THE LIFE OF NELSON THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SEA POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN BY CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, D. C. L. , LL. D. UNITED STATES NAVY AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, ""THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, "AND OF A "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT" IN TWO VOLUMESVOL. II. LONDONSAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, & COMPANY, _LIMITED_1897 CONTENTS OF VOL. II. CHAPTER XIV. NELSON TEMPORARILY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. --RELIEVEDBY LORD KEITH. --APPLIES TO RETURN TO ENGLAND ON ACCOUNT OF ILL HEALTH. AUGUST, 1799--JUNE, 1800. Nelson left in temporary commandHis disposition of the squadronMade Duke of Bronté in SicilyHis hopes of remaining in command disappointedHis discontentEnergy and tact in exercising commandAffairs in Rome and NaplesNelson visits MinorcaHis anxiety about MaltaPortuguese squadron recalled to Lisbon. --Nelson's actionCharacteristics of his intercourse with foreign officialsUrgency with army to support blockade of La ValettaPartial success in thisSuccesses on the Continent of the Coalition against FranceSubsequent blunders and disastersNelson's mortification at Bonaparte's escape to FranceThe French defeat the Turks at AboukirNelson peremptorily forbids Sidney Smith to allow any Frenchto leave EgyptSmith nevertheless countenances the Convention of El ArishHis action disallowed by Keith and NelsonNelson's vivid expressions of disapprovalNelson joins Keith at LeghornThey visit Palermo and Malta togetherCapture of "Le Généreux, " 74, by Nelson's divisionNelson's relations with Keith, and bearing towards himKeith orders Nelson to take personal charge off MaltaNelson's annoyance and remonstranceHis restiveness under Keith's commandHe returns from Malta to PalermoThe "Guillaume Tell, " 80, captured in his absenceDispleasure of the Admiralty at his quitting his stationLetters of the First LordNelson's soreness under themHe applies for leave to return to England CHAPTER XV. NELSON LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN. --THE JOURNEY OVERLANDTHROUGH GERMANY. --ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND. --SEPARATIONFROM LADY NELSON. --HOISTS HIS FLAG IN THE CHANNELFLEET, UNDER LORD ST. VINCENT. JUNE, 1800--JANUARY, 1801. Nelson escorts the Queen of Naples to Leghorn with two Britishships-of-the-lineKeith's displeasureNelson at LeghornAustrians defeated at MarengoNelson and the Hamiltons leave Leghorn for AnconaJourney to Trieste and ViennaEnthusiasm shown towards Nelson by the peopleMention of him and Lady Hamilton by eye-witnessesAnecdotes of himHis meeting with the Archduke Charles at PragueMrs. St. George's account of him at DresdenHer disparaging mention of Lady HamiltonArrival of the party in EnglandLady Nelson's attitude at this timeHer letters to NelsonHis reception and conduct in LondonGrowing estrangement between him and Lady NelsonAnecdote of his visit to FonthillFinal breach with Lady NelsonHer blameless character, and subsequent lifeNelson's testimony to her conductHoists his flag on board the "San Josef" at PlymouthBirth of the child HoratiaNelson's care to conceal his relations with Lady Hamilton CHAPTER XVI. THE EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC AND BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN. --NELSONRETURNS TO ENGLAND. FEBRUARY--JUNE, 1801. Origin of the trouble between Great Britain and DenmarkThe entrance of the Czar Paul into the quarrelRenewal of the Armed Neutrality of 1780Relations of Bonaparte to this eventNelson joins the fleet under Sir Hyde Parker, at YarmouthRelations between him and ParkerNelson's disapproval of the plans for the expeditionEvident change in his general dispositionAnecdote of Nelson and the turbotThe fleet collected off the SkawParker's slowness and Nelson's impatienceAlarming reports of the Danes' preparationsNelson's attitude and counselsAccuracy of his judgment of the conditionsTact and discretion in his dealings with ParkerHis letter to Parker upon the general situationParker's indecisionNelson's plans adoptedThe fleet passes the SoundDetail and discussion of Nelson's plan of operationsHis feelings and speech in the Council of WarNelson's division anchors south of CopenhagenNelson on the night before the battleThe Danish dispositions for defenceNelson's Plan of Attack--Detail and discussionThe Battle of CopenhagenParker makes the signal to leave off actionNelson refuses to repeat itDiscussion of this incidentIncidents of the battleNelson addresses a letter to the Crown Prince under a flag oftruceCharacteristic anecdoteDiscussion of the sending of the flag of truceThe battle discontinuedNelson removes his shipsCompleteness of his successMerit of his conduct throughoutHe is advanced in the peerage to be a ViscountNo other rewards, or medals, bestowed for this actionNegotiations intrusted to Nelson by ParkerThe murder of the Czar PaulArmistice for fourteen weeks concluded with DenmarkQualified approval of the British GovernmentThe British fleet enters the BalticNelson's ardor and personal recklessness. --AnecdoteParker's sluggishness of action. --Nelson's impatienceRussia intimates her purpose to abstain from hostilitiesNelson's controversy with the Danish Commodore FischerParker ordered home, and Nelson left in commandDissatisfaction of the latterHis longing to return to Lady HamiltonHe insists upon being relieved, on account of his healthHe starts at once with the fleet for RevelDispleasure manifested by the Czar AlexanderNelson withdraws from Revel to RostockThe Czar thereupon raises the embargo on British merchantshipsNelson's elation over this result of his conductDetails of his life on boardHis avoidance of social relations outside the shipRelieved by Admiral Pole, and returns to England CHAPTER XVII. NELSON COMMANDS THE "SQUADRON ON A PARTICULAR SERVICE, "FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE COAST OF ENGLAND AGAINST INVASION. --SIGNATUREOF PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITHFRANCE. JULY-OCTOBER, 1801. Nelson's longing for reposeHis services immediately required againHis reluctant consentBonaparte's threats of invasionInadequacy of British preparations for coast-defenceNature of British apprehensions in 1801Nelson's Memoranda for the Defence of the ThamesAnalysis and discussion of this paperSt. Vincent's sagacious views on national defenceApparent divergence between him and NelsonNelson hoists his flag againHis tact and courtesy towards othersActivity of his movementsSatisfied that there can be no invasionBoat attack upon the vessels before BoulogneIts disastrous failureNelson's distressHis exasperation at being kept afloatHis alienation from TroubridgeAnnoyances of his situationDeath of Commander Parker. --Nelson's griefHis liberality in money mattersPecuniary embarrassmentsSignature of the preliminaries of peaceNelson's satisfaction at the prospect of releaseHis indignation at the excessive elation of othersReceives leave of absence and goes home CHAPTER XVIII. RELEASE FROM ACTIVE SERVICE DURING THE PEACE OF AMIENS. --HOMELIFE AT MERTON. --PUBLIC INCIDENTS. OCTOBER, 1801--MAY, 1803. Nelson makes his home with the HamiltonsHis letter of final severance to his wifeHis relations to his stepson, Josiah NisbetDesire to have a home of his ownLady Hamilton selects Merton for himThe purchase effected, and the Hamiltons reside with himPosition of Sir William and of Lady Hamilton in the houseDifferences between themMinto's account of the household at MertonReminiscence of the same by Nelson's nephewIncident narrated by Lieutenant LaymanRecollections of Nelson by the vicar's daughterNelson's strong religious sense of Divine ProvidenceTakes his place in the House of LordsHis controversy about rewards for the Battle of CopenhagenHis action justifiedNelson's warm and avowed sympathy with his followersHis consistent maintenance of the ground assumedHis interest in public questionsDissatisfaction with the general conduct of the AdmiraltyHis sense of neglectEmbarrassment in money mattersInadequacy of his pension to his servicesHis doubts as to the continuance of peaceHis antagonism to Bonaparte illustratedSpeech in seconding the address to the throneDesignated for the Mediterranean in case of warVolunteers his servicesHoists his flag in the "Victory, " and sailsBreaks in his home-ties during this periodDeath of his fatherDeath of Sir William HamiltonHamilton's expressed confidence in NelsonRelations of Nelson's family to Lady Nelson and to Lady Hamilton CHAPTER XIX. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. --THE LONGWATCH OFF TOULON. --OCCUPATIONS OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. MAY, 1803--JANUARY, 1805. Changed political conditions in the MediterraneanAttitude of the Great PowersSituation of Spain and PortugalPolicy of the Italian StatesNelson's sense of the importance of the MediterraneanBonaparte's policyThe course advocated by NelsonAccuracy of his general forecastImpatience to reach his stationUnwilling detention off UshantQuits the "Victory, " and proceeds in a frigateMomentary stop in GibraltarArrival at MaltaExtensive correspondencePolicy as regards the Two SiciliesHis impatience with blind observance of ordersDeparture from Malta for ToulonEmotions at the sight of NaplesOpinion on Malta's value to EnglandStrategic importance of Malta and GibraltarNelson joins the fleet before ToulonBad condition of the shipsHis skilful administration of the fleetDifficulty of obtaining suppliesHis attitude towards SpainImportance of Sardinia in Nelson's eyesThe valuable anchorage at MadalenaStation taken by him off ToulonFears loss of Sardinia, and serious consequencesSignificance of Napoleon's inactivity in the MediterraneanThe winter rendezvous of the fleet. --NumberSeamanlike care of ships and sparsPreserves health of seamen by constant activitySanitary conditions of the fleetHis personal health, and anxietiesFears a break-downSpeculations as to French intentionsCharacteristic distrust of FrenchmenIncreasing perplexitiesFirmness of his resolutionThe French manoeuvre outside ToulonNelson's tactical conclusions and arrangementsHis care to impart his ideas to his officersMethods of intercourse with themExasperation at a statement of Latouche TrévilleEndeavors to force or to lure the French to seaEffect of worry upon his mindHis last promotion. --Vice-Admiral of the WhiteWearing effect of protracted monotonyRefuses to let Lady Hamilton join himThe daily life on boardAccount of Nelson's health and habitsOccupations in business hoursDiplomatic ability and conciliatory temperSharp reply to remonstrance about blockadesDifficulties with AlgiersNelson's diligent pursuit of informationInterest in listening to conversationsExamination of foreign journals and captured lettersKindliness in intercourse with othersExercise of official patronageProtection of British tradeWant of frigates and small cruisersCollection and protection of convoysNelson applies for sick leaveDesire to return to the station afterwardsLeave is granted by the AdmiraltyThe Mediterranean Station dividedSir John Orde given the portion west of GibraltarNelson's dissatisfaction and complaintsHis change of mind about going homeLearns Cornwallis's order to seize Spanish treasure-shipsDirects captains under his orders not to obeyLetter illustrative of the characteristics of his ordersAdequacy of his measures to the requirements of the caseDetermines not to use his leave of absenceOrde arrives off CadizIndications of the French fleet leaving ToulonNelson receives word of the seizure of Spanish shipsPromptness of his measures. --Reasons thereforRumors of French departureAnnoyances caused Nelson by OrdeThe mission of the frigate "Amazon"Nelson's hope of meeting the French fleetOpinions on general subjectsSympathetic insight into Bonaparte's purposesThe French fleet sails from Toulon CHAPTER XX. THE ESCAPE AND PURSUIT OF THE TOULON FLEET. --NELSON'SRETURN TO ENGLAND. JANUARY-AUGUST, 1805. Object of Napoleon's combinations in 1805Details of his planNelson's share in thwarting itThe difficulties of one dealing with NapoleonNelson's guiding principleThe sailing of the Toulon fleetNelson's movements and perplexitiesGoes to AlexandriaReturns to Gulf of Palmas, SardiniaBritish disasters in Western MediterraneanCharacteristic letter of Nelson in behalf of an officerExplanations to the Admiralty about his own courseMakes a round off Toulon and Barcelona to deceive the enemyReturns to the Gulf of PalmasThe Toulon fleet sails againIts movements and those of NelsonDistress and misfortunes of the latterLearns that the French fleet has passed the StraitsThoroughness and sagacity of his measuresContinued head winds and distress of mindThe excitement in LondonGloom at the AdmiraltyNelson's constancy against bad fortuneHears that the French and Spaniards are gone to the West IndiesDetermines to follow them thereSails in pursuitIncidents of the voyageArrives in BarbadoesMisled by false informationRapid measures to retrieve the mis-stepInfers that the enemy have returned to EuropeHe starts back immediately for GibraltarHis judgments rapid, but not precipitateStrength of his convictionsRelief from the anxiety previously feltMovements of the allies and of NelsonPrecautions of the latterHis own explanation of his reasonsDiscussion of this utteranceIndecisive engagement between the allies and Sir Robert CalderAlarm in London at the failure of the latterNelson's protracted pursuit and mental depressionReaches the Straits againAppreciation of his action by othersExchange of views between Nelson and CollingwoodMovements of Villeneuve, Calder, and NelsonNelson's arrival in GibraltarSubsequent rapid movementsLearns the news brought by the "Curieux"Starts at once for the northwardJoins the Channel Fleet off UshantLeaves his squadron with Cornwallis, and proceeds to EnglandAnchors at SpitheadHis sympathy with CalderTenacity of his opinions CHAPTER XXI. NELSON'S LAST STAY IN ENGLAND. AUGUST 19--SEPTEMBER 15, 1805. Nelson hauls down his flag and goes to MertonInterviews with the AdmiraltyHis one meeting with WellingtonInterview with Lord CastlereaghPopular demonstrations of affectionHome life at MertonPresentimentsIntimations of early summons into serviceNews arrives that the combined fleets are in CadizDetermination of the British GovernmentNelson's opinion on the License SystemHis services requested by the GovernmentLady Hamilton's part in his decisionIt is settled that he return to the MediterraneanHis health and spiritsHis insistence upon the need for numbersFinal departure from homeFlag re-hoisted on board the "Victory"Anecdote of Nelson and the gypsy CHAPTER XXII. THE ANTECEDENTS OF TRAFALGAR. SEPTEMBER--OCTOBER 19, 1805. Popular demonstrations when Nelson embarkedThe passage to CadizPrecautions to deceive the enemyHis reception by the officers of the fleetThe "Plan of Attack" of May, 1805The "Nelson Touch"Discussion and comparison of these two papersComparison between the second and the Battle of Trafalgar, as foughtNelson and Sir Robert CalderNelson's concession to Calder, and his own comments upon itHis disposition of the fleet before CadizHis fear lest the enemy should evade himGrowing presentiments, and cheerful calmnessAnecdote showing his consideratenessNecessity for sending away a detachmentNumbers of the British, and of the allies in CadizNelson's general intentions, made known to his subordinatesThe enemy begins to leave Cadiz CHAPTER XXIII. TRAFALGAR. --THE DEATH OF NELSON. OCTOBER 19-21, 1805. Numbers and composition of the opposing fleetsDifficulties of the allies in leaving portRespective movements of the two fleetsNelson's last letter to Lady HamiltonHis last letter to his childEvents and incidents of October 20Relative positions of the fleets at midnightConditions at daybreak of the 21stThe manoeuvres of the two fleetsNelson's intercourse with Blackwood on the 21stHe bequeaths Lady Hamilton and Horatia to the care of his CountryThe hostile fleets forming for battleNelson's impatience to close the enemyThe anxiety of others for his personal safetyThe order of the allies while awaiting attackNelson's last prayer as entered in his journalThe origin and development of his famous signalThe battle opensThe "Victory" comes under fireNelson bids Blackwood a final farewellExposure and loss of life on board the "Victory"The "Victory" breaks the enemy's lineHer duel with the "Redoutable"Nelson falls, mortally woundedThe death-scene in the cockpitThe decisive hour of the battleThe second and closing phase of the battleNelson's anxiety about HardyHardy's first visit to his death-bedThe final exchange of shotsHardy's second visit and Nelson's farewellThe last momentsThe death of NelsonThe close of the fightThe significance of Nelson's lifeThe perfect fulfilment of his life's work INDEX CHAPTER XIV. NELSON TEMPORARILY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. --RELIEVEDBY LORD KEITH. --APPLIES TO RETURN TO ENGLAND ON ACCOUNT OF ILL HEALTH. AUGUST, August 1799--JUNE, 1800. AGE, 41. Upon Keith's departure, the command in the Mediterranean devolved uponNelson, who for some time remained in doubt of the fact, but with hisusual promptitude acted as if all depended upon himself. "I amventuring certainly out of my line of duty, but as thecommander-in-chief may not even be on the station, I must do the bestwhich my judgment points out during his temporary absence. " Sixsail-of-the-line, under Admiral Duckworth, were sufficient for serviceat Gibraltar and Cadiz, if the latter port was deserted. Four of theline were about Minorca, constantly, though inefficiently, threatenedfrom the adjacent coasts of Spain. Three were blockading Malta, conjointly with the Portuguese vessels. Sidney Smith with his divisionremained in the Levant. Troubridge was operating with a few ships onthe coast of Italy, against Civita Vecchia, still in the hands of theFrench. A small squadron was maintained on the Riviera of Genoa, disturbing the communications of the French, and keeping touch withthe advance of the Austro-Russians; but it was expected that theRussian fleet, as was natural and proper, would soon assume the dutyof co-operating with their general, Suwarrow. The smaller Britishcruisers were distributed among these various duties. The flagship"Foudroyant" was at Palermo, whither the King returned from Naples onthe 8th of August, and there the headquarters of the squadron remainedduring Nelson's command. Soon after this arrival in Palermo the Kingconferred upon him the title of Duke of Bronté, with an estate of thesame name in Sicily, valued at £3, 000 per annum. After this theadmiral for a time signed his papers as Bronté Nelson, [1] changedsubsequently to Bronté Nelson of the Nile, and finally settled down toNelson and Bronté, which was his form of signature for the last fouryears of his life. He placed upon his new estate an annual charge of£500 in favor of his father for the term of the latter's life. "Receive this small tribute, my honoured father, " he wrote, "as a markof gratitude to the best of parents from his most dutiful son. " On the 20th of September he received letters from the Admiralty, investing him with the chief command, "till the return of Lord Keithor some other your superior officer. " He was not, however, allowed theappointments of a commander-in-chief, and often complained of theinadequacy of his staff to the extent of his duties. Nelson naturallyhoped that his long and eminent services in that particular field, andthe conspicuous ability he had shown on so many occasions, would leadto the station remaining permanently in his hands, and that LordKeith, who was now in England, would succeed in due course to theChannel Fleet, whose commander, Lord Bridport, soon after retired. TheMediterranean was naturally attributed to a vice-admiral, and one ofsome seniority; but Nelson was now a rear-admiral of the Red, thehighest color, not far, therefore, from promotion, and it would not bean unreasonable conclusion that the same ministry which had beenfortunate enough to choose him for the campaign of the Nile, might nowprefer to entrust to such able and enterprising hands the greatinterests of the Mediterranean at large. It was not, however, to be so. Whether moved only by routineconsiderations of rank, as afterwards at Copenhagen, or whether hisrelations with the Sicilian Court, his conduct of affairs at Naples, and his collisions with Keith, had excited doubt of the normal balanceof his mind, the Admiralty decided to send Keith back, and Nelson, greatly to his mortification, was kept in charge only till the end ofthe year. As St. Vincent had always left him practically independent, he had known no superior since he entered the Straits, except duringKeith's brief period of succession, when leagues of shelteringdistance left him free, as has been seen, to defy orders when not inaccordance with his views; and he found it impossible now to bow hiswill to the second place on the very field of his glory. To thisfeeling, natural in any man, and doubly so to one of Nelson's quicksusceptibilities, at once stimulated and soothed by the lavishadulation of the past year, was added personal dislike to his newsuperior, aggravated, if not originated, by the clash of judgment overthe relative importance of Naples and Minorca. "I have seriousthoughts of giving up active service, " he wrote to Minto; "GreenwichHospital seems a fit retreat for me after being _evidently_ thoughtunfit to command in the Mediterranean. " Complaints of Keith's lack ofconsideration then abound, nor does he seem to be conscious that therewas anything in his mode of life, in current rumor, or in his pastrelations with his new commander-in-chief, which might make the latterunwilling to give him the loose rein St. Vincent had done. From the time that Keith left the Mediterranean in July, 1799, toNelson's own departure a year later, there was little to be done inthe naval way except to maintain and press existing advantages, andwait until the fruit was ready to drop. The absolute supremacy of theBritish squadrons, challenged for a moment by the incursion of AdmiralBruix, had reverted, in even greater degree than before, by theabsence of the Spanish ships which had accompanied him to Brest. Impeded by their own numbers, and paralyzed by the insufficiency ofthe resources of the port, they remained there a huge, inert mass, whose impotence was only partially understood by the British; a factwhich conduced to prolong Keith's presence in the Channel. The yearunder consideration was therefore devoid of stirring events at sea. In the Mediterranean, it is true, Nelson's unwearying mental energy, and keen sense of the necessity of seizing opportunity, did not allowthings to lapse into indolence. Whether or not he was well advised tosettle himself at Palermo, aware as he must have been of the actualtemptation, and of the serious injury that scandal was doing to hisreputation, both professional and personal, may admit of doubt. Withnumerous detached and minor services carrying on at the same moment, there was much to be said for the commander-in-chief remaining in afixed position, near the centre of affairs; and in his apprehensioneverything then revolved about the Kingdom of Naples. There can be noquestion, however, that all his faculties were constantly on thealert; and that his administration of the station until Keith's returnwas characterized by the same zeal, sagacity, and politic tact that hehad shown in earlier days. It is admirable to note the patience, courtesy, and adroit compliment, he brings into play, to kindle, inthose over whom he has no direct control, the ardor for the generalgood, and the fearlessness of responsibility, which actuate himself;and at the same time to observe how severe the strain was upon hisnervous and irritable temper, as betrayed in comments upon these verypersons, made in private letters which he never expected would see thelight. The points of principal importance were the consolidation of theroyal power in the continental territory of the Two Sicilies, thereduction of Malta, and the retention of the French army in Egypt inentire isolation from France. For the first, Nelson entirely failed inhis efforts to induce the King to trust himself again in Naples, asthe Hamiltons and he had expected when they came back to Palermo. "Mysituation here is indeed an uncomfortable one, " he said to EarlSpencer; "for plain common sense points out that the King shouldreturn to Naples, but nothing can move him. " "Our joint exertions havebeen used to get the King to go to Naples, " he wrote to Troubridge, "but of no avail; the Austrians will be there before him. " Althoughthe French had been expelled from all the Neapolitan dominions, thepresence of fifteen hundred in Rome and Civita Vecchia served then asan excuse. Nelson implored the commander of the British troops atMinorca to spare twelve hundred of his men, to aid Troubridge on theRoman coast. "Sir Charles Stuart, " he tells him flatteringly, "by histimely exertion saved this Kingdom [Sicily] from anarchy andconfusion, and perhaps from rebellion. So it is now, my dear Sir, Itrust, in your power (and I have assured the good King and Queen ofyour readiness to serve them and the good cause as much as SirCharles) to send for the taking possession of Civita Vecchia and Rome;this done, and with my life, I will answer for the success of theexpedition. All would be quiet and happy; and their Sicilian Majestiesmight return to their throne without any alarm from mobs. .. . I am sureI need not venture to say more on the subject. Your Excellency'sjudgment and heart will point out the necessity of the measure if itcan be accomplished. " "Our King would be much gratified that _Britain_not _Austria_ should reinstate the Pope. " Sir James Erskine, thus importuned, did not see his way to sending thetroops. Naturally, as a soldier, he did not rely as much upon thenavy preventing a landing in his island, as upon his own powers ofresistance after it was effected, and was therefore unwilling to sparefrom the latter. The point of view of a seaman was, and is, different. He complained, too, that Duckworth had taken a great many ships toGibraltar. Nelson admits the mistake, and expresses his regret, but noword of dissatisfaction with Erskine transpires through his evidentdisappointment. He only says, "Pardon what I am going to repeat, thateither in Malta or on the Continent, a field of glory is open. ""Minorca, " he wrote to Spencer, "I have never yet considered in thesmallest danger, but it has been a misfortune that others have thoughtdifferently from me on that point. " Towards the end of September, Troubridge, without the aid of British troops, but supported by thearrival of a division sent by Suwarrow, reported the evacuation ofRome and Civita Vecchia. "How happy you have made us!" wrote Nelson tohim. "My pen will not say what I feel. " The King, however, would notreturn to Naples, now that this obstacle was withdrawn. "The Queen hasa noble generous disposition, " said Nelson two months later. "Unfortunately the King and her Majesty do not at this moment drawexactly the same way; therefore, his Majesty will not go at thismoment to Naples, where his presence is much wanted. " "We do but wasteour breath, " he avowed afterwards. In the beginning of October, a visit which he had intended making toMinorca was hastened by a report that thirteen hostileships-of-the-line had been seen off Cape Finisterre, and it wasthought they might be destined for the Mediterranean. Nelson hoped toassemble ten to meet them; but the news proved to be false. He leftPalermo for this trip on the 5th of October, and returned again on the22d, having remained five days in Port Mahon. The arrangements for thenaval force, depending entirely upon himself, were soon settled; buthe was disappointed in obtaining, as he had hoped to do from apersonal interview with Erskine, a detachment of two thousand troopsfor Malta. About that island he was, to use his own words, almost indespair. For over a year La Valetta had been blockaded by land andsea. For the latter he could with difficulty find ships; for theformer he could obtain no men to aid the islanders, who, halfstarving, dependent for food chiefly upon Sicily, were sustained intheir resistance mainly by hatred of the invaders, and by the tactfulappeals and encouragement of Captain Ball, who lived ashore amongthem. The Barbary pirates, by virtue of their war with Naples, captured many of the vessels laden with supplies, despite Nelson'spassports; while the Sicilian Court, though well disposed, lacked theenergy and the propelling force necessary to compel the collection anddespatch of the needed grain. On one occasion Troubridge or Ball, desperate at the sight of the famine around them, sent a ship of warinto Girgenti, a Sicilian port, seized, and brought away twocorn-laden vessels. "The measure was strong, " said Nelson, but herefrained from censuring; and, while apologizing to the Government, added he hoped it "would not again force officers to so unpleasant analternative. " He feared that in their misery the Maltese would abandonthe struggle, particularly if they got wind of the purpose of GreatBritain to restore the hated Order of Knights, in deference to thewishes of the Czar. "The moment the French flag is struck, " he hadbeen obliged to write to Ball, "the colours of the Order must behoisted and no other; when it was settled otherwise, the orders fromEngland were not so strong. " About this time came information that several ships were fitting outat Toulon, with supplies for the besieged. This increased Nelson'sanxieties, and at the same time emphasized the necessity which he hadalways urged of using speedier and surer means to reduce the place, while the undisputed mastery of the sea gave the opportunity. "Whatmight not Bruix have done, had he done his duty?" was his own commentupon that recent incursion; and who could tell how soon as great aforce might appear again under an abler man? He turned in everydirection, and was instant in his appeals for aid. He wrote to Actonthat he had positive information that seven ships were loaded inToulon. "I therefore beg leave to propose to your Excellency, whetherunder our present circumstances, it would not be right for hisSicilian Majesty to desire that the English garrison at Messina shouldinstantly go to Malta, for I am clear, that if Malta is relieved, thatour forces got together could not take it, and the commencement of anew blockade would be useless. All the Barbary cruisers would therehave their rendezvous, and not a vessel of his Sicilian Majesty'scould put to sea. " He exhorts the minister also to apply to theRussians for immediate help at Malta. At the same time, to augment his embarrassments, orders came fromLisbon recalling the Portuguese squadron, which formed the larger partof the sea blockade. Nelson forgot how often he had abused them asuseless, and grappled with that part of the difficulty withcharacteristic boldness. He peremptorily forbade the admiral to obeyhis orders. "As the reduction of the Island of Malta is of thegreatest consequence to the interests of the allied Powers at war withFrance, and the withdrawing of the squadron under your command, atthis time, from the blockade of that island, will be of the mostruinous consequences to their interests . .. You are hereby requiredand directed, in consideration of the above circumstances, andnotwithstanding the orders you may have received from your Court toreturn to Lisbon, not on any consideration whatsoever to withdraw oneman from that island, which may have been landed from the squadronunder your Excellency's command, or detach one ship down theMediterranean, until further orders from me for that purpose. " Yourorders, he tells Niza in a private letter, were founded upon thebelief that your presence was no longer necessary; "but the contraryis the fact--for your services were never more wanted than at thismoment, when every exertion is wanting to get more troops of Englishand Russians to Malta. " He is evidently thinking of his differencewith Keith; but now he is within the limits of his commission asCommander-in-chief. Doubting, however, whether his official authoritywill prevail with Niza to disobey his recall, he plies him skilfullywith appeals to those sentiments of honor which had received suchillustration in his own noble career. "If you quit your most importantstation till I can get" reliefs for you, "depend upon it, yourillustrious Prince will disapprove of (in this instance) yourpunctilious execution of orders. " "We shall soon get more troops fromMessina and Minorca; and I am not a little anxious for the honour ofPortugal and your Excellency, that you should be present at thesurrender. I hold myself responsible. " "You was the first at theblockade. Your Excellency's conduct has gained you the love and esteemof Governor Ball, all the British officers and men, and the wholeMaltese people; and give me leave to add the name of Nelson as one ofyour warmest admirers, as an officer and a friend. " As he dealt with the Portuguese admiral, so, in due measure, heconducted his intercourse with all others who came within the scope ofhis widely ranging activities. Already more Neapolitan than the King, to the Russian he became as a Russian, to the Turk as a Turk, allthings to all men, if he could by any means promote the interest ofthe Allied cause and save Malta. Amid the diverse and conflictingmotives of a coalition, Nelson played a steady hand, his attentionunified, and his sight cleared, by an unwavering regard to the singleobject which he compressed into the words, "Down, down, with theFrench!" In that sense, he asserts truthfully enough to each and allof his correspondents that the advantage of their country and theirmonarch is as dear to him as that of Great Britain. He touches withartful skill upon the evident interests of each nation, appeals to theofficer's sense of the cherished desires of his sovereign, and, whilefrankly setting forth the truths necessary to be spoken, as to thecomparative claims upon himself of the various portions of the field, he insinuates, rather than suggests, what the person immediatelyaddressed ought to be doing in furtherance of the one great aim. Withal, despite the uneasiness to which he is constantly a prey onaccount of the failures of others, no lack of confidence in the one towhom he is writing is suffered to appear. Each is not only exhortedand cheered, but patted on the back with an implied approbation, whichin his own service constituted much of his well-deserved influence. Heis as hearty and generous in his praises to Sir Sidney Smith, whom henever fully trusted, for his services at Acre, as he is to the valuedfriend, and pattern of all naval efficiency, Troubridge. To theEmperor of Russia he paid the politic attention of sending a detailedreport of all that had been done about Malta, made to him as GrandMaster of the Order, --a delicate and adroit flattery at the moment, for the Czar then valued himself more as the restorer of an ancientorder of chivalry than as the inheritor of a great Sovereignty; andhis position was further recognized by asking of him the insignia ofthe Order for Captain Ball and Lady Hamilton. This immense load of correspondence and anxiety was additional to thenumerous unrecorded cares and interviews, relating to the routine workand maintenance of a great squadron, often left bare of resources fromhome, and to the support of the destitute population of Malta, --sixtythousand souls; and all was carried on amid the constant going andcoming of the ambassador's house, kept open to naval officers andothers. This public sort of life and excitement involved considerableexpense, and was little to the taste of either Nelson or Hamilton, the latter of whom was now approaching his seventieth year; but in itLady Hamilton was in all her glory, overwhelmed with compliments, thevictor of the Nile at her feet, and "making a great figure in ourpolitical line, " to use her husband's words. "Except to the Court, "wrote Nelson, replying to a censure from the Admiralty for failing tosend a letter by a certain channel, when he had sent duplicates by twoother conveyances, --"except to the Court, till after eight o'clock atnight I never relax from business. I have had hitherto, the Boardknows, no one emolument--no one advantage of a Commander-in-chief. " Itwas in reference to this captious rebuff, received when immersed incares, that he wrote to Spencer: "Do not, my dear Lord, let theAdmiralty write harshly to me--my generous soul cannot bear it, beingconscious it is entirely unmerited. " While he was striving to gain assistance for the Maltese, he does notforget to sustain them with hopes, not always too well founded. Hetells Ball he trusts the Messina troops will soon be with him. "Youmay depend, in October, I will get 2, 000 men on shore at Malta. Nizais ordered to Lisbon, but I have directed his stay off Malta. " Heappeals personally to the British commander at Messina, and to theRussian minister at Palermo, reminding the latter how dear Malta andits Order were to his sovereign. "Malta, my dear Sir, is in mythoughts sleeping or waking. " The Portuguese, he tells him, areordered home; but, wishing Russian assistance, he does not say that hehas stopped them, --as to which, indeed, he could not feel sure. The same object pressed upon him while in Port Mahon, and hesucceeded, by his personal enthusiasm, in arousing Erskine's interestin the matter; but the latter was loaded to the muzzle withobjections. "Sir James, " said Nelson to Troubridge, with the amusingprofessional prejudice they both entertained, "enters upon thedifficulty of the undertaking in a true soldier way. " "I am just comefrom Sir James, " he wrote to Hamilton on the 13th of October. "He seesall the difficulty of taking Malta in the clearest point of views, andtherefore it became an arduous task to make him think that with God'sblessing the thing was possible. " He has, however, consented toprepare fifteen hundred men with stores and equipments, but only oncondition that the Russians will also give a thousand, --a furtherdraft on Nelson's diplomacy, --and a thousand be landed from thesquadron, etc. Besides, there is the further difficulty that asuperior officer is expected from England, and what will he say? Andwill Erskine be justified in sending men before his entirely uncertainarrival? It may be imagined what such proceedings were to Nelson'snervous, ardent, unhesitating temperament, and they elicited thecharacteristic comment, "This has been my first conference. It hascost me four hours hard labour, and may be upset by a fool. " "My heartis, I assure you, almost broke with this and other things, " he wroteto Spencer. "If the enemy gets supplies in, we may bid adieu to Malta. This would complete my misery; for I am afraid I take all services toomuch to heart. The accomplishing of them is my study, night and day. " "My dear Sir James, " he writes to Erskine after returning to Palermo, "I am in desperation about Malta--we shall lose it, I am afraid, pastredemption. I send you copies of Niza's and Ball's letters, alsoGeneral Acton's, so you will see I have not been idle. " As it is, Ballcan hardly keep the inhabitants in hope of relief; what then will itbe if the Portuguese withdraw? "If the islanders are forced again tojoin the French, we may not find even landing a very easy task, muchless to get again our present advantageous position. I thereforeentreat for the honour of our King, that whether General Fox isarrived or not, at least the garrison of Messina may be ordered tohold post in Malta until a sufficient force can be collected toattack it. .. . I know well enough of what officers in your situationcan do; the delicacy of your feelings on the near approach of GeneralFox I can readily conceive; but the time you know nothing about; thisis a great and important moment, and the only thing to be considered, _is his Majesty's service to stand still for an instant?_ . .. Was thecall for these troops known at home, would they not order them toproceed when the service near at hand loudly calls for them? _this isthe only thing in my opinion for consideration_. If we lose thisopportunity it will be impossible to recall it. " From this desperateappeal he turns to Ball, with words of encouragement for hisislanders. "We shall soon hear to a certainty of at least 5, 000Russian troops for the service of Malta. Within a month I hope to see10, 000 men in arms against La Valetta. I have sent for Troubridge andMartin, that I may get a force to relieve Niza. I trust he will not gotill I can get not only a proper force to relieve his ships, but thoseof his people who are on shore. " "The great order of all, " he writesErskine three weeks later, "is to destroy the power of the French. Tworegiments for two months would probably, with the assistance of theRussians, give us Malta, liberate us from an enemy close to our doors, gratify the Emperor of Russia, protect our Levant trade, relieve alarge squadron of ships from this service, and enable me the better toafford naval protection to the island of Minorca, and assist ourallies on the northern coast of Italy, and to annoy the enemy on thecoast of France. " Nelson's entreaties and efforts met with success, sufficient at leastto stay the ebbing tide. General Fox arrived in Minorca, gavepermission for the garrison of Messina to go to Malta, and on the 25thof November Troubridge, bringing this news, arrived off Palermo. Nelson's haste did not permit the "Culloden" to anchor. Shifting hisflag to a transport, he sent out the "Foudroyant" to meet her, withorders for both to go to Messina, embark the garrison, and get offMalta as soon as possible. The "Northumberland, " seventy-four, wasalso to join off Malta, forming a division to replace the Portuguesesquadron. The latter quitted the blockade in December, Nelsonnotifying Niza on the 18th of the month that he no longer consideredhim under his command. The Messina troops landed at Malta on the 10th. The British then had fifteen hundred men on the island, supported bytwo thousand Maltese, well disciplined and armed, besides a number ofnative irregulars upon whom only partial dependence could be placed. The Russians never came to take part. They got as far as Messina, butthere received orders to go to Corfu, both ships and men. This was inpursuance of a change of policy in the Czar, who, being enraged at theconduct of his allies, particularly of the Austrians, in the latecampaign, intended withdrawing from the Coalition, and wasconcentrating troops at Corfu. This revived Nelson's fears for Malta. "I trust Graham will not think of giving the island to the French bywithdrawing, till he receives orders from General Fox. " The troopsremained, but in numbers too small to admit active operations. Theresult was left perforce to the slow pressure of blockade; and finalsuccess, insured mainly by Nelson's untiring efforts, was not attaineduntil after he had left the Mediterranean. The six months of his independent command, though unmarked by strikingincidents at sea, were crowded with events, important in themselves, but far more important as pregnant of great and portentous changes inthe political and military conditions of Europe. When Keith passed theStraits in pursuit of the Franco-Spanish fleet, on the 30th of July, the forces of the Coalition in Upper Italy were in the full tide ofrepeated victories and unchecked success. On that same day thefortress of Mantua, the siege of which in 1796 had stayed for ninemonths the triumphal progress of Bonaparte, was surrendered by theFrench, whose armies in the field, driven far to the westward, weremaintaining a difficult position on the crests of the Apennines. Seeking to descend from there into the fields of Piedmont, they weremet by Suwarrow, and on the 15th of August, at Novi, received oncemore a ruinous defeat, in which their commander-in-chief was slain. At this moment of success, instead of pressing onward to drive theenemy out of Italy, and possibly to pursue him into France, it wasdecided that the Russians should be sent across the Alps intoSwitzerland, to take the place of a number of Austrians. The latter, in turn, were to move farther north, on the lower Rhine, to favor by adiversion an intended invasion of Holland by a combined force ofRussians and British. This gigantic flank movement and change of planresulted most disastrously. In the midst of it the French generalMasséna, commanding in Switzerland, the centre of the great hostilefront which extended from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, made avehement and sustained attack upon the Austro-Russians at Zurich, onthe 25th of September. Gaining a complete victory, he drove the enemyback beyond the point where Suwarrow expected to make his junction. The veteran marshal, who had left Italy on the 11th of September, arrived two days after the Battle of Zurich was fought. Isolated ininsufficient numbers from the friends he expected to meet, it was onlyafter severe hardships and superhuman efforts, extending over tendays, that he at length, on the 9th of October, reached a place ofsafety at Ilanz. Declining further co-operation with the Austrians, and alleging the need of rest for his troops after their frightfulexposure in the mountains, he withdrew into winter quarters in Bavariaat the end of the month. Thus Switzerland remained in possession ofthe French, inactivity continued in Italy, and the Czar, furious atthe turn events had taken, was rapidly passing into hatred of bothAustria and Great Britain. On the 9th of October, also, Bonaparte landed in France, after a sixweeks' voyage from Alexandria. The immense consequences involved inthis single event could not then be foreseen; but it none the lesscaused mortification and regret to Nelson. It was a cardinal principlewith him, vehemently and frequently uttered, that not a singleFrenchman should be allowed to return from Egypt; and here theircommander-in-chief had passed successfully from end to end of thestation, unseen by any British cruiser. He did not, however, considerhimself at fault, and his judgment may be allowed, although in his owncase. "If I could have had any cruisers, as was my plan, off Cape Bon, in Africa, and between Corsica and Toulon, Mr. Buonaparte could notprobably have got to France. " This he said to Earl Spencer. Elsewherehe wrote: "I have regretted sincerely the escape of Buonaparte; butthose ships which were destined by me for the two places where hewould certainly have been intercepted, were, from the Admiraltythinking, doubtless, that the Russians would do something at sea, obliged to be at Malta, and other services which I thought the RussianAdmiral would have assisted me in--therefore, no blame lies at mydoor. " He took some comfort in contrasting the stealthy return of theFrench general, with the great armada that accompanied his departure. "No Crusader ever returned with more humility--contrast his going inL'Orient, &c. &c. " A report that Bonaparte had passed Corsica reached Nelson on October24th. The same day came despatches from Sir Sidney Smith, narrating adisastrous defeat sustained by the Turks on the shores of Aboukir Bay. Smith's period of command in the Levant had been chiefly, andbrilliantly, distinguished by the successful defence of Acre againstBonaparte. The latter, threatened by simultaneous attacks by the Turksfrom Syria and from the sea, had determined to anticipate such acombination by going himself against the enemy on the land side, before the weather conditions made it possible to disembark anyformidable body of men on the shores of Egypt. Starting with thispurpose in February, he had proceeded with slight resistance until the18th of March, when his army appeared before Acre. Smith was thenlying in the roads with two ships-of-the-line. The siege which ensuedlasted for sixty-two days, so great was Bonaparte's pertinacity, andanxiety to possess the place; and in its course Smith displayed, notonly courage and activity, which had never been doubted, but a degreeof conduct and sound judgment that few expected of him. His divisionwas fortunate enough to capture the French siege train, which had tobe sent by water, and he very much disturbed the enemy's coastwisecommunications, besides contributing materially to the direction ofthe defence, to which the Turks, though brave enough, were notadequate. After several desperate assaults the siege was raised on the20th of May, and Bonaparte retreated to Egypt, regaining Cairo on the14th of June. Following up the success at Acre, a Turkish fleet of thirteenships-of-the-line anchored in Aboukir Bay on the 11th of July, attended by a body of transports carrying troops, variously estimatedat from ten to thirty thousand. Smith with his ships accompanied theexpedition. The Turks landed, and stormed the castle of Aboukir; buton the 25th Bonaparte, having concentrated his forces rapidly, fellupon them and totally defeated them. All who had landed were eitherkilled, driven into the sea and drowned, or taken prisoners; thecommander-in-chief being among the latter. Four weeks later, as isalready known, Bonaparte embarked for France. It was thus conclusively demonstrated that for the present at least, and until the French numbers were further diminished by the inevitablelosses of disease and battle, the Turks could not regain control ofEgypt. On the other hand, it was equally evident, and was admitted byboth Bonaparte and his able successor, Kleber, that withoutreinforcements, which could not be sent while the British controlledthe sea, the end of the French occupation was only a question of time. After Bonaparte's departure, Kleber wrote home strongly to thiseffect. His letters, being addressed to the Government, fell uponarrival into Bonaparte's hands; but, with these convictions, he wasready to enter into an arrangement for the evacuation of the country, upon condition of being allowed to return freely to Europe. Such also appears to have been the disposition of the Britishrepresentatives in the East. Immediately after taking over the commandin the Levant from Troubridge, Smith gave him, among other papers, aform of passport which he intended to use, permitting individualFrenchmen to go to Europe by sea. This Troubridge handed to Nelson, telling him also that it was Smith's intention to send word intoAlexandria, that all French ships might pass to France. This passport, adopted after Smith had been to Constantinople, had doubtless thesanction of the joint minister, his brother, and was signed by himselfboth as plenipotentiary and naval officer. Nelson had by this timebeen instructed that Smith was under his command, and he at once senthim an order, couched in the most explicit, positive, and peremptoryterms, which merit especial attention because Smith disobeyed them. "_As this is in direct opposition to my opinion_, which is, _never tosuffer any one individual Frenchman to quit Egypt_--I must therefore_strictly charge and command you_, [2] never to give any French ship orman leave to quit Egypt. And I must also desire that _you will opposeby every means in your power, any permission which may he attempted tobe given by any foreigner_, Admiral, General, or other person; and youwill acquaint those persons, that I shall not pay the smallestattention to any such passport after your notification; and _you areto put my orders in force, not on any pretence to permit a single__Frenchman to leave Egypt_. " It seems clear from these expressionsthat Nelson had gathered, through Troubridge, that it was the policyof the Sultan and of the British representatives to get the French outof Egypt at any cost, --to look, in short, to local interests ratherthan to the general policy of the Allies. This he was determined toprevent by instructions so comprehensive, yet so precise, as to leaveno loophole for evasion. Here matters seem to have rested for a time. Smith could scarcely dareto disregard such orders at once, and Bonaparte was not yet disposedopenly to confess failure by seeking terms. In the autumn of 1799, however, the Earl of Elgin went to Constantinople as ambassador, Spencer Smith dropping to secretary of embassy, and his brotherremaining on the Egyptian coast. Elgin was far from being in accordwith Smith's general line of conduct, which was marked withpresumption and self-sufficiency, and in the end he greatly deploredthe terms "granted to the French, so far beyond our expectation;" buthe shared the belief that to rid Egypt of the French was an end forwhich considerable sacrifices should be made, and his correspondencewith Smith expressed this conviction. When prepossessions such as thisexist among a number of men associated with one another, they are apt, as in the case of Admiral Man consulting with his captains, to resultin some ill-advised step, bearing commonly the stamp of concern forlocal interests, and forgetfulness of general considerations. Theupshot in this particular instance was the conclusion of a Convention, known as that of El Arish, between the Turks and the French, signed onboard Smith's ship on the 24th of January, 1800, by which this army ofveterans was to be permitted to return to France unmolested, and freeat once to take the field against the allies of Turkey and GreatBritain, at the moment when Bonaparte's unrivalled powers ofadministration were straining every nerve, to restore the Frenchforces from the disorganization into which they had fallen, and toprepare for the spring campaign. Smith, though present, did not sign this precious paper, which, in aletter to Hamilton, he called "the gratifying termination of hislabours;" but he had in his hand the orders of his immediate superior, and temporary commander-in-chief, to notify any "foreigner, general, or admiral, " that the execution of such an agreement would not bepermitted by the British Navy, and it would have been his own duty tostop any ships attempting to carry it out, until other orders werereceived. His powers as joint plenipotentiary having ceased, he wasnow simply the naval officer. As it happened, Keith, who by this timehad relieved Nelson, brought out from England clear directions fromthe Government not to allow any transaction of this kind; and althoughhe personally favored the policy of evacuation, feeling perhaps theinconvenience of detaching ships so far from his centre of operations, he was not a man to trifle with orders. Rumors of what was going onhad evidently reached him, for on the 8th of January, a fortnightbefore the convention was signed, he wrote to Kleber a letter, whichhe directed Smith to deliver, thus placing it out of the power of thatvery independent officer to leave any mistake as to actual conditionsin the mind of the French general. To the latter he said: "I havepositive orders not to consent to any capitulation with the Frenchtroops, at least unless they lay down their arms, surrender themselvesprisoners of war, and deliver up all the ships and stores of the portof Alexandria to the Allied Powers. " Even in such case they would notbe allowed to leave Egypt until exchanged. Any persons that attemptedto return, pursuant to an arrangement with one of the Allies, exclusive of the others, as the El-Arish Convention was, would be madeprisoners of war. Nelson's opinions in this matter had never wavered. As rumors of whatwas brewing got about, he wrote to the Earl of Elgin, on the 21st ofDecember, 1800: "I own my hope yet is, that the Sublime Porte willnever permit a single Frenchman to quit Egypt; and I own myself wickedenough to wish them all to die in that country they chose to invade. We have scoundrels of French enough in Europe without them. " "I neverwould consent to one of them returning to the Continent of Europeduring the war, " he tells Spencer Smith. "I wish them to _perish_ inEgypt, and give a great lesson to the world of the justice of theAlmighty. " When Elgin, thinking him still commander-in-chief, sent himthe Convention, he replied formally: "I shall forward the papers toLord Keith, who will answer your Excellency. But I cannot help mostsincerely regretting that ever any countenance was given to the Turksto enter into such a treaty with the French; for I ever held it to beimpossible to permit that army to return to Europe, but as prisonersof war, and in that case, not to France. And was I commander-in-chief, even when the thing was done, I should have refused to ratify anyconsent or approbation of Sir Sidney Smith, and have wrote to both theGrand Vizir and the French General, the impossibility of permitting avanquished army to be placed by one Ally in a position to attackanother Ally. " The last phrase put the facts in a nutshell, andillustrates well Nelson's power of going straight to the root of amatter, disregardful of confusing side-issues, of policy or timidity. To Hamilton he wrote passionately concerning the manifold difficultiescaused to all, except the Turks and the Smiths. "If all the wise headshad left them to God Almighty, after the bridge was broke, all wouldhave ended well. For I differ entirely with my commander-in-chief, inwishing they were permitted to return to France; and, likewise, withLord Elgin on the great importance of removing them from Egypt. " "I have wrote to Lord Keith, and home, " said Nelson to Sir SidneySmith on the 15th of January, "that I did not give credit that it waspossible for you to give any passport for a single Frenchman, muchless the Army, after my positive order of March 18th, 1799. " The wordsshow what reports had already got about of the general trend ofpolicy, on the part of the Porte and the British representatives; butthe irony of the matter as regards Nelson is, that Smith disobeyed hisorders, as he himself, six months before, had disobeyed Keith's; andfor the same reason, that he on the spot was a better judge of localconditions and recent developments than one at a distance. To one, Naples was more important than Minorca, more important than ahalf-dozen ships in a possible fleet action; to the other, Egypt wasmore important than the presence of sixteen thousand veterans, more orless, on a European battle-field. It is impossible and bootless, toweigh the comparative degree of culpability involved in breaches oforders which cannot be justified. It is perhaps safe to say that whilea subordinate has necessarily a large amount of discretion in theparticular matter intrusted to him, the burden of proof rests whollyupon him when he presumes to depart from orders affecting the generalfield of war, which is the attribute of the commander-in-chief. Whatin the former case may be simply an error of judgment, in the latterbecomes a military crime. On the 16th of January, 1800, Nelson, who some days before had beennotified by Keith of his approach, and directed to place himself underhis command, left Palermo for Leghorn, arriving on the 20th. Thecommander-in-chief was already there in the "Queen Charlotte. " On the25th they sailed together for Palermo, and after nine days' stay inthat port went on again for Malta, which they reached on the 15th ofFebruary. No incident of particular interest occurred during thesethree weeks, but Nelson's letters to the Hamiltons show that he waschafing under any act in his superior which could be construed into aslight. "I feel all, and notwithstanding my desire to be as humble asthe lowest midshipman, perhaps, I cannot submit to be much lower, I amused to have attention paid me from his superiors. " "To say how I missyour house and company would be saying little; but in truth you andSir William have so spoiled me, that I am not happy anywhere else butwith you, nor have I an idea that I ever can be. " Keith's comment--theother point of view--is worth quoting. "Anything absurd coming fromthe quarter you mention does not surprise me, " he wrote to Paget, whosucceeded Hamilton as minister. "The whole was a scene of fulsomevanity and absurdity all the _long_ eight days I was at Palermo. "[3] When Keith returned, the capture of Malta, and of the twoships-of-the-line which had escaped from the Battle of the Nile, were, by common consent, all that remained to do, in order to round off andbring to a triumphant conclusion Nelson's Mediterranean career. Fortune strove hard against his own weakness to add all these jewelsto his crown, but she strove in vain. "We may truly call him a_heaven_-born Admiral, upon whom fortune smiles wherever he goes. " Sowrote Ball to Lady Hamilton, alluding to the first of the favors flungat his head. "We have been carrying on the blockade of Malta sixteenmonths, during which time the enemy never attempted to throw in greatsuccours. His Lordship arrived off here the day they were within a fewleagues of the island, captured the principal ships, and dispersed therest, so that not one has reached the port. " It was indeed amarvellous piece of what men call luck. Nelson had never gone nearMalta since October, 1798, till Keith took him there on the 15th ofFebruary, 1800. The division had no sooner arrived at the island, thana frigate brought word of a French squadron having been seen off thewest end of Sicily. It was then blowing strong from southeast, andraining. Keith took his own station off the mouth of the harbor, placed other ships where he thought best, and signalled Nelson tochase to windward with three ships-of-the-line, which were afterwardsjoined by a fourth, then cruising on the southeast of the island. Thenext day the wind shifted to northwest, but it was not until themorning of the 18th that the enemy were discovered. Guns were thenheard to the northward, by those on board the "Foudroyant, " which madeall sail in pursuit, and soon sighted the "Alexander" chasing fourFrench sail. "Pray God we may get alongside of them, " wrote Nelson inhis journal; "the event I leave to Providence. I think if I can takeone 74 by myself, I would retire, and give the staff to more ablehands. " "I feel anxious to get up with these ships, " he wrote to LadyHamilton, "and shall be unhappy not to take them myself, for first mygreatest happiness is to serve my gracious King and Country, and I amenvious only of glory; for if it be a sin to covet glory, I am themost offending soul alive. _But here I am_ in a heavy sea and thickfog--Oh, God! the wind subsided--but I trust to Providence I shallhave them. 18th in the evening, I have got her--Le Généreux--thankGod! 12 out of 13, onely the Guillaume Telle remaining; I am after theothers. " The enemy's division had consisted of this seventy-four, alarge transport, also captured, and three corvettes which escaped. An account of Nelson on the quarter-deck on this occasion has beentransmitted by an eye-witness, whose recollections, committed to papernearly forty years later, are in many points evidently faulty, but inthe present instance reflect a frame of mind in the great admiral inperfect keeping with the words last quoted from his own letter. Thewriter was then a midshipman of the "Foudroyant;" and the scene asdescribed opens with a hail from a lieutenant at the masthead, withhis telescope on the chase. "'Deck there! the stranger is evidently a man of war--she is aline-of-battle-ship, my lord, and going large on the starboard tack. ' "'Ah! an enemy, Mr. Stains. I pray God it may be Le Généreux. Thesignal for a general chase, Sir Ed'ard, (the Nelsonian pronunciationof Edward, ) make the Foudroyant fly!' "Thus spoke the heroic Nelson; and every exertion that emulation couldinspire was used to crowd the squadron with canvas, the Northumberlandtaking the lead, with the flag-ship close on her quarter. "'This will not do, Sir Ed'ard; it is certainly Le Généreux, and to myflag-ship she can alone surrender. Sir Ed'ard, we must and shall beatthe Northumberland. ' "'I will do the utmost, my lord; get the engine to work on thesails--hang butts of water to the stays--pipe the hammocks down, andeach man place shot in them--slack the stays, knock up the wedges, andgive the masts play--start off the water, Mr. James, and pump theship. ' The Foudroyant is drawing a-head, and at last takes the lead inthe chase. 'The admiral is working his fin, (the stump of his rightarm, ) do not cross his hawse, I advise you. ' "The advice was good, for at that moment Nelson opened furiously onthe quarter-master at the conn. 'I'll knock you off your perch, yourascal, if you are so inattentive. --Sir Ed'ard, send your bestquarter-master to the weather wheel. ' "'A strange sail a-head of the chase!' called the look-out man. "'Youngster, to the mast-head. What! going without your glass, and bed----d to you? Let me know what she is immediately. ' "'A sloop of war, or frigate, my lord, " shouted the youngsignal-midshipman. "'Demand her number. ' "'The Success, my lord. ' "'Captain Peard; signal to cut off the flying enemy--great odds, though--thirty-two small guns to eighty large ones. ' "'The Success has hove-to athwart-hawse of the Généreux, and is firingher larboard broadside. The Frenchman has hoisted his tri-colour, witha rear-admiral's flag. ' "'Bravo--Success, at her again!' "'She has wore round, my lord, and firing her starboard broadside. Ithas winged her, my lord--her flying kites are flying away alltogether. ' The enemy is close on the Success, who must receive hertremendous broadside. The Généreux opens her fire on her little enemy, and every person stands aghast, afraid of the consequences. The smokeclears away, and there is the Success, crippled, it is true, but, bull-dog like, bearing up after the enemy. "'The signal for the Success to discontinue the action, and come undermy stern, ' said Lord Nelson; 'she has done well, for her size. Try ashot from the lower-deck at her, Sir Ed'ard. ' "'It goes over her. ' "'Beat to quarters, and fire coolly and deliberately at her masts andyards. ' "Le Généreux at this moment opened her fire on us; and, as a shotpassed through the mizen stay-sail, Lord Nelson, patting one of theyoungsters on the head, asked him jocularly how he relished the music;and observing something like alarm depicted on his countenance, consoled him with the information, that Charles XII. Ran away from thefirst shot he heard, though afterwards he was called 'The Great, ' anddeservedly, from his bravery. 'I, therefore, ' said Lord Nelson, 'hopemuch from you in future. ' "Here the Northumberland opened her fire, and down came thetri-colored ensign, amidst the thunder of our united cannon. "[4] According to Keith, Nelson "on this occasion, as on all others, conducted himself with skill, and great address, in comprehending mysignals, which the state of the weather led me greatly to suspect. "Nelson's account to Hamilton was, "By leaving my admiral withoutsignal, for which _I may be broke_, I took these French villains. " "Ihave wrote to Lord Spencer, " he tells his eldest brother, "and havesent him my journal, to show that the Généreux was taken by me, and myplan--that my quitting Lord Keith was at my own risk, and for which, if I had not succeeded, I might have been broke. The way he went, theGénéreux never could have been taken. " In a letter to Lord Minto heattributed his success to his knowledge of all the local conditions, acquired by seven years' experience. In his anxiety to make thisinstance prove his case, in the previous disobedience to Keith, forwhich the Admiralty had censured him, Nelson overreached himself andcertainly fell into an ungenerous action. His vaunt of success by theroad of disobedience rested only on the fact that he had failed to seeKeith's signal. This the latter did not know, and evidently consideredhe had complied with its spirit. The signal to chase to windward wasnot strained to disobedience in being construed to search a fairlywide area for the enemy, keeping the rendezvous, which was also theenemy's destination, to leeward, so as to be readily regained. The"Queen Charlotte, " Keith's flagship, covered the inner line, and, being a first-rate, was competent to handle any force that could comeout of Toulon. There is a good deal of human nature in this captiousunofficial attack on a superior, whose chief fault, as towardshimself, was that he had been the victim of disobedience; but it isnot pleasant to see in a man so truly great. The "Généreux" carried the flag of a rear-admiral, who was killed inthe action. Nelson seized the opportunity of further conciliating theCzar, by sending the sword of this officer to him, as Grand Master ofthe Order of Malta. Upon rejoining Keith, he reported in person, ascustom demands. "Lord Keith received my account and myself like aphilosopher (but very unlike you), " he wrote to Hamilton; "it did not, that I could perceive, cause a pleasing muscle in his face. " "Had youseen the Peer receive me, " he wrote to Lady Hamilton the same day, "Iknow not what you would have done; but I can guess. But never mind. Itold him that I had made a vow, if I took the Généreux by myself, itwas my intention to strike my flag. To which he made no answer. " Whatcould he very well say, if a man chose to throw away his chances, especially when that man was a subordinate who a short time before hadflatly refused to obey his orders. Soreness and testiness had fullswing in Nelson at this time; at some fancied neglect, he wroteTroubridge a letter which reduced that gallant officer to tears. Between Palermo and Malta Keith had received letters from GeneralMélas, commanding the Austrian army in Piedmont, giving the plan ofthe approaching campaign, in which, as the Austrians were to besiegeGenoa, and advance to the Riviera, much depended upon navalco-operation. Rightly judging that to be the quarter calling for thenaval commander-in-chief, he was anxious to get away. On the 24th ofFebruary he issued an order to Nelson to take charge of the blockade, and "to adopt and prosecute the necessary measures for contributing tothe complete reduction of Malta. " Short of the chief command, which hecoveted and grudged, Nelson himself could not have contrived aposition better fitted to crown his work in the Mediterranean. Withinthe harbor of La Valetta, concentrating there the two objects that yetremained to be attained, --- Valetta itself being one, --was the"Guillaume Tell, " the thirteenth ship, which alone was lacking now tocomplete the tale of the trophies of the Nile. Yet the fair prospectof success, inevitable since the capture of the "Généreux" haddestroyed the French hopes of relief, brought to Nelson nothing butdismay. "My Lord, " he replied the same day, "my state of health issuch, that it is impossible I can much longer remain here. Withoutsome rest, I am gone. I must, therefore, whenever I find the servicewill admit of it, request your permission to go to my friends, atPalermo, for a few weeks, and leave the command here to CommodoreTroubridge. Nothing but absolute necessity obliges me to write thisletter. " "I could no more stay fourteen days longer here, thanfourteen years, " he said in a private letter to Keith of the samedate. By the next day he had recognized that even he could not leave at oncethe task appointed him, without discredit. "My situation, " he thenwrote to Hamilton, "is to me very irksome, but how at this moment toget rid of it is a great difficulty. The French ships here ["GuillaumeTell" and others] are preparing for sea; the Brest fleet, Lord Keithsays, may be daily expected, and with all this I am very unwell. .. . The first moment which offers with credit to myself I shall assuredlygive you my company. .. . Lord Keith is commander-in-chief, and I havenot been kindly treated. " His tried friends, Troubridge and Ball, realized the false step he was about to take, but they could notchange his purpose. "Remember, my Lord, " wrote the former, "theprospects are rather good at present of reducing this place, and thatWilliam Tell, Diane, [1] and Justice, [5] are the only three ships leftfrom the Nile fleet. I beseech you hear the entreaties of a sincerefriend, and do not go to Sicily for the present. Cruizing may beunpleasant. Leave the Foudroyant outside, and hoist your flag in theCulloden, to carry on operations with the General. Everything shall bedone to make it comfortable and pleasing to you: a month will do all. If you comply with my request, I shall be happy, as I shall then beconvinced I have not forfeited your friendship. " "I dined with hisLordship yesterday, who is apparently in good health, " wrote Ball toLady Hamilton, "but he complains of indisposition and the necessity ofrepose. I do not think a short stay here will hurt his health, particularly as his ship is at anchor, and his mind not harassed. Troubridge and I are extremely anxious that the French ships, and theFrench garrison of La Valetta, shall surrender to him. I would noturge it if I were not convinced that it will ultimately add both tohis honour and happiness. " The fear of his friends that he would lose honor, by not resistinginclination, is evident--undisguised; but they could not prevail. Onthe 4th of March he wrote to Lady Hamilton: "My health is in such astate, and to say the truth, an uneasy mind at being taught my lessonlike a school boy, that my DETERMINATION is made to leave Malta on the15th morning of this month, on the first moment after the wind comesfavourable; unless I am SURE that I shall get hold of the Frenchships. " Keith's directions had been full and explicit on details, andthis Nelson seems to have resented. Among the particular orders wasone that Palermo, being so distant from Malta, should be discontinuedas the rendezvous, and Syracuse substituted for it; Nelson was, however, at liberty to use Messina or Augusta, both also on the westcoast of Sicily, if he preferred. It will be remembered that Nelsonhimself, before he fell under the influence of Naples, had expressedhis intention to make Syracuse the base of his operations. Coming asthis change did, as one of the first acts of a new commander-in-chief, coinciding with his own former judgment, it readily took the color ofan implied censure upon his prolonged stay at Palermo--an echo of theincreasing scandal that attended it. On the 10th of March he left Malta for Palermo in the "Foudroyant, "sending the ship back, however, to take her place in the blockade, andhoisting his own flag on board a transport. His mind was now rapidlyturning towards a final retirement from the station, a decision whichwas accelerated by the capture of the "Guillaume Tell. " Thiseighty-gun ship started on the night of March 29th to run out from LaValetta, to relieve the famished garrison from feeding the twelvehundred men she carried. Fortunately, the "Foudroyant" had resumed herstation off the island; and it was a singular illustration of the goodfortune of the "heaven-born" admiral, to repeat Ball's expression, that she arrived barely in time, only a few hours before the event, her absence from which might have resulted in the escape of the enemy, and a just censure upon Nelson. The French ship was sighted first by afrigate, the "Penelope, " Captain Blackwood, which hung gallantly uponher quarters, as Nelson in former days had dogged the "Ça Ira" withthe "Agamemnon, " until the heavier ships could gather round thequarry. The "Guillaume Tell, " necessarily intent only on escape fromoverpowering numbers, could not turn aside to crush the smallantagonist, which one of her broadsides might have swept out ofexistence; yet even so, the frigate decided the issue, for she shotaway the main and mizzen topmasts of the French vessel, permitting theremainder of the British to come up. No ship was ever more gallantlyfought than the "Guillaume Tell;" the scene would have been wellworthy even of Nelson's presence. More could not be said, but Nelsonwas not there. She had shaken off the "Penelope" and the "Lion, "sixty-four, when the "Foudroyant" drew up at six in the morning. "Athalf-past six, " says the latter's log, "shot away the [French] mainand mizen-masts: saw a man nail the French ensign to the stump of themizen-mast. Five minutes past eight, shot away the enemy's foremast. Ten minutes past eight, all her masts being gone by the board, theenemy struck his colours, and ceased firing. " The last of the fleet inAboukir Bay had surrendered to Nelson's ship, but not to Nelson'sflag. "I am sensible, " he wrote from Palermo to Sir Edward Berry, thecaptain of the "Foudroyant, " "of your kindness in wishing my presenceat the finish of the Egyptian fleet, but I have no cause for sorrow. The thing could not be better done, and I would not for all the worldrob you of one particle of your well-earned laurels. " In the matter ofglory Nelson might well yield much to another, nor miss what he gave;but there is a fitness in things, and it was not fitting that thecommander of the division should have been away from his post whensuch an event was likely to happen. "My task is done, my health islost, and the orders of the great Earl St. Vincent are completelyfulfilled. " "I have wrote to Lord Keith, " he tells Spencer, "forpermission to return to England, when you will see a broken-heartedman. My spirit cannot submit patiently. " But by this time, if theforbearance of the First Lord was not exhausted, his patience verynearly was, and a letter had already been sent, which, while couchedin terms of delicate consideration, nevertheless betrayed the profounddisappointment that had succeeded to admiration for services soeminent, and for a spirit once so indomitable: "To your letter of the20th of March, all I shall say is, to express my extreme regret thatyour health should be such as to oblige you to quit your station offMalta, at a time when I should suppose there must be the finestprospect of its reduction. I should be very sorry that you did notaccomplish that business in person, as the Guillaume Tell is your due, and that ship ought not to strike to any other. If the enemy shouldcome into the Mediterranean, and whenever they do, it will besuddenly, I should be much concerned to hear that you learnt of theirarrival in that sea, either on shore or in a transport at Palermo. " A nearer approach to censure was soon to follow. On the 9th of May, apparently before Nelson's application for leave to return to Englandhad been received, the Admiralty sent orders to Keith, that if hishealth rendered him incapable of doing his duty, he was to bepermitted to return home by sea when opportunity offered, or by landif he preferred. Earl Spencer wrote him at the same time a privateletter, in which disapprobation was too thinly masked by carefullychosen words to escape attention: "It is by no means my wish orintention to call you away from service, but having observed that youhave been under the necessity of quitting your station off Malta, onaccount of your health, which I am persuaded you could not havethought of doing without such necessity, it appeared to me much moreadvisable for you to come home at once, than to be obliged to remaininactive at Palermo, while active service was going on in other partsof the station. I should still much prefer your remaining to completethe reduction of Malta, which I flatter myself cannot be very fardistant, and I still look with anxious expectation to the GuillaumeTell striking to your flag. But if, unfortunately, these agreeableevents are to be prevented, by your having too much exhausted yourselfin the service to be equal to follow them up, I am quite clear, and Ibelieve I am joined in opinion by all your friends here, that you willbe more likely to recover your health and strength in England than inan inactive situation at a Foreign Court, however pleasing the respectand gratitude shown to you for your services may be, and notestimonies of respect and gratitude from that Court to you can be, Iam convinced, too great for the very essential services you haverendered it. I trust that you will take in good part what I havetaken the liberty to write to you as a friend. " Both these letters reached Nelson in June, at Leghorn, on his wayhome. The underlying censure did not escape him, --"your two lettersgave me much pain, " he replied, --but he showed no traces ofself-condemnation, or of regret for the past. Lord Minto, who was nowambassador at Vienna, wrote thence in March of this year, before thequestion of going home was decided: "I have letters from Nelson andLady Hamilton. It does not seem clear whether he will go home. I hopehe will not for his own sake, and he will at least, I hope, take Maltafirst. He does not seem at all conscious of the sort of discredit hehas fallen into, or the cause of it, for he still writes, not wisely, about Lady H. And all that. But it is hard to condemn and use ill ahero, as he is in his own element, for being foolish about a woman whohas art enough to make fools of many wiser than an admiral. " Manyyears later, immediately after the parting which he did not then knowwas the last, Minto said of him, "He is in many points a really greatman, in others a baby. " Nelson himself, conscious of the diligencewhich he had used in the administration of his wide command and itsvaried interests, put out of court all other considerations ofpropriety. "I trust you and all my friends will believe, " he toldSpencer, "that mine cannot be an inactive life, although it may notcarry all the outward parade of _much ado about nothing_. " Had the Hamiltons remained in Palermo, Nelson would have been forcedto a choice between leaving her and the Mediterranean, or yielding asubmission to orders which to the last he never gave, when fairly outof signal distance. But the Foreign Office had decided that SirWilliam should not return after the leave for which he had applied;and in the beginning of March it was known at Palermo that hissuccessor had been appointed. This Nelson also learned, at the latest, when he came back there on the 16th. To one correspondent he wrote, on the 28th, "Most probably my health will force me to retire inApril, for I am worn out with fatigue of body and mind, " and hisapplication was sent in on the 6th of the latter month, after news ofthe "Guillaume Tell's" capture. On the 22d Hamilton presented hisletters of recall, and on the 24th he and Lady Hamilton, with a party, embarked on board the "Foudroyant" for a trip to Syracuse and Malta, from which they all returned to Palermo on the first of June. Againstthis renewed departure Troubridge again remonstrated, in words whichshowed that he and others saw, in Nelson's determination to abandonthe field, the results of infatuation rather than of illness. "Yourfriends, my Lord, absolutely, as far as they dare, insist on yourstaying to sign the capitulation. Be on your guard. " Keith also wrotehim in generous and unexceptionable terms: "I am very sorry, my dearNelson, for the contents of your letter, and I hope you will not beobliged to go: strictly speaking, I ought to write to the Admiraltybefore I let a flag-officer go off the station; particularly as I amdirected to send you, if you like it, to Egypt; but when a man'shealth is concerned, there is an end of all, and I will send you thefirst frigate I can lay hold of. " FOOTNOTES: [1] The title of Bronté was assumed in Sicily only, until he received theconsent of George III. To accept it. [2] The italics to this point are Nelson's; afterwards the author's. [3] The Paget Papers, London, 1896, vol. I. P. 200. [4] Nelsonian Reminiscences, by Lieutenant G. S. Parsons. The author hasbeen able to test Parsons' stories sufficiently to assure himself that theycannot be quoted to establish historical fact; but such scenes as heregiven, or how many glasses of wine Nelson drank at dinner, or that thewriter himself was out of clean shirts, when asked to dine at the admiral'stable, are trivialities which memory retains. [5] Frigates. CHAPTER XV. NELSON LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN. --THE JOURNEY OVERLAND THROUGHGERMANY. --ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND. --SEPARATION FROM LADY NELSON. --HOISTSHIS FLAG IN THE CHANNEL FLEET, UNDER LORD ST. VINCENT. JUNE, 1800--JANUARY, 1801. AGE, 42. At the time Nelson and the Hamiltons returned to Palermo, the Queen ofNaples was wishing, for political reasons, to visit Vienna. To meetthis wish Nelson took the "Foudroyant" and "Alexander" off theblockade of Malta, that they might carry herself and suite to Leghorn, together with the Hamiltons. He clung also to the hope that Keithwould give him his powerful flagship to return to England, in whichcase the Hamiltons would go with him. "I go with our dear friends SirWilliam and Lady Hamilton, " he wrote to Lord Minto; "but whether bywater or land depends on the will of Lord Keith. May all orders be aspunctually obeyed, " alluding to the completion of the destruction ofthe Nile fleet by the capture of the "Guillaume Tell, " "but neveragain an officer at the close of what I must, without being thoughtvain (for such I am represented by enemies), call a glorious career, be so treated!" Keith's opinion of Nelson's obedience was probably somewhat different. The latter had written him on the 12th of May, that, being under anold promise to carry the Queen to the Continent, he proposed to takethe two ships-of-the-line for that purpose, and Keith sent him aletter forbidding him to do so, and directing them to be sent back atonce to Malta. Nelson, it is true, did not receive this; but it isimpossible to reconcile with attention to orders the diversion of twoships of their force from the singularly important station appointedthem by the commander-in-chief, without reference to him, and usingthem to carry about foreign sovereigns. On arriving in Leghorn, on the14th of June, Nelson announced the fact to Keith, with apparentperfect unconsciousness that the latter could be other than charmed. "I was obliged to bring the Alexander, or the party never could havebeen accommodated: I therefore trust you will approve of it. " "I wasso displeased by the withdrawing of the ships from before Malta, "wrote Keith to Paget, "and with other proceedings, that her Majestydid not take any notice of me latterly. " It would seem also that someharm had come of it. "What a clamour, too, letting in the ships toMalta will occasion. I assure you nothing has given me more realconcern, it was so near exhausted. " "Had not Nelson quitted theblockade, " he wrote a week later, "and taken the ships off thestation, it might have fallen about this time. "[6] Lord Keith had been engaged for six weeks past in the famous blockadeand siege of Genoa, the garrison of which, spent with famine anddisease, marched out on the 5th of June, 1800. On the 14th--the dayNelson reached Leghorn--was fought the Battle of Marengo, in which theAustrians were totally defeated, the French army under Bonaparteremaining victorious across their line of retreat to Mantua. The nextday Mélas signed a convention, abandoning Northern Italy, as far asthe Mincio, to the French, to whom were given up all the fortifiedplaces, Genoa included. At midnight of June 18, Nelson received anorder from Keith to take all the ships at Leghorn to Spezia, forcertain minor military purposes. Nelson sent the "Alexander" and afrigate, but remained himself in Leghorn with the "Foudroyant, " ready, he wrote the admiral, "to receive the queen and royal family, shouldsuch an event be necessary. " Keith rejoined with a peremptory orderthat no ships-of-the-line should be used for such purpose; the Queen, he said, had better get to Vienna as fast as she could, and not thinkof going back to Palermo. "If the French fleet gets the start of oursa day, Sicily cannot hold out even that one day. " "Lord Keith, "commented Nelson, "believes reports of the Brest fleet, which I givenot the smallest credit to. " "I own I do not believe the Brest fleetwill return to sea, " he told Keith; "and if they do, the Lord havemercy on them, for our fleet will not, I am sure. " It was not theleast of his conspicuous merits that he was blind to imaginative orexaggerated alarms. Keith saw too vividly all that might happen inconsequence of recent reverses--much more than could happen. On the 24th of June the latter reached Leghorn in person. "I must goto Leghorn, " he complained, "to land the fugitives, and to be bored byLord Nelson for permission to take the Queen to Palermo, and princesand princesses to all parts of the globe. " The Queen was in a panic, and besought him with tears to give her the "Foudroyant, " but Keithwas obdurate. "Mr. Wyndham[7] arrived here yesterday from Florence, "wrote Lady Minto on the 6th of July to her sister. "He left the Queenof Naples, Sir William and Lady Hamilton, and Nelson, at Leghorn. TheQueen has given up all thoughts of coming here. She asked Lord Keithin her own proper person for the Foudroyant to take her back. Herefused positively giving her such a ship. The Queen wept, concludingthat royal tears were irresistible; but he remained unmoved, and wouldgrant nothing but a frigate to convoy her own frigates[8] to Trieste. He told her Lady Hamilton had had command of the fleet long enough. The Queen is very ill with a sort of convulsive fit, and Nelson isstaying there to nurse her; he does not intend going home till he hasescorted her back to Palermo. His zeal for the public service seemsentirely lost in his love and vanity, and they all sit and flattereach other all day long. " It is only fair to say that there areindications, in the correspondence, of bad terms between the Hamiltonsand Wyndham, who, therefore, was probably not a sympathetic observer. He had also before this written unpleasantly to Nelson, insinuating, apparently, a lack of attention to duty; for the latter in a letter toTroubridge says, "I send you an extract of Mr. Wyndham's unhandsomemode of expressing himself towards me. " Towards Keith her Majestymanifested her displeasure by omitting him in the public leave shetook of all the officials. The Queen finally resolved to continue her journey, but the victoriesof the French introduced into the political future an element ofuncertainty, which caused her to delay a month in Leghorn, undecidedwhether to go by sea or land; and Nelson had vowed not to forsake her. Keith, after some days, relented so far as to authorize the"Alexander" taking the royal family to Trieste, but many of the partywere averse to the sea voyage. There had been for some time livingwith the Hamiltons a Miss Knight, an English lady already in middlelife, whose journal gives the chief particulars that have beenpreserved of this period. "The Queen, " she wrote, "wishes, ifpossible, to prosecute her journey. Lady Hamilton cannot bear thethought of going by sea; and therefore nothing but impracticabilitywill prevent our going to Vienna. " When it was at last fixed, aftermany vacillations, that they should go to Ancona, and there take smallAustrian vessels for Trieste, she exclaims, "to avoid the danger ofbeing on board an English man-of-war, where everything is commodious, and equally well arranged for defence and comfort! But the die iscast, and go we must. " She mentions that Lord Nelson was well, andkept up his spirits amazingly, but Sir William appeared broken, distressed, and harassed. On the 11th the travellers started for Florence, passing within twomiles of the French advanced posts. At Ancona they embarked on boardsome Russian frigates, and in them reached Trieste safely on the 2d ofAugust. Nelson was received with acclamations in all the towns of thePope's states. A party in which were not only the queen of a reigningsovereign, but an English minister and his wife, was sure of receivingattention wherever it passed or stopped; but in the present case itwas the naval officer who carried off the lion's share of homage, sowidely had his fame spread throughout the Continent. At Trieste, saysMiss Knight, "he is followed by thousands when he goes out, and forthe illumination which is to take place this evening, there are many_Viva Nelsons_ prepared. " The same enthusiasm was shown at Vienna, where they arrived on the21st or 22d of August. "You can have no notion of the anxiety andcuriosity to see him, " wrote Lady Minto. [9] "The door of his house isalways crowded with people, and even the street when his carriage isat the door; and when he went to the play he was applauded, a thingwhich rarely happens here. " "Whenever he appeared in public, " recordsMiss Knight, "a crowd was collected, and his portrait was hung up as asign over many shops--even the milliners giving his name to particulardresses, but it did not appear to me that the English nation was atall popular. " At a dinner at Prince Esterhazy's, where he spent somedays, his health was drunk with a flourish of trumpets and firing ofcannon. "I don't think him altered in the least, " continued LadyMinto, who remembered him from the old days in Corsica. "He has thesame shock head and the same honest simple manners; but he is devotedto _Emma_, he thinks her quite an _angel_, and talks of her as such toher face and behind her back, and she leads him about like a keeperwith a bear. She must sit by him at dinner to cut his meat, and hecarries her pocket-handkerchief. He is a gig from ribands, orders andstars, but he is just the same with us as ever he was;" and shementions his outspoken gratitude to Minto for the substantial servicehe had done him, and the guidance he had imparted to his politicalthought, --an acknowledgment he frequently renewed up to the last daysof his life. Lady Minto's nephew, Lord Fitzharris, the son of the Earl ofMalmesbury, was then in Vienna, apparently as an attaché. He speaks inthe same way of Nelson himself, but with less forbearance for LadyHamilton; and he confirms the impression that Nelson at this time hadlost interest in the service. Writing to his father, he says: "Nelsonpersonally is not changed; open and honest, not the least vanity abouthim. He looks very well, but seems to be in no hurry to sail again. Hetold me he had no thoughts of serving again. " "Lord Nelson and theHamiltons dined here the other day; it is really disgusting to see herwith him. " A few days later there was a ball at Prince Esterhazy's, where Fitzharris was present. "Lady Hamilton is without exception themost coarse, ill-mannered, disagreeable woman I ever met with. ThePrincess had with great kindness got a number of musicians, and thefamous Haydn, who is in their service, to play, knowing Lady Hamiltonwas fond of music. Instead of attending to them she sat down to theFaro table, played Nelson's cards for him, and won between £300 and£400. In short, I could not disguise my feeling, and joined in thegeneral abuse of her. "[10] The impression that Nelson would declinefurther service had been conveyed to other friends. Troubridge, whohad meanwhile returned to England, wrote two months later to a younglieutenant who wished to get on board the admiral's next ship: "LordNelson is not yet arrived in England, and between ourselves I do notthink he will serve again. " Both Lady Minto and Fitzharris have recorded an account given them byNelson, of his motives for action at the Battle of the Nile. "Hespeaks in the highest terms of all the captains he had with him offthe coast of Egypt, " writes the former, "adding that without knowingthe men he had to trust to, he would not have hazarded the attack, that there was little room, but he was sure each would find a hole tocreep in at. " In place of this summary, her nephew gives wordsevidently quite fresh from the speaker's lips. "He says, 'When I sawthem, I could not help popping my head every now and then out of thewindow, (although I had a d----d toothache), and once as I wasobserving their position I heard two seamen quartered at a gun nearme, talking, and one said to the other, 'D----n them, look at them, there they are, Jack, if we don't beat them, they will beat us. ' Hesays, 'I knew what stuff I had under me, so I went into the attackwith only a few ships, perfectly sure the others would follow me, although it was nearly dark and they might have had every excuse fornot doing it, yet they all in the course of two hours found a hole topoke in at. If, ' he added, 'I had taken a fleet of the same force fromSpithead, I would sooner have thought of flying than attacking theFrench in their position, but I knew my captains, nor could I saywhich distinguished himself most. '" Yet to Lady Minto he revealed thespirit he was of. "I told him I wished he had the command of theEmperor's army. He said, 'I'll tell you what. If I had, I would onlyuse one word--_advance_, and never say _retreat_. '" After a month's stop at Vienna, during which Sir William Hamilton'shealth continued to cause anxiety, the party started north for Prague, Dresden, and Hamburg, following the course of the Elbe. On the 28thof September, Prague was reached, and there Nelson was met byarrangement by the Archduke Charles, the first in ability of theAustrian generals, approved as no unworthy antagonist by Bonapartehimself, but rarely employed, except in moments of emergency, becauseof his pronounced opposition to the Court policy. The next day, September 29th, was Nelson's birthday, and the Archduke gave a grandentertainment in his honor. Continuing thence, the travellers onOctober 2d reached Dresden, to which Court the British minister wasHugh Elliot, the brother of Lord Minto. It was here that they cameunder the eye of Mrs. St. George, a young Irish widow, who by a secondmarriage, some years later, became Mrs. Trench, and the mother of thelate Archbishop of Dublin. Her description and comments have beenconsidered severe, and even prejudiced; but they do not differessentially from those of the Mintos and Fitzharris, except in sayingthat on one occasion, after dinner, Nelson took too much champagne, and showed the effects. Such a thing has happened on isolatedoccasions to many a good man and true, and, however much to bedeplored, is not so impossible an occurrence, even in a man ofNelson's well-established habitual abstemiousness, which indeed hishealth necessitated, as to invalidate the testimony of an eye-witness. Mrs. St. George's journal was not written for publication, and did notsee the light till thirty-odd years after her death. "October 3d. Dined at Mr. Elliot's with only the Nelson party. It is plain thatLord Nelson thinks of nothing but Lady Hamilton, [11] who is totallyoccupied by the same object. Lord Nelson is a little man, without anydignity; who, I suppose, must resemble what Suwarrow was in his youth, as he is like all the pictures I have seen of that General. LadyHamilton takes possession of him, and he is a willing captive, themost submissive and devoted I have ever seen. Sir William is old, infirm, all admiration of his wife, and never spoke to-day but toapplaud her. Miss Cornelia Knight seems the decided flatterer of thetwo, and never opens her mouth but to show forth their praise; andMrs. Cadogan, Lady Hamilton's mother, is--what one might expect. Afterdinner we had several songs in honour of Lord Nelson, written by MissKnight, and sung by Lady Hamilton. [12] She puffs the incense full inhis face; but he receives it with pleasure, and snuffs it up verycordially. " Lord Minto, whose friendship for Nelson was of proof, wrote eighteen months after this to his wife: "She goes on crammingNelson with trowelfuls of flattery, which he goes on taking as quietlyas a child does pap. "[13] "Lady Hamilton, " wrote Mrs. St. George on succeeding days, "paid methose kinds of compliments which prove she thinks mere exterior aloneof any consequence . .. She loads me with all marks of friendship atfirst sight, which I always think more extraordinary than love of thesame kind, pays me many compliments both when I am absent and present, and said many fine things about my accompanying her at sight. Stillshe does not gain upon me . .. Mr. Elliot says, 'She will captivate thePrince of Wales, whose mind is as vulgar as her own, and play a greatpart in England, '"--a remark which showed shrewd judgment ofcharacter, as Nelson afterwards found to his intense disturbance. AtVienna the whole party had been presented at Court, but at Dresden theElectress refused to receive Lady Hamilton, on account of her formerdissolute life. "She wished to go to Court, " says Mrs. St. George, "onwhich a pretext was made to avoid receiving company last Sunday, and Iunderstand there will be no Court while she stays. " Nelson feltresentment at this exclusion, though powerless, of course, to expressit; but he declined an invitation to a private house which had notbeen extended to her. This incident naturally raised the question, what prospect there was of the lady being accepted at the Court of herown sovereign. "She talked to me a great deal of her doubts whetherthe Queen would receive her, adding, 'I care little about it. I hadmuch rather she would settle half Sir William's pension on me, '"--aremark which showed more philosophy than self-esteem. A week's visit in Dresden ended by the party taking boats for Hamburg, which they reached on the 21st of October, the journey being prolongedby stopping every night. They there remained ten days, of which novery noteworthy incidents have been recorded, although the generalinterest of all classes of people in the renowned warrior, of whomthey had heard so much, continued to be manifested, sometimes inquaint and touching expression. On the 31st of October they embarkedon board the mail-packet for England, and after a stormy passagelanded at Yarmouth on the 6th of November, 1800. Two years and eightmonths had passed since Nelson sailed from Spithead, on a cruisedestined to have so marked an influence on his professional reputationand private happiness. He was received on his landing with everyevidence of popular enthusiasm, and of official respect from allauthorities, civil and military. With the unvarying devout spiritwhich characterized him in all the greater events of his life, heasked that public service might be held, to enable him to give thanksin church for his safe return to his native country, and for the manyblessings which he had experienced. The whole party then went on totown, arriving on the 8th. From those who welcomed Nelson when he first put his foot on shorethere was one conspicuously missing. Lady Nelson had not thought wellto go to Yarmouth to await her husband. Under ordinary conditionsthere would have been little to challenge remark, in the decision notto leave the feeble old man, her husband's father, who depended muchupon her, for the period of uncertain duration during which she mighthave to wait at Yarmouth, in those days of sailing-vessels and headwinds. Coining as her husband did, hand in hand with the woman whosename had been scandalously linked with his for nearly two years, theabsence easily took on the appearance of cold and reserved censure. Unquestionably, if Lady Nelson wished above all things to win herhusband back, and cared more for that than for her own humiliation, more or less, the best fighting chance would have been to meet him atonce, with a smile on her face and words of love on her lips. Considering the flagrancy of the affair throughout Europe, and theantecedents of Lady Hamilton, it may be permitted to doubt whether, regarded as a struggle for possession, many women would have thoughtthe game worth the candle; although Lady Nelson did not then know thather husband expected soon to be a father, by the woman whom he at oncebrought to her apartments and presented to her. In the scanty details that have been transmitted to us concerning LadyNelson, there is little to appeal to the imagination, or to impressone strongly with her attractions; but candor to her surely compelsthe admission that, to await her husband in their own home, to greethim alone, without the observation even of beloved outsiders, was nosingular impulse in a tender and reserved woman. A seaside hotel andthe inevitable clamor of the multitude do not fit in well with theemotions that would naturally stir her, and a very little tact, a verylittle sympathy, would have induced Nelson to let the Hamiltons gotheir way for one evening, while he went directly and alone to her andhis father. She had been sorely tried, and as far as is known hadrestrained herself patiently in her letters. The latest one that isnow accessible is dated the 29th of March, 1800, seven monthstherefore before they now met, and is lacking neither in dignity, affection, nor pathos. "I have this instant received a note from Admiral Young, who tells meif I can send him a letter for you in an hour, he will send it, therefore, I have only time to say I have at last had the pleasure ofreceiving two letters from you, dated January 20th and 25th. I rejoiceexceedingly I did not follow the advice of the physician and our goodfather to change the climate, and I hope my health will be establishedby hot sea-bathing and the warmth of the summer. "I can with safety put my hand on my heart and say it has been mystudy to please and make you happy, and I still flatter myself weshall meet before very long. I feel most sensibly all your kindnessesto my dear son, and I hope he will add much to our comfort. Our goodfather has been in good spirits ever since we heard from you; indeed, my spirits were quite worn out, the time had been so long. I thank Godfor the preservation of my dear husband, and your recent success offMalta. The taking of the Généreux seems to give great spirits to all. God bless you, my dear husband, and grant us a happy meeting, andbelieve me, " etc. [14] From the difficulties attendant upon the mails in those days, thisletter would not be likely to reach Nelson till towards the end ofMay, when he was on the point of leaving Palermo finally; and, havingregard to the uncertainties of his movements before quitting Leghorn, it is not improbable that it was among the last, if not the very last, he received before landing in England. If so, it represented fairlythe attitude of Lady Nelson, as far as known to him, --free fromreproach, affectionate, yet evidently saddened by a silence on hispart, which tended to corroborate the rumors rife, not only in societybut in the press. It is possible that, like many men, though it wouldnot be in the least characteristic of himself, he, during his journeyhome, simply put aside all consideration of the evil day when the twowomen would be in the same city, and trusted to the chapter ofaccidents to settle the terms on which they might live; but, from hisactions, he seems to have entertained the idea that he could stillmaintain in London, with the cheerful acquiescence of his wife, thepublic relations towards Lady Hamilton which were tolerated by theeasy tone of Neapolitan society. Miss Knight relates that, while atLeghorn, he said he hoped Lady Nelson and himself would be much withSir William and Lady Hamilton, that they all would dine together veryoften, and that when the latter went to their musical parties, he andLady Nelson would go to bed. In accordance with this programme, hetook his two friends to dine with his wife and father, immediatelyupon his arrival in town. Miss Knight went to another hotel with LadyHamilton's mother, and was that evening visited by Troubridge. Headvised her to go and stop with a friend; and, although no reason isgiven, it is probable that he, who knew as much as any one of thepast, saw that the position of residence with the Hamiltons would besocially untenable for a woman. Miss Knight accordingly went to livewith Mrs. Nepean, the wife of the Secretary to the Admiralty. A few days later there was again a dinner at the house taken by theHamiltons in Grosvenor Square. The Nelsons were there, as was MissKnight. The next day several of the party attended the theatre, andLady Nelson, it is said, fainted in the box, overcome by feeling, manythought, at her husband's marked attentions to Lady Hamilton. Thelatter being in her way a character as well known as Nelson himself, the affair necessarily became more than usually a matter of comment, especially as the scene now provided for London gossipers was are-presentation of that so long enacted at Palermo, and notoriousthroughout Europe; but it was received with little toleration. "Mostof my friends, " wrote Miss Knight, "were urgent with me to drop theacquaintance, but, circumstanced as I had been, I feared the charge ofingratitude, though