THE LIFE OF NELSON

THE EMBODIMENT OF THE SEA POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN

BY

CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, D. C. L. , LL. D. UNITED STATES NAVY

AUTHOR OF"THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, ""THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, "AND OF A "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT"

IN TWO VOLUMESVOL. I. 

LONDONSAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, & COMPANY, _LIMITED_1897

PREFACE. 

The Life of Nelson has been written so often, that anexplanation--almost an apology--seems due for any renewal of theattempt; but, not to mention the attractiveness of the theme initself, it is essential to the completeness and rounding off of theauthor's discussion of the Influence of Sea Power, that he present astudy, from his own point of view, of the one man who in himselfsummed up and embodied the greatness of the possibilities which SeaPower comprehends, --the man for whom genius and opportunity workedtogether, to make him the personification of the Navy of GreatBritain, the dominant factor in the periods hitherto treated. In thecentury and a half embraced in those periods, the tide of influenceand of power has swelled higher and higher, floating upward before theeyes of mankind many a distinguished name; but it is not until theirclose that one arises in whom all the promises of the past find theirfinished realization, their perfect fulfilment. Thenceforward the nameof Nelson is enrolled among those few presented to us by History, thesimple mention of which suggests, not merely a personality or acareer, but a great force or a great era concrete in a single man, whois its standard-bearer before the nations. 

Yet, in this process of exaltation, the man himself, even when so veryhuman and so very near our own time as Nelson is, suffers from anassociation which merges his individuality in the splendor of hissurroundings; and it is perhaps pardonable to hope that the subject isnot so far exhausted but that a new worker, gleaning after thereapers, may contribute something further towards disengaging thefigure of the hero from the glory that cloaks it. The aim of thepresent writer, while not neglecting other sources of knowledge, hasbeen to make Nelson describe himself, — tell the story of his owninner life as well as of his external actions. To realize this object, it has not seemed the best way to insert numerous letters, because, inthe career of a man of action, each one commonly deals with a varietyof subjects, which bear to one another little relation, except that, at the moment of writing, they all formed part of the multifold lifethe writer was then leading. It is true, life in general is passed inthat way; but it is not by such distraction of interest among minutedetails that a particular life is best understood. Few letters, therefore, have been inserted entire; and those which have, have beenchosen because of their unity of subject, and of their value ascharacteristic. 

The author's method has been to make a careful study of Nelson'svoluminous correspondence, analyzing it, in order to detect theleading features of temperament, traits of thought, and motives ofaction; and thence to conceive within himself, by gradual familiarityeven more than by formal effort, the character therein revealed. Theimpression thus produced he has sought to convey to others, partly inthe form of ordinary narrative, --daily living with his hero, --andpartly by such grouping of incidents and utterances, not always, noreven nearly, simultaneous, as shall serve by their joint evidence toemphasize particular traits, or particular opinions, more forciblythan when such testimonies are scattered far apart; as they would be, if recounted in a strict order of time. 

A like method of treatment has been pursued in regard to that purelyexternal part of Nelson's career in which are embraced his militaryactions, as well as his public and private life. The same aim is keptin view of showing clearly, not only what he did, but the principleswhich dominated his military thought, and guided his military actions, throughout his life; or, it may be, such changes as must inevitablyoccur in the development of a man who truly lives. This cannot be donesatisfactorily without concentrating the evidence from time to time;and it is therefore a duty a writer owes to his readers, if they wishsuch acquaintance with his subject as he thinks he has succeeded inacquiring for himself. 

The author has received individual assistance from several persons. Toa general expression of thanks he wishes to add his specialacknowledgments to the present Earl Nelson, through whose aid he hasobtained information of interest which otherwise probably would haveescaped him; and to Lords Radstock and De Saumarez, both of whom havebeen good enough to place in his hands letters contemporary withNelson, and touching incidentally matters that throw light on hiscareer. Material of the same kind has also been furnished him byProfessor John Knox Laughton, whose knowledge of Nelson and of theNavy of that period is second to none; it is not the least of thewriter's advantages that he has had before him, to check possibleerrors in either fact or conclusions, the admirable, though brief, Life of Nelson published by Mr. Laughton two years since. 

Illustrative anecdotes have also been supplied by Admiral Sir WilliamR. Mends, G. C. B. , who has shown his continued interest in the work bythe trouble he has taken for it; by Mr. Stuart J. Reid, of BlackwellCliff, East Grinstead; and by Mr. Edgar Goble, of Fareham, Hants. Mr. B. F. Stevens, of 4 Trafalgar Square, has also kindly exerted himselfon several occasions to obtain needed information. To Mrs. F. H. B. Eccles, of Sherwell House, Plymouth, granddaughter of Josiah Nisbet, Nelson's stepson, the author is indebted for reminiscences of LadyNelson, and for her portrait here published; and his thanks are alsodue to Lieutenant-Colonel W. Clement D. Esdaile, of Burley Manor, Ringwood, Hants, through whom he was brought into communication withMrs. Eccles, and who has in other ways helped him. 

Throughout the writing of the book constant assistance has beenreceived from Mr. Robert B. Marston, to whom cordial acknowledgment ismade for the untiring pains taken in prosecuting necessary inquiries, which could not have been done without great delay by one not livingin England. Suggestions valuable to the completeness of the work havebeen given also by Mr. Marston. 

For the portrait of Mrs. Philip Ward, the "Horatia" whom Nelson calledgenerally his adopted daughter, but at times spoke of as his daughtersimply, and whom, on the last morning of his life, he commended to thecare of his Country, the author has to thank Mr. And Mrs. Nelson Ward, of 15 Lancaster Road, Belsize Park, London. Mr. Nelson Ward is herson. 

To the more usual sources of information already in print, it is notnecessary to refer in detail; but it is right to mention especiallythe collection of Hamilton and Nelson letters, published by Mr. AlfredMorrison, a copy of which by his polite attention was sent the writer, and upon which must necessarily be based such account of Nelson'srelations with Lady Hamilton as, unfortunately, cannot be omittedwholly from a life so profoundly affected by them. 

A. T. MAHAN. 

MARCH, 1897. 

CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. 

Distinction of Nelson's careerHis extensive and varied correspondenceParentage and birthDelicacy of constitutionFirst entry in the NavyAnecdotes of childhoodCared for by his uncle, Captain Maurice SucklingServes in a West India merchantmanExpedition to the Arctic SeaCruise to the East IndiesActing lieutenant in the Channel FleetPromoted lieutenant in the "Lowestoffe"Goes to the West IndiesIncidents of serviceTransferred to the flagship "Bristol"Promoted to Commander and to Post-CaptainPersonal appearance, 1780Youth when promotedScanty opportunities for war serviceThe Nicaragua ExpeditionHealth breaks downReturns to EnglandAppointed to the "Albemarle"Short trip to the BalticGoes to the North American StationAt New York, and transferred to the West IndiesPersonal appearance, 1782Sentiments concerning honor and moneyReturns to England and goes on half-payVisit to FranceUnsuccessful courtship

CHAPTER II. 

CRUISE OF THE "BOREAS. "--CONTROVERSY OVER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THENAVIGATION ACT. --RETURN TO ENGLAND. --RETIREMENT UNTIL THE OUTBREAK OFTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION. --APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE "AGAMEMNON. "

1784-1793. 

Appointed to command the "Boreas"Sails for the Leeward IslandsTraits of character and mannersRefuses to recognize a commodore's pendant, of a captain "notin commission"Indications of character in this actControversy over the Navigation ActRefuses obedience to the Admiral's order, as illegalPersists in seizing vessels violating the ActConsequent legal proceedingsConduct approved by the Home GovernmentResults of his actionCharacteristics shown by itMeets his future wife, Mrs. NisbetContemporary description of himProgress of courtshipReconciliation with the AdmiralCharacteristics manifested by Nelson in the controversyLeft senior officer on the StationHealth and marriageThe "Boreas" returns to EnglandEmployed on the Impress ServiceAnnoyances and dissatisfactionPrejudices against himThe "Boreas" paid offSensitiveness under censureFlattering reception at CourtEfforts to suppress frauds in West IndiesBreadth and acuteness of intellectResults of his efforts against fraudsPrejudices against him at the AdmiraltyHis partisanship for Prince William HenryInsubordinate conduct of the latterNelson's difference with Lord HoodOut of favor at CourtOn half-pay, 1788-1792Progress of the French RevolutionNelson applies for a shipAppointed to the "Agamemnon, " 64France declares war against Great Britain

CHAPTER III. 

NELSON'S DEPARTURE FROM ENGLAND IN THE "AGAMEMNON. "--SERVICES IN THEMEDITERRANEAN UNTIL THE RECOVERY OF TOULON BY THE FRENCH. --LORD HOODIN COMMAND. 

FEBRUARY-DECEMBER, 1793. 

Significance of Nelson's careerIntimate association of the "Agamemnon" with his nameDelay in her equipmentNelson's hatred for the FrenchSails for SpitheadCruising in the ChannelDeparture for Mediterranean, and arrival off ToulonRemarks on the Spanish NavyProfessional utterancesServices off Toulon and at NaplesToulon surrendered to the British and SpaniardsNelson's reconcilement with HoodHardships of the cruiseHis intelligence and zealRejoins fleet off ToulonConstantly on detached, semi-independent, serviceSent to TunisAction with four French frigatesNegotiations at TunisNelson's wish to go to the West IndiesOrdered to command a division blockading CorsicaThe allies are forced to quit Toulon

CHAPTER IV. 

REDUCTION OF CORSICA BY THE BRITISH. --DEPARTURE OF LORD HOOD FORENGLAND. --THE "AGAMEMNON" REFITTED AT LEGHORN. 

JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1794. 

Importance of CorsicaHood orders Nelson to open communications with PaoliOperations begun at San FiorenzoBastia blockaded by NelsonDescription of BastiaThe army refuses to undertake the siegeDestitute condition of the "Agamemnon"Quarrel between Hood and General DundasNelson's opinions about besieging BastiaCommentsStrength of the placeNelson's military character as shown by his opinionInstances in his correspondenceProgress of the siegeThe place capitulatesNelson's part in the operationsInadequate credit from HoodNelson's dissatisfaction, but continued zealLoftiness of his motivesArrival of General Stuart to command army in CorsicaPreparations for siege of CalviNews of the sailing of French Toulon fleetHood sails in pursuitDevelopment of Nelson's military opinions"Agamemnon" sent back to BastiaProceeds thence to San FiorenzoNelson's meeting with General StuartHis opinions on a "fleet in being"Arrival off CalviNelson lands with the troopsArrival of Lord HoodNelson's part in the siege of CalviDefences of CalviNelson loses his right eyeFriction between Army and NavyNelson's tact towards bothFeeling between Hood and MooreProgress of the siegeCalvi capitulatesSickness among the BritishCondition of "Agamemnon's" crewRepose given at LeghornHood is relieved by Hotham and returns to EnglandNelson's criticisms on naval actionsHis distress at prolonged continuance in portBroods over Hood's inadequate mention of himCompliment from the Viceroy of Corsica

CHAPTER V. 

NELSON'S SERVICES WITH THE FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER ADMIRALHOTHAM. --PARTIAL FLEET ACTIONS OF MARCH 13 AND 14, AND JULY13. --NELSON ORDERED TO COMMAND A DETACHED SQUADRON CO-OPERATING WITHTHE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN THE RIVIERA OF GENOA. 

JANUARY-JULY, 1795. 

General military conditions in Europe and ItalyImportance of the British conquest of CorsicaGeneral character of Nelson's serviceHe rejoins the fleetHis speculations as to the French objectsThe French put to seaAction between "Agamemnon" and "Ça Ira"Characteristics displayed by NelsonPartial fleet action, MarchNelson's urgency with HothamDiscussion of Hotham's actionNelson's share in the general resultHis affectionate correspondence with his wifeAnxiety for CorsicaRegret at Hood's detachment from commandReceives Honorary Colonelcy of MarinesSent on detached service to the RivieraEncounters French fleetRejoins Hotham at San FiorenzoPartial fleet action of JulyNelson's dissatisfaction with itDiscussion of his criticismsEffects of Hotham's inertness

CHAPTER VI. 

NELSON'S COMMAND OF A DETACHED SQUADRON ON THE RIVIERA OF GENOA, UNTILTHE DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS AT THE BATTLE OF LOANO. --SIR JOHN JERVISAPPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

JULY-DECEMBER, 1795. 

Nelson takes command of a squadron on the RivieraConditions of belligerents and neutrals on the RivieraNelson's "political courage"Disregards Hotham's ordersHotham approves his actionEffect of his action upon the enemyEvasion of his efforts by the coastersHe proposes to the Austrians to occupy San RemoDiscussion of this proposalThe effect in his mind of a "fleet in being"Inactivity of the Austrians and of the fleetMenacing attitude of the FrenchHotham succeeded by Hyde ParkerBattle of Loano. --Defeat of the AustriansNelson's condemnation of the British admiralsIncrease of his own reputationForcible letter repudiating an attack on his integrityGenerally congenial character of his service on the RivieraCorrespondence with homePassing desire to return to England

CHAPTER VII. 

NELSON'S SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DURING THE YEAR1796. --BONAPARTE'S ITALIAN CAMPAIGN. --THE BRITISH ABANDON CORSICA, ANDTHE FLEET LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1796. 

The "Agamemnon" refits at LeghornNelson's sensitiveness to censureHis vindication of his recent conductHis erroneous conceptions of French military aimsImportance of Vado BayFirst meeting between Nelson and JervisNelson's anxiety to remain on the stationCoincidence of views between Nelson and JervisNelson sent again to the RivieraReconnoitres ToulonExpects a French descent in force near LeghornAnalogy between this and Napoleon's plans in 1805Nelson urges the Austrians to occupy VadoHe hoists his broad pendant as CommodoreThe Austrian general, Beaulieu, advancesNelson accompanies the movement with his shipsPremature attack by AustriansNelson receives news of their defeat by BonaparteAustrians retreat behind the ApenninesNelson resumes operations against the coasting-trafficHis singleness of purpose and resolutenessHis activity, difficulties encountered, and plansTransferred from the "Agamemnon" to the "Captain"Subsequent fortunes of the "Agamemnon"Bonaparte's designs upon CorsicaThe French seize LeghornNelson's inferences from that actNelson and Bonaparte comparedBritish blockade of LeghornOccupation of Elba by the BritishThe Austrians under Wurmser attack BonaparteNelson plans an assault on LeghornHe learns the Austrian defeat at CastiglioneHis gradual change of opinion as to leaving the MediterraneanHis pride in the British fleetGenoa closes her ports against the BritishThe fleet ordered to quit the MediterraneanEffect on NelsonHe superintends the evacuation of BastiaThe fleet withdraws to GibraltarGrowth of Nelson's reputationHis susceptibility to flatteryHis home relationsHis inadequate appreciation of the character of the war

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE EVACUATION OF ELBA. --NIGHT COMBAT WITH TWO SPANISHFRIGATES. --BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. --NELSON PROMOTED TOREAR-ADMIRAL. --SERVICES BEFORE CADIZ. 

DECEMBER, 1796-JUNE, 1797. 

Nelson sent to Elba to remove naval materialCombat with Spanish frigatesArrival at ElbaHesitations of the General about evacuatingNelson leaves Elba with the naval vesselsDeliberate reconnoissance of the enemy's coastCharacteristic action of Nelson throughout this expeditionNight encounter with the Spanish fleetRejoins Jervis off Cape St. VincentBattle of Cape St. VincentNelson's exceptional actionHis merit in taking itTakes possession of two Spanish ships-of-the-lineCharacteristics here evincedControversy with Vice-Admiral William ParkerComments upon thisJervis's neglect to mention special servicesHis sense of Nelson's meritNelson's preferences in the matter of rewardsMade a Knight of the BathPromoted Rear-AdmiralCruises for treasure-ships from MexicoAnxiety about the Elba troopsSent by Jervis to escort them to GibraltarSafe return to GibraltarProvides protection for American merchant-ships against French privateersRejoins Jervis off CadizOperations against CadizGeneral good health and happinessPride in his reputation

CHAPTER IX. 

THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AGAINST TENERIFFE. --NELSON LOSES HIS RIGHTARM. --RETURN TO ENGLAND. --REJOINS ST. VINCENT'S FLEET, AND SENT INTOTHE MEDITERRANEAN TO WATCH THE TOULON ARMAMENT. 

JULY, 1797-MAY, 1798. 

Origin of the Teneriffe ExpeditionConditions conducive to successOrders to Nelson to undertake itFailure of the first attemptNelson determines to storm the townThe assault and the repulseNelson loses his right armRejoins the Commander-in-Chief off CadizReturns to England on sick-leavePainful convalescenceRestoration to healthHis flag hoisted again, on board the "Vanguard"Rejoins St. Vincent off CadizOrdered to the Mediterranean to watch the Toulon ArmamentClose of the first period of his careerContrasts between his career hitherto and subsequentlyRelations with his wife while in EnglandQuits the fleet to repair off Toulon

CHAPTER X. 

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF THE NILE. 

MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1798. 

Changed political conditions in Europe, 1798The British Cabinet decides to take the offensiveThe quarter in which to strike determined by the Toulon armamentOrders issued to St. VincentPreference for Nelson indicated by GovernmentNelson's flagship, the "Vanguard, " dismasted at seaIndications of character elicited by the accidentHe is joined by ten ships-of-the-line, raising his squadron to thirteenPursuit of the expedition under BonaparteNelson's fixedness of purposeAttitude of NaplesPerplexities of the pursuitThe light of the single eyeEmbarrassment from the want of frigatesSquadron reaches Alexandria before the FrenchRenewed perplexityNelson returns to the westwardAnchors at SyracuseAgain goes east in search of the FrenchThe French fleet discovered at anchor in Aboukir BayPrompt resolution to attackDisposition of the French fleet for battleSteadiness and caution of Nelson's advanceThe Battle of the NileNelson severely woundedThe French flagship blows upNelson's dissatisfaction with the resultsHis orders after the battleSubsequent measuresEffect of the news in Great BritainNelson's rewardsReception of the news in Europe generallyNelson's concern about TroubridgeImmediate effect of the victory upon the French in EgyptNelson ordered with his fleet to the westwardSails for Naples

CHAPTER XI. 

NELSON'S RETURN FROM EGYPT TO NAPLES. --MEETING WITH LADYHAMILTON. --ASSOCIATION WITH THE COURT OF NAPLES. --WAR BETWEEN NAPLESAND FRANCE. --DEFEAT OF THE NEAPOLITANS. --FLIGHT OF THE COURT TOPALERMO. 

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER, 1798. 

Voyage to NaplesRecovery from woundHis views as to future operationsChange of view after reaching NaplesArrival at NaplesMeeting with the HamiltonsPrevious career of Lady HamiltonHer political influence in NaplesHer characteristicsHer influence over NelsonRapid progress of the intimacyHis association with the CourtHe urges Naples to declare war against FrancePolitical situation of Naples relatively to FranceNelson goes off MaltaReturns to NaplesNeapolitans advance against the French in RomeTheir overthrow and routThe royal family and Court fly to PalermoNelson in PalermoScandals about his residence thereTroubridge's remonstrances with him

CHAPTER XII. 

NELSON'S CAREER, AND GENERAL EVENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY, FROM THE OVERTHROW OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN NAPLES TO THE INCURSIONOF THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER ADMIRAL BRUIX. 

JANUARY-MAY, 1799. 

The French enter NaplesNelson's distress and commentsThe Sidney Smith missionNelson's indignationModification of Smith's ordersNelson's diplomatic capacityJealousy of Russian progress in the MediterraneanHis expectations of Russian assistancePrecautions against Russians in MaltaHis poor opinion of the Neapolitan troopsDifficulties with the Barbary StatesNelson's dealings with themHis hatred of the FrenchDeep depression of spiritsFears for SicilyFrench reverses in Germany and ItalyBritish and Neapolitan successes about NaplesThe French evacuate the kingdom of NaplesNews of the approach of the French fleet under Bruix

CHAPTER XIII. 

FROM THE INCURSION OF THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER BRUIX TO THE RESTORATIONOF THE ROYAL AUTHORITY AT NAPLES. --THE CARACCIOLO EXECUTION. --NELSON'SDISOBEDIENCE TO ADMIRAL LORD KEITH. 

MAY-JULY, 1799. 

Nelson's measures to meet Bruix's fleetHis perplexity and mental distressConcentrates his division off MaritimoHis sagacity and resolutionGrowing infatuation about Lady HamiltonLearns that Bruix has gone to ToulonTakes his squadron to PalermoDistress at St. Vincent's intention to go homeMovements of St. Vincent and of Keith with the main fleetNelson starts from Palermo for NaplesNews from Keith causes him to return off MaritimoDissatisfaction with Keith's measuresResolves to go to Naples with the squadronArrival at NaplesState of affairs thereNelson's powers as representative of the King of NaplesAnnuls the existing armisticeCapitulation of the castles Uovo and NuovoDiscussion of Nelson's action at this timeJustification of his conductThe Caracciolo incidentExecution of CaraccioloDiscussion of Nelson's action in this caseHis profound attachment to the royal family of NaplesThe King establishes his court on board Nelson's flagshipMutual admiration of Nelson and the HamiltonsCastle of St. Elmo capitulatesTroubridge sent against CapuaKeith orders Nelson to send ships to MinorcaNelson disobeysKeith repeats his ordersNelson again refuses obedienceDiscussion of this incidentThe Admiralty censure NelsonNelson's discontentHis complaints of his health

CHAPTER I. 

THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. 

1758-1783. 

It is the appointed lot of some of History's chosen few to come uponthe scene at the moment when a great tendency is nearing its crisisand culmination. Specially gifted with qualities needed to realize thefulness of its possibilities, they so identify themselves with it bytheir deeds that they thenceforth personify to the world the movementwhich brought them forth, and of which their own achievements are atonce the climax and the most dazzling illustration. Fewer still, buthappiest of all, viewed from the standpoint of fame, are those whosedeparture is as well timed as their appearance, who do not survive theinstant of perfected success, to linger on subjected to the searchingtests of common life, but pass from our ken in a blaze of glory whichthenceforth forever encircles their names. In that evening light breakaway and vanish the ominous clouds wherewith human frailties or tyrantpassions had threatened to darken their renown; and their sun goesdown with a lustre which the lapse of time is powerless to dim. Suchwas the privilege of the stainless Wolfe; such, beyond all others, that of Nelson. Rarely has a man been more favored in the hour of hisappearing; never one so fortunate in the moment of his death. 

Yet, however accidental, or providential, this rarely allottedportion, this crowning incident of an heroic career, it is after allbut an incident. It the man has not contrived; but to it he hascontributed much, without which his passing hour would have faded tomemory, undistinguished among those of the myriads, great and small, who have died as nobly and are forever forgotten. A sun has set; butbefore its setting it has run a course, be it long or short, and hasgathered a radiance which fixes upon its parting beams the raptattention of beholders. The man's self and the man's works, what hewas and what he did, the nature which brought forth such fruits, thethoughts which issued in such acts, hopes, fears, desires, quickintuitions, painful struggles, lofty ambitions, happy opportunities, have blended to form that luminous whole, known and seen of all, butnot to be understood except by a patient effort to resolve the greatresult into its several rays, to separate the strands whose twistinghas made so strong a cord. 

Concerning the man's external acts, it will often happen that theirtrue value and significance can best be learned, not from his ownpersonal recital, but from an analytic study of the deeds themselves. Yet into them, too, often enters, not only the subtile working oftheir author's natural qualities, but also a certain previous historyof well-defined opinions, of settled principles firmly held, of trainsof thought and reasoning, of intuitions wrought into rationalconvictions, all of which betray both temperament and character. Ofthese intellectual antecedents, the existence and development may begleaned from his writings, confirming the inference reached somewhatmechanically by the scrutiny of his actions. They play to the latterthe part of the soul to the body, and thus contribute to the ratheranatomical result of the dissecting process a spiritual element itwould otherwise lack. But if this is so even of the outward career, itis far more deeply true of the inner history, of that underlyingnative character, which masterfully moulds and colors every life, yetevades the last analysis except when the obscure workings of heart andmind have been laid bare by their owner's words, recording thefeelings of the fleeting hour with no view to future inspection. Inthese revelations of self, made without thought of the world outside, is to be found, if anywhere, the clue to that complex and oftencontradictory mingling of qualities which go to form the oneness ofthe man's personality. This discordance between essential unity andsuperficial diversities must be harmonized, if a true conception ofhis being is to be formed. We know the faces of our friends, but wesee each as one. The features can, if we will, be separatelyconsidered, catalogued, and valued; but who ever thus thinkshabitually of one he knows well? Yet to know well must be the aim ofbiography, --so to present the traits in their totality, withoutsuppression of any, and in their true relative proportions, as toproduce, not the blurred or distorted outlines seen through animperfect lens, but the vivid apprehension which follows long intimacywith its continual, though unconscious, process of correction. 

For such a treatment of Nelson's character, copious, if imperfect, material is afforded in his extensive and varied correspondence. Fromit the author aims, first, to draw forth a distinct and living imageof the man himself, as sketched therein at random and loosely by hisown hand. It is sought to reach the result by keeping the reader inconstant contact, as by daily acquaintance, with a personality ofmingled weakness and strength, of grave faults as well as of greatvirtues, but one whose charm was felt in life by all who knew it. Thesecond object, far less ambitious, is to present a clear narrative ofthe military career, of the mighty deeds of arms, of this first ofBritish seamen, whom the gifts of Nature and the course of Historyhave united to make, in his victories and in their results, therepresentative figure of the greatest sea-power that the world hasknown. 

It will not be thought surprising that we have, of the first thirtyyears of Nelson's life, no such daily informal record as that whichillustrates the comparatively brief but teeming period of his activefighting career, from 1793 to 1805, when he at once, with inevitabledirectness and singular rapidity, rose to prominence, and establishedintimate relations with numbers of his contemporaries. A fewanecdotes, more or less characteristic, have been preserved concerninghis boyhood and youth. In his early manhood we have his own account, both explicit and implied in many casual unpremeditated phrases, ofthe motives which governed his public conduct in an episode occurringwhen, scarcely yet more than a youth, he commanded a frigate in theWest Indies, --the whole singularly confirmatory, it might better besaid prophetic, of the distinguishing qualities afterwards sobrilliantly manifested in his maturity. But beyond these, it is onlyby the closest attention and careful gleaning that can be found, inthe defective and discontinuous collection of letters which remainsfrom his first thirty years, the indisputable tokens, in mostimportant particulars, of the man that was to be. 

The external details of this generally uneventful period can berapidly summarized. He was born on the 29th of September, 1758, thefifth son and sixth child of Edmund Nelson, then rector of the parishof Burnham Thorpe, in Norfolk, a county which lies along the easterncoast of England, bordering the North Sea. His mother, whose namebefore marriage was Catherine Suckling, was grandniece to Sir RobertWalpole, the famous prime minister of Great Britain during twentyyears of the reigns of the first two Georges. Sir Robert's secondbrother was called Horatio; and it was from the latter, or from hisson, that the future hero took his baptismal name, which, in a morecommon form, was also that of Sir Robert's younger son, the celebratedletter and memoir writer, Horace Walpole. 

Of the eleven children borne by Nelson's mother in her eighteen weddedyears, only two lived to grow old. She herself died at forty-two; andher brother, Captain Maurice Suckling, of the Royal Navy, was also cutoff in the prime of his age. As the earlier Nelsons were unusuallylong-lived, it seems probable that a certain delicacy of constitutionwas transmitted through the Sucklings to the generation to which theadmiral belonged. He was himself, at various periods through life, agreat sufferer, and frequently an invalid; allusions to illness, oftenof a most prostrating type, and to his susceptibility to theinfluences of climate or weather, occur repeatedly and at briefintervals throughout his correspondence. This is a factor in hiscareer which should not be lost to mind; for on the one hand itexplains in part the fretfulness which at times appears, and on theother brings out with increased force the general kindly sweetness ofhis temper, which breathed with slight abatement through suchdepressing conditions. It enhances, too, the strength of purpose thattrod bodily weakness under foot, almost unconsciously, at the call ofduty or of honor. It is notable, in his letters, that the necessityfor exertion, even when involving severe exposure, is apt to befollowed, though without apparent recognition of a connection betweenthe two, by the remark that he has not for a long time been so well. He probably experienced, as have others, that it is not the greaterhardships of the profession, much less the dangers, but itsuncertainties and petty vexations, which tell most severely on ahigh-strung organization like his own. 

The immediate occasion of his going to sea was as follows. In 1770 theFalkland Islands, a desolate and then unimportant group, lying in theSouth Atlantic, to the eastward of Patagonia, were claimed as apossession by both Spain and Great Britain. The latter had upon thema settlement called Port Egmont, before which, in the year named, anoverwhelming Spanish squadron suddenly appeared, and compelled theBritish occupants to lower their flag. The insult aroused publicindignation in England to the highest pitch; and while peremptorydemands for reparation were despatched to Spain, a number of ships ofwar were ordered at once into commission. Among these was the"Raisonnable, " of sixty-four guns, to the command of which wasappointed Nelson's uncle, Captain Maurice Suckling. The latter hadsome time before promised to provide for one of his sister's children, the family being very poor; and, the custom of the day permittingnaval captains, as a kind of patronage, to take into the King'sservice on board their own ships a certain number of lads, asmidshipmen or otherwise, the opportunity of giving a nephew a start inlife was now in his hands. The story is that Horatio, though then buttwelve years old, realized the burden of pecuniary care that hisfather was carrying, and himself volunteered the wish that his unclewould take him to sea. However it happened, the suggestion staggeredSuckling, who well knew the lad's puny frame and fragile constitution. "What has poor little Horatio done, " cried he, "that he, being soweak, should be sent to rough it at sea? But let him come, and if acannon-ball takes off his head, he will at least be provided for. "Under such gloomy foreboding began the most dazzling career that thesea, the mother of so many heroes, has ever seen. [1] Spain, after ashort hesitation, yielded the British demands, so that war did notcome, and the "Raisonnable, " with other ships, was again put out ofcommission. The incident of the Falkland Islands, however, had servedthe purpose of introducing Nelson to his profession, for whichotherwise the opportunity might not have offered. Being so young whenthus embarked, he, in common with many of the most successful seamenof that day, got scanty schooling; nor did he, as some others did, byafter application remedy the eccentricities of style, and even ofgrammar, which are apt to result from such early neglect. His letters, vigorous and direct as they are, present neither the polished dictionof Collingwood, nor the usual even correctness of St. Vincent andSaumarez, but are, on the contrary, constantly disfigured by awkwardexpressions and bad English. There was rarely, however, danger ofmistaking his meaning, as was sometimes charged against Lord Howe. 

Here, before fairly parting with the humble home life, of which themotherless boy had seen, and was throughout his career to see solittle, is a fit place to introduce two anecdotes associated withthose early days which his biographers have transmitted to us. We ofthese critical times have learned to look with incredulity, not alwaysunmixed with derision, upon stories relating to the childhood ofdistinguished men; but it can safely be said that the two now to begiven are in entire keeping, not merely with particular traits, butwith the great ruling tenor of Nelson's whole life. He and his elderbrother were going to school one winter day upon their ponies. Finding the snow so deep as to delay them seriously, they went back, and the elder reported that they could not get on. The father veryjudiciously replied: "If that be so, I have of course nothing to say;but I wish you to try again, and I leave it to your honour not to turnback, unless necessary. " On the second attempt, the elder was morethan once for returning; but Horatio stuck it out, repeatingcontinually, "Remember it was left to our honour, " and the difficultjourney was accomplished. 

The children in this instance seem to have felt that there was dangerin going on. The other recorded occurrence shows in the lad thatindifference to personal benefit, as distinguished from the sense ofconspicuous achievement, which was ever a prominent characteristic ofthe man. The master of his school had a very fine pear-tree, whosefruit the boys coveted, but upon which none dared hazard an attempt. At last Nelson, who did not share their desires, undertook the risk, climbed the tree by night, and carried off the pears, but refused toeat any of them, --saying that he had taken them only because theothers were afraid. 

Trivial though these incidents may seem, they are so merely becausethey belong to the day of small things. To those accustomed to watchchildren, they will not appear unworthy of note. Taken together, theyillustrate, as really as do his greatest deeds, the two forms assumedat different times by the one incentive which always most powerfullydetermined Nelson's action through life, --the motive to which anappeal was never made in vain. No material considerations, neitherdanger on the one hand, nor gain on the other, ever affected him asdid that idealized conception which presented itself, now as duty, nowas honor, according as it bore for the moment upon his relations tothe state or to his own personality. "In my mind's eye, " said he tohis friend Captain Hardy, who afterwards bent over him as his spiritwas parting amid the tumult of his last victory, "I ever saw a radiantorb suspended which beckoned me onward to renown. " Nelson did notoften verge upon the poetical in words, but to the poetry of loftyaspiration his inmost being always answered true. 

To the young naval officer of a century ago, especially if withoutpolitical or social influence, it was a weighty advantage to beattached to some one commanding officer in active employment, who byfavorable opportunity or through professional friendships could pushthe fortunes of those in whom he was interested. Much of the promotionwas then in the hands of the admirals on foreign stations; and thislocal power to reward distinguished service, though liable to abuse inmany ways, conduced greatly to stimulate the zeal and efforts ofofficers who felt themselves immediately under the eye of one whocould make or mar their future. Each naval captain, also, could in hisdegree affect more or less the prospects of those dependent upon him. Thus Suckling, though not going to sea himself, continued withintelligent solicitude his promised care of the young Nelson. When the"Raisonnable" was paid off, he was transferred to the command of the"Triumph, " of seventy-four guns, stationed as guard-ship in the riverMedway; and to her also he took with him his nephew, who was borneupon her books for the two following years, which were, however, farfrom being a period of inactive harbor life. Having considerableprofessional interest, he saw to the lad's being kept afloat, andobtained for him from time to time such service as seemed mostdesirable to his enterprising spirit. 

The distinction between the merchant seaman and the man-of-war's man, or even the naval officer, in those days of sailing ships and simpleweapons was much less sharply marked than it has since become. Skillin seamanship, from the use of the marlinespike and the sail-needleup to the full equipping of a ship and the handling of her undercanvas, was in either service the prime essential. In both alike, cannon and small arms were carried; and the ship's company, in thepeaceful trader as well as in the ship of war, expected to repel forcewith force, when meeting upon equal terms. With a reduced number ofnaval vessels in commission, and their quarter-decks consequentlyover-crowded with young officers, a youth was more likely to find onboard them a life of untasked idleness than a call to professionaloccupation and improvement. Nelson therefore was sent by his carefulguardian to a merchant-ship trading to the West Indies, to learn uponher, as a foremast hand, the elements of his profession, underconditions which, from the comparative fewness of the crew and theactivity of the life, would tend to develop his powers most rapidly. In this vessel he imbibed, along with nautical knowledge, theprejudice which has usually existed, more or less, in the merchantmarine against the naval service, due probably to the more rigorousexactions and longer terms of enlistment in the latter, although thelife in other respects is one of less hardship; but in Nelson's daythe feeling had been intensified by the practice of impressment, andby the severe, almost brutal discipline that obtained on board someships of war, through the arbitrary use of their powers by captains, then insufficiently controlled by law. In this cruise he seems to havespent a little over a year; a time, however, that was not lost to himfor the accomplishment of the period of service technically requiredto qualify as a lieutenant, his name continuing throughout on thebooks of the "Triumph, " to which he returned in July, 1772. 

Suckling's care next insured for him a continuance of active, semi-detached duty, in the boats of the "Triumph, "--an employment verydifferent from, and more responsible than, that in which he hadrecently been occupied, and particularly calculated to develop in soapt a nature the fearlessness of responsibility, both professionaland personal, that was among the most prominent features of Nelson'scharacter. "The test of a man's courage is responsibility, " said thatgreat admiral and shrewd judge of men, the Earl of St. Vincent, aftera long and varied experience of naval officers; and none ever shonemore brightly under this supreme proof than the lad whose career isnow opening before us. It may be interesting, too, to note that thiscondition of more or less detached service, so early begun, in which, though not in chief command, he held an authority temporarilyindependent, and was immediately answerable for all that happened onthe spot, was the singular characteristic of most of his brilliantcourse, during which, until 1803, two years before Trafalgar, he wasonly for brief periods commander-in-chief, yet almost always actedapart from his superior. Many a man, gallant, fearless, and capable, within signal distance of his admiral, has, when out of sight of theflag, succumbed with feeble knees to the burden of independentresponsible action, though not beyond his professional powers. Thisstrength, like all Nature's best gifts, is inborn; yet, both for thehappy possessor and for the merely average man, it is susceptible ofhigh development only by being early exercised, which was the goodfortune of Nelson. 

Of these two years of somewhat irregular service, while nominallyattached to the "Triumph, " it will be well to give the account in hisown words; for, having been written a full quarter of a century later, they record the deepest and most lasting impressions made upon himduring that susceptible period when first becoming familiar with thecalling he was to adorn:--

 "The business with Spain being accommodated, I was sent in a West India ship belonging to the house of Hibbert, Purrier, and Horton, with Mr. John Rathbone, who had formerly been in the Navy, in the Dreadnought with Captain Suckling. From this voyage I returned to the Triumph at Chatham in July, 1772; and, if I did not improve in my education, I returned a practical Seaman, with a horror of the Royal Navy, and with a saying, then constant with the Seamen, _'Aft the most honour, forward the better man_!' It was many weeks before I got the least reconciled to a Man-of-War, so deep was the prejudice rooted; and what pains were taken to instil this erroneous principle in a young mind! However, as my ambition was to be a Seaman, it was always held out as a reward, that if I attended well to my navigation, I should go in the cutter and decked long-boat, which was attached to the Commanding officer's ship at Chatham. Thus by degrees I became a good pilot, for vessels of that description, from Chatham to the Tower of London, down the Swin, and the North Foreland; and confident of myself amongst rocks and sands, which has many times since been of great comfort to me. In this way I was trained, till the expedition towards the North Pole was fitted out; when, although no boys were allowed to go in the Ships, (as of no use, ) yet nothing could prevent my using every interest to go with Captain Lutwidge in the Carcass; and, as I fancied I was to fill a man's place, I begged I might be his cockswain; which, finding my ardent desire for going with him, Captain Lutwidge complied with, and has continued the strictest friendship to this moment. Lord Mulgrave, whom I then first knew, maintained his kindest friendship and regard to the last moment of his life. When the boats were fitting out to quit the two Ships blocked up in the ice, I exerted myself to have the command of a four-oared cutter raised upon, which was given me, with twelve men; and I prided myself in fancying I could navigate her better than any other boat in the Ship. "

It will be recognized from this brief yet suggestive andcharacteristic narrative, that, however valuable and evenindispensable may have been his uncle's assistance in forwarding hiswishes, it was his own ambition and his own impulse that even at thisearly day gave direction to his course, and obtained opportunitieswhich would scarcely have been offered spontaneously to one of hisphysical frailty. In this Arctic expedition he underwent theexperiences common to all who tempt those icebound seas. During itoccurred an incident illustrative of Nelson's recklessness of personaldanger, --a very different thing from official recklessness, which henever showed even in his moments of greatest daring and highestinspiration. The story is so hackneyed by frequent repetition as tomake its relation a weariness to the biographer, the more so that thetrait of extreme rashness in youth is one by no means so rare as to bespecially significant of Nelson's character. It will be given in thewords of his first biographers:--

 "There is also an anecdote recollected by Admiral Lutwidge, which marked the filial attention of his gallant cockswain. Among the gentlemen on the quarter-deck of the Carcass, who were not rated midshipmen, there was, besides young Nelson, a daring shipmate of his, to whom he had become attached. One night, during the mid-watch, it was concerted between them that they should steal together from the ship, and endeavour to obtain a bear's skin. The clearness of the nights in those high latitudes rendered the accomplishment of this object extremely difficult: they, however, seem to have taken advantage of the haze of an approaching fog, and thus to have escaped unnoticed. Nelson in high spirits led the way over the frightful chasms in the ice, armed with a rusty musket. It was not, however, long before the adventurers were missed by those on board; and, as the fog had come on very thick, the anxiety of Captain Lutwidge and his officers was very great. Between three and four in the morning the mist somewhat dispersed, and the hunters were discovered at a considerable distance, attacking a large bear. The signal was instantly made for their return; but it was in vain that Nelson's companion urged him to obey it. He was at this time divided by a chasm in the ice from his shaggy antagonist, which probably saved his life; for the musket had flashed in the pan, and their ammunition was expended. 'Never mind, ' exclaimed Horatio, 'do but let me get a blow at this devil with the but-end of my musket, and we shall have him. ' His companion, finding that entreaty was in vain, regained the ship. The captain, seeing the young man's danger, ordered a gun to be fired to terrify the enraged animal. This had the desired effect; but Nelson was obliged to return without his bear, somewhat agitated with the apprehension of the consequence of this adventure. Captain Lutwidge, though he could not but admire so daring a disposition, reprimanded him rather sternly for such rashness, and for conduct so unworthy of the situation he occupied; and desired to know what motive he could have for hunting a bear? Being thought by his captain to have acted in a manner unworthy of his situation, made a deep impression on the high-minded cockswain; who, pouting his lip, as he was wont to do when agitated, replied, 'Sir, I wished to kill the bear, that I might carry its skin to my father. '"

Upon his return to England from the Arctic Seas, Nelson again by hisown choice determined his immediate future. Within a fortnight ofleaving the "Carcass, " he was, through his uncle's influence, receivedon board by the captain of the "Seahorse, " of twenty guns, one of theships composing a squadron that was just then fitting out for the EastIndies. To quote himself, "Nothing less than such a distant voyagecould in the least satisfy my desire of maritime knowledge. " During anabsence of three years he for much of the time, as formerly in hisWest India cruise, did the duty of a seaman aloft, from which he wasafterwards rated midshipman, and placed, this time finally, upon thequarter-deck as an officer. In the ordinary course of cruising inpeace times, he visited every part of the station from Bengal toBussorah; but the climate, trying even to vigorous Europeans, provedtoo much for his frail health. After a couple of years he broke downand was invalided home, reaching England in September, 1776. Hisescape from death was attributed by himself to the kind care ofCaptain Pigot of the "Dolphin, " in which ship he came back. At thisperiod we are told that, when well, he was of florid countenance, rather stout and athletic; but, as the result of his illness, he wasreduced to a mere skeleton, and for some time entirely lost the use ofhis limbs, --a distressing symptom, that returned upon him a few yearslater after his Central American expedition in 1780, and confirms theimpression of extreme fragility of constitution, which is frequentlyindicated in other ways. 

During this absence in the East Indies Captain Suckling, in April, 1775, had been named Comptroller of the Navy, --a civil position, butone that carried with it power and consequent influence. This probablytold for much in obtaining for Nelson, who was but just eighteen, andhad not yet passed the examinations for his first promotion, an actingappointment as lieutenant. With this he joined a smallship-of-the-line, the "Worcester, " of sixty-four guns, on board whichhe remained for six months, engaged in convoy duty between the Channeland Gibraltar, seeing from her decks for the first time the waters ofthe Mediterranean and its approaches, since then indissolublyassociated with his name and his glory. He took with him a letter fromhis uncle to the captain of his new ship; but while such introduction, coming from so influential a quarter, doubtless contributed powerfullyto clear from his path the obstacles commonly encountered by youngmen, Nelson had gained for himself a reputation for professionalcapacity, which, here as throughout his life, quickly won him the fullconfidence of his superiors. In later years, when his admiral's flagwas flying, he recorded, with evident pride in the recollection, thatwhile on board the "Worcester, " notwithstanding his youth, his captainused to say, "He felt as easy when I was upon deck as any officer ofthe ship. " It is doubtful, indeed, whether Nelson ever possessed in ahigh degree the delicate knack of handling a ship with the utmostdexterity and precision. He certainly had not the reputation for sodoing. Codrington, --a thorough Nelsonian, to use his own somewhatfactious expression--used to say in later years, "Lord Nelson was noseaman; even in the earlier stages of the profession his genius hadsoared higher, and all his energies were turned to becoming a greatcommander. " His apprenticeship, before reaching command, was probablytoo short; and, as captain, his generous disposition to trust othersto do work for which he knew them fitted, would naturally lead him tothrow the manipulation of the vessel upon his subordinates. Butalthough, absorbed by broader and deeper thoughts of theresponsibilities and opportunities of a naval commander, to which hewas naturally attracted by both his genius and his temperament, he wasexcelled in technical skill by many who had no touch of his owninspiration, he nevertheless possessed a thoroughly competentknowledge of his profession as a simple seaman; which, joined to hiszeal, energy, and intelligence, would more than justify the confidenceexpressed by his early commander. Of this knowledge he gave full proofa year later, when, before a board of captains, strangers to him, hesuccessfully passed his examinations for a lieutenancy. His uncleSuckling, as Comptroller of the Navy, was indeed on the Board; but heconcealed the fact of relationship until the other members hadexpressed themselves satisfied. 

His examination was held within a week of his leaving the "Worcester, "on the 8th of April, 1777; and Suckling once more, but for the lasttime in his life, was able to exert his influence in behalf of hisrelative by promptly securing for him, not only his promotion tolieutenant, which many waited for long, but with it his commission, dated April 10, to the "Lowestoffe, " a frigate of thirty-two guns. This class of vessel was in the old days considered particularlydesirable for young officers, being more active thanships-of-the-line, while at the same time more comfortable, and abetter school for the forming of an officer, than were the smallercruisers; and his uncle probably felt that Nelson, whose servicehitherto had been mainly upon the latter, needed yet to perfect thehabits and methods distinctive of a ship of war, for he now wrote hima letter upon the proprieties of naval conduct, excellently conceived, yet embracing particulars that should scarcely have been necessary toone who had served his time on board well-ordered ships. Theappointment to the "Lowestoffe" was further fortunate, both for himand for us, as in the commander of the vessel, Captain William Locker, he found, not only an admirable officer and gentleman, but a friendfor whom he formed a lasting attachment, ending only with Locker'sdeath in 1800, two years after the Battle of the Nile. To thisfriendship we owe the fullest record, at his own hands, of his earlycareer; for Locker kept the numerous letters written him by Nelsonwhile still an unknown young man. Of sixty-seven which now remain, covering the years from 1777 to 1783, all but thirty were to this onecorrespondent. 

In another respect the appointment to the "Lowestoffe" was fortunatefor Nelson. The ship was destined to the West Indies--or, to speakmore precisely, to Jamaica, which was a command distinct from that ofthe eastern Caribbean, or Lesser Antilles, officially styled theLeeward Islands Station. Great Britain was then fully embarked in thewar with her North American colonies, which ended in theirindependence; and the course of events was hastening her to therupture with France and Spain that followed within a year. In thisprotracted contest the chief scene of naval hostilities was to be theWest Indies; but beyond even the casualties of war, the banefulclimate of that region insured numerous vacancies by prostration anddeath, with consequent chances of promotion for those who escaped thefevers, and found favor in the eyes of their commander-in-chief. Thebrutal levity of the old toast, "A bloody war and a sickly season, "nowhere found surer fulfilment than on those pestilence-strickencoasts. Captain Locker's health soon gave way. Arriving at Jamaica onthe 19th of July, 1777, we find Nelson in the following month writingto him from the ship during an absence produced by a serious illness, from which fatal results were feared. The letter, like all those toLocker, was marked by that tone of quick, eager sympathy, of genialinclination always to say the kindest thing, that characterized hiscorrespondence, and, generally, his intercourse with others, --traitsthat through life made him, beyond most men, acceptable and beloved. He was, from first to last, not merely one of those whose services areforced upon others by sheer weight of ability, becauseindispensable, --though this, too, he was, --but men wanted him because, although at times irritable, especially after the wounds received inlater years, he was an easy yoke-fellow, pleasant to deal with, cordial and ready to support those above him, a tolerant andappreciative master to subordinates. It may even be said that, inmatters indifferent to him, he too readily reflected the feelings, views, and wishes of those about him; but when they clashed with hisown fixed convictions, he was immovable. As he himself said in such acase, "I feel I am perfectly right, and you know upon those occasionsI am not famous for giving up a point. "

Of his connection with the "Lowestoffe" he himself, in the shortautobiographical sketch before quoted, mentions two circumstances, which, from the very fact of their remaining so long in his memory, illustrate temperament. "Even a frigate, " he says, "was notsufficiently active for my mind, and I got into a schooner, tender tothe Lowestoffe. In this vessel I made myself a complete pilot for allthe passages through the [Keys] Islands situated on the north sideHispaniola. " This kind of service, it will be noted, was in directsequence, as to training, to his handling of the "Triumph's" long-boatin the lower waters of the Thames, and would naturally contribute toincrease that "confidence in himself among rocks and sands, " whichwas afterwards to be so "great a comfort" to him. In his later careerhe had frequent and pressing need of that particular form ofprofessional judgment and self-reliance for which these earlyexperiences stood him in good stead. As he afterwards wrote to theFirst Lord of the Admiralty, when pleading the cause of a daring andskilful officer who had run his ship ashore: "If I had been censuredevery time I have run my ship, or fleets under my command, into greatdanger, I should long ago have been _out_ of the service, and never_in_ the House of Peers. " At the critical instants of the Nile andCopenhagen, as well as in the less conspicuous but more prolongedanxieties of the operations off Corsica and along the Riviera ofGenoa, this early habit, grafted upon the singularly steady nervewherewith he was endowed by nature, sustained him at a height ofdaring and achievement to which very few have been able to rise. 

The other incident recorded by him as happening while on board the"Lowestoffe, " he himself cites as illustrative of temperament. "Whilstin this frigate, an event happened which presaged my character; and, as it conveys no dishonour to the officer alluded to, I shall insertit. Blowing a gale of wind, and a very heavy sea, the frigate capturedan American letter-of-marque. The first Lieutenant was ordered toboard her, which he did not do, owing to the very heavy sea. On hisreturn, the Captain said, 'Have I no officer in the ship who can boardthe prize?' On which the Master ran to the gangway, to get into theboat: when I stopped him, saying, 'It is my turn now; and if I comeback, it is yours. ' This little incident, " he continues, "has oftenoccurred to my mind; and I know it is my disposition, thatdifficulties and dangers do but increase my desire of attemptingthem. " An action of this sort, in its results unimportant, giveskeener satisfaction in the remembrance than do greater deeds, becausemore purely individual, --entirely one's own. It is upon such as this, rather than upon his victories, that Nelson in his narrative dwellscaressingly. His personal daring at St. Vincent, and against thegunboats off Cadiz, ministered more directly to his self-esteem, tothat consciousness of high desert which was dear to him, than did theBattle of the Nile, whose honors he, though ungrudgingly, shared withhis "band of brothers. "

When the "Lowestoffe" had been a year upon the station, it became verydoubtful whether Locker could continue in her, and finally he did gohome ill. It was probably due to this uncertainty that he obtained thetransfer of Nelson, in whom he had become most affectionatelyinterested, to the "Bristol, " flagship of Sir Peter Parker, thecommander-in-chief. Here, under the admiral's own eye, warmlyrecommended by his last captain, and with a singular faculty forenlisting the love and esteem of all with whom he was brought intocontact, the young officer's prospects were of the fairest; nor didthe event belie them. Joining the "Bristol" as her third lieutenant, not earlier than July, 1778, he had by the end of September risen "bysuccession"--to use his own phrase--to be first; a promotion byseniority whose rapidity attests the rate at which vacancies occurred. Both Parker and his wife became very fond of him, cared for him inillness, and in later years she wrote to him upon each of theoccasions on which he most brilliantly distinguished himself--afterSt. Vincent, the Nile, and Copenhagen. "Your mother, " said she afterthe first, "could not have heard of your deeds with more affection;nor could she be more rejoiced at your personal escape from all thedangers of that glorious day;" and again, after the Nile, "Sir Peterand I have ever regarded you as a son. " The letter following thevictory at Copenhagen has not been published; but Nelson, whose heartwas never reluctant to gratitude nor to own obligation, wrote inreply: "Believe me when I say that I am as sensible as ever that Iowe my present position in life to your and good Sir Peter'spartiality for me, and friendly remembrance of Maurice Suckling. "

This last allusion indicates some disinterestedness in Parker'spatronage, and its vital importance to Nelson at that time. CaptainSuckling had died in July, 1778, and with him departed the onlypowerful support upon which the young lieutenant could then count, apart from his own merits and the friends obtained by them. There wasin those days an immense difference in prospects between the nephew ofthe Comptroller of the Navy and a man unknown at headquarters. By whatleading principles, if any, Sir Peter Parker was guided in thedistribution of his favors, can scarcely now be ascertained; but thathe brought rapidly forward two men of such great yet widely differingmerit as Nelson and Collingwood, is a proof that his judgment wassound and the station one where vacancies were frequent. Collingwood, who was then a lieutenant on board a sloop-of-war, went to the"Lowestoffe" in Nelson's place. When the latter, in December, 1778, was made commander into the brig "Badger, " the other was transferredto the vacant room in the "Bristol;" and when Nelson, on the 11th ofJune, 1779, became post-captain in the "Hinchinbrook" frigate, Collingwood again followed him as commander of the "Badger. " Finally, when through a death vacancy a better frigate offered for Nelson, Collingwood also was posted into the "Hinchinbrook;" this ship thushaving the singular distinction of conferring the highest rankobtainable by selection, and so fixing the final position of the twolife-long friends who led the columns at Trafalgar, the crowningachievement of the British Navy as well as of their own illustriouscareers. The coincidence at the earlier date may have been partlyfactitious, due to a fad of the commander-in-chief; but it assumes adifferent and very impressive aspect viewed in the light of theirlater close association, especially when it is recalled thatCollingwood also succeeded, upon Nelson's death, to the Mediterraneancommand, and was there worn out, as his predecessor fell, in thedischarge of his duty upon that important station, which thus provedfatal to them both. Few historic parallels are so complete. Sir PeterParker, living until 1811, survived both his illustrious juniors, andat the age of eighty-two followed Nelson's coffin, as chief mourner atthe imposing obsequies, where the nation, from the highest to thelowest, mingled the exultation of triumph with weeping for the loss ofits best-beloved. 

Of Nelson's exterior at this time, his early biographers have securedan account which, besides its value as a portrait, possesses thefurther interest of mentioning explicitly that charm of manner whichwas one of his best birth-gifts, reflecting, as it did, the generousand kindly temper of his heart. "The personal appearance of CaptainNelson at this period of his life, owing to his delicate health anddiminutive figure, was far from expressing the greatness of hisintellectual powers. From his earliest years, like Cleomenes, the heroof Sparta, he had been enamoured of glory, and had possessed agreatness of mind. Nelson preserved, also, a similar temperance andsimplicity of manners. Nature, as Plutarch adds of the noble Spartan, had given a spur to his mind which rendered him impetuous in thepursuit of whatever he deemed honourable. The demeanour of thisextraordinary young man was entirely the demeanour of a Britishseaman; when the energies of his mind were not called forth by someobject of duty, or professional interest, he seemed to retire withinhimself, and to care but little for the refined courtesies of polishedlife. " No saving sense of humor seems to have suggested that theprofane might here ask, "Is this the British seaman?" "In his dress hehad all the cleanliness of an Englishman, though his manner of wearingit gave him an air of negligence; and yet his general address andconversation, when he wished to please, possessed a charm that wasirresistible. "[2]

In June, 1779, when posted into the "Hinchinbrook, " Nelson wantedstill three months of being twenty-one. By the custom of the BritishNavy, then and now, promotions from the grade of Captain to that ofAdmiral are made by seniority only. Once a captain, therefore, a man'sfuture was assured, so far as concerned the possibility of juniorspassing over his head, --neither favor nor merit could procure that;his rank relatively to others was finally fixed. The practicaldifficulty of getting at a captain of conspicuous ability, to make ofhim a flag-officer, was met by one of those clumsy yet adequateexpedients by which the practical English mind contrives to reconcilerespect for precedent with the demands of emergency. There being thenno legal limit to the number of admirals, a promotion was in such casemade of all captains down to and including the one wanted; and LordSt. Vincent, one of the most thorough-going of naval statesmen, iscredited with the declaration that he would promote a hundred down thelist of captains, if necessary, to reach the one demanded by the needsof the country. Even with this rough-riding over obstacles, --for theother officers promoted, however useful in their former grade, notbeing wanted as admirals, remained perforce unemployed, --the advantageof reaching post-rank betimes is evident enough; and to this chieflyNelson referred in acknowledging his permanent indebtedness to SirPeter Parker. With this early start, every artificial impediment wascleared from his path; his extraordinary ability was able to assertitself, and could be given due opportunity, without a too violentstraining of service methods. He had, indeed, to wait eighteen yearsfor his flag-rank; but even so, he obtained it while still in the veryprime of his energies, before he was thirty-nine, --a good fortuneequalled by none of his most distinguished contemporaries. [3]

A somewhat singular feature of this early promotion of Nelson is thatit was accorded without the claim of service in actual battle, --acircumstance that seems yet more remarkable when contrasted with thestormy and incessant warfare of his later career. While he was thusstriding ahead, his equals in years, Saumarez and Pellew, werefighting their way up step by step, gaining each as the reward of adistinct meritorious action, only to find themselves outstripped byone who had scarcely seen a gun fired in anger. The result was mainlydue to the nature of the station, where sickness made vacancies morerapidly than the deadliest engagement. But while this is true, andmust be taken into the account, it was characteristic of Nelson thathis value transpired through the simplest intercourse, and amid thecommonplace incidents of service. Locker and Parker each in turn feltthis. A little later, while he and Collingwood were still unknowncaptains, the latter, usually measured and formal in his language, wrote to him in these singularly strong words: "My regard for you, mydear Nelson, my respect and veneration for your character, I hope andbelieve, will never lessen. " So, some years afterwards, but before hebecame renowned or had wrought his more brilliant achievements, anenvious brother captain said to him, "You did just as you pleased inLord Hood's time, the same in Admiral Hotham's, and now again with SirJohn Jervis; it makes no difference to you who is Commander-in-chief. "This power of winning confidence and inspiring attachment was one ofthe strongest elements in Nelson's success, alike as a subordinate andwhen himself in chief command. 

With his mind ever fixed upon glory, or rather upon honor, --the wordhe himself most often used, and which more accurately expresses hisdesire for fame; honor, which is to glory what character is toreputation, --the same hard fortune persisted in denying to him, duringthe War of the American Revolution, the opportunities for distinctionwhich he so ardently coveted. In the "Badger" and in the"Hinchinbrook, " during the year 1779, his service was confined toroutine cruising about Jamaica and along the Mosquito coast of CentralAmerica. A gleam of better things for a moment shone upon him inAugust of that year, when the French fleet, under Count D'Estaing, appeared in Haiti, numbering twenty-two ships-of-the-line, withtransports reported to be carrying twenty thousand troops. All Jamaicawas in an uproar of apprehension, believing an attack upon the islandto be imminent; for its conquest was known to be one of the greatobjects of the enemy. Nelson was at the time living on shore, the"Hinchinbrook" seemingly[4] not having returned to the port since hisappointment to her, and he eagerly accepted the duty of commanding theland batteries. The odds were great, --"You must not be surprised tohear of my learning to speak French, " he wrote, laughingly, to Lockerin England, --but if so, the greater the honor attendant, whether uponsuccess or defeat. D'Estaing, however, passed on to America toencounter disaster at Savannah, and Nelson's hopes were againdisappointed. 

In January, 1780, an opportunity for service offered, which ended inno conspicuous or permanent result, but nevertheless conferreddistinction upon one who, to use his own expression, was determined toclimb to the top of the tree, and to neglect no chance, howeverslight, that could help him on. War with Spain had then been aboutseven months declared, and the British governor of Jamaica hadsagaciously determined to master Lake Nicaragua, and the course of theriver San Juan, its outlet to the Caribbean Sea. The object of theattempt was twofold, both military and commercial. The route wasrecognized then, as it is now, as one of the most important, if notthe most important, of those affording easy transit from the Pacificto the Atlantic by way of the Isthmus. To a nation of the mercantileaptitudes of Great Britain, such a natural highway was necessarily anobject of desire. In her hands it would not only draw to itself thewealth of the surrounding regions, but would likewise promote thedevelopment of her trade, both north and south, along the eastern andwestern coasts of the two Americas. But the pecuniary gain was notall. The military tenure of this short and narrow strip, supported ateither end, upon the Pacific and the Atlantic, by naval detachments, all the more easily to be maintained there by the use of the beltitself, would effectually sever the northern and southern colonies ofSpain, both by actual interposition, and by depriving them of one oftheir most vital lines of intercommunication. To seek control of sovaluable and central a link in a great network of maritime interestswas as natural and inevitable to Great Britain a century ago, as itnow is to try to dominate the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, whichfulfil a like function to her Eastern possessions and Easterncommerce. 

Preoccupied, however, with numerous and more pressing cares in manyquarters of the world, and overweighted in a universal struggle withoutnumbering foes, Great Britain could spare but scanty forces to herWest India Islands, and from them Governor Dalling could muster butfive hundred men for his Nicaraguan undertaking. Nelson was directedto convoy these with the "Hinchinbrook" to the mouth of the San Juandel Norte, where was the port now commonly called Greytown, in thosedays a fine and spacious harbor. There his charge ended; but hismental constitution never allowed him to look upon a military task aswell done while anything remained to do. In the spirit of his famoussaying, fifteen years later, "Were ten ships out of eleven taken, Iwould never call it well done if the eleventh escaped, if able to getat her, " he determined to go with the troops. With his temperament itwas impossible to turn his back upon the little body of soldiers, whose toilsome advance up the tropical stream might be aided andhastened by his ready seamen. 

The first objective of the expedition was Fort San Juan, a powerfulwork controlling the river of the same name, and thereby the onlynatural water transit between the sea and Lake Nicaragua. Upon thepossession of this, as a position of vantage and a safe depot forsupplies and reinforcements, Dalling based his hopes of futureadvance, both west and south. Nelson took with him forty-seven seamenand marines from his ship's company; the former, aided by someIndians, doing most of the labor of forcing the boats against thecurrent, through shoal and tortuous channels, under his own constantsupervision and encouragement. A small outpost that withstood theirprogress was by him intrepidly stormed, sword in hand, by suddenassault; and upon reaching Fort San Juan he urgently recommended thesame summary method to the officer commanding the troops. The latter, however, was not one of the men who recognize the necessity forexceptional action. Regular approaches, though the slower, were thesurer way of reducing a fortified place, and entailed less bloodshed. Professional rule commonly demanded them, and to professional rule hesubmitted. Nelson argued that through delays, which, however incurred, were now past discussion, the expedition had reached its destinationin April, at the end of the healthy, dry season, instead of shortlyafter its beginning, in January. Consequently, owing to the fall ofthe water, much additional trouble had been experienced in theadvance, the men were proportionately weakened by toil and exposure, and the wet months, with their dire train of tropical diseases, wereat hand. Therefore, though more might fall by the enemy's weapons in adirect attack, the ultimate loss would be less than by the protractedand sickly labors of the spade; while with San Juan subdued, the forcecould receive all the care possible in such a climate, and under thebest conditions await the return of good weather for further progress. 

In military enterprises there will frequently arise the question, Istime or life in this case of the greater value? Those regularlyordered and careful procedures which most economize the blood of thesoldier may, by their inevitable delays, seriously imperil the objectsof the campaign as a whole; or they may even, while less sanguinary, entail indirectly a greater loss of men than do prompter measures. Insuch doubtful matters Nelson's judgment was usually sound; and hisinstinct, which ever inclined to instant and vigorous action, wascommonly by itself alone an accurate guide, in a profession whoseprizes are bestowed upon quick resolve more often than upon deliberateconsultation. The same intuition that in his prime dictated hisinstant, unhesitating onslaught at the Nile, depriving the French ofall opportunity for further preparation, --that caused him in thematurity of his renown, before Copenhagen, to write, "every hour'sdelay makes the enemy stronger; we shall never be so good a match forthem as at this moment, "--that induced him at Trafalgar to modify hisdeliberately prepared plan in favor of one vastly more hazardous, butwhich seized and held the otherwise fleeting chance, --led him herealso at San Juan, unknown, and scarcely more than a boy, to press thepolicy of immediate attack. 

