannot be sure that the Afghan diplomat eversaid the things which the _Izvestia_ relates. But, even if the interviewbe a fake, the words put into his mouth express the feelings of vastnumbers of Orientals and explain a prime cause of Bolshevik propagandistsuccesses in Eastern lands. 

So successful, indeed, had been the progress of Bolshevik propagandathat the Soviet leaders now began to work openly for their ultimateends. At first Moscow had posed as the champion of Oriental "peoples"against Western "imperialism"; its appeals had been to "peoples, "irrespective of class; and it had promised "self-determination, " withfull respect for native ideas and institutions. For instance: aBolshevist manifesto to the Turks signed by Lenin and issued toward theclose of 1919 read: "Mussulmans of the world, victims of thecapitalists, awake! Russia has abandoned the Czar's pernicious policytoward you and offers to help you overthrow English tyranny. She willallow you freedom of religion and self-government. The frontiersexisting before the war will be respected, no Turkish territory will begiven Armenia, the Dardanelles Straits will remain yours, andConstantinople will remain the capital of the Mussulman world. TheMussulmans in Russia will be given self-government. All we ask inexchange is that you fight the reckless capitalists, who would exploityour country and make it a colony. " Even when addressing its own people, the Soviet Government maintained the same general tone. An "Order of theDay" to the Russian troops stationed on the borders of India stated:"Comrades of the Pamir division, you have been given a responsible task. The Soviet Republic sends you to garrison the posts on the Pamir, on thefrontiers of the friendly countries of Afghanistan and India. The Pamirtableland divides revolutionary Russia from India, which, with its300, 000, 000 inhabitants, is enslaved by a handful of Englishmen. On thistableland the signallers of revolution must hoist the red flag of thearmy of liberation. May the peoples of India, who fight against theirEnglish oppressors, soon know that friendly help is not far off. Makeyourselves at home with the liberty-loving tribes of northern India, promote by word and deed their revolutionary progress, refute the massof calumnies spread about Soviet Russia by agents of the Britishprinces, lords, and bankers. Long live the alliance of the revolutionarypeoples of Europe and Asia!"

Such was the nature of first-stage Bolshevik propaganda. Presently, however, propaganda of quite a different character began to appear. Thissecond-stage propaganda of course continued to assail Western"capitalist imperialism. " But alongside, or rather intermingled with, these anti-Western, fulminations, there now appeared special appeals tothe Oriental masses, inciting them against all "capitalists" and"bourgeois, " native as well as foreign, and promising the "proletarians"remedies for all their ills. Here is a Bolshevist manifesto to theTurkish masses, published in the summer of 1920. It is very differentfrom the manifestoes of a year before. "The men of toil, " says thisinteresting document, "are now struggling everywhere against the richpeople. These people, with the assistance of the aristocracy and theirhirelings, are now trying to hold Turkish toilers in their chains. It isthe rich people of Europe who have brought suffering to Turkey. Comrades, let us make common cause with the world's toilers. If we donot do so we shall never rise again. Let the heroes of Turkey'srevolution join Bolshevism. Long live the Third International! Praise beto Allah!"

And in these new efforts Moscow was not content with words; it waspassing to deeds as well. The first application of Bolshevism to anEastern people was in Russian Turkestan. When the Bolsheviki first cameto power at the end of 1917 they had granted Turkestan full"self-determination, " and the inhabitants had acclaimed their nativeprinces and re-established their old state-units, subject to a loosefederative tie with Russia. Early in 1920, however, the SovietGovernment considered Turkestan ripe for the "Social Revolution. "Accordingly, the native princes were deposed, all political power wastransferred to local Soviets (controlled by Russians), the native upperand middle classes were despoiled of their property, and sporadicresistance was crushed by mass-executions, torture, and other familiarforms of Bolshevist terrorism. [302] In the Caucasus, also, the socialrevolution had begun with the Sovietization of Azerbaidjan. The Tartarrepublic of Azerbaidjan was one of the fragments of the former Russianprovince of Transcaucasia which had declared its independence on thecollapse of the Czarist Empire in 1917. Located in easternTranscaucasia, about the Caspian Sea, Azerbaidjan's capital was the cityof Baku, famous for its oil-fields. Oil had transformed Baku into anindustrial centre on Western lines, with a large working population ofmixed Asiatic and Russian origin. Playing upon the nascentclass-consciousness of this urban proletariat, the Bolshevik agents madea _coup d'état_ in the spring of 1920, overthrew the nationalistgovernment, and, with prompt Russian backing, made Azerbaijan a Sovietrepublic. The usual accompaniments of the social revolution followed:despoiling and massacring of the upper and middle classes, confiscationof property in favour of the town proletarians and agriculturallabourers, and ruthless terrorism. With the opening months of 1920, Bolshevism was thus in actual operation in both the Near and MiddleEast. [303]

Having acquired strong footholds in the Orient, Bolshevism now feltstrong enough to throw off the mask. In the autumn of 1920, the SovietGovernment of Russia held a "Congress of Eastern Peoples" at Baku, theaim of which was not merely the liberation of the Orient from Westerncontrol but its Bolshevizing as well. No attempt at concealment of thislarger objective was made, and so striking was the language employedthat it may well merit our close attention. 

In the first place, the call to the congress, issued by the Third(Moscow) International, was addressed to the "peasants and workers" ofthe East. The summons read:

"Peasants and workers of Persia! The Teheran Government of the Khadjarsand its retinue of provincial Khans have plundered and exploited youthrough many centuries. The land, which, according to the laws of theSheriat, was your common property, has been taken possession of more andmore by the lackeys of the Teheran Government; they trade it away attheir pleasure; they lay what taxes please them upon you; and when, through their mismanagement, they got the country into such a conditionthat they were unable to squeeze enough juice out of it themselves, theysold Persia last year to English capitalists for 2, 000, 000 pounds, sothat the latter will organize an army in Persia that will oppress youstill more than formerly, and so the latter can collect taxes for theKhans and the Teheran Government. They have sold the oil-wells in SouthPersia and thus helped plunder the country. 

"Peasants of Mesopotamia! The English have declared your country to beindependent; but 80, 000 English soldiers are stationed in your country, are robbing and plundering, are killing you and are violating yourwomen. 

