THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE BY A. T. MAHAN, D. C. L. , LL. D. CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY AUTHOR OF 'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, ''THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, 1783-1812, ' 'THE RELATIONS OF SEA POWER TO THE WAR OF 1812, ' 'NAVALSTRATEGY' ETC. _WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND BATTLE PLANS_ LONDONSAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LIMITEDOVERY HOUSE, 100 SOUTHWARK STREET, S. E. [Illustration: (frontispiece)] _Copyright, 1913_, By A. T. MAHAN _All rights reserved_ Published, October, 1913 THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, MASS. , U. S. A. PREFACE The contents of this volume were first contributed as a chapter, underthe title of "Major Operations, 1762-1783, " to the "History of theRoyal Navy, " in seven volumes, published by Messrs. Sampson Low, Marston, and Company, under the general editorship of the late SirWilliam Laird Clowes. For permission to republish now in this separateform, the author has to express his thanks to the publishers of thatwork. In the Introduction following this Preface, the author has summarizedthe general lesson to be derived from the course of this War ofAmerican Independence, as distinct from the particular discussionand narration of the several events which constitute the body of thetreatment. These lessons he conceives to carry admonition for thepresent and future based upon the surest foundations; namely, uponthe experience of the past as applicable to present conditions. Theessential similarity between the two is evident in a common dependenceupon naval strength. There has been a careful rereading and revision of the whole text; butthe changes found necessary to be made are much fewer than might havebeen anticipated after the lapse of fifteen years. Numerous footnotesin the History, specifying the names of ships in fleets, and of theircommanders in various battles, have been omitted, as not necessary tothe present purpose, though eminently proper and indeed indispensableto an extensive work of general reference and of encyclopædic scope, such as the History is. Certain notes retained with the initialsW. L. C. Are due to the editor of that work. A. T. MAHAN. DECEMBER, 1912. CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xix LIST OF MAPS xxi LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS xxiii INTRODUCTION THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD Macaulay quoted on the action of Frederick the Great 1 Illustration from Conditions of the Turkish Empire 2 Lesson from the Recent War in the Balkans, 1912-1913 2 The War of American Independence a striking example of the Tendency of Wars to Spread 3 Origin and Train of Events in that War, Traced 3 Inference as to possible Train of Future Events in the History of the United States 4 The Monroe Doctrine Simply a Formulated Precaution against the Tendency of Wars to Spread 4 National Policy as to Asiatic Immigration 4 Necessity of an Adequate Navy if these two National Policies are to be sustained 4 Dependence on Navy Illustrated in the Two Great National Crises; in the War of Independence and in the War of Secession 4 The United States not great in Population in proportion to Territory 5 Nor Wealthy in Proportion to exposed Coast-Line 5 Special Fitness of a Navy to meet these particular conditions 5 The Pacific a great World Problem, dependent mainly on Naval Power 5 CHAPTER I THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776 Preponderant effect of Control of the Water upon the Struggle for American Independence 6 Deducible then from Reason and from Experience 6 Consequent Necessity to the Americans of a Counterpoise to British Navy 6 This obtained through Burgoyne's Surrender 6 The Surrender of Burgoyne traceable directly to the Naval Campaigns on Lake Champlain, 1775, 1776 7 The subsequent Course of the War in all Quarters of the world due to that decisive Campaign 7 The Strategic Problem of Lake Champlain familiar to Americans from the Wars between France and Great Britain prior to 1775 8 Consequent prompt Initiative by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold 8 Energetic Pursuit of first Successes by Arnold 9 Complete Control of Lake Champlain thus secured 9 Invasion of Canada by Montgomery, 1775 9 Arnold marches through Maine Wilderness and joins Montgomery before Quebec 10 Assault on Quebec. Failure, and Death of Montgomery 10 Arnold maintains Blockade of Quebec, 1776 10 Relief of the Place by British Navy 11 Arnold Retreats to Crown Point 12 Arnold's Schemes and Diligence to create a Lake Navy, 1776 13 Difficulties to be overcome 13 Superior Advantages of the British 13 The British by building acquire Superiority, but too late for effect in 1776 13 Ultimate Consequences from this Retardation 14 Constitution of the Naval Force raised by Arnold 14 He moves with it to the foot of Lake Champlain 15 Takes position for Defence at Valcour Island 15 Particular Difficulties encountered by British 15 Constitution of the British Lake Navy 16 Land Forces of the Opponents 17 Naval Forces of the Two at the Battle of Valcour Island 17 Magnitude of the Stake at Issue 18 Arnold's Purposes and Plans 18 Advance of the British 19 Arnold's Disposition of his Flotilla to receive Attack 20 The Battle of Valcour Island 21 The Americans Worsted 22 Arnold Retreats by night Undetected 23 Pursuit by the British 24 Destruction of the American Vessels 25 British Appreciation of the Importance of the Action, as shown 26 Criticism of the conduct of the Opposing Leaders 26 Arnold's Merit and Gallantry 27 End of the Naval Story of the Lakes 27 Effect of the Campaign upon the Decisive Events of 1777 28 CHAPTER II NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETTBAY--ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS, TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON 1776 Necessity that Force, if resorted to, be from the first Adequate 29 Application to National Policy in peace 29 To the Monroe Doctrine 29 Failure of the British Government of 1775 in this respect 30 Consequences of such failure 30 General Howe evacuates Boston and retires to Halifax. Extent of his Command 30 Dissemination of Effort by British Government 30 Expedition against South Carolina 31 Local Conditions about Charleston 32 Description of Fort Moultrie 33 Plan of British Naval Attack 33 The Battle of Fort Moultrie 34 Failure of the Attack. British Losses 36 Comment upon the Action 37 The Expedition retires to New York 38 The Howes, Admiral and General, arrive in New York Bay 39 Operations about the City 39 Continuous and Decisive, but Inconspicuous, Part played by the British Navy 40 Description of Local Conditions about New York 40 American Preparations for Defence 41 Crucial Weakness of the Scheme 42 The Advance of the British 42 Washington withdraws his Army from the Brooklyn side 43 Success of this Withdrawal due to British Negligence 44 Subsequent Operations, and Retreat of Washington to New Jersey 45 Retreat continued to Pennsylvania, where he receives reinforcements 46 Slackness of Sir William Howe's actions 47 The British take possession of Narragansett Bay. Importance of that position 48 Washington suddenly takes the Offensive. Battle of Trenton 48 He recovers most of the State of New Jersey 49 CHAPTER III THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OFPHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION 1777 British Object in Campaign of 1777 the same as that in 1776 50 Part assigned to Burgoyne 50 Slowness of his Progress at the beginning 51 Sir William Howe, instead of coöperating, takes his Army to the Chesapeake 52 Criticism of this Course 52 Howe's Progress to Philadelphia, and Capture of that City 53 Admiral Lord Howe takes the Fleet from the Chesapeake to the Delaware 53 Surrender of Burgoyne and his Army 53 British Naval Operations in Delaware Bay 54 Brief Tenure--Nine Months--of Philadelphia by British 55 The general Failure of the British Campaign determined by Howe's move to the Chesapeake 55 General Results of the Campaign 56 Part played by the British Navy. Analogous to that in Spain, 1808-1812, and in many other instances 57 CHAPTER IV WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATEPHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK, NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICANDISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND 1778 France recognizes the Independence of the United States, and makes with them a defensive Alliance 58 A French Fleet sails for America under Comte d'Estaing 59 Unprepared condition of the British Navy 59 Admiral Byron sails with a Reinforcement for America 59 Ill effect of Naval Unreadiness upon British Commerce; and especially on the West Indies 60 Admiral Keppel puts to Sea with the British Channel Fleet 61 First Guns of the War with France 62 Extreme Length of Byron's Passage 62 He turns back to Halifax 62 D'Estaing's slowness allows Howe to escape from Delaware Bay. Howe's Celerity 62 Evacuation of Philadelphia by British Army, and its precipitate Retreat to New York 63 Escape of both Army and Fleet due to d'Estaing's Delays 63 Rapid Action of Lord Howe 64 D'Estaing Arrives off New York 64 Howe's elaborate Dispositions for the Defence of New York Bay 65 Statement of British and French Naval Force 66 D'Estaing decides not to attempt Passage of the Bar, and puts to Sea 67 Anchors off Narragansett Bay 69 Forces the Entrance to Newport and Anchors inside the Bay 70 The British garrison besieged by superior American and French forces 70 Howe appears with his Fleet and anchors off the entrance, at Point Judith 71 Sustained Rapidity of his action at New York 71 D'Estaing Withdraws from Siege of Newport and puts to Sea 73 Manoeuvres of the two Opponents 74 D'Estaing quits the Field, and both Fleets are scattered by a heavy Gale 75 Howe returns to New York and collects his Fleet 76 D'Estaing calls oft Newport; but abandons the Siege finally, taking his Fleet to Boston 77 Critical Condition of British garrison in Newport. D'Estaing's withdrawal compels Americans to raise the siege 77 Howe follows d'Estaing to Boston 77 Discussion of the Conduct of the opposing Admirals 78 Howe gives up his Command and returns to England 80 CHAPTER V THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT 1778 Admirals Keppel and D'Orvilliers put to Sea from Portsmouth and Brest 82 Instructions given to the French Admiral 83 Preliminary Manoeuvres after the two Fleets had sighted one another 83 The Battle of Ushant 84 A Drawn Battle. The respective Losses 91 The Significance of the Battle in the fighting Development of the British Navy 93 The "Order of Battle" 93 The Disputes and Courts Martial in Great Britain arising from the Battle of Ushant 94 Keppel Resigns his Command 97 CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OFGEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA Influence of Seasonal Conditions upon Naval Operations in America 98 Commercial Importance of the West Indies 98 The French seize Dominica 99 D'Estaing Sails with his Fleet from Boston for Martinique 100 A British Squadron under Hotham sails the same day for Barbados, with Five Thousand Troops 100 Admiral Barrington's Seizure of Santa Lucia 101 D'Estaing sails to Recapture it 102 Rapidity and Skill shown in Barrington's Movements and Dispositions 102 D'Estaing's attacks Foiled, both on Sea and on Shore 103 He Abandons the attempt and Returns to Martinique 104 Importance of Santa Lucia in Subsequent Operations 104 Byron Reaches Barbados, and takes over Command from Barrington 105 D'Estaing Captures the British Island Grenada 105 Byron goes to its Relief 106 The Action between the two Fleets, of Byron and d'Estaing, July 6, 1779 106 Criticism of the two Commanders-in-Chief 110 D'Estaing returns to Grenada, which remains French 112 Byron returns to England. British North American Station assigned to Admiral Arbuthnot, Leeward Islands to Rodney 113 British Operations in Georgia and South Carolina. Capture of Savannah 113 Fatal Strategic Error in these Operations 114 D'Estaing's attempt to Retake Savannah Foiled 115 His appearance on the coast, however, causes the British to abandon Narragansett Bay 115 D'Estaing succeeded by de Guichen in North America. Rodney also arrives 115 CHAPTER VII THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THEENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVESGIBRALTAR Spain declares War against Great Britain 116 Delays in Junction of French and Spanish Fleets 116 They enter the Channel. Alarm in England 117 Plans of the French Government 118 Their Change and Failure. The Allied Fleets return to Brest 119 Criticism of the British Ministry 120 Divergent views of France and Spain 120 Prominence given to Gibraltar, and the resulting Effect upon the general War 121 Exhaustion of Supplies at Gibraltar 121 Rodney with the Channel Fleet Sails for its Relief, with ultimate Destination to Leeward Islands Command 121 He Captures a large Spanish Convoy 122 And Destroys a Second Spanish Squadron of Eleven Sail-of-the-Line 123 Distinction of this Engagement 124 Gibraltar and Minorca Relieved 125 Rodney proceeds to the West Indies 126 The Channel Fleet returns to England 126 CHAPTER VIII RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHENRETURNS TO EUROPE AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THECAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNSTO WEST INDIES 1780 Rodney's Force upon arrival in West Indies 128 Action between British and French Squadrons prior to his arrival 129 Rodney and de Guichen put to sea 130 Action between them of April 17, 1780 131 Cause of Failure of Rodney's Attack 133 His Disappointment in his Subordinates 135 His Expression of his Feelings 135 Discussion of the Incidents and Principles involved 137 The Losses of the Respective Fleets 140 They Continue to Cruise 141 The Action of May 15, 1780 142 That of May 19, 1780 144 The Results Indecisive 144 Contrary Personal Effect produced upon the two Admirals by the encounters 145 De Guichen asks to be Relieved 145 Rodney's Chary Approval of his Subordinates in these two instances 145 Suspicion and Distrust rife in the British Navy at this period 146 Twelve Spanish Sail-of-the-Line, with Ten Thousand Troops, Arrive at Guadeloupe 147 They refuse Coöperation with de Guichen in the Windward Islands 147 De Guichen Accompanies them to Haïti with his Fleet 147 He declines to Coöperate on the Continent with the Americans, and sails for Europe 148 Rodney Arranges for the protection of the Homeward West India Trade, and then proceeds to New York 149 Effect of his coming 150 The Year 1780 one of great Discouragement to Americans 151 Summary of the Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia, 1780, which led to Lord Cornwallis's Surrender in 1781 151 Two Naval Actions sustained by Commodore Cornwallis against superior French forces, 1780 153 The Year 1780 Uneventful in European seas 157 Capture of a great British Convoy 157 The Armed Neutrality of the Baltic Powers 158 The Accession of Holland to this followed by a Declaration of War by Great Britain 158 The French Government withdraws all its Ships of War from before Gibraltar 158 CHAPTER IX NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BYRODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TODE GRASSE Effects of the Great Hurricanes of 1780 in West Indies 159 Rodney's Diminished Force. Arrival of Sir Samuel Hood with reinforcements 160 Rodney receives Orders to seize Dutch Possessions in Caribbean 160 Capture of St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba 161 The large Booty and Defenceless state of St. Eustatius 161 Effect of these Conditions upon Rodney 161 Hood detached to cruise before Martinique 162 De Grasse arrives there with Twenty Ships-of-the-Line 163 Indecisive Action between de Grasse and Hood 164 Criticism of the two Commanders 166 Junction of Rodney and Hood 166 De Grasse attempts Santa Lucia, and Fails 167 He captures Tobago 168 He decides to take his Meet to the American Continent 168 CHAPTER X NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN. CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS 1781 Summary of Land Operations in Virginia early in 1781 169 Portsmouth Occupied 170 A French Squadron from Newport, and a British from Gardiner's Bay, proceed to the Scene 170 They meet off the Chesapeake 171 Action between Arbuthnot and des Touches, March 16, 1781 171 The Advantage rests with the French, but they return to Newport. Arbuthnot enters the Chesapeake 174 Cornwallis reaches Petersburg, Virginia, May 20 175 Under the directions of Sir Henry Clinton he evacuates Portsmouth and concentrates his forces at Yorktown, August 22 175 The French Fleet under de Grasse Anchors in the Chesapeake, August 30 176 British Naval Movements, in July and August, affecting conditions in the Chesapeake 176 Admiral Graves, successor to Arbuthnot at New York, joined there by Sir Samuel Hood, August 28 177 Washington and Rochambeau move upon Cornwallis 178 The British Fleet under Graves arrives off the Chesapeake 179 Action between de Grasse and Graves, September 5 179 Hood's Criticism of Graves's Conduct 181 The British, worsted, return to New York. De Grasse, reinforced, re-enters the Chesapeake, September 11 184 Cornwallis Surrenders, October 19 184 De Grasse and Hood Return to West Indies 185 CHAPTER XI NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THEBATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK Leading Objects of the Belligerents in 1781 186 The Relief of Gibraltar by Admiral Darby 186 Capture of British Convoy with the spoils of St. Eustatius 188 The French and Spanish Fleet under Admiral de Cordova again enters the English Channel 188 Darby in inferior Force shut up in Tor Bay 188 The Allies Decide not to attack him, but to turn their Efforts against British Commerce 189 Minorca Lost by British 189 The Battle of the Dogger Bank, between British and Dutch Fleets 190 CHAPTER XII THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE. RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782 Capture and Destruction near Ushant of a great French Convoy for the West Indies opens the Naval Campaign of 1782 195 Attack upon the Island of St. Kitts by de Grasse and de Bouillé 197 Hood sails for its Relief from Barbados 197 His Plan of procedure 198 Balked by an Accident 199 He Succeeds in dislodging de Grasse and taking the Anchorage left by the French 200 Unsuccessful Attempt by de Grasse to shake Hood's position 203 St. Kitts nevertheless compelled to Surrender owing to having insufficient Land Force 205 Hood Extricates himself from de Grasse's Superior Force and Retires 205 Rodney arrives from England and joins Hood 205 Project of French and Spaniards against Jamaica 206 De Grasse sails from Martinique with his whole Fleet and a large Convoy 207 Rodney's Pursuit 208 Partial Actions of April 9, 1782 209 British Pursuit continues 211 It is favored by the Lagging of two Ships in the French Fleet, April 11 211 An Accident that night induces de Grasse to bear down, and enables Rodney to force Action 212 The Battle of April 12 begins 214 A Shift of Wind enables the British to Break the French Order in three places 217 Consequences of this Movement 218 Resultant Advantages to the British 219 Practices of the opposing Navies in regard to the Aims of Firing 219 Consequences Illustrated in the Injuries received respectively 220 Inadequate Use made by Rodney of the Advantage gained by his Fleet 220 Hood's Criticisms 220 Hood's Opinion shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's Chief-of-Staff 222 Rodney's own Reasons for his Course after the Battle 222 His Assumptions not accordant with the Facts 223 Actual Prolonged Dispersion of the French Fleet 224 Hood, Detached in Pursuit, Captures a small French Squadron 224 Rodney Superseded in Command before the news of the victory reached England 225 The general War Approaches its End 226 CHAPTER XIII HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR 1782 Howe appointed to Command Channel Fleet 227 Cruises first in North Sea and in Channel 228 The Allied Fleets in much superior force take Position in the Chops of the Channel, but are successfully evaded by Howe 229 The British Jamaica Convoy also escapes them 229 Howe ordered to Relieve Gibraltar 229 Loss of the _Royal George_, with Kempenfelt 229 Howe Sails 229 Slow but Successful Progress 230 Great Allied Fleet in Bay of Gibraltar 230 Howe's Success in Introducing the Supplies 231 Negligent Mismanagement of the Allies 231 Partial Engagement when Howe leaves Gibraltar 232 Estimate of Howe's Conduct, and of his Professional Character 232 French Eulogies 232 CHAPTER XIV THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THEBAILLI DE SUFFREN Isolation characteristic of Military and Naval Operations in India 234 Occurrences in 1778 234 Sir Edward Hughes sent to India with a Fleet, 1779 235 The Years prior to 1781 Uneventful 235 A British Squadron under Commodore Johnstone sent in 1781 to seize Cape of Good Hope 236 A Week Later, a French Squadron under Suffren sails for India 236 Suffren finds Johnstone Anchored in Porto Praya, and attacks at once 237 The immediate Result Indecisive, but the Cape of Good Hope is saved by Suffren arriving first 238 Suffren reaches Mauritius, and the French Squadron sails for India under Comte d'Orves 239 D'Orves dies, leaving Suffren in Command 240 Trincomalee, in Ceylon, captured by Hughes 240 First Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782 240 Second Engagement, April 12 242 Third Engagement, July 6 244 Suffren captures Trincomalee 247 Hughes arrives, but too late to save the place 247 Fourth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, September 3 248 Having lost Trincomalee, Hughes on the change of monsoon is compelled to go to Bombay 251 Reinforced there by Bickerton 251 Suffren winters in Sumatra, but regains Trincomalee before Hughes returns. Also receives Reinforcements 251 The British Besiege Cuddalore 252 Suffren Relieves the Place 253 Fifth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, June 20, 1783 253 Comparison between Hughes and Suffren 254 News of the Peace being received, June 29, Hostilities in India cease 255 GLOSSARY OF NAUTICAL AND NAVAL TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK 257 INDEX 267 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Remains of the _Revenge_, one of Benedict Arnold's Schooners on Lake Champlain in 1776. Now in Fort Ticonderoga. _Frontispiece_ FACING PAGE Major-General Philip Schuyler 12 Edward Pellew, afterwards Admiral, Lord Exmouth 12 Benedict Arnold 27 Attack on Fort Moultrie in 1776 33 Richard, Earl Howe 78 Charles Henri, Comte d'Estaing 78 Admiral, the Honourable Samuel Barrington 104 Comte de Guichen 144 George Brydges, Lord Rodney 144 François-Joseph-Paul, Comte de Grasse, Marquis de Tilly 204 Admiral, Lord Hood 204 Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. 254 Pierre André de Suffren de Saint Tropez 254 LIST OF MAPS FACING PAGE Lake Champlain and Connected Waters 8 New York and New Jersey: to illustrate Operations of 1776, 1777, and 1778 40 Narragansett Bay 70 Leeward Islands (West Indies) Station 99 Island of Santa Lucia 101 Island of Martinique 164 Peninsula of India, and Ceylon 234 North Atlantic Ocean. General Map to illustrate Operations in the War of American Independence 280 LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS FACING PAGE D'Orvilliers and Keppel, off Ushant, July 27, 1778 Figure 1 86 Figures 2 and 3 90 D'Estaing and Byron, July 6, 1779 106 Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780, Figures 1 and 2 132 Rodney and De Guichen, May 15, 1780 143 Cornwallis and De Ternay, June 20, 1780 156 Arbuthnot and Des Touches, March 16, 1781 172 Graves and De Grasse, September 5, 1781 180 Hood and De Grasse, January 25, 1782, Figures 1 and 2 201 Hood and De Grasse, January 26, 1782, Figure 3 203 Rodney and De Grasse, April 9 and 12, 1782 Figures 1 and 2 210 Figure 3 212 Figures 4 and 5 215 Figure 6 218 Johnstone and Suffren, Porto Praya, April 16, 1781 237 Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782 240 Hughes and Suffren, April 12, 1782 243 Hughes and Suffren, July 6, 1782 243 Hughes and Suffren, September 3, 1782 249 * * * * * THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE INTRODUCTION THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD Macaulay, in a striking passage of his Essay on Frederick the Great, wrote, "The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in landswhere the name of Prussia was unknown. In order that he might roba neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on thecoast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakesof North America. " Wars, like conflagrations, tend to spread; more than ever perhapsin these days of close international entanglements and rapidcommunications. Hence the anxiety aroused and the care exercised bythe governments of Europe, the most closely associated and themost sensitive on the earth, to forestall the kindling of even theslightest flame in regions where all alike are interested, though withdiverse objects; regions such as the Balkan group of States in theirexasperating relations with the Turkish empire, under which the Balkanpeoples see constantly the bitter oppression of men of their own bloodand religious faith by the tyranny of a government which can neitherassimilate nor protect. The condition of Turkish European provincesis a perpetual lesson to those disposed to ignore or to depreciatethe immense difficulties of administering politically, under onegovernment, peoples traditionally and racially distinct, yet livingside by side; not that the situation is much better anywhere in theTurkish empire. This still survives, though in an advanced state ofdecay, simply because other States are not prepared to encounter therisks of a disturbance which might end in a general bonfire, extendingits ravages to districts very far remote from the scene of theoriginal trouble. Since these words were written, actual war has broken out in theBalkans. The Powers, anxious each as to the effect upon its ownambitions of any disturbance in European Turkey, have steadilyabstained from efficient interference in behalf of the downtroddenChristians of Macedonia, surrounded by sympathetic kinsfolk. Consequently, in thirty years past this underbrush has grown drierand drier, fit kindling for fuel. In the Treaty of Berlin, in 1877, stipulation was made for their betterment in governance, and weare now told that in 1880 Turkey framed a scheme for such, --andpigeonholed it. At last, under unendurable conditions, spontaneouscombustion has followed. There can be no assured peace until it isrecognised practically that Christianity, by the respect which italone among religions inculcates for the welfare of the individual, is an essential factor in developing in nations the faculty ofself-government, apart from which fitness to govern others does notexist. To keep Christian peoples under the rule of a non-Christianrace, is, therefore, to perpetuate a state hopeless of reconcilementand pregnant of sure explosion. Explosions always happeninconveniently. _Obsta principiis_ is the only safe rule; theapplication of which is not suppression of overt discontent but reliefof grievances. The War of American Independence was no exception to the general ruleof propagation that has been noted. When our forefathers began toagitate against the Stamp Act and the other measures that succeededit, they as little foresaw the spread of their action to the East andWest Indies, to the English Channel and Gibraltar, as did the Britishministry which in framing the Stamp Act struck the match from whichthese consequences followed. When Benedict Arnold on Lake Champlain byvigorous use of small means obtained a year's delay for the colonists, he compassed the surrender of Burgoyne in 1777. The surrender ofBurgoyne, justly estimated as the decisive event of the war, was dueto Arnold's previous action, gaining the delay which is a first objectfor all defence, and which to the unprepared colonists was a vitalnecessity. The surrender of Burgoyne determined the intervention ofFrance, in 1778; the intervention of France the accession of Spainthereto, in 1779. The war with these two Powers led to the maritimeoccurrences, the interferences with neutral trade, that gave rise tothe Armed Neutrality; the concurrence of Holland in which brought warbetween that country and Great Britain, in 1780. This extension ofhostilities affected not only the West Indies but the East, throughthe possessions of the Dutch in both quarters and at the Cape ofGood Hope. If not the occasion of Suffren being sent to India, theinvolvement of Holland in the general war had a powerful effect uponthe brilliant operations which he conducted there; as well as at, andfor, the Cape of Good Hope, then a Dutch possession, on his outwardvoyage. In the separate publication of these pages, my intention and hope areto bring home incidentally to American readers this vast extent ofthe struggle to which our own Declaration of Independence was but theprelude; with perchance the further needed lesson for the future, that questions the most remote from our own shores may involve usin unforeseen difficulties, especially if we permit a train ofcommunication to be laid by which the outside fire can leap step bystep to the American continents. How great a matter a little firekindleth! Our Monroe Doctrine is in final analysis merely theformulation of national precaution that, as far as in its powerto prevent, there shall not lie scattered about the material whichforeign possessions in these continents might supply for the extensionof combustion originating elsewhere; and the objection to Asiaticimmigration, however debased by less worthy feelings or motives, ison the part of thinking men simply a recognition of the same dangerarising from the presence of an inassimilable mass of population, racially and traditionally distinct in characteristics, behind whichwould lie the sympathies and energy of a powerful military and navalAsiatic empire. Conducive as each of these policies is to national safety and peaceamid international conflagration, neither the one nor the other can besustained without the creation and maintenance of a preponderant navy. In the struggle with which this book deals, Washington at thetime said that the navies had the casting vote. To Arnold on LakeChamplain, to DeGrasse at Yorktown, fell the privilege of exercisingthat prerogative at the two great decisive moments of the War. To theNavy also, beyond any other single instrumentality, was due eightyyears later the successful suppression of the movement of Secession. The effect of the blockade of the Southern coasts upon the financialand military efficiency of the Confederate Government has neverbeen closely calculated, and probably is incalculable. At thesetwo principal national epochs control of the water was the mostdeterminative factor. In the future, upon the Navy will depend thesuccessful maintenance of the two leading national policies mentioned;the two most essential to the part this country is to play in theprogress of the world. For, while numerically great in population, the United States isnot so in proportion to territory; nor, though wealthy, is she so inproportion to her exposure. That Japan at four thousand miles distancehas a population of over three hundred to the square mile, while ourthree great Pacific States average less than twenty, is a portentousfact. The immense aggregate numbers resident elsewhere in theUnited States cannot be transfered thither to meet an emergency, norcontribute effectively to remedy this insufficiency; neither can aland force on the defensive protect, if the way of the sea is open. In such opposition of smaller numbers against larger, nowhere doorganisation and development count as much as in navies. Nowhere sowell as on the sea can a general numerical inferiority be compensatedby specific numerical superiority, resulting from the correspondencebetween the force employed and the nature of the ground. It followsstrictly, by logic and by inference, that by no other means can safetybe insured as economically and as efficiently. Indeed, in matters ofnational security, economy and efficiency are equivalent terms. Thequestion of the Pacific is probably the greatest world problem ofthe twentieth century, in which no great country is so largely anddirectly interested as is the United States. For the reason given itis essentially a naval question, the third in which the United Statesfinds its well-being staked upon naval adequacy. CHAPTER I THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776 At the time when hostilities began between Great Britain and herAmerican Colonies, the fact was realised generally, being evident toreason and taught by experience, that control of the water, both oceanand inland, would have a preponderant effect upon the contest. It wasclear to reason, for there was a long seaboard with numerous interiornavigable watercourses, and at the same time scanty and indifferentcommunications by land. Critical portions of the territory involvedwere yet an unimproved wilderness. Experience, the rude but efficientschoolmaster of that large portion of mankind which gains knowledgeonly by hard knocks, had confirmed through the preceding French warsthe inferences of the thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the greatsuperiority of the British Navy, which, however, had not then attainedthe unchallenged supremacy of a later day, the American leaders earlysought the alliance of the Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, thehereditary enemies of Great Britain. There alone could be found thecounterpoise to a power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail. Nearly three years elapsed before the Colonists accomplished thisobject, by giving a demonstration of their strength in the enforcedsurrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. This event has meritedthe epithet "decisive, " because, and only because, it decided theintervention of France. It may be affirmed, with little hesitation, that this victory of the colonists was directly the result of navalforce, --that of the colonists themselves. It was the cause that navalforce from abroad, entering into the contest, transformed it froma local to a universal war, and assured the independence of theColonies. That the Americans were strong enough to impose thecapitulation of Saratoga, was due to the invaluable year of delaysecured to them by their little navy on Lake Champlain, created by theindomitable energy, and handled with the indomitable courage, of thetraitor, Benedict Arnold. That the war spread from America to Europe, from the English Channel to the Baltic, from the Bay of Biscay to theMediterranean, from the West Indies to the Mississippi, and ultimatelyinvolved the waters of the remote peninsula of Hindustan, istraceable, through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla which in 1776anticipated its enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain. The eventswhich thus culminated merit therefore a clearer understanding, anda fuller treatment, than their intrinsic importance and petty scalewould justify otherwise. In 1775, only fifteen years had elapsed since the expulsion of theFrench from the North American continent. The concentration of theirpower, during its continuance, in the valley of the St. Lawrence, hadgiven direction to the local conflict, and had impressed upon men'sminds the importance of Lake Champlain, of its tributary LakeGeorge, and of the Hudson River, as forming a consecutive, though notcontinuous, water line of communications from the St. Lawrence toNew York. The strength of Canada against attack by land lay in itsremoteness, in the wilderness to be traversed before it was reached, and in the strength of the line of the St. Lawrence, with thefortified posts of Montreal and Quebec on its northern bank. Thewilderness, it is true, interposed its passive resistance to attacksfrom Canada as well as to attacks upon it; but when it had beentraversed, there were to the southward no such strong naturalpositions confronting the assailant. Attacks from the south fell uponthe front, or at best upon the flank, of the line of the St. Lawrence. Attacks from Canada took New York and its dependencies in the rear. [Illustration] These elements of natural strength, in the military conditions of theNorth, were impressed upon the minds of the Americans by the prolongedresistance of Canada to the greatly superior numbers of the BritishColonists in the previous wars. Regarded, therefore, as a base forattacks, of a kind with which they were painfully familiar, but to beundergone now under disadvantages of numbers and power never beforeexperienced, it was desirable to gain possession of the St. Lawrenceand its posts before they were strengthened and garrisoned. At thisoutset of hostilities, the American insurgents, knowing clearly theirown minds, possessed the advantage of the initiative over the Britishgovernment, which still hesitated to use against those whom it styledrebels the preventive measures it would have taken at once against arecognised enemy. Under these circumstances, in May, 1775, a body of two hundred andseventy Americans, led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, seizedthe posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, which were inadequatelygarrisoned. These are on the upper waters of Lake Champlain, where itis less than a third of a mile wide; Ticonderoga being on a peninsulaformed by the lake and the inlet from Lake George, Crown Point ona promontory twelve miles lower down. [1] They were positions ofrecognised importance, and had been advanced posts of the British inprevious wars. A schooner being found there, Arnold, who had been aseaman, embarked in her and hurried to the foot of the lake. The windfailed him when still thirty miles from St. John's, another fortifiedpost on the lower narrows, where the lake gradually tapers down tothe Richelieu River, its outlet to the St. Lawrence. Unable to advanceotherwise, Arnold took to his boats with thirty men, pulled throughthe night, and at six o'clock on the following morning surprised thepost, in which were only a sergeant and a dozen men. He reaped therewards of celerity. The prisoners informed him that a considerablebody of troops was expected from Canada, on its way to Ticonderoga;and this force in fact reached St. John's on the next day. When itarrived, Arnold was gone, having carried off a sloop which he foundthere and destroyed everything else that could float. By such triflingmeans two active officers had secured the temporary control of thelake itself and of the approaches to it from the south. There beingno roads, the British, debarred from the water line, were unable toadvance. Sir Guy Carleton, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Canada, strengthened the works at St. John's, and built a schooner; but hisforce was inadequate to meet that of the Americans. The seizure of the two posts, being an act of offensive war, was notat once pleasing to the American Congress, which still clung to thehope of reconciliation; but events were marching rapidly, andere summer was over the invasion of Canada was ordered. GeneralMontgomery, appointed to that enterprise, embarked at Crown Point withtwo thousand men on September 4th, and soon afterwards appeared beforeSt. John's, which after prolonged operations capitulated on the 3d ofNovember. On the 13th Montgomery entered Montreal, and thence presseddown the St. Lawrence to Pointe aux Trembles, twenty miles aboveQuebec. There he joined Arnold, who in the month of October hadcrossed the northern wilderness, between the head waters of theKennebec River and St. Lawrence. On the way he had endured immenseprivations, losing five hundred men of the twelve hundred with whom hestarted; and upon arriving opposite Quebec, on the 10th of November, three days had been unavoidably spent in collecting boats to pass theriver. Crossing on the night of the 13th, this adventurous soldierand his little command climbed the Heights of Abraham by the samepath that had served Wolfe so well sixteen years before. Withcharacteristic audacity he summoned the place. The demand of coursewas refused; but that Carleton did not fall at once upon the littleband of seven hundred that bearded him shows by how feeble a tenureGreat Britain then held Canada. Immediately after the junctionMontgomery advanced on Quebec, where he appeared on the 5th ofDecember. Winter having already begun, and neither his numbers norhis equipments being adequate to regular siege operations, he veryproperly decided to try the desperate chance of an assault upon thestrongest fortress in America. This was made on the night of December31st, 1775. Whatever possibility of success there may have beenvanished with the death of Montgomery, who fell at the head of hismen. The American army retired three miles up the river, went intowinter-quarters, and established a land blockade of Quebec, which wascut off from the sea by the ice. "For five months, " wrote Carleton tothe Secretary for War, on the 14th of May, 1776, "this town has beenclosely invested by the rebels. " From this unpleasant position it wasrelieved on the 6th of May, when signals were exchanged between it andthe _Surprise_, the advance ship of a squadron under Captain CharlesDouglas, [2] which had sailed from England on the 11th of March. Arriving off the mouth of the St. Lawrence, on the morning of April12th, Douglas found ice extending nearly twenty miles to sea, andpacked too closely to admit of working through it by dexteroussteering. The urgency of the case not admitting delay, he ran hisship, the _Isis_, 50, with a speed of five knots, against a largepiece of ice about ten or twelve feet thick, to test the effect. Theice, probably softened by salt water and salt air, went to pieces. "Encouraged by this experiment, " continues Douglas, somewhatmagnificently, "we thought it an enterprise worthy an English ship ofthe line in our King and country's sacred cause, and an effort due tothe gallant defenders of Quebec, to make the attempt of pressing herby force of sail, through the thick, broad, and closely connectedfields of ice, to which we saw no bounds towards the western part ofour horizon. Before night (when blowing a snow-storm, we brought-to, or rather stopped), we had penetrated about eight leagues into it, describing our path all the way with bits of the sheathing of theship's bottom, and sometimes pieces of the cutwater, but none of theoak plank; and it was pleasant enough at times, when we stuck fast, to see Lord Petersham exercising his troops on the crusted surfaceof that fluid through which the ship had so recently sailed. " It tooknine days of this work to reach Anticosti Island, after which the iceseems to have given no more trouble; but further delay was occasionedby fogs, calms, and head winds. Upon the arrival of the ships of war, the Americans at once retreated. During the winter, though reinforcements must have been received fromtime to time, they had wasted from exposure, and from small-pox, which ravaged the camp. On the 1st of May the returns showed nineteenhundred men present, of whom only a thousand were fit for duty. Therewere then on hand but three days' provisions, and none other nearerthan St. John's. The inhabitants would of course render no furtherassistance to the Americans after the ships arrived. The Navy hadagain decided the fate of Canada, and was soon also to determine thatof Lake Champlain. [Illustration] When two hundred troops had landed from the ships, Carleton marchedout, "to see, " he said, "what these mighty boasters were about. " Thesneer was unworthy a man of his generous character, for the boastershad endured much for faint chances of success; and the smallness ofthe reinforcement which encouraged him to act shows either an extremeprudence on his part, or the narrow margin by which Quebec escaped. He found the enemy busy with preparations for retreat, and upon hisappearance they abandoned their camp. Their forces on the two sides ofthe river being now separated by the enemy's shipping, the Americansretired first to Sorel, where the Richelieu enters the St. Lawrence, and thence continued to fall back by gradual stages. It was not untilJune 15th that Arnold quitted Montreal; and at the end of June theunited force was still on the Canadian side of the present borderline. On the 3d of July it reached Crown Point, in a pitiable statefrom small-pox and destitution. Both parties began at once to prepare for a contest upon LakeChamplain. The Americans, small as their flotilla was, still kept thesuperiority obtained for them by Arnold's promptitude a year before. On the 25th of June the American General Schuyler, commanding theNorthern Department, wrote: "We have happily such a naval superiorityon Lake Champlain, that I have a confident hope the enemy will notappear upon it this campaign, especially as our force is increasingby the addition of gondolas, two nearly finished. Arnold, however, "--whose technical knowledge caused him to be intrusted withthe naval preparations, --"says that 300 carpenters should be employedand a large number of gondolas, row-galleys, etc. , be built, twenty orthirty at least. There is great difficulty in getting the carpentersneeded. " Arnold's ideas were indeed on a scale worthy of the momentousissues at stake. "To augment our navy on the lake appears to me of theutmost importance. There is water between Crown Point and Pointe auFer for vessels of the largest size. I am of opinion that row-galleysare the best construction and cheapest for this lake. Perhaps it maybe well to have one frigate of 36 guns. She may carry 18-pounders onthe Lake, and be superior to any vessel that can be built or floatedfrom St. John's. " Unfortunately for the Americans, their resources in men and means werefar inferior to those of their opponents, who were able eventuallyto carry out, though on a somewhat smaller scale, Arnold's idea of asailing ship, strictly so called, of force as yet unknown in inlandwaters. Such a ship, aided as she was by two consorts of somewhatsimilar character, dominated the Lake as soon as she was afloat, reversing all the conditions. To place and equip her, however, required time, invaluable time, during which Arnold's two schoonersexercised control. Baron Riedesel, the commander of the Germancontingent with Carleton, after examining the American position atTiconderoga, wrote, "If we could have begun our expedition four weeksearlier, I am satisfied that everything would have been ended thisyear (1776); but, not having shelter nor other necessary things, wewere unable to remain at the other [southern] end of Champlain. " Sodelay favors the defence, and changes issues. What would have been theeffect upon the American cause if, simultaneously with the loss ofNew York, August 20th-September 15th, had come news of the fall ofTiconderoga, the repute of which for strength stood high? Nor wasthis all; for in that event, the plan which was wrecked in 1777 bySir William Howe's ill-conceived expedition to the Chesapeake woulddoubtless have been carried out in 1776. In a contemporary Englishpaper occurs the following significant item: "London, September 26th, 1776. Advices have been received here from Canada, dated August 12th, that General Burgoyne's army has found it impracticable to get acrossthe lakes this season. The naval force of the Provincials is too greatfor them to contend with at present. They must build larger vesselsfor this purpose, and these cannot be ready before next summer. Thedesign _was_[3] that the two armies commanded by Generals Howe andBurgoyne should coöperate; that they should both be on the HudsonRiver at the same time; that they should join about Albany, andthereby cut off all communication between the northern and southernColonies. "[4] As Arnold's more ambitious scheme could not be realised, he had tocontent himself with gondolas and galleys, for the force he was tocommand as well as to build. The precise difference between the twokinds of rowing vessels thus distinguished by name, the writer hasnot been able to ascertain. The gondola was a flat-bottomed boat, and inferior in nautical qualities--speed, handiness, andseaworthiness--to the galleys, which probably were keeled. The lattercertainly carried sails, and may have been capable of beating towindward. Arnold preferred them, and stopped the building of gondolas. "The galleys, " he wrote, "are quick moving, which will give us agreat advantage in the open lake. " The complements of the galleys wereeighty men, of the gondolas forty-five; from which, and from theirbatteries, it may be inferred that the latter were between one thirdand one half the size of the former. The armaments of the two werealike in character, but those of the gondolas much lighter. Americanaccounts agree with Captain Douglas's report of one galley capturedby the British. In the bows, an 18 and a 12-pounder; in the stern, two9's; in broadside, from four to six 6's. There is in this a somewhatdroll reminder of the disputed merits of bow, stern, and broadsidefire, in a modern iron-clad; and the practical conclusion is much thesame. The gondolas had one 12-pounder and two 6's. All the vessels ofboth parties carried a number of swivel guns. Amid the many difficulties which lack of resources imposed upon allAmerican undertakings, Arnold succeeded in getting afloat with threeschooners, a sloop, and five gondolas, on the 20th of August. Hecruised at the upper end of Champlain till the 1st of September, whenhe moved rapidly north, and on the 3d anchored in the lower narrows, twenty-five miles above St. John's, stretching his line from shoreto shore. Scouts had kept him informed of the progress of the Britishnaval preparations, so that he knew that there was no immediatedanger; while an advanced position, maintained with a bold front, would certainly prevent reconnoissances by water, and possibly mightimpose somewhat upon the enemy. The latter, however, erected batterieson each side of the anchorage, compelling Arnold to fall back to thebroader lake. He then had soundings taken about Valcour Island, andbetween it and the western shore; that being the position in which heintended to make a stand. He retired thither on the 23rd of September. The British on their side had contended with no less obstacles thantheir adversaries, though of a somewhat different character. To getcarpenters and materials to build, and seamen to man, were thechief difficulties of the Americans, the necessities of the seaboardconceding but partially the demands made upon it; but their vesselswere built upon the shores of the Lake, and launched into navigablewaters. A large fleet of transports and ships of war in the St. Lawrence supplied the British with adequate resources, which wereutilized judiciously and energetically by Captain Douglas; but to getthese to the Lake was a long and arduous task. A great part of theRichelieu River was shoal, and obstructed by rapids. The pointwhere lake navigation began was at St. John's, to which the nearestapproach, by a hundred-ton schooner, from the St. Lawrence, wasChambly, ten miles below. Flat-boats and long-boats could be draggedup stream, but vessels of any size had to be transported by land; andthe engineers found the roadbed too soft in places to bear the weightof a hundred tons. Under Douglas's directions, the planking and framesof two schooners were taken down at Chambly, and carried round by roadto St. John's, where they were again put together. At Quebec he foundbuilding a new hull, of one hundred and eighty tons. This he tookapart nearly to the keel, shipping the frames in thirty long-boats, which the transport captains consented to surrender, together withtheir carpenters, for service on the Lake. Drafts from the ships ofwar, and volunteers from the transports, furnished a body of sevenhundred seamen for the same employment, --a force to which theAmericans could oppose nothing equal, commanded as it was by regularnaval officers. The largest vessel was ship-rigged, and had a batteryof eighteen 12-pounders; she was called the _Inflexible_, and wascommanded by Lieutenant John Schanck. The two schooners, _Maria_, Lieutenant Starke, and _Carleton_, Lieutenant James Richard Dacres, carried respectively fourteen and twelve 6-pounders. These werethe backbone of the British flotilla. There were also a radeau, the_Thunderer_, and a large gondola, the _Loyal Convert_, both heavilyarmed; but, being equally heavy of movement, they do not appear tohave played any important part. Besides these, when the expeditionstarted, there were twenty gunboats, each carrying one fieldpiece, from 24's to 9-pounders; or, in some cases, howitzers. [5] "By all these means, " wrote Douglas on July 21st, "our acquiringan absolute dominion over Lake Champlain is not doubted of. "The expectation was perfectly sound. With a working breeze, the_Inflexible_ alone could sweep the Lake clear of all that floated onit. But the element of time remained. From the day of this writingtill that on which he saw the _Inflexible_ leave St. John's, October4th, was over ten weeks; and it was not until the 9th that Carletonwas ready to advance with the squadron. By that time the Americantroops at the head of the Lake had increased to eight or ten thousand. The British land force is reported[6] as thirteen thousand, of whichsix thousand were in garrison at St. John's and elsewhere. Arnold's last reinforcements reached him at Valcour on the 6th ofOctober. On that day, and in the action of the 11th, he had with himall the American vessels on the Lake, except one schooner and onegalley. His force, thus, was two schooners and a sloop, broadsidevessels, besides four galleys and eight gondolas, which may be assumedreasonably to have depended on their bow guns; there, at least, wastheir heaviest fire. Thus reckoned, his flotilla, disposed to the bestadvantage, could bring into action at one time, two 18's, thirteen12's, one 9, two 6's, twelve 4's, and two 2-pounders, independent ofswivels; total thirty-two guns, out of eighty-four that were mountedin fifteen vessels. To this the British had to oppose, in threebroadside vessels, nine 12's and thirteen 6's, and in twenty gunboats, twenty other brass guns, "from twenty-four to nines, some withhowitzers;"[7] total forty-two guns. In this statement the radeau andgondola have not been included, because of their unmanageableness. Included as broadside vessels, they would raise the Britisharmament--by three 24's, three 12's, four 9's, and a howitzer--to atotal of fifty-three guns. Actually, they could be brought into actiononly under exceptional circumstances, and are more properly omitted. These minutiæ are necessary for the proper appreciation of whatCaptain Douglas justly called "a momentous event. " It was a strife ofpigmies for the prize of a continent, and the leaders are entitledto full credit both for their antecedent energy and for theirdispositions in the contest; not least the unhappy man who, havingdone so much to save his country, afterwards blasted his name by atreason unsurpassed in modern war. Energy and audacity had so farpreserved the Lake to the Americans; Arnold determined to have onemore try of the chances. He did not know the full force of the enemy, but he expected that "it would be very formidable, if not equal toours. "[8] The season, however, was so near its end that a severe checkwould equal a defeat, and would postpone Carleton's further advanceto the next spring. Besides, what was the worth of such a force asthe American, such a flotilla, under the guns of Ticonderoga, the Lakebeing lost? It was eminently a case for taking chances, even if thedetachment should be sacrificed, as it was. Arnold's original purpose had been to fight under way; and it wasfrom this point of view that he valued the galleys, because of theirmobility. It is uncertain when he first learned of the rig and batteryof the _Inflexible_; but a good look-out was kept, and the Britishsquadron was sighted from Valcour when it quitted the narrows. Itmay have been seen even earlier; for Carleton had been informed, erroneously, that the Americans were near Grand Island, which led himto incline to that side, and so open out Valcour sooner. The Britishanchored for the night of October 10th, between Grand and Long[9]Islands. Getting under way next morning, they stood up the Lake witha strong north-east wind, keeping along Grand Island, upon which theirattention doubtless was fastened by the intelligence which they hadreceived; but it was a singular negligence thus to run to leeward witha fair wind, without thorough scouting on both hands. The consequencewas that the American flotilla was not discovered until ValcourIsland, which is from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eightyfeet high throughout its two miles of length, was so far passed thatthe attack had to be made from the south, --from leeward. When the British were first made out, Arnold's second in command, Waterbury, urged that in view of the enemy's superiority the flotillashould get under way at once, and fight them "on a retreat in the mainlake;" the harbour being disadvantageous "to fight a number so muchsuperior, and the enemy being able to surround us on every side, welying between an island and the main. " Waterbury's advice evidentlyfound its origin in that fruitful source of military errors of design, which reckons the preservation of a force first of objects, making theresults of its action secondary. With sounder judgment, Arnold decidedto hold on. A retreat before square-rigged sailing vessels having afair wind, by a heterogeneous force like his own, of unequal speedsand batteries, could result only in disaster. Concerted fire andsuccessful escape were alike improbable; and besides, escape, iffeasible, was but throwing up the game. Better trust to a steady, well-ordered position, developing the utmost fire. If the enemydiscovered him, and came in by the northern entrance, there was afive-foot knoll in mid-channel which might fetch the biggest of themup; if, as proved to be the case, the island should be passed, and theattack should be made from leeward, it probably would be partial andin disorder, as also happened. The correctness of Arnold's decisionnot to chance a retreat was shown in the retreat of two days later. Valcour is on the west side of the Lake, about three quarters of amile from the main; but a peninsula projecting from the island atmid-length narrows this interval to a half-mile. From the accounts, it is clear that the American flotilla lay south of this peninsula. Arnold therefore had a reasonable hope that it might be passedundetected. Writing to Gates, the Commander-in-Chief at Ticonderoga, he said: "There is a good harbour, and if the enemy venture upthe Lake it will be impossible for them to take advantage ofour situation. If we succeed in our attack upon them, it will beimpossible for any to escape. If we are worsted, our retreat is openand free. In case of wind, which generally blows fresh at this season, our craft will make good weather, while theirs cannot keep the Lake. "It is apparent from this, written three weeks before the battle, thathe then was not expecting a force materially different from his own. Later, he describes his position as being "in a small bay on the westside of the island, as near together as possible, and in such a formthat few vessels can attack us at the same time, and those will beexposed to the fire of the whole fleet. " Though he unfortunately givesno details, he evidently had sound tactical ideas. The formationof the anchored vessels is described by the British officers as ahalf-moon. When the British discovered the enemy, they hauled up for them. Arnold ordered one of his schooners, the _Royal Savage_, and thefour galleys, to get under way; the two other schooners and the eightgondolas remaining at their anchors. The _Royal Savage_, droppingto leeward, --by bad management, Arnold says, --came, apparentlyunsupported, under the distant fire of the _Inflexible_, as she drewunder the lee of Valcour at 11 A. M. , followed by the _Carleton_, andat greater distance by the _Maria_ and the gunboats. Three shotsfrom the ship's 12-pounders struck the _Royal Savage_, which then ranashore on the southern point of the island. The _Inflexible_, followedclosely by the _Carleton_, continued on, but fired only occasionally;showing that Arnold was keeping his galleys in hand, at longbowls, --as small vessels with one eighteen should be kept, whenconfronted with a broadside of nine guns. Between the island and themain the north-east wind doubtless drew more northerly, adverse to theship's approach; but, a flaw off the cliffs taking the fore and aftsails of the _Carleton_, she fetched "nearly into the middle of therebel half-moon, where Lieutenant J. R. Dacres intrepidly anchoredwith a spring on her cable. " The _Maria_, on board which was Carleton, together with Commander Thomas Pringle, commanding the flotilla, wasto leeward when the chase began, and could not get into close actionthat day. By this time, seventeen of the twenty gunboats had comeup, and, after silencing the _Royal Savage_, pulled up to withinpoint-blank range of the American flotilla. "The cannonade wastremendous, " wrote Baron Riedesel. Lieutenant Edward Longcroft, of theradeau _Thunderer_, not being able to get his raft into action, wentwith a boat's crew on board the _Royal Savage_, and for a time turnedher guns upon her former friends; but the fire of the latter forcedhim again to abandon her, and it seemed so likely that she might bere-taken that she was set on fire by Lieutenant Starke of the _Maria_, when already "two rebel boats were very near her. She soon after blewup. " The American guns converging on the _Carleton_ in her centralposition, she suffered severely. Her commander, Lieutenant Dacres, was knocked senseless; another officer lost an arm; only Mr. EdwardPellew, afterwards Lord Exmouth, remained fit for duty. The springbeing shot away, she swung bows on to the enemy, and her fire was thussilenced. Captain Pringle signalled to her to withdraw; but she wasunable to obey. To pay her head off the right way, Pellew himself hadto get out on the bowsprit under a heavy fire of musketry, to bear thejib over to windward; but to make sail seems to have been impossible. Two artillery boats were sent to her assistance, "which towed her offthrough a very thick fire, until out of farther reach, much to thehonour of Mr. John Curling and Mr. Patrick Carnegy, master's mateand midshipman of the _Isis_, who conducted them; and of Mr. EdwardPellew, mate of the _Blonde_, who threw the tow-rope from the_Carleton's_ bowsprit. "[10] This service on board the _Carleton_started Pellew on his road to fortune; but, singularly enough, thelieutenancy promised him in consequence, by both the First Lordand Lord Howe, was delayed by the fact that he stayed at the front, instead of going to the rear, where he would have been "within theirjurisdiction. "[11] The _Carleton_ had two feet of water in the hold, and had lost eight killed and six wounded, --about half her crew, --whenshe anchored out of fire. In this small but stirring business, theAmericans, in addition to the _Royal Savage_, had lost one gondola. Besides the injuries to the _Carleton_, a British artillery boat, commanded by a German lieutenant, was sunk. Towards evening the_Inflexible_ got within point-blank shot of the Americans, "when fivebroadsides, " wrote Douglas, "silenced their whole line. " One freshship, with scantling for sea-going, and a concentrated battery, has anunquestioned advantage over a dozen light-built craft, carrying one ortwo guns each, and already several hours engaged. At nightfall the _Inflexible_ dropped out of range, and the Britishsquadron anchored in line of battle across the southern end of thepassage between the island and the main; some vessels were extendedalso to the eastward, into the open Lake. "The best part of myintelligence, " wrote Burgoyne next day from St. John's, to Douglas atQuebec, "is that our whole fleet was formed in line above the enemy, and consequently they must have surrendered this morning, or given usbattle on our own terms. The Indians and light troops are abreastwith the fleet; they cannot, therefore, escape by land. " The Britishsquadron sharing this confidence, a proper look-out was not kept. TheAmerican leader immediately held a conference with his officers, anddecided to attempt a retreat, "which was done with such secrecy, "writes Waterbury, "that we went through them entirely undiscovered. "The movement began at 7 P. M. , a galley leading, the gondolas andschooners following, and Arnold and his second bringing up the rearin the two heaviest galleys. This delicate operation was favoured bya heavy fog, which did not clear till next morning at eight. As theAmericans stole by, they could not see any of the hostile ships. Bydaylight they were out of sight of the British. Riedesel, speaking ofthis event, says, "The ships anchored, secure of the enemy, who stoleoff during the night, and sailing round the left wing, aided bya favourable wind, escaped under darkness. " The astonishment nextmorning, he continues, was great, as was Carleton's rage. The latterstarted to pursue in such a hurry that he forgot to leave ordersfor the troops which had been landed; but, failing to discover thefugitives, he returned and remained at Valcour till nightfall, whenscouts brought word that the enemy were at Schuyler's Island, eightmiles above. The retreat of the Americans had been embarrassed by their injuries, and by the wind coming out ahead. They were obliged to anchor on the12th to repair damages, both hulls and sails having suffered severely. Arnold took the precaution to write to Crown Point for bateaux, to towin case of a southerly wind; but time did not allow these to arrive. Two gondolas had to be sunk on account of their injuries, making threeof that class so far lost. The retreat was resumed at 2 P. M. , but thebreeze was fresh from the southward, and the gondolas made verylittle way. At evening the British chased again. That night the windmoderated, and at daybreak the American flotilla was twenty-eightmiles from Crown Point, --fourteen from Valcour, --having still fivemiles' start. Later, however, by Arnold's report, "the wind againbreezed up to the southward, so that we gained very little either bybeating or rowing. At the same time the enemy took a fresh breeze fromnortheast, and, by the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongsideof us. " The galleys of Arnold and Waterbury, the _Congress_ and the_Washington_, had throughout kept in the rear, and now received thebrunt of the attack, made by the _Inflexible_ and the two schooners, which had entirely distanced their sluggish consorts. This fight wasin the upper narrows, where the Lake is from one to three miles wide;and it lasted, by Arnold's report, for five glasses (two hours and ahalf), [12] the Americans continually retreating, until about ten milesfrom Crown Point. There, the _Washington_ having struck some timebefore, and final escape being impossible, Arnold ran the _Congress_and four gondolas ashore in a small creek on the east side; pulling towindward, with the cool judgment that had marked all his conduct, sothat the enemy could not follow him--except in small boats with whichhe could deal. There he set his vessels on fire, and stood by themuntil assured that they would blow up with their flags flying. He thenretreated to Crown Point through the woods, "despite the savages;"a phrase which concludes this singular aquatic contest with a quainttouch of local colour. In three days of fighting and retreating the Americans had lost oneschooner, two galleys, and seven gondolas, --in all, ten vessels out offifteen. The killed and wounded amounted to over eighty, twenty oddof whom were in Arnold's galley. The original force, numbering sevenhundred, had been decimated. Considering its raw material and therecency of its organisation, words can scarcely exaggerate theheroism of the resistance, which undoubtedly depended chiefly upon thepersonal military qualities of the leader. The British loss in killedand wounded did not exceed forty. The little American navy on Champlain was wiped out; but never had anyforce, big or small, lived to better purpose or died more gloriously, for it had saved the Lake for that year. Whatever deductions may bemade for blunders, and for circumstances of every character which madethe British campaign of 1777 abortive and disastrous, thus leadingdirectly to the American alliance with France in 1778, the delay, withall that it involved, was obtained by the Lake campaign of 1776. OnOctober 15th, two days after Arnold's final defeat, Carleton dateda letter to Douglas from before Crown Point, whence the Americangarrison was withdrawn. A week later Riedesel arrived, and wrote that, "were our whole army here it would be an easy matter to drive theenemy from their entrenchments, " at Ticonderoga, and--as has beenquoted already--four weeks sooner would have insured its fall. It isbut a coincidence that just four weeks had been required to set up the_Inflexible_ at St. John's; but it typifies the whole story. Save forArnold's flotilla, the two British schooners would have