The decision was not in his hands, and he was overruled; whereupon, with his usual readiness to do his utmost, he accepted the course hedisapproved, and, without nursing a grievance, became at once activein erecting batteries and serving the guns. "When unfortunatecontentions, " says one dispassionate narrator, "had slackened theardour for public service, Captain Nelson did not suffer any narrowspirit to influence his conduct. He did more than his duty: whereanything was to be done, he saw no difficulties. " Great as his meritswere, he was never insensible to them; and, in the sketch of hiscareer, furnished by him to his chief biographers, he records hisexploits with naïve self-satisfaction, resembling the sententioustablets of Eastern conquerors: "I boarded, if I may be allowed theexpression, an outpost of the enemy, situated on an island in theriver; I made batteries, and afterwards fought them, and was aprincipal cause of our success. " But this simple, almost childlike, delight in his own performances, which continually crops out in hiscorrespondence, did not exaggerate their deserts. Major Polson, commanding the land forces, wrote to Governor Dalling: "I want wordsto express the obligations I owe to Captain Nelson. He was the firston every service, whether by day or night. There was not a gun firedbut was pointed by him, or by Captain Despard, Chief Engineer. "Dalling, after some delay, wrote in the same sense to the Minister ofWar in London, warmly recommending Nelson to the notice of the homeGovernment. 

While the siege was in progress, Nelson received word of hisappointment to a better ship, the "Janus, " of forty-four guns, and itbecame necessary for him to join her. He left Fort San Juan only theday before it surrendered, and returned to Jamaica; but his health nowgave way wholly, and his command of the "Janus, " for the most partmerely nominal, soon came to an end altogether. Dalling had trulysaid, "Captain Nelson's constitution is rather too delicate forservice in this northern ocean. "[5] Before starting on theexpedition, he had himself written to his friend Locker: "If my healthis not much better than it is at present, I shall certainly come homeafter this trip, as all the doctors are against my staying so long inthis country. You know my old complaint in my breast: it is turned outto be the gout got there. I have twice been given over since you leftthis country with that cursed disorder, the gout. " In such weakness helived and worked through a month of a short campaign, in which, of the"Hinchinbrook's" crew of two hundred, one hundred and forty-five wereburied in his time or that of his successor, Collingwood, --a mortalitywhich he justly cites as a further proof of the necessity forexpedition in such climates. But, though he survived, he escaped bythe skin of his teeth. Worn out by dysentery and fatigue, he wascarried ashore in his cot, and soon after taken to Sir Peter Parker'shouse, where Lady Parker herself nursed him through. Her kindness tohim and his own debility are touchingly shown by a note written fromthe mountains, where he was carried in his convalescence: "Oh, Mr. Ross, what would I give to be at Port Royal! Lady Parker not here, andthe servants letting me lay as if a log, and take no notice. " BySeptember, 1780, it was apparent that perfect restoration, withoutchange of climate, was impossible, and in the autumn, having beensomewhat over three years on the station, he sailed for home in the"Lion, " of sixty-four guns, Captain Cornwallis, [6] to whose carefulattention, as formerly to that of Captain Pigot, he gratefullyattributed his life. The expedition with which he had been associatedended in failure, for although a part of the force pushed on to LakeNicaragua, sickness compelled the abandonment of the conquests, whichwere repossessed by the Spaniards. 

Arriving in England, Nelson went to Bath, and there passed through aperiod of extreme suffering and tedious recovery. "I have been so illsince I have been here, " says one of his letters, "that I was obligedto be carried to and from bed, with the most excruciating tortures. "Exact dates are wanting; but he seems to have been under treatmentnear three months, when, on the 28th of January, 1781, he wrote toLocker, in his often uncouth style: "Although I have not quiterecovered the use of my limbs, yet my inside is a new man;" and again, three weeks later, "I have now the perfect use of all my limbs, exceptmy left arm, which I can hardly tell what is the matter with it. Fromthe shoulder to my fingers' ends are as if half dead. " He remained inBath until the middle of March, latterly more for the mild climatethan because feeling the necessity of prosecuting his cure; yet thathis health was far from securely re-established is evident, for asevere relapse followed his return to London. On the 7th of May, 1781, he writes to his brother: "You will say, why does not he come intoNorfolk? I will tell you: I have entirely lost the use of my left arm, and very near of my left leg and thigh. " In estimating Nelson'sheroism, the sickly fragility of his bodily frame must be kept inmemory; not to excuse shortcomings of nerve or enterprise, for therewere none, but to exalt duly the extraordinary mental energy whichrather mocked at difficulties than triumphed over them. 

While yet an invalid he had again applied for employment, and, as thewar was still raging, was appointed in August, 1781, to the"Albemarle, " a small frigate of twenty-eight guns. He was pleased withthe ship, the first commissioned by himself at home, with a longcruise in prospect; and, together with his expressions of content withher, there appears that manifestation of complete satisfaction withhis officers and crew, with those surrounding him as subordinates, that so singularly characterized his habit of mind. "I have anexceeding good ship's company. Not a man or officer in her I wouldwish to change. .. . I am perfectly satisfied with both officers andship's company. " Down to the month before Trafalgar, when, to thebidding of the First Lord of the Admiralty to choose his own officers, he replied, "Choose yourself, my lord; the same spirit actuates thewhole profession, you cannot choose wrong, " there is rarely, it mightalmost be said never, anything but praise for those beneath him. Withthe "Agamemnon, " "We are all well; indeed, nobody can be ill with myship's company, they are so fine a set. " At the Nile, "I had thehappiness to command a band of brothers; therefore night was to myadvantage. Each knew his duty, and I was sure each would feel for aFrench ship. _My friends_ readily conceived my plan. " His ships in theMediterranean, in 1803, "are the best commanded and the very bestmanned" in the navy. So his frequent praise of others in hisdespatches and letters has none of the formal, perfunctory ring of anofficial paper; it springs evidently from the warmest appreciation andadmiration, is heartfelt, showing no deceptive exterior, but the truenative fibre of the man, full of the charity which is kind andthinketh no evil. It was not always so toward those above him. Underthe timid and dilatory action of Hotham and Hyde Parker, under thesomewhat commonplace although exact and energetic movements of LordKeith, he was restive, and freely showed what he felt. On the otherhand, around Hood and Jervis, who commanded his professional respectand esteem, he quickly threw the same halo of excellence, arising fromhis tendency to idealize, that colored the medium through which heinvariably saw the men whom he himself commanded. The disposition toinvest those near to him with merits, which must in part at least havebeen imaginary, is a most noteworthy feature of his character, andgoes far to explain the attraction he exerted over others, theenthusiasm which ever followed him, the greatness of his success, andalso, unhappily, the otherwise almost inexplicable but enduringinfatuation which enslaved his later years, and has left the mostserious blot upon his memory. 

Though thus pleased with his surroundings, his own health continuedindifferent. He excuses himself for delay in correspondence, because"so ill as to be scarce kept out of bed. " In such a state, and for onewhose frame had been racked and weakened by three years spent in thedamp heat of the tropics, a winter's trip to the Baltic was hardly thebest prescription; but thither the "Albemarle" was sent, --"it wouldalmost be supposed, " he wrote, "to try my constitution. " He was awayon this cruise from October to December, 1781, reaching Yarmouth onthe 17th of the latter month, with a large convoy of a hundred and tensail of merchant-ships, all that then remained of two hundred andsixty that had started from Elsinore on the 8th. "They behaved, as allconvoys that ever I saw did, shamefully ill; parting company everyday. " After being several days wind-bound in Yarmouth Roads, hearrived in the Downs on the first day of 1782. The bitter cold of theNorth had pierced him almost as keenly as it did twenty years later inthe Copenhagen expedition. "I believe the Doctor has saved my lifesince I saw you, " he wrote to his brother. The ship was then orderedto Portsmouth to take in eight months' provisions, --a sure indicationthat she was intended for a distant voyage. Nelson himself surmisedthat she would join the squadron of Sir Richard Bickerton, thenfitting out to reinforce the fleet in the East Indies. Had thishappened, he would have been on hand to hear much and perchance seesomething of one of his own professional forerunners, the great FrenchAdmiral Suffren, as well as of the latter's doughty antagonist, SirEdward Hughes; for Bickerton arrived in time to take part in the lastof the five pitched battles between those two hard fighters. Unluckily, a severe accident had befallen the "Albemarle, "--a largeEast Indiaman having dragged down upon her during a heavy gale in theDowns. The injuries received by this collision were so extensive thatthe ship was under repairs at Portsmouth for six weeks, during whichtime Bickerton sailed. 

While thus detained in one of the principal dockyards and navalstations of the kingdom, another large detachment, belonging to theChannel fleet, assembled before Nelson's eyes. It comprised twelvesail-of-the-line, under Admiral Barrington; and among these was the"Foudroyant, " the most famous ship of her time, then commanded byCaptain John Jervis, with whom, as the Earl of St. Vincent, Nelson wasafterwards closely associated; but the young frigate captain did notnow come in contact with his stately superior, who in later years sohighly valued and loved him. It was for him still the day of smallthings. Though thus thrown in the midst of the din and bustle ofextensive naval preparations, he had not the fortune to be directlyconnected with them; and consequently no occasion arose for becomingknown to admirals who could recognize his worth, and give him theopportunities without which distinction cannot be achieved. It is, however, a significant and instructive fact that, while thuspersistently dissociated from the great operations then in progress, and employed wholly in detached service, Nelson's natural genius forwar asserted itself, controlling the direction of his thoughts andinterests, and fixing them to that broad field of his profession fromwhich he was as yet debarred. "The height of his ambition, " anacquaintance of this period tells us, "was to command a line-of-battleship; as for prize money, " for which frigates offered the bestchances, "it never entered his thoughts. " A few months later, whilestill in the "Albemarle, " it was said of him by Lord Hood, the mostoriginal tactician of the day, that he knew as much about navaltactics as any officer in the fleet. When this high encomium wasbestowed, Nelson had barely passed his twenty-fourth birthday. 

Meanwhile the "Albemarle" was again ordered upon convoy duty, thistime to Quebec. This destination also was distasteful on account ofthe climate. "I want much to get off from this d----d voyage, " hewrote. "Mr. Adair, " an eminent London surgeon, who the year before hadtreated him for the paralysis of his limbs, "has told me that if I wassent to a cold damp climate it would make me worse than ever. " Hehimself had scruples about applying for an exchange, and the effortsof some friends who interfered proved useless. The "Albemarle" startedwith a convoy of thirty-odd vessels on the 10th of April, 1782; andafter a short stop at Cork, anchored at St. John's, Newfoundland, onMay 27, whence she reached Quebec July 1. Three days later she againsailed on a cruise that lasted over two months, spent chiefly aboutBoston Bay and Cape Cod. During this time several enemy's vessels weretaken or destroyed; but, with the bad luck that so often followedNelson in the matter of prize-money, none of the captures reachedport, and the cruise was pecuniarily unprofitable. It afforded him, however, an opportunity for displaying conduct and gaining deservedreputation, which he valued more highly. On the 14th of August thesudden lifting of a fog showed the "Albemarle" within gunshot of aFrench squadron, of four ships-of-the-line and a frigate, that hadjust come out of Boston. A close chase followed, lasting nine or tenhours; but Nelson threw off the heavy ships by running among theshoals of George's Bank, which he ventured to do, trusting to the coolhead and aptitude for pilotage acquired in earlier life. The frigatefollowed warily, watching for a chance to strike at advantage; butwhen the ships-of-the-line had been dropped far enough to be unable tohelp their consort, the British vessel hove-to[7] in defiance, and theenemy fell back upon his supports. 

Shortly after this escape, so many of the ship's company fell illwith scurvy that Nelson decided to go back to Quebec, where he arrivedon the 17th of September. "For eight weeks, " he wrote, "myself and allthe officers lived upon salt beef; nor had the ship's company had afresh meal since the 7th of April. " The fears for his health that hehad expressed before sailing from England had happily provedgroundless, and a month's stay in port which now followed, at the mostdelightful and invigorating of the American seasons, wrought wondersfor him. His letters to Locker state that the voyage agreed with himbetter than he had expected; while from the St. Lawrence he wrote tohis father, "Health, that greatest of blessings, is what I never trulyenjoyed until I saw _Fair_ Canada. The change it has wrought, I amconvinced, is truly wonderful. " This happy result had been due, inpart at least, to surroundings that told favorably upon his sensitivenervous system, and not to the bracing climate alone. He had beenactively occupied afloat, and had fallen desperately in love with afair Canadian, around whom his ardent imagination threw that glamourof exaggerated charm in which he saw all who were dear to him, excepthis wife. Her he seems from the first to have looked upon withaffection indeed, but without rapture or illusion. The Canadian affaircame near ending in an imprudent offer, from which he was withdifficulty deterred by a cool-headed friend. The story runs that, theship being ordered to New York and ready for sea, he had bidden hergood-bye and gone on board, expecting to sail next day; but that, unable to bear the approaching separation, he returned to the city, and was on his way to the lady's home when his friend met him. 

Tearing himself away from his mistress by a violent effort, Nelson, onthe 20th of October, sailed for New York. Arriving on the 13th ofNovember, he found there a large part of the West India fleet, underLord Hood, who had been second in command to Rodney on the occasionof the latter's celebrated victory over De Grasse in the previousApril. Rodney had since then been recalled to England, while Hood hadgone to Boston to look after a division of the beaten French fleet, which was there refitting. He was now on his return to the islands, where the enemy was expected to make a vigorous aggressive campaignthe following spring. Extensive preparations were in fact on foot forthe reduction of Jamaica, frustrated six months before by De Grasse'smishap. Nelson thus found himself again in tantalizing contact withthe stirring circumstance that preludes hostilities, in which hehimself had little hope to share; for the "Albemarle" belonged to theNorth American station, where all active naval operations had ceasedwith the surrender of Cornwallis the year before. He went, therefore, to Hood, and begged to be transferred to his squadron. In vain didAdmiral Digby, his own commander-in-chief, tell him that he was on agood station for prize-money. "Yes, " he replied, "but the West Indiesis the station for honour. "

Digby was reluctant to part with a frigate, as all admirals were; butHood, either from an intuitive faculty for judging men, or from hisconversations with Nelson eliciting the latter's singular knowledge ofthe higher part of his profession, wished to push an officer of somuch promise, and succeeded in obtaining the transfer of the"Albemarle" to his squadron. "I am a candidate with Lord Hood for aline-of-battle ship, " wrote Nelson to Locker; "he has honoured mehighly, by a letter, for wishing to go off this station to a stationof service, and has promised me his friendship. " A few months later hewrote again: "My situation in Lord Hood's fleet must be in the highestdegree flattering to any young man. He treats me as if I were his son, and will, I am convinced, give me anything I can ask of him. " This wasreally the beginning, the outstart, of Nelson's great career; forHood's interest in him, then aroused, and deepened by experience tothe utmost confidence and appreciation, made itself felt the instantthe French Revolutionary War began. Nelson then came at once under hisorders, went with him to the Mediterranean, and there speedily madehis mark, being transferred from admiral to admiral with ever-growingtokens of reliance. Despite the lapse of time, and the long intervalof peace, it is no exaggeration to say that there is a directconnection of cause and effect between his transfer to Hood's fleet, in the harbor of New York, and the battle of Cape St. Vincent, in1797, when he emerged from merely professional distinction to nationalrenown, standing head and shoulders above all competitors. In the fourdays that followed his arrival in New York, Nelson took the tide atthe flood, and was borne on to fortune. Yet in this, as in many otherinstant and happy decisions, we may not see the mere casting of a die, the chance result of an irreflective impulse. The determination tochange into Hood's squadron, with its powerful, far-reaching effectupon his future, was in necessary logical sequence to Nelson's wholehabit of thought, and wish, and previous preparation. He was sweptinto the current that carried him on to fame by the irresistibletendency of his own conscious will and cherished purpose. Opportunityflitted by; he was ready, and grasped it. 

At this turning-point the commendable diligence of his principalbiographers has again secured for us a striking description of theyoung captain's personal appearance, and of the impression produced byhis manner upon an interested acquaintance, who afterwards became awarm friend and admirer as well as a frequent correspondent. Thenarrator--then Prince William Henry, afterwards King William IV. --gavethe following account, apparently at some period between 1805, whenNelson fell, and 1809, when the first edition of Clarke and M'Arthur'sLife appeared. "I was then a midshipman on board the Barfleur, " LordHood's flagship, "lying in the Narrows off Staten Island, and had thewatch on deck, when Captain Nelson, of the Albemarle, came in hisbarge alongside, who appeared to be the merest boy of a captain I everbeheld; and his dress was worthy of attention. He had on a full-laceduniform; his lank unpowdered hair was tied in a stiff Hessian tail, ofan extraordinary length; the old-fashioned flaps of his waistcoatadded to the general quaintness of his figure, and produced anappearance which particularly attracted my notice; for I had neverseen anything like it before, nor could I imagine who he was, nor whathe came about. My doubts were, however, removed when Lord Hoodintroduced me to him. There was something irresistibly pleasing in hisaddress and conversation; and an enthusiasm, when speaking onprofessional subjects, that showed he was no common being. " TheCountess of Minto, in her Life of Lord Minto, speaks of Nelson's"shock head" at the time (1794) when he was a frequent visitor at thehouse of Minto, then Sir Gilbert Elliott, and Viceroy of Corsica; atrivial detail, but confirmatory, so far, of the picture drawn by theprince. The latter continued: "Nelson, after this, went with us to theWest Indies, and served under Lord Hood's flag during hisindefatigable cruise off Cape François. .. . I found him warmly attachedto my father [King George III. ], and singularly humane. He had thehonour of the King's service and the independence of the British navyparticularly at heart; and his mind glowed with this idea as much whenhe was simply captain of the Albemarle, and had obtained none of thehonours of his Country, as when he was afterwards decorated with somuch well-earned distinction. "

The war of 1778 was now fast drawing to its close; the preliminariesof peace being signed in January, 1783, though not ratified till thefollowing September. Hood cruised off Cap François, a naval station ofthe French at the west end of Haiti, to intercept the fleet fromBoston, which was understood to be on its way to the Caribbean; butthe enemy, learning his whereabouts, went through the Mona Passage, east of the island, thus avoiding a meeting, and was next heard of bythe British as being off Curaçao far to the southward. Nelson, therefore, had no opportunity to show his prowess in battle; and asonly three letters remain covering this uneventful period, little isknown of his movements, except that he made an abortive attempt torecapture Turk's Island from the French with a small force of ships hewas able to gather at short notice. An interesting indication of thespirit which animated him transpires in the first of the three lettersmentioned. He had received unexpected orders to wait in New York afterHood's leaving. "I was to have sailed with the fleet this day, but forsome private reasons, when my ship was under sail from New York tojoin Lord Hood, at Sandy Hook, I was sent for on shore, and told I wasto be kept forty-eight hours after the sailing of the fleet. It ismuch to my private advantage, " allowing more latitude for picking upprizes, without having to share with the other ships, "but I had muchrather have sailed with the fleet. " "Money, " he continues, "is thegreat object here, " on the North American Station, "nothing else isattended to, "--a motive of action which he always rejected withdisdain, although by no means insensible to the value of money, norever thoroughly at his ease in the matter of income, owing largely tothe lavish liberality with which he responded to the calls upon hisgenerosity or benevolence. A year later he wrote in the same strain:"I have closed the war without a fortune; but I trust, and, from theattention that has been paid to me, believe, that there is not a speckin my character. True honour, I hope, predominates in my mind farabove riches. "

When news of the peace reached the West Indies, Hood was ordered toreturn with his fleet to England. Nelson went home at the same time, being directed first to accompany Prince William Henry in a visit toHavana. The "Albemarle" reached Spithead on the 25th of June, 1783, and was paid off a week later, her captain going on half-pay until thefollowing April. The cruise of nearly two years' duration closed withthis characteristic comment: "Not an officer has been changed, exceptthe second lieutenant, since the Albemarle was commissioned;therefore, it is needless to say, I am happy in my ship's company. "And again he writes: "My ship was paid off last week, and in such amanner that must flatter any officer, in particular in these turbulenttimes. The whole ship's company offered, if I could get a ship, toenter for her immediately. " Nelson was keenly alive to the impolicyand injury to the service involved in the frequent changes of officersand men from ship to ship. "The disgust of the seamen to the Navy, " hewrote immediately after leaving the Albemarle, "is all owing to theinfernal plan of turning them over from ship to ship, so that mencannot be attached to their officers, or the officers care twopenceabout them. " This element of personal attachment is never left out ofcalculation safely. 

Nelson was now nearly twenty-five. In direct achievement he hadaccomplished little, and to most he was unknown; but he did notdeceive himself in believing that his reputation was established, andhis promise, as a capable man of action, understood by those who knewhim, and especially by the brilliant admiral under whom he had lastserved. Within a week of his release from the ship Hood carried him toCourt, and presented him to the King, --an evident proof of hisapprobation; and Nelson notes that the sovereign was exceedinglyattentive. The next few months were spent in London, or at his oldhome in Norfolk, to which and to his family he was always fondlyattached. Toward the end of October he obtained a leave of absence, inorder to visit France and acquire the French language. His impressionsof that country, as far as he went, --from Calais to St. Omer, --aregiven in lively enough style in a few letters; but they differ littlefrom what might be expected from any very young man deeply tinged withinsular prejudice. "I hate their country and their manners, " he wrote, soon after his return; and his biographers were quite right in sayingthat he had been brought up in the old anti-Gallican school, withprejudices not to be eradicated by a flying visit. He duly records hisdisgust with two British naval captains, one of whom was afterwardsamong his most valued and valuable friends, for wearing epaulettes, atthat time confined to the French service. "I hold them a little_cheap_, " he said, "for putting on any part of a Frenchman's uniform. "

It is more interesting to notice that his impressionable fancy wasagain taken by an attractive young Englishwoman, the daughter of aclergyman named Andrews, living at St. Omer. "Two very beautiful youngladies, " he writes to Locker and to his brother; "I must take care ofmy heart, I assure you. " "My heart is quite secured against the Frenchbeauties; I almost wish I could say as much for an English young lady, the daughter of a clergyman, with whom I am just going to dine, andspend the day. She has such accomplishments that, had I a million ofmoney, I am sure I should at this moment make her an offer of them. ""The most accomplished woman my eyes ever beheld, " he repeats, a monthlater. The sentimental raptures of a young man about a handsome girlhave in themselves too much of the commonplace to justify mention. What is remarkable, and suggests an explanation of the deplorablevagary of his later years, is that his attachment to his wife, even inthe days of courtship, elicited no such extravagance of admiration asthat into which he freely lapses in his earlier fancies, and yet morein his last absorbing passion. Respect and tenderness for her hecertainly felt and expressed; but there is no indication that she everenkindled his ardent imagination, or filled for him the place of anideal, which his mental constitution imperatively demanded as anobject of worship. The present attachment went so far with him that hewrote to his uncle William Suckling, asking for an allowance to enablehim to marry. "If nothing can be done for me, " said he, gloomily, "Iknow what I have to trust to. Life is not worth preserving withouthappiness; and I care not where I may linger out a miserableexistence. I am prepared to hear your refusal, and have fixed myresolution if that should happen. .. . I pray you may never know thepangs which at this instant tear my heart. " If, as is said by thegentlemen into whose hands this letter passed, Suckling consented tohelp him, as he certainly did at the time of his actual marriage, itseems probable that the lady refused him. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The precise date of Nelson's entering the Navy, which would be that ofhis being rated upon the books of the "Raisonnable, " is not stated. Accepting the times during which he was borne upon the books of differentships, as given by Sir Harris Nicolas (Letters and Despatches of LordNelson, vol. I. P. 4, note), and with them calculating back from October15, 1773, the day mentioned by Nelson himself as that on which he was paidoff from the "Carcass" (Nicolas, p. 5), the date of entry upon the books ofthe "Raisonnable" would be November 27, 1770; unless, which is unlikely, there were any lost days. The news of the Port Egmont business reachedEngland in October, 1770. Clarke and M'Arthur (Life of Nelson, vol. I. P. 14, note) infer January 1, 1771, for his entry upon the "Raisonnable's"books; but this would not allow the times which Nicolas gives with minuteexactness. For his actually joining the "Raisonnable" they give, loosely, the spring of 1771, --March or April. This is very possible, as rating back, for the sake of gaining constructive time needed to qualify for promotion, was tolerated by the practice of the day. 

[2] Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. I. P. 31. 

[3] Collingwood was nearly fifty when he got his flag. Howe was forty-five, St. Vincent fifty-three, Saumarez forty-four, Exmouth (Pellew) forty-eight. 

[4] This appears certain from his letters of July 28 and August 12, whichexplicitly mention that ship's absence. 

[5] The Caribbean was formerly thus styled in contradistinction to theSouth Sea, the Pacific, which was so called because its first discovererssaw it to the south from the Isthmus. 

[6] Cornwallis was an officer of marked gallantry and conduct, whodistinguished himself on several occasions, as captain, during the War of1778, and as admiral during the wars of the French Revolution. He wasbrother to Lord Cornwallis, who surrendered at Yorktown, in 1781. 

[7] That is, stopped. 

CHAPTER II. 

THE CRUISE OF THE "BOREAS. "--CONTROVERSY OVER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THENAVIGATION ACT. --RETURN TO ENGLAND. --RETIREMENT UNTIL THE OUTBREAK OFTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION. --APPOINTED TO COMMAND THE "AGAMEMNON, " 64. 

1784-1793. AGE, 26-34. 

Whatever the cause, Nelson's visit to France ended prematurely andabruptly. Early in January, 1784, after an absence of two months, hewent back to England, announcing to his friends that his coming wasonly temporary, partly on business, partly for treatment; for hisdelicate health again occasioned him anxiety. "The frost, thank God, is broke, " he wrote; "cold weather is death to me. " But even whilespeaking confidently of his speedy return to the Continent, he droppeda hint that he was disposed to resume the active pursuit of hisprofession, although on leaving the "Albemarle, " six months before, hehad said that he could not afford to live afloat, in peace times, inthe style then prevalent. "My stay in England will be but very short, without the First Lord in the Admiralty thinks proper to employ me. Ishall offer my services. " He did see Lord Howe, at that time FirstLord, asking him for a ship; and he renewed his cordial relations withHood, then living in London. On the 18th of March Howe appointed himto the command of the frigate "Boreas. " Occupation in peace, with areduced establishment, was not easy to get, and his brother, aninveterate wirepuller, must needs know to whose favor Nelson owed it. "You ask, " replied the hero, "by what interest did I get a ship? Ianswer, having served with credit was my recommendation to Lord Howe. Anything in reason that I can ask, I am sure of obtaining from hisjustice. " The statement was no more than fair to Howe; but in hisknowledge of the merits of Nelson, whose claim lay rather in evidentpromise than in conspicuous performance, we can probably trace thefriendly intervention of Lord Hood. 

Nelson's wish was that the "Boreas" should go to the East Indies. Tothis he inclined, apparently, because the station was to be under thecommand of Commodore Cornwallis, in whose ship he had returned fromJamaica as an invalid in 1780, and to whom on that occasion he wasindebted for the most friendly care. He was not long allowed toindulge this hope, for five days after receiving his appointment hewrote that the ship was bound to the Leeward Islands, and that he hadbeen asked to take as passengers the wife and family of thecommander-in-chief, Sir Richard Hughes, who had already gone out. In asmall vessel, for such the "Boreas" was, the request, which he couldnot well refuse, gave Nelson cause of reasonable discontent, entailingcrowding and a large outlay of money. "I shall be pretty well filledwith _lumber_, " he wrote; and later, on the voyage out, "I shall notbe sorry to part with them, although they are very pleasant, goodpeople; but they are an incredible expense. " The incident, annoyingthough it was, was not without compensations. After arriving on thestation, he soon became involved in a serious difference with SirRichard Hughes; and the latter, though a weak man and in the wrong, might have acted more peremptorily, had he not laid himself under suchobligations. On the other hand, Lady Hughes, many years later, shortlyafter Nelson's death, committed to writing some recollections of hispersonal traits and actions during the passage, so characteristic, even though trivial, that we could ill have spared them. 

"I was too much affected when we met at Bath, " wrote she to Mr. Matcham, Nelson's brother-in-law, "to say every particular in whichwas always displayed the infinite cleverness and goodness of heart ofour dearly beloved Hero. As a woman, I can only be a judge of thosethings that I could comprehend--such as his attention to the younggentlemen who had the happiness of being on his quarter-deck. It mayreasonably be supposed that among the number of thirty, there must betimid as well as bold; the timid he never rebuked, but always wishedto show them he desired nothing of them that he would not instantly dohimself: and I have known him say, 'Well, Sir, I am going a race tothe masthead, and beg I may meet you there. ' No denial could be givento such a wish, and the poor fellow instantly began his march. HisLordship never took the least notice with what alacrity it was done, but when he met in the top, instantly began speaking in the mostcheerful manner, and saying how much a person was to be pitied thatcould fancy there was any danger, or even anything disagreeable, inthe attempt. After this excellent example, I have seen the timid youthlead another, and rehearse his captain's words. In like manner, heevery day went into the school-room, and saw them do their nauticalbusiness, and at twelve o'clock he was the first upon deck with hisquadrant. No one there could be behindhand in their business whentheir captain set them so good an example. One other circumstance Imust mention which will close the subject, which was the day we landedat Barbadoes. We were to dine at the Governor's. Our dear captainsaid, 'You must permit me, Lady Hughes, to carry one of myaid-de-camps with me;' and when he presented him to the Governor, hesaid, 'Your Excellency must excuse me for bringing one of mymidshipmen, as I make it a rule to introduce them to all the goodcompany I can, as they have few to look up to besides myself duringthe time they are at sea. ' This kindness and attention made the youngpeople adore him; and even his wishes, could they have been known, would have been instantly complied with. "

The charm and wisdom of such a bearing is patent; but it was thenatural character of the man that thus shone out, and no mere resultof conscientious care. To the last, through all his ill-health, anxiety, and sufferings, the same genial sweetness of manner, theoutcome of an unaffected, cordial good-will to all, was shown to thosewho came in contact with him. Captain Duff, who met him for the firsttime three weeks before Trafalgar, and who fell in the battle, wroteto his wife in almost the same words as Lady Hughes: "You ask me aboutLord Nelson, and how I like him. I have already answered that questionas every person must do that ever served under him. He is so good andpleasant a man, that we all wish to do what he likes, without any kindof orders. I have been myself very lucky with most of my admirals, butI really think the present the pleasantest I have met with. " There do, it is true, occur in Nelson's letters occasional, though very rare, expressions of that passing annoyance with individuals which isinseparable from the close and long-continued contact of ship life. Thus, shortly before leaving the "Boreas, " he writes: "I begin to bevery strict in my Ship. Whenever I may set off in another, I shall beindifferent whether I ever speak to an Officer in her, but upon duty. "One wonders what passing and soon forgotten breeze, was responsiblefor this most un-Nelson-like outburst. But to the end it remained truethat between the officers and crews under Nelson's command and theirchief, there was always that cordial regard which can only spring fromthe hearty sympathy of the commander with those beneath him. 

While thoughtful and considerate, even to gentleness, for the weak anddependent, the singular energy that quickened Nelson's frail and punyframe showed itself on occasion in instant resentment of any officialslight to himself or his ship, or injury to the interests of thecountry. During the "Boreas's" stay at Madeira, the British Consulneglected to return his visit, on the plea that the Government allowedhim no boat. Nelson declined any further intercourse with him. Whilelying in the Downs, he learns that sixteen British seamen are detainedby force on board a Dutch Indiaman. He requires their delivery to him;and when their effects were withheld, on the alleged ground of theirbeing in debt to the ship, he stops all intercourse between it and theshore, sending an armed cutter to enforce his order. "The Admiralty, "he wrote, "have fortunately approved my conduct in the business, " andadded grimly, "a thing they are not very guilty of where there is alikelihood of a scrape. " When entering the harbor of Fort Royal, Martinique, the principal French island in the Lesser Antilles, theofficer at the citadel neglected to hoist the colors, a ceremonialobservance customary when a ship of war approached. Nelson at oncedemanded an explanation and received ample amends; the offending partybeing placed under arrest. To the governor of some of the British WestIndia islands, he wrote making suggestions for the better discharge ofcertain duties, in which both of them were interested. He received, itis said, a testy message that "old generals were not in the habit oftaking advice from young gentlemen. " "I have the honour, Sir, " repliedNelson, "of being as old as the prime minister of England, and thinkmyself as capable of commanding one of his majesty's ships as thatminister is of governing the state;" and throughout he held to thestand he had taken. 

The most remarkable instance, however, of this promptness to assertthe dignity and rights of his official position, allowing no man todespise his youth, occurred very soon after his arrival upon thestation, and brought him to a direct issue with hiscommander-in-chief, --if not, indeed, with an authoritative precedentset by so great a man as Lord Rodney. Young though he still was inyears, --only twenty-six, --Nelson was by date of commission the seniorcaptain in the small squadron, of some half-dozen vessels, to whichthe economies of the administration had reduced the Leeward Islandsstation. Being thus next in rank to the admiral, the latter, who madehis headquarters at Barbadoes in the southern part of the station, sent him to the northern division, centring about the island ofAntigua. Having remained in harbor, as was usual, during the hurricanemonths, Nelson cruised during the winter and until February, 1785, when some damage received compelled the "Boreas" to put into Antiguafor repairs. Here he found a vessel of the squadron, whose own captainwas of course junior to him, flying a Commodore's broad pendant, whichasserted the official presence of a captain superior to himself inrank and command, and duly qualified to give him orders. He at onceasked the meaning of this from the ship's proper commander, and wasinformed by him that Captain Moutray, an old officer, twenty years hissenior on the post list, and then acting as Commissioner of the Navy, a civil office connected with the dockyard at Antigua, had directed itto be hoisted, and claimed to exercise control over all men-of-war inthe harbor, during the admiral's absence. 

Nelson was not wholly unprepared for this, for Hughes had notified himand the other captains that Moutray was authorized by himself to takethis step. Being then away from the island, he had replied guardedlythat if Commissioner Moutray _was put into commission_, he would havegreat pleasure in serving under him, --thus reserving his decision tothe moment for action. He now took the ground that an officer notcommissioned afloat, but holding only a civil appointment, could notexercise naval command, --that an order authorizing him to do so wasinvalid, --that to entitle him to such command he must be put intomilitary commission by being attached to a ship in commission. Hetherefore flatly declined to obey Moutray's orders, refusing to admithis claim to be considered a commodore, or entitled to militaryobedience, unless he produced a commission. This he held to whenMoutray gave him a written order to put himself under his command. 

On technical points of this kind Nelson was a clear and accuratethinker, and in the admiral he had to do with a muddle-headed, irresolute superior. Hughes had already been badly worried andprodded, on matters concerning his own neglected duties, by hisunquiet young subordinate, who was never satisfied to leave bad enoughalone, but kept raising knotty points to harass an easy-going oldgentleman, who wanted only to be allowed to shut his eyes to what wenton under his nose. He was now exasperated by Nelson's contumacy, buthe was also a little afraid of him, and supported his own order by nomore decisive action than laying the case before the Admiralty, whoinformed Nelson that he should have referred his doubts to theadmiral, instead of deciding for himself in a matter that concerned"the exercise of the functions of his [the admiral's] appointment. "This was rather begging the question, for Nelson expressed no doubts, either to Hughes or in his explanatory letter to the Admiralty. Thelatter in turn shirked thus the decision of the question, --for, ifNelson was right, Hughes's order was illegal and not entitled toobedience; if he was wrong, he had been guilty of flagrantinsubordination, and should have been sharply dealt with. TheGovernment probably thought that the admiral had blundered inundertaking to give military authority to a civil official, --a step sogenerally disastrous in experience that it is now explicitly forbiddenby the regulations of most navies. It is worthy of note that twentyyears later, when commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, Nelsondirected the captains of ships cruising in the Straits of Gibraltarto consult on all occasions with the Commissioner of the Navy residentin Gibraltar, as well as to receive his advice, if proffered, --addingthat the commissioner's opinion of their conduct would have greatweight with himself; but he did not put them under his orders. [8]

Reasoning from Nelson's position, as the pendant was flying withoutproper authority on board a ship under his immediate command, heshould, as senior captain afloat, have gone further and hauled itdown. Of his authority to do so he felt no doubt, as is evident fromhis letter to the Admiralty; but his motive for refraining wascharacteristic. He was unwilling to wound Moutray; just as, beforeTrafalgar, in direct disregard of the Admiralty's orders, he allowedan admiral going home under charges to take with him his flagship, avessel of the first force and likely to be sorely needed in theapproaching battle, because he was reluctant to add to the distressthe officer was undergoing already. "I did not choose to order theCommissioner's pendant to be struck, as Mr. Moutray is an old officerof high military character; and it might hurt his feelings to besupposed wrong by so young an officer. " The question solved itselfshortly by the Commissioner's returning to England; but thecontroversy seems to have made no change in the friendly and evenaffectionate relations existing between him and his wife and Nelson. For Mrs. Moutray the latter had formed one of those strong idealizingattachments which sprang up from time to time along his path. "You maybe certain, " he writes to his brother at the very period thediscussion was pending, "I never passed English Harbour without acall, but alas! I am not to have much comfort. My dear, sweet friendis going home. I am really an April day; happy on her account, buttruly grieved were I only to consider myself. Her equal I never saw inany country or in any situation. If my dear Kate [his sister] goes toBath next winter she will be known to her, for my dear friend promisedto make herself known. What an acquisition to any female to beacquainted with, what an example to take pattern from. " "My sweet, amiable friend sails the 20th for England. I took my leave of herthree days ago with a heavy heart. What a treasure of a woman. "Returning to Antigua a few weeks later, he writes again in asentimental vein very rare in him: "This country appears nowintolerable, my dear friend being absent. It is barren indeed. EnglishHarbour I hate the sight of, and Windsor I detest. I went once up thehill to look at the spot where I spent more happy days than in any onespot in the world. E'en the trees drooped their heads, and thetamarind tree died:--all was melancholy: the road is covered withthistles; let them grow. I shall never pull one of them up. " Hisregard for this attractive woman seems to have lasted through hislife; for she survived him, and to her Collingwood addressed a letterafter Trafalgar, giving some particulars of Nelson's death. Her onlyson also died under the latter's immediate command, ten years later, when serving in Corsica. 

The chief interest of the dispute over Moutray's position lies not inthe somewhat obscure point involved, but in the illustration itaffords of Nelson's singular independence and tenacity in a matter ofprinciple. Under a conviction of right he throughout life feared noresponsibility and shrank from no consequences. It is difficult forthe non-military mind to realize how great is the moral effort ofdisobeying a superior, whose order on the one hand covers allresponsibility, and on the other entails the most serious personal andprofessional injury, if violated without due cause; the burden ofproving which rests upon the junior. For the latter it is, justly andnecessarily, not enough that his own intentions or convictions werehonest: he has to show, not that he meant to do right, but that heactually did right, in disobeying in the particular instance. Under noless rigorous exactions can due military subordination be maintained. The whole bent of advantage and life-long training, therefore, drawsin one direction, and is withstood by nothing, unless either strongpersonal character supplies a motive, or established professionalstanding permits a man to presume upon it, and to exercise a certainright to independence of action. At this time Nelson was practicallyunknown, and in refusing compliance with an order he took a risk thatno other captain on the station would have assumed, as was shown bytheir failure a few months later to support their convictions in ananalogous controversy, upon which Nelson had entered even before theMoutray business. In both cases he staked all upon legal points, considered by him vital to the welfare of the navy and the country. The spirit was identically the same that led him to swing his ship outof the line at Cape St. Vincent without waiting for signals. Afterthat day and the Nile he could afford to take liberties, and sometimestook them with less justification than in his early career. 

When the Moutray question arose, Nelson was already engaged in a morefar-reaching dispute, not only with his commander-in-chief, but withthe colonial authorities and the popular sentiment of the West IndiaIslands. Like most men, great and small, he shared the prepossessionsof his day and generation; differing, however, from others, in that heheld his opinions as principles, from asserting which he was not to bedeterred by the ill-will or dislike of those immediately about him. Upon arriving in the West Indies he found nourishing a system of tradeextremely beneficial to the islands, but which his education condemnedas hurtful to Great Britain, as it certainly was contrary to thenexisting laws that had for a century previous regulated the commerceof the kingdom. In 1784, a year only had elapsed since the UnitedStates had been formally recognized as independent, thereby becoming, in British estimation as well as in their own, a nation foreign to theBritish flag. By the Navigation Laws, first established by Cromwell, but continued under the restored monarchy without serious modificationuntil 1794, trade with the Colonies was reserved to vessels built inGreat Britain or her dependencies, and manned in three-fourths part byBritish subjects. The chief object and advantage of the law wereconceived to be, not merely a monopoly of the trade, --concerning theeconomical wisdom of which serious doubts began to be felt, --but thefostering of the British merchant service as a nursery of seamen, uponwhom, in time of war, the navy could draw. The military strength ofthe Empire was thought to be involved in the enforcement of theNavigation Act. [9]

Before the United States declared their independence, they, as Britishcolonies, enjoyed the privilege of trading with their fellow-colonistsunder what was then the common flag; and the nearness of the tworegions contributed to the advantage of both in this traffic, in whichthe continental communities were the chief suppliers of many articlesessential to the islands, notably provisions and lumber. This mutualintercourse and dependence promoted a sympathy which was scarcelydisguised in the West Indies during the War of Independence; indeed, Nelson wrote that many of the inhabitants were as arrant rebels asthose who had renounced their allegiance. Under these conditions, whenpeace was restored, the old relations were readily resumed; and asthere had really been considerable inconvenience and loss to theislanders from the deprivation of American products, the renewal waseagerly promoted by popular sentiment. The local authorities, asusual and natural, yielded to the pressure around them, and in entiredisregard of the known policy of the home government permittedAmerican vessels to trade openly under their own colors. In Jamaicathe governor had even gone so far as to authorize formally a freetrade, during pleasure, with the United States, contrary to theexplicit orders of his superiors in Great Britain. Where scruples werefelt or hesitation was shown, advantage was taken of the exceptions ofthe law, which allowed vessels in distress to sell so much of theircargoes as would pay for necessary repairs. With the tendency ofcommerce to evade restrictions by liberal stretching of theconscience, the merchant captain and the colonial officer found littledifficulty in arranging that the damage should be great enough tocover the sale of the whole lading. 

After laying up in Antigua during the hurricane season of 1784, Nelsonwas summoned to Barbadoes in November, with the other captains, toreceive orders for the winter's cruising. These, when issued, werefound to direct only the examination of anchorages, and the gatheringof information about supplies of wood and water. Nelson's attentionhad been drawn already to the American traffic; and he, with hisfriend Collingwood, who was again on the station, went to the admiral, and urged that it was the duty of ships of war to enforce theNavigation Laws. The admiral professed ignorance of these; and Nelsonhimself remarks that British vessels up to that time had been so muchcheaper built than others, that they had, without artificialprotection, naturally absorbed their own colonial trade, --thequestion, therefore, had dropped out of sight till it was revived byAmerican competition. A copy of the Act being then produced, Hughesgave an order requiring his vessels to enforce it; making specialmention of the changed relations of the United States to GreatBritain, whereby they were "to be considered as foreigners, andexcluded from all commerce with the islands in these seas. "

With these instructions Nelson sailed again for the north, where theVirgin Islands, with those of Montserrat, Nevis, and St. Christopher, were put under his especial charge, --the sloop "Rattler, " CaptainWilfred Collingwood, a brother of the well-known admiral, beingassociated with the "Boreas. " At first the two officers confined theiraction to warning off American vessels, and at times forcing them toleave ports where they had anchored; but they found that either thevessels returned during the absence of the ships of war, or thatpermissions to land, upon what they thought trivial grounds, weregiven by the Customs' officials, in virtue of the exceptions to thelaw above mentioned. 

There matters stood until the 11th of January, 1785, Nelson acting bythe authority of the commander-in-chief, but exercising his owndiscretion, and with forbearance, in carrying out his instructions. Onthe day named he received another order from the admiral, modifyingthe first upon the grounds of a more mature consideration, and of "theopinion of the King's Attorney-General" in the islands. Nelson was nowdirected, in case of a foreign merchant-ship coming within the limitsof his station, to cause her to anchor near his own vessel and toreport her arrival, and situation in all respects, to the governor ofthe colony where he then was; "and if, after such report shall havebeen made and received, the governor or his representative shall thinkproper to admit the said foreigner into the port or harbour of theisland where you may be, _you are on no account to hinder or preventsuch foreign vessel from going in accordingly, or to interfere anyfurther in her subsequent proceedings_. "

Here the admiral not only raised, but also decided, the point as towhether the enforcement of the Navigation Act rested with navalofficers, or was vested only in the civil authorities of the islands. Nelson was convinced that an essential part of the duty of ships ofwar, and especially when peace took from them so much of theirmilitary function, was to afford to the commerce of the nation properprotection, of which a necessary feature, according to the ideas ofthe age, was the interdiction of foreign traders. A seaman, heplausibly argued, could decide better than an unprofessional man thequestions of injuries and distress upon which the unlawful trafficlargely hinged. "In judging of their distress, no person can knowbetter than the sea officers, " he wrote to Hughes. "The governors maybe imposed upon by false declarations; we, who are on the spot, cannot. " He was aware, also, that a petition for relaxing the Act infavor of the American trade with the West Indies had been referred tothe home government, by which it had been explicitly rejected. Strengthened by this knowledge, but actuated, after all, chiefly byhis invariable resoluteness to assume responsibility where he felt hewas right, he replied to the admiral's letter with a clear statementof the facts, concluding with the words: "Whilst I have the honour tocommand an English man-of-war, I never shall allow myself to besubservient to the will of any Governor, nor coöperate with him indoing _illegal acts_. .. . If I rightly understand your order of the29th of December, it is founded upon an Opinion of the King'sAttorney-General, viz. : 'That it is legal for Governors or theirrepresentatives to admit foreigners into the ports of theirgovernment, if they think fit. ' How the King's Attorney-Generalconceives he has a right to give an illegal opinion, which I assertthe above is, he must answer for. I know the Navigation Laws. " As hesummed up the matter in a letter to his friend Locker: "Sir RichardHughes was a delicate business. I must either disobey my orders, ordisobey Acts of Parliament, which the admiral was disobeying. Idetermined upon the former, trusting to the uprightness of myintention. In short, I wrote the Admiral that I should decline obeyinghis orders, till I had an opportunity of seeing and talking to him, atthe same time making him an apology. "

Hughes's first impulse was to supersede his recalcitrant subordinate, and bring him to trial. He learned, however, that many of the othercaptains, of whom the court must be formed, shared his junior's views, although they shrank, with the submissiveness of military men, fromthe decisive act of disobedience. The result of a trial must thereforebe doubtful. He was, moreover, a fiddler, as Nelson continually styledhim, shifting back and forth, from opinion to opinion, and to berelied upon for only one thing, --to dodge responsibility, if possible. Consequently, no official action was taken; the commander-in-chiefcontented himself with washing his hands of all accountability. He hadgiven orders which would clear himself, in case Nelson's conduct wascensured in England. If, on the contrary, it was approved, it wouldredound to the credit of the station. 

The matter was soon brought to a test. The governors and all theofficials, particularly of the Custom House, resented the action ofthe naval officers; but the vigilance of the latter so seriouslyinterrupted the forbidden traffic under American colors, that recoursewas had to giving British registers to the vessels concerned, allowingthem to trade under British flags. This, however, was equally contraryto the Navigation Act, which forbade British registry to foreign-builtships, except when prizes taken in war; and the disguise wast too thinto baffle men like Collingwood and Nelson. The latter reported thepractice to the home Government, in order that any measures deemednecessary might be taken. Meanwhile he patiently persisted in turningaway all vessels, not British built, which he encountered, confininghimself for the time to this merely passive prevention; but finding atlast that this was not a sufficient deterrent, he gave notice thatafter the 1st of May, 1785, he would seize all American vesselstrading to the islands, "let them be registered by whom they might. "Accordingly, on the 2d of May he arrested an American-built schooner, owned in Philadelphia and manned entirely by Americans, but having aBritish register issued at the island of St. Christopher. 

The Crown lawyer was now called upon to prosecute the suit. Heexpressed grave doubts as to a naval captain's power to act by virtuesimply of his commission, the sole authority alleged by the captor;and, although he proceeded with the case, his manner so betrayed hisuncertainty that Nelson felt it necessary to plead for himself. To theconfusion of all opponents the judge decided in his favor, saying hehad an undoubted right to seize vessels transgressing the NavigationLaws. The principle thus established, Nelson on the 23d of the samemonth, at the island of Nevis, upon the same grounds, seized fourvessels, --one of which had been registered at Dominica by GovernorOrde, a naval captain senior in rank to himself, and with whom he cameinto unpleasant contact upon several occasions in his later life. 

There was no serious question as to the condemnation of the four lastseizures, the facts being clear and the principle settled;[10] but therage of the inhabitants of Nevis led them to seek revenge upon Nelsonfor the injury they could no longer prevent. He had summoned themasters of the ships on board the "Boreas, " and, after satisfyinghimself that the vessels were not entitled to British registers, hadsent marines to hold them, and to prevent essential witnesses fromleaving them, until the cases were tried. Upon these circumstances wasbased an accusation of assault and imprisonment, the masters swearingthat they had made their statements under bodily fear. Writs wereissued against Nelson, damages being laid at four thousand pounds, asum which to him meant ruin. Although he asserted that there wasabsolutely no truth in the charges, which are certainly in entirecontradiction to the general, if not invariable, tenor of his life andconduct, he was advised by the Crown lawyers not to subject himself totrial, as in the state of public feeling he could not expect a fairverdict. To avoid arrest, he was forced to confine himself to the shipfor seven weeks, during which the marshal made several attempts toserve the writ, but without success. On the day that the case of theseized ships came up, he was able to be present in court only by thesafe conduct of the judge. 

Two days after the seizure of the four vessels, Sir Richard Hughes, who was making a tour of the station under his command, arrived atNevis; but he had no support to give his zealous lieutenant. "He didnot appear to be pleased with my conduct, " wrote Nelson to Locker. "Atleast he did not approve it, but told me I should get into a scrape. Seven weeks I was kept a close prisoner to my ship; nor did I everlearn that the admiral took any steps for my release. He did not evenacquaint the Admiralty Board how cruelly I had been treated; nor ofthe attempts which had been made to take me out of my ship by force, and that indignity offered under the fly of his flag. " "I had thegovernor, the Customs, all the planters upon me; subscriptions weresoon filled to prosecute; and my admiral stood neuter, although hisflag was then in the roads. " To this lack of countenance on the partof his superior, and direct persecution by those injuriously affectedby his action, there was added a general social ostracism, to which hefrequently alludes, and which was particularly emphasized by itscontrast with the habits of hospitality prevalent among the small andwealthy planter community. One friend, however, stood by him, andoffered to become his bail in the sum of ten thousand pounds, --Mr. Herbert, the President of Nevis, and one of the wealthiest men in theisland. He had, Nelson said, suffered more than any one else from theinterruption of the trade, but he considered that the young captainhad done only his duty. Possibly there may have been a warmer feelingunderlying this esteem, for he was the uncle of the lady whom Nelsonafterwards married, and to whom he seems to have been paying attentionalready. 

Despite his indomitable pluck and resolve, the confinement, uncertainty, and contention told heavily on Nelson's health andspirits. His temper was too kindly and social not to feel the generalalienation. It could not affect his purpose; but the sense ofright-doing, which sustained him in that, did not make his roadotherwise easier. It is, indeed, especially to be noticed that therewas not in him that hard, unyielding fibre, upon which care, orneglect, or anxiety, makes little impression. He was, on the contrary, extremely sympathetic, even emotional; and although insensible tobodily fear, he was by no means so to censure, or to risk of othermisfortune. To this susceptibility to worry, strong witness is borneby an expression of his, used at the very time of which we are nowwriting. One of his friends--Captain Pole of the Navy--had detainedand sent in a neutral vessel for breach of belligerent rights. Afterlong legal proceedings, extending over five years, she was condemned, and proved to be a very valuable prize to the captors. "Our friendCharles Pole, " he writes, "has been fortunate in his trial; but thelottery is so very much against an officer, that never will Iknowingly involve myself in a doubtful cause. Prize-money is doubtlessvery acceptable; but my mind would have suffered so much, that nopecuniary compensation, at so late a period, would have made meamends. " Contrasting this utterance with the resolution shown by himat this time, in fighting what he considered the cause of his countryin the West Indies, it can be seen how much stronger with him was theinfluence of duty than that exercised by any considerations of merelymaterial advantage. In the one he could find support; in the othernot. But in neither case was he insensible to care, nor could heescape the physical consequences of anxiety upon a delicate frame andnervous organization. Of this, his harassment in the pursuit of theFrench fleet in 1798, during Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, gave avery conspicuous illustration. 

With such a temperament, being now very much in the position of anindividual fighting a corporation, he appealed to the home Government;addressing, on the 29th of June, 1785, a memorial to the King, settingforth the facts of the case, as already given, adding that his healthwas much impaired, and asking for assistance. He received a reply tothis in the following September, informing him that the King haddirected that he should be defended by the Crown lawyers. This impliedapproval of his course was succeeded, in November, by a letter fromthe Secretary of the Treasury, through the usual official channels ofthe Admiralty, acquainting him that the Government was "of opinionthat the commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands, and officers underhim, have shown a very commendable zeal, in endeavouring to put a stopto the very illicit practices which were carrying on in the islands, in open violation of the law, and to the great detriment of thenavigation and trade of his Majesty's dominions. " Verily, Hughes hadhis reward. Here he was commended in express terms for doing thatwhich he had been too prudent to do, for zeal which he had nevershown, for maintaining a law which he had given orders not tomaintain. "I own I was surprised, " wrote Nelson, "that thecommander-in-chief should be thanked for an act which he did notorder, but which, if I understand the meaning of words, by his orderof the 29th December, 1784, he ordered not to be. " "To the end of thestation, [11] his order of the 29th of December was never repealed, sothat I always acted with a rod over me. " How heavily theresponsibility he assumed was felt by others, is clearly shown inanother statement made by him. "The Captains Collingwood were the onlyofficers, with myself, who ever attempted to hinder the illicit tradewith America; _and I stood singly with respect to seizing_, for theother officers were fearful of being brought into scrapes. "

Backed by the royal approval, and with his legal expenses guaranteed, Nelson's course was now smooth. He continued in all parts of thestation to suppress the contraband trade, and his unpopularity, ofcourse, also continued; but excitement necessarily subsided as itbecame clear that submission was unavoidable, and as men adaptedthemselves to the new conditions. The whole procedure now lookssomewhat barbarous and blundering, but in no essential principlediffers from the methods of protection to which the world at presentseems again tending. It is not for us to throw stones at it. Theresults, then, were completely successful, judged by the standards ofthe time. "At this moment, " wrote Nelson some few months later, "thereare nearly fifty sail employed in the trade between the Islands of St. Kitts, Nevis, and America, which are truly British built, owned, andnavigated. Had I been an idle spectator, my firm belief is that not asingle vessel would have belonged to those islands in the foreigntrade. " His own action was further endorsed by the ministry, which nowgave captains of ships-of-war much more extensive powers, therebyjustifying his contention that it was within their office to enforcethe Navigation Act. Nor was this increased activity of the executivebranch of the government the only result of Nelson's persistence. Hissagacious study of the whole question, under the local conditions ofthe West Indies, led to his making several suggestions for more surelycarrying out the spirit of the Law; and these were embodied the nextyear in a formal Act of the Legislature. 

With so vivid a career as that of Nelson ahead, the delay imposed bythis wrangling episode is somewhat dreary; but it undeniably shows hischaracteristics in the strongest light. Duty, not ease; honor, notgain; the ideal, not the material, --such, not indeed without frailtyand blemish, were ever his motives. And, while he craved his reward inthe approval and recognition of those around and above him, he couldfind consolation for the lack of them in his own sense of right-doing. "That thing called Honour, " he writes to a friend soon after the"Boreas" cruise, "is now, alas! thought of no more. My integritycannot be mended, I hope; but my fortune, God knows, has grown worsefor the service; so much for serving my country. But I have invariablylaid down, and followed close, a plan of what ought to be uppermost inthe breast of an officer: that it is much better to serve anungrateful Country than to give up his own fame. Posterity will do himjustice; a uniform conduct of honour and integrity seldom fails ofbringing a man to the goal of fame at last. "

This struggle with Sir Richard Hughes, in which Nelson took theundesirable, and to a naval officer invidious, step of disobeyingorders, showed clearly, not only the loftiness of his motives, but thedistinguishing features which constituted the strength of hischaracter, both personal and military. There was an acute perceptionof the right thing to do, an entire readiness to assume all theresponsibility of doing it, and above all an accurate judgment of thebest way to do it, --to act with impunity to himself and with mostchances of success to his cause. Its analogy to a military situationis striking. There was a wrong condition of things to be righted--avictory to be won. To achieve this a great risk must be taken, and hewas willing to take it; but in so doing he made such choice of hisground as to be practically unassailable--to attain his end withoutlasting harm to himself. That Nelson would have managed better had hebeen ten years older is very probable. Likely enough he betrayed someof the carelessness of sensibilities which the inexperience of youthis too apt to show towards age; but, upon a careful review of thewhole, it appears to the writer that his general course of action wasdistinctly right, judged by the standards of the time and thewell-settled principles of military obedience, and that he pursued anextremely difficult line of conduct with singular resolution, withsound judgment, and, in the main, with an unusual amount of tact, without which he could scarcely have failed, however well purposing, to lay himself open to serious consequences. Certainly he achievedsuccess. 

It was in the midst of this legal warfare, and of the preoccupationsarising from it, that Nelson first met the lady who became his wife. She was by birth a Miss Frances Woolward, her mother being a sister ofthe Mr. Herbert already mentioned as President of the Council inNevis. She was born in the first half of 1758, [12] and was therefore afew months older than Nelson. In 1779 she had married Dr. JosiahNisbet, of Nevis, and the next year was left a widow with one son, whobore his father's full name. After her husband's death, beingapparently portionless, she came to live with Herbert, who lookedupon and treated her as his own child, although he also had an onlydaughter. When Nelson first arrived at Nevis, in January, 1785, [13]she was absent, visiting friends in a neighboring island, so that theydid not then meet, --a circumstance somewhat fortunate for us, becauseit led to a description of him being sent to her in a letter from alady of Herbert's family, not improbably her cousin, Miss Herbert. Nelson had then become a somewhat conspicuous factor in the contractedinterests of the island society, owing to the stand he had alreadypublicly assumed with reference to the contraband trade. People weretalking about him, although he had not as yet enforced the extrememeasures which made him so unpopular. "We have at last, " so ran theletter, "seen the little captain of the Boreas of whom so much hasbeen said. He came up just before dinner, much heated, and was verysilent; but seemed, according to the old adage, to think the more. Hedeclined drinking any wine; but after dinner, when the president, asusual, gave the three following toasts, 'the King, ' 'the Queen andRoyal Family, ' and 'Lord Hood, ' this strange man regularly filled hisglass, and observed that those were always bumper toasts with him;which, having drank, he uniformly passed the bottle, and relapsed intohis former taciturnity. It was impossible, during this visit, for anyof us to make out his real character; there was such a reserve andsternness in his behaviour, with occasional sallies, though verytransient, of a superior mind. Being placed by him, I endeavoured torouse his attention by showing him all the civilities in my power; butI drew out little more than 'Yes' and 'No. ' If you, Fanny, had beenthere, we think you would have made something of him, for you havebeen in the habit of attending to these odd sort of people. "

Mrs. Nisbet very quickly made something of him. Little directdescription has been transmitted to us concerning the looks orcharacteristics of the woman who now, at the time when marriage waspossible to him, had the misfortune to appear in the line ofsuccession of Nelson's early fancies, and to attract the too easilyaroused admiration and affection of a man whose attachment she had notthe inborn power to bind. That Nelson was naturally inconstant, beyondthe volatility inherent in youth, is sufficiently disproved by thestrength and endurance of his devotion to the one woman, in whom heeither found or imagined the qualities that appealed to the heroicside of his character. How completely she mastered all the approachesto his heart, and retained her supremacy, once established, to theend, is evidenced by the whole tenor of his correspondence with her, by his mention of her in letters to others, by the recordedexpressions he used in speaking to or about her. Despite all that hecertainly knew of her, and much more that it is unreasonable to doubthe must have known of her history, there is no mistaking the profoundemotions she stirred in his spirit, which show themselves continuallyin spontaneous outbreaks of passionate fondness and extravagantadmiration, whose ring is too true and strong for doubt concerningtheir reality to find a place. 

Many men are swayed by strong and wayward impulses; but to most thefetters imposed by social conventions, by inherited or implantedstandards of seemliness and decorum, suffice to steady them in thepath of outward propriety. Of how great and absorbing a passion LordNelson was capable is shown by the immensity of the sacrifice that hemade to it. Principle apart, --and principle wholly failed him, --allelse that most appeals to man's self-respect and regard for the esteemof others was powerless to exert control. Loyalty to friendship, thesanctity which man is naturally fain to see in the woman he loves, and, in Nelson's own case, a peculiar reluctance to woundanother, --all these were trampled under foot, and ruthlessly piled onthe holocaust which he offered to her whom he worshipped. He couldfling to the winds, as others cannot, considerations of interest orexpediency, as he flung them over and over in his professional career. My motto, he said once and again, is "All or nothing. " The samedisregard of consequences that hazarded all for all, in battle or forduty, broke through the barriers within which prudence, reputation, decency, or even weakness and cowardice, confine the actions of lessermen. And it must be remembered that the admitted great stain uponNelson's fame, which it would be wicked to deny, lies not in a generallooseness of life, but in the notoriety of one relation, --a notorietydue chiefly to the reckless singleness of heart which was not ashamedto own its love, but rather gloried in the public exhibition of afaith in the worthiness of its object, and a constancy, which neverwavered to the hour of his death. [14] The pitifulness of it is to seethe incongruity between such faith, such devotion, and the distastefulinadequacy of their object. 

To answer the demands of a nature capable of such energeticmanifestation--to fulfil the imagination of one who could so casthimself at the feet of an ideal--was beyond the gentle, well-ordered, and somewhat prosaic charms with which alone Mrs. Nisbet was investedby Nelson, even when most loverlike in tone. "My greatest wish, " hewrites in the first of his letters to her that has been preserved, "is to be united to you; and the foundation of all conjugal happiness, real love and esteem, is, I trust, what you believe I possess in thestrongest degree toward you. " Fifteen months later, and but a shorttime before their wedding, he says again: "His Royal Highness oftentells me, he believes I am married; for he never saw a lover so easy, or say so little of the object he has a regard for. When I tell him Icertainly am not, he says, 'Then he is sure I must have a great esteemfor you, and that it is not what is (vulgarly), I do not much like theuse of that word, called love. ' He is right: my love is founded onesteem, the only foundation that can make the passion last. " Butgeneral maxims, even when less disputable than this, do not admit ofuniversal application; and if an affection was to hold its own in anature enthusiastic and imaginative as that of Nelson, it had need tostrike root deeper than that surface soil indicated by mere esteem, atleast when the latter rests simply upon an assemblage of upright andamiable qualities, and not upon that force of character which compelsdependence as well as appreciation. At their last parting he solemnlyavowed that his esteem was not lessened; while he was destined also toafford a conspicuous illustration of how enduring a passion mayflourish where no just title to esteem exists. 