greatly embarrassed as to what to do, for thingsbecame very unpleasant. " Had it been a new development, it would havepresented little difficulty; but as she had quietly lived many monthsin the minister's house under the same conditions, only in the morecongenial atmosphere of Palermo, it was not easy now to join in thedisapproval shown by much of London society. Lady Hamilton, of course, could not have any social acceptance, buteven towards Nelson himself, in all his glory, a marked coldness wasshown in significant quarters. "The Lady of the Admiralty, " wrote heto his friend Davison, "never had any just cause for being cool tome;" an allusion probably to Lady Spencer, the wife of the First Lord. Coldness from her must have been the more marked, for after the Nileshe had written him a wildly enthusiastic letter, recognizing withgratitude the distinction conferred upon her husband's administrationby the lustre of that battle. "Either as a public or private man, " hecontinued, "I wish nothing undone which I have done, "--a remarkentirely ambiguous and misleading as regards his actual relations toLady Hamilton. He told Collingwood, at this same time, that he had notbeen well received by the King. "He gave me an account of hisreception at Court, " his old comrade writes, "which was not veryflattering, after having been the adoration of that of Naples. HisMajesty merely asked him if he had recovered his health; and then, without waiting for an answer, turned to General----, and talked tohim near half an hour in great good humour. It could not be about hissuccesses. " This slight was not a revival of the old prejudiceentertained by the King before the war, which had been wholly removedby the distinguished services Nelson had rendered afterwards. Eighteenmonths before this Davison had written to him: "I waited upon the Kingearly last Sunday morning, and was _alone_ with him a full hour, whenmuch of the conversation was about you. It is impossible to expresshow warmly he spoke of you, and asked me a thousand questions aboutyou . .. I have been again at the Queen's house, and have given theKing a copy of your last letter to me, giving an account of yourhealth, which he read twice over, with great attention, and withapparent emotion of concern. His Majesty speaks of you with thetenderness of a father. " Samuel Rogers has an incidental mention ofthe effect produced upon Nelson by the treatment now experienced. "Iheard him once during dinner utter many bitter complaints (which LadyHamilton vainly attempted to check) of the way he had been treated atCourt that forenoon: the Queen had not condescended to take theslightest notice of him. In truth, Nelson was hated at Court; theywere jealous of his fame. "[15] People, however, are rarely jealous ofthose who are not rivals. The position which Nelson had proposed to himself to establish was ofcourse impossible. The world was no more disposed to worry about anyprivate immoralities of his than it did about those of other men, butit was not prepared to have them brandished in its face, and it wouldhave none of Lady Hamilton, --nor would Lady Nelson. The general publicopinion at the time receives, probably, accurate expression from SirWilliam Hotham, a man then in London society. "His vanity, excusableas such a foible is in such a man, led him to unpardonable excesses, and blinded him to the advantages of being respected in society. .. . His conduct to Lady Nelson was the very extreme of unjustifiableweakness, for he should at least have attempted to conceal hisinfirmities, without publicly wounding the feelings of a woman whoseown conduct he well knew was irreproachable. "[16] On the other hand, Nelson could not forget the kindnesses he had accepted from LadyHamilton, nor was he either able or willing to lessen an intimacywhich, unless diminished, left the scandal unabated. He was not able, for a man of his temperament could not recede before opposition, orslight a woman now compromised by his name; and he was not willing, for he was madly in love. Being daily with her for seven months afterleaving Palermo, there occurs a break in their correspondence; butwhen it was resumed in the latter part of January, 1801, everyparticle of the reticence which a possible struggle with consciencehad imposed disappears. He has accepted the new situation, cast asideall restraints, and his language at times falls little short offrenzy, while belying the respect for her which he asserts continuallyand aggressively, as though against his convictions. The breach with Lady Nelson had in this short time become final. Wehave not the means--happily--to trace through its successive stages arapid process of estrangement, of which Nelson said a few monthsafterwards: "Sooner than live the unhappy life I did when last I cameto England, I would stay abroad forever. " A highly colored account isgiven in Harrison's Life of Nelson, emanating apparently from LadyHamilton, of the wretchedness the hero experienced from the temper ofhis wife; while in the "Memoirs of Lady Hamilton, " published shortlyafter her death, another side of the case is brought forward, and LadyNelson appears as rebutting with quiet dignity the reproaches of herhusband for heartlessness, displayed in her unsympathetic attitudetowards her rival, when suffering from indisposition. Into theserecriminations it is needless to enter; those who wish can read forthemselves in the works mentioned. A marked symptom of growingalienation was afforded by his leaving her on the 19th of December, incompany with the Hamiltons, to spend the Christmas holidays atFonthill, the seat of William Beckford. During this visit occurred a curious incident, which shows that theexultant delight unquestionably felt by Nelson in battle did notindicate insensibility to danger, or to its customary effects uponmen, but resulted from the pleasurable predominance of other emotions, which accepted danger and the startling tokens of its presence as theaccompaniments, that only enhanced the majesty of the part he wascalled upon to play. Beckford tells the story as follows: "I offeredto show him what had been done by planting in the course of years. Nelson mounted by my side in a phaeton, drawn by four well-trainedhorses, which I drove. There was not the least danger, the horsesbeing perfectly under my command, long driven by myself. Singular tosay, we had not gone far before I observed a peculiar anxiety in hiscountenance, and presently he said: 'This is too much for me, you mustset me down. ' I assured him that the horses were continually driven byme, and that they were perfectly under command. All would not do. Hewould descend, and I walked the vehicle back again. "[17] Nelson, ofcourse, never claimed for himself the blind ignorance of fear whichhas been asserted of him; on the contrary, the son of his old friendLocker tells us, "The bravest man (so we have heard Lord Nelsonhimself declare) feels an anxiety '_circa præcordia_' as he enters thebattle; but he dreads disgrace yet more. "[18] In battle, like a greatactor in a great drama, he knew himself the master of an invisibleconcourse, whose homage he commanded, whose plaudits he craved, andwhom, by the sight of deeds raised above the common ground of earth, he drew to sympathy with heroism and self-devotion. There, too, herejoiced in the noblest exercise of power, in the sensation ofenergies and faculties roused to full exertion, contending with mightyobstacles, and acting amid surroundings worthy of their grandeur; likeMasséna, of whom it was said that he only found his greatest selfwhen the balls flew thick about him, and things began to look theirworst. After his return from Fonthill Lady Nelson and himself lived togetheragain for a time in their London lodgings, in Arlington Street, andthere, according to the story told forty-five years afterwards by Mr. William Haslewood, Nelson's solicitor, the crisis of their troubleswas reached. "In the winter of 1800, 1801, I was breakfasting withLord and Lady Nelson, at their lodgings in Arlington Street, and acheerful conversation was passing on indifferent subjects, when LordNelson spoke of something which had been done or said by 'dear LadyHamilton;' upon which Lady Nelson rose from her chair, and exclaimed, with much vehemence, 'I am sick of hearing of dear Lady Hamilton, andam resolved that you shall give up either her or me. ' Lord Nelson, with perfect calmness, said: 'Take care, Fanny, what you say. I loveyou sincerely; but I cannot forget my obligations to Lady Hamilton, orspeak of her otherwise than with affection and admiration. ' Withoutone soothing word or gesture, but muttering something about her mindbeing made up, Lady Nelson left the room, and shortly after drove fromthe house. They never lived together afterwards. " Though committed topaper so many years later, the incident is just one of those thatsticks to the memory, and probably occurred substantially as told. Lady Nelson's ultimatum will probably be differently regarded bydifferent persons; it shows that she was at least living human fleshand blood. In later life, we are told by Hotham, who was in the habitof frequently seeing her, up to her death, in 1831, "she continuallytalked of him, and always attempted to palliate his conduct towardsher, was warm and enthusiastic in her praises of his publicachievements, and bowed down with dignified submission to the errorsof his domestic life. " The same testimony is borne by a lady, of whom Nicolas speaks as "thepersonal and intimate friend both of Lord and Lady Nelson, and thewidow of one of his most distinguished followers, " but whose name hedoes not give. [19] "I am aware of your intention not to touch uponthis delicate subject: I only allude to it in order to assure you, from my personal knowledge, in a long and intimate acquaintance, thatLady Nelson's conduct was not only affectionate, wise, and prudent, but admirable, throughout her married life, and that she had not asingle reproach to make herself. I say not this to cast unnecessaryblame upon _one_ whose memory I delight to honour, but only in justiceto that truly good and amiable woman. .. . If mildness, forbearance, andindulgence to the weaknesses of human nature could have availed, herfate would have been very different. No reproach ever passed her lips;and when she parted from her Lord, on his hoisting his flag again, itwas without the most distant suspicion that he meant it to be final, and that in this life they were never to meet again. I am desirousthat you should know the worth of her who has so often beenmisrepresented, from the wish of many to cast the blame anywhere, buton him who was so deservedly dear to the Nation. " The latter years of Lady Nelson's life were passed partly in Paris, where she lived with her son and his family. Her eldest grandchild, agirl, was eight or ten years old at the time of her death. Sheremembers the great sweetness of her grandmother's temper, and tellsthat she often saw her take from a casket a miniature of Nelson, lookat it affectionately, kiss it, and then replace it gently; after whichshe would turn to her and say, "When you are older, little Fan, youtoo may know what it is to have a broken heart. " This triflingincident, transpiring as it now does for the first time, after nearlyseventy years, from the intimate privacies of family life, bears itsmute evidence to the truth of the last two witnesses, that Lady Nelsonneither reproached her husband, nor was towards him unforgiving. [20]Nelson's early friend, the Duke of Clarence, who had given her away atthe wedding, maintained his kindly relations with her to the end, andcontinued his interest to her descendants after his accession to thethrone. Thus abruptly and sadly ended an attachment which, if never ardent, had for many years run undisturbed its tender course, and apparentlyhad satisfied Nelson's heart, until the wave of a great passion swepthim off his feet. "I remember, " writes Miss Knight, "that, shortlyafter the Battle of the Nile, when my mother said to him that no doubthe considered the day of that victory as the happiest in his life, heanswered, 'No; the happiest was that on which I married Lady Nelson. '"On the 13th of January, 1801, Nelson took formal and final leave ofher before hoisting his flag at Torbay. "I call God to witness, " hethen said, "there is nothing in you, or your conduct, that I wishotherwise. " His alienation from her was shared by most of his family, except his father, who said to him frankly, that gratitude required heshould spend part of his time with Lady Nelson. Two years before, hehad written of her: "During the whole war [since 1793] I have beenwith Lady Nelson, a good woman, and attentive to an infirm old man, "and they had continued to live together. The old man persuaded himselfthat there was nothing criminal in relations, the result of which, asregarded his son and daughter-in-law, he could not but deplore; buthis letters to Lady Hamilton go little beyond the civility that wasnecessary to avoid giving offence to Nelson. Nelson's two marriedsisters, Mrs. Bolton and Mrs. Matcham, evidently shared their father'sbelief. They and their children maintained with Lady Hamilton afriendly and even affectionate correspondence, long after Trafalgar, and until the death of the parties put an end to it. Immediately upon landing at Yarmouth, Nelson had written to theAdmiralty that his health was perfectly restored, and that he wishedto resume service immediately. He was soon designated to a command inthe Channel fleet, under Earl St. Vincent, who had beencommander-in-chief since the spring of 1800. The "San Josef, " thethree-decker boarded by him at Cape St. Vincent, was named to receivehis flag, and on the 17th of January it was hoisted on board her, atPlymouth, --blue at the fore, he having been promoted Vice-Admiral ofthe Blue on New Year's Day. An arrangement, however, had already beenmade, that, if the impending difficulties with Denmark threatened tolead to hostilities, he should accompany the fleet sent to the Baltic, as second to Sir Hyde Parker, selected for the chief command. While hewas officially reporting to St. Vincent, on the 16th, at Torbay, preparatory to hoisting his flag, a letter from Parker informed himthat the armament was decided upon. This he showed at once to St. Vincent, who acquiesced of course in the disappointment, but expresseda hope that after a brief absence he would rejoin him. By the first of February the "San Josef" had gone round to Torbay, therendezvous of the Channel fleet under St. Vincent's command, and thereit was that Nelson received the news of the birth, on the 29th or 30thof January, of the child Horatia, whose parentage for a long time gaverise to much discussion, and is even yet considered by some a matterof doubt. Fortunately, that question requires no investigation here;as regards the Life of Nelson, and his character as involved in thismatter, the fact is beyond dispute that he believed himself thefather, and Lady Hamilton the mother, of the girl, whose origin hesought to conceal by an elaborate though clumsy system ofmystification. This might possibly have left the subject covered withclouds, though not greatly in doubt, had not Lady Hamilton, afterwildly unnecessary lying on her own part, recklessly preserved herholdings of a correspondence which Nelson scrupulously destroyed, andenjoined her to destroy. The sedulous care on his side to conceal the nature of theirrelations, and the reckless disregard of his wishes shown by her, issingularly illustrated by the method he took to bring the child intoher charge, from that of the nurse to whom it had been intrusted. Whenit was somewhat over three years old, on the 13th of August, 1804, hewrote Lady Hamilton a letter, evidently to be used, where necessary, to account for its presence under his roof. "I am now going to state athing to you and to request your kind assistance, which, from my dearEmma's goodness of heart, I am sure of her acquiescence in. Before weleft Italy I told you of the extraordinary circumstance of a childbeing left to my care and protection. On your first coming to EnglandI presented you the child, dear Horatia. You became, to my comfort, attached to it, so did Sir William, thinking her the finest child hehad ever seen. She is become of that age when it is necessary toremove her from a mere nurse and to think of educating her. .. . I shalltell you, my dear Emma, more of this matter when I come to England, but I am now anxious for the child's being placed under yourprotecting wing. " With this letter (or, possibly, with another writtenthe same day) was found an enclosure, undated and unsigned, but inNelson's handwriting. "My beloved, how I feel for your situation andthat of our dear Horatia, our dear child. .. . "[21] The indifference to incidental consequences which was shown by Nelson, when once he had decided upon a course of action, was part of hisnatural, as well as of his more distinctively military character; butin this connection with Lady Hamilton he must have felt intuitivelythat not only her reputation--which probably was his first care--wasinvolved, but his own also. The hospitality, the attention, thefriendship, extended to him at Naples and Palermo, were not from LadyHamilton only but from her husband also, in whose house he lived, andwho to the end, so far as the records show, professed for himunbounded esteem and confidence. This confidence had been betrayed, and the strongest line of argument formerly advanced, by those whodisputed Lady Hamilton's being the mother of the child, has become nowNelson's severest condemnation. "However great was Nelson's infatuation, " says Sir Harris Nicolas, "his nice sense of honour, his feelings of propriety, and his love oftruth, were unquestionable. Hence, though during a long separationfrom his wife on the public service in the Mediterranean, he so faryielded to temptation as to become the father of a child, it isnevertheless difficult to believe that he should for years have had acriminal intercourse with the wife of a man of his own rank, whom heconsidered as his dearest friend, who placed the greatest confidencein his honour and virtue, and in whose house he was living. Still moredifficult is it to believe, even if this had been the case, that heshould not only have permitted every one of his relations, male andfemale, --his wife, his father, his brothers, his brothers-in-law, histwo sisters, and all their daughters, --to visit and correspond withher, but even have allowed three of his nieces to live for aconsiderable time with her; have ostentatiously and frequently writtenand spoken of her 'virtuous and religious' character, --holding her upas an example to his family; have appointed her the sole guardian ofhis child; have avowedly intended to make her his wife; have actedupon every occasion as if the purity of their intimacy was altogetherfree from suspicion; and in the last written act of his life havesolemnly called upon his country to reward and support her. Anhonourable and conscientious man rarely acts thus towards hismistress. .. . Moreover, Nelson's most intimate friends, including theEarl of St. Vincent, who called them 'a pair of sentimental fools, 'Dr. Scott, his Chaplain, and Mr. Haslewood, were of the sameopinion; and Southey says, 'there is no reason to believe that thismost unfortunate attachment was criminal. '" This complicated and difficult path of deception had to be trod, because the offence was not one of common error, readily pardoned ifdiscovered, but because the man betrayed, whatever his faultsotherwise, had shown both the culprits unbounded confidence andkindness, and upon the woman, at least, had been led by his love toconfer a benefit which neither should have forgotten. FOOTNOTES: [6] The Paget Papers, vol. I. Pp. 253, 257. [7] British minister to Tuscany. [8] There were some Neapolitan frigates in Leghorn, but the royal familywere never willing to trust them. [9] Life of Lord Minto, vol. Iii. Pp. 147-150. [10] Malmesbury's Memoirs, vol, ii. P. 24. [11] Mrs. St. George's description of Lady Hamilton has already been given, _ante_, vol. I. P. 380. [12] Miss Knight mentions the same ceremony occurring in Vienna. [13] Life of Lord Minto, vol. Iii. Pp. 242-243. [14] This letter, with another, appears in the Alfred Morrison "Collectionof Autograph Letters" (Nos. 472, 473). It is purposely given entire, exceptimmaterial postscripts. [15] Table-Talk of Samuel Rogers. [16] The author is indebted to Prof. J. Knox Laughton for some extractsfrom Hotham's diary. [17] Beckford's Memoirs, London, 1859, vol. Ii. P. 127. [18] Locker's Greenwich Gallery, article "Torrington. " [19] Nicolas, vol. Ii. P. 353. The present writer believes this lady tohave been Lady Berry, wife of Nelson's flag-captain, who gave Nicolas muchof his information. [20] The author is indebted for this anecdote to Mrs. F. H. B. Eccles, ofSherwell House, Plymouth, the daughter of the "little Fan" who told it. [21] Morrison. The Hamilton and Nelson Papers, Nos. 777, 778, 779. CHAPTER XVI. THE EXPEDITION TO THE BALTIC AND BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN. --NELSON RETURNSTO ENGLAND. FEBRUARY--JUNE, 1801. AGE, 42. The trouble between Great Britain and Denmark, which now called Nelsonagain to the front, leading to the most difficult of his undertakings, and, consequently, to the most distinguished of his achievements, arose about the maritime rights of neutrals and belligerents. Thecontention was not new. In 1780 the Baltic States, Russia, Sweden, andDenmark, being neutrals in the war then raging, had combined toassert, by arms, if necessary, certain claims advanced by them toimmunity from practices which international law had hithertosanctioned, or concerning which it had spoken ambiguously. Theseclaims Great Britain had rejected, as contrary to her rights andinterests; but, being then greatly outnumbered, she temporized untilthe end of the war, which left her in possession of the principles atstake, although she had forborne to enforce them offensively. Thecoalition of the Baltic States, at that time, received the name of theArmed Neutrality. From 1793 to 1800 Sweden and Denmark had again succeeded inmaintaining their neutrality, and, as most other maritime states wereat war, their freedom of navigation had thrown into their hands alarge carrying trade. But, while their profit was thus great, it wouldbe much greater, if their ships could be saved the interruptions totheir voyages arising from the right of belligerents to stop, tosearch, and, if necessary, to send into port, a vessel on board whichwere found enemy's goods, or articles considered "contraband of war. "The uncertainty hanging round the definitions of the latter phrasegreatly increased the annoyance to neutrals; and serious disputesexisted on certain points, as, for example, whether materials forshipbuilding, going to an enemy's port, were liable to capture. GreatBritain maintained that they were, the neutrals that they were not;and, as the Baltic was one of the chief regions from which suchsupplies came, a principal line of trade for the Northern States wasmuch curtailed. Sweden and Denmark were too weak to support their contention againstthe sea-power of Great Britain. Where there is lack of force, therewill always be found the tendency to resort to evasion to accomplishan end; and Denmark, in 1799, endeavored to secure for her merchantships immunity from search by belligerent cruisers--whichInternational Law has always conceded, and still concedes, to bewithin the rights of a belligerent--by sending them on their voyagesin large convoys, protected by ships of war. It was claimed that thestatement of the senior naval officer, that there were not in theconvoy any articles subject to capture, was sufficient; and that thebelligerent would in that case have no right to search. Great Britainreplied that the right of search rested upon longstanding commonconsent, and precedent, and that it could not be taken from heragainst her will by any process instituted by another state. TheDanish ships of war being instructed to use force against search, twohostile collisions followed, in one of which several men were killedand wounded, and the Danish frigate was taken into a Britishport--though afterwards released. The latter of these conflicts occurred in July, 1800. Great Britainthen sent an ambassador to Denmark, backing him with a fleet of nineships-of-the-line, with bomb-vessels; and at the end of August aconvention was signed, by which the general subject was referred tofuture discussion, but Denmark agreed for the time to discontinue herconvoys. The importance of the subject to Great Britain was twofold. First, by having the right to seize enemy's property in neutral ships, she suppressed a great part of the commerce which France could carryon, thus crippling her financially; and, second, by capturing articlesof shipbuilding as contraband of war, she kept from the Frenchmaterials essential to the maintenance of their navy, which their owncountry did not produce. British statesmen of all parties maintainedthat in these contentions there was at stake, not an empty andoffensive privilege, but a right vital to self-defence, to theeffective maintenance of which the power to search was fundamentallynecessary. In 1800 the Czar Paul I. Had become bitterly hostile to Austria andGreat Britain. This feeling had its origin in the disasters of thecampaign of 1799, and was brought to a climax by the refusal of GreatBritain to yield Malta to him, as Grand Master of the Order, after itscapture from the French in September, 1800. It had been the fullpurpose of the British ministry to surrender it, and Nelson, much tohis distaste, had received specific orders to that effect; but, besides the fact that the Russians had contributed nothing directly tothe reduction of the island, the attitude of the Czar had become sodoubtful, that common prudence forbade putting into the hands of aprobable future enemy the prize so hardly won from a present foe. Paulhad already announced his intention of reviving the Armed Neutralityof 1780; and when, in November, he learned the fall of Malta, heseized three hundred British vessels lying in Russian ports, marchedtheir crews into the interior, and at the same time placed seals onall British warehoused property, --a measure intended to support hisdemand for the restitution of the island to him. On the 16th of December a treaty was signed at St. Petersburg byRussia and Sweden, to which Denmark and Prussia promptly adhered, renewing the Armed Neutrality, for the support of their variousclaims. The consenting states bound themselves to maintain theirdemands by force, if necessary; but no declaration of war was issued. Great Britain, in accepting the challenge, equally abstained from actswhich would constitute a state of war; but she armed at once toshatter the coalition, before it attained coherence in aught butwords. From first to last, until the Armed Neutrality again dissolved, though there was hard fighting, there was not formal war. The relation of these occurrences to the life of Nelson will not befully understood, unless the general state of Europe be recalled, andthe master hand of Bonaparte be recognized, underlying and controllingprevious changes and present conditions. After the Battle of the Nile, and up to a year before this, Austria, Russia, and Great Britain hadbeen united in arms against France; and, in addition to the undisputedcontrol of the sea by the British Navy, they were pressing inoverpowering numbers upon her eastern frontiers, from the North Sea tothe Mediterranean. Blunders of their own had arrested the full tide ofsuccess, and the return of Bonaparte from Egypt reversed the current. Russia withdrew in anger, and Austria, beaten upon field after field, in Italy and Germany, by Bonaparte and Moreau, had finally consentedto peace after the disastrous defeat of Hohenlinden, on the 3d ofDecember, 1800. Great Britain was left without an ally; and Russia wasadded to the list of her active enemies by the skilful politicalmanipulation of Bonaparte, who played upon the impulses and weaknessesof the half-mad Czar, releasing with distinguished marks of respectall Russian prisoners, and offering the vain gift of Malta, the Frenchgarrison of which was even then clutched by the throat in the irongrip of the British sea-power. The renewal of the Armed Neutrality was thus, primarily, the work ofBonaparte. He alone had the keenness to see all the possibilities infavor of France that were to be found in the immense combination, andhe alone possessed the skill and the power to touch the variouschords, whose concert was necessary to its harmonious action. Althoughit was true, as Nelson said, that Paul was the trunk of themany-limbed tree, it was yet more true that Bonaparte's deft cajolingof the Czar, and the inducements astutely suggested by him to Prussia, were the vitalizing forces which animated the two principal parties inthe coalition, in whose wake the weaker states were dragged. Throughthe former he hoped to effect a combination of the Baltic naviesagainst the British; through the latter he looked to exclude GreatBritain from her important commerce with the Continent, which wascarried on mainly by the ports of Prussia, or by those of NorthGermany, which she could control. Thus, by the concerted andsimultaneous action of direct weight of arms on the one hand, and ofcommercial embarrassment on the other, Bonaparte hoped to overbear thepower of his chief enemy; and here, as on other occasions, both beforeand after, Nelson was at once the quickening spirit of the enterprise, and the direct agent of the blow, which brought down his plans, inruins, about his ears. Relaxing none of her efforts in other quarters of the world, GreatBritain drew together, to confront the new danger, everything in thehome waters that could float, till she had gathered a fleet of twentysail-of-the-line, with smaller cruisers in due proportion. "Under thepresent impending storm from the north of Europe, " wrote St. Vincent, from his perch above the waters of Torbay, "to enable us to meet sucha host of foes, no ship under my command must have anything done toher at Plymouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this anchorage. " "Weare now arrived at that period, " wrote Nelson, "what we have oftenheard of, but must now execute--that of fighting for our dear Country;and I trust that, although we may not be able to subdue our host ofenemies, yet we may make them ashamed of themselves, and prove thatthey cannot injure us. " "I have only to say, " he wrote to EarlSpencer, who must have rejoiced to see the old spirit flaming again inundiminished vigor, "what you, my dear Lord, are fully satisfied of, that the service of my King and Country is the object nearest myheart; and that a first-rate, or sloop of war, is a matter of perfectindifference to your most faithful and obliged Nelson. " The "San Josef" being considered too heavy a ship for the Balticservice, Nelson's flag was shifted on the 12th of February to the "St. George, " a three-decker of lighter draft. Hardy accompanied him ascaptain, and on the 17th Nelson received orders to place himself underthe command of Sir Hyde Parker. A few days afterwards, the "St. George" went to Spithead, where she received on board six hundredtroops, under the command of Colonel William Stewart, to whom we owethe fullest and most interesting account of the expedition in general, and of the Battle of Copenhagen in particular, that has beentransmitted by an eye-witness. The ship sailed again on the 2d ofMarch for Yarmouth, where she arrived on the 6th. The next day Nelsonwent to call on the commander-in-chief, who was living on shore, hisflag flying on board a vessel in the roads. "I remember, " says ColonelStewart, "that Lord Nelson regretted Sir Hyde being on shore. Webreakfasted that morning as usual, soon after six o'clock, for we werealways up before daylight. We went on shore, so as to be at Sir Hyde'sdoor at eight o'clock, Lord Nelson choosing to be amusingly exact tothat hour, which he considered as a very late one for business. " At this, his first official visit, the commander-in-chief, it issaid, scarcely noticed him, and Nelson, as will be seen, complainedfreely of the treatment he at the beginning received. Parker was nowverging on old age, but he had recently married a young wife, who wasin Yarmouth with him, and the two had arranged to give a great ball onthe 13th of March; altogether a bad combination for a militaryundertaking. Nelson, who was in haste to get away, --chiefly because ofhis sound martial instinct that this was peculiarly a case forcelerity, but partly, also, because of anxiety to get the thing overand done, and to return to his home comforts, --appears to haverepresented matters unofficially to the Admiralty, a step for whichhis personal intimacy with St. Vincent and Troubridge afforded easyopportunity; and an express quickly arrived, ordering the fleet to seaat once. [22] "The signal is made to prepare to unmoor at twelveo'clock, " wrote Nelson to Troubridge on the 11th. "Now we can have nodesire for staying, for her ladyship is gone, and the _Ball_ forFriday knocked up by yours and the Earl's unpoliteness, to sendgentlemen to sea instead of dancing with white gloves. I will onlysay, " he continues, "as yet I know not that we are even going to theBaltic, except from the newspapers, and at sea I cannot go out of myship but with serious inconvenience, "--owing to the loss of his arm. What was not told him before starting, therefore, could not be told bymouth till after arrival. It will be remembered that Sir Hyde Parker had succeeded Hotham in thechief command of the Mediterranean, for a brief but critical month in1795, [23] and that Nelson had then complained of his action as regardsthe general conduct of the campaign, and specifically for havingreduced to the point of inefficiency the small squadron under Nelson'sown direction, upon which the most important issues hinged. PossiblyParker had heard this, possibly the notorious disregard of Keith'sorders a few months before influenced him to keep his renowned, butindependent, subordinate at a distance in official matters. It was notwell advised; though probably the great blunderers were the Admiralty, in sending as second a man who had shown himself so exceptionally anduniquely capable of supreme command, and so apt to make trouble formediocre superiors. If Lord St. Vincent's surmise was correct, Parker, who was a very respectable officer, had been chosen for his presentplace because in possession of all the information acquired during thelast preparation for a Russian war; while Nelson fancied that St. Vincent himself, as commander of the Channel fleet, had recommendedhim, in order to get rid of a second in command who did not carry outsatisfactorily the methods of his superior. If that were so, themistake recoiled upon his own head; for, while the appointment wasmade by Earl Spencer, St. Vincent succeeded him as First Lord beforethe expedition sailed, and the old seaman would much have preferred tosee Nelson at the helm. He was quite sure of the latter, he said, andshould have been in no apprehension if he had been of rank to take thechief command; but he could not feel so sure about Sir Hyde, as he hadnever been tried. Whatever the truth, Lady Malmesbury's comment afterthe event was indisputable: "I feel very sorry for Sir Hyde; but nowise man would ever have gone with Nelson, or over him, as he was sureto be in the background in every case. " "I declare solemnly, " wrote Nelson to Davison four days afterreporting, "that I do not know"--officially, of course--"that I amgoing to the Baltic, and much worse than that I could tell you. SirHyde is on board sulky. Stewart tells me, his treatment of me is nownoticed. Dickson came on board to-day to say all were scandalized athis gross neglect. Burn this letter: then it can never appear, and youcan speak as if your knowledge came from another quarter. " That daythe orders came from the Admiralty to go to sea; and the next, March12, the ships then present sailed, --fifteen ships-of-the-line and twofifties, besides frigates, sloops of war, brigs, cutters, fireships, and seven bomb-vessels, --for, if the Danes were obstinate, Copenhagenwas to be bombarded. On the 16th of March Nelson wrote both to Davisonand Lady Hamilton that he as yet knew nothing, except by commonreport. "Sir Hyde has not told me officially a thing. I am sorryenough to be sent on such an expedition, but nothing can, I trust, degrade, do what they will. " His mind was in a condition to see theworst motives in what befell him. "I know, I see, that I am not to besupported in the way I ought, but the St. George is beginning toprepare this day for battle, and she shall be true to herself. .. . Captain Murray sees, as do every one, what is meant to disgrace me, but that is impossible. Even the Captain of the Fleet [Parker's Chiefof Staff] sent me word that it was not his doing, for that Sir HydeParker had run his pen through all that could do me credit, or give mesupport; but never mind, Nelson will be first if he lives, and youshall partake of all his glory. So it shall be my study to distinguishmyself, that your heart shall leap for joy when my name ismentioned. "[24] Enough reached his ears to draw forth unqualified expressions ofdissent from the plans proposed, and equally clear statements as towhat should be done, --all stamped unmistakably with the "Nelsontouch, " to use an apt phrase of his own. "Reports say, " he tells LadyHamilton, "we are to anchor before we get to Cronenburg Castle, thatour minister at Copenhagen may negotiate. What nonsense! How muchbetter could we negotiate was our fleet off Copenhagen, and the Danishminister would seriously reflect how he brought the fire of England onhis Master's fleet and capital; but to keep us out of sight is toseduce Denmark into a war. .. . If they are the plans of Ministers, theyare weak in the extreme, and very different to what I understood fromMr. Pitt. [25] If they originate with Sir Hyde, it makes him, in mymind, as--but never mind, your Nelson's plans are bold anddecisive--all on the great scale. I hate your pen and ink men; a fleetof British ships of war are the best negotiators in Europe. " While thegreatness and decision of his character remain unimpaired, perhapseven heightened, it will be noticed that self-reliance, never in anyman more justified, has tended to degenerate into boastfulness, andrestlessness under displeasing orders to become suspicion of themotives prompting them. "They all hate me and treat me ill, " he says, speaking of Spencer's and St. Vincent's administrations. "I cannot, mydear friend, recall to mind any one real act of kindness, but all ofunkindness. " It must, of course, be remembered that, while suchexpressions portray faithfully the working of the inner spirit, andserve, by contrast, to measure the Nelson of 1801 against the Nelsonof 1796, they were addressed to the most intimate of friends, and donot necessarily imply a corresponding bearing before the eyes of theworld. An amusing story is told of a shrewd stratagem resorted to by Nelson, on the passage to the Baltic, to thaw the barrier of frigidity in hissuperior, which not only was unpleasant to him personally, as well asinjurious to the interests of the state, but threatened also toprevent his due share in the planning and execution of the enterprisein hand, thus diminishing the glory he ever coveted. The narrator, Lieutenant Layman, was serving on board the "St. George, " and happenedto mention, in Nelson's presence, that some years before he had seencaught a very fine turbot on the Dogger Bank, over which the fleetmust pass on its way. "This being a mere casual remark, nothing more would have beenthought of it, had not Nelson, after showing great anxiety in hisinquiries when they should be on the Dogger Bank, significantly saidto Mr. Layman, 'Do you think we could catch a turbot?' After a try ortwo, a small turbot was caught. Lord Nelson appeared delighted, andcalled out, 'Send it to Sir Hyde. ' Something being said about the riskof sending a boat, from the great sea, lowering weather, and its beingdark, his Lordship said with much meaning, 'I know the Chief is fondof good living, and he shall have the turbot. ' That his Lordship wasright appeared by the result, as the boat returned with a note ofcompliment and thanks from Parker. The turbot having opened acommunication, the effect was wonderful. At Merton Mr. Layman toldLord Nelson that a man eminent in the naval profession had said tohim, 'Do tell me how Parker came to take the laurel from his own brow, and place it on Nelson's?' 'What did you say?' asked Nelson. 'That itwas not a gift, ' replied Layman, 'as your Lordship had gained thevictory by a turbot. ' 'A turbot!' 'Yes, my lord, I well recollect yourgreat desire to catch a turbot, and your astonishing many, byinsisting upon its being immediately sent to Sir Hyde, whocondescended to return a civil note; without which opening yourLordship would not have been consulted in the Cattegat, and withoutsuch intercourse your Lordship would not have got the detachedsquadron; without which there would not have been any engagement, andconsequently no victory. ' Lord Nelson smilingly said, 'You areright. '"[26] On the 19th of March the fleet was collected off the northern point ofDenmark, known as the Skaw. From there the broad channel, called theKattegat, extends southward, between Sweden and the northern part ofthe Danish peninsula, until it reaches the large Island of Zealand, upon the eastern shore of which Copenhagen lies. The two principalentrances into the Baltic are on either side of Zealand. The easternone, separating it from Sweden, is called the Sound, that to the westis known as the Great Belt; each, from the military point of view, possessed its particular advantages and particular drawbacks. "We areslow in our motions as ever, " wrote Nelson, whose impatient anddecided character would have used the fair wind that was blowing toenter the Kattegat, and to proceed at once to Copenhagen, "but I hopeall for the best. I have not yet seen Sir Hyde, but I purpose goingthis morning; for no attention shall be wanting on my part. " The nextday he reports the result of the interview to his friend Davison: "Istaid an hour, and ground out something, but there was not that degreeof openness which I should have shown to my second in command. " Thefleet advanced deliberately, a frigate being sent ahead to land theBritish envoy, Mr. Vansittart, whose instructions were that onlyforty-eight hours were to be allowed the Danes to accept the demandsof Great Britain, and to withdraw from the coalition. The slownesshere, like every other delay, chafed Nelson, whose wish from thebeginning was to proceed at the utmost speed, not merely from theSkaw, but from England, with whatever ships could be collected; for hereasoned perfectly accurately upon the safe general principle thatdelay favors the defence more than the offence. "I only now long to begone, " he wrote before leaving Yarmouth; "time is precious, and everyhour makes more resistance; strike quick, and home. " It wasparticularly true in this case, for Denmark, long used to peace, hadnot thought war possible, and every day was precious to her inrestoring and increasing the neglected protection of Copenhagen. On the evening of March 20 the fleet anchored in the Kattegat, eighteen miles from Cronenburg Castle and the town of Elsinore, atwhich the Sound narrows to three miles. Both shores being hostile, Parker would not attempt to force the passage until he learned theresult of the British mission to Copenhagen; meanwhile the Danes wereworking busily at the blockships and batteries of the city. On the 23dMr. Vansittart returned with the terms rejected; and he brought, also, alarming reports of the state of the batteries at Elsinore andCopenhagen, which were much stronger than the previous information ofthe British Cabinet had shown, proving, as Nelson urged, that eachday's delay increased the enemy's relative power. Sir Hyde called acouncil. "Now we are sure of fighting, " wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton. "I am sent for. When it was a joke I was kept in the background;to-morrow will I hope be a proud day for England--to have it so, noexertion shall be wanting from your most attached and affectionatefriend. " He was accompanied to Parker's flagship by Lieutenant Layman, who wentin the boat to steer for him. "On board the London, " according toLayman, "the heads appeared very gloomy. Mr. Vansittart, who arrivedat the same moment Nelson did, said that if the fleet proceeded toattack, it would be beaten, and the attempt was in danger of beingrelinquished. The Captain of the Fleet said to Layman that the Daneswere too strong to attack, and a torpor verging to despondencyprevailed in the councils. While others were dismayed, however, LordNelson questioned those just arrived from Copenhagen not only as tothe force, but as to the position of the enemy. Such interrogatorieshe called 'bringing people to the post. ' Having learned that the greatstrength of the enemy was at the head of the line, supported by theCrown Battery, his Lordship emphatically observed that to begin theattack there would be like taking a bull by the horns, and hetherefore suggested the attempt by the tail. "[27] In order to avoidthe formidable works at Cronenburg, and yet come up in rear ofCopenhagen, according to this proposition of Nelson's, it was proposedin the council to go by the Great Belt. That passage is moreintricate, and therefore, from the pilot's point of view, morehazardous than the Sound. Nelson was not much deterred by the alarmingreports. "Go by the Sound, or by the Belt, or anyhow, " he said, "onlylose not an hour. " The minutes of the council have not been transmitted, but it isevident from Nelson's own letter of the following day, soon to bequoted in full, and also from one written to him by Mr. Vansittart, after the latter reached London, that he urged upon Parker, andprevailed with him, to throw aside the instructions of the Government, under the changed conditions, and to adopt boldly the plan which, according to his present knowledge, should seem most certain to crushDenmark at once. After that, he would shatter the coalition byimmediate steps against Russia. Only such a bold spirit, with theprestige of a Nelson, can dominate a council of war, or extortdecisive action from a commander-in-chief who calls one. "Thedifficulty, " wrote Nelson some time afterwards, "was to get ourcommander-in-chief to either go past Cronenburg or through the Belt[that is, by any passage], because, what Sir Hyde thought best, andwhat I believe was settled before I came on board the London, was tostay in the Cattegat, and there wait the time when the whole navalforce of the Baltic might choose to come out and fight--a measure, inmy opinion, disgraceful to our Country. I wanted to get at an enemy assoon as possible to strike a _home_ stroke, and Paul was the enemymost vulnerable, and of the greatest consequence for us to humble. " Sopressing, daring, and outspoken were his counsels, so freely did henow, as at former times, advocate setting aside the orders of distantsuperiors, that he thought advisable to ask Vansittart, who was tosail immediately for England, to explain to the Admiralty all theconditions and reasons, which Vansittart did. St. Vincent, as FirstLord, gave unhesitating approval to what his former lieutenant hadadvised. Nelson's understanding of the situation was, in truth, acute, profound, and decisive. In the northern combination against GreatBritain, Paul was the trunk, Denmark and Sweden the branches. Could heget at the trunk and hew it down, the branches fell with it; butshould time and strength first be spent lopping off the branches, thetrunk would remain, and "my power must be weaker when its greateststrength is required. " As things then were, the Russian Navy wasdivided, part being in Cronstadt, and a large fraction, twelveships-of-the-line, in Revel, an advanced and exposed port, where itwas detained fettered by the winter's ice. Get at that and smite it, and the Russian Navy is disabled; all falls together. This would behis own course, if independent. As Parker, however, was obstinatelyresolved not to leave Denmark hostile in his rear, Nelson had to bendto the will of his superior. He did so, without forsaking his ownpurpose. As in the diverse objects of his care in the Mediterranean, where he could not compel, he sought diligently to compass his objectby persuasion, by clear and full explanation of his lofty views, bystirring appeals to duty and opportunity, striving to impart toanother his own insight, and to arouse in him his own single-mindedand dauntless activity. Conceding, perforce, that Denmark was not tobe left hostile in the rear, --although he indicates that this objectmight be attained by masking her power with a detachment, while themain effort was immediately directed against Revel, --his suggestionsto Parker for reducing Denmark speedily are dominated by the sameconception. Strategic and tactical considerations unite to dictate, that the fleet, whether it go by the Sound or the Belt, must quicklyreach and hold a position beyond--and therefore in the rearof--Copenhagen. There it interposed between Denmark and Russia; fromthere it approached Copenhagen where its defences were weakest. Thiscomprehensive exposition went, with Nelson's customary directness, straight to the root of the matter. Next day, after returning to his own ship, Nelson drew up thefollowing paper, which is at once so characteristic of his temperamentand genius, and so lucid and masterly a review of the political andmilitary conditions, that, contrary to the author's usual practice, itis given entire. Being devoted to a single subject, and inspired bythe spirit of the writer when in a state of more than usualexaltation, it possesses a unity of purpose and demonstration, necessarily absent from most of his letters, in which many and diversematters have to be treated. 24th March, 1801. MY DEAR SIR HYDE, --The conversation we had yesterday has naturally, from its importance, been the subject of my thoughts; and the more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy: they will every day and hour be stronger; we never shall be so good a match for them as at this moment. The only consideration in my mind is, how to get at them with the least risk to our ships. By Mr. Vansittart's account, the Danes have taken every means in their power to prevent our getting to attack Copenhagen by the passage of the Sound. Cronenburg has been strengthened, the Crown Islands fortified, on the outermost of which are twenty guns, pointing mostly downwards, and only eight hundred yards from very formidable batteries placed under the Citadel, supported by five Sail of the Line, seven Floating batteries of fifty guns each, besides Small-craft, Gun-boats, &c. &c. ; and that the Revel Squadron of twelve or fourteen Sail of the Line are soon expected, as also five Sail of Swedes. It would appear by what you have told me of your instructions, that Government took for granted you would find no difficulty in getting off Copenhagen, and in the event of a failure of negotiation, you might instantly attack; and that there would be scarcely a doubt but the Danish Fleet would be destroyed, and the Capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to reason and its true interest. By Mr. Vansittart's account, their state of preparation exceeds what he conceives our Government thought possible, and that the Danish Government is hostile to us in the greatest possible degree. Therefore here you are, with almost the safety, certainly with the honour of England more intrusted to you, than ever yet fell to the lot of any British Officer. On your decision depends, whether our Country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her head higher than ever; again do I repeat, never did our Country depend so much on the success of any Fleet as on this. How best to honour our Country and abate the pride of her Enemies, by defeating their schemes, must be the subject of your deepest consideration as Commander-in-Chief; and if what I have to offer can be the least useful in forming your decision, you are most heartily welcome. I shall begin with supposing you are determined to enter by the Passage of the Sound, as there are those who think, if you leave that passage open, that the Danish Fleet may sail from Copenhagen, and join the Dutch or French. I own I have no fears on that subject; for it is not likely that whilst their Capital is menaced with an attack, 9, 000 of her best men should be sent out of the Kingdom. I suppose that some damage may arise amongst our masts and yards; yet perhaps there will not be one of them but could be made serviceable again. You are now about Cronenburg: if the wind be fair, and you determine to attack the Ships and Crown Islands, you must expect the natural issue of such a battle--Ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost; for the wind which carries you in, will most probably not bring out a crippled Ship. This mode I call taking the bull by the horns. It, however, will not prevent the Revel Ships, or Swedes, from joining the Danes; and to prevent this from taking effect, is, in my humble opinion, a measure absolutely necessary--and still to attack Copenhagen. Two modes are in my view; one to pass Cronenburg, taking the risk of damage, and to pass up[28] the deepest and straightest Channel above the Middle Grounds; and coming down the Garbar or King's Channel, to attack their Floating batteries, &c. &c, as we find it convenient. It must have the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians, Swedes, and Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding Copenhagen. I am also pretty certain that a passage could be found to the northward of Southolm for all our Ships; perhaps it might be necessary to warp a short distance in the very narrow part. Should this mode of attack be ineligible, the passage of the Belt, I have no doubt, would be accomplished in four or five days, and then the attack by Draco could be carried into effect, and the junction of the Russians prevented, with every probability of success against the Danish Floating batteries. What effect a bombardment might have, I am not called upon to give an opinion; but think the way would be cleared for the trial. Supposing us through the Belt with the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with the Fleet, or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one Bomb and two Fire-ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment. In supporting you, my dear Sir Hyde, through the arduous and important task you have undertaken, no exertion of head or heart shall be wanting from your most obedient and faithful servant, NELSON AND BRONTE. On the 25th the wind was too strong to allow the ships to lift theiranchors. On the 26th the fleet weighed, and proceeded for a few hoursin the direction of the Great Belt, which Parker had decided tofollow. Captain Otway of the "London, " Sir Hyde's flagship, chanced tohave local knowledge of that passage, which had not come before thecouncil, because he was not a member. When he ascertained theintention, he explained the difficulties and risks to the admiral, upon which the latter concluded that the batteries of Cronenburg andElsinore presented fewer dangers. He accordingly directed the fleet toreturn toward the Sound, and sent Otway to tell Nelson he should takethat route. "I don't care a d--n by which passage we go, " replied thelatter, "so that we fight them. " "Sir Hyde Parker, " he wrote the sameday to Lady Hamilton, "has by this time found out the worth of yourNelson, and that he is a useful sort of man on a pinch; therefore, ifhe ever has thought unkindly of me, I freely forgive him. Nelson muststand among the first, or he must fall. " Side by side with suchexpressions of dauntless resolve and unfailing self-confidence standwords of deepest tenderness, their union under one cover typifyingaptly the twin emotions of heroic aspiration and passionate devotion, which at this time held within him alternate, yet not conflicting, sway. In the same letter he tells her fondly, "You know I am morebigoted to your picture--the faithful representation of you I havewith me--than ever a Neapolitan was to St. Januarius, and look uponyou as my guardian angel, and God, I trust, will make you so to me. His will be done. " From the time of leaving he wrote to herpractically every day. "Mr. S. Is quite right, " he says to her on oneoccasion, "that through the medium of your influence is the surest wayto get my interest. It is true, and it will ever be, whilst you holdyour present conduct, for you never ask anything that does not dohonour to your feelings, as the best woman, as far as my knowledgegoes, that ever lived, and it must do me honour the complying withthem. " The fleet anchored again on the evening of the 26th of March, sixmiles from Cronenburg, and was there detained three days by head windsand calms. In this interval, Nelson's general plan of operationshaving been adopted, he shifted his flag to a lighter ship, the"Elephant, " seventy-four, commanded by Captain Foley, the same who hadled the fleet inside the French line in Aboukir Bay. On the 30th, thewind coming fair from northwest, the ships weighed and passedCronenburg Castle. It had been expected that the Swedish batterieswould open upon them, but, finding they remained silent, the columninclined to that side, thus going clear of the Danish guns. "Morepowder and shot, I believe, never were thrown away, " wrote Nelson, "for not one shot struck a single ship of the British fleet. Some ofour ships fired; but the Elephant did not return a single shot. I hopeto reserve them for a better occasion. " That afternoon they anchored again, about five miles below Copenhagen. Parker and Nelson, accompanied by several senior officers, went atonce in a schooner to view the defences of the town. "We soonperceived, " wrote Stewart, "that our delay had been of importantadvantage to the enemy, who had lined the northern edge of the shoalsnear the Crown batteries, and the front of the harbour and arsenal, with a formidable flotilla. The Trekroner (Three Crowns) Battery"--astrong work established on piles, whose position will begiven--"appeared, in particular, to have been strengthened, and allthe buoys of the Northern, and of the King's Channels had beenremoved. " Nelson, however, was, or feigned to be, less impressed. "Ihave just been reconnoitring the Danish line of defence, " he wrote toLady Hamilton. "It looks formidable to those who are children at war, but to my judgment, with ten sail-of-the-line I think I can annihilatethem; at all events, I hope to be allowed to try. " This is again thesame spirit of the seaman "determined to attack" at Aboukir; the sameresolution as before Bastia, where he kept shut in his own breast theknowledge of the odds, feeling that to do nothing was as bad asfailure--and worse. A like eagerness does not seem to have prevailedon board the flagship. Parker had allowed himself to be stiffened tothe fighting-point by the junior he had before disregarded, but thathe looked to the issue with more than doubt may be inferred from thewords of his private secretary, the Rev. Mr. Scott, who afterwardsheld the same relation to Nelson. "I fear, " he wrote on the day ofthe council, "there is a great deal of Quixotism in this business;there is no getting any positive information of their strength. " Nelson's general plan of attack is set forth in main outlines in theletter already given, but it is desirable to give a somewhat moredetailed description. It will be seen, by the annexed chart, thatthere are before Copenhagen two channels by which the city can bepassed. Between the two lies a shoal, called the Middle Ground. Theinner, known as the King's Channel, lay under the guns of the defenceswhich had been hurriedly improvised for the present emergency. Theseconsisted of a line of hulks, mostly mastless, ranged along the innerside of the King's Channel, close to the flats which bordered it, flanked at the northern end by the permanent work, called theTrekroner[29] Battery. Westward of the latter lay, across the mouth ofthe harbor proper, two more hulks, and a small squadron consisting oftwo ships-of-the-line and a frigate, masted, and in commission. Thisdivision was not seriously engaged, and, as a factor in the battle, may be disregarded. The northern part of this defence was decisively the stronger. Toattack there, Nelson called "taking the bull by the horns. " Thesouthern wing was much more exposed. Nor was this all. An advance fromthe north must be made with a northerly wind. If unsuccessful, oreven, in case of success, if ships were badly crippled, they could notreturn to the north, where the fleet was. On the other hand, attackfrom the south presupposed a southerly wind, with which, after anaction, the engaged ships could rejoin the fleet, if they threadedsafely the difficult navigation. In any event there was risk, but noneknew better than Nelson that without risks war is not made. To theconsiderations above given he added that, when south of the city, theBritish would be interposed between the other Baltic navies andDenmark. The latter, in that case, could not receive reinforcements, unless the English squadron were first defeated. He therefore proposedthat ten ships-of-the-line, of the lighter draughts, which he offeredhimself to lead, should pass through the outer, or northern channel, gain the southern flank of the defence, and thence make the principalattack, while the rest of the fleet supported them by a demonstrationagainst the northern end. The sagacity of this scheme is best attestedfrom the enemy himself. "We have been deceived in the plan of attack, "wrote the historian Niebuhr, then residing in the city; "and, " nowthat the right wing of the defence is destroyed, "all is at stake. "The nights of the 30th and 31st were employed in surveying the waters, laying down buoys to replace those removed by the Danes, and infurther reconnoissance of the enemy's position. The artillery officerswho were to supervise the bombardment satisfied themselves that, ifthe floating defences south of the Trekroner were destroyed, thebomb-vessels could be placed in such a position as to shell the city, without being themselves exposed to undue peril. Parker gave Nelson twelve ships-of-the-line, two more than he hadasked; a judicious addition, for the main part of the fighting was tofall to him, and the difficulties of pilotage might, and actually did, deprive him of several ships. Moreover, while it was proposed that thevessels remaining with Parker should approach and engage the northerndefences, yet the time of attack depended upon a fair wind for Nelson;and as that would necessarily be foul for the other body, thediversion made by it might be, and proved to be, ineffective. Soundjudgment dictated giving Nelson all that could be spared. On the afternoon of the 31st another council was held, in whichNelson's plan was finally ratified; he again volunteered hisservices, which were accepted and his force detailed. As usual, thecouncil was prolific in suggestions of danger. Stewart, who seems tohave been present, writes: "During this Council of War, the energy ofLord Nelson's character was remarked: certain difficulties had beenstarted by some of the members, relative to each of the three Powerswe should either have to engage, in succession or united, in thoseseas. The number of the Russians was, in particular, represented asformidable. Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified at everythingthat savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the above remarkwas applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, 'The more numerous thebetter;' and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said, 'So much thebetter, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the victory, dependon it. ' He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to thetotal want of tactique among the Northern fleets; and to hisintention, whenever he should bring either the Swedes or Russians toaction, of attacking the head of their line, and confusing theirmovements as much as possible. He used to say, 'Close with aFrenchman, but out-manoeuvre a Russian. '" Nelson gave personal supervision to the general work of buoying theNorthern Channel. On the morning of April 1st he made a finalexamination of the ground in the frigate "Amazon, " commanded byCaptain Riou, who fell in the next day's battle. Returning at aboutone in the afternoon, he signalled his division to weigh, and, thewind favoring, the whole passed without accident, the "Amazon"leading. By nightfall they were again anchored, south of the MiddleGround, not over two miles from that end of the Danish line. As theanchor dropped, Nelson called out emphatically, "I will fight them themoment I have a fair wind. " As there were in all thirty-three ships ofwar, they were crowded together, and, being within shelling distanceof the mortars on Amag Island, might have received much harm; but theDanes were too preoccupied with their yet incomplete defences to notethat the few shells thrown dropped among their enemies. "On board the Elephant, " writes Stewart, who with his soldiers hadfollowed Nelson from the "St. George, " "the night of the 1st of Aprilwas an important one. As soon as the fleet was at anchor, the gallantNelson sat down to table with a large party of his comrades in arms. He was in the highest spirits, and drank to a leading wind and to thesuccess of the ensuing day. Captains Foley, Hardy, Freemantle, Riou, Inman, Admiral Graves, his Lordship's second in command, and a fewothers to whom he was particularly attached, were of this interestingparty; from which every man separated with feelings of admiration fortheir great leader, and with anxious impatience to follow him to theapproaching battle. The signal to prepare for action had been madeearly in the evening. All the captains retired to their respectiveships, Riou excepted, who with Lord Nelson and Foley arranged theOrder of Battle, and those instructions that were to be issued to eachship on the succeeding day. These three officers retired between nineand ten to the after-cabin, and drew up those Orders that have beengenerally published, and which ought to be referred to as the bestproof of the arduous nature of the enterprise in which the fleet wasabout to be engaged. "From the previous fatigue of this day, and of the two preceding, LordNelson was so much exhausted while dictating his instructions, that itwas recommended to him by us all, and, indeed, insisted upon by hisold servant, Allen, who assumed much command on these occasions, thathe should go to his cot. It was placed on the floor, but from it hestill continued to dictate. Captain Hardy returned about eleven. Hehad rowed as far as the leading ship of the enemy; sounding round her, and using a pole when he was apprehensive of being heard. He reportedthe practicability of the Channel, and the depth of water up to theships of the enemy's line. Had we abided by this report, in lieu ofconfiding in our Masters and Pilots, we should have acted better. TheOrders were completed about one o'clock, when half a dozen clerks inthe foremost cabin proceeded to transcribe them. Lord Nelson'simpatience again showed itself; for instead of sleeping undisturbedly, as he might have done, he was every half hour calling from his cot tothese clerks to hasten their work, for that the wind was becomingfair: he was constantly receiving a report of this during the night. "It was characteristic of the fortune of the "heaven-born" admiral, that the wind which had been fair the day before to take him south, changed by the hour of battle to fair to take him north; but it isonly just to notice also that he himself never trifled with a fairwind, nor with time. The Orders for Battle, the process of framing which Stewart narrates, have been preserved in full;[30] but they require a little study andanalysis to detect Nelson's thought, and their tactical merit, whichin matters of detail is unique among his works. At the Nile andTrafalgar he contented himself with general plans, to meet cases whichhe could only foresee in broad outlines; the method of application hereserved to the moment of battle, when again he signified the generaldirection of the attack, and left the details to his subordinates. Here at Copenhagen he had been able to study the hostile dispositions. Consequently, although he could not mark with precision the situationsof the smaller floating batteries, those of the principal blockshipswere known, and upon that knowledge lie based very particularinstructions for the position each ship-of-the-line was to occupy. Thesmaller British vessels also had specific orders. Taking the Trekroner as a point of reference for the Danish order, there were north of it, on the Danish left flank, two blockships. South of it were seven blockships, with a number of miscellaneousfloating batteries, which raised that wing of the defence toeighteen--the grand total being therefore twenty. This was alsoNelson's count, except that he put one small vessel on the north wing, reducing the southern to seventeen--an immaterial difference. South ofthe Trekroner, the Danes had disposed their seven blockships--whichwere mastless ships-of-the-line--as follows. Two were on the rightflank, supporting each other, two on the left, the three others spacedbetween these extremes; the distance from the Trekroner to thesouthernmost ship being about a mile and a half. The intervals werefilled with the floating batteries. It will be recognized that theDanes treated this southern wing as an entity by itself, of which theystrengthened the flanks, relying for the protection of the centre uponthe nearness to shoal water, which would prevent the line beingpierced. As thus described, the southern wing covered the front of the cityagainst bombardment. The two northern blockships and the Trekroner didnot conduce materially to that; they protected chiefly the entrance ofthe harbor. It was therefore only necessary to reduce the southernwing; but Nelson preferred to engage at once the whole line of vesselsand the Trekroner. It is difficult entirely to approve this refusal toconcentrate upon a part of the enemy's order, --an advantage to whichNelson was fully alive, --but it was probably due to underestimatingthe value of the Danish gunnery, knowing as he did how long they hadbeen at peace. He may, also, have hoped something from Parker'sdivision. Be this as it may, he spread his ships-of-the-line, in thearrangement he prescribed, from one end to the other of the enemy'sorder. Having done this, however, he adopted measures well calculated tocrush the southern flank speedily, and then to accumulate superiornumbers on the northern. The British were arranged in a column ofattack, and the directions were that the three leading ships shouldpass along the hostile line, engaging as they went, until the headmostreached the fifth Dane, a blockship inferior to itself, abreast whichit was to anchor by the stern, as all the British ships were to do. Numbers two and three were then to pass number one, and anchorsuccessively ahead of her, supporting her there against the otherenemy's batteries, while four and five were to anchor astern of her, engaging the two flank blockships, which would have received alreadythe full broadsides of the three leading vessels. Nelson hoped thatthe two southern Danes, by this concentration of fire upon them, wouldbe speedily silenced; and their immediate antagonists had orders, whenthat was done, to cut their cables and go north, to reinforce thefight in that quarter. The sooner to attain this end, a frigate andsome smaller vessels were told off to take position across the bows ofthe two blockships, and to keep a raking fire upon them. The dispositions for the other British vessels were more simple. Theywere to follow along the outer side of their own engaged ships, eachone anchoring as it cleared the headmost ship already inaction, --number six ahead of number five, number seven of numbersix, --so that the twelfth would be abreast the twentieth Dane. Oneship-of-the-line was of course thought equivalent to two or threefloating batteries, if opposed to them in an interval. By thisarrangement, each of the British was covered in its advance, until itreached its prescribed antagonist as nearly fresh as possible, and theorder of the British column was reversed from end to end. [31] Adivision of frigates and fireships, under Captain Riou, was held readyfor any special service. The bomb-vessels were to anchor in the King'sChannel, but well outside the line of battle, from which positionthey threw some bombs. Alongside each ship-of-the-line was towed aflat-boat, intended to carry soldiers in an attempt to storm theTrekroner, if circumstances favored; and other boats were sent forthat purpose from Parker's division. These orders were copied, and ready for distribution, by six in themorning. Nelson, who was already up and had breakfasted, signalled atseven for all captains, and by eight these had their instructions. Thewind had become so fair that ships anchoring by the stern would lieperfectly well for using their broadsides at once. At this instantindecision appeared among the pilots, who were mostly men of only alittle local experience, and that gained in vessels much smaller thanthose they were now to conduct. Nelson, reverting afterwards to thesemoments, said: "I experienced in the Sound the misery of having thehonour of our Country intrusted to pilots, who have no other thoughtthan to keep the ship clear of danger, and their own silly heads clearof shot. At eight in the morning of the 2d of April, not one pilotwould take charge of a ship. " There is in these words scarcely fairallowance for the men's ignorance. At length one of the Masters of thefleet, a Mr. Brierley, undertook to lead the column, and the signal toweigh in succession was made. The leading ship got off handsomely, butdifficulties soon arose. Nelson's old "Agamemnon" was so anchored thatshe could not weather the Middle Ground; she consequently did not getinto action at all. Two other ships, the "Bellona" and "Russell, "seventy-fours, grounded on the east side of the Middle Ground, wherethey remained fast. Although they could use their guns, and did usethem against those southern ships which Nelson particularly wantedcrushed, the disadvantages of distance, of position, and of generalhelplessness, detracted exceedingly from their usefulness. The validBritish force was thus reduced by one-fourth, --to nine vessels. Nelson's ship, the "Elephant, " was following the "Bellona" and"Russell, " and he saw them ground. "His agitation during these momentswas extreme, " says an eye-witness. "I shall never forget theimpression it made on me. It was not, however, the agitation ofindecision, but of ardent, animated patriotism panting for glory, which had appeared within his reach, and was vanishing from hisgrasp. " He doubtless well knew the thinly veiled reproaches ofrashness, cast by timid counsels upon the daring, which even underthese disadvantages was to cover with confusion their prophecies ofdisaster; but, as on many another day, and in that more famousincident, a few hours later, in this same battle, his tenaciouspurpose harbored no side-thought of retreat. "Before you receivethis, " he had written to Lady Hamilton, "all will be over withDenmark, --either your Nelson will be safe, and Sir Hyde Parker avictor, or he, your own Nelson, will be laid low. " The signal toadvance was kept flying, but new dispositions had to be made to meetthe new and adverse conditions. [32] The remaining ships were made toclose to the rear, as they anchored. The "Elephant" had beenoriginally assigned as antagonist to the biggest Danish ship, the"Sjaelland, " seventy-four; but, the "Bellona" having grounded, she nowdropped into the latter's berth immediately ahead of the "Glatton;"and Nelson hailed the "Ganges, " as she was passing, to place herselfas close as possible ahead of the "Elephant. " This movement wasimitated by the "Monarch, " which thus got the "Elephant's" positionabreast the "Sjaelland. " Here, according to Danish accounts, thecontest stood for some time, until the "Defiance, " Graves's flagship, arriving, anchored ahead of the "Monarch, " completing the line of nineBritish ships. Captain Riou with his light division engaged theTrekroner, and the Danish blockship next south of it, which was by himterribly battered. From this moment, and for some time, to usesubsequent words of Nelson, "Here was no manoeuvring: it was downrightfighting. " Meanwhile Parker's division, which had weighed as agreed, was somefour miles off, beating up against Nelson's fair wind. It had not yetcome into action, and the anxious chief, ever doubtful of the resultof a step into which he had been persuaded, contrary, not, perhaps, tohis will, but certainly to his bent, watched the indecisive progressof the strife with a mind unoccupied by any fighting of his own. Twothings were evident: that Nelson had met with some mishaps, and thatthe Danish resistance was more prolonged and sturdier than he hadargued in the Council that it would be. Parker began to talk aboutmaking the signal to leave off action, and the matter was discussedbetween himself, his fleet-captain, and Otway, the captain of theship. The latter opposed the idea strongly, and at last, as a stay, obtained the admiral's authority to go on board the "Elephant" andlearn how things were. He shoved off accordingly, but before hereached Nelson the signal was made. Nelson at the moment was walking the quarter-deck of the "Elephant, "which was anchored on the bow of the Danish flagship "Dannebroge, "engaging her and some floating batteries ahead of her. At this time, Stewart says, "Few, if any, of the enemy's heavy ships and praams hadceased to fire;" and, after mentioning various disappointments thathad befallen the smaller British vessels, besides the failure of threeheavy ships to reach their stations, he continues: "The contest, ingeneral, although from the relaxed state of the enemy's fire, itmight not have given much room for apprehension as to the result, hadcertainly not declared itself in favour of either side. Nelson wassometimes much animated, and at others heroically fine in hisobservations. A shot through the mainmast knocked a few splintersabout us. He observed to me, with a smile, 'It is warm work, and thisday may be the last to any of us at a moment;' and then, stoppingshort at the gangway, he used an expression never to be erased from mymemory, and said with emotion, 'but mark you, I would not be elsewherefor thousands. ' "When the signal, No. 39, was made, the Signal Lieutenant reported itto him. He continued his walk, and did not appear to take notice ofit. The lieutenant meeting his Lordship at the next turn asked, 'whether he should repeat it?' Lord Nelson answered, 'No, acknowledgeit. '[33] On the officer returning to the poop, his Lordship calledafter him, 'Is No. 16 [For Close Action] still hoisted?' Thelieutenant answering in the affirmative, Lord Nelson said, 'Mind youkeep it so. ' He now walked the deck considerably agitated, which wasalways known by his moving the stump of his right arm. After a turn ortwo, he said to me, in a quick manner, 'Do you know what's shown onboard the Commander-in-Chief, No. 39?' On asking him what that meant, he answered, 'Why, to leave off action. ' 'Leave off action!' herepeated, and then added, with a shrug, 'Now damn me if I do. ' He alsoobserved, I believe, to Captain Foley, 'You know, Foley, I have onlyone eye--I have a right to be blind sometimes;' and then with anarchness peculiar to his character, putting the glass to his blindeye, he exclaimed, 'I really do not see the signal. ' This remarkablesignal was, therefore, only acknowledged on board the Elephant, notrepeated. Admiral Graves did the latter, not being able todistinguish the Elephant's conduct: either by a fortunate accident, orintentionally, No. 16 was not displaced. "The squadron of frigates obeyed the signal, and hauled off. Thatbrave officer, Captain Riou, was killed by a raking shot, when theAmazon showed her stern to the Trekroner. He was sitting on a gun, wasencouraging his men, and had been wounded in the head by a splinter. He had expressed himself grieved at being thus obliged to retreat, andnobly observed, 'What will Nelson think of us?' His clerk was killedby his side; and by another shot, several of the marines, whilehauling on the main-brace, shared the same fate. Riou then exclaimed, 'Come then, my boys, let us all die together!' The words were scarcelyuttered, when the fatal shot severed him in two. Thus, and in aninstant, was the British service deprived of one of its greatestornaments, and society of a character of singular worth, resemblingthe heroes of romance. " Fortunately for the British, not aship-of-the-line budged. Graves had indeed transmitted the order byrepeating it, but as he kept that for close action also flying, anddid not move himself, the line remained entire throughout a periodwhen the departure of a single ship would have ruined all, andprobably caused its own destruction. This incident of refusing to see the signal has become as hackneyed asa popular ballad, and in its superficial aspect, showing Nelson as themere fighting man, who, like a plucky dog, could not be dragged offhis antagonist, might well now have been dismissed with the shortestand most summary mention. Of late years doubt has been cast over thereality of Nelson's disobedience, for the reason that Otway, whosemission has already been noted, carried a verbal message that theorder was to be understood as permissive, leaving Nelson the libertyto obey or not. From Otway's biography, however, it appears that thesignal was hoisted before he reached the "Elephant. " Parker'sSecretary, Mr. Scott, has also stated distinctly, that "it wasarranged between the admirals, that, should it appear the ships whichwere engaged were suffering too severely, the signal for retreat wouldbe made, to give Lord Nelson the option of retiring, if he thoughtfit. "[34] On the other hand, without affirming positively, it should be saidthat Nelson's own impressions do not seem to have agreed with Scott's. Not only did he say, some hours after the fight, "Well, I have foughtcontrary to orders, and I shall perhaps be hanged; never mind, letthem, "--which might pass as a continuation of the quarter-deck drama, if such it was, --but his account of the matter to Lord Minto is notconsistent with any clear understanding, on his part, that he had suchliberty of action. Nearly a year later, in March, 1802, Minto writes:"Lord Nelson explained to me a little, on Saturday last, the sort ofblame which had been imputed to Sir Hyde Parker for Copenhagen; in thefirst place, for not commanding the attack in person, and in the nextplace for making signals to recall the fleet during the action; andeverything would have been lost if these signals had been obeyed. " IfNelson understood that the signal was to be construed as permissiveonly, it was extremely ungenerous, and most unlike Nelson, to havewithheld an explanation which extenuated, if it did not excuse, one ofthe most dangerous and ill-judged orders that ever was conveyed byflags; nor is it probable that Parker, if the understanding had beenexplicit, would not have insisted with the Admiralty upon the fact, when he was smarting under the general censure, which had led to talkof an inquiry. It seems, also, unlikely that Nelson, having such acontingency in view, would have failed to give explicit instructionsthat his ships should not withdraw (as Riou's frigates did) unless herepeated; nor is it easy to reconcile the agitation noted by Stewartwith a previous arrangement of the kind asserted. What Parker said was, probably, simply one of those by-remarks, withwhich an apprehensive man consoles himself that he reserves a chanceto change his mind. Such provision rarely entered Nelson's head whenembarking upon an enterprise in which "do or die" was the only orderfor success. The man who went into the Copenhagen fight with an eyeupon withdrawing from action would have been beaten before he began. It is upon the clear perception of this truth, and his tenacious gripof it, that the vast merit of Nelson in this incident depends, and notupon the disobedience; though never was disobedience more justified, more imperative, more glorious. To retire, with crippled ships andmangled crews, through difficult channels, under the guns of thehalf-beaten foe, who would renew his strength when he saw themovement, would be to court destruction, --to convert probable victoryinto certain, and perhaps overwhelming, disaster. It was not, however, only in superiority of judgment or of fighting quality that Nelson inthis one act towered like a giant above his superior; it was in thatsupreme moral characteristic which enabled him to shut his eyes to theperils and doubts surrounding the only path by which he could achievesuccess, and save his command from a defeat verging on annihilation. The pantomime of putting the glass to his blind eye was, howeverunintentionally, a profound allegory. There is a time to be blind aswell as a time to see. And if in it there was a little bit ofconscious drama, it was one of those touches that not only provoke theplaudits of the spectators, but stir and raise their hearts, givingthem both an example of heroic steadfastness, and also the assurancethat there is one standing by upon whom their confidence can repose tothe bitter end, --no small thing in the hour of hard and doubtfulbattle. It had its counterpart in the rebuke addressed by him on thisvery occasion to a lieutenant, who uttered some desponding words onthe same quarter-deck: "At such a moment, the delivery of adesponding opinion, unasked, was highly reprehensible, and deservedmuch more censure than Captain Foley gave you. " At two o'clock, an hour after the signal was made, the resistance ofthe Danes had perceptibly slackened; the greater part of their line, Stewart says, had ceased to reply. The flagship "Dannebroge" had beenon fire as early as half-past eleven, and the commander-in-chief, Commodore Fischer, had felt necessary to shift his broad pendant tothe "Holstein, " the second ship from the north flank. The "Dannebroge"continued to fight bravely, losing two hundred and seventy killed andwounded out of a total of three hundred and thirty-six, but at lengthshe was driven out of the line in flames, and grounded near theTrekroner, where she blew up after the action. The "Sjaelland, "seventy-four, next north of her, was likewise carried out of the lineby her cables being cut; while the "Holstein, " and the northernmostship of all, the "Indfödsretten, " were so shattered, the latter mainlyby Riou's frigates, that Fischer again shifted his flag, this time tothe Trekroner. The two southern flank ships, upon whom the mostconcentrated attack was made, had also met with tremendous losses. Their flags were shot away many times, till at the last, by a Danishaccount, no one had time to raise them again, whence the impressionarose amongst the British that these vessels, as well as some others, fought after having surrendered. This incident, occurring in several cases, was the immediate cause ofNelson's taking a step which both then and since has been blamed as anunjustifiable stratagem. So much of the Danish fire south of theTrekroner had ceased, that that wing could be looked upon as subdued;some vessels were helpless, some had their flags down. Between himselfand the Trekroner, Nelson alleged, there was a group of four Danes, unresisting and unmanageable, across and through which the battery wasfiring, and the British replying. Ships which had struck repelledboats sent to board them, and the batteries on Amag Island also firedupon those boats, and over the surrendered Danes. That there was someground for the complaints made by him appears from the Danishadmission just quoted, as well as from several British statements;Stewart's being explicit. Nelson accordingly sent a message ashore, under a flag of truce, to the Crown Prince, who was in generalcommand, saying that if he were not allowed to take possession of hisprizes, he would have to burn them. The message ran:-- TO THE BROTHERS OF ENGLISHMEN, THE DANES. Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark, when no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without having the power of saving the brave Danes who have defended them. NELSON AND BRONTE. It was in the preparation and despatch of this note that Nelson gaveanother illustration, often quoted, of his cool consideration of allthe circumstances surrounding him, and of the politic regard to effectwhich he ever observed in his official intercourse with men. It waswritten by his own hand, a secretary copying as he wrote. Whenfinished, the original was put into an envelope, which the secretarywas about to seal with a wafer; but this Nelson would not permit, directing that taper and wax should be brought. The man sent waskilled before he could return. When this was reported to the admiral, his only reply was, "Send another messenger;" and he waited until thewax came, and then saw that particular care was exercised to make afull and perfect impression of the seal, which bore his own arms. Stewart said to him, "May I take the liberty of asking why, under sohot a fire, and after so lamentable an accident, you have attached somuch importance to a circumstance apparently so trifling?" Nelsonreplied, "Had I made use of the wafer, it would still have been wetwhen presented to the Crown Prince; he would have inferred that theletter was sent off in a hurry, and that we had some very pressingreasons for being in a hurry. The wax told no tales. " A flag of truce in a boat asks no cessation of hostilities, except sofar as the boat itself is concerned. As for the message sent, itsimply insisted that the Danes should cease firing; failing which, Nelson would resort to the perfectly regular, warlike measure ofburning their ships. As the ships were beaten, this might not behumane; but between it and leaving them under the guns of bothparties, the question of humanity was only one of degree. If Nelsoncould extort from the Danes a cessation of hostilities by such athreat, he had a perfect right to do it, and his claim that what hedemanded was required by humanity, is at least colorable. It must beobserved, however, that he makes no suggestion of truce orarmistice, --he demands that firing shall be discontinued, or he willresort to certain steps. The Crown Prince at once sent back his principal aid-de-camp, with averbal message, which the latter reduced to writing, as follows:-- "His Royal Highness, the Prince Royal of Denmark, has sent me, General Adjutant Lindholm, on board to his Britannic Majesty's Vice-Admiral, the Right Honourable Lord Nelson, to ask the particular object of sending the flag of truce. " To this Nelson replied in writing:-- "Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a flag of truce is humanity; he, therefore, consents that hostilities shall cease till Lord Nelson can take his prisoners out of the prizes, and he consents to land all the wounded Danes, and to burn or remove his prizes. " This message concluded with a complimentary expression of hope thatgood relations would be restored between the two nations, whom Nelsonalways carefully spoke of as natural friends. It will be observed thathe again alludes only to the flag of truce sent by the boat, and, asat first he demanded, so now he consents to a cessation ofhostilities, until he can secure his prisoners and remove his prizes. If he could rightly remove his prizes, which he avowed as part of hisdemand, then still more he could his own ships. This part of thenegotiation he took upon himself to settle; for discussion of anyfurther matters he referred Lindholm to Sir Hyde Parker, and theDanish officer started for the "London" at the same time that theEnglish officer pushed off to carry Nelson's second message to theCrown Prince. The latter had already sent orders to the batteries tocease firing. The battle then ended, and both sides hoisted flags oftruce. Nelson at once began to remove his ships, which had sufered more thanin any other battle he had ever fought. That he was fully aware of theimminent necessity for some of them to withdraw, and of the advantagethe Danes had yielded him by accepting his terms, is indisputable, andhis own opinion was confirmed by that of two of his leading captains, whom he consulted. This he never denied; but he did deny that he hadused a _ruse de guerre_, or taken unfair advantage of a truce. On thescore of humanity he had consented to a cessation of hostilities, conditional upon his freedom to take out of the surrendered ships theunwounded prisoners, and to remove the prizes. If the bargain was moreto his advantage than to that of the Danes--which is a matter ofopinion--it was none the less a bargain, of which he had full right toreap the benefit. The Danes did not then charge him with taking anunfair advantage. On the contrary, Lindholm, who was closely cognizantof all that passed in relation to these negotiations, wrote to him:"Your Lordship's motives for sending a flag of truce to ourGovernment can never be misconstrued, and your subsequent conduct hassufficiently shown that humanity is always the companion of truevalour. " The truce that then began was prolonged from day to day tillApril 9th. During it both parties went on with their preparations forwar. "These few days, " wrote Niebuhr, on the 6th, "have certainly beenemployed in repairing the evil [of faulty preparation] as far aspossible. " It is clear that the Danes understood, what Nelson'smessage specified, a cessation of direct hostilities, not of othermovements. The British during the same days were putting bomb-vesselsin place, a perfectly overt act. Nelson's success at Copenhagen was secured by address, as it had beenwon by force. But it had been thoroughly won. "We cannot deny it, "wrote Niebuhr, "we are quite beaten. Our line of defence is destroyed. We cannot do much injury to the enemy, as long as he contents himselfwith bombarding the city, docks, and fleet. The worst is the CrownBatteries can be held no longer. " Two or three days later he saysagain: "The truce has been prolonged. The remaining half of ourdefences are useless, now that the right wing is broken, --a defectover which I have meditated uselessly many a time since last summer. "The result was due to Nelson's sagacious and emphatic advice as to thedirection and manner of the attack, by which the strong points of theDanish positions were completely and unexpectedly turned. This plan, it is credibly stated, he had formed before leaving England, althoughhe was not formally consulted by Parker until the 23d of March. Having regard to the general political conditions, and especially tothe great combination of the North at this time directed against GreatBritain, the victory of Copenhagen was second in importance to nonethat Nelson ever gained; while in the severity of the resistance, andin the attendant difficulties to be overcome, the battle itself wasthe most critical of all in which he was engaged. So conspicuous werethe energy and sagacity shown by him, that most seamen will agree inthe opinion of Jurien de la Gravière: "They will always be in the eyesof seamen his fairest title to glory. He alone was capable ofdisplaying such boldness and perseverance; he alone could confront theimmense difficulties of that enterprise and overcome them. "Notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding that the valor of thesquadron, as manifested in its losses, was never excelled, no medalswere ever issued for the battle, nor were any individual rewardsbestowed, except upon Nelson himself, who was advanced in the peerageto be a Viscount, and upon his immediate second, Rear-Admiral Graves, who was made a Knight of the Bath. The cause for this action--it wasnot a case of oversight--has never been explained; nor did Nelsonconsider the reasons for it, which the Prime Minister advanced to himin a private interview, at all satisfactory. If it was because aformal state of war did not exist between Great Britain and Denmark, the obvious reply of those engaged would be that they had hazardedtheir lives, and won an exceptionally hard-fought fight, in obedienceto the orders of their Government. If, on the other hand, the Ministryfelt the difficulty of making an invidious distinction between shipsengaged and those not engaged, as between Nelson's detachment and themain body under Parker, it can only be said that that was shirking theduty of a government to reward the deserving, for fear lest those whohad been less fortunate should cry out. The last administration hadnot hesitated to draw a line at the Battle of the Nile, even thoughthe mishap of so great an officer as Troubridge left him on the wrongside. St. Vincent, positive as he was, had shrunk from distinguishingby name even Nelson at the battle which had won for himself his title. This naturally suggests the speculation whether the joint presence ofSt. Vincent and Troubridge at the Admiralty was not the cause of thisfutility; but nothing can be affirmed. "First secure the victory, then make the most of it, " had beenavowedly Nelson's motto before the Nile. In the Battle of Copenhagenhe had followed much the same rule. After beating the forceimmediately opposed to him, he obtained the safe removal of hisdetachment from the critical position in which it lay, by the shrewduse made of the advantage then in his hands. This achieved, and hisships having rejoined the main body, after various mishaps fromgrounding, under the enemy's guns, which emphasized over and over theadroit presence of mind he had displayed, it next fell to him to makethe most of what the British had so far gained; having regard notmerely to Denmark and Copenhagen, but to the whole question of Britishinterests involved in the Coalition of the Baltic States. Parkerintrusted to him the direct management of the negotiations, just as hehad given him the immediate command of the fighting. One circumstance, which completely changed the political complexion ofaffairs, was as yet unknown to him. On the night of March 24th theCzar Paul had been murdered, and with him fell the main motive forceand support of the Armed Neutrality. Ignorant of this fact, Nelson'sone object, the most to be made of the victory, was to get at thedetachment of the Russian fleet--twelve ships--lying in the harbor ofRevel, before the breaking up of the ice allowed it to join the mainbody at Cronstadt. The difficulty in the way lay not in Nelson'shesitation to act instantly, nor in the power of the British fleet todo so; it lay in the conflicting views and purposes of other persons, of the Crown Prince and of Parker, the representatives of Denmark andof Great Britain. Parker was resolved, so Nelson has told us, not toleave Denmark hostile in his rear, flanking his line of communicationsif he proceeded up the Baltic; and Nelson admits, although with hissagacious daring he would have disregarded, that the batteries whichcommanded the shoal ground above Copenhagen might have seriouslyinterrupted the passage. He was ready to run risks again for the veryadequate object mentioned. On the other hand the Crown Prince, whilerecognizing the exposure of Copenhagen, feared to yield even to themenace of bombardment, lest he should incur the vengeance of the Czar. It was to find a middle term between these opposing motives thatNelson's diplomacy was exerted. On the 3d of April he went ashore to visit the Crown Prince, by whomhe was received with all possible attention. "The populace, " saysStewart, "showed a mixture of admiration, curiosity, and displeasure. A strong guard secured his safety, and appeared necessary to keep offthe mob, whose rage, although mixed with admiration at his thustrusting himself amongst them, was naturally to be expected. Itperhaps savored of rashness in him thus early to risk himself amongthem; but with him his Country's cause was paramount to all personalconsiderations. " Nelson himself did not note these threateningindications. Fond of observation, with vanity easily touched, andindifferent to danger, he heard only homage in the murmurs about him. "The people received me as they always have done; and even the stairsof the palace were crowded, huzzaing, and saying, 'God bless LordNelson. '" His interview with the Crown Prince was private, only Lindholm beingpresent. It ranged, according to his private letter to Addington, overthe whole subject of the existing differences with Great Britain, andthe respective interests of the two states. The most important pointsto be noticed in this personal discussion, which was preliminary tothe actual negotiation, are, first, Nelson's statement of the causefor the presence of the British fleet, and, second, the basis ofagreement he proposed. As regards the former, to a question of thePrince he replied categorically: The fleet is here "to crush a mostformidable and unprovoked Coalition against Great Britain. " For thesecond, he said that the only foundation, upon which Sir Hyde Parkercould rest his justification for not proceeding to bombardment, wouldbe the total suspension of the treaties with Russia for a fixed time, and the free use of Danish ports and supplies by the British fleet. These two concessions, it will be observed, by neutralizing Denmark, would remove the threat to British communications, and convert Denmarkinto an advanced base of operations for the fleet. Nelson did not havegreat hope of success in negotiating, for he observed that fear ofRussia, not desire for war, was controlling the Prince. Therefore, hadhe been commander-in-chief, he would at all risks have pushed on toRevel, and struck the coalition to the heart there. "I make noscruple, " he wrote to St. Vincent after he had procured the armistice, "in saying that I would have been at Revel fourteen days ago. No manbut those on the spot can tell what I have gone through, and dosuffer. I wanted Sir Hyde to let me at least go and cruise offCarlscrona, [where the Swedish fleet was, ] to prevent the Revel shipsgetting in. Think of me, my dear Lord, and if I have deserved well, let me retire; if ill, for heaven's sake supersede me, for I cannotexist in this state. " Pegasus was indeed shackled. The truce was continued from day to day, both sides preparing to renewhostilities, while the negotiators sat. Discussing thus, sword inhand, Nelson frankly told the other side that he wanted an armisticefor sixteen weeks, to give him time to act against the Russian fleet, and then to return to Denmark. On the likely supposition that thelatter would not greatly grieve over a Russian disaster, this opennesswas probably discreet. In the wrangling that preceded consent, one ofthe Danes hinted, in French, at a renewal of hostilities. "Renewhostilities!" said Nelson, who understood the language, but could notspeak it, "tell him that we are ready at this moment; ready to bombardthis very night. " But, while he thus could use on occasion thehaughty language of one at whose back stood a victorious fleet oftwenty ships-of-the-line, "the best negotiators in Europe, " to repeathis own words, his general bearing was eminently conciliatory, asbecame one who really longed for peace in the particular instance, andwas alive to the mingled horror and inutility of the next move open toGreat Britain, under Parker's policy, --the bombardment of Copenhagen. "Whoever may be the respective Ministers who shall sign the peace, "wrote to him Count Waltersdorff, who with Lindholm conducted theDanish case and signed the armistice, "I shall always consider yourlordship as the Pacificator of the North, and I am sure that yourheart will be as much flattered by that title, as by any other whichyour grateful Country has bestowed upon you. " Had Paul lived, the issue might have been doubtful, and in that caseEngland might well have rued the choice of a commander-in-chief whosechief function was to hamstring her greatest seaman; but the Danesreceived word of the murder, and on the 9th of April an agreement wasreached. There was to be a cessation of hostilities for fourteenweeks, during which Denmark suspended her part in the ArmedNeutrality, and would leave her ships of war in the same state ofunpreparedness as they then were. The British fleet was at liberty toget supplies in all Danish ports. In return, it was merely stipulatedthat no attacks should be made on any part of the coast of Denmarkproper. Norway[35] and the Danish colonies were not included, nor wasHolstein. In a letter to Addington, Nelson pointed out that as amilitary measure, which it was, the result was that the hands ofDenmark were tied, those of the fleet loosed, its communicationssecured, its base of supplies advanced, and last, but far from least, the timid counsels of its commander-in-chief disconcerted; no excusefor not advancing being left. Besides, as he said, to extort theseconcessions he had nothing in his hand but the threat of bombardment, which done, "we had done our worst, and not much nearer beingfriends. " Sir Hyde would not have advanced. As a military negotiation it is difficult to conceive one moreadroitly managed, more perfectly conducive to the ends in view, or, itmay be added, more clearly explained. The Government, withextraordinary dulness, replied in that patronizing official tone ofsuperior wisdom, which is probably one of the most exasperating thingsthat can be encountered by a man of such insight and action as Nelsonhad displayed. "Upon a consideration of all the circumstances, HisMajesty has thought fit to approve. " "I am sorry, " replied Nelson, "that the Armistice is only approved under _all_ considerations. Now Iown myself of opinion that every part of the _all_ was to theadvantage of our King and Country. " As First Lord of the Admiralty, old St. Vincent had to transmit this qualified approval; but he wroteafterwards to Nelson: "Your Lordship's whole conduct, from your firstappointment to this hour, is the subject of our constant admiration. It does not become me to make comparisons: all agree there is but oneNelson. " The armistice being signed and ratified, the fleet on the 12th ofApril entered the Baltic; the heavy ships having to remove their guns, in order to cross the "Grounds, " between the islands of Amager andSaltholm. Nelson was left behind in the "St. George, " which, for somereason, was not ready. "My commander-in-chief has left me, " he wroteto Lady Hamilton, "but if there is any work to do, I dare say theywill wait for me. _Nelson will be first_. Who can stop him?" "We havereports, " he says again, "that the Swedish fleet is above theShallows, distant five or six leagues. All our fellows are longing tobe at them, and so do I, as great a boy as any of them, for I considerthis as being at school, and going to England as going home for theholidays, therefore I really long to finish my task. " His confidencein himself and in his fortune was growing apace at this time, as wasboth natural and justifiable. "This day, twenty-two years, " he writessoon after, on the 11th of June, "I was made a Post-Captain by SirPeter Parker. If you meet him again, say that I shall drink his healthin a bumper, for I do not forget that I owe my present exalted rank tohis partiality, although I feel, if I had even been in an humblersphere, that Nelson would have been Nelson still. " Although alwaysreverently thankful to the Almighty for a favorable issue to events, there does not seem to have been in him any keen consciousness ofpersonal dependence, such as led Moltke to mark the text, "My strengthis made perfect in weakness. " While thus lying, about twenty-four miles from the main body, a reportcame that the Swedish squadron had put to sea. Alarmed lest a battlemight take place in his absence, Nelson jumped into a boat alongside, and started for a six hours' pull against wind and current to join thefleet, in haste so great that he refused even to wait for a boatcloak. "His anxiety lest the fleet should have sailed before he got onboard one of them, " tells the officer who was with him, "is beyond allconception. I will quote some expressions in his own words. It wasextremely cold, and I wished him to put on a great coat of mine whichwas in the boat: 'No, I am not cold; my anxiety for my Country willkeep me warm. Do you not think the fleet has sailed?' 