"Peasants of Anatolia! The English, French, and Italian Governments holdConstantinople under the mouths of their cannon. They have made theSultan their prisoner, they are obliging him to consent to thedismemberment of what is purely Turkish territory, they are forcing himto turn the country's finances over to foreign capitalists in order tomake it possible for them better to exploit the Turkish people, alreadyreduced to a state of beggary by the six-year war. They have occupiedthe coal-mines of Heraclea, they are holding your ports, they aresending their troops into your country and are trampling down yourfields. 

"Peasants and workers of Armenia! Decades ago you became the victims ofthe intrigues of foreign capital, which launched heavy verbal attacksagainst the massacres of the Armenians by the Kurds and incited you tofight against the Sultan in order to obtain through your blood newconcessions and fresh profits daily from the bloody Sultan. During thewar they not only promised you independence, but they incited yourmerchants, your teachers, and your priests to demand the land of theTurkish peasants in order to keep up an eternal conflict between theArmenian and Turkish peoples, so that they could eternally deriveprofits out of this conflict, for as long as strife prevails between youand the Turks, just so long will the English, French, and Americancapitalists be able to hold Turkey in check through the menace of anArmenian uprising and to use the Armenians as cannon-fodder through themenace of a pogrom by Kurds. 

"Peasants of Syria and Arabia! Independence was promised to you by theEnglish and the French, and now they hold your country occupied by theirarmies, now the English and the French dictate your laws, and you, whohave freed yourselves from the Turkish Sultan, from the ConstantinopleGovernment, are now slaves of the Paris and London Governments, whichmerely differ from the Sultan's Government in being stronger and betterable to exploit you. 

"You all understand this yourselves. The Persian peasants and workershave risen against their traitorous Teheran Government. The peasants inMesopotamia are in revolt against the English troops. You peasants inAnatolia have rushed to the banner of Kemal Pasha in order to fightagainst the foreign invasion, but at the same time we hear that you aretrying to organize your own party, a genuine peasants' party that willbe willing to fight even if the Pashas are to make their peace with theEntente exploiters. Syria has no peace, and you, Armenian peasants, whomthe Entente, despite its promises, allows to die from hunger in order tokeep you under better control, you are understanding more and more thatit is silly to hope for salvation by the Entente capitalists. Even yourbourgeois Government of the Dashnakists, the lackeys of the Entente, iscompelled to turn to the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russiawith an appeal for peace and help. 

"Peasants and workers of the Near East! If you organize yourselves, ifyou form your own Workers' and Peasants' Government, if you armyourselves, if you unite with the Red Russian Workers' and Peasants'Army, then you will be able to defy the English, French, and Americancapitalists, then you will settle accounts with your own nativeexploiters, then you will find it possible, in a free alliance with theworkers' republics of the world, to look after your own interests; thenyou will know how to exploit the resources of your country in your owninterest and in the interest of the working people of the whole world, that will honestly exchange the products of their labour and mutuallyhelp each other. 

"We want to talk over all these questions with you at the Congress inBaku. Spare no effort to appear in Baku on September 1 in as largenumbers as possible. You march, year in and year out, through thedeserts to the holy places where you show your respect for your past andfor your God--now march through deserts, over mountains, and acrossrivers in order to come together to discuss how you can escape from thebonds of slavery, how you can unite as brothers so as to live as men, free and equal. "

From this summons the nature of the Baku congress can be imagined. Itwas, in fact, a social revolutionist far more than a nationalistassembly. Of its 1900 delegates, nearly 1300 were professed communists. Turkey, Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus countries sent the largestdelegations, though there were also delegations from Arabia, India, andeven the Far East. The Russian Soviet Government was of course incontrol and kept a tight hand on the proceedings. The character of theseproceedings were well summarized by the address of the noted Bolshevikleader Zinoviev, president of the Executive Committee of the Third(Moscow) International, who presided. 

Zinoviev said:

"We believe this Congress to be one of the greatest events in history, for it proves not only that the progressive workers and working peasantsof Europe and America are awakened, but that we have at last seen theday of the awakening, not of a few, but of tens of thousands, ofhundreds of thousands, of millions of the labouring class of the peoplesof the East. These peoples form the majority of the world's wholepopulation, and they alone, therefore, are able to bring the warbetween capital and labour to a conclusive decision. . . . 

"The Communist International said from the very first day of itsexistence: 'There are four times as many people living in Asia as livein Europe. We will free all peoples, all who labour. '. . . We know thatthe labouring masses of the East are in part retrograde, though not bytheir own fault; they cannot read or write, are ignorant, are bound insuperstition, believe in the evil spirit, are unable to read anynewspapers, do not know what is happening in the world, have not theslightest idea of the most elementary laws of hygiene. Comrades, ourMoscow International discussed the question whether a socialistrevolution could take place in the countries of the East before thosecountries had passed through the capitalist stage. You know that theview which long prevailed was that every country must first go throughthe period of capitalism . . . Before socialism could become a livequestion. We now believe that this is no longer true. Russia has donethis, and from that moment we are able to say that China, India, Turkey, Persia, Armenia also can, and must, make a direct fight to get theSoviet System. These countries can, and must, prepare themselves to beSoviet republics. 

"I say that we give patient aid to groups of persons who do not believein our ideas, who are even opposed to us on some points. In this way, the Soviet Government supports Kemal in Turkey. Never for one moment dowe forget that the movement headed by Kemal is not a communist movement. We know it. I have here extracts from the verbatim reports of the firstsession of the Turkish people's Government at Angora. Kemal himself saysthat 'the Caliph's person is sacred and inviolable. ' The movement headedby Kemal wants to rescue the Caliph's 'sacred' person from the hands ofthe foe. That is the Turkish Nationalist's point of view. But is it acommunist point of view? No. We respect the religious convictions ofthe masses; we know how to re-educate the masses. It will be the work ofyears. 