The progress of his wooing was rapid enough. On the 12th of May hementions their first meeting; on the 28th of June he writes to hisbrother: "_Entre, nous_. --Do not be surprised to hear I am a_Benedict_, for if at all, it will be before a month. Do not tell. " Onthe 11th of September is dated his first letter to her, alreadyquoted, in which he addresses her as "My dear Fanny, " and alludes tothe understanding existing between them. At the expiration of sixmonths he wrote, formally announcing his engagement, to Mr. WilliamSuckling, his mother's brother. He anticipates the latter's doubts asto the permanence of this fancy: "This Horatio, you will say, is forever in love;" but he considers that six months without changesettles that question. "My present attachment is of pretty longstanding; but I was determined to be fixed before I broke this matterto any person. " He then explains the situation, --that the lady herselfhas little or nothing; that Mr. Herbert, though rich, is not likely tohelp the young couple much, and he asks his uncle's assistance. ThisSuckling consented to give, and for several years continued liberallyto extend. But still, impatient though Nelson always was to completewhatever he had on hand, various causes delayed the wedding foranother year. Even with Suckling's help the question of means waspressing; and while, with pardonable self-justification, he gloried tohis betrothed that "the world is convinced that I am superior topecuniary considerations in my public and private life, as in bothinstances I might have been rich, " he nevertheless owned to regrettingthat he "had not given greater attention to making money. " Besides, ashe wrote to his brother, "What should I do carrying a wife in a ship, and when I marry I do not mean to part with my wife. " The cruisingduty of the "Boreas" took her from port to port of the limited areaembraced in the Leeward Islands Station, and Nevis was among the leastimportant of the points demanding his attention. He was, therefore, frequently away from his betrothed during this period, and absencerather fanned than cooled the impetuous ardor which he carried intoall his undertakings. Whether it were the pursuit of a love affair, orthe chase of an enemy's fleet, delays served only to increase thevehemence with which Nelson chafed against difficulties. "Duty, " hetells Mrs. Nisbet, "is the great business of a sea officer, --allprivate considerations must give way to it, however painful it is;"but he owns he wishes "the American vessels at the Devil, and thewhole continent of America to boot, " because they detain him from herside. 

There is no singularity in the experience that obstacles tend ratherto inflame than to check a lover's eagerness. What is noteworthy inNelson's letters at this time is the utter absence of any illusions, of any tendency to exaggerate and glorify the qualities of the womanwho for the nonce possessed his heart. There is not a sign of theperturbation of feeling, of the stirring of the soul, that wasafterwards so painfully elicited by another influence. "The dearobject, " he writes to his brother, "you must like. Her sense, politemanners, and, to you I may say, beauty, you will much admire. Shepossesses sense far superior to half the people of our acquaintance, and her manners are Mrs. Moutray's. " The same calm, measured tonepervades all his mention of her to others. His letters to herself, onthe other hand, are often pleasing in the quiet, simple, and generallyunaffected tenderness which inspires them. In a more ordinary man, destined to more commonplace fortunes, they might well be regarded aspromising that enduring wedded love which strikes root downward andbears fruit upward, steadily growing in depth and devotion as theyears roll by. But Nelson was not an ordinary man, and from that morehumble happiness a childless marriage further debarred him. He couldrise far higher, and, alas! descend far lower as he followed theradiant vision, --the image of his own mind rather than an externalreality, --the ideal, which, whether in fame or in love, beckoned himonward. The calm, even, and wholly matter-of-fact appreciation of hiswife's estimable traits can now be seen in the light of his aftercareer, and its doubtful augury descried; for to idealize was anessential attribute of his temperament. Her failure, even in theheyday of courtship, to arouse in him any extravagance of emotion, anyillusive exaltation of her merits, left vacant that throne in his mindwhich could be permanently occupied only by a highly wroughtexcellence, --even though that were the purely subjective creation ofhis own enthusiasm. This hold Lady Nelson never gained; and the longabsence from 1793 to 1797, during the opening period of the war of theFrench Revolution, probably did to death an affection which owed whatlanguid life it retained chiefly to propinquity and custom. BothSaumarez and Codrington, who served under him, speak passingly of thelightness with which his family ties sat upon Nelson in the yearsfollowing his short stay at home in 1797. The house was empty, swept, and garnished, when the simple-minded, if lion-hearted, seaman cameunder the spell of one whose fascinations had overpowered theresistance of a cool-headed man of the world, leading him in his oldage, with open eyes, to do what every prepossession and everyreasonable conviction of his life condemned as folly. 

In the summer of 1786 Sir Richard Hughes was recalled to England. During the later part of his association with Nelson, the strain whichhad characterized their earlier relations had not only disappeared, but had been succeeded by feelings approaching cordiality. TheGovernment's approval of his subordinate's action, and of himself ascredited with supporting it, had removed that element of apprehensionwhich in timid men induces irritation; and Hughes, who, thoughirresolute, was naturally kindly, had been still farther placated bythe prize-money falling to him from the vessels condemned through thezeal of Nelson. The latter, who never harbored malice, easily forgavethe past, and responded to this change of tone. "I have been upon thebest terms with the Admiral, " he wrote from Barbadoes to his intendedwife in April, 1786, "and I declare I think I could ever remain so. Heis always remarkably kind and civil to every one;" and again, a fewdays earlier, "The admiral is highly pleased with my conduct here, asyou will believe, by sending me such fine lines with a white hat. Iwell know I am not of abilities to deserve what he has said of me: butI take it as they are meant, to show his regard for me; and hispoliteness and attention to me are great: nor shall I forget it. Ilike the man, although not all his acts. " He then directs that thelines shall not be shown to any one, "as the compliment is paid to meat the expense of the officers of the squadron, " an injunctionthoroughly characteristic of the man's kindly consideration forothers. It was creditable to Hughes that, after being so braved, andhis instructions set at naught, by his junior, he had candor enough tosee and acknowledge his merit; but the fact still remained that in thehour of trial he had failed Nelson, nor did the latter, though heforgave, forget it. As he wrote to Locker in September, 1786, afterthe admiral's departure, "Instead of being supported by my admiral, Iwas obliged to keep him up, for he was frightened at this business;"of which business he truly said, emphasizing, but not at allexaggerating, the gravity of the responsibility he had taken indefiance of his superior: "After loss of health and risk of fortune, another is thanked for what I did against his orders. _Either Ideserved to be sent out of the service_, [15] or at least to have hadsome little notice taken of me. "

Nelson indeed, in the West Indies, as an unknown captain, had donethat which as a junior admiral he did later at Copenhagen, at a momentfar more critical to Great Britain. By his own unusual powers ofimpulse and resolve he had enforced, as far as was possible againstthe passive, inert lethargy--not to say timidity--of his superior, thecourse of action which at the moment was essential to the interests ofhis country. Truly great in his strength to endure, he knew not theperturbations nor the vacillations that fret the temper, and cripplethe action, of smaller men; and, however harassed and distressedexternally, the calmness of a clear insight and an unshaken purposeguided his footsteps, unwavering, in the path of duty, through allopposition, to the goal of success. It is reported that an officer ofthe "Boreas, " speaking to him of the vexations and odium he hadundergone, used the word "pity. " Nelson's reply showed the profoundconfidence which throughout had animated him, keenly as he hadundoubtedly felt the temporary anxieties. "Pity, did you say? I shalllive, Sir, to be envied; and to that point I shall always direct mycourse. "

By the departure of Sir Richard Hughes Nelson was left senior officerupon the station until his own return home, a twelvemonth later. InNovember he renewed his acquaintance with Prince William Henry, whomhe had known as a midshipman in 1782, and who now came to the LeewardIslands a post-captain, in command of the frigate "Pegasus. " The twoyoung men were not far apart in age, and an intimacy between them soonarose, which ended only with the death of Nelson. The latter had aprofound reverence for royalty, both as an institution and asrepresented in its members; and to this, in the present case, wasadded a strong personal esteem, based upon the zeal and efficiency inthe discharge of official duties, which he recognized in one whoserank would assure him impunity for any mere indifference. The prince, on the other hand, quickly yielded to the charm of Nelson'sintercourse, so vividly felt by most who knew him, and to thecontagious enthusiasm which animated his conversation when talking ofhis profession. This, also, his ardent imagination endowed withpossibilities and aspirations, not greater, indeed, than its deserts, but which only the intuitions of a genius like his could realize andvivify, imparting to slower temperaments something of his own fire. Tothis association the prince afterwards attributed the awakening ofthat strong interest in maritime affairs which he retained to the dayof his death. The two friends dined alternately one with the other, and, in their association of some six months at this time, theytogether fought over all the naval battles that during the recent warhad illustrated the waters through which they were then cruising. 

The incessant energy displayed by Nelson, and the agitations throughwhich he passed during the three years of this stay upon the WestIndian station, again produced distressing symptoms in his generalhealth. To use his own words, the activity of the mind was "too muchfor my puny constitution. " "I am worn to a skeleton, " he writes to Mr. Suckling in July, 1786; and three months later to Locker, "I have beensince June so very ill that I have only a faint recollection ofanything which I did. My complaint was in my breast, such a one as Ihad going out to Jamaica [in 1777]. The Doctor thought I was in aconsumption, and quite gave me up. " This fear, however, provedunfounded; nor does there appear at any time to have been any serioustrouble with his lungs. 

On the 11th[16] of March, 1787, the marriage of Captain Nelson to Mrs. Nisbet took place at Nevis. Prince William Henry, whose rule it wasnever to visit in any private house, made an exception on thisoccasion, having exacted from Nelson a promise that the wedding shouldwait until he could be present; and he gave away the bride. Threemonths later, on the 7th of June, the "Boreas" sailed for England, andon the 4th of July anchored at Spithead. Whether Mrs. Nelsonaccompanied him in the ship does not appear certainly; but fromseveral expressions in his letters it seems most probable that shedid. Five days after his arrival he sent a message from her toLocker, in terms which indicate that she was with him. 

A newly married man, who had just concluded a full cruise of sucharduous and unremitting exertions, might reasonably have wished andexpected a period of relaxation; but the return of the "Boreas"coincided with a very disturbed state of European politics. In theneighboring republic of Holland two parties were striving for themastery; one of which was closely attached to France, the other, thatof the Stadtholder, to Great Britain. In 1785 the former had gainedthe upper hand; and, by a treaty signed on Christmas Day of that year, a decided preponderance in the councils of the United Provinces hadbeen given to France. The enfeebled condition of the latter country, however, had allowed little prospect of permanence to thisarrangement; and, in the summer of 1787, an insult offered by theFrench party to the wife of the Stadtholder led to a forcibleintervention by the King of Prussia, whose sister she was. Louis XVI. Prepared to support his partisans, and notified his purpose to GreatBritain; whereupon the latter, whose traditional policy for over acentury had been to resist the progress of French influence in the LowCountries, replied that she could not remain a quiet spectator, and atonce began to arm. "The Dutch business, " wrote Nelson, "is becomingevery day more serious; and I hardly think we can keep from a war, without giving forever the weight of the Dutch to the French, andallowing the Stadtholdership to be abolished, --things which I shouldsuppose hardly possible. " Already his eager spirit was panting for thefray. "If we are to have a bustle, I do not want to come on shore; Ibegin to think I am fonder of the sea than ever. " Only five monthsmarried!

The threatening aspect of affairs necessitated the "Boreas" being keptin commission, --the more so because the economies introduced by Mr. Pitt into the administration of the two military services had reducedthe available naval force below that which France could at once sendout. "The Boreas is kept in readiness to go to sea with the squadronat Spithead, " wrote Nelson; "but in my poor opinion we shall go nofurther at present. The French have eight sail in Brest water readyfor sea: therefore I think we shall not court the French out ofport, "--singular illustration of the unreadiness of Great Britain inthe years immediately preceding the French Revolution. He looks forwar, however, the following summer. As not only ships, but men also, were urgently needed, the impress service was hastily organized. Hisfriend Locker was summoned from his long retirement to superintendthat work in Exeter, and the "Boreas" was ordered to the Thames on thesame business, arriving on the 20th of August at the Nore. There herduty was to board passing vessels, and take from them as many of theircrew as were above the number barely necessary for the safety of theship. She herself, besides acting as receiving ship for the men thuspressed, was to be kept in readiness to sail at a moment's warning. Mrs. Nelson had therefore to leave her and go to London. "Here weare, " wrote Nelson on the 23d of September, "laying seven miles fromthe land on the Impress service, and I am as much separated from mywife as if I were in the East Indies;" and he closes the letter withthe words, "I am this moment getting under sail after some ships. "

His early biographers say that Nelson keenly felt and resented thekind of service in which he was then engaged; so much so that, movedalso by other causes of irritation, he decided at one time to quit theNavy. No indication of such feeling, however, appears in his letters. On the contrary, one of the surest signs with him of pleasurable, orat least of interested, excitement, was now manifested in hisimproving health. As he himself said, many years later, "To say thetruth, when I am actively employed I am not so bad. "[17] A monthafter reaching England, though then midsummer, he wrote: "It is notkind in one's native air to treat a poor wanderer as it has me sincemy arrival. The rain and cold at first gave me a sore throat and itsaccompaniments; the hot weather has given me a slow fever, notabsolutely bad enough to keep my bed, yet enough to hinder me fromdoing anything;" and again, "I have scarcely been able to hold up myhead. " In blustering October, on the other hand, while in the midst ofthe detested Impress work, he says: "My health, thank God, was neverbetter, and I am fit for any quarter of the globe;" although "it rainshard, and we have had very bad weather of late. " Whatever momentaryvexation he may have vented in a hasty expression, it was entirelyinconsistent with his general tone to take amiss an employment whosevital importance he would have been the first to admit. Lack of zeal, or haggling about the duty assigned him, was entirely foreign to hischaracter; that the country needed the men who were to be pressed wasreason sufficient for one of his temper. If, indeed, there had been anapparent intention to keep him in such inglorious occupation, and outof the expected war, he might have chafed; but his orders to beconstantly ready indicated the intention to send him at once to thefront, if hostilities began. Doubtless he was disappointed that theapplication he made for a ship-of-the-line was not granted; but heknew that, being still a very young captain, what he asked was afavor, and its refusal not a grievance, nor does he seem to havelooked upon it otherwise. 

There were, however, some annoyances, which, joined to the lack ofappreciation for his eminent services to the interests of the nationin the West Indies, must have keenly stung him. Without the slightestnecessity, except that laid upon him by his own public spirit, he hadfought and struggled, and endured three years of hot water to servethe Government. He might have gone easy, as did the admiral and theother captains; but instead of so doing he had destroyed thecontraband trade, and re-established the working of laws upon whichthe prosperity and security of the kingdom were thought to depend. Forthis he had received a perfunctory, formal acknowledgment, though noneapparently from the Admiralty, the head of his own service. But hesoon found that, if slow to thank, they were prompt to blame, and thatwith no light hand nor disposition to make allowances. He had run hishead against various regulations of the bureaucracy; and this let himknow, with all the amenities of official censure, that if they couldnot recognize what he had done well, they were perfectly clear-sightedas to where he had gone wrong. 

So far from appreciation, there seems even to have been a prejudiceagainst Nelson in high quarters, due not only to the discomposure feltby the routine official, at the rude irregularities of the man who ismore concerned to do his work than nice about the formalitiessurrounding it, but also to misrepresentation by the powerfulinterests he had offended through his independent course in the WestIndies. After Hughes had gone home, Nelson, as senior officer on thestation, began to examine the modes of conducting government business, and especially of making purchases. Conceiving that there were seriousirregularities in these, he suggested to the Civil Department of theNavy, under whose cognizance the transactions fell, some alterationsin the procedure, by which the senior naval officer would have morecontrol over the purchases than simply to certify that so much moneywas wanted. The Comptroller of the Navy replied that the old formswere sufficient, --"a circumstance which hurt me, " wrote Nelson; whileall the civil functionaries resented his interference with theirmethods, and seem to have received the tacit support, if not thedirect sympathy, of the Navy Board, as the Civil Department was thencalled. His disposition to look into matters, however, had becomeknown, and the long struggle over the contraband trade had given himin the islands a reputation for tenacity and success. It was probablyin dependence upon these that two merchants came to him, two monthsbefore he left the station, and told him of the existence of veryextensive frauds, dating back several years, in which were implicatedboth civil officials of the Navy and private parties on shore. It ispossible that the informants themselves had shared in some of thesetransactions, and they certainly demanded in payment a part of thesums recovered; but, as Nelson truly said, the question was not as totheir character, but how to stop the continuance of embezzlementswhich had then amounted to over two millions sterling. 

The reports made by him upon this subject reached London about a monthbefore the return of the "Boreas;" but the war scare, and the urgentcall upon all departments of the Navy to mobilize the available force, prevented any immediate steps being taken. His letters wereacknowledged, and the intention expressed to investigate the matter, but nothing more was then done. October, however, the Prussian troopsoccupied Amsterdam, reinstating the Stadtholder in all his privileges, and restoring to power the partisans of Great Britain; while Franceremained passive, her power for external action paralyzed by the dyingconvulsions of the monarchy. The curtain had just risen upon theopening scene in the great drama of the Revolution, --the firstAssembly of Notables. Warlike preparations consequently ceased, and onthe 30th of November, 1787, the cruise of the "Boreas" came to an end. 

It was during this last month of servitude, and immediately beforequitting the ship, that Nelson is said to have used the vehementexpressions of discontent with "an ungrateful service, " recorded byhis biographers, concluding with his resolve to go at once to Londonand resign his commission. In the absence of the faintest trace, inhis letters, of dissatisfaction with the duty to which the ship wasassigned, it is reasonable to attribute this exasperation to hissoreness under the numerous reprimands he had received, --a feelingwhich plainly transpires in some of his replies, despite the forms ofofficial respect that he scrupulously observed. Even in much laterdays, when his distinguished reputation might have enabled him tosustain with indifference this supercilious rudeness, he winced underit with over-sensitiveness. "Do not, my dear lord, " he wrote to EarlSpencer a year after the battle of the Nile, "let the Admiralty writeharshly to me--my generous soul cannot bear it, being conscious it isentirely unmerited. " This freedom of censure, often felt by him to beundeserved, or at least excessive, and its sharp contrast with thescanty recognition of his unwearied efforts, --of whose value hehimself was by no means forgetful, --though not unusual in theexperience of officers, are quite sufficient to account for the senseof neglect and unjust treatment by which he was then outraged. Thisfeeling was probably accentuated, also, by a renewal of the legalpersecution which had been begun in the West Indies; for towards theend of the year he received formal notice of suits being institutedagainst him for the seizure of the American vessels, and it is likelyenough that some intimation of what was coming reached him beforeleaving the "Boreas. " Scanty thanks, liberal blame, and the prospectof an expensive lawsuit based upon his official action, constituted, for a poor man lately married, causes of disturbance which might wellhave upset his equanimity. 

Lord Howe, who was then at the head of the Admiralty, though formaland unbending in outward bearing, was a just and kind man, and onefully appreciative of professional worth. A mutual friend acquaintedhim with Nelson's irritation, and Howe wrote a private letter askingthat he would call upon him as soon as he came to town. Though quickto resent, Nelson was easily soothed by attention and pleased bycompliment, even when it rose to flattery, --which Howe's was notlikely to do. A short interview gave the First Lord a clearer ideathan he before had of the extent, value, and wholly voluntarycharacter of the services rendered by the young captain in the WestIndies; and he indicated the completeness of his satisfaction byoffering to present him to the King, which was accordingly done at thenext levee. George III. Received him graciously; and the resentment ofNelson, whose loyalty was of the most extreme type, melted away in thesunshine of royal favor. 

Thus reconciled to the service, and convinced, as in his less morbidmoods he often said, that gratitude and honor, though long deferred, were sure to follow upon steadfast performance of duty, he speedilyrenewed his efforts to bring to light the frauds practised in thecolonies. His letters on the subject to Mr. Pitt, the Prime Minister, had been turned over to the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. GeorgeRose, and upon the latter Nelson now called. Rose received him atfirst with that courteous nonchalance which is the defensive armor ofthe beset official, --the name of his visitor, and the business withwhich it was connected, had for the moment slipped his mind. Nelson'smastery of his subject, however, and his warmth in it, soon roused theattention of his hearer, who, being then pressed for time, asked tosee him again the next day, stipulating only that the interview shouldbe early, before office hours. "It cannot be too early for me, "replied Nelson, whose habit, in his career as admiral, was to getthrough his correspondence before eight o'clock, --"six o'clock, ifyou please. "

The arrangement was so made, and the consequent meeting lasted fromsix to nine the next morning. Of its general nature and results wehave an authentic outline, given in later years to Nelson'sbiographers by Rose, who became, and to the last remained, his warmpersonal friend. The conversation ranged, apparently, over all thechief occurrences in the West Indies during the cruise of the"Boreas, " including both the naval frauds and the contraband trade. The breadth and acuteness of Nelson's intellect have been too muchoverlooked, in the admiration excited by his unusually grand moralendowments of resolution, dash, and fearlessness of responsibility. Though scarcely what could be called an educated man, he was one ofclose and constant observation, thereby gaining a great deal ofinformation; and to the use of this he brought a practical sagacity, which coped with the civil or political questions placed before it, _for action_, much as it did with military questions--for, after all, good generalship, on its intellectual side, is simply the application, to the solution of a military problem, of a mind naturally giftedtherefor, and stored with experience, either personal or of others. Asa strategist and tactician, Nelson made full proof of high nativeendowments, of wisdom garnered through fruitful study and meditation, and of clear insight into the determining conditions of the variousmilitary situations with which he had to deal. To Mr. Rose, the youngcaptain of barely thirty years displayed a precise knowledge ofseveral political subjects, connected with the commerce of thecountry, that would not naturally come under his notice as an officer, and which therefore the mere seaman would probably not have imbibed. Not only so, but his suggestions for dealing practically with theinterests at stake were so judicious, that Rose, a valued associate ofPitt and intimately acquainted with the financial measures of thatbrilliant administrator, complimented him warmly upon the justice andcorrectness of his views, the result, as they were, of reflectionbased upon a mastery of the data involved. With Nelson's consent, heundertook to lay them before the prime minister, as the directtestimony of a singularly competent first-hand observer. 

It is to be noted, however, of Nelson, that this accuracy of mentalperception, this power of penetrating to the root of a matter, disregarding unessential details and fastening solely on decisivefeatures, was largely dependent upon the necessity laid upon him foraction; which is probably equivalent to saying that it was usuallyelicited by a sobering sense of responsibility. In his letters anddespatches may be found many wild guesses, inconsistent from week toweek, colored by changing moods and humors, --the mere passing commentsof a mind off guard, --the records of evanescent impressions asnumerous, fickle, and unfounded as those of the most ordinary mortal. It is when urgency presses and danger threatens, when the need foraction comes, that his mental energies are aroused, and he begins tospeak, as it were, _ex cathedrâ_. Then the unsubstantial haze rollsaway; and the solid features of the scene one by one appear, until, amid all the unavoidable uncertainties of imperfect information, itbecomes plain that the man has a firm grasp upon the great landmarksby which he must guide his course. Like the blind, who at first sawmen as trees walking, and then saw everything clearly, so his mentalillumination gradually reduces confusion to order, and from perplexityevolves correct decision. But what shall be said of those flashes ofinsight, as at Cape St. Vincent, elicited in a moment, as by thestroke of iron on rock, where all the previous processes of orderedthought and labored reasoning are condensed into one vividinspiration, and transmuted without a pause into instant heroicaction? Is that we call "genius" purely a mystery, of which our onlyaccount is to give it a name? Or is it true, as Napoleon said, that"on the field of battle the happiest inspiration is often but arecollection"?

From Rose Nelson went to the Comptroller of the Navy, Sir CharlesMiddleton, who afterwards, as Lord Barham, sent him forth toTrafalgar. Middleton had replied promptly to the first report of thefraudulent transactions, giving assurance of his readiness to act, andurging that all the information possible should be secured, as hefeared that the allegations were substantially true. He now showed theinstructions of the Navy Board, under which its colonial employeesacted, to Nelson, who said that, if honestly followed, they mustprevent the unlawful practices; but that he believed they werehabitually violated, and that he himself, though senior officer on thestation, had never before seen the instructions. This failure tointrust supervision to the one person upon whom all responsibilityshould ultimately have rested, practically neutralized the otherwiselaudable methods prescribed by the Board. It was simply anotherinstance of the jealousy between the civil and military branches ofthe naval organization, which, as is well known, resulted in constantstrained relations between the Admiralty and the Naval Commissioners, until the latter Board was at last abolished. 

It is, fortunately, unnecessary to follow farther this dreary recordof old-time dishonesty. Nelson continued to interest himselfstrenuously in the matter for two years after his return to England, both by letter and interview with persons in authority. His ownposition and influence were too insignificant to effect anything, except by moving the home officials, whose administration wascompromised and embarrassed by the malpractices of theirrepresentatives. Though uphill work, it was far from fruitless. "Hisrepresentations, " said Mr. Rose, in a memorandum furnished to hisbiographers, "were all attended to, and every step which herecommended was adopted. He thus put the investigation into a propercourse; which ended in the detection and punishment of some of theparties whose conduct was complained of. " The broad result appears tohave been that the guilty for the most part escaped punishment, unless, indeed, some of them lost their positions, of which no certaininformation exists; but the corrupt combination was broken up, andmeasures were adopted to prevent the recurrence of the sameiniquities. Upon Nelson himself the effect was twofold. His energy andintelligence could not fail to impress the powerful men with whom hewas in this way brought into contact. The affair increased hisreputation, and made him more widely known than as a simple captain inthe Navy he would otherwise have been. As the various public Boardswhose money had been stolen realized the amount of the thefts, and theextent of the conspiracy to rob the Government, they felt theirobligations to him, and expressed them in formal, but warm, letters ofthanks. On the other hand, the principal culprits had command of bothmoney and influence; and by means of these, as so often happens, theynot only impeded inquiry, but, according to Southey, who wrote notvery long after the events, "succeeded in raising prejudices againstNelson at the Board of Admiralty which it was many years before hecould subdue. " Clarke and M'Arthur make the same assertion. 

That these prejudices did at one time exist is beyond doubt, and thatthey should have been fostered by this means is perfectly in keepingwith common experience. Such intrigues, however, work in the dark andby indirection; it is not often easy to trace their course. Theindependence and single-mindedness with which Nelson followed hisconvictions, and the outspoken frankness with which he expressed hisviews and feelings, not improbably gave a handle to maliciousmisrepresentation. His known intimacy with Prince William Henry, uponwhose favor he to some extent relied, was also more likely to do himharm than good; and he entertained for the royal captainprepossessions not far removed from partisanship, at a time when theprince avowed himself not a friend to the present minister. "Amidstthat variety of business which demanded his attention on his return toEngland, " say his biographers, "he failed not, by every means in hispower, to fulfil the promise which he had made to his Royal HighnessPrince William of counteracting whatever had been opposed to themerited reputation of his illustrious pupil, and to the friendshipthey had invariably preserved for each other. " It was a difficulttask. Opinionated and headstrong as the King, his father, the youngman was an uneasy subordinate to the Admiralty, and made those abovehim realize that he was full as conscious of his personal rank as ofhis official position as a captain in the Navy. It was, indeed, thisself-assertive temperament that afterwards frustrated his naturalambition to be the active head of the service. Having such an ally, there is something ominous for Nelson's own prospects to find himwriting in evident sympathy: "The great folks above now see he willnot be a cypher, therefore many of the rising people must submit toact subordinate to him, which is not so palatable; and I think a Lordof the Admiralty is hurt to see him so able, after what he has saidabout him. He has certainly not taken a leaf out of his book, for heis steady in his command and not violent. " Upon this follows, "He haswrote Lord Hood what I cannot but approve, "--a sentence unquestionablyvague, but which sounds combative. Nelson had already felt itnecessary to caution the prince to be careful in the choice of thoseto whom he told his mind. 

In fact, at the time when the letter just quoted was written, theconduct of the prince had been such as necessarily, and not whollyunjustly, to prejudice an officer who displayed marked partisanshipfor him, such as certainly was indicated by Nelson's expressions. Hehad brought his ship from Newfoundland to Ireland in flatdisobedience of orders, issued by the commander of the station, to goto Quebec. When this action became known to the Admiralty by hisarrival at Cork, in December, 1787, it was at once reported to theKing, who himself directed that the prince should proceed to Plymouthwith his ship, should remain within the limits of the port for as manymonths as he had been absent from his station, and should then be sentback to Halifax. The Prince of Wales, afterwards George IV. , who wasalready at variance with the King, took advantage of this flagrantbreach of discipline to flaunt his opposition before the world. Incompany with his second brother, the Duke of York, he went down toPlymouth, and paid a ceremonious visit to Prince William on board hisship. The round of festivities necessitated by their presenceemphasized the disagreement between the sovereign and the heir to thethrone, and drew to it public attention. Immediately after this, inJanuary, 1788, Nelson also visited the prince, having been summoned byhim from London. He could, indeed, scarcely decline, nor was he at allthe man to turn his back on a friend in difficulty; but, in his fightagainst corruption, the matter could scarcely fail to be representedby his opponents under the worst light to the King, to whom corruptionwas less odious than insubordination. If, in conversation, Nelsonuttered such expressions as he wrote to his friend Locker, he had onlyhimself to blame for the disfavor which followed; for, to a navalofficer, the prince's conduct should have appeared absolutelyindefensible. In the course of the same year the King became insane, and the famous struggle about the Regency took place. The prince hadmeantime returned to America, in accordance with his orders, and bythe time he again reached England the King had recovered. He could, therefore, have refrained from any indication of his own sympathies;but instead of this he openly associated himself with the party of thePrince of Wales, whose course throughout, when it became known to hisfather, had bitterly displeased the latter, and accentuated the breachbetween them. At a banquet given by the Spanish ambassador incelebration of the King's recovery, the three princes sat at a tableseparate from the rest of the royal family. A formal reconciliationtook place in September, 1789; but the Duke of Clarence, as he hadthen become, continued attached to the Prince of Wales's clique. Thosewho know how party considerations influenced naval appointments atthat time, will in these facts find at least a partial explanation ofthe cloud which then hung over Nelson. 

Lord Chatham, brother of the minister to whom Prince William was not afriend, became head of the Admiralty in July, 1788, and so remaineduntil after the war with France began in 1793. With him was associatedLord Hood, between whom and Nelson there arose what the latter called"a difference of opinion, " which led to a cessation of "familiarcorrespondence. " The exact date at which this occurred does notappear, but it was probably before May, 1790; for Hood refused to usehis influence to get Nelson a ship, in the armament which was thenordered on account of a difficulty with Spain, whereas eighteen monthsbefore he had assured him that in case of hostilities he need not fearnot having a good ship. This refusal was the more marked, because"almost the whole service was then called out. " On the same occasion, Nelson wrote, "he made a speech never to be effaced from my memory, viz. : that the King was impressed with an unfavourable opinion of me. "Knowing Nelson's value as an officer as well as Hood did, there canscarcely remain a doubt that some serious indiscretion, real orimagined, must have caused this alienation; but of what it was thereis no trace, unless in his evident siding with the prince, who wasthen out of favor with both the King and the administration. 

The five years--from 1788 to 1792 inclusive--intervening between thecruise of the "Boreas" and the outbreak of war with the FrenchRepublic, were thus marked by a variety of unpleasant circumstances, of which the most disagreeable, to a man of Nelson's activetemperament, was the apparently fixed resolve of the authorities todeny him employment. He was harassed, indeed, by the recurring threatsof prosecution for the West India seizures; but both the Admiralty andthe Treasury agreed that he should be defended at the expense of theCrown, --a fact which tends to show that his subsequent disfavor arosefrom some other cause than disapproval of his official action, howeversome incidents may have been misrepresented. On its private side, hislife during this period seems to have been happy, though uneventful;but in the failure of children he was deprived, both then andafterwards, of that sweetest of interests, continuous yet ever new inits gradual unfolding, which brings to the most monotonous existenceits daily tribute of novelty and incident. The fond, almost rapturous, expressions with which he greeted the daughter afterwards born to himout of wedlock, shows the blank in his home, --none the less realbecause not consciously realized. 

The lack of stimulus to his mind from his surroundings at this time isalso manifested by the fewness of his letters. But thirty remain toshow his occupation during the five years, and seventeen of these arepurely official in character. From the year 1791 no record survives. His wife being with him, one line of correspondence was therebyclosed; but even to his brother, and to his friend Locker, he findsnothing to write. For the ordinary country amusements and pursuits ofthe English gentry he had scant liking; and, barring the occasionalworry over his neglect by the Admiralty, there was little else toengage his attention. The first few months after his release from the"Boreas" were spent in the West of England, chiefly at Bath, for therecovery of Mrs. Nelson's health as well as his own; but toward thelatter part of 1788 the young couple went to live with his father atthe parsonage of Burnham Thorpe, and there made their home until hewas again called into active service. "It is extremely interesting, "say his biographers, "to contemplate this great man, when thus removedfrom the busy scenes in which he had borne so distinguished a part tothe remote village of Burnham Thorpe;" but the interest seems by theiraccount to be limited to the energy with which he dug in the garden, or, from sheer want of something to do, reverted to the bird-nestingof his boyhood. His favorite amusement, we are told, was coursing, andhe once shot a partridge; but his habit of carrying his gun at fullcock, and firing as soon as a bird rose, without bringing the piece tohis shoulder, made him a dangerous companion in a shooting-party. Hisown account is somewhat different: "Shoot I cannot, therefore I havenot taken out a license; but notwithstanding the neglect I have metwith I am happy;" and again, to his brother, he says: "It was not myintention to have gone to the coursing meeting, for, to say the truth, I have rarely escaped a wet jacket and a violent cold; besides, to me, even the ride to the Smee is longer than any pleasure I find in thesport will compensate for. " The fact is that Nelson cared for none ofthese things, and the only deduction of real interest from his lettersat this time is the absolute failure of his home life and affectionsto content his aspirations, --the emptiness both of mind and heart, which caused his passionate eagerness for external employment to fillthe void. Earnestness appears only when he is brooding over the slightwith which he was treated, and the resultant thwarting of his career. For both mind and heart the future held in store for him the mostengrossing emotions, but it did not therefore bring him happiness. 

Of his frames of mind during this period of neglect and disfavor, hisbiographers give a very strongly colored picture, for which, it is tobe presumed, they drew upon contemporary witnesses that were to themstill accessible. "With a mortified and dejected spirit, he lookedforward to a continuance of inactivity and neglect. .. . During thisinterval of disappointment and mortification, his latent ambitionwould at times burst forth, and despise all restraint. At others, asudden melancholy seemed to overshadow his noble faculties, and toaffect his temper; at those moments the remonstrances of his wife andvenerable father alone could calm the tempest of his passions. " ThatNelson keenly felt the cold indifference he now underwent, isthoroughly in keeping with the sensitiveness to censure, expressed orimplied, which his correspondence frequently betrays, while his frailorganization and uncertain health would naturally entail periods ofdepression or nervous exasperation; but the general tenor of hisletters, few as they at this time were, shows rather dignifiedacceptance of a treatment he had not merited, and a steady resolve notto waver in his readiness to serve his country, nor to cease asking anopportunity to do so. Many years later, at a time of still moresickening suspense, he wrote: "I am in truth half dead, but what mancan do shall be done, --I am not made to despair;" and now, accordingto a not improbable story, he closed an application for employmentwith the words, "If your Lordships should be pleased to appoint me toa cockle boat, I shall feel grateful. " Hood, whose pupil he in a sensewas, and who shared his genius, said of himself, when under acondition of enforced inactivity: "This proves very strongly thedifferent frames of men's minds; some are full of anxiety, impatience, and apprehension, while others, under similar circumstances, areperfectly cool, tranquil, and indifferent. "

The latter half of the year 1792 was marked by the rapid progress inFrance of the political distemper, which was so soon to culminate inthe worst excesses of the Revolution. The quick succession ofsymptoms, each more alarming than the other, --the suspension of theroyal power at the tumultuous bidding of a mob, the Septembermassacres, the abolition of royalty, the aggressive character of theNational Convention shown by the decrees of November 19 and December15, --roused the apprehensions of most thoughtful men throughoutEurope; and their concern was increased by the growing populareffervescence in other countries than France. The British cabinet, aswas natural, shifted more slowly than did the irresponsible members ofthe community; nor could Pitt lightly surrender his strong instinctiveprepossessions in favor of peace, with the continuance of which wasidentified the exercise of his own best powers. 

During this stormy and anxious period, Nelson shared the feelings ofhis day and class. It is noteworthy, however, that, in regarding theperils of the time, he was no mere panic-monger, but showed the samediscriminating carefulness of observation that had distinguished himas captain of the "Boreas, " and had elicited the admiration of Mr. Rose. Strenuous and even bigoted royalist as he always was, satisfiedof the excellence of the British Constitution, and condemning utterlythe proceedings of the more or less seditious societies then formingthroughout the kingdom, he yet recognized the substantial grievancesof the working-men, as evident in the district immediately under hiseye. The sympathetic qualities which made him, fortune's own favoritein his profession, keenly alive to the hardships, neglect, andinjustice undergone by the common seaman, now engaged him to set forththe sad lot of the ill-paid rural peasantry. In his letters to theDuke of Clarence, he on the one hand strongly blames the weakness andtimidity of the justices and country gentlemen, in their attitudetowards the abettors of lawlessness; but, on the other, he dwells uponthe sufferings of the poor, prepares a careful statement of theirearnings and unavoidable expenses, and insists upon the necessity ofthe living wage. The field laborers, he said, "do not want loyalty, many of their superiors, in many instances, might have imitated theirconduct to advantage; but hunger is a sharp thorn, and they are notonly in want of food sufficient, but of clothes and firing. "

Under the threatening outlook, he considers that every individual willsoon "be called forth to show himself;" and for his own part, hewrites on the 3d of November, he sees no way so proper as asking for aship. But, even at that late moment, neither Pitt nor his associateshad abandoned the hope of peace, and this, as well as otherapplications of Nelson's, received only a formal acknowledgmentwithout encouragement. Roused, however, by the Convention's decree ofNovember 19, which extended the succor of France to all people whoshould wish to recover their liberty, and charged the generals of therepublic to make good the offer with the forces under their command, the ministry decided to abandon their guarded attitude; and their newresolution was confirmed by the reception, on the 28th of November, ofdeputations from British revolutionary societies at the bar of theConvention, on which occasion the president of the latter affected todraw a dividing line between the British government and the Britishnation. On the 1st of December the militia was called out byproclamation, and Parliament summoned to meet on the 15th of themonth. On the latter day the Convention put forth another decree, announcing in the most explicit terms its purpose to overthrow allexisting governments in countries where the Republican armies couldpenetrate. Pitt now changed his front with an instantaneousness andabsoluteness which gave the highest proof of his capacity as a leaderof men. It was not so much that war was then determined, as that thepurpose was formed, once for all, to accept the challenge contained inthe French decree, unless France would discontinue her avowed courseof aggression. Orders were immediately given to increase largely thenumber of ships of war in commission. 

When danger looms close at hand, the best men, if known, are not leftin the cold shade of official disfavor. "Post nubila Phoebus, " was theexpression of Nelson, astonished for a rarity into Latin by thesuddenness with which the sun now burst upon him through the clouds. "The Admiralty so smile upon me, that really I am as much surprised aswhen they frowned. " On the 6th of January, 1793, the First Lord, withmany apologies for previous neglect, promised to give him aseventy-four-gun ship as soon as it was in his power to do so, andthat meanwhile, if he chose to take a sixty-four, he could have one assoon as she was ready. On the 30th he was appointed to the"Agamemnon, " of the latter rate. Within the preceding fortnight LouisXVI. Had been beheaded, and the French ambassador ordered to leaveEngland. On February 1, 1793, two days after Nelson's orders wereissued, the Republic declared war against Great Britain and Holland. 

FOOTNOTES:

[8] Nicolas, vol. V. P. 356. 

[9] Thus Collingwood, rarely other than sober and restrained in hislanguage, wrote to Hughes: "It is from the idea that the greatness andsuperiority of the British navy very much depends upon preserving inviolatethe Act of Navigation, excluding foreigners from access to the colonies, that I am induced to make this representation to you. " Nicolas, vol. I. P. 172. 

[10] Nelson's letters are contradictory on this point. In a letter toLocker of March 3, 1786, he says, "Before the first vessel was tried I hadseized four others;" whereas in the formal and detailed narrative drawnup--without date, but later than the letter to Locker--he says the firstvessel was tried and condemned May 17, the other four seized May 23. (Nicolas, vol. I. Pp. 177, 178. ) The author has followed the latter, because from the particularity of dates it seems to have been compiled frommemoranda, that of Locker written from memory, --both nearly a year afterthe events. 

[11] This word is used by Nelson, apparently, as equivalent to"season, "--the cruising period in the West Indies. "The admiral wishes toremain another station, " he writes elsewhere. 

[12] Lady Nelson's tombstone in Littleham Churchyard, Exmouth, reads thatshe died May 6, 1831, "aged 73. " She would then have been born before May6, 1758. Nicolas (vol. I. P. 217) says that she died May 4, 1831, aged 68, but does not mention his authority. 

[13] Prior to May, 1785, the only stops of the "Boreas" at Nevis wereJanuary 6-8, February 1-4, and March 11-15. (Boreas's Log in Nicolas'sLetters and Despatches of Lord Nelson, vol. Vii. Addenda, pp. Viii, ix. )

[14] The author is satisfied, from casual expressions in Nelson's lettersto Lady Hamilton, that his famous two years' confinement to the ship, 1803-1805, and, to a less extent, the similar seclusion practised in theBaltic and the Downs, proceeded, in large part at least, from a romanticand chivalrous resolve to leave no room for doubt, in the mind of LadyHamilton or of the world, that he was entirely faithful to her. 

[15] The author has italicized these words because they accurately expressthe just penalty that military law would have required of Nelson, had henot shown adequate grounds for his disobedience. They measure, therefore, the responsibility he shouldered, and the reward he deserved. 

[16] Sir Harris Nicolas (Nelson's Despatches and Letters, vol. I. P. 217)gives March 12 as the day of the wedding, upon the ground of a letter ofLady Nelson's. Her mention of the date is, however, rather casual; andMarch 11 is given in the parish register of the church in Nevis. 

[17] The same symptom will be noted in the anxious pursuit of Villeneuve tothe West Indies in 1805, where he grew better, although for some months hehad had in his hands the Admiralty's permission to return home on accountof his health. 

CHAPTER III. 

NELSON'S DEPARTURE FROM ENGLAND IN THE "AGAMEMNON. "--SERVICES IN THEMEDITERRANEAN UNTIL THE RECOVERY OF TOULON BY THE FRENCH. --LORD HOODIN COMMAND. 

FEBRUARY-DECEMBER, 1793. AGE, 34. 

Nelson's page in history covers a little more than twelve years, fromFebruary, 1793, to October, 1805. Its opening coincides with themoment when the wild passions of the French Revolution, still atfiercest heat, and which had hitherto raged like flame uncontrolled, operative only for destruction, were being rapidly mastered, guided, and regulated for efficient work, by the terrors of the RevolutionaryTribunal and the Committee of Public Safety. In the object to whichthese tremendous forces were now about to be applied lay the threat tothe peace of Europe, which aroused Great Britain to action, and sentinto the field her yet unknown champion from the Norfolk parsonage. The representatives of the French people had imparted to the originalmovement of their nation, --which aimed only at internal reforms, however radical, --a new direction, of avowed purposeful aggressionupon all political institutions exterior to, and differing from, theirown. This became the one characteristic common to the successive formsof government, which culminated in the pure military despotism ofNapoleon. 

To beat back that spirit of aggression was the mission of Nelson. Therein is found the true significance of his career, which mountshigher and higher in strenuous effort and gigantic achievement, as theblast of the Revolution swells fiercer and stronger under the mightyimpulse of the great Corsican. At each of the momentous crises, so farremoved in time and place, --at the Nile, at Copenhagen, atTrafalgar, --as the unfolding drama of the age reveals to the onlookerthe schemes of the arch-planner about to touch success, over againstNapoleon rises ever Nelson; and as the latter in the hour of victorydrops upon the stage where he has played so chief a part, his task isseen to be accomplished, his triumph secured. In the very act of dyinghe has dealt the foe a blow from which recovery is impossible. Moscowand Waterloo are the inevitable consequences of Trafalgar; as theglories of that day were but the fit and assured ending of theillustrious course which was begun upon the quarter-deck of the"Agamemnon. "

With the exception of the "Victory, " under whose flag he fell aftertwo years of arduous, heart-breaking uncertainties, no ship has suchintimate association with the career and name of Nelson as has the"Agamemnon. " And this is but natural, for to her he was the captain, solely, simply, and entirely; identified with her alone, glorying inher excellences and in her achievements, one in purpose and in spiritwith her officers and seamen; sharing their hopes, their dangers, andtheir triumphs; quickening them with his own ardor, moulding them intohis own image, until vessel and crew, as one living organism, reflected in act the heroic and unyielding energy that inspired hisfeeble frame. Although, for a brief and teeming period, he while incommand of her controlled also a number of smaller vessels on detachedservice, it was not until after he had removed to another ship that hebecame the squadron-commander, whose relations to the vessel on whichhe himself dwelt were no longer immediate, nor differed, save in hisbodily presence, from those he bore to others of the same division. Apersonality such as Nelson's makes itself indeed felt throughout itsentire sphere of action, be that large or small; but, withal, diffusion contends in vain with the inevitable law that forevercouples it with slackening power, nor was it possible even for him tolavish on the various units of a fleet, and on the diverse conflictingclaims of a great theatre of war, the same degree of interest andinfluence that he concentrated upon the "Agamemnon, " and upon thebrilliant though contracted services through which he carried her. Bonds such as these are not lightly broken, and to the "Agamemnon"Nelson clave for three long years and more, persistently refusinglarger ships, until the exhausted hulk could no longer respond to thedemands of her masters, and separation became inevitable. When hequitted her, at the moment of her departure for England, it was simplya question whether he would abandon the Mediterranean, and theprospect of a great future there opening before him, or sever a fewweeks earlier a companionship which must in any event end upon herarrival home. 

There is yet another point of view from which his command of the"Agamemnon" is seen to hold a peculiar relation to Nelson's story. This was the period in which expectation passed into fulfilment, whendevelopment, long arrested by unpropitious circumstances, resumed itsoutward progress under the benign influence of a favoring environment, and the bud, whose rare promise had long been noted by a fewdiscerning eyes, unfolded into the brilliant flower, destined in themagnificence of its maturity to draw the attention of a world. To thefulness of his glorious course these three years were what the days ofearly manhood are to ripened age; and they are marked by the sameelasticity, hopefulness, and sanguine looking to the future thatcharacterize youth, before illusions vanish and even success is foundto disappoint. Happiness was his then, as at no other time before orafter; for the surrounding conditions of enterprise, of difficultiesto be overcome, and dangers to be met, were in completecorrespondence with those native powers that had so long struggledpainfully for room to exert themselves. His health revived, and hisvery being seemed to expand in this congenial atmosphere, which to himwas as life from the dead. As with untiring steps he sped onward andupward, --counting naught done while aught remained to do, forgettingwhat was behind as he pressed on to what was before, --the ardor ofpursuit, the delight of achievement, the joy of the giant running hiscourse, sustained in him that glow of animation, that gladness in themere fact of existence, physical or moral, in which, if anywhere, thisearth's content is found. Lack of recognition, even, wrung from himonly the undaunted words: "Never mind! some day I will have a gazetteof my own. " Not till his dreams were realized, till aspiration hadissued in the completest and most brilliant triumph ever wrought uponthe seas, and he had for his gazette the loud homage of every mouth inEurope, --not till six months after the battle of the Nile, --did Nelsonwrite: "There is no true happiness in this life, and in my presentstate I could quit it with a smile. My only wish is to sink withhonour into the grave. "

The preparation of the Mediterranean fleet, to which the "Agamemnon"was assigned, was singularly protracted, and in the face of awell-ordered enemy the delay must have led to disastrous results. Nelson himself joined his ship at Chatham on the 7th of February, aweek after his orders were issued; but not until the 16th of March didshe leave the dockyard, and then only for Sheerness, where sheremained four weeks longer. By that time it seems probable, fromremarks in his letters, that the material equipment of the vessel wascomplete; but until the 14th of April she remained over a hundred menshort of her complement. "Yet, I think, " wrote Nelson, "that we shallbe far from ill-manned, even if the rest be not so good as they oughtto be. " Mobilization in those days had not been perfected into ascience, even in theory, and the difficulty of raising crews on theoutbreak of war was experienced by all nations, but by none more thanby Great Britain. Her wants were greatest, and for supply dependedupon a merchant service scattered in all quarters of the globe. "Menare very hard to be got, " Nelson said to his brother, "and without apress I have no idea that our fleet can be manned. " It does not appearthat this crude and violent, yet unavoidable, method was employed forthe "Agamemnon, " except so far as her crew was completed from theguard-ship. Dependence was placed upon the ordinary wiles of therecruiting-sergeant, and upon Nelson's own popularity in the adjacentcounties of Suffolk and Norfolk, from which the bulk of his ship'scompany was actually drawn. "I have sent out a lieutenant and fourmidshipmen, " he writes to Locker, "to get men at every seaport inNorfolk, and to forward them to Lynn and Yarmouth; my friends inYorkshire and the North tell me they will send what men they can layhands on;" but at the same time he hopes that Locker, thenCommander-in-chief at the Nore, will not turn away any who from otherdistricts may present themselves for the "Agamemnon. " Coming mainlyfrom the same neighborhood gave to the crew a certain homogeneousnessof character, affording ground for appeal to local pride, a mostpowerful incentive in moments of difficulty and emulation; and thisfeeling was enhanced by the thought that their captain too was aNorfolk man. To one possessing the sympathetic qualities of Nelson, who so readily shared the emotions and gained the affections of hisassociates, it was easy to bind into a living whole the units animatedby this common sentiment. 

His stepson, Josiah Nisbet, at this time about thirteen years old, nowentered the service as a midshipman, and accompanied him on board the"Agamemnon. " The oncoming of a great war naturally roused to a yethigher pitch the impulse towards the sea, which in all generationshas stirred the blood of English boys. Of these, Nelson, using hiscaptain's privilege, received a number as midshipmen upon hisquarter-deck, among them several from the sons of neighbors andfriends, and therefore, like the crew, Norfolk lads. It is told thatto one, whose father he knew to be a strong Whig, of the party whichin the past few years had sympathized with the general current of theFrench Revolution, he gave the following pithy counsels for hisguidance in professional life: "First, you must always implicitly obeyorders, without attempting to form any opinion of your own respectingtheir propriety; secondly, you must consider every man as your enemywho speaks ill of your king; and thirdly, you must hate a Frenchman asyou do the devil. " On the last two items Nelson's practice was in fullaccord with his precept; but to the first, his statement of which, sound enough in the general, is open to criticism as being tooabsolute, he was certainly not obedient. Not to form an opinion ispushing the principle of subordination to an indefensible extreme, even for a junior officer, though the caution not to express it iswise, as well as becoming to the modesty of youth. Lord Howe's adviceto Codrington, to watch carefully all that passed and to form his ownconclusions, but to keep them to himself, was in every respect morereasonable and profitable. But in fact this dictum of Nelson's wassimply another instance of hating the French as he did the devil. TheFrench were pushing independence and private judgment to one extreme, and he instinctively adopted the other. 

It was not till near the end of April that the "Agamemnon" finallyleft the Thames, anchoring at Spithead on the 28th of that month. Still the fleet which Lord Hood was to command was not ready. Whileawaiting her consorts, the ship made a short cruise in the Channel, and a few days later sailed as one of a division of fiveships-of-the-line under Admiral Hotham, to occupy a station fifty toa hundred miles west of the Channel Islands. Nelson's disposition notto form any opinion of his own respecting the propriety of orders wasthus evidenced: "What we have been sent out for is best known to thegreat folks in London: to us, it appears, only to hum the nation andmake tools of us, for where we have been stationed no enemy was likelyto be met with, or where we could protect our own trade. " There can beno doubt that not only was the practical management of the Navy atthis time exceedingly bad, but that no sound ideas even prevailed uponthe subject. Hotham's squadron gained from neutral vessels twoimportant pieces of information, --that Nantes, Bordeaux, and L'Orientwere filled with English vessels, prizes to French cruisers; and thatthe enemy kept eight sail-of-the-line, with frigates in proportion, constantly moving in detachments about the Bay of Biscay. Under thedispositions adopted by the British Admiralty, these hostile divisionsgave, to the commerce destroying of the smaller depredators, a supportthat sufficiently accounts for the notorious sufferings of Britishtrade during the opening years of the war. Nelson had no mastery ofthe terminology of warfare, --he never talked about strategy and littleabout tactics, --but, though without those valuable aids to precisionof thought, he had pondered, studied, and reasoned, and he had, besides, what is given to few, --real genius and insight. Accordinglyhe at once pierced to the root of the trouble, --the enemy's squadrons, rather than the petty cruisers dependent upon them, to which thedamage was commonly attributed. "They are always at sea, and Englandnot willing to send a squadron to interrupt them. " But, whileinstancing this intuitive perception of a man gifted with rarepenetration, it is necessary to guard against rash conclusions thatmight be drawn from it, and to remark that it by no means follows thateducation is unnecessary to the common run of men, because a geniusis in advance of his times. It is well also to note that even in himthis flash of insight, though unerring in its indications, lacked thedefiniteness of conviction which results from ordered thought. Howeveraccurate, it is but a glimmer, --not yet a fixed light. 

Hotham's division joined the main body under Lord Hood, off the ScillyIslands, on the 23d of May, the total force then consisting of elevensail-of-the-line, with the usual smaller vessels. It remained cruisingin that neighborhood until the 6th of June, keeping the approaches ofthe Channel open for a homeward-bound convoy of merchantmen, whichpassed on that day. The fleet then bore up for the Straits, and on the14th six ships, the "Agamemnon" among them, parted company for Cadiz, there to fill up with water, in order to avoid the delays which wouldarise if the scanty resources of Gibraltar had to supply all thevessels. On the 23d this division left Cadiz, reaching Gibraltar thesame evening; and on the 27th Hood, having now with him fifteen of theline, sailed for Toulon. 

Nelson's mind was already busy with the prospects of the campaign, andthe various naval factors that went to make up the military situation. "Time must discover what we are going after, " he writes to hisbrother; while to Locker he propounds the problem which always hasperplexed the British mind, and still does, --how to make the Frenchfight, if they are unwilling. So long as that question remainsunsolved, the British government has to bear the uncertainties, exposure, and expense of a difficult and protracted defensive. "Wehave done nothing, " he says, "and the same prospect appears before us:the French cannot come out, and we have no means of getting at them inToulon. " In "cannot come out, " he alludes to the presence of a Spanishfleet of twenty-four ships-of-the-line. This, in conjunction withHood's force, would far exceed the French in Toulon, which thehighest estimate then placed at twenty-one of the line. He had, however, already measured the capabilities of the Spanish Navy. Theyhave very fine ships, he admits, but they are shockingly manned, --somuch so that if only the barges' crews of the six British vessels thatentered Cadiz, numbering at the most seventy-five to a hundred men, but all picked, could have got on board one of their first-rates, hewas certain they could have captured her, although her ship's companynumbered nearly a thousand. "If those we are to meet in theMediterranean are no better manned, " he continues, "much servicecannot be expected of them. " The prediction proved true, for no soonerdid Hood find the Spanish admiral than the latter informed him he mustgo to Cartagena, having nineteen hundred sick in his fleet. Theofficer who brought this message said it was no wonder they weresickly, for they had been sixty days at sea. This excited Nelson'sderision--not unjustly. "From the circumstance of having been longerthan that time at sea, do we attribute our getting healthy. It hasstamped with me the extent of their nautical abilities: long may theyremain in their present state. " The last sentence reveals hisintuitive appreciation of the fact that the Spain of that day could inno true sense be the ally of Great Britain; for, at the moment hepenned the wish, the impotence or defection of their allies wouldleave the British fleet actually inferior to the enemy in thosewaters. He never forgot these impressions, nor the bungling efforts ofthe Spaniards to form a line of battle. Up to the end of his life theprospect of a Spanish war involved no military anxieties, but only theprospect of more prize money. 

Among the various rumors of that troubled time, there came one thatthe French were fitting their ships with forges to bring their shot toa red heat, and so set fire to the enemy's vessel in which they mightlodge. Nelson was promptly ready with a counter and quite adequatetactical move. "This, if true, " he wrote, "I humbly conceive wouldhave been as well kept secret; but as it is known, we must take careto get so close that their red shots may go _through_ both sides, whenit will not matter whether they are hot or cold. " It is somewhat oddthat the extremely diligent and painstaking Sir Harris Nicolas, in hisversion of this letter, should have dropped the concluding sentence, one of the most important and characteristic occurring in Nelson'scorrespondence at this time. 

On the 14th of July Nelson notes that the fleet had received orders toconsider Marseilles and Toulon as invested, and to take all vessels ofwhatever nation bound into those ports. He at once recognized theimportance of this step, and the accurate judgment that dictated it. The British could not, as he said, get at the enemy in his fortifiedharbor; but they might by this means exercise the pressure that wouldforce him to come out. Undoubtedly, whether on a large or on a smallscale, whether it concern the whole plan of a war or of a campaign, ormerely the question of a single military position, the best way tocompel an unwilling foe to action, and to spoil his waiting game whichis so onerous to the would-be assailant, is to attack him elsewhere, to cut short his resources, and make his position untenable byexhaustion. "This has pleased us, " Nelson wrote; "if we make thesered-hot gentlemen hungry, they may be induced to come out. "

The investment by sea of these two harbors, but especially of Toulon, as being an important dockyard, was accordingly the opening move madeby the British admiral. On the 16th of July he approached the latterport, and from that time until August 25 a close blockade wasmaintained, with the exception of a very few days, during which Hoodtook the fleet off Nice, and thence to Genoa, to remonstrate with thatrepublic upon its supplying the south of France with grain, andbringing back French property under neutral papers. "Our being here isa farce if this trade is allowed, " said Nelson, and rightly; for sofar as appearances then went, the only influence the British squadronscould exert was by curtailing the supplies of southern France. Thatdistrict raised only grain enough for three months' consumption; forthe remainder of the year's food it depended almost wholly upon Sicilyand Barbary, its communications with the interior being so bad thatthe more abundant fields of distant French provinces could not sendtheir surplus. 

In the chaotic state in which France was then plunged, the utmostuncertainty prevailed as to the course events might take, and rumorsof all descriptions were current, the wildest scarcely exceeding inimprobability the fantastic horrors that actually prevailed throughoutthe land during these opening days of the Reign of Terror. Theexpectation that found most favor in the fleet was that Provence wouldseparate from the rest of France, and proclaim itself an independentrepublic under the protection of Great Britain; but few looked for theamazing result which shortly followed, in the delivery of Toulon byits citizens into the hands of Lord Hood. This Nelson attributedpurely to the suffering caused by the strictness of the blockade. "AtMarseilles and Toulon, " wrote he on the 20th of August, "they arealmost starving, yet nothing brings them to their senses. Although theConvention has denounced them as traitors, yet even these people willnot declare for anything but Liberty and Equality. " Three days later, Commissioners from both cities went on board Hood's flagship to treatfor peace, upon the basis of re-establishing the monarchy, andrecognizing as king the son of Louis XVI. The admiral accepted theproposal, on condition that the port and arsenal of Toulon should bedelivered to him for safe keeping, until the restoration of the youngprince was effected. On the 27th of August the city ran up the whiteflag of the Bourbons, and the British fleet, together with theSpanish, which at this moment arrived on the scene, anchored in theouter port. The allied troops took possession of the forts commandingthe harbor, while the dockyards and thirty ships-of-the-line weredelivered to the navies. 

"The perseverance of our fleet has been great, " wrote Nelson, "and tothat only can be attributed our unexampled success. Not even a boatcould get into Marseilles or Toulon, or on the coast, with provisions;and the old saying, 'that hunger will tame a lion, ' was never morestrongly exemplified. " In this he deceived himself, however naturalthe illusion. The opposition of Toulon to the Paris Government waspart of a general movement of revolt, which spread throughout theprovinces in May and June, 1793, upon the violent overthrow of theGirondists in the National Convention. The latter then proclaimedseveral cities outlawed, Toulon among them; and the bloody severitiesit exercised were the chief determining cause of the sudden treason, the offspring of fear more than of hunger, --though the latterdoubtless contributed, --which precipitated the great southern arsenalinto the arms of the Republic's most dangerous foe. Marseilles fellbefore the Conventional troops, and the resultant panic in the sistercity occasioned the hasty step, which in less troubled moments wouldhave been regarded with just horror. But in truth Nelson, despite hisacute military perceptions, had not yet developed that keen politicalsagacity, the fruit of riper judgment grounded on wider information, which he afterwards showed. His ambition was yet limited to the sphereof the "Agamemnon, " his horizon bounded by the petty round of theday's events. He rose, as yet, to no apprehension of the mighty crisishanging over Europe, to no appreciation of the profound meanings ofthe opening strife. "I hardly think the War can last, " he writes tohis wife, "for what are we at war about?" and again, "I think we shallbe in England in the winter or spring. " Even some months later, inDecember, before Toulon had reverted to the French, he is completelyblind to the importance of the Mediterranean in the great struggle, and expresses a wish to exchange to the West Indies, "for I think ourSea War is over in these seas. "

It is probable, indeed, that in his zeal, thoroughness, and fidelityto the least of the duties then falling to him, is to be seen a surerindication of his great future than in any wider speculations aboutmatters as yet too high for his position. The recent coolness betweenhim and Lord Hood had been rapidly disappearing under the admiral'sreviving appreciation and his own aptitude to conciliation. "Lord Hoodis very civil, " he writes on more than one occasion, "I think we maybe good friends again;" and the offer of a seventy-four-gun ship inplace of his smaller vessel was further proof of his superior'sconfidence. Nelson refused the proposal. "I cannot give up myofficers, " he said, in the spirit that so endeared him to hisfollowers; but the compliment was felt, and was enhanced by theadmiral's approval of his motives. The prospective occupation ofToulon gave occasion for a yet more nattering evidence of the esteemin which he was held. As soon as the agreement with the city wascompleted, but the day before taking possession, Hood despatched himin haste to Oneglia, a small port on the Riviera of Genoa, and thenceto Naples, to seek from the latter court and that of Turin[18] areinforcement of ten thousand troops to hold the new acquisition. The"Agamemnon" being a fast sailer undoubtedly contributed much to thisselection; but the character of the commanding officer could not butbe considered on so important, and in some ways delicate, a mission. "I should have liked to have stayed one day longer with the fleet, when they entered the harbour, " he wrote to Mrs. Nelson, "but servicecould not be neglected for any private gratification, "--a sentimentshe had to hear pretty often, as betrothed and as wife, but which wasno platitude on the lips of one who gave it constant demonstration inhis acts. "Duty is the great business of a sea officer, " he told hisintended bride in early manhood, to comfort her and himself under aprolonged separation. "Thank God! I have done my duty, " was the spokenthought that most solaced his death hour, as his heart yearned towardsthose at home whom he should see no more. 

About this time he must have felt some touch of sympathy for theeffeminate Spaniards, who were made ill by a sixty days' cruise. "Allwe get here, " he writes, "is honour and salt beef. My poor fellowshave not had a morsel of fresh meat or vegetables for near nineteenweeks; and in that time I have only had my foot twice on shore atCadiz. We are absolutely getting sick from fatigue. " "I am here[Naples] with news of our most glorious and great success, but, alas!the fatigue of getting it has been so great that the fleet generally, and I am sorry to say, my ship most so, are knocked up. Day after day, week after week, month after month, we have not been two gun shotsfrom Toulon. " The evident looseness of this statement, for the shiphad only been a little over a month off Toulon, shows the impressionthe service had made upon his mind, for he was not prone to suchexaggerations. "It is hardly possible, " he says again, "to conceivethe state of my ship; I have little less than one hundred sick. " Thiscondition of things is an eloquent testimony to the hardships endured;for Nelson was singularly successful, both before and after thesedays, in maintaining the health of a ship's company. His biographerssay that during the term of three years that he commanded the "Boreas"in the West Indies, not a single officer or man died out of her wholecomplement, --an achievement almost incredible in that sicklyclimate;[19] and he himself records that in his two months' chase ofVilleneuve, in 1805, no death from sickness occurred among the sevenor eight thousand persons in the fleet. He attributed these remarkableresults to his attention, not merely to the physical surroundings ofthe crews, but also to the constant mental stimulus and interest, which he aroused by providing the seamen with occupation, frequentamusements, and change of scene, thus keeping the various faculties incontinual play, and avoiding the monotony which most saps health, through its deadening influence on the mind and spirits. 