settled thebusiness. "Upon the whole, Sir, " wrote Douglas in his final letterfrom Quebec before sailing for England, "I scruple not to say, thathad not General Carleton authorized me to take the extraordinarymeasure of sending up the _Inflexible_ from Quebec, things couldnot this year have been brought to so glorious a conclusion on LakeChamplain. " Douglas further showed the importance attached to thissuccess by men of that day, by sending a special message to theBritish ambassador at Madrid, "presuming that the early knowledge ofthis great event in the southern parts of Europe may be of advantageto His Majesty's service. " That the opinion of the government wassimilar may be inferred from the numerous rewards bestowed. Carletonwas made a Knight of the Bath, and Douglas a baronet. The gallantry shown by both sides upon Lake Champlain in 1776 isevident from the foregoing narrative. With regard to the directionof movements, --the skill of the two leaders, --the same equal creditcannot be assigned. It was a very serious blunder, on October 11th, torun to leeward, passing a concealed enemy, undetected, upon waters soperfectly well known as those of Champlain were; it having been thescene of frequent British operations in previous wars. Owing tothis, "the _Maria_, because of her distant situation (from which the_Inflexible_ and _Carleton_ had chased by signal) when the rebelswere first discovered, and baffling winds, could not get into closeaction. "[13] For the same reason the _Inflexible_ could not supportthe _Carleton_. The Americans, in the aggregate distinctly inferior, were thus permitted a concentration of superior force upon part oftheir enemies. It is needless to enlarge upon the mortifyingincident of Arnold's escape that evening. To liken small things togreat, --always profitable in military analysis, --it resembled Hood'sslipping away from de Grasse at St. Kitts. [14] [Illustration] In conduct and courage, Arnold's behavior was excellent throughout. Without enlarging upon the energy which created the flotilla, andthe breadth of view which suggested preparations that he could notenforce, admiration is due to his recognition of the fact--implicitin deed, if unexpressed in word--that the one use of the Navy was tocontest the control of the water; to impose delay, even if it couldnot secure ultimate victory. No words could say more clearly than dohis actions that, under the existing conditions, the navy was useless, except as it contributed to that end; valueless, if buried in port. Upon this rests the merit of his bold advance into the lower narrows;upon this his choice of the strong defensive position of Valcour;upon this his refusal to retreat, as urged by Waterbury, when the fullforce of the enemy was disclosed, --a decision justified, or rather, illustrated, by the advantages which the accidents of the day threwinto his hands. His personal gallantry was conspicuous there as atall times of his life. "His countrymen, " said a generous enemy of thatday, "chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention which he paid to anice point of honour, in keeping his flag flying, and not quitting hisgalley till she was in flames, lest the enemy should have boarded, andstruck it. " It is not the least of the injuries done to his nation inafter years, that he should have silenced this boast and effaced thisglorious record by so black an infamy. With the destruction of the flotilla ends the naval story of the Lakesduring the War of the American Revolution. Satisfied that it was toolate to proceed against Ticonderoga that year, Carleton withdrewto St. John's and went into winter-quarters. The following year theenterprise was resumed under General Burgoyne; but Sir William Howe, instead of coöperating by an advance up the Hudson, which was the planof 1776, carried his army to Chesapeake Bay, to act thence againstPhiladelphia. Burgoyne took Ticonderoga and forced his way as far asSaratoga, sixty miles from Ticonderoga and thirty from Albany, whereHowe should have met him. There he was brought to a stand by the armywhich the Americans had collected, found himself unable to advance orto retreat, and was forced to lay down his arms on October 17th, 1777. The garrison left by him at Ticonderoga and Crown Point retired toCanada, and the posts were re-occupied by the Americans. No furthercontest took place on the Lake, though the British vessels remainedin control of it, and showed themselves from time to time up to 1781. With the outbreak of war between Great Britain and France, in 1778, the scene of maritime interest shifted to salt water, and thereremained till the end. [Footnote 1: In customary representation of maps, North is upper, and movement northward is commonly spoken of as up. It is necessarytherefore to bear in mind that the flow of water from Lake George tothe St. Lawrence, though northward, is _down_. ] [Footnote 2: Afterwards Captain of the Fleet (Chief of Staff) toRodney in his great campaign of 1782. _Post_, p. 222. He died aRear-Admiral and Baronet in 1789. ] [Footnote 3: Author's italics. ] [Footnote 4: _Remembrancer_, iv. 291. ] [Footnote 5: The radeau had six 24-pounders, six 12's, and twohowitzers; the gondola, seven 9-pounders. The particulars of armamentare from Douglas's letters. ] [Footnote 6: By American reports. Beatson gives the force sent out, inthe spring of 1776, as 13, 357. ("Mil. And Nav. Memoirs, " vi. 44. )] [Footnote 7: Douglas's letters. ] [Footnote 8: Douglas thought that the appearance of the _Inflexible_was a complete surprise; but Arnold had been informed that a thirdvessel, larger than the schooners, was being set up. With a man ofhis character, it is impossible to be sure, from his letters to hissuperior, how much he knew, or what he withheld. ] [Footnote 9: called North Hero. ] [Footnote 10: Douglas's letter. The _Isis_ and the _Blonde_ werevessels of the British squadron under Douglas, then lying in the St. Lawrence. The officers named were temporarily on the lake service. ] [Footnote 11: Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Pellew. ] [Footnote 12: Beatson, "Nav. And Mil. Memoirs, " says two hours. ] [Footnote 13: Douglas's letters. The sentence is awkward, butcarefully compared with the copy in the author's hands. Douglas says, of the details he gives, that "they have been collected with the mostscrupulous circumspection. "] [Footnote 14: _Post_, p. 205. ] CHAPTER II NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETTBAY--ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS UP TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON 1776 The opening conflict between Great Britain and her North AmericanColonies teaches clearly the necessity, too rarely recognised inpractice, that when a State has decided to use force, the forceprovided should be adequate from the first. This applies with equalweight to national policies when it is the intention of the nation tomaintain them at all costs. The Monroe Doctrine for instance is sucha policy; but unless constant adequate preparation is maintained also, the policy itself is but a vain form of words. It is in preparationbeforehand, chiefly if not uniformly, that the United States hasfailed. It is better to be much too strong than a little too weak. Seeing the evident temper of the Massachusetts Colonists, force wouldbe needed to execute the Boston Port Bill and its companion measuresof 1774; for the Port Bill especially, naval force. The supplies for1775 granted only 18, 000 seamen, --2000 less than for the previousyear. For 1776, 28, 000 seamen were voted, and the total appropriationsrose from £5, 556, 000 to £10, 154, 000; but it was then too late. Bostonwas evacuated by the British army, 8000 strong on the 17th of March, 1776; but already, for more than half a year, the spreading spirit ofrevolt in the thirteen Colonies had been encouraged by the sightof the British army cooped up in the town, suffering from wantof necessaries, while the colonial army blockading it was able tomaintain its position, because ships laden with stores for the onewere captured, and the cargoes diverted to the use of the other. Tosecure free and ample communications for one's self, and to interruptthose of the opponent, are among the first requirements of war. Tocarry out the measures of the British government a naval forcewas needed, which not only should protect the approach of its owntransports to Boston Bay, but should prevent access to all coast portswhence supplies could be carried to the blockading army. So far fromthis, the squadron was not equal, in either number or quality, to thework to be done about Boston; and it was not until October, 1775, thatthe Admiral was authorized to capture colonial merchant vessels, whichtherefore went and came unmolested, outside of Boston, carrying oftenprovisions which found their way to Washington's army. After evacuating Boston, General Howe retired to Halifax, there toawait the coming of reinforcements, both military and naval, and ofhis brother, Vice-Admiral Lord Howe, appointed to command the NorthAmerican Station. General Howe was commander-in-chief of the forcesthroughout the territory extending from Nova Scotia to West Florida;from Halifax to Pensacola. The first operation of the campaign was tobe the reduction of New York. The British government, however, had several objects in view, andpermitted itself to be distracted from the single-minded prosecutionof one great undertaking to other subsidiary operations, not alwaysconcentric. Whether the control of the line of the Hudson and LakeChamplain ought to have been sought through operations beginning atboth ends, is open to argument; the facts that the Americans were backin Crown Point in the beginning of July, 1776, and that Carleton's13, 000 men got no farther than St. John's that year, suggest that thegreater part of the latter force would have been better employed inNew York and New Jersey than about Champlain. However that may be, thediversion to the Carolinas of a third body, respectable in pointof numbers, is scarcely to be defended on military grounds. Thegovernment was induced to it by the expectation of local support fromroyalists. That there were many of these in both Carolinas iscertain; but while military operations must take account of politicalconditions, the latter should not be allowed to overbalance elementaryprinciples of the military art. It is said that General Howedisapproved of this ex-centric movement. The force destined for the Southern coasts assembled at Cork towardsthe end of 1775, and sailed thence in January, 1776. The troops werecommanded by Lord Cornwallis, the squadron by Nelson's early patron, Commodore Sir Peter Parker, whose broad pennant was hoisted on boardthe _Bristol_, 50. After a boisterous passage, the expedition arrivedin May off Cape Fear in North Carolina, where it was joined by twothousand men under Sir Henry Clinton, Cornwallis's senior, whom Howeby the government's orders had detached to the southward in January. Upon Clinton's appearance, the royalists in North Carolina had risen, headed by the husband of Flora Macdonald, whose name thirty yearsbefore had been associated romantically with the escape of the youngPretender from Scotland. She had afterwards emigrated to America. Therising, however, had been put down, and Clinton had not thoughtit expedient to try a serious invasion, in face of the large forceassembled to resist him. Upon Parker's coming, it was decided to makean attempt upon Charleston, South Carolina. The fleet thereforesailed from Cape Fear on the 1st of June, and on the 4th anchored offCharleston Bar. Charleston Harbour opens between two of the sea-islands which fringethe coasts of South Carolina and Georgia. On the north is Sullivan'sIsland, on the south James Island. The bar of the main entrance wasnot abreast the mouth of the port, but some distance south of it. Inside the bar, the channel turned to the northward, and thence lednear Sullivan's Island, the southern end of which was therefore chosenas the site of the rude fort hastily thrown up to meet this attack, and afterwards called Fort Moultrie, from the name of the commander. From these conditions, a southerly wind was needed to bring shipsinto action. After sounding and buoying the bar, the transportsand frigates crossed on the 7th and anchored inside; but as it wasnecessary to remove some of the _Bristol's_ guns, she could not followuntil the 10th. On the 9th Clinton had landed in person with fivehundred men, and by the 15th all the troops had disembarked upon LongIsland, next north of Sullivan's. It was understood that the inletbetween the two was fordable, allowing the troops to coöperate withthe naval attack, by diversion or otherwise; but this proved to be amistake. The passage was seven feet deep at low water, and there wereno means for crossing; consequently a small American detachment inthe scrub wood of the island sufficed to check any movement in thatquarter. The fighting therefore was confined to the cannonading of thefort by the ships. Circumstances not fully explained caused the attack to be fixedfor the 23d; an inopportune delay, during which Americans werestrengthening their still very imperfect defences. On the 23d the windwas unfavourable. On the 25th the _Experiment_, 50, arrived, crossedthe bar, and, after taking in her guns again, was ready to join inthe assault. On the 27th, at 10 A. M. , the ships got under way with asouth-east breeze, but this shifted soon afterwards to north-west, andthey had to anchor again, about a mile nearer to Sullivan's Island. Onthe following day the wind served, and the attack was made. In plan, Fort Moultrie was square, with a bastion at each angle. Inconstruction, the sides were palmetto logs, dovetailed and boltedtogether, laid in parallel rows, sixteen feet apart; the interspacebeing filled with sand. At the time of the engagement, the south andwest fronts were finished; the other fronts were only seven feethigh, but surmounted by thick planks, to be tenable against escalade. Thirty-one guns were in place, 18 and 9-pounders, of which twenty-onewere on the south face, commanding the channel. Within was a traverserunning east and west, protecting the gunners from shots from therear; but there was no such cover against enfilading fire, in casean enemy's ship passed the fort and anchored above it. "The generalopinion before the action, " Moultrie says, "and especially amongsailors, was that two frigates would be sufficient to knock the townabout our ears, notwithstanding our batteries. " Parker may have sharedthis impression, and it may account for his leisureliness. When theaction began, the garrison had but twenty-eight rounds for each oftwenty-six cannon, but this deficiency was unknown to the British. [Illustration] Parker's plan was that the two 50's, _Bristol_ and _Experiment_, andtwo 28-gun frigates, the _Active_ and the _Solebay_, should engage themain front; while two frigates of the same class, the _Actæon_ and the_Syren_, with a 20-gun corvette, the _Sphinx_, should pass the fort, anchoring to the westward, up-channel, to protect the heavy vesselsagainst fire-ships, as well as to enfilade the principal Americanbattery. The main attack was to be further supported by a bomb-vessel, the _Thunder_, accompanied by the armed transport _Friendship_, whichwere to take station to the southeast of the east bastion of theengaged front of the fort. The order to weigh was given at 10. 30A. M. , when the flood-tide had fairly made; and at 11. 15 the _Active_, _Bristol_, _Experiment_, and _Solebay_, anchored in line ahead, in theorder named, the _Active_ to the eastward. These ships seem to havetaken their places skilfully without confusion, and their fire, whichopened at once, was rapid, well-sustained, and well-directed; buttheir position suffered under the radical defect that, whether fromactual lack of water, or only from fear of grounding, they were toofar from the works to use grape effectively. The sides of ships beingmuch weaker than those of shore works, while their guns were much morenumerous, the secret of success was to get near enough to beat downthe hostile fire by a multitude of projectiles. The bomb-vessel_Thunder_ anchored in the situation assigned her; but her shells, though well aimed, were ineffective. "Most of them fell within thefort, " Moultrie reported, "but we had a morass in the middle, whichswallowed them instantly, and those that fell in the sand wereimmediately buried. " During the action the mortar bed broke, disablingthe piece. Owing to the scarcity of ammunition in the fort, the garrison hadpositive orders not to engage at ranges exceeding four hundred yards. Four or five shots were thrown at the _Active_, while still undersail, but with this exception the fort kept silence until the shipsanchored, at a distance estimated by the Americans to be three hundredand fifty yards. The word was then passed along the platform, "Mindthe Commodore; mind the two 50-gun ships, "--an order which wasstrictly obeyed, as the losses show. The protection of the work provedto be almost perfect, --a fact which doubtless contributed to thecoolness and precision of fire vitally essential with such deficientresources. The texture of the palmetto wood suffered the balls to sinksmoothly into it without splintering, so that the facing of the workheld well. At times, when three or four broadsides struck together, the merlons shook so that Moultrie feared they would come bodily in;but they withstood, and the small loss inflicted was chiefly throughthe embrasures. The flagstaff being shot away, falling outside intothe ditch, a young sergeant, named Jasper, distinguished himself byjumping after it, fetching back and rehoisting the colours under aheavy fire. In the squadron an equal gallantry was shown under circumstances whichmade severe demands upon endurance. Whatever Parker's estimate ofthe worth of the defences, no trace of vain-confidence appears in hisdispositions, which were thorough and careful, as the execution ofthe main attack was skilful and vigorous; but the ships' companies, expecting an easy victory, had found themselves confronted with aresistance and a punishment as severe as were endured by the leadingships at Trafalgar, and far more prolonged. Such conditions imposeupon men's tenacity the additional test of surprise and discomfiture. The _Experiment_, though very small for a ship of the line, lost 23killed and 56 wounded, out of a total probably not much exceeding 300;while the _Bristol_, having the spring shot away, swung with her headto the southward and her stern to the fort, undergoing for a longtime a raking fire to which she could make little reply. Threeseveral attempts to replace the spring were made by Mr. JamesSaumarez, --afterwards the distinguished admiral, Lord de Saumarez, then a midshipman, --before the ship was relieved from this gravedisadvantage. Her loss was 40 killed and 71 wounded; not a manescaping of those stationed on the quarter-deck at the beginning ofthe action. Among the injured was the Commodore himself, whose coolheroism must have been singularly conspicuous, from the notice itattracted in a service where such bearing was not rare. At onetime when the quarter-deck was cleared and he stood alone upon thepoop-ladder, Saumarez suggested to him to come down; but he replied, smiling, "You want to get rid of me, do you?" and refused to move. The captain of the ship, John Morris, was mortally wounded. Withcommendable modesty Parker only reported himself as slightly bruised;but deserters stated that for some days he needed the assistance oftwo men to walk, and that his trousers had been torn off him by shotor splinters. The loss in the other ships was only one killed, 14wounded. The Americans had 37 killed and wounded. The three vessels assigned to enfilade the main front of the fort didnot get into position. They ran on the middle ground, owing, Parkerreported, to the ignorance of the pilots. Two had fouled each otherbefore striking. Having taken the bottom on a rising tide, two floatedin a few hours, and retreated; but the third, the _Actæon_, 28, sticking fast, was set on fire and abandoned by her officers. Beforeshe blew up, the Americans boarded her, securing her colours, bell, and some other trophies. "Had these ships effected their purpose, "Moultrie reported, "they would have driven us from our guns. " The main division held its ground until long after nightfall, firingmuch of the time, but stopping at intervals. After two hours it hadbeen noted that the fort replied very slowly, which was attributed toits being overborne, instead of to the real cause, the necessity forsparing ammunition. For the same reason it was entirely silent from3. 30 P. M. To 6, when fire was resumed from only two or three guns, whence Parker surmised that the rest had been dismounted. TheAmericans were restrained throughout the engagement by the fear ofexhausting entirely their scanty store. "About 9 P. M. , " Parker reported, "being very dark, great part of ourammunition expended, the people fatigued, the tide of ebb almostdone, no prospect from the eastward (that is, from the army), and nopossibility of our being of any further service, I ordered the shipsto withdraw to their former moorings. " Besides the casualties amongthe crew, and severe damage to the hull, the _Bristol's_ mainmast, with nine cannon-balls in it, had to be shortened, while themizzen-mast was condemned. The injury to the frigates was immaterial, owing to the garrison's neglecting them. The fight in Charleston Harbour, the first serious contest in whichships took part in this war, resembles generically the battle ofBunker's Hill, with which the regular land warfare had opened a yearbefore. Both illustrate the difficulty and danger of a front attack, without cover, upon a fortified position, and the advantage conferredeven upon untrained men, if naturally cool, resolute, and intelligent, not only by the protection of a work, but also, it may be urged, bythe recognition of a tangible line up to which to hold, and to abandonwhich means defeat, dishonour, and disaster. It is much for untriedmen to recognise in their surroundings something which gives the unityof a common purpose, and thus the coherence which discipline imparts. Although there was in Parker's dispositions nothing open to seriouscriticism, --nothing that can be ascribed to undervaluing hisopponent, --and although, also, he had good reason to expect from thearmy active coöperation which he did not get, it is probable that hewas very much surprised, not only at the tenacity of the Americans'resistance, but at the efficacy of their fire. He felt, doubtless, the traditional and natural distrust--and, for the most part, the justified distrust--with which experience and practice regardinexperience. Some seamen of American birth, who had been serving inthe _Bristol_, deserted after the fight. They reported that her crewsaid, "We were told the Yankees would not stand two fires, but wenever saw better fellows;" and when the fire of the fort slackened andsome cried, "They have done fighting, " others replied, "By God, we areglad of it, for we never had such a drubbing in our lives. " "All thecommon men of the fleet spoke loudly in praise of the garrison, "--anote of admiration so frequent in generous enemies that we may beassured that it was echoed on the quarter-deck also. They could affordit well, for there was no stain upon their own record beyond thenatural mortification of defeat; no flinching under the severity oftheir losses, although a number of their men were comparatively raw, volunteers from the transports, whose crews had come forward almostas one man when they knew that the complements of the ships were shortthrough sickness. Edmund Burke, a friend to both sides, was justifiedin saying that "never did British valour shine more conspicuously, nor did our ships in an engagement of the same nature experienceso serious an encounter. " There were several death-vacancies forlieutenants; and, as the battle of Lake Champlain gave Pellew hisfirst commission, so did that of Charleston Harbour give his toSaumarez, who was made lieutenant of the _Bristol_ by Parker. Twoyears later, when the ship had gone to Jamaica, he was followed on herquarter-deck by Nelson and Collingwood, who also received promotion inher from the same hand. The attack on Fort Moultrie was not resumed. After necessary repairs, the ships of war with the troops went to New York, where theyarrived on the 4th of August, and took part in the operations for thereduction of that place under the direction of the two Howes. * * * * * The occupation of New York Harbour, and the capture of the city werethe most conspicuous British successes of the summer and fall of 1776. While Parker and Clinton were meeting with defeat at Charleston, andArnold was hurrying the preparation of his flotilla on Champlain, thetwo brothers, General Sir William Howe and the Admiral, Lord Howe, were arriving in New York Bay, invested not only with the powersproper to the commanders of great fleets and armies, but also withauthority as peace commissioners, to negotiate an amicable arrangementwith the revolted Colonies. Sir William Howe had awaited for some time at Halifax the arrival ofthe expected reinforcements, but wearying at last he sailed thenceon the 10th of June, 1776, with the army then in hand. On the 25thhe himself reached Sandy Hook, the entrance to New York Bay, havingpreceded the transports in a frigate. On the 29th, the day afterParker's repulse at Fort Moultrie, the troops arrived; and on July 3d, the date on which Arnold, retreating from Canada, reached Crown Point, the British landed on Staten Island, which is on the west side of thelower Bay. On the 12th came in the _Eagle_, 64, carrying the flag ofLord Howe. This officer was much esteemed by the Americans for his ownpersonal qualities, and for his attitude towards them in the presentdispute, as well as for the memory of his brother, who had endearedhimself greatly to them in the campaign of 1758, when he had fallennear Lake Champlain; but the decisive step of declaring theirindependence had been taken already, on July 4th, eight days beforethe Admiral's arrival. A month was spent in fruitless attempts tonegotiate with the new government, without recognising any officialcharacter in its representatives. During that time, however, whileabstaining from decisive operations, cruisers were kept at seato intercept American traders, and the Admiral, immediately uponarriving, sent four vessels of war twenty-five miles up the HudsonRiver, as far as Tarrytown. This squadron was commanded by HydeParker, afterwards, in 1801, Nelson's commander-in-chief atCopenhagen. The service was performed under a tremendous cannonadefrom all the batteries on both shores, but the ships could notbe stopped. Towards the middle of August it was evident that theAmericans would not accept any terms in the power of the Howes tooffer, and it became necessary to attempt coercion by arms. [Illustration] In the reduction of New York in 1776, the part played by the BritishNavy, owing to the nature of the campaign in general and of theenemy's force in particular, was of that inconspicuous character whichobscures the fact that without the Navy the operations could not havebeen undertaken at all, and that the Navy played to them the partof the base of operations and line of communications. Like thefoundations of a building, these lie outside the range of superficialattention, and therefore are less generally appreciated than thebrilliant fighting going on at the front, to the maintenance ofwhich they are all the time indispensable. Consequently, whatever ofinterest may attach to any, or to all, of the minor affairs, whichin the aggregate constitute the action of the naval force in suchcircumstances, the historian of the major operations is confinedperforce to indicating the broad general effect of naval power uponthe issue. This will be best done by tracing in outline the scene ofaction, the combined movements, and the Navy's influence in both. The harbour of New York divides into two parts--the upper and lowerBays--connected by a passage called the Narrows, between Long andStaten Islands, upon the latter of which the British troops wereencamped. Long Island, which forms the eastern shore of the Narrows, extends to the east-north-east a hundred and ten miles, enclosingbetween itself and the continent a broad sheet of water called LongIsland Sound, that reaches nearly to Narragansett Bay. The latter, being a fine anchorage, entered also into the British scheme ofoperations, as an essential feature in a coastwise maritime campaign. Long Island Sound and the upper Bay of New York are connected by acrooked and difficult passage, known as the East River, eight or tenmiles in length, and at that time nearly a mile wide[15] abreast thecity of New York. At the point where the East River joins New YorkBay, the Hudson River, an estuary there nearly two miles wide, alsoenters from the north, --a circumstance which has procured for itthe alternative name of the North River. Near their confluence isGovernor's Island, half a mile below the town, centrally situated tocommand the entrances to both. Between the East and North rivers, withtheir general directions from north and east-north-east, is embraceda long strip of land gradually narrowing to the southward. The end ofthis peninsula, as it would otherwise be, is converted into an island, of a mean length of about eight miles, by the Harlem River, --a narrowand partially navigable stream connecting the East and North rivers. To the southern extreme of this island, called Manhattan, the city ofNew York was then confined. As both the East and North rivers were navigable for large ships, the former throughout, the latter for over a hundred miles above itsmouth, it was evident that control of the water must play a largepart in warlike operations throughout the district described. With thelimited force at Washington's disposal, he had been unable to push thedefences of the city as far to the front as was desirable. Thelower Bay was held by the British Navy, and Staten Island had beenabandoned, necessarily, without resistance, thereby giving up thestrong defensive position of the Narrows. The lines were contractedthus to the immediate neighbourhood of New York itself. Small detachedworks skirted the shores of Manhattan Island, and a line of redoubtsextended across it, following the course of a small stream which thenpartly divided it, a mile from the southern end. Governor's Island wasalso occupied as an outpost. Of more intrinsic strength, but not atfirst concerned, strong works had been thrown up on either side of theNorth River, upon commanding heights eight miles above New York, todispute the passage of ships. The crucial weakness in this scheme of defence was that the shore ofLong Island opposite the city was much higher than that of Manhattan. If this height were seized, the city, and all below it, becameuntenable. Here, therefore, was the key of the position and the chiefstation for the American troops. For its protection a line of workswas thrown up, the flanks of which rested upon Wallabout Bay andGowanus Cove, two indentations in the shores of Long Island. TheseWashington manned with nine thousand of the eighteen thousand menunder his command. By the arrival of three divisions of Hessiantroops, Howe's army now numbered over thirty-four thousand men, towhich Clinton brought three thousand more from before Charleston. [16] On the 22d of August the British crossed from Staten Island toGravesend Bay, on the Long Island shore of the Narrows. The Navycovered the landing, and the transportation of the troops was underthe charge of Commodore William Hotham, who, nineteen years later, was Nelson's commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. By noon fifteenthousand men and forty field-guns had been carried over and placed onshore. The force of the Americans permitted little opposition to theBritish advance; but General Howe was cautious and easy-going, andit was not till the 27th that the army, now increased to twenty-fivethousand, was fairly in front of the American lines, having killed, wounded, and taken about 1, 500 men. Hoping that Howe would be temptedto storm the position, Washington replaced these with two thousanddrawn from his meagre numbers; but his opponent, who had borne adistinguished part at Bunker's Hill, held back his troops, who wereeager for the assault. The Americans now stood with their backs toa swift tidal stream, nearly a mile wide, with only a feeble line ofworks between them and an enemy more than double their number. On the morning of the 27th, Sir Peter Parker, with a 64-gun ship, two50's, and two frigates, attempted to work up to New York, with a viewof supporting the left flank of the army; but the wind came out fromthe north, and, the ebb-tide making, the ships got no nearer thanthree miles from the city. Fortunately for the Americans, they eithercould not or would not go farther on the following two days. After dark of the 28th, Howe broke ground for regular approaches. Washington, seeing this, and knowing that there could be but oneresult to a siege under his condition of inferiority, resolved towithdraw. During the night of the 29th ten thousand men silentlyquitted their positions, embarked, and crossed to Manhattan Island, carrying with them all their belongings, arms, and ammunition. Theenemy's trenches were but six hundred yards distant, yet no suspicionwas aroused, nor did a single deserter give treacherous warning. Thenight was clear and moonlit, although a heavy fog towards daybreakprolonged the period of secrecy which shrouded the retreat. Whenthe fog rose, the last detachment was discovered crossing, but a fewineffectual cannon-shot were the only harassment experienced by theAmericans in the course of this rapid and dexterous retirement. Thegarrison of Governor's Island was withdrawn at the same time. The unmolested use of the water, and the nautical skill of thefishermen who composed one of the American regiments, were essentialto this escape; for admirable as the movement was in arrangementand execution, no word less strong than escape applies to it. By itWashington rescued over half his army from sure destruction, and, not improbably, the cause of his people from immediate collapse. Anopportunity thus seized implies necessarily an opportunity lost on theother side. For that failure both army and navy must bear their shareof the blame. It is obvious that when an enemy is greatly outnumberedhis line of retreat should be watched. This was the business of bothcommanders-in-chief, the execution of it being primarily the duty ofthe navy, as withdrawal from the American position could be onlyby water. It was a simple question of look-out, of detection, ofprevention by that means. To arrest the retreat sailing ships wereinadequate, for they could not have remained at anchor under the gunsof Manhattan Island, either by day or night; but a few boatswith muffled oars could have watched, could have given the alarm, precipitating an attack by the army, and such a movement interruptedin mid-course brings irretrievable disaster. Washington now withdrew the bulk of his force to the line of theHarlem. On his right, south of that river and commanding the Hudson, was a fort called by his name; opposite to it on the Jersey shore wasFort Lee. A garrison of four thousand men occupied New York. Afteramusing himself with some further peace negotiations, Howe determinedto possess the city. As a diversion from the main effort, and to coverthe crossing of the troops, two detachments of ships were ordered topass the batteries on the Hudson and East rivers. This was done onthe 13th and the 15th of September. The East River division sufferedseverely, especially in spars and rigging;[17] but the success ofboth, following upon that of Hyde Parker a few weeks earlier, in hisexpedition to Tarrytown, confirmed Washington in the opinion which heexpressed five years later to de Grasse, that batteries alone couldnot stop ships having a fair wind. This is now a commonplace of navalwarfare; steam giving always a fair wind. On the 15th Howe's armycrossed under cover of Parker's ships, Hotham again superintending theboat work. The garrison of New York slipped along the west shore ofthe island and joined the main body on the Harlem; favored again, apparently, in this flank movement a mile from the enemy's front, by Howe's inertness, and fondness for a good meal, to which a shrewdAmerican woman invited him at the critical moment. Despite these various losses of position, important as they were, theAmerican army continued to elude the British general, who apparentlydid not hold very strongly the opinion that the most decisive factorin war is the enemy's organised force. As control of the valley ofthe Hudson, in connection with Lake Champlain, was, very properly, thechief object of the British government, Howe's next aim was to loosenWashington's grip on the peninsula north of the Harlem. The positionseeming to him too strong for a front attack, he decided to strike forits left flank and rear by way of Long Island Sound. In this, whichinvolved the passage of the tortuous and dangerous channel calledHell Gate, with its swift conflicting currents, the Navy again borean essential part. The movement began on October 12th, the day afterArnold was defeated at Valcour. So far as its leading object went itwas successful, Washington feeling obliged to let go the line of theHarlem, and change front to the left. As the result of the variousmovements and encounters of the two armies, he fell back across theHudson into New Jersey, ordering the evacuation of Fort Washington, and deciding to rest his control of the Hudson Valley upon West Point, fifty miles above New York, a position of peculiar natural strength, on the west bank of the river. To these decisions he was compelledby his inferiority in numbers, and also by the very isolated andhazardous situation in which he was operating, between two navigablewaters, absolutely controlled by the enemy's shipping. This conclusionwas further forced upon him by another successful passage before theguns of Forts Washington and Lee by Hyde Parker, with three ships, onthe 9th of October. On this occasion the vessels, two of which werefrigates of the heaviest class, suffered very severely, losing ninekilled and eighteen wounded; but the menace to the communications ofthe Americans could not be disregarded, for their supplies came mostlyfrom the west of the Hudson. It was early in November that Washington crossed into New Jersey withfive thousand men; and soon afterwards he directed the remainder ofhis force to follow. At that moment the blunder of one subordinate, and the disobedience of another, brought upon him two serious blows. Fort Washington not being evacuated when ordered, Howe carried it bystorm, capturing not only it but its garrison of twenty-seven hundredmen; a very heavy loss to the Americans. On the other hand, the mostexplicit orders failed to bring the officer left in command onthe east of the Hudson, General Charles Lee, to rejoin thecommander-in-chief. This criminal perverseness left Washington withonly six thousand men in New Jersey, seven thousand being in New York. Under these conditions nothing remained but to put the Delaware alsobetween himself and the enemy. He therefore retreated rapidly throughNew Jersey, and on the 8th of December crossed into Pennsylvaniawith an army reduced to three thousand by expiry of enlistments. Thedetachment beyond the Hudson, diminishing daily by the same cause, gradually worked its way to him; its commander luckily being capturedon the road. At the time it joined, a few battalions also arrivedfrom Ticonderoga, released by Carleton's retirement to the foot ofChamplain. Washington's force on the west bank of the Delaware wasthus increased to six thousand men. In this series of operations, extending from August 22d to December14th, when Howe went into winter-quarters in New Jersey, the Britishhad met with no serious mishaps, beyond the inevitable lossesundergone by the assailants of well-chosen positions. Nevertheless, having in view the superiority of numbers, of equipment, and ofdiscipline, and the command of the water, the mere existence of theenemy's army as an organised body, its mere escape, deprives thecampaign of the claim to be considered successful. The red ribbon ofthe Bath probably never was earned more cheaply than by Sir WilliamHowe that year. Had he displayed anything like the energy of his twoelder brothers, Washington, with all his vigilance, firmness, and enterprise, could scarcely have brought off the force, vastlydiminished but still a living organism, around which Americanresistance again crystallised and hardened. As it was, within a monthhe took the offensive, and recovered a great part of New Jersey. Whatever verdict may be passed upon the merit of the military conductof affairs, there is no doubt of the value, or of the unflaggingenergy, of the naval support given. Sir William Howe alludes to itfrequently, both in general and specifically; while the Admiral sumsup his always guarded and often cumbrous expressions of opinion inthese words: "It is incumbent upon me to represent to your Lordships, and I cannot too pointedly express, the unabating perseverance andalacrity with which the several classes of officers and seamen havesupported a long attendance and unusual degree of fatigue, consequentof these different movements of the army. " The final achievement of the campaign, and a very important one, wasthe occupation of Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay by a combinedexpedition, which left New York on the 1st of December, and on the 8thlanded at Newport without opposition. The naval force, consistingof five 50-gun ships and eight smaller vessels, was commanded bySir Peter Parker; the troops, seven thousand in number, byLieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton. The immediate effect was toclose a haven of privateers, who centred in great numbers around ananchorage which flanked the route of all vessels bound from Europeto New York. The possession of the bay facilitated the control of theneighbouring waters by British ships of war, besides giving thema base central for coastwise operations and independent of tidalconsiderations for entrance or exit. The position was abandonedsomewhat precipitately three years later. Rodney then deplored itsloss in the following terms: "The evacuating Rhode Island was the mostfatal measure that could possibly have been adopted. It gave up thebest and noblest harbor in America, capable of containing the wholeNavy of Britain, and where they could in all seasons lie in perfectsecurity; and from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, couldblockade the three capital cities of America; namely, Boston, NewYork, and Philadelphia. " At the end of 1776 began the series of British reverses whichcharacterised the year 1777, making this the decisive period of thewar, because of the effect thus produced upon general public opinionabroad; especially upon the governments of France and Spain. On the20th of December, Howe, announcing to the Ministry that he hadgone into winter-quarters, wrote: "The chain, I own, is rather tooextensive, but I was induced to occupy Burlington to cover the countyof Monmouth; and trusting to the loyalty of the inhabitants, and thestrength of the corps placed in the advanced posts, I conclude thetroops will be in perfect security. " Of this unwarranted securityWashington took prompt advantage. On Christmas night a sudden descent, in a blinding snow-storm, upon a British outpost at Trenton, swept offa thousand prisoners; and although for the moment the American leaderagain retired behind the Delaware, it was but to resume the offensivefour days later. Cornwallis, who was in New York on the point ofsailing for England, hurried back to the front, but in vain. A seriesof quick and well-directed movements recovered the State of NewJersey; and by the 5th of January the American headquarters, and mainbody of the army, were established at Morristown in the Jersey hills, the left resting upon the Hudson, thus recovering touch with thestrategic centre of interest. This menacing position of the Americans, upon the flank of the line of communications from New York to theDelaware, compelled Howe to contract abruptly the lines he hadextended so lightly; and the campaign he was forced thus reluctantlyto reopen closed under a gloom of retreat and disaster, whichprofoundly and justly impressed not only the generality of men butmilitary critics as well. "Of all the great conquests which hisMajesty's troops had made in the Jersies, " writes Beatson, "Brunswickand Amboy were the only two places of any note which they retained;and however brilliant their successes had been in the beginning ofthe campaign, they reaped little advantage from them when the winteradvanced, and the contiguity of so vigilant an enemy forced them toperform the severest duty. " With deliberate or unconscious humourhe then immediately concludes the chronicle of the year with thisannouncement: "His Majesty was so well pleased with the abilities andactivity which General Howe had displayed this campaign, that on the25th of October he conferred upon him the Most Honourable Order of theBath. " [Footnote 15: At the present day reduced by reclaimed land. ] [Footnote 16: Beatson's "Military and Naval Memoirs, " vi. 44, give34, 614 as the strength of Howe's army. Clinton's division is notincluded in this. Vi. 45. ] [Footnote 17: Admiral James's Journal, p. 30. (Navy Records Society. )] CHAPTER III THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OFPHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION 1777 The leading purpose of the British government in the campaign of 1777was the same as that with which it had begun in 1776, --the controlof the line of the Hudson and Lake Champlain, to be mastered by twoexpeditions, one starting from each end, and both working towards acommon centre at Albany, near the head of navigation of the River. Preliminary difficulties had been cleared away in the previous year, by the destruction of the American flotilla on the Lake, and by thereduction of New York. To both these objects the Navy had contributedconspicuously. It remained to complete the work by resuming theadvance from the two bases of operations secured. In 1777 thefortifications on the Hudson were inadequate to stop the progress of acombined naval and military expedition, as was shown in the course ofthe campaign. The northern enterprise was intrusted to General Burgoyne. Theimpossibility of creating a new naval force, able to contend withthat put afloat by Carleton, had prevented the Americans from furtherbuilding. Burgoyne therefore moved by the Lake without opposition toTiconderoga, before which he appeared on the 2d of July. A positioncommanding the works was discovered, which the Americans had neglectedto occupy. It being seized, and a battery established, the fort had tobe evacuated. The retreat being made by water, the British Lake Navy, under Captain Skeffington Lutwidge, with whom Nelson had served afew years before in the Arctic seas, had a conspicuous part in thepursuit; severing the boom blockading the narrow upper lake andjoining impetuously in an attack upon the floating material, theflat-boat transports, and the few relics of Arnold's flotilla whichhad escaped the destruction of the previous year. This affair tookplace on the 6th of July. From that time forward the progress of thearmy was mainly by land. The Navy, however, found occupation upon LakeGeorge, where Burgoyne established a dépôt of supplies, although hedid not utilise its waterway for the march of the army. A partyof seamen under Edward Pellew, still a midshipman, accompanied theadvance, and shared the misfortunes of the expedition. It is told thatBurgoyne used afterwards to chaff the young naval officer with beingthe cause of their disaster, because he and his men, by rebuilding abridge at a critical moment, had made it possible to cross the upperHudson. Impeded in its progress by immense difficulties, both naturaland imposed by the enemy, the army took twenty days to make twentymiles. On the 30th of July it reached Fort Edward, forty miles fromAlbany, and there was compelled to stay till the middle of September. Owing to neglect at the War Office, the peremptory orders to SirWilliam Howe, to move up the Hudson and make a junction withBurgoyne, were not sent forward. Consequently, Howe, acting uponthe discretionary powers which he possessed already, and swayed bypolitical reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, determinedto renew his attempt upon Philadelphia. A tentative advance into NewJersey, and the consequent manoeuvres of Washington, satisfied himthat the enterprise by this route was too hazardous. He thereforeembarked fourteen thousand men, leaving eight thousand with Sir HenryClinton to hold New York and make diversions in favor of Burgoyne;and on the 23d of July sailed from Sandy Hook, escorted by five 64-gunships, a 50, and ten smaller vessels, under Lord Howe's immediatecommand. The entire expedition numbered about 280 sail. Elaboratepains were taken to deceive Washington as to the destination of thearmament; but little craft was needed to prevent a competent opponentfrom imagining a design so contrary to sound military principle, having regard to Burgoyne's movements and to the well-understoodgeneral purpose of the British ministry. Accordingly Washington wrote, "Howe's in a manner abandoning Burgoyne is so unaccountable a matter, that till I am fully assured of it, I cannot help casting my eyescontinually behind me. " He suspected an intention to return upon NewYork. On the 31st of July, just as Burgoyne reached Fort Edward, where hestuck fast for six weeks, Howe's armament was off the Capes ofthe Delaware. The prevailing summer wind on the American coast issouth-south-west, fair for ascending the river; but information wasreceived that the enemy had obstructed the channel, which lends itselfto such defences for some distance below Philadelphia. Therefore, although after occupying the city the free navigation of the river tothe sea would be essential to maintaining the position, --for trial hadshown that the whole army could not assure communications by landwith New York, the other sea base, --Howe decided to prosecute hisenterprise by way of the Chesapeake, the ascent of which, under allthe conditions, could not be seriously impeded. A fortnight more wasconsumed in contending against the south-west winds and calms, beforethe fleet anchored on the 15th of August within the Capes of theChesapeake; and yet another week passed before the head of the Bay wasreached. On the 25th the troops landed. Washington, though so longin doubt, was on hand to dispute the road, but in inferior force;and Howe had no great difficulty in fighting his way to Philadelphia, which was occupied on the 26th of September. A week earlier Burgoynehad reached Stillwater, on the west bank of the Hudson, the utmostpoint of his progress, where he was still twenty miles from Albany. Three weeks later, confronted by overwhelming numbers, he was forcedto capitulate at Saratoga, whither he had retreated. Lord Howe held on at the head of the Chesapeake until satisfied thathis brother no longer needed him. On the 14th of September he starteddown the Bay with the squadron and convoy, sending ahead to theDelaware a small division, to aid the army, if necessary. The windsholding southerly, ten days were required to get to sea; and outsidefurther delay was caused by very heavy weather. The Admiral therequitted the convoy and hastened up river. On the 6th of October he wasoff Chester, ten miles below Philadelphia. The navy had already beenat work for a week, clearing away obstructions, of which there weretwo lines; both commanded by batteries on the farther, or Jersey, shore of the Delaware. The lower battery had been carried by troops;and when Howe arrived, the ships, though meeting lively oppositionfrom the American galleys and fire-rafts, had freed the channel forlarge vessels to approach the upper obstructions. These were defendednot only by a work at Red Bank on the Jersey shore, but also, onthe other side of the stream, by a fort called Fort Mifflin, on MudIsland. [18] As the channel at this point, for a distance of half amile, was only two hundred yards wide, and troops could not reach theisland, the position was very strong, and it detained the British forsix weeks. Fort Mifflin was supported by two floating batteries anda number of galleys. The latter not only fought, offensively anddefensively, but maintained the supplies and ammunition of thegarrison. On the 22d of October, a concerted attack, by the army on the works atRed Bank, and by the Navy on Fort Mifflin, resulted disastrously. Theformer was repulsed with considerable loss, the officer commandingbeing killed. The squadron, consisting of a 64, three frigates, anda sloop, went into action with Mud Island at the same time; but, the channel having shifted, owing possibly to the obstructions, thesixty-four and the sloop grounded, and could not be floated that day. On the 23d the Americans concentrated their batteries, galleys, andfire-rafts upon the two; and the larger ship took fire and blew up inthe midst of the preparations for lightening her. The sloop was thenset on fire and abandoned. So long as this obstacle remained, all supplies for the Britisharmy in Philadelphia had to be carried by boats to the shore, andtransported considerable distances by land. As direct attacks hadproved unavailing, more deliberate measures were adopted. The armybuilt batteries, and the navy sent ashore guns to mount in them; butthe decisive blow to Mud Island was given by a small armed ship, the_Vigilant_, 20, which was successfully piloted through a channel onthe west side of the river, and reached the rear of the work, towingwith her a floating battery with three 24-pounders. This was on the15th of November. That night the Americans abandoned Fort Mifflin. Their loss, Beatson says, amounted to near 400 killed and wounded;that of the British to 43. If this be correct, it should haveestablished the invincibility of men who under such prodigiousdisparity of suffering could maintain their position so tenaciously. After the loss of Mud Island, Red Bank could not be held to advantage, and it was evacuated on the 21st, when an attack was imminent. TheAmerican vessels retreated up the river; but they were cornered, and of course ultimately were destroyed. The obstructions being nowremoved, the British water communications by the line of the Delawarewere established, --eight weeks after the occupation of the city, whichwas to be evacuated necessarily six months later. While these things were passing, Howe's triumph was marred by the newsof Burgoyne's surrender on the 17th of October. For this he couldnot but feel that the home government must consider him largelyresponsible; for in the Chesapeake, too late to retrieve his falsestep, he had received a letter from the minister of war saying that, whatever else he undertook, support to Burgoyne was the great objectto be kept in view. During the operations round Philadelphia, Sir Henry Clinton in NewYork had done enough to show what strong probabilities of successwould have attended an advance up the Hudson, by the twenty thousandmen whom Howe could have taken with him. Starting on the 3d of Octoberwith three thousand troops, accompanied by a small naval division offrigates, Clinton in a week had reached West Point, fifty miles upthe river. The American fortifications along the way were captured, defences levelled, stores and shipping burned; while an insignificantdetachment, with the light vessels, went fifty miles further up, and there destroyed more military stores without encountering anyresistance worth mentioning. Certainly, had Howe taken the same lineof operations, he would have had to reckon with Washington's tenthousand men which confronted him on the march from the Chesapeake toPhiladelphia; but his flank would have been covered, up to Albany, bya navigable stream on either side of which he could operate by thatflying bridge which the presence and control of the navy continuallyconstituted. Save the fortifications, which Clinton easily carried, there was no threat to his communications or to his flank, such as thehill country of New Jersey had offered and Washington had skilfullyutilised. The campaign of 1777 thus ended for the British with a conspicuousdisaster, and with an apparent success which was as disastrous as afailure. At its close they held Narragansett Bay, the city and harbourof New York, and the city of Philadelphia. The first was an admirablenaval base, especially for sailing ships, for the reasons given byRodney. The second was then, as it is now, the greatest militaryposition on the Atlantic coast of the United States; and althoughthe two could not communicate by land, they did support each otheras naval stations in a war essentially dependent upon maritime power. Philadelphia served no purpose but to divide and distract Britishenterprise. Absolutely dependent for maintenance upon the sea, theforces in it and in New York could not coöperate; they could not evenunite except by sea. When Clinton relieved Howe as commander-in-chief, though less than a hundred miles away by land, he had to take a voyageof over two hundred miles, from New York to Philadelphia, half ofit up a difficult river, to reach his station; and troops weretransferred by the same tedious process. In consequence of theseconditions, the place had to be abandoned the instant that war withFrance made control of the sea even doubtful. The British held it forless than nine months in all. During 1777 a number of raids were made by British combined land andsea forces, for the purpose of destroying American dépôts and otherresources. Taken together, such operations are subsidiary to, and aid, the great object of interrupting or harassing the communications ofan enemy. In so far, they have a standing place among the majoroperations of war; but taken singly they cannot be so reckoned, andthe fact, therefore, is simply noted, without going into details. It may be remarked, however, that in them, although the scale wassmaller, the Navy played the same part that it now does in the manyexpeditions and small wars undertaken by Great Britain in variousparts of the world; the same that it did in Wellington's campaignsin the Spanish peninsula, 1808-1812. The land force depended upon thewater, and the water was controlled by the Navy. [Footnote 18: This was just below the mouth of the Schuylkill, a shortdistance below the present League Island navy yard. ] CHAPTER IV WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATEPHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK, NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICANDISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND. 1778 The events of 1777 satisfied the French government that the Americanshad strength and skill sufficient to embarrass Great Britainseriously, and that the moment, therefore, was opportune for takingsteps which scarcely could fail to cause war. On the 6th of February, 1778, France concluded with the United States an open treaty ofamity and commerce; and at the same time a second secret treaty, acknowledging the independence of the late Colonies, and contractingwith them a defensive alliance. On the 13th of March, the FrenchAmbassador in London communicated the open treaty to the Britishgovernment, with the remark that "the United States were in fullpossession of the independence proclaimed by their declaration of July4th, 1776. " Great Britain at once recalled her Ambassador, and bothcountries prepared for war, although no declaration was issued. Onthe 13th of April, a French fleet of twelve ships of the line and fivefrigates, under the command of the Count d'Estaing, [19] sailed fromToulon for the American coast. It was destined to Delaware Bay, hoping to intercept Howe's squadron. D'Estaing was directed to beginhostilities when forty leagues west of Gibraltar. The British ministry was not insensible of the danger, the imminenceof which had been felt during the previous year; but it had not gotready betimes, owing possibly to confident expectations of successfrom the campaign of 1777. The ships, in point of numbers andequipment, were not as far forward as the Admiralty had represented;and difficulty, amounting for the moment to impossibility, wasexperienced in manning them. The vessels of the Channel fleet had tobe robbed of both crews and stores to compose a proper reinforcementfor America. Moreover, the destination of the Toulon squadron wasunknown, the French government having given out that it was bound toBrest, where over twenty other ships of the line were in an advancedstate of preparation. Not until the 5th of June, when d'Estaing wasalready eight weeks out, was certain news brought by a frigate, whichhad watched his fleet after it had passed Gibraltar, and which hadaccompanied it into the Atlantic ninety leagues west of the Straits. The reinforcement for America was then permitted to depart. On the9th of June, thirteen ships of the line sailed for New York under thecommand of Vice-Admiral John Byron. [20] These delays occasioned a singular and striking illustration of theill effects upon commerce of inadequate preparation for manningthe fleet. A considerable number of West India ships, with storesabsolutely necessary for the preservation of the islands, waited atPortsmouth for convoy for upwards of three months, while the wholefleet, of eighty sail, was detained for five weeks after it hadassembled; "and, although the wind came fair on the 19th of May, itdid not sail till the 26th, owing to the convoying ships, the _Boyne_and the _Ruby_, not being ready. " Forty-five owners and masters signeda letter to the Admiralty, stating these facts. "The convoy, " theysaid, "was appointed to sail April 10th. " Many ships had been readyas early as February. "Is not this shameful usage, my Lords, thus todeceive the public in general? There are two hundred ships loaded withprovisions, etc. , waiting at Spithead these three months. The averageexpense of each ship amounts to £150 monthly, so that the expense ofthe whole West India fleet since February amounts to £90, 000. " The West Indies before the war had depended chiefly upon their fellowcolonies on the American continent for provisions, as well as forother prime necessaries. Not only were these cut off as an incident ofthe war, entailing great embarrassment and suffering, which elicitedvehement appeals from the planter community to the home government, but the American privateers preyed heavily upon the commerce of theislands, whose industries were thus smitten root and branch, importand export. In 1776, salt food for whites and negroes had risen from50 to 100 per cent, and corn, the chief support of the slaves, --thelaboring class, --by 400 per cent. At the same time sugar had fallenfrom 25 to 40 per cent in price, rum over 37 per cent. The words"starvation" and "famine" were freely used in these representations, which were repeated in 1778. Insurance rose to 23 per cent; and this, with actual losses by capture, [21] and by cessation of American trade, with consequent fall of prices, was estimated to give a total lossof £66 upon every £100 earned before the war. Yet, with all this, the outward West India fleet in 1778 waited six weeks, April 10th-May26th, for convoy. Immediately after it got away, a rigorous embargowas laid upon all shipping in British ports, that their crews mightbe impressed to man the Channel fleet. Market-boats, even, were notallowed to pass between Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. Three days after Byron had sailed, Admiral Augustus Keppel also putto sea with twenty-one ships of the line, to cruise off Brest. Hisinstructions were to prevent the junction of the Toulon and Brestdivisions, attacking either that he might meet. On the 17th of June, two French frigates were sighted. In order that they might not reporthis force or his movements, the British Admiral sent two of his ownfrigates, with the request that they would speak him. One, the _BellePoule_, 36, refused; and an engagement followed between her and theBritish ship, the _Arethusa_, 32. The King of France subsequentlydeclared that this occurrence fixed the date of the war's beginning. Although both Keppel's and d'Estaing's orders prescribed acts ofhostility, no formal war yet existed. Byron had a very tempestuous passage, with adverse winds, by which hisvessels were scattered and damaged. On the 18th of August, sixty-sevendays from Plymouth, the flagship arrived off the south coast of LongIsland, ninety miles east of New York, without one of the fleet incompany. There twelve ships were seen at anchor to leeward (north), nine or ten miles distant, having jury masts, and showing other signsof disability. The British vessel approached near enough to recognisethem as French. They were d'Estaing's squadron, crippled by a veryheavy gale, in which Howe's force had also suffered, though to aless extent. Being alone, and ignorant of existing conditions, Byron thought it inexpedient to continue on for either New York orNarragansett Bay. The wind being southerly, he steered for Halifax, which he reached August 26th. Some of his ships also entered there. A very few had already succeeded in joining Howe in New York, beingfortunate enough to escape the enemy. So far as help from England went, Lord Howe would have been crushedlong before this. He owed his safety partly to his own celerity, partly to the delays of his opponent. Early in May he received advicesfrom home, which convinced him that a sudden and rapid abandonment ofPhiladelphia and of Delaware Bay might become necessary. He thereforewithdrew his ships of the line from New York and Narragansett, concentrating them at the mouth of Delaware Bay, while the transportsembarked all stores, except those needed for a fortnight's supplyof the army in a hostile country. The threatening contingency ofa superior enemy's appearing off the coast might, and did, make itimperative not to risk the troops at sea, but to choose instead thealternative of a ninety-mile march through New Jersey, which a yearbefore had been rejected as too hazardous for an even larger force. Thus prepared, no time was lost when the evacuation became necessary. Sir William Howe, who had been relieved on the 24th of May by SirHenry Clinton, and had returned to England, escaped the humiliation ofgiving up his dearly bought conquest. On the 18th of June the Britishtroops, twelve thousand in number, were ferried across the Delaware, under the supervision of the Navy, and began their hazardous march toNew York. The next day the transports began to move down the river;but, owing to the intricate navigation, head winds, and calms, theydid not get to sea until the 28th of June. On the 8th of July, tendays too late, d'Estaing anchored in the mouth of the Delaware. "Had apassage of even ordinary length taken place, " wrote Washington, "LordHowe with the British ships of war and all the transports in the riverDelaware must inevitably have fallen; and Sir Henry Clinton must havehad better luck than is commonly dispensed to men of his professionunder such circumstances, if he and his troops had not shared at leastthe fate of Burgoyne. " Had Howe's fleet been intercepted, there would have been no navaldefence for New York; the French fleet would have surmounted thedifficulties of the harbour bar at its ease; and Clinton, caughtbetween it and the American army, must have surrendered. Howe'sarrival obviated this immediate danger; but much still needed to bedone, or the end would be postponed only, not averted. A fair windcarried the fleet and the whole convoy from the Delaware to SandyHook in forty-eight hours. On the morning of the 29th, as Howe wasapproaching his port, he spoke a packet from England, which not onlybrought definite news of d'Estaing's sailing, but also reported thatshe herself had fallen in with him to the southward, not very far fromthe American coast, and had been chased by his ships. His appearanceoff New York, therefore, was imminent. Howe's measures were prompt and thorough, as became his greatreputation. To watch for d'Estaing's approach, a body of cruisers wasdespatched, numerous enough for some to bring frequent word of hismovements, while others kept touch with him. The ships at New Yorkwere ordered down to Sandy Hook, where the defence of the entrancewas to be made. Clinton, who had been hard pressed by Washingtonthroughout his march, arrived on the 30th of June--the day after Howehimself--on the heights of Navesink, on the seacoast, just southof Sandy Hook. During the previous winter the sea had made a breachbetween the heights and the Hook, converting the latter into anisland. Across this inlet the Navy threw a bridge of boats, bywhich the army on the 5th of July passed to the Hook, and thence wasconveyed to the city. On the same day the French fleet was sighted off the coast of Virginiaby a cruiser, which reached Howe on the 7th; and two days lateranother brought word that the enemy had anchored on the 8th off theDelaware. There d'Estaing again tarried for two days, which werediligently improved by the British Admiral, who at the same timesent off despatches to warn Byron, of whose coming he now had