The Naval War of 1812 or the History of the United States Navy during the Last War with Great Britain to Which Is Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans By Theodore Roosevelt With an Introduction by Edward K. Eckert CONTENTS List of Illustrations Acknowledgments Introduction _The Naval War of 1812_ Index ILLUSTRATIONS Captain Isaac Hull _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "The Engagement" _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "In Action" _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "Dropping Astern" _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_: "She Fell in the Sea" _Wasp_ vs. _Frolic_ Captain Stephen Decatur Captain William Bainbridge _Constitution_ vs. _Java_ Captain James Lawrence _Chesapeake_ vs. _Shannon_ _Argus_ vs. _Pelican_ The Battle of Lake Erie The _Essex_ Captain David Porter Master Commandant Lewis Warrington Captain Samuel C. Reid The Battle of Lake Borgne Commodore Thomas Macdonough Capture of the _President_ Captain Charles Stewart _Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_ Master Commandant James Biddle _Hornet_ vs. _Penguin_ ACKNOWLEDGMENTS For their amiable and expert assistance in the selection of theillustrations in this volume, thanks are due to Mr. James W. Cheevers, curator of the U. S. Naval Academy Museum; Ms. Sigrid Trumpy, curator ofthe museum's Beverley R. Robinson Collection of naval prints; and Mrs. Patty Maddocks, director of the Naval Institute Library and PhotographicService. JS PREFACE The history of the naval events of the War of 1812 has been repeatedlypresented both to the American and the English reader. Historicalwriters have treated it either in connection with a general account ofthe contest on land and sea, or as forming a part of the complete recordof the navies of the two nations. A few monographs, which confinethemselves strictly to the naval occurrences, have also appeared. Butnone of these works can be regarded as giving a satisfactorily full orimpartial account of the war--some of them being of he "popular" andloosely-constructed order, while others treat it from a purely partisanstandpoint. No single book can be quoted which would be accepted by themodern reader as doing justice to both sides, or, indeed, as tellingthe whole story. Any one specially interested in the subject must readall; and then it will seem almost a hopeless task to reconcile themany and widely contradictory statements he will meet with. There appear to be three works which, taken in combination, give thebest satisfaction on the subject. First, in James' "Naval History ofGreat Britain" (which supplies both the material and the opinions ofalmost every subsequent English or Canadian historian) can be foundthe British view of the case. It is an invaluable work, written withfulness and care; on the other hand it is also a piece of specialpleading by a bitter and not over-scrupulous partisan. This, in thesecond place, can be partially supplemented by Fenimore Cooper's"Naval History of the United States. " The latter gives the Americanview of the cruises and battles; but it is much less of an authoritythan James', both because it is written without great regard forexactness, and because all figures for the American side need to besupplied from Lieutenant (now Admiral) George E. Emmons' statistical"History of the United States Navy, " which is the third of the worksin question. But even after comparing these three authors, many contradictionsremain unexplained, and the truth can only be reached in such casesby a careful examination of the navy "Records, " the London "NavalChronicle, " "Niles' Register, " and other similar documentarypublications. Almost the only good criticisms on the actions arethose incidentally given in standard works on other subjects, such asLord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery, " and Admiral Jurien de laGravière's "Guerres Maritimes. " Much of the material in our NavyDepartment has never been touched at all. In short, no full, accurate, and unprejudiced history of the war has ever been written. The subject merits a closer scrutiny than it has received. At presentpeople are beginning to realize that it is folly for the greatEnglish-speaking Republic to rely for defence upon a navy composedpartly of antiquated hulks, and partly of new vessels rather moreworthless than the old. It is worth while to study with some carethat period of our history during which our navy stood at the highestpitch of its fame; and to learn any thing from the past it is necessaryto know, as near as may be, the exact truth. Accordingly the workshould be written impartially, if only from the narrowest motives. Without abating a jot from one's devotion to his country and flag, I think a history can be made just enough to warrant its beingreceived as an authority equally among Americans and Englishmen. Ihave endeavored to supply such a work. It is impossible that errors, both of fact and opinion, should not have crept into it; andalthough I have sought to make it in character as non-partisan aspossible, these errors will probably be in favor of the Americanside. As my only object is to give an accurate narrative of events, I shallesteem it a particular favor if any one will furnish me with themeans of rectifying such mistakes; and if I have done injustice toany commander, or officer of any grade, whether American or British, I shall consider myself under great obligations to those who will setme right. I have been unable to get access to the original reports of theBritish commanders, the logs of the British ships, or theirmuster-rolls, and so have been obliged to take them at second handfrom the "Gazette, " or "Naval Chronicle, " or some standard history. The American official letters, log-books, original contracts, muster-rolls, etc. , however, being preserved in the Archives atWashington, I have been able, thanks to the courtesy of the Hon. Wm. H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, to look them over. The set ofletters from the officers is very complete, in three series, --"Captains'Letters, " "Masters' Commandant Letters, " and "Officers' Letters, "there being several volumes for each year. The books of contractscontain valuable information as to the size and build of some ofthe vessels. The log-books are rather exasperating, often being veryincomplete. Thus when I turned from Decatur's extremely vagueofficial letter describing the capture of the Macedonian to thelog-book of the Frigate _United States_, not a fact about the fightcould be gleaned. The last entry in the log on the day of the fightis "strange sail discovered to be a frigate under English colors, "and the next entry (on the following day) relates to the removalof the prisoners. The log of the _Enterprise_ is very full indeed, for most of the time, but is a perfect blank for the period duringwhich she was commanded by Lieutenant Burrows, and in which shefought the Boxer. I have not been able to find the Peacock's logat all, though there is a very full set of letters from her commander. Probably the fire of 1837 destroyed a great deal of valuable material. When ever it was possible I have referred to printed matter inpreference to manuscript, and my authorities can thus, in most cases, be easily consulted. In conclusion I desire to express my sincerestthanks to Captain James D. Bulloch, formerly of the United StatesNavy, and Commander Adolf Mensing, formerly of the German Navy, without whose advice and sympathy this work would probably neverhave been written or even begun. NEW YORK CITY, 1882. PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION I originally intended to write a companion volume to this, whichshould deal with the operations on land. But a short examinationshowed that these operations were hardly worth serious study. They teach nothing new; it is the old, old lesson, that a miserlyeconomy in preparation may in the end involve a lavish outlay ofmen and money, which, after all, comes too late to more than partiallyoffset the evils produced by the original short-sighted parsimony. This might be a lesson worth dwelling on did it have any practicalbearing on the issues of the present day; but it has none, as faras the army is concerned. It was criminal folly for Jefferson, andhis follower Madison, to neglect to give us a force either of regularsor of well-trained volunteers during the twelve years they had inwhich to prepare for the struggle that any one might see wasinevitable; but there is now far less need of an army than there wasthen. Circumstances have altered widely since 1812. Instead of thedecaying might of Spain on our southern frontier, we have the stillweaker power of Mexico. Instead of the great Indian nations of theinterior, able to keep civilization at bay, to hold in check strongarmies, to ravage large stretches of territory, and needingformidable military expeditions to overcome them, there are now onlyleft broken and scattered bands, which are sources of annoyancemerely. To the north we are still hemmed in by the Canadianpossessions of Great Britain; but since 1812 our strength hasincreased so prodigiously, both absolutely and relatively, whileEngland's military power has remained almost stationary, that weneed now be under no apprehensions from her land-forces; for, evenif checked in the beginning, we could not help conquering in theend by sheer weight of numbers, if by nothing else. So that thereis now no cause for our keeping up a large army; while, on thecontrary, the necessity for an efficient navy is so evident thatonly our almost incredible short-sightedness prevents our at oncepreparing one. Not only do the events of the war on land teach very little to thestatesman who studies history in order to avoid in the present themistakes of the past, but besides this, the battles and campaignsare of little interest to the student of military matters. The Britishregulars, trained in many wars, thrashed the raw troops opposed tothem whenever they had any thing like a fair chance; but this is notto be wondered at, for the same thing has always happened the worldover under similar conditions. Our defeats were exactly such asany man might have foreseen, and there is nothing to be learnedfrom the follies committed by incompetent commanders and untrainedtroops when in the presence of skilled officers having under themdisciplined soldiers. The humiliating surrenders, abortive attacks, and panic routs of our armies can all be paralleled in the campaignswaged by Napoleon's marshals against the Spaniards and Portuguesein the years immediately preceding the outbreak of our own war. ThePeninsular troops were as little able to withstand the French veteransas were our militia to hold their own against the British regulars. But it must always be remembered, to our credit, that while sevenyears of fighting failed to make the Spaniards able to face theFrench, [Footnote: At the closing battle of Toulouse, fought betweenthe allies and the French, the flight of the Spaniards was so rapidand universal as to draw from the Duke of Wellington the bitterobservation, that "though he had seen a good many remarkable thingsin the course of his life, yet this was the first time he had everseen ten thousand men running a race. "] two years of warfare gave ussoldiers who could stand against the best men of Britain. On thenorthern frontier we never developed a great general, --Brown's claimto the title rests only on his not having committed the phenomenalfollies of his predecessors, --but by 1814 our soldiers had becomeseasoned, and we had acquired some good brigade commanders, notablyScott, so that in that year we played on even terms with the British. But the battles, though marked by as bloody and obstinate fightingas ever took place, were waged between small bodies of men, and werenot distinguished by any feats of generalship, so that they are notof any special interest to the historian. In fact, the only reallynoteworthy feat of arms of the war took place at New Orleans, andthe only military genius that the struggle developed was AndrewJackson. His deeds are worthy of all praise, and the battle he wonwas in many ways so peculiar as to make it well worth a much closerstudy than it has yet received. It was by far the most prominentevent of the war; it was a victory which reflected high honor onthe general and soldiers who won it, and it was in its way asremarkable as any of the great battles that took place about thesame time in Europe. Such being the case, I have devoted a chapterto its consideration at the conclusion of the chapters devoted tothe naval operations. As before said, the other campaigns on land do not deserve veryminute attention; but, for the sake of rendering the account of thebattle of New Orleans more intelligible, I will give a hasty sketchof the principal engagements that took place elsewhere. The war opened in mid-summer of 1812, by the campaign of GeneralHull on the Michigan frontier. With two or three thousand rawtroops he invaded Canada. About the same time Fort Mackinaw wassurrendered by its garrison of 60 Americans to a British and Indianforce of 600. Hull's campaign was unfortunate from the beginning. Near Brownstown the American Colonel Van Horne, with some 200 men, was ambushed and routed by Tecumseh and his Indians. In revengeCol. Miller, with 600 Americans, at Maguaga attacked 150 Britishand Canadians under Capt. Muir, and 250 Indians under Tecumseh, and whipped them, --Tecumseh's Indians standing their ground longest. The Americans lost 75, their foes 180 men. At Chicago the smallforce of 66 Americans was surprised and massacred by the Indians. Meanwhile, General Brock, the British commander, advanced againstHull with a rapidity and decision that seemed to paralyze hissenile and irresolute opponent. The latter retreated to Detroit, where, without striking a blow, he surrendered 1, 400 men to Brock'snearly equal force, which consisted nearly one half of Indians underTecumseh. On the Niagara frontier, an estimable and honest oldgentleman and worthy citizen, who knew nothing of military matters, Gen. Van Rensselaer, tried to cross over and attack the British atQueenstown; 1, 100 Americans got across and were almost all killed orcaptured by a nearly equal number of British, Canadians, and Indians, while on the opposite side a large number of their countrymen lookedon, and with abject cowardice refused to cross to their assistance. The command of the army was then handed over to a ridiculouspersonage named Smythe, who issued proclamations so bombastic thatthey really must have come from an unsound mind, and then made aludicrously abortive effort at invasion, which failed almost ofits own accord. A British and Canadian force of less than 400 menwas foiled in an assault on Ogdensburg, after a slight skirmish, by about 1, 000 Americans under Brown; and with this triflingsuccess the military operations of the year came to an end. Early in 1813, Ogdensburg was again attacked, this time by between500 and 600 British, who took it after a brisk resistance from some300 militia; the British lost 60 and the Americans 20, in killedand wounded. General Harrison, meanwhile, had begun the campaignin the Northwest. At Frenchtown, on the river Raisin, Winchester'scommand of about 900 Western troops was surprised by a force of1, 100 men, half of them Indians, under the British Colonel Proctor. The right division, taken by surprise, gave up at once; the leftdivision, mainly Kentucky riflemen, and strongly posted in housesand stockaded enclosures, made a stout resistance, and onlysurrendered after a bloody fight, in which 180 British and abouthalf as many Indians were killed or wounded. Over 300 Americanswere slain, some in battle, but most in the bloody massacre thatfollowed. After this, General Harrison went into camp at Fort Meigs, where, with about 1, 100 men, he was besieged by 1, 000 British andCanadians under Proctor and 1, 200 Indians under Tecumseh. A forceof 1, 200 Kentucky militia advanced to his relief and tried to cutits way into the fort while the garrison made a sortie. The sortiewas fairly successful, but the Kentuckians were scattered likechaff by the British regulars in the open, and when broken werecut to pieces by the Indians in the woods. Nearly two thirds ofthe relieving troops were killed or captured; about 400 got intothe fort. Soon afterward Proctor abandoned the siege. Fort Stephenson, garrisoned by Major Croghan and 160 men, was attacked by a forceof 391 British regulars, who tried to carry it by assault, andwere repulsed with the loss of a fourth of their number. Some fourthousand Indians joined Proctor, but most of them left him afterPerry's victory on Lake Erie. Then Harrison, having received largereinforcements, invaded Canada. At the River Thames his army of 3, 500men encountered and routed between 600 and 700 British under Proctor, and about 1, 000 Indians under Tecumseh. The battle was decided atonce by a charge of the Kentucky mounted riflemen, who broke throughthe regulars, took them in rear, and captured them, and thendismounting attacked the flank of the Indians, who were alsoassailed by the infantry. Proctor escaped by the skin of his teethand Tecumseh died fighting, like the hero that he was. This battleended the campaign in the Northwest. In this quarter it must beremembered that the war was, on the part of the Americans, mainlyone against Indians; the latter always forming over half of theBritish forces. Many of the remainder were French Canadians, andthe others were regulars. The American armies, on the contrary, were composed of the armed settlers of Kentucky and Ohio, nativeAmericans, of English speech and blood, who were battling for landsthat were to form the heritage of their children. In the West thewar was only the closing act of the struggle that for many yearshad been waged by the hardy and restless pioneers of our race, aswith rifle and axe they carved out the mighty empire that we theirchildren inherit; it was but the final effort with which they wrestedfrom the Indian lords of the soil the wide and fair domain that nowforms the heart of our great Republic. It was the breaking down ofthe last barrier that stayed the flood of our civilization; itsettled, once and for ever, that henceforth the law, the tongue, and the blood of the land should be neither Indian, nor yet French, but English. The few French of the West were fighting against arace that was to leave as little trace of them as of the doomedIndian peoples with whom they made common cause. The presence ofthe British mercenaries did not alter the character of the contest;it merely served to show the bitter and narrow hatred with whichthe Mother-Island regarded her greater daughter, predestined asthe latter was to be queen of the lands that lay beyond the Atlantic. Meanwhile, on Lake Ontario, the Americans made successful descentson York and Fort George, scattering or capturing their comparativelysmall garrisons; while a counter descent by the British on Sackett'sHarbor failed, the attacking force being too small. After the captureof Fort George, the Americans invaded Canada; but their advance guard, 1, 400 strong, under Generals Chandler and Winder, was surprised inthe night by 800 British, who, advancing with the bayonet, broke upthe camp, capturing both the generals and half the artillery. Thoughthe assailants, who lost 220 of their small number, suffered muchmore than the Americans, yet the latter were completely demoralized, and at once retreated to Fort George. Soon afterward, Col. Boerstlerwith about 600 men surrendered with shamefully brief resistance toa somewhat smaller force of British and Indians. Then about 300British crossed the Niagara to attack Black Rock, which they took, but were afterward driven off by a large body of militia with theloss of 40 men. Later in the season the American General McClurewantonly burned the village of Newark, and then retreated in panicflight across the Niagara. In retaliation the British in turn crossedthe river; 600 regulars surprised and captured in the night FortNiagara, with its garrison of 400 men; two thousand troops attackedBlack Rock, and after losing over a hundred men in a smart engagementwith somewhat over 1, 500 militia whom they easily dispersed, capturedand burned both it and Buffalo. Before these last events took placeanother invasion of Canada had been attempted, this time under GeneralWilkinson, "an unprincipled imbecile, " as Scott very properlystyled him. It was mismanaged in every possible way, and was atotal failure; it was attended with but one battle, that of Chrystler'sFarm, in which 1, 000 British, with the loss of less than 200 men, beat back double their number of Americans, who lost nearly 500 menand also one piece of artillery. The American army near LakeChamplain had done nothing, its commander, General Wade Hampton, being, if possible, even more incompetent than Wilkinson. He remainedstationary while a small force of British plundered Plattsburg andBurlington; then, with 5, 000 men he crossed into Canada, but returnedalmost immediately, after a small skirmish at Chauteaugay betweenhis advance guard and some 500 Canadians, in which the former lost41 and the latter 22 men. This affair, in which hardly a tenth ofthe American force was engaged, has been, absurdly enough, designateda "battle" by most British and Canadian historians. In reality itwas the incompetency of their general and not the valor of theirfoes that caused the retreat of the Americans. The same comment, by the way, applies to the so-called "Battle" of Plattsburg, in thefollowing year, which may have been lost by Sir George Prevost, butwas certainly not won by the Americans. And, again, a similarcriticism should be passed on General Wilkinson's attack on LaColle Mill, near the head of the same lake. Neither one of thethree affairs was a stand-up fight; in each a greatly superiorforce, led by an utterly incapable general, retreated after a slightskirmish with an enemy whose rout would have been a matter ofcertainty had the engagement been permitted to grow serious. In the early spring of 1814 a small force of 160 American regulars, under Captain Holmes, fighting from behind felled logs, routed 200British with a loss of 65 men, they themselves losing but 8. OnLake Ontario the British made a descent on Oswego and took it byfair assault; and afterward lost 180 men who tried to cut out someAmerican transports, and were killed or captured to a man. Allthrough the spring and early summer the army on the Niagara frontierwas carefully drilled by Brown, and more especially by Scott, andthe results of this drilling were seen in the immensely improvedeffectiveness of the soldiers in the campaign that opened in July. Fort Erie was captured with little resistance, and on the 4th ofJuly, at the river Chippeway, Brown, with two brigades of regulars, each about 1, 200 strong, under Scott and Ripley, and a brigade of800 militia and Indians under Porter, making a total of about 3, 200men, won a stand-up fight against the British General Riall, whohad nearly 2, 500 men, 1, 800 of them regulars. Porter's brigadeopened by driving in the Canadian militia and the Indians; but wasitself checked by the British light-troops. Ripley's brigade tookvery little part in the battle, three of the regiments not beingengaged at all, and the fourth so slightly as to lose but five men. The entire brunt of the action was borne by Scott's brigade, whichwas fiercely attacked by the bulk of the British regulars underRiall. The latter advanced with great bravery, but were terriblycut up by the fire of Scott's regulars; and when they had comenearly up to him, Scott charged with the bayonet and drove themclean off the field. The American loss was 322, including 23 Indians;the British loss was 515, excluding that of the Indians. The numberof Americans actually engaged did not exceed that of the British;and Scott's brigade, in fair fight, closed by a bayonet charge, defeated an equal force of British regulars. On July 25th occurred the Battle of Niagara, or Lundy's Lane, foughtbetween General Brown with 3, 100 [Footnote: As near as can be foundout; most American authorities make it much less; Lossing, forexample, says only 2, 400. ] Americans and General Drummond with3, 500 [Footnote: General Drummond in his official letter makes itbut 2, 800; James, who gives the details, makes it 3, 000 rank andfile; adding 13 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and drummers, brings it up to 3, 400; and we still have to count in the artillerydrivers, etc. ] British. It was brought on by accident in the evening, and was waged with obstinate courage and savage slaughter tillmidnight. On both sides the forces straggled into action bydetachments. The Americans formed the attacking party. As before, Scott's brigade bore the brunt of the fight, and over half of hismen were killed or wounded; he himself was disabled and borne fromthe field. The struggle was of the most desperate character, thecombatants showing a stubborn courage that could not be surpassed. [Footnote: General Drummond writes: "In so determined a manner weretheir attacks directed against our guns that our artillerymen werebayoneted while in the act of loading, and the muzzle of the enemy'sguns were advanced within a few yards of ours. " Even James says:"Upon the whole, however, the American troops fought bravely; and theconduct of many of the officers, of the artillery corps especially, would have done honor to any service. "] Charge after charge was madewith the bayonet, and the artillery was taken and retaken once andagain. The loss was nearly equal; on the side of the Americans, 854 men (including Generals Brown and Scott, wounded) and two guns;on that of the British, 878 men (including General Riall captured)and one gun. Each side claimed it as a victory over superior numbers. The truth is beyond question that the British had the advantage innumbers, and a still greater advantage in position; while it isequally beyond question that it was a defeat and not a victory forthe Americans. They left the field and retired in perfect order toFort Erie, while the British held the field and the next day pursuedtheir foes. Having received some reinforcements General Drummond, now withabout 3, 600 men, pushed forward to besiege Fort Erie, in which wasthe American army, some 2, 400 strong, under General Gaines. Col. Tucker with 500 British regulars was sent across the Niagara todestroy the batteries at Black Rock, but was defeated by 300American regulars under Major Morgan, fighting from behind a strongbreastwork of felled trees, with a creek in front. On the night ofthe 15th of August, the British in three columns advanced to stormthe American works, but after making a most determined assaultwere beaten off. The assailants lost 900 men, the assailed about80. After this nothing was done till Sept. 17th, when GeneralBrown, who had resumed command of the American forces, determinedupon and executed a sortie. Each side had received reinforcements;the Americans numbered over 3, 000, the British nearly 4, 000. Thefighting was severe, the Americans losing 500 men; but theiropponents lost 600 men, and most of their batteries were destroyed. Each side, as usual, claimed the victory; but, exactly as Lundy'sLane must be accounted an American defeat, as our forces retreatedfrom the ground, so this must be considered an American victory, for after it the British broke up camp and drew off to Chippeway. Nothing more was done, and on November 5th the American armyrecrossed the Niagara. Though marked by some brilliant feats ofarms this four months' invasion of Canada, like those that hadpreceded it, thus came to nothing. But at the same time a Britishinvasion of the United States was repulsed far more disgracefully. Sir George Prevost, with an army of 13, 000 veteran troops, marchedsouth along the shores of Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, which washeld by General Macomb with 2, 000 regulars, and perhaps doublethat number of nearly worthless militia;--a force that the Britishcould have scattered to the winds, though, as they were stronglyposted, not without severe loss. But the British fleet was capturedby Commodore MacDonough in the fight on the lake; and then Sir George, after some heavy skirmishing between the outposts of the armies, inwhich the Americans had the advantage, fled precipitately back toCanada. All through the war the sea-coasts of the United States had beenharried by small predatory excursions; a part of what is now theState of Maine was conquered with little resistance, and kept untilthe close of hostilities; and some of the towns on the shores ofChesapeake Bay had been plundered or burnt. In August, 1814, a moreserious invasion was planned, and some 5, 000 troops--regulars, sailors, and marines--were landed, under the command of GeneralRoss. So utterly helpless was the Democratic Administration atWashington, that during the two years of warfare hardly any stepshad been taken to protect the Capitol, or the country round about;what little was done, was done entirely too late, and bungled badlyin addition. History has not yet done justice to the ludicrous andpainful folly and stupidity of which the government founded byJefferson, and carried on by Madison, was guilty, both in itspreparations for, and in its way of carrying on, this war; nor isit yet realized that the men just mentioned, and their associates, are primarily responsible for the loss we suffered in it, and thebitter humiliation some of its incidents caused us. The small Britisharmy marched at will through Virginia and Maryland, burned Washington, and finally retreated from before Baltimore and reembarked to takepart in the expedition against New Orleans. Twice, at Bladensburgand North Point, it came in contact with superior numbers of militiain fairly good position. In each case the result was the same. After some preliminary skirmishing, manoeuvring, and volley firing, the British charged with the bayonet. The rawest regiments amongthe American militia then broke at once; the others kept prettysteady, pouring in quite a destructive fire, until the regulars hadcome up close to them, when they also fled. The British regularswere too heavily loaded to pursue, and, owing to their mode ofattack, and the rapidity with which their opponents ran away, theloss of the latter was in each case very slight. At North Point, however, the militia, being more experienced, behaved better thanat Bladensburg. In neither case were the British put to any troubleto win their victory. The above is a brief sketch of the campaigns of the war. It is notcheerful reading for an American, nor yet of interest to a militarystudent; and its lessons have been taught so often by similaroccurrences in other lands under like circumstances, and, moreover, teach such self-evident truths, that they scarcely need to bebrought to the notice of an historian. But the crowning event ofthe war was the Battle of New Orleans; remarkable in its militaryaspect, and a source of pride to every American. It is well wortha more careful study, and to it I have devoted the last chapter ofthis work. New York City, 1883. [Illustration: Fig. 1. --Long gun. ] [Illustration: Fig. 2. --Carronade. ] [Illustration: Fig. 3. --Section of flush-decked corvette or sloop, carrying long guns. Such was the armament of the _Pike_ and _Adams_, but most flush-decked ships mounted carronades. ] [Illustration: Fig. 4. --Section of frigate-built ship, with longgun on main-deck and carronade on spar-deck. Taken from the_American Artillerist's Companion_, by Louis de Toussard(Philadelphia, 1811). ] PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO (_See also in alphabetical place in index_. ) American State Papers. Brenton, E. P. Naval History of Great Britain, 1783 to 1836. 2 vols. , octavo. London, 1837. Broke, Adm. , Memoir of, by Rev. J. G. Brighton. Octavo, London, 1866. "Captains' Letters" in Archives at Washington. Codrington, Adm. Sir E. Memoirs, edited by his daughter. 2 vols. , octavo. London, 1873. Coggeshall, George. History of American Privateers. New York, 1876. Cooper, J. F. Naval History of the United States. New York, 1856. Dundonald, Earl. Autobiography of a Seaman. London, 1860. Douglass, Lord Howard. Naval Gunnery. Octavo. London, 1860. Emmons, Lieut. G. E. Statistical History of United States Navy, 1853. Farragut, Adm. D. G. , Life of, by his son, Loyall Farragut. Octavo. New York, 1878. Gravière, Adm. , J. De la. Guerres Maritimes. 2 vols. , octavo. Paris, 1881. James, William. Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols. , octavo. London, 1837. James, William. Naval Occurrences with the Americans. Octavo, London, 1817. Lossing, Benson J. Field-book of the War of 1812. Octavo. New York, 1869. Low, C. R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613 to 1863. 2 vols. , octavo. London, 1877. _London Naval Chronicle_. Marshall. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols. , octavo. London, 1825. "Masters-Commandant Letters" in the Archives at Washington. Morris, Com. Charles. Autobiography. Annapolis, 1880. Naval Archives at Washington. Niles. _Weekly Register_. Pielat. B. La Vie et les Actions Mémorables du St. Michel de Ruyter. Amsterdam, 1677. Rivière, Lieut. H. La Marine Française sous le Régime de Louis XV. Paris, 1859. Tatnall, Commod. , Life, by C. C. Jones, Jr. Savannah, 1878. Toussard, L. De. American Artillerists' Companion. Phila. , 1811. Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. Paris, 1868. Ward, Com. J. H. Manual of Naval Tactics. 1859. Yonge, Charles Duke. History of the British Navy. 3 vols. , octavo. London, 1866. AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER X Alison, Sir A. History of Europe. Ninth edition. 20 vols. London, 1852. Butler, Adjutant-General Robert. Official Report for the Morningof Jan. 8, 1815. Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward. Memoir of, by Lady Bourchier. London, 1873. Cole, John William. Memoirs of British Generals Distinguishedduring the Peninsular War. London, 1856. Court of Inquiry on Conduct of General Morgan. Official Report. Gleig, Ensign H. R. Narrative of the Campaigns of the BritishArmy at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Philadelphia, 1821. Jackson, Andrew. As a Public Man. A sketch by W G. Sumner. Boston, 1882. Jackson, General Andrew. Official Letters. James, William. Military Occurrences of the Late War. 2 vols. London, 1818. Keane, Major-General John. Letter, December 26, 1814. Lambert, General. Letters, January 10 and 28, 1815. Latour, Major A. Lacarriex. Historical Memoir of the War in WestFlorida and Louisiana. Translated from the French by H. P. Nugent. Philadelphia, 1816. Lossing, Benson J. Field-Book of the War of 1812. New York, 1859. Patterson, Com. Daniel G. Letters, Dec. 20, 1814, and Jan. 13, 1815. Monroe, James. Sketch of his Life, by Daniel C. Gilman. 16mo. Boston, 1883. Napier, Maj. -Gen. Sir W. F. P. History of the War in the Peninsula. 5 vols. New York, 1882. Scott, Lieut. -Gen. W. Memoirs, by himself, 2 vols. New York, 1864. Thornton, Col. W. Letter, Jan. 8, 1815. CONTENTS PREFACE Chapter I INTRODUCTORY Causes of the war of 1812--Conflicting views of America and Britainas regards neutral rights--Those of the former power right--Impossibilityof avoiding hostilities--Declaration of war June 18, 1812--Slightpreparations made--General features of the contest--Race identityof combatants--The treaty of peace nominally leaves the situationunchanged--But practically settles the dispute in our favor in respectto maritime rights--The British navy and its reputation prior to1812--Comparison with other European navies--British and Americanauthorities consulted in the present work Chapter II Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America declared waragainst her--Race identity of the combatants--American navy at thebeginning of the war--Officers well trained--Causes tending to makeour seamen especially efficient--Close similarity between Britishand American sailors--Our ships manned chiefly by native Americans, many of whom had formerly been impressed into the British navy--Quotasof seamen contributed by the different States--Navy yards--Listsof officers and men--List of vessels--Tonnage--Different ways ofestimating it in Britain and America--Ratings--American shipsproperly rated--Armaments of the frigates and corvettes--Threestyles of guns used--Difference between long guns and carronades--Shortweight of American shot--Comparison of British frigates rating 38and American frigates rating 44 guns--Compared with a 74 Chapter III 1812 ON THE OCEAN Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the_Belvidera_--Engagement between _Belvidera_ and _President_--_Hornet_captures a privateer--Cruise of the _Essex_--Captain Hull's cruiseand escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke--_Constitution_captures _Guerrière_--Marked superiority shown by the Americans--_Wasp_captures _Frolic_--Disproportionate loss on British side--Bothafterward captured by _Poictiers_--Second unsuccessful cruise ofCommodore Rodgers--_United States_ captures _Macedonian_--_Constitution_captures _Java_--Cruise of _Essex_--Summary Chapter IV 1812 ON THE LAKES PRELIMINARY. --The combatants starting nearly on an equality--Difficultiesof creating a naval force--Difficulty of comparing the force of therival squadrons--Meagreness of the published accounts--Unreliabilityof authorities, especially James. --ONTARIO--Extraordinary nature ofthe American squadron--Canadian squadron a kind of watermilitia--Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by Commodore Earle--CommodoreChauncy attacks the Royal George--And bombards York. --ERIE--LieutenantElliot captures the _Detroit_ and _Caledonia_--Lieutenant Angus'unsuccessful attack on Red House barracks Chapter V 1813 ON THE OCEAN Blockade of the American coast--Commodore Porter's campaign withthe _Essex_ in the South Pacific--_Hornet_ blockades BonneCitoyenne--_Hornet_ captures _Resolution_--_Hornet_ captures_Peacock_--Generous treatment shown to the conquered--_Viper_captured by _Narcissus_--American privateers cut out by Britishboats--Third cruise of Commodore Rodgers--_United States_, _Macedonian_, and _Wasp_ blockaded in New London--Broke's challengeto Lawrence--The _Chesapeake_ captured by the _Shannon_--Commentsand criticisms by various authorities--_Surveyor_ captured byboats of _Narcissus_--Futile gun-boat actions--British attack onCraney Island repulsed--Cutting out expeditions--The _Argus_ capturedby the _Pelican_--The _Enterprise_ captures the _Boxer_--Ocean warfareof 1813 in favor of British--Summary Chapter VI 1813 ON THE LAKES ONTARIO--Comparison of the rival squadrons--Chauncy's superior instrength--Chauncy takes York and Fort George--Yeo is repulsed atSackett's Harbor, but keeps command of the lake--_The Lady of theLake_ captures _Lady Murray_--_Hamilton_ and _Scourge_ founder in asquall--Yeo's partial victory off Niagara--Indecisive action offthe Genesee--Chauncy's partial victory off Burlington, which giveshim the command of the lake--Yeo and Chauncy compared--Reasonsfor American success. --ERIE--Perry's success in creating afleet--His victory--"Glory" of it overestimated--Cause of hissuccess--CHAMPLAIN--The _Growler_ and _Eagle_ captured bygun-boats--Summary of year's campaign Chapter VII 1814 ON THE OCEAN Strictness of the blockade--Cruise of Rodgers--Cruise of the_Constitution_--Chased into Marblehead--Attempt to cut-out the_Alligator_--The _Essex_ captured after engagement with _Phoebe_ and_Cherub_--The _Frolic_ captured--The _Peacock_ captures the_Epervier_--Commodore Barney's flotilla afloat--The British inthe Chesapeake--Capture of Washington, and burning of the publicbuildings--The _Wasp_ captures the _Reindeer_--The _Wasp_ sinks the_Avon_--Cruise and loss of the _Adams_--The privateer _GeneralArmstrong_--The privateer _Prince de Neufchatel_--Loss of the gun-boatson Lake Borgne--Fighting near New Orleans--Summary Chapter VIII 1814 ON THE LAKES ONTARIO--The contest one of ship-building merely--Statistics ofthe two squadrons--Serious sickness among the Americans--Extremecaution of the commanders, verging on timidity--Yeo takes Oswegoand blockades Sackett's Harbor--British gun-boats captured--Chauncyblockades Kingston. --ERIE--Captain Sinclair burns St. Joseph--Makesunsuccessful expedition against Mackinaw--Daring and successfulcutting-out expeditions of the British--Capture of the _Ohio_ and_Somers_. --CHAMPLAIN--Macdonough's and Downie's squadrons--James'erroneous statements concerning them--Gallant engagement andsplendid victory of Macdonough--Macdonough one of the greatestof American sea-captains Chapter IX 1815 CONCLUDING OPERATIONS The _President_ captured by Captain Hayes' squadron--Successfulcutting-out expedition of the Americans--American privateer_Chasseur_ captures _St. Lawrence_--The _Constitution_ engages the_Cyane_ and the _Levant_ and captures both--Escapes from a Britishsquadron--The _Hornet_ captures the _Penguin_ and escapes from pursuitof the _Cornwallis_--The _Peacock's_ wanton attack on the_Nautilus_--Wanton attack on American gun-boat after treaty ofpeace--Summary of events in 1815--Remarks on the war--Tables ofcomparative loss, etc. --Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle Chapter X 1815 THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS The war on land generally disastrous--British send great expeditionagainst New Orleans--Jackson prepares for the defence of the city--Nightattack on the British advance guard--Artillery duels--Great Battleof Jan. 8th, 1815--Slaughtering repulse of the main attack--Rout ofthe Americans on the right bank of the river--Final retreat of theBritish--Observations on the character of the troops and commandersengaged APPENDIX Chapter I INTRODUCTORY _Causes of the War of 1812--Conflicting views of America and Britainas regards neutral rights--Those of the former power right--Impossibilityof avoiding hostilities--Declaration of war--General featuresof the contest--Racial identity of the contestants--The treaty ofpeace nominally leaves the situation unchanged--But practicallysettles the dispute in our favor in respect to maritime rights--TheBritish navy and its reputation prior to 1812--Comparison with otherEuropean navies--British and American authorities consulted in thepresent work. _ The view professed by Great Britain in 1812 respecting the rightsof belligerents and neutrals was diametrically opposite to that heldby the United States. "Between England and the United States ofAmerica, " writes a British author, "a spirit of animosity, causedchiefly by the impressment of British seamen, or of seamen assertedto be such, from on board of American merchant vessels, had unhappilysubsisted for a long time" prior to the war. "It is, we believe, "he continues, "an acknowledged maxim of public law, as well thatno nation but the one he belongs to can release a subject from hisnatural allegiance, as that, provided the jurisdiction of anotherindependent state be not infringed, every nation has a right toenforce the services of her subjects wherever they may be found. Nor has any neutral nation such a jurisdiction over her merchantvessels upon the high seas as to exclude a belligerent nation fromthe right of searching them for contraband of war or for the propertyor persons of her enemies. And if, in the exercise of that right, the belligerent should discover on board of the neutral vessel asubject who has withdrawn himself from his lawful allegiance, theneutral can have no fair ground for refusing to deliver him up;more especially if that subject is proved to be a deserter fromthe sea or land service of the former. " [Footnote: "The Naval Historyof Great Britain, " by William James, vol. Iv, p. 324. (New editionby Captain Chamier, R. N. , London, 1837. )] Great Britain's doctrine was "once a subject always a subject. " Onthe other hand, the United States maintained that any foreigner, after five years' residence within her territory, and after havingcomplied with certain forms, became one of her citizens as completelyas if he was native born. Great Britain contended that her warships possessed the right of searching all neutral vessels for theproperty and persons of her foes. The United States, resisting thisclaim, asserted that "free bottoms made free goods, " and thatconsequently her ships when on the high seas should not be molestedon any pretext whatever. Finally, Great Britain's system ofimpressment, [Footnote: The best idea of which can be gained byreading Marryatt's novels. ] by which men could be forcibly seizedand made to serve in her navy, no matter at what cost to themselves, was repugnant to every American idea. Such wide differences in the views of the two nations producedendless difficulties. To escape the press-gang, or for otherreasons, many British seamen took service under the American flag;and if they were demanded back, it is not likely that they or theirAmerican shipmates had much hesitation in swearing either that theywere not British at all, or else that they had been naturalized asAmericans. Equally probable is it that the American blockade-runnerswere guilty of a great deal of fraud and more or less thinly veiledperjury. But the wrongs done by the Americans were insignificantcompared with those they received. Any innocent merchant vesselwas liable to seizure at any moment; and when overhauled by aBritish cruiser short of men was sure to be stripped of most ofher crew. The British officers were themselves the judges as towhether a seaman should be pronounced a native of America or ofBritain, and there was no appeal from their judgment. If a captainlacked his full complement there was little doubt as to the viewhe would take of any man's nationality. The wrongs inflicted on ourseafaring countrymen by their impressment into foreign ships formedthe main cause of the war. There were still other grievances which are thus presented by theBritish Admiral Cochrane. [Footnote: "Autobiography of a Seaman, "by Thomas, tenth Earl of Dundonald, Admiral of the Red; Rear-Admiralof the Fleet, London, 1860, vol. I, p. 24. ] "Our treatment of its(America's) citizens was scarcely in accordance with the nationalprivileges to which the young Republic had become entitled. Therewere no doubt many individuals among the American people who, caringlittle for the Federal Government, considered it more profitableto break than to keep the laws of nations by aiding and supportingour enemy (France), and it was against such that the efforts of thesquadron had chiefly been directed; but the way the object wascarried out was scarcely less an infraction of those national lawswhich we were professedly enforcing. The practice of taking English(and American) seamen out of American ships without regard to thesafety of navigating them when thus deprived of their hands hasbeen already mentioned. To this may be added the detention ofvessels against which nothing contrary to international neutralitycould be established, whereby their cargoes became damaged; thecompelling them, on suspicion only, to proceed to ports other thanthose to which they were destined; and generally treating them asthough they were engaged in contraband trade. * * * American shipswere not permitted to quit English ports without giving securityfor the discharge of their cargoes in some other British or neutralport. " On the same subject James [Footnote: _L. C. _, iv, 325. ]writes: "When, by the maritime supremacy of England, France couldno longer trade for herself, America proffered her services, as aneutral, to trade for her; and American merchants and their agents, in the gains that flowed in, soon found a compensation for all theperjury and fraud necessary to cheat the former out of herbelligerent rights. The high commercial importance of the UnitedStates thus obtained, coupled with a similarity of language and, to a superficial observer, a resemblance in person between thenatives of America and Great Britain, has caused the former to bethe chief, if not the only sufferers by the exercise of the rightof search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and prosperity toemigration from Europe, the United States hold out every allurementto foreigners, particularly to British seamen, whom, by a processpeculiarly their own, they can naturalize as quickly as a dollarcan exchange masters and a blank form, ready signed and sworn to, can be filled up. [Footnote: This is an exaggeration. ] It is theknowledge of this fact that makes British naval officers whensearching for deserters from their service, so harsh in theirscrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and asseverations. " The last sentence of the foregoing from James is an euphemisticway of saying that whenever a British commander short of men cameacross an American vessel he impressed all of her crew that hewanted, whether they were citizens of the United States or not. Itmust be remembered, however, that the only reason why Great Britaindid us more injury than any other power was because she was betterable to do so. None of her acts were more offensive than Napoleon'sMilan decree, by which it was declared that any neutral vessel whichpermitted itself to be searched by a British cruiser should beconsidered as British, and as the lawful prize of any French vessel. French frigates and privateers were very apt to snap up any Americanvessel they came across and were only withheld at all by the memoryof the sharp dressing they had received in the West Indies duringthe quasi-war of 1799-1800. What we undoubtedly ought to have donewas to have adopted the measure actually proposed in Congress, anddeclared war on both France and England. As it was, we chose as afoe the one that had done, and could still do, us the greatest injury. The principles for which the United States contended in 1812 arenow universally accepted, and those so tenaciously maintained byGreat Britain find no advocates in the civilized world. That Englandherself was afterward completely reconciled to our views was amplyshown by her intense indignation when Commodore Wilkes, in theexercise of the right of search for the persons of the foes of hiscountry, stopped the neutral British ship _Trent_; while the applausewith which the act was greeted in America proves pretty clearlyanother fact, that we had warred for the right, not because it_was_ the right, but because it agreed with our self-interest to doso. We were contending for "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights": meaningby the former expression, freedom to trade wherever we chose withouthindrance save from the power with whom we were trading; and by thelatter, that a man who happened to be on the sea should have thesame protection accorded to a man who remained on land. Nominally, neither of these questions was settled by, or even alluded to, inthe treaty of peace; but the immense increase of reputation thatthe navy acquired during the war practically decided both pointsin our favor. Our sailors had gained too great a name for any oneto molest them with impunity again. Holding views on these maritime subjects so radically differentfrom each other, the two nations could not but be continually dealingwith causes of quarrel. Not only did British cruisers molest ourmerchant-men, but at length one of them, the 50-gun ship _Leopard_, attacked an American frigate, the _Chesapeake_, when the latter wasso lumbered up that she could not return a shot, killed or disabledsome twenty of her men and took away four others, one Briton andthree Americans, who were claimed as deserters. For this act anapology was offered, but it failed to restore harmony betweenthe two nations. Soon afterward another action was fought. TheAmerican frigate _President_, Commodore Rodgers, attacked theBritish sloop _Little Belt_, Captain Bingham, and exchanged oneor two broadsides with her, --the frigate escaping scot-freewhile the sloop was nearly knocked to pieces. Mutual recriminationsfollowed, each side insisting that the other was the assailant. When Great Britain issued her Orders in Council forbidding ourtrading with France, we retaliated by passing an embargo act, whichprevented us from trading at all. There could be but one result tosuch a succession of incidents, and that was war. Accordingly, inJune, 1812, war was declared; and as a contest for the rights ofseamen, it was largely waged on the ocean. We also had not a littlefighting to do on land, in which, as a rule, we came out second-best. Few or no preparations for the war had been made, and the resultwas such as might have been anticipated. After dragging on throughthree dreary and uneventful years it came to an end in 1815, by apeace which left matters in almost precisely the state in whichthe war had found them. On land and water the contest took the formof a succession of petty actions, in which the glory acquired bythe victor seldom eclipsed the disgrace incurred by the vanquished. Neither side succeeded in doing what it intended. Americans declaredthat Canada must and should be conquered, but the conquering camequite as near being the other way. British writers insisted thatthe American navy should be swept from the sea; and, during thesweeping process it increased fourfold. When the United States declared war, Great Britain was strainingevery nerve and muscle in a death struggle with the most formidablemilitary despotism of modern times, and was obliged to entrust thedefence of her Canadian colonies to a mere handful of regulars, aidedby the local fencibles. But Congress had provided even fewer trainedsoldiers, and relied on militia. The latter chiefly exercised theirfighting abilities upon one another in duelling, and, as a rule, were afflicted with conscientious scruples whenever it wasnecessary to cross the frontier and attack the enemy. Accordingly, the campaign opened with the bloodless surrender of an Americangeneral to a much inferior British force, and the war continuedmuch as it had begun; we suffered disgrace after disgrace, whilethe losses we inflicted, in turn, on Great Britain were so slightas hardly to attract her attention. At last, having crushed hergreater foe, she turned to crush the lesser, and, in her turn, suffered ignominious defeat. By this time events had graduallydeveloped a small number of soldiers on our northern frontier, who, commanded by Scott and Brown, were able to contend on equalterms with the veteran troops to whom they were opposed, thoughthese formed part of what was then undoubtedly the most formidablefighting infantry any European nation possessed. The battles atthis period of the struggle were remarkable for the skill andstubborn courage with which they were waged, as well as for theheavy loss involved; but the number of combatants was so smallthat in Europe they would have been regarded as mere outpostskirmishes, and they wholly failed to attract any attentionabroad in that period of colossal armies. When Great Britain seriously turned her attention to hertransatlantic foe, and assembled in Canada an army of 14, 000 menat the head of Lake Champlain, Congressional forethought enabledit to be opposed by soldiers who, it is true, were as welldisciplined, as hardy, and as well commanded as any in the world, but who were only a few hundred strong, backed by more or lessincompetent militia. Only Macdonough's skill and Sir GeorgePrevost's incapacity saved us from a serious disaster; the sea-fightreflected high honor on our seamen, but the retreat of the Britishland-forces was due to their commander and not their antagonists. Meanwhile a large British fleet in the Chesapeake had not achievedmuch glory by the destruction of local oyster-boats and the burningof a few farmers' houses, so an army was landed to strike a decisiveblow. At Bladensburg [Footnote: See the "Capture of Washington, "by Edward D. Ingraham (Philadelphia. 1849). ] the five thousandBritish regulars, utterly worn out by heat and fatigue, by theirmere appearance, frightened into a panic double their number ofAmerican militia well posted. But the only success attained wasburning the public buildings of Washington, and that result wasof dubious value. Baltimore was attacked next, and the attackrepulsed, after the forts and ships had shelled one another withthe slight results that usually attend that spectacular and harmlessspecies of warfare. The close of the contest was marked by the extraordinary battle ofNew Orleans. It was a perfectly useless shedding of blood, sincepeace had already been declared. There is hardly another contest ofmodern times where the defeated side suffered such frightful carnage, while the victors came off almost scatheless. It is quite inaccordance with the rest of the war that the militia, hitherto worsethan useless, should on this occasion win against great odds in pointof numbers; and, moreover, that their splendid victory should havebeen of little consequence in its effects upon the result. On thewhole, the contest by land, where we certainly ought to have beensuccessful, reflected greater credit on our antagonists than uponus, in spite of the services of Scott, Brown, and Jackson. Our smallforce of regulars and volunteers did excellently; as for the militia, New Orleans proved that they _could_ fight superbly, and the otherbattles that they generally _would not_ fight at all. At sea, as will appear, the circumstances were widely different. Here we possessed a small but highly effective force, the shipswell built, manned by thoroughly trained men, and commanded byable and experienced officers. The deeds of our navy form a partof history over which any American can be pardoned for lingering. * * * * * Such was the origin, issue, and general character of the war. Itmay now be well to proceed to a comparison of the authorities onthe subject. Allusion has already been made to them in the preface, but a fuller reference seems to be necessary in this connection. At the close of the contest, the large majority of historians whowrote of it were so bitterly rancorous that their statements mustbe received with caution. For the main facts, I have relied, wherever it was practicable, upon the official letters of thecommanding officers, taking each as authority for his own forceand loss. [Footnote: As where Broke states his own force at 330, his antagonists at 440, and the American court of inquiry makesthe numbers 396 and 379, I have taken them as being 330 and 379respectively. This is the only just method; I take it for grantedthat each commander meant to tell the truth, and of course knewhis own force, while he might very naturally and in perfect goodfaith exaggerate his antagonist's. ] For all the British victorieswe have British official letters, which tally almost exactly, asregards matters of _fact_ and not of _opinion_, with the correspondingAmerican accounts. For the first year the British also publishedofficial accounts of their defeats, which in the cases of the_Guerrière_, _Macedonian_ and _Frolic_, I have followed as closelyas the accounts of the American victors. The last British officialletter published announcing a defeat was that in the case of the_Java_, and it is the only letter that I have not strictly accepted:The fact that no more were published thereafter is of itselfunfortunate; and from the various contradictions it contains itwould appear to have been tampered with. The surgeon's reportaccompanying it is certainly false. Subsequent to 1812 no letterof a defeated British commander was published, [Footnote: Exceptabout the battles on the Lakes, where I have accordingly given thesame credit to the accounts both of the British and of the Americans. ]and I have to depend upon the various British historians, especiallyJames, of whom more anon. The American and British historians from whom we are thus attimes forced to draw our material regard the war from very differentstand-points, and their accounts generally differ. Each writernaturally so colored the affair as to have it appear favorable tohis own side. Sometimes this was done intentionally and sometimesnot. Not unfrequently errors are made against the historian's ownside; as when the British author, Brenton, says that the Britishbrig _Peacock_ mounted 32's instead of 24's, while Lossing in his"Field-Book of the War of 1812" makes the same mistake about thearmament of the American brig _Argus_. Errors of this descriptionare, of course, as carefully to be guarded against as any others. Mere hearsay reports, such as "it has been said, " "a prisoner onboard the opposing fleet has observed, " "an American (or British)newspaper of such and such a date has remarked, " are of course tobe rejected. There is a curious parallelism in the errors on bothsides. For example, the American, Mr. Low, writing in 1813, tellshow the _Constitution_, 44, captured the _Guerrière_ of 49 guns, while the British Lieutenant Low, writing in 1880, tells how the_Pelican_, 18, captured the _Argus_ of 20 guns. Each records thetruth but not the whole truth, for although rating 44 and 18 thevictors carried respectively 54 and 21 guns, of heavier metal thanthose of their antagonists. Such errors are generally intentional. Similarly, most American writers mention the actions in which theprivateers were victorious, but do not mention those in which theywere defeated; while the British, in turn, record every successful"cutting-out" expedition, but ignore entirely those which terminatedunfavorably. Other errors arise from honest ignorance. Thus, Jamesin speaking of the repulse of the _Endymion's_ boats by the_Neufchatel_ gives the latter a crew of 120 men; she had more thanthis number originally, but only 40 were in her at the time of theattack. So also when the captain of the _Pelican_ writes that theofficers of the _Argus_ report her loss at 40, when they reallyreported it at 24 or when Captain Dacres thought the _Constitution_had lost about 20 men instead of 14. The American gun-boat captainsin recounting their engagements with the British frigates invariablygreatly overestimated the loss of the latter. So that on both sidesthere were some intentional misstatements or garblings, and a muchmore numerous class of simple blunders, arising largely from anincapacity for seeing more than one side of the question. Among the early British writers upon this war, the ablest wasJames. He devoted one work, his "Naval Occurrences, " entirely toit; and it occupies the largest part of the sixth volume of his moreextensive "History of the British Navy. " [Footnote: A new edition, London, 1826. ] Two other British writers, Lieutenant Marshall[Footnote: "Royal Naval Biography, " by John Marshall (London, 1823-1835). ] and Captain Brenton, [Footnote: "Naval History ofGreat Britain, " by Edward Pelham Brenton (new edition, London, 1837). ] wrote histories of the same events, about the same time;but neither of these naval officers produced half as valuable awork as did the civilian James. Marshall wrote a dozen volumes, each filled with several scores of dreary panegyrics, or memoirsof as many different officers. There is no attempt at order, hardlyany thing about the ships, guns, or composition of the crews; andnot even the pretence of giving both sides, the object being tomake every Englishman appear in his best light. The work isanalogous to the numerous lives of Decatur, Bainbridge, Porter, etc. , that appeared in the United States about the same time, andis quite as untrustworthy. Brenton made a far better and veryinteresting book, written on a good and well-connected plan, andapparently with a sincere desire to tell the truth. He accepts theBritish official accounts as needing nothing whatever to supplementthem, precisely as Cooper accepts the American officials'. A moreserious fault is his inability to be accurate. That this inaccuracyis not intentional is proved by the fact that it tells as oftenagainst his own side as against his opponents. He says, for example, that the guns of Perry's and Barclay's squadrons "were about equalin number and weight, " that the _Peacock_ (British) was armed with32's instead of 24's, and underestimates the force of the second_Wasp_. But the blunders are quite as bad when distributed as whenconfined to one side; in addition, Brenton's disregard of alldetails makes him of but little use. James, as already said, is by far the most valuable authority onthe war, as regards _purely British_ affairs. He enters minutelyinto details, and has evidently laboriously hunted up his authorities. He has examined the ships' logs, the Admiralty reports, varioustreatises, all the _Gazette_ reports, gives very well-chosenextracts, has arranged his work in chronological order, discriminatesbetween the officers that deserve praise and those that deserveblame, and in fact writes a work which ought to be consulted byevery student of naval affairs. But he is unfortunately afflictedwith a hatred toward the Americans that amounts to a monomania. Hewishes to make out as strong a case as possible against them. The_animus_ of his work may be gathered from the not over complimentaryaccount of the education of the youthful seafaring American, whichcan be found in vol. Vi, p. 113, of his "History. " On page 153 heasserts that he is an "impartial historian"; and about three linesbefore mentions that "it may suit the Americans to invent anyfalsehood, no matter how barefaced, to foist a valiant characteron themselves. " On page 419 he says that Captain Porter is to bebelieved, "so far as is borne out by proof (the only safe way wherean American is concerned), "--which somewhat sweeping denunciationof the veracity of all of Captain Porter's compatriots would seemto indicate that James was not, perhaps, in that dispassionateframe of mind best suited for writing history. That he should bebiassed against individual captains can be understood, but when hemakes rabid onslaughts upon the American people as a whole, herenders it difficult for an American, at any rate, to put implicitcredence in him. His statements are all the harder to confutewhen they are erroneous, because they are intentionally so. It isnot, as with Brenton and Marshall, because he really thinks aBritish captain _cannot_ be beaten, except by some kind of distortedspecial providence, for no man says worse things than he does aboutcertain officers and crews. A writer of James' undoubted abilitymust have known perfectly well that his statements were untrue inmany instances, as where he garbles Hilyar's account of Porter'sloss, or misstates the comparative force of the fleets on LakeChamplain. When he says (p. 194) that Captain Bainbridge wished to runaway from the _Java_, and would have done so if he had not beenwithheld by the advice of his first lieutenant, who was a renegadeEnglishman, [Footnote: Who, by the way, was Mr. Parker, born inVirginia, and never in England in his life. ] it is not of muchconsequence whether his making the statement was due to excessivecredulity or petty meanness, for, in either case, whether thedefect was in his mind or his morals, it is enough to greatlyimpair the value of his other "facts. " Again, when James (p. 165)states that Decatur ran away from the _Macedonian_ until, by somemarvellous optical delusion, he mistook her for a 32, he merelydetracts a good deal from the worth of his own account. When theAmericans adopt boarding helmets, he considers it as provingconclusively that they are suffering from an acute attack ofcowardice. On p. 122 he says that "had the _President_, when shefell in with the _Belvidera_, been cruising alone * * * CommodoreRodgers would have magnified the British frigate into a line-of-battleship, and have done his utmost to avoid her, " which gives an excellentidea of the weight to be attached to the various other anecdotes herelates of the much-abused Commodore Rodgers. But it must always be remembered that untrustworthy as James is inany thing referring purely to the Americans, he is no worse thanhis compeers of both nationalities. The misstatements of Niles inhis "Weekly Register" about the British are quite as flagrant, andhis information about his own side even more valuable. [Footnote:In Niles, by the way, can be found excellent examples of thetraditional American "spread-eagle" style. In one place I rememberhis describing "The Immortal Rodgers, " baulked of his natural prey, the British, as "soaring about like the bold bald eagle of hisnative land, " seeking whom he might devour. The accounts he gives ofBritish line-of-battle ships fleeing from American 44's quite matchJames' anecdotes of the latter's avoidance of British 38's and 36'sfor fear they might mount twenty-four-pounders. The two works takentogether give a very good idea of the war; separately, either isutterly unreliable, especially in matters of opinion. ] Every littleAmerican author crowed over Perry's "Nelsonic victory over a greatlysuperior force. " The _Constitution_ was declared to have been at adisadvantage when she fought the _Guerrière_, and so on _adinfinitum_. But these writers have all faded into oblivion, andtheir writings are not even referred to, much less believed. James, on the contrary, has passed through edition after edition, isconsidered as unquestionable authority in his own country, andlargely throughout Europe, and has furnished the basis for everysubsequent account by British authors. From Alison to LieutenantLow, almost every English work, whether of a popular character ornot, is, in so far as it touches on the war, simply a "rehash" ofthe works written by James. The consequence is that the Britishand American accounts have astonishingly little resemblance. Oneascribes the capture of the British frigates simply to the factthat their opponents were "cut down line-of-battle ships"; theother gives all the glory to the "undaunted heroism, " etc. , ofthe Yankee sailors. One not very creditable trait of the early American naval historiansgave their rivals a great advantage. The object of the former wasto make out that the _Constitution_, for example, won her victoriesagainst an equal foe, and an exact statement of the forces showedthe contrary; so they always avoided figures, and thus left theground clear for James' careful misstatements. Even when theycriticised him they never went into details, confining themselvesto some remark about "hurling" his figures in his face with"loathing. " Even Cooper, interesting though his work is, has gonefar less into figures than he should, and seems to have paid littleif any attention to the British official statements, which ofcourse should be received as of equal weight with the American. His comments on the actions are generally very fair, the book neverbeing disfigured by bitterness toward the British; but he iscertainly wrong, for example, in ascribing the loss of the_Chesapeake_ solely to accident, that of the _Argus_ solely to herinferiority in force, and so on. His disposition to praise _all_the American commanders may be generous, but is nevertheless unjust. If Decatur's surrender of the _President_ is at least impliedlypraised, then Porter's defence of the _Essex_ can hardly receiveits just award. There is no weight in the commendation bestowedupon Hull, if commendation, the same in kind though less in degree, is bestowed upon Rodgers. It is a great pity that Cooper did notwrite a criticism on James, for no one could have done it morethoroughly. But he never mentions him, except once in speaking ofBarclay's fleet. In all probability this silence arose from sheercontempt, and the certainty that most of James' remarks were false;but the effect was that very many foreigners believe him to haveshirked the subject. He rarely gives any data by which the statementsof James can be disproved, and it is for this reason that I havebeen obliged to criticise the latter's work very fully. Many ofJames' remarks, however, defy criticism from their random nature, as when he states that American midshipmen were chiefly masters andmates of merchantmen, and does not give a single proof to supportthe assertion. It would be nearly as true to assert that theBritish midshipmen were for the most part ex-members of theprize-ring, and as much labor would be needed to disprove it. Inother instances it is quite enough to let his words speak forthemselves, as where he says (p. 155) that of the American sailorsone third in number and one half in point of effectiveness were inreality British. That is, of the 450 men the _Constitution_ had whenshe fought the _Java_ 150 were British, and the remaining 300 couldhave been as effectively replaced by 150 more British. So a verylittle logic works out a result that James certainly did not intendto arrive at; namely, that 300 British led by American officerscould beat, with ease and comparative impunity, 400 British led bytheir own officers. He also forgets that the whole consists of thesum of the parts. He accounts for the victories of the Americansby stating (p. 280) that they were lucky enough to meet with frigatesand brigs who had unskilful gunners or worthless crews; he alsocarefully shows that the _Macedonian_ was incompetently handled, the _Peacock_ commanded by a mere martinet, the _Avon's_ crewunpractised weak and unskilful, the _Java's_ exceedingly poor, andmore to the same effect. Now the Americans took in single fightthree frigates and seven sloops, and when as many as ten vesselsare met it is exceedingly probable that they represent the fairaverage; so that James' strictures, so far as true, simply showthat the average British ship was very apt to possess, comparativelyspeaking, an incompetent captain or unskilful crew. Thesedisadvantages were not felt when opposed to navies in which theyexisted to an even greater extent, but became very apparent whenbrought into contact with a power whose few officers knew how toplay their own parts very nearly to perfection, and, somethingequally important, knew how to make first-rate crews out of whatwas already good raw material. Finally, a large proportion ofJames' abuse of the Americans sufficiently refutes itself, andperhaps Cooper's method of contemptuously disregarding him was thebest; but no harm can follow from devoting a little space tocommenting upon him. Much the best American work is Lieutenant George E. Emmons'statistical "History of the United States Navy. " Unfortunately itis merely a mass of excellently arranged and classified statistics, and while of invaluable importance to the student, is not interestingto the average reader. Almost all the statements I have made ofthe force, tonnage, and armament of the American vessels, thoughI have whenever practicable taken them from the Navy Records, etc. , yet could be just as well quoted from Emmons. Copies of most ofthe American official letters which I have quoted can be found in"Niles' Register, " volumes 1 to 10, and all of the British ones inthe "London Naval Chronicle" for the same years. It is to these twoauthorities that I am most indebted, and nearly as much so to the"American State Papers, " vol. Xiv. Next in order come Emmons, Cooper, and the invaluable, albeit somewhat scurrilous, James; anda great many others whose names I have quoted in their properplaces. In commenting upon the actions, I have, whenever possible, drawn from some standard work, such as Jurien de la Gravière's"Guerres Maritimes, " Lord Howard Douglass' "Naval Gunnery, "or, better still, from the lives and memoirs of Admirals Farragut, Codrington, Broke, or Durham. The titles of the various works willbe found given in full as they are referred to. [Footnote: To getan idea of the American seamen of that time Cooper's novels, "Miles Wallingford, " "Home as Found, " and the "Pilot, " are farbetter than any history; in the "Two Admirals" the description ofthe fleet manoeuvring is unrivalled. His view of Jack's life israther rose-colored however. "Tom Cringle's log" ought to be readfor the information it gives. Marryatt's novels will show some ofthe darker aspects of sailor life. ] In a few cases, where extremeaccuracy was necessary, or where, as in the case of the _President's_capture, it was desirable that there should be no room for disputeas to the facts, I have given the authority for each sentence; butin general this would be too cumbersome, and so I have confinedmyself to referring, at or near the beginning of the account ofeach action, to the authorities from whom I have taken it. For theless important facts on which every one is agreed I have often givenno references. Chapter II _Overwhelming naval supremacy of England when America declared waragainst her--Race identity of the combatants--The American navy atthe beginning of the war--Officers well trained--Causes tending tomake our seamen especially efficient--Close similarity between theBritish and American sailors--Our ships manned chiefly by nativeAmericans, many of whom had formerly been impressed into the Britishnavy--Quotas of seamen contributed by the differentStates--Navy-yards--Lists of officers and men--List ofvessels--Tonnage--Different ways of estimating it in Britain andAmerica--Ratings--American ships properly rated--Armaments of thefrigates and corvettes--Three styles of guns used--Differencebetween long guns and carronades--Short weight of Americanshot--Comparison of British frigates rating 38, and Americanfrigates rating 44 guns--Compared with a 74. _ During the early years of this century England's naval power stoodat a height never reached before or since by that of any othernation. On every sea her navies rode, not only triumphant, butwith none to dispute their sway. The island folk had long claimedthe mastery of the ocean, and they had certainly succeeded inmaking their claim completely good during the time of bloodywarfare that followed the breaking out of the French Revolution. Since the year 1792 each European nation, in turn, had learned tofeel bitter dread of the weight of England's hand. In the Baltic, Sir Samuel Hood had taught the Russians that they must needs keepin port when the English cruisers were in the offing. The descendantsof the Vikings had seen their whole navy destroyed at Copenhagen. No Dutch fleet ever put out after the day when, off Camperdown, LordDuncan took possession of De Winter's shattered ships. But a fewyears before 1812, the greatest sea-fighter of all time had diedin Trafalgar Bay, and in dying had crumbled to pieces the naviesof France and of Spain. From that day England's task was but to keep in port such of herfoes' vessels as she had not destroyed. France alone still possessedfleets that could be rendered formidable, and so, from the Scheldtto Toulon, her harbors were watched and her coasts harried by theblockading squadrons of the English. Elsewhere the latter had nofear of their power being seriously assailed; but their vast commerceand numerous colonies needed ceaseless protection. Accordingly inevery sea their cruisers could be found, of all sizes, from thestately ship-of-the-line, with her tiers of heavy cannon and hermany hundreds of men, down to the little cutter carrying but ascore of souls and a couple of light guns. All these cruisers, butespecially those of the lesser rates, were continually brought intocontact with such of the hostile vessels as had run through theblockade, or were too small to be affected by it. French and Italianfrigates were often fought and captured when they were skirtingtheir own coasts, or had started off on a plundering cruise throughthe Atlantic, or to the Indian Ocean; and though the Danes had losttheir larger ships they kept up a spirited warfare with brigs andgun-boats. So the English marine was in constant exercise, attendedwith almost invariable success. Such was Great Britain's naval power when the Congress of the UnitedStates declared war upon her. While she could number her thousandsail, the American navy included but half a dozen frigates, and sixor eight sloops and brigs; and it is small matter for surprise thatthe British officers should have regarded their new foe withcontemptuous indifference. Hitherto the American seamen had neverbeen heard of except in connection with two or three engagementswith French frigates, and some obscure skirmishes against the Moorsof Tripoli; none of which could possibly attract attention in theyears that saw Aboukir, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar. And yet thesesame petty wars were the school which raised our marine to thehighest standard of excellence. A continuous course of victory, wonmainly by seamanship, had made the English sailor overweeninglyself-confident, and caused him to pay but little regard to manoeuvringor even to gunnery. Meanwhile the American learned, by receivinghard knocks, how to give them, and belonged to a service too youngto feel an over-confidence in itself. One side had let its trainingrelax, while the other had carried it to the highest possible point. Hence our ships proved, on the whole, victorious in the apparentlyunequal struggle, and the men who had conquered the best seamen ofEurope were now in turn obliged to succumb. Compared with the greatnaval battles of the preceding few years, out bloodiest conflictswere mere skirmishes, but they were skirmishes between the hithertoacknowledged kings of the ocean, and new men who yet proved to bemore than their equals. For over a hundred years, or since the timewhen they had contended on equal terms with the great Dutch admirals, the British had shown a decided superiority to their various foes, and during the latter quarter of the time this superiority, asalready said, was very marked, indeed; in consequence, the victoriesof the new enemy attracted an amount of attention altogetherdisproportionate to their material effects. And it is a curious factthat our little navy, in which the art of handling and fighting theold broadside, sailing frigate in single conflict was brought tothe highest point of perfection ever reached, that this same navyshould have contained the first representative of the modern warsteamer, and also the torpedo--the two terrible engines which wereto drive from the ocean the very whitewinged craft that had firstwon honor for the starry flag. The tactical skill of Hull or Decaturis now of merely archaic interest, and has but little more bearingon the manoeuvring of a modern fleet than have the tactics of theAthenian gallies. But the war still conveys some most practicallessons as to the value of efficient ships and, above all, ofefficient men in them. Had we only possessed the miserable gun-boats, our men could have done nothing; had we not possessed good men, theheavy frigates would have availed as little. Poor ships and impotentartillery had lost the Dutch almost their entire navy; fine shipsand heavy cannon had not saved the French and Spanish from the likefate. We owed our success to putting sailors even better than theDutch on ships even finer than those built by the two Latin seaboardpowers. The first point to be remembered in order to write a fair accountof this war is that the difference in fighting skill, which certainlyexisted between the two parties, was due mainly to training, andnot to the nature of the men. It seems certain that the Americanhad in the beginning somewhat the advantage, because his surroundings, partly physical and partly social and political, had forced him intohabits of greater self-reliance. Therefore, on the average, heoffered rather the best material to start with; but the differencewas very slight, and totally disappeared under good training. Thecombatants were men of the same race, differing but little from oneanother. On the New England coast the English blood was as pure asin any part of Britain; in New York and New Jersey it was mixed withthat of the Dutch settlers--and the Dutch are by race nearer to thetrue old English of Alfred and Harold than are, for example, thethoroughly anglicized Welsh of Cornwall. Otherwise, the infusionof new blood into the English race on this side of the Atlantic hasbeen chiefly from three sources--German, Irish, and Norse; and thesethree sources represent the elemental parts of the composite Englishstock in about the same proportions in which they were originallycombined, --mainly Teutonic, largely Celtic, and with a Scandinavianadmixture. The descendant of the German becomes as much anAnglo-American as the descendant of the Strathclyde Celt has alreadybecome an Anglo-Briton. Looking through names of the combatants itwould be difficult to find any of one navy that could not be matchedin the other--Hull or Lawrence, Allen, Perry, or Stewart. And amongall the English names on both sides will be found many Scotch, Irish, or Welsh--Macdonough, O'Brien, or Jones. Still stranger ones appear:the Huguenot Tattnall is one among the American defenders of the_Constellation_, and another Huguenot Tattnall is among the Britishassailants at Lake Borgne. It must always be kept in mind that theAmericans and the British are two substantially similar branches ofthe great English race, which both before and after their separationhave assimilated, and made Englishmen of many other peoples. [Footnote:The inhabitants of Great Britain are best designated as"British"--English being either too narrow or too broad a term, inone case meaning the inhabitants of but a part of Britain, and inthe other the whole Anglo-Saxon people. ] The lessons taught by thewar can hardly be learned unless this identity is kept in mind. [Footnote: It was practically a civil war, and was waged with muchharshness and bitterness on both sides. I have already spoken ofthe numerous grievances of the Americans; the British, in turn, looked upon our blockade-runners which entered the French portsexactly as we regarded, at a later date, the British steamers thatran into Wilmington and Charleston. It is curious to see how illogicalwriters are. The careers of the _Argus_ and _Alabama_ for example, were strikingly similar in many ways, yet the same writer who speaksof one as an "heroic little brig, " will call the other a "blackpirate. " Of course there can be no possible comparison as to thecauses for which the two vessels were fighting; but the cruisesthemselves were very much alike, both in character and history. ] To understand aright the efficiency of our navy, it is necessary totake a brief look at the character and antecedents of the officersand men who served in it. When war broke out the United States Navy was but a few years old, yet it already had a far from dishonorable history. The captainsand lieutenants of 1812 had been taught their duties in a verypractical school, and the flag under which they fought was endearedto them already by not a few glorious traditions--though these, perhaps, like others of their kind, had lost none of their gloryin the telling. A few of the older men had served in the war of theRevolution, and all still kept fresh in mind the doughty deeds ofthe old-time privateering war craft. Men still talked of Biddle'sdaring cruises and Barney's stubborn fights, or told of Scotch Pauland the grim work they had who followed his fortunes. Besidesthese memories of an older generation, most of the officers hadthemselves taken part, when younger in years and rank, in deedsnot a whit less glorious. Almost every man had had a share in somegallant feat, to which he, in part at least, owed his presentposition. The captain had perhaps been a midshipman under Truxtunwhen he took the _Vengeance_, and had been sent aboard the capturedFrench frigate with the prize-master; the lieutenant had borne apart in the various attacks on Tripoli, and had led his men in thedesperate hand-to-hand fights in which the Yankee cutlass provedan overmatch for the Turkish and Moorish scimitars. Nearly everysenior officer had extricated himself by his own prowess or skillfrom the dangers of battle or storm; he owed his rank to the factthat he had proved worthy of it. Thrown upon his own resources, hehad learned self-reliance; he was a first-rate practical seaman, and prided himself on the way his vessel was handled. Having reachedhis rank by hard work, and knowing what real fighting meant, he wascareful to see that his men were trained in the _essentials_ ofdiscipline, and that they knew how to handle the guns in battle aswell as polish them in peace. Beyond almost any of his countrymen, he worshipped the "Gridiron Flag, " and, having been brought up inthe Navy, regarded its honor as his own. It was, perhaps, the Navyalone that thought itself a match, ship against ship, for GreatBritain. The remainder of the nation pinned its faith to the army, or rather to that weakest of weak reeds, the militia. The officersof the navy, with their strong _esprit de corps, _ their jealousyof their own name and record, and the knowledge, by actual experience, that the British ships sailed no faster and were no better handledthan their own, had no desire to shirk a conflict with any foe, andhaving tried their bravery in actual service, they made it doublyformidable by cool, wary skill. Even the younger men, who had neverbeen in action, had been so well trained by the tried veterans overthem that the lack of experience was not sensibly felt. The sailors comprising the crews of our ships were well worthy oftheir leaders. There was no better seaman in the world than AmericanJack; he had been bred to his work from infancy, and had been offin a fishing dory almost as soon as he could walk. When he grewolder, he shipped on a merchant-man or whaler, and in those warliketimes, when our large merchant-marine was compelled to rely prettymuch on itself for protection, each craft _had_ to be well handled;all who were not were soon weeded out by a process of naturalselection, of which the agents were French picaroons, Spanishbuccaneers, and Malay pirates. It was a rough school, but ittaught Jack to be both skilful and self-reliant; and he was all thebetter fitted to become a man-of-war's man, because he knew moreabout fire-arms than most of his kind in foreign lands. At home hehad used his ponderous ducking gun with good effect on the flocksof canvasbacks in the reedy flats of the Chesapeake, or among thesea-coots in the rough water off the New England cliffs; and whenhe went on a sailing voyage the chances were even that there wouldbe some use for the long guns before he returned, for the Americanmerchant sailor could trust to no armed escort. The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at the date of which Iam writing as well as long subsequently to it was largely due tothe curious condition of things in Europe. For thirty years allthe European nations had been in a state of continuous and verycomplicated warfare, during the course of which each nation in turnfought almost every other, England being usually at loggerheadswith all. One effect of this was to force an enormous proportionof the carrying trade of the world into American bottoms. The oldMassachusetts town of Salem was then one of the main depots ofthe East India trade; the Baltimore clippers carried goods into theFrench and German ports with small regard to the blockade; NewBedford and Sag Harbor fitted out whalers for the Arctic seas aswell as for the South Pacific; the rich merchants of Philadelphiaand New York sent their ships to all parts of the world; and everysmall port had some craft in the coasting trade. On the New Englandseaboard but few of the boys would reach manhood without havingmade at least one voyage to the Newfoundland Banks after codfish;and in the whaling towns of Long Island it used to be an old sayingthat no man could marry till he struck his whale. The wealthy merchantsof the large cities would often send their sons on a voyage or twobefore they let them enter their counting-houses. Thus it came aboutthat a large portion of our population was engaged in seafaringpursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a resolute andhardy character in the men that followed them. The Britishmerchant-men sailed in huge convoys, guarded by men-of-war, while, as said before, our vessels went alone, and relied for protectionon themselves. If a fishing smack went to the Banks it knew that itran a chance of falling in with some not over-scrupulous NovaScotian privateer. The barques that sailed from Salem to the SpiceIslands kept their men well trained both at great guns and musketry, so as to be able to beat off either Malay proas, or Chinese junks. The New York ships, loaded for the West Indies, were prepared todo battle with the picaroons that swarmed in the Spanish main;while the fast craft from Baltimore could fight as well as theycould run. Wherever an American seaman went, he not only had tocontend with all the legitimate perils of the sea, but he had alsoto regard almost every stranger as a foe. Whether this foe calledhimself pirate or privateer mattered but little. French, Spaniards, Algerines, Malays, from all alike our commerce suffered, and againstall, our merchants were forced to defend themselves. The effect ofsuch a state of things, which made commerce so remunerative thatthe bolder spirits could hardly keep out of it, and so hazardousthat only the most skilful and daring could succeed in it, was toraise up as fine a set of seamen as ever manned a navy. The sternschool in which the American was brought up, forced him into habitsof independent thought and action which it was impossible that themore protected Briton could possess. He worked more intelligentlyand less from routine, and while perfectly obedient and amenableto discipline, was yet able to judge for himself in an emergency. He was more easily managed than most of his kind--being shrewd, quiet, and, in fact, comparatively speaking, rather moral thanotherwise; if he was a New Englander, when he retired from a sealife he was not unapt to end his days as a deacon. Altogether therecould not have been better material for a fighting crew than cool, gritty American Jack. Moreover, there was a good nucleus of veteransto begin with, who were well fitted to fill the more responsiblepositions, such as captains of guns, etc. These were men who hadcruised in the little _Enterprise_ after French privateers, who hadbeen in the _Constellation_ in her two victorious fights, or who, perhaps, had followed Decatur when with only eighty men he cut outthe _Philadelphia_, manned by fivefold his force and surrounded byhostile batteries and war vessels, --one of the boldest expeditionsof the kind on record. It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connection, that by asingular turn of fortune, Great Britain, whose system of impressingAmerican sailors had been one of the chief causes of the war, herselfbecame, in consequence of that very system, in some sort, a nurseryfor the seamen of the young Republican navy. The American sailorfeared nothing more than being impressed on a British ship--dreadingbeyond measure the hard life and cruel discipline aboard of her;but once there, he usually did well enough, and in course of timeoften rose to be of some little consequence. For years before 1812, the number of these impressed sailors was in reality greater thanthe entire number serving in the American navy, from which it willreadily be seen that they formed a good stock to draw upon. Verymuch to their credit, they never lost their devotion to the homeof their birth, more than two thousand of them being imprisoned atthe beginning of the war because they refused to serve against theircountry. When Commodore Decatur captured the _Macedonian_, thatofficer, as we learn from Marshall's "Naval Biography" (ii. 1019), stated that most of the seamen of his own frigate, the _UnitedStates_, had served in British war vessels, and that some had beenwith Lord Nelson in the _Victory_, and had even been bargemen tothe great Admiral, --a pretty sure proof that the American sailorsdid not show a disadvantage when compared with others. [Footnote:With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume Decatur'sstatement to be equivalent to saying that he had chiefly Britishseamen on board; whereas, even as quoted by Marshall, Decaturmerely said that "his seamen had served on board a Britishman-of-war, " and that some "had served under Lord Nelson. " Likethe _Constitution_, the _United States_ had rid herself of most ofthe British subjects on board, before sailing. Decatur's remarksimply referred to the number of his American seamen who had beenimpressed on board British ships. Whenever James says that anAmerican ship had a large proportion of British sailors aboard, the explanation is that a large number of the crew were Americanswho had been impressed on British ships. It would be no more absurdto claim Trafalgar as an American victory because there was acertain number of Americans in Nelson's fleet, than it is to assertthat the Americans were victorious in 1812, because there were afew renegade British on board their ships. ] Good seaman as the impressed American proved to be, yet he seldommissed an opportunity to escape from the British service, bydesertion or otherwise. In the first place, the life was very hard, and, in the second, the American seaman was very patriotic. He hadan honest and deep affection for his own flag; while, on the contrary, he felt a curiously strong hatred for England, as distinguished fromEnglishmen. This hatred was partly an abstract feeling, cherishedthrough a vague traditional respect for Bunker Hill, and partlysomething very real and vivid, owing to the injuries he, and otherslike him, had received. Whether he lived in Maryland or Massachusetts, he certainly knew men whose ships had been seized by British cruisers, their goods confiscated, and the vessels condemned. Some of hisfriends had fallen victims to the odious right of search, and hadnever been heard of afterward. He had suffered many an injury tofriend, fortune, or person, and some day he hoped to repay themall; and when the war did come, he fought all the better becausehe knew it was in his own quarrel. But, as I have said, this hatredwas against England, not against Englishmen. Then, as now, sailorswere scattered about over the world without any great regard fornationality; and the resulting intermingling of natives andforeigners in every mercantile marine was especially great in thoseof Britain and America, whose people spoke the same tongue and worethe same aspect. When chance drifted the American into Liverpoolor London, he was ready enough to ship in an Indiaman or whaler, caring little for the fact that he served under the British flag;and the Briton, in turn, who found himself in New York orPhiladelphia, willingly sailed in one of the clipper-built barques, whether it floated the stars and stripes or not. When Captain Porterwrought such havoc among the British whalers in the South Seas, he found that no inconsiderable portion of their crews consistedof Americans, some of whom enlisted on board his own vessel; andamong the crews of the American whalers were many British. In fact, though the skipper of each ship might brag loudly of his nationality, yet in practical life he knew well enough that there was very littleto choose between a Yankee and a Briton. [Footnote: What choicethere was, was in favor of the American. In point of courage therewas no difference whatever. The _Essex_ and the _Lawrence_, aswell as the _Frolic_ and the _Reindeer_, were defended with thesame stubborn, desperate, cool bravery that marks the English raceon both sides of the Atlantic. But the American was a free citizen, any one's equal, a voter with a personal interest in his country'swelfare, and, above all, without having perpetually before his eyesthe degrading fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he was moretractable than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and possessedgreater judgment. In the fight between the _Wasp_ and the _Frolic_, the latter's crew had apparently been well trained at the guns, forthey aimed well; but they fired at the wrong time, and nevercorrected the error; while their antagonists, delivering theirbroadsides far more slowly, by intelligently waiting until theproper moment, worked frightful havoc. But though there was acertain slight difference between the seamen of the two nations, it must never be forgotten that it was very much less than thatbetween the various individuals of the same nation; and when theBritish had been trained for a few years by such commanders asBroke and Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it neededour best men to equal them. ] Both were bold and hardy, cool andintelligent, quick with their hands, and showing at their best inan emergency. They looked alike and spoke alike; when they tookthe trouble to think, they thought alike; and when they got drunk, which was not an infrequent occurrence, they quarrelled alike. Mingled with them were a few seamen of other nationalities. TheIrishman, if he came from the old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford, Dublin, and Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much likethe two chief combatants; the Celto-Turanian kern of the west didnot often appear on shipboard. The French, Danes, and Dutch werehemmed in at home; they had enough to do on their own seaboard, and could not send men into foreign fleets. A few Norse, however, did come in, and excellent sailors and fighters they made. Withthe Portuguese and Italians, of whom some were to be found servingunder the union-jack, and others under the stars and stripes, itwas different; although there were many excellent exceptions theydid not, as a rule, make the best of seamen. They were treacherous, fond of the knife, less ready with their hands, and likely to loseeither their wits or their courage when in a tight place. In the American navy, unlike the British, there was no impressment;the sailor was a volunteer, and he shipped in whatever craft hisfancy selected. Throughout the war there were no "picked crews" onthe American side, [Footnote: James' statements to the contrarybeing in every case utterly without foundation. He is also wrongin his assertion that the American ships had no boys; they had nearlyas many in proportion as the British. The _Constitution_ had 31, the _Adams_ 15, etc. So, when he states that our midshipmen weregenerally masters and mates of merchantmen; they were generallyfrom eleven to seventeen years old at the beginning of the war, and besides, had rarely or never been in the merchant marine. ]excepting on the last two cruises of the _Constitution_. In fact(as seen by the letter of Captains Stewart and Bainbridge toSecretary Hamilton), there was often much difficulty in gettingenough men. [Footnote: Reading through the volumes of officialletters about this war, which are preserved in the office of theSecretary of the Navy, one of the most noticeable things is thecontinual complaints about the difficulty of getting men. The_Adams_ at one time had a crew of but nineteen men--"fourteen ofwhom are marines, " adds the aggrieved commander. A log-book ofone of the gun-boats records the fact that after much difficulty_two_ men were enlisted--from the jail, with a parentheticalmemorandum to the effect that they were both very drunk. Britishships were much more easily manned, as they could always haverecourse to impressment. The _Constitution_ on starting out her last cruises had anextraordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz. , 218, with but 92ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, making, with the officers, a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain Bainbridge, Oct. 16, 1814; it is letter No. 51, in the fortieth volume of "Captains'Letters, " in the clerk's office of the Secretary of the Navy. )]Many sailors preferred to serve in the innumerable privateers, and, the two above-mentioned officers, in urging the necessity ofbuilding line-of-battle ships, state that it was hard work torecruit men for vessels of an inferior grade, so long as the enemyhad ships of the line. One of the standard statements made by the British historians aboutthis war is that our ships were mainly or largely manned by Britishsailors. This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons whichit teaches; and, besides that, it is _not_ true. In this, as in every thing else, all the modern writers have merelyfollowed James or Brenton, and I shall accordingly confine myselfto examining their assertions. The former begins (vol. Iv, p. 470)by diffidently stating that there is a "similarity" of language betweenthe inhabitants of the two countries--an interesting philologicaldiscovery that but few will attempt to controvert. In vol. Vi, p. 154, he mentions that a number of blanks occur in the American NavyList in the column "Where Born"; and in proof of the fact that theseblanks are there because the men were not Americans, he says thattheir names "are all English and Irish. " [Footnote: For example, James writes: "Out of the 32 captains one only, Thomas Tingey, hadEngland marked as his birthplace.... Three blanks occur, and weconsider it rather creditable to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and John Ord Creighton, that they were ashamed to tellwhere they were born. " I have not been able to find out the latter'sbirth-place, but Captain Shaw was born in New York, and I have seenCaptain Patterson incidentally alluded to as "born and bred inAmerica. " Generally, whenever I have been able to fill up thevacancies in the column "Where Born, " I have found that it was inAmerica. From these facts it would appear that James was somewhathasty in concluding that the omission of the birth-place proved theowner of the name to be a native of Great Britain. ] They certainlyare; and so are all the other names in the list. It could not wellbe otherwise, as the United States Navy was not officered by Indians. In looking over this same Navy List (of 1816) it will be seen thatbut a little over 5 per cent, of the officers were born abroad--asmaller proportion by far than would exist in the population of thecountry at large--and most of these had come to America when underten years of age. On p. 155 James adds that the British sailorscomposed "one third in number and one half in point of effectiveness"of the American crews. Brenton in his "Naval History" writes: "Itwas said, and I have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were200 British seamen aboard the _Constitution_. " [Footnote: Newedition, London, 1837, vol. Ii, p. 456. ] These statements are mereassertions unsupported by proof, and of such a loose character asto be difficult to refute. As our navy was small, it may be bestto take each ship in turn. The only ones of which the British couldwrite authoritatively were, of course, those which they captured. The first one taken was the _Wasp_. James says many British werediscovered among her crew, instancing especially one sailor namedJack Lang; now Jack Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, NewJersey, _but had been impressed and forced to serve in the BritishNavy_. The same was doubtless true of the rest of the "many British"seamen of her crew; at any rate, as the only instance James mentions(Jack Lang) was an American, he can hardly be trusted for thosewhom he does not name. Of the 95 men composing the crew of the _Nautilus_ when she wascaptured, "6 were detained and sent to England to await examinationas being suspected of being British subjects. " [Footnote: Quotedfrom letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 12, 1812 (in NavalArchives, "Captains' Letters, " vol xxv, No. 43), enclosing a "Listof American prisoners of war discharged out of custody of LieutenantWilliam Miller, agent at the port of Halifax, " in exchange forsome of the British captured by Porter. This list, by the way, shows the crew of the _Nautilus_ (counting the six men detainedas British) to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as statedby James. Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 12 men ofthe _Guerrière's_ crew as an offset to the 6 men belonging to the_Nautilus_. ] Of the other small brigs, the _Viper_, _Vixen_, _Rattlesnake_, and _Syren_, James does not mention the compositionof the crew, and I do not know that any were claimed as British. Of the crew of the _Argus_ "about 10 or 12 were believed to beBritish subjects; the American officers swore the crew containednone" (James, "Naval Occurrences, " p. 278). From 0 to 10 per centcan be allowed. When the _Frolic_ was captured "her crew consistedof native Americans" (_do_, p. 340). James speaks ("History, " p. 418) of "a portion of the British subjects on board the _Essex_, "but without giving a word of proof or stating his grounds of belief. One man was claimed as a deserter by the British, but he turned outto be a New Yorker. There were certainly a certain number of Britishaboard, but the number probably did not exceed thirty. Of the_President's_ crew he says ("Naval Occurrences, " p. 448): "In theopinion of several British officers there were among them manyBritish seamen" but Commodore Decatur, Lieutenant Gallagher, andthe other officers swore that there were none. Of the crew of the_Chesapeake_, he says, "about 32" were British subjects, or about10 per cent. One or two of these were afterward shot, and some 25, together with a Portuguese boatswain's mate, entered into theBritish service. So that of the vessels captured by the British, the _Chesapeake_ had the largest number of British (about 10 percent. Of her crew) on board, the others ranging from that numberdown to none at all, as in the case of the _Wasp_. As these elevenships would probably represent a fair average, this proportion, of0 to 10 per cent. , should be taken as the proper one. James, however, is of the opinion that those ships manned by Americans were moreapt to be captured than those manned by the braver British; whichcalls for an examination of the crews of the remaining vessels. Of the American sloop _Peacock_, James says ("Naval Occurrences, "p. 348) that "several of her men were recognized as British seamen";even if this were true, "several" could not probably mean morethan sixteen, or 10 per cent. Of the second _Wasp_ he says, "Captain Blakely was a native of Dublin, and, along with someEnglish and Scotch, did not, it may be certain, neglect to havein his crew a great many Irish. " Now Captain Blakely left Irelandwhen he was but 16 months old, and the rest of James' statement isavowedly mere conjecture. It was asserted positively in the Americannewspapers that the _Wasp_, which sailed from Portsmouth, wasmanned exclusively by New Englanders, except a small draft of menfrom a Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a foreigner inher crew. Of the _Hornet_ James states that "some of her men werenatives of the United Kingdom"; but he gives no authority, and themen he refers to were in all probability those spoken of in thejournal of one of the _Hornet's_ officers, which says that "Manyof our men (Americans) had been impressed in the British service. "As regards the gun-boats, James asserts that they were commandedby "Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ireland. " This officer, however, was born at Baltimore on July 6, 1759. As to the_Constitution_, Brenton, as already mentioned, supposes the numberof British sailors in her crew to have been 200; James makes itless, or about 150. Respecting this, the only definite statementsI can find in British works are the following: In the "NavalChronicle, " vol. Xxix, p. 452, an officer of the _Java_ statesthat most of the _Constitution's_ men were British, many beingfrom the _Guerrière_; which should be read in connection withJames' statement (vol. Vi, p. 156) that but eight of the _Guerrière's_crew deserted, and but two shipped on board the _Constitution_. Moreover, as a matter of fact, these eight men were all impressedAmericans. In the "Naval Chronicle" it is also said that the_Chesapeake's_ surgeon was an Irishman, formerly of the Britishnavy; he was born in Baltimore, and was never in the British navyin his life. The third lieutenant "was supposed to be an Irishman"(Brenton, ii, 456). The first lieutenant "was a native of GreatBritain, we have been informed" (James, vi, 194); he was Mr. GeorgeParker, born and bred in Virginia. The remaining three citations, if true, prove nothing. "One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the_Guerrière_ (James, vi, p. 153). "One had been in the _Achille_"and "one in the _Eurydice_" (Brenton, ii, 456). These three menwere most probably American seamen who had been impressed on Britishships. From Cooper (in "Putnam's Magazine, " vol. I, p. 593) as wellas from several places in the _Constitution's_ log, [Footnote: Seeher log-book (vol. Ii, Feb. 1, 1812 to Dec. 13, 1813); especiallyon July 12th, when twelve men were discharged. In some of Hull'sletters he alludes to the desire of the British part of the crewto serve on the gun boats or in the ports; and then writes that"in accordance with the instructions sent him by the Secretary ofthe Navy, " he had allowed the British-born portion to leave theship. The log-books are in the Bureau of Navigation. ] we learnthat several of the crew who were British deserters were dischargedfrom the _Constitution_ before she left port, as they were afraidto serve in a war against Great Britain. That this fear wasjustifiable may be seen by reading James, vol. Iv, p. 483. Of thefour men taken by the _Leopard_ from the _Chesapeake_, as deserters, one was hung and three scourged. In reality the crew of the_Constitution_ probably did not contain a dozen British sailors;in her last cruises she was manned almost exclusively by NewEnglanders. The only remainder vessel is the _United States_, respecting whose crew some remarkable statements have been made. Marshall (vol. Ii, p. 1019) writes that Commodore Decatur "declaredthere was not a seaman in his ship who had not served from 5 to 12years in a British man-of-war, " from which he concludes that theywere British themselves. It may be questioned whether Decatur evermade such an assertion; or if he did, it is safe to assume againthat his men were long-impressed Americans. [Footnote: At thebeginning of the war there were on record in the American StateDepartment 6, 257 cases of impressed American seamen. These couldrepresent but a small part of the whole, which must have amountedto 20, 000 men, or more than sufficient to man our entire navy fivetimes over. According to the British Admiralty Report to the Houseof Commons, February 1, 1815, 2, 548 impressed American seamen, whorefused to serve against their country, were imprisoned in 1812. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in the House, February 18, 1813, 3, 300 men claiming to be American subjects were serving inthe British navy in January, 1811, and he certainly did not giveany thing like the whole number. In the American service the termof enlistment extended for two years, and the frigate, _UnitedStates_, referred to, had not had her crew for any very greatlength of time as yet. If such a crew were selected at randomfrom American sailors, among them there would be, owing to thesmall number serving in our own navy and the enormous numberimpressed into the British navy, probably but one of the formerto two of the latter. As already mentioned the American alwaysleft a British man-of-war as soon as he could, by desertion ordischarge; but he had no unwillingness to serve in the home navy, where the pay was larger, and the discipline far more humane, notto speak of motives of patriotism. Even if the ex-Britishman-of-war's man kept out of service for some time, he would bevery apt to enlist when a war broke out, which his countryundertook largely to avenge his own wrongs. ] Of the _Carolina's_ crew of 70 men, five were British. This factwas not found out till three deserted, when an investigation wasmade and the two other British discharged. Captain Henly, inreporting these facts, made no concealment of his surprise thatthere should be any British at all in his crew. [Footnote: Seehis letter in "Letters of Masters' Commandant, " 1814, I. No. 116. ] From these facts and citations we may accordingly conclude thatthe proportion of British seamen serving on American ships _afterthe war broke out_, varied between none, as on the _Wasp_ and_Constitution_, to ten per cent. , as on the _Chesapeake_ and_Essex_. On the average, nine tenths of each of our crews wereAmerican seamen, and about one twentieth British, the remainderbeing a mixture of various nationalities. On the other hand, it is to be said that the British frigate_Guerrière_ had ten Americans among her crew, who were permittedto go below during action, and the _Macedonian_ eight, who werenot allowed that privilege, three of them being killed. Three ofthe British sloop _Peacock's_ men were Americans, who were forcedto fight against the _Hornet_: one of them was killed. Two of the_Epervier's_ men were Americans, who were also forced to fight. When the crew of the _Nautilus_ was exchanged, a number of otherAmerican prisoners were sent with them; among these were a numberof American seamen who had been serving in the _Shannon_, _Acasta_, _Africa_, and various other vessels. So there was also a certainproportion of Americans among the British crews, although forminga smaller percentage of them than the British did on board theAmerican ships. In neither case was the number sufficient to at allaffect the result. The crews of our ships being thus mainly native Americans, it maybe interesting to try to find out the proportions that werefurnished by the different sections of the country. There is notmuch difficulty about the officers. The captains, masters commandant, lieutenants, marine officers, whose birthplaces are given in theNavy List of 1816, --240 in all, --came from the various States asfollows: . - N. H.. 5-. | Mass.. 20 |New England -| R. I. 11 |- 42 '- Conn.. 6-' . - N. Y.. 17-. | N. J.. 22 |Middle States-| Penn.. 35 |- 78 '- Del.. 4-' District of Columbia -[D. C.. 4]- 4 . - Md.. 46-. | Va.. 42 | | N. C.. 4 |Southern States-| S. C.. 16 |-116 | Ga.. 2 | | La.. 4 | '- Ky.. 2-' ---------Total of given birthplaces 240 Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and proportionately, thegreatest number of officers, Virginia, then the most populous ofall the States, coming next; four fifths of the remainder camefrom the Northern States. It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the sailors. Something can be inferred from the number of privateers and lettersof marque fitted out. Here Baltimore again headed the list; followingclosely came New York, Philadelphia, and the New England coasttowns, with, alone among the Southern ports, Charleston, S. C. Amore accurate idea of the quotas of sailors furnished by thedifferent sections can be arrived at by comparing the total amountof tonnage the country possessed at the outbreak of the war. Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of it belonged to New England, 32per cent, to the Middle States, and 11 per cent, to Maryland. Thismakes it _probable_ (but of course not certain) that three fourthsof the common sailors hailed from the Northern States, half theremainder from Maryland, and the rest chiefly from Virginia andSouth Carolina. Having thus discussed somewhat at length the character of ourofficers and crews, it will now be necessary to present somestatistical tables to give a more accurate idea of the compositionof the navy; the tonnage, complements, and armaments of the ships, etc. At the beginning of the war the Government possessed six navy-yards(all but the last established in 1801) as follows: [Footnote: Reportof Naval Secretary Jones, Nov. 30. 1814. ] Place Original Cost. Minimum number of men employed. 1. Portsmouth. N. H. , $ 5, 500 10 2. Charleston, Mass. , 39, 214 20 3. New York, 40, 000 102 4. Philadelphia, 37, 000 13 5. Washington, 4, 000 36 6. Gosport, 12, 000 16 In 1812 the following was the number of officers in the navy:[Footnote: "List of Vessels" etc. , by Gen. H Preble U. S. N (1874)] 12 captains 10 masters commandant 73 lieutenants 53 masters310 midshipmen 42 marine officers-----500 At the opening of the year, the number of seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys in service was 4, 010, and enough more were recruited toincrease it to 5, 230, of whom only 2, 346 were destined for thecruising war vessels, the remainder being detailed for forts, gun-boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc. [Footnote: Report of SecretaryPaul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812. ] The marine corps was already ample, consisting of 1, 523 men. [Footnote: _Ibid_. ] No regular navy lists were published till 1816, and I have beenable to get very little information respecting the increase inofficers and men during 1813 and 1814; but we have full returnsfor 1815, which may be summarized as follows: [Footnote: Seybert's"Statistical Annals, " p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818)] 30 captains, 25 masters commandant, 141 lieutenants, 24 commanders, 510 midshipmen, 230 sailing-masters, 50 surgeons, 12 chaplains, 50 pursers, 10 coast pilots, 45 captain's clerks, 80 surgeon's mates, 530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sailmakers, 268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc. , 1, 106 quarter gunners, etc. , 5, 000 able seamen, 6, 849 ordinary seamen and boys. Making a total of 14, 960, with 2, 715 marines. [Footnote: Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816. ] Comparing this list with the figures given before, it can be seenthat during the course of the war our navy grew enormously, increasing to between three and four times its original size. At the beginning of the year 1812, the navy of the United Stateson the ocean consisted of the following vessels, which eitherwere, or could have been, made available during the war. [Footnote:Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Congress, Dec. 24, 1798; Letter of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812; "AmericanState Papers, " vol. Xix, p. 149. See also The "History of the Navyof the United States, " by Lieut. G. E. Emmons, U. S. N. (publishedin Washington, MDCCCLIII, under the authority of the Navy Department. )] Rate When(Guns). Name. Where Built. Built. Tonnage. Cost. 44 _United States_, Philadelphia, 1797 1576 $299, 336 44 _Constitution_, Boston, 1797 1576 302, 718 44 _President_, New York, 1800 1576 220, 910 38 _Constellation_, Baltimore, 1797 1265 314, 212 38 _Congress_, Portsmouth, 1799 1268 197, 246 38 _Chesapeake_, Norfolk, 1799 1244 220, 677 32 _Essex_, Salem, 1799 860 139, 362 28 _Adams_, New York, 1799 560 76, 622 18 _Hornet_, Baltimore, 1805 480 52, 603 18 _Wasp_, Washington, 1806 450 40, 000 16 _Argus_, Boston, 1803 298 37, 428 16 _Syren_, Philadelphia, 1803 250 32, 521 14 _Nautilus_, Baltimore, 1803 185 18, 763 14 _Vixen_, Baltimore, 1803 185 20, 872 12 _Enterprise_, Baltimore, 1799 165 16, 240 12 _Viper_, Purchased, 1810 148 There also appeared on the lists the _New York_, 36, _Boston_, 28, and _John Adams_, 28. The two former were condemned hulks; the latterwas entirely rebuilt after the war. The _Hornet_ was originally abrig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having been transformed into a ship, she was pierced for 20 guns, and in size was of an intermediategrade between the _Wasp_ and the heavy sloops, built somewhat later, of 509 tons. Her armament consisted of 32-pound carronades, withthe exception of the two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The wholebroadside was in nominal weight just 300 pounds; in actual weightabout 277 pounds. Her complement of men was 140, but during the warshe generally left port with 150. [Footnote: In the _Hornet's_ logof Oct. 25, 1812, while in port, it is mentioned that she had 158men; four men who were sick were left behind before she started. (See, in the Navy Archives, the Log-book, _Hornet_, _Wasp_, and_Argus_, July 20, 1809, to Oct. 6, 1813. )] The _Wasp_ had been aship from the beginning, mounted the number of guns she rated (ofthe same calibres as the _Hornet's_) and carried some ten men less. She was about the same length as the British 18-gun brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured nearly 30 tons less. The _Argus_ and _Syren_were similar and very fine brigs, the former being the longer. Eachcarried two more guns than she rated; and the _Argus_, in addition, had a couple thrust through the bridle-ports. The guns were 24-poundcarronades, with two long 12's for bow-chasers. The proper complementof men was 100, but each sailed usually with about 125. The foursmaller craft were originally schooners, armed with the same numberof light long guns as they rated, and carrying some 70 men apiece;but they had been very effectually ruined by being changed intobrigs, with crews increased to a hundred men. Each was armed with18-pound carronades, carrying two more than she rated. The_Enterprise_, in fact, mounted 16 guns, having two long nines thrustthrough the bridle-ports. These little brigs were slow, not veryseaworthy, and overcrowded with men and guns; they all fell intothe enemy's hands without doing any good whatever, with the singleexception of the _Enterprise_, which escaped capture by sheer goodluck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted against one ofthe corresponding and equally bad class of British gun-brigs. The_Adams_ after several changes of form finally became a flush-deckedcorvette. The _Essex_ had originally mounted twenty-six long 12'son her main-deck, and sixteen 24-pound carronades on her spar-deck;but official wisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty-four32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on the main-deck, andsixteen 32-pound carronades with four long 12's on the spar-deck. When Captain Porter had command of her he was deeply sensible ofthe disadvantages of an armament which put him at the mercy of anyordinary antagonist who could choose his distance; accordingly hepetitioned several times, but always without success, to have hislong 12's returned to him. The American 38's were about the size of the British frigates ofthe same rate, and armed almost exactly in the same way, eachhaving 28 long 18's on the main-deck and 20 32-pound carronades onthe spar-deck. The proper complement was 300 men, but each carriedfrom 30 to 80 more. [Footnote: The _Chesapeake_, by some curiousmistake, was frequently rated as a 44, and this drew in its traina number of attendant errors. When she was captured, James saysthat in one of her lockers was found a letter, dated in February, 1811, from Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans, at Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for manningthe _Chesapeake_, and enumerating her crew at a total of 443. Naturally this gave British historians the idea that such was theordinary complement of our 38-gun frigates. But the ordering solarge a crew was merely a mistake, as may be seen by a letter fromCaptain Bainbridge to the Secretary of the Navy, which is given infull in the "Captains' Letters, " vol. Xxv. No. 19 (Navy Archives). In it he mentions the extraordinary number of men ordered for the_Chesapeake_, saying, "There is a mistake in the crew ordered forthe _Chesapeake_, as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gunfrigates, whereas the _Chesapeake_ is of the class of the _Congress_and _Constellation_. "] Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates then afloat (althoughthe British possessed some as heavy, such as the _Egyptienne_, 44). They were beautifully modelled, with very thick scantling, extremelystout masts, and heavy cannon. Each carried on her main-deck thirtylong 24's, and on her spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and twentyor twenty-two carronades--42-pounders on the _President_ and _UnitedStates_, 32-pounders on the _Constitution_. Each sailed with a crewof about 450 men--50 in excess of the regular complement. [Footnote:The _President_ when in action with the _Endymion_ had 450 menaboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-roll of the _Constitution_, a few days before her action with the _Guerrière_ contains 464names (including 51 marines); 8 men were absent in a prize, so shehad aboard in the action 456. Her muster-roll just before theaction with the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ shows 461 names. ] It may be as well to mention here the only other class of vesselsthat we employed during the war. This was composed of the ship-sloopsbuilt in 1813, which got to sea in 1814. They were very fine vessels, measuring 509 tons apiece, [Footnote: The dimensions were 117 feet11 inches upon the gun-deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring from one foot before the forward perpendicular and alongthe base line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting3/5 of the moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 6 inches;making 509 21/95 tons. (See in Navy Archives, "Contracts, " vol. Ii. P. 137. )] with very thick scantling and stout masts and spars. Eachcarried twenty 32-pound carronades and two long 12's with a crewnominally of 160 men, but with usually a few supernumeraries. [Footnote: The _Peacock_ had 166 men, as we learn from her commanderWarrington's letter of June 1st (Letter No. 140 in "Masters'Commandant Letters, " 1814, vol. I). The _Frolic_ took aboard "10or 12 men beyond her regular complement" (see letter of JosephBainbridge, No. 51, in same vol. ). Accordingly when she wascaptured by the _Orpheus_, the commander of the latter, CaptainHugh Pigot, reported the number of men aboard to be 171. The_Wasp_ left port with 173 men, with which she fought her firstaction; she had a much smaller number aboard in her second. ] The British vessels encountered were similar, but generallyinferior, to our own. The only 24-pounder frigate we encounteredwas the _Endymion_ of about a fifth less force than the _President_. Their 38-gun frigates were almost exactly like ours, but withfewer men in crew as a rule. They were three times matched againstour 44-gun frigates, to which they were inferior about as three isto four. Their 36-gun frigates were larger than the _Essex_, witha more numerous crew, but the same number of guns; carrying onthe lower deck, however, long 18's instead of 32-pound carronades, --amuch more effective armament. The 32-gun frigates were smaller, with long 12's on the main-deck. The largest sloops were alsofrigate-built, carrying twenty-two 32-pound carronades on themain-deck, and twelve lighter guns on the quarter-deck andforecastle, with a crew of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloopscarried 21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men. But our vesselsmost often came in contact with the British 18-gun brig-sloop;this was a tubby craft, heavier than any of our brigs, being aboutthe size of the _Hornet_. The crew consisted of from 110 to 135 men;ordinarily each was armed with sixteen 32-pound carronades, twolong 6's, and a shifting 12-pound carronade; often with a lightlong gun as a stern-chaser, making 20 in all. The _Reindeer_ and_Peacock_ had only 24-pound carronades; the _Epervier_ had buteighteen guns, all carronades. [Footnote: The _Epervier_ was takeninto our service under the same name and rate. Both Preble andEmmons describe her as of 477 tons. Warrington, her captor, however, says: "The surveyor of the port has just measured the _Epervier_and reports her 467 tons. " (In the Navy Archives, "Masters'Commandant Letters, " 1814, i. No. 125. ) For a full discussion oftonnage, see Appendix, A. ] Among the stock accusations against our navy of 1812, were, andare, statements that our vessels were rated at less than theirreal force, and in particular that our large frigates were "disguisedline-of-battle ships. " As regards the ratings, most vessels ofthat time carried more guns than they rated; the disparity wasless in the French than in either the British or American navies. Our 38-gun frigates carried 48 guns, the exact number the British38's possessed. The worst case of underrating in our navy was the_Essex_, which rated 32, and carried 46 guns, so that her real was44 per cent, in excess of her nominal force; but this was not asbad as the British sloop _Cyane_, which was rated a 20 or 22, andcarried 34 guns, so that she had either 55 or 70 per cent, greaterreal than nominal force. At the beginning of the war we owned two18-gun ship-sloops, one mounting 18 and the other 20 guns; the18-gun brig-sloops they captured mounted each 19 guns, so theaverage was the same. Later we built sloops that rated 18 andmounted 22 guns, but when one was captured it was also put down inthe British navy list as an 18-gun ship-sloop. During all thecombats of the war there were but four vessels that carried asfew guns as they rated. Two were British, the _Epervier_ and_Levant_, and two American, the _Wasp_ and _Adams_. One navy wascertainly as deceptive as another, as far as underrating went. The force of the statement that our large frigates were disguisedline-of-battle ships, of course depends entirely upon what thewords "frigate" and "line-of-battle ship" mean. When on the 10thof August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great convoy by beating off SirGeorge Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail, the largest of the Dutch admiral's"33 sail of the line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, and his ownflag-ship but 28 guns and 134 men. [Footnote: La Vie et les ActionsMemorables du Sr. Michel de Ruyter, à Amsterdam, Chez Henry etTheodore Boom. MDCLXXVII. The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, asurgeon in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally present during manyof his battles. It is written in French, but is in tone morestrongly anti-French than anti-English. ] The Dutch book from whichthis statement is taken speaks indifferently of frigates of 18, 40, and 58 guns. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the terms hadcrystallized. Frigate then meant a so-called single-decked ship;it in reality possessed two decks, the main- or gun-deck, and theupper one, which had no name at all, until our sailors christenedit spar-deck. The gun-deck possessed a complete battery, and thespar-deck an interrupted one, mounting guns on the forecastle andquarter-deck. At that time all "two-decked" or "three-decked" (inreality three- and four-decked) ships were liners. But in 1812this had changed somewhat; as the various nations built more andmore powerful vessels, the lower rates of the different divisionswere dropped. Thus the British ship _Cyane_, captured by the_Constitution_, was in reality a small frigate, with a main-deckbattery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar-deck; a few yearsbefore she would have been called a 24-gun frigate, but she thenranked merely as a 22-gun sloop. Similarly the 50- and 64-gun shipsthat had fought in the line at the Doggerbank, Camperdown, andeven at Aboukir, were now no longer deemed fit for the purpose, and the 74 was the lowest line-of-battle ship. The _Constitution_, _President_, and _States_ must then be comparedwith the existing European vessels that were classed as frigates. The French in 1812 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very goodreason that they had all fallen victims to the English 18-pounder's;but in July of that year a Danish frigate, the _Nayaden_, whichcarried long 24's, was destroyed by the English ship _Dictator_, 64. The British frigates were of several rates. The lowest rated 32, carrying in all 40 guns, 26 long 12's on the main-deck and 1424-pound carronades on the spar-deck--a broadside of 324 pounds. [Footnote: In all these vessels there were generally two long 6'sor 9's substituted for the bow-chase carronades. ] The 36-gunfrigates, like the _Phoebe_, carried 46 guns, 26 long 18's on thegun-deck and 32-pound carronades above. The 38-gun frigates, likethe _Macedonian_, carried 48 or 49 guns, long 18's below and32-pound carronades above. The 32-gun frigates, then, presented inbroadside 13 long 12's below and 7 24-pound carronades above; the38-gun frigates, 14 long 18's below and 10 32-pound carronadesabove; so that a 44-gun frigate would naturally present 15 long24's and 12 42-pound carronades above, as the _United States_ didat first. The rate was perfectly proper, for French, British, andDanes already possessed 24-pounder frigates; and there was reallyless disparity between the force and rate of a 44 that carried 54guns than there was in a 38 that carried 49, or, like the_Shannon_, 52. Nor was this all. Two of our three victories werewon by the _Constitution_, which only carried 32-pound carronades, and once 54 and once 52 guns; and as two thirds of the work wasthus done by this vessel, I shall now compare her with the largestBritish frigates. Her broadside force consisted of 15 long 24's onthe main-deck, and on the spar-deck one long 24, and in one case10, in the other 11 32-pound carronades--a broadside of 704 or 736pounds. [Footnote: Nominally; in reality about 7 per cent, less onaccount of the short weight in the metal. ] There was then in theBritish navy the _Acasta_, 40, carrying in broadside 15 long 18'sand 11 32-pound carronades; when the spar-deck batteries are equal, the addition of 90 pounds to the main-deck broadside (which is allthe superiority of the _Constitution_ over the _Acasta_) iscertainly not enough to make the distinction between a frigate anda disguised 74. But not considering the _Acasta_, there were in theBritish navy three 24-pounder frigates, the _Cornwallis_, _Indefatigable_, and _Endymion_. We only came in contact with thelatter in 1815, when the _Constitution_ had but 52 guns. The_Endymion_ then had an armament of 28 long 24's, 2 long 18's, and20 32-pound carronades, making a broadside of 674 pounds, [Footnote:According to James 664 pounds; he omits the chase guns for noreason. ] or including a shifting 24-pound carronade, of 698pounds--just _six pounds_, or 1 per cent, less than the force ofthat "disguised line-of-battle ship" the _Constitution_! As the_Endymion_ only rated as a 40, and the _Constitution_ as a 44, itwas in reality the former and not the latter which was underrated. I have taken the _Constitution_, because the British had more todo with her than they did with our other two 44's taken together. The latter were both of heavier metal than the _Constitution_, carrying 42-pound carronades. In 1812 the _United States_ carriedher full 54 guns, throwing a broadside of 846 pounds; when captured, the _President_ carried 53, having substituted a 24-pound carronadefor two of her 42's, and her broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or16 per cent _nominal_, and, on account of the short weight of hershot, 9 per cent, _real_ excess over the _Endymion_. If thisdifference made her a line-of-battle ship, then the _Endymion_ wasdoubly a line-of-battle ship compared to the _Congress_ or_Constellation_. Moreover, the American commanders found their42-pound carronades too heavy; as I have said the _Constitution_only mounted 32's, and the _United States_ landed 6 of her guns. When, in 1813, she attempted to break the blockade, she carriedbut 48 guns, throwing a broadside of 720 pounds--just 3 per centmore than the _Endymion_. [Footnote: It was on account of thisdifference of 3 per cent that Captain Hardy refused to allow the_Endymion_ to meet the _States_ (James, vi. P. 470). This wasduring the course of some challenges and counter-challenges whichended in nothing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the_Macedonian_ meet the _Statira_, unless the latter should agreenot to take on a picked crew. He was perfectly right in this; buthe ought never to have sent the challenge at all, as two ships butan hour or two out of port would be at a frightful disadvantagein a fight. ] If our frigates were line-of-battle ships the disguisewas certainly marvellously complete, and they had a number ofcompanions equally disguised in the British ranks. The 44's were thus _true frigates_, with one complete battery oflong guns and one interrupted one of carronades. That they werebetter than any other frigates was highly creditable to ouringenuity and national skill. We cannot, perhaps, lay claim tothe invention and first use of the heavy frigate, for 24-pounderfrigates were already in the service of at least three nations, and the French 36-pound carronnade, in use on their spar-decks, threw a heavier ball than our 42-pounder. But we had enlarged andperfected the heavy frigate, and were the first nation that everused it effectively. The French _Forte_ and the Danish _Nayaden_shared the fate of ships carrying guns of lighter calibre; andthe British 24-pounders, like the _Endymion_, had never accomplishedany thing. Hitherto there had been a strong feeling, especiallyin England, that an 18-pound gun was as effective as a 24- inarming a frigate; we made a complete revolution in this respect. England had been building only 18-pounder vessels when she oughtto have been building 24-pounders. It was greatly to our creditthat our average frigate was superior to the average British frigate;exactly as it was to our discredit that the _Essex_ was soineffectively armed. Captain Porter owed his defeat chiefly to hisineffective guns, but also to having lost his topmast, to theweather being unfavorable, and, still more, to the admirableskill with which Hilyar used his superior armament. The _Java_, _Macedonian_, and _Guerrière_ owed their defeat partly to theirlighter guns, but much more to the fact that their captains andseamen did not display either as good seamanship or as good gunneryas their foes. Inferiority in armament was a factor to be takeninto account in all the four cases, but it was more marked in thatof the _Essex_ than in the other three; it would have been fairerfor Porter to say that he had been captured by a line-of-battleship, than for the captain of the _Java_ to make that assertion. In this last case the forces of the two ships compared almostexactly as their rates. A 44 was matched against a 38; it was notsurprising that she should win, but it _was_ surprising that sheshould win with ease and impunity. The long 24's on the_Constitution's_ gun-deck no more made her a line-of-battle shipthan the 32-pound carronades mounted on an English frigate'squarter-deck and forecastle made _her_ a line-of-battle ship whenopposed to a Frenchman with only 8's and 6's on his spar-deck. When, a few years before, the English _Phoebe_ had captured theFrench _Nereide_, their broadsides were respectively 407 and 258pounds, a greater disparity than in any of our successful fights;yet no author thought of claiming that the _Phoebe_ was any thingbut a frigate. So with the _Clyde_, throwing 425 lbs. , which tookthe _Vestale_, throwing but 246. The facts were that 18-pounderfrigates had captured 12-pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders inturn captured the 18-pounders. Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, one of her18-pounder frigates, the _San Florenzo_, throwing 476 lbs. In abroadside, captured the 12-pounder French frigate _Psyché_, whosebroadside was only 246 lbs. The force of the former was thusalmost double that of the latter, yet the battle was long anddesperate, the English losing 48 and the French 124 men. Thisconflict, then, reflected as much credit on the skill and seamanshipof the defeated as of the victorious side; the difference in losscould fairly be ascribed to the difference in weight of metal. But where, as in the famous ship-duels of 1812, the difference inforce is only a fifth, instead of a half and yet the slaughter, instead of being as five is to two, is as six to one, then thevictory is certainly to be ascribed as much to superiority in skillas to superiority in force. But, on the other hand, it should alwaysbe remembered that there was a very decided superiority in force. It is a very discreditable feature of many of our naval historiesthat they utterly ignore this superiority, seeming ashamed toconfess that it existed. In reality it was something to be proudof. It was highly to the credit of the United States that herfrigates were of better make and armament than any others; italways speaks well for a nation's energy and capacity that any ofher implements of warfare are of superior kind. This is a perfectlylegitimate reason for pride. It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that they opposedbreech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders of the Austrians; but it wouldbe folly to give all the credit of the victory to the breech-loadersand none to Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it must rememberedthat two things contributed to our victories. One was the excellentmake and armament of our ships; the other was the skilful seamanship, excellent discipline, and superb gunnery of the men who were inthem. British writers are apt only to speak of the first, and Americansonly of the last, whereas both should be taken into consideration. To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate, in buildand armament, properly rated, stronger than a 38-gun frigate justabout in the proportion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding in strengthan 18-pounder frigate as much as the latter exceeded one carrying12-pounders. They were in no way whatever line-of-battle ships;but they were superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what isstill more important, they were better manned and commanded thanthe _average_ frigate of any other navy. Lord Codrington says("Memoirs, " i, p. 310): "But I well know the system of favoritismand borough corruption prevails so very much that many people arepromoted and kept in command that should be dismissed the service, and while such is the case the few Americans chosen for their meritmay be expected to follow up their successes except where they meetwith our best officers on even terms. " [Footnote: To show that I amnot quoting an authority biassed in our favor I will give SirEdward Codrington's opinion of our rural better class (i, 318). "It is curious to observe the animosity which prevails here amongwhat is called the better order of people, which I think is morea misnomer here than in any other country I have ever been. Their_whig_ and _tory_ are democrat and federalist, and it would seemfor the sake of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred whichmarks the Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term)who takes possession of a property adopts the opposite politicalcreed to that of his nearest neighbor. "] The small size of ournavy was probably to a certain extent effective in keeping it upto a high standard; but this is not the only explanation, as canbe seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On the other hand, thechampions or pick of a large navy _ought_ to be better than thechampions of a small one. [Footnote: In speaking of tonnage I wishI could have got better authority than James for the British sideof the question. He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives onea distrust of his judgment. Thus, in speaking of the _Penguin's_capture, he, in endeavoring to show that the _Hornet's_ loss wasgreater than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerouslywounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was afraid toamputate, owing to his want of experience" ("Naval Occurrences, "492). Now what could persuade a writer to make such a foolishaccusation? No matter how utterly depraved and brutal CaptainBiddle might be, he would certainly not throw his wounded overalive because he feared they might die. Again, in vol. Vi, p. 546, he says: "Captain Stewart had caused the _Cyane_ to be painted toresemble a 36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize hisexploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston. " No matterhow skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no matter how greatthe gaping capacities of the Bostonians, the _Cyane_ (which by theway went to New York and not Boston) could no more be painted tolook like a 36-gun frigate than a schooner could be painted to looklike a brig. Instances of rancor like these two occur constantlyin his work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matterof fact from what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the Britishofficial accounts when they can be reached, except in the case ofthe _Java_, which seem garbled. That such was sometimes the casewith British officials is testified to by both James (vol. Iv, p. 17) and Brenton (vol. Ii, p. 454, note). From the "Memoir ofAdmiral Broke" we learn that his public letter was wrong in a numberof particulars. See also any one of the numerous biographies ofLord Dundonald, the hero of the little _Speedy's_ fight. It isvery unfortunate that the British stopped publishing officialaccounts of their defeats; it could not well help giving rise tounpleasant suspicions. It may be as well to mention here, again, that James' accusations do notreally detract from the interest attaching to the war, and its value forpurposes of study. If, as he says, the American commanders were cowards, and their crews renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson thatgood training will make such men able to beat brave officers with loyalcrews. And why did the British have such bad average crews as he makesout? He says, for instance, that the Java's was unusually bad; yetBrenton says (vol. Ii, p. 461) it was like "the generality of our crews. "It is worth while explaining the reason that such a crew was generallybetter than a French and worse than an American one. ] Again, the armaments of the American as well as of the Britishships were composed of three very different styles of guns. Thefirst, or long gun, was enormously long and thick-barrelled incomparison to its bore, and in consequence very heavy; it possesseda very long range, and varied in calibre from two to forty-twopounds. The ordinary calibres in our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and24. The second style was the carronade, a short, light gun oflarge bore; compared to a long gun of the same weight it carrieda much heavier ball for a much shorter distance. The chief calibreswere 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, and 68-pounders, the first and thelast being hardly in use in our navy. The third style was thecolumbiad, of an intermediate grade between the first two. Thusit is seen that a gun of one style by no means corresponds to agun of another style of the same calibre. As a rough example, along 12, a columbiad 18, and a 32-pound carronade would be aboutequivalent to one another. These guns were mounted on two differenttypes of vessel. The first was flush-decked; that is, it had asingle straight open deck on which all the guns were mounted. This class included one heavy corvette, (the _Adams_), theship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. Through the bow-chase port, oneach side, each of these mounted a long gun; the rest of their gunswere carronades, except in the case of the _Adams_, which had alllong guns. Above these came the frigates, whose gun-deck wascovered above by another deck; on the fore and aft parts (forecastleand quarter-deck) of this upper, open deck were also mounted guns. The main-deck guns were all long, except on the _Essex_, whichhad carronades; on the quarter-deck were mounted carronades, andon the forecastle also carronades, with two long bow-chasers. Where two ships of similar armament fought one another, it is easyto get the comparative force by simply comparing the weight inbroadsides, each side presenting very nearly the same proportionof long guns to carronades. For such a broadside we take half theguns mounted in the ordinary way; and all guns mounted on pivotsor shifting. Thus Perry's force in guns was 54 to Barclay's 63;yet each presented 34 in broadside. Again, each of the Britishbrig-sloops mounted 19 guns, presenting 10 in broadside. Besidesthese, some ships mounted bow-chasers run through the bridle-ports, or stern-chasers, neither of which could be used in broadsides. Nevertheless, I include them, both because it works in about anequal number of cases against each navy, and because they weresometimes terribly effective. James excludes the _Guerrière's_bow-chaser; in reality he ought to have included both it and itsfellow, as they worked more damage than all the broadside gunsput together. Again, he excludes the _Endymion's_ bow-chasers, though in her action they proved invaluable. Yet he includes thoseof the _Enterprise_ and _Argus_, though the former's were probablynot fired. So I shall take the half of the fixed, plus all themovable guns aboard, in comparing broadside force. But the chief difficulty appears when guns of one style arematched against those of another. If a ship armed with long 12's, meets one armed with 32-pound carronades, which is superior inforce? At long range the first, and at short range the second; andof course each captain is pretty sure to insist that "circumstances"forced him to fight at a disadvantage. The result would dependlargely on the skill or luck of each commander in choosing position. One thing is certain; long guns are more formidable than carronadesof the same calibre. There are exemplifications of this rule onboth sides; of course, American writers, as a rule, only payattention to one set of cases, and British to the others. The _Cyane_and _Levant_ threw a heavier broadside than the _Constitution_ butwere certainly less formidably armed; and the _Essex_ threw a heavierbroadside than the _Phoebe_, yet was also less formidable. On LakeOntario the American ship _General Pike_ threw less metal at abroadside than either of her two chief antagonists, but neithercould be called her equal; while on Lake Champlain a parallel caseis afforded by the British ship _Confiance_. Supposing that twoships throw the same broadside weight of metal, one from long guns, the other from carronades, at short range they are equal; at long, one has it all her own way. Her captain thus certainly has a greatsuperiority of force, and if he does not take advantage of it itis owing to his adversary's skill or his own mismanagement. As amere approximation, it may be assumed, in comparing the broadsidesof two vessels or squadrons, that long guns count for at leasttwice as much as carronades of the same calibre. Thus on LakeChamplain Captain Downie possessed an immense advantage in hislong guns, which Commodore Macdonough's exceedingly good arrangementsnullified. Sometimes part of the advantage may be willingly foregone, so as to acquire some other. Had the _Constitution_ kept at longbowls with the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ she could have probably capturedone without any loss to herself, while the other would have escaped;she preferred to run down close so as to insure the capture of both, knowing that even at close quarters long guns are somewhat betterthan short ones (not to mention her other advantages in thickscantling, speed, etc. ). The British carronades often upset inaction; this was either owing to their having been insufficientlysecured, and to this remaining undiscovered because the men werenot exercised at the guns, or else it was because the unpractisedsailors would greatly overcharge them. Our better-trained sailorson the ocean rarely committed these blunders, but the less-skilledcrews on the lakes did so as often as their antagonists. But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had heavier and better-fittedguns, they labored under one or two disadvantages. Our foundrieswere generally not as good as those of the British, and our guns, in consequence, more likely to burst; it was an accident of thisnature which saved the British _Belvidera_; and the _General Pike_, under Commodore Chauncy, and the new American frigate _Guerrière_suffered in the same way; while often the muzzles of the guns wouldcrack. A more universal disadvantage was in the short weight ofour shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the _Avon_ he officiallyreported that her four shot which came aboard weighed just 32pounds apiece, a pound and three quarters more than his _heaviest_;this would make his average shot about 2 1/2 pounds less, orrather over 7 per cent. Exactly similar statements were made bythe officers of the _Constitution_ in her three engagements. Thus when she fought the _Java_, she threw at a broadside, asalready stated, 704 pounds; the _Java_ mounted 28 long 18's, 1832-pound carronades, 2 long 12's, and one shifting 24-poundcarronade, a broadside of 576 pounds. Yet by the actual weighingof all the different shot on both sides it was found that thedifference in broadside force was only about 77 pounds, or the_Constitution's_ shot were about 7 per cent, short weight. Thelong 24's of the _United States_ each threw a shot but 4 1/4 poundsheavier than the long 18's of the _Macedonian_; here again thedifference was about 7 per cent. The same difference existed infavor of the _Penguin_ and _Epervier_ compared with the _Wasp_and _Hornet_. Mr. Fenimore Cooper [Footnote: See "Naval History, "i, p. 380. ] weighed a great number of shot some time after the war. The later castings, even weighed nearly 5 per cent, less than theBritish shot, and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent. Theaverage is safe to take at 7 per cent. Less, and I shall throughoutmake this allowance for ocean cruisers. The deficit was sometimesowing to windage, but more often the shot was of full size butdefective in density. The effect of this can be gathered from thefollowing quotation from the work of a British artillerist: "Thegreater the density of shot of like calibres, projected with equalvelocity and elevation, the greater the range, accuracy, andpenetration. " [Footnote: "Heavy Ordnance, " Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A. , London, 1837. James supposes that the "Yankee captains"have in each case hunted round till they could get particularlysmall American shot to weigh; and also denies that short weightis a disadvantage. The last proposition carried out logicallywould lead to some rather astonishing results. ] This defectivenessin density might be a serious injury in a contest at a longdistance, but would make but little difference at close quarters(although it may have been partly owing to their short weightthat so many of the Chesapeake's shot failed to penetrate the_Shannon's_ hull). Thus in the actions with the _Macedonian_ and_Java_ the American frigates showed excellent practice when thecontest was carried on within fair distance, while their firstbroadsides at long range went very wild; but in the case of the_Guerrière_, the _Constitution_ reserved her fire for closequarters, and was probably not at all affected by the shortweight of her shot. As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, the following wasthe regular complement established by law: [Footnote: See StatePapers, vol. Xiv, 159 (Washington, 1834). ] 1 captain, 4 lieutenants, 2 lieutenants of marines, 2 sailing-masters, 2 master's mates, 7 midshipmen, 1 purser, 1 surgeon, 2 surgeon's mates, 1 clerk, 1 carpenter, 2 carpenter's mates, 1 boatswain, 2 boatswain's mates, 1 yeoman of gun-room, 1 gunner, 11 quarter gunners, 1 coxswain, 1 sailmaker, 1 cooper, 1 steward, 1 armorer, 1 master of arms, 1 cook, 1 chaplain. __ 50 120 able seamen, 150 ordinary seamen, 30 boys, 50 marines. ___400 in all. An 18-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 20 marines--140 in all. Sometimesships put to sea without their full complements (as in the case ofthe first _Wasp_), but more often with supernumeraries aboard. The weapons for close quarters were pikes, cutlasses, and a fewaxes; while the marines and some of the topmen had muskets, andoccasionally rifles. In comparing the forces of the contestants I have always giventhe number of men in crew; but this in most cases was unnecessary. When there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails, make repairs, act as marines, etc. , any additional number simplyserved to increase the slaughter on board. The _Guerrière_undoubtedly suffered from being short-handed, but neither the_Macedonian_ nor _Java_ would have been benefited by the presenceof a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about as many menas Perry, but this did not give him an equality of force. The_Penguin_ and _Frolic_ would have been taken just as surely hadthe _Hornet_ and _Wasp_ had a dozen men less apiece than they did. The principal case where numbers would help would be in ahand-to-hand fight. Thus the _Chesapeake_ having fifty more menthan the _Shannon_ ought to have been successful; but she was not, because the superiority of her crew in numbers was more thancounterbalanced by the superiority of the _Shannon's_ crew inother respects. The result of the battle of Lake Champlain, whichwas fought at anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketryto reach, was not in the slightest degree affected by the numberof men on either side, as both combatants had amply enough tomanage the guns and perform every other service. In all these conflicts the courage of both parties is taken forgranted: it was not so much a factor in gaining the victory, asone which if lacking was fatal to all chances of success. In theengagements between regular cruisers, not a single one was gainedby superiority in courage. The crews of both the _Argus_ and_Epervier_ certainly flinched; but had they fought never sobravely they were too unskilful to win. The _Chesapeake's_ crewcould hardly be said to lack courage; it was more that they wereinferior to their opponents in discipline as well as in skill. There was but one conflict during the war where the victory couldbe said to be owing to superiority in pluck. This was when the_Neufchatel_ privateer beat off the boats of the _Endymion_. Theprivateersmen suffered a heavier proportional loss than theirassailants, and they gained the victory by sheer ability to standpunishment. For convenience in comparing them I give in tabulated form theforce of the three British 38's taken by American 44's (allowingfor short weight of metal of latter). CONSTITUTION. GUERRIÈRE. 30 long 24's, 30 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 22 short 32's. 16 short 32's, ___________________________ 1 short 18. Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs. __________________ real. 684 lbs. Broadside, 556 lbs. UNITED STATES MACEDONIAN30 long 24's, 28 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 22 short 42's. 2 long 9's, ___________________________ 16 short 32's, Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs. 1 short 18. Real, 786 lbs. ___________________ Broadside, 547 lbs. CONSTITUTION JAVA30 long 24's, 28 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 20 short 32's. 18 short 32's, ____________________________ 1 short 24. Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs. ___________________ real. 654 lbs. Broadside. 576 lbs. The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with only long 18's onthe second deck, was armed as follows: 28 long 32's, 28 " 18's, 6 " 12's. 14 short 32's 7 " 18's or a broadside of 1, 032 lbs. , 736 from long guns, 296 fromcarronades; while the _Constitution_ threw (in reality) 684 lbs. , 356 from long guns, and 328 from her carronades, and the _UnitedStates_ 102 lbs. More from her carronades. Remembering the differencebetween long guns and carronades, and considering sixteen of the74's long 18's as being replaced by 42-pound carronades [Footnote:That this change would leave the force about as it was, can begathered from the fact that the _Adams_ and _John Adams_ both ofwhich had been armed with 42 pound carronades (which were sent toSackett's Harbor), had them replaced by long and medium 18 pounders, these being considered to be formidable: so that the substitutionof 42-pound carronades would, if any thing, reduce the force ofthe 74] (so as to get the metal on the ships distributed in similarproportions between the two styles of cannon), we get as the 74'sbroadside 592 lbs from long guns, and 632 from carronades. The_United States_ threw nominally 360 and 486, and the _Constitution_nominally 360 and 352; so the 74 was superior even to the formernominally about as three is to two; while the _Constitution_, if"a line-of-battle ship, " was disguised to such a degree that shewas in reality of but little more than _one half_ the force of oneof the smallest _true_ liners England possessed! Chapter III 1812 ON THE OCEAN _Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the_Belvidera--_Cruise of the _Essex--_Captain Hull's cruise, andescape from the squadron of Commodore Broke_--Constitution _captures_Guerrière--Wasp _captures_ Frolic--_Second unsuccessful cruise ofCommodore Rodgers_--United States _captures_ Macedonian--Constitution_captures_ Java--Essex _starts on a cruise--Summary_ At the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 1812, the Americannavy was but partially prepared for effective service. The _Wasp_, 18, was still at sea, on her return voyage from France; the_Constellation_, 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river, unable toreceive a crew for several months to come; the _Chesapeake_, 38, was lying in a similar condition in Boston harbor; the _Adams_, 28, was at Washington, being cut down and lengthened from a frigateinto a corvette. These three cruisers were none of them fit to goto sea till after the end of the year. The _Essex_, 32, was inNew York harbor, but, having some repairs to make, was not yetready to put out. The _Constitution_, 44, was at Annapolis, withoutall of her stores, and engaged in shipping a new crew, the time ofthe old one being up. The _Nautilus_, 14, was cruising off NewJersey, and the other small brigs were also off the coast. Theonly vessels immediately available were those under the commandof Commodore Rodgers, at New York, consisting of his own ship, the_President_, 44, and of the _United States_, 44, Commodore Decatur, _Congress_, 38, Captain Smith, _Hornet_, 18, Captain Lawrence, and _Argus_, 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It seems marvellous that anynation should have permitted its ships to be so scattered, andmany of them in such an unfit condition, at the beginning ofhostilities. The British vessels cruising off the coast were notat that time very numerous or formidable, consisting of the_Africa_, 64, _Acasta_, 40, _Shannon_, 38, _Guerrière_, 38, _Belvidera_, 36, _Aeolus_, 32, _Southampton_, 32, and _Minerva_, 32, with a number of corvettes and sloops; their force was, however, strong enough to render it impossible for CommodoreRodgers to make any attempt on the coast towns of Canada or theWest Indies. But the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed fromJamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by the _Thalia_, 36, Capt. Vashon, and _Reindeer_, 18, Capt. Manners. Its capture ordestruction would have been a serious blow, and one which thereseemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet would have to passalong the American coast, running with the Gulf Stream. CommodoreRodgers had made every preparation, in expectation of war beingdeclared, and an hour after official intelligence of it, togetherwith his instructions, had been received, his squadron put to sea, on June 21st, and ran off toward the south-east [Footnote: Letterof Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 1, 1812. ] to get at the Jamaica ships. Having learned from anAmerican brig that she had passed the plate fleet four days beforein lat. 36° N. , long. 67° W. , the Commodore made all sail in thatdirection. At 6 A. M. On June 23d a sail was made out in the N. E. , which proved to be the British frigate _Belvidera_, 36, Capt. Richard Byron. [Footnote: Brenton, v. 46. ] The latter had sightedsome of Commodore Rodgers' squadron some time before, and stoodtoward them, till at 6. 30 she made out the three largest ships tobe frigates. Having been informed of the likelihood of war by a NewYork pilot boat, the _Belvidera_ now stood away, going N. E. By E. , the wind being fresh from the west. The Americans made all sail inchase, the _President_, a very fast ship off the wind, leading, and the _Congress_ coming next. At noon the _President_ bore S. W. , distant 2 3/4 miles from the _Belvidera_, Nantucket shoals bearing100 miles N. And 48 miles E [Footnote: Log of _Belvidera_, June 23, 1812. ]. The wind grew lighter, shifting more toward the south-west, while the ships continued steadily in their course, going N. E. By E. As the _President_ kept gaining, Captain Byron cleared his shipfor action, and shifted to the stern ports two long eighteen-pounderson the main-deck and two thirty-two pound carronades on thequarter-deck. At 4:30 [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117, the _President_ was then 600 yards distant from the _Belvidera_, half a point on her weather or port quarter. ] the _President's_starboard forecastle bowgun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself;the corresponding main-deck gun was next discharged, and thenCommodore Rodgers fired again. These three shots all struck thestern of the _Belvidera_, killing and wounding nine men, --one ofthem went through the rudder coat, into the after gun-room, theother two into the captain's cabin. A few more such shots wouldhave rendered the _Belvidera's_ capture certain, but when the_President's_ main-deck gun was discharged for the second time itburst, blowing up the forecastle deck and killing and wounding 16men, among them the Commodore himself, whose leg was broken. Thissaved the British frigate. Such an explosion always causes a halfpanic, every gun being at once suspected. In the midst of theconfusion Captain Byron's stern-chasers opened with spirit andeffect, killing or wounding six men more. Had the _President_ stillpushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers until she closedabreast, which she could probably have done, the _Belvidera_ couldstill have been taken; but, instead, the former now bore up andfired her port broadside, cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly, but doing no other damage, while the _Belvidera_ kept up a briskand galling fire, although the long bolts, breeching-hooks, andbreechings of the guns now broke continually, wounding several ofthe men, including Captain Byron. The _President_ had lost groundby yawing, but she soon regained it, and, coming up closer thanbefore, again opened from her bow-chasers a well-directed fire, which severely wounded her opponent's main-top mast, cross-jackyard, and one or two other spars; [Footnote: James, vi, 119. Hesays the _President_ was within 400 yards. ] but shortly afterwardshe repeated her former tactics and again lost ground by yawingto discharge another broadside, even more ineffectual than thefirst. Once more she came up closer than ever, and once more yawed;the single shots from her bow-chasers doing considerable damage, but her raking broadsides none. [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery, " p. 419 (third edition). ] Meanwhile the activecrew of the _Belvidera_ repaired every thing as fast as it wasdamaged, while under the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce, and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired from herstern guns. [Footnote: James, vi, 118. ] Finding that if the_President_ ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, CaptainByron cut away one bower, one stream, and two sheet anchors, thebarge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat, and started 14 tons of water. The effect of this was at once apparent, and she began to gain;meanwhile the damage the sails of the combatants had received hadenabled the _Congress_ to close, and when abreast of his consortCaptain Smith opened with his bow-chasers, but the shot fell short. The _Belvidera_ soon altered her course to east by south, set herstarboard studding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; andthree days afterward reached Halifax harbor. Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on this encounter seem very just. He says that the President opened very well with her bow-chasers(in fact the Americans seem to have aimed better and to have donemore execution with these guns than the British with theirstern-chasers); but that she lost so much ground by yawing anddelivering harmless broadsides as to enable her antagonist toescape. Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost to nopurpose, the Commodore would have run alongside his opponent, andthe fate of the little 36 would have been sealed. On the other handit must be remembered that it was only the bursting of the gun onboard the _President_, causing such direful confusion and loss, and especially harmful in disabling her commander, that gave the_Belvidera_ any chance of escape at all. At any rate, whether theAmerican frigate does, or does not, deserve blame, Captain Byronand his crew do most emphatically deserve praise for the skillwith which their guns were served and repairs made, the coolnesswith which measures to escape were adopted, and the courage withwhich they resisted so superior a force. On this occasion CaptainByron showed himself as good a seaman and as brave a man as hesubsequently proved a humane and generous enemy when engaged inthe blockade of the Chesapeake. [Footnote: Even Niles, unscrupulouslybitter as he is toward the British, does justice to the humanityof Captains Byron and Hardy--which certainly shone in comparisonto some of the rather buccaneering exploits of Cockburn's followersin Chesapeake Bay. ] This was not a very auspicious opening of hostilities for America. The loss of the _Belvidera_ was not the only thing to be regretted, for the distance the chase took the pursuers out of their courseprobably saved the plate fleet. When the _Belvidera_ was firstmade out, Commodore Rodgers was in latitude 39° 26' N. , andlongitude 71° 10' W. ; at noon the same day the _Thalia_ and herconvoy were in latitude 39° N. , longitude 62° W. Had they notchased the _Belvidera_ the Americans would probably have runacross the plate fleet. The American squadron reached the western edge of the NewfoundlandBanks on June 29th, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 1st. ] and on July 1st, a little to the east of the Banks, fell inwith large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, etc. , which filled every one with great hopes of overtaking the quarry. On July 9th, the _Hornet_ captured a British privateer, in latitude45° 30' N. , and longitude 23° W. , and her master reported that hehad seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening; but nothing furtherwas heard or seen of them, and on July 13th, being within twentyhours' sail of the English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantlyturned southward, reaching Madeira July 21st. Thence he cruisedtoward the Azores and by the Grand Banks home, there beingconsiderable sickness on the ships. On August 31st he reachedBoston after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he had made butseven prizes, all merchant-men, and had recaptured one American vessel. On July 3d the _Essex_, 32, Captain David Porter, put out of NewYork. As has been already explained she was most inefficientlyarmed, almost entirely with carronades. This placed her at themercy of any frigate with long guns which could keep at a distanceof a few hundred yards; but in spite of Captain Porter's petitionsand remonstrances he was not allowed to change his armament. On the11th of July at 2 A. M. , latitude 33° N. , longitude 66° W. , the_Essex_ fell in with the _Minerva_, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins, convoying seven transports, each containing about 200 troops, boundfrom Barbadoes to Quebec. The convoy was sailing in open order, and, there being a dull moon, the _Essex_ ran in and cut outtransport No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard. Having taken out thesoldiers, Captain Porter stood back to the convoy, expectingCaptain Hawkins to come out and fight him; but this the latterwould not do, keeping the convoy in close order around him. Thetransports were all armed and still contained in the aggregate1, 200 soldiers. As the _Essex_ could only fight at close quartersthese heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to cut outthe _Minerva_. Her carronades would have to be used at short rangeto be effective, and it would of course have been folly to run inright among the convoy, and expose herself to the certainty ofbeing boarded by five times as many men as she possessed. The_Minerva_ had three less guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried24-pound carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, had fifty menless than the _Essex_, which had about 270 men this cruise; on theother hand, her main-deck was armed with long 12's, so that it ishard to say whether she did right or not in refusing to fight. Shewas of the same force as the _Southampton_ whose captain, Sir JamesLucas Yeo, subsequently challenged Porter, but never appointed ameeting-place. In the event of a meeting, the advantage, in shipsof such radically different armaments, would have been with thatcaptain who succeeded in outmanoeuvring the other and in makingthe fight come off at the distance best suited to himself. At longrange either the _Minerva_ or _Southampton_ would possess an immensesuperiority; but if Porter could have contrived to run up withina couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, his superiorityin weight of metal and number of men would have enabled him to carryeither of them. Porter's crew was better trained for boarding thanalmost any other American commander's; and probably none of theBritish frigates on the American station, except the _Shannon_ and_Tenedos_, would have stood a chance with the _Essex_ in ahand-to-hand struggle. Among her youngest midshipmen was one, byname David Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, whoafterward became the first and greatest admiral of the United States. His own words on this point will be read with interest. "Everyday, " he says, [Footnote: "Life of Farragut" (embodying his journaland letters), p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York. 1879. ]"the crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms, and singlestick. And I may here mention the fact that I have never been ona ship where the crew of the old _Essex_ was represented but thatI found them to be the best swordsmen on board. They had been sothoroughly trained as boarders that every man was prepared forsuch an emergency, with his cutlass as sharp as a razor, a dirkmade by the ship's armorer out of a file, and a pistol. " [Footnote:James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to bring the_Minerva_ to action we do not see what could have prevented the_Essex_ with her superiority of sailing, from coming alongside ofher. But no such thought, we are sure, entered into Captain Porter'shead. " What "prevented the _Essex_" was the _Minerva's_ notventuring out of the convoy. Farragut, in his journal writes: "Thecaptured British officers were very anxious for us to have a fightwith the _Minerva_, as they considered her a good match for the_Essex_, and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify themwith pleasure if his majesty's commander was of their taste. Sowe stood toward the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, andawaited the _Minerva_, but she tacked and stood in among the convoy, to the utter amazement of our prisoners, who denounced the commanderas a base coward, and expressed their determination to report himto the Admiralty. " An incident of reported "flinching" like thisis not worth mentioning; I allude to it only to show the value ofJames' sneers. ] On August 13th a sail was made out to windward, which proved to bethe British ship-sloop _Alert_, 16, Captain T. L. O. Laugharne, carrying 20 eighteen-pound carronades and 100 men. [Footnote:James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men. " In the Naval Archivesat Washington in the "Captains' Letters" for 1812 (vol. N. No. 182) can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the parole of theofficers and crew of the _Alert_ signed by Captain Laugharne; itcontains either 100 or 101 names of the crew of the _Alert_ besidesthose of a number of other prisoners sent back in the same cartel. ]As soon as the _Essex_ discovered the _Alert_ she put out dragsastern, and led the enemy to believe she was trying to escape bysending a few men aloft to shake out the reefs and make sail. Concluding the frigate to be a merchant-man, the _Alert_ bore downon her; while the Americans went to quarters and cleared for action, although the tompions were left in the guns, and the ports keptclosed. [Footnote: "Life of Farragut, " p. 16. ] The _Alert_ fireda gun and the _Essex_ hove to, when the former passed under herstern, and when on her lee quarter poured in a broadside of grapeand canister; but the sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beamthat her shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage. Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as soon as his gunswould bear, tompions and all. The _Alert_ now discovered her errorand made off, but too late, for in eight minutes the _Essex_ wasalong side, and the _Alert_ fired a musket and struck, three menbeing wounded and several feet of water in the hold. She wasdisarmed and sent as a cartel into St. Johns. It has been thefashion among American writers to speak of her as if she were"unworthily" given up, but such an accusation is entirelygroundless. The _Essex_ was four times her force, and all thatcould possibly be expected of her was to do as she did--exchangebroadsides and strike, having suffered some loss and damage. The_Essex_ returned to New York on September 7th, having made 10prizes, containing 423 men. [Footnote: Before entering New Yorkthe _Essex_ fell in with a British force which, in both Porter'sand Farragut's works, is said to have been composed of the_Acasta_ and _Shannon_, each of fifty guns, and _Ringdove_, oftwenty. James says it was the _Shannon_, accompanied by a merchantvessel. It is not a point of much importance, as nothing came ofthe meeting, and the _Shannon_, alone, with her immensely superiorarmament, ought to have been a match twice over for the _Essex_:although, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather acomical turn to Porter's account of his "extraordinary escape. "] The _Belvidera_, as has been stated, carried the news of the warto Halifax. On July 5th Vice-Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadronto cruise against the United States, commanded by Philip VereBroke, of the _Shannon_, 38, having under him the _Belvidera_, 36, Captain Richard Byron, _Africa_, 64, Captain John Bastard, and_Aeolus_. 32, Captain Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while offNantucket, they were joined by the _Guerrière_, 38, Captain JamesRichard Dacres. On the 16th the squadron fell in with and capturedthe United States brig _Nautilus_, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which, like all the little brigs, was overloaded with guns and men. Shethrew her lee guns overboard and made use of every expedient toescape, but to no purpose. At 3 P. M. Of the following day, whenthe British ships were abreast of Barnegat, about four leaguesoff shore, a strange sail was seen and immediately chased, in thesouth by east, or windward quarter, standing to the northeast. This was the United States frigate _Constitution_, 44, CaptainIsaac Hull. [Footnote: For the ensuing chase I have relied mainlyon Cooper; see also "Memoir of Admiral Broke, " p. 240; James, vi, 133: and Marshall's "Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii. 625. ]When the war broke out he was in the Chesapeake River getting anew crew aboard. Having shipped over 450 men (counting officers), he put out of harbor on the 12th of July. His crew was entirelynew, drafts of men coming on board up to the last moment. [Footnote:In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Letters. "1812. Ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his men werearriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted with a ship ofwar, as many have but lately joined and have never been on anarmed ship before. * * * We are doing all that we can to makethem acquainted with their duty, and in a few days we shall havenothing to fear from any single-decked ship. "] On the 17th, at2 P. M. , Hull discovered four sail, in the northern board, headingto the westward. At 3, the wind being very light, the _Constitution_made sail and tacked, in 18-1/2 fathoms. At 4, in the N. E. , afifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be the _Guerrière_, The first four ships bore N. N. W. , and were all on the starboardtack; while by 6 o'clock the fifth bore E. N. E. At 6. 15 thewind shifted and blew lightly from the south, bringing the Americanship to wind-ward. She then wore round with her head to theeastward, set her light studding-sails and stay-sails, and at7. 30 beat to action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the_Guerrière_. The two frigates neared one another gradually and at10 the _Constitution_ began making signals, which she continuedfor over an hour. At 3. 30 A. M. On the 18th the _Guerrière_, goinggradually toward the _Constitution_ on the port tack, and butone half mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the _Belvidera_and the other British vessels, and signalled to them. They didnot answer the signals, thinking she must know who they were--acircumstance which afterward gave rise to sharp recriminationsamong the captains--and Dacres, concluding them to be CommodoreRodgers' squadron, tacked, and then wore round and stood awayfrom the _Constitution_ for some time before discovering his mistake. [Illustration: Captain Isaac Hull: a miniature by an unknown artist, circa 1807-1812. (Courtesy The New-York Historical Society)] At 5 A. M. Hull had just enough steerage way on to keep his headto the east, on the starboard tack; on his lee quarter, bearingN. E. By N. , were the _Belvidera_ and _Guerrière_ and astern the_Shannon_, _Aeolus_, and _Africa_. At 5. 30 it fell entirely calm, and Hull put out his boats to tow the ship, always going southward. At the same time he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and gotthe forecastlechaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give thetwo guns more freedom to work in and also running out, throughthe cabin windows, two of the long main-deck 24's. The Britishboats were towing also. At 6 A. M. A light breeze sprang up, andthe _Constitution_ set studding-sails and stay-sails; the _Shannon_opened at her with her bow guns, but ceased when she found shecould not reach her. At 6. 30, the wind having died away, the_Shannon_ began to gain, almost all the boats of the squadrontowing her. Having sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieutenant CharlesMorris suggested to Hull to try kedging. All the spare rope wasbent on to the cables, payed out into the cutters, and a kedgerun out half a mile ahead and let go; then the crew clapped onand walked away with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedgeas she came up with the end of the line. Meanwhile, fresh linesand another kedge were carried ahead, and the frigate glided awayfrom her pursuers. At 7. 30 A. M. A little breeze sprang up, whenthe _Constitution_ set her ensign and fired a shot at the _Shannon_. It soon fell calm again and the _Shannon_ neared. At 9. 10 a lightair from the southward struck the ship, bringing her to windward. As the breeze was seen coming, her sails were trimmed, and as soonas she obeyed her helm she was brought close up on the port tack. The boats dropped in alongside; those that belonged to the davitswere run up, while the others were just lifted clear of water, bypurchases on the spare spars, stowed outboard, where they could beused again at a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on her lee beam, the_Guerrière_ opened fire; but her shot fell short, and the Americanspaid not the slightest heed to it. Soon it again fell calm, whenHull had 2000 gallons of water started, and again put out his boatsto tow. The _Shannon_ with some of the other boats of the squadronhelping her, gained on the _Constitution_ but by severe exertionwas again left behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind springingup, the _Belvidera_ gained on the other British ships, and when itfell calm she was nearer to the _Constitution_ than any of herconsorts, their boats being put on to her. [Footnote: Cooper speaksas if this was the _Shannon_; but from Marshall's "Naval Biography"we learn that it was the _Belvidera_. At other times he confusesthe _Belvidera_ with the _Guerrière_. Captain Hull, of course, could not accurately distinguish the names of his pursuers. Myaccount is drawn from a careful comparison of Marshall, Cooper, and James. ] At 10. 30, observing the benefit that the _Constitution_had derived from warping, Captain Byron did the same, bending allhis hawsers to one another, and working two kedge anchors at thesame time by paying the warp out through one hawse-hole as it wasrun in through the other opposite. Having men from the other frigatesaboard, and a lighter ship to work, Captain Byron at 2 P. M. Wasnear enough to exchange bow--and stern-chasers with the_Constitution_, out of range however. Hull expected to be overtaken, and made every arrangement to try in such case to disable thefirst frigate before her consorts could close. But neither the_Belvidera_ nor the _Shannon_ dared to tow very near for fear ofhaving their boats sunk by the American's stern-chasers. The _Constitution's_ crew showed the most excellent spirit. Officersand men relieved each other regularly, the former snatching theirrest any where on deck, the latter sleeping at the guns. Graduallythe _Constitution_ drew ahead, but the situation continued mostcritical. All through the afternoon the British frigates kepttowing and kedging, being barely out of gunshot. At 3 P. M. A lightbreeze sprung up, and blew fitfully at intervals; every puff waswatched closely and taken advantage of to the utmost. At 7 in theevening the wind almost died out, and for four more weary hoursthe worn-out sailors towed and kedged. At 10. 45 a little breezestruck the frigate, when the boats dropped alongside and werehoisted up, excepting the first cutter. Throughout the night thewind continued very light, the _Belvidera_ forging ahead till shewas off the _Constitution's_ lee beam; and at 4 A. M. , on themorning of the 19th, she tacked to the eastward, the breeze beinglight from the south by east. At 4. 20 the _Constitution_ tackedalso; and at 5. 15 the _Aeolus_, which had drawn ahead, passed onthe contrary tack. Soon afterward the wind freshened so thatCaptain Hull took in his cutter. The _Africa_ was now so far toleeward as to be almost out of the race; while the five frigateswere all running on the starboard tack with every stitch of canvasset. At 9 A. M. An American merchant-man hove in sight and boredown toward the squadron. The _Belvidera_, by way of decoy, hoisted American colors, when the _Constitution_ hoisted theBritish flag, and the merchant vessel hauled off. The breezecontinued light till noon, when Hull found he had dropped theBritish frigates well behind; the nearest was the _Belvidera_, exactly in his wake, bearing W. N. W. 2 1/2 miles distant. The_Shannon_ was on his lee, bearing N. By W. 1/2 W. Distant 3 1/2miles. The other two frigates were five miles off on the lee quarter. Soon afterward the breeze freshened, and "old Ironsides" drewslowly ahead from her foes, her sails being watched and tended withthe most consummate skill. At 4 P. M. The breeze again lightened, but even the _Belvidera_ was now four miles astern and to leeward. At 6. 45 there were indications of a heavy rain squall, which oncemore permitted Hull to show that in seamanship he excelled eventhe able captains against whom he was pitted. The crew werestationed and every thing kept fast till the last minute, whenall was clewed up just before the squall struck the ship. Thelight canvas was furled, a second reef taken in the mizzen top-sail, and the ship almost instantly brought under short sail. The Britishvessels seeing this began to let go and haul down without waitingfor the wind, and were steering on different tacks when the firstgust struck them. But Hull as soon as he got the weight of thewind sheeted home, hoisted his fore and main-top gallant sails, and went off on an easy bowline at the rate of 11 knots. At 7. 40sight was again obtained of the enemy, the squall having passedto leeward; the _Belvidera_, the nearest vessel, had altered herbearings two points to leeward, and was a long way astern. Nextcame the _Shannon_; the _Guerrière_ and _Aeolus_ were hull down, and the _Africa_ barely visible. The wind now kept light, shiftingoccasionally in a very baffling manner, but the _Constitution_gained steadily, wetting her sails from the sky-sails to thecourses. At 6 A. M. , on the morning of the 20th the pursuers werealmost out of sight; and at 8. 15 A. M. They abandoned the chase. Hull at once stopped to investigate the character of two strangevessels, but found them to be only Americans; then, at midday, he stood toward the east, and went into Boston on July 26th. In this chase Captain Isaac Hull was matched against five Britishcaptains, two of whom, Broke and Byron, were fully equal to anyin their navy; and while the latter showed great perseverance, good seamanship, and ready imitation, there can be no doubt thatthe palm in every way belongs to the cool old Yankee. Every daringexpedient known to the most perfect seamanship was tried, and triedwith success; and no victorious fight could reflect more credit onthe conqueror than this three days' chase did on Hull. Later, ontwo occasions, the _Constitution_ proved herself far superior ingunnery to the average British frigate; this time her officers andmen showed that they could handle the sails as well as they couldthe guns. Hull out-manoeuvred Broke and Byron as cleverly as amonth later he out-fought Dacres. His successful escape and victoriousfight were both performed in a way that place him above any singleship captain of war. On Aug. 2d the _Constitution_ made sail from Boston [Footnote:Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 28, 1812. ] and stood to theeastward, in hopes of falling in with some of the British cruisers. She was unsuccessful, however, and met nothing. Then she ran downto the Bay of Fundy, steered along the coast of Nova Scotia, and thence toward Newfoundland, and finally took her station offCape Race in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where she took and burnedtwo brigs of little value. On the 15th she recaptured an Americanbrig from the British ship-sloop _Avenger_, though the latterescaped; Capt. Hull manned his prize and sent her in. He thensailed southward, and on the night of the 18th spoke a Salemprivateer which gave him news of a British frigate to the south;thither he stood, and at 2 P. M. On the 19th, in lat. 41° 30' N. And 55° W. , made out a large sail bearing E. S. E. And to leeward, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Isaac Hull, Aug. 30, 1812. ] which provedto be his old acquaintance, the frigate _Guerrière_, Captain Dacres. It was a cloudy day and the wind was blowing fresh from thenorthwest. The _Guerrière_ was standing by the wind on thestarboard tack, under easy canvas; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. JamesR. Dacres, Sept. 7, 1812. ] she hauled up her courses, took in hertop-gallant sails, and at 4. 30 backed her main-top sail. Hull thenvery deliberately began to shorten sail, taking in top-gallant sails, stay-sails, and flying jib, sending down the royal yards and puttinganother reef in the top-sails. Soon the Englishman hoisted threeensigns, when the American also set his colors, one at eachmast-head, and one at the mizzen peak. The _Constitution_ now ran down with the wind nearly aft. The_Guerrière_ was on the starboard tack, and at five o'clock openedwith her weather-guns, [Footnote: Log of _Guerrière_. ] the shotfalling short, then wore round and fired her port broadside, ofwhich two shot struck her opponent, the rest passing over andthrough her rigging. [Footnote: See in the Naval Archives (Bureauof Navigation) the _Constitution's_ Log-Book (vol. Ii, from Feb. 1, 1812, to Dec. 13, 1813). The point is of some little importancebecause Hull, in his letter, speaks as if both the first broadsidesfell short, whereas the log distinctly says that the second wentover the ship, except two shot, which came home. The hypothesis ofthe _Guerrière_ having damaged powder was founded purely on thissupposed falling short of the first two broadsides. ] As the Britishfrigate again wore to open with her starboard battery, the_Constitution_ yawed a little and fired two or three of her portbow-guns. Three or four times the _Guerrière_ repeated thismanoeuvre, wearing and firing alternate broadsides, but with littleor no effect, while the _Constitution_ yawed as often to avoidbeing raked, and occasionally fired one of her bow guns. Thiscontinued nearly an hour, as the vessels were very far apart whenthe action began, hardly any loss or damage being inflicted by eitherparty. At 6. 00 the _Guerrière_ bore up and ran off under hertop-sails and jib, with the wind almost astern, a little on herport quarter; when the _Constitution_ set her main-top gallant sailand foresail, and at 6. 05 closed within half pistol-shot distanceon her adversary's port beam. [Footnote: "Autobiography of CommodoreMorris" (Annapolis, 1880), p. 164. ] Immediately a furious cannonadeopened, each ship firing as the guns bore. By the time the shipswere fairly abreast, at 6. 20, the _Constitution_ shot away the_Guerrière's_ mizzen-mast, which fell over the starboard quarter, knocking a large hole in the counter, and bringing the ship roundagainst her helm. Hitherto she had suffered very greatly and the_Constitution_ hardly at all. The latter, finding that she was rangingahead, put her helm aport and then luffed short round her enemy'sbows, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_. ] delivering a heavy rakingfire with the starboard guns and shooting away the _Guerrière's_main-yard. Then she wore and again passed her adversary's bows, raking with her port guns. The mizzen-mast of the _Guerrière_, dragging in the water, had by this time pulled her bow round tillthe wind came on her starboard quarter; and so near were the twoships that the Englishman's bowsprit passed diagonally over the_Constitution's_ quarter-deck, and as the latter ship fell off itgot foul of her mizzen-rigging, and the vessels then lay with the_Guerrière's_ starboard bow against the _Constitution's_ port, orlee quarter-gallery. [Footnote: Cooper, in "Putnam's Magazine. "i. 475. ] The Englishman's bow guns played havoc with Captain Hull'scabin, setting fire to it; but the flames were soon extinguishedby Lieutenant Hoffmann. On both sides the boarders were calledaway; the British ran forward, but Captain Dacres relinquishedthe idea of attacking [Footnote: Address of Captain Dacres to thecourt-martial at Halifax. ] when he saw the crowds of men on theAmerican's decks. Meanwhile, on the _Constitution_, the boardersand marines gathered aft, but such a heavy sea was running thatthey could not get on the _Guerrière_. Both sides suffered heavilyfrom the closeness of the musketry fire; indeed, almost the entireloss on the _Constitution_ occurred at this juncture. As LieutenantBush, of the marines, sprang upon the taffrail to leap on theenemy's decks, a British marine shot him dead; Mr. Morris, thefirst Lieutenant, and Mr. Alwyn, the master, had also both leapedon the taffrail, and both were at the same moment wounded by themusketry fire. On the _Guerrière_ the loss was far heavier, almostall the men on the forecastle being picked off. Captain Dacreshimself was shot in the back and severely wounded by one of theAmerican mizzen topmen, while he was standing on the starboardforecastle hammocks cheering on his crew [Footnote: James, vi, 144. ]; two of the lieutenants and the master were also shot down. The ships gradually worked round till the wind was again on theport quarter, when they separated, and the _Guerrière's_ foremastand main-mast at once went by the board, and fell over on thestarboard side, leaving her a defenseless hulk, rolling hermain-deck guns into the water. [Footnote: Brenton, v, 51. ] At6. 30 the _Constitution_ hauled aboard her tacks, ran off a littledistance to the eastward, and lay to. Her braces and standing andrunning rigging were much cut up and some of the spars wounded, but a few minutes sufficed to repair damages, when Captain Hullstood under his adversary's lee, and the latter at once struck, at 7. 00 P. M. , [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_. ] just twohours after she had fired the first shot. On the part of the_Constitution_, however, the actual fighting, exclusive of sixor eight guns fired during the first hour, while closing, occupiedless than 30 minutes. [Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (1): "The Engagement"is the original title of this, the first in a series of fourpaintings of the action done for Captain Hull by Michele F. Corné. (Courtesy US. Naval Academy Museum)] [Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (2): "In Action. "The _Guerrière's_ mizzenmast goes down. (Courtesy U. S. NavalAcademy Museum)] [Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (3): "DroppingAstern. " The _Guerrière's_ mainmast and foremast follow. (CourtesyU. S. Naval Academy Museum)] [Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Guerrière_ (4): "She Fell inthe Sea, A Perfect Wreck. " The puff of smoke over the _Guerrière's_bow is from a gun being fired to leeward to signal her surrender, the customary practice when a vessel no longer had a flag to strike. (Courtesy New Haven Historical Society)] The tonnage and metal of the combatants have already been referredto. The _Constitution_ had, as already said, about 456 men aboard, while of the _Guerrière's_ crew, 267 prisoners were received aboardthe _Constitution_; deducting 10 who were Americans and would notfight, and adding the 15 killed outright, we get 272; 28 men wereabsent in prizes. COMPARATIVE FORCE Comparative Broad- Comparative loss Tons Guns side Men Loss Force Inflicted _Constitution_ 1576 27 684 456 14 1. 00 1. 00_Guerrière_ 1338 25 556 272 79 . 70 . 18 The loss of the _Constitution_ included Lieutenant William S. Bush, of the marines, and six seamen killed, and her first lieutenant, Charles Morris, Master, John C. Alwyn, four seamen, and one marine, wounded. Total, seven killed and seven wounded. Almost all thisloss occurred when the ships came foul, and was due to the_Guerrière's_ musketry and the two guns in her bridle-ports. The _Guerrière_ lost 23 killed and mortally wounded, including hersecond lieutenant, Henry Ready, and 56 wounded severely and slightly, including Captain Dacres himself, the first lieutenant, BartholomewKent, Master, Robert Scott, two master's mates, and one midshipman. The third lieutenant of the _Constitution_, Mr. George CampbellRead, was sent on board the prize, and the _Constitution_ remainedby her during the night; but at daylight it was found that she wasin danger of sinking. Captain Hull at once began removing theprisoners, and at three o'clock in the afternoon set the _Guerrière_on fire, and in a quarter of an hour she blew up. He then set sailfor Boston, where he arrived on August 30th. "Captain Hull and hisofficers, " writes Captain Dacres in his official letter, "have treatedus like brave and generous enemies; the greatest care has been takenthat we should not lose the smallest trifle. " The British laid very great stress on the rotten and decayedcondition of the _Guerrière_; mentioning in particular that themainmast fell solely because of the weight of the falling foremast. But it must be remembered that until the action occurred she wasconsidered a very fine ship. Thus, in Brighton's "Memoir of AdmiralBroke, " it is declared that Dacres freely expressed the opinionthat she could take a ship in half the time the _Shannon_ could. The fall of the main-mast occurred when the fight was practicallyover; it had no influence whatever on the conflict. It was alsoasserted that her powder was bad, but on no authority; her firstbroadside fell short, but so, under similar circumstances, did thefirst broadside of the _United States_. None of these causes accountfor the fact that her shot did not hit. Her opponent was of suchsuperior force--nearly in the proportion of 3 to 2--that successwould have been very difficult in any event, and no one can doubtthe gallantry and pluck with which the British ship was fought; butthe execution was very greatly disproportioned to the force. Thegunnery of the _Guerrière_ was very poor, and that of the_Constitution_ excellent; during the few minutes the ships wereyard-arm and yard-arm; the latter was not hulled once, while noless than 30 shot took effect on the former's engaged side, [Footnote: Captain Dacres' address to the court-martial. ] fivesheets of copper beneath the bends. The _Guerrière_, moreover, was out-manoeuvred; "in wearing several times and exchangingbroadsides in such rapid and continual changes of position, herfire was much more harmless than it would have been if she hadkept more steady. " [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Treatise onNaval Gunnery" (London, 1851), p. 454. ] The _Constitution_ washandled faultlessly; Captain Hull displayed the coolness and skillof a veteran in the way in which he managed, first to avoid beingraked, and then to improve the advantage which the precision andrapidity of his fire had gained. "After making every allowanceclaimed by the enemy, the character of this victory is not essentiallyaltered. Its peculiarities were a fine display of seamanship in theapproach, extraordinary efficiency in the attack, and great readinessin repairing damages; all of which denote cool and capable officers, with an expert and trained crew; in a word, a disciplined man-of-war. "[Footnote: Cooper, ii. 173. ] The disparity of force, 10 to 7, isnot enough to account for the disparity of execution, 10 to 2. Ofcourse, something must be allowed for the decayed state of theEnglishman's masts, although I really do not think it had anyinfluence on the battle, for he was beaten when the main mast fell;and it must be remembered, on the other hand, that the Americancrew was absolutely new, while the _Guerrière_ was manned by oldhands. So that, while admitting and admiring the gallantry, and, on the whole, the seamanship of Captain Dacres and his crew, andacknowledging that he fought at a great disadvantage, especiallyin being short-handed, yet all must acknowledge that the combatshowed a marked superiority, particularly in gunnery, on the partof the Americans. Had the ships not come foul, Captain Hull wouldprobably not have lost more than three or four men; as it was, hesuffered but slightly. That the _Guerrière_ was not so weak as shewas represented to be can be gathered from the fact that she mountedtwo more main-deck guns than the rest of her class; thus carryingon her main-deck 30 long 18-pounders in battery, to oppose to the30 long 24's, or rather (allowing for the short weight of shot)long 22's, of the _Constitution_. Characteristically enough, James, though he carefully reckons in the long bow-chasers in thebridle-ports of the _Argus_ and _Enterprise_, yet refuses to countthe two long eighteens mounted through the bridle-ports on the_Guerrière's_ main-deck. Now, as it turned out, these two bow gunswere used very effectively, when the ships got foul, and causedmore damage and loss than all of the other main-deck guns put together. [Illustration: This diagram is taken from Commodore Morris'autobiography and the log of the _Guerrière_: the official accountsapparently consider "larboard" and "starboard" as interchangeableterms. ] Captain Dacres, very much to his credit, allowed the ten Americanson board to go below, so as not to fight against their flag; andin his address to the court-martial mentions, among the reasonsfor his defeat, "that he was very much weakened by permitting theAmericans on board to quit their quarters. " Coupling this with theassertion made by James and most other British writers that the_Constitution_ was largely manned by Englishmen, we reach thesomewhat remarkable conclusion, that the British ship was defeatedbecause the Americans on board would _not_ fight against theircountry, and that the American was victorious because the Britishon board _would_. However, as I have shown, in reality there wereprobably not a score of British on board the _Constitution_. In this, as well as the two succeeding frigate actions, every onemust admit that there was a great superiority in force on the sideof the victors, and British historians have insisted that thissuperiority was so great as to preclude any hopes of a successfulresistance. That this was not true, and that the disparity betweenthe combatants was not as great as had been the case in a number ofencounters in which English frigates had taken French ones, can bebest shown by a few accounts taken from the French historian Troude, who would certainly not exaggerate the difference. Thus on March 1, 1799, the English 38-gun 18-pounder frigate _Sybille_, captured theFrench 44-gun 24-pounder frigate _Forte_, after an action of twohours and ten minutes. [Footnote: "Batailles Navales de la France. "O. Troude (Paris, 1868), iv, 171. ] In _actual_ weight the shotthrown by one of the main-deck guns of the defeated _Forte_ wasover six pounds heavier than the shot thrown by one of the main-deckguns of the victorious _Constitution_ or _United States_. [Footnote:See Appendix B, for actual weight of French shot. ] There are later examples than this. But a very few years beforethe declaration of war by the United States, and in the samestruggle that was then still raging, there had been at least twovictories gained by English frigates over French foes as superiorto themselves as the American 44's were to the British ships theycaptured. On Aug. 10, 1805, the _Phoenix_, 36, captured the _Didon_, 40, after 3 1/2 hours' fighting, the comparative broadside forcebeing: [Footnote: Ibid. , lii, 425. ] _PHOENIX_ _DIDON_ 13×18 14×18 2× 9 2× 8 6×32 7×36 ----------------- ----------------- 21 guns, 444 lbs. 23 guns, 522 lbs. (nominal; about 600, real) On March 8, 1808, the _San Florenzo_, 36, captured the _Piedmontaise_, 40, the force being exactly what it was in the case of the _Phoenix_and Didon. [Footnote: Ibid. , in, 499. ] Comparing the real, not thenominal weight of metal, we find that the _Didon_ and _Piedmontaise_were proportionately of greater force compared to the _Phoenix_and _San Florenzo_, than the _Constitution_ was compared to the_Guerrière_ or _Java_. The French 18's threw each a shot weighingbut about two pounds less than that thrown by an American 24 of1812, while their 36-pound carronades each threw a shot over 10pounds heavier than that thrown by one of the _Constitution's_spar-deck 32's. That a 24-pounder can not always whip an 18-pounder frigate isshown by the action of the British frigate _Eurotas_ with theFrench frigate _Chlorinde_, on Feb. 25, 1814. [Footnote: James, vi, 391. ] The first with a crew of 329 men threw 625 pounds ofshot at a broadside, the latter carrying 344 men and throwing 463pounds; yet the result was indecisive. The French lost 90 and theBritish 60 men. The action showed that heavy metal was not of muchuse unless used well. To appreciate rightly the exultation Hull's victory caused in theUnited States, and the intense annoyance it created in England, itmust be remembered that during the past twenty years the IslandPower had been at war with almost every state in Europe, at onetime or another, and in the course of about two hundred singleconflicts between ships of approximately equal force (that is, wherethe difference was less than one half), waged against French, Spanish, Italian, Turkish, Algerine, Russian, Danish, and Dutch antagonists, her ships had been beaten and captured in but five instances. Thenwar broke out with America, and in eight months five single-shipactions occurred, in every one of which the British vessel wascaptured. Even had the victories been due solely to superior forcethis would have been no mean triumph for the United States. On October 13, 1812, the American 18-gun ship-sloop _Wasp_, CaptainJacob Jones, with 137 men aboard, sailed from the Delaware and ranoff southeast to get into the track of the West India vessels; onthe 16th a heavy gale began to blow, causing the loss of thejib-boom and two men who were on it. The next day the weathermoderated somewhat, and at 11. 30 P. M. , in latitude 37° N. , longitude65° W. , several sail were descried. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' officialletter, Nov. 24, 1812. ] These were part of a convoy of 14merchant-men which had quitted the bay of Honduras on September12th, bound for England, [Footnote: James' History, vi, 158. ] underthe convoy of the British 18-gun brig-sloop _Frolic_, of 19 gunsand 110 men, Captain Thomas Whinyates. They had been dispersed bythe gale of the 16th, during which the _Frolic's_ main-yard wascarried away and both her top-sails torn to pieces [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' official letter, Oct. 18, 1812. ]; next day she spent inrepairing damages, and by dark six of the missing ships had joinedher. The day broke almost cloudless on the 18th (Sunday), showingthe convoy, ahead and to leeward of the American ship, still somedistance off, as Captain Jones had not thought it prudent to closeduring the night, while he was ignorant of the force of his antagonists. The _Wasp_ now sent down to her top-gallant yards, close reefed hertop-sails, and bore down under short fighting canvas; while the_Frolic_ removed her main-yard from the casks, lashed it on deck, and then hauled to the wind under her boom main-sail and close-reefedforetop-sail, hoisting Spanish colors to decoy the stranger underher guns, and permit the convoy to escape. At 11. 32 the actionbegan--the two ships running parallel on the starboard tack, not60 yards apart, the _Wasp_, firing her port, and the _Frolic_ herstarboard, guns. The latter fired very rapidly, delivering threebroadsides to the _Wasp's_ two, [Footnote: Cooper, 182. ] both crewscheering loudly as the ships wallowed through the water. There wasa very heavy sea running, which caused the vessels to pitch androll heavily. The Americans fired as the engaged side of their shipwas going down, aiming at their opponent's hull [Footnote: Miles'Register, in, p. 324. ]; while the British delivered their broadsideswhile on the crests of the seas, the shot going high. The waterdashed in clouds of spray over both crews, and the vessels rolledso that the muzzles of the guns went under. [Footnote: _Do_. ] Butin spite of the rough weather, the firing was not only spiritedbut well directed. At 11. 36 the _Wasp's_ maintop-mast was shotaway and fell, with its yard, across the port fore and foretop-sailbraces, rendering the head yards unmanageable; at 11. 46 the gaffand mizzentop-gallant mast came down, and by 11. 52 every brace andmost of the rigging was shot away. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter. ]It would now have been very difficult to brace any of the yards. But meanwhile the _Frolic_ suffered dreadfully in her hull and lowermasts, and had her gaff and head braces shot away. [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' letter. ] The slaughter among her crew was very great, but the survivors kept at their work with the dogged courage oftheir race. At first the two vessels ran side by side, but theAmerican gradually forged ahead, throwing in her fire from aposition in which she herself received little injury; by degreesthe vessels got so close that the Americans struck the _Frolic's_side with their rammers in loading, [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter. ]and the British brig was raked with dreadful effect. The Frolicthen fell aboard her antagonist, her jib-boom coming in betweenthe main- and mizzen-rigging of the _Wasp_ and passing over theheads of Captain Jones and Lieutenant Biddle, who were standingnear the capstan. This forced the _Wasp_ up in the wind, and sheagain raked her antagonist, Captain Jones trying to restrain hismen from boarding till he could put in another broadside. But theycould no longer be held back, and Jack Lang, a New Jersey seaman, leaped on the _Frolic's_ bowsprit. Lieutenant Biddle then mountedon the hammock cloth to board, but his feet got entangled in therigging, and one of the midshipmen seizing his coat-tails to helphimself up, the lieutenant tumbled back on the deck. At the nextswell he succeeded in getting on the bowsprit, on which there werealready two seamen whom he passed on the forecastle. But there wasno one to oppose him; not twenty Englishmen were left unhurt. [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' letter. ] The man at the wheel was stillat his post, grim and undaunted, and two or three more were on deck, including Captain Whinyates and Lieutenant Wintle, both so severelywounded that they could not stand without support. [Footnote: James, vi, 161. ] There could be no more resistance, and Lieutenant Biddlelowered the flag at 12. 15--just 43 minutes after the beginning ofthe fight. [Footnote: Capt. Jones' letter. ] A minute or two afterwardboth the _Frolic's_ masts went by the board--the foremast aboutfifteen feet above the deck, the other short off. Of her crew, asalready said, not twenty men had escaped unhurt. Every officer waswounded; two of them, the first lieutenant, Charles McKay, andmaster, John Stephens, soon died. Her total loss was thus over90 [Footnote: Capt. Whinyates' official letter thus states it, andis, of course, to be taken as authority; the Bermuda account makesit 69, and James only 62;] about 30 of whom were killed outrightor died later. The _Wasp_ suffered very severely in her riggingand aloft generally, but only two or three shots struck her hull;five of her men were killed--two in her mizzen-top and one in hermaintop-mast rigging--and five wounded, [Footnote: Capt. Jones'letter. ] chiefly while aloft. [Illustration: _Wasp_ vs. _Frolic_: a contemporary painting byThomas Birch, believed to have been done for the _Wasp's_ captain, James Biddle. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)] The two vessels were practically of equal force. The loss of the_Frolic's_ main-yard had merely converted her into a brigantine, and, as the roughness of the sea made it necessary to fight undervery short canvas, her inferiority in men was fully compensated forby her superiority in metal. She had been desperately defended; nomen could have fought more bravely than Captain Whinyates and hiscrew. On the other hand, the Americans had done their work with acoolness and skill that could not be surpassed; the contest hadbeen mainly one of gunnery, and had been decided by the greatlysuperior judgment and accuracy with which they fired. Both officersand crew had behaved well; Captain Jones particularly mentionsLieutenant Claxton, who, though too ill to be of any service, persisted in remaining on deck throughout the engagement. The _Wasp_ was armed with 2 long 12's and 16 32-pound carronades;the _Frolic_ with 2 long 6's, 16 32-pound carronades, and 1 shifting12-pound carronade. COMPARATIVE FORCE. Tons. No. Guns. Weight Metal. Crews. Loss. _Wasp_ 450 9 250 135 10_Frolic_ 467 10 274 110 90 Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière comments on this action asfollows [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes, " ii, 287 (Septième Édition, Paris, 1881). ]: DIAGRAM [Footnote: It is difficult to reconcile the accounts ofthe manoeuvres in this action. James says "larboard" where Coopersays "starboard"; one says the _Wasp_ wore, the other says thatshe could not do so, etc. ] [Illustration: Shows the paths of the _Wasp_ and the _Frolic_ duringtheir battle and the positions of the ships at various times duringthe battle from 11. 32 to 12. 15] "The American fire showed itself to be as accurate as it was rapid. On occasions when the roughness of the sea would seem to renderall aim excessively uncertain, the effects of their artillery werenot less murderous than under more advantageous conditions. Thecorvette _Wasp_ fought the brig _Frolic_ in an enormous sea, undervery short canvas, and yet, forty minutes after the beginning ofthe action, when the two vessels came together, the Americans wholeaped aboard the brig found on the deck, covered with dead anddying, but one brave man, who had not left the wheel, and threeofficers, all wounded, who threw down their swords at the feet ofthe victors. " Admiral de la Gravière's criticisms are especiallyvaluable, because they are those of an expert, who only refers tothe war of 1812 in order to apply to the French navy the lessonswhich it teaches, and who is perfectly unprejudiced. He cares forthe lesson taught, not the teacher, and is quite as willing tolearn from the defeat of the _Chesapeake_ as from the victoriesof the _Constitution_--while most American critics only pay heedto the latter. The characteristics of the action are the practical equality of thecontestants in point of force and the enormous disparity in thedamage each suffered; numerically, the _Wasp_ was superior by 5 percent. , and inflicted a ninefold greater loss. Captain Jones was not destined to bring his prize into port, fora few hours afterward the _Poictiers_, a British 74, Captain JohnPoer Beresford, hove in sight. Now appeared the value of the _Frolic's_desperate defence; if she could not prevent herself from beingcaptured, she had at least ensured her own recapture, and also thecapture of the foe. When the _Wasp_ shook out her sails they werefound to be cut into ribbons aloft, and she could not make off withsufficient speed. As the _Poictiers_ passed the _Frolic_, rollinglike a log in the water, she threw a shot over her, and soonovertook the _Wasp_. Both vessels were carried into Bermuda. CaptainWhinyates was again put in command of the _Frolic_. Captain Jonesand his men were soon exchanged; 25, 000 dollars prize-money wasvoted them by Congress, and Captain and Lieutenant Biddle wereboth promoted, the former receiving the captured ship _Macedonian_. Unluckily the blockade was too close for him to succeed in gettingout during the remainder of the war. On Oct. 8th Commodore Rodgers left Boston on his second cruise, withthe _President_, _United States_, _Congress_, and _Argus_, [Footnote:Letter of Commodore Rodgers. Jan. 1. 1813. ] leaving the _Hornet_in port. Four days out, the _United States_ and _Argus_ separated, while the remaining two frigates continued their cruise together. The _Argus_, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4, 1813. ] Captain Sinclair, cruised to the eastward, making prizesof 6 valuable merchant-men, and returned to port on January 3d. During the cruise she was chased for three days and three nights(the latter being moonlight) by a British squadron, and was obligedto cut away her boats and anchors and start some of her water. Butshe saved her guns, and was so cleverly handled that during thechase she actually succeeded in taking and manning a prize, thoughthe enemy got near enough to open fire as the vessels separated. Before relating what befell the _United States_, we shall bringCommodore Rodgers' cruise to an end. On Oct. 10th the Commodore chased, but failed to overtake, theBritish frigate _Nymphe_, 38, Captain Epworth. On the 18th, offthe great Bank of Newfoundland, he captured the Jamaica packet_Swallow_, homeward bound, with 200, 000 dollars in specie aboard. On the 31st, at 9 A. M. , lat. 33° N. , long. 32° W. , his two frigatesfell in with the British frigate _Galatea_, 36, Captain WoodleyLosack, convoying two South Sea ships, to windward. The _Galatea_ran down to reconnoitre, and at 10 A. M. , recognizing her foes, hauled up on the starboard tack to escape. The American frigatesmade all sail in chase, and continued beating to windward, tackingseveral times, for about three hours. Seeing that she was beingoverhauled, the _Galatea_ now edged away to get on her best pointof sailing; at the same moment one of her convoy, the _Argo_, boreup to cross the hawse of her foes, but was intercepted by the_Congress_, who lay to to secure her. Meanwhile the _President_kept after the _Galatea_; she set her top-mast, top-gallant mastand lower studding-sails, and when it was dusk had gained greatlyupon her. But the night was very dark, the _President_ lost sightof the chase, and, toward midnight, hauled to the wind to rejoinher consort. The two frigates cruised to the east as far as 22° W. , and then ran down to 17° N. ; but during the month of November theydid not see a sail. They had but slightly better luck on theirreturn toward home. Passing 120 miles north of Bermuda, and cruisinga little while toward the Virginia capes, they reentered Bostonon Dec. 31st, having made 9 prizes, most of them of little value. When four days out, on Oct. 12th, Commodore Decatur had separatedfrom the rest of Rodgers' squadron and cruised east; on the 25th, in lat. 29° N. , and long. 29° 30' W. While going close-hauled onthe port tack, with the wind fresh from the S. S. E. , a sail wasdescried on the weather beam, about 12 miles distant. [Footnote:Official letter of Commodore Decatur, Oct. 30. 1812. ] This was theBritish 38-gun frigate _Macedonian_, Captain John Surnam Carden. She was not, like the _Guerrière_, an old ship captured from theFrench, but newly built of oak and larger than any American18-pounder frigate; she was reputed (very wrongfully) to be a"crack ship. " According to Lieut. David Hope, "the state ofdiscipline on board was excellent; in no British ship was moreattention paid to gunnery. Before this cruise, the ship had beenengaged almost every day with the enemy; and in time of peace thecrew were constantly exercised at the great guns. " [Footnote:Marshall's "Naval Biography, " vol. Iv, p. 1018. ] How they could havepractised so much and learned so little is certainly marvellous. The Macedonian set her foretop-mast and top-gallant studdings sailsand bore away in chase, [Footnote: Capt. Carden to Mr. Croker, Oct. 28, 1812. ] edging down with the wind a little aft the starboardbeam. Her first lieutenant wished to continue on this course andpass down ahead of the _United States_, [Footnote: James, vi. 165. ]but Capt. Carden's over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage lost himthis opportunity of closing. [Footnote: Sentence of Court-martialheld on the _San Domingo_, 74. At the Bermudas. May 27, 1812. ]Accordingly he hauled by the wind and passed way to windward of theAmerican. As Commodore Decatur got within range, he eased off andfired a broadside, most of which fell short [Footnote: Marshall, iv, 1080. ]; he then kept his luff, and, the next time he fired, hislong 24's told heavily, while he received very little injury himself. [Footnote: Cooper, 11, 178. ] The fire from his main-deck (for hedid not use his carronades at all for the first half hour) [Footnote:Letter of Commodore Decatur. ] was so very rapid that it seemed asif the ship was on fire; his broadsides were delivered with almosttwice the rapidity of those of the Englishman. [Footnote: James, vi, 169. ] The latter soon found he could not play at long bowls with anychance of success; and, having already erred either from timidityor bad judgment, Captain Carden decided to add rashness to thecatalogue of his virtues. Accordingly he bore up, and came downend on toward his adversary, with the wind on his port quarter. The _States_ now (10. 15) laid her main-topsail aback and made heavyplay with her long guns, and, as her adversary came nearer, withher carronades also. [Illustration: Shows the paths of the _United States_ and the_Macedonian_ during their battle and the positions of the shipsat various times during the battle from 09. 45 to 11. 15] The British ship would reply with her starboard guns, hauling upto do so; as she came down, the American would ease off, run alittle way and again come to, keeping up a terrific fire. As the_Macedonian_ bore down to close, the chocks of all her forecastleguns (which were mounted on the outside) were cut away [Footnote:Letter of Captain Carden. ]; her fire caused some damage to theAmerican's rigging, but hardly touched her hull, while she herselfsuffered so heavily both alow and aloft that she gradually droppedto leeward, while the American fore-reached on her. Finding herselfahead and to windward, the _States_ tacked and ranged up under heradversary's lee, when the latter struck her colors at 11. 15, justan hour and a half after the beginning of the action. [Footnote:Letter of Commodore Decatur. ] [Illustration: Captain Stephen Decatur: a charcoal drawing donein 1809 by Charles B. J. F. St. -Memin. (Courtesy Library of Congress)] The _United States_ had suffered surprisingly little; what damagehad been done was aloft. Her mizzen top-gallant mast was cut away, some of the spars were wounded, and the rigging a good deal cut;the hull was only struck two or three times. The ships were neverclose enough to be within fair range of grape and musketry, [Footnote:Letter of Commodore Decatur. ] and the wounds were mostly inflictedby round shot and were thus apt to be fatal. Hence the loss of theAmericans amounted to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th of the ship)and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and only five severelyand slightly wounded. The _Macedonian_, on the other hand, had received over a hundredshot in her hull, several between wind and water; her mizzen-masthad gone by the board; her fore--and maintop-masts had been shotaway by the caps, and her main-yard in the slings; almost all herrigging was cut away (only the fore-sail being left); on theengaged side all of her carronades but two, and two of her main-deckguns, were dismounted. Of her crew 43 were killed and mortallywounded, and 61 (including her first and third lieutenants) severelyand slightly wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Carden. ] Amongher crew were eight Americans (as shown by her muster-roll); theseasked permission to go below before the battle, but it was refusedby Captain Carden, and three were killed during the action. Jamessays that they _were_ allowed to go below, but this is untrue; forif they had, the three would not have been slain. The otherstestified that they had been forced to fight, and they afterwardentered the American service--the only ones of the _Macedonian's_crew who did, or who were asked to. The _Macedonian_ had her full complement of 301 men; the _States_had, by her muster-roll of October 20th, 428 officers, petty officers, seamen, and boys, and 50 officers and privates of marines, a totalof 478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his "Naval Biography" makesit). COMPARATIVE FORCE. Broadside Weight Size. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss. _United States_ 1576 27 786 478 12_Macedonian_ 1325 25 547 301 104 Comparative Comparative Loss Force. Inflicted. _States_ 100 100_Macedonian_ 66 11 That is, the relative force being about as three is to two, [Footnote: I have considered the _United States_ as mounting herfull allowance of 54 guns; but it is possible that she had no morethan 49. In Decatur's letter of challenge of Jan. 17, 1814 (whichchallenge, by the way, was a most blustering affair, reflectingcredit neither on Decatur, nor his opponent, Captain Hope, nor onany one else, excepting Captain Stackpole of H. M. S. _Statira_), she is said to have had that number; her broadside would then be15 long 24's below, 1 long 24, 1 12-pound, and 8 42-pound carronadesabove. Her _real_ broadside weight of metal would thus be about680 lbs. , and she would be superior to the _Macedonian_ in theproportion of 5 to 4. But it is possible that Decatur had landedsome of his guns in 1813, as James asserts; and though I am not atall sure of this, I have thought it best to be on the safe side indescribing his force. ] the damage done was as nine to one! Of course, it would have been almost impossible for the _Macedonian_to conquer with one third less force; but the disparity was by nomeans sufficient to account for the ninefold greater loss suffered, and the ease and impunity with which the victory was won. TheBritish sailors fought with their accustomed courage, but theirgunnery was exceedingly poor; and it must be remembered that thoughthe ship was bravely fought, still the defence was by no means sodesperate as that made by the _Essex_ or even the _Chesapeake_, as witnessed by their respective losses. The _Macedonian_, moreover, was surrendered when she had suffered less damage than either the_Guerrière_ or _Java_. The chief cause of her loss lay in the factthat Captain Carden was a poor commander. The gunnery of the _Java_, _Guerrière_, and _Macedonian_ was equally bad; but while CaptainLambert proved himself to be as able as he was gallant, and CaptainDacres did nearly as well, Captain Carden, on the other hand, wasfirst too timid, and then too rash, and showed bad judgment at alltimes. By continuing his original course he could have closed atonce; but he lost his chance by over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage, and was censured by the court-martial accordingly. Then he triedto remedy one error by another, and made a foolishly rash approach. A very able and fair-minded English writer says of this action:"As a display of courage the character of the service was noblyupheld, but we would be deceiving ourselves were we to admit thatthe comparative expertness of the crews in gunnery was equallysatisfactory. Now, taking the difference of effect as given byCaptain Carden, we must draw this conclusion--that the comparativeloss in killed and wounded (104 to 12), together with the dreadfulaccount he gives of the condition of his own ship, while he admitsthat the enemy's vessel was in comparatively good order, must havearisen from inferiority in gunnery as well as in force. " [Footnote:Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery. " p. 525] On the other hand, the American crew, even according to James, wereas fine a set of men as ever were seen on shipboard. Though not onefourth were British by birth, yet many of them had served on boardBritish ships of war, in some cases voluntarily, but much moreoften because they were impressed. They had been trained at theguns with the greatest care by Lieutenant Allen. And finallyCommodore Decatur handled his ship with absolute faultlessness. To sum up: a brave and skilful crew, ably commanded, was matchedagainst an equally brave but unskilful one, with an incompetentleader; and this accounts for the disparity of loss being so muchgreater than the disparity in force. At the outset of this battle the position of the parties was justthe reverse of that in the case of the _Constitution_ and _Guerrière_:the Englishman had the advantage of the wind, but he used it in avery different manner from that in which Captain Hull had done. Thelatter at once ran down to close, but manoeuvred so cautiously thatno damage could be done him till he was within pistol shot. CaptainCarden did not try to close till after fatal indecision, and thenmade the attempt so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces before hegot to close quarters. Commodore Decatur, also, manoeuvred moreskilfully than Captain Dacres, although the difference was lessmarked between these two. The combat was a plain cannonade; the_States_ derived no advantage from the superior number of her men, for they were not needed. The marines in particular had nothingwhatever to do, while they had been of the greatest service againstthe _Guerrière_. The advantage was simply in metal, as 10 is to 7. Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on these actions seem to me onlyapplicable in part. He says (p. 524): "The Americans would neitherapproach nor permit us to join in close battle until they had gainedsome extraordinary advantage from the superior faculties of theirlong guns in distant cannonade, and from the intrepid, uncircumspect, and often very exposed approach of assailants who had long beenaccustomed to contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were crippledin distant cannonade from encountering rashly the seriousdisadvantage of making direct attacks; the uncircumspectgallantry of our commanders led our ships unguardedly into thesnares which wary caution had spread. " These criticisms are very just as regards the _Macedonian_, and Ifully agree with them (possibly reserving the right to doubt CaptainCarden's gallantry, though readily admitting his uncircumspection). But the case of the _Guerrière_ differed widely. There the Americanship made the attack, while the British at first avoided closecombat; and, so far from trying to cripple her adversary by adistant cannonade, the _Constitution_ hardly fired a dozen timesuntil within pistol shot. This last point is worth mentioning, because in a work on "Heavy Ordnance, " by Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A. (London, 1837), it is stated that the _Guerrière_ receivedher injuries _before_ the closing, mentioning especially the "thirtyshot below the water-line"; whereas, by the official accounts ofboth commanders, the reverse was the case. Captain Hull, in hisletter, and Lieutenant Morris, (in his autobiography) say they onlyfired a few guns before closing; and Captain Dacres, in his letter, and Captain Brenton, in his "History, " say that not much injury wasreceived by the _Guerrière_ until about the time the mizzen-mastfell, which was three or four minutes after close action began. Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the _Macedonian_ as prize-master;he secured the fore- and main-masts and rigged a jury mizzen-mast, converting the vessel into a bark. Commodore Decatur discontinuedhis cruise to convoy his prize back to America; they reached NewLondon Dec. 4th. Had it not been for the necessity of convoyingthe _Macedonian_, the _States_ would have continued her cruise, for the damage she suffered was of the most trifling character. Captain Garden stated (in Marshall's "Naval Biography") that the_States_ measured 1, 670 tons, was manned by 509 men, suffered sofrom shot under water that she had to be pumped out every watch, and that two eighteen-pound shot passed in a horizontal line throughher main-masts; all of which statements were highly creditable tothe vividness of his imagination. The _States_ measured but 1, 576tons (and by English measurement very much less), had 478 men aboard, had not been touched by a shot under water-line, and her lower mastswere unwounded. James states that most of her crew were British, which assertion I have already discussed; and that she had but oneboy aboard, and that he was seventeen years old, --in which case 29others, some of whom (as we learn from the "Life of Decatur") wereonly twelve, must have grown with truly startling rapidity duringthe hour and a half that the combat lasted. During the twenty years preceding 1812 there had been almostincessant warfare on the ocean, and although there had beeninnumerable single conflicts between French and English frigates, there had been but one case in which the French frigate, single-handed, was victorious. This was in the year 1805 when the _Milan_ capturedthe _Cleopatra_. According to Troude, the former threw at a broadside574 pounds (actual), the latter but 334; and the former lost 35 menout of her crew of 350, the latter 58 out of 200. Or, the forcesbeing as 100 to 58, the loss inflicted was as 100 to 60; while the_States'_ force compared to the _Macedonian's_ being as 100 to 66, the loss she inflicted was as 100 to 11. British ships, moreover, had often conquered against odds as great;as, for instance, when the _Sea Horse_ captured the great Turkishfrigate _Badere-Zaffer_; when the _Astrea_ captured the Frenchfrigate _Gloire_, which threw at a broadside 286 pounds of shot, while she threw but 174; and when, most glorious of all, LordDundonald, in the gallant little _Speedy_, actually captured theSpanish xebec _Gamo_ of over five times her own force! Similarly, the corvette _Comus_ captured the Danish frigate _Fredrickscoarn_, the brig _Onyx_ captured the Dutch sloop _Manly_, the little cutter_Thorn_ captured the French _Courier-National_, and the _Pasly_the Spanish _Virgin_; while there had been many instances of drawnbattles between English 12-pound frigates and French or Spanish18-pounders. Captain Hull having resigned the command of the _Constitution_, she was given to Captain Bainbridge, of the _Constellation_, whowas also entrusted with the command of the _Essex_ and _Hornet_. The latter ship was in the port of Boston with the _Constitution_, under the command of Captain Lawrence. The _Essex_ was in theDelaware, and accordingly orders were sent to Captain Porter torendezvous at the Island of San Jago; if that failed several otherplaces were appointed, and if, after a certain time, he did notfall in with his commodore he was to act at his own discretion. [Illustration: Captain William Bainbridge: a portrait by JohnWesley Jarvis, circa 1814. (Courtesy U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] On October 26th the _Constitution_ and _Hornet_ sailed, touchedat the different rendezvous, and on December 13th arrived off SanSalvador, where Captain Lawrence found the _Bonne Citoyenne_, 18, Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene. The _Bonne Citoyenne_ was armed with18 32-pound carronades and 2 long nines, and her crew of 150 menwas exactly equal in number to that of the _Hornet_; the latter'sshort weight in metal made her antagonist superior to her in aboutthe same proportion that she herself was subsequently superior tothe _Penguin_, or, in other words, the ships were practically equal. Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain Greene to single fight, giving the usual pledges that the _Constitution_ should notinterfere. The challenge was not accepted for a variety of reasons;among others the _Bonne Citoyenne_ was carrying home half a millionpounds in specie. [Footnote: Brenton and James both deny thatCaptain Greene was blockaded by the _Hornet_, and claim that hefeared the _Constitution_. James says (p. 275) that the occurrencewas one which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned greatlyto their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only sent the challengebecause "it could not be accepted, " and so he would "suffer nopersonal risk. " He states that the reason it was sent, as well asthe reason that it was refused, was because the _Constitution_ wasgoing to remain in the offing and capture the British ship if sheproved conqueror. It is somewhat surprising that even James shouldhave had the temerity to advance such arguments. According to hisown account (p. 277) the _Constitution_ left for Boston on Jan. 6th, and the _Hornet_ remained blockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_ till the24th, when the _Montagu_, 74, arrived. During these eighteen daysthere could have been no possible chance of the _Constitution_ orany other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous to suppose thatany such fear kept Captain Greene from sailing out to attack hisfoe. No doubt Captain Greene's course was perfectly justifiable, but it is curious that with all the assertions made by James as tothe cowardice of the Americans, this is the only instance throughoutthe war in which a ship of either party declined a contest with anantagonist of equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and SirGeorge Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate of theopposing ships. )] Leaving the _Hornet_ to blockade her, CommodoreBainbridge ran off to the southward, keeping the land in view. At 9 A. M. , Dec. 29, 1812, while the _Constitution_ was runningalong the coast of Brazil, about thirty miles offshore in latitude13° 6' S. , and longitude 31° W. , two strange sail were made, [Footnote: Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan. 3, 1813. ]inshore and to windward. These were H. B. M. Frigate _Java_, CaptainLambert, forty-eight days out of Spithead, England, with the capturedship _William_ in company. Directing the latter to make for SanSalvador, the _Java_ bore down in chase of the _Constitution_. [Footnote: Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec. 31, 1812. ] Thewind was blowing light from the N. N. E. , and there was very littlesea on. At 10 the _Java_ made the private signals, English, Spanish, and Portuguese in succession, none being answered; meanwhile the_Constitution_ was standing up toward the _Java_ on the starboardtack; a little after 11 she hoisted her private signal, and then, being satisfied that the strange sail was an enemy, she wore andstood off toward the S. E. , to draw her antagonist away from theland, [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_. ] which was plainlyvisible. The _Java_ hauled up, and made sail in a parallel course, the _Constitution_ bearing about three points on her lee bow. The _Java_ gained rapidly, being much the swifter. At 1. 30 the _Constitution_ luffed up, shortened her canvas totop-sails, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker, and ran easily offon the port tack, heading toward the southeast; she carried hercommodore's pendant at the main, national ensigns at the mizzenpeakand main top-gallant mast-head, and a Jack at the fore. The _Java_also had taken in the main-sail and royals, and came down in alasking course on her adversary's weather-quarter, [Footnote:Lieutenant Chads' Address to the Court-martial, April 23, 1813. ]hoisting her ensign at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at the mizzentop-gallant mast-head, and another lashed to the main-rigging. At2 P. M. , the _Constitution_ fired a shot ahead of her, followingit quickly by a broadside, [Footnote: Commodore Bainbridge'sletter. ] and the two ships began at long bowls, the English firingthe lee or starboard battery while the Americans replied with theirport guns. The cannonade was very spirited on both sides, the shipssuffering about equally. The first broadside of the _Java_ was verydestructive, killing and wounding several of the _Constitution's_crew. The _Java_ kept edging down, and the action continued, withgrape and musketry in addition; the swifter British ship soonforereached and kept away, intending to wear across her slowerantagonist's bow and rake her; but the latter wore in the smoke, and the two combatants ran off to the westward, the Englishmanstill a-weather and steering freer than the _Constitution_, whichhad luffed to close. [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_. ] Theaction went on at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes, however, the _Java_ again forged ahead, out of the weight of her adversary'sfire, and then kept off, as before, to cross her bows; and, asbefore, the _Constitution_ avoided this by wearing, both shipsagain coming round with their heads to the east, the Americanstill to leeward. The Java kept the weather-gage tenaciously, forereaching a little, and whenever the __Constitution_ luffedup to close, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_. ] the former triedto rake her. But her gunnery was now poor, little damage beingdone by it; most of the loss the Americans suffered was early inthe action. By setting her foresail and main-sail the _Constitution_got up close on the enemy's lee beam, her fire being very heavyand carrying away the end of the _Java's_ bowsprit and her jib-boom. [Footnote: Lieutenant Chads' letter. ] The _Constitution_ forgedahead and repeated her former manoeuvre, wearing in the smoke. The_Java_ at once hove in stays, but owing to the loss of head-sailfell off very slowly, and the American frigate poured a heavy rakingbroadside into her stern, at about two cables' length distance. The_Java_ replied with her port guns as she fell off. [Footnote:Lieutenant Chads' letter. ] Both vessels then bore up and ran offfree, with the wind on the port quarter; the _Java_ being abreastand to windward of her antagonist, both with their heads a littleeast of south. The ships were less than a cable's length apart, andthe _Constitution_ inflicted great damage while suffering very littleherself. The British lost many men by the musketry of the Americantopmen, and suffered still more from the round and grape, especiallyon the forecastle, [Footnote: Testimony of Christopher Speedy, inminutes of the Court-martial on board H. M. S. _Gladiator_, atPortsmouth, April 23, 1813] many marked instances of valor beingshown on both sides. The _Java's_ masts were wounded and her riggingcut to pieces, and Captain Lambert then ordered her to be laidaboard the enemy, who was on her lee beam. The helm was put a-weather, and the _Java_ came down for the _Constitution's_ main-chains. Theboarders and marines gathered in the gangways and on the forecastle, the boatswain having been ordered to cheer them up with his pipethat they might make a clean spring. [Footnote: Testimony of JamesHumble, in _do. , do. _] The Americans, however, raked the Britishwith terrible effect, cutting off their main top-mast above the cap, and their foremast near the cat harpings. [Footnote: Log of_Constitution_. ] The stump of the _Java's_ bowsprit got caught inthe _Constitution's_ mizzen-rigging, and before it got clear theBritish suffered still more. [Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Java_: a comptemporary Americanengraving done under the supervision of a witness to the action. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] Finally the ships separated, the _Java's_ bowsprit passing over thetaffrail of the _Constitution_; the latter at once kept away toavoid being raked. The ships again got nearly abreast, but the_Constitution_, in her turn, forereached; whereupon CommodoreBainbridge wore, passed his antagonist, luffed up under his quarter, raked him with the starboard guns, then wore, and recommenced theaction with his port broadside at about 3. 10. Again the vesselswere abreast, and the action went on as furiously as ever. The wreckof the top hamper on the _Java_ lay over her starboard side, so thatevery discharge of her guns set her on fire, [Footnote: Lieut. Chads'Address. ] and in a few minutes her able and gallant commander wasmortally wounded by a ball fired by one of the American main-top-men. [Footnote: Surgeon J. C. Jones' Report. ] The command then devolvedon the first lieutenant, Chads, himself painfully wounded. Theslaughter had been terrible, yet the British fought on with stubbornresolution, cheering lustily. But success was now hopeless, fornothing could stand against the cool precision of the Yankee fire. The stump of the _Java's_ foremast was carried away by a double-headedshot, the mizzen-mast fell, the gaff and spanker boom were shot away, also the main-yard, and finally the ensign was cut down by a shot, and all her guns absolutely silenced; when at 4. 05 the _Constitution_, thinking her adversary had struck, [Footnote: Log of the _Constitution_(as given in Bainbridge's letter). ] ceased firing, hauled aboardher racks, and passed across her adversary's bows to windward, withher top-sails, jib, and spanker set. A few minutes afterward the_Java's_ main-mast fell, leaving her a sheer hulk. The _Constitution_assumed a weatherly position, and spent an hour in repairing damagesand securing her masts; then she wore and stood toward her enemy, whose flag was again flying, but only for bravado, for as soon asthe _Constitution_ stood across her forefoot she struck. At 5. 25she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker, 1st of the_Constitution_, in one of the latter's only two remaining boats. The American ship had suffered comparatively little. But a few roundshot had struck her hull, one of which carried away the wheel; one18-pounder went through the mizzen-mast; the fore-mast, main-top-mast, and a few other spars were slightly wounded, and the running riggingand shrouds were a good deal cut; but in an hour she was again ingood fighting trim. Her loss amounted to 8 seamen and 1 marinekilled; the 5th lieutenant, John C. Alwyn, and 2 seamen, mortally, Commodore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely, and 7 seamen and 2marines, slightly wounded; in all 12 killed and mortally wounded, and 22 wounded severely and slightly. [Footnote: Report of SurgeonAmos A. Evans. ] "The _Java_ sustained unequalled injuries beyond the _Constitution_, "says the British account. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle, " xxix. 452. ]These have already been given in detail; she was a riddled andentirely dismasted hulk. Her loss (for discussion of which seefarther on) was 48 killed (including Captain Henry Lambert, whodied soon after the close of the action, and five midshipmen), and 102 wounded, among them Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Lieutenantof Marines David Davies, Commander John Marshall, Lieut. JamesSaunders, the boatswain. James Humble, master, Batty Robinson, andfour midshipmen. In this action both ships displayed equal gallantry and seamanship. "The _Java_, " says Commodore Bainbridge, "was exceedingly wellhandled and bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was a distinguishedand gallant officer, and a most worthy man, whose death I sincerelyregret. " The manoeuvring on both sides was excellent; CaptainLambert used the advantage which his ship possessed in her superiorspeed most skilfully, always endeavoring to run across his adversary'sbows and rake him when he had forereached, and it was only owingto the equal skill which his antagonist displayed that he was foiled, the length of the combat being due to the number of evolutions. Thegreat superiority of the Americans was in their gunnery. The fireof the _Java_ was both less rapid and less well directed than thatof her antagonist; the difference of force against her was notheavy, being about as ten is to nine, and was by no means enoughto account for the almost fivefold greater loss she suffered. [Illustration: This differs somewhat from the English diagram:the American officers distinctly assert that the Java kept theweather-gage in every position. ] The foregoing is a diagram of the battle. It differs from both ofthe official accounts, as these conflict greatly both as to timeand as regards some of the evolutions. I generally take the meanin cases of difference; for example, Commodore Bainbridge's reportmakes the fight endure but 1 hour and 55 minutes, Lieutenant Chads'2 hours and 25 minutes: I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc. , etc. The tonnage and weight of metal of the combatants have alreadybeen stated; I will give the complements shortly. The following isthe COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS. Relative Weight No. Relative Loss Tons. Metal. Men. Loss. Force. Inflicted. _Constitution_ 1576 654 475 34 100 100_Java_ 1340 576 426 150 89 23 In hardly another action the war do the accounts of the respectiveforces differ so widely; the official British letter makes theirtotal of men at the beginning of the action 377, of whom CommodoreBainbridge officially reports that he paroled 378! The Britishstate their loss in killed and mortally wounded at 24; CommodoreBainbridge reports that the dead alone amounted to nearly 60!Usually I have taken each commander's account of his own forceand loss, and I should do so now if it were not that the Britishaccounts differ among themselves, and whenever they relate to theAmericans, are flatly contradicted by the affidavits of the latter'sofficers. The British first handicap themselves by the statementthat the surgeon of the _Constitution_ was an Irishman and latelyan assistant surgeon in the British navy ("Naval Chronicle, " xxix, 452); which draws from Surgeon Amos A. Evans a solemn statement inthe Boston _Gazette_ that he was born in Maryland and was never inthe British navy in his life. Then Surgeon Jones of the _Java_, inhis official report, after giving his own killed and mortally woundedat 24, says that the Americans lost in all about 60, and that 4 oftheir amputations perished under his own eyes; whereupon SurgeonEvans makes the statement (_Niles' Register_, vi, p. 35), backedup by affidavits of his brother officers, that in all he had butfive amputations, of whom only one died, and that one, a monthafter Surgeon Jones had left the ship. To meet the assertions ofLieutenant Chads that he began action with but 377 men, the_Constitution's_ officers produced the _Java's_ muster-roll, datedNov. 17th, or five days after she had sailed, which showed 446persons, of whom 20 had been put on board a prize. The presence ofthis large number of supernumeraries on board is explained by thefact that the _Java_ was carrying out Lieutenant-General Hislop, the newly-appointed Governor of Bombay, and his suite, togetherwith part of the crews for the _Cornwallis_, 74, and gun-sloops_Chameleon_ and _Icarus_; she also contained stores for those two ships. Besides conflicting with the American reports, the British statementscontradict one another. The official published report gives but twomidshipmen as killed; while one of the volumes of the "Naval Chronicle"(vol. Xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from one of the _Java's_lieutenants, in which he states that there were five. Finally, Commodore Bainbridge found on board the _Constitution_, after theprisoners had left, a letter from Lieutenant H. D. Cornick, datedJan. 1, 1813, and addressed to Lieutenant Peter V. Wood, 22d Regiment, foot, in which he states that 65 of their men were killed. James("Naval Occurrences") gets around this by stating that it wasprobably a forgery; but, aside from the improbability of CommodoreBainbridge being a forger, this could not be so, for nothing wouldhave been easier than for the British lieutenant to have deniedhaving written it, which he never did. On the other hand, it wouldbe very likely that in the heat of the action, Commodore Bainbridgeand the _Java's_ own officers should overestimate the latter's loss. [Footnote: For an account of the shameless corruption then existingin the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord Dundonald's"Autobiography of a seaman. " The letters of the commanders wereoften garbled, as is mentioned by Brenton. Among numerous casesthat he gives, may be mentioned the cutting out of the _Chevrette_, where he distinctly says, "our loss was much greater than was everacknowledged. " (Vol. I, p. 505, edition of 1837. )] Taking all these facts into consideration, we find 446 men on boardthe _Java_ by her own muster-list; 378 of these were paroled byCommodore Bainbridge at San Salvador; 24 men were acknowledged bythe enemy to be killed or mortally wounded; 20 were absent in aprize, leaving 24 unaccounted for, who were undoubtedly slain. The British loss was thus 48 men killed and mortally wounded, and102 wounded severely and slightly. The _Java_ was better handledand more desperately defended than the _Macedonian_ or even the_Guerrière_. And the odds against her were much smaller; so shecaused her opponent greater loss, though her gunnery was no betterthan theirs. Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the _Java_, removed all theprisoners and baggage to the _Constitution_, and reported the prizeto be in a very disabled state; owing partly to this, but more tothe long distance from home and the great danger there was ofrecapture, Commodore Bainbridge destroyed her on the 31st, andthen made sail for San Salvador. "Our gallant enemy, " reportsLieutenant Chads, "has treated us most generously"; andLieutenant-General Hislop presented the Commodore with a veryhandsome sword as a token of gratitude for the kindness with whichhe had treated the prisoners. Partly in consequence of his frigate's injuries, but especiallybecause of her decayed condition, Commodore Bainbridge sailed fromSan Salvador on Jan. 6, 1813, reaching Boston Feb. 27th, after hisfour months' cruise. At San Salvador he left the _Hornet_ stillblockading the _Bonne Citoyenne_. In order "to see ourselves as others see us, " I shall again quotefrom Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, [Footnote "Guerres Maritimes, "ii, 284 (Paris, 1881). ] as his opinions are certainly well worthyof attention both as to these first three battles, and as to thelessons they teach. "When the American Congress declared war onEngland in 1812, " he says, "it seemed as if this unequal conflictwould crush her navy in the act of being born; instead, it butfertilized the germ. It is only since that epoch that the UnitedStates has taken rank among maritime powers. Some combats of frigates, corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without doubt as regardsmaterial results, sufficed to break the charm which protected thestandard of St. George, and taught Europe what she could havealready learned from some of our combats, if the louder noise of ourdefeats had not drowned the glory, that the only invincibles on thesea are good seamen and good artillerists. "The English covered the ocean with their cruisers when thisunknown navy, composed of six frigates and a few small crafthitherto hardly numbered, dared to establish its cruisers at themouth of the Channel, in the very centre of the British power. Butalready the _Constitution_ had captured the _Guerrière_ and _Java_, the _United States_ had made a prize of the _Macedonian_, the _Wasp_of the _Frolic_, and the _Hornet_ of the _Peacock_. The honor ofthe new flag was established. England, humiliated, tried toattribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size of thevessels which Congress had had constructed in 1799, and which didthe fighting in 1812. She wished to refuse them the name of frigates, and called them, not without some appearance of reason, disguisedline-of-battle ships. Since then all maritime powers have copiedthese gigantic models, as the result of the war of 1812 obligedEngland herself to change her naval material; but if they hademployed, instead of frigates, cut-down 74's (vaisseaux rasés), it would still be difficult to explain the prodigious success ofthe Americans. * * * "In an engagement which terminated in less than half an hour, theEnglish frigate _Guerrière_, completely dismasted, had fifteen menkilled, sixty-three wounded, and more than thirty shot below thewater-line. She sank twelve hours after the combat. The_Constitution_, on the contrary, had but seven men killed and sevenwounded, and did not lose a mast. As soon as she had replaced a fewcut ropes and changed a few sails, she was in condition, even bythe testimony of the British historian, to take another _Guerrière_. The _United States_ took an hour and a half to capture the_Macedonian_, and the same difference made itself felt in the damagesuffered by the two ships. The _Macedonian_ had her masts shattered, two of her main-deck and all her spar-deck guns disabled; more thana hundred shot had penetrated the hull, and over a third of thecrew had suffered by the hostile fire. The American frigate, on thecontrary, had to regret but five men killed and seven wounded; herguns had been fired each sixty-six times to the _Macedonian's_thirty-six. The combat of the _Constitution_ and the _Java_ lastedtwo hours, and was the most bloody of these three engagements. The_Java_ only struck when she had been razed like a sheer hulk; shehad twenty-two men killed and one hundred and two wounded. * * * * * "This war should be studied with unceasing diligence; the pride oftwo peoples to whom naval affairs are so generally familiar hascleared all the details and laid bare all the episodes, and throughthe sneers which the victors should have spared, merely out of carefor their own glory, at every step can be seen that great truth, thatthere is only success for those who know how to prepare it. * * * * * "It belongs to us to judge impartially these marine events, toomuch exalted perhaps by a national vanity one is tempted to excuse. The Americans showed, in the War of 1812, a great deal of skilland resolution. But if, as they have asserted, the chances hadalways been perfectly equal between them and their adversaries, ifthey had only owed their triumphs to the intrepidity of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge, there would be for us but little interestin recalling the struggle. We need not seek lessons in courageoutside of our own history. On the contrary, what is to be wellconsidered is that the ships of the United States constantly foughtwith chances in their favor, and it is on this that the Americangovernment should found its true title to glory. * * * The Americansin 1812 had secured to themselves the advantage of a betterorganization [than the English]. " The fight between the _Constitution_ and the _Java_ illustratesbest the proposition, "that there is only success for those whoknow how to prepare it. " Here the odds in men and metal were onlyabout as 10 to 9 in favor of the victors, and it is safe to saythat they might have been reversed without vitally affecting theresult. In the fight Lambert handled his ship as skilfully asBainbridge did his; and the _Java's_ men proved by their indomitablecourage that they were excellent material. The _Java's_ crew wasnew shipped for the voyage, and had been at sea but six weeks; inthe _Constitution's_ first fight her crew had been aboard of herbut _five_ weeks. So the chances should have been nearly equal, and the difference in fighting capacity that was shown by theenormous disparity in the loss, and still more in the damageinflicted, was due to the fact that the officers of one ship had, and the officers of the other had not, trained their raw crews. The _Constitution's_ men were not "picked, " but simply averageAmerican sailors, as the _Java's_ were average British sailors. The essential difference was in the training. During the six weeks the _Java_ was at sea her men had fired butsix broadsides, of blank cartridges; during the first five weeksthe _Constitution_ cruised, her crew were incessantly practisedat firing with blank cartridges and also at a target. [Footnote:In looking through the logs of the _Constitution_, _Hornet_, etc. , we continually find such entries as "beat to quarters, exercisedthe men at the great guns, " "exercised with musketry, " "exercisedthe boarders, " "exercised the great guns, blank cartridges, andafterward firing at mark. "] The Java's crew had only been exercisedoccasionally, even in pointing the guns, and when the captain ofa gun was killed the effectiveness of the piece was temporarilyruined, and, moreover, the men did not work together. The_Constitution's_ crew were exercised till they worked like machines, and yet with enough individuality to render it impossible tocripple a gun by killing one man. The unpractised British sailorsfired at random; the trained Americans took aim. The Britishmarines had not been taught any thing approximating to skirmishingor sharp-shooting; the Americans had. The British sailors had noteven been trained enough in the ordinary duties of seamen; whilethe Americans in five weeks had been rendered almost perfect. Theformer were at a loss what to do in an emergency at all out oftheir own line of work; they were helpless when the wreck fell overtheir guns, when the Americans would have cut it away in a jiffy. As we learn from Commodore Morris' "Autobiography, " each Yankeesailor could, at need, do a little carpentering or sail-mending, and so was more self-reliant. The crew had been trained to act asif guided by one mind, yet each man retained his own individuality. The petty officers were better paid than in Great Britain, and sowere of a better class of men, thoroughly self-respecting; theAmericans soon got their subordinates in order, while the Britishdid not. To sum up: one ship's crew had been trained practicallyand thoroughly, while the other crew was not much better off thanthe day it sailed; and, as far as it goes, this is a good test ofthe efficiency of the two navies. The U. S. Brig _Vixen_, 12, Lieutenant George U. Read, had beencruising off the southern coast; on Nov. 22d she fell in with the_Southampton_, 32, Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo, and was capturedafter a short but severe trial of speed. Both vessels were wreckedsoon afterward. The _Essex_, 32, Captain David Porter, left the Delaware on Oct. 28th, two days after Commodore Bainbridge had left Boston. Sheexpected to make a very long cruise and so carried with her anunusual quantity of stores and sixty more men than ordinarily, sothat her muster-roll contained 319 names. Being deep in the watershe reached San Jago after Bainbridge had left. Nothing was met withuntil after the Essex had crossed the equator in longitude 30° W. On Dec. 11th. On the afternoon of the next day a sail was made outto windward, and chased. At nine in the evening it was overtaken, and struck after receiving a volley of musketry which killed oneman. The prize proved to be the British packet _Nocton_, of 10guns and 31 men, with $55, 000 in specie aboard. The latter wastaken out, and the _Nocton_ sent home with Lieutenant Finch anda prize crew of 17 men, but was recaptured by a British frigate. The next appointed rendezvous was the Island of Fernando de Noronha, where Captain Porter found a letter from Commodore Bainbridge, informing him that the other vessels were off Cape Frio. Thithercruised Porter, but his compatriots had left. On the 29th hecaptured an English merchant vessel; and he was still cruisingwhen the year closed. The year 1812, on the ocean, ended as gloriously as it had begun. In four victorious fights the disparity in loss had been so greatas to sink the disparity of force into insignificance. Our successeshad been unaccompanied by any important reverse. Nor was it aloneby the victories, but by the cruises, that the year was noteworthy. The Yankee men-of-war sailed almost in sight of the British coastand right in the tract of the merchant fleets and their armedprotectors. Our vessels had shown themselves immensely superiorto their foes. The reason of these striking and unexpected successes was that ournavy in 1812 was the exact reverse of what our navy is now, in 1882. I am not alluding to the personnel, which still remains excellent;but, whereas we now have a large number of worthless vessels, standing very low down in their respective classes, we thenpossessed a few vessels, each unsurpassed by any foreign ship ofher class. To bring up our navy to the condition in which it stoodin 1812 it would not be _necessary_ (although in reality both verywise and in the end very economical) to spend any more money thanat present; only instead of using it to patch up a hundred antiquatedhulks, it should be employed in building half a dozen ships on themost effective model. If in 1812 our ships had borne the same relationto the British ships that they do now, not all the courage and skillof our sailors would have won us a single success. As it was, wecould only cope with the lower rates, and had no vessels to opposeto the great "liners"; but to-day there is hardly any foreign ship, no matter how low its rate, that is not superior to the correspondingAmerican ones. It is too much to hope that our political shortsightednesswill ever enable us to have a navy that is first-class in point ofsize; but there certainly seems no reason why what ships we haveshould not be of the very best quality. The effect of a victory istwo-fold, moral and material. Had we been as roughly handled on wateras we were on land during the first year of the war, such a successionof disasters would have had a most demoralizing effect on the nationat large. As it was, our victorious seafights, while they did notinflict any material damage upon the colossal sea-might of England, had the most important results in the feelings they produced at homeand even abroad. Of course they were magnified absurdly by most ofour writers at the time; but they do not need to be magnified, foras they are any American can look back upon them with the keenestnational pride. For a hundred and thirty years England had had noequal on the sea; and now she suddenly found one in the untried navyof an almost unknown power. BRITISH VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED IN 1812. Name. Guns. Tonnage. Remarks. _Guerrière_ 49 1, 340_Macedonian_ 49 1, 325_Java_ 49 1, 340_Frolic_ 19 477 Recaptured. _Alert_ 20 323 _____ _______ 186 4, 807 19 477 Deducting Frolic. _____ _______ 167 4, 330 AMERICAN VESSELS CAPTURED OR DESTROYED. Name. Guns. Tonnage. _Wasp_ 18 450_Nautilus_ 14 185_Vixen_ 14 185 _____ _______ 46 820 VESSELS BUILT IN 1812. Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage. Where Built. Cost. _Nonsuch_ Schooner 14 148 Charleston $15, 000_Carolina_ Schooner 14 230 " 8, 743_Louisiana_ Ship 16 341 New Orleans 15, 500 PRIZES MADE. [Footnote: These can only be approximately given;the records are often incomplete or contradictory, especiallyas regards the small craft. Most accounts do not give by anymeans the full number. ] Ship. No. Of Prizes. _President_ 1_United States_ 2_Constitution_ 9_Congress_ 2_Chesapeake_ 1_Essex_ 11_Wasp_ 2_Hornet_ 1_Argus_ 6_Small Craft_ 5 __ 46 Chapter IV 1812 ON THE LAKES _PRELIMINARY. --The combatants starting nearly on anequality--Difficulties of creating a naval force--Difficulty ofcomparing the force of the rival squadrons--Meagreness of thepublished accounts--Unreliability of James--ONTARIO--Extraordinarynature of the American squadron--Canadian squadron forming only akind of water militia--Sackett's Harbor feebly attacked by CommodoreEarle--Commodore Chauncy bombards York--ERIE--Lieutenant Elliottcaptures the_ Detroit _and_ Caledonia--_Unsuccessful expedition ofLieutenant Angus. _ At the time we are treating of, the State of Maine was so sparselysettled, and covered with such a dense growth of forest, that itwas practically impossible for either of the contending parties toadvance an army through its territory. A continuation of the samewooded and mountainous district protected the northern parts ofVermont and New Hampshire, while in New York the Adirondack regionwas an impenetrable wilderness. It thus came about that thenorthern boundary was formed, for military purposes, by LakeHuron, Lake Erie, the Niagara, Lake Ontario, the St. Lawrence, and, after an interval, by Lake Champlain. The road into the Statesby the latter ran close along shore, and without a naval force theinvader would be wholly unable to protect his flanks, and wouldprobably have his communications cut. This lake, however, wasalmost wholly within the United States, and did not become ofimportance till toward the end of the war. Upon it were twoAmerican gun-boats, regularly officered and manned, and for suchsmooth water sufficiently effective vessels. What was at that time the western part of the northern frontierbecame the main theatre of military operations, and as it presentedlargely a water front, a naval force was an indispensable adjunct, the command of the lakes being of the utmost importance. As theselakes were fitted for the manoeuvring of ships of the largest size, the operations upon them were of the same nature as those on theocean, and properly belong to naval and not to military history. But while on the ocean America started with too few ships to enableher really to do any serious harm to her antagonist, on the inlandwaters the two sides began very nearly on an equality. The chiefregular forces either belligerent possessed were on Lake Ontario. Here the United States had a man-of-war brig, the _Oneida_, of 240tons, carrying 16 24-pound carronades, manned by experienced seamen, and commanded by Lieutenant M. T. Woolsey. Great Britain possessedthe _Royal George_, 22, _Prince Regent_, 16, _Earl of Moira_, 14, _Gloucester_, 10, _Seneca_, 8, and _Simco_, 8, all under the commandof a Commodore Earle; but though this force was so much the morepowerful it was very inefficient, not being considered as belongingto the regular navy, the sailors being undisciplined, and the officerstotally without experience, never having been really trained inthe British service. From these causes it resulted that the struggleon the lakes was to be a work as much of creating as of using a navy. On the seaboard success came to those who made best use of the shipsthat had already been built; on the lakes the real contest lay inthe building. And building an inland navy was no easy task. Thecountry around the lakes, especially on the south side, was stillvery sparsely settled, and all the American naval supplies had tobe brought from the seaboard cities through the valley of the Mohawk. There was no canal or other means of communication, except verypoor roads intermittently relieved by transportation on the Mohawkand on Oneida Lake, when they were navigable. Supplies were thusbrought up at an enormous cost, with tedious delays and greatdifficulty; and bad weather put a stop to all travel. Very littleindeed, beyond timber, could be procured at the stations on thelakes. Still a few scattered villages and small towns had grown upon the shores, whose inhabitants were largely engaged in the carryingtrade. The vessels used for the purpose were generally small sloopsor schooners, swift and fairly good sailors, but very shallow andnot fitted for rough weather. The frontiersmen themselves, whetherCanadian or American, were bold, hardy seamen, and when properlytrained and led made excellent man-of-war's men; but on the Americanside they were too few in number, and too untrained to be made useof, and the seamen had to come from the coast. But the Canadianshores had been settled longer, the inhabitants were more numerous, and by means of the St. Lawrence the country was easy of access toGreat Britain; so that the seat of war, as regards getting navalsupplies, and even men, was nearer to Great Britain than to us. Ourenemies also possessed in addition to the squadron on Lake Ontarioanother on Lake Erie, consisting of the _Queen Charlotte_, 17, _Lady Prevost_, 13, _Hunter_, 10, _Caledonia_, 2, _Little Belt_, 2, and _Chippeway_, 2. These two squadrons furnished training schoolsfor some five hundred Canadian seamen, whom a short course ofdiscipline under experienced officers sufficed to render as goodmen as their British friends or American foes. Very few Britishseamen ever reached Lake Erie (according to James, not over fifty);but on Lake Ontario, and afterward on Lake Champlain, they formedthe bulk of the crews, "picked seamen, sent out by governmentexpressly for service on the Canada lakes. " [Footnote: James, vi, 353. ] As the contrary has sometimes been asserted it may be as wellto mention that Admiral Codrington states that no want of seamencontributed to the British disasters on the lakes, as theirsea-ships at Quebec had men drafted from them for that servicetill their crews were utterly depleted. [Footnote: Memoirs, i, 322, referring especially to battle of Lake Champlain. ] I am bound tostate that while I think that on the ocean our sailors showedthemselves superior to their opponents, especially in gun practice, on the lakes the men of the rival fleets were as evenly matched, in skill and courage, as could well be. The difference, when therewas any, appeared in the officers, and, above all, in the builders;which was the more creditable to us, as in the beginning we werehandicapped by the fact that the British already had a considerablenumber of war vessels, while we had but one. The Falls of Niagara interrupt navigation between Erie and Ontario;so there were three independent centres of naval operations on thenorthern frontier. The first was on Lake Champlain, where only theAmericans possessed any force, and, singularly enough, this was theonly place where the British showed more enterprise in ship-buildingthan we did. Next came Lake Ontario, where both sides made theirgreatest efforts, but where the result was indecisive, though thebalance of success was slightly inclined toward us. Our navalstation was at Sackett's Harbor; that of our foes at Kingston. Thethird field of operations was Lake Erie and the waters above it. Here both sides showed equal daring and skill in the fighting, andour advantage must be ascribed to the energy and success with whichwe built and equipped vessels. Originally we had no force at allon these waters, while several vessels were opposed to us. It isa matter of wonder that the British and Canadian governments shouldhave been so supine as to permit their existing force to go badlyarmed, and so unenterprising as to build but one additional ship, when they could easily have preserved their superiority. It is very difficult to give a full and fair account of the lakecampaigns. The inland navies were created especially for the war, and, after it were allowed to decay, so that the records of thetonnage, armament, and crews are hard to get at. Of course, whereeverything had to be created, the services could not have the regularcharacter of those on the ocean. The vessels employed were of widelydifferent kinds, and this often renders it almost impossible tocorrectly estimate the relative force of two opposing squadrons. While the Americans were building their lake navy, they, asmakeshifts, made use of some ordinary merchant schooners, whichwere purchased and fitted up with one or two long, heavy guns each. These gun-vessels had no quarters, and suffered under all the otherdisadvantages which make a merchant vessel inferior to a regularlyconstructed man-of-war. The chief trouble was that in a heavy seathey had a strong tendency to capsize, and were so unsteady thatthe guns could not be aimed when any wind was blowing. Now, if afew of these schooners, mounting long 32's, encountered a coupleof man-of-war brigs, armed with carronades, which side was strongest?In smooth water the schooners had the advantage, and in roughweather they were completely at the mercy of the brigs; so that itwould be very hard to get at the true worth of such a contest, aseach side would be tolerably sure to insist that the weather wassuch as to give a great advantage to the other. In all the battlesand skirmishes on Champlain. Erie, and Huron, at least there wasno room left for doubt as to who were the victors. But on LakeOntario there was never any decisive struggle, and whenever anencounter occurred, each commodore always claimed that his adversaryhad "declined the combat" though "much superior in strength. " Itis, of course, almost impossible to rind out which really did declinethe combat, for the official letters flatly contradict each other;and it is often almost as difficult to discover where the superiorityin force lay, when the fleets differed so widely in character aswas the case in 1813. Then Commodore Chauncy's squadron consistedlargely of schooners; their long, heavy guns made his total footup in a very imposing manner, and similar gun-vessels did verygood work on Lake Erie; so Commodore Yeo, and more especiallyCommodore Yeo's admirers, exalted these schooners to the skies, and conveyed the impression that they were most formidable craft, by means of which Chauncy ought to have won great victories. Yetwhen Yeo captured two of them he refused to let them even cruisewith his fleet, and they were sent back to act as coast gun-boatsand transports, which certainly would not have been done had theybeen fitted to render any effectual assistance. Again, one nighta squall came on and the two largest schooners went to the bottom, which did not tend to increase the confidence felt in the others. So there can be no doubt that in all but very smooth water theschooners could almost be counted out of the fight. Then the questionarises in any given case, was the water smooth? And the testimonyis as conflicting as ever. It is not too easy to reconcile the official letters of the commanders, and it is still harder to get at the truth from either the Americanor British histories. Cooper is very inexact, and, moreover, paintsevery thing _couleur de rose_, paying no attention to the Britishside of the question, and distributing so much praise to everybodythat one is at a loss to know where it really belongs. Still, heis very useful, for he lived at the time of the events he narrates, and could get much information about them at first hand, from theactors themselves. James is almost the only British authority onthe subject; but he is not nearly as reliable as when dealing withthe ocean contests, most of this part of his work being taken upwith a succession of acrid soliloquies on the moral defects of theAmerican character. The British records for this extraordinaryservice on the lakes were not at all carefully kept, and so Jamesis not hampered by the necessity of adhering more or less closelyto official documents, but lets his imagination run loose. On theocean and seaboard his account of the British force can generallybe relied upon; but on the lakes his authority is questionable inevery thing relating either to friends or foes. This is the moreexasperating because it is done wilfully, when, if he had chosen, he could have written an invaluable history; he must often haveknown the truth when, as a matter of preference, he chose eitherto suppress or alter it. Thus he ignores all the small "cuttingout" expeditions in which the Americans were successful, and whereone would like to hear the British side. For example, Captain Yeocaptured two schooners, the _Julia_ and _Growler_, but Chauncyrecaptured both. We have the American account of this recapturein full, but James does not even hint at it, and blandly puts downboth vessels in the total "American loss" at the end of his smallerwork. Worse still, when the _Growler_ again changed hands, he countsit in again, in the total, as if it were an entirely different boat, although he invariably rules out of the American list all recapturedvessels. A more serious perversion of facts are his statementsabout comparative tonnage. This was at that time measured arbitrarily, the depth of hold being estimated at half the breadth of beam; andthe tonnage of our lake vessels was put down exactly as if theywere regular ocean cruisers of the same dimensions in length andbreadth. But on these inland seas the vessels really did not drawmore than half as much water as on the ocean, and the depth wouldof course be much less. James, in comparing the tonnage, gives thatof the Americans as if they were regular ocean ships, but in thecase of the British vessels, carefully allows for their shallowness, although professing to treat the two classes in the same way; andthus he makes out a most striking and purely imaginary difference. The best example is furnished by his accounts of the fleets on LakeErie. The captured vessels were appraised by two captains and theship-builder, Mr. Henry Eckford; their tonnage being computedprecisely as the tonnage of the American vessels. The appraisementwas recorded in the Navy Department, and was first made public byCooper, so that it could not have been done for effect. Thusmeasured it was found that the tonnage was in round numbers asfollows: _Detroit_, 490 tons; _Queen Charlotte_, 400; _Lady Prevost_, 230; _Hunter_, 180; _Little Belt_, 90; _Chippeway_, 70. James makesthem measure respectively 305, 280, 120, 74, 54, and 32 tons, butcarefully gives the American ships the regular sea tonnage. Soalso he habitually deducts about 25 percent, from the real numberof men on board the British ships; as regards Lake Erie he contradictshimself so much that he does not need to be exposed from outsidesources. But the most glaring and least excusable misstatementsare made as to the battle of Lake Champlain, where he gives theAmerican as greatly exceeding the British force. He reaches thisconclusion by the most marvellous series of garblings andmisstatements. First, he says that the _Confiance_ and the _Saratoga_were of nearly equal tonnage. The _Confiance_ being captured wasplaced on our naval lists, where for years she ranked as a 36-gunfrigate, while the _Saratoga_ ranked among the 24-gun corvettes;and by actual measurement the former was half as large again as thelatter. He gives the _Confiance_ but 270 men; one of her officers, in a letter published in the _London Naval Chronicle_, [Footnote: Vol. Xxxii, p. 272. The letter also says that hardly five of her menremained unhurt. ] gives her over 300; more than that number of deadand prisoners were taken out of her. He misstates the calibre ofher guns, and counts out two of them because they were used throughthe bow-ports; whereas, from the method in which she made her attack, these would have been peculiarly effective. The guns are givenaccurately by Cooper, on the authority of an officer [Footnote:Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette. ] who was on board the _Confiance_within 15 minutes after the _Linnet_ struck, and who was in chargeof her for two months. Then James states that there were but 10 British gallies, whileSir George Prevost's official account, as well as all the Americanauthorities, state the number to be 12. He says that the _Finch_grounded opposite an American battery before the engagement began, while in reality it was an hour afterward, and because she had beendisabled by the shot of the American fleet. The gallies were largelymanned by Canadians, and James, anxious to put the blame on theserather than the British, says that they acted in the most cowardlyway, whereas in reality they caused the Americans more troublethan Downie's smaller sailing vessels did. His account of thearmament of these vessels differs widely from the official reports. He gives the _Linnet_ and _Chubb_ a smaller number of men than thenumber of prisoners that were actually taken out of them, notincluding the dead. Even misstating Downie's force in guns, underestimating the number of his men, and leaving out two of hisgun-boats, did not content James; and to make the figures show aproper disproportion, he says (vol. Vi, p. 504) that he shall excludethe _Finch_ from the estimate, because she grounded, and half ofthe gun-boats, because he does not think they acted bravely. Evenwere these assertions true, it would be quite as logical for anAmerican writer to put the _Chesapeake's_ crew down as only 200, and say he should exclude the other men from the estimate becausethey flinched; and to exclude all the guns that were disabled byshot, would be no worse than to exclude the _Finch_. James'manipulation of the figures is a really curious piece of audacity. Naturally, subsequent British historians have followed him withoutinquiry. James' account of this battle, alone, amply justifiesour rejecting his narrative entirely, as far as affairs on the lakesgo, whenever it conflicts with any other statement, British orAmerican. Even when it does not conflict, it must be followed withextreme caution, for whenever he goes into figures the only thingcertain about them is that they are wrong. He gives no details atall of most of the general actions. Of these, however, we alreadypossess excellent accounts, the best being those in the "Manual ofNaval Tactics, " by Commander J. H. Ward, U. S. N. (1859), and inLossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812, " and Cooper's "NavalHistory. " The chief difficulty occurs in connection with matterson Lake Ontario, [Footnote: The accounts of the two commanders onLake Ontario are as difficult to reconcile as are those of thecontending admirals in the battles which the Dutch waged againstthe English and French during the years 1672-1675. In every one ofDe Ruyter's last six battles each side regularly claimed the victory, although there can be but little doubt that on the whole thestrategical, and probably the tactical, advantage remained withDe Ruyter. Every historian ought to feel a sense of the most livelygratitude toward Nelson; in his various encounters he never leftany possible room for dispute as to which side had come out firstbest. ] where I have been obliged to have recourse to a perfectpatchwork of authors and even newspapers, for the details, using_Niles' Register_ and James as mutual correctives. The armamentsand equipments being so irregular I have not, as in other cases, made any allowance for the short weight of the Americans shot, ashere the British may have suffered under a similar disadvantage;and it may be as well to keep in mind that on these inland watersthe seamen of the two navies seem to have been as evenly matchedin courage and skill as was possible. They were of exactly thesame stock, with the sole exception that among and under, butentirely distinct from, the Canadian-English, fought the descendantsof the conquered Canadian-French; and even these had been trainedby Englishmen, were led by English captains, fought on ships builtby English gold, and with English weapons and discipline. On Lake Ontario. There being, as already explained, three independent centres ofinland naval operations, the events at each will be consideredseparately. At the opening of the war Lieutenant Woolsey, with the _Oneida_, was stationed at Sackett's Harbor, which was protected at theentrance by a small fort with a battery composed of one long 32. The Canadian squadron of six ships, mounting nearly 80 guns, wasof course too strong to be meddled with. Indeed, had the _RoyalGeorge_, 22, the largest vessel, been commanded by a regularBritish sea-officer, she would have been perfectly competent totake both the _Oneida_ and Sackett's Harbor; but before theCanadian commodore, Earle, made up his mind to attack, Lieut. Woolsey had time to make one or two short cruises, doing somedamage among the merchant vessels of the enemy. On the 19th of July Earle's ships appeared off the Harbor; the_Oneida_ was such a dull sailor that it was useless for her to tryto escape, so she was hauled up under a bank where she raked theentrance, and her off guns landed and mounted on the shore, whileLieut. Woolsey took charge of the "battery, " or long 32, in thefort. The latter was the only gun that was of much use, for aftera desultory cannonade of about an hour, Earle withdrew, havingsuffered very little damage, inflicted none at all, and provedhimself and his subordinates to be grossly incompetent. Acting under orders, Lieut. Woolsey now set about procuring merchantschooners to be fitted and used as gun-vessels until more regularcruisers could be built. A captured British schooner was christenedthe _Julia_, armed with a long 32 and two 6's, manned with 30 men, under Lieut. Henry Wells, and sent down to Ogdensburg. "On her waythither she encountered and actually beat off, without losing a man, the _Moira_, of 14, and _Gloucester_, of 10 guns. " [Footnote: James, vi, 350. ] Five other schooners were also purchased; the _Hamilton_, of 10 guns, being the largest, while the other four, the _GovernorTompkins_, _Growler_, _Conquest_, and _Pert_ had but 11 piecesbetween them. Nothing is more difficult than to exactly describethe armaments of the smaller lake vessels. The American schoonerswere mere makeshifts, and their guns were frequently changed, [Footnote: They were always having accidents happen to them thatnecessitated some alteration. If a boat was armed with a long 32, she rolled too much, and they substituted a 24; if she also had an18-pound carronade, it upset down the hatchway in the middle of afight, and made way for a long 12, which burst as soon as it wasused, and was replaced by two medium 6's. So a regular gamut ofchanges would be rung. ] as soon as they could be dispensed withthey were laid up, or sold, and forgotten. It was even worse with the British, who manifested the mostindefatigable industry in intermittently changing the armament, rig, and name of almost every vessel, and, the records being veryloosely kept, it is hard to find what was the force at any one time. A vessel which in one conflict was armed with long 18's, in thenext would have replaced some of them with 68-pound carronades;or, beginning life as a ship, she would do most of her work as aschooner, and be captured as a brig, changing her name even oftenerthan any thing else. On the first of September Commodore Isaac Chauncy was appointedcommander of the forces on the lakes (except of those on LakeChamplain), and he at once bent his energies to preparing aneffective flotilla. A large party of ship-carpenters were immediatelydespatched to the Harbor; and they were soon followed by about ahundred officers and seamen, with guns, stores, etc. The keel of aship to mount 24 32-pound carronades, and to be called the _Madison_, was laid down, and she was launched on the 26th of November, justwhen navigation had closed on account of the ice. Late in theautumn, four more schooners were purchased, and named the _Ontario_, _Scourge_, _Fair American_, and _Asp_, but these were hardly useduntil the following spring. The cruising force of the Americanswas composed solely of the _Oneida_ and the six schooners firstmentioned. The British squadron was of nearly double this strength, and had it been officered and trained as it was during the ensuingsummer, the Americans could not have stirred out of port. But asit was, it merely served as a kind of water militia, the verysailors, who subsequently did well, being then almost useless, andunable to oppose their well-disciplined foes, though the latterwere so inferior in number and force. For the reason that it wasthus practically a contest of regulars against militia, I shall notgive numerical comparisons of the skirmishes in the autumn of 1812, and shall touch on them but slightly. They teach the old lessonthat, whether by sea or land, a small, well-officered, andwell-trained force, can not, except very rarely, be resisted by agreater number of mere militia; and that in the end it is trueeconomy to have the regular force prepared beforehand, withoutwaiting until we have been forced to prepare it by the disastershappening to the irregulars. The Canadian seamen behaved badly, but no worse than the American land-forces did at the same time;later, under regular training, both nations retrieved their reputations. Commodore Chauncy arrived at Sackett's Harbor in October, andappeared on the lake on Nov. 8th, in the _Oneida_. LieutenantWoolsey, with the six schooners _Conquest_, Lieutenant Elliott;_Hamilton_, Lieutenant McPherson; _Tompkins_, Lieutenant Brown;_Pert_, Sailing-master Arundel; _Julia_, Sailing-master Trant;_Growler_, Sailing-master Mix. The Canadian vessels were engagedin conveying supplies from the westward. Commodore Chauncydiscovered the _Royal George_ off the False Duck Islands, andchased her under the batteries of Kingston, on the 9th. Kingstonwas too well defended to be taken by such a force as Chauncy's;but the latter decided to make a reconnaissance, to discover theenemy's means of defence and see if it was possible to lay the_Royal George_ aboard. At 3 P. M. The attack was made. The_Hamilton_ and _Tompkins_ were absent chasing, and did not arriveuntil the fighting had begun. The other four gun-boats, _Conquest_, _Julia_, _Pert_, and _Growler_, led, in the order named, to openthe attack with their heavy guns, and prepare the way for the_Oneida_, which followed. At the third discharge the _Pert's_ gunburst, putting her nearly _hors de combat_, badly wounding hergallant commander, Mr. Arundel (who shortly afterward fell overboardand was drowned), and slightly wounding four of her crew. The othergun-boats engaged the five batteries of the enemy, while the _Oneida_pushed on without firing a shot till at 3. 40 she opened on the_Royal George_, and after 20 minutes' combat actually succeeded incompelling her opponent, though of double her force, to cut hercables, run in, and tie herself to a wharf, where some of herpeople deserted her; here she was under the protection of a largebody of troops, and the Americans could not board her in face ofthe land-forces. It soon began to grow dusk, and Chauncy's squadronbeat out through the channel, against a fresh head-wind. In thisspirited attack the American loss had been confined to half a dozenmen, and had fallen almost exclusively on the _Oneida_. The nextday foul weather came on, and the squadron sailed for Sackett'sHarbor. Some merchant vessels were taken, and the _Simco_, 8, waschased, but unsuccessfully. The weather now became cold and tempestuous, but cruising continuedtill the middle of November. The Canadian commanders, however, utterly refused to fight; the _Royal George_ even fleeing from the_Oneida_, when the latter was entirely alone, and leaving theAmerican commodore in undisputed command of the lake. Four of theschooners continued blockading Kingston till the middle of November;shortly afterward navigation closed. [Footnote: These preliminaryevents were not very important, and the historians on both sidesagree almost exactly, so that I have not considered it necessaryto quote authorities. ] Lake Erie. On Lake Erie there was no American naval force; but the army hadfitted out a small brig, armed with six 6-pounders. This fell intothe hands of the British at the capture of Detroit, and was namedafter that city, so that by the time a force of American officersand seamen arrived at the lake there was not a vessel on it forthem to serve in, while their foes had eight. But we only have todeal with two of the latter at present. The _Detroit_, stillmounting six 6-pounders, and with a crew of 56 men, under thecommand of Lieutenant of Marines Rolette, of the Royal Navy, assisted by a boatswain and gunner, and containing also 30 Americanprisoners, and the _Caledonia_, a small brig mounting two 4-pounderson pivots, with a crew of 12 men, Canadian-English, under Mr. Irvine, and having aboard also 10 American prisoners, and a very valuablecargo of furs worth about 200, 000 dollars, moved down the lake, and on Oct. 7th anchored under Fort Erie. [Footnote: Letter of CaptainJesse D. Elliott to Secretary of Navy. Black Rock. Oct. 5, 1812. ]Commander Jesse D. Elliott had been sent up to Erie some time beforewith instructions from Commodore Chauncy to construct a naval force, partly by building two brigs of 300 tons each, [Footnote: That is, of 300 tons actual capacity; measured as if they had been ordinarysea vessels they each tonned 480. Their opponent, the ship _Detroit_, similarly tonned 305, actual measurement, or 490, computing it inthe ordinary manner. ] and partly by purchasing schooners to act asgun-boats. No sailors had yet arrived; but on the very day on whichthe two brigs moved down and anchored under Fort Erie, CaptainElliott received news that the first detachment of the promisedseamen, 51 in number, including officers, [Footnote: The number ofmen in this expedition is taken from Lossing's "Field-Book of theWar of 1812, " by Benson L. Lossing, New York, 1869, p. 385, note, where a complete list of the names is given. ] was but a few milesdistant. He at once sent word to have these men hurried up, butwhen they arrived they were found to have no arms, for whichapplication was made to the military authorities. The latter notonly gave a sufficiency of sabres, pistols, and muskets to thesailors, but also detailed enough soldiers, under Captain N. Towson and Lieutenant Isaac Roach, to make the total number of menthat took part in the expedition 124. This force left Black Rockat one o'clock on the morning of the 8th in two large boats, oneunder the command of Commander Elliott, assisted by Lieutenant Roach, the other under Sailing-master George Watts and Captain Towson. After two hours' rowing they reached the foe, and the attack wasmade at three o'clock. Elliott laid his boat alongside the _Detroit_before he was discovered, and captured her after a very briefstruggle, in which he lost but one man killed, and MidshipmanJ. C. Cummings wounded with a bayonet in the leg. The noise of thescuffle roused the hardy provincials aboard the _Caledonia_, andthey were thus enabled to make a far more effectual resistance toSailing-master Watts than the larger vessel had to Captain Elliott. As Watts pulled alongside he was greeted with a volley of musketry, but at once boarded and carried the brig, the twelve Canadiansbeing cut down or made prisoners; one American was killed and fourbadly wounded. The wind was too light and the current too strongto enable the prizes to beat out and reach the lake, so the cableswere cut and they ran down stream. The _Caledonia_ was safelybeached under the protection of an American battery near BlackRock. The _Detroit_, however, was obliged to anchor but four hundredyards from a British battery, which, together with some flyingartillery, opened on her. Getting all his guns on the port side, Elliott kept up a brisk cannonade till his ammunition gave out, when he cut his cable and soon grounded on Squaw Island. Here the_Detroit_ was commanded by the guns of both sides, and which everparty took possession of her was at once driven out by the other. The struggle ended in her destruction, most of her guns beingtaken over to the American side. This was a very daring andhandsome exploit, reflecting great credit on Commander Elliott, and giving the Americans, in the _Caledonia_, the nucleus of theirnavy on Lake Erie; soon afterward Elliott returned to Lake Ontario, a new detachment of seamen under Commander S. Angus having arrived. On the 28th of November, the American general, Smith, despatchedtwo parties to make an attack on some of the British batteries. One of these consisted of 10 boats, under the command of CaptainKing of the 15th infantry, with 150 soldiers, and with him wentMr. Angus with 82 sailors, including officers. The expedition leftat one o'clock in the morning, but was discovered and greeted witha warm fire from a field battery placed in front of some Britishbarracks known as the Red House. Six of the boats put back; butthe other four, containing about a hundred men, dashed on. Whilethe soldiers were forming line and firing, the seamen rushed inwith their pikes and axes, drove off the British, capturing theircommander, Lieut. King, of the Royal Army, spiked and threw intothe river the guns, and then took the barracks and burned them, after a desperate fight. Great confusion now ensued, which endedin Mr. Angus and some of the seamen going off in the boats. Severalhad been killed; eight, among whom were Midshipmen Wragg, Dudley, and Holdup, all under 20 years old, remained with the troops underCaptain King, and having utterly routed the enemy found themselvesdeserted by their friends. After staying on the shore a couple ofhours some of them found two boats and got over; but Captain Kingand a few soldiers were taken prisoners. Thirty of the seamen, including nine of the twelve officers, were killed or wounded--amongthe former being Sailing-masters Sisson and Watts, and among thelatter Mr. Angus, Sailing-master Carter, and Midshipmen Wragg, Holdup, Graham, Brailesford, and Irvine. Some twenty prisonerswere secured and taken over to the American shore; the enemy'sloss was more severe than ours, his resistance being very stubborn, and a good many cannon were destroyed, but the expedition certainlyended most disastrously. The accounts of it are hard to reconcile, but it is difficult to believe that Mr. Angus acted correctly. Later in the winter Captain Oliver Hazard Perry arrived to takecommand of the forces on Lake Erie. Chapter V 1813 ON THE OCEAN _Blockade of the American coast--The_ Essex _in the SouthPacific--The_ Hornet _captures the_ Peacock--_American privateerscut out by British boats--Unsuccessful cruise of CommodoreRodgers--The_ Chesapeake _is captured by the_ Shannon--_Futilegun boat actions--Defence of Craney Island--Cutting outexpeditions--The_ Argus _is captured by the_ Pelican--_The_Enterprise _captures the_ Boxer--_Summary. _ By the beginning of the year 1813 the British had been thoroughlyaroused by the American successes, and active measures were at oncetaken to counteract them. The force on the American station waslargely increased, and a strict blockade begun, to keep the Americanfrigates in port. The British frigates now cruised for the most partin couples, and orders were issued by the Board of Admiralty thatan 18-pounder frigate was not to engage an American 24-pounder. Exaggerated accounts of the American 44's being circulated, a newclass of spar-deck frigates was constructed to meet them, rating50 and mounting 60 guns; and some 74's were cut down for the samepurpose. [Footnote: 1. James. Vi, p. 206] These new ships were allmuch heavier than their intended opponents. As New England's loyalty to the Union was, not unreasonably, doubtedabroad, her coasts were at first troubled but little. A Britishsquadron was generally kept cruising off the end of Long IslandSound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of course America had no meansof raising a blockade, as each squadron contained generally a 74or a razee, vessels too heavy for any in our navy to cope with. Frigates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of New Jersey, theCarolinas, and Georgia. Delaware Bay no longer possessed theimportance it had during the Revolutionary War, and as the only warvessels in it were some miserable gun-boats, the British generallykept but a small force on that station. Chesapeake Bay became theprincipal scene of their operations; it was there that their mainbody collected, and their greatest efforts were made. In it a numberof line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and cutters had beencollected, and early in the season Admiral Sir John Warren and RearAdmiral Cockburn arrived to take command. The latter made numerousdescents on the coast, and frequently came into contact with thelocal militia, who generally fled after a couple of volleys. Theseexpeditions did not accomplish much, beyond burning the houses anddriving off the live-stock of the farmers along shore, and destroyinga few small towns--one of them, Hampton, being sacked with revoltingbrutality. [Footnote: James (vi, 340) says: The conduct of theBritish troops on this occasion was "revolting to human nature"and "disgraceful to the flag. "] The government of the United Stateswas, in fact, supported by the people in its war policy very largelyon account of these excesses, which were much exaggerated by Americanwriters. It was really a species of civil war, and in such a contest, at the beginning of this century, it was impossible that someoutrages should not take place. The American frigate _Constellation_ had by this time got ready forsea, and, under the command of Captain Stewart, she prepared to putout early in January. As the number of blockaders rendered a fightalmost certain within a few days of her departure, her crew werepreviously brought to the highest state of discipline, the men beingexercised with especial care in handling the great guns and in firingat a target. [Footnote: Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones(Savannah, 1878), p. 15. ] However, she never got out; for when shereached Hampton Roads she fell in with a British squadron ofline-of-battle ships and frigates. She kedged up toward Norfolk, and when the tide rose ran in and anchored between the forts; anda few days later dropped down to cover the forts which were beingbuilt at Craney Island. Here she was exposed to attacks from thegreat British force still lying in Hampton Roads, and, fearing theywould attempt to carry her by surprise, Captain Stewart made everypreparation for defence. She was anchored in the middle of thenarrow channel, flanked by gun-boats, her lower ports closed, nota rope left hanging over the sides; the boarding nettings, boiled inhalf-made pitch till they were as hard as wire, were triced outboardtoward the yard arms, and loaded with kentledge to fall on theattacking boats when the tricing lines were cut, while the carronadeswere loaded to the muzzle with musket balls, and depressed so asto sweep the water near the ship. [Footnote: For an admirable accountof these preparations, as well as of the subsequent events, see Cooper, ii, 242. ] Twice, a force of British, estimated by their foes to number2, 000 men, started off at night to carry the _Constellation_ bysurprise; but on each occasion they were discovered and closelywatched by her guard-boats, and they never ventured to make theattack. However, she was unable to get to sea, and remainedblockaded to the close of the war. At the beginning of the year several frigates and smaller craft wereat sea. The _Chesapeake_, Captain Evans, had sailed from Boston onDec. 13, 1812. [Footnote: Statistical "History of the U. S. Navy, "by Lieutenant G. E. Emmons. ] She ran down past Madeira, the Canaries, and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and for six weeks cruisedto the south of the line between longitudes 16° and 25°. Thence shesteered to the west, passing near Surinam, over the same spot onwhich the _Hornet_ had sunk the _Peacock_ but a day previous. Cruising northward through the West Indies, she passed near theBermudas, where she was chased by a 74 and a frigate; escapingfrom them she got into Boston on April 9th, having captured fivemerchantmen, and chased unsuccessfully for two days a brigsloop. The term of two years for which her crew were enlisted now being up, they, for the most part, left, in consequence of some trouble aboutthe prize-money. Captain Evans being in ill health, Captain JamesLawrence was appointed to command her. He reached Boston about themiddle of May [Footnote: He was still on the _Hornet_ at New Yorkon May 10th, as we know from a letter of Biddle's, written on thatdate (in letters of "Masters' Commandant, " 1813, No. 58), and socould hardly have been with the _Chesapeake_ two weeks before heput out; and had to get his crew together and train them duringthat time. ] and at once set about enlisting a new crew, and tried, with but partial success, to arrange matters with the old sailors, who were now almost in open mutiny. When the year 1812 had come to an end, the _Essex_, 32, was in theSouth Atlantic, and Captain Porter shortly afterward ran into St. Catherines to water. Being at a loss where to find his consorts, he now decided to adopt the exceedingly bold measure of doublingCape Horn and striking at the British whalers in the Pacific. Thiswas practically going into the enemy's waters, the Portuguese andSpanish countries being entirely under the influence of Britain, while there were no stations where Porter could revictual or repairin safety. However, the _Essex_ started, doubled the Horn, and onMarch 13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. Her adventurouscruise in the Pacific was the most striking feature of the war; butas it has been most minutely described by Commodore Porter himself, by his son, Admiral Porter, by Admiral Farragut, and by Cooper, Ishall barely touch upon it. On March 20th the _Essex_ captured the Peruvian corsair _Nereyda_, 16, hove her guns and small arms overboard, and sent her into port. She made the island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and thencewent to the Gallipagos, getting every thing she wanted from herprizes. Then she went to Tumbez, and returned to the Gallipagos;thence to the Marquesas, and finally back to Valparaiso again. Bythis year's campaign in the Pacific, Captain Porter had saved allour ships in those waters, had not cost the government a dollar, living purely on the enemy, and had taken from him nearly 4, 000tons of shipping and 400 men, completely breaking up his whalingtrade in the South Pacific. The cruise was something _sui generis_ in modern warfare, recallingto mind the cruises of the early English and Dutch navigators. AnAmerican ship was at a serious disadvantage in having no harbor ofrefuge away from home; while on almost every sea there were British, French, and Spanish ports into which vessels of those nations couldrun for safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a small frigateto cruise a year and a half in enemy's waters, and to supply herselfduring that time, purely from captured vessels, with everything--cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions, and medicines, and even money to pay the officers and men! Porter's cruise was thevery model of what such an expedition should be, harassing the enemymost effectually at no cost whatever. Had the _Essex_ been decentlyarmed with long guns, instead of carronades, the end might havebeen as successful as it was glorious. The whalers were many of themarmed letters-of-marque, and, though of course unable to oppose thefrigate, several times smart skirmishes occurred in attacking themwith boats, or in captured ships; as when Lieutenant Downs and 20men in the prize _Georgiana_ after a short brush captured the _Hector_, with 25 men, two of whom were killed and six wounded; and when, undersimilar circumstances, the prize _Greenwich_, of 25 men, capturedthe _Seringapatam_ of 40. The cruise of the _Essex_, the firstAmerican man-of-war ever in the Pacific, a year and a half out andmany thousand miles away from home, was a good proof of Porter'saudacity in planning the trip and his skill and resource incarrying it out. [Illustration: Captain James Lawrence: a portrait by Gilbert Stuartpainted in Boston in 1812, shortly before Lawrence's promotion tocaptain, showing him wearing the single epaulet of a mastercommandant. (Courtesy U. S. Naval Academy Museum) ] To return now to the _Hornet_. This vessel had continued blockadingthe _Bonne Citoyenne_ until January 24th, when the _Montagu_, 74, arrived toward evening and chased her into port. As the darknesscame on the _Hornet_ wore, stood out to sea, passing into the openwithout molestation from the 74, and then steered toward thenortheast, cruising near the coast, and making a few prizes, amongwhich was a brig, the _Resolution_, with $23, 000 in specie aboard, captured on February 14th. On the 24th of February, while nearingthe mouth of the Demerara River, Captain Lawrence discovered abrig to leeward, and chased her till he ran into quarter less five, when, having no pilot, he hauled off-shore. Just within the bar aman-of-war brig was lying at anchor; and while beating round CarobandBank, in order to get at her, Captain Lawrence discovered anothersail edging down on his weather-quarter. [Footnote: Letter ofCaptain Lawrence, March 29, 1813. ] The brig at anchor was the_Espiègle_, of 18 guns, 32-pound carronades, Captain John Taylor[Footnote: James, vi, 278. ]; and the second brig seen was the _Peacock_, Captain William Peake, [Footnote: _Do_. ] which, for some unknownreason, had exchanged her 32-pound carronades for 24's. She hadsailed from the _Espiègle's_ anchorage the same morning at 10 o'clock. At 4. 20 P. M. The _Peacock_ hoisted her colors; then the _Hornet_beat to quarters and cleared for action. Captain Lawrence kept closeby the wind, in order to get the weather-gage; when he was certainhe could weather the enemy, he tacked, at 5. 10, and the _Hornet_hoisted her colors. The ship and the brig now stood for each other, both on the wind, the _Hornet_ being on the starboard and the_Peacock_ on the port tack, and at 5. 25 they exchanged broadsides, at half pistol-shot distance, while going in opposite directions, the Americans using their lee and the British their weather battery. The guns were fired as they bore, and the _Peacock_ suffered severely, while her antagonist's hull was uninjured, though she sufferedslightly aloft and had her pennant cut off by the first shot fired. [Footnote: Cooper, p. 200. ] One of the men in the mizzen-top waskilled by a round shot, and two more were wounded in the main-top. [Footnote: See entry in her log for this day (In "Log-Book of _Hornet_, _Wasp_, and _Argus_, from July 20, 1809, to October 6, 1813, ") inthe Bureau of Navigation, at Washington. ] As soon as they were clear, Captain Peake put his helm hard up and wore, firing his starboardguns; but the _Hornet_ had watched him closely, bore up as quickly, and coming down at 5. 35, ran him close aboard on the starboard quarter. Captain Peake fell at this moment, together with many of his crew, and, unable to withstand the _Hornet's_ heavy fire, the _Peacock_surrendered at 5. 39, just 14 minutes after the first shot; anddirectly afterward hoisted her ensign union down in the foreriggingas a signal of distress. Almost immediately her main-mast went bythe board. Both vessels then anchored, and Lieutenant J. T Shubrick, being sent on board the prize, reported her sinking. Lieutenant D. Connor was then sent in another boat to try to save the vessel; butthough they threw the guns overboard, plugged the shot holes, triedthe pumps, and even attempted bailing, the water gained so rapidlythat the _Hornet's_ officers devoted themselves to removing thewounded and other prisoners; and while thus occupied the shorttropical twilight left them. Immediately afterward the prize settled, suddenly and easily, in 51/2 fathoms water, carrying with her threeof the _Hornet's_ people and nine of her own, who were rummagingbelow; meanwhile four others of her crew had lowered her damagedstern boat, and in the confusion got off unobserved and made theirway to the land. The foretop still remained above water, and fourof the prisoners saved themselves by running up the rigging into it. Lieutenant Connor and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come on board)saved themselves, together with most of their people and theremainder of the _Peacock's_ crew, by jumping into the launch, whichwas lying on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship with piecesof boards in default of oars. The _Hornet's_ complement at this time was 150, of whom she had 8men absent in a prize and 7 on the sick list, [Footnote: Letter ofCaptain Lawrence. ] leaving 135 fit for duty in the action; [Footnote:Letter of Lieutenant D. Connor, April 26, 1813] of these one manwas killed, and two wounded, all aloft. Her rigging and sails werea good deal cut, a shot had gone through the foremast, and thebowsprit was slightly damaged; the only shot that touched her hullmerely glanced athwart her bows, indenting a plank beneath thecat-head. The _Peacock's_ crew had amounted to 134, but 4 were absentin a prize, and but 122 [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright(of the _Peacock_), April 17, 1813. ] fit for action; of these shelost her captain, and seven men killed and mortally wounded, andher master, one midshipman, and 28 men severely and slightlywounded, --in all 8 killed and 30 wounded, or about 13 times herantagonist's loss. She suffered under the disadvantage of lightmetal, having 24's opposed to 32's; but judging from her gunnerythis was not much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have inflictednearly as great damage. She was well handled and bravely fought;but her men showed a marvellous ignorance of gunnery. It appearsthat she had long been known as "the yacht, " on account of thetasteful arrangement of her deck; the breechings of the carronadeswere lined with white canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancythe polish upon the traversing bars and elevating screws. [Footnote:James, vi, 280. ] In other words, Captain Peake had confounded themere _incidents_ of good discipline with the essentials. [Footnote:Codrington ("Memoirs, " i. 310) comments very forcibly on theuselessness of a mere martinet. ] The _Hornet's_ victory cannot be regarded in any other light thanas due, _not_ to the heavier metal, but to the far more accuratefiring of the Americans; "had the guns of the _Peacock_ been of thelargest size they could not have changed the result, as the weightof shot that do not hit is of no great moment. " Any merchant-shipmight have been as well handled and bravely defended as she was; andan ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as creditable a defence. During the entire combat the _Espiégle_ was not more than 4 milesdistant and was plainly visible from the _Hornet_; but for somereason she did not come out, and her commander reported that he knewnothing of the action till the next day. Captain Lawrence of coursewas not aware of this, and made such exertions to bend on new sails, stow his boats, and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he was againprepared for action, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Lawrence. ] and at2 P. M. Got underway for the N. W. Being now overcrowded with peopleand short of water he stood for home, anchoring at Holmes' Hole inMartha's Vineyard on the 19th of March. On their arrival at New York the officers of the _Peacock_ publisheda card expressing in the warmest terms their appreciation of the waythey and their men had been treated. Say they: "We ceased to considerourselves prisoners; and every thing that friendship could dictatewas adopted by you and the officers of the _Hornet_ to remedy theinconvenience we would otherwise have experienced from the unavoidableloss of the whole of our property and clothes owing to the suddensinking of the _Peacock_. " [Footnote: Quoted in full in "Niles'Register" and Lossing's "Field Book. "] This was signed by the firstand second lieutenants, the master, surgeon and purser. [Illustration of _Peacock_ and _Hornet_ action from 5. 10 to 5. 35. ] Weight Tonnage. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss. _Hornet_ 480 10 279 135 3_Peacock_ 477 10 210 122 38 Relative Relative Loss Force. Inflicted. _Hornet_ 1. 00 1. 00_Peacock_ . 83 . 08 That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 11, the relativeexecution was about as 13 is to 1. The day after the capture Captain Lawrence reported 277 souls aboard, including the crew of the English brig _Resolution_ which he hadtaken, and of the American brig _Hunter_, prize to the _Peacock_. As James, very ingeniously, tortures these figures into meaning whatthey did not, it may be well to show exactly what the 277 included. Of the _Hornet's_ original crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize, 1killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick) 138; of the _Peacock's_original 134, 4 were absent in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4escaped, leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally wounded) 112; therewere also aboard 16 other British prisoners, and the _Hunter's_ crewof 11 men--making just 277. [Footnote: The 277 men were thus dividedinto: _Hornet's_ crew, 138; _Peacock's_ crew, 112; _Resolution's_crew, 16; _Hunter's_ crew, 11. James quotes "270" men, which he dividesas follows: _Hornet_ 160, _Peacock_ 101, _Hunter_ 9, --leaving outthe _Resolution's_ crew, 11 of the _Peacock's_, and 2 of the _Hunter's_. ]According to Lieutenant Connor's letter, written in response to onefrom Lieutenant Wright, there were in reality 139 in the _Peacock's_crew when she began action; but it is, of course, best to take eachcommander's account of the number of men on board his ship that werefit for duty. On Jan. 17th the _Viper_, 12, Lieutenant J. D. Henly was capturedby the British frigate _Narcissus_, 32, Captain Lumly. On Feb. 8th, while a British squadron, consisting of the four frigates_Belvidera_ (Captain Richard Byron), _Maidstone_, _Junon_, and_Statira_, were at anchor in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner was observedin the northeast standing down Chesapeake Bay. [Footnote: James, vi, 325. ] This was the _Lottery_, letter-of-marque, of six 12-poundercarronades and 25 men, Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimoreto Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under the command of LieutenantKelly Nazer were sent against her, and, a calm coming on, overtookher. The schooner opened a well-directed fire of round and grape, but the boats rushed forward and boarded her, not carrying her tillafter a most obstinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and 19of his men, together with 13 of the assailants, were killed or wounded. The best war ship of a regular navy might be proud of the disciplineand courage displayed by the captain and crew of the little _Lottery_. Captain Byron on this, as well as on many another occasion, showedhimself to be as humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain Southcomb, mortally wounded, was taken on board Byron's frigate, where he wastreated with the greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, andwhen he died his body was sent ashore with every mark of the respectdue to so brave an officer. Captain Stewart (of the _Constellation_)wrote Captain Byron a letter of acknowledgment for his great courtesyand kindness. [Footnote: The correspondence between the two captainsis given in full in "Niles' Register, " which also contains fragmentarynotes on the action, principally as to the loss incurred. ] On March 16th a British division of five boats and 105 men, commandedby Lieutenant James Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateerschooner _Dolphin_ of 12 guns and 70 men, and the letters-of-marque, _Racer_, _Arab_, and _Lynx_, each of six guns and 30 men. LieutenantPolkinghorne, after pulling 15 miles, found the four schooners allprepared to receive him, but in spite of his great inferiority inforce he dashed gallantly at them. The _Arab_ and _Lynx_ surrenderedat once; the _Racer_ was carried after a sharp struggle in whichLieutenant Polkinghorne was wounded, and her guns turned on the_Dolphin_. Most of the latter's crew jumped overboard; a few ralliedround their captain, but they were at once scattered as the Britishseamen came aboard. The assailants had 13, and the privateersmen 16men killed and wounded in the fight. It was certainly one of the mostbrilliant and daring cutting-out expeditions that took place duringthe war, and the victors well deserved their success. The privateersmen(according to the statement of the _Dolphin's_ master, in "Niles'Register") were panic-struck, and acted in any thing but a bravemanner. All irregular fighting-men do their work by fits and starts. No regular cruisers could behave better than did the privateers_Lottery_, _Chasseur_, and _General Armstrong_; none would behaveas badly as the _Dolphin_, _Lynx_, and _Arab_. The same thing appearson shore. Jackson's irregulars at New Orleans did as well, or almostas well, as Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's troops wouldnever have suffered from such a panic as overcame the militia atBladensburg. On April 9th the schooner _Norwich_, of 14 guns and 61 men, Sailing-master James Monk, captured the British privateer _Caledonia_, of 10 guns and 41 men, after a short action in which the privateerlost 7 men. On April 30th Commodore Rodgers, in the _President_. 44, accompaniedby Captain Smith in the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813. ] On May 2dhe fell in with and chased the British sloop _Curlew_, 18, CaptainMichael Head, but the latter escaped by knocking away the wedges ofher masts and using other means to increase her rate of sailing. Onthe 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N. , long. 60° W. , the _Congress_ partedcompany, and sailed off toward the southeast, making four prizes, of no great value, in the North Atlantic; [Footnote: Letter of CaptainSmith, Dec. 15, 1813. ] when about in long. 35 ° W. She steered south, passing to the south of the line. But she never saw a man-of-war, and during the latter part of her cruise not a sail of any kind;and after cruising nearly eight months returned to Portsmouth Harboron Dec. 14th, having captured but four merchant-men. Being unfit tocruise longer, owing to her decayed condition, she was disarmed andlaid up; nor was she sent to sea again during the war. [Footnote:James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the _Tenedos_, during part of 1814; but was too much awed by the fate of the_Chesapeake_ to come out during the "long blockade" of CaptainParker. Considering the fact that she was too decayed to put to sea, had no guns aboard, no crew, and was, in fact, laid up, the feat ofthe _Tenedos_ was not very wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded"her quite as well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the wayJames alters a fact by suppressing half of it. ] Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the eastern edge of the Grand Bankuntil he reached latitude 48°, without meeting any thing, then stoodto the southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. Thenhe crowded sail to the northeast after a Jamaica fleet of which hehad received news, but which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th, in lat. 46°, long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped his coursetoward the North Sea, still without any good luck befalling him. On June 27th he put into North Bergen in the Shetlands for water, and thence passed the Orkneys and stretched toward the North Cape, hoping to intercept the Archangel fleet. On July 19th, when off theNorth Cape, in lat. 71° 52' N. , long. 20° 18' E. , he fell in withtwo sail of the enemy, who made chase; after four days' pursuit thecommodore ran his opponents out of sight. According to his letterthe two sail were a line-of-battle ship and a frigate; accordingto James they were the 12-pounder frigate _Alexandria_, CaptainCathcart, and _Spitfire_, 16, Captain Ellis. James quotes from thelogs of the two British ships, and it would seem that he is correct, as it would not be possible for him to falsify the logs so utterly. In case he is true, it was certainly carrying caution to an excessivedegree for the commodore to retreat before getting some idea of whathis antagonists really were. His mistaking them for so much heavierships was a precisely similar error to that made by Sir George Collierand Lord Stuart at a later date about the _Cyane_ and _Levant_. Jameswishes to prove that each party perceived the force of the other, and draws a contrast (p. 312) between the "gallantry of one partyand pusillanimity of the other. " This is nonsense, and, as in similarcases, James overreaches himself by proving too much. If he had madean 18-pounder frigate like the _Congress_ flee from another 18-pounder, his narrative would be within the bounds of possibility and wouldneed serious examination. But the little 12-pounder _Alexandria_, and the ship-sloop with her 18-pound carronades, would not have stoodthe ghost of a chance in the contest. Any man who would have beenafraid of them would also have been afraid of the _Little Belt_, thesloop Rodgers captured before the war. As for Captains Cathcart andEllis, had they known the force of the _President_, and chased herwith a view of attacking her, their conduct would have only beenexplicable on the ground that they were afflicted with emotionalinsanity. The _President_ now steered southward and got into the mouth of theIrish Channel; on August 2d she shifted her berth and almost circledIreland; then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked south alongthe coast. On Sept. 23d, a little south of Nantucket, she decoyedunder her guns and captured the British schooner _Highflyer_, 6, Lieut. William Hutchinson, and 45 men; and went into Newport on the27th of the same month, having made some 12 prizes. On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the _United States_, which had sentashore six carronades, and now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied byCaptain Jones in the _Macedonian_, 38, and Captain Biddle in the_Wasp_, 20, left New York, passing through Hell Gate, as there wasa large blockading force off the Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point themain-mast of the _States_ was struck by lightning, which cut offthe broad pendant, shot down the hatchway into the doctor's cabin, put out his candle, ripped up the bed, and entering between the skinand ceiling of the ship tore off two or three sheets of copper nearthe waterline, and disappeared without leaving a trace! The_Macedonian_, which was close behind, hove all aback, in expectationof seeing the _States_ blown up. At the end of the sound Commodore Decatur anchored to watch for achance of getting out. Early on June 1st he started; but in a coupleof hours met the British Captain R. D. Oliver's squadron, consistingof a 74, a razee, and a frigate. These chased him back, and all histhree ships ran into New London. Here, in the mud of the Thames river, the two frigates remained blockaded till the close of the war; butthe little sloop slipped out later, to the enemy's cost. We left the _Chesapeake_, 38, being fitted out at Boston by CaptainJames Lawrence, late of the _Hornet_. Most of her crew, as alreadystated, their time being up, left, dissatisfied with the ship's illluck, and angry at not having received their due share of prize-money. It was very hard to get sailors, most of the men preferring to shipin some of the numerous privateers where the discipline was lessstrict and the chance of prize-money much greater. In consequenceof this an unusually large number of foreigners had to be taken, including about forty British and a number of Portuguese. The latterwere peculiarly troublesome; one of their number, a boatswain's mate, finally almost brought about a mutiny among the crew which was onlypacified by giving the men prize-checks. A few of the _Constitution's_old crew came aboard, and these, together with some of the men whohad been on the _Chesapeake_ during her former voyage, made an excellentnucleus. Such men needed very little training at either guns or sails;but the new hands were unpractised, and came on board so late thatthe last draft that arrived still had their hammocks and bags lyingin the boats stowed over the booms when the ship was captured. Theofficers were largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant, Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former cruise; the thirdand fourth lieutenants were not regularly commissioned as such, butwere only midshipmen acting for the first time in higher positions. Captain Lawrence himself was of course new to all, both officers andcrew. [Footnote: On the day on which he sailed to attack the _Shannon_, Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows: "LieutenantPaige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with the ship. At theurgent request of Acting-Lieutenant Pierce I have granted him, also, permission to go on shore; one inducement for my granting his requestwas his being at variance with every officer in his mess. " "Captains'Letters, " vol. 29, No. 1, in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neitherofficers nor men had shaken together. ] In other words, the _Chesapeake_possessed good material, but in an exceedingly unseasoned state. Meanwhile the British frigate _Shannon_, 38, Captain Philip BowesVere Broke, was cruising off the mouth of the harbor. To give someidea of the reason why she proved herself so much more formidablethan her British sister frigates it may be well to quote, slightlycondensing, from James: "There was another point in which the generality of British crews, as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient;that is, skill in the art of gunnery. While the American seamenwere constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except inparticular cases, scarcely did so once in a year; and some shipscould be named on board which not a shot had been fired in this wayfor upward of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the captain's. The instructions under which he was bound to act forbade him to use, during the first six months after the ship had received her armament, more shots per month than amounted to a third in number of theupper-deck guns; and, after these six months, only half the quantity. Many captains never put a shot in the guns till an enemy appeared;they employed the leisure time of the men in handling the sails andin decorating the ship. Captain Broke was not one of this kind. From the day on which he had joined her, the 14th of September, 1806, the _Shannon_ began to feel the effect of her captain's proficiencyas a gunner and zeal for the service. The laying of the ship'sordnance so that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal directionis justly deemed a most important operation, as upon it depends ina great measure the true aim and destructive effect of the shot;this was attended to by Captain Broke in person. By draughts fromother ships, and the usual means to which a British man-of-war isobliged to resort, the _Shannon_ got together a crew; and in thecourse of a year or two, by the paternal care and excellent regulationsof Captain Broke, the ship's company became as pleasant to commandas it was dangerous to meet. " The _Shannon's_ guns were all carefullysighted, and, moreover, "every day, for about an hour and a halfin the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the state of theweather, the men were exercised at training the guns, and for thesame time in the afternoon in the use of the broadsword, pike, musket, etc. Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both with great gunsand musketry; and Captain Broke, as an additional stimulus beyondthe emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man thatput a shot through the bull's eye. " He would frequently have a caskthrown overboard and suddenly order some one gun to be manned to sinkthe cask. In short, the _Shannon_ was very greatly superior, thanksto her careful training, to the average British frigate of her rate, while the _Chesapeake_, owing to her having a raw and inexperiencedcrew, was decidedly inferior to the average American frigate of thesame strength. In force the two frigates compared pretty equally, [Footnote: Takingeach commander's account for his own force. ] the American being thesuperior in just about the same proportion that the _Wasp_ was tothe _Frolic_, or, at a later date, the _Hornet_ to the _Penguin_. The _Chesapeake_ carried 50 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18'son the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 18, eighteen 32-pound carronades, and one 12-pound carronade (which wasnot used in the fight however). Her broadside, allowing for the shortweight of metal was 542 lbs. ; her complement, 379 men. The _Shannon_earned 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's on the gun-deck, andon the spar-deck four long 9's, one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades, and three 12-pound carronades (two of which were not used in thefight). Her broadside was 550 lbs. ; her crew consisted of 330 men, 30 of whom were raw hands. Early on the morning of June 1st, CaptainBroke sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American prisoner, a letterof challenge, which for courteousness, manliness, and candor is thevery model of what such an epistle should be. Before it reached Boston, however, Captain Lawrence had weighed anchor, to attack the _Shannon_, which frigate was in full sight in the offing. It has been often saidthat he engaged against his judgment, but this may be doubted. Hisexperience with the _Bonne Citoyenne_, _Espiègle_, and _Peacock_had not tended to give him a very high idea of the navy to which hewas opposed, and there is no doubt that he was confident of capturingthe _Shannon_. [Footnote: In his letter written just before sailing(already quoted on p. 177) he says: An English frigate is now insight from our deck. * * * I am in hopes to give a good account ofher before night. My account of the action is mainly taken fromJames' "Naval History" and Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke"(according to which the official letter of Captain Broke was tamperedwith); see also the letter of Lieut. George Budd, June 15, 1813;the report of the Court of Inquiry. Commodore Bainbridge presiding, and the Court-martial held on board frigate _United States_, April 15, 1814, Commodore Decatur presiding. ] It was most unfortunate that hedid not receive Broke's letter, as the latter in it expressed himselfwilling to meet Lawrence in any latitude and longitude he mightappoint; and there would thus have been some chance of the Americancrew having time enough to get into shape. At midday of June 1, 1813, the _Chesapeake_ weighed anchor, stoodout of Boston Harbor, and at 1 P. M. Rounded the Light-house. The_Shannon_ stood off under easy sail, and at 3. 40 _Shannon_ up andreefed top-sails. At 4 P. M. She again bore away with her foresailbrailed up, and her main top-sail braced flat and shivering, thatthe _Chesapeake_ might overtake her. An hour later, Boston Light-housebearing west distant about six leagues, she again hauled up, withher head to the southeast and lay to under top-sails, top-gallantsails, jib, and spanker. Meanwhile, as the breeze freshened the_Chesapeake_ took in her studding-sails, top-gallant sails, androyals, got her royal yards on deck, and came down very fast undertop-sails and jib. At 5. 30, to keep under command and be able towear if necessary, the _Shannon_ filled her main top-sail and kepta close luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5. 25 the_Chesapeake_ hauled up her foresail, and, with three ensigns flying, steered straight for the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter. Broke wasafraid that Lawrence would pass under the _Shannon's_ stern, rakeher, and engage her on the quarter; but either overlooking or waivingthis advantage, the American captain luffed up within 50 yards uponthe _Shannon's_ starboard quarter, and squared his main-yard. Onboard the _Shannon_ the captain of the 14th gun, William Mindham, had been ordered not to fire till it bore into the second main-deckport forward; at 5. 50 it was fired, and then the other guns in quicksuccession from aft forward, the _Chesapeake_ replying with herwhole broadside. At 5. 53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead, hauled up a little. The _Chesapeake's_ broadsides were doing greatdamage, but she herself was suffering even more than her foe; themen in the _Shannon's_ tops could hardly see the deck of theAmerican frigate through the cloud of splinters, hammocks, and otherwreck that was flying across it. Man after man was killed at thewheel; the fourth lieutenant, the master, and the boatswain wereslain; and at 5. 56, having had her jib sheet and foretop-sail tieshot away, and her spanker brails loosened so that the sail blewout, the _Chesapeake_ came up into the wind somewhat, so as to exposeher quarter to her antagonist's broadside, which beat in herstern-ports and swept the men from the after guns. One of the armchests on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade thrownfrom the _Shannon_. [Footnote: This explosion may have had more effectthan is commonly supposed in the capture of the _Chesapeake_. Commodore Bainbridge, writing from Charleston, Mass. , on June 2, 1813 (see "Captains' Letters, " vol. Xxix. No. 10), says: "Mr. Knox, the pilot on board, left the _Chesapeake_ at 5 P. M. * * * At 6 P. M. , Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, and at 12 minutes past sixboth ships were laying alongside one another as if in the act ofboarding; at that moment an explosion took place on board the_Chesapeake_, which spread a fire on her upper deck from the foremastto the mizzen-mast, as high as her tops, and enveloped both shipsin smoke for several minutes. After it cleared away they were seenseparate, with the British flag hoisted on board the _Chesapeake_over the American. " James denies that the explosion was caused bya hand-grenade, though he says there were some of these aboard the_Shannon_. It is a point of no interest. ] The _Chesapeake_ was nowseen to have stern-way on and to be paying slowly off; so the_Shannon_ put her helm a-starboard and shivered her mizzen top-sail, so as to keep off the wind and delay the boarding. But at that momenther jib stay was shot away, and her head-sails becoming becalmed, shewent off very slowly. In consequence, at 6 P. M. The two frigates fellaboard, the _Chesapeake's_ quarter pressing upon the _Shannon's_ sidejust forward the starboard main-chains, and the frigates were keptin this position by the fluke of the _Shannon's_ anchor catchingin the _Chesapeake's_ quarter port. The _Shannon's_ crew had suffered severely, but not the least panicor disorder existed among them. Broke ran forward, and seeing hisfoes flinching from the quarter-deck guns, he ordered the ships tobe lashed together, the great guns to cease firing, and the boardersto be called. The boatswain, who had fought in Rodney's action, setabout fastening the vessels together, which the grim veteran succeededin doing, though his right arm was literally hacked off by a blowfrom a cutlass. All was confusion and dismay on board the _Chesapeake_. Lieutenant Ludlow had been mortally wounded and carried below;Lawrence himself, while standing on the quarterdeck, fatally conspicuousby his full-dress uniform and commanding stature, was shot down, asthe vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law of the British marines. He felldying, and was carried below, exclaiming: "Don't give up the ship"--aphrase that has since become proverbial among his countrymen. Thethird lieutenant, Mr. W. S. Cox, came on deck, but, utterly demoralizedby the aspect of affairs, he basely ran below without staying torally the men, and was court-martialled afterward for so doing. At6. 