The "Agamemnon" reached Naples on the 12th of September, and remainedthere four days. Nelson pressed the matter of reinforcements with suchdiligence, and was so heartily sustained by the British minister, SirWilliam Hamilton, that he obtained the promise of six thousand troopsto sail at once under the convoy of the "Agamemnon. " "I have acted forLord Hood, " he wrote, "with a zeal which no one could exceed;" and afew weeks later he says: "The Lord is very much pleased with myconduct about the troops at Naples, which I undertook without anyauthority whatever from him; and they arrived at Toulon before hisrequisition reached Naples. " It appears, therefore, that his orderswere rather those of a despatch-bearer than of a negotiator; but thathe, with the quick initiative he always displayed, took upon himselfdiplomatic action, to further the known wishes of his superior and thecommon cause of England and Naples. It was upon this occasion thatNelson first met Lady Hamilton, who exercised so marked an influenceover his later life; but, though she was still in the prime of hersingular loveliness, being yet under thirty, not a ripple stirred thesurface of his soul, afterward so powerfully perturbed by thisfascinating woman. "Lady Hamilton, " he writes to his wife, "has beenwonderfully kind and good to Josiah [his stepson]. She is a youngwoman of amiable manners, and who does honour to the station to whichshe is raised. " His mind was then too full of what was to be done; notas after the Nile, when, unstrung by reaction from the exhaustingemotions of the past months, it was for the moment empty of aspirationand cloyed with flattery only. 

The prospect of sailing with the convoy of troops, as well as of a fewdays' repose for the wearied ship's company, was cut short by the newsthat a French ship of war, with some merchant vessels in convoy, hadanchored on the Sardinian coast. Although there were at Naples severalNeapolitan naval vessels, and one Spaniard, none of them moved; and asthe Prime Minister sent the information to Nelson, he felt bound togo, though but four days in port. "Unfit as my ship was, I had nothingleft for the honour of our country but to sail, which I did in twohours afterwards. It was necessary to show them what an Englishman-of-war would do. " The expected enemy was not found, and, afterstretching along the coast in a vain search, the "Agamemnon" put intoLeghorn on the 25th of September, nine days after leaving Naples, --to"absolutely save my poor fellows, " wrote her captain to his brother. But even so, he purposed staying at his new anchorage but three days, "for I cannot bear the thought of being absent from the scene ofaction" at Toulon. In the same letter he mentions that since the 23dof April--five months--the ship had been at anchor only twenty days. 

The unwavering resolution and prompt decision of his character thuscrop out at every step. In Leghorn he found a large French frigate, which had been on the point of sailing when his ship came in sight. "Iam obliged to keep close watch to take care he does not give me theslip, which he is inclined to do. I shall pursue him, and leave thetwo Courts [Great Britain and Tuscany] to settle the propriety of themeasure, which I think will not be strictly regular. Have been up allnight watching him--ready to cut the moment he did. " The enemy, however, made no movement, and Nelson was not prepared to violateflagrantly the neutrality of the port. On the 30th of September hesailed, and on the 5th of October rejoined Lord Hood off Toulon, wherefour thousand of the Neapolitan troops, for which he had negotiated, had already arrived. 

The high favor in which the admiral had held him ten years before inthe West Indies, though slightly overcast by the coolness which aroseduring the intervening peace, had been rapidly regained in the courseof the present campaign; and the customary report of his proceedingsduring the six weeks' absence could not but confirm Hood in theassurance that he had now to deal with a very exceptional character, especially fitted for separate and responsible service. Accordingly, from this time forward, such is the distinguishing feature of Nelson'scareer as a subordinate. He is selected from among many competitors, frequently his seniors, for the performance of duty outside the reachof the commander-in-chief, but requiring the attention of one uponwhose activity, intelligence, and readiness, the fullest dependencecould be placed. Up to the battle of the Nile, --in which, it mustalways be remembered, he commanded a squadron detached from the mainfleet, and was assigned to it in deliberate preference to two olderflag-officers, --Nelson's life presents a series of detached commands, independent as regarded the local scene of operations, and his methodof attaining the prescribed end with the force allotted to him, butdependent, technically, upon the distant commanders-in-chief, each ofwhom in succession, with one accord, recognized his singular fitness. The pithy but characteristic expression said to have been used by EarlSt. Vincent, when asked for instructions about the Copenhagenexpedition, --"D--n it, Nelson, send them to the devil your ownway, "--sums up accurately enough the confidence shown him by hissuperiors. He could not indeed lift them all to the height of his ownconceptions, fearlessness, and enterprise; but when they had made uptheir minds to any particular course, they were, each and all, perfectly willing to intrust the execution to him. Even at Copenhagenhe was but second in command, though conspicuously first inachievement. It was not till the opening of the second war of theFrench Revolution, in May, 1803, that he himself had supreme charge ofa station, --his old familiar Mediterranean. 

Being held in such esteem, it was but a short time before Nelson wasagain sent off from Toulon, to which he did not return during theBritish occupation. He was now ordered to report to Commodore Linzee, then lying with a detachment of three ships-of-the-line in the harborof Cagliari, at the south end of Sardinia. On her passage the"Agamemnon" met and engaged a French squadron, of four large frigatesand a brig. Though without decisive results, Nelson was satisfied withhis own conduct in this affair, as was also Lord Hood when it came tohis knowledge; for, one of the frigates being badly crippled, thewhole force, which was on its way to Nice, was compelled to takerefuge in Corsica, where it was far from secure. Two days later, onthe 24th of October, Cagliari was reached, and the "Agamemnon"accompanied the division to Tunis, arriving there on the 1st ofNovember. 

Linzee's mission was to try and detach the Bey from the Frenchinterest, and it was hoped he could be induced to allow the seizureof a number of French vessels which had entered the port, under theconvoy of a ship-of-the-line and four frigates. When the Britishentered, the frigates had disappeared, being in fact the same thatNelson had fought ten days before. In accordance with hisinstructions, Linzee strove to persuade the Bey that the Republicangovernment, because of its revolutionary and bloodthirsty character, should receive no recognition or support from more regular states, noteven the protection usually extended by a neutral port, and that inconsequence he should be permitted to seize for Great Britain thevessels in Tunis. The Turk may possibly have overlooked the fallacy inthis argument, which assumed that the protection extended by neutralgovernments was rather for the benefit of the belligerent than for thequiet and safety of its own waters; but he was perfectly clear-sightedas to his personal advantage in the situation, for the French owners, in despair of getting to France, were selling their cargoes to him atone third their value. To the argument that the French had beheadedtheir king, he drily replied that the English had once done the same;and he decisively refused to allow the ships to be molested. Nelsonwas disgusted that his consent should have been awaited. "The Englishseldom get much by negotiation except the being laughed at, which wehave been; and I don't like it. Had we taken, which in my opinion weought to have done, the men-of-war and convoy, worth at least£300, 000, how much better we could have negotiated:--given the Bey£50, 000, he would have been glad to have put up with the insultoffered to his dignity;" and he plainly intimates his dissatisfactionwith Linzee. This irresponsible and irreflective outburst was, however, only an instance of the impatience his enterprising, energetic spirit always felt when debarred from prompt action, whetherby good or bad reasons; for almost on the same day he expresses thesounder judgment: "Had we latterly attempted to take them I am surethe Bey would have declared against us, and done our trade somedamage. " No advantage could have accrued from the seizure of theFrench vessels, at all proportioned to the inconvenience of having thehostility of Tunis, flanking as it did the trade routes to the Levant. The British had then quite enough on their hands, without detaching anadditional force from the north coast of the Mediterranean, to supporta gratuitous quarrel on the south. As a matter of mere policy it wouldhave been ill-judged. 

Nelson, however, did not as yet at all realize the wideness of theimpending struggle, for it was in these very letters that he expresseda wish to exchange to the West Indies. "You know, " he writes to hisold friend Locker, "that Pole is gone to the West Indies. I have notseen him since his order, but I know it was a thing he dreaded. Had Ibeen at Toulon I should have been a candidate for that service, for Ithink our sea war is over in these seas. " Perhaps his intrinsic meritwould have retrieved even such a mistake as we can now see this wouldhave been, and he would there have come sooner into contact with SirJohn Jervis--to whom, if to any one, the name of patron to Nelson maybe applied--for Jervis then had the West India command; but it isdifficult to imagine Nelson's career apart from the incidents of hisMediterranean service. The Mediterranean seems inseparable from hisname, and he in the end felt himself identified with it beyond allother waters. 

His longing for action, which prompted the desire for the West Indies, was quickly gratified, for orders were received from Hood, by Linzee, to detach him from the latter's command. The admiral sent him a veryhandsome letter upon his single-handed combat with the Frenchfrigates, and directed him to go to the north end of Corsica, to takecharge of a division of vessels he would there find cruising, and tosearch for his late enemies along that coast and through theneighboring waters, between the island and the shores of Italy. He wasalso to warn off neutral vessels bound to Genoa, that port beingdeclared blockaded, and to seize them if they persisted in theirvoyage thither. "I consider this command as a very high compliment, "wrote Nelson to his uncle Suckling, "there being five older captainsin the fleet. " This it certainly was, --a compliment and a prophecy aswell. 

In pursuance of these orders Nelson left Tunis on the 30th ofNovember, and on the 8th of December discovered the French squadron, protected by shore batteries, in San Fiorenzo Bay, in Corsica. Thisisland, which during the middle ages, and until some twenty yearsbefore the beginning of the French Revolution, was a dependency ofGenoa, had then by the latter been ceded to France, against theexpress wishes of the inhabitants, whose resistance was crushed onlyafter a prolonged struggle. Although it was now in open revolt againstthe Revolutionary government, the troops of the latter still heldthree or four of the principal seaports, among them the northern onein which the frigates then lay, as well as Bastia upon the east coastof the island, and Calvi on the west. His force being insufficient toengage the works of any of these places, there was nothing for Nelsonto do but to blockade them, in hopes of exhausting their resources andat least preventing the escape of the ships of war. In this he wassuccessful, for the latter either were destroyed or fell into thehands of Great Britain, when the ports were reduced. 

Meanwhile affairs at Toulon were approaching the crisis which endedits tenure by the British and their allies. The garrison had neverbeen sufficient to man properly the very extensive lines, which thepeculiar configuration of the surrounding country made it necessary tooccupy for the security of the town; and the troops themselves werenot only of different nations, but of very varying degrees ofefficiency. Under these conditions the key of the position, accurately indicated by Napoleon Bonaparte, then a major and incommand of the artillery, was held in insufficient force, and wassuccessfully stormed on the night of December 16, 1793. It wasimmediately recognized that the ships could no longer remain in theharbor, and that with them the land forces also must depart. After twodays of hurried preparations, and an attempt, only partiallysuccessful, to destroy the dockyard and French ships of war, thefleets sailed out on the 19th of December, carrying with them, besidesthe soldiery, as many as possible of the wretched citizens, who wereforced to fly in confusion and misery from their homes, in order toescape the sure and fearful vengeance of the Republican government. The "Agamemnon" was in Leghorn, getting provisions, when the fugitivesarrived there, and Nelson speaks in vivid terms of the impression madeupon him by the tales he heard and the sights he saw. "Fathers arehere without families, and families without fathers, the pictures ofhorror and despair. " "In short, all is horror. I cannot write all: mymind is deeply impressed with grief. Each teller makes the scene morehorrible. " He expressed the opinion that the evacuation was a benefitto England, and it unquestionably was. He had not always thought so;but it must be allowed that the hopes and exultation with which hegreeted the acquisition of the place had sufficient foundation, in thereported attitude of the people of Southern France, to justify thefirst opinion as well as the last. The attempt was worth making, though it proved unsuccessful. As it was, the occupation had resultedin a degree of destruction to the French ships and arsenal in Toulon, which, though then over-estimated, was a real gain to the allies. 

FOOTNOTES:

[18] Turin was capital of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which embraced theisland of that name and the Province of Piedmont. 

[19] This statement, which apparently depends upon a memoir supplied manyyears later by the first lieutenant of the "Boreas, " is not strictlyaccurate, for Nelson himself, in a letter written shortly after her arrivalin the West Indies, mentions that several of her ship's company had beencarried off by fever (Nicolas, vol. I. P. 111); but it can doubtless beaccepted as evidence of an unusually healthy condition. 

CHAPTER IV. 

REDUCTION OF CORSICA BY THE BRITISH. --DEPARTURE OF LORD HOOD FORENGLAND. --THE "AGAMEMNON" REFITTED AT LEGHORN. 

JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1794. AGE, 35. 

By the loss of Toulon the British fleet in the Mediterranean was leftadrift, without any secure harbor to serve as a depot for supplies anda base for extended operations. Hood took his ships to Hyères Bay, afew miles east of Toulon, a spot where they could lie safely atanchor, but which was unsuitable for a permanent establishment, --theshores not being tenable against French attack. He now turned his eyesupon Corsica, whence the celebrated native chieftain, Paoli, who hadled the natives in their former struggle against France, had madeovertures to him, looking to the union of the island to the Britishcrown. Nelson in person, or, during his brief absence in Leghorn, hisdivision, had so closely invested the shores, that neither troops norsupplies of any kind had been able to enter since the early part ofDecember, nor had the blockaded vessels been able to get out. Thethoroughness with which this work was done brought him, on the 6th ofJanuary, 1794, yet further compliments from Hood, who wrote him that"he looked upon these frigates as certain, trusting to my zeal andactivity, and knows, if it is in the power of man to have them, I willsecure them. " At the same time he was instructed to enter intocommunication with Paoli, and settle plans for the landing of thetroops. In attending to this commission his intermediary wasLieutenant George Andrews, brother to the lady to whom he had becomeattached at St. Omer, and who had afterwards been a midshipman withhim on board the "Boreas. " "This business going through my hands, " hewrote with just pride, "is a proof of Lord Hood's confidence in me, and that I shall pledge myself for nothing but what will be acceptableto him. " It was indeed evident that Hood was more and more reposing inhim a peculiar trust, a feeling which beyond most others tends toincrease by its own action. Nelson repaid him with the most unboundedadmiration. "The Lord is very good friends with me, " he writes; "he iscertainly the best officer I ever saw. Everything from him is so clearit is impossible to misunderstand him. " "His zeal, his activity forthe honour and benefit of his country, " he says at another time, "arenot abated. Upwards of seventy, he possesses the mind of forty yearsof age. He has not a thought separated from honour and glory. " Theflattering proofs of his superior's esteem, and the demand made uponhis natural powers to exert themselves freely, had a very beneficialeffect upon his health and spirits. It was not effort, howeverprotracted and severe, but the denial of opportunity to act, whetherby being left unemployed or through want of information, that woreNelson down. "I have not been one hour at anchor for pleasure in eightmonths; but I can assure you I never was better in health. "

Meanwhile a commission from the fleet arrived in Corsica. Sir GilbertElliot, the representative of the British government in the island, was at its head, and with him were associated two army officers, oneof whom afterwards became widely celebrated as Sir John Moore. Asatisfactory agreement being concluded, Hood sailed from Hyères Baywith the ships and troops, and operations began against San Fiorenzo, terminating in the evacuation of the place by the French, who upon the19th of February retreated by land to Bastia. Nelson was notimmediately connected with this undertaking; but he had thesatisfaction of knowing that two of the four frigates, of whosedetention in the island he was the immediate cause, were here lost tothe enemy. He was during these weeks actively employed harrying thecoast--destroying depots of stores on shore, and small vessels ladenwith supplies. These services were mainly, though not entirely, rendered in the neighborhood of Bastia, a strongly fortified town, which was to become the next object of the British efforts, and thescene of his own exertions. There, also, though on a comparativelysmall scale, he was to give striking evidence of the characteristicswhich led him on, step by step, to his great renown. 

When Hood himself took command at San Fiorenzo, he relieved Nelsonfrom that part of his charge, and sent him on the 7th of February toblockade Bastia, --a strictly detached service, and one of the utmostimportance, as upon the intercepting of supplies the issue of thesiege largely turned. Three weeks later, on the 1st of March, Nelsonwrote: "We are still in the busy scene of war, a situation in which Iown I feel pleasure, more especially as my actions have given greatsatisfaction to my commander-in-chief. The blocking up of Corsica heleft to me: it has been accomplished in the most complete manner, nota boat got in, nor a soldier landed, although eight thousand men wereembarked at Nice;" and, he might have added, although a vessel wassaid to sail from Nice every thirty-six hours. Nor was his activityconfined to blockading. He continually reconnoitered the town and theworks, in doing which on the 23d of February he engaged the batteriesat short range, with the "Agamemnon" and two frigates, --the actionlasting for nearly two hours. While it was at its height, the heads ofthe British columns, coming from San Fiorenzo, only twelve milesdistant by land, were seen upon the heights overlooking Bastia fromthe rear. "What a noble sight it must have been" to them! wrote Nelsonenthusiastically, in the ardor of his now opening career, --for itmust be remembered that this hero of a hundred fights was even thenbut beginning to taste that rapture of the strife, in which he alwaysbreathed most freely, as though in his native element. 

Bastia, as he saw it and reported to Lord Hood, was a walled town withcentral citadel, of some ten thousand inhabitants, on the east coastof Corsica, and twenty miles south of Cape Corso, the northernextremity of the island. The main fortifications were along thesea-front; but there was, besides, a series of detached works oneither flank and to the rear. The latter not only guarded theapproaches from the interior, but also, being situated on the hills, much above the town, were capable of commanding it, in case of anenemy gaining possession. Nelson, while modestly disclaiming anypresumptuous dependence upon his own judgment, expressed a decidedopinion, based upon the engagement of the 23d, that the "Agamemnon"and the frigates could silence the fire of the sea-front, batter downthe walls, and that then five hundred troops could carry the place byassault. "That the works on the hills would annoy the town afterwardsis certain, but the enemy being cut off from all supplies--theprovisions in the town being of course in our possession--would thinkof nothing but making the best terms they could for themselves. " Tohis dismay, however, and to the extreme annoyance of the admiral, General Dundas, commanding the army, refused to move against Bastia, condemning the attempt as visionary and rash. Meantime the French, unmolested except by the desultory efforts of the insurgent Corsicans, were each day strengthening their works, and converting thepossibilities Nelson saw into the impossibilities of the cautiousgeneral. 

Hood on the 25th of February came round from San Fiorenzo to Bastia;but he purposely brought with him no captain senior to Nelson, inorder that the latter might remain in charge of the operations he hadbegun so well. When Dundas retreated again to San Fiorenzo, Hood onthe 3d of March followed him there with the flagship, to urge hisco-operation; leaving Nelson with six frigates to conduct the blockadeand take such other steps as the opportunities might justify. By themiddle of March, nearly three months having elapsed since her lasthasty visit to Leghorn, the "Agamemnon" was wholly destitute ofsupplies. "We are really, " wrote Nelson to Hood, "without firing, wine, beef, pork, flour, and almost without water: not a rope, canvas, twine, or nail in the ship. The ship is so light she cannot hold herside to the wind. .. . We are certainly in a bad plight at present, nota man has slept dry for many months. Yet, " he continues, with thatindomitable energy which made light of mere difficulties of material, and conveys so impressive a lesson to our modern days, when slightphysical defects appear insurmountable, and ships not wholly up todate are counted obsolete, --"yet if your Lordship wishes me to remainoff Bastia, I can, by going to Porto Ferrajo, get water and stores, and twenty-four hours in Leghorn will give us provisions; and ourrefitting, which will take some time, can be put off a little. My wishis to be present at the attack of Bastia. "

On the 18th of March Hood summoned him to San Fiorenzo. The differencebetween him and Dundas had become a quarrel, and the latter hadquitted his command. Hood wished to strengthen the argument with hissuccessor, by a report of the observations made by Nelson; but thelatter records that, after expressing his opinion that eight hundredtroops with four hundred seamen could reduce the place, it was foundthat all the army was united against an attack, declaring theimpossibility of taking Bastia, even if all the force wereunited, --and this, notwithstanding that an engineer and an artilleryofficer had visited the scene, and agreed with Nelson that there was aprobability of success. On the north side both they and he consideredthe place weak, and at the same time found the ground favorable forestablishing the siege guns. Moreover, even during the winter gales, he had succeeded in so closing the sea approaches, while the revoltedCorsicans intercepted those by land, that a pound of coarse bread wasselling for three francs. The spring equinox was now near at hand, andwith better weather the blockade would be yet more efficient. Betweenactual attack and famine, he argued, the place must fall. "Notattacking it I could not but consider as a national disgrace. If theArmy will not take it, we must, by some way or other. "

If every particular operation of war is to be considered by itselfalone, and as a purely professional question, to be determined bystriking a balance between the arguments pro and con, it is probablethat the army officers were right in their present contention. Innothing military was scientific accuracy of prediction so possible asin forecasting the result and duration of a regular siege, where theforce brought to bear on either side could be approximately known. But, even in this most methodical and least inspired of processes, theelements of chance, of the unforeseen, or even the improbable, willenter, disturbing the most careful calculations. For this reason, nocase must be decided purely on its individual merits, without takinginto account the other conditions of the campaign at large. For goodand sufficient reasons, the British had undertaken, not to conquer ahostile island, but to effect the deliverance of a people who werealready in arms, and had themselves redeemed their country with theexception of two or three fortified seaports, for the reduction ofwhich they possessed neither the materials nor the technical skill. Topause in the movement of advance was, with a half-civilized race ofunstable temperament, to risk everything. But besides, for the merepurpose of the blockade, it was imperative to force the enemy as faras possible to contract his lines. Speaking of a new work thrown upnorth of the town, Nelson said with accurate judgment: "It must bedestroyed, or the Corsicans will be obliged to give up a post whichthe enemy would immediately possess; and of course throw us on thatside at a greater distance from Bastia. " The result would be, notmerely so much more time and labor to be expended, nor yet only themoral effect on either party, but also the uncovering of a greaterlength of seaboard, by which supplies might be run into the town. 

The strength of the place, in which, when it fell, were found"seventy-seven pieces of ordnance with an incredible amount ofstores, " was far superior to that estimated by the eye of Nelson, untrained as an engineer. Not only so, but the force within the wallswas very much larger than he thought, when he spoke with suchconfidence. "I never yet told Lord Hood, " he wrote nearly a yearlater, "that after everything was fixed for the attack of Bastia, Ihad information given me of the enormous number of troops we had tooppose us; but my own honour, Lord Hood's honour, and the honour ofour Country must have all been sacrificed, had I mentioned what Iknew; therefore you will believe what must have been my feelingsduring the whole siege, when I had often proposals made to me by men, now rewarded, to write to Lord Hood to raise the siege. " "Had thisbeen an English town, " he said immediately after the surrender, "I amsure it would not have been taken by them. The more we see of thisplace, the more we are astonished at their giving it up, but the truthis, the different parties were afraid to trust each other. " The lastassertion, if correct, conveys just one of those incidents which sofrequently concur to insure the success of a step rightly taken, asthat of Nelson and Hood in this instance certainly was. "Forty-fivehundred men, " he continues, "have laid down their arms to under twelvehundred troops and seamen. If proofs were wanting to show thatperseverance, unanimity, and gallantry, can accomplish almostincredible things, we are an additional instance. "

"I always was of opinion, " he wrote in the exultation of reaction fromthe weight of responsibility he had assumed by his secrecy, --"I alwayswas of opinion, have ever acted up to it, and never have had anyreason to repent it, that one Englishman was equal to threeFrenchmen. " This curious bit of the gasconade into which Nelson fromtime to time lapsed, can scarcely be accepted as a sound workingtheory, or as of itself justifying the risk taken; and yet itundoubtedly, under a grossly distorted form, portrays the temperamentwhich enabled him to capture Bastia, and which made him what hewas, --a man strong enough to take great chances for adequate ends. "All naval operations undertaken since I have been at the head of thegovernment, " said Napoleon, "have always failed, because the admiralssee double, and have learned--where I do not know--that war can bemade without running risks. " It is not material certainty of success, the _ignis fatuus_ which is the great snare of the mere engineer, orof the merely accomplished soldier, that points the way to heroicachievements. It is the vivid inspiration that enables its happypossessor, at critical moments, to see and follow the bright clearline, which, like a ray of light at midnight, shining among manifolddoubtful indications, guides his steps. Whether it leads him tosuccess or to failure, he may not know; but that it is the path ofwisdom, of duty, and of honor, he knows full well by the persuasionwithin, --by conviction, the fortifier of the reason, though not bysight, the assurance of demonstration. Only a man capable of incurringa disaster like that at Teneriffe could rise to the level of daring, which, through hidden perils, sought and wrought the superb triumph ofAboukir Bay. Such is genius, that rare but hazardous gift, whichseparates a man from his fellows by a chasm not to be bridged byhuman will. Thus endowed, Nelson before the walls of Bastia showed, though in a smaller sphere, and therefore with a lighter hazard, thesame keen perception, the same instant decision, the same unfalteringresolve, the same tenacity of purpose, that, far over and beyond theglamour of mere success, have rendered eternally illustrious the daysof St. Vincent, of the Nile, and of Copenhagen. 

Of the spirit which really actuated him, in his unwavering support ofLord Hood's inclination to try the doubtful issue, many interestinginstances are afforded by his correspondence. "I feel for the honourof my Country, and had rather be beat than not make the attack. If wedo not try we can never be successful. I own I have no fears for thefinal issue: it will be conquest, certain we will deserve it. Myreputation depends on the opinion I have given; but I feel an honestconsciousness that I have done right. We must, we will have it, orsome of our heads will be laid low. I glory in the attempt. " "Whatwould the immortal Wolfe have done?" he says again, refreshing his ownconstancy in the recollection of an equal heroism, crowned withsuccess against even greater odds. "As he did, beat the enemy, if heperished in the attempt. " Again, a fortnight later: "We are in highhealth and spirits besieging Bastia; the final event, I feel assured, will be conquest. " When the siege had already endured for a month, andwith such slight actual progress as to compel him to admit to Hoodthat the town battery had been "put in such a state, that firing awaymany shot at it is almost useless till we have a force sufficient toget nearer, " his confidence remains unabated. "I have no fears aboutthe final issue, " he writes to his wife; "it will be victory, Bastiawill be ours; and if so, it must prove an event to which the historyof England can hardly boast an equal. " Further on in the same letterhe makes a prediction, so singularly accurate as to excite curiosityabout its source: "I will tell you as a secret, Bastia will be oursbetween the 20th and 24th of this month"--three weeks after the dateof writing--"if succours do not get in. " It surrendered actually onthe 22d. One is tempted to speculate if there had been any suchunderstanding with the garrison as was afterwards reached with Calvi;but there is no other token of such an arrangement. It is instructivealso to compare this high-strung steadfastness of purpose to dareevery risk, if success perchance might be won thereby, with hiscomment upon his own impulses at a somewhat later date. "Mydisposition cannot bear tame and slow measures. Sure I am, had Icommanded our fleet on the 14th, that either the whole French fleetwould have graced my triumph, or I should have been in a confoundedscrape. " Surely the secret of great successes is in these words. 

The siege of Bastia was not in its course productive of strikingevents. Having reasoned in vain with the two successive generals, Hooddemanded that there should be sent back to him a contingent of troops, which had originally been detailed to serve as marines in the fleet, but which he had loaned to the army for the operations against SanFiorenzo. Having received these, he returned to Bastia, and on the 4thof April, 1794, the besieging force, twelve hundred troops and twohundred and fifty seamen, landed to the northward of the town. They atonce began to throw up batteries, while the Corsicans harassed thelandward approaches to the place. Nelson being with the troops, the"Agamemnon" with some frigates was anchored north of the city, Hoodwith his ships south of it. During the nights, boats from the fleetrowed guard near to the sea-front, with such diligence that few of thecraft that attempted to run in or out succeeded in so doing. Whendarkness covered the waters, British gunboats crept close to thewalls, and by an intermitting but frequent fire added much to thedistress of the enemy. On the 11th of April the garrison was formallysummoned, and, the expected refusal having been received, the Britishbatteries opened. There was not force enough, however, to bring theplace to terms as a consequence of direct attack, and after threeweeks Nelson, while betraying no apprehension of failure, practicallyadmitted the fact. "Although I have no doubt but even remaining in ourpresent situation, and by strict guard rowing close to the town, andthe Corsicans harassing them on the hills, and the gunboats by night, but that the enemy must surrender before any great length of time, yet, if force can be spared, a successful attack on the heights mustmuch facilitate a speedy capture. I own it will give me the highestpleasure to assist in the attack. "

It was by such an attack, or rather by the fear of it, coming upon thelong and exhausting endurance of cannonade and hunger, that Bastiafinally fell. "We shall in time accomplish the taking of Bastia, "wrote Nelson on the 3d of May. "I have no doubt in the way we proposedto attempt it, by bombardment and cannonading, joined to a closeblockade of the harbour. " "If not, " he adds, "our Country will, Ibelieve, sooner forgive an officer for attacking his enemy than forletting it alone. " On the 12th a large boat was captured coming outfrom the port; and on her were found letters from the governor, Gentili, confessing the annoyance caused by the British fire, andsaying that if relief did not arrive by the 29th, the place must belooked upon as lost. Three nights later another boat was caughtattempting to enter. On board her was a brother of the Mayor ofBastia. This man, while talking with Hood's secretary, expressed hisfears for the result to his relatives, if the town were carried byassault. The secretary replied that Hood could not prevent thoseevils, if the garrison awaited the attack, and gave the Corsican tounderstand that it was imminent, troops being expected from SanFiorenzo. At the urgent request of the prisoner, one of the seamentaken with him was permitted to land with a letter, stating theimpending danger. By a singular coincidence, or by skilfulcontrivance, the San Fiorenzo troops appeared on the heights upon theevening, May 19, following this conversation. Flags of truce hadalready been hoisted, negotiations were opened, and on the 22d theFrench colors were struck and the British took possession. "When Ireflect what we have achieved, " confessed the hitherto outwardlyunmoved Nelson, "I am all astonishment. The most glorious sight thatan Englishman can experience, and which, I believe, none but anEnglishman could bring about, was exhibited, --4, 500 men laying downtheir arms to less than 1, 000 British soldiers, who were serving asmarines. " As towards the French this account is perhaps somewhat lessthan fair; but it does no more than justice to the admirable firmnessand enterprise shown by Hood and Nelson. As a question of Bastia only, their attempt might be charged with rashness; but having regard to thepolitical and military conditions, to the instability of the Corsicancharacter, and to the value of the island as a naval station, it wasamply justified, for the risks run were out of all proportion lessthan the advantage to be gained. 

Thus the siege of Bastia ended in triumph, despite the priorpronouncement of the general commanding the troops, that the attemptwas "most visionary and rash. " These epithets, being used to Hoodafter his own expressions in favor of the undertaking, had notunnaturally provoked from him a resentful retort; and, as men arerarely conciliated by the success of measures which they haveridiculed, there arose a degree of strained relations between army andnavy, that continued even after the arrival of a new commander of theland forces, and indeed throughout Hood's association with theoperations in Corsica. 

During this busy and laborious period, despite his burden of secretanxiety, Nelson's naturally delicate health showed the favorablereaction, which, as has before been noted, was with him the usualresult of the call to exertion. His letters steadily reflect, andoccasionally mention, the glow of exultation produced by constantaction of a worthy and congenial nature. "We are in high health andspirits besieging Bastia, " he writes to his wife soon after landing;and shortly before the fall of the place he says again: "As to myhealth, it was never better, seldom so well. " Yet, although frombeginning to end the essential stay of the enterprise, the animatingsoul, without whose positive convictions and ardent support Lord Hoodcould scarcely have dared so great a hazard, he was throughout thesiege left, apparently purposely, in an anomalous position, and was atthe end granted a recognition which, though probably not grudging, wascertainly scanty. No definition of his duties was ever given by thecommander-in-chief. He appears as it were the latter's unacknowledgedrepresentative ashore, a plenipotentiary without credentials. "What mysituation is, " he writes to a relative, "is not to be described. I ameverything, yet nothing ostensible; enjoying the confidence of LordHood and Colonel Villettes, and the captains landed with the seamenobeying my orders. " A fortnight later he writes to Hood: "YourLordship knows exactly the situation I am in here. With ColonelVillettes I have no reason but to suppose I am respected in thehighest degree; nor have I occasion to complain of want of attentionto my wishes from any parties; but yet I am considered as notcommanding the seamen landed. My wishes may be, and are, compliedwith; my orders would possibly be disregarded. Therefore, if we movefrom hence, I would wish your Lordship to settle that point. YourLordship will not, I trust, take this request amiss: I have beenstruggling with it since the first day I landed. "

Hood apparently gave him full satisfaction as regards his own view ofthe situation. "I am happy, " Nelson wrote, when acknowledging hisreply, "that my ideas of the situation I am in here so perfectly agreewith your Lordship's;" but he did not settle the matter by a decisiveorder. His object, as he seems to have explained, was to bestow acertain amount of prominence upon a young captain, Hunt, who hadrecently lost his ship, and who, Hood thought, would be soonerprovided with another, if he appeared as in command at the guns. Nelson acceded to this arrangement with his usual generosity. "Yourkind intention to Captain Hunt, " he wrote, "I had the honour oftelling your Lordship, should be furthered by every means in my power;and my regard for him, I assure you, is undiminished. He is a mostexceeding good young man, nor is any one more zealous for the service. I don't complain of any one, but an idea has entered into the heads ofsome under him, that his command was absolutely distinct from me; andthat I had no authority over him, except as a request. " Unfortunately, Hood, in his desire to serve Hunt, not only unduly but absurdlyminimized Nelson's relations to the whole affair. His despatch ran:"Captain Nelson, of his Majesty's ship Agamemnon, who had the commandand directions of the seamen _in landing the guns, mortars andstores_, [20] and Captain Hunt _who commanded at the batteries_, [20]. .. Have an equal claim to my gratitude. " To limit Nelson's share inthe capture of Bastia to the purely subsidiary though importantfunction of landing the guns, was as unjust as it was unnecessary tothe interests of Hunt. The latter, being second in command ashore, andafterwards sent home with the despatches, was sure to receive thereward customarily bestowed upon such services. 

The incident singularly and aptly illustrates the difference, which ina military service cannot be too carefully kept in mind, betweenindividual expressions of opinion, which may be biassed, andprofessional reputation, which, like public sentiment, usuallysettles at last not far from the truth. Despite this curious inversionof the facts by Lord Hood, there probably was no one among the navalforces, nor among the soldiery, who did not thoroughly, if perchancesomewhat vaguely, appreciate that Nelson was the moving spirit of thewhole operation, even beyond Hood himself. As the Greek commandersafter Salamis were said to have voted the award of merit each tohimself first, but all to Themistocles second, so at Bastia, whatevervalue individuals might place on their own services, all probablywould have agreed that Nelson came next. 

The latter meantime was happily unconscious of the wrong done him, sothat nothing marred the pleasure with which he congratulated thecommander-in-chief, and received the latter's brief but hearty generalorder of thanks, wherein Nelson's own name stood foremost, as was dueboth to his seniority and to his exertions. When the despatch reachedhim, he freely expressed his discontent in letters to friends; butbeing, at the time of its reception, actively engaged in the siege ofCalvi, the exhilaration of that congenial employment for the momenttook the edge off the keenness of his resentment. "Lord Hood andmyself were never better friends--_nor, although his Letter does_, [21]did he wish to put me where I never was--in the rear. Captain Hunt, who lost his ship, he wanted to push forward for another, --a young manwho never was on a battery, or ever rendered any service during thesiege; if any person ever says he did, then I submit to the characterof a story-teller. Poor Serocold, who fell here, [22] was determined topublish an advertisement, as he commanded a battery under my orders. The whole operations of the siege were carried on through Lord Hood'sletters to me. I was the mover of it--I was the cause of its success. Sir Gilbert Elliot will be my evidence, if any is required. I am nota little vexed, but shall not quarrel. " "I am well aware, " he hadwritten to Mrs. Nelson a few days before, "my poor services will notbe noticed: I have no interest; but, however services may be received, it is not right in an officer to slacken his zeal for his Country. "

These noble words only voiced a feeling which in Nelson's heart hadall the strength of a principle; and this light of the single eyestood him in good stead in the moments of bitterness which followed afew months later, when a lull in the storm of fighting gave the senseof neglect a chance to rankle. "My heart is full, " he writes then tohis uncle Suckling, speaking not only of Bastia, but of the entirecourse of operations in Corsica, "when I think of the treatment I havereceived: every man who had any considerable share in the reductionhas got some place or other--I, only I, am without reward. .. . Nothingbut my anxious endeavour to serve my Country makes me bear up againstit; but I sometimes am ready to give all up. " "Forgive this letter, "he adds towards the end: "I have said a great deal too much of myself;but indeed it is all too true. " In similar strain he expressed himselfto his wife: "It is very true that I have ever served faithfully, andever has it been my fate to be neglected; but that shall not make meinattentive to my duty. I have pride in doing my duty well, and aself-approbation, which if it is not so lucrative, yet perhaps affordsmore pleasing sensations. " Thus the consciousness of duty done in thepast, and the clear recognition of what duty still demanded in thepresent and future, stood him in full stead, when he failed to receiveat the hands of others the honor he felt to be his due, and which, henever wearied in proclaiming, was in his eyes priceless, above allother reward. "Corsica, in respect of prizes, " he wrote to Mrs. Nelson, "produces nothing but honour, far above the consideration ofwealth: not that I despise riches, quite the contrary, yet I wouldnot sacrifice a good name to obtain them. Had I attended less than Ihave done to the service of my Country, I might have made some moneytoo: however, I trust my name will stand on record, when themoney-makers will be forgot, "--a hope to be abundantly fulfilled. 

At the moment Bastia fell there arrived from England a newcommander-in-chief for the land forces, General Stuart, an officer ofdistinguished ability and enterprise. Cheered by the hope of cordialco-operation, Hood and Nelson resumed without delay their enthusiasticefforts. Within a week, on the 30th of May, the latter wrote that the"Agamemnon" was taking on board ammunition for the siege of Calvi, thelast remaining of the hostile strongholds. In the midst of thepreparations, at eleven P. M. Of June 6, word was received that nineFrench ships-of-the-line had come out of Toulon, and were believed tobe bound for Calvi, with reinforcements for the garrison. At seven thenext morning the squadron was under way; the "Agamemnon, " which hadtwo hundred tons of ordnance stores to unload, sailing only half anhour after her less encumbered consorts, whom she soon overtook. 

Hood shaped his course for Calvi, being constrained thereto, not onlyby the rumor of the enemy's destination, but also by the militarynecessity of effecting a junction with the rest of his fleet. AdmiralHotham, who commanded the British division of seven ships in front ofToulon, instead of waiting to verify the report brought to him of theenemy's force, --which was actually the same, numerically, as hisown, --bore up hastily for Calvi, intending, so wrote Nelson at thetime, to fight them there, rather than that they should throw insuccors. Whatever their numbers, thus to surrender touch of them atthe beginning was an evident mistake, for which, as for most mistakes, a penalty had in the end to be paid; and in fact, if the relief ofCalvi was the object of the sortie, the place to fight was evidentlyas far from there as possible. Off Toulon, even had Hotham beenbeaten, his opponents would have been too roughly handled to carry outtheir mission. As it was, this precipitate retirement lost the Britishan opportunity for a combat that might have placed their control ofthe sea beyond peradventure; and a few months later, Nelson, who atfirst had viewed Hotham's action with the generous sympathy andconfident pride which always characterized his attitude towards hisbrother officers, showed how clearly he was reading in the book ofexperience the lessons that should afterwards stand himself in goodstead. "When 'Victory' is gone, " he wrote, "we shall be thirteen sailof the line [to the French fifteen], when the enemy will keep our newCommanding Officer [Hotham] in hot water, who missed, unfortunately, the opportunity of fighting them, last June. " Ten years later, in hiscelebrated chase of Villeneuve's fleet, he said to his captains: "Ifwe meet the enemy we shall find them not less than eighteen, I ratherthink twenty, sail of the line, and therefore do not be surprised if Ishould not fall on them immediately [he had but eleven]--_we won'tpart_[23] without a battle;" and he expressed with the utmost decisionhis clear appreciation that even a lost battle, if delivered at theright point or at the right moment, would frustrate the ulteriorobjects of the enemy, by crippling the force upon which they depended. As will be seen in the sequel, Hotham, throughout his brief command asHood's successor, suffered the consequences of permitting so importanta fraction of the enemy's fleet to escape his grasp, when it was inhis power to close with it. 

The British divisions met off the threatened port two days afterleaving Bastia, and two hours later a lookout frigate brought wordthat the French fleet had been seen by her the evening before, to thenorthward and westward, some forty miles off its own coast. Hood atonce made sail in pursuit, and in the afternoon of the 10th of Junecaught sight of the enemy, but so close in with the shore that theysucceeded in towing their ships under the protection of the batteriesin Golfe Jouan, where, for lack of wind, he was unable to follow themfor some days, during which they had time to strengthen their positionbeyond his powers of offence. Hotham's error was irreparable. The"Agamemnon" was then sent back to Bastia, to resume the work oftransportation, which Nelson pushed with the untiring energy thatcharacterized all his movements. Arriving on the 12th, fifteen hundredtroops were embarked by eight the next morning, and at four in theafternoon he sailed, having with him two smaller ships of war andtwenty-two transports. On the 15th he anchored at San Fiorenzo. 

Here he met General Stuart. The latter was anxious to proceed at oncewith the siege of Calvi, but asked Nelson whether he thought it properto take the shipping to that exposed position; alluding to the Frenchfleet that had left Toulon, and which Hood was then seeking. Nelson'sreply is interesting, as reflecting the judgment of a warrior at onceprudent and enterprising, concerning the influence of a hostile "fleetin being" upon a contemplated detached operation. "I certainly thoughtit right, " he said, "placing the firmest reliance that we should beperfectly safe under Lord Hood's protection, who would take care thatthe French fleet at Gourjean[24] should not molest us. " To Hood hewrote a week later: "I believed ourselves safe under your Lordship'swing. " At this moment he thought the French to be ninesail-of-the-line to the British thirteen, --no contemptible inferiorforce. Yet that he recognized the possible danger from such adetachment is also clear; for, writing two days earlier, under thesame belief as to the enemy's strength, and speaking of the expectedapproach of an important convoy, he says: "I hope they will notventure up till Lord Hood can get off Toulon, or wherever the Frenchfleet are got to. " When a particular opinion has received the extremeexpression now given to that concerning the "fleet in being, " andapparently has undergone equally extreme misconception, it isinstructive to recur to the actual effect of such a force, upon thepractice of a man with whom moral effect was never in excess of thefacts of the case, whose imagination produced to him no paralyzingpicture of remote contingencies. Is it probable that, with the greatissues of 1690 at stake, Nelson, had he been in Tourville's place, would have deemed the crossing of the Channel by French troopsimpossible, because of Torrington's "fleet in being"?

Sailing again on June 16, the expedition arrived next day off Calvi. Although it was now summer, the difficulties of the new undertakingwere, from the maritime point of view, very great. The town of Calvi, which was walled and had a citadel, lies upon a promontory on the westside of an open gulf of the same name, a semicircular recess, threemiles wide by two deep, on the northwest coast of Corsica. The westernpoint of its shore line is Cape Revellata; the eastern, Point Espano. The port being fortified and garrisoned, it was not practicable totake the shipping inside, nor to establish on the inner beach a safebase for disembarking. The "Agamemnon" therefore anchored outside, nearly two miles south of Cape Revellata, and a mile from shore, inthe excessive depth of fifty-three fathoms; the transports coming-tooff the cape, but farther to seaward. The water being so deep, and thebottom rocky, the position was perilous for sailing-ships, for theprevailing summer wind blows directly on the shore, which is steep-toand affords no shelter. Abreast the "Agamemnon" was a small inlet, Porto Agro, about three miles from Calvi by difficult approaches. Here Nelson landed on the 18th with General Stuart; and, afterreconnoitring both the beach and the town, the two officers decidedthat, though a very bad landing, it was the best available. On the19th, at 7 A. M. , the troops disembarked. That afternoon Nelson himselfwent ashore to stay, taking with him two hundred and fifty seamen. Thenext day it came on to blow so hard that most of the ships put to sea, and no intercourse was had from the land with those which remained. The "Agamemnon" did not return till the 24th. Lord Hood was by thistime in San Fiorenzo Bay, having abandoned the hope of attacking theFrench fleet in Golfe Jouan. On the 27th he arrived off Calvi, andthenceforth Nelson was in daily communication with him till the placefell. 

As the army in moderate, though not wholly adequate, force conductedthe siege of Calvi, under a general officer of vigorous character, thepart taken by Nelson and his seamen, though extremely important, andindeed essential to the ultimate success, was necessarily subordinate. It is well to notice that his journal, and correspondence with LordHood, clearly recognize this, his true relation to the siege of Calvi;for it makes it probable that, in attributing to himself a much moreimportant part at Bastia, and in saying that Hood's report had put himunfairly in the background, he was not exaggerating his actual thoughill-defined position there. That Nelson loved to dwell in thought uponhis own achievements, that distinction in the eyes of his fellows wasdear to him, that he craved recognition, and was at times perhaps tooinsistent in requiring it, is true enough; but there is no indicationthat he ever coveted the laurels of others, or materially misconceivedhis own share in particular events. Glory, sweet as it was to him, lost its value, if unaccompanied by the consciousness of desert whichstamps it as honor. It is, therefore, not so much for personalachievement as for revelation of character that this siege hasinterest in his life. 

Besides the defences of the town proper, Calvi was protected by aseries of outworks extending across the neck of land upon which itlay. Of these the outermost was on the left, looking from the place. It flanked the approaches to the others, and commanded thecommunications with the interior. It was, by Nelson's estimate, abouttwenty-two hundred yards from the town, and had first to be reduced. By the 3d of July thirteen long guns, besides a number of mortars andhowitzers, had been dragged from the beach to the spot by the seamen, who also assisted in placing them in position, and for the most partworked them in battle, an artillerist from the army pointing. Nelson, with Captain Hallowell, already an officer of mark and afterwards oneof distinction, took alternate day's duty at the batteries, a thirdcaptain, Serocold, having fallen early in the siege. Fearing newsmight reach his wife that a naval captain had been killed, without thename being mentioned, he wrote to her of this sad event, addingexpressively: "I am very busy, yet own I am in all my glory; exceptwith you, I would not be anywhere but where I am, for the world. " OnJuly 7th the first outwork fell. The attack upon the others was thensteadily and systematically prosecuted, until on the 19th all had beencaptured, and the besiegers stood face to face with the town walls. 

During this time Nelson, as always, was continually at the front andamong the most exposed. Out of six guns in the battery which he calls"ours, " five were disabled in six days. On the 12th at daylight, aheavy fire opened from the town, which, he says, "seldom missed ourbattery;" and at seven o'clock a shot, which on the ricochet clearedhis head by a hair's breadth, drove sand into his face and right eyewith such violence as to incapacitate him. He spoke lightly andcheerfully of the incident to Lord Hood, "I got a little hurt thismorning: not much, as you may judge by my writing, " and remainedabsent from duty only the regular twenty-four hours; but, after somefluctuations of hope, the sight of the eye was permanently lost tohim. Of General Stuart's conduct in the operations he frequentlyspeaks with cordial admiration. "He is not sparing of himself on anyoccasion, he every night sleeps with us in the advanced battery. If Imay be allowed to judge, he is an extraordinary good judge of ground. No officer ever deserved success more. " At the same time he expressesdissatisfaction with some of the subordinate army officers, to whoseinefficiency he attributes the necessity for undue personal exertionon the general's part: "The General is not well. He fatigues himselftoo much, but I can't help seeing he is obliged to do it. He has not aperson to forward his views, --the engineer sick, the artillery captainnot fit for active service; therefore every minute thing must be doneby himself, or it is not done at all. "

The work was tedious and exhausting, and the malaria of the hotCorsican summer told heavily on men's health and patience. The supplyof ammunition, and of material of war generally, for the army seems tohave been inadequate; and heavy demands were made upon the fleet, notonly for guns, which could be returned, but for powder and shot, theexpenditure of which might prove embarrassing before they could berenewed. The troops also were not numerous enough, under the climaticconditions, to do all their own duty. In such circumstances, when twoparties are working together to the same end, but under no commoncontrol, each is prone to think the other behindhand in his work andexacting in his demands. "Why don't Lord Hood land 500 men to work?"said Colonel Moore, the general's right-hand man. "Our soldiers aretired. " Nelson, on the other hand, thought that Moore wanted over-muchbattering done to the breach of a work, before he led the stormers toit; and Hood, who was receiving frequent reports of the preparationsof the French fleet in Toulon, was impatient to have the siege pushed, and thought the army dilatory. "The rapidity with which the French aregetting on at Toulon, " he wrote confidentially to Nelson, "makes itindispensably necessary for me to put the whole of the fleet under mycommand in the best possible state for service; and I must soon applyto the general for those parts of the regiments now on shore, orderedby his Majesty to serve in lieu of marines, to be held in readiness toembark at the shortest notice. I shall delay this application as longas possible. "

Nelson, being a seaman, sympathized of course with his own service, and with Hood, for whom he had most cordial admiration, both personaland professional. But at the same time he was on the spot, a constanteye-witness to the difficulties of the siege, a clear-headed observer, with sound military instincts, and fair-minded when facts were beforehim. The army, he wrote to Hood, is harassed to death, and he noticesthat it suffers from sickness far more than do the seamen. He repeatsthe request for more seamen, and, although he seems to doubt thereasonableness of the demand, evidently thinks that they should befurnished, if possible. Hood accordingly sent an additional detachmentof three hundred, raising the number on shore to the five hundredsuggested by Moore. "I had much rather, " he wrote, "that a hundredseamen should be landed unnecessarily, than that one should be keptback that was judged necessary. " On the other hand, when the general, after a work bearing on the bay had been destroyed, suggests that thenavy might help, by laying the ships against the walls, Nelson takes"the liberty of observing that the business of laying wood beforewalls was much altered of late, " and adds the common-sense remark, that "the quantity of powder and shot which would be fired away onsuch an attack could be much better directed from a battery on shore. "This conversation took place immediately after all the outworks hadbeen reduced. It was conducted "with the greatest politeness, " hewrites, and "the General thanked me for my assistance, but it wasnecessary to come to the point whether the siege should be perseveredin or given up. If the former, he must be supplied with the means, which were more troops, more seamen to work, and more ammunition. "Nelson replied that, if the requisite means could not be had on thespot, they could at least hold on where they were till supplied fromelsewhere. 

It will be noticed that Nelson was practically the intermediarybetween the two commanders-in-chief. In fact, there appears to havebeen between them some constraint, and he was at times asked totransmit a message which he thought had better go direct. In thisparticularly delicate situation, one cannot but be impressed with thetact he for the most part shows, the diplomatic ability, which wasfreely attributed to him by his superiors in later and moreinfluential commands. This was greatly helped by his cordial good-willtowards others, combined with disinterested zeal for the duty beforehim; the whole illumined by unusual sagacity and good sense. He seesboth sides, and conveys his suggestions to either with aself-restraint and deference which avert resentment; and he preservesboth his calmness and candor, although he notices in the camp somejealousy of his confidential communication with his immediatesuperior, the admiral. Though never backward to demand what he thoughtthe rights of himself or his associates, Nelson was always naturallydisposed to reconcile differences, to minimize causes of trouble, andthis native temperament had not yet undergone the warping whichfollowed his later wounds--especially that on the head received at theNile--and the mental conflict into which he was plunged by hisunhappy passion for Lady Hamilton. At this time, in the flush ofearlier enthusiasm, delighting as few men do in the joy of battle, hestrove to promote harmony, to smooth over difficulties by everyexertion possible, either by doing whatever was asked of him, or byjudicious representations to others. Thus, when Hood, impatient at thedisturbing news from Toulon, wishes to hasten the conclusion bysummoning the garrison, in the hope that it may yield at once, thegeneral objected, apparently on the ground that the statement of theirown advantages, upon which such a summons might be based, would beprejudicial, if, as was most probable, the demand was rejected. Whatever his reason, Nelson, though indirectly, intimates to Hood thatin this matter he himself agrees, upon the whole, with the general, and Hood yields the point, --the more so that he learns from Nelsonthat the outposts are to be stormed the next night; and sorely was thecaptain, in his judicious efforts thus to keep the peace, tried by thepostponement of the promised assault for twenty-four hours. "_Suchthings are_, " he wrote to Hood, using a favorite expression. "I hopeto God the general, who seems a good officer and an amiable man, isnot led away; but Colonel Moore is his great friend. "

The feeling between the land and sea services was emphasized in therelations existing between Lord Hood and Colonel Moore, whoafterwards, as Sir John Moore, fell gloriously at Corunna. To thesetwo eminent officers fortune denied the occasion to make full proof oftheir greatness to the world; but they stand in the first rank ofthose men of promise whose failure has been due, not to their ownshortcomings, but to the lack of opportunity. Sir John Moore has beenthe happier, in that the enterprise with which his name is chieflyconnected, and upon which his title to fame securely rests, wascompleted, and wrought its full results; fortunate, too, in havingreceived the vindication of that great action at the hands of themost eloquent of military historians. His country and his professionmay well mourn a career of such fair opening so soon cut short. Butdaring and original in the highest degree as was the march fromSalamanca to Sahagun, it did not exceed, either in originality or indaring, the purposes nourished by Lord Hood, which he had noopportunity so to execute as to attract attention. Condemned tosubordinate positions until he had reached the age of seventy, hisgenius is known to us only by his letters, and by the frustrated plansat St. Kitts in 1782, and at Golfe Jouan in 1794, in the former ofwhich, less fortunate than Moore, he failed to realize hiswell-grounded hope of reversing, by a single blow, the issues of acampaign. 

It is to be regretted that two such men could not understand eachother cordially. Hood, we know from his letters, was "of that frameand texture that I cannot be indifferent, "--"full of anxiety, impatience, and apprehension, "--when service seemed to him slothfullydone. Moore, we are told by Napier, "maintained the right withvehemence bordering upon fierceness. " Had he had the chief command onshore, it is possible that the two, impetuous and self-assertingthough they were, might have reached an understanding. But in the mostunfortunate disagreement about Bastia, --wherein it is to a navalofficer of to-day scarcely possible to do otherwise than blame thesullen lack of enterprise shown by the army, --and afterwards at Calvi, Moore appeared to Hood, and to Nelson also, as the subordinate, thepower behind the throne, who was prompting a line of action they bothcondemned. No position in military life is more provocative of troublethan to feel you are not dealing with the principal, but with anirresponsible inferior; and the situation is worse, because one inwhich it is almost impossible to come to an issue. Moore'sprofessional talent and force of character naturally made itself felt, even with a man of Stuart's ability. Hood and Nelson recognized this, and they resented, as inspired by a junior, what they might havecombated dispassionately, if attributed to the chief. There wasfriction also between Moore and Elliot, the viceroy of the island. Doubtless, as in all cases where suspicion, not to say jealousy, hasbeen begot, much more and worse was imagined by both parties thanactually occurred. The apportionment of blame, or prolonged discussionof the matter, is out of place in a biography of Nelson. To that it isof moment, only because it is proper to state that Nelson, on the spotand in daily contact, --Nelson, upon whose zeal and entireself-devotion at this period no doubt is cast, --agreed in the mainwith Hood's opinion as to what the latter called the San Fiorenzoleaven, of which Moore was to them the exponent. It is true thatNelson naturally sympathized with his profession and his admiral, whomhe heartily admired; but some corrective, at least, to suchpartiality, was supplied by his soreness about the latter's omissionduly to report his services at Bastia, of which he just now becameaware. The estrangement between the two commanders-in-chief wasdoubtless increased by the apparent reluctance, certainly the lack ofeffort, to see one another frequently. 

The principal work, called by Nelson the Mozelle battery, was carriedbefore daylight of July 19, and before dark all the outposts were inthe hands of the British. "I could have wished to have had a littlepart in the storm, " wrote Nelson, characteristically covetous ofstrenuous action, "if it was only to have placed the ladders andpulled away the palisadoes. However, we did the part allotted to us. "That day a summons was sent to the garrison, but rejected, and workupon batteries to breach the town walls was then pushed rapidlyforward; for it was becoming more and more evident that the siege mustbe brought to an end, lest the entire force of besiegers should becomedisabled by sickness. On the 28th the batteries were ready, andGeneral Stuart sent in word that he would not fire upon the hospitalpositions, where indicated by black flags. The besieged then asked fora truce of twenty-five days, undertaking to lay down their arms, ifnot by then relieved. The general and admiral refused, but werewilling to allow six days. This the garrison in turn rejected; and onthe night of the 30th four small vessels succeeded in eluding theblockading frigates and entering supplies, which encouraged thebesieged. On the 31st the batteries opened, and after thirty-sixhours' heavy cannonade the town held out a flag of truce. Anarrangement was made that it should surrender on the 10th of August, if not relieved; the garrison to be transported to France withoutbecoming prisoners of war. 

No relief arriving, the place capitulated on the day named. It washigh time for the besiegers. "We have upwards of one thousand sick outof two thousand, " wrote Nelson, "and the others not much better thanso many phantoms. We have lost many men from the season, very few fromthe enemy. " He himself escaped more easily than most. To use his ownquaint expression, "All the prevailing disorders have attacked me, butI have not strength enough for them to fasten upon. I am here the reedamongst the oaks: I bow before the storm, while the sturdy oak is laidlow. " The congenial moral surroundings, in short, --the atmosphere ofexertion, of worthy and engrossing occupation, --the consciousness, tohim delightful, of distinguished action, of heroic persistence throughtoil and danger, --prevailed even in his physical frame overdiscomfort, over the insidious climate, and even over his distressingwound. "This is my ague day, " he writes when the batteries opened; "Ihope so active a scene will keep off the fit. It has shaken me a gooddeal; but I have been used to them, and now don't mind them much. ""Amongst the wounded, in a slight manner, is myself, my head being agood deal wounded and my right eye cut down; but the surgeons flatterme I shall not entirely lose the sight. It confined me, thank God, only one day, and at a time when nothing particular happened to bedoing. " "You must not think my hurts confined me, " he tells his wife;"no, nothing but the loss of a limb would have kept me from my duty, and I believe my exertions conduced to preserve me in this generalmortality. " In his cheery letters, now, no trace is perceptible of thefretful, complaining temper, which impaired, though it did notdestroy, the self-devotion of his later career. No other mistress atthis time contended with honor for the possession of his heart; noother place than the post of duty before Calvi distracted his desires, or appealed to his imagination through his senses. Not even LordHood's report of the siege of Bastia, which here came to hisknowledge, and by which he thought himself wronged, had bitterness toovercome the joy of action and of self-contentment. 

Not many days were required, after the fall of Calvi, to remove thefleet, and the seamen who had been serving on shore, from thepestilential coast. Nelson seems to have been intrusted with theembarkation of the prisoners in the transports which were to take themto Toulon. He told his wife that he had been four months landed, andfelt almost qualified to pass his examination as a besieging general, but that he had no desire to go on with campaigning. On the 11th ofAugust, the day after the delivery of the place, he was again on boardthe "Agamemnon, " from whose crew had been drawn the greatestproportion of the seamen for the batteries. One hundred and fifty ofthem were now in their beds. "My ship's company are all worn out, " hewrote, "as is this whole army, except myself; nothing hurts me, --oftwo thousand men I am the most healthy. Every other officer isscarcely able to crawl. " Among the victims of the deadly climate wasLieutenant Moutray, the son of the lady to whom, ten years before, hehad been so warmly attracted in the West Indies. Nelson placed amonument to him in the church at San Fiorenzo. 

On the 10th of August the "Agamemnon" sailed from Calvi, and after astop at San Fiorenzo, where Hood then was, reached Leghorn on the18th. Now that the immediate danger of the siege was over, Nelsonadmitted to his wife the serious character of the injury he hadreceived. The right eye was nearly deprived of sight, --only so farrecovered as to enable him to distinguish light from darkness. For allpurposes of use it was gone; but the blemish was not to be perceived, unless attention was drawn to it. 

At Leghorn the ship lay for a month, --the first period of repose sinceshe went into commission, a year and a half before. While there, thephysician to the fleet came on board and surveyed the crew, findingthem in a very weak state, and unfit to serve. This condition ofthings gave Nelson hopes that, upon the approaching departure of LordHood for England, the "Agamemnon" might go with him; for he was loathto separate from an admiral whose high esteem he had won, and uponwhom he looked as the first sea-officer of Great Britain. Hood wasinclined to take her, and to transfer the ship's company bodily to aseventy-four. This he considered no more than due to Nelson'sdistinguished merit and services, and he had indeed offered him eachship of that rate whose command fell vacant in the Mediterranean; butthe strong sense of attachment to those who had shared his toils anddangers, of reluctance that they should see him willing to leave them, after their hard work together, --that combination of sympathy and tactwhich made so much of Nelson's success as a leader of men, --continuedto prevent his accepting promotion that would sever his ties to them. 

The exigencies of the war in the Mediterranean forbade the departure, even of a sixty-four with a disabled crew. A full month later hersick-list was still seventy-seven, out of a total of less than fourhundred. "Though certainly unfit for a long cruise, " Nelson said, "weare here making a show, "--a military requirement not to be neglectedor despised. He accepted the disappointment, as he did all servicerubs at this period, with perfect temper and in the best spirit. "Wemust not repine, " he wrote to his wife on the 12th of October, the dayafter Hood sailed for England. "Lord Hood is very well inclinedtowards me, but the service must ever supersede all privateconsideration. I hope you will spend the winter cheerfully. Do notrepine at my absence; before spring I hope we shall have peace, whenwe must look out for some little cottage. " She fretted, however, assome women will; and he, to comfort her, wrote more sanguinely abouthimself than the facts warranted. "Why you should be uneasy about me, so as to make yourself ill, I know not. I feel a confident protectionin whatever service I may be employed upon; and as to my health, Idon't know that I was ever so truly well. I fancy myself grown quitestout. " To his old captain, Locker, he admitted that he could not getthe better of the fever. 