heard. Despite all his energy, his preparations still were far from complete, when on the morning of the 11th a third vessel arrived, announcingthat the French were approaching. That evening they anchored outside, four miles south of Sandy Hook. Howe, who during all these days wasindefatigable, not only in planning but also in personal supervisionof details, hastened at once to place his vessels according to thedisposition which he had determined, and which he had carefullyexplained to his captains, thus insuring an intelligent coöperation ontheir part. The narrow arm of land called Sandy Hook projects in a northerlydirection from the New Jersey coast, and covers the lower bay of NewYork on the south side. The main ship-channel, then as now, ran nearlyeast and west, at right angles to the Hook and close to its northernend. Beyond the channel, to the north, there was no solid ground forfortification within the cannon range of that day. Therefore such gunsas could be mounted on shore, five in number, were placed in batteryat the end of the Hook. These formed the right flank of the defence, which was continued thence to the westward by a line of seven ships, skirting the southern edge of the channel. As the approach of theFrench, if they attacked, must be with an easterly wind and a risingtide, the ships were placed with that expectation; and in such wisethat, riding with their heads to the eastward, each successive one, from van to rear, lay a little outside--north--of her next ahead. Theobject of this indented formation was that each ship might bring herbroadside to bear east, and yet fire clear of those to the east ofher. In order to effect this concentration of all the batteries inan easterly direction, which would rake the approach of the enemy, a spring[23] was run from the outer, or port quarter of every ship, except the leader. [24] These springs were not taken to the bow cableor anchor, as was often done, but to anchors of their own, placedbroad off the port bows. If, then, the enemy attacked, the ships, bysimply keeping fast the springs and veering the cables, would swingwith their broadsides facing east. If the enemy, which had no bowfire, survived his punishment, and succeeded in advancing till abreastthe British line, it was necessary only to keep fast the cables andlet go the springs; the ships would swing head to the east wind, andthe broadsides would once more bear north, across the channel insteadof along it. These careful arrangements were subject, of course, tothe mischance of shot cutting away cables or springs; but this wasmore than offset by the probable injury to the enemy's spars andrigging, as well as hulls, before he could use his batteries at all. Such was the main defence arranged by Howe; with which New York stoodor fell. In the line were five 64's, one 50, and an armed storeship. An advanced line, of one fifty with two smaller vessels, was placedjust inside the bar--two or three miles outside the Hook--to rakethe enemy as he crossed, retiring as he approached; and four galleys, forming a second line, were also stationed for the same purpose, across the channel, abreast of the Hook. [25] The retreat of these wassecure into the shoal water, where they could not be followed. One 64and some frigates were held as a reserve, inside the main line, to actas occasion might require. The total available force was, six 64's, three 50's, and six frigates. D'Estaing's fleet, in detail, consistedof one 90-gun ship, one 80, six 74's and one 50. Great as was thisdiscrepancy between the opponents, it was counterbalanced largely byHowe's skilful dispositions, which his enemy could not circumvent. Ifthe latter once got alongside, there was little hope for the British;but it was impossible for the French to evade the primary necessityof undergoing a raking fire, without reply, from the extreme range oftheir enemies' cannon up to the moment of closing. The stake, however, was great, and the apparent odds stirred to the bottom the fightingblood of the British seamen. The ships of war being short-handed, Howecalled for volunteers from the transports. Such numbers came forwardthat the agents of the vessels scarcely could keep a watch on board;and many whose names were not on the lists concealed themselves inthe boats which carried their companions to the fighting ships. Themasters and mates of merchantmen in the harbour in like manner offeredtheir services, taking their stations at the guns. Others cruised offthe coast in small boats, to warn off approaching vessels; many ofwhich nevertheless fell into the enemy's hands. Meanwhile d'Estaing was in communication with Washington, one of whoseaides-de-camp visited his flagship. A number of New York pilots alsowere sent. When these learned the draught of the heavier French ships, they declared that it was impossible to take them in; that there wason the bar only twenty-three feet at high water. Had that been reallythe case, Howe would not have needed to make the preparations fordefence that were visible to thousands of eyes on sea and on shore;but d'Estaing, though personally brave as a lion, was timid in hisprofession, which he had entered at the age of thirty, without servingin the lower grades. The assurances of the pilots were accepted afteran examination by a lieutenant of the flagship, who could find nothingdeeper than twenty-two feet. Fortune's favors are thrown away, asthough in mockery, on the incompetent or the irresolute. On the 22d ofJuly a fresh north-east wind concurred with a spring tide to give thehighest possible water on the bar. [26] "At eight o'clock, " wrote an eye-witness in the British fleet, "d'Estaing with all his squadron appeared under way. He kept working to windward, as if to gain a proper position for crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind could not be more favourable for such a design; it blew from the exact point from which he could attack us to the greatest advantage. The spring tides were at the highest, and that afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently expected the hottest day that had ever been fought between the two nations. On our side all was at stake. Had the men-of-war been defeated, the fleet of transports and victuallers must have been destroyed, and the army, of course, have fallen with us. D'Estaing, however, had not spirit equal to the risk; at three o'clock we saw him bear off to the southward, and in a few hours he was out of sight. " Four days later, Howe, reporting these occurrences, wrote: "Theweather having been favourable the last three days for forcingentrance to this port, I conclude the French commander has desisted. "It is clear that the experienced British admiral did not recognise theimpossibility of success for the enemy. After the demonstration of the 22d, d'Estaing stood to the southward, with the wind at east. The British advice-boats brought back wordthat they had kept company with him as far south as the Capes ofthe Delaware, and there had left him ninety miles from land. Whentheir leaving freed him from observation, he turned, and made forNarragansett Bay, an attack on which, in support of an American landforce, had been concerted between him and Washington. On the 29thhe anchored three miles south of Rhode Island, and there awaited asuitable moment for forcing the entrance. Narragansett Bay contains several islands. The two largest, nearthe sea, are Rhode Island and Conanicut, the latter being the morewesterly. Their general direction, as that of the Bay itself, is northand south; and by them the entrance is divided into three passages. Of these, the eastern, called Seakonnet, is not navigable above RhodeIsland. The central, which is the main channel, is joined by thewestern above Conanicut, and thus the two lead to the upper Bay. Thetown of Newport is on the west side of Rhode Island, four miles fromthe main entrance. On the 30th of July, the day after the French fleet had arrived, twoof its ships of the line, under command of the afterwards celebratedSuffren, went up the western channel, anchoring within it near thesouth end of Conanicut. One of them, as she passed, was hulledtwice by the British batteries. At the same time, two frigates anda corvette entered Seakonnet; whereupon the British abandoned andburned a sloop of war, the _Kingfisher_, 16, and some galleys therestationed. The British general, Sir Robert Pigot, now withdrew hisdetachments from Conanicut, after disabling the guns, and concentratedthe bulk of his force in the southern part of Rhode Island and aboutNewport. Goat Island, which covers the inner harbour of the town, wasstill occupied, the main channel being commanded by its batteries, aswell as by those to the north and south of it upon Rhode Island. Onthe 5th of August, Suffren's two ships again got under way, sailedthrough the western passage, and anchored in the main channel, northof Conanicut; their former positions being taken by two other shipsof the line. [27] The senior British naval officer, seeing retreat cutoff both north and south, now destroyed those ships of war[28] whichcould not enter the inner harbour, sinking two between Goat and RhodeIslands, to prevent any enemy passing there. Five transports alsowere sunk north of Goat Island, between it and Coaster's Harbour, to protect the inside anchorage in that direction. These preliminaryoperations cost the British five frigates and two sloops, besidessome galleys. Guns and ammunition taken from them went to increasethe defences; and their officers and crews, over a thousand in number, served in the fortifications. [Illustration] On the 8th of August the eight remaining French ships of the line ranthe batteries on Rhode and Goat Islands, anchoring above the latter, between it and Conanicut, and were rejoined there by the fourpreviously detached to the western passage. Ten thousand Americantroops having by this time crossed from the mainland to the northernpart of Rhode Island, d'Estaing immediately landed four thousandsoldiers and seamen from the fleet upon Conanicut, for a preliminaryorganisation; after which they also were to pass to Rhode Islandand join in the operations. For the moment, therefore, the Britishgarrison, numbering probably six thousand men, [29] was hemmed inby vastly superior forces, by land and by water. Its embarrassment, however, did not last long. On the following morning Lord Howeappeared and anchored off Point Judith, seven miles from the entranceto the Bay, and twelve from the position then occupied by the Frenchfleet. He brought a stronger force than he had been able to gather forthe defence of New York, having now one 74, seven 64's, and five 50's, in all thirteen of the line, besides several smaller vessels; but hestill was greatly inferior to opponent, by any rational mode of navalreckoning. Howe's energies in New York had not been confined to preparationsfor resisting the entrance of the enemy, nor did they cease with thelatter's departure. When he first arrived there from Philadelphia, hehad hastened to get his ships ready for sea, a pre-occupation whichsomewhat, but not unduly, delayed their taking their positions atSandy Hook. Two, for instance, had been at the watering-place when theapproach of the French was signalled. Owing to this diligence, no timewas lost by his fault when the new destination of the enemy was madeknown to him, on the 28th or 29th of July, by the arrival of the_Raisonnable_, 64, [30] from Halifax. This ship narrowly escaped theFrench fleet, having passed it on the evening of the 27th, steeringfor Rhode Island. The _Renown_, 50, which on the 26th had reached NewYork from the West Indies, had a similar close shave, having sailedunnoticed through the rear of the enemy the night before. Besidesthese two, Howe was joined also by the _Centurion_, 50, from Halifax, and by the _Cornwall_, 74; the latter, which crossed the bar on the30th, being the first of Byron's fleet to reach New York. The threeothers belonged to Howe's own squadron. For the two Halifax shipswhich helped to make this most welcome reinforcement, the Admiral wasindebted to the diligence of the officer there commanding, who hurriedthem away as soon as he learned of d'Estaing's appearance on thecoast. The opportuneness of their arrival attracted notice. "Hadthey appeared a few days sooner, " says a contemporary narrative, "either they must have been prevented from forming a junction withour squadron, and forced again to sea, or we should have had themortification to see them increase the triumph of our enemy. " On the 1st of August, forty-eight hours after the _Cornwall_ had comein from a stormy passage of fifty-two days, the squadron was ready forsea, and Howe attempted to sail; but the wind hauled foul immediatelyafter the signal to weigh had been made. It did not become fair at thehour of high water, when alone heavy ships could cross the bar, untilthe morning of the 6th. "Rhode Island was of such importance, " saysthe narrator already quoted, "_and the fate of so large a portionof the British army as formed the garrison was of such infiniteconsequence to the general cause_, that it was imagined the Admiralwould not lose a moment in making some attempt for their relief. "He had learned of the detachments made from the French fleet, andhoped that some advantage might be taken of this division. Inshort, he went, as was proper and incumbent on him in such criticalcircumstances, to take a great risk, in hope of a favourable chanceoffering. On the 9th, as before stated, he anchored off Point Judith, and opened communications with the garrison, from which he learnedthe events that had so far occurred, and also that the enemy was wellprovided with craft of all kinds to make a descent upon any part ofthe Island. As deGrasse at Yorktown, when rumour announced the approach ofa British fleet, was deterred only by the most urgent appeals ofWashington from abandoning his control of the Chesapeake, essentialto the capture of Cornwallis, so now d'Estaing, in Narragansett Bay, was unwilling to keep his place, in face of Howe's greatly inferiorsquadron. [31] The influence exerted upon these two admirals by themere approach of a hostile fleet, when decisive advantages dependedupon their holding their ground, may be cited plausibly in supportof the most extreme view of the effect of a "fleet in being;" butthe instances also, when the conditions are analysed, will suggestthe question: Is such effect always legitimate, inherent in theexistence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend often uponthe characteristics of the man affected? The contemporary Britishnarrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after reciting thevarious obstacles and the inferiority of the British squadron, says: "The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion thatthe Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack; and it appears by hisLordship's public letter that this was also his own opinion: undersuch circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford theGeneral any essential relief. " In both these instances, the admiralsconcerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain capture, notof a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy's organisedforces, by the mere possibility of action; by the moral effectproduced by a fleet greatly inferior to their own, which in neithercase would have attacked, as things stood. What does this prove? Immediately upon Howe's appearance, the French seamen who had landedthe day before on Conanicut were recalled to their ships. The nextmorning, August 10, at 7 A. M. , the wind came out strong at north-east, which is exceptional at that season. D'Estaing at once put to sea, cutting the cables in his haste. In two hours he was outside, steeringfor the enemy. Howe, of course, retired at once; his inferiority[32]did not permit an engagement except on his own terms. To insure these, he needed the weather-gage, the offensive position of that day, whichby keeping south he expected to gain, when the usual wind from thatquarter should set in. The French Admiral had the same object, hopingto crush his agile opponent; and, as the sea breeze from south-westdid not make that day, he succeeded in keeping the advantage withwhich he had started, despite Howe's skill. At nightfall both fleetswere still steering to the southward, on the port tack, the Frenchfive or six miles in the rear of the British, with the wind variableat east. The same course was maintained throughout the night, theFrench gradually overhauling the British, and becoming visible at 3A. M. Of the 11th. By Howe's dispatch, they bore in the morning, at anhour not specified, east-north-east, which would be nearly abeam, butsomewhat more distant than the night before, having apparently keptcloser to the wind, which by this had steadied at east-north-east. In the course of the day Howe shifted his flag from the _Eagle_, 64, to the _Apollo_, 32, and placed himself between the two fleets, thebetter to decide the movements of his own. Finding it impossibleto gain the weather-gage, and unwilling, probably, to be drawn toofar from Rhode Island, he now made a wide circle with the fleetby a succession of changes of course: at 8 A. M. To south, then tosouth-west and west, until finally, at 1. 30 P. M. , the ships weresteering north-west; always in line of battle. The French Admiralseems to have followed this movement cautiously, on an outer circlebut with a higher speed, so that from east-north-east in the morning, which, as the fleets were then heading, would be on the starboard sideof the British, abreast and to windward, at 4 P. M. The French boresouth-south-east, which would be somewhat on the port quarter, ornearly astern but to leeward. At this time their van was estimated byHowe to be two or three miles from the British rear, and, accordingto his reading of their manoeuvres, d'Estaing was forming his linefor the same tack as the British, with a view of "engaging the Britishsquadron to leeward, " whereby he would obtain over it the advantageof using the lower-deck guns, the wind and sea having become muchheavier. As the French Admiral, in this new disposition, had put hisheaviest ships in the van, and his line was nearly in the wake of theBritish, Howe inferred an attack upon his rear. He therefore orderedhis heaviest ship, the _Cornwall_, 74, to go there from the centre, exchanging places with the _Centurion_, 50, and at the same timesignalled the fleet to close _to the centre_, --a detail worthremembering in view of Rodney's frustrated manoeuvre of April 17th, 1780. It now remained simply to await firmly the moment when theFrench should have covered the intervening ground, and broughtto action so much of his rear as d'Estaing saw fit to engage; theconditions of the sea favoring the speed of the bulkier ships thatcomposed the hostile fleet. The latter, however, soon abandoned theattempt, and "bore away to the southward, apparently from the state ofthe weather, which, by the wind freshening much, with frequent rain, was now rendered very unfavorable for engaging. " It may be added thatthe hour was very late for beginning an action. At sundown the Britishwere under close-reefed topsails, and the sea such that Howe wasunable to return to the _Eagle_. [33] The wind now increased to great violence, and a severe storm raged onthe coast until the evening of the 13th, throwing the two fleets intoconfusion, scattering the ships, and causing numerous disasters. The_Apollo_ lost her foremast, and sprung the mainmast, on the night ofthe 12th. The next day only two British ships of the line and threesmaller vessels were in sight of their Admiral. When the weathermoderated, Howe went on board the _Phoenix_, 44, and thence to the_Centurion_, 50, with which he "proceeded to the southward, and on the15th discovered ten sail of the French squadron, some at anchor in thesea, about twenty-five leagues east from Cape May. "[34] Leaving therethe _Centurion_, to direct to New York any of Byron's ships thatmight come on the coast, he departed thither himself also, and onthe evening of the 17th rejoined the squadron off Sandy Hook, theappointed rendezvous. Many injuries had been received by the variousships, but they were mostly of a minor character; and on the 22d thefleet again put to sea in search of the enemy. The French had suffered much more severely. The flagship _Languedoc_, 90, had carried away her bowsprit, all her lower masts followedit overboard, and her tiller also was broken, rendering the rudderunserviceable. The _Marseillais_, 74, lost her foremast and bowsprit. In the dispersal of the two fleets that followed the gale, each ofthese crippled vessels, on the evening of the 13th, encountered singlya British 50-gun ship; the _Languedoc_ being attacked by the _Renown_, and the _Marseillais_ by the _Preston_. The conditions in eachinstance were distinctly favourable to the smaller combatant; but bothunfortunately withdrew at nightfall, making the mistake of postponingto to-morrow a chance which they had no certainty would exist afterto-day. When morning dawned, other French ships appeared, and theopportunity passed away. The British _Isis_, 50, also was chased andovertaken by the _César_, 74. In the action which ensued, the Frenchship's wheel was shot away, and she retired;--two other Britishvessels, one of the line, being in sight. The latter are not mentionedin the British accounts, and both sides claimed the advantage in thisdrawn action. The French captain lost an arm. After making temporary repairs, at the anchorage where Howe saw themon the 15th of August, the French fleet had proceeded again towardsNewport. It was in the course of this passage that they were seen byByron's flagship[35] on the 18th, to the southward of Long Island. The_Experiment_, 50, which Howe had sent to reconnoitre Narragansett Bay, was chased by them into Long Island Sound, and only reached New Yorkby the East River; being the first ship of the line or 50-gun shipthat ever passed through Hell Gate. On the 20th d'Estaing communicatedwith General Sullivan, the commander of the American land forces onRhode Island; but it was only to tell him that in his own opinion, and in that of a council of war, the condition of the squadronnecessitated going to Boston to refit. Whatever may be thought of thepropriety of this decision, its seriousness can be best understoodfrom the report sent by Pigot to Howe. "The rebels had advanced theirbatteries within fifteen hundred yards of the British works. He wasunder no apprehensions from any of their attempts in front; but, should the French fleet come in, it would make an alarming change. Troops might be landed and advanced in his rear; and in that casehe could not answer for the consequences. " Disregarding Sullivan'sentreaties that he would remain, d'Estaing sailed next day for Boston, which he reached on August 28th. On the 31st the indefatigable Howecame in sight; but the French had worked actively in the three days. Forty-nine guns, 18 and 24-pounders, with six mortars, were alreadyin position covering the anchorage; and "the French squadron, farfrom fearing an attack, desired it eagerly. "[36] The withdrawal of theFrench fleet from Rhode Island was followed by that of the Americantroops from before Newport. Howe had quitted New York the instant he heard of d'Estaing'sreappearance off Rhode Island. He took with him the same number ofvessels as before, --thirteen of the line, --the _Monmouth_, 64, ofByron's squadron, having arrived and taken the place of the _Isis_, crippled in her late action. Before reaching Newport, he learnedthat the French had started for Boston. He hoped that they wouldfind it necessary to go outside George's Bank, and that he mightintercept them by following the shorter road inside. In this he wasdisappointed, as has been seen, and the enemy's position was nowtoo strong for attack. The French retreat to Boston closed the navalcampaign of 1778 in North American waters. [Illustration] The inability or unwillingness of d'Estaing to renew the enterpriseagainst Rhode Island accords the indisputable triumph in this campaignto Howe, --an honour he must share, and doubtless would have sharedgladly, with his supporters in general. That his fleet, for the mostpart two years from home, in a country without dockyards, should havebeen able to take the sea within ten days after the gale, while theiropponents, just from France, yet with three months' sea practice, wereso damaged that they had to abandon the field and all the splendidprospects of Rhode Island, --as they already had allowed to slip thechance at New York, --shows a decisive superiority in the Britishofficers and crews. The incontestable merits of the rank and file, however, must not be permitted to divert attention from the greatqualities of the leader, but for which the best material would havebeen unavailing. The conditions were such as to elicit to the utmostHowe's strongest qualities, --firmness, endurance, uninterruptedpersistence rather than celerity, great professional skill, ripened byconstant reflection and ready at an instant's call. Not brilliant inintellect, perhaps, but absolutely clear, and replete with expedientsto meet every probable contingency, Howe exhibited an equable, unflagging energy, which was his greatest characteristic, and whicheminently fitted him for the task of checkmating an enemy's everymove--for a purely defensive campaign. He was always on hand andalways ready; for he never wearied, and he knew his business. Togreat combinations he was perhaps unequal. At all events, such are notassociated with his name. The distant scene he did not see; but stepby step he saw his way with absolute precision, and followed it withunhesitating resolution. With a force inferior throughout, to havesaved, in one campaign, the British fleet, New York, and Rhode Island, with the entire British army, which was divided between those twostations and dependent upon the sea, is an achievement unsurpassedin the annals of naval defensive warfare. It may be added that hisaccomplishment is the measure of his adversary's deficiencies. Howe's squadron had been constituted in 1776 with reference to thecolonial struggle only, and to shallow water, and therefore wascomposed, very properly, of cruisers, and of ships of the line of thesmaller classes; there being several fifties, and nothing larger thana sixty-four. When war with France threatened, the Ministry, havinglong warning, committed an unpardonable fault in allowing such a forceto be confronted by one so superior as that which sailed from Toulon, in April, 1778. This should have been stopped on its way, or, failingthat, its arrival in America should have been preceded by a Britishreinforcement. As it was, the government was saved from a tremendousdisaster only by the efficiency of its Admiral and the inefficiency ofhis antagonist. As is not too uncommon, gratitude was swamped by theinstinct of self-preservation from the national wrath, excited bythis, and by other simultaneous evidences of neglect. An attempt wasmade to disparage Howe's conduct, and to prove that his force was evensuperior to that of the French, by adding together the guns in all hisships, disregarding their classes, or by combining groups of his smallvessels against d'Estaing's larger units. The instrument of the attackwas a naval officer, of some rank but slender professional credit, whoat this most opportune moment underwent a political conversion, whichearned him employment on the one hand, and the charge of apostasy onthe other. For this kind of professional arithmetic, Howe felt andexpressed just and utter contempt. Two and two make four in a primer, but in the field they may make three, or they may make five. Notto speak of the greater defensive power of heavy ships, nor of theconcentration of their fire, the unity of direction under one captainpossesses here also that importance which has caused unity of commandand of effort to be recognised as the prime element in militaryefficiency, from the greatest things to the smallest. Taken together, the three elements--greater defensive power, concentration of fire, and unity of direction--constitute a decisive and permanent argumentin favor of big ships, in Howe's days as in our own. Doubtless, now, as then, there is a limit; most arguments can be pushed to an_absurdum_, intellectual or practical. To draw a line is always hard;but, if we cannot tell just where the line has been passed we canrecognise that one ship is much too big, while another certainly isnot. Between the two an approximation to an exact result can be made. On his return to New York on September 11th, Howe found thereRear-Admiral Hyde Parker[37] with six ships of the line of Byron'ssquadron. Considering his task now accomplished, Howe decided toreturn to England, in virtue of a permission granted some timebefore at his own request. The duty against the Americans, lately hisfellow-countrymen, had been always distasteful to him, although hedid not absolutely refuse to undertake it, as did Admiral Keppel. The entrance of France into the quarrel, and the coming of d'Estaing, refreshed the spirits of the veteran, who moreover scorned to abandonhis command in the face of such odds. Now, with the British positionssecure, and superiority of force insured for the time being, hegladly turned over his charge and sailed for home; burning against theAdmiralty with a wrath common to most of the distinguished seamen ofthat war. He was not employed afloat again until a change of Ministrytook place, in 1782. [Footnote 19: Charles H. , Comte d'Estaing. Born, 1729. Served inIndia under Lally Tollendal, 1758. After having been taken prisoner atMadras in 1759, exchanged into the navy. Commanded in North America, 1778-80. Guillotined, 1794. W. L. C. ] [Footnote 20: Grandfather of the poet. ] [Footnote 21: The Secretary of Lloyd's, for the purposes of this work, has been so good as to cause to be specially compiled a summary of thelosses and captures during the period 1775-1783. This, so far as itdeals with merchantmen and privateers, gives the following results. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | BRITISH VESSELS | ENEMY'S VESSELS |---------------------------------+---------------------------------- | Merchantmen | Privateers | Merchantmen | Privateers |----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------- | |Re-taken| |Re-taken| |Re-taken| |Re-taken | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | [22] | somed | [22] | somed | [22] | somed | [22] | somed-----+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+---------1775 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---1776 | 229 | 51 | --- | --- | 19 | --- | 6 | ---1777 | 331 | 52 | --- | --- | 51 | 1 | 18 | ---1778 | 359 | 87 | 5 | --- | 232 | 5 | 16 | ---1779 | 487 | 106 | 29 | 5 | 238 | 5 | 31 | ---1780 | 581 | 260 | 15 | 2 | 203 | 3 | 34 | 11781 | 587 | 211 | 38 | 6 | 277 | 10 | 40 | ---1782 | 415 | 99 | 1 | --- | 104 | 1 | 68 | ---1783 | 98 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3 | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Footnote 22: Including those re-taken or ransomed. W. L. C. ] [Footnote 23: A spring is a rope taken usually from the quarter (oneside of the stern) of a ship, to the anchor. By hauling upon it thebattery is turned in the direction desired. ] [Footnote 24: The leader, the _Leviathan_, was excepted, evidentlybecause she lay under the Hook, and her guns could not bear downchannel. She was not a fighting ship of the squadron, but an armedstoreship, although originally a ship of war, and therefore by herthickness of side better fitted for defence than an ordinary merchantvessel. Placing her seems to have been an afterthought, to close thegap in the line, and prevent even the possibility of the enemy's shipsturning in there and doubling on the van. Thus Howe avoided the fataloversight made by Brueys twenty years later, in Aboukir Bay. ] [Footnote 25: It may be recalled that a similar disposition was madeby the Confederates at Mobile against Farragut's attack in 1864, andthat it was from these small vessels that his flagship _Hartford_underwent her severest loss. To sailing ships the odds weregreater, as injury to spars might involve stoppage. Moreover, Howe'sarrangements brought into such fire all his heavier ships. ] [Footnote 26: A letter to the Admiralty, dated October 8th, 1779, fromVice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, then commander-in-chief at New York, states that "at spring tides there is generally thirty feet of wateron the bar at high water. "] [Footnote 27: These four ships were among the smallest of the fleet, being one 74, two 64's, and a 50. D'Estaing very properly reserved hisheaviest ships to force the main channel. ] [Footnote 28: _Flora_, 32; _Juno_, 32; Lark, 32; _Orpheus_, 32;_Falcon_, 16. ] [Footnote 29: I have not been able to find an exact statement of thenumber; Beatson gives eight regiments, with a reinforcement of fivebattalions. ] [Footnote 30: It may be interesting to recall that this was the shipon the books of which Nelson's name was first borne in the navy, in1771. ] [Footnote 31: Troude attributes d'Estaing's sortie to a sense ofthe insecurity of his position; Lapeyrouse Bonfils, to a desire forcontest. Chevalier dwells upon the exposure of the situation. ] [Footnote 32: For the respective force of the two fleets see pp. 66, 67, 71. ] [Footnote 33: This account of the manoeuvres of the two fleets isbased upon Lord Howe's dispatch, and amplified from the journal ofCaptain Henry Duncan of the flagship _Eagle_ which has been published(1902) since the first publication of this work. See "Navy RecordsSociety, Naval Miscellany. " Vol. I, p. 161. ] [Footnote 34: At the mouth of Delaware Bay. ] [Footnote 35: _Ante_, p. 62. ] [Footnote 36: Chevalier: "Marine Française, " 1778. ] [Footnote 37: Later Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, Bart. , who perishedin the _Cato_ in 1783. He was father of that Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, who in 1801 was Nelson's commander-in-chief at Copenhagen, and who in1778 commanded the _Phoenix_, 44, in Howe's fleet. (_Ante_, pp. 39, 46. )] CHAPTER V THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT 1778 During the same two months that saw the contest between d'Estaing andHowe in America the only encounter between nearly equal fleets in1778 took place in European waters. Admiral Keppel, having returnedto Spithead after the affair between the _Belle Poule_ and the_Arethusa_, [38] again put to sea on the 9th of July, with a forceincreased to thirty ships of the line. He had been mortified by thenecessity of avoiding action, and of even retiring into port, with theinadequate numbers before under his command, and his mind was fixednow to compel an engagement, if he met the French. The Brest fleet also put to sea, the day before Keppel, under thecommand of Admiral the Comte d'Orvilliers. It contained thirty-twoships of the line. Of these, three--64, a 60, and a 50--were notconsidered fit for the line of battle, which was thus reduced totwenty-nine sail, carrying 2098 guns. To these the British opposed anaggregate of 2278; but comparison by this means only is very rough. Not only the sizes of the guns, but the classes and weight of thevessels need to be considered. In the particular instance the matteris of little importance; the action being indecisive, and creditdepending upon manoeuvres rather than upon fighting. The French admiral was hampered by vacillating instructions, reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry. Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that he was expected to avoidaction, unless under very favourable circumstances. At the moment ofsailing he wrote: "Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, Iwill not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless by positive orders, until I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instructions, and known to all the captains. Till then I will not fly before AdmiralKeppel, whatever his strength; only, if I know him to be too superior, I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can; but if theenemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to shun. " Thesewords explain his conduct through the next few days. On the afternoon of July 23d the two fleets sighted each other, abouta hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to leeward. Towards sunset, they were standing south-west, with the wind atwest-north-west, and bore north-east from the enemy, who werelying-to, heads to the northward. The British remaining nearlymotionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting, d'Orvilliersavailed himself of the conditions to press to windward, and in themorning was found to bear north-west from his opponent. [39] Theirrelative positions satisfied both admirals for the moment; forKeppel found himself interposed between Brest and the French, whiled'Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open retreat to hisport, had made it possible, by getting the weather-gage, to fulfilhis promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of his ships, however, the _Duc de Bourgogne_, 80, and a 74, were still to leeward, not only of their own main body, but also of the British. Keppelsent chasers after them, for the expressed purpose of compellingd'Orvilliers to action in their support, [40] and it was believed bythe British that they were forced to return to Brest, to avoid beingcut off. They certainly quitted their fleet, which was thus reduced totwenty-seven effective sail. From this time until July 27th the windcontinued to the westward, and the wariness of the French admiralbaffled all his antagonist's efforts to get within range. Keppel, having no doubts as to what was expected of him, pursued vigorously, watching his chance. On the morning of July 27th the two fleets [Fig1, AA, AA], were from six to ten miles apart, wind south-west, both onthe port tack, [41] steering north-west; the French dead to windward, in line ahead. The British were in bow-and-quarter line. In thisformation, when exact, the ships of a fleet were nearly abreast eachother; so ranged, however, that if they tacked all at the same timethey would be at once in line of battle ahead close to the wind, --thefighting order. [42] Both fleets were irregularly formed, the Britishespecially so; for Keppel rightly considered that he would notaccomplish his purpose, if he were pedantic concerning the order ofhis going. He had therefore signalled a "General Chase, " which, by permitting much individual freedom of movement, facilitated theprogress of the whole body. At daylight, the division commanded bySir Hugh Palliser--the right wing, as then heading--had dropped astern[R]; and at 5. 30 A. M. The signal was made to seven of its fastestsailers to chase to windward, to get farther to windward by pressingsail, the object being so to place them relatively to the main body, as to support the latter, if an opportunity for action should offer. At 9 A. M. The French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy and tosee more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession, --tocountermarch. As the van ships went round (b) under this signal, theyhad to steer off the wind (be), parallel to their former line, onwhich those following them still were, until they reached the point towhich the rear ship meantime had advanced (c), when they could againhaul to the wind. This caused a loss of ground to leeward, but notmore than d'Orvilliers could afford, as things stood. Just after hehad fairly committed himself to the manoeuvre, the wind hauled to thesouthward two points, [43] from south-west to south-south-west, whichfavoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards theenemy (BB). The shift also threw the bows of the French off the linethey were following, deranging their order. Keppel therefore continuedon the port tack, until all the French (BB), were on the starboard, and at 10. 15, being nearly in their wake, he ordered his own ships totack together (dd), which would bring them into line ahead on the sametack as the French; that is, having the wind on the same side. Thisput the British in column, [44] still to leeward, but nearly astern ofthe enemy and following (CC). At this moment a thick rain-squall cameup, concealing the fleets one from another for three quarters of anhour. With the squall the wind shifted back to southwest, favouringthe British on this tack, as it had on the other, and enabling them tolay up for the enemy's rear after which (French BB) they were standingand could now bring to action. When the weather cleared, at 11, theFrench were seen to have gone about again, all the ships together, and were still in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre (CC). Their admiral had doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, andfrom the direction of the enemy when last visible, that an encountercould not be avoided. If he continued on the starboard tack, the vanof the pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not bemisunderstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many ofthem as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of thecolumns would meet, and the fleets pass in opposite directions, onequal terms as regarded position; because all the French would engage, and not only a part of their rear. Therefore he had ordered his shipsto go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again rapidly, but reversing the order so that the rear became the van. [Illustration] Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did henow. Recognising from the four days' chase that his enemy was avoidingaction, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at somerisk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade. Besides, thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to chase, these, forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he was advancing, were now well to windward, able therefore to support their comrades, if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In short, practically thewhole force was coming into action, although much less regularly thanmight have been desired. What was to follow was a rough-and-readyfight, but it was all that could be had, and better than nothing. Keppel therefore simply made the signal for battle, and that just asthe firing began. The collision was so sudden that the ships at firsthad not their colours flying. The French also, although their manoeuvres had been more methodical, were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of thirty ships, ofvarying qualities, to attain perfection of movement in a fortnight ofsea practice. The change of wind had precipitated an action, which oneadmiral had been seeking, and the other shunning; but each had to meetit with such shift as he could. The British (CC) being close-hauled, the French (CC), advancing on a parallel line, were four points[45]off the wind. Most of their ships, therefore, could have gone clearto windward of their opponents, but the fact that the latter couldreach some of the leaders compelled the others to support them. Asd'Orvilliers had said, it was hard to avoid an enemy resolute tofight. The leading three French vessels[46] (e) hauled their wind, inobedience to the admiral's signal to form the line of battle, whichmeans a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to draw themgradually away from the hostile line, taking them out of range of theBritish centre and rear. This, if imitated by their followers, wouldrender the affair even more partial and indecisive than such passingby usually was. The fourth French ship began the action, opening firesoon after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by undershort canvas, (D), firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily muchhandicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy, andcaused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside. "Thedistance between the _Formidable_, 90, (Palliser's flagship) and the_Egmont_, 74, was so short, " testified Captain John Laforey, whosethree-decker, the _Ocean_, 90, was abreast and outside this interval, "that it was with difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage, without firing upon them, and I was once very near on board the_Egmont_, "--next ahead of the _Ocean_. The _Formidable_ kept hermizzen topsail aback much of the time, to deaden her way, to make theneeded room ahead for the _Ocean_, and also to allow the rear shipsto close. "At a quarter past one, " testified Captain Maitland of the_Elizabeth_, 74, "we were very close behind the _Formidable_, and amidshipman upon the poop called out that there was a ship coming onboard on the weatherbow. I put the helm up, . .. And found, when thesmoke cleared away, I was shot up under the _Formidable's_ lee. Shewas then engaged with the two last ships in the French fleet, and, asI could not fire at them without firing through the _Formidable_, Iwas obliged to shoot on. "[47] Captain Bazely, of the _Formidable_, says of the same incident, "The _Formidable_ did at the time of actionbear up to one of the enemy's ships, to avoid being aboard of her, whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the_Formidable_. I thought we could not avoid being on board. " Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in killedand wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of the twoothers. [48] This was due to the morning signal to chase to windward, which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As soon as theBritish van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its commander, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, anticipating Keppel's wishes, signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 2, V). As theFrench column was running free, these ships, when about, fetched towindward of its wake. When the _Victory_ drew out of the fire, at 1P. M. , Keppel also made a similar signal, and attempted to wear (c), the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking; but caution wasneeded in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and itwas not till 2 P. M. , that the _Victory_ was about on the other tack(Fig. 2, C), heading after the French. At this time, 2 P. M. , justbefore or just after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down, and that for the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latterwas to re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partlybecause no longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradictthe urgent call for a re-formation. At this time six or seven of Harland's division were on the weatherbow of the _Victory_, to windward (westward), but a little ahead, andstanding like her after the French; all on the port tack (Fig. 2). None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flagship at once. At 2. 30 Palliser's ship, the _Formidable_ (R), on the starboard tack, passed the _Victory_ to leeward, apparently the last of the fleet outof action. A half-hour after this the _Victory_ had been joined bythree of the centre, which were following her in close order, the vanremaining in the same relative position. Astern of these two groupsfrom van and centre were a number of other ships in various degreesof confusion, --some going about, some trying to come up, otherscompletely disabled. Especially, there was in the south-south-east, therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or five British vessels, evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring. This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral, scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of theBritish, which originated in the general chase, had increased throughthe hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminatedin the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of amilitary exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped. TheFrench, starting from a better formation, had come out in bettershape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy thedisadvantage of a policy essentially defensive; and d'Orvilliers'next order, though well conceived, was resultless. At 1 P. M. [49] hesignalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battleon the starboard tack (Fig. 2, F). This signal was not seen by theleading ship, which should have begun the movement. The junior Frenchadmiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went about, andspoke the flagship, to know what was the Commander-in-Chief's desire. D'Orvilliers explained that he wished to pass along the enemy's fleetfrom end to end, to _leeward_, because in its disordered state therewas a fair promise of advantage, and by going to leeward--presentinghis weather side to the enemy--he could use the weather lower-deckguns, whereas, in the then state of the sea, the lee lower ports couldnot be opened. Thus explained, the movement was executed, but thefavourable moment had passed. It was not till 2. 30 that the manoeuvrewas evident to the British. [Illustration] As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent's intention, he wore the_Victory_ again, (d), a few minutes after 3 P. M. , and stood slowlydown, on the starboard tack _off the wind_, towards his crippled shipsin the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line ofbattle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station(Fig. 3, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy, (F), Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight, --apreposterous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at onceand joined the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the_Victory_, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell inbehind her, to cover the rear until Palliser's division could repairdamage and take their places. At 4 P. M. Harland's division was in theline. Palliser's ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselvesbefore or behind his flagship; their captains considering, as theytestified, that they took station from their divisional commander, andnot from the ship of the Commander-in-Chief. There was formed thus, on the weather quarter of the _Victory_, and a mile or two distant, aseparate line of ships, constituting on this tack the proper rear ofthe fleet, and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig. 3, R). At 5 P. M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasteninto the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, theFrench now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not attacked, asthey might have done, but had drawn up under the lee of the British, their van abreast the latter's centre. At the same time Harland wasdirected to move to his proper position in the van, which he atonce did (Fig. 3, V). Palliser made no movement, and Keppel withextraordinary--if not culpable--forbearance refrained from summoningthe rear ships into line by their individual pennants. This he at lastdid about 7 P. M. , signalling specifically to each of the vessels thengrouped with Palliser, (except his own flagship), to leave the latterand take their posts in the line. This was accordingly done, but itwas thought then to be too late to renew the action. At daylight thenext morning, only three French ships were in sight from the decks;but the main body could be seen in the south-east from some of themastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to twenty miles distant. Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish; theBritish loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the French 161killed and 513 wounded. The general result would appear to indicatethat the French, in accordance with their usual policy, had fired tocripple their enemy's spars and rigging, the motive-power. This wouldbe consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed purpose of avoiding actionexcept under favourable circumstances. As the smoke thickened andconfusion increased, the fleets had got closer together, and, whateverthe intention, many shot found their way to the British hulls. Nevertheless, as the returns show, the number of men hit among theFrench was to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand, it iscertain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the action wasgreater than that of the British. Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of honour, or of credit, for material advantage accrued to neither. Keppelhad succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his will;d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superiorityof manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next signal beenpromptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the British fleet, infairly good order, before it re-formed, and concentrated his fireon the more leewardly of its vessels. Even under the delay, it wasdistinctly in his power to renew the fight; and that he did not do soforfeits all claim to victory. Not to speak of the better conditionof the French ships, Keppel, by running off the wind, had given hisopponent full opportunity to reach his fleet and to attack. Insteadof so doing, d'Orvilliers drew up under the British lee, out of range, and offered battle; a gallant defiance, but to a crippled foe. Time was thus given to the British to refit their ships sufficientlyto bear down again. This the French admiral should not have permitted. He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated; to windward, or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the conditions, itwas not good generalship to give the enemy time, and to await hispleasure. Keppel, on the other hand, being granted this chance, shouldhave renewed the fight; and here arose the controversy which setall England by the ears, and may be said to have immortalised thisotherwise trivial incident. Palliser's division was to windward from4 to 7 P. M. , while the signals were flying to form line of battle, andto bear down in the Admiral's wake; and Keppel alleged that, had thesebeen obeyed by 6 P. M. , he would have renewed the battle, having stillover two hours of daylight. It has been stated already that, besidesthe signals, a frigate brought Palliser word that the Admiral waswaiting only for him. The immediate dispute is of slight present interest, except as anhistorical link in the fighting development of the British Navy;and only this historical significance justifies more than a passingmention. In 1778 men's minds were still full of Byng's executionin 1757, and of the Mathews and Lestock affair in 1744, whichhad materially influenced Byng in his action off Minorca. Keppelrepeatedly spoke of himself as on trial for his life; and he had beena member of Byng's court-martial. The gist of the charges againsthim, preferred by Palliser, was that he attacked in the firstinstance without properly forming his line, for which Mathews had beencensured; and, secondly, that by not renewing the action after thefirst pass-by, and by wearing away from the French fleet, he had notdone his utmost to "take, sink, burn, and destroy. " This had been thecharge on which Byng was shot. Keppel, besides his justifying reasonsfor his course in general, alleged and proved his full intention toattack again, had not Palliser failed to come into line, a delinquencythe same as that of Lestock, which contributed to Mathew's ruin. In other words, men's minds were breaking away from, but had notthrown off completely, the tyranny of the Order of Battle, --one of theworst of tyrannies, because founded on truth. Absolute error, like awhole lie, is open to speedy detection; half-truths are troublesome. The Order of Battle[50] was an admirable servant and a mostobjectionable despot. Mathews, in despair over a recalcitrant second, cast off the yoke, engaged with part of his force, was ill supportedand censured; Lestock escaping. Byng, considering this, and being apedant by nature, would not break his line; the enemy slipped away, Minorca surrendered, and he was shot. In Keppel's court-martial, twenty-eight out of the thirty captains who had been in the line weresummoned as witnesses. Most of them swore that if Keppel had chasedin line of battle that day, there could have been no action, andthe majority of them cordially approved his course; but there wasevidently an undercurrent still of dissent, and especially in the rearships, where there had been some of the straggling inevitable in suchmovements. Their commanders therefore had uncomfortable experienceof the lack of mutual support, which the line of battle was meant toinsure. Another indication of still surviving pedantry was the obligation feltin the rear ships to take post about their own admiral, and to remainthere when the signals for the line of battle, and to bear down in theadmiral's wake, were flying. Thus Palliser's own inaction, to whatevercause due, paralysed the six or eight sail with him; but it appearsto the writer that Keppel was seriously remiss in not summoning thoseships by their own pennants, as soon as he began to distrust thepurposes of the Vice-Admiral, instead of delaying doing so till7 P. M. , as he did. It is a curious picture presented to us by theevidence. The Commander-in-Chief, with his staff and the captain ofthe ship, fretting and fuming on the _Victory's_ quarter-deck; thesignals flying which have been mentioned; Harland's division gettinginto line ahead; and four points on the weather quarter, only twomiles distant, so that "every gun and port could be counted, " a groupof seven or eight sail, among them the flag of the third in command, apparently indifferent spectators. The _Formidable's_ only sign ofdisability was the foretopsail unbent for four hours, --a delay which, being unexplained, rather increased than relieved suspicion, rife thenthroughout the Navy. Palliser was a Tory, and had left the Board ofAdmiralty to take his command. Keppel was so strong a Whig that hewould not serve against the Americans; and he evidently feared that hewas to be betrayed to his ruin. Palliser's defence rested upon three principal points: (1), that thesignal for the line of battle was not seen on board the _Formidable_;(2), that the signal to get into the Admiral's wake was repeated byhimself; (3), that his foremast was wounded, and, moreover, foundto be in such bad condition that he feared to carry sail on it. Asregards the first, the signal was seen on board the _Ocean_, nextastern of and "not far from"[51] the _Formidable_; for the second, theAdmiral should have been informed of a disability by which a singleship was neutralizing a division. The frigate that brought Keppel'smessage could have carried back this. Thirdly, the most damagingfeature to Palliser's case was that he asserted that, after coming outfrom under fire, he wore at once towards the enemy; afterwards he woreback again. A ship that thus wore twice before three o'clock, mighthave displayed zeal and efficiency enough to run two miles, offthe wind, [52] at five, to support a fight. Deliberate treachery isimpossible. To this writer the Vice-Admiral's behaviour seems that ofa man in a sulk, who will do only that which he can find no excusesfor neglecting. In such cases of sailing close, men generally slipover the line into grievous wrong. Keppel was cleared of all the charges preferred against him; theaccuser had not thought best to embody among them the delay to recallthe ships which his own example was detaining. Against Palliser nospecific charge was preferred, but the Admiralty directed a generalinquiry into his course on the 27th of July. The court found hisconduct "in many instances highly exemplary and meritorious, "--hehad fought well, --"but reprehensible in not having acquainted theCommander-in-Chief of his distress, which he might have done either bythe _Fox_, or other means which he had in his power. " Public opinionrunning strongly for Keppel, his acquittal was celebrated withbonfires and illuminations in London; the mob got drunk, smashed thewindows of Palliser's friends, wrecked Palliser's own house, and camenear to killing Palliser himself. The Admiralty, in 1780, made himGovernor of Greenwich Hospital. On the 28th of July, the British and French being no longer in sightof each other, Keppel, considering his fleet too injured aloft tocruise near the French coast, kept away for Plymouth, where he arrivedon the 31st. Before putting to sea again, he provided against arecurrence of the misdemeanor of the 27th by a general order, that"in future the Line is always to be taken from the Centre. " Had thisbeen in force before, Palliser's captains would have taken station bythe Commander-in-Chief, and the _Formidable_ would have been left towindward by herself. At the same time Howe was closing his squadronupon the centre in America; and Rodney, two years later, experiencedthe ill-effects of distance taken from the next ahead, when theleading ship of a fleet disregarded an order. Although privately censuring Palliser's conduct, theCommander-in-Chief made no official complaint, and it was not untilthe matter got into the papers, through the talk of the fleet, thatthe difficulty began which resulted in the trial of both officers, early in the following year. After this, Keppel, being dissatisfiedwith the Admiralty's treatment, intimated his wish to give up thecommand. The order to strike his flag was dated March 18th, 1779. Hewas not employed afloat again, but upon the change of administrationin 1782 he became First Lord of the Admiralty, and so remained, with abrief intermission, until December, 1783. It is perhaps necessary to mention that both British and Frenchasserted, and assert to this day, that the other party abandonedthe field. [53] The point is too trivial, in the author's opinion, towarrant further discussion of an episode the historical interest ofwhich is very slight, though its professional lessons are valuable. The British case had the advantage--through the courts-martial--ofthe sworn testimony of twenty to thirty captains, who agreed that theBritish kept on the same tack under short sail throughout the night, and that in the morning only three French ships were visible. As faras known to the author, the French contention rests only on the usualreports. [Footnote 38: _Ante_, pp. 61, 62. ] [Footnote 39: Testimony of Captains Hood, Robinson, and Macbride, andof Rear-Admiral Campbell, captain of the fleet to Keppel. ] [Footnote 40: See note on preceding page. ] [Footnote 41: A vessel is said to be on the port tack when she has thewind blowing on her port, or left side; on the starboard tack, whenthe wind is on the right side. Thus with an east wind, if she headnorth, she is on the starboard tack; if south, on the port. ] [Footnote 42: See also note; _post_, p. 200. ] [Footnote 43: Twenty-two degrees. ] [Footnote 44: Column and line ahead are equivalent terms, each shipsteering in the wake of its next ahead. ] [Footnote 45: Forty-five degrees. ] [Footnote 46: Chevalier says, p. 89, "The English passed out of range"of these ships. As these ships had the wind, they had the choice ofrange, barring signals from their own admiral. In truth, they wereobeying his order. ] [Footnote 47: This evidence of the captains of the _Ocean_ and the_Elizabeth_ contradicts Palliser's charge that his ship was notadequately supported. ] [Footnote 48: It was actually quite equal, but this was due to anaccidental explosion on board the _Formidable_. ] [Footnote 49: Chevalier. Probably later by the other times used inthis account. ] [Footnote 50: The Order of Battle was constituted by the ships "ofthe line" ranging themselves one behind the other in a prescribedsuccession; the position of each and the intervals between being takenfrom the ship next ahead. This made the leading vessel the pivot ofthe order and of manoeuvring, unless specially otherwise directed;which in an emergency could not always be easily done. Strictly, ifcircumstances favoured, the line on which the ships thus formed wasone of the two close-hauled lines; "close-hauled" meaning to bring thevessel's head as "near" the direction of the wind as possible, usuallyto about 70 degrees. The advantage of the close-hauled line was thatthe vessels were more manageable than when "off" the wind. ] [Footnote 51: Evidence of Captain John Laforey, of the _Ocean_. ] [Footnote 52: "I do not recollect how many points I went from thewind; I must have bore down a pretty large course. " Testimony ofCaptain J. Laforey, of the _Ocean_, on this point. ] [Footnote 53: "During the night (of the 27th) Admiral Keppel kept away(_fit route_) for Portsmouth. " Chevalier, "Marine Française, " p. 90. Paris, 1877. Oddly enough, he adds that "on the evening of the 28ththe French squadron, _carried eastward by the currents_, sightedUshant. "] CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OFGEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA Conditions of season exerted great influence upon the time and placeof hostilities during the maritime war of 1778; the opening scenesof which, in Europe and in North America, have just been narrated. In European seas it was realised that naval enterprises by fleets, requiring evolutions by masses of large vessels, were possible onlyin summer. Winter gales scattered ships, impeded manoeuvres, andmade gun-fire ineffective. The same consideration prevailed to limitactivity in North American waters to the summer; and complementaryto this was the fact that in the West Indies hurricanes of excessiveviolence occurred from July to October. The practice therefore wasto transfer effort from one quarter to the other in the WesternHemisphere, according to the season. In the recent treaty with the United States, the King of France hadformally renounced all claim to acquire for himself any part of theAmerican continent then in possession of Great Britain. On the otherhand, he had reserved the express right to conquer any of her islandssouth of Bermuda. The West Indies were then the richest commercialregion on the globe in the value of their products; and France wishednot only to increase her already large possessions there, but also toestablish more solidly her political and military tenure. [Illustration] In September, 1778, the British Island of Dominica was seized by anexpedition from the adjacent French colony of Martinique. The affairwas a surprise, and possesses no special military interest; but itis instructive to observe that Great Britain was unprepared, in theWest Indies as elsewhere, when the war began. A change had been madeshortly before in the command of the Leeward Islands Station, as itwas called, which extended from Antigua southward over the LesserAntilles with headquarters at Barbados. Rear-Admiral the Hon. SamuelBarrington, the new-comer, leaving home before war had been declared, had orders not to quit Barbados till further instructions shouldarrive. These had not reached him when he learned of the loss ofDominica. The French had received their orders on the 17th of August. The blow was intrinsically somewhat serious, so far as the merecapture of a position can be, because the fortifications were strong, though they had been inadequately garrisoned. It is a mistake to buildworks and not man them, for their fall transfers to the enemy strengthwhich he otherwise would need time to create. To the French theconquest was useful beyond its commercial value, because it closed agap in their possessions. They now held four consecutive islands, fromnorth to south, Guadeloupe, Dominica, Martinique, and Santa Lucia. Barrington had two ships of the line: his flagship, the _Prince ofWales_, 74, and the _Boyne_, 70. If he had been cruising, these wouldprobably have deterred the French. Upon receiving the news he putto sea, going as far as Antigua; but he did not venture to stay awaybecause his expected instructions had not come yet, and, like Keppel, he feared an ungenerous construction of his actions. He thereforeremained in Barbados, patiently watching for an opportunity to act. The departure of Howe and the approach of winter determined thetransference of British troops and ships from the continent to theLeeward Islands. Reinforcements had given the British fleet in Americaa numerical superiority, which for the time imposed a check upond'Estaing; but Byron, proverbially unlucky in weather, was drivencrippled to Newport, leaving the French free to quit Boston. Thedifficulty of provisioning so large a force as twelve ships of theline at first threatened to prevent the withdrawal, supplies beingthen extremely scarce in the port; but at the critical moment Americanprivateers brought in large numbers of prizes, laden with provisionsfrom Europe for the British army. Thus d'Estaing was enabled to sailfor Martinique on the 4th of November. On the same day there left NewYork for Barbados a British squadron, --two 64's, three 50's, andthree smaller craft, --under the command of Commodore William Hotham, convoying five thousand troops for service in the West Indies. Being bound for nearly the same point, the two hostile bodies steeredparallel courses, each ignorant of the other's nearness. In thelatitude of Bermuda both suffered from a violent gale, but the Frenchmost; the flagship _Languedoc_ losing her main and mizzen topmasts. Onthe 25th of November one[54] of Hotham's convoy fell into the handsof d'Estaing, who then first learned of the British sailing. Doubtfulwhether their destination was Barbados or Antigua, --their two chiefstations, --he decided for the latter. Arriving off it on the 6th ofDecember, he cruised for forty-eight hours, and then bore away forFort Royal, Martinique, the principal French depot in the West Indies, where he anchored on the 9th. On the 10th Hotham joined Barrington atBarbados. Barrington knew already what he wanted to do, and therefore lost not amoment in deliberation. The troops were kept on board, Hotham's convoyarrangements being left as they were. On the morning of December 12ththe entire force sailed again, the main changes in it being in thechief command, and in the addition of Barrington's two ships of theline. On the afternoon of the 13th the shipping anchored in the GrandCul de Sac, an inlet on the west side of Santa Lucia, which is seventymiles east-north-east from Barbados. Part of the troops landed atonce, and seized the batteries and heights on the north side of thebay. The remainder were put on shore the next morning. The Frenchforces were inadequate to defend their works; but it is to be observedthat they were driven with unremitting energy, and that to thispromptness the British owed their ability to hold the position. [Illustration] Three miles north of the Cul de Sac is a bay then called the Carénage;now Port Castries. At its northern extremity is a precipitouspromontory, La Vigie, then fortified, upon the tenure of whichdepended not only control of that anchorage, but also access to therear of the works which commanded the Cul de Sac. If those works fell, the British squadron must abandon its position and put to sea, whered'Estaing's much superior fleet would be in waiting. On the otherhand, if the squadron were crushed at its anchors, the troops wereisolated and must ultimately capitulate. Therefore La Vigie and thesquadron were the two keys to the situation, and the loss of eitherwould be decisive. By the evening of the 14th the British held the shore line fromLa Vigie to the southern point of the Cul de Sac, as well as MorneFortuné (Fort Charlotte), the capital of the island. The feeble Frenchgarrison retired to the interior, leaving its guns unspiked, and itsammunition and stores untouched, --another instance of the danger ofworks turning to one's own disadvantage. It was Barrington's purposenow to remove the transports to the Carénage, as a more commodiousharbour, probably also better defended; but he was prevented bythe arrival of d'Estaing that afternoon. "Just as all the importantstations were secured, the French colours struck, and General Grant'sheadquarters established at the Governor's house, the _Ariadne_frigate came in sight with the signal abroad for the approach of anenemy. "[55] The French fleet was seen soon afterwards from the heightsabove the squadron. The British had gained much so far by celerity, but they still sparedno time to take breath. The night was passed by the soldiers instrengthening their positions, and by the Rear-Admiral in rectifyinghis order to meet the expected attack. The transports, between fiftyand sixty in number, were moved inside the ships of war, and thelatter were most carefully disposed across the mouth of the Cul deSac bay. At the northern (windward)[56] end was placed the _Isis_, 50, well under the point to prevent anything from passing round her; butfor further security she was supported by three frigates, anchoredabreast of the interval between her and the shore. From the _Isis_the line extended to the southward, inclining slightly outward; the_Prince of Wales_, 74, Barrington's flagship, taking the southernflank, as the most exposed position. Between her and the _Isis_ werefive other ships, --the _Boyne_, 70, _Nonsuch_, 64, _St. Albans_, 64, _Preston_, 50, and _Centurion_, 50. The works left by the French atthe north and south points of the bay may have been used to supportthe flanks, but Barrington does not say so in his report. D'Estaing had twelve ships of the line, and two days after this wasable to land seven thousand troops. With such a superiority it isevident that the British would have been stopped in the midst of theiroperations, if he had arrived twenty-four hours sooner. To gain time, Barrington had sought to prevent intelligence reaching Fort Royal, less than fifty miles distant, by sending cruisers in advance of hissquadron, to cover the approaches to Santa Lucia; but, despite hiscare, d'Estaing had the news on the 14th. He sailed at once, and, ashas been said, was off Santa Lucia that evening. At daybreak of the15th he stood in for the Carénage; but when he came within range, alively cannonade told him that the enemy was already in possession. He decided therefore to attack the squadron in the Cul de Sac, andat 11. 