'I shouldsuppose not, my Lord. ' 'If they are, we shall follow then toCarlscrona in the boat, by G--d!'--I merely state this to show how histhoughts must have been employed. The idea of going in a small boat, rowing six oars, without a single morsel of anything to eat or drink, the distance of about fifty leagues, must convince the world thatevery other earthly consideration than that of serving his Country, was totally banished from his thoughts. " Such preoccupation with oneidea, and that idea so fine, brings back to us the old Nelson, whohas found himself again amid the storm and stress of danger and ofaction, for which he was created. About midnight he reached the "Elephant, " where his flag was againhoisted; but he did not escape unharmed from the exposure he had toocarelessly undergone. "Since April 15, " he wrote several weeksafterwards to Lady Hamilton, "I have been rapidly in a decline, but amnow, thank God, I firmly believe, past all danger. At that time Irowed five hours in a bitter cold night. A cold struck me to theheart. On the 27th I had one of my terrible spasms of heart-stroke, which had near carried me off, and the severe disappointment of beingkept in a situation where there can be nothing to do before August, almost killed me. From that time to the end of May I brought up whatevery one thought was my lungs, and I was emaciated more than you canconceive. " The fleet proceeded in a leisurely manner toward Carlscrona, Nelsonchafing and fretting, none the less for his illness, under theindecision and dilatoriness that continued to characterize Parker'smovements. "My dear friend, " he had written to Lady Hamilton, "we arevery lazy. We Mediterranean people are not used to it. " "Lord St. Vincent, " he tells his brother, "will either take this late businessup with a very high hand, or he will depress it; but how they willmanage about Sir Hyde I cannot guess. I am afraid much will be saidabout him in the public papers; but not a word shall be drawn from me, for God knows they may make him Lord Copenhagen if they please, itwill not offend me. " But now that Denmark has been quieted, he cannotunderstand nor tolerate the delay in going to Revel, where theappearance of the fleet would checkmate, not only Russia, but all theallied squadrons; for it would occupy an interior and commandingposition between the detachments at Revel, Cronstadt, and Carlscrona, in force superior to any one of them. "On the 19th of April, " heafterwards wrote bitterly to St. Vincent, "we had eighteen ships ofthe line and a fair wind. Count Pahlen [the Russian Cabinet Minister]came and resided at Revel, evidently to endeavour to prevent anyhostilities against the Russian fleet there, which was, I decidedlysay, at our mercy. Nothing, if it had been right to make the attack, could have saved one ship of them in two hours after our entering thebay; and to prevent their destruction, Sir Hyde Parker had a greatlatitude for asking for various things for the suspension of hisorders. " That is, Parker having the fleet at his mercy could haveexacted terms, just as Nelson himself had exacted them from Denmarkwhen Copenhagen was laid open; the advantage, indeed, was far greater, as the destruction of an organized force is a greater military evilthan that of an unarmed town. This letter was written after Nelson hadbeen to Revel, and seen the conditions on which he based his opinion. So far from taking this course, --which it may be said would haveconformed to instructions from his Government then on their way, andissued after knowing Paul's death, --Parker appeared off Carlscrona onApril 20th. Two days afterwards he received a letter from the Russianminister at Copenhagen, saying that the Emperor had ordered his fleetto abstain from all hostilities. Parker apparently forgot that he wasfirst a naval officer, and only incidentally a diplomatist; for, instead of exacting guarantees which would have insured the militarysituation remaining unchanged until definite agreements had beenreached, he returned to Kioge Bay, near Copenhagen, but within theShallows, leaving the Revel squadron untrammelled, either by force orpledge, free to go out when the ice allowed, and to join either theSwedes or its own main body. Accordingly, it did come out a fortnightlater, went to Cronstadt, and so escaped the British fleet. While on this cruise towards Carlscrona, Nelson became involved in apen-and-ink controversy about Commodore Fischer, who had commanded theDanish line at the Battle of Copenhagen, --one of two or three rareoccasions which illustrate the vehemence and insolence that could bearoused in him when his vanity was touched, or when he conceived hisreputation to be assailed. Fischer, in his official report of theaction, had comforted himself and his nation, as most beaten men do, by dwelling upon--and unquestionably exaggerating--the significance ofcertain incidents, either actual, or imagined by the Danes; forinstance, that towards the end of the battle, Nelson's own ship hadfired only single guns, and that two British ships had struck, --thelatter being an error, and the former readily accounted for by thefact that the "Elephant" then had no enemy within easy range. Whatparticularly stung Nelson, however, seems to have been the assertionthat the British force was superior, and that his sending a flag oftruce indicated the injury done his squadron. Some of his friends hadthought, erroneously in the opinion of the author, that the flag wasan unjustifiable _ruse de guerre_, which made him specially sensitiveon this point. His retort, addressed to his Danish friend, Lindholm, was written andsent in such heat that it is somewhat incoherent in form, and morefull of abuse than of argument, besides involving him incontradictions. That the British squadron was numerically superior inguns seems certain; it would have been even culpable, having shipsenough, not to have employed them in any case, and especially when theattacking force had to come into action amid dangerous shoals, andagainst vessels already carefully placed and moored. In his officialreport he had stated that the "Bellona" and "Russell" had grounded;"but although not in the situation assigned them, yet so placed as tobe of great service. " In the present dispute he claimed that theyshould be left out of the reckoning, and he was at variance with theDanish accounts as to the effect of Riou's frigates. But such errors, he afterwards admitted to Lindholm, may creep into any officialreport, and to measure credit merely by counting guns is whollyillusory; for, as he confessed, with exaggerated humility, some monthslater, "if any merit attaches itself to me, it was in combating thedangers of the shallows in defiance of the pilots. " He chose, however, to consider that Fischer's letter had thrownridicule upon his character, and he resented it in terms as violent ashe afterwards used of the French admiral, Latouche Tréville, whoasserted that he had retired before a superior force; as thoughNelson, by any flight of imagination, could have been suspected ofover-caution. Fischer had twice shifted his broad pendant--that is, his own position--in the battle; therefore he was a coward. "In hisletter he states that, after he quitted the Dannebrog, she longcontested the battle. If so, more shame for him to quit so many bravefellows. _Here_ was no manoeuvring: _it was_ downright fighting, andit was his duty to have shown an example of firmness becoming the hightrust reposed in him. " This was probably a just comment, but not afair implication of cowardice. "He went in such a hurry, if he wentbefore she struck, which but for his own declaration I can hardlybelieve, that he forgot to take his broad pendant with him. " ThisLindholm showed was a mistake. "He seems to exult that I sent on shorea flag of truce. Men of his description, if they ever are victorious, know not the feeling of humanity. .. . Mr. Fischer's carcase was safe, and he regarded not the sacred call of humanity. " This letter was sentto Lindholm, to be communicated to the Crown Prince; for, had notFischer addressed the latter as an eye-witness, Nelson "would havetreated his official letter with the contempt it deserved. " Lindholmkept it from Fischer, made a temperate reply defending the latter, andthe subject there dropped. On the 25th of April the fleet was at anchor in Kioge Bay, and thereremained until the 5th of May, when orders arrived relieving Parker, and placing Nelson in chief command. The latter was utterly dismayed. Side by side with the unquenchable zeal for glory and for hisCountry's service had been running the equally unquenchable passionfor Lady Hamilton; and, with the noble impulses that bore him up inbattle, sickness, and exposure, had mingled soft dreams of flight fromthe world, of days spent upon the sunny slopes of Sicily, on hisestate of Bronté, amid scenes closely resembling those associated withhis past delights, and with the life of the woman whom he loved. Tothis he several times alludes in the almost daily letters which hewrote her. But, whether to be realized there or in England, he pantedfor the charms of home which he had never known. "I am fixed, " hetells her, "to live a country life, and to have many (I hope) years ofcomfort, which God knows, I never yet had--only moments ofhappiness, "--a pathetic admission of the price he had paid for theglory which could not satisfy him, yet which, by the law of his being, he could not cease to crave. "I wish for happiness to be my reward, and not titles or money;" and happiness means being with her whom herepeatedly calls Santa Emma, and his "guardian angel, "--a fondimagining, the sincerity of which checks the ready smile, but elicitsno tenderness for a delusion too gross for sympathy. Whatever sacrifices he might be ready to make for his country'sservice, he was not willing to give up all he held dear when the realoccasion for his exceptional powers had passed away; and theassurances that the service absolutely required his presence in theBaltic made no impression upon him. He knew better. "Had the commandbeen given me in February, " he said, "many lives would have beensaved, and we should have been in a very different situation; but thewiseheads at home know everything. " Now it means expense andsuffering, and nothing to do beyond the powers of an average officer. "Any other man can as well look about him as Nelson. " "Sir ThomasTroubridge, " he complains, after enumerating his grievances, "had thenonsense to say, now I was a Commander-in-Chief I must be pleased. Does he take me for a greater fool than I am?" It was indeed shavingpretty close to insult to send out a man like Nelson as second, whengreat work was in hand, and then, after he had done all his superiorhad permitted, and there was nothing left to do, to tell him that hewas indispensable; but to be congratulated upon the fact by a Lord ofthe Admiralty, which Troubridge then was, was rather too much. Hecould not refuse to accept the command, but he demanded his relief interms which could not be disregarded. His health, he said, made himunequal to the service. For three weeks he could not leave his cabin. "The keen air of the North kills me. " "I did not come to the Balticwith the design of dying a natural death. " Parker had no sooner departed than Nelson made the signal for thefleet to weigh, and started at once for Revel. He did not know whetheror not the Russian ships were still there, and he felt that the changeof sovereigns probably implied a radical change of policy; but heunderstood, also, that the part of a commander-in-chief was to seethat the military situation was maintained, from day to day, asfavorable as possible to his own country. He anticipated, therefore, by his personal judgment, the instructions of the Cabinet, not toenter upon hostilities if certain conditions could be obtained, but toexact of the Russian Government, pending its decision, that the Revelships should remain where they were. "My object, " he said, writing thesame day he took command, "_was_ to get at Revel before the frostbroke up at Cronstadt, that the twelve sail of the line might bedestroyed. I shall _now_ go there as a friend, _but the two fleetsshall not form a junction_, if not already accomplished, unless myorders permit it. " For the same reason, he wrote to the Swedishadmiral that he had no orders to abstain from hostilities if he methis fleet at sea. He hoped, therefore, that he would see the wisdom ofremaining in port. His visit to Revel, consequently, was to wear the external appearanceof a compliment to a sovereign whose friendly intentions were assumed. To give it that color, he took with him only twelve ships-of-the-line, leaving the others, with the small vessels of distinctly hostilecharacter, bombs, fireships, etc. , anchored off Bornholm Island, aDanish possession. The resolution to prevent a junction was contingentand concealed. On the 12th the squadron arrived in the outer bay ofRevel, and a complimentary letter, announcing the purpose of hiscoming, was sent to St. Petersburg. The next day he paid an officialvisit to the authorities, when his vanity and love of attentionreceived fresh gratification. "Except to you, my own friend, I shouldnot mention it, 'tis so much like vanity; but hundreds come to look atNelson, '_that is him, that is him_, ' in short, 'tis the same as inItaly and Germany, and I now feel that a good name is better thanriches, not amongst our great folks in England; but it has its finefeelings to an honest heart. All the Russians have taken it into theirheads that I am like _Suwaroff, Le jeune Suwaroff_;" thus confirmingthe impression made upon Mrs. St. George at Dresden. On the 16th of May a letter arrived from Count Pahlen, the Russianminister. The Czar declined to see a compliment in the appearance inRussian waters of so formidable a force, commanded by a seaman whosename stood foremost, not merely for professional ability, but forsudden, resolute, and aggressive action. "Nelson's presence, " Niebuhrhad written, "leads us to think, judging of him by his past conduct, that a furious attack will be made upon our harbor;" and he himselfhad recorded with complacency that a Danish officer, visiting the"London, " upon learning that he was with the fleet in the Kattegat, had said, "Is he here? Then I suppose it is no joke, if he is come. ""The Baltic folks will never fight me, if it is to be avoided. " "TheEmperor, my Master, " wrote Pahlen, "does not consider this stepcompatible with the lively desire manifested by His Britannic Majesty, to re-establish the good intelligence so long existing between the twoMonarchies. The only guarantee of the loyalty of your intentions thatHis Majesty can accept, is the prompt withdrawal of the fleet underyour command, and no negotiation with your Court can take place, solong as a naval force is in sight of his ports. " Nelson had of course recognized that the game was lost, as soon as hesaw that the Russian fleet was gone. The conditions which had mainlyprompted his visit were changed, and the Russian Government was in aposition to take a high tone, without fear of consequences. "Aftersuch an answer, " he wrote indignantly to St. Vincent, "I had nobusiness here. Time will show; but I do not believe he would havewritten such a letter, if the Russian fleet had been in Revel. " "LordNelson received the letter a few minutes before dinner-time, " wroteStewart. "He appeared to be a good deal agitated by it, but saidlittle, and did not return an immediate reply. During dinner, however, he left the table, and in less than a quarter of an hour sent for hissecretary to peruse a letter which, in that short absence, he hadcomposed. The signal for preparing to weigh was immediately made; theanswer above-mentioned was sent on shore; and his Lordship caused thefleet to weigh, and to stand as far to sea as was safe for thatevening. " Nelson took hold of Pahlen's expression, that he had come "with hiswhole fleet" to Revel. Confining himself to that, he pointed out themistake the minister had made, for he had brought "not one-seventh ofhis fleet in point of numbers. " He mentioned also the deference thathe had paid to the Revel authorities. "My conduct, I feel, is soentirely different to what your Excellency has expressed in yourletter, that I have only to regret, that my desire to pay a markedattention to His Imperial Majesty has been so entirely misunderstood. That being the case, I shall sail immediately into the Baltic. "Retiring thus in good order, if defeated, he had the satisfaction ofknowing that it was not his own blunder, but the wretched dilatorinessof his predecessor, that had made the Czar, instead of the Britishadmiral, master of the situation. Stopping for twenty-four hours at Bornholm on the way down, Nelson onthe 24th anchored in Rostock Bay, on the German coast of the Baltic, and there awaited the relief he confidently expected. He had scarcelyarrived when a second letter from Pahlen overtook him. The ministerexpressed his regret for any misunderstanding that had arisen as tothe purpose of his first visit, and continued, "I cannot give yourexcellency a more striking proof of the confidence which the Emperormy Master reposes in you, than by announcing the effect produced byyour letter of the 16th of this month. His Imperial Majesty hasordered the immediate raising of the embargo placed upon the Englishmerchant ships. " Nelson plumed himself greatly upon this result of hisdiplomacy. "Our diplomatic men are so slow. Lord St. Helens told methat he hoped in a month he should be able to tell me somethingdecisive. Now, what can take two hours I cannot even guess, butMinisters must do something for their diamond boxes. I gained theunconditional release of our ships, which neither Ministers nor SirHyde Parker could accomplish, by showing my fleet. Then they becamealarmed, begged I would go away, or it would be considered as warlike. On my complying, it pleased the Emperor and his ministers so much, that the whole of the British shipping were given up. " There isnothing like the point of view; but it must be admitted that Nelsonextricated himself from an unpleasant position with great good temperand sound judgment. He remained in his flagship between Rostock and Kioge Bay, untilrelieved by Vice-Admiral Pole on the 19th of June. Nothing of officialimportance occurred during these three weeks; for the naval part ofthe Baltic entanglement was ended, as he had foreseen. A pleasantpicture of his daily life on board the "St. George" at this time hasbeen preserved for us by Colonel Stewart: "His hour of rising was fouror five o'clock, and of going to rest about ten; breakfast was neverlater than six, and generally nearer to five o'clock. A midshipman ortwo were always of the party; and I have known him send during themiddle watch[36] to invite the little fellows to breakfast with him, when relieved. At table with them, he would enter into their boyishjokes, and be the most youthful of the party. At dinner he invariablyhad every officer of the ship in their turn, and was both a polite andhospitable host. The whole ordinary business of the fleet wasinvariably despatched, as it had been by Earl St. Vincent, beforeeight o'clock. The great command of time which Lord Nelson thus gavehimself, and the alertness which this example imparted throughout thefleet, can only be understood by those who witnessed it, or who knowthe value of early hours. .. . He did not again land whilst in theBaltic; his health was not good, and his mind was not at ease; withhim, mind and health invariably sympathized. " While thus generally pleasant on board ship, he resolutely refusedintercourse with the outside world when not compelled by duty. In thisthere appears to have been something self-imposed, in deference toLady Hamilton. There are indications that she felt, or feigned, somejealousy of his relations with others, especially with women, corresponding to the frenzied agitation he manifested at theassociation of her name with that of any other man, and especiallywith that of the then Prince of Wales. Whatever her real depth ofattachment to him, her best hope for the future was in his constancy, and that he would eventually marry her; for Sir William's death couldnot be far distant, and matters might otherwise favor the hope thatboth he and she cherished. Her approaching widowhood would in factleave her, unless her husband's will was exceptionally generous, in acondition as precarious, her acquired tastes considered, as that fromwhich her marriage had rescued her; and her uneasiness would naturallyarouse an uncertain and exacting temper, as in the old days at Naples, when Hamilton could not make up his mind. The condition of Nelson'shealth furnished him an excuse for declining all civilities or calls, even from a reigning prince, on the ground that he was not well enoughto go ashore and return them. Soon after this, however, he was able towrite Lady Hamilton that he was perfectly recovered. "As far asrelates to health, I don't think I ever was stronger or in betterhealth. It is odd, but after severe illness I feel much better. " Thushe was, when definitely informed that his relief was on the way. "Tofind a proper successor, " said Lord St. Vincent, when announcing thefact to him, "your lordship knows is no easy task; for I never saw theman in our profession, excepting yourself and Troubridge, whopossessed the magic art of infusing the same spirit into others, whichinspired their own actions; exclusive of other talents and habits ofbusiness, not common to naval characters. " "I was so overcomeyesterday, " wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton, "with the good and happynews that came about my going home, that I believe I was in truthscarcely myself. The thoughts of going do me good, yet all night I wasso restless that I could not sleep. It is nearly calm, thereforeAdmiral Pole cannot get on. If he was not to come, I believe it wouldkill me. I am ready to start the moment I have talked with him onehour. " On the 19th of June Nelson left the Baltic in the brig "Kite, " and onthe 1st of July landed at Yarmouth. FOOTNOTES: [22] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxxvii. P. 445. [23] _Ante_, vol. I. Pp. 199-202. [24] Nelson to Lady Hamilton. Pettigrew, vol. I. Pp. 442-444. [25] Pitt had resigned from office since then. [26] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxxvii. P. 446. [27] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxxvii. , art. "Layman. " [28] That is, from north to south. It may be well to notice that to go fromthe Kattegat to the Baltic is _up_, although from north to south. [29] Trekroner, which was then a favorite military name in Denmark, refersto the three Crowns of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, once united. [30] They are to be found in Nicolas's "Despatches and Letters of LordNelson, " vol. Iv. P. 304. [31] Except numbers 4 and 5, whose stations, as has been said, were abreastthe two southernmost Danes. [32] The following is the order of the ships in the column of attack, asoriginally prescribed:-- 1. Edgar, 74. 2. Ardent, 64. 3. Glatton, 54. 4. Isis, 50. 5. Agamemnon, 64. 6. Bellona, 74. 7. Elephant, 74. 8. Ganges, 74. 9. Monarch, 74. 10. Defiance, 74. 11. Russell, 74. 12. Polyphemus, 64. [33] To acknowledge a signal is simply to hoist a flag, showing that it hasbeen seen and understood. To repeat is to hoist the signal yourself, thustransmitting it as an order to those concerned. [34] Life of Rev. Dr. A. J. Scott, p. 70 [35] Norway was then attached to the Danish Crown, as now to that ofSweden. [36] Midnight to four A. M. CHAPTER XVII. NELSON COMMANDS THE "SQUADRON ON A PARTICULAR SERVICE, " FOR THEDEFENCE OF THE COAST OF ENGLAND AGAINST INVASION. --SIGNATURE OFPRELIMINARIES OF PEACE WITH FRANCE. JULY-OCTOBER, 1801. AGE, 43. Before sailing for the Baltic, and throughout his service in that sea, the longing for repose and for a lover's paradise had disputed withthe love of glory for the empire in Nelson's heart, and signs were notwanting that the latter was making a doubtful, if not a losing, fight. Shortly before his departure for the North, he wrote to St. Vincent, "Although, I own, I have met with much more honours and rewards thanever my most sanguine ideas led me to expect, yet I am socircumstanced that probably this Expedition will be the last serviceever performed by your obliged and affectionate friend. " His oldcommander was naturally perturbed at the thought that the illustriouscareer, which he had done so much to foster, was to have the ignobletermination to be inferred from these words and the notorious facts. "Be assured, my dear Lord, " he replied, "that every _public_[37] actof your life has been the subject of my admiration, which I shouldhave sooner declared, but that I was appalled by the last sentence ofyour letter: for God's sake, do not suffer yourself to be carried awayby any sudden impulse. " During his absence, the uncertain deferment of his desires had workedtogether with the perverse indolence of Sir Hyde Parker, the frettingsight of opportunities wasted, the constant chafing against the curb, to keep both body and mind in perpetual unrest, to which the severeclimate contributed by undermining his health. This unceasingdiscomfort had given enhanced charm to his caressing dreams ofreposeful happiness, soothed and stimulated by the companionship whichhe so far had found to fulfil all his power of admiration, and all hisdemands for sympathy. Released at last, he landed in Englandconfidently expecting to realize his hopes, only to find that theymust again be postponed. Reputation such as his bears its own penalty. There was no other man in whose name England could find the calmcertainty of safety, which popular apprehension demanded in the newemergency, that had arisen while he was upholding her cause in thenorthern seas. Nelson repined, but he submitted. Within four weeks hisflag was flying again, and himself immersed in professional anxieties. War on the continent of Europe had ceased definitively with the treatyof Lunéville, between France and Austria, signed February 9, 1801. Over four years were to elapse before it should recommence. But, asGreat Britain was to be the first to take up arms again to resist theencroachments of Bonaparte, so now she was the last to consent topeace, eager as her people were to have it. Malta had fallen, theArmed Neutrality of the North had dissolved, the French occupation ofEgypt was at its last gasp. Foiled in these three directions by thesea-power of Great Britain, unable, with all his manipulation of theprostrate continent, to inflict a deadly wound, Bonaparte now resortedto the threat of invasion, well aware that, under existing conditions, it could be but a threat, yet hoping that its influence upon a peopleaccustomed to sleep securely might further his designs. But, thoughthe enchanter wove his spells to rouse the demon of fear, their oneeffect was to bring up once more, over against him, the defiant formof his arch-subverter. Both the Prime Minister, Addington, and theFirst Lord of the Admiralty assured Nelson that his presence in chargeof the dispositions for defence, and that only, could quiet the publicmind. "I have seen Lord St. Vincent, " he wrote the former, "and submitto your and his partiality. Whilst my health will allow, I can onlysay, that every exertion of mine shall be used to merit thecontinuance of your esteem. " St. Vincent, writing to him a fortnightlater, avowed frankly the weight attached to his very name by bothfriend and foe. "Our negotiation is drawing near its close, and mustterminate one way or another in a few days, and, I need not add, howvery important it is that the enemy should know that _you_ areconstantly opposed to him. " The purpose of Bonaparte in 1801 is not to be gauged by the samemeasure as that of 1803-1805. In 1798 he had told the then governmentof France that to make a descent upon England, without being master ofthe sea, would be the boldest and most difficult operation everattempted. Conditions had not changed since then, nor had he now thetime or the money to embark in the extensive preparations, whichafterwards gave assurance that he was in earnest in his threats. Anadept in making false demonstrations, perfectly appreciative of thepower of a great name, he counted upon his own renown, and his amazingachievement of the apparently impossible in the past, to overawe theimagination of a nation, whose will, rather than whose strength, hehoped to subdue. Boulogne and the small neighboring ports, whosenearness clearly indicated them as the only suitable base from whichan invasion could start, were in that year in no state to receive theboats necessary to carry an army. This the British could see withtheir own eyes; but who could be sure that the paper flotilla atBoulogne, like the paper Army of Reserve at Dijon a year before, hadnot elsewhere a substantial counterpart, whose sudden appearance mightyet work a catastrophe as unexpected and total as that of Marengo? Andwho more apt than Bonaparte to spread the impression that some suchsurprise was brewing? "I can venture to assure you that no embarkationof troops can take place at Boulogne, " wrote Nelson, immediately afterhis first reconnoissance; but he says at the same time, "I have nowmore than ever reason to believe that the ports of Flushing andFlanders are much more likely places to embark men from, than Calais, Boulogne, or Dieppe; for in Flanders we cannot tell by our eyes whatmeans they have collected for carrying an army. " "Great preparationsat Ostend, " he notes a week later; "Augereau commands that part of theArmy. I hope to let him feel the bottom of the Goodwin Sand. " It wasjust this sort of apprehension, specific in direction, yet vague andelusive in details, that Bonaparte was skilled in disseminating. St. Vincent, and the Government generally, agreed with Nelson'sopinion. "We are to look to Flanders for the great effort, " wrote theEarl to him. Neither of them had, nor was it possible for clear-headednaval officers to have, any substantial, rational, fear of a descentin force; yet the vague possibility did, for the moment, impress eventhem, and the liability of the populace, and of the commercialinterests, to panic, was a consideration not to be overlooked. Besides, in a certain way, there was no adequate preparation forresistance. The British Navy, indeed, was an overwhelming force ascompared to the French; but its hands were fully occupied, and thefleet Nelson had just left in the Baltic could not yet be recalled. Itwas, however, in purely defensive measures, in the possession of aforce similar to that by which the proposed attack was to be made, andin dispositions analogous to coast defences, that the means weresingularly defective, both in material and men. "Everything, my dearLord, " wrote Nelson, the day after he hoisted his flag at Sheerness, "must have a beginning, and we are literally at the foundation of ourfabric of defence;" but, he continues, reverting to his own and St. Vincent's clear and accurate military intuitions, "I agree perfectlywith you, that we must keep the enemy as far from our own coasts aspossible, and be able to attack them the moment they come out of theirports. " "Our first defence, " he writes a fortnight later, showing the gradualmaturing of the views which he, in common with St. Vincent, held withsuch illustrious firmness in the succeeding years, "is close to theenemy's ports. When that is broke, others will come forth on our owncoasts. " It was in the latter that the unexpected anxieties of 1801found the Government deficient, and these it was to be Nelson's firstcare to organize and dispose. By the time his duties were completed, and the problems connected with them had been two months under hisconsideration, he had reached the conclusion which Napoleon also held, and upon which he acted. "This boat business may be a part of a greatplan of Invasion, but can never be the only one. " From the first hehad contemplated the possibility of the French fleets in Brest andelsewhere attempting diversions, such as Napoleon planned in supportof his later great projects. "Although I feel confident that thefleets of the enemy will meet the same fate which has always attendedthem, yet their sailing will facilitate the coming over of theirflotilla, as they will naturally suppose our attention will be calledonly to the fleets. " What was feared in 1801 was not a grand military operation, in thenature of an attempt at conquest, or, at the least, at injury soserious as to be disabling, but rather something in the nature of agreat raid, of which the most probable object was the city of London, the chief commercial centre. It was upon this supposition that theinstructions of the Admiralty to Nelson were framed, and upon thisalso the memorandum as to methods, submitted by him to it, on the 25thof July, 1801. "It is certainly proper to believe that the French arecoming to attack London. I will suppose that 40, 000 men are destinedfor this attack, or rather surprise. " His plan is given first in hisown words, as due to a matter of so much importance; and to them thewriter appends a summary of the principal features, as understood byhim. These are not always easily to be seen on the face of the paper, owing to the small time for its preparation, and the consequenthaste--off-hand almost--with which it was drawn up, as is furtherindicated from the copy in the Admiralty being in his own writing. MEMORANDA BY LORD NELSON, ON THE DEFENCE OF THE THAMES, ETC. 25th July, 1801. Besides the stationed Ships at the different posts between the North Foreland and Orfordness, as many Gun-vessels as can be spared from the very necessary protection of the Coast of Sussex and of Kent to the westward of Dover, should be collected, for this part of the Coast must be seriously attended to; for supposing London the object of surprise, I am of opinion that the Enemy's object _ought_ to be the getting on shore as speedily as possible, for the dangers of a navigation of forty-eight hours, appear to me to be an insurmountable objection to the rowing from Boulogne to the Coast of Essex. It is therefore most probable (for it is certainly proper to believe the French are coming to attack London, and therefore to be prepared) that from Boulogne, Calais, and even Havre, that the enemy will try and land in Sussex, or the lower part of Kent, and from Dunkirk, Ostend, and the other Ports of Flanders, to land on the Coast of Essex or Suffolk; for I own myself of opinion that, the object being to get on shore somewhere within 100 miles of London, as speedily as possible, that the Flats in the mouth of the Thames will not be the only place necessary to attend to; added to this, the Enemy will create a powerful diversion by the sailing of the Combined Fleet, and the either sailing, or creating such an appearance of sailing, of the Dutch Fleet, as will prevent Admiral Dickson from sending anything from off the great Dutch Ports, whilst the smaller Ports will spew forth its Flotilla, --viz. , Flushing, &c. &c. It must be pretty well ascertained what number of small Vessels are in each Port. "I will suppose that 40, 000 men are destined for this attack, or rather surprise, of London; 20, 000 will land on the west side of Dover, sixty or seventy miles from London, and the same number on the east side: they are too knowing to let us have but one point of alarm for London. Supposing 200 craft, or 250, collected at Boulogne &c, they are supposed equal to carry 20, 000 men. In very calm weather, they might row over, supposing no impediment, in twelve hours; at the same instant, by telegraph, the same number of troops would be rowed out of Dunkirk, Ostend, &c. &c. These are the two great objects to attend to from Dover and the Downs, and perhaps one of the small Ports to the westward. Boulogne (which I call the central point of the Western attack) must be attended to. If it is calm when the Enemy row out, all our Vessels and Boats appointed to watch them, must get into the Channel, and meet them as soon as possible: if not strong enough for the attack, they must watch, and keep them company till a favourable opportunity offers. If a breeze springs up, our Ships are to deal _destruction_; no delicacy can be observed on this great occasion. But should it remain calm, and our Flotilla not fancy itself strong enough to attack the Enemy on their passage, the moment that they begin to touch our shore, strong or weak, our Flotilla of Boats must attack as much of the Enemy's Flotilla as they are able--say only one-half or two-thirds; it will create a most powerful diversion, for the bows of our Flotilla will be opposed to their unarmed sterns, and the courage of Britons will never, I believe, allow one Frenchman to leave the beach. A great number of Deal and Dover Boats to be on board our vessels off the Port of Boulogne, to give notice of the direction taken by the Enemy. If it is calm, Vessels in the Channel can make signals of intelligence to our shores, from the North Foreland to Orfordness, and even as far as Solebay, not an improbable place, about seventy or eighty miles from London. "A Flotilla to be kept near Margate and Ramsgate, to consist of Gun-boats and Flat-boats; another Squadron to be stationed near the centre, between Orfordness and North Foreland, and the third in Hoseley Bay. [38] The Floating Batteries are stationed in all proper positions for defending the different Channels, and the smaller Vessels will always have a resort in the support of the stationed ships. The moment of the Enemy's movement from Boulogne, is to be considered as the movement of the Enemy from Dunkirk. Supposing it calm, the Flotillas are to be rowed, and the heavy ones towed, (except the stationed Ships), those near Margate, three or four leagues to the north of the North Foreland; those from Hoseley Bay, a little approaching the Centre Division, but always keeping an eye towards Solebay; the Centre Division to advance half-way between the two. The more fast Rowing boats, called Thames Galleys, which can be procured the better, to carry orders, information, &c. &c. "Whenever the Enemy's Flotilla can be seen, our Divisions are to unite, but not intermix, and to be ready to execute such orders as may be deemed necessary, or as the indispensable circumstances may require. For this purpose, men of such confidence in each other should be looked for, that (as far as human foresight can go, ) no little jealousy may creep into any man's mind, but to be all animated with the same desire of preventing the descent of the Enemy on our Coasts. Stationary Floating Batteries are not, from any apparent advantage, to be moved, for the tide may prevent their resuming the very important stations assigned them; they are on no account to be supposed neglected, even should the Enemy surround them, for they may rely on support, and reflect that perhaps their gallant conduct may prevent the mischievous designs of the Enemy. Whatever plans may be adopted, the moment the Enemy touch our Coast, be it where it may, they are to be attacked by every man afloat and on shore: this must be perfectly understood. _Never fear the event_. The Flat Boats can probably be manned (partly, at least, ) with the Sea Fencibles, (the numbers or fixed places of whom I am entirely ignorant of, ) but the Flat Boats they may man to be in grand and sub-divisions, commanded by their own Captains and Lieutenants, as far as is possible. The number of Flat Boats is unknown to me, as also the other means of defence in Small Craft; but I am clearly of opinion that a proportion of the small force should be kept to watch the Flat-Boats from Boulogne, and the others in the way I have presumed to suggest. These are offered as merely the rude ideas of the moment, and are only meant as a Sea plan of defence for the City of London; but I believe other parts may likewise be menaced, if the Brest fleet, and those from Rochfort and Holland put to sea; although I feel confident that the Fleets of the Enemy will meet the same fate which has always attended them, yet their sailing will facilitate the coming over of their Flotilla, as they will naturally suppose our attention will be called only to the Fleets. " Coming by water, the expectation seems to have been that the enemymight proceed up the river, or to a landing on some of the flats atthe mouth of the Thames. Nelson says expressly that he does not thinkthose alone are the points to be guarded; but he characterizes hispaper as being "only meant as a sea plan of defence for the city ofLondon, " and the suggestion already noticed, that the enemy's fleetwill support the attack by diversions, is merely mentioned casually. London being the supposed object, and the Thames the highway, thepurely defensive force is to be concentrated there; the Channelcoasts, though not excluded, are secondary. "As many gun-vessels ascan be spared from the very necessary protection of the coast ofSussex, and of Kent to the westward of Dover, should be collectedbetween the North Foreland and Orfordness, for this part of the coastmust be seriously attended to. " The attack is expected in this quarter, because from Flanders andFlushing it is the most accessible. The object, Nelson thinks, will beto get on shore as speedily as possible, and therefore somewherewithin one hundred miles of London. Anywhere from the westward ofDover round to Solebay--"not an improbable place"--must be looked uponas a possible landing. If there are forty thousand men coming, heregards it as certain that they will come in two principal bodies, oftwenty thousand each--"they are too knowing to let us have but onepoint of alarm for London. " "From Boulogne, Calais, and even Havre, the enemy will try and land in Sussex, or the lower part of Kent; andfrom Dunkirk, Ostend, and the other ports of Flanders, to land on thecoast of Essex or Suffolk. " "In very calm weather, they might row overfrom Boulogne, supposing no impediment, in twelve hours; at the sameinstant, by telegraph, the same number of troops would be rowed out ofDunkirk, Ostend, &c. &c. Added to this, the enemy will create apowerful diversion by the sailing of the combined fleet, and eitherthe sailing, or creating such an appearance of sailing, of the Dutchfleet, as will prevent Admiral Dickson [commander-in-chief in theNorth Sea] from sending anything from off the great Dutch ports, whilst the smaller ports will spew forth its flotilla--viz, Flushing&c. &c. " To frustrate that part of this combined effort which is supposed to bedirected against the Channel coast, Nelson proposes that, "if it iscalm when the enemy row out, all our vessels and boats appointed towatch them, must get into the Channel, and meet them as soon aspossible; if not strong enough for the attack, they must watch, andkeep them company till a favourable opportunity offers. Should itremain calm, " so that the cruising ships cannot assist, "the momentthat they begin to touch our shore, strong or weak, our flotilla ofboats must attack as much of the enemy's flotilla as they areable--say only one half or two thirds--it will create a most powerfuldiversion, for the bows of our flotilla will be opposed to theirunarmed sterns. " The dispositions to defend the entrance of the Thames, beingconsidered the more important, are the more minute. Blockships arestationed in the principal channels, as floating fortifications, commanding absolutely the water around them, and forming strong pointsof support for the flotilla. It is sagaciously ordered that these "arenot, from any apparent advantage, to be moved, for the tide mayprevent their resuming the very important stations assigned them. "Nelson was evidently alive to that advantage in permanent works, whichputs it out of the power of panic to stampede them; tide is not theonly factor that prevents retrieving a false step. The easternflotilla is organized into three bodies, the right wing being nearMargate, the left in Hollesley Bay near Harwich, the centre, vaguely, between Orfordness and the North Foreland. When the alarm is given, they are to draw together towards the centre, but not to emphasizetheir movement sufficiently to uncover either flank, until the enemy'sflotilla can be seen; then they are "to unite, but not intermix. " To both divisions--that in the Channel and that on' the EastCoast--the commander-in-chief, in concluding, renews his charge, withone of those "Nelson touches" which electrified his followers:"Whatever plans may be adopted, the moment the enemy touch our coast, be it where it may, they are to be attacked by every man afloat and onshore: this must be perfectly understood. _Never fear the event_. " This plan for the defence of London against an attack by surprise, drawn up by Nelson on the spur of the moment, was based simply uponhis general ideas, and without specific information yet as to eitherthe character or extent of the enemy's preparations, or of the meansof resistance available on his own side. It has, therefore, somethingof an abstract character, embodying broad views unmodified by specialcircumstances, and possessing, consequently, a somewhat peculiarvalue in indicating the tendency of Nelson's military conceptions. Heassumes, implicitly, a certain freedom of movement on the part of thetwo opponents, unrestricted by the friction and uncertainty which inpractice fetter action; and the use which, under these conditions, heimagines either will make of his powers, may not unfairly be assumedto show what he thought the correct course in such a general case. Prominent among his ideas, and continuous in all his speculations asto the movements of an enemy, from 1795 onward, is the certainty that, for the sake of diversion, Bonaparte will divide his force into twogreat equal fragments, which may land at points so far apart, andseparated by such serious obstacles, as were Solebay and Dover. Thosewho will be at the trouble to recall his guesses as to the futuremovements of the French in the Riviera, Piedmont, and Tuscany, in 1795and 1796, as well as his own propositions to the Austrians at the sameperiod, will recognize here the recurrence, unchastened by experienceor thought, of a theory of warfare it is almost impossible to approve. That Bonaparte, --supposed to be master of his first movements, --if hemeant to land in person at Dover, would put half his army ashore atSolebay, is as incredible as that he would have landed one half atLeghorn, meaning to act with the other from the Riviera. If thiscriticism be sound, it would show that Nelson, genius as he was, suffered from the lack of that study which reinforces its ownconclusions by the experience of others; and that his experience, resting upon service in a navy so superior in quality to its enemies, that great inferiority in number or position could be accepted, hadnot supplied the necessary corrective to an ill-conceived readiness tosub-divide. The resultant error is clearly traceable, in the author's opinion, inhis dispositions at Copenhagen, and in a general tendency to allowhimself too narrow a margin, based upon an under-valuation of theenemy not far removed from contempt. It was most fortunate for him, inthe Baltic, that Parker increased to twelve the detachment he himselfhad fixed at ten. The last utterances of his life, however, show adistinct advance and ripening of the judgment, without the slightestdecrease of the heroic resolution that so characterized him. "I havetwenty-three sail with me, " he wrote a fortnight before Trafalgar, "and should they come out I will immediately bring them to battle; . .. But I am _very, very, very_ anxious for the arrival of the force whichis intended. It is, as Mr. Pitt knows, annihilation that the countrywants, and not merely a splendid victory of twenty-three tothirty-six. Numbers only can annihilate. " The assumption that Bonaparte's plan would be such as he mentioned, naturally controlled Nelson in the dispositions he sketched for thelocal defence of the shore lines. The invasion being in two bodies, the defence was to be in two bodies also; nor is there any suggestionof a possibility that these two might be united against one of theenemy's. The whole scheme is dual; yet, although the chance of eitherdivision of the British being largely inferior to the enemy opposed toit is recognized, the adoption of a central position, or concentrationupon either of the enemy's flotillas, apparently is not contemplated. Such uncertainty of touch, when not corrected by training, is thenatural characteristic of a defence essentially passive; that is, of adefence which proposes to await the approach of the enemy to its ownfrontier, be that land or water. Yet it scarcely could have failedsoon to occur to men of Nelson's and St. Vincent's martial capacities, that a different disposition, which would clearly enable them to uniteand intercept either one of the enemy's divisions, must wreck theentire project; for the other twenty thousand men alone could not doserious or lasting injury. The mere taking a position favorable tosuch concentration would be an adequate check. The trouble for themundoubtedly was that which overloads, and so nullifies, all schemesfor coast defence resting upon popular outcry, which demands outwardand visible protection for every point, and assurance that people atwar shall be guarded, not only against broken bones, but against evenscratches of the skin. This uneducated and weak idea, that protection is only adequate whenco-extensive with the frontier line threatened, finds its naturaloutcome in a system of defence by very small vessels, in greatnumbers, capable of minute subdivision and wide dispersal, to which anequal tonnage locked up in larger ships cannot be subjected. AlthoughSt. Vincent was at the head of the Admiralty which in 1801 orderedthat Nelson should first organize such a flotilla, and only after thatproceed to offensive measures, the results of his experience now wereto form--or at the least to confirm in him--the conclusion which heenunciated, and to which he persistently held, during the later trulyformidable preparations of Napoleon. "Our great reliance is on thevigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in thenumber of which, by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, andbeaches, would in my judgment tend to our destruction. " Verystrangely, so far as the author's opinion goes, Nelson afterwardsexpressed an apparently contrary view, and sustained Mr. Pitt in hisattack upon St. Vincent's administration on this very point; anattack, in its tendency and in the moment chosen, among the mostdangerous to his country ever attempted by a great and sagaciousstatesman. Nelson, however, writing in May, 1804, says: "I had wrote amemoir, many months ago, upon the propriety of a flotilla. I had thatcommand at the end of the last war, and I know the necessity of it, even had you, and which you ought to have, thirty or forty sail of theline in the Downs and North Sea, besides frigates &c. ; but havingfailed so entirely in submitting my mind upon three points I wasdisheartened. " This Memoir has not been preserved, but it will benoticed that, in expressing his difference from St. Vincent in thewords quoted, he assumes, what did not at any time exist, thirty orforty sail-of-the-line for the North Sea and the Downs. St. Vincent'sstand was taken on the position that the flotilla could not be mannedwithout diminishing the cruisers in commission, which were far shortof the ideal number named by Nelson. It may be believed, or at leasthoped, that if forced to choose between the two, as St. Vincent was, his choice would have been that of the great Earl. It seems clear, however, that in 1804 he believed it possible that the Army ofInvasion _might_ get as far as the shores of England--a question whichhas been much argued. "I am very uneasy, " he then wrote to LadyHamilton, "at your and Horatia being on the coast: for you cannotmove, if the French make the attempt. " Whatever weight may be attributed to this criticism on Nelson'shastily sketched scheme, there can scarcely be any discord in the noteof admiration for the fire that begins to glow, the instant he inthought draws near the enemy. There, assuredly, is no uncertain sound. They must be met as soon as possible; if not strong enough to attack, they must be watched, and company kept, till a favorable opportunityoffers. If none occur till they draw near the beach, then, "Whateverplans may be adopted, the moment they touch our coast, be it where itmay, they are to be attacked by every man afloat and on shore: thismust be perfectly understood. Never fear the event. " The resolutionshown by such words is not born of carelessness; and the man whoapproaches his work in their spirit will wring success out of manymistakes of calculation--unless indeed he stumble on an enemy of equaldetermination. The insistence upon keeping the enemy underobservation, "keeping company" with them, however superior innumbers, may also be profitably noted. This inspired his wholepurpose, four years later, in the pursuit of the French to the WestIndies--if the odds are too great for immediate attack, "We won't partwithout a battle. " It was the failure to hold the same principle ofaction, applicable to such diverse cases, that ruined Calder in thesame campaign. With the general views that have been outlined, Nelson hastened to histask. His commission for the new service was dated July 24, threeweeks after his return from the Baltic. On the 25th he presented thememorandum of operations which has been discussed, on the 26th theAdmiralty issued their instructions, and on the 27th he hoisted hisflag upon the "Unité" frigate at Sheerness. "I shall go on board thisday, " he said, "in order to show we must all get to our posts asspeedily as possible. " His orders, after mentioning the general reasonfor creating the "Squadron on a Particular Service, " as his commandwas officially styled, designated the limits of his charge, coastwise, as from Orfordness, on the Suffolk shore, round to Beachy Head, on theChannel. On the enemy's side of the water, it extended from end to endof the line of ports from which the especial danger of an invasion bytroops might be supposed to issue--from Dieppe to Ostend; but themouth of the Scheldt was implicitly included. The district thus assigned to him was taken out of the commandshitherto held by some very reputable admirals, senior to himself, whootherwise retained their previous charges, surrounding and touchinghis own; while at the Scheldt he trenched closely upon the province ofthe commander-in-chief in the North Sea. Such circumstances areextremely liable to cause friction and bad blood, and St. Vincent, whowith all his despotism was keenly alive to the just susceptibilitiesof meritorious officers, was very careful to explain to them that hehad with the greatest reluctance yielded to the necessity ofcombining the preparations for defence under a single flag-officer, who should have no other care. The innate tact, courtesy, andthoughtful consideration which distinguished Nelson, when in normalconditions, removed all other misunderstandings. "The delicacy youhave always shown to senior officers, " wrote St. Vincent to him, "is asure presage of your avoiding by every means in your power to giveumbrage to Admiral Dickson, who seems disposed to judge favourably ofthe intentions of us all: it is, in truth, the most difficult card wehave to play. " "Happy should I be, " he said at another time, "to placethe whole of our offensive and defensive war under your auspices, butyou are well aware of the difficulties on that head. " From first tolast there is no trace of a serious jar, and Nelson's instructions tohis subordinates were such as to obviate the probability of any. "Ifeel myself, my dear Lord, " he wrote St. Vincent, relative to aprojected undertaking on the Dutch coast, "as anxious to get a medal, or a step in the peerage as if I had never got either. If I succeeded, and burnt the Dutch fleet, probably medals and an earldom. I must havehad every desire to try the matter, regardless of the feelings ofothers; but I should not have been your Nelson, that wants not to takehonours or rewards from any man; and if ever I feel great, it is, mydear Lord, in never having, in thought, word, or deed, robbed any manof his fair fame. " He was accompanied from London by a young commander, Edward Parker, who seems first to have become known to him in the Baltic, and who nowacted as an additional aide. The latter was filled with theadmiration, felt by most of those thrown into contact with Nelson, forthe rapidity with which he transacted business, and set all about himin movement. "He is the cleverest and quickest man, and the mostzealous in the world. In the short time we were in Sheerness, heregulated and gave orders for thirty of the ships under his command, made every one pleased, filled them with emulation, and set them allon the _qui vive_. " In forty-eight hours he was off again for theDowns, by land, having to make some inquiries on the way as to theorganization, and readiness to serve, of the Sea Fencibles, a largebody of naval reserves, who were exempt from impressment upon theunderstanding that they would come forward for coast defence, in caseof threatened invasion. Concerning their dispositions he receivedfairly flattering assurances, which in the event were not realized. Ifthe men were certified that they would not be detained after thedanger was over, it was said, they certainly would go on board. "Thisservice, my dear Lord, " he wrote to St. Vincent, "above all others, would be terrible for me: to get up and harangue like a recruitingsergeant; but as I am come forth, I feel that I ought to do thisdisagreeable service as well as any other, if judged necessary. " Three days more, and he was off Boulogne in a frigate with somebomb-vessels. The French admiral, Latouche Tréville, had moored infront of the pier a line of gun-vessels, twenty-four in number, fastened together from end to end. At these, and at the shipping inthe small port, some bombs were thrown. Not much injury was done oneither side. Prevented by an easterly wind from going on to Flushing, as he had intended, Nelson returned to Margate on the 6th of August, issued a proclamation to the Fencibles, assuring them that the Frenchundoubtedly intended an invasion, that their services were absolutelyrequired at once on board the defence-ships, and that they could relyupon being returned to their homes as soon as the danger was over. Outof twenty-six hundred, only three hundred and eighty-five volunteeredto this urgent call. "They are no more willing to give up theiroccupations than their superiors, " wrote Nelson, withcharacteristically shrewd insight into a frame of mind wholly aliento his own self-sacrificing love of Country and of glory. Hurrying from station to station, on the shores, and in the channelsof the Thames, he was on the 12th of August back at Margate, evidentlydisappointed in the prospects for coast-defence, and more and moreinclining to the deep-sea cruising, and to action on the enemy'scoast, recommended by the Admiralty, and consonant to his own temper, always disdainful of mere defensive measures. "Our active force isperfect, " he wrote to St. Vincent, "and possesses so much zeal that Ionly want to catch that Buonaparte on the water. " He has satisfiedhimself that the French preparations were greatly exaggerated;Boulogne in fact could not harbor the needed vessels, unless enlarged, as afterwards by Napoleon. "Where is our invasion to come from? The_time_ is gone. " Nevertheless, he favors an attack of some sort, suggests an expedition against Flushing, with five thousand troops, and proposes a consultation. St. Vincent replied that he did notbelieve in consultations, and had always avoided them. "I disapproveof unnecessary consultations as much as any man, " retorted Nelson, "yet being close to the Admiralty, I should not feel myself justifiedin risking our ships through the channels of Flushing without buoysand pilots, without a consultation with such men as your Lordship, andalso I believe you would think an order absolutely necessary. " "LordSt. Vincent tells me he hates councils, " he writes rather sorely toAddington. "So do I between military men; for if a man consultswhether he is to fight, when he has the power in his own hands, _it iscertain that his opinion is against fighting_; but that is not thecase at present, and I own I do want good council. Lord St. Vincent isfor keeping the enemy closely blockaded; but I see they get alongshoreinside their sand banks, and under their guns, which line the coast ofFrance. Lord Hood is for keeping our squadrons of defence stationaryon our own shore (except light cutters to give information of everymovement of the enemy). .. . When men of such good sense, such greatsea-officers, differ so widely, is it not natural that I should wishthe mode of defence to be well arranged by the mature consideration ofmen of judgment?" Meanwhile he had again gone off Boulogne, and directed an attack inboats upon the line of vessels moored outside. He took great care inthe arrangements for this hazardous expedition, giving personalsupervision to all details. "As you may believe, my dear Emma, " hewrote to her who had his closest confidence, "my mind feels at what isgoing forward this night; it is one thing to order and arrange anattack, and another to execute it; but I assure you I have taken muchmore precaution for others, than if I was to go myself--then my mindwould be perfectly at ease. " He professed, and probably felt, entireconfidence in the result. Fifty-seven boats were detailed for theattack. They were in four divisions, each under a commander; EdwardParker having one. Each division was to advance in two columns, theboats of which were secured one to another by tow-ropes; a precautioninvaluable to keep them together, though rendering progress slower. The points in the enemy's line which each division was to make forwere clearly specified, and special boats told off and fitted to towout any vessels that were captured. Simultaneous with this onslaught, a division of howitzer flatboats was to throw shot into the port. At half-past eleven on the night of August 15th, the boats, which hadassembled alongside the flag-frigate "Medusa, " shoved off together;but the distance which they had to pull, with the strong, uncertaincurrents, separated them; and, as so often happens in concertedmovements, attacks intended to be simultaneous were madedisconnectedly, while the French were fully prepared. The firstdivision of the British arrived at half-past twelve, and after adesperate struggle was beaten off, Commander Parker being mortallywounded. Two other divisions came up later, while the fourth lost itsway altogether. The affair was an entire failure, except so far as toshow that the enemy would be met on their own shores, rather than onthose of Great Britain. The British loss was forty-four killed, andone hundred and twenty-eight wounded. Nelson returned to the Downs, bitterly grieved, but not greatlydiscouraged. The mishap, he said, was due to the boats not arriving atthe same moment; and that, he knew, was caused by conditions ofcurrents, which would ever prevent the dull flatboats of the enemymoving in a concert that the cutters of ships of war had not attained. "The craft which I have seen, " he wrote, "I do not think it possibleto _row_ to England; and sail they cannot. " As yet, however, he hadnot visited Flushing, and he felt it necessary to satisfy himself onthat point. On the 24th of August, taking some pilots with him, hewent across and inspected the ground, where the officer in charge ofthe British observing squadron was confident something might beeffected. Nelson, however, decided otherwise. "I cannot but admireCaptain Owen's zeal in his anxious desire to get at the enemy, but Iam afraid it has made him overleap sand-banks and tides, and laid himaboard the enemy. I could join most heartily in his desire; but wecannot do impossibilities, and I am as little used to find out theimpossibles as most folks; and I think I can discriminate between theimpracticable and the fair prospect of success. " By the 27th of Augusthe had returned to the Downs, where, with a brief and unimportantintermission, he remained until the cessation of hostilities withFrance in October. Satisfied that invasion was, for that year at least, an empty menace, Nelson fell again into the tone of angry and fretful complaint whichwas so conspicuous in the last weeks of his stay in the Baltic. Toborrow the words of a French admirer, "He filled the Admiralty withhis caprices and Europe with his fame. " Almost from his first contactwith this duty, it had been distasteful to him. "There is nothing tobe done on the great scale, " he said. "I own, my dear Lord, " he toldSt. Vincent, "that this boat warfare is not exactly congenial to myfeelings, and I find I get laughed at for my puny mode of attack. " Asusual, he threw himself with all his might into what he had to do, butthe inward friction remained. "Whilst I serve, I will do it actively, and to the very best of my abilities. I have all night had a fever, which is very little abated this morning; my mind carries me beyond mystrength, and will do me up; but such is my nature. I require nursinglike a child. " That he was far from well is as unquestionable as that his distemperproceeded largely from his mind, if it did not originate there. "Ourseparation is terrible, " he writes to Lady Hamilton; "my heart isready to flow out of my eyes. I am not unwell, but I am very low. Ican only account for it by my absence from all I hold dear in thisworld. " From the first he had told St. Vincent that he could not staylonger than September 14th, that it was beyond his strength to standthe equinoctial weather. The veteran seaman showed towards him thesame delicate consideration that he always had, using the flatteringurgency which Nelson himself knew so well how to employ, in elicitingthe hearty co-operation of others. "The public mind is so muchtranquillised by your being at your post, it is extremely desirablethat you should continue there: in this opinion all His Majesty'sservants, with Sir Thomas Troubridge, agree. Let me entreat yourLordship to persevere in the measures you are so advantageouslyemployed in, and give up, at least for the present, your intention ofreturning to town, which would have the worst possible effect at thiscritical juncture. The dispositions you have made, and are making, appear to us all as the most judicious possible. " "I hope you willnot relinquish your situation at a moment when the services of everyman are called for by the circumstances the Country is placed in, soimperiously that, upon reflection, I persuade myself you will think asI, and every friend you have, do on this subject. " Nelson admitted, ina calmer moment, that "although my whole soul is devoted to get rid ofthis command, yet I do not blame the Earl for wishing to keep me herea little longer. " "Pray take care of your health, " the latter saysagain, "than which nothing is of so much consequence to the Country atlarge, more particularly so to your very affectionate St. Vincent. ""Your health is so precious at all times, more particularly so at thiscrisis. " St. Vincent tried in vain to conjure with the once beloved name ofTroubridge, whom Nelson used to style the "Nonpareil, " whose merits hehad been never weary of extolling, and whose cause he had pleaded sovehemently, when the accident of his ship's grounding deprived him ofhis share in the Battle of the Nile. From the moment that he waschosen by St. Vincent, who called him the ablest adviser and bestexecutive officer in the British Navy, to assist in the administrationof the Admiralty, Nelson began to view him jealously. "Our friendTroubridge is to be a Lord of the Admiralty, and I have a sharp eye, and almost think I see it. No, poor fellow, I hope I do him injustice;he cannot surely forget my kindness to him. " But when the single eyehas become double, suspicion thrives, and when tortured by his desireto return to Lady Hamilton, Nelson saw in every obstacle and everydelay the secret hand of Troubridge. "I believe it is all the plan ofTroubridge, " he wrote in one such instance, "but I have wrote both himand the Earl my mind. " To St. Vincent, habit and professionaladmiration enabled him to submit, if grudgingly, and with constantcomplaints to his _confidante_; but Troubridge, though now one of theBoard that issued his orders, was his inferior in grade, and heresented the imagined condition of being baffled in his wishes by ajunior. The latter, quick-tempered and rough of speech, but true ashis sword, to use St. Vincent's simile, must have found himself put toit to uphold the respect due to his present position, without wrongingthe affection and reverence which he undoubtedly felt for his oldcomrade, and which in the past he had shown by the moral courage thateven ventured to utter a remonstrance, against the infatuation thatthreatened to stain his professional honor. Such straining of personal relations constantly accompanies accessionto office; many are the friendships, if they can be called such, whichcannot endure the experience that official action may not always becontrolled by them. If such is to be noted in Nelson, it is because hewas no exception to the common rule, and it is sad that a man so greatshould not in this have been greater than he was. St. Vincent felt itnecessary to tell him, with reference to the difficulty of grantingsome requests for promotion, "Encompassed as I am by applications andpresumptuous claims, I have nothing for it but to act upon thedefensive, as your Lordship will be compelled to do, whenever you areplaced in the situation I at present fill. " This Nelson contentshimself with quoting; but of Troubridge he says: "Troubridge has socompletely prevented my mentioning any body's service, that I ambecome a cypher, and he has gained a victory over Nelson's spirit. Captain Somerville has been begging me to intercede with the Admiraltyagain; but I have been so _rebuffed_, that my spirits are gone, andthe _great_ Troubridge has what we call _cowed_ the spirits of Nelson;but I shall never forget it. He told me if I asked anything more thatI should get nothing. No wonder I am not well. " The refusal of the Admiralty to give him leave to come to London, though founded on alleged motives of state, he thinks absurd. "Theyare beasts for their pains, " he says; "it was only depriving me of oneday's comfort and happiness, for which they have my hearty prayers. "His spleen breaks out in oddly comical ways. "I have a letter fromTroubridge, recommending me to wear flannel shirts. Does he care forme? _No_; but never mind. " "Troubridge writes me, that as the weatheris set in fine again, he hopes I shall get walks on shore. He is, Isuppose, laughing at me; but, never mind. " Petulant words, such asquoted, and others much more harsh, used to an intimate friend, are ofcourse to be allowed for as indicating mental exasperation and theexcitement of baffled longings, rather than expressing permanentfeeling; but still they illustrate mental conditions more faithfullythan do the guarded utterances of formal correspondence. Friendshiprarely regains the ground lost in them. The situation did undoubtedlybecome exasperating towards the end, for no one pretended that anyactive service could be expected, or that his function was other thanthat of a signal displayed, indicating that Great Britain, thoughnegotiating for peace, was yet on her guard. Lying in an openroadstead, with a heavy surf pouring in on the beach many days of theweek, a man with one arm and one eye could not easily or safely getback and forth; and, being in a small frigate pitching and tugging ather anchors, he was constantly seasick, so much so "that I cannot holdup my head, " afflicted with cold and toothache, --"but none of themcares a d--n for me and my sufferings. " In September the Hamiltons came to Deal, off which the ship was lying, and remained for a fortnight, during which he was happy; but thereaction was all the more severe when they returned to town on the20th. "I came on board, but no Emma. No, no, my heart will break. I amin silent distraction. .. . My dearest wife, how can I bear ourseparation? Good God, what a change! I am so low that I cannot hold upmy head. " His depression was increased by the condition of Parker, the young commander, who had been wounded off Boulogne, and had sincethen hovered between life and death. The thigh had been shattered toofar up for amputation, and the only faint hope had been that the bonesmight reunite. The day that the Hamiltons left, the great arteryburst, and, after a brief deceitful rally, he died on the 27th ofSeptember. Nelson, who was tenderly attached to him, followed him tothe grave with emotion so deep as to be noticeable to the bystanders. "Thank God, " he wrote that afternoon, "the dreadful scene is past. Iscarcely know how I got over it. I could not suffer much more and bealive. " "I own, " he had written to St. Vincent immediately after therepulse, "I shall never bring myself again to allow any attack to goforward, where I am not personally concerned; my mind suffers muchmore than if I had a leg shot off in this late business. " The Admiralty refusing any allowances, much of the expense of Parker'sillness and of his funeral fell upon Nelson, who assumed all hisdebts. It was but one instance among many of a liberality in moneymatters, which kept him constantly embarrassed. To the surgeon who hadattended the wounded, and to the captain of the "Medusa, " a muchricher man than he was, but who had shown him kindness, he gavehandsome remembrances of the favors which he was pleased to considerdone to himself personally. In a like spirit he wrote some monthsafterwards, concerning a proposed monument to Captain Ralph WillettMiller, who had fought under his flag. "I much doubt if all theadmirals and captains will subscribe to poor dear Miller's monument;but I have told Davison, that whatever is wanted to make up the sum, Ishall pay. I thought of Lord St. Vincent and myself paying, £50 each;some other admirals may give something, and I thought about £12 eachfor the captains who had served with him in the actions off Cape St. Vincent and the Nile. The spirit of liberality seems declining; butwhen I forget an old and dear friend, may I cease to be youraffectionate Nelson and Bronté. " Yet at this period he felt itadvisable to sell the diamonds from the presents given him by foreignsovereigns. He was during these weeks particularly pressed, because intreaty for a house which he bought at Merton in Surrey, and for whichhe had difficulty in raising funds. In this his friend Davison helpedhim by a generous and unlimited offer of a loan. "The Balticexpedition, " wrote Nelson in his letter of thanks, "cost me full£2, 000. Since I left London it has cost me, for Nelson cannot be likeothers, near £1, 000 in six weeks. If I am continued here, ruin to myfinances must be the consequence. " On the 1st of October the Preliminaries of Peace with France weresigned, and on the 9th news of their ratification reached Nelson onboard his ship. "Thank God! it is peace, " he exclaimed. Yet, whiledelighted beyond measure at the prospect of release from his presentduties, and in general for the repose he now expected, he was mostimpatient at the exuberant demonstrations of the London populace, andof some military and naval men. "Let the rejoicings be proper to ourseveral stations--the manufacturer, because he will have more marketsfor his goods, --but seamen and soldiers ought to say, 'Well, as it ispeace, we lay down our arms; and are ready again to take them up, ifthe French are insolent. ' There is no person in the world rejoicesmore in the peace than I do, but I would burst sooner than let a d--dFrenchman know it. We have made peace with the French despotism, andwe will, I hope, adhere to it whilst the French continue in duebounds; but whenever they overstep that, and usurp a power which woulddegrade Europe, then I trust we shall join Europe in crushing herambition; then I would with pleasure go forth and risk my life for topull down the overgrown detestable power of France. " When the mob inLondon dragged the carriage of the French ambassador, his wrath quiteboiled over. "Can you cure madness?" he wrote to his physician; "for Iam mad to read that our d--d scoundrels dragged a Frenchman'scarriage. I am ashamed for our Country. " "I hope never more to bedragged by such a degenerate set of people, " he tells Lady Hamilton. "Would our ancestors have done it? So, the villains would have drawnBuonaparte if he had been able to get to London to cut off the King'shead, and yet all our Royal Family will employ Frenchmen. Thanks tothe navy, they could not. " Nelson's soul was disturbed without cause. Under the ephemeral effervescence of a crowd lay a purpose as set ashis own, and of which his present emotions were a dim and unconsciousprophecy. On the 15th of October he received official notification for thecessation of hostilities with the French Republic, the precise date atwhich they were to be considered formally at an end having been fixedat the 22d of the month. The Admiralty declined to allow him to leavehis station until that day arrived. Then he had their permission totake leave of absence, but not to haul down his flag. "I heartily hopea little rest will soon set you up, " wrote St. Vincent, "but until thedefinitive treaty is signed, your Lordship must continue in pay, although we may not have occasion to require your personal services atthe head of the squadron under your orders. " In accordance with thisdecision, Nelson's flag continued to fly as Commander-in-Chief of aSquadron of ships "on a particular service, " throughout the anxiousperiod of doubt and suspicion which preceded the signing of the treatyof Amiens, on the 25th of March, 1802. It was not till the 10th of thefollowing April that he received the formal orders, to strike his flagand come on shore. On the 22d of October, 1801, he left the flagship and set off for hisnew home in Surrey. FOOTNOTES: [37] These suggestive italics are in the letter as printed by Clarke andM'Arthur, and reproduced by Nicolas. [38] Hollesley Bay. CHAPTER XVIII. RELEASE FROM ACTIVE SERVICE DURING THE PEACE OF AMIENS. --HOME LIFE ATMERTON. --PUBLIC INCIDENTS. OCTOBER, 1801--MAY, 1803. AGE, 43-44. During the brief interval between his return from the Baltic, JulyI, 1801, and his taking command of the Squadron on a ParticularService, on the 27th of the same month, Nelson had made his home inEngland with the Hamiltons, to whose house in Piccadilly he wentimmediately upon his arrival in London. Whatever doubt may haveremained in his wife's mind, as to the finality of their parting inthe previous January, or whatever trace of hesitation may then haveexisted in his own, had been definitively removed by letters duringhis absence. To her he wrote on the 4th of March, immediately beforethe expedition sailed from Yarmouth: "Josiah[39] is to have anothership and to go abroad, if the Thalia cannot soon be got ready. I havedone _all_ for him, and he may again, as he has often done before, wish me to break my neck, and be abetted in it by his friends, who arelikewise my enemies; but I have done my duty as an honest, generousman, and I neither want or wish for anybody to care what becomes ofme, whether I return, or am left in the Baltic. Living, I have doneall in my power for you, and if dead, you will find I have done thesame; therefore my only wish is, to be left to myself: and wishing youevery happiness, believe that I am, your affectionate Nelson andBronté. " Upon this letter Lady Nelson endorsed: "This is My LordNelson's Letter of dismissal, which so astonished me that Iimmediately sent it to Mr. Maurice Nelson, [40] who was sincerelyattached to me, for his advice. He desired me not to take the leastnotice of it, as his brother seemed to have forgot himself. " A separation preceded and caused by such circumstances as this was, could not fail to be attended with bitterness on both sides; yet onecould have wished to see in a letter which is believed, and probablywas intended, to be the last ever addressed by him to her, somerecollection, not only of what he himself had done for his stepson, but that once, to use his own expression, "the boy" had "saved hislife;" and that, after all, if he was under obligations to Nelson, hewould have been more than youth, had no intemperance of expressionmingled with the resentment he felt for the slights offered his motherin the face of the world. With Nelson's natural temperament andprevious habits of thought, however, it was imperative, for his peaceof mind, to justify his course of action to himself; and this he coulddo only by dwelling upon the wrong done him by those who, in the eyesof men generally, seemed, and must still seem, the wronged. Of whatpassed between himself and Lady Nelson, we know too little toapportion the blame of a transaction in which she appears chiefly asthe sufferer. Nisbet, except in the gallantry and coolness shown byhim at Teneriffe, has not the same claim to consideration, and hiscareer had undoubtedly occasioned great and legitimate anxiety toNelson, whose urgency with St. Vincent was primarily the cause of apremature promotion, which spoiled the future of an officer, otherwisefairly promising. [41] If the relations between the two had not beenso soon strained by Nelson's attentions to Lady Hamilton, things mighthave turned out better, through the influence of one who rarely failedto make the most of those under his command. The annual allowance made to Lady Nelson by her husband, after theirseparation, was £1, 800; which, by a statement he gave to the PrimeMinister, two years later, when asking an increase of pension, appearsto have been about half of his total income. On the 23d of April, 1801, when daily expecting to leave the Baltic for England, he senther a message through their mutual friend Davison: "You will, at aproper time, and before my arrival in England, signify to Lady N. ThatI expect, and for which I have made such a very liberal allowance toher, to be left to myself, and without any inquiries from her; forsooner than live the unhappy life I did when last I came to England, Iwould stay abroad for ever. My mind is fixed as fate: therefore youwill send my determination in any way you may judge proper. "[42] ToLady Hamilton he wrote about the same time, assuring her, under theassumption of mystery with which he sought to guard their relationsagainst discovery through the postal uncertainties of the day, that hehad no communication with his wife: "Thomson[43] desires me to say hehas never wrote his aunt[44] since he sailed, and all the parade abouta house is nonsense. He has wrote to his father, but not a word ormessage to her. He does not, nor cannot, care about her; he believesshe has a most unfeeling heart. "[45] His stay with the Hamiltons in Piccadilly, though broken by severaltrips to the country, convinced Nelson that if they were to livetogether, as he wished to do, it must be, for his own satisfaction, ina house belonging to him. It is clear that the matter was talked overbetween Lady Hamilton and himself; for, immediately upon joining hiscommand in the Downs, he began writing about the search for a house, as a matter already decided, in which she was to act for him. "Haveyou heard of any house? I am very anxious to have a home where myfriends might be made welcome. " As usual, in undertakings of everykind, he chafed under delays, and he was ready to take the first thatseemed suitable. "I really wish you would buy the house at TurnhamGreen, " he writes her within a week. The raising of the money, it istrue, presents some difficulty, for he has in hand but £3, 000. "It is, my dear friend, " he moralizes, "extraordinary, but true, that the manwho is pushed forward to defend his country, has not from that countrya place to lay his head in; but never mind, happy, truly happy, in theestimation of such friends as you, I care for nothing. " Lady Hamilton, however, was a better business-man than himself, andwent about his purchase with the deliberation of a woman shopping. Atthe end of three weeks he was still regretting that he could not "finda house and a little ece of ground, for if I go on much longer withmy present command, I must be ruined. I think your perseverance andmanagement will at last get me a home. " By the 20th of August she wassuited, for on that date he writes to her, "I approve of the house atMerton;" and, as the Admiralty would not consent to his leaving hisstation even for a few days, all the details of the bargain were leftin her hands. "I entreat, my good friend, manage the affair of thehouse for me. " He stipulates only that everything in it shall be his, "to a book or a cook, " or even "to a pair of sheets, towels, &c. " "Ientreat I may never hear about the expenses again. If you live inPiccadilly or Merton it makes no difference, and if I was to live atMerton I must keep a table, and nothing can cost me one-sixth partwhich it does at present. " "You are to be, recollect, Lady Paramountof all the territories and waters of Merton, and we are all to be yourguests, and to obey, all lawful commands. " In this way were conducted the purchase and preparation of the onlyhome of his own on English ground that Nelson ever possessed, where hepassed his happiest hours, and from which he set out to fight his lastbattle. The negotiation was concluded three days before the rumors ofthe peace got abroad, therefore about the 27th of September, 1801; andin consequence, so Sir William Hamilton thought, the property wasacquired a thousand pounds cheaper than it otherwise might havebeen--a piece of financial good luck rare in Nelson's experience. "Wehave now inhabited your Lordship's premises some days, " continued theold knight, "and I can now speak with some certainty. I have livedwith our dear Emma several years. I know her merit, have a greatopinion of the head and heart that God Almighty has been pleased togive her; but a seaman alone could have given a fine woman full powerto chuse and fit up a residence for him without seeing it himself. Youare in luck, for in my conscience I verily believe that a place sosuitable to your views could not have been found, and at so cheap arate. The proximity to the capital, "--Nelson found it an hour's drivefrom Hyde Park--"and the perfect retirement of this place, are, foryour Lordship, two points beyond estimation; but the house is socomfortable, the furniture clean and good, and I never saw so manyconveniences united in so small a compass. You have nothing but tocome and enjoy immediately; you have a good mile of pleasant dry walkaround your own farm. It would make you laugh to see Emma and hermother fitting up pig-sties and hencoops, and already the Canal isenlivened with ducks, and the cock is strutting with his hens aboutthe walks. " As time passed, Sir William did not realize the comfort he hadanticipated from surroundings so pleasant as those he described. Hewas troubled in money matters, fearing lest he might be distressed tomeet the current expenses of the house. "If we had given up the housein Piccadilly, " he lamented to Greville, "the living here would indeedbe a great saving; but, as it is, we spend neither more nor less thanwe did. " Why he did not give it up does not appear. As Lady Paramountover the owner of the place, Lady Hamilton insisted upon entertainingto a degree consonant to the taste neither of Lord Nelson, who wasonly too pleased to humor her whims, nor of her husband, who had anold man's longing for quiet, and, besides, was not pleased to findhimself relegated to a place in her consideration quite secondary tothat of his host. "It is but reasonable, " he wrote to Greville, inJanuary, 1802, "after having fagged all my life, that my last daysshould pass off comfortably and quietly. Nothing at present disturbsme but my debt, and the nonsense I am obliged to submit to here toavoid coming to an explosion, which would be attended with manydisagreeable effects, and would totally destroy the comfort of thebest man and the best friend I have in the world. However, I amdetermined that my quiet shall not be disturbed, let the nonsensicalworld go on as it will. " Neither the phlegm on which he prided himself, nor his resolutions, were sufficient, however, to keep the peace, or to avoid undignifiedcontentions with his wife. Some months later he addressed her aletter, which, although bearing no date, was evidently written after aprolonged experience of the conditions entailed upon himself by thisodd partnership; for partnership it was, in form at least, the livingexpenses being divided between the two. [46] In their quietreasonableness, his words are not without a certain dignified pathos, and they have the additional interest of proving, as far as words canprove, that, battered man of the world though he was, he had nosuspicion, within a year of his death, that the relations between hishost and his wife were guilty towards himself. "I have passed the last 40 years of my life in the hurry & bustle thatmust necessarily be attendant on a publick character. I am arrived atthe age when some repose is really necessary, & I promised myself aquiet home, & altho' I was sensible, & said so when I married, that Ishou'd be superannuated when my wife wou'd be in her full beauty andvigour of youth. That time is arrived, and we must make the best of itfor the comfort of both parties. Unfortunately our tastes as to themanner of living are very different. I by no means wish to live insolitary retreat, but to have seldom less than 12 or 14 at table, andthose varying continually, is coming back to what was become soirksome to me in Italy during the latter years of my residence in thatcountry. I have no connections out of my own family. I have nocomplaint to make, but I feel that the whole attention of my wife isgiven to Ld. N. And his interest at Merton. I well know the purity ofLd. N. 's friendship for Emma and me, and I know how very uncomfortableit wou'd make his Lp, our best friend, if a separation shou'd takeplace, & am therefore determined to do all in my power to preventsuch an extremity, which wou'd be _essentially detrimental_ to allparties, but wou'd be more sensibly felt by our dear friend than byus. Provided that our expences in housekeeping do not encrease beyondmeasure (of which I must own I see some danger), I am willing to go onupon our present footing; but as I cannot expect to live many years, every moment to me is precious, & I hope I may be allow'd sometimes tobe my own master, & pass my time according to my own inclination, either by going my fishing parties on the Thames or by going to Londonto attend the Museum, R. Society, the Tuesday Club, & Auctions ofpictures. I mean to have a light chariot or post chaise by the month, that I may make use of it in London and run backwards and forwards toMerton or to Shepperton, &c. This is my plan, and we might go on verywell, but I am fully determined not to have more of the very sillyaltercations that happen but too often between us and embitter thepresent moments exceedingly. If realy one cannot live comfortablytogether, a _wise_ and well _concerted separation_ is preferable; butI think, considering the probability of my not troubling any partylong in this world, the best for us all wou'd be to bear those ills wehave rather than flie to those we know not of. I have fairly statedwhat I have on my mind. There is no time for nonsense or trifling. Iknow and admire your talents & many excellent qualities, but I am notblind to your defects, and confess having many myself; therefore letus bear and forbear for God's sake. "[47] There are other accounts by eye-witnesses of the home life at Merton, in which participated, from time to time, not only the many outsideguests, of whose burden Hamilton complained, but also most of themembers of the Nelson family. Lord Minto, who had returned to Englandfrom Vienna, and whose personal friendship to Nelson never slackened, wrote to his wife, in March, 1802: "I went to Lord Nelson's onSaturday to dinner, and returned to-day in the forenoon. The wholeestablishment and way of life are such as to make me angry, as well asmelancholy; but I cannot alter it, and I do not think myself obliged, or at liberty, to quarrel with him for his weakness, though nothingshall ever induce me to give the smallest countenance to LadyHamilton. She looks ultimately to the chance of marriage, as SirWilliam will not be long in her way, and she probably indulges a hopethat she may survive Lady Nelson; in the meanwhile she and SirWilliam, and the whole set of them, are living with him at hisexpense. She is in high looks, but more immense than ever. The loveshe makes to Nelson is not only ridiculous, but disgusting: not onlythe rooms, but the whole house, staircase and all, are covered withnothing but pictures of her and him, of all sizes and sorts, andrepresentations of his naval actions, coats-of-arms, pieces of platein his honour, the flag-staff of L'Orient, &c. --an excess of vanitywhich counteracts its own purpose. If it was Lady Hamilton's housethere might be a pretence for it; to make his own house a merelooking-glass to view himself all day is bad taste. Braham, thecelebrated Jew singer, performed with Lady Hamilton. She is horrid, but he entertained me in spite of her. " Of this same period, but ayear later, at the time of Hamilton's death, Minto wrote: "LadyHamilton talked very freely [to me] of her situation with Nelson, andthe construction the world may have put upon it, but protested thattheir attachment had been perfectly pure, which I declare I canbelieve, though I am sure it is of no consequence whether it be so ornot. The shocking injury done to Lady Nelson is not made less orgreater, by anything that may or may not have occurred between him andLady Hamilton. " On the 6th of November, 1861, Mr. Matcham, a nephew of Lord Nelson, wrote for the "Times" some reminiscences of the great admiral, as hehad known him in private life, both at this period, and three yearslater, just before Trafalgar. His letter was elicited by thepublication of the "Remains of Mrs. Trench. " In this had appearedextracts from her journal, when Mrs. St. George, containing statementsderogatory to Nelson's conduct in Dresden, when on the journey fromTrieste to Hamburg in the year 1800; some of which have been quotedalready in this work. [48] Mr. Matcham's words, so far as they relateto Nelson himself, are here given in full[49]:-- I too Sir, as well as "the Lady, " had some knowledge of that person, so much honoured and so much maligned; and although I do not defend his one great error (though in that, with some palliation, there were united elements of a generous and noble nature), I venture to say that whoever forms a notion of his manners and deportment in private life from this account of him, will labour under a very great delusion. I visited my uncle twice during the short periods in which he was on shore--once in 1802, during his journey to Wales, when he was received at Oxford and other places; and the second time at his house at Merton, in 1805, for three weeks preceding the 15th of September, when he left to embark at Portsmouth to return no more; and I can assert with truth that a more complete contrast between this lady's portrait and my thorough recollection of him could not be forced on my mind. Lord Nelson in private life was remarkable for a demeanour quiet, sedate, and unobtrusive, anxious to give pleasure to every one about him, distinguishing each in turn by some act of kindness, and chiefly those who seemed to require it most. During his few intervals of leisure, in a little knot of relations and friends, he delighted in quiet conversation, through which occasionally ran an undercurrent of pleasantry, not unmixed with caustic wit. At his table he was the least heard among the company, and so far from being the hero of his own tale, I never heard him voluntarily refer to any of the great actions of his life. I have known him lauded by the great and wise; but he seemed to me to waive the homage with as little attention as was consistent with civility. Nevertheless, a mind like his was necessarily won by attention from those who could best estimate his value. On his return from his last interview with Mr. Pitt, being asked in what manner he had been received, he replied that he had reason to be gratified with his reception, and concluded with animation, "Mr. Pitt, when I rose to go, left the room with me, and attended me to the carriage"--a spontaneous mark of respect and admiration from the great statesman, of which, indeed, he might well be proud. It would have formed an amusement to the circle at Merton, if intemperance were set down to the master of the house, who always so prematurely cut short the _sederunt_ of the gentlemen after dinner. A man of more temperate habits could not, I am persuaded, have been found. It appears that the person of Lord Nelson (although he was not as described, a little man, but of the middle height and of a frame adapted to activity and exertion) did not find favour with the lady; and I presume not to dispute her taste, but in his plain suit of black, in which he alone recurs to my memory, he always looked what he was--a gentleman. Whatever expletives of an objectionable kind may be ascribed to him, I feel persuaded that such rarely entered into his conversation. He was, it is true, a sailor, and one of a warm and generous disposition; yet I can safely affirm that I never heard a coarse expression issue from his lips, nor do I recollect one word or action of his to which even a disciple of Chesterfield could reasonably object. If such did arise, it would be drawn forth when a friend was attacked, or even an enemy unjustly accused; for his disposition was so truly noble, that it revolted against all wrong and oppression. His heart, indeed, was as tender as it was courageous. Nor do I think, Sir, that it is a necessary concession to truth that you or others should lower your conception of this popular personage, on account of the exaggerated colours in which he is here drawn. Those who best knew the man the most estimated his value, and many who like myself could not appreciate his professional superiority, would yet bear witness to his gentleness, kindness, good-breeding, and courtesy. He was not "a rude and boisterous captain of the sea. " From his early years, by the introduction of his uncle, the Comptroller of the Navy, he was associated with the _élite_ of his own profession; and the influences of his own paternal home, and his acquaintance with the first families of his native county, to many of whom he was related, would not allow a man of his intelligence and proper pride to foster coarseness beyond the habits of his age. It appears to me that, however flattering or consolatory the recital of the follies or foibles of great men may be to that mediocrity which forms the mass of mankind, the person who undertakes to cater for mere amusement withdraws something from the common stock of his country. The glory of Great Britain depends as much on the heroes she has produced, as on her wealth, her influence, and her possessions; and the true patriot and honourable man, if he cannot add to their lustre, will at least refrain from any premeditated act which may dim their fame, and diminish that high estimation of them which expedience, nationality, and gratitude should alike contribute to sustain. A NEPHEW OF ADMIRAL LORD NELSON. A glimpse of the family life at Merton, and of the society whichgathered there, has been casually preserved for us. It presents notonly an interesting group of the admiral's associates, but also therecord of a conversation concerning him, under his own roof, transmitted by one of the parties to it; particularly instructive, because showing the contradictory traits which illustrated hischaracter, and the impression made by him upon his contemporaries andintimates, --men who had seen him upon all kinds of occasions, bothgreat and small. It corroborates, too, the report of these superficialinconsistencies made by the Duke of Wellington on a later occasion. The narrator, Lieutenant Layman, was the same who had recently beenwith Nelson in the Baltic, and who has before been quoted inconnection with that expedition. Sir Alexander Ball will be rememberedas one of his chief supports during the long chase that preceded theBattle of the Nile, as well as in the action, and afterwards duringthe protracted operations around Malta. Hood was also a Nile captain. "During the temporary peace, Mr. Layman spent some days at Merton, with Sir Alexander Ball and Sir Samuel Hood. One day, after tea in thedrawing-room, Lord Nelson was earnestly engaged in conversation withSir Samuel. Mr. Layman observed to Sir Alexander, that Lord Nelson wasat work by his countenance and mouth, that he was a most extraordinaryman, possessing opposite points of character; little in little things, but by far the greatest man in great things he ever saw: that he hadseen him petulant in trifles, and as cool and collected as aphilosopher when surrounded by dangers, in which men of common minds, with clouded countenance, would say, 'Ah! what is to be done?' It wasa treat to see his animated and collected countenance in the heat ofaction. Sir Alexander remarked this seeming inconsistency, andmentioned that, after the Battle of the Nile, the captains of thesquadron were desirous to have a good likeness of their heroic chieftaken, and for that purpose employed one of the most eminent paintersin Italy. The plan was to ask the painter to breakfast, and get him tobegin immediately after. Breakfast being over, and no preparationbeing made by the painter, Sir Alexander was selected by the othercaptains to ask him when he intended to begin; to which the answerwas, 'Never. ' Sir Alexander said, he stared, and they all stared, butthe artist continued: 'There is such a mixture of humility withambition in Lord Nelson's countenance, that I dare not risk theattempt. '"[50] There is yet another casual mention of the Merton home life, illustrative of more than one feature of Nelson's native character. Many years later the daughter of the Vicar of the parish, whentransmitting a letter to Sir Harris Nicolas, added: "In reveredaffection for the memory of that dear man, I cannot refrain frominforming you of his unlimited charity and goodness during hisresidence at Merton. His frequently expressed desire was, that none inthat place should want or suffer affliction that he could alleviate;and this I know he did with a most liberal hand, always desiring thatit should not be known from whence it came. His residence at Mertonwas a continued course of charity and goodness, setting such anexample of propriety and regularity that there are few who would notbe benefited by following it. " His thoughtfulness and generosity tothose about him was equally shown in his charges to his agents atBronté, for the welfare of the Sicilian peasantry upon his estate. Inthe regularity and propriety of observance which impressed theclergyman's daughter, he carried out the ideal he had proposed to LadyHamilton. "Have we a nice church at Merton? We will set an example ofgoodness to the under parishioners. " Whatever of censure or of allowance may be pronounced upon the life hewas living, there was in the intention just quoted no effort toconciliate the opinion of society, which he was resolute in braving;nor was it inconsistent with the general tenor of his thoughts. In thesense of profound recognition of the dependence of events upon God, and of the obligation to manifest gratitude in outward act, Nelson wasfrom first to last a strongly religious man. To his sin he hadcontrived to reconcile his conscience by fallacies, analogies to whichwill be supplied by the inward experience of many, if they will behonest with themselves. The outcome upon character of such dealingswith one's self is, in the individual case, a matter to which man'sjudgment is not competent. During the last two years and a half ofNelson's life, the chaplain of the "Victory" was associated with himin close intimacy as confidential secretary, with whom he talkedfreely on many matters. "He was, " said this gentleman, "a thoroughclergyman's son--I should think he never went to bed or got up withoutkneeling down to say his prayers. " He often expressed his attachmentto the church in which he had been brought up, and showed thesincerity of his words by the regularity and respect with which healways had divine service performed on board the "Victory, " wheneverthe weather permitted. After the service he had generally a few wordswith the chaplain on the subject of the sermon, either thanking himfor its being a good one, or remarking that it was not so well adaptedas usual to the crew. More than once, on such occasions, he took downa volume of sermons in his own cabin, with the page already marked atsome discourse which he thought well suited to such a congregation, and requested Dr. Scott to preach it on the following Sunday. [51] On the 29th of October, 1801, just one week after he left the Downs, Nelson took his seat in the House of Lords as a Viscount, his formercommander-in-chief, Hood, who was of the same rank in the peerage, being one of those to present him. While in England he spoke from timeto time on professional subjects, or those connected with the externalpolicy of the country, on which he held clear and decided opinions, based, naturally, upon naval exigencies. His first speech was a warmand generous eulogy of Sir James Saumarez, once second to himself atthe Battle of the Nile, an officer with whom it is not too much to sayhe was not in close personal sympathy, as he had been with Troubridge, but who had just fought two desperate squadron actions underconditions of singular difficulty, out of which he had wrenched asuccess that was both signal and, in the then state of the war andnegotiations, most opportune. "Sir James Saumarez's action, " saidLord St. Vincent, "has put us upon velvet. " Nelson's own thirst for glory made him keenly appreciative of thenecessity to be just and liberal, in distributing to those who hadachieved great deeds the outward tokens of distinguished service, which often are the sole recompense for dangers run and hardshipsborne. Scarcely had he retired from his active command in the Channelwhen he felt impelled to enter upon a painful and humiliatingcontroversy, on behalf of those who had shared with him all the perilsof the desperate Battle of Copenhagen; for which, unlike himself, theyhad received no reward, but from whom he refused to be dissociated inthe national esteem and gratitude. On the 19th of November, 1801, the City of London voted its thanks tothe divisions of the Army and the Navy, whose joint operations duringthe previous summer had brought to an end the French occupation ofEgypt, begun by Bonaparte in 1798. Nelson had for some time beenuneasy that no such notice had been taken of the Battle of Copenhagen, for the custom of the Corporation of the chief city of the Empire, thus to honor the great achievements of their armed forces, was, heasserted, invariable in his experience; consequently, the omission inthe case of Copenhagen was a deliberate slight, the implication ofwhich, he thought, could not be disregarded. Delay, up to the timethen present, might be attributed to other causes, not