Corsica being now wholly in the power of its inhabitants, allied withand supported by Great Britain, his attention and interest wereengrossed by the French fleet centring upon Toulon, the dominantfactor of concern to the British in the Mediterranean, whereVice-Admiral Hotham had succeeded Hood as commander-in-chief. Nelsonrealizes more and more the mistake that was made, when a fraction ofit was allowed to escape battle in the previous June. The variousreasons by which he had at first excused the neglect to bring it toaction no longer weigh with him. He does not directly blame, but hespeaks of the omission as an "opportunity lost, "--a phrase than whichthere are few more ominous, in characterizing the closely balanced, yet weighty, decisions, upon which the issues of war depend. Nothing, he thinks, can prevent the junction of the two fragments, --then inGolfe Jouan and Toulon, --one of which, with more resolution andpromptitude on Hotham's part, might have been struck singly at sea afew months before; and if they join, there must follow a fleet action, between forces too nearly equal to insure to Great Britain thedecisive results that were needed. The thought he afterwardsexpressed, "Numbers only can annihilate, " was clearly floating in hisbrain, --inarticulate, perhaps, as yet, but sure to come to the birth. "If we are not completely victorious, --I mean, able to remain at seawhilst the enemy must retire into port, --if we only make a Lord Howe'svictory, take a part, and retire into port, Italy is lost. " Criticismclearly is going on in his mind; and not mere criticism, (there isenough and to spare of that in the world, and not least in navies), but criticism judicious, well considered, and above all fruitful. Theerror of opportunity lost he had seen; the error of a partialvictory--"a Lord Howe's victory, " another opportunity lost--heintuitively anticipated for the Mediterranean, and was soon to see. Hewas already prepared to pass an accurate judgment instantly, when hesaw it. May we not almost hear, thundering back from the clouds thatyet veiled the distant future of the Nile, the words, of which histhought was already pregnant, "You may be assured I will bring theFrench fleet to action the moment I can lay my hands upon them. "

The year closed with the British fleet watching, as best it could, theFrench ships, which, according to Nelson's expectation, had given theblockaders the slip, and had made their junction at Toulon. There wasnow no great disparity in the nominal force of the two opponents, theBritish having fourteen ships-of-the-line, the French fifteen; and itwas quite in the enemy's power to fulfil his other prediction, bykeeping Hotham in hot water during the winter. In the middle ofNovember the "Agamemnon" had to go to Leghorn for extensive repairs, and remained there, shifting her main and mizzen masts, until the 21stof December. Nelson, who had endured with unyielding cheerfulness thedangers, exposure, and sickliness of Calvi, found himself unable tobear patiently the comfort of quiet nights in a friendly port, whilehot work might chance outside. "Lying in port is misery to me. Myheart is almost broke to find the Agamemnon lying here, little betterthan a wreck. I own my sincere wish that the enemy would rest quietuntil we are ready for sea, and a gleam of hope sometimes crosses methat they will. " "I am uneasy enough for fear they will fight, andAgamemnon not present, --it will almost break my heart; but I hope thebest, --that they are only boasting at present, and will be quiet untilI am ready. " "It is misery, " he repeats, "for me to be laid updismantled. "

It was during this period of comparative inactivity in port, followedby monotonous though arduous winter cruising off Toulon, which wasbroken only by equally dreary stays at San Fiorenzo, that Nelson foundtime to brood over the neglect of which he thought himself the victim, in the omission of Lord Hood to notice more markedly his services inCorsica. It is usually disagreeable to the uninterested bystander tosee an excessive desire for praise, even under the guise of justrecognition of work done. Words of complaint, whether heard or read, strike a discord to one who himself at the moment is satisfied withhis surroundings. We all have an instinctive shrinking from the tonesof a grumbler. Nelson's insistence upon his grievances has noexemption from this common experience; yet it must be remembered thatthese assertions of the importance of his own services, anddissatisfaction with the terms in which they had been mentioned, occurchiefly, if not solely, in letters to closest relations, --to his wifeand uncle, --and that they would never have become known but for theafter fame, which has caused all his most private correspondence tohave interest and to be brought to light. As a revelation of characterthey have a legitimate interest, and they reveal, or rather theyconfirm, what is abundantly revealed throughout his life, --thatintense longing for distinction, for admiration justly earned, forconspicuous exaltation above the level of his kind, which existed inhim to so great a degree, and which is perhaps the mostpotent--certainly the most universal--factor in military achievement. They reveal this ambition for honor, or glory, on its weak side; onits stronger side of noble emulation, of self-devotion, of heroicaction, his correspondence teems with its evidence in words, as doeshis life in acts. To quote the words of Lord Radstock, who at thisperiod, and until after the battle of Cape St. Vincent, was serving asone of the junior admirals in the Mediterranean, and retained hisfriendship through life, "a perpetual thirst of glory was ever ragingwithin him. " "He has ever showed himself as great a despiser of richesas he is a lover of glory; and I am fully convinced in my own mindthat he would sooner defeat the French fleet than capture fiftygalleons. "

After all allowance made, however, it cannot be denied that there isin these complaints a tone which one regrets in such a man. Therepeated "It was I" jars, by the very sharpness of its contrast, withthe more generous expressions that abound in his correspondence. "WhenI reflect that I was the cause of re-attacking Bastia, after our_wise_ generals gave it over, from not knowing the force, fancying it2, 000 men; that it was I, who, landing, joined the Corsicans, and withonly my ship's party of marines, drove the French under the walls ofBastia; that it was I, who, knowing the force in Bastia to be upwardsof 4, 000 men, as I have now only ventured to tell Lord Hood, landedwith only 1, 200 men, and kept the secret till within this weekpast;--what I must have felt during the whole siege may be easilyconceived. Yet I am scarcely mentioned. I freely forgive, but cannotforget. This and much more ought to have been mentioned. It is knownthat, for two months, I blockaded Bastia with a squadron; only fiftysacks of flour got into the town. At San Fiorenzo and Calvi, for twomonths before, nothing got in, and four French frigates could not getout, and are now ours. Yet my diligence is not mentioned; and others, for keeping succours out of Calvi for a few summer months, arehandsomely mentioned. _Such things are_. I have got upon a subjectnear my heart, which is full when I think of the treatment I havereceived. .. . The taking of Corsica, like the taking of St. Juan's, hascost me money. St. Juan's cost near £500; Corsica has cost me £300, aneye, and a cut across my back; and my money, I find, cannot be repaidme. "

As regards the justice of his complaints, it seems to the authorimpossible to read carefully Hood's two reports, after the fall ofBastia and that of Calvi, and not admit, either that Nelson played avery unimportant part in the general operations connected with thereduction of Corsica, with which he became associated even before itwas effectively undertaken, and so remained throughout; or else thatno due recognition was accorded to him in the admiral's despatches. Had he not become otherwise celebrated in his after life, he wouldfrom these papers be inferred to stand, in achievement, rather belowthan above the level of the other captains who from time to time werepresent. That this was unfair seems certain; and notably at Calvi, where, from the distance of the operations from the anchorage, and thestrained relations which kept Hood and Stuart apart, he waspractically the one naval man upon whose discretion and zeal successdepended. It is probable, however, that the failure to do him justiceproceeded as much from awkward literary construction, phrases badlyturned, as from reluctance to assign due prominence to one subordinateamong several others. 

How readily, yet how keenly, he derived satisfaction, even fromslight tributes of recognition, is shown by the simplicity andpleasure with which he quoted to Mrs. Nelson the following words ofSir Gilbert Elliot, the Viceroy of Corsica, then and always a warmfriend and admirer: "I know that you, who have had such an honourableshare in this acquisition, will not be indifferent at the prosperityof the Country which you have so much assisted to place under HisMajesty's government. " "Whether these are words of course and to beforgotten, " wrote Nelson, "I know not; they are pleasant, however, forthe time. " Certainly his demands for praise, if thus measured, werenot extreme. 

FOOTNOTES:

[20] The italics are the author's. 

[21] The italics are Nelson's. 

[22] Written at the siege of Calvi. 

[23] Author's italics. 

[24] Golfe Jouan; on the coast of France between Toulon and Nice. 

CHAPTER V. 

NELSON'S SERVICES WITH THE FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER ADMIRALHOTHAM. --PARTIAL FLEET ACTIONS OF MARCH 13 AND 14, AND JULY13. --NELSON ORDERED TO COMMAND A DETACHED SQUADRON CO-OPERATING WITHTHE AUSTRIAN ARMY IN THE RIVIERA OF GENOA. 

JANUARY-JULY, 1795. AGE, 36. 

From the naval point of view, as a strategic measure, the acquisitionof Corsica by the British was a matter of great importance. It was, however, only one among several factors, which went to make up thegeneral military and political situation in the Mediterranean at theend of the year 1794. Hitherto the exigencies of the well-nighuniversal hostilities in which France had been engaged, and theanarchical internal state of that country, had prevented any decisiveoperations by her on the side of Italy, although she had, since 1792, been formally at war with the Kingdom of Sardinia, of which Piedmontwas a province. 

At the close of 1794 the conditions were greatly modified. In thenorth, the combined forces of Great Britain, Austria, and Holland hadbeen driven out of France and Belgium, and the United Provinces wereon the point of submission. On the east, the Austrians and Prussianshad retreated to the far bank of the Rhine, and Prussia was about towithdraw from the coalition, which, three years before, she had beenso eager to form. On the south, even greater success had attended theFrench armies, which had crossed the Pyrenees into Spain, drivingbefore them the forces of the enemy, who also was soon to ask forpeace. It was therefore probable that operations in Italy would assumegreatly increased activity, from the number of French soldiersreleased elsewhere, as well as from the fact that the Austriansthemselves, though they continued the war in Germany, had abandonedother portions of the continent which they had hitherto contested. 

The political and military conditions in Italy were, briefly, asfollows. The region north of the Maritime Alps and in the valley ofthe Po was, for the most part, in arms against France, --the westernprovince, Piedmont, as part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, whose capitalwas at Turin, and, to the eastward of it, the duchies of Milan andMantua, as belonging to Austria. The governments of the numerous smallstates into which Northern and Central Italy were thendivided--Venice, Genoa, Tuscany, the States of the Church, andothers--sympathized generally with the opponents of France, but, asfar as possible, sought to maintain a formal though difficultneutrality. The position of Genoa was the most embarrassing, becausein direct contact with all the principal parties to the war. To thewestward, her territory along the Riviera included Vintimiglia, bordering there on the county of Nice, and contained Vado Bay, thebest anchorage between Nice and Genoa. To the eastward, it embracedthe Gulf of Spezia, continually mentioned by Nelson as Porto Especia. 

The occupation of the Riviera was of particular moment to the French, for it offered a road by which to enter Italy, --bad, indeed, butbetter far than those through the passes of the upper Alps. Skirtingthe sea, it afforded a double line of communications, by land and bywater; for the various detachments of their army, posted along it, could in great degree be supplied by the small coasting-vessels of theMediterranean. So long, also, as it was in their possession, and theyheld passes of the Maritime Alps and Apennines, as they did in 1794, there was the possibility of their penetrating through them, to turnthe left flank of the Sardinian army in Piedmont, which was, in fact, what Bonaparte accomplished two years later. These inducements had ledthe French to advance into the county of Nice, then belonging toSardinia, which in the existing state of war it was perfectly properfor them to do; but, not stopping there, they had pushed on past theSardinian boundary into the neutral Riviera of Genoa, as far as VadoBay, which they occupied, and where they still were at the end of1794. 

Genoa submitted under protest to this breach of her neutrality, as shedid both before[25] and after to similar insults from parties to thewar. She derived some pecuniary benefit from the condition ofaffairs, --her ports, as well as those of Tuscany, immediately to thesouthward, becoming depots of a trade in grain, which supplied boththe French army and the southern provinces of France. These foodstuffs, absolutely essential to the French, were drawn chiefly fromSicily and the Barbary States, and could not be freely taken intoFrench ports by the larger class of sea-going vessels, in face of theBritish fleet. They were, therefore, commonly transshipped in Leghornor Genoa, and carried on by coasters. As so much Genoese sea-coast wasoccupied by French divisions, it was practically impossible forBritish cruisers to distinguish between vessels carrying corn for theinhabitants and those laden for the armies, and entirely impossible toknow that what was intended for one object would not be diverted toanother. If, too, a vessel's papers showed her to be destined forVintimiglia, near the extreme of the Genoese line, there could be nocertainty that, having got so far, she might not quietly slip by intoa French port, either Nice or beyond. The tenure of the neutralRiviera of Genoa by the French army was a threat to the allies ofGreat Britain in Piedmont and Lombardy, as well as to thequasi-neutrals in Genoa, Tuscany, Venice, and the Papal States. Itsfurther advance or successes would imperil the latter, and seriouslyaffect the attitude of Naples, hostile to the Republic, but weak, timid, and unstable of purpose. On the other hand, the retention ofits position, and much more any further advance, depended uponcontinuing to receive supplies by way of the sea. To do so by theshore route alone was not possible. Southern France itself dependedupon the sea for grain, and could send nothing, even if the thenmiserable Corniche road could have sufficed, as the sole line ofcommunications for forty thousand troops. 

Thus the transfer of Corsica to Great Britain had a very importantbearing upon the military and political conditions. At the moment whenItaly was about to become the scene of operations which might, and inthe event actually did, exercise a decisive influence upon the courseof the general war, the British position was solidified by theacquisition of a naval base, unassailable while the sea remained intheir control and the Corsicans attached to their cause, and centrallysituated with reference to the probable scenes of hostilities, as wellas to the points of political interest, on the mainland of Italy. Thefleet resting upon it, no longer dependent upon the reluctanthospitality of Genoese or Tuscan ports, or upon the far distantKingdom of Naples, was secure to keep in its station, whence itmenaced the entire seaboard trade of France and the Riviera, as wellas the tenure of the French army in the latter, and exerted a stronginfluence upon the attitude of both Genoa and Tuscany, who yieldedonly too easily to the nearest or most urgent pressure. The fleet towhich Nelson belonged had spent the greater part of the year 1794 insecuring for itself, as a base of operations, this position, by farthe most suitable among those that could be considered at all. Itremained now to utilize the advantage obtained, to make the situationof the French army in Italy untenable, by establishing an indisputablecontrol of the sea. To this the holding of Corsica also contributed, indirectly; for the loss of the island forced the French fleet to goto sea, in order, if possible, to expedite its re-conquest. In all theoperations resulting from these various motives, Nelson bore a part asconspicuous and characteristic as he had done in the reduction ofCorsica. Almost always on detached service, in positions approachingindependent command, he was continually adding to his reputation, and, what was far more important, maturing the professional character, theseeds of which had been so bountifully bestowed upon him by nature. His reputation, won hard and step by step, obtained for himopportunity; but it was to character, ripened by experience andreflection, that he owed his transcendent successes. 

The scheme for the government of the island as a British dependency, stated broadly, was that it should be administered by the Corsicansthemselves, under a viceroy appointed by the British crown. Itsmilitary security was provided for by the control of the sea, and byBritish soldiers holding the fortified ports, --a duty for which theCorsicans themselves had not then the necessary training. Nelson, whodid not yet feel the impossibility of sustaining a successful over-seainvasion, when control of the sea was not had, was anxious about theexpected attempts of the French against the island, and urged theviceroy, by private letter, to see that Ajaccio, which he regarded asthe point most favorable to a descent, was garrisoned sufficiently tokeep the gates shut for a few days. This caution did not then proceedfrom a distrust of the Corsicans' fidelity, without which neitherFrance nor England could hold the island, as was shown by thequickness of its transfer two years later, when the inhabitants againrevolted to France. "With this defence, " he wrote, "I am confidentAjaccio, and I believe I may say the island of Corsica, would beperfectly safe until our fleet could get to the enemy, when I have nodoubt the event would be what every Briton might expect. "

The repairs of the "Agamemnon" were completed before Nelson's anxiousapprehensions of a battle taking place in his absence could befulfilled. On the 21st of December, 1794, he sailed from Leghorn withthe fleet, in company with which he remained from that time until thefollowing July, when he was sent to the Riviera of Genoa on specialdetached service. He thus shared the severe cruising of that winter, as well as the abortive actions of the spring and early summer, wherethe admiral again contrived to lose opportunities of settling the seacampaign, and with it, not improbably, that of the land also. Therewere plain indications in the port of Toulon that a maritimeenterprise of some importance was in contemplation. In the outer roadlay fifteen sail-of-the-line, the British having then fourteen; butmore significant of the enemy's purpose was the presence at Marseillesof fifty large transports, said to be ready. "I have no doubt, " wroteNelson, "but Porto Especia is their object. " This was a mistake, interesting as indicating the slight weight that Nelson at that timeattributed to the deterrent effect of the British fleet "in being"upon such an enterprise, involving an open-sea passage of over ahundred miles, though he neither expressed nor entertained anyuncertainty as to the result of a meeting, if the enemy wereencountered. The French Government, not yet appreciating theinefficiency to which its navy had been reduced by many concurrentcircumstances, was ready to dispute the control of the Mediterranean, and it contemplated, among other things, a demonstration at Leghorn, similar to that successfully practised at Naples in 1792, which mightcompel the Court of Tuscany to renounce the formally hostile attitudeit had assumed at the bidding of Great Britain; but it does not appearthat there was any serious purpose of exposing a large detachment, inthe attempt to hold upon the Continent a position, such as Spezia, with which secure communication by land could not be had. 

Though none too careful to proportion its projects to the force at itsdisposal, the Directory sufficiently understood that a detachment atSpezia could not be self-dependent, nor could, with any certainty, combine its operations with those of the army in the Riviera; and alsothat, to be properly supported at all, there must be reasonably secureand unbroken communication, either by land or water, neither of whichwas possible until the British fleet was neutralized. The sameconsideration dictated to it the necessity of a naval victory, beforesending out the expedition, of whose assembling the British were nowhearing, and which was actually intended for Corsica; although it wasknown that in the island there had already begun the revulsion againstthe British rule, which culminated in open revolt the following year. Owing to the dearth of seamen, the crews of the French ships werelargely composed of soldiers, and it was thought that, after beatingthe enemy, four or five thousand of these might be at once thrown onshore at Ajaccio, and that afterwards the main body could be sentacross in safety. First of all, however, control of the sea must beestablished by a battle, more or less decisive. 

On the 24th of February, 1795, the British fleet arrived at Leghorn, after a very severe cruise of over a fortnight. On the 2d of MarchNelson mentioned, in a letter to his wife, that the French were saidthen to have a hundred and twenty-four transports full of troops, fromwhich he naturally argued that they must mean to attempt something. Onthe evening of the 8th, an express from Genoa brought Hotham word thatthey were actually at sea, fifteen ships-of-the-line, with half adozen or more smaller vessels. He sailed in pursuit early the nextmorning, having with him thirteen[26] British ships-of-the-line andone Neapolitan seventy-four. Of the former, four were three-deckedships, carrying ninety-eight to one hundred guns, a class of vessel ofwhich the French had but one, the "Sans Culottes, " of one hundred andtwenty, which, under the more dignified name of "L'Orient, "afterwards, met so tragic a fate at the Battle of the Nile; but theyhad, in compensation, three powerful ships of eighty guns, muchsuperior to the British seventy-fours. As, however, only partialengagements followed, the aggregate of force on either side is amatter of comparatively little importance in a Life of Nelson. 

Standing to the northward and westward, with a fresh easterly wind, the British fleet through its lookouts discovered the enemy on theevening of the day of sailing, and by the same means kept touch withthem throughout the 10th and 11th; but the baffling airs, frequent inthe Mediterranean, prevented the main body seeing them until themorning of the 12th. At daylight, then, they were visible from the"Agamemnon, " in company with which were five British ships and theNeapolitan; the remainder of the fleet being so far to the eastwardthat their hulls were just rising out of the water. The British lyingnearly becalmed, the French, who were to windward, bore down to withinthree miles; but although, in Nelson's judgment, they had a fairopportunity to separate the advanced British ships, with which he was, from the main body, they failed to improve it. Nothing happened thatday, and, a fresh breeze from the west springing up at dusk, bothfleets stood to the southward with it, the French being to windward. That night one of the latter, a seventy-four, having lost a topmast, was permitted to return to port. 

The next morning the wind was still southwest and squally. Hotham atdaylight ordered a general chase, which allowed each ship a certainfreedom of movement in endeavoring to close with the French. The"Agamemnon" had been well to the westward, from the start; and being avery handy, quick-working ship, as well as, originally at least, morethan commonly fast, was early in the day in a position where she had afair chance for reaching the enemy. A favorable opportunity soonoccurred, one of those which so often show that, if a man only putshimself in the way of good luck, good luck is apt to offer. At 8 A. M. The eighty-gun ship "Ça Ira, " third from the rear in the French order, ran on board the vessel next ahead of her, and by the collision losther fore and main topmasts. These falling overboard on the leeside--in this case the port, [27]--not only deprived her of by far thegreater part of her motive power, but acted as a drag on her progress, besides for the time preventing the working of the guns on that side. The "Ça Ira" dropped astern of her fleet. Although this eighty-gunship was much bigger than his own, --"absolutely large enough to takeAgamemnon in her hold, " Nelson said, --the latter saw his chance, andinstantly seized it with the promptitude characteristic of all hisactions. The "Agamemnon, " if she was not already on the port tack, opposite to that on which the fleets had been during the night, musthave gone about at this time, and probably for this reason. She wasable thus to fetch into the wake of the crippled vessel, which afrigate had already gallantly attacked, taking advantage of theuselessness of the Frenchman's lee batteries, encumbered with thewreckage of the masts. 

At 10 A. M. , the "Ça Ira" and the "Agamemnon" having passed on oppositetacks, the latter again went about and stood in pursuit under allsail, rapidly nearing the enemy, who at this time was taken in tow bya frigate. But although in this position the French ship could nottrain her broadside guns upon her smaller opponent, she could stillwork freely the half-dozen stern guns, and did so with much effect. "So true did she fire, " noted Nelson, "that not a shot missed somepart of the ship, and latterly the masts were struck every shot, whichobliged me to open our fire a few minutes sooner than I intended, forit was my intention to have touched his stern before a shot wasfired. " At quarter before eleven, the "Agamemnon" was within a hundredyards of the "Ça Ira's" stern, and this distance she was able to keepuntil I P. M. Here, by the use of the helm and of the sails, the shipalternately turned her starboard side to the enemy to fire herbatteries, and again resumed her course, to regain the distancenecessarily lost at each deviation. This raking fire not only killedand wounded many of the "Ça Ira's" crew, and injured the hull, but, what was tactically of yet greater importance, preventing thereplacing of the lost spars. Thus was entailed upon the French thatnight a crippled ship, which they could not in honor abandon, nor yetcould save without fighting for her, --a tactical dilemma which was thedirect cause of the next day's battle. 

Brief and cursory as is the notice of this action of the "Agamemnon"in Hotham's despatches, he mentions no other ship-of-the-line asengaged at this time, and states that she and the frigate were so fardetached from the fleet, that they were finally obliged to retire onaccount of other enemy's vessels approaching. Nelson's journal saysthat two French ships, one of one hundred and twenty guns and aseventy-four, were at gunshot distance on the bow of the "Ça Ira" whenhe began to attack her. These, with several others of their fleet, went about some time before one, at which hour the frigate, towing thedisabled ship, tacked herself, and also got the latter around. The"Agamemnon" standing on, she and the "Ça Ira" now crossed within halfpistol-range; but, the French guns being too much elevated, the shotpassed over their antagonist, who lost in this day's work only sevenmen wounded. Nelson then again tacked to follow, but by this time theFrench admiral had apparently decided that his crippled vessel must berescued, and his fleet no longer defied by a foe so inferior instrength. Several of the enemy were approaching, when Hotham made asignal of recall, which Nelson on this occasion at least had nohesitation in obeying, and promptly. There was no pursuit, the hostilecommander-in-chief being apparently satisfied to save the "Ça Ira" forthe moment, without bringing on a general engagement. 

In this affair, what is mainly to be noted in Nelson is not thepersonal courage, nor yet even the professional daring, or the skillwhich justified the daring. It may be conceded that all these weredisplayed in a high degree, but they can scarcely be claimed to haveexceeded that shown by other officers, not a few, when equally tried. What is rather striking, account for it how we will, is that Nelson, here as always, was on hand when opportunity offered; that after threedays of chase he, and he only, was so far to the front as to be ableto snatch the fleeting moment. "On looking round, " he says at teno'clock, when about to begin the action, "I saw no ship-of-the-linewithin several miles to support me; the Captain was the nearest on ourlee-quarter. " With the looseness and lack of particularity whichcharacterize most logs and despatches remaining from those days, andmake the comprehension of naval engagements, other than the greatest, a matter of painful and uncertain inference, it is impossibleaccurately to realize the entire situation; but it seems difficult toimagine that among all the other thirteen captains, "where emulationwas common to all and zeal for his Majesty's service the generaldescription of the fleet, " to use Hotham's words, none could have beenon the spot to support so promising an attempt, had there been"common" that sort of emulation which takes a man ever to the front, not merely in battle but at all times, --the spirit that will not andcannot rest while anything remains to be done, ever pressing onward tothe mark. To this unquestionably must be added the rapid comprehensionof a situation, and the exceeding promptitude with which Nelson seizedhis opportunity, as well as the tenacious intrepidity with which heheld to his position of advantage, despite the imminent threat to hissafety from the uninjured and gigantic "Sans Culottes, " barely out ofgunshot to windward. It is right also to note the accessibility toadvice, a feature of his genial and kindly temperament, to which headmitted much of the success was due. The trait is not rare in mankindin general, but it is exceptional in men of a character soself-reliant and decided as Nelson. "If the conduct of the Agamemnonon the 13th, " he generously wrote, "was by any means the cause of oursuccess on the 14th, Lieutenant Andrews has a principal share in themerit, for a more proper opinion was never given by an officer thanthe one he gave me on the 13th, in a situation of great difficulty. "

The same hot spirit, the same unwearying energy, made itself stillmore manifest the next day, when were to be garnered the results ofhis own partial, yet, in its degree, decisive action of the 13th. "Sure I am, " said he afterwards, "had I commanded our fleet on the14th, that either the whole French fleet would have graced my triumph, or I should have been in a confounded scrape. " A confounded scrape hewould have been in on the 13th, and on other days also, great andsmall, had there been a different issue to the risks he dared, andrightly dared, to take. Of what man eminent in war, indeed, is not thelike true? It is the price of fame, which he who dare not pay mustforfeit; and not fame only, but repute. 

During the following night the "Sans Culottes" quitted the Frenchfleet. The wind continued southerly, both fleets standing to thewestward, the crippled "Ça Ira" being taken in tow by the "Censeur, "of seventy-four guns. At daylight of March 14, being about twentymiles southwest from Genoa, these two were found to be much astern andto leeward, of their main body, --that is, northeast from it. TheBritish lay in the same direction, and were estimated by Nelson to bethree and a half miles from the disabled ship and her consort, fivemiles from the rest of the French. At 5. 30 A. M. A smart breeze sprangup from the northwest, which took the British aback, but enabled themafterwards to head for the two separated French ships. Apparently, from Nelson's log, this wind did not reach the main body of the enemy, a circumstance not uncommon in the Mediterranean. Two Britishseventy-fours, the "Captain" and the "Bedford, " in obedience tosignals, stood down to attack the "Censeur" and the "Ça Ira;" and, having in this to undergo for twenty minutes a fire to which theycould not reply, were then and afterwards pretty roughly handled. Theywere eventually left behind, crippled, as their own fleet advanced. The rest of the British were meantime forming in line and moving downto sustain them. The French main body, keeping the southerly wind, wore in succession to support their separated ships, and headed topass between them and their enemies. The latter, having formed, stoodalso towards these two, which now lay between the contestants as theprize to the victor. 

Apparently, in these manoeuvres, the leading British ships ran againinto the belt of southerly wind, --which the French keptthroughout, --while part of the centre and rear were left becalmed, andhad little or no share in the cannonade that followed. Under theseconditions the resolution of the French admiral seems to havefaltered, for instead of passing to leeward--north--of his endangeredships, which was quite in his power, and so covering them from theenemy, he allowed the latter to cut them off, thus insuring theirsurrender. His fleet kept to windward of the British, passing fairlynear the two leading ships, the "Illustrious" and the "Courageux, " whothus underwent a "concentration by defiling, " that took the main andmizzen masts out of both, besides killing and wounding many of theirpeople. The "Princess Royal" and "Agamemnon, " which came next, couldonly engage at long range. "The enemy's fleet kept the southerlywind, " wrote Nelson in his journal, "which enabled them to keep theirdistance, which was very great. At 8 A. M. They began to pass our lineto windward, and the Ça Ira and Le Censeur were on our lee side;therefore the Illustrious, Courageux, Princess Royal, and Agamemnonwere obliged to fight on both sides of the ship. " At five minutes pastten A. M. Both the French vessels struck, the "Ça Ira" having lost herthree masts, and the "Censeur" her mainmast. It was past one P. M. Whenfiring wholly ceased; and the enemy then crowded all possible sail tothe westward, the British fleet lying with their heads to thesoutheast. 

When the British line was forming, between seven and eight in themorning, Nelson was directed by Vice-Admiral Goodall, the second incommand, to take his station astern of his flagship, the "PrincessRoyal, " of ninety guns. Immediately behind the "Agamemnon" came the"Britannia, " carrying Hotham's flag. This position, and the lightnessof the wind, serve to explain how Nelson came to take the step hementions in several letters; going on board the "Britannia, " after thetwo French vessels struck, and urging the commander-in-chief to leavethe prizes in charge of the British frigates and crippledships-of-the-line, and vigorously to pursue the French, who havinglost four ships out of their fleet, by casualty or capture, were nowreduced to eleven sail. "I went on board Admiral Hotham as soon as ourfiring grew slack in the van, and the Ça Ira and the Censeur hadstruck, to propose to him leaving our two crippled ships, the twoprizes, and four frigates, to themselves, and to pursue the enemy;but he, much cooler than myself, said, 'We must be contented, we havedone very well. ' Now, had we taken ten sail, and had allowed theeleventh to escape, when it had been possible to have got at her, Icould never have called it well done. Goodall backed me; I got him towrite to the admiral, but it would not do: we should have had such aday as I believe the annals of England never produced. "

Nelson here evidently assumes that it was possible to have got at theFrench fleet. After a man's reputation has been established, there isalways the danger of giving undue weight to his opinions, expressed atan earlier time, somewhat casually, and not under the sobering senseof responsibility. Hotham may have questioned the possibility ofgetting at the French effectively, having regard to the ficklelightness of the wind then prevalent, and to the fact that, besidesthe two ships partially dismasted and for the moment useless, twoothers, the "Captain" and the "Bedford, " had suffered severely insails and rigging. He would also doubtless consider that thethree-decked ships, of which he had four, were notoriously badsailers, and sure to drop behind if the chase lasted long, leaving toeight ships, including the "Neapolitan, " the burden of arresting theenemy, who had shown very fair offensive powers in the morning. Nelsonwas not blind to these facts, and not infrequently alludes to them. "Had we only a breeze, I have no doubt we should have given adestructive blow to the enemy's fleet. " "Sure I am, that had thebreeze continued, so as to have allowed us to close with the enemy, weshould have destroyed their whole fleet. " Whether these remarks applyto the heat of the engagement, or to the proposed chase, which Hothamdeclined to permit, is not perfectly clear; but inasmuch as the secondpart of the action of the 14th consisted, actually, in the Frenchfiling by the "Courageux" and the "Illustrious, " upon whom their firewas thus concentrated, while the rest of the British were becalmedout of gunshot, it is very possible he was thinking of that incidentonly, which doubtless would have taken a very different turn had themain body been able to come down. His wish to pursue isunquestionable, both from his assertion and from the whole characterof his career before and after; and a casual remark, written ten daysafter the affair, shows his opinion confirmed by time. "Had our goodadmiral followed the blow, we should probably have done more, but therisk was thought too great. "

The question attracts attention, both impersonally, as of militaryinterest, and also as bearing upon Nelson's correctness of judgment, and professional characteristics, at this time. As regards the amountof wind, it is sufficient to say that the French fleet, having borneaway to the westward in the afternoon, was next day out of sight. [28]Most of the British might equally have been out of sight from theposition in which they remained. As for the risk--of course there wasrisk; but the whole idea of a general chase rests upon the fact that, for one reason or another, the extreme speed of the ships in eachfleet will vary, and that it is always probable that the fastest ofthe pursuers can overtake the slowest of the pursued. The resultingcombats compel the latter either to abandon his ships, or to incur ageneral action, which, from the fact of his flight, it is evident hehas reason to avoid. In this case many of the retreating French werecrippled, --some went off towed by frigates, and some withoutbowsprits. Unquestionably, the pursuers who thus engage may beoverpowered before those following them come up; but the balance ofchances is generally in their favor, and in the particular instancewould have been markedly so, as was shown by the results of the twodays' fighting, which had proved the superior quality of the Britishships' companies. 

The fact is, neither Hotham nor his opponent, Martin, was willing tohazard a decisive naval action, but wished merely to obtain atemporary advantage, --the moment's safety, no risks. "I have goodreason, " wrote Hotham in his despatch, "to hope, from the enemy'ssteering to the westward after having passed our fleet, that whatevermight have been their design, _their intentions are for the presentfrustrated_. " It is scarcely necessary to say that a man who looks nofurther ahead than this, who fails to realize that the destruction ofthe enemy's fleet is the one condition of permanent safety to hiscause, will not rise to the conception presented to him on hisquarter-deck by Nelson. The latter, whether by the sheer intuition ofgenius, which is most probable, or by the result of well-orderedreasoning, which is less likely, realized fully that to destroy theFrench fleet was the one thing for which the British fleet was there, and the one thing by doing which it could decisively affect the war. As he wrote four years later to St. Vincent, "Not one moment shall belost in bringing the enemy to battle; for I consider the best defencefor his Sicilian Majesty's dominions is to place myself alongside theFrench. "

Yet Nelson was far from unconscious of the difficulties of Hotham'sposition, or from failing duly to allow for them. "Admiral Hotham hashad much to contend with, a fleet half-manned, and in every respectinferior to the enemy; Italy calling him to her defence, our newlyacquired kingdom[29] calling might and main, our reinforcements andconvoy hourly expected; and all to be done without a force by anymeans adequate to it. " Add to this the protection of British trade, ofwhose needs Nelson was always duly sensible. Yet, as one scans thislist of troubles, with the query how to meet them running in his mind, it is scarcely possible not to see that each and every difficultywould have been solved by a crushing pursuit of the beaten French, preventing their again taking the sea. The British admiral had in hiscontrol no means to force them out of port. Therefore, when out, heshould by no means have allowed them to get back. It is only just toHotham, who had been a capable as well as gallant captain, to say thathe had objected to take the chief command, on account of his health. 

Nelson was delighted with his own share in these affairs, and with thepraise he received from others for his conduct, --especially that onthe 13th. He was satisfied, and justly, that his sustained and daringgrapple with the "Ça Ira, " in the teeth of her fleet, had been theeffective cause of the next day's action and consequent success. Itwas so, in truth, and it presented an epitome of what the 14th and15th ought to have witnessed, --a persistent clinging to the crippledships, in order to force their consorts again into battle. "You willparticipate, " he wrote to his uncle, "in the pleasure I must have feltin being the great cause of our success. Could I have been supported, I would have had Ça Ira on the 13th. " Elliot, the Viceroy of Corsica, wrote to him: "I certainly consider the business of the 13th of Marchas a very capital feature in the late successful contest with theFrench fleet; and the part which the Agamemnon had in it must be feltby every one to be one of the circumstances that gave lustre to thisevent, and rendered it not only useful, but peculiarly honourable tothe British arms. " "So far, " added Nelson, in quoting this to hiswife, "all hands agree in giving me the praises which cannot but becomfortable to me to the last moment of my life. " He adds then areflection, evincing that he was assimilating some of the philosophyof life as well as of fighting. "The time of my being left out here byLord Hood, " which he had so much regretted, "I may call well spent;had I been absent, how mortified should I now be. What has happenedmay never happen to any one again, that only one ship-of-the-line outof fourteen should get into action with the French fleet for so longa time as two hours and a half, and with such a ship as the Ça Ira. "It may be of interest to mention that the French fleet, upon thisoccasion, was largely composed of the vessels which three years laterwere destroyed by him at the Battle of the Nile. 

In all his interests, ambitions, and gratification with success andpraise, he at this period writes fully and intimately to his wife, between whom and himself there evidently still existed, after thesetwo years of absence, a tender and affectionate confidence. "It iswith an inexpressible pleasure I have received your letters, with ourfather's. I rejoice that my conduct gives you pleasure, and I trust Ishall never do anything which will bring a blush on your face. Restassured you are never absent from my thoughts. " When looking forwardto the action of March 14, he tells her: "Whatever may be my fate, Ihave no doubt in my own mind but that my conduct will be such as willnot bring a blush on the face of my friends: the lives of all are inthe hands of Him who knows best whether to preserve mine or not; toHis will do I resign myself. My character and good name are in my ownkeeping. Life with disgrace is dreadful. A glorious death is to beenvied;" and he signs himself with unwonted tenderness, "Ever yourmost faithful and affectionate husband. " Save of the solemn hoursbefore Trafalgar, when another image occupied his thoughts, this isthe only personal record we have of the feelings with which this man, dauntless above his fellows, went into battle. He refrainsthoughtfully from any mention of his health that may cause heranxiety, which she had shown herself over weak and worrying to bear;but he speaks freely of all that passes, confiding that with her heneed have no reserves, even in a natural self-praise. "This I can say, that all I have obtained I owe to myself, and to no one else, and _toyou_ I may add, that my character stands high with almost all Europe. Even the Austrians knew my name perfectly. " While silent on thesubject of illness, he admits now that his eye had grown worse, andwas in almost total darkness, besides being very painful at times;"but never mind, " he adds cheeringly, "I can see very well with theother. "

It is instructive to note, in view of some modern debated questions, that, despite the recent success, Nelson was by no means sure that theBritish fleet could defend Corsica. "I am not even now certain Corsicais safe, " he wrote on the 25th of March, "if they undertake theexpedition with proper spirit. " The threat, never absent while theFrench fleet remained, was emphasized by the arrival of sixships-of-the-line from Brest, which reached Toulon on the 4th ofApril, materially altering the complexion of affairs in theMediterranean, and furnishing an instructive instance of the probablepunishment for opportunity imperfectly utilized, as on the 14th ofMarch. Great discontent was felt at the apparent failure of theAdmiralty to provide against this chance. "Hotham is very muchdispleased with them, " wrote Nelson, "and certainly with reason;" anddoubtless it is satisfactory to believe, rightly or wrongly, that ourdisadvantages are due to the neglect of others, and not to our ownshortcomings. 

Although the nominal force of the French was thus raised to twenty ofthe line, the want of seamen, and the absence of discipline, preventedtheir seizing the opportunity offered by the temporary inferiority ofthe British, reduced to thirteen besides two Neapolitans, in whoseefficiency, whether justly or not, Nelson placed little confidence. Atthis critical moment, with a large British military convoy expected, and the fleet, to use his impatient expression, "skulking in port, " aJacobin outbreak occurred in Toulon, and the seamen assumed the_opéra-bouffe_ rôle of going ashore to assist in deliberations uponthe measures necessary to save the country. Before they were againready to go to sea, the convoy had arrived. On the 7th of June, however, the French again sailed from Toulon, seventeenships-of-the-line; and the following day Nelson, writing to hisbrother, thus gave vent to the bitterness of his feelings: "We havebeen cruising off Minorca for a long month, every moment inexpectation of reinforcements from England. Great good fortune hashitherto saved us, what none in this fleet could have expected for solong a time. Near two months we have been skulking from them. Had theynot got so much cut up on the 14th of March, Corsica, Rome, and Napleswould, at this moment, have been in their possession, and may yet, ifthese people [the Admiralty] do not make haste to help us. I am out ofspirits, although never better in health. "

His depression was due less to the inadequacy of the British fleetthan to the dismissal of Lord Hood from the command, news of which wasat this time received. When about to sail from England, to resume hisduty as commander-in-chief, he got into a controversy with theGovernment about the force necessary in the Mediterranean, and, givingoffence by the sharpness of his language, was ordered to haul down hisflag. He never again went to sea. Nelson deplored his loss in termsunusually vivacious: "Oh, miserable Board of Admiralty! They haveforced the first officer in our service away from his command. " Inmore temperate but well-weighed words, he said: "This fleet mustregret the loss of Lord Hood, the best officer, take him altogether, that England has to boast of. Lord Howe is certainly a great officerin the management of a fleet, but that is all. Lord Hood is equallygreat in all situations which an admiral can be placed in. " In thejudgment of the present writer, this estimate of Hood is as accurateas it is moderate in expression. It was nothing less than providentialfor the French that he was not in command on the 14th of March, or inthe yet more trivial and discreditable affair of July 13th, when, touse again Nelson's words, "To say how much we wanted Lord Hood atthat time, is to say, will you have all the French fleet or noaction?"

On the 14th of June the expected reinforcement from England, nineships-of-the-line, joined the fleet off Minorca; and a few days latera large convoy also arrived, with which the whole body of ships of warput into San Fiorenzo Bay on the 29th. This concluded for Nelson aperiod of three months, counting from the action of March 14th, ofpretty monotonous cruising with the fleet, the last in which he was totake part until his admiral's flag was hoisted, two years later. Though unmarked by any event of importance, the time was passed notunprofitably to himself, for his correspondence bears marks offruitful reflection, not merely upon the evident inadequacy of hiscommander-in-chief to the position he unwillingly occupied, but uponthe character of the operations and the line of conduct that ought tobe followed. If he does criticise the former's want of head forenterprise, he formulates for himself a general principle which showedits vital influence in his future career. "After all my complaints, Ihave no doubt but, if we can get close to the enemy, we shall defeatany plan of theirs; _but we ought to have our ideas beyond meredefensive measures_. "

Among other matters for reflection, he had at this time a curiouscause of anxiety, lest he should be promoted to flag rank, or ratherthat, being promoted, he should be obliged to return to England atonce, as there would be too many admirals in the Mediterranean topermit his retention. A rumor was current, which proved to be correct, that there would be a large promotion on the 1st of June, the firstanniversary of the victory celebrated by that name. Being thenforty-six on the list of captains, Nelson feared that it might includehim; in which case, if not permitted to hoist his flag where he was, not only would he lose his ardently desired opportunities fordistinction, --"not an hour this war will I, if possible, be out ofactive service, "--but he would be put to much inconvenience and loss. "If they give me my flag, I shall be half ruined: unless I amimmediately employed in this country, I should, by the time I landedin England, be a loser, several hundred pounds out of pocket. " To betaken "from actual service would distress me much, more especially asI almost believe these people will be mad enough to come out. " Heescaped this disappointment, however, for the promotion left him stillon the post-captains' list, seven from its head; but he received, whatwas both complimentary and profitable, the honorary rank of Colonel ofMarines, --a sinecure appointment, of which there were then four, givento post-captains of distinguished services, and vacated by them uponpromotion. These are now discontinued, and replaced, as a matter ofemolument, by Good Service Pensions. Nelson heard later that thisreward had been conferred upon him, not merely as a favor, but with afull recognition of all his claims to it. "The Marines have been givento me in the handsomest manner. The answer given to many was, the Kingknew no officer who had served so much for them as myself. "

These promotions came timely to insure for him an employmentparticularly suited to his active temperament and fearlessness ofresponsibility, but which, though the fittest man for it, he might, with less seniority, not have received from Hotham, despite thewell-known confidence in him shown by Hood. Since the spring opened, the Austrians and their allies, the Sardinians, had been waiting, ostensibly at least, for assistance from the Navy, to begin a forwardmovement, the first object of which was the possession of Vado Bay asa safe anchorage for the fleet. Until the arrival of Man and theconvoy, Hotham had not felt strong enough to spare the required force;but now, after the ships had filled their wants from the transports, he, on the 4th of July, detached Nelson, with the "Agamemnon" and sixsmaller vessels, to co-operate with the Austrian commander-in-chief. The latter had begun his movement on the 13th of June, passing throughGenoese territory despite the remonstrances of the Republic, whoseneutrality could claim but slight regard from one belligerent, whenshe had already permitted the occupation of so much of her shore lineby the other. The French had fallen back, when attacked, abandoningVado Bay to the enemy, whose headquarters were established at thatpoint. 

Nelson, having sailed with four of his squadron, fell in with theFrench fleet of seventeen of the line, off the Riviera, on the 6th ofJuly. He had, of course, to retreat, which he did upon San Fiorenzo, to join the body of the fleet. On the morning of the 7th the"Agamemnon" and her followers, with the French in close pursuit, weresighted from the anchorage, much to the surprise of the admiral, whoknew the enemy had come out, but, upon the information of the Austriangeneral, believed them returned to Toulon. Why he had not moreaccurate news from lookout frigates is not clear; but, as Nelson said, he took things easy, and he had persuaded himself that they had leftharbor only to exercise their men. As it was, the "Agamemnon" was hardpressed, but escaped, chiefly through the enemy's lack of seamanship. The fleet, when she arrived, was in the midst of refitting andwatering, but succeeded in getting to sea the following morning insearch of the enemy, who meantime had disappeared. 

Precise information of the French whereabouts could not be obtaineduntil the evening of the 12th, when two of the British lookout shipsreported that they had been seen a few hours before to the southwest, south of the Hyères Islands. The fleet made sail in that direction. During the night a heavy gale came on from west-northwest, out of theGulf of Lyons, which split the main-topsails of several British ships. At daybreak the enemy were discovered in the southeast, standingnorth to close the land. After some elaborate manoeuvring--to reachone of those formal orders, often most useful, but which the irregularMediterranean winds are prone to disarrange as soon as completed--theadmiral at 8 A. M. Signalled a general chase. The British being towindward, and the breeze fresh, the half-dozen leading ships had atnoon closed the enemy's rear within three-quarters of a mile; but, from their relative positions, as then steering, the guns of neithercould be used effectively. At this time a shift of wind to northheaded off both fleets, which put their bows to the eastward, throwingthe British advanced vessels, to use Nelson's expression, into lineabreast, and bringing to bear the broadsides of the ships, of bothfleets, that were within range. The action then began, the Britishfire being directed mainly upon the French rear ship, the "Alcide, "which surrendered at about 2 P. M. , and soon afterwards blew up. Thewind had meanwhile changed again to the eastward, giving theweather-gage to the French, most of whom were considerably nearer theshore than their opponents, and better sailers. 

Up to this time Nelson, who in the forenoon had thought there wasevery prospect of taking every ship in the French fleet, still feltalmost certain that six would be secured; but, to use his own words, it was now "impossible to close. " In the space between the shipsengaged, and to leeward, the light air seems to have been killed bythe cannonading; whereas the French, who were now to windward, stillreceived enough to draw slowly away. Hotham, being in one of the veryworst sailers in the fleet, if not in the Navy, had fallen eight milesastern, and not seeing clearly how things were going, made at thistime a signal of recall, which was certainly premature. It seems a notimproper comment that, in light and baffling weather, such as that ofthe Mediterranean, the commander-in-chief should have been in a fastand handy ship, able at the least to keep him within eyeshot of thedecisive scene. Remaining in the "Britannia" may have been due to thenatural unwillingness of an invalid to quit his well-orderedsurroundings, by which even St. Vincent was led to take a first-rateship away with himself at a critical moment; but, if so, it onlyemphasizes the absolute necessity of physical vigor to acommander-in-chief. 

Nelson had again managed to keep the "Agamemnon" well to the front, for the other ships that succeeded in getting into action were almostwholly from among those which had recently arrived from England withRear-Admiral Man. These, being fresh from home, should naturallyoutsail a ship now two and a half years in commission, and which, notlong after, had to be wrapped with hawsers to hold her together. Inhis comments on the action he says comparatively little of the signalof recall, which, though ill-timed, he does not seem to have thoughtaffected the result materially; but he was utterly dissatisfied withthe previous management of the business, and into the causes of thisdissatisfaction it is desirable to look, as bearing at once upon hisnatural military characteristics, and the development they receivedfrom time and thought. "The scrambling distant fire was a farce, " hewrote; "but if one fell by such a fire, what might not have beenexpected had our whole fleet engaged? Improperly as the part of thefleet which fired got into action, we took one ship; but the subjectis unpleasant, and I shall have done with it. " The criticism, thoughfar from explicit, evidently bears upon the manner in which the fleetwas handled, from the moment the enemy was sighted until the firingbegan. During the latter, Man was the senior officer on the spot, andNelson does not blame him; on the contrary, punning on the name, says, "He is a good _man_ in every sense of the word. "

The precise working of his thought can only be inferred. "The wholefleet" failed to get into action. Why? Because the signal for ageneral chase was delayed from 4 to 8 A. M. , pending certaindrill-ground manoeuvres, upon whose results, however well intended, nodependence could be placed in Mediterranean weather. During these fourhours the wind was fresh, --the heel of a short summer's gale, invaluable to both sides, --and the enemy were using it to close theshore, where wind, the sole dependence for motive power, baffles most. Had the fastest British ships, under a competent flag-officer, utilized that time and that wind, there was, to put the case mostmildly, the chance that they could repeat, upon the French rear, thesame part the "Agamemnon" alone had played with the "Ça Ira, "--andsuch a chance, were it no more, should not have been dawdled with. "Missed the opportunity, "--the fatal words, "it might have been. " Isit far-fetched to see in his reflections upon "this miserable action, "as it is styled independently by James and himself, the forecast ofthe opening sentence of his celebrated order beforeTrafalgar?--"Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of fortysail-of-the-line[30] into a line of battle in variable winds, thickweather, and other circumstances which must occur, _without such aloss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringingthe enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the businessdecisive_, I have therefore made up my mind--" Or, again, as he sawMan dragged off--with too little remonstrance, it may be--by asuperior, who could by no means see what was the state of the action, is there not traceable a source of the feeling, partly inborn, partlyreasoned, that found expression in the generous and yet most wisewords of the same immortal order?--"The second in command will [infact command his line and], [31] after my intentions are made known tohim, have the entire direction of his line to make the attack uponthe enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured ordestroyed. " Whether such words be regarded as the labored result ofobservation and reflection, or whether as the flashes of intuition, with which genius penetrates at once to the root of a matter, withoutthe antecedent processes to which lesser minds are subjected, --ineither case they are instructive when linked with the events of hiscareer here under discussion, as corroborative indications of naturaltemperament and insight, which banish altogether the thought of merefortuitous valor as the one explanation of Nelson's successes. 

With this unsatisfactory affair, Nelson's direct connection with themain body of the fleet came to an end for the remainder of Hotham'scommand. It is scarcely necessary to add that the prime object of theBritish fleet at all times, and not least in the Mediterranean in1795, --the control of the sea, --continued as doubtful as it had beenat the beginning of the year. The dead weight of the admiral's havingupon his mind the Toulon fleet, undiminished in force despite twooccasions for decisive action, was to be clearly seen in the ensuingoperations. On this, also, Nelson did much thinking, as passing eventsthrew light upon the consequences of missing opportunities. "TheBritish fleet, " he wrote, five years later, and no man better knew thefacts, "could have prevented the invasion of Italy; and, if our friendHotham had kept his fleet on that coast, I assert, and you will agreewith me, no army from France could have been furnished with stores orprovisions; even men could not have marched. " But how keep the fleeton the Italian coast, while the French fleet in full vigor remained inToulon? What a curb it was appeared again in the next campaign, andeven more clearly, because the British were then commanded by Sir JohnJervis, a man not to be checked by ordinary obstacles. From the decksof his flagship Nelson, in the following April, watched a convoypassing close in shore. "To get at them was impossible before theyanchored under such batteries as would have crippled our fleet; and, had such an event happened, _in the present state of the enemy'sfleet_, Tuscany, Naples, Rome, Sicily, &c. , would have fallen as fastas their ships could have sailed along the coast. Our fleet is theonly saviour at present for those countries. "

FOOTNOTES:

[25] In the year 1793 the French frigate "Modeste" had been forcibly takenfrom the harbor of Genoa by an English squadron. 

[26] The "Berwick, " seventy-four, had been left in San Fiorenzo forrepairs. Putting to sea at this time, she fell in with the French fleet, and was taken. 

[27] The port side, or, as it was called in Nelson's day, the larboardside, is the left, looking from the stem to the bow of a ship. 

[28] Nelson to the Duke of Clarence, March 15, 1795. (Nicolas. )

[29] Corsica. 

[30] There were twenty-three present on July 13, 1795. 

[31] The words in brackets were erased in the rough draft, but are hereinserted, because they emphasize the underlying thought, that the secondwas to have real command, not wait nor look for signals, nor yet fear them. 

CHAPTER VI. 

NELSON'S COMMAND OF A DETACHED SQUADRON ON THE RIVIERA OF GENOA, UNTILTHE DEFEAT OF THE AUSTRIANS AT THE BATTLE OF LOANO. --SIR JOHN JERVISAPPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

JULY-DECEMBER, 1795. AGE, 37. 

After the action of July 13, Nelson was again despatched upon hismission to co-operate with the Austrians on the Riviera. His orders, dated July 15, were to confer first with the British minister atGenoa, and thence to proceed with his squadron to the Austrianheadquarters at Vado Bay. The seniority he had now attained made hisselection for this detached and responsible service less evidentlyflattering than Hood's preferment of him to such positions when he wasjunior in rank; but the duty had the distinction of being not onlyarduous from the purely naval standpoint, but delicate in thediplomatic management and tact required. Although Great Britain atthat period was rarely slack in resorting to strong and arbitrarymeasures in dealing with neutrals, when her interests seemed to demandit, she was always exceedingly desirous to avoid causes of needlessoffence. The exigencies of Southern France, and of both the opposingarmies in the Riviera, had created a busy neutral trade, occupied insupplying all parties to the war, as well as the inhabitants ofGenoese towns then in military occupation by the French. Although thelatter and the Austrians had both openly disregarded the neutrality ofGenoa, it was the policy of Great Britain now to manifest respect forit as far as possible, and at the same time not to raise causes ofdiplomatic contention over the neutral trade, although this was wellknown to be supporting the enemy's army. 

When Nelson left the fleet, he had, besides his special orders for hisown mission, a circular letter from the admiral to all vessels underhis command, framed upon instructions received from England a monthbefore, directing special care "not to give any just cause of offenceto the foreign powers in amity with his Majesty, and whenever anyships or vessels belonging to the subjects of those powers shall bedetained, or brought by you into port, you are to transmit to theSecretary of the Admiralty a complete specification of their cargoes, and not to institute any legal process against such ships or vesselsuntil their lordships' further pleasure shall be known. "

To the naval officers on the spot this order was calculated toincrease vastly the perplexities, which necessarily arose from theoccupation of the Genoese coast by French troops. But, besidesquestions of trade, the weaker States, Genoa and Tuscany, --the latterof which had recently made peace with France, --were driven to manifoldshifts and compromises, in order to maintain in their ports suchsemblance of impartial neutrality as would save them from reprisals byeither party. These measures, while insuring to some extent the end inview, gave rise also to a good deal of friction and recriminationbetween the neutral and the belligerents. The vessels of the latterwere admitted, under certain limitations as to number, into theneutral port, where they lay nearly side by side, jealously watchingeach other, and taking note of every swerving, real or presumed, froman exact and even balance. Each sailed from the neutral port to carryon war, but it is obvious that the shelter of such a port was far moreuseful to the belligerent who did not control the water, who movedupon it only by evasion and stealth, and who was therefore tempted, inorder to improve such advantages, to stretch to the verge of abusethe privileges permitted to him by the neutral. "The Genoese allow theFrench, " wrote Nelson, "to have some small vessels in the port ofGenoa, that I have seen towed out of the port, and board vesselscoming in, and afterwards return into the mole; the conduct of theEnglish is very different. " He elsewhere allows, however, that, "inthe opinion of the Genoese, my squadron is constantly offending; sothat it almost appears a trial between us, who shall first be tired, they of complaining, or me of answering them. "

After the first successes of the Austrians and Sardinians, in theprevious June, the French commander-in-chief, Kellerman, feeling hisinferiority to be such as compelled him to a defensive attitude, hadcarefully selected the most advanced line that he thought could beheld. His right rested upon the sea, near the village of Borghetto, some fifty or sixty miles east of Nice, extending thence to and acrossthe mountains, to Ormea. The Austrian front was parallel, in a generalsense, to that of the enemy, and a couple of leagues to the eastward;thus securing for the British Vado Bay, considered the best anchoragebetween Genoa and Nice. In rear of Vado, to the eastward, and on thecoast road, lay the fortress of Savona, esteemed by Bonaparte of thefirst importance to an army operating in the Riviera and dependentupon the control of the road. The town was occupied by the Austrians, but they were excluded from the citadel by Genoese troops, --acondition of weakness in case of sudden retreat. It ought, saidBonaparte, to be the object of all the enemy's efforts. In thesepositions, both armies depended for supplies partly upon the sea, partly upon the land road along the Riviera. Across the mountains, inPiedmont, lay the Sardinian forces, extending perpendicularly to themain front of the French operations, and, so far as position went, threatening their communications by the narrow land road. Thecharacter of the ground intervening between the French and Austriansrendered an attack upon either line, once fairly established, verydifficult; and it was doubtless a fault in the Austrian commander, DeVins, while superior in force, to allow the enemy to strengthenhimself in a position which at the first had its weak points; the moreso as the plainly approaching peace between Spain and France foretoldthat the Army of Italy would soon be reinforced. Having, however, madethis mistake, the Austrian settled himself in his works, shrugged theresponsibility off his own shoulders, and awaited that either theSardinians by land, or the British by sea, should, by choking thecommunications of the French, compel them to abandon their lines. 

Such was the situation when Nelson, on the 21st of July, had his firstinterview with De Vins; on the 22d peace between Spain and France wasformally concluded. Within a month, Bonaparte, who then occupied aprominent position in Paris, as military adviser to the Government, was writing: "Peace with Spain makes offensive war in Piedmontcertain; my plan is being discussed; Vado will soon be taken;" and afew days later, on the 25th of August, "Troops from Spain are marchingto Italy. " It was incumbent upon the French to repossess Vado, for, byaffording safe anchorage to small hostile cruisers, it effectuallystopped the trade with Genoa. De Vins had there equipped severalprivateers, under the Austrian flag. Of it Bonaparte said: "Byintercepting the coasters from Italy, it has suspended our commerce, stopped the arrival of provisions, and obliged us to supply Toulonfrom the interior of the Republic. It is recognized that our commerceand subsistence require that communication with Genoa be promptlyopened. " Having in view Bonaparte's remarkable campaign of thefollowing year, and the fact that Vado was now held in force by theAustrians, the importance of British co-operation by the fleet, atthis critical moment, becomes strikingly apparent. The future thusthrows back a ray of illuminating significance upon the otherwisepaltry and obscure campaign of 1795, dragging out into broad daylightthe full meaning of lost opportunities in the early year, and ofNelson's strenuous efforts in his detached command. 

Immediately upon his arrival in Genoa, on July 17, the effect of theneutral trade, if unchecked, upon the operations of both armies, wasbrought before him by the British minister. Unless the supplies thusreceived by the French could be stopped, the Austrian general wouldnot only be unable to advance, but feared he could not hold hispresent position. If, on the other hand, the forage and grain thusbrought to them could be intercepted, they would be forced to retreat, and there were hopes that the Austrians might reach Nice beforewinter, thus covering the excellent and advanced harbor ofVillefranche as an anchorage for their British allies. Nelson readilyunderstood the situation, and admitted the necessity of the servicedemanded of his squadron, which was simply a blow at the enemy'scommunications; but he pointed out to the minister that the circularinstructions, before quoted, tied his hands. Not only would theordinary difficulties of proving the ownership and destination of acargo give rise to the usual vexatious disputes, and irritateneutrals, contrary to the spirit of the order; but there was aparticular complication in this instance, arising from the occupationof Genoese towns by French troops, and from the close proximity of theneutral and hostile seaboards. These embarrassments might be met, wereit permissible to sell the cargoes, and hold the money value, subjectto the decision of an admiralty court upon the propriety of theseizure; but this the circular explicitly forbade, until the case wasreferred to England. If the decision there was adverse to the captors, the other party would look to the responsible naval officer forpecuniary redress, and as, during the delay, the cargo would bespoiled, costs could come only out of the captor's pocket. Nelson'sexperiences in the West Indies, ten years before, naturally made himcautious about further legal annoyances. 

All this he stated with his usual lucidity; but the case was one inwhich his course could have been safely predicted by a person familiarwith his character. The need for the proposed action was evident. "Thewhole of the necessity of stopping all the vessels is comprised in avery few words: that, if we will not stop supplies of corn, etc. , going to France, the armies will return from whence they came, and thefailure of this campaign, from which so much is expected, will be laidto our want of energy; for the only use of the naval co-operation isthe keeping out a supply of provisions. " He therefore, after a night'sreflection, told the minister that if he would tell him, officially, that it was for the benefit of his Majesty's service that he shouldstop all trade between the neutral towns and France, and placesoccupied by the armies of France, he would give the proper directionsfor that purpose. It would have been possible for him, though withsome delay, to refer the matter to Hotham, but he knew the latter'stemperament, and distrusted it. "Our admiral has no political couragewhatever, " he wrote to Collingwood, "and is alarmed at the mention ofany strong measure; but, in other respects, he is as good a man as canpossibly be. " With a superior so little decided, it was better, by hisown independent initiative, to create a situation, which the formerwould be as backward to reverse as he would have been to change theprevious and wholly different state of things. Like the Americanfrontiersman, whose motto was, "Be sure you're right, then go ahead, "Nelson, when convinced, knew no hesitations; but further, heunquestionably derived keen enjoyment from the sense that the thingdone involved risk to himself, appealed to and brought into play hisphysical or moral courage, in the conscious exercise of which hedelighted. "I am acting, not only without the orders of mycommander-in-chief, but in some measure contrary to them. However, Ihave not only the support of his Majesty's ministers, both at Turinand Genoa, but a consciousness that I am doing what is right andproper for the service of our King and Country. Political courage inan officer abroad is as highly necessary as military courage. " "Theorders I have given are strong, and I know not how my admiral willapprove of them, for they are, in a great measure, contrary to thosehe gave me; but the service requires strong and vigorous measures tobring the war to a conclusion. "

The case bore some resemblance to that in which he had disobeyedHughes in the West Indies; but the disregard of the superior's orderson the earlier occasion was more direct, and the necessity for it lessurgent. In both he disobeyed first, and referred afterwards, and inboth his action was practically sustained; for, whatever the technicalfault, the course taken was the one demanded by the needs of thesituation. It is possible to recognize the sound policy, the moralcourage, and the correctness of such a step in the particularinstance, without at all sanctioning the idea that an officer may bejustified in violating orders, because he thinks it right. Thejustification rests not upon what he thinks, but upon the attendantcircumstances which prove that he _is_ right; and, if he is mistaken, if the conditions have not warranted the infraction of the fundamentalprinciple of military efficiency, --obedience, --he must take the fullconsequences of his error, however honest he may have been. Nor canthe justification of disobedience fairly rest upon any happyconsequences that follow upon it, though it is a commonplace to saythat the result is very apt to determine the question of reward orblame. There is a certain confusion of thought prevalent on thismatter, most holding the rule of obedience too absolutely, otherstending to the disorganizing view that the integrity of the intentionis sufficient; the practical result, and for the average man thebetter result, being to shun the grave responsibility of departingfrom the letter of the order. But all this only shows more clearly thegreat professional courage and professional sagacity of Nelson, thathe so often assumed such a responsibility, and so generally--with, perhaps, but a single exception--was demonstrably correct in hisaction. 

Hotham in this case very heartily approved what had been done, andissued, to the fleet in general, orders similar to those given byNelson; but he did not like the difficulties that surrounded thequestion of co-operation, and left the conduct of affairs on the spotwholly to his eager and enterprising subordinate. The latter directedthe seizure of all vessels laden with corn for France or the Frencharmies, an order that was construed to apply to the Genoese townsoccupied by them. The cargoes appear to have been sold and the moneyheld. The cruisers in his command were stationed along the Riviera, east and west of Genoa itself. Those to the eastward, in theneighborhood of Spezia, where no French were, gave great offence tothe Government of the Republic, which claimed that their chief citywas blockaded; but Nelson refused to remove them. They are notblockading Genoa, he said, but simply occupying the station bestsuited to intercept a contraband trade. The various British vesselsdisplayed the full activity that might have been expected from thecharacter of their leader, and the pressure was speedily felt by theenemy, and by the neutrals whose lucrative trade was summarilyinterrupted. The traffic in vessels of any considerable size, sea-going vessels, soon ceased, and Nelson entertained at first greathopes of decisive results from the course adopted by him. "We havemuch power here at present to do great things, if we know how to applyit, " he wrote, after being ten days on the ground; and at the end of amonth, "The strong orders which I judged it proper to give on my firstarrival, have had an extraordinary good effect; the French army is nowsupplied with almost daily bread from Marseilles; not a single boathas passed with corn. " The enemy themselves admitted the stringency oftheir situation. But Nelson had yet to learn how ingenuity andenterprise could find a way of eluding his care. The coasting-tradesoon began to take on a large development. The Spaniards, now at peacewith France, supplied Marseilles, and from both that port and Genoagrain was carried by small boats, that could be moved by oar as wellas sail, could hug closely the rocky shore, and run readily under thebatteries with which the French had covered the small bays of thewestern Riviera, whither the cruisers could not follow. The operationsof the latter, dependent only upon their canvas, could not always beextended to within easy gunshot of the beach, along which theblockade-runners kept, usually under cover of night. 