30 the French passed along it from north to south, firing, butwithout effect. A second attempt was made in the afternoon, directedupon the lee flank, but it was equally unavailing. The British hadthree men killed; the French loss is not given, but is said tohave been slight. It is stated that that day the sea breeze did notpenetrate far enough into the bay to admit closing. This frequentlyhappens, but it does not alter the fact that the squadron was theproper point of attack, and that, especially in the winter season, anopportunity to close must offer soon. D'Estaing, governed probably bythe soldierly bias he more than once betrayed, decided now to assaultthe works on shore. Anchoring in a small bay north of the Carénage, he landed seven thousand men, and on the 18th attempted to storm theBritish lines at La Vigie. The neck of land connecting the promontorywith the island is very flat, and the French therefore labored undergreat disadvantage through the commanding position of their enemy. It was a repetition of Bunker Hill, and of many other ill-judgedand precipitate frontal attacks. After three gallant but ineffectualcharges, led by d'Estaing in person, the assailants retired, with theloss of forty-one officers and eight hundred rank and file, killed andwounded. [Illustration] D'Estaing reëmbarked his men, and stood ready again to attackBarrington; a frigate being stationed off the Cul de Sac, to givenotice when the wind should serve. On the 24th she signalled, and thefleet weighed; but Barrington, who had taken a very great risk for anadequate object, took no unnecessary chances through presumption. Hehad employed his respite to warp the ships of war farther in, wherethe breeze reached less certainly, and where narrower waters gavebetter support to the flanks. He had strengthened the latter also bynew works, in which he had placed heavy guns from the ships, mannedby seamen. For these or other reasons d'Estaing did not attack. On the29th he quitted the island, and on the 30th the French governor, theChevalier de Micoud, formally capitulated. This achievement of Barrington and of Major-General James Grant, whowas associated with him, was greeted at the time with an applausewhich will be echoed by the military judgment of a later age. Thereis a particular pleasure in finding the willingness to incur a greatrisk, conjoined with a care that chances nothing against which theutmost diligence and skill can provide. The celerity, forethought, wariness, and daring of Admiral Barrington have inscribed upon therecords of the British Navy a success the distinction of which shouldbe measured, not by the largeness of the scale, but by the perfectionof the workmanship, and by the energy of the execution in face ofgreat odds. Santa Lucia remained in the hands of the British throughout the war. It was an important acquisition, because at its north-west extremitywas a good and defensible anchorage, Gros Ilet Bay, only thirty milesfrom Fort Royal in Martinique. In it the British fleet could lie, whendesirable to close-watch the enemy, yet not be worried for the safetyof the port when away; for it was but an outpost, not a base ofoperations, as Fort Royal was. It was thus used continually, and fromit Rodney issued for his great victory in April, 1782. During the first six months of 1779 no important incident occurred inthe West Indies. On the 6th of January, Vice-Admiral Byron, with tenships of the line from Narragansett Bay, reached Santa Lucia, andrelieved Barrington of the chief command. Both the British and theFrench fleets were reinforced in the course of the spring, but therelative strength remained nearly as before, until the 27th of June, when the arrival of a division from Brest made the French numberssomewhat superior. Shortly before this, Byron had been constrained by one of thecommercial exigencies which constantly embarrassed the militaryaction of British admirals. A large convoy of trading ships, boundto England, was collecting at St. Kitts, and he thought necessary toaccompany it part of the homeward way, until well clear of the FrenchWest India cruisers. For this purpose he left Santa Lucia early inJune. As soon as the coast was clear, d'Estaing, informed of Byron'sobject, sent a small combined expedition against St. Vincent, whichwas surrendered on the 18th of the month. On the 30th the Frenchadmiral himself quitted Fort Royal with his whole fleet, --twenty-fiveships of the line and several frigates, --directing his course for theBritish Island of Grenada, before which he anchored on the 2d of July. With commendable promptitude, he landed his troops that evening, andon the 4th the island capitulated. Except as represented by one smallarmed sloop, which was taken, the British Navy had no part in thistransaction. Thirty richly laden merchant ships were captured in theport. At daybreak of July 6th, Byron appeared with twenty-one sail of theline, one frigate, and a convoy of twenty-eight vessels, carryingtroops and equipments. He had returned to Santa Lucia on the 1st, and there had heard of the loss of St. Vincent, with a rumor that theFrench had gone against Grenada. He consequently had put to sea on the3d, with the force mentioned. [Illustration] The British approach was reported to d'Estaing during the night ofJuly 5th. Most of his fleet was then lying at anchor off Georgetown, at the south-west of the island; some vessels, which had been underway on look-out duty, had fallen to leeward. [57] At 4 A. M. The Frenchbegan to lift their anchors, with orders to form line of battle onthe starboard tack, in order of speed; that is, as rapidly as possiblewithout regard to usual stations. When daylight had fully made, theBritish fleet (A) was seen standing down from the northward, closeinshore, on the port tack, with the wind free at north-east by east. It was not in order, as is evident from the fact that the shipsnearest the enemy, and therefore first to close, ought to have beenin the rear on the then tack. For this condition there is no evidentexcuse; for a fleet having a convoy necessarily proceeds so slowlythat the war-ships can keep reasonable order for mutual support. Moreover, irregularities that are permissible in case of emergency, or when no enemy can be encountered suddenly, cease to be so when theimminent probability of a meeting exists. The worst results of the dayare to be attributed to this fault. Being short of frigates, Byron hadassigned three ships of the line (a), under Rear-Admiral Rowley, tothe convoy, which of course was on the off hand from the enemy, andsomewhat in the rear. It was understood, however, that these would becalled into the line, if needed. When the French (AA) were first perceived by Byron, their linewas forming; the long thin column lengthening out gradually to thenorth-north-west, from the confused cluster[58] still to be seen atthe anchorage. Hoping to profit by their disorder, he signalled "ageneral chase in that quarter, [59] as well as for Rear-Admiral Rowleyto leave the convoy; and as not more than fourteen or fifteen of theenemy's ships appeared to be in line, the signal was made for theships to engage, _and form as they could get up_. "[60] It is clearfrom this not only that the ships were not in order, but also thatthey were to form under fire. Three ships, the _Sultan_, 74, the_Prince of Wales_, 74, and the _Boyne_, 70, in the order named, --thesecond carrying Barrington's flag, --were well ahead of the fleet (b). The direction prescribed for the attack, that of the clustered shipsin the French rear, carried the British down on a south-south-west, orsouth by west, course; and as the enemy's van and centre were drawingout to the north-north-west, the two lines at that time resembled thelegs of a "V, " the point of which was the anchorage off Georgetown. Barrington's three ships therefore neared the French order gradually, and had to receive its fire for some time before they could reply, unless, by hauling to the wind, they diverged from the set course. This, and their isolation, made their loss very heavy. When theyreached the rear of the French, the latter's column was tolerablyformed, and Barrington's ships wore (w) in succession, --just asHarland's had done in Keppel's action, --to follow on the other tack. In doing this, the _Sultan_ kept away under the stern of the enemy'srearmost ship, to rake her; to avoid which the latter bore up. The_Sultan_ thus lost time and ground, and Barrington took the lead, standing along the French line, from rear to van, and to windward. Meanwhile, the forming of the enemy had revealed to Byron for thefirst time, and to his dismay, that he had been deceived in thinkingthe French force inferior to his own. "However, the general chasewas continued, and the signal made for close engagement. "[61] Theremainder of the ships stood down on the port tack, as the first threehad done, and wore in the wake of the latter, whom they followed; butbefore reaching the point of wearing, three ships, "the _Grafton_, 74, the _Cornwall_, 74, and the _Lion_, 64 (c), _happening to be toleeward_, [62] sustained the fire of the enemy's whole line, as itpassed on the starboard tack. " It seems clear that, having had thewind, during the night and now, and being in search of an enemy, itshould not have "happened" that any ships should have been so far toleeward as to be unsupported. Captain Thomas White, R. N. , writing asan advocate of Byron, says, [63] "while the van was wearing . .. Thesternmost ships were coming up under Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker. .. . Among these ships, the _Cornwall_ and _Lion_, from being nearerthe enemy than those about them (for the rear division had notthen _formed into line_), drew upon themselves almost the whole ofthe enemy's fire. " No words can show more clearly the disastrous, precipitate disorder in which this attack was conducted. The_Grafton_, White says, was similarly situated. In consequence, thesethree were so crippled, besides a heavy loss in men, that they droppedfar to leeward and astern (c', c"), when on the other tack. When the British ships in general had got round, and were in lineahead on the starboard tack, --the same as the French, --ranging fromrear to van of the enemy (Positions B, B, B), Byron signalled forthe eight leading ships to close together, for mutual support, andto engage close. This, which should have been done--not with finikinprecision, but with military adequacy--before engaging, was lesseasy now, in the din of battle and with crippled ships. A quick-eyedsubordinate, however, did something to remedy the error of his chief. Rear-Admiral Rowley was still considerably astern, having to makeup the distance between the convoy and the fleet. As he followed thelatter, he saw Barrington's three ships unduly separated and doubtlessvisibly much mauled. Instead, therefore, of blindly following hisleader, he cut straight across (aa) to the head of the column tosupport the van, --an act almost absolutely identical with that whichwon Nelson renown at Cape St. Vincent. In this he was followed by the_Monmouth_, 64, the brilliancy of whose bearing was so conspicuous tothe two fleets that it is said the French officers after the battletoasted "the little black ship. " She and the _Suffolk_, 74, Rowley'sflagship, also suffered severely in this gallant feat. It was imperative with Byron now to keep his van well up with theenemy, lest he should uncover the convoy, broad on the weather bowof the two fleets. "They seemed much inclined to cut off the convoy, and had it much in their power by means of their large frigates, independent of ships of the line. "[64] On the other hand, the_Cornwall, Grafton_, and _Lion_, though they got their heads round, could not keep up with the fleet (c', c"), and were dropping also toleeward--towards the enemy. At noon, or soon after, d'Estaing boreup with the body of his force to join some of his vessels that hadfallen to leeward. Byron very properly--under his conditions ofinferiority--kept his wind; and the separation of the two fleets, thusproduced, caused firing to cease at 1 P. M. The enemies were now ranged on parallel lines, some distance apart;still on the starboard tack, heading north-north west. Between thetwo, but far astern, the _Cornwall, Grafton, Lion_, and a fourthBritish ship, the _Fame_, were toiling along, greatly crippled. At 3P. M. , the French, now in good order, tacked together (t, t, t), whichcaused them to head towards these disabled vessels. Byron at onceimitated the movement, and the eyes of all in the two fleets anxiouslywatched the result. Captain Cornwallis of the _Lion_, measuring thesituation accurately, saw that, if he continued ahead, he would bein the midst of the French by the time he got abreast of them. Havingonly his foremast standing, he put his helm up, and stood broad offbefore the wind (c"), across the enemy's bows, for Jamaica. He wasnot pursued. The other three, unable to tack and afraid to wear, whichwould put them also in the enemy's power, stood on, passed to windwardof the latter, receiving several broadsides, and so escaped to thenorthward. The _Monmouth_ was equally maltreated; in fact, she hadnot been able to tack to the southward with the fleet. Continuingnorth (a'), she became now much separated. D'Estaing afterwardsreestablished his order of battle on the port tack, forming upon thethen leewardmost ship, on the line BC. Byron's action off Grenada, viewed as an isolated event, was the mostdisastrous in results that the British Navy had fought since BeachyHead, in 1690. That the _Cornwall, Grafton_, and _Lion_ were notcaptured was due simply to the strained and inept caution of theFrench admiral. This Byron virtually admitted. "To my great surpriseno ship of the enemy was detached after the _Lion_. The _Grafton_ and_Cornwall_ might have been weathered by the French, if they had kepttheir wind, . .. But they persevered so strictly in declining everychance of close action that they contented themselves with firing uponthese ships when passing barely within gunshot, and suffered them torejoin the squadron, without one effort to cut them off. " Suffren, [65]who led the French on the starboard tack, and whose ship, the_Fantasque_, 64, lost 22 killed and 43 wounded, wrote: "Had ouradmiral's seamanship equalled his courage, we would not have allowedfour dismasted ships to escape. " That the _Monmouth_ and _Fame_ couldalso have been secured is extremely probable; and if Byron, in orderto save them, had borne down to renew the action, the disaster mighthave become a catastrophe. That nothing resulted to the French from their great advantageis therefore to be ascribed to the incapacity of theirCommander-in-Chief. It is instructive to note also the causes of thegrave calamity which befell the British, when twenty-one ships mettwenty-four, [66]--a sensible but not overwhelming superiority. Thesefacts have been shown sufficiently. Byron's disaster was due toattacking with needless precipitation, and in needless disorder. He had the weather-gage, it was early morning, and the northeasttrade-wind, already a working breeze, must freshen as the dayadvanced. The French were tied to their new conquest, which they couldnot abandon without humiliation; not to speak of their troops ashore. Even had they wished to retreat, they could not have done so beforea general chase, unless prepared to sacrifice their slower ships. If twenty-four ships could reconcile themselves to running fromtwenty-one, it was scarcely possible but that the fastest of thesewould overtake the slowest of those. There was time for fighting, anopportunity for forcing action which could not be evaded, and timealso for the British to form in reasonably good order. It is important to consider this, because, while Keppel must beapproved for attacking in partial disorder, Byron must be blamed forattacking in utter disorder. Keppel had to snatch opportunity froman unwilling foe. Having himself the lee-gage, he could not pickand choose, nor yet manoeuvre; yet he brought his fleet into action, giving mutual support throughout nearly, if not quite, the whole line. What Byron did has been set forth; the sting is that his bunglingtactics can find no extenuation in any urgency of the case. The loss of the two fleets, as given by the authorities of eithernation, were: British, 183 killed, 346 wounded; French, 190 killed, 759 wounded. Of the British total, 126 killed and 235 wounded, or twothirds, fell to the two groups of three ships each, which by Byron'smismanagement were successively exposed to be cut up in detail bythe concentrated fire of the enemy. The British loss in spars andsails--in motive-power--also exceeded greatly that of the French. After the action d'Estaing returned quietly to Grenada. Byron wentto St. Kitts to refit; but repairs were most difficult, owing to thedearth of stores in which the Admiralty had left the West Indies. Withall the skill of the seamen of that day in making good damages, theships remained long unserviceable, causing great apprehension for theother islands. This state of things d'Estaing left unimproved, as hehad his advantage in the battle. He did, indeed, parade his superiorforce before Byron's fleet as it lay at anchor; but, beyond thehumiliation naturally felt by a Navy which prided itself on ruling thesea, no further injury was done. In August Byron sailed for England. Barrington had already gone home, wounded. The station therefore was left in command of Rear-AdmiralHyde Parker, [67] and so remained until March, 1780, when thecelebrated Rodney arrived as Commander-in-Chief on the Leeward IslandsStation. The North American Station was given to Vice-Admiral MarriotArbuthnot, who had under him a half-dozen ships of the line, withheadquarters at New York. His command was ordinarily independent ofRodney's, but the latter had no hesitation in going to New York onemergency and taking charge there; in doing which he had the approvalof the Admiralty. The approach of winter in 1778 had determined the cessation ofoperations, both naval and military, in the northern part of theAmerican continent, and had led to the transfer of five thousandtroops to the West Indies, already noted. At the same time, anunjustifiable extension of British effort, having regard to thedisposable means, was undertaken in the southern States of Georgia andSouth Carolina. On the 27th of November a small detachment of troopsunder Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Campbell, sailed from SandyHook, convoyed by a division of frigates commanded by Captain HydeParker. [68] The expedition entered the Savannah River four weekslater, and soon afterwards occupied the city of the same name. Simultaneously with this, by Clinton's orders, General Prevost movedfrom Florida, then a British colony, with all the men he could sparefrom the defence of St. Augustine. Upon his arrival in Savannah hetook command of the whole force thus assembled. These operations, which during 1779 extended as far as theneighbourhood of Charleston, depended upon the control of the water, and are a conspicuous example of misapplication of power to the pointof ultimate self-destruction. They were in 1778-79 essentially of aminor character, especially the maritime part, and will therefore bedismissed with the remark that the Navy, by small vessels, accompaniedevery movement in a country cut up in all directions by watercourses, big and little. "The defence of this province, " wrote Parker, "mustgreatly depend on the naval force upon the different inland creeks. I am therefore forming some galleys covered from musketry, whichI believe will have a good effect. " These were precursors of the"tin-clads" of the American War of Secession, a century later. Noteven an armored ship is a new thing under the sun. In the southern States, from Georgia to Virginia, the part of the Navyfrom first to last was subsidiary, though important. It is thereforeunnecessary to go into details, but most necessary to note that here, by misdirection of effort and abuse of means, was initiated the fatalmovement which henceforth divided the small British army in NorthAmerica into two sections, wholly out of mutual support. Here SirWilliam Howe's error of 1777 was reproduced on a larger scale andwas therefore more fatal. This led directly, by the inevitable logicof a false position, to Cornwallis's march through North Carolinainto Virginia, to Yorktown in 1781, and to the signal demonstrationof sea power off Chesapeake Bay, which at a blow accomplished theindependence of the United States. No hostile strategist couldhave severed the British army more hopelessly than did the Britishgovernment; no fate could have been more inexorable than was its ownperverse will. The personal alienation and official quarrel betweenSir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis, their divided counsels anddivergent action, were but the natural result, and the reflection, ofa situation essentially self-contradictory and exasperating. As the hurricane season of 1779 advanced, d'Estaing, who had ordersto bring back to France the ships of the line with which he had sailedfrom Toulon in 1778, resolved to go first upon the American coast, offSouth Carolina or Georgia. Arriving with his whole fleet at the mouthof the Savannah, August 31st, he decided to attempt to wrest the cityof Savannah from the British. This would have been of real serviceto the latter, had it nipped in the bud their ex-centric undertaking;but, after three weeks of opening trenches, an assault upon the placefailed. D'Estaing then sailed for Europe with the ships designatedto accompany him, the others returning to the West Indies in twosquadrons, under de Grasse and La Motte-Picquet. Though fruitlessin its main object, this enterprise of d'Estaing had the importantindirect effect of causing the British to abandon Narragansett Bay. Upon the news of his appearance, Sir Henry Clinton had felt that, withhis greatly diminished army, he could not hold both Rhode Island andNew York. He therefore ordered the evacuation of the former, thussurrendering, to use again Rodney's words, "the best and noblestharbour in America. " The following summer it was occupied in force bythe French. D'Estaing was succeeded in the chief command, in the West Indies andNorth America, by Rear-Admiral de Guichen, [69] who arrived on thestation in March, 1780, almost at the same moment as Rodney. [Footnote 54: The French accounts say three. ] [Footnote 55: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs, " iv. 390. ] [Footnote 56: Santa Lucia being in the region of the north-east tradewinds, north and east are always windwardly relatively to south andwest. ] [Footnote 57: To the westward. These islands lie in the trade-winds, which are constant in _general_ direction from north-east. ] [Footnote 58: Admiral Keppel, in his evidence before the PalliserCourt, gave an interesting description of a similar scene, althoughthe present writer is persuaded that he was narrating things as theyseemed, rather than as they were--as at Grenada. "The French wereforming their line exactly in the manner M. Conflans did when attackedby Admiral Hawke. " (Keppel had been in that action. ) "It is a mannerpeculiar to themselves; and to those who do not understand it, itappears like confusion. They draw out ship by ship from a cluster. "] [Footnote 59: That is, towards the ships at anchor, --the enemy's rearas matters then were. ] [Footnote 60: Byron's Report. The italics are the author's. ] [Footnote 61: Byron's Report. ] [Footnote 62: Ibid. Author's italics. ] [Footnote 63: "Naval Researches. " London, 1830, p. 22. ] [Footnote 64: Byron's Report. ] [Footnote 65: Pierre A. De Suffren de Saint Tropez, a Bailli of theOrder of Knights of Malta. Born, 1726. Present at two naval actionsbefore he was twenty. Participated in 1756 in the attack on PortMahon, and in 1759 in the action off Lagos. Chef d'escadre in 1779. Dispatched to the East Indies in 1781. Fought a British squadronin the Bay of Praya, and a succession of brilliant actions with SirEdward Hughes, 1782-83. Vice-Admiral, 1783. Killed in a duel, 1788. One of the greatest of French naval officers. --W. L. C. ] [Footnote 66: Troude says that one French seventy-four, having touchedin leaving port, was not in the engagement. ] [Footnote 67: First of the name. Born 1714. In 1780, he fell underRodney's censure, and went home. In 1781, he commanded in the generalaction with the Dutch, known as the Dogger Bank. In 1782, he sailedfor the East Indies in the _Cato_, 64; which ship was never againheard from. ] [Footnote 68: Sir Hyde Parker, Kt. Second of the name, son of thefirst. Born, 1739. Captain, 1763. Rear-Admiral, 1793. Vice-Admiral, 1794. Admiral, 1799. Died, 1807. Nelson's chief at Copenhagen, in1801. ] [Footnote 69: Louis Urbain de Bouënic, Comte de Guichen. Born, 1712. Entered the navy, 1730. Commanded the _Illustre_ with success in NorthAmerica in 1756. Second in command in the action off Ushant in 1778. Thrice fought Rodney in the West Indies in 1780. Fought Kempenfelt offthe Azores in 1781. Died, 1790. --W. L. C. ] CHAPTER VII THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THEENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVESGIBRALTAR In June, 1779, the maritime situation of Great Britain had becomemuch more serious by Spain's declaring war. At the same moment thatd'Estaing with twenty-five ships of the line had confronted Byron'stwenty-one, the Channel fleet of forty sail had seen gathering againstit a host of sixty-six. Of this great number thirty-six were Spanish. The open declaration of Spain had been preceded by a secret alliancewith France, signed on the 12th of April. Fearing that the Britishgovernment would take betimes the reasonable and proper step ofblockading the Brest fleet of thirty with the Channel forty, thusassuming a central position with reference to its enemies andanticipating the policy of Lord St. Vincent, the French Ministryhurried its ships to sea on the 4th of June; Admiral d'Orvilliers, Keppel's opponent, still in command. His orders were to cruise nearthe island of Cizarga, off the north-west coast of Spain, wherethe Spaniards were to join him. On the 11th of June he was at therendezvous, but not till the 23d of July did the bulk of the Spanishforce appear. During this time, the French, insufficiently equippedfrom the first, owing to the haste of their departure, were consumingprovisions and water, not to speak of wasting pleasant summer weather. Their ships also were ravaged by an epidemic fever. Upon the junction, d'Orvilliers found that the Spaniards had not been furnished with theFrench system of signals, although by the treaty the French admiralwas to be in chief command. The rectification of this oversight causedfurther delay, but on the 11th of August the combined fleet sightedUshant, and on the 14th was off the Lizard. On the 16th it appearedbefore Plymouth, and there on the 17th captured the British 64-gunship _Ardent_. Thirty-five ships of the Channel fleet had gone to sea on the 16th ofJune, and now were cruising outside, under the command of Admiral SirCharles Hardy. His station was from ten to twenty leagues south-westof Scilly; consequently he had not been seen by the enemy, who fromUshant had stood up the Channel. The allies, now nearly double thenumbers of the British, were between them and their ports, --a serioussituation doubtless, but by no means desperate; not so dangerous forsailing ships as it probably will be for steamers to have an enemybetween them and their coal. The alarm in England was very great, especially in the south. On the9th of July a royal proclamation had commanded all horses and cattleto be driven from the coasts, in case of invasion. Booms had beenplaced across the entrance to Plymouth Harbor, and orders were sentfrom the Admiralty to sink vessels across the harbour's mouth. Manywho had the means withdrew into the interior, which increased thepanic. Great merchant fleets were then on the sea, homeward bound. If d'Orvilliers were gone to cruise in the approaches to the Channel, instead of to the Spanish coast, these might be taken; and for sometime his whereabouts were unknown. As it was, the Jamaica convoy, overtwo hundred sail, got in a few days before the allies appeared, andthe Leeward Islands fleet had similar good fortune. Eight homewardbound East Indiamen were less lucky, but, being warned of theirdanger, took refuge in the Shannon, and there remained till thetrouble blew over. On the other hand, the stock market stood firm. Nevertheless, it was justly felt that such a state of things as avastly superior hostile fleet in the Channel should not have been. SirJohn Jervis, afterward Earl St. Vincent, who commanded a ship in thefleet, wrote to his sister: "What a humiliating state is our countryreduced to!" but he added that he laughed at the idea of invasion. The French had placed a force of fifty thousand men at Le Havre andSt. Malo, and collected four hundred vessels for their transport. Their plans were not certainly known, but enough had transpiredto cause reasonable anxiety; and the crisis, on its face, was veryserious. Not their own preparations, but the inefficiency of theirenemies, in counsel and in preparation, saved the British Islandsfrom invasion. What the results of this would have been is anotherquestion, --a question of land warfare. The original scheme of theFrench Ministry was to seize the Isle of Wight, securing Spithead asan anchorage for the fleet, and to prosecute their enterprise fromthis near and reasonably secure base. Referring to this first project, d'Orvilliers wrote: "We will seek the enemy at St. Helen's, [70] andthen, if I find that roadstead unoccupied, or make myself master ofit, I will send word to Marshal De Vaux, at Le Havre, and inform himof the measures I will take to insure his passage, which [measures]will depend upon the position of the English main fleet [dèpendrontdes forces supèrieures des Anglais]. That is to say, I myself willlead the combined fleet on that side [against their main body], tocontain the enemy, and I will send, on the other side [to convoy], a light squadron, with a sufficient number of ships of the line andfrigates; or I will propose to M. De Cordova to take this latterstation, in order that the passage of the army may be free and sure. I assume that then, either by the engagement I shall have fought withthe enemy, _or by their retreat into their ports_, I shall be certainof their situation and of the success of the operation. "[71] It willbe observed that d'Orvilliers, accounted then and now one of the bestofficers of his day in the French navy, takes here into full accountthe British "fleet in being. " The main body of the allies, fiftyships, was to hold this in check, while a smaller force--Cordova hadcommand of a special "squadron of observation, " of sixteen ships ofthe line--was to convoy the crossing. These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and achange of mind in the French government. On the 16th of August, beforePlymouth, d'Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of Wight, butthe coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene of landing. The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any anchorage, --aresource necessary even to steamers, and far more to sailing vesselsaiming to remain in a position. As a point to begin shore operations, too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote corner of the countryto be invaded was absurd. D'Orvilliers duly represented all this, butcould not stay where he was long enough to get a reply. An easterlygale came on, which blew hard for several days and drove the alliesout of the Channel. On the 25th of August word was received that theBritish fleet was near Scilly. A council of war was then held, whichdecided that, in view of the terrible increase of disease in theshipping, and of the shortness of provisions, it was expedient not toreënter the Channel, but to seek the enemy, and bring him to battle. This was done. On the 29th Hardy was sighted, being then on his returnup Channel. With the disparity of force he could not but declineaction, and the allies were unable to compel it. On the 3d ofSeptember he reached Spithead. D'Orvilliers soon afterwards receivedorders to return to Brest, and on the 14th the combined fleet anchoredthere. The criticism to be passed on the conduct of this summer campaign bythe British Ministry is twofold. In the first place, it was not readyaccording to the reasonable standard of the day, which recognisedin the probable coõperation of the two Bourbon kingdoms, France andSpain, the measure of the minimum naval force permissible to GreatBritain. Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the war had beenforeseen months before. For the inferior force, therefore, it wasessential to prevent a junction, --to take an interior position. TheChannel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French sailed. After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the contentionof the Opposition, that they should have been followed, and attacked, off the coast of Spain. During the six weeks they waited there, theywere inferior to Hardy's force. Allowance here must be made, however, for the inability of a representative government to disregard popularoutcry, and to uncover the main approach to its own ports. This, indeed, does but magnify the error made in not watching Brest betimes;for in such case a fleet before Brest covered also the Channel. With regard to the objects of the war in which they had becomepartners, the views of France and Spain accorded in but onepoint, --the desirability of injuring Great Britain. Each had itsown special aim for its own advantage. This necessarily introduceddivergence of effort; but, France having first embarked alone in thecontest and then sought the aid of Spain, the particular objects ofher ally naturally obtained from the beginning a certain precedence. Until near the close of the war, it may be said that the chiefambitions of France were in the West Indies; those of Spain, inEurope, --to regain Minorca and Gibraltar. In this way Gibraltar became a leading factor in the contest, andaffected, directly or indirectly, the major operations throughout theworld, by the amount of force absorbed in attacking and preservingit. After the futile effort in the Channel, in 1779, Spain recalledher vessels from Brest. "The project of a descent upon England wasabandoned provisionally. To blockade Gibraltar, to have in America andAsia force sufficient to hold the British in check, and to take theoffensive in the West Indies, --such, " wrote the French government toits ambassador in Madrid, "was the plan of campaign adopted for 1780. "Immediately upon the declaration of war, intercourse between Gibraltarand the Spanish mainland was stopped. Soon afterwards a blockade bysea was instituted; fifteen cruisers being stationed at the entranceof the Bay, where they seized and sent into Spanish ports all vessels, neutral or British, bound to the Rock. This blockade was effectivelysupported from Cadiz, but a Spanish force of some ships of theline and many small vessels also maintained it more directly fromAlgeciras, on the Spanish side of the Bay of Gibraltar. The BritishMediterranean squadron, then consisting only of one 60-gun ship, three frigates, and a sloop, was wholly unable to afford relief. Atthe close of the year 1779, flour in Gibraltar was fourteen guineasthe barrel, and other provisions in proportion. It became thereforeimminently necessary to throw in supplies of all kinds, as well as toreinforce the garrison. To this service Rodney was assigned; and withit he began the brilliant career, the chief scene of which was to bein the West Indies. Rodney was appointed to command the Leeward Islands Station on the1st of October, 1779. He was to be accompanied there immediately byonly four or five ships of the line; but advantage was taken of hissailing, to place under the charge of an officer of his approvedreputation a great force, composed of his small division and a largefraction of the Channel fleet, to convey supplies and reinforcementsto Gibraltar and Minorca. On the 29th of December the whole body, after many delays in getting down Channel, put to sea from Plymouth:twenty-two ships of the line, fourteen frigates and smaller vessels, besides a huge collection of storeships, victuallers, ordnancevessels, troop-ships, and merchantmen, --the last named being the"trade" for the West Indies and Portugal. On the 7th of January, 1780, a hundred leagues west of CapeFinisterre, the West India ships parted for their destination, underconvoy of a ship of the line and three frigates. At daylight onthe 8th, twenty-two sail were seen to the north-east, the squadronapparently having passed them in the night. Chase was at once given, and the whole were taken in a few hours. Seven were ships of war, one64 and six frigates; the remainder merchant vessels, laden with navalstores and provisions for the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. The provisionships, twelve in number, were diverted at once to the relief ofGibraltar, under charge of the Spanish sixty-four, which had been oneof their convoy before capture, and was now manned by a British crew. Continuing on, intelligence was received from time to time by passingvessels that a Spanish squadron was cruising off Cape St. Vincent. Thus forewarned, orders were given to all captains to be preparedfor battle as the Cape was neared. On the 16th it was passed, and at1 P. M. Sails in the south-east were signalled. These were a Spanishsquadron of eleven ships of the line, and two 26-gun frigates. Rodneyat once bore down for them under a press of canvas, making signal forthe line abreast. [72] Seeing, however, that the enemy was trying toform line of battle ahead on the starboard tack, which with a westerlywind was with heads to the southward, towards Cadiz, a hundred milesto the south-east, he changed the orders to a "General Chase, " theships to engage as they came up; "to leeward, " so as to get betweenthe enemy and his port, and "in rotation, " by which probably wasmeant that the leading British vessel should attack the sternmost ofthe Spaniards, and that her followers should pass her to leeward, successively engaging from the enemy's rear towards the van. At 4 P. M. The signal for battle was made, and a few minutes laterthe four headmost of the pursuers got into action. At 4. 40 one of theSpanish ships, the _Santo Domingo_, 80, blew up with all on board, andat 6 another struck. By this hour, it being January, darkness had setin. A night action therefore followed, which lasted until 2 A. M. , whenthe headmost of the enemy surrendered, and all firing ceased. Of theeleven hostile ships of the line, only four escaped. Besides theone blown up, six were taken. These were the _Fénix_, 80, flag ofthe Spanish Admiral, Don Juan de Langara, the _Monarca_, 70, the_Princesa_, 70, the _Diligente_, 70, the _San Julian_, 70, and the_San Eugenio_, 70. The two latter drove ashore and were lost. [73] Theremaining four were brought into Gibraltar, and were ultimately addedto the Navy. All retained their old names, save the _Fénix_, whichwas renamed _Gibraltar_. "The weather during the night, " by Rodney'sreport, "was at times very tempestuous, with a great sea. It continuedvery bad weather the next day, when the _Royal George_, 100, _PrinceGeorge_, 90, _Sandwich_, 90 (Rodney's flagship), and several otherships were in great danger, and under the necessity of making sail toavoid the shoals of San Lucar, nor did they get into deep water tillthe next morning. " It was in this danger from a lee shore, which was deliberately thoughpromptly incurred, that the distinction of this action of Rodney'sconsists. The enemy's squadron, being only eleven ships of the line, was but half the force of the British, and it was taken by surprise;which, to be sure, is no excuse for a body of war-ships in war-time. Caught unawares, the Spaniards took to flight too late. It wasRodney's merit, and no slight one under the conditions of weather andnavigation, that they were not permitted to retrieve their mistake. His action left nothing to be desired in resolution or readiness. Itis true that Rodney discussed the matter with his flag-captain, WalterYoung, and that rumor attributed the merit of the decision to thelatter; but this sort of detraction is of too common occurrence toaffect opinion. Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician to the Fleet, givesthe following account: "When it was close upon sunset, it became aquestion whether the chase should be continued. After some discussionbetween the Admiral and Captain, at which I was present, the Admiralbeing confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the samecourse, with the signal to engage to leeward. " Rodney at that timewas nearly sixty-two, and a constant martyr to gout in both feet andhands. The two successes by the way imparted a slightly triumphal characterto the welcome of the Admiral by the garrison, then sorely in needof some good news. The arrival of much-needed supplies from home wasitself a matter of rejoicing; but it was more inspiriting still to seefollowing in the train of the friendly fleet five hostile ships ofthe line, one of them bearing the flag of a Commander-in-Chief, andto hear that, besides these, three more had been sunk or destroyed. The exultation in England was even greater, and especially at theAdmiralty, which was labouring under the just indignation of thepeople for the unpreparedness of the Navy. "You have taken moreline-of-battle ships, " wrote the First Lord to Rodney, "than had beencaptured in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars. " It should be remembered, too, as an element in the triumph, that thisadvantage over an exposed detachment had been snatched, as it were, inthe teeth of a main fleet superior to Rodney's own; for twenty Spanishand four French ships of the line, under Admiral de Cordova, werelying then in Cadiz Bay. During the eighteen days when the Britishremained in and near the Straits, no attempt was made by Cordova totake revenge for the disaster, or to reap the benefit of superiorforce. The inaction was due, probably, to the poor condition of theSpanish ships in point of efficiency and equipment, and largely totheir having uncoppered bottoms. This element of inferiority in theSpanish navy should be kept in mind as a factor in the general war, although Spanish fleets did not come much into battle. A FrenchCommodore, then with the Spanish fleet in Ferrol, wrote as follows:"Their ships all sail so badly that they can neither overtake an enemynor escape from one. The _Glorieux_ is a bad sailer in the Frenchnavy, but better than the best among the Spaniards. " He adds: "Thevessels of Langara's squadron were surprised at immense distancesone from the other. Thus they always sail, and their negligence andsecurity on this point are incredible. " On approaching Gibraltar, the continuance of bad weather, and thestrong easterly current of the Straits, set many of Rodney's ships andconvoy to leeward, to the back of the Rock, and it was not till the26th that the flagship herself anchored. The storeships for Minorcawere sent on at once, under charge of three coppered ships of theline. The practice of coppering, though then fully adopted, had notyet been extended to all vessels. As an element of speed, it was animportant factor on an occasion like this, when time pressed to getto the West Indies; as it also was in an engagement. The action on the16th had been opened by the coppered ships of the line, which firstovertook the retreating enemy and brought his rear to battle. Inthe French navy at the time, Suffren was urging the adoption upon anapparently reluctant Minister. It would seem to have been more generalamong the British, going far to compensate for the otherwise inferiorqualities of their ships. "The Spanish men-of-war we have taken, "wrote Rodney to his wife concerning these prizes, "are much superiorto ours. " It may be remembered that Nelson, thirteen years later, saidthe same of the Spanish vessels which came under his observation. "Inever saw finer ships. " "I perceive you cry out loudly for copperedships, " wrote the First Lord to Rodney after this action; "and Iam therefore determined to stop your mouth. You shall have copperenough. " Upon the return of the Minorca ships, Rodney put to sea again on the13th of February, for the West Indies. The detachment from the Channelfleet accompanied him three days' sail on his way, and then partedfor England with the prizes. On this return voyage it fell in withfifteen French supply vessels, convoyed by two 64's, bound for theIle de France, [74] in the Indian Ocean. One of the ships of war, the_Protée_, and three of the storeships were taken. Though trivial, theincident illustrates the effect of operations in Europe upon war inIndia. It may be mentioned here as indicative of the government'sdilemmas, that Rodney was censured for having left one ship of theline at the Rock. "It has given us the trouble _and risk_ of sendinga frigate on purpose to order her home immediately; and if you willlook into your original instructions, you will find that there wasno point more strongly guarded against than that of your leavingany line-of-battle ship behind you. " These words clearly show theexigency and peril of the general situation, owing to the inadequatedevelopment of the naval force as compared with its foes. Suchisolated ships ran the gantlet of the fleets in Cadiz, Ferrol, andBrest flanking the routes. [Footnote 70: An anchorage three miles to seaward of Spithead. ] [Footnote 71: Chevalier, "Marine Française, " 1778, p. 165. Author'sitalics. ] [Footnote 72: In line "abreast, " as the word indicates, the ships arenot in each other's wake, as in line "ahead, " but abreast; that is, ranged on a line perpendicular to the course steered. ] [Footnote 73: Rodney's Report. Chevalier says that one of them wasretaken by her crew and carried into Cadiz. ] [Footnote 74: Now the British Mauritius. ] CHAPTER VIII RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHENRETURNS TO EUROPE, AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THECAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNSTO WEST INDIES When Rodney arrived at Santa Lucia with his four ships of the line, onMarch 27, 1780, he found there a force of sixteen others, composed inabout equal proportions of ships that had left England with Byron inthe summer of 1778, and of a reinforcement brought by Rear-AdmiralRowley in the spring of 1779. During the temporary command of Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker, betweenthe departure of Byron and the arrival of Rodney, a smart affair hadtaken place between a detachment of the squadron and one from theFrench division, under La Motte-Picquet, then lying in Fort Royal, Martinique. On the 18th of December, 1779, between 8 and 9 A. M. , the Britishlook-out ship, the _Preston_, 50, between Martinique and Santa Luciamade signal for a fleet to windward, which proved to be a body ofFrench supply ships, twenty-six in number, under convoy of a frigate. Both the British and the French squadrons were in disarray, sailsunbent, ships on the heel or partially disarmed, crews ashore forwood and water. In both, signals flew at once for certain ships toget under way, and in both the orders were executed with a rapiditygratifying to the two commanders, who also went out in person. TheBritish, however, were outside first, with five sail of the line anda 50-gun ship. Nine of the supply vessels were captured by them, andfour forced ashore. The French Rear-Admiral had by this time gotout of Fort Royal with three ships of the line, --the _Annibal_, 74, _Vengeur_, 64, and _Réfléchi_, 64, --and, being to windward, coveredthe entrance of the remainder of the convoy. As the two hostiledivisions were now near each other, with a fine working breeze, theBritish tried to beat up to the enemy; the _Conqueror_, 74, CaptainWalter Griffith, being ahead and to windward of her consorts. Comingwithin range at 5, firing began between her and the French flagship, _Annibal_, 74, and subsequently between her and all the three vesselsof the enemy. Towards sunset, the _Albion_, 74, had got close up withthe _Conqueror_, and the other ships were within distant range; "butas they had worked not only well within the dangers of the shoals ofthe bay (Fort Royal), but within reach of the batteries, I called themoff by night signal at a quarter before seven. "[75] In this chivalrousskirmish, --for it was little more, although the injury to the Frenchin the loss of the convoy was notable, --Parker was equally delightedwith his own squadron and with his enemy. "The steadiness and coolnesswith which on every tack the _Conqueror_ received the fire of thesethree ships, and returned her own, working his ship with as muchexactness as if he had been turning into Spithead, and on everyboard gaining on the enemy, gave me infinite pleasure. It was withinexpressible concern, " he added, "that I heard that Captain WalterGriffith, of the _Conqueror_, was killed by the last broadside. "[76]Having occasion, a few days later, to exchange a flag of trucewith the French Rear-Admiral, he wrote to him; "The conduct of yourExcellency in the affair of the 18th of this month fully justifies thereputation which you enjoy among us, and I assure you that I could notwitness without envy the skill you showed on that occasion. Our enmityis transient, depending upon our masters; but your merit has stampedupon my heart the greatest admiration for yourself. " This was theofficer who was commonly known in his time as "Vinegar" Parker; butthese letters show that the epithet fitted the rind rather than thekernel. Shortly after de Guichen[77] took command, in March, 1780, he arrangedwith the Marquis de Bouillé, Governor of Martinique, to make acombined attack upon some one of the British West India Islands. Forthis purpose three thousand troops were embarked in the fleet, whichsailed on the night of the 13th of April, 1780, intending first toaccompany a convoy for Santo Domingo, until it was safely out ofreach of the British. Rodney, who was informed at once of the Frenchdeparture, put to sea in chase with all his ships, twenty of the line, two of which were of 90 guns, and on the 16th came in sight of theenemy to leeward (westward) of Martinique, beating up against thenorth-east trade-winds, and intending to pass through the channelbetween that island and Dominica. "A general chase to the north-westfollowed, and at five in the evening we plainly discovered that theyconsisted of twenty-three sail of the line, and one 50 gun ship. "[78] As it fell dark Rodney formed his line of battle, standing still tothe north-west, therefore on the starboard tack; and he was attentiveto keep to windward of the enemy, whom his frigates watched diligentlyduring the night. "Their manoeuvres, " he wrote, "indicated a wish toavoid battle, " and he therefore was careful to counteract them. Atdaylight of April 17th, they were seen forming line of battle, on theport tack, four or five leagues to leeward, --that is, to the westward. The wind being east, or east by north, the French would be headingsouth-south-east (Fig. 1, aa). The British order now was rectified bysignal from the irregularities of darkness, the ships being directedto keep two cables'[79] lengths apart, and steering as before tothe northward and westward. At 7 A. M. , considering this line tooextended, the Admiral closed the intervals to one cable (aa). The twofleets thus were passing on nearly parallel lines, but in oppositedirections, which tended to bring the whole force of Rodney, whoseline was better and more compact than the enemy's, abreast thelatter's rear, upon which he intended to concentrate. At 8 A. M. Hemade general signal that this was his purpose; and at 8. 30, to executeit, he signalled for the ships to form line abreast, bearing from eachother south by east and north by west, and stood down at once uponthe enemy (Fig. 1, bb). The object of the British being evident, deGuichen made his fleet wear together to the starboard tack (bb). The French rear thus became the van, and their former van, which wasstretched too far for prompt assistance to the threatened rear, nowheaded to support it. Rodney, baulked in his first spring, hauled at once to the wind on theport tack (Fig. 1, _cc_), again contrary to the French, standing thusonce more along their line, for their new rear. The intervals wereopened out again to two cables. The fleets thus were passing once moreon parallel lines, each having reversed its order; but the Britishstill retained the advantage, on whatever course and interval, thatthey were much more compact than the French, whose line, by Rodney'sestimate, extended four leagues in length. [80] The wariness of thetwo combatants, both trained in the school of the eighteenth centurywith its reverence for the line of battle, will appear to the carefulreader. Rodney, although struggling through this chrysalis stageto the later vigor, and seriously bent on a deadly blow, still wasconstrained by the traditions of watchful fencing. Nor was his cautionextravagant; conditions did not justify yet the apparent recklessnessof Nelson's tactics. "The different movements of the enemy, " he wrote, "obliged me to be very attentive, and watch every opportunity thatoffered of attacking them to advantage. " [Illustration] The two fleets continued to stand on opposite parallel courses--theFrench north by west, the British south by east--until the flagship_Sandwich_, 90, (Fig. 2, S^1) was abreast the _Couronne_, 80, (C), theflagship of de Guichen. Then, at 10. 10 A. M. , the signal was made towear together, forming on the same tack as the enemy. There being somedelay in execution, this had to be repeated, and further enforced bythe pennant of the _Stirling Castle_, which, as the rear ship, shouldbegin the evolution. At half-past ten, apparently, the fleet was about(Fig. 2, aa), for an order was then given for rectifying the line, still at two cables. At 11 A. M. The Admiral made the signal to preparefor battle, "to convince the whole fleet I was determined to bring theenemy to an engagement, "[81] and to this succeeded shortly the orderto alter the course to port (bb), towards the enemy. [82] Why hethought that any of the fleet should have required such assurancecannot certainly be said. Possibly, although he had so recentlyjoined, he had already detected the ill-will, or the slackness, ofwhich he afterwards complained; possibly he feared that the warinessof his tactics might lead men to believe that he did not mean toexceed the lukewarm and indecisive action of days scarce yet passedaway, which had led Suffren to stigmatize tactics as a mere veil, behind which timidity thinks to hide its nakedness. At 11. 50 A. M. The decisive signal was made "for every ship to beardown, and steer for _her opposite in the enemy's line_, agreeableto the 21st article of the Additional Fighting Instructions. " Fiveminutes later, when the ships, presumably, had altered their coursefor the enemy, the signal for battle was made, followed by the messagethat the Admiral's intention was to engage closely; he expecting, naturally, that every ship would follow the example he purposed toset. The captain of the ship which in the formation (aa) had beenthe leader, upon whose action depended that of those near her, unfortunately understood Rodney's signal to mean that he was toattack the enemy's leader, not the ship opposite to him at the momentof bearing away. This ship, therefore, diverged markedly from theAdmiral's course, drawing after her many of the van. A few minutesbefore 1 P. M. , one of the headmost ships began to engage at longrange; but it was not till some time after 1 P. M. That the _Sandwich_, having received several broadsides, came into close action (S^2) withthe second vessel astern from the French Admiral, the _Actionnaire_, 64. The latter was soon beat out of the line by the superiority ofthe _Sandwich's_ battery, and the same lot befell the ship astern ofher, --probably the _Intrépide_, 74, --which came up to close the gap. Towards 2. 30 P. M. , the _Sandwich_, either by her own efforts toclose, or by her immediate opponents' keeping away, was found to beto leeward (S^3) of the enemy's line; the _Couronne_ (C) being on herweather bow. The fact was pointed out by Rodney to the captain of theship, Walter Young, who was then in the lee gangway. Young, going overto look for himself, saw that it was so, and that the _Yarmouth_, 64, had hauled off to windward, where she lay with her main and mizzentopsails aback. Signals were then made to her, and to the _Cornwall_, 74, to come to closer engagement, they both being on the weather bowof the flagship. De Guichen, recognising this state of affairs, then or a littlelater, attributed it to the deliberate purpose of the British Admiralto break his line. It does not appear that Rodney so intended. Histactical idea was to concentrate his whole fleet on the French rearand centre, but there is no indication that he now aimed at breakingthe line. De Guichen so construing it, however, gave the signal towear together, away from the British line. The effect of this, in anyevent, would have been to carry his fleet somewhat to leeward; butwith ships more or less crippled, taking therefore greater room tomanoeuvre, and with the exigency of re-forming the line upon them, thetendency was exaggerated. The movement which the French called wearingtogether was therefore differently interpreted by Rodney. "The actionin the centre continued till 4. 15 P. M. , when M. De Guichen, in the_Couronne_, the _Triomphant_, and the _Fendant_, after engaging the_Sandwich_ for an hour and a half, bore away. The superiority of firefrom the _Sandwich_, and the gallant behavior of the officers and men, enabled her to sustain so unequal a combat; though before attackedby them, she had beat three ships out of their line of battle, hadentirely broke it, and was to leeward of the French Admiral. " Possiblythe French accounts, if they were not so very meagre, might disputethis prowess of the flagship; but there can be no doubt that Rodneyhad set an example, which, had it been followed by all, would havemade this engagement memorable, if not decisive. He reported that thecaptains, with very few exceptions, had placed their ships improperly(cc). The _Sandwich_ had eighty shot in her hull, had lost herforemast and mainyard, and had fired 3288 rounds, an average of 73to each gun of the broadside engaged. Three of her hits being belowthe water line, she was kept afloat with difficulty during the nexttwenty-four hours. With the wearing of the French the battle ceased. In the advantage offered by the enemy, whose order was too greatlyextended, and in his own plan of attack, Rodney always considered thisaction of April 17th, 1780, to have been the great opportunity of hislife; and his wrath was bitter against those by whose misconduct heconceived it had been frustrated. "The French admiral, who appearedto me to be a brave and gallant officer, had the honour to be noblysupported during the whole action. It is with concern inexpressible, mixed with indignation, that the duty I owe my sovereign and mycountry obliges me to acquaint your Lordships that during the actionbetween the French fleet, on the 17th inst, and his Majesty's, theBritish flag was not properly supported. " Divided as the Navy wasthen into factions, with their hands at each other's throats or atthe throat of the Admiralty, the latter thought it more discreet tosuppress this paragraph, allowing to appear only the negative stigmaof the encomium upon the French officers, unaccompanied by any uponhis own. Rodney, however, in public and private letters did notconceal his feelings; and the censure found its way to the ears ofthose concerned. Subsequently, three months after the action, in apublic letter, he bore testimony to the excellent conduct of fiveof the captains, Walter Young, of the flagship, George Bowyer ofthe _Albion_, John Douglas of the _Terrible_, John Houlton of the_Montagu_, and A. J. P. Molloy[83] of the _Trident_. "To them I havegiven certificates, under my hand, " "free and unsolicited. " Beyondthese, "no consideration in life would induce" him to go; and thetwo junior flag-officers were implicitly condemned in the words, "toinattention to signals, both in the van and rear divisions, is to beattributed the loss of that glorious opportunity (perhaps never tobe recovered) of terminating the naval contest in these seas. " Thesejunior admirals were Hyde Parker and Rowley; the latter the same whohad behaved, not only so gallantly, but with such unusual initiative, in Byron's engagement. A singular incident in this case led him to alike independence of action, which displeased Rodney. The _Montagu_, of his division, when closing the French line, wore against thehelm, and could only be brought into action on the wrong (port) tack. Immediately upon this, part of the French rear also wore, and Rowleyfollowed them of his own motion. Being called to account by Rodney, hestated the facts, justifying the act by the order that "the greatestimpression was to be made on the enemy's rear. " Both parties soon woreback. Hyde Parker went home in a rage a few weeks later. The certificates toBowyer and Douglas, certainly, and probably to Molloy, all of Parker'sdivision, bore the stinging words that these officers "meant well, andwould have done their duty had they been permitted. " It is stated thattheir ships, which were the rear of the van division, were going downto engage close, following Rodney's example, when Parker made them asignal to keep the line. If this be so, as Parker's courage was beyondall doubt, it was simply a recurrence of the old superstition of theline, aggravated by a misunderstanding of Rodney's later signals. These must be discussed, for the whole incident is part of the historyof the British Navy, far more important than many an indecisive thoughbloody encounter. One of the captains more expressly blamed, Carkett of the _StirlingCastle_, which had been the leading ship at the time the signal toalter the course toward the enemy was made, wrote to Rodney that heunderstood that his name had been mentioned, unfavourably of course, in the public letter. Rodney's reply makes perfectly apparent thepoint at issue, his own plan, the ideas running in his head as he madehis successive signals, the misconceptions of the juniors, and theconsequent fiasco. It must be said, however, that, granting the factsas they seem certainly to have occurred, no misunderstanding, notechnical verbal allegation, can justify a military stupidity so greatas that of which he complained. There are occasions in which not onlyis literal disobedience permissible, but literal obedience, flying inthe face of the evident conditions, becomes a crime. At 8 in the morning, Rodney had made a general signal of his purposeto attack the enemy's rear. This, having been understood and answered, was hauled down; all juniors had been acquainted with a generalpurpose, to which the subsequent manoeuvres were to lead. How he meantto carry out his intention was evidenced by the consecutive courseof action while on that tack, --the starboard; when the time came, thefleet bore up together, in line abreast, standing for the French rear. This attempt, being balked then by de Guichen's wearing, was renewedtwo hours later; only in place of the signal to form line abreast, was made one to alter the course to port, --towards the enemy. As thisfollowed immediately upon that to prepare for battle, it indicatedalmost beyond question, that Rodney wished, for reasons of the moment, to run down at first in a slanting direction, --not in line abreast, as before, --ships taking course and interval from the flagship. Lateragain, at 11. 