necessarilyoffensive, although, from a letter to his friend Davison, he seems tohave feared neglect; but the vote of thanks to the two Services fortheir successes in Egypt left no room to doubt, that the failure totake similar action in the case of Copenhagen was intentional. This Nelson regarded, and justly, as an imputation upon thetransactions there. Where a practice is invariable, omission is assignificant as commission can be. Either the victory was doubtful, orof small consequence, or, for some other reason, not creditable tothe victors. He wrote at once to the Lord Mayor. After recalling thefacts, he said: "If I were only personally concerned, I should bearthe stigma, now first attempted to be placed upon my brow, withhumility. But, my Lord, I am the natural guardian of the characters ofthe Officers of the Navy, Army, and Marines, who fought, and soprofusely bled, under my command on that day. .. . When I am called uponto speak of the merits of the Captains of his Majesty's ships, and ofthe officers and men, whether seamen, marines, or soldiers, I that dayhad the happiness to command, _I say_, that never was the glory ofthis country upheld with more determined bravery than upon thatoccasion, and more important service was never rendered to our Kingand Country. It is my duty to prove to the brave fellows, mycompanions in dangers, that _I_ have not failed, at every properplace, to represent, as well as I am able, their bravery andmeritorious services. " This matter was the occasion, possibly the cause, of bringing him intocollision with the Admiralty and the Government on the same subject. Although his private representations, soon after his return toEngland, had obtained from Lord St. Vincent, as he thought, a promisethat medals should be issued for the battle, no steps thereto had beentaken. He now enclosed to the Prime Minister and to the First Lord acopy of his letter to the Lord Mayor; and to both he alluded to theassurance he believed had been made him. "I have, " he said, "beenexpecting the medals daily since the King's return from Weymouth. " St. Vincent's reply was prompt as himself. With reference to the formermatter, he confined himself to drily thanking Nelson, without comment, "for communicating the letter you have judged fit to write to the LordMayor;" but as to the medals, he wrote a separate note, telling himthat he had "given no encouragement, but on the contrary had explainedto your Lordship, and to Mr. Addington, the impropriety of such ameasure being recommended to the King. " Nelson, to use his own word, was "thunder-struck" by this statement. "I own, " he said, "I considered the words your Lordship used asconveying an assurance. It was an apology for their not being givenbefore, which, I understood you, they would have been, but for thedifficulty of fixing who was to have them;" an allusion particularlyvaluable as indicating, in this case of flat contradiction between twohonorable men, what was the probable cause of withholding the marks ofhard-won distinction. "I have never failed assuring the Captains, thatI have seen and communicated with, that they might depend on receivingthem. I could not, my dear Lord, have had any interest inmisunderstanding you, and representing that as an intended Honour fromthe King which you considered as so improper to be recommended to theKing: therefore I must beg that your Lordship will reconsider ourconversation--to me of the very highest concern, and think that Icould not but believe that we would have medals. I am truly made illby your letter. " St. Vincent replied briefly, "That you have perfectlymistaken all that passed between us in the conversation you allude to, is most certain. At the same time I am extremely concerned that itshould have had so material an effect upon your health, " etc. "EitherLord St. Vincent or myself are liars, " wrote Nelson to Davison; aconclusion not inevitable to those who have had experience of humanmisunderstandings. The Prime Minister took a week to reply. When he did, he deprecatedthe sending of any letter to the Mayor, for reasons, he said, "notmerely of a public nature, but connected with the interest I shallever take in your well-earned fame. " These reasons, he added, he wouldbe ready to give him in a private interview. Nelson had asked hisopinion upon the terms of the letter; but, impatient after waitingthree days, had already sent it in when this answer came. It seemsprobable that, with his usual promptness, he called at once; for onthe same day, November 28, that he received Addington's letter hewithdrew that to the Mayor. [52] "By the advice of a friend, " he said, "I have now to request that your Lordship will consider my letter aswithdrawn, _as the discussion of the question may bring forwardcharacters which had better rest quiet_. "[53] There seems, therefore, little reason to doubt that the honors, due to those who fought, werewithheld out of consideration to those who did not fight. Nelsonhimself recognized the difficulty. "They are not Sir Hyde Parker'sreal friends who wish for an inquiry, " he had written confidentiallyto Davison before leaving the Baltic. "His friends in the fleet wisheverything of this fleet to be forgot, for we all respect and love SirHyde; but the dearer his friends, the more uneasy they have been athis _idleness_, for that is the truth--no criminality. " But, as hevigorously and characteristically said of another matter occurringabout this time, "I was told the difficulties were insurmountable. Myanswer was, 'As the thing is necessary to be done, the moredifficulties, the more necessary to try to remove them. '" As regards the soundness of Nelson's grounds, and the propriety of hisaction in this matter, it must, first, be kept in mind, that, beforethe City voted its thanks to the Navy engaged in Egypt, he had spokenin the House of Lords in favor of the thanks of the Government to thesame force, although, as a whole, it had there played a subordinatepart; and also, that, although deprived of the medal which he hoped toget in common with others, he had himself been rewarded for Copenhagenby promotion in the peerage. [54] This separation between himself andthe mass of those who fought under him, necessarily intensified thefeeling of one always profusely generous, in praise as in money; buthis point otherwise was well taken. The task was ungracious andunpleasant, it may almost be called dirty work to have thus to solicithonors and distinction for deeds in which one has borne the principalpart; but dirty work must at times be done, with hands or words, andthe humiliation then rests, not with him who does it, but with themwho make it necessary. Had the victors at Copenhagen fought adesperate fight, and were they neglected? If so, and the outside worldlooked indifferently on, who from among them should first come forthto defend their glory from implication of some undefined stain, if nottheir Commander-in-Chief, one whose great renown could well spare theadditional ray of lustre which he demanded for them. Whetherunderneath lay some spot of self-seeking, of the secondary motive fromwhich so few of us are free, matters little or nothing. The thing wasright to be done, and he did it. If the Government and the City ofLondon, by calculated omission, proclaimed, as they did, that thesemen had not deserved well of their country, it became him to say, ashe did, openly to the City, subordinately to his superiors, that theyhad done men's work and deserved men's reward. "If Lord Nelson could forget the services of those who have foughtunder his command, he would ill deserve to be so supported as healways has been. " Thus he closed his last letter to the Lord Mayor onthis subject, a year after the correspondence began. It was this noblesympathy with all beneath him, the lack of which has been chargedagainst the great Commander of the British Army of this period, thatwon for Nelson the enthusiastic affection which, in all parts of hiscommand, however remote from his own eyes, aroused the ardent desireto please him. No good service done him escaped his heartyacknowledgment, and he was unwearied in upholding the just claims ofothers to consideration. In the matter of Copenhagen, up to the timehe left the country, eighteen months later, he refused anycompromise. He recognized, of course, that he was powerless in theface of St. Vincent's opposition; but, he wrote to one of the captainsengaged, "I am fixed never to abandon the fair fame of my companionsin dangers. I have had a meeting with Mr. Addington on the subject; Idon't expect we shall get much by it, except having had a fullopportunity of speaking my mind. " The Premier's arguments had been tohim wholly inconclusive. Oddly enough, as things were, the Sultan senthim a decoration for Copenhagen. Coming from a foreign sovereign, there was, in accepting it, no inconsistency with his generalattitude; but in referring the question to the Government, as wasnecessary, he told the Prime Minister, "If I can judge the feelings ofothers by myself, there can be no honours bestowed upon me byforeigners that do not reflect ten times on our Sovereign andCountry. "[55] In conformity with this general stand, when it was proposed in June, 1802, to give him the thanks of the City, for taking command of theforce destined to defend it against invasion, he wrote to request thatthe motion might be withdrawn, on the express ground that no thankshad been given those engaged at Copenhagen. "I should feel muchmortified, when I reflected on the noble support I that day received, at any honour which could separate me from them. " He alleged the samereason, in the following September, for refusing to dine with theCorporation. "Never, till the City of London think justly of themerits of my brave companions of the 2d of April, can I, theircommander, receive any attention from the City of London. " A likerefusal was sent to his invitation for Lord Mayor's day. After the interview with Mr. Addington, the question of medals wasdropped. He had explained his position fully, and felt that it washopeless to attempt more, so long as the Admiralty was against him;but when the Administration changed, in May, 1804, he wrote to LordMelville, the new First-Lord, enclosing a statement of facts, including his correspondence with St. Vincent, and requesting areconsideration of the matter. "The medal, " he said, is withheld, "forwhat reason Lord St. Vincent best knows. I hope, " he concluded, "foryour recommendation to his Majesty, that he may be pleased to bestowthat mark of honour on the Battle of Copenhagen, which his goodnesshas given to the Battle of St. Vincent, the First of June, ofCamperdown, and the Nile. " Melville, in a very sympathetic andcourteous letter, declined, for a reason whose weight must beadmitted: "When badges of triumph are bestowed in the heat andconflict of war, they do not rankle in the minds even of the enemy, atwhose expense they are bestowed; but the feeling, I suspect, would bevery different in Denmark, if the present moment was to be chosen foropening afresh wounds which are, I trust, now healed, or in the dailyprogress of being so. " So it resulted that for some reason, only dimlyoutlined, no mark of public recognition ever was conferred upon themost difficult, the most hazardous, and, at the moment, perhaps themost critically important of Nelson's victories; that which he himselfconsidered the greatest of his achievements. This unfortunate and embittering controversy was the most marked andcharacteristic incident of his residence at Merton, between October, 1801, when he first went there, and May, 1803, when he departed forthe Mediterranean, upon the renewal of war with France. Living alwayswith the Hamiltons, the most copious stream of private correspondencewas cut off; and being unemployed after April, 1802, his officialletters are confined to subjects connected rather with the past thanwith the then present time. Upon general naval questions he had, however, something to say. A trip to Wales suggests a memorandum tothe Prime Minister concerning the cultivation and preservation of oaktimber in the Forest of Dean. He submits to him also his views as tothe disposition of Malta, in case the provision of the Treaty ofAmiens, which re-established there the Order of the Knights under theguarantee of the six great Powers, should fail, owing to the refusalof Russia to join in the proposed guarantee. At the time hewrote, --December, 1802, --the question was become burning, threateningthe rupture of the existing peace between France and Great Britain; aresult which, in fact, soon followed, and turned mainly upon thispoint. The essential aim in the provision, he observed, was thatneither of the two countries should have the island. If the Ordercould not be restored, then it ought to go to Naples, again under theguarantee of the Powers. It was useless to England, for operationsagainst France; and in the hands of the latter was a direct menace toSicily. This arrangement would accord with the spirit of the treaty;but if it also was impracticable, Great Britain had no choice but tokeep Malta herself. It would cost £300, 000 annually, but anything wasbetter than to chance its falling again into the hands of France. In like manner he submitted to the Admiralty plans for the morecertain manning of the Navy, and for the prevention of desertion. Thematerial conditions of seamen while in the service, the pay andprovisions, were, he considered, all that could be desired; but stillthere was great indisposition to enlist, and the desertions in thelast war, 1793-1801, rose to the enormous figure of forty-twothousand. The remedy he outlined was a Registration of seamen, and ofcertificates to be given them, bearing a personal description bywhich they could be identified, and on which their character andservices would appear. For lack of such papers, seamen by hundredswere in London in distress, although large amounts of money were duethem at prize agencies, where the agent feared to pay for want ofidentification. A certificate showing five years' faithful serviceshould entitle the holder to an annual bounty of two guineas, to beincreased by further periods. Such provisions were well calculated toappeal to men accustomed to entertain prudential considerations, andto create gradually a class with whom they would weigh, and who wouldby them be retained in permanent employment. In meeting the case ofdesertions, caused by the heedlessness and weakness of seamen, Nelsonbecame more vague. The nature of the trouble he recognized clearlyenough, but there is a lack of definiteness in the remedy he proposedto meet an evil which still exists. "The mainspring of all my plan is, that of Certificates fully descriptive of the persons; the verygreatest good must result from it. Something should be attempted atthese times to make our seamen, at the din of war, fly to our Navy, instead of flying from it. " His plan is substantially that nowadopted. Closely connected with the discontent of seamen was the subject ofprize-money, in the receipt and distribution of which greatirregularities and abuses existed among the agents, to remove whichalso he made particular and detailed suggestions; and he stronglysupported, though with discriminating criticism, the Bill for anInquiry into Naval Abuses, which embodied the most prominent of St. Vincent's administrative measures while at the head of the Admiralty. But, though thus supporting the Earl in his policy of investigation, and retaining his respect for him as a sea-officer, he was utterlydissatisfied with the general conduct of the Admiralty and with itsattitude towards himself in particular. "I attribute none of thetyrannical conduct of the late Board to Lord St. Vincent, " he wrotetwo years later. "For the Earl I have a sincere regard, but he wasdreadfully ill-advised, and I fear the Service has suffered much fromtheir conduct. " It would seem as if he did not, after the firstmoments of annoyance, forget the irritation he felt against Troubridgeat being retained in the Downs against his will, and, as he thought, without necessity. "I thank you, " he wrote to Captain Murray, "fortaking the trouble of driving seven miles to make me a visit; for, could you believe it, there are those who I thought were my firmfriends, some of near thirty years' standing--who have never takenthat trouble!" This may not refer to Troubridge, but the descriptionanswers to him, and it appears that in the Nelson-Hamilton circle hisname now stood as a type of ingratitude. [56] Writing to Davison in September, 1802, after a trip of six weeks madeto Wales, in company with the Hamiltons, he says: "Our tour has beenvery fine and interesting, and the way in which I have been everywherereceived most flattering to my feelings; and although some of thehigher powers may wish to keep me down, yet the reward of the generalapprobation and gratitude for my services is an ample reward for all Ihave done; but it makes a _comparison_ fly up to my mind, not much tothe credit of some in the higher Offices of the State. " He seems tohave felt that neither in his influence with the Admiralty, nor inreference to his opinions on foreign topics, did he receive therecognition that his distinguished services, abilities, and experienceclaimed. "Having failed entirely in submitting my thoughts on threepoints"--those just cited, manning, desertion, and prize-money--"I wasdisheartened;" and to this he attributes his not sending in a memoirwhich he had prepared upon the subject of the Flotilla for CoastDefence. But, while he resented this neglect, it did not greatly interfere withhis happiness, which was at this time well-nigh complete. Hecomplains of ill health, it is true, from time to time, and his meanswere insufficient duly to keep up the two establishments--LadyNelson's and Merton--for which he was pecuniarily responsible. Underthis embarrassment he chafed, and with a sense of injustice which wasnot unfounded; for, if reward be proportioned to merit and to theimportance of services rendered, Nelson had been most inadequatelyrepaid. For the single victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown, eachcommander-in-chief had received a pension of £3, 000. The Nile andCopenhagen together had brought him no more than £2, 000; indeed, as hehad already been granted £1, 000 a year for St. Vincent, anotherthousand may be said to have been all he got for two of the greatestvictories of the war. In submitting a request for an increase, heasked pertinently, "Was it, or not, the intention of his Majesty'sGovernment to place my rewards for services lower than Lord St. Vincent or Lord Duncan?" There was, of course, the damagingcircumstance that the conditions under which he chose to live made himpoorer than he needed to be; but with this the Government had noconcern. Its only care should have been that its recompense wascommensurate with his deserts, and it is revolting to see a man likeNelson, naturally high-toned and always liberal, forced to theundignified position of urging--and in vain--for the equalremuneration that should have been granted spontaneously long before. In his criticisms of the Admiralty's general course, it does notappear whether Nelson, who was hereafter to be the greatest suffererfrom St. Vincent's excessive economies, realized as yet the particularinjury being done by them to the material of the Navy. In his passionfor reform, the veteran seaman obstinately shut his eyes to thethreatening condition of the political atmosphere, and refused torecognize the imminent danger of a renewal of the war, because itnecessarily would postpone his projected innovations. Assuming thecontinuance of peace with all the violence of a prejudice, hepermitted the strength and resources of the Navy to deterioraterapidly, both by direct action and by omission to act. "Lord St. Vincent, " wrote Minto in November, 1802, "is more violent than anybodyagainst the war, and has declared that he will resign if ministersdare go to war. His principal reason is, I believe, that the ships areso much out of repair as to be unfit for service. " "Lord Nelson, " hesays at the same period, "has been with me a long time to-day. Heseems much of my mind on material points, but especially on thenecessity of being better prepared than we now are. " The admiral's ownletters at this time make little allusion to the measures, or theneglects, which were rapidly undermining the efficiency of the fleet;but a year after leaving England he wrote, "With all my personalregard for Lord St. Vincent, I am sorry to see that he has been ledastray by the opinion of ignorant people. There is scarcely a thing hehas done since he has been at the Admiralty that I have not heard himreprobate before he came to the Board. " Much as he enjoyed his home and desired peace, Nelson had never feltassured of its continuance. Like Great Britain herself during thisrepose, he rested with his arms at his side, ready for a call. ThePrime Minister, Addington, has transmitted a curious story of themanner in which he exemplified his ideas of the proper mode ofnegotiating with Bonaparte. "It matters not at all, " he said, takingup a poker, "in what way I lay this poker on the floor. But ifBonaparte should say it _must_ be placed in this direction, " suitingthe action to the word, "we must instantly insist upon its being laidin some other one. " At the same time Bonaparte, across the Channel, was illustrating in almost identical phrase the indomitable energythat was common to these two men, the exponents of the two opposingand irreconcilable tendencies of their age. "If the British ministryshould intimate that there was anything the First Consul had not done, because he was prevented from doing it, that instant he would do it. ""You have proved yourself too true a prophet, " wrote an occasionalcorrespondent to Nelson, "for you have said ever since the peace thatit could not be of long duration. " Jar after jar, as Bonaparte drovehis triumphal chariot over the prostrate continent, announced theinstability of existing conditions; and the speech from the throne onthe 16th of November, 1802, was distinctly ominous, if vague. Nelsonthen seconded the address in the House of Peers, in words socharacteristic of his own temper, and of that then prevailing in thenation, that they serve to explain the strong accord between him andit, and to show why he was so readily and affectionately distinguishedas its representative hero. They are thus reported:-- "I, my Lords, have in different countries, seen much of the miseries of war. I am, therefore, in my inmost soul, a man of peace. Yet I would not, for the sake of any peace, however fortunate, consent to sacrifice one jot of England's honour. Our honour is inseparably combined with our genuine interest. Hitherto there has been nothing greater known on the Continent than the faith, the untainted honour, the generous public sympathies, the high diplomatic influence, the commerce, the grandeur, the resistless power, the unconquerable valour of the British nation. Wherever I have served in foreign countries, I have witnessed these to be sentiments with which Britons were regarded. The advantages of such a reputation are not to be lightly brought into hazard. I, for one, rejoice that his Majesty has signified his intention to pay due regard to the connection between the interests of this country and the preservation of the liberties of Europe. It is satisfactory to know, that the preparations to maintain our dignity in peace, are not to be neglected. Those supplies which his Majesty shall for such purposes demand, his people will most earnestly grant. The nation is satisfied that the Government seeks in peace or war no interest separate from that of the people at large; and as the nation was pleased with that sincere spirit of peace with which the late treaty was negotiated, so, now that a restless and unjust ambition in those with whom we desired sincere amity has given a new alarm, the country will rather prompt the Government to assert its honour, than need to be roused to such measures of vigorous defence as the exigency of the times may require. " During the winter, Bonaparte, resentful of Great Britain's claim to avoice in the politics of the Continent, became more and moredistinctly menacing in deed and word. On the 20th of February, 1803, in a message to the legislature, he made the imprudent, becauseuseless, vaunt, "This government says with just pride, England, alone, cannot to-day contend against France. " Two days later Minto, who wasin opposition, was told by Nelson, "in strict confidence, " that forsome time back there had been great doubts between peace and war inthe ministry. "One measure in contemplation has been to send him tothe Mediterranean, by way of watching the armament and being ready ifwanted. He says that he is thought the fitter for that delicateservice, as on the one hand he wishes the continuance of peace, andtherefore is not likely to precipitate matters, and on the other handBonaparte knows that if he hoists his flag it will not be in joke. " Ithad for some time been arranged that, if war came, he was to have theMediterranean command. On the 8th of March, 1803, the King sent a message to Parliament, that, in consequence of military preparations going on in the ports ofFrance and Holland, he judged expedient to adopt additional measuresof precaution for the security of his dominions. While this was underdiscussion in the Upper House, Nelson, impressed with the idea thatwar must come, left his seat, and wrote to the Prime Minister thefollowing line: "Whenever it is necessary, I am _your_ Admiral. " Yethe felt the tug at his heartstrings as he never had before. "War orPeace?" he writes to his old flag-captain, Berry. "Every person has adifferent opinion. I fear perhaps the former, as I hope so much thelatter. " Only with large reservations would he now have repeated therule Codrington tells us he inculcated, --"that every man became abachelor after passing the Rock of Gibraltar, and he was not verytardy in showing that he practised what he preached. Honour, glory anddistinction were the whole object of his life, and that dear domestichappiness never abstracted his attention. " He did, indeed, rail atmarriage[57] during his last cruise, now fast approaching; but hispassionate devotion to Lady Hamilton, and his yearning for home, knewno abatement. Yet, through all and over all, the love of glory and thesense of honor continued to the last to reign supreme. "Governmentcannot be more anxious for my departure, " he tells St. Vincent, "thanI am, if a war, to go. " Meantime the necessary preparations were quietly progressing, whilethe diplomatic discussions with France became more and more bitter andhopeless, turning mainly on the question of Malta, though the root ofthe trouble lay far deeper. The "Victory, " of a hundred guns, wasnamed for Nelson's flag, her officers appointed, and the shipcommissioned. On the 6th of May he received orders to prepare fordeparture. On the 12th the British ambassador left Paris, havinghanded in the Government's ultimatum and demanded his passports. Onthe 16th Great Britain declared war against France, and the same dayNelson at the Admiralty received his commission as commander-in-chiefin the Mediterranean. Within forty-eight hours he joined the "Victory"at Portsmouth, and on the 20th sailed for his station. Thus ended the longest period of retirement enjoyed by Nelson, fromthe opening of the war with France, in 1793, until his death in 1805. During it, besides the separation from Lady Nelson, two great breaksoccurred in his personal ties and surroundings. His father died atBath on the 26th of April, 1802, at the age of seventy-nine. There hadbeen no breach in the love between the two, but it seems to the authorimpossible to overlook, in the guarded letters of the old man to hisfamous son, a tinge of regret and disapproval for the singularcircumstances under which he saw fit to live. That he gladly acceptedthe opinion professed by many friends, naval and others, and carefullyfostered by the admiral, that his relations with Lady Hamilton wereperfectly innocent, is wholly probable; but, despite the usual silenceconcerning his own views, observed by himself and Nelson, two clues tohis thought and action appear in his letters. One is the remark, already quoted, that gratitude required him to spend some of his timewith Lady Nelson. The other, singular and suggestive, is the casualmention to Nelson that he had received an anonymous letter, containing"severe reproaches for my conduct to you, which is such, it seems, aswill totally separate us. "[58] There is no record that he permittedhimself to use direct expostulation, and it seems equally clear thathe would not, by any implication, manifest approval or acquiescence. It has been said, indeed, but only upon the authority of LadyHamilton, that it was his intention to take up his residence entirelyat Merton, with the admiral and the Hamiltons; an act which would havegiven express countenance to the existing arrangements, and disavowed, more strongly than any words, the bearing imputed to him by theanonymous letter. In whose interest would such a letter most likely bepenned? Nelson mourned him sincerely, but was prevented by illnessfrom being present at the funeral. He is a man known to us only by hisletters, which are marked by none of the originality thatdistinguishes the professional utterances of the admiral, and cannotbe said to rise much above the commonplace; but they show a strongand unaffected piety, and particularly a cheerful, resolute, acceptance of the infirmities of protracted old age, which possessescharm and inspires respect. There is also a clear indication of thefirmness that characterized Nelson himself, in the determination, amidall the feebleness of age, and notwithstanding his pride and love forhis famous son, upon whom, too, he was partially dependent, that hewould not join in the general abandonment of the wife by the husband'sfamily. His attitude in this regard, as far as can be inferred fromhis letters, commands sympathy and admiration. A year later, on the 6th of April, 1803, Sir William Hamilton alsodied, "in Lady Hamilton's and my arms, " wrote Nelson, "without a sighor a struggle. The world never lost a more upright and accomplishedgentleman. " Lady Hamilton, with ready tears, recorded: "Unhappy dayfor the forlorn Emma. Ten minutes past ten dear blessed Sir Williamleft me. " The grouping of figures and emotions at that death-bed wasodd almost beyond comprehension; one of the most singular studieswhich human nature has presented to itself of its powers ofself-cajolement. A man systematically deceived, yet apparentlysincerely regarded, and affectionately tended to the last by hisbetrayers, one of whom at least prided himself, and for the most partnot unjustly, upon his fidelity to his friends. Hamilton, alone amongthe three, seems to have been single-minded--to have viewed theirmutual relations to the end, not with cynical indifference, but with asimplicity of confidence hard to be understood in a man of hisantecedents. It may have been, however, that he recognized theinevitable in the disparity of years and in his wife's early training, and that he chose to cover her failings with a self-abnegation thatwas not without nobility. Upon such a tacit affirmation he set a finalseal in a codicil to his will, well calculated to silence those whosaw scandal in the association between his wife and his friend. "Thecopy of Madam Le Brunn's picture of Emma, in enamel, by Bone, I giveto my dearest friend Lord Nelson, Duke of Bronté, a very small tokenof the great regard I have for his Lordship, the most virtuous, loyal, and truly brave character I ever met with. God bless him, and shamefall on those who do not say amen. " Sir William's death, by withdrawing the husband's countenance toNelson's remaining under the same roof, might have complicated mattersfor the two lovers, but the outbreak of war necessitated the admiral'sdeparture a month later. When he returned to England for the lasttime, in August, 1805, he was, deservedly, the object of suchwidespread popular devotion, and his stay was so short, that the voiceof censure was hushed amid the general murmur of affectionateadmiration. The noble qualities of the man, the exalted spirit ofself-sacrifice and heroic aspiration that breathed in his utterances, and was embodied, not only in his brilliant deeds, but in the obscure, patient endurance of the last two years, evoked a sentiment whichspread over him and her a haze of tender sympathy that still survives. In the glory of Trafalgar, in his last touching commendation of herand his child to the British Government, in the general grief of thenation, there was justly no room to remember their fault; bothacquaintance and strangers saw in her only the woman whom he loved tothe end. The sisters of Nelson, women of mature years andirreproachable character, maintained a correspondence with LadyHamilton during their lives; long after his death, and the departureof his influence, removed any interested motive for courting herfriendship. Between them and Lady Nelson, on the other hand, thebreach was final. Their occasional mention of her is unfriendly, andupon the whole contemptuous; while she, as far as can be judged fromtheir letters, returned to them an equal measure of disdain. FOOTNOTES: [39] Josiah Nisbet, her son. [40] Nelson's eldest brother. There appear to have been two copies of thisletter in Nelson's hand. One, of which the latter half only remains, is inthe British Museum. It bears the endorsement of Lady Nelson, as given. Theother copy, entire, is in the Alfred Morrison collection--Number 536. Nelson probably sent a copy to Lady Hamilton to satisfy her exigencies thatthe breach was final. The two correspond, word for word, --as far, that is, as the former remains. Maurice Nelson died in April, 1801. [41] Nelson several times spoke of Nisbet's early promise. The author isindebted to Mrs. F. H. B. Eccles, Nisbet's granddaughter, for a copy of thefollowing letter from St. Vincent to his sister Mrs. Ricketts:-- LONDON, January 22, 1807. My dear sister, --Upon reflexion it appears best to send you the onlyletters I can find relative to Captain Nisbet, and to authorize you toassert in my name that Lord Nelson assured me that he owed his life to theresolution and admirable conduct of his stepson, when wounded at Teneriffe, and that he had witnessed many instances of his courage and enterprise. Yours most affectionately, ST. VINCENT. This letter explains how St. Vincent, feeling the value of Nelson's life tothe country, granted, in the still warm memories of Teneriffe, a promotionwhich must have been sorely against his judgment. [42] Nicolas, vol. Vii. Addenda, p. Ccix. In a letter to Lady Hamilton ofthe same date, Nelson says: "Read the enclosed, and send it if you approve. Who should I consult but my friends?" (Morrison, vol. Ii. P. 142. ) Whetherthe enclosed was this letter to Davison cannot be said; but it is likely. Compare foot-note, preceding page. [43] Nelson. [44] Lady Nelson. [45] Morrison, vol. Ii. P. 137. [46] On the 21st of September, 1802, six months before Hamilton's death, hewas still £1, 200 in Nelson's debt. (Morrison, vol. Ii. P. 404. ) [47] Morrison, No. 684. [48] _Ante_, p. 43. [49] From Mr. G. Lathora Browne's "Nelson: His Public and Private Life, "London, 1891, p. 412. [50] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxxvii. P. 445. [51] Life of Rev. A. J. Scott, D. D. , p. 191. [52] Nicolas, vol. Iv. P. 533. [53] Ibid. , vol. Vii. P. Ccx. Author's italics. [54] Ibid. , vol. V. P. 60. [55] It is possible that Nelson here used the word "reflect" in the primarysense of reflecting honor; but in the secondary sense of being a reflectionupon those who had denied a just claim, the phrase, ambiguous as it stands, represented accurately his feelings. "I own, my dear Sir, " he said again tothe Premier, with reference to this decoration, "great as this honour willbe, it will have its alloy, if I cannot at the same time wear the medal forthe Battle of Copenhagen, the greatest and most honourable reward in thepower of our Sovereign to bestow, as it marks my personal services. " [56] See Pettigrew, vol. Ii. P. 225; Morrison, vol. Ii. P. 176. [57] This habit is mentioned by Captain James Hillyar, for extracts fromwhose journals the author is indebted to Admiral Sir W. R. Mends, G. C. B. [58] Morrison Collection, No. 632, October 8, 1801. CHAPTER XIX. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. --THE LONG WATCH OFFTOULON. --OCCUPATIONS OF A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. MAY, 1803--JANUARY, 1805. AGE, 45-46. When Nelson, after a three years' absence, returned to theMediterranean in 1803, he found the conditions, upon which themilitary balance of power there depended, greatly altered from thosehe had known during the period of his previous service. He had beenpresent, indeed, almost an eye-witness, at the tremendous reverseassociated with the name of Marengo, for that battle, it will beremembered, was fought while he was at Leghorn on his return toEngland; but Marengo, and the conventions following it, were at themoment only the beginning of an end which then could not be foreseen. The most significant token of the entire change of conditions--of thepredominant, far-reaching, and firmly fastened grip of France on theland--was the presence of an army corps of fifteen thousand men in theextreme southeast of Italy, occupying the Kingdom of Naples from theriver Ofanto, on the Adriatic coast, round to the Bradano on the Gulfof Taranto, and including the useful ports of Brindisi and Taranto. This distant and ex-centric extension of the arms of the Republicbespoke Bonaparte's confidence in the solidity of his situation in theSouth of Europe; for under previous circumstances, even after hisvictorious campaign of 1796, he had always deprecated an occupation ofNaples, and relied upon threats and a display of force to insure thequiescence of that state. That one of his first steps, upon therenewal of war with Great Britain, should have been to place a largebody of troops in a position he once considered so exposed, shows thefulness of his conviction that upon the Continent he had, for themoment, nothing to fear from the other Great Powers. Strongly stirredas they had been by his highhanded aggressions, none as yet venturedto call him directly to account. Great Britain, the least immediatelyaffected, had stepped into the lists, and demanded not only thataggression should cease, but that the state of the Continent should berestored as it existed when she signed the treaty of Amiens. With thisrequirement she maintained the war, single-handed, from May, 1803, tothe autumn of 1805. It was not without reason that Bonaparte reckoned upon the inaction ofthe Continent. Austria, although profoundly discontented by much hehad done since the peace of Lunéville, in 1801, was too thoroughlydisheartened and exhausted by the unsuccessful and protracted strugglewhich preceded it, to be ready to renew the strife. Limited as she nowwas, by the treaty, to the eastern bank of the Adige, there was inNorthern Italy no force to threaten the French communications, betweentheir divisions in the valley of the Po and the one at the heel of thepeninsula. Prussia, playing a double part for years back, seeking fromday to day the favor of the most powerful, was wholly committed forthe time to the First Consul; while Russia, although her youthfulsovereign had abandoned the anti-British policy of his predecessor, remained undecided as to the general course she should pursue amid theever-shifting perplexities of the day. Less fantastic in imaginationthan his insane father, Alexander I. Inherited a visionary tendency, which hindered practical action, and showed itself in plans too vastand complicated for realization, even when two rulers of theoverwhelming power of himself and Napoleon, at a later date, set theirhands to the task. Swayed, alternately, by sympathy with the ancientorder of things, which Great Britain for the moment represented, andby prospects of Russian aggrandizement, which Bonaparte dangled beforehis eyes, the Czar halted between two opinions, pleasing himself, meanwhile, in weaving, with associates of his own age, schemes for ageneral reorganization of Europe. In these the interests of Russianaturally, and quite properly, had a leading part, and not least inthose seas and regions that fell within the limits of Nelson'scommand. The power of the great states which lay to the northward and eastwardof him being thus neutralized, Bonaparte found upon the land nothingto oppose his will, or to contest his influence, in the smaller andweaker nations to the southward and westward, close to his own doors, but isolated from the rest of Europe, except by sea--a weightyexception. Spain, reduced to virtual vassalage in the previous war, nolonger even pretended to dispute his orders. She was not engaged inthe present hostilities, simply because it suited him better to take amoney tribute from her, and to enjoy for French ships the benevolentneutrality of Spanish ports, more necessary to them than to theBritish. Moreover, if Spain joined in the war, Minorca, restored toher at the peace, would be at the mercy of Great Britain, and PortMahon, the fine haven of that island, was always a menace to Toulon. The harbors of remote Portugal, where Lisbon formerly had givenpowerful support to the British fleet, were now closed to it foroffensive operations; and Nelson, within whose command its seaboardlay, was strictly enjoined to refrain from any such use of them, evenfrom sending in prizes, except under stress of weather. In Italy, Piedmont had been incorporated with France, while the Italian andLigurian (Genoa) Republics in the North were so identified with her inaction, and so submissive to her, that the capture of the latter'sships was at once ordered by Nelson; and he recommended to hisGovernment that a formal blockade should be proclaimed of her ports, as well as of Leghorn, where the French flag was flown on the samestaff as the Tuscan. The States of the Pope, intermediate betweenthese tributaries of Bonaparte in the North and his garrisonedprovince in Naples, enjoyed only such precarious independence as hefrom day to day allowed. But, mighty as was the growth of Frenchascendency, as shown by these changes, the very advantages accruing toFrance from her advanced maritime positions laid her further open tothe Sea Power of Great Britain. The neutrality of Genoa and Tuscanycould no longer embarrass the British admiral, as it had Nelson in1795 and 1796. Offensive operations against them were now merely aquestion of adequate force, and the South of France depended greatlyupon free access to their ports. Taking Piedmont from the King ofSardinia, too, relieved any scruples the British might have concerningtheir use of the island of Sardinia injuring a friendly monarch, aconsideration which kept them away from Sicily. Nelson, instructed by the experience and observation of the recentpast, and by a certain prescient sagacity which was at once native andcultivated in him, recognized that the Mediterranean, with its immenseindented coast line, its positions of critical importance, --such asthe Straits of Gibraltar and the Bosphorus, Egypt and Malta, --and itscomparatively short water distances, was the field of operations towhich the maritime ambitions of Bonaparte, debarred a wider flight bythe sea-power of Great Britain, must inevitably incline. To thiscontributed also its remoteness from England, as well as its nearnessto France and to the ports subject to her influence in Italy andSpain; while the traditional ambitions of French rulers, for threecenturies back, had aspired to control in the Levant, and had regardedTurkey for that reason as a natural ally. It was, therefore, notmerely as magnifying his own office, nor yet as the outcome of naturalbias, resulting from long service in its waters, that Nelson saw inthe Mediterranean the region at once for defence and offence againstBonaparte; where he might be most fatally checked, and where also hemight be induced most surely to steps exhaustive to his strength. Thisconviction was, indeed, rather an instance of accurate intuition thanof formulated reasoning. Clear, ample, and repeated, as are hisdemonstrations of the importance of the various positions at stake, and of the measures necessary to be taken, they rather apply to thenecessities of the moment than indicate a wide scheme of policy, whichshould divert the energies of the enemy to the South of Europe, and soprovide the best of defences against his projected invasion ofEngland. Yet even of such broader view tokens are not wanting. "To saythe truth, " he writes to the Queen of Naples, "I do not believe we hadin the last war, and, according to all appearance, we shall not havein the present one either, plans of a sufficiently grand scale toforce France to keep within her proper limits. Small measures produceonly small results. The intelligent mind of your Majesty will readilycomprehend the great things which might be effected in theMediterranean. On this side Buonaparte is the most vulnerable. It isfrom here that it would be the most easy to mortify his pride, and sofar humble him, as to make him accept reasonable conditions of peace. " It cannot be claimed, however, that there entered into Nelson'sthoughts, for Italy, any such diversion as that by which the SpanishPeninsular War some years later drained the life blood of France. Thetime, indeed, was not yet ripe, nor would the scene have been in anyway as favorable to Great Britain; and, moreover, so far from beingready to threaten, her energies were effectually constrained to herown defence, by the superior audacity and direct threats of Bonaparte. Even the limited suggestions for the employment of troops in theMediterranean, made by Nelson from time to time, failed to receiveattention, and he himself was left to struggle on as best he might, with inadequate means and upon a bare defensive, even in navalmatters. Great Britain, in short, had stripped herself, incautiously, so bare, and was so alarmed by the French demonstrations of invasion, that she for the moment could think only of the safety of herterritory and of her home waters, and her offensive operations wereconfined to the sea. Bonaparte understood as fully as Nelson the importance of theMediterranean to him. His mind was set upon the extension of France'sdominion therein, --in its islands, upon its northern and southernshores, and in the East; nor was he troubled with scruples as to themeans by which that object might be attained. During the short peaceof Amiens, Lord Keith had felt it necessary to take precautionsagainst the re-occupation of Corfu by the French troops; and again ata later date had stationed a ship for the same purpose at the MadalenaIslands, belonging to Sardinia, which Nelson afterwards made arendezvous for his fleet. Algiers, too, had attracted the FirstConsul's attention. "Algiers will be French in one year after apeace, " wrote Nelson in August, 1804. "You see it, and a man may runand read; that is the plan of Buonaparte. " "The Ministers of the Deymust know, that an armament at Toulon, and a large army, after thepeace with Great Britain, was intended to land and plunder Algiers, which they doubtless would have effected, had not a British fleet beenplaced in Oristan Bay [Sardinia] to watch their motions. " These andsimilar reasons had led the British Government to maintain theMediterranean Squadron nearly upon a war footing during the peace. But, if Bonaparte's purpose was fixed to control the Mediterraneansome day, it now was set also upon the invasion of England; andalthough he looked and plotted in many directions, taking long views, and neglecting no opportunity to secure advanced footholds for futureuses, he had not yet reached the stage in his development when hewould divide his energies between two gigantic undertakings. One at atime, and with an accumulation of force abundantly adequate to the endin view, was his policy all the days of Nelson. The Mediterranean withits varied interests was to him at this time one of several means, bywhich he hoped to distract British counsels and to dissever Britishstrength; but it was no part of his design to provoke Great Britain tomeasures which would convert her alarm for the Mediterraneanpeninsulas into open war with them, or in them, compelling Franceeither to recede from thence, or to divert thither a force that mightweaken his main effort. His aim was to keep anxiety keenly alive, andto cut short the resources of his enemy, by diplomatic pressure uponneutral states, up to the last extreme that could be borne without waragainst them being declared, as the lesser evil; and the nearer hecould approach this delicate boundary line, without crossing it, thegreater his success. "I do not think a Spanish war [that is, adeclaration by Spain] so near, " wrote Nelson in November, 1803. "Weare more likely to go to war with Spain for her complaisance to theFrench; but the French can gain nothing, but be great losers, byforcing Spain to go to war with us; therefore, I never expect that theSpaniards will begin, unless Buonaparte is absolutely mad, as many sayhe is. I never can believe that he or his counsellors are such foolsas to force Spain to begin. " The course instinctively advocated by Nelson, transpiring throughoccasional utterances, was directly contrary to Bonaparte's aims andwould have marred his game. "We never wanted ten thousand troops morethan at this moment, " Nelson wrote shortly after he had reached thestation and become acquainted with the state of affairs. "They mightsave Naples, Sicily, the Morea and Egypt, by assisting and givingconfidence to the inhabitants. " "It has been my plan to have 10, 000disposable troops in the Mediterranean, " he wrote to Acton; and heregretted to the Ministry that they should have withdrawn all the finearmy which had regained Egypt in 1801. "The sending them home, " heremarked to an occasional correspondent, "was a very inconsideratemeasure, to say nothing further of it. " His idea was to garrison Gaetaand Naples on the coast of the mainland, and Messina in Sicily; and tothrow a force into the mountains of Calabria, which should sustain andgive cohesion to the insurrection that he confidently expected wouldfollow. With the British fleet covering the approaches by water, andsustaining and reinforcing garrisons in the ports, there would beimposed upon the enemy, unless he chose to abandon Southern Italy, ascene of operations in a distant, difficult country, with a long andnarrow line of communications, flanked throughout by the sea, andparticularly by the two fortified harbors which he proposed to occupy. "The peasantry would, I believe, defend their mountains, and at leastit would give a check to the movements of the French, and give us timeto get a fleet into the Mediterranean. " That the attempt would havebeen ultimately successful, against such power as Napoleon thenwielded, cannot be affirmed; but, until put down, it necessarily wouldhave engaged a force very disproportionate to its own numbers, drawingoff in great part the army destined against England, as it wasdiverted two years later by Austria, and giving opportunity forchanges in the political conditions, even to the formation of a newCoalition. Nelson, therefore, was not far from right in reasoning that theMediterranean should, and therefore would, be the chief scene ofoperations. In Bonaparte's eyes, to invade Britain was, justly, thegreatest of all ends, the compassing of which would cause all the restto fall. Nelson, weighing the difficulties of that enterprise moreaccurately than could be done by one unaccustomed to the sea, doubtedthe reality of the intention, and thought it more consonant to thetrue policy of France to seize control of the Mediterranean, by asudden concentration of her fleets, and then to transport her troopsby water to the heel of Italy, to the Ionian Islands, to the Morea, toEgypt. So stationed, with fortified stepping-stones rising at shortintervals from the deep, future movements of troops and supplies frompoint to point would be but an affair of coasters, slipping frombattery to battery, such as he had experienced to his cost in theRiviera. In this project he thought it likely that France could securethe co-operation of Russia, by allowing the latter her share of thespoils of Turkey, especially in Constantinople. He saw, indeed, thatthe partition would involve some difficulty between the two partners, and in his correspondence he attributes the Morea and the islands, nowto one, now to the other; but the prediction, elicited piece-meal fromhis letters, received a close fulfilment four years later in thegeneral tenor of the agreements of Tilsit, nor was it less accurate inits dim prophecy of a disagreement. Such, in broad outline, were the prepossessions and views Nelson tookwith him from England in 1803, as modified by the information hereceived upon reaching the station; and such the counter-projects ofBonaparte, to whom belonged, as the privilege of the offensive, thechoice of direction for his attack. The essential difference betweenthe two was, that one believed the invasion of England, howeverdifficult, to be possible, and therefore to be the true and firstobject of his efforts; while the other, without pronouncing thatattempt impossible, saw its difficulties so clearly, that he conceivedhis enemy must be aiming for the Mediterranean from the beginning. Itis permissible to remark that Bonaparte, after the failure of theinvasion, first busied himself in reducing Austria, Prussia, andRussia, successively, to the state of inaction in which they were in1803; next came to an understanding with the latter, such as Nelsonhad foreseen; and then turned to the Mediterranean, where heestablished his own rule in Naples, in the Ionian Islands, on theeastern shore of the Adriatic, and finally in the Spanish peninsula. Beyond that his advance was stayed by the Sea Power of Great Britain, which at last wrought his ruin. Thus in the event the predictions ofthe British admiral were postponed, but not falsified. Nelson's characteristic impatience and energy hurried him on from themoment he took up his command. "I cannot sail before to-morrow, " hesaid repeatedly in Portsmouth, "and that's an age. " "If the Devilstands at the door, " he tells St. Vincent, "we shall sail to-morrowforenoon. " The Admiralty, in its primary anxiety about Brest, imposedupon him a delay under which he chafed angrily. He was directed tomeet off that port the squadron of Admiral Cornwallis, in order that, if the latter wanted the "Victory, " she might be left there, and anintimation was even given that he was "on no account to pass AdmiralCornwallis, so as to run any chance of his being deprived of theservices of the Victory, if he should judge it necessary to detainher. " Nelson resented the implication that he was capable of evadingan order, like a frigate-captain parting company to better his chanceof prize-money. "I beg to assure you that I hold it impossible for anyofficer, under such orders as their Lordships' to me, to designedlymiss Admiral Cornwallis off Brest. " On the 22d of May he was off Ushant, between which and Cornwallis'srendezvous he passed twenty-four hours, fuming and fretting over adelay that was losing him a fresh, fair, northerly wind; the more so, that he was satisfied Cornwallis neither needed nor wanted the ship. "From his conduct, "--not being on his rendezvous, --"I am clear therecan be nothing in Brest to demand his attention. " On the 23d, however, he could stand it no longer. "What a wind we are losing!" "If thewisdom of my superiors had not prevented me, " he growled, "at thismoment I should have been off the coast of Portugal. I am aware of theimportance of my getting to the Mediterranean, and think I mightsafely have been allowed to proceed in the Victory. " At 6 P. M. Of thatday, Cornwallis not turning up, he tumbled himself and his suite onboard the frigate "Amphion, " which was in company, and continued hisvoyage, going out in all the discomfort of "a convict, " to use St. Vincent's expression; "seven or eight sleeping in one cabin, " asNelson himself described it. "It is against my own judgment but inobedience to orders, " he told the Earl; while to the Prime Minister, with whom he was in personal correspondence, he lamented the loss, "for I well know the weight of the Victory in the Mediterranean. " Ashe anticipated, Cornwallis did not want the ship, and she joinedNelson two months afterwards off Toulon. Late in the evening of June 3d, the "Amphion" anchored at Gibraltar, whither she brought the first certain news of the war, though it hadbeen declared nearly three weeks before. The next day was activelyemployed in giving necessary instructions to the yard officials, anddetailing cruisers to guard the entrance to the Straits, and tomaintain the communications with the Barbary coast, upon which theRock depended for supplies of fresh provisions. At 4 P. M. The shipagain sailed for Malta, accompanied by the frigate "Maidstone, " towhich, on the 11th of June, was transferred, for direct passage toNaples by the north of Sicily, the new British minister to the TwoSicilies, Mr. Elliot, who had embarked with Nelson on board the"Victory, " and afterwards gone with him to the "Amphion. " Throughoutthe following two years an active correspondence, personal anddiplomatic, was maintained with this gentleman, who, like his brother, Lord Minto, placed the utmost dependence upon the political sagacityand tact of the admiral. When the latter, a year later, spoke ofleaving the station on account of his health, Elliot wrote to him:"Where such great interests are concerned, I shall not presume todwell upon my own feelings, although I cannot but recall to yourLordship that I only consented to depart as abruptly as I did fromEngland, to undertake this arduous and ruinous mission, from theexpectation that my efforts to direct the councils of this Kingdomwould have been seconded by your pre-eminent talents and judgment. "After the two frigates parted, the "Amphion" kept on to Malta, whereshe arrived on the 15th of June. With the separation of the "Maidstone" Nelson began the extensivediplomatic correspondence, which employed so much of his time duringthis command, and through which we are made familiar with the workingsof his mind on the general political conditions of the Mediterranean. She carried from him letters to the King and Queen of the Sicilies, totheir Prime Minister, Acton, and to the British minister to the Courtof Sardinia. To these succeeded, upon his arrival in Malta, --as abetter point of departure for the farther East, now that the Frenchheld the west coast of the Adriatic, --despatches to the Britishminister to the Porte, to the Grand Vizier and the Capitan Pacha, tothe Republic of the Seven Islands, as the group of Corfu and itssisters was now styled, and to the British representative to theirgovernment. All these communications were, of course, tentative, based upon a yetimperfect knowledge of conditions. For the most part they conveyed, besides the notification of his having taken the command, chieflygeneral assurances of the good-will of the writer's government, and anundefined intimation that all had best be on their guard againstFrench scheming and aggressions. To Naples he spoke more definitely, and indicated at once the considerations that would dictate hiscourse, and, he intimated, should control theirs also. He had beeninstructed, he said, to consider the welfare of the Two Sicilies asone of the first of British objects, and his Government was convincedof the advantages that would accrue both to Sicily and Naples, iftheir neutrality could be maintained. They had to do, however, with anenemy that was not only powerful, but wily and unscrupulous; one whoseaction would be governed wholly by considerations of interest andexpediency, not by those of right. Great Britain could not, probably, keep the French out of Naples, but she could out of Sicily, provided, and only provided, Messina was adequately garrisoned and held. If, however, there was any hasty overt action taken, looking to thesecurity of Sicily, it might merely precipitate the seizure of Naplesand the entire conquest of the King's continental dominions; or, "tentimes more humiliating, " leave him "an odious commissary to raisecontributions from his unhappy subjects for the French. " On the otherhand, if, to avert suspicion, there was too much slackness in themeasures to guard Sicily, Messina might be suddenly seized, the gatesof the island thus thrown open, and, Sicily once lost, "_Naples fallsof course_. " "It is a most important point, " he wrote to Elliot soonafter, "to decide when Sicily ought to be placed in a state ofsecurity. For the present, I am content to say that Messina need notbe taken possession of; but the strictest watch must be kept by SirJohn Acton that we are not lulled into a fatal security, and thus loseboth Kingdoms. To save for the moment Naples, we risk the twoKingdoms, and General Acton must join me in this heavyresponsibility. " "My whole opinion rests in these few words--_that wemust not risk Sicily too far in trying to save Naples; therefore, General Acton, yourself and myself must keep a good lookout_. " This summed up the conditions for Naples during the long two years ofwatching and waiting, while Bonaparte, concentrating his purposes uponhis invasion scheme, was content to leave things quiet in the South. To check, as far as might be, the designs of the French towards Moreaor towards Sicily, on either side of the central position they held atthe heel of Italy, Nelson employed a proportionately large number ofcruisers--five--between Messina and the mouth of the Adriatic; while, to provide for the safety of the royal family, he kept always aship-of-the-line in the Bay of Naples, the British minister holdingorders for her captain to embark them at a moment's notice, and takethem to Sicily. "I have kept everything here to save Italy, if in mypower, " he wrote Elliot two months later, "and you know I was orderedto send a squadron outside the Straits. Fourteen days ago, a Frenchseventy-four got into Cadiz from Santo Domingo, and two Frenchfrigates, with some merchant ships. What will they say at home?However, I feel I have done right, and care not. " "I must place asquadron between Elba and Genoa, " he says again, "to prevent thatexpedition from moving, and also send some ships to the Straits'mouth, and keep enough to watch the ships in Toulon. These are allimportant objects, but nothing when compared to the security of theSicilies. " Nelson's anxiety for Sicily threw him again into contact with aninstance of that rigid and blind conformity to orders which alwaysexasperated him. He had brought out directions to the generalcommanding in Malta, to hold a detachment of two thousand Britishtroops in readiness to go at once to Messina, on the appearance ofdanger, and to garrison the works there, if he thought they could bespared from the defence of Malta. Nelson told the Prime Minister thatdiscretion, as to such a step, was a responsibility greater than theaverage officer could bear, and would certainly defeat the object inview; for he would never feel his charge secure enough to permit sucha diminution. There was at this time in Malta a body of Neapolitansoldiers, which had been sent there during the peace of Amiens, inaccordance with a stipulation of the treaty. The general received anorder to send them to Messina. Nelson had pointed out to him that ifhe did so, in the divided state of feeling in the Neapolitandominions, and with the general character of Neapolitan officers, forboth efficiency and fidelity, the citadel would not be safe frombetrayal at their hands. "I have requested him to keep the orderssecret, and not to send them; for if they got into Messina, they wouldcertainly not keep the French out one moment, and it would give a goodexcuse for not asking us to secure Messina. " "If General Acton sendsfor them we must submit; but at present we need not find means ofsending them away. " The British general, however, sent them over, andthen the Neapolitan governor, as Nelson foretold, said it was quiteunnecessary for any British to come. "I must apprise you, " wroteNelson to Addington, "that General Villettes, although a mostexcellent officer, will do nothing but what he receives, 'You arehereby required and directed;' for to obey, is with him the very acmeof discipline. With respect to Sicily, I have no doubt but that theFrench will have it. My former reasons for inducing General Villettesto keep the Neapolitan troops in Malta, was to prevent what hashappened; but, in a month after my back was turned, Villettes obeyedhis orders, and now the Governor of Messina says, 'We can defend it, and want no assistance. ' His whole conduct, I am bold to say, iseither that of a traitor or a fool. "[59] Upon his own subordinates Nelson laid a distinct charge, that heshould expect them to use their judgment and act upon it withindependence, sure of his generous construction and support of theiraction. "We must all in our several stations, " he tells one of them, "exert ourselves to the utmost, and not be nonsensical in saying, 'Ihave an order for this, that, and the other, ' if the King's serviceclearly marks what ought to be done. I am well convinced of yourzeal. " In accordance with this, he was emphatic in his expressions ofcommendation for action rightly taken; a bare, cold approval was notadequate reward for deeds which he expected to reproduce his ownspirit and temper, vivifying the whole of his command, and making hispresence virtually co-extensive with its utmost limits. No severercondemnation, perhaps, was ever implied by him, than when he wrote toSidney Smith, unqualifiedly, "I strictly charge and command you neverto give any French ship or man leave to quit Egypt. " To deny anofficer discretion was as scathing an expression of dissatisfaction asNelson could utter; and as he sowed, so he reaped, in a devotion andvigor of service few have elicited equally. In Malta Nelson remained but thirty-six hours. Arriving at 4 P. M. Onthe evening of June 15th, he sailed again at 4 A. M. Of the 17th. Hehad expected partly to find the fleet there; but by an oddcoincidence, on the same day that he hoisted his flag in Portsmouth, it had sailed, although in ignorance of the war, to cruise betweenSicily and Naples; whence, on the day he left Gibraltar, thecommanding officer, Sir Richard Bickerton, had started forToulon, --"very judiciously, " said Nelson, --the instant he heard of therenewal of hostilities. The "Amphion" passed through the Straits of Messina, and within sightof Naples, carrying Nelson once more over well-known seas, and insight of fondly remembered places. "I am looking at _dear_ Naples, ifit is what it was, " he wrote to Elliot from off Capri. "Close toCapri, " he tells Lady Hamilton, "the view of Vesuvius calls so manycircumstances to my mind, that it almost overpowers my feelings. " "Iam using force upon myself to keep away, " he had already said toActon; "for I think it likely, was I to fly to Naples, which I am muchinclined to do, that the French might turn it to some plea againstthose good sovereigns. " In his anxiety to join the fleet, and get intouch of the French, the length of the passage, three weeks, causedhim great vexation, and deepened his convictions of the uselessness ofthe island to his squadron off Toulon. "My opinion of Malta, as anaval station for watching the French in Toulon, is well known; and mypresent experience of what will be a three weeks' passage, most fullyconfirms me in it. The fleet can never go there, if I can find anyother corner to put them in; but having said this, I now declare, thatI consider Malta as a most important outwork to India, that it willever give us great influence in the Levant, and indeed all thesouthern parts of Italy. In this view, I hope we shall never give itup. " "Malta and Toulon are entirely different services. It takes uponan average seven weeks to get an answer to a letter. When I am forcedto send a ship there, I never see her under two months. " With Gibraltar, however, Malta gave the British two impregnable andsecure bases of operations, within reasonable distance of one another, and each in close proximity to points most essential to control. During Nelson's entire command, the three chief centres of interestand of danger were the Straits of Gibraltar, the heel of Italy, andToulon. The narrowing of the trade routes near the two former renderedthem points of particular exposure for merchant shipping. Around them, therefore, and in dependence upon them, gathered the largest bodies ofthe cruisers which kept down privateering, and convoyed the merchantships, whose protection was not the least exacting of the many caresthat fell upon Nelson. Upon the Malta division depended also the watchover the mouth of the Adriatic and the Straits of Messina, by whichNelson hoped to prevent the passage of the French, in small bodies, toeither Sicily, the Morea, or the Ionian Islands. Malta in truth, evenin Nelson's time, was the base for operations only less importantthan the destruction of the Toulon fleet. The latter he rightlyconsidered his principal mission, success in which would solve mostother maritime difficulties. "My first object must ever be to keep theFrench fleet in check; and, if they put to sea, to have force enoughwith me to _annihilate_ them. That would keep the Two Sicilies freefrom any attack from sea. " On the 8th of July the "Amphion" joined the fleet off Toulon. Itnumbered then nine ships-of-the-line, with three smaller cruisers. "Asfar as outside show goes, " he reported to St. Vincent, "the ships lookvery well; but they complain of their bottoms, and are very short ofmen. " The fact was, as he afterwards explained, that before the warcame they had been expecting every day to go to England, andconsequently had been allowed to run down gradually, a result whichdoubtless had been hastened by St. Vincent's stringent economies. Gibraltar and Malta were both bare, Nelson wrote six months later, andit was not the fault of the naval storekeepers. The ships, everywhere, were "distressed for almost every article. They have entirely eat uptheir stores, and their real wants not half complied with. I haveapplications from the different line-of-battle-ships for surveys onmost of their sails and running rigging, which cannot be compliedwith, as there is neither cordage nor sails to replace theunserviceable stores, and, therefore, the evil must be combated in thebest manner possible. " As the whole Navy had suffered from the samecause, there was no reserve of ships at home to replace those in theMediterranean, which, besides lacking everything, were between eightand nine hundred men short of their complement, or about one hundredfor each ship-of-the-line. "We can send you neither ships nor men, "wrote St. Vincent as winter drew on; and even a year later, theadministration which followed his found it impossible to replace the"crazy" vessels, of which Nelson said only four were fit for wintercruising. "It is not a storeship a week, " he declared, "that wouldkeep them in repair. " The trouble was greater because, when leavingMalta, they had anticipated only a cruise of three weeks, which formany of them became two years. Despite the difficulties, he determined that the fleet as a bodyshould not go into port; nor should the individual ships-of-the-line, except when absolutely necessary, and then to Gibraltar, not Malta. "Ihave made up my mind never to go into port till after the battle, ifthey make me wait a year, provided the Admiralty change the ships whocannot keep the sea in winter;" nor did the failure of the Admiraltyto meet this proviso alter his resolution. It was the carrying out ofthis decision, with ships in such condition, in a region where windsand seas were of exceptional violence, and supplies of food and watermost difficult to be obtained, because surrounded in all directions bycountries either directly hostile, or under the overmasteringinfluence of Bonaparte, that made the exercise of Nelson's commandduring this period a triumph of naval administration and prevision. Itdoes not necessarily follow that an officer of distinguished abilityfor handling a force in the face of an enemy, will possess also thefaculty which foresees and provides for the many contingencies, uponwhich depend the constant efficiency and readiness of a greatorganized body; though both qualities are doubtless essential toconstitute a great general officer. For twenty-two months Nelson'sfleet never went into a port, other than an open roadstead on aneutral coast, destitute of supplies; at the end of that time, whenthe need arose to pursue an enemy for four thousand miles, it wasfound massed, and in all respects perfectly prepared for so distantand sudden a call. To quote his own words, written a year before thissummons in reply to an intimation from the Admiralty to be on hisguard against Spain, "I have the pleasure to acquaint you that thesquadron under my command is all collected, except the Gibraltar, [60]complete in their provisions and stores to near five months, and in aperfect state of readiness to act as the exigency of the moment maydetermine. " "With the resources of your mind, " wrote St. Vincent, whenunable to reinforce him, "you will do very well;" and Nelson, when heput off his harness, might have boasted himself that the predictionwas more than fulfilled. Provisions, water, and supplies of all sorts were brought to the shipson their station, either at sea, or in unfrequented roadsteads withinthe limits of the cruising ground. "I never could have spared theships to go to Gibraltar for them, " he wrote to St. Vincent, to whomhe expressed his satisfaction with the way the plan worked. He soonabandoned, in fact, the method of sending individual ships for water, because of the long absence thus entailed. When water could not bebrought in transports, or rather could not easily be transhipped owingto the badness of the season, he thought it better to take the wholefleet to the nearest watering-place than to divide its strength. Freshprovisions, absolutely indispensable to the health of the ships'companies, constituted the greatest of difficulties. Opposition tofurnishing them must be expected wherever French influence could befelt. "The great distance from Malta or Gibraltar renders the gettingsuch refreshments from those places, in a regular manner, absolutelyimpossible;" and from the Spanish ports, Barcelona or Rosas, whichwere near his cruising ground, they could be had only "clandestinely. "Government Bills would not be taken there, nor in Barbary or Sardinia, where bullocks might be got. Hard money must be paid, and about thisthere was some routine bureau difficulty. "I certainly hate to haveanything to do with the management of money, " he wrote, "but I submitthe propriety of lodging public money on board the fleet, for thepurpose of paying for fresh beef and vegetables, provided, but on _noaccount otherwise_, that the simple receipt from the captain of theship may be a sufficient voucher for the disbursement of such money. "Absolutely disposed as he was to assume political or militaryresponsibilities, he was not willing, even for the health of thefleet, to incur the risk of pecuniary imputations for himself or hiscaptains. Great dexterity of management was required to obtain these supplies, without drawing, upon those who gave them, such tokens of displeasurefrom Bonaparte as might result in their discontinuance. Towards Spain, although he felt for her perplexities, Nelson took a firm tone. Shewas nominally neutral, and enjoyed privileges as such; he insistedtherefore that she should deal equal measure to both belligerents. "Iam ready to make large allowances for the miserable situation Spainhas placed herself in; but there is a certain line beyond which Icannot submit to be treated with disrespect. " That line of forbearancewas dictated, of course, less by indulgence towards Spain than by thenecessities of Great Britain, which Nelson, however indignant, was toogood a diplomatist to drop out of sight; but he kept up a pressurewhich secured very substantial assistance, though grudgingly given. "Refreshments we have a right to as long as we remain at peace, and ifthis goes on"--the refusal, that is, to allow provisions to be boughtin quantities--"you may acquaint them that I will anchor in Rosas withthe squadron, and receive our daily supplies, which will offend theFrench much more than our staying at sea. " Towards Naples, as secretly friendly to Great Britain, he was ofcourse far more tender; and, while he rejected no suggestion withoutconsideration, he regarded the distance as too great to render such ameans of subsistence certain. The numerous privateers that hauntedevery port would intercept the transports and render convoysnecessary; it was not worth while, for so small an advantage, toinvolve Naples, in its already critical state, in a dispute withFrance. An occasional purchase, however, seems to have been madethere; and even France herself was at times brought to contribute, indirectly, to the support of the squadron which was watching one ofher principal ports. "Latterly our cattle and onions have beenprocured from France, " wrote Nelson; "but from the apparentincivilities of the Spaniards, I suppose we are on the eve of beingshut out. " To escape the notice of the French agents, it was obviouslydesirable to distribute as widely as possible the sources of supply, so as not to concentrate observation upon any one, or upon the generalfact. It was, however, upon Sardinia that Nelson in the end chieflydepended. The importance of this island, both in fact and in hisestimation, was so great, that it may be said to have constituted thechief object of his thought and anxiety, after his own squadron andthe French, which also he at times prophetically spoke of as his own. "I do not mean to use the shells you have sent me at sea, " he writesto General Villettes, "for that I hope to consider burning _our own_ships; but in case they run ashore, then a few put into their sideswill do their business. " In addition to its extremely favorablecentral position, Sardinia, as compared to Sicily, did not entail theperplexity that its use by the British might cause a friendlysovereign the loss of his continental dominions. Those of the King ofSardinia had passed already nearly, if not wholly, out of his hands. The island itself was so wild, poor, and neglected, that, even ifseized by the enemy, the King would lose little. The net revenuederived from it was only £5, 000. During the previous war Nelson's attention had not been called much toSardinia. Up to the withdrawal from the Mediterranean in 1796, Corsicahad been a sufficient, and more suitable, base for the operations ofthe fleet, which until then had been upon the Riviera and thenorthern coast of Italy. When he returned in 1798, even after theBattle of the Nile and the disasters of the French in 1799, theunsettled condition of Naples, the blockade of Malta, and the affairsof Egypt, had combined to keep him in the South; while the tenure ofthe Allies in Northern Italy, up to the Battle of Marengo, wasapparently so secure as to require no great support from the fleet. Irrespective of any personal influences that may have swayed him, Sicily was better suited then to be the centre from which tosuperintend the varied duties of his wide command. When he returned in 1803, the old prepossessions naturally remained. In a survey of the political conditions written for the Prime Ministerwhen on the passage to Toulon, much is said of Malta, Sicily, andNaples, but Sardinia is dismissed with a passing hope that the Frenchwould not seize it. After joining the fleet off Toulon, however, hehad to realize that, if it was to remain at sea, as he purposed andeffected, and yet be kept fully provisioned and watered, it must attimes make an anchorage, which should be so far convenient as to keepit, practically, as much on its station as when under way. In thisdilemma his attention was called to the Madalena Islands, a group offthe northeast end of Sardinia, where wood and water could be obtained. Between them and the main island there was a good harbor, having thedecisive advantage of two entrances, by one or other of which it couldbe left in winds from any quarter. A survey had been made a yearbefore, during the peace, by a Captain Ryves, now commanding a ship inthe fleet. As winter approached, Nelson decided to examine the spothimself, which he did in the last days of October, taking advantage ofa moonlight week when the enemy would be less likely to leave port. Hefound it admirably adapted for his purposes, and that freshprovisions, though not of the best quality, could be had. "It iscertainly one of the best anchorages I have met with for a fleet, " hewrote, "but I suppose the French will take it now we have used it. "This they did not attempt, and the British fleet continued to resortto it from time to time, obtaining water and bullocks. Such a roadstead as an occasional rendezvous, where transports coulddischarge their stores to the vessels, and ships be refitted andsupplied, would make the fleet as secure of holding its position aswere the cruisers that depended upon Malta and Gibraltar. Its beingtwo hundred miles from Toulon was not a serious drawback, for it wasno part of Nelson's plan to keep the fleet close to Toulon. When hetook command, he found it so stationed, but he soon removed to aposition thirty to forty miles west of the harbor's mouth, which seemsto have been his general summer rendezvous. "Lord Nelson, " wrote ayoung officer of the fleet, [61] "pursues a very different plan fromSir Richard Bickerton. The latter kept close to the harbour, but LordNelson is scarce ever in sight of the land, and there is but onefrigate inshore. " "I chose this position, " Nelson said, "to answer twoimportant purposes: one to prevent the junction of a Spanish fleetfrom the westward; and the other, to be to windward, so as to enableme, if the northerly gale came on to the N. N. W. , to take shelter in afew hours under the Hières Islands, or if N. N. E. , under Cape SanSebastian. " "It is not my intention to close-watch Toulon, even withfrigates, " he wrote, and his dispositions were taken rather with aview to encourage the enemy to come out; although, of course, he tookevery precaution that they should not get far without being observed, and assured himself by frequent reconnoitring that they had not leftport. "My system is the very contrary of blockading, " he told AdmiralPole. "Every opportunity has been offered the enemy to put to sea, "he says again, "for it is there we hope to realize the hopes andexpectations of our Country. " There was also the obvious advantagethat, if habitually out of sight, the enemy could not know hismovements, nor profit by his occasional absences in any direction. From Madalena he extended his observations over the whole island ofSardinia, upon the holding of which he thenceforth laid the greateststress, and entertained most anxious fears lest the French shouldsnatch it out of his hands. "If we could possess Sardinia, we shouldwant neither Malta nor any other. It is the most important island, asa naval and military station, in the Mediterranean. It possesses atthe northern end the finest harbour in the world [Madalena]. It istwenty-four hours' sail from Toulon; it covers Italy; it is a positionthat the wind which carries the French to the westward is fair for youto follow. In passing to the southward they go close to you. In short, it covers Egypt, Italy, and Turkey. " He was anxious that the BritishGovernment should buy it. "If we, from delicacy, or commiseration ofthe unfortunate king of Sardinia, do not get possession of thatisland, the French will. If I lose Sardinia, I lose the French fleet. " His apprehensions were not verified; as also they were not during hiscommand, either in the Morea, in Naples, or in Sicily. Napoleon tookno active steps against Sardinia, although the proceedings there didnot escape the sharp eyes of the French agents, but elicited from themvivacious remonstrances. "The government of the Republic, " wrote one, "has a right to complain of this excessive complaisance. To giveregular support to a squadron blockading a port, to revictual it, inone word, periodically, is to tread under foot the neutrality which isprofessed. I shall notify my government of a fact which demands allits attention, and in which it is painful to me to see a cause ofmisunderstanding between France and his Sardinian Majesty. " It issingularly confirmatory of the reality of Bonaparte's intention toattempt the invasion of England, that he confined his efforts in theSouth--in the Mediterranean--to feints and demonstrations. What he didthere looked to the future, not to the present; although, doubtless, he stood always so ready that no opportunity offering advantage wouldhave passed neglected. The active mind of Nelson, condemned to theuncertainties of the defensive and to military idleness, however itmay have been burdened with administrative routine and officialcorrespondence, found ample time to speculate on the designs ofBonaparte, and the latter took care that he should have matter enoughto occupy him--and if possible mislead him--in rumor and in movements. "At Marseilles they are fitting, as reports say, eighty or ninetygunboats, and intend sending them, by the canal of Languedoc toBordeaux; but I am sure this is not true. They are to go alongshore tothe Heel of Italy, and to embark and protect their army either toSicily or the Morea, or to both; and the Navy of Europe can hardlyprevent these alongshore voyages. " In this will be noticed therecurrence of ideas familiar to him in the Riviera eight years before;the expectation of ex-centric operations into which Bonaparte wasrarely betrayed. Frequent stories also reach him of projects to invade and seizeSardinia. Vessels are fitting for that purpose, now at Marseilles, nowat Villefranche; now the expedition is to come from Corsica only. "Alight linen jacket, trowsers, red cap, and a pair of shoes, is thewhole expense of Government; the plunder of the Sardinian Anglo-Sardesis held out as the reward. " To prevent it he seeks the authority ofhis Government and of the King of Sardinia to garrison Madalena. Thestraits of Bonifacio are but ten miles wide; it is impossibletherefore for a cruiser to prevent boats passing. If the attempt ismade, no scruples about the neutrality of Sardinia shall tie hishands. "I have directed the frigates to pursue them, even should theychase into Sardinia, and to take or destroy them, and also theCorsican troops; for if I wait till the island is taken I should feeldeserving of reprobation. Of course, they will say we have broken theneutrality, if we attack them in the ports of Sardinia before theirconquest, and if we do not I shall be laughed at for a fool. _Prevention is better than cure_. " With his usual long-headedcircumspection, however, even when most bent on an extreme step, hewarns the Prime Minister, to whom he is writing, to mention hispurpose to the Russian ambassador--that the latter may understand theapparent breach of neutrality; for Russia has constituted herself achampion of the Sardinian monarch. "I mention my intention that idlereports may not be attended to. " As the winter of 1803-4 approached, and it became evident that Spainwas to persevere in her neutrality, Nelson removed his fleet to arendezvous about thirty miles south of Cape San Sebastian, on theSpanish coast--the Number 97 continually mentioned in his officialletters to captains. There the highlands of Spain afford some shelterfrom the furious northerly gales, which, sweeping over France from theAtlantic, are compressed as in a funnel between the Pyrenees and theAlps, to fall with redoubled violence on the Gulf of Lyons. Only theutmost care and the most skilful seamanship could preserve the ricketyships, upon whose efficiency so much depended, and which, if damaged, there was none to replace. I "bear up for every gale, " wrote Nelson. "I must not in our present state quarrel with the northwesters--withcrazy masts and no port or spars near us. " Even in September, hewrites, there are "three days' gale of severe blowing weather out ofthe seven, which frequently comes on suddenly, and thereby exposes thetopmasts, topsail yards and sails, to great hazard, under every careand attention; and there are no topmasts or topsail yards in store, either at Gibraltar or Malta. " "The French fleet keep us waiting; andsuch a place as all the Gulf of Lyons, for gales of wind from the N. W. To N. E. , I never saw; but by always going away large, we generallylose much of their force and the heavy sea. By the great care andattention of every captain, we have suffered much less than could havebeen expected. I do not believe Lord St. Vincent would have kept thesea with such ships. However, with nursing our ships, we have roughedit out better than could have been expected. We either run to thesouthward, or furl all the sails and make the ships as easy aspossible. " Under such circumstances, it was no small nor unworthyboast he made near the close of the cruise, when the first ineffectualattempt of the French to leave Toulon ended in numerous accidents. "These gentlemen are not accustomed to a Gulf of Lyons gale, which wehave buffeted for twenty-one months, and not carried away a spar. "Nelson himself, though reckless to desperation when an adequate objectwas at stake, in the moments of repose husbanded his means, and lookedto the efficiency of his instruments, with the diligence of a miser. With his own hand he noted the weather indications, including thebarometer, at least three times every twenty-four hours, andoccasionally even more often. A rendezvous, however advantageous, was not permitted by Nelson tobecome a permanent station, or a long-continued resting-place for thefleet. In the inevitable monotony of a watch protracted so far beyondhis original expectations, his sleepless solicitude for the health andcontentment of the ships' companies warned him that lack of mentalinterest saps the spirit, and wears away the strength, beyond thepower of mere bodily comfort to prevent. On Number 97 was kept alwaysa ship--frigate or smaller cruiser--with word where the admiral was tobe found at any time; and thither resorted the vessels returning fromtheir missions to all parts of the station, or coming out fromEngland. "Rejoin me at Number 97, " their instructions ran, "where youwill find me, or orders for your further proceedings. " Otherrendezvous there were, of course, each with its own number, and with acruiser if at sea; but in the anchorages occasionally resorted to, asMadalena, or the Gulf of Palmas in the south of Sardinia, communications were left on shore. With the threads thus reaching fromthese centres to the different parts of his command, Nelson's habitwas to keep his fleet in motion from point to point, in the stretch ofsea bounded on the one side by the coast of Spain, as far south as theBalearics, and on the east by the islands of Sardinia and Corsica. Through this hunting-ground, from end to end of which he roamed inunceasing restlessness, like a lion roaring for his prey, the Toulonfleet must pass, wherever bound; and by the judicious distribution ofthe cruisers--all too few--allowed him by St. Vincent's economies, hehoped to get timely and sufficient information of its leaving port. "The great thing in all military service is health, " he wrote to hisold friend, Dr. Moseley, who had been with him in the far-back CentralAmerican expedition in 1780; "and you will agree with me, that it iseasier for an officer to keep men healthy, than for a physician tocure them. Situated as this fleet has been, without a friendly port, where we could get all the things so necessary for us, yet I have, bychanging the cruizing ground, not allowed the sameness of prospect tosatiate the mind--sometimes by looking at Toulon, Ville Franche, Barcelona, and Rosas; then running round Minorca, Majorca; Sardiniaand Corsica; and two or three times anchoring for a few days, andsending a ship to the last place for _onions_, which I find the bestthing that can be given to seamen; having always good mutton for thesick, cattle when we can get them, and plenty of fresh water. In thewinter it is the best plan to give half the allowance of grog, insteadof all wine. These things are for the commander-in-chief to look to;but shut very nearly out from Spain, and only getting refreshments bystealth from other places, my command has been an arduous one. " "Ourmen's minds, " he added, "are always kept up with the daily hopes ofmeeting the enemy. " An order indicating one of the squadron movements, of which he here speaks, may be worth quoting. "Whereas it is myintention, " he writes at Number 97 to the captain there stationed, "toproceed with the squadron, the first westerly wind, off Toulon, forthe purpose of reconnoitring the enemy at that port, and from thencepass through Rendezvous No. 102, to secure any information the shipsthere may have obtained of them, you are hereby required and directedto keep on your station and inform any of his Majesty's ships arrivingon said rendezvous, " etc. The health of the crews, thus carefully watched, remained excellentthroughout, and is mentioned by him continually with evident pride aswell as satisfaction. Occasional slight outbursts of scurvy are noted, despite his efforts for fresh food, and he mentions hecticcomplaints--"of the few men we have lost, nine in ten are dead ofconsumption "--but upon the whole, the general condition isunparalleled in his experience. "We are healthy beyond example, and ingreat good humour with ourselves, " he writes in October, 1803, "and sosharp-set, that I would not be a French Admiral in the way of any ofour ships for something. " It would be tedious to quote the numerousassertions to the same effect scattered up and down his correspondenceat this time; but in December, 1804, when near the end of this longperiod of suspense, and after eighteen months at sea, he writes to theAdmiralty: "The Fleet is in perfect good health and good humour, unequalled by anything which has ever come within my knowledge, andequal to the most active service which the times may call for. " Dr. Gillespie, who joined the "Victory" as physician to the fleet inJanuary, 1805, wrote immediately afterwards that out of her eighthundred and forty men, but one was confined to his bed by sickness, and that the other ships, though upwards of twenty months off Toulon, were in a like condition of health. The same could not then, nor for long before, be said of Nelsonhimself. The first flush of excitement in leaving England and takingcommand, the expectation and change of scene in going out, affectedhim favorably. "As to my health, " he says, immediately after joiningthe fleet, "thank God, I have not had a finger ache since I leftEngland;" but this, unfortunately, did not endure. It was his firstexperience of the weightier anxieties of a commander-in-chief; forwhen he had succeeded to that position, temporarily, in theMediterranean and the Baltic, he had found either a squadron in goodrunning order, or at the least no serious hitch about necessarymaintenance. Now all this was different. The difficulties aboutsupplies and the condition of his ships have been mentioned, as havealso his fears for Naples, Sicily, and the Morea, --all of which, inhis belief, might possibly be conquered, even without theinterposition of the Toulon fleet. The latter, however, kept him mostuneasy; for he could get no certain knowledge as to its destination, or the probable time of its moving; and the wide field for injury opento it, if his vigilance were eluded, kept his eager, unquiet mindcontinually on the strain of speculation and anticipation. "I hopethey will come out and let us settle the matter. You know I hate beingkept in suspense. " The nervous excitability--irritability--that oftenoverlay the usually cordial kindliness and gracious bearing of theman, was an easy prey to such harassment. It breaks out at times inhis letters, but was only occasionally visible to those around him. Bythe first of December he already foresees that he cannot last long. "Next Christmas, please God, I shall be at Merton; for, by that time, with all the anxiety attendant on such a command as this, I shall bedone up. The mind and body both wear out. " As autumn drew towards winter, the bitter cold went through his feebleframe, and in the wild weather he was "always tossed about, and alwayssea-sick. " "We have had a most terrible winter, " he writes, evenbefore the New Year. "It has almost knocked me up. I have been veryill, and am now far from recovered; but I hope to hold out till thebattle is over, when I must recruit. " "My heart, my Lord, is warm, " hetells Lord Hobart, the Secretary of State for War, "my head is firm, but my body is unequal to my wishes. I am visibly shook; but as longas I can hold out, I shall never abandon my truly honourable post. " Hefeared also blindness. "My eyesight fails me most dreadfully, " hewrites to his old friend Davison. "I firmly believe that, in a veryfew years, I shall be stone-blind. It is this only, of all mymaladies, that makes me unhappy; but God's will be done. " The firstwinter was unusually severe, and during it was added, to his officialcares and personal suffering, an extreme anxiety about Lady Hamilton, for he was expecting the birth of a second child in January. Thischild, a girl, lived but a short time; he never saw her. The effect ofthese various causes upon his health was so great, that thephysicians, as early as January, 1804, were advising his return. "Themedical gentlemen are wanting to survey me, and to send me to Bristolfor the re-establishment of my health, " he tells Minto; but he adds, "do not mention it (it is my concern) I beg of you. " Reports were thenunusually persistent that the enemy was about to put to sea. "_I_ mustnot be sick until after the French fleet is taken. " To the last moment the destination of the French and the purposes ofBonaparte remained unknown to him, a fruitful source of guessing andworry. "It is at best but a guess, " he wrote to Ball, after a year'spondering, "and the world attaches wisdom to him that guesses right. "Yet his conclusions, however reached, though subject to temporaryvariations, were in the main correct. Strongly impressed though he waswith the importance and exposure of Egypt, he inclined upon the wholeto the belief that the French were bound to the westward, out of theStraits and into the Atlantic. This confirmed him in taking hisgeneral summer rendezvous to the westward, where he was to windward ofsuch a movement, as well as interposed between Toulon and any Spanishfleet attempting to go there. "My station to the westward of Toulon, an unusual one, " he writes to Addington in August, 1803, "has beentaken upon an idea that the French fleet is bound out of the Straitsand probably to Ireland. I shall follow them to the Antipodes. " Twomonths later he says: "Plausible reasons may certainly be given forevery one of the plans" suggested by his various correspondents; buthe thinks that either Alexandria or outside the Mediterranean is themost probable. "To those two points my whole attention is turned. ""Their destination, is it Ireland or the Levant? That is what I wantto know;" but in December he still holds to his first impression: "Myopinion is, certainly, out of the Mediterranean. " In this perplexity Elliot suggested to him to receive on board thefleet some good Frenchmen, who could land from time to time and getinformation in Toulon, --a proposition which drew from Nelson acharacteristic and amusing explosion. "Mr. Elliot wanted to send mesome _good_ Frenchmen, to go ashore and get me information. My answerto all these offers is 'No. ' I can be told nothing of any consequenceto me; but a copy of the French admiral's orders, when he is to put tosea, and where he is destined to, is the only useful information I cancare about. I can see the number and force at Toulon any day I please, and as for the names of the Captains or Admirals I care not what theyare called; therefore, as you may suppose, I have none of these 'goodFrenchmen' about me. " "I put no confidence in them, " he tells Elliot. "You think yours good: the Queen thinks hers the same: I believe theyare all alike. Whatever information you can get me, I shall be verythankful for; but not a Frenchman comes here. Forgive me, but mymother hated the French. " "I never trust a Corsican or a Frenchman. Iwould give the devil ALL the good ones to take the remainder. " As winter advanced, his perplexities increased, for eachcorrespondent, by long dwelling on his particular concern, saw itsdanger and importance growing in his own eyes, and dwelt upon themwith greater emphasis in his letters. "Ball is sure they are going toEgypt; the Turks are sure they are going to the Morea; Mr. Elliot atNaples, to Sicily; and the King of Sardinia, to his only spot. Everypower thinks they are destined against them; but whatever the Frenchmay intend to do, " he concludes, with a quaint humor occasional withhim, "I trust, and with confidence, they are destined for _Spithead_. "He recognized, too, that Bonaparte himself was not wholly master ofhis own projects when contending with such uncertain elements; and thegreat master of War, in this instance as in many others, had placedhis force so centrally, in the heel of Italy, that he threatened withequal facility in two opposite directions, to his own advantage andhis enemies' perplexity. "Circumstances may even make it necessary toalter its destination by Buonaparte; Egypt or Ireland, and I ratherlean to the latter destination. " Anything, indeed, is possible; for, as winter approaches, "we can be sure of nothing in so short arun, "--as to Sardinia or Sicily. For a little while during February, 1804, he was further stirred up byreports that the French were about to concentrate their naval forces, from Brest and Ferrol, in the Mediterranean; and this he was inclinedto believe, unfavorable as the season would be for maritime operationsin that stormy sea, with the inexperienced crews of the enemy. In thesummer his conviction of the importance of the Mediterranean had fullyprepared him for such an attempt. "Naples, the Morea, and ultimatelyEgypt, are in Buonaparte's view, " he had then written. "With thisidea, I fully expect that the French fleet from Brest will assuredlycome into the Mediterranean, to protect this army across the water. Ishall try and fight one party or the other, before they form ajunction. " "Much may be done before British reinforcements arrive, " hereminded St. Vincent. "Your Lordship knows what Admiral Bruix mighthave done, had he done his duty, and they may buy their experience. "Now he says to Ball, "The Admiralty tells me nothing, they knownothing; but my private letters say, that the Brest squadron, as wellas Ferrol, [62] is bound here--if so, we shall have work enough uponour hands. " Thirty thousand troops, also, were ready to embark inMarseilles and Nice. The conclusion, in view of so great a forceassembling, was natural: "Egypt, I have no doubt is the favourite andultimate object of the Corsican tyrant. " Nelson's spirit rises withthe occasion. "I shall try to intercept them, but I cannot go so farto the westward as is necessary; for I will not lose sight of theToulon fleet. What a most zealous man can do to meet all points ofdifficulty, shall be done. My squadron is the finest for its numbersin the world, and much may be expected of it. Should superior numbersjoin, we must look it in the face. _Nil desperandum!_ God is good, andour cause is just. " This alarm passed away like others. Bonaparte had no idea of pushingships into the Mediterranean, or embarking his naval forces on anydoubtful experiments, until he had first tested the possibility ofthat supreme adventure, the invasion of England. When that mightyimagination passed away like a dream that leaves no trace, he orderedhis fleets into the Mediterranean, as Nelson had expected, and theresult was Trafalgar. As the spring of 1804 opened, the French admiral at Toulon began toexercise his ships outside the harbor, singly or in small groups, likehalf-fledged birds learning to fly; or, to use Nelson's expression, "My friend Monsieur La Touche sometimes plays bo-peep in and out ofToulon, like a mouse at the edge of her hole. " The only drill-groundfor fleets, the open sea, being closed to him, he could do no betterthan these furtive excursions, to prepare for the eagle's flightNapoleon had prescribed to him. "Last week, at different times, twosail of the line put their heads out of Toulon, and on Thursday, the5th [April], in the afternoon, they all came out. " "Yesterday [the9th] a rear-admiral and seven sail, including frigates, put their noseoutside the harbour. If they go on playing this game, some day weshall lay salt upon their tails, and so end the campaign. " These outings--"capers, " Nelson called them--naturally became moreventuresome by little and little, as the British suffered them toproceed without serious attempt at molestation, or near approach ontheir part. Nelson veiled the keenness of his watch, as he crouchedfor a spring, with a drowsy appearance of caution and indifference. The French admiral, Latouche Tréville, was he who had commanded atBoulogne when Nelson's boats were repelled with slaughter; and it wasalso he who in 1792 had sent a grenadier to the King of Naples, with aperemptory summons to diplomatic apology in one hand, and a threat ofbombardment in the other. For both these affairs Nelson considered hehad a personal score to settle. "I rather believe my antagonist atToulon begins to be angry with me: at least, I am trying to make himso; and then, he may come out, and beat me, as he says he did offBoulogne. He is the Admiral that went to Naples in December, 1792, who landed the grenadier. I owe him something for that. " The French having eight sail-of-the-line certainly ready for sea, andtwo or three more nearly so--how nearly Nelson was not sure--he nowendeavored to lure them out. "I have taken a method of making Mr. LaTouche Tréville angry. I have left Sir Richard Bickerton, with part ofthe fleet, twenty leagues from hence, and, with five of the line, ampreventing his cutting capers, which he has done for some time past, off Cape Sicie. " "He seems inclined to try his hand with us, " hewrites a week later, "and by my keeping so great an inferiority closeto him, perhaps he may some day be tempted. " Nelson had near Toulon atthe time nine ships-of-the-line. Had he succeeded in bringing LatoucheTréville to attack his five, he would have hoped, even with such odds, for a decisive victory; but, failing that, he was assured that theToulon fleet would be out of the game for that summer. It wasimportant to bring matters to an issue, for, as he wrote Elliot, hisforce was diminishing daily through the deterioration of ships neverfrom the first fit for their work. Measured by the standard of theships in the Channel, "I have but four sail fit to keep the sea. Iabsolutely keep them out by management. " Except the four, all neededdocking, and there was not a dock open to the British west ofConstantinople. But, while thus keenly anxious to force an action, he was wary toobtain tactical conditions that should insure a success, adequate bothto the risk he ran, and to the object at which he aimed. "I thinktheir fleet will be ordered out to fight close to Toulon, that theymay get their crippled ships in again, and that we must then quit thecoast to repair our damages, and thus leave the coast clear; but mymind is fixed not to fight them, unless with a westerly wind, outsidethe Hières, and with an easterly wind, to the westward of Sicie. "Crippled there, to leeward of their port, the other British divisioncoming up fresh, as a reserve, from the southward, where it layconcealed, would both cut them off, and rescue any of their own fleetthat might have been overpowered. Bickerton's orders were to remaindue south from Port Cros, one of the Hyères, at a distance such that, with the upper canvas furled, his ships could not be seen from theislands, but could keep the main division in sight from theirmastheads. In all cases of anticipated battle, Nelson not only tookhis measures thus thoughtfully, but was careful to put hissubordinates in possession both of his general plans, and, as far aspossible, of the underlying ideas. Thus, in a memorandum issued aboutthis time to the captains, he says: "As it is my determination toattack the French fleet in any place where there is a reasonableprospect of getting fairly alongside of them, I recommend that everycaptain will make himself, by inquiries, as fully acquainted aspossible with the following places, viz. , Hières Bay, [with its threeentrances], Gourjean Bay, (of which I send a chart from the latestsurveys made, ) Port Especia, and, in particular the northern Passageinto Leghorn Roads, from which side it is only, in my opinion, possible to attack an enemy's fleet to advantage; and with the Gulf ofAjaccio. " To these instructions he adds some details of practicalpreparation for anchoring under fire, and the reasons therefor. In thesame spirit, when expecting the Brest fleet in the Mediterranean, hesays: "I am perfectly prepared how to act with either a superior or aninferior force. My mind is firm as a rock, and my plans for everyevent fixed in my mind. " No man ever was served better than Nelson bythe inspiration of the moment; no man ever counted on it less. In communicating his ideas to his subordinates Nelson did not confinehimself to official intercourse; on the contrary, his naturaldisposition impelled him rather to familiar conversation with them onservice subjects. "Even for debating the most important navalbusiness, " we learn through his confidential secretary at this period, "he preferred a turn on the quarter-deck with his captains, whom heled by his own frankness to express themselves freely, to all thestiffness and formality of a council of war. "[63] An interestinginstance of these occasional counsels has been transmitted to us byone of his captains, then little more than a youth, but the last tosurvive of those who commanded ships under him. "Throughout the monthof October, 1804, Toulon was frequently reconnoitred, and the Phoebeand Amazon were ordered to cruize together. Previous to their goingaway Lord Nelson gave to Captains Capel and Parker severalinjunctions, in case they should get an opportunity of attacking twoof the French frigates, which now got under weigh more frequently. Theprincipal one was, that they should not each single out and attack anopponent, but 'that both should endeavour together to take _onefrigate_; if successful, chase the other: but if you do not take thesecond, still you have won a victory, and your country will gain afrigate. ' Then, half laughing, and half snappishly, said kindly tothem as he wished them good-bye, 'I daresay you consider yourselves acouple of fine fellows, and when you get away from me you will donothing of the sort, but think yourselves wiser than I am!'"