02 Captain Broke stepped from the _Shannon's_ gangway rail on tothe muzzle of the _Chesapeake's_ aftermost carronade, and thence overthe bulwark on to her quarter-deck, followed by about 20 men. As theycame aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ foreign mercenaries and the raw nativesof the crew deserted their quarters; the Portuguese boatswain's materemoved the gratings of the berth-deck, and he ran below, followedby many of the crew, among them one of the midshipmen named Deforest. On the quarter-deck almost the only man that made any resistance wasthe chaplain, Mr. Livermore, who advanced, firing his pistol at Broke, and in return nearly had his arm hewed off by a stroke from the latter'sbroad Toledo blade. On the upper deck the only men who behaved wellwere the marines, but of their original number of 44 men, 14, includingLieutenant James Broom and Corporal Dixon, were dead, and 20, includingSergeants Twin and Harris, wounded, so that there were left but onecorporal and nine men, several of whom had been knocked down andbruised, though reported unwounded. There was thus hardly any resistance, Captain Broke stopping his men for a moment till they were joined bythe rest of the boarders under Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. The_Chesapeake's_ mizzen-topmen began firing at the boarders, mortallywounding a midshipman, Mr. Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt; butone of the _Shannon's_ long nines was pointed at the top and clearedit out, being assisted by the English main-topmen, under MidshipmanCoshnahan. At the same time the men in the _Chesapeake's_ main-topwere driven out of it by the fire of the _Shannon's_ foretopmen, under Midshipman Smith. Lieutenant George Budd, who was on themain-deck, now for the first time learned that the English had boarded, as the upper-deck men came crowding down, and at once called on hispeople to follow him; but the foreigners and novices held back, andonly a few of the veterans followed him up. As soon as he reachedthe spar-deck, Budd, followed by only a dozen men, attacked theBritish as they came along the gangways, repulsing them for a moment, and killing the British purser, Aldham, and captain's clerk, Dunn;but the handful of Americans were at once cut down or dispersed, Lieutenant Budd being wounded and knocked down the main hatchway. "The enemy, " writes Captain Broke, "fought desperately, but indisorder. " Lieutenant Ludlow, already mortally wounded, struggledup on deck followed by two or three men, but was at once disabledby a sabre cut. On the forecastle a few seamen and marines turnedto bay. Captain Broke was still leading his men with the samebrilliant personal courage he had all along shown. Attacking thefirst American, who was armed with a pike, he parried a blow fromit, and cut down the man; attacking another he was himself cut down, and only saved by the seaman Mindham, already mentioned, who slewhis assailant. One of the American marines, using his clubbed musket, killed an Englishman, and so stubborn was the resistance of the littlegroup that for a moment the assailants gave back, having lost severalkilled and wounded; but immediately afterward they closed in and slewtheir foes to the last man. The British fired a volley or two downthe hatchway, in response to a couple of shots fired up; all resistancewas at an end, and at 6. 05, just fifteen minutes after the first gunhad been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had come aboard, thecolors of the _Chesapeake_ were struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61were killed or mortally wounded, including her captain, her firstand fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of marines, the master (White), boatswain (Adams), and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and slightlywounded, including both her other lieutenants, five midshipmen, andthe chaplain; total, 148; the loss falling almost entirely upon theAmerican portion of the crew. [Illustration: Chesapeake vs. _Shannon_: an engraving published inLondon in or before 1815 from a painting done under the supervisionof the _Shannon's_ first lieutenant. (Courtesy Beverly R. RobinsonCollection, U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] Of the _Shannon's_ men, 33 were killed outright or died of theirwounds, including her first lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk, and one midshipman, and 50 wounded, including the captain himselfand the boatswain; total, 83. The _Chesapeake_ was taken into Halifax, where Captain Lawrence andLieutenant Ludlow were both buried with military honors. CaptainBroke was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieutenants Wallisand Falkiner were both made commanders. The British writers accuse some of the American crew of treachery;the Americans, in turn, accuse the British of revolting brutality. Of course in such a fight things are not managed with urbane courtesy, and, moreover, writers are prejudiced. Those who would like to hearone side are referred to James; if they wish to hear the other, tothe various letters from officers published in "Niles' Register, "especially vol. V, p. 142. [Illustration of _Chesapeake_ and _Shannon_ action from 5. 50 to 6. 04. ] "CHESAPEAKE" STRUCK BY "SHANNON" STRUCK BY 29 eighteen-pound shot, 12 eighteen-pound shot, 25 thirty-two-pound shot, 13 thirty-two pound shot, 2 nine-pound shot, 14 bar shot, 306 grape, 119 grape, ---------- ---------- 362-shot. 158 shot. Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower masts, especiallythe two mizzen-masts, were badly wounded. The Americans at thatperiod were fond of using bar shot, which were of very questionablebenefit, being useless against a ship's hull, though said to besometimes of great help in unrigging an antagonist from whom onewas desirous of escaping, as in the case of the _President_ and_Endymion_. It is thus seen that the _Shannon_ received from shot alone onlyabout half the damage the _Chesapeake_ did; the latter was thoroughlybeaten at the guns, in spite of what some American authors say tothe contrary. And her victory was not in the slightest degree to beattributed to, though it may have been slightly hastened by, accident. Training and discipline won the victory, as often before; only inthis instance the training and discipline were against us. It is interesting to notice that the _Chesapeake_ battered the_Shannon's_ hull far more than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_, or_Macedonian_ did the hulls of their opponents, and that she sufferedless in return (not in _loss_ but in _damage_) than they did. The_Chesapeake_ was a better fighter than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_, or _Macedonian_, and could have captured any one of them. The_Shannon_ of course did less damage than any of the American 44's, probably just about in the proportion of the difference in force. Almost all American writers have treated the capture of the_Chesapeake_ as if it was due simply to a succession of unfortunateaccidents; for example, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism, says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its short duration, are "altogether the results of the chances of war, " and that it wasmainly decided by "fortuitous events as unconnected with any particularmerit on the one side as they are with any particular demerit on theother. " [Footnote: The worth of such an explanation is very aptlygauged in General Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClellan'sCampaign of 1862" (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he speaks of "thoseunforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which are vaguely describedas the 'fortune of war, ' but which usually prove to be the superiorability or resources of the antagonist. "] Most naval men considerit a species of treason to regard the defeat as due to any thingbut extraordinary ill fortune. And yet no disinterested reader canhelp acknowledging that the true reason of the defeat was the verysimple one that the _Shannon_ fought better than the _Chesapeake_. It has often been said that up to the moment when the ships cametogether the loss and damage suffered by each were about the same. This is not true, and even if it was, would not affect the question. The heavy loss on board the _Shannon_ did not confuse or terrifythe thoroughly trained men with their implicit reliance on theirleaders; and the experienced officers were ready to defend any pointthat was menaced. An equal or greater amount of loss aboard the_Chesapeake_ disheartened and confused the raw crew, who simply hadnot had the time or chance to become well disciplined. Many of theold hands, of course, kept their wits and their pluck, but the novicesand the disaffected did not. Similarly with the officers; some, asthe Court of Inquiry found, had not kept to their posts, and allbeing new to each other and the ship, could not show to their best. There is no doubt that the _Chesapeake_ was beaten at the guns beforeshe was boarded. Had the ships not come together, the fight would havebeen longer, the loss greater, and more nearly equal; but the resultwould have been the same. Cooper says that the enemy entered withgreat caution, and so slowly that twenty resolute men could haverepulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Captain Broke and hisfew followers to leap on board, unsupported, and then they onlywaited for the main body to come up; and no twenty men could haverepulsed such boarders as followed Broke. The fight was anotherlesson, with the parties reversed, to the effect that want oftraining and discipline is a bad handicap. Had the _Chesapeake's_crew been in service as many months as the _Shannon's_ had been years, such a captain as Lawrence would have had his men perfectly in hand;they would not have been cowed by their losses, nor some of theofficers too demoralized to act properly, and the material advantageswhich the _Chesapeake_ possessed, although not very great, wouldprobably have been enough to give her a good chance of victory. Itis well worth noticing that the only thoroughly disciplined set ofmen aboard (all, according to James himself, by the way, nativeAmericans), namely, the marines, did excellently, as shown by thefact that three fourths of their number were among the killed andwounded. The foreigners aboard the _Chesapeake_ did not do as wellas the Americans, but it is nonsense to ascribe the defeat in anyway to them; it was only rendered rather more disastrous by theiractions. Most of the English authors give very fair accounts of thebattle, except that they hardly allude to the peculiar disadvantagesunder which the _Chesapeake_ suffered when she entered into it. Thus, James thinks the _Java_ was unprepared because she had only been tosea six weeks; but does not lay any weight on the fact that the_Chesapeake_ had been out only as many hours. Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that written by M. Dela Gravière. [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes, " ii, 272. ] "It isimpossible to avoid seeing in the capture of the _Chesapeake_ a newproof of the enormous power of a good organization, when it hasreceived the consecration of a few years' actual service on the sea. On this occasion, in effect, two captains equally renowned, the honorof two navies, were opposed to each other on two ships of the sametonnage and number of guns. Never had the chances seemed betterbalanced, but Sir Philip Broke had commanded the _Shannon_ for nearlyseven years, while Captain Lawrence had only commanded the _Chesapeake_for a few days. The first of these frigates had cruised for eighteenmonths on the coast of America; the second was leaving port. One hada crew long accustomed to habits of strict obedience; the other wasmanned by men who had just been engaged in mutiny. The Americans werewrong to accuse fortune on this occasion. Fortune was not fickle, she was merely logical. The _Shannon_ captured the _Chesapeake_ onthe first of June, 1813, but on the 14th of September, 1806, the daywhen he took command of his frigate, Captain Broke had begun toprepare the glorious termination to this bloody affair. " Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a man as Lawrence, a very Bayard of the seas, who was admired as much for his dauntlessbravery as he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it mustbe confessed that he acted rashly. And after he had sailed, it was, as Lord Howard Douglass has pointed out, a tactical error, howeverchivalric to neglect the chance of luffing across the _Shannon's_stern to rake her; exactly as it was a tactical error of his equallychivalrous antagonist to have let him have such an opportunity. Hullwould not have committed either error, and would, for the matter ofthat, have been an overmatch for either commander. But it must alwaysbe remembered that Lawrence's encounters with the English had notbeen such as to give him a high opinion of them. The only foe hehad fought had been inferior in strength, it is true, but had hardlymade any effective resistance. Another sloop, of equal, if notsuperior force, had tamely submitted to blockade for several days, and had absolutely refused to fight. And there can be no doubt thatthe _Chesapeake_, unprepared though she was, would have been anovermatch for the _Guerrière_, _Macedonian_, or _Java_. Altogetherit is hard to blame Lawrence for going out, and in every other respecthis actions never have been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friendor foe, without the warmest respect. But that is no reason forinsisting that he was ruined purely by an adverse fate. We will dofar better to recollect that as much can be learned from reversesas from victories. Instead of flattering ourselves by saying thedefeat was due to chance, let us try to find out what the real causewas, and then take care that it does not have an opportunity to actagain. A little less rashness would have saved Lawrence's life andhis frigate, while a little more audacity on one occasion would havemade Commodore Chauncy famous for ever. And whether a lesson is tobe learned or not, a historian should remember that his professionis not that of a panegyrist. The facts of the case unquestionablyare that Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the enemy'sharbor, proved conqueror over a nominally equal and in reality slightlysuperior force; and that this is the only single-ship action of thewar in which the victor was weaker in force than his opponent. Somuch can be gathered by reading only the American accounts. Moreoveraccident had little or nothing to do with the gaining of the victory. The explanation is perfectly easy; Lawrence and Broke were probablyexactly equal in almost every thing that goes to make up a first-classcommander, but one had trained his crew for seven years, and theother was new to the ship, to the officers, and to the men, and thelast to each other. The _Chesapeake's_ crew must have been of finematerial, or they would not have fought so well as they did. So much for the American accounts. On the other hand, the captureof the _Chesapeake_ was, and is, held by many British historiansto "conclusively prove" a good many different things; such as, thatif the odds were anything like equal, a British frigate could alwayswhip an American, that in a hand-to-hand conflict such would invariablybe the case, etc. ; and as this was the only single-ship action ofthe war in which the victor was the inferior in force, most Britishwriters insist that it reflected more honor on them than all thefrigate actions of 1812 put together did on the Americans. These assertions can be best appreciated by reference to a victorywon by the French in the year of the Battle of the Nile. On the 14thof December, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the French 24-guncorvette _Bayonnaise_ captured, by boarding, the English 32-gunfrigate _Ambuscade_. According to James the _Ambuscade_ threw ata broadside 262 pounds of shot, and was manned by 190 men, whilethe _Bayonnaise_ threw 150 pounds, and had on board supernumerariesand passenger soldiers enough to make in all 250 men. Accordingto the French historian Rouvier [Footnote: "Histoire des MarinsFrançais sous la République, " par Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant deVaisseau. Paris, 1868. ] the broadside force was 246 pounds against80 pounds; according to Troude [Footnote: "Batailles Navales. "] itwas 270 pounds against 112. M. Léon Guérin, in his voluminous butexceedingly prejudiced and one-sided work, [Footnote: "HistoireMaritime de France" (par Léon Guérin, Historien titulaire de laMarine, Membre de la Legion d'Honneur), vi. 142 (Paris, 1852). ] makesthe difference even greater. At any rate the English vessel wasvastly the superior in force, and was captured by boarding, aftera long and bloody conflict in which she lost 46, and her antagonistover 50, men. During all the wars waged with the Republic and theEmpire, no English vessel captured a French one as much superiorto itself as the _Ambuscade_ was to the _Bayonnaise_, precisely asin the war of 1812 no American vessel captured a British opponentas much superior to itself as the _Chesapeake_ was to the _Shannon_. Yet no sensible man can help acknowledging, in spite of these anda few other isolated instances, that at that time the French wereinferior to the English, and the latter to the Americans. It is amusing to compare the French histories of the English withthe English histories of the Americans, and to notice the similarityof the arguments they use to detract from their opponents' fame. Of course I do not allude to such writers as Lord Howard Douglassor Admiral de la Gravière, but to men like William James and LéonGuérin, or even O. Troude. James is always recounting how Americanships ran away from British ones, and Guérin tells as many anecdotesof British ships who fled from French foes. James reproaches theAmericans for adopting a "Parthian" mode of warfare, instead of"bringing to in a bold and becoming manner. " Precisely the samereproaches are used by the French writers, who assert that the Englishwould not fight "fairly, " but acquired an advantage by manoeuvring. James lays great stress on the American long guns; so does LieutenantRouvier on the British carronades. James always tells how theAmericans avoided the British ships, when the crews of the latterdemanded to be led aboard; Troude says the British always kept atlong shot, while the French sailors "demandérent, à grands cris, l'abordage. " James says the Americans "hesitated to grapple" withtheir foes "unless they possessed a twofold superiority"; Guérinthat the English "never dared attack" except when they possessed"une supériorité énorme. " The British sneer at the "mighty dollar";the French at the "eternal guinea. " The former consider Decatur'sname as "sunk" to the level of Porter's or Bainbridge's; the latterassert that the "presumptuous Nelson" was inferior to any of theFrench admirals of the time preceding the Republic. Says James:"The Americans only fight well when they have the superiority offorce on their side"; and Lieutenant Rouvier: "Never have theEnglish vanquished us with an undoubted inferiority of force. " On June 12, 1813, the small cutter _Surveyor_, of 6 12-poundcarronades, was lying in York River, in the Chesapeake, under thecommand of Mr. William S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men. [Footnote: Letter of W. S. Travis, June 16, 1813. ] At nightfallshe was attacked by the boats of the _Narcissus_ frigate, containingabout 50 men, under the command of Lieutenant John Creerie. [Footnote:James, vi. 334. ] None of the carronades could be used; but Mr. Travismade every preparation that he could for defence. The Americanswaited till the British were within pistol shot before they openedtheir fire; the latter dashed gallantly on, however, and at oncecarried the cutter. But though brief, the struggle was bloody;5 of the Americans were wounded, and of the British 3 were killedand 7 wounded. Lieutenant Creerie considered his opponents to haveshown so much bravery that he returned Mr. Travis his sword, witha letter as complimentary to him as it was creditable to the writer. [Footnote: The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows: "Your gallantand desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more than doubleyour number, on the night of the 12th instant, excited such admirationon the part of your opponents as I have seldom witnessed, and inducedme to return you the sword you had so nobly used, in testimony ofmine. Our poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly, if not solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent surprise. In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous arrangementaboard the _Surveyor_, or the determined manner in which her deckwas disputed inch by inch. I am, sir, " etc. ] As has been already mentioned, the Americans possessed a large forceof gun-boats at the beginning of the war. Some of these were fairlysea-worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop--or schooner-rigged, and armed with one or two long, heavy guns, and sometime with severallight carronades to repel boarders. [Footnote: According to a letterfrom Captain Hugh G. Campbell (in the Naval Archives, "Captains'Letters, " 1812, vol. Ii. Nos. 21 and 192), the crews were distributedas follows: ten men and a boy to a long 32. Seven men and a boy toa long 9. And five men and a boy to a carronade, exclusive of pettyofficers. Captain Campbell complains of the scarcity of men, andrather naively remarks that he is glad the marines have beenwithdrawn from the gun boats, as this may make the commanders ofthe latter keep a brighter lookout than formerly. ] Gun-boats of thiskind, together with the few small cutters owned by the government, were serviceable enough. They were employed all along the shoresof Georgia and the Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound, in protectingthe coasting trade by convoying parties of small vessels from oneport to another, and preventing them from being molested by theboats of any of the British frigates. They also acted as checksupon the latter in their descents upon the towns and plantations, occasionally capturing their boats and tenders, and forcing them tobe very cautious in their operations. They were very useful inkeeping privateers off the coast, and capturing them when theycame too far in. The exploits of those on the southern coast willbe mentioned as they occurred. Those in Long Island Sound nevercame into collision with the foe, except for a couple of slightskirmishes at very long range; but in convoying little fleets ofcoasters, and keeping at bay the man-of-war boats sent to molestthem, they were invaluable; and they also kept the Sound clear ofhostile privateers. Many of the gun-boats were much smaller than those just mentioned, trusting mainly to their sweeps for motive power, and each relyingfor offence on one long pivot gun, a 12- or 18-pounder. In theChesapeake there was a quite a large number of these small gallies, with a few of the larger kind, and here it was thought that byacting together in flotillas the gun-boats might in fine weatherdo considerable damage to the enemy's fleet by destroying detachedvessels, instead of confining themselves to the more humble tasksin which their brethren elsewhere were fairly successful. At thisperiod Denmark, having lost all her larger ships of war, was confiningherself purely to gun-brigs. These were stout little crafts, withheavy guns, which, acting together, and being handled with spiritand skill, had on several occasions in calm weather captured smallBritish sloops, and had twice so injured frigates as to make theirreturn to Great Britain necessary; while they themselves had frequentlybeen the object of successful cutting-out expeditions. Congresshoped that our gun-boats would do as well as the Danish; but fora variety of reasons they failed utterly in every serious attack thatthey made on a man-of-war, and were worse than useless for all butthe various subordinate employments above mentioned. The mainreason for this failure was in the gun-boats themselves. They wereutterly useless except in perfectly calm weather, for in any windthe heavy guns caused them to careen over so as to make it difficultto keep them right side up, and impossible to fire. Even in smoothwater they could not be fought at anchor, requiring to be kept inposition by means of sweeps; and they were very unstable, the recoilof the guns causing them to roll so as to make it difficult to aimwith any accuracy after the first discharge, while a single shothitting one put it _hors de combat_. This last event rarely happened, however, for they were not often handled with any approach totemerity, and, on the contrary, usually made their attacks at arange that rendered it as impossible to inflict as to receive harm. It does not seem as if they were very well managed; but they weresuch ill-conditioned craft that the best officers might be pardonedfor feeling uncomfortable in them. Their operations throughout thewar offer a painfully ludicrous commentary on Jefferson's remarkableproject of having our navy composed exclusively of such craft. The first aggressive attempt made with the gun-boats wascharacteristically futile. On June 20th 15 of them, under CaptainTarbell, attacked the _Junon_, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmedin Hampton Roads, with the _Barossa_, 36, and _Laurestinus_, 24, near her. The gun-boats, while still at very long range, anchored, and promptly drifted round so that they couldn't shoot. Then theygot under way, and began gradually to draw nearer to the _Junon_. Her defence was very feeble; after some hasty and ill-directedvollies she endeavored to beat out of the way. But meanwhile, aslight breeze having sprung up, the _Barossa_, Captain Sherriff, approached near enough to take a hand in the affair, and at oncemade it evident that she was a more dangerous foe than the _Junon_, though a lighter ship. As soon as they felt the effects of thebreeze the gun-boats became almost useless and, the _Barossa's_ firebeing animated and well aimed, they withdrew. They had sufferednothing from the _Junon_, but during the short period she was engaged, the _Barossa_ had crippled one boat and slightly damaged another;one man was killed and two wounded. The _Barossa_ escaped unscathedand the _Junon_ was but slightly injured. Of the combatants, the_Barossa_ was the only one that came off with credit, the _Junon_behaving, if any thing, rather worse than the gun-boats. There wasno longer any doubt as to the amount of reliance to be placed on thelatter. [Footnote: Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats, they acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bladensburg. The British Lieutenant Graig, himself a spectator, thus writes oftheir deeds on that occasion ("Campaign at Washington, " p. 119). "Of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in theterms which their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, andnot only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precisionwhich astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of themwere actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it tilltheir leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves desertedon all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field. " Certainlysuch men could not be accused of lack of courage. Something else isneeded to account for the failure of the gun-boat system. ] On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, one 64, four frigates, two sloops, and three transports was anchored off Craney Island. On the north-west side of this island was a battery of 18-pounders, to take charge of which Captain Cassin, commanding the naval forcesat Norfolk, sent ashore one hundred sailors of the _Constellation_, under the command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick, and Saunders, andfifty marines under Lieutenant Breckenbridge. [Footnote: Letter ofCaptain John Cassin, June 23, 1813. ] On the morning of the 22d theywere attacked by a division of 15 boats, containing 700 men, [Footnote: James, vi, 337. ] seamen, marines, chasseurs, and soldiersof the 102d regiment, the whole under the command of Captain Pechell, of the _San Domingo_, 74. Captain Hanchett led the attack in the_Diadem's_ launch. The battery's guns were not fired till the Britishwere close in, when they opened with destructive effect. While stillsome seventy yards from the guns the _Diadem's_ launch grounded, and the attack was checked. Three of the boats were now sunk by shot, but the water was so shallow that they remained above water; and whilethe fighting was still at its height, some of the _Constellation's_crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall, waded out and took possessionof them. [Footnote: "Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall, " by CharlesC. Jones, Jr. (Savannah, 1878), p. 17. ] A few of their crew threwaway their arms and came ashore with their captors; others escapedto the remaining boats, and immediately afterward the flotilla madeoff in disorder having lost 91 men. The three captured barges werelarge, strong boats, one called the Centipede being fifty feet long, and more formidable than many of the American gun-vessels. The_Constellation's_ men deserve great credit for their defence, butthe British certainly did not attack with their usual obstinacy. Whenthe foremost boats were sunk, the water was so shallow and the bottomso good that the Americans on shore, as just stated, at once wadedout to them; and if in the heat of the fight Tatnall and his seamencould get _out_ to the boats, the 700 British ought to have beenable to get _in_ to the battery, whose 150 defenders would then havestood no chance. [Footnote: James comments on this repulse as "adefeat as discreditable to those that caused it as honorable to thosethat suffered in it. " "Unlike most other nations, the Americans inparticular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this nature, always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather than on numbers. "These comments read particularly well when it is remembered thatthe assailants outnumbered the assailed in the proportion of 5 to 1. It is monotonous work to have to supplement a history by a runningcommentary on James' mistakes and inventions; but it is worth whileto prove once for all the utter unreliability of the author who isaccepted in Great Britain as the great authority about the war. Still, James is no worse than his compeers. In the American Coggeshall's"History of Privateers, " the misstatements are as gross and thesneers in as poor taste--the British, instead of the Americans, being the objects. ] On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels _Scorpion_ and _Asp_, thelatter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, got under way from out of theYeocomico Creek, [Footnote: Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July15, 1813. ] and at 10 A. M. Discovered in chase the British brig-sloops_Contest_, Captain James Rattray, and _Mohawk_, Captain Henry D. Byng. [Footnote: James, vi, 343. ] The _Scorpion_ beat up theChesapeake, but the dull-sailing _Asp_ had to reenter the creek;the two brigs anchored off the bar and hoisted out their boats, under the command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry; whereupon the _Asp_cut her cable and ran up the creek some distance. Here she wasattacked by three boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twentymen, with two light guns, beat off; but they were joined by twoothers, and the five carried the _Asp_, giving no quarter. Mr. Sigourney and 10 of his men were killed or wounded, while theBritish also suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (includingLieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving Americans reached the shore, rallied under Midshipman H. McClintock (second in command), and whenthe British retired after setting the _Asp_ on fire, at once boardedher, put out the flames, and got her in fighting order; but theywere not again molested. On July 29th, while the _Junon_, 38, Captain Sanders, and _Martin_, 18, Captain Senhouse, were in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded onthe outside of Crow's Shoal; the frigate anchored within supportingdistance, and while in this position the two ships were attacked bythe American flotilla in those waters, consisting of eight gun-boats, carrying each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier block-sloops, [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813. ] commanded byLieutenant Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a distance thatan hour's cannonading did no damage whatever to anybody; and duringthat time gun-boat No. 121, Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mileand a half away from her consorts. Seeing this the British made adash at her, in 7 boats, containing 140 men, led by Lieutenant PhilipWestphal. Mr. Shead anchored and made an obstinate defence, but atthe first discharge the gun's pintle gave way, and the next timeit was fired the gun-carriage was almost torn to pieces. He keptup a spirited fire of small arms, in reply to the boat-carronadesand musketry of the assailants; but the latter advanced steadilyand carried the gun-boat by boarding, 7 of her people being wounded, while 7 of the British were killed and 13 wounded. [Footnote: Letterof Mr. Shead. Aug. 5, 1813. ] The defence of No. 121 was very creditable, but otherwise the honor of the day was certainly with the British;whether because the gun-boats were themselves so worthless or becausethey were not handled boldly enough, they did no damage, even tothe grounded sloop, that would seem to have been at their mercy. [Footnote: The explanation possibly lies in the fact that thegun-boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is aletter from Mr. Angus ("Masters' Commandant Letters, " 1813, No. 3:see also No. 91), in which he says that the frigate's shot passedover them, while theirs could not even reach the sloop. He alsoencloses a copy of a paper, signed by the other gun-boat officers, which runs: "We, the officers of the vessels comprising the Delawareflotilla, protest against the powder as being unfit for service. "] On June 18th the American brig-sloop _Argus_, commanded by LieutenantWilliam Henry Allen, late first of the _United States_, sailed fromNew York for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that country, aboard, and reached L'Orient on July 11th, having made one prizeon the way. On July 14th she again sailed, and cruised in the chopsof the Channel, capturing and burning ship after ship, and creatingthe greatest consternation among the London merchants; she thencruised along Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, where thework of destruction went on. The labor was very severe and harassing, the men being able to get very little rest. [Footnote: Court ofInquiry into loss of _Argus_, 1815. ] On the night of August 13th, a brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured and burnt, andunluckily many of the crew succeeded in getting at some of thecargo. At 5 A. M. On the 14th a large brig-of-war was discoveredstanding down under a cloud of canvas. [Footnote: Letter of LieutenantWatson, March 2, 1815. ] This was the British brig-sloop _Pelican_, Captain John Fordyce Maples, which, from information received atCork three days previous, had been cruising especially after the_Argus_, and had at last found her; St. David's Head bore eastfive leagues (lat. 52° 15' N. And 5° 50' W. ) The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her lofty masts andlong spars, could easily have escaped from her heavier antagonist:but Captain Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could notget the weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran easily along on thestarboard tack, while the _Pelican_ came down on him with the wind(which was from the south) nearly aft. At 6 A. M. The _Argus_ woreand fired her port guns within grape distance, the _Pelican_ respondingwith her starboard battery, and the action began with great spiriton both sides. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Maples to AdmiralThornborough, Aug. 14, 1813. ] At 6. 04 a round shot carried off CaptainAllen's leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on deck tillhe fainted from loss of blood. Soon the British fire carried awaythe main-braces, main-spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the_Argus_; the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in the headby a grape-shot and carried below; the second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no relation of the captain), continued to fight the shipwith great skill. The _Pelican's_ fire continued very heavy, the_Argus_ losing her spritsail-yard and most of the standing riggingon the port side of the foremast. At 6. 14 Captain Maples bore upto pass astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed intothe wind and threw the main-top-sail aback, getting into a beautifulraking position [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Watson. ]; had themen at the guns done their duty as well as those on the quarter-deckdid theirs, the issue of the fight would have been very different;but, as it was, in spite of her favorable position, the rakingbroadside of the _Argus_ did little damage. Two or three minutesafterward the _Argus_ lost the use of her after-sails through havingher preventer-main-braces and top-sail tie shot away, and fell offbefore the wind, when the _Pelican_ at 6. 18 passed her stern, rakingher heavily, and then ranged up on her starboard quarter. In a fewminutes the wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every description wereshot away, and the _Argus_ became utterly unmanageable. The _Pelican_continued raking her with perfect impunity, and at 6. 35 passed herbroadside and took a position on her starboard bow, when at 6. 45the brigs fell together, and the British "were in the act of boardingwhen the _Argus_ struck her colors, " [Footnote: Letter of CaptainMaples. ] at 6. 45 A. M. The _Pelican_ carried, besides her regulararmament, two long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside weightof metal was thus: [Footnote: James, vi, 320. ] 1 X 61 X 61 X 128 X 32 or 280 lbs. Against the _Argus_': 1 X 129 X 24 or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent. For light weight of metal, 210lbs. The _Pelican's_ crew consisted of but 116 men, according tothe British account, though the American reports make it much larger. The _Argus_ had started from New York with 137 men, but having mannedand sent in several prizes, her crew amounted, as near as can beascertained, to 104. Mr. Low in his "Naval History, " published justafter the event, makes it but 99. James makes it 121; as he placedthe crew of the _Enterprise_ at 125, when it was really 102; thatof the _Hornet_ at 162, instead of 135; of the _Peacock_ at 185, instead of 166; of the _Nautilus_ at 106 instead of 95, etc. , etc. , it is safe to presume that he has overestimated it by at least 20, which brings the number pretty near to the American accounts. The_Pelican_ lost but two men killed and five wounded. Captain Mapleshad a narrow escape, a spent grape-shot striking him in the chestwith some force, and then falling on the deck. One shot had passedthrough the boatswain's and one through the carpenter's cabin; hersides were filled with grape-shot, and her rigging and sails muchinjured; her foremast, main-top-mast, and royal masts were slightlywounded, and two of her carronades dismounted. The injuries of the _Argus_ have already been detailed; her hulland lower masts were also tolerably well cut up. Of her crew, CaptainAllen, two midshipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed ormortally wounded; her first lieutenant and 13 seamen severely andslightly wounded: total, 10 killed and 14 wounded. In reckoning the comparative force, I include the Englishman'ssix-pound stern-chaser, which could not be fired in broadside withthe rest of the guns, because I include the _Argus_' 12-poundbow-chaser, which also could not be fired in broadside, as it wascrowded into the bridle-port. James, of course, carefully includesthe latter, though leaving out the former. [Illustration: _Argus_ vs. _Pelican_: an engraving published inLondon in 1817. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] COMPARISON. Comparative No. Weight Comparative Loss Tons. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss. Force. Inflicted. _Argus_ 298 10 210 104 24 . 82 . 29_Pelican_ 467 11 280 116 7 1. 00 1. 00 [Illustration of _ARGUS_ and _PELICAN_ action from 6. 00 A. M. To 6. 45] Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war this is the leastcreditable to the Americans. The odds in force, it is true, wereagainst the _Argus_, about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but thisis neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as 10 to3, nor for her surrendering when she had been so little ill used. It was not even as if her antagonist had been an unusually finevessel of her class. The _Pelican_ did not do as well as eitherthe _Frolic_ previously, or the _Reindeer_ afterward, though perhapsrather better than the _Avon_, _Penguin_, or _Peacock_. With acomparatively unmanageable antagonist, in smooth water, she oughtto have sunk her in three quarters of an hour. But the _Pelican's_not having done particularly well merely makes the conduct of theAmericans look worse; it is just the reverse of the _Chesapeake's_case, where, paying the highest credit to the British, we stillthought the fight no discredit to us. Here we can indulge no suchreflection. The officers did well, but the crew did not. Coopersays: "The enemy was so much heavier that it may be doubted whetherthe _Argus_ would have captured her antagonist under any ordinarycircumstances. " This I doubt; such a crew as the _Wasp's_ or _Hornet's_probably would have been successful. The trouble with the guns ofthe _Argus_ was not so much that they were too small, as that theydid not hit; and this seems all the more incomprehensible when itis remembered that Captain Allen is the very man to whom CommodoreDecatur, in his official letter, attributed the skilful gun-practiceof the crew of the frigate _United States_. Cooper says that thepowder was bad; and it has also been said that the men of the _Argus_were over-fatigued and were drunk, in which case they ought not tohave been brought into action. Besides unskilfulness, there isanother very serious count against the crew. Had the _Pelican_ beensome distance from the _Argus_, and in a position where she couldpour in her fire with perfect impunity to herself, when the surrendertook place, it would have been more justifiable. But, on the contrary, the vessels were touching, and the British boarded just as thecolors were hauled down; it was certainly very disgraceful that theAmericans did not rally to repel them, for they had still four fifthsof their number absolutely untouched. They certainly _ought_ to havesucceeded, for boarding is a difficult and dangerous experiment;and if they had repulsed their antagonists they might in turn havecarried the _Pelican_. So that, in summing up the merits of thisaction, it is fair to say that both sides showed skilful seamanshipand unskilful gunnery; that the British fought bravely and that theAmericans did not. It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, where a weakerAmerican sloop was taken by a stronger British one, with two or threeothers, where both the comparative force and the result were reversed. Comparing it, therefore, with the actions between the _Hornet_ and_Peacock_ (British), the _Wasp_ and _Avon_, and the _Peacock_(American) and _Epervier_, we get four actions, in one of which, thefirst-named, the British were victorious, and in the other three theAmericans. Comparative Comparative Loss Per cent. Force. Inflicted. Loss. _Pelican_ (British) 1. 00 1. 00 . 06_Argus_ (American) . 82 . 29 . 23 _Hornet_ (American) 1. 00 1. 00 . 02_Peacock_ (British) . 83 . 07 . 31 _Wasp_ (American) 1. 00 1. 00 . 02_Avon_ (British) . 80 . 07 . 33 _Peacock_ (American) 1. 00 1. 00 . 01_Epervier_ (British) . 81 . 08 . 20 It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the superiority of forceon the side of the victor was each time about the same. The _Argus_made a much more effectual resistance than did either the _Peacock_, _Avon_, or _Epervier_, while the _Pelican_ did her work in poorerform than either of the victorious American sloops; and, on the otherhand, the resistance of the _Argus_ did not by any means show as muchbravery as was shown in the defence of the _Peacock_ or _Avon_, although rather more than in the case of the _Epervier_. This is the only action of the war where it is almost impossibleto find out the cause of the inferiority of the beaten crew. Inalmost all other cases we find that one crew had been carefullydrilled, and so proved superior to a less-trained antagonist; butit is incredible that the man, to whose exertions when first lieutenantof the _States_ Commodore Decatur ascribes the skilfulness of thatship's men, should have neglected to train his own crew; and thishad the reputation of being composed of a fine set of men. Bad powderwould not account for the surrender of the _Argus_ when so littledamaged. It really seems as if the men _must_ have been drunk orover-fatigued, as has been so often asserted. Of course drunkennesswould account for the defeat, although not in the least altering itshumiliating character. "Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument; still it may be as wellto call to mind here two engagements in which British sloops sufferedmuch more discreditable defeats than the _Argus_ did. The figuresare taken from James; as given by the French historians they makeeven a worse showing for the British. A short time before our war the British brig _Carnation_, 18, hadbeen captured, by boarding, by the French brig _Palinure_, 16, andthe British brig _Alacrity_, 18, had been captured, also by boarding, by the corvette _Abeille_, 20. The following was the comparative force, etc. , of the combatants: Weight Metal. No. Crew. Loss. _Carnation_ 262 117 40_Palmure_ 174 100 20 _Alacrity_ 262 100 18_Abeille_ 260 130 19 In spite of the pride the British take in their hand-to-hand prowessboth of these ships were captured by boarding. The _Carnation_ wascaptured by a much smaller force, instead of by a much larger one, as in the case of the _Argus_; and if the _Argus_ gave up beforeshe had suffered greatly, the _Alacrity_ surrendered when she hadsuffered still less. French historians asserted that the capture ofthe two brigs proved that "French valor could conquer Britishcourage"; and a similar opinion was very complacently expressed byBritish historians after the defeat of the _Argus_. All that thethree combats really "proved" was, that in eight encounters betweenBritish and American sloops the Americans were defeated once, andin a far greater number of encounters between French and Britishsloops the British were defeated twice. No one pretends that eithernavy was invincible; the question is, which side averaged best? At the opening of the war we possessed several small brigs; thesehad originally been fast, handy little schooners, each armed with12 long sixes, and with a crew of 60 men. As such they were effectiveenough; but when afterward changed into brigs, each armed with acouple of extra guns, and given 40 additional men, they became tooslow to run, without becoming strong enough to fight. They carriedfar too many guns and men for their size, and not enough to givethem a chance with any respectable opponent; and they were almostall ignominiously captured. The single exception was the brig_Enterprise_. She managed to escape capture, owing chiefly to goodluck, and once fought a victorious engagement, thanks to the factthat the British possessed a class of vessels even worse than ourown. She was kept near the land and finally took up her station offthe eastern coast, where she did good service in chasing away orcapturing the various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick privateers, which were smaller and less formidable vessels than the privateersof the United States, and not calculated for fighting. By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and over-manning herself, the _Enterprise_, now under the command of Lieutenant WilliamBurrows, mounted 14 eighteen-pound carronades and 2 long 9's, with102 men. On September 5th, while standing along shore near PenguinPoint, a few miles to the eastward of Portland, Me. , she discovered, at anchor inside, a man-of-war brig [Footnote: Letter from LieutenantEdward R. McCall to Commodore Hull, September 5, 1813. ] which provedto be H. M. S. _Boxer_, Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carronades, eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with but 66 men aboard, 12 ofher crew being absent. [Footnote: James, "Naval Occurrences, " 264. The American accounts give the _Boxer_ 104 men, on very insufficientgrounds. Similarly, James gives the _Enterprise_ 123 men. Each sidewill be considered authority for its own force and loss. ] The _Boxer_at once hoisted three British ensigns and bore up for the _Enterprise_, then standing in on the starboard tack; but when the two brigs werestill 4 miles apart it fell calm. At midday a breeze sprang up fromthe southwest, giving the American the weather-gage, but the lattermanoeuvred for some time to windward to try the comparative ratesof sailing of the vessels. At 3 P. M. Lieutenant Burrows hoisted threeensigns, shortened sail, and edged away toward the enemy, who camegallantly on. Captain Blyth had nailed his colors to the mast, tellinghis men they should never be struck while he had life in his body. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle, " vol. Xxxii, p. 462. ] Both crews cheeredloudly as they neared each other, and at 3. 15, the two brigs beingon the starboard tack not a half pistol-shot apart, they opened fire, the American using the port, and the English the starboard, battery. Both broadsides were very destructive, each of the commanders fallingat the very beginning of the action. Captain Blyth was struck byan eighteen-pound shot while he was standing on the quarter-deck;it passed completely through his body, shattering his left arm andkilling him on the spot. The command, thereupon, devolved on LieutenantDavid McCreery. At almost the same time his equally gallant antagonistfell. Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his men, laid hold ofa gun-tackle fall to help the crew of a carronade run out the gun;in doing so he raised one leg against the bulwark, when a canistershot struck his thigh, glancing into his body and inflicting afearful wound. [Footnote: Cooper, "Naval History, " vol. Ii, p. 259. ]In spite of the pain he refused to be carried below, and lay on thedeck, crying out that the colors must never be struck. LieutenantEdward McCall now took command. At 3. 30 the _Enterprise_ rangedahead, rounded to on the starboard tack, and raked the _Boxer_ withthe starboard guns. At 3. 35 the _Boxer_ lost her main-top-mast andtop-sail yard, but her crew still kept up the fight bravely, withthe exception of four men who deserted their quarters and wereafterward court-martialed for cowardice. [Footnote: Minutes ofcourt-martial held aboard H. M. S. _Surprise_, January 8, 1814. ] The_Enterprise_ now set her fore-sail and took position on the enemy'sstarboard bow, delivering raking fires; and at 3. 45 the lattersurrendered, when entirely unmanageable and defenceless. LieutenantBurrows would not go below until he had received the sword of hisadversary, when he exclaimed, "I am satisfied, I die contented. " [Illustration of action between _ENTERPRISE_ and _BOXER_ from3. 15 to 3. 45] Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the _Boxer_, which hadbeen hulled repeatedly, had three eighteen-pound shot through herforemast, her top-gallant forecastle almost cut away, and severalof her guns dismounted. Three men were killed and seventeen wounded, four mortally. The _Enterprise_ had been hulled by one round andmany grape; one 18-pound ball had gone through her foremast, andanother through her main-mast, and she was much cut up aloft. Twoof her men were killed and ten wounded, two of them (her commanderand Midshipman Kervin Waters) mortally. The British court-martialattributed the defeat of the _Boxer_ "to a superiority in the enemy'sforce, principally in the number of men, as well as to a greaterdegree of skill in the direction of her fire, and to the destructiveeffects of the first broadside. " But the main element was thesuperiority in force, the difference in loss being very nearlyproportional to it; both sides fought with equal bravery and equalskill. This fact was appreciated by the victors, for at a naval dinnergiven in New York shortly afterward, one of the toasts offered was:"The crew of the _Boxer_; enemies by law, but by gallantry brothers. "The two commanders were both buried at Portland, with all the honorsof war. The conduct of Lieutenant Burrows needs no comment. He wasan officer greatly beloved and respected in the service. CaptainBlyth, on the other side, had not only shown himself on many occasionsto be a man of distinguished personal courage, but was equally notedfor his gentleness and humanity. He had been one of Captain Lawrence'spall-bearers, and but a month previous to his death had received apublic note of thanks from an American colonel, for an act of greatkindness and courtesy. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle, " xxxii, 466. ] The _Enterprise_, under Lieut. -Com. Renshaw, now cruised off thesouthern coast, where she made several captures. One of them wasa heavy British privateer, the _Mars_, of 14 long nines and 75 men, which struck after receiving a broadside that killed and wounded 4of her crew. The _Enterprise_ was chased by frigates on severaloccasions; being once forced to throw overboard all her guns buttwo, and escaping only by a shift in the wind. Afterward, as shewas unfit to cruise, she was made a guard-ship at Charlestown; forthe same reason the _Boxer_ was not purchased into the service. On October 4th some volunteers from the Newport flotilla captured, by boarding, the British privateer _Dart_, [Footnote: Letter ofMr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1813. ] after a short struggle inwhich two of the assailants were wounded and several of theprivateersmen, including the first officer, were killed. On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in command of the_President_, sailed again from Providence, Rhode Island. On the25th, in lat. 19° N. And long. 35° W. , the _President_, during thenight, fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the head-mostfired at her, when she made off. These were thought to be British, but were in reality the two French 40-gun frigates _Nymphe_ and_Meduse_, one month out of Brest. After this little encounter Rodgersheaded toward the Barbadoes, and cruised to windward of them. On the whole the ocean warfare of 1813 was decidedly in favor ofthe British, except during the first few months. The _Hornet's_fight with the _Peacock_ was an action similar to those that tookplace in 1812, and the cruise of Porter was unique in our annals, both for the audacity with which it was planned, and the successwith which it was executed. Even later in the year the _Argus_ andthe _President_ made bold cruises in sight of the British coasts, the former working great havoc among the merchant-men. But by thattime the tide had turned strongly in favor of our enemies. From thebeginning of summer the blockade was kept up so strictly that itwas with difficulty any of our vessels broke through it; they wereeither chased back or captured. In the three actions that occurred, the British showed themselves markedly superior in two, and in thethird the combatants fought equally well, the result being fairlydecided by the fuller crew and slightly heavier metal of the_Enterprise_. The gun-boats, to which many had looked for harbordefence, proved nearly useless, and were beaten off with easewhenever they made an attack. The lessons taught by all this were the usual ones. Lawrence'svictory in the _Hornet_ showed the superiority of a properly trainedcrew to one that had not been properly trained; and his defeat inthe _Chesapeake_ pointed exactly the same way, demonstrating inaddition the folly of taking a raw levy out of port, and, beforethey have had the slightest chance of getting seasoned, pitting themagainst skilled veterans. The victory of the _Enterprise_ showedthe wisdom of having the odds in men and metal in our favor, whenour antagonist was otherwise our equal; it proved, what hardlyneeded proving, that, whenever possible, a ship should be soconstructed as to be superior in force to the foes it would be likelyto meet. As far as the capture of the _Argus_ showed any thing, itwas the advantage of heavy metal and the absolute need that a crewshould fight with pluck. The failure of the gun-boats _ought_ tohave taught the lesson (though it did not) that too great economyin providing the means of defence may prove very expensive in theend, and that good officers and men are powerless when embarkedin worthless vessels. A similar point was emphasized by the strictnessof the blockade, and the great inconvenience it caused; namely, that we ought to have had ships powerful enough to break it. We had certainly lost ground during this year; fortunately weregained it during the next two. BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN. Name. Guns. Tonnage. _Peacock_ 20 477_Boxer_ 14 181_Highflyer_ 6 96 ___ ____ 40 754 AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN. Name. Guns. Tonnage. _Chesapeake_ 50 1, 265_Argus_ 20 298_Viper_ 10 148 ___ _____ 80 1, 711 VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED. Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage. Where Built. Cost. _Rattlesnake_ Brig 14 278 Medford, Pa. $18, 000_Alligator_ Schooner 4 80_Asp_ Sloop 3 56 2, 600 PRIZES MADE. Name of Ship. No. Of Prizes. _President_ 13_Congress_ 4_Chesapeake_ 6_Essex_ 14_Hornet_ 3_Argus_ 21Small craft 18 ___ 79 Chapter VI 1813 ON THE LAKES _ONTARIO--Comparison of the rival squadrons---Chauncy takes Yorkand Fort George--Yeo is repulsed at Sackett's Harbor, but keepscommand of the lake--Chauncy sails--Yeo's partial victory offNiagara---Indecisive action off the Genesee--Chauncy's partialvictory off Burlington, which gives him the command of thelake--ERIE--Perry's success in creating a fleet--Hisvictory--CHAMPLAIN--Loss of the Growler and Eagle--Summary. _ ONTARIO. Winter had almost completely stopped preparations on the Americanside. Bad weather put an end to all communication with Albany orNew York, and so prevented the transit of stores, implements, etc. It was worse still with the men, for the cold and exposure so thinnedthem out that the new arrivals could at first barely keep the ranksfilled. It was, moreover, exceedingly difficult to get seamen tocome from the coast to serve on the lakes, where work was hard, sickness prevailed, and there was no chance of prize-money. TheBritish government had the great advantage of being able to moveits sailors where it pleased, while in the American service, atthat period, the men enlisted for particular ships, and the onlyway to get them for the lakes at all was by inducing portions ofcrews to volunteer to follow their officers thither. [Footnote:Cooper, ii, 357. One of James' most comical misstatements is thaton the lakes the American sailors were all "picked men. " On p. 367, for example, in speaking of the battle of Lake Erie he says:"Commodore Perry had picked crews to all his vessels. " As a matterof fact Perry had once sent in his resignation solely on account ofthe very poor quality of his crews, and had with difficulty beeninduced to withdraw it. Perry's crews were of hardly averageexcellence, but then the average American sailor was a very goodspecimen. ] However, the work went on in spite of interruptions. Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely owing to the energyand capacity of the head builder, Mr. Henry Eckford (who did asmuch as any naval officer in giving us an effective force on Ontario), the _Madison_ was equipped, a small despatch sloop, The _Lady of theLake_ prepared, and a large new ship, the _General Pike_, 28, begun, to mount 13 guns in each broadside and 2 on pivots. Meanwhile Sir George Prevost, the British commander in Canada, hadordered two 24-gun ships to be built, and they were begun; but hecommitted the mistake of having one laid down in Kingston and theother in York, at the opposite end of the lake. Earle, the Canadiancommodore, having proved himself so incompetent, was removed; andin the beginning of May Captain Sir James Lucas Yeo arrived, to actas commander-in-chief of the naval forces, together with four captains, eight lieutenants, twenty-four midshipmen, and about 450 pickedseamen, sent out by the home government especially for service onthe Canada lakes. [Footnote: James, vi, 353. ] The comparative force of the two fleets or squadrons it is hard toestimate. I have already spoken of the difficulty in finding outwhat guns were mounted on any given ship at a particular time, andit is even more perplexing with the crews. A schooner would makeone cruise with but thirty hands; on the next it would appear withfifty, a number of militia having volunteered as marines. Findingthe militia rather a nuisance, they would be sent ashore, and onher third cruise the schooner would substitute half a dozen frontierseamen in their place. It was the same with the larger vessels. The_Madison_ might at one time have her full complement of 200 men;a month's sickness would ensue, and she would sail with but 150effectives. The _Pike's_ crew of 300 men at one time would shortlyafterward be less by a third in consequence of a draft of sailorsbeing sent to the upper lakes. So it is almost impossible to beperfectly accurate; but, making a comparison of the various authoritiesfrom Lieutenant Emmons to James, the following tables of the forcesmay be given as very nearly correct. In broadside force I countevery pivot gun, and half of those that were not on pivots. CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON. BroadsideName. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal; lbs Armament _Pike_, Ship 875 300 360 28 long 24's_Madison_, " 593 200 364 24 short 32's_Oneida_, brig 243 100 172 16 " 24's -+- 1 long 32_Hamilton_, schooner 112 50 80 | 1 " 24 - 8 " 6's -+- 1 " 32_Scourge_, " 110 50 80 - 8 short 12's -+- 1 long 32_Conquest_, " 82 40 56 | 1 " 12 - 4 " 6's -+- 1 " 32_Tompkins_, " 96 40 62 | 1 " 12 - 6 " 6's -+- 1 " 32_Julia_, " 82 35 44 - 1 " 12 -+- 1 " 32_Growler_, " 81 35 44 - 1 " 12 -+- 1 long 32_Ontario_, schooner 53 35 44 - 1 " 12 _Fair -+- 1 " 24 American_, " 53 30 36 - 1 " 12_Pert_, " 50 25 24 1 " 24_Asp_, " 57 25 24 1 " 24_Lady of the Lake_, " 89 15 9 1 " 9_________________________________________________________________ 14 2, 576 980 1, 399 112 This is not materially different from James' account (p. 356), whichgives Chauncy 114 guns, 1, 193 men, and 2, 121 tons. The _Lady of theLake_, however, was never intended for anything but a despatch boat, and the _Scourge_ and _Hamilton_ were both lost before Chauncyactually came into collision with Yeo. Deducting these, in orderto compare the two foes, Chauncy had left 11 vessels of 2, 265 tons, with 865 men and 92 guns throwing a broadside of 1, 230 pounds. YEO'S SQUADRON. BroadsideName. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal; lbs. Armament. _Wolfe_, ship 637 220 392 -+- 1 long 24 | 8 " 18's | 4 short 68's '- 10 " 32's_Royal " 510 200 360 -+- 3 long 18's George_, | 2 short 68's '- 16 " 32's_Melville_, brig 279 100 210 -+- 2 long 18's '- 12 short 32 s_Moira_, " 262 100 153 -+- 2 long 9's '- 12 short 24's_Sydney schooner 216 80 172 -+- 2 long 12's Smith_, '- 10 short 32's_Beresford_, " 187 70 87 -+- 1 long 24 | 1 " 9 '- 6 short 18's___________ _____ _____ _____ _________________ 6 2, 091 770 1, 374 92 This differs but slightly from James, who gives Yeo 92 guns throwinga broadside of 1, 374 pounds, but only 717 men. As the evidence inthe court-martial held on Captain Barclay, and the official accounts(on both sides) of Macdonough's victory, convict him of very muchunderrating the force in men of the British on Erie and Champlain, it can be safely assumed that he has underestimated the force inmen on Lake Ontario. By comparing the tonnage he gives to Barclay'sand Downie's squadrons with what it really was, we can correct hisaccount of Yeo's tonnage. The above figures would apparently make the two squadrons aboutequal, Chauncy having 95 men more, and throwing at a broadside 144pounds shot less than his antagonist. But the figures do not by anymeans show all the truth. The Americans greatly excelled in the numberand calibre of their long guns. Compared thus, they threw at onedischarge 694 pounds of long-gun metal and 536 pounds of carronademetal; while the British only threw from their long guns 180 pounds, and from their carronades 1, 194. This unequal distribution of metalwas very much in favor of the Americans. Nor was this all. The_Pike_, with her 15 long 24's in battery was an overmatch for anyone of the enemy's vessels, and bore the same relation to them thatthe _Confiance_, at a later date, did to Macdonough's squadron. Sheshould certainly have been a match for the _Wolfe_ and _Melville_together, and the _Madison_ and _Oneida_ for the _Royal George_ and_Sydney Smith_. In fact, the three heavy American vessels ought tohave been an overmatch for the four heaviest of the British squadron, although these possessed the nominal superiority. And in ordinarycases the eight remaining American gun-vessels would certainly seemto be an overmatch for the two British schooners, but it is justhere that the difficulty of comparing the forces comes in. When thewater was very smooth and the wind light, the long 32's and 24's ofthe Americans could play havoc with the British schooners, at adistance which would render the carronades of the latter useless. But the latter were built for war, possessed quarters and were goodcruisers, while Chauncy's schooners were merchant vessels, withoutquarters, crank, and so loaded down with heavy metal that wheneverit blew at all hard they could with difficulty be kept from upsetting, and ceased to be capable even of defending themselves. When Sir JamesYeo captured two of them he would not let them cruise with his othervessels at all, but sent them back to act as gun-boats, in whichcapacity they were serving when recaptured; this is a tolerable testof their value compared to their opponents. Another disadvantagethat Chauncy had to contend with, was the difference in the speedof the various vessels. The _Pike_ and _Madison_ were fast, weatherlyships; but the _Oneida_ was a perfect slug, even going free, andcould hardly be persuaded to beat to windward at all. In this respectYeo was much better off; his six ships were regular men-of-war, withquarters, all of them seaworthy, and fast enough to be able to actwith uniformity and not needing to pay much regard to the weather. His force could act as a unit; but Chauncy's could not. Enough windto make a good working breeze for his larger vessels put all hissmaller ones _hors de combat_: and in weather that suited the latter, the former could not move about at all. When speed became necessarythe two ships left the brig hopelessly behind, and either had to dowithout her, or else perhaps let the critical moment slip by whilewaiting for her to come up. Some of the schooners sailed quite asslowly; and finally it was found out that the only way to get allthe vessels into action at once was to have one half the fleet towthe other half. It was certainly difficult to keep the command ofthe lake when, if it came on to blow, the commodore had to put intoport under penalty of seeing a quarter of his fleet founder beforehis eyes. These conflicting considerations render it hard to passjudgment; but on the whole it would seem as if Chauncy was thesuperior in force, for even if his schooners were not counted, histhree square-rigged vessels were at least a match for the foursquare-rigged British vessels, and the two British schooners wouldnot have counted very much in such a conflict. In calm weather hewas certainly the superior. This only solves one of the points inwhich the official letters of the two commanders differ: after everymeeting each one insists that he was inferior in force, that theweather suited his antagonist, and that the latter ran away, andgot the worst of it; all of which will be considered further on. In order to settle toward which side the balance of success inclined, we must remember that there were two things the combatants were tryingto do viz. : (1) To damage the enemy directly by capturing or destroying his vessels. This was the only object we had in view in sending out ocean cruisers, but on the lakes it was subordinated to:-- (2) Getting the control of the lake, by which invaluable assistancecould be rendered to the army. The most thorough way of accomplishingthis, of course, was by destroying the enemy's squadron; but it couldalso be done by building ships too powerful for him to face, or bybeating him in some engagement which, although not destroying hisfleet, would force him to go into port. If one side was stronger, then the weaker party by skillful manoeuvring might baffle the foe, and rest satisfied by keeping the sovereignty of the lake disputed;for, as long as one squadron was not undisputed master it could notbe of much assistance in transporting troops attacking forts, orotherwise helping the military. In 1813 the Americans gained the first point by being the first tobegin operations. They were building a new ship, afterward the _Pike_, at Sackett's Harbor; the British were building two new ships, eachabout two thirds the force of the _Pike_, one at Toronto (then calledYork), one at Kingston. Before these were built the two fleets werejust on a par; the destruction of the _Pike_ would give the Britishthe supremacy; the destruction of either of the British ships, providedthe _Pike_ were saved, would give the Americans the supremacy. Bothsides had already committed faults. The Americans had left Sackett'sHarbor so poorly defended and garrisoned that it invited attack, while the British had fortified Kingston very strongly, but had donelittle for York, and, moreover, ought not to have divided their forcesby building ships in different places. Commodore Chauncy's squadron was ready for service on April 19th, and on the 25th he made sail with the _Madison_, Lieutenant-CommanderElliott, floating his own broad pennant, _Oneida_, Lieutenant Woolsey, _Hamilton_, Lieutenant McPherson, _Scourge_, Mr. Osgood, _Tompkins_, Lieutenant Brown, _Conquest_, Lieutenant Pettigrew, _Growler_, Mr. Mix, _Julia_, Mr. Trant, _Asp_, Lieutenant Smith, _Pert_, Lieutenant Adams, _American_, Lieutenant Chauncy, _Ontario_, Mr. Stevens, _Lady of theLake_, Mr. Hinn, and _Raven_, transport, having on board GeneralDearborn and 1700 troops, to attack York, which was garrisoned byabout 700 British regulars and Canadian militia under Major-GeneralSheafe. The new 24-gun ship was almost completed, and the _Gloucester_10-gun brig was in port; the guns of both vessels were used in defenceof the port. The fleet arrived before York early on April 27th, andthe debarkation began at about 8 A. M. The schooners beat up to thefort under a heavy cannonade, and opened a spirited fire from theirlong guns; while the troops went ashore under the command ofBrigadier-General Pike. The boats were blown to leeward by the strongeast wind, and were exposed to a galling fire, but landed the troopsunder cover of the grape thrown by the vessels. The schooners nowbeat up to within a quarter of a mile from the principal work, andopened heavily upon it, while at the same time General Pike and themain body of the troops on shore moved forward to the assault, usingtheir bayonets only. The British regulars and Canadian militia, outnumbered three to one (including the American sailors) and withno very good defensive works, of course had to give way, having lostheavily, especially from the fire of the vessels. An explosionimmediately afterward killed or wounded 250 of the victors, includingGeneral Pike. The Americans lost, on board the fleet, 4 killed, including midshipmen Haifield and Thompson, and 8 wounded; [Footnote:Letter of Commodore Chauncy, April 28, 1813. ] and of the army, [Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences" (London, 1818), vol. I, p. 151. ] 14 killed and 32 wounded by the enemy's fire, and 52 killedand 180 wounded by the explosion: total loss, 288. The Britishregulars lost 130 killed and wounded, including 40 by the explosion;[Footnote: Lossing's "Field-Book of the War of 1812, " p. 581. Theaccounts vary somewhat. ] together with 50 Canadians and Indians, making a total of 180, besides 290 prisoners. The 24-gun ship wasburned, her guns taken away, and the _Gloucester_ sailed back toSackett's Harbor with the fleet. Many military and naval stores weredestroyed, and much more shipped to the Harbor. The great fault thatthe British had committed was in letting the defences of so importanta place remain so poor, and the force in it so small. It was impossibleto resist very long when Pike's troops were landed, and the fleetin position. On the other hand, the Americans did the work in goodstyle; the schooners were finely handled, firing with great precisionand completely covering the troops, who, in turn, were disembarkedand brought into action very handsomely. After being detained in York a week by bad weather the squadron gotout, and for the next fortnight was employed in conveying troopsand stores to General Dearborn. Then it was determined to make anattack on Fort George, where the British General Vincent was stationedwith from 1, 000 [Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences, " i, p. 151. ]to 1, 800 [Footnote: Lossing, 596. ] regulars, 600 militia, and about100 Indians. The American troops numbered about 4, 500, practicallyunder the command of Colonel Scott. On May 26th Commodore Chauncycarefully reconnoitred the place to be attacked, and in the nightmade soundings along the coast, and laid buoys so as to direct thesmall vessels, who were to do the fighting. At 3 A. M. On the 27ththe signal was made to weigh, the heavy land artillery being on the_Madison_, and the other troops on the _Oneida_, the _Lady of theLake_, and in batteaux, many of which had been captured at York. The _Julia_, _Growler_, and _Ontario_ moved in and attacked a batterynear the light-house, opening a cross-fire which silenced it. Thetroops were to be disembarked farther along the lake, near a batteryof one long 24, managed by Canadian militia. The _Conquest_ and_Tompkins_ swept in under fire to this battery, and in 10 minuteskilled or drove off the artillerymen, who left the gun spiked, andthen opened on the British. "The American ships with their heavydischarges of round and grape too well succeeded in thinning theBritish ranks. " [Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences, " i, p. 151. ]Meanwhile the troop-boats, under Captain Perry and Colonel Scottdashed in, completely covered by a heavy fire of grape directedpoint-blank at the foe by the _Hamilton_, _Scourge_, and _Asp_. "The fire from the American shipping committed dreadful havoc amongthe British, and rendered their efforts to oppose the landing ofthe enemy ineffectual. " [Footnote: _Loc. Cit_] Colonel Scott's troops, thus protected, made good their landing and met the British regulars;but the latter were so terribly cut up by the tremendous dischargesof grape and canister from the schooners, that in spite of theirgallantry and discipline they were obliged to retreat, blowing upand abandoning the fort. One sailor was killed and two wounded[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Chauncy, May 29, 1813. ]; seventeensoldiers were killed and forty-five wounded [Footnote: Letter ofGeneral Dearborn, May 27, 1813. ]; making the total American losssixty-five. Of the British regulars 52 were killed, 44 wounded, and262 "wounded and missing, " [Footnote: Letter of Brig. -Gen. Vincent, May 28, 1813. ] in addition to about forty Canadians and Indians_hors de combat_ and nearly 500 militia captured; so that in thisvery brilliant affair the assailants suffered hardly more than afifth of the loss in killed and wounded that the assailed did;which must be attributed to the care with which Chauncy hadreconnoitred the ground and prepared the attack, the excellenthandling of the schooners, and the exceedingly destructive natureof their fire. The British batteries were very weak, and, moreover, badly served. Their regular troops fought excellently; it wasimpossible for them to stand against the fire of the schooners, which should have been engaged by the batteries on shore; and theywere too weak in numbers to permit the American army to land andthen attack it when away from the boats. The Americans were greatlysuperior in force, and yet deserve very much credit for achievingtheir object so quickly, with such slight loss to themselves, andat such a heavy cost to the foe. The effect of the victory was mostimportant, the British evacuating the whole Niagara frontier, andleaving the river in complete possession of the Americans for thetime being. This offered the opportunity for despatching CaptainPerry up above the falls to take out one captured brig (the_Caledonia_) and four purchased schooners, which had been lying inthe river unable to get past the British batteries into Lake Erie. These five vessels were now carried into that lake, being trackedup against the current by oxen, to become a most important additionto the American force upon it. While Chauncy's squadron was thus absent at the west end of the lakethe _Wolfe_, 24, was launched and equipped at Kingston, making theBritish force on the lake superior to that of the Americans. Immediately Sir George Prevost, and Sir James Lucas Yeo, thecommanders-in-chief of the land and water forces in the Canadas, decided to strike a blow at Sackett's Harbor and destroy the _GeneralPike_, 28, thus securing to themselves the superiority for the restof the season. Accordingly they embarked on May 27th, in the _Wolfe_, _Royal George_, _Moira_, _Prince Regent_, _Simco_, and _Seneca_, with a large number of gun-boats, barges, and batteaux; and on thenext day saw and attacked a brigade of 19 boats transporting troopsto Sackett's Harbor, under command of Lieutenant Aspinwall. Twelveboats were driven ashore, and 70 of the men in them captured; butLieutenant Aspinwall and 100 men succeeded in reaching the Harbor, bringing up the total number of regulars there to 500 men, GeneralBrown having been summoned to take the chief command. About 400militia also came in, but were of no earthly service. There were, however, 200 Albany volunteers, under Colonel Mills, who could berelied on. The defences were miserably inadequate, consistingof a battery of one long gun and a block-house. On the 29th Sir George Prevost and 800 regulars landed, being coveredby the gun-boats under Sir James Lucas Yeo. The American militiafled at once, but the regulars and volunteers held their ground inand around the block-house. "At this point the further energies ofthe [British] troops became unavailing. The [American] block-houseand stockade could not be carried by assault nor reduced byfield-pieces, had we been provided with them; the fire of thegun-boats proved insufficient to attain that end; light and adversewinds continued, and our larger vessels were still far off. "[Footnote: Letter of Adj. -Gen. Baynes, May 30. 1813. ] The Britishreëmbarked precipitately. The American loss amounted to 23 killedand 114 wounded; that of the British to 52 killed and 211 wounded, [Footnote: James, "Military Occurrences, " p. 173. ] most of thelatter being taken prisoners. During the fight some of the frightenedAmericans set fire to the store-houses, the _Pike_ and the _Gloucester_;the former were consumed, but the flames were extinguished beforethey did any damage to either of the vessels. This attack differedespecially from those on Fort George and York, in that the attackingforce was relatively much weaker; still it ought to have beensuccessful. But Sir George could not compare as a leader with Col. Scott or Gen. Pike; and Sir James did not handle the gun-boats byany means as well as the Americans did their schooners in similarattacks. The admirers of Sir James lay the blame on Sir George, and_vice versa_; but in reality neither seems to have done particularlywell. At any rate the affair was the reverse of creditable to the British. The British squadron returned to Kingston, and Chauncy, having heardthat they were out, came down the lake and went into port about June2d. So far the Americans had had all the success, and had controlledthe lake; but now Yeo's force was too formidable to be encountereduntil the _Pike_ was built, and the supremacy passed undisputed intohis hands, while Chauncy lay in Sackett's Harbor. Of course with the_Pike_ soon to be built, Yeo's uncontested superiority could be ofbut short duration; but he used his time most actively. He sailedfrom Kingston on the 3d of June, to coöperate with the British armyat the head of the lake, and intercept all supplies going to theAmericans. On the 8th he discovered a small camp of the latter nearForty Mile Creek, and attacked it with the _Beresford_, _SydneySmith_, and gun-boats, obliging the Americans to leave their camp, while their equipages, provisions, stores, and batteaux fell intothe hands of the British, whose troops occupied the post, thusassisting in the series of engagements which ended in the humiliatingrepulse of General Wilkinson's expedition into Canada. On the 13thtwo schooners and some boats bringing supplies to the Americans werecaptured, and on the 16th a depot of provisions at the Genesee Rivershared the same fate. On the 19th a party of British soldiers werelanded by the fleet at Great Sodas, and took off 600 barrels of flour. Yeo then returned to Kingston, where he anchored on the 27th havingdone good service in assisting the land forces. [Footnote: Letter ofSir James Lucas Yeo to Mr. Croker, June 29, 1813. ] As a smallcompensation, on the 18th of the same month the _Lady of the Lake_, Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy, captured off Presqu' Isle the British schooner_Lady Murray_, containing 1 ensign, 15 soldiers, and 6 sailors, together with stores and ammunition. [Footnote: Letter of Lieut. Wolcott Chauncy to Com. Chauncy, June 18, 1813. ] During the early part of July neither squadron put out in force;although on the first of the month Commodore Yeo made an abortiveattempt to surprise Sackett's Harbor, but abandoned it when it wasdiscovered. Meanwhile the Americans were building a new schooner, the _Sylph_, and the formidable corvette _Pike_ was made ready tosail by July 21st. On the same day the entire American squadron, orfleet, sailed up to the head of the lake, and reached Niagara on the27th. Here Col. Scott and some of his regulars were embarked, and onthe 30th a descent was made upon York, where 11 transports weredestroyed, 5 cannon, a quantity of flour, and some ammunition carriedoff, and the barracks burned. On the 3d of August the troops weredisembarked at the Niagara, and 111 officers and men were sent upto join Perry on Lake Erie. As this left the squadron much deranged150 militia were subsequently lent it by General Boyd, but they provedof no assistance (beyond swelling the number of men Yeo captured inthe _Growler_ and _Julia_ from 70 individuals to 80), and were againlanded. Commodore Yeo sailed with his squadron from Kingston on Aug. 2d, and on the 7th the two fleets for the first time came in sight ofone another, the Americans at anchor off Fort Niagara, the Britishsix miles to windward, in the W. N. W. Chauncy's squadron containedone corvette, one ship sloop, one brig sloop, and ten schooners, manned by about 965 men, and throwing at a broadside 1, 390 lbs. Ofshot, nearly 800 of which were from long guns. Yeo's included twoship sloops, two brig sloops, and two schooners, manned by 770 men, and throwing at a broadside 1, 374 lbs. , but 180 being from long guns. But Yeo's vessels were all built with bulwarks, while ten of Chauncy'shad none; and, moreover, his vessels could all sail and manoeuvretogether, while, as already remarked, one half of the American fleetspent a large part of its time towing the other half. The _Pike_would at ordinary range be a match for the _Wolfe_ and _Melville_together; yet in actual weight of metal she threw less than the formership alone. In calm weather the long guns of the American schoonersgave them a great advantage; in rough weather they could not be usedat all. Still, on the whole, it could fairly be said that Yeo wasadvancing to attack a superior fleet. All through the day of the 7th the wind blew light and variable, and the two squadrons went through a series of manoeuvres, nominallyto bring on an action. As each side flatly contradicts the otherit is hard to tell precisely what the manoeuvres were; each captainsays the other avoided him and that _he_ made all sail in chase. Atany rate it was just the weather for Chauncy to engage in. That night the wind came out squally; and about 1 A. M. On the morningof the 8th a heavy gust struck the _Hamilton_ and _Scourge_, forcingthem to careen over till the heavy guns broke loose, and they foundered, but 16 men escaping, --which accident did not open a particularlycheerful prospect to the remainder of the schooners. Chauncy's forcewas, by this accident, reduced to a numerical equality with Yeo's, having perhaps a hundred more men, [Footnote: This estimate as to menis a mere balancing of probabilities. If James underestimates theBritish force on Ontario as much as he has on Erie and Champlain, Yeo had as many men as his opponent. Chauncy, in one of his letters(preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives), says: "I enclose the muster-rolls of all my ships, " but I have notbeen able to find them, and in any event the complements werecontinually changing completely. The point is not important, as eachside certainly had plenty of men on this occasion. ] and throwing 144lbs. Less shot at a broadside. All through the two succeeding daysthe same manoeuvring went on; the question as to which avoided thefight is simply one of veracity between the two commanders, and ofcourse each side, to the end of time, will believe its own leader. But it is not of the least consequence, as neither accomplished any thing. On the 10th the same tedious evolutions were continued, but at 7 P. M. The two squadrons were tolerably near one another, Yeo to windward, the breeze being fresh from the S. W. Commodore Chauncy formed hisforce in two lines on the port tack, while Commodore Yeo approachedfrom behind and to windward, in single column, on the same tack. Commodore Chauncy's weather line was formed of the _Julia_, _Growler_, _Pert_, _Asp_, _Ontario_, and _American_, in that order, and thelee line of the _Pike_, _Oneida_, _Madison_, _Tompkins_, and_Conquest_. Chauncy formed his weather line of the smaller vessels, directing them, when the British should engage, to edge away andform to leeward of the second line, expecting that Sir James wouldfollow them down. At 11 the weather line opened fire at very longrange; at 11. 15 it was returned, and the action became general andharmless; at 11. 30 the weather line bore up and passed to leeward, except the _Julia_ and _Growler_, which tacked. The British shipskept their luff and cut off the two that had tacked; while CommodoreChauncy's lee line "edged away two points, to lead the enemy down, not only to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him from the_Julia_ and _Growler_. " [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Isaac Chauncy. Aug. 13, 1813. ] Of course, the enemy did not come down, and the_Julia_ and _Growler_ were not saved. Yeo kept on till he had cutoff the two schooners, fired an ineffectual broadside at the otherships, and tacked after the _Growler_ and _Julia_. Then, when toolate, Chauncy tacked also, and stood after him. The schooners, meanwhile, kept clawing to windward till they were overtaken, and, after making a fruitless effort to run the gauntlet through theenemy's squadron by putting before the wind, were captured. Yeo'saccount is simple: "Came within gunshot of _Pike_ and _Madison_, when they immediately bore up, fired their stern-chase guns, andmade all sail for Niagara, leaving two of their schooners astern, which we captured. " [Footnote: Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, Aug. 10, 1813. ] The British had acted faultlessly, and the honor andprofit gained by the encounter rested entirely with them. On thecontrary, neither Chauncy nor his subordinates showed to advantage. Cooper says that the line of battle was "singularly well adaptedto draw the enemy down, " and "admirable for its advantages andingenuity. " In the first place it is an open question whether theenemy needed drawing down; on this occasion he advanced boldlyenough. The formation may have been ingenious, but it was thereverse of advantageous. It would have been far better to have hadthe strongest vessels to windward, and the schooners, with theirlong guns, to leeward, where they would not be exposed to captureby any accident happening to them. Moreover, it does not speak wellfor the discipline of the fleet, that two commanders should havedirectly disobeyed orders. And when the two schooners did tack, andit was evident that Sir James would cut them off, it was anextraordinary proceeding for Chauncy to "edge away two points * * *to lead the enemy from the _Growler_ and _Julia_. " It is certainlya novel principle, that if part of a force is surrounded the trueway to rescue it is to run away with the balance, in hopes that theenemy will follow. Had Chauncy tacked at once, Sir James would havebeen placed between two fires, and it would have been impossible forhim to capture the schooners. As it was, the British commander hadattacked a superior force in weather that just suited it, and yet hadcaptured two of its vessels without suffering any injury beyond a fewshot holes in the sails. The action, however, was in no way decisive. All next day, the 11th, the fleets were in sight of one another, theBritish to windward, but neither attempted to renew the engagement. The wind grew heavier, and the villainous little American schoonersshowed such strong tendencies to upset, that two had to run intoNiagara Bay to anchor. With the rest Chauncy ran down the lake toSackett's Harbor, which he reached on the 13th, provisioned hissquadron for five weeks, and that same evening proceeded up the lake again. [Illustration: The ships are shown just before the weather line boreup; the dotted lines show the courses the vessels kept, and the crossesindicate their positions shortly after the _Julia_ and _Growler_had tacked, and after Chauncy's lee line had "kept off two points. "] The advantage in this action had been entirely with the British, but it is simple nonsense to say, as one British historian does, that "on Lake Ontario, therefore, we at last secured a decisivepredominance, which we maintained until the end of the war. "[Footnote: "History of the British Navy, " by Charles Duke Yonge(London, 1866), vol. Iii. P. 24. It is apparently not a work of anyauthority, but I quote it as showing probably the general feelingof British writers about the action and its results, which can onlyproceed from extreme partizanship and ignorance of the subject. ]This "decisive" battle left the Americans just as much in command ofthe lake as the British; and even this very questionable "predominance"lasted but six weeks, after which the British squadron was blockadedin port most of the time. The action has a parallel in that foughton the 22d of July, 1805, by Sir Robert Calder's fleet of 15 sailof the line against the Franco-Spanish fleet of 20 sail of the line, under M. Villeneuve. [Footnote: "Batailles Navales de la France, " par O. Troude, iii, 352. It seems rather ridiculous to compare these lakeactions, fought between small flotillas, with the gigantic contestswhich the huge fleets of Europe waged in contending for the supremacyof the ocean; but the difference is one of degree and not of kind, andthey serve well enough for purposes of illustration or comparison. ]The two fleets engaged in a fog, and the English captured two ships, when both sides drew off, and remained in sight of each other thenext day without either renewing the action. "A victory thereforeit was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a 'decisive' nora 'brilliant' victory. " [Footnote: James' "Naval History, " iv, 14. ]This is exactly the criticism that should be passed on Sir JamesLucas Yeo's action of the 10th of August. From the 13th of August to the 10th of September both fleets wereon the lake most of the time, each commodore stoutly maintainingthat he was chasing the other; and each expressing in his lettershis surprise and disgust that his opponent should be afraid ofmeeting him "though so much superior in force. " The facts are ofcourse difficult to get at, but it seems pretty evident that Yeo wasdetermined to engage in heavy, and Chauncy in light, weather; andthat the party to leeward generally made off. The Americans hadbeen re-inforced by the _Sylph_ schooner, of 300 tons and 70 men, carrying four long 32's on pivots, and six long 6's. Theoreticallyher armament would make her formidable; but practically her gunswere so crowded as to be of little use, and the next year she wasconverted into a brig, mounting 24-pound carronades. On the 11th of September a partial engagement, at very long range, in light weather, occurred near the mouth of the Genesee River; theAmericans suffered no loss whatever, while the British had onemidshipman and three seamen killed and seven wounded, and afterwardran into Amherst Bay. One of their brigs, the _Melville_, receiveda shot so far under water that to get at and plug it, the guns hadto be run in on one side and out on the other. Chauncy describesit as a running fight of 3 1/2 hours, the enemy then escaping intoAmherst Bay. [Footnote: Letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 13, 1813. ] James (p. 38) says that "At sunset a breeze sprang upfrom the westward, when Sir James steered for the American fleet;but the American commodore avoided a close action, and thus the affairended. " This is a good sample of James' trustworthiness; his accountis supposed to be taken from Commodore Yeo's letter, [Footnote: Letterto Admiral Warren, Sept. 12. 1813. ] which says: "At sunset a breezesprang up from the westward, when I steered for the False Duck Islands, under which the enemy could not keep the weather-gage, but be obligedto meet us on equal terms. This, however, he carefully avoided doing. "In other words Yeo did _not_ steer _for_ but _away from_ Chauncy. Both sides admit that Yeo got the worst of it and ran away, and itis only a question as to whether Chauncy followed him or not. Ofcourse in such light weather Chauncy's long guns gave him a greatadvantage. He had present 10 vessels; the _Pike_, _Madison_, _Oneida_, _Sylph_, _Tompkins_, _Conquest_, _Ontario_, _Pert_, _American_, and _Asp_, throwing 1, 288 lbs. Of shot, with a total of 98 guns. Yeohad 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1, 374 lbs. Nevertheless, Chauncytold but part of the truth in writing as he did: "I was muchdisappointed at Sir James refusing to fight me, as he was so muchsuperior in point of force, both in guns and men, having upward of20 guns more than we have, and heaves a greater weight of shot. "His inferiority in the long guns placed Yeo at a great disadvantagein such a very light wind; but in his letter he makes a marvellousadmission of how little able he was to make good use of even whathe had. He says: "I found it impossible to bring them to closeaction. We remained in this mortifying situation five hours, havingonly six guns in all the squadron that would reach the enemy (nota carronade being fired). " Now according to James himself ("NavalOccurrences, " p. 297) he had in his squadron 2 long 24's, 13 long18's, 2 long 12's, and 3 long 9's, and, in a fight of five hours, at very long range, in smooth water, it was a proof of culpableincompetency on his part that he did not think of doing what Elliottand Perry did in similar circumstances on Lake Erie--substitute allhis long guns for some of the carronades on the engaged side. Chauncy could place in broadside 7 long 32's, 18 long 24's, 4 long12's, 8 long 6's; so he could oppose 37 long guns, throwing 752 lbs. Of shot, to Yeo's 20 long guns, throwing 333 lbs. Of shot. The oddswere thus more than two to one against the British in any case; andtheir commander's lack of resource made them still greater. But itproved a mere skirmish, with no decisive results. The two squadrons did not come in contact again till on the 28th, in York Bay. The Americans had the weather-gage, the wind beingfresh from the east. Yeo tacked and stretched out into the lake, while Chauncy steered directly for his centre. When the squadronswere still a league apart the British formed on the port tack, withtheir heavy vessels ahead; the Americans got on the same tack andedged down toward them, the _Pike_ ahead, towing the _Asp_; the_Tompkins_, under Lieut. Bolton Finch, next; the _Madison_ next, being much retarded by having a schooner in tow; then the _Sylph_, with another schooner in tow, the _Oneida_, and the two otherschooners. The British, fearing their sternmost vessels would becut off, at 12. 10 came round on the starboard tack, beginning withthe _Wolfe_, Commodore Yeo, and _Royal George_, Captain WilliamHowe Mulcaster, which composed the van of the line. They openedwith their starboard guns as soon as they came round. When the_Pike_ was a-beam of the _Wolfe_, which was past the centre of theBritish line, the Americans bore up in succession for their centre. The _Madison_ was far back, and so was the _Sylph_, neither havingcast off their tows; so the whole brunt of the action fell on the_Pike_, _Asp_, and _Tompkins_. The latter kept up a most gallantand spirited fire till her foremast was shot away. But already the_Pike_ had shot away the _Wolfe's_ main-top-mast and main-yard, andinflicted so heavy a loss upon her that Commodore Yeo, not veryheroically, put dead before the wind, crowding all the canvas hecould on her forward spars, and she ran completely past all her ownvessels, who of course crowded sail after her. The retreat of thecommodore was most ably covered by the _Royal George_, under CaptainMulcaster, who was unquestionably the best British officer on thelake. He luffed up across the commodore's stern, and deliveredbroadsides in a manner that won the admiration even of his foes. The _Madison_ and _Sylph_, having the schooners in tow, could notovertake the British ships, though the _Sylph_ opened a distant fire;the _Pike_ kept on after them, but did not cast off the _Asp_, andso did not gain; and at 3. 15 the pursuit was relinquished, [Footnote:Letter of Commodore Chauncy. Sept. 28, 1813. ] when the enemy wererunning into the entirely undefended port of Burlington Bay, whenceescape would have been impossible. The _Tompkins_ had lost herforemast, and the _Pike_ her foretop-gallant mast, with her bowspritand main-mast wounded; and of her crew five men were killed or wounded, almost all by the guns of the _Royal George_. These were the onlyinjuries occasioned by the enemy's fire, but the _Pike's_ starboardbow-chaser burst, killing or wounding 22 men, besides blowing upthe top-gallant forecastle, so that the bow pivot gun could not beused. Among the British ships, the _Wolfe_ lost her main-top-mast, mizzen-top-mast, and main-yard, and the _Royal George_ her foretop-mast;both suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded, according to thereport of the British officers captured in the transports a few daysafterward. [Illustration of the action between _TOMPKINS_, _ASP_, and _PIKE_, and the _WOLFE_, _ROYAL GEORGE_, and small gun-boats. ] As already mentioned, the British authorities no longer publishedaccounts of their defeats, so Commodore Yeo's report on the actionwas not made public. Brenton merely alludes to it as follows (vol. Ii, p. 503): "The action of the 28th of September, 1813, in whichSir James Yeo in the _Wolfe_ had his main- and mizzen-top-mastsshot away, and was obliged to put before the wind, gave Mulcasteran opportunity of displaying a trait of valor and seamanship whichelicited the admiration of friends and foes, when he gallantlyplaced himself between his disabled commodore and a superior enemy. "James speaks in the vaguest terms. He first says, "Commodore Chauncy, having the weather-gage, kept his favorite distance, " which he didbecause Commodore Yeo fled so fast that he could not be overtaken;then James mentions the injuries the _Wolfe_ received, and says that"it was these and not, as Mr. Clark says, 'a manoeuvre of thecommodore's' that threw the British in confusion. " In other words, it was the commodore's shot and not his manoeuvring that threw theBritish into confusion--a very futile distinction. Next he says that"Commodore Chauncy would not venture within carronade range, " whereashe _was_ within carronade range of the _Wolfe_ and _Royal George_, but the latter did not wait for the _Madison_ and _Oneida_ to getwithin range with _their_ carronades. The rest of his article istaken up with exposing the absurdities of some of the Americanwritings, miscalled histories, which appeared at the close of thewar. His criticisms on these are very just, but afford a funny instanceof the pot calling the kettle black. This much is clear, that theBritish were beaten and forced to flee, when but part of the Americanforce was engaged. But in good weather the American force was sosuperior that being beaten would have been no disgrace to Yeo, hadit not been for the claims advanced both by himself and his friends, that on the whole he was victorious over Chauncy. The _Wolfe_ madeany thing but an obstinate fight, leaving almost all the work to thegallant Mulcaster, in the _Royal George_, who shares with LieutenantFinch of the _Tompkins_ most of the glory of the day. The battle, if such it may be called, completely established Chauncy's supremacy, Yeo spending most of the remainder of the season blockaded in Kingston. So Chauncy gained a victory which established his control over thelakes; and, moreover, he gained it by fighting in succession, almostsingle-handed, the two heaviest ships of the enemy. But gaining thevictory was only what should have been expected from a superior force. The question is, did Chauncy use his force to the best advantage?And it can not be said that he did. When the enemy bore up it wasa great mistake not to cast off the schooners which were being towed. They were small craft, not of much use in the fight, and they entirelyprevented the _Madison_ from taking any part in the contest, andkept the _Sylph_ at a great distance; and by keeping the _Asp_ intow the _Pike_, which sailed faster than any of Yeo's ships, wasdistanced by them. Had she left the _Asp_ behind and run in to engagethe _Royal George_ she could have mastered, or at any rate disabled, her; and had the swift _Madison_ cast off her tow she could alsohave taken an effective part in the engagement. If the _Pike_ couldput the British to flight almost single-handed, how much more couldshe not have done when assisted by the _Madison_ and _Oneida_? Thecardinal error, however, was made in discontinuing the chase. TheBritish were in an almost open roadstead, from which they could notpossibly escape. Commodore Chauncy was afraid that the wind wouldcome up to blow a gale, and both fleets would be thrown ashore; and, moreover, he expected to be able to keep a watch over the enemy andto attack him at a more suitable time. But he utterly failed inthis last; and had the American squadron cast off their tows andgone boldly in, they certainly ought to have been able to destroyor capture the entire British force before a gale could blow up. Chauncy would have done well to keep in mind the old adage, sopeculiarly applicable to naval affairs: "L'audace! toujours l'audace!et encore l'audace!" Whether the fault was his or that of hissubordinates, it is certain that while the victory of the 28th ofSeptember definitely settled the supremacy of the lake in favor ofthe Americans, yet this victory was by no means so decided as itshould have been, taking into account his superiority in force andadvantage in position, and the somewhat spiritless conduct of his foe. Next day a gale came on to blow, which lasted till the evening ofthe 31st. There was no longer any apprehension of molestation fromthe British, so the troop transports were sent down the lake bythemselves, while the squadron remained to watch Yeo. On Oct. 2dhe was chased, but escaped by his better sailing; and next dayfalse information induced Chauncy to think Yeo had eluded himand passed down the lake, and he accordingly made sail in thedirection of his supposed flight. On the 5th, at 3 P. M. , while nearthe False Ducks, seven vessels were made out ahead, which provedto be British gun-boats, engaged in transporting troops. All sailswas made after them; one was burned, another escaped, and five werecaptured, the _Mary_, _Drummond_, _Lady Gore_, _Confiance_, and_Hamilton_, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Chauncy, Oct. 8, 1813. ]--thetwo latter being the rechristened _Julia_ and _Growler_. Eachgun-vessel had from one to three guns, and they had aboard in all264 men, including seven naval (three royal and four provincial)and ten military officers. These prisoners stated that in the actionof the 28th the _Wolfe_ and _Royal George_ had lost very heavily. After this Yeo remained in Kingston, blockaded there by Chauncy formost of the time; on Nov. 10th he came out and was at once chasedback into port by Chauncy, leaving the latter for the rest of theseason entirely undisturbed. Accordingly, Chauncy was able to converthis small schooners into transports. On the 17th these transportswere used to convey 1, 100 men of the army of General Harrison fromthe mouth of the Genesee to Sackett's Harbor, while Chauncy blockadedYeo in Kingston. The duty of transporting troops and stores wenton till the 27th, when every thing had been accomplished; and a dayor two afterward navigation closed. As between the Americans and British, the success of the season wasgreatly in favor of the former. They had uncontested control overthe lake from April 19th to June 3d, and from Sept. 28th to Nov. 29th, in all 107 days; while their foes only held it from June 3dto July 21st, or for 48 days; and from that date to Sept. 28th, for69 days, the two sides were contending for the mastery. York andFort George had been taken, while the attack on Sackett's Harborwas repulsed. The Americans lost but two schooners, both of whichwere recaptured; while the British had one 24-gun-ship nearly readyfor launching destroyed, and one 10-gun brig taken, and the lossinflicted upon each other in transports, gun-boats, store-houses, stores, etc. , was greatly in favor of the former. Chauncy's fleet, moreover, was able to co-operate with the army for over twice thelength of time Yeo's could (107 days to 48). It is more difficult to decide between the respective merits of thetwo commanders. We had shown so much more energy than theAnglo-Canadians that at the beginning of the year we had overtakenthem in the building race, and the two fleets were about equallyformidable. The _Madison_ and _Oneida_ were not quite a match forthe _Royal George_ and _Sydney Smith_ (opposing 12 32-pound and 824-pound carronades to 2 long 18's, 1 long 12, 1 68-pound and 1332-pound carronades); and our ten gun-schooners would hardly beconsidered very much of an overmatch for the _Melville_, _Motra_, and _Beresford_. Had Sir James Yeo been as bold and energetic asBarclay or Mulcaster he would certainly not have permitted theAmericans, when the forces were so equal, to hold uncontested swayover the lake, and by reducing Fort George, to cause disaster tothe British land forces. It would certainly have been better to riska battle with equal forces, than to wait till each fleet receivedan additional ship, which rendered Chauncy's squadron the superiorby just about the superiority of the _Pike_ to the _Wolfe_. Again, Yeo did not do particularly well in the repulse before Sackett'sHarbor; in the skirmish off Genesee river he showed a marked lackof resource; and in the action of the 28th of September (popularlycalled the "Burlington Races" from the celerity of his retreat) heevinced an amount of caution that verged toward timidity, in allowingthe entire brunt of the fighting to fall on Mulcaster in the _RoyalGeorge_, a weaker ship than the _Wolfe_. On the other hand, he gaveable co-operation to the army while he possessed control of the lake;he made a most gallant and successful attack on a superior force onthe 10th of August; and for six weeks subsequently by skilful manoeuvringhe prevented this same superior force from acquiring the uncontestedmastery. It was no disgrace to be subsequently blockaded; but it isvery ludicrous in his admirers to think that he came out first best. Chauncy rendered able and invaluable assistance to the army all thewhile that he had control of the water; his attacks on York and FortGeorge were managed with consummate skill and success, and on the28th of September he practically defeated the opposing force withhis own ship alone. Nevertheless he can by no means be said to havedone the best he could with the materials he had. His stronger fleetwas kept two months in check by a weaker British fleet. When he firstencountered the foe, on August 10th, he ought to have inflicted sucha check upon him as would at least have confined him to port andgiven the Americans immediate superiority on the lake; instead ofwhich he suffered a mortifying, although not at all disastrous, defeat, which allowed the British to contest the supremacy with him for sixweeks longer. On the 28th of September, when he only gained a ratherbarren victory, it was nothing but excessive caution that preventedhim from utterly destroying his foe. Had Perry on that day commandedthe American fleet there would have been hardly a British ship lefton Ontario. Chauncy was an average commander; and the balance ofsuccess inclined to the side of the Americans only because they showedgreater energy and skill in shipbuilding, the crews and commanderson both sides being very nearly equal. Lake Erie. Captain Oliver Hazard Perry had assumed command of Erie and the upperlakes, acting under Commodore Chauncy. With intense energy he at oncebegan creating a naval force which should be able to contend successfullywith the foe. As already said, the latter in the beginning had exclusivecontrol of Lake Erie; but the Americans had captured the _Caledonia_, brig, and purchased three schooners, afterward named the _Somers_, _Tigress_, and _Ohio_, and a sloop, the _Trippe_. These at firstwere blockaded in the Niagara, but after the fall of Fort George andretreat of the British forces, Captain Perry was enabled to get themout, tracking them up against the current by the most arduous labor. They ran up to Presque Isle (now called Erie), where two 20-gun brigswere being constructed under the directions of the indefatigablecaptain. Three other schooners, the _Ariel_, _Scorpion_, and_Porcupine_, were also built. The harbor of Erie was good and spacious, but had a bar on whichthere was less than seven feet of water. Hitherto this had preventedthe enemy from getting in; now it prevented the two brigs fromgetting out. Captain Robert Heriot Barclay had been appointedcommander of the British forces on Lake Erie; and he was havingbuilt at Amherstburg a 20-gun ship. Meanwhile he blockaded Perry'sforce, and as the brigs could not cross the bar with their guns in, or except in smooth water, they of course could not do so in hispresence. He kept a close blockade for some time; but on the 2d ofAugust he disappeared. Perry at once hurried forward every thing;and on the 4th, at 2 P. M. , one brig, the _Lawrence_, was towed tothat point of the bar where the water was deepest. Her guns werewhipped out and landed on the beach, and the brig got over the barby a hastily improvised "camel. " "Two large scows, prepared for the purpose, were hauled alongside, and the work of lifting the brig proceeded as fast as possible. Pieces of massive timber had been run through the forward and afterports, and when the scows were sunk to the water's edge, the endsof the timbers were blocked up, supported by these floating foundations. The plugs were now put in the scows, and the water was pumped outof them. By this process the brig was lifted quite two feet, thoughwhen she was got on the bar it was found that she still drew toomuch water. It became necessary, in consequence, to cover up everything, sink the scows anew, and block up the timbers afresh. Thisduty occupied the whole night. " [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 389. Perry'sletter of Aug. 5th is very brief. ] Just as the _Lawrence_ had passed the bar, at 8 A. M. On the 5th, the enemy reappeared, but too late; Captain Barclay exchanged a fewshots with the schooners and then drew off. The _Niagara_ crossedwithout difficulty. There were still not enough men to man the vessels, but a draft arrived from Ontario, and many of the frontiersmenvolunteered, while soldiers also were sent on board. The squadronsailed on the 18th in pursuit of the enemy, whose ship was now ready. After cruising about some time the _Ohio_ was sent down the lake, and the other ships went into Put-in Bay. On the 9th of SeptemberCaptain Barclay put out from Amherstburg, being so short of provisionsthat he felt compelled to risk an action with the superior forceopposed. On the 10th of September his squadron was discovered fromthe mast-head of the _Lawrence_ in the northwest. Before going intodetails of the action we will examine the force of the two squadrons, as the accounts vary considerably. The tonnage of the British ships, as already stated, we know exactly, they having been all carefully appraised and measured by the builderMr. Henry Eckford, and two sea-captains. We also know the dimensionsof the American ships. The _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_ measured 480tons apiece. The _Caledonia_, brig, was about the size of the _Hunter_, or 180 tons. The _Tigress_, _Somers_, and _Scorpion_ were subsequentlycaptured by the foe and were then said to measure, respectively, 96, 94, and 86 tons; in which case they were larger than similarboats on Lake Ontario. The _Ariel_ was about the size of the _Hamilton_;the _Porcupine_ and _Trippe_ about the size of the _Asp_ and _Pert_. As for the guns, Captain Barclay in his letter gives a completeaccount of those on board his squadron. He has also given a completeaccount of the American guns, which is most accurate, and, if anything, underestimates them. At least Emmons in his "History" givesthe _Trippe_ a long 32, while Barclay says she had only a long 24;and Lossing in his "Field-Book" says (but I do not know on whatauthority) that the _Caledonia_ had 3 long 24's, while Barclay givesher 2 long 24's and one 32-pound carronade; and that the _Somers_had two long 32's, while Barclay gives her one long 32 and one24-pound carronade. I shall take Barclay's account, which correspondswith that of Emmons; the only difference being that Emmons puts a24-pounder on the _Scorpion_ and a 32 on the _Trippe_, while Barclayreverses this. I shall also follow Emmons in giving the _Scorpion_a 32-pound carronade instead of a 24. It is more difficult to give the strength of the respective crews. James says the Americans had 580, all "picked men. " They were justas much picked men as Barclay's were, and no more; that is, the shipshad "scratch" crews. Lieutenant Emmons gives Perry 490 men; and Lossingsays he "had upon his muster-roll 490 names. " In vol. Xiv, p. 566, of the American State Papers, is a list of the prize-monies owingto each man (or to the survivors of the killed), which gives a grandtotal of 532 men, including 136 on the _Lawrence_ and 155 on the_Niagara_, 45 of whom were volunteers--frontiersmen. Deducting thesewe get 487 men, which is pretty near Lieutenant Emmons' 490. PossiblyLieutenant Emmons did not include these volunteers; and it may bethat some of the men whose names were down on the prize list hadbeen so sick that they were left on shore. Thus Lieutenant Yarnalltestified before a Court of Inquiry in 1815, that there were but131 men and boys of every description on board the _Lawrence_ inthe action; and the _Niagara_ was said to have had but 140. LieutenantYarnall also said that "but 103 men on board the _Lawrence_ werefit for duty"; as Captain Perry in his letter said that 31 were unfitfor duty, this would make a total of 134. So I shall follow theprize-money list; at any rate the difference in number is so slightas to be immaterial. Of the 532 men whose names the list gives, 45were volunteers, or landsmen, from among the surrounding inhabitants;158 were marines or soldiers (I do not know which, as the list givesmarines, soldiers, and privates, and it is impossible to tell whichof the two former heads include the last); and 329 were officers, seamen, cooks, pursers, chaplains, and supernumeraries. Of the totalnumber, there were on the day of action, according to Perry's report, 116 men unfit for duty, including 31 on board the _Lawrence_, 28 onboard the _Niagara_, and 57 on the small vessels. All the later American writers put the number of men in Barclay'sfleet precisely at "502, " but I have not been able to find out theoriginal authority. James ("Naval Occurrences, " p. 289) says theBritish had but 345, consisting of 50 seamen, 85 Canadians, and 210soldiers. But the letter of Adjutant-General E. Bayne, Nov. 24, 1813, states that there were 250 soldiers aboard Barclay's squadron, ofwhom 23 were killed, 49 wounded, and the balance (178) captured;and James himself on a previous page (284) states that there were102 Canadians on Barclay's vessels, not counting the _Detroit_, andwe know that Barclay originally joined the squadron with 19 sailorsfrom the Ontario fleet, and that subsequently 50 sailors came upfrom the _Dover_, James gives at the end of his "Naval Occurrences"some extracts from the court-martial held on Captain Barclay. Lieut. Thomas Stokes, of the _Queen Charlotte_, there testified that hehad on board "between 120 and 130 men, officers and all together, "of whom "16 came up from the _Dover_ three days before. " James, onp. 284, says her crew already consisted of 110 men; adding these16 gives us 126 (almost exactly "between 120 and 130"). LieutenantStokes also testified that the _Detroit_ had more men on accountof being a larger and heavier vessel; to give her 150 is perfectlysafe, as her heavier guns and larger size would at least need 24men more than the _Queen Charlotte_. James gives the _Lady Prevost_76, _Hunter_ 39, _Little Belt_ 15, and _Chippeway_ 13 men, Canadiansand soldiers, a total of 143; supposing that the number of Britishsailors placed on them was proportional to the amount placed on boardthe _Queen Charlotte_, we could add 21. This would make a grandtotal of 440 men, which must certainly be near the truth. This numberis corroborated otherwise: General Bayne, as already quoted, saysthat there were aboard 250 soldiers, of whom 72 were killed or wounded. Barclay reports a total loss of 135, of whom 63 must therefore havebeen sailors or Canadians, and if the loss suffered by these borethe same proportion to their whole number as in the case of thesoldiers, there ought to have been 219 sailors and Canadians, makingin all 469 men. It can thus be said with certainty that there werebetween 440 and 490 men aboard, and I shall take the former number, though I have no doubt that this is too small. But it is not a pointof very much importance, as the battle was fought largely at longrange, where the number of men, provided there were plenty to handlethe sails and guns, did not much matter. The following statementof the comparative force must therefore be very nearly accurate: PERRY'S SQUADRON. Crew Broad Total fit for side;Name. Rig. Tons. Crew. Duty. Lbs. Armament. _Lawrence_, brig 480 136 105 300 -+- 2 long 12's '-18 short 32's_Niagara_, " 480 155 127 300 -+- 2 long 12's |-18 short 32's_Caledonia_, " 180 53-+ 80 -+- 2 long 24's | '- 1 short 32_Ariel_, schooner 112 36 | 48 4 long 12's_Scorpion_, " 86 35 | 64 -+- 1 " 32 | '- 1 short 32_Somers_, " 86 35 +- 184 56 -+- 1 long 24 | '- 1 short 32_Porcupine_, " 83 25 | 32 1 long 32_Tigress_, " 96 27 | 32 1 " 32_Trippe_, sloop 60 35-+ 24 1 " 24--------- ---- --- ---- --- ---------------9 vessels, 1, 671 532 (416) 936 lbs. During the action, however, the _Lawrence_ and _Niagara_ each foughta long 12 instead of one of the carronades on the engaged side, makinga broadside of 896 lbs. , 288 lbs. Being from long guns. BARCLAY'S SQUADRON. Broadside;Name. Rig. Tons. Crew. Lbs. Armament. , - 1 long 18 | 2 " 24's_Detroit_, Ship 490 150 138 -+ 6 " 12's | 2 " 24's | 8 " 9's | 1 short 24 '- 1 " 18, - 1 long 12_Queen Charlotte_, " 400 126 189 -+ 2 " 9's '-14 short 24's_Lady Prevost_, schooner 230 86 75 -+- 1 long 9 | 2 " 6's '- 10 short 12's_Hunter_, brig 180 45 30 -+- 4 long 6's | 2 " 4's | 2 " 2's '- 2 short 12's_Chippeway_, schooner 70 15 9 1 long 9_Little Belt_, sloop 90 18 18 -+- 1 " 12 '- 2 " 6's-------- ---- --- ------6 vessels 1460 440 459 lbs. These six vessels thus threw at a broadside 459 lbs. , of which 195were from long guns. The superiority of the Americans in long-gun metal was thereforenearly as three is to two, and in carronade metal greater than twoto one. The chief fault to be found in the various American accountsis that they sedulously conceal the comparative weight of metal, while carefully specifying the number of guns. Thus, Lossing says:"Barclay had 35 long guns to Perry's 15, and possessed greatly theadvantage in action at a distance"; which he certainly did not. Thetonnage of the fleets is not so very important; the above tables areprobably pretty nearly right. It is, I suppose, impossible to tellexactly the number of men in the two crews. Barclay almost certainlyhad more than the 440 men I have given him, but in all likelihoodsome of them were unfit for duty, and the number of his effectiveswas most probably somewhat less than Perry's. As the battle wasfought in such smooth water, and part of the time at long range, this, as already said, does not much matter. The Niagara might beconsidered a match for the Detroit, and the Lawrence and Caledoniafor the five other British vessels; so the Americans were certainlyvery greatly superior in force. At daylight on Sept. 10th Barclay's squadron was discovered in theN. W. , and Perry at once got under weigh; the wind soon shifted tothe N. E. , giving us the weather-gage, the breeze being very light. Barclay lay to in a close column, heading to the S. W in thefollowing order: _Chippeway_, _Master's Mate J. Campbell; _Detroit_, Captain R. H. Barclay; _Hunter_, Lieutenant G. Bignall; _QueenCharlotte_, Captain R. Finnis; _Lady Prevost_, Lieutenant EdwardBuchan; and _Little Belt_, by whom commanded is not said. Perrycame down with the wind on his port beam, and made the attack incolumn ahead, obliquely. First in order came the _Ariel_, Lieut. John H. Packet, and _Scorpion_, Sailing-Master Stephen Champlin, both being on the weather bow of the _Lawrence_, Captain O. H. Perry; next came the _Caledonia_, Lieut. Daniel Turner; _Niagara_, Captain Jesse D. Elliott; _Somers_, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conklin;_Porcupine_, Acting Master George Serrat; _Tigress_, Sailing-MasterThomas C. Almy, and _Trippe_, Lieutenant Thomas Holdup. [Footnote:The accounts of the two commanders tally almost exactly. Barclay'sletter is a model of its kind for candor and generosity. Letter ofCaptain R. H. Barclay to Sir James. Sept. 2, 1813; of LieutenantInglis to Captain Barclay, Sept. 10th; of Captain Perry to theSecretary of the Navy, Sept. 10th and Sept. 13th, and to GeneralHarrison, Sept. 11th and Sept. 13th. I have relied mainly on Lossing's"Field-Book of the War of 1812" (especially for the diagrams furnishedhim by Commodore Champlin), on Commander Ward's "Naval Tactics, " p. 76, and on Cooper's "Naval History. " Extracts from the court-martial onCaptain Barclay are given in James' "Naval Occurrences, " lxxxiii. ] As, amid light and rather baffling winds, the American squadronapproached the enemy, Perry's straggling line formed an angle ofabout fifteen degrees with the more compact one of his foes. At 11. 