"We use great caution in approaching the religious convictions of thelabouring masses in the East and elsewhere. But at this Congress we arebound to tell you that you must not do what the Kemal Government isdoing in Turkey; you must not support the power of the Sultan, not evenif religious considerations urge you to do so. You must press on, andmust not allow yourselves to be pulled back. We believe the Sultan'shour has struck. You must not allow any form of autocratic power tocontinue; you must destroy, you must annihilate, faith in the Sultan;you must struggle to obtain real Soviet organizations. The Russianpeasants also were strong believers in the Czar; but when a truepeople's revolution broke out there was practically nothing left of thisfaith in the Czar. The same thing will happen in Turkey and all over theEast as soon as a true peasants' revolution shall burst forth over thesurface of the black earth. The people will very soon lose faith intheir Sultan and in their masters. We say once more, the policy pursuedby the present people's Government in Turkey is not the policy of theCommunist International, it is not our policy; nevertheless, we declarethat we are prepared to support any revolutionary fight against theEnglish Government. 

"Yes, we array ourselves against the English bourgeoisie; we seize theEnglish imperialist by the throat and tread him underfoot. It is againstEnglish capitalism that the worst, the most fatal blow must be dealt. That is so. But at the same time we must educate the labouring masses ofthe East to hatred, to the will to fight the whole of the rich classesindifferently, whoever they be. The great significance of the revolutionnow starting in the East does not consist in begging the Englishimperialist to take his feet off the table, for the purpose of thenpermitting the wealthy Turk to place his feet on it all the morecomfortably; no, we will very politely ask all the rich to remove theirdirty feet from the table, so that there may be no luxuriousness amongus, no boasting, no contempt of the people, no idleness, but that theworld may be ruled by the worker's horny hand. "

The Baku congress was the opening gun in Bolshevism's avowed campaignfor the immediate Bolshevizing of the East. It was followed by increasedSoviet activity and by substantial Soviet successes, especially in theCaucasus, where both Georgia and Armenia were Bolshevized in the springof 1921. 

These very successes, however, awakened growing uneasiness among SovietRussia's nationalist protégés. The various Oriental nationalist parties, which had at first welcomed Moscow's aid so enthusiastically against theEntente Powers, now began to realize that Russian Bolshevism might proveas great a peril as Western imperialism to their patriotic aspirations. Of course the nationalist leaders had always realized Moscow's ultimategoal, but hitherto they had felt themselves strong enough to control thesituation and to take Russian aid without paying Moscow's price. Nowthey no longer felt so sure. The numbers of class-conscious"proletarians" in the East might be very small. The communist philosophymight be virtually unintelligible to the Oriental masses. Nevertheless, the very existence of Soviet Russia was a warning not to be disregarded. In Russia an infinitesimal communist minority, numbering, by its ownadmission, not much over 600, 000, was maintaining an unlimited despotismover 170, 000, 000 people. Western countries might rely on their populareducation and their staunch traditions of ordered liberty; the Eastpossessed no such bulwarks against Bolshevism. The East was, in fact, much like Russia. There was the same dense ignorance of the masses; thesame absence of a large and powerful middle class; the same tradition ofdespotism; the same popular acquiescence in the rule of ruthlessminorities. Finally, there were the ominous examples of SovietizedTurkestan and Azerbaidjan. In fine, Oriental nationalists bethought themof the old adage that he who sups with the devil needs a long spoon. 

Everywhere it has been the same story. In Asia Minor, Mustapha Kemal hasarrested Bolshevist propaganda agents, while Turkish and Russian troopshave more than once clashed on the disputed Caucasus frontiers. In Egyptwe have already seen how an amicable arrangement between Lord Milner andthe Egyptian nationalist leaders was facilitated by the latter's fear ofthe social revolutionary agitators who were inflaming the fellaheen. InIndia, Sir Valentine Chirol noted as far back as the spring of 1918 howRussia's collapse into Bolshevism had had a "sobering effect" on Indianpublic opinion. "The more thoughtful Indians, " he wrote, "now see howhelpless even the Russian _intelligentsia_ (relatively far more numerousand matured than the Indian _intelligentsia_) has proved to control thegreat ignorant masses as soon as the whole fabric of government has beenhastily shattered. "[304] In Afghanistan, likewise, the Ameer was losinghis love for his Bolshevist allies. The streams of refugees fromSovietized Turkestan that flowed across his borders for protection, headed by his kinsman the Ameer of Bokhara, made Amanullah Khan do somehard thinking, intensified by a serious mutiny of Afghan troops on theRussian border, the mutineers demanding the right to form Soldiers'Councils quite on the Russian pattern. Bolshevist agents might tempt himby the loot of India, but the Ameer could also see that that would dohim little good if he himself were to be looted and killed by his ownrebellious subjects. [305] Thus, as time went on, Oriental nationalistsand conservatives generally tended to close ranks in dislike andapprehension of Bolshevism. Had there been no other issue involved, there can be little doubt that Moscow's advances would have beenrepelled and Bolshevist agents given short shrift. 

Unfortunately, the Eastern nationalists feel themselves between theBolshevist devil and the Western imperialist deep sea. The upshot hasbeen that they have been trying to play off the one against theother--driven toward Moscow by every Entente aggression; driven towardthe West by every Soviet _coup_ of Lenin. Western statesmen shouldrealize this, and should remember that Bolshevism's best propagandistagent is, not Zinoviev orating at Baku, but General Gouraud, with hisSenegalese battalions and "strong-arm" methods in Syria and the Arabhinterland. 

Certainly, any extensive spread of Bolshevism in the East would be aterrible misfortune both for the Orient and for the world at large. Ifthe triumph of Bolshevism would mean barbarism in the West, in the Eastit would spell downright savagery. The sudden release of the ignorant, brutal Oriental masses from their traditional restraints of religion andcustom, and the submergence of the relatively small upper and middleclasses by the flood of social revolution would mean the destruction ofall Oriental civilization and culture, and a plunge into an abyss ofanarchy from which the East could emerge only after generations, perhapscenturies. 

FOOTNOTES:

[284] For these early forms of unrest, see A. Le Chatelier, _L'Islam audix-neuvième Siècle_, pp. 22-44 (Paris, 1888). 

[285] D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India, " _Economic Journal_, December, 1910. 

[286] Bipin Chandra Pal, "The Forces Behind the Unrest in India, "_Contemporary Review_, February, 1910. 