[64] The game of cat and mouse, off Toulon, occasioned one incident whichgreatly upset Nelson's composure, and led to a somewhat amusingdisplay of ire, excited by a statement of the French admiral, published throughout Europe, that his renowned antagonist had run awayfrom him. On the 13th of June, two French frigates and a brig wereseen under the Hyères Islands, where they had been sent by LatoucheTréville, upon the report that some enemy's cruisers were in theneighborhood. Nelson despatched two frigates after them, which, owingto light winds, did not get near until the next day. The Frenchvessels being then seen from the "Victory" to be close in with thebatteries, the "Excellent, " 74, was sent to support the frigates, andsome time afterwards the other four ships also bore up for the mainentrance to the islands. Upon this, Latouche Tréville got under way, and at about 5 P. M. Came out of the harbor with his eightsail-of-the-line. Nelson's division reduced their canvas, hauling tothe wind in line of battle, on the starboard tack, which, with thethen wind, was with their heads off shore, and the "Excellent" wasrecalled, although she could not rejoin till midnight. In this orderthey hove-to (stopped), with two reefs in the topsails and the mainyards square, at 7. 30 P. M. , which at that time of the year was broaddaylight, and in this general position remained till next morning. As the distance between the hostile bodies was apparently from twelveto fifteen miles, the French admiral's observations may have failed torecognize that the enemy, by backing his topsails, had offered a fairchallenge; else, in his report of this very commonplace occurrence, hecould scarcely have used, concerning the movement of heading south, the expression, _prit chasse_, which, whether rendered "retired, " or"retreated, " or, as Nelson did, "ran away, " was a misrepresentation ofthe facts, and heightened by the assertion that he pursued tillnightfall, and next morning could not see the enemy. Writing to Elliotfour days after the affair happened, Nelson mentioned casually hisview of the matter. "Monsieur La Touche came out with eight sail ofthe line and six frigates, cut a caper off Sepet, and went in again. Ibrought-to for his attack, although I did not believe anything wasmeant serious, but merely a gasconade. " "On the morning of the 15th, "he tells Acton on the same day, "I believe I may call it, we chasedhim into Toulon. " His purpose evidently was, as has been shown, tofight, if the enemy meant business, to leeward of the port, and farenough off to give Bickerton a chance to come up. Great was his wrath, two months later, when Latouche's statement reached him, and he foundthat not only no mention was made of the relative numbers, but thatthe offensive expression quoted had been used. "I do assure you, " hewrote to the Admiralty, enclosing a copy of the day's log, "I know notwhat to say, except by a flat contradiction; for if my character isnot established by this time for not being apt to run away, it is notworth my time to attempt to put the world right. " He might well haverested there, --an imputation that might have injured an untried mancould provoke only a smile when levelled at his impregnable renown;but his ruffled mind would not let him keep quiet, and in privatecorrespondence he vented his rage in terms similar to those used ofthe Danish commodore after Copenhagen. "You will have seen Monsieur LaTouche's letter of how he chased me and how I _ran_. I keep it; and, by G--d, if I take him, he shall _eat_ it. " He is a "poltroon, " a"liar, " and a "miscreant. " It may be added that no admiral, whether aNelson or not, could have abandoned the "Excellent" under theconditions. Immediately after this abortive affair, Nelson, convinced by it thatsomething more than a taunt was needed to bring his enemy under hisguns, stationed frigates at the Hyères, and to cruise thence to theeastward as far as Cape Taillat, to intercept the commerce betweenItaly and Toulon and Marseilles. For this purpose he had recommended, and the Government had ordered, a blockade of all Genoese portsincluding Spezia; Genoa, now the Ligurian Republic, being consideredas much France as Toulon. Nothing, he said, could distress Francemore. This blockade had been but feebly enforced, owing to the lackof small cruisers; but he hoped to attain the same end by the frigatesoff the Hyères. "I really am of opinion, " he told their commander, "that it will force La Touche out. " In the latter, however, he had todo with an opponent of skill as well as of resolution. Firmly imbuedwith the French tradition, and with Bonaparte's instructions, whichsubordinated his local action entirely to the great scheme in whichthe Toulon fleet had its appointed part, Latouche Tréville was neitherto be provoked nor betrayed into an action, by which, however temptingthe promise, his fleet might be made unfit for their intended service. Nelson did him no more than justice, when he said, "I am confident, when he is ordered for any service, that he will risk falling in withus, and the event of a battle, to try and accomplish his orders;" but, short of the appointed time, nothing else could entice him. In vaindid the British admiral bait his trap by exposing frigates, withoutvisible support, to draw him to leeward, while the hostile fleethovered out of sight to windward. The shrewd Frenchman doubtless feltthe temptation, but he distrusted the gifts too plausibly tendered. Besides the interest of the public service, Nelson had the strongestpersonal motives for bringing matters to an issue. The prolongedsuspense and the anxiety were exhausting him, the steady tension evenof the normal conditions fretted him beyond endurance; but when acrisis became accentuated by an appearance that the enemy had eludedhim, his feelings of distress, acting upon an enfeebled organization, and a nervous temperament so sensitive that he started at the meredropping of a rope beside him, drove him almost to distraction. Onsuch an occasion he wrote: "I am absolutely beginning this letter in afever of the mind. It is thick as butter-milk, and blowing a Levanter;and the Narcissus has just spoke me to say, 'she boarded a vessel, and they understood that the men had seen, a few days before, twelvesail of ships of war off Minorca. It was in the dusk, and he did notknow which way they were steering. ' This is the whole story, and alame one. You will imagine my feelings, although I cannot bring mymind to believe. To miss them, God forbid. .. . If I should miss thesefellows, my heart will break: I am actually only now recovering theshock of missing them in 1798. God knows I only serve to fight thosescoundrels; and if I cannot do that, I should be better on shore. "When the weather cleared, and a reconnoissance showed the news wasfalse, his intense relief found expression in the words: "I believethis is the only time in my life, that I was glad to hear the Frenchwere in port. " "The French ships, " he says at another time, "haveeither altered their anchorage, or some of them have got to sea in thelate gales: the idea has given me half a fever. If that admiral wereto cheat me out of my hopes of meeting him, it would kill me mucheasier than one of his balls. Since we sat down to dinner CaptainMoubray has made the signal, but I am very far from being easy. " On the 12th of May, 1804, there was a change of administration inEngland. Earl St. Vincent left the Admiralty, as First Lord, and wassucceeded by Lord Melville. A few days before this Nelson, by ageneral promotion, had become Vice-Admiral of the White, the rank inwhich he died eighteen months later. The return of summer had improved his health from the low conditioninto which it had fallen during the winter, but he did not flatterhimself as to the future. The combination of colorless monotony withconstant racking anxiety slackened the springs of moral energy, which, and which alone, responding joyously to a call to action, afforded thestimulus capable of triumphing over his bodily weakness, and causingit for the moment to disappear. "This is an odd war, " he said, "not abattle!" Tying himself to the ship, in profound sympathy with thecrews, he never went ashore from the time he left Malta in June, 1803, until he reached Gibraltar in July, 1805; nor was he ever outside ofthe "Victory" from July 30, 1803, the day he went on board her fromthe "Amphion. " "Always shut up in the Victory's cabin, " as he himselfwrote, "cannot be very good for the constitution. I think you willfind me grown thin, but never mind. " Other officers, especially of thefrigates, got their occasional runs ashore; but his slight figure wascontinually in view, walking the front of the poop, to the unconsciouscontentment of the men, thus reminded ever that their admiral sharedtheir deprivations. This profound seclusion to the narrow circle ofthe flagship, although often broken by the presence of officers fromthe other vessels, who, whether cruising in company with the fleet, orarriving with tidings from different ports, were daily partakers ofthe admiral's hospitable table, could not but depress him; and therewas with him the constant sense of loss, by absence from those he heldmost dear. "I have not a thought except on you and the French fleet, "he tells Lady Hamilton; "all my thoughts, plans, and toils tend tothose two objects. Don't laugh at my putting you and the French fleettogether, but you cannot be separated. " Yet even towards her his mind is fixed as of old, that she must take aplace second to duty. She had, it appears, insisted upon her wish tocome out to the station to be near him. Malta and Italy were both, hesaid, out of the question. His place was off Toulon, as long as theFrench fleet was there; therefore he could not go into harbor; nay, "Imight absolutely miss you, by leaving the Mediterranean withoutwarning. The other day we had a report the French were out, and seensteering to the westward. We were as far as Minorca when the alarmproved false. " As for coming on board the "Victory" to live, whichshe seems to have suggested, "Imagine what a cruize off Toulon is;even in summer time we have a hard gale every week, and two days'heavy swell. It would kill you; and myself to see you. Much lesspossible to have Charlotte, Horatia, &c. , on board ship! And I, thathave given orders to carry no women to sea in the Victory, to be thefirst to break them! I know, my own dear Emma, if she will let herreason have fair play, will say I am right; but she is like Horatia, very angry if she cannot have her own way. " "Horatia is like hermother; will have her own way, or kick up a devil of a dust, "--anobservation both Greville and Hamilton had had to make. "Your Nelson, "he concludes, "is called upon, in the most honourable manner, todefend his country. Absence to us is equally painful: but, if I hadeither stayed at home, or neglected my duty abroad, would not my Emmahave blushed for me? She could never have heard my praises, and howthe country looks up. " "The call of our country, " he says again, "makes it indispensable for both our honours--the country looks up tothe services of the poorest individual, much more to me, and are younot a sharer of my glory?" Of his daily life on board, and intercourse with others, we haveintimations, fragmentary yet sufficient. "Our days, " he himself says, "pass so much alike that, having described one, you have them all. Wenow [October] breakfast by candle light; and all retire, at eighto'clock, to bed. " "We cruise, cruise, and one day so like another thatthey are hardly distinguishable, but _hopes_, blessed _hopes_, keepsus up, that some happy day the French may come out, then I shallconsider my duty to my country fulfilled. " Of one of these monotonousdays we have received a description from an officer, [65] a member ofthe admiral's mess, who had then too lately entered upon them to feelthe full weight of their deadly sameness. "At 6 o'clock my servant brings a light and informs me of the hour, wind, weather, and course of the ship, when I immediately dress andgenerally repair to the deck, the dawn of day at this season andlatitude being apparent at about half or three-quarters of an hourpast six. Breakfast is announced in the Admiral's cabin, where LordNelson, Rear Admiral Murray, (the Captain of the Fleet, ) CaptainHardy, commander of the Victory, the chaplain, secretary, one or twoofficers of the ship, and your humble servant assemble and breakfaston tea, hot rolls, toast, cold tongue, &c, which when finished werepair upon deck to enjoy the majestic sight of the rising sun(scarcely ever obscured by clouds in this fine climate) surmountingthe smooth and placid waves of the Mediterranean, which supports thelofty and tremendous bulwarks of Britain, following in regular traintheir admiral in the Victory. Between the hours of 7 and 2 there isplenty of time for business, study, writing, and exercise, whichdifferent occupations I endeavour to vary in such a manner as toafford me sufficient employment. At 2 o'clock a band of music playstill within a quarter of 3, when the drum beats the tune called, 'TheRoast Beef of Old England' to announce the Admiral's dinner, which isserved up exactly at 3 o'clock, and which generally consists of threecourses and a dessert of the choicest fruit [a fact which bespeaks thefrequency of communications with the land], together with three orfour of the best wines, champagne and claret not excepted. If a persondoes not feel himself perfectly at his ease it must be his own fault, such is the urbanity and hospitality which reign here, notwithstandingthe numerous titles, the four orders of Knighthood, worn by LordNelson, [66] and the well earned laurels which he has acquired. Coffeeand liqueurs close the dinner about half-past 4 or 5 o'clock, afterwhich the company generally walk the deck, where the band of musicplays for nearly an hour. [67] A 6 o'clock tea is announced, when thecompany again assemble in the Admiral's cabin, where tea is served upbefore 7 o'clock, and, as we are inclined, the party continue toconverse with his lordship, who at this time generally unbendshimself, though he is at all times as free from stiffness and pomp asa regard to proper dignity will admit, and is very communicative. At 8o'clock a rummer of punch with cake or biscuit is served up, soonafter which we wish the Admiral a good night (who is generally in bedbefore 9 o'clock). Such is the journal of a day at sea in fine or atleast moderate weather, in which this floating castle goes through thewater with the greatest imaginable steadiness. " Another medical officer, who served on board the "Victory" soon afterthe writer of the lines just quoted, has transmitted some otherinteresting particulars of Nelson's personal habits and health, whichrelate to the general period now under narration. "An opinion has been very generally entertained, that Lord Nelson'sstate of health, and supposed infirmities arising from his formerwounds and hard services, precluded the probability of his longsurviving the battle of Trafalgar, had he fortunately escaped theEnemy's shot: but the writer of this can assert that his Lordship'shealth was uniformly good, with the exception of some slight attacksof indisposition arising from accidental causes; and which nevercontinued above two or three days, nor confined him in any degree withrespect to either exercise or regimen: and during the last twelvemonths of his life, he complained only three times in this way. It istrue, that his Lordship, about the meridian of life, had been subjectto frequent fits of the gout; which disease, however, as well as hisconstitutional tendency to it, he totally overcame by abstaining forthe space of nearly two years from animal food, and wine, and allother fermented drink; confining his diet to vegetables, and commonlymilk and water. And it is also a fact, that early in life, when hefirst went to sea, he left off the use of salt, which he then believedto be the sole cause of scurvy, and never took it afterwards with hisfood. "His Lordship used a great deal of exercise, generally walking on decksix or seven hours in the day. He always rose early, for the most partshortly after daybreak. He breakfasted in summer about six, and atseven in winter: and if not occupied in reading or writing despatches, or examining into the details of the Fleet, he walked on thequarter-deck the greater part of the forenoon; going down to his cabinoccasionally to commit to paper such incidents or reflections asoccurred to him during that time, and as might be hereafter useful tothe service of his country. He dined generally about half-past twoo'clock. At his table there were seldom less than eight or ninepersons, consisting of the different Officers of the Ship: and whenthe weather and the service permitted, he very often had several ofthe Admirals and Captains in the Fleet to dine with him; who weremostly invited by signal, the rotation of seniority being commonlyobserved by his Lordship in these invitations. At dinner he was alikeaffable and attentive to every one: he ate very sparingly himself; theliver and wing of a fowl, and a small plate of macaroni, in generalcomposing his meal, during which he occasionally took a glass ofchampagne. He never exceeded four glasses of wine after dinner, andseldom drank three; and even those were diluted with either Bristol orcommon water. "Few men subject to the vicissitudes of a Naval life, equalled hisLordship in an habitual systematic mode of living. He possessed such awonderful activity of mind, as even prevented him from taking ordinaryrepose, seldom enjoying two hours of uninterrupted sleep; and onseveral occasions he did not quit the deck during the whole night. Atthese times he took no pains to protect himself from the effects ofwet, or the night air; wearing only a thin great coat: and he hasfrequently, after having his clothes wet through with rain, refused tohave them changed, saying that the leather waistcoat which he woreover his flannel one would secure him from complaint. He seldom woreboots, and was consequently very liable to have his feet wet. Whenthis occurred he has often been known to go down to his cabin, throwoff his shoes, and walk on the carpet in his stockings for the purposeof drying the feet of them. He chose rather to adopt thisuncomfortable expedient, than to give his servants the trouble ofassisting him to put on fresh stockings; which, from his having onlyone hand, he could not himself conveniently effect. "From these circumstances it may be inferred, that though LordNelson's constitution was not of that kind which is generallydenominated strong, yet it was not very susceptible of complaint fromthe common occasional causes of disease necessarily attending a Navallife. The only bodily pain which his Lordship felt in consequence ofhis many wounds, was a slight rheumatic affection of the stump of hisamputated arm on any sudden variation in the state of the weather;which is generally experienced by those who have the misfortune tolose a limb after the middle age. His Lordship usually predicted analteration in the weather with as much certainty from feelingtransient pains in his stump, as he could by his marine barometer;from the indications of which latter he kept a diary of theatmospheric changes, which was written with his own hand. "His Lordship had lost his right eye by a contusion which he receivedat the siege of Calvi, in the island of Corsica. The vision of theother was likewise considerably impaired: he always therefore wore agreen shade over his forehead, to defend this eye from the effect ofstrong light; but as he was in the habit of looking much through aglass while on deck, there is little doubt that had he lived a fewyears longer, and continued at sea, he would have lost his sighttotally. "[68] The business hours of the day from seven to two were spent by Nelsonlargely with his secretaries. We know from Colonel Stewart that in theBaltic, where his command was more numerous than in the Mediterranean, his habit was to get through the ordinary business of the squadronbefore eight o'clock; for the rest, the greater part of the detailwork would fall upon the Captain of the Fleet, then Rear-AdmiralGeorge Murray, who would require only general instructions and littleinterference for carrying on the laborious internal administration ofthe fleet. The admiral's energies were sufficiently taxed inconsidering and meeting, so far as his resources would permit, thenumerous and complicated demands for external services in thedifferent quarters of his wide command--the ingenious effort to inducetwo and two to make five, in which so much of the puzzle of lifeconsists. His position necessarily involved extensive diplomaticrelations. Each British Minister around the shores of theMediterranean had his own particular care; the British admiral was inconfidential communication with all, and in every movement had toconsider the consequences, both of what he did and of what he leftundone. It was a day when force ruled, and all the nations of Europe, whether they wished or not, had to put their chief trust in the sword, and in those who bore it. Not the least of Nelson's qualifications forhis post was that he possessed intimate knowledge and experience ofpolitical conditions in the Mediterranean, knew the peoples and therulers well, and to great sagacity and sound judgment added a temperat once firm and conciliatory. "He had in a great degree, " said acontemporary who knew him well, [69] "the valuable but rare quality ofconciliating the most opposite tempers, and forwarding the publicservice with unanimity amongst men not of themselves disposed toaccord;" and although the remark referred primarily to his conduct inthe naval service, it will readily be seen that this aptitude isnowhere more useful than in the tangled maze of conflicting nationalinterests. "My line of conduct, " he wrote to Hobart, a year aftertaking his command, "in obedience to the spirit of his Majesty'sinstructions communicated through your Lordship, has been simplythis, --to conciliate all, to protect all from French rapacity. I havebeen honoured with your letter of January 7th, and it has given memost sincere pleasure that my whole conduct in my command here hasbeen such as to meet his Majesty's approbation. " The new Ministry, upon assuming office, requested him in the most flattering terms tocontinue his direct correspondence on political subjects with them, aswith their predecessors. Yet, while conciliatory, he could at times be curt and arbitraryenough. Fault was found with the blockade of Genoa on the ground thatit did not comply with the requirements of international law; thecomplaint resting, apparently, on the statement that the blockaderscould not be seen from Genoa. Nelson replied that the proof of evidentdanger to vessels seeking to enter or leave, rested on the fact thatcaptures were made; and it is, on the face of it, absurd to say thatthere can be no danger to a vessel seeking to enter a blockaded port, because the blockading vessels are not visible from the latter. Muchmore depends upon their number, disposition, and speed. "From myknowledge of Genoa and its Gulf, " said Nelson, "I assert without fearof contradiction, that the nearer ships cruise to Genoa, the morecertain is the escape of vessels from that port, or their entranceinto it insured. I am blockading Genoa, according to the orders of theAdmiralty, and in the way I think most proper. Whether modern law orancient law makes my mode right, I cannot judge; and surely of themode of disposing of a fleet, I must, if I am fit for my post, be abetter judge than any landsman, however learned he may appear. Itwould be the act of a fool to tell Europe where I intend to place theships, for the purpose of effectually obeying my orders; not a captaincan know it, and their positions will vary, according to theinformation I may receive. .. . I endeavour, as well as I am able, toobey my orders, without entering into the nice distinctions oflawyers. I will not further take up your time on a subject which, without being a lawyer, merely as a man, could have admitted of nodispute. " Along with much truth, there was in this a certain amount ofspecial pleading, as appeared when he took the further position that, to intercept ships from Genoa, bound to the Atlantic, there was nobetter place than the Gut of Gibraltar. When a definition ofinternational law is stretched as far as that, it will have littleelastic force left. A petty, yet harassing, diplomatic difficulty, curiously illustrativeof maritime conditions at that day, ran unsettled through almost thewhole of his command. Malta, under the Knights, had been always at warwith the Barbary Powers; and there was trouble in impressing upon therulers of the latter that, when it passed into British hands, itspeople and ships were under British protection. Several Maltesevessels had been taken by Algerine cruisers, and their crews enslaved. When Nelson came out in 1803, he found pending these cases, and alsothe question of compelling, or inducing, the Dey to receive back theBritish consul, whom he had expelled with insult. In the absence of aBritish representative, the negotiations were intrusted wholly to theadmiral. Nelson's feelings were strongly excited. He was tenacious ofeverything he conceived to touch his country's honor, and long servicein the Mediterranean had made him familiar with the outrages on itsdefenceless coasts practised by these barbarians, under the pretenceof war with the weaker states. Even in the remote and impoverishednorth of Sardinia, the shepherds near the beaches watched their flockswith arms beside them, day and night, to repel the attacks ofmarauders from the sea. Not only were trading-vessels seized, butdescents were made upon the shore, and the inhabitants swept off intoslavery. Speaking of one such case in 1799, he had said: "My bloodboils that I cannot chastise these pirates. They could not showthemselves in the Mediterranean did not our Country permit. Never letus talk of the cruelty of the African slave trade, while we permitsuch a horrid war. " But he knew, both then and afterwards, that GreatBritain, with the great contest on her hands, could not spare theships which might be crippled in knocking the barbarians' strongholdsabout their ears, and that no British admiral would be sustained in acourse that provoked these pirates to cast aside the fears thatrestrained them, and to declare war on British commerce, which, as itwas, he had difficulty to protect. He estimated ten ships-of-the-lineas the force necessary, in case the batteries at Algiers were to beattacked. Exmouth, twelve years later, with fuller information, thought and found five to be sufficient. Nelson's conduct and self-control were sorely tested by the necessityof temporizing with this petty foe, who reckoned securely on theembarrassments of Great Britain. He acted with great judgment, however, holding a high tone, and implying much in the way of menace, without at any time involving himself in a definite threat, fromwhich he could not recede without humiliation; careful and precise inhis demands, but never receding from them, or allowing them to beevaded, when once made; sensible of the difficulties in his way, aswell those raised by his own Government as those dependent upon hisopponent, but equally aware that he held in his hands, if authorizedto use it, the power to suppress the career of depredation, upon whichthe Dey relied to support his revenue, and to content his officers. Personally, he favored a short and summary proceeding, accordant tohis own decided character. The Dey proving immovable when firstsummoned, he proposed to the British Government "that on the 28th ofApril next, when, if he means to send his cruisers to sea, they willbe out, that, on that day, every ship under my command should havestrict orders (to open on that day) to take, sink, burn, and destroyevery Algerine, and that on that day the port of Algiers should bedeclared in a state of blockade. Thus the Dey could get neithercommerce, presents, or plunder; and, although the other Powers mayrejoice at the war with us, yet I am firmly persuaded that it will bemost advantageous to us for the next hundred years. " At the same time, with his usual circumspection, he issued a general direction to allcommanders of convoys to carry their charges well clear of theAlgerine coast, until matters were settled. In the end, the BritishMinistry yielded much more than Nelson approved, but, however sorelyagainst the grain, he carried out all his instructions with scrupuloussubordination. It was only three days before the active campaign beganwith the sortie of the French fleet, that he was rejoined by the shipto whose captain were intrusted the final arrangements with Algiers. For his diplomatic and naval correspondence, Nelson had two principalsecretaries, public and private, both, awkwardly enough, named Scott;but the latter, being a clergyman and chaplain of the ship, wascolloquially brevetted Doctor, a distinction which, for convenience, will be observed when it is necessary to mention him. He had becomeknown to Nelson while serving in the same capacity with Sir HydeParker, and had been found very useful in the negotiations atCopenhagen. An accomplished linguist and an omnivorous reader, Dr. Scott was doubly useful. Upon him devolved the translating of alldespatches and letters, not only from, but to, foreign courts andofficials; for Nelson made a point of sending with all such papers acopy in the language of the person addressed, and an apology forfailing to do so sometimes appears, on account of his secretary'sabsence. The latter was also a man of wide information, acquired, notas his superior's chiefly was, by mingling among men and dealing withaffairs, but from books; and the admiral, while rightly valuing theteachings of experience above all, was duly sensible that one's ownexperience is susceptible of further extension through that of others, imparted either by word or pen. Nelson entertained a persuasion, soScott has told us, that no man ever put his hand to paper withouthaving some information or theory to deliver, which he fancied was notgenerally known, and that this was worth looking after through all theencumbering rubbish. For the same reason, besides being naturallysociable, he liked to draw others into conversation, and to startsubjects for discussion, from which, when fairly under way, he wouldwithdraw himself into silence and allow the company to do the talking, both in order to gather ideas that might be useful to himself, andalso to observe character transpiring in conversation. Bourrienne hastold us that Bonaparte took pleasure in provoking similar debates. Scott himself, a man essentially unpractical, afforded Nelsonamusement as well as interest, and was the object of a good deal ofinnocent chaffing. He would, in those after-dinner gatherings whichGillespie mentions, lead the doctor into arguments on literature, politics, Spanish and even naval affairs, and would occasionallyprovoke from him a lecture on navigation itself, to the greatentertainment of Murray, Hardy, and the other officers present. [70]"Ah, my dear Doctor!" he would say chaffingly, "give me knowledgepractically acquired--experience! experience! experience! andpractical men!" Nelson, however, was too big and too broad a man not to know that, while by doing the same thing, or bearing the same thing, manytimes, --by experience, that is, --one acquires a facility not otherwisecommunicable, in a novel situation a man is abler to act, the more hehas availed himself of the knowledge and the suggestions of others. Absorbed with the duties of his station, it was of the firstimportance that he should possess every information, and ponder everyidea, small and great, bearing upon its conditions, as well as uponthe general political state of Europe in that period of ominouswaiting, wherein great events were evidently coming to birth. Dayafter day, Dr. Scott's biographer tells us, was passed by the twotogether, sitting in two black leathern arm-chairs with roomy pockets, stuffed with papers, written and printed, journals and pamphlets, gathered from every source--from prizes, from passing neutral vessels, from cruisers returning from neutral or friendly ports, or picked upby the doctor himself in the not infrequent trips on which he wassent, ostensibly for pleasure, but with a keen eye also to thecollection of intelligence. Marked externally by the abstraction of abook-worm, entirely unpractical and heedless in the common affairs oflife, and subject to an occasional flightiness of action, the resultin part of an injury to his head while in the service, Scott gavethose who saw him going about an impression of guilelessness, whichcovered him from the suspicion of having a mission. He had, says hisbiographer, "in union with a capacity for very difficult services, asimplicity that often put him at disadvantage in worldly matters, andit became a common joke with the Admiral, that 'the doctor wouldalways want somebody to take care of him. '" Nelson had everything read to him; first of all, newspapers, whichwere sent regularly to the fleet by British agents in variousquarters. Upon them chiefly, and not upon England, he depended forknowledge of what was happening; in Great Britain itself, as well ason the Continent. From ten to twelve weeks was no uncommon length oftime for him to be without word from home. "I never hear fromEngland, " he wrote to Elliot in the summer of 1804, "but as we manageto get the Paris papers regularly through Spain. From ten days to afortnight we get them from their date at Paris: therefore we know thevery great events which are passing in Europe--at least as much as theFrench people;" a shrewd limitation. These, therefore, together withSpanish, Italian, and other sheets, it was Scott's daily task to readaloud to his chief, who found therein not only information butamusement. He insisted also upon hearing the numerous ephemeralpamphlets, of which the age was prolific, and which found their way tohim. His quickness in detecting the drift of an author was marvellous. Two or three pages of a pamphlet were generally sufficient to put himin complete possession of the writer's object, while nothing was tootrivial for his attention where there existed a possibility of itscontributing a clue to the problems of his command. Not the leastonerous of the doctor's duties was the deciphering of private lettersfound in prizes, a channel by which important public interests areoften betrayed. Nelson's quickness to see the bearing and value of anapparently trifling mention, dropped by the way by a careless pen, rendered such an exercise of his ingenuity at once a pleasure and aprofit. The public secretary, Mr. Scott, was equally struck with thealertness and sagacity of his employer's mind. "I have heard much ofLord Nelson's abilities as an officer and statesman, but the accountof the latter is infinitely short. In my travels through the service Ihave met with no character in any degree equal to his Lordship; hispenetration is quick, judgment clear, wisdom great, and his decisionscorrect and decided: nor does he in company appear to bear any weighton his mind. " It was with difficulty, after a prolonged session, thatthe doctor could at times beg off, and leave, stuffed in the arm-chairpockets, for another day's work, a dozen or two of such letters, sealed to Nelson by his imperfect eyesight and inadequate mastery ofother tongues. The arm-chairs, lashed together, formed at times acouch upon which the admiral "slept those brief slumbers for which hewas remarkable;" in those moments, doubtless, when anxiety about theenemy's movements did not permit him to go regularly to bed. In common with all those closely associated with Nelson, Dr. Scott wasparticularly struck with the kindliness and cordiality of his bearingand actions; which is the more to be noted, because no one, probably, had more occasion to see the movements of irritability, of impatience, which lay very near the surface, than did his secretaries, throughwhom his most vexatious work must be done. That he was vehement toexpress annoyance has appeared frequently in these pages. The firstLord Radstock, who was senior to him in the service, and knew himwell, writing to his son, then a midshipman in the "Victory, " isconstant and extreme in his admiration of Nelson; but he gives thecaution to be careful of impressions made upon a chief upon whomadvancement depends. Quick in all his ways, a moment's heedlessness, possibly misunderstood or misrepresented, may produce lasting injury. "Lord Nelson is of so hasty a temper, that in spite of all his naturalgoodness, I should fear that he would too readily give ear to thosein whom he had placed his confidence. He is a man of strong passions, and his prejudices are proportionate. " "On many occasions, " saysanother writer, "Lord Nelson evinced an impatience that has beenconsidered as irreconcileable with magnanimity; but the secretworkings of his soul have not been received into the account oranalysis of character, for we find the same individual, while employedin watching the French fleet off Toulon, display the most unexampledpatience and forbearance, and never betray the smallest symptom ofinquietude or disappointment. "[71] Murray, the Captain of the Fleet, when first offered his appointment, had hesitated to accept. UponNelson urging him, he gave as his reason that the nature of the dutiesoften led to disagreements between the admiral and his chief of staff, and that he was unwilling to risk any diminution of the regardexisting between him and his Lordship; a remark true enough in thegeneral, but clearly of somewhat special application. Nelson assuredhim that, should anything go contrary to his wishes, he would waivehis rank and explain or expostulate with him as his friend, and when, after two years' service, Murray had to leave the ship, he refused toreplace him, --he would have Murray or none. In truth, such readinessto flare up must needs be the defect of that quality of promptness, that instant succession of deed to thought, which was a distinguishingfeature of Nelson's genius and actions. Captain Hillyar more than oncealludes to this trait as characteristic of the fleet, to which itschief had transmitted his own spirit. "I have had to-day to lament, "he says, speaking of some trifling disappointment, "the extremepromptitude with which we all move when near his lordship. " But, while traces of this failing may be detected here and there bythe watchful reader, as Nelson himself gleaned useful indicationsamid the rubbishy mass of captured correspondence, there survives, among the remains left by those in daily contact with him, only therecord of a frank, open bearing, and unfailing active kindness. "Setting aside his heroism, " wrote Dr. Scott after Trafalgar, "when Ithink what an affectionate, fascinating little fellow he was, howdignified and pure his mind, how kind and condescending his manners, Ibecome stupid with grief for what I have lost. " "He is so cheerful andpleasant, " wrote the public secretary, Mr. Scott, "that it is ahappiness to be about his hand. " Dr. Gillespie notes "his noblefrankness of manners, freedom from vain formality and pomp (sonecessary to the decoration of empty little great men), which can onlybe equalled by the unexampled glory of his naval career, and thewatchful and persevering diligence with which he commands this fleet. ""Nelson was the man to _love_" said Captain Pulteney Malcolm, who knewintimately both him and Wellington. "I received Captain Leake, " Nelsonhimself says, speaking of an army officer on a special mission to theMediterranean, "with that openness which was necessary to make myselfas well acquainted with him in three days, as others might do in asmany years. I have given him all the knowledge of the men, theirviews, &c. &c. , as far as I have been able to form a judgment. " Theremark is valuable, for it shows that frankness and cordiality wererecognized by him as the wisest and most politic method of dealingwith men. "Our friend, Sir Alexander, " he says testily, "is a verygreat diplomatic character, and even an admiral must not know what heis negotiating about. You shall judge, viz. , 'The Tunisian envoy isstill here, negotiating. He is a moderate man; and, apparently, thebest disposed of any I ever did business with. ' Could even the oldestdiplomatic character be drier? I hate such parade and nonsense. " Captain Hillyar, who commanded one of the frigates that were evercoming and going, writes in his journal: "If extreme kindness andattention could render me happy, I have this day experienced both fromour revered and good commander-in-chief. How can I repay his kindness?By obeying his injunctions 'not to be in a hurry to get married, '[72]or by a continued perseverance in discharging those duties withalacrity and honour, which he is more immediately concerned in?" "LordNelson talked a great deal against matrimony yesterday, and I feelwill not trust me at Malta, while we are capable of remaining at sea. It was all, however, in a good natured way. He is going to charge mewith two of his boys [midshipmen], I am pleased that an opportunity isoffered for showing my gratitude in a small degree for his almostfatherly kindness. I wish you knew him; if he has failings, reflections on his virtues cause them to be forgotten, and the minddwells with pleasure on a character where bravery, generosity, andgood nature, are joined to a heart that can feel for the woes ofothers, and delights in endeavouring to alleviate them. " Hillyar wasexperiencing what Radstock had remarked: "Gain his esteem, and thereis nothing he will not dash through to put you forward. " "Gain hisesteem, and you will have nothing to fear, for I know not a morehonourable man existing, or one who would more readily do you justicein all respects. " "I am well aware, " wrote another young captain toNelson himself, "of the good construction which your Lordship has everbeen in the habit of putting on circumstances, although wearing themost unfavourable appearances. .. . Your Lordship's good opinionconstitutes the summit of my ambition, and the most effective spur tomy endeavours. " Nelson loved to bestow promotion, when deserved, on the spot, to givea man his spurs, if it might be, on the field of battle; but vacancieswould not always offer at the happy moment. A brother of Hillyar's wasa midshipman in one of two boats, sent to visit a suspicious vessel. A sudden and staggering fire killed the lieutenant in command, besides disabling a number of the boats' crews. The men hesitated; butthe lad, left in charge, cheered them on and carried the vessel byboarding. Although he was but a couple of months over fifteen, Nelsongave him at once his commission into the vacancy made by thelieutenant. One very dark night, the "Victory" being under way, amidshipman, at the imminent risk of his life, leaped into the sea tosave a seaman who had fallen overboard, and otherwise would have beendrowned. Nelson gave him, too, his commission the following morning;but, seeing the jubilation among the young man's messmates, andthinking the act might be a dangerous precedent, he leaned over thepoop and said, smiling good-naturedly, "Stop, young gentlemen! Mr. Flin has done a gallant thing today, and he has done many gallantthings before, for which he has now got his reward. But mind, I'llhave no more making lieutenants for men falling overboard. " The power thus to reward at discretion, and speedily, though liable toabuse, was, he claimed, essential to the due influence of acommander-in-chief; his subordinates must feel that it was in hispower to make their future, to distinguish them, and that they were inso far dependent upon him. Nevertheless, with him as with others, personal interest had a weight which qualified his argument. Thepremature[73] and disastrous promotion of his stepson, at his request, by St. Vincent, was a practical abuse which in most minds wouldoutweigh theoretical advantages. Writing to Sir Peter Parker aboutthis time, he said, "You may be assured I will lose no time in makingyour grandson a postcaptain. It is the only opportunity ever offeredme, of showing that my feelings of gratitude to you are as warm andalive as when you first took me by the hand: I owe all my honours toyou, and I am proud to acknowledge it to all the world. " Suchenduring gratitude is charming to see, and tends to show that Nelsonrecognized some other reason for Parker's favor to himself thandeference to Suckling's position; but it is scarcely a good workingprinciple for the distribution of official patronage, although theyounger Parker was a good and gallant officer. Among the military duties that weighed upon Nelson, not the least wasthe protection of British trade. The narrow waters of theMediterranean favored the operations of privateers, which did not haveto go far from their ports, and found shelter everywhere; for thelittoral states, in their weakness and insecurity, could but feeblyenforce neutrality either in their continental or insular territories. In fact, both parties to the war, Great Britain and France, derivedfrom the infringement of neutrality advantages which checked theirremonstrances, and gave the feebler nations an apt retort, when takento task in their painful efforts to preserve an attitude that wasrather double-faced than neutral. If France, on the one hand, wasderiving a considerable revenue from Spanish subsidies, and subsistingan army corps upon Neapolitan territory, Great Britain, on the other, could scarcely have maintained her fleet in the Gulf of Lyons, ifunable to get fresh provisions and water from neutral ports; for, saveGibraltar and Malta, she had none that was her own or allied. Underthese conditions, small privateers, often mere rowboats, but under thecolors of France or the Italian Republic, swarmed in every port andinlet; in the Adriatic, --a deep, secluded pocket, particularlyfavorable to marauding, --in the Ionian Islands, along the Barbarycoast, upon the shores of Spain, and especially in Sicily, whosecentral position and extensive seaboard commanded every trade-routeeast of the Balearics. Nelson's correspondence is full of remonstrances addressed to thevarious neutral states--including even Austria, whose shore-line onthe Adriatic was extensive--for their toleration of these abuses, which rested ultimately upon the fear of Bonaparte. He has, also, constant explanations to make to his own Government, or to Britishministers at the different Courts, of the acts of his cruisers indestroying the depredators within neutral limits, when foundred-handed. He makes no apologies, but stands firmly by his officers, who, when right, could always count upon his support in trouble. Henever left a man in the lurch, or damned him with faint approval. "Theprotection afforded the enemy's privateers and rowboats in thedifferent neutral ports of these seas, so contrary to every known lawof neutrality, is extremely destructive of our commerce. .. . Althoughtheir conduct is infamous, yet their doing wrong is no rule why weshould. There is a general principle which I have laid down for theregulation of the officers' conduct under my command--which is neverto break the neutrality of any port or place; but never to consider asneutral any place from whence an attack is allowed to be made. It iscertainly justifiable to attack any vessel in a place from whence shemakes an attack. " "I very fully approve every part of Captain ----'sconduct on the above occasion, " he writes to the Admiralty in such acase. The supplying of convoys, therefore, was ceaseless, for thedepredations of the marauders were unending. "I am pulled to pieces bythe demands of merchants for convoys, " Nelson said; and he recognizedthat it must be so, for he entirely disapproved of even a fast-sailingvessel attempting to make a passage unprotected. "I wrote to theAdmiralty for more cruisers until I was tired, " he told Ball, "andthey left off answering those parts of my letters. The late Admiraltythought I kept too many to the eastward of Sicily; the Smyrna folkscomplain of me, so do the Adriatic, so they do between Cape de Gatteand Gibraltar. If I had the vessels, I do assure you not one of themshould go prize-hunting: that I never have done, I am a poorer manthan the day I was ordered to the Mediterranean command, by upwards of£1, 000; but money I despise except as it is useful, and I expect myprize money is embarked in the Toulon fleet. " "I am distressed forfrigates, " was his continual cry. "From Cape St. Vincent to the headof the Adriatic I have only eight; which, with the service of watchingToulon, and the necessary frigates with the fleet, are absolutely notone half enough. " For military duties, "frigates are the eyes of afleet. I want ten more than I have in order to watch that the Frenchshould not escape me, and ten sloops besides, to do all duties. " Fornine stations which ought to be filled, "I have but two frigates;therefore, my dear Ball, have a little mercy, and do not think I haveneglected the protection of the trade of Malta. " This was written soonafter joining the station, and he represents the number as diminishingas time passed. "It is shameful!" he cries in a moment of intenseanxiety. In this fewness of cruisers he was forced to keep his vesselsconstantly on the go, --to the Levant, to the Adriatic, to Sicily, toItaly, --scouring the coasts for privateers, gathering merchant shipsby driblets, picking up information, and at the end of the roundreturning to Malta with their fractions of the large convoy. When thiswas assembled, a frigate or a ship-of-the-line, with one or twosmaller ships of war, sailed with it for Gibraltar at a date fixed, approximately, months before. Meanwhile, at the latter place a similarprocess of collection had been going on from the ports of the westernMediterranean, and, after the Malta convoy arrived, the whole startedtogether in charge of a division, composed usually of vessels of warthat had to return to England for repairs. To arrange and maintain this complicated process, and to dovetail itwith the other necessary cruising duties, having in considerationwhich ships should first go home, required careful study and longforesight--infinite management, in fact. "The going on in the routineof a station, " he tells Ball, who seems to have trod on his toes, "ifinterrupted, is like stopping a watch--the whole machine gets wrong. If the Maidstone takes the convoy, and, when Agincourt arrives, thereis none for her or Thisbe, it puzzles me to know what orders to givethem. If they chace the convoy to Gibraltar, the Maidstone may havegone on with it to England, and in that case, two ships, unless Ibegin to give a new arrangement, will either go home without convoy, or they must return [to Malta] in contradiction to the Admiralty'sorders to send them home; I am sure you see it in its true point ofview. " "I dare not send a frigate home without a convoy, " he sayslater. "Not an officer in the service bows with more respect to theorders of the Admiralty than myself, " he writes St. Vincent; "but I amsure you will agree with me, that if I form plans for the sending homeour convoys, and the clearing the different parts of the station fromprivateers, and the other services requisite, and that the Admiraltyin some respects makes their arrangements, we must clash. " Then hepoints out how the Admiralty diverting a ship, unknown to him, hastumbled over a whole train of services, like a child's row of blocks. An extremely critical point in the homeward voyage was the firsthundred miles west of Gibraltar; and it was a greater thorn inNelson's side, because of a French seventy-four, the "Aigle, " whichhad succeeded in entering Cadiz just after he got off Toulon. For theordinary policing of that locality he assigned a division of threefrigates, under a Captain Gore, who possessed his confidence. "Theenemy's privateers and cruisers, " he tells him, "are particularlydestructive to our trade passing the skirts of the station. "Privateering was thus reduced; but when a convoy sailed, he triedalways to have it accompanied through that stage by a ship of sizesufficient to grapple with the "Aigle. " For a while, indeed, he placedthere an eighty-gun ship, but the gradual deterioration of hissquadron and the increase of Latouche Tréville's obliged him to recallher, and at times his anxiety was great; not the less because Gore, like other frigate captains, entertained the fancy that his threefrigates might contend with a ship-of-the-line. "Your intentions ofattacking that ship with the small squadron under your command arecertainly very laudable; but I do not consider your force by any meansequal to it. " The question of two or three small ships against onelarge involves more considerations than number and weight of guns. Unity of direction and thickness of sides--defensive strength, thatis--enter into the problem. As Hawke said, "Big ships take a good dealof drubbing. " Howe's opinion was the same as Nelson's; and Hardy, Nelson's captain, said, "After what I have seen at Trafalgar, I amsatisfied it would be mere folly, and ought never to succeed. "[74]What Hardy saw at Trafalgar, however, was not frigates againstships-of-the-line, but vessels of the latter class opposed, smalleragainst greater. It seems singular, with such a weak link in the chain of communicationfrom the Mediterranean to England, that the Admiralty, on the outbreakof the war with Spain, in the latter part of 1804, should have dividedNelson's command at this very point, leaving as a somewhat debatableground, for mutual jealousy, that through which valuable interestsmust pass, and where they must be transferred. The reason and mannerof this division, impolitic and inopportune as it was, and bitterly asNelson resented it, seem to have been misunderstood. Convinced that hecould not endure another winter such as the last, he made a formalapplication, about the middle of August, 1804, for permission to gohome for a while. "I consider the state of my health to be such as tomake it absolutely necessary that I should return to England tore-establish it. Another winter such as the last, I feel myself unableto stand against. A few months of quiet may enable me to serve againnext spring; and I believe that no officer is more anxious to servethan myself. " In accordance with this last intimation, which speakshis whole heart, he wrote privately to the First Lord that he wouldlike to come back in the spring, if his health were restored, as hebelieved it would be; and he assured him that his second, Bickerton, whose rank did not entitle him to the chief command under ordinaryconditions, was perfectly fitted to hold it during his absence--inshort, to keep the place warm for his return. Nelson knew that the Admiralty was besieged with admirals, many seniorto himself, seeking for employment, and that it would be verydifficult for it to resist the pressure for the vacancy in "myfavourite command, " to resume which he was impelled by both his senseof duty and his love of glory. He wrote therefore to Elliot, and tothe King of the Two Sicilies, in the same sense as he had to Melville, recalling his well-tried devotion to the interests of that Court, which a successor might not equally show, and suggesting that hiscause would be strengthened by an application for his return on thepart of the King. The latter consequently intimated to the BritishGovernment that he hoped Lord Nelson would be sent back. He was, intruth, so much agitated over the prospect of his going, that heoffered him a house in either Palermo or Naples, if he wished toremain in the South to recruit; an offer which Elliot, equally uneasy, urged him to accept. The Government did exactly what was asked. Nelson received permissionto go to England, when he felt it necessary, leaving the command inthe hands of Bickerton; but at the same time the Admiralty had to meetthe rush of claimants for the vacancy, all the more pressing becauserumors were afloat of a Spanish war, which would make theMediterranean not only the most important, but, in prize-money, themost lucrative command. Among the applicants was Sir John Orde, whohad been nursing a technical grievance ever since he had been passedover, in Nelson's favor, for the command of the detachment with whichthe Battle of the Nile was fought. Nelson's leave was issued on the6th of October, and on the 26th Orde was given a small squadron--fiveships-of-the-line--to blockade Cadiz. Being senior to Nelson, and ofcourse to Bickerton, he could only have this position by reducing thelatter's station, which had extended to Cape Finisterre. The linebetween the two commands was drawn at the Straits' mouth, a rathervague phrase, but Gibraltar was left with Nelson. Orde thus got thestation for prize-money, and Nelson that for honor, which from youthuntil now he most valued. "The arrangement, " wrote his friend, LordRadstock, "will be a death-stroke to his hopes of the galleons; but asyour chief has ever showed himself to be as great a despiser of richesas he is a lover of glory, I am fully convinced in my own mind that hewould sooner defeat the French fleet than capture fifty galleons. " Nevertheless, Nelson was sorely aggrieved, and complained bitterly tohis correspondents. "I have learnt not to be surprised at anything;but the sending an officer to such a point, to take, if it is aSpanish war, the whole harvest, after all my trials (God knowsunprofitable enough! for I am a much poorer man than when we startedin the Amphion, ) seems a little hard: but _patienza_. " "He is sent offCadiz to reap the golden harvest, as Campbell was to reap my sugarharvest. It's very odd, two Admiralties to treat me so: surely I havedreamt that I have 'done the State some service. ' But never mind; I amsuperior to those who could treat me so. " His contempt for money, however acquired, except as a secondary consideration, remainedunchanged. "I believe I attend more to the French fleet than makingcaptures; but what I have, I can say as old Haddock said, 'it nevercost a sailor a tear, nor the nation a farthing. ' This thought is farbetter than prize-money;--not that I despise money--quite thecontrary, I wish I had one hundred thousand pounds this moment. " "I amkeeping as many frigates as possible round me, " he wrote to his friendBall, "for I know the value of them on the day of battle: and comparedwith that day, what signifies any prizes they might take?"[75] Nor didsuch utterances stand alone. "I hope war with Spain may be avoided, "he wrote. "I want not riches at such a dreadful price. Peace for ourCountry is all I wish to fight for, --I mean, of course, an honourableone, without which it cannot be a secure one. " But his outlays werevery heavy. Besides the £1, 800 annually paid to Lady Nelson, he gaveLady Hamilton £1, 200 a year, exclusive of what was spent on the houseand grounds at Merton; and it may be inferred from Dr. Gillespie thatthe cost of the cabin mess, beyond the table money allowed by theGovernment, was assumed by him. He himself said, early in the cruise, "Unless we have a Spanish war, I shall live here at a great expense, although Mr. Chevalier [his steward] takes every care. " "God knows, inmy own person, I spend as little money as any man; but you[76] know Ilove to give away. " That he was thus sore was most natural; but it was also natural thatthe Government should expect, in view of his strong representationsabout his health, that the three weeks between the issuing his leaveand Orde's orders would have insured his being on his way home, beforethe latter reached his station. Had things fallen out so, it would nothave been Nelson, the exceptional hero of exceptional services, butBickerton, a man with no peculiar claims as yet, who would have lostthe prize-money; for Nelson himself had just won a suit against St. Vincent, which established that the moment a commander-in-chief lefthis station, his right lapsed, and that of the next flag-officercommenced. Nor was the division of the station an unprecedentedmeasure. It had been extended from the Straits to Cape Finisterre atthe time St. Vincent withdrew from the Mediterranean, in 1796; and in1802, when Lord Keith asked for additional aids, on account of theenormous administrative work, the Admiralty made of the request apretext for restricting his field to the Mediterranean, a step whichKeith successfully resisted. Before Nelson received his leave he had begun to change his mind aboutgoing home. This was due, partly, to a slight betterment in hishealth, which he at this time mentions; chiefly, it would seem, to theprospects of a Spanish war. This, by doubling the number of hisenemies and the quarters whence they might come, contributed to thepleasurable excitement that was always a tonic to his physical frame, and roused the eager desire for conspicuous action, which was his mostprominent passion. Indications also assured him that the expectationof the French coming out, in which appearances had so often deceivedhim, was now on the point of being realized; that Bonaparte'sprojects, whatever they were, were approaching maturity. His "guess, "founded on the reports before him, was wonderfully penetrative. He didnot see all the way through the French mill-stone, but he saw verydeep into it; his inference, indeed, was one in which intuition andsagacity bore equal shares. "If the Russians continue increasing theirnaval force in this country [that is, in the eastern Mediterranean], Ido not think the French will venture to the eastward; therefore, Irather expect they will, as the year advances, try to get out of thestraits; and should they accomplish it with 7, 000 troops on board, Iam sure we should lose half our West India Islands, for I think theywould go there, and not to Ireland. Whatever may be their destination, I shall certainly follow, be it even to the East Indies. " The lastallusion is interesting, for it shows the wide flight of hisspeculations, which had found utterance before in the casual remarkthat his ships were provisioned for a voyage to Madras; and, even as aguess, it struck perilously near one of Bonaparte's purposes. Thesplendid decision, formulated so long before the case arose, to followwherever they went, held in its womb the germ of the great campaign ofTrafalgar; while in the surmise that the Toulon fleet was bound to theWest Indies, the arrow of conjecture had gone straight to thebull's-eye. In this same letter, addressed to General Villettes, at Malta, formerly his coadjutor at the siege of Bastia, Nelson, in the intimacyof friendship, reveals what was to him at once the secret of healthand the fulfilment of desire; the congenial atmosphere in which hisbeing throve, and expanded to fulfil the limits of his genius. "Such apursuit would do more, perhaps, towards restoring me to health thanall the doctors; but I fear" (his application for leave having gonein) "this is reserved for some happier man. Not that I complain; Ihave had a good race of glory, but we are never satisfied, although Ihope I am duly thankful for the past; but one cannot help, being atsea, longing for a little more. " "I hope, " he had written a few monthsearlier to Lord Minto, "some day, very soon, to fulfil the warmestwishes of my Country and expectations of my friends. I hope you may beable, at some debate, to say, as your partiality has said before, 'Nelson has done more than he has done before;' I can assure you itshall be a stimulus to my exertion on the day of battle. .. . Whateverhappens, I have run a glorious race. " On the 12th of October Nelson received a piece of news which elicitedinstantaneously a flash of action, illustrative at once of thepromptness of his decisions and of the briskness of temper that hasbeen noted already. A letter arrived from Captain Gore, commanding thedetachment outside of the Straits, that two frigates, sent from theBrest squadron by Admiral Cornwallis, had arrived, with a captainsenior to himself, who had taken him under his orders, and carried twoof Nelson's frigates off Cadiz to intercept the Spanish treasure-fleetexpected there from America. Cornwallis's action had been taken byorders from England, but no communication to that effect, either fromhim or from the Admiralty, reached Nelson at this moment. Astounded bya measure which could scarcely fail to cause war, and convinced, as hesaid, that Spain had no wish to go to war with Great Britain, he gavehimself a night to pause; but early next day he wrote to theAdmiralty, intimating pretty plainly that, if done by its direction, this was not the way the commander of the Mediterranean fleet shouldreceive word of so momentous a step taken in his district, while toGore he sent emphatic orders to disobey Cornwallis, although thelatter was Nelson's senior. Summing up with admirable lucidity thefacts before him, and thereby proving that the impression under whichCornwallis's action probably was taken was erroneous, he said: "Unlessyou have much weightier reasons than the order of Admiral Cornwallis, or that you receive orders from the Admiralty, it is my most positivedirections that neither you, or any ship under your orders, do molestor interrupt in any manner the lawful commerce of Spain, with whom weare at perfect peace and amity. " It is permissible, because instructive, to note that in this order, while Nelson amply provides for discretion on the part of hissubordinate, he throws the full weight of his authority on thedifficult horn of a possible dilemma, the act--so momentous to anofficer--of disobedience to a present superior; in this case thecaptain sent by Cornwallis. Contrast this with the Government's ordersto the commander of the troops at Malta, when it wished him to send agarrison to Messina. [77] Instead of saying, "You will send so manymen, _unless_ you think you _cannot_ spare them, " its orders ran:"You will send, _if_ you think you _can_ spare them. " Of course, asNelson invariably experienced, an officer addressed in the latterstyle found always a lion in his path. So his orders to Gore were not, "Obey, _if_" but "Disobey, _unless_;" and Gore knew, as every man inthe Mediterranean knew by long trial, that, if he disobeyed, he wouldhave at his back, through thick and thin, the first sea-officer inGreat Britain. But Nelson's orders were always stamped with thepositive, daring, lucid character of his genius and its conceptions;and so, except in unworthy hands, they were fulfilled in spirit aswell as in letter. An interesting illustration of this trenchant clearness is to be foundin instructions given to the captain of the "Donegal, " an eighty-gunship, sent under very critical circumstances to cruise off Cadiz, inSeptember, 1803. It appears to the author not only characteristic ofNelson, but a perfect example of the kind of directions a junior wouldwish to have in a difficult case, when desirous to carry out thespirit of his superior's orders. It explains itself. 26th September, 1803. TO CAPTAIN SIR RICHARD JOHN STRACHAN, BART. , H. M. SHIP DONEGAL. The occurrences which pass every day in Spain forbode, I fancy, a speedy War with England; therefore it becomes proper for me to put you on your guard, and advise you how to act under particular circumstances. By looking at the former line of conduct on the part of Spain, which she followed just before the commencement of the last War, we may naturally expect the same events to happen. The French Admiral Richery was in Cadiz, blocked up by Admiral Man; on August the 22nd, they came to sea, attended by the Spanish Fleet, which saw the French safe beyond St. Vincent, and returned into Cadiz. Admiral Man very properly did not choose to attack Admiral Richery under such an escort. This is a prelude to what I must request your strict attention to; at the same time, I am fully aware that you must be guided, in some measure, by actual circumstances. I think it very probable, even before Spain breaks with us, that they may send a Ship or two of the Line to see L'Aigle round Cape St. Vincent; and that if you attack her in their presence, they may attack you; and giving them possession of the Donegal, would be more than either you or I should wish, therefore I am certain it must be very comfortable for you to know my sentiments. From what you hear in Cadiz, you will judge how far you may venture yourself in company with a Spanish Squadron; but if you are of opinion that you may trust yourself near them, keeping certainly out of gun-shot, send your Boat with a letter to the Spanish Commodore, and desire to know whether he means to defend the French Ships; and get his answer in writing, and have it as plain as possible. If it be 'yes, that he will fire at you if you attack the French under his protection, ' then, if you have force enough, make your attack on the whole body, and take them all if you can; for I should consider such an answer as a perfect Declaration of War. If you are too weak for such an attack, you must desist; but you certainly are fully authorized to take the Ships of Spain whenever you meet them. Should the answer be ambiguous, you must then act as your judgment may direct you, and I am sure that will be very proper. Only recollect, that it would be much better to let the French Ships escape, than to run too great a risk of losing the Donegal, yourself, and the Ship's company. I am, &c. NELSON AND BRONTE. This letter fulfils his own request to the Admiralty: "All I wish andsubmit to their Lordships is, that if the business is left to me, myorders may be decisive. " Later in the same day that Nelson received Gore's letter, theAdmiralty's orders arrived, sent, as despatches too often were, by avessel so small and slow that it would seem they counted upon herinsignificance to elude an enemy's notice. The delay served, as hasbeen said, to give proof of the rapidity of Nelson's action; thereceipt of the orders enabled him also to show how much clearer werehis conceptions of adequacy than those of ordinary men. To stoptreasure-ships, or to embargo merchant-ships, when difficulty wasthreatening, was no new idea to the British Government. The latter hadbeen done with Baltic merchantmen at the time of the Armed Neutrality. In the case of Spain, it was a measure particularly efficacious, forthe financial solvency and belligerent capacity of that countrydepended upon the galleons, which brought to her the tribute of hercolonies; and her relations and dealings with France at this time wereso partial and suspicious as to justify precautions. Evidently, however, such a step, being avowedly preventive and not offensive, should be taken in such a way as to avert all chance of possibledisaster. Several Spanish frigates being expected, the BritishGovernment charged four vessels of the same rate with the task ofarresting them. Nelson, the instant he got his orders, detached to thespot an eighty-gun ship, to which he added four other cruisers, thinking, as he said in his orders to the captain selected, that "thisis a service of the highest importance, and that an officer of yourrank and experience should be employed therein. " With such oddsagainst him, the Spanish commander would need no militaryjustification for submission. As it was, he resisted, necessitating afight, which under the circumstances was barbarous and brutal, andended in one of the Spanish vessels blowing up with several women onboard; a result due wholly to the blundering lack of foresight whichsent a corporal's guard to do the work of a sheriff's posse. This incident, of the order to arrest the treasure-ships, which wasmade general for all vessels of that class, was probably thedetermining occasion of Nelson's decision to remain in theMediterranean. War with Spain, with consequent increased activity onthe part of France, though not certain, became probable. There was atthat time on board the "Victory" a Dr. Lambton Este, who had gone tothe Mediterranean in a civil capacity, and was on his way home. Nelson, hoping to return soon himself, asked Este to remain until hestarted, and to accompany him in a worn-out seventy-four, the"Superb, " which he was holding for that purpose. It seems that, inlooking forward to the resumption of his command, he expected it wouldbe the scene of a more wide-spread political activity, especially inthe far East where Este had been employed, and that, for this purpose, he wished to attach the latter to his person. "There may be moreoccupation there for us all, hereafter, than we just now foresee, ormay expect. " In confirmation of this general forecast, we are told by Dr. Scottthat, when the admiral left England before Trafalgar, arrangements hadbeen made with the Foreign Office for Este with six clerks to beattached to the flagship, to conduct the diplomatic correspondence. The fact is doubly interesting. It shows, on the one hand, theaccuracy of Nelson's foresight as to the vast importance theMediterranean was about to assume, to meet which he thus was makingprovision in a general way; although neither he nor any other mancould have anticipated the extraordinary, complicated snarl of thepolitical threads in Napoleon's later years. The cares from these, itmay be said in passing, were by Nelson's death devolved uponCollingwood; who, though a strong man, was killed by them, throughgeneral debility resulting from confinement, and through organicinjury produced by bending over his desk. On the other hand, it cannotbut be grateful to those who admire the hero, to see that Nelsonlooked forward to no inglorious ease, but to a life of strenuous work, as well as, if it might be so, of military honor. Had he lived, we mayhope, the days after Trafalgar would not have been the grave of hisrenown. On the first of November his decision was taken. He sent for Este andsaid, "Oh, my good fellow! I have abandoned the idea of going toEngland, at present. I shall not go yet, and when I may go is quiteuncertain--must depend upon events, and upon my own precarious health;at the same time, I am doing you an evident injustice, by detainingyou here so long in uncertainty. " Este of course expressed hiswillingness to remain while needed, but Nelson interrupted him, saying, "No, _my_ wish is that you should go, --I am anxious that youshould go, and go without further delay. To tell you the truth, I amnot entirely disinterested. Go home; get confirmed in yourappointment, according to my desire, and return to me as soonafterwards as you can. Should I retain my command in theMediterranean, with the powers already conceded to me, I shall requireyour assistance. " It seems probable that he was anxious to get someone home as rapidly as possible, to forestall, if time permitted, afinal recall, which the appointment of a successor would be. "Longbefore this time, " he had written Lady Hamilton, "I expect, anotheradmiral is far on his way to supersede me. I should for your sake, andfor many of our friends, have liked an odd hundred thousand pounds [bya Spanish war]; but, never mind. If they give me the choice of stayinga few months longer, it will be very handsome; and, for the sake ofothers, we would give up very much of our own felicity. " The despatches and routine papers were got ready rapidly, and placedin charge of Este, who sailed for Lisbon, in a sloop-of-war, on the6th of November, furnished with orders to all officials to expeditehim on his way, and particularly to captains not to communicate withthe ship, because the plague, then raging in Gibraltar, would involveher, if visited, in the delays of quarantine. On the 18th of November, off Cape St. Vincent, Este met the "Swiftsure, " seventy-four, bringingOrde out. It has been charged that the latter discourteously delayedto notify Nelson of his taking over part of the station. [78] Itappears, however, from this encounter, that his letter to thateffect, dated the 17th, [79] though headed "off Cadiz, " was actuallyprepared before he reached his position there. It was forwarded toNelson by the "Anson, " whose captain was senior officer of thedivision till then blockading the port, whom Orde relieved and sent onwith his despatch. The "Anson" joined Nelson on the 15th of December. The "Swiftsure, " which was also destined to his squadron, did notreach him until the 25th. It seems, therefore, fair to acquit Orde ofa discourtesy as aimless as it would be reprehensible. Just before Este's departure Nelson had reconnoitred Toulon. A newvice-admiral had hoisted his flag in place of Latouche Tréville, whohad died on the 20th of August. "He has given me the slip, " wroteNelson, who felt himself balked of his vengeance. "The French paperssay he died of walking so often up to the signal-post, upon Sepet, towatch us: I always pronounced that would be his death. " His successorwas Villeneuve, the predestined victim of Trafalgar. "They now amusethemselves with night-signals, " Nelson informed the First Lord; "andby the quantity of rockets and blue lights they show with everysignal, they plainly mark their position. These gentlemen must soon beso perfect in theory, that they will come to sea to put theirknowledge into practice. Could I see that day, it would make mehappy. " The time was now not far distant. The weariness of waiting wassoon to give way to the anxious fever of doubtful and protractedpursuit, of prolonged uncertainty and steadfast endurance, throughwhich he advanced to his final triumph, just as he had to those of thepast. The seizure of the Spanish treasure-ships, with its lamentablecatastrophe, took place on the 5th of October. Nelson had the news onthe 8th of November, which, extraordinary as it may appear, was beforethe fact was known in Madrid. On the 10th of November, when theBritish minister received his passports upon his own demand, no wordhad reached there. On the 15th, Nelson was informed that a Britishvessel had been fired upon by the batteries of Barcelona, which was anerror; but receiving at the same time a letter from the minister, probably to the effect that he would break off relations on the 10th, he inferred that war existed, and issued orders for a general seizureof Spanish vessels of war and commerce throughout the station. Thiswas done on his own responsibility, but he guarded himself bystringent provisions against any injury beyond detention beinginflicted; and he alleged, very reasonably, that a commander-in-chiefwho never got letters from home less than two months old must act uponhis own motion. "I am completely in the dark. It is now more than twomonths since the John Bull [the last despatch boat] sailed. " "I haveset the whole Mediterranean to work, " he tells Lady Hamilton on the23d; "and if I had had the spare troops at Malta at my disposal, Minorca would at this moment have had English colours flying. " ASwedish ship, carrying a Spanish regiment from Barcelona to the latterisland, was among the first captures. "With respect to my making war upon Spain, and Sir John Orde nothaving done it, " so he wrote to Elliot, "I believe you will think Ihave acted not precipitately, but consistent with the firmness of JohnBull. I can't tell what schemes ministers may have; but when I amwithout orders, and unexpected occurrences arise, I shall always actas I think the honour and glory of my King and Country demand. Uponthe most mature and serious consideration I can give the subject, thepresent lays within the compass of a nutshell. Our Ministers demandcertain points to be conceded to them; they, to give a spur, detainthe Spanish treasure. Spain, the moment she hears of it, kicks yourminister out of Madrid; a plain proof they had not acceded to ourpropositions. Indeed, Mr. Frere, [80] you will see by his letter, didnot believe it would have a favourable termination, even had not thefrigates been detained. I send your Excellency his letters. I feel Ihave done perfectly right. No desire of wealth could influence myconduct; for I had nothing to take worth two-pence to me. Sir JohnOrde was sent, if it was a Spanish war, to take the money; but untilhe saw my orders, he did not act. I suppose he was fearful of thatresponsibility which I am ever ready to take upon me; and now he is towallow in wealth, whilst I am left a beggar. But such things are. Ireceive the kindest letters from Lord Melville and the Secretary ofState, but they think the French fleet is prize enough for me. " Nowonder Nelson found that diplomatists were slow, measured by himselfas a standard; but what a wonderful instinct it shows in him, that, with action ever prompt to the verge of precipitancy, he made so fewblunders in deed. There are several errors of fact in his summary ofreasons, but his action was absolutely well-timed--to the very hour. Meanwhile, and up to the 15th of December, when Orde's letter wasreceived, no reply had come to his application for leave, and nointimation of a successor. A fresh complication here arose by theentire break-down of one of his two junior admirals--Rear-AdmiralCampbell--whose health became so affected that it was necessary tosend him immediately home. He quitted the fleet on the 4th ofDecember. Nelson rightly felt that he himself could not go, leavingBickerton without any assistant. He went further; for, when a rumorcame that Orde was to relieve him, he determined that he would offerhis services to him, as second, until a successor to Campbell shouldarrive. As there was friction between himself and Orde, who had, besides, a not very pleasant official reputation, this intention, totake a lower place where he had been chief, was not onlyself-sacrificing, but extremely magnanimous; it was, however, disfigured by too much self-consciousness. "I have wrote to LordMelville that I should make such an offer, and that I entreated him tosend out a flag-officer as soon as possible, but I dare say Sir JohnOrde is too great a man to want my poor services, and that he willreject them; be that as it may, you will, I am sure, agree with me, that I shall show my superiority to him by such an offer, and theworld will see what a sacrifice I am ready to make for the service ofmy King and Country, for what greater sacrifice could I make, thanserving for a moment under Sir John Orde, and giving up for thatmoment the society of all I hold most dear in this world?" Orde's letter reached Nelson in Pula Roads, in the Gulf of Cagliari, at the southern extremity of Sardinia; an out-of-the-way positionwhich probably accounts for much of its delay. He remained there, orin the Gulf of Palmas, a little to the westward, for about a week, andon the 19th of December left for his station off Cape San Sebastian. At the latter place, on Christmas Day, he was joined by the"Swiftsure, " which brought him a great batch of official mail that hadcome out with Orde. He thus received at one and the same time hisleave to go home and the Admiralty's order reducing his station. Unluckily, the latter step, though taken much later than the issuingof his leave, had become known to him first, through Orde; and theimpression upon his mind remained with that firmness of prejudicewhich Radstock had noted in him. He does not appear at any time tohave made allowance for the fact that his command was cut down under areasonable impression that he was about to quit it. Immediately after the "Swiftsure" joined at Rendezvous 97, he took thefleet off Toulon. The enemy was found to be still in port, but therumors of an approaching movement, and of the embarkation of troops, were becoming more specific. He remained off the harbor for at leasta week, and thence went to Madalena, where he anchored on the 11th ofJanuary, 1805. This was, though he knew it not, the end of the longwatch off Toulon. Short as the time was, Nelson had already experienced theinconvenience of a senior admiral, lying, like an enemy, on the flankof his communications with Great Britain, and dealing as he pleasedwith his vessels. One frigate at least had been sent already toEngland, without his knowledge and consent. "I have in a formerletter, " he tells the First Lord, "stated my opinion freely upon thestations of Gibraltar and Cadiz being given to the same officer; forwithout that is done, our convoys can never be considered safe. Thereis also another consideration, why the Officer at Gibraltar should beunder the orders of the Admiral commanding the Mediterraneanfleet--which is, that any admiral independent of that station, takesall the stores he chooses, or fancies he wants, for the service of hisfleet; thereby placing the fleet in the Gulf of Lyons in greatdistress for many articles. " Off Toulon, having a large official mail to make up in reply to thatbrought by the "Swiftsure, " he thought it both quicker and safer, under all the conditions of the time, to send it to Lisbon. Hetherefore called on board the "Victory" a smart young frigate-captain, William Parker, a nephew of Lord St. Vincent, gave him orders to takethe despatches to Lisbon, and added, "Sir John Orde takes my frigatesfrom me, and sends them away in some other direction from what I wish. I cannot even get my despatches home. You must contrive to get to thewestward and go into Lisbon, and avoid his ships. I have not signedyour orders, " alluding to memorandum instructions separate from theformal orders, "because Sir John Orde is my senior officer; but, if itshould come to a Court Martial, Hardy can swear to my handwriting, andyou shall not be broke. Take your orders, and good bye; and remember, Parker, if you cannot weather _that fellow_, I shall think you havenot a drop of your old uncle's blood in your veins. " The memorandumdirected him to pass Cape Spartel in the night, steering to thesouthward and westward to avoid Orde, and ended thus: "Bring-to [stop]for nothing, if you can help it. Hoist the signal for quarantine, andthat you are charged with dispatches. If you are forced to speak by asuperior officer, show him only my order for not interfering with you;and unless he is an admiral, superior to me, you will obey my ordersinstead of any pretended ones from him, from my superior officer. " Parker executed his commission successfully, but in doing so met witha curious adventure. Leaving Gibraltar with a north wind, favorablefor his purpose, he passed Spartel as directed, and, the night beingmoonlight, saw in the distance Orde's squadron cruising under easysail. Unluckily, one of the outlying lookout frigates discovered him, gave chase, and overtook him. Her captain himself came on board, andwas about to give Parker orders not to proceed to the westward, Ordejealously objecting to any apparent intrusion upon his domain. Parkerstopped him hastily from speaking on the quarter-deck, within earshotof others, and took him into the cabin. The stranger had been one ofNelson's old midshipmen and a favorite; had started with him in the"Agamemnon, " and by him had been made a commander after the Nile. "Captain Hoste, " said Parker, "I believe you owe all your advancementin the service to my uncle, Lord St. Vincent, and to Lord Nelson. I amavoiding Sir John Orde's squadron by desire of Lord Nelson; you knowhis handwriting; _I must go on_. "[81] (Parker being senior to Hoste, the latter could not detain him by his own authority; and heunderstood from this avowal that Orde's orders, if produced, wouldbecome a matter of record, would be disobeyed, and a court-martialmust follow. ) "The question of a court-martial would be verymischievous. Do you not think it would be better if you were not tomeet the 'Amazon' this night?" Captain Hoste, after a littlereflection, left the ship without giving his admiral's orders toParker. [82] Having determined not to leave Bickerton alone, Nelson decided to keepsecret his own leave to return to England. "I am much obliged by theirLordships' kind compliance with my request, which is absolutelynecessary from the present state of my health, " he writes on the 30thof December; "and I shall avail myself of their Lordships' permission, the moment another admiral, in the room of Admiral Campbell, joins thefleet, unless the enemy's fleet should be at sea, when I should notthink of quitting my command until after the battle. " "I shall neverquit my post, " he tells a friend, "when the French fleet is at sea, asa commander-in-chief of great celebrity once did, "--a not verygenerous fling at St. Vincent. "I would sooner die at my post, thanhave such a stigma upon my memory. " "Nothing has kept me here, " hewrites Elliot, "but the fear for the escape of the French fleet, andthat they should get to either Naples or Sicily in the short days. Nothing but gratitude to those good Sovereigns could have induced meto stay one moment after Sir John Orde's extraordinary command, forhis general conduct towards me is not such as I had a right toexpect. " During this last month of monotonous routine, while off Toulon and atMadalena, he had occasion to express opinions on current generaltopics, which found little room in his mind after the French fleetbegan to move. There was then a report of a large expedition forforeign service forming in England, and rumor, as usual, had athousand tongues as to its destination. "A blow struck in Europe, "Nelson wrote to Lord Moira, "would do more towards making usrespected, and of course facilitate a peace, than the possession ofMexico or Peru, "--a direction towards which the commercial ambitionsof Great Britain had a traditional inclination, fostered by somemilitary men and statesmen, who foresaw the break-up of the Spanishcolonial system. "Above all, I hope we shall have no buccaneeringexpeditions. Such services fritter away our troops and ships, whenthey are so much wanted for more important occasions, and are of nouse beyond enriching a few individuals. I know not, if thesesentiments coincide with yours; but as glory, and not money, hasthrough life been your pursuit, I should rather think that you willagree with me, that in Europe, and not abroad, is the place for us tostrike a blow. " "I like the idea of English troops getting into theKingdom of Naples, " he tells Elliot at this same time; whence it maybe inferred that that was the quarter he would now, as upon his firstarrival, choose for British effort. "If they are well commanded, I amsure they will do well. They will have more wants than us sailors. "The expedition, which sailed the following spring, was destined forthe Mediterranean, and reinforced the garrisons of Gibraltar and Maltato an extent that made the latter a factor to be considered in thestrategy of the inland sea; but when it arrived, Nelson had left theMediterranean, not to return. As regards general politics, Nelson, writing to the Queen of Naples, took a gloomy view of the future. The Prime Minister of the TwoSicilies, Sir John Acton, had some time before been forced out ofoffice and had retired to Palermo, an event produced by the pressureof French influence, which Nelson regarded now as absolutely dominantin that kingdom, and menacing to Europe at large. "Never, perhaps, wasEurope more critically situated than at this moment, and never was theprobability of universal Monarchy more nearly being realized, than inthe person of the Corsican. I can see but little difference betweenthe name of Emperor, King, or Prefect, if they perfectly obey hisdespotic orders. Prussia is trying to be destroyed last--Spain islittle better than a province of France--Russia does nothing on thegrand scale. Would to God these great Powers reflected, that theboldest measures are the safest! They allow small states to fall, andto serve the enormous power of France, without appearing to reflectthat every kingdom which is annexed to France, makes their ownexistence, as independent states, more precarious. " How shrewd aprophecy this was as regards Prussia and Spain, those two countrieswere to learn by bitter experience; and remote Russia herself, thoughshe escaped the last humiliation, saw in the gigantic hosts whoseonset a few years later shook her to her centre, the armed subjects ofthe many smaller states, in whose subjugation she had acquiescedduring the period of the Czar's moral subservience to Napoleon. Nelson's essentially military genius had in political matters a keenlysensitive intuition of the probable action of his fellow-warrior, Bonaparte. "Russia's going to war in the way I am sure she will, willcause the loss of Naples and Sardinia; for that Court will not send100, 000 men into Italy, and less are useless for any grand purpose. ""Your Excellency's summary account of the situation of Naples sincethe negotiations with Russia, " he wrote to Elliot in October, "areperfectly clear; but the times are such that kingdoms must not beplayed with. So far from Russia assisting Naples, it may involve her, without the greatest care and circumspection, in total ruin. Naplesmust not be hastily involved in war with France. Sicily must be saved. The Calabrians must be kept from the entrance of French troops. If weare consulted, we must assist Naples in keeping off the blow as longas possible. " That Napoleon's action would have been as here surmised, had his purposes then tended towards the Mediterranean instead of theEnglish Channel, we have his own assertion. "At the solicitation ofyour ambassador at St. Petersburg, " wrote he to the Queen of Naples, three months later, referring to the same subject, "ten thousandRussians have been sent to Corfu. .. . If it had entered into my plansto make war upon the King of Naples, I should have done it on theentrance of the first Russian in Corfu, but I wish for peace withNaples, with Europe entire, with England even. " Napoleon's wishes forpeace, except on the condition of having his own way, are scarcely tobe taken seriously; but his care to keep things quiet in the Southcorroborates the other indications of his firm purpose to invadeEngland. He was too astute to precipitate troubles elsewhere whilethat was pending. The appearance of the Russians in Corfu, althoughunwise in Nelson's view, relieved his fears for the islands and theMorea, and enabled him to reduce a little his detachment about theheel of Italy. Towards the middle of December Nelson had received information, whichwas substantially correct, "from various places, and amongst others, from the King of Sardinia [then in Gaeta], that the French wereassembling troops near Toulon, and had taken some of the best troopsand a corps of cavalry from the Riviera of Genoa. Every seaman waspressed and sent to Toulon. On the 16th the Active spoke a vessel fromMarseilles, who reported that seven thousand troops had embarked onboard the French fleet. " It was in Madalena Roads that the long-expected summons came at last. In the afternoon of January 19, 1805, blowing a heavy gale of windfrom the northwest, the two lookout frigates from off Toulon came insight, with the signal flying that the French fleet was at sea. At 3P. M. They anchored near the "Victory. " Three hours later Nelson hadleft Madalena forever. FOOTNOTES: [59] This sentence refers to the governor; not to Villettes, as theconstruction might indicate. [60] Unfit for sea, and kept at Naples for political reasons. [61] The Honourable Mr. Waldegrave, afterwards Admiral Lord Eadstock. [62] Five French ships-of-the-line, returning from the West Indies, hadtaken refuge in Ferrol. [63] Life of Rev. A. J. Scott, p. 124. [64] Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, p. 122. A portion of thisincident has before been quoted, in another connection (vol. I. P. 355, note). It is repeated, because again applicable, to illustrate a differenttrait of Nelson's character. [65] The letter of this gentleman, Dr. Gillespie, from which a quotationhas already been made, was published in the London "Times" of October 6, 1894. [66] This incidental remark may be noted, as bearing upon the statement, now rejected, that his orders were put on especially for battle. [67] There is here no mention of smoking; nor has any allusion to it, or totobacco, caught the author's eye in Nelson's letters. [68] Dr. Beatty's Narrative of the Death of Lord Nelson. Nicolas, vol. Vii. P. 259. [69] Sir William Hotham. [70] Many of these details are taken with little alteration from the "Lifeof Rev. A. J. Scott. " [71] Memoir of Sir Thomas Hardy, in Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelsonvol. Iii. P. 234. [72] Hillyar was then engaged to a lady in Malta. [73] As Lady Nelson's first marriage was in 1779, Josiah Nisbet could nothave been eighteen when made a commander, in 1797. [74] Phillimore's "The Last of Nelson's Captains, " p. 146. [75] Flag-officers had a share in all prizes taken by vessels of theirsquadrons. [76] Davison. [77] _Ante_, p. 192. [78] Pettigrew, vol. Ii. P. 444. [79] Nicolas, vol. Vi. P. 288. [80] Late British minister to Spain. [81] Author's italics. [82] The whole of this account is taken from the Life of Sir WilliamParker. Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, pp. 125-129. CHAPTER XX. THE ESCAPE AND PURSUIT OF THE TOULON FLEET. --NELSON'S RETURN TOENGLAND. JANUARY-AUGUST, 1805. AGE, 46. To understand rightly the movements of Nelson during the first monthsof 1805, up to his return to England in August, and to appreciatefully the influence of this closing period of his career upon theplans and fortunes of Napoleon, it is necessary to state briefly theprojects of the latter, as formulated in his correspondence. The great object of the Emperor was to invade England, crossing theChannel with the army, 150, 000 strong, which for two years past he hadbeen assembling and drilling in the neighborhood of Boulogne. To thisend all his plans were subsidiary--to it all movements at this momentwere intended to conduce. He had no illusions as to the difficultiesof the enterprise; he recognized fully that the odds were againstsuccess, but he had too often achieved the apparently impossible topermit the word to stop him in an attempt, which, if accomplished, would cause all other obstacles to disappear from his path ofconquest. There were chances in his favor. Warily and steadfastly headvanced, step by step, determined to take no risk that could by theutmost care be changed into security, but equally resolved to dare thehazard, if by the military movements set in action by his unsurpassedgenius, he could for a moment obtain the particular combination whichwould, to use his own phrase, make him master of the world. What ifthe soldiers of the Grand Army never returned from England? There werestill in France men enough, as good as they were before his energizingspirit wrought them into the force which in its might trod theContinent under foot. Like Nelson dying at Trafalgar, it too wouldhave laid down its life, leaving its work finished. Neither man norarmy could have a prouder memorial. The particular combination upon which Napoleon was willing to stakeeverything was a naval control of the Straits of Dover for a very fewdays, coincident with the presence there of an army ready and equippedto cross at once. The latter condition was merely a question ofpreparation--long, tedious, and expensive, but perfectly feasible. Inthe early months of 1805 it was realized. The army, a substantial, absolute fact, was there, awaiting only the throwing of the bridge. The naval part of the problem was far more difficult. In the face ofthe naval supremacy of Great Britain, the sought-for control couldonly be casual and transient--a fleeting opportunity to be seized, utilized, and so to disappear. Its realization must be effected bystratagem, by successful deception and evasion. The covetedsuperiority would be not actual, but local, --the French fleet in forcethere, the British fleet, though the greater in force, elsewhere; theweight of the former concentrated at one point by simultaneousmovements of its different detachments, which movements had been socalculated and directed that they had misled the British divisions, and, of themselves, diverted them from the decisive centre. Subsidiaryto this main effort, Napoleon also contemplated a simultaneous landingof some twenty thousand men in Ireland, which, like the navalmovements, would distract and tend to divide the unity of the Britishresistance. The British admirals considered this project to be easierthan the invasion of Great Britain, and it engaged their much moreserious attention. There were three principal French detachments to be united, --in Bresttwenty ships, in Toulon ten, in Rochefort five. To these the outbreakof the war between Great Britain and Spain added the forces of thelatter kingdom, in Ferrol and Cadiz, aggregating fifteen serviceableships; but this was not until March, 1805. Of the three Frenchcontingents, the one from Rochefort was small; and, as a factor, although important, it was not essential. Its failure might weaken orimpede the progress of the general movement, without entirelydestroying it; but it was of necessity that the Toulon and Brestdivisions both should fulfil their missions, accurately and on time, if the great combination, of which they were parts, was to advance toa triumphant conclusion. This emphasized to the British theimportance, which Nelson always so keenly felt, of meeting the enemyimmediately after they left port. Once away, and their destination indoubt, the chances in favor of any scheme were multiplied. In theirgreatest and final effort, Cornwallis, off Brest, was fortunate, inthat the plans of the Emperor first, and afterwards unusual weatherconditions, retained the French fleet there in harbor; a result towhich the material efficiency of his own ships, and their nearness totheir base, much contributed. Upon Nelson, with his crazy ships, on the other hand, fell the burdenof counteracting a successful evasion of the Toulon fleet, of foiling, by sagacious and untiring pursuit, through immense and protracteddiscouragements, the efforts of the one division which had beencommitted to his watch. Although it became much superior to his ownforce, he drove it out of the position in the West Indies firstappointed for the meeting, followed it back to Europe, arrived beforeit, and then, finding it had gone to Ferrol, carried his squadron, without orders, counselled simply by his own genius, to the aid ofCornwallis; by which act the British navy, to the number ofthirty-five ships-of-the-line, was massed in a central position, separating the two enemy's bodies, and able to act decisively againsta foe approaching from either direction. Thus a second time heprevented the enemy from forming a junction, unless they fought forit--an alternative Napoleon wished to avoid. To him fell all thestrain of uncertainty, all the doubtful and complicated mental effort, all the active strategic movement, of the campaign, and to himconsequently has been attributed justly the greater meed of glory;though care must be taken not to ignore or undervalue the well-playedparts of other admirals, which were essential to the success of thegreat defensive campaign comprehended under the name Trafalgar. The point selected by the Emperor for the meeting of his navaldivisions, in both the unsuccessful attempts made in 1805, was theWest Indies. There was the most powerful foreign arsenal, Martinique, left in the hands of France, and there the greatest single interest ofthe wide-spread commerce upon which depended the life of GreatBritain. The latter, therefore, was specially sensitive to anythingthreatening the safety of the West India Islands. "I should think theWest Indies the more likely place for the French to succeed in, " wroteNelson to Ball, on the 6th of September, 1804. "Suppose the Toulonfleet escapes, and gets out of the Straits, I rather think I shouldbend my course to the westward; for if they carry 7, 000 men--with whatthey have at Martinico and Guadaloupe--St. Lucia, Grenada, St. Vincent, Antigua, and St. Kitts would fall, and, in that case, Englandwould be so clamorous for peace that we should humble ourselves. " Thisis a noteworthy passage, for it shows great sagacity of prediction, and, in announcing beforehand his resolve, --of which this is not thesole previous mention, --it dispels entirely the idea that he wasdecoyed to the West Indies. It explains, also, the remarkable outburstof gratitude that hailed him on his return from a chase which hadbeen wholly unsuccessful as regards his own chief object--theannihilation of the French fleet. He had failed to find it, but he haddriven the enemy out of the West Indies before they could do anyserious injury to the vital interests of the country. A man cannot besaid to be decoyed, because, in pursuance of a judgment deliberatelyformed beforehand, he does the thing which the moment demands; unlessit can be shown that he has thereby uncovered greater interests. ThisNelson did not do. He saved the West Indies, and returned in time toprotect Great Britain and Ireland from invasion. It is through the perplexities of this momentous period that we havenow to follow him, and we shall do so to most advantage by taking asour clue his own avowed primary motive of action, the finding anddestroying of the French fleet. A man dealing with Napoleon was boundto meet perplexities innumerable, to thread a winding and devioustrack, branching out often into false trails that led nowhere, andconfused by cross-lights which glittered only to mislead. In such acase, as in the doubtful paths of common life, the only sure guide toa man's feet is principle; and Nelson's principle was the destructionof the French fleet. No other interest, his own least of all, coulddivert him from it. For it he was willing not only to sacrificefortune, but to risk renown; and so, amid troubles manifold, he walkedsteadfastly in the light of the single eye. While Napoleon's object remained the same throughout, his methodsreceived various modifications, as all plans must do whencircumstances change. In his original intention the execution of themain effort was intrusted to Latouche Tréville, by far and away thebest admiral he had. Upon his death, the Toulon fleet was committed toVilleneuve. Its sailing was to take place as nearly as possible at thesame time as that of the Rochefort division. They were to go to theWest Indies, proceed at once, independently, to offensive operations, then to unite and return together to Rochefort. Napoleon's calculationwas that the British, impressed by this simultaneous departure, anduncertain about the enemy's purpose, must send at once thirtyships-of-the-line in pursuit, in order to secure all the differentquarters they would think endangered. This diversion, if realized, would facilitate the operations of the Brest fleet, which was to landan army corps in Ireland, and then to cover the crossing of the mainbody at Boulogne into England; the precise character of its movementsdepending necessarily upon conditions of wind at the moment ofexecution. The Rochefort ships sailed on the 11th of January. For a week beforeand a week after that date the winds at Toulon hung between northeastand southeast, favorable, therefore, for a voyage to the Straits ofGibraltar; but Villeneuve argued, judiciously, that a fleet intent onevasion only, and to avoid fighting, should move with great speeduntil lost to sight--that is, should start with a very fresh breeze, the direction of which was of secondary moment. This view of thematter escaped Nelson's attention, and therefore contributed seriouslyto mislead him in his reasoning as to the enemy's probable object. On the 17th of January the wind at Toulon shifted to north-northwest, with signs of an approaching gale, such as the Gulf of Lyons is notedfor. The next morning Villeneuve sent a division to drive awayNelson's lookouts. This duty was imperfectly performed. It should havebeen done by a frigate squadron strong enough to force them out ofsight of the main body, and having orders to rejoin the latter at adistant rendezvous. As it was, the British frigates did not lose touchof the hostile fleet, which sailed that evening. They dogged it lateinto the night, going at times thirteen knots before the blast of thestorm, in order to keep clear of the enemy; and at two in the morningof January 19th, being then in the latitude of Ajaccio, satisfied thatthe French were steering steadily south-southwest, and under a pressof sail, which indicated a mission of importance, they parted companyand hastened to Nelson, whom they joined twelve hours later, asalready stated. Nelson needed no time to deliberate. His mind was long before fixed tofollow, and there was but one way to do so. The enemy's course, asreported, led to the southern end of Sardinia, after reaching whichthe wind was fair for Naples, Sicily, and the East. The British shipswere moored--two anchors down. At half-past four they were under way, standing in single column for the narrow passage between Biche andSardinia, the "Victory" leading, each vessel steering by the sternlights of the one ahead of her. At seven P. M. All were clear, and thefleet hauled up along the east coast of Sardinia, which made a lee forthem. "At midnight, " Nelson notes in his journal, "moderate breezesand clear. " During the same hours the untrained squadron of Villeneuvewas losing topmasts in the fury of the gale. The following afternoon, [83] as the British drew out from under thelee of Sardinia, they found the wind blowing a hard gale fromsouth-southwest, which lasted all that night. The fleet could make noway against it, but neither could the French utilize it, unless, whichwas unlikely, they had got much farther to the southward than Nelsonhad. When he left Madalena, he had sent a frigate ahead, with ordersto round Sardinia by the south and try to get sight or word of theenemy. On the morning of the 22d she rejoined, the fleet having thendrifted to fifty miles east of Cape Carbonara, the southeastern pointof Sardinia. At 11 A. M. Her captain informed Nelson that theafternoon before he had seen a French frigate standing into the Gulfof Cagliari, but, the weather being thick, giving an horizon of onlythree miles, nothing more had been discovered. The admiral had sentword of the French sailing to Acton at Palermo, and through him toNaples and Malta, Ball being requested to seek for information inevery practicable direction. Naples was for the moment safe, as theBritish squadron stood across any possible road by which the Frenchcould approach it. The gale, hauling gradually to the westward, lasted in its force untilthe morning of January 25th. During these three days Nelson receivedno news, but he did much thinking and had made up his mind. The Frenchmight be intending to land in Cagliari, to windward of which they hadbeen during these four days that he had been to leeward. WithCagliari, therefore, he must communicate; the Viceroy of Sardiniawould know if any landing had been attempted or threatened. IfSardinia was safe, he would next go or send to Palermo for news, andthence push for the Faro of Messina, where he would cover both thatimportant fortress and the approaches to Naples from either side ofSicily. "You will believe my anxiety, " he wrote to Acton in Palermo, on the 25th. "I have neither ate, drank, or slept with any comfortsince last Sunday" (the 20th). "I am naturally very anxious, " he tellsBall, "therefore you must forgive my short letter. We have a dead foulwind and heavy sea. I cannot, for want of frigates, send off thisletter. " The lack of small cruisers; so often lamented in quieterdays, now embarrassed him cruelly. The few he had were dispersed inall directions in search of news, and to communicate with Acton he hadto detach one of his fastest ships-of-the-line, the "Leviathan, "intending himself to follow her with the fleet to Palermo. At thelatter point he could obtain all the intelligence of the common enemywhich might have reached any Sicilian port, before he carried out hisalready formed purpose of chasing to leeward, to the Morea and Egypt. With firm grip, though in agony of mind, he held himself in hand, determined, burning as he was to pursue somewhere, not to yield theadvantage of the wind till he had reached a reasonable certainty--asin 1798--that the circumstances justified it. "I hope, " he says toActon, "that the governor of Augusta[84] will not give up the post tothe French fleet; but if he does, I shall go in and attack them; for Iconsider the destruction of the enemy's fleet of so much consequence, that I would gladly have half of mine burnt to effect theirdestruction. I am in a fever. God send I may find them!" Throughoutthe long chase which followed, all, so to say, slept on their arms. Onthe 11th of March he wrote: "Ever since January 21st we have beenprepared for battle: not a bulkhead[85] up in the fleet. Night or day, it is my determination not to lose one moment in attacking them. " On the 26th Nelson communicated with Cagliari, and learned that nolanding had been attempted in Sardinia. The same day the frigate"Phoebe" rejoined, with information that a French eighty-gun ship hadanchored in Ajaccio on the evening of the 19th, dismasted andcrippled. Putting these facts together, and in connection with his ownmovements, he inferred conclusively that either the French had goneback to Toulon in consequence of injuries, or that they had given himthe slip, had got round Sicily, and proceeded to the eastward. Thelatter was improbable, because the westerly gales, as he had noted, could scarcely have allowed them to weather Maritimo[86]; it was not, however, impossible. A return to Toulon was, antecedently, equallyimprobable, although it proved to be the alternative adopted byVilleneuve. "Although I knew one of the French ships was crippled, yet I considered the character of Bonaparte; and that the orders givenby him, on the banks of the Seine, would not take into considerationwinds or weather; nor indeed could the accident of three or four shipsalter, _in my opinion_, [87] a destination of importance: thereforesuch an accident did not weigh in my mind, and I went first to theMorea and then to Egypt. " This quotation is especially interesting, asit proves how closely Nelson scanned every known element in a problem, even to the temperament of his opponent; and it also shows thesubstantial agreement in judgment between him and Napoleon. Thelatter, Thiers writes, "was sensibly displeased on hearing of thisresultless sortie. 'What is to be done, ' he said, 'with admirals whoallow their spirits to sink, and determine to hasten home at the firstdamage they receive? All the captains ought to have had sealed ordersto meet off the Canary Islands. The damages should have been repaired_en route_. A few topmasts carried away, some casualties in a gale ofwind, were every-day occurrences. But the great evil of our Navy is, that the men who command it are unused to all the risks of command. '" Still without definite tidings, compelled to act upon his owninferences--for merely doing nothing was action under suchcircumstances--Nelson reasoned that, if the French had returned, hecould not overtake them, and if they had gone east, he had no time tolose before following. He fell back therefore from his windwardposition to the Straits of Messina, through which the whole squadronbeat on the 31st of January--"a thing unprecedented in nauticalhistory, " he wrote to the Admiralty, "but although the danger from therapidity of the current was great, yet so was the object of mypursuit; and I relied with confidence on the zeal and ability of thefleet under my command. " The same day, knowing now that Sicily andNaples were not threatened, he despatched six cruisers forintelligence, "in all directions from Tunis to Toulon;" three of thembeing frigates, which were to rendezvous off the latter port andresume the watch of the French, if found there. A seventh vessel wassent ahead of the squadron to Koron, off which he appeared on the 2dof February, and, still getting no news, went on to Alexandria, wherehe communicated with the British consul on the 7th. "I beg the boatmay not be detained, nor must any communication be had with theofficer, so as to put the ship in quarantine. The officer is orderednot to wait more than thirty minutes; for you will readily believe myanxiety to find out the enemy's fleet. " No news was to be had; but itwas ascertained that Egypt was practically defenceless against anyrenewed attempts of the French. Nelson at once started back to the westward. On the 19th of February, twelve days after leaving Alexandria, he was off Malta, and there forthe first time received information that the enemy had returned toToulon in a very crippled state. It was now necessary to regain hisstation as speedily as possible, and also to resume the operation ofvictualling the squadron, which had been interrupted at Madalena bythe news of the enemy's sailing. The captain left there in charge ofthe transports had taken them for safety to Malta, in pursuance of theorders left with him, and they would have to be convoyed again to theGulf of Palmas, which was appointed for their joining. The incidentshows at once the forehandedness of Nelson, in that he was ableimmediately to go on so long a chase, and also the difficultiesattendant upon the administration of the fleet. Against the prevailingwinds the convoy did not reach Palmas until the 14th of March. Thefleet had preceded it there by a week. After a tedious beat, in whicheight days were consumed to make the three hundred and fifty miles towindward, Nelson anchored on the 27th of February in Pula Roads, Gulfof Cagliari, just to hold on. "What weather!" wrote he to Bickerton, when the anchor dropped. "Did you ever see such in almost any country?It has forced me to anchor here, in order to prevent being drove toleeward, but I shall go to sea the moment it moderates. " Palmas isonly forty miles to windward of Pula, but it was not till the 8th ofMarch, after three or four ineffectual efforts, that the squadron gotthere. "From the 19th of February to this day, " wrote Nelson to Ball, "have we been beating, and only now going to anchor here as it blows agale of wind at northwest. It has been without exception, the veryworst weather I have ever seen. " Bad as it was, it was but a sample ofthat he was to meet a month later, in the most wearing episode of hisanxious life. Besides the weary struggle with foul winds and weather, other greatdisappointments and vexations met Nelson at Palmas. During his absenceto the eastward, one despatch vessel had been wrecked off Cadiz andfallen into the hands of the Spaniards, another had been interceptedby the battered French fleet as it approached Toulon, and a convoy, homeward-bound from Malta, had been waylaid, the two small ships ofwar which formed the escort had been taken, and the merchant shipsdispersed. This last misfortune he ascribed unhesitatingly to thedivision of the command. "It would not have happened, could I haveordered the officer off Cadiz to send ships to protect them. " Theincident was not without its compensations to one who valued honorabove loss, for his two petty cruisers had honored themselves and himby such a desperate resistance, before surrendering to superior force, that the convoy had time to scatter, and most of it escaped. There wasreason to fear that the despatch vessel taken off Toulon had mistakenthe French fleet for the British, which it had expected to findoutside, and that her commander might have had to haul down his flagbefore getting opportunity to throw the mail-bags overboard. In thatcase, both public and private letters had gone into the enemy'spossession. "I do assure you, my dearest Emma, " he wrote LadyHamilton, "that nothing can be more miserable, or unhappy, than yourpoor Nelson. " Besides the failure to find the French, "You willconceive my disappointment! It is now[88] from November 2nd that Ihave had a line from England. " A characteristic letter was elicited from Nelson by the loss of thedespatch-vessel off Cadiz, the brig "Raven, " whose commander, CaptainLayman, had gained his cordial professional esteem in the Copenhagenexpedition, in connection with which he has already been mentioned. Asusual in the case of a wreck, a court-martial was held. This censuredthe captain, much to Nelson's vexation; the more so because, at hisrequest, Layman had not produced before the court certain orders forthe night given by him, the proved neglect of which would have broughta very heavy punishment upon the officer of the watch. In weighing theadmiral's words, therefore, allowance may be made for a sense ofpersonal responsibility for the finding of the court; but the letter, which was addressed to the First Lord, contains expressions that aremost worthy of attention, not only because illustrative of Nelson'stemperament and mode of thought, but also for a point of view toorarely taken in the modern practice, which has grown up in peace. MY DEAR LORD, --Give me leave to recommend Captain Layman to your kind protection; for, notwithstanding the Court Martial has thought him deserving of censure for his running in with the land, yet, my Lord, allow me to say, that Captain Layman's misfortune was, perhaps, conceiving other people's abilities were equal to his own, which, indeed, very few people's are. I own myself one of those who do not fear the shore, for hardly any great things are done in a small ship by a man that is; therefore, I make very great allowances for him. Indeed, his station was intended never to be from the shore in the straits: and if he did not every day risk his sloop, he would he useless upon that station. Captain Layman has served with me in three ships, and I am well acquainted with his bravery, zeal, judgment, and activity; _nor do I regret the loss of the Raven compared to the value of Captain Layman's services, which are a national loss_. [89] You must, my dear Lord, forgive the warmth which I express for Captain Layman; but he is in adversity, and, therefore, has the more claim to my attention and regard. If I had been censured every time I have run my ship, or fleets under my command, into great danger, I should long ago have been _out_ of the Service, and never _in_ the House of Peers. I am, my dear Lord, most faithfully, your obedient servant, NELSON AND BRONTE. It is something to meet with the clear recognition that a man may beof more value than a ship. As Clarendon said, it is not all of anofficer's duty to bring his ship safe home again. On the voyage back from Alexandria be had busied himself withvindications of his course in going there, manifesting again thatover-sensitiveness to the judgment of others, which contrasts sosingularly with his high resolve and self-dependence when assuming thegreatest responsibilities. To Ball, to the Admiralty, and to the FirstLord privately, he sent explanations of his action, accompanied by asummary of his reasons. As the latter have been given, one by one, aseach step was taken, it is not necessary here to say more than that, in the author's judgment, each successive movement was made upon good;grounds, and rightly timed. This is true, although Nelson was entirelymisled as to Bonaparte's object. The ruse of the latter, as put intoeffect by Villeneuve, not only deceived the British admiral, but, inits issue, confounded the French. The critical moment of decision, forthe whole fruitless campaign, was when Nelson determined to go firstoff Messina, then to the Morea, and finally to Egypt, upon theinference that by this time one of three things must have happened. Either (1) he must have met the French fleet, personally or by hislookouts, or (2) it had returned to Toulon, or (3) it had gone on toEgypt. The first being eliminated, the choice he made between theothers, wide as was the flight for which it called, was perfectlyaccurate. It is difficult to know which most to admire, --the sagacitywhich divined the actual, though not the intended, movements of theenemy, the fiery eagerness which gave assurance of a fierce anddecisive battle, or the great self-restraint which, in all his feverof impatience, withheld him from precipitating action before everymeans of information was exhausted. There will be occasion to noteagain the same traits in the yet sharper trial he was soon to undergo. His conclusion upon the whole matter, therefore, though erroneous asto the fact, may be accepted as entirely justified by all theindications; and it must be added that, with the dispositions he took, nothing could have saved the French fleet but its prompt retreat toToulon. "Had they not been crippled, " he wrote Davison, "nothing couldhave hindered our meeting them on January 21st, off the south end ofSardinia. " "I have not the smallest doubt, " he concluded his letter tothe Admiralty, "but that the destination of the French armament whichleft the coast of France on the 18th of January, was Alexandria; and, under all the circumstances which I have stated, I trust theirLordships will approve my having gone to Egypt in search of the Frenchfleet. " There was, however, no occasion for him to be forward insuggesting the sacrifice of himself, as he did to Melville. "At thismoment of sorrow I still feel that I have acted right. The result ofmy inquiries at Coron and Alexandria confirm me in my former opinion;and therefore, my Lord, if my obstinacy or ignorance is so gross, Ishould be the first to recommend your superseding me. " It may be notedhere that Nelson never realized--he did not live long enough torealize--how thoroughly Bonaparte had learned from Egypt his lesson asto the control of the sea by sea-power, and what it meant to amaritime expedition which left it out of the account. To the end ofhis reign, and in the height of his sway, he made no serious attemptto occupy Sardinia or even Sicily, narrow as was the water separatingthe latter from Naples, become practically a French state, over whichhis brother and brother-in-law reigned for six years. Nelson to thelast made light of the difficulties of which Bonaparte had had bitterexperience. "France, " he wrote to the Secretary for War, "will haveboth Sardinia and Sicily very soon, if we do not prevent it, and Egyptbesides. " "We know, " he said in a letter to Ball, "there would be nodifficulty for single polaccas to sail from the shores of Italy with300 or 400 men in each, (single ships;) and that, in the northerlywinds, they would have a fair chance of not being seen, and even ifseen, not to be overtaken by the Russian ships. Thus, 20, 000 men wouldbe fixed again in Egypt, with the whole people in their favour. Whowould turn them out?" Nelson left the Gulf of Palmas as soon as the wind served, which wason the 9th of March. It was necessary to revictual; but, as the timeof the storeships' arrival was uncertain, he thought best to make around off Toulon and Barcelona, to renew the impression of the Frenchthat his fleet was to the westward. This intention he carried out, "showing myself, " to use his own words, "off Barcelona and the coastof Spain, and the islands of Majorca and Minorca, until the 21st ofMarch. " "I shall, if possible, " he wrote to a captain on detachedservice, "make my appearance off Barcelona, in order to induce theenemy to believe that I am fixed upon the coast of Spain, when I haveevery reason to believe they will put to sea, as I am told the troopsare still embarked. From Barcelona I shall proceed direct toRendezvous 98. "[90] Accordingly, on the 26th of March he anchored atPalmas, and began at once to clear the transports. "By the report ofthe Fleet Captain, I trust [it will be evident that] it could not withpropriety be longer deferred. " Still satisfied that the French werebound to Egypt, he would here be close to their necessary route, andwith a lookout ship thirty miles to the westward felt assured theywould not escape him. Four days after he anchored, Villeneuve startedon his second venture, and thinking, as Nelson had plotted, that theBritish fleet was off Cape San Sebastian, he again shaped his courseto pass east of the Balearics, between them and Sardinia. The news ofhis sailing reached Nelson five days later, on April 4th, at 10 A. M. He had left Palmas the morning before, and was then twenty miles westof it, beating against a head wind. The weary work of doubt, inference, and speculation was about to begin once more, and to beprotracted for over three months. In the present gigantic combination of Napoleon, the Brest squadron, as well as those of Rochefort and Toulon, was to go to the WestIndies, whence the three should return in mass to the English Channel, to the number of thirty-five French ships-of-the-line. To these it washoped to add a number of Spanish ships, from Cartagena and Cadiz. Ifthe movements were successful, this great force would overpower, orhold in check, the British Channel Fleet, and secure control of theStraits of Dover long enough for the army to cross. It is with theToulon squadron that we are immediately concerned, as it alone for thepresent touches the fortunes of Nelson. Villeneuve's orders were tomake the best of his way to the Straits of Gibraltar, evading theBritish fleet, but calling off Cartagena, to pick up any Spanish shipsthere that might be perfectly ready to join him. He was not, however, to delay for them on any account, but to push on at once to Cadiz. This port he was not to enter, but to anchor outside, and there bejoined by the "Aigle, " the ship that had so long worried Nelson, andalso by six or eight Spanish ships believed to be ready. As soon asthese came out, he was to sail with all speed for Martinique, andthere wait forty days for the Brest squadron, if the latter, whoseadmiral was to be commander-in-chief of the allied fleets, did notappear sooner. Villeneuve had other contingent instructions, whichbecame inoperative through the persistent pursuit of Nelson. The French fleet sailed during the night of March 30, with a lightnortheast wind, and steered a course approaching due south, inaccordance with Villeneuve's plan of going east of Minorca. TheBritish lookout frigates, "Active" and "Phoebe, " saw it at eighto'clock the next morning, and kept company with its slow progress tilleight P. M. , when, being then sixty miles south by west, true, fromToulon, the "Phoebe" was sent off to Nelson. During the day the windshifted for a time to the northwest. The French then hauled up tosouthwest, and were heading so when darkness concealed them from theBritish frigates, which were not near enough for night observations. After the "Phoebe's" departure, the "Active" continued to steer as theenemy had been doing when last seen, but at daybreak they were nolonger in sight. Just what Villeneuve did that night does not appear;but no vessel of Nelson's knew anything more about him till April18th, when information was received from a chance passer that he hadbeen seen on the 7th off Cape de Gata, on the coast of Spain, with afresh easterly wind steering to the westward. Villeneuve doubtless had used the night's breeze, which was fresh, tofetch a long circuit, throw off the "Active, " and resume his course tothe southward. It was not till next day, April 1st, that he spoke aneutral, which had seen Nelson near Palmas. Undeceived thus as to theBritish being off Cape San Sebastian, and the wind having then comeagain easterly, the French admiral kept away at once to the westward, passed north of the Balearic Islands, and on the 6th appeared offCartagena. The Spanish ships there refusing to join him, he pressedon, went by Gibraltar on the 8th, and on the 9th anchored off Cadiz, whence he drove away Orde's squadron. The "Aigle, " with six Spanishships, joined at once, and that night the combined force, eighteenships-of-the-line, sailed for Martinique, where it arrived on the 14thof May. By Villeneuve's instructions it was to remain in the WestIndies till the 23d of June. When the captain of the "Active" found he had lost sight of theFrench, he kept away for Nelson's rendezvous, and joined him at 2 P. M. Of April 4th, five or six hours after the "Phoebe. " Prepossessed withthe opinion that Naples, Sicily, or Egypt was the enemy's aim, anopinion which the frigate's news tended to confirm, Nelson at oncetook the fleet midway between Sardinia and the Barbary coast, spreading lookouts on either side. Thus, without yielding ground toleeward, he covered all avenues leading to the eastward. He summed uphis purpose in words which showed an entire grasp of the essentials ofhis perplexing situation. "I shall neither go to the eastward ofSicily, or to the westward of Sardinia, until I know somethingpositive. " Amid the diverse objects demanding his care, this choice ofthe strategic position was perfectly correct; but as day followed daywithout tidings, the distress of uncertainty, and the strain ofadhering to his resolve not to move without information to guide him, became almost unbearable--a condition not hard to be realized bythose who have known, in suspense, the overpowering impulse to dosomething, little matter what. It is an interesting illustration ofthe administrative difficulties of the fleet, that three supply-shipsjoined him on the 5th of April, and their stores were transferred atsea while momentarily expecting the enemy's appearance; one at leastbeing completely discharged by the night of the 6th. On this date, Nelson, having waited forty-eight hours to windward ofSicily, decided to fall back on Palermo; reckoning that if any attempthad been made upon Naples or Sicily, he should there hear of it. Thelookouts which were scattered in all directions were ordered to joinhim there, and a frigate was sent to Naples. On the 9th and 10th hewas off Palermo, and, though he got no word of the French, receivedtwo pieces of news from which his quick perceptions jumped to theconclusion that he had been deceived, and that the enemy had gonewest. "April 10, 7 A. M. Hallowell is just arrived from Palermo. Hebrings accounts that the great Expedition is sailed, [91] and thatseven Russian sail-of-the-line are expected in the Mediterranean;therefore I may suppose the French fleet are bound to the westward. Imust do my best. God bless you. I am very, very miserable, but ever, my dear Ball, " etc. A week more was to elapse before this dreadfully harassing surmise wasconverted into a certainty. On the 9th he started back from Palermo, intending to go towards Toulon, to make sure that the French had notreturned again. Meeting a constant strong head wind, he was nine daysgetting again to the south of Sardinia, a distance of less than twohundred miles. There, on the 18th, the vessel was spoken whichinformed him that she had seen the French off Cape de Gata, threehundred miles to the westward, ten days before. "If this account istrue, " he wrote to Elliot, "much mischief may be apprehended. Itkills me, the very thought. " Yet, now that the call for decisionsounds, he knows no faltering, nor does he, as in hours of reaction, fret himself about the opinions of others. "I am going out of theMediterranean, " he says in farewell. "It may be thought that I haveprotected too well Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, the Morea, and Egypt; butI feel I have done right, and am, therefore, easy about any fate whichmay await me for having missed the French fleet. " The following day a vessel joined from Gibraltar, with certaininformation that the enemy had passed the Straits. Nelson had no needto ponder the next step. His resolve had been taken long before tofollow to the Antipodes. He comforted himself, mistakenly, that hiswatchfulness was the cause that the French had abandoned the attemptagainst Egypt in force. "Under the severe affliction which I feel atthe escape of the French fleet out of the Mediterranean, " he wrote theAdmiralty, "I hope that their Lordships will not impute it to any wantof due attention on my part; but, on the contrary, that by myvigilance the enemy found it was impossible to undertake anyexpedition in the Mediterranean. " Mindful, also, that Bonaparte'sgreat attempt of 1798 had depended upon the absence of the Britishfleet, he left a squadron of five frigates to cruise together to thewindward of Sicily, lest the French even now might try to sendtransports with troops to the eastward, under the protection of smallarmed vessels. The number of letters written on the 18th and 19th of April show howthoroughly his mind was prepared for contingencies. Despatched, in alldirections, they outline his own intended course, for the informationof those who might have to co-operate, as well as that which he wishedto be pursued by the officers under his orders. They are issued neatand complete, at one cast, and no other follows for a week. Hesurmises, from the fact of the Spanish ships accompanying themovement, that it is directed, not against the West Indies, but foreither Ireland or Brest; not a bad "guess, " which is all he would haveclaimed for it, for the West Indies were actually only arallying-point on the roundabout road to the Channel prescribed byNapoleon. "Therefore, " he wrote to the Admiralty, "if I receive nointelligence to do away my present belief, I shall proceed from CapeSt. Vincent, and take my position fifty leagues west from Scilly, approaching that island slowly, that I may not miss any vessels sentin search of the squadron with orders. My reason for this position is, that it is equally easy to get to either the fleet off Brest, or to goto Ireland, should the fleet be wanted at either station. " Thesuitableness of this position to any emergency arising about theBritish Islands can be realized at a glance, bearing in mind thatwesterly winds prevail there. A copy of the letter was sent toIreland, and another to the commander of the Channel fleet off Brest. "I have the pleasure to say, " he concludes, "that I shall bring withme eleven as fine ships of war, as ably commanded, and in as perfectorder, and in health, as ever went to sea. " It will be interesting to support even Nelson's opinion of his ownsquadron by that of an unbiassed and competent witness. Sir EdwardCodrington was associated with it, still nearly entire, some threemonths later, after the return from the West Indies; the "Orion, "which he commanded, being one of a detachment of eighteenships-of-the-line sent off from Brest by Admiral Cornwallis. "LordNelson's squadron (of which we have now eight with us) seems to be invery high order indeed; and although their ships do not look sohandsome as objects, they look so very warlike and show such highcondition, that when once I can think Orion fit to manoeuvre withthem, I shall probably paint her in the same manner. " There was, itwould seem, a Nelson pattern for painting ships, as well as a "Nelsontouch" in Orders for Battle. "I have been employed this week past, "wrote Captain Duff of the "Mars, " "to paint the ship _à la Nelson_, which most of the fleet are doing. " This, according to the admiral'sbiographers, was with two yellow streaks, but the portholes black, which gave the sides an appearance of being chequered. The frigate "Amazon, " sent ahead with the letters, was ordered to goon to Lisbon, get all the news she could, and rejoin at Cape St. Vincent. She passed Gibraltar on the 29th, and, getting decisiveinformation just outside the Straits, held on there. It was not tillthe 6th that Nelson reached Gibraltar, where he anchored for only fourhours. This gain of a week by a frigate, in traversing ground forwhich the fleet took seventeen days, may well be borne in mind bythose unfamiliar with the delays attending concerted movements, thathave to be timed with reference to the slowest units taking part inthe combination. The days of chase, over which we have hurried in a few lines, passedfor Nelson not only wearily, but in agony of soul. Justified as hisaction was to his own mind, and as it must be by the dispassionatereview of military criticism, he could not but be tormented by thethought of what might have been, and by his temper, which lackedequanimity and fretted uncontrollably to get alongside the enemy--todo the duty and to reap the glory that he rightly conceived to be hisown. "I am entirely adrift, " he complained, "by my frigates losingsight of the French fleet so soon after their coming out of port. " Hispurpose never faltered, nor did the light that led him grow dim. Hisaction left nothing to be desired, but the chafing of his spiritapproached fury. Lord Radstock, writing from London to his son, says:"I met a person yesterday, who told me that he had seen a letter fromLord Nelson, concluding in these words: 'O French fleet, French fleet, if I can but once get up with you, I'll make you pay dearly for allthat you have made me suffer!' Another told me that he had seen aletter from an officer on board the Victory, describing his chief 'asalmost raving with anger and vexation. ' This, " continues Radstock, who knew him very well, "I can readily credit, so much so, indeed, that I much fear that he will either undertake some desperate measureto retrieve his ground, or, should not such an opportunity offer, thathe will never suffer us to behold him more. " Being in London, the writer just quoted was in close touch with thepopular feeling of anxiety, a suspicion of which he could well imagineNelson also had, and which added to his burden. "It is believed here, "he says on the 21st of May, "that the combined fleet from Cadiz isbound to the West Indies. This is by no means improbable. .. . The Citypeople are crying out against Sir J. O. , [92] and, as usual, are equallyabsurd and unjust. Some are so ridiculous as to say that he ought tohave captured some of the Toulon squadron, whilst others, moremoderate, think that he might at all events, have so crippled theenemy as to have checked the expedition. [93] You may readily guessthat your chief is not out of our thoughts at this critical moment. Should Providence once more favour him, he will be considered ourguardian angel; but, on the other hand, should he unfortunately take awrong scent, and the Toulon fleet attain their object, the hero of the14th of February and of Aboukir will be--I will not say what, but theingratitude of the world is but too well known on these occasions. " A week before, on the 13th of May, the same officer had written:"Where are you all this time?[94] for that is a point justly agitatingthe whole country more than I can describe. I fear that your gallantand worthy chief will have much injustice done him on this occasion, for the cry is stirring up fast against him, and the loss of Jamaicawould at once sink all his past services into oblivion. All I know forcertain is that we ought never to judge rashly on these occasions, andnever merely by the result. Lord Barham[95] told me this morning thatthe Board had no tidings of your squadron. This is truly melancholy, for certainly no man's zeal and activity ever surpassed those of yourchief. .. . The world is at once anxious for news and dreading itsarrival. " The Admiralty itself, perplexed and harassed by the hazardsof the situation, were dissatisfied because they received no word fromhim, being ignorant of the weather conditions which had retarded evenhis frigates so far beyond the time of Villeneuve's arrival at Cadiz. Radstock, whose rank enabled him to see much of the members of theBoard, drew shrewd inferences as to their feelings, though mistaken asto Nelson's action. "I fear that he has been so much soured by theappointment of Sir John Orde, that he has had the imprudence to venthis spleen on the Admiralty by a long, and, to the Board, painfulsilence. I am sure that they are out of humour with him, and I have mydoubts whether they would risk much for him, were he to meet with anyserious misfortune. " Through such difficulties in front, and such clamor in the rear, Nelson pursued his steadfast way, in anguish of spirit, but constantstill in mind. "I am not made to despair, " he said to Melville, "whatman can do shall be done. I have marked out for myself a decided lineof conduct, and I shall follow it well up; although I have now beforeme a letter from the physician of the fleet, enforcing my return toEngland before the hot months. " "Brokenhearted as I am, at the escapeof the Toulon fleet, " he tells the governor of Gibraltar, "yet itcannot prevent my thinking of all the points intrusted to my care, amongst which Gibraltar stands prominent. " "My good fortune seemsflown away, " he cries out to Ball. "I cannot get a fair wind, or evena side wind. Dead foul!--dead foul! But my mind is fully made up whatto do when I leave the Straits, supposing there is no certaininformation of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill-luck willgo near to kill me; but as these are times for exertions, I must notbe cast down, whatever I feel. " A week later, on the 26th of April, hecomplains: "From the 9th I have been using every effort to get downthe Mediterranean, but to this day we are very little advanced. FromMarch 26th, we have had nothing like a Levanter, [96] except for theFrench fleet. I have never been one week without one, until this veryimportant moment. It has half killed me; but fretting is of no use. "On the 1st of May he wrote to the Admiralty, "I have as yet heardnothing of the enemy;" beyond, of course, the fact of their havingpassed the Straits. On the 4th of May the squadron was off Tetuan, on the African coast, alittle east of Gibraltar, and, as the wind was too foul for progress, Nelson, ever watchful over supplies, determined to stop for water andfresh beef, which the place afforded. There he was joined by thefrigate "Decade" from Gibraltar, and for the first time, apparently, received a rumor that the allied fleets had gone to the West Indies. He complains, certainly not unreasonably, and apparently not unjustly, that Sir John Orde, who had seen the French arrive off Cadiz, had notdogged their track and ascertained their route; a feat certainly notbeyond British seamanship and daring, under the management of a dozenmen that could be named off-hand. "I believe my ill luck is to go onfor a longer time, and I now much fear that Sir John Orde has not senthis small ships to watch the enemy's fleet, and ordered them to returnto the Straits mouth, to give me information, that I might know how todirect my proceedings: for I cannot very properly run to the WestIndies, without something beyond mere surmise; and if I defer mydeparture, Jamaica may be lost. Indeed, as they have a month's startof me, I see no prospect of getting out time enough to prevent muchmischief from being done. However, I shall take all matters into mymost serious consideration, and shall do that which seemeth best underall circumstances. " "I am like to have a West India trip, " he wrote toKeats, one of his favorite captains; "but that I don't mind, if I canbut get at them. " The wind hauling somewhat to the southward on the 5th, allowed thefleet to lay a course for Gibraltar. The operation of getting bullockswas stopped at once, and the ships weighed. In this brief stay, thewater of the fleet had been completed and another transport cleared. Next day Gibraltar was reached. The wind, westerly still, though fairfor this stretch, remained foul for beating out of the Straits againsta current which ever sets to the eastward; and many of the officers, presuming on a continuance of the weather that had so long baffledthem, hurried their washing ashore. Nelson, however, keenly vigilantand with long experience, saw indications of a change. "Off went a gunfrom the Victory, and up went the Blue Peter, [97] whilst the Admiralpaced the deck in a hurry, with anxious steps, and impatient of amoment's delay. The officers said, 'Here is one of Nelson's madpranks. ' But he was right. "[98] The wind came fair, a condition withwhich the great admiral never trifled. Five hours after the anchorsdropped they were again at the bows, and the fleet at last standingout of the Mediterranean; the transports in tow of the ships of war. Nelson's resolve was fast forming to go to the West Indies. In fact, at Tetuan, acting upon this possibility, he had given conditionalorders to Bickerton to remain in command of the Mediterraneansquadron, assigning to that service half a dozen frigates and doublethat number of smaller cruisers, and had transferred to him allstation papers necessary for his guidance, --a promptness of decisionwhich sufficiently shows one of the chief secrets of his greatness. "If I fail, " said he to Dr. Scott, "if they are not gone to the WestIndies, I shall be blamed: to be burnt in effigy or Westminster Abbeyis my alternative. " Evidently he was not unmindful of the ficklebreath of popular favor, whose fluctuations Radstock was noting. Dr. Scott, who witnessed his chief's bearing at this time, alwaysconsidered that he never exhibited greater magnanimity than in thisresolution, which Jurien de la Gravière also has called one of hisfinest inspirations. Great, indeed, was his promptitude, alike in decision and in act; buthe was no less great in his delays, in the curb he placed on hisnatural impetuosity. "God only knows, my dear friend, " he wrote atthis moment to Davison, "what I have suffered by not getting at theenemy's fleet;" but, in all his impatience, he would not start on thatlong voyage until he had exhausted every possibility of furtherenlightenment. "Perseverance _and_ patience, " he said, "may do much;"but he did not separate the one from the other, in deed or in word. Circumspection was in him as marked a trait as ardor. "I was in greathopes, " he wrote the Admiralty, "that some of Sir John Orde's frigateswould have arrived at Gibraltar, from watching the destination of theenemy, from whom I should have derived information of the route theenemy had taken, but none had arrived. " Up to April 27th nothing hadbeen heard of them at Lisbon. "I am now pushing off Cape St. Vincent, and hope that is the station to which Sir John Orde may have directedhis frigates to return from watching the route of the enemy. Ifnothing is heard there, I shall probably think the rumours which arespread are true, that their destination is the West Indies, and inthat case think it my duty to follow them. " "I am as much in the darkas ever, " he wrote on the same date, May 7th, to Nepean, one of thepuisne lords. "If I hear nothing, I shall proceed to the West Indies. " The wind continued fair for nearly forty-eight hours, when it againbecame westerly; but the fleet was now in the Atlantic. On the 9th ofMay the "Amazon" rejoined, bringing a letter from another ship of war, which enclosed a report gathered from an American brig that had leftCadiz on the 2d. According to this, while there were in Cadiz diverserumors as to the destination of the allied fleets, the one mostgenerally accepted was that they were bound to the West Indies. Thatnight the fleet anchored in Lagos Bay, to the eastward of Cape St. Vincent, and the unending work of discharging transports was againresumed. Nelson, shortly before leaving Gibraltar, had receivedofficial notification that a convoy carrying five thousand troops wason its way to the Mediterranean, and would depend upon him forprotection. He felt it necessary to await this in his presentposition, and he utilized the time by preparing for a very long chase. At Lagos, Rear-Admiral Campbell of the Portuguese Navy, who had servedwith the British in the Mediterranean six years before, visited the"Victory, " and certain intelligence that Villeneuve was gone to theWest Indies was by him given to Nelson. The latter had now all theconfirmation needed, by such an one as he, to decide upon his line ofaction. "My lot is cast, my dear Ball, and I am going to the WestIndies, where, although I am late, yet chance may have given them abad passage, and me a good one: I must hope the best. " "Disappointmenthas worn me to a skeleton, " he writes to his late junior in theMediterranean, Campbell, "and I am in good truth, very, very far fromwell. " "If I had not been in pursuit of the enemy's fleet, I shouldhave been at this moment in England, but my health, or even my life, must not come into consideration at this important crisis; for, however I may be called unfortunate, it never shall be said that Ihave been neglectful of my duty, or spared myself. " "It will not besupposed I am on a party of pleasure, " he wrote to the Secretary ofthe Admiralty, "running after eighteen sail of the line with ten, andthat to the West Indies;" but, he summed up his feelings to Davison, "Salt beef and the French fleet, is far preferable to roast beef andchampagne without them. " On the 10th of May only was his purpose finally and absolutely formed, for on that day he sent a sloop to Barbadoes, his intended point ofarrival, to announce his coming; requesting that an embargo might belaid at once on all vessels in port, to prevent the news reaching theenemy at Martinique or elsewhere. In the morning of the 11th the fleetweighed, and at 4 P. M. The expedition from England arrived. It wasaccompanied by two ships-of-the-line, to which Nelson joined a third, the "Royal Sovereign, " which sailed so badly, from the state of herbottom, that she would retard a movement already too long delayed. Atseven that evening the fleet was under full sail for the West Indies. The voyage across was uneventful; the ships, as customary for thispassage, stood to the southward and westward into the trade winds, under whose steady impulse they advanced at a daily average speed ofone hundred and thirty-five miles, or between five and six miles anhour. This rate, however, was a mean between considerable extremes, --arate of nine miles being at times attained. The slackest winds, whichbrought down the average, are found before reaching the trades, andNelson utilized this period to transmit to the fleet his general planfor action, in case he found the allies at sea. The manner in whichthis was conveyed to the individual ships is an interesting incident. The speed of the fleet is necessarily that of its slowest member; thefaster ships, therefore, have continually a reserve, which they may atany moment bring into play. The orders being prepared, a frigatecaptain was called on board the "Victory" and received them. Returningto his own vessel, he made all sail until on the bow[99] of one of theships-of-the-line. Deadening the way of the frigate, a boat wasdropped in the water and had only to pull alongside the other vesselas it came up. The frigate remained slowed until passed, and the boat, having delivered its letter, came easily alongside again, --the wholeoperation being thus conducted with the least expenditure of time andexertion. [100] There was in the fleet one ship that had been steadily in commissionsince 1801, and was now in very shaky condition. This was the"Superb, " seventy-four. She had only been kept out by the extremeexertions of her commander, Keats, one of the most distinguishedcaptains of the day, and he had entreated that he should not be sentaway now, when the moment of battle seemed near. By a singular ironyof fate, this zealous insistence caused him to miss Trafalgar, atwhich the "Royal Sovereign, " that parted at Lagos, was present, repaired and recoppered, --a new ship. Keats, whose energy andreadiness made him a great favorite with Nelson, obtained permissionnot to stop when other ships did, but always to carry a press of sail;and he lashed his studding-sail booms to the yards, as the constantdirection of the trade-winds allows them to be carried steadily. Notwithstanding all that could be done, the "Superb" seems to have setthe pace, and slower than could have been wished; which drew fromNelson's customary kindly thoughtfulness a few lines toocharacteristic to be omitted. MY DEAR KEATS, --I am fearful that you may think that the Superb does not go so fast as I could wish. However that may be, (for if we all went ten knots, I should not think it fast enough, ) yet I would have you be assured that I know and feel that the Superb does all which is possible for a ship to accomplish; and I desire that you will not fret upon the occasion. .. . Whatever may happen, believe me ever, my dear Keats, your most obliged and sincere friend, NELSON AND BRONTE. A week seems to have elapsed before he could get a suitableopportunity for sending this, and he then, on the 27th of May, added:"Our passage, although not very quick, has been far from a bad one;"and he thought that they would gain fourteen days upon the allies. Theactual gain was ten, the latter being thirty-four days from Cadiz toMartinique, the British twenty-four to Barbadoes. The enemy weretherefore three weeks in the West Indies before Nelson arrived; but inthat time they neither accomplished nor undertook anything but therecapture of Diamond Rock, a precipitous islet off the south end ofMartinique, which the British had held for some time, to the greatannoyance of the main island. Reaching Barbadoes on the afternoon of June 4th, Nelson found that theday before information had been received from General Brereton, commanding the troops at Santa Lucia, that the allied fleets hadpassed there, going south, during the night of May 28-29. Theintelligence was so circumstantial that it compelled respect, comingfrom the quarter it did. "There is not a doubt in any of the Admirals'or Generals' minds, " wrote Nelson to the Admiralty, in the despatchannouncing his arrival, "but that Tobago and Trinidada are the enemy'sobjects. " Nelson himself was sceptical, --the improbability seemedgreat to his sound military perceptions; but, confident as he was inhis own conclusions in dilemmas, his mind was too sane and wellbalanced to refuse direct and credible evidence. Summing up thesituation with lamentations, six weeks later, he said to Davison:"When I follow my own head, I am, in general, much more correct in myjudgment, than following the opinion of others. I resisted the opinionof General Brereton's information till it would have been the heightof presumption to have carried my disbelief further. I could not, inthe face of generals and admirals, go N. W. , when it was _apparently_clear that the enemy had gone south. " His purpose had been not toanchor, but to pick up such ships-of-the-line as he found there, --twoseventy-fours, [101] as it turned out, --and to proceed with them toMartinique, which he naturally assumed to be the enemy's headquarters. As it was, receiving a pressing request from the commanding general atBarbadoes to let him accompany the fleet with two thousand troops, heanchored in Carlisle Bay at 5 P. M. At half-past nine the next morninghe was again under way for Trinidad. Some curious misunderstandingsmaintained this mistaken impression as to the enemy's actions, untilcommunication with Trinidad was had on the evening of June 7th. It wasfound then that no hostile force had appeared, although the Britishfleet for a moment had been believed to be such. Nelson at once started north again. A report reached him that a secondsquadron, of fourteen French and Spanish ships from Ferrol, hadarrived at Martinique. He said frankly that he thought this verydoubtful, but added proudly: "Powerful as their force may be, theyshall not with impunity make any great attacks. Mine is compact, theirs must be unwieldy, and although a very pretty fiddle, I don'tbelieve that either Gravina or Villeneuve know how to play upon it. "On the 9th he for the first time got accurate information. An officialletter from Dominica[102] announced that eighteen ships-of-the-line, with smaller vessels, had passed there on the 6th of June. But for thefalse tidings which on the 4th had led him, first to pause, and thento take a wrong direction, Nelson argued, and not unjustly, that hewould have overtaken them at this point, a bare hundred miles fromBarbadoes. "But for wrong information, I should have fought the battleon June 6th where Rodney fought his. " The famous victory of the latterwas immediately north of Dominica, by which name it is known in Frenchnaval history. "There would have been no occasion for opinions, " wroteNelson wrathfully, as he thought of his long anxieties, and the narrowmargin by which he failed, "had not General Brereton sent his damnedintelligence from St. Lucia; nor would I have received it to haveacted by it, but that I was assured that his information was verycorrect. It has almost broke my heart, but I must not despair. " It washard to have borne so much, and then to miss success from such acause. "Brereton's wrong information could not be doubted, " he toldhis intimates, "and by following it, I lost the opportunity offighting the enemy. " "What a race I have run after these fellows; butGod is just, and I may be repaid for all my moments of anxiety. " When Villeneuve, with his ill-trained and sickly[103] fleet, leftMartinique on the 4th of June, he had, of course, no knowledge ofNelson's approach. Nearly up to that date it was not known, even inLondon, where the latter had gone. A frigate had reached the Frenchadmiral on the 29th of May, with orders from Napoleon to make someattempts against the British islands during the time he was awaitingthe Brest squadron. For this reason he sailed, and just outside theharbor was joined by two ships from France, raising his force totwenty of the line. He steered north, intending to gain to windward, and thence return upon Barbadoes, his first proposed conquest. On the8th of June, off Antigua, were captured fourteen Britishmerchant-ships, which had imprudently put to sea from that island. From these Villeneuve got a report that Nelson had arrived withfourteen ships-of-the-line, to which his imagination added five hebelieved to be at Barbadoes. He decided at once to return to Europe, abandoning all his projects against the British possessions. Transferring hastily a number of troops to frigates, as garrisons forthe French islands, he sailed the next day for the northward to gainthe westerly winds which prevail in the higher latitudes. Of the fortydays he was to remain in the West Indies--reduced to thirty-five bysubsequent instructions--only twenty-six had passed. Whatever elsemight result in the future, Nelson was justified in claiming that hispursuit, effected under such discouragements, had driven the enemy outof the West Indies, saved the islands, and, as he added, two hundredsail of sugar ships. Only extreme imprudence, he fairly maintained, was responsible for the loss of the fourteen from Antigua. Nelson himself was off Antigua on the 12th of June, exactly one weekafter he left Barbadoes. There he received all the information thathas just been mentioned as to the enemy's movements. A rapid decisionwas necessary, if he might hope yet to overtake his fortune, and tobaffle finally the objects of the allies, whatever they might be. "Imust be satisfied they have bent their course for Europe before I pushafter them, which will be to the Straits' mouth;" but later in thesame day he has learned that they were standing to the northward whenlast seen, and had sent back their troops to Guadaloupe, therefore, "Ihope to sail in the morning after them for the Straits' mouth. " Thatnight the troops were landed, and a brig of war, the "Curieux, " wasdespatched to England with word of his intentions. At the same time, while believing the allies were bound back to the Mediterranean, herecognized that it was possible they might be going farther north, toone of the Biscay ports, and consequently took measures to notify thecommanding officer off Ferrol to be on his guard. The frigate chargedwith this communication was kept with the fleet until the 19th, bywhich time he had obtained at sea additional and more preciseknowledge of Villeneuve's direction. This important warning was dulyreceived, and in advance of the enemy's appearance, by the admiral forwhom it was intended. In taking this second decision, to abandon the West Indies once moreto themselves, as a month before he had abandoned the Mediterranean, Nelson had to rely only upon his own natural sagacity and practisedjudgment. "I hear all, and even feel obliged, for all is meant askindness to me, that I should get at them. In this diversity ofopinions I may as well follow my own, which is, that the Spaniards aregone to the Havannah, and that the French will either stand for Cadizor Toulon--I feel most inclined to the latter place; and then they mayfancy that they will get to Egypt without any interruption. " "So farfrom being infallible, like the Pope, I believe my opinions to be veryfallible, and therefore I may be mistaken that the enemy's fleet hasgone to Europe; but I cannot bring myself to think otherwise, notwithstanding the variety of opinions which different people of goodjudgment form. " Still, as before, his judgments, if rapid, are not precipitate. Thoughcharacterized by even more of insight than of reasoning, no conditionsare left out of sight, nor, as he declared, was a deaf ear turned toany suggestion. Upon the whole, one is more struck by the accuracy ofthe inferences than by the antecedent processes as summarized byhimself; yet the weight of evidence will be found on the side heespouses. Erroneous in particulars, the general conclusions upon whichhe bases his future course are justified, not only by the results nowknown to us, but to impartial review of their probability at themoment. Most impressive of all, however, is the strength ofconviction, which lifts him from the plane of doubt, where unaidedreason alone would leave him, to that of unhesitating action, incapable of looking backward. In the most complete presentation ofall his views, the one he wished brought before the Prime Minister, ifhis conduct on this momentous occasion were called in question, heends thus: "My opinion is firm as a rock, that some cause, _orders_, or _inability_ to perform any service in these seas, has made themresolve to proceed direct for Europe, sending the Spanish ships to theHavannah. " It is such conviction, in which opinion rather possesses aman than is possessed by him, that exalts genius above talent, andimbues faith with a power which reason has not in her gift. There were among his conclusions certain ones which placed Nelson'smind, however fretted by disappointment, at ease concerning any futureharm the enemy might be able to do. Another wreath of laurel, whichseemed almost within his grasp, had indeed evaded him, and no man feltmore keenly such a loss; but he was reasonably sure that, ifVilleneuve were gone to Europe, he could not outstrip pursuit by longenough to do much harm. The harassing fear, which he had borne throughthe long beat down the Mediterranean and the retarded voyage toMartinique, had now disappeared. Going out he had gained ten days uponthe allies; they had only five days' start of him in the return. Herecognized, moreover, the great significance of their inactivityduring the three weeks they had the Windward Islands, if not all theWest Indies, defenceless before them. "If they were not able to makean attack for three weeks after their arrival, they could not hope forgreater success after our means of resistance increased, and theirmeans of offence were diminished. " If this consideration, on the onehand, showed the improbability of their proceeding against Jamaica, after Nelson's coming, when they had not ventured before, it gave alsoan inkling of their probable efficiency for immediate action inEurope. "They will not give me credit for quitting the West Indies fora month to come;" therefore it was unlikely that they would think itnecessary to proceed at once upon their next enterprise, afterreaching port. "I must not despair of getting up with them before theyenter the Straits, " he writes Elliot. "At least, they will have notime to carry any of their future plans into execution, and do harm toany of the countries under my charge. " If his thirst for glory wasunslaked, his fears of disaster had disappeared. Villeneuve, guided by instructions recently received from Napoleon, tomeet the case of the Brest squadron not getting away, had goneactually for Ferrol, where he was to join a squadron of five Frenchand nine Spanish ships, which would raise his own force to thirty-fourof the line; but Nelson, unable to know this, argued correctly that, in the uncertainty, he must leave this chance to the Biscay ships, andthat for himself the Mediterranean possessed the first claim. At noonof June 13th, nine days after reaching Barbadoes, he got away fromAntigua. The necessity for gaining the westerly winds made his coursefor some time the same as that of Villeneuve, and left him not withouthopes that he might yet fall in with the allies, especially if, as hethought, they were destined to the Straits. On the 17th an Americanschooner was spoken, which had seen the combined squadron two daysbefore, steering also to the northward. This report, wrote Nelson tothe Admiralty, "can leave me no room to doubt but that I am hard uponthe heels of the enemy's fleet. I think we cannot be more than eightyleagues from them at this moment, and by carrying every sail, andusing my utmost efforts, I shall hope to close with them before theyget to either Cadiz or Toulon. " The news was sent ahead by twovessels, which parted from the fleet on the 19th of June, --one forGibraltar, with despatches and letters for the admiral and ministersin the Mediterranean; one for Lisbon, whence this importantintelligence would be forwarded to England and to the commandingofficer off Ferrol. Still believing them bound for the Straits, Nelsonexpressed in the fleet the opinion that they would keep well to thesouthward of the Azores, so as not to be seen by British cruiserscentred there. In this he was mistaken, as he was in their finaldestination; both fleets sighted the islands, --- the French on the30th of June to the northward of the group, while the British passedthrough it on the 8th of July. He admitted, however, that he wasdoubtful in the matter. "It is very uncertain whether they will go toFerrol or Cadiz;" and nothing can indicate more clearly hisperplexity, and his sense of the urgency of the case, than his partingon the same day with two of the four small cruisers he had with him, in order to insure that Ferrol as well as Gibraltar should have promptwarning. It was at about this time that Nelson expressed, to one or more of hiscaptains, his views as to what he had so far effected, what he hadproposed to do if he had met the hostile fleets, and what his futurecourse would be if they were yet found. "I am thankful that the enemyhave been driven from the West India Islands with so little loss toour Country. I had made up my mind to great sacrifices; for I haddetermined, notwithstanding his vast superiority, to stop his career, and to put it out of his power to do any further mischief. Yet do notimagine I am one of those hot brained people, who fight at an immensedisadvantage, _without an adequate object_. [1] My object is partlygained, " that is, the allies had been forced out of the West Indies. "If we meet them, we shall find them not less than eighteen, I ratherthink twenty sail of the line, and therefore do not be surprised if Ishould not fall on them immediately: _we won't part without abattle_. [104] I think they will be glad to leave me alone, if I willlet them alone; which I will do, either till we approach the shoresof Europe, or they give me an advantage too tempting to be resisted. " It is rare to find so much sagacious appreciation of conditions, combined with so much exalted resolution and sound discretion, as inthis compact utterance. Among the external interests of Great Britain, the West Indies were the greatest. They were critically threatened bythe force he was pursuing; therefore at all costs that force should beso disabled, that it could do nothing effective against the defenceswith which the scattered islands were provided. For this end he wasprepared to risk the destruction of his squadron. The West Indies werenow delivered; but the enemy's force remained, and other Britishinterests. Three months before, he had said, "I had rather see half mysquadron burnt than risk what the French fleet may do in theMediterranean. " In the same spirit he now repeats: "Though we are buteleven to eighteen or twenty, we won't part without a battle. " Whyfight such odds? He himself has told us a little later. "By the timethe enemy has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no harm thisyear. " Granting this conclusion, --the reasonableness of which wassubstantiated at Trafalgar, --it cannot be denied that the sacrificewould be justified, the enemy's combinations being disconcerted. Yetthere shall be no headlong, reckless attack. "I will leave them alonetill they offer me an opportunity too tempting to be resisted, "--thatspeaks for itself, --or, "until we approach the shores of Europe, " whenthe matter can no longer be deferred, and the twenty ships must betaken out of Napoleon's hosts, even though eleven be destroyed toeffect this. The preparedness of mind is to be noted, and yet more thefirmness of the conviction, in the strength of which alone such deedsare done. It is the man of faith who is ever the man of works. Singularly enough, his plans were quickly to receive the best ofillustrations by the failure of contrary methods. Scarcely a monthlater fifteen British ships, under another admiral, met these twenty, which Nelson with eleven now sought in vain. They did not part withouta battle, but they did part without a decisive battle; they were notkept in sight afterwards; they joined and were incorporated withNapoleon's great armada; they had further wide opportunities ofmischief; and there followed for the people of Great Britain a periodof bitter suspense and wide-spread panic. "What a game had Villeneuveto play!" said Napoleon of those moments. "Does not the thought of thepossibilities remaining to Villeneuve, " wrote Lord Radstock ofCalder's fruitless battle, "make your blood boil when you reflect onthe never to be forgotten 22d of July? Notwithstanding the inferiorityof Lord Nelson's numbers, " he says at the same time, with keenappreciation of the man he knew so well, "should he be so lucky as tofall in with the enemy, I have no doubt that _he would never quitthem_[105] until he should have destroyed or taken some of the Frenchships; and that he himself would seek the French admiral's ship, ifpossible, I would pledge my life on it. " "There is such an universalbustle and cry about invasion, that no other subject will be listenedto at present by those in power. I found London almost a desert, andno good news stirring to animate it; on the contrary, the few faces Isaw at the Admiralty at once confirmed the truth of the report of thecombined squadron having safely arrived at Ferrol. " This was afterCalder had met and fought them, and let them get out of his sight. Lord Minto, speaking of the same crisis, says: "There has been thegreatest alarm ever known in the city of London, since the combinedfleet [Villeneuve's] sailed from Ferrol. If they had captured ourhomeward-bound convoys, it is said the India Company and half the citymust have been bankrupt. " These gleams of the feelings of the times, reflected by two men in close contact with the popular apprehensions, show what Nelson was among British admirals to the men of his day, andwhy he was so. "Great and important as the victory is, " wrote Minto, three months later, after the news of Trafalgar, "it is bought toodearly, even for our interest, by the death of Nelson. We shall wantmore victories yet, and to whom can we look for them? The navy iscertainly full of the bravest men, but they are mostly below the rankof admiral; and brave as they almost all are, there was a sort ofheroic cast about Nelson that I never saw in any other man, and whichseems wanting to the achievement of _impossible things_ which becameeasy to him, and on which the maintenance of our superiority at seaseems to depend against the growing navy of the enemy. " "The clamouragainst poor Sir Robert Calder is gaining ground daily, " wroteRadstock, condemnatory yet pitiful towards the admiral who had failedduly to utilize the opportunity Nelson then was seeking in vain, "andthere is a general cry against him from all quarters. Thus much onemay venture to say, that had your old chief commanded our squadron, the enemy would have had but little room for lying or vapouring, as Ihave not a shadow of a doubt but that he would either have taken ordestroyed the French admiral. " But there was but one Nelson, and he meantime, faint yet pursuing, toiled fruitlessly on, bearing still the sickness of hope deferred andsuspense protracted. "Midnight, " he notes in his private diary of June21st. "Nearly calm, saw three planks which I think came from theFrench fleet. Very miserable, which is very foolish. " "We crawledthirty-three miles the last twenty-four hours, " he enters on the 8thof July. "My only hope is, that the enemy's fleet are near us, and inthe same situation. All night light breezes, standing to the eastward, to go to the northward of St. Michael's. [106] At times squally withrain. " Amid these unavoidable delays, he was forecasting andpreparing that no time should be lost when he reached the Straits andonce more came within the range of intelligence. The light winds, whenboats could pass without retarding the ships, were utilized inpreparing letters to the officials at Gibraltar and Tangiers, to haveready the stores necessary for the fleet upon arrival. These paperswere already on board the two frigates remaining with him, with thenecessary instructions for their captains, so that they might part atany moment judged fitting, irrespective of weather conditions. Againhe cautions the authorities to keep his approach a profound secret. Noprivate letters for Gibraltar were permitted in the mail-bags, lestthey should unwittingly betray counsel. The vessels were directed torejoin him forty miles west of Cape Spartel, giving him thus time todecide upon his course before he reached Gibraltar; for it was quiteon the cards that he might find it imperative to hurry north withoutanchoring. On the 13th of July, five hundred miles from Cape St. Vincent, one of these ships left him, probably the last to go. On the 18th of July, Cape Spartel was sighted. "No French fleet, "wrote the admiral in his diary, "nor any information about them: howsorrowful this makes me, but I cannot help myself!" "I am, my dear Mr. Marsden, " he wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty, "as completelymiserable as my greatest enemy could wish me; but I blame neitherfortune or my own judgment. Oh, General Brereton! General Brereton!"To his friend Davison he revealed yet more frankly the bitterness ofhis spirit, now that the last hope was dashed, and it was evenpossible that the mis-step of going to Trinidad had caused him toincur a further mistake, by leaving the allies in the West Indies. "But for General Brereton's damned information, Nelson, " he said, halfprophetically, "would have been, living or dead, the greatest man inhis profession that England ever saw. Now alas! I am nothing--perhapsshall incur censure for misfortunes which may happen, and havehappened. " But if he himself were disappointed, and foreboded the discontent ofothers, the greatness of what he had done was quickly apparent, andreceived due recognition from thoughtful men. "Either the distancesbetween the different quarters of the globe are diminished, " wrote Mr. Elliot from Naples, "or you have extended the powers of human action. After an unremitting cruise of two long years in the stormy Gulf ofLyons, to have proceeded without going into port to Alexandria, fromAlexandria to the West Indies, from the West Indies back again toGibraltar; to have kept your ships afloat, your rigging standing, andyour crews in health and spirits--is an effort such as never wasrealised in former times, nor, I doubt, will ever again be repeated byany other admiral. You have protected us for two long years, and yousaved the West Indies by only a few days. " Thus truly summarized, suchachievements are seen to possess claims to admiration, not to beexceeded even by the glory of Trafalgar. Although no French fleet was visible, as Nelson approached theStraits, there were a half-dozen British ships-of-the-line, under thecommand of his old friend Collingwood, blockading Cadiz. When Orde wasdriven off that station by Villeneuve on the 9th of April, and retiredupon Brest, he had already sent in an application to be relieved froma duty which he himself had sought, and had held for so short a time;alleging a bundle of grievances which show clearly enough theimpracticable touchiness of the man. His request was at once granted. Early in May, Collingwood was sent from England with eightsail-of-the-line for the West Indies; but learning on the way thatNelson had gone thither, he detached to him two of his swiftestseventy-fours, and, with great good judgment, himself took positionoff Cadiz, where he covered the entrance of the Mediterranean, andeffectually prevented any ships from either Cartagena or Ferrolconcentrating in the neighborhood of the Straits. Nelson received word from some of his lookouts appointed to meet himhere, that nothing had been heard of the allied squadrons. The anxietywhich had never ceased to attend him was increased by this prolongedsilence. He had no certainty that the enemy might not have doubledback, and gone to Jamaica. He would not stop now to exchange withCollingwood speculations about the enemy's course. "My dearCollingwood, I am, as you may suppose, miserable at not having fallenin with the enemy's fleet; and I am almost increased in sorrow by notfinding them [here]. The name of General Brereton will not soon beforgot. I must now only hope that the enemy have not tricked me, andgone to Jamaica; but if the account, [107] of which I send you a copy, is correct, it is more than probable that they are either gone to thenorthward, or, if bound to the Mediterranean, not yet arrived. " Hissurmise remains accurate. He then continues, with that delicate andrespectful recognition of the position and ability of others, whichwon him so much love: "The moment the fleet is watered, and got somerefreshments, of which we are in great want, I shall come out and makeyou a visit; not, my dear friend, to take your command from you, (forI may probably add mine to you, ) but to consult how we can best serveour Country, by detaching a part of this large force. " Circumstancesprevented his neighborly intention from taking effect. A week laterNelson returned north with his squadron, and the friends did not meetuntil shortly before Trafalgar. In reply to Nelson's letter, Collingwood summed up his view of thesituation as so far developed. "I have always had an idea that Irelandalone was the object they had in view, and still believe that to betheir ultimate destination--that they will now liberate the Ferrolsquadron from Calder, make the round of the Bay, [108] and, taking theRochefort people with them, appear off Ushant--perhaps withthirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more. AdmiralCornwallis collecting his out squadrons may have thirty and upwards. This appears to be a probable plan; for unless it is to bring theirgreat fleets and armies to some point of service--some rash attempt atconquest--they have been only subjecting them to chance of loss, whichI do not believe the Corsican would do, without the hope of anadequate reward. " It is upon this letter, the sagacious and well-ordered inferences ofwhich must be candidly admitted, that a claim for superiority ofdiscernment over Nelson has been made for its writer. It must beremembered, however, not as a matter of invidious detraction from oneman, but in simple justice to the other, whose insight and belief hadtaken form in such wonderful work, that Nelson also had fully believedthat the enemy, if they left the Mediterranean, would proceed toIreland; and further, and yet more particularly, Collingwood's viewshad been confirmed to him by the fact, as yet unknown to Nelson, thatthe Rochefort squadron, which sailed at the time Villeneuve firstescaped in January, had since returned to Europe on the 26th of May. "The flight to the West Indies, " Collingwood said, in a letter datedthe day after the one just quoted, "was to take off our naval force, which is the great impediment to their undertaking. The RochefortSquadron's return confirmed me. " "I well know what your lordship'sdisappointment is, " he wrote, with generous sympathy; "and I share themortification of it. It would have been a happy day for England, couldyou have met them; small as your force was, I trust it would have beenfound enough. This summer is big with events. Sincerely I wish yourLordship strength of body to go through--_and to all others, yourstrength of mind_. " Testy even to petulance as these two great seamenwere at times in small matters, when overwrought with their manifoldanxieties, they nowhere betray any egotistic concern as to the valueattached by others to their respective speculations, the uncertaintiesof which none knew better than they, who had to act upon theirconclusions. Meantime, at the very moment they were exchanging letters, pregnantmovements were taking place, unknown to either. The brig "Curieux, "despatched to England by Nelson the night before he left Antigua, hadfallen in with the allied squadrons, nine hundred milesnorth-northeast from Antigua, on the 19th of June--just a week aftershe sailed. Keeping company with them long enough to ascertain theircourse and approximate numbers, the captain then hastened on, anchoring in Plymouth on the 7th of July. "I am sorry, " wrote Nelsonwhen he heard of this meeting, "that Captain Bettesworth did not standback and try to find us out;" but grateful as the word would have beento him, the captain was better advised to make for a fixed and certaindestination. At daylight of the 9th the news was in the hands of theFirst Lord, who issued instant orders for the blockading squadrons offRochefort and Ferrol to unite, and to take post one hundred miles westof Cape Finisterre. On the 19th of July Admiral Calder was in thisposition, with fifteen ships-of-the-line, and received through Lisbonthe information of the French movements, which Nelson had forwardedthither an exact month before. On the 20th Nelson's fleet anchored atGibraltar, and he went ashore, "for the first time since the 16th ofJune, 1803. " On the 22d Calder and Villeneuve met and fought. TwoSpanish ships-of-the-line were captured, but the battle was otherwiseindecisive. Calder hesitated to attack again, and on the 26th lostsight of the enemy, who, on the 28th, put into Vigo Bay; whence, by alucky slant of wind, they reached Ferrol on the first of August withfifteen ships, having left three in Vigo. Calder sent five of hisfleet to resume the blockade of Rochefort, and himself with ninejoined Cornwallis off Brest, raising the force there to twenty-six. This junction was made August 14th. The next day appeared there theindefatigable Nelson, with his unwearied and ever ready squadron ofeleven ships--veterans in the highest sense of the word, inorganization, practice, and endurance; alert, and solid as men ofiron. This important and most opportune arrival came about as follows. Anchoring on the 19th of July at Gibraltar, Nelson found everythingready for the re-equipment of his ships, owing to his foresight indirecting it. All set to work at once to prepare for immediatedeparture. When I have "completed the fleet to four months'provisions, and with stores for Channel service, " he wrote to theAdmiralty, "I shall get outside the Mediterranean, leaving asufficient force to watch Carthagena, and proceed as upon a dueconsideration, (on reading Vice-Admiral Collingwood's orders, andthose which Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton may have receivedduring my absence, ) may suggest to be most proper. Should I hear thatthe enemy are gone to some of the ports in the Bay, I shall join thesquadron off Ferrol, or off Ushant, as I think the case requires. "There will be observed here the same striking combination of rapidity, circumspection, and purpose prepared by reflection for instant actionin emergencies, that characterized him usually, and especially inthese four months of chase. "The squadron is in the most perfecthealth, " he continues, "except some symptoms of scurvy, which I hopeto eradicate by bullocks and refreshments from Tetuan, to which I willproceed to-morrow. " The getting fresh beef at Tetuan, it will beremembered, had been stopped by a fair wind on the 5th of May. Sincethen, and in fact since a month earlier, no opportunity of obtainingfresh provisions had offered during his rapid movements. "The fleetreceived not the smallest refreshment, not even a cup of water in theWest Indies, " he told the Queen of Naples. The admiral himself gotonly a few sheep, in the nine days' round. Even now, the intention to go to Tetuan, advisable as the step was, was contingent upon the opportunity offering of reaching a positionwhence he could move with facility. Nelson did not mean to beback-strapped again within the Mediterranean, with a west wind, and acurrent setting to leeward, if the enemy turned up in the Atlantic. "If the wind is westerly, " he wrote on the early morning of the 22d, "I shall go to Tetuan: if easterly, out of the straits. " At half-pastnine that day the fleet weighed, and at half-past seven in the eveninganchored at Tetuan, whither orders had already gone to preparebullocks and fresh vegetables for delivery. At noon of the 23d theships again lifted their anchors, and started. "The fleet iscomplete, " he wrote the First Lord that day, "and the first easterlywind, I shall pass the Straits. " Fortune apparently had made up hermind now to balk him no more. Thirty-six hours later, at 3. 30 A. M. OfJuly 25th, being then off Tarifa, a little west of Gibraltar, thesloop-of-war "Termagant, " one of his own Mediterranean cruisers, camealongside, and brought him a newspaper, received from Lisbon, containing an account of the report carried to England by the"Curieux. " "I know it's true, " he wrote to the Admiralty, "from mywords being repeated, therefore I shall not lose a moment, after Ihave communicated with Admiral Collingwood, in getting to thenorthward to either Ferrol, Ireland, or Ushant; as information orcircumstances may point out to be proper. " In his haste to proceed, and wishing to summon the "Amazon" frigate to rejoin him, he sent the"Termagant" at once to Gibraltar, without understanding that she wasjust from there and had on board his clothes left for washing; inconsequence of which precipitancy she "carried all my things, even tomy last shirt, back again. " "As I fancied he came from Lisbon, " heexplained, "I would not allow him to stop. " "My dear Parker, " he wrotethe frigate-captain, "make haste and join me. If all places fail youwill find me at Spithead. " Parker, who was a favorite of theadmiral's, followed out the careful detailed instructions whichaccompanied this note, but could not overtake the fleet, and fromincidents of the service never met Nelson again. With a fresh easterly gale the squadron pressed again into theAtlantic. As it went on for Cape St. Vincent, Collingwood's divisionwas seen some distance to leeward, but, as not infrequently happens inand near the Mediterranean, the wind with it came from the oppositequarter to that which Nelson had. The latter, therefore, would notstop, nor lose a mile of the ground over which his fair breeze wascarrying him. "My dear Collingwood, " he wrote, "We are in a freshLevanter. You have a westerly wind, therefore I must forego thepleasure of taking you by the hand until October next, when, if I amwell enough, I shall (if the Admiralty please) resume the command. Iam very far from well; but I am anxious that not a moment of theservices of this fleet should be lost. " Matters therefore were leftstanding much as they were when he passed in a week before. He hadtaken upon himself, however, with a discretion he could now assumefreely, to change the Admiralty's orders, issued during his absence, withdrawing most of the small cruisers from about Malta, to reinforceCollingwood's division. When he first learned of this step, he said itwas a mistake, for double the number he had left there were needed;"but the orders of the Admiralty must be obeyed. I only hope officerswill not be blamed for the events which it is not difficult to foreseewill happen. " With the crowd of enemy's privateers in those waters, Malta, he was assured, would be cut off from all communication. Hesoon made up his mind that he would use his own discretion and modifythe dispositions taken. "Malta cannot more than exist, and our troopswould be placed in a position of great distress, " he told theAdmiralty. "I transmit a statement of the force I think necessary tothe eastward of Carthagena for performing the services intrusted to mycare, and when I get the lists I shall apportion them as far as theirnumber will allow, and my judgment will admit. " "I hope the Board willconsider this as not wishing to alter any arrangement of theirs, butas a measure absolutely necessary. " Within his own field Nelson wasnow, by proved professional genius, above the restraint of Boards; andwhen he reached England the new First Lord had the wisdom to admit it, in this supreme crisis, by giving him full control, within theresources of the country, over the constitution of the fleet withwhich he fought Trafalgar. Letters left for Bickerton and Collingwood placed them in possessionof his ideas, including the revocation of the Admiralty's order; and, in an official letter, he earnestly recommended the latter officer toadhere to his arrangements. Word was also sent forward to Cornwallis, and to the commander-in-chief at Cork, as well as to the Admiralty, tonotify them of his approach. To the northward of Cape St. Vincent hemet the northerly winds that prevail on the Portuguese coast. Delayedby these, he was three full weeks making the passage from Gibraltar tothe Channel Fleet, which he joined at 3 P. M. Of August 15th, twenty-five miles west of Ushant. To this point his movements werefinally determined by a frigate, which was spoken on the 12th ofAugust, and informed him that up to three days before no intelligencehad been received of the enemy's arrival in the Bay of Biscay, or onthe Irish coast. Cornwallis excused him from the customary personalvisit, and authorized him to proceed at once to Portsmouth with the"Victory, " in pursuance of the Admiralty's leave which he so long hadhad in his hands. On the morning of August 18th, the long andfruitless chase of the allied fleet was brought to an end by thedropping of the "Victory's" anchor at Spithead. To Davison Nelsonsummed up his disappointment in the exasperated expression, "--nGeneral Brereton. "[109] From newspapers received off Ushant he first learned of Calder'sbattle, and the public dissatisfaction with the results. He hadundergone too much frustration and anxiety himself not to feel for anofficer who had made a mistake, although it may safely be said thatCalder's mistake was not only one Nelson could not have made, but wasthe exact opposite of the course which Nelson by anticipation had saidhe would adopt. He expressed himself in words of generous sympathy. "Iwas bewildered by the account of Sir Robert Calder's victory, and thejoy of the event; together with the hearing that _John Bull_ was notcontent, which I am sorry for. Who can, my dear Freemantle, commandall the success which our Country may wish? We have fought together, and therefore well know what it is. I have had the best disposed fleetof friends, but who can say what will be the event of a battle? and itmost sincerely grieves me, that in any of the papers it should beinsinuated, that Lord Nelson could have done better. I should havefought the enemy, so did my friend Calder; but who can say that hewill be more successful than another? I only wish to stand upon my ownmerits, and not by comparison, one way or the other, upon the conductof a brother officer. You will forgive this dissertation, but I feelupon the occasion. " These words, which spoke the whole of his honestheart, were the more generous, because he believed Calder to be one ofthe few professional enemies that he had. From the place where Villeneuve was met, Nelson reasoned, again, thatthe primary intention of the allies, returning from the West Indies, had been to enter the Straits. "By all accounts I am satisfied theiroriginal destination was the Mediterranean, but they heard frequentlyof our track. " This persistence in his first view was partly due tothe confidence with which he held to his own convictions, --the defectof a strong quality, --partly, doubtless, to the fact that Villeneuvehad blundered in his homeward course, and fetched unnecessarily toleeward of his port, with reference to winds perfectly understood byseamen of that day. In fact he had no business to be where he broughtup, except on the supposition that he was making for the Straits. FOOTNOTES: [83] At noon, January 20, "Mount Santo bore N. W. , distant sixleagues. "--"_Victory's" Log_. Cape Monte Santo is sixty miles north of thesouthern extremity of Sardinia. [84] On the east coast of Sicily. [85] Bulkheads are the light partitions which divide cabins, offices, etc. From the rest of the decks. For battle they are removed to allow freercommunication, and to lessen the risk of fire and splinters. [86] An island twenty miles west of Sicily. [87] Author's italics. [88] March 9th. [89] Author's italics. [90] Apparently Gulf of Palmas. [91] From England. [92] Sir John Orde. [93] Orde's squadron never exceeded six ships-of-the-line, whileVilleneuve's numbered eleven without the Spaniards. It will be seen furtheron that Nelson blamed Orde for not keeping track of the enemy's movements, and sending word to him at Gibraltar, and elsewhere, of the directiontaken. As far as the author's information goes, he agrees with thiscensure. To fight eleven ships with six could only be justified by extremecircumstances; but to lose sight of them in spring weather infers evenworse judgment than fighting would. It was of the first importance to learnthe destination of so large a body, considering that the interests of GreatBritain were threatened in directions so diverse as the Channel, the EastIndies, and the West Indies. [94] Lord Radstock's son had been transferred before this from the"Victory" to the "Hydra"; but his father did not yet know the fact, andsupposed him with Nelson. [95] First Lord of the Admiralty, who had very lately succeeded Melville. [96] An east wind. [97] The signal flag for a vessel about to sail. [98] Life of the Rev. A. J. Scott, p. 171. [99] Ahead, but a little to one side. [100] Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains. [101] The "Northumberland" and the "Spartiate. " [102] The island immediately north of Martinique. [103] "The Trench and Spaniards landed 1, 000 sick when they arrived atMartinico, and buried full that number during their stay. " Nicolas, vol. Vi. P. 480. [104] Author's italics. [105] Author's italics. [106] One of the easternmost of the Azores. [107] The report of the American schooner, which saw the allied fleet, June15th. [108] Of Biscay. [109] The extent of Brereton's fault (if at fault) depended, probably, uponthe character and responsibility of the man he had on lookout at socritical a moment, and the care with which he tested the report made tohim. Brereton did not know of Nelson's arrival, possibly not of hisapproach. At the same time men must take the blame of carelessness, whenharm comes of it. Ball, commenting to Nelson upon the incident, said: "Ithink orders should be given, that when a fleet is discovered, an officershould be sent for to witness it, and that one should be at the signal hillat the rising and setting of the sun. I have often reflected on thesecircumstances, and on the little attention generally paid them. " As itstands, the whole affair is a warning to officers, of what results may flowfrom errors small in themselves. CHAPTER XXI. NELSON'S LAST STAY IN ENGLAND. AUGUST 19--SEPTEMBER 15, 1805. AGE, 46. The "Victory" was delayed in quarantine twenty-four hours, when ordersfrom London directed her release. At 9 P. M. Of the 19th of August, Nelson's flag was hauled down, and he left the ship for Merton, thusending an absence of two years and three months. His home being but anhour's drive from the heart of London, the anxieties of the time, andhis own eagerness to communicate his views and experience, carried himnecessarily and at once to the public offices--to the Admiralty first, but also to the Secretaries for Foreign Affairs and for War, both ofwhom had occasion for the knowledge and suggestions of so competentand practised an observer. The present head of the Admiralty, LordBarham, had succeeded to the office, unexpectedly, upon the suddenretirement of Melville the previous May. He was a naval officer, eighty years of age, who since middle life had exchanged the activesea-going of the profession, for civil duties connected with it. Hehad thus been out of touch with it on the military side; and althoughNelson was of course well known to him by reputation and achievement, he had not that intimate personal experience of his character andhabit of thought, upon which was based the absolute confidence felt bySt. Vincent, and by all others who had seen the great warrior inactive service. "Lord Barham is an almost entire stranger to me, "wrote Nelson; but after their interview he left with him the journalsin which were embodied the information obtained during his recentcommand, with his comments upon the affairs of the Mediterranean inparticular, and, as incidental thereto, of Europe in general. Barham, who gave proof of great military capacity during his short term ofoffice, was so much impressed by the sagacity and power of Nelson'sremarks, that he assured the Cabinet he ought by all means to go backto the Mediterranean; and it may be assumed that the latter's wish soto do would have been gratified, at the time of his own choosing, hadnot other events interposed to carry him away earlier, and to end hiscareer. It was upon one of these visits to Ministers that Nelson andWellington met for the only time in their lives. The latter had justreturned from a long service in India, reaching England in September, 1805. His account of the interview, transmitted to us by Croker, is asfollows:-- WALMER, October 1st, 1834. We were talking of Lord Nelson, and some instances were mentioned of the egotism and vanity that derogated from his character. "Why, " said the Duke, "I am not surprised at such instances, for Lord Nelson was, in different circumstances, two quite different men, as I myself can vouch, though I only saw him once in my life, and for, perhaps, an hour. It was soon after I returned from India. I went to the Colonial Office[110] in Downing Street, and there I was shown into the little waiting-room on the right hand, where I found, also waiting to see the Secretary of State, a gentleman, whom, from his likeness to his pictures and the loss of an arm, I immediately recognised as Lord Nelson. He could not know who I was, but he entered at once into conversation with me, if I can call it conversation, for it was almost all on his side and all about himself, and in, really, a style so vain and so silly as to surprise and almost disgust me. I suppose something that I happened to say may have made him guess that I was _somebody_, and he went out of the room for a moment, I have no doubt to ask the office-keeper who I was, for when he came back he was altogether a different man, both in manner and matter. All that I had thought a charlatan style had vanished, and he talked of the state of this country and of the aspect and probabilities of affairs on the Continent with a good sense, and a knowledge of subjects both at home and abroad, that surprised me equally and more agreeably than the first part of our interview had done; in fact, he talked like an officer and a statesman. The Secretary of State kept us long waiting, and certainly, for the last half or three quarters of an hour, I don't know that I ever had a conversation that interested me more. Now, if the Secretary of State had been punctual, and admitted Lord Nelson in the first quarter of an hour, I should have had the same impression of a light and trivial character that other people have had; but luckily I saw enough to be satisfied that he was really a very superior man; but certainly a more sudden and complete metamorphosis I never saw. "[111] This is not the only record that remains to us of those interestinginterviews with Cabinet Ministers, although the most have passed awayunnoted. It was in one of them that he uttered a military opinion, forwhose preservation we are indebted to his own mention of it in aprivate letter; an opinion so characteristic of his habits of thought, his reasoned motives of action, that, although it has before beenquoted, it is fitting to repeat it in his own words and in full. When he reached England, the naval situation, as far as then known, was that Napoleon had twenty-one French ships-of-the-line in Brest, and twenty-eight or nine, French and Spanish, in Ferrol; whileCornwallis had thirty-five British off Brest. This was the conditionon the 15th of August, when Nelson parted from the fleet off Ushant. Very soon after his arrival in town, news was received that Villeneuvehad gone to sea from Ferrol, and that Cornwallis, when informed of thefact, had divided his fleet, with great lack of judgment, keepinghimself seventeen ships to confront the Brest squadron, while eighteenwere sent to look for Villeneuve under the command of Admiral Calder. In the public discontent with the latter, it was not reassuring toknow that, at a moment when every one's nerves were on the rack, hewas again intrusted with the always difficult task of coping with amuch superior force. While this state of excitement prevailed, Nelsoncalled upon the Secretary of State, Lord Castlereagh, on the 23d ofAugust. "Yesterday, " he wrote to Captain Keats, "the Secretary ofState, which is a man who has only sat one solitary day in his office, and of course knows but little of what is passed, and indeed theMinister, [112] were all full of the enemy's fleet, and as I am now setup for a _Conjuror_, and God knows they will very soon find out I amfar from being one, I was asked my opinion, against my inclination, for if I make one wrong guess the charm will be broken; but this Iventured without any fear, that if Calder got close alongside theirtwenty-seven or twenty-eight sail, that by the time the enemy had beatour fleet soundly, they would do us no harm this year. " This acute perception of the reason why it was at times desirable andproper to hurl a smaller though more efficient force against superiornumbers, content that the latter, as a factor, were for the campaignannihilated, --this realization of the possible fruitfulness of adefeat, or rather, of a battle wisely lost, as contrasted with whatJomini calls the sterile glory of fighting battles merely to winthem, --is one of the most marked and decisive features of Nelson'sgenius as a general officer. It recurs over and over again, and at allperiods, in his correspondence, this clear and full appreciation ofthe relation of the parts to the whole. [113] It underlay his sustainedpurpose during the long pursuit of the preceding months, that, if hefound the allied squadron, "they would not part without a battle. "Whatever else the result, that particular division would do no harmthat year, and with it necessarily fell the great combination, whatever that might be, of which it was an essential factor. "Theevent would have been in the hands of Providence, " he wrote to Barham;"but we may without, I hope, vanity, believe that the enemy would havebeen fit for no active service after such a battle. " There is wantingto the completeness of this admirable impulse only the steadyingresolve that he would bide his time, so as, to use Napoleon's phrase, to have the most of the chances on his side when he attacked. Thisalso we know he meant to do. "I will _wait_, till they give me anopportunity too tempting to be resisted, or till they draw near theshores of Europe. " In such qualification is to be seen the equipoiseof the highest order of ability. This union of desperate energy withcalculating wariness was in him not so much a matter of reasoning, though reason fully endorses it, as it was the gift ofnature, --genius, in short. Reasoning of a very high order illuminatesNelson's mental processes and justifies his conclusions, but it is notin the power of reason, when face to face with emergency, to bridgethe chasm that separates perception, however clear, from the inwardconviction which alone sustains the loftiest action. "Responsibility, "said St. Vincent, "is the test of a man's courage. " Emergency, it maybe said, is the test of his faith in his beliefs. While those at the head of the State thus hung upon his counsels, anddrew encouragement from his indomitable confidence, the people in thestreets looked up to him with that wistful and reverent dependencewhich does not wholly understand, but centres all its trust upon atried name. They knew what he had done in the now distant past, andthey had heard lately that he had been to the West Indies, and hadreturned, having saved the chief jewel among the colonies of theempire. They knew, also, that their rulers were fearful aboutinvasion, and that in some undefined way Nelson had stood, and wouldyet stand, between them and harm. The rapidity of his movements leftlittle interval between the news of his being back at Gibraltar andthe announcement of his arrival at Portsmouth, which was not generallyexpected. On the 19th of August, a day after the "Victory" anchored atSpithead, Lord Radstock wrote: "'T is extraordinary no officialaccounts have been received from Lord Nelson since the 27th of July. He then hinted that he might perhaps go to Ireland; nevertheless, wehave had no tidings of him on that coast. I confess I begin to befearful that he has worried his mind up to that pitch, that he cannotbear the idea of showing himself again to the world, until he shallhave struck some blow, and that it is this hope that is now making himrun about, half-frantic, in quest of adventures. That suchunparalleled perseverance and true valor should thus evaporate in airis truly melancholy. " If any doubt of the approval of his countrymen mingled with thedistress Nelson unquestionably felt at having missed the enemy, he wastouchingly undeceived. As soon as the "Victory" and his flag were madeout, the people flocked to Portsmouth, collecting on the ramparts ofthe town and other points of view, in inaudible testimony of welcome. As the barge pulled to the shore, and upon landing, he was greetedwith loud and long-continued cheering. In London the samedemonstrations continued whenever he was recognized in public. "LordNelson arrived a few days ago, " wrote Radstock. "He was received intown almost as a conqueror, and was followed round by the people withhuzzas. So much for a great and good name most nobly and deservedlyacquired. " "I met Nelson in a mob in Piccadilly, " wrote Minto at thesame time, "and got hold of his arm, so that I was mobbed too. It isreally quite affecting to see the wonder and admiration, and love andrespect of the whole world; and the genuine expression of all thesesentiments at once, from gentle and simple, the moment he is seen. Itis beyond anything represented in a play or in a poem of fame. " Inthese few days was concentrated the outward reward of a life spent inthe service of his country. During them, Nelson was conspicuously thefirst man in England, --first alike in the love of the people and inimportance to the State. On the private side, also, his life for this brief respite waseminently happy, marred only by the prospect of a speedy departure, the signal for which sounded even sooner than was expected. By his ownaccount, he was only four times in London, and all the moments thatcould be spared from external calls he spent at Merton, where theregathered a large family party, including all his surviving brothersand sisters, with several of their children. "I cannot move atpresent, " he writes on the 31st of August, in declining an invitation, "as all my family are with me, and my stay is very uncertain; and, besides, I have refused for the present all invitations. " "I went toMerton on Saturday" (August 24th), wrote Minto, "and found Nelson justsitting down to dinner, surrounded by a family party, of his brotherthe Dean, Mrs. Nelson, their children, and the children of a sister. Lady Hamilton at the head of the table, and Mother Cadogan[114] at thebottom. I had a hearty welcome. He looks remarkably well and full ofspirits. His conversation is a cordial in these low times. LadyHamilton has improved and added to the house and the place extremelywell, without his knowing she was about it. He found it already done. She is a clever being, after all: the passion is as hot as ever. " Over all hung, unseen, the sword of Damocles. Nelson himself seems tohave been possessed already by vague premonitions of the coming end, which deepened and darkened around him as he went forward to his fate. The story told of his saying to the upholsterer, who had in charge thecoffin made from the mast of the "Orient, " that a certificate of itsidentity should be engraved on the lid, because he thought it highlyprobable that he might want it on his return, is, indeed, but acommonplace, light-hearted remark, which derives what significance ithas purely from the event; but it is easy to recognize in his writingsthe recurrent, though intermittent, strain of unusual foreboding. Lifethen held much for him; and it is when richest that the possibility ofapproaching loss possesses the consciousness with the sense ofprobability. Upon a soul of his heroic temper, however, suchpresentiments, though they might solemnize and consecrate the passingmoments, had no power to appall, nor to convert cheerfulness intogloom. The light that led him never burned more brightly, nor did heever follow with more unfaltering step. Fixed in his mind to return to his command in October, he soon feltthat, in the uncertainties of the French movements, a call might comeat any moment. Although he nowhere says so, his mind was doubtlessmade up that, if Villeneuve's twenty-nine sail went to, or near, theMediterranean, he would go out at once. "Every ship, " he writes on the31st of August, "even the Victory, is ordered out, for there is anentire ignorance whether the Ferrol fleet is coming to the northward, gone to the Mediterranean, or cruizing for our valuable homeward-boundfleet. " "Mr. Pitt, " he tells a friend as early as the 29th, "ispleased to think that my services may be wanted. I hope Calder'svictory (which I am most anxiously expecting) will render my goingforth unnecessary. " "I hold myself ready, " he writes again on the 3dof September, "to go forth whenever I am desired, although God knowsI want rest; but self is entirely out of the question. "[115] It was not, therefore, to a mind or will unprepared that the suddenintimation came on the 2d of September--just a fortnight after he leftthe "Victory. " That morning there arrived in town Captain Blackwood ofthe frigate "Euryalus, " which had been despatched by Collingwood tonotify the Admiralty that the missing Villeneuve had turned up withhis squadron at Cadiz, on the 20th of August. Blackwood was an oldfriend and follower. It was he who had commanded the "Penelope" inMarch, 1800, and more than any one present had insured the capture ofthe "Guillaume Tell, " when she ran out from Malta, [116]--the greatestservice, probably, rendered to Nelson's reputation by any man who eversailed under his orders. He stopped first at Merton at five o'clock inthe morning, and found Nelson already up and dressed. The latter saidat once, "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanishfleets, and I think I shall yet have to beat them. " Later in the dayhe called at the Admiralty, and there saw Blackwood again. In thecourse of conversation, which turned chiefly upon future operations inthe Mediterranean, he frequently repeated, "Depend on it, Blackwood, Ishall yet give Mr. Villeneuve a drubbing, " an expression whose wordingevinces animation and resolve, --far removed from the troubledindecision from which, by her own account, Lady Hamilton freed him. It was speedily determined by the Government that the combined fleetsin Cadiz should be held there, or forced to fight if they left; thecountry had passed through a fortnight of too great anxiety, to riskany chance of its repetition by a renewed evasion. Ignorant of thereasons which dictated Villeneuve's course, and that it was notaccordant but contrary to his orders, it was natural to suppose thatthere was some further object indicated by the position now taken, andthat that object was the Mediterranean. Moreover, so large a body ofcommissioned ships--nearly forty--as were now assembled, could notfail to tax severely the resources of a port like Cadiz, and distresswould tend to drive them out soon. Thirty thousand able-bodied men area heavy additional load on the markets of a small city, blockaded bysea, and with primitive communications by land. Upon this restedNelson's principal hope of obliging them to come forth, if Napoleonhimself did not compel them. Their position, he wrote the Secretaryfor War soon after he joined the fleet, seemed to favor an attack byrockets; "but I think we have a better chance of forcing them out bywant of provisions: it is said hunger will break through stonewalls, --ours is only a wall of wood. " "It is said that there is agreat scarcity of provisions in Cadiz. " He then mentioned that theallies were endeavoring to meet this difficulty by sending neutralvessels, loaded with food-stuffs, from French ports to all the smallharbors on either side of Cadiz, whence the stores carried by themcould be transferred by coasting-boats, --a process which ships werepowerless to stop. Collingwood, therefore, had seized the neutrals, and sent them into Gibraltar, a step which Nelson had approved andcontinued. For it he then demanded the authority of his government. "Should it be thought proper to allow the enemy's fleet to bevictualled, I request that I may be informed as soon as possible. " In connection with this subject Nelson made an allusion to a policywith which Castlereagh, the minister he was addressing, was afterwardsidentified, --that of the celebrated Orders in Council of 1807, and thelicense system connected with it. This is one of the few intimationswe have of the wide range of subjects upon which he conversed withmembers of the Cabinet while in England; and it is interesting, notonly as showing how far back those measures originated, but also asillustrating his own prophetic intuition of the construction whichwould be placed upon such proceedings. "I can have nothing, as anAdmiral, to say upon the propriety of granting licences; but from whatyour Lordship told me of the intention of Ministers respecting theneutral trade, it strikes me, some day it may be urged that it was notfor the sake of blockade, but for the purpose of taking all the tradeinto her own hands, that Great Britain excluded the Neutrals. YourLordship's wisdom will readily conceive all that Neutral Courts mayurge at this apparent injustice, and of might overcoming right. "[117]This shrewdly accurate forecast of a contention which was not to arisetill after his death is but one instance among many of Nelson'sclearness of judgment, in political as well as in military matters. Nelson's services, upon this, his final departure from England, wererather requested by the Government than by him volunteered--in theordinary sense of the word. He went willingly enough, doubtless, butin obedience, proud and glad, to the summons, not only of the popularcry, but of the Cabinet's wish. "I own I want much more rest, " hewrote to Elliot, immediately after joining the fleet off Cadiz; "butit was thought right to desire me to come forth, and I obeyed. " "Iexpected to lay my weary bones quiet for the winter, " he told anotherfriend in Naples, "but I ought, perhaps, to be proud of the generalcall which has made me to go forth. " The popularly received account, therefore, derived from Lady Hamilton, of her controlling influence inthe matter, may be dismissed as being--if not apocryphal--merely oneside of the dealing by which he had to reconcile the claims ofpatriotic duty with the appeals of the affections. As told bySouthey, her part in his decision was as follows: "When Blackwood hadleft him, he wanted resolution to declare his wishes to Lady Hamiltonand his sisters, and endeavoured to drive away the thought. He haddone enough, he said: 'Let the man trudge it who has lost his budget!'His countenance belied his lips; and as he was pacing one of the walksin the garden, which he used to call the quarter-deck, Lady Hamiltoncame up to him, and said she saw he was uneasy. He smiled, and said:'No, he was as happy as possible; he was surrounded by his family, hishealth was better since he had been on shore, and he would not givesixpence to call the king his uncle. ' She replied, that she did notbelieve him, that she knew he was longing to get at the combinedfleets, that he considered them as his own property, that he would bemiserable if any man but himself did the business, and that he oughtto have them, as the price and reward of his two years' long watching, and his hard chase. 