45the Detroit opened the action by a shot from her long 24, which fellshort; at 11. 50 she fired a second which went crashing through the_Lawrence_, and was replied to by the _Scorpion's_ long 32. At 11. 55the _Lawrence_, having shifted her port bow-chaser, opened with boththe long 12's, and at meridian began with her carronades, but theshot from the latter all fell short. At the same time the actionbecame general on both sides, though the rearmost American vesselswere almost beyond the range of their own guns, and quite out ofrange of the guns of their antagonists. Meanwhile the _Lawrence_was already suffering considerably as she bore down on the enemy. [Illustration: The Battle of Lake Eire: a painting done for ThomasBrownell, sailing master of the _Ariel_, by George I. Cook in 1815-16. The composition was inspected for accuracy by Commodore Perry andthree other officers as well as by Brownell himself, "all of whom, "he wrote years later, "were in the battle, and in whose minds allits incidents, the positions of the fleets & appearance of the vesselswas fresh. In the last two particulars the picture is the productof our joined opinions and recollections; it is, therefore, to bepresumed that it is a correct representation of that naval combat. "Here published for the first time, it depicts the second stage ofthe battle, in which Perry, having transferred his flag to the_Niagara_, brought the entire American squadron into action. Thevessels, from left to right, are American unless denoted (Br):_Lady Prevost_ (Br), _Trippe_, _Chippeway_ (Br), _Caledonia_, _Niagara_, _Detroit_ (Br), _Queen Charlotte_ (Br), _Hunter_ (Br), _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, _Porcupine_, and _Lawrence_. (Courtesy U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] It was twenty minutes before she succeeded in getting within goodcarronade range, and during that time the action at the head of theline was between the long guns of the _Chippeway_ and _Detroit_, throwing 123 pounds, and those of the _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, and_Lawrence_, throwing 104 pounds. As the enemy's fire was directedalmost exclusively at the _Lawrence_ she suffered a great deal. The_Caledonia_, _Niagara_, and _Somers_ were meanwhile engaging, atlong range, the _Hunter_ and _Queen Charlotte_, opposing from theirlong guns 96 pounds to the 39 pounds of their antagonists, whilefrom a distance the three other American gun-vessels engaged the_Prevost_ and _Little Belt_. By 12. 20 the _Lawrence_ had workeddown to close quarters, and at 12. 30 the action was going on withgreat fury between her and her antagonists, within canister range. The raw and inexperienced American crews committed the same faultthe British so often fell into on the ocean, and overloaded theircarronades. In consequence, that of the _Scorpion_ upset down thehatchway in the middle of the action, and the sides of the _Detroit_were dotted with marks from shot that did not penetrate. One of the_Ariel's_ long 12's also burst. Barclay fought the _Detroit_exceedingly well, her guns being most excellently aimed, though theyactually had to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touchholes, so deficient was the ship's equipment. Meanwhile the _Caledonia_came down too, but the _Niagara_ was wretchedly handled, Elliottkeeping at a distance which prevented the use either of his carronadesor of those of the _Queen Charlotte_, his antagonist; the latter, however, suffered greatly from the long guns of the opposing schooners, and lost her gallant commander, Captain Finnis, and first lieutenant, Mr. Stokes, who were killed early in the action; her next in command, Provincial Lieutenant Irvine, perceiving that he could do no good, passed the _Hunter_ and joined in the attack on the _Lawrence_, atclose quarters. The _Niagara_, the most efficient and best-mannedof the American vessels, was thus almost kept out of the action byher captain's misconduct. At the end of the line the fight went onat long range between the _Somers_, _Tigress_, _Porcupine_, and_Trippe_ on one side, and _Little Belt_ and _Lady Prevost_ on theother; the _Lady Prevost_ making a very noble fight, although her12-pound carronades rendered her almost helpless against the longguns of the Americans. She was greatly cut up, her commander, LieutenantBuchan, was dangerously, and her acting first lieutenant, Mr. Roulette, severely wounded, and she began falling gradually to leeward. The fighting at the head of the line was fierce and bloody to anextraordinary degree. The _Scorpion_, _Ariel_, _Lawrence_, and_Caledonia_, all of them handled with the most determined courage, were opposed to the _Chippeway_, _Detroit_, _Queen Charlotte_, and _Hunter_, which were fought to the full as bravely. At suchclose quarters the two sides engaged on about equal terms, theAmericans being superior in weight of metal, and inferior in numberof men. But the _Lawrence_ had received such damage in working downas to make the odds against Perry. On each side almost the wholefire was directed at the opposing large vessel or vessels; inconsequence the _Queen Charlotte_ was almost disabled, and the_Detroit_ was also frightfully shattered, especially by the rakingfire of the gun-boats, her first lieutenant, Mr. Garland, beingmortally wounded, and Captain Barclay so severely injured that hewas obliged to quit the deck, leaving his ship in the command ofLieutenant George Inglis. But on board the _Lawrence_ matters hadgone even worse, the combined fire of her adversaries having madethe grimmest carnage on her decks. Of the 103 men who were fit forduty when she began the action, 83, or over four fifths, were killedor wounded. The vessel was shallow, and the ward-room, used as acockpit, to which the wounded were taken, was mostly above water, and the shot came through it continually, killing and wounding manymen under the hands of the surgeon. The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was three times wounded, but keptto the deck through all; the only other lieutenant on board, Brooks, of the marines, was mortally wounded. Every brace and bowline wasshot away, and the brig almost completely dismantled; her hull wasshattered to pieces, many shot going completely through it, and theguns on the engaged side were by degrees all dismounted. Perry keptup the fight with splendid courage. As the crew fell one by one, the commodore called down through the skylight for one of thesurgeon's assistants; and this call was repeated and obeyed tillnone were left; then he asked, "Can any of the wounded pull a rope?"and three or four of them crawled up on deck to lend a feeble handin placing the last guns. Perry himself fired the last effectiveheavy gun, assisted only by the purser and chaplain. A man who didnot possess his indomitable spirit would have then struck. Instead, however, although failing in the attack so far, Perry merely determinedto win by new methods, and remodelled the line accordingly. Mr. Turner, in the _Caledonia_, when ordered to close, had put his helm up, rundown on the opposing line, and engaged at very short range, though thebrig was absolutely without quarters. The _Niagara_ had thus becomethe next in line astern of the _Lawrence_, and the sloop _Trippe_, having passed the three schooners in front of her, was next ahead. The _Niagara_ now, having a breeze, steered for the head of Barclay'sline, passing over a quarter of a mile to windward of the _Lawrence_, on her port beam. She was almost uninjured, having so far taken verylittle part in the combat, and to her Perry shifted his flag. Leapinginto a row boat, with his brother and four seamen, he rowed to thefresh brig, where he arrived at 2. 30, and at once sent Elliott asternto hurry up the three schooners. The _Trippe_ was now very near the_Caledonia_. The _Lawrence_, having but 14 sound men left, struck hercolors, but could not be taken possession of before the actionre-commenced. She drifted astern, the _Caledonia_ passing betweenher and her foes. At 2. 45, the schooners having closed up, Perry, in his fresh vessel, bore up to break Barclay's line. The British ships had fought themselves to a standstill. The _LadyPrevost_ was crippled and sagged to leeward, though ahead of theothers. The _Detroit_ and _Queen Charlotte_ were so disabled thatthey could not effectually oppose fresh antagonists. There couldthus be but little resistance to Perry, as the _Niagara_ stood down, and broke the British line, firing her port guns into the _Chippeway_, _Little Belt_, and _Lady Prevost_, and the starboard ones into the_Detroit_, _Queen Charlotte_, and _Hunter_, raking on both sides. Too disabled to tack, the _Detroit_ and _Charlotte_ tried to wear, the latter running up to leeward of the former; and, both vesselshaving every brace and almost every stay shot away, they fell foul. The _Niagara_ luffed athwart their bows, within half pistol-shot, keeping up a terrific discharge of great guns and musketry, whileon the other side the British vessels were raked by the _Caledonia_and the schooners so closely that some of their grape shot, passingover the foe, rattled through Perry's spars. Nothing further couldbe done, and Barclay's flag was struck at 3 P. M. , after three anda quarter hours' most gallant and desperate fighting. The _Chippeway_and _Little Belt_ tried to escape, but were overtaken and broughtto respectively by the _Trippe_ and _Scorpion_, the commander ofthe latter, Mr. Stephen Champlin, firing the last, as he had thefirst, shot of the battle. "Captain Perry has behaved in the mosthumane and attentive manner, not only to myself and officers, butto all the wounded, " writes Captain Barclay. The American squadron had suffered severely, more than two thirdsof the loss falling upon the _Lawrence_, which was reduced to thecondition of a perfect wreck, her starboard bulwarks being completelybeaten in. She had, as already stated, 22 men killed, includingLieutenant of Marines Brooks and Midshipman Lamb; and 61 wounded, including Lieutenant Yarnall, Midshipman (acting second lieutenant)Forrest, Sailing-Master Taylor, Purser Hambleton, and MidshipmenSwartout and Claxton. The _Niagara_ lost 2 killed and 25 wounded(almost a fifth of her effectives), including among the latter thesecond lieutenant, Mr. Edwards, and Midshipman Cummings. The_Caledonia_ had 3, the _Somers_ 2, and _Trippe_ 2, men wounded. The_Ariel_ had 1 killed and 3 wounded; the _Scorpion_ 2 killed, includingMidshipman Lamb. The total loss was 123; 27 were killed and 96 wounded, of whom 3 died. The British loss, falling most heavily on the _Detroit_ and _QueenCharlotte_, amounted to 41 killed (including Capt. S. J. Garden, R. N. , and Captain R. A. Finnis), and 94 wounded (including CaptainBarclay and Lieutenants Stokes, Buchan, Rolette, and Bignall): inall 135. The first and second in command on every vessel were killedor wounded, a sufficient proof of the desperate nature of the defence. [Illustration: The following diagrams will serve to explain the movements. ] [Illustration: 2 P. M. ] [Illustration: 2:30 P. M. ] The victory of Lake Erie was most important, both in its materialresults and in its moral effect. It gave us complete command of allthe upper lakes, prevented any fears of invasion from that quarter, increased our prestige with the foe and our confidence in ourselves, and ensured the conquest of upper Canada; in all these respects itsimportance has not been overrated. But the "glory" acquired by itmost certainly _has_ been estimated at more than its worth. MostAmericans, even the well educated, if asked which was the mostglorious victory of the war, would point to this battle. CaptainPerry's name is more widely known than that of any other commander. Every school-boy reads about _him_, if of no other sea-captain;yet he certainly stands on a lower grade than either Hull orMacdonough, and not a bit higher than a dozen others. On Lake Erieour seamen displayed great courage and skill; but so did theirantagonists. The simple truth is, that, where on both sides theofficers and men were equally brave and skilful, the side whichpossessed the superiority in force, in the proportion of three totwo, could not well help winning. The courage with which the_Lawrence_ was defended has hardly ever been surpassed, and may fairlybe called heroic; but equal praise belongs to the men on board the_Detroit_, who had to discharge the great guns by flashing pistols atthe touchholes, and yet made such a terribly effective defence. Courage is only one of the many elements which go to make up thecharacter of a first-class commander; something more than braveryis needed before a leader can be really called great. There happened to be circumstances which rendered the bragging ofour writers over the victory somewhat plausible. Thus they couldsay with an appearance of truth that the enemy had 63 guns to our54, and outnumbered us. In reality, as well as can be ascertainedfrom the conflicting evidence, he was inferior in number; but a fewmen more or less mattered nothing. Both sides had men enough to workthe guns and handle the ships, especially as the fight was in smoothwater, and largely at long range. The important fact was that thoughwe had nine guns less, yet, at a broadside, they threw half as muchmetal again as those of our antagonist. With such odds in our favorit would have been a disgrace to have been beaten. The water wastoo smooth for our two brigs to show at their best; but this verysmoothness rendered our gun-boats more formidable than any of theBritish vessels, and the British testimony is unanimous, that itwas to them the defeat was primarily due. The American fleet cameinto action in worse form than the hostile squadron, the shipsstraggling badly, either owing to Perry having formed his line badly, or else to his having failed to train the subordinate commandershow to keep their places. The Niagara was not fought well at first, Captain Elliott keeping her at a distance that prevented her fromdoing any damage to the vessels opposed, which were battered to piecesby the gun-boats without the chance of replying. It certainly seemsas if the small vessels at the rear of the line should have beencloser up, and in a position to render more effectual assistance;the attack was made in too loose order, and, whether it was the faultof Perry or of his subordinates, it fails to reflect credit on theAmericans. Cooper, as usual, praises all concerned; but in thisinstance not with very good judgment. He says the line-of-battlewas highly judicious, but this may be doubted. The weather waspeculiarly suitable for the gun-boats, with their long, heavy guns;and yet the line-of-battle was so arranged as to keep them in therear and let the brunt of the assault fall on the _Lawrence_, withher short carronades. Cooper again praises Perry for steering forthe head of the enemy's line, but he could hardly have done any thingelse. In this battle the firing seems to have been equally skilfulon both sides, the _Detroit's_ long guns being peculiarly well served;but the British captains manoeuvred better than their foes at first, and supported one another better, so that the disparity in damagedone on each side was not equal to the disparity in force. The chiefmerit of the American commander and his followers was indomitablecourage, and determination not to be beaten. This is no slight merit;but it may well be doubted if it would have ensured victory hadBarclay's force been as strong as Perry's. Perry made a headlongattack; his superior force, whether through his fault or hismisfortune can hardly be said, being brought into action in sucha manner that the head of the line was crushed by the inferior forceopposed. Being literally hammered out of his own ship, Perry broughtup its powerful twin-sister, and the already shattered hostile squadronwas crushed by sheer weight. The manoeuvres which marked the closeof the battle, and which ensured the capture of all the opposingships, were unquestionably very fine. The British ships were fought as resolutely as their antagonists, not being surrendered till they were crippled and helpless, andalmost all the officers, and a large proportion of the men placed_hors de combat_. Captain Barclay handled his ships like a first-rateseaman. It was impossible to arrange them so as to be superior tohis antagonist, for the latter's force was of such a nature that insmooth water his gun-boats gave him a great advantage, while in anysea his two brigs were more than a match for the whole British squadron. In short, our victory was due to our heavy metal. As regards thehonor of the affair, in spite of the amount of boasting it has givenrise to, I should say it was a battle to be looked upon as in anequally high degree creditable to both sides. Indeed, if it werenot for the fact that the victory was so complete, it might be saidthat the length of the contest and the trifling disparity in lossreflected rather the most credit on the British. Captain Perry showedindomitable pluck, and readiness to adapt himself to circumstances;but his claim to fame rests much less on his actual victory than onthe way in which he prepared the fleet that was to win it. Here hisenergy and activity deserve all praise, not only for his success incollecting sailors and vessels and in building the two brigs, butabove all for the manner in which he succeeded in getting them outon the lake. On _that_ occasion he certainly out-generalled Barclay;indeed the latter committed an error that the skill and address hesubsequently showed could not retrieve. But it will always be asource of surprise that the American public should have so glorifiedPerry's victory over an inferior force, and have paid comparativelylittle attention to Macdonough's victory, which really was wonagainst decided odds in ships, men, and metal. There are always men who consider it unpatriotic to tell the truth, if the truth is not very flattering; but, aside from the moralityof the case, we never can learn how to produce a certain effect unlesswe know rightly what the causes were that produced a similar effectin times past. Lake Erie teaches us the advantage of having the oddson our side; Lake Champlain, that, even if they are not, skill canstill counteract them. It is amusing to read some of the pamphletswritten "in reply" to Cooper's account of this battle, the writersapparently regarding him as a kind of traitor for hinting that thevictory was not "Nelsonic, " "unsurpassed, " etc. The arguments arestereotyped: Perry had 9 fewer guns, and also fewer men than thefoe. This last point is the only one respecting which there is anydoubt. Taking sick and well together, the Americans unquestionablyhad the greatest number in crew; but a quarter of them were sick. Even deducting these they were still, in all probability, morenumerous than their foes. But it is really not a point of much consequence, as both sides hadenough, as stated, to serve the guns and handle the ships. Insea-fights, after there are enough hands for those purposes additionalones are not of so much advantage. I have in all my accounts summedup as accurately as possible the contending forces, because it isso customary with British writers to follow James' minute andinaccurate statements, that I thought it best to give every thingexactly; but it was really scarcely necessary, and, indeed, it isimpossible to compare forces numerically. Aside from a few exceptionalcases, the number of men, after a certain point was reached, madelittle difference. For example, the _Java_ would fight just aseffectually with 377 men, the number James gives her, as with 426, the number I think she really had. Again, my figures make the _Wasp_slightly superior in force to the _Frolic_, as she had 25 men themost; but in reality, as the battle was fought under very short sail, and decided purely by gunnery, the difference in number of crew wasnot of the least consequence. The Hornet had nine men more than the_Penguin_, and it would be absurd to say that this gave her muchadvantage. In both the latter cases, the forces were practically equal, although, numerically expressed, the odds were in favor of theAmericans. The exact reverse is the case in the last action of the_Constitution_. Here, the _Levant_ and _Cyane_ had all the men theyrequired, and threw a heavier broadside than their foe. Expressedin numbers, the odds against them were not great, but numbers couldnot express the fact that carronades were opposed to long guns, andtwo small ships to one big one. Again, though in the action on LakeChamplain numbers do show a slight advantage both in weight of metaland number of men on the British side, they do not make the advantageas great as it really was, for they do not show that the Britishpossessed a frigate with a main-deck battery of 24-pounders, whichwas equal to the two chief vessels of the Americans, exactly as the_Constitution_ was superior to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_. [Footnote:It must always be remembered that these rules cut both ways. Britishwriters are very eloquent about the disadvantage in which carronadesplaced the _Cyane_ and _Levant_, but do not hint that the _Essex_suffered from a precisely similar cause, in addition to her othermisfortunes; either they should give the _Constitution_ more creditor the _Phoebe_ less. So the _Confiance_, throwing 480 pounds ofmetal at a broadside, was really equal to both the _Eagle_ and_Saratoga_, who jointly threw 678. From her long guns she threw 384pounds, from her carronades 96. Their long guns threw 168, theircarronades 510. Now the 32-pound carronade mounted on the spar-deckof a 38-gun frigate, was certainly much less formidable than thelong 18 on the main-deck; indeed, it probably ranked more nearlywith a long 12, in the ordinary chances of war (and it must beremembered that Downie was the attacking party and chose his ownposition, so far as Macdonough's excellent arrangements would lethim. ) So that in comparing the forces, the carronades should notbe reckoned for more than half the value of the long guns, and weget, as a mere approximation, 384 + 48 = 432, against 168 + 255 =423. At any rate, British writers, as well as Americans, shouldremember that if the _Constitution_ was greatly superior to hertwo foes, then the _Confiance_ was certainly equal to the _Eagle_and __Saratoga; and _vica versa_. ] And on the same principles I thinkthat every fair-minded man must admit the great superiority of Perry'sfleet over Barclay's, though the advantage was greater in carronadesthan in long guns. But to admit this by no means precludes us from taking credit forthe victory. Almost all the victories gamed by the English over theDutch in the 17th century were due purely to great superiority inforce. The cases have a curious analogy to this lake battle. Perrywon with 54 guns against Barclay's 63; but the odds were largelyin his favor. Blake won a doubtful victory on the 18th of February, 1653, with 80 ships against Tromp's 70; but the English vessels weretwice the size of the Dutch, and in number of men and weight of metalgreatly their superior. The English were excellent fighters, but nobetter than the Dutch, and none of their admirals of that perioddeserve to rank with De Ruyter. Again, the great victory of La Hoguewas won over a very much smaller French fleet, after a day's hardfighting, which resulted in the capture of _one_ vessel! This victorywas most exultingly chronicled, yet it was precisely as if Perry hadfought Barclay all day and only succeeded in capturing the _LittleBelt_. Most of Lord Nelson's successes were certainly won againstheavy odds by his great genius and the daring skill of the captainswho served under him; but the battle of the Baltic, as far as thefighting went, reflected as much honor on the defeated Danes as onthe mighty sea-chief who conquered them. Many a much-vaunted victory, both on sea and land, has really reflected less credit on the victorsthan the battle of Lake Erie did on the Americans. And it must alwaysbe remembered that a victory, honorably won, if even over a weakerfoe, _does_ reflect credit on the nation by whom it is gained. Itwas creditable to us as a nation that our ships were better madeand better armed than the British frigates, exactly as it was creditableto them that a few years before their vessels had stood in the samerelation to the Dutch ships. [Footnote: After Lord Duncan's victoryat Camperdown, James chronicled the fact that all the capturedline-of-battle ships were such poor craft as not to be of as muchvalue as so many French frigates. This at least showed that the Dutchsailors must have done well to have made such a bloody and obstinatefight as they did, with the materials they had. According to hisown statements the loss was about proportional to the forces in action. It was another parallel to Perry's victory. ] It was greatly to ourcredit that we had been enterprising enough to fit out such an effectivelittle flotilla on Lake Erie, and for this Perry deserves the highestpraise. [Footnote: Some of my countrymen will consider this but scantapprobation, to which the answer must be that a history is not apanegyric. ] Before leaving the subject it is worth while making a few observationson the men who composed the crews. James, who despised a Canadianas much as he hated an American, gives as one excuse for the defeat, the fact that most of Barclay's crew were Canadians, whom he considersto be "sorry substitutes. " On each side the regular sailors, fromthe seaboard, were not numerous enough to permit the battle to befought purely by them. Barclay took a number of soldiers of the regulararmy, and Perry a number of militia, aboard; the former had a fewIndian sharp-shooters, the latter quite a number of negroes. A greatmany men in each fleet were lake sailors, frontiersmen, and thesewere the especial objects of James' contempt; but it may be doubtedif they, thoroughly accustomed to lake navigation, used to contestswith Indians and whites, naturally forced to be good sailors, andskilful in the use of rifle and cannon, were not, when trained bygood men and on their own waters, the very best possible material. Certainly the battle of Lake Erie, fought mainly by Canadians, wasbetter contested than that of Lake Champlain, fought mainly by British. The difference between the American and British seamen on the Atlanticwas small, but on the lakes what little there was disappeared. ANew Englander and an Old Englander differed little enough, but theydiffered more than a frontiersman born north of the line did fromone born south of it. These last two resembled one another more nearlythan either did the parent. There had been no long-established navalschool on the lakes, and the British sailors that came up there werethe best of their kind; so the combatants were really so evenly matchedin courage, skill, and all other fighting qualities, as to make itimpossible to award the palm to either for these attributes. Thedogged obstinacy of the fighting, the skilful firing and manoeuvring, and the daring and coolness with which cutting-out expeditions wereplanned and executed, were as marked on one side as the other. Theonly un-English element in the contest was the presence among theCanadian English of some of the descendants of the Latin race fromwhom they had conquered the country. Otherwise the men were equallymatched, but the Americans owed their success--for the balance ofsuccess was largely on their side--to the fact that their officershad been trained in the best and most practical, although the smallest, navy of the day. The British sailors on the lakes were as good asour own, but no better. None of their commanders compare with Macdonough. Perry deserves all praise for the manner in which he got his fleetready; his victory over Barclay was precisely similar to thequasi-victories of Blake over the Dutch, which have given that admiralsuch renown. Blake's success in attacking Spanish and Algerian fortsis his true title to fame. In his engagements with the Dutch fleets(as well as in those of Monk, after him) his claim to merit is nogreater and no less than Perry's. Each made a headlong attack, withfurious, stubborn courage, and by dint of sheer weight crushed ordisabled a greatly inferior foe. In the fight that took place onFeb. 18, 1653, De Ruyter's ship carried but 34 guns, [Footnote:"La Vie et Les Actions Memorables de Lt. -Amiral Michel De Ruyter"(Amsterdam, 1677), p. 23. By the way, why is Tromp always calledVan Tromp by English writers? It would be quite as correct for aFrenchman to speak of MacNelson. ] and yet with it he captured the_Prosperous_ of 54; which vessel was stronger than any in the Dutchfleet. The fact that Blake's battles were generally so indecisivemust be ascribed to the fact that his opponents were, though inferiorin force, superior in skill. No decisive defeat was inflicted onthe Dutch until Tromp's death. Perry's operations were on a verysmall, and Blake's on a very large, scale; but whereas Perry leftno antagonists to question his claim to victory, Blake's successeswere sufficiently doubtful to admit of his antagonists in almostevery instance claiming that _they_ had won, or else that it wasa draw. Of course it is absurd to put Perry and Blake on a par, for one worked with a fleet forty times the strength of the other'sflotilla; but the way in which the work was done was very similar. And it must always be remembered that when Perry fought this battlehe was but 27 years old; and the commanders of his other vesselswere younger still. Champlain. The commander on this lake at this time was Lieutenant ThomasMacdonough, who had superseded the former commander, LieutenantSydney Smith, --whose name was a curious commentary on the closeinter-relationship of the two contesting peoples. The American navalforce now consisted of two sloops, the _Growler_ and _Eagle_, eachmounting 11 guns, and six galleys, mounting one gun each. LieutenantSmith was sent down with his two sloops to harass the Britishgun-boats, which were stationed round the head of Sorel River, theoutlet to Lake Champlain. On June 3d he chased three gun-boats intothe river, the wind being aft, up to within sight of the fort ofIsle-aux-noix. A strong British land-force, under Major-GeneralTaylor, now came up both banks of the narrow stream, and joined thethree gun-boats in attacking the sloops. The latter tried to beatup the stream, but the current was so strong and the wind so lightthat no headway could be made. The gun-boats kept out of range ofthe sloop's guns, while keeping up a hot fire from their long 24's, to which no reply could be made; but the galling fire of the infantrywho lined the banks was responded to by showers of grape. After threehours' conflict, at 12. 30, a 24-pound shot from one of the galleysstruck the _Eagle_ under her starboard quarter, and ripped out awhole plank under water. She sank at once, but it was in such shoalwater that she did not settle entirely, and none of the men weredrowned. Soon afterward the _Growler_ had her forestay and main-boomshot away, and, becoming unmanageable, ran ashore and was also captured. The _Growler_ had 1 killed and 8 wounded, the _Eagle_ 11 wounded;their united crews, including 34 volunteers, amounted to 112 men. The British gun-boats suffered no loss; of the troops on shore threewere wounded, one dangerously, by grape. [Footnote: Letter from MajorGeneral Taylor (British) to Major-General Stone. June 3, 1813. Lossingsays the loss of the British was "probably at least one hundred, "--onwhat authority, if any, I do not know. ] Lieutenant Smith had certainlymade a very plucky fight, but it was a great mistake to get coopedup in a narrow channel, with wind and current dead against him. Itwas a very creditable success to the British, and showed theeffectiveness of well-handled gun-boats under certain circumstances. The possession of these two sloops gave the command of the lake tothe British. Macdonough at once set about building others, but withall his energy the materials at hand were so deficient that he couldnot get them finished in time. On July 31st, 1, 000 British troops, under Col. J. Murray, convoyed by Captain Thomas Everard, with thesloops _Chubb_ and _Finch_ (late _Growler_ and _Eagle_) and threegunboats, landed at Plattsburg and destroyed all the barracks andstores both there and at Saranac. For some reason Colonel Murrayleft so precipitately that he overlooked a picket of 20 of his men, who were captured; then he made descents on two or three other places, and returned to the head of the lake by Aug. 3d. Three days afterward, on Aug. 6th, Macdonough completed his three sloops, the _President_, _Montgomery_, and _Preble_, of 7 guns each, and also six gunboats;which force enabled him to prevent any more plundering expeditionstaking place that summer, and to convoy Hampton's troops when theymade an abortive effort to penetrate into Canada by the Sorel Riveron Sept. 21st. BRITISH LOSS ON THE LAKES DURING 1813. Name. Tons Guns Remarks_Ship_. 600 24 Burnt on stocks. _Gloucester_. 180 10 Taken at York. _Mary_. 80 3 Burnt. _Drummond_. 80 3 Captured. _Lady Gore_. 80 3 "_Schooner_. 80 3 "_Detroit_. 490 19 "_Queen Charlotte_. 400 17 "_Lady Prevost_. 230 13 "_Hunter_. 180 10 "_Chippeway_. 70 1 "_Little Belt_. 90 3 "-------------- ----- -----12 vessels 2, 560 109 AMERICAN LOSS. [1] Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks_Growler_. 112 11 Captured_Eagle_. 110 11 "------------- ----- ----2 vessels, 222 22 [Footnote 1: Excluding the _Growler_ and _Julia_ which were recaptured. ] Chapter VII 1814 ON THE OCEAN _Strictness of the blockade--Cruise of Rodgers--Cruise of the_Constitution--_Her unsuccessful chase of_ La Pique--_Attack on the_Alligator--_The_ Essex _captured--The_ Frolic _captured--The_Peacock _captures the_ Epervier--_Commodore Barney's flotilla--TheBritish in the Chesapeake--The_ Wasp _captures the_ Reindeer _andsinks the_ Avon--_Cruise and loss of the_ Adams--_The privateer_General Armstrong--_The privateer_ Prince de Neufchatel--_Loss ofthe gunboats in Lake Borgne--Fighting near New Orleans--Summary_. During this year the blockade of the American coast was kept upwith ever increasing rigor. The British frigates hovered like hawksoff every seaport that was known to harbor any fighting craft; theyalmost invariably went in couples, to support one another and tolighten, as far as was possible, the severity of their work. On thenorthern coasts in particular, the intense cold of the furious wintergales rendered it no easy task to keep the assigned stations; theropes were turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were coatedwith ice, and many, both of men and officers, were frost-bitten andcrippled. But no stress of weather could long keep the stubborn andhardy British from their posts. With ceaseless vigilance they traversedcontinually the allotted cruising grounds, capturing the privateers, harrying the coasters, and keeping the more powerful ships confinedto port; "no American frigate could proceed singly to sea withoutimminent risk of being crushed by the superior force of the numerousBritish squadrons. " [Footnote: Captain Broke's letter of challengeto Captain Lawrence. ] But the sloops of war, commanded by officersas skillful as they were daring, and manned by as hardy seamen asever sailed salt water, could often slip out; generally on some darknight, when a heavy gale was blowing, they would make the attempt, under storm canvas, and with almost invariable success. The harderthe weather, the better was their chance; once clear of the coastthe greatest danger ceased, though throughout the cruise the mostuntiring vigilance was needed. The new sloops that I have mentionedas being built proved themselves the best possible vessels for thiskind of work; they were fast enough to escape from most cruisers ofsuperior force, and were overmatches for any British flush-deckedship, that is, for any thing below the rank of the frigate-builtcorvettes of the _Cyane's_ class. The danger of recapture was toogreat to permit of the prizes being sent in, so they were generallydestroyed as soon as captured; and as the cruising grounds were chosenright in the track of commerce, the damage done and consternationcaused were very great. Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the coast in couplesor small squadrons, there were two or three places that were blockadedby a heavier force. One of these was New London, before which cruiseda squadron under the direction of Sir Thomas Hardy, in the 74 gun-ship_Ramillies_. Most of the other cruising squadrons off the coast containedrazees or two-deckers. The boats of the _Hogue_, 74, took part inthe destruction of some coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge inApril; and those of the _Superb_, 74, shared in a similar expeditionagainst Wareham in June. [Footnote: James, vi. 474. ] The command onthe coast of North America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir AlexanderCochrane. The main British force continued to lie in the Chesapeake, where about 50 sail were collected. During the first part of thisyear these were under the command of Sir Robert Barrie, but in Mayhe was relieved by Rear-Admiral Cockburn. [Footnote: James, vi, 437. ] The _President_, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the beginning of 1814was still out, cruising among the Barbadoes and West Indies, onlymaking a few prizes of not much value. She then turned toward theAmerican coast, striking soundings near St. Augustine, and thenceproceeding north along the coast to Sandy Hook, which was reachedon Feb. 18th. The light was passed in the night, and shortly afterwardseveral sail were made out, when the _President_ was at once clearedfor action. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Feb. 20, 1814. ]One of these strange sail was the _Loire_, 38 (British), Capt. ThomasBrown, which ran down to close the _President_, unaware of her force;but on discovering her to be a 44, hauled to the wind and made off. [Footnote: James, vi, 412. ] The _President_ did not pursue, anotherfrigate and a gunbrig being in sight. [Footnote: "Naval Monument, "p. 235. ] This rencontre gave rise to nonsensical boastings on bothsides; one American writer calls the _Loire_ the _Plantagenet_, 74;James, on the other hand, states that the _President_ was afraid toengage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason the latter declinedthe combat was because she was short of men. The best answer to thisis a quotation from his own work (vol. Vi, p. 402), that "the admiraltyhad issued an order that no 18-pounder frigate was voluntarily toengage one of the 24-pounder frigates of America. " Coupling thisorder with the results of the combats that had already taken placebetween frigates of these classes, it can always be safely set downas sheer bravado when any talk is made of an American 44 refusingto give battle to a British 38; and it is even more absurd to saythat a British line-of-battle ship would hesitate for a minute aboutengaging _any_ frigate. On Jan. 1st, the _Constitution_, which had been lying in Boston harborundergoing complete repairs, put out to sea under the command ofCapt. Charles Stewart. The British 38-gun frigate _Nymphe_ had beenlying before the port, but she disappeared long before the_Constitution_ was in condition, in obedience to the order alreadymentioned. Capt. Stewart ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the14th of February captured and destroyed the British 14-gun schooner_Pictou_, with a crew of 75 men. After making a few other prizesand reaching the coast of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the23d of the same month fell in, at the entrance to the Mona passage, with the British 36-gun frigate _Pique_ (late French _Pallas_), CaptainMaitland. The _Constitution_ at once made sail for the _Pique_, steeringfree; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Stewart, April 8, 1814. ] the latterat first hauled to the wind and waited for her antagonist, but whenthe latter was still 3 miles distant she made out her force andimmediately made all sail to escape; the _Constitution_, however, gained steadily till 8 P. M. , when the night and thick squally weathercaused her to lose sight of the chase. Captain Maitland had on boardthe prohibitory order issued by the admiralty, [Footnote: James, vi, 477. ] and acted correctly. His ship was altogether too lightfor his antagonist. James, however, is not satisfied with this, andwishes to prove that _both_ ships were desirous of avoiding the combat. He says that Capt. Stewart came near enough to count "13 ports anda bridle on the _Pique's_ main-deck, " and "saw at once that she wasof a class inferior to the _Guerrière_ or _Java_, " but "thought the_Pique's_ 18's were 24's, and therefore did not make an effort tobring her to action. " He portrays very picturesquely the grief ofthe _Pique's_ crew when they find they are not going to engage; howthey come aft and request to be taken into action; how Captain Maitlandreads them his instructions, but "fails to persuade them that therehad been any necessity of issuing them"; and, finally, how the sailors, overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to take their supper-timegrog, --which was certainly remarkable. As the _Constitution_ hadtwice captured British frigates "with impunity, " according to Jameshimself, is it likely that she would now shrink from an encounterwith a ship which she "saw at once was of an inferior class" to thosealready conquered? Even such abject cowards as James' Americans wouldnot be guilty of so stupid an action. Of course neither Capt. Stewartnor any one else supposed for an instant that a 36-gun frigate wasarmed with 24-pounders. It is worth while mentioning as an instance of how utterly untrustworthyJames is in dealing with American affairs, that he says (p. 476)the _Constitution_ had now "what the Americans would call a bad crew, "whereas, in her previous battles, all her men had been "picked. "Curiously enough, this is the exact reverse of the truth. In no casewas an American ship manned with a "picked" crew, but the nearestapproach to such was the crew the _Constitution_ carried in thisand the next cruise, when "she probably possessed as fine a crewas ever manned a frigate. They were principally New England men, and it has been said of them that they were almost qualified to fightthe ship without her officers. " [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 463. ] Thestatement that such men, commanded by one of the bravest and mostskilful captains of our navy, would shrink from attacking a greatlyinferior foe, is hardly worth while denying; and, fortunately, suchdenial is needless, Captain Stewart's account being fully corroboratedin the "Memoir of Admiral Durham, " written by his nephew, CaptainMurray, London, 1846. The _Constitution_ arrived off the port of Marblehead on April 3d, and at 7 A. M. Fell in with the two British 38-gun frigates _Junon_, Captain Upton, and _Tenedos_, Captain Parker. "The American frigatewas standing to the westward with the wind about north by west andbore from the two British frigates about northwest by west. The_Junon_ and _Tenedos_ quickly hauled up in chase, and the _Constitution_crowded sail in the direction of Marblehead. At 9. 30, finding the_Tenedos_ rather gaining upon her, the _Constitution_ started herwater and threw overboard a quantity of provisions and other articles. At 11. 30 she hoisted her colors, and the two British frigates, whowere now dropping slowly in the chase, did the same. At 1. 30 P. M. The _Constitution_ anchored in the harbor of Marblehead. CaptainParker was anxious to follow her into the port, which had no defences;but the _Tenedos_ was recalled by a signal from the _Junon_. "[Footnote: James, vi, 479. ] Shortly afterward the _Constitution_again put out, and reached Boston unmolested. On Jan. 29, 1814, the small U. S. Coasting schooner _Alligator_, of4 guns and 40 men, Sailing-master R. Basset, was lying at anchorin the mouth of Stone River, S. C. , when a frigate and a brig wereperceived close inshore near the breakers. Judging from their motionsthat they would attempt to cut him out when it was dark, Mr. Bassetmade his preparations accordingly. [Footnote: Letter of Sailing-masterBasset, Jan. 31, 1814. ] At half-past seven six boats were observedapproaching cautiously under cover of the marsh, with muffled oars;on being hailed they cheered and opened with boat carronades andmusketry, coming on at full speed; whereupon the _Alligator_ cuther cable and made sail, the wind being light from the southwest;while the crew opened such a heavy fire on the assailants, who werethen not thirty yards off, that they stopped the advance and fellastern. At this moment the _Alligator_ grounded, but the enemy hadsuffered so severely that they made no attempt to renew the attack, rowing off down stream. On board the _Alligator_ two men were killedand two wounded, including the pilot, who was struck down by agrape-shot while standing at the helm; and her sails and riggingwere much cut. The extent of the enemy's loss was never known; nextday one of his cutters was picked up at North Edisto, much injuredand containing the bodies of an officer and a seaman. [Footnote:Letter from Commander J. H. Dent, Feb. 21, 1814. ] For his skill andgallantry Mr. Basset was promoted to a lieutenancy, and for a timehis exploit put a complete stop to the cutting-out expeditions alongthat part of the coast. The _Alligator_ herself sank in a squall onJuly 1st, but was afterward raised and refitted. It is much to be regretted that it is almost impossible to get atthe British account of any of these expeditions which endedsuccessfully for the Americans; all such cases are generally ignoredby the British historians; so that I am obliged to rely solely uponthe accounts of the victors, who, with the best intentions in theworld, could hardly be perfectly accurate. At the close of 1813 Captain Porter was still cruising in the Pacific. Early in January the _Essex_, now with 255 men aboard, made the SouthAmerican coast, and on the 12th of that month anchored in the harborof Valparaiso. She had in company a prize, re-christened the _EssexJunior_, with a crew of 60 men, and 20 guns, 10 long sixes and 10eighteen-pound carronades. Of course she could not be used in a combatwith regular cruisers. On Feb. 8th, the British frigate _Phoebe_, 36, Captain James Hilyar, accompanied by the _Cherub_, 18, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, theformer carrying 300 and the latter 140 men, [Footnote: They afterwardtook on board enough men from British merchant-vessels to raise theircomplements respectively to 320 and 180. ] made their appearance, and apparently proposed to take the _Essex_ by a _coup de main_. They hauled into the harbor on a wind, the _Cherub_ falling to leeward;while the _Phoebe_ made the port quarter of the _Essex_, and then, putting her helm down, luffed up on her starboard bow, but 10 or15 feet distant. Porter's crew were all at quarters, the powder-boyswith slow matches ready to discharge the guns, the boarders standingby, cutlass in hand, to board in the smoke; every thing was clearedfor action on both frigates. Captain Hilyar now probably saw thatthere was no chance of carrying the _Essex_ by surprise, and, standingon the after-gun, he inquired after Captain Porter's health; thelatter returned the inquiry, but warned Hilyar not to fall foul. The British captain then braced back his yards, remarking that ifhe did fall aboard it would be purely accidental. "Well, " saidPorter, "you have no business where you are; if you touch a rope-yarnof this ship I shall board instantly. " [Footnote: "Life of Farragut, "p. 33. ] The _Phoebe_, in her then position, was completely at themercy of the American ships, and Hilyar, greatly agitated, assuredPorter that he meant nothing hostile; and the _Phoebe_ backed down, her yards passing over those of the _Essex_ without touching a rope, and anchored half a mile astern. Shortly afterward the two captainsmet on shore, when Hilyar thanked Porter for his behavior, and, onhis inquiry, assured him that after thus owing his safety to thelatter's forbearance, Porter need be under no apprehension as tohis breaking the neutrality. [Illustration: The _Essex_: a watercolor by Joseph Howard of Salem, circa 1801. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)] The British ships now began a blockade of the port. On Feb. 27th, the _Phoebe_ being hove to close off the port, and the _Cherub_ aleague to leeward, the former fired a weather-gun; the _Essex_interpreting this as a challenge, took the crew of the _Essex Junior_aboard and went out to attack the British frigate. But the latter didnot await the combat; she bore up, set her studding-sails, and randown to the _Cherub_. The American officers were intensely irritatedover this, and American writers have sneered much at "a British 36refusing combat with an American 32. " But the armaments of the twofrigates were so wholly dissimilar that it is hard to make comparison. When the fight really took place, the Essex was so crippled and thewater so smooth that the British ships fought at their own distance;and as they had long guns to oppose to Porter's carronades, thisreally made the _Cherub_ more nearly suited to contend with the _Essex_than the latter was to fight the _Phoebe_. But when the _Essex_ infairly heavy weather, with the crew of the _Essex Junior_ aboard, was to windward, the circumstances were very different; she carriedas many men and guns as the _Phoebe_, and in close combat, or ina hand-to-hand struggle, could probably have taken her. Still, Hilyar'sconduct in avoiding Porter except when the _Cherub_ was in companywas certainly over-cautious, and very difficult to explain in a manof his tried courage. On March 27th Porter decided to run out of the harbor on the firstopportunity, so as to draw away his two antagonists in chase, andlet the _Essex Junior_ escape. This plan had to be tried sooner thanwas expected. The two vessels were always ready, the _Essex_ onlyhaving her proper complement of 255 men aboard. On the next day, the 28th, it came on to blow from the south, when the _Essex_ partedher port cable and dragged the starboard anchor to leeward, so shegot under way, and made sail; by several trials it had been foundthat she was faster than the _Phoebe_, and that the _Cherub_ wasvery slow indeed, so Porter had little anxiety about his own ship, only fearing for his consort. The British vessels were close in withthe weather-most point of the bay, but Porter thought he could weatherthem, and hauled up for that purpose. Just as he was rounding theoutermost point, which, if accomplished, would have secured his safety, a heavy squall struck the _Essex_, and when she was nearly gunwaleunder, the main-top-mast went by the board. She now wore and stoodin for the harbor, but the wind had shifted, and on account of hercrippled condition she could not gain it; so she bore up and anchoredin a small bay, three miles from Valparaiso, and half a mile froma detached Chilian battery of one gun, the _Essex_ being withinpistol-shot of the shore. [Footnote: Letter of Captain David Porter, July 3, 1814. ] The _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ now bore down upon her, covered with ensigns, union-jacks, and motto flags; and it becameevident that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, as soon as hesaw that Porter was disabled. So the _Essex_ prepared for action, though there could be no chance whatever of success. Her flags wereflying from every mast, and every thing was made ready as far aswas possible. The attack was made before springs could be got onher cables. She was anchored so near the shore as to preclude thepossibility of Captain Hilyar's passing ahead of her; [Footnote:Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1814. ] so his two shipscame cautiously down, the _Cherub_ taking her position on thestarboard bow of the _Essex_, and the _Phoebe_ under the latter'sstern. The attack began at 4 P. M. [Footnote: Mean time. Porter says3. 45; Hilyar, a few minutes past 4. The former says the first attacklasted half an hour; the latter, but 10 minutes. I accordingly makeit 20. ] Some of the bow-guns of the American frigate bore upon the_Cherub_, and, as soon as she found this out, the sloop ran downand stationed herself near the _Phoebe_. The latter had opened withher broadside of long 18's, from a position in which not one ofPorter's guns could reach her. Three times springs were got on thecables of the _Essex_, in order to bring her round till her broadsidebore; but in each instance they were shot away, as soon as they werehauled taut. Three long 12's were got out of the stern-ports, andwith these an animated fire was kept up on the two British ships, the aim being especially to cripple their rigging. A good many ofPorter's crew were killed during the first five minutes, before hecould bring any guns to bear; but afterward he did not suffer much, and at 4. 20, after a quarter of an hour's fight between the threelong 12's of the _Essex_, and the whole 36 broadside guns of the_Phoebe_ and _Cherub_, the latter were actually driven off. Theywore, and again began with their long guns; but, these producingno visible effect, both of the British ships hauled out of the fightat 4. 30. "Having lost the use of main-sail, jib, and main-stay, appearances looked a little inauspicious, " writes Captain Hilyar. But the damages were soon repaired, and his two ships stood backfor the crippled foe. Both stationed themselves on her port-quarter, the _Phoebe_ at anchor, with a spring, firing her broadside, whilethe _Cherub_ kept under way, using her long bow-chasers. Their firewas very destructive, for they were out of reach of the _Essex's_carronades, and not one of her long guns could be brought to bearon them. Porter now cut his cable, at 5. 20, and tried to close withhis antagonists. After many ineffectual efforts sail was made. Theflying-jib halyards were the only serviceable ropes uncut. That sailwas hoisted, and the foretop-sail and fore-sail let fall, though thewant of sheets and tacks rendered them almost useless. Still the_Essex_ drove down on her assailants, and for the first time gotnear enough to use her carronades; for a minute or two the firingwas tremendous, but after the first broadside the _Cherub_ hauledout of the fight in great haste, and during the remainder of theaction confined herself to using her bow-guns from a distance. Immediately afterward the _Phoebe_ also edged off, and by hersuperiority of sailing, her foe being now almost helpless, was enabledto choose her own distance, and again opened from her long 18's, out of range of Porter's carronades. [Footnote: American writersoften sneer at Hilyar for keeping away from the _Essex_, and outof reach of her short guns; but his conduct was eminently properin this respect. It was no part of his duty to fight the _Essex_at the distance which best suited her; but, on the contrary, atthat which least suited her. He, of course, wished to win the victorywith the least possible loss to himself, and acted accordingly. Hisconduct in the action itself could not be improved upon. ] The carnageon board the _Essex_ had now made her decks look like shambles. Onegun was manned three times, fifteen men being slam at it; its captainalone escaped without a wound. There were but one or two instancesof flinching; the wounded, many of whom were killed by flying splinterswhile under the hands of the doctors, cheered on their comrades, and themselves worked at the guns like fiends as long as they couldstand. At one of the bow-guns was stationed a young Scotchman, namedBissly, who had one leg shot off close by the groin. Using hishandkerchief as a tourniquet, he said, turning to his Americanshipmates: "I left my own country and adopted the United States, to fight for her. I hope I have this day proved myself worthy ofthe country of my adoption. I am no longer of any use to you or toher, so good-by!" With these words he leaned on the sill of the port, and threw himself overboard. [Footnote: This and most of the otheranecdotes are taken from the invaluable "Life of Farragut, " pp. 37-46. ]Among the very few men who flinched was one named William Roach;Porter sent one of his midshipmen to shoot him, but he was not tobe found. He was discovered by a man named William Call, whose leghad been shot off and was hanging by the skin, and who dragged theshattered stump all round the bag-house, pistol in hand, trying toget a shot at him. Lieut. J. G. Cowell had his leg shot off abovethe knee, and his life might have been saved had it been amputatedat once; but the surgeons already had rows of wounded men waitingfor them, and when it was proposed to him that he should be attendedto out of order, he replied: "No, doctor, none of that; fair play'sa jewel. One man's life is as dear as another's; I would not cheatany poor fellow out of his turn. " So he stayed at his post, anddied from loss of blood. [Illustration: Captain David Porter: an unattributed early-19th-centuryportrait. (Courtesy U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] Finding it hopeless to try to close, the _Essex_ stood for the land, Porter intending to run her ashore and burn her. But when she haddrifted close to the bluffs the wind suddenly shifted, took her flataback and paid her head off shore, exposing her to a raking fire. Atthis moment Lieutenant Downes, commanding the _Junior_, pulled outin a boat, through all the fire, to see if he could do any thing. Three of the men with him, including an old boatswain's mate, namedKingsbury, had come out expressly "to share the fate of their oldship"; so they remained aboard, and, in their places, LieutenantDownes took some of the wounded ashore, while the Cherub kept up atremendous fire upon him. The shift of the wind gave Porter a fainthope of closing; and once more the riddled hulk of the little Americanfrigate was headed for her foes. But Hilyar put his helm up to avoidclose quarters; the battle was his already, and the cool old captainwas too good an officer to leave any thing to chance. Seeing hecould not close, Porter had a hawser bent on the sheet-anchor andlet go. This brought the ship's head round, keeping her stationary;and from such of her guns as were not dismounted and had men enoughleft to man them, a broadside was fired at the _Phoebe_. The windwas now very light, and the _Phoebe_, whose main- and mizzen-mastsand main-yard were rather seriously wounded, and who had suffereda great loss of canvas and cordage aloft, besides receiving a numberof shot between wind and water, [Footnote: Captain Hilyar's letter. James says the _Phoebe_ had 7 shot between wind and water, and onebelow the water-line. Porter says she had 18 12-pound shot belowthe water-line. The latter statement must have been an exaggeration;and James is probably farther wrong still] and was thus a good dealcrippled, began to drift slowly to leeward. It was hoped that shewould drift out of gun-shot, but this last chance was lost by theparting of the hawser, which left the _Essex_ at the mercy of theBritish vessels. Their fire was deliberate and destructive, and couldonly be occasionally replied to by a shot from one of the long 12'sof the _Essex_. The ship caught fire, and the flames came burstingup the hatchway, and a quantity of powder exploded below. Many ofthe crew were knocked overboard by shot, and drowned; others leapedinto the water, thinking the ship was about to blow up, and triedto swim to the land. Some succeeded; among them was one man who hadsixteen or eighteen pieces of iron in his leg, scales from the muzzleof his gun. The frigate had been shattered to pieces above thewater-line, although from the smoothness of the sea she was not harmedenough below it to reduce her to a sinking condition. [Footnote:An exactly analogous case to that of the British sloop _Reindeer_. ]The carpenter reported that he alone of his crew was fit for duty;the others were dead or disabled. Lieutenant Wilmer was knockedoverboard by a splinter, and drowned; his little negro boy, "Ruff, "came up on deck, and, hearing of the disaster, deliberately leapedinto the sea and shared his master's fate. Lieutenant Odenheimerwas also knocked overboard, but afterward regained the ship. A shot, glancing upward, killed four of the men who were standing by a gun, striking the last one in the head and scattering his brains overhis comrades. The only commissioned officer left on duty was LieutenantDecatur McKnight. The sailing-master, Barnwell, when terribly wounded, remained at his post till he fainted from loss of blood. Of the 255men aboard the _Essex_ when the battle began, 58 had been killed, 66 wounded, and 31 drowned ("missing"), while 24 had succeeded inreaching shore. But 76 men were left unwounded, and many of thesehad been bruised or otherwise injured. Porter himself was knockeddown by the windage of a passing shot. While the young midshipman, Farragut, was on the ward-room ladder, going below for gun-primers, the captain of the gun directly opposite the hatchway was struckfull in the face by an 18-pound shot, and tumbled back on him. Theyfell down the hatch together, Farragut being stunned for some minutes. Later, while standing by the man at the wheel, an old quartermasternamed Francis Bland, a shot coming over the fore-yard took off thequartermaster's right leg, carrying away at the same time one ofFarragut's coat tails. The old fellow was helped below, but he diedfor lack of a tourniquet, before he could be attended to. Nothing remained to be done, and at 6. 20 the _Essex_ surrenderedand was taken possession of. The _Phoebe_ had lost 4 men killed, including her first lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 wounded; the_Cherub_, 1 killed, and 3, including Captain Tucker, wounded. Total, 5 killed and 10 wounded. [Footnote: James says that most of the losswas occasioned by the first three broadsides of the _Essex_; thisis not surprising, as in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and thelast were discharged when half of the guns had been disabled, andthere were scarcely men enough to man the remainder. Most of thetime her resistance was limited to firing such of her six long gunsas would bear. ] The difference in loss was natural, as, owing totheir having long guns and the choice of position, the British hadbeen able to fire ten shot to the Americans' one. The conduct of the two English captains in attacking Porter as soonas he was disabled, in neutral waters, while they had been very carefulto abstain from breaking the neutrality while he was in good condition, does not look well; at the best it shows that Hilyar had only beenwithheld hitherto from the attack by timidity, and it looks all theworse when it is remembered that Hilyar owed his ship's previousescape entirely to Porter's forbearance on a former occasion whenthe British frigate was entirely at his mercy, and that the Britishcaptain had afterward expressly said that he would not break theneutrality. Still, the British in this war did not act very differentlyfrom the way we ourselves did on one or two occasions in the CivilWar, --witness the capture of the _Florida_. And after the battlewas once begun the sneers which most of our historians, as well asthe participators in the fight, have showered upon the Britishcaptains for not foregoing the advantages which their entire mastsand better artillery gave them by coming to close quarters, aredecidedly foolish. Hilyar's conduct during the battle, as well ashis treatment of the prisoners afterward, was perfect, and as a minormatter it may be mentioned that his official letter is singularlyjust and fair-minded. Says Lord Howard Douglass: [Footnote: "NavalGunnery, " p. 149. ] "The action displayed all that can reflect honoron the science and admirable conduct of Captain Hilyar and his crew, which, without the assistance of the _Cherub_, would have insuredthe same termination. Captain Porter's sneers at the respectfuldistance the _Phoebe_ kept are in fact acknowledgments of the abilitywith which Captain Hilyar availed himself of the superiority of hisarms; it was a brilliant affair. " While endorsing this criticism, it may be worth while to compare it with some of the author's commentsupon the other actions, as that between Decatur and the _Macedonian_. To make the odds here as great against Garden as they were againstPorter, it would be necessary to suppose that the _Macedonian_ hadlost her main-top-mast, had but six long 18's to oppose to herantagonist's 24's, and that the latter was assisted by the corvette_Adams_; so that as a matter of fact Porter fought at fully doubleor treble the disadvantage Garden did, and, instead of surrenderingwhen he had lost a third of his crew, fought till three fifths ofhis men were dead or wounded, and, moreover, inflicted greater lossand damage on his antagonists than Garden did. If, then, as LordDouglass says, the defence of the _Macedonian_ brilliantly upheldthe character of the British navy for courage, how much more didthat of the _Essex_ show for the American navy; and if Hilyar'sconduct was "brilliant, " that of Decatur was more so. This was an action in which it is difficult to tell exactly how toaward praise. Captain Hilyar deserves it, for the coolness and skillwith which he made his approaches and took his positions so as todestroy his adversary with least loss to himself, and also for theprecision of his fire. The Cherub's behavior was more remarkablefor extreme caution than for any thing else. As regards the merefight, Porter certainly did every thing a man could do to contendsuccessfully with the overwhelming force opposed to him, and thefew guns that were available were served with the utmost precision. As an exhibition of dogged courage it has never been surpassed sincethe time when the Dutch captain, Klaesoon, after fighting two longdays, blew up his disabled ship, devoting himself and all his crewto death, rather than surrender to the hereditary foes of his race, and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim "sea-beggars" ofHolland; the days when Drake singed the beard of the Catholic king, and the small English craft were the dread and scourge of the greatfloating castles of Spain. Any man reading Farragut's account isforcibly reminded of some of the deeds of "derring do" in that, theheroic age of the Teutonic navies. Captain Hilyar in his letter says:"The defence of the _Essex_, taking into consideration our superiorityof force and the very discouraging circumstances of her having losther main-top-mast and being twice on fire, did honor to her bravedefenders, and most fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter andthose under his command. Her colors were not struck until the lossin killed and wounded was so awfully great and her shattered conditionso seriously bad as to render all further resistance unavailing. "[Footnote: James (p. 419) says: "The _Essex_, as far as is borneout by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned), had 24 men killed and 45 wounded. But Capt. Porter, thinking byexaggerating his loss to prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed andmortally wounded, 39 severely, 27 slightly, " etc. , etc. This wouldbe no more worthy of notice than any other of his falsifications, were it not followed by various British writers. Hilyar states thathe has 161 prisoners, has found 23 dead, that 3 wounded were takenoff, between 20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the "remainderare either killed or wounded. " It is by wilfully preserving silenceabout this last sentence that James makes out his case. It will beobserved that Hilyar enumerates 161 + 23 + 3 + 25 (say) or 212, andsays the remainder were either killed or wounded; Porter having 255men at first, this remainder was 43. Hilyar stating that of his 161prisoners, 42 were wounded, his account thus gives the Americans 111killed and wounded. James' silence about Hilyat's last sentenceenables him to make the loss but 69, and his wilful omission is quiteon a par with the other meannesses and falsehoods which utterlydestroy the reliability of his work. By Hilyar's own letter it isthus seen that Porter's loss in killed and wounded was certainly 111, perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James says, 265 men, 126. Therestill remain some discrepancies between the official accounts, whichcan be compared in tabular form: Hilyar. Porter. Prisoners unwounded. 119 75 prisoners unwounded. " wounded. 42 27 " slightly wounded, Taken away wounded. 3 39 " severely "Those who reached shore. 25 58 killed. Remainder killed or wounded. 43 31 missing. Killed. 23 25 reached shore. ------ ----- 255 255 The explanation probably is that Hilyar's "42 wounded" do not includePorter's "27 slightly wounded, " and that his "161 prisoners" includePorter's "25 who reached shore, " and his "25 who reached shore" comesunder Porter's "31 missing. " This would make the accounts nearlytally. At any rate in Porter's book are to be found the names ofall his killed, wounded, and missing; and their relatives receivedpensions from the American government, which, if the returns werefalse, would certainly have been a most elaborate piece of deception. It is far more likely that Hilyar was mistaken; or he may havecounted in the _Essex Junior's_ crew, which would entirely accountfor the discrepancies. In any event it must be remembered that hemakes the American killed and wounded 111 (Porter, 124), and _not_69, as James says. The latter's statement is wilfully false, as hehad seen Hilyar's letter. ] He also bears very candid testimony tothe defence of the _Essex_ having been effective enough to at onetime render the result doubtful, saying: "Our first attack * * *produced no visible effect. Our second * * * was not more successful;and having lost the use of our main-sail, jib, and main-stay, appearances looked a little inauspicious. " Throughout the war noship was so desperately defended as the _Essex_, taking into accountthe frightful odds against which she fought, which always enhancesthe merit of a defence. The _Lawrence_, which suffered even more, was backed by a fleet; the _Frolic_ was overcome by an equal foe;and the _Reindeer_ fought at far less of a disadvantage, and sufferedless. None of the frigates, British or American, were defended withany thing like the resolution she displayed. But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether Porter's course, after the accident to his top-mast occurred, was altogether the bestthat could have been taken. On such a question no opinion could havebeen better than Farragut's, although of course his judgment was_ex post facto_, as he was very young at the time of the fight. "In the first place, I consider our original and greatest error wasin attempting to regain the anchorage; being greatly superior insailing powers we should have borne up and run before the wind. If we had come in contact with the _Phoebe_ we should have carriedher by boarding; if she avoided us, as she might have done by hergreater ability to manoeuvre, then we should have taken her fireand passed on, leaving both vessels behind until we had replacedour top-mast, by which time they would have been separated, as unlessthey did so it would have been no chase, the _Cherub_ being a dullsailer. "Secondly, when it was apparent to everybody that we had no chanceof success under the circumstances, the ship should have been runashore, throwing her broadside to the beach to prevent raking, andfought as long as was consistent with humanity, and then set on fire. But having determined upon anchoring we should have bent a springon to the ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, where it wasexposed, and could be shot away as fast as put on. " But it must be remembered that when Porter decided to anchor nearshore, in neutral water, he could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberateand treacherous breach of faith. I do not allude to the mere disregardof neutrality. Whatever international moralists may say, suchdisregard is a mere question of expediency. If the benefits to begained by attacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are such as tocounterbalance the risk of incurring the enmity of the neutralpower, why then the attack ought to be made. Had Hilyar, when hefirst made his appearance off Valparaiso, sailed in with his twoships, the men at quarters and guns out, and at once attackedPorter, considering the destruction of the _Essex_ as outweighingthe insult to Chili, why his behavior would have been perfectlyjustifiable. In fact this is unquestionably what he intended to do, but he suddenly found himself in such a position, that in the evenof hostilities, _his_ ship would be the captured one, and he owedhis escape purely to Porter's over-forbearance, under great provocationThen he gave his word to Potter that he would not infringe on theneutrality; and he never dared to break it, until he saw Porter wasdisabled and almost helpless! This may seem strong language to useabout a British officer, but it is justly strong. Exactly as anyoutsider must consider Warrington's attack on the British brig_Nautilus_ in 1815, as a piece of needless cruelty; so any outsidermust consider Hilyar as having most treacherously broken faith withPorter. After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and courteously to theprisoners; and, as already said, he fought his ship most ably, forit would have been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages. But previous to the battle his conduct had been over-cautious. Itwas to be expected that the _Essex_ would make her escape as soonas practicable, and so he should have used every effort to bringher to action. Instead of this he always declined the fight whenalone; and he owed his ultimate success to the fact that the _Essex_instead of escaping, as she could several times have done, stayed, hoping to bring the _Phoebe_ to action single-handed. It must beremembered that the _Essex_ was almost as weak compared to the_Phoebe_, as the _Cherub_ was compared to the _Essex_. The latterwas just about midway between the British ships, as may be seen bythe following comparison. In the action the _Essex_ fought all sixof her long 12's, and the _Cherub_ both her long 9's, instead ofthe corresponding broadside carronades which the ships regularlyused. This gives the _Essex_ a better armament than she would havehad fighting her guns as they were regularly used; but it can beseen how great the inequality still was. It must also be kept inmind, that while in the battles between the American 44's andBritish 38's, the short weight 24-pounders of the former had inreality no greater range or accuracy than the full weight 18's oftheir opponents, in this case the _Phoebe's_ full weight 18's hada very much greater range and accuracy than the short weight 12'sof the _Essex_. COMPARATIVE FORCE. Men. Broadside Guns. Weight. Total. _Phoebe_, 320 13 long 18's 234 lbs. 1 " 12 12 " 1 " 9 9 " (255) 7 short 32's 224 " 1 " 18 18 " (242) __________ _____ 23 guns. 497 lbs. _Cherub_, 180 2 long 9's 18 lbs. (18) 2 short 18's 36 " 9 " 32's 288 " (342) ___________ ______ 13 guns. 342 lbs. ______________________________ ______ _____ 500 men. 36 guns. 839 lbs. Metal. -+- 273 long. -+- '- 566 short. -' _Essex_, 255 6 long 12's 66 lbs. -+- Taking 7 per 17 short 32's 504 " | cent off | for short '- weight. ____________ _____________ ________ _______________ 255 men, 32 guns, 570 lbs. All accounts agree as to the armament of the _Essex_. I have takenthat of the _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ from James; but Captain Porter'sofficial letter, and all the other American accounts make the_Phoebe's_ broadside 15 long 18's and 8 short 32's, and give the_Cherub_, in all, 18 short 32's, 8 short 24's, and two long nines. This would make their broadside 904 lbs. , 288 long, 616 short. Iwould have no doubt that the American accounts were right if thequestion rested solely on James' veracity; but he probably took hisfigures from official sources. At any rate, remembering the differencebetween long guns and carronades, it appears that the _Essex_ wasreally nearly intermediate in force between the _Phoebe_ and the_Cherub_. The battle being fought, with a very trifling exception, at long range, it was in reality a conflict between a crippled shipthrowing a broadside of 66 lbs. Of metal, and two ships throwing273 lbs. , who by their ability to manoeuvre could choose positionswhere they could act with full effect, while their antagonist couldnot return a shot. Contemporary history does not afford a singleinstance of so determined a defence against such frightful odds. The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter agree substantiallyin all respects; the details of the fight, as seen in the _Essex_, are found in the "Life of Farragut. " But although the British captaindoes full justice to his foe, British historians have universallytried to belittle Porter's conduct. It is much to be regretted thatwe have no British account worth paying attention to of the proceedingsbefore the fight, when the _Phoebe_ declined single combat with the_Essex_. James, of course, states that the _Phoebe_ did not declineit, but he gives no authority, and his unsupported assertion wouldbe valueless even if uncontradicted. His account of the action isgrossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar's report. One instance of this I have already mentioned, as regards Hilyar'saccount of Porter's loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the_Essex_ was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies this, thereby impliedly accusing the British captain of falsehood. Thereis really no need of the corroboration of Porter's letter, but hehas it most fully in the "Life of Farragut, " p. 37: "The men camerushing up from below, many with their clothes burning, which weretorn from them as quickly as possible, and those for whom this couldnot be done were told to jump overboard and quench the flames. * * *One man swam to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body whichhad not been burned, and, although he was deranged for some days, he ultimately recovered, and afterward served with me in the WestIndies. " The third unfounded statement in James' account is thatbuckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main deck of the_Essex_, and that most of the prisoners were drunk. No authorityis cited for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it. He endsby stating that "few even in his own country will venture to speakwell of Captain David Porter. " After these various paragraphs weare certainly justified in rejecting James' account _in toto_. Anoccasional mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance ofa good many facts does not invalidate a man's testimony with regardto some others with which he is acquainted; but a wilful and systematicperversion of the truth in a number of cases throws a very strongdoubt on a historian's remaining statements, unless they are supportedby unquestionable authority. But if British historians have generally given Porter much less thanhis due, by omitting all reference to the inferiority of his guns, his lost top-mast, etc. , it is no worse than Americans have done insimilar cases. The latter, for example, will make great allowancesin the case of the _Essex_ for her having carronades only, but utterlyfail to allude to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ as having suffered underthe same disadvantage. They should remember that the rules cut both ways. The _Essex_ having suffered chiefly above the waterline, she wasrepaired sufficiently in Valparaiso to enable her to make the voyageto England, where she was added to the British navy. The _Essex Junior_was disarmed and the American prisoners embarked in her for New York, on parole. But Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman Lyman, and 11 seamen were exchanged on the spot for some of the Britishprisoners on board the _Essex Junior_. McKnight and Lyman accompaniedthe _Phoebe_ to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on a Swedish vessel, were taken out of her by the _Wasp_, Captain Blakely, and were lostwith the rest of the crew of that vessel. The others reached NewYork in safety. Of the prizes made by the _Essex_, some were burntor sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by the British. And so, after nearly two years' uninterrupted success, the career of the_Essex_ terminated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least herofficers and crew could reflect that they had afforded an exampleof courage in adversity that it would be difficult to match elsewhere. The first of the new heavy sloops of war that got to sea was the_Frolic_, Master Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out earlyin February. Shortly afterward she encountered a large Carthagenianprivateer, which refused to surrender and was sunk by a broadside, nearly a hundred of her crew being drowned. Before daylight on the20th of April, lat. 24° 12' N. , long. 81° 25' W. , she fell in withthe British 36-gun frigate _Orpheus_, Capt. Pigot, and the 12-gunschooner _Shelburne_, Lieut. Hope, both to leeward. The schoonersoon weathered the _Frolic_, but of course was afraid to close, andthe American sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort toescape, for nearly 13 hours; the water was started, the anchors cutaway, and finally the guns thrown overboard--a measure by means ofwhich both the _Hornet_, the _Rattlesnake_, and the _Adams_ succeededin escaping under similar circumstances, --but all was of no avail, and she was finally captured. The court of inquiry honorably acquittedboth officers and crew. As was to be expected James considers thesurrender a disgraceful one, because the guns were thrown overboard. As I have said, this was a measure which had proved successful inseveral cases of a like nature; the criticism is a piece of pettymeanness. Fortunately we have Admiral Codrington's dictum on thesurrender ("Memoirs, " vol. 1, p. 310), which he evidently consideredas perfectly honorable. [Illustration: Master Commandant Lewis Warrington: a contemporaryportrait by Rembrandt Peale. (Courtesy Naval Historical Foundation)] A sister ship to the _Frolic_, the _Peacock_, Capt. Lewis Warrington, sailed from New York on March 12th, and cruised southward; on the28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47' N. , long. 80°7' W. , several sail were made to windward. [Footnote: Official letterof Capt. Warrington, April 29. 1814. ] These were a small convoy ofmerchant-men, bound for the Bermudas, under the protection of the18-gun brig-sloop _Epervier_, Capt. Wales, 5 days out of Havana, and with $118, 000 in specie on board. [Footnote: James, vi, 424. ]The _Epervier_ when discovered was steering north by east, the windbeing from the eastward; soon afterward the wind veered graduallyround to the southward, and the _Epervier_ hauled up close on theport tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the _Peacock_came down with the wind on her starboard quarter. At 10 A. M. Thevessels were within gun-shot, and the _Peacock_ edged away to getin a raking broadside, but the _Epervier_ frustrated this by puttingher helm up until close on her adversary's bow, when she rounded toand fired her starboard guns, receiving in return the starboardbroadside of the _Peacock_ at 10. 20 A. M. These first broadsides tookeffect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, while the_Peacock's_ fore-yard was totally disabled by two round shot in thestarboard quarter, which deprived the ship of the use of her fore-sailand fore-top-sail, and compelled her to run large. However, the_Epervier_ eased away [Footnote: According to some accounts she atthis time tacked. ] when abaft her foe's beam, and ran off alongsideof her (using her port guns, while the American still had thestarboard battery engaged) at 10. 35. The _Peacock's_ fire was nowvery hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on whichit told heavily, while she did not suffer at all in return. The_Epervier_ coming up into the wind, owing somewhat to the loss ofhead-sail, Capt. Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but theyrefused, saying "she's too heavy for us, " [Footnote: James, "NavalOccurrences, " p. 243. ] and then, at 11. 05 the colors were hauled down. [Illustration of the action between _PEACOCK_ and _EPERVIER_ between10. 10 and 11. 05. ] Except the injury to her fore-yard, the _Peacock's_ damages wereconfined to the loss of a few top-mast and top-gallant backstays, and some shot-holes through her sails. Of her crew, consisting, alltold, of 166 men and boys, [Footnote: "Niles' Register, " vi. 196, says only 160; the above is taken from Warrington's letter of June1st, preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives. The crew contained about 10 boys, was not composed of picked men, and did not number 185--_vide_ James. ] only two were wounded, bothslightly. The _Epervier_, on the other hand, had 45 shot-holes inher hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main-top-mast over the side, main-mast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit woundedseverely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays shot away; and ofher crew of 128 men (according to the list of prisoners given byCaptain Warrington; James says 118, but he is not backed up by anyofficial report) 9 were killed and mortally wounded, and 14 severelyand slightly wounded. Instead of two long sixes for bow-chasers, and a shifting carronade, she had two 18-pound carronades (accordingto the American prize-lists; [Footnote: American State Papers, vol. Xiv, p. 427. ] Capt. Warrington says 32's). Otherwise she was armedas usual. She was, like the rest of her kind, very "tubby, " beingas broad as the _Peacock_, though 10 feet shorter on deck. Allowing, as usual, 7 per cent, for short weight of the American shot, we get the COMPARATIVE FORCE. Tons. No. Broadside Guns. Weight Metal. Crew. Loss. _Peacock_ 509 11 315 166 2_Epervier_ 477 9 274 128 23 That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, the relativeexecution done was as 12 is to 1, and the _Epervier_ surrenderedbefore she had lost a fifth of her crew. The case of the _Epervier_closely resembles that of the _Argus_. In both cases the officersbehaved finely; in both cases, too, the victorious foe was heavier, in about the same proportion, while neither the crew of the _Argus_, nor the crew of the _Epervier_ fought with the determined braverydisplayed by the combatants in almost every other struggle of thewar. But it must be added that the _Epervier_ did worse than the_Argus_, and the _Peacock_ (American) better than the _Pelican_. The gunnery of the _Epervier_ was extraordinarily poor; "the mostdisgraceful part of the affair was that our ship was cut to piecesand the enemy hardly scratched. " [Footnote: "Memoirs of AdmiralCodrington, " i, 322. ] James states that after the first two or threebroadsides several carronades became unshipped, and that the otherswere dismounted by the fire of the _Peacock_; that the men had notbeen exercised at the guns; and, most important of all, that thecrew (which contained "several foreigners, " but was chiefly British;as the _Argus_ was chiefly American) was disgracefully bad. The_Peacock_, on the contrary, showed skilful seamanship as well asexcellent gunnery. In 45 minutes after the fight was over the fore-yardhad been sent down and fished, the fore-sail set up, and every thingin complete order again; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, April29, 1814. ] the prize was got in sailing order by dark, though greatexertions had to be made to prevent her sinking. Mr. Nicholson, firstof the _Peacock_, was put in charge as prize-master. The next daythe two vessels were abreast of Amelia Island, when two frigates werediscovered in the north, to leeward. Capt. Warrington at once directedthe prize to proceed to St. Mary's, while he separated and made sailon a wind to the south, intending to draw the frigates after him, as he was confident that the _Peacock_, a very fast vessel, couldoutsail them. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, May 4, 1814. ]The plan succeeded perfectly, the brig reaching Savannah on the firstof May, and the ship three days afterward. The _Epervier_ was purchasedfor the U. S. Navy, under the same name and rate. The _Peacock_ sailedagain on June 4th, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, Oct. 30, 1814. ]going first northward to the Grand Banks, then to the Azores; thenshe stationed herself in the mouth of the Irish Channel, and afterwardcruised off Cork, the mouth of the _Shannon_, and the north of Ireland, capturing several very valuable prizes and creating great consternation. She then changed her station, to elude the numerous vessels thathad been sent after her, and sailed southward, off Cape Ortegal, Cape Finisterre, and finally among the Barbadoes, reaching New York, Oct. 29th. During this cruise she encountered no war vessel smallerthan a frigate; but captured 14 sail of merchant-men, some containingvaluable cargoes, and manned by 148 men. On April 29th, H. M. S. Schooner _Ballahou_, 6, Lieut. King, whilecruising off the American coast was captured by the _Perry_, privateer, a much heavier vessel, after an action of 10 minutes' duration. The general peace prevailing in Europe allowed the British to turntheir energies altogether to America; and in no place was thisincreased vigor so much felt as in Chesapeake Bay where a greatnumber of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and transportshad assembled, in preparation for the assault on Washington andBaltimore. The defence of these waters was confided to Capt. JoshuaBarney, [Footnote: He was born at Baltimore, July 7, 1759; James, with habitual accuracy, calls him an Irishman. He makes Decatur, by the way, commit the geographical solecism of being born in"Maryland, Virginia. "] with a flotilla of gun-boats. These consistedof three or four sloops and schooners, but mainly of barges, whichwere often smaller than the ship's boats that were sent against them. These gun-boats were manned by from 20 to 40 men each, and eachcarried, according to its size, one or two long 24-, 18-, or 12-pounders. They were bad craft at best; and, in addition, it is difficult tobelieve that they were handled to the fullest advantage. On June 1st Commodore Barney, with the block sloop _Scorpion_ and14 smaller "gun-boats, " chiefly row gallies, passed the mouth ofthe Patuxent, and chased the British schooner _St. Lawrence_ andseven boats, under Captain Barrie, until they took refuge with the_Dragon_, 74, which in turn chased Barney's flotilla into the Patuxent, where she blockaded it in company with the _Albion_, 74. They wereafterward joined by the _Loire_, 38, _Narcissus_, 32, and _Lasseur_, 18, and Commodore Barney moved two miles up St. Leonard's Creek, while the frigates and sloop blockaded its mouth. A deadlock nowensued; the gunboats were afraid to attack the ships, and the ships'boats were just as afraid of the gun-boats. On the 8th, 9th, and11th skirmishes occurred; on each occasion the British boats cameup till they caught sight of Barney's flotilla, and were promptlychased off by the latter, which, however, took good care not tomeddle with the larger vessels. Finally, Colonel Wadsworth, of theartillery, with two long 18-pounders, assisted by the marines, underCaptain Miller, and a few regulars, offered to cooperate from theshore while Barney assailed the two frigates with the flotilla. Onthe 26th the joint attack took place most successfully; the _Loire_and _Narcissus_ were driven off, although not much damaged, and theflotilla rowed out in triumph, with a loss of but 4 killed and 7wounded. But in spite of this small success, which was mainly dueto Colonel Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made no more attempts withhis gun-boats. The bravery and skill which the flotilla men showedat Bladensburg prove conclusively that their ill success on the waterwas due to the craft they were in, and not to any failing of the men. At the same period the French gun-boats were even more unsuccessful, but the Danes certainly did very well with theirs. Barney's flotilla in the Patuxent remained quiet until August 22d, and then was burned when the British advanced on Washington. Thehistory of this advance, as well as of the unsuccessful one onBaltimore, concerns less the American than the British navy, andwill be but briefly alluded to here. On August 20th Major-GeneralRoss and Rear-Admiral Cockburn, with about 5, 000 soldiers and marines, moved on Washington by land; while a squadron, composed of the_Seahorse_, 38, _Euryalus_, 36, bombs _Devastation_, _Aetna_, and_Meteor_, and rocket-ship _Erebus_, under Captain James AlexanderGordon, moved up the Potomac to attack Fort Washington, nearAlexandria; and Sir Peter Parker, in the _Menelaus_, 38, was sent"to create a diversion" above Baltimore. Sir Peter's "diversion"turned out most unfortunately for him: for, having landed to attack120 Maryland militia, under Colonel Reade, he lost his own life, while fifty of his followers were placed _hors de combat_ and theremainder chased back to the ship by the victors, who had but threewounded. The American army, which was to oppose Ross and Cockburn, consistedof some seven thousand militia, who fled so quickly that only about1, 500 British had time to become engaged. The fight was really betweenthese 1, 500 British regulars and the American flotilla men. Theseconsisted of 78 marines, under Captain Miller, and 370 sailors, someof whom served under Captain Barney, who had a battery of two 18'sand three 12's, while the others were armed with muskets and pikes, and acted with the marines. Both sailors and marines did nobly, inflicting most of the loss the British suffered, which amountedto 256 men, and in return lost over a hundred of their own men, including the two captains, who were wounded and captured, withthe guns. [Footnote: The optimistic Cooper thinks that two regularregiments would have given the Americans this battle--which is opento doubt. ] Ross took Washington and burned the public buildings;and the panic-struck Americans foolishly burned the _Columbia_, 44, and _Argus_, 18, which were nearly ready for service. Captain Gordon's attack on Fort Washington was conducted with greatskill and success. Fort Washington was abandoned as soon as firedupon, and the city of Alexandria surrendered upon most humiliatingconditions. Captain Gordon was now joined by the _Fairy_, 18, CaptainBaker, who brought him orders to return from Vice-Admiral Cochrane;and the squadron began to work down the river, which was very difficultto navigate. Commodore Rodgers, with some of the crew of the two44's, _Guerrière_ and _Java_, tried to bar their progress, but hadnot sufficient means. On September 1st an attempt was made to destroythe _Devastation_ by fire-ships, but it failed; on the 4th the attemptwas repeated by Commodore Rodgers, with a party of some forty men, but they were driven off and attacked by the British boats, underCaptain Baker, who in turn was repulsed with the loss of his secondlieutenant killed, and some twenty-five men killed or wounded. Thesquadron also had to pass and silence a battery of light field-pieceson the 5th, where they suffered enough to raise their total loss toseven killed and thirty-five wounded. Gordon's inland expedition wasthus concluded most successfully, at a very trivial cost; it wasa most venturesome feat, reflecting great honor on the captains andcrews engaged in it. Baltimore was threatened actively by sea and land early in September. On the 13th an indecisive conflict took place between the Britishregulars and American militia, in which the former came off withthe honor, and the latter with the profit. The regulars held thefield, losing 350 men, including General Ross; the militia retreatedin fair order with a loss of but 200. The water attack was alsounsuccessful. At 5 A. M. On the 13th the bomb vessels _Meteor_, _Aetna_, _Terror_, _Volcano_, and _Devastation_, the rocket-ship_Erebus_, and the frigates _Severn_, _Euryalus_, _Havannah_, and_Hebrus_ opened on Fort McHenry, some of the other fortificationsbeing occasionally fired at. A furious but harmless cannonade waskept up between the forts and ships until 7 A. M. On the 14th, whenthe British fleet and army retired. I have related these events out of their natural order because theyreally had very little to do with our navy, and yet it is necessaryto mention them in order to give an idea of the course of events. The British and American accounts of the various gun-boat attacksdiffer widely; but it is very certain that the gun-boats accomplishedlittle or nothing of importance. On the other hand, their loss amountedto nothing, for many of those that were sunk were afterward raised, and the total tonnage of those destroyed would not much exceed thatof the British barges captured by them from time to time or destroyedby the land batteries. The purchased brig _Rattlesnake_, 16, had been cruising in theAtlantic with a good deal of success; but in lat. 40° N. , long. 33° W. , was chased by a frigate from which Lieutenant Renshaw, the brig'scommander, managed to escape only by throwing overboard all hisguns except two long nines; and on June 22d he was captured bythe _Leander_, 50, Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C. B. The third of the new sloops to get to sea was the _Wasp_, 22, CaptainJohnston Blakely, which left Portsmouth on May 1st, with a very finecrew of 173 men, almost exclusively New Englanders; there was saidnot to have been a single foreign seaman on board. It is, at allevents, certain that during the whole war no vessel was ever bettermanned and commanded than this daring and resolute cruiser. The _Wasp_slipped unperceived through the blockading frigates, and ran intothe mouth of the English Channel, right in the thick of the Englishcruisers; here she remained several weeks, burning and scuttlingmany ships. Finally, on June 28th, at 4 A. M. , in lat. 48° 36' N. , long. 11° 15' W. , [Footnote: Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. ] while in chase of two merchant-men, a sail was made on theweather-beam. This was the British brig-sloop _Reindeer_, 18, Captain William Manners, [Footnote: James, vi, 429. ] with a crewof 118, as brave men as ever sailed or fought on the narrow seas. Like the _Peacock_ (British) the _Reindeer_ was only armed with24-pounders, and Captain Manners must have known well that he wasto do battle with a foe heavier than himself; but there was no moregallant seaman in the whole British navy, fertile as it was in menwho cared but little for odds of size or strength. As the day broke, the _Reindeer_ made sail for the _Wasp_, then lying in the west-southwest. The sky was overcast with clouds, and the smoothness of the sea washardly disturbed by the light breeze that blew out of the northeast. Captain Blakely hauled up and stood for his antagonist, as the lattercame slowly down with the wind nearly aft, and so light was the weatherthat the vessels kept almost on even keels. It was not till quarterpast one that the _Wasp's_ drum rolled out its loud challenge asit beat to quarters, and a few minutes afterward the ship put aboutand stood for the foe, thinking to weather him; but at 1. 50 the brigalso tacked and stood away, each of the cool and skilful captainsbeing bent on keeping the weather-gage. At half past two the _Reindeer_again tacked, and, taking in her stay-sails, stood for the _Wasp_, who furled her royals; and, seeing that she would be weathered, at2. 50, put about in her turn and ran off, with the wind a little forwardthe port beam, brailing up the mizzen, while the _Reindeer_ hoistedher flying-jib, to close, and gradually came up on the _Wasp's_weather-quarter. At 17 minutes past three, when the vessels werenot sixty yards apart, the British opened the conflict, firing theshifting 12-pound carronade, loaded with round and grape. To thisthe Americans could make no return, and it was again loaded and fired, with the utmost deliberation; this was repeated five times, and wouldhave been a trying ordeal to a crew less perfectly disciplined thanthe _Wasp's_. At 3. 26 Captain Blakely, finding his enemy did notget on his beam, put his helm a-lee and luffed up, firing his gunsfrom aft forward as they bore. For ten minutes the ship and the briglay abreast, not twenty yards apart, while the cannonade was terriblydestructive. The concussion of the explosions almost deadened whatlittle way the vessels had on, and the smoke hung over them like apall. The men worked at the guns with desperate energy, but the oddsin weight of metal (3 to 2) were too great against the _Reindeer_, where both sides played their parts so manfully. Captain Mannersstood at his post, as resolute as ever, though wounded again andagain. A grape-shot passed through both his thighs, bringing himto the deck; but, maimed and bleeding to death, he sprang to hisfeet, cheering on the seamen. The vessels were now almost touching, and putting his helm aweather, he ran the _Wasp_ aboard on her port[Footnote: Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper starboard:it is a point of little importance; all accounts agree as to the_relative_ positions of the craft. ] quarter, while the boardersgathered forward, to try it with the steel. But the Carolina captainhad prepared for this with cool confidence; the marines came aft;close under the bulwarks crouched the boarders, grasping in theirhands the naked cutlasses, while behind them were drawn up the pikemen. As the vessels came grinding together the men hacked and thrust atone another through the open port-holes, while the black smoke curledup from between the hulls. Then through the smoke appeared the grimfaces of the British sea-dogs, and the fighting was bloody enough;for the stubborn English stood well in the hard hand play. But thosewho escaped the deadly fire of the topmen, escaped only to be riddledthrough by the long Yankee pikes; so, avenged by their own hands, the foremost of the assailants died, and the others gave back. Theattack was foiled, though the _Reindeer's_ marines kept answeringwell the American fire. Then the English captain, already mortallywounded, but with the indomitable courage that nothing but deathcould conquer, cheering and rallying his men, himself sprang, swordin hand, into the rigging, to lead them on; and they followed himwith a will. At that instant a ball from the _Wasp's_ main-topcrashed through his skull, and, still clenching in his right handthe sword he had shown he could wear so worthily, with his face tothe foe, he fell back on his own deck dead, while above him yetfloated the flag for which he had given his life. No Norse Viking, slain over shield, ever died better. As the British leader fell andhis men recoiled, Captain Blakely passed the word to board; withwild hurrahs the boarders swarmed over the hammock nettings, therewas a moment's furious struggle, the surviving British were slainor driven below, and the captain's clerk, _the highest officer left_, surrendered the brig, at 3. 44, just 27 minutes after the _Reindeer_had fired the first gun, and just 18 after the _Wasp_ had responded. [Illustration showing the action between the _WASP_ and the _REINDEER_from 3. 17 to 3. 45. ] Both ships had suffered severely in the short struggle; but, as withthe __Shannon_ and _Chesapeake_, the injuries were much less severealoft than in the hulls. All the spars were in their places. The_Wasp's_ hull had received 6 round, and many grape; a 24-pound shothad passed through the foremast; and of her crew of 173, 11 werekilled or mortally wounded, and 15 wounded severely or slightly. The _Reindeer_ was completely cut to pieces in a line with her ports;her upper works, boats, and spare spars being one entire wreck. Ofher crew of 118 men, 33 were killed outright or died later, and 34were wounded, nearly all severely. COMPARATIVE FORCE. Broadside Weight No. Tons. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss_Wasp, _ 509 11 315 173 26_Reindeer, _ 477 10 210 118 67 It is thus seen that the _Reindeer_ fought at a greater disadvantagethan any other of the various British sloops that were captured insingle action during the war; and yet she made a better fight thanany of them (though the _Frolic_, and the _Frolic_ only, was defendedwith the same desperate courage); a pretty sure proof that heavymetal is not the only factor to be considered in accounting for theAmerican victories. "It is difficult to say which vessel behaved thebest in this short but gallant combat. " [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 287. ]I doubt if the war produced two better single-ship commanders thanCaptain Blakely and Captain Manners; and an equal meed of praiseattaches to both crews. The British could rightly say that theyyielded purely to heavy odds in men and metal; and the Americans, that the difference in execution was fully proportioned to thedifference in force. It is difficult to know which to admire most, the wary skill with which each captain manoeuvred before the fight, the perfect training and discipline that their crews showed, thedecision and promptitude with which Captain Manners tried to retrievethe day by boarding, and the desperate bravery with which the attemptwas made; or the readiness with which Captain Blakely made hispreparations, and the cool courage with which the assault was foiled. All people of the English stock, no matter on which side of theAtlantic they live, if they have any pride in the many feats offierce prowess done by the men of their blood and race, should neverforget this fight; although we cannot but feel grieved to find thatsuch men--men of one race and one speech; brothers in blood, as wellas in bravery--should ever have had to turn their weapons againstone another. The day after the conflict the prize's foremast went by the board, and, as she was much damaged by shot, Captain Blakely burned her, put a portion of his wounded prisoners on board a neutral, and withthe remainder proceeded to France, reaching l'Orient on the 8th dayof July. On July 4th Sailing-master Percival and 30 volunteers of the New Yorkflotilla [Footnote: Letter of Com. J. Lewis, July 6, 1814. ] concealedthemselves on board a fishing-smack, and carried by surprise the_Eagle_ tender, which contained a 32-pound howitzer and 14 men, 4of whom were wounded. On July 12th, while off the west coast of South Africa, the Americanbrig _Syren_ was captured after a chase of 11 hours by the _Medway_, 74, Capt. Brine. The chase was to windward during the whole time, and made every effort to escape, throwing overboard all her boats, anchors, cables, and spare spars. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Brineto Vice-Admiral Tyler, July 12. 1814. ] Her commander, Captain Parker, had died, and she was in charge of Lieut. N. J. Nicholson. By a curiouscoincidence, on the same day, July 12th, H. M. Cutter _Landrail_, 4, [Footnote: James, vi, 436: his statement is wrong as regards theprivateer. ] of 20 men, Lieut. Lancaster, was captured by the Americanprivateer _Syren_, a schooner mounting 1 long heavy gun, with a crewof 70 men; the _Landrail_ had 7, and the _Syren_ 3 men wounded. On July 14th Gun-boat No. 88, Sailing-master George Clement, capturedafter a short skirmish the tender of the _Tenedos_ frigate, withher second lieutenant, 2 midshipmen, and 10 seamen. [Footnote: Letterof Capt. Isaac Hull, July 15. 