50, the signal was made, "agreeable to the 21st Articleof the Additional Fighting Instructions, for every ship to steerfor her opposite in the enemy's line;" and here the trouble began. Rodney meant the ship opposite when the signal was hauled down. Hehad steered slanting, till he had gained as nearly as possible theposition he wanted, probably till within long range; then it wasdesirable to cover the remaining ground as rapidly and orderly aspossible, for which purpose the enemy's ship then abreast gave eachof his fleet its convenient point of direction. He conceived thathis signalled purpose to attack the enemy's rear, never having beenaltered, remained imperative; and further, that the signal for twocables' length interval should govern all ships, and would tie them tohim, and to his movements, in the centre. Carkett construed "opposite"to mean opposite in numerical order, British van ship against Frenchvan ship, wherever the latter was. Rodney states--in his letter toCarkett--that the French van was then two leagues away. "You led tothe van ship, notwithstanding you had answered my signals signifyingthat it was my intention to attack the enemy's rear; which signalI had never altered. .. . Your leading in the manner you did, inducedothers to follow so bad an example; and thereby, forgetting that thesignal for the line was only at two cables' length distance fromeach other, the van division was led by you to more than two leagues'distance from the centre division, which was thereby not properlysupported. "[84] Carkett was the oldest captain in the fleet, his post commissionbeing dated March 12th, 1758. How far he may have been excusable inconstruing as he did Fighting Instructions, which originated in theinane conception that the supreme duty of a Commander-in-Chief was tooppose ship to ship, and that a fleet action was only an agglomerationof naval duels, is not very material, though historically interesting. There certainly was that in the past history of the British Navy whichextenuated the offence of a man who must have been well on in middlelife. But since the Fighting Instructions had been first issued therehad been the courts-martial, also instructive, on Mathews, Lestock, Byng, Keppel, and Palliser, all of which turned more or less on theconstraint of the line of battle, and the duty of supporting shipsengaged, --above all, an engaged Commander-in-Chief. Rodney perhapsunderestimated the weight of the Fighting Instructions upon a dullman; but he was justified in claiming that his previous signals, and the prescription of distance, created at the least a conflict oforders, a doubt, to which there should have been but one solution, namely: to support the ships engaged, and to close down upon theenemy, as near as possible to the Commander-in-Chief. And in momentsof actual perplexity such will always be the truth. It is likemarching towards the sound of guns, or, to use Nelson's words, "_Incase_ signals cannot be understood, no captain can do very wrong if heplaces his ship alongside that of an enemy. " The "In Case, " however, needs also to be kept in mind; and that it was Nelson who said it. Utterances of to-day, like utterances of all time, show how feware the men who can hold both sides of a truth firmly, withoutexaggeration or defect. Judicial impartiality can be had, and positiveconvictions too; but their combination is rare. A two-sided man is aptalso to be double-minded. The loss of men in this sharp encounter was: British, killed, 120, wounded, 354; French, killed, 222, wounded, 537. [85] This givesthree French hit for every two British, from which, and from the muchgreater damage received aloft by the latter, it may be inferred thatboth followed their usual custom of aiming, the British at the hull, the French at the spars. To the latter conduced also the lee-gage, which the French had. The British, as the attacking party, sufferedlikewise a raking fire as they bore down. Rodney repaired damages at sea, and pursued, taking care to keepbetween Martinique and the French. The latter going into Guadeloupe, he reconnoitred them there under the batteries, and then took hisstation off Fort Royal. "The only chance of bringing them to action, "he wrote to the Admiralty on the 26th of April, "was to be off thatport before them, where the fleet now is, in daily expectation oftheir arrival. " The French represent that he avoided them, but asthey assert that they came out best on the 17th, and yet admit that heappeared off Guadeloupe, the claim is not tenable. Rodney here showedthorough tenacity of purpose. De Guichen's orders were "to keep thesea, so far as the force maintained by England in the Windward Islandswould permit, without too far compromising the fleet intrusted tohim. "[86] With such instructions, he naturally and consistently shrunkfrom decisive engagement. After landing his wounded and refitting inGuadeloupe, he again put to sea, with the intention of proceeding toSanta Lucia, resuming against that island the project which both heand De Bouillé continuously entertained. The latter and his troopsremained with the fleet. Rodney meantime had felt compelled to return momentarily to SantaLucia. "The fleet continued before Fort Royal till the condition ofmany of the ships under my command, and the lee currents, [87] renderedit necessary to anchor in Choque Bay (Anse du Choc), St. Lucie, inorder to put the wounded and sick men on shore, and to water andrefit the fleet, frigates having been detached both to leeward and towindward of every island, in order to gain intelligence of the motionsof the enemy, and timely notice of their approach towards Martinique, the only place they could refit at in these seas. " In this last clauseis seen the strategic idea of the British Admiral: the French mustcome back to Martinique. From the vigilance of his frigates it resulted that when the look-outsof de Guichen, who passed to windward of Martinique on the 7th ofMay, came in sight of Gros Ilet on the 9th, it was simply to findthe British getting under way to meet the enemy. During the fivefollowing days both fleets were engaged in constant movements, uponthe character of which the writers of each nation put differentconstructions. Both are agreed, however, that the French were towindward throughout, except for a brief hour on the 15th, when afleeting change of wind gave the British that advantage, only to loseit soon again. They at once used it to force action. As the windwardposition carries the power to attack, and as the French weretwenty-three to the British twenty, it is probably not a strainedinference to say that the latter were chasing to windward, and theformer avoiding action, in favour, perhaps, of that ulterior motive, the conquest of Santa Lucia, for which they had sailed. Rodney statesin his letter that, when the two fleets parted on the 20th of May, they were forty leagues to windward (eastward) of Martinique, in sightof which they had been on the 10th. During these days de Guichen, whose fleet, according to Rodney, sailedthe better, and certainly sufficiently well to preserve the advantageof the wind, bore down more than once, generally in the afternoon, when the breeze is steadiest, to within distant range of the British. Upon this movement, the French base the statement that the BritishAdmiral was avoiding an encounter; it is equally open to theinterpretation that he would not throw away ammunition until sure ofeffective distance. Both admirals showed much skill and mastery oftheir profession, great wariness also, and quickness of eye; but itis wholly untenable to claim that a fleet having the weather-gagefor five days, in the trade-winds, was unable to bring its enemy toaction, especially when it is admitted that the latter closed theinstant the wind permitted him to do so. On the afternoon of May 15th, about the usual hour, Rodney "made agreat deal of sail upon the wind. " The French, inferring that he wastrying to get off, which he meant them to do, approached somewhatcloser than on the previous days. Their van ship had come within longrange, abreast the centre of the British, who were on the port tackstanding to the south-south-east, with the wind at east (aa, aa). Herethe breeze suddenly hauled to south-southeast (wind b). The headsof all the ships in both fleets were thus knocked off to south-west(s, s), on the port tack, but the shift left the British rear, whichon that tack led the fleet, to windward of the French van. Rodney'ssignal flew at once, to tack in succession and keep the wind of theenemy; the latter, unwilling to yield the advantage, wore all together(w), hauling to the wind on the starboard tack, and to use Rodney'swords, "fled with a crowd of sail" (a', a'). [Illustration] The British fleet tacking in succession after their leaders, (t, t), the immediate result was that both were now standing on the starboardtack, --to the eastward, --the British having a slight advantage of thewind, but well abaft the beam of the French (bb, bb). The result, hadthe wind held, would have been a trial of speed and weatherliness. "His Majesty's fleet, " wrote Rodney, "by this manoeuvre had gained thewind, and would have forced the enemy to battle, had it not at oncechanged six points (back to east, its former direction, ) when near theenemy, and enabled them to recover that advantage. " When the wind thusshifted again, de Guichen tacked his ships together and stood acrossthe bows of the advancing enemy (cc, cc). The British leader struckthe French line behind the centre, and ran along to leeward, theBritish van exchanging a close cannonade with the enemy's rear. Such an engagement, two lines passing on opposite tacks, is usuallyindecisive, even when the entire fleets are engaged, as at Ushant; butwhere, as in this case, the engagement is but partial, the result isnaturally less. The French van and centre, having passed the head ofthe enemy, diverged at that point farther and farther from the trackof the on-coming British ships, which from the centre rearwards didnot fire. "As the enemy were under a press of sail, none but the vanof our fleet could come in for any part of the action without wastinghis Majesty's powder and shot, the enemy wantonly expending theirsat such a distance as to have no effect. " Here again the French wereevidently taking the chance of disabling the distant enemy in hisspars. The British loss in the action of May 15th was 21 killed and100 wounded. [Illustration] The fleets continued their respective movements, each acting asbefore, until the 19th, when another encounter took place, of exactlythe same character as the last, although without the same preliminarymanoeuvring. On that occasion the British, who in the interim hadbeen reinforced by one 74 and one 50-gun ship, lost 47 killed and 113wounded. The result was equally indecisive, tactically considered;but both by this time had exhausted their staying powers. The French, having been absent from Martinique since the 13th of April, had nowbut six days' provisions. [88] Rodney found the _Conqueror, Cornwall_, and _Boyne_ so shattered that he sent them before the wind to SantaLucia, while he himself with the rest of the fleet stood for Barbados, where he arrived on the 22d. The French anchored on the same dayat Fort Royal. "The English, " says Chevalier, "stood on upon thestarboard tack, to the southward, after the action of the 19th, andthe next day were not to be seen. " "The enemy, " reported Rodney, "stood to the northward with all the sail they could possibly press, and were out of sight the 21st inst. The condition of his Majesty'sships was such as not to allow a longer pursuit. " By their dexterity and vigilance each admiral had thwarted the other'saims. Rodney, by a pronounced, if cautious, offensive effort, hadabsolutely prevented the "ulterior object" of the French, which heclearly understood to be Santa Lucia. De Guichen had been successfulin avoiding decisive action, and he had momentarily so crippled a fewof the British ships that the fleet must await their repairs beforeagain taking the sea. The tactical gain was his, the strategic victoryrested with his opponent; but that his ships also had been muchmaltreated is shown by the fact that half a dozen could not put to seathree weeks later. The French admiral broke down under the strain, to which was added the grief of losing a son, killed in the recentengagements. He asked for his recall. "The command of so large afleet, " he wrote, "is infinitely beyond my capacity in all respects. My health cannot endure such continual fatigue and anxiety. " Certainlythis seems a tacit testimony to Rodney's skill, persistence, andoffensive purpose. The latter wrote to his wife: "For fourteen daysand nights the fleets were so near each other that neither officersnor men could be said to sleep. Nothing but the goodness of theweather and climate would have enabled us to endure so continual afatigue. Had it been in Europe, half the people must have sunk underit. For my part, it did me good. " Rodney stated also in his home letters that the action of hissubordinates in the last affairs had been efficient; but he gavethem little credit for it. "As I had given public notice to all mycaptains, etc. , that I expected implicit obedience to every signalmade, under the certain penalty of being instantly superseded, ithad an admirable effect; as they were all convinced, after theirlate gross behaviour, that they had nothing to expect at my hands butinstant punishment to those who neglected their duty. My eye on themhad more dread than the enemy's fire, and they knew it would be fatal. No regard was paid to rank: admirals as well as captains, if out oftheir station, were instantly reprimanded by signals, or messages sentby frigates; and, in spite of themselves, I taught them to be, whatthey had never been before, --_officers_. " Rodney told his officersalso that he would shift his flag into a frigate, if necessary, towatch them better. It is by no means obligatory to accept these grossaspersions as significant of anything worse than the suspiciousnessprevalent throughout the Navy, traceable ultimately to a corruptadministration of the Admiralty. The latter, like the government of1756, was open to censure through political maladministration; everyone feared that blame would be shifted on to him, as it had been onto Byng, --who deserved it; and not only so, but that blame wouldbe pushed on to ruin, as in his case. The Navy was honeycombed withdistrust, falling little short of panic. In this state of apprehensionand doubt, the tradition of the line of battle, resting upon men whodid not stop to study facts or analyse impressions, and who had seenofficers censured, cashiered, and shot, for errors of judgment or ofaction, naturally produced hesitations and misunderstandings. An orderof battle is a good thing, necessary to insure mutual support and todevelop a plan. The error of the century, not then exploded, was toobserve it in the letter rather than in the spirit; to regard theorder as an end rather than a means; and to seek in it not merelyefficiency, which admits broad construction in positions, butpreciseness, which is as narrowing as a brace of handcuffs. Rodneyhimself, Tory though he was, found fault with the administration. Withall his severity and hauteur, he did not lose sight of justice, as isshown by a sentence in his letter to Carkett. "Could I have imaginedyour conduct and inattention to signals had proceeded from anythingbut error in judgment, I had certainly superseded you, but God forbidI should do so for error in judgment only, "--again an illusion, notobscure, to Byng's fate. In Barbados, Rodney received certain information that a Spanishsquadron of twelve ships of the line, with a large convoy of tenthousand troops, had sailed from Cadiz on April 28th for the WestIndies. The vessel bringing the news had fallen in with them on theway. Rodney spread a line of frigates "to windward, from Barbados toBarbuda, " to obtain timely warning, and with the fleet put to sea onthe 7th of June, to cruise to the eastward of Martinique to interceptthe enemy. The latter had been discovered on the 5th by a frigate, fifty leagues east of the island, steering for it; but the Spanishadmiral, seeing that he would be reported, changed his course, and passed north of Guadeloupe. On the 9th he was joined in thatneighbourhood by de Guichen, who was able to bring with him onlyfifteen sail, --a fact which shows that he had suffered in the latebrushes quite as severely as Rodney, who had with him seventeen of histwenty. Having evaded the British, the allies anchored at Fort Royal; but theSpanish admiral absolutely refused to join in any undertaking againstthe enemy's fleet or possessions. Not only so, but he insisted onbeing accompanied to leeward. The Spanish squadron was ravaged byan epidemic, due to unsanitary conditions of the ships and theuncleanliness of the crews, and the disease was communicated to theirallies. De Guichen had already orders to leave the Windward Islandswhen winter approached. He decided now to anticipate that time, andon the 5th of July sailed from Fort Royal with the Spaniards. Havingaccompanied the latter to the east end of Cuba, he went to CapFrançois, in Haïti, then a principal French station. The Spaniardscontinued on to Havana. At Cap François, de Guichen found urgent entreaties from the FrenchMinister to the United States, and from Lafayette, to carry his fleetto the continent, where the clear-sighted genius of Washington hadrecognised already that the issue of the contest depended upon thenavies. The French admiral declined to comply, as contrary to hisinstructions, and on the 16th of August sailed for Europe, withnineteen sail of the line, leaving ten at Cap François. Sealed orders, opened at sea, directed him to proceed to Cadiz, where he anchoredon the 24th of October. His arrival raised the allied force thereassembled to fifty-one sail of the line, besides the ninety-five sugarand coffee ships which he had convoyed from Haïti. It is significantof the weakness of Great Britain in the Mediterranean at that time, that these extremely valuable merchant ships were sent on to Toulon, instead of to the more convenient Atlantic ports, only five ships ofthe line accompanying them past Gibraltar. The French government hadfeared to trust them to Brest, even with de Guichen's nineteen sail. The allied operations in the Windward Islands for the season of1780 had thus ended in nothing, notwithstanding an incontestableinferiority of the British to the French alone, of which Rodneystrongly complained. It was, however, contrary to the intentionsof the Admiralty that things so happened. Orders had been sent toVice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, at New York, to detach ships toRodney; but the vessel carrying them was driven by weather tothe Bahamas, and her captain neglected to notify Arbuthnot of hiswhereabouts, or of his dispatches. A detachment of five ships of theline under Commodore the Hon. Robert Boyle Walsingham was detainedthree months in England, wind-bound. They consequently did not jointill July 12th. The dispositions at once made by Rodney afford a verygood illustration of the kind of duties that a British Admiral hadthen to discharge. He detailed five ships of the line to remain withHotham at Santa Lucia, for the protection of the Windward Islands. On the 17th, taking with him a large merchant convoy, he put to seawith the fleet for St. Kitts, where the Leeward Islands "trade" wascollecting for England. On the way he received precise information asto the route and force of the Franco-Spanish fleet under de Guichen, of the sickness on board it, and of the dissension between the allies. From St. Kitts the July "trade" was sent home with two ships of theline. Three others, he wrote to the Admiralty, would accompany theSeptember fleet, "and the remainder of the ships on this station, which are in want of great repair and are not copper-bottomed, shallproceed with them or with the convoy which their Lordships have beenpleased to order shall sail from hence in October next. " If thesearrived before winter, he argued, they would be available by spring asa reinforcement for the Channel fleet, and would enable the Admiraltyto send him an equivalent number for the winter work on his station. As de Guichen had taken the whole French homeward merchant fleet fromMartinique to Cap François and as the height of the hurricane seasonwas near, Rodney reasoned that but a small French force would remainin Haïti, and consequently that Jamaica would not require all theBritish fleet to save it from any possible attack. He therefore sentthither ten sail of the line, notifying Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parkerthat they were not merely to defend the island, but to enable him tosend home its great trade in reasonable security. These things being done by July 31st, Rodney, reasoning that theallies had practically abandoned all enterprises in the West Indiesfor that year, and that a hurricane might at any moment overtake thefleet at its anchors, possibly making for it a lee shore, went to sea, to cruise with the fleet off Barbuda. His mind, however, was inclinedalready to go to the continent, whither he inferred, correctly butmistakenly, that the greater part of de Guichen's fleet would go, because it should. His purpose was confirmed by information from anAmerican vessel that a French squadron of seven ships of the line, convoying six thousand troops, had anchored in Narragansett Bay onthe 12th of July. He started at once for the coast of South Carolina, where he communicated with the army in Charleston, and thence, "sweeping the southern coast of America, " anchored with fourteen shipsof the line at Sandy Hook, on the 14th of September, unexpected andunwelcome to friends and foes alike. Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, being junior to Rodney, showed plainly andwith insubordination his wrath at this intrusion into his command, which superseded his authority and divided the prize-money of alucrative station. This, however, was a detail. To Washington, Rodney's coming was a deathblow to the hopes raised by the arrivalof the French division at Newport, which he had expected to seereinforced by de Guichen. Actually, the departure of the latter madeimmaterial Rodney's appearance on the scene; but this Washingtondid not know then. As it was, Rodney's force joined to Arbuthnot'sconstituted a fleet of over twenty sail of the line, before which, vigorously used, there can be little doubt that the French squadron inNewport must have fallen. But Rodney, though he had shown great energyin the West Indies, and unusual resolution in quitting his own stationfor a more remote service, was sixty-two, and suffered from gout. "Thesudden change of climate makes it necessary for me to go on shore forsome short time, " he wrote; and although he added that his illnesswas "not of such a nature as shall cause one moment's delay in hisMajesty's service, " he probably lost a chance at Rhode Island. Hedid not overlook the matter, it is true; but he decided upon theinformation of Arbuthnot and Sir Henry Clinton, and did not inspectthe ground himself. Nothing of consequence came of his visit; and onthe 16th of November he sailed again for the West Indies, taking withhim only nine sail of the line. The arrival of de Ternay's seven ships at Newport was more than offsetby a British reinforcement of six ships of the line under Rear-AdmiralThomas Graves which entered New York on July 13th, --only one daylater. Arbuthnot's force was thus raised to ten of the line, oneof which was of 98 guns. After Rodney had come and gone, the Frenchdivision was watched by cruisers, resting upon Gardiner's Bay, --acommodious anchorage at the east end of Long Island, between thirtyand forty miles from Rhode Island. When a movement of the enemy wasapprehended, the squadron assembled there, but nothing of consequenceoccurred during the remainder of the year. The year 1780 had been one of great discouragement to the Americans, but the injury, except as the lapse of time taxed their staying power, was more superficial than real. The successes of the British in thesouthern States, though undeniable, and seemingly substantial, wereinvolving them ever more deeply in a ruinously ex-centric movement. They need here only to be summarised, as steps in the process leadingto the catastrophe of Yorktown, --a disaster which, as Washington said, exemplified naval rather than military power. The failure of d'Estaing's attack upon Savannah in the autumn of1779[89] had left that place in the possession of the British asa base for further advances in South Carolina and Georgia; lastingsuccess in which was expected from the numbers of royalists in thoseStates. When the departure of the French fleet was ascertained, SirHenry Clinton put to sea from New York in December, 1779, for theSavannah River, escorted by Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot. The details ofthe operations, which were leisurely and methodical, will not begiven here; for, although the Navy took an active part in them, theyscarcely can be considered of major importance. On the 12th of May, 1780, the city of Charleston capitulated, between six and seventhousand prisoners being taken. Clinton then returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command in the south. The latter proposedto remain quiet during the hot months; but the activity of theAmerican partisan troops prevented this, and in July the approach of asmall, but relatively formidable force, under General Gates, compelledhim to take the field. On the 16th of August the two little armiesmet at Camden, and the Americans, who were much the more numerous, butlargely irregulars, were routed decisively. This news reached GeneralWashington in the north nearly at the same moment that the treason ofBenedict Arnold became known. Although the objects of his treacherywere frustrated, the sorrowful words, "Whom now can we trust?" showthe deep gloom which for the moment shadowed the constant mind of theAmerican Commander-in-Chief. It was just at this period, too, thatRodney arrived at New York. Cornwallis, not content with his late success, decided to push on intoNorth Carolina. Thus doing, he separated himself from his naval basein Charleston, communication with which by land he had not forceto maintain, and could recover effective touch with the sea only inChesapeake Bay. This conclusion was not apparent from the first. In North Carolina, the British general did not receive from theinhabitants the substantial support which he had expected, and foundhimself instead in a very difficult and wild country, confronted byGeneral Greene, the second in ability of all the American leaders. Harassed and baffled, he was compelled to order supplies to be sentby sea to Wilmington, North Carolina, an out-of-the-way and inferiorport, to which he turned aside, arriving exhausted on the 7th ofApril, 1781. The question as to his future course remained to besettled. To return to Charleston by sea was in his power, but to do sowould be an open confession of failure, --that he could not return byland, through the country by which he had come--much the same dilemmaas that of Howe and Clinton in Philadelphia. To support him in hisdistress by a diversion, Sir Henry Clinton had sent two successivedetachments to ravage the valley of the James River in Virginia. These were still there, under the command of General Phillips; andCornwallis, in the circumstances, could see many reasons that thitherwas the very scene to carry the British operations. On the 25th ofApril, 1781, he left Wilmington, and a month later joined the divisionat Petersburg, Virginia, then commanded by Benedict Arnold; Phillipshaving died. There, in touch now with his fate, we must leave him forthe moment. To complete the naval transactions of 1780, it is necessary to mentionbriefly two incidents, trivial in themselves, but significant, notonly as associated with the greater movements of the campaign, but asindicative of the naval policy of the States which were at war. Thetwo, though not otherwise connected, have a certain unity of interest, in that the same British officer commanded on both occasions. It will be remembered that in Byron's action off Grenada, inJuly, 1779, the 64-gun ship _Lion_ received such injuries that hercommander, Captain Cornwallis, had been compelled to run down beforethe trade-winds to Jamaica, in order to save her from capture. Since that time she had remained there, as one of the squadron ofVice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker. In March, 1780, still commanded byCornwallis, she was making an ordinary service cruise off the northside of Haïti, having in company the _Bristol_, 50, and the _Janus_, 44. On the 20th of March, off Monte Christi, a number of sail weresighted to the eastward, which proved to be a French convoy, on itsway from Martinique to Cap François, protected by La Motte-Picquet'ssquadron of two 74's, one 64, one 50, and a frigate. The Frenchmerchant ships were ordered to crowd sail for their port, while themen-of-war chased to the north-west. La Motte-Picquet's flagship, the_Annibal_, 74, got within range at 5 P. M. , when a distant cannonadebegan, which lasted till past midnight, and was resumed on thefollowing morning. From it the _Janus_ was the chief sufferer, losingher mizzen topmast and foretopgallant mast. It falling nearly calm, the _Bristol_ and _Lion_ got out their boats and were towed by them toher support. The two other French ships of the line got up duringthe forenoon of the 21st, so that the action that afternoon, thoughdesultory, might be called general. The two opposing commodores differ in their expressed opinions as tothe power of the French to make the affair more decisive. Some of LaMotte-Picquet's language seems to show that he felt the responsibilityof his position. "The _Janus_, being smaller and more easily worked, lay upon our quarter and under our stern, where she did considerabledamage. A little breeze springing up enabled us (the _Annibal_) tostand towards our own ships, which did everything possible to comeup and cover us, without which we should have been _surrounded_. " Itis easy to see in such an expression the reflection of the commandsof the French Cabinet, to economise the ships. This was still moreevident in La Motte-Picquet's conduct next day. On the morning of the22d, "at daylight we were within one and a half cannon-shot, breezefresh at the east-north-east, and I expected to overtake the Britishsquadron in an hour, when we perceived four ships in chase of us. At 6. 30 A. M. Three were seen to be men-of-war. This superiority offorce compelled me to desist, and to make signal to haul our windfor Cap François. " These three new-comers were the _Ruby_, 64, andtwo frigates, the _Pomona_, 28, and _Niger_, 32. The comparison offorces, therefore, would be: French, two 74's, one 64, one 50, and onefrigate, opposed to, British, two 64's, one 50, and three frigates. La Motte-Picquet evidently did not wait to ascertain the size ofthe approaching ships. His courage was beyond all dispute, and, asHyde Parker had said, he was among the most distinguished of Frenchofficers; but, like his comrades, he was dominated by the faultytheory of his government. The captain of the _Janus_ died a natural death during the encounter. It may be interesting to note that the ship was given to Nelson, who was recalled for that purpose from the expedition to San Juan, Nicaragua, one of the minor operations of the war. His health, however, prevented this command from being more than nominal, and notlong afterward he returned to England with Cornwallis, in the _Lion_. Three months later, Cornwallis was sent by Parker to accompany a bodyof merchant ships for England as far as the neighborhood of Bermuda. This duty being fulfilled, he was returning toward his station, havingwith him two 74's, two 64's, and one 50, when, on the morning ofJune 20, a number of sail were seen from north-east to east (a);the British squadron (aa) then steering east, with the wind atsouth-south-east. The strangers were a body of French transports, carrying the six thousand troops destined for Rhode Island, andconvoyed by a division of seven ships of the line--one 80, two 74's, and four 64's--under the command of Commodore de Ternay. Two of theships of war were with the convoy, the other five very properly towindward of it. The latter therefore stood on, across the bows of theBritish, to rejoin their consorts, and then all hauled their wind tothe south-west, standing in column (bb) towards the enemy. Cornwallison his part had kept on (b) to reconnoitre the force opposed to him;but one of his ships, the _Ruby_, 64, was so far to leeward (b') thatthe French, by keeping near the wind, could pass between her andher squadron (b, b, b'). She therefore went about (t) and steeredsouthwest, on the port tack (c'), close to the wind. The French, whowere already heading the same way, were thus brought on her weatherquarter in chase. Cornwallis then wore his division (w), formed lineof battle on the same tack as the others (c), and edged down towardsthe _Ruby_. If the French now kept their wind, either the _Ruby_ (c')must be cut off, or Cornwallis, to save her, must fight the largeodds against him. De Ternay, however, did not keep his wind but boreup, --yielded ground (cc). "The enemy, " wrote Cornwallis, "kept edgingoff and forming line, though within gunshot. At 5. 30 P. M. , seeingwe had pushed the French ships to leeward sufficiently to enable the_Ruby_, on our lee bow, to join us, I made the signal to tack. " Asthe British squadron went about to stand east again (d), the French, heading now west-south-west (cc), hoisted their colours and openedfire in passing. The _Ruby_ kept on till she fetched the wake of theBritish column (d'), when she too tacked. The French then tacked also, in succession (d), and the two columns stood on for awhile in parallellines, exchanging shots at long range, the British to windward. Cornwallis very properly declined further engagement with so superiora force. He had already done much in saving a ship so greatly exposed. [Illustration] The account above followed is that of the British commander, but itdoes not differ in essentials from the French, whose captains weregreatly incensed at the cautious action of their chief. A French_commissaire_ in the squadron, who afterwards published his journal, tells that de Ternay a few days later asked the captain of one of theships what English admiral he thought they had engaged, and receivedthe reply, "We have lost our opportunity of finding out. " He givesalso many details of the talk that went on in the ships, which neednot be repeated. Chevalier points out correctly, however, that deTernay had to consider that an equal or even a superior force might beencountered as Narragansett Bay was approached, and that he shouldnot risk crippling his squadron for such a contingency. The chargeof six thousand troops, under the then conditions, was no lightresponsibility, and at the least must silence off-hand criticism now. Comment upon his action does not belong to British naval history, to which the firmness and seamanship of Captain Cornwallis added alasting glory. It may be noted that fifteen years later, in the FrenchRevolution, the same officer, then a Vice-Admiral, again distinguishedhimself by his bearing in face of great odds, bringing five ships safeoff, out of the jaws of a dozen. It illustrates how luck seems in manycases to characterise a man's personality, much as temperament does. Cornwallis, familiarly known as "Billy Blue" to the seamen of his day, never won a victory, nor had a chance of winning one; but in commandboth of ships and of divisions, he repeatedly distinguished himself bysuccessfully facing odds which he could not overcome. The year 1780 was uneventful also in European waters, after Rodney'srelief of Gibraltar in January. The detachment of the Channel Fleetwhich accompanied him on that mission returned safely to England. The"Grand Fleet, " as it still was styled occasionally, cruised at seafrom June 8th to August 18th, an imposing force of thirty-one ships ofthe line, eleven of them three-deckers of 90 guns and upwards. AdmiralFrancis Geary was then Commander-in-Chief, but, his health failing, and Barrington refusing to take the position, through professeddistrust of himself and actual distrust of the Admiralty, Vice-AdmiralGeorge Darby succeeded to it, and held it during the year 1781. The most notable maritime event in 1780 in Europe was the capture onAugust 9th of a large British convoy, two or three hundred mileswest of Cape St. Vincent, by the allied fleets from Cadiz. As out ofsixty-three sail only eight escaped, and as of those taken sixteenwere carrying troops and supplies necessary for the West Indiagarrisons, such a disaster claims mention among the greater operationsof war, the success of which it could not fail to influence. CaptainJohn Moutray, the officer commanding the convoy, was brought to trialand dismissed his ship; but there were not wanting those who chargedthe misadventure to the Admiralty, and saw in the captain a victim. Itwas the greatest single blow that British commerce had received inwar during the memory of men then living, and "a general inclinationprevailed to lay the blame upon some individual, who might be punishedaccording to the magnitude of the object, rather than in proportion tohis demerit. "[90] During the year 1780 was formed the League of the Baltic Powers, knownhistorically as the Armed Neutrality, to exact from Great Britain theconcession of certain points thought essential to neutral interests. The accession of Holland to this combination, together with othermotives of dissatisfaction, caused Great Britain to declare waragainst the United Provinces on the 20th of December. Orders were atonce sent to the East and West Indies to seize Dutch possessions andships, but these did not issue in action until the following year. Towards the end of 1780 the French Government, dissatisfied with thelack of results from the immense combined force assembled in Cadizduring the summer months, decided to recall its ships, and to refitthem during the winter for the more extensive and aggressive movementsplanned for the campaign of 1781. D'Estaing was sent from France forthe purpose; and under his command thirty-eight ships of the line, inwhich were included those brought by de Guichen from the West Indies, sailed on the 7th of November for Brest. Extraordinary as it may seem, this fleet did not reach its port until the 3d of January, 1781. [Footnote 75: Parker's Report. ] [Footnote 76: Ibid. ] [Footnote 77: _Ante_, p. 115. ] [Footnote 78: Rodney's Report. The French authorities give their lineof battle as twenty-two ships of the line. There was no 90-gun shipamong them--no three-decker; but there were two of 80 guns, of whichalso the British had none. ] [Footnote 79: A cable was then assumed to have a length of 120fathoms, --720 feet. ] [Footnote 80: A properly formed line of twenty ships, at two cables'interval, would be about five miles long. Rodney seems to have beensatisfied that this was about the condition of his fleet at thismoment. ] [Footnote 81: Rodney's Report. ] [Footnote 82: Testimony of the signal officer at the court-martial onCaptain Bateman. ] [Footnote 83: Singularly enough, this officer was afterwardscourt-martialled for misbehaviour, on the 1st of June, 1794, ofprecisely the same character as that from all share in which Rodneynow cleared him. ] [Footnote 84: The words in Rodney's public letter, suppressed at thetime by the Admiralty, agree with these, but are even more explicit. "I cannot conclude this letter without acquainting their Lordshipsthat had Captain Carkett, who led the van, properly obeyed my signalfor attacking the enemy, and agreeable to the 21st Article of theAdditional Fighting Instructions, bore down instantly to the shipat that time abreast of him, instead of leading as he did to the vanship, the action had commenced much sooner, and the fleet engaged ina more compact manner. .. . " This clearly implies that the _Additional_Fighting Instructions prescribed the direction which Rodney expectedCarkett to take. If these Additional Instructions are to be found, their testimony would be interesting. Since this account was written, the Navy Records Society has published(1905) a volume, "Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816, " by Mr. JulianCorbett, whose diligent researches in matters of naval history andwarfare are appreciated by those interested in such subjects. Thespecific "Additional Instructions" quoted by Rodney appear not to havebeen found. Among those given prior to 1780 there is none that extendsto twenty-one articles. In a set issued by Rodney in 1782 an article(No. 17, p. 227) is apparently designed to prevent the recurrenceof Carkett's mistake. This, like one by Hawke, in 1756 (p. 217), prescribes the intended action rather by directing that the line ofbattle shall not prevent each ship engaging its opponent, irrespectiveof the conduct of other ships, than by making clear which thatopponent was. Lucidity on this point cannot be claimed for either. ] [Footnote 85: Lapeyrouse Bonfils, "Histoire de la Marine Française, "iii, 132. Chevalier gives much smaller numbers, but the former hasparticularised the ships. ] [Footnote 86: Chevalier, "Marine Française, " 1778, p. 185. ] [Footnote 87: A lee current is one that sets to leeward, with thewind, in this case the trade-wind. ] [Footnote 88: Chevalier, p. 91. ] [Footnote 89: _Ante_, p. 115. ] [Footnote 90: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs. "] CHAPTER IX NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BYRODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TODE GRASSE Rodney, returning to the West Indies from New York, reached Barbadoson December 6th, 1780. There he seems first to have learned of thedisastrous effects of the great October hurricanes of that year. Notonly had several ships--among them two of the line--been wrecked, withthe loss of almost all on board, but the greater part of those whichsurvived had been dismasted, wholly or in part, as well as injuredin the hull. There were in the West Indies no docking facilities;under-water damage could be repaired only by careening orheaving-down. Furthermore, as Barbados, Santa Lucia, and Jamaica, all had been swept, their supplies were mainly destroyed. Antigua, it is true, had escaped, the hurricane passing south of St. Kitts;but Rodney wrote home that no stores for refitting were obtainablein the Caribbee Islands. He was hoping then that Sir Peter Parkermight supply his needs in part; for when writing from Santa Lucia onDecember 10th, two months after the storm, he was still ignorantthat the Jamaica Station had suffered to the full as severely as theeastern islands. The fact shows not merely the ordinary slowness ofcommunications in those days, but also the paralysis that fellupon all movements in consequence of that great disaster. "Themost beautiful island in the world, " he said of Barbados, "has theappearance of a country laid waste by fire and sword. " Hearing that the fortifications at St. Vincent had been almostdestroyed by the hurricane, Rodney, in combination with GeneralVaughan, commanding the troops on the station, made an attemptto reconquer the island, landing there on December 15th; but theintelligence proved erroneous, and the fleet returned to Santa Lucia. "I have only nine sail of the line now with me capable of going tosea, " wrote the Admiral on the 22d, "and not one of them has sparerigging or sails. " In the course of January, 1781, he was joined by adivision of eight ships of the line from England, under the commandof Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, --Nelson's Lord Hood. These, with fourothers refitted during that month, not improbably from stores broughtin Hood's convoy of over a hundred sail, raised the disposable forceto twenty-one ships of the line: two 90's, one 80, fifteen 74's, andthree 64's. On the 27th of January, an express arrived from England, directing theseizure of the Dutch possessions in the Caribbean, and specifying, as first to be attacked, St. Eustatius and St. Martin, two smallislands lying within fifty miles north of the British St. Kitts. St. Eustatius, a rocky patch six miles in length by three in breadth, had been conspicuous, since the war began, as a great trade centre, where supplies of all kinds were gathered under the protection ofits neutral flag, to be distributed afterwards in the belligerentislands and the North American continent. The British, owing totheir extensive commerce and maritime aptitudes, derived from such anintermediary much less benefit than their enemies; and the island hadbeen jealously regarded by Rodney for some time. He asserted thatwhen de Guichen's fleet could not regain Fort Royal, because of itsinjuries received in the action of April 17th, it was refitted to meethim by mechanics and materials sent from St. Eustatius. On the otherhand, when cordage was to be bought for the British vessels after thehurricanes of 1780, the merchants of the island, he said, allegedthat there was none there; although, when he took the island soonafterwards, many hundred tons were found that had been long in stock. Rodney and Vaughan moved promptly. Three days after their ordersarrived, they sailed for St. Eustatius. There being in Fort Royal fourFrench ships of the line, six British were left to check them, andon the 3d of February the fleet reached its destination. A peremptorysummons from the commander of a dozen ships of the line securedimmediate submission. Over a hundred and fifty merchant ships weretaken; and a convoy of thirty sail, which had left the island two daysbefore, was pursued and brought back. The merchandise found was valuedat over £3, 000, 000. The neighbouring islands of St. Martin and Sabawere seized also at this time. Rodney's imagination, as is shown in his letters, was greatlyimpressed by the magnitude of the prize and by the defencelesscondition of his capture. He alleged these as the motives for stayingin person at St. Eustatius, to settle the complicated tangle ofneutral and belligerent rights in the property involved, and toprovide against the enemy's again possessing himself of a place nowso equipped for transactions harmful to Great Britain. The storehousesand conveniences provided for the particular traffic, if not properlyguarded, were like fortifications insufficiently garrisoned. If theypassed into the hands of the enemy, they became sources of injury. The illicit trade could start again at once in full force, with meanswhich elsewhere would have first to be created. There were a mile anda half of storehouses in the lower town, he said, and these he mustleave at the least roofless, if not wholly demolished. For such reasons he remained at St. Eustatius throughout February, March, and April. The amount of money involved, and the arbitrarymethods pursued by him and by Vaughan, gave rise to much scandal, which was not diminished by the King's relinquishing all the bootyto the captors, nor by the latters' professed disinterestedness. Menthought they did protest too much. Meanwhile, other matters arose toclaim attention. A week after the capture, a vessel arrived from theBay of Biscay announcing that eight or ten French sail of the line, with a large convoy, had been seen on the 31st of December steeringfor the West Indies. Rodney at once detached Sir Samuel Hood witheleven ships of the line, directing him to take also under his commandthe six left before Fort Royal, and to cruise with them to windwardof Martinique, to intercept the force reported. Hood sailed February12th. The particular intelligence proved afterwards to be false, butHood was continued on his duty. A month later he was ordered to movefrom the windward to the leeward side of the island, and to blockadeFort Royal closely. Against this change he remonstrated, and the eventshowed him to be right; but Rodney insisted, saying that from hisexperience he knew that a fleet could remain off Fort Royal for monthswithout dropping to leeward, and that there ships detached to SantaLucia, for water and refreshments, could rejoin before an enemy'sfleet, discovered to windward, could come up. Hood thought theAdmiral's object was merely to shelter his own doings at St. Eustatius; and he considered the blockade of Fort Royal to be futile, if no descent upon the island were intended. "It would doubtlesshave been fortunate for the public, " he remarked afterwards, "had SirGeorge been with his fleet, as I am confident he would have been towindward instead of to leeward, when de Grasse made his approach. " The preparations of the French in Brest were completed towards the endof March, and on the 22d of that month Rear-Admiral de Grasse sailed, having a large convoy under the protection of twenty-six ships ofthe line. A week later six of the latter parted company, five underSuffren for the East Indies and one for North America. The remainingtwenty continued their course for Martinique, which was sighted on the28th of April. Before sunset, Hood's squadron also was discovered toleeward of the island, as ordered by Rodney to cruise, and off thesouthern point, --Pointe des Salines. De Grasse then hove-to forthe night, but sent an officer ashore both to give and to obtainintelligence, and to reach an understanding for concerted action nextday. The French fleet consisted of one ship of 110 guns, three 80's, fifteen 74's, and one 64, in all 20 of the line, besides three armed_en flûte_, [91] which need not be taken into account, although theyserved to cover the convoy. Besides these there were the four in FortRoyal, one 74 and three 64's, a junction of which with the approachingenemy it was one of Hood's objects to prevent. The force of theBritish was one 90, one 80, twelve 74's, one 70, and two 64's: total, 17. Thus both in numbers and in rates of ships Hood was inferior tothe main body alone of the French; but he had the advantage of shipsall coppered, owing to Rodney's insistence with the Admiralty. He alsohad no convoy to worry him; but he was to leeward. Early in the morning of the 29th, de Grasse advanced to round thesouthern point of the island, which was the usual course for sailingships. Hood was too far to leeward to intercept this movement, forwhich he was blamed by Rodney, who claimed that the night had not beenproperly utilised by beating to windward of Pointe des Salines. [92]Hood, on the other hand, said in a private letter: "I never once lostsight of getting to windward, but it was totally impossible. .. . Had Ifortunately been there, I must have brought the enemy to close actionupon more equal terms, or they must have given up their transports, trade, etc. " Hood's subsequent career places it beyond doubt that hadhe been to windward there would have been a severe action, whateverthe result; but it is not possible to decide positively between hisstatement and Rodney's, as to where the fault of being to leeward lay. The writer believes that Hood would have been to windward, if in anyway possible. It must be added that the British had no word that sogreat a force was coming. On this point Hood and Rodney are agreed. [Illustration] Under the conditions, the French passed without difficulty roundPointe des Salines, the transports hugging the coast, the ships ofwar being outside and to leeward of them. Thus they headed up to thenorthward for Fort Royal Bay (Cul de Sac Royal), Hood standing to thesouthward until after 10, and being joined at 9. 20 by a sixty-four(not reckoned in the list above) from Santa Lucia, making his forceeighteen. At 10. 35 the British tacked together to the northward. Thetwo fleets were now steering the same way, the French van abreast ofthe British centre. At 11 the French opened their fire, to which noreply was made then. At 11. 20, the British van being close in with theshore to the northward of the Bay, Hood tacked again together, and theenemy, seeing his convoy secure, wore, also together, which broughtthe two lines nearer, heading south. At this time the four Frenchships in the Bay got under way and easily joined the rear of theirfleet, it having the weather-gage. The French were thus 24 to 18. As their shot were passing over the British, the latter now beganto reply. At noon Hood, finding that he could not close the enemy, shortened sail to topsails and hove-to, hoping by this defiance tobring them down to him. At 12. 30 the French admiral was abreast ofthe British flagship, and the action became general, but at too longrange. "Never, I believe, " wrote Hood, "was more powder and shotthrown away in one day before. " The French continuing to stand on, Hood filled his sails again at 1 P. M. , as their van had stretchedbeyond his. As the leading ships, heading south, opened the channel between SantaLucia and Martinique, they got the breeze fresher, which caused themto draw away from the centre. Hood, therefore, at 1. 34 made the signalfor a close order, and immediately afterwards ceased firing, findingnot one in ten of the enemy's shot to reach. The engagement, however, continued somewhat longer between the southern--van--ships, where, bythe account of Captain Sutherland, who was in that part of the line, four of the British were attacked very smartly by eight of the French. The _Centaur_, _Russell_, _Intrepid_, and _Shrewsbury_ appear to havebeen the ships that suffered most heavily, either in hull, spars, orcrews. They were all in the van on the southern tack. The _Russell_, having several shot between wind and water, was with difficulty keptafloat, the water rising over the platform of the magazine. Hood senther off at nightfall to St. Eustatius, where she arrived on the 4th ofMay, bringing Rodney the first news of the action, and of the numbersof the French reinforcement. During the 30th Hood held his ground, still endeavouring to get to windward of the enemy; but failingin that attempt, and finding two of his squadron much disabled, he decided at sunset to bear away to the northward, because to thesouthward the westerly currents set so strong that the crippled shipscould not regain Santa Lucia. On the 11th of May, between St. Kittsand Antigua, he joined Rodney, who, after hurried repairs to the_Russell_, had left St. Eustatius on the 5th, with that ship, the_Sandwich_, and the _Triumph_. It is somewhat difficult to criticise positively the conduct of Hoodand of de Grasse in this affair. It is clear that Hood on the firstday seriously sought action, though his force was but three-fourthsthat of his foe. He tried first to take the offensive, and, failingthat, to induce his enemy to attack frankly and decisively. Troudeis doubtless correct in saying that it was optional with de Grasseto bring on a general engagement; and the writer finds himself inagreement also with another French authority, Captain Chevalier, that "Count de Grasse seems to have been too much preoccupied withthe safety of his convoy on the 29th, Admiral Hood having shownhimself much less circumspect on that day than he was on the next. Notwithstanding our numerical superiority, Count de Grasse keptnear the land until all the convoy were safe. " He represents Hood asfencing cautiously on the following day, keeping on the field, butavoiding a decisive encounter. This differs somewhat from the versionof Hood himself, who mentions signalling a general chase to windwardat 12. 30 P. M. Of the 30th. The two statements are not irreconcilable. Hood having coppered ships, had the speed of the French, whosevessels, being partly coppered and partly not, sailed unevenly. TheBritish commander consequently could afford to take risks, and hetherefore played with the enemy, watching for a chance. Hood wasan officer of exceptional capacity, much in advance of his time. Hethoroughly understood a watching game, and that an opportunity mightoffer to seize an advantage over part of the enemy, if the eagernessof pursuit, or any mishap, caused the French to separate. Fromany dilemma that ensued, the reserve of speed gave him a power ofwithdrawal, in relying upon which he was right. The present writeradopts here also Chevalier's conclusion: "Admiral Hood evidently hadthe very great advantage over his enemy of commanding a squadron ofcoppered ships. Nevertheless, homage is due to his skill and to theconfidence shown by him in his captains. If some of his ships haddropped behind through injuries received, he would have had tosacrifice them, or to fight a superior force. " This means that Hoodfor an adequate gain ran a great risk; that he thoroughly understoodboth the advantages and the disadvantages of his situation; and thathe acted not only with great skill, but warily and boldly, --a rarecombination. The British loss in this affair was 39 killed, includingCaptain Nott, of the _Centaur_, and 162 wounded. The French loss isgiven by Chevalier as 18 killed and 56 wounded; by Beatson, as 119killed and 150 wounded. Rodney, having collected his fleet, proceeded south, and on the 18thof May put into Barbados for water. Much anxiety had been felt atfirst for Santa Lucia, which Hood's retreat had uncovered. As wasfeared, the French had attacked it at once, their fleet, with theexception of one or two ships, going there, and twelve hundred troopslanding at Gros Ilet Bay; but the batteries on Pigeon Island, whichRodney had erected and manned, kept them at arms' length. The workselsewhere being found too strong, the attempt was abandoned. At the same time, two French ships of the line and thirteen hundredtroops had sailed from Martinique against Tobago. When de Grassereturned from the failure at Santa Lucia, he learned that the Britishwere at sea, apparently bound for Barbados. Alarmed for his detachmentbefore Tobago, he again sailed with the fleet for that island on the25th of May, accompanied by three thousand more troops. Rodney learnedat Barbados of the attempt on Tobago, and on the 29th dispatched asquadron of six sail of the line, under Rear-Admiral Francis SamuelDrake, to support the defence. On the 30th he heard that the Frenchmain fleet had been seen to windward of Santa Lucia, steering south, evidently for Tobago. On the same day Drake and de Grasse encounteredone another off the latter island, the French being to leeward, nearest the land. Drake necessarily retired, and on the morning ofJune 3d was again off Barbados, whereupon Rodney at once sailed forTobago with the whole fleet. On the 4th the island was sighted, andnext morning information was received that it had capitulated on the2d. The two fleets returning north were in presence of one another on the9th; but no engagement took place. Rodney, who was to windward, havingtwenty sail to twenty-three, [93] was unwilling to attack unless hecould get a clear sea. The strength of the currents, he said, wouldthrow his fleet too far to leeward, in case of reverse, into the foulground between St. Vincent and Grenada, thus exposing Barbados, whichhad not recovered sufficiently from the hurricane to stand alone. Hetherefore put into Barbados. De Grasse went to Martinique to preparethe expedition to the American continent, which resulted in thesurrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. On the 5th of July he sailed fromFort Royal taking with him the "trade" for France, and on the 26thanchored with it at Cap François in Haïti, where he found a divisionof four ships of the line which had been left the year before by deGuichen. There also was a frigate, which had left Boston on the 20thof June, and by which De Grasse received dispatches from Washington, and from Rochambeau, the general commanding the French troops inAmerica. These acquainted him with the state of affairs on thecontinent, and requested that the fleet should come to either theChesapeake or New York, to strike a decisive blow at the British powerin one quarter or the other. [Footnote 91: This latter is applied to vessels, usually ships of war, which are used as transports or supply ships, and therefore carry onlya part of their normal battery. ] [Footnote 92: Rodney said that Hood "lay-to" for the night. This isantecedently incredible of an officer of Hood's character, and isexpressly contradicted by Captain Sutherland of the _Russell_. "At 6P. M. (of the 28th) our fleet tacked to the north, and _kept moving_across the bay (Fort Royal) for the right (_sic_), in line of battle. "Ekins, "Naval Battles, " p. 136. The word "right" is evidently amisprint for "night. " Rodney's criticisms seem to the author captiousthroughout. ] [Footnote 93: One French ship had left the fleet, disabled. ] CHAPTER X NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN. CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS 1781 Having now brought the major naval transactions in the West Indiesto the eve of the great events which determined the independence ofthe American States, it is expedient here to resume the thread ofoperations, both sea and land, on the American continent, so as tobring these also up to the same decisive moment, when the militaryand naval blended and in mutual support forced the surrender of theBritish army at Yorktown under Lord Cornwallis. It has been said that, to support the operations of Cornwallis in theCarolinas, Clinton had begun a series of diversions in the valleyof the James River. [94] The first detachment so sent, under GeneralLeslie, had been transferred speedily to South Carolina, to meet theexigencies of Cornwallis's campaign. The second, of sixteen hundredtroops under Benedict Arnold, left New York at the end of December, and began its work on the banks of the James at the end of January, 1781. It advanced to Richmond, nearly a hundred miles from the sea, wasting the country round about, and finding no opposition adequate tocheck its freedom of movement. Returning down stream, on the 20thit occupied Portsmouth, south of the James River; near the sea, andvaluable as a naval station. Washington urged Commodore des Touches, who by de Ternay's death hadbeen left in command of the French squadron at Newport, to interruptthese proceedings, by dispatching a strong detachment to ChesapeakeBay; and he asked Rochambeau also to let some troops accompany thenaval division, to support the scanty force which he himself couldspare to Virginia. It happened, however, that a gale of wind just thenhad inflicted severe injury upon Arbuthnot's squadron, three of whichhad gone to sea from Gardiner's Bay upon a report that three Frenchships of the line had left Newport to meet an expected convoy. Oneseventy-four, the _Bedford_, was wholly dismasted; another, the_Culloden_, drove ashore on Long Island and was wrecked. The Frenchships had returned to port the day before the gale, but the incidentindisposed des Touches to risk his vessels at sea at that time. Hesent only a sixty-four, with two frigates. These left Newport onFebruary 9th, and entered the Chesapeake, but were unable to reachthe British vessels, which, being smaller, withdrew up the ElizabethRiver. Arbuthnot, hearing of this expedition, sent orders to somefrigates off Charleston to go to the scene. The French division, whenleaving the Bay, met one of these, the _Romulus_, 44, off the Capes, captured her, and returned to Newport on February 25th. On the 8thof March, Arnold reported to Clinton that the Chesapeake was clear ofFrench vessels. On the same day Arbuthnot also was writing to Clinton, from Gardiner'sBay, that the French were evidently preparing to quit Newport. Hisutmost diligence had failed as yet to repair entirely the damage donehis squadron by the storm, but on the 9th it was ready for sea. On theevening of the 8th the French had sailed. On the 10th Arbuthnot knewit, and, having taken the precaution to move down to the entrance ofthe bay, he was able to follow at once. On the 13th he spoke a vesselwhich had seen the enemy and gave him their course. Favoured by astrong north-west wind, and his ships being coppered, he outstrippedthe French, only three of which had coppered bottoms. At 6 A. M. OfMarch 16th a British frigate reported that the enemy were astern--tothe north-east--about a league distant, a thick haze preventing thesquadron from seeing them even at that distance (A, A). Cape Henry, the southern point of the entrance to the Chesapeake, then boresouthwest by west, distant forty miles. The wind as stated byArbuthnot was west; by the French, south-west. The British admiral at once went about, steering in the directionreported, and the opposing squadrons soon sighted one another. TheFrench finding the British between them and their port, hauled to thewind, which between 8 and 9 shifted to north by west, putting themto windward. Some preliminary manoeuvres then followed, both partiesseeking the weather-gage. The weather remained thick and squally, often intercepting the view; and the wind continued to shift untiltowards noon, when it settled at north-east. The better sailing, orthe better seamanship, of the British had enabled them to gain sofar upon their opponents that at 1 P. M. They were lying nearly up intheir wake, on the port tack, overhauling them; both squadrons in lineof battle, heading east-south-east, the French bearing from theirpursuers east by south, --one point on the weather bow (B, B). Thewind was rising with squalls, so that the ships lay over well to theircanvas, and the sea was getting big. As the enemy now was threatening his rear, and had the speed toovertake, des Touches felt it necessary to resort to the usual parryto such a thrust, by wearing his squadron and passing on the othertack. This could be done either together, reversing the order of theships, or in succession, preserving the natural order; depending muchupon the distance of the enemy. Having room enough, des Toucheschose the latter, but, as fighting was inevitable, he decided also toutilise the manoeuvre by surrendering the weather-gage, and passing toleeward. The advantage of this course was that, with the existing seaand wind, and the inclination of the ships, the party that had theopponent on his weather side could open the lower-deck ports and usethose guns. There was thus a great increase of battery power, for thelower guns were the heaviest. Des Touches accordingly put his helm up, his line passing in succession to the southward (c) across the headof the advancing British column, and then hauling up so as to runparallel to the latter, to leeward, with the wind four points free. [Illustration] Arbuthnot accepted the position offered, stood on as he was untilnearly abreast of the French, and at 2 P. M. Made the signal to wear. It does not appear certainly how this was executed; but from theexpression in the official report, "the van of the squadron wore inthe line, " and from the fact that the ships which led in the attackwere those which were leading on the port tack, --the tack beforethe signal was made, --it seems likely that the movement was made insuccession (a). The whole squadron then stood down into action, butwith the customary result. The ships in the van and centre were allengaged by 2. 