Hence, although seriously inconvenienced, the French did not findtheir position untenable. There were two ways by which the pressuremight be increased. A flotilla of small vessels, similar to thecoasters themselves, but armed and heavily manned, might keep close inwith the points which the latter had to round, and prevent theirpassage; but the British had no such vessels at their disposal, and, even if they had, the operations would be exposed to danger from theweather upon a hostile, iron-bound coast, whose shelter was forbiddenthem by the enemy's guns. The Neapolitans had such a flotilla, and itseems probable that its co-operation was asked, for Nelson speaks ofit as a desirable aid on the 23d of August; but it did not actuallyjoin him until the 15th of September, when the season for its actingwas almost past. "Had I the flotilla, " wrote he, "nothing should be onthis coast. A few weeks more and they will not stay a night at sea tosave an empire. " Prior to its arrival the British attempted to harassthe traffic with their ships' boats, but these were undecked, and oflimited capacity compared to those against which they were to act. They were occasionally successful, but the results were too uncertainand hazardous to warrant perseverance, although Bonaparte had to admitthat "The audacity of the English boats and the indolence of theGenoese, who allow their own vessels to be taken in their own roads, make it necessary to erect a battery for hot shot at a proper point, which you will exact shall be done by the governor of San Remo. "

Nelson's active mind, clinging with its usual accurate insight to thedecisive factor in the situation, now fixed upon the idea of seizing asuitable point upon the Riviera to the westward of the French, upontheir line of communication with Nice. A body of troops there, strongenough to hold the position, would stop the passage of supplies byland, and, if they controlled an anchorage, a condition indispensableto their support, --and to their retreat, if necessary to retire, --thesmall vessels based upon that could better interrupt the coastingbusiness. In pursuance of this plan, he in the first week of Septembermade a cruise with the "Agamemnon" as far to the westward as Nice, reconnoitring carefully all recesses of the shore line that seemedavailable for the purpose. Upon his return, he wrote to De Vins whathe had done, and described San Remo as the only available spot. Hementioned its disadvantages as well as its advantages, but undertookpositively to land there five thousand men with field-guns, andprovisions for a few days, to maintain their supplies by sea, and tocover their embarkation in case retreat became imperative. In short, he guaranteed to land such a force safely, and to be responsible forits communications; for both which he practically pledged hisprofessional reputation. He added, what was indisputable, that theFrench army must abandon its present lines for want of supplies, ifSan Remo were held for some time. 

De Vins replied on the 14th of September, expressing his interest inthe matter thus broached to him, but carefully evading the issue. Headdressed his remarks to the comparative merits of Vado and San Remoas anchorages, upon which Nelson had touched barely, and onlyincidentally, for the gist of his proposal was simply to intercept theenemy's communications; if this were feasible, all otherconsiderations were subsidiary and matters of detail. San Remo wasadmitted to be the poorer anchorage, unfit for the fleet, but open tosmall vessels, which could carry the supplies to the Austriandetachment, and stop those of the enemy. The move proposed wasintended to effect by sea, substantially, the object which De Vinshimself had told Nelson, three weeks before, that he was trying tosecure through the co-operation of the Sardinian land forces. "He hasbeen long expecting, " wrote Nelson on the 13th of August, "an attackby General Colli with the Piedmontese near Ormea, directly back fromVintimiglia. This is the great point to be carried, as the Piedmontesearmy would then get Vintimiglia, and . .. Probably, unless the enemyare very active, their retreat to Nice will be cut off. De Vins sayshe has flattered and abused the Piedmontese and Neapolitans, butnothing will induce them to act. " Colli was a good soldier, but hisrelations with the Austrian were very strained, and coalitions rarelyact cordially. This plan, however, becoming known to the French, wascommended by Bonaparte as well conceived. "We have examinedattentively the project attributed to the enemy in the enclosed note. We have found it conformable to his real interests, and to the presentdistribution of his troops. The heights of Briga are in truth the keyto the Department of the Maritime Alps, since from there the high-roadmay be intercepted and we be obliged to evacuate Tende. We charge youto pay serious attention to this matter. "[32] Disappointed inSardinian support, Nelson and De Vins had then discussed a plan, ofwhich the former's present proposal was the very clear and practicaloutcome. Some risk must be run, he said; but De Vins, when it came tothe point, saw the dangers too plainly. He did not distinctly refuse, but talked only, and instead of San Remo proposed to land west ofNice, between it and the Var. Nothing, however, was done, or evenattempted, and Hotham refused co-operation. 

Having regard to the decisive effect exercised upon any strategicposition, or movement, by a valid threat against thecommunications, --considering, for example, the vital influence whichthe French occupation of Genoa in 1800 had upon the campaign whichterminated at Marengo, --it is impossible to speak otherwise than withrespect of this proposal of Nelson's. Nevertheless, serious reflectioncan scarcely fail to affirm that it was not really practicable. Thereis an immeasurable difference between the holding of a stronglyfortified city with an army corps, and the mere seizure of acomparatively open position by a detachment, which, if it means toremain, must have time to fortify itself, in order to withstand theoverwhelming numbers that the enemy must at once throw upon it. Thetime element, too, is of the utmost importance. It is one thing tograsp a strong position with a few men, expecting to hold it for somehours, to delay an advance or a retreat until other forces can comeinto play, and quite another to attempt to remain permanently andunsupported in such a situation. In the case before us, De Vins wouldhave landed five thousand men in a comparatively exposed position;for, although the town of San Remo was in possession of the French, who might be driven out for the moment, the only strong point, thecitadel, was occupied--as in the case of Savona, to the eastward ofthe Austrians--by the Genoese, who would doubtless have refusedadmission. Before his main body would still lie the works which theFrench had been diligently strengthening for more than two months, andwhich, with his whole force in hand, he did not care to assail. Theenemy, knowing him thus weakened, could well afford to spare a numbergreatly superior to the detachment he had adventured, certain that, while they were dislodging it, he could make no serious impressionupon their lines. As for retreat and embarkation under cover of theguns of a squadron, when pressed by an enemy, the operation is toocritical to be hazarded for less than the greatest ends, and with atleast a fair possibility of success for the undertaking whose failurewould entail it. 

Nelson's confidence in himself and in his profession, and his accurateinstinct that war cannot be made without running risks, combined withhis lack of experience in the difficulties of land operations tomislead his judgment in the particular instance. In a converse sense, there may be applied to him the remark of the French naval critic, that Napoleon lacked "le sentiment exact des difficultés de lamarine. " It was not only to British seamen, and to the assured controlof the sea, that Nelson thought such an attempt offered reasonableprospect of success. He feared a like thing might be effected by theFrench, --by evasion. "If the enemy's squadron comes on this coast, andlands from three to four thousand men between Genoa and Savona, I amconfident that either the whole Austrian army will be defeated, ormust inevitably retreat into Piedmont, and abandon their artillery andstores. " These words, the substance of which he frequently repeats, though written immediately before the disastrous Battle of Loano, donot apply to the purpose entertained by the French on that occasion, of endeavoring, by a small detachment at Voltri, to check the Austrianretreat till their pursuers came up. He is contemplating a much moreconsiderable and sustained effort, strategic in character, andidentical in aim with his own proposal to De Vins about San Remo. Itis clear that Nelson, in his day, did not attach absolute deterrenteffect to a fleet in being, even to such an one as the British thenhad in the Mediterranean. Important a factor as it was, it mightconceivably be disregarded, by a leader who recognized that the end inview justified the risk. 

There was yet another motive actuating Nelson in his presentproposals. Justly impatient of the delays and colorless policy of bothDe Vins and the British leaders, he foresaw that the latter would bemade to take the blame, if the campaign proved abortive or disastrous. The Austrians had at least something to show. They had advanced, andthey had seized Vado Bay, cutting off the intercourse between Genoaand France, which Bonaparte deemed so important, and at the same timesecuring an anchorage for the fleet. The latter had done nothing, although its co-operation had been promised; except Nelson's littlesquadron, in which was but one small ship-of-the-line out of thetwenty-three under Hotham's command, it had not been seen. [33] Nelsonwas determined, as far as in him lay, to remove all grounds forreproach. He urged the admiral to send him more ships, and abounded inwillingness towards De Vins. For the latter he had at first felt theesteem and confidence which he almost invariably showed, even to thepoint of weakness, towards those associated with him; but he nowbecame distrustful, and devoted himself to stopping every loophole ofexcuse which might afterwards be converted into reproaches to thenavy. 

The cause for the inadequacy of the force left under his command, ofwhich he often complains, is not apparent. The question was put directto the admiral whether he would co-operate with the fleet in theproposed descent of the Austrians. He said that he could not, owing tothe nature of his instructions from home; but that he would answerfor it that the French navy should not interfere. Six weeks later thequestion was repeated; but the admiral replied that, after aconsultation with the flag-officers under his command, he refusedco-operation in what he considered a wild scheme. In this opinion hewas probably right, though Nelson possibly was reminded of Dundas'sobjections to besieging Bastia. Nelson then went in person to Leghorn, and saw Hotham. He asked to be given two seventy-fours and thetransports, to make the attempt himself. Hotham again refused a singleship; but not only so, reduced Nelson's squadron, and ordered him, inaddition to his present duties, to reconnoitre Toulon continually, "whilst he, " said Nelson, scornfully, "lies quiet in Leghorn Roads. "It would almost seem as if the admiral thought that the time had comefor a little judicious snubbing, and repression of ardor in theuncomfortable subordinate, whose restless energy conflicted so muchwith his repose of mind. The fleet spent its time chiefly in SanFiorenzo Bay or in Leghorn, making occasional cruises off Toulon toobserve the French navy in that port. The latter was undoubtedly itsprincipal care; but, being distinctly inferior to the British, it isimpossible to say why Nelson should not have been reinforced. If itwas due to the wish to continue so largely superior in numbers, itcertainly illustrates with singular appositeness the deterrent effectof an inferior "fleet in being, " and that that effect lies less in thenature of things than in the character of the officer upon whom it isproduced. Moreover, the employment of adequate force upon the Riviera, in active aggressive work under Nelson during the summer, when it waspracticable to do so, would have compelled the French fleet to comeout and fight, or the French army to fall back. 

On the 1st of November Hotham struck his flag in Genoa, and departed, bequeathing to his successors a military estate encumbered by the oldmortgage of the French fleet, still in being, which he might havecleared off, and by a new one in the numerous and powerful batteriesof the Riviera, built and controlled by troops whose presence to erectthem might have been prevented by a timely action on his part. Theharm, being done, was thenceforth irreparable. As time passed, thesituation became more and more favorable to the French. Thereinforcements from Spain arrived, and gunboats and flatboats, fittedout at Toulon, began to come upon the scene. Their appearance revived, in Nelson the apprehension, so consonant to his military ideas at thistime, of an attempt upon the coast road in rear of the Austrians. Heeven feared for Genoa itself, and for the "Agamemnon, " while she laythere, as the result of such a dash. The recurrence of thisprepossession is illustrative of his view of possibilities. The trueand primary object of the French was to consolidate theircommunications; nor, with Bonaparte in the influential position hethen occupied, was any such ex-centric movement likely. For usefulpurposes, Genoa was already at his disposal; the French subsistencedepartment was, by his plans, to collect there rations of corn forsixty thousand men for three months, preparatory to an advance. Forthe same object the coasting activity redoubled along the Riviera, from Toulon to the French front. By November 1st a hundredsail--transports and small ships of war--had assembled fifteen milesbehind Borghetto, in Alassio Bay, whither Nelson had chased them. Depots and supplies were collecting there for the prospectivemovement. Nelson offered to enter the bay with threeships-of-the-line, specified by name, and to destroy them; but thiswas declined by Sir Hyde Parker, who had temporarily succeeded Hothamin command, and who at a later day, in the Baltic, was to check someof Nelson's finest inspirations. "I pretend not to say, " wrote thelatter, a month afterwards, when the Austrians had been driven fromtheir lines, "that the Austrians would not have been beat had not thegunboats harassed them, for, on my conscience, I believe they would;but I believe the French would not have attacked had we destroyed allthe vessels of war, transports, etc. " As to the practicability ofdestroying them, Nelson's judgment can safely be accepted, subjectonly to the chances which are inseparable from war. 

So far from reinforcing the squadron on the Riviera, Sir Hyde Parkerfirst reduced it, and then took away the frigates at this criticalmoment, when the indications of the French moving were becomingapparent in an increase of boldness. Their gunboats, no longerconfining themselves to the convoy of coasters, crept forward at timesto molest the Austrians, where they rested on the sea. Nelson had nosimilar force to oppose to them, except the Neapolitans, whom heordered to act, but with what result is not clear. At the same timethe French partisans in Genoa became very threatening. On the 10th ofNovember a party of three hundred, drawn from the ships in the port, landed at Voltri, about nine miles from Genoa, seized a magazine ofcorn, and an Austrian commissary with £10, 000 in his charge. The placewas quickly retaken, but the effrontery of the attempt from a neutralport showed the insecurity of the conditions. At the same time a rumorspread that a force of between one and two thousand men, partlycarried from Genoa in the French ships of war then lying there, partlystealing along shore in coasters from Borghetto, was to seize a postnear Voltri, and hold it. Nelson was informed that men were absolutelybeing recruited on the Exchange of Genoa for this expedition. When theattack at Voltri was made, the "Agamemnon" was lying in Vado Bay. Leaving a frigate there, Nelson started immediately for Genoa, inorder, by the presence of a superior naval force and the fear ofretaliation, both to compel the Republic to have its neutralityobserved, and to check similar undertakings in the future. The"Agamemnon" was laid across the harbor's mouth, and no French vesselwas allowed to sail. Urgent representations were made to Nelson bythe Austrian minister and commander-in-chief, that, if the ship werewithdrawn, the consequences to the army would be most serious. Contrary, therefore, to his personal inclinations, which were alwaysto be at the front, he remained, although the demonstrations of thegunboats continued, and it was evident that they would at least annoythe Austrian flank in case of an assault. The latter evil, however, was much less disquieting than a descent on the army's line ofretreat, at the same moment that it was assailed in front in force;and it was evident that the Austrian general was feeling anuneasiness, the full extent of which he did not betray. De Vins had bythis time quitted his command, ill, and had been succeeded by GeneralWallis. 

In this condition of affairs, a general attack upon the Austrianpositions was made by the French on the morning of November 24. As hadbeen feared, the gunboats took part, in the absence of any Britishships, --the frigate having been removed, Nelson asserts, without hisknowledge; but the matter was of very secondary importance, for theweight of the enemy's attack fell upon the positions in the mountains, the centre and right, which were routed and driven back. Swinginground to their own right, towards the sea, the victorious Frenchpushed after the disordered enemy, seeking to intercept their retreatby the coast. Had there then been established, in a well-chosen pointof that narrow road, a resolute body of men, even though small, theymight well have delayed the fliers until the main body of the pursuerscame up; but the presence of the "Agamemnon" controlled the departureof the intended expedition from Genoa, upon which alone, as anorganized effort, the projected obstruction depended. Thus she was theefficient cause, as Nelson claimed, that many thousands of Austriansescaped capture. As it was, they lost in this affair, known as theBattle of Loano, seven thousand men, killed, wounded, or prisoners. The entire Riviera was abandoned, and they retreated across theApennines into Piedmont. 

When things go wrong, there is always a disposition on the part ofeach one concerned to shift the blame. The Austrians had complainedbefore the action, and still more afterwards, of the failure of thefleet to aid them. Nelson thought their complaint well founded. "Theysay, and true, they were brought on the coast at the express desire ofthe English, to co-operate with the fleet, which fleet nor admiralthey never saw. " On his own part he said: "Our admirals will have, Ibelieve, much to answer for in not giving me that force which I sorepeatedly called for, and for at last leaving me with Agamemnonalone. Admiral Hotham kept my squadron too small for its duty; and themoment Sir Hyde took the command of the fleet he reduced it tonothing, --only one frigate and a brig; whereas I demanded twoseventy-four-gun ships and eight or ten frigates and sloops to insuresafety to the army. "

It is unnecessary to inquire into the motives of the two admirals forthe distribution of their force. Unquestionably, the first thing forthem to do was to destroy or neutralize the French fleet; and next todestroy, or at least impede, the communications of the French army. That it was possible to do this almost wholly may be rested upon theauthority of Nelson, whose matured opinion, given five years later, has already been quoted. Two opportunities to cripple the Toulon fleetwere lost; but even so, after the junction of Man, in June, thesuperiority over it was so great that much might have been spared tothe Riviera squadron. The coast was not at this time so extensivelyfortified that coasting could not, in Nelson's active hands, have beenmade a very insufficient means of supply. As an illustration of theoperations then possible, on the 26th of August, six weeks after thenaval battle of July 13, the "Agamemnon, " with her little squadron, anchored in the Bay of Alassio, three cables' length from the fort inthe centre of the town, and with her boats took possession of all theFrench vessels in the harbor. Two months later, so much had the placebeen strengthened, he could not vouch for success with less than threeships-of-the-line; but had the pressure been consistently appliedduring those months, the French position would long before have becomeuntenable. That a shore line, by great and systematic effort, could berendered secure throughout for coasters, was proved by Napoleon'smeasures to cover the concentration of the Boulogne flotilla in1803-5; but such conditions did not obtain between Nice and Vado in1795. 

Despite the abortive and ignominious ending to the campaign, Nelson'sown reputation issued from it not only unscathed, but heightened; andthis is saying much, for, although due public recognition of hisservices had scarcely been extended, --except in conferring the Marinesupon him, --he had already, before its beginning, made upon all whowere brought into contact with him that impression of unusualefficiency, zeal, and sound judgment, to which subsequent employmentand opportunity apply a sure and searching test. As he entered uponhis detached duties, the Viceroy of Corsica, who had necessarily seenand known much of his past conduct, wrote to him thus: "Give me leave, my dear Sir, to congratulate you on the Agamemnon's supportinguniformly, on all occasions, the same reputation which has alwaysdistinguished that ship since I have been in the Mediterranean. Itgives me great pleasure also to see you employed in your presentimportant service, which requires zeal, activity, and a spirit ofaccommodation and co-operation, qualities which will not be wanting inthe Commodore of your squadron. I consider the business you are about, I mean the expulsion of the enemy from the Genoese and Piedmonteseterritories, as the most important feature in the southern campaign. "These anticipations of worthy service and exceptional merit wereconfirmed, after all the misfortunes and disappointments of thecampaign, by the singularly competent judgment of the newcommander-in-chief, Sir John Jervis. The latter at his first interviewwith Nelson, nearly two months after his arrival on the station, sothat time enough had elapsed to mature his opinion, asked him toremain under his command, as a junior admiral, when he received hispromotion. Having regard to Jervis's own high endowments, it was notthen in the power of the British Navy to pay an officer of Nelson'srank a higher compliment. 

During these months of service upon the Riviera, there occurred anincident, which, from the reflection made upon Nelson's integrity, drew from him a letter, struck off at such white heat, and sotransparently characteristic of his temperament, aspirations, andhabit of thought, as to merit quotation. A report had been spread thatthe commanders of the British ships of war connived at the entry ofsupply-vessels into the ports held by the French, and a statement tothat effect was forwarded to the Secretary of State for ForeignAffairs. The latter sent the paper, for investigation, to the Ministerto Genoa, who mentioned its tenor to Nelson. The latter, justlystigmatizing the conduct imputed to him and his officers as"scandalous and infamous, " requested a copy of the accusation, inorder that by his refutation he might convince the King, that he was"an officer who had ever pursued the road of honour, very differentfrom that to wealth. " Having received the copy, he wrote to theSecretary as follows:--

 AGAMEMNON, GENOA ROAD, 23d November, 1795. 

 MY LORD, --Having received, from Mr. Drake, a copy of your Lordship's letter to him of October, enclosing a paper highly reflecting on the honour of myself and other of His Majesty's Officers employed on this Coast under my Orders, it well becomes me, as far as in my power lies, to wipe away this ignominious stain on our characters. I do, therefore, in behalf of myself, and much injured Brethren, demand, that the person, whoever he may be, that wrote, or gave that paper to your Lordship, do fully, and expressly bring home his charge; which, as he states that this agreement is made by numbers of people on both sides, there can be no difficulty in doing. We dare him, my Lord, to the proof. If he cannot, I do most humbly implore, that His Majesty will be most graciously pleased to direct his Attorney-General to prosecute this infamous libeller in His Courts of Law; and I likewise feel, that, without impropriety, I may on behalf of my brother Officers, demand the support of His Majesty's Ministers: for as, if true, no punishment can be too great for the traitors; so, if false, none can be too heavy for the villain, who has dared to allow his pen to write such a paper. Perhaps I ought to stop my letter here; but I feel too much to rest easy for a moment, when the honour of the Navy, and our Country, is struck at through us; for if nine [ten] Captains, whom chance has thrown together, can instantly join in such a traitorous measure, it is fair to conclude we are all bad. 

 As this traitorous agreement could not be carried on but by concert of all the Captains, if they were on the Stations allotted them, and as they could only be drawn from those Stations by orders from me, I do most fully acquit all my brother Captains from such a combination, and have to request, that I may be considered as the only responsible person for what is done under my command, if I approve of the conduct of those under my orders, which in this most public manner I beg leave to do: for Officers more alert, and more anxious for the good, and honour, of their King and Country, can scarcely ever fall to the lot of any Commanding Officer: their Names I place at the bottom of this letter. 

 For myself, from my earliest youth I have been in the Naval Service; and in two Wars, have been in more than one hundred and forty Skirmishes and Battles, at Sea and on shore; have lost an eye, and otherwise blood, in fighting the Enemies of my King and Country; and, God knows, instead of riches, my little fortune has been diminished in the Service: but I shall not trouble your Lordship further at present, than just to say--that at the close of this Campaign, where I have had the pleasure to receive the approbation of the Generals of the Allied Powers; of his Excellency Mr. Drake, who has always been on the spot; of Mr. Trevor, who has been at a distance; when I expected and hoped, from the representation of His Majesty's Ministers, that His Majesty would have most graciously condescended to have favourably noticed my earnest desire to serve Him, and when, instead of all my fancied approbation, to receive an accusation of a most traitorous nature--it has almost been too much for me to bear. Conscious innocence, I hope, will support me. 

 I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant, HORATIO NELSON. 

Except this vexatious but passing cloud, his service upon the Riviera, despite the procrastinations and final failure of his associates inthe campaign, was pleasant both personally and officially. He earnedthe warm esteem of all with whom he acted, notably the Britishministers at Turin and Genoa; and though necessarily in constantcollision with the Genoese authorities upon international questions, he upheld the interests and policy of his own government, withoutentailing upon it serious cause of future reclamations anddisputes. [34] Hotham's very indifference and lethargy, while cripplinghis enterprise, increased his independence. "I cannot get Hotham onthe coast, " he said, "for he hates this co-operation;" but he owns tothe fear that the admiral, if he came, might overrule his projects. The necessity for exertion delighted him. "My command here is so farpleasant, " he wrote to his friend Collingwood, "as it relieves me fromthe inactivity of our fleet, which is great indeed, as you will soonsee. " "At present, " he tells his wife, "I do not write less than fromten to twenty letters every day; which, with the Austrian general, andaide-de-camps, and my own little squadron, fully employ my time: thisI like; active service or none. " As usual, when given room for theexercise of his powers, he was, for him, well. He had a severe attackof illness very soon after assuming the duty--"a complaint in thebreast"--the precursor perhaps of the similar trouble from which hesuffered so much in later years; but it wore off after an acute attackof a fortnight, and he wrote later that, except being at home, he knewno country so pleasant to serve in, nor where his health was so good. This well-grounded preference for the Mediterranean, as best suited tohis naturally frail constitution, remained with him to the end. 

Besides his official correspondence, he wrote freely and fully tothose at home, unburdening to them the thoughts, cares, anddisappointments of his career, as well as the commendations hereceived, so dear to himself as well as to them. Mrs. Nelson and hisfather lived together, and to her most of his home letters wereaddressed. "I have been very negligent, " he admits to her, "in writingto my father, but I rest assured he knows I would have done it longago, had you not been under the same roof. .. . Pray draw on me, " hecontinues, "for £200, my father and myself can settle our accountswhen we meet; at present, I believe I am the richer man, therefore Idesire you will give my dear father that money. " One wonders whether, in the slightly peremptory tone of the last sentence, is to be seen atrace of the feeling she is said, by one biographer, to have shown, that he was too liberal to his relatives; an indication of that lackof sympathy, which, manifested towards other traits of his, no lessmarked than openhandedness, struck a jarring note within him, andpossibly paved the way to an indifference which ended so unfortunatelyfor both. An absent husband, however, very possibly failed to realizewhat his extreme generosity might mean, to one who had to meethousehold expenses with narrow means. 

The political surmises with which his correspondence at this periodabounds were often crude, though not infrequently also characterizedby the native sagacity of his intellect, as yet undisciplined, and tosome extent deficient in data for accurate forecasts. The erroneousmilitary conception which colored much of his thought, thepropositions for ex-centric movements in an enemy's rear, by bodiescomparatively small, out of supporting distance from the rest of thearmy, and resting upon no impregnable base, contributed greatly to thefaulty anticipations entertained and expressed by him from time totime. When applied to operations directed by the consummate and highlytrained genius of Bonaparte, speculations so swayed naturally flewwide of the mark. His sanguine disposition to think the best of allpersons and all things--except Frenchmen--made him also a ready preyto the flattering rumors of which war is ever fertile. Theseimmaturities will be found to disappear, as his sphere widens and hisresponsibilities increase. 

After the close of the campaign, Nelson made a short cruise from Genoato the westward, seeing the French on November 29 in full possessionof Vado Bay. He then went to Leghorn, where he arrived on the 6th ofDecember and remained till the middle of January, repairing, to makethe "Agamemnon" "as fit for sea as a rotten ship can be. " The longingfor rest and for home, after nearly three years' absence, was againstrong upon him in this moment of relaxation. "I fear our new admiralis willing to keep me with him, " he wrote to his brother. "He haswrote me, I am sorry to say, a most nattering letter, and I hear I amto be offered St. George or Zealous [much larger ships], but, in mypresent mind, I shall take neither. My wish is to see England oncemore, and I want a few weeks' rest. " But here again, having regard tothat fame which was to him most dear, he was mistaken, as he now ownedhe had been in the wish, a year before, to accompany Lord Hood on hisreturn. In Sir John Jervis he was to meet, not only one of the mostaccomplished and resolute officers of the British Navy, closely akinto himself in enterprise and fearlessness, though without hisexceptional genius, but also a man capable of appreciating perfectlythe extraordinary powers of his subordinate, and of disregarding everyobstacle and all clamor, in the determination to utilize his qualitiesto the full, for the good of the nation. 

FOOTNOTES:

[32] Correspondance de Napoléon, August 30, 1795. The letter was fromBonaparte's hand, though signed by the Committee of Public Safety. 

[33] The fleet passed once, August 14, in sight of Vado Bay. Nelson went onboard, and tried to induce Hotham to go in and meet De Vins. He refused, saying he must go to Leghorn, but would return, and water the fleet inVado; but he never came. 

[34] A year later, when all his transactions with Genoa as an independentrepublic were concluded, Nelson received from the British Minister ofForeign Affairs, through the Admiralty, the following strong andcomprehensive endorsement of his political conduct:--

"I esteem it an act of justice due to that officer, to inform yourlordships that His Majesty has been graciously pleased entirely to approveof the conduct of Commodore Nelson in all his transactions with theRepublic of Genoa. I have the honour to be, &c, &c. GRENVILLE. "

The First Lord of the Admiralty about the same time expressed "the greatsatisfaction derived here from the very spirited, and at the same timedignified and temperate manner, in which your conduct has been marked bothat Leghorn and Genoa. "

CHAPTER VII. 

NELSON'S SERVICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN DURING THE YEAR1796. --BONAPARTE'S ITALIAN CAMPAIGN. --THE BRITISH ABANDON CORSICA, ANDTHE FLEET LEAVES THE MEDITERRANEAN. 

JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1796. AGE, 38. 

While the "Agamemnon" was refitting in Leghorn, the sensitive mind ofher captain, no longer preoccupied with the cares of campaigning andnegotiations, dwelt with restless anxiety upon the reflections towhich the British Navy was liable, for its alleged failure to supportthe Austrians throughout the operations, and especially at thecritical moment of the Battle of Loano, when the left flank of theirarmy was harassed with impunity by the French gunboats. Nelson feltrightly that, with the British superiority at sea, this should havebeen impossible; and he feared that his own name might be unpleasantlyinvolved, from the fact that the "Agamemnon" had remained throughoutat Genoa, instead of being where the fighting was. He was by nature, and at all times, over-forward to self-vindication, --an infirmityspringing from the innate nobility of his temperament, which wasimpatient of the faintest suspicion of backwardness or negligence, andat the same time resolved that for any shortcoming or blunder, occurring by his order or sanction, no other than himself should bearblame, directly or indirectly. 

After the first unsuccessful pursuit of Bonaparte's expedition toEgypt, in 1798, in the keenness of his emotions over a failure thatmight by some be charged to a precipitate error of judgment, he drewup for Lord St. Vincent a clear and able statement of all the reasonswhich had determined his action, arraigning himself, as it were, atthe bar of his lordship's opinion and that of the nation, and assumingentire responsibility for the apparent mistake, while at the same timejustifying the step by a review of the various considerations which atthe time had occasioned it. His judicious friend and subordinate, Captain Ball, whom he consulted, strongly advised him not to send thepaper. "I was particularly struck, " he wrote, "with the clear andaccurate style, as well as with the candour of the statement in yourletter, but I should recommend a friend never to begin a defence ofhis conduct before he is accused of error. " Nevertheless, in February, 1805, when he once more went to Alexandria in search of Villeneuve, this time really misled by the elaborate mystifications of Napoleon, he again brought himself before the Admiralty. "I am entirelyresponsible to my King and Country for the whole of my conduct . .. Ihave consulted no man, therefore the whole blame of ignorance informing my judgment must rest with me. I would allow no man to takefrom me an atom of my glory, had I fallen in with the French fleet, nor do I desire any man to partake any of the responsibility--all ismine, right or wrong. "

In 1795, being a much younger man, of less experience of the world, and with a reputation, already brilliant indeed, but still awaitingthe stamp of solidity which the lapse of time alone can give, Nelsonfelt strongly, and not improperly, that it was necessary to bevigilant against any possible imputations upon his action. This wasthe more true, because blame certainly did attach to the service ofwhich he was the representative on the spot, and the course he hadbeen obliged to follow kept him to the rear instead of at the front. There would have been no greater personal danger to a man on board the"Agamemnon" in one place than in the other; but current rumor, seekinga victim, does not pause to analyze conditions. Not only, therefore, did he draw up for Sir John Jervis a succinct synopsis of occurrencessubsequent to his taking command of the operations along the Riviera, in which he combined a justification of his own conduct with thegeneral information necessary for a new commander-in-chief, but to allhis principal correspondents he carefully imparted the facts necessaryto clear him from blame, and to show just what the Navy had effected, and where it had fallen short through inadequate force. 

To the British minister to Genoa, who was constantly at the Austrianheadquarters, he wrote with clear emphasis, as to one cognizant of allthe truth, and so a witness most important to himself. Having firstasked certain certificates, essential to be presented in the AdmiraltyCourts when Genoese prizes came to be adjudicated, he continuedcharacteristically: "The next request much more concerns my honour, than the other does my interest--it is to prove to the world, to myown admiral, or to whoever may have a right to ask the question, why Iremained at Genoa. I have therefore to desire that you will have thegoodness to express, in writing, what you told me, that the Imperialminister and yourself were assured, if I left the port of Genoaunguarded, not only the Imperial troops at St. Pierre d'Arena andVoltri would be lost, but that the French plan for taking post betweenVoltri and Savona would certainly succeed; and also, that if theAustrians should be worsted in the advanced posts, the retreat by theBocchetta would be cut off: to which you added, that if this happened, the loss of the Army would be laid to my leaving Genoa, andrecommended me most strongly not to think of it. I am anxious, as youwill believe, to have proofs in my possession, that I employed to thelast the Agamemnon as was judged most beneficial to the common cause. "

A week later he wrote again, having heard that the Austriancommander-in-chief, General Wallis, had declared that the defeat wasdue to the failure of the British to co-operate. Nelson thought thatthey had a strong hold on Wallis, and he therefore enclosed a letterto him, which he asked might be forwarded by the minister. Theexperience and training of the latter, however, here interposed toprevent his sensitive uneasiness leading to a false step, and one thatmight involve him farther than he foresaw. While bearing the clearestand strongest witness to the facts which Nelson had asked him toestablish, he hinted to him, tactfully and with deference, that, itwas scarcely becoming a public servant to justify his conduct to aforeign official, he being accountable only to his own government. Nelson accepted the suggestion, and in so doing characterized aptlyenough the temperament which then and at other times carried himfarther than discretion warranted. "My feelings ever alive, perhaps, to too nice a sense of honour, are a little cooled. "

Along with this care for the stainless record of the past, there wenton in his mind a continual reasoning upon the probable course of thenext year's operations. In his forecasts it is singular to notice how, starting from the accurate premise that it is necessary for the Frenchto get into the plains of Italy, --"the gold mine, "--he is continuallymisled by his old prepossession in favor of landing in rear of theenemy a body of troops, supported neither by sure communication withtheir main army, nor by a position in itself of great strength. Themistake, if mistake it was, illustrates aptly the errors into which aman of great genius for war, of quick insight, such as Nelsonindisputably had, can fall, from want of antecedent study, offamiliarity with those leading principles, deduced from the experienceof the past, which are perhaps even more serviceable in warningagainst error than in prompting to right. Everything assures him thatthe French will carry some twenty thousand men to Italy by sea. "Ifthey mean to carry on the war, they must penetrate into Italy. I amconvinced in my own mind, that I know their very landing-place. " This, it appears afterwards, he believed would be between Spezia andLeghorn, in the districts of Massa and Carrara, whence also they woulddoubtless turn upon Leghorn, though neutral, as a valuable andfortified seaport. "The prevention, " he continues, "requires greatforesight; for, if once landed, our fleet is of no use. "

The importance of Vado Bay, so discreditably lost the year before, strikes him from this point of view, as it did also Bonaparte from hismore closely coherent plan of operations. Nelson reasoned that, ifVado were possessed by the allies, the French, in their attempt toreach the Tuscan coast, would be compelled to put to sea, where theywould be exposed to the British fleet, while such an anchorage wouldenable the latter, when necessary, to keep the coast close aboard, orwould provide a refuge to a small squadron, if threatened by thesudden appearance of a superior force. Bonaparte thought Vadoimportant, because, on the one hand, essential to uninterruptedcoasting-trade with Genoa, and on the other as advancing his waterline of communications--that by land being impassable for heavyarticles, such as siege-guns and carriages--to Savona, from whichpoint the mountains could be crossed at their lowest elevation, and bytheir most practicable passes. 

Nelson's analysis of the conditions, in other respects than the onementioned, was not unworthy of his great natural aptitudes. There arethree things to be guarded against, he says. One is that pet scheme ofhis imagination, the transport of a corps by sea to Tuscany; the othertwo are an invasion of Piedmont, and the entrance into Italy by thepass of the Bocchetta, behind Genoa. "If three are to be attended to, depend upon it one will fall, and the Emperor, very possibly, may bemore attentive to the Milanese than to Piedmont. " Upon this divergenceof interests in a coalition Bonaparte also explicitly counted; andhis plan, in its first inception, as laid before the Directory in thesummer of 1795, looked primarily to the subjugation of Piedmont, byseparating it from the support of the Austrian Army. The bearing ofVado Bay upon this project is not definitely recognized by Nelson. Hesees in the possession of it only the frustration of both the enemy'ssupposed alternatives, --invasion of Italy by the Bocchetta, and ofTuscany by sea. 

With these views Nelson arrived, at San Fiorenzo, on the 19th ofJanuary, and had his first interview with Jervis. His reception by thelatter, whom he never before had met, was not only cordial butflattering. He was at once offered the choice of two larger ships, which were declined, "but with that respect and sense of obligation onmy part which such handsome conduct demanded of me. " The admiral thenasked him if he would have any objection to remain on the station, when promoted, as he soon must be. Nelson's longing to go home hadworn off with his disgust, occasioned by the impotent conclusions oflast year's work. Then he was experiencing the feeling voiced by thegreat Frenchman, Suffren, some dozen years before: "It was clear that, though we had the means to impose the law, all would be lost. Iheartily pray you may permit me to leave. War alone can make bearablethe weariness of certain things. " Now his keen enjoyment of activeservice revived as the hour of opening hostilities drew near. Withthese dispositions, the graciousness of his reception easily turnedthe scale, and before long he was not only willing to remain, butfearful lest he should be disappointed, despite the application forhis retention which the admiral hastened to make. 

"The credit I derive from all these compliments, " he wrote to hiswife, "must be satisfactory to you; and, should I remain until peace, which cannot be very long, you will, I sincerely hope, make your mindeasy. " But more grateful than open flattery, to one so interested in, and proud of, his military activities, was the respect paid by Jervisto his views and suggestions relative to the approaching operations. "He was so well satisfied with my opinion of what is likely to happen, and the means of prevention to be taken, that he had no reserve withme respecting his information and ideas of what is likely to be done;"or, as he wrote a month later, "he seems at present to consider memore as an associate than a subordinate officer; for I am actingwithout any orders. This may have its difficulties at a future day;but I make none, knowing the uprightness of my intentions. 'You musthave a larger ship, ' continued the admiral, 'for we cannot spare you, either as captain or admiral. '" Such were the opening relationsbetween these two distinguished officers, who were in the future toexert great influence upon each other's career. 

It is far from improbable that the ready coincidence of Jervis's viewswith those of Nelson, as to future possibilities, arose, partly indeedfrom professional bias and prepossession as to the potency of navies, but still more from the false reports, of which Bonaparte was an aptpromoter, and which a commission of the allies in Genoa greedilyswallowed and transmitted. The deterrent effect of their own fleet, "in being, " seems not to have prevented either of them from believingthat the attempt upon Tuscany by sea was seriously intended. True, Nelson does at times speak of the French as being so unreasonable thatone may expect anything from them; but this scheme, which probably hadnot even a paper existence in France, was accepted by him as imminent, because he thought it suitable. As he cogently remarked to Beaulieu, it is likely that your enemy will not do the thing which you wish himto do; and conversely, in this case, what to him appeared mostthreatening to his own cause was just what he expected to occur. Jervis, sharing his views, and already knowing his man, despatchedhim again to the Gulf of Genoa, within forty-eight hours of hisarrival in San Fiorenzo, somewhat to the disgust of the othercaptains, weary of being ever under the eye of an observant andexacting admiral. "You did as you pleased in Lord Hood's time, " saidone grumbler, "the same in Admiral Hotham's, and now again with SirJohn Jervis; it makes no difference to you who is commander-in-chief. "The tone of these words, which in the reading are almost flattering, is evident from Nelson's comment: "I returned a pretty strong answerto this speech. "

The object of his present mission was to ascertain what preparationsfor the expected descent were being made along the Riviera, and tofrustrate them as far as lay in the power of his squadron. He soonreported to Jervis that there was as yet no collection of vesselsbetween Nice and Genoa. He then went on to reconnoitre Toulon, wherehe saw thirteen sail-of-the-line and five frigates lying in the outerroads, ready for sea, while five more of the line he learned werefitting at the arsenal. During the six days he remained off the porthe noted that continual progress was being made in the enemy'spreparations. At the end of this time, on the 23d of February, 1796, the admiral joined with the fleet, and the same afternoon the"Agamemnon" again parted company for Genoa, where she anchored on the2d of March. 

The bustle on board the French ships confirmed Nelson's belief in thedescent upon Tuscany; and it is interesting here to quote his wordsupon the possibilities of the operation, regarded from the naval pointof view by one of the ablest of sea-generals. His opinion throws lightupon the vexed question of the chances for and against Napoleon'sprojected invasion of England in 1805, --so far, that is, as the purelynaval part of the latter project is concerned. He imagines asperfectly feasible ("I firmly believe, " are his words) a combinationat Toulon, of the fleet already there with divisions arriving fromCadiz and Brest, giving a total much superior to that actually withJervis. This anticipates Napoleon's projected concentration underVilleneuve in the Channel. Nelson then continues: "One week's verysuperior fleet will effect a landing between Port Especia and Leghorn, I mean on that coast of Italy. .. . We may fight their fleet, but unlesswe can destroy them [i. E. The transports], their transports will pushon and effect their landing. What will the French care for the loss ofa few men-of-war? It is nothing if they can get into Italy. " "Make usmasters of the channel for three days, and we are masters of theworld, " wrote Napoleon to his admirals, with preparations far morecomplete than those Nelson was considering in 1796, and the distanceacross the Channel is less than from Vado to Spezia. [35]

With these convictions, Nelson immediately began to urge the necessityof again occupying Vado upon the Austrian commander-in-chief, throughthe medium of the British ministers to Genoa and Turin, with whom hewas in frequent correspondence. If this were not done, he assuredthem, the enemy's fleet could with ease convoy a body of troops intransports to Italy, which they could not do with their present forceunless they held Vado. It was also the only means, he added, by whichthe French could be prevented from receiving plenty of provisions fromGenoa. "Unless the Austrians get possession of a point of land, wecannot stop the coasting-trade. " The latter argument, at any rate, wasincontestable; and it was also true that only by an advance to Vadocould communication between the army and the British fleet berestored and maintained. Beaulieu, who had lately acquired a highreputation on the battle-fields of Belgium, had now succeeded De Vinsin the command. He was averse to opening the campaign by an advance tothe sea, a feeling shared by the Austrians generally. He wished ratherto await the enemy in the plains of Lombardy, and to follow up by adecisive blow the victory which he confidently expected there. It wasin this connection that Nelson warned him, that he must not reckonupon the French following the line of action which he himself wouldprefer. 

The time for hostilities had now arrived; from February to Augustbeing the period that Bonaparte, who knew the wars of Italyhistorically, considered the most proper for operations in the field, because the least sickly. But for the backwardness of the spring, --forsnow that year lay upon the mountains late into March, --the campaigndoubtless would have been begun before. At the same time came freshreports, probably set afloat by the French, of large reinforcements ofseamen for the fleet and transports, in Toulon and Marseilles; andNelson furthermore received precise information that the enemy'smovement would be in three columns, --one upon Ceva, which wasBonaparte's original scheme, one by the Bocchetta, and the thirdeither to march through Genoese territory to Spezia, or to be carriedthither by sea. Nelson felt no doubt that the last was the real plan, aiming at the occupation of Leghorn and entrance into the plains ofItaly. The others he considered to be feints. There will in thisopinion be recognized the persistency of his old ideas. In fact, he amonth later revived his proposal of the previous year, to occupy SanRemo, --this time with British troops. 

The urgency of the British, aided, perhaps, by the reports of theFrench designs, prevailed at last upon Beaulieu to advance asrequested; nor can it be denied that the taking of Vado was in itselfa most proper and desirable accessory object of the campaign. Unfortunately, the Austrian general, as is well known, fastening hiseyes too exclusively upon the ulterior object of his movement, neglected to provide for the immediate close combination and mutualsupport of the organized forces, --his own and the Piedmontese, --uponwhich final success would turn. Manoeuvring chiefly by his own left, towards the Riviera, and drawing in that direction the efforts of thecentre and right, he weakened the allied line at the point where theAustrian right touched the Sardinian left. Through this thin curtainBonaparte broke, dividing the one from the other, and, after a seriesof combats which extended over several days, rendering final thatdivision, both political and military, for the remainder of the war. 

To one who has accustomed himself to see in Nelson the exponent of thechief obstacle Napoleon had to meet, --who has recognized in the Nile, in Copenhagen, and in Trafalgar, the most significant andcharacteristic incident attending the failure of each of three greatand widely separated schemes, --there is something impressive in notingthe fact, generally disregarded, that Nelson was also present andassisting at the very opening scene of the famous campaign in Italy. This was not, certainly, the beginning of Napoleon's career any morethan it was of Nelson's, who at the same moment hoisted for the firsttime his broad pendant as commodore; but it was now that, upon thehorizon of the future, toward which the world was fast turning, beganto shoot upward the rays of the great captain's coming glory, and thesky to redden with the glare from the watchfires of the unseen armieswhich, at his command, were to revolutionize the face of Europe, causing old things to pass away, never to be restored. 

The Austrians had asked for a clear assurance that their movement tothe seashore should receive the support of the fleet, whether on theRiviera or at Spezia, upon the possession of which also Nelson hadlaid stress, as a precaution against the invasion of Tuscany. Theseengagements he readily made. He would support any movement, andprovide for the safety of any convoys by water. He told theaid-de-camp whom Beaulieu sent to him that, whenever the general camedown to the sea-coast, he would be sure to find the ships; and to thequestion whether his squadron would not be risked thereby, he repliedthat it would be risked at all times to assist their allies, and, iflost, the admiral would find another. "If I find the French convoy inany place where there is a probability of attacking them, " he wroteabout this time, "you may depend they shall either be taken ordestroyed at the risk of my squadron, . .. Which is built to be riskedon proper occasions. " Here was indeed a spirit from which much mightbe expected. The fleet, doubtless, must be husbanded in coastwise workso long as the French fleet remained, the legacy of past errors, --thisNelson clearly maintained; but such vessels as it could spare forco-operation were not to be deterred from doing their work by fear ofharm befalling them. Warned by the recriminations of the lastcampaign, he had minutes taken of his interview with the Austrianofficer, of the questions he himself put, as well as of theundertakings to which he pledged himself; and these he caused to bewitnessed by the British consul at Genoa, who was present. 

On the 8th of April the "Agamemnon, " having shortly before left thefleet in San Fiorenzo Bay, anchored at Genoa; and the followingmorning the port saluted the broad pendant of the new commodore. Thenext day, April 10, Beaulieu attacked the French at Voltri. The"Agamemnon, " with another sixty-four-gun ship, the "Diadem, " and twofrigates, sailed in the evening, and stood along the shore, bypreconcerted arrangement, to cover the advance and harass the enemy. At 11 P. M. The ships anchored abreast the positions of the Austrians, whose lights were visible from their decks--the sails hanging in theclewlines, ready for instant movement. They again got under way thefollowing day, and continued to the westward, seeing the French troopsin retreat upon Savona. The attack, Nelson said, anticipated the hourfixed for it, which was daylight; so that, although the ships hadagain started at 4 A. M. Of the 11th, and reached betimes a point fromwhich they commanded every foot of the road, the enemy had alreadypassed. "Yesterday afternoon I received, at five o'clock, a note fromthe Baron de Malcamp [an aid-de-camp], to tell me that the general hadresolved to attack the French at daylight this morning, and on theright of Voltri. Yet by the Austrians getting too forward in theafternoon, a slight action took place; and, in the night, the Frenchretreated. They were aware of their perilous situation, and passed ourships in the night. Had the Austrians kept back, very few of theFrench could have escaped. " Whether this opinion was wholly accuratemay be doubted; certain it is, however, that the corps which thenpassed reinforced betimes the positions in the mountains, whichsteadfastly, yet barely, checked the Austrian attack there thefollowing day. Beaulieu wrote that the well-timed co-operation of thesquadron had saved a number of fine troops, which must have been lostin the attack. This was so far satisfactory; but the economizing ofone's own force was not in Nelson's eyes any consolation for theescape of the enemy, whose number he estimated at four thousand. "Ibeg you will endeavour to impress on those about the general, " hewrote to the British minister, "the necessity of punctuality in ajoint operation, for its success to be complete. "

There was, however, to be no more co-operation that year on theRiviera. For a few days Nelson remained in suspense, hoping for goodnews, and still very far from imagining the hail-storm of ruinousblows which a master hand, as yet unrecognized, was even then dealingto the allied cause. On the 15th only he heard from Beaulieu, throughthe minister, that the Austrians had been repulsed at Montenotte; andon the 16th he wrote to Collingwood that this reverse had beeninflicted by the aid of those who slipped by his ships. On the 18thnews had reached him of the affairs at Millesimo and Dego, as well asof further disasters; for on that day he wrote to the Duke of Clarencethat the Austrians had taken position between Novi and Alessandria, with headquarters at Acqui. Their loss he gave as ten thousand. "Hadthe general's concerted time and plan been attended to, " he repeats, "I again assert, none of the enemy could have escaped on the night ofthe 10th. By what has followed, the disasters commenced from theretreat of those troops. "

There now remained, not the stirring employment of accompanying andsupporting a victorious advance, but only the subordinate, though mostessential, duty of impeding the communications of the enemy, uponwhich to a great extent must depend the issues on unseen and distantfields of war. To this Nelson's attention had already been turned, asone of the most important functions intrusted to him, even were theallies successful, and its difficulties had been impressed upon him bythe experience of the previous year. But since then the conditions hadbecome far more onerous. The defeat of the Austrians not only leftVado Bay definitively in the power of the French, but enabled thelatter to push their control up to the very walls of Genoa, where theyshortly established a battery and depot on the shore, at St. Pierre d'Arena, within three hundred yards of the mole. Thus the whole westernRiviera, from the French border, was in possession of the enemy, whohad also throughout the previous year so multiplied and strengthenedthe local defences, that, to use Nelson's own words, "they havebatteries from one end of the coast to the other, within shot of eachother. " Such were the means, also, by which Napoleon, the trueoriginator of this scheme for securing these communications, insuredthe concentration of the flotilla at Boulogne, eight or ten yearslater, without serious molestation from the British Navy. 

It may not unnaturally cause some surprise that, with the urgent needNelson had felt the year before for small armed vessels, to controlthe coastwise movements of the enemy, upon which so much thendepended, no serious effort had been made to attach a flotilla of thatkind to the fleet. The reply, however, to this very obvious criticismis, that the British could not supply the crews for them withoutcrippling the efficiency of the cruising fleet; and it was justly feltthen, as it was some years later at the time of the Boulogne flotilla, that the prime duty of Great Britain was to secure the sea against theheavy fleets of the enemy. If, indeed, the Italian States, whoseimmediate interests were at stake, had supplied seamen, as they mighthave done, these could quickly have been formed to the comparativelyeasy standard of discipline and training needed for such guerillawarfare, and, supported by the cruising fleet, might have renderedinvaluable service, so long as the system of coast defence wasdefective. How far the rulers of those States, trained heretofore tothe narrowest considerations of personal policy, could have beeninduced to extend this assistance, is doubtful. They did nothing, orlittle. 

Nelson measured the odds against him accurately, and saw that thesituation was well-nigh hopeless. Nevertheless, there was a chancethat by vigorous and sustained action the enemy might be not onlyimpeded, but intimidated. He sought earnestly to obtain theco-operation of the Sardinians and Neapolitans in manning a flotilla, with which to grapple the convoys as they passed in shore. By thismeans, and the close scouring of the coast by the vessels of hissquadron, something might be effected. He contemplated also using thecrews of the British vessels themselves in gunboats and light-armedfeluccas; but he said frankly that, important as was the duty ofintercepting communications, the efficiency of the fleet was moreimportant still, and that to divert their crews over-much to suchobjects would hazard the vessels themselves, and neutralize theirproper work. The resort, therefore, could only be occasional. Thegeneral political complexion of affairs in the Mediterranean dependedgreatly upon the presence and readiness of the British fleet, and itsefficiency therefore could not be risked, to any serious extent, except for the object of destroying the enemy's naval forces, to whichit was then the counterpoise. 

Acting, however, on his determination to co-operate effectively, atwhatever risk to his own squadron, --to the detachment, that is, whichthe commander-in-chief thought could safely be spared from his mainforce for the secondary object, --Nelson applied all his intelligenceand all his resolution to the task before him. In words of admirableforce and clearness, he manifests that exclusiveness of purpose, whichNapoleon justly characterized as the secret of great operations and ofgreat successes. "I have not a thought, " he writes to the minister atGenoa, "on any subject separated from the immediate object of mycommand, nor a wish to be employed on any other service. So far theallies, " he continues, with no unbecoming self-assertion, "arefortunate, if I may be allowed the expression, in having an officer ofthis character. " He felt this singleness of mind, which is so rare agift, to be the more important, from his very consciousness that thedifficulty of his task approached the border of impossibility. "Icannot command winds and weather. A sea-officer cannot, like aland-officer, form plans; his object is to embrace the happy momentwhich now and then offers, --it may be this day, not for a month, andperhaps never. " Nothing can be more suggestive of his greatestcharacteristics than this remark, which is perhaps less applicable tonaval officers to-day than it was then. In it we may fairly see one ofthose clearly held principles which serve a man so well in moments ofdoubt and perplexity. At the Nile and at Trafalgar, and scarcely lessat St. Vincent and Copenhagen, the seizure of opportunity, theunfaltering resolve "to embrace the happy moment, " is perhaps evenmore notable and decisive than the sagacity which so accurately chosethe proper method of action. 

Nelson's deeds did not belie his words. Immediately after definitenews of Beaulieu's retreat to the Po was received, Sir John Jervisappeared off Genoa with the fleet. The "Agamemnon" joined him, andremained in company until the 23d of April, when by Nelson's requestshe sailed on a cruise to the westward. From that time until the 4thof June she was actively employed between Nice and Genoa, engaging thebatteries, and from time to time cutting out vessels from theanchorages. His attempts were more or less successful; on one occasionhe captured a considerable portion of the French siege-train goingforward for the siege of Mantua; but upon the whole, the futility ofthe attempt became apparent. "Although I will do my utmost, I do notbelieve it is in my power to prevent troops or stores from passingalong shore. Heavy swells, light breezes, and the near approach to theshore which these vessels go are our obstacles. .. . You may perceive Iam distressed. Do you really think we are of any use here? If not, wemay serve our country much more by being in other places. The Levantand coast of Spain call aloud for ships, and they are, I fancy, employed to no purpose here. " The position was almost hopelesslycomplicated by the Genoese coasters, which plied their trade close tothe beach, between the mother city and the little towns occupied bythe French, and which Nelson felt unable to touch. "There are novessels of any consequence in any bay from Monaco to Vado, " he wroteto Jervis; "but not less than a hundred Genoese are every day passing, which may or may not have stores for the French. " "The French have nooccasion to send provisions from France. The coasts are covered withGenoese vessels with corn, wine, hay, &c. , for places on the coast;and they know I have no power to stop the trade with the towns. I sawthis day not less than forty-five Genoese vessels, all laden, passingalong the coast. What can I do?"

Although not definitely so stated, it is shown, by an allusion, thatNelson at this time entertained, among other ideas, the project ofkeeping afloat in transports a body of three thousand troops, whichshould hover upon the coast, and by frequent descents impose aconstant insecurity upon the long line of communications from Nice toGenoa. The same plan was advocated by him against the Spanishpeninsula in later years. [36] Of this conception it may be said thatit is sound in principle, but in practice depends largely upon thedistance from the centre of the enemy's power at which its executionis attempted. Upon the Spanish coast, in 1808, in the hands of LordCochrane, it was undoubtedly a most effective secondary operation; butwhen that distinguished officer proposed to apply a like method, eventhough on a much greater scale, to the western coast of France, against the high-road south of Bordeaux, it can scarcely be doubtedthat he would have met a severe disappointment, such as attendedsimilar actions upon the Channel in the Seven Years' War. On theRiviera, in 1795, this means might have been decisive; in 1796, in theface of Bonaparte's fortified coast, it could scarcely have been morethan an annoyance. At all events, the advocacy of it testifies to theacuteness and energy with which Nelson threw himself into theoperations especially intrusted to him. 

His letters during this period reflect the varying phases of hope andof discouragement; but, upon the whole, the latter prevails. There isno longer the feeling of neglect by his superior, of opportunityslipping away through the inadequate force which timid counsels andapathetic indolence allowed him. He sees that the chance which waspermitted to pass unimproved has now gone forever. "As the Frenchcannot want supplies to be brought into the Gulf of Genoa, for theirgrand army, " he writes to the admiral, "I am still of opinion that ifour frigates are wanted for other services, they may very well bespared from the Gulf. " And again, "As the service for which mydistinguishing pendant was intended to be useful, is nearly if notquite at an end, I assure you I shall have no regret in striking it. "Sir John Jervis, he asserts with pride, has cruised with the fleet inthe Gulf of Genoa, close to shore, "where I will venture to say nofleet ever cruised before--no officer can be more zealous or able torender any service in our profession to England;" yet from the decksof the flagship he and Nelson had helplessly watched a convoy passingclose in shore, and directly to windward, but wholly out of reach oftheir powers of offence. At times, indeed, somewhat can beaccomplished. For several days the "Agamemnon" "has kept close toshore, and harassed the enemy's troops very much. Field pieces aredrawn out on our standing in shore. You must defend me if any Genoesetowns are knocked down by firing at enemy's batteries. I will not firefirst. " Six weeks later he writes again: "Our conduct has socompletely alarmed the French that all their coasting trade is at anend; even the corvette, gunboats, &c. , which were moored under thefortress of Vado, have not thought themselves in security, but are allgone into Savona Mole, and unbent their sails. "

This movement, however, which he notes under the date of June 23, proceeded probably less from fear than from the growing indifferenceof the French concerning their communications by water, now that theiroccupation of the line of the Adige River had solidified theircontrol over the ample resources of Piedmont and Lombardy. At the veryhour when Nelson was thus writing, he learned also the criticalcondition of Leghorn through the approach of a French division, themere sending of which showed Bonaparte's sense of his present securityof tenure. 

Nelson had severed by this time his long and affectionate connectionwith the battered "Agamemnon. " On the 4th of June the old shipanchored at San Fiorenzo, having a few days before, with theassistance of the squadron, cut out from under the French batteriesthe vessels carrying Bonaparte's siege-train, as well as the gunboatswhich convoyed them. There was then in the bay the "Egmont, "seventy-four, whose commander had expressed to the admiral his wish toreturn to England. Jervis, therefore, had ordered Nelson to the spot, to make the exchange, and the latter thought the matter settled; butto his surprise he found the captain did not wish to leave the stationunless the ship went also. This did away with the vacancy he looked tofill; and, as the "Agamemnon, " from her condition, must be the firstof the fleet to go home, it seemed for the moment likely that he wouldhave to go in her with a convoy then expected in the bay. "I remainedin a state of uncertainty for a week, " he wrote to his wife; "and hadthe corn ships, which were momentarily expected from Naples, arrived, I should have sailed for England. " The dilemma caused him greatanxiety; for the longing for home, which he had felt in the early partof the winter, had given away entirely before the pride and confidencehe felt in the new admiral, and the keen delight in active service hewas now enjoying. "I feel full of gratitude for your good wishestowards me, " he wrote to Jervis in the first moment of disappointment, "and highly flattered by your desire to have me continue to serveunder your command, which I own would afford me infinitesatisfaction. " The following day he is still more restless. "I am notless anxious than yesterday for having slept since my last letter. Indeed, Sir, I cannot bear the thoughts of leaving your command. " Hethen proposed several ways out of the difficulty, which reducedthemselves, in short, to a readiness to hoist his pendant in anything, if only he could remain. 

No violent solution was needed, as several applicants came forwardwhen Nelson's wish was known. On the 11th of June, 1796, he shiftedhis broad pendant to the "Captain, " of seventy-four guns, taking withhim most of his officers. Soon afterwards the "Agamemnon" sailed forEngland. Up to the last day of his stay on board, Nelson, although acommodore, was also her captain; it was not until two months afterjoining his new ship that another captain was appointed to her, leaving to himself the duties of commodore only. In later years the"Agamemnon" more than once bore a share in his career. She was presentat Copenhagen and at Trafalgar, being in this final scene under thecommand of an officer who had served in her as his first lieutenant, and was afterwards his flag-captain at the Nile. In 1809 she wastotally lost in the river La Plata, having run aground, and thensettled on one of her anchors, which, upon the sudden shoaling of thewater, had been let go to bring her up. [37] It is said that there werethen on board several seamen who had been with her during Nelson'scommand. 

On the 13th of June the "Captain" sailed from San Fiorenzo Bay, and onthe 17th joined the fleet off Cape Sicie, near Toulon, where Jervis, six weeks before, had established the first of those continuous closeblockades which afterwards, off Brest, became associated with hisname, and proved so potent a factor in the embarrassments that droveNapoleon to his ruin. There were then twelve British ships off theport, while inside the enemy had eleven ready for sea, and four orfive more fitting. The following day Nelson again left the fleet, andon the 21st of June arrived at Genoa, where very serious news was tobe received. 

The triumphant and hitherto unchecked advance of Bonaparte had greatlyencouraged the French party in Corsica, which had been increased by anumber of malcontents, dissatisfied with their foreign rulers. Owingto the disturbed condition of the interior, the British troops hadbeen drawn down to the sea-coast. Bonaparte, from the beginning of hissuccesses, had kept in view the deliverance of his native island, which he expected to effect by the exertions of her own people, stimulated and supported by the arrival upon the spot of Corsicanofficers and soldiers from the French armies. These refugees, proceeding in parties of from ten to twenty each, in small boats, movable by sail or oars, and under cover of night, could seldom bestopped, or even detected, by the British cruisers, while making theshort trip, of little more than a hundred miles, from Genoa, Nice, andLeghorn. The latter port, from its nearness, was particularlyfavorable to these enterprises; but, although neutral, and freelypermitting the ingress and egress of vessels belonging to bothbelligerents, its facilities for supporting a Corsican uprising werenot so great as they would be if the place were held for the French. For this reason, partly, Bonaparte had decided to seize it; and he wasstill more moved to do so by the fact that it was a centre of Britishtrade, that it contributed much to the supply and repair of theBritish fleet, and that the presence of vessels from the latterenabled an eye to be kept upon the movements of the Corsicans, andmeasures to be taken for impeding them. 

"The enemy possessing themselves of Leghorn, " Nelson had written inthe middle of March, when expecting them to do so by a coastwiseexpedition, "cuts off all our supplies, such as fresh meat, fuel, andvarious other most essential necessaries; and, of course, our fleetcannot always [in that case] be looked for on the northern coast ofItaly. " Bonaparte had not, indeed, at that time, contemplated any suchex-centric movement, which, as things then were, would have risked solarge a part of his army out of his own control and his own support;but in the middle of June, having driven the Austrians for the momentinto the Tyrol, consolidated his position upon the Adige, establishedthe siege of Mantua, and enforced order and submission throughout thefertile valley of the Po, which lay in rear of his army and amplysupplied it with the necessaries of subsistence, he felt not only ableto spare the force required, but that for the security of the rightflank and rear of his army it had become essential to do so. ThePapacy and Naples, although they had contributed little to the activecampaigning of the allies, were still nominally at war with France, and might possibly display more energy now that operations wereapproaching their own frontiers. Should the British take possession ofLeghorn with a body of troops, --their own or Neapolitan, --the portwould remain a constant menace to the operations and communications ofthe French, and especially at the critical moments when the Austriansadvanced to the relief of Mantua, as they must be expected to do, andactually did on four several occasions during the succeeding sixmonths. 

Bonaparte, as he was ever wont, diligently improved the opportunitypermitted to him by the need of the Austrians to reorganize andreinforce Beaulieu's beaten army before again taking the field. Threatened, as often again in later years, by enemies in divergentdirections, he with the utmost promptitude and by the most summarymeasures struck down the foe on one side, before the other could stir. Occupying Verona in the first days of June, he immediately afterwardsdetached to the southward a corps under Augereau to enter the PapalStates; and at the same time another small division, commanded byGeneral Vaubois, started from the upper valley of the Po, ostensiblydestined to proceed against Rome by passing through Tuscany. Theeffect of Augereau's movement, which was closely followed by thecommander-in-chief in person, was to bring both Naples and the Popespeedily to terms. An armistice was signed by the former on the 5th, and by the latter on the 24th of June. Vaubois, on the other hand, after passing the Arno below Florence, instead of continuing on toSiena, as the Grand Duke had been assured that he would, turned sharpto the westward, and on the 28th of June entered Leghorn, which wasthenceforth held by the French. Thus within a brief month were theBritish deprived of two allies, lethargic, it is true, in actualperformance, but possessed of a degree of potential strength thatcould not but enter largely into Bonaparte's anxieties; while at thesame time they lost the use of a seaport that had heretofore beenconsidered essential to their support. 