[287] J. Chailley, _Administrative Problems of British India_, p. 339(London, 1910--English translation). 

[288] Dr. Ronald Ross, "Wretchedness a Cause of Political Unrest, " _TheSurvey_, 18 February, 1911. 

[289] A. Yusuf Ali, _Life and Labour in India_, pp. 3, 32 (London, 1907). 

[290] E. W. Capen, "A Sociological Appraisal of Western Influence on theOrient, " _American Journal of Sociology_, May, 1911. 

[291] P. Khorat, "Psychologie de la Révolution chinoise, " _Revue desDeux Mondes_, 15 March, 1912; L. Bertrand, _Le Mirage orientale_, pp. 164-166; J. D. Rees, _The Real India_, pp. 162-163. 

[292] Albert Métin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Étude sociale_, p. 276(Paris, 1918). 

[293] Albert Métin, _L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Étude sociale_, pp. 339-345. 

[294] J. Ramsay Macdonald, _The Government of India_, pp. 133-134(London, 1920). 

[295] Georges Foucart. Quoted in _The Literary Digest_, 17 August, 1907, pp. 225-226. 

[296] A. Van Gennep, _En Algérie_, p. 182 (Paris, 1914). 

[297] _The Englishman_ (Calcutta). Quoted in _The Literary Digest_, 21February, 1914, p. 369. 

[298] For these larger world-aspects of Bolshevik propaganda, see PaulMiliukov, _Bolshevism: An International Danger_ (London, 1920); also, my_Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy_, pp. 218-221, andmy article, "Bolshevism: The Heresy of the Under-Man, " _The Century_, June, 1919. 

[299] See Chapter V. 

[300] See Chapter VI. 

[301] For events in Afghanistan and Central Asia, see Sir T. H. Holdich, "The Influence of Bolshevism in Afghanistan, " _New Europe_, December 4, 1919; Ikbal Ali Shah, "The Fall of Bokhara, " _The Near East_, October28, 1920, and his "The Central Asian Tangle, " _Asiatic Review_, October, 1920. For Bolshevist activity in the Near and Middle East generally, seeMiliukov, _op. Cit. _, pp. 243-260; 295-297; Major-General Sir GeorgeAston, "Bolshevik Propaganda in the East, " _Fortnightly Review_, August, 1920; W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present, " _QuarterlyReview_, October, 1920; Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting Policies inthe Near East, " _New Europe_, July 1, 1920; L. Dumont-Wilden, "AwakeningAsia, " _The Living Age_, August 7, 1920 (translated from the French);Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen, "Moslems and the Tangle in theMiddle East, " _National Review_, December, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Russiaat Peace, " _The Nation_ (New York), January 26, 1921; H. Von Hoff, "Dienationale Erhebung in der Türkei, " _Deutsche Revue_, December, 1919; R. G. Hunter, "Entente--Oil--Islam, " _New Europe_, August 26, 1920;"Taira, " "The Story of the Arab Revolt, " _Balkan Review_, August, 1920;"Voyageur, " "Lenin's Attempt to Capture Islam, " _New Europe_, June 10, 1920; Hans Wendt, "Ex Oriente Lux, " _Nord und Süd_, May, 1920; GeorgeYoung, "Russian Foreign Policy, " _New Europe_, July 1, 1920. 

[302] Ikbal Ali Shah, _op. Cit. _

[303] For events in the Caucasus, see W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present, " _Quarterly Review_, October, 1920; C. E. Bechhofer, "The Situation in the Transcaucasus, " _New Europe_, September 2, 1920;"D. Z. T. , " "L'Azerbaidjan: La Première République musulmane, " _Revue duMonde musulman_, 1919; Paxton Hibben, "Exit Georgia, " _The Nation_ (NewYork), March 30, 1921. 

[304] Sir V. Chirol, "India in Travail, " _Edinburgh Review_, July, 1918. Also see H. H. The Aga Khan, _India in Transition_, p. 17 (London, 1918). 

[305] Ikbal Ali Shah, _op. Cit. _

CONCLUSION

Our survey of the Near and Middle East is at an end. What is theoutstanding feature of that survey? It is: Change. The "Immovable East"has been moved at last--moved to its very depths. The Orient is to-dayin full transition, flux, ferment, more sudden and profound than any ithas hitherto known. The world of Islam, mentally and spirituallyquiescent for almost a thousand years, is once more astir, once more onthe march. 

Whither? We do not know. Who would be bold enough to prophesy theoutcome of this vast ferment--political, economical, social, religious, and much more besides? All that we may wisely venture is to observe, describe, and analyse the various elements in the great transition. 

Yet surely this is much. To view, however empirically, the mightytransformation at work; to group its multitudinous aspects in some sortof relativity; to follow the red threads of tendency running through thetangled skein, is to gain at least provisional knowledge and acquirecapacity to grasp the significance of future developments as they shallsuccessively arise. 

"To know is to understand"--and to hope: to hope that this presenttravail, vast and ill-understood, may be but the birth-pangs of a trulyrenascent East taking its place in a renascent world. 

INDEX

Aali Pasha, Pan-Islam agitation of, 54

Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, pro Turkish views of, 155; deposition of, 156; Pan-Arabianism supported by, 170

Abd-el-Kader, French resisted by, 41

Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, Pro-Germanism of, 156

Abd-el-Wahab, Mohammedan revival begun by, 21, 40; birth of, 21; early life of, 22 _ff. _; influence of, 22; death of, 22

Abdul Hamid, despotism of, 32; as caliph, 39; Sennussi's opposition to, 39, 46; Djemal-ed-Din protected by, 53 _ff. _; Pan-Islam policy of, 53 _ff. _; character of, 54 _ff. _; government of, 55; deposition of, 56, 119; tyrannical policy of, 116; nationalism opposed by, 139, 165; Arabs conciliated by, 142 _ff. _

Abu Bekr 22; policy of, 114 _ff. _

Abyssinian Church, Mohammedan threat against, 50

Afghanistan, religious uprisings in, 41; nineteenth-century independence of, 118; Bolshevism in, 286 _ff. _; rebellion of, 286_ff. _