'Nelson, ' said she, 'however we may lament yourabsence, offer your services; they will be accepted, and you will gaina quiet heart by it; you will have a glorious victory, and then youmay return here, and be happy. ' He looked at her with tears in hiseyes: 'Brave Emma! Good Emma! If there were more Emmas, there would bemore Nelsons. ' His services were as willingly accepted as they wereoffered. " The fidelity with which Nelson destroyed Lady Hamilton's lettersprevents our knowing just what was her attitude towards hisaspirations for glory, and her acquiescence in his perils, in view ofthe entire dependence of her future upon his life; a dependence suchas an honored wife could by no means feel, for the widow of Nelsoncould rely safely upon the love of the nation. Certain it is that hisletters to her contain enough appeals to the sense she should have ofhis honor, to show that he stood in need of no strengthening at herhands; and it seems legible enough, between the lines, that he hadrather to resist the pull of her weakness, or her interest, than tolook for encouragement in the path of hardship and self-denial. It iscertain, too, that some days before Blackwood arrived, Nelsonunderstood that he might be wanted soon, and avowed his entirewillingness to go, while not affecting to conceal his hope thatcircumstances might permit him to remain until October, the time hehad fixed to Collingwood for his return. Whatever the inside history, the matter was quickly settled. On September 3d, the day afterBlackwood's arrival, he writes to Rose: "I shall rejoice to see you onboard the Victory, if only for a moment; but I shall certainly not bean advocate for being at Portsmouth till one of the Victory's anchorsare at the bows. "[118] The next day, the 4th, Lord Minto writes: "LordNelson has been here to-day. He is going to resume the command of theMediterranean as soon as the Victory is ready, which will be within aweek. " On the 5th he himself tells a friend, "_All my things_ are thisday going off for Portsmouth. " The ten days that followed were for him, necessarily, very busy; butmental preoccupation--definiteness of object--was always beneficial tohim. Even the harassing run to and from the West Indies had done himgood. "I am but so-so, " he had written to his brother upon arrival;"yet, what is very odd, the better for going to the West Indies, evenwith the anxiety. " To this had succeeded the delightful fortnight athome, and now the animation and stir of expected active service. Mintohad already noted his exhilaration amid the general public gloom, andafter his death, speaking of these last days, said, "He was remarkablywell and fresh, and full of hope and spirit. " The care of providinghim with adequate force he threw off upon the Admiralty. There was, ofcourse, a consultation between him and it as to the numbers and kindof vessels he thought necessary, but his estimate was acceptedwithout question, and the ships were promised, as far as the resourceswent. When Lord Barham asked him to select his own officers, he issaid to have replied, "Choose yourself, my lord, the same spiritactuates the whole profession; you cannot choose wrong. " He did, nevertheless, indicate his wishes in individual cases; and theexpression, though characteristic enough of his proud confidence inthe officers of the navy, must be taken rather as a resolve not to beburdened with invidious distinctions, than as an unqualified assertionof fact. Nelson, however, gave one general admonition to the Cabinet which isworthy to be borne in mind, as a broad principle of unvaryingapplication, more valuable than much labored detail. What is wanted, he said, is the annihilation of the enemy--"Only numbers canannihilate. "[119] It is brilliant and inspiring, indeed, to see skilland heroism bearing up against enormous odds, and even wrenchingvictory therefrom; but it is the business of governments to insurethat such skill and heroism be more profitably employed, in utterlydestroying, with superior forces, the power of the foe, and socompelling peace. No general has won more striking successes oversuperior numbers than did Napoleon; no ruler has been more careful tosee that adequate superiority for his own forces was provided fromthe beginning. Nelson believed that he had fully impressed the PrimeMinister that what was needed now, after two and a half years ofcolorless war, was not a brilliant victory for the British Navy, but acrushing defeat for the foe. "I hope my absence will not be long, " hewrote to Davison, "and that I shall soon meet the combined fleets witha force sufficient to do the job well: for half a victory would buthalf content me. But I do not believe the Admiralty can give me aforce within fifteen or sixteen sail-of-the-line of the enemy; andtherefore, if every ship took her opponent, we should have to contendwith a fresh fleet of fifteen or sixteen sail-of-the-line. But I willdo my best; and I hope God Almighty will go with me. I have much tolose, but little to gain; and I go because it's right, and I willserve the Country faithfully. " He doubtless did not know then thatCalder, finding Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz, had taken thither theeighteen ships detached with him from the Brest blockade, and thatBickerton had also joined from within the Mediterranean, so thatCollingwood, at the moment he was writing, had with him twenty-six ofthe line. His anticipation, however, was substantially correct. Despite every effort, the Admiralty up to a fortnight before Trafalgarhad not given him the number of ships he thought necessary, to insurecertain watching, and crushing defeat. He was particularly short ofthe smaller cruisers wanted. On the 12th of September Minto took his leave of him. "I wentyesterday to Merton, " he wrote on the 13th, "in a great hurry, as LordNelson said he was to be at home all day, and he dines at half-pastthree. But I found he had been sent for to Carleton House, and he andLady Hamilton did not return till half-past five. " The Prince of Waleshad sent an urgent command that he particularly wished to see himbefore he left England. "I stayed till ten at night, " continues Minto, "and I took a final leave of him. He goes to Portsmouth to-night. Lady Hamilton was in tears all day yesterday, could not eat, andhardly drink, and near swooning, and all at table. It is a strangepicture. She tells me nothing can be more pure and ardent than thisflame. " Lady Hamilton may have had the self-control of an actress, butclearly not the reticence of a well-bred woman. On the following night Nelson left home finally. His last act beforeleaving the house, it is said, was to visit the bed where his child, then between four and five, was sleeping, and pray over her. Thesolemn anticipation of death, which from this time forward deepenedmore and more over his fearless spirit, as the hour of battleapproached, is apparent in the record of his departure made in hisprivate diary:-- Friday Night, September 13th. At half-past ten drove from dear dear Merton, where I left all which I hold dear in this world, to go to serve my King and Country. May the great God whom I adore enable me to fulfil the expectations of my Country; and if it is His good pleasure that I should return, my thanks will never cease being offered up to the Throne of His Mercy. If it is His good Providence to cut short my days upon earth, I bow with the greatest submission, relying that He will protect those so dear to me, that I may leave behind. His will be done: Amen, Amen, Amen. At six o'clock on the morning of the 14th Nelson arrived atPortsmouth. At half-past eleven his flag was again hoisted on boardthe "Victory, " and at 2 P. M. He embarked. His youngest and favoritesister, Mrs. Matcham, with her husband, had gone to Portsmouth to seehim off. As they were parting, he said to her: "Oh, Katty! thatgypsy;" referring to his fortune told by a gypsy in the West Indiesmany years before, that he should arrive at the head of his professionby the time he was forty. "What then?" he had asked at the moment; butshe replied, "I can tell you no more; the book is closed. "[120] TheBattle of the Nile, preceding closely the completion of his fortiethyear, not unnaturally recalled the prediction to mind, where thesingularity of the coincidence left it impressed; and now, standing ashe did on the brink of great events, with half-acknowledged forebodingweighing on his heart, he well may have yearned to know what laybeyond that silence, within the closed covers of the book of fate. FOOTNOTES: [110] In a letter to the Earl of Mornington, dated December 21st, 1805, Wellington, then Wellesley, said, "I arrived in England about September10th. " The margin of time for meeting Nelson, who left Merton on the 13th, was therefore small, and fixes very closely the date of this interestinginterview. The Colonial and War Offices seem then to have been under onehead. [111] Correspondence and Diaries of John Wilson Croker, vol. Ii. P. 233. [112] The Prime Minister Pitt. [113] Compare for example, _ante_, vol. I. P. 421. [114] Lady Hamilton's mother. [115] Nelson to Right Hon. George Rose, August 29 and September 3, 1805:Nicolas, vol. Vii. Pp. 18, 19, 29. [116] _Ante_, p. 31. [117] This is the earliest intimation that has come under the author's eyeof the formulation (as distinguished from the development) of the groups ofOrders in Council of 1807, bearing upon the Neutral Trade, which wereissued and carried out by a Ministry other than the one which Nelson knew. The measure was clearly under consideration before Trafalgar. [118] That is, the ship ready to sail in half an hour, one of the twoanchors which moor a ship being lifted. [119] The author wishes to guard himself from seeming to share theperversion, as he thinks it, of this saying, into an argument against heavyships, because the heavier the ships, the smaller the number. Without hereexpressing any opinion upon this controverted subject, he would simplyquote on the other side the view attributed to Nelson during the chase tothe West Indies. "He knew that the French had no three-decked ships intheir fleet, and he reckoned on the great superiority in close action ofthree batteries of guns over two. " (Last of Nelson's Captains, p. 137. )With this may be joined a quotation from himself involving implicitly thesame idea: "Two [two-deckers] alongside an enemy are better thanthree-deckers _a great way off_. " This evidently suggests the idea that onethree-decker was better than two seventy-fours, conditions being similar. In truth, numbers should be read "numbers of guns"--or, better still, "numbers, other things being equal. " [120] The author has to thank the present Earl Nelson for this anecdote. CHAPTER XXII. THE ANTECEDENTS OF TRAFALGAR. SEPTEMBER 15--OCTOBER 19, 1805. AGE, 47. The crowds that had assembled to greet Nelson's arrival at Portsmouth, four weeks before, now clustered again around his footsteps to bid hima loving farewell. Although, to avoid such demonstrations, he hadchosen for his embarkation another than the usual landing-place, themultitude collected and followed him to the boat. "They pressedforward to obtain sight of his face, " says Southey; "Many were intears, and many knelt down before him, and blessed him as he passed. England has had many heroes, but never one, " he justly adds, "who soentirely possessed the love of his fellow countrymen as Nelson. " Thereattached to him not only the memory of many brilliant deeds, nor yetonly the knowledge that more than any other he stood between them andharm, --his very name a tower of strength over against their enemies. The deep human sympathy which won its way to the affections of thoseunder his command, in immediate contact with his person, seamen aswell as officers, had spread from them with quick contagion throughoutall ranks of men; and heart answered to heart in profound trust, amongthose who never had seen his face. "I had their huzzas before, " hesaid to Captain Hardy, who sat beside him in the boat. "Now I havetheir hearts. " He was accompanied to the ship by Mr. Canning and Mr. Rose, intimateassociates of Mr. Pitt, and they remained on board to dine. Nelsonnoted that just twenty-five days had been passed ashore, "from dinnerto dinner. " The next morning, Sunday, September 15th, at 8 A. M. , the"Victory" got under way and left St. Helen's, where she had been lyingat single anchor, waiting to start. Three other line-of-battle shipsbelonging to his fleet, and which followed him in time for Trafalgar, were then at Spithead, but not yet ready. The "Victory" thereforesailed without them, accompanied only by Blackwood's frigate, the"Euryalus. " The wind outside, being west-southwest, was dead foul, andit was not till the 17th that the ship was off Plymouth. There it fellnearly calm, and she was joined by two seventy-fours from the harbor. The little squadron continued its course, the wind still ahead, untilthe 20th of the month, when it had not yet gained a hundred milessouthwest from Scilly. Here Nelson met his former long-tried second inthe Mediterranean, Sir Richard Bickerton, going home ill; havingendured the protracted drudgery off Toulon only to lose, by a hair'sbreadth, his share in the approaching triumph. On the 25th the "Victory" was off Lisbon. "We have had only one day'sreal fair wind, " wrote Nelson to Lady Hamilton, "but by perseverancewe have done much. " The admiral sent in letters to the British consuland naval officers, urging them to secure as many men as possible forthe fleet, but enjoining profound secrecy about his coming, consciousthat his presence would be a deterrent to the enemy and might preventthe attempt to leave Cadiz, upon which he based his hopes of a speedyissue, and a speedy return home for needed repose. His departure fromEngland, indeed, could not remain long unknown in Paris; butcommunications by land were slow in those times, and a few days'ignorance of his arrival, and of the reinforcement he brought, mightinduce Villeneuve to dare the hazard which he otherwise might fear. "Day by day, " he wrote to Davison, "I am expecting the allied fleet toput to sea--every day, hour, and moment. " "I am convinced, " he tellsBlackwood, who took charge of the inshore lookout, "that you estimate, as I do, the importance of not letting these rogues escape us withouta fair fight, which I pant for by day, and dream of by night. " For thesame reasons of secrecy he sent a frigate ahead to Collingwood, withorders that, when the "Victory" appeared, not only should no salutesbe fired, but no colors should be shown, if in sight of the port. Thelike precautions were continued when any new ship joined. Every carewas taken to lull the enemy into confidence, and to lure him out ofport. At 6 P. M. Of Saturday, September 28th, the "Victory" reached thefleet, then numbering twenty-nine of the line; the main body beingfifteen to twenty miles west of Cadiz, with six ships close in withthe port. The next day was Nelson's birthday--forty-seven years old. The junior admirals and the captains visited the commander-in chief, as customary, but with demonstrations of gladness and confidence thatfew leaders have elicited in equal measure from their followers. "Thereception I met with on joining the fleet caused the sweetestsensation of my life. The officers who came on board to welcome myreturn, forgot my rank as commander-in-chief in the enthusiasm withwhich they greeted me. As soon as these emotions were past, I laidbefore them the plan I had previously arranged for attacking theenemy; and it was not only my pleasure to find it generally approved, but clearly perceived and understood. " To Lady Hamilton he gave anaccount of this scene which differs little from the above, except inits greater vividness. "I believe my arrival was most welcome, notonly to the Commander of the fleet, but also to every individual init; and, when I came to explain to them the '_Nelson touch_, ' it waslike an electric shock. Some shed tears, all approved--'It wasnew--it was singular--it was simple!' and, from admirals downwards, it was repeated--'It must succeed, if ever they will allow us to getat them! You are, my Lord, surrounded by friends whom you inspire withconfidence. ' Some may be Judas's: but the majority are certainly muchpleased with my commanding them. " No more joyful birthday levee wasever held than that of this little naval court. Besides the adorationfor Nelson personally, which they shared with their countrymen ingeneral, there mingled with the delight of the captains the sentimentof professional appreciation and confidence, and a certain relief, noticed by Codrington, from the dry, unsympathetic rule ofCollingwood, a man just, conscientious, highly trained, and efficient, but self-centred, rigid, uncommunicative; one who fostered, if he didnot impose, restrictions upon the intercourse between the ships, against which he had inveighed bitterly when himself one of St. Vincent's captains. Nelson, on the contrary, at once invited cordialsocial relations with the commanding officers. Half of the thirty-oddwere summoned to dine on board the flagship the first day, and halfthe second. Not till the third did he permit himself the luxury of aquiet dinner chat with his old chum, the second in command, whosesterling merits, under a crusty exterior, he knew and appreciated. Codrington mentions also an incident, trivial in itself, butillustrative of that outward graciousness of manner, which, in a manof Nelson's temperament and position, is rarely the result of carefulcultivation, but bespeaks rather the inner graciousness of the heartthat he abundantly possessed. They had never met before, and theadmiral, greeting him with his usual easy courtesy, handed him aletter from his wife, saying that being intrusted with it by a lady, he made a point of delivering it himself, instead of sending it byanother. The "Nelson touch, " or Plan of Attack, expounded to his captains atthe first meeting, was afterwards formulated in an Order, copies ofwhich were issued to the fleet on the 9th of October. In this"Memorandum, " which was doubtless sufficient for those who hadlistened to the vivid oral explanation of its framer, the writer findsthe simplicity, but not the absolute clearness, that they recognized. It embodies, however, the essential ideas, though not the precisemethod of execution, actually followed at Trafalgar, under conditionsconsiderably different from those which Nelson probably anticipated;and it is not the least of its merits as a military conception that itcould thus, with few signals and without confusion, adapt itself at amoment's notice to diverse circumstances. This great order not onlyreflects the ripened experience of its author, but contains also theproof of constant mental activity and development in his thought; forit differs materially in detail from the one issued a few monthsbefore to the fleet, when in pursuit of Villeneuve to the West Indies. As the final, and in the main consecutive, illustrations of hismilitary views, the two are presented here together. PLAN OF ATTACK. [121] The business of an English Commander-in-Chief being first to bring an Enemy's Fleet to Battle, on the most advantageous terms to himself, (I mean that of laying his Ships close on board the Enemy, as expeditiously as possible;) and secondly, to continue them there, without separating, until the business is decided; I am sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that I should say a word, being fully assured that the Admirals and Captains of the Fleet I have the honour to command, will, knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive Battle, supply any deficiency in my not making signals; which may, if extended beyond these objects, either be misunderstood, or, if waited for, very probably, from various causes, be impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to make: therefore, it will only be requisite for me to state, in as few words as possible, the various modes in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object, on which depends, not only the honour and glory of our Country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all Europe, from French tyranny and oppression. If the two Fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is necessary; the less the better;--a day is soon lost in that business: therefore I will only suppose that the Enemy's Fleet being to leeward, standing close upon a wind on the starboard tack, and that I am nearly ahead of them, standing on the larboard tack, of course I should weather them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of wind, the manoeuvring of both Fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive Action would take place with the whole Fleet. Two modes present themselves: one to stand on, just out of gunshot, until the Van-Ship of my Line would be about the centre Ship of the Enemy, then make the signal to wear together, then bear up, engage with all our force the six or five Van-Ships of the Enemy, passing, certainly, if opportunity offered, through their Line. This would prevent their bearing up, and the Action, from the known bravery and conduct of the Admirals and Captains, would certainly be decisive: the second or third Rear-Ships of the Enemy would act as they please, and our Ships would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our Ships. The other mode would be, to stand under an easy but commanding sail, directly for their headmost Ship, so as to prevent the Enemy from knowing whether I should pass to leeward or windward of him. In that situation, I would make the signal to engage the Enemy to leeward, and to cut through their Fleet about the sixth Ship from the Van, passing very close; they being on a wind, and you going large, could cut their Line when you please. The Van-Ships of the Enemy would, by the time our Rear came abreast of the Van-Ship, be severely cut up, and our Van could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our _Rear_ Ship, and every Ship in succession, wear, continue the Action with either the Van-Ship, or second Ship, as it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and this mode pursued, I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six Ships of the Enemy's Van. The two or three Ships of the Enemy's Rear[122] must either bear up, or wear; and, in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably than our two Van-Ships (now in the Rear) yet they would be separated, and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our Ships time to refit; and by that time, I believe, the Battle would, from the judgment of the Admiral and Captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from these moments are useless, when every man is disposed to do his duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep close to the Enemy, and to leeward of him. If the Enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be, to engage the Enemy as arriving up with them; and the other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c. , giving, if possible, a close fire into the Enemy in passing, taking care to give our Ships engaged notice of your intention. MEMORANDUM. (Secret) Victory, off CADIZ, 9th October, 1805. [Sidenote: General Considerations. ] Thinking it almost impossible to bring a Fleet of forty Sail of the Line into a Line of Battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the Enemy to Battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have therefore made up my mind to keep the Fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the First and Second in Command) that the Order of Sailing is to be the Order of Battle, placing the Fleet in two Lines of sixteen Ships each, with an Advanced Squadron of eight of the fastest sailing Two-decked Ships, which will always make, if wanted, a Line of twenty-four Sail, on whichever Line the Commander-in-Chief may direct. [Sidenote: Powers of Second in Command. ] The Second in Command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his Line to make the attack upon the Enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed. [Sidenote: The Attack from to Leeward. ] If the Enemy's Fleet should be seen to windward in Line of Battle, and that the two Lines and the Advanced Squadron can fetch them, they will probably be so extended that their Van could not succour their Rear. I should therefore probably make the Second in Command's signal to lead through, about their twelfth Ship from their Rear, (or wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced); my Line would lead through about their Centre, and the Advanced Squadron to cut two or three or four Ships a-head of their Centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander-in-Chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture. [Sidenote: The General Controlling Idea, under all Conditions. ] The whole impression of the British Fleet must be to overpower from two or three Ships a-head of their Commander-in-Chief supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of their Fleet. I will suppose twenty Sail of the Enemy's Line to be untouched, it must be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British Fleet engaged, or to succour their own Ships, which indeed would be impossible without mixing with the Ships engaged. Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a Sea Fight beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a Victory before the Van of the Enemy could succour their Rear, and then that the British Fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty Sail of the Line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off. If the Van of the Enemy tacks, the Captured Ships must run to leeward of the British Fleet; if the Enemy wears, the British must place themselves between the Enemy and the Captured, and disabled British Ships; and should the Enemy close, I have no fears as to the result. [Sidenote: Duties of Subordinate. ] The Second in Command will in all possible things direct the movements of his Line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular Line as their rallying point. But, in case Signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship alongside that of an Enemy. Of the intended attack from to windward, the Enemy in Line of Battle ready to receive an attack, [Illustration][123] [Sidenote: The Attack from to Windward. ] The divisions of the British Fleet will be brought nearly within gun shot of the Enemy's Centre. The signal will most probably then be made for the Lee Line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the Enemy's Line, and to cut through, beginning from the 12 Ship from the Enemy's Rear. Some Ships may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their friends; and if any are thrown round the Rear of the Enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve Sail of the Enemy. Should the Enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the twelve Ships composing, in the first position, the Enemy's Rear, are to be the object of attack of the Lee Line, unless otherwise directed from the Commander-in-Chief, which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the Lee Line, after the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, is signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the Admiral commanding that Line. [Sidenote: Special Charge of the Commander-in-Chief. ] The remainder of the Enemy's Fleet, 34 Sail, are to be left to the management of the Commander-in-Chief, who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the Second in Command are as little interrupted as is possible. NELSON AND BRONTE. It will be borne in mind that the first of these instructions wasissued for the handling of a small body of ships--ten--expecting tomeet fifteen to eighteen enemies; whereas the second contemplated thewielding of a great mass of vessels, as many as forty British, directed against a possible combination of forty-six French andSpanish. In the former case, however, although the aggregate numberswere smaller, the disproportion of force was much greater, even afterallowance made for the British three-deckers; and we know, from othercontemporary remarks of Nelson, that his object here was not so much acrushing defeat of the enemy--"only numbers can annihilate"--as thedisorganization and neutralization of a particular detachment, as theresult of which the greater combination of the enemy would fall topieces. "After they have beaten our fleet soundly, they will do us nomore harm this summer. "[124] Consequently, he relies much upon theconfusion introduced into the enemy's movements by an attack, which, though of much inferior force, should be sudden in character, developing only at the last moment, into which the enemy should beprecipitated unawares, while the British should encounter it, orrather should enter it, with minds fully prepared, --not only for theimmediate manoeuvre, but for all probable consequences. In accordance with the same general object--confusion--he directs hisassault upon the van, instead of, as at Trafalgar, upon the rear;according to his saying in the Baltic, recorded by Stewart, [125]"Close with a Frenchman, but out-manoeuvre a Russian, " for whichpurpose he would throw his own force, preferably, upon the van of thelatter. The reason is obvious, upon reflection; for in attacking andcutting off the head--van and centre--of a column of ships, the rear, coming up under full way, has _immediate_ action forced upon it. Thereis no time for deliberation. The van is already engaged, and access toit more or less impeded, by the hostile dispositions. The decisionmust be instant--to the right hand, or to the left, to windward, or toleeward--and there is at least an even chance that the wrong thingwill be done, as well as a probability, falling little short ofcertainty, that all the ships of the rear will _not_ do the samething; that is, they will be thrown into confusion with all its diretrain of evils, doubt, hesitancy, faltering, and inconsequent action. It is hard work to knit again a shattered line under the unremittentassault of hardened veterans, such as Nelson's Mediterranean ships. The method employed in the second of these instructions, thecelebrated Memorandum, differs essentially from that of the Plan ofAttack, though both are simply developments of the one idea ofconcentration. It is unfortunate for us that Nelson, like most men ofaction, reveals his reasoning processes, not in ordered discussion, but by stray gleams of expression, too often unrecorded, from which wecan infer only the general tenor of his thought. It is in the chancephrase, transmitted by Stewart, coupled with the change of object, sodefinitely announced in the second instance, --the crushing, namely, ofthe enemy's great fleet, and not the mere crippling of a detachmentsuch as went to the West Indies, --that the author thinks to find theclew to the difference of dispositions, in the first case, from thoseprescribed and followed for Trafalgar--the "Nelson touch" thatthrilled the captains. There is again, indeed, in the latter, thedistinct reliance upon confusion, for the line of the foe is to bebroken in two places; but now the confusion introduced is in the partof the enemy that is assailed, not, as before, in that which is leftout of action. Confusion, in short, is now imposed by external force, rather than induced by internal perplexity, --a condition surer, andtherefore more liable to result in a crushing victory, for it dependsupon the vigor of the offensive, and not on the weakness of thedefensive, which may prove a deceitful reliance. Moreover, effectualcrushing requires time, even when, as in the final memorandum, a greatconcentration of superiority is intended on part of an enemy's order. Now, when the van and centre are attacked, the rear is pointed fair, and, if it does not lose its head, comes quickly up to the rescue; butwhen, in the contrary case, the centre and rear receive the assault, the van, being left out of action, not only has to turn round, butnaturally stands away, for an interval dependent upon the initiativeof its immediate commander, as occurred to an extreme degree atTrafalgar. Thus time, the invaluable five minutes or half hour, isgained for the offensive to bring its first concentration to asuccessful issue, as well as to prepare to repel the van of thedefensive, if it countermarches, as it should. "I look with confidenceto a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear, andthen that the British fleet would most of them be ready to receivetheir twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should theyendeavour to make off. " The organization of a distinct body of eight fast-sailingships-of-the-line, to be carried to such part of the field as mightappear necessary to the commander-in-chief in a particular emergency, resulted inevitably, perhaps, from the considerations presented byNelson in the opening sentences of the Memorandum, and from the greatnumber of ships he then hoped to have. There were precedents for sucha formation, in the practice of the day; but, as far as recalled bythe author, they were the advanced guards, the skirmish line, of thefleet, not, as in this case, essentially a reserve. In Nelson'spresent thought, the employment of this force would be, not antecedentto, but consequent upon, the particular indications of the day. Probably they would not be held back as long--for as distinctindications--as in the case of an army's reserve; but nevertheless, the chief object of their separate organization was to redress, at themoment, the unforeseen developments of a battle, whether at theinstant of engagement or during its subsequent progress. Theunfortunate Villeneuve, who commanded the allies, an accomplishedthough irresolute seaman, had adopted a similar arrangement, placingtwelve detached ships under his colleague Gravina; but, with sailingvessels, the effective use of such a force depended largely upon thewindward position, which the allies did not have. If placed to leewardof a lee line, it was in the power of the assailant to throw them outof action altogether; if to windward, to attack them separately;therefore at Trafalgar Villeneuve ordered them back into the line. Nelson likewise then embodied his reserve in the two columns ofattack, because he had fewer vessels than he expected, and because thelight wind forbade the wasting of time in evolutionary refinements. The incident of the simultaneous adoption of the same provision by thetwo opposing admirals, however, is interesting as indicative of theprogress of naval thought, though still hampered by the uncertaintiesof the motive power. The second of these Orders, that of October 9, is memorable, not onlyfor the sagacity and comprehensiveness of its general dispositions, but even more for the magnanimous confidence with which the details ofexecution were freely intrusted to those upon whom they had to fall. It was evidently drawn up in the first instance for Collingwood only;the word "your" in the original draught having been struck out, and"second in command" substituted. The comparison already made betweenit and its predecessor of May, may not uninstructively be followed bya study of the difference in details between itself and the executionit actually received at the Battle of Trafalgar. To aid this purposethe author has traced, in marginal notes, the succession of theleading ideas. After a statement of General Considerations, and a frank attributionof full powers to the second in command for carrying out his part, Nelson lays down the manner of Attack from to Leeward. This conditionnot obtaining at Trafalgar, the plan cannot be contrasted with theperformance of that day. Upon this follows a luminous enunciation ofthe general idea, namely, Collingwood's engaging the twelve rearships, which underlies the method prescribed for each attack--from toleeward and to windward. Of the latter Nelson fortunately gives anoutline diagram, which illustrates the picture before his own mind, facilitating our comprehension of his probable expectations, andallowing a comparison between them and the event as it actuallyoccurred. It is not to the discredit, but greatly to the credit, ofhis conception, that it was susceptible of large modification inpractice while retaining its characteristic idea. Looking at his diagram, [126] and following his words, it will be seenthat the British lines are not formed perpendicularly to that of theenemy (as they were at Trafalgar), but parallel to it. Starting fromthis disposition, near the enemy and abreast his centre, the lee lineof sixteen ships was to bear up _together_, and advance in line, notin column (as happened at Trafalgar); their object being the twelverear ships of the enemy. This first move stands by itself; the actionof the weather line, and of the reserve squadron still farther towindward, are held in suspense under the eye of thecommander-in-chief, to take the direction which the latter shallprescribe as the struggle develops. The mere menace of such a force, just out of gunshot to windward, would be sufficient to prevent anyextensive manoeuvre of the unengaged enemies. Nelson doubtless had inmind the dispositions, more than a century old, of Tourville and DeRuyter, by which a few ships, spaced to windward of an enemy's van, could check its tacking, because of the raking fire to which theywould subject it. Unquestionably, he would not have kept long in idleexpectancy twenty-four ships, the number he had in mind; but clearlyalso he proposed to hold them until he saw how things went withCollingwood. Thus much time would allow, granting the position heassumed and a reasonable breeze. His twenty-four to windward held anabsolute check over the supposed thirty-four unengaged, of the enemy. The attack as planned, therefore, differed from that executed (1) inthat the lee line was not to advance in column, but in line, therebydispersing the enemy's fire, and avoiding the terrific concentrationwhich crushed the leaders at Trafalgar; and (2) in that the weathersquadrons were not to attack simultaneously with the lee, but after ithad engaged, in order to permit the remedying of any mishap that mightarise in delivering the crucial blow. In both these matters of detailthe plan was better than the modification; but the latter was forcedupon Nelson by conditions beyond his control. It will be observed that, when considering attacking from to leeward, he orders a simultaneous movement of the three Britishdivisions, --lee, weather, and reserve; for the obvious reason that ifhe held his own divisions in reserve to leeward he could not at allcount upon bringing them into action at will; and, moreover, such anattack would probably have to be in columns, and, if simultaneous, would be less liable to disaster than in succession, mutual supportdiverting the enemies' fire. In fact, the highest order of offensivecombination was only possible when having the advantage of thewind--fair, and enough of it. The plan upon which Trafalgar was to be fought, as above described andanalyzed, was formed some time before leaving England, and it is notunreasonable to suppose that it was in fact a modification of theearlier idea, laid down during the chase to the West Indies. On the10th of September, three days only before quitting Merton, Nelsoncalled upon his old friend, Lord Sidmouth, [127] who until recently hadbeen Prime Minister. In the course of the interview he explained hisintentions as regards the attack. "Rodney, " he said, "broke theenemy's line in one place, [128] I will break it in two;" and with hisfinger he indicated upon a table the general character of the assault, to be made in two lines, led by himself and Collingwood. He feltconfident, according to Sidmouth's narration, that he should captureeither their van and centre or their centre and rear. It was of courseout of his power to prevent the enemy inverting their order, by thesimultaneous turning round of every ship, at the time of engagement, so that the attack intended for the rear should fall upon it becomethe van. Against this contingency he provided by the words, "shouldthe enemy wear together, still the twelve ships composing, _in thefirst position_, the enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack ofthe lee line. " Sidmouth did not commit his recollection of thisincident to writing until many years later, and, not being a seaman, very likely failed to comprehend some of the details--there seems tothe author to be in the story a confusion of what Nelson planned withwhat Nelson did; but a great conception is largely independent ofdetails, and the essential features of Trafalgar are in Sidmouth'saccount. The idea was doubtless imparted also to the family circle atMerton, where probably the expression, "Nelson touch, " originated. Itoccurs chiefly, if not wholly, in his letters to Lady Hamilton, towhom, some days before reaching the fleet, he wrote, "I am anxious tojoin, for it would add to my grief if any other man was to give themthe Nelson touch, which WE say is warranted never to fail;" but theremay be a quaint allusion to it in the motto he told Rose he hadadopted: "Touch and Take. " When Nelson left England, he was intrusted by the First Lord with thedelicate and unpleasant mission of communicating to Sir Robert Calderthe dissatisfaction of the Government with his conduct, in theencounter with the allied fleets the previous July; especially forfailing to keep touch with them and bring them again to action. Thenational outcry was too strong to be disregarded, nor is it probablethat the Admiralty took a more lenient view of the matter. At allevents, an inquiry was inevitable, and the authorities seem to havefelt that it was a favor to Calder to permit him to ask for the Courtwhich in any case must be ordered. "I did not fail, " wrote Nelson toBarham, "immediately on my arrival, to deliver your message to SirRobert Calder; and it will give your Lordship pleasure to find, as ithas me, that an inquiry is what the Vice-Admiral wishes, and that hehad written to you by the Nautilus, which I detained, to say so. SirRobert thinks that he can clearly prove, that it was not in his powerto bring the combined squadrons again to battle. " Nelson felt a profound sympathy for the unfortunate officer, pursuedby the undiscriminating and ignorant fury of popular clamor, theextent and intensity of which he had had opportunity to realize whenin England. While he probably did not look for so tragic an issue, theexecution of Byng under a similar odium and a similar charge, althoughexpressly cleared of cowardice and disaffection, was still fresh inthe naval mind. "Sir Robert has an ordeal to pass through, " he wroteCollingwood, "which he little expects. " His own opinion upon the caseseems to have undergone some modification, since the generous outburstwith which he at first deprecated the prejudgment of a disappointedand frightened people; nor could it well fail, as details became knownto him, that he should pass a silent censure upon proceedings, whichcontravened alike his inward professional convictions, and hisexpressed purposes of action for a similar contingency. "I have had, as you will believe, a very distressing scene with poor Sir RobertCalder, " he told Lady Hamilton. "He has wrote home to beg an inquiry, feeling confident that he can fully justify himself. I sincerely hopehe may, but--I have given him the advice as to my dearest friend. Heis in adversity, and if he ever has been my enemy, he now feels thepang of it, and finds me one of his best friends. " "Sir RobertCalder, " he wrote to another correspondent, "has just left us to standhis trial, which I think of a very serious nature. " Nelson was obligedto detain him until reinforcements arrived from England, becauseCalder was unwilling to undergo the apparent humiliation of leavinghis flagship under charges, and she could not yet be spared. It wasnot the least of this unlucky man's misfortunes that he left the fleetjust a week before the battle, where his conduct would undoubtedlyhave redeemed whatever of errors he may have committed. One of thelast remarks Nelson made before the action began, was, "Hardy, whatwould poor Sir Robert Calder give to be with us now!" Calder's reluctance to quit his flagship, and the keen sensitivenesswith which he expressed his feelings, drew from Nelson a concession heknew to be wrong, but which is too characteristic, both in the actitself and in his own account of it, to be omitted. "Sir Robert feltso much, " he wrote to the First Lord, "even at the idea of beingremoved from his own ship which he commanded, in the face of thefleet, that I much fear I shall incur the censure of the Board ofAdmiralty, without your Lordship's influence with the members of it. Imay be thought wrong, as an officer, to disobey the orders of theAdmiralty, by not insisting on Sir Robert Calder's quitting the Princeof Wales for the Dreadnought, and for parting with a 90-gun ship, before the force arrives which their Lordships have judged necessary;but I trust that I shall be considered to have done right as a man, and to a brother officer in affliction--my heart could not stand it, and so the thing must rest. I shall submit to the wisdom of the Boardto censure me or not, as to them may seem best for the Service; Ishall bow with all due respect to their decision. " From the military point of view this step was indefensible, but it isin singular keeping with Nelson's kindness of heart, his generosity oftemper, and with a certain recklessness of consequences, --whensupported by inward conviction of right, or swayed by naturalimpulses, --which formed no small part of his greatness as a warrior. "Numbers only can annihilate;" yet to spare the feelings of an unhappyman, whom he believed to have been his enemy, he parted with one ofthe best units from his numbers, although, even with her present, hewas inferior to the allies. He felt keenly, however, theresponsibility he assumed, not only towards the Admiralty, but towardshis own success and reputation. At one time he seems, with unusualvacillation, even to have returned upon his decision, and to havenotified Calder that the ship could not be spared; for on the 12th ofOctober the latter wrote him: "The contents of your Lordship's letterhave cut me to the soul. If I am to be turned out of my ship, afterall that has passed, I have only to request I may be allowed to takemy Captain, and such officers as I find necessary for thejustification of my conduct as an officer, and that I may be permittedto go without a moment's further loss of time. My heart is broken. "This appeal broke down all Nelson's power of resistance. He deprivedhimself on the eve of battle of a first-rate ship, taking only theprecaution of sending his entire correspondence with Calder, publicand private, to explain his course, though scarcely to justify it. Thesignificance of this act is enhanced by the known importance which hehimself attached to the presence or absence of even a third-rateship-of-the-line. When the expedition to the Baltic was on the eve ofstarting, a seventy-four went aground, in leaving the Downs. Lieutenant Layman having been conspicuously instrumental in gettingher off, Nelson told him that he had in consequence written in hisfavor to the Admiralty; and upon Layman's remarking that what he haddone scarcely deserved so much, the admiral replied, "I thinkdifferently, the loss of one line-of-battle ship might be the loss ofa victory. " When Nelson joined the fleet, he found it stationed some fifteen totwenty miles from Cadiz. He soon moved the main body to fifty mileswest of the port. "It is desirable, " he admitted, "to be well up ineasterly winds, but I must guard against being caught with a westerlywind near Cadiz, as a fleet of ships with so many three-deckers wouldinevitably be forced into the Straits, and then Cadiz would beperfectly free for the enemy to come out with a westerly wind, as theyserved Lord Keith in the late war. " The memory of his weary beat outof the Mediterranean the previous April, against wind and current, remained vividly in his mind; and he feared also that the willingnessof the enemy to come out, which was his great object, would be muchcooled by the certainty that his fleet could not be avoided, and byseeing such additions as it might receive. "I think we are nearenough, " he wrote Colling wood, "for the weather if it is fine, thewind serves, and we are in sight, they will never move. " "I rely onyou, " he tells Blackwood, "that we can't miss getting hold of them, and I will give them such a shaking as they never yet experienced; atleast I will lay down my life in the attempt. " An advanced squadron offast-sailing seventy-fours was thrown out ten or twelve miles east ofthe fleet, through which daily signals could be exchanged withBlackwood's squadron of frigates, that cruised day and night close tothe harbor's mouth. This disposition received a farther developmentafter the 10th of October, when the combined fleets shifted from theinner harbor to the Bay of Cadiz, and gave other tokens of a speedystart. On the 14th of the month he made the following entry in hisdiary: "Enemy at the harbour's mouth. Placed Defence and Agamemnonfrom seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz, and Mars and Colossus fiveleagues east of fleet [that is, under way between the fleet and theformer group], whose station is from fifteen to twenty leagues west ofCadiz; and by this chain I hope to have constant communication withthe frigates off Cadiz. " To the captain of the "Defence" he wrote thatit was possible the enemy might try to drive off the frigate squadron, in order to facilitate their own evasion; in which case the innerships-of-the-line would be at hand to resist the attempt. Despite these careful dispositions, his mind was still ill at easelest the enemy might escape undetected. He never had frigates enoughto make the result as sure as it ought to be, where such vast issueswere at stake. While eight at least were needed to be always with thefleet before Cadiz, he had but five; and to maintain even so many itwas necessary to cut short other services and essential stations. Thisdeficiency he urged upon the Government still more than he did theinadequacy of the line-of-battle force; for his fear of the enemyeluding him was greater than that of a conflict with superior numbers. As regards the latter contingency, he wrote to Lord Barham that, ifthe enemy came out, he would immediately bring them to battle; "but, although I should not doubt of spoiling any voyage they might attempt, yet I hope for the arrival of the ships from England, that as anenemy's fleet they may be annihilated. " On the other hand, "the lastfleet was lost to me for want of frigates. " Besides his own directrepresentations, he pressed Rose to obtain an intimation to theAdmiralty from the Prime Minister, that the latter was personallysolicitous that more small cruisers should be supplied. BothCollingwood and Nelson believed the allies bound to the Mediterranean;but in this they might be mistaken, and as the real object might beagain the West Indies, lookouts should be placed off Cape Blanco onthe coast of Africa, and off the Salvages, [129] both which he knew hadbeen sighted by Villeneuve, in the outward voyage of the previousspring. To his concern about the immediate situation before Cadiz were addedthe universal cares of the Mediterranean, with all parts of which herenewed his correspondence, occupying his active mind with provisionsfor forwarding the cause of Great Britain and her allies. Under hismany anxieties, however, he preserved his buoyant, resolute temper, not worrying over possible happenings against which he was unable toprovide. "The force is at present not so large as might be wished, " hewrites to Ball, "but I will do my best with it; they will give me morewhen they can, and I am not come forth to find difficulties, but toremove them. " "Your Lordship may depend upon my exertions, " he tellsBarham. The possibility that he himself might fall was, as always, present to his thoughts, and never did life mean more to him than itnow did; yet, as the twilight deepened, and the realization of dangerpassed gradually into a presentiment of death, he faced the prospectwithout gloom--steadfast still in mind. "Let the battle be when itmay, it will never have been surpassed. My shattered frame, if Isurvive that day, will require rest, and that is all I shall ask for. If I fall on such a glorious occasion, it shall be my pride to takecare that my friends shall not blush for me. These things are in thehands of a wise and just Providence, and His will be done! I have gotsome trifle, thank God, to leave those I hold most dear, and I havetaken care not to neglect it. Do not think I am low-spirited on thisaccount, or fancy anything is to happen to me; quite the contrary--mymind is calm, and I have only to think of destroying our inveteratefoe. " Of these days of preoccupation, while in hourly expectation of theissue, overcharged with official anxieties, and facing, howeverfearlessly, a growing impression that he himself would not survive theconflict for which he longed, an anecdote has been transmitted thatshows again how to the end, and whatever his personal cares, his quicksympathy went out to men of all classes. Word had been passed throughthe fleet that a mail was about to start for England, which would notimprobably be the last opportunity of writing home before the enemycame forth. The letters had been collected as usual, the bags were allon board the departing vessel, and she herself, under full sail, hadgot already some distance away, when Nelson saw a midshipman come upand speak to Lieutenant Pasco, the signal officer, who, upon hearingwhat was said, stamped his foot in evident vexation, and uttered anexclamation. The admiral, of whose nearness Pasco was not aware, called him, and asked what was the matter. "Nothing that need troubleyour Lordship, " was the reply. "You are not the man to lose yourtemper for nothing, " rejoined Nelson. "What was it?" "Well, if youmust know, my Lord, I will tell you. You see that cockswain, " pointingto one of the most active of the petty officers; "we have not a betterman on board the Victory and the message which put me out was this. Iwas told that he was so busy receiving and getting off the mail-bags, that he forgot to drop his own letter to his wife into one of them, and he has just discovered it in his pocket. " "Hoist a signal to bringher back, " was Nelson's instant command; "who knows that he may notfall in action to-morrow. His letter shall go with the rest, "--and thedespatch vessel was brought back for that alone. [130] In telling thestory, Pasco used to say it was no wonder that the common sailorsidolized Nelson, since he was always thinking about them, and wontheir hearts by showing his own. In addition to the combined fleets in Cadiz, which numbered thirty-sixof the line, besides frigates, the enemy had a half-dozen of the linein Cartagena, which showed signs of moving, and whose junction must beprevented, if possible. Partly for this reason, partly because it wasnecessary to renew the water of the ships, Nelson sent a detachment ofsix of the line to Gibraltar and Tetuan, immediately after he tookcharge. To the junior admiral who commanded it, and who lamented thatthey might lose their share in the expected battle, he replied: "Ihave no other means of keeping my fleet complete in provisions andwater. The enemy _will_ come out, and we shall fight them; but therewill be time for you to get back first. " They did not, however, returnas thus expected, a misadventure which was chiefly due to their havingto guard a convoy past Cartagena, --a potent illustration of theinfluence exerted by a powerful squadron, judiciously placed on theflank of an important trade route, or line of communication; but evenhad they rejoined, six others were told off to leave at once in turn. Nelson did not dare to take the fleet in mass to Tetuan, as he used toMadalena; for he could never be sure of getting out of the Straitswhen he wished, or when the enemy moved. Thus his fleet was reduced, by both administrative and strategic exigencies, to twenty-threeships-of-the-line. Fortunately, four more joined before the battle, raising the numbers actually engaged to twenty-seven. It will berecognized that Calder's ninety-gun ship was no small loss. Such were the general dispositions in which the sailing of the enemywas awaited. A main body of eighteen to twenty, fifty miles west ofCadiz, a frigate squadron close in to the harbor, and two groups ofships-of-the-line extended between these extremes. With a westerlywind, approach to the port would be easy for all; with an easterly, Nelson wrote to Blackwood, he would habitually beat up for Cadiz, never going north of the port. His whereabouts in case of thickweather was thus always known. He notified Collingwood and his othersubordinates, that if the enemy came out, he should stand for CapeSpartel, the African outpost of the Straits, to bar the entrance ofthe allies to the Mediterranean. Signals were arranged, precise, yetnot so elaborate as to tend to confusion, by which the departure andgeneral direction of the enemy could be continually transmitted, fromthe furthest lookouts to the main body, by night as by day. On the 13th of October his old ship, the "Agamemnon, " joined thefleet. She was commanded by Sir Edward Berry, who had been firstlieutenant in her with Nelson, had accompanied him in boarding the"San Nicolas" and "San Josef" at St. Vincent, and was afterwards hisflag-captain at the Nile. When her approach was reported to theadmiral, he exclaimed gleefully, "Here comes Berry! Now we shall havea battle;" for Berry, having been in more fleet actions than anycaptain in the British Navy, [131] had a proverbial reputation for suchluck. The event did not belie the prediction. Five days later, on the18th of the month, Nelson noted in his diary: "Fine weather, windeasterly; the combined fleets cannot have finer weather to put tosea;" and the following morning, at half-past nine, the signal, repeated from masthead to masthead, from the inshore frigates to theircommander-in-chief fifty miles at sea, announced that thelong-expected battle was at hand--for "The Enemy are coming out ofport. " FOOTNOTES: [121] May, 1805. [122] The author does not here understand the speaking of "two or three"rear ships, when the van is supposed to be five or six--making a total ofnot over nine or ten enemies. If this order of attack was issued, asexpressly stated by Clarke and M'Arthur, on the chase to the West Indies, Nelson then was fully aware that he with ten ships was in pursuit ofeighteen. (See _ante_, p. 296) It appears to the author more probable thatit was issued to the fleet when off Toulon, in anticipation of a possiblemeeting with the French squadron there, when the disparity of force wasless--say, eight to ten. This impression is confirmed by the "Plan ofAttack" speaking of the junior "Admirals"--in the plural. There was but onesuch in the pursuit to the West Indies. It is quite possible, however, thatthe same order was re-issued upon the later occasion, re-copied withoutchange of words. In any event, it confirms other statements and actions ofNelson's, that an enemy should not be fought ship to ship, but by aconcentration on part of his order. [123] Inserted by author. [124] _Ante_, pp. 306, 323. [125] _Ante_, p. 82. [126] The author has introduced an arrow to show the direction of the windas viewed by Nelson; the arrow flying _with_ the wind. [127] Formerly Mr. Addington, who was at the head of the Government duringthe Copenhagen expedition. [128] This was a mistake on Nelson's part. Rodney's fleet actually, thoughaccidentally, broke through De Grasse's order in two (if not three) places. [129] A desert group of small islands between Madeira and the Canaries. [130] The author is indebted for this reminiscence to Mr. Stuart J. Reid, who received it from Pasco's son, also an officer in the Navy. [131] Besides three of the battles associated with Nelson's name--St. Vincent, the Nile, and Trafalgar--Berry as a midshipman had been in thefive fleet actions between Suffren and Hughes, in the East Indies, in 1782and 1783. ("The Nelson Memorial, " by John Knox Laughton, pp. 83, 284. ) CHAPTER XXIII. TRAFALGAR. --THE DEATH OF NELSON. OCTOBER 19-21, 1805. AGE, 47. Contrary to the general policy that for many years had governed thenaval undertakings of France and Spain, the combined fleets put to seaon the 19th of October, 1805, with the fixed purpose of daring thehazard of battle, which they could scarcely expect to avoid. Theynumbered thirty-three ships-of-the-line, eighteen French and fifteenSpanish, and were accompanied by five frigates and two brigs, all ofwhich were French. This great force in its aggregate was one. Therewere not two separate entities, a French fleet and a Spanish fleet, acting in concert, as is often the case in alliances. Whatever theadministrative arrangements, for cruising and for battle the vesselsof the two nations were blended in a single mass, at the head of whichwas the French admiral, just as the general direction of the navalcampaign was in the hands of the French Emperor alone. Thecommander-in-chief was Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, the same that Nelsonrecently had pursued to the West Indies and back to Europe. Thecommander of the Spanish contingent, Vice-Admiral Gravina, was lesshis colleague than his subordinate. There were also flying in thecombined fleet the flags of four junior admirals, two French and twoSpanish, and the broad pendants of several commodores. In the allied force there were four three-decked ships, of from onehundred to one hundred and thirty guns, all Spanish, of which one, the "Santísima Trinidad, " was the largest vessel then afloat. AmongNelson's twenty-seven there were seven three-deckers, of ninety-eightto one hundred guns; but in the lower rates the British were at adisadvantage, having but one eighty-gun ship and three sixty-fours, whereas the allies had six of the former and only one of the latter. All the other vessels of the line-of-battle were seventy-fours, thenormal medium type, upon which the experience of most navies of thatday had fixed, as best fitted for the general purposes of fleetwarfare. Where more tonnage and heavier batteries were put into singleships, it was simply for the purpose of reinforcing the criticalpoints of an order of battle; an aim that could not be as effectivelyattained by the combination of two ships, under two captains. As Nelson said in his celebrated order, so large a body asthirty-three heavy vessels is not easily handled, even at sea; andleaving port with them is an operation yet more difficult. Consequently, the movement which began soon after daylight on the 19thwas not completed that day. Owing to the falling of the wind, onlytwelve ships got fairly clear of the bay, outside of which they laybecalmed. The following morning the attempt was resumed, and by two orthree o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th the whole combined fleetwas united, and standing with a fresh southwest wind to the northwardand westward, to gain room to windward for entering the Straits. As has been said, the movement that Blackwood recognized at 7 A. M. Ofthe 19th was communicated to the admiral at half-past nine. Accordingto his announced plan, to cut the enemy off from the Mediterranean, heat once made signal for a General Chase to the southeast, --towardsCape Spartel, --and the fleet moved off in that direction with a lightsoutherly wind. At noon Nelson sat down in his cabin to begin his lastletter to Lady Hamilton. The words then written he signed, as thoughconscious that no opportunity to continue might offer; nor is itdifficult to trace that some such thought was then uppermost in hismind, and sought expression in the tenderness of farewell. Thefollowing day, however, he added a few lines, in which the dominantnote was fear that the enemy might again elude him, by returning intoport; an apprehension that expelled the previous haunting sense offinality. There he laid down the pen, never again to address herdirectly. The letter, thus abruptly closed by death, was found openand unsigned upon his desk after the battle. Victory, October 19th, 1805, Noon. CADIZ, E. S. E. , 16 Leagues. MY DEAREST BELOVED EMMA, the dear friend of my bosom. The signal has been made that the Enemy's Combined Fleet are coming out of Port. We have very little wind, so that I have no hopes of seeing them before to-morrow. May the God of Battles crown my endeavours with success; at all events, I will take care that my name shall ever be most dear to you and Horatia, both of whom I love as much as my own life. And as my last writing before the Battle will be to you, so I hope in God that I shall live to finish my letter after the Battle. May Heaven bless you prays your NELSON AND BRONTE. October 20th. In the morning, we were close to the Mouth of the Straits, but the wind had not come far enough to the Westward to allow the Combined Fleets to weather the Shoals off Trafalgar; but they were counted as far as forty Sail of Ships of War, which I suppose to be thirty-four of the Line, and six Frigates. A group of them was seen off the Lighthouse of Cadiz this morning, but it blows so very fresh and thick weather, that I rather believe they will go into the Harbour before night. May God Almighty give us success over these fellows, and enable us to get a Peace. He wrote the same day to his daughter, addressing the letter to MissHoratia Nelson Thompson, [132] by which name she had hitherto beenknown. In the Codicil to his Will, signed on the morning of the 21st, a few hours before the battle, he called her his adopted daughter, anddesired that she would in future use the name of Nelson only. Victory, October 19th, 1805. MY DEAREST ANGEL, --I was made happy by the pleasure of receiving your letter of September 19th, and I rejoice to hear that you are so very good a girl, and love my dear Lady Hamilton, who most dearly loves you. Give her a kiss for me. The Combined Fleets of the Enemy are now reported to be coming out of Cadiz; and therefore I answer your letter, my dearest Horatia, to mark to you that you are ever uppermost in my thoughts. I shall be sure of your prayers for my safety, conquest, and speedy return to dear Merton, and our dearest good Lady Hamilton. Be a good girl, mind what Miss Connor says to you. Receive, my dearest Horatia, the affectionate parental blessing of your Father, NELSON AND BRONTE. The 20th of October opened with fresh breezes from south-southwest andheavy rains. At daybreak the British fleet was near the Straits'mouth, between Capes Trafalgar and Spartel, unable to see anything, but certain that, with the existing winds, the enemy could not haveanticipated it there. Blackwood's frigates, out of sight to thenorthward, were dogging the path of the allies, of whose generalposition they were certain, although the thick weather hid them fromobservation. At 7 A. M. The frigate "Phoebe" signalled to Nelson thatthe enemy bore north. With the wind as it was, and considering theposition of the land, they must be standing to the northwest, so thatthe British fleet wore and steered the same course, keeping parallelto the enemy and spreading lookouts in their direction. Soon afternoon, the weather clearing, Blackwood saw the combined fleets where hebelieved them to be, under low sail, and so close that the "Euryalus"went about immediately. At 1 P. M. He left the squadron in temporarycharge of a junior captain, and with his own ship kept away south tospeak the admiral. At two he sighted the main body, and at 3. 20 wasnear enough to send the telegraphic message, "The enemy appearsdetermined to push to the westward. " "That, " wrote Nelson in hisdiary, "they shall _not_ do, if in the power of Nelson and Bronté toprevent them, " and he telegraphed back, "I rely upon your keepingsight of the enemy. " The frigates and lookout ships, he noted in hisjournal, had so far discharged their duties most admirably, informinghim promptly of all the hostile movements; he was justified thereforein the confidence that they would do as well in the night nowapproaching. While Blackwood was communicating, Nelson himself was much of the timeon the "Victory's" poop. Seeing there a number of midshipmenassembled, he observed to them, "This day or to-morrow will be afortunate one for you, young gentlemen, " alluding to their prospect ofpromotion after a successful battle. The same day at dinner, he saidto some of the company, "To-morrow I will do that which will give youyounger gentlemen something to talk and think about for the rest ofyour lives, but I shall not live to know about it myself;" and headded that he expected to capture twenty to twenty-two of the hostilefleet. [133] It may be inferred from this remark that by the dinnerhour, between three and five, he had become satisfied that the enemyeither would not, or could not, return into port, according to thefear he had expressed to Lady Hamilton, and that a battle thereforewas certain. The letter to her, from its mention of the weather asthick, must have been written in the forenoon. His expectation thatthe morrow would prove the decisive day was reinforced by one of thoseprepossessions for coincidences, half jesting, half serious, which arenatural to men, but fall too far short of conviction to be calledsuperstitious. On the 21st of October, 1757, his uncle MauriceSuckling had commanded one of three ships-of-the-line which had beatenoff a superior force. Nelson had several times said to Captain Hardyand Dr. Scott, "The 21st will be our day;" and on the morning of thebattle, when the prediction was approaching fulfilment, he againremarked that the 21st of October was the happiest day in the year forhis family; but he mentioned no reason other than that just given. The main bodies of the contending navies did not come in sight of eachother during the 20th; the British lookout frigates, between the two, and three or four miles from the allied line, could see their ownfleet only from the masthead. At about 2 P. M. , soon after the weathercleared, the wind shifted to west-northwest, taking the ships aback. After filling their sails again to the new wind, as this was now fairfor their approach to the Straits' mouth, the combined fleets wore, and headed to the southward. The British remaining on the same tack asbefore, --the port, --stood to the northward until 8 P. M. , when theyalso wore to the southwest; but this interval of steering in nearlyopposite directions changed the relative bearings. At midnight, by thelog of Blackwood's frigates, the enemy stretched along the easternhorizon, while the British bore southwest; the space between the twobeing ten miles. The "Euryalus, " three miles from the allies, saw theloom of the lights of her own fleet. Still fearful lest the view ofhis ships should shake the enemy's purpose, Nelson was careful not tolessen this distance; the more so because the British, having thewind, could attack when they pleased, provided the enemy by continuingto the southward deprived themselves of the power to regain Cadiz. TwoBritish frigates were directed to keep them in sight during the night, reporting their movements to two others who were stationed a littlefarther from them, whence a chain of line-of-battle ships communicatedwith the "Victory. " Thus, throughout the dark hours, signal lights andguns flashed across the waters to Nelson instantaneous information ofevery noteworthy occurrence in the hostile order. Since the morning of the 19th, the weather, fine for some daysprevious, had become unsettled, working up for the southwest galewhich wrought so much damage among the victims of the fight. As thenight of the 20th advanced, the wind fell, and at midnight there wereonly light westerly breezes, inclining to calm. The same conditionscontinued at dawn, and throughout the day of the 21st until after thebattle; but there was also a great swell from the westward, theprecursor of a storm. At 4 A. M. The British fleet again wore, and wasstanding northeast when the day broke. After leaving Cadiz, in order to avoid separations during the night, or in thick weather, the combined fleets had been disposed in fivecolumns, a formation whose compactness, though not suited to anengagement, was less liable to straggling than a single long line, andbrought all parts more directly under the control of thecommander-in-chief at the centre. Of the five, the two to windward, ofsix ships each, constituted a reserve, similar to Nelson's proposeddetachment of eight. It was commanded by Admiral Gravina, and wasintended to reinforce such part of the battle as should appear torequire it; an object for which the windward position was of theutmost moment, as it was for all naval initiative in that day. Thisadvantage the allies did not have on the morning of Trafalgar. WhenVilleneuve, therefore, formed the line of battle, these twelve shipswere at once incorporated with it, taking the lead of their order asit stood to the southward, with the wind at west-northwest, --a longcolumn stretching over five miles of sea from end to end. In a general sense, then, it may be said that, when daylight showedthe enemies to each other, the British fleet was heading to thenorthward, and that of the allies to the southward; the latter beingten or twelve miles east of their opponents. In the far distance, CapeTrafalgar, from which the battle takes its name, was just visibleagainst the eastern sky. At twenty minutes before seven Nelson made inquick succession the signals, "To form the order of sailing, "--whichby his previous instructions was to be the order of battle, --and "Toprepare for battle. " Ten minutes later followed the command to "Bearup, " the "Victory" setting the example by at once altering her coursefor the enemy. Collingwood did the same, and the ships of the twodivisions fell into the wake of their leaders as best they could, forthe light wind afforded neither the means nor the time for refinementsin manoeuvring. Fourteen ships followed the "Royal Sovereign, " whichbore Collingwood's flag, while the remaining twelve gathered inNelson's division behind the "Victory. "[134] The two columns steeredeast, about a mile apart, that of Nelson being to the northward; fromwhich circumstance, the wind being west-northwest, it has been calledcommonly the weather line. Thus, as Ivanhoe, at the instant of encounter in the lists, shiftedhis lance from the shield to the casque of the Templar, Nelson, at themoment of engaging, changed the details of his plan, and substitutedan attack in two columns, simultaneously made, for the charge ofCollingwood's division, in line and in superior numbers, upon theenemy's flank; to be followed, more or less quickly, according toindications, by such movement of his own division as might seemadvisable. It will be observed, however, that the order of sailingremained the order of battle, --probably, although it is not so stated, the fleet was already thus disposed when the signal was made, needingonly rectification after the derangements incident to darkness, --andfurther, that the general direction of attack continued the same, Collingwood guiding his column upon the enemy's southern flank, whileNelson pointed a few ships north of their centre. In this way waspreserved the comprehensive aim which underlay the particulardispositions of his famous order: "The whole impression of the Britishfleet must be to overpower from two or three ships ahead of theircommander-in-chief, supposed to be in the Centre, to the Rear of theirfleet. " The northern flank of the allies--ten or a dozen ships--wasconsequently left unengaged, unless by their own initiative they camepromptly into action; which, it may be added, they did not do untilafter the battle was decided. When the development of the British movement was recognized byVilleneuve, he saw that fighting was inevitable; and, wishing to keepCadiz, then twenty miles to the northward and eastward, under his lee, he ordered the combined fleets to wear together. [135] The scanty windwhich embarrassed the British impeded this manoeuvre also, so that itwas not completed till near ten o'clock. Nelson, however, noted itsbeginning at seven, and with grave concern; for not only would it putthe allies nearer their port, as it was intended to do, but it wouldcause vessels crippled in the action to find to leeward of them, during the gale which he foresaw, the dangerous shoals off Trafalgarinstead of the open refuge of the Straits. The appreciation of theperil thus entailed led him to make a signal for all the ships to beprepared to anchor after the battle, for it was not to be hoped thatthe spars of many of them would be in a condition to bear sail. Theresult of the allied movement was to invert their order. Their ships, which had been steering south, now all headed north; the van becamethe rear; Gravina, who had been leading the column, was in the rearship; and it was upon this rear, but still the southern flank of thehostile array, that the weight of Collingwood's attack was to fall. Soon after daylight Nelson, who, according to his custom, was alreadyup and dressed, had gone on deck. He wore as usual his admiral's frockcoat, on the left breast of which were stitched the stars of fourdifferent Orders that he always bore. It was noticed that he did notwear his sword at Trafalgar, although it lay ready for him on thecabin table; and it is supposed he forgot to call for it, as this wasthe only instance in which he was known not to carry it when engaged. At about six o'clock he summoned Captain Blackwood on board the"Victory. " This officer had had a hard fag during the past forty-eighthours, dogging the enemy's movements through darkness and mist; butthat task was over, and his ambition now was to get command of one oftwo seventy-fours, whose captains had gone home with Calder to giveevidence at his trial. "My signal just made on board the Victory, " hewrote to his wife. "I hope to order me to a vacant line-of-battleship. " Nelson's purpose, however, as far as stated by Blackwood, wassimply to thank him for the successful efforts of the past two days, and to have him by his side till the flagship came under fire, inorder to receive final and precise instructions, as the situationdeveloped, for the conduct of the frigates during and after thebattle. To Blackwood's congratulations upon the approach of the momentthat he had, to use his own word, panted for, he replied: "I meanto-day to bleed the captains of the frigates, as I shall keep you onboard to the very last moment. " Blackwood found him in good but very calm spirits, preoccupied withthe movements of the allies, and the probable results of his own planof attack. He frequently asked, "What would you consider a victory?"Blackwood answered: "Considering the handsome way in which the battleis offered by the enemy, their apparent determination for a fair trialof strength, and the proximity of the land, I think if fourteen shipsare captured, it will be a glorious result. " Nelson's constant replywas that he would not be satisfied with anything short of twenty. Headmitted, however, that the nearness of the land might make itdifficult to preserve the prizes, and he was emphatic in directingthat, if the shattered enemies had any chance of returning to Cadiz, the frigates were to be actively employed in destroying them, and werenot to be diverted from that single aim in order to save either shipsor men. Annihilation, he repeated, was his aim, and nothing short ofit; and he must have regretted the absence of the six of the line inthe Mediterranean, imperative as that had been. Word had been sent forthem to Gibraltar by Blackwood the moment the enemy moved, but theywere still away with the convoy. Blackwood, being a great personal friend of the admiral, took theliberty, after exchanging greetings, of submitting to him theexpediency of shifting his flag to the "Euryalus, " and conducting thebattle from her. Nelson made no reply, but immediately ordered moresail to be made upon the "Victory. " Finding himself foiled in this, Blackwood then made a direct request for the command of one of thetwo vacant seventy-fours. This would give him a chance to share inthe fight, which in a frigate he probably would not have, but it wouldalso displace the first lieutenant of the ship from the position towhich he had succeeded temporarily. Nelson replied instantly, "No, Blackwood, it is those men's birthright, and they shall have it. "[136]The incident shows vividly the lively sympathy and sense of justicewhich ever distinguished Nelson; for it must have pained him to deny arequest so consonant to his own temper, coming from one whom he hadlong known and valued, both as a friend and as an officer, and ofwhose recent service such orders would have been a graceful andappropriate acknowledgment. It may be desirable to explain tounprofessional readers what was the claim of the lieutenants whichNelson refused to ignore. The efficiency of the ships for the comingday's work was due to them scarcely less than to the absent captains, and if they survived the battle, having been in command through it, they would reap not only the honor but also their confirmation in therank of post-captain, through having exercised it in actual battle. This succession the admiral aptly called their birthright. Nelson availed himself of Blackwood's presence to have him, togetherwith Hardy, witness his signature to a paper, in which he bequeathedLady Hamilton and the child Horatia to the care of the nation, andwhich consequently has been styled a Codicil to his Will. UnlessBlackwood's memory a few years later was at fault, in stating that hissignal was made at six o'clock, [137] it is likely enough that thisearly summons was for the special purpose of giving formalcompleteness, by the attestation of two of his closest friends, to aprivate duty which was the last to engage Nelson's attention andaffections; for, in addition to the date, the place and hour of hiswriting are fixed by the words, "In sight of the Combined Fleets ofFrance and Spain, distant about ten miles. " This was the commonestimate of the relative positions, made by the British fleet at largeat daybreak, and coincides fairly well with the inferences to bedrawn, from the slow rate of speed at which the wind permitted theBritish to advance, and from the hour the conflict began. Nor wasthere time, nor convenient room, for further delay. A fresheningbreeze might readily have brought the fleet into action in a couple ofhours, and it is the custom in preparing for battle--the signal forwhich was made at 6. 40--to remove most of the conveniences, andarrangements for privacy, from the living spaces of the officers;partly to provide against their destruction, chiefly to clear away allimpediments to fighting the guns, and to moving about the ship. In thecase of the admiral, of course, much might be postponed to the lastmoment, but in fact his cabin was cleared of fixtures immediatelyafter he went on the poop in the early morning; for it is distinctlymentioned that while there he gave particular directions in thematter, and enjoined great care in handling the portrait of LadyHamilton, saying, "Take care of my guardian angel. " It seems, therefore, probable that this so-called Codicil was writtenin the quiet minutes of the morning, while the fleet was forming itsorder of sailing and bearing up for the enemy, but before theadmiral's cabin was cleared for battle. In it Nelson first recounted, briefly but specifically, "the eminent services of Emma Hamilton" tothe state, on two occasions, as believed by himself to have beenrendered. Into the actuality of these services it is not necessaryhere to inquire;[138] it is sufficient to say that Nelson's knowledgeof them could not have been at first hand, and that the credence heunquestionably gave to them must have depended upon the evidence ofothers, --probably of Lady Hamilton herself, in whom he felt, andalways expressed, the most unbounded confidence. "Could I haverewarded these services, " the paper concludes, "I would not now callupon my Country; but as that has not been in my power, I leave EmmaLady Hamilton, therefore, a legacy to my King and Country, that theywill give her an ample provision to maintain her rank in life. I alsoleave to the beneficence of my Country my adopted daughter, HoratiaNelson Thompson; and I desire she will use in future the name ofNelson only. These are the only favours I ask of my King and Countryat this moment when I am going to fight their battle. May God bless myKing and Country, and all those who I hold dear. My relations it isneedless to mention: they will of course be amply provided for. " At seven o'clock Nelson had returned from the poop to the cabin, forat that hour was made in his private journal the last entry ofoccurrences, --"At seven the combined fleets wearing in succession. "Here it seems likely that he laid down the pen, for, when he was foundwriting again, some hours later, it was to complete the long record ofexperiences and of duties, with words that summed up, in fit and mosttouching expression, the self-devotion of a life already entering theshadow of death. Between eight and nine o'clock the other frigate commanders came onboard the "Victory;" aides-de-camp, as it were, waiting to the lastmoment to receive such orders as might require more extensive wording, or precise explanation, than is supplied by the sententious phrases ofthe signal-book. Blackwood himself, a captain of long standing and oftried ability, was in fact intrusted contingently with no small shareof the power and discretion of the commander-in-chief. "He not onlygave me command of all the frigates, but he also gave me a latitude, seldom or ever given, that of making any use I pleased of his name, inordering any of the sternmost line-of-battle ships to do what struckme as best. " While thus waiting, the captains accompanied the admiralin an inspection which he made of the decks and batteries of theflagship. He addressed the crew at their several quarters, cautionedthem against firing a single shot without being sure of their object, and to the officers he expressed himself as highly satisfied with thearrangements made. Meanwhile the two fleets were forming, as best they could with thescanty breeze, the order in which each meant to meet the shock ofbattle. The British could not range themselves in regular columnswithout loss of time that was not to be thrown away. They advancedrather in two elongated groups, all under full sail, even tostudding-sails on both sides, the place of each ship being determinedchiefly by her speed, or, perhaps, by some fortuitous advantage ofposition when the movement began. The great point was to get the headsof the columns into action as soon as possible, to break up theenemy's order. That done, those which followed could be trusted tocomplete the business on the general lines prescribed by Nelson. Collingwood's ship, the "Royal Sovereign, " being but a few days outfrom home, and freshly coppered, easily took the lead in her owndivision. After her came the "Belleisle, " also a recent arrival offCadiz, but an old Mediterranean cruiser which had accompanied Nelsonin the recent chase to the West Indies. Upon these two ships, as uponthe heads of all columns, fell the weight of destruction from theenemy's resistance. The "Victory, " always a fast ship, had likewise little difficulty inkeeping her place at the front. Blackwood, having failed to get Nelsonon board his own frigate, and realizing the exposure inseparable fromthe position of leader, ventured, at about half-past nine, when stillsix miles from the enemy, to urge that one or two ships should bepermitted to precede the "Victory. " Nelson gave a conditionalassent--"Let them go, " if they can. The "Téméraire, " a three-decker, being close behind, was hailed to go ahead, and endeavored to do so;but at the same moment the admiral gave an indication of how littledisposed he was to yield either time or position. The lee lowerstudding-sail happening to be badly set, the lieutenant of theforecastle had it taken in, meaning to reset it; which Nelsonobserving, ran forward and rated him severely for delaying the ship'sprogress. Anything much less useful than a lee lower studding-sail ishard to imagine, but by this time the admiral was getting veryrestive. "About ten o'clock, " says Blackwood, "Lord Nelson's anxietyto close with the enemy became very apparent: he frequently remarkedthat they put a good face upon it; but always quickly added: 'I'llgive them such a dressing as they never had before. '" Seeing that the "Téméraire" could not pass the "Victory" in time tolead into the hostile order, unless the flagship gave way, Blackwood, feeling perhaps that he might wear out his own privilege, told Hardyhe ought to say to the admiral that, unless the "Victory" shortenedsail, the other ships could not get into place; but Hardy naturallydemurred. In any event, it was not just the sort of proposition thatthe captain of the ship would wish to make, and it was very doubtfulhow Nelson might take it. This the latter soon showed, however; for, as the "Téméraire" painfully crawled up, and her bows doubled on the"Victory's" quarter, he hailed her, and speaking as he always did witha slight nasal intonation, said: "I'll thank you, Captain Harvey, tokeep in your proper station, which is astern of the Victory. " The sameconcern for the admiral's personal safety led the assembled officersto comment anxiously upon the conspicuous mark offered by his blaze ofdecorations, knowing as they did that the enemy's ships swarmed withsoldiers, that among them were many sharpshooters, and that the actionwould be close. None, however, liked to approach him with thesuggestion that he should take any precaution. At length the surgeon, whose painful duty it was a few hours later to watch over the sadfulfilment of his apprehensions, said that he would run the risk ofhis Lordship's displeasure; but before he could find a fittingopportunity to speak, a shot flew over the "Victory, " and the admiraldirected all not stationed on deck to go to their quarters. No remarktherefore was made; but it is more likely that Nelson would haveresented the warning than that he would have heeded it. The French and Spanish fleets, being neither a homogeneous nor awell-exercised mass, experienced even greater difficulty than theBritish in forming their array; and the matter was to them of moreconsequence, for, as the defensive has an advantage in the carefulpreparations he may make, so, if he fail to accomplish them, he haslittle to compensate for the loss of the initiative, which he hasyielded his opponent. The formation at which they aimed, the customaryorder of battle in that day, was a long, straight, single column, presenting from end to end an unbroken succession of batteries, closeto one another and clear towards the foe, so that all the ships shouldsweep with their guns the sea over which, nearly at right angles, thehostile columns were advancing. Instead of this, embarrassed by bothlack of wind and lack of skill, their manoeuvres resulted in a curvedline, concave to the enemy's approach; the horns of the crescent thusformed being nearer to the latter. Collingwood noted that thisdisposition facilitated a convergent fire upon the assailants, theheads of whose columns were bearing down on the allied centre; it doesnot seem to have been remarked that the two horns, or wings, being towindward of the centre, also had it more in their power to support thelatter--a consideration of very great importance. Neither of theseadvantages, however, was due to contrivance. The order of the combinedfleets was the result merely of an unsuccessful effort to assume theusual line of battle. The ships distributed along the crescent layirregularly, sometimes two and three abreast, masking each other'sfire. On the other hand, even this irregularity had somecompensations, for a British vessel, attempting to pass through atsuch a place, fell at once into a swarm of enemies. From horn to hornwas about five miles. Owing to the lightness of the breeze, the alliescarried a good deal of sail, a departure from the usual battlepractice. This was necessary in order to enable them to keep theirplaces at all, but it also had the effect of bringing themcontinually, though very gradually, nearer to Cadiz. Seeing this, Nelson signalled to Collingwood, "I intend to pass through the van ofthe enemy's line, to prevent him from getting into Cadiz, " and thecourse of the "Victory, " for this purpose, was changed a little to thenorthward. After this, towards eleven o'clock, Nelson went below to the cabin. Itwas his habit, when an engagement was expected, to have all thebulkheads[139] upon the fighting decks taken down, and those of hisown apartments doubtless had been removed at least as soon as theenemy's sailing was signalled; but it was possible to obtain somedegree of privacy by hanging screens, which could be hurried out ofthe way at the last moment. The "Victory" did not come under fire till12. 30, so that at eleven she would yet be three miles or more distantfrom the enemy, [140] and screens could still remain. Shortly, after heentered, the signal-lieutenant, who had been by his side all themorning, followed him, partly to make an official report, partly toprefer a personal request. He was the ranking lieutenant on board, buthad not been permitted to exercise the duties of first lieutenant, because Nelson some time before, to avoid constant changes in thatimportant station, had ordered that the person then occupying itshould so continue, notwithstanding the seniority of any who mightafterwards join. Now that battle was at hand, the oldest in rankwished to claim the position, and to gain the reward that it insuredafter a victory, --a request natural and not improper, but more suitedfor the retirement of the cabin than for the publicity of the deck. Whatever the original injustice, --or rather hardship, --it is scarcelylikely, remembering the refusal encountered by Blackwood, that Nelsonwould have consented now to deprive of his "birthright" the man who sofar had been doing the work; but the petition was never preferred. Entering the cabin, the officer paused at the threshold, for Nelsonwas on his knees writing. The words, the last that he ever penned, were written in the private diary he habitually kept, in which werenoted observations and reflections upon passing occurrences, mingledwith occasional self-communings. They followed now, without break ofspace, or paragraph, upon the last incident recorded--"At seven theenemy wearing in succession"--and they ran thus:-- "May the Great God, whom I worship, grant to my Country, and for thebenefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory; and may nomisconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory bethe predominant feature in the British fleet. For myself, individually, I commit my life to Him who made me, and may Hisblessing light upon my endeavours for serving my Country faithfully. To Him I resign myself and the just cause which is entrusted to me todefend. Amen. Amen. Amen. " The officer, Lieutenant Pasco, waited quietly till Nelson rose fromhis knees, and then made his necessary report; but, although hisfuture prospects hung upon the wish he had to express, he refrainedwith singular delicacy from intruding it upon the preoccupation ofmind evidenced by the attitude in which he had found his commander. The latter soon afterwards followed him to the poop, where Blackwoodwas still awaiting his final instructions. To him Nelson said, "I willnow amuse the fleet with a signal;" and he asked if he did not thinkthere was one yet wanting. Blackwood replied that the whole fleetseemed very clearly to understand what they were about, and were vyingwith each other to get as near as possible to the leaders of thecolumns. Upon this succeeded the celebrated signal, the development ofwhich to its final wording is a little uncertain. Comparing thevarious accounts of witnesses, it seems probably to have been asfollows. Nelson mused for a little while, as one who phrases a thoughtin his own mind before uttering it, and then said, "Suppose wetelegraph 'Nelson confides that every man will do his duty. '" In thisform it was the call of the leader to the followers, the personalappeal of one who trusts to those in whom he trusts, a feelingparticularly characteristic of the speaker, whose strong hold overothers lay above all in the transparent and unswerving faith he showedin their loyal support; and to arouse it now in full force he used thewatchword "duty, " sure that the chord it struck in him would find itsquick response in every man of the same blood. The officer to whom theremark was made, suggested "England" instead of "Nelson. " To the fleetit could have made no difference, --to them the two names meant thesame thing; but Nelson accepted the change with delight. "Mr. Pasco, "he called to the signal officer, "I wish to say to the fleet, 'Englandconfides that every man will do his duty;'" and he added, "You must bequick, for I have one more to make, which is for close action. " Thisremark shows that the columns, and particularly Collingwood's ship, were already nearing the enemy. Pasco answered, "If your Lordship willpermit me to substitute 'expects' for 'confides, ' it will be soonercompleted, because 'expects' is in the vocabulary, [141] and 'confides'must be spelt. " Nelson replied hastily, but apparently satisfied, "That will do, Pasco, make it directly;" but the slightly mandatory"expects" is less representative of the author of this renownedsentence than the cordial and sympathetic "confides. " It is "Allez, "rather than "Allons;" yet even so, become now the voice of the distantmotherland, it carries with it the shade of reverence, as well as ofaffection, which patriotism exacts. It is said that Collingwood, frequently testy, and at the momentpreoccupied with the approaching collision with the Spanishthree-decker he had marked for his opponent, exclaimed impatientlywhen the first number went aloft, "I wish Nelson would stopsignalling, as we know well enough what we have to do. " But the twolife-long friends, who were not again to look each other in the face, soon passed to other thoughts, such as men gladly recall when deathhas parted them. When the whole signal was reported to him, and cheersresounded along the lines, Collingwood cordially expressed his ownsatisfaction. A few moments later, just at noon, the French ship"Fougueux, " the second astern of the "Santa Ana, " for which the "RoyalSovereign" was steering, fired at the latter the first gun of thebattle. As by a common impulse the ships of all the nations engagedhoisted their colors, and the admirals their flags, --a courteous andchivalrous salute preceding the mortal encounter. For ten minutes the"Royal Sovereign" advanced in silence, the one centre of the hostilefire, upon which were fixed all eyes, as yet without danger of theirown to distract. As she drew near the two ships between which sheintended to pass, Nelson exclaimed admiringly, "See how that noblefellow Collingwood carries his ship into action. " At about the sameinstant Collingwood was saying to his flag-captain, "Rotherham, whatwould Nelson give to be here!" These things being done, Nelson said to Blackwood, "Now I can do nomore. We must trust to the great Disposer of all events, and to thejustice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doingmy duty. " When his last signal had been acknowledged by a few ships inthe van, the admiral directed Pasco to make that for close action, andto keep it up. This was accordingly hoisted on board the flagship, where it was flying still as she disappeared into the smoke of thebattle, and so remained till shot away. The "Victory" was about twomiles from the "Royal Sovereign" when the latter, at ten minutes pasttwelve, broke through the allied order, and she had still a mile and ahalf to go before she herself could reach it. At twenty minutes pasttwelve Villeneuve's flagship, the "Bucentaure, " of eighty guns, fireda shot at her, to try the range. It fell short. A few minutes later asecond was fired, which dropped alongside. The distance then was amile and a quarter. Two or three followed in rapid succession andpassed over the "Victory. " Nelson then turned to Blackwood, anddirected him and Captain Prowse of the "Sirius" to return to theirships, but in so doing to pass along the column and tell the captainshe depended upon their exertions to get into action as quickly aspossible. He then bade them again to go away. Blackwood, who wasstanding by him at the forward end of the poop, took his hand, andsaid, "I trust, my Lord, that on my return to the Victory, which willbe as soon as possible, I shall find your Lordship well and inpossession of twenty prizes. " Nelson replied, "God bless you, Blackwood, I shall never speak to you again. " The "Victory" was all the time advancing, the feeble breeze urging herprogress, which was helped also by her lurching through the heavyfollowing swell that prevailed. Before Blackwood could leave her, ashot passed through the main-topgallantsail, and the rent proclaimedto the eager eyes of the foes that the ship was fairly under theirguns. Thereupon everything about the "Bucentaure, " some seven or eightships, at least, opened upon this single enemy, as the allied rear andcentre had upon the "Royal Sovereign;" for it was imperative to stopher way, if possible, or at least to deaden it, and so to delay aslong as might be the moment when she could bring her broadside to beareffectively. During the forty minutes that followed, the "Victory" wasan unresisting target to her enemies, and her speed, slow enough atthe first, decreased continually as the hail of shot riddled thesails, or stripped them from the yards. Every studding-sail boom wasshot away close to the yard arms, and this light canvas, invaluable inso faint a wind, fell helplessly into the water. During these tryingmoments, Mr. Scott, the admiral's public secretary, was struck by around shot while talking with Captain Hardy, and instantly killed. Those standing by sought to remove the body without drawing Nelson'sattention to the loss of one so closely associated with him; but theadmiral had noticed the fall. "Is that poor Scott, " he said, "who isgone?" The clerk who took the dead man's place was killed a fewmoments later by the wind of a ball, though his person was untouched. The "Victory" continuing to forge slowly ahead, despite her injuries, and pointing evidently for the flagship of the hostilecommander-in-chief, the ships round the latter, to use James'sstriking phrase, now "closed like a forest. " The nearer the Britishvessel drew, the better necessarily became the enemies' aim. Just asshe got within about five hundred yards--quarter of a mile--from the"Bucentaure's" beam, the mizzen topmast was shot away. At the sametime the wheel was hit and shattered, so that the ship had to besteered from below, a matter that soon became of little importance. Acouple of minutes more, eight marines were carried off by a singleprojectile, while standing drawn up on the poop, whereupon Nelsonordered the survivors to be dispersed about the deck. Presently a shotcoming in through the ship's side ranged aft on the quarter-decktowards the admiral and Captain Hardy, between whom it passed. On itsway it struck the fore-brace bitts--a heavy block of timber--carryingthence a shower of splinters, one of which bruised Hardy's foot. Thetwo officers, who were walking together, stopped, and lookedinquiringly at each other. Seeing that no harm was done, Nelsonsmiled, but said, "This is too warm work, Hardy, to last long. " Hethen praised the cool resolution of the seamen around him, compelledto endure this murderous fire without present reply. He had never, hesaid, seen better conduct. Twenty men had so far been killed andthirty wounded, with not a shot fired from their own guns. Still the ship closed the "Bucentaure. " It had been Nelson's purposeand desire to make her his special antagonist, because of Villeneuve'sflag; but to do so required room for the "Victory" to turn under theFrench vessel's stern, and to come up alongside. As she drew near, Hardy, scanning the hostile array, saw three ships crowded togetherbehind and beyond the "Bucentaure. " He reported to Nelson that hecould go close under her stern, but could not round-to alongside, norpass through the line, without running on board one of these. Theadmiral replied, "I cannot help it, it does not signify which we runon board of. Go on board which you please: take your choice. " At oneo'clock the bows of the "Victory" crossed the wake of the"Bucentaure, " by whose stern she passed within thirty feet, theprojecting yard arms grazing the enemy's rigging. One after another, as they bore, the double-shotted guns tore through the woodwork of theFrench ship, the smoke, driven back, filling the lower decks of the"Victory, " while persons on the upper deck, including Nelson himself, were covered with the dust which rose in clouds from the wreck. Fromthe relative positions of the two vessels, the shot ranged from end toend of the "Bucentaure, " and the injury was tremendous. Twenty gunswere at once dismounted, and the loss by that single discharge wasestimated, by the French, at four hundred men. Leaving the furthercare of the enemy's flagship to her followers, secure that they wouldgive due heed to the admiral's order, that "every effort must be madeto capture the hostile commander-in-chief, " the "Victory" put her helmup, inclining to the right, and ran on board a French seventy-four, the "Redoutable, " whose guns, as well as those of the French"Neptune, " had been busily playing upon her hitherto. At 1. 