30, so Arbuthnot states; but the brunt of the engagementhad already fallen upon the three leading vessels, which got the firstraking fire, and, as is also usual, came to closer action than thosewhich followed them (C). They therefore not only lost most heavilyin men, but also were so damaged aloft as to be crippled. The BritishVice-Admiral, keeping the signal for the line flying, and not hoistingthat for close action, appears to have caused a movement of indecisionin the squadron, --an evidence again of the hold which the line thenstill had upon men's minds. Of this des Touches cleverly availedhimself, by ordering his van ships, which so far had borne the brunt, to keep away together and haul up on the other tack (e), while theships behind them were to wear in succession; that is, in column, one following the other. The French column then filed by the threedisabled British vessels (d), gave them their broadsides one by one, and then hauled off to the eastward, quitting the field (D). Arbuthnotmade signal to wear in pursuit, but the _Robust_ and _Prudent_, twoof the van ships, were now wholly unmanageable from the concentrationof fire upon them caused by des Touches's last movement; and themaintopsail yard of the _London_, the only British three-decker, hadbeen shot away. The chase therefore was abandoned, and the squadronput into Chesapeake Bay, for which the wind was fair (D). The Frenchreturned to Newport. The respective losses in men were: British, 30killed, 73 wounded; French, 72 killed, 112 wounded. In this encounter, both sides had eight ships in line, besides smallercraft. The advantage in force was distinctly with the British, whohad one three-decked ship, three 74's, three 64's, and a 50; whilethe French had one 84, two 74's, four 64's, and the late British_Romulus_, 44. Because of this superiority, probably, the action wasconsidered particularly discreditable by contemporaries; the moreso because several vessels did not engage closely, --a fault laid tothe British admiral's failure to make the signal for close action, hauling down that for the line. This criticism is interesting, forit indicates how men's minds were changing; and it shows also thatArbuthnot had not changed, but still lived in the middle of thecentury. The French commodore displayed very considerable tacticalskill; his squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with precision. With inferior force he carried off a decided advantage by sheerintelligence and good management. Unluckily, he failed in resolutionto pursue his advantage. He probably could have controlled theChesapeake had he persisted. His neglect to do so was justified by Commodore de Barras, who on the10th of May arrived in Newport from France to command the squadron. This officer, after pointing out the indisputable tactical success, continued thus:-- "As to the advantage which the English obtained, in fulfilling their object, that is a necessary consequence of their superiority, and, _still more_, of their purely defensive attitude. _It is a principle in war that one should risk much to defend one's own positions, and very little to attack those of the enemy. _ M. Des Touches, whose object was purely offensive, could and should, when the enemy opposed to him superior forces, renounce a project which could no longer succeed, unless, _contrary to all probability_, it ended not only in beating but also in _destroying entirely_, that superior squadron. " This exaltation of the defensive above the offensive, this despairingview of probabilities, this aversion from risks, go far to explain theFrench want of success in this war. No matter how badly the enemy wasthrashed, unless he were entirely destroyed, he was still a fleet "inbeing, " a paralysing factor. The retreat of des Touches and the coming of Arbuthnot restored tothe British the command of Chesapeake Bay. Clinton, as soon as heknew that the British and French squadrons had sailed, had sent offa reinforcement of two thousand troops for Arnold, under GeneralPhillips. These arrived in Lynnhaven Bay on March 26th, ten days afterthe naval battle, and proceeded at once to Portsmouth, Virginia. It isunnecessary to speak of the various operations of this land force. Onthe 9th of May, in consequence of letters received from Cornwallis, it moved to Petersburg. There on the 13th Phillips died, the commandreverting momentarily to Arnold. On the 20th Cornwallis joined fromWilmington, North Carolina, [95] and Arnold soon after returned to NewYork. Cornwallis now had with him about seven thousand troops, including thegarrison at Portsmouth; but a serious difference of opinion existedbetween him and Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief. The latter had begunthe conquest of South Carolina, and did not welcome the conclusion ofhis lieutenant that the conquest could not be maintained away from theseaboard, unless Virginia also were subdued; for from there, a richand populous region, men and supplies supported the American causein the south. Cornwallis had tested the asserted strength of theRoyalists in the Carolinas, and had found it wanting. Offensiveoperations in Virginia were what he wished; but Clinton did notapprove this project, nor feel that he could spare troops enough forthe purpose. Between October, 1780, and June, 1781, he said, seventhousand seven hundred and twenty-four effectives had been sent fromNew York to the Chesapeake; and he could not understand the failureto cut off the greatly inferior force of the enemy in Virginia. Thisat least did not indicate probable success for a renewed offensive. The garrison of New York was now short of eleven thousand and couldnot be diminished further, as he was threatened with a siege. Inshort, the British situation in America had become essentiallyfalse, by the concurring effect of insufficient force andex-centric--double--operations. Sent to conquer, their numbersnow were so divided that they could barely maintain the defensive. Cornwallis therefore was ordered to occupy a defensive position whichshould control an anchorage for ships of the line, and to strengthenhimself in it. After some discussion, which revealed furtherdisagreement, he placed himself at Yorktown, on the peninsula formedby the James and York rivers. Portsmouth was evacuated, the garrisonreaching Yorktown on the 22d of August. Cornwallis's force wasthen seven thousand troops; and there were with him besides about athousand seamen, belonging to some half-dozen small vessels, whichwere shut up in the York by the arrival from Haïti of the French fleetunder de Grasse, which on August 30th, 1781, had anchored in LynnhavenBay, inside of Cape Henry. On July 2d Arbuthnot had sailed for England, leaving the command atNew York to Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves. Graves on the same day wroteto Rodney by the brig _Active_, that intercepted dispatches of theenemy had revealed that a large division from the West Indies was toarrive on the American coast during the summer, to coöperate with theforce already in Newport. Rodney, on the other hand, dispatched to NewYork on July 7th the _Swallow_ sloop, 16, with word that, if he sentreinforcements from the West Indies, they would be ordered to make theCapes of the Chesapeake, and to coast thence to New York. He asked, therefore, that cruisers with information might be stationed alongthat route. Two days later, having then certain news that de Grassehad sailed for Cap François, he sent this intelligence to Sir PeterParker at Jamaica, and gave Sir Samuel Hood preparatory orders tocommand a reinforcement of ships destined for the continent. This, however, was limited in numbers to fifteen sail of the line, Rodneybeing misled by his intelligence, which gave fourteen ships as thesize of the French division having the same destination, and reportedthat de Grasse himself would convoy the trade from Cap François toFrance. On the 24th instructions were issued for Hood to proceed onthis duty. He was first to convoy the trade from Jamaica as far as thepassage between Cuba and Haïti, and thence to make the utmost speedto the Chesapeake. A false rumour, of French ships reaching Martiniquefrom Europe, slightly delayed this movement. The convoy was dispatchedto Jamaica with two ships of the line, which Sir Peter Parker wasdirected to send at once to America, and requested to reinforce withothers from his own squadron. Hood was detained until the rumour couldbe verified. On the 1st of August Rodney sailed for England on leaveof absence. On the 10th Hood left Antigua with fourteen ships of theline, direct for the Capes. He had already received, on August 3d, Graves's letter by the _Active_, which he sent back on the 8th withhis answers and with a notification of his speedy departure. The _Swallow_ and the _Active_ should have reached Graves before Hood;but neither got to him at all. The _Swallow_ arrived safely in NewYork on the 27th of July; but Graves had sailed with all his squadronon the 21st, for Boston Bay, hoping there to intercept an expectedconvoy from France, concerning which a special caution had been senthim by the Admiralty. The _Swallow_ was at once sent on by the seniornaval officer at New York, but was attacked by hostile vessels, forcedashore on Long Island, and lost. The _Active_ was captured before shereached New York. Graves, thus uninformed of the momentous crisis athand, continued cruising until the 16th of August, when he returned toSandy Hook. There he found the duplicates of the _Swallow's_ letters, but they only notified him of the course a reinforcement would take, not that Hood had started. On August 25th the latter, being then offthe Chesapeake, sent duplicates of the _Active's_ dispatches, butthese preceded by little his own arrival on the 28th. That eveningnews was received in New York that de Barras had sailed from Newporton the 25th, with his whole division. Hood anchored outside the Hook, where Graves, who was senior to him, undertook to join at once. Onthe 31st five sail of the line and a 50-gun ship, all that could begot ready in time, crossed the bar, and the entire body of nineteenships of the line started at once for the Chesapeake, whither it wasunderstood now that both the French fleet and the united armies ofWashington and Rochambeau were hurrying. Count de Grasse upon his arrival at Cap François had found that manythings must be done before he could sail for the continent. Measuresneeded to be taken for the security of Haïti; and a large sum ofmoney, with a considerable reinforcement of troops, was required toinsure the success of the projected operation, for which but a shorttime was allowed, as it was now August and he must be again in theWest Indies in October. It was not the least among the fortunateconcurrences for the American cause at that moment, that de Grasse, whose military capacity was not conspicuous, showed then a remarkableenergy, politic tact, and breadth of view. He decided to take with himevery ship he could command, postponing the sailing of the convoys;and by dexterous arrangement with the Spaniards he contrived to secureboth the funds required and an efficient corps of thirty-three hundredFrench troops, without stripping Haïti too closely. On the 5th ofAugust he left Cap François, with twenty-eight ships of the line, taking the route through the Old Bahama Channel, [96] and anchoredin Lynnhaven Bay, just within the entrance of the Chesapeake, on the30th, the day before Graves sailed from New York for the same place. The troops were landed instantly on the south side of the James River, and soon reached La Fayette, who commanded the forces so far opposedto Cornwallis, which were thus raised to eight thousand men. Atthe same time Washington, having thrown Clinton off his guard, wascrossing the Delaware on his way south, with six thousand regulartroops, two thousand American and four thousand French, to join LaFayette. French cruisers took position in the James River, to preventCornwallis from crossing, and escaping to the southward into Carolina. Others were sent to close the mouth of the York. By these detachmentsthe main fleet was reduced to twenty-four sail of the line. On the 5th of September, at 8 A. M. , the French look-out frigate, cruising outside Cape Henry, made the signal for a fleet steering forthe Bay. It was hoped at first that this was de Barras's squadronfrom Newport, known to be on its way, but it was soon evident fromthe numbers that it must be an enemy. The forces now about to beopposed, nineteen. British sail of the line to twenty-four French, were constituted as follows: British, two 98's (three-deckers);twelve 74's, one 70, four 64's, besides frigates; French, one 104(three-decker), [97] three 80's, seventeen 74's, three 64's. The mouth of the Chesapeake is about ten miles wide, from Cape Charleson the north to Cape Henry on the south. The main channel is betweenthe latter and a shoal, three miles to the northward, called theMiddle Ground. The British fleet, when the French were first seenfrom it, was steering south-west for the entrance, under foresails andtopgallant sails, and it so continued, forming line as it approached. The wind was north-north-east. At noon the ebb-tide made, and theFrench began to get under way, but many of their ships had to makeseveral tacks to clear Cape Henry. Their line was consequently late informing, and was by no means regular or closed as they got outside. At 1 P. M. Graves made the signal to form column on an east and westline, which with the wind as it was would be the close-hauled lineheading out to sea, on the other tack from that on which his fleetstill was. In this order he continued to head in for the entrance. At2 P. M. The French van, standing out, three miles distant by estimate, bore south from the _London_, Graves's flagship, and was thereforeabreast of the centre of the British line. As the British van camenear the Middle Ground, at 2. 13 P. M. , the ships wore together. Thisput them on the same tack as the French, Hood's division, which hadbeen leading, being now the rear in the reversed order. The fleet thenbrought-to, --stopped, --in order to allow the centre of the enemy tocome abreast of the centre of the British (aa, aa. ) The two linesnow were nearly parallel, but the British, being five ships fewer, naturally did not extend so far as the rear of the French, which infact was not yet clear of the Cape. At 2. 30 Graves made the signalfor the van ship (the _Shrewsbury_), to lead more to starboard(l)--towards the enemy. As each ship in succession would take hercourse to follow the leader, the effect of this was to put the Britishon a line inclined to that of the enemy, the van nearest, and as thesignal was renewed three quarters of an hour later, --at 3. 17, --thisangle became still more marked (bb). [98] This was the original andenduring cause of a lamentable failure by which seven of the rearships, in an inferior force undertaking to attack, never came intobattle at all. At 3. 34 the van was ordered again to keep still moretoward the enemy. [Illustration] At 3. 46 the signal was made for ships to close to one cable, followedalmost immediately by that to bear down and engage the enemy, --thesignal for the line still flying. Graves's flagship, the _London_, 98(f), which was hove-to, filled and bore down. Under the conditions, the van ships of course got first under fire, and the action graduallyextended from them to the twelfth in the order, two ships astern ofthe _London_. According to the log of the latter, at 4. 11 the signalfor the line ahead was hauled down, that it might not interfere withthat for close action, but at 4. 22 it was rehoisted, "the ships notbeing sufficiently extended. " The meaning of this expression may beinferred from Beatson's account:-- "The _London_, by taking the lead, had advanced farther towards the enemy than some of the ships stationed immediately ahead of her in the line of battle; and upon luffing up (f') to bring her broadside to bear, they having done the same thing, her second ahead (m) was brought nearly upon her weather beam. The other ships ahead of her were likewise too much crowded together. " As the ship on the _London's_ weather beam could not fire upon theenemy unless she drew ahead, this condition probably accounts for theflagship being again hove-to, while firing, as Hood says that shewas. The signal for the line was hauled down again at 4. 27, by the_London's_ log, that for close action being up, and repeated at 5. 20, when Hood (h) at last bore down with his division (h'), but the Frenchships bearing up also, he did not near them. Firing ceased shortlyafter sunset. The loss of the British was 90 killed, 246 wounded; thatof the French is given only in round numbers, as about 200 killed andwounded. Hood's statement introduces certain important qualifications into theabove account:-- "Our centre began to engage at the same time as the van, at four, but at a most _improper_ distance, and our rear, being barely within random shot, did not fire while the signal for the line was flying. The _London_ had the signal for close action flying, as well as the signal for the line ahead at _half a cable_ was under her topsails, with the main topsail to the mast, [99] though the enemy's ships were pushing on. " As showing the improper distance at which the _London_ brought-to tofire, he says:-- "The second ship astern of her (of the _London_) received but trifling damage, and the third astern of her received no damage at all, which most clearly proves [at] how much too great a distance was the centre division engaged. " The day after the action Hood made a memorandum of his criticisms uponit, which has been published. The gist of this is as follows. As theFrench stood out, their line was not regular or connected. The van wasmuch separated from the centre and rear, and it appears also, from theFrench narratives, that it was to windward of the rest of the fleet. From these causes it was much exposed to be attacked unsupported. There was, by Hood's estimate, "a full hour and a half to have engagedit before any of the rear could have come up. " The line of battleon the port tack, with the then wind, was east and west, and Graveshad first ranged his fleet on it, as the French were doing; butafterwards, owing to his method of approach, by the van bearing downand the other ships following in its wake, the two lines, instead ofbeing parallel, formed an angle, the British centre and rear beingmuch more distant from the enemy than the van was. This alone wouldcause the ships to come into battle successively instead of together, a fault of itself; but the Commander-in-Chief, according to Hood, committed the further mistake that he kept the signal for theline of battle flying until 5. 30 P. M. , near to sunset. In Hood'sunderstanding, while that signal flew the position of each ship wasdetermined by that of Graves's flagship. None could go closer than theline through her parallel to the enemy. Hence Hood's criticism, whichis marked by much acerbity towards his superior, but does not betrayany consciousness that he himself needed any justification for hisdivision not having taken part. "Had the centre gone to the support of the van, _and the signal forthe line been hauled down_, or the Commander-in-Chief had set theexample of close action, _even with the signal for the line flying_, the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces, and the reardivision of the British fleet would have been opposed to those shipsthe centre division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging, or the Rear-Admiral who commanded it[100] would have a great deal toanswer for. "[101] So much for the tactical failure of that day. The question remainedwhat next was to be done. Graves contemplated renewing the action, butearly in the night was informed that several of the van ships were toocrippled to permit this. He held his ground, however, in sight of theFrench, until dark on the 9th, when they were seen for the last time. They were then under a cloud of sail, and on the morning of the 10thhad disappeared. From their actions during this interval, Hood hadinferred that de Grasse meant to get back into the Chesapeake withoutfurther fighting; and he implies that he advised Graves to anticipatethe enemy in so doing. Though some ships were crippled aloft, theBritish batteries were practically intact, nor had men enough beendisabled to prevent any gun in the fleet from being fought. Could buta single working day be gained in taking up an anchorage, a defensiveorder could be assumed, practically impregnable to the enemy, coveringCornwallis, and not impossibly intercepting the French ships left inthe Bay. In the case of many men such comment might be dismissed asthe idle talk of the captious fault-finder, always to the fore inlife; but in the case of Hood it must be received with deference, for, but a few months later, when confronted with greater odds, he himselfdid the very thing he here recommended, for an object less vital thanthe relief of Cornwallis. Having regard to the character of de Grasse, it is reasonable to believe that, if he had found the British fleetthus drawn up at anchor in Chesapeake Bay, as he found Hood at St. Kitts in the following January, he would have waited off the entrancefor de Barras, and then have gone to sea, leaving Washington andRochambeau to look at Cornwallis slipping out of their grasp. On the 10th of September Graves decided to burn the _Terrible_, 74, which had been, kept afloat with difficulty since the action. Thisdone, the fleet stood towards the Chesapeake, a frigate going aheadto reconnoitre. On the 13th, at 6 A. M. , Graves wrote to Hood that thelook-outs reported the French at anchor above the Horse Shoe (shoal)in the Chesapeake, and desired his opinion what to do with the fleet. To this Hood sent the comforting reply that it was no more than whathe had expected, as the press of sail the (French) fleet carriedon the 9th, and on the night of the 8th, made it very clear to himwhat de Grasse's intentions were. He "would be very glad to send anopinion, but he really knows not what to say in the truly lamentablestate [to which] we have brought ourselves. "[102] On the 10th deBarras had reached the Bay, where he was joined by de Grasse on the11th, so that there were then present thirty-six French ships of theline. Graves, therefore, returned to New York, reaching Sandy HookSeptember 19th. On the 14th Washington had arrived before Yorktown, where he took the chief command; and the armies closed in uponCornwallis by land as the French fleets had done already by water. On the 19th of October the British force was compelled to surrender, seven thousand two hundred and forty-seven troops and eight hundredand forty seamen laying down their arms. During the siege the latterhad served in the works, the batteries of which were largely composedof ships' guns. After Graves's return to New York, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert Digbyarrived from England on the 24th of September, to take command of thestation in Arbuthnot's place. He brought with him three ships of theline; and the two which Sir Peter Parker had been ordered by Rodney tosend on at once had also reached the port. It was decided by the landand sea officers concerned to attempt the relief of Cornwallis, andthat it was expedient for Graves to remain in command until after thisexpedition. He could not start, however, until the 18th of October, by which time Cornwallis's fate was decided. Graves then departed forJamaica to supersede Sir Peter Parker. On the 11th of November Hoodsailed from Sandy Hook with eighteen ships of the line, and on the5th of December anchored at Barbados. On the 5th of November de Grassealso quitted the continent with his whole fleet, and returned to theWest Indies. [Footnote 94: _Ante_, p. 153. ] [Footnote 95: See _ante_, p. 153. ] [Footnote 96: Along the north coast of Cuba, between it and the BahamaBanks. ] [Footnote 97: The _Ville de Paris_, to which Troude attributes 104guns. She was considered the biggest and finest ship of her day. ] [Footnote 98: This reproduced the blunder of Byng, betweenwhose action and the one now under discussion there is a markedresemblance. ] [Footnote 99: _I. E. _ she had stopped. ] [Footnote 100: Hood himself. ] [Footnote 101: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 32. Navy Records Society. Myitalics. Concerning the crucial fact of the signal for the line ofbattle being kept flying continuously until 5. 30 P. M. , upon whichthere is a direct contradiction between Hood and the log of the_London_, it is necessary to give the statement of Captain ThomasWhite, who was present in the action in one of the rear ships. "If the_London's_ log, or the log of any other individual ship in the fleet, confirm this statement, " (that Hood was dilatory in obeying the orderfor close action), "I shall be induced to fancy that what I thatday saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and that what Ibelieved to be the signal for the line was not a union jack, but an_ignis fatuus_ conjured up to mock me. " White and Hood also agreethat the signal for the line was rehoisted at 6. 30. (White: "NavalResearches, " London, 1830, p. 45. )] [Footnote 102: "Letters of Lord Hood. " Navy Records Society, p. 35. ] CHAPTER XI NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THEBATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK In Europe, during the year 1781, the two leading questions whichdominated the action of the belligerents were the protection, ordestruction, of commerce, and the attack and defence of Gibraltar. TheBritish Channel Fleet was much inferior to the aggregate sea forces ofFrance and Spain in the waters of Europe; and the Dutch navy also wasnow hostile. The French government represented to its allies that byconcentrating their squadrons near the entrance of the Channel theywould control the situation in every point of view; but the Spaniards, intent upon Gibraltar, declined to withdraw their fleet from Cadizuntil late in the summer, while the French persisted in keeping theirown at Brest. The Channel Fleet was decisively superior to the latter, and inferior to the Spaniards in numbers only. No relief having been given Gibraltar since Rodney had left itin February, 1780, the question of supplying the fortress becamepressing. For this purpose, twenty-eight ships of the line, underVice-Admiral George Darby, sailed from St. Helen's on the 13th ofMarch, 1781, with a large convoy. Off Cork a number of victuallersjoined, and the whole body then proceeded for Gibraltar, accompaniedby five ships of the line which were destined for the East Indies, as well as by the West India and American "trade. " These severalattachments parted from time to time on the way, and on the 11th ofApril the main expedition sighted Cape Spartel, on the African coast. No attempt to intercept it was made by the great Spanish fleet inCadiz; and on the 12th of April, at noon, the convoy anchored in theBay of Gibraltar. That night thirteen sail of the transports, undercharge of two frigates, slipped out and made their way to Minorca, then a British possession. The British ships of war continued underway, cruising in the Bay and Gut of Gibraltar. As the convoy entered, the besiegers opened a tremendous cannonade, which was ineffectual, however, to stop the landing of the stores. More annoyance was caused by a flotilla of gunboats, specially builtfor this siege, the peculiar fighting power of which lay in one26-pounder, whose great length gave a range superior to the batteriesof ships of the line. Being moved by oars as well as by sails, theselittle vessels could choose their distance in light airs and calms, and were used so actively to harass the transports at anchor thatDarby was obliged to cover them with three ships of the line. Theseproved powerless effectually to injure the gunboats; but, while thelatter caused great annoyance and petty injury, they did not hinderthe unlading nor even greatly delay it. The experience illustratesagain the unlikelihood that great results can be obtained by pettymeans, or that massed force, force concentrated, can be effectuallycounteracted either by cheap and ingenious expedients, or by thecoöperative exertions of many small independent units. "They wereonly capable of producing trouble and vexation. So far were they frompreventing the succours from being thrown into the garrison, or fromburning the convoy, that the only damage of any consequence thatthey did to the shipping was the wounding of the mizzen-mast of the_Nonsuch_ so much that it required to be shifted. "[103] On the 19thof April--in one week--the revictualling was completed, and theexpedition started back for England. The fleet anchored again atSpithead on the 22d of May. While Darby was returning, La Motte Picquet had gone to sea fromBrest with six ships of the line and some frigates to cruise in theapproaches to the Channel. There, on the 2d of May, he fell in withthe convoy returning from the West Indies with the spoils of St. Eustatius. The ships of war for the most part escaped, but La MottePicquet carried twenty-two out of thirty merchant ships into Brestbefore he could be intercepted, although a detachment of eight sailsent by Darby got close upon his heels. After a long refit, Darby put to sea again, about the 1st of August, to cover the approach of the large convoys then expected to arrive. Being greatly delayed by head winds, he had got no further than theLizard, when news was brought him that the Franco-Spanish grand fleet, of forty-nine ships of the line, was cruising near the Scilly Isles. Having himself but thirty of the line, he put into Tor Bay on the 24thof August, and moored his squadron across the entrance to the Bay. This appearance of the allies was a surprise to the Britishauthorities, who saw thus unexpectedly renewed the invasion of theChannel made in 1779. Spain, mortified justly by her failure evento molest the intrusion of succours into Gibraltar, had thought toretrieve her honour by an attack upon Minorca, for which she asked thecoöperation of France. De Guichen was sent in July with nineteen shipsof the line; and the combined fleets, under the chief command of theSpanish admiral, Don Luis de Cordova, convoyed the troops into theMediterranean beyond the reach of Gibraltar cruisers. Returning thenceinto the Atlantic, de Cordova directed his course for the Channel, keeping far out to sea to conceal his movements. But though thussuccessful in reaching his ground unheralded, he made no attempt toprofit by the advantage gained. The question of attacking Darby athis anchors was discussed in a council of war, at which de Guichenstrongly advocated the measure; but a majority of votes decidedthat Great Britain would be less hurt by ruining her fleet thanby intercepting the expected convoys. Even for the latter purpose, however, de Cordova could not wait. On the 5th of September heinformed de Guichen that he was at liberty to return to Brest; andhe himself went back to Cadiz with thirty-nine ships, nine of whichwere French. "This cruise of the combined fleet, " says Chevalier, "diminished the consideration of France and Spain. These two powershad made a great display of force, without producing the slightestresult. " It may be mentioned here that Minorca, after a six months'siege, capitulated in February, 1782. While Darby was beating down Channel in the early days of August, 1781, Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker, lately Rodney's second in command inthe West Indies, was returning to England convoying a large merchantfleet from the Baltic. On the 5th of August, at daylight, a Dutchsquadron, also with a convoy, but outward bound, from the Texel tothe Baltic, was discovered in the south-west, near the Doggersbank. Heading as the two enemies then were, their courses must shortlyintersect. Parker, therefore, ordered his convoy to steer to thewestward for England, while he himself bore down for the enemy. TheDutch Rear-Admiral, Johan Arnold Zoutman, on the contrary, kept themerchant vessels with him, under his lee, but drew out the ships ofwar from among them, to form his order on the side towards the enemy. Each opponent put seven sail into the line. The British vessels, besides being of different rates, were chiefly very old ships, draggedout from Rotten Row to meet the pressing emergency caused by thegreatly superior forces which were in coalition against Great Britain. Owing to the decayed condition of some of them, their batteries hadbeen lightened, to the detriment of their fighting power. Two of them, however, were good and new seventy-fours. It is probable that theDutch vessels, after a long peace, were not much better than theirantagonists. In fact, each squadron was a scratch lot, in the worstsense of the phrase. The conduct of the affair by the two admirals, even to the very intensity of their pugnaciousness, contributes atinge of the comic to the history of a desperately fought action. Thebreeze was fresh at north-east, and the sea smooth. The Dutch, beingto leeward, awaited attack, forming line on the port tack, headingsouth-east by east, a point off the wind, under topsails andforesails, a cable's length apart. There is little room to doubt thatan adversary who thus holds his ground means to make a stand-up fight, but Parker, although the sun of a midsummer day had scarcely risen, thought advisable to order a general chase. Of course, no shipspared her canvas to this, while the worse sailers had to set theirstuddingsails to keep up; and the handling of the sails took the menoff from the preparations for battle. Parker, who doubtless was stillsore over Rodney's censure of the year before, and who moreover hadincurred the Admiralty's rebuke, for apparent hesitation to attack theenemy's islands while temporarily in command in the West Indies, wasdetermined now to show the fight that was in him. "It is related that, upon being informed of the force of the Dutch squadron in the morning, he replied (pulling up his breeches), 'It matters little what theirforce is; we must fight them if they are double the number. '" At 6. 10A. M. The signal was made for line abreast, the ships running downnearly before the wind. This of course introduced more regularity, theleading ships taking in their lighter sails to permit the others toreach their places; but the pace still was rapid. At 6. 45 the orderwas closed to one cable, and at 7. 56 the signal for battle washoisted. It is said that at that moment the 80-gun ship was stillsecuring a studding-sail-boom, which indicates how closely action trodon the heels of preparation. The Dutch admiral was as deliberate as Parker was headlong. An Englishwitness writes:-- "They appeared to be in great order; and their hammocks, quarter-cloths, etc. , were spread in as nice order as if for show in harbour. Their marines also were well drawn up, and stood with their muskets shouldered, with all the regularity and exactness of a review. Their politeness ought to be remembered by every man in our line; for, as if certain of what happened, we came down almost end-on upon their broadsides; yet did not the Dutch admiral fire a gun, or make the signal to engage, till the red flag was at the _Fortitude's_ masthead, and her shot finding their way into his ship. This was a manoeuvre which Admiral Zutman should not be warmly thanked for by their High Mightinesses; as he had it in his power to have done infinite mischief to our fleet, coming down in that unofficer-like manner. Having suffered Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly waited till the signal was hoisted on board the _Fortitude_, and at the same time we saw the signal going up on board Admiral Zutman's ship. " The British, thus unmolested, rounded-to just to windward of theenemy. A pilot who was on board their leading ship was for some reasontold to assist in laying her close to her opponent. "By close, " heasked, "do you mean about a ship's breadth?" "Not a gun was firedon either side, " says the official British report, "until within thedistance of half musket-shot. " Parker, whom an on-looker describes asfull of life and spirits, here made a mistake, of a routine character, which somewhat dislocated his order. It was a matter of tradition forflagship to seek flagship, just as it was to signal a general chase, and to bear down together, each ship for its opposite, well extendedwith the enemy. Now Parker, as was usual, was in the centre ofhis line, the fourth ship; but Zoutman was for some reason in thefifth. Parker therefore placed his fourth by the enemy's fifth. Inconsequence, the rear British ship overlapped the enemy, and for atime had no opponent; while the second and third found themselvesengaged with three of the Dutch. At 8 A. M. The signal for the linewas hauled down, and that for close action hoisted, --thus avoiding amistake often made. All the vessels were soon satisfactorily and hotly at work, and theaction continued with varying phases till 11. 35 A. M. The leading twoships in both orders got well to leeward of the lines, the British twohaving to tack to regain their places to windward. Towards the middleof the engagement the Dutch convoy bore away, back to the Texel, asthe British had steered for England before it began; the differencebeing that the voyage was abandoned by the Dutch and completed bythe British. At eleven o'clock Parker made sail, and passed with theflagship between the enemy and the _Buffalo_, his next ahead and thirdin the British order; the three rear ships following close in hiswake, in obedience to the signal for line ahead, which had beenrehoisted at 10. 43. [104] A heavy cannonade attended this evolution, the Dutch fighting gloriously to the last. When it was completed, theBritish fleet wore and the action ceased. "I made an effort to formthe line, in order to renew the action, " wrote Parker in his report, "but found it impracticable. The enemy appeared to be in as bad acondition. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each other, when the Dutch, with their convoy, bore away for the Texel. We werenot in a condition to follow them. " This was a most satisfactory exhibition of valour, and a mostunsatisfactory battle; magnificent, but not war. The completion oftheir voyage by the British merchant ships, while the Dutch wereobliged to return to the port which they had just left, may beconsidered to award success, and therefore the essentials of victory, to Parker's fleet. With this exception the _status quo_ remained muchas before, although one of the Dutch ships sank next day; yet theBritish loss, 104 killed and 339 wounded, was nearly as great asin Keppel's action, where thirty ships fought on each side, or inRodney's of April 17th, 1780, where the British had twenty sail;greater than with Graves off the Chesapeake, and, in proportion, fullyequal to the sanguinary conflicts between Suffren and Hughes in theEast Indies. The Dutch loss is reported as 142 killed, 403 wounded. Both sides aimed at the hull, as is shown by the injuries; forthough much harm was done aloft, few spars were wholly shot away. The_Buffalo_, a small ship, had 39 shot through and through her, and avery great number pierced between wind and water; in the British vanship as many as 14, another proof that the Dutch fired low. With the rudimentary notions of manoeuvring evinced, it is notsurprising that Parker was found an unsatisfactory second by anenlightened tactician like Rodney. The Vice-Admiral, however, laid hisunsuccess to the indifferent quality of his ships. George III visitedthe squadron after the action, but Parker was not open to compliments. "I wish your Majesty better ships and younger officers, " he said. "Formyself, I am now too old for service. " No rewards were given, and itis asserted that Parker made no secret that none would be accepted, if offered, at the hands of the then Admiralty. He voiced the protestof the Navy and of the nation against the mal-administration of thepeace days, which had left the country unprepared for war. The gallantveteran was ordered soon afterwards to command in the East Indies. Hesailed for his station in the _Cato_, which was never heard of again. Though unfruitful in substantial results, Parker's action meritscommemoration; for, after all, even where skill does its utmost, staunchness such as his shows the sound constitution of a militarybody. [Footnote 103: Beatson, "Military and Naval Memoirs, " v. 347. ] [Footnote 104: Sir John Ross, in his "Life of Saumarez, " who waslieutenant in the flagship, says that the flagship only passed aheadof the _Buffalo_, and that the rear ships closed upon the latter. The version in the text rests upon the detailed and circumstantialstatements of another lieutenant of the squadron, in Ekins's "NavalBattles. " As Ekins also was present as a midshipman, this gives, as itwere, the confirmation of two witnesses. ] CHAPTER XII THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE. RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782 The year 1781 closed with an incident more decisive in character thanmost of the events that occurred in European waters during its course;one also which transfers the interest, by natural transition, again tothe West Indies. The French government had felt throughout the summerthe necessity of sending de Grasse reinforcements both of ships and ofsupplies, but the transports and material of war needed could not becollected before December. As the British probably would attempt tointercept a convoy upon which the next campaign so much depended, Rear-Admiral de Guichen was ordered to accompany it clear of the Bayof Biscay, with twelve ships of the line, and then to go to Cadiz. Five ships of the line destined to de Grasse, and two going to theEast Indies, raised to nineteen the total force with which de Guichenleft Brest on the 10th of December. On the afternoon of the 12th, theFrench being then one hundred and fifty miles to the southward andwestward of Ushant, with a south-east wind, the weather, which hadbeen thick and squally, suddenly cleared and showed sails to windward. These were twelve ships of the line, one 50, and some frigates, underRear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt, who had left England on the 2d of themonth, to cruise in wait for this expedition. The French numbers wereamply sufficient to frustrate any attack, but de Guichen, ordinarilya careful officer, had allowed his ships of war to be to leeward andahead of the convoy. The latter scattered in every direction, as theBritish swooped down upon them, but all could not escape; and theFrench ships of war remained helpless spectators, while the victimswere hauling down their flags right and left. Night coming on, someprizes could not be secured, but Kempenfelt carried off fifteen, laden with military and naval stores of great money value and greatermilitary importance. A few days later a violent storm dispersed andshattered the remainder of the French body. Two ships of the lineonly, the _Triomphant_, 84, and _Brave_, 74, and five transports, could pursue their way to the West Indies. The rest went back toBrest. This event may be considered as opening the naval campaign of1782 in the West Indies. Kempenfelt, before returning to England, sent off express to Hoodin the West Indies the fireship _Tisiphone_, 8, Commander JamesSaumarez, [105]--afterwards the distinguished admiral, --with news ofthe French approach. Saumarez, having been first to Barbados, joinedHood on the 31st of January, 1782, in Basse Terre Roads, on the leeside of St. Kitts; a position from which Hood had dislodged de Grassesix days before by a brilliant manoeuvre, resembling that which hehad contemplated[106] as open to Graves the previous September atChesapeake Bay for the relief of Cornwallis. The campaign for the year1782 had opened already with an attack upon St. Kitts by the Frencharmy and navy; and the French fleet was even then cruising close athand to leeward, between St. Kitts and Nevis. The original intention of de Grasse and de Bouillé had been to captureBarbados, the most important of the Eastern Antilles still remainingto the British; but the heavy trade-winds, which in those days madea winter passage to windward so long and dreary a beat, twice drovethem back to port. "The whole French fleet, " wrote Hood, "appearedoff Santa Lucia on the 17th of last month, endeavouring to getto windward, and having carried away many topmasts and yards instruggling against very squally weather, returned to Fort Royal Bayon the 23d, and on the 28th came out again with forty transports, manoeuvring as before. " On the 2d of January it disappeared from SantaLucia, and, after a short stay again at Martinique, proceeded on the5th to St. Kitts, anchoring in Basse Terre Roads on the 11th. TheBritish garrison retired to Brimstone Hill, a fortified position atthe north-west of the island, while the inhabitants surrendered thegovernment to the French, pledging themselves to neutrality. Theadjacent island of Nevis capitulated on the same terms on the 20th. On the 14th of January, an express sent by General Shirley, governorof St. Kitts, had informed Hood at Barbados that a great fleetapproaching had been seen from the heights of Nevis on the 10th. Hoodat once put to sea, though short of bread and flour, which could notbe had, and with the material of his ships in wretched condition. "When the _President_[107] joins, " he wrote the Admiralty, "I shall betwenty-two strong, with which I beg you will assure their LordshipsI will seek and give battle to the Count de Grasse, be his numbersas they may. " On the way a ship reached him with word that the Frenchfleet had invested St. Kitts. On the 21st he anchored at Antiguafor repairs and supplies, indispensable for keeping the sea in theoperations which he contemplated, the duration of which could not beforeseen. About a thousand troops also were embarked, which, with themarines that could be spared from the squadron, would give a landingforce of twenty-four hundred men. St. Kitts being less than fifty miles from Antigua, Hood doubtless nowgot accurate information of the enemy's dispositions, and could forma definite, well-matured plan. This seems to have been carefullyimparted to all his captains, as was the practice of Nelson, who wasthe pupil of Hood, if of any one. "At 9. 15 A. M. The Admiral made thesignal for all flag-officers, " says the log of the _Canada_; "and at4 P. M. The Admirals and Commodore made the signals for all captainsof their divisions. " At 5 P. M. Of the same day, January 23d, the fleetweighed and stood over for Nevis, round the southern point of whichBasse Terre must be approached; for, the channel between Nevis and St. Kitts being impracticable for ships of the line, the two islands werevirtually one, and, their common axis lying north-west and south-east, the trade-wind is fair only when coming from the south. Basse Terre, where de Grasse then was, is about fifteen miles from thesouth point of Nevis. The roadstead lies east and west, and the Frenchfleet, then twenty-four of the line and two fifties, were anchoredwithout attention to order, three or four deep; the eastern ships soplaced that an enemy coming from the southward could reach them withthe prevailing trade-wind, against which the western ships could notbeat up quickly to their support. This being so, we are told thatHood, starting shortly before sunset with a fair, and probably freshwind, from a point only sixty miles distant, hoped to come upon theFrench by surprise at early daybreak, to attack the weather ships, and from them to sail along the hostile order so far as might seemexpedient. His column, thus passing in its entirety close to a certainexposed fraction of the enemy, the latter would be cut up in detail bythe concentration upon it. The British then, wearing to the southward, would haul their wind, tack, and again stand up to the assault, if theenemy continued to await it. This reasonable expectation, and skilful conception, was thwarted bya collision, during the night, between a frigate, the _Nymphe_, 36, and the leading ship of the line, the _Alfred_, 74. The repairs tothe latter delayed the fleet, the approach of which was discoveredby daylight. De Grasse therefore put to sea. He imagined Hood'spurpose was to throw succours into Brimstone Hill; and moreover theposition of the enemy now was between him and four ships of the linemomentarily expected from Martinique, one of which joined him on thesame day. The French were all under way by sunset, standing to thesouthward under easy sail, towards the British, who had rounded thesouth point of Nevis at 1 P. M. Towards dark, Hood went about and stoodalso to the southward, seemingly in retreat. During the following night the British tacked several times, to keeptheir position to windward. At daylight of January 25th, the twofleets were to the westward of Nevis; the British near the island, the French abreast, but several miles to leeward. Foiled in hisfirst spring by an unexpected accident, Hood had not relinquished hisenterprise, and now proposed to seize the anchorage quitted by theFrench, so establishing himself there, --as he had proposed to Gravesto do in the Chesapeake, --that he could not be dislodged. For such adefensive position St. Kitts offered special advantages. The anchoragewas a narrow ledge, dropping precipitately to very deep water; andit was possible so to place the ships that the enemy could not easilyanchor near them. At 5. 30 A. M. Of the 25th Hood made the signal to form line of battleon the starboard tack, at one cable interval. [108] It is mentionedin the log of the _Canada_, 74, Captain Cornwallis, that that shipbrought-to in her station, fourth from the rear, at 7 o'clock. By 10o'clock the line was formed, and the ships hove-to in it. At 10. 45 thesignal was made to fill [to go ahead], the van ships to carry the samesail as the Admiral, --topsails and foresails, --followed, just beforenoon, by the order to prepare to anchor, with springs on the cables. The French, who were steering south, on the port tack, while theBritish were hove-to, went about as soon as the latter filled, andstood towards them in bow and quarter line. [109] [Illustration] At noon the British fleet was running along close under the high landof Nevis; so close that the _Solebay_, 28, one of the frigates inshoreof the line, grounded and was wrecked. No signals were needed, exceptto correct irregularities in the order, for the captains knew whatthey were to do. The French were approaching steadily, but inevitablydropping astern with reference to the point of the enemy's line forwhich they were heading. At 2 P. M. De Grasse's flagship, the _Villede Paris_, fired several shot at the British rear, which alone shecould reach, while his left wing was nearing the _Barfleur_, Hood'sflagship, and the vessels astern of her, the centre of the column, which opened their fire at 2. 30. Hood, trusting to his captains, disregarded this threat to the rear half of his force. Signals flewfor the van to crowd sail and take its anchorage, and at 3. 30 P. M. Theleading ships began to anchor in line ahead, (Fig. 1, a), covered asthey did so by the broadsides of the rear and the rear centre (b). Upon the latter the French were now keeping up a smart fire. Betweenthe _Canada_ and her next astern, the _Prudent_, 64, --which was adull sailer, --there was a considerable interval. Towards it theFrench admiral pressed, aiming to cut off the three rear vessels; butCornwallis threw everything aback and closed down upon his consort, --astirring deed in which he was imitated by the _Resolution_ and_Bedford_, 74's, immediately ahead of him. De Grasse was thus foiled, but so narrowly, that an officer, looking from one of the ships whichhad anchored, asserted that for a moment he could perceive the _Villede Paris's_ jib inside the British line. As the rear of the latterpushed on to its place, it cleared the broadsides of the now anchoredvan and centre, (Fig. 2, a), and these opened upon the enemy, agreat part of whom were strung out behind the British column, withoutopponents as yet, but hastening up to get their share of the action. Hood's flagship, (f), which anchored at 4. 03, opened fire again at4. 40 P. M. Thus, as the _Canada_ and her few companions, who bore thebrunt of the day, were shortening sail and rounding-to, (b), stillunder a hot cannonade, the batteries of their predecessors wereringing out their welcome, and at the same time covering theirmovements by giving the enemy much else to think about. The _Canada_, fetching up near the tail of the column and letting go in a hurry, ranout two cables on end, and found upon sounding that she had droppedher anchor in a hundred and fifty fathoms of water. The French columnstood on, off soundings, though close to, firing as it passed, andthen, wearing to the southward in succession, stood out of action onthe port tack, (c), its ineffectual broadsides adding to the grandeurand excitement of the scene, and swelling the glory of Hood'ssuccessful daring, of which it is difficult to speak too highly. LordRobert Manners, the captain of the _Resolution_, which was fifthship from the British rear, writing a week later, passed upon thisachievement a verdict, which posterity will confirm. "The takingpossession of this road was well judged, well conducted, and wellexecuted, though indeed the French had an opportunity--which theymissed--of bringing our rear to a very severe account. The van andcentre divisions brought to an anchor under the fire of the rear, which was engaged with the enemy's centre (Fig. 1); and then thecentre, being at an anchor and properly placed, covered us while weanchored (Fig. 2), making, I think, the most masterly manoeuvre I eversaw. " Whether regard be had to the thoughtful preparation, the craftymanagement of the fleet antecedent to the final push, the calculatedaudacity of the latter, or the firm and sagacious tactical handlingfrom the first moment to the last, Nelson himself never did a morebrilliant deed than this of Hood's. [110] All firing ceased at 5. 30. Naturally, an order taken up under such conditions needed somerectifying before further battle. As the proper stationing of thefleet depended in great measure upon the position of the van ship, Hood had put a local pilot on board her; but when the action ceased, he found that she was not as close to the shore as he had intended. The rear, on the other hand, was naturally in the most disorder, owingto the circumstances attending its anchorage. Three ships from therear were consequently directed to place themselves ahead of the van, closing the interval, while others shifted their berths, accordingto specific directions. The order as finally assumed (Fig. 3) was asfollows. The van ship was anchored so close to the shore that it wasimpossible to pass within her, or, with the prevailing wind, even toreach her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering herposition. From her the line extended in a west-north-west directionto the fifteenth ship, --the _Barfleur_, 98, Hood's flagship, --when itturned to north, the last six ships being on a north and south line. These six, with their broadsides turned to the westward, prevented acolumn passing from south to north, the only way one could pass, fromenfilading the main line with impunity. The latter covered with itsguns the approach from the south. All the ships had springs on theircables, enabling them to turn their sides so as to cover a large arcof a circle with their batteries. [Illustration] At daylight on the following morning, January 26th, the ships beganchanging their places, the French being then seven or eight milesdistant in the south-south-east. At 7 A. M. They were seen to beapproaching in line of battle, under a press of sail, heading for theBritish van. The _Canada_, which had begun at 5 A. M. To tackle her200-odd fathoms of cable, was obliged to cut, whereby "we lost thesmall bower anchor and two cables with one 8-inch and one 9-inchhawsers, which were bent for springs. " The ship had to work towindward to close with the fleet, and was therefore ordered by theRear-Admiral to keep engaging under way, until 10. 50, when a messagewas sent her to anchor in support of the rear. The action beganbetween 8. 30 and 9 A. M. , the leading French ship heading for theBritish van, seemingly with the view of passing round and inside it. Against this attempt Hood's precautions probably were sufficient; butas the enemy's vessel approached, the wind headed her, so that shecould only fetch the third ship. The latter, with the vessels aheadand astern, sprung their batteries upon her. "The crash occasioned bytheir destructive broadsides was so tremendous on board her that wholepieces of plank were seen flying from her off side, ere she couldescape the cool concentrated fire of her determined adversaries. "[111]She put her helm up, and ran along outside the British line, receivingthe first fire of each successive ship. Her movement was imitated byher followers, some keeping off sooner, some later; but de Grasse inhis flagship not only came close, but pointed his after yards to thewind, [112] to move the slower. As he ported his helm when leaving the_Barfleur_, this brought these sails aback, keeping him a still longertime before the British ships thrown to the rear. "In this he wassupported by those ships which were astern, or immediately ahead ofhim. During this short but tremendous conflict in that part of thefield of battle, nothing whatever could be seen of them for upwardsof twenty minutes, save de Grasse's white flag at the main-topgallantmasthead of the _Ville de Paris_, gracefully floating above theimmense volumes of smoke that enveloped them, or the pennants of thoseships which were occasionally perceptible, when an increase of breezewould waft away the smoke. "[113] [Illustration] Though most gallantly done, no such routine manoeuvre as this couldshake Hood's solidly assumed position. The attempt was repeated in theafternoon, but more feebly, and upon the centre and rear only. Thisalso was ineffectual; and Hood was left in triumphant possession ofthe field. The losses in the several affairs of the two days had been:British, 72 killed, 244 wounded; French, 107 killed, 207 wounded. Thenceforth the French fleet continued cruising to leeward of theisland, approaching almost daily, frequently threatening attack, andoccasionally exchanging distant shots; but no serious encounter tookplace. Interest was centred on Brimstone Hill, where alone on theisland the British flag still flew. De Grasse awaited its surrender, flattering himself that the British would be forced then to putto sea, and that his fleet, increased by successive arrivals tothirty-two of the line, would then find an opportunity to crush theman who had outwitted and out-manoeuvred him on January 25th and 26th. In this hope he was deceived by his own inaptness and his adversary'sreadiness. Hood was unable to succour Brimstone Hill, for want oftroops; the French having landed six thousand men, against which theBritish twenty-four hundred could effect nothing, either alone or incoöperation with the garrison, which was but twelve hundred strong. The work capitulated on the 13th of February. De Grasse, who hadneglected to keep his ships provisioned, went next day to Nevis andanchored there to empty the storeships. That evening Hood calledhis captains on board, explained his intentions, had them set theirwatches by his, and at 11 P. M. The cables were cut one by one, lightsbeing left on the buoys, and the fleet silently decamped, passinground the north end of St. Kitts, and so towards Antigua. When deGrasse opened his eyes next morning, the British were no longer to beseen. "Nothing could have been more fortunately executed, " wrote LordRobert Manners, "as not one accident happened from it. Taking thewhole in one light, though not successful in the point we aimed at, nevertheless it was well conducted, and has given the enemy a prettysevere check; and if you give him half the credit the enemy does, SirSamuel Hood will stand very high in the public estimation. " Hood's intention had been to return to Barbados; but on the 25th ofFebruary he was joined, to windward of Antigua, by Rodney, who hadarrived from England a week earlier, bringing with him twelve ships ofthe line. The new Commander-in-Chief endeavoured to cut off de Grassefrom Martinique, but the French fleet got in there on the 26th. Rodney consequently went to Santa Lucia, to refit Hood's ships, andto prepare for the coming campaign, in which it was understood thatthe conquest of Jamaica was to be the first object of the allies. An important condition to their success was the arrival of a greatconvoy, known to be on its way from Brest to repair the losseswhich Kempenfelt's raid and subsequent bad weather had inflicted inDecember. Hood suggested to Rodney to halve the fleet, which thennumbered thirty-six of the line, letting one part cruise north ofDominica, between that island and Deseada, while the other guardedthe southern approach, between Martinique and Santa Lucia. Rodney, however, was unwilling to do this, and adopted a half-measure, --Hood'sdivision being stationed to windward of the north end of Martinique, reaching only as far north as the latitude of Dominica, while thecenter and rear were abreast of the centre and south of Martinique;all in mutual touch by intermediate vessels. It would seem--readingbetween the lines--that Hood tried to stretch his cruising groundnorthwards, in pursuance of his own ideas, but Rodney recalled him. The French convoy consequently passed north of Deseada, convoyed bytwo ships of the line, and on the 20th of March reached Martiniquesafely. De Grasse's force was thus raised to thirty-five of the line, including two 50-gun ships, as against the British thirty-six. At theend of the month Rodney returned to Santa Lucia, and there remained atanchor, vigilantly watching the French fleet in Fort Royal by means ofa chain of frigates. The problem now immediately confronting de Grasse--the first steptowards the conquest of Jamaica--was extremely difficult. It was toconvoy to Cap François the supply vessels essential to his enterprise, besides the merchant fleet bound for France; making in all one hundredand fifty unarmed ships to be protected by his thirty-five sail of theline, in face of the British thirty-six. The trade-wind being fair, he purposed to skirt the inner northern edge of the Caribbean Sea;by which means he would keep close to a succession of friendly ports, wherein the convoy might find refuge in case of need. With this plan the French armament put to sea on the 8th of April, 1782. The fact being reported promptly to Rodney, by noon his wholefleet was clear of its anchorage and in pursuit. Then was evident thevital importance of Barrington's conquest of Santa Lucia; for, had theBritish been at Barbados, the most probable alternative, the Frenchmovement not only would have been longer unknown, but pursuit wouldhave started from a hundred miles distant, instead of thirty. If theBritish had met this disadvantage by cruising before Martinique, theywould have encountered the difficulty of keeping their ships suppliedwith water and other necessaries, which Santa Lucia afforded. Intruth, without in any degree minimizing the faults of the loser, orthe merits of the winner, in the exciting week that followed, theopening situation may be said to have represented on either side anaccumulation of neglects or of successes, which at the moment of theiroccurrence may have seemed individually trivial; a conspicuous warningagainst the risk incurred by losing single points in the game of war. De Grasse was tremendously handicapped from the outset by the errorsof his predecessors and of himself. That the British had Santa Luciaas their outpost was due not only to Barrington's diligence, but alsoto d'Estaing's slackness and professional timidity; and it may bequestioned whether de Grasse himself had shown a proper understandingof strategic conditions, when he neglected that island in favour ofTobago and St. Kitts. Certainly, Hood had feared for it greatly theyear before. That the convoy was there to embarrass his movements, may not have been the fault of the French admiral; but it was greatlyand entirely his fault that, of the thirty-six ships pursuing him, twenty-one represented a force that he might have crushed in detaila few weeks before, --not to mention the similar failure of April, 1781. [114] Large bodies of ships commonly will move less rapidly than small. By2. 30 P. M. Of the day of starting, Rodney's look-outs had sighted theFrench fleet; and before sundown it could be seen from the mastheadsof the main body. At 6 next morning, April 9th, the enemy, bothfleet and convoy, was visible from the deck of the _Barfleur_, theflagship of Hood's division, then in the British van. The French borenorth-east, distant four to twelve miles, extending from abreast ofthe centre of Dominica northwards towards Guadeloupe. The British hadgained much during the night, and their centre was now off Dominica toleeward of the enemy's rear, which was becalmed under the island. Somefourteen or fifteen of the French van, having opened out the channelbetween Dominica and Guadeloupe, felt a fresh trade-wind, from east bynorth, with which they steered north; and their number was graduallyincreased as individual ships, utilising the catspaws, stole clear ofthe high land of Dominica. Hood's division in like manner, first amongthe British, got the breeze, and, with eight ships, the commander ofthe van stood north in order of battle. To the north-west of him weretwo French vessels, separated from their consorts and threatened tobe cut off (i). These stood boldly down and crossed the head of Hood'scolumn; one passing so close to the leading ship, the _Alfred_, thatthe latter had to bear up to let her pass. Rodney had hoisted a signalto engage at 6. 38 A. M. , but had hauled it down almost immediately, and Hood would not fire without orders. These ships therefore rejoinedtheir main body unharmed. At 8. 30 the French hoisted their colours, and shortly afterwards the vessels which had cleared Dominica tackedand stood south, opposite to Hood. De Grasse now had recognised that he could not escape action, ifthe convoy kept company. He therefore directed the two 50-gun ships, _Expériment_ and _Sagittaire_, to accompany it into Guadeloupe, whereit arrived safely that day (Position 1, dd); and he decided that thefleet should ply to windward through the channel between Dominicaand Guadeloupe, nearly midway in which lies a group of small islandscalled Les Saintes, --a name at times given to the battle of April12th. By this course he hoped not only to lead the enemy away fromthe convoy, but also to throw off pursuit through his superior speed, and so to accomplish his mission unharmed. The French ships, larger, deeper, and with better lines than their opponents, were naturallybetter sailers, and it may be inferred that even coppering had notentirely overcome this original disadvantage of the British. At the very moment of beginning his new policy, however, a subtletemptation assailed de Grasse irresistibly, in the exposed position ofHood's column (h); and he met it, not by a frank and hearty acceptanceof a great opportunity, but by a half-measure. Hood thoroughlycrushed, the British fleet became hopelessly inferior to the French;Hood damaged, and it became somewhat inferior: possibly it wouldbe deterred from further pursuit. De Grasse decided for this secondcourse, and ordered part of his fleet to attack. This operation wascarried out under the orders of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the secondin command. The ships engaged in it bore down from the windward, attacked Hood's rear ships, stood along northward (f) on the weatherside of his column at long range, and, having passed ahead, tacked (t)in succession and formed again in the rear, (f^2) whence they repeatedthe same manoeuvre (Positions 1 and 2). Thus a procession of fifteenships kept passing by eight, describing a continuous curve ofelliptical form. They were able to do this because Hood was condemnedto a low speed, lest he should draw too far away from the Britishcentre (a) and rear (c), still becalmed under Dominica (Position 2). The French, having choice of distance, kept at long gunshot, becausethey were deficient in carronades, of which the British had many. These guns, of short range but large calibre, were thus rendereduseless. Could they have come into play, the French rigging and sailswould have suffered severely. This first engagement (Position 1)lasted, by Hood's log, from 9. 48 to 10. 25 A. M. It was resumed instronger force (Position 2) at 14 minutes past noon, and continuedtill 1. 45 P. M. , when firing ceased for that day; Rodney haulingdown the signal for battle at 2. Between the two affairs, which wereidentical in general character, Hood's column was reinforced, andgreat part of the British centre also got into action with some ofthe French main body, though at long range only. "Except the two rearships, " wrote Rodney to Hood that night, "the others fired at such adistance that I returned none. " [Illustration] The injuries to the British ships engaged were not such as to compelthem to leave the fleet. The _Royal Oak_ lost her main topmast, andthat of the _Warrior_ fell two days later, not improbably from wounds;but in these was nothing that the ready hands of seamen could notrepair so as to continue the chase. Rodney, therefore, contentedhimself with reversing the order of sailing, putting Hood in the rear, whereby he was able to refit, and yet follow fast enough not to be outof supporting distance. This circumstance caused Hood's division tobe in the rear in the battle of the 12th. One of the French ships, the _Caton_, 64, had been so injured that de Grasse detached her intoGuadeloupe. It must be remembered that a crippled ship in a chasedfleet not only embarrasses movement, but may compromise the wholebody, if the latter delay to protect it; whereas the chaser keepsbetween his lame birds and the enemy. During the night of the 9th the British lay-to for repairs. The nextmorning they resumed the pursuit, turning to windward after theenemy, but upon the whole losing throughout the 10th and the 11th. Atdaylight of the 10th the French, by the logs of Hood and Cornwallis, were "from four to five leagues distant, " "just in sight from thedeck. " During that night, however, the _Zélé_, 74, had collided withthe _Jason_, 64; and the latter was injured so far as to be compelledto follow the _Caton_ into Guadeloupe. At sunset of that day Rodneysignalled a general chase to windward, the effect of which was toenable each ship to do her best according to her captain's judgmentduring the dark hours. Nevertheless, on the morning of the 11ththe French seem again to have gained, for Hood, who, it will beremembered, was now in the rear, notes that at 10 A. M. Twenty-twoFrench sail (not all the fleet) could be counted _from the masthead_;Cornwallis, further to windward, could count thirty-three. Troude, a French authority, says that at that time nearly all the French haddoubled The Saintes, that is, had got to windward of them, and itlooked as though de Grasse might succeed in throwing off his pursuer. Unluckily, two ships, the _Magnanime_, 74, and the _Zélé_, 74, thelatter of which had lost her main topmast, were several miles toleeward of the French main body. It was necessary to delay, or to dropthose vessels. Again, trivial circumstances conspired to further agreat disaster, and de Grasse bore down to cover the crippled ships;so losing much of his hard-won ground, and entailing a furthermisfortune that night. Rodney hung doggedly on, relying on thechapter of accidents, as one who knows that all things come to himwho endures. To be sure, there was not much else he could do; yethe deserves credit for unremitting industry and pluck. During theafternoon, the signals noted in the British logs--to call in allcruisers and for the fleet to close--attest mutely the movement of deGrasse in bearing down, --coming nearer. [Illustration] During the night, at 2 A. M. Of April 12th, the _Zélé_ and de Grasse'sflagship, the _Ville de Paris_, 110, crossing on opposite tacks, cameinto collision. The former lost both foremast and bowsprit. It hasbeen stated by John Paul Jones, who by permission of Congress embarkeda few months later on board the French fleet as a volunteer, anddoubtless thus heard many personal narratives, that this accidentwas due to the deficiency of watch-officers in the French navy; thedeck of the _Zélé_ being in charge of a young ensign, instead ofan experienced lieutenant. It was necessary to rid the fleet of the_Zélé_ at once, or an action could not be avoided; so a frigatewas summoned to tow her, and the two were left to make their way toGuadeloupe, while the others resumed the beat to windward. At 5 A. M. She and the frigate were again under way, steering for Guadeloupe, tothe north-west, making from five to six miles (Position 3, a); but inthe interval they had been nearly motionless, and consequently whenday broke at 5. 