Africa, Mohammedan missionary work in, 49 _ff. _ _See_ also North Africa

Agadir crisis, 57

Ahmed Bey Agayeff, Pan-Turanism aided by, 165

Alexandria, massacre of Europeans in, 149

Algeria, French conquest of, 40, 158; Kabyle insurrection in, 41; compulsory vaccination in, 95; liberal political aspirations in, 118 _ff. _; need for European government in, 122

Allenby, General, Egypt in control of, 177

Amanullah Khan, Bolshevism of, 286; war on England declared by, 286; present policy of, 298

Anatolia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 292

Anglo-Russian Agreement, terms of, 159 _ff. _

Arabi Pasha, Djemal-ed-Din's influence on, 148; revolution in Egypt headed by, 148

Arabia, description of natives of, 21; Turks fought by, 23; defeat of, 23; political freedom of, 113; democracy in, 127; nationalist spirit in, 140 _ff. _; Turkish rulers opposed by, 140 _ff. _; suppression of, 143; 1905 rebellion of, 143; effect of Young-Turk revolution on, 145 _ff. _; 1916 revolt of, 146; Pan-Arabism in, 145; religious character of Pan-Arab movement in, 169 _ff. _; effect of Great War on, 170, 183 _ff. _; Allied encouragement of, 184; peace terms and, 185; English agreement with, 185 _ff. _; revolt against Turks of, 185; secret partition of, 185 _ff. _; Colonel Lawrence's influence in, 186; secret treaties revealed to, 187; France and England in, 187 _ff. _; Mustapha Kemal aided by 194, _ff. _; English negotiations with, 198; Bolshevist manifesto to, 292

Arabian National Committee, creation of, 143

Archer William, on over-population in India, 263

Argyll, Duke of, over-population in India, 263

Armenia, Bolshevist manifesto to, 292

Arya Somaj, 208

Atchin War, 41

Azerbaidjan, Bolshevist revolution in, 290 _ff. _

Babbist movement in Persia, 274

Baber, Mogul Empire founded by, 204

Baku, Congress of Eastern Peoples at, 291, 297

Balkan War, 57; Mohammedans roused by, 58

Barbary States, French conquest of, 158

Bérard, Victor, on the enmity of Turks and Arabs, 141 _ff. _; France's Syrian policy criticised by, 199

Bertrand, Louis, anti-Western feeling in Orient described by, 95 _ff. _; on social conditions in the Levant, 269, 271

Bevan, Edwyn, nationalist views of, 125 _ff. _

Bin Saud, Ikhwan movement led by, 72

Bolshevism, effects on Orient of, 175; Mustapha Kemal aided by, 196 _ff. _; the East a field for, 283 _ff. _; propaganda of, 284 _ff. _, 288 _ff. _; Oriental policy of, 285; in Afghanistan, 286 _ff. _; manifesto to Mohammedans issued by, 288 _ff. _; manifesto to Turks issued by, 289 _ff. _; "Congress of Eastern Peoples" held by, 291 _ff. _

Bombay, English character of, 100; social conditions in, 270 _ff. _

Bose, Pramatha Nath, on economic conditions in India, 245 _ff. _

Brahminism, illiberalism of, 120

Brailsford, H. N. , on modern industry in Egypt, 236 _ff. _; on social conditions in Egypt, 269 _ff. _

British East India Company, 205

Bukhsh, S. Khuda, reform work of, 31 _ff. _; nationalism in India opposed by, 125 _ff. _; on Indian social conditions, 253 _ff. _

Caetani, Leone, 63

Cahun, Léon, Turanism and, 163

Cairo, revolt in, 178; modern women in, 258

Calcutta, English character of, 100; social conditions in, 270

Caliphate, Islam strengthened by, 38 _ff. _; history of, 39; Turkey the head of, 39 _ff. _

Chelmsford, Lord, report of, 216 _ff. _

China, Mohammedan insurrection in, 41, 51 _ff. _; Mohammedan missionary work in, 50; number of Mohammedans in, 51; Mohammedan agitation in, 60

Chirol, Valentine, Western influence in Orient described by, 79 _ff. _; on Egyptian situation, 179 _ff. _; Montagu-Chelmsford Report approved by, 220; on Egyptian conditions since the war, 271 _ff. _; on Bolshevism in India, 298

Congress of Eastern Peoples, 291 _ff. _

Constantine, King, recalled, 194

Constantinople, Allied occupation of, 192 _ff. _; changes since 1896 in, 251 _ff. _; status of women in, 258

Cox, Sir Percy, English-Arabian negotiations made by, 198; influence of, 200

Cromer, Lord, on Islam, 29, 32; Western influence in Orient described by, 80; ethics of imperialism formulated by, 84, 102, 120 _ff. _; Egyptian administration of, 149; resignation of, 152; on western-educated Egypt, 257; on over-population in India, 263

Curtis, Lionel, nationalism in India supported by, 130 _ff. _; Montagu-Chelmsford Report approved by, 220

Curzon-Wyllie, Sir, assassination of, 212

Damascus, French in, 191 _ff. _

Dar-ul-Islam, 171 _ff. _

Dickinson, G. Lowes, on Eastern economics, 249

Djemal-ed-Din, birth of, 52; character of, 52; anti-European work of, 52; in India, 52; in Egypt, 53; Abdul Hamid's protection of, 53 _ff. _; death of, 53; teachings of, 53 _ff. _; nationalism taught by, 138; Egypt influenced by, 148; in Russia, 285

Dutch East Indies, Mohammedan uprisings in, 41; Mohammedan missionary work in, 52

Egypt, nationalism in, 32, 118 _ff. _; Mahdist insurrection in, 41; 1914 insurrection of, 61; exiled Arabs in, 143; characteristics of people of, 147 _ff. _; early European influences in, 147; nationalist agitation in, 148 _ff. _; influence of Djemal-ed-Din in, 148; 1882 revolution in, 148 _ff. _; Lord Cromer's rule of, 149; France's influence in, 150 _ff. _; failure of English liberal policy in, 153 _ff. _; Lord Kitchener's rule in, 153 _ff. _; effect of outbreak of World War on, 155 _ff. _; made English protectorate, 156 _ff. _; Pan-Arabism in, 169; Versailles conference's treatment of, 174; nationalist demands of, 177; Allenby in control of, 177; rebellion of, 178 _ff. _; martial law in, 178; situation after rebellion in, 179 _ff. _; English commission of inquiry in, 181; English compromise with, 182; opposition to compromise in, 182 _ff. _; modern factories in, 234, 236; industrial conditions in, 236 _ff. _; social conditions in, 269; social revolution in, 281 _ff. _