10 she layalong the port side of the "Redoutable, " the two ships falling offwith their heads to the eastward, and moving slowly before the wind tothe east-southeast. In the duel which ensued between these two, in which Nelson fell, thedisparity, so far as weight of battery was concerned, was all againstthe French ship; but the latter, while greatly overmatched at theguns, much the greater part of which were below deck, was markedlysuperior to her antagonist in small-arm fire on the upper deck, andespecially aloft, where she had many musketeers stationed. Nelsonhimself was averse to the employment of men in that position, thinkingthe danger of fire greater than the gain, but the result on this daywas fatal to very many of the "Victory's" men as well as to himself. As the ship's place in the battle was fixed for the moment, nothingnow remained to be done, except for the crews to ply their weaponstill the end was reached. The admiral and the captain, their parts ofdirection and guidance being finished, walked back and forth togetheron the quarter-deck, on the side farthest from the "Redoutable, " wherethere was a clear space of a little over twenty feet in length, foreand aft, from the wheel to the hatch ladder leading down to the cabin. The mizzen-top of the "Redoutable, " garnished with sharpshooters, wasabout fifty feet above them. Fifteen minutes after the vessels cametogether, as the two officers were walking forward, and had nearlyreached the usual place of turning, Nelson, who was on Hardy's left, suddenly faced left about. Hardy, after taking a step farther, turnedalso, and saw the admiral in the act of falling--on his knees, withhis left hand touching the deck; then, the arm giving way, he fell onhis left side. It was in the exact spot where Scott, the secretary, had been killed an hour before. To Hardy's natural exclamation that hehoped he was not badly hurt, he replied, "They have done for me atlast;" and when the expression of hope was repeated, he said again, "Yes, my back-bone is shot through. " "I felt it break my back, " hetold the surgeon, a few minutes later. The ball had struck him on theleft shoulder, on the forward part of the epaulette, piercing thelung, where it severed a large artery, and then passed through thespine from left to right, lodging finally in the muscles of the back. Although there was more than one mortal injury, the immediate andmerciful cause of his speedy death was the internal bleeding from theartery. Within a few moments of his wounding some forty officers andmen were cut down by the same murderous fire from the tops of theenemy. Indeed so stripped of men was the upper deck of the "Victory"that the French made a movement to board, which was repulsed, thoughwith heavy loss. The stricken hero was at once carried below, himself covering his faceand the decorations of his coat with his handkerchief, that the sightof their loss might not affect the ship's company at this criticalinstant. The cockpit was already cumbered with the wounded and dying, but the handkerchief falling from his face, the surgeon recognizedhim, and came at once to him. "You can do nothing for me, Beatty, " hesaid; "I have but a short time to live. " The surgeon also uttered theinvoluntary exclamation of encouragement, which rises inevitably tothe lips at such a moment; but a short examination, and the sufferer'sstatement of his sensations, especially the gushing of blood withinthe breast, which was vividly felt, convinced him that there wasindeed no hope. "Doctor, I am gone, " he said to the Rev. Mr. Scott, the chaplain, who knelt beside him; and then added in a low voice, "Ihave to leave Lady Hamilton, and my adopted daughter Horatia, as alegacy to my Country. " After the necessary examination had been made, nothing further couldbe done, nor was attempted, than to obtain the utmost possible relieffrom suffering. Dr. Scott and the purser of the "Victory" sustainedthe bed under his shoulders, raising him into a semi-recumbentposture, the only one that was supportable to him, and fanned him;while others gave him the cooling drink--lemonade--which hecontinually demanded. Those about did not speak to him, except whenaddressed; but the chaplain, to whom Nelson frequently said, "Pray forme, Doctor, " ejaculated with him short prayers from time to time. Theagony of mortal pain wrung from him repeated utterance, though nounmanly complaint; and his thoughts dwelt more upon home and thebattle than upon his own suffering and approaching death. His mindremained clear until he became speechless, about fifteen minutesbefore he passed away, and he took frequent notice of what occurrednear him, as well as of sounds on deck. The hour that succeeded his wounding was the decisive one of thefight; not that the issue admitted of much doubt, after once Nelson'splans had received fulfilment, and the battle joined, --unless thedelinquent van of the allies had acted promptly, --but in those momentsthe work was done which was thenceforth, for the enemy, beyond repair. Overhead, therefore, the strife went on incessantly, the seamentoiling steadily at their guns, and cheering repeatedly. Near theadmiral lay Lieutenant Pasco, severely but not fatally wounded. At oneburst of hurrahs, Nelson asked eagerly what it was about; and Pascoreplying that another ship had struck, he expressed his satisfaction. Soon he became very anxious for further and more exact information ofthe course of the battle, and about the safety of Captain Hardy, uponwhom now was devolved such guidance as the fleet, until the action wasover, must continue to receive from the flagship of thecommander-in-chief. In accordance with his wishes many messages weresent to Hardy to come to him, but for some time it was not possiblefor that officer to leave the deck. During this period, up to betweenhalf-past two and three, the ships of the two British divisions, thatfollowed the leaders, were breaking successively into the enemy'sorder, and carrying out with intelligent precision the broad outlinesof Nelson's instructions. The heads of the columns had dashedthemselves to pieces, like a forlorn hope, against the overpoweringnumber of foes which opposed their passage--an analysis of the returnsshows that upon the four ships which led, the "Victory" and"Téméraire, " the "Royal Sovereign" and "Belleisle, " fell one-third ofthe entire loss in a fleet of twenty-seven sail. But they had forcedtheir way through, and by the sacrifice of themselves had shatteredand pulverized the local resistance, destroyed the coherence of thehostile line, and opened the road for the successful action of theirfollowers. With the appearance of the latter upon the scene, succeededshortly by the approach of the allied van, though too late and indisorder, began what may be called the second and final phase of thebattle. While such things were happening the deck could not be left by Hardy, who, for the time being, was commander-in-chief as well as captain. Shortly after Nelson fell, the "Téméraire" had run on board the"Redoutable" on the other side, and the French "Fougueux" upon the"Téméraire, " so that for a few minutes the four ships were fasttogether, in the heat of the fight. About quarter past two, the"Victory" was shoved clear, and lay with her head to the northward, though scarcely with steerage way. The three others remained incontact with their heads to the southward. While this _mêlée_ was inprogress, the French flagship "Bucentaure" surrendered, at fiveminutes past two; but, before hauling down the flag, Villeneuve made asignal to his recreant van, --"The ships that are not engaged, takepositions which will bring them most rapidly under fire. " Thussummoned, the ten vessels which constituted the van began to go about, as they should have done before; and, although retarded by the slackwind, they had got their heads to the southward by half-past two. Fivestood to leeward of the line of battle, but five to windward. Thelatter would pass not far to the westward of the "Victory, " and tomeet this fresh attack demanded the captain's further care, andpostponed his going to the death-bed of his chief. The latter hadbecome very agitated at the delay, thinking that Hardy might be deadand the news kept from him. "Will nobody bring Hardy to me?" hefrequently exclaimed. "He must be killed; he is surely destroyed. " Atlast a midshipman came down with the message that "circumstancesrespecting the fleet required the captain's presence on deck, but thathe would take the first favourable moment to visit his Lordship. "Nelson, hearing the voice, asked who it was that spoke. The lad, Bulkeley, who later in the day was wounded also, was the son of aformer shipmate in the far back days of the San Juan expedition, andthe dying admiral charged the lad with a remembrance to his father. Two ships of Nelson's column, as yet not engaged, --the "Spartiate" andthe "Minotaur, "--were then just reaching the scene. Being in theextreme rear, the lightness of the breeze had so far delayed them. Arriving thus opportunely, they hauled to the wind so as to interposebetween the "Victory" and the approaching van of the allies. Coverednow by two wholly fresh ships, the captain felt at liberty to quit thedeck, in accordance with Nelson's desire. The two tried friends--Hardyhad been everywhere with him since the day of St. Vincent, and wasfaithful enough to speak to Lady Hamilton more freely than sheliked--shook hands affectionately. "Well, Hardy, " said Nelson, "howgoes the battle? How goes the day with us?" "Very well, my Lord, "replied Hardy. "We have got twelve or fourteen of the enemy's ships inour possession, but five of their van have tacked, and show anintention of bearing down upon the Victory. I have therefore calledtwo or three of our fresh ships round us, and have no doubt of givingthem a drubbing. " "I hope none of _our_ ships have struck, Hardy. ""No, my Lord, " was the answer, "there is no fear of that. " Nelson thensaid, "I am a dead man, Hardy. I am going fast: it will be all overwith me soon. Come nearer to me. Pray let my dear Lady Hamilton havemy hair, and all other things belonging to me. " Hardy observed that hehoped Mr. Beatty could yet hold out some prospect of life. "Oh no!"replied Nelson; "it is impossible. My back is shot through. Beattywill tell you so. " Hardy then returned to the deck, shaking handsagain before parting. Nelson now desired the surgeons to leave him to the attendants, as onefor whom nothing could be done, and to give their professional carewhere it would be of some avail. In a few moments he recalled thechief surgeon, and said, "I forgot to tell you that all power ofmotion and feeling below my breast are gone; and _you_ very well_know_ I can live but a short time. " From the emphasis he placed onhis words, the surgeon saw he was thinking of a case of spinal injuryto a seaman some months before, which had proved mortal after manydays' suffering; yet it would seem that, despite the conviction thatrested on his mind, the love of life, and of all it meant to him, yetclung to the hope that possibly there might be a reprieve. "One wouldlike to live a little longer, " he murmured; and added, "What wouldbecome of poor Lady Hamilton if she knew my situation!" "Beatty, " hesaid again, "_you know_ I am gone. " "My Lord, " replied the surgeon, with a noble and courteous simplicity, "unhappily for our country, nothing can be done for you;" and he turned away to conceal theemotion which he could not at once control. "I know it, " said Nelson. "I feel something rising in my breast, " putting his hand on his leftside, "which tells me I am gone. God be praised, I have done my duty. "To this latter thought he continually recurred. At about three o'clock, the five ships of the enemy's van, passingwithin gunshot to windward, [142] opened fire upon the British shipsand their prizes. The "Victory" with her consorts replied. "Oh, Victory! Victory!" cried the sufferer, "how you distract my poorbrain!" and after a pause added, "How dear life is to all men!" Thisdistant exchange of shots was ineffectual, except to kill or wound afew more people, but while it continued Hardy had to be on deck, forthe flag of the commander-in-chief still vested his authority in thatship. During this period an officer was sent to Collingwood to informhim of the admiral's condition, and to bear a personal message offarewell from the latter; but Nelson had no idea of transferring anyportion of his duty until he parted with his life also. A short hour elapsed between Hardy's leaving the cockpit and hisreturning to it, which brings the time to four o'clock. Strength hadebbed fast meanwhile, and the end was now very near; but Nelson wasstill conscious. The friends again shook hands, and the captain, before releasing his grasp, congratulated the dying hero upon thebrilliancy of the victory. It was complete, he said. How many werecaptured, it was impossible to see, but he was certain fourteen orfifteen. The exact number proved to be eighteen. "That is well, " saidNelson, but added, faithful to his exhaustive ideas of sufficiency, "Ibargained for twenty. " Then he exclaimed, "_Anchor_, Hardy, _anchor_!"Hardy felt the embarrassment of issuing orders now that Collingwoodknew that his chief was in the very arms of death; but Nelson wasclearly within his rights. "I suppose, my Lord, " said the captain, "Admiral Collingwood will now take upon himself the direction ofaffairs. " "Not while I live, I hope, Hardy, " cried Nelson, and for amoment endeavored, ineffectually, to raise himself from the bed. "No. Do _you_ anchor, Hardy. " Captain Hardy then said, "Shall we make thesignal, Sir?" "Yes, " answered the admiral, "for if I live, I'llanchor. " These words he repeated several times, even after Hardy hadleft him, and the energy of his manner showed that for the moment thesense of duty and of responsibility had triumphed over his increasingweakness. Reaction of course followed, and he told Hardy he felt that in a fewminutes he should be no more. "Don't throw me overboard, " he added;"you know what to do. " Hardy having given assurance that these wishesshould be attended to, Nelson then said, "Take care of my dear LadyHamilton, Hardy: take care of poor Lady Hamilton. Kiss me, Hardy. " Thecaptain knelt down and kissed his cheek. "Now I am satisfied. ThankGod, I have done my duty. " Hardy rose and stood looking silently athim for an instant or two, then knelt down again and kissed hisforehead. "Who is that?" asked Nelson. The captain answered, "It isHardy;" to which his Lordship replied, "God bless you, Hardy!" Thelatter then returned to the quarter-deck, having passed about eightminutes in this final interview. Nelson now desired his steward, who was in attendance throughout, toturn him on his right side. "I wish I had not left the deck, " hemurmured; "for I shall soon be gone. " Thenceforth he sank rapidly; hisbreathing became oppressed and his voice faint. To Dr. Scott he said, "Doctor, I have _not_ been a _great_ sinner, " and after a short pause, "_Remember_, that I leave Lady Hamilton and my daughter Horatia as alegacy to my country--never forget Horatia. " This injunction, withremembrances to Lady Hamilton and the child, he frequently repeated;and he charged Scott to see Mr. Rose, and tell him--but here paininterrupted his utterance, and after an interval he simply said, "Mr. Rose will remember, " alluding to a letter which he had written him, but which as yet could not have been received. His thirst nowincreased; and he called for "drink, drink, " "fan, fan, " and "rub, rub, " addressing himself in this last case to Dr. Scott, who had beenrubbing his breast with his hand, by which some relief was given. These words he spoke in a very rapid manner, which rendered hisarticulation difficult; but he every now and then, with evidentincrease of pain, made a greater effort, and said distinctly, "ThankGod, I have done my duty. " This he repeated at intervals as long asthe power of speech remained. The last words caught by Dr. Scott, whowas bending closely over him, were, "God and my Country. " Fifteen minutes after Hardy left him for the second time, the admiralbecame speechless; and when this had continued five minutes, thesurgeon, who was busied among the other wounded, was summoned again. He found him upon the verge of dissolution, the hands cold and thepulse gone; but upon laying his hand upon his forehead, Nelson openedhis eyes, looked up, and then closed them forever. Five minutes laterhe was dead. The passing was so quiet that Dr. Scott, still rubbinghis breast, did not perceive it, until the surgeon announced that allwas over. It was half-past four o'clock, just three hours after thefatal wound was received. Not till an hour later did the last of theeighteen prizes strike, and firing cease altogether; but thesubstantial results were known to Nelson before consciousness lefthim. To quote the rugged words of the "Victory's" log, "Partial firingcontinued until 4. 30, when a victory having been reported to the RightHonourable Lord Viscount Nelson, K. B. , he died of his wound. " Of the five ships of the allied van which passed to windward of the"Victory, " one was cut off and captured by the "Minotaur" and"Spartiate. " The other four continued on the wind to the southwest, and escaped to sea. By the surrender of Villeneuve the chief commandof the combined fleets remained with the Spanish admiral Gravina. Thelatter, at quarter before five, fifteen minutes after Nelson breathedhis last, retreated upon Cadiz, making signal for the vessels whichhad not struck to rally round his flag. Ten other ships, five Frenchand five Spanish, --in all eleven sail-of-the-line, --made good theirescape into the port. "Before sunset, " wrote an eye-witness on board the "Belleisle, " "allfiring had ceased. The view of the fleet at this period was highlyinteresting, and would have formed a beautiful subject for a painter. Just under the setting rays were five or six dismantled prizes; on onehand lay the Victory with part of our fleet and prizes, and on theleft hand the Royal Sovereign and a similar cluster of ships. To thenorthward, the remnant of the combined fleets was making for Cadiz. The Achille, with the tricoloured ensign still displayed, had burnt tothe water's edge about a mile from us, and our tenders and boats wereusing every effort to save the brave fellows who had so gloriouslydefended her; but only two hundred and fifty were rescued, and sheblew up with a tremendous explosion. " There, surrounded by the companions of his triumph, and by thetrophies of his prowess, we leave our hero with his glory. Sharer ofour mortal weakness, he has bequeathed to us a type of single-mindedself-devotion that can never perish. As his funeral anthem proclaimed, while a nation mourned, "His body is buried in peace, but his Nameliveth for evermore. " Wars may cease, but the need for heroism shallnot depart from the earth, while man remains man and evil exists to beredressed. Wherever danger has to be faced or duty to be done, at costto self, men will draw inspiration from the name and deeds of Nelson. Happy he who lives to finish all his task. The words, "I have done myduty, " sealed the closed book of Nelson's story with a truth broaderand deeper than he himself could suspect. His duty was done, and itsfruit perfected. Other men have died in the hour of victory, but forno other has victory so singular and so signal graced the fulfilmentand ending of a great life's work. "Finis coronat opus" has of no manbeen more true than of Nelson. There were, indeed, consequencesmomentous and stupendous yet to flow from the decisive supremacy ofGreat Britain's sea-power, the establishment of which, beyond allquestion or competition, was Nelson's great achievement; but his partwas done when Trafalgar was fought. The coincidence of his death withthe moment of completed success has impressed upon that superb battlea stamp of finality, an immortality of fame, which even its owngrandeur scarcely could have insured. He needed, and he left, nosuccessor. To use again St. Vincent's words, "There is but oneNelson. " FOOTNOTES: [132] The name Thompson was spelled by Nelson indifferently with or withoutthe "p", which, as Nicolas observes, confirms the belief that it wasfictitious. The fact is singular; for, from a chance remark of his, itappears that he meant it to be Thomson. (Morrison, Letter No. 569. ) [133] The author is indebted for this anecdote to Mr. Edgar Goble, ofFareham, Hants, whose father, Thomas Goble, then secretary to CaptainHardy, was present at the table. [134] One sixty-four, the "Africa, " had separated to the northward duringthe night, and joined in the battle by passing alone along the enemy'sline, much of the time under fire. She belonged, therefore, to Nelson'scolumn, and cooperated with it during the day. [135] Nelson in his journal wrote: "The enemy wearing _in succession_. " Asthe allies' order was reversed, however, it is evident that he meant merelythat the ships wore one after the other, from rear to van, but in theirrespective stations, each waiting till the one astern had, to use the oldphrase, "marked her manoeuvre, "--a precaution intended to preventcollisions, though it necessarily extended the line. [136] The author is indebted for these incidents to Admiral Sir W. R. Mends, G. C. B. , who received them from the second baronet, Sir Henry M. Blackwood, when serving with him as first lieutenant. [137] The "Euryalus's" log gives eight o'clock as the hour of the captain'sgoing on board the "Victory;" but Blackwood not only says six, but alsomentions that his stay on board lasted five and a half hours, which givesabout the same time for going on board. The other frigate captains did notgo till eight. Blackwood, as the senior, might need a fuller and longercontinued interview, because the general direction of the frigate squadronwould be in his hands; or Nelson might particularly desire the presence ofa close professional friend, the captains of the ships-of-the-line havingtheir hands now full of preparations. [138] The question of Lady Hamilton's services on the occasions mentionedby Nelson, vigorously asserted by herself, has been exhaustively discussedby Professor John Knox Laughton, in the "United Service Magazine" for Apriland May, 1889. His conclusions are decisively adverse to her claims. [139] See _ante_, p. 275. [140] That is, with a one and a half knot breeze. [141] The vocabulary of the telegraphic signal book provides certain wordswhich can be signalled by a single number. Words not in this vocabularymust be spelled letter by letter, --each letter of the alphabet having itsown number. [142] That is, to the westward. INDEX. Aboukir, Bay, Island, Promontory, and Castle, i. 342, 343, 345-347, 365; ii. 16, 17, 32. Aboukir, Battle of, ii. 17. Acton, Sir John, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, i. 328, 329, 340, 342, 383, 428, 430, 443; ii. 8, 190, 191, 193, 194, 219, 264, 274, 275. Addington (afterwards Lord Sidmouth), Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1801-1804, Nelson's intercourse with, i. 383; ii. 101, 103, 120, 136, 162-164, 166, 167, 172, 174, 189, 193, 205, 211, 352. Adriatic, importance to the communications of the Austrians in Italy, i. 247, 405; British concern in, 369, ii. 192, 195, 243; Napoleon's interest in, 188, 195, 266; resort of privateers, 241, 242. "Agamemnon, " British ship-of-the-line, Nelson ordered to command her, i. 95; relation to his career, 97-99; action with four French frigates, 113, 115; engages the batteries at Bastia, 120, 121; action with the "Ça Ira, " French 80-gun ship, 163-166; engagement of March 14, 1795, 168; engagement of July 13, 178-180; services at Genoa, 200-202; on the opening of Bonaparte's campaign, 1796, 220-223; Nelson leaves her for the "Captain, " seventy-four, 229, 230; she sails for England, 230; subsequent history, 230; misfortune at the Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 87; joins the fleet shortly before Trafalgar, 361. "Albemarle, " British frigate commanded by Nelson, i. 31-41. Alexandria, Nelson's first voyage to, i. 332-339; second voyage, 342, 343; blockaded, 366; Nelson's third voyage to, ii. 276, 277. Algiers, Bonaparte's designs upon, ii. 184; Nelson's difficulties with, 230-232. "Amazon, " British frigate, services at Copenhagen, ii. 82, 86, 89, 91; subsequent mention, 217, 261-263, 289, 295, 315. Amiens, Peace of, signature of, ii. 146; Nelson's home life during, 150-178; rupture of, 175. "Amphion, " British frigate, Nelson's passage to Mediterranean in, ii. 189-196; leaves her for the "Victory, " 222. Archduke Charles, Nelson's meeting with, at Prague, ii. 43. Austria and Austrians, result of campaign of 1794 in Holland and Germany, 155; in Italy, 156; delay in opening campaign of 1795 in Italy, 177; their advance to Vado Bay, on the Riviera, 178; Nelson ordered to co-operate with, 178, 184; their disregard of Genoese neutrality, 184; position of, in summer of 1795, 186; inability, or unwillingness to advance, 188, 189, 194; their attitude towards the British, 197, 202, 213; growing insecurity of their position, 196, 200, 201, 212; attacked and defeated by French at Battle of Loano, 201; retreat across the Apennines, 202; urged by Nelson to reoccupy Vado in 1796, 218, 219; their advance under Beaulieu, 220-223; Nelson's assurances to, 221; defeat by Bonaparte, 220, 223; driven into the Tyrol, and behind the Adige, 232; besieged in Mantua, 232; advance under Wurmser to relieve Mantua, 238; Nelson's hopes therefrom, 238-241; hears of their defeat again, 241, 244; the peace of Campo Formio between Austria and France, 317, 318; dissatisfaction of Austria with France, 319, 322; effect of their position in upper Italy upon French operations, 391; attitude towards France and Naples, 1798, 392; Nelson's judgment on, 399, 400; alliance with Russia, 1799, 400; successes in 1799, 400, 415, 416, ii. 1, 14, 15; reverses, 15; capture of Genoa, 1800, 37; defeat at Marengo, 37; abandon Northern Italy, 37; Nelson's visit to, 40-43; peace with France, 1801, 63, 119; exhaustion of, 1801-1805, 180; Nelson's remonstrance with, on failure to enforce her neutrality, 242. Ball, Sir Alexander J. , British captain, letter to Nelson, i. 211; joins Nelson's division at Gibraltar, 316; services in saving the flagship, 324; advice asked by Nelson, 333; at the Battle of the Nile, 347, 352-354; accompanies Nelson to Naples, 366; gallantry towards Lady Hamilton, 386; serves ashore at Malta, 392, 406-409, ii. 7, 9, 11, 12, 13; mentions with unbelief reports about Nelson and Lady Hamilton, i. 396; summoned to join Nelson upon the incursion of Admiral Bruix, 419-421, 426; ordered to resume duties at Malta, 423; mention of Nelson in letters to Lady Hamilton, ii. 23, 30; visits Nelson at Merton, 158; anecdote of Nelson told by him, 158; letters from Nelson to, 211, 213, 242-244, 270, 274, 278, 280, 286, 292; opinion as to French objects in 1804, 212; Nelson's testy vexation with, 238; opinion as to the management of coast lookout stations, 318, note. Barbary States. _See_ Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis. Barham, Lord, Nelson's interview with, as Comptroller of the Navy, i. 85; First Lord of the Admiralty, ii. 291 and note, 317, 320, 321; Nelson's interviews with, 320, 333; Nelson's letters to, 324, 353, 355, 358. Bastia, town in Corsica, in possession of French, i. 116; blockade of, by Nelson, 120, 122; engagement with batteries of, 120; description of, 121; Nelson's opinion as to besieging, 121-124, 126; siege of, 127-131; capitulation of, 129; Nelson's estimate as to his own services at, 132, 133, 152; Nelson directed to superintend evacuation of, by British, 247; evacuation of, 251-253. Battles, land, mentioned: Aboukir, ii. 17; Castiglione, i. 241, 244; Hohenlinden, ii. 63; Loano, i. 201; Marengo, ii. 37; Novi, 15. Battles, naval, mentioned: Calder's action, ii. 307, 313, 318, 323; Camperdown, i. 309; Copenhagen, ii. 79-97, 98, 161-167; First of June (Lord Howe's), i. 150, 176; July 13, 1795, i. 178-182; March 14, 1795, i. 166-173; the Nile, i. 343-358; St. Vincent, i. 268-277; Trafalgar, ii. 377-397. Beatty, Dr. , surgeon of the "Victory, " account of Nelson's habits and health, ii. 225-228 and note; present at Nelson's death, 388, 389, 392, 393, 396. Beaulieu, Austrian general, commands the army in Italy, 1796, i. 219; defeated by Bonaparte, and driven into the Tyrol, 220-223, 232. Beckford, William, opinion of Lady Hamilton, i. 381; visited by Nelson at Fonthill, ii. 51-53; anecdote of Nelson, 52. Berry, Sir Edward, British captain, accompanies Nelson in boarding the "San Nicolas" and "San Josef, " i. 273-275, 279; commands Nelson's flagship, the "Vanguard, " 309; account of the campaign of the Nile (quoted), 332, 339, 344, 355, 359; at the Battle of the Nile, 351, 354, 363; sent to England with despatches, 360; commands the "Foudroyant" at the capture of the "Généreux, " ii. 24-27; at the capture of the "Guillaume Tell, " 31, 32; commands the "Agamemnon" at Trafalgar, 361; numerous services of, 362. Bickerton, Sir Richard, British admiral, commands in the "Mediterranean" when war with France begins, 1803, ii. 194; second in command to Nelson, 1803-1805, 202, 215, 219, 246, 248, 259, 263, 278; left in command by Nelson, upon his departure for the West Indies, 294, 314, 317; joins Collingwood before Cadiz, 334; returns to England, ill, just before Trafalgar, 338. Blackwood, Sir Henry, British captain, distinguished part taken in the capture of the "Guillaume Tell, " ii. 31, 328; arrives in London with news that the combined fleets are in Cadiz, 328; interviews with Nelson, 328; commands advanced squadron of frigates off Cadiz, 339, 357, 361, 364-369; last day spent with Nelson, 372-379, 382-385; witnesses the "Codicil" to Nelson's will, 374, 375; special mark of confidence shown him by Nelson, 377; Nelson's farewell to him, 385. Bolton, Susannah, Nelson's sister, relations of, with Lady Nelson and Lady Hamilton, ii. 55, 178. Bonaparte, Napoleon, decisive influence of Nelson upon the career of, i. 96, 97, 220, ii. 63, 64, 119, 120, 267-270, 283, 284, 301, 310, 314; indicates the key of the defences of Toulon, i. 117; opinions upon operations in Italy, 186, 187, 193, 194, 197, 208, 214-216, 219, 391, 394; command of Army of Italy, 220; defeats Beaulieu, advances to the Adige, and establishes the French position in Northern Italy, 220-223, 228, 229, 232; fortifies the coastline of the Riviera, 223, 224, 227; seizes Leghorn, 231-233, 236; contrasted with Nelson, 234-236, 258, ii. 129, 130, 172; overthrows Wurmser, i. 238, 240, 241; effect of his campaign in Italy upon the career of Nelson, 242, 243, 318; forces Genoa to close her ports to Great Britain, 245; sails on the Egyptian Expedition, 323, 325, 328, 329, 331-334, 336-339; landing in Egypt, 339; Nelson's appreciation of the effect upon, by the Battle of the Nile, 366, 369, 370, 406, ii. 18-22; expedition into Syria, 17; escape from Egypt to France, 16, 17, after defeating a Turkish army in Aboukir Bay, 17; defeats Austrians at Marengo, 37; influence upon the formation of the Baltic Coalition, 63, 64; threats of invading England, 1801, 119-122; his dominant situation on the Continent in 1803, 179-187; firmness of intention to invade England, 1803-1805, 184-188, 191, 204, 213; his policy and Nelson's counter projects, 182-187; Nelson's singularly accurate prediction of future of, 188, 265; Nelson's intuitive recognition of probable action of, 265, 270; vast combinations for invasion of England, 267-272, 283, 284; his understanding of the value of sea-power evidenced, 282. "Boreas, " British frigate, commanded by Nelson, 1784-1787, i. 44-80. Brereton, British general, erroneous information sent to Nelson, ii. 298-300; Nelson's expressions of annoyance, 300, 309, 311, 318; comment upon his mistake, 318, note. Bronté, Duke of, Sicilian title and estate conferred upon Nelson, ii. 2; his form of signature afterwards, 2 and note. Brueys, French admiral, commander-in-chief at the Battle of the Nile, i. 345; his dispositions for action, 345-347. Bruix, French admiral, commander-in-chief of a French fleet entering the Mediterranean from Brest, i. 417, 422, 425, 428, 432; effect of his approach upon proceedings in Naples, 432, 437, 441; his return to Brest, 446, 448; Nelson's comment upon his conduct, ii. 213. "Bucentaure, " French flagship at Trafalgar, Nelson's encounter with, ii. 384-387; surrender of, 391. Cadiz, Nelson's visit to, i. 103-104; his operations before, under Jervis, 286-288, 289-294; his watch before, prior to Trafalgar, ii. 339, 356-361; effect of position of, upon the Battle of Trafalgar, 369, 371, 372, 380. "Ça Ira, " French ship-of-the-line, Nelson's action with, in the "Agamemnon, " i. 163-166; his credit for, 172. Calder, Sir Robert, British admiral, captain of the fleet at the Battle of St. Vincent, i. 281, 282; his indecisive action with the allied fleets, in 1805, ii. 307, 313; popular outcry against, 308, 315, 323, 353; Nelson's relations with, 318, 319, 323, 327, 353-356; recalled to England for trial, 353. Calvi, town in Corsica, Nelson at the siege of, i. 136-148; loses there his right eye, 139, 140. Canary Islands. _See_ Teneriffe. Capel, Thomas B. , British captain, bearer of despatches after the Battle of the Nile, i. 361, 371; mentioned, 355, note, ii. 217. "Captain, " British ship-of-the-line, carries Nelson's broad pendant as commodore, i. 230; at the Battle of St. Vincent, 270-276; injuries received there, 285; Nelson quits her for the "Theseus, " 285, 289. Caracciolo, Francesco, commodore in the Neapolitan navy, wounded feelings at the distrust of his Court, i. 390; accompanies the flight to Palermo, obtains leave to return to Naples, and joins the insurgents there, 437; apprehension, trial, and execution of, 438; comments upon Nelson's part in this transaction, 439-443. Castlereagh, Lord, British Minister, Nelson's shrewd prediction to him of the results of the Orders in Council affecting neutral flags, and of the License System, ii. 330. Clarence, Duke of. _See_ William Henry. Codrington, Edward, British captain, expressions quoted: about Nelson's seamanship, i. 15; his family ties and love of glory, 72, ii. 175; appearance of Nelson's ships, 288; graciousness of Nelson's bearing, 340. Collingwood, Cuthbert, British admiral, close connection between his career and that of Nelson, i. 21, 22; strong expression of regard for Nelson, 24; association with Nelson in the West Indies, 54 and note, 55, 63; at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 269, 273, 276, 281, 282; strong expression upon the credit due to Nelson, 272; his account of Nelson's cold reception at Court, in 1800, ii. 49; sent from England to West Indies in 1805, 310; hearing that Nelson is gone thither, takes position off Cadiz instead, 311; correspondence with Nelson on his return, 311-313; left by Nelson in charge off Cadiz, 316, 317; force collected under, when allies enter Cadiz, 334; characteristics, 340; part assigned to, by Nelson, for Trafalgar, 350-352; his part at Trafalgar, 370-372, 377, 380, 383, 384; Nelson's praise of, 384; his sympathy with Nelson, 384; notified of Nelson's fatal wound, 394. Convoys, Nelson's comments on the behavior of, i. 33; gives one to American merchant ships against French privateers, 289; difficulty of providing in the Mediterranean, ii. 241-244. Copenhagen, defences of, in 1801, ii. 72, 80, 81, 84, 85; Battle of, Nelson's plans for, 84-87; the battle, 87-97; importance and difficulty of the achievement, 98, 99; failure of the British Government to reward, 99, 162; silence of the city of London, 161; Nelson's action, 161-167. Corfu, transferred, with the other Ionian Islands, from Venice to France, i. 318; Nelson's concern for, after the Battle of the Nile, 368, 405, 406; taken by Russo-Turkish forces, 405; British precautions against re-occupation by French, ii. 184; concern of Nelson for, while commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, 1803-1805, 187, 190, 195, 266; resort of privateers, 241; Napoleon's estimate of, 206. Cornwallis, William, British admiral, kindness to Nelson in early life, i. 30 and note, 45; Nelson directed to communicate with, off Brest in 1803, ii. 188, 189; orders seizure of Spanish treasure-ships, 251; Nelson directs that the order be disobeyed, 251; services of, off Brest, 269; Nelson joins, off Brest, on return from West Indies, 314, 317; authorizes Nelson to return to England, 317. Correspondence, Nelson's extensive, while in the Mediterranean, ii. 190; his manner of conducting, 232-236. Corsica, Island of, Nelson ordered to coast of, i. 115, 116; Nelson's connection with operations there in 1794, 118-148; strategic value of, to British, 155-159; government as a British dependency, 159; dissatisfaction of natives with British rule, 231; tenure of, dependent on support of the natives, 234; abandonment of, by the British, 247, 251-254; threatened invasion of Sardinia from, ii. 204. "Curieux, " British brig of war, sent by Nelson to England from West Indies with news of his movements, ii. 301; falls in with combined fleets, 313; Nelson's comment on hearing the fact, 313, 315. Davison, Alexander, intimate friend of Nelson, Nelson expresses despondency to, i. 412; tells him circumstances of surrender of castles at Naples, 431, 432; the "Lady of the Admiralty's" coolness, ii. 49; account given by, of George III. Speaking of Nelson, 49, 50; Nelson's mention of Sir Hyde Parker to, 67, 68, 71, 164; aids Nelson pecuniarily, 144; charged by Nelson with a final message to Lady Nelson, 148; Nelson's expressions to, about St. Vincent, 163; about treatment of himself by the government, 170; "Salt beef and the French fleet, " 296; about General Brereton, 318. De Vins, Austrian general, commands on the Riviera in 1795, i. 187; Nelson's association with, 187, 193-197, and opinion of, 197. Dresden, Nelson's visit to, in 1800, ii. 43-45. Drinkwater, Colonel, returns from Elba in frigate with Nelson, 1797, i. 262; incidents narrated of the voyage, 266-268; witnesses the Battle of St. Vincent, 281; interview with Nelson after the battle, 283; characteristic anecdote of Nelson, 309. Duckworth, Sir J. T. , British admiral, association with Nelson during operations in the Mediterranean, 1799, i. 418, 419, 420, 421, 423, 442, ii. 1, 6. Dundas, British general, commanding troops in Corsica, i. 121; controversy with Lord Hood, 121, 122; Nelson's opinion, 121. Egypt, Bonaparte's expedition to, in 1798, i. 323-339; Nelson's pursuit, 327-329, 331-338; Nelson's constant attention to, 369, 404, 406, ii. 182, 185, 201, 203, 211, 212, 213, 255, 270, 277, 280-282, 287, 302; his urgency that the French army be not permitted to leave, 18-22. El Arish, Convention of, signed, ii. 19. Elba, island of, Nelson's opinion of importance of, i. 237; his seizure of, 237; evacuation of, 259-263, 287, 288. "Elephant, " British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's flagship at Copenhagen, ii. 78, 83, 88-97. Elgin, Earl of, British ambassador to Turkey, opinion upon the state of things at Palermo during Nelson's residence there, i. 397; Nelson's divergence of opinion from, concerning the French quitting Egypt, ii. 19-21. Elliot, Sir Gilbert, afterwards Lord Minto, British representative in Corsica, 1794, i. 119; Viceroy of Corsica, 154; friendship between him and Nelson, 154, 275, 281, 283, 284, ii. 153, 250, 325; Nelson's correspondence with, i. 172, 203, 237, 239, 275, 281, 356, ii. 3, 27, 36, 210, 250; directs the seizure of Elba by Nelson, i. 237; present at the evacuation of Corsica, 252, 253, and of Elba. 262; passage with Nelson to Gibraltar, 262-268; witnesses the Battle of St. Vincent, 275, 281; advocacy of Nelson's claims to distinction, 284, 403; incidental mention of Nelson by, i. 308, ii. 34, 44, 92, 154, 172, 174, 308, 326, 332, 335; mention of Lady Hamilton by, i. 379-382, ii. 44, 154, 320, 335; ambassador to Vienna, i. 396 note. Elliot, Hugh, British minister at Dresden during Nelson's visit in 1800, ii. 43, 44; minister to the two Sicilies during Nelson's Mediterranean command, 1803-1805, 189-310; takes passage out with Nelson, 189; correspondence between Nelson and, quoted, 191, 192, 194, 211, 212, 215, 218, 235, 246, 258, 263, 264, 286, 304, 310, 330. Este, Lambton, association with Nelson mentioned, ii. 254-257. Fischer, Commodore, commander-in-chief of Danish fleet at the Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 94; Nelson's controversy with, on account of his official report of the battle, 107-109. Fitzharris, Lord, British attaché at Vienna during Nelson's visit, 1800, anecdotes of Nelson and of Lady Hamilton, ii. 41, 42. Flag of Truce, incident of the, at Copenhagen, ii. 94-98. "Fleet in Being, " indications of Nelson's probable opinion of its deterrent effect, i. 135-137, 160, 182, 183, 196, 198, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 227; ii. 301-306. Freemantle, British captain, with Nelson, at Teneriffe, i. 301-304; at Copenhagen, ii. 83; letter from Nelson to, concerning Calder, 318. Frigates, Nelson's sense of the importance of, and of small cruisers generally, i. 338, 340, 341; ii. 242-245, 274, 294, 334, 357, 358. "Généreux, " French ship-of-the-line, escape of, after the Battle of the Nile, i. 357, 358; capture of the "Leander" by, 361, 405; captured by Nelson's squadron off Malta, ii. 24-29. Genoa, importance of, to the South of France, i. 105, 106, 107; difficult neutrality of, 157, 158, 184-192, 199-201, 218, 223, 226-228, 233, 393; closes her ports against Great Britain, 1796, 244-246; siege of city, in 1800, ii. 28; surrender of, by Masséna, 37; identified with France as the Ligurian Republic, 181, 182; ports of, blockaded by Nelson, 219, 229, 230. George III. , King of Great Britain, prejudice of, against Nelson in early life, i. 88, 89, 284; subsequent approbation, 177, 284, 308; interest in Nelson manifested by, ii. 49, 50; subsequent coldness of, toward Nelson, apparently in consequence of his relations to Lady Hamilton, 49. Gillespie, Dr. , account of life on board Nelson's flagship by, ii. 223-225, 238, 248. Goodall, Admiral, at the partial fleet action of March 14, 1795, i. 168, 169; his support of Nelson when under public censure for failure to find the French fleet, 334. Gore, British captain, commands squadron of frigates under Nelson's orders, outside Straits of Gibraltar, ii. 244; letter of Nelson to, concerning three frigates attacking a ship-of-the-line, 245; ordered by Nelson to disobey orders of Admiral Cornwallis to seize Spanish treasure-ships, 250, 251. Graves, Rear Admiral, second to Nelson at the Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 83, 90; made Knight of the Bath in reward for the action, 99. Gravina, Spanish admiral, commander of the Spanish contingent, and second in command of the combined fleet, at Trafalgar, ii. 363, 369, 372, 396. Greville, Charles, nephew to Sir William Hamilton, relations of, to Emma Hart, afterwards Lady Hamilton, i. 373-379. Hallowell, British captain, under Nelson at the siege of Calvi, i. 139; commands the "Swiftsure" at the Battle of the Nile, 353. Hamilton, Emma, Lady, Nelson's first meeting with, i. 110, 111; letter of Nelson to. 340; conduct of, in Naples, upon receipt of news of the Battle of the Nile, 371; Nelson's second meeting with, 372; previous history of, 373-379; married to Sir William Hamilton, 378; personal appearance and characteristics, 379-382, 384-386, ii. 43-45, 150, 154, 223, 326, 335; influence at Court of Naples, i. 383, 426, 442; influence upon Nelson, 385-388, 441, 442, 444, ii. 23, 28-30, 38, 39, 41, 78, 330-332; intermediary between the Court and Nelson, i. 389, 426, 428; efficiency during the flight of the Court from Naples, 395; scandal concerning her relations to Nelson, 396-398, ii. 30, 34, 35, 48-51, 154, 177, 178; love of play, i. 397, ii. 41; Nelson's infatuation for, i. 380, 422, 441, ii. 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 41, 43, 51, 53, 78, 110, 154, 326; with Sir William Hamilton accompanies Nelson to Naples in flagship, i. 428; usefulness there, 444; Nelson asks of the Czar insignia of the Order of Malta for, ii. 10; accompanies Nelson, with her husband, on a trip to Malta, 35, and on the return journey to England, 36-45; her reception by the London world, 48-50, 154; Lady Nelson's attitude towards, 46-48, 51, 53; attitude of Nelson's father towards, 55, 176; of other members of Nelson's family, 55, 178, 326; believed by Nelson to be the mother of Horatia, 56-58; Nelson's letters to, during Copenhagen expedition, 68, 69, 72, 79, 88, 104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 116, 149; letters to, while commanding preparations against invasion, 137, 139, 140-143, 149, 150; purchases the Merton property for Nelson, 149-151; disturbed relations with her husband, 151-153; death of husband, 177; Nelson's letters to, during his command in the Mediterranean, 1803-1805, 194, 222, 223, 256, 258, 279, 339, 353, 354; Nelson's anxiety about confinement of, 210; birth of a second child, 210; allowance made by Nelson to, 248; Nelson's last letter to, 365; bequeathed by Nelson to his Country, 376, 389, 395; mentioned by Nelson, when dying, 392, 393, 395. Hamilton, Sir William, British minister to Naples, Nelson's first association with, i. 110; Nelson's correspondence with, during the Nile campaign, 327, 329, 330, 340-342, 368, 372; Nelson's association with, while in command in Neapolitan waters, 1798-1800, 372, 387, 389, 390, 393, 395-398, 427, 428-444, ii. 21, 23, 27-30, 34, 35; relations to Amy Lyon, otherwise Emma Hart, prior to their marriage, 375-378; marriage to Emma Hart, 378; onerous increase of diplomatic duties after the French Revolution began, 384; influence of Lady Hamilton upon, 383, 389, 397, ii. 44; apparent unfitness for his position, i. 383, 397, 398, 435, 436; accompanies Nelson to Naples in flagship, 428; assertion of Nelson's full powers at this time by, 430; official despatch of, relative to transactions at Naples, June-July, 1799, quoted and discussed, 432-436; share of, in these transactions, 444; recalled to England, ii. 34; accompanied by Nelson on return to England, 36-45; Nelson takes up his residence with, 146; with Lady Hamilton goes to live with Nelson at Merton, 150; disturbed relations of, with his wife, 151-153; death of, 177; his professed confidence in Nelson, 178. Hardy, Captain Thomas M. , captured in the prize "Sabina, " i. 260; exchanged, 264, 266; narrow escape from recapture, 267; commander of the brig "Mutine, " 323; accompanies Nelson in Baltic expedition, ii. 65, 83; continuous association with Nelson after St. Vincent, 392; presence at Nelson's death-bed, 392-395; incidentally mentioned, ii. 224, 234, 245, 337, 368, 374, 378, 385-389, 391. Hart, Emma, name assumed by Lady Hamilton, prior to marriage, i. 375. Haslewood, anecdote of final breach between Lord and Lady Nelson, ii. 53. Hillyar, Captain James, anecdotes of Nelson, ii. 175, note, 237-239. "Hinchinbrook, " British frigate, commanded by Nelson in youth, i. 21-30;singular coincidence that both Nelson and Collingwood were made post into this ship, 21. Hood, Admiral, Lord, opinion of Nelson in early life, i. 34; Nelson obtains transfer of his ship to the fleet of, 36-39; relations of Nelson with, prior to French Revolution, 37, 39, 41, 45, 66, 87, 89, 108; appointed to command the Mediterranean fleet, 1793, 101; services off Toulon, 103-117; employs Nelson on detached service, at Naples, 108, at Tunis, 113, around Corsica, 115-120; reduction of Corsica, 118-148; return to England, 148, 149; removed from the Mediterranean command, 175; Nelson's opinion of, 119, 175, 176; Nelson's relations with, during his Mediterranean command, 112, 116, 119, 122, 124, 148; at siege of Bastia, 130-132; at siege of Calvi, 142, 143; inadequate mention of Nelson's services in Corsica by, 131-134, 152, 153; differences with Colonel Moore, 143-145; opinion of Nelson's merits at the Battle of the Nile, 361-363; presents Nelson in the House of Peers, when taking his seat as a viscount, ii. 160. Hood, Captain Sir Samuel, pilots Nelson's fleet into Aboukir Bay, i. 348; share of, in the Battle of the Nile, 349, 350, 358; left to blockade Alexandria, 366, 392; incidentally mentioned, 401, 404, ii. 158. Horatia, Nelson's daughter, birth of, ii. 56; mentioned, 57, 223, 335; Nelson's last letter to, 366; desired by him to use the name of "Nelson" only, 366; bequeathed by Nelson to his Country, 376, 389; mentioned by Nelson in dying, 395. Hoste, Captain William, midshipman with Nelson from 1793 to 1797, i. 304; describes Nelson's return on board wounded, after the affair at Santa Cruz, 304; lieutenant, and commander of the "Mutine, " 371; reception at Naples by Lady Hamilton, 371; curious anecdote of, ii. 262, 263. Hotham, Vice-Admiral, second in command to Lord Hood, mistaken action of, i. 134, 135; Nelson's comment on, 135, 150; succeeds Hood as commander-in-chief, 149; encounter with French Toulon fleet, 161-170; Nelson's urgency with, 168, and criticism of his action in this case, 169-172; inadequate military conceptions of, 171, 182, 198; difficulties of, recognized by Nelson, 171; second encounter with the French, 178-180; incompetent action, and Nelson's criticism, 179-182; disastrous results of inefficiency of, 182, 183, 198, 203, 210; sends Nelson to co-operate with Austrians on the Riviera, 184; Nelson's opinion of his "political courage, " 189; personal dislike to co-operation of, 191, 197 and note; inadequate support given to Nelson by, 197, 198, 202; Nelson's opinion of the consequent mishaps, 182, 199, 202; relieved by Sir Hyde Parker, 199. Hotham, Sir William, criticism of Nelson's conduct towards Lady Nelson, ii. 50; mention of Lady Nelson's conduct after the separation, 53; Nelson's aptitude at forwarding public service, 229. Howe, Admiral, Lord, appoints Nelson to the command of the "Boreas, " i. 44; kind reception of Nelson in 1787, 82; victory of June 1st, 1794, Nelson's opinion of, 150; Nelson's expression to, about the Battle of the Nile, 356; opinion of, concerning the Battle of the Nile, 357, 363. Hughes, Sir Richard, commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands Station, 1784-1786, i. 45; Nelson's difficulties with, 49-53, and 53-58; his attitude towards Nelson in the matter of enforcing the Navigation Act, 58, 60, 63; Nelson's reconciliation with, 72. Hughes, Lady, account of Nelson as a very young captain, i. 46. Ionian Islands, Corfu, etc. , objects of Nelson's solicitude, i. 368, 391, 405, 406, ii. 265. 266; Russian occupation of, i. 405, ii. 14; importance of, to Bonaparte, ii. 187, 188, 195, 241; temporary political name of Republic of the Seven Islands, 190. Ireland, Nelson's speculations as to Bonaparte's intentions against, ii. 211, 212, 288, 315; Collingwood's, 311, 312. Jervis, Admiral Sir John, afterwards Earl of St. Vincent, i. 34; commander-in-chief in the West Indies, 115; commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, 204, 212; Nelson's first meeting with, 215; desire of, to have Nelson remain under his command, 216, 229, 255; his close blockade of Toulon, 230, 242; Nelson's lofty opinion of, 244, 248; forced to concentrate his fleet owing to the attitude of Spain, 245, 246; embarrassment caused to, by conduct of Admiral Man, 246, 251; ordered to evacuate the Mediterranean, 247; retires to Gibraltar, 254; sends Nelson back to superintend the evacuation of Elba, 259; his opinions of Nelson, as expressed, 261, 281, 282, 294, 299, 306, 323, 363, 403, ii. 67, 104, 116, 118, 120, 196, 198; rejoined by Nelson, off Cape St. Vincent, i. 268; Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 268-277; operations after the battle, 285-288; blockade and bombardment of Cadiz, 288-294; sends Nelson to Teneriffe, 298, 299; sympathy with Nelson in his defeat and wound, 306; created Earl of St. Vincent, 306; rejoined by Nelson after convalescence, 310; expressions of satisfaction thereat, 310; aversion of, to extending the operations of the fleet, 320; sends Nelson to watch the Toulon armament, 310, 323; denounced for choosing so young a flag-officer, 337; opinion of the Battle of the Nile, 363; orders Nelson to return to the western Mediterranean, 366; the affair of Sir Sidney Smith, 401, 402; absolute confidence of, in Nelson, 408; action upon the incursion of Bruix's fleet, 420-423; gives up the command of the Mediterranean, 424; Nelson's distress and vexation, 424, ii. 263; succeeded in command by Lord Keith, i. 425, 428; takes command of Channel Fleet, 1800, ii. 56; Nelson joins him as subordinate, 56; stern resolution in face of the Baltic Coalition, 64; becomes First Lord of the Admiralty, 67; Nelson's gradual alienation from, 69, 140, 141, 142, 162, 163, 167, 170, 172; full approval of Nelson's course in the Baltic by, 73, 104; indisposition to grant rewards for services at Copenhagen, 99, 162, 163, 167; reluctance to relieve Nelson, 116; insists with Nelson that he must accept and retain command of preparations against invasion, 120, 139, 145; correspondence with Nelson on this subject, 120-126, 134, 135, 136, 139, 143; divergence of views from Nelson's on the subject of a flotilla, 131, 132; misunderstanding between Nelson and, on the subject of medals for Copenhagen, 162, 163, 167; sends Nelson to the Mediterranean as commander-in-chief, 175; injury to Navy from excessive economy of, 172, 196; correspondence of Nelson with, while commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, quoted, 188, 189, 196, 198, 213; retires from the Admiralty, and succeeded by Lord Melville, 221. KEATS, Captain Richard G. , favorite with Nelson, ii. 293; letters from Nelson to, 293, 297, 298, 323. Keith, Admiral, Lord, second in command to St. Vincent in the Mediterranean, i. 423; St. Vincent relinquishes command to, 425, 428; characteristics of, 425; friction between Nelson and, 425-427; advice of, to Nelson, concerning executions in Naples, 442; Nelson's disobedience to orders of, 445-454; pursues combined fleets to English Channel, 448, ii. 14; inferiority of, to Nelson, in military sagacity, i. 450, ii. 38; absence from Mediterranean prolonged, ii. 4; resumes command in the Mediterranean, 22; Nelson's resentment at his return, 3, 23; relations between the two, 23, 27-30, 32, 36-38; orders Nelson to assume personal charge of blockade of Malta, 28; generous letter of, to Nelson, 35; dissatisfaction of, with Nelson's course, 36-38; displeasure of Queen of Naples with, 38, 39; measures of, to prevent French encroachments during Peace of Amiens, 184; successful resistance of, to the Admiralty's attempt to reduce his station, 249. Kleber, French general, succeeds Bonaparte in the command in Egypt, ii. 17; convinced of the hopelessness of retaining Egypt, 18; makes the Convention of El Arish with the Turks, 18-20. Knight, Miss, friend and companion of the Hamiltons, ii. 39; accompanies them and Nelson on journey to England in 1800, 39-48; incidents mentioned by, relative to this period, 39, 40, 48; testimony to Nelson's love for his wife, prior to meeting with Lady Hamilton, 55. LATOUCHE-TRÉVILLE, French admiral, in command off Boulogne, and successful repulse of British boats, ii. 135-138, 214; in command of Toulon fleet, 214; Nelson's attempts to lure out of port, 214-216, 219, 220; reports that Nelson retreated before him, and Nelson's wrath, 217-219; death of, 257. Layman, Lieutenant, and Commander, serving with Nelson on board the St. George, 1801, ii. 69; anecdotes of Nelson by, 70, 72, 158, 356; loses the brig "Raven" when carrying despatches, 279; characteristic letter of Nelson in behalf of, 279, 280. "Leander, " British fifty-gun ship, Campaign and Battle of the Nile, i. 327, 352, 353; sent with despatches to Gibraltar, 360; captured by the "Généreux, " 361; recaptured by Russians, and restored to Great Britain, 405. Leghorn, Nelson's visits to, i. 148, 151, 161, 208; importance of, to the French, 157, 160, and to the British fleet, 161, 231, 232; occupation of, by Bonaparte, in 1796, 233; blockade of, by Nelson, 236-238; Nelson's project for an assault of, 238-241; occupation of, by Neapolitans, in 1798, 393, 406; blockade of, recommended by Nelson, in 1803, ii. 182. Lindholm, Danish officer, aide-de-camp to Crown Prince at the Battle of Copenhagen, sent to Nelson with reply to the message under flag of truce, ii. 96; association with the negotiations, 97, 101, 103; testimony of, to Nelson's motives in sending flag of truce, 97; correspondence of, with Nelson, relative to the conduct of Commodore Fischer, 108, 109. Linzee, Commodore, Nelson serves under, on mission to Tunis, i. 113; Nelson's causeless dissatisfaction with conduct of, 114. Lisbon, headquarters of British fleet after evacuation of the Mediterranean, i. 260, 285, 286, 310; forbidden to British in 1803, ii. 181. Locker, Captain William, Nelson's early commander and life-long friend, i. 17-20, 21. Louis, Captain Thomas, Nelson's expressions of obligation to, at the Battle of the Nile, i. 351. "Lowestoffe, " British frigate, Nelson commissioned lieutenant into, and incidents on board of, i. 16-20; his place on board of, filled by Collingwood, 21. Lyon, Amy, maiden name of Lady Hamilton, i. 373. Mack, Austrian general, association with Nelson before and after the disastrous Neapolitan campaign of 1798, i. 392-394. Madalena Islands, situation of, and importance to Nelson's fleet, ii. 201-205, 207; Nelson there receives news of Villeneuve's first sailing, 266. Malmesbury, Lady, mention of Lady Hamilton by, i. 379, 382; of Nelson and Hyde Parker, ii. 67. Malta, seizure of, by Bonaparte, i. 329, 331; Nelson's estimate of the importance of, 330, 407, ii. 13, 195, 198; his concern for, i. 368, 369, 414, ii. 5, 7-14, 243, 316, 317; directs blockade of, i. 369, by Portuguese squadron, 371; blockade of, 391, 392, 409, 420, 423, ii. 1, 7-14, 23-34, 36, 37; Nelson's jealousy of Russian designs upon, i. 406-408; capture near, of the "Généreux, " ii. 23-28, and of the "Guillaume Tell, " 31; Nelson ordered by Keith to take personal charge of blockade of, 28; Nelson quits blockade of, 30, 31; takes ships off blockade, contrary to Keith's wishes, 36-39; surrender of, to the British, 62; effect of surrender of, upon the Czar, 62; Nelson's views as to the ultimate disposition of, 168; Nelson's visit to, in 1803, 189, 194; strategic importance of, 182, 195, 264. Man, Admiral Robert, in command under Hotham, at the fleet action of July 13, 1795, i. 180; Nelson's commendation of, 180; subsequent mistakes of, in 1796, 240, 248, 249, 254; Nelson's expressions concerning, 240, 248; allusion to, ii. 19. Marengo, Battle of, Nelson in Leghorn at the time of, ii. 37, 179. Maritimo, Island of, strategic centre for a rendezvous, i. 420, 426, 427. Masséna, French general, defeats the combined Austrians and Russians near Zurich, ii. 15; Nelson likened to, 52. Matcham, Mrs. , Nelson's sister, attitude towards Lady Hamilton, ii. 55, 178; towards Lady Nelson, 178; anecdote of Nelson transmitted by, 335. Matcham, George, Nelson's nephew, letter of, dated 1861, giving recollections of Nelson, ii. 155-157. Melville, Lord, First Lord of the Admiralty, in succession to St. Vincent, reply to Nelson's appeal to reverse previous refusal of medals for Copenhagen, ii. 167; Nelson's letter to, about his missing the French fleet, 280-282. Merton, Nelson's home in England, purchase of, by him, ii. 144, 149, 150; life at, during Peace of Amiens, 146-178; final stay at, 320-336. Messina, importance of, to the security of Sicily, Nelson's opinions, i. 413, 414, 417, ii. 186, 191-193. Middleton, Sir Charles, afterwards Lord Barham, i. 85. _See_ Barham. Miles, Commander Jeaffreson, able defence of Lord Nelson's action at Naples, in 1799, i. 441. Miller, Captain Ralph W. , commands Nelson's flagship at the Battle of St. Vincent, i. 274, 279; at Teneriffe, 302; at the Battle of the Nile, 355; Nelson's expressions of affection for, and anxiety for a monument to, ii. 143. Minorca, Nelson ordered from Egypt for an expedition against, i. 366; Nelson directs his squadron upon, on receiving news of Bruix's incursion, 418-420; Nelson's difference with Keith, as to the value and danger of, 445-451, ii. 3, 5, 6; Nelson's visit to, in 1799, ii. 6, 11, 12; restored to Spain at Peace of Amiens, 181. Minto, Lord. _See_ Elliot, Sir Gilbert. Minto, Lady, mention of Nelson at Palermo, in letters of, i. 396, 397; at Leghorn, ii. 38, 39; at Vienna, 40-42. Moore, Colonel, afterwards Sir John, i. 119; friction between Lord Hood and, in Corsica, 140-145; Nelson's agreement, in the main, with Hood's views, 143, 144, 145. Morea, Nelson's anxieties about, ii. 185, 187, 195, 203, 204, 213, 266, 276, 281, 287. Moutray, Captain, Nelson's refusal to recognize pendant of, as commodore, i. 49-51; undisturbed friendship between Nelson and, 51. Moutray, Mrs. , Nelson's affection and admiration for, i. 51, 52; Collingwood writes to, after Nelson's death, 52. Moutray, Lieutenant James, son of the above, dies before Calvi, while serving under Nelson, i. 52, 148; Nelson erects a monument to, 148. Murray, Rear-Admiral George, Nelson's pleasure at a visit from, ii. 170; captain of the fleet to Nelson, 1803-1805, 224, 228, 234, 237. NAPLES, city of, Nelson's first visit to, i. 108-111; second visit, 371, 372, 385-395; flight of the Court from, 395; the French enter, 399; the French evacuate, after their disasters in Upper Italy, 415; the royal power re-established in, 429-432, 444; Nelson's action in the Bay of, 430-444; Nelson leaves finally, for Palermo, ii. 2; Nelson's emotions upon distant view of, in 1803, 194. Naples, Kingdom of. _See_ Two Sicilies. Naples, King of, Nelson's regrets for, upon the evacuation of the Mediterranean, 1798, i. 248; gives orders that supplies be furnished Nelson's squadron before the Battle of the Nile, 329; Nelson's appeal to, to take a decided stand, 330; Nelson's indignation against, when difficulties about supplies are raised in Syracuse, 340; congratulates Nelson on the issue of the Battle of the Nile, 363; visits Nelson's flagship, 372; distrust of his own officers, 390, 416; under Nelson's influence, decides upon war with France, 391; Nelson promises support to, 391, 392; decides to advance against French in Rome, 393; defeat and precipitate flight of, 394; takes refuge at Palermo, 395; promises Nelson that Malta, being legitimately his territory, should not be transferred to any power without consent of England, 406; authorizes British flag to be hoisted in Malta alongside the Sicilian, 407; Nelson's devotion to, 408, 443, 450; personal timidity and apathy of, 416, 417, ii. 5, 6; requests Nelson to go to Naples and support the royalists, i. 425; gives Nelson full powers to act as his representative in Naples, 429, 430; goes himself to Bay of Naples, but remains on board Nelson's flagship, 443; alienation of, from the queen, 444, ii. 6; returns to Palermo, ii. 2; confers upon Nelson the dukedom of Bronté, 2; Nelson renews correspondence with, in 1803, 190; Nelson's apprehensions for, 191, 195; Nelson keeps a ship-of-the-line always in the Bay of Naples to receive royal family, 192; application of, to the British government, to send Nelson back to the Mediterranean, after sick-leave, 246; agitation of, at the prospect of Nelson's departure, 246; offers him a house at Naples or at Palermo, 246. Naples, Queen of, agitation at hearing of the Battle of the Nile, i. 372; friendship with Lady Hamilton, 378, 383, 384, 426, 444; characteristics of, 388, ii. 6; association with Nelson, i. 388-391; Nelson's devotion to, 392; distrust of her subjects, 394, 416, ii. 5; flight to Palermo, i. 395; apprehensions of, 419, 428; alienation of the King from, 444, ii. 6; wishes to visit Vienna, and is carried to Leghorn by Nelson, with two ships-of-the-line, ii. 36; refused further assistance of the same kind by Lord Keith, 38; her distress of mind, and anger with Keith, 39; proceeds to Vienna by way of Ancona, 40; Nelson renews correspondence with, in 1803-1805, 183, 190, 264. Nelson, Rev. Edmund, father of Lord Nelson, i. 4; Nelson and his wife live with, 1788-1793, 91; Mrs. Nelson continues to live with, after Nelson goes to the Mediterranean, 207, 257, 308, ii. 48-48, 55; his testimony to Lady Nelson's character, ii. 55; attitude towards Lady Hamilton, 55, 176; persuaded of the absence of criminality in her relations with Nelson, 55, 176; refuses to be separated from Lady Nelson, 55, 176, 177; death of, 176; character of, 176, 177. NELSON, HORATIO, LORD. _Historical Sequence of Career:_ and birth, i. 4; first going to sea, 5; service in merchantman, 9; cruise to the Arctic Seas, 12; to the East Indies, 14; acting lieutenant, 15; lieutenant, 16; cruise to West Indies, 17; commander and post-captain, 21; Nicaraguan expedition, 26; invalided home, 30; command of "Albemarle, " 1781, 31; paid off, and visits France, 41; cruise of the "Boreas, " 1784, 44; refuses to obey orders of commander-in-chief, first, to recognize broad pendant of a captain "not in commission, " 49, and, second, when directed not to enforce the Navigation Act, 53-64; engagement to Mrs. Nisbet, 69; marriage, 75; return to England, and "Boreas" paid off. 1787, 75-80; exposure of frauds in the West Indies, 79, 82-86; half-pay, 1788-1792, 90-94; commissions the "Agamemnon, " February, 1793, 99; joins the Mediterranean fleet under Lord Hood, 103; constant detached service, 108-114; blockade of Corsica, 116; siege of Bastia, 120-133; siege of Calvi, 136-146; loss of right eye, 139; refitting in Leghorn, 151-160; action of "Agamemnon" with "Ça Ira, " 163; partial fleet action of March 14, 1795, 166; partial fleet action of July 13, 1795, 178; command of a detached squadron on the Riviera of Genoa, under Hotham, 1795, 184-204, and under Jervis, 1796, 215-229; hoists broad pendant as commodore, 220; leaves "Agamemnon" for "Captain, " 230; the blockade of Leghorn, 233; seizure of Elba, 237, and of Capraia, 245; evacuation of Corsica, 247-254; British fleet retires to Gibraltar, 254; mission to evacuate Elba, 259; action with Spanish frigates, 259; rejoins Jervis off Cape St. Vincent, 268; Battle of Cape St. Vincent, 1797, 268; made a Knight of the Bath, 284; promoted rear-admiral, 285; mission into the Mediterranean, 288; blockade and bombardment of Cadiz, 289-294; the Teneriffe expedition, 296; loses his right arm, 303; invalided home, 307; rejoins Mediterranean fleet in the "Vanguard, " 1798, 310; sent to watch the Toulon armament, 316; Campaign of the Nile, 323-366; Battle of the Nile, 343-358; severely wounded in the head, 351; advanced to the peerage as Baron Nelson of the Nile, 361; arrives at Naples, 371; meeting with Lady Hamilton, 372; urges Naples to declare war against France, 389; war between Naples and France, 393; Neapolitan court carried to Palermo by, 395; residence at Palermo and contemporary events, 1799, --Sidney Smith and the Levant, 400; Ionian Islands, 404; Malta, 406; Barbary States, 409; about Naples, 413; incursion of French fleet under Admiral Bruix, 417-427; proceeds to Naples, 428; incident of the surrender of the Neapolitan insurgents, 429-436; the Caracciolo incident, 437; refuses to obey an order of Lord Keith, 445; reiterated refusal, 448; left temporarily commander-in-chief by Keith's departure, ii. 1-22; created Duke of Bronté by King of Naples, 2; dissatisfaction at not being continued as commander-in-chief, 3; Keith's return, 1800, 22; superseded by Keith's return, 22; capture of "Le Généreux, " 24; capture of "Le Guillaume Tell, " in Nelson's absence, 31; returns to England through Germany, 1800, 39-45; breach with Lady Nelson, 45-57; promoted vice-admiral, 56; hoists flag on board "San Josef, " in the Channel Fleet, under Lord St. Vincent, 1801, 56; birth of the child Horatia, 56; the Baltic expedition, 60-116; Battle of Copenhagen, 80-97; incident of disobeying the signal to leave off action, 89; incident of the flag of truce, 94; created a viscount, 99; negotiations, 100; return to England, 107; charged with defence of the coast of England against invasion, 118-145; retirement from active service during the Peace of Amiens, 146-175; interest in public questions, 168-174; commissioned commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, 1803, 175; death of his father, 176; arrival in the Mediterranean, 189; the long watch off Toulon, 196-261; last promotion, Vice-Admiral of the White, 1804, 221; escape and pursuit of the French Toulon fleet, 1805, 272-295; follows it and its Spanish auxiliaries to the West Indies, 296; returns to Gibraltar, 309; carries his squadron to Cornwallis off Brest, 315-317; returns himself to England, August, 1805, 315; last stay in England, 320-336; resumes command in the Mediterranean, 339; the Battle of Trafalgar, 363; mortally wounded, 388; death of, 396. _Personal Characteristics_: Appearance, in boyhood, i. 15; at twenty-one, 22; at twenty-four, 38; at twenty-seven, 66; at thirty-six, 39; at forty-two, ii. 40, 41, 43; at forty-three, 112; later years, 155-157, 228, 238, 321, 332; expression, 158. Health, inherited delicacy of constitution, i. 5; invalided from East Indies, 15; from West Indies, 29, 30, 31; in Baltic, 33; in Canada, 36; mentioned, 44, 75, 78, 91, 119, 146, 147, 149, 207, 236, 294, 309, 368, 401, 413, 453, 454, ii. 29-33, 35, 56, 105, 106, 111, 115, 119, 139, 142 (sea-sickness), 209, 210, 221, 225-228, 245, 246, 292, 326, 332; influence of active employment upon, i. 77, 78, 119, 130, 207, 236, 292, 294, ii. 332. Charm of manner and considerateness of action, i. 18, 24, 32, 46, 47, 51, 74, 93, 108, 166, 290, 291, 359; ii. 4, 9, 10, 40, 41, 70, 71, 103, 115, 159, 165, 226, 229, 236-239, 298, 311, 318, 337, 339, 340, 353-356, 359, 374. Vanity, and occasional petulance, i. 138, 152, 153, 255-257, 277-281, 295, 315, 385, 388-389, 452-453; ii. 3, 23, 27-29, 30, 32, 34, 39, 44, 50, 69, 78, 104-105, 112, 138-142, 144, 236, 237, 300, 322. Courage, illustrated, i. 8, 13, 19, 145, 274, 293, 302-304, 306; ii. 90, 95, 101, 327, 359, 379. Love of glory and honor, i. 8, 20, 22, 25, 29, 37, 39, 40, 64, 76, 119, 124, 126, 133, 138, 151, 152, 172, 173, 215, 241, 248, 255, 280, 283, 286, 293, 302, 309, 359, 419; ii. 24, 52, 65, 90, 104, 105, 112, 134, 175, 250, 339. Strength and tenacity of convictions, i. 18, 38, 52, 57, 62, 63, 73, 74, 125, 126, 127, 136, 137, 226, 241, 244, 312, 313, 335, 341, 344, 421, 427, 450, 451; ii. 18-21, 71, 73, 74, 78, 82, 93, 137, 183, 271, 273, 281, 285, 287, 289, 294, 302, 303, 306, 314, 315, 319, 324. Sensitiveness to anxiety, perplexity, and censure, i. 61, 62, 75, 79, 81, 92, 133, 204, 210-213, 302, 306, 307, 341, 401, 412, 419, 452-454; ii. 3, 11, 12, 13, 29-34, 49, 50, 68, 105, 113, 116, 119, 141, 161-167, 170, 188, 209, 219-221, 247, 274, 280, 286, 287, 289, 292, 296, 300, 308, 309, 378. Daily life, examples of, and occupations, i. 139-141, 146-147, 207, 289-294, 332-333, 367-369, 396-398; ii. 115-116, 150-159, 223-228, 232-236, 275, 326-328, 330-335, 340. Religious feelings, indications of, i. 173, 324, 325, 352, 358-360; ii. 159, 160, 335, 381, 382, 384, 389, 395, 396. _Professional Characteristics:_ Duty, sense of, i. 8, 70, 109, 133, 225, 257, 302, 419; ii. 65, 101, 105, 119-120, 222-223, 263, 291, 296, 382, 384, 393-396. Exclusiveness and constancy of purpose, i. 16, 27, 34, 37, 38, 40, 62, 64, 68, 74, 86, 99, 109, 111, 122, 126, 133, 147, 151, 169, 221, 222, 225, 236, 253, 255, 257, 284, 309, 315, 324, 325, 326, 327, 334, 337, 339, 344, 351, 355; ii. 9, 42, 65, 74, 75, 88, 93, 107, 188, 222, 234-236, 271, 287, 291, 315, 324, 394. Professional courage, i. 35, 73, 125, 127, 163-165, 166, 221, 240, 248, 263, 265, 266, 271-273, 292, 301, 328, 334, 344, 421, 427; ii. 27, 72-77, 79, 88-93, 102, 107, 111, 132, 136, 215, 270, 280, 281, 294, 305-307, 323, 324, 334, 355. Fearlessness of responsibility, i. 11, 19, 49-52, 52-59, 63, 64, 124-126, 188-191, 221, 268, 271, 282, 334-336, 445-453; ii. 8, 73, 89-93, 193, 194, 205, 242, 250-253, 258, 259, 261-263, 270, 292-296, 302, 306, 316. Diplomacy, natural aptitude for, and tact in dealing with men, i. 31-33, 47, 65, 110, 140-143, 189-191, 206 and note, 403-404; ii. 4-6, 8-10, 12-14, 69-70, 71, 72-73, 76, 94-97, 100-104, 114, 133-134, 194, 199, 216-217, 229, 231-232, 237-239, 255, 258, 264-266, 311, 337, 339-340; extensive cares in, i. 383, 405-408, 411-413; ii. 10, 11, 181-188, 190, 199, 228-229, 233-236. Fleet, when commander-in-chief, Administration of, ii. 4, 10, 11, 16, 115, 116, 134-136, 168-170, 197, 198-200, 209, 228, 229, 234-236, 237, 241-245, 277, 278, 283, 286, 292, 293, 295, 309, 314, 315. Condition of, in the Mediterranean, 1803-1805, ii. 171, 196, 205, 269, 288, 297, 310. Preservation and management of, ii. 195-198, 201-204, 205-207, 210, 211, 214-216, 219-220, 229, 230, 241-245, 253-254, 282, 283, 285, 287, 296-298, 310, 315, 316, 317, 329, 356-358, 361. Health of, i. 109, 110; ii. 207-209, 310, 314. Strategic ideas, indications of, i. 27, 28, 102, 105, 107, 115, 123, 135, 136, 150, 159, 160, 171, 174, 176, 182, 183, 191, 193-196, 199-200, 213-215, 216, 217-218, 231-232, 234, 239, 243-246, 247-250, 330, 332-336, 337, 342, 365, 366, 391, 407, 419-421, 427; ii. 18-21, 42, 71-73, 74-77, 106, 111, 122, 123-133, 136, 182-184, 185-188, 198, 200-203, 204, 207, 211-213, 249, 250, 269-271, 276, 281, 282, 285-288, 293, 302, 305, 306, 314-317, 323, 324, 364. Tactical ideas, indications of, i. 34, 105, 121, 126, 135, 163, 164, 166, 180-182, 217-218, 222, 226, 240, 244, 270-272, 301, 327, 344-345, 350, 355-357, 358, 421; ii. 76, 79, 80-82, 84-87, 92, 100, 124-126, 137, 138, 215-217, 219, 220, 230, 306, 333, 341-353, 356, 357, 360, 361, 366-369, 370, 371, 373, 380. Nelson, Frances, Lady, wife ofLord Nelson, birth, parentage, and first marriage to Dr. JosiahNisbet, i. 65; one son, JosiahNisbet, 65; widowhood, 65; liveswith her uncle, at Nevis, 66;characteristics, 67-69, 71, 149, 173, 386, ii. 46, 53, 54; wooingof, by Nelson, i. 69-71; marriageto Nelson, and departure to England, 75; no children by Nelson, 90; resides with Nelson, in hisfather's house, 91; lives withfather of Nelson, during the latter'sabsences, 1793-1800, 207, 257, 308, ii. 46-48, 55; letters ofNelson to, quoted, i. 111, 133, 139, 147, 149, 172, 173, 207, 248, 255-258, 295, 307, 325, 372, 387, ii. 47, 146, 147; continued attachmentof Nelson to, on returninghome in 1797, i. 308, 309, 316;Nelson's message to, when thinkinghimself mortally wounded atthe Nile, 351; uneasiness of, atthe reports of Nelson's intimacywith Lady Hamilton, 396; apparentpurpose of, to go to the Mediterranean, discouraged by Nelson, 396; growing alienation of Nelsonfrom, 422, ii. 45-47, 48, 51, 53; attitude of, towards Nelson, ii. 46, 47, 50, 53, 54; letters of, toNelson, quoted, 47; Nelson's bearingtowards, 48, 50; attitude of, towards Lady Hamilton, 51; finalbreach between Nelson and, 53, 55, 146-149; later years of, 54, 55; testimony to, of Nelson andof his father, 55; Nelson's "letterof dismissal" to, and her endorsementthereon, 146, 147; date ofdeath, i. 65 note. Nelson, Maurice, Nelson's eldestbrother, quoted by Lady Nelson, ii. 147 and note. Niebuhr, the historian, accounts ofthe Battle of Copenhagen, quoted, ii. 81, 98, 112. Nile, Battle of the, i. 343-358. Nisbet, Captain Josiah, Nelson'sstepson, birth and parentage, i. 65; goes to sea with Nelson in the"Agamemnon, " 100; Lady Hamilton'skindness to, 111; good conductof, at Teneriffe, 302, 303;Nelson attributes the saving ofhis life to, 306, ii. 147; St. Vincentpromotes to commander atNelson's request, i. 306; Nelson'sdisappointment in, 412; estrangementbetween Nelson and, ii. 146-148; St. Vincent's assertionof Nelson's high opinion of, inearly life, 148 note. Nisbet, Dr. Josiah, first husband of Lady Nelson, i. 65. Nisbet, Mrs. Josiah, Lady Nelson's name by first marriage. _See_ Nelson, Lady. Niza, Marquis de, Portuguese admiral, commanding squadron under Nelson's orders in the Mediterranean, 1798, 1799, i. 370; conducts sea blockade of Malta, 370, 392, ii. 1, 8, 9, 12, 14; ordered temporarily to defence of Messina, i. 413; co-operates at sea with Nelson, when expecting Bruix's fleet, 420, 425; limitations to Nelson's authority over, 439; recalled by Portuguese government, ii. 8; Nelson forbids him to obey, 8, 9; Nelson's expressions of esteem for, 9; final recall allowed by Nelson, 14. Orde, Admiral Sir John, governor of Dominica, i. 59; difficulty with Lord St. Vincent concerning Nelson's appointment to command a squadron, 337, 338; assigned in 1804 to command part of Nelson's station, from the Straits of Gibraltar to Cape Finisterre, ii. 247; relations between Nelson and, 247, 248, 256-263, 291; driven from before Cadiz by combined fleets, 285; popular outcry against, 290; Nelson's complaint against, for not watching course of combined fleets, 290 note, 292-295; relieved from duty at his own request, 310. "Orient, " French flagship at the Battle of the Nile, present as the "Sans Culottes, " in Hotham's action of March 13, 1795, i. 162, 164, 166; at the Battle of the Nile, 347, 349, 353, 354; blows up, 354; Nelson's coffin made from mainmast of, ii. 327. Otway, Captain, commands Sir Hyde Parker's flagship at the Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 77; advises against the passage of the Great Belt, 77, 78; opposes the making signal to Nelson to leave off action, 89; message from Parker to Nelson by, 89, 91. Paget, Sir Arthur, succeeds Hamilton as British minister to Naples, i. 397, ii. 34, 35; quotations from the "Paget Papers, " i. 397, 398, ii. 23, 37. Pahlen, Russian minister of state during Nelson's command in the Baltic, ii. 107; Nelson's correspondence with, 112-114. Palermo, Nelson's residence in, i. 395-420; ii. 2-35. Palmas, Gulf of, in Sardinia, rendezvous of Nelson's fleet, ii. 207, 277, 278, 282, 283; Nelson learns there of Villeneuve's second sailing, 283. Parker, Commander Edward, aide to Nelson, ii. 134; description of Nelson's celerity by, 134; takes part in boat-attack on the French vessels off Boulogne, 137; mortally wounded, 138; death of, and Nelson's distress, 143. Parker, Admiral Sir Hyde, succeeds Hotham in command in the Mediterranean, i. 199, 200; Nelson's dissatisfaction with, 202; selected to command the Baltic expedition, ii. 56; Nelson joins, as second in command, 65; cool reception of Nelson by, 66-69; growing influence of Nelson with, 70-74; sluggish movements of, 71, 102, 106, 107; Nelson's comprehensive letter to, 75-77; authorizes Nelson's plan of attack, 79; the signal to leave off action, 89-93; intrusts negotiations to Nelson, 100-104; relieved from command, 110; Nelson's opinion of his conduct in the Baltic, 110, 164. Parker, Admiral Sir Peter, early patron of Nelson, and chief mourner at his funeral, i. 20-22; personal kindness to Nelson of, 20, 30; Nelson's gratitude expressed to, ii. 105, 240. Parker, Vice-Admiral Sir William, controversy with Nelson about the latter's account of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, i. 277-282; remonstrates with Lord St. Vincent for Nelson's appointment to command a detached squadron, 337, 338. Parker, Captain William, commander of the frigate "Amazon, " anecdote of Nelson, i. 337 note, ii. 217; anecdote of Captain Hardy, 245; special mission and singular orders given by Nelson to, 261-263; accompanies Nelson to the West Indies, 289, 295, 297; final letter from Nelson to, 315, 316. Pasco, Lieutenant, Nelson's signal officer at Trafalgar, ii. 359; anecdotes of Nelson by, 359, 360, 381, 882; makes the signals "England expects, " etc. , 383, and for "close action, " 384; wounded, 390; replies to a query made by Nelson while dying, 390. Paul I. , Emperor of Russia, congratulations to Nelson on the Battle of the Nile, i. 363; coalition of, with Austria and Naples, 400, 404-406; becomes Grand Master of Knights of Malta, and seeks the restoration of the Order, 406-408; Nelson's compliments to, ii. 10, 28; successes of his general, Suwarrow, 14; subsequent reverses, and anger of, against Austria and Great Britain, 15, 62; indignation at the refusal of Great Britain to surrender Malta to himself, 62; renews the Armed Neutrality of 1780, with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, 63; Bonaparte's management of, 64; murder of, 100. "Penelope, " British frigate, efficacious action of, in compelling the surrender of the "Guillaume Tell, " French ship-of-the-line, ii. 31, 328. Pitt, William, Prime Minister of Great Britain, marked courtesy shown to Nelson when last in England by, ii. 156; intercourse of Nelson with, just before Trafalgar, 323, 327. Porto Ferrajo, Island of Elba, seized by Nelson in 1796, i. 237; British forces retire from Bastia to, 253; naval evacuation of, superintended by Nelson, 259-262. Radstock, Admiral, Lord, quotations from letters of, relating to Nelson, i. 152, ii. 202 and note, 236, 239, 247, 289, 290, 291, 307, 308, 325. "Redoutable, " French ship-of-the-line, Nelson mortally wounded by a shot from, ii. 387-389. Registration of seamen, Nelson's plans for, ii. 168. 169. Revel, Nelson's desire to attack the Russian detachment of ships in, ii. 74, 77, 100, 102, 106, 107, 111; Nelson's visit to, 112-114; results of Nelson's visit, 114. Riou, Captain, commands the frigate "Amazon, " and a light squadron in the Battle of Copenhagen, ii. 82, 83, 86, 89, 91; obeys signal to retire, and is killed, 91. Riviera of Genoa, operations of Nelson upon the, 1795, 1796, i. 184-236; importance of, to the French, 184-190. Rochefort, the part of the French squadron at, in Napoleon's combinations, ii. 269, 272, 312. Rodney, Admiral, Lord, effect of his victory upon Nelson's plans for Trafalgar, ii. 352. Rogers, Samuel, anecdote of Nelson, ii. 50. Rose, George, Nelson's interview with, in 1788, i. 82-84; accompanies Nelson on board ship before Trafalgar, ii. 337; Nelson's message to, when dying, 395. Ruffo, Cardinal, leader of the Neapolitan "Christian Army" at Naples, 1799, i. 416; concludes with the insurgents in the castles a capitulation which Nelson annuls, 429 and note, 432; stormy interview of, with Nelson, 431. "Sabina, " Spanish frigate, captured by the "Minerve" carrying Nelson's broad pendant, i. 259; recaptured, 260. "San Josef, " Spanish three-decked ship, taken possession of by Nelson at Battle of St. Vincent, i. 273-276; flagship to Nelson in the Channel Fleet, ii. 56, 65. "San Nicolas, " Spanish eighty-gun ship, boarded by Nelson at Battle of St. Vincent, i. 273-276. Santa Cruz, Canary Islands. _See_ Teneriffe. Sardinia, Island of, importance of, in Nelson's opinion, ii. 200-205. Saumarez, Sir James, commands the "Orion, " at the Battle of St. Vincent, i. 276, 277; relieves Nelson in the blockade of Cadiz, 288; accompanies Nelson as second in command in the Nile campaign, 316, 325, 332, 333 and note, 336, 345; at Battle of the Nile, 349, 353; sent to Gibraltar with the prizes, 366, 368; Nelson's eulogy of, in the House of Lords, ii. 160. Scott, Rev. A. J. , private secretary to Sir Hyde Parker, and afterwards to Nelson in the Mediterranean, ii. 80, 92; testimony of, to Nelson's religious feelings, 160; Nelson's method of transacting business with, 233-235; mention of Nelson's kindliness by, 236-238; anecdote of Nelson, 293, 294; remark of Nelson to, 368; at Nelson's death-bed, 389, 395, 396. Scott, John, public secretary to Nelson, ii. 232; remarks on the quickness of Nelson's intelligence, 236, and on his kindliness, 238; killed at Trafalgar, 385. Sicily, importance of Malta to, i. 330; Nelson's anxiety for, in 1799, 413, 414, 419, 423, 426-428, 445, 447, ii. 5; in 1803-5, ii. 185, 191-193, 196, 212, 282, 285-287; Nelson's estate of Bronté in, ii. 2, 110. Sidmouth, Lord. _See_ Addington. Smith, Sir Sidney, Nelson's indignation at the mission of, to the Levant, i. 400-402; Nelson's relations with, 402-404; successful defence of Acre by, ii. 17; Nelson's peremptory orders to, not to permit any Frenchman to quit Egypt, 18; nevertheless, Convention of El Arish countenanced by, 20-22; Nelson's distrust of, 10, 194. Smith, Spencer, brother to Sir Sidney, minister and joint minister of Great Britain to Constantinople, i. 400-403; becomes secretary of embassy, ii. 13. Spain, Nelson sees that Spain cannot be a true ally to Great Britain, i. 104; effect upon Nelson of declaration of war by, 243-250; political condition of, in 1803, ii. 181; Nelson's views concerning, 185, 199, 248, 251, 254, 258, 259, 265; Nelson's letter of instructions to a captain contingent upon action of, 252. Spencer, Earl, first Lord of the Admiralty, i. 294; letters to Nelson from, quoted, 285, 361, 452, ii. 32-34; letters of Nelson to, quoted, i. 294, 327, 362, 401, 402, 407, 444, 445, 447, ii. 5, 6, 11, 12, 16, 27, 32, 34, 65; indicates to Jervis the Government's wish that Nelson command the squadron in the Mediterranean, i. 321, 322; selects Sir Hyde Parker for Baltic command, ii. 67. St. George, Mrs. , description of Lady Hamilton, i. 380, 382; account of meeting with Nelson and the Hamiltons at Dresden in 1800, ii. 43-45; remarks likeness of Nelson to the Russian Marshal Suwarrow, 43. "St. George, " British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's flagship in the Baltic expedition, ii. 65; Nelson quits, for the "Elephant, " for the Battle of Copenhagen, 78. St. Vincent, Battle of Cape, i. 268-277. St. Vincent, Earl. _See_ Jervis. Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel, accompanies the Baltic expedition on board Nelson's flagship, ii. 65; narrative of the expedition, and anecdotes of Nelson by, quoted, 65, 79, 82-84, 89-91, 94-96, 101, 113, 115. Stuart, General, in command of the British troops at the siege of Calvi, i. 134, 136-146; apparent friction between Lord Hood and, 142-145; Nelson's high opinion of, 140, 143. Suckling, Catherine, maiden name of Nelson's mother, i. 4. Suckling, Captain Maurice, Nelson's maternal uncle, i. 5; receives Nelson on board his ship the "Raisonnable, " on entering the navy, 6; care for Nelson during his early years, 9-16; made Comptroller of the Navy, 15; procures Nelson's promotion to lieutenant, 16; death of, 21; Nelson's care, when wounded at Teneriffe, to save the sword of, 303; successful naval engagement of, on the date of Trafalgar, and expectation formed therefrom by Nelson, ii. 368. Suckling, William, Nelson's maternal uncle, Nelson appeals to, for aid to marry, i. 43, 69, 70; makes an allowance to Nelson, 70; letters of Nelson to, 43, 69, 133. Suwarrow, Russian marshal, commands the combined Russian and Austrian troops in Italian campaign of 1799, i. 416, ii. 2, 6, 15; personal resemblance of Nelson to, ii. 43, 112. Sweden, joins Russia, Denmark, and Prussia in the Armed Neutrality of 1800, ii. 60-63. Syracuse, Nelson refreshes his squadron in, before the Battle of the Nile, i. 340-342; Nelson's opinion of, as a base for his operations after the battle, 368, 369; insecurity of, with headquarters at Palermo, 414; Nelson ordered by Keith to make his headquarters at, ii. 30. "TÉMÉRAIRE, " British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's supporter at Trafalgar, ii. 378, 391. Teneriffe, Nelson's expedition against, i. 296-306. Tetuan, Nelson's visits to, for water and fresh provisions, ii. 292-294, 314, 315; sends a detachment to, before Trafalgar, 360. "Theseus, " British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's flagship before Cadiz and at Teneriffe, 289-291, 300, 304. Thomson, name under which Nelson speaks of himself in his correspondence with Lady Hamilton, ii. 149, and borne by his daughter prior to his own death, 366. Toulon, delivered by its inhabitants to Lord Hood, i. 106, 107; retaken by the French, 117; Nelson reconnoitres, 198, 217; Jervis's efficient blockade of, 230, 242; Nelson's method of watching, ii. 197-199, 202, 211-217. Trafalgar, Battle of, general plan of action, as originally conceived, ii. 343-346; discussed, 347-349; contrasted with the tactics of the battle as fought, 350-352; anecdote concerning its conception, 352; narrative of, 363-397. Trench, Mrs. _See_ St. George. Tripoli, maintains formal war with Naples and Portugal, for the purposes of piracy, i. 409, ii. 7; Nelson's diplomatic difficulties with, i. 409, 410. Troubridge, Sir Thomas, nobly supports Nelson in his initiative at the Battle of St. Vincent, i. 271-273, 277-282; advises and accompanies Nelson in the Teneriffe expedition, 296-306; limitations of, 300, 301, and admirable qualities, 304-306, ii. 141; sent with a detachment of ten ships-of-the-line to join Nelson in the Nile campaign, i. 323, 325, 326; mentioned, 328, 329, 333, 340, 341, 343; his ship, the "Culloden, " unfortunately grounds before getting into action at the Nile, 352; Nelson's praise of, 364, ii. 10; incidental services in the waters of Italy and Malta, i. 393, 405, 414-416, 419, 420, 437, 444, ii. 6, 13, 29; remonstrates with Nelson on his life at Palermo, i. 398; sent by Nelson on a special mission to Alexandria, 401; singular anecdote of, 411; letters of, to Nelson, 453, ii. 29, 35; Nelson's petulant reproach to, ii. 28; strong remonstrances of, to Nelson, against quitting the blockade of Malta, 29, 30, 35; return of, to England, 41; impression of, that Nelson will not serve again, 42; advice to Miss Knight concerning the Hamiltons, 48; letter of Nelson to, concerning the sailing of the Baltic fleet, 66; beginning alienation of Nelson from, 111, 140, 141, 142, 170; St. Vincent's opinion of, 116, 140. Tunis, Nelson's mission to, in 1793, i. 113-116; maintains formal war with Naples and Portugal, for the purposes of piracy, 409, ii. 7; Nelson's diplomatic difficulties with, i. 409, 410. Turkey, co-operates with Russia and Great Britain in the Mediterranean, 1798, i. 392, 404-406, 419, 420, 429, ii. 16-18; Nelson's sympathy with, against Russia, i. 406, 408; makes separate convention of El Arish with French, regardless of her allies, ii. 19, 20; interests of, threatened in the Morea and in Egypt by the French in1803-5, 185-188, 195, 211-213. Tuscany, attitude of, towards France, in 1794, i. 156, 161; importance of ports of, to France, 157, 158; difficult neutrality of, 185, 233; Nelson imagines a French enterprise against, by sea, 214, 217, 218, 219; control of, obtained by the French, 233; Nelson's operations on the coast of, 236; blockade of Leghorn and seizure of Elba, 237; political condition of, in 1803-5, during Nelson's Mediterranean command, ii. 182. Two Sicilies, the Kingdom of the, (Naples and Sicily, ) Nelson'ssuccessful mission to, to obtain troops for the occupation ofToulon, i. 110; attitude towards France, 1795, 158; sends flotilla to aid Nelson, but too late in the season, 192; makes an armistice with France, 1796, 233; Nelson's interest keenly excited for, 247, 248; makes peace with France, 1796, 251; dissatisfaction with course of France, in 1798, 319; attitude of, towards France, during the campaign of the Nile, 329-331, 340, 341, 342; Nelson's anxieties for, 339; Nelson's extreme interest in, throughout his life, after his return from the Nile, 369, 388, 412, 417, 427, 442-446, 448, 450-452, ii. 4, 5, 6, 39, 183, 190-194, 264-266, 282, 285-287; joy of, upon receipt of the news of Battle of the Nile, i. 371, 372; strategic weight of, in the counsels of Bonaparte, 391; Nelson persuades, to declare war against France, 389-393; overwhelming defeat of, and flight of Court to Palermo, 394, 395; restoration of the royal authority in Naples, ii. 6; refusal of the king to reside in Naples, 5, 6; occupation of Adriatic coast of, by Bonaparte, 1803-5, 179. Vado, Bay of, occupied by Austrians in 1795, i. 178; best anchorage between Nice and Genoa, 186; importance of, to France, 187, 214, 215; evacuated by Austrians after the Battle of Loano, 201, 208; held definitively by French, 223. Valetta, French in Malta shut in, i. 392, 407, 409, ii. 7; Nelson's difficulties in maintaining the blockade, ii. 7-10, 12-14; urgency of Spencer and Troubridge upon Nelson to await the capitulation of, 28-30, 32-35. "Vanguard, " British ship-of-the-line, Nelson's flagship at theBattle of the Nile, commissioned, i. 310; dismasted off Corsica, 323; at the Battle of the Nile, 348, 349, 350; arrives at Naples, 371; Nelson's flag shifted from, to the "Foudroyant, " 423. Vansittart, British envoy to Copenhagen in 1801, ii. 71-73; report of Danish defences, 73; explanations conveyed from Nelson to the Admiralty by, 73. "Victory, " British hundred-gun ship, Nelson's flagship at Trafalgar, Jervis's flagship at Battle of St. Vincent, i. 275; Nelson sails in, for the Mediterranean, ii. 175; his long stay on board of, 222, 313; returns to England, 318; again sails with Nelson, 338; at Battle of Trafalgar, 370, 378-380, 384-389, 390-394, 397. Villeneuve, French admiral, commands the rear at the Battle of the Nile, i. 357; escapes with two ships-of-the-line and two frigates, 357; indecision of, 358, ii. 349; commands the Toulon squadron, after the death of Latouche Tréville, ii. 257, 271; Napoleon's orders to, 271, 272; first sailing of, and disasters encountered by, 272, 275, 276, 277; second sailing of, from Toulon, 284; arrival at Cadiz and in the West Indies, 285; Nelson learns of his passing the Straits, 287, and of his destination to the West Indies, 292-295; leaves West Indies for Europe, on learning Nelson's arrival, 301; followed by Nelson, 302; engagement of, with Calder's fleet, 313; arrives at Ferrol, 314; sails from Ferrol, 323; arrival in Cadiz, 328; dispositions for battle, before Trafalgar, 349, 369, 370, 379, 380; commander-in-chief of the entire combined fleet, 363; encounter of his flagship and Nelson's, 384-387; surrender of, 391. Villettes, British general, at the siege of Bastia, i. 130; Nelson's criticism on, when commander of the troops at Malta, 1803, ii. 193; characteristic letters of Nelson to, 200, 250. Wellington, Nelson's one meeting with, ii. 321. West Indies, Nelson's early service in, i. 17-30; called by Nelson "the station for honour, " i. 37; Nelson enforces Navigation Act in, 53-65; wishes to return to, in search of more active service, 108, 115; conjectures destination of French Toulon fleet to, in 1804, ii. 249, 270; importance of, to Great Britain, 270; rendezvous fixed by Napoleon, for the concentration of his fleets, in 1805, 271, 283; Toulon squadron goes to, 284, 285; Nelson pursues to, 296, 297; Nelson's week in, in June, 1805, 298-303; his estimate of his services rendered by going there, 301, 305; Nelson returns to Europe from, 302-310. William Henry, Prince, son of George III. , and captain in the British navy, first meeting of Nelson with, i. 38, 39; description of Nelson at twenty-four, by, 39; accompanied by Nelson in visit to Havana, 41; Nelson's association with, in 1786-87, 74, 75; gives away the bride at Nelson's wedding, 75; intimacy of Nelson with, 86-88; returns with his ship from America, contrary to orders, 88; at variance with the King, 88, 89; made Duke of Clarence, 89; effect of intimacy with, upon Nelson, 89; subsequent correspondence between Nelson and, 239, 244, 256, 284, 451; continues his friendship to Lady Nelson, after her husband's alienation, ii. 55. Woolward, Frances Herbert, maiden name of Lady Nelson, i. 65. Wurmser, Austrian marshal, succeeds Beaulieu, after the latter's defeat by Bonaparte, in 1796, i. 238; raises the siege of Mantua, 238; Nelson's enterprise against Leghorn dependent on the success of, 240; defeated by Bonaparte, at Castiglione and Lonato, 241. Wyndham, British minister to Tuscany, mention of Nelson and the Hamiltons by, ii. 38, 39; strained relations of, towards Nelson and the Hamiltons, 39. SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & CO. 'S Naval and Military Publications Captain Mahan's Works on Sea Power. Captain Mahan's works on the "Influence of Sea Power" have receivedofficial recognition from the Governments of the United States andGreat Britain--the War and Navy Departments of the United Stateshaving purchased a large edition for use in the service and shiplibraries, and the British Government having supplied the books to thecruising ships of the Royal Navy. German and French translations haveappeared. I. The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1660-1783. With 25Charts of Great Naval Battles. Demy 8vo. Cloth extra, gilt top, 18_s. _ II. The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution andEmpire. With 13 Maps and Battle Plans. 2 vols. Demy 8vo. , clothextra, gilt top, 30_s. _ III. The Life of Admiral Farragut. With Steel Engraved Portrait, also a General Map and Plans of the Passage of the Mississippi Forts, the Vicksburg Batteries, and Port Hudson, and the Battle of MobileBay. Crown 8vo. , cloth, price 6_s. _ Captain Mahan's book is admirable, both as a picture of the Admiralhimself and as gathering up the lessons of strategy and conduct whichare to be learnt from a survey of his career. --_Times. _ IV. The Life of Nelson: the Embodiment of the Sea Power of GreatBritain. With 12 Battle Plans, 7 Lithographic Maps, and 19Photogravure Plates. 2 vols. Demy 8vo. , cloth extra, gilt top, price36_s. _ _net_. The late Admiral Tryon, of the British Navy, pronounced them _simplygreat_, --_the best things ever written. _ THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY. Extracts from Reviews. Captain Mahan, whose name is famous all the world over as that of theauthor of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History, " a work, or rathera series of works, which may fairly be said to have codified the lawsof naval strategy--_The Westminster Gazette. _ An instructive work of the highest value and interest to students andto the reading public, and should find its way into all the librariesand homes of the land. --_Magazine of American History. _ Captain Mahan has been recognized by all competent judges not merelyas the most distinguished living writer on naval strategy, but as theoriginator and first exponent of what may be called the philosophy ofnaval history. --_London Times. _ The greatest of living writers on naval subjects. .. . Captain Mahan isthe author of books which mark a new era in historical literature. They are to sailors of every navy in the world what Napier's "Historyof the Peninsular War" was to British soldiers, and something more. Captain Mahan is a born historian. --_London Daily News. _ The American officer was fitted by nature as well as by training forthe work to which he happily turned his hand. Possessed of a charmingstyle; precise and clear instead of verbose; completely conscious ofwhat he intends to convey and perfectly competent to convey it; anddowered with a perspicacious breadth of view which dwells on all thatis important and passes over all that is irrelevant, Captain Mahan hasgiven us two very remarkable books. --_The Fortnightly Review. _ The distinguished author of some of the most important books on navalhistory and strategy which have ever been published, and which serveas text-books for nearly every naval lecture or article of the presentday. --_London Globe. _ Captain Mahan's book should be read by all who are interested in thedevelopment of the navy, and who believe in the importance of the navyas the principal factor of defence. --_C. H. Davis, Commander and ChiefIntelligence Officer, U. S. N. _ An altogether exceptional work; there is nothing like it in the wholerange of naval literature. .. . The work is entirely original inconception, masterful in construction, and scholarly inexecution. --_The Critic. _ THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE. Press Notices. A book that must be read. _First_, it must be read by allschoolmasters, from the headmaster of Eton to the head of the humblestboard-school in the country. No man is fit to train English boys tofulfil their duties as Englishmen who has not marked, learned, andinwardly digested it. _Secondly_, it must be read by every Englishmanand Englishwoman who wishes to be worthy of that name. It is no hardor irksome task to which I call them The writing is throughout clear, vigorous, and incisive. .. . The book deserves and must attain aworld-wide reputation. --_Colonel Maurice of the British Army in "TheUnited Service Magazine. "_ Delightful reading. .. . The most exciting and among the best writtennaval battles ever described, for its clearness, is the battle of theNile, fought in the darkness and upon strange waters. --_ChicagoInter-Ocean. _ Remarkable volumes. .. . Captain Mahan has for the first time made clearto the unprofessional reader how much the plans of Napoleon wereinfluenced by the successes of the British squadrons and theconsequent failure of his "Continental System. "--_Macmillan'sMagazine. _ Do not contain a page that cannot be read with pleasure as well aswith profit by any man for whom foreign politics, the history of therise and fall of nations, and the sources of national greatnesspossess the slightest attractions. --_The Fortnightly Review. _ No other writer has told the influence of British naval power upon thecareer of Napoleon with the skill and lucidity characterizing CaptainMahan's account. --_Springfield Republican (Editorial). _ Of great permanent value and exceptional interest, and in a highdegree creditable to our naval service and to the country. --_The NewYork Nation. _ Masterly and comprehensive. .. . The drama of the great war unfoldsitself in these pages in a manner at once novel and engrossing. --_TheSpectator. _ A highly interesting and an important work, having lessons andsuggestions which are calculated to be of high value to the people ofthe United States. His pages abound with spirited and careful accountsof the great naval battles and manoeuvres which occurred during theperiod treated. We have before had occasion to praise Captain Mahan'sliterary style, which is flexible, nervous, and sufficiently dignifiedto satisfy every reasonable demand. It is, moreover, full of energy, and marked by a felicitous choice of language, and its tone andqualities are sustained steadily throughout. --_New York Tribune. _ Of the way in which this great theme is treated we need say little; noliving writer is so well qualified to do it justice as Captain Mahan, and certainly the true significance of the tremendous events of thesemomentous years has never been more luminously or more instructivelydisplayed. --_London Times. _ He penetrates to the real meaning of the mass of books, diplomatic, political, naval and historical, which have been written to describethe state of things in Europe during the last decade of the eighteenthcentury--_The Critic. _ We do not hesitate to assert that, in treating this theme, he haseasily surpassed all previous writers. --_Judge William O'Connor Morrisin "The Academy. "_