30 they were only two leagues from the _Barfleur_, Hood's flagship, which, still in the British rear, was then standingsouth on the port tack. The body of the French, (Position 3), was atabout the same distance as on the previous evening, --ten to fifteenmiles, --but the _Ville de Paris_ (c) not more than eight. Just before6 A. M. Rodney signalled Hood, who was nearest, to chase the _Zélé_;and four of the rearmost ships of the line were detached for thatpurpose (b). De Grasse, seeing this, signalled his vessels at 6 A. M. To close the flagship, making all sail; and he himself bore down tothe westward (cc'), on the port tack, but running free, to frightenaway Rodney's chasers. The British Admiral kept them out until 7o'clock, by which time de Grasse was fairly committed to his falsestep. All cruisers were then called in, and the line was closed to onecable. [115] Within an hour were heard the opening guns of the greatbattle, since known by the names of the 12th of April, or of TheSaintes, and, in the French navy, of Dominica. The successive lossesof the _Caton_, _Jason_, and _Zélé_, with the previous detachment ofthe two 50-gun ships with the convoy, had reduced the French numbersfrom thirty-five to thirty effective vessels. The thirty-six Britishremained undiminished. The British appear to have been standing to the south on the porttack at daylight; but, soon after sending out the chasers, Rodney hadordered the line of bearing (from ship to ship) to be north-north-eastto south-south-west, evidently in preparation for a close-hauled lineof battle on the starboard tack, heading northerly to an east wind. Somewhat unusually, the wind that morning held at south-east for sometime, enabling the British to lie up as high as east-north-east onthe starboard tack (Position 3, d), on which they were when the battlejoined; and this circumstance, being very favourable for gaining towindward, --to the eastward, --doubtless led to the annulling of thesignal for the line of bearing, half an hour after it was made, andthe substitution for it of the line of battle ahead at one cable. Itis to be inferred that Rodney's first purpose was to tack together, thus restoring Hood to the van, his natural station; but the accidentof the wind holding to the southward placed the actual van--regularlythe rear--most to windward, and rendered it expedient to tack insuccession, instead of all together, preserving to the full theopportunity which chance had extended for reaching the enemy. In theengagement, therefore, Hood commanded in the rear, and Rear-AdmiralDrake in the van. The wind with the French seems to have been more tothe eastward than with the British, --not an unusual circumstance inthe neighbourhood of land. As Rodney, notwithstanding his haste, had formed line from time totime during the past three days, his fleet was now in good order, andhis signals were chiefly confined to keeping it closed. The French, onthe other hand, were greatly scattered when their Commander-in-Chief, in an impulse of hasty, unbalanced judgment, abandoned his previouscautious policy and hurried them into action. Some of them were overten miles to windward of the flagship. Though they crowded sail torejoin her, there was not time enough for all to take their stationsproperly, between daylight and 8 A. M. , when the firing began. "Ourline of battle was formed under the fire of musketry, "[116] wrote theMarquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command, who, being in the rearof the fleet on this occasion, and consequently among the last to beengaged, had excellent opportunity for observation. At the beginningit was in de Grasse's power to postpone action, until the order shouldbe formed, by holding his wind under short canvas; while the meresight of his vessels hurrying down for action would have compelledRodney to call in the ships chasing the _Zélé_, the rescue of whichwas the sole motive of the French manoeuvre. Instead of this, theFrench flagship kept off the wind; which precipitated the collision, while at the same time delaying the preparations needed to sustain it. To this de Grasse added another fault by forming on the port tack, the contrary to that on which the British were, and standing southerlytowards Dominica. The effect of this was to bring his ships into thecalms and baffling winds which cling to the shore-line, thus deprivingthem of their power of manoeuvre. His object probably was to confinethe engagement to a mere pass-by on opposite tacks, by which in allprevious instances the French had thwarted the decisive action thatRodney sought. Nevertheless, the blunder was evident at once toFrench eyes. "What evil genius has inspired the admiral?" exclaimed duPavillon, Vaudreuil's flag-captain, who was esteemed one of the besttacticians in France, and who fell in the battle. [Illustration] As the two lines drew near to one another, standing, the French south, the British east-north-east, the wind shifted back to the eastward, allowing the French to head higher, to south-south-east, and knockingthe British off to north-north-east (Position 4). The head of theFrench column thus passed out of gunshot, across the bows of Rodney'sleading vessel, the _Marlborough_, (m), which came within range whenabreast the eighth ship. The first shots were fired by the _Brave_, 74, ninth in the French line, at 8 A. M. The British captain then puthis helm up and ran slowly along, north-north-west, under the lee ofthe French, towards their rear. The rest of the British fleet followedin his wake. The battle thus assumed the form of passing in oppositedirections on parallel lines; except that the French ships, as theysuccessively cleared the point where the British column struck theirline, would draw out of fire, their course diverging thenceforth fromthat of the British approach. The effect of this would be that theBritish rear, when it reached that point, would be fresh, havingundergone no fire, and with that advantage would encounter the Frenchrear, which had received already the fire of the British van andcentre. To obviate this, by bringing his own van into action, deGrasse signalled the van ships to lead south-south-west, parallelwith the British north-north-east (4, a). The engagement thus becamegeneral all along the lines; but it is probable that the French vanwas never well formed. Its commander, at all events, reached his postlater than the commander of the rear did his. [117] At five minutes past eight, Rodney made a general signal for closeaction, followed immediately by another for the leading ships to headone point to starboard--towards the enemy--which indicates that hewas not satisfied with the distance first taken by the _Marlborough_. The _Formidable_, his flagship, eighteenth in the column, beganto fire at 8. 23;[118] but the _Barfleur_, Hood's flagship, whichwas thirty-first, not till 9. 25. This difference in time is to beaccounted for chiefly by the light airs near Dominica, contrastedwith the fresh trades in the open channel to the northward, which theleading British vessels felt before their rear. De Grasse now, toolate, had realised the disastrous effect which this would have uponhis fleet. If he escaped all else, his ships, baffled by calms andcatspaws while the British had a breeze, must lose the weather-gage, and with it the hope of evading pursuit, hitherto his chiefpreoccupation. Twice he signalled to wear, --first, all together, thenin succession, --but, although the signals were seen, they could notbe obeyed with the enemy close under the lee. "The French fleet, "comments Chevalier justly, "had freedom of movement no longer. A fleetcannot wear with an enemy's fleet within musket-range to leeward. " The movement therefore continued as described, the opposing shipsslowly "sliding by" each other until about 9. 15, when the windsuddenly shifted back to south-east again. The necessity of keepingthe sails full forced the bows of each French vessel towards the enemy(Position 5), destroying the order in column, and throwing the fleetinto _échelon_, or, as the phrase then was, into bow and quarterline. [119] The British, on the contrary, were free either to holdtheir course or to head towards the enemy. Rodney's flagship (5, a)luffed, and led through the French line just astern of the _Glorieux_, 74, (g), which was the nineteenth in their order. She was followedby five ships; and her next ahead also, the _Duke_ (d), seeing herchief's movement, imitated it, breaking through the line astern of thetwenty-third French. The _Glorieux_, on the starboard hand of Rodney'slittle column, received its successive broadsides. Her main and mizzenmasts went overboard at 9. 28, when the _Canada_, third astern ofthe _Formidable_, had just passed her; and a few moments later herforemast and bowsprit fell. At 9. 33 the _Canada_ was to windward ofthe French line. The flagship _Formidable_ was using both broadsidesas she broke through the enemy's order. On her port hand, between herand the _Duke_, were four French ships huddled together (c), one ofwhich had paid off the wrong way; that is, after the shift of windtook her aback, her sails had filled on the opposite tack from thatof the rest of her fleet. [120] These four, receiving the repeatedbroadsides, at close quarters, of the _Formidable_, _Duke_, and_Namur_, and having undergone besides the fire of the British van, were very severely mauled. While these things were happening, the_Bedford_, the sixth astern of the _Formidable_, perhaps unable tosee her next ahead in the smoke, had luffed independently (b), and wasfollowed by the twelve rearmost British ships, whom she led throughthe French order astern of the _César_, 74, (k), twelfth from the van. This ship and her next ahead, the _Hector_, 74, (h), suffered as didthe _Glorieux_. The _Barfleur_, which was in the centre of this columnof thirteen, opened fire at 9. 25. At 10. 45 she "ceased firing, havingpassed the enemy's van ships;" that is, she was well on the weatherside of the French fleet. Some of the rearmost of Hood's division, however, were still engaged at noon; but probably all were then towindward of the enemy. [Illustration] The British ships ahead of the _Duke_, the van and part of the centre, in all sixteen sail, had continued to stand to the northward. At thetime Rodney broke the line, several of them must have passed beyondthe French rear, and out of action. One, the _America_, the twelfthfrom the van, wore without signals, to pursue the enemy, and herexample was followed at once by the ship next ahead, the _Russell_, Captain Saumarez. No signal following, the _America_ again wore andfollowed her leaders, but the _Russell_ continued as she was, nowto windward of the French; by which course she was able to take aconspicuous share in the closing scenes. At 11. 33 Rodney signalled thevan to tack, but the delay of an hour or more had given the _Russell_a start over the other ships of her division "towards the enemy" whichcould not be overcome. The effect of these several occurrences had been to transfer theweather-gage, the position for attack, to the British from the French, and to divide the latter also into three groups, widely separatedand disordered (Position 6). In the centre was the flagship _Ville deParis_ with five ships (c). To windward of her, and two miles distant, was the van, of some dozen vessels (v). The rear was four miles awayto leeward (r). To restore the order, and to connect the fleet again, it was decided to re-form on the leewardmost ships; and severalsignals to this effect were made by de Grasse. They received butimperfect execution. The manageable vessels succeeded easily enoughin running before the wind to leeward, but, when there, exactitude ofposition and of movement was unattainable to ships in various degreesof disability, with light and baffling side airs. The French werenever again in order after the wind shifted and the line was broken;but the movement to leeward left the dismasted _Glorieux_, (g), _Hector_, (h), and _César_, (k), motionless between the hostile lines. It has been remarked, disparagingly, that the British fleet alsowas divided into three by the manoeuvre of breaking the line. Thisis true; but the advantage remained with it incontestably, in tworespects. By favor of the wind, each of the three groups had been ableto maintain its general formation in line or column, instead of beingthrown entirely out, as the French were; and passing thus in columnalong the _Glorieux_, _Hector_, and _César_, they wrought upon thesethree ships a concentration of injury which had no parallel among theBritish vessels. The French in fact had lost three ships, as well asthe wind. To these certain disadvantages is probably to be added ademoralisation among the French crews, from the much heavier lossesresultant upon the British practice of firing at the hull. An officerpresent in the action told Sir John Ross[121] afterwards that theFrench fired very high throughout; and he cited in illustration thatthe three trucks[122] of the British _Princesa_ were shot away. SirGilbert Blane, who, though Physician to the Fleet, obtained permissionto be on deck throughout the action, wrote ten days after it, "Ican aver from my own observation that the French fire slackens as weapproach, and is totally silent when we are close alongside. " It isneedless to say that a marked superiority of fire will silence that ofthe bravest enemy; and the practice of aiming at the spars and sails, however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially concededthat superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends. Asillustrative of this result, the British loss will be stated here. Itwas but 243 killed and 816 wounded in a fleet of thirty-six sail. Thehighest in any one ship was that of the _Duke_, 73 killed and wounded. No certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French losshas ever been given. None is cited by French authorities. Sir GilbertBlane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned that ofthe _Ville de Paris_ alone to be 300. There being fifty-four hundredtroops distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualtieswould be proportionately more numerous; but, even allowing for this, there can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier'swords, "was certainly much more considerable" than that reported bythe British. Six post-captains out of thirty were killed, against twoBritish out of thirty-six. Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity, whichaccident rather than design had given him at noon of April 12th. Hedid allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing the orderfor the line of battle; but the signal for close action, hoisted at1 P. M. , was hauled down a half-hour later. Hood, who realised theconditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferencestherefrom, wished the order given for a general chase, which wouldhave applied the spur of emulation to every captain present, withoutsurrendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreetmovements. He bitterly censured the Admiral's failure to issue thiscommand. Had it been done, he said:-- "I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the enemy's ships before dark. Instead of that, he pursued only under his topsails (sometimes his foresail was set and at others his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the afternoon, though the _flying_ enemy had all the sail set their very shattered state would allow. "[123] To make signal for a general chase was beyond the competence of ajunior admiral; but Hood did what he could, by repeated signals toindividual ships of his own division to make more sail, by setting allhe could on the _Barfleur_, and by getting out his boats to towher head round. Sir Gilbert Blane unintentionally gives a similarimpression of laxity. "After cutting the French line, the action during the rest of the day was partial and desultory, the enemy never being able to form, and several of the [our] ships being obliged to lie by and repair their damages. As the signal for the line was now hauled down, every ship annoyed the enemy as their respective commanders judged best. "[124] For this indolent abandonment of the captains to their own devices, the correctest remedy was, as Hood indicated, the order for a generalchase, supplemented by a watchful supervision, which should check theover-rash and stimulate the over-cautious. If Hood's account of thesail carried by Rodney be correct, the Commander-in-Chief did noteven set the best example. In this languid pursuit, the three crippledFrench ships were overhauled, and of course had to strike; and afourth, the _Ardent_, 64, was taken, owing to her indifferent sailing. Towards sunset the flagship _Ville de Paris_, 110, [125] the finestship of war afloat, having been valiantly defended against a host ofenemies throughout great part of the afternoon, and having expendedall her ammunition, hauled down her colours. The two Britishvessels then immediately engaged with her were the _Russell_ andthe _Barfleur_, Hood's flagship, to the latter of which she formallysurrendered; the exact moment, noted in Hood's journal, being 6. 29P. M. At 6. 45 Rodney made the signal for the fleet to bring-to (form lineand stop) on the port tack, and he remained lying-to during the night, while the French continued to retreat under the orders of theMarquis de Vaudreuil, who by de Grasse's capture had becomecommander-in-chief. For this easy-going deliberation also Hood hadstrong words of condemnation. "Why he should bring the fleet to because the _Ville de Paris_ was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under easy sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy in the night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled him to have taken almost every ship the next day. .. . Had I had the honour of commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the 12th, I may, without much imputation of vanity, say the flag of England should now have graced the sterns of _upwards_ of twenty sail of the enemy's ships of the line. "[126] Such criticisms by those not responsible are to be received generallywith caution; but Hood was, in thought and in deed, a man so muchabove the common that these cannot be dismissed lightly. His opinionis known to have been shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's Captainof the Fleet;[127] and their conclusion is supported by the inferencesto be drawn from Rodney's own assumptions as to the condition ofthe French, contrasted with the known facts. The enemy, he wrote, in assigning his reasons for not pursuing, "went off in a _closeconnected body_, [128] and might have defeated, by rotation, the shipsthat had come up with them. " "The enemy _who went off in a body oftwenty-six ships of the line_, [128] might, by ordering two or threeof their best sailing ships or frigates to have shown lights at times, and by changing their course, have induced the British fleet to havefollowed them, while the main of their fleet, by hiding their lights, might have hauled their wind, and have been far to windward bydaylight, and intercepted the captured ships, and the most crippledships of the English;" and he adds that the Windward Islands evenmight have been endangered. That such action was in a remote degreepossible to a well-conditioned fleet may be guardedly conceded; but itwas wildly improbable to a fleet staggering under such a blow as theday had seen, which had changed its commander just as dark came on, and was widely scattered and disordered up to the moment when signalsby flags became invisible. The facts, however, were utterly at variance with these ingenioussuppositions. Instead of being connected, as Rodney represents, deVaudreuil had with him next morning but ten ships; and no othersduring the whole of the 13th. He made sail for Cap François, and wasjoined on the way by five more, so that at no time were there upwardsof fifteen[129] French ships of the line together, prior to hisarrival at that port on April 25th. He there found four others of thefleet. The tale of twenty-five survivors, from the thirty engaged onApril 12th, was completed by six which had gone to Curaçao, and whichdid not rejoin until May. So much for the close connected body of theFrench. It is clear, therefore, that Rodney's reasons illustrate theframe of mind against which Napoleon used to caution his generalsas "making to themselves a picture" of possibilities; and that hisconclusion at best was based upon the ruinous idea, which a vividimagination or slothful temper is prone to present to itself, thatwar may be made decisive without running risks. That Jamaica evenwas saved was not due to this fine, but indecisive battle, but to thehesitation of the allies. When de Vaudreuil reached Cap François, hefound there the French convoy safely arrived from Guadeloupe, and alsoa body of fifteen Spanish ships of the line. The troops available forthe descent upon Jamaica were from fifteen to twenty thousand. Wellmight Hood write: "Had Sir George Rodney's judgment, after the enemyhad been so totally put to flight, borne any proportion to the highcourage, zeal and exertion, so very manifestly shown by every captain, _all_ difficulty would now have been at an end. We might havedone just as we pleased, instead of being at this hour upon thedefensive. "[130] The allies, however, though superior in numbers, did not ventureto assume the offensive. After the battle, Rodney remained nearGuadeloupe until the 17th of April, refitting, and searching theneighbouring islands, in case the French fleet might have entered someone of them. For most of this time the British were becalmed, but Hoodremarks that there had been wind enough to get twenty leagues to thewestward; and there more wind probably would have been found. On the17th Hood was detached in pursuit with ten sail of the line; and aday or two later Rodney himself started for Jamaica. Left to his owndiscretion, Hood pushed for the Mona Passage, between Puerto Rico andSanto Domingo, carrying studding-sails below and aloft in his haste. At daybreak of the 19th he sighted the west end of Puerto Rico; andsoon afterwards a small French squadron was seen. A general chaseresulted in the capture of the _Jason_ and _Caton_, sixty-fours, whichhad parted from their fleet before the battle and were on their way toCap François. A frigate, the _Aimable_, 32, and a sloop, the _Cérès_, 18, also were taken. In reporting this affair to Rodney, Hood got athrust into his superior. "It is a very mortifying circumstance torelate to you, Sir, that the French fleet which you put to flighton the 12th went through the Mona Channel on the 18th, only the daybefore I was in it. "[131] A further proof of the utility of pursuit, here hinted at, is to be found in the fact that Rodney, starting sixdays later than de Vaudreuil, reached Jamaica, April 28th, only threedays after the French got into Cap François. He had therefore gainedthree days in a fortnight's run. What might not have been done by anuntiring chase! But a remark recorded by Hood summed up the frame ofmind which dominated Rodney: "I lamented to Sir George on the 13ththat the signal for a general chase was not made when that for theline was hauled down and that he did not continue to pursue so as tokeep sight of the enemy all night, to which he only answered, 'Come, we have done very handsomely as it is. '"[132] Rodney stayed at Jamaica until the 10th of July, when AdmiralHugh Pigot arrived from England to supersede him. This change wasconsequent upon the fall of Lord North's ministry, in March, 1782, andhad been decided before the news of the victory could reach England. Admiral Keppel now became the head of the Admiralty. Rodney sailed forhome from Port Royal on the 22d of July; and with his departure thewar in the West Indies and North America may be said to have ended. Pigot started almost immediately for New York, and remained inNorth American waters until the end of October, when he returned toBarbados, first having detached Hood with thirteen ships of the linefrom the main fleet, to cruise off Cap François. It is of interest tonote that at this time Hood took with him from New York the frigate_Albemarle_, 28, then commanded by Nelson, who had been serving on theNorth American station. These various movements were dictated by thoseof the enemy, either actually made or supposed to be in contemplation;for it was an inevitable part of the ill-effects of Rodney's mostimperfect success, that the British fleet was thenceforth on thedefensive purely, with all the perplexities of him who waits upon theinitiative of an opponent. Nothing came of them all, however, forthe war now was but lingering in its death stupor. The defeat of deGrasse, partial though it was; the abandonment of the enterprise uponJamaica; the failure of the attack upon Gibraltar; and the success ofHowe in re-victualling that fortress, --these had taken all heart outof the French and Spaniards; while the numerical superiority of theallies, inefficiently though it had been used heretofore, weighedheavily upon the imagination of the British Government, which nowhad abandoned all hope of subduing its American Colonies. Upon theconclusion of peace, in 1783, Pigot and Hood returned to England, leaving the Leeward Islands' Station under the command of Rear-AdmiralSir Richard Hughes, an officer remembered by history only throughNelson's refusing to obey his orders not to enforce the NavigationActs, in 1785. [Footnote 105: James Saumarez, Lord de Saumarez, G. C. B. Born, 1757. Commander, 1781. Captain, 1782. Captain of _Russell_ in Rodney'saction, 1782. Knighted for capture of frigate _Réunion_, 1793. Captainof _Orion_ in Bridport's action, at St. Vincent, and at the Nile (whenhe was second in command). Rear-Admiral and Baronet, 1801. DefeatedFrench and Spaniards off Cadiz, July 12th, 1801. Vice-Admiral, 1805. Vice-Admiral of England and a peer, 1831. Died, 1836. ] [Footnote 106: _Ante_, p. 183. ] [Footnote 107: Probably _Prudent_, 64. There was no _President_ in thefleet. ] [Footnote 108: The times and general movements are put together fromHood's Journal and the Log of the _Canada_, published by the NavyRecords Society. "Letters of Lord Hood, " pp. 64, 86. ] [Footnote 109: When ships were in order of battle, or column, closeto the wind, if they all tacked at the same time they would stillbe ranged on the same line but steering at an angle to it, on theopposite tack. This formation was called bow and quarter line, becauseeach vessel had a comrade off its bow--to one side and ahead--and oneoff its quarter--to one side but astern. The advantage of this, ifheading towards the enemy, was that by tacking again together theywould be at once again in column, or line ahead, the customary orderof battle. ] [Footnote 110: Illustrations of other phases of this battle can befound in Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon History, " pp. 470, 472. ] [Footnote 111: White, "Naval Researches. "] [Footnote 112: Sharp up by the starboard braces, the wind being on thestarboard quarter. This emptied the aftersails of wind, neutralizingtheir effect, and, by causing the ship to move more slowly, kept herlonger abreast an anchored opponent. ] [Footnote 113: White, "Naval Researches. "] [Footnote 114: _Ante_, p. 164. ] [Footnote 115: Seven hundred and twenty feet. For ships of the lineof that day this would make the interval between each two about fourships' length. At five knots speed this distance would be covered insomething over a minute. ] [Footnote 116: Probably not over one or two hundred yards from theenemy. ] [Footnote 117: The position, in the French order, of the ships takenin the battle, is shown by the crosses in Positions 4, 5, 6. ] [Footnote 118: _Canada's_ log, 8. 15; reduced to Hood's times, whichare generally followed. ] [Footnote 119: _Ante_, p. 200 (note). ] [Footnote 120: This mishap occurred to three French vessels. ] [Footnote 121: Ross, "Life of Saumarez, " i. 71. ] [Footnote 122: Circular pieces of wood which cap the top of themasts. ] [Footnote 123: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 103. Navy Records Society. ] [Footnote 124: Mundy, "Life of Rodney, " ii. 234. ] [Footnote 125: She is thus rated in the British Navy Lists publishedbetween the time of her capture and the receipt of news of her loss;but she seems to have carried 120 guns. ] [Footnote 126: Letters of Lord Hood, pp. 103, 104. ] [Footnote 127: See letter of Sir Howard Douglas, son to Sir Charles;"United Service Journal, " 1834, Part II, p. 97. ] [Footnote 128: Author's italics; Mundy, "Life of Rodney, " ii. 248. ] [Footnote 129: Troude. Chevalier says sixteen, differing with. Troudeas to the whereabouts of the _Brave_. ] [Footnote 130: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 136. ] [Footnote 131: Letters of Lord Hood, p. 134. ] [Footnote 132: Ibid. , p. 104. ] CHAPTER XIII HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR 1782 The fall of Lord North's Ministry, besides occasioning the recallof Rodney, drew Lord Howe out of his long retirement, to command theChannel Fleet. He hoisted his flag on the 20th of April, 1782, onboard the _Victory_, 100. Owing to the various directions in whichthe efforts of Great Britain had to be made, either to defend her owninterests or to crush the movements of the many enemies now combinedagainst her, the operations of the Channel fleet were for some monthscarried on by detached squadrons, --in the North Sea, in the Bayof Biscay, and at the entrance of the Channel; Howe having underhim several distinguished subordinates, at the head of whom, inprofessional reputation, were Vice-Admiral Barrington, the captor ofSanta Lucia, and Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt. In the North Sea, the Dutchwere kept in their ports; and a convoy of near 400 merchant shipsfrom the Baltic reached England unmolested. In the Bay of Biscay, Barrington, having with him twelve of the line, discovered and chaseda convoy laden with stores for the fleet in the East Indies. One ofthe ships of the line accompanying it, the _Pégase_, 74, surrendered, after a night action of three hours with the _Foudroyant_, 80, CaptainJohn Jervis, afterwards Earl St. Vincent. Of nineteen transports, thirteen, one of which, the _Actionnaire_, was a 64-gun ship armed_en flûte_, [133] were taken; a weighty blow to the great Suffren, whose chief difficulty in India was inadequate material of war, andespecially of spars, of which the _Actionnaire_ carried an outfit forfour ships of the line. After Barrington's return, Kempenfelt made asimilar but uneventful cruise of a month in the Bay. Howe himself went first to the North Sea in the month of May. Havingthere held the Dutch in check during a critical moment, he wasdirected next to go to the entrance of the Channel, leaving only adivision in the Downs. Information had been received that an alliedfleet of thirty-two ships of the line, five only of which wereFrench, had sailed from Cadiz early in June, to cruise between Ushantand Scilly. It was expected that they would be joined there by areinforcement from Brest, and by the Dutch squadron in the Texel, making a total of about fifty of the line, under the command of theSpanish Admiral, Don Luis de Cordova. The Dutch did not appear, owingprobably to Howe's demonstration before their ports; but eight shipsfrom Brest raised the allied fleet to forty. To oppose these Howesailed on the 2d of July with twenty-two sail, of which eight werethree-deckers. Before his return, in the 7th of August, he was joinedby eight others; mostly, however, sixty-fours. With this inferiorityof numbers the British Admiral could expect only to act on thedefensive, unless some specially favourable opportunity should offer. The matter of most immediate concern was the arrival of the Jamaicaconvoy, then daily expected; with which, it may be mentioned, deGrasse also was returning to England, a prisoner of war on board the_Sandwich_. On its voyage north, the allied fleet captured on June 25th eighteenships of a British convoy bound for Canada. A few days later it wasfixed in the chops of the Channel, covering the ground from Ushantto Scilly. On the evening of July 7th it was sighted off Scilly byHowe, who then had with him twenty-five sail. The allies prepared foraction; but the British Admiral, possessing a thorough knowledge ofthe neighbouring coasts, either in his own person or in some of hisofficers, led the fleet by night to the westward through the passagebetween Scilly and Land's End. On the following morning he was no moreto be seen, and the enemy, ignorant of the manner of his evasion, wasthrown wholly off his track. [134] Howe met the convoy; and a stronggale of wind afterwards forcing the allies to the southward, both itand the fleet slipped by successfully, and reached England. Howe was ordered now to prepare to throw reinforcements and suppliesinto Gibraltar, which had not received relief since Darby's visit, inApril, 1781. For this urgent and critical service it was determinedto concentrate the whole Channel Fleet at Spithead, where also thetransports and supply-ships were directed to rendezvous. It was whilethus assembling for the relief of Gibraltar that there occurred thecelebrated incident of the _Royal George_, a 100-gun ship, whilebeing heeled for under-water repairs, oversetting and sinking at heranchors, carrying down with her Rear-Admiral Kempenfelt and about ninehundred souls, including many women and children. This was on the 29thof August, 1782. On the 11th of September the expedition started, onehundred and eighty-three sail in all; thirty-four being ships of theline, with a dozen smaller cruisers, the rest unarmed vessels. Of thelatter, thirty-one were destined for Gibraltar, the remainder beingtrading ships for different parts of the world. With so extensive acharge, the danger to which had been emphasised by numerous capturesfrom convoys during the war, Howe's progress was slow. It is told thatshortly before reaching Cape Finisterre, but after a violent gale ofwind, the full tally of one hundred eighty-three sail was counted. After passing Finisterre, the several "trades" probably parted fromthe grand fleet. On the 8th of October, off Cape St. Vincent, a frigate was sent aheadfor information. It was known that a great combined force of shipsof war lay in Algeciras Bay, --opposite Gibraltar, --and that an attackupon the works was in contemplation; but much might have happenedmeantime. Much, in fact, had happened. A violent gale of wind onthe 10th of September had driven some of the allied fleet from theirmoorings, one vessel, the _San Miguel_, 72, being forced under thebatteries of Gibraltar, where she had to surrender; but there stillremained the formidable number of forty-eight ships of the line, anchored only four miles from the point which the relief ships mustreach. This was the problem which Howe had to solve. More importantstill, though of less bearing upon his mission, was the cheering newsbrought by the frigate, when she rejoined on October 10th, that thelong-intended attack had been made on the 13th of September, and hadbeen repelled gloriously and decisively. The heavily protected Spanishfloating batteries, from which success had been expected confidently, one and all had been set on fire and destroyed. If Howe couldintroduce his succours, the fortress was saved. The admiral at once summoned his subordinate officers, gave themfull and particular instructions for the momentous undertaking, andissued at the same time, to the masters of the supply-ships, preciseinformation as to local conditions of wind and currents at Gibraltar, to enable them more surely to reach their anchorage. On the 11th ofOctober, being now close to its destination, the fleet bore up forthe Straits, which it entered at noon with a fair westerly wind. Theconvoy went first, --sailing before the wind it was thus to leewardof the fleet, in a position to be defended, --and the ships of warfollowed at some distance in three divisions, one of which was ledby Howe himself. At 6 P. M. The supply-ships were off the mouth ofthe Bay, with a wind fair for the mole; but, through neglect of theinstructions given, all but four missed the entrance, and were sweptto the eastward of the Rock, whither the fleet of course had to followthem. On the 13th the allied fleets came out, being induced to quit theircommanding position at Algeciras by fears for two of their number, which shortly before had been driven to the eastward. During theforenoon of the same day the British were off the Spanish coast, fiftymiles east of Gibraltar. At sunset the allies were seen approaching, and Howe formed his fleet, but sent the supply-ships to anchor atthe Zaffarine Islands, on the coast of Barbary, to await events. Nextmorning the enemy was close to land northward, but visible only fromthe mastheads; the British apparently having headed south during thenight. On the 15th the wind came east, fair for Gibraltar, towardswhich all the British began cautiously to move. By the evening of the16th, eighteen of the convoy were safe at the mole; and on the 18thall had arrived, besides a fireship with 1, 500 barrels of powder, sentin by the Admiral upon the governor's requisition. Throughout thesecritical hours, the combined fleets seem to have been out of sight. Either intentionally or carelessly, they had got to the eastward andthere remained; having rallied their separated ships, but allowedGibraltar to be replenished for a year. On the morning of the 19ththey appeared in the north-east, but the relief was then accomplishedand Howe put out to sea. He was not willing to fight in mid-Straits, embarrassed by currents and the land; but when outside hebrought-to, --stopped, by backing some of the sails, --to allow theenemy to attack if they would, they having the weather-gage. On thefollowing day, the 20th, towards sunset they bore down, and a partialengagement ensued; but it was wholly indecisive, and next day was notrenewed. The British loss was 68 killed and 208 wounded; that of theallies 60 killed and 320 wounded. On the 14th of November the fleetregained Spithead. The services rendered to his country by Howe on this occasion wereeminently characteristic of the special qualities of that greatofficer, in whom was illustrated to the highest degree the solidstrength attainable by a man not brilliant, but most able, who giveshimself heart and soul to professional acquirement. In him, profoundand extensive professional knowledge, which is not inborn but gained, was joined to great natural staying powers; and the combinationeminently fitted him for the part we have seen him play in DelawareBay, at New York, before Rhode Island, in the Channel, and now atGibraltar. The utmost of skill, the utmost of patience, the utmost ofpersistence, such had Howe; and having these, he was particularly aptfor the defensive operations, upon the conduct of which chiefly mustrest his well-deserved renown. A true and noble tribute has been paid by a French officer to thisrelief of Gibraltar:[135]-- "The qualities displayed by Lord Howe during this short campaign rose to the full height of the mission which he had to fulfil. This operation, one of the finest in the War of American Independence, merits a praise equal to that of a victory. If the English fleet was favoured by circumstances, --and it is rare that in such enterprises one can succeed without the aid of fortune--it was above all the Commander-in-Chief's quickness of perception, the accuracy of his judgment, and the rapidity of his decisions, that assured success. " To this well-weighed, yet lofty praise of the Admiral, the same writerhas added words that the British Navy may remember long with pride, as sealing the record of this war, of which the relief of Gibraltarmarked the close in European and American waters. After accordingcredit to the Admiralty for the uniform high speed of the Britishvessels, and to Howe for his comprehension and use of this advantage, Captain Chevalier goes on:-- "Finally, if we may judge by the results, the Commander-in-Chief of the English fleet could not but think himself most happy in his captains. There were neither separations, nor collisions, nor casualties; and there occurred none of those events, so frequent in the experiences of a squadron, which often oblige admirals to take a course wholly contrary to the end they have in view. In contemplation of this unvexed navigation of Admiral Howe, it is impossible not to recall the unhappy incidents which from the 9th to the 12th of April befell the squadron of the Count de Grasse. .. . If it is just to admit that Lord Howe displayed the highest talent, it should be added that he had in his hands excellent instruments. " To quote another French writer: "Quantity disappeared before quality. " [Footnote 133: That is, with a great part of her guns dismounted, andbelow as cargo. ] [Footnote 134: Chevalier, following La Motte-Picquet's report, ascribes Howe's escape to greater speed. ("Mar. Fran. En 1778, " p. 335. ) It must be noted that Howe's object was not merely to escapeeastward, up Channel, by better sailing, but to get to the westward, _past_ the allies, a feat impracticable save by a stratagem such as ismentioned. ] [Footnote 135: Chevalier, "Mar. Fran, dans la Guerre de 1778, " p. 358. ] CHAPTER XIV THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THEBAILLI DE SUFFREN The operations in India, both naval and military, stand by themselves, without direct influence upon transactions elsewhere, and unaffectedalso by these, except in so far as necessary succours were interceptedsometimes in European waters. The cause of this isolation was thedistance of India from Europe; from four to six months being requiredby a fleet for the voyage. [Illustration] Certain intelligence of the war between Great Britain and Francereached Calcutta July 7th, 1778. On the same day the Governor-Generalordered immediate preparations to attack Pondicherry, the principalseaport of the French. The army arrived before the place on the 8thof August, and on the same day Commodore Sir Edward Vernon anchoredin the roads to blockade by sea. A French squadron, under CaptainTronjoly, soon after appearing in the offing, Vernon gave chase, andon the 10th an action ensued. The forces engaged were about equal, theFrench, if anything, slightly superior; a 60-gun ship and four smallervessels being on each side. As the French then went into Pondicherry, the immediate advantage may be conceded to them; but, Vernon returningon the 20th, Tronjoly soon after quitted the roads, and returned tothe Ile de France. [136] From that day the British squadron blockadedclosely, and on the 17th of October Pondicherry capitulated. On the 7th of March, 1779, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes sailedfor the East Indies with a small squadron. The French also sent outoccasional ships; but in 1779 and 1780 these went no further than theIle de France, their naval station in the Indian Ocean. Hughes's forceremained unopposed during those years. The period was critical, forthe British were at war with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore, and with theMahrattas; and all depended upon command of the sea. In January, 1781, when Hughes was wintering at Bombay, the French squadron under Comted'Orves appeared off the Coromandel coast, but, despite Hyder Ali'sentreaties, it refused to coöperate with him. The different spirit ofthe two commanders may be illustrated from contemporary documents. "We have advices from Fort St. George of a French squadron which appeared off that place on January 25, 26, and 27, consisting of 1 seventy-four, 4 sixty-fours, and 2 fifties. They proceeded south without making any attempt on five Indiamen then in the roads, with a number of vessels laden with grain and provisions; the destroying of which might have been easily accomplished, and would have been severely felt. " "On December 8th, off Mangalore, "[137] writes Hughes, "I saw two ships, a large snow, three ketches, and many smaller vessels at anchor in the road with Hyder's flag flying; and, standing close, found them vessels of force and all armed for war. I anchored as close as possible, sent in all armed boats, under cover of three smaller ships of war, which anchored in four fathoms water, close to the enemy's ships. In two hours took and burned the two ships, one of 28 and one of 26 guns, and took or destroyed all the others, save one which, by throwing everything overboard, escaped over the bar into the port. Lost 1 lieutenant and 10 men killed, 2 lieutenants and 51 wounded. " It is interesting to note these evidences of Hughes's conceptions ofnaval warfare and enterprise, common though they were to the Britishservice; for their positive character brings into strong relief thequalities of his next antagonist, Suffren, and his great superiorityin these respects over the average run of French officers of that day. D'Orves returned to the Ile de France. When war with Holland began, the British government decided to attemptthe capture of the Cape of Good Hope. For that object a squadron ofone 74, one 64, and three 50's, with numerous smaller vessels, underCommodore George Johnstone, convoying a considerable body of troops, sailed from England on the 13th of March, 1781, in company with theChannel fleet under Vice-Admiral George Darby, then on its way torelieve Gibraltar. The French government, having timely notice of theexpedition, undertook to frustrate it; detailing for that purposea division of two 74's, and three 64's, under the since celebratedSuffren. [139] These ships left Brest on the 22d of March, with thefleet of de Grasse. They also carried some battalions of troops. On April 11th the British squadron reached Porto Praya, Cape de VerdeIslands. This bay is open to the southward, extending from eastto west about a mile and a half, and is within the limits of thenorth-east trade-winds. Although aware that a French division wason his track, and conscious, by the admissions of his report, thatprotection could not be expected from the neutrality of the place, Johnstone permitted his vessels to anchor without reference to attack. His own flagship, the _Romney_, 50, was so surrounded by others thatshe could fire only with great caution through intervals. On the16th of April, at 9. 30 A. M. , the _Isis_, 50, which was the outermostof the British squadron, signalled eleven sail in the north-east. Fifteen hundred persons were then ashore engaged in watering, fishing, embarking cattle, and amusing themselves. The strangers were Suffren'sdivision. The meeting was not expected by the French commander, whoseobject in entering was simply to complete the water of the ships; buthe determined at once to attack, and hauled round the east point ofthe bay in column, the two seventy-fours at the head, his own ship, the _Héros_, leading with the signal for battle (line ab). Passingthrough, or along, the disordered enemy until he reached the onlyseventy-four among them, he there luffed to the wind, anchoring fivehundred feet from the starboard beam of this vessel (f) which by anodd coincidence bore the same name--_Hero_. From this position he atonce opened fire from both broadsides. His next astern, the _Annibal_(b), brought up immediately ahead of him, but so close that the_Héros_ had to veer cable and drop astern (a), which brought her onthe beam of the _Monmouth_, 64[140] (m). The captain of the _Annibal_had thought the order for battle merely precautionary, and had notcleared for action. He was therefore taken unawares, and his ship didno service proportionate to her force. The third French vessel (c)reached her station, but her captain was struck dead just when aboutto anchor, and in the confusion the anchor was not let go. The shipdrifted foul of a British East Indiaman, which she carried out to sea(c' c"). The two remaining French (d, e) simply cannonaded as theypassed across the bay's mouth, failing through mishap or awkwardnessto reach an effective position. [Illustration] The attack thus became a mere rough and tumble, in which the twoseventy-fours alone sustained the French side. After three quartersof an hour, Suffren, seeing that the attempt had failed, slipped hiscable and put to sea. The _Annibal_ followed, but she had been sodamaged that all her masts went overboard; fortunately, not until herhead was pointed out of the harbour. Johnstone, thus luckily escapingthe consequences of his neglect, now called his captains together tolearn the condition of their ships, and then ordered them to cut theircables and pursue. All obeyed except Captain Sutton of the _Isis_, whorepresented that the spars and rigging of his ship could not bear sailat once. Johnstone then ordered him to come out anyhow, which he did, and his fore topmast shortly went overboard. The disability of thisship so weighed upon the Commodore that his pursuit was exceedinglysluggish; and the French kept drawing him away to leeward, the_Annibal_ having got a bit of canvas on a jury foremast. Night, therefore, was falling as Johnstone came near them; the _Isis_ and_Monmouth_ were two or three miles astern; the sea was increasing;if he got much further to leeward, he could not get back; he hadforgotten to appoint a rendezvous where the convoy might rejoin; anight action, he considered, was not to be thought of. Yet, if helet the enemy go, they might anticipate him at the Cape. In short, Johnstone underwent the "anguish" of an undecided man in a "cruelsituation, "[141] and of course decided to run no risks. He returnedtherefore to Porto Praya, put the captain of the _Isis_ under arrest, and remained in port for a fortnight. Suffren hurried on to the Cape, got there first, landed his troops, and secured the colony againstattack. Johnstone arrived in the neighbourhood some time later, and, finding himself anticipated, turned aside to Saldanha Bay, wherehe captured five Dutch East Indiamen. He then sent the _Hero_, _Monmouth_, and _Isis_ on to India, to reinforce Hughes, and himselfwent back to England. No accusation of misbehavior lies against any of the Britishsubordinates in this affair of Porto Praya. The captain of the _Isis_was brought to a court-martial, and honourably acquitted of allthe charges. The discredit of the surprise was not redeemed by anyexhibition of intelligence, energy, or professional capacity, on thepart of the officer in charge. It has been said that he never hadcommanded a post-ship[142] before he was intrusted with this veryimportant mission, and it is reasonably sure that his selection forit was due to attacks made by him upon the professional conductof Keppel and Howe, when those admirals were at variance with theadministration. [143] His preposterous mismanagement, therefore, wasprobably not wholly bitter to the Navy at large. In the British shipsof war, the entire loss in men, as reported, was only 9 killed, 47wounded. Several casualties from chance shots occurred on board theconvoy, bringing up the total to 36 killed and 130 wounded. The Frenchadmit 105 killed and 204 wounded, all but 19 being in the _Héros_ and_Annibal_. Although precipitated by Suffren, the affair clearly wasas great a surprise to his squadron as to the British. Therefore, thelatter, being already at anchor and more numerous as engaged, had adistinct advantage; to which also contributed musketry fire from thetransports. Nevertheless, the result cannot be deemed creditable tothe French captains or gunnery. Suffren remained in the neighbourhood of the Cape for two months. Then, having seen the colony secure, independent of his squadron, hedeparted for the Ile de France, arriving there October 25th. On the17th of December the whole French force, under the command of d'Orves, sailed for the Coromandel coast. On the way the British 50-gun ship_Hannibal_, Captain Alexander Christie, was taken. On the 9th ofFebruary, 1782, Comte d'Orves died, and Suffren found himself atthe head of twelve ships of the line: three 74's, seven 64's and two50's. [144] On the 15th Hughes's fleet was sighted, under the guns ofMadras. It numbered nine of the line: two 74's, one 68, five 64's, andone 50. Suffren stood south towards Pondicherry, which had passed intothe power of Hyder Ali. After nightfall Hughes got under way, and alsosteered south. He feared for Trincomalee, in Ceylon, recently a Dutchport, which the British had captured on the 5th of January. It was avaluable naval position, as yet most imperfectly defended. [Illustration] At daylight the British saw the French squadron twelve miles east (A, A) and its transports nine miles south-west (c). Hughes chased thelatter and took six. Suffren pursued, but could not overtake beforesunset, and both fleets steered south-east during the night. Nextmorning there were light north-north-east airs, and the French weresix miles north-east of the British (B, B). The latter formed lineon the port tack (a), heading to seaward; Hughes hoping that thus theusual sea-breeze would find him to windward. The breeze, however, didnot make as expected; and, as the north-east puffs were bringing theenemy down, he kept off before the wind (b) to gain time for his shipsto close their intervals, which were too great. At 4 P. M. The nearapproach of the French compelled him to form line again, (C), on theport tack, heading easterly. The rear ship, _Exeter_, 64 (e), was leftseparated, out of due support from those ahead. Suffren, leading onesection of his fleet in person, passed to windward of the Britishline, from the rear, as far as Hughes's flagship, which was fifth fromthe van. There he stopped, and kept at half cannon-shot, to preventthe four ships in the British van from tacking to relieve theirconsorts. It was his intention that the second half of his fleetshould attack the other side of the English rear. This plan ofintended battle is shown by the figure D in the diagram. Actually, only two of the French rear did what Suffren expected, engaging toleeward of the extreme British rear; the others of the French rearremaining long out of action (C). The figure C shows the imperfectachievement of the design D. However, as the position of Suffren'sflagship prevented the British van from tacking into action, the netresult was, to use Hughes's own words, that "the enemy brought eightof their best ships to the attack of five of ours. " It will be notedwith interest that these were exactly the numbers engaged in the firstact of the battle of the Nile. The _Exeter_ (like the _Guerrier_at the Nile) received the fresh broadsides of the first five of theenemy, and then remained in close action on both sides, assailed bytwo, and at last by three, opponents, --two 50's, and one 64. When thethird approached, the master of the ship asked Commodore Richard King, whose broad pennant flew at her masthead, "What is to be done?" "Thereis nothing to be done, " replied King, "but to fight her till shesinks. " Her loss, 10 killed and 45 wounded, was not creditable underthe circumstances to the French gunnery, which had been poor also atPorto Praya. At 6 P. M. The wind shifted to south-east, throwing allon the other tack, and enabling the British van at last to come intoaction. Darkness now approaching, Suffren hauled off and anchored atPondicherry. Hughes went on to Trincomalee to refit. The British losshad been 32 killed, among whom were Captain William Stevens of theflagship, and Captain Henry Reynolds, of the _Exeter_, and 83 wounded. The French had 30 killed; the number of their wounded is put byProfessor Laughton at 100. On the 12th of March Hughes returned to Madras, and towards the endof the month sailed again for Trincomalee carrying reinforcements andsupplies. On the 30th he was joined at sea by the _Sultan_, 74, andthe _Magnanime_, 64, just from England. Suffren had remained on thecoast from reasons of policy, to encourage Hyder Ali in his leaningto the French; but, after landing a contingent of troops on the 22d ofMarch, to assist at the siege of the British port of Cuddalore, he putto sea on the 23d, and went south, hoping to intercept the _Sultan_and _Magnanime_ off the south end of Ceylon. On the 9th of Aprilhe sighted the British fleet to the south and west of him. Hughes, attaching the first importance to the strengthening of Trincomalee, had resolved neither to seek nor to shun action. He thereforecontinued his course, light northerly airs prevailing, until the 11th, when, being about fifty miles to the north-east of his port, he boreaway for it. Next morning, April 12th, finding that the enemy couldovertake his rear ships, he formed line on the starboard tack, attwo cables' intervals, heading to the westward, towards the coastof Ceylon, wind north by east, and the French dead to windward (A, A). Suffren drew up his line (a) on the same tack, parallel to theBritish, and at 11 A. M. Gave the signal to steer west-south-west alltogether; his vessels going down in a slanting direction (bb'), eachto steer for one of the enemy. Having twelve ships to eleven, thetwelfth was ordered to place herself on the off side of the rearBritish, which would thus have two antagonists. In such simultaneous approach it commonly occurred that the attackingline ceased to be parallel with the foe's, its van becoming nearer andrear more distant. So it was here. Further, the British opening fireas soon as the leading French were within range, the latter at oncehauled up to reply. Suffren, in the centre, wishing closest action, signalled them to keep away again, and himself bore down wrathfullyupon Hughes to within pistol-shot; in which he was supported closelyby his next ahead and the two next astern. The rear of the French, though engaged, remained too far distant. Their line, therefore, resembled a curve, the middle of which--four or five ships--wastangent to the British centre (B). At this point the heat of theattack fell upon Hughes's flagship, the _Superb_, 74 (C, d), and hernext ahead, the _Monmouth_, 64. Suffren's ship, the _Héros_, havingmuch of her rigging cut, could not shorten sail, shot by the _Superb_, and brought up abreast the _Monmouth_. The latter, already hotlyengaged by one of her own class, and losing her main and mizzen mastsin this unequal new contest, was forced at 3 P. M. To bear up out ofthe line (m). The place of the _Héros_ alongside the _Superb_ wastaken by the _Orient_, 74, supported by the _Brillant_, 64; and whenthe _Monmouth_ kept off, the attack of these two ships was reinforcedby the half-dozen stern chasers of the _Héros_, which had drifted intothe British line, and now fired into the _Superb's_ bows. The conflictbetween these five ships, two British and three French, was one of thebloodiest in naval annals; the loss of the _Superb_, 59 killed and 96wounded, and of the _Monmouth_, 45 killed and 102 wounded, equallingthat of the much larger vessels which bore the flags of Nelson andCollingwood at Trafalgar. The loss of the three French was 52 killedand 142 wounded; but to this should be added properly that of the_Sphinx_, 64, the _Monmouth's_ first adversary: 22 killed and 74wounded. At 3. 40 P. M. , fearing that if he continued steering west hewould get entangled with the shore, Hughes wore his ships, formingline on the port tack, heading off shore. The French also wore, andSuffren hoped to secure the _Monmouth_, which was left between the twolines; but the quickness of a British captain, Hawker, of the _Hero_, ran a tow-rope to her in time, and she was thus dragged out of danger. At 5. 40 Hughes anchored, and Suffren did the same at 8 P. M. The totalBritish loss in men on this occasion was 137 killed and 430 wounded;that of the French 137 killed, and 357 wounded. [Illustration] The exhausted enemies remained at anchor in the open sea, two milesapart, for a week, repairing. On the 19th of April the French gotunder way and made a demonstration before the British, invitingbattle, yet not attacking; but the condition of the _Monmouth_ forbadeHughes from moving. Suffren therefore departed to Batacalo, in Ceylon, south of Trincomalee, where he covered his own convoys from Europe, and flanked the approach of his adversary's. Hughes, on the 22d ofApril, got into Trincomalee, where he remained till June 23d. He thenwent to Negapatam, formerly a Dutch possession, but then held by theBritish. There he learned that Suffren, who meanwhile had capturedseveral British transports, was a few miles north of him, atCuddalore, which had surrendered to Hyder Ali on April 4th. On the 5thof July, at 1 P. M. , the French squadron appeared. At 3 P. M. Hughesput to sea, and stood south during the night to gain the wind, --thesouth-west monsoon now blowing. Next morning, at daylight, the French were seen at anchor, seven oreight miles to leeward. At 6 A. M. They began to get under way. One oftheir sixty-fours, the _Ajax_, had lost her main and mizzen topmastsin a violent squall on the previous afternoon, and was not in theline. There were therefore eleven ships on each side. The action, known as that of Negapatam, began shortly before 11, when both fleetswere on the starboard tack, heading south-south-east, wind south-west. The British being to windward, Hughes ordered his fleet to bear uptogether to the attack, exactly as Suffren had done on the 12th ofApril. As commonly happened, the rear got less close than the van(Position I). The fourth ship in the French order, the _Brillant_, 64(a), losing her mainmast early, dropped to leeward of the line, (a'), and astern of her place (a"). At half-past noon the wind flew suddenlyto south-south-east, --the sea-breeze, --taking the ships a little onthe port bow. Most of them, on both sides, paid off from the enemy, the British to starboard, the French to port; but between the mainlines, which were in the momentary confusion consequent upon suchan incident, were left six ships--four British and two French--thathad turned the other way (Positions II and III). [145] These were the_Burford_, _Sultan_ (s), _Worcester_, and _Eagle_, fourth, fifth, eighth and tenth, in the British order; and the _Sévère_ (b), thirdin the French, with the dismasted _Brillant_, which was now towardsthe rear of the fight (a). Under these conditions, the _Sévère_, 64, underwent a short but close action with the _Sultan_, 74; and withtwo other British ships, according to the report of the _Sévère's_captain. The remainder of the incident shall be given in the latter'sown words. "Seeing the French squadron drawing off, --for all the ships except the _Brillant_ had fallen off on the other tack, --Captain de Cillart thought it useless to prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled down. The ships engaged with him immediately ceased their fire, and the one on the starboard side moved away. At this moment the _Sévère_ fell off to starboard, and her sails filled. Captain de Cillart then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones which remained manned, and he rejoined his squadron. " When the _Sévère's_ flag came down, Suffren was approaching with hisflagship. The _Sultan_ wore to rejoin her fleet, and was raked by the_Sévère_ in so doing. The _Brillant_, whose mainmast had been shotaway in conflict with either the _Sultan_ or the _Burford_, both muchheavier ships, had at this later phase of the fight fallen under theguns of the _Worcester_ and the _Eagle_. Her captain, de Saint-Félix, was one of the most resolute of Suffren's officers. She was rescued bythe flagship, but she had lost 47 killed and 136 wounded, --an almostincredible slaughter, being over a third of the usual complement of asixty-four; and Suffren's ships were undermanned. These spirited episodes, and the fact that his four separated shipswere approaching the enemy, and being approached by them, causedHughes to give the orders to wear, and for a general chase; the flagfor the line being hauled down. These signals would bring all the mainbody to the support of the separated ships, without regard to theirorder in battle, and therefore with the utmost expedition that theirremaining sail power would admit. Two of the fleet, however, madesignals of disability; so Hughes annulled the orders, and at 1. 30formed on the port tack, recalling the engaged vessels. Both squadronsnow stood in shore, and anchored at about 6 P. M. ; the British nearNegapatam, the French some ten miles north. The loss in the actionhad been: British, 77 killed, 233 wounded; French, 178 killed, 601wounded. On the following day Suffren sailed for Cuddalore. There he receivedword that two ships of the line--the _Illustre_, 74, and _St. Michel_, 60, with a convoy of supplies and 600 troops--were to be expectedshortly at Pointe de Galle, then a Dutch port, on the south-west sideof Ceylon. It was essential to cover these, and on the 18th he wasready for sea; but the necessity of an interview with Hyder Alidelayed him until the 1st of August, when he started for Batacalo. On the 9th he arrived there, and on the 21st the reinforcement joinedhim. Within forty-eight hours the supply-ships were cleared, andthe squadron sailed again with the object of taking Trincomalee. On the 25th he was off the port, and, the operation being pushedenergetically, the place capitulated on the 31st of August. It is difficult to resist the impression that greater energy onHughes's part might have brought him up in time to prevent thismishap. He reached Madras only on July 20th, a fortnight after thelate action; and he did not sail thence until the 20th of August, notwithstanding that he apprehended an attempt upon Trincomalee. Hence, when he arrived there on the 2d of September, not only hadit passed into the hands of the enemy, but Suffren had reëmbarkedalready the men and the guns that had been landed from his fleet. When Hughes's approach was signalled, all preparations for sea werehastened, and the following morning, at daybreak, the French came out. Hughes had been joined since the last action by the _Sceptre_, 64, so that the respective forces in the action fought off Trincomalee onSeptember 3d were twelve of the line to fourteen, viz. : British, three74's, one 70, one 68, six 64's, one 50; French, four 74's, seven 64's, one 60, two 50's. Suffren had also put into the line a 36-gun ship, the _Consolante_. [146] While the French were getting underway from Trincomalee, the Britishfleet was standing south-south-east towards the entrance, close-hauledon the starboard tack, a fresh south-west monsoon blowing. WhenHughes made out the hostile flags on the works, he kept away fourpoints, [147] and steered east-south-east, still in column, under shortcanvas (A). Suffren pursued, being to windward yet astern, with hisfleet on a line of bearing; that is, the line on which the ships wereranged was not the same as the course which they were steering. Thisformation, (A), wherein the advance is oblique to the front, isvery difficult to maintain. Wishing to make the action, whatever theimmediate event, decisive in results, by drawing the French well toleeward of the port, Hughes, who was a thorough seaman and had goodcaptains, played with his eager enemy. "He kept avoiding me withouttaking flight, " wrote Suffren; "or rather, he fled in good order, regulating his canvas by his worst sailers; and, keeping off bydegrees, he steered from first to last ten or twelve differentcourses. " Hughes, on his part, while perfectly clear as to hisown object, was somewhat perplexed by the seeming indecision of anadversary whose fighting purpose he knew by experience. "Sometimesthey edged down, " he wrote; "sometimes they brought-to; in no regularorder, as if undetermined what to do. " These apparent vacillationswere due to the difficulty of maintaining the line of bearing, whichwas to be the line of battle; and this difficulty was the greater, because Hughes was continually altering his course and Suffren's shipswere of unequal speed. At length, at 2 P. M. , being then twenty-five miles south-east of theport, the French drew near enough to bear down. That this movementmight be carried out with precision, and all the vessels come intoaction together, Suffren caused his fleet to haul to the wind, on thestarboard tack, to rectify the order. This also being done poorly andslowly, he lost patience, --as Nelson afterwards said, "A day is soonlost in manoeuvring, "--and at 2. 