El-Gharami, 30

El Mahdi, 42

England, Egypt's rebellion against, 175 _ff. _; Commission of Inquiry into Egyptian affairs appointed by, 181; Egyptian compromise with, 182; opposition to compromise in, 182; Arabia and, 184 _ff. _; in Mesopotamia, 185 _ff. _; in Palestine, 186; French disagreement with, 188 _ff. _; at San Remo conference, 190; Mesopotamian rebellion against, 192 _ff. _; Sèvres Treaty and, 193; Greek agreement with, 193; Arabian negotiation with, 198; in India, 204 _ff. _

Enver Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 167; in Russia, 285

Feisal, Prince, at peace conference, 187 _ff. _; peace counsels of, 188; made king of Syria, 191

Fisher, on social conditions in India, 270 _ff. _

France, Morocco seized by, 57; anti-British propaganda of, 150 _ff. _; Arabia and, 184; Syrian aspirations of, 185 _ff. _; at San Remo conference, 190; Syrian rebellion and, 191 _ff. _; Sèvres Treaty and, 193; Greek agreement with, 193; present Syrian situation of, 198 _ff. _

Gandhi, M. K. , boycott of England advocated by, 224

Gorst, Sir Eldon, Lord Cromer succeeded by, 152; failure of policy of, 153 _ff. _

Gouraud, General, Feisal subdued by, 191; danger in methods of, 299

Greece, anti-Turk campaign of, 193; Venizelos repudiated by, 194; Constantine supported by, 194

Habibullah Khan, Ameer, England supported by, 286; death of, 286

Haifa, to be British, 186

Hajj, Islam strengthened by, 38 _ff. _

Halil Pasha, Pan-Turanism and, 168

Hanotaux, Gabriel, 57

Harding, Lord, Indian nationalist movement supported by, 215

Hedjaz, Turkish dominion of, 140

Hindustan, Islam's appeal to 60; anti-Western feeling in, 99 _ff. _; illiberal tradition of, 120

Hunter, Sir William, on over-population in India, 263 _ff. _

Hussein Kamel, made Sultan of Egypt, 156

Ikhwan, beginning of, 71; progress of, 71

Imam Yahya, 199

India, reform of Islamism in, 30; English mastery of, 40; Islam's missionary work in, 52; 1914 insurrection in, 61; English towns and customs in, 100; effect of Russo-Japanese War in, 105, 210 _ff. _; liberal political aspirations in, 118 _ff. _; democracy introduced by England in, 122 _ff. _; opposition to nationalism in, 124 _ff. _, 218 _ff. _; support of nationalism in, 129 _ff. _, 136 _ff. _; history of, 201; Aryan invasion of, 201 _ff. _; beginning of caste system in, 202 _ff. _; Mohammedan invasion of, 203 _ff. _; Mogul Empire founded in, 204; British conquest of, 205 _ff. _; beginning of discontent in, 206 _ff. _; Hindu nationalist movement in, 208 _ff. _, 212 _ff. _; English liberal policy in, 213 _ff. _; result of outbreak of war in, 214; Montagu-Chelmsford Report in, 216 _ff. _; militant unrest in, 220 _ff. _; effect of Rowlatt Bill in, 222 _ff. _; English boycotted by, 223 _ff. _; present turmoil in, 224; industries in, 233 _ff. _; industrial conditions in, 237 _ff. _; industrial future of, 239 _ff. _; agriculture in, 243 _ff. _; Swadeshi movement in, 244 _ff. _; social conditions in, 253 _ff. _; status of women in, 254, 258 _ff. _; education in, 255 _ff. _; over-population in, 262 _ff. _; condition of peasants in, 269; city and rural life in, 275 _ff. _; economic revolution in, 276 _ff. _; attitude of Bolshevists toward, 289 _ff. _

Indian Councils Act, terms of, 213; effect of 213

Indian National Congress, 206

Islam, eighteenth-century decadence of, 20 _ff. _; revival of, 21; Christian opinions of, 26 _ff. _; present situation of, 27 _ff. _; agnosticism in, 32 _ff. _; fanatics in, 33 _ff. _; solidarity of, 37 _ff. _; Hajj an aid to, 38 _ff. _; caliphate an aid to, 38 _ff. _; Western successes against, 40; proselytism of, 48 _ff. _; effect of Balkan War on, 58 _ff. _; effect of Russo-Japanese War on, 59, 105 _ff. _; Western influence on, 75 _ff. _; anti-Western reaction of, 88 _ff. _; race mixture in, 102 _ff. _; tyranny in, 111 _ff. _; early equality in, 113 _ff. _; political reformation in, 115 _ff. _; birth of nationalism in, 137 _ff. _; Bolshevist propaganda in, 284 _ff. _ _See_ also Pan-Islam

Ismael, Hamet, on scepticism among Moslems, 32

Ismael, Khedive, tyrannical policy of, 116; Egypt Europeanized by, 147 _ff. _

Italy, Tripoli attacked by, 57; San Remo Treaty opposed by, 190, 193

Japan, Mohammedan missionary work in, 59 _ff. _

Jowf, Sennussi stronghold, 45

Kabyle insurrection, 41

Khadjar dynasty, Persian revolution against, 160

Kharadjites, Islamic spirit preserved by, 274

Khartum, capture of, 41

Kheir-ed-Din, attempt to regenerate Tunis made by, 89

Kitchener, Lord, Mahdist insurrection suppressed by, 41; anti-nationalist beliefs of, 122; nationalism in Egypt suppressed by, 153 _ff. _

Krishnavarma, S. , assassination commended by, 211

Lawrence, Colonel, influence of, 186; Arab-Turk agreement, views of, 194 _ff. _; Mesopotamia, views of, 197