Rumors of Vaubois' movement reached Nelson in Genoa at noon of June23, but somewhat vaguely. "Reports are all we have here, " he wrote toJervis the same day, "nothing official from the armies;" but hethought the situation critical, and started without delay for Leghorn. Arriving there on the morning of June 27, after a passage renderedtedious by light airs and calms, he found the British merchant vesselsthat had been in the harbor, to the number of nearly forty sail, already under way, laden with British merchants and their property, and standing out under convoy of several ships of war; while inpursuit of them--a singular indication of the neutrality possible tosmall States like Tuscany and Genoa at that time--were a dozen Frenchprivateers, which had been lying beside them within the mole. One ortwo of the departing vessels were thus taken. 

The first impression upon Nelson's mind was that the occupation ofLeghorn was only the prelude to an invasion of Corsica in force. "Ihave no doubt, " he wrote to the Viceroy, "but the destination of theFrench army was Corsica, and it is natural to suppose their fleet wasto amuse ours whilst they cross from Leghorn. " Thus reasoning, heannounced his purpose of rejoining the admiral as soon as possible, soas not to lose his share in the expected battle. "My heart wouldbreak, " he says to Jervis, "to be absent at such a glorious time;" butit is difficult to understand why he imagined that the French wouldtransfer their army into the destitution of the Corsican mountainsfrom the fertile plains of Lombardy, abandoning the latter to theirenemy, and exchanging their assured communications with France for theuncertainties and irregularities of a water transit over seascommanded by the British fleet. The tenure of the island, as he wellknew, depended upon the willing support of the Corsicans themselves;in the equal balance of the existing war, neither belligerent couldmaintain its control against the opposition of the natives. 

This anticipation, in its disregard of the perfectly obviousconditions, was scarcely worthy of Nelson's real native sagacity, andshows clearly how much a man, even of genius, is hampered in theconclusions of actual life by the lack of that systematic ordering andtraining of the ideas which it is the part of education to supply. Genius is one thing, the acquirements of anaccomplished--instructed--officer are another, yet there is betweenthe two nothing incompatible, rather the reverse; and when to theformer, which nature alone can give, --and to Nelson did give, --isadded the conscious recognition of principles, the practised habit ofviewing, under their clear light, all the circumstances of asituation, assigning to each its due weight and relative importance, then, and then only, is the highest plane of military greatnessattained. Whether in natural insight Nelson fell short of Napoleon'smeasure need not here be considered; that he was at this time farinferior, in the powers of a trained intellect, to his youngercompetitor in the race for fame, is manifest by the readiness withwhich he accepted such widely ex-centric conjectures as that of anattempt by sea upon Leghorn at the opening of the campaign, and nowupon Corsica by a great part, if not the whole, of the army of Italy. 

"On the side of the French, " says Jomini, speaking of Bonaparte atthis very period, "was to be seen a young warrior, trained in the bestschools, endowed with an ardent imagination, brought up upon theexamples of antiquity, greedy of glory and of power, knowingthoroughly the Apennines, in which he had distinguished himself in1794, and already measuring with a practised eye the distances he mustoverpass before becoming master of Italy. To these advantages for awar of invasion, Bonaparte united an inborn genius, and clearlyestablished principles, the fruits of an enlightened theory. "

Jomini doubtless may be considered somewhat too absolute and pedanticin his insistence upon definite formulation of principles; but inthese words is nevertheless to be recognized the fundamentaldifference between these two great warriors, a difference by which theseaman was heavily handicapped in the opening of his career. As timepassed on, responsibility, the best of educators, took under her firmand steady guidance the training of his yet undeveloped genius, gleamsof which from time to time, but fitfully and erratically, illumine hisearlier correspondence. The material was there from the first, butinchoate, ill-ordered, confused, and therefore not readily availableto correct passing impressions, wild rumors, or even to prevent theradically false conceptions of an enemy's possible movements, such aswe have had before us. Bonaparte, furthermore, whose career began amidthe troubled scenes of a revolution which had shattered all thefetters of established custom, --so strong in England to impede a man'snatural progress, --had enjoyed already for some time the singularadvantage of being military adviser to the Directory, a duty whichcompelled him to take a broad view of all current conditions, toconsider them in their mutual relations, and not narrowly to look toone sphere of operations, without due reference to its effects uponothers. 

As to the invasion of Corsica after the manner he had imagined, Nelsonwas soon undeceived. Bonaparte himself, after a hurried visit toLeghorn, again departed to press the siege of Mantua, having assuredhimself that for a measurable time he had nothing to apprehend frommovements on his flank and rear. Orders were received from Jervis onthe 2d of July to institute a commercial blockade of Leghorn, permitting no vessels to enter or depart. The conduct of thisbusiness, as well as the protection of British trade in that district, and the support of the Viceroy in securing Corsica against theattempts of French partisans, were especially intrusted to Nelson, whose movements during the following months, until the first ofOctober, were consequently confined to the waters between Corsica andTuscany, while the Riviera west of Genoa saw him no more. Leghornbecame the chief centre of his activities. These redoubled with thedemands made upon him; his energy rose equal to every call. A fewweeks before, he had made a conditional application to the admiral, though with evident reluctance, for a short leave of absence onaccount of his health. "I don't much like what I have written, " heconfessed at the end of his diffident request, and some days later heagain alludes to the subject. "My complaint is as if a girth wasbuckled taut over my breast, and my endeavours, in the night, is toget it loose. To say the truth, when I am actively employed, I am notso bad. If the Service will admit of it, perhaps I shall at a futureday take your leave. " The service now scarcely admitted it, and theactive duty apparently restored his health; at all events we now hearno more of it. Everything yielded to the requirements of the war. "The Captain has wants, but I intend she shall last till the autumn:for I know, when once we begin, our wants are innumerable. "

In his still limited sphere, and on all matters directly connectedwith it and his professional duties, his judgment was sound and acute, as his activity, energy, and zeal were untiring. The menace to Corsicafrom the fall of Leghorn was accurately weighed and considered. Midwaybetween the two lay the since famous island of Elba, a dependence ofTuscany, so small as to be held readily by a few good troops, andhaving a port large enough, in Nelson's judgment, to harbor theBritish fleet with a little management. "The way to Corsica, " he wroteto the Viceroy, "if our fleet is at hand, is through Elba; for if theyonce set foot on that island, it is not all our fleet can stop theirpassage to Corsica. " The Viceroy took upon himself to direct that theisland be occupied by the British. Nelson complied without waiting forJervis's orders, and on the 10th of July a detachment of troops, convoyed by his squadron, were landed in the island, and took charge, without serious opposition, of the town of Porto Ferrajo and the worksfor the defence of the harbor. The measure was justified upon theground that the seizure of Leghorn by the French showed that Tuscanywas unable to assure Elba against a similar step, prejudicial to theBritish tenure in Corsica. The administration remained in the hands ofthe Tuscan officials, the British occupation being purely military, and confined to the places necessary for that purpose. 

The blockade of Leghorn was enforced with the utmost rigor and greateffectiveness. For a long time no vessels were allowed to go eitherout or in. Afterwards the rule was gradually relaxed, so far as topermit neutrals to leave the port in ballast; but none entered. Thetrade of the place was destroyed. Nelson hoped, and for a timeexpected, that the populace, accustomed to a thriving commerce, anddrawing their livelihood from its employments, would rise against thefeeble garrison, whose presence entailed upon them such calamities;but herein, of course, he underestimated the coercive power of a fewresolute men, organized for mutual support, over a mob of individuals, incapable of combined action and each uncertain of the constancy ofhis fellows. 

The Austrian preparations in the Tyrol gradually matured as the monthof July wore on. Towards its end Marshal Wurmser, the successor ofBeaulieu, advanced for the relief of Mantua and the discomfiture ofBonaparte, whose numbers were much inferior to his opponents. Theprojected movement was of course known to the British, and its firstresults in raising the siege of Mantua, and throwing reinforcementsinto the place, gave them great hopes. Amid the conflicting rumors ofthe succeeding days, the wonderful skill and success of Bonaparte, whooverthrew in detail forces greatly superior in the aggregate to hisown, escaped notice for the time; the superficial incidents of hisabandoning his previous positions alone received attention, andnothing less than his retreat in confusion was confidently expected. Nelson, justly estimating the importance of Leghorn, and over-sanguineof the support he might hope from the inhabitants, projected a suddenassault upon the town, by troops to be drawn from the garrisons inCorsica, supported by seamen of the squadron. Speaking of the steadyintercourse between, that island and the mainland by way of Leghorn, he says: "The only way is to cut at the root, for whilst Leghorn isopen, this communication must constantly be going on. This momentbrings to my eyes a body of about 200 men, with the Corsican flagcarrying before them; they are partly from Nice, and joined byGenoese, &c. , on the road. The time approaches, " he rightly forecasts, "when we shall either have to fight them in Corsica or Leghorn. " Theimminence of the danger was evident. "Our affairs in Corsica aregloomy, " he had already written to the Duke of Clarence. "There is avery strong republican party in that island, and they are wellsupported from France; the first favourable moment, they willcertainly act against us. "

The details of the intended assault upon Leghorn do not appear, and itis probable that they never passed beyond the stage of discussion tothat of acceptance, although he alludes to the plans as "laid. "Clear-sighted for the key of a situation, and ardent to strike "at theroot, " as five years later in the Baltic he was eager to cut away theRussian root of the Armed Neutrality, instead of hewing off the Danishbranch, Nelson urged the speedy adoption of the measure, and pressedhis own fitness to harmonize the land and sea forces under onecommand, in virtue of his rank as Colonel of Marines. "Leghorn is insuch a state, " he writes to Elliot on the 5th of August, "that arespectable force landed, would, I have every reason to suppose, insure the immediate possession of the town. Not less than a thousandtroops should be sent, to which I will add every soldier in mysquadron, and a party of seamen to make a show. In every way, prayconsider this as private, and excuse my opinions. I well know thedifficulty of getting a proper person to command this party. Firmness, and that the people of Leghorn should know the person commanding, willmost assuredly have a great effect. A cordial co-operation with me(for vanity apart, no one is so much feared or respected in Leghorn asmyself) is absolutely necessary. I am going further: we know thejealousy of the army against the navy, but I am by the King'scommission a Colonel in the army from June 1st, 1795. " Afterdiscussing this difficult question of professional susceptibilities, he concludes: "You will consider, Sir, all these points, and form amuch better judgment than I can, only give me credit that the nearestwish of my heart is to serve my King and my Country, at everypersonal risk and consideration. It has ever pleased God to prosperall my undertakings, and I feel confident of His blessing on thisoccasion. I ever consider my motto, _Fides et Opera_. "[38]

Having, with true strategic insight, chosen the place where the blowought to be struck for the preservation of Corsica, he pressed, withcharacteristic fervor, the necessity of taking risks. He discussesdetails indeed; he proposes no mere adventure, real as was hispersonal enjoyment of danger and action. What man can do, shall bedone; but being done, still "something must be left to chance. Ouronly consideration, is the honour and benefit to our Country worth therisk? If it is (and I think so), in God's name let us get to work, andhope for His blessing on our endeavours to liberate a people who havebeen our sincere friends. " Hearing at the same time that an armyofficer of general rank will have the command instead of himself, headds: "Pray assure him there is nothing I feel greater pleasure inthan hearing he is to command. Assure him of my most sincere wishesfor his speedy success, and that he shall have every support andassistance from me. " Truly, in generosity as in ardor, Nelson was, touse the fine old phrase, "all for the service. "

The project upon Leghorn had the approval of the Viceroy and ofJervis; but the latter, while expressing perfect reliance upon "thepromptitude of Commodore Nelson, " was clear that the attempt mustdepend upon the contimied advance of the Austrians. This was alsoNelson's own view. "All will be well, I am satisfied, provided Wurmseris victorious; upon this ground only have I adopted the measure. " Thisqualification redeems the plan from the reproach of rashness, whichotherwise might have been applied to the somewhat desperateundertaking of carrying a fortified town by such a feat of hardihood. It loses thus the color of recklessness, and falls into place as onepart of a great common action, to harass the retreat of a beatenenemy, and to insure the security of one's own positions. 

On the 15th of August, when the above words were written, Nelson wasstill ignorant of the Austrian defeats at Lonato and Castiglione, nearly two weeks before, and of their subsequent retreat to the Tyrol. A rumor of the reverse had reached him through Florence, but he gaveit little attention, as the French in Leghorn were not claiming avictory. On the 19th he knew it definitely, and had to abandon theexpectation, confided to his brother, that the next letter seen fromhim would be in the "Public Gazette. " "An expedition is thought of, and of course I shall be there, for most of these services fall to mylot. " "One day or other, " he had written to his wife, apparently withthis very enterprise in mind, "I will have a long Gazette to myself; Ifeel that such an opportunity will be given me. I cannot, " hecontinued with prophetic self-reliance, "if I am in the field ofglory, be kept out of sight. "

During the remainder of the month he continued to be amused with thoseunfounded reports of victories, which are among the invariableconcomitants of all wars, and which his sanguine temperament andpeculiar readiness to trust others made him especially ready toaccept. He was not wholly unaware of this tendency in himself, thoughhe continued to repeat with apparent belief reports of the moststartling and erroneous character, and never seems to haveappreciated, up to the time of his leaving the Mediterranean, theastonishing quickness and sagacity with which Bonaparte frustrated theoverwhelming combinations against him. "We hear what we wish, " he sayson one occasion. "The Toulon information is, as I always thought it, pleasant to know but never to be depended upon; all is guess. I havelong had reason to suspect great part is fabricated in Genoa;" but hewas continually deceived by it. 

Throughout the discomfitures of the Austrians on shore, the purelynaval part of the war continued to be successfully maintained. Jervis, with unrelaxing grip, kept his position before Toulon, effectuallychecking every attempt of the French fleet to escape unobserved intothe open, while Nelson shut up Leghorn so rigorously that the enemylost even the partial advantage, as a port of supply, which they hadbefore drawn from its neutrality. But, during this pregnant summer, grave causes for anxiety were rolling up in the western basin of theMediterranean. The attitude of Spain had long been doubtful, so muchso that before Sir John Jervis left England, in the previous autumn, the ministry had deliberated upon the contingency of her declaringwar, and a conditional decision had been reached to evacuate Corsica, if that event occurred. During the spring of 1796 reports of cominghostilities were current in the fleet. Nelson's first opinion wasthat, if they ensued, there was no object in remaining in theMediterranean, except to preserve Corsica from the French. This, hethought, was not a sufficient motive, nor had the conduct of thenatives entitled them to protection. With all the powers making peacewith France, he hoped Great Britain would leave the Mediterranean. This, however, was but a passing expression of discouragement, whencehe soon rallied, and, with a spirit worthy of his race, which was soonto face all Europe undismayed, his courage mounted continually as thestorm drew nearer. 

The summer of 1796 was in truth the period of transition, when thevictories of Bonaparte, by bringing near a cessation of warfare uponthe land, were sweeping from the scene the accessories that confusedthe view of the future, removing conditions and details whichperplexed men's attention, and bringing into clear relief the onefield upon which the contest was finally to be fought out, and theone foe, the British sea-power, upon whose strength and constancywould hinge the issues of the struggle. The British Navy, in theslight person of its indomitable champion, was gradually rising to theappreciation of its own might, and gathering together its energies toendure single-handed the gigantic strife, with a spirit unequalled inits past history, glorious as that had often been. From 1796 began therapid ascent to that short noontide of unparalleled brilliancy, inwhich Nelson's fame outshone all others, and which may be said to havebegun with the Spanish declaration of war, succeeded though that wasby the retreat in apparent discomfiture from the Mediterranean, now athand. 

The approach of this extraordinary outburst of maritime vigor is aptlyforetokened in the complete change, gradual yet rapid, that passedover Nelson's opinions, from the time when rumors of a Spanish warfirst assumed probability, up to the moment when the fact becametangible by the appearance of the Spanish fleet in the waters ofCorsica. Accentuated thus in a man of singular perceptions and heroicinstincts, it further affords an interesting illustration of themanner in which a combative race--for Nelson was through and through achild of his people--however at first averse to war, from motives ofwell-understood interest, gradually warms to the idea, and finallygrows even to welcome the fierce joy which warriors feel, as the clashof arms draws near. "If all the states of Italy make peace, " he writeson the 20th of May, "we have nothing to look to but Corsica; which inthe present state of the inhabitants, is not, in my opinion, an objectto keep us in the Mediterranean: we shall, I hope, quit it, and employour fleet more to our advantage. " "Reports here, " on the 20th of June, "are full of a Spanish war. If that should be the case, we shallprobably draw towards Gibraltar and receive large reinforcements. "

On the 15th of August, however, he writes to Jervis, betraying theincipient revulsion, as yet not realized, against abandoning theMediterranean, which was already affecting the current of histhoughts. "I hope we shall have settled Leghorn before the Dons, ifthey intend it, arrive. I have still my doubts as to a Spanish war;and if there should be one, with your management I have no fears. Should the Dons come, I shall then hope I may be spared, [39] in my ownperson, to help to make you at least a Viscount. " A few days later, having meantime heard of Wurmser's disasters at Castiglione: "Austria, I suppose, must make peace, and we shall, as usual, be left to fightit out: however, at the worst, we only give up Corsica, an acquisitionwhich I believe we cannot keep, and our fleet will draw down theMediterranean;" but at the same time, August 19, he writes to the Dukeof Clarence with glowing hopes and rising pride: "I hope Governmentwill not be alarmed for our safety--I mean more than is proper. Undersuch a commander-in-chief as Sir John Jervis nobody has any fears. Weare now twenty-two sail of the line; the combined fleet will not beabove thirty-five sail of the line. I will venture my life Sir JohnJervis defeats them. This country is the most favourable possible forskill with an inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable, that someone time in twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of alarge fleet, and the other will be becalmed, or have a contrary wind. "That the Duke trembled and demurred to such odds is not wonderful; butthe words have singular interest, both as showing the clear tacticalapprehensions that held sway in Nelson's mind, and still more, at themoment then present, as marking unmistakably his gradual conversion tothe policy of remaining in the Mediterranean, and pursuing the mostvigorous aggressive measures. 

A fortnight after this letter was written, Genoa, under pressure fromBonaparte, closed her ports against British ships, interdicting eventhe embarkation of a drove of cattle, already purchased, and ready forshipment to the fleet off Toulon. Nelson immediately went there tomake inquiries, and induce a revocation of the orders. While the"Captain" lay at anchor in the roads, three of the crew deserted, andwhen her boats were sent to search for them they were fired upon by aFrench battery, established near the town. Nelson, in retaliation, seized a French supply ship from under the guns of the battery, whereupon the Genoese forts opened against the "Captain, " which hadmeantime got under way and was lying-to off the city. Nelson did notreturn the fire of the latter, which was kept up for two hours, butthrew three shot into the French battery, "to mark, " as he said, thepower of the English to bombard the town, and their humanity in notdestroying the houses and innocent Genoese inhabitants. In thecommunications which followed under a flag of truce, Nelson wasinformed, verbally, that all the ports of the Republic were closedagainst Great Britain. This stand, and the firing on the ship, beingconsidered acts of hostility, the little island of Capraia, betweenCorsica and Genoa, and belonging to the latter, was seized by Nelson, acting under the counsel of the Viceroy of Corsica. This was done bothas a retaliatory measure, and to put a stop to the use which Frenchprivateers and parties of Corsicans had hitherto made of it, undercover of Genoese neutrality. 

As Jervis was already under apprehension of an outbreak of scurvy inthe fleet, consequent upon the failure of supplies of live cattlefollowing the French occupation of Leghorn, the closure of the Genoeseports was a severe blow. It was, however, but one among severalincidents, occurring nearly simultaneously, which increased hisembarrassments, and indicated the close approach of the long-mutteringstorm. To use his own words, "The lowering aspect of Spain, with theadvanced state of the equipment of the French fleet in Toulon, "impelled him to concentrate his force. Rear-Admiral Man, who had beenblockading Cadiz since his detachment there by Hotham, in October, 1795, was ordered up to the main fleet. Swayed by fears very unlike toNelson's proud confidence in his admiral and his service, he actedwith such precipitation as to leave Gibraltar without filling withprovisions, and arrived so destitute that Jervis had to send him backat once, with orders to replenish with stores and then to rejoinwithout delay. Under the influence of the panic which prevailed atGibraltar, Man had also sent such advices to the coast of Portugal ascaused the commander-in-chief to fear that expected supplies might bearrested. "Oh, our convoy!" cried Nelson; "Admiral Man, how could youquit Gibraltar?" Yet, as he wrote to Jervis, he had expected some suchstep, from what he had already seen "under his hand to you. "

Thus, for the time at least, there were lost to the British seven ofthe ships-of-the-line upon which Nelson had reckoned in his letter tothe Duke of Clarence. It was possibly on this account that Jerviswrote him to shift his commodore's pendant to a frigate, and send the"Captain" to the fleet. Nelson obeyed, of course, and at once; buttaking advantage of the fact that no captain had yet joined his ship, he thought it "advisable to go in her myself. " In this he doubtlesswas influenced chiefly by his unwillingness to miss a battle, especially against such great numerical odds. "I take for granted, " headmitted to the Viceroy, "that the admiral will send me back in acutter, but I shall give him a good ordered seventy-four, and take mychance of helping to thrash Don Langara, than which few things, Iassure you, would give me more real pleasure. " The particularemergency seems, however, soon to have passed; for after two days withthe fleet he returned off Leghorn in the "Captain, " somewhat comfortedas to the apprehensions of the British Cabinet. "Whatever fears wemay have for Corsica, it is certain Government at home have none, bytaking so very respectable a part of your force away. " A regiment hadbeen transferred to Gibraltar with Man's squadron, when the latterreturned there. 

These rising hopes and stirring expectations of brilliant service werespeedily dashed. On the 25th of September Jervis received orders fromthe Admiralty to abandon Corsica, to retreat from the Mediterranean, and to proceed with the fleet to England. In pursuance of theseinstructions Nelson was directed to superintend the evacuation ofBastia, the "most secret" letter to that effect reaching him at thatport on the 29th of September, --his birthday. The purpose of theministry filled him with shame and indignation. Confronted abruptlywith the course which four months before had seemed to him natural andproper, the shock brought out the fulness of the change through whichhe had passed meantime. He has no illusions about Corsica. Theinhabitants had disappointed all the expectations of the British, --"Ata peace I should rejoice at having given up the island. " But the dayspassing over his head had brought wider and maturer views of thegeneral policy of Great Britain, as well as increasing faith in thepowers of the fleet, vigorously used in aggressive warfare. "Whilst wecan keep the combined fleet in the Mediterranean [by our ownpresence], so much the more advantageous to us; and the moment weretire, the whole of Italy is given to the French. If the Dons detachtheir fleet out of the Mediterranean, we can do the same--however, that is distant. Be the successes of the Austrians on the other handwhat they may, their whole supply of stores and provisions comes fromTrieste, across the Adriatic to the Po, and when this is cut off [asby our uncovering the sea it must be], they must retire. " Above all hegrieves for Naples. If a weak and vacillating ally, there was no doubther heart was with them. "I feel more than all for Naples. The Kingof Naples is a greater sacrifice than Corsica. If he has been inducedto keep off the peace, and perhaps engaged in the war again by theexpectation of the continuance of the fleet in the Mediterranean, hardindeed is his fate; his kingdom must inevitably be ruined. " In theimpression now made upon him, may perhaps be seen one cause ofNelson's somewhat extravagant affection in after days for the royalfamily of Naples, independent of any influence exerted upon him byLady Hamilton. 

With these broad views of the general strategic situation, which areunquestionably far in advance of the comparatively narrow and vagueconceptions of a year, or even six months before, and doubtlessindicate the results of independent command and responsibility, actingupon powers of a high order, he at the same time shows his keenappreciation of the value of the organized force, whose movements, properly handled, should dominate the other conditions. "When Manarrives, who is ordered to come up, we shall be twenty-two sail ofsuch ships as England hardly ever produced, and commanded by anadmiral who will not fail to look the enemy in the face, be theirforce what it may: I suppose it will not be more than thirty-four ofthe line. There is not a seaman in the fleet who does not feelconfident of success. " "The fleets of England, " he says again, "areequal to meet the world in arms; and of all fleets I ever saw, I neverbeheld one in point of officers and men equal to Sir John Jervis's, who is a commander-in-chief able to lead them to glory. "

Reasoning so clearly and accurately upon the importance to GreatBritain's interests and honor, at that time, of maintaining herposition in the Mediterranean, and upon the power of her fleet inbattle, it is not strange that Nelson, writing in intimate confidenceto his wife, summed up in bitter words his feelings upon the occasion;unconscious, apparently, of the great change they indicated, notmerely in his opinions, but in his power of grasping, in well-orderedand rational sequence, the great outlines of the conditions amid whichhe, as an officer, was acting. "We are all preparing to leave theMediterranean, a measure which I cannot approve. They at home do notknow what this fleet is capable of performing; anything, andeverything. Much as I shall rejoice to see England, I lament ourpresent orders in sackcloth and ashes, so dishonourable to the dignityof England. " To the British minister at Naples his words were evenstronger: "Till this time it has been usual for the allies of Englandto fall from her, but till now she never was known to desert herfriends whilst she had the power of supporting them. I yet hope theCabinet may, on more information, change their opinion; it is not allwe gain elsewhere which can compensate for our loss of honour. Thewhole face of affairs is totally different to what it was when theCabinet formed their opinion. "

Nevertheless, although Nelson's perceptions and reasoning wereaccurate as far as they went, they erred in leaving out of thecalculation a most important consideration, --the maintenance of thecommunications with England, which had assumed vital importance sincethe general defection of the Italian States, caused by Bonaparte'ssuccesses and his imperious demands. It would be more true to say thathe underestimated this factor than that he overlooked it; for he hadhimself observed, six weeks earlier, when the approach of a Spanishwar first became certain: "I really think they would do us more damageby getting off Cape Finisterre;[40] it is there I fear them, " and thereason for that fear is shown by his reproach against Man, alreadyquoted, for his neglect of the convoy. The position of the SpanishNavy in its home ports was in fact intermediate--interior--asregarded the British fleet and the source of its most essentialsupplies. So long as its future direction remained uncertain, it layupon the flank of the principal British line of communications. Nelsondid not use, perhaps did not know, the now familiar terms of themilitary art; and, with all his insight and comprehensive sagacity, hesuffered from the want of proper tools with which to transmute hisacute intuitions into precise thought, as well as of clearlyenunciated principles, which serve to guide a man's conclusions, andwould assuredly have qualified his in the present instance. Upon thesupposition that the Spanish Navy, practically in its entirety, entered the Mediterranean and appeared off Corsica, --as itdid, --Nelson's reasoning was correct, and his chagrin at a retreatjustified; but, as he himself had wisely remarked to Beaulieu, it isnot safe to count upon your enemy pursuing the course you wish. Hadthe Spanish Government chosen the other alternative open to it, andstruck at the communications, such a blow, or even such a threat, musthave compelled the withdrawal of the fleet, unless some other base ofsupplies could be found. The straitness of the situation is shown bythe fact that Jervis, after he had held on to the last moment in SanFiorenzo Bay, sailed for Gibraltar with such scanty provisions thatthe crews' daily rations were reduced to one-third the ordinaryamount; in fact, as early as the first of October they had been cutdown to two-thirds. Whether, therefore, the Government was right inordering the withdrawal, or Nelson in his condemnation of it, may beleft to the decision of those fortunate persons who can be cocksure ofthe true solution of other people's perplexities. 

In evacuating the Mediterranean, Jervis determined, upon his ownresponsibility, to retain Elba, if the troops, which were not underhis command, would remain there. This was accordingly done; a stronggarrison, adequately provisioned, thus keeping for Great Britain afoothold within the sea, at a time when she had lost Minorca and didnot yet possess Malta. Nelson hoped that this step would encourage theTwo Sicilies to stand firm against the French; but, however valuableElba would be to the fleet as a base, if held until its return, it wasuseless to protect Naples in the absence of the fleet, and upon thenews of the latter's proposed retirement that Kingdom at once madepeace. 

After the receipt of his orders for the evacuation of Bastia, andpending the assembling of the transports, Nelson was despatched by theadmiral to Genoa, to present reclamations for injuries alleged to havebeen done to Great Britain, and to propose terms of accommodation. Thelittle Republic, however, under the coercive influence of Bonaparte'scontinued success, was no longer in doubt as to the side which policydictated her to take, between the two belligerents who vexed herborders. During this visit of Nelson's, on the 9th of October, shesigned a treaty with France, stipulating, besides the closure of theports against Great Britain, the payment of a sum of money, and freepassage to troops and supplies for the army of Italy. Thus was Genoaconverted formally, as she for some time had been actually, into aFrench base of operations. Returning from this fruitless mission, Nelson rejoined the commander-in-chief on the 13th of October, at SanFiorenzo, and the same afternoon left again for Bastia, where hearrived the following day. 

During the fortnight intervening since he left the place, the factthat the Spanish fleet was on its way to Corsica had become known, andthe French partisans in the island were proportionately active. It wasimpossible for the British to go into the interior; their friends, ifnot in a minority, were effectually awed by the preponderance of theirenemies, on land and sea. Nelson, wishing to cross overland to SanFiorenzo to visit Jervis, was assured he could not do so with safety. In Bastia itself the municipality had wrested the authority from theViceroy, and consigned the administration to a Committee of Thirty. The ships of war and transports being blown to sea, the inhabitantsbecame still more aggressive; for, foreseeing the return of theFrench, they were naturally eager to propitiate their future mastersby a display of zeal. British property was sequestered, and shippingnot permitted to leave the mole. 

Nelson was persuaded that only the arrival of the ships accompanyinghim saved the place. Except a guard at the Viceroy's house, theBritish troops had been withdrawn to the citadel. Even there, at thegates of the citadel, and within it, Corsican guards were present innumbers equal to the British, while the posts in the towns were allheld by them. Arriving at early dawn of the 14th, Nelson at oncevisited the general and the Viceroy. The former saw no hope, under theconditions, of saving either stores, cannon, or provisions. "TheArmy, " said Nelson in a private letter to Jervis, with something ofthe prejudiced chaff of a seaman of that day, "is, as usual, welldressed and powdered. I hope the general will join me cordially, but, as you well know, great exertions belong exclusively to the Navy. "After the evacuation, however, he admitted handsomely that it wasimpossible to "do justice to the good dispositions of the general. "

Between the heads of the two services such arrangements were perfectedas enabled almost everything in the way of British property--publicand private--to be brought away. By midday the ships, of which threewere of the line, were anchored close to the mole-head, abreast thetown, and the municipality was notified that any opposition to theremoval of the vessels and stores would be followed by instantbombardment. Everything yielded to the threat, made by a man whosedetermined character left no doubt that it would be carried intoexecution. "Nothing shall be left undone that ought to be done, " hewrote to Jervis, "even should it be necessary to knock down Bastia. "From time to time interference was attempted, but the demand forimmediate desistence, made, watch in hand, by the naval officer on thespot, enforced submission. "The firm tone held by Commodore Nelson, "wrote Jervis to the Admiralty, "soon reduced these gentlemen to order, and quiet submission to the embarkation. " Owing to the anarchyprevailing, the Viceroy was persuaded to go on board before nightfall, he being too valuable as a hostage to be exposed to possiblekidnappers. 

On the 18th of October a large number of armed French landed at CapeCorso, and approached the town. On the 19th they sent to themunicipality a demand that the British should not be permitted toembark. Under these circumstances even Nelson felt that nothing morecould be saved. The work of removal was continued actively untilsunset, by which time two hundred thousand pounds worth of cannon, stores, and provisions had been taken on board. At midnight the troopsevacuated the citadel, and marched to the north end of the town, wherethey embarked--twenty-four hours ahead of the time upon which Nelsonhad reckoned four days before. It was then blowing a strong gale ofwind. Last of all, about six o'clock on the morning of the 20th, Nelson and the general entered a barge, every other man being by thattime afloat, and were pulled off to the ships, taking with them twofield-guns, until then kept ashore to repel a possible attack at thelast moment. The French, who "were in one end of Bastia before wequitted the other, " had occupied the citadel since one in the morning, and the Spanish fleet, of over twenty sail-of-the-line, which hadalready arrived, was even then off Cape Corso, about sixty milesdistant; but the little British squadron, sailing promptly with a fairwind, in a few hours reached Elba, where every vessel was safely atanchor before night. On the 24th Nelson joined the commander-in-chiefin Martello Bay, the outer anchorage of San Fiorenzo. Everything wasthen afloat, and ready for a start as soon as the transports, still atElba, should arrive. The evacuation of Corsica was complete, thoughthe ships remained another week in its waters. 

The Spanish fleet continued cruising to the northward of the island, and was every day sighted by the British lookout frigates. Jervis heldgrimly on, expecting the appearance of the seven ships of Admiral Man, who had been ordered to rejoin him. That officer, however, acting onhis own responsibility, weakly buttressed by the opinion of a councilof his captains, had returned to England contrary to his instructions. The commander-in-chief, ignorant of this step, was left in the sorelyperplexing situation of having his fleet divided into two parts, eachdistinctly inferior to the Spanish force alone, of twenty-six ships, not to speak of the French in Toulon. Under the conditions, the onlything that could be done was to await his subordinate, in theappointed spot, until the last moment. By the 2d of November furtherdelay had become impossible, from the approaching failure ofprovisions. On that day, therefore, the fleet weighed, and after atedious passage anchored on the first of December at Gibraltar. ThereNelson remained until the 10th of the month, when he temporarilyquitted the "Captain, " hoisted his broad pendant on board the frigate"Minerve, " and, taking with him one frigate besides, returned into theMediterranean upon a detached mission of importance. 

Nelson's last services in Corsica were associated with the momentarygeneral collapse of the British operations and influence in theMediterranean; and his final duty, by a curious coincidence, was toabandon the position which he more than any other man had beeninstrumental in securing. Yet, amid these discouraging circumstances, his renown had been steadily growing throughout the year 1796, whichmay justly be looked upon as closing the first stage in the historyof British Sea Power during the wars of the French Revolution, and asclearing the way for his own great career, which in the repossessionof the Mediterranean reached its highest plane, and there continued inunabated glory till the hour of his death. It was not merely theexceptional brilliancy of his deeds at Cape St. Vincent, now soon tofollow, great and distinguished as those were, which designated him tomen in power as beyond dispute the coming chief of the British Navy;it was the long antecedent period of unswerving continuance instrenuous action, allowing no flagging of earnestness for a moment toappear, no chance for service, however small or distant, to passunimproved. It was the same unremitting pressing forward, which hadbrought him so vividly to the front in the abortive fleet actions ofthe previous year, --an impulse born, partly, of native eagerness forfame, partly of zeal for the interests of his country and hisprofession. "Mine is all honour; so much for the Navy!" as he wrote, somewhat incoherently, to his brother, alluding to a disappointmentabout prize money. 

Nelson himself had an abundant, but not an exaggerated, consciousnessof this increase of reputation; and he knew, too, that he was butreaping as he had diligently sowed. "If credit and honour in theservice are desirable, " he tells his brother, "I have my full share. Ihave never lost an opportunity of distinguishing myself, not only as agallant man, but as having a head; for, of the numerous plans I havelaid, not one has failed. " "You will be informed from my lateletters, " he writes to his wife, "that Sir John Jervis has such anopinion of my conduct, that he is using every influence, both publicand private, with Lord Spencer, for my continuance on this station;and I am certain you must feel the superior pleasure of knowing, thatmy integrity and plainness of conduct are the cause of my being keptfrom you, to the receiving me as a person whom no commander-in-chiefwould wish to keep under his flag. Sir John was a perfect stranger tome, therefore I feel the more flattered; and when I reflect that Ihave had the unbounded confidence of three commanders-in-chief, Icannot but feel a conscious pride, and that I possess abilities. " "Ifmy character is known, " he writes to the Genoese Government, whichknew it well, "it will be credited that this blockade [of Leghorn]will be attended to with a degree of rigour unexampled in the presentwar. " "It has pleased God this war, " he tells the Duke of Clarence, "not only to give me frequent opportunities of showing myself anofficer worthy of trust, but also to prosper all my undertakings inthe highest degree. I have had the extreme good fortune, not only tobe noticed in my immediate line of duty, but also to obtain therepeated approbation of His Majesty's Ministers at Turin, Genoa, andNaples, as well as of the Viceroy of Corsica, for my conduct in thevarious opinions I have been called upon to give; and my judgmentbeing formed from common sense, I have never yet been mistaken. "

Already at times his consciousness of distinction among men betrayssomething of that childlike, delighted vanity, half unwitting, whichwas afterward forced into exuberant growth and distasteful prominence, by the tawdry flatteries of Lady Hamilton and the Court of Naples. Now, expressed to one who had a right to all his confidence and toshare all his honors, it challenges rather the sympathy than thecriticism of the reader. "I will relate another anecdote, all vanityto myself, but you will partake of it: A person sent me a letter, anddirected as follows, 'Horatio Nelson, Genoa. ' On being asked how hecould direct in such a manner, his answer, in a large party, was, 'Sir, there is but one Horatio Nelson in the world. ' I am knownthroughout Italy, " he continues; "not a Kingdom, or State, where myname will be forgotten. This is my Gazette. Probably my services maybe forgotten by the great, by the time I get home; but my mind willnot forget, nor cease to feel, a degree of consolation and of applausesuperior to undeserved rewards. Wherever there is anything to be done, there Providence is sure to direct my steps. Credit must be given mein spite of envy. Had all my actions been gazetted, not one fortnightwould have passed during the whole war without a letter from me. Eventhe French respect me. " After the conclusion of the campaign, when onthe way to Gibraltar, he tells her again: "Do not flatter yourselfthat I shall be rewarded; I expect nothing, and therefore shall not bedisappointed: the pleasure of my own mind will be my reward. I am moreinterested, and feel a greater satisfaction, in obtaining yours and myfather's applause than that of all the world besides. " The wholesomebalance between self-respect and a laudable desire for the esteem ofmen was plainly unimpaired. 

Though devoid of conspicuous events, the year 1796, from the openingof the campaign, early in April, up to the evacuation of theMediterranean, had been to Nelson one of constant and engrossingoccupation. There is therefore little mention by him of his privateaffairs and feelings. In the home correspondence there is nodiminution in the calm tenderness of affection always shown by himtowards his wife and father, who continued to live together; rather, perhaps, the expressions to Mrs. Nelson are more demonstrative thanbefore, possibly because letters were less frequent. But there isnothing thrilling in the "assurance of my unabated and steadyaffection, which, if possible, is increasing by that propriety ofconduct which you pursue. " He is clearly satisfied to remain away; thepath of honor has no rival in his heart; there is no suggestion of aninward struggle between two masters, no feeling of aloneness, nopetulant discontent with uneasy surroundings, or longing for thepresence of an absent mistress. The quiet English home, the "littlebut neat cottage, " attracts, indeed, with its sense of repose, --"Ishall not be very sorry to see England again. I am grown old andbattered to pieces, and require some repairs "--but the magnet failsto deflect the needle; not even a perceptible vibration of the will isproduced. 

Yet, while thus engrossed in the war, eager for personal distinctionand for the military honor of his country, he apparently sees in itlittle object beyond a mere struggle for superiority, and has noconception of the broader and deeper issues at stake, the recognitionof which intensified and sustained the resolution of the peace-lovingminister, who then directed the policy of Great Britain. Of this hehimself gives the proof in a curious anecdote. An Algerine officialvisiting the "Captain" off Leghorn, Nelson asked him why the Dey wouldnot make peace with the Genoese and Neapolitans, for they would paywell for immunity, as the Americans at that period always did. Hisanswer was: "If we make peace with every one, what is the Dey to dowith his ships?" "What a reason for carrying on a naval war!" saidNelson, when writing the story to Jervis; "but has our minister abetter one for the present?" Jervis, a traditional Whig, and opposedin Parliament to the war, probably sympathized with this view, and inany case the incident shows the close confidence existing between thetwo officers; but it also indicates how narrowly Nelson's genius andunquestionable acuteness c£ intellect confined themselves, at thattime, to the sphere in which he was visibly acting. In this hepresents a marked contrast to Bonaparte, whose restless intelligenceand impetuous imagination reached out in many directions, and surveyedfrom a lofty height the bearing of all things, far and near, upon thedestinies of France. 

FOOTNOTES:

[35] This indicates no opinion as to the fortune of the military operationsin England, a landing once effected. It has, however, seemed to the authorsingular that men fail to consider that Napoleon would not have hesitatedto abandon an army in England, as he did in Egypt and in Russia. A fewhours' fog or calm, and a quick-pulling boat, would have landed himselfagain in France; while the loss of 150, 000 men, if it came to that, wouldhave been cheaply bought with the damage such an organized force could havedone London and the dockyards, not to speak of the moral effect. 

[36] Naval Chronicle, vol. Xxi. P. 60. 

[37] An account of this disaster, said to be that of an eye-witness, is tobe found in Colburn's United Service Journal, 1846, part i. 

[38] This motto was subsequently adopted by Nelson, when arms were assignedto him as a Knight of the Bath, in May, 1797. 

[39] That is, apparently, from detached service, and ordered to the mainfleet. 

[40] On the northwest coast of Spain, at the entrance of the Bay of Biscay, and therefore right in the track of vessels from the Channel to the Straitsof Gibraltar. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE EVACUATION OF ELBA. --NIGHT COMBAT WITH TWO SPANISHFRIGATES. --BATTLE OF CAPE ST. VINCENT. --NELSON PROMOTED TOREAR-ADMIRAL. --SERVICES BEFORE CADIZ. 

DECEMBER, 1796-JUNE, 1797. AGE, 38. 

"When we quitted Toulon, " wrote Nelson to his old captain, Locker, while on the passage to Gibraltar, "I remember we endeavoured toreconcile ourselves to Corsica; now we are content with Elba--suchthings are. " Even this small foothold was next to be resigned. Uponreaching Gibraltar, Jervis received orders from the Admiralty toevacuate the island. 

This was the duty upon which Nelson was so soon despatched again tothe Mediterranean. Though "most important, " wrote he to his wife, "itis not a fighting mission, therefore be not uneasy. " The assurance wasdoubtless honestly given, but scarcely to be implicitly accepted inview of his past career. Leaving the admiral on the evening ofDecember 14, with the frigates "Blanche" and "Minerve, " hiscommodore's pendant flying in the latter, the two vessels, about 11p. M. Of the 19th, encountered two Spanish frigates close to Cartagena. The enemies pairing off, a double action ensued, which, in the case ofthe "Minerve, " ended in the surrender of her opponent, "La Sabina, " athalf-past one in the morning. Throwing a prize-crew on board, theBritish ship took her late antagonist in tow and stood away to thesoutheast. At half-past three another Spanish frigate came up, and, inorder to meet this fresh enemy on fairly equal terms, the "Minerve"had to drop her prize. The second fight began at 4. 30, and lastedhalf an hour, when the Spaniard hauled off. With daylight appearedalso two hostile ships-of-the-line, which had been chasing towards thesound of the guns. These had already been seen by the "Blanche, " whichwas by them prevented from taking possession of her antagonist, afterthe latter struck. The pursuit lasted through the day, the "Minerve"being hard pressed in consequence of the injuries received by all hermasts during the engagement; but both British frigates succeeded inshaking off their pursuers. "La Sabina" was recaptured; she hadalready lost one mast, and the remaining two were seen to go over theside as she was bringing-to, when the enemy overtook her. It isinteresting to note that her captain, Don Jacobo Stuart, was descendedfrom the British royal house of Stuart. He, with many of his crew, hadbeen transferred to the "Minerve, " and remained prisoners. 

Nelson reached Porto Ferrajo a week later, on the 26th of December. "On my arrival here, " wrote he to his brother, "it was a ball night, and being attended by the captains, I was received in due form by theGeneral, and one particular tune was played:[41] the second was 'RuleBritannia. ' From Italy I am loaded with compliments. " Having regard tocomparative strength, the action was in all respects most creditable, but it received additional lustre from being fought close to theenemy's coast, and in full view of a force so superior as that fromwhich escape had been handsomely made, under conditions requiring bothsteadiness and skill. Though on a small scale, no such fair stand-upfight had been won in the Mediterranean during the war, and theresultant exultation was heightened by its contrast with the generaldepression then weighing upon the British cause. Especially keen andwarmly expressed was the satisfaction of the veterancommander-in-chief at Lisbon, who first learned the success of hisvalued subordinate through Spanish sources. "I cannot express to you, and Captain Cockburn, the feelings I underwent on the receipt of theenclosed bulletin, the truth of which I cannot doubt, as far asrelates to your glorious achievement in the capture of the Sabina, anddignified retreat from the line-of-battle ship, which deprived you ofyour well-earned trophy; your laurels were not then within theirgrasp, and can never fade. "

General De Burgh, who commanded the troops in Elba, had received noinstructions to quit the island, and felt uncertain about his course, in view of the navy's approaching departure. Nelson's orders wereperfectly clear, but applied only to the naval establishment. Herecognized the general's difficulty, though he seems to have thoughtthat, under all the circumstances, he might very well have acted uponhis own expressed opinion, that "the signing of a Neapolitan peacewith France ought to be our signal for departure. " "The army, " wroteNelson to the First Lord of the Admiralty, "are not so often calledupon to exercise their judgment in political measures as we are;therefore the general feels a certain diffidence. " He told De Burghthat, the King of Naples having made peace, Jervis considered hisbusiness with the courts of Italy as terminated; that the Admiralty'sorders were to concentrate the effort of the fleet upon preventing theallied fleets from quitting the Mediterranean, and upon the defence ofPortugal, invaluable to the British as a base of naval operations. Forthese reasons, even if he had to leave the land forces in Elba, heshould have no hesitation in following his instructions, which were towithdraw all naval belongings. "I have sent to collect my squadron, and as soon as they arrive, I shall offer myself for embarking thetroops, stores, &c. ; and should you decline quitting this post, Ishall proceed down the Mediterranean with such ships of war as are notabsolutely wanted for keeping open the communication of Elba with theContinent. "

The necessary preparations went on apace. Vessels were sent out tosummon the scattered cruisers to the port. A frigate was despatched toNaples to bring back Sir Gilbert Elliot, the late Viceroy of Corsica, who, since the abandonment of the latter island, had been on adiplomatic visit to Rome and Naples. It is to this incident that weowe the fullest account transmitted of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent;the narrator, Colonel Drinkwater, being then a member of the Viceroy'ssuite, and attending him upon his return with Nelson's squadron. TheSpanish prisoners were sent to Cartagena in a cartel, Nelson restoringto the captain of the "Sabina" the sword which he had surrendered. "Ifelt this consonant to the dignity of my Country, and I always act asI feel right, without regard to custom. " By the 16th of January allthe naval establishment was embarked, ready for departure, though someof the ships of war had not yet returned, nor had the Viceroy arrived. The delay allowed the "Minerve" to be completely refitted, two of hermasts and most of her rigging having to be renewed. 

When Elliot came, it was decided in a consultation between him, Nelson, and De Burgh, that the troops should remain. The transportshad been completely victualled, and so prepared that every soldiercould be embarked in three days. With them were left two frigates anda few smaller ships of war. On the 29th of January, Nelson sailed withthe rest of his force and the convoy, divided into three sections, which proceeded for the Straits by different routes, to diminish thechances of total loss by capture. Nelson himself, with anotherfrigate, the "Romulus, " in company, intended to make a round of theenemy's ports, in order to bring the admiral the latest information ofthe number of ships in each, and their state of preparation. "I hopeto arrive safe in Lisbon with my charge, " he wrote to his wife on theeve of sailing, "but in war much is left to Providence: however, as Ihave hitherto been most successful, confidence tells me I shall notfail: and as nothing will be left undone by me, should I not alwayssucceed, my mind will not suffer; nor will the world, I trust, bewilling to attach blame, where my heart tells me none would be due. "The habit of taking risks had wrought its beneficial influence uponmind and temper, when he thus calmly and simply reasoned from theexperience of the past to the prospective fortnight, to be passed insight of a hostile coast, and in waters where he could meet nofriendly sail. "It has ever pleased Almighty God to give his blessingto my endeavours, " was his New Year greeting to his father at thistime. 

During this month in Elba a slight political reference shows how hisviews and purpose were changing with the rapidly shifting politicalscene. In this hour of deepening adversity he no longer looks forpeace, nor seeks the reason for the current war, which a few monthsbefore he had failed to find. "As to peace, I do not expect it; LordMalmesbury will come back as he went. But the people of England will, I trust, be more vigorous for the prosecution of the war, which canalone insure an honourable peace. "

The "Minerve" and the "Romulus" looked first into the old Britishanchorage in San Fiorenzo Bay, which was found deserted. Standingthence to Toulon, they remained forty-eight hours off that port, inwhich were to be seen no ships in condition for sailing. From therethey passed off Barcelona, showing French colors, but withoutsucceeding in drawing out any vessel there lying. The wind not beingfair for Minorca, where Nelson had purposed to reconnoitre Port Mahon, the frigates next went to Cartagena, and ascertained that the greatSpanish fleet was certainly not there. As Toulon also had been foundempty, it seemed clear that it had gone to the westward, the more soas the most probable information indicated that the naval enterprisesof the French and their allies at that time were to be outside of theMediterranean. Nelson therefore pushed ahead, and on the 9th ofFebruary the "Minerve" and "Romulus" anchored in Gibraltar. All threedivisions from Elba passed the Straits within the same forty-eighthours. 

The Spanish grand fleet had been seen from the Rock, four days before, standing to the westward into the Atlantic. Two ships-of-the-line anda frigate had been detached from it, with supplies for the Spanishlines before Gibraltar, and had anchored at the head of the bay, wherethey still were when Nelson arrived. On board them had also been sentthe two British lieutenants and the seamen, who became prisoners whenthe "Sabina" was recaptured. Their exchange was effected, for whichalone Nelson was willing to wait. The fact that the Spanish fleet hadgone towards Jervis's rendezvous, and the continuance of easterlywinds, which would tend to drive them still farther in the samedirection, gave him uneasy premonitions of that coming battle which itwould "break his heart" to miss. It was, besides, part of hisingrained military philosophy, never absent from his careful mind, that a fair wind may fall or shift. "The object of a sea-officer is toembrace the happy moment which now and then offers, --it may be to-day, it may be never. " Regretting at this moment the loss even of a tide, entailed by the engagements of the Viceroy, whom he had to carry toJervis, and therefore could not leave, he wrote, "I fear a _westerly_wind. " The Providence in which he so often expresses his reliance, nowas on many other occasions, did not forsake the favored son, who neverby sluggishness or presumption lost his opportunities. The wind heldfair until the 13th of February, when Nelson rejoined thecommander-in-chief. That night it shifted to the westward, and thefollowing day was fought the Battle of Cape St. Vincent. 

Taken in its entirety, the episode of this nearly forgotten mission toElba is singularly characteristic, not only of Nelson's own qualities, but also of those concurrences which, whatever the origin attributedto them by this or that person, impress upon a man's career the stampof "fortunate. " An errand purely of evasion, not in itself of primeimportance, but for an object essentially secondary, it results in anight combat of unusual brilliancy, which would probably not have beenfought at all could the British have seen the overwhelming force readyto descend upon conqueror and conquered alike. With every sparwounded, and a hostile fleet in sight, the "Minerve" neverthelessmakes good her retreat. Solitary, in an enemy's sea, she roams it withpremeditated deliberateness, escaping molestation, and, except in thefirst instance, even detection. She carries the fortunes of a Caesaryet unknown, who is ready to stake them at any moment for adequatecause; but everything works together, not merely for his preservation, but to bring him up just in time for the exceptional action, whichshowed there was more to him than even his untiring energy andfearlessness had so far demonstrated. As when, in later years, burninganxiety pressed him to hasten after Villeneuve, yet failed so todiscompose him as to cause the neglect of any preparation essential todue provision for the abandoned Mediterranean; so now, with everypower at highest tension to rejoin the admiral, eager not to waste amoment, he mars his diligence by no precipitancy, he grudges no hournecessary to the rounded completion of the present task, --to see, andknow, and do, all that can be seen and done. He might almost have usedagain, literally, the expression before quoted: "I have not a thoughton any subject separated from the immediate object of my command. "

Leaving the "Romulus" in Gibraltar, the "Minerve" sailed again on the11th. The Spanish ships-of-the-line followed her at once. The eastwind blows in wild and irregular puffs upon the anchorages immediatelyunder the lofty Rock, where the frigate lay. Farther up, where theSpaniards were, it crosses the low neck joining the peninsula to themainland, and is there more equable and more constant. The "Minerve"was consequently at a disadvantage until she got fairly from under itslee, and the chase through the Straits became close enough to draw theidlers of the town and garrison in crowds to the hillsides. It soonbecame evident that the leading ship-of-the-line was gaining upon thefrigate, and the latter cleared for action. Nelson had but a pooropinion of the Spanish navy of his day, and doubtless chose, beforesurrendering, to take his chance of one of those risks which in waroften give strange results. He said to Drinkwater that he thought anengagement probable, but added, "Before the Dons get hold of that bitof bunting I will have a struggle with them, and sooner than give upthe frigate, I'll run her ashore. "

About this time the officers' dinner was announced. Drinkwater wentbelow, and was just congratulating Lieutenant Hardy, who had beencaptured in the "Sabina, " upon his exchange, when the cry "Manoverboard!" was heard. The party dispersed hurriedly, in sympathy withthe impulse which invariably causes a rush under such circumstances;and Drinkwater, running to the stern windows, saw a boat alreadylowering with Hardy in it, to recover the man, who, however, could notbe found. The boat therefore, making signal to that effect, soonturned to pull to the ship. The situation was extremely embarrassing, not to say critical; on the one hand, the natural reluctance toabandon any one or anything to the enemy, on the other, the imminentrisk of sacrificing the ship and all concerned by any delay, --for theleading Spaniard, by himself far superior in force, was nearly withingunshot. Temperament and habit decide, in questions where reason haslittle time and less certainty upon which to act; by nature andexperience Nelson was inclined to take risks. It was evident the boatcould not overtake the frigate unless the latter's way was lessened, and each moment that passed made this step more perilous, as thepursuer was already overhauling the "Minerve. " "By God, I'll not loseHardy!" he exclaimed; "back the mizzen-topsail. " The ship's speedbeing thus checked, the boat came alongside, and the party scrambledon board. Singularly enough, the enemy, disconcerted by Nelson'saction, stopped also, to allow his consort to come up, --a measurewholly inexcusable, and only to be accounted for by that singularmoral effect produced in many men by a sudden and unexpectedoccurrence. The daring deed had therefore the happiest results of astratagem, and the frigate was troubled no further. 

Steering that night to the southward, to throw off her pursuers, the"Minerve" found herself unexpectedly in the midst of a fleet, which, from the signals made, was evidently not that of Jervis, and thereforemust be hostile. The hazy atmosphere veiled the British frigate fromclose observation, and, by conforming her movements to those of thestrangers, she escaped suspicion. Nelson was uncertain whether it wasthe Spanish grand fleet, or, possibly, a detached body proceeding tothe West Indies. He had heard a rumor of such an expedition, and theimpression was probably confirmed by these ships being met whensteering southerly from the Straits; Cadiz, the known destination ofthe grand fleet, being north. As the British commercial interests inthe Caribbean were of the first importance, and would be muchendangered, he told Drinkwater, who lay awake in his cot, that, if hebecame convinced the ships in sight were bound there, he should giveup the attempt to join the commander-in-chief, and should start atonce for the Islands, to forewarn them of the approaching danger. Thecolonel was naturally startled at the prospect of an involuntary tripacross the Atlantic, and represented the equally urgent necessity--ashe thought--of Jervis and the British Cabinet getting the information, which Elliot was bringing, of the views and intentions of the Italiangovernments. This Nelson admitted, but replied that he thought theother consideration greater, and that--the condition arising--he mustdo as he had said. The incident illustrates the activity of his mind, in comprehending instantly the singular opportunity thrustunexpectedly upon him, as well as the readiness to acceptresponsibility and to follow his own judgment, which he showed on somany other occasions, both before and after this. 

Later in the night the hostile ships went about, evidencing thereby adesire to keep to windward, which pointed much more toward Cadiz thanto any western destination. The "Minerve" imitated them, but alteredher course so as to edge away gradually from her dangerous neighbors. Nelson, some time after, again entered the cabin, and told Drinkwaterand Elliot, the latter having also waked, that he had got clear of theenemy, but that at daylight the course would be altered so as to sightthem once more, if they were really going west. Should it prove to beso, they must make up their minds to visit the West Indies. Nothing, however, being seen during the 12th, the commodore, satisfied at lastthat he had been in the midst of the grand fleet, hastened on, andtowards noon of the 13th joined the admiral. Before doing so, some ofthe Spaniards were again sighted. They had been seen also by theregular British lookouts, one at least of which had kept touch withthem through the preceding days of hazy weather. Nelson, after aninterview with Jervis, went on board the "Captain, " where his broadpendant was again hoisted at 6 P. M. 

At daybreak, the position of the two fleets was twenty-five miles westof Cape St. Vincent, a headland on the Portuguese coast, a hundred andfifty miles northwest of Cadiz. During the night the wind had shiftedfrom the eastward to west by south, and, being now fair, the Spaniardswere running for their port, heading about east-southeast; but theywere in disorder, and were divided into two principal fragments, ofwhich the headmost, and therefore leewardmost, numbered six ships. Itwas separated from the other division of twenty-one by a space of sixor eight miles. In the whole force, of twenty-seven ships, there wereseven of three decks, the least of which carried one hundred andtwelve guns; the remainder were principally seventy-fours, therebeing, however, one of eighty-four guns. Jervis's fleet consisted offifteen ships-of-the-line, --two of one hundred guns, four ofninety-eight or ninety, eight seventy-fours, and one sixty-four. Fromthe intelligence received the previous day of the enemy's proximity, the admiral kept the command throughout the night in two columns, inclose order, a formation suited by its compactness to a hazy night, and at the same time manageable in case of encountering an enemysuddenly. The course was south by west, almost perpendicular to thatof the Spaniards. The two fleets were thus running, one from thewestward, and the other from the northward, to a common crossing. [42]

At daylight the enemy's fleet was partly visible to the leading shipsof the British columns. As the morning advanced, and the situationdeveloped, it was seen that the Spanish line was long and straggling, and the gap began to show. As the British were heading directlytowards it, Jervis ordered a half-dozen of his ships, which were allstill under moderate canvas, to press on and interpose between theenemy's divisions. An hour or so later he made the signal to form thesingle column, which was the usual fighting order of those days. Thefleet being already properly disposed for manoeuvres, this change oforder was effected, to use his own words, "with the utmost celerity. "Nelson's ship was thirteenth in the new order, therefore nearly thelast. Next after him came the sixty-four, the "Diadem, " whileCollingwood, in the "Excellent, " brought up the rear. Immediatelyahead of Nelson was the "Barfleur, " carrying the flag of one of thejunior admirals, to whom naturally fell the command in that part ofthe line. 

Three of the larger Spanish body succeeded in crossing ahead of theBritish column and joining the lee group, thus raised to nine ships. No others were able to effect this, the headmost British shipsanticipating them in the gap. Jervis's plan was to pass between theirtwo divisions with his one column, protracting this separation, thento go about in succession and attack the eighteen to windward, becausetheir comrades to leeward could not help them in any short time. Thiswas done. The lee ships did attempt to join those to windward bybreaking through the British order, but were so roughly handled thatthey gave it up and continued to the south-southwest, hoping to gain abetter opportunity. The weather ships, on the other hand, finding theycould not pass, steered to the northward, --nearly parallel, butopposite, to the course which both the British and their own lee groupwere then following. 

A heavy cannonade now ensued, each British ship engaging as itsbatteries came to bear, through the advance of the column to thesouth-southwest. After an hour of this, the admiral made the signal totack in succession. This was instantly obeyed by the leader, the"Culloden, " which was expecting it, and each following ship tackedalso as it reached the same point. But as the Spaniards werecontinually receding from this point, which the British rear wasapproaching, it was evident that in time the latter would leaveuncovered the ground that had so far separated the two hostiledivisions. This the Spanish admiral expected to be his opportunity; itproved to be Nelson's. 

At 1 P. M. , [43] by Nelson's journal, the "Captain, " standing south bywest, had come abreast the rearmost of the eighteen weather ships, having passed the others. He then noticed that the leaders of thatbody were bearing up before the wind, to the eastward, to cross behindthe British column. If this were carried out unmolested, they couldjoin the lee ships, which heretofore had been separated from them bythe centre and rear of the British line, and at this moment were notvery far distant, being still engaged with the British centre; orelse, so Nelson thought, they might fly before the wind, makingineffective all that had been done so far. "To prevent either of theirschemes from taking effect, I ordered the ship to be wore, and passingbetween the Diadem and Excellent, at a quarter past one o'clock, wasengaged with the headmost, and of course leewardmost of the Spanishdivision. The ships which I know were, the Santissima Trinidad, 126;San Josef, 112;[1] Salvador del Mundo, 112;[1] San Nicolas, 80;[44]another first-rate, and seventy-four, names not known. I wasimmediately joined and most nobly supported by the Culloden, CaptainTroubridge. The Spanish fleet, [45] from not wishing (I suppose) tohave a decisive battle, hauled to the wind [again] on the larboardtack, which brought the ships afore-mentioned to be the leewardmostand sternmost ships in their fleet. "

By this spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority, bysignal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick perceptions, Nelson entirely defeated the Spanish movement. Devoting his own shipto a most unequal contest, he gained time for the approaching Britishvan to come up, and carry on the work they had already begun whenfirst passing these ships--before the moment of tacking. The Britishcolumn being then in a V shape, --part on one tack, part on the other, the point of the V being that of tacking, --he hastened across, by ashort cut, from the rear of one arm of the V to a position on theother side, toward which the van was advancing, but which it, beingmore distant, could not reach as soon as he, and therefore not to asgood effect. To quote Jervis's words concerning this incident, "Commodore Nelson, who was in the rear on the starboard tack, _tookthe lead_ on the larboard, and contributed very much to the fortune ofthe day. " On the intellectual side, the side of skill, this is what hedid; on the side of valor, it is to be said that he did it for themoment single-handed. The "Culloden, " the actual leader, came upshortly, followed afterwards by the "Blenheim;" and the "Excellent"was ordered by Jervis to imitate Nelson's movement, and strengthen theoperation which he had initiated. It was the concentration of theseships at the point which Nelson seized, and for a moment held alone, that decided the day; and it was there that the fruits of victory werechiefly reaped. 