1814. ] The _Wasp_ stayed in l'Orient till she was thoroughly refitted, andhad filled, in part, the gaps in her crew, from the American privateersin port. On Aug. 27th, Captain Blakely sailed again, making two prizesduring the next three days. On Sept. 1st she came up to a convoy of10 sail under the protection of the _Armada_, 74, all bound forGibraltar; the swift cruiser hovered round the merchant-men likea hawk, and though chased off again and again by the line-of-battleship, always returned the instant the pursuit stopped, and finallyactually succeeded in cutting off and capturing one ship, laden withiron and brass cannon, muskets, and other military stores of greatvalue. At half past six on the evening of the same day, in lat. 47°30' N. , long. 11° W. , while running almost free, four sail, two onthe starboard bow, and two on the port, rather more to leeward, weremade out. [Footnote: Official letter of Capt. Blakely. Sept. 8, 1814. ]Capt. Blakely at once made sail for the most weatherly of the fourships in sight, though well aware that more than one of them mightprove to be hostile cruisers, and they were all of unknown force. But the determined Carolinian was not one to be troubled by suchconsiderations. He probably had several men less under his commandthan in the former action, but had profited by his experience withthe _Reindeer_ in one point, having taken aboard her 12-pounderboat carronade, of whose efficacy he had had very practical proof. The chase, the British brig-sloop _Avon_, 18, Captain the HonorableJames Arbuthnot, [Footnote: James, vi, 432] was steering almostsouthwest; the wind, which was blowing fresh from the southeast, being a little abaft the port beam. At 7. 00 the _Avon_ began makingnight signals with the lanterns, but the _Wasp_, disregarding these, came steadily on; at 8. 38 the _Avon_ fired a shot from her stern-chaser, [Footnote: James, vi, 432. ] and shortly afterward another from oneof her lee or starboard guns. At 20 minutes past 9, the _Wasp_ wason the port or weather-quarter of the _Avon_, and the vessels interchangedseveral hails; one of the American officers then came forward onthe forecastle and ordered the brig to heave to, which the latterdeclined doing, and set her port foretop-mast studding sail. The_Wasp_ then, at 9. 29, fired the 12-pound carronade into her, to whichthe _Avon_ responded with her stern-chaser and the aftermost portguns. Capt. Blakely then put his helm up, for fear his adversarywould try to escape, and ran to leeward of her, and then ranged upalongside, having poured a broadside into her quarter. A close andfurious engagement began, at such short range that the only one ofthe _Wasp's_ crew who was wounded, was hit by a wad; four round shotstruck her hull, killing two men, and she suffered a good deal inher rigging. The men on board did not know the name of their antagonist;but they could see through the smoke and the gloom of the night, as her black hull surged through the water, that she was a largebrig; and aloft, against the sky, the sailors could be discerned, clustering in the tops. [Footnote: Captain Blakely's letter. ] Inspite of the darkness the _Wasp's_ fire was directed with deadlyprecision; the _Avon's_ gaff was shot away at almost the firstbroadside, and most of her main-rigging and spars followed suit. She was hulled again and again, often below water-line; some of hercarronades were dismounted, and finally the main-mast went by theboard. At 10. 00, after 31 minutes of combat, her fire had beencompletely silenced and Captain Blakely hailed to know if she hadstruck. No answer being received, and the brig firing a few randomshot, the action recommended; but at 10. 12 the _Avon_ was againhailed, and this time answered that she had struck. While loweringaway a boat to take possession, another sail (H. B. M. Brig-sloop_Castilian_, 18, Captain Braimer) was seen astern. The men were againcalled to quarters, and every thing put in readiness as rapidly aspossible; but at 10. 36 two more sail were seen (one of which wasH. B. M. _Tartarus_, 20 [Footnote: "Niles' Register, " vi. 216. ]). The braces being cut away, the _Wasp_ was put before the wind untilnew ones could be rove. The _Castilian_ pursued till she came upclose, when she fired her lee guns into, or rather over, theweather-quarter of the _Wasp_, cutting her rigging slightly. Repeatedsignals of distress having now been made by the _Avon_ (which hadlost 10 men killed and 32 wounded), the _Castilian_ tacked and stoodfor her, and on closing found out she was sinking. Hardly had hercrew been taken out when she went down. [Illustration of the action between _WASP_ and _AVON_ from 9. 25to 10. 00. ] Counting the _Wasp's_ complement as full (though it was probablytwo or three short), taking James' statement of the crew of the_Avon_ as true, including the boat carronades of both vessels, andconsidering the _Avon's_ stern-chaser to have been a six-pounder, we get the COMPARATIVE FORCE. No. Weight No. Tons. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss. _Wasp, _ 509 12 327 160 3_Avon, _ 477 11 280 117 42 It is self-evident that in the case of this action the odds, 14 to11, are neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as14 to 1, nor for the rapidity with which, during a night encounter, the _Avon_ was placed in a sinking condition. "The gallantry of the_Avon's_ officers and crew cannot for a moment be questioned; butthe gunnery of the latter appears to have been not one whit betterthan, to the discredit of the British navy, had frequently beforebeen displayed in combats of this kind. Nor, judging from the specimengiven by the _Castilian_, is it likely that she would have performedany better. " [Footnote: James, vi, 435. ] On the other hand, "Capt. Blakely's conduct on this occasion had all the merit shown in theprevious action, with the additional claim of engaging an enemyunder circumstances which led him to believe that her consorts werein the immediate vicinity. The steady, officer-like way in whichthe _Avon_ was destroyed, and the coolness with which he preparedto engage the _Castilian_ within ten minutes after his first antagonisthad struck, are the best encomiums on this officer's character andspirit, as well as on the school in which he had been trained. "[Footnote: Cooper, ii, 291. ] The _Wasp_ now cruised to the southward and westward, taking andscuttling one or two prizes. On Sept. 21st, lat. 33° 12' N. , long. 14° 56' W. , she captured the brig _Atalanta_, 8, with 19 men, whichproved a valuable prize, and was sent in with one of the midshipmen, Mr. Geisinger, aboard, as prize-master, who reached Savannah in safetyon Nov. 4th. Meanwhile the _Wasp_ kept on toward the southeast. OnOct. 9th, in lat. 18° 35' N. , long. 30° 10' W. , she spoke and boardedthe Swedish brig _Adonis_, and took out of her Lieut. McKnight andMr. Lyman, a master's mate, both late of the _Essex_, on their wayto England from Brazil. This was the last that was ever heard of the gallant but ill-fated_Wasp_. How she perished none ever knew; all that is certain is thatshe was never seen again. She was as good a ship, as well manned, and as ably commanded as any vessel in our little navy; and it maybe doubted if there was at that time any foreign sloop of war of hersize and strength that could have stood against her in fair fight. As I have said, the _Wasp_ was manned almost exclusively by Americans. James says they were mostly Irish; the reason he gives for theassertion being that Capt. Blakely spent the first 16 months of hislife in Dublin. This argument is quite on a par with another pieceof logic which I cannot resist noticing. The point he wishes to proveis that Americans are cowards. Accordingly, on p. 475: "On her capstanthe _Constitution_ now mounted a piece resembling 7 musket barrels, fixed together with iron bands. It was discharged by one lock, andeach barrel threw 25 balls. * * * What could have impelled the Americansto invent such extraordinary implements of war but fear, down-rightfear?" Then a little further on: "The men were provided with leatherboarding-caps, fitted with bands of iron, * * * another strong symptomof fear!" Now, such a piece of writing as this is simply evidenceof an unsound mind; it is not so much malicious as idiotic. I onlyreproduce it to help prove what I have all along insisted on, thatany of James' unsupported statements about the Americans, whetherrespecting the tonnage of the ships or the courage of the crews, are not worth the paper they are written on; on all points connectedpurely with the British navy, or which can be checked off by officialdocuments or ships' logs, or where there would be no particular objectin falsifying, James is an invaluable assistant, from the diligenceand painstaking care he shows, and the thoroughness and minutenesswith which he goes into details. A fair-minded and interesting English critic, [Footnote: Lord HowardDouglass, "Treatise on Naval Gunnery, " p. 416. ] whose remarks aregenerally very just, seems to me to have erred somewhat in commentingon this last sloop action. He says that the _Avon_ was first crippledby dismantling shot from _long guns_. Now, the _Wasp_ had but _one_long gun on the side engaged, and, moreover, began the action withthe shortest and lightest of her carronades. Then he continues thatthe _Avon_, like the _Peacock_, "was hulled so low that the shot-holescould not be got at, and yielded to this fatal circumstance only. "It certainly cannot be said when a brig has been dismasted, has hada third of her crew placed _hors de combat_, and has been renderedan unmanageable hulk, that she yields _only_ because she has receiveda few shot below the water-line. These shot-holes undoubtedly hastenedthe result, but both the _Peacock_ and the _Avon_ would havesurrendered even if they had remained absolutely water-tight. The _Adams_, 28, had been cut down to a sloop of war at Washington, and then lengthened into a flush-decked, heavy corvette, mountingon each side 13 medium 18's, or columbiads, and 1 long 12, with acrew of 220 men, under the command of Capt. Charles Morris, latefirst lieut. Of the _Constitution_. [Footnote: "Autobiography ofCommodore Morris, " Annapolis, 1880, p. 172. ] She slipped out of thePotomac and past the blockaders on Jan. 18th, and cruised eastwardto the African coast and along it from Cape Mount to Cape Palmas, thence to the Canaries and Cape de Verd. She returned very nearlyalong the Equator, thence going toward the West Indies. The cruisewas unlucky, but a few small prizes, laden with palm-oil and ivory, being made. In hazy weather, on March 25th, a large Indiaman (the_Woodbridge_) was captured; but while taking possession the weathercleared up, and Capt. Morris found himself to leeward of 25 sail, two of which, a two-decker and a frigate, were making for him, andit took him till the next day to shake them off. He entered Savannahon May 1st and sailed again on the 8th, standing in to the GulfStream, between Makanillan and Florida, to look out for the Jamaicafleet. He found this fleet on the 24th, but the discovery failedto do him much good, as the ships were under the convoy of a 74, two frigates, and three brigs. The _Adams_ hovered on their skirtsfor a couple of days, but nothing could be done with them, for themerchant-men sailed in the closest possible order and the six warvessels exercised the greatest vigilance. So the corvette passednorthward to the Newfoundland Banks, where she met with nothing butfogs and floating ice, and then turned her prow toward Ireland. OnJuly 4th she made out and chased two sail, who escaped into the mouthof the Shannon. After this the _Adams_, heartily tired of fogs andcold, stood to the southward and made a few prizes; then, in lat. 44° N. , long. 10° W. , on July 15th, she stumbled across the 18-pounder36-gun frigate _Tigris_, Capt. Henderson. The frigate was to leeward, and a hard chase ensued. It was only by dint of cutting away heranchors and throwing overboard some of her guns that the _Adams_held her own till sunset, when it fell calm. Capt. Morris and hisfirst lieutenant, Mr. Wadsworth, had been the first and secondlieutenants of _Old Ironsides_ in Hull's famous cruise, and theyproved that they had not forgotten their early experience, for theygot out the boats to tow, and employed their time so well that bysunrise the frigate was two leagues astern. After 18 hours' morechase the _Adams_ dropped her. But in a day or two she ran acrossa couple more, one of which, an old bluff-bows, was soon thrown out;but the other was very fast, and kept close on the corvette's heels. As before, the frigate was to leeward. The _Adams_ had been builtby contract; one side was let to a sub-contractor of economicalinstincts, and accordingly turned out rather shorter than the other;the result was, the ship sailed a good deal faster on one tack thanon the other. In this chase she finally got on her good tack in thenight, and so escaped. [Footnote: This statement is somewhattraditional; I have also seen it made about the _John Adams_. Butsome old officers have told me positively that it occurred to the_Adams_ on this cruise. ] Capt. Morris now turned homeward. Duringhis two cruises he had made but 10 prizes (manned by 161 men), noneof very great value. His luck grew worse and worse. The continualcold and damp produced scurvy, and soon half of his crew wereprostrated by the disease; and the weather kept on foggy as ever. Off the Maine coast a brig-sloop (the _Rifleman_, Capt. Pearce) wasdiscovered and chased, but it escaped in the thick weather. The foggrew heavier, and early on the morning of Aug. 17th the _Adams_ struckland--literally struck it, too, for she grounded on the Isle of Haute, and had to throw over provisions, spare spars, etc. , before she couldbe got off. Then she entered the Penobscot, and sailed 27 miles upit to Hampden. The _Rifleman_ meanwhile conveyed intelligence ofher whereabouts to a British fleet, consisting of two line-of-battleships, three frigates, three sloops, and ten troop transports, underthe joint command of Rear-Admiral Griffeth and Lieutenant-GeneralSherbrooke. [Footnote: James, vi, 479. ] This expedition accordingly went into the Penobscot and anchoredoff Castine. Captain Morris made every preparation he could to defendhis ship, but his means were very limited; seventy of his men weredead or disabled by the scurvy; the remainder, many of them alsodiseased, were mustered out, to the number of 130 officers and seamen(without muskets) and 20 marines. He was joined, however, by 30regulars, and later by over 300 militia armed with squirrel guns, ducking- and fowling-pieces, etc. , --in all between 500 and 550 men, [Footnote: "Autobiography of Commodore Morris. "] only 180 of whom, with 50 muskets among them, could be depended upon. On Sept. 3d theBritish advanced by land and water, the land-force being under thedirection of Lieutenant-Colonel John, and consisting of 600 troops, 80 marines, and 80 seamen. [Footnote: James, vi. 481. Whenever militiaare concerned James has not much fear of official documents and letshis imagination run riot; he here says the Americans had 1, 400 men, which is as accurate as he generally is in writing about this speciesof force. His aim being to overestimate the number of the Americansin the various engagements, he always supplies militia _ad libitum_, to make up any possible deficiency. ] The flotilla was composed ofbarges, launches, and rocket-boats, under the command of CaptainBarry of the _Dragon_, 74. In all there were over 1, 500 men. Theseamen of the _Adams_, from the wharf, opened fire on the flotilla, which returned it with rockets and carronades; but the advance waschecked. Meanwhile the British land-forces attacked the militia, who acted up to the traditional militia standard, and retreated withthe utmost promptitude and celerity, omitting the empty formalityof firing. This left Captain Morris surrounded by eight times hisnumber, and there was nothing to do but set fire to the corvetteand retreat. The seamen, marines, and regulars behaved well, andno attempt was made to molest them. None of Captain Morris' menwere hit; his loss was confined to one sailor and one marine whowere too much weakened by scurvy to retreat with the others, whomarched to Portland, 200 miles off. The British lost ten men killedor wounded. On Sept. 9th Gunboats No. 160 and 151, commanded by Mr. Thomas M. Pendleton, captured off Sapoleo Bar, Ga. , the British privateer_Fortune of War_, armed with two heavy pivot guns, and 35 men. Shemade a brief resistance, losing two of her men. [Footnote: Letterfrom Commodore H. E. Campbell, St. Mary's, Sept. 12, 1814. ] On Sept. 15th the British 20-gun ship-sloops _Hermes_ and _Carron_, and 18-gun brig-sloops _Sophie_ and _Childers_, and a force of 200men on shore, [Footnote: James, vi, 527. ] attacked Fort Bowyer, onMobile Point, but were repulsed without being able to do any damagewhatever to the Americans. The _Hermes_ was sunk and the assailantslost about 80 men. [Illustration: Captain Samuel C. Reid: a portrait painted by JohnWesley Jarvis in 1815. (Courtesy U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] On the 26th of September, while the privateer-schooner _GeneralArmstrong_, of New York, Captain Samuel C. Reid, of one long 24, eight long 9's, and 90 men, was lying at anchor in the road of Fayal, a British squadron, composed of the _Plantagenet_, 74, Captain RobertFloyd, _Rota_, 38, Captain Philip Somerville, and _Carnation_, 18, Captain George Bentham, hove in sight. [Footnote: Letter of CaptainS. C. Reid, Oct. 7, 1814; and of John B. Dabney, Consul at Fayal, Oct. 5, 1814. ] One or more boats were sent in by the British, toreconnoitre the schooner, as they asserted, or, according to theAmerican accounts, to carry her by a _coup de main_. At any rate, after repeatedly warning them off, the privateer fired into them, and they withdrew. Captain Reid then anchored, with springs on hiscables, nearer shore, to await the expected attack, which was notlong deferred. At 8 P. M. Four boats from the _Plantagenet_ and threefrom the _Rota_, containing in all 180 men, [Footnote: James, vi, 509: Both American accounts say 12 boats, with 400 men, and givethe British loss as 250. According to my usual rule, I take eachside's statement of its own force and loss. ] under the command ofLieutenant William Matterface, first of the _Rota_, pulled in towardthe road, while the _Carnation_ accompanied them to attack the schoonerif she got under way. The boats pulled in under cover of a smallreef of rocks, where they lay for some time, and about midnightmade the attack. The Americans opened with the pivot gun, andimmediately afterward with their long 9's, while the boats repliedwith their carronades, and, pulling spiritedly on amidst a terrificfire of musketry from both sides, laid the schooner aboard on herbow and starboard quarter. The struggle was savage enough, the Britishhacking at the nettings and trying to clamber up on deck, while theAmericans fired their muskets and pistols in the faces of theirassailants and thrust the foremost through with their long pikes. The boats on the quarter were driven off; but on the forecastle allthree of the American lieutenants were killed or disabled, and themen were giving back when Captain Reid led all the after-divisionup and drove the British back into their boats. This put an end tothe assault. Two boats were sunk, most of the wounded being savedas the shore was so near; two others were captured, and but threeof the scattered flotilla returned to the ships. Of the Americans, 2 were killed, including the second lieutenant, Alexander O. Williams, and 7 were wounded, including the first and third lieutenants, Frederick A. Worth and Robert Johnson. Of the British, 34 were killedand 86 were wounded; among the former being the Rota's first andthird lieutenants, William Matterface and Charles R. Norman, andamong the latter her second lieutenant and first lieutenant ofmarines, Richard Rawle and Thomas Park. The schooner's long 24 hadbeen knocked off its carriage by a carronade shot, but it was replacedand the deck cleared for another action. Next day the _Carnation_came in to destroy the privateer, but was driven off by the judicioususe the latter made of her "Long Tom. " But affairs being now hopeless, the _General Armstrong_ was scuttled and burned, and the Americansretreated to the land. The British squadron was bound for New Orleans, and on account of the delay and loss that it suffered, it was latein arriving, so that this action may be said to have helped in savingthe Crescent City. Few regular commanders could have done as wellas Captain Reid. On October 6th, while Gun-boat No. 160 was convoying some coastersfrom Savannah, it was carried by a British tender and nine boats. [Footnote: Letter from Commander H. C. Campbell, Oct. 12, 1814. ]The gun-vessel was lying at anchor about eight leagues from St. Mary's, and the boats approached with muffled oars early in themorning. They were not discovered till nearly aboard, but the defencethough short was spirited, the British losing about 20 men. Of thegun-boat's 30 men but 16 were fit for action: those, underSailing-master Thomas Paine, behaved well. Mr. Paine, especially, fought with the greatest gallantry; his thigh was broken by agrape-shot at the very beginning, but he hobbled up on his otherleg to resist the boarders, fighting till he was thrust through bya pike and had received two sabre cuts. Any one of his wounds wouldhave been enough to put an ordinary man _hors de combat_. On October 11th, another desperate privateer battle took place. The brigantine _Prince-de-Neufchatel_, Captain Ordronaux, of NewYork, was a superbly built vessel of 310 tons, mounting 17 guns, and originally possessing a crew of 150 men. [Footnote: "Historyof American Privateers, " by George Coggeshall, p. 241, New York, 1876. ] She had made a very successful cruise, having on board goodsto the amount of $300, 000, but had manned and sent in so many prizesthat only 40 of her crew were left on board, while 37 prisoners wereconfined in the hold. One of her prizes was in company, but haddrifted off to such a distance that she was unable to take part inthe fight. At mid-day, on the 11th of October, while off Nantucket, the British frigate _Endymion_, 40, Captain Henry Hope, discoveredthe privateer and made sail in chase. [Footnote: James, vi, p. 527. ]At 8. 30 P. M. , a calm having come on, the frigate despatched 5 boats, containing 111 men, [Footnote: According to Captain Ordronaux; Jamesdoes not give the number, but says 28 were killed, 37 wounded, andthe crew of the launch captured. Ten of the latter were unwounded, and 18 wounded. I do not know if he included these last among his"37 wounded. "] under the command of the first lieutenant, Abel Hawkins, to take the brigantine; while the latter triced up the boardingnettings, loaded the guns with grape and bullets, and prepared herselfin every way for the coming encounter. She opened fire on the boatsas they drew near, but they were soon alongside, and a most desperateengagement ensued. Some of the British actually cut through thenettings and reached the deck, but were killed by the privateersmen;and in a few minutes one boat was sunk, three others drifted off, and the launch, which was under the brigantine's stern, was takenpossession of. The slaughter had been frightful, considering thenumber of the combatants. The victorious privateersmen had lost7 killed, 15 badly and 9 slightly wounded, leaving but 9 untouched!Of the _Endymion's_ men, James says 28, including the first lieutenantand a midshipman, were killed, and 37, including the second lieutenantand a master's mate, wounded; "besides which the launch was capturedand the crew made prisoners. " I do not know if this means 37 wounded, _besides_ the wounded in the launch, or not [Footnote: I think Jamesdoes not include the wounded in the launch, as he says 28 woundedwere sent aboard the _Saturn_; this could hardly have included themen who had been captured. ]; of the prisoners captured 18 werewounded and 10 unhurt, so the loss was either 28 killed, 55 wounded, and 10 unhurt prisoners; or else 28 killed, 37 wounded, and 10prisoners; but whether the total was 93 or 75 does not much matter. It was a most desperate conflict, and, remembering how short-handedthe brigantine was, it reflected the highest honor on the Americancaptain and his crew. After their repulse before Baltimore the British concentrated theirforces for an attack upon New Orleans. Accordingly a great fleetof line-of-battle ships, frigates, and smaller vessels, underVice-Admiral Cochrane, convoying a still larger number of store-shipsand transports, containing the army of General Packenham, appearedoff the Chandeleur Islands on Dec. 8th. The American navy in theseparts consisted of the ship _Louisiana_ and schooner _Carolina_ inthe Mississippi river, and in the shallow bayous a few gun-boats, of course without quarters, low in the water, and perfectly easyof entrance. There were also a few tenders and small boats. TheBritish frigates and sloops anchored off the broad, shallow inletcalled Lake Borgne on the 12th; on this inlet there were 5 gun-boatsand 2 small tenders, under the command of Lieut. Thomas Catesby Jones. It was impossible for the British to transport their troops acrossLake Borgne, as contemplated, until this flotilla was destroyed. Accordingly, on the night of the 12th, 42 launches, armed with24-, 18-, and 12-pounder carronades, and 3 unarmed gigs, carrying980 seamen and marines, under the orders of Capt. Lockyer, [Footnote:James, vi, 521. ] pushed off from the _Armide_, 38, in three divisions;the first under the command of Capt. Lockyer, the second under Capt. Montresor, and the third under Capt. Roberts. [Footnote: Letter ofCapt. Lockyer to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, Dec. 18, 1814. ] Lieut. Joneswas at anchor with his boats at the Malheureux Islands, when hediscovered, on the 13th, the British flotilla advancing toward PortChristian. He at once despatched the _Seahorse_ of one 6-pounderand 14 men, under Sailing-master William Johnston, to destroy thestores at Bay St. Louis. She moored herself under the bank, whereshe was assisted by two 6-pounders. There the British attacked herwith seven of their smaller boats, which were repulsed after sustainingfor nearly half an hour a very destructive fire. [Footnote: James, vi, 521. ] However, Mr. Johnston had to burn his boat to prevent itfrom being taken by a larger force. Meanwhile Lieut. Jones got underway with the five gun-vessels, trying to reach Les Petites Coquilles, near a small fort at the mouth of a creek. But as the wind was lightand baffling, and the current very strong, the effort was given up, and the vessels came to anchor off Malheureux Island passage at1 A. M. On the 14th. [Footnote: Official letter of Lieut. Jones, March12, 1815. ] The other tender, the _Alligator_, Sailing-master Sheppard, of one 4-pounder and 8 men, was discovered next morning trying toget to her consorts, and taken with a rush by Capt. Roberts and hisdivision. At daybreak Lieut. Jones saw the British boats about ninemiles to the eastward, and moored his 5-gun vessel abreast in thechannel, with their boarding nettings triced up, and every thingin readiness; but the force of the current drifted two of them, Nos. 156 and 163, a hundred yards down the pass and out of line, No. 156 being the headmost of all. Their exact force was as follows:No. 156, Lieut. Jones, 41 men and 5 guns (1 long 24 and 4 12-poundcarronades); No. 163, Sailing-master Geo. Ulrick, 21 men, 3 guns(1 long 24 and 2 12-pound carronades); No. 162, Lieut. Robert Speddes, 35 men, 5 guns (1 long 24 and 4 light sixes); No. 5, Sailing-masterJohn D. Ferris, 36 men, 5 guns (1 long 24, 4 12-pound carronades);No. 23, Lieut. Isaac McKeever, 39 men and 5 guns (1 long 32 and 4light sixes). There were thus, in all, 182 men and a broadside of14 guns, throwing 212 pounds of shot. The British forces amounted, as I have said, to 980 men, and (supposing they had equal numbersof 24's, 18's and 12's, ) the flotilla threw seven hundred andfifty-eight pounds of shot. The odds of course were not as muchagainst the Americans as these figures would make them, for theywere stationary, had some long, heavy guns and boarding nettings;on the other hand the fact that two of their vessels had driftedout of line was a very serious misfortune. At any rate, the oddswere great enough, considering that he had British sailors to dealwith, to make it any thing but a cheerful look-out for Lieut. Jones;but nowise daunted by the almost certain prospect of defeat the Americanofficers and seamen prepared very coolly for the fight. In thisconnection it should be remembered that simply to run the boats onshore would have permitted the men to escape, if they had chosen todo so. [Illustration: The Battle of Lake Borgne: an early-19th-centurypainting by Thomas Hornbrook. (Courtesy U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] Captain Lockyer acted as coolly as his antagonist. When he had reacheda point just out of gun-shot, he brought the boats to a grapnel, to let the sailors eat breakfast and get a little rest after thefatigue of their long row. When his men were rested and in good trimhe formed the boats in open order, and they pulled gallantly on againstthe strong current. At 10. 50 the Americans opened fire from theirlong guns, and in about 15 minutes the cannonade became general onboth sides. At 11. 50 [Footnote: Lieut. Jones' letter. ] Captain Lockyer'sbarge was laid alongside No. 156, and a very obstinate struggle ensued, "in which the greater part of the officers and crew of the barge werekilled or wounded, " [Footnote: Captain Lockyer's letter. ] includingamong the latter the gallant captain himself, severely, and his equallygallant first lieutenant, Mr. Pratt, of the _Seahorse_ frigate, mortally. At the same time Lieut. Tatnall (of the _Tonnant_) also laid hisbarge aboard the gun-boat, only to have it sunk; another shared thesame fate; and the assailants were for the moment repulsed. But atthis time Lieut. Jones, who had shown as much personal bravery duringthe assault, as forethought in preparing for it, received a dangerousand disabling wound, while many of his men received the same fate;the boarding nettings, too, had all been cut or shot away. Severalmore barges at once assailed the boats, the command of which haddevolved on a young midshipman, Mr. George Parker; the latter, fightingas bravely as his commander, was like him severely wounded, whereuponthe boat was carried at 12. 10. Its guns were turned on No. 163, andthis, the smallest of the gun-boats, was soon taken; then the Britishdashed at No. 162 and carried it, after a very gallant defence, inwhich Lieut. Speddes was badly wounded. No. 5 had her long 24 dismountedby the recoil, and was next carried; finally, No. 23, being leftentirely alone, hauled down her flag at 12. 30. [Footnote: Minutesof the Court of Inquiry, held May 15, 1851. *] The Americans had lost6 killed and 35 wounded; the British 17 killed and 77 (many mortally)wounded. The greater part of the loss on both sides occurred in boardingNo. 156, and also the next two gun-boats. __________________________________* Poster's note: the date 1851 above may well have been 1815in the original; if you have a copy of this book, we wouldappreciate confirmation. __________________________________ I have in this case, as usual, taken each commander's account ofhis own force and loss. Lieut. Jones states the British force tohave been 1, 000, which tallies almost exactly with their own account;but believes that they lost 300 in killed and wounded. CaptainLockyer, on the other hand, gives the Americans 225 men and threeadditional light guns. But on the main points the two accounts agreeperfectly. The victors certainly deserve great credit for theperseverance, gallantry and dash they displayed; but still morebelongs to the vanquished for the cool skill and obstinate couragewith which they fought, although with the certainty of ultimate defeatbefore them, --which is always the severest test of bravery. No commentis needed to prove the effectiveness of their resistance. Even Jamessays that the Americans made an obstinate struggle, that Lieut. Jonesdisplayed great personal bravery, and that the British loss was verysevere. On the night of Dec. 23d Gen. Jackson beat up the quarters of theBritish encamped on the bank of the Mississippi. The attack wasopened by Capt. Patterson in the schooner _Carolina_, 14; she wasmanned by 70 men, and mounted on each side six 12-pound carronadesand one long 12. Dropping down the stream unobserved, till oppositethe bivouac of the troops and so close to the shore that his firstcommand to fire was plainly heard by the foe, Patterson opened aslaughtering cannonade on the flank of the British, and kept it upwithout suffering any loss in return, as long as the attack lasted. But on the 27th the British had their revenge, attacking the littleschooner as she lay at anchor, unable to ascend the current on accountof the rapid current and a strong head-wind. The assailants had abattery of 5 guns, throwing hot shot and shell, while the only gunof the schooner's that would reach was the long 12. After half anhour's fighting the schooner was set on fire and blown up; the crewescaped to the shore with the loss of 7 men killed and wounded. Theonly remaining vessel, exclusive of some small, unarmed row-boats, was the _Louisiana_, 16, carrying on each side eight long 24's. Shewas of great assistance in the battle of the 28th, throwing duringthe course of the cannonade over 800 shot, and suffering very littlein return. [Footnote: Cooper, ii, p. 320. ] Afterward the Americanseamen and marines played a most gallant part in all the engagementson shore; they made very efficient artillerists. SUMMARY. The following vessels were got ready for sea during this year:[Footnote: Am. State Papers, xiv, p. 828; also Emmons' statistical"History. "] Name. Rig. Where Built. Cost. Men. Guns. Tons. Remarks _Wasp_, Ship Newburyport $77, 459. 60 160 22 509 Built_Frolic_, " Boston 72, 094. 82 " " " "_Peacock_, " New York 75, 644. 36 " " " "_Ontario_, " Baltimore 59, 343. 69 " " " "_Erie_, " " 56, 174. 36 " " " "_Tom Bowline_, Schooner Portsmouth 13, 000. 00 90 12 260 Purchased_Lynx_, " Washington 50 6 Built_Epervier_, Brig England 50, 000. 00 130 18 477 Captured_Flambeau_, " Baltimore 14, 000. 00 90 14 300 Purchased-+- _Spark_, " " 17, 389. 00 " " " " | _Firefly_, " " 17, 435. 00 " " 333 " | _Torch_, Schooner " 13, 000. 00 60 12 260 " | _Spitfire_, " " 20, 000. 00 " " 286 " '- _Eagle_, " N. O. " " 270 "-+- _Prometheus_, " Philadelphia 20, 000. 00 " " 290 " | _Chippeway_, Brig R. I. 52, 000. 00 90 14 390 " | _Saranac_, " Middleton 26, 000. 00 " " 360 " '- _Boxer_, " " 26, 000. 00 " " 370 "_Despatch_, Schooner 23 2 52 The first 5 small vessels that are bracketed were to cruise underCommodore Porter; the next 4 under Commodore Perry; but the newsof peace arrived before either squadron put to sea. Some of thevessels under this catalogue were really almost ready for sea atthe end of 1813; and some that I have included in the catalogue of1815 were almost completely fitted at the end of 1814, --but thisarrangement is practically the best. LIST OF VESSELS LOST TO THE BRITISH. 1. Destroyed by British Armies. Name. Tons. Guns. _Columbia_, 1, 508 52-+- Destroyed to prevent them_Adams_, 760 28 | falling into hands of enemy. _Argus_. 509 22 '-_Carolina_. 230 14 Destroyed by battery. ----- ---- 3, 007 116 2. Captured, Etc. , By British Navy on Ocean. Name. Tons. Guns. _Essex_. 860 46 Captured by frigate and corvette. _Frolic_. 509 22 " by frigate and schooner. _Rattlesnake_, 258 16 " by frigate. _Syren_, 250 16 " by seventy-four. --- ---- 1, 877 100 Total, 4, 884 tons. 216 guns There were also a good many gun-boats, which I do not count, because, as already said, they were often not as large as the barges thatwere sunk and taken in attacking them, as at Craney Island, etc. LIST OF VESSELS TAKEN FROM THE BRITISH. 1. Captured by American Privateers. Name. Tons. Guns. _Ballabou_, 86 4_Landrail_, 76 4 2. Captured, Etc. , By British Navy on Ocean. Name. Tons. Guns. _Epervier_, 477 18 captured by sloop _Peacock_. _Avon_, 477 20 sunk " " _Wasp_. _Reindeer_, 477 19 " " " ". _Pictou_, 300 14 captured by frigate. 3. Sunk in Attacking Fort. Name. Tons. Guns. _Hermes_, 500 22 ----- ----- 2, 393 101 Taking into account the losses on the lakes, there was not very muchdifference in the amount of damage done to each combatant by the other;but both as regards the material results and the moral effects, thebalance inclined largely to the Americans. The chief damage doneto our navy was by the British land-forces, and consisted mainlyin forcing us to burn an unfinished frigate and sloop. On the oceanour three sloops were captured in each case by an overwhelming force, against which no resistance could be made, and the same was trueof the captured British schooner. The _Essex_ certainly gained asmuch honor as her opponents. There were but three single ship actions, in all of which the Americans were so superior in force as to givethem a very great advantage; nevertheless, in two of them the victorywas won with such perfect impunity and the difference in the lossand damage inflicted was so very great, that I doubt if the resultwould have been affected if the odds had been reversed. In the othercase, that of the _Reindeer_, the defeated party fought at a stillgreater disadvantage, and yet came out of the conflict with fullas much honor as the victor. No man with a particle of generosityin his nature can help feeling the most honest admiration for theunflinching courage and cool skill displayed by Capt. Manners andhis crew. It is worthy of notice (remembering the sneers of so manyof the British authors at the "wary circumspection" of the Americans)that Capt. Manners, who has left a more honorable name than any otherBritish commander of the war, excepting Capt. Broke, behaved withthe greatest caution as long as it would serve his purpose, whilehe showed the most splendid personal courage afterward. It is thiscombination of courage and skill that made him so dangerous anantagonist; it showed that the traditional British bravery was notimpaired by refusing to adhere to the traditional British tacticsof rushing into a fight "bull-headed. " Needless exposure to dangerdenotes not so much pluck as stupidity. Capt. Manners had no intentionof giving his adversary any advantage he could prevent. No one canhelp feeling regret that he was killed; but if he was to fall, whatmore glorious death could he meet? It must be remembered that whilepaying all homage to Capt. Manners, Capt. Blakely did equally well. It was a case where the victory between two combatants, equal incourage and skill, was decided by superior weight of metal and numberof men. PRIZES MADE. Name of ship. Number of prizes. _President_ 3_Constitution_ 6_Adams_ 10_Frolic_ 2_Wasp_ 15_Peacock_ 15_Hornet_ 1Small craft 35 --- 87 Chapter VIII 1814 ON THE LAKES _ONTARIO-The contest one of ship-building merely--Extreme cautionof the commanders, verging on timidity--Yeo takes Oswego, andblockades Sackett's Harbor--British gun-boats captured--Chauncyblockades Kingston--ERIE--Captain Sinclair's unsuccessfulexpedition--Daring and successful cutting-out expeditions of theBritish--CHAMPLAIN--Macdonough's victory. _ Ontario. The winter was spent by both parties in preparing more formidablefleets for the ensuing summer. All the American schooners had provedthemselves so unfit for service that they were converted intotransports, except the _Sylph_, which was brig-rigged and armed likethe _Oneida_. Sackett's Harbor possessed but slight fortifications, and the Americans were kept constantly on the alert, through fearlest the British should cross over. Commodore Chauncy and Mr. Eckfordwere as unremitting in their exertions as ever. In February two 22-gunbrigs, the _Jefferson_ and _Jones_, and one large frigate of 50 guns, the _Superior_, were laid; afterward a deserter brought in news ofthe enormous size of one of the new British frigates, and the_Superior_ was enlarged to permit her carrying 62 guns. The _Jefferson_was launched on April 7th, the _Jones_ on the 10th; and the _Superior_on May 2d, --an attempt on the part of the British to blow her uphaving been foiled a few days before. Another frigate, the _Mohawk_, 42, was at once begun. Neither guns nor men for the first three shipshad as yet arrived, but they soon began to come in, as the roadsgot better and the streams opened. Chauncy and Eckford, besidesbuilding ships that were literally laid down in the forest, andseeing that they were armed with heavy guns, which, as well as alltheir stores, had to be carried overland hundreds of miles throughthe wilderness, were obliged to settle quarrels that occurred amongthe men, the most serious being one that arose from a sentinel'saccidentally killing a shipwright, whose companions instantly struckwork in a body. What was more serious, they had to contend with suchconstant and virulent sickness that it almost assumed the proportionsof a plague. During the winter it was seldom that two thirds of theforce were fit for duty, and nearly a sixth of the whole number ofmen in the port died before navigation opened. [Footnote: Coopermentions that in five months the _Madison_ buried a fifth of her crew. ] Meanwhile Yeo had been nearly as active at Kingston, laying downtwo frigates and a huge line-of-battle ship, but his shipwrightsdid not succeed in getting the latter ready much before navigationclosed. The _Prince Regent_, 58, and _Princess Charlotte_, 42, werelaunched on April 15th. I shall anticipate somewhat by giving tabularlists of the comparative forces, after the two British frigates, thetwo American frigates, and the two American brigs had all been equippedand manned. Commodore Yeo's original six cruisers had been all renamed, some of them re-armed, and both the schooners changed into brigs. The _Wolfe_, _Royal George_, _Melville_, _Moira_, _Beresford_, and_Sydney Smith_, were now named respectively _Montreal_, _Niagara_, _Star_, _Charwell_, _Netly_, and _Magnet_. On the American side therehad been but slight changes, beyond the alteration of the _Sylph_into a brig armed like the _Oneida_. Of the _Superior's_ 62 guns, 4 were very shortly sent on shore again. CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON. Broadside Name. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal. Armament. _Superior_, ship, 1, 580 500 1, 050lbs. +- 30 long 32's | 2 " 24's - 26 short 42's_Mohawk_, " 1, 350 350 554 lbs. -+- 26 long 24's | 2 " 18's '- 14 short 32's_Pike_, " 875 300 360 " -+- 26 long 24's '- 2 " 24's_Madison_, " 593 200 364 " -+- 2 long 12's '- 22 short 32's_Jones_, brig, 500 160 332 " -+- 2 long 12's '- 20 short 32's_Jefferson_, " 500 160 332 " -+- 2 long 12's '- 20 short 32's_Sylph_, " 300 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12's '- 14 short 24's_Oneida_, " 243 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12's '- 14 short 24's__________ _____ _____ __________ ________8 vessels, 5, 941 1, 870 3, 352 lbs. 228 guns. This is considerably less than James makes it, as he includes allthe schooners, which were abandoned as cruisers, and only used astransports or gun-boats. Similarly Sir James had a large number ofgun-boats, which are not included in his cruising force. James thusmakes Chauncy's force 2, 321 men, and a broadside of 4, 188 lbs. YEO'S SQUADRON BroadsideName. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal. Armament. _Prince ship, 1, 450 485 872 lbs. -+- 32 long 24's Regent_, | 4 short 68's '- 22 " 32's_Princess " 1, 215 315 604 " -+- 26 long 24's Charlotte_, | 2 short 68's '- 14 " 32's_Montreal_, " 637 220 258 " -+- 7 long 24's '- 18 " 18's_Niagara_, " 510 200 332 " -+- 2 long 12's '- 20 short 32's_Charwell_, brig, 279 110 236 " -+- 2 long 12's '-14 short 32's_Star_, " 262 110 236 " -+- 2 long 12's '-14 short 32's_Netly_, " 216 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12's '-14 short 24's_Magnet_, " 187 80 156 " -+- 2 long 12's '-12 short 24's__________ _____ _____ _________ ________8 vessels, 4, 756 1, 620 2, 874 lbs. 209 guns. This tallies pretty well with James' statement, which (on p. 488)is 1, 517 men, and a broadside of 2, 752 lbs. But there are veryprobably errors as regards the armaments of the small brigs, whichwere continually changed. At any rate the American fleet was certainlythe stronger, about in the proportion of six to five. The disproportionwas enough to justify Sir James in his determination not to hazarda battle, although the odds were certainly not such as Britishcommanders had been previously accustomed to pay much regard to. Chauncy would have acted exactly as his opponent did, had he beensimilarly placed. The odds against the British commodore were toogreat to be overcome, where the combatants were otherwise on a par, although the refusal to do battle against them would certainly precludeYeo from advancing any claims to _superiority_ in skill or courage. The _Princess Charlotte_ and _Niagara_ were just about equal to the_Mohawk_ and _Madison_, and so were the _Charwell_ and _Netly_ tothe _Oneida_ and _Sylph_; but both the _Star_ and _Magnet_ togethercould hardly have matched either the _Jones_ or the _Jefferson_, while the main-deck 32's of the _Superior_ gave her a great advantageover the _Prince Regent's_ 24's, where the crews were so equal; andthe _Pike_ was certainly too heavy for the _Montreal_. A decidedsuperiority in the effectiveness of both crews and captains couldalone have warranted Sir James Lucas Yeo in engaging, and thissuperiority he certainly did not possess. This year the British architects outstripped ours in the race forsupremacy, and Commodore Yeo put out of port with his eight vesselslong before the Americans were ready. His first attempt was asuccessful attack on Oswego. This town is situated some 60 milesdistant from Sackett's Harbor, and is the first port on the lakewhich the stores, sent from the seaboard to Chauncy, reached. Accordingly it was a place of some little importance, but was verymuch neglected by the American authorities. It was insufficientlygarrisoned, and was defended only by an entirely ruined fort of 6guns, two of them dismounted. Commodore Yeo sailed from Kingstonto attack it on the 3d of May, having on board his ships a detachmentof 1, 080 troops. Oswego was garrisoned by less than 300 men, [Footnote:General order of Gen. Jacob Brown, by R. Jones, Ass. Adj. -General, May 12, 1814. ] chiefly belonging to a light artillery regiment, witha score or two of militia; they were under the command of ColonelMitchell. The recaptured schooner _Growler_ was in port, with 7 gunsdestined for the Harbor; she was sunk by her commander, but afterwardraised and carried off by the foe. On the 5th Yeo appeared off Oswego and sent in Captain Collier and13 gun-boats to draw the fort's fire; after some firing between themand the four guns mounted in the fort (two long 24's, one long 12, and one long 6), the gun-boats retired. The next day the attack wasseriously made. The _Princess Charlotte_, _Montreal_, and _Niagara_engaged the batteries, while the _Charwell_ and _Star_ scoured thewoods with grape to clear them of the militia. [Footnote: Letter ofGeneral Gordon Drummond, May 7, 1814. ] The debarkation of the troopswas superintended by Captain O'Connor, and until it was accomplishedthe _Montreal_ sustained almost the whole fire of the fort, beingset on fire three times, and much cut up in hull, masts, and rigging. [Footnote: Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, May 17, 1814. ] Under thisfire 800 British troops were landed, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, assisted by 200 seamen, armed with long pikes, under Captain Mulcaster. They moved gallantly up the hill, under a heavy fire, and carriedthe fort by assault; Mitchell then fell back unmolested to the Falls, about 12 miles above the town, where there was a large quantity ofstores. But he was not again attacked. The Americans lost 6 men killed, including Lieutenant Blaeny, 38 wounded, and 25 missing, both ofthese last falling into the enemy's hands. The British lost 22soldiers, marines, and seamen (including Captain Hollaway) killed, and 73 (including the gallant Captain Mulcaster dangerously, andCaptain Popham slightly) wounded, [Footnote: Letter of Lieut. -Col. V. Fischer, May 17, 1814. James says "18 killed and 64 wounded, "why I do not know; the official report of Col. Fischer, as quoted, says: "Of the army, 19 killed and 62 wounded; of the navy, 3 killedand 11 wounded. "] the total loss being 95--nearly a third of theAmerican force engaged. General Drummond, in his official letter, reports that "the fort being everywhere almost open, the whole ofthe garrison * * * effected their escape, except about 60 men, halfof them wounded. " No doubt the fort's being "everywhere almost open"afforded excellent opportunities for retreat; but it was not muchof a recommendation of it as a structure intended for defence. The British destroyed the four guns in the battery, and raised the_Growler_ and carried her off, with her valuable cargo of seven longguns. They also carried off a small quantity of ordnance stores andsome flour, and burned the barracks; otherwise but little damage wasdone, and the Americans reoccupied the place at once. It certainlyshowed great lack of energy on Commodore Yeo's part that he did notstrike a really important blow by sending an expedition up to destroythe quantity of stores and ordnance collected at the Falls. But theattack itself was admirably managed. The ships were well placed, and kept up so heavy a fire on the fort as to effectually cover thedebarkation of the troops, which was very cleverly accomplished; andthe soldiers and seamen behaved with great gallantry and steadiness, their officers leading them, sword in hand, up a long, steep hill, under a destructive fire. It was similar to Chauncy's attacks onYork and Fort George, except that in this case the assailants suffereda much severer loss compared to that inflicted on the assailed. ColonelMitchell managed the defence with skill, doing all he could withhis insufficient materials. After returning to Kingston, Yeo sailed with his squadron forSackett's Harbor, where he appeared on May 19th and began a strictblockade. This was especially troublesome because most of the gunsand cables for the two frigates had not yet arrived, and though thelighter pieces and stores could be carried over land, the heavierones could only go by water, which route was now made dangerous bythe presence of the blockading squadron. The very important dutyof convoying these great guns was entrusted to Captain Woolsey, anofficer of tried merit. He decided to take them by water to StonyCreek, whence they might be carried by land to the Harbor, whichwas but three miles distant; and on the success of his enterprisedepended Chauncy's chances of regaining command of the lake. Onthe 28th of May, at sunset, Woolsey left Oswego with 19 boats, carrying 21 long 32's, 10 long 24's, three 42-pound carronades, and10 cables--one of the latter, for the _Superior_, being a huge rope22 inches in circumference and weighing 9, 600 pounds. The boatsrowed all through the night, and at sunrise on the 29th 18 of themfound themselves off the Big Salmon River, and, as it was unsafeto travel by daylight, Woolsey ran up into Big Sandy Creek, 8 milesfrom the Harbor. The other boat, containing two long 24's and acable, got out of line, ran into the British squadron, and wascaptured. The news she brought induced Sir James Yeo at once tosend out an expedition to capture the others. He accordinglydespatched Captains Popham and Spilsbury in two gun-boats, one armedwith one 68-pound and one 24-pound carronade, and the other witha long 32, accompanied by three cutters and a gig, mounting betweenthem two long 12's and two brass 6's, with a total of 180 men. [Footnote: James, vi. 487; while Cooper says 186, James says theBritish loss was 18 killed and 50 wounded; Major Appling says "14were killed, 28 wounded, and 27 marines and 106 sailors captured. "]They rowed up to Sandy Creek and lay off its mouth all the night, and began ascending it shortly after daylight on the 30th. Theirforce, however, was absurdly inadequate for the accomplishment oftheir object. Captain Woolsey had been reinforced by some OneidaIndians, a company of light artillery, and some militia, so thathis only care was, not to repulse, but to capture the British partyentire, and even this did not need any exertion. He accordinglydespatched Major Appling down the river with 120 riflemen [Footnote:Letter from Major D. Appling, May 30, 1814. ] and some Indians tolie in ambush. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. M. T. Woolsey, June 1, 1814. There were about 60 Indians: In all, the American force amountedto 180 men. James adds 30 riflemen, 140 Indians, and "a large bodyof militia and cavalry, "--none of whom were present. ] When goingup the creek the British marines, under Lieutenant Cox, were landedon the left bank, and the small-arm men, under Lieutenant Brown, on the right bank; while the two captains rowed up the stream betweenthem, throwing grape into the bushes to disperse the Indians. MajorAppling waited until the British were close up, when his riflemenopened with so destructive a volley as to completely demoralize and"stampede" them, and their whole force was captured with hardly anyresistance, the American having only one man slightly wounded. TheBritish loss was severe, --18 killed and 50 dangerously wounded, according to Captain Popham's report, as quoted by James; or "14killed and 28 wounded, " according to Major Appling's letter. It wasa very clever and successful ambush. On June 6th Yeo raised the blockade of the Harbor, but Chauncy'ssquadron was not in condition to put out till six weeks later, during which time nothing was done by either fleet, except that twovery gallant cutting-out expeditions were successfully attemptedby Lieutenant Francis H. Gregory, U. S. N. On June 16th he left theHarbor, accompanied by Sailing-masters Vaughan and Dixon and 22seamen, in three gigs, to intercept some of the enemy's provisionschooners; on the 19th he was discovered by the British gun-boat_Black Snake_, of one 18-pound carronade and 18 men, commanded byCaptain H. Landon. Lieutenant Gregory dashed at the gun-boat andcarried it without the loss of a man; he was afterward obliged toburn it, but he brought the prisoners, chiefly royal marines, safelyinto port. On the 1st of July he again started out, with Messrs. Vaughan and Dixon, and two gigs. The plucky little party sufferedgreatly from hunger, but on the 5th he made a sudden descent onPresque Isle, and burned a 14-gun schooner just ready for launching;he was off before the foe could assemble, and reached the Harborin safety next day. On July 31st Commodore Chauncy sailed with his fleet; some dayspreviously the larger British vessels had retired to Kingston, wherea 100-gun two-decker was building. Chauncy sailed up to the headof the lake, where he intercepted the small brig _Magnet_. The_Sylph_ was sent in to destroy her, but her crew ran her ashore andburned her. The _Jefferson_, _Sylph_, and _Oneida_ were left to watchsome other small craft in the Niagara; the _Jones_ was kept cruisingbetween the Harbor and Oswego, and with the four larger vesselsChauncy blockaded Yeo's four large vessels lying in Kingston. Thefour American vessels were in the aggregate of 4, 398 tons, mannedby rather more than 1, 350 men, and presenting in broadside 77 guns, throwing 2, 328 lbs. Of shot. The four British vessels measured inall _about_ 3, 812 tons, manned by 1, 220 men, and presenting inbroadside 74 guns, throwing 2, 066 lbs. Of shot. The former were thussuperior by about 15 per cent. , and Sir James Yeo very properlydeclined to fight with the odds against him--although it was a nicercalculation than British commanders had been accustomed to enter into. Major-General Brown had written to Commodore Chauncy on July 13th:"I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field and tomarch in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying forme the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara, and carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct to Kingstonand carry that place. For God's sake let me see you: Sir James willnot fight. " To which Chauncy replied: "I shall afford every assistancein my power to cooperate with the army whenever it can be done withoutlosing sight of the great object for the attainment of which thisfleet has been created, --the capture or destruction of the enemy'sfleet. But that I consider the primary object. * * * We are intendedto seek and fight the enemy's fleet, and I shall not be divertedfrom my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to renderus subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army. " That is, by any"sinister attempt" to make him cooperate intelligently in a reallywell-concerted scheme of invasion. In further support of these nobleand independent sentiments, he writes to the Secretary of the Navyon August 10th [Footnote: See Niles, vii, 12, and other places (under"Chauncy" in index). ], "I told (General Brown) that I should notvisit the head of the lake unless the enemy's fleet did so. * * *To deprive the enemy of an apology for not meeting me, I have sentashore four guns from the _Superior_ to reduce her armament in numberto an equality with the _Prince Regent_'s, yielding the advantageof their 68-pounders. The _Mohawk_ mounts two guns less than the_Princess Charlotte_, and the _Montreal_ and _Niagara_ are equalto the _Pike_ and _Madison_. " He here justifies his refusal toco-operate with General Brown by saying that he was of only equalforce with Sir James, and that he has deprived the latter of "anapology" for not meeting him. This last was not at all true. The_Mohawk_ and _Madison_ were just about equal to the _PrincessCharlotte_ and _Niagara_: but the _Pike_ was half as strong againas the _Montreal_; and Chauncy could very well afford to "yield theadvantage of their 68-pounders, " when in return Sir James had toyield the advantage of Chauncy's long 32's and 42-pound carronades. The _Superior_ was a 32-pounder frigate, and, even without her fourextra guns, was about a fourth heavier than the _Prince Regent_ withher 24-pounders. Sir James was not acting more warily than Chauncyhad acted during June and July, 1813. Then he had a fleet which tonned1, 701, was manned by 680 men, and threw at a broadside 1, 099 lbs. Of shot; and he declined to go out of port or in any way try to checkthe operation of Yeo's fleet which tonned 2, 091, was manned by 770men, and threw at a broadside 1, 374 lbs. Of shot. Chauncy then actedperfectly proper, no doubt, but he could not afford to sneer at Yeofor behaving in the same way. Whatever either commander might write, in reality he well knew that his officers and crews were, man forman, just about on a par with those of his antagonists, and so, afterthe first brush or two, he was exceedingly careful to see that theodds were not against him. Chauncy, in his petulant answers to Brown'sletter, ignored the fact that his superiority of force would preventhis opponent from giving battle, and would, therefore, prevent anything more important than a blockade occurring. His ideas of the purpose for which his command had been created wereerroneous and very hurtful to the American cause. That purpose wasnot, except incidentally, "the destruction of the enemy's fleet";and, if it was, he entirely failed to accomplish it. The real purposewas to enable Canada to be successfully invaded, or to assist inrepelling an invasion of the United States. These services couldonly be efficiently performed by acting in union with the land-forces, for his independent action could evidently have little effect. Theonly important services he had performed had been in attacking FortsGeorge and York, where he _had_ been rendered "subordinate to, andan appendage of, the army. " His only chance of accomplishing anything lay in similar acts of cooperation, and he refused to do these. Had he acted as he ought to have done, and assisted Brown to theutmost, he would certainly have accomplished much more than he did, and might have enabled Brown to assault Kingston, when Yeo's fleetwould of course have been captured. The insubordination, pettystickling for his own dignity, and lack of appreciation of thenecessity of acting in concert that he showed, were the very faultswhich proved most fatal to the success of our various land commandersin the early part of the war. Even had Chauncy's assistance availednothing, he could not have accomplished less than he did. He remainedoff Kingston blockading Yeo, being once or twice blown off by gales. He sent Lieutenant Gregory, accompanied by Midshipman Hart and sixmen, in to reconnoitre on August 25th; the lieutenant ran acrosstwo barges containing 30 men, and was captured after the midshipmanhad been killed and the lieutenant and four men wounded. On September21st he transported General Izard and 3, 000 men from Sackett's Harborto the Genesee; and then again blockaded Kingston until the two-deckerwas nearly completed, when he promptly retired to the Harbor. The equally cautious Yeo did not come out on the lake till Oct. 15th;he did not indulge in the empty and useless formality of blockadinghis antagonist, but assisted the British army on the Niagara frontiertill navigation closed, about Nov. 21st. A couple of days before, Midshipman McGowan headed an expedition to blow up the two-decker(named the _St. Lawrence_) with a torpedo, but was discovered bytwo of the enemy's boats, which he captured and brought in; theattempt was abandoned, because the _St. Lawrence_ was found not tobe lying in Kingston. For this year the material loss again fell heaviest on the British, amounting to one 14-gun brig burned by her crew, one 10-gun schoonerburned on the stocks, three gun-boats, three cutters, and one gigcaptured; while in return the Americans lost one schooner loadedwith seven guns, one boat loaded with two, and a gig captured andfour guns destroyed at Oswego. In men the British loss was heavierstill relatively to that of the Americans, being in killed, wounded, and prisoners about 300 to 80. But in spite of this loss and damage, which was too trivial to be of any account to either side, thesuccess of the season was with the British, inasmuch as they heldcommand over the lake for more than four months, during which timethey could coöperate with their army; while the Americans held itfor barely two months and a half. In fact the conduct of the twofleets on Lake Ontario during the latter part of the war was almostfarcical. As soon as one, by building, acquired the superiority, the foe at once retired to port, where he waited until _he_ had builtanother vessel or two, when he came out, and the other went intoport in turn. Under such circumstances it was hopeless ever to finishthe contest by a stand-up sea-fight, each commander calculating thechances with mathematical exactness. The only hope of destroyingthe enemy's fleet was by cooperating with the land-forces in asuccessful attack on his main post, when he would be forced to beeither destroyed or to fight--and this cooperation Chauncy refusedto give. He seems to have been an excellent organizer, but he didnot use (certainly not in the summer of 1813) his materials by anymeans to the best advantage. He was hardly equal to his opponent, and the latter seems to have been little more than an average officer. Yeo blundered several times, as in the attack on Sackett's Harbor, in not following up his advantage at Oswego, in showing so littleresource in the action off the Genesee, etc. , and he was not troubledby any excess of daring; but during the period when he was actuallycruising against Chauncy on the lake he certainly showed to betteradvantage than the American did. With an inferior force he won apartial victory over his opponent off Niagara, and then kept himin check for six weeks; while Chauncy, with his superior force, wasnot only partially defeated once, but, when he did gain a partialvictory, failed to take advantage of it. In commenting upon the timid and dilatory tactics of the two commanderson Ontario, however, it must be remembered that the indecisive natureof the results attained had been often paralleled by the numeroussimilar encounters that took place on the ocean during the wars ofthe preceding century. In the War of the American Revolution, theEnglish fought some 19 fleet actions with the French, Dutch, andSpaniards; one victory was gained over the French, and one over theSpaniards, while the 17 others were all indecisive, both sides claimingthe victory, and neither winning it. Of course, some of them, thoughindecisive as regards loss and damage, were strategetical victories:thus, Admiral Arbuthnot beat back Admiral Barras off the Chesapeake, in March of 1781; and near the same place in September of the sameyear the French had their revenge in the victory (one at least inits results) of the Comte de Grasse over Sir Thomas Graves. In thefive desperate and bloody combats which De Suffrein waged with SirEdward Hughes in the East Indies, the laurels were very evenly divided. These five conflicts were not rendered indecisive by any overwarinessin manoeuvring, for De Suffrein's attacks were carried out with asmuch boldness as skill, and his stubborn antagonist was never inclinedto baulk him of a fair battle; but the two hardy fighters were soevenly matched that they would pound one another till each was helplessto inflict injury. Very different were the three consecutive battlesthat took place in the same waters, on the 25th of April, 1758, the3d of August, 1758, and on the 10th of September, 1759, between Pocockand d'Aché [Footnote: "La Marine Française sous le Regne de Louis XV, "par Henri Riviere, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur. (Paris et Toulon, 1859), pp. 385 and 439. ], where, by skilfulmanoeuvring, the French admiral saved his somewhat inferior forcefrom capture, and the English admiral gained indecisive victories. M. Riviere, after giving a most just and impartial account of thebattles, sums up with the following excellent criticism. [Footnote:_Ibid_. , p. 425. I pay more attention to the sense than to the letterin my translation. ] "It is this battle, won by Hawke, the 20th of November, 1757, andthe combats of Pocock and d'Aché, from which date two distinct schoolsin the naval affairs of the 18th century: one of these was all forpromptness and audacity, which were regarded as the indispensableconditions for victory; the other, on the contrary, praised skilfuldelays and able evolutions, and created success by science unitedto prudence. * * * But these two schools were true only accordingto circumstances, not absolutely. When two fleets of equal worthare facing one another, as in the War of the American Revolution, then tactics should come into play, and audacity would often be merefoolhardiness. If it happens, on the other hand, as in the Republic, or during the last years of Louis XV, that an irresolute fleet, withoutorganization, has to contend with a fleet prepared in every way, then, on the part of this last, audacity is wisdom and prudence wouldbe cowardice, for it would give an enemy who distrusts himself timeto become more hardy. The only school always true is that one which, freed from all routine, produces men whose genius will unite in one, in knowing how to apply them appropriately, the audacity which willcarry off victory, and the prudence which knows how to obtain it inpreparing for it. " These generalizations are drawn from the results of mighty battles, but they apply just as well to the campaigns carried on on a smallscale, or even to single-ship actions. Chauncy, as already said, does not deserve the praise which most American historians, andespecially Cooper, have lavished on him as well as on all our otherofficers of that period. Such indiscriminate eulogy entirely detractsfrom the worth of a writer's favorable criticisms. Our _average_commander was, I firmly believe, at that time superior to the averagecommander of any other nation; but to get at this average we mustinclude Chauncy, Rodgers, and Angus, as well as Hull, Macdonough, Perry, Porter, Bainbridge, Biddle, Lawrence, and Warrington. Sir James Yeo did to the full as well as his opponent, and like himwas a good organizer; but he did little enough. His campaigns mustbe considered as being conducted well or ill according as he is believedto have commanded better men than his opponent, or not. If, as manyBritish writers contend, his crews were an overmatch for the Americans, man for man, even to a slight degree, then Yeo's conduct was verycowardly; if, on the contrary, the officers and men of the two fleetswere on a par, then he acted properly and outgeneralled his opponent. It is to be regretted that most of the histories written on the subject, on either side of the Atlantic, should be of the "hurrah" order ofliterature, with no attempt whatever to get at the truth, but merelyto explain away the defeats or immensely exaggerate the victoriessuffered or gained by their own side. Erie and the Upper Lakes. Hitherto the vessels on these lakes (as well as on Ontario) had beenunder the command of Commodore Chauncy; but they were now formed intoa separate department, under Captain Arthur Sinclair. The Americanshad, of course, complete supremacy, and no attempt was seriously madeto contest it with them; but they received a couple of stinging, ifnot very important, defeats. It is rather singular that here theBritish, who began with a large force, while there was none whateverto oppose it, should have had it by degrees completely annihilated;and should have then, and not till then, when apparently renderedharmless, have turned round and partially revenged themselves bytwo cutting-out expeditions which were as boldly executed as theywere skilfully planned. Captain Sinclair sailed into Lake Huron with the _Niagara_, _Caledonia_, _Ariel_, _Scorpion_, and _Tigress_, and on July 20th burnt the fortand barracks of St. Joseph, which were abandoned by their garrison. On Aug. 4th he arrived off the fort of Machilimacinac (Mackinaw), which was situated on such an eminence that the guns of the vesselscould not reach it. Accordingly, the troops under Col. Croghan werelanded, covered by the fire of the schooners, very successfully; butwhen they tried to carry the fort they were driven back with the lossof 70 men. Thence Sinclair sailed to the Nattagawassa Creek, attackedand destroyed a block-house three miles up it, which mounted threelight guns, and also a schooner called the _Nancy_; but the commanderof the schooner, Lieutenant Worsely, with his crew, escaped up theriver. Captain Sinclair then departed for Lake Erie, leaving the_Scorpion_, Lieutenant Turner, and _Tigress_, Sailing-master Champlin, to blockade the Nattagawassa. News was received by the British froma party of Indians that the two American vessels were five leaguesapart, and it was at once resolved to attempt their capture. On thefirst of September, in the evening, four boats started out, one mannedby 20 seamen, under Lieutenant Worsely, the three others by 72 soldiersunder Lieutenants Bulger, Armstrong, and Raderhurst of the army--inall 92 men and two guns, a 6- and a 3-pounder. A number of Indiansaccompanied the expedition but took no part in the fighting. At sunseton the 2d the boats arrived at St. Mary's Strait, and spent 24 hoursin finding out where the American schooners were. At 6 P. M. On the 3d, the nearest vessel, the _Tigress_, was made out, six miles off, andthey pulled for her. It was very dark, and they were not discoveredtill they had come within fifty yards, when Champlin at once firedhis long 24 at them; before it could be reloaded the four boats haddashed up, those of Lieutenants Worsely and Armstrong placing themselveson the starboard, and those of Lieutenants Bulger and Raderhurst onthe port side. There was a short, sharp struggle, and the schoonerwas carried. Of her crew of 28 men, 3 were killed and five, includingMr. Champlin, dangerously wounded. The assailants lost three seamenkilled, Lieutenant Bulger, seven soldiers and several seamen wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant A. H. Bulger, Sept. 7, 1814. Jamessays only 3 killed and 8 wounded; but Lieutenant Bulger distinctlysays in addition, "and several seamen wounded. "] "The defence ofthis vessel, " writes Lieut. Bulger, "did credit to her officers, who were all severely wounded. " Next day the prisoners were senton shore; and on the 5th the _Scorpion_ was discovered working upto join her consort, entirely ignorant of what had happened. Sheanchored about 2 miles from the _Tigress_; and next morning at 6o'clock the latter slipped her cable and ran down under the jib andfore-sail, the American ensign and pendant still flying. When within10 yards of the _Scorpion_, the concealed soldiers jumped up, poureda volley into her which killed 2 and wounded 2 men, and the nextmoment carried her, her surprised crew of 30 men making no resistance. The whole affair reflected great credit on the enterprise and pluckof the British without being discreditable to the Americans. It waslike Lieut. Elliot's capture of the _Detroit_ and _Caledonia_. Meanwhile a still more daring cutting-out expedition had taken placeat the foot of Lake Erie. The three American schooners, _Ohio_, _Somers_, and _Porcupine_, each with 30 men, under Lieut. Conkling, were anchored just at the outlet of the lake, to cover the flank ofthe works at Fort Erie. On the night of August 12th, Capt. Dobbs, of the _Charwell_, and Lieut. Radcliffe, of the _Netly_, with 75seamen and marines from their two vessels, which were lying off FortErie, resolved to attempt the capture of the schooners. The seamencarried the captain's gig upon their shoulders from Queenstown toFrenchman's Creek, a distance of 20 miles; thence, by the aid ofsome militia, 5 batteaux as well as the gig were carried 8 milesacross the woods to Lake Erie, and the party (whether with or withoutthe militia I do not know) embarked in them. Between 11 and 12 theboats were discovered a short distance ahead of the _Somers_ andhailed. They answered "provision boats, " which deceived the officeron deck, as such boats had been in the habit of passing and repassingcontinually during the night. Before he discovered his mistake theboats drifted across his hawse, cut his cables, and ran him aboardwith a volley of musketry, which wounded two of his men, and beforethe others could get on deck the schooner was captured. In anothermoment the British boats were alongside the _Ohio_, Lieut. Conkling'svessel. Here the people had hurried on deck, and there was a moment'ssharp struggle, in which the assailants lost Lieut. Radcliffe andone seaman killed and six seamen and marines wounded; but on boardthe _Ohio_ Lieut. Conkling and Sailing-master M. Cally were shotdown, one seaman killed, and four wounded, and Captain Dobbs carriedher, sword in hand. The _Porcupine_ was not molested, and made noeffort to interfere with the British in their retreat; so they drifteddown the rapids with their two prizes and secured them below. Theboldness of this enterprise will be appreciated when it is rememberedthat but 75 British seamen (unless there were some militia along), with no artillery, attacked and captured two out of three fineschooners, armed each with a long 32 or 24, and an aggregate of 90men; and that this had been done in waters where the gig and fivebatteaux of the victors were the only British vessels afloat. CHAMPLAIN. This lake, which had hitherto played but an inconspicuous part, wasnow to become the scene of the greatest naval battle of the war. ABritish army of 11, 000 men under Sir George Prevost undertook theinvasion of New York by advancing up the western bank of Lake Champlain. This advance was impracticable unless there was a sufficiently strongBritish naval force to drive back the American squadron at the sametime. Accordingly, the British began to construct a frigate, the_Confiance_, to be added to their already existing force, which consistedof a brig, two sloops, and 12 or 14 gun-boats. The Americans alreadypossessed a heavy corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and 10 gun-boatsor row-galleys; they now began to build a large brig, the _Eagle_, which was launched about the 16th of August. Nine days later, on the25th, the _Confiance_ was launched. The two squadrons were equallydeficient in stores, etc. ; the _Confiance_ having locks to her guns, some of which could not be used, while the American schooner_Ticonderoga_ had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed atthe touchholes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Macdonough and Downiewere hurried into action before they had time to prepare themselvesthoroughly; but it was a disadvantage common to both, and arose fromthe nature of the case, which called for immediate action. The Britisharmy advanced slowly toward Plattsburg, which was held by GeneralMacomb with less than 2, 000 effective American troops. Captain ThomasMacdonough, the American commodore, took the lake a day or two beforehis antagonist, and came to anchor in Plattsburg harbor. The Britishfleet, under Captain George Downie, moved from Isle-aux-Noix on Sept. 8th, and on the morning of the 11th sailed into Plattsburg harbor. The American force consisted of the ship _Saratoga_, Captain T. Macdonough, of about 734 tons, [Footnote: In the Naval Archives("Masters'-Commandant Letters, " 1814, 1, No. 134) is a letter fromMacdonough in which he states that the _Saratoga_ is intermediatein size between the _Pike_, of 875, and the _Madison_, of 593 tons;this would make her 734. The _Eagle_ was very nearly the size ofthe _Lawrence_ or _Niagara_, on Lake Erie. The _Ticonderoga_ wasoriginally a small steamer, but Commodore Macdonough had herschooner-rigged, because he found that her machinery got out oforder on almost every trip that she took. Her tonnage is onlyapproximately known, but she was of the same size as the _Linnet_. ]carrying eight long 24-pounders, six 42-pound and twelve 32-poundcarronades; the brig _Eagle_, Captain Robert Henly, of about 500tons, carrying eight long 18's and twelve 32-pound carronades; schooner_Ticonderoga_, Lieut. -Com. Stephen Cassin, of about 350 tons carryingeight long 12-pounders, four long 18-pounders, and five 32-poundcarronades; sloop _Preble_, Lieutenant Charles Budd, of about 80tons, mounting seven long 9's; the row-galleys _Boxer_, _Centipede_, _Nettle_, _Allen_, _Viper_, and _Burrows_, each of about 70 tons, and mounting one long 24- and one short 18-pounder; and the row-galleys_Wilmer_, _Ludlow_, _Aylwin_, and _Ballard_, each of about 40 tons, and mounting one long 12. James puts down the number of men on boardthe squadron as 950, --merely a guess, as he gives no authority. Coopersays "about 850 men, including officers, and a small detachment ofsoldiers to act as marines. " Lossing (p. 866, note 1) says 882 in all. Vol. Xiv of the "American State Papers" contains on p. 572 theprize-money list presented by the purser, George Beale, Jr. Thisnumbers the men (the dead being represented by their heirs or executors)up to 915, including soldiers and seamen, but many of the numbersare omitted, probably owing to the fact that their owners, thoughbelonging on board; happened to be absent on shore, or in the hospital;so that the actual number of names tallies very closely with thatgiven by Lossing; and accordingly I shall take that. [Footnote: Inthe Naval Archives are numerous letters from Macdonough, in which hestates continually that, as fast as they arrive, he substitutes sailorsfor the soldiers with which the vessels were originally manned. Menwere continually being sent ashore on account of sickness. In theBureau of Navigation is the log-book of "sloop-of-war _Surprise_, Captain Robert Henly" (_Surprise_ was the name the _Eagle_ originallywent by). It mentions from time to time that men were buried and sentashore to the hospital (five being sent ashore on September 2d); andfinally mentions that the places of the absent were partially filledby a draft of 21 soldiers, to act as marines. The notes on the dayof battle are very brief. ] The total number of men in the galleys(including a number of soldiers, as there were not enough sailors)was 350. The exact proportions in which this force was distributedamong the gunboats can not be told, but it may be roughly said tobe 41 in each large galley and 26 in each small one. The complementof the _Saratoga_ was 210, of the _Eagle_, 130, of the _Ticonderoga_, 100, and of the _Preble_, 30; but the first three had also a fewsoldiers distributed between them. The following list is probablypretty accurate as to the aggregate; but there may have been a scoreor two fewer men on the gun-boats, or more on the larger vessels. MACDONOUGH'S FORCE. Metal, from longName. Tons. Crew. Broadside. Or short guns. _Saratoga_, 734 240 414 lbs. -+- long, 96 '- short, 318_Eagle_, 500 150 264 " -+- long, 72 '- short, 192_Ticonderoga_, 350 112 180 " -+- long, 84 '- short, 96_Preble_, 80 30 36 " long, 36 Six gun-boats, 420 246 252 " -+- long, 144 '- short, 108Four gun-boats, 160 104 48 " long, 48 In all, 14 vessels of 2, 244 tons and 882 men, with 86 guns throwingat a broadside 1, 194 lbs. Of shot, 480 from long, and 714 from short guns. [Illustration: Commodore Thomas Macdonough: a contemporaryportrait by Gilbert Stuart. (Courtesy National Gallery ofArt, Mellon Collection)] The force of the British squadron in guns and ships is known accurately, as most of it was captured. The _Confiance_ rated for years in ourlists as a frigate of the class of the _Constellation_, _Congress_, and _Macedonian_; she was thus of over 1, 200 tons. (Cooper says more, "nearly double the tonnage of the _Saratoga. _") She carried on hermain-deck thirty long 24's, fifteen in each broadside. She did nothave a complete spar-deck; on her poop, which came forward to themizzen-mast, were two 32-pound (or possibly 42-pound) carronadesand on her spacious top-gallant forecastle were four 32--(or 42-)pound carronades, and a long 24 on a pivot. [Footnote: This is herarmament as given by Cooper, on the authority of Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette. Who was in charge of her for three months, and wentaboard her ten minutes after the _Linnet_ struck. ] She had aboard hera furnace for heating shot; eight or ten of which heated shot werefound with the furnace. [Footnote: James stigmatizes the statementof Commodore Macdonough about the furnace as "as gross a falsehoodas ever was uttered"; but he gives no authority for the denial, andit appears to have been merely an ebullition of spleen on his part. Every American officer who went aboard the _Confiance_ saw the furnaceand the hot shot. ] This was, of course, a perfectly legitimate advantage. The _Linnet_, Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the same size asthe _Ticonderoga_, mounting 16 long 12's. The _Chubb_ and _Finch_, Lieutenants James McGhie and William Hicks, were formerly theAmerican sloops _Growler_ and _Eagle_, of 112 and 110 tons respectively. The former mounted ten 18-pound carronades and one long 6; the latter, six 18-pound carronades, four long 6's, and one short 18. There weretwelve gun-boats. [Footnote: Letter of General George Prevost, Sept. 11, 1814. All the American accounts say 13; the British officialaccount had best be taken. James says only ten, but gives no authority;he appears to have been entirely ignorant of all things connected withthis action. ] Five of these were large, of about 70 tons each; threemounted a long 24 and a 32-pound carronade each; one mounted a long18 and a 32-pound carronade; one a long 18 and a short 18. Sevenwere smaller, of about 40 tons each; three of these carried each along 18, and four carried each a 32-pound carronade. There is greaterdifficulty in finding out the number of men in the British fleet. American historians are unanimous in stating it at from 1, 000 to1, 100; British historians never do any thing but copy James blindly. Midshipman Lea of the _Confiance_, in a letter (already quoted)published in the "London Naval Chronicle, " vol. Xxxii, p. 292, givesher crew as 300; but more than this amount of dead and prisonerswere taken out of her. The number given her by Commander Ward inhis "Naval Tactics, " is probably nearest right--325. [Footnote: Jamesgives her but 270 men, --without stating his authority. ] The _Linnet_had about 125 men, and the _Chubb_ and _Finch_ about 50 men each. According to Admiral Paulding (given by Lossing, in his "Field Bookof the War of 1812, " p. 868) their gun-boats averaged 50 men each. This is probably true, as they were manned largely by soldiers, anynumber of whom could be spared from Sir George Prevost's great army;but it may be best to consider the large ones as having 41, and thesmall 26 men, which were the complements of the American gun-boatsof the same sizes. The following, then, is the force of DOWNIE'S SQUADRON. From what guns, Name. Tonnage. Crew. Broadside. Long or short. _Confiance_, 1200 325 480 lbs. -+- long, 384 '- short, 96_Linnet_, 350 125 96 " long, 96 _Chubb_, 112 50 96 " -+- long, 6 '- short, 90_Finch_, 110 50 84 " -+- long, 12 '- short, 72Five gun-boats, 350 205 254 " -+- long, 12 '- short, 72Seven gun-boats, 280 182 182 " -+- long, 54 '- short, 128 In all, 16 vessels, of about 2, 402 tons, with 937 men, [Footnote:About; there were probably more rather than less. ] and a total of92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1, 192 lbs. , 660 from long and532 from short pieces. These are widely different from the figures that appear in the pagesof most British historians, from Sir Archibald Alison down and up. Thus, in the "History of the British Navy, " by C. D. Yonge (alreadyquoted), it is said that on Lake Champlain "our (the British) forcewas manifestly and vastly inferior, * * * their (the American) broadsideoutweighing ours in more than the proportion of three to two, whilethe difference in their tonnage and in the number of their crews wasstill more in their favor. " None of these historians, or quasi-historians, have made the faintest effort to find out the facts for themselves, following James' figures with blind reliance, and accordingly it isonly necessary to discuss the latter. This reputable gentleman endshis account ("Naval Occurrences, " p. 424) by remarking that Macdonoughwrote as he did because "he knew that nothing would stamp a falsehoodwith currency equal to a pious expression, * * * his falsehoodsequalling in number the lines of his letter. " These remarks areinteresting as showing the unbiassed and truthful character of theauthor, rather than for any particular weight they will have ininfluencing any one's judgment on Commodore Macdonough. James givesthe engaged force of the British as "8 vessels, of 1, 426 tons, with537 men, and throwing 765 lbs. Of shot. " To reduce the force downto this, he first excludes the _Finch_, because she "grounded oppositean American battery _before the engagement commenced_, " which readsespecially well in connection with Capt. Pring's official letter:"Lieut. Hicks, of the _Finch_, had the mortification to strike ona reef of rocks to the eastward of Crab Island _about the middle ofthe engagement_. " [Footnote: The italics are mine. The letter isgiven in full in the "Naval Chronicle. "] What James means cannotbe imagined; no stretch of language will convert "about the middleof" into "before. " The _Finch_ struck on the reef in consequence ofhaving been disabled and rendered helpless by the fire from the_Ticonderoga_. Adding her force to James' statement (counting hercrew only as he gives it), we get 9 vessels, 1, 536 tons, 577 men, 849 lbs. Of shot. James also excludes five gun-boats, because theyran away almost as soon as the action commenced (vol. Vi, p. 501). This assertion is by no means equivalent to the statement in CaptainPring's letter "that the flotilla of gun-boats had abandoned theobject assigned to them, " and, if it was, it would not warrant hisexcluding the five gun-boats. Their flight may have been disgraceful, but they formed part of the attacking force nevertheless; almostany general could say that he had won against superior numbers ifhe refused to count in any of his own men whom he suspected of behavingbadly. James gives his 10 gun-boats 294 men and 13 guns (two long24's, five long 18's, six 32-pound carronades), and makes them average45 tons; adding on the five he leaves out, we get 14 vessels, of1, 761 tons, with 714 men, throwing at a broadside 1, 025 lbs. Ofshot (591 from long guns, 434 from carronades). But Sir George Prevost, in the letter already quoted, says there were 12 gun-boats, and theAmerican accounts say more. Supposing the two gun-boats James didnot include at all to be equal respectively to one of the largestand one of the smallest of the gun-boats as he gives them ("NavalOccurrences, " p. 417); that is, one to have had 35 men, a long 24, and a 32-pound carronade, the other, 25 men and a 32-pound carronade, we get for Downie's force 16 vessels, of 1, 851 tons, with 774 men, throwing at a broadside 1, 113 lbs. Of shot (615 from long guns, 498 from carronades). It must be remembered that so far I have merelycorrected James by means of the authorities from which he draws hisaccount--the official letters of the British commanders. I have notbrought up a single American authority against him, but have onlymade such alterations as a writer could with nothing whatever butthe accounts of Sir George Prevost and Captain Pring before him tocompare with James. Thus it is seen that according to James himselfDownie really had 774 men to Macdonough's 882, and threw at a broadside1, 113 lbs. Of shot to Macdonough's 1, 194 lbs. James says ("NavalOccurrences, " pp. 410, 413): "Let it be recollected, no musketrywas employed on either side, " and "The marines were of no use, asthe action was fought out of the range of musketry"; the 106 additionalmen on the part of the Americans were thus not of much consequence, the action being fought at anchor, and there being men enough tomanage the guns and perform every other duty. So we need only attendto the broadside force. Here, then, Downie could present at a broadside615 lbs. Of shot from long guns to Macdonough's 480, and 498 lbs. From carronades to Macdonough's 714; or, he threw 135 lbs. Of shotmore from his long guns, and 216 less from his carronades. This isequivalent to Downie's having seven long 18's and one long 9, andMacdonough's having one 24-pound and six 32-pound carronades. A32-pound carronade is not equal to a long 18; so that _even byJames' own showing Downie's force was slightly the superior_. Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected James solely by the evidenceof his own side; now I shall bring in some American authorities. These do not contradict the British official letters, for they virtuallyagree with them; but they do go against James' unsupported assertions, and, being made by naval officers of irreproachable reputation, willcertainly outweigh them. In the first place, James asserts that onthe main-deck of the _Confiance_ but 13 guns were presented in broadside, two 32-pound carronades being thrust through the bridle- and twoothers through the stern-ports; so he excludes two of her guns fromthe broadside. Such guns would have been of great use to her at certainstages of the combat, and ought to be included in the force. Butbesides this the American officers positively say that she had a_broadside_ of 15 guns. Adding these two guns, and making a triflingchange in the arrangement of the guns in the row-galleys, we geta broadside of 1, 192 lbs. , exactly as I have given it above. Thereis no difficulty in accounting for the difference of tonnage as givenby James and by the Americans, for we have considered the same subjectin reference to the battle of Lake Erie. James calculates the Americantonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep holds, while, as regards theBritish vessels, he allows for the shallow holds that all the lakecraft had; that is, he gives in one the nominal, in the other thereal, tonnage. This fully accounts for the discrepancy. It only remainsto account for the difference in the number of men. From James wecan get 772. In the first place, we can reason by analogy. I havealready shown that, as regards the battle of Lake Erie, he is convicted(by English, not by American, evidence) of having underestimatedBarclay's force by about 25 per cent. If he did the same thing here, the British force was over 1, 000 strong, and I have no doubt thatit was. But we have other proofs. On p. 417 of the "Naval Occurrences"he says the complement of the four captured British vessels amountedto 420 men, of whom 54 were killed in action, leaving 366 prisoners, including the wounded. But the report of prisoners, as given by theAmerican authorities, gives 369 officers and seamen unhurt or butslightly wounded, 57 wounded men paroled, and other wounded whosenumber was unspecified. Supposing this number to have been 82, andadding 54 dead, we would get in all 550 men for the four ships, thenumber I have adopted in my list. This would make the British wounded129 instead of 116, as James says: but neither the Americans northe British seem to have enumerated all their wounded in this fight. Taking into account all these considerations, it will be seen thatthe figures I have given are probably approximately correct, and, at any rate, indicate pretty closely the _relative_ strength of thetwo squadrons. The slight differences in tonnage and crews (158 tonsand 55 men, in favor of the British) are so trivial that they neednot be taken into account, and we will merely consider the broadsideforce. In absolute weight of metal the two combatants were evenlymatched--almost exactly;--but whereas from Downie's broadside of1, 192 lbs. 660 were from long and 532 from short guns, of Macdonough'sbroadside of 1, 194 lbs. , but 480 were from long and 714 from shortpieces. The forces were thus equal, except that Downie opposed 180lbs. From long guns to 182 from carronades; as if 10 long 18's wereopposed to ten 18-pound carronades. This would make the odds on theirface about 10 to 9 against the Americans; in reality they were greater, for the possession of the _Confiance_ was a very great advantage. The action is, as regards metal, the exact reverse of those betweenChauncy and Yeo. Take, for example, the fight off Burlington onSept. 28, 1813. Yeo's broadside was 1, 374 lbs. To Chauncy's 1, 288;but whereas only 180 of Yeo's was from long guns, of Chauncy's but536 was from carronades. Chauncy's fleet was thus much the superior. At least we must say this: if Macdonough beat merely an equal force, then Yeo made a most disgraceful and cowardly flight before aninferior foe; but if we contend that Macdonough's force was inferiorto that of his antagonist, then we must admit that Yeo's was inlike manner inferior to Chauncy's. These rules work both ways. The_Confiance_ was a heavier vessel than the _Pike_, presenting inbroadside one long 24- and three 32-pound carronades more than thelatter. James (vol. Vi, p. 355) says: "The _Pike_ alone was nearlya match for Sir James Yeo's squadron, " and Brenton says (vol. Ii, 503): "The _General Pike_ was more than a match for the whole Britishsquadron. " Neither of these writers means quite as much as he says, for the logical result would be that the _Confiance_ alone was amatch for all of Macdonough's force. Still it is safe to say thatthe _Pike_ gave Chauncy a great advantage, and that the _Confiance_made Downie's fleet much superior to Macdonough's. Macdonough saw that the British would be forced to make the attackin order to get the control of the waters. On this long, narrow lakethe winds usually blow pretty nearly north or south, and the set ofthe current is of course northward; all the vessels, being flat andshallow, could not beat to windward well, so there was little chanceof the British making the attack when there was a southerly windblowing. So late in the season there was danger of sudden and furiousgales, which would make it risky for Downie to wait outside the baytill the wind suited him; and inside the bay the wind was prettysure to be light and baffling. Young Macdonough (then but 28 yearsof age) calculated all these chances very coolly and decided to awaitthe attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the head of his lineso far to the north that it could hardly be turned; and then proceededto make all the other preparations with the same foresight. Notonly were his vessels provided with springs, but also with anchorsto be used astern in any emergency. The _Saratoga _was furtherprepared for a change of wind, or for the necessity of winding ship, by having a kedge planted broad off on each of her bows, with a hawserand preventer hawser (hanging in bights under water) leading fromeach quarter to the kedge on that side. There had not been time totrain the men thoroughly at the guns; and to make these produce theirfull effect the constant supervision of the officers had to be exerted. The British were laboring under this same disadvantage, but neitherside felt the want very much, as the smooth water, stationary positionof the ships, and fair range, made the fire of both sides very destructive. Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the southward; so that a windwhich would enable the British to sail up the lake would force themto beat when entering the bay. The east side of the mouth of thebay is formed by Cumberland Head; the entrance is about a mile anda half across, and the other boundary, southwest from the Head, isan extensive shoal, and a small, low island. This is called CrabIsland, and on it was a hospital and one six-pounder gun, which wasto be manned in case of necessity by the strongest patients. Macdonoughhad anchored in a north-and-south line a little to the south of theoutlet of the Saranac, and out of range of the shore batteries, beingtwo miles from the western shore. The head of his line was so nearCumberland Head that an attempt to turn it would place the opponentunder a very heavy fire, while to the south the shoal prevented aflank attack. The _Eagle_ lay to the north, flanked on each sideby a couple of gun-boats; then came the _Saratoga_, with threegun-boats between her and the _Ticonderoga_, the next in line; thencame three gun-boats and the _Preble_. The four large vessels wereat anchor; the galleys being under their sweeps and forming a secondline about 40 yards back, some of them keeping their places and somenot doing so. By this arrangement his line could not be doubled upon, there was not room to anchor on his broadside out of reach of hiscarronades, and the enemy was forced to attack him by standing in bows on. The morning of September 11th opened with a light breeze from thenortheast. Downie's fleet weighed anchor at daylight, and came downthe lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the two sloopsswinging out to starboard. At half-past seven, [Footnote: The lettersof the two commanders conflict a little as to time, both absolutelyand relatively. Pring says the action lasted two hours and threequarters, the American accounts, two hours and twenty minutes. Pringsays it began at 8. 00; Macdonough says a few minutes before nine, etc. I take the mean time. ] the people in the ships could see theiradversaries' upper sails across the narrow strip of land ending inCumberland Head, before the British doubled the latter. Captain Downiehove to with his four large vessels when he had fairly opened theBay, and waited for his galleys to overtake him. Then his four vesselsfilled on the starboard tack and headed for the American line, goingabreast, the _Chubb_ to the north, heading well to windward of the_Eagle_, for whose bows the _Linnet_ was headed, while the _Confiance_was to be laid athwart the hawse of the _Saratoga_; the _Finch_ wasto leeward with the twelve gun-boats, and was to engage the rear ofthe American line. As the English squadron stood bravely in, young Macdonough, who fearedhis foes not at all, but his God a great deal, knelt for a moment, with his officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a few minutesof perfect quiet, the men waiting with grim expectancy for the openingof the fight. The Eagle spoke first with her long 18's, but to noeffect, for the shot fell short. Then, as the _Linnet_ passed the_Saratoga_, she fired her broadside of long 12's, but her shot alsofell short, except one that struck a hen-coop which happened to beaboard the _Saratoga_. There was a game cock inside, and, insteadof being frightened at his sudden release, he jumped up on a gun-slide, clapped his wings, and crowed lustily. The men laughed and cheered;and immediately afterward Macdonough himself fired the first shotfrom one of the long guns. The 24-pound ball struck the _Confiance_near the hawse-hole and ranged the length of her deck, killing andwounding several men. All the American long guns now opened and werereplied to by the British galleys. The _Confiance_ stood steadily on without replying. But she wasbaffled by shifting winds, and was soon so cut up, having both herport bow-anchors shot away, and suffering much loss, that she wasobliged to port her helm and come to while still nearly a quarterof a mile distant from the _Saratoga_. Captain Downie came to anchorin grand style, --securing every thing carefully before he fired agun, and then opening with a terribly destructive broadside. The_Chubb_ and _Linnet_ stood farther in, and anchored forward the_Eagle's_ beam. Meanwhile the _Finch_ got abreast of the _Ticonderoga_, under her sweeps, supported by the gun-boats. The main fighting wasthus to take place between the vans, where the _Eagle_, _Saratoga_, and six or seven gun-boats were engaged with the _Chubb_, _Linnet_, _Confiance_, and two or three gun-boats; while in the rear, the_Ticonderoga_, the _Preble_, and the other American galleys engagedthe _Finch_ and the remaining nine or ten English galleys. The battleat the foot of the line was fought on the part of the Americans toprevent their flank being turned, and on the part of the Britishto effect that object. At first, the fighting was at long range, but gradually the British galleys closed up, firing very well. TheAmerican galleys at this end of the line were chiefly the small ones, armed with one 12-pounder apiece, and they by degrees drew back beforethe heavy fire of their opponents. About an hour after the dischargeof the first gun had been fired the _Finch_ closed up toward the_Ticonderoga_, and was completely crippled by a couple of broadsidesfrom the latter. She drifted helplessly down the line and groundednear Crab Island; some of the convalescent patients manned thesix-pounder and fired a shot or two at her, when she struck, nearlyhalf of her crew being killed or wounded. About the same time theBritish gun-boats forced the _Preble_ out of line, whereupon shecut her cable and drifted inshore out of the fight. Two or threeof the British gun-boats had already been sufficiently damaged bysome of the shot from the _Ticonderoga's_ long guns to make themwary; and the contest at this part of the line narrowed down to onebetween the American schooner and the remaining British gun-boats, who combined to make a most determined attack upon her. So hastilyhad the squadron been fitted out that many of the matches for herguns were at the last moment found to be defective. The captain ofone of the divisions was a midshipman, but sixteen years old, HiramPaulding. When he found the matches to be bad he fired the guns ofhis section by having pistols flashed at them, and continued thisthrough the whole fight. The _Ticonderoga's_ commander, Lieut. Cassin, fought his schooner most nobly. He kept walking the taffrail amidstshowers of musketry and grape, coolly watching the movements of thegalleys and directing the guns to be loaded with canister and bagsof bullets, when the enemy tried to board. The British galleys werehandled with determined gallantry, under the command of LieutenantBell. Had they driven off the _Ticonderoga_ they would have wonthe day for their side, and they pushed up till they were not aboat-hook's length distant, to try to carry her by boarding; butevery attempt was repulsed and they were forced to draw off, someof them so crippled by the slaughter they had suffered that theycould hardly man the oars. Meanwhile the fighting at the head of the line had been even fiercer. The first broadside of the _Confiance_, fired from 16 long 24's, double shotted, coolly sighted, in smooth water, at point-blank range, produced the most terrible effect on the _Saratoga_. Her hull shiveredall over with the shock, and when the crash subsided nearly half ofher people were seen stretched on deck, for many had been knockeddown who were not seriously hurt. Among the slain was her firstlieutenant, Peter Gamble; he was kneeling down to sight the bow-gun, when a shot entered the port, split the quoin, and drove a portionof it against his side, killing him without breaking the skin. Thesurvivors carried on the fight with undiminished energy. Macdonoughhimself worked like a common sailor, in pointing and handling afavorite gun. While bending over to sight it a round shot cut intwo the spanker boom, which fell on his head and struck him senselessfor two or three minutes; he then leaped to his feet and continuedas before, when a shot took off the head of the captain of the gunand drove it in his face with such a force as to knock him to theother side of the deck. But after the first broadside not so muchinjury was done; the guns of the _Confiance_ had been levelled topoint-blank range, and as the quoins were loosened by the successivedischarges they were not properly replaced, so that her broadsideskept going higher and higher and doing less and less damage. Veryshortly after the beginning of the action her gallant captain wasslain. He was standing behind one of the long guns when a shot fromthe _Saratoga_ struck it and threw it completely off the carriageagainst his right groin, killing him almost instantly. His skin wasnot broken; a black mark, about the size of a small plate, was theonly visible injury. His watch was found flattened, with its handspointing to the very second at which he received the fatal blow. Asthe contest went on the fire gradually decreased in weight, the gunsbeing disabled. The inexperience of both crews partly caused this. The American sailors overloaded their carronades so as to very muchdestroy the effect of their fire; when the officers became disabled, the men would cram the guns with shot till the last projected fromthe muzzle. Of course, this lessened the execution, and also graduallycrippled the guns. On board the _Confiance_ the confusion was evenworse: after the battle the charges of the guns were drawn, and onthe side she had fought one was found with a canvas bag containingtwo round of shot rammed home and wadded without any powder; anotherwith two cartridges and no shot; and a third with a wad below thecartridge. At the extreme head of the line the advantage had been with the British. The _Chubb_ and _Linnet_ had begun a brisk engagement with the _Eagle_and American gun-boats. In a short time the _Chubb_ had her cable, bowsprit, and main-boom shot away, drifted within the American lines, and was taken possession of by one of the _Saratoga's_ midshipmen. The _Linnet_ paid no attention to the American gunboats, directingher whole fire against the _Eagle_, and the latter was, in addition, exposed to part of the fire of the _Confiance_. After keeping up aheavy fire for a long time her springs were shot away, and she cameup into the wind, hanging so that she could not return a shot tothe well-directed broadsides of the _Linnet_. Henly accordingly cuthis cable, started home his top-sails, ran down, and anchored bythe stern between and inshore of the _Confiance_ and _Ticonderoga_, from which position he opened on the _Confiance_. The _Linnet_ nowdirected her attention to the American gun-boats, which at this endof the line were very well fought, but she soon drove them off, andthen sprung her broadside so as to rake the _Saratoga_ on her bows. Macdonough by this time had his hands full, and his fire was slackening;he was bearing the whole brunt of the action, with the frigate onhis beam and the brig raking him. Twice his ship had been set onfire by the hot shot of the _Confiance_; one by one his long gunswere disabled by shot, and his carronades were either treated thesame way or else rendered useless by excessive overcharging. Finallybut a single carronade was left in the starboard batteries, and onfiring it the naval-bolt broke, the gun flew off the carriage andfell down the main hatch, leaving the Commodore without a singlegun to oppose to the few the _Confiance_ still presented. The battlewould have been lost had not Macdonough's foresight provided themeans of retrieving it. The anchor suspended astern of the _Saratoga_was let go, and the men hauled in on the hawser that led to thestarboard quarter, bringing the ship's stern up over the kedge. Theship now rode by the kedge and by a line that had been bent to abight in the stream cable, and she was raked badly by the accuratefire of the _Linnet_. By rousing on the line the ship was at lengthgot so far round that the aftermost gun of the port broadside boreon the _Confiance_. The men had been sent forward to keep as muchout of harm's way as possible, and now some were at once called backto man the piece, which then opened with effect. The next gun wastreated in the same manner; but the ship now hung and would go nofarther round. The hawser leading from the port quarter was thengot forward under the bows and passed aft to the starboard quarter, and a minute afterward the ship's whole port battery opened withfatal effect. The _Confiance_ meanwhile had also attempted to round. Her springs, like those of the _Linnet_, were on the starboard side, and so of course could not be shot away as the _Eagle's_ were; but, as she had nothing but springs to rely on, her efforts did littlebeyond forcing her forward, and she hung with her head to the wind. She had lost over half of her crew, [Footnote: Midshipman Lee, inhis letter already quoted, says "not five men were left unhurt";this would of course include bruises, etc. , as hurts. ] most of herguns on the engaged side were dismounted, and her stout masts hadbeen splintered till they looked like bundles of matches; her sailshad been torn to rags, and she was forced to strike, about two hoursafter she had fired the first broadside. Without pausing a minutethe _Saratoga_ again hauled on her starboard hawser till her broadsidewas sprung to bear on the _Linnet_, and the ship and brig began abrisk fight, which the _Eagle_ from her position could take no partin, while the _Ticonderoga_ was just finishing up the British galleys. The shattered and disabled state of the _Linnet's_ masts, sails, and yards precluded the most distant hope of Capt. Pring's effectinghis escape by cutting his cable; but he kept up a most gallant fightwith his greatly superior foe, in hopes that some of the gun-boatswould come and tow him off, and despatched a lieutenant to the_Confiance_ to ascertain her state. The lieutenant returned withnews of Capt. Downie's death, while the British gun-boats had beendriven half a mile off; and, after having maintained the fightsingle-handed for fifteen minutes, until, from the number of shotbetween wind and water, the water had risen a foot above her lowerdeck, the plucky little brig hauled down her colors, and the fightended, a little over two hours and a half after the first gun hadbeen fired. Not one of the larger vessels had a mast that would bearcanvas, and the prizes were in a sinking condition. The Britishgalleys drifted to leeward, none with their colors up; but as the_Saratoga's_ boarding-officer passed along the deck of the _Confiance_he accidentally ran against a lock-string of one of her starboardguns, [Footnote: A sufficient commentary, by the way, on James'assertion that the guns of the _Confiance_ had to be fired by matches, as the gun-locks did not fit!] and it went off. This was apparentlyunderstood as a signal by the galleys, and they moved slowly off, pulling but a very few sweeps, and not one of them hoisting an ensign. On both sides the ships had been cut up in the most extraordinarymanner; the _Saratoga_ had 55 shot-holes in her hull, and the_Confiance_ 105 in hers, and the _Eagle_ and _Linnet_ had sufferedin proportion. The number of killed and wounded can not be exactlystated; it was probably about 200 on the American side, and over300 on the British. [Footnote: Macdonough returned his loss as follows: Killed. Wounded. _Saratoga_. 28 29_Eagle_. 13 20_Ticonderoga_ 6 6_Preble_. 2_Boxer_. 3 1_Centipede_. 1_Wilmer_. 1 A total of 52 killed and 58 wounded; but the latter head apparentlyonly included those who had to go to the hospital. Probably about90 additional were more or less slightly wounded. Captain Pring, in his letter of Sept. 12th, says the _Confiance_ had 41 killed and40 wounded; the _Linnet_, 10 killed and 14 wounded; the _Chubb_, 6 killed and 16 wounded; the _Finch_, 2 wounded: in all, 57 killedand 72 wounded. But he adds "that no opportunity has offered tomuster * * * this is the whole as yet ascertained to be killed orwounded. " The Americans took out 180 dead and wounded from the_Confiance_, 50 from the _Linnet_, and 40 from the _Chubb_ and_Finch_; in all, 270. James ("Naval Occurrences, " p. 412) says the_Confiance_ had 83 wounded. As Captain Pring wrote his letter inPlattsburg Bay the day after the action, he of course could not givethe loss aboard the British gun-boats; so James at once assumed thatthey suffered none. As well as could be found out they had between50 and 100 killed and wounded. The total British loss was between300 and 400, as nearly as can be ascertained. For this action, asalready shown, James is of no use whatever. Compare his statements, for example, with those of Midshipman Lee, in the "Naval Chronicle. "The comparative loss, as a means of testing the competitive prowessof the combatants, is not of much consequence in this case, as theweaker party in point of force conquered. ] Captain Macdonough at once returned the British officers their swords. Captain Pring writes: "I have much satisfaction in making you acquaintedwith the humane treatment the wounded have received from CommodoreMacdonough; they were immediately removed to his own hospital onCrab Island, and furnished with every requisite. His generous andpolite attention to myself, the officers, and men, will ever hereafterbe gratefully remembered. " The effects of the victory were immediateand of the highest importance. Sir George Prevost and his army atonce fled in great haste and confusion back to Canada, leaving ournorthern frontier clear for the remainder of the war; while the victoryhad a very great effect on the negotiations for peace. In this battle the crews on both sides behaved with equal bravery, and left nothing to be desired in this respect; but from their rawnessthey of course showed far less skill than the crews of most of theAmerican and some of the British ocean cruisers, such as the_Constitution_, _United States_, or _Shannon_, the _Hornet_, _Wasp_, or _Reindeer_, Lieut. Cassin handled the _Ticonderoga_, and CaptainPring the _Linnet_, with the utmost gallantry and skill, and, afterMacdonough, they divide the honors of the day. But Macdonough inthis battle won a higher fame than any other commander of the war, British or American. He had a decidedly superior force to contendagainst, the officers and men of the two sides being about on a parin every respect; and it was solely owing to his foresight and resourcethat we won the victory. He forced the British to engage at adisadvantage by his excellent choice of position; and he preparedbeforehand for every possible contingency. His personal prowess hadalready been shown at the cost of the rovers of Tripoli, and in thisaction he helped fight the guns as ably as the best sailor. His skill, seamanship, quick eye, readiness of resource, and indomitable pluck, are beyond all praise. Down to the time of the Civil War he is thegreatest figure in our naval history. A thoroughly religious man, he was as generous and humane as he was skilful and brave; one ofthe greatest of our sea-captains, he has left a stainless namebehind him. BRITISH LOSS. Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks. Brig, 100 10 Burnt by Lieut. Gregory. _Magnet_, 187 12 " by her crew. _Black Snake_, 30 1 Captured. Gun-boat, 50 2 " " 50 3 "_Confiance_, 1, 200 37 "_Linnet_, 350 16 "_Chubb_, 112 11 "_Finch_, 110 11 " _____ ___ 9 vessels 2, 189 103 AMERICAN LOSS. Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks. _Growler_, 81 7 Captured. Boat, 50 2 "_Tigress_, 96 1 "_Scorpion_, 86 2 "_Ohio_, 94 1 "_Somers_, 98 2 " ___ __ 6 vessels, 505 15 Chapter IX 1815 CONCLUDING OPERATIONS President _captured by Captain Hayes' squadron--Successful cutting-outexpeditions of the Americans--Privateer brig_ Chasseur _captures_St. Lawrence _schooner_--Constitution _captures_ Cyane _and_Levant--_Escapes from a British squadron--The_ Hornet _captures the_Penguin, _and escapes from a 74--The_ Peacock _and the_Nautilus_--Summary--Remarks on the war--Tables of comparativeloss, etc. --Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle. _ The treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain wassigned at Ghent, Dec. 24, 1814, and ratified at Washington, Feb. 18, 1815. But during these first two months of 1815, and until the newsreached the cruisers on the ocean, the warfare went on with muchthe same characteristics as before. The blockading squadrons continuedstanding on and off before the ports containing war-ships with thesame unwearying vigilance; but the ice and cold prevented any attemptsat harrying the coast except from the few frigates scattered alongthe shores of the Carolinas and Georgia. There was no longer anyformidable British fleet in the Chesapeake or Delaware, while atNew Orleans the only available naval force of the Americans consistedof a few small row-boats, with which they harassed the rear of theretreating British. The _Constitution_, Capt. Stewart, was alreadyat sea, having put out from Boston on the 17th of December, whilethe blockading squadron (composed of the same three frigates shesubsequently encountered) was temporarily absent. The _Hornet_, Capt. Biddle, had left the port of New London, runningin heavy weather through the blockading squadron, and had gone intoNew York, where the _President_, Commodore Decatur, and _Peacock_, Capt. Warrington, with the _Tom Bowline_ brig were already assembled, intending to start on a cruise for the East Indies. The blockadingsquadron off the port consisted of the 56-gun razee _Majestic_, Capt. Hayes, 24-pounder frigate _Endymion_, Capt. Hope, 18-pounder frigate_Pomone_, Capt. Lumly, and 18-pounder frigate _Tenedos_, Capt. Parker. [Footnote: Letter of Rear-Admiral Hotham, Jan 23, 1815. ] On the14th of January a severe snow-storm came on and blew the squadronoff the coast. Next day it moderated, and the ships stood off tothe northwest to get into the track which they supposed the Americanswould take if they attempted to put out in the storm. Singularlyenough, at the instant of arriving at the intended point, an hourbefore daylight on the 15th, Sandy Hook bearing W. N. W. 15 leagues, a ship was made out, on the Majestic's weather-bow, standing S. E. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes, Jan. 17, 1815. ] This ship wasthe unlucky _President_. On the evening of the 14th she had lefther consorts at anchor, and put out to sea in the gale. But by amistake of the pilots who were to place boats to beacon the passagethe frigate struck on the bar, where she beat heavily for an hourand a half, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur, Jan. 18, 1815. ]springing her masts and becoming very much hogged and twisted. [Footnote: Report of Court-martial, Alex. Murray presiding. April20, 1815. ] Owing to the severity of her injuries the _President_would have put back to port, but was prevented by the westerly gale. [Footnote: Decatur's letter, Jan. 18th. ] Accordingly Decatur steeredat first along Long Island, then shaped his course to the S. E. , andin the dark ran into the British squadron, which, but for his unfortunateaccident, he would thus have escaped. At daylight, the _President_, which had hauled up and passed to the northward of her opponents, [Footnote: Decatur's letter. Jan. 18th. ] found herself with the_Majestic_ and _Endymion_ astern, the _Pomona_ on the port and the_Tenedos_ on the starboard quarter. [Footnote: James, vi, 529. ]The chase now became very interesting. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes. ] During the early part of the day, while the wind was stillstrong, the _Majestic_ led the _Endymion_ and fired occasionallyat the _President_, but without effect. [Footnote: Letter of CommodoreDecatur. ] The _Pomona_ gained faster than the others, but by Capt. Hayes' orders was signalled to go in chase of the _Tenedos_, whosecharacter the captain could not make out [Footnote: James, vi, 529. ];and this delayed her several hours in the chase. [Footnote: Log of_Pomona_, published at Bermuda, Jan. 29th, and quoted in full inthe "Naval Chronicle, " xxxiii. 370. ] In the afternoon, the windcoming out light and baffling, the _Endymion_ left the _Majestic_behind, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Hayes. ] and, owing to the_President's_ disabled state and the amount of water she made inconsequence of the injuries received while on the bar, gained rapidlyon her, [Footnote: Letter of Decatur. ] although she lightened shipand did everything else that was possible to improve her sailing. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur. ] But a shift of wind helped the_Endymion_, [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 466. ] and the latter was ableat about 2. 30, to begin skirmishing with her bow-chasers, answeredby the stern-chasers of the _President_. [Footnote: Log of _Pomona_. ]At 5. 30 the _Endymion_ began close action, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes. ] within half point-blank shot on the _President's_ starboardquarter, [Footnote: James, vi, 530. ] where not a gun of the lattercould bear. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur. ] The _President_ continuedin the same course, steering east by north, the wind being northwest, expecting the _Endymion_ soon to come up abeam; but the latter warilykept her position by yawing, so as not to close. [Footnote: Letterof Decatur. ] So things continued for half an hour during which the_President_ suffered more than during all the remainder of the combat. [Footnote: Cooper, 470. ] At 6. 00 the _President_ kept off, headingto the south, and the two adversaries ran abreast, the Americansusing the starboard and the British the port batteries. [Footnote:Log of _Pomone_. ] Decatur tried to close with his antagonist, butwhenever he hauled nearer to the latter she hauled off [Footnote:Report of Court-martial. ] and being the swiftest ship could of courseevade him; so he was reduced to the necessity of trying to throwher out of the combat [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur. ] bydismantling her. He was completely successful in this, and aftertwo hours' fighting the _Endymion's_ sails were all cut from heryards [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes. ] and she dropped astern, the last shot being fired from the _President_. [Footnote: Log of_Pomone_. ] The _Endymion_ was now completely silent, [Footnote: Logof _Pomone_. ] and Commodore Decatur did not board her merely becauseher consorts were too close astern [Footnote: Report of Court-martial. ];accordingly the _President_ hauled up again to try her chances atrunning, having even her royal studding-sails set, [Footnote: James, vi, 538. ] and exposed her stern to the broadside of the _Endymion_, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur. ] but the latter did not firea single gun. [Footnote: Log of the _Pomone_. ] Three hours afterward, at 11, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes. ] the _Pomone_ caught upwith the _President_, and luffing to port gave her the starboardbroadside [Footnote: Log of the _Pomone_. ]; the _Tenedos_ being twocables' length's distance astern, taking up a raking position. [Footnote: Decatur's letter. ] The _Pomone_ poured in another broadside, within musket shot, [Footnote: Log of _Pomone_. ] when the _President_surrendered and was taken possession of by Capt. Parker of the_Tenedos_. [Footnote: James, vi, 531. ] A considerable number of the_President's_ people were killed by these two last broadsides. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur, March 6, 1815; depositionof Chaplain Henry Robinson before Admiralty Court at St. Georges, Bermuda, Jan. 1815. ] The _Endymion_ was at this time out of sightastern. [Footnote: Letter of Decatur, Jan. 18th. ] She did not comeup, according to one account, for an hour and three quarters, [Footnote: Log of _Pomone_. ] and according to another, for threehours [Footnote: Letter of Decatur, Mar. 6th. ]; and as she was afaster ship than the _President_, this means that she was at leasttwo hours motionless repairing damages. Commodore Decatur deliveredhis sword to Capt. Hayes of the _Majestic_, who returned it, statingin his letter that both sides had fought with great gallantry. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hayes. ] The _President_ having been takenby an entire squadron, [Footnote: Admiral Hotham's letter, Jan. 23rd. ]the prize-money was divided equally among the ships. [Footnote:Bermuda "Royal Gazette, " March 8, 1815. ] The _President's_ crew alltold consisted of 450 men, [Footnote: Depositions of Lieut. Gallagherand the other officers. ] none of whom were British. [Footnote:Deposition of Commodore Decatur. ] She had thus a hundred more menthan her antagonist and threw about 100 pounds more shot at a broadside;but these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the injuriesreceived on the bar, and by the fact that her powder was so bad thatwhile some of the British shot went through both her sides, such athing did not once happen to the _Endymion_, [Footnote: Bermuda"Royal Gazette, " Jan. 6, 1818. ] when fairly hulled. The _President_lost 24 killed and 55 wounded [Footnote: Decatur's letter. ]; the_Endymion_, 11 killed and 14 wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Hope, Jan. 15, 1815. ] Two days afterward, on their way to the Bermudas, a violent easterly gale came on, during which both ships were dismasted, and the _Endymion_ in addition had to throw over all her spar-deckguns. [Footnote: James, vi, 534. ] [Illustration: The capture of the _President_: an engravingpublished in London in 1815 from a painting done under thesupervision of an officer in the _Endymion_. From left to right:HMS _Majestic_, USS _President_, HMS _Pomone_, HMS _Endymion_, HMS _Tenedos_. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] As can been seen, almost every sentence of this account is taken(very nearly word for word) from the various official reports, relyingespecially on the log of the British frigate _Pomone_. I have beenthus careful to have every point of the narrative established byunimpeachable reference: first, because there have been quite a numberof British historians who have treated the conflict as if it werea victory and not a defeat for the _Endymion_: and in the secondplace, because I regret to say that I do not think that the factsbear out the assertions, on the part of most American authors, thatCommodore Decatur "covered himself with glory" and showed the "utmostheroism. " As regards the first point, Captain Hope himself, in hissingularly short official letter, does little beyond detail his ownloss, and makes no claim to having vanquished his opponent. Almostall the talk about its being a "victory" comes from James; and inrecounting this, as well as all the other battles, nearly everysubsequent British historian simply gives James' statements overagain, occasionally amplifying, but more often altering or omitting, the vituperation. The point at issue is simply this: could a frigatewhich, according to James himself, went out of action with everysail set, take another frigate which for two hours, according tothe log of the _Pomone_, lay motionless and unmanageable on the waters, without a sail? To prove that it could not, of course needs somenot over-scrupulous manipulation of the facts. The intention withwhich James sets about his work can be gathered from the triumphantconclusion he comes to, that Decatur's name has been "sunk quiteas low as that of Bainbridge or Porter, " which, comparing smallthings to great, is somewhat like saying that Napoleon's defeat byWellington and Blucher "sunk" him to the level of Hannibal. For theaccount of the American crew and loss, James relies on the statementsmade in the Bermuda papers, of whose subsequent forced retractionhe takes no notice, and of course largely overestimates both. Onthe same authority he states that the _President's_ fire was "silenced, "Commodore Decatur stating the exact reverse. The point is fortunatelysettled by the log of the _Pomone_, which distinctly says that thelast shot was fired by the _President_. His last resort is to statethat the loss of the _President_ was fourfold (in reality threefold)that of the _Endymion_. Now we have seen that the _President_ lost"a considerable number" of men from the fire of the _Pomone_. Estimatingthese at only nineteen, we have a loss of sixty caused by the _Endymion_, and as most of this was caused during the first half hour, when the_President_ was not firing, it follows that while the two vesselswere both fighting, broadside and broadside, the loss inflicted wasabout equal; or, the _President_, aiming at her adversary's rigging, succeeded in completely disabling her, and incidentally killed 25men, while the _Endymion_ did not hurt the _President's_ riggingat all, and, aiming at her hull, where, of course, the slaughterought to have been far greater than when the fire was directed aloft, only killed about the same number of men. Had there been no othervessels in chase, Commodore Decatur, his adversary having been thusrendered perfectly helpless, could have simply taken any positionhe chose and compelled the latter to strike, without suffering anymaterial additional loss himself. As in such a case he would neitherhave endured the unanswered fire of the _Endymion_ on his quarterfor the first half hour, nor the subsequent broadsides of the _Pornone_, the _President's_ loss would probably have been no greater than thatof the _Constitution_ in taking the _Java_. It is difficult to seehow any outsider with an ounce of common-sense and fairmindednesscan help awarding the palm to Decatur, as regards the action withthe _Endymion_. But I regret to say that I must agree with Jamesthat he acted rather tamely, certainly not heroically, in strikingto the _Pomone_. There was, of course, not much chance of successin doing battle with two fresh frigates; but then they only mountedeighteen-pounders, and, judging from the slight results of thecannonading from the _Endymion_ and the two first (usually the mostfatal) broadsides of the _Pomone_, it would have been rather a longtime before they would have caused much damage. Meanwhile the_President_ was pretty nearly as well off as ever as far as fightingand sailing went. A lucky shot might have disabled one of heropponents, and then the other would, in all probability, have undergonethe same fate as the _Endymion_. At least it was well worth trying, and though Decatur could not be said to be disgraced, yet it isexcusable to wish that Porter or Perry had been in his place. Itis not very pleasant to criticise the actions of an American whosename is better known than that of almost any other single-ship captainof his time; but if a man is as much to be praised for doing fairly, or even badly, as for doing excellently, then there is no use inbestowing praise at all. This is perhaps as good a place as any other to notice one or twoof James' most common misstatements; they really would not needrefutation were it not that they have been reechoed, as usual, byalmost every British historian of the war for the last 60 years. In the first place, James puts the number of the _President's_ menat 475; she had 450. An exactly parallel reduction must often bemade when he speaks of the force of an American ship. Then he saysthere were many British among them, which is denied under oath bythe American officers; this holds good also for the other Americanfrigates. He says there were but 4 boys; there were nearly 30; andon p. 120 he says the youngest was 14, whereas we incidentally learnfrom the "Life of Decatur" that several were under 12. A favoriteaccusation is that the American midshipmen were chiefly masters andmates of merchant-men; but this was hardly ever the case. Many ofthe midshipmen of the war afterward became celebrated commanders, and most of these (a notable instance being Farragut, the greatestadmiral since Nelson) were entirely too young in 1812 to have hadvessels under them, and, moreover, came largely from the so-called"best families. " Again, in the first two frigate actions of 1812, the proportion ofkilled to wounded happened to be unusually large on board the Americanfrigates; accordingly James states (p. 146) that the returns of thewounded had been garbled, under-estimated, and made "subservientto the views of the commanders and their government. " To supporthis position that Capt. Hull, who reported 7 killed and 7 wounded, had not given the list of the latter in full, he says that "an equalnumber of killed and wounded, as given in the American account, hardlyever occurs, except in cases of explosion"; and yet, on p. 519, hegives the loss of the British _Hermes_ as 25 killed and 24 wounded, disregarding the incongruity involved. On p. 169, in noticing theloss of the _United States_, 5 killed and 7 wounded, he says that"the slightly wounded, as in all other American cases, are omitted. "This is untrue, and the proportion on the _United States_, 5 to 7, is just about the same as that given by James himself on the_Endymion_, 11 to 14, and _Nautilus_, 6 to 8. In supporting his theory, James brings up all the instances where the American wounded borea larger proportion to their dead than on board the British ships, but passes over the actions with the _Reindeer_, _Epervier_, _Penguin_, _Endymion_, and _Boxer_, where the reverse was the case. One of James'most common methods of attempting to throw discredit on the muchvilified "Yankees" is by quoting newspaper accounts of their wounded. Thus he says (p. 562) of the _Hornet_, that several of her men toldsome of the _Penguin's_ sailors that she lost 10 men killed, 16wounded, etc. Utterly false rumors of this kind were as often indulgedin by the Americans as the British. After the capture of the_President_ articles occasionally appeared in the papers to the effectthat some American sailor had counted "23 dead" on board the _Endymion_, that "more than 50" of her men were wounded, etc. Such statementswere as commonly made and with as little foundation by one side asby the other, and it is absurd for a historian to take any noticeof them. James does no worse than many of our own writers of thesame date; but while their writings have passed into oblivion, hiswork is still often accepted as a standard. This must be my apologyfor devoting so much time to it. The severest criticism to which itcan possibly be subjected is to compare it with the truth. Wheneverdealing with purely American affairs, James' history is as utterlyuntrustworthy as its contemporary, "Niles' Register, " is in matterspurely British, while both are invaluable in dealing with thingsrelating strictly to their own nation; they supplement each other. On Jan. 8th General Packenham was defeated and killed by GeneralJackson at New Orleans, the Louisiana and the seamen of the _Carolina_having their full share in the glory of the day, and Captain Henlybeing among the very few American wounded. On the same daySailing-master Johnson, with 28 men in two boats, cut out theBritish-armed transport brig _Cyprus_, containing provisions andmunitions of war, and manned by ten men. [Footnote: Letter ofSailing-master Johnson, Jan. 9, 1815. ] On the 18th the Britishabandoned the enterprise and retreated to their ships; and Mr. ThomasShields, a purser, formerly a sea-officer, set off to harass themwhile embarking. At sunset on the 20th he left with five boats anda gig, manned in all with 53 men, and having under him Sailing-masterDaily and Master's Mate Boyd. [Footnote: Letter of Thomas Shieldsto Com. Patterson, Jan. 25, 1815. ] At ten o'clock P. M. A large barge, containing 14 seamen and 40 officers and men of the 14th Light Dragoons, was surprised and carried by boarding after a slight struggle. Theprisoners outnumbering their captors, the latter returned to shore, left them in a place of safety, and again started at 2 A. M. On themorning of the 22d. Numerous transports and barges of the enemy couldbe seen, observing very little order and apparently taking noprecautions against attack, which they probably did not apprehend. One of the American boats captured a transport and five men; another, containing Mr. Shields himself and eight men, carried by boarding, after a short resistance, a schooner carrying ten men. The flotillathen re-united and captured in succession, with no resistance, fivebarges containing 70 men. By this time the alarm had spread and theywere attacked by six boats, but these were repelled with some loss. Seven of the prisoners (who were now half as many again as theircaptors) succeeded in escaping in the smallest prize. Mr. Shieldsreturned with the others, 78 in number. During the entire expeditionhe had lost but three men, wounded; he had taken 132 prisoners, anddestroyed eight craft whose aggregate tonnage about equalled thatof the five gun-vessels taken on Lake Borgne. On Jan. 30, 1815, information was received by Captain Dent, commandingat North Edisto, Ga. , that a party of British officers and men, infour boats belonging to H. M. S. _Hebrus_, Capt. Palmer, were wateringat one of the adjacent islands. [Footnote: Letter of Lawrence Kearneyof Jan. 30, 1815 (see in the Archives at Washington, "Captains'Letters, " vol. 42, No. 100). ] Lieut. Lawrence Kearney, with threebarges containing about 75 men, at once proceeded outside to cutthem off, when the militia drove them away. The frigate was at anchorout of gunshot, but as soon as she perceived the barges began firingguns as signals. The British on shore left in such a hurry that theydeserted their launch, which, containing a 12-pound boat carronadeand six swivels, was taken by the Americans. The other boats--twocutters, and a large tender mounting one long nine and carrying 30men--made for the frigate; but Lieut. Kearney laid the tender aboardand captured her after a sharp brush. The cutters were only savedby the fire of the _Hebrus_, which was very well directed--one ofher shot taking off the head of a man close by Lieut. Kearney. Thefrigate got under way and intercepted Kearney's return, but theLieutenant then made for South Edisto, whither he carried his prizein triumph. This was one of the most daring exploits of the war, and was achieved at very small cost. On Feb. 14th a similar featwas performed. Lieutenant Kearney had manned the captured launchwith 25 men and the 12-pound carronade. News was received of anotherharrying expedition undertaken by the British, and Captain Dent, with seven boats, put out to attack them, but was unable to crossthe reef. Meanwhile Kearney's barge had gotten outside, and attackedthe schooner _Brant_, a tender to H. M. S. _Severn_, mounting an18-pounder, and with a crew of two midshipmen, and twenty-one marinesand seamen. A running fight began, the _Brant_ evidently fearingthat the other boats might get across the reef and join in the attack;suddenly she ran aground on a sand-bank, which accident totallydemoralized her crew. Eight of them escaped in her boat, to thefrigate; the remaining fifteen, after firing a few shot, surrenderedand were taken possession of. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Dent, Feb. 16th (in "Captains' Letters, " vol. 42, No. 130). Most Americanauthors, headed by Cooper, give this exploit a more vivid coloringby increasing the crew of the _Brant_ to forty men, omitting tomention that she was hard and fast aground, and making no allusionto the presence of the five other American boats which undoubtedlycaused the _Brant's_ flight in the first place. ] I have had occasion from time to time to speak of cutting-outexpeditions, successful and otherwise, undertaken by British boatsagainst American privateers; and twice a small British nationalcutter was captured by an overwhelmingly superior American opponentof this class. We now, for the only time, come across an engagementbetween a privateer and a regular cruiser of approximately equalforce. These privateers came from many different ports and variedgreatly in size. Baltimore produced the largest number; but New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Salem, were not far behind; and Charleston, Bristol, and Plymouth, supplied some that were very famous. Manywere merely small pilot-boats with a crew of 20 to 40 men, intendedonly to harry the West Indian trade. Others were large, powerfulcraft, unequalled for speed by any vessels of their size, whichpenetrated to the remotest corners of the ocean, from Man to theSpice Islands. When a privateer started she was overloaded with men, to enable her to man her prizes; a successful cruise would reduceher crew to a fifth of its original size. The favorite rig was thatof a schooner, but there were many brigs and brigantines. Each wasgenerally armed with a long 24 or 32 on a pivot, and a number oflight guns in broadside, either long 9's or short 18's or 12's. Somehad no pivot gun, others had nothing else. The largest of them carried17 guns (a pivotal 32 and 16 long 12's in broadside) with a crewof 150. Such a vessel ought to have been a match, at her own distance, for a British brig-sloop, but we never hear of any such engagements, and there were several instances where privateers gave up, withoutfiring a shot, to a force superior, it is true, but not enough soto justify the absolute tameness of the surrender. [Footnote: Aswhen the _Epervter_, some little time before her own capture, tookwithout resistance the _Alfred_, of Salem, mounting 16 long ninesand having 108 men aboard. ] One explanation of this was that theywere cruising as private ventures, and their object was purely tocapture merchant-men with as little risk as possible to themselves. Another reason was that they formed a kind of sea-militia, and, liketheir compeers on land, some _could_ fight as well as any regulars, while most would _not_ fight at all, especially if there was needof concerted action between two or three. The American papers ofthe day are full of "glorious victories" gained by privateers overpackets and Indiamen; the British papers are almost as full of instanceswhere the packets and Indiamen "heroically repulsed" the privateers. As neither side ever chronicles a defeat, and as the narration isapt to be decidedly figurative in character, there is very littlehope of getting at the truth of such meetings; so I have confinedmyself to the mention of those cases where privateers, of eitherside, came into armed collision with regular cruisers. We are thensure to find some authentic account. The privateer brig _Chasseur_, of Baltimore, Captain Thomas Boyle, carried 16 long 12's, and had, when she left port, 115 men aboard. She made 18 prizes on her last voyage, and her crew was thus reducedto less than 80 men; she was then chased by the _Barossa_ frigate, and threw overboard 10 of her long 12's. Afterward eight 9-poundcarronades were taken from a prize, to partially supply the placesof the lost guns; but as she had no shot of the calibre of thesecarronades each of the latter was loaded with one 4-pound and one6-pound ball, giving her a broadside of 76 lbs. On the 26th ofFebruary, two leagues from Havana, the _Chasseur_ fell in with theBritish schooner _St. Lawrence_, Lieut. H. C. Gordon, mounting twelve12-pound carronades, and one long 9; her broadside was thus 81 lbs. , and she had between 60 and 80 men aboard. [Footnote: Letter of CaptainThomas Boyle, of March 2, 1815 (see Niles and Coggeshall); he saysthe schooner had two more carronades; I have taken the number givenby James (p. 539). Captain Boyle says the _St. Lawrence_ had onboard89 men and several more, including a number of soldiers and marinesand gentlemen of the navy, as passengers; James says her crew amountedto 51 "exclusive of some passengers, " which I suppose must mean atleast nine men. So the forces were pretty equal; the _Chasseur_ mayhave had 20 men more or 10 men less than her antagonist, and shethrew from 5 to 21 lbs. Less weight of shot. ] The _Chasseur_ mistookthe _St. Lawrence_ for a merchant-man and closed with her. The mistakewas discovered too late to escape, even had such been Captain Boyle'sintention, and a brief but bloody action ensued. At 1. 26 P. M. , the_St. Lawrence_ fired the first broadside, within pistol shot, towhich the _Chasseur_ replied with her great guns and musketry. Thebrig then tried to close, so as to board; but having too much wayon, shot ahead under the lee of the schooner, which put her helmup to wear under the _Chasseur's_ stern. Boyle, however, followedhis antagonist's manoeuvre, and the two vessels ran along side byside, the _St. Lawrence_ drawing ahead, while the firing was veryheavy. Then Captain Boyle put his helm a starboard and ran his foeaboard, when in the act of boarding, her colors were struck at 1. 41P. M. , 15 minutes after the first shot. Of the _Chasseur's_ crew 5were killed and 8 wounded, including Captain Boyle slightly. Of the_St. Lawrence's_ crew 6 were killed and 17 (according to James 18)wounded. This was a very creditable action. The _St. Lawrence_ hadherself been an American privateer, called the _Atlas_, and was of241 tons, or just 36 less than the _Chasseur_. The latter could thusfairly claim that her victory was gained over a regular cruiser ofabout her own force. Captain Southcombe of the _Lottery_, CaptainReid of the _General Armstrong_, Captain Ordronaux of the _Neufchatel_, and Captain Boyle of the _Chasseur_, deserve as much credit as anyregularly commissioned sea-officers. But it is a mistake to considerthese cases as representing the _average_; an ordinary privateerwas, naturally enough, no match for a British regular cruiser ofequal force. The privateers were of incalculable benefit to us, andinflicted enormous damage on the foe; but in fighting they sufferedunder the same disadvantages as other irregular forces; they wereutterly unreliable. A really brilliant victory would be followedby a most extraordinary defeat. [Illustration: Captain Charles Stewart: a study painted by ThomasSully in 1817 for use as the model for the bust of Stewart on theCongressional Gold Medal awarded to him for the capture of the _Cyane_and _Levant_. (Courtesy U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] [Illustration: _Constitution_ vs. _Cyane_ and _Levant_: an engravingpublished in the U. S. Military Magazine for December 1840 of a paintingby Thomas Birch. From left to right: _Levant_, _Constitution_, _Cyane_. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] After the _Constitution_ had escaped from Boston, as I have described, she ran to the Bermudas, cruised in their vicinity a short while, thence to Madeira, to the Bay of Biscay, and finally off Portugal, cruising for some time in sight of the Rock of Lisbon. CaptainStewart then ran off southwest, and on Feb. 20th, Madeira bearingW. S. W. 60 leagues, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Stewart to theSecretary of the Navy, May 20, 1815. ] the day being cloudy, witha light easterly breeze, [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_, Feb. 20, 1815. ] at 1 P. M. A sail was made two points on the port bow; andat 2 P. M. , Captain Stewart, hauling up in chase, discovered anothersail. The first of these was the frigate-built ship corvette _Cyane_, Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon, and the second was the ship sloop_Levant_, Captain the Honorable George Douglass. [Footnote: "NavalChronicle, " xxxiii, 466. ] Both were standing close hauled on thestarboard tack, the sloop about 10 miles to leeward of the corvette. At 4 P. M. The latter began making signals to her consort that thestrange sail was an enemy, and then made all sail before the windto join the sloop. The _Constitution_ bore up in chase, setting hertop-mast, top-gallant, and royal studding-sails. In half an hourshe carried away her main royal mast, but immediately got anotherprepared, and at 5 o'clock began firing at the corvette with thetwo port-bow guns; as the shot fell short the firing soon ceased. At 5. 30 the _Cyane_ got within hail of the _Levant_, and the latter'sgallant commander expressed to Captain Gordon his intention of engagingthe American frigate. The two ships accordingly hauled up their coursesand stood on the starboard tack; but immediately afterward theirrespective captains concluded to try to delay the action till dark, so as to get the advantage of manoeuvring. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle, "xxxiii, 466. ] Accordingly they again set all sail and hauled closeto the wind to endeavor to weather their opponent; but finding thelatter coming down too fast for them to succeed they again strippedto fighting canvas and formed on the starboard tack in head and sternline, the _Levant_ about a cable's length in front of her consort. The American now had them completely under her guns and showed herensign, to which challenge the British ships replied by setting theircolors. At 6. 10 the _Constitution_ ranged up to windward of the _Cyane_and _Levant_, the former on her port quarter, the latter on her portbow, both being distant about 250 yards from her [Footnote: Testimonysworn to by Lieutenant W. B. Shubrick and Lieutenant of MarinesArchibald Henderson before Thomas Welsh. Jr. , Justice of the Peace, Suffolk St. , Boston, July 20, 1815. The depositions were taken inconsequence of a report started by some of the British journals thatthe action began at a distance of 1/4 of a mile. All the Americandepositions were that all three ships began firing at once, whenequidistant from each other about 250 yards, the marines being engagedalmost the whole time. ]--so close that the American marines wereconstantly engaged almost from the beginning of the action. The fightbegan at once, and continued with great spirit for a quarter of anhour, the vessels all firing broadsides. It was now moonlight, andan immense column of smoke formed under the lee of the _Constitution_, shrouding from sight her foes; and, as the fire of the latter hadalmost ceased, Captain Stewart also ordered his men to stop, so asto find out the positions of the ships. In about three minutes thesmoke cleared, disclosing to the Americans the _Levant_ dead to leewardon the port beam, and the _Cyane_ luffing up for their port quarter. Giving a broadside to the sloop, Stewart braced aback his main andmizzen top-sails, with top-gallant sails set, shook all forward, and backed rapidly astern, under cover of the smoke, abreast thecorvette, forcing the latter to fill again to avoid being raked. The firing was spirited for a few minutes, when the _Cyane's_ almostdied away. The _Levant_ bore up to wear round and assist her consort, but the _Constitution_ filled her top-sails, and, shooting ahead, gave her two stern rakes, when she at once made all sail to get outof the combat. The _Cyane_ was now discovered wearing, when the_Constitution_ herself at once wore and gave her in turn a sternrake, the former luffing to and firing her port broadside into thestarboard bow of the frigate. Then, as the latter ranged up on herport quarter, she struck, at 6. 50, just forty minutes after thebeginning of the action. She was at once taken possession of, andLieut. Hoffman, second of the _Constitution_, was put in command. Having manned the prize, Captain Stewart, at 8 o'clock, filled awayafter her consort. The latter, however, had only gone out of thecombat to refit. Captain Douglass had no idea of retreat, and nosooner had he rove new braces than he hauled up to the wind, andcame very gallantly back to find out his friend's condition. At 8. 50he met the _Constitution_, and, failing to weather her, the frigateand sloop passed each other on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides. Finding her antagonist too heavy, the _Levant_ then crowded all sailto escape, but was soon overtaken by the _Constitution_, and at about9. 30 the latter opened with her starboard bow-chasers, and soonafterward the British captain hauled down his colors. Mr. Ballard, first of the _Constitution_, was afterward put in command of theprize. By one o'clock the ships were all in order again. The _Constitution_ had been hulled eleven times, more often thanin either of her previous actions, but her loss was mainly due tothe grape and musketry of the foe in the beginning of the fight. [Footnote: Deposition of her officers as before cited. ] The Britishcertainly fired better than usual, especially considering the factthat there was much manoeuvering, and that it was a night action. The Americans lost 3 men killed, 3 mortally, and 9 severely andslightly, wounded. The corvette, out of her crew of 180, had 12 menkilled and 26 wounded, several mortally; the sloop, out of 140, had7 killed and 16 wounded. The _Constitution_ had started on her cruisevery full-handed, with over 470 men, but several being absent on aprize, she went into battle with about 450. [Footnote: 410 officersand seamen, and 41 marines, by her muster-roll of Feb. 19th. (Themuster-rolls are preserved in the Treasury Department at Washington. )]The prizes had suffered a good deal in their hulls and rigging, andhad received some severe wounds in their masts and principal spars. The _Cyane_ carried on her main-deck twenty-two 32-pound carronades, and on her spar-deck two long 12's, and ten 18-pounder carronades. The _Levant_ carried, all on one deck, eighteen 32-pound carronadesand two long 9's, together with a shifting 12-pounder. Thus, theirbroadside weight of metal was 763 pounds, with a total of 320 men, of whom 61 fell, against the _Constitution's_ 704 pounds and 450men, of whom 15 were lost; or, nominally, the relative force was100 to 91, and the relative loss 100 to 24. But the British gunswere almost exclusively carronades which, as already pointed outin the case of the Essex and in the battle off Plattsburg, are nomatch for long guns. Moreover, the scantling of the smaller shipswas, of course, by no means as stout as that of the frigate, so thatthe disparity of force was much greater than the figures would indicate, although not enough to account for the difference in loss. Both theBritish ships were ably handled, their fire was well directed, andthe _Levant_ in especial was very gallantly fought. [Illustration of the action between the _Constitution_ and the_Cyane_ and the _Levant_ from 6. 05 to 6. 40. ] As regards the _Constitution_, "her manoeuvring was as brilliantas any recorded in naval annals, " and it would have been simplyimpossible to surpass the consummate skill with which she washandled in the smoke, always keeping her antagonists to leeward, and, while raking both of them, not being once raked herself. Thefiring was excellent, considering the short time the ships wereactually engaged, and the fact that it was at night. Altogether thefight reflected the greatest credit on her, and also on her adversaries. [Footnote: There is no British official account of the action. Jamesstates that the entire British force was only 302 men of whom 12were killed and 29 wounded. This is probably not based on any authority. Captain Stewart received on board 301 prisoners, of whom 42 werewounded, several mortally. Curiously enough James also underestimatesthe American loss, making it only 12. He also says that many attemptswere made by the Americans to induce the captured British to desert, while the _Constitution's_ officers deny this under oath, beforeJustice Welsh, as already quoted, and state that, on the contrary, many of the prisoners offered to enlist on the frigate, but wereall refused permission--as "the loss of the _Chesapeake_ had taughtus the danger of having renegades aboard. " This denial, by the way, holds good for all the similar statements made by James as regards the_Guerrièrre_, _Macedonian_, etc. He also states that a Britishcourt-martial found various counts against the Americans for harshtreatment, but all of these were specifically denied by the Americanofficers, under oath, as already quoted. I have relied chiefly on Captain Stewart's narratives; but partly(as to time, etc. ) on the British account in the "Naval Chronicle. "] The merits of this action can perhaps be better appreciated by comparingit with a similar one that took place a few years before between aBritish sloop and corvette on the one side, and a French frigate onthe other, and which is given in full by both James and Troude. Althoughthese authors differ somewhat in the account of it, both agree thatthe Frenchman, the _Nereide_, of 44 guns, on Feb. 14, 1810, foughta long and indecisive battle with the _Rainbow_ of 26 and _Avon_ of18 guns, the British sloops being fought separately, in succession. The relative force was almost exactly as in the _Constitution's_fight. Each side claimed that the other fled. But this much is sure:the _Constitution_ engaging the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ together, capturedboth; while the _Nereide_, engaging the _Rainbow_ and _Avon_ separately, captured neither. The three ships now proceeded to the Cape de Verds, and on March 10thanchored in the harbor of Porto Praya, Island of San Jago. Here amerchant-brig was taken as a cartel, and a hundred of the prisonerswere landed to help fit her for sea. The next day the weather wasthick and foggy, with fresh breezes. [Footnote: Log of _Constitution_, March 11, 1815. ] The first and second lieutenants, with a good partof the people, were aboard the two prizes. At five minutes past twelve, while Mr. Shubrick, the senior remaining lieutenant, was on thequarter-deck, the canvas of a large vessel suddenly loomed up throughthe haze, her hull being completely hidden by the fog-bank. Hercharacter could not be made out; but she was sailing close-hauled, and evidently making for the roads. Mr. Shubrick at once went downand reported the stranger to Captain Stewart, when that officer coollyremarked that it was probably a British frigate or an Indiaman, anddirected the lieutenant to return on deck, call all hands, and getready to go out and attack her. [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 459. ] At thatmoment the canvas of two other ships was discovered rising out ofthe fog astern of the vessel first seen. It was now evident thatall three were heavy frigates. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. ] In fact, they were the _Newcastle_, 50, CaptainLord George Stewart; _Leander_, 50, Captain Sir Ralph Collier, K. C. B. , and _Acasta, 40, Captain Robert Kerr, standing into Porto Praya, close-hauled on the starboard tack, the wind being light northeastby north. [Footnote: Marshall's "Naval Biography, " ii, 535. ] CaptainStewart at once saw that his opponents were far too heavy for a fairfight, and, knowing that the neutrality of the port would not bethe slightest protection to him, he at once signalled to the prizesto follow, cut his cable, and, in less than ten minutes from thetime the first frigate was seen, was standing out of the roads, followedby Hoffmann and Ballard. Certainly a more satisfactory proof of theexcellent training of both officers and men could hardly be giventhan the rapidity, skill, and perfect order with which every thingwas done. Any indecision on the part of the officers or bunglingon the part of the men would have lost every thing. The prisonerson shore had manned a battery and delivered a furious but ill-directedfire at their retreating conquerors. The frigate, sloop, and corvette, stood out of the harbor in the order indicated, on the port tack, passing close under the east point, and a gunshot to windward ofthe British squadron, according to the American, or about a league, according to the British, accounts. The Americans made out the forceof the strangers correctly, and their own force was equally clearlydiscerned by the _Acasta_; but both the _Newcastle_ and _Leander_mistook the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ for frigates, a mistake similarto that once made by Commodore Rodgers. The _Constitution_ now crossedher top-gallant yards and set the foresail, main-sail, spanker, flyingjib, and top-gallant sails; and the British ships, tacking, madeall sail in pursuit. The _Newcastle_ was on the _Constitution's_lee quarter and directly ahead of the _Leander_, while the _Acasta_was on the weather-quarter of the _Newcastle_. All six ships wereon the port tack. The _Constitution_ cut adrift the boats towingastern, and her log notes that at 12. 50 she found she was sailingabout as fast as the ships on her lee quarter, but that the _Acasta_was luffing into her wake and dropping astern. The log of the _Acasta_says, "We had gained on the sloops, but the frigate had gained onus. " At 1. 10 the _Cyane_ had fallen so far astern and to leewardthat Captain Stewart signalled to Lieutenant Hoffman to tack, lesthe should be cut off if he did not. Accordingly the lieutenant putabout and ran off toward the northwest, no notice being taken ofhim by the enemy beyond an ineffectual broadside from the sternmostfrigate. At 2. 35 he was out of sight of all the ships and shapedhis course for America, which he reached on April 10th. [Footnote:Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. ] At 1. 45 the _Newcastle_opened on the _Constitution_ firing by divisions, but the shot allfell short, according to the American statements, about 200 yards, while the British accounts (as given in Marshall's "Naval Biography")make the distance much greater; at any rate the vessels were so nearthat from the _Constitution_ the officers of the _Newcastle_ couldbe seen standing on the hammock nettings. But, very strangely, boththe 50-gun ships apparently still mistook the _Levant_, though alow, flush-decked sloop like the _Hornet_, for the "_President_, _Congress_, or _Macedonian_, " Captain Collier believing that the_Constitution_ had sailed with two other frigates in company. [Footnote:Marshal, ii, 533. ] By three o'clock the _Levant_ had lagged so asto be in the same position from which the _Cyane_ had just been rescued;accordingly Captain Stewart signalled to her to tack, which she did, and immediately afterward all three British ships tacked in pursuit. Before they did so, it must be remembered the _Acasta_ had weatheredon the _Constitution_, though left considerably astern, while the_Newcastle_ and _Leander_ had about kept their positions on her leeor starboard quarter; so that if any ship had been detached afterthe _Levant_ it should have been the _Leander_, which had least chanceof overtaking the American frigate. The latter was by no means asheavily armed as either of the two 50's, and but little heavier thanthe _Acasta_; moreover, she was shorthanded, having manned her twoprizes. The _Acasta_, at any rate, had made out the force of the_Levant_, and, even had she been a frigate, it was certainly carryingprudence to an extreme to make more than one ship tack after her. Had the _Newcastle_ and _Acasta_ kept on after the _Constitution_there was a fair chance of overtaking her, for the _Acasta_ hadweathered on her, and the chase could not bear up for fear of beingcut off by the _Newcastle_. At any rate the pursuit should not havebeen given up so early. Marshall says there was a mistake in thesignalling. The British captains certainly bungled the affair; evenJames says (p. 558): "It is the most blundering piece of businessrecorded in these six volumes. " As for Stewart and his men, theydeserve the highest credit for the cool judgment and prompt, skilfulseamanship they had displayed. The _Constitution_, having shakenoff her pursuers, sailed to Maranham, where she landed her prisoners. At Porto Rico she learned of the peace, and forthwith made sail forNew York, reaching it about the middle of May. As soon as he saw Captain Stewart's signal, Lieutenant Ballard hadtacked, and at once made for the anchorage at Porto Prayo, which hereached, though pursued by all his foes, and anchored within 150yards of a heavy battery. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Ballard. May 2, 1815. ] The wisdom of Captain Stewart's course in not trustingto the neutrality of the port, now became evident. The _Acasta_ openedupon the sloop as soon as the latter had anchored, at 4. 30. [Footnote:_Newcastle's_ log, as given by Marshall and James. ] The _Newcastle_, as soon as she arrived, also opened, and so did the _Leander_, whilethe British prisoners on shore fired the guns of the battery. Havingborne this combined cannonade for 15 minutes, [Footnote: Ballard'sletter. ] the colors of the _Levant_ were hauled down. The unskilfulfiring of the British ships certainly did not redeem the blunderspreviously made by Sir George Collier, for the three heavy frigatesduring 15 minutes' broadside practice in smooth water against astationary and unresisting foe, did her but little damage, and didnot kill a man. The chief effect of the fire was to damage the housesof the Portuguese town. [Footnote: James, vi, 551. ] After the capture of the _President_, the _Peacock_, Captain Warrington, the _Hornet_, Captain Biddle, and _Tom Bowline_, brig, still remainedin New York harbor. On the 22d of January a strong northwesterlygale began to blow, and the American vessels, according to theircustom, at once prepared to take advantage of the heavy weather andrun by the blockaders. They passed the bar by daylight, under stormcanvas, the British frigates lying to in the southeast being plainlyvisible. They were ignorant of the fate of the _President_, andproceeded toward Tristan d'Acunha, which was the appointed rendezvous. A few days out the _Hornet_ parted company from the two others; theselast reached Tristan d'Acunha about March 18th, but were driven offagain by a gale. The _Hornet_ reached the island on the 23d, andat half-past ten in the morning, the wind being fresh S. S. W. , whenabout to anchor off the north point, a sail was made in the southeast, steering west. [Footnote: Letter from Captain Biddle to CommodoreDecatur, Mar. 25, 1815. ] This was the British brig-sloop _Penguin_, Captain James Dickenson. She was a new vessel, having left port forthe first time in September, 1814. While at the Cape of Good Hopeshe had received from Vice-Admiral Tyler 12 marines from the _Medway_, 74, increasing her complement to 132; and was then despatched onspecial service against a heavy American privateer, the _Young Wasp_, which had been causing great havoc among the homeward-bound Indiamen. [Illustration: Master Commandant James Biddle: a contemporary portraitby Jacob Eichholz painted after Biddle's promotion to captain (CourtesyU. S. Naval Academy Museum)] [Illustration: _Hornet_ vs. _Penguin_: a lithograph published inLiverpool, circa 1816. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U. S. Naval Academy Museum)] [Illustration of the action between _PENGUIN_ and _HORNET_ from1. 40 to 2. 02. ] When the strange sail was first seen Captain Biddle was just lettinggo his top-sail sheets; he at once sheeted them home, and the strangerbeing almost instantly shut out by the land, made all sail to thewest, and again caught sight of her. Captain Dickenson now, for thefirst time, saw the American sloop, and at once bore up for her. Theposition of the two vessels was exactly the reverse of the _Wasp_and _Frolic_, the Englishman being to windward. The _Hornet_ hoveto, to let her antagonist close; then she filled her maintop-sailand continued to yaw, wearing occasionally to prevent herself frombeing raked. At forty minutes past one the _Penguin_, being withinmusket-shot, hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, hoisted aSt. George's ensign and fired a gun. The _Hornet_ luffed up on thesame tack, hoisting American colors, and the action began with heavybroadsides. The vessels ran along thus for 15 minutes, graduallycoming closer together, and Captain Dickenson put his helm aweather, to run his adversary aboard. At this moment the brave young officerreceived a mortal wound, and the command devolved on the firstlieutenant, Mr. McDonald, who endeavored very gallantly to carryout his commander's intention, and at 1. 56 the _Penguin's_ bowspritcame in between the _Hornet's_ main- and mizzen-rigging on thestarboard side. The American seamen had been called away, and wereat their posts to repel boarders, but as the British made no attemptto come on, the cutlass men began to clamber into the rigging to goaboard the brig. Captain Biddle very coolly stopped them, "it beingevident from the beginning that our fire was greatly superior bothin quickness and effect. " There was a heavy sea running, and as the_Hornet_ forged ahead, the _Penguin's_ bowsprit carried away hermizzen shrouds, stern davits, and spanker boom; and the brig thenhung on her starboard quarter, where only small arms could be usedon either side. An English officer now called out something whichBiddle understood, whether correctly or not is disputed, to be theword of surrender; accordingly he directed his marines to cease firing, and jumped on the taffrail. At that minute two of the marines onthe _Penguin's_ forecastle, not 30 feet distant, fired at him, oneof the balls inflicting a rather severe wound in his neck. A dischargeof musketry from the _Hornet_ at once killed both the marines, andat that moment the ship drew ahead. As the vessels separated the_Penguin's_ foremast went overboard, the bowsprit breaking shortoff. The _Hornet_ at once wore, to present a fresh broadside, whilethe _Penguin's_ disabled condition prevented her following suit, and having lost a third of her men killed and wounded (14 of theformer and 28 of the latter), her hull being riddled through andthrough, her foremast gone, main-mast tottering, and most of theguns on the engaged side dismounted, she struck her colors at twominutes past two, twenty-two minutes after the first gun was fired. Of the _Hornet's_ 150 men, 8 were absent in a prize. By actualmeasurement she was two feet longer and slightly narrower than herantagonist. Her loss was chiefly caused by musketry, amounting to1 marine killed, 1 seaman mortally, Lieutenant Conner very severely, and Captain Biddle and seven seamen slightly, wounded. Not a roundshot struck the hull, nor was a mast or spar materially injured, but the rigging and sails were a good deal cut, especially aboutthe fore and main top-gallant masts. The _Hornet's_ crew had beensuffering much from sickness, and 9 of the men were unable to be atquarters, thus reducing the vessels to an exact equality. Countingin these men, and excluding the 8 absent in a prize, we get as COMPARATIVE FORCE. No. Weight Tonnage. Guns. Metal. Crew. Loss. _Hornet_ 480 10 279 142[1] 11_Penguin_ 477 10 274 132 42 [Footnote 1: This number of men is probably too great; I have notpersonally examined the _Hornet's_ muster-roll for that period. Lieutenant Emmons in his "History, " gives her 132 men; but perhapshe did not include the nine sick, which would make his statementabout the same as mine. In response to my inquiries, I received avery kind letter from the Treasury Department (Fourth Auditor'soffice), which stated that the muster-roll of the _Hornet_ on thisvoyage showed "101 officers and crew (marines excepted). " Addingthe 20 marines would make but 121 in all. I think there must besome mistake in this, and so have considered the _Hornet's_ crewas consisting originally of 150 men, the same as on her cruisesin 1812. The _Penguin_ was in reality slightly larger than the _Hornet_, judging from the comparisons made in Biddle's letter (for the originalof which see in the Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters, " vol. 42, No. 112). He says that the _Penguin_, though two feet shorter on deckthan the _Hornet_, had a greater length of keel, a slightly greaterbreadth of beam, stouter sides, and higher bulwarks, with swivelson the capstan and tops, and that she fought both her "long 12's"on the same side. I have followed James, however, as regards this;he says her long guns were 6-pounders, and that but one was foughton a side. ] Or, the force being practically equal, the _Hornet_ inflicted fourfoldthe loss and tenfold the damage she suffered. Hardly any action ofthe war reflected greater credit on the United States marine thanthis; for the cool, skilful seamanship and excellent gunnery thatenabled the Americans to destroy an antagonist of equal force insuch an exceedingly short time. The British displayed equal bravery, but were certainly very much behind their antagonists in the otherqualities which go to make up a first-rate man-of-warsman. Even Jamessays he "cannot offer the trifling disparity of force in this actionas an excuse for the _Penguin's_ capture. The chief cause is * * *the immense disparity between the two vessels in * * * the effectivenessof their crews. " [Footnote: After the action but one official account, that of Captain Biddle, was published; none of the letters of thedefeated British commanders were published after 1813. As regardsthis action, every British writer has followed James, who beginshis account thus: "Had the vessel in sight to windward been riggedwith three masts instead of two, and had she proved to be a Britishcruiser, Captain Biddle would have marked her down in his log as a'frigate, ' and have made off with all the canvas he could possiblyspread. Had the ship overtaken the _Hornet_ and been in reality atrifle superior in force, Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, wouldhave exhausted his eloquence in lauding the blessings of peace beforehe tried a struggle for the honors of war. " After this preface (whichshould be read in connection with the _Hornet's_ unaccepted challengeto the _Bonne Citoyenne_, a ship "a trifle superior in force") itcan be considered certain that James will both extenuate and alsoset down a good deal in malice. One instance of this has alreadybeen given in speaking of the _President's_ capture. Again, he says, "the _Hornet_ received several round shot in her hull, " which shedid--a month after this action, from the _Cornwallis_, 74; Jamesknew perfectly well that not one of the _Penguin's_ shot hit the_Hornet's_ hull. The quotations I have given are quite enough toprove that nothing he says about the action is worth attending to. The funniest part of his account is where he makes Captain Biddleget drunk, lose his "native cunning, " and corroborate his (James')statements. He does not even hint at the authority for this. ] The _Penguin_ was so cut up by shot that she had to be destroyed. After the stores, etc. , had been taken out of her, she was thoroughlyexamined (Captain Biddle, from curiosity, taking her measurementsin comparison with those of the _Hornet_). Her destruction washastened on account of a strange sail heaving in sight; but the latterproved to be the _Peacock_, with the _Tom Bowline_ in company. Thelatter was now turned to account by being sent in to Rio de Janeiroas a cartel with the prisoners. The _Peacock_ and _Hornet_ remainedabout the island till April 13th, and then, giving up all hopes ofseeing the _President_, and rightly supposing she had been captured, started out for the East Indies. On the 27th of the month, in lat. 38°30' S. And long. 33° E. , [Footnote: Letter of Captain Biddle, June10th, and extracts from her log. ] the _Peacock_ signalled a strangerin the S. E. , and both sloops crowded sail in chase. The next morningthey came down with the wind aft from the northwest, the studding-sailsset on both sides. The new 22-gun sloops were not only betterwar-vessels, but faster ones too, than any other ships of their rate;and the _Peacock_ by afternoon was two leagues ahead of the _Hornet_, At 2 P. M. The former was observed to manifest some hesitation aboutapproaching the stranger, which instead of avoiding had rather hauledup toward them. All on board the _Hornet_ thought her an Indiaman, and "the men began to wonder what they would do with the silks, "when, a few minutes before four, the _Peacock_ signalled that itwas a line-of-battle ship, which reversed the parts with a vengeance. Warrington's swift ship was soon out of danger, while Biddle hauledclose to the wind on the port tack, with the _Cornwallis_, 74, bearingthe flag of Admiral Sir George Burleton, K. C. B. , [Footnote: James, vi, 564. ] in hot pursuit, two leagues on his lee quarter. The 74gained rapidly on the _Hornet_, although she stopped to pick up amarine who had fallen overboard. Finding he had to deal with a mostweatherly craft, as well as a swift sailer, Captain Biddle, at 9 P. M. , began to lighten the _Hornet_ of the mass of stores taken from the_Penguin_. The _Cornwallis_ gained still, however, and at 2 A. M. Onthe 29th was ahead of the _Hornet's_ lee or starboard beam, when thesloop put about and ran off toward the west. Daylight showed the74 still astern and to leeward, but having gained so much as to bewithin gunshot, and shortly afterward she opened fire, her shotpassing over the Hornet. The latter had recourse anew to the lighteningprocess. She had already hove overboard the sheet-anchor, severalheavy spare spars, and a large quantity of shot and ballast; theremaining anchors and cables, more shot, six guns, and the launchnow followed suit, and, thus relieved, the _Hornet_ passed temporarilyout of danger; but the breeze shifted gradually round to the east, and the liner came looming up till at noon she was within a mile, a shorter range than that at which the _United States_ crippled andcut up the _Macedonian_; and had the _Cornwallis'_ fire been halfas well aimed as that of the _States_, it would have been the lastof the _Hornet_. But the 74's guns were very unskilfully served, and the shot passed for the most part away over the chase, but threegetting home. Captain Biddle and his crew had no hope of ultimateescape, but no one thought of giving up. All the remaining sparespars and boats, all the guns but one, the shot, and in fact everything that could be got at, below or on deck, was thrown overboard. This increased the way of the _Hornet_, while the _Cornwallis_ lostground by hauling off to give broadsides, which were as ineffectualas the fire from the chase-guns had been. The _Hornet_ now had gaineda little, and managed to hold her own, and shortly afterward thepluck and skill of her crew [Footnote: It is perhaps worth notingthat the accounts incidentally mention the fact that almost the entirecrew consisted of native Americans, of whom _quite a number had servedas impressed seamen on board British war-ships_. James multipliesthese threefold and sets them down as British. ] were rewarded. Theshift in the wind had been very much against them, but now it veeredback again so as to bring them to windward; and every minute, as itblew fresher and fresher, their chances increased. By dark the_Cornwallis_ was well astern, and during the night the wind keptfreshening, blowing in squalls, which just suited the _Hornet_, andwhen day broke the liner was hull down astern. Then, on the morningof the 30th, after nearly 48 hours' chase, she abandoned the pursuit. The _Hornet_ was now of course no use as a cruiser, and made sailfor New York, which she reached on June 9th. This chase requiresalmost the same comments as the last chase of the _Constitution_. In both cases the American captains and their crews deserve the veryhighest praise for plucky, skilful seamanship; but exactly as Stewart'scoolness and promptitude might not have saved the _Constitution_had it not been for the blunders made by his antagonists, so the_Hornet_ would have assuredly been taken, in spite of Biddle'sstubbornness and resource, if the _Cornwallis_ had not shown suchunskilful gunnery, which was all the more discreditable since shecarried an admiral's flag. The _Peacock_ was thus the only one left of the squadron originallyprepared for the East Indies; however, she kept on, went round theCape of Good Hope, and cruised across the Indian Ocean, capturing4 great Indiamen, very valuable prizes, manned by 291 men. Then sheentered the Straits of Sunda, and on the 30th of June, off the fortof Anjier fell in with the East India Company's cruiser _Nautilus_, Lieut. Boyce, a brig of 180 (American measurement over 200) tons, with a crew of 80 men, and 14 guns, 4 long 9's and ten 18-poundcarronades. [Footnote: "History of the Indian Navy, " by CharlesRathbone Low (late lieutenant of the Indian Navy), London, 1877, p. 285. ] Captain Warrington did not know of the peace; one of theboats of the _Nautilus_, however, with her purser, Mr. Bartlett, boarded him. Captain Warrington declares the latter made no mentionof the peace, while Mr. Bartlett swears that he did before he wassent below. As the _Peacock_ approached, Lieut. Boyce hailed to askif she knew peace had been declared. Captain Warrington, accordingto his letter, regarded this as a ruse to enable the brig to escapeunder the guns of the fort, and commanded the lieutenant to hauldown his colors, which the latter refused to do, and very gallantlyprepared for a struggle with a foe of more than twice his strength. According to Captain Warrington, one, or, by the deposition of Mr. Bartlett, [Footnote: As quoted by Low. ] two broadsides were theninterchanged, and the brig surrendered, having lost 7 men, includingher first lieutenant, killed and mortally wounded, and 8 severelyor slightly wounded. Two of her guns and the sheet-anchor were disabled, the bends on the starboard side completely shivered from aft to theforechains, the bulwarks from the chess-tree aft much torn, and therigging cut to pieces. [Footnote: Letter of Lieut. Boyce to Company'sMarine Board, as quoted by Low. ] The _Peacock_ did not suffer theslightest loss or damage. Regarding the affair purely as a conflictbetween vessels of nations at war with each other, the criticismmade by Lord Howard Douglass on the action between the _President_and _Little Belt_ applies here perfectly. "If a vessel meet an enemyof even greatly superior force, it is due to the honor of her flagto try the effect of a few rounds; but unless in this gallant attemptshe leave marks of her skill upon the larger body, while she, thesmaller body, is hit at every discharge, she does but salute herenemy's triumph and discredit her own gunnery. " [Footnote: "NavalGunnery, " p. 3. ] There could not have been a more satisfactoryexhibition of skill than that given by Captain Warrington; but Iregret to say that it is difficult to believe he acted with properhumanity. It seems impossible that Mr. Bartlett did not mention thatpeace had been signed; and when the opposing force was so much lessthan his own it would have been safe at least to defer the order"haul down your flag" for a short time, while he could have keptthe brig within half pistol-shot, until he could have inquired intothe truth of the report. Throughout this work I have wherever possibleavoided all references to the various accusations and recriminationsof some of the captains about "unfairness, " "cruelty, " etc. , as inmost cases it is impossible to get at the truth, the accounts flatlycontradicting one another. In this case, however, there certainlyseems some ground for the rather fervent denunciations of CaptainWarrington indulged in by Lieut. Low. But it is well to remember thata very similar affair, with the parties reversed, had taken placebut a few months before on the coast of America. This was on Feb. 22d, after the boats of the _Erebus_, 20, and _Primrose_, 18, underCaptains Bartholomew and Phillot, had been beaten off with a lossof 30 men (including both captains wounded), in an expedition upSt. Mary's River, Ga. The two captains and their vessels then joinedAdmiral Cockburn at Cumberland Island, and on the 25th of Februarywere informed officially of the existence of peace. Three weeksafterward the American gunboat, No. 168, Mr. Hurlburt, sailed fromTybee Bar, Ga. , bearing despatches for the British admiral. [Footnote:Letter from Com. Campbell to Sec. Of Navy, Mar. 29, 1815. Includingone from Sailing-master John H. Hurlburt of Mar. 18, 1815, preservedin the Naval Archives, in vol. 43, No. 125, of "Captains' Letters. "See also "Niles' Register, " viii, 104, 118, etc. ] On the same dayin the afternoon she fell in with the _Erebus_, Captain Bartholomew. Peace having been declared, and having been known to exist for overthree weeks, no effort was made to avoid the British vessel; butwhen the gunboat neared the latter she was suddenly hailed and toldto heave to. Mr. Hurlburt answered that he had dispatches for AdmiralCockburn, to which Captain Bartholomew responded, with many oaths, that he did not care, he would sink her if she did not send a boataboard. When Mr. Hurlburt attempted to answer some muskets weredischarged at him, and he was told to strike. He refused, and the_Erebus_ immediately opened fire from her great guns; the gunboathad gotten so far round that her pivot-gun would not bear properly, but it was discharged across the bows of the _Erebus_, and then Mr. Hurlburt struck his colors. Although he had lain right under thefoe's broadside, he had suffered no loss or damage except a few ropescut, and some shot-holes in the sails. Afterward Captain Bartholomewapologized, and let the gunboat proceed. This attack was quite as wanton and unprovoked as Warrington's, andBartholomew's foe was relatively to himself even less powerful;moreover, while the _Peacock's_ crew showed great skill in handlingtheir guns, the crew of the _Erebus_ most emphatically did not. Theintent in both cases was equally bad, only the British captain lackedthe ability to carry his out. Summary. The concluding operations of the war call for much the same commentsas those of the preceding years. The balance of praise certainlyinclines toward the Americans. Captain John Hayes' squadron showedgreat hardihood, perseverance and judgment, which were rewarded bythe capture of the _President_; and Decatur's surrender seems decidedlytame. But as regards the action between the _President_ and _Endymion_(taking into account the fact that the former fought almost underthe guns of an overwhelming force, and was therefore obliged to exposeherself far more than she otherwise would have), it showed nearlyas great superiority on the side of the Americans as the frigateactions of 1812 did--in fact, probably quite as much as in the caseof the _Java_. Similarly, while the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ did well, the _Constitution_ did better; and Sir George Collier's ships certainlydid not distinguish themselves when in chase of _Old Ironsides_. Sowith the _Hornet_ in her two encounters; no one can question thepluck with which the _Penguin_ was fought, but her gunnery was asbad as that of the _Cornwallis_ subsequently proved. And though theskirmish between the _Peacock_ and _Nautilus_ is not one to whichan American cares to look back, yet, regarding it purely from afighting stand-point, there is no question which crew was the besttrained and most skilful. LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815. Name. Rate. Where Built. Cost. _Washington_ 74 Portsmouth $235, 861. 00_Independence_ 74 Boston 421, 810. 41_Franklin_ 74 Philadelphia 438, 149. 40_Guerrière_ 44 " 306, 158. 56_Java_ 44 Baltimore 232, 767. 38_Fulton_ 30 New York 320, 000. 00_Torpedo_ " These ships first put to sea in this year. For the first time inher history the United States possessed line-of-battle ships; andfor the first time in all history, the steam frigate appeared onthe navy list of a nation. The _Fulton_, with her clumsy centralwheel, concealed from shot by the double hull, with such thick scantlingthat none but heavy guns could harm her, and relying for offensiveweapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of small calibre, but ontwo pivotal 100-pounder columbiads, or, perhaps, if necessary, onblows from her hog snout, --the _Fulton_ was the true prototype ofthe modern steam ironclad, with its few heavy guns and ram. Almostas significant is the presence of the _Torpedo_. I have not chronicledthe several efforts made by the Americans to destroy British vesselswith torpedoes; some very nearly succeeded, and although they failedit must not be supposed that they did no good. On the contrary, theymade the British in many cases very cautious about venturing intogood anchorage (especially in Long Island Sound and the Chesapeake), and by the mere terror of their name prevented more than one harryingexpedition. The _Fulton_ was not got into condition to be foughtuntil just as the war ended; had it continued a few months, it ismore than probable that the deeds of the _Merrimac_ and the havocwrought by the Confederate torpedoes would have been forestalled bynearly half a century. As it was, neither of these engines of warattracted much attention. For ten or fifteen years the _Fulton_ wasthe only war-vessel of her kind in existence, and then her namedisappears from our lists. The torpedoes had been tried in theRevolutionary War, but their failure prevented much notice from beingtaken of them, and, besides, at that time there was a strong feelingthat it was dishonorable to blow a ship up with a powder-can concealed_under_ the water, though highly laudable to burn her by means ofa fire-raft floating _on_ the water--a nice distinction in navalethics that has since disappeared. [Footnote: James fairly foams atthe mouth at the mere mention of torpedoes. ] AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. By Ocean Cruisers. Name. Guns. Tonnage. Remarks. _President_ 52 1, 576 captured by squadron. --- ----- 52 guns 1, 576 tons. BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. a. --By Privateers. Name. Guns. Tonnage. Remarks. _Chasseur_ 12 240 by privateer _St. Lawrence_. b. --By Ocean Cruisers_Cyane_ 34 659 by _Constitution_. _Levant_ 20 500 retaken. _Penguin_ 19 477 by _Hornet_. --- ----- 85 guns 1, 876 tons. 20 500 (subtracting _Levant_). 65 guns, 1, 376 tons. In summing up the results of the struggle on the ocean it is to benoticed that very little was attempted, and nothing done, by theAmerican Navy that could _materially_ affect the result of the war. Commodore Rodgers' expedition after the Jamaica Plate fleet failed;both the efforts to get a small squadron into the East Indian watersalso miscarried; and otherwise the whole history of the struggle onthe ocean is, as regards the Americans, only the record of individualcruises and fights. The material results were not very great, atleast in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous navy did notfeel in the slightest degree the loss of a few frigates and sloops. But morally the result was of inestimable benefit to the United States. The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast down by thedefeats on land; practically decided in favor of the Americans thechief question in dispute--Great Britain's right of search andimpressment--and gave the navy, and thereby the country, a world-widereputation. I doubt if ever before a nation gained so much honorby a few single-ship duels. For there can be no question which sidecame out of the war with the greatest credit. The damage inflictedby each on the other was not very unequal in amount, but the balancewas certainly in favor of the United States, as can be seen by thefollowing tables, for the details of which reference can be made tothe various years: AMERICAN LOSS. BRITISH LOSS. Caused: Tonnage. Guns. Tonnage. [1] Guns. By Ocean Cruisers 5, 984 278 8, 451 351On the Lakes 727 37 4, 159 212By the Army 3, 007 116 500 22By Privateers -- -- 402 20 ------ ---- ------ ---- Total, 9, 718 431 13, 512 605 [Footnote 1: The tonnage can only be given approximately, as thatof the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although weknow about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one another. ] In addition we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 24 guns, and, inthe aggregate, of 387 tons, and also, 25 gun-boats, with 71 guns, and, in the aggregate, of nearly 2, 000 tons. This would swell ourloss to 12, 105 tons, and 526 guns; [Footnote: This differs greatlyfrom the figures given by James in his "Naval Occurrences" (App. Ccxv). He makes the American loss 14, 844 tons, and 660 guns. His list includes, for example, the "_Growler_ and _Hamilton_, upset in carrying sailto avoid Sir James' fleet"; it would be quite reasonable to put downthe loss of the _Royal George_ to the credit of the French. Then hementions the _Julia_ and _Growler_, which were recaptured; the _Asp_, which was also recaptured; the "_New York_, 46, destroyed at Washington, "which was _not_ destroyed or harmed in any way, and which, moreover, was a condemned hulk; the "_Boston_, 42 (in reality 32), destroyedat Washington, " which had been a condemned hulk for ten years, andhad no guns or anything else in her, and was as much a loss to ournavy as the fishing up and burning of an old wreck would have been;and 8 gun-boats whose destruction was either mythical, or else whichwere not national vessels. By deducting all these we reduce James'total by 120 guns, and 2, 600 tons; and a few more alterations (suchas excluding the swivels in the _President's_ tops, which he counts, etc. ), brings his number down to that given above--and also affordsa good idea of the value to be attached to his figures and tables. The British loss he gives at but 530 guns and 10, 273 tons. He omitsthe 24-gun ship burnt by Chauncy at York, although including thefrigate and corvette burnt by Ross at Washington; if the former isexcluded the two latter should be, which would make the balance stillmore in favor of the Americans. He omits the guns of the _Gloucester_, because they had been taken out of her and placed in battery on theshore, bur he includes those of the _Adams_, which had been servedin precisely the same way. He omits all reference to the British14-gun schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3 and 4-gun sloops andschooners captured there, although including the corresponding Americanvessels. The reason that he so much underestimates the tonnage, especially on the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed. His tables ofthe relative loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating thatof the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the British;but I have not tabulated this on account of the impossibility ofgetting fair estimates of the killed and wounded in the cutting-outexpeditions, and the difficulty of enumerating the prisoners takenin descents, etc. Roughly, about 2, 700 Americans and 3, 800 Britishwere captured; the comparative loss in killed and wounded stood muchmore in our favor. I have excluded from the British loss the brigs _Detroit_ and_Caledonia_, and schooner _Nancy_ (aggregating 10 guns and about500 tons), destroyed on the upper lakes, because I hardly know whetherthey could be considered national vessels; the schooner _Highflyer_, of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons, taken by Rodgers, because she seemsto have been merely a tender; and the _Dominica_, 15, of 77 men, and270 tons, because her captor, the privateer _Decatur_, though nominallyan American, was really a French vessel. Of course both tables areonly approximately exact; but at any rate the balance of damage andloss was over 4 to 3 in our favor. ] but the loss of the revenue-cuttersand gun-boats can fairly be considered to be counterbalanced by thecapture or destruction of the various British Royal Packets (allarmed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, etc. , which wouldbe in the aggregate of at least as great tonnage and gun force, andwith more numerous crews. But the comparative material loss gives no idea of the comparativehonor gained. The British navy, numbering at the onset a thousandcruisers, had accomplished less than the American, which numberedbut a dozen. Moreover, most of the loss suffered by the former wasin single fight, while this had been but twice the case with theAmericans, who had generally been overwhelmed by numbers. The_President_ and _Essex_ were both captured by more than double theirforce simply because they were disabled before the fight began, otherwise they would certainly have escaped. With the exceptionsof the _Chesapeake_ and _Argus_ (both of which were taken fairly, because their antagonists, though of only equal force, were betterfighters), the remaining loss of the Americans was due to the smallcruisers stumbling from time to time across the path of some oneof the innumerable British heavy vessels. Had Congressional forethoughtbeen sufficiently great to have allowed a few line-of-battle shipsto have been in readiness some time previous to the war, resultsof weight might have been accomplished. But the only activity everexhibited by Congress in materially increasing the navy previous tothe war, had been in partially carrying out President Jefferson'sideas of having an enormous force of very worthless gun-boats--ascheme whose wisdom was about on a par with some of that statesman'spolitical and military theories. Of the twelve [Footnote: Not counting the last action of the_Constitution_, the _President's_ action, or the capture of the _Essex_, on account of the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of creditdue to each side. In both the first actions, however, the Americanships seem to have been rather more ably fought than their antagonists, and, taking into account the overwhelming disadvantages under whichthe _Essex_ labored, her defence displayed more desperate braverythan did that of any other ship during the war. ] single-ship actions, two (those of the _Argus_ and _Chesapeake_) undoubtedly redoundedmost to the credit of the British, in two (that of the _Wasp_ withthe _Reindeer_, and that of the _Enterprise_ with the _Boxer_), thehonors were nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority ofthe Americans was very manifest. In three actions (those with the_Penguin_, _Frolic_, and _Shannon_) the combatants were about equalin strength, the Americans having slightly the advantage; in allthe others but two, the victors combined superiority of force withsuperiority of skill. In but two cases, those of the _Argus_ and_Epervier_, could any lack of courage be imputed to the vanquished. The second year alone showed to the advantage of the British; thevarious encounters otherwise were as creditable to the Americansat the end as at the beginning of the war. This is worth attendingto, because many authors speak as if the successes of the Americanswere confined to the first year. It is true that no frigate was takenafter the first year, but this was partly because the strictnessof the blockade kept the American frigates more in port, while thesloops put out to sea at pleasure, and partly because after thatyear the British 18-pounder frigates either cruised in couples, or, when single, invariably refused, by order of the Board of Admiralty, an encounter with a 24-pounder; and though much of the American successwas unquestionably to be attributed to more men and heavier guns, yet much of it was not. The war itself gives us two instances inwhich defeat was owing solely, it may be said, to inferiority offorce, courage and skill being equal. The _Wasp_ was far heavierthan the _Reindeer_, and, there being nothing to choose between themin any thing else, the damage done was about proportionate to thisdifference. It follows, as a matter of course, that the very muchgreater disproportion in loss in the cases of the _Avon_, _Epervier_, etc. , where the disproportion in force was much less (they mounting32's instead of 24's, and the victors being all of the same class), is only to be explained by the inferiority in skill on the part ofthe vanquished. These remarks apply just as much to the _Argus_. The _Reindeer_, with her 24's, would have been almost exactly on apar with her, and yet would have taken her with even greater easethan the _Peacock_ did with her 32's. In other words, the only effectof our superiority in metal, men, and tonnage was to increase somewhatthe disparity in loss. Had the _Congress_ and _Constellation_, insteadof the _United States_ and _Constitution_, encountered the _Macedonian_and _Java_, the difference in execution would have been less thanit was, but the result would have been unchanged, and would havebeen precisely such as ensued when the _Wasp_ met the _Frolic_, orthe _Hornet_ the _Penguin_. On the other hand, had the _Shannon_ metthe _Constitution_ there would have been a repetition of the fightbetween the _Wasp_ and _Reindeer_; for it is but fair to rememberthat great as is the honor that Broke deserves, it is no more thanthat due to Manners. The Republic of the United States owed a great deal to the excellentmake and armament of its ships, but it owed still more to the menwho were in them. The massive timbers and heavy guns of _Old Ironsides_would have availed but little had it not been for her able commandersand crews. Of all the excellent single-ship captains, British orAmerican, produced by the war, the palm should be awarded to Hull. [Footnote: See "Naval Tactics, " by Commander J. H. Ward, and "Lifeof Commodore Tatnall, " by Charles C. Jones, Jr. ] The deed of no otherman (excepting Macdonough) equalled his escape from Broke's fiveships, or surpassed his half-hour's conflict with the _Guerrière_. After him, almost all the American captains deserve high praise--Decatur, Jones, Blakely, Biddle, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Burrows, Allen, Warrington, Stewart, Porter. It is no small glory to a country to have had suchmen upholding the honor of its flag. On a par with the best of themare Broke, Manners, and also Byron and Blythe. It must be but apoor-spirited American whose veins do not tingle with pride whenhe reads of the cruises and fights of the sea-captains, and theirgrim prowess, which kept the old Yankee flag floating over the watersof the Atlantic for three years, in the teeth of the mightiest navalpower the world has ever seen; but it is equally impossible not toadmire Broke's chivalric challenge and successful fight, or theheroic death of the captain of the _Reindeer_. Nor can the war ever be fairly understood by any one who does notbear in mind that the combatants were men of the same stock, whofar more nearly resembled each other than either resembled any othernation. I honestly believe that the American sailor offered ratherbetter material for a man-of-warsman than the British, because thefreer institutions of his country (as compared with the Britain ofthe drunken Prince Regent and his dotard father--a very differentland from the present free England) and the peculiar exigencies ofhis life tended to make him more intelligent and self-reliant; butthe difference, when there was any, was very small, and disappearedentirely when his opponents had been drilled for any length of timeby men like Broke or Manners. The advantage consisted in the factthat our _average_ commander was equal to the best, and higher thanthe average, of the opposing captains; and this held good throughoutthe various grades of the officers. The American officers knew theyhad redoubtable foes to contend with, and made every preparationaccordingly. Owing their rank to their own exertions, trained bypractical experience and with large liberty of action, they madeevery effort to have their crews in the most perfect state of skilland discipline. In Commodore Tatnall's biography (p. 15) it ismentioned that the blockaded _Constellation_ had her men well trainedat the guns and at target practice, though still lying in the river, so as to be at once able to meet a foe when she put out to sea. TheBritish captain, often owing his command to his social standing orto favoritism, hampered by red tape, [Footnote: For instance, Jamesmentions that they were forbidden to use more than so many shot inpractice, and that Capt. Broke utterly disregarded this command. ]and accustomed by 20 years' almost uninterrupted success to regardthe British arms as invincible, was apt to laugh at all manoeuvring, [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery, " states this invarious places. --"Accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring. "] and scornedto prepare too carefully for a fight, trusting to the old British"pluck and luck" to carry him through. So, gradually he forgot howto manoeuvre or to prepare. The _Java_ had been at sea six weeksbefore she was captured, yet during that time the entire exerciseof her crew at the guns had been confined to the discharge of sixbroadsides of blank cartridges (James, vi, 184); the _Constitution_, like the _Java_, had shipped an entirely new and raw crew previousto her first cruise, and was at sea but five weeks before she metthe _Guerrière_, and yet her men had been trained to perfection. This is a sufficient comment on the comparative merits of CaptainHull and Captain Lambert. The American prepared himself in everypossible way; the Briton tried to cope with courage alone againstcourage united to skill. His bad gunnery had not been felt incontending with European foes [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass; heseems to think that in 1812 the British had fallen off absolutely, though not relatively to their European foes. ] as unskilful ashimself. Says Lord Howard Douglass (p. 3): "We entered with toomuch confidence into a war with a marine much more expert than anyof our European enemies * * * there was inferiority of gunnery aswell as of force, " etc. Admiral Codrington, commenting on the_Epervier's_ loss, says, as before quoted, that, owing to his beingchosen purely for merit, the American captain was an overmatch forthe British, unless "he encountered our best officers on equal terms. " The best criticism on the war is that given by Capitaine Jurien dela Gravière. [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes, " ii, p. 269, 272, 274(Paris, 1847). ] After speaking of the heavier metal and greater numberof men of the American ships, he continues: "And yet only an enormoussuperiority in the precision and rapidity of their fire can explainthe difference in the losses sustained by the combatants. * * * Norwas the skill of their gunners the only cause to which the Americansowed their success. Their ships were faster; the crews, composedof chosen men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision; their captainshad that practical knowledge which is only to be acquired by longexperience of the sea; and it is not to be wondered at that the_Constitution_, when chased during three days by a squadron of fiveEnglish frigates, succeeded in escaping, by surpassing them inmanoeuvring, and by availing herself of every ingenious resourceand skilful expedient that maritime science could suggest. * * *To a marine exalted by success, but rendered negligent by the veryhabit of victory, the Congress only opposed the best of vessels andmost formidable of armaments. * * *" [Footnote: The praise shouldbe given to the individual captains and _not_ to Congress, however;and none of the American ships had picked crews. During the war the_Shannon_ had the only crew which could with any fairness be termed"picked, " for her men had been together seven years, and all of her"boys" must have been well-grown young men, much older than the boyson her antagonist. ] It is interesting to compare the results of this inter-Anglian warfare, waged between the Insular and the Continental English, with the resultsof the contest that the former were at the same time carrying onwith their Gallo-Roman neighbors across the channel. For this purposeI shall rely on Troude's "Batailles Navales, " which would certainlynot give the English more than their due. His account of the comparativeforce in each case can be supplemented by the corresponding one givenin James. Under drawn battles I include all such as were indecisive, in so far that neither combatant was captured; in almost every caseeach captain claimed that the other ran away. During the year 1812 to 1815 inclusive, there were eight actionsbetween French and English ships of approximately equal force. Inthree of these the English were victorious. In 1812 the _Victorious_, 74, captured the _Rivoli_, 74. COMPARATIVE FORCE. Broadsides, Metal, lbs. Troude. James. _Victorious_ 1, 014 1, 060_Rivoli_ 1, 010 1, 085 In 1814 the _Tagus_ captured the _Ceres_ and the _Hebrus_ capturedthe _Etoile_. Broadsides, Metal, lbs. Troude. James. _Tagus_ 444 467_Ceres_ 428 463 _Hebrus_ 467 467_Etoile_ 428 463 The _Ceres_, when she surrendered, had but one man wounded, althoughshe had suffered a good deal aloft. The fight between the 74's wasmurderous to an almost unexampled degree, 125 English and 400 Frenchfalling. The _Hebrus_ lost 40 and the _Etoile_ 120 men. Five actions were "drawn. " In 1812 the _Swallow_ fought the _Renard_ and _Garland_. The formerthrew 262, the latter 290 lbs. Of shot at a broadside. In 1815 the _Pilot_, throwing 262 lbs. , fought a draw with the_Egerie_ throwing 260. In 1814 two frigates of the force of the _Tagus_ fought a draw withtwo frigates of the force of the _Ceres_; and the _Eurotas_, with24-pounders failed to capture the _Chlorinde_, which had only18-pounders. In 1815 the _Amelia_ fought a draw with the _Arethuse_, the ships throwing respectively 549 and 463 lbs. , according to theEnglish, or 572 and 410 lbs. , according to the French accounts. Inspite of being superior in force the English ship lost 141 men, andthe French but 105. This was a bloodier fight than even that of the_Chesapeake_ with the _Shannon_; but the gunnery was, nevertheless, much worse than that shown by the two combatants in the famous dueloff Boston harbor, one battle lasting four hours and the other 15minutes. There were a number of other engagements where the British weresuccessful but where it is difficult to compare the forces. Twicea 74 captured or destroyed two frigates, and a razee performed asimilar feat. An 18-gun brig, the _Weasel_, fought two 16-gun brigstill one of them blew up. The loss of the two navies at each other's hands during the fouryears was:-- English Ships. French Ships. 1 16-gun brig 3 line-of-battle ships 1 12-gun brig 11 frigates 1 10-gun cutter 2 26-gun flûtes 2 16-gun brigs 1 10-gun brig many gun-boats, etc. Or one navy lost three vessels, mounting 38 guns, and the other 19vessels, mounting 830 guns. During the same time the English lost to the Danes one 14-gun brig, and destroyed in return a frigate of 46 guns, a 6-gun schooner, a4-gun cutter, two galliots and several gun-brigs. In the above lists it is to be noticed how many of the engagementswere indecisive, owing chiefly to the poor gunnery of the combatants. The fact that both the _Eurotas_ and the _Amelia_, though morepowerfully armed and manned than the _Hebrus_, yet failed to capturethe sister ships of the frigate taken by the latter, shows that heavymetal and a numerous crew are not the only elements necessary forsuccess; indeed the _Eurotas_ and _Amelia_ were as superior in forceto their antagonists as the _Constitution_ was to the _Java_. But the chief point to be noticed is the overwhelming differencein the damage the two navies caused each other. This difference was, roughly, as five to one against the Danes, and as fifty to one againstthe French; while it was as four to three in favor of the American. These figures give some idea of the effectiveness of the variousnavies. At any rate they show that we had found out what the Europeannations had for many years in vain striven to discover--a way todo more damage than we received in a naval contest with England. Chapter X 1815 THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS _The war on land generally disastrous--British send great expeditionagainst New Orleans--Jackson prepares for the defence of the city--Nightattack on the British advance guard--Artillery duels--Great battleof January 8, 1815--Slaughtering repulse of the main attack--Routof the Americans on the right bank of the river--Final retreat ofthe British--Observations on the character of the troops andcommanders engaged. _ While our navy had been successful, the war on land had been forus full of humiliation. The United States then formed but a looselyknit confederacy, the sparse population scattered over a great expanseof land. Ever since the Federalist party had gone out of power in1800, the nation's ability to maintain order at home and enforcerespect abroad had steadily dwindled; and the twelve years' nervelessreign of the Doctrinaire Democracy had left us impotent for attackand almost as feeble for defence. Jefferson, though a man whose viewsand theories had a profound influence upon our national life, wasperhaps the most incapable Executive that ever filled the presidentialchair; being almost purely a visionary, he was utterly unable tograpple with the slightest actual danger, and, not even exceptinghis successor, Madison, it would be difficult to imagine a man lessfit to guide the state with honor and safety through the stormy timesthat marked the opening of the present century. Without the prudenceto avoid war or the forethought to prepare for it, the Administrationdrifted helplessly into a conflict in which only the navy preparedby the Federalists twelve years before, and weakened rather thanstrengthened during the intervening time, saved us from completeand shameful defeat. True to its theories, the House of Virginiamade no preparations, and thought the war could be fought by "thenation in arms"; the exponents of this particular idea, the militiamen, a partially armed mob, ran like sheep whenever brought into the field. The regulars were not much better. After two years of warfare, Scottrecords in his autobiography that there were but two books of tactics(one written in French) in the entire army on the Niagara frontier;and officers and men were on such a dead level of ignorance thathe had to spend a month drilling all of the former, divided intosquads, in the school of the soldier and school of the company. [Footnote: "Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott, " written by himself(2 vols. , New York, 1864), i, p. 115. ] It is small wonder that suchtroops were utterly unable to meet the English. Until near the end, the generals were as bad as the armies they commanded, and theadministration of the War Department continued to be a triumph ofimbecility to the very last. [Footnote: Monroe's biographer (see"James Monroe, " by Daniel C. Gilman, Boston, 1883, p. 123) thinkshe made a good Secretary of War. I think he was as much a failureas his predecessors, and a harsher criticism could not be passedon him. Like the other statesmen of his school, he was mighty inword and weak in action; bold to plan but weak to perform. As aninstance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the fact thathe never gave him a particle of practical help. ] With the exceptionof the brilliant and successful charge of the Kentucky mounted infantryat the battle of the Thames, the only bright spot in the war in theNorth was the campaign on the Niagara frontier during the summer of1814; and even here, the chief battle, that of Lundy's Lane, thoughreflecting as much honor on the Americans as on the British, wasfor the former a defeat, and not a victory, as most of our writersseem to suppose. But the war had a dual aspect. It was partly a contest between thetwo branches of the English race, and partly a last attempt on thepart of the Indian tribes to check the advance of the most rapidlygrowing one of these same two branches; and this last portion ofthe struggle, though attracting comparatively little attention, wasreally much the most far-reaching in its effect upon history. Thetriumph of the British would have distinctly meant the giving a newlease of life to the Indian nationalities, the hemming in, for a time, of the United States, and the stoppage, perhaps for many years, ofthe march of English civilization across the continent. The Englishof Britain were doing all they could to put off the day when theirrace would reach to a worldwide supremacy. There was much fighting along our Western frontier with various Indiantribes; and it was especially fierce in the campaign that a backwoodsgeneral of Tennessee, named Andrew Jackson, carried on against thepowerful confederacy of the Creeks, a nation that was thrust in likea wedge between the United States proper and their dependency, thenewly acquired French province of Louisiana. After several slaughteringfights, the most noted being the battle of the Horse-shoe Bend, thepower of the Creeks was broken for ever; and afterward, as therewas much question over the proper boundaries of what was then theLatin land of Florida, Jackson marched south, attacked the Spaniardsand drove them from Pensacola. Meanwhile the British, having madea successful and ravaging summer campaign through Virginia andMaryland, situated in the heart of the country, organized the mostformidable expedition of the war for a winter campaign against theoutlying land of Louisiana, whose defender Jackson of necessity became. Thus, in the course of events, it came about that Louisiana was thetheatre on which the final and most dramatic act of the war was played. Amid the gloomy, semi-tropical swamps that cover the quaking deltathrust out into the blue waters of the Mexican Gulf by the strongtorrent of the mighty Mississippi, stood the fair, French city ofNew Orleans. Its lot had been strange and varied. Won and lost, onceand again, in conflict with the subjects of the Catholic king, therewas a strong Spanish tinge in the French blood that coursed so freelythrough the veins of its citizens; joined by purchase to the greatFederal Republic, it yet shared no feeling with the latter, savethat of hatred to the common foe. And now an hour of sore need hadcome upon the city; for against it came the red English, lords offight by sea and land. A great fleet of war vessels--ships of theline--frigates and sloops--under Admiral Cochrane, was on the wayto New Orleans, convoying a still larger fleet of troop ships, withaboard them some ten thousand fighting men, chiefly the fierce andhardy veterans of the Peninsular War, [Footnote: "The British infantryembarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England. " ("Historyof the War in the Peninsula, " by Major-General Sir W. F. P. Napier, K. C. B. New Edition. New York, 1882, vol. V, p. 200. ) For discussionof numbers, see farther on. ] who had been trained for seven yearsin the stern school of the Iron Duke, and who were now led by oneof the bravest and ablest of all Wellington's brave and ablelieutenants, Sir Edward Packenham. On the 8th of December 1814, the foremost vessels, with among theirnumber the great two-decker _Tonnant_, carrying the admiral's flag, anchored off the Chandeleur Islands [Footnote: See, ante, p. 343. ];and as the current of the Mississippi was too strong to be easilybreasted, the English leaders determined to bring their men by boatsthrough the bayous, and disembark them on the bank of the river tenmiles below the wealthy city at whose capture they were aiming. Therewas but one thing to prevent the success of this plan, and that wasthe presence in the bayous of five American gun-boats, manned bya hundred and eighty men, and commanded by Lieutenant Comdg. CatesbyJones, a very shrewd fighter. So against him was sent Captain NicholasLockyer with forty-five barges, and nearly a thousand sailors andmarines, men who had grown gray during a quarter of a century ofunbroken ocean warfare. The gun-boats were moored in a head-and-sternline, near the Rigolets, with their boarding-nettings triced up, and every thing ready to do desperate battle; but the British rowedup with strong, swift strokes, through a murderous fire of greatguns and musketry; the vessels were grappled amid fierce resistance;the boarding-nettings were slashed through and cut away; with furiousfighting the decks were gained; and one by one, at push of pike andcutlass stroke the gun-boats were carried in spite of their stubborndefenders; but not till more than one barge had been sunk, while theassailants had lost a hundred men, and the assailed about half as many. There was now nothing to hinder the landing of the troops; and as thescattered transports arrived, the soldiers were disembarked, and ferriedthrough the sluggish water of the bayous on small flat-bottomed craft;and finally, Dec. 23d, the advance guard, two thousand strong, underGeneral Keane, emerged at the mouth of the canal Villeré, and camped onthe bank of the river, [Footnote: Letter of Major-General John Keane, Dec. 26, 1814. ] but nine miles below New Orleans, which now seemed acertain prize, almost within their grasp. Yet, although a mighty and cruel foe was at their very gates, nothingsave fierce defiance reigned in the fiery creole hearts of the CrescentCity. For a master-spirit was in their midst. Andrew Jackson, havingutterly broken and destroyed the most powerful Indian confederacythat had ever menaced the Southwest, and having driven the haughtySpaniards from Pensacola, was now bending all the energies of hisrugged intellect and indomitable will to the one object of defendingNew Orleans. No man could have been better fitted for the task. Hehad hereditary wrongs to avenge on the British, and he hated themwith an implacable fury that was absolutely devoid of fear. Bornand brought up among the lawless characters of the frontier, andknowing well how to deal with them, he was able to establish andpreserve the strictest martial law in the city without in the leastquelling the spirit of the citizens. To a restless and untiring energyhe united sleepless vigilance and genuine military genius. Promptto attack whenever the chance offered itself, seizing with readygrasp the slightest vantage-ground, and never giving up a foot ofearth that he could keep, he yet had the patience to play a defensivegame when it so suited him, and with consummate skill he alwaysfollowed out the scheme of warfare that was best adapted to thiswild soldiery. In after-years he did to his country some good andmore evil; but no true American can think of his deeds at New Orleanswithout profound and unmixed thankfulness. He had not reached the city till December 2d, and had therefore butthree weeks in which to prepare the defence. The Federal Government, throughout the campaign, did absolutely nothing for the defence ofLouisiana; neither provisions nor munitions of war of any sort weresent to it, nor were any measures taken for its aid. [Footnote:"Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana" (byMajor A. Lacarriex Latour, translated from the French by H. P. Nugent, Philadelphia, 1816), p. 66. ] The inhabitants had been in a state ofextreme despondency up to the time that Jackson arrived, for theyhad no one to direct them, and they were weakened by factionaldivisions [Footnote: Latour, 53. ]; but after his coming there wasnothing but the utmost enthusiasm displayed, so great was the confidencehe inspired, and so firm his hand in keeping down all opposition. Under his direction earthworks were thrown up to defend all theimportant positions, the whole population working night and day atthem; all the available artillery was mounted, and every ounce ofwar material that the city contained was seized; martial law wasproclaimed; and all general business was suspended, every thingbeing rendered subordinate to the one grand object of defence. Jackson's forces were small. There were two war vessels in the river. One was the little schooner _Carolina_, manned by regular seamen, largely New Englanders. The other was the newly built ship _Louisiana_, a powerful corvette; she had of course no regular crew, and her officerswere straining every nerve to get one from the varied ranks of themaritime population of New Orleans; long-limbed and hard-visaged Yankees, Portuguese and Norwegian seamen from foreign merchantmen, dark-skinnedSpaniards from the West Indies, swarthy Frenchmen who had served underthe bold privateersman Lafitte, --all alike were taken, and all alikeby unflagging exertions were got into shape for battle. [Footnote:Letter of Commodore Daniel G. Patterson, Dec. 20, 1814. ] There weretwo regiments of regulars, numbering together about eight hundredmen, raw and not very well disciplined, but who were now drilledwith great care and regularity. In addition to this Jackson raisedsomewhat over a thousand militiamen among the citizens. There weresome Americans among them, but they were mostly French Creoles, [Footnote: Latour, 110. ] and one band had in its formation somethingthat was curiously pathetic. It was composed of free men of color, [Footnote: Latour, 111. ] who had gathered to defend the land whichkept the men of their race in slavery; who were to shed their bloodfor the Flag that symbolized to their kind not freedom but bondage;who were to die bravely as freemen, only that their brethren mightlive on ignobly as slaves. Surely there was never a stranger instancethan this of the irony of fate. But if Jackson had been forced to rely only on these troops New Orleanscould not have been saved. His chief hope lay in the volunteers ofTennessee, who, under their Generals, Coffee and Carroll, were pushingtheir toilsome and weary way toward the city. Every effort was madeto hurry their march through the almost impassable roads, and at last, in the very nick of time, on the 23d of December, the day of whichthe British troops reached the river bank, the vanguard of theTennesseeans marched into New Orleans. Gaunt of form and grim offace; with their powder-horns slung over their buckskin shirts; carryingtheir long rifles on their shoulders and their heavy hunting-knivesstuck in their belts; with their coon-skin caps and fringed leggings;thus came the grizzly warriors of the backwoods, the heroes of theHorse-Shoe Bend, the victors over Spaniard and Indian, eager to pitthemselves against the trained regulars of Britain, and to throwdown the gage of battle to the world-renowned infantry of the islandEnglish. Accustomed to the most lawless freedom, and to giving freereign to the violence of their passions, defiant of discipline andimpatient of the slightest restraint, caring little for God and nothingfor man, they were soldiers who, under an ordinary commander, wouldhave been fully as dangerous to themselves and their leaders as totheir foes. But Andrew Jackson was of all men the one best fittedto manage such troops. Even their fierce natures quailed before theungovernable fury of a spirit greater than their own; and their sullen, stubborn wills were bent as last before his unyielding temper andiron hand. Moreover, he was one of themselves; he typified theirpassions and prejudices, their faults and their virtues; he sharedtheir hardships as if he had been a common private, and, in turn, he always made them partakers of his triumphs. They admired hispersonal prowess with pistol and rifle, his unswerving loyalty tohis friends, and the relentless and unceasing war that he waged alikeon the foes of himself and his country. As a result they loved andfeared him as few generals have ever been loved or feared; they obeyedhim unhesitatingly; they followed his lead without flinching or murmuring, and they ever made good on the field of battle the promise theircourage held out to his judgment. It was noon of December 23d when General Keane, with nineteen hundredmen, halted and pitched his camp on the east bank of the Mississippi;and in the evening enough additional troops arrived to swell his forceto over twenty-three hundred soldiers. [Footnote: James ("MilitaryOccurrences of the Late War, " by Wm. James, London, 1818), vol. Ii, p. 362, says 2, 050 rank and file; the English returns, as alreadyexplained, unlike the French and American, never included officers, sergeants, drummers, artillerymen, or engineers, but only "sabres andbayonets" (Napier, iv, 252). At the end of Napier's fourth volumeis given the "morning state" of Wellington's forces on April 10, 1814. This shows 56, 030 rank and file and 7, 431 officers, sergeants, andtrumpeters or drummers; or, in other words, to get at the real Britishforce in action, even supposing there are no artillerymen or engineerspresent, 13 percent, must be added to the given number, which includesonly rank and file. Making this addition, Keane had 2, 310 men. TheAmericans greatly overestimated his force, Latour making it 4, 980. ]Keane's encampment was in a long plain, rather thinly covered withfields and farmhouses, about a mile in breadth, and bounded on oneside by the river, on the other by gloomy and impenetrable cypressswamps; and there was no obstacle interposed between the Britishcamp and the city it menaced. At two in the afternoon word was brought to Jackson that the foe hadreached the river bank, and without a moment's delay the old backwoodsfighter prepared to strike a rough first blow. At once, and as ifby magic, the city started from her state of rest into one of fierceexcitement and eager preparation. The alarm-guns were fired; in everyquarter the war-drums were beaten; while, amid the din and clamor, all the regulars and marines, the best of the creole militia, andthe vanguard of the Tennesseeans, under Coffee, --forming a total ofa little more than two thousand men, [Footnote: General Jackson, inhis official letter, says only 1, 500; but Latour. In a detailedstatement, makes it 2, 024; exclusive of 107 Mississippi dragoonswho marched with the column, but being on horseback had to stay behind, and took no part in the action. Keane thought he had been attackedby 5, 000 men. ]--were assembled in great haste, and the gray of thewinter twilight saw them, with Old Hickory at their head, marchingsteadily along the river bank toward the camp of their foes. Patterson, meanwhile, in the schooner _Carolina_, dropped down with the currentto try the effect of a flank attack. Meanwhile the British had spent the afternoon in leisurely arrangingtheir camp, in posting the pickets, and in foraging among the farm-houses. There was no fear of attack, and as the day ended huge campfires werelit, at which the hungry soldiers cooked their suppers undisturbed. One division of the troops had bivouacked on the high levee that keptthe waters from flooding the land near by; and about half past sevenin the evening their attention was drawn to a large schooner whichhad dropped noiselessly down, in the gathering dusk, and had come toanchor a short distance offshore, the force of the stream swinging herbroadside to the camp. [Footnote: I have taken my account of the nightaction chiefly from the work of an English soldier who took part init; Ensign (afterward Chaplain-General) H. R. Gleig's "Narrative ofthe Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and NewOrleans. " (New edition, Philadelphia, 1821, pp. 286-300. ) ] The soldierscrowded down to the water's edge, and, as the schooner returned noanswer to their hails, a couple of musket-shots were fired at her. As if in answer to this challenge, the men on shore heard plainly theharsh voice of her commander, as he sung out, "Now then, give it tothem for the honor of America"; and at once a storm of grape hurtledinto their ranks. Wild confusion followed. The only field-pieces withKeane were two light 3-pounders, not able to cope with the _Carolina's_artillery; the rocket guns were brought up, but were speedily silenced;musketry proved quite as ineffectual; and in a very few minutes thetroops were driven helter-skelter off the levee, and were forced toshelter themselves behind it, not without having suffered severe loss. [Footnote: General Keane, in his letter, writes that the British sufferedbut a single casualty; Gleig, who was present, says (p. 288): "Thedeadly shower of grape swept down numbers in the camp. "] The nightwas now as black as pitch; the embers of the deserted camp-fires, beaten about and scattered by the schooner's shot, burned with adull red glow; and at short intervals the darkness was momentarilylit up by the flashes of the _Carolina's_ guns. Crouched behind thelevee, the British soldiers lay motionless, listening in painfulsilence to the pattering of the grape among the huts, and to themoans and shrieks of the wounded who lay beside them. Things continuedthus till toward nine o'clock, when a straggling fire from the picketsgave warning of the approach of a more formidable foe. The Americanland-forces had reached the outer lines of the British camp, and theincreasing din of the musketry, with ringing through it the whip-likecrack of the Tennesseean rifles, called out the whole British armyto the shock of a desperate and uncertain strife. The young moon hadby this time struggled through the clouds, and cast on the battle-fielda dim, unearthly light that but partly relieved the intense darkness. All order was speedily lost. Each officer, American or British, as fastas he could gather a few soldiers round him, attacked the nearestgroup of foes; the smoke and gloom would soon end the struggle, when, if unhurt, he would rally what men he could and plunge once more intothe fight. The battle soon assumed the character of a multitude ofindividual combats, dying out almost as soon as they began, becauseof the difficulty of telling friend from foe, and beginning withever-increasing fury as soon as they had ended. The clatter of thefirearms, the clashing of steel, the rallying cries and loud commandsof the officers, the defiant shouts of the men, joined to the yellsand groans of those who fell, all combined to produce so terrible anoise and tumult that it maddened the coolest brains. From one sideor the other bands of men would penetrate into the heart of the enemy'slines, and would there be captured, or would cut their way out withthe prisoners they had taken. There was never a fairer field for thefiercest personal prowess, for in the darkness the firearms were oflittle service, and the fighting was hand to hand. Many a sword, tillthen but a glittering toy, was that night crusted with blood. TheBritish soldiers and the American regulars made fierce play withtheir bayonets, and the Tennesseeans, with their long hunting-knives. Man to man, in the grimmest hate, they fought and died, some by bulletand some by bayonet-thrust or stroke of sword. More than one in hisdeath agony slew the foe at whose hand he himself had received themortal wound; and their bodies stiffened as they lay, locked in thedeath grip. Again the clouds came over the moon; a thick fog creptup from the river, wrapping from sight the ghastly havoc of thebattlefield; and long before midnight the fighting stopped perforce, for the fog and the smoke and the gloom were such that no one couldsee a yard away. By degrees each side drew off. [Footnote: Keanewrites: "The enemy thought it prudent to retire, and did not againdare to advance. It was now 12 o'clock, and the firing ceased onboth sides"; and Jackson: "We should have succeeded... In capturingthe enemy, had not a thick fog, which arose about (?) o'clock, occasioned some confusion.... I contented myself with lying on thefield that night. " Jackson certainly failed to capture the British;but equally certainly damaged them so as to arrest their march tillhe was in condition to meet and check them. ] In sullen silenceJackson marched his men up the river, while the wearied Britishreturned to their camp. The former had lost over two hundred, [Footnote: 24 killed, 115 wounded, 74 missing. ] the latter nearlythree hundred [Footnote: 46 killed, 167 wounded, 64 missing. I takethe official return for each side, as authority for the respectiveforce and loss. ] men; for the darkness and confusion that added tothe horror, lessened the slaughter of the battle. Jackson drew back about three miles, where he halted and threw upa long line of breastworks, reaching from the river to the morass;he left a body of mounted riflemen to watch the British. All theEnglish troops reached the field on the day after the fight; butthe rough handling that the foremost had received made them cautiousabout advancing. Moreover, the left division was kept behind thelevee all day by the _Carolina_, which opened upon them wheneverthey tried to get away; nor was it till dark that they made theirescape out of range of her cannon. Christmas-day opened drearilyenough for the invaders. Although they were well inland, the schooner, by greatly elevating her guns, could sometimes reach them, and sheannoyed them all through the day [Footnote: "While sitting at table, a loud shriek was heard.... A shot had taken effect on the body ofan unfortunate soldier... Who was fairly cut in two at the lowerportion of the belly!" (Gleig, p. 306. ) ]; and as the Americans hadcut the levee in their front, it at one time seemed likely that theywould be drowned out. However, matters now took a turn for the better. The river was so low that the cutting of the levee instead of floodingthe plain [Footnote: Latour, 113. ] merely filled the shrunken bayous, and rendered it easy for the British to bring up their heavy guns;and on the same day their trusted leader, Sir Edward Packenham, arrivedto take command in person, and his presence gave new life to thewhole army. A battery was thrown up during the two succeeding nightson the brink of the river opposite to where the _Carolina_ lay; andat dawn a heavy cannonade of red-hot shot and shell was opened uponher from eleven guns and a mortar. [Footnote: Gleig, 307. The Americansthought the battery consisted of 5 18- and 12-pounders; Gleig says 9field-pieces (9--and 6-pounders), 2 howitzers, and a mortar. ] Sheresponded briskly, but very soon caught fire and blew up, to thevengeful joy of the troops whose bane she had been for the past fewdays. Her destruction removed the last obstacle to the immediateadvance of the army; but that night her place was partly takenby the mounted riflemen, who rode down to the British lines, shotthe sentries, engaged the out-posts, and kept the whole camp in aconstant state of alarm. [Footnote: Gleig, 310. ] In the morning SirEdward Packenham put his army in motion, and marched on New Orleans. When he had gone nearly three miles he suddenly, and to his greatsurprise, stumbled on the American army. Jackson's men had workedlike beavers, and his breastworks were already defended by over threethousand fighting men, [Footnote: 3, 282 men in all, according tothe Adjutant-General's return for Dec. 28, 1814. ] and by half a dozenguns, and moreover were flanked by the corvette _Louisiana_, anchoredin the stream. No sooner had the heads of the British columns appearedthan they were driven back by the fire of the American batteries;the field-pieces, mortars, and rocket guns were then brought up, and a sharp artillery duel took place. The motley crew of the_Louisiana_ handled their long ship guns with particular effect;the British rockets proved of but little service [Footnote: Latour, 121. ]; and after a stiff fight, in which they had two field-piecesand a light mortar dismounted, [Footnote: Gleig, 314. The officialreturns show a loss of 18 Americans and 58 British, the latter sufferingmuch less than Jackson supposed. Lossing, in his "Field Book of theWar of 1812, " not only greatly overestimates the British loss, butspeaks as if this was a serious attack, which it was not. Packenham'sarmy, while marching, unexpectedly came upon the American intrenchment, and recoiled at once, after seeing that his field-pieces were unableto contend with the American artillery. ] the British artillerymenfell back on the infantry. Then Packenham drew off his whole armyout of cannon shot, and pitched his camp facing the intrenched linesof the Americans. For the next three days the British battalionslay quietly in front of their foe, like wolves who have brought tobay a gray boar, and crouch just out of reach of his tusks, waitinga chance to close in. Packenham, having once tried the strength of Jackson's position, made up his mind to breach his works and silence his guns with aregular battering train. Heavy cannon were brought up from the ships, and a battery was established on the bank to keep in check the_Louisiana_. Then, on the night of the last day of the year, strongparties of workmen were sent forward, who, shielded by the darkness, speedily threw up stout earthworks, and mounted therein fourteenheavy guns, [Footnote: 10 long 18s and 4 24-pound carronades (James, ii, 368). Gleig says (p. 318), "6 batteries, mounting 30 pieces ofheavy cannon. " This must include the "brigade of field-pieces" ofwhich James speaks. 