Lebanon, France's control of, 184

Lenine, manifesto to Mohammedans issued by, 288 _ff. _

Low, Sidney, modern imperialism described by, 86 _ff. _; on Egyptian situation, 154

Lyall, Sir Alfred, on Western education in India, 256 _ff. _

Lybyer, Professor A. H. , democracy in Islam described by, 114, 127

Macdonald, J. Ramsay, on economic conditions in India, 245; on social revolution in India, 280 _ff. _

McIlwraith, Sir M. , on Egyptian situation, 180

McMahon, Sir Henry, agreement with Arabs made by, 185 _ff. _

Madras, English character of, 100

Mahdism, definition of, 42 _ff. _

Mahdist insurrection, 42

Mahmud II, Sultan, liberal policy of, 115

Mahmud of Ghazni, India invaded by, 204

Mecca, decadence of, 21; Abd-el-Wahab's pilgrimage to, 22; Saud's subjugation of, 23; Turkish reconquest of, 23; aid to strength of Islam, 38 _ff. _; post cards sold at, 251

Medina, decadence of, 21; Abd-el-Wahab's studies at, 22; Saud's subjugation of, 23; Turkish reconquest of, 23; electricity at, 251

Mehemet Ali, army of, 23; Turks aided by, 23; Wahabi defeated by, 23; liberal policy of, 115; Egypt Europeanized by, 147

Mesopotamia, Turkish dominion of, 140; England in, 184 _ff. _; rebellion against England of 192 _ff. _; denunciation of English policy in, 197; Bolshevists' manifesto issued to, 292

Métin, Albert, on nationalist movement in India, 279 _ff. _

Midhat Pasha, liberal movement aided by, 32

Milner, Lord, Egyptian inquiry commission headed by, 181; character of, 181; compromise agreed on by, 182 _ff. _; resignation of, 182; influence of, 200

Mogul Empire, foundation of, 204

Mohammed Abdou, Sheikh, liberal movement aided by, 32; Djemal-ed-Din's influence on, 148; conservative teachings of, 150

Mohammed Ahmed, Sennussi's scorn of, 46

Mohammed Farid Bey, anti-English policy of, 152; mistakes of, 152 _ff. _; pro German policy of, 156

Mohammedan Revival. _See_ Pan-Islam

Mollahs, anti-liberalism of, 30

Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 217 _ff. _

Montagu, liberal policy of, 216 _ff. _

Morison, Sir Theodore, on Moslem situation, 67, 70 _ff. _; on modern industry in India, 234 _ff. _, 245

Morley, John, liberal policy of, 213

Morocco, French seizure of, 57, 158; in nineteenth century, 118

Motazelism, re-discovery of, 26; influence of, 30

Moulvie Cheragh Ali, reform work of, 31

Muhammed Ali, Shah, revolt in Persia against, 119

Muir, Ramsay, European imperialism described by, 83

Mustapha Kemal, character of, 150; beliefs of, 151 _ff. _; death of, 151; Allies defied by, 191; Turkish denunciation of, 193; Greek campaign against, 193 _ff. _; Arab aid given to, 194 _ff. _; policy of, 196; Bolshevists allied with, 196 _ff. _; French negotiations with, 199; Bolshevist support of, 286, 295

Mutiny of 1857, 205

Nair, Doctor T. Madavan, anti-nationalist opinions of, 124, 219

Nakechabendiya fraternity, 41

Namasudra, anti-nationalist organization, 124, 219

Nejd, birth of Abd-el-Wahab in, 21 _ff. _; description of, 21 _ff. _; return of Abd-el-Wahab to, 22; conversion of, 22; consolidation of, 23

Nitti, Premier, San Remo Treaty opposed by, 190 _ff. _

North Africa, "Holy Men" insurrection in, 41; lack of nationalism in, 157 _ff. _; races in, 158 _ff. _

Nyassaland, Mohammedanism in, 49 _ff. _

Orient, _See_ Islam

Pal, Bepin Chander, on Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 218; on social revolution in India, 277

Palestine, Sykes-Picot Agreement and, 185; England in, 185

Pan-Islam, fanatics' scheme for, 33 _ff. _; definition of, 37 _ff. _; Hajj an aid to, 38 _ff. _; caliphate an aid to, 39 _ff. _; anti-Western character of, 41 _ff. _; fraternities in, 43 _ff. _; Abdul Hamid's support of, 54 _ff. _; Young-Turk interruption of, 56; renewal of, 57 _ff. _; effect of Balkan War on, 58 _ff. _; Great War and, 61 _ff. _; Versailles Treaty and, 62 _ff. _; press strength of, 67; propaganda of, 67; menacing temper of, 70 _ff. _; economic evolution in, 72 _ff. _

Pan-Syrian Congress, 191

Pan-Turanism. _See_ Turanians

Pan-Turkism, _See_ Turkey, rise of nationalism in

Persia, 1914 insurrection in, 61; an English protectorate, 62; tyranny in, 116; independence of, 118; liberal movement in, 118; 1908 revolution in, 119, 159 _ff. _; need for European government in, 122; nineteenth-century conditions in, 159; Versailles conference's treatment of, 174 _ff. _; war conditions in, 196; Bolshevism in, 196 _ff. _, 287 _ff. _; Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 291

_Population Problem of India, The_, 264

Ramsay, Sir William, on economic conditions in Asia Minor, 241 _ff. _

_Realpolitik_, treatment of Orient by, 86, 106

Reshid Pasha, liberal movement aided by, 32

Roushdi Pasha, nationalist demands of, 177 _ff. _

Rowlatt Bill, nationalist opposition to, 222 _ff. _

Russia, Turanian antagonism for, 167 _ff. _ _See_ also Bolshevism and Soviet Russia

Russo-Japanese War, Islam roused by, 59, 105

Salafî, rise and growth of, 72; spirit of, 72

San Remo, conference at, 190 _ff. _

Saud, Abd-el-Wahab succeeded by, 22; power and character of, 22; government of, 22, 40; holy cities subdued by, 23; death of, 23