30, to spur on the laggard ships, the French admiral gave the signal to attack, (a), specifyingpistol-range. Even this not sufficing to fetch the delinquentspromptly into line with the flagship, the latter fired a gun toenforce obedience. Her own side being still turned towards theBritish, as she waited, the report was taken by the flagship's menbelow decks to be the signal for opening fire, and her whole broadsidewas discharged. This example was followed by the other ships, so thatthe engagement, instead of being close, was begun at half cannon-shot. [Illustration] Owing to his measured and deliberate retreat, Hughes had his fleetnow in thoroughly good shape, well aligned and closed-up. The French, starting from a poor formation to perform a difficult evolution, under fire, engaged in utter disorder (B). Seven ships, prematurelyrounding-to to bring their broadsides to the enemy, and fore-reaching, formed a confused group (v), much to windward and somewhat aheadof the British van. Imperfectly deployed, they interfered with oneanother and their fire consequently could not be adequately developed. In the rear a somewhat similar condition existed. Suffren, expectingthe bulk of his line to fight the British to windward, had directedthe _Vengeur_, 64, and the _Consolante_, 36, to double to leewardon the extreme rear; but they, finding that the weather sides of theenemy were not occupied, feared to go to leeward, lest they should becut off. They attacked the rear British ship, the _Worcester_, 64 (w), to windward; but the _Monmouth_, 64 (m), dropping down to her support, and the _Vengeur_ catching fire in the mizzen top, they were compelledto haul off. Only Suffren's own ship, the _Héros_, 74 (a), and hernext astern, the _Illustre_, 74, (i), came at once to close actionwith the British centre; but subsequently the _Ajax_, 64, succeedingin clearing herself from the snarl in the rear, took station ahead (j)of the _Héros_. Upon these three fell the brunt of the fight. They notonly received the broadsides of the ships immediately opposed to them, but, the wind having now become light yet free, the British vesselsahead and astern, (h, s, ) by luffing or keeping off, played also uponthem. "The enemy formed a semicircle around us, " wrote Suffren's chiefof staff, "and raked us ahead and astern, as the ship came up andfell off with the helm to leeward. " The two seventy-fours were crushedunder this fire. Both lost their main and mizzen masts in the courseof the day, and the foretopmast of the flagship also fell. The _Ajax_, arriving later, and probably drawing less attention, had only atopmast shot away. The British total of killed and wounded was very evenly distributedthroughout the fleet. Only the rear ship lost an important spar, --themain topmast. It was upon her, as already mentioned, and upon the twoleading ships, the _Exeter_ and _Isis_, that fell the heaviest fire, proportionately, of the French. From the position of the seven vanships of the latter, such fire as they could make must needs be uponthe extreme British van, and the _Exeter_ was forced to leave theline. The loss of the French that day was 82 killed and 255wounded; of which 64 killed and 178 wounded belonged to the _Héros_, _Illustre_, and _Ajax_. The British had 51 killed and 283 wounded; thegreatest number of casualties in one ship being 56. Singularly enough, in such a small list of deaths, three were commanding officers:Captains Watt of the _Sultan_, Wood of the _Worcester_, and Lumley ofthe _Isis_. At 5. 30 P. M. The wind shifted suddenly from south-west toeast-south-east (C). The British wore together, formed on the othertack, and continued the fight. It was during this final act, and at6 P. M. , that the mainmast of the French flagship came down. The vanships of the French had towed their heads round with boats before4, in order to come to the support of the centre, in obedience to asignal from Suffren; but the light airs and calms had retarded them. With the shift they approached, and passed in column (c) between theircrippled vessels and the enemy. This manoeuvre, and the failure ofdaylight, brought the battle to an end. According to Hughes's report, several of his fleet "were making much water from shot-holes so verylow down in the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually stopped;and the whole had suffered severely in their masts and rigging. "Trincomalee being in the enemy's possession, and the east coast ofCeylon an unsafe anchorage now, at the change of the monsoon, hefelt compelled to return to Madras, where he anchored on the 9th ofSeptember. Suffren regained Trincomalee on the 7th of the month, butthe _Orient_, 74, running ashore at the entrance and being lost, heremained outside until the 17th, saving material from the wreck. The break-up of the south-west monsoon, then at hand, is apt to beaccompanied by violent hurricanes, and is succeeded by the north-eastmonsoon, during which the east coasts of the peninsula and of Ceylongive a lee shore, with heavy surf. Naval operations, therefore, weresuspended for the winter. During that season Trincomalee is the onlysecure port. Deprived of it, Hughes determined to go to Bombay, andfor that purpose left Madras on the 17th of October. Four days latera reinforcement of five ships of the line arrived from England, under Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, who at once followed theCommander-in-Chief to the west coast. In the course of December theentire British force was united at Bombay. In Trincomalee Suffren had a good anchorage; but the insufficiencyof its resources, with other military considerations, decided him towinter at Acheen, at the west end of Sumatra. He arrived there onthe 2d of November, having first paid a visit to Cuddalore, where the_Bizarre_, 64, was wrecked by carelessness. On the 20th of December heleft Acheen for the Coromandel coast, having shortened his stay to theeastward for reasons of policy. On the 8th of January, 1783, he wasoff Ganjam, on the Orissa coast, and thence reached Trincomalee againon the 23d of February. There he was joined on the 10th of March bythree ships of the line from Europe: two 74's and one 64. Under theirconvoy came General de Bussy, with twenty-five hundred troops, whichwere at once despatched to Cuddalore. On the 10th of April Vice-Admiral Hughes, returning from Bombay, passed Trincomalee on the way to Madras, The various maritimeoccurrences, wrecks and reinforcements, since the battle of September3d had reversed the naval odds, and Hughes now had eighteen shipsof the line, one of which was an eighty, opposed to fifteen underSuffren. Another important event in the affairs of India was the deathof Hyder Ali, on the 7th of December, 1782. Although his policy wascontinued by his son, Tippoo Saib, the blow to the French was serious. Under all the conditions, the British authorities were emboldenedto attempt the reduction of Cuddalore. The army destined to thisenterprise marched from Madras, passed round Cuddalore, and encampedsouth of it by the shore. The supply-ships and lighter cruisersanchored near, while the fleet cruised to the southward. Being thereto windward, for the south-west monsoon had then set in, it coveredthe operations against disturbance from the sea. Towards the beginning of June the investment of the place was completeby land and by water. Intelligence of this state of things was broughton the 10th of June to Suffren, who by Bussey's direction was keepinghis inferior fleet in Trincomalee until its services should beabsolutely indispensable. Immediately upon receiving the news he leftport, and on the 13th sighted the British fleet, then at anchor offPorto Novo, a little south of Cuddalore. Upon his approach Hughesmoved off, and anchored again five miles from the besieged place. Forthe next two days the French were baffled by the winds; but on the17th the south-west monsoon resumed, and Suffren again drew near. The British Vice-Admiral, not caring to accept action at anchor, got under way, and from that time till the 20th remained outside, trying to obtain the weather-gage, in which he was frustrated by thevariableness of the winds. Meanwhile Suffren had anchored near thetown, communicated with the general, and, being very short of men atthe guns, had embarked twelve hundred troops for his expected battle;for it was evident that the issue of the siege would turn upon thecontrol of the sea. On the 18th he weighed again, and the two fleetsmanoeuvred for the advantage, with light baffling airs, the Britishfurthest from shore. On the 20th of June, the wind holding at west with unexpectedconstancy, Hughes decided to accept the attack which Suffren evidentlyintended. The latter, being distinctly inferior in force, --fifteento eighteen, --probably contemplated an action that should be decisiveonly as regarded the fate of Cuddalore; that is, one which, while notresulting in the capture or destruction of ships, should compel hisopponent to leave the neighbourhood to repair damages. The Britishformed line on the port tack, heading to the northward. Suffren rangedhis fleet in the same manner, parallel to the enemy, and was carefulto see the order exact before bearing down. When the signal to attackwas given, the French kept away together, and brought-to again onthe weather beam of the British, just within point-blank range. Theaction lasted from shortly after 4 P. M. To nearly 7, and was generalthroughout both lines; but, as always experienced, the rears wereless engaged than the centres and vans. No ship was taken; no veryimportant spars seem to have been shot away. The loss of the Britishwas 99 killed, 434 wounded; of the French, 102 killed, 386 wounded. As the ships' heads were north, the course of the action carried themin that direction. Suffren anchored next morning twenty-five milesnorth of Cuddalore. There he was sighted on the 22d by Hughes, who hadremained lying-to the day after the fight. The British Vice-Admiralreported several ships much disabled, a great number of hismen--1, 121--down with scurvy, and the water of the fleet very short. He therefore thought it necessary to go to Madras, where he anchoredon the 25th. Suffren regained Cuddalore on the afternoon of the 23d. His return and Hughes's departure completely changed the militarysituation. The supply-ships, upon which the British scheme ofoperations depended, had been forced to take flight when Suffren firstapproached, and of course could not come back now. "My mind is on therack without a moment's rest since the departure of the fleet, " wrotethe commanding general on the 25th, "considering the character of M. De Suffren, and the infinite superiority on the part of the French nowthat we are left to ourselves. " [Illustration] The battle of June 20th, 1783, off Cuddalore, was the last of themaritime war of 1778. It was fought, actually, exactly five monthsafter the preliminaries of peace had been signed on January 20th, 1783. Although the relative force of the two fleets remainedunchanged, it was a French victory, both tactically and strategically:tactically, because the inferior fleet held its ground, and remainedin possession of the field; strategically, because it decided theobject immediately at stake, the fate of Cuddalore, and with it, momentarily at least, the issue of the campaign. It was, however, thetriumph of one commander-in-chief over another; of the greater manover the lesser. Hughes's reasons for quitting the field involve theadmission of his opponent's greater skill. "Short of water, "--witheighteen ships to fifteen, able therefore to spare ships bydetachments for watering, that should not have happened; "injury tospars, "--that resulted from the action; "1, 121 men short, "--Suffrenhad embarked just that number--1, 200--because Hughes let himcommunicate with the port without fighting. Notwithstanding themuch better seamanship of the British subordinates, and their doggedtenacity, Suffren here, as throughout the campaign, demonstrated againthe old experience that generalship is the supreme factor in war. Withinferior resources, though not at first with inferior numbers, bya steady offensive, and by the attendant anxiety about Trincomaleeimpressed upon the British admiral, he reduced him to a fruitlessdefensive. By the seizure of that place as a base he planted himselffirmly upon the scene of action. Able thus to remain, while theBritish had to retire to Bombay, he sustained the Sultan of Mysorein his embarrassing hostility to the British; and in the end he savedCuddalore by readiness and dexterity despite the now superior numbersof the British fleet. He was a great sea-captain, Hughes was not; andwith poorer instruments, both in men and ships, the former overcamethe latter. On the 29th of June a British frigate, the _Medea_, bearing a flag oftruce, reached Cuddalore. She brought well-authenticated intelligenceof the conclusion of peace; and hostilities ceased by common consent. [Footnote 136: Now Mauritius. ] [Footnote 137: On the Malabar--western--coast. ] [Footnote 139: See _ante_, p. 163. ] [Footnote 140: I infer, from the accounts, that the _Monmouth_ waswell east of the _Hero_, that the French had passed her first, andthat the _Héros_ was now on her port beam; but this point is notcertain. ] [Footnote 141: Expressions in Johnstone's Report. ] [Footnote 142: Charnock, however, says that in 1762, immediately afterreceiving his post-commission, he commanded in succession the _Hind_, 20, and the _Wager_, 20. Moreover, before his appointment to theexpedition of 1781, he had been Commodore on the Lisbon Station. Buthe had spent comparatively little time at sea as a captain. --W. L. C. ] [Footnote 143: See _ante_, pp. 79, 80. ] [Footnote 144: One being the captured British _Hannibal_, 50, whichwas commissioned by Captain Morard de Galles, retaining the Englishform of the name, Hannibal, to distinguish her from the _Annibal_, 74, already in the squadron. ] [Footnote 145: In the plan, Positions II and III, the second positionis indicated by ships with broken outlines. These show the twolines of battle in the engagement until the wind shifted tosouth-south-east. The results of the shift constituted a thirdposition, consecutive with the second, and is indicated by ships infull outline. ] [Footnote 146: Previously the British East Indiaman, _Elizabeth_. ] [Footnote 147: Forty-five degrees. ] GLOSSARY OF NAUTICAL AND NAVAL TERMS USED IN THE TEXT (_This glossary is intended to cover only the technical expressionsactually used in the book itself. _) ABACK. A sail is aback when the wind blows on the forward part tendingto move the vessel astern. ABAFT. Behind, towards the stern. ABEAM. }ABREAST. } See "Bearing. " AFT. See "Bearing. " AHEAD. See "Bearing. " ASTERN. See "Bearing. " BEAM. The width of a vessel, so used because of the cross timbers, called beams. BEAR, to. To be in a specified direction from a vessel. BEAR, to. To change the direction of a vessel's movement. To bear _down_, to move towards; to bear _up_, or _away_, to move away, from the wind or from an enemy. BEARING. The direction of an object from a vessel; either by compass, or with reference to the vessel itself. Thus, the lighthouse bearsnorth; the enemy bears abeam, or two points off the port bow. BEARING, Line of. The compass bearing on which the vessels of a fleetare ranged, whatever their bearings from one another. BEARINGS, with reference to the vessel. Abeam. } Abreast. } Perpendicular to the vessel's length. Aft. } Directly behind. Astern. } Ahead. Directly before; forward. Abaft the beam, starboard or port, weather or lee. To the rear of abeam, to the right or left, to windward or to leeward. Before (or forward of) the beam (as above). Ahead of abeam, etc. Broad. A large angle of bearing, used ordinarily of the bow. "Broad off the bow" approaches "before the beam. " On the bow, starboard or port, weather or lee. To one side of ahead, to right or left, to windward or to leeward. On the quarter, starboard or port, weather or lee. To one side of astern; to right or left, to windward or to leeward. BEARINGS, by compass. The full circle of the compass, 360 degrees, is divided into thirty-two _points_, each point being subdivided intofourths. From north to east, eight points, are thus named: North;north by east; north-northeast; northeast by north; northeast;northeast by east; east-northeast; east by north; East. From East to South, from South to West, and from West to North, a like naming is used. BEAT, to. To gain ground to windward, by successive changes ofdirection, called tacks. BOOM. See "Spars. " BOW, or head. The forward part of a vessel, which is foremost when inmotion ahead. On the Bow. See "Bearing. " To head "bows-on": to move directly towards. BOW AND QUARTER LINE. See pp. 84, 200. BOWSPRIT. See "Spars. " BRACES. Ropes by which the yards are turned, so that the wind maystrike the sails in the manner desired. BRING-TO. To bring a vessel's head as near as possible to thedirection from which the wind blows; usually with a view toheaving-to, that is, stopping. See heave-to and luff. BROADSIDE. The whole number of guns carried on one side of a vessel;starboard or port broadside, weather or lee broadside. CABLE. The heavy rope which was attached to the anchor, and held theship to it. Cables are now chains, but in the period of this bookwere always hemp. To veer cable, to let more out, to let the shipgo farther from the anchor. To slip the cable, to let it all gooverboard, releasing the vessel. Cable's length: 120 fathoms. CHASE, General. A chase by a fleet, in which, in order to more rapidadvance, the places of the vessels in their usual order are not to beobserved. CLOSE-HAULED. See "Course. " COLUMN. See "Line Ahead. " COME UP. A ship comes up, when her bow comes more nearly to thedirection of the wind. Used generally when the movement proceeds fromsome other cause than the movement of the helm. See "Luff. " CONVOY. A body of unarmed or weakly armed vessels, in company withships of war. CONVOY, to. To accompany a number of unarmed vessels, for theirprotection. COURSE. The direction of a vessel's movement, with regard to thecompass or to the wind. Compass course. The point of the compass towards which the vessel heads. Wind courses: Close-hauled. As nearly in the direction from which the wind blows as is compatible with keeping the sails full; for square-rigged vessels six points. (See "Bearings by Compass. ") For a north wind, the close-hauled courses are east-northeast and west-northwest. Free. Not close-hauled. Large. Very free. Off the wind. Free. On (or by) the wind. Close-hauled. COURSES. The lowest sails on the fore and main masts. CRUISE, to. To cover a certain, portion of sea by movement back andforth over it. CRUISER. A general term for armed ships, but applied more specificallyto those not "of the line, " which therefore are more free and wider intheir movements. CURRENT. Lee Current. One the movement of which is away from the wind. Weather Current. One which sets towards the wind. EBB, ebb-tide. See "Tide. " FAIR, wind. A wind which allows a vessel to head her desired compasscourse. FALL OFF. A vessel falls off, when, without the action of the helm, her head moves away from the wind. See "Come up. " FILL. } Sails are said to fill, or to be full, when the windFULL. } strikes the rear side, tending to move the vessel ahead. FLOOD, flood tide. See "Tide. " FORE AND AFT. In classification of vessels, indicates those whosesails, when set, stretch from forward aft; more nearly lengthwise thanacross. Opposite to square-rigged. FOREMAST, fore-topmast, etc. See "Spars. " FORESAIL, fore-topsail, etc. See "Sails. " FOUL, to. To entangle, to collide. A foul anchor, when the cable getsround the anchor. FOUL, wind. A wind which prevents the vessel heading the desiredcompass course, compelling her to beat. FREE, wind. A wind which allows the vessel to head the coursedesired. The amount to spare from the close-hauled course is sometimesdesignated. E. G. , the wind four points free; the wind would allow thevessel to come four points nearer the wind than her course requires. FRIGATE. See "Vessel. " GAGE, weather and lee. A vessel, or fleet, is said to have the weathergage, when it is to windward of its opponent. Lee is opposite toweather. HAUL, to. To haul (to) the wind is to change the course to thatnearest the direction whence the wind comes. To haul down the colors: to strike, to surrender. HEAVE DOWN. To incline a vessel on one side, by purchases at the lowermastheads. HEAVE-TO. (HOVE-TO. ) To bring-to, (which see), and then to lay somesails aback, in order to keep the ship without movement ahead orastern. HEEL, to. To incline a vessel on one side by shifting the weights onboard, such as guns. "On the heel": to be thus inclined. HELM. The tiller, or bar, which like a handle turns the rudder, andthus changes the course of the vessel. Port the helm. To put the tiller to port, which turns the vessel's head to the right; to starboard the helm is the reverse. Helm down. Tiller to leeward, vessel's head to windward; helm up, the reverse. See "Rudder. " HULL. The body of a vessel, as distinguished from the spars, orengines. HULL, to. (HULLED. ) A cannon ball striking the hull of a vessel issaid to hull her. JIB. See "Sails. " JIB-BOOM. See "Spars. " KEEP, to. To keep off, or away, is to change course away from the windor from an enemy. See "To bear up. " LARGE. See "Course. " LEE. The direction toward which the wind blows. "Under the lee of, "protected from wind and sea by land, or by a vessel, interposed. Lee Tide. See "Tide. " LEECH. The vertical side of a square sail. The upper and lower sides, horizontal, are called head and foot. LEEWARD (pronounced looard). Direction of movement, or of bearing, opposite to the wind. LIE-TO, to. To bring the vessels head on, or near, the wind, andremain nearly stopped. Usually in heavy weather, but not always. LINE ABREAST. See p. 122. LINE AHEAD. See p. 85. LINE OF BATTLE. In the line of battle the vessels are ranged on thesame straight line, steering the same course, one behind the others, so that all the broadsides are clear to bear upon an enemy. Theline preferred is one of the close-hauled lines, because on them themovement of a vessel in the line is more easily regulated by backing, or shaking, some of the sails. LINE OF BEARING. See "Bearing, line of. " LINE, Ship of the. A vessel fitted by its force for the line ofbattle. Opposite generically to "cruiser. " The modern term is"battleship. " LUFF, to. The movement of changing the course to nearer the directionwhence the wind comes, by using the helm. MAIN. }MIZZEN. } See "Spars" and "Sails. " MAST. See "Spars. " "To the mast. " A sail is said to be so when aback. MONSOON. A trade wind, in the China and Indian seas, which blowsuniformly from the northeast in winter, and from southwest in summer. NEAP. See "Tide. " OFF--the wind. See "Course. " ON--the wind. See "Course. " PENNANT. A flag, indicating either the rank of the senior officer onboard, or a signal applicable to a particular vessel. POINT. See "Bearings, by Compass. " PORT. To the left hand, or on the left side, of a vessel, looking fromaft forward. Opposite to Starboard. PORT, to. Applied to steering. To move the tiller, or helm, to theleft, which moves the rudder to the right and causes the vessel tochange course towards the right hand. QUARTER. Either side of the after part of a vessel;--as starboardquarter, port quarter; weather quarter, lee quarter. Quarter deck:one side of the after upper deck, reserved for the officer exercisingcommand, and for ceremonial purposes. QUARTERS. A crew is at quarters when at the stations for battle. RAKE, to. To fire the broadside from ahead or astern of an antagonist, so that the shot may sweep the length of the vessel, which at theperiod of this book was about four times the width. RANDOM SHOT. The extreme range to which a gun could send its shot, giving very uncertain results. REEF, to. To reduce the surface of a sail. RUDDER. A solid framework, pivoted at the stern of a vessel, whichbeing turned to one side deflects her course. See "Helm" and "Wheel. " SAILS. Sails are of two kinds: square, and fore and aft. Square sailsspread more across the vessel, in the direction of her width. Fore andaft sails more in the direction of the length. Square sails are betterfor a free wind; and also for large vessels, because they can be morereadily subdivided. Fore and aft sails trim nearer to the wind, and soare convenient for coasters, which generally are smaller. Vessels carrying square sails are called square-rigged. They have always two masts, usually three; each carrying three or four sails, one above the other. These are named from the mast on which they are carried (see "Spars"); e. G. , _main_ sail, _fore_ topsail, _mizzen_ topgallant-sail; and also from their positions on the same mast. Thus, from lowest up, main sail, main topsail, main topgallantsail; and main royal, if there be a fourth. The fore and main sails are called also courses. The topsails were the chief battle sails, because the largest, except the courses, and more manageable than the courses. All square-rigged vessels carry fore and aft sails, three cornered, stretched between the bowsprit and jib-booms, and the fore topmast. These sails are called jibs. Fore and aft vessels also carry jibs; but on each upright mast they have one great sail, the size of which makes it less easily handled in an emergency, therefore less fit for fighting. Above the big sail they have a small, light, three-cornered topsail, but this is merely a fair weather sail, useless in battle. Vessels of war were almost all square-rigged, with three masts. SAILS, STUDDING. Light square sails, for moderate weather, extendedbeyond the other square sails, to increase the normal spread ofcanvas. Set only with a free wind, and never in battle. SCANTLING. The size, and consequent weight and strength, of thetimbers of a vessel's hull. SCHOONER. See "Vessel. " SHAKE, to. So to place a sail that the wind blows along it, neitherfilling nor backing. The sail is thus neutralized without taking in. SHARP-UP. A yard is sharp-up, when turned by the braces as far as therigging of the mast will allow. A close-hauled course requires theyards to be sharp-up, in order that the sails may be full. SHIP. See "Vessel. " SLIP. See "Cable. " SLOOP. See "Vessel. " SPARS. A spar is a long piece of timber, cylindrical, tapering, inmasts, towards one end, and in yards towards both. Spars serve forspreading the several sails of a vessel. The names of spars vary with their use and position. Chiefly, for ships of war, they divide into masts, yards, and booms. A mast is an upright, and is in three connected pieces: the lower mast, the topmast, and the top-gallant-mast. Most ships of war had three such masts: fore, near the bow; main, near the centre; mizzen, near the stern. The bowsprit is also a mast; not upright, but projecting straight ahead from the bow, approaching horizontal, but inclining upwards. Like the masts, it has three divisions: the lower, or bowsprit proper, the jib-boom, and the flying-jib-boom. Across the masts, horizontal, are the yards, four in number, lower, topsail, topgallant, and royal. Yards are further designated by the name of the mast to which each belongs; e. G. , foreyard, main topsail yard, mizzen topgallant yard, main royal yard. The bowsprit formerly had one yard, called the spritsail yard. This has disappeared. Otherwise it serves to spread the three-cornered sails called jibs. These sails were useful for turning a vessel, because their projection before the centre gave them great leverage. Fore and aft vessels had no yards. See "Sails. " SPRING. See p. 65, note. SQUARE-RIGGED. See "Sails" and "Spars. " STAND, to. Used, nautically, to express movement and direction, e. G. , "to stand toward the enemy, " "to stand out of harbor, " "to standdown, " "to stand south. " The underlying idea seems to be that ofsustained, decided movement. STARBOARD. TO the right hand, or on the right side, of a vessel, looking from aft forward. Opposite to Port. STEER, to. To control the course by the use of the helm and rudder. STERN. The extreme rear, or after, part of a vessel. STRATEGY. That department of the Art of War which decides thedistribution and movements of armies, or of fleets, with reference tothe objects of a campaign as a whole. STRIKE, to. Applied to the flag. To haul down the flag in token ofsurrender. TACK. A vessel is on the starboard tack, or port tack, according asthe wind comes from the starboard or port hand. See p. 84, note. TACK, to. When a vessel is close-hauled, with the wind on one side, to tack is to turn round towards the wind, in order to be againclose-hauled, with the wind on the other side. To wear is to attain the same object by turning away from the wind. Wearing is surer than tacking, but loses ground to leeward. To tack, or wear, _in succession_, the leading vessel tacks, and those which follow tack, each, as it arrives at the same point; the order thus remaining the same. To tack, or wear _together_, all tack at the same moment, which reverses the order. TACTICS. That department of the Art of War which decides thedisposition and movements of an army, or of a fleet, on a particularfield of battle, in presence of an enemy. TIDAL CURRENTS. Ebb tide, the outflow of the water due to the tides. Flood tide, the inflow of the water due to the tides. Lee tide, the set of the current to leeward. Weather tide, the set of the current to windward. TIDE. The rise and fall of the water of the oceans under the influenceof the moon. Used customarily, but inaccurately, to express thecurrents produced by the changes of level. High tide, or high water, the two highest levels of the day. Low tide, or low water, the two lowest. Neap tide: the least rise and fall during the lunar month. Spring tide: the greatest rise and fall during the same, being soon after full and change of moon. TRADE, the. A term applied to a body of merchant vessels, to or from aparticular destination. TRADE WIND. A wind which blows uniformly from the same generaldirection throughout a fixed period. In the West Indies, from thenortheast the year round. See also "Monsoon. " VEER. See "Cable. " VESSEL. A general term for all constructions intended to float uponand move through the water. Specific definitions applicable to thisbook: Ship, a square-rigged vessel with three masts. Brig, a square-rigged vessel with two masts. Schooner, a fore and aft rigged vessel with two or more masts. Sloop, a fore and aft rigged vessel with one mast. See pp. 9, 15, 17. VESSELS OF WAR. Ship of the Line. A ship with three or more tiers ofguns, of which two are on covered decks; that is, have a deck abovethem. See "Line of Battle Ship. " Frigate. A ship with one tier of guns on a covered deck. Sloop of War. A ship, the guns of which are not covered, being on the upper (spar) deck. Sloops of war were sometimes brigs, but then were usually so styled. WAKE. The track left by a vessel's passage through the water. "In thewake of": directly astern of. WAY. Movement through the water. "To get underway": to pass fromstand-still to movement. WEAR, to. See under "Tack. " WEATHER. Relative position to windward of another object. Opposite toLee. Weather side, lee side, of a vessel; weather fleet, lee fleet;weather gage, lee gage (see "Gage"); weather shore, lee shore. WEATHER, to. To pass to windward of a vessel, or of any other object. WEATHERLY. The quality of a vessel which favors her getting, orkeeping, to windward. WEIGH, to. To raise the anchor from the bottom. Used alone; e. G. , "thefleet weighed. " WHEEL. So called from its form. The mechanical appliance, a wheel, with several handles for turning it, by which power is increased, andalso transmitted from the steersman on deck to the tiller below, inorder to steer the vessel. WIND AND WATER, between. That part of a vessel's side which comes outof water when she inclines to a strong side wind, but otherwise isunder water. WINDWARD. Direction from which the wind blows. YARD. See "Spars. " INDEX Algeciras, in Gibraltar Bay, station of Franco-Spanish Fleet supporting the Siege of Gibraltar, 121, 230, 231. Arbuthnot, Marriott, British Admiral, commands North American Station, 1779, 113, 148; anger at Rodney's intrusion on his command, 150; supports the attack on Charleston, 1780, 151; station in Gardiner's Bay, 151, 170; action with French squadron under des Touches, 1781, 171; regains command of Chesapeake Bay, 174; superseded, 1781, 176. _Arethusa_, British frigate. Encounter with French frigate _Belle Poule_ marks beginning of War of 1778 with France, 62, 82. Armed Neutrality, The, of 1780, 3, 158. Arnold, Benedict, American General. Effects following his action on Lake Champlain in 1776, 3, 4, 7, 25; with, Ethan Allen, seizes Ticonderoga and Crown Point, 1775, 8; captures or destroys all hostile shipping on Lake Champlain, 9; traverses Maine forests, and joins Montgomery before Quebec, 10; maintains blockade of Quebec till arrival of a British squadron, 10; retreats to Crown Point, and destitution of his troops, 11; schemes for maintaining command of Lake Champlain, 12; his force, and its character, 14, 15, 17; compelled by shore batteries to abandon lower Narrows of the Lake, 15; selects Valcour Island as position for defence, 15; decision to risk destruction of force rather than retire, 18, 19; sound strategic and tactical ideas, 20; Battle of Valcour Island, 21; successful withdrawal after defeat, 23; overtaken and flotilla destroyed, 25; effect of his resistance in delaying British advance, 25; conduct, courage, and heroism throughout, 27; his subsequent treason, 18, 27, 152; commands British detachment in Virginia, 153, 169, 170, 174. Asiatic Immigration, Danger involved in, 4. Barbados, West India Island, headquarters of British Leeward Islands Station, 99; advantage of Santa Lucia over, 104, 144, 207; notably for crippled ships, 144; devastated by hurricane, 1780, 159. Bartington, Samuel, British Admiral, commands Leeward Islands Station, 99; capture of Santa Lucia by, 100-102; successfully resists d'Estaing's effort to recapture, 103, 104; superseded in chief command by Byron, 105; share in Byron's action with d'Estaing, 107, 109; goes home wounded, 112; refuses command-in-chief of the Channel Fleet, 1780, 157; serves in it under Howe, 227; captures a French convoy for East Indies, 227. Basse Terre, St. Kitts, Operations around, 1782, 196-205; character of anchorage at, 199. Battle, Order of, defined, 93 (note), 200 (note). Battles, Naval, Valcour Island, October 11, 1776, 19-23. Charleston Harbor, June 28, 1776, 33. D'Estaing and Howe, August 10 and 11, 1778, 73-75. Ushant, July 27, 1778, 84-91. Barrington and d'Estaing, Santa Lucia, December 15, 1778, 102-104. Byron and d'Estaing, Grenada, July 6, 1779, 105-112. De Langara and Rodney, Cape St. Vincent, January 16, 1780, 123. De Guichen and Rodney, off Martinique, April 17, 1780, 131-135. De Guichen and Rodney, May 15, 1780, 143, 144. De Guichen and Rodney, May 19, 1780, 144. Cornwallis and La Motte-Picquet, off Haiti, March 20, 1780, 153. Cornwallis and de Ternay, June 20, 1780, 155-157. De Grasse and Hood, off Martinique, April 29, 1781, 163-167. Arbuthnot and des Touches, off Cape Henry, March 16, 1781, 171-173. De Grasse and Graves, off Cape Henry, September 5, 1781, 179-183. The Doggers Bank, August 5, 1781, 189-193. De Grasse and Hood, St. Kitts, January 25 and 26, 1782, 199-204. De Grasse and Rodney, near Dominica, April 9 and 12, 1782, 207-221. Howe with Franco-Spanish Fleet near Gibraltar, October 20, 1782, 231, 232. Johnstone and Suffren, Porto Praya, Cape Verde Islands, April 16, 1781, 236-238. Hughes and Suffren, Coromandel Coast, February 17, 1781, 240-242. Hughes and Suffren, off Ceylon, April 12, 1782, 242-244. Hughes and Suffren, off Nega-patam, July 6, 1782, 244-246. Hughes and Suffren, off Trincomalee, September 3, 1782, 247-251. Hughes and Suffren, off Cuddalore, June 20, 1783, 253. N. B. Naval Battles end here. _Belle Poule_, French Frigate. Encounter with British _Arethusa_ marks beginning of War of 1778 with Great Britain, 61, 82. Blane, Sir Gilbert, Physician to British Fleet under Rodney, quoted, 124, 219, 220, 221. Burgoyne, Sir John, British General, 3, 6, 14, 23, 27, 28, 50-53, 55; decisive effect of American control of Lake Champlain, in 1776, upon his expedition, in 1777, 3, 9, 13, 14, 25; his surrender at Saratoga, 53; it determines France to intervene, 6, 58. Byng, John, British Admiral, influence of his execution, in 1756, upon the minds of naval officers, 93, 139, 146. Byron, John, British Admiral, ordered to North American Station, 1778, 59; delayed by heavy weather, and puts into Halifax, 62; Howe superseded by, 80; goes to West Indies, 105; action with D'Estaing off Grenada, 105-111; comments upon course of, 110-112; returns to England, 112. Canada, Strength of, against attack from southward, 7; its advantage in this respect over New York, 8; comprehension of these facts by Americans of 1775, from the old French Wars, 8; attempt to utilize, by British, frustrated by Arnold's promptitude, 9; invasion of, under Montgomery, ordered by American Congress, 1775, 9; failure of the attempt, decided by British Navy, 10-12; British advance from, under Carleton, 1776, 15-26; Burgoyne's advance from, 1777, 51-53. Cap François (now Cap Haitien), French naval station on north side of Haiti, 147-149, 153, 154, 168, 176, 178, 206, 223, 225. Carkett, Robert, British Naval Captain, misunderstanding of Rodney's orders by, causes failure of British attack of April 17, 1780, 133; Rodney's censure of, 137-139. Carleton, Sir Guy, Governor and Commander-in-Chief, in Canada, 1775-6, 9; besieged and blockaded in Quebec by Americans, 10-12; relieved by British Navy, 11; takes the offensive, 17; delayed decisively by Arnold's preparations on Lake Champlain, 13, 18; battle of Valcour Island, 20-23; successfully eluded by Arnold, 23; honored by Government for the campaign, 26. Carolinas, North and South, supposed British sympathies in, 31, exaggerated, 175; expedition against Charleston, and battle of Charleston Harbor, 1776, 31-38; operations against, and against Georgia, renewed, 1779, 113-115, and 1780, 151-153; disastrous consequences to British operations, 114, 152, 174-176. Champlain, Lake, Decisive effect of naval operations upon, 3, 4, 7, 13, 14, 25, 26; strategic importance of, 7; naval campaign upon, 1775-1776, chapter i; remains in naval control of British throughout the war, 28. Charleston, South Carolina, attack upon by British squadron, 1776, 32-37; siege and capture of, by the British, 1780, 114, 151. Chesapeake Bay, naval command of, by French, 1781, accomplishes independence of United States, 4, 114, 184; Sir William Howe moves by way of, against Philadelphia, 1777, 52; operations in and near, 1781, 169-174, 177-185; British control of, in 1781, prior to arrival of de Grasse, 174; de Grasse reaches, 1781, 178. Clinton, Sir Henry, British General, commands land force employed in Carolinas, 1776, 31, 32; in seizure of Narragansett Bay, 48; left in command at New York by Howe, 1777, 52; advance up the Hudson River, 1777, 55; relieves Howe as Commander-in-Chief in North America, 56, 63; evacuates Philadelphia, and retreats upon New York, 1778, 63; narrowness of his escape, 63, 64; evacuates Narragansett Bay, 1779, 115; operations of, in South Carolina, and capture of Charleston, 151; leaves Cornwallis in command in Carolina, and returns to New York, 152; sends detachments to Virginia, for diversion in favor of Cornwallis, 1781, 153, 169; serious difference of opinion between, and Cornwallis, 115, 175; orders of, to Cornwallis, which result in position at Yorktown, 1781, 175. Commerce, effects upon, through inadequate naval preparation, 59-61, 117, 126, 158; table of losses of British, 61 (note). Convoys, effect of, upon naval action, strategic or tactical, 105, 106, 109, 122, 126, 130, 148, 155-157, 158, 166, 176, 188, 189, 193, 199, 206-209, 227-229, 229-231, 235, 236-238, 240, 246. Cornwallis, Charles, Earl, British General, accompanies expedition against Charleston, 1776, 31; hurried to Trenton, after Washington's victory there, 49; professional quarrel with Sir H. Clinton, 115, 175; at siege and capture of Charleston, 152; left in command of southern department, 1780, 152; defeats Gates at Camden, 1780, 152; pushes on to North Carolina, 152; embarrassments there, 152; enters Virginia, and joins Arnold at Petersburg, 1781, 153, 174; ordered by Clinton to occupy a defensive position which should cover anchorage for a fleet, 175; evacuates Portsmouth, and takes position at Yorktown, 175; French cruisers bar his retreat towards the Carolinas, and occupy York River, 179; enclosed by French fleet and French and American armies, 184; compelled to surrender, 185. Cornwallis, Sir William (brother of Lord), British naval captain, share in action between Byron and d'Estaing, 1779, 108-110, 153; in command of a squadron, action with La Motte-Picquet, 1780, 153; action with de Ternay's squadron, 155-157; characteristics, and nickname of, 157; distinguished part in Hood's action with de Grasse, 1782, 201; share in Rodney's victory, 217; quoted, 156, 198, 200, 203, 211. Crown Point, military post on Lake Champlain, 8; seized by Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen, 1775, 8; General Montgomery embarks at, to invade Canada, 1775, 9; Arnold retreats to, in 1776, after reverses in Canada, 12; part in campaign of 1776, 24; recovered by British, 25; reoccupied by Americans after Burgoyne's surrender, 28. Cuddalore, British post in India, on Coromandel Coast, besieged by Hyder Ali and Suffren, 242; taken by Hyder Ali, 244; British attempt to retake, 252; relieved by Suffren, 252-254. Darby, George, British Admiral, commands Channel Fleet, 1780, 157; relief of Gibraltar by, 1781, 186-188; blocked in Torbay by Franco-Spanish fleet, 1781, 188-189. Delaware, Naval Operations in the, 1777, 52-55; in 1778, 59, 62-64. De Barras, French Commodore, commands squadron in Newport, 1781, 174; opinion concerning des Touches' conduct, 174; junction with de Grasse in Chesapeake Bay, 1781, 184. De Bouille, French General, governor of Martinique, 1780, concerts with de Guichen an attack on British West Indies, 130; project against Barbados, 1782, 197; capture of St. Kitts, 197-205. De Cordova, Spanish Admiral, commands in allied fleet under d'Orvilliers, 1779, 118, 119; in chief command, at Cadiz, 125; in Channel, 1781, 188; in 1782, 228; at Algeciras, during Howe's relief of Gibraltar, 230-232. D'Estaing, Comte, French Admiral, in chief command, in 1778, of first French fleet sent to America, 59; biographical summary of, 59 (note); Government instructions to, 59; slowness of movements of, 62-64; failure to attack Howe at Sandy Hook, 66-68; professional inefficiency of, 67, 79, 111, 112; proceeds to Newport, R. I. , 69, and enters the harbor, 70; joins Americans in siege of the town, 70; abandons it on Howe's appearance and puts to sea, 73; manoeuvres against Howe, 73-75; fleet scattered by gale, 75; refuses to renew siege of Newport, and goes to Boston, 77, 78; outgeneralled throughout by Howe, 78; goes to West Indies, 1779, 100; fails to recover Santa Lucia, 102-104; captures Grenada, 105; action with Byron, 106-112; fails in attempt to retake Savannah, 115; returns to Europe with ships of his original command, 115; sent to Cadiz, in 1780, to bring back to Brest French contingent of Allied Fleet, 158. De Grasse, Comte, French Admiral, exercises the decisive effect in obtaining American Independence, 4; sails to take chief command in America, 1781, 162; action with Hood off Martinique, 163-165; Chevalier's comment on conduct of, 166; abortive attempt against Santa Lucia, 167; capture of Tobago by, 168; goes to Cap François, 168, 176, and there prepares for expedition against Cornwallis, 178; on this occasion shows energy and foresight unusual to him, 178; anchors in Chesapeake Bay, 178; action with Graves, 179-184; regains Chesapeake, 184; returns to West Indies after Cornwallis's surrender, 185; expedition against St. Kitts, 1782, 197-205; outgeneralled by Hood, 201, 204, 205; St. Kitts surrenders to, 205; Hood escapes from, 205; returns to Martinique, 206; expedition against Jamaica, plan of, 206; puts to sea, 207; transactions from April 8 to April 12, 207-212; defeated in great battle of April 12, 213-221, and captured with flagship, 221; professional character of, illustrated, 166, 178, 184, 198, 205, 207, 209, 214, 215, 216. De Guichen, Comte de, succeeds d'Estaing in North American command, 1780, 115, 130; biographical summary of, 115 (note); project of against Barbados, 130; frustrated by Rodney, 130; action of April 17, with Rodney, 130-135; orders of French Government to, 141; consequent conduct of, 141-145; actions with Rodney, May 15, 142, and May 19, 144; broken down by responsibility, 145; under orders, accompanies Spanish squadron to Cap François, 147; there refuses to coöperate with Americans, 147; returns to Europe, 148; commands French contingent to Allied Fleet under de Cordova, 1781, 188; advises attack upon British Fleet in Tor Bay, 189; loses great part of West India military convoy entrusted to his charge, 196. De Langara, Spanish Admiral, squadron under command of, defeated, and himself captured by Rodney, 122, 123; inefficiency of, 125. D'Orves, Comte, French Admiral, commands in East Indies, 1781, 235, 236; joined by Suffren, 239; sails for Coromandel Coast, 240; dies, and succeeded by Suffren, 240. D'Orvilliers, Comte, French Admiral, commander-in-chief of Brest Fleet, 1778, 82; puts to sea, 82; Government instructions to, 83; encounter with British Fleet under Keppel, 83; manoeuvres of, and action of July 27, 83-91; comment upon, 92, 97; summer cruise of, 1779, 116-120; hampered by instructions, 119; returns to Brest unsuccessful, 120. De Suffren, Bailli, French Captain and Admiral, with d'Estaing in Narragansett Bay, 1778, 69; in the action with Byron off Grenada, 111; his comment upon d'Estaing's conduct, 111; biographical summary of, 111 (note); sails for East Indies, 1781, 163, 236; effect upon operations of, in India, by capture of a French convoy in Bay of Biscay, 228; attacks British squadron in Porto Praya, 236-238; saves Cape of Good Hope, 238; arrives Ile de France, 239; succeeds to chief command in East Indies, 240; five battles with British squadron, 240, 242, 244, 247, 253; captures Trincomalee, 1782, 247; relieves Cuddalore, 252-254; estimate of, 254, 255. De Ternay, French Commodore, commands squadron with convoy, from Brest for Newport, R. I. , 155; action with British squadron under Cornwallis, 1780, 155-157; comment, favorable and unfavorable, 156; death of, 1781, and succeeded by des Touches, 170. Des Touches, French Commodore, succeeds de Ternay in command at Newport, 1781, 170; sails to enter Chesapeake Bay, to check British operations in Virginia, 170; pursued by Arbuthnot, 171; action between the two squadrons, 171-173; gains tactical advantage, but leaves the field to the British, 174; justified by de Barras, who arrives and supersedes him, 174. De Vaudreuil, Marquis, French Admiral, second to de Grasse in 1782, 209; commands-in-chief partial attack on Hood's division, 209; quoted, 214; succeeds to chief command upon de Grasse's surrender, 222; condition of his command after the battle, 223; pursued by Rodney, but reaches Cap François, 225. Doggers Bank, Battle of the, 1781, 189-194. Dominica, British West India Island, captured by French, 1778, 99; battle of, 208, 209, 210, 213, 215. Douglas, Sir Charles, British naval captain, commands squadron which relieves Quebec, 1776, 10; quoted, 11, 14, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26; energetic preparations by, to regain control of Lake Champlain, 15-17; force created by, 17; made a baronet for his services at this time, 26; captain of the fleet to Rodney, 1782, 222; opinion as to Rodney's conduct cited, 222. Farragut, at Mobile, cited in illustration, 66 (note). Fighting Instructions, Additional, point in, bearing upon the failure of Rodney's plan of attack, April 17, 1780, 133, 138, 139 (and note). "Fleet in Being, " 73, 174; how regarded, apparently, by D'Orvilliers in 1779, 119. France, intervention of France in the American quarrel determined by Burgoyne's defeat, and leads to Spanish intervention, 3, 58, 116; vacillating naval instructions of Government of, 83, 118, 119, 141, 154; divergence of views between Spain and, 120, 121, 147, 158, 186, 188, 189. France, Ile de (now Mauritius), French naval station in Indian Ocean, 126, 234, 236, 239. Gardiner's Bay, east end of Long Island, station of British fleet under Arbuthnot, watching French at Newport, 151, 170. Gates, Horatio, American General, defeated by Cornwallis at Camden, 152. George, Lake, a link in consecutive water communications from New York to Canada, 7, 51. Gibraltar, d'Estaing ordered to commence hostilities when forty leagues west of, 59; capture of, a leading object with Spanish Government, 120; this desire affects the major operations of Allies throughout the war, 121, 186; blockade of, by land and sea, 121; Rodney's relief of, 1780, 121-126, 157; Darby's relief of, 1781, 186, 188; Howe's relief of, 1782, 229-233. Glossary, of technical terms used in this book, 257. Grant, James, British General, share of in capture of Santa Lucia, 102-104. Graves, Sir Thomas, British Admiral, brings reinforcement of vessels to New York, 151; relieves Arbuthnot in command of North American Station, 1781, 176; difficulties of, owing to interception of communications, 177; joined by Hood off New York, 177; sails for the relief of Cornwallis, 178; action of, with French fleet under de Grasse, 179-184; conduct of, criticized by Hood, 181, 182, 184; returns to New York, 184; relieves Sir Peter Parker in Jamaica command, 185. Great Britain, feeble hold of, upon Canada, 1775, 10; shown by rewards for saving the colony, 26; inadequate provision of force by, 1774-1776, 29, 30, 59, 62, 79, 82, 99, 112, 116, 117, 120, 127, 148, 189, 193, 226; improper dispersion of effort by, 30, 31, 48, 52, 56, 62, 63, 72, 113-115, 151-153, 175; distrust of Government of, among naval officers, 79, 81, 93, 95, 97, 99, 135, 146, 157, 158, 193; alarm in, produced by Allied fleets in Channel, 1779, 117; declares war against Holland, 1780, 158. Grenada, British West India Island, captured by French, 105; naval battle off, 105-112. Haiti, French West India Island, 147, 148, 168 (see "Cap François"); squadron action off north coast of, 153-155. Hardy, Sir Charles, British Admiral, commands Channel Fleet, 117, 119. Holland, brought into War of American Independence by concurring in Armed Neutrality of Baltic Powers, 1780, 3, 158, 236; colonial possessions of, 3, 158, 160-162, 236, 240, 246; St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba, West India Islands of, taken by Rodney, 160-162; battle of Doggers Bank, 189-193; fleet of, held in check by Howe, 1782, 228; Cape of Good Hope menaced by British, saved by Suffren, 236-238; Trincomalee, in Ceylon, taken by British, 240, recaptured by Suffren, 247. Hood, Sir Samuel (afterwards Lord), British Admiral, arrives in West Indies, 1781, with reinforcements for Rodney, 160; sent to cruise off Martinique, to intercept de Grasse, 162; action between, and de Grasse, 163-167; exceptional ability of, 166, 184; French tribute to, 167; sent by Rodney with fourteen ships-of-the-line to reinforce North American station, 176; under command of Admiral Graves, sails for Chesapeake, 177; part of, in action between Graves and de Grasse, 180-183; criticisms of, upon Graves's conduct, 181, 182, 184; returns to West Indies, 185; in chief command there for two months, 196-205; brilliant operations of, at St. Kitts, 197-205; superseded by Rodney's return, 205; part of, in action of April 9, 1782, 208-210; in battle of April 12, 212-221; de Grasse's flagship strikes to, 221; censures passed by, upon Rodney's course after the battle, 220, 222, 224, 225; detached in pursuit, captures a small French squadron, 224; returns to England after the peace, 226. Hotham, William, British naval Captain, in operations against New York, 1776, 42; convoys reinforcement of troops to West Indies, 100; left in West Indies in temporary command, by Rodney, 148. Howe, Richard, Earl, British Admiral, appointed to command North American Station, 1776, 30; invested also with powers as peace commissioner, 39; arrives at New York, 39; failure of peace negotiations, 39; operations at and about New York, 39, 42-47; tribute of, to force under his command, 47; accompanies army expedition to Chesapeake Bay, 52; operations in the Delaware, 53-55, and coastwise, 56; purpose of d'Estaing to intercept, in Delaware, 59; serious exposure of, through inadequate force, 62, 66; "extricates himself by rapid movements, 62-64; preparations to defend entrance to New York, 65-68; inferiority of force to d'Estaing, 66; follows French Fleet to Narragansett Bay, 70, and by his presence there induces d'Estaing to abandon siege of Newport, and put to sea, 73; manoeuvres of, with inferior force, 73-75; fleet of, scattered by gale, 75; returns to New York, 76, and again follows French Fleet to Boston, 77; admirable qualities of, as illustrated in this campaign, 78; futile contemporary criticism of, 79; relinquishes command, and returns to England, 1778, 81; not employed again, until change of Ministry, 1782, 81, 227; appointed to command Channel Fleet, 1782, and primary operations there, 227-229; successful evasion of very superior Franco-Spanish Fleet, 229; skilful conduct of relief of Gibraltar by, 1782, 229-231; engagement with Allied Fleet, 232; special qualities of, again illustrated, 232; French eulogy of, 232, and of force under his command, 233. Howe, Sir William (brother of Earl), British General, failure of to support Burgoyne, 1777, 28, 51, 52; evacuates Boston, 1776, and retires to Halifax, 29, 30; extent of regions under his command-in-chief, 30; appointed peace commissioner, jointly with Lord Howe, 39; goes from Halifax to New York, 39; fruitless peace negotiations, 39; reduction of New York by, 42-45; subsequent operations of, to Battle of Trenton, 45-49; constitutional sluggishness of, 45, 47; occupies Narragansett Bay, 48; injudicious extension of front of operations, 48; small results after New York, 49; rewarded with the Order of the Bath, 49; takes the greater part of his force to Chesapeake Bay, 52; effect of this upon Burgoyne's operations, 52, 53, 55; occupies Philadelphia, 53; this success worse than fruitless, 56; relieved in command by Clinton, and returns to England, 56, 63. Hudson River, a link in the chain of water communications from Canada to New York, 7, 30, 45; mentioned, 28, 41, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53; alternative name, North River, 41; Washington retreats across, into New Jersey, 45; British advance up valley of, 1777, 55. Hughes, Sir Edward, British Admiral, commander-in-chief in East Indies, 1779, 235; enterprise of, 235; engagements with French Fleet under Suffren, 240, 242, 244, 247, 253; loses Trincomalee, 247, and compelled thereby to leave Coromandel coast for Bombay, 251; reinforced by Bickerton, 251; contrasted with Suffren, as a general officer, 254. Hughes, Sir Richard, succeeds to West India command at peace of 1783, 226; subsequent controversy with Nelson, 226. Hyder, Ali, Sultan of Mysore, at war with British, 1779, 235; French Admiral d'Orves refuses coöperation with, 235; Suffren acts with, 240, 242; captures Cuddalore, 1782, 244; death of, 1782, 252; succeeded by Tippoo Saib, 252. _Inflexible_, British cruiser built by Sir Charles Douglas on Lake Champlain, 1776, 16; in herself sufficient to control the lake, 17. Jamaica, British West India Island, 38, 110, 149, 153, 159, 176, 177, 185, 224, 226; conquest of, intended by France and Spain, 1782, 206; attempt leads to defeat of de Grasse by Rodney, 208, 209; Rodney repairs to, after his victory, 225. Japan, significance of contrast of population of, to square mile, with that of the United States, 5. Johnstone, George, British Commodore, commands squadron despatched to take Cape of Good Hope from Dutch, 236; attacked by Suffren in Porto Praya Bay, 237; arrives at Cape too late, Suffren having strengthened it, 238; returns to England, 238; professional capacity of, 239; attacks made by, upon professional conduct of Howe and Keppel, 239. (See also p. 80. ) Jones, John Paul, American naval captain, serves as a volunteer in French Fleet, 1782, 212. Kempenfelt, Richard, British Admiral, captures in Bay of Biscay great part of French convoy going to West Indies, 1781, 195, 196; commands a division in Channel Fleet under Howe, 1782, 227, 228; lost in sinking of the _Royal George_, 229. Keppel, Augustus, British Admiral, refuses to serve against Americans, 81; commander-in-chief of Channel Fleet, 1778, 61, 82; encounter with French Brest Fleet, 83-91; comments on the conduct of, 92, 97; controversy with Palliser, third in command under, 95; returns to port with fleet, 96; court martial upon, 93; and cited from, 87, 88, 95; resigns command, 97; becomes first Lord of the Admiralty, 97, 225; quoted, 107 (note). La Motte Picquet, French Commodore, 115; action with a British division off Martinique, 1779, 128; encounter with squadron under Cornwallis, 1780, 153-155; captures great part of a British convoy returning from West Indies, 1781, 188; quoted, 229 (note). Leeward Islands Station, extent of, 99; under command of Barrington when war begins, 1778, 99; Byron succeeds to command, 1779, 105; held temporarily by Hyde Parker, 1779, 113; Rodney takes command, 1780, 121, 128; Hood in temporary charge of, 1782, 177, 185, 196-205; Rodney relieved by Pigot, 225. Les Saintes, small West India Islands, between Dominica and Guadeloupe, scene of Rodney's battle with de Grasse, 209, 211, 213. Manners, Lord Robert, British naval captain (killed in the battle of April 12, 1782), encomiums of, upon Hood, quoted, 202, 205. Martinique, French West India Island, 99, 104, 128, 130, 140, 141, 142, 144, 147, 149, 153, 167, 206, 207; principal French depot in West Indies, 100; action off, between de Grasse and Hood, 162-167. Mathews, Thomas, British Admiral, Influence in British Navy of court martial upon, in 1744, 93, 139. Minorca, Mediterranean Island in British possession, Byng's action off, 1756, 93, 94; recovery of, a primary object with Spain, 120; supplied by Rodney, 1780, 125, 126; by Darby, 1781, 187; attack upon by France and Spain, 1781, 188; capitulates, 1782, 189. Mobile, Farragut's attack in entering, cited in illustration, 66 (note). Monroe Doctrine, in last analysis is the formulation, in terms, of a purpose to prevent the propagation to the American continents of wars arising elsewhere, 4; recognition of same danger in unchecked Asiatic immigration, 4; necessity of adequate force in order to maintain, 29. Montgomery, Richard, American General, sent by the Congress to conduct invasion of Canada, 9; killed in assault on Quebec, 10. Moultrie, Fort, Description of, 33. Moultrie, William, American officer, commands Fort Moultrie when attacked by British squadron, 32-36. Narragansett Bay, occupation of by British, 1777, 47; value of, 47, 56; Rodney's opinion of, 48, 115; description of, 69; military and naval situation in, 1778, 72, 73; abandonment of, by British, 1779, because of improper dispersion of their army, 113, 114, 115; occupied by French squadron and troops, 1780, 149, 150, 155-157; Rodney neglects to attack, 150; French division in, watched by British from Gardiner's Bay, 151, 170; but starts, 1781, for Chesapeake Bay, 170; returns to, unsuccessful, 173; sails again from, 177, and joins main fleet in the Chesapeake, 184. Navy, and Navies, Washington's remark that to them belonged "the casting vote" in the War of American Independence, 4, 147; exercised on two decisive occasions, by Arnold on Lake Champlain, 1776, and by de Grasse at Yorktown, 1781, 4, 7, 9, 168, 176, 178, 179, 184; decisive influence also in American War of Secession, 4; present and future dependence upon, of Monroe Doctrine and of question of Asiatic Immigration, 4, 5; military explanation for this "casting vote, " 5; Pacific question essentially one of, 5; military reasons for general dominant effect of, in War of Independence, 6, 114; British, saves Canada for Great Britain, 12; specific effect, on ultimate result of the general war, exerted by American, on Lake Champlain, 1776, 12, 13, 14, 25; inadequacy of British, to demands upon it, 29, 30, 59, 62, 79, 82, 99, 116, 117, 120, 127, 148, 189, 193, 226; British, in operations at New York, 1776, 40, 44, 47; in Burgoyne's advance, 1777, 51; misuse of British, to divide the land forces, 51, 52, 114, 115, 152; subsidiary operations of British, 56, in the Carolinas, 151, in Virginia, 170; under Howe, though inadequate, saves Army under Clinton, 63, 64, and also New York, 64-68, and subsequently Narragansett Bay with army division at Newport, 72, 77; tone of French, as indicated by Government instructions, and action of officers, 83, 89, 91, 92, 166, 235; effect of seasonal conditions upon operations of, in Europe and in America, 98, 100, 113, 115, 147, 149, 159; in East Indies, 251; inefficiency of Spanish, 116, 125, 147, 189, 231, 232. Nelson, mentioned or quoted, 38, 39, 109, 126, 132, 140, 155, 160, 202, 225, 226, 243. New Jersey, Washington crosses from New York into, 45; operations in, 1776, 46-49; impracticable to British, in 1777, and consequent effect upon Howe's course, 51, 52, 56; retreat of British from Philadelphia through, 1778, 63, 64. Newport, Rhode Island, taken possession of by British, 47; importance of, 48; siege of, by Americans and French, 70, 73, 77; abandoned by British, 115; occupied by French, 150, 155, 170, 173, 174, 179. See Narragansett Bay. New York, water communications between St. Lawrence and, 7, 8; British occupy harbor of, 1776, 38; operations around, 1776, 39-46; harbor, approaches, and fortifications about, 40-42; Washington abandons, 45, 46; British occupy, 45; British forces in, unable to coöperate with those in Philadelphia, 56, 63; Lord Howe's preparations to defend, 64-67; d'Estaing's failure to attack, 67, 68; Rodney goes from West Indies to, 150, 152, 159. Order, of Battle, 93 (and note), 137-140, 191; comparison between Keppel's, off Ushant, and Byron's, off Grenada, 112; Graves', off Cape Henry, 179-183, criticized by Hood, 181, 182; Hood's at anchor off St. Kitts, 202, 203. Palliser, Sir Hugh, British Admiral, third in command at Battle of Ushant, 84, 87, 90, 91, 93-96; court of inquiry upon, 95-97. Parker, Sir Hyde, (1) British Admiral, left in temporary command at New York by Howe, 1778, 80 (and note); in like position in Leeward Islands by Byron, 1779-1780, 113, 128; biographical summary of, 113; quoted, 129, 130; nickname of, 130; implied censure of, by Rodney, in battle of April 17, 1780, 136; returns to England, 136; commands at Battle of the Dogger Bank, 189-193; his reply to George III, 193; ordered to East Indian command, and lost at sea, 194. Parker, Hyde, (2) British Naval captain (afterwards Admiral Sir Hyde), in operations about New York, 1776, 39, 44, 46; in expedition against Savannah, 1778, 113, 114; biographical summary of, 113 (note). (In 1801, commander-in-chief over Nelson, at Copenhagen, 39, 80, note). Parker, Sir Peter, British Admiral, commands naval force in expedition against Charleston, 1776, 31; attack of, upon Fort Moultrie, 33-38; gives promotion to Nelson, Collingwood, and Saumarez, 38; at operations around New York, 38, 43, 45, and at Narragansett Bay, 48; commands Jamaica Station, 149, 153, 155, 159, 176, 177, 185; superseded at Jamaica by Graves, 1781, 185. Pellew, Edward, (afterwards Admiral Lord Exmouth), British midshipman, at Lake Champlain, 1776, 22; in Burgoyne's advance to Saratoga, 1777, 51. Philadelphia, occupation of, by British, 52-55; brief tenure of, 55; inutility of, to British, 56; evacuation of, by British, and hazardous retreat from, to New York, 63, 64. Quebec, attack upon by Americans, under Montgomery, 1775, 9, 10; blockade of, by Arnold, 1776, 10, 11; relieved by British navy, 10-12; utility of, to British preparations to control Lake Champlain, 15-17, 26. Raids, by British navy, 56, 114. Rhode Island, 47, 48, 69, 70, 72, 77, 78, 79, 115, 150, 155. See Narragansett Bay. Riedesel, Baron, commander of German troops in Canada, 1776; testimony of, to effects of delay by Arnold's flotilla on Lake Champlain, 13, 25; quoted, 21, 23. Rochambeau, French general, commanding forces in America, requests coöperation of de Grasse against Cornwallis, 168. Rodney, Sir George (afterwards Lord), British Admiral, appointed to command Leeward Islands Station, 1779, 115, 121; sails to relieve Gibraltar, 122; on the way, destroys two Spanish squadrons, 122-125; relieves the place, and sails for West Indies, 125, 126; actions with de Guichen, April and May, 1780, 130-135, 142-144; censures officers of the fleet, 135-139, 145; further proceedings in West Indies, 1780, 146-150; takes fleet to New York, 150, and turns to West Indies, 159; capture of Dutch islands, 1781, 160; proceedings of, at St. Eustatius, 161, 162; sends Hood off Martinique to intercept de Grasse, 162; successes of de Grasse against, 167, 168; sends Hood to New York with fleet, 176, 177, and returns to England on leave, 177; returns to West Indies, 1782, and rejoins Hood, 205; pursuit of French armament against Jamaica, 207-212; victory of, in battle of April 12, 213-220; failure of, to improve his success, 220-225; superseded by Pigot, and returns finally to England, 225. Rowley, Joshua, British Admiral, brilliant conduct of, in Byron's action, 106, 107, 109; implicitly censured by Rodney, 136. Sandy Hook, at entrance to New York Harbor, 52, 63, 64, 65, 66, 76, 113, 150, 177, 184, 185; Lord Howe's preparations at, for defence of New York, 1778, 65, 66. Santa Lucia, French West India Island, capture of, by British, 1778, 100-102; d'Estaing's ineffectual attempt to retake, 103, 104; military value of, 104, 207; de Guichen seeks to retake, 142; mentioned, 105, 106, 128, 141, 144, 148, 165, 167, 168, 206. Saratoga, surrender of Burgoyne at, why decisive, 3, 6; capitulation there, determined by Arnold's defence of Lake Champlain, 3, 7, 13, 14, 25; Burgoyne's surrender at, 28, 50-53. Saumarez, James (afterwards Lord de), British naval officer, midshipman at attack upon Fort Moultrie, 1776, 35, 38; lieutenant at the battle of the Dogger Bank, 1781, 192 (note); captain in West Indies, 1782, 196; biographical summary of, 196 (note); in Rodney's victory, 1782, 218, 221. Savannah, capture of, by British, 1778, 113; disastrous effect of operations thus initiated upon the British position in America, 114, 115, 151-153, 175-178, 184; failure of d'Estaing's attempt to retake, 115, 151. Schuyler, Philip, American General, commanding Northern Department, 1776; quoted, 12. Seasons, effect of, upon naval operations, 98, 113, 115, 145, 149, 159, 251. Spain, induced to enter the war, 1779, 3, 116; cruise of fleet of, in conjunction with French, 1779, 116-121; divergence of views between France and, 120, 121, 147, 158, 186; two squadrons of, dispersed or destroyed by Rodney, 122-126; inefficiency of navy of, 125, 126, 147, 158, 187-189; fruitless cruise of fleet of, in conjunction with French, 1781, 188, 189; projected conquest of Jamaica, 206. St. Eustatius, Dutch West India Island, capture of, by British, 1781, 160-162; a great trade centre in the war, prior to capture, 160. St. Kitts, British West India Island, attacked by French, 1782, 196; naval operations of Hood and de Grasse about, 196-205; capitulates to French, owing to lack of British land force, 205. St. Lawrence, River, the centre of French power in Canada, 7; strength of, as a military line, 7, 8; as a naval line of communications, closed by ice, 10, 11, but at other seasons controlling, 11, 12; relations, to the decisive naval campaign on Lake Champlain, 1776, 15-17, 25-26. Ticonderoga, strong post at head of Lake Champlain, 8, 9, 13, 18, 20, 27, 28, 46, 50; saved from capture in 1775, and 1776, by Arnold's naval action on Lake Champlain, 9, 13, 25; taken by British, 1777, but reoccupied by Americans after Burgoyne's surrender, 28. Tiller. See "Helm. " Tippoo Saib, Sultan of Mysore, in India, succeeds his father, Hyder Ali, 1782, and continues his policy, 252. Tobago, British West India Island, taken by French, 167, 168. Trenton, battle of, 48. Trincomalee, harbor in Ceylon, a Dutch possession in 1780, captured by British, 1782, 240; importance, and imperfect defences, of, 240, 242, 244, 251, 252, 255; taken by French, 1782, 247; naval battle off, between Hughes and Suffren, 247-251. Ushant, battle of, 83-93. Valcour, Island in Lake Champlain, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24; selected by Arnold as the position in which to await British advance, 1776, 15; description of, 19, 20; battle of, 20-23; American retreat from, 23-25. Washington, George, commander-in-chief of the American armies, expression of, that the navies had "the casting vote" in the War of Independence, 4, 151; arrangements of, for defence of New York City, 1776, 41-43; withdraws the exposed division on Brooklyn Heights, 43, 44; successive retirements of, to Harlem River, to New Jersey, and across Delaware River, 44-46; wins battle of Trenton, 1776, and recovers great part of New Jersey, 48, 49; comment of, on Howe's sailing from New York, 1777, 52; disputes, unsuccessfully, Howe's advance on Philadelphia, 53, 55; skilful strategic position of, in New Jersey hills, 56; comment of, upon effects of d'Estaing's long passage out, 1778, 63; hot pursuit by, of Clinton in retreat from Philadelphia to New York, 64; disappointment of, at failure of French naval assistance, 1780, 150, 152; comment of, on Arnold's treason, 152; with Rochambeau, asks coöperation of de Grasse, 1781, 168; movement of, against Cornwallis at Yorktown, 178, 184; surrender of Cornwallis to, 185; mentioned incidentally, 67, 72. Washington, Fort, commanding Hudson River, 1776, 44, 46; Washington orders evacuation of, 45; stormed by British, and garrison taken, 46. West Indies, dependence of, upon American continent, 60; seasonal conditions in, affecting naval operations, 98, 115, 149, 159; commercial importance of, 98; naval battles in, 103, 106-112, 129, 130-135, 142-144, 153, 163-167, 198-205, 207-220. White, Thomas, British naval author serving during War of American Independence, quoted, 108, 183 (note), 204. Yorktown, series of events which brought Cornwallis to, 152, 153, 169, 170, 174, 175; naval actions affecting control of waters around, 170-173, 179-184; Cornwallis shut up in, 176; French navy in force before, 184; French and American armies arrive before, 184; surrender of Cornwallis at, 185. Zoutman, Johan A. , Dutch Admiral, commands the squadron at the battle of the Dogger Bank, 189-193. [Illustration]