9 of these, 9--and 6-pounders, and 2 howitzers, had been used in the attack on the _Carolina_; and there were also2 field-mortars and 2 3-pounders present; and there must have been1 other field-piece with the army, to make up the 30 of which Gleigspeaks. ] to face the thirteen [Footnote: viz. : 1 long 32, 3 long 24s, 1 long 18, 3 long 12s, 3 long 6s, a 6-inch howitzer, and a smallcarronade (Latour, 147); and on the same day Patterson had in hiswater-battery 1 long 24 and 2 long 12s (see his letter of Jan. 2d), making a total of 16 American guns. ] mounted in Jackson's lines, which were but three hundred yards distant. New Year's day dawned very misty. As soon as the haze cleared offthe British artillerymen opened with a perfect hail of balls, accompanied by a cloud of rockets and mortar shells. The Americanswere taken by surprise, but promptly returned the fire, with equalfury and greater skill. Their guns were admirably handled; some bythe cool New England seamen lately forming the crew of the _Carolina_, others by the fierce creole privateersmen of Lafitte, and still othersby trained artillerymen of the regular army. They were all old hands, who in their time had done their fair share of fighting, and werenot to be flurried by any attack, however unexpected. The Britishcannoneers plied their guns like fiends, and fast and thick fell theirshot; more slowly but with surer aim, their opponents answered them. [Footnote: The British historian, Alison, says ("History of Europe, "by Sir Archibald Alison, 9th edition, Edinburgh and London, 1852, vol. Xii. P. 141): "It was soon found that the enemy's guns were so superiorin weight and number, that nothing was to be expected from that speciesof attack. " As shown above, at this time Jackson had on both sides ofthe river 16 guns; the British, according to both James and Gleig, between 20 and 30. Jackson's long guns were 1 32, 4 24s, 1 18, 5 12s, and 3 6s, throwing in all 224 pounds; Packenham had 10 long 18s. 2long 3s, and from 6 to 10 long 9s and 6s, thus throwing between 228and 258 pounds of shot; while Jackson had but 1 howitzer and 1 carronadeto oppose 4 carronades, 2 howitzers, 2 mortars, and a dozen rocket guns;so in both number and weight of guns the British were greatly superior. ]The cotton bales used in the American embrasures caught fire, and blewup two powder caissons; while the sugar hogsheads of which the Britishbatteries were partly composed were speedily shattered and splinteredin all directions. Though the British champions fought with unflaggingcourage and untiring energy, and though they had long been versedin war, yet they seemed to lack the judgment to see and correct theirfaults, and most of their shot went too high. [Footnote: In strongcontrast to Alison, Admiral Codrington, an eye-witness, states thetrue reason of the British failure: ("Memoir of Admiral Sir EdwardCodrington, " by Lady Bourchier, London, 1873, vol. I, p. 334. ) "Onthe 1st we had our batteries ready, by severe labor, in situation, from which the artillery people were, as a matter of course, to destroyand silence the opposing batteries, and give opportunity for awell-arranged storm. But, instead, not a gun of the enemy appearedto suffer, and our own firing too high was not discovered till" toolate. "Such a failure in this boasted arm was not to be expected, and I think it a blot on the artillery escutcheon. "] On the otherhand, the old sea-dogs and trained regulars who held the field againstthem, not only fought their guns well and skilfully from the beginning, but all through the action kept coolly correcting their faults andmaking more sure their aim. Still, the fight was stiff and wellcontested. Two of the American guns were disabled and 34 of theirmen were killed or wounded. But one by one the British cannon weresilenced or dismounted, and by noon their gunners had all been drivenaway, with the loss of 78 of their number. The _Louisiana_ herself took no part in this action. Patterson hadpreviously landed some of her guns on the opposite bank of the river, placing them in a small redoubt. To match these the British alsothrew up some works and placed in them heavy guns, and all throughNew Year's day a brisk cannonade was kept up across the river betweenthe two water-batteries, but with very little damage to either side. For a week after this failure the army of the invaders lay motionlessfacing the Americans. In the morning and evening the defiant, rollingchallenge of the English drums came throbbing up through the gloomycypress swamps to where the grim riflemen of Tennessee were lyingbehind their log breastworks, and both day and night the stillnesswas at short intervals broken by the sullen boom of the great gunswhich, under Jackson's orders, kept up a never-ending fire on theleaguering camp of his foes. [Footnote: Gleig, 322. ] Nor could thewearied British even sleep undisturbed; all through the hours ofdarkness the outposts were engaged in a most harassing bush warfareby the backwoodsmen, who shot the sentries, drove in the pickets, and allowed none of those who were on guard a moment's safety orfreedom from alarm. [Footnote: Gleig, 323. ] But Packenham was all the while steadily preparing for his last andgreatest stroke. He had determined to make an assault in force assoon as the expected reinforcements came up; nor, in the light ofhis past experience in conflict with foes of far greater militaryrepute than those now before him, was this a rash resolve. He hadseen the greatest of Napoleon's marshals, each in turn, defeatedonce and again, and driven in headlong flight over the Pyrenees bythe Duke of Wellington; now he had under him the flower of the troopswho had won those victories; was it to be supposed for a moment thatsuch soldiers [Footnote: Speaking of Souk's overthrow a few monthsprevious to this battle, Napier says (v, 209): "He was opposed toone of the greatest generals of the world, at the head of unconquerabletroops. For what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal'sAfricans at Cannae, Caesar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's Guardsat Austerlitz--such were Wellington's British soldiers at thisperiod.... Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on theirnatural strength and fierceness a confidence that made them invincible. "]who, in a dozen battles, had conquered the armies and captured theforts of the mighty French emperor, would shrink at last from a mudwall guarded by rough backwoodsmen? That there would be loss of lifein such an assault was certain; but was loss of life to daunt menwho had seen the horrible slaughter through which the stormers movedon to victory at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian? At thebattle of Toulouse an English army, of which Packenham's troops thenformed part, had driven Soult from a stronger position than was nowto be assailed, though he held it with a veteran infantry. Of a surety, the dashing general who had delivered the decisive blow on the strickenfield of Salamanca, [Footnote: It was about 5 o'clock when Packenhamfell upon Thomieres.... From the chief to the lowest soldier, all[of the French] felt that they were lost, and in an instant Packenham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle. The Britishcolumns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners, standingup manfully for the honor of their country, sent showers of grapeinto the advancing masses, while a crowd of light troops poured ina fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavoredto display a front. But, bearing onwards through the skirmisherswith the might of a giant, Packenham broke the half-formed linesinto fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancingsupports... Packenham, bearing onwards with conquering violence, ... Formed one formidable line two miles in advance of where Packenhamhad first attacked; and that impetuous officer, with unmitigatedstrength, still pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder onthe enemy's left. (Napier, iv, 57, 58. 59. )] who had taken part inthe rout of the ablest generals and steadiest soldiers of ContinentalEurope, was not the man to flinch from a motley array of volunteers, militia, and raw regulars, led by a grizzled old bush-fighter, whosename had never been heard of outside of his own swamps, and thereonly as the savage destroyer of some scarcely more savage Indiantribes. Moreover, Packenham was planning a flank attack. Under hisorders a canal was being dug from the head of the bayou up whichthe British had come, across the plain to the Mississippi. This wasto permit the passage of a number of ships' boats, on which onedivision was to be ferried to the opposite bank of the river, whereit was to move up, and, by capturing the breastworks and water-batteryon the west side, flank Jackson's main position on the east side. [Footnote: "A particular feature in the assault was our cutting acanal into the Mississippi... To convey a force to the right bank, which... Might surprise the enemy's batteries on that side. I donot know how far this measure was relied on by the general, but, as he ordered and made his assault at daylight, I imagine he didnot place much dependence upon it. " (Codrington, i, 335. ) ] Whenthis canal was nearly finished the expected reinforcements, twothousand strong, under General Lambert, arrived, and by the eveningof the 7th all was ready for the attack, which was to be made atdaybreak on the following morning. Packenham had under him nearly10, 000 [Footnote: James (ii, 373) says the British "rank and file"amounted to 8, 153 men, including 1, 200 seamen and marines. The onlyother place where he speaks of the latter is in recounting the attackon the right bank, when he says "about 200" were with Thornton, whileboth the admirals, Cochrane and Codrington, make the number 300; sohe probably underestimates their number throughout, and at least 300can be added, making 1, 500 sailors and marines, and a total of 8, 453. This number is corroborated by Major McDougal. The officer who receivedSir Edward's body in his arms when was killed; he says (as quotedin the "Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished During the PeninsularWar, " by John William Cole, London. 1856, vol. Ii, p. 364) that afterthe battle and the loss of 2, 036 men, "we had still an effectiveforce of 6, 400, " making a total before the attack of 8, 436 rank andfile. Calling it 8, 450, and adding (see ante, note 10) 13. 3 per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get about 9, 600 men. ]fighting men; 1, 500 of these, under Colonel Thornton were to crossthe river and make the attack on the west bank. Packenham himselfwas to superintend the main assault, on the east bank, which was tobe made by the British right under General Gibbs, while the leftmoved forward under General Keane, and General Lambert commandedthe reserve. [Footnote: Letter of Major-General John Lambert to EarlBathurst, Jan. 10, 1815. ] Jackson's [Footnote: 4, 698 on the east bank, according to the official report of Adjutant-General Robert Butler, for the morning of January 8th. The details are as follow: At batteries..................................................... 154Command of Col. Ross (671 regulars and 742 Louisiana militia)... 1413Command of General Carroll (Tennesseeans, and somewhat under 500Kentuckians).................................................... 1562General Coffee's command (Tennesseeans, and about 250 Louisianamilitia)........................................................ 813Major Hind's dragoons........................................... 230Col. Slaughter's command........................................ 526 _____Total, 4, 698 These figures tally almost exactly with those given by Major Latour, except that he omits all reference to Col. Slaughter's command, thusreducing the number to about 4, 100. Nor can I anywhere find any allusionto Slaughter's command as taking part in the battle; and it is possiblethat these troops were the 500 Kentuckians ordered across the riverby Jackson; in which case his whole force but slightly exceeded 5, 000 men. On the west bank there were 546 Louisiana militia--260 of the Firstregiment, 176 of the Second, and 110 of the Sixth. Jackson had ordered500 Kentucky troops to be sent to reinforce them; only 400 started, of whom but 180 had arms. Seventy more received arms from the NavalArsenal; and thus a total of 250 armed men were added to the 546already on the west bank. ] position was held by a total of 5, 500 men. [Footnote: Two thousand Kentucky militia had arrived, but in wretchedplight; only 500 had arms, though pieces were found for about 250 more;and thus Jackson's army received an addition of 750 very badlydisciplined soldiers. "Hardly one third of the Kentucky troops, so long expected, are armed, and the arms they have are not fit for use. " (Letter of Gen. Jacksonto the Secretary of War, Jan. 3d. ) Having kept a constant watch onthe British, Jackson had rightly concluded that they would make themain attack on the east bank, and had, accordingly, kept the bulk ofhis force on that side. His works consisted simply of a mud breastwork, with a ditch in front of it, which stretched in a straight line fromthe river on his right across the plain, and some distance into themorass that sheltered his left. There was a small, unfinished redoubtin front of the breastworks on the river bank. Thirteen pieces ofartillery were mounted on the works. [Footnote: Almost all Britishwriters underestimate their own force and enormously magnify thatof the Americans. Alison, for example, quadruples Jackson's _relative_strength, writing: "About 6, 000 combatants were on the British side;a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to theteeth in works bristling with bayonets and loaded with heavy artillery. "Instead of double, he should have said half; the bayonets only"bristled" metaphorically, as less than a quarter of the Americanswere armed with them; and the British breaching batteries had a heavier"load" of artillery than did the American lines. Gleig says that "tocome nearer the truth" he "will choose a middle course, and supposetheir whole force to be about 25, 000 men, " (p. 325). Gleig, by theway, in speaking of the battle itself, mentions one most startlingevolution of the Americans, namely, that "without so much as liftingtheir faces above the ramparts, they swung their firelocks by onearm over the wall and discharged them" at the British. If any onewill try to perform this feat, with a long, heavy rifle held in onehand, and with his head hid behind a wall, so as not to see the objectaimed at, he will get a good idea of the likelihood of any man inhis senses attempting it. ] On the right was posted the Seventh regularinfantry, 430 strong; then came 740 Louisiana militia (both FrenchCreoles and men of color, and comprising 30 New Orleans riflemen, who were Americans), and 240 regulars of the Forty-fourth regiment;while the rest of the line was formed by nearly 500 Kentuckians andover 1, 600 Tennesseeans, under Carroll and Coffee, with 250 creolemilitia in the morass on the extreme left, to guard the head of abayou. In the rear were 230 dragoons, chiefly from Mississippi, andsome other troops in reserve; making in all 4, 700 men on the eastbank. The works on the west bank were farther down stream, and werevery much weaker. Commodore Patterson had thrown up a water-batteryof nine guns, three long 24's and six long 12's, pointing acrossthe river, and intended to take in flank any foe attacking Jackson. This battery was protected by some strong earthworks, mounting threefield-pieces, which were thrown up just below it, and stretched fromthe river about 200 yards into the plain. The line of defence wasextended by a ditch for about a quarter of a mile farther, when itended, and from there to the morass, half a mile distant, there wereno defensive works at all. General Morgan, a very poor militia officer, [Footnote: He committed every possible fault, except showing lack ofcourage. He placed his works at a very broad instead of a narrow partof the plain, against the advice of Latour, who had Jackson's approval(Latour, 167). He continued his earthworks but a very short distanceinland, making them exceedingly strong in front, and absolutelydefenceless on account of their flanks being unprotected. He did notmount the lighter guns of the water-battery on his lines, as he oughtto have done. Having a force of 800 men, too weak anyhow, he promptlydivided it; and, finally, in the fight itself, he stationed a smallnumber of absolutely raw troops in a thin line on the open, withtheir flank in the air; while a much larger number of older troopswere kept to defend a much shorter line, behind a strong breastwork, with their flanks covered. ] was in command, with a force of 550Louisiana militia, some of them poorly armed; and on the night beforethe engagement he was reinforced by 250 Kentuckians, poorly armed, undisciplined, and worn out with fatigue. [Footnote: Latour, 170. ] All through the night of the 7th a strange, murmurous clangor arosefrom the British camp, and was borne on the moist air to the linesof their slumbering foes. The blows of pickaxe and spade as the groundwas thrown up into batteries by gangs of workmen, the rumble of theartillery as it was placed in position, the measured tread of thebattalions as they shifted their places or marched off underThornton, --all these and the thousand other sounds of warlikepreparation were softened and blended by the distance into onecontinuous humming murmur, which struck on the ears of the Americansentries with ominous foreboding for the morrow. By midnight Jacksonhad risen and was getting every thing in readiness to hurl back theblow that he rightly judged was soon to fall on his front. Beforethe dawn broke his soldiery was all on the alert. The bronzed andbrawny seamen were grouped in clusters around the great guns. Thecreole soldiers came of a race whose habit it has ever been to takeall phases of life joyously; but that morning their gayety was temperedby a dark undercurrent of fierce anxiety. They had more at stakethan any other men on the field. They were fighting for their homes;they were fighting for their wives and their daughters. They wellknew that the men they were to face were very brave in battle andvery cruel in victory [Footnote: To prove this, it is only needfulto quote from the words of the Duke of Wellington himself; referring, it must be remembered, to their conduct in a friendly, not a hostilecountry. "It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities andoutrages committed by the troops. They are never out of sight of theirofficers, I might almost say, out of sight of the commanding officersof the regiments that outrages are not committed... There is not anoutrage of any description which has not been committed on a peoplewho have uniformly received them as friends. " "I really believe thatmore plunder and outrages have been committed by this army than byany other that ever was in the field. " "A detachment seldom marches... That a murder, or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage is notcommitted by the British soldiers composing it. They have killedeight people since the army returned to Portugal. " "They really forgetevery thing when plunder or wine is within reach. "]; they well knewthe fell destruction and nameless woe that awaited their city shouldthe English take it at the sword's point. They feared not for themselves;but in the hearts of the bravest and most careless there lurked adull terror of what that day might bring upon those they loved. [Footnote: That these fears were just can be seen by the followingquotations, from the works of a British officer, General Napier, who was an eye-witness of what he describes. It must be rememberedthat Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian were friendly towns, only the garrisons being hostile. "Now commenced that wild anddesperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldiers'heroism. All, indeed, were not alike, for hundreds risked and manylost their lives in striving to stop the violence; but the madnessgenerally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, allthe dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shamelessrapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, thehissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors andwindows, the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for twodays and nights in the streets of Badajos. On the third, when thecity was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their ownexcesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled. " (Vol. Iii, 377). And again: "This storm seemed to be a signal from hell forthe perpetration of villainy which would have shamed the most ferociousbarbarians of antiquity. At Rodrigo intoxication and plunder hadbeen the principal object; at Badajos lust and murder were joinedto rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian the direst, the mostrevolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes--one atrocity, of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind byits enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity... A Portugueseadjutant, who endeavored to prevent some wickedness, was put to deathin the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately, by a number of English soldiers.... And the disordercontinued until the flames, following the steps of the plunderer, put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town. " Packenhamhimself would have certainly done all in his power to prevent excesses, and has been foully slandered by many early American writers. Alludingto these, Napier remarks, somewhat caustically: "Pre-eminentlydistinguished for detestion of inhumanity and outrage, he has been, with astounding falsehood, represented as instigating his troops tothe most infamous excesses; but from a people holding millions oftheir fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prateand vaunt of liberty until all men turn in loathing from the sickeningfolly, what can be expected?" (Vol. V, p. 31. ) Napier possessed toa very eminent degree the virtue of being plain-spoken. Elsewhere(iii, 450), after giving a most admirably fair and just account ofthe origin of the Anglo-American war, he alludes, with a good dealof justice, to the Americans of 1812, as "a people who (notwithstandingthe curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the mosthorrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous) do, in their generalgovernment, uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazydespotisms of Europe. "] The Tennesseeans were troubled by no suchmisgivings. In saturnine, confident silence they lolled behind theirmud walls, or, leaning on their long rifles, peered out into thegray fog with savage, reckless eyes. So, hour after hour, the twoarmies stood facing each other in the darkness, waiting for the lightof day. At last the sun rose, and as its beams struggled through the morningmist they glinted on the sharp steel bayonets of the English, wheretheir scarlet ranks were drawn up in battle array, but four hundredyards from the American breastworks. There stood the matchless infantryof the island king, in the pride of their strength and the splendorof their martial glory; and as the haze cleared away they movedforward, in stern silence, broken only by the angry, snarling notesof the brazen bugles. At once the American artillery leaped intofurious life; and, ready and quick, the more numerous cannon of theinvaders responded from their hot, feverish lips. Unshaken amidthe tumult of that iron storm the heavy red column moved steadilyon toward the left of the American line, where the Tennesseeanswere standing in motionless, grim expectancy. Three fourths of theopen space was crossed, and the eager soldiers broke into a run. Then a fire of hell smote the British column. From the breastworkin front of them the white smoke curled thick into the air, as rankafter rank the wild marksmen of the backwoods rose and fired, aiminglow and sure. As stubble is withered by flame, so withered the Britishcolumn under that deadly fire; and, aghast at the slaughter, thereeling files staggered and gave back. Packenham, fit captain forhis valorous host, rode to the front, and the troops, rallying roundhim, sprang forward with ringing cheers. But once again the pealingrifle-blast beat in their faces; and the life of their dauntlessleader went out before its scorching and fiery breath. With himfell the other general who was with the column, and all of the menwho were leading it on; and, as a last resource, Keane brought uphis stalwart Highlanders; but in vain the stubborn mountaineers rushedon, only to die as their comrades had died before them, withunconquerable courage, facing the foe, to the last. Keane himselfwas struck down; and the shattered wrecks of the British column, quailing before certain destruction, turned and sought refuge beyondreach of the leaden death that overwhelmed their comrades. Nor didit fare better with the weaker force that was to assail the rightof the American line. This was led by the dashing Colonel Rennie, who, when the confusion caused by the main attack was at its height, rushed forward with impetuous bravery along the river bank. Withsuch headlong fury did he make the assault, that the rush of histroops took the outlying redoubt, whose defenders, regulars andartillerymen, fought to the last with their bayonets and clubbedmuskets, and were butchered to a man. Without delay Rennie flunghis men at the breastworks behind, and, gallantly leading them, sword in hand, he, and all around him, fell, riddled through andthrough by the balls of the riflemen. Brave though they were, theBritish soldiers could not stand against the singing, leaden hail, for if they stood it was but to die. So in rout and wild dismay theyfled back along the river bank, to the main army. For some timeafterward the British artillery kept up its fire, but was graduallysilenced; the repulse was entire and complete along the whole line;nor did the cheering news of success brought from the west bank giveany hope to the British commanders, stunned by their crushing overthrow. [Footnote: According to their official returns the British loss was2, 036; the American accounts, of course, make it much greater. Latouris the only trustworthy American contemporary historian of this war, and even he at times absurdly exaggerates the British force and loss. Most of the other American "histories" of that period were the mostpreposterously bombastic works that ever saw print. But as regardsthis battle, none of them are as bad as even such British historiansas Alison; the exact reverse being the case in many other battles, notably Lake Erie. The devices each author adopts to lessen theseeming force of his side are generally of much the same character. For instance, Latour says that 800 of Jackson's men were employedon works at the rear, on guard duty, etc. , and deducts them; James, for precisely similar reasons, deducts 853 men: by such means onereduces Jackson's total force to 4, 000, and the other gives Packenhambut 7, 300. Only 2, 000 Americans were actually engaged on the east banks. ] Meanwhile Colonel Thornton's attack on the opposite side had beensuccessful, but had been delayed beyond the originally intended hour. The sides of the canal by which the boats were to be brought throughto the Mississippi caved in, and choked the passage, [Footnote:Codrington, i, 386. ] so that only enough got through to take overa half of Thornton's force. With these, seven hundred in number, [Footnote: James says 298 soldiers and about 200 sailors; but AdmiralCochrane in his letter (Jan. 18th) says 600 men, half sailors; andAdmiral Codrington also (p. 335) gives this number, 300 beingsailors: adding 13 1/3 per cent. For the officers, sergeants, andtrumpeters, we get 680 men. ] he crossed, but as he did not allowfor the current, it carried him down about two miles below the properlanding-place. Meanwhile General Morgan, having under him eighthundred militia [Footnote: 796. (Latour, 164-172. )] whom it was ofthe utmost importance to have kept together, promptly divided themand sent three hundred of the rawest and most poorly armed down tomeet the enemy in the open. The inevitable result was their immediaterout and dispersion; about one hundred got back to Morgan's lines. He then had six hundred men, all militia, to oppose to seven hundredregulars. So he stationed the four hundred best disciplined men todefend the two hundred yards of strong breastworks, mounting threeguns, which covered his left; while the two hundred worst disciplinedwere placed to guard six hundred yards of open ground on his right, with their flank resting in air, and entirely unprotected. [Footnote:Report of Court of Inquiry, Maj. -Gen. Wm. Carroll presiding. ] Thistruly phenomenal arrangement ensured beforehand the certain defeatof his troops, no matter how well they fought; but, as it turnedout, they hardly fought at all. Thornton, pushing up the river, firstattacked the breastwork in front, but was checked by a hot fire;deploying his men he then sent a strong force to march round andtake Morgan on his exposed right flank. [Footnote: Letter of Col. W. Thornton, Jan. 8. 1815. ] There, the already demoralized Kentuckymilitia, extended in thin order across an open space, outnumbered, and taken in flank by regular troops, were stampeded at once, andafter firing a single volley they took to their heels. [Footnote:Letter of Commodore Patterson, Jan. 13, 1815. ] This exposed the flankof the better disciplined creoles, who were also put to flight; butthey kept some order and were soon rallied. [Footnote: Alison outdoeshimself in recounting this feat. Having reduced the British forceto 340 men, he says they captured the redoubt, "though defended by22 guns and 1, 700 men. " Of course, it was physically impossiblefor the water-battery to take part in the defence; so there werebut 3 guns, and by halving the force on one side and trebling iton the other, he makes the relative strength of the Americans justsixfold what it was, --and is faithfully followed by other Britishwriters. ] In bitter rage Patterson spiked the guns of his water-batteryand marched off with his sailors, unmolested. The American loss hadbeen slight, and that of their opponents not heavy, though amongtheir dangerously wounded was Colonel Thornton. This success, though a brilliant one, and a disgrace to the Americanarms, had no effect on the battle. Jackson at once sent overreinforcements under the famous French general, Humbert, andpreparations were forthwith made to retake the lost position. Butit was already abandoned, and the force that had captured it hadbeen recalled by Lambert, when he found that the place could notbe held without additional troops. [Footnote: The British Col. Dickson, who had been sent over to inspect, reported that 2, 000 men would beneeded to hold the battery; so Lambert ordered the British to retire. (Lambert's letter, Jan. 10th. )] The total British loss on both sidesof the river amounted to over two thousand men, the vast majorityof whom had fallen in the attack on the Tennesseeans, and most ofthe remainder in the attack made by Colonel Rennie. The Americanshad lost but seventy men, of whom but thirteen fell in the mainattack. On the east bank, neither the creole militia nor theForty-fourth regiment had taken any part in the combat. The English had thrown for high stakes and had lost every thing, and they knew it. There was nothing to hope for left. Nearly afourth of their fighting men had fallen; and among the officers theproportion was far larger. Of their four generals, Packenham wasdead, Gibbs dying, Keane disabled, and only Lambert left. Theirleader, the ablest officers, and all the flower of their bravestmen were lying, stark and dead, on the bloody plain before them;and their bodies were doomed to crumble into mouldering dust on thegreen fields where they had fought and had fallen. It was uselessto make another trial. They had learned to their bitter cost, thatno troops, however steady, could advance over open ground againstsuch a fire as came from Jackson's lines. Their artillerymen hadthree times tried conclusions with the American gunners, and eachtime they had been forced to acknowledge themselves worsted. Theywould never have another chance to repeat their flank attack, forJackson had greatly strengthened and enlarged the works on the westbank, and had seen that they were fully manned and ably commanded. Moreover, no sooner had the assault failed, than the Americansagain began their old harassing warfare. The heaviest cannon, bothfrom the breastwork and the water-battery, played on the Britishcamp, both night and day, giving the army no rest, and the mountedriflemen kept up a trifling, but incessant and annoying, skirmishingwith their pickets and outposts. The British could not advance, and it was worse than useless forthem to stay where they were, for though they, from time to time, were reinforced, yet Jackson's forces augmented faster than theirs, and every day lessened the numerical inequality between the twoarmies. There was but one thing left to do, and that was to retreat. They had no fear of being attacked in turn. The British soldiers weremade of too good stuff to be in the least cowed or cast down evenby such a slaughtering defeat as that they had just suffered, andnothing would have given them keener pleasure than to have hada fair chance at their adversaries in the open; but this chance wasjust what Jackson had no idea of giving them. His own army, thoughin part as good as an army could be, consisted also in part ofuntrained militia, while not a quarter of his men had bayonets; andthe wary old chief, for all his hardihood, had far too much wit tohazard such a force in fight with a superior number of seasonedveterans, thoroughly equipped, unless on his own ground and in hisown manner. So he contented himself with keeping a sharp watch onLambert; and on the night of January 18th the latter deserted hisposition, and made a very skilful and rapid retreat, leaving eightywounded men and fourteen pieces of cannon behind him. [Footnote:Letter of General Jackson, Jan. 19th, and of General Lambert, Jan. 28th. ] A few stragglers were captured on land, and, while the troopswere embarking, a number of barges, with over a hundred prisoners, were cut out by some American seamen in row-boats; but the bulk ofthe army reached the transports unmolested. At the same time, asquadron of vessels, which had been unsuccessfully bombarding FortSaint Philip for a week or two, and had been finally driven off whenthe fort got a mortar large enough to reach them with, also returned;and the whole fleet set sail for Mobile. The object was to captureFort Bowyer, which contained less than four hundred men, and, thoughformidable on its sea-front, [Footnote: "Towards the sea itsfortifications are respectable enough; but on the land side it islittle better than a block-house. The ramparts being composed ofsand not more than three feet in thickness, and faced with plank, are barely cannon-proof; while a sand hill, rising within pistol-shotof the ditch, completely commands it. Within, again, it is as muchwanting in accommodation as it is in strength. There are no bomb-proofbarracks, nor any hole or arch under which men might find protectionfrom shells; indeed, so deficient is it in common-lodging rooms, that great part of the garrison sleep in tents ... With the reductionof this trifling work all hostilities ended. " (Gleig, 357. ) General Jackson impliedly censures the garrison for surrendering soquickly; but in such a fort it was absolutely impossible to actotherwise, and not the slightest stain rests upon the fort's defenders. ]was incapable of defence when regularly attacked on its land side. The British landed, February 8th, some 1, 500 men, broke ground, andmade approaches; for four days the work went on amid a continualfire, which killed or wounded 11 Americans and 31 British; by thattime the battering guns were in position and the fort capitulated, February 12th, the garrison marching out with the honors of war. Immediately afterward the news of peace arrived and all hostilitiesterminated. In spite of the last trifling success, the campaign had been to theBritish both bloody and disastrous. It did not affect the resultsof the war; and the decisive battle itself was a perfectly uselessshedding of blood, for peace had been declared before it was fought. Nevertheless, it was not only glorious but profitable to the UnitedStates. Louisiana was saved from being severely ravaged, and NewOrleans from possible destruction; and after our humiliating defeatsin trying to repel the invasions of Virginia and Maryland, thesignal victory of New Orleans was really almost a necessity for thepreservation of the national honor. This campaign was the greatevent of the war, and in it was fought the most important battle asregards numbers that took place during the entire struggle; and thefact that we were victorious, not only saved our self-respect at home, but also gave us prestige abroad which we should otherwise havetotally lacked. It could not be said to entirely balance the numerousdefeats that we had elsewhere suffered on land--defeats which had sofar only been offset by Harrison's victory in 1813 and the campaignin Lower Canada in 1814--but it at any rate went a long waytoward making the score even. Jackson is certainly by all odds the most prominent figure thatappeared during this war, and stands head and shoulders above anyother commander, American or British, that it produced. It will bedifficult, in all history, to show a parallel to the feat that heperformed. In three weeks' fighting, with a force largely composedof militia, he utterly defeated and drove away an army twice thesize of his own, composed of veteran troops, and led by one of theablest of European generals. During the whole campaign he only erredonce, and that was in putting General Morgan, a very incompetentofficer, in command of the forces on the west bank. He suited hismovements admirably to the various exigencies that arose. Thepromptness and skill with which he attacked, as soon as he knewof the near approach of the British, undoubtedly saved the city;for their vanguard was so roughly handled that, instead of beingable to advance at once, they were forced to delay three days, duringwhich time Jackson entrenched himself in a position from which hewas never driven. But after this attack the offensive would havebeen not only hazardous, but useless, and accordingly Jackson, adopting the mode of warfare which best suited the ground he wason and the troops he had under him, forced the enemy always to fighthim where he was strongest, and confined himself strictly to thepure defensive--a system condemned by most European authorities, [Footnote: Thus Napier says (vol. V, p. 25): "Soult fared as mostgenerals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want ofnumbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders andundisciplined soldiers, lines may avail; seldom against accomplishedcommanders, never when the assailants are the better soldiers. " Andagain (p. 150), "Offensive operations must be the basis of a gooddefensive system. "] but which has at times succeeded to admirationin America, as witness Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Kenesaw Mountain, and Franklin. Moreover, it must be remembered that Jackson's successwas in no wise owing either to chance or to the errors of hisadversary. [Footnote: The reverse has been stated again and againwith very great injustice, not only by British, but even by Americanwriters (as e. G. , Prof. W. G. Sumner, in his "Andrew Jackson as aPublic Man, " Boston, 1882). The climax of absurdity is reached byMajor McDougal, who says (as quoted by Cole in his "Memoirs ofBritish Generals, " ii, p. 364): "Sir Edward Packenham fell, notafter an utter and disastrous defeat, but at the very moment whenthe arms of victory were extended towards him"; and by James, whosays (ii, 388): "The premature fall of a British general saved anAmerican city. " These assertions are just on a par with those madeby American writers, that only the fall of Lawrence prevented the_Chesapeake_ from capturing the _Shannon_. British writers have always attributed the defeat largely to thefact that the 44th regiment, which was to have led the attack withfascines and ladders, did not act well. I doubt if this had anyeffect on the result. Some few of the men with ladders did reachthe ditch, but were shot down at once, and their fate would havebeen shared by any others who had been with them; the bulk of thecolumn was never able to advance through the fire up to the breastwork, and all the ladders and fascines in Christendom would not have helpedit. There will always be innumerable excuses offered for any defeat;but on this occasion the truth is simply that the British regularsfound they could not advance in the open against a fire more deadlythan they had ever before encountered. ] As far as fortune favoredeither side, it was that of the British [Footnote: E. G. : Theunexpected frost made the swamps firm for them to advance through;the river being so low when the levee was cut, the bayous were filled, instead of the British being drowned out; the Carolina was onlyblown up because the wind happened to fail her; bad weather delayedthe advance of arms and reinforcements, etc. , etc. ]; and Packenhamleft nothing undone to accomplish his aim, and made no movementsthat his experience in European war did not justify his making. Thereis not the slightest reason for supposing that any other Britishgeneral would have accomplished more or have fared better than hedid. [Footnote: "He was the next man to look to after Lord Wellington"(Codrington, i, 339). ] Of course Jackson owed much to the natureof the ground on which he fought; but the opportunities it affordedwould have been useless in the hands of any general less ready, hardy, and skilful than Old Hickory. A word as to the troops themselves. The British infantry was at thattime the best in Europe, the French coming next. Packenham's soldiershad formed part of Wellington's magnificent peninsular army, andthey lost nothing of their honor at New Orleans. Their conductthroughout was admirable. Their steadiness in the night battle, their patience through the various hardships they had to undergo, their stubborn courage in action, and the undaunted front they showedin time of disaster (for at the very end they were to the full asready and eager to fight as at the beginning), all showed that theirsoldierly qualities were of the highest order. As much cannot besaid of the British artillery, which, though very bravely foughtwas clearly by no means as skilfully handled as was the case withthe American guns. The courage of the British officers of all armsis mournfully attested by the sadly large proportion they bore tothe total on the lists of the killed and wounded. An even greater meed of praise is due to the American soldiers, forit must not be forgotten that they were raw troops opposed to veterans;and indeed, nothing but Jackson's tireless care in drilling themcould have brought them into shape at all. The regulars were justas good as the British, and no better. The Kentucky militia, whohad only been 48 hours with the army and were badly armed andtotally undisciplined, proved as useless as their brethren of NewYork and Virginia, at Queenstown Heights and Bladensburg, hadpreviously shown themselves to be. They would not stand in the openat all, and even behind a breastwork had to be mixed with bettermen. The Louisiana militia, fighting in defence of their homes, andwell trained, behaved excellently, and behind breastworks were asformidable as the regulars. The Tennesseeans, good men to start with, and already well trained in actual warfare under Jackson, were intheir own way unsurpassable as soldiers. In the open field theBritish regulars, owing to their greater skill in manoeuvring, andto their having bayonets, with which the Tennesseeans were unprovided, could in all likelihood have beaten them; but in rough or brokenground the skill of the Tennesseeans, both as marksmen and woodsmen, would probably have given them the advantage; while the extremedeadliness of their fire made it far more dangerous to attempt tostorm a breastwork guarded by these forest riflemen than it wouldhave been to attack the same work guarded by an equal number of thebest regular troops of Europe. The American soldiers deserve greatcredit for doing so well; but greater credit still belongs to AndrewJackson, who, with his cool head and quick eye, his stout heart andstrong hand, stands out in history as the ablest general the UnitedStates produced, from the outbreak of the Revolution down to thebeginning of the Great Rebellion. Appendix A TONNAGE OF THE BRITISHAND AMERICAN MEN-OF-WARIN 1812-15 According to Act of Congress (quoted in "Niles' Register, " iv, 64), the way of measuring double-decked or war-vessels was as follows: "Measure from fore-part of main stem to after-part of stern port, above the upper deck; take the breadth thereof at broadest partabove the main wales, one half of which breadth shall be accountedthe depth. Deduct from the length three fifths of such breadth, multiply the remainder by the breadth and the product by the depth;divide by 95; quotient is tonnage. " (_i. E. _, if length = x, and breadth = y; (x - 3/5 y) X y X 1/2 yTonnage = ----------------------- . ) 95 Niles states that the British mode, as taken from Steele's "Shipmaster'sAssistant, " was this: Drop plumb-line over stem of ship and measuredistance between such line and the after part of the stern port atthe load water-mark; then measure from top of said plumb-line inparallel direction with the water to perpendicular point immediatelyover the load water-mark of the fore part of main stem; subtractfrom such admeasurement the above distance; the remainder is ship'sextreme length, from which deduct 3 inches for every foot of theload-draught of water for the rake abaft, and also three fifths ofthe ship's breadth for the rake forward; remainder is length of keelfor tonnage. Breadth shall be taken from outside to outside of theplank in broadest part of the ship either above or below the mainwales, exclusive of all manner of sheathing or doubling. Depth isto be considered as one half the length. Tonnage will then be thelength into the depth into breadth, divided by 94. Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbitrary manner, with noregard to actual capacity or displacement; and, moreover, what isof more importance, the British method differed from the Americanso much that a ship measured in the latter way would be nominallyabout 15 per cent. Larger than if measured by British rules. Thisis the exact reverse of the statement made by the British navalhistorian, James. His mistake is pardonable, for great confusionexisted on the subject at that time, even the officers not knowingthe tonnage of their own ships. When the _President_ was captured, her officers stated that she measured about 1, 400 tons; in realityshe tonned 1, 576, American measure. Still more singular was thetestimony of the officers of the _Argus_, who thought her to be ofabout 350 tons, while she was of 298, by American, or 244, by Britishmeasurement. These errors were the more excusable as they occurredalso in higher quarters. The earliest notice we have about the three44-gun frigates of the _Constitution's_ class, is in the letter ofSecretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddart, on Dec. 24, 1798, [Footnote:"American State Papers, " xiv, 57. ] where they are expressly said tobe of 1, 576 tons; and this tonnage is given them in every navy listthat mentions it for 40 years afterward; yet Secretary Paul Hamiltonin one of his letters incidentally alludes to them as of 1, 444 tons. Later, I think about the year 1838, the method of measuring was changed, and their tonnage was put down as 1, 607. James takes the Americantonnage from Secretary Hamilton's letter as 1, 444, and states (vol. Vi, p. 5), that this is equivalent to 1, 533 tons, English. But inreality, by American measurement, the tonnage was 1, 576; so thateven according to James' own figures the British way of measurementmade the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American way did; actuallythe difference was nearer 290 tons. James' statements as to the sizeof our various ships would seem to have been largely mere guesswork, as he sometimes makes them smaller and sometimes larger than theywere according to the official navy lists. Thus, the _Constitution_, _President_, and _United States_, each of 1, 576, he puts down as of1, 533; the _Wasp_, of 450, as of 434; the _Hornet_, of 480, as of 460;and the _Chesapeake_, of 1, 244, as of 1, 135 tons. On the other handthe _Enterprise_, of 165 tons, he states to be of 245; the _Argus_of 298, he considers to be of 316, and the _Peacock_, _Frolic_, etc. , of 509 each, as of 539. He thus certainly adopts different standardsof measurement, not only for the American as distinguished from theBritish vessels, but even among the various American vessels themselves. And there are other difficulties to be encountered; not only werethere different ways of casting tonnage from given measurements, but also there were different ways of getting what purported to bethe same measurement. A ship, that, according to the British methodof measurement was of a certain length, would, according to theAmerican method, be about 5 per cent. Longer; and so if two vesselswere the same size, the American would have the greatest nominaltonnage. For example, James in his "Naval Occurrences" (p. 467) givesthe length of the __Cyane's__ main deck as 118 feet 2 inches. Thissame _Cyane_ was carefully surveyed and measured, under orders fromthe United States navy department, by Lieut. B. F. Hoffman, and inhis published report [Footnote: "American State Papers, " xiv, p. 417. ] he gives, among the other dimensions: "Length of spar-deck, 124 feet 9 inches, " and "length of gun-deck 123 feet 3 inches. " Withsuch a difference in the way of taking measurements, as well as ofcomputing tonnage from the measurements when taken, it is not surprisingthat according to the American method the _Cyane_ should have rankedas of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James takes no account ofany of these differences I hardly know how to treat his statementsof comparative tonnage. Thus he makes the _Hornet_ 460 tons, andthe _Peacock_ and _Penguin_, which she at different times captured, about 388 each. As it happens both Captain Lawrence and Captain Biddle, who commanded the _Hornet_ in her two successful actions, had theirprizes measured. The _Peacock_ sank so rapidly that Lawrence couldnot get very accurate measurements of her; he states her to be fourfeet shorter and half a foot broader than the _Hornet_. The Britishnaval historian, Brenton (vol. V, p. 111), also states that theywere of about the same tonnage. But we have more satisfactory evidencefrom Captain Biddle. He stayed by his prize nearly two days, andhad her thoroughly examined in every way; and his testimony is, ofcourse, final. He reports that the _Penguin_ was by actual measurementtwo feet shorter, and somewhat broader than the _Hornet_, and withthicker scantling. She tonned 477, compared to the _Hornet's_ 480--adifference of about one half of one per cent. This testimony iscorroborated by that of the naval inspectors who examined the_Epervier_ after she was captured by the _Peacock_. Those two vesselswere respectively of 477 and 509 tons, and as such they ranked onthe navy lists. The American _Peacock_ and her sister ships werevery much longer than the brig sloops of the _Epervier's_ class, but were no broader, the latter being very tubby. All the Englishsloops were broader in proportion than the American ones were; thusthe __Levant_, which was to have mounted the same number of guns asthe _Peacock_, had much more beam, and was of greater tonnage, although of rather less length. The _Macedonian_, when captured, ranked on our lists as of 1, 325 tons, [Footnote: See the work ofLieutenant Emmons, who had access to all the official records. ] the_United States_ as of 1, 576; and they thus continued until, as Ihave said before, the method of measurement was changed, when theformer ranked as of 1, 341, and the latter as of 1, 607 tons. James, however, makes them respectively, 1, 081, and 1, 533. Now to get thecomparative force he ought to have adopted the first set of measurementsgiven, or else have made them 1, 081 and 1, 286. Out of the twelvesingle-ship actions of the war, four were fought with 38-gun frigateslike the _Macedonian_, and seven with 18-gun brig sloops of the_Epervier's_ class; and as the _Macedonian_ and _Epervier_ were bothregularly rated in our navy, we get a very exact idea of our antagonistsin those eleven cases. The twelfth was the fight between the_Enterprise_ and the _Boxer_, in which the latter was captured; the_Enterprise_ was apparently a little smaller than her foe, but hadtwo more guns, which she carried in her bridle ports. As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get it comparatively, andnot absolutely, I have given it throughout for both sides as estimatedby the American method of that day. The tonnage of the vessels onthe lakes has been already noticed. Appendix B PREVIOUS HISTORY OFUNITED STATES NAVY Very few students of naval history will deny that in 1812 the averageAmerican ship was superior to the average British ship of the samestrength; and that the latter was in turn superior to the averageFrench ship. The explanation given by the victor is in each casethe same; the American writer ascribes the success of his nationto "the aptitude of the American character for the sea, " and theBriton similarly writes that "the English are inherently better suitedfor the sea than the French. " Race characteristics may have had somelittle effect between the last pair of combatants (although onlya little), and it is _possible_ that they somewhat affected theoutcome of the Anglo-American struggle, but they did not form themain cause. This can best be proved by examining the combats oftwo preceding periods, in which the English, French, and Americanswere at war with one another. During the years 1798-1800, the United States carried on a desultoryconflict with France, then at war with England. Our navy was justbuilt, and was rated in the most extraordinary manner; the _Chesapeake_, carrying 18-pounders, was called a 44; and the _Constellation_ whichcarried 24's, a 36, while the _Washington_, rating 24, was reallymuch heavier than the _Boston_, rating 28. On Feb. 9, 1799, afteran hour's conflict, the _Constellation_ captured the French frigate_Insurgente_; the Americans lost 3, the French 70 men, killed andwounded. The _Constitution_ carried but 38 guns; 28 long 24's, onthe main-deck, and 10 long 12's on the quarter-deck, with a crewof 309 men. According to Troude (iii, 169), _l'lnsurgente_ carried26 long 12's, 10 long 6's, and 4 36-pound carronades; the Americansreport her number of men as nearly four hundred. Thus in actual[Footnote: French shot was really very much heavier than the nominallycorresponding English shot, as the following table, taken from CaptainT. L. Simmon's work on "Heavy Ordnance" (London, 1837, p. 62) will show: Nominal French Weight Actual Weight of Same Shot in of Shot. English Pounds. 36 lbs. 43 lbs 4 oz. 24 " 28 " 8 3/4" 18 " 21 " 4 1/2" 12 " 14 " 7 "] (not nominal) weight of shot the _Constitution_ was superior byabout 80 pounds, and was inferior in crew by from 50 to 100 men. This would make the vessels apparently nearly equal in force; butof course the long 24's of the Constellation made it impossible that_l'lnsurgente_, armed only with long 12's, should contend with her. As already said, a superiority in number of men makes very littledifference, provided each vessel has ample to handle the guns, repairdamages, work the sails, etc. Troude goes more into details thanany other French historian; but I think his details are generallywrong. In this case he gives the _Constellation_ 12's, instead ofthe 24's she really carried; and also supplies her with 10 32-poundcarronades--of which species of ordnance there was then not one piecein our navy. The first carronades we ever had were those carriedby the same frigate on her next voyage. She had completely changedher armament, having 28 long 18's on the main-deck, ten 24-poundcarronades on the quarter-deck; and, I believe, 6 long 12's on theforecastle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, she encountered andfought a drawn battle with _la Vengeance_. Troude (vol. Iii, pp. 201, and 216) describes the armament of the latter as 26 long 18's, 10 long 8's, and 4 36-pound carronades. On board of her was anAmerican prisoner, James Howe, who swore she had 52 guns, and 400men (see Cooper, i, 306). The French and American accounts thusradically disagree. The point is settled definitely by the reportof the British captain Milne, who, in the _Seine_ frigate, captured_la Vengeance_ in the same year, and then reported her armament asbeing 28 long 18's, 16 long 12's, and 8 36-pound carronades, with326 men. As the American and British accounts, written entirelyindependently of one another, tally almost exactly, it is evidentthat Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders very much overthe _Constellation's_ armament. Thus in this action the American frigate fought a draw with anantagonist, nearly as much superior to herself as an American 44was to a British 38. In November, 1800, the "28-gun frigate, "_Boston_, of 530 tons, 200 men, carrying 24 long 9's on the main-deck, and on the spar-deck 8 long 6's (or possibly 12-pound carronades)captured, after two hours action, the French corvette _Berceau_, of 24 guns, long 8's; the _Boston_ was about the same size as herfoe, with the same number of men, and superior in metal about asten to nine. She lost 15, and the _Berceau_ 40 men. Troude (iii, p. 219) gives the _Berceau_ 30 guns, 22 long 8's, and 8 12-poundcarronades. If this is true she was in reality of equal force withthe _Boston_. But I question if Troude really knew anything aboutthe combatants; he gives the _Boston_ (of the same size and buildas the _Cyane_) 48 guns--a number impossible for her to carry. Hecontinually makes the grossest errors; in this same (the third)volume, for example, he arms a British 50-gun-ship with 72 cannon, giving her a broadside fifty per cent. Heavier than it should be(p. 141); and, still worse, states the ordinary complement of aBritish 32-gun frigate to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p. 417). He is by no means as trustworthy as James, though less rancorous. The United States schooner _Experiment_, of 12 guns, long 6's, and70 men, captured the French man-of-war three-masted-schooner _LaDiane_, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), with a crew of 60 men, and 30 passengers; and the _Enterprise_, the sister vessel of the_Experiment_, captured numerous strong privateers. One of them, amuch heavier vessel than her captor, made a most obstinate fight. She was the _Flambeau_ brig of fourteen 8-pounders and 100 men, ofwhom half were killed or wounded. The _Enterprise_ had 3 killed and7 wounded. Comparing these different actions, it is evident that the Americanswere superior to the French in fighting capacity during the years1799 and 1800. During the same two years there had been numeroussingle contests between vessels of Britain and France, ending almostinvariably in favor of the former, which I mention first in eachcouple. The 12-pounder frigate _Daedalus_ captured the 12-pounderfrigate _Prudente_, of equal force. The British 18-pounder frigate_Sybille_ captured the frigate _Forte_, armed with 52 guns, 30 ofthem long 24's on the main-deck; she was formidably armed and asheavy as the _Constitution_. The _Sybille_ lost 22 and the _Forte_145 men killed and wounded. The 18-pounder frigate _Clyde_, withthe loss of 5 men, captured the 12-pounder frigate _Vestale_, whichlost 32. The cutter _Courser_, of twelve 4-pounders and 40 men, captured the privateer _Guerrière_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 44men. The cutter _Viper_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men, capturedthe privateer _Suret_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 57 men. The 16-gunship-sloop, _Peterel_, with 89 men, engaged the _Cerf_, 14, _Lejoille_, 6, and _Ligurienne_, 16, with in all 240 men, and captured the_Ligunenne_. The 30-gun corvette _Dart_ captured by surprise the38-gun frigate _Desirée_. The _Gypsey_, of ten 4-pounders and 82men, captured the _Quidproquo_, of 8 guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and98 men. The schooner _Milbrook_ of sixteen 18-pounder carronadesand 47 men, fought a draw with the privateer _Bellone_, of 24 long8's and six 36-pound carronades. Finally, six months after the_Vengeance_ had escaped from the _Constellation_ (or beaten her off, as the French say) she was captured by the British frigate _Seine_, which threw a broadside about 30 pounds more than the American didin her action, and had some 29 men less aboard. So that her commander, Captain Milne, with the same force as Commodore Truxtun, of the_Constellation_, accomplished what the latter failed to do. Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty clear that, while theAmericans were then undoubtedly much superior to the French, theywere still, at least slightly, inferior to the British. From 1777 to 1782 the state of things was very different. The singlecombats were too numerous for me to mention them here; and besidesit would be impossible to get at the truth without going to a greatdeal of trouble--the accounts given by Cooper, Sohomberg, and Troudediffering so widely that they can often hardly be recognized astreating of the same events. But it is certain that the British werevery much superior to the Americans. Some of the American shipsbehaved most disgracefully, deserting their consorts and fleeingfrom much smaller foes. Generally the American ship was capturedwhen opposed by an equal force--although there were some brilliantexceptions to this. With the French things were more equal; theirfrigates were sunk or captured time and again, but nearly as oftenthey sunk or captured their antagonists. Some of the most gallantfights on record are recounted of French frigates of this period;in 1781 the _Minerve_, 32, resisted the _Courageous_, 74, till shehad lost 73 men and had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men on hergigantic antagonist, and the previous year the _Bellepoule_, 32, had performed a similar feat with the _Nonsuch_, 64, while the_Capricieuse_, 32, had fought for five hours before surrenderingto the _Prudente_ and _Licorne_, each of force equal to herself. She lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 upon her two antagonists. Such instances make us feel rather ashamed when we compare them withthe fight in which the British ship _Glasgow_, 20, beat off anAmerican squadron of 5 ships, including two of equal force to herself, or with the time when the _Ariadne_, 20, and _Ceres_, 14, attackedand captured without resistance the _Alfred_, 20, the latter shipbeing deserted in the most outrageously cowardly manner by her consortthe _Raleigh_, 32. At that period the average American ship wascertainly by no means equal to the average French ship of the sameforce, and the latter in turn was a little, but only a little, inferiorto the average British ship of equal strength. Thus in 1782 the British stood first in nautical prowess, separatedbut by a very narrow interval from the French, while the Americansmade a bad third. In 1789 the British still stood first, while theAmericans had made a great stride forward, coming close on theirheels, and the French had fallen far behind into the third place. In 1812 the relative positions of the British and French wereunchanged, but the Americans had taken another very decided stepin advance, and stood nearly as far ahead of the British as thelatter were ahead of the French. The explanation of these changes is not difficult. In 1782 the Americanwar vessels were in reality privateers; the crews were unpracticed, the officers untrained, and they had none of the traditions anddiscipline of a regular service. At the same time the French marinewas at its highest point; it was commanded by officers of abilityand experience, promoted largely for merit, and with crews thoroughlytrained, especially in gunnery, by a long course of service on thesea. In courage, and in skill in the management of guns, musketry, etc. , they were the full equals of their English antagonists; theirslight _average_ inferiority in seamanship may, it is possible, befairly put down to the difference in race. (It seems certain that, when serving in a neutral vessel, for example, the Englishmen aboardare apt to make better sailors than the Frenchmen. ) In 1799 therevolution had deprived the French of all their best officers, hadlet the character of the marine run down, and the discipline of theservice become utterly disorganized; this exposed them to frightfulreverses, and these in turn prevented the character of the servicefrom recovering its former tone. Meanwhile the Americans had establishedfor the first time a regular navy, and, as there was excellent materialto work with, it at once came up close to the English; constant andarduous service, fine discipline, promotion for merit, and the mostunflagging attention to practical seamanship and gunnery had in 1812raised it far above even the high English standard. During all thesethree periods the English marine, it must be remembered, did not falloff, but at least kept its position; the French, on the contrary, _did_ fall off, while the American navy advanced by great stridesto the first place. Appendix C After my work was in press I for the first time came across Prof. J. Russell Soley's "Naval Campaign of 1812, " in the "Proceedingsof the United States Naval Institute, " for October 20, 1881. It isapparently the precursor of a more extended history. Had I knownthat such a writer as Professor Soley was engaged on a work of thiskind I certainly should not have attempted it myself. In several points our accounts differ. In the action with the_Guerrière_ his diagram differs from mine chiefly in his making the_Constitution_ steer in a more direct line, while I have representedher as shifting her course several times in order to avoid beingraked, bringing the wind first on her port and then on herstarboard-quarter. My account of the number of the crew of the_Guerrière_ is taken from the _Constitution's_ muster-book (in theTreasury Department at Washington), which contains the names of allthe British prisoners received aboard the _Constitution_ after thefight. The various writers used "larboard" and "starboard" withsuch perfect indifference, in speaking of the closing and the lossof the _Guerrière's_ mizzen-mast, that I hardly knew which accountto adopt; it finally seemed to me that the only way to reconcilethe conflicting statements was by making the mast act as a rudder, first to keep the ship off the wind until it was dead aft and thento bring her up into it. If this was the case, it deadened her speed, and prevented Dacres from keeping his ship yardarm and yardarm withthe foe, though he tried to steady his course with the helm; but, in this view, it rather delayed Hull's raking than helped him. IfProfessor Soley's account is right, I hardly know what to make ofthe statement in one of the American accounts that the _Constitution_"luffed across the enemy's bow, " and of Cooper's statement (in_Putnam's Magazine_) that the _Guerrière's_ bowsprit pressed againstthe _Constitution's_ "lee or port quarter. " In the action of the _Wasp_ with the _Frolic_, I have adopted James'statement of the latter's force; Professor Soley follows CaptainJones' letter, which gives the brig three additional guns and 18pounds more metal in broadside. My reason for following James wasthat his account of the _Frolic's_ force agrees with the regulararmament of her class. Captain Jones gives her _two_ carronades onthe topgallant forecastle, which must certainly be a mistake; hemakes her chase-guns long 12's, but all the other British brigscarried 6's; he also gives her another gun in broadside, which hecalls a 12-pounder, and Lieutenant Biddle (in a letter to his father)a 32-pound carronade. His last gun should perhaps be counted in;I excluded it because the two American officials differed in theiraccount of it, because I did not know through what port it couldbe fought, and because James asserted that it was dismounted andlashed to the forecastle. The _Wasp_ left port with 138 men; subtractingthe pilot and two men who were drowned, makes 135 the number on boardduring the action. As the battle was fought, I doubt if the loss ofthe brig's main-yard had much effect on the result; had it been herobject to keep on the wind, or had the loss of her after-sails enabledher antagonist to cross her stern (as in the case of the _Argus_and _Pelican_), the accident could fairly be said to have had a decidedeffect upon the contest. But as a short time after the fight beganthe vessels were running nearly free, and as the _Wasp_ herself wasgreatly injured aloft at the time, and made no effort to cross herfoe's stern, it is difficult to see that it made much difference. The brig's head-sails were all right, and, as she was not close-hauled, the cause of her not being kept more under command was probably purelydue to the slaughter on her decks. Professor Soley represents the combat of the _States_ and _Macedonian_as a plain yardarm and yardarm action after the first forty minutes. I have followed the English authorities and make it a running fightthroughout. If Professor Soley is right, the enormous disparity inloss was due mainly to the infinitely greater accuracy of the Americanfire; according to my diagram the chief cause was the incompetencyof the _Macedonian's_ commander. In one event the difference wasmainly in the gunnery of the crews, in the other, it was mainly inthe tactical skill of the captains. The question is merely as tohow soon Carden, in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was enabledto close with Decatur. I have represented the closing as taking placelater than Professor Soley has done; very possibly I am wrong. Couldmy work now be rewritten I think I should adopt his diagram of theaction of the _Macedonian_. But in the action with the _Java_ it seems to me that he is mistaken. He has here followed the British accounts; but they are contradictedby the American authorities, and besides have a very improbable look. When the _Constitution_ came round for the second time, on the porttack, James declares the _Java_ passed directly across her stern, almost touching, but that the British crew, overcome by astonishmentor awe, did not fire a shot; and that shortly afterward the manoeuvrewas repeated. When this incident is said to have occurred the _Java's_crew had been hard at work fighting the guns for half an hour, andthey continued for an hour and a half afterward; it is impossibleto believe that they would have foreborne to fire more than one gunwhen in such a superb position for inflicting damage. Even had themen been struck with temporary lunacy the officers alone would havefired some of the guns. Moreover, if the courses of the vessels weresuch as indicated on Professor Soley's diagram the _Java_ would herselfhave been previously exposed to a terrible raking fire, which wasnot the case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, _per se_, a decidedlyapocryphal look; and besides they are flatly contradicted by theAmerican accounts which state distinctly that the _Java_ remainedto windward in every portion of the fight. On this same tack ProfessorSoley represents the _Java_ as forereaching on the _Constitution_;I have reversed this. At this time the _Java_ had been much cut upin her rigging and aloft generally, while the _Constitution_ hadset much additional sail, and in consequence the latter forged aheadand wore in the smoke unperceived. When the ships came foul ProfessorSoley has drawn the _Constitution_ in a position in which she wouldreceive a most destructive stern rake from her antagonist's wholebroadside. The positions could not have been as there represented. The _Java's_ bowsprit came foul in the _Constitution's_ mizzen riggingand as the latter forged ahead she pulled the former gradually roundtill when they separated the ships were in a head and stern line. Commodore Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at once "kept awayto avoid being raked, " while the loss of the head-sails aboard the_Java_ would cause the latter to come up in the wind, and the twoships would again be running parallel, with the American to leeward. I have already discussed fully the reasons for rejecting in thisinstance the British report of their own force and loss. This wasthe last defeat that the British officially reported; the admiraltywere smarting with the sting of successive disasters and anxiousat all costs to put the best possible face on affairs (as witnessMr. Croker's response to Lord Dundonald's speech in the House). Thereis every reason for believing that in this case the reports weregarbled; exactly as at a later date the official correspondencepreceding the terrible disasters at Cabul was tampered with beforebeing put before the public (see McCarthy's "History of our Own Times"). It is difficult to draw a diagram of the action between the _Hornet_and _Peacock, _ although it was so short, the accounts contradictingone another as to which ship was to windward and which on the "larboardtack;" and I do not know if I have correctly represented the positionof the combatants at the close of the engagement. Lieutenant Connerreported the number of men aboard the _Hornet_ fit for duty as 135;Lawrence says she had 8 absent in a prize and 7 too sick to be atquarters. This would make an original complement of 150, and talliesexactly with the number of men left on the _Hornet_ after the actionwas over, as mentioned by Lawrence in his account of the total numberof souls aboard. The log-book of the _Hornet_ just before startingon her cruise, states her entire complement as 158; but 4 of thesewere sick and left behind. There is still a discrepancy of 4 men, but during the course of the cruise nothing would be more likelythan that four men should be gotten rid of, either by sickness, desertion, or dismissal. At any rate the discrepancy is very trivial. In her last cruise, as I have elsewhere said, I have probablyoverestimated the number of the _Hornet's_ crew; this seems especiallylikely when it is remembered that toward the close of the war ourvessels left port with fewer supernumeraries aboard than earlierin the contest. If such is the case, the _Hornet_ and _Penguin_ wereof almost exactly equal force. My own comments upon the causes of our success, upon the varioushistorians of the war, etc. , are so similar to those of ProfessorSoley, that I almost feel as if I had been guilty of plagiarism;yet I never saw his writings till half an hour ago. But in commentingon the actions of 1812, I think the Professor has laid too much stresson the difference in "dash" between the combatants. The _Wasp_ boredown with perfect confidence to engage an equal foe; and the _Hornet_could not tell till the _Peacock_ opened fire that the latter wasinferior in force, and moreover fought in sight of another hostilevessel. In the action with the _Guerrière_ it was Hull and not Dacreswho acted boldly, the Englishman delaying the combat and trying tokeep it at long range for some time. In this fight it must be rememberedthat neither foe knew the exact force of the other until the closework began; then, it is true, Dacres fought most bravely. So withthe _Macedonian;_ James particularly says that she did not know theforce of her foe, and was confident of victory. The _Java, _ however, must have known that she was to engage a superior force. In neitherof the first two frigate actions did the Americans have a chanceto display any courage in the actual fighting, the victory was wonwith such ease. But in each case they entered as bravely, althoughby no means as rashly or foolishly, into the fight as their antagonistsdid. It must always be remembered that until this time it was byno means proved that 24-pounders were better guns than 18's to puton frigates; exactly as at a little later date it was vigorouslycontended that 42-pounders were no more effective guns for two-deckersthan 32-pounders were. Till 1812 there had been no experience tojustify the theory that the 24-pounder was the better gun. So thatin the first five actions it cannot be said that the British showedany especial courage in _beginning_ the fight; it was more properlyto be called ignorance. After the fight was once begun they certainlyacted very bravely, and, in particular, the desperate nature of the_Frolic's_ defence has never been surpassed. But admitting this is a very different thing from admitting thatthe British fought more bravely than their foes; the combatants wereabout on a par in this respect. The Americans, it seems to me, werealways to the full as ready to engage as their antagonists were;on each side there were few over-cautious men, such as CommodoreRodgers and Sir George Collier, the opposing captains on LakeOntario, the commander of the _Bonne Citoyenne_, and perhapsCommodore Decatur, but as a rule either side jumped at the chanceof a fight. The difference in tactics was one of skill and commonsense, not one of timidity. The _United States_ did not "avoid closeaction" from over-caution, but simply to take advantage of heropponent's rashness. Hull's approach was as bold as it was skilful;had the opponent to leeward been the _Endymion_, instead of the_Guerrière_, her 24-pounders would not have saved her from the fatethat overtook the latter. Throughout the war I think that the Americanswere as bold in beginning action, and as stubborn in continuing it, as were their foes--although no more so. Neither side can claim anysuperiority on the average, though each can in individual cases, as regards courage. Foolhardiness does not imply bravery. Aprize-fighter who refused to use his guard would be looked upon asexceptionally brainless, not as exceptionally brave; yet such a caseis almost exactly parallel to that of the captain of the _Macedonian_. Appendix D In the "Historical Register of the United States" (Edited by T. H. Palmer, Philadelphia, 1814), vol. 1 p. 105 (State Papers), is a letterfrom Lieut. L. H. Babbitt to Master-commandant Wm. U. Crane, bothof the _Nautilus_, dated Sept. 13, 1812, in which he says that ofthe six men imprisoned by the British on suspicion of being of Englishbirth, four were native-born Americans, and two naturalized citizens. He also gives a list of six men who deserted, and entered on the_Shannon_, of whom two were American born--the birthplaces of thefour others not being given. Adding these last, we still have butsix men as the number of British aboard the _Nautilus_, It is thusseen that the crack frigate _Shannon_ had American deserters aboardher--although these probably formed a merely trifling faction ofher crew, as did the British deserters aboard the crack frigate_Constitution. _ On p. 108, is a letter of Dec. 17, 1812, from Geo. S. Wise, purserof the _Wasp_, stating that twelve of that ship's crew had beendetained "under the pretence of their being British subjects"; sothat nine per cent. Of her crew may have been British--or theproportion may have been very much smaller. On p. 117, is a letter of Jan. 14, 1813, from Commodore J. Rodgers, in which he states that he encloses the muster-rolls of H. B. M. Ships, _Moselle_ and _Sappho_, taken out of the captured packet_Swallow_; and that these muster-rolls show that in August 1812, one eighth of the crews of the _Moselle_ and _Sappho_, was composedof Americans. These various letters thus support strongly the conclusions reachedon a former page as to the proportion of British deserters on Americanvessels. In "A Biographical Memoir of the late Commodore Joshua Barney, fromAutographical Notes and Journals" (Edited by Mary Barney, Boston, 1832), on pages 263, and 315, are descriptions of the flotilla destroyedin the Patuxent. It consisted of one gun-boat, carrying a long 24;one cutter, carrying a long 18, a columbiad 18, and four 9-poundcarronades, and thirteen row barges, each carrying a long 18 or 12in the bow, with a 32-pound or 18-pound carronade in the stern. Onp. 256, Barney's force in St. Leonard's creek, is described asconsisting of one sloop, two gun-boats, and thirteen barges, within all somewhat over 500 men; and it is claimed that the flotilladrove away the blockading frigates, entirely unaided; the infantryforce on shore rendering no assistance. The work is of some value, as showing that James had more than doubled the size, and almostdoubled the strength, of Barney's various gun-boats. It may be mentioned that on p. 108, Commodore Barney describes theDutch-American frigate _South Carolina_, which carried a crew of550 men, and was armed with 28 long 42's on the maindeck, and 12long 12's on the spardeck. She was far heavier than any of our44-gun frigates of 1812, and an overmatch for anything under therank of a 74. This gives further emphasis to what I have alreadystated--that the distinguishing feature of the war of 1812, is _not_the introduction of the heavy frigate, for heavy frigates had beenin use among various nations for thirty years previously, but thefact that for the first time the heavy frigate was used to the bestpossible advantage. Appendix E In the last edition of James' "Naval History of Great Britain, "published in London, in 1886, by Richard Bentley & Son, there isan appendix by Mr. H. T. Powell, devoted to the war of 1812, mainlyto my account thereof. Mr. Powell begins by stating with naïf solemnity that "most Britishreaders will be surprised to learn that, notwithstanding the infinitepains taken by William James to render his history a monument ofaccuracy, and notwithstanding the exposure he brought upon contemporarymisstatements, yet to this day the Americans still dispute his facts. "It is difficult to discuss seriously any question with a man capableof writing down in good faith such a sentence as the above. James(unlike Brenton and Cooper) knew perfectly well how to be accurate;but if Mr. Powell will read the comments on his accounts which Ihave appended to the description of almost every battle, he willsee that James stands convicted beyond possibility of doubt, notmerely of occasional inaccuracies or errors, but of the systematic, malicious, and continuous practice of every known form of wilfulmisstatement, from the suppression of the truth and the suggestionof the false to the lie direct. To a man of his character thetemptation was irresistible; for when he came to our naval war, hehad to appear as the champion of the beaten side, and to explainaway defeat instead of chronicling victory. The contemporary Americanwriters were quite as boastful and untruthful. No honorable Americanshould at this day endorse their statements; and similarly, noreputable Englishman should permit his name to be associated in anyway with James' book without explicitly disclaiming all share in, or sympathy with, its scurrilous mendacity. Mr. Powell's efforts to controvert my statements can be disposedof in short order. He first endeavors to prove that James was rightabout the tonnage of the ships; but all that he does is to show thathis author gave for the English frigates and sloops the correcttonnage by English and French rules. This I never for a momentdisputed. What I said was that the _comparative_ tonnage of thevarious pairs of combatants as given by James was all wrong; andthis Mr. Powell does not even discuss. James applied one systemcorrectly to the English vessels; but he applied quite another tothe American (especially on the lakes). Mr. Powell actually quotesAdmiral Chads as a witness, because he says that his father consideredJames' account of the _Java's_ fight accurate; if he wishes suchtestimony, I can produce many relatives of the Perrys, Porters, andRodgers of 1812, who insist that I have done much less than justiceto the American side. He says I passed over silently James' scheduleof dimensions of the frigates and sloops. This is a mistake; I showedby the testimony of Captains Biddle and Warrington and LieutenantHoffman that his _comparative_ measurements (the absolute measurementsbeing of no consequence) for the American and British sloops areall wrong; and the same holds true of the frigates. Mr. Powell deals with the weight of shot exactly as he does withthe tonnage--that is, he seeks to show what the _absolute_ weightof the British shot was; but he does not touch upon the point atissue, the _comparative_ weight of the British and American shot. When he comes to the lake actions, Mr. Powell is driven to concludethat what I aver must be accurate, because he thinks the _Confiance_was the size of the _General Pike_ (instead of half as large again;she mounted 30 guns in battery on her main deck, as against the_Pike's_ 26, and stood to the latter as the _Constellation_ did tothe _Essex_), and because an American writer (very properly) expressesdissatisfaction with Commodore Chauncy! What Mr. Powell thinks thislast statement tends to prove would be difficult to say. In the bodyof my work I go into the minute details of the strength of thecombatants in the lake action; I clearly show that James was guiltyof gross and wilful falsification of the truth; and no materialstatement I make can be successfully controverted. So much for Mr. Powell. But a much higher authority, Mr. Frank Chiswell, has recently published some articles which tend to show that myconclusions as to the tonnage of the sea vessels (not as to the lakevessels, which are taken from different sources) are open to question. In the appendix to my first edition I myself showed that it was quiteimpossible to reconcile all the different statements; that the mostthat could be done was to take one method and apply it all through, admitting that even in this way it would be impossible to make allthe cases square with one another. Mr. Chiswell states that "the American tonnage measurements, properlytaken, never could give results for frigates varying largely from theEnglish tonnage. " But a statement like this is idle; for the answerto the "never could" is that they _did_. If Mr. Chiswell will turnto James' "Naval Occurrences, " he will find the _Chesapeake_ set downas 1, 135 tons, and the _Macedonian_ as of 1, 081; but in the AmericanNavy lists, which are those I followed, the _Chesapeake_ is put downas of 1, 244 tons. A simple application of the rule of three showsthat even if I accepted James' figures, I would be obliged to considerthe _Macedonian_ as of about 1, 185 tons, to make her correspond withthe system I had adopted for the American ships. But this is not all. James gives the length of the _Macedonian_ as154 ft. 6 in. In the Navy Department at Washington are two plansof the _Macedonian_. One is dated 1817, and gives her length as157 ft. 3 in. This difference in measurement would make a differenceof 20 odd tons; so that by the American mode she must certainlyhave been over 1, 200 tons, instead of under 1, 100, as by the Britishrules. The second plan in the Navy Department, much more elaboratethan the first, is dated 1829, and gives the length as 164 ft. ; itis probably this that Emmons and the United States Navy lists havefollowed--as I did myself in calling the tonnage of the _Macedonian_1, 325. Since finding the plan of 1817, however, I think it possiblethat the other refers to the second vessel of the name, which wasbuilt in 1832. If this is true, then the _Macedonian_ (as well asthe _Guerrière_ and _Java_) should be put down as about 120 tonsless than the measurements given by Emmons and adopted by me; buteven if this is so, she must be considered as tonning over 1, 200, using the method I have applied to the _Chesapeake_. Therefore, adopting the same system that I apply to the American 38-gun frigates, the British 38-gun frigates were of over 1, 200, not under 1, 100, tons. As for the _Cyane_, James makes her but 118 ft. And 2 in. Long, whilethe American _Peacock_ he puts at 119 ft. 5 in. But Lieut. Hoffman'sofficial report makes the former 123 ft. 3 in. , and the plans in theState Department at Washington make the latter 117 ft. 11 in. Inlength. I care nothing for the different methods of measuring differentvessels; what I wish to get at is the comparative measurement, andthis stands as above. The comparative tonnage is thus the very reverseof that indicated by James' figures. Finally, as to the brigs, James makes them some ten feet shorterthan the American ship-sloops. In the Washington archives I canfind no plan on record of the measurements of the captured__Epervier_; but in the Navy Department, volume 10, of the "Lettersof Master Commandants, 1814, " under date of May 12th, is the statementof the Surveyor of the Port of Charleston that she measured 467 tons(in another place it is given as 477). James makes her 388; but ashe makes the American _Wasp_ 434, whereas she stands on our listas of 450, the application of the same rule as with the frigatesgives us, even taking his own figures, 400 as her tonnage, when measuredas our ships were. But the measurements of the Surveyor of the Portwho examined the _Epervier_ are corroborated by the statements ofCaptain Biddle, who captured her sister brig, the _Penguin_. Biddlereported that the latter was two feet shorter and a little broaderthan his own ship, the _Hornet_, which was of 480 tons. This wouldcorrespond almost exactly with the Surveyor's estimate. It still seems impossible to reconcile all these conflicting statements;but I am inclined to think that, on the whole, in the sea (not thelake) vessels I have put the British tonnage too high. On the scaleI have adopted for the American 44-gun and 38-gun frigates and 18-gunsloops like the Hornet and _Wasp_, the British 38-gun frigates oughtto be put down as of a little over 1, 200, and the British 18-gunsloops as of between 400 and 450, tons. In other words, of the twelvesingle-ship actions of the war five, those of the _Chesapeake_ and_Shannon_, _Enterprise_ and _Boxer_, _Wasp_ and _Frolic_, _Hornet_and _Peacock_, _Hornet_ and _Penguin_, were between vessels of nearlyequal size; in six the American was the superior about in the proportionof five to four (rather more in the case of the frigates, ratherless in the case of the brigs); and in one, that of the _Argus_ and_Pelican_, the British sloop was the bigger, in a somewhat similar ratio. This correction would be in favor of the British. But in a moreimportant particular I think I have done injustice to the Americans. I should have allowed for the short weight of American metal on thelakes, taking off seven per cent, from the nominal broadsides ofPerry and Macdonough; for the American ordnance was of exactly thesame quality as that on the ocean vessels, while the British wasbrought over from England, and must have shown the same superioritythat obtained on the sea-going ships. Moreover, I am now inclined to believe that both the _Guerrière_and the _Java_, which were originally French ships, still carriedFrench 18's on their main-deck, and that, therefore, about 20 poundsshould be added to the broadside weight of metal of each. The Americanaccounts stated this to be the case in both instances; but I paidno heed to them until my attention was called to the fact that theEnglish had captured enormous quantities of French cannon and shotand certainly used the captured ordnance on some of their ships. In writing my history I have had to deal with a mass of confusedand contradictory testimony, which it has sometimes been quiteimpossible to reconcile, the difficulty being greatly enhanced bythe calculated mendacity of James and some others of the earlierwriters, both American and British. Often I have had simply to balanceprobabilities, and choose between two sets of figures, aware that, whichever I chose, much could be said against the choice. It has, therefore, been quite impossible to avoid errors; but I am confidentthey have been as much in favor of the British as the Americans;and in all important points my statements are substantially accurate. I do not believe that my final conclusions on the different fightscan be disputed. James asserts that the American ships were officeredby cunning cowards, and manned to the extent of half their force inpoint of effectiveness by renegade British. I show that the percentageof non-American seamen aboard the American ships was probably butlittle greater than the percentage of non-British seamen aboard theBritish ships; and as for the charges of cowardice, there were buttwo instances in which it could be fairly urged against a beatencrew--that of the British _Epervier_ and that of the American _Argus_(for the cases of Sir George Collier, Commodore Rodgers, Chauncy, Yeo, the commander of the _Bonne Citoyenne_, etc. , etc. , cannot beconsidered as coming under this head). James states that there wasusually a great superiority of force on the side of the Americans;this is true; but I show that it was not nearly as great as he makesit, and that in dealing with the lake flotillas his figures areabsolutely false, to the extent of even reversing the relative strengthof the combatants on Lake Champlain, where the Americans won, althoughwith an inferior force. In the one noteworthy British victory, thatof the _Shannon_, all British authors fail to make any allowance forthe vital fact that the _Shannon's_ crew had been drilled for sevenyears, whereas the _Chesapeake_ had an absolutely new crew, and hadbeen out of port just eight hours; yet such a difference in lengthof drill is more important than disparity in weight of metal. As a whole, it must be said that both sides showed equal courageand resolution; that the Americans usually possessed the advantagein material force; and that they also showed a decided superiorityin fighting skill, notably in marksmanship. INDEX _Abeille_Aboukir_Acasta__Adams_Adams, ChaplainAdams, LieutenantAdonis_Aeolus__Aetna__Africa__Alacrity__Albion__Alert__Alexandria__Alfred_Alison, Mr. _Allen_Allen, Lieutenant William Henry_Alligator_Almy, Sailing-master Thomas C. Alwyn, John C. _Ambuscade__Amelia__American_American Revolution_American State Papers_Angus, Commander S. Annapolis, MarylandAppling, Major_Arab_Arbuthnot, Captain James_Arethuse__Argo__Argus__Ariadne__Ariel__Armada__Armide_Armstrong, LieutenantArundel, Sailing-master_Asp_Aspinwall, Lieutenant_Atalanta__Atlas_Austria_Avenger__Avon__Aylwin_Ayscough, Sir GeorgeAzores Babbit, Lieutenant L. H. Badajos_Badere Zaffer_Bainbridge, Master CommandantBaker, Captain_Ballahou__Ballard_Ballard, CaptainBaltic SeaBaltimore, MarylandBarbadoesBarclay, Captain R. H. Barney, Captain JoshuaBarnwell, Sailing-master_Barossa_Barras, AdmiralBarrie, Sir RobertBarry, CaptainBartholomew, CaptainBartlett, Mr. Bassett, Sailing-master R. Bastard, Captain JohnBay of FundyBayne, Adjutant General E. _Bayonnaise_Beale, George, Jr. Bell, Lieutenant_Bellepoule__Bellone__Belvidera_Bentham, Captain George_Berceau__Beresford_Beresford, Captain John PoerBermudaBiddle, CaptainBiddle, LieutenantBignall, Lieutenant G. Bingham, CaptainBlack Rock_Black Snake_Bladensburg, MarylandBlake, Mr. Blakely, Captain JohnstonBland, FrancisblockadingBlucher, Mr. Blyth, Captain SamuelBoerstler, Colonel_Bonne Citoyenne__Boston_Boston, Massachusetts_Boxer_Boyce, LieutenantBoyd, GeneralBoyd, Master's MateBoyle, Captain ThomasBrailesford, MidshipmanBraimer, Captain_Brant_Breckenbridge, LieutenantBrenton, Edward P. Brine, CaptainBrock, GeneralBroke, Admiral Philip VereBrooks, LieutenantBroom, Lieutenant JamesBrown, Captain ThomasBrown, GeneralBrown, LieutenantBruce, LieutenantBuchan, Lieutenant EdwardBudd, Lieutenant CharlesBudd, Lieutenant GeorgeBuffalo, New YorkBulger, LieutenantBulloch, Captain James D. Bunker Hill, Burleton, Admiral Sir GeorgeBurlington, Vermont_Burrows_Burrows, Lieutenant WilliamBush, Lieutenant William S. Byng, Captain Henry D. Byron, Captain Richard Cabul, Mr. Calder, Sir Robert_Caledonia_Call, WilliamCampbell, LieutenantCampbell, Master's Mate J. CamperdownCanadaCape of Good HopeCape Race_Capricieuse_Carden, Captain John Surnam_Carnation__Carolina_Carroll, General_Carron_Carter, Sailing-masterCassin, Captain_Castilian_Cathcart, Captain_Centipe__Ceres__Cerf_Chads, Lieutenant Henry D. _Chameleon_Champlin, Sailing-master StephenChandeleur IslandsChandler, GeneralCharleston, South Carolina_Charwell_Chauncy, CommodoreChauncy, Lieutenant Wolcott_Chausseur__Cherub__Chesapeake_Chesapeake BayChicago, Illinois_Childers__Chippeway_ChippewayChiswell, Frank_Chlorinde_Chrystler's Farm_Chubb_Civil WarClaxton, LieutenantClement, Sailing-master George_Cleopatra__Clyde_Cochrane, Admiral Sir AlexanderCockburn, Rear AdmiralCodrington, Lord EdwardCoffee, GeneralCollier, Sir GeorgeCollier, Sir Ralph_Columbia__Comus__Confiance__Congress_CongressConklin, Lieutenant A. H. M. Conkling, LieutenantConner, LieutenantConnor, Lieutenant D. _Conquest__Constellation__Constitution__Contest_Cooper, J. FenimoreCopenhagenCornick, Lieutenant H. D. _Cornwallis_Coshnahan, MidshipmanCoswell, Lieutenant J. G. _Courageous__Courier-National__Courser_Cox, W. S. Cox, LieutenantCrab IslandCrane, LieutenantCrane, Master Commandant William VCraney IslandCrawford, MinisterCreerie, Lieutenant JohnCroghan, ColonelCroker, Mr. CubaCumberland IslandCummings, Midshipman J. C. _Curlew_Curry, Lieutenant Rodger C. _Cyane__Cyprus_ Dacres, Captain James R. _Daedalus_Daily, Sailing-master_Dant_Davies, Lieutenant DavidDearborn, GeneralDecatur, StephenDeforest, Midshipmande Grasse, Comtede la Gravière, Admiral JurienDelaware BayDenmarkDent, CaptainDe Ruyter_Desiree__Despatch_De Suffrein_Detroit_Detroit, Michigan_Devastation__Diadem_Dickenson, Captain James_Dictator__Didon_Dixon, Sailing-masterDobbs, CaptainDoggerbank_Dolphin__Dover_Douglass, Captain GeorgeDouglass, Lord HowardDownie, Captain George. Downes, LieutenantDowns, Lieutenant_Dragon__Drummond_Drummond, GeneralDudley, MidshipmanDundonald, LordDurham, Admiral _Eagle__Earl of Moira_Earle, CommodoreEast IndiesEckford, HenryEdwards, Lieutenant_Egyptienne_Elliott, LieutenantEllis, CaptainEmmons, Lieutenant George E. _Endymion_English Channel_Enterprise__Epervier_Epworth, Captain_Erebus__Erie__Espiegle__Essex__Essex Junior__Etoile__Eurotas__Euryalus__Eurydice_Evans, Amos A. Everard, Captain Thomas_Experiment_ _Fair American__Fairy_Falcon, Captain Gordon ThomasFalkiner, LieutenantFalse Duck IslandFarragut, Admiral David GlasgowFerris, Sailing-master John D. _Finch_Finch, Lieutenant BoltonFinnis, Captain_Firefly_Fischer, Lieutenant Colonel_Flambeau__Florida_FloridaFloyd, Captain RobettForrest, LieutenantFort BowyerFort ErieFort GeorgeFort McHenryFort MackinawFort MeigsFort St. PhilipFort StephensonFort Washington_Forte__Fortune of War_Forty Mile Creek14th Light DragoonsFrance_Franklin__Fredrickscoarn_FrenchtownFrench Revolution_Frolic__Fulton_Funk, John Messer_Funon_ Gaines, General_Galatea_Gamble, Lieutenant Peter_Gamo_Garden, Captain S. J. _Garland_Garland, Lieutenant_General Armstrong__General Pike_Georgia_Georgiana_GhentGibbs, General_Glasgow__Gloire__Gloucester_Gordon, Captain James A. Gordon, Lieutenant H. C. _Governor Tompkins_Grand BanksGraves, Sir ThomasGreene, Captain Pill Barnaby_Greenwich_Gregory, Lieutenant Francis A. Griffeth, Rear Admiral_Growler_Guérin, Leon_Guerres Maritimes__Guerrière__Guemere_Gunboat #5Gunboat #23Gunboat #156Gunboat #162Gunboat #163Gunboat #168_Gypsy_ _Hamilton_Hamilton, Secretary PaulHampton, General WadeHampton RoadsHanahett, CaptainHardy, CaptainHardy, Sir ThomasHarrison, GeneralHart, Midshipman_Havannah_Hawkins, Captain RichardHayes, Captain JohnHead, Captain Michael_Hebrus__Hector_Henderson, CaptainHenly, Captain J. D. Henly, Captain Robert_Hermes_Hicks, Lieutenant William_Highflyer_Hilyar, Captain JamesHinn, Mr. Hislop, Lieutenant General_History of the British Navy__History of the U. S. Navy_Hoffman, Lieutenant B. F. Holdup, LieutenantHollaway, CaptainHolmes, CaptainHondurasHood, Sir SamuelHope, Captain HenryHope, Lieutenant David_Hornet_Horseshoe BendHowe, JamesHughes, Sit EdwardHull, General IsaacHumbert, GeneralHumble, JamesHunt, William H. _Hunter_Hurlburt, Mr. Hutchinson, Lieutenant William _Icarus_impressment_Indefatigable__Independence_Indian OceanIndiansInglis, Lieutenant GeorgeIngram, Lieutenant William_Insurgente_Irvine, LieutenantIsle-au-noixItalyIzard, General Jackson, General AndrewJamaica PlateJames, William_Jasseur__Java__Jefferson_Jefferson, Thomas_John Adams_John, Lieutenant ColonelJohnson, Lieutenant RobertJohnson, Sailing-masterJohnston, Sailing-master_Jones_Jones, Captain JacobJones, Lieutenant Thomas Catesby_Julia__Junon_ Keane, GeneralKearney. Captain PalmerKent, Lieutenant BartholomewKentuckyKerr, Captain RobertKing, CaptainKing, LieutenantKingstonKlaeson, Captain LaColle Mill_La Diane__Lady Gore__Lady Murray__Lady of the Lake__Lady Prevost_LafitteLake BorgneLake ChamplainLake ErieLake HuronLake OntarioLamb, MidshipmanLambert, CaptainLambert, GeneralLandon, Captain H. _Landrail_Lang, JackLaugharne, T. L. O. _Lawrence_Lawrence, Captain_Leander__Lejoille__Leopard_Les Petites Coquilles_Levant__Linnet__Little Belt_Lockyer, Captain_Loire__London Naval Chronicle_Long Island SoundLosack, Captain Woodley_Lottery__Louisiana_Low. Lieutenant_Ludlow_Ludlow, Lieutenant A. Lumly, CaptainLundy's Lane_Lynx_ McCall, Lieutenant EdwardMcClintock, MidshipmanMcClure, GeneralMcCreery, Lieutenant DavidMcDonald, LieutenantMacdonough, Commodore_Macedonia_McGhie, Lieutenant JamesMcGowan, MidshipmanMcKay, CharlesMcKeever, Lieutenant IsaacMcKnight, Lieutenant DecaturMacomb, GeneralMcPherson, Lieutenant_Madison_Madison, James_Magnet_MaineMaitland, Captain_Majestic__Manly_Manners, Captain WilliamMaples, Captain John FMarblehead, Massachusetts_Mars_Marshall, Lieutenant John_Martin__Mary_MarylandMatterface, Lieutenant William_Meduse__Medway__Melville__Menelaus_Mensing, Commander Adolf_Merrimac__Meteor_Mexico_Milan__Milbrook_Miller, CaptainMills, ColonelMilne, CaptainMindham, William_Minerva__Minerve_Mississippi RiverMitchell, ColonelMix, Sailing-masterMobile Point_Mohawk_MoltkeMonk, Sailing-master James_Montagu__Montgomery__Montreal_Montresor, CaptainMorgan, GeneralMorgan, MajorMorris, Captain Charles_Moselle_Muir, CaptainMulcaster, Captain William Howe, Murray, Colonel J. _Nancy_NantucketNapoleon_Narcissus__Nautilus__Naval Chronicle__Naval Gunnery__Naval History of Great Britain__Naval History of the United States__Naval Occurrences_Navy Department_Nayaden_Nazer, Lieutenant KellyNeale, LieutenantNelson, Lord_Nereide__Nereyda__Netly__Nettle__Neufchatel_New HampshireNew JerseyNew Orleans_New York_New YorkNewark_Newcastle_Newfoundland_Niagara_NiagaraNicholson, Lieutenant N. J. _Nile's Register__Nocton__Nonsuch_Norman, Lieutenant Charles R. North Point_Norwich__Nymphe_ O'Brien, Mr. O'Connor, CaptainOdenheimer, LieutenantOgdensburg_Ohio_Oliver, Captain R. D. _Oneida__Ontario_Ordronaux, Captain_Orpheus_Osgood, LieutenantOswego Packenham, General EdwardPacket, Lieutenant John H. Paine, Sailing-master Thomas_Palunure_Palmer, CaptainParker, CaptainParker, GeorgeParker, LieutenantParker, Sir Peter_Pasley_Patterson, CaptainPatuxent RiverPaulding, AdmiralPaulding, Midshipman Hiram_Peacock__Peacock_ (British)Peake, WilliamPechell, Captain_Pelican_Pendleton, Thomas M. _Penguin__Perry_Perry, Captain Oliver H. _Pert__Peterel_Pettigrew, LieutenantPettipauge_Philadelphia_Phillot, Captain_Phoebe__Phoenix__Pictou__Piedmontaise_Pigot, Captain_Pike_Pike, Brigadier General_Pilot__Pique__Plantagenet_Plattsburg_Poictiers_Polkinghorne, Lieutenant James_Pomona__Pomone_Popham, Captain_Porcupine_Porter, Captain DavidPorto PrayaPorto RicoPortsmouth, New HampshirePortugalPotomac RiverPowell, H. T. Pratt, Lieutenant_Preble__President_Presque IslePrevost, Sir George, _Primrose__Prince Regent__Princess Charlotte_Pring, Captain DanielprivateersProctor, Colonel_Prometheus__Prosperous__Prudente__Psyche_ Quasi-War (1799-1800)_Queen Charlotte_Queenstown_Quidproquo_ _Racer_Radchffe, LieutenantRaderhurst, Lieutenant_Rainbow__Raleigh__Ramillies__Rattlesnake_Rattray, Captain James_Raven_Rawle, Lieutenant RichardRead, George CampbellReade, ColonelReady, Lieutenant HenryRed HouseReid, Captain Samuel C. _Reindeer_Rennie, ColonelRenshaw, Lieutenant Commander, _Resolution_Riall, General_Rifleman_Ripley, Mr. _Rivoli_Roach, Lieutenant IsaacRoberts, CaptainRobinson, BattyRodgers, Commodore John, RodneyRolette, LieutenantRoss, General_Rota_Rouvier, Charles_Royal George_RussiaSackett's Harbor_St. Lawrence_St. LawrenceSalamancaSamwell, Midshipman_San Domingo__San Florenzo_San SalvadorSan SebastianSanders, CaptainSandy CreekSandy Hook, New Jersey_Sappho__Saranac__Saratoga_Saunders, LieutenantSawyer, Vice Admiral_Schooner_Scott, ColonelScott, GeneralScott, Robert_Scorpion__Scourge__Sea Horse__Seine__Seneca__Seringapatam__Severn__Shannon_Sheafe, Major General_Shelburne_Sherbroke, Lieutenant GeneralSherriff, CaptainShields, ThomasShubrick, Lieutenant J. T. Sigourney, Mr. _Simco_Simmons, Captain T. F. Sisson, Sailing-masterSinclair, Captain ArthurSmith, Lieutenant SydneySmith, MidshipmanSohomberg, Solcy, J. Russell, _Somers, _Somerville, Captain PhilipSorel River_Soult__South Carolina__Southampton_Southcombe, CaptainSpain_Spark__Speedy_Spilsbury, Captain, _Spitfire_Speddes, Lieutenant RobertSquaw Island_Star__Statira_Stephens, JohnStewart, Captain GeorgeStoddart, BenjaminStokes, Lieutenant ThomasStone, Major-GeneralStuart, Lord_Superb__Superior__Suret__Surveyor__Swallow__Sybille__Sydney Smith_Sykes, Lieutenant_Sylph__Syren_ _Tagus_Tarbell, Captain_Tartarus_Tattnall. LieutenantTaylor, Captain JohnTaylor, Major-GeneralTecumseh_Tenedos_Tennessee_Terror__Thalia_Thames River_Thorn_Thornton, Colone_Ticonderoga__Tigress__Tigris__Tom Bowline__Tompkins_tonnage, _Tonnant__Torch_Toronto (see York)_Torpedo_ToulouseTownsend, Captain Lord JamesTowson, Captain N. TrafalgarTrant. Sailing-masterTravis. William S. _Trent_Tripoli_Trippe_TrompTroudeTruxtun, CommodoreTucker, Captain Thomas TudorTucker, GeneralTurkeyTurner, Lieutenant DanielTyler, Vice Admiral Ulrick, Sailing-master George_United States_Upton. Captain ValparaisoVan Horne, ColonelVan Rensselaer. GeneralVashon. CaptainVaughan, Sailing-master_Vengeance_Vermont_Vestale__Victorious__Victory_Villeneuve. M. Vincent. General_Viper__Virgin_Virginia_Vixen__Volcano_ Wadsworth, ColonelWales. CaptainWar DepartmentWard, Commander J. H. WarehamWarren, Admiral Sir John. Warrington, Master Commandant Lewis. _Washington_Washington, D. C. _Wasp_Waters, Midshipman KervinWatson, LieutenantWatt, LieutenantWatts, George_Weasel_Wellington, Duke ofWells, Lieutenant HenryWest IndiesWestphal, Lieutenant PhilipWhinyates, Captain ThomasWilkes, CommodoreWilkinson, General_William_Williams, Lieutenant Alexander D. _Wilmer_Wilmer, LieutenantWinchesterWinder, GeneralWintle, LieutenantWise, George S. _Wolfe_Wood, Lieutenant Peter V. _Woodbridge_Woolsey, Captain M. T. Worsely, LieutenantWorth, Lieutenant Frederick A. Wragg, MidshipmanWright, Lieutenant Yarnall, LieutenantYeo, Sir James LucasYork (Toronto)York Bay_Young Wasp_