Saud, clan of, converted, 24

Schweinfurth, Georg, Egyptian nationalism described by, 149 _ff. _

Sennussi-el-Mahdi, leadership won by, 44; power of, 45

Sennussiya, foundation of, 43 _ff. _; leadership of, 45; present power of, 45 _ff. _; government of, 45; policy of, 46 _ff. _; proselytism of, 48 _ff. _

Sèvres Treaty, 193, 199

Seyid Ahmed, state in India founded by, 24; conquest of, 24

Seyid Ahmed Khan, Sir, reforms of, 30

Seyid Amir Ali, reform work of, 31

Seyid Mahommed ben Sennussi, in Mecca, 24, 39; Abdul Hamid opposed by, 39, 44; birth of, 44; education of, 44; "Zawias" built by, 44; power of, 44 _ff. _

Shamyl, Russia opposed by, 41

Shiah Emir, 199

Shuster, W. Morgan, Persia's political capacity described by, 127 _ff. _

South Africa, Mohammedan threat against, 49

Soviet Russia, Afghanistan allied with, 287 _ff. _; Kemal supported by, 295; success of, 297 _ff. _

Sun-Yat-Sen, Doctor, 60

Sydenham, Lord, Montagu-Chelmsford Report criticised by, 219

Swadeshi movement, 244 _ff. _

Sykes-Picot Agreement, terms of, 185 _ff. _; French opposition to, 189 _ff. _; fulfilment of, 190

Syria, Turkish dominion of, 140; nationalist agitation in, 142 _ff. _; France in, 184 _ff. _; declaration of independence of, 191; French suppression of, 191; present situation in, 198 _ff. _; Bolshevist manifesto issued to, 293

Tagore, Rabindranath, on economic conditions in India, 248

Talaat, in Russia, 285

Tartars, liberal movement among, 32; Mohammedan missionary work among, 50 _ff. _; nationalist revival of, 163 _ff. _; Bolshevism among, 285

Tekin Alp, on Pan-Turanism, 167

Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 149

Tewfik Pasha, anti-English feeling of, 92

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, nationalist work of, 210, 218

Townsend, Meredith, anti-Western feeling in Orient explained by, 102, 104

Transcaucasia, Russian conquest of, 40; after-the-war situation in, 196; Mustapha Kemal supported by, 196

Tripoli, Italy's raid on, 57; Mohammedan resistance in, 57; 1914 insurrection in, 61

Tunis, Kheir-ed-Din's reforms in, 89 _ff. _

Turanians, peoples composing, 162 _ff. _; nationalist movement among, 163 _ff. _; effect of Young-Turk Revolution on, 165; effect of Balkan Wars on, 166 _ff. _; effect of Great War on, 167 _ff. _

Turkestan, Bolshevism in, 286; social revolution in, 290

Turkestan, Chinese, Mohammedans in, 51; revolt of, 51

Turkey, Islam conquered by, 23; Arabs war against, 23 _ff. _; Mehemet Ali's aid of, 28; liberal movement in, 31 _ff. _; 1908 revolution in, 32, 119; Balkan attack on, 57 _ff. _; anti-Western feeling in, 90 _ff. _; effect of Russo-Japanese War in, 106; independence of, 118; liberal movement in, 118; democracy in, 126; birth of nationalism in, 138; language of, 138; Pan-Turanism in, 140 _ff. _, 161 _ff. _, 183 _ff. _; Arabian rebellion against, 141 _ff. _; Allied treaty with, 193; Arab aid given to, 194 _ff. _; Western educational methods in, 256; status of women in, 258; Bolshevists' manifesto to, 289 _ff. _

_Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal, The_, 167

Vambéry, Arminius, warning against Mohammedans uttered by, 65 _ff. _, 107; Moslem politics described by, 114, 126; Young-Turk party described by, 117; Turanism and, 63; on changes at Constantinople, 251 _ff. _; on native officials in East, 257 _ff. _; on status of woman in East, 259;

Venizelos, Allied agreement with, 193; Greek repudiation of, 194

Versailles Peace, Islam affected by 107 _ff. _, 173; secret treaties revealed by, 174 _ff. _

Victoria, Queen, made Empress of India, 205

Wacha, Sir Dinshaw, on Montagu-Chelmsford Report 217 _ff. _

Wahabi, formation of state of, 22, 40; government of, 22, 41; successful fighting of, 23; defeat of, 23; end of political power of, 23; spiritual power of, 24; in India, 24; English conquest of, in India, 24; influence of, 24; characteristics of, 25 _ff. _

Wattal, P. K. , on over-population in India, 264 _ff. _

Willcocks, Sir William, on Egyptian situation, 179

Yahya Siddyk, on pro-war Mohammedan situation, 68 _ff. _

Yakub Beg, Turkestan insurrection led by, 51

Young Arabia, 143 _ff. _

Young-Turk party, rise of, 116 _ff. _; nationalist policy of, 140; Arabian nationalism and, 145 _ff. _

Young-Turk revolution, 56, 119

_Yugantar_, anti-English organ, 211 _ff. _

Yunnan, Mohammedan insurrection in, 41, 51 _ff. _; Chinese Mohammedans in, 51

Yusuf Bey Akchura Oglu, Pan-Turanian society founded by, 165

Zagloul Pasha, Milner's discussions with, 181; Milner's compromise with, 182; opposition to, 182 _ff. _

Zaidite Emir, 199

Zawia Baida, Sennussi's founding of, 44

Zinoviev, on Third International, 294 _ff. _

[Illustration: THE WORLD OF ISLAM]

TRANSCRIBERS' NOTES

General: Accents and capitalisation, particularly on cited sources, havebeen left as in the original. 

Pages 8, 274, 303: Spelling of Kharijites/Kharidjites/Kharadjites leftas in source. 

Page 21: Inquity replaced with iniquity. 

Page 39: Hyphen added to El-Afghani for consistency. 

Page 45: Zawais corrected to Zawias. 

Page 49: Hyphen removed from repercussions for consistency. 

Page 94: Hyphen removed from easy-going. 

Footnote 257: Italicisation removed from March following The Century. 

Footnotes 257 and 259 (originally on page 261): Full-stop (period) addedafter op (in op. Cit. ) for consistency. 

Page 290: Hyphen added to oil-fields for consistency.