It must not be understood, of course, that all the honors of the dayare to be claimed for Nelson, even conjointly with those present withhim at the crucial moment. Much was done, both before and after, whichcontributed materially to the aggregate results, some of which weremissed by the very reluctance of men of solid military qualities todesist from seeking enemies still valid, in order to enjoy what Nelsoncalled the "parade of taking possession of beaten enemies. " It seemsprobable that more Spanish ships might have been secured, had it notbeen for the eagerness of some British vessels to push on to newcombats. But, while fully allowing the merits of many others, from thecommander-in-chief down, it is true of St. Vincent, as of mostbattles, that there was a particular moment on which success orfailure hinged, and that upon the action then taken depended the chiefoutcome, --a decisive moment, in short. That moment was when the enemyattempted, with good prospect, to effect the junction which Nelsonfoiled. As Collingwood afterwards summed up the matter: "The highestrewards are due to you and Culloden; you formed the plan ofattack, --we were only accessories to the Dons' ruin; for had they goton the other tack, they would have been sooner joined, and thebusiness would have been less complete. "

When Collingwood came up with the "Excellent, " the "Captain" waspractically disabled for further movement, had lost heavily in men, and was without immediate support. The "Culloden" had dropped astern, crippled, as had two of the Spanish vessels; the "Blenheim, " afterpassing the "Culloden" and the "Captain, " between them and the enemy, had drawn ahead. The "Excellent, " steering between the two Spanishships that had fallen behind, fired into both of them, and Nelsonthought both then struck; but Collingwood did not stop to secure them. "Captain Collingwood, " says Nelson, in his account, "disdaining theparade of taking possession of beaten enemies, most gallantly pushedup, with every sail set, to save his old friend and messmate, who wasto appearance in a critical state. The Excellent ranged up within tenfeet of the San Nicolas, giving a most tremendous fire. The SanNicolas luffing up, the San Josef fell on board her, and the Excellentpassing on for the Santissima Trinidad, the Captain resumed[46] hersituation abreast of them, and close alongside. At this time theCaptain having lost her fore-topmast, not a sail, shroud, [47] or ropeleft, her wheel shot away, and incapable of further service in theline, or in chase, I directed Captain Miller to put the helma-starboard, and calling for the boarders, ordered them to board. "[48]

The "Captain" fetched alongside of the "San Nicolas, " her bow touchingthe lee (starboard) quarter of the Spanish vessel, her spritsail yardhooking in the other's mizzen shrouds. Commander Berry, a very youngman, who had lately been first lieutenant of the "Captain, " leapedactively into the mizzen chains, the first on board the enemy; he wasquickly supported by others, who passed over by the spritsail yard. The captain of the ship was in the act of following, at the head ofhis men, when Nelson stopped him. "No, Miller, " he said, "_I_ musthave that honour;" and he directed him to remain. One of the soldiersof the Sixty-ninth Regiment, who were serving on board as marines, broke open the upper quarter-gallery window of the "San Nicolas, " andthrough this Nelson entered, with a crowd of followers, to findhimself in the cabin of the enemy's ship. The doors being fastened, they were held there a few moments, while Spanish officers from thequarter-deck discharged their pistols at them; but the doors were soonbroken down, and the party, after firing a volley, sallied on the spardeck, which the enemy yielded to them, --a Spanish commodore falling bythe wheel as he retreated. Berry had by this time reached the poop, where he hauled down the colors, while Nelson passed to the forwardpart of the ship, meeting on his way several Spanish officers, who, being by this time in the hands of British seamen, gave up to himtheir swords. The Spanish guns on the lower decks still continuedfiring for some moments, apparently at the "Prince George, " which hadpassed to leeward of the "Captain, " and now kept her batteries playingupon the hull of the "San Nicolas" forward of the part where the"Captain" touched her. 

At this moment a small-arm fire was opened from the stern galleries ofthe "San Josef" upon the British party in the "San Nicolas. " Nelsoncaused the soldiers to reply to it, and ordered reinforcements sent tohim from the "Captain. " Parties were stationed at the hatchways of the"San Nicolas" to control the enemy and keep them below decks, and thenthe boarders charged again for the Spanish three-decker. Nelson washelped by Berry into her main chains; but he had got no farther beforea Spanish officer put his head over the rail and said theysurrendered. "From this most welcome information, " continues Nelson, in his narrative, "it was not long before I was on the quarter-deck, when the Spanish captain, with a bow, presented me his sword, and saidthe admiral was dying of his wounds below. I asked him, on his honour, if the ship were surrendered? he declared she was; on which I gave himmy hand, and desired him to call to his officers and ship's company, and tell them of it--which he did; and on the quarter-deck of aSpanish First-rate, extravagant as the story may seem, did I receivethe swords of vanquished Spaniards; which, as I received, I gave toWilliam Fearney, one of my bargemen, who put them with the greatestsangfroid under his arm. I was surrounded by Captain Berry, LieutenantPierson, 69th Regiment, John Sykes, John Thomson, Francis Cook, allold Agamemnons, and several other brave men, seamen and soldiers: thusfell these ships. " The firing from the lower deck of the "San Nicolas"was by this time stopped, and the "Prince George" was hailed that boththe enemy's vessels were in possession of the British. The "Victory, "Jervis's flagship, passed a few moments later and cheered, as didevery ship in the fleet. 

The dramatic and picturesque surroundings which colored the seizure ofthese two Spanish ships have doubtless given an exaggerated idea ofthe danger and difficulty attending the exploit. The impression madeupon a sympathetic and enthusiastic eye-witness, Sir Gilbert Elliot, who saw the affair from the decks of the frigate "Lively, " has beentransmitted to posterity with little diminution. "Nothing in the worldwas ever more noble than the transaction of the Captain from beginningto end, and the glorious group of your ship and her two prizes, fastin your gripe, was never surpassed, and I dare say never will. " Yet itmay better be looked upon as another of those "fortunate" occurrenceswhich attend--and in Nelson's career repeatedly attended--the happymeeting of opportunity and readiness. Doubtless they were beatenships, but other beaten ships have escaped in general actions--did atSt. Vincent. "I pretend not to say, " wrote Nelson a week later, "thatthese ships might not have fell, had I not boarded them; but truly itwas far from impossible but they might have forged into the Spanishfleet as the other two ships did. " He was there, he could do nothingelse, he saw with his rapid glance that he might do this, and he didit. And, after all, it was a big thing, --this boarding a first-rateship over the decks of another hostile ship, not inaptly characterizedin the fleet as "Nelson's patent bridge. " We must mark, too, or weshall miss significant indications of character, that the samequalities which led him to the quarter-deck of the "San Josef" had ledhim but an hour before from the rear of the fleet to the van to savethe fight, --the same quickness to see opportunity, the same promptnessto seize it, the same audacity to control it. The brilliant crowningof the day may be but an ornament, but it sits well and fitly upon theknightly deed that rolled back the tide of battle in the hour of need. 

Those Spanish ships of the weather division which were firstencountered by Nelson, after he wore out of the line, bore the bruntof the fighting. As the whole division continued to stand on close tothe wind, these ships, becoming crippled, dropped astern of theirconsorts, and so first received the broadsides of the British van asthat arrived. Being also the leaders in the movement frustrated byNelson, they became the most leewardly; and, as the British van oncoming up passed to leeward, this contributed farther to concentratefire upon the same vessels. Among them was the "Santisima Trinidad, "of four decks and one hundred and thirty guns, then the largest shipof war in the world. When Collingwood passed ahead of Nelson, heengaged her, but not as near as he wished, and could have done, hadnot the "Excellent's" rigging been so cut as to prevent her haulingclose to the wind. She was also brought to action by Sir JamesSaumarez, in the "Orion, " and towards the close of her contest withthe latter ship showed a British Union Jack, --a token of submissionpossibly unauthorized, as it was almost immediately hauled in again. Besides those boarded by Nelson, two other enemy's ships had alreadystruck. 

It was now after four o'clock, and the other Spanish division, ofeight ships, was heading for the scene and near at hand. Althougheffectually blocked in their first attempt to pierce the British line, these had not received such injury as to detract seriously from theirefficiency. Continuing to stand south-southwest, after the Britishbegan tacking, they at last gained ground sufficiently to come up towindward, the side on which their other division was. In view of thenow inevitable junction of a great number of comparatively freshships, and of the casualties in his own vessels, Jervis decided todiscontinue the action. He ordered his fleet to form on the starboardtack, covering the four prizes and the "Captain;" and with this donethe firing soon ceased. The Spanish divisions united, and carried offtheir other disabled ships. 

Nelson's account of the proceedings of the "Captain" on the 14th ofFebruary, having been published not long afterwards, apparently by hisauthority, was challenged as incorrect by Vice-Admiral William Parker, commanding the van, whose flag was on board the third British ship, the "Prince George. " Parker claimed that the latter, with the"Blenheim" and "Orion, " had been much closer to the "Captain" and"Culloden" than was implied in Nelson's narrative by the words, "Fornear an hour, I believe, (but do not pretend to be correct as totime, ) did the Culloden and Captain support this apparently, but notreally, unequal contest; when the Blenheim, passing between us and theenemy, gave us a respite. " Parker labored under the misfortune of asingularly involved and obscure style, while in two separate papers hecontradicted himself more than once on points of detail; but the toneof his letter to Nelson was temperate and dignified, and he assertedthat, "so different to your statement, very soon after you commencedyour fire, you had four ships pressing on [Culloden, Blenheim, PrinceGeorge, and Orion], almost on board of each other, close in your rear;but"--and the admission following must be noted as well as thecharge--"ships thus pressing upon each other, and the _two latter notfar enough ahead to fire with proper effect_, [49] besides having noneof the enemy's ships left in the rear for our succeeding ships, atforty-three[50] minutes past one I made the signal to fill and standon. " Parker had also stated, in his log of the action, that the bruntfell upon the "Captain, " the "Culloden, " and the "Blenheim, " but moreparticularly the two former, "from their being more in the van. "

It appears to the writer probable that Nelson over-estimated theperiod that he and Troubridge remained unsupported; time would seemlong to the bravest man, when opposed to such heavy odds. Parker seemsto have reckoned it to be about fifteen minutes, and he admits that itwas impossible for him to open fire with proper effect for some time, although close on the heels of the "Captain" and the "Culloden, "because he could not get abreast of the enemy. All the ships--Spanishand British--were moving ahead, probably at not very different ratesof speed. The "Prince George" certainly became in the end actively andclosely engaged, much of the time with the "San Josef, " a ship offorce superior to her own. 

Nelson's account is a simple, if somewhat exultant, narrative of thefacts as they passed under his observation; and, except in thestatement to which Parker objected, they do not even inferentiallycarry an imputation upon any one else. There was a reflection, thoughscarcely intended, upon the van ships, which should have been, andParker says were, close behind the "Culloden;" but the attack was uponthe extreme rear of the enemy, and Nelson probably forgot that readersmight not understand, as he did, that the ships behind him must needsome time to get up, and that his own position, abreast the enemy'srear, was in itself an obstacle to their reaching a place whence theirbatteries could bear, with the limited train of broadside guns inthose days. 

Another and interesting illustration of the injustice a man may thusunintentionally do, through inadvertence, is afforded by Nelson'saccounts of St. Vincent. There were two drawn up on board the"Captain, "--one by himself in his own hand; the second simply signedby him, Miller, and Berry. It is quite evident that the latter isbased upon the former, much of the phraseology being identical; butthe whole is toned down in many points. The instance of unintentionalinjustice is this. In his autograph account, Nelson, thinking only ofhimself, [51] speaks of his going with the boarders, and makes nomention of the captain of the ship, Miller, whose proper business itwould be rather than his. In the revision, Miller would naturally feelthat his failure to board should be accounted for, and it containsaccordingly the statement, "Captain Miller was in the very act ofgoing also, but I directed him to remain. " Berry's hand also appears;for whereas Nelson's own account of boarding the "San Josef" simplysays, "I got into her main-chains, " the published copy reads, "CaptainBerry assisting me into the main-chains. "

So too with reference to Parker's controversy. In the first draftthere occurs the unqualified statement: "For an hour the Culloden andCaptain supported this apparently unequal contest. " The revisionreads: "For near an hour, I believe, (_but do not pretend to becorrect as to time_, )[52] did Culloden and Captain, " etc. Parkerquotes from the revision, which was therefore the one published, butdoes not quote the words italicized. Probably, if the "Blenheim" andthe "St. George" had had a hand in this revision, there would havebeen more modification; but Nelson did not realize where he washurting them, any more than he did in Miller's case. 

The love of glory, the ardent desire for honorable distinction byhonorable deeds, is among the most potent and elevating of militarymotives, which in no breast has burned with a purer flame than in thatof Nelson; but it is better that officers leave the public telling oftheir own exploits to others, and it is evident that Nelson, whentaken to task, realized uncomfortably that he had not exercised duethoughtfulness. Parker refrained from addressing him till he hadreceived the printed account. This was not till July, and hisremonstrance reached Nelson shortly after the loss of his arm atTeneriffe, when on his way home for what proved to be a tedious andpainful recovery. He was then suffering, not only from pain andweakness, but also from discouragement about his professional future, which he thought threatened by disability, and for these conditionsallowance must be made; but for all this his reply did not comparefavorably with Parker's letter, which had been explicit in itscomplaint as well as moderate in expression. He wrote curtly: "I mustacknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th of July; and, afterdeclaring that I know nothing of the Prince George till she was hailedfrom the forecastle of the San Nicolas, [53] it is impossible I canenter into the subject of your letter. "

This course was the more ungenerous, because no explanation, or evenadmission of involuntary wrong done, could have detracted in theleast from the abounding credit due and accorded to Nelson for hisconduct at St. Vincent, which indeed did not depend upon the length oftime he remained unsupported, but upon the rapidity and fearlessnesswith which he had acted aright at a very critical juncture. This hadbeen done so openly, under the eyes of all men, that it could by nomeans be hid. Collingwood had borne witness to it, in words which havebeen quoted. Drinkwater and Elliot had watched the whole from the deckof their frigate. The latter had written to him: "To have had anyshare in yesterday's glory is honour enough for one man's life, but tohave been foremost on such a day could fall to your share alone. " Thecommander-in-chief had come out to greet him upon the quarter-deck ofthe flagship, --a compliment naval officers can appreciate, --had thereembraced him, saying he could not sufficiently thank him, and "usedevery kind expression which could not fail to make me happy. " Jervishad also insisted upon his keeping the sword of the Spanishrear-admiral who fell on board the "San Josef. "

Before dropping this subject, which has the unpleasantness thatattends all contentions between individuals about their personaldeserts, it is right to say that Nelson had held from the first thatCollingwood, Troubridge, and himself were the only ones "who madegreat exertions on that glorious day: the others did their duty, andsome not exactly to my satisfaction. " "Sir John Jervis, " he continued, "is not quite contented, but says nothing publicly. " He then quotes ananecdote which, if he had it from Jervis, confirms his own opinionabout the support given. "Calder [the Chief of Staff] said, 'Sir, theCaptain and Culloden are separated from the fleet, and unsupported:shall we recall them?' 'I will not have them recalled. I put my faithin those ships: it is a disgrace that they are not supported and [are]separated. '"

In his public letter Jervis refrained alike from praise and fromblame. He mentions but one name, that of Calder, as bearer ofdespatches, and only incidentally says that he has been useful to himat all times. In a private letter to the First Lord he was moreexplicit, yet scarcely adequately so. Whatever momentary expression ofimpatience escaped him, when anxious about the "Culloden" and"Captain, " he knew that his own flagship could not get to them in timefor efficient support, and he gives as the reason for reticence in hispublic letter that all had behaved well, and that he was "confidentthat had those who were least in action been in the situation of thefortunate few, their conduct would not have been less meritorious. " Hethen mentions by name Troubridge, --who led the fleet, --Nelson, andCollingwood, and five ships (without the names of the captains), "Blenheim, " "Prince George, " "Orion, " "Irresistible, " and "Colossus, "which "gallantly supported" Troubridge, though just where or when isnot specified. "The ships' returns of killed and wounded, " he saysexplicitly, "although not always the criterion of their being more orless in action, is, in this instance, correctly so. " This wouldinclude the "Blenheim, " whose casualties were in excess of any exceptthe "Captain, " and Parker's ship, the "Prince George, " which lost notmany less than Collingwood. The "Captain's" loss in killed, twenty-four, was double that of any other ship, and in killed andwounded nearly one-third that of the whole fleet. 

An interesting anecdote of Jervis shows the importance conceded by himto Nelson's action. It rests on good authority, and is eminentlycharacteristic of one who valued beyond most traits in an officer thepower to assume responsibility. "The test of a man's courage, " he usedto say, "is responsibility. " In the evening, while talking over theevents of the day, Calder spoke of Nelson's wearing out of the line asan unauthorized departure from the method of attack prescribed by theadmiral. "It certainly was so, " replied Jervis, "and if ever youcommit such a breach of your orders, I will forgive you also. "Success covers many faults, yet it is difficult to believe that hadNelson been overwhelmed, the soundness of his judgment and hisresolution would not equally have had the applause of a man, who hadjust fought twenty-seven ships with fifteen, because "a victory wasessential to England at that moment. " The justification of departurefrom orders lies not in success, but in the conditions of the case;and Jervis was not one to overlook these, nor hereafter to forget thatonly one man in his fleet had both seen the thing to do and dared theresponsibility of doing it. 

A victory so signal entailed, as a matter of course, a number of thoserewards and titles with which Great Britain judiciously fostered thespirit of emulation in her Navy. These were to a considerable extentaffairs of routine and precedent, and Nelson, knowing that juniorflag-officers had on several previous occasions been made baronets, wished to avoid this hereditary dignity because inconsistent with hismeans. His love of distinction also prompted him to desire one ofthose Orders which carry with them the outward token of merit. MeetingDrinkwater the day after the battle, he expressed his reluctance tothe baronetage, and upon the other's asking him whether he wouldprefer to be a Knight of the Bath, he replied, "Yes; if my serviceshave been of any value, let them be noticed in a way that the publicmay know them. " To Elliot, who was about to return at once to England, he wrote, asking him to make known his wishes to the Admiralty. "Ifyou can be instrumental in keeping back what I expect will happen, itwill be an additional obligation. I conceive to take hereditaryhonours without a fortune to support the dignity, is to lower thathonour it would be my pride to support in proper splendour. There areother honours which die with the possessor, and I should be proud toaccept, if my efforts are thought worthy of the favour of my King. "

Elliot started for England a few days afterwards, and reached Londonat a time when the whole country was ringing with the news of thevictory. Arriving at such a propitious moment, there could have beenfor Nelson no better advocate than this man, placed high in politicalcouncils, and having to give to the Ministry a long account of hiscareer in the Mediterranean, throughout the whole of which the two hadbeen in intimate contact and constant correspondence. Himself aneye-witness, and filled with enthusiasm for Nelson's latest exploit, Elliot knew better than any one that it was no sporadic outburst, butonly a signal manifestation of the intuitive sagacity, the flashingpromptness, and the sustained energy, whose steady fires he had knownto burn, without slackening of force or change of motive, through twoyears of close personal association in public action to a common end. The government thus learned more of him than can easily transpireunder ordinary service conditions, or be shown even by an incidentlike that at St. Vincent; and Elliot's admiration, free from all biasof professional partiality or professional jealousy, doubtless wasmore useful to Nelson than any narrative of his own could have been. Even the royal favor was conciliated, despite the obstinate temperwhich yielded prejudices with difficulty. "I must rejoice, " wroteNelson to the Duke of Clarence, who had mentioned to him the King'sapproval, "in having gained the good opinion of my Sovereign, which Ionce was given to understand I had no likelihood of enjoying. "[54] Itwas to the honor of the monarch that he was thus as pliant to admitmerit in an officer as yet only rising to distinction, as he was firmat a later day to stamp with the marks of his displeasure the flagrantmoral aberration of the then world-renowned admiral. 

The coveted Knighthood of the Bath was accorded on the 17th of March, "in order, " wrote the First Lord, "to mark the Royal approbation ofyour successful and gallant exertions on several occasions during thecourse of the present war in the Mediterranean, and more particularlyof your very distinguished conduct in the glorious and brilliantvictory obtained over the fleet of Spain by His Majesty's fleet, onthe 14th of February last. " Nelson's delight was great andcharacteristic. Material rewards were not in his eyes the most real orthe richest. "Chains and Medals, " he wrote to his brother, "are whatno fortune or connexion in England can obtain; and I shall feelprouder of those than all the titles in the King's power to bestow. "To his wife he said: "Though we can afford no more than acottage--yet, with a contented mind, my chains, medals, and ribbonsare all sufficient. " To receive honor was second to no possession, except that of knowing he had deserved it. 

On the evening of the Battle of St. Vincent, soon after the firingceased, Nelson shifted his commodore's pendant to the "Irresistible, "of seventy-four guns, the "Captain" being unmanageable from the damagedone to her spars and rigging. Her hull also had been so battered, that he wrote a few days later she would never be able to receive himagain, which proved to be true; for although, after she had beenpatched up, he returned to her temporarily, a newly fitted ship, the"Theseus, " seventy-four, was assigned to his flag, as soon as areinforcement arrived from England. 

After a vain effort to reach the Tagus against contrary winds, withdisabled ships, Jervis decided to take his fleet into Lagos Bay, anopen roadstead on the southern coast of Portugal, and there to refitsufficiently to make the passage to Lisbon. While lying at LagosNelson became a Rear-Admiral of the Blue, by a flag-promotion dated onthe 20th of February, although his flag was not hoisted until thefirst of April, when the official notification of his advancement wasreceived by him. He was then thirty-eight and a half years of age. Inthis rank he remained until after the Battle of the Nile was fought, but it mattered comparatively little where he stood on the list offlag-officers, while Jervis commanded; that he was an admiral at allmade it possible to commit to him undertakings for which he waspre-eminently qualified, but which could scarcely have been intrustedto a simple captain by any stretching of service methods, always--andnot improperly--conservative. 

On the 23d of February the fleet sailed again, and on the 28thanchored in the Tagus. The same day Nelson wrote to his wife that hewas to go to sea on the 2d of March, with three ships-of-the-line, tolook out for the Viceroy of Mexico, who was reported to be on his wayto Cadiz, also with three ships-of-the-line, laden with treasure. "Twoare first-rates, " said he, "but the larger the ships the better themark, and who will not fight for dollars?" Foul winds prevented hisgetting away until the 5th. From that date until the 12th of April heremained cruising between Cape St. Vincent and the coast of Africa, covering the approaches to Cadiz; frigates and smaller vessels beingspread out to the westward, to gain timely notice of the approach ofthe specie ships, upon whose safe arrival Spain depended both for hercommercial affairs and her naval preparations. 

But while thus actively employed, and not insensible to the charm ofdollars, the immediate business on board was not in itself soengrossing, nor to him so attractive, as to obtain that exclusivenessof attention which he prided himself upon giving to matters moremilitary in character, and more critical in importance. "The Spaniardsthreaten us they will come out, and take their revenge, " he writes toan occasional correspondent. "The sooner the better; but I will notbelieve it till I see it; and if they do, what will the mines ofMexico and Peru signify, compared with the honour I doubt not we shallgain by fighting an angry Don? They will have thirty sail of theline, we twenty or twenty-two; but fear we shall have a peace beforethey are ready to come out. What a sad thing that will be!" His mindreverts to the troops in Elba, which had been left in a most exposedposition, and were now about to withdraw under the protection of somefrigates, passing through a thousand miles of hostile sea open to theline-of-battle ships at Toulon. He is more concerned about them thanabout his possible prize-money in the rich ships from Vera Cruz andHavana, whose danger from his own squadron was agitating all Spain. "Respecting myself, " he writes to Jervis, "I wish to stay at sea, andI beg, if line-of-battle ships are left out, [55] either on this sidethe Gut, or to the eastward of Gibraltar, that I may be the man. Thisbrings forward a subject which I own is uppermost in my mind, --that ofthe safety of our troops, should they embark from Elba. The Frenchhave a number of ships at Toulon. They may get two, three, or fourready, with a number of frigates, and make a push for our convoy. I amready, you know, to go eastward to cover them, even to Porto Ferrajo, or off Toulon, or Minorca, as you may judge proper. "

This exposed detachment continued to occupy his thoughts. A monthlater, on the 11th of April, he again writes: "I own, Sir, my feelingsare alive for the safety of our army from Elba. If the French get outtwo sail of the line, which I am confident they may do, our troops arelost, and what a triumph that would be to them! I know you have manydifficulties to contend with, but I am anxious that nothing shouldmiscarry under your orders. If you think a detachment can be spared, Iam ready to go and do my best for their protection. " In both lettershe apologizes for this freedom of urgency with his superior: "I havesaid much, but you have spoiled me by allowing me to speak and writefreely. I trust you will not imagine that my taking the great libertyof thus mentioning my thoughts, arises from any other motive thanaffection towards you. "

Jervis had already joined him on the 1st of April, before the secondletter was written. His hesitation about sending the detachmentsuggested by Nelson had arisen, not from doubt as to the danger of thetroops, but from the imminent expectation of the Spanish fleet comingout. The British force was already too inferior, numerically, to riskany diminution, in view of such a contingency. Confronted withdivergent objects, Jervis would not be drawn into the snare ofdividing his force; but after reconnoitring the port, he was satisfiedthat the Spaniards could not sail before Nelson had time to fulfil theproposed mission, and on the 12th of April he gave him the necessaryorders. The latter transferred his own squadron to the command of SirJames Saumarez, and started at once. He had now returned to the"Captain, " which had doubtless come down with Jervis. "She is littlebetter than a wreck, " he wrote to a friend; but the cripples had to bekept to the front, pending the arrival of fresh ships. Besides her, hehad the "Colossus, " seventy-four, and "Leander, " fifty, with asuitable number of smaller cruisers. Passing within gunshot of PortMahon in Minorca, he heard from several passing vessels that a Frenchsquadron of four ships-of-the-line was at sea, as he had anticipated;and these, he afterwards learned, were seen off Minorca onlytwenty-two hours before he passed. Fortunately a fresh northwest galehad carried them to the southward, and on the 21st of April, sixtymiles west of Corsica, he joined the convoy, which carried over threethousand soldiers. He reached Gibraltar with it in safety in the earlydays of May, without adventures of any kind. "I observed a man-of-warbrig evidently looking at us; but my charge was too important toseparate one ship in chase of her, especially as three frigates hadparted company; for until this garrison is safe down, I do not thinkour business is well finished. " Its arrival completed the evacuationof the Mediterranean. 

At Gibraltar several days were spent, evidently crowded withadministrative details concerning the coming and going of convoys, forthere is here an almost total cessation of Nelson's usually copiousletter-writing. An interesting and instructive incident is, however, made known to us by one of the three letters dated during these tendays. The Consul of the United States of America had to apply to himfor the protection of twelve American merchant ships, then at Malaga, against the probable depredations of French privateers lying in thatport, which, under the edicts of the government of the FrenchRepublic, with whom the United States was at peace, were expected tooverhaul and capture them when they sailed. Nelson at once complied, ordering a British frigate to go to Malaga and escort the vessels tothe Barbary coast, and even out of the Straits, if necessary. In doingthis, he wrote courteously to the Consul: "I am sure of fulfilling thewishes of my Sovereign, and I hope of strengthening the harmony whichat present so happily subsists between the two nations. "

On the 24th of May Nelson rejoined the admiral off Cadiz, and on the27th shifted his own flag into the "Theseus. " The day before he leftthe fleet, April 11th, Jervis had decided to institute a strictcommercial blockade of Cadiz, with the object of distressing Spanishtrade, preventing the entrance of supplies, upon which depended theoperations of Spain against Portugal, as well as her navalpreparations, and so forcing the Spanish fleet out to fight, in orderto rid itself of such embarrassment. Nelson, as commander of theinshore squadron, had then issued the necessary notices to neutrals inthe port, and to this charge he now returned. Under Jervis'sintelligent partiality, he, the junior flag-officer, was thusintrusted with a command, which in the conduct of details, great andsmall, and in emergencies, was practically independent. Jervis, knowing his man, was content to have it so, reserving of course tohimself the decision of the broad outlines of military exertion. Theinshore squadron was gradually increased till it numbered tensail-of-the-line. The boats of the fleet, which had been rowing guardoff the harbor's mouth under the general supervision of the two seniorflag-officers, were ordered, shortly after Nelson's arrival, to reportto him; and upon him, indeed, devolved pretty nearly all the activeenterprises of the fleet. It was his practice to visit the line ofboats every night in his barge, to see by personal inspection of theseoutposts that his instructions were fully observed. "Our inferiority, "he wrote about this time, "is greater than before. I am barely out ofshot of a Spanish rear-admiral. The Dons hope for peace, but must soonfight us, if the war goes on. "

Another motive, perhaps even more imperative than the wish to forcethe Dons out, now compelled Jervis to seek by all means to increasethe activity of his fleet, and to intrust the management of suchactivities to his most zealous and capable subordinate. These were themonths of the great mutinies of the British Navy, in which the seamenof the Channel fleet, and of the North Sea fleet, at the Nore, hadtaken the ships out of the hands of their officers. The details ofJervis's management, which was distinguished as much by keen judgmentand foresight as by iron-handed severity, that knew neither fear norruth when it struck, belong to his biography, not to Nelson's; but itis necessary to note the attitude of the latter, a man moresympathetic, and in common life gentler, than his stern superior. Always solicitous for everything that increased the well-being andhappiness of his crew, --as indeed was eminently the case with Jervisalso, --he did not withhold his candid sympathy from the grievancesalleged by the Channel fleet; grievances which, when temperatelypresented to the authorities, had been ignored. "I am entirely withthe seamen in their first complaint. We are a neglected set, and, whenpeace comes, are shamefully treated; but for the Nore scoundrels, "passing on to those who had rebelled after substantial redress hadbeen given, and had made unreasonable demands when the nation was indeadly peril, "I should be happy to command a ship against them. "Jervis's measures received full support from him, clear-headed as everto see the essentials of a situation. The senior vice-admiral, forinstance, went so far as to criticise the commander-in-chief forhanging a convicted mutineer on Sunday. "Had it been Christmas Dayinstead of Sunday, " wrote Nelson, "I would have executed them. We knownot what might have been hatched by a Sunday's grog: _now_ yourdiscipline is safe. " His glorious reputation and his known kindlycharacter, supported by that of his captain, made mutiny impossibleunder his flag. It had not been up a month on board the "Theseus, "which was lately from the Channel and infected with the prevalentinsubordination, when a paper was dropped on the quarter-deck, expressing the devotion of the ship's company to their commander, andpledging that the name of the "Theseus" should yet be as renowned asthat of the "Captain. "

The stringent blockade, and the fears for the specie ships, weighedheavily on the Spaniards, who were not as a nation hearty in supportof a war into which they had been coerced by France. Their authoritieswere petitioned to compel the fleet to go out. Whatever the event, theBritish would at least have to retire for repairs; while if the Limaand Havana ships--to look for which the Cadiz people every morningflocked to the walls, fearing they might be already in the enemy'shands--should be captured, the merchants of Spain would be ruined. Better lose ten ships-of-the-line, if need be, than this convoy. Withrumors of this sort daily reaching him, Nelson's faculties were in aconstant state of pleasing tension. He was in his very element ofjoyous excitement and expectation. "We are in the advance day andnight, prepared for battle; bulkheads down, ready to weigh, cut, orslip, [56] as the occasion may require. I have given out a line ofbattle--myself to lead; and you may rest assured that I will make avigorous attack upon them, the moment their noses are outside theDiamond. Pray do not send me another ship, " he implores; "if you sendany more, they may believe we are prepared, and know of theirintention. " "If they come out, " he writes later to a naval friend, when he had ten sail under him, "there will be no fighting beyond mysquadron. "

To increase yet further the pressure upon the Spanish fleet to comeout, a bombardment was planned against the town and the shipping, thesuperintendence of which also was intrusted to the commander of theinshore squadron. Only one bomb-vessel was provided, so that veryextensive results could scarcely have been anticipated; but Nelsonsaw, with evident glee, that the enemy's gunboats had taken advancedpositions, and intended to have a hand in the night's work. "So muchthe better, " wrote he to Jervis; "I wish to make it a warm night inCadiz. If they venture from their walls, I shall give Johnny[57] hisfull scope for fighting. It will serve to talk of better thanmischief. " "It is good, " he writes to another, "at these times to keepthe devil out of their heads. I had rather see fifty shot by theenemy, than one hanged by us. "

The bombardment, which was continued upon two successive nights, didlittle direct harm; but it led to a sharp hand-to-hand contest betweenthe British and Spanish boats, in which Nelson personally bore a part, and upon which he seems afterwards to have dwelt with even greaterpride and self-satisfaction than upon the magnificent victories withwhich his name is associated. "It was during this period that perhapsmy personal courage was more conspicuous than at any other part of mylife. " On the first night the Spaniards sent out a great number ofmortar gunboats and armed launches. Upon these he directed a vigorousattack to be made, which resulted in their being driven back under thewalls of Cadiz; the British, who pursued them, capturing two boats anda launch. In the affray, he says, "I was boarded in my barge with itscommon crew of ten men, coxswain, Captain Freemantle, and myself, bythe commander of the gunboats; the Spanish barge rowed twenty-sixoars, besides officers, --thirty men in the whole. This was a servicehand-to-hand with swords, in which my coxswain, John Sykes, now nomore, twice saved my life. Eighteen of the Spaniards being killed andseveral wounded, we succeeded in taking their commander. " In hisreport he complimented this Spanish officer, Don Miguel Tyrason, uponhis gallantry. Near a hundred Spaniards were made prisoners in thissharp skirmish. 

Not even the insult of bombardment was sufficient to attain thedesigned end of forcing the enemy's fleet out to fight. The Spaniardsconfined themselves to a passive defence by their shore batteries, which proved indeed sufficient to protect the town and shipping, foron the second night they got the range of the bomb-vessel soaccurately that the British were forced to withdraw her; but this didnot relieve the vital pressure of the blockade, which could only beremoved by the mobile naval force coming out and fighting. So far fromdoing this, the Spanish ships of war shifted their berth inside to getout of the range of bombs. Nelson cast longing eyes upon the smallervessels which lay near the harbor's mouth, forming a barricade againstboat attack, and threatening the offensive measures to which theyrarely resorted. "At present the brigs lie too close to each other tohope for a dash at them, but soon I expect to find one off her guard, and then--" For the rest, his sanguine resolve to persist in annoyanceuntil it becomes unbearable, and insures the desired object, findsvent in the words: "if Mazaredo will not come out, down comes Cadiz;and not only Cadiz, but their fleet. "

This close succession of varied and exciting active service, unbrokenbetween the day of his leaving Lisbon, March 5th, and the date of thelast bombardment, July 5th, had its usual effect upon his spirits. Hiscorrespondence is all animation, full of vitality and energy, betraying throughout the happiness of an existence absorbed incongenial work, at peace with itself, conscious of power adequate tothe highest demands upon it, and rejoicing in the strong admirationand confidence felt and expressed towards him on all sides, especiallyby those whose esteem he most valued. He complains of his health, indeed, from time to time; he cannot last another winter; he issuffering for the want of a few months' rest, which he must ask for inthe coming October, and trusts that, "after four years and ninemonths' service, without one moment's repose for body or mind, creditwill be given me that I do not sham. "

Bodily suffering was his constant attendant, to which he alwaysremained subject, but at this time it was powerless to depress themoral energies which, under less stimulating conditions, at times lostsomething of their elastic force. They never, indeed, failed to riseequal to imminent emergency, however obscured in hours of gloom, orperplexity, or mental conflict; but now, supported by the concurrenceof every favoring influence, they carried him along in the full flowof prosperity and exhilaration. Thanking Earl Spencer, the First Lordof the Admiralty, for a complimentary letter, he says: "The unboundedpraises Sir John Jervis has ever heaped, and continues to heap on me, are a noble reward for any services which an officer under his commandcould perform. Nor is your Lordship less profuse in them. " To hiswife he writes: "I assure you I never was better, and rich in thepraises of every man, from the highest to the lowest in the fleet. ""The imperious call of honour to serve my country, is the only thingthat keeps me a moment from you, and a hope, that by staying a littlelonger, it may enable you to enjoy those little luxuries which you sohighly merit. " "My late affair here[58] will not, I believe, lower mein the opinion of the world. I have had flattery enough to make mevain, and success enough to make me confident. "

FOOTNOTES:

[41] It is evident that this must have involved a compliment personal toNelson. 

[42] See Plate, Figure 1. 

[43] See Plate, Figure 2. 

[44] Captured. 

[45] That is, the weather division, --the eighteen ships. 

[46] That is, was left in. 

[47] Shrouds are large ropes which support the masts. 

[48] See Plate, Figure 3. 

[49] The italics are the author's. 

[50] In his letter to Nelson this is thirteen, but evidently a slip. Hislog of the action says forty-three. 

[51] Both papers are headed: "A few remarks relative to myself in theCaptain, " etc. It is unfortunate that Nicolas, in giving these two papers, puts first the one which, from internal indications, is (in the author'sjudgment) the later in date. 

[52] Author's italics. 

[53] Hailed to stop firing because the "San Nicolas" had surrendered. 

[54] See _ante_, page 89. 

[55] That is, at sea, the main fleet being still in the Tagus. 

[56] Cut, or let go, the cables, --leaving the anchor in haste, instead ofraising it from the bottom. 

[57] The British seamen. 

[58] The night conflict with the Spanish launches. 

CHAPTER IX. 

THE UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AGAINST TENERIFFE. --NELSON LOSES HIS RIGHTARM. --RETURN TO ENGLAND. --REJOINS ST. VINCENT'S FLEET, AND SENT INTOTHE MEDITERRANEAN TO WATCH THE TOULON ARMAMENT. 

JULY, 1797-APRIL, 1798. AGE, 39. 

Too much success is not wholly desirable; an occasional beating isgood for men--and nations. When Nelson wrote the words with which thepreceding chapter ends, he was on the eve of a sharp reverse, met inattempting an enterprise that had occupied his thoughts for more thanthree months. While cruising for the Viceroy of Mexico, before Jervisleft Lisbon with the fleet, he had considered the possibility of theenemy's treasure-ships, warned of their danger, taking refuge in theCanary Islands, which belong to Spain. Meditating upon thecontingency, he had formed a project of seizing them there, andprobably had already suggested the matter to Jervis, taking advantageof the freedom permitted him by the latter in advancing opinions. However that be, immediately before he started to meet the Elbaconvoy, the commander-in-chief asked for his plan, which he submittedin writing, after talking it over with Troubridge, his intimatefriend, upon whose judgment Jervis also greatly relied. Regarded as apurely naval expedition, Nelson pointed out that it was subject togreat uncertainties, because, the land being very high, the wind couldnot be depended on. It might blow in from the sea, but if so it wouldbe by daylight, which would deprive the attack of the benefits of asurprise; while at night the land wind was too fitful and unreliableto assure the ships reaching their anchorage before the enemy coulddiscover them, and have time for adequate preparation against assault. 

For these reasons, certainty of success would depend upon co-operationby the army, and for that Nelson suggested that the Elba troops, overthree thousand strong, already in transports and on their way, wouldprovide a force at once available and sufficient. Save a naval dash byBlake, more than a century before, Teneriffe had never been seriouslyattacked. Probably, therefore, the heights commanding the town ofSanta Cruz had not been fortified, and could be easily seized by thedetachment designated; besides which, the water supply was exposed tointerruption by an outside enemy. If only General De Burgh could bepersuaded, Nelson was sure of success, and offered himself to commandthe naval contingent. Failing the consent of De Burgh, whom he andJervis both thought deficient in moral courage to undertakeresponsibility, could not the admiral get assistance from O'Hara, thegovernor of Gibraltar, who would have at his disposal one thousand tofifteen hundred men? More would be better, but still with that numbersuccess would be probable. "Soldiers, " regretted Nelsoncharacteristically, "have not the same boldness in undertaking apolitical measure that we have; we look to the benefit of our Countryand risk our own fame [not life merely] every day to serve her: asoldier obeys his orders and no more. " But he thought O'Hara anexception, and then--could not the substantial advantages move him?The public treasure of Spain that might be seized would be six orseven millions sterling. Think what that sum would be, "thrown intocirculation in England!" where specie payments had just beensuspended. It was nearly a year's value of the subsidies which GreatBritain was lavishing on the general war. Whatever the merits ofNelson's judgment upon the soldiers of his day, this avowal ofreadiness, for the nation's sake, to risk fame--reputation--which wasin his eyes the dearest of possessions, should not be overlooked. Itwas the best he had to give; to hazard life was but a vulgar thingcompared to it. His career, both before and after, fully bore out theboast. 

While on the return with the Elba troops, in a despatch sent ahead ofthe convoy, he jogs Jervis's memory about O'Hara, having doubtlessascertained that De Burgh, as they expected, would not deviate fromhis orders to proceed to Lisbon. "I hope you will press General O'Haraabout Teneriffe. What a strike it would be!" In a copy of this letterforwarded to the Admiralty, presumably by Jervis for its generalinformation, these words were omitted. Possibly he had already soundedO'Hara, and found him unwilling, for he was not optimistic; possiblyJervis himself thought that the fitting conditions had not yetobtained, and did not care to let the idea get abroad before the hourfor execution arrived. For the time, the commander-in-chief preferredto keep his fleet concentrated before Cadiz, and to try to worry theenemy out to battle; for which object, indisputably the mostadvantageous to be pursued, he also naturally wished to use his mostactive and efficient subordinate. Both blockade and bombardment havingfailed to provoke the enemy to action, and intelligence having beenreceived that a treasure-ship from Manila had put into Teneriffe, itwas decided in July to make the attempt, which had only beenpostponed--never abandoned. In words written by Nelson on the 18th ofJune, the conditions determining Jervis's course are clearlyindicated. "I wish these fellows would come out, and then, with thegood ships we have left [after a general engagement], we might be alittle at liberty to make dashes. I hope your design about Teneriffewill not get wind, by making inquiries at the present moment. WheneverI see it, " he added characteristically, "ten hours shall decide itsfate. " Although unable to obtain the troops upon which he consideredcertainty to depend, he felt little fear for the result. Two hundredadditional marines must be given, and certain specified artillery andammunition in excess of what he had. With these, "I have no doubt ofdoing the job as it ought to be, the moment the ships come in sight. ""Under General Troubridge ashore, and myself afloat, I am confident ofsuccess. "

[Illustration: SKETCH OF SANTA CRUZ AND SURROUNDINGS. (_From Nelson'sJournal. _)]

On the 14th of July he received his orders, which were to seize SantaCruz, the chief town, and hold the island to ransom, unless all publictreasure were surrendered to his squadron, in which case thecontribution on the inhabitants should not be levied. "God bless andprosper you, " wrote Jervis, who, although he considered the enterprisepromising, was less sanguine than his junior. "I am sure you willdeserve success. To mortals is not given the power of commanding it. "On the 15th Nelson sailed, having under his command threeseventy-fours, a fifty-gun ship, three frigates, and a cutter. Towardssundown of the 20th the Peak of Teneriffe was sighted, distant fiftyor sixty miles. The following morning the landing-party, a thousandstrong, under the command of Captain Troubridge, was transferred tothe frigates. The intention was to keep the line-of-battle-ships outof sight, while the frigates, whose apparent force would carry noimpression of menace, approached near enough to make a dash during thenight. It was hoped that thus the assault might be so far a surpriseas to enable the British to storm from the rear a fort on the heights, to the northeast of the town, and commanding it. Santa Cruz was thento be summoned. In the meantime the ships-of-the-line would be comingin from the sea, and upon arrival would support the shore movement bybringing their broadsides to bear upon the walls. 

By midnight the frigates were within three miles of the landing-place;but there strong wind and contrary current delayed them, and beforethey could get within a mile the day dawned. Thus discovered, the hopeof surprise was lost. At 6 A. M. , when the squadron approached, Troubridge went on board the "Theseus" and told Nelson that hethought, if the heights over the fort, in its rear, could be seized, he could yet compel it to surrender. The landing-party was thereforeput on shore at nine, but could not dispossess the enemy, who hadrecognized the importance of the position indicated by Troubridge, andhad occupied it in force. The ships-of-the-line endeavored to getwithin range of the fort, to batter it, but could not come nearer thanthree miles. They were unable even to reach anchoring-ground, and, asit was blowing very fresh, they struck their topgallantmasts and stoodoff and on. At night Troubridge re-embarked his men on board thefrigates, which had remained where they were. The following morning, July 23d, Nelson abandoned the attempt upon the fort, recalling thefrigates; and, as the wind did not yet serve to approach the shore, hecontinued under sail during that day and the next. The members of thelanding-party rejoined their proper ships. 

Troubridge's failure to act at once upon his own judgment, and seizethe heights above the fort, instead of waiting until he couldcommunicate with the admiral, whereby were lost more than threeinvaluable hours, excites surprise, in view of the extremely highvalue set upon him as an officer by St. Vincent and Nelson; and is themore singular because the latter, in certain "Recommendations, " datedJuly 17, had indicated the heights, as well as the fort, among theobjects to be secured. It is, of course, possible that theseRecommendations were not given out; but even so, the formal ordersissued gave ample discretion. This hesitation was wholly contrary toNelson's own readiness to assume responsibility, and probably accountsfor his subsequent remark, in a private letter, that had he himselfbeen present this first attempt would not have failed. Occurring in anofficer of Troubridge's high standing, and contrasted with Nelson'saction at St. Vincent, as well as on many other occasions, theincident serves to bring out forcibly the characteristic eminence ofthe latter, --the distinction between a really great captain and thebest type of a simply accomplished and gallant officer. It may safelybe said that had Nelson been in the frigates that morning, and thoughtas Troubridge thought, he would either have had the heights withoutwaiting for orders, or, to use his own words on a former occasion, would have "been in a confounded scrape. "

His first plan having miscarried, Nelson was nevertheless unwilling toforsake the enterprise wholly, without attempting a direct assaultupon the town itself. Meantime the enemy was not idle, but employedthe delay caused by the wind to collect a greater force, and todevelop further the preparations to repel attack. At half-past five inthe evening of July 24 the squadron reached an anchorage two or threemiles north of Santa Cruz, and all boats were ordered prepared for anight expedition. Captain Freemantle, of the frigate "Seahorse, " hadwith him his wife, whom he had lately married; and with them Nelson, who intended to lead the attack in person, supped that evening. He wasconscious of the imminent danger to which he was about to exposehimself and his followers; it is indeed scarcely possible that hecould, in undertaking the adventure, have expected to succeed, exceptthrough some happy accident skilfully improved, --the deserved goodfortune which had so often attended him. It was not so much the hopeof victory that moved him, as the feeling that to retreat baffled, without a further effort, would be worse than defeat. This in fact wasthe reason which he afterwards gave. "Although I felt the secondattack a forlorn hope, yet the honour of our Country called for theattack, and that I should command it. I never expected to return. ""Your partiality will give me credit, " he wrote to Jervis, "that allhas hitherto been done which was possible, but without effect: thisnight I, humble as I am, command the whole, destined to land under thebatteries of the town, and to-morrow my head will probably be crownedwith either laurel or cypress. I have only to recommend Josiah Nisbet[his stepson] to you and my Country. " He urged Nisbet not to go in theboats, on the ground that his mother should not run the risk of losingboth husband and son in one night, and that in the absence of CaptainMiller, who was going in charge of a division of men, Nisbet's dutieswith the ship demanded his remaining. Nisbet steadily refused, and hispresence was the immediate means of saving the admiral's life. 

At eleven P. M. The boats shoved off, carrying a thousand men. Theorders were for all to land at the mole, the intention being to stormit, and the batteries covering it, in a body, and to fight their way, thus massed, to the great square, which was designated as the placefor rallying. A considerable sea was running and the night dark, sothat the Spaniards did not discover the assailants till they werewithin half gunshot. The bells of the place then began to ring, and aheavy fire opened, amid which the British pushed vigorously forward. Many, however, missed the mole. Nelson's own boat reached it with fouror five besides, and the parties from these succeeded in carrying themole itself, advancing to its head and spiking the guns; but therethey were met with such a sustained fire of musketry and grape fromthe citadel and the neighboring houses, that they could get nofarther. Many were killed and wounded, and the rest after a strugglehad to retreat. 

Troubridge, with a number of others who missed the mole, landed amid aheavy surf, which stove the boats on a rocky beach and tumbled the meninto the water, whereby most of the ammunition was spoiled. In themidst of the turmoil the cutter "Fox" was struck by a shot underwater, and went down, taking with her her commander and ninety-sevenmen. Although the scaling-ladders had all been lost in the generalupset, those who here got on shore succeeded in climbing over thewalls, and forced their way to the place of rendezvous in the greatsquare. There Troubridge, having assembled between three and fourhundred men, held his ground, awaiting Nelson and the party that mighthave entered by way of the mole. 

It was in vain. Nelson had been struck by a grapeshot in the rightelbow, as, with sword drawn, he was stepping from the boat to thelanding. Bleeding profusely and faint, but clinging with his left handto the sword, which had belonged to his uncle Maurice Suckling, hefell back into the arms of Josiah Nisbet, who managed withconsiderable presence of mind to bind up the shattered limb and stopthe flowing of the blood. A few men being got together, the boatpushed off to take the admiral back to the ship. At this momentoccurred the sinking of the "Fox;" upon which much delay ensued, because Nelson refused to abandon the men struggling in the water, andinsisted upon looking personally to their being saved. At last the"Seahorse" was reached; but here again he would not go on board, saying that he would not have Mrs. Freemantle alarmed by seeing him insuch a condition and without any news of her husband, who hadaccompanied the landing. When he got to the "Theseus, " he declinedassistance to climb to the deck. "At two in the morning, " wrote Hoste, one of her midshipmen, who had been with him continuously since the"Agamemnon" left England, "Admiral Nelson returned on board, beingdreadfully wounded in the right arm. I leave you to judge of mysituation, when I beheld our boat approach with him, who I may say hasbeen a second father to me, his right arm dangling by his side, whilewith the other he helped himself to jump up the ship's side, and witha spirit that astonished every one, told the surgeon to get hisinstruments ready, for he knew he must lose his arm, and that thesooner it was off the better. "

At daylight Troubridge, who had collected some ammunition from Spanishprisoners, started from the square to try what could be done withoutladders against the citadel; but, finding every approach blocked byoverwhelming force, he had to retreat. Having neither powder norprovisions, and no boats with which to return to the ship, he sent aflag of truce to the governor to say that he was prepared to burn theplace down with means at his disposal, but, being most reluctant to doso, was willing to treat, upon condition of the whole party beingpermitted to return to the ships, free and with their arms. Onescarcely knows which most to admire, Troubridge's cool audacity inmaking such a demand, or the chivalrous readiness with which thesehonorable terms were at once granted to a man whose gallant bearingcompelled the esteem of his enemies. Don Juan Gutierrez had repulsedthe various attempts with such steadiness and watchfulness, hadmanaged his business so well, that he could afford to be liberal. Heagreed that Troubridge's men should withdraw, carrying off with themall British equipments, even to such boats as had been taken by theSpaniards, but could still swim. On the other hand, it was stipulatedthat no further attempt upon the town should be made by Nelson'ssquadron. Prisoners on both sides were to be given up. Thisarrangement having been concluded, the governor directed that theBritish wounded should be at once received into the hospitals, whilethe rest of the party, with their colors flying, marched to the mole, and there embarked. 

Troubridge dwelt with evident pride upon his part in this night'swork, --a pride that was shared then by his superiors, and will bejustified in the eyes of military men now. "The Spanish officersassure me they expected us, and were perfectly prepared with all thebatteries, and the number of men I have before mentioned [8, 000], under arms: with the great disadvantage of a rocky coast, high surf, and in the face of forty pieces of cannon, though we were notsuccessful, will show what an Englishman is equal to. " His conductaffords for all time an example of superb courage in the face ofextraordinary and unexpected difficulty and danger, and especially ofsingle-minded energy in carrying through one's own share of anenterprise, without misplaced concern about consequences, or worry asto whether the other parties were prospering or not. Had Nelsonreached the square he would have found Troubridge there, and that wasthe one thing about which the latter needed to care. Nelson's ownwords recur to mind: "I have not a thought on any subject separatedfrom the immediate object of my command, "--a maxim eminently suited tothe field and to the subordinate, though not necessarily so to thecouncil chamber or to the general officer. Troubridge that nightproved himself invaluable as a subordinate, though the conduct of theprevious attempt seems to show a lack of that capacity to seize afavorable moment, although in the presence of a superior, of whichNelson himself had given so brilliant an example at Cape St. Vincent. 

The squadron remained off Teneriffe for three days after the assault, intercourse with the shore for the purpose of obtaining freshprovisions being permitted by the governor, between whom and theadmiral were exchanged complimentary letters and presents of courtesy. On the 27th Nelson sailed for Cadiz, and on the 16th of Augustrejoined the commander-in-chief, now become Earl St. Vincent. Thelatter received him with generous sympathy and appreciation, whichleave little doubt as to what his verdict would have been, had thegallant initiative taken by his junior at St. Vincent ended indisaster, instead of in brilliant success. Nelson's letters, sentahead of the squadron by a frigate, had shown the despondency producedby suffering and failure, which had reversed so sharply the goodfortune upon which he had begun to pride himself. "I am become aburthen to my friends and useless to my Country. When I leave yourcommand, I become dead to the world; I go hence and am no more seen. ""Mortals cannot command success, " replied St. Vincent. "You and yourcompanions have certainly deserved it, by the greatest degree ofheroism and perseverance that ever was exhibited. " Nelson had askedfor his stepson's promotion, implying that he himself would nothereafter be in a position of influence to help the boy--for he waslittle more. "He is under obligations to me, but he repaid me bybringing me from the mole of Santa Cruz. " "He saved my life, " he saidmore than once afterwards. St. Vincent immediately made him acommander into the vacancy caused by the death of Captain Bowen, whohad fallen in the assault. "Pretty quick promotion, " wrote hismessmate Hoste, who probably knew, from close association, that Nisbethad not the promising qualities with which he was then credited byhis stepfather, from whom in later years he became wholly estranged. 

On the 20th Nelson received formal leave to return to England in the"Seahorse, " and on the 3d of September his flag was hauled down atSpithead. On the way home he suffered much. After amputation theligature had been awkwardly applied to the humeral artery. As he wouldnot allow the surgeon to examine the stump during the passage, thiswas not then discovered, but the intense spasms of pain kept himirritable and depressed. It is likely, too, that his discouragementwas increased by brooding over the failure of his enterprise;believing, as he did, that had he been with the landing-party, thefirst attempt would have succeeded. He could scarcely fail now to seethat, although it was strictly in accordance with service methods forthe senior to remain with the ships, the decisive point in the plan, as first formed, was the seizure of the heights, and that there, consequently, was the true place for the one in chief command. Anycaptain, Troubridge especially, could have placed the ships as well asNelson. It is self-accusation, and not fault-finding merely, thatbreathes in the words: "Had I been with the first party, I have reasonto believe complete success would have crowned our efforts. _My pridesuffered_. "

Whatever his mental distress, however, he always, from the time ofreceiving the wound, wrote to his wife with careful cheerfulness. "Asto my health, it never was better; and now I hope soon to return toyou; and my Country, I trust, will not allow me any longer to lingerin want of that pecuniary assistance which I have been fighting thewhole war to preserve to her. But I shall not be surprised to beneglected and forgot, as probably I shall no longer be considered asuseful. However, I shall feel rich if I continue to enjoy youraffection. I am fortunate in having a good surgeon on board; in short, I am much more recovered than I could have expected. I beg neitheryou or my father will think much of this mishap: my mind has long beenmade up to such an event. "

Immediately after quitting the "Seahorse" he joined his wife andfather at Bath. For a time the wound seemed to be progressingfavorably, but the unlucky complication of the ligature threw himback. "Much pain and some fever, " he wrote to a friend soon after hisarrival; and while he kept up fairly before his wife, who spoke of hisspirits as very good, he confessed to St. Vincent, on the 18th ofSeptember, that he was then not the least better than when he left thefleet. "I have suffered great misery. " This letter was dated inLondon, whither he had gone a few days before to be invested with theOrder of the Bath, which was formally done by George III. In person onthe 27th of September. He was graciously received by the King, whoconversed with him after the ceremony, and by his manner throughoutmade a lasting impression upon the mind of Nelson, whose loyalty wasintense. The Order of the Bath remained the most highly prized amonghis many decorations. At the same time was awarded him a pension of£1, 000 a year. 

He remained in London till near Christmas. Sir Gilbert Elliot, thelate Viceroy of Corsica, who about this time became Lord Minto, sawhim not long after his arrival there, as did also Colonel Drinkwater. Elliot found him looking better and fresher than he ever rememberedhim, although the continued pain prevented sleep, except by use ofopium. He was already impatient to go to sea again, and chafed underthe delay of healing, concerning the duration of which the surgeonscould give him no assurance. The ligature must be left to slough away, for it was two inches up the wound, and if, in attempting to cut it, the artery should be cut, another amputation would be necessary higherup, which would not be easy, for the stump was already very short. There was consequently nothing for it but endurance. To his sufferingat this time an accomplished surgeon, who sailed with him shortlybefore Trafalgar, attributed a neuralgic predisposition under which hethen labored, and which produced serious effects upon his generalhealth. 

A singular exhibition of his characteristic animation and temperamentwas elicited by Drinkwater's visit. The colonel saw him shortly beforethe naval battle of Camperdown, fought on the 11th of October. "One ofthe first questions which Nelson put to me was whether I had been atthe Admiralty. I told him there was a rumour that the British fleethad been seen engaged with that of Holland. He started up in hispeculiar energetic manner, notwithstanding Lady Nelson's attempts toquiet him, and stretching out his unwounded arm, --'Drinkwater, saidhe, 'I would give this other arm to be with Duncan[59] at thismoment;' so unconquerable was the spirit of the man, and so intensehis eagerness to give every instant of his life to the service. "

Until the 4th of December his agony continued. On that day theligature came away, giving instant and entire relief. In a letter to afriend, apologizing for delay in replying, he said: "Truly, till lastMonday, I have suffered so much, I hope for your forgiveness. I am nowperfectly recovered, and on the eve of being employed. " On Friday, the8th, he wrote to Captain Berry, who had led the boarders to the "SanNicolas" at Cape St. Vincent, and was designated to command the shipin which the admiral's flag should next be hoisted, saying that he waswell; and the same day, with that profound recognition of a personalProvidence which was with him as instinctive as his courage, he sentto a London clergyman the following request: "An officer desires toreturn thanks to Almighty God for his perfect recovery from a severewound, and also for the many mercies bestowed upon him. (For nextSunday. )"

As the close attention of the skilled surgeons in whose hands he hadbeen was now no longer needed, he returned to Bath to await the timewhen his flagship should be completely equipped. St. Vincent had askedthat the "Foudroyant, " of eighty guns, should be prepared for him;but, after his sudden recovery, as she was not yet ready, there wassubstituted for her the "Vanguard, " seventy-four, which wascommissioned by Berry at Chatham on the 19th of December. In March shehad reached Portsmouth, and Nelson then went up to London, where heattended a levee on the 14th of the month and took leave of the King. On the 29th his flag was hoisted, and on the 10th of April, after aweek's detention at St. Helen's by head winds, he sailed for Lisbon. There he remained for four days, and on the 30th of the month, offCadiz, rejoined St. Vincent, by whom he was received with open arms. The veteran seaman, stern and resolved as was his bearing in the faceof danger, was unhopeful about the results of the war, which from thefirst he had not favored, and for whose ending he was eager. Now, atsixty-four, his health was failing, and the difficulties and dangersof the British cause in the Mediterranean weighed upon him, with adiscouragement very alien from the sanguine joy with which his ardentjunior looked forward to coming battles. His request to be relievedfrom command, on the score of ill health, was already on file at theAdmiralty. "I do assure your Lordship, " he wrote to Earl Spencer, "that the arrival of Admiral Nelson has given me new life; you couldnot have gratified me more than in sending him; his presence in theMediterranean is so very essential, that I mean to put the "Orion" and"Alexander" under his command, with the addition of three or fourfrigates, and send him away, to endeavour to ascertain the realobject of the preparations making by the French. " These preparationsfor a maritime expedition were being made at Toulon and theneighboring ports, on a scale which justly aroused the anxiety of theBritish Cabinet, as no certain information about their object had beenobtained. 

Nelson's departure from England on this occasion closes the first ofthe two periods into which his career naturally divides. From hisyouth until now, wherever situated, the development has beenconsecutive and homogeneous, external influences and internalcharacteristics have worked harmoniously together, nature and ambitionhave responded gladly to opportunity, and the course upon which theyhave combined to urge him has conformed to his inherited and acquiredstandards of right and wrong. Doubt, uncertainty, inward friction, double motives, have been unknown to him; he has moved freely inaccordance with the laws of his being, and, despite the anxieties ofhis profession and the frailty of his health, there is no mistakingthe tone of happiness and contentment which sounds without a jarringnote throughout his correspondence. A change was now at hand. As thesails of the "Vanguard" dip below the horizon of England, a briefinterlude begins, and when the curtain rises again, the scene isshifted, --surroundings have changed. We see again the same man, butstanding at the opening of a new career, whose greatness exceeds byfar even the high anticipations that had been formed for him. Beforeleaving England he is a man of distinction only; prominent, possibly, among the many distinguished men of his own profession, but the steadyupward course has as yet been gradual, the shining of the light, if ithas latterly shot forth flashes suggestive of hidden fires, is stillcharacterized by sustained growth in intensity rather than by rapidincrease. No present sign so far foretells the sudden ascent to fame, the burst of meridian splendor with which the sun of his renown wassoon to rise upon men's eyes, and in which it ran its course to thecloudless finish of his day. 

Not that there is in that course--in its achievements--anydisproportion with the previous promise. The magnitude of thedevelopment we are about to witness is due, not to a change in him, but to the increased greatness of the opportunities. A man of likerecord in the past, but less gifted, might, it is true, have failed tofill the new sphere which the future was to present. Nelson provedfully equal to it, because he possessed genius for war, intellectualfaculties, which, though not unsuspected, had not hitherto beenallowed scope for their full exercise. Before him was now about toopen a field of possibilities hitherto unexampled in naval warfare;and for the appreciation of them was needed just those perceptions, intuitive in origin, yet resting firmly on well-ordered rationalprocesses, which, on the intellectual side, distinguished him aboveall other British seamen. He had already, in casual comment upon themilitary conditions surrounding the former Mediterranean campaigns, given indications of these perceptions, which it has been the aim ofprevious chapters to elicit from his correspondence, and to marshal insuch order as may illustrate his mental characteristics. But, forsuccess in war, the indispensable complement of intellectual grasp andinsight is a moral power, which enables a man to trust the innerlight, --to have faith, --a power which dominates hesitation, andsustains action, in the most tremendous emergencies, and which, fromthe formidable character of the difficulties it is called to confront, is in no men so conspicuously prominent as in those who are entitledto rank among great captains. The two elements--mental and moralpower--are often found separately, rarely in due combination. InNelson they met, and their coincidence with the exceptionalopportunities afforded him constituted his good fortune and hisgreatness. 

The intellectual endowment of genius was Nelson's from the first; butfrom the circumstances of his life it was denied the privilege ofearly manifestation, such as was permitted to Napoleon. It is, consequently, not so much this as the constant exhibition of moralpower, force of character, which gives continuity to his professionalcareer, and brings the successive stages of his advance, inachievement and reputation, from first to last, into the closerelation of steady development, subject to no variation save that ofhealthy and vigorous growth, till he stood unique--above allcompetition. This it was--not, doubtless, to the exclusion of thatreputation for having a head, upon which he justly pridedhimself--which had already fixed the eyes of his superiors upon him asthe one officer, not yet indeed fully tested, most likely to cope withthe difficulties of any emergency. In the display of this, in its manyself-revelations, --in concentration of purpose, untiring energy, fearlessness of responsibility, judgment sound and instant, boundlessaudacity, promptness, intrepidity, and endurance beyond allproof, --the restricted field of Corsica and the Riviera, thesubordinate position at Cape St. Vincent, the failure of Teneriffe, had in their measure been as fruitful as the Nile was soon to be, andfell naught behind the bloody harvests of Copenhagen and Trafalgar. Men have been disposed, therefore, to reckon this moral energy--callit courage, dash, resolution, what you will--as Nelson's one and onlygreat quality. It was the greatest, as it is in all successful men ofaction; but to ignore that this mighty motive force was guided bysingularly clear and accurate perceptions, upon which also itconsciously rested with a firmness of faith that constituted much ofits power, is to rob him of a great part of his due renown. 

But it was not only in the greatness of the opportunities offered toNelson that external conditions now changed. The glory of the herobrought a temptation which wrecked the happiness of the man. The lossof serenity, the dark evidences of inward conflict, of yieldingagainst conviction, of consequent dissatisfaction with self andgradual deterioration, make between his past and future a break asclear, and far sharper than, the startling increase of radiancy thatattends the Battle of the Nile, and thenceforth shines withundiminished intensity to the end. The lustre of his well-deserved andworld-wide renown, the consistency and ever-rising merit of hisprofessional conduct, contrast painfully with the shadows ofreprobation, the swerving, and the declension, which begin to attend alife heretofore conformed, in the general, to healthy normal standardsof right and wrong, but now allowed to violate, not merely idealChristian rectitude, but the simple, natural dictates of uprightdealing between man and man. It had been the proud boast of earlyyears: "There is no action in my whole life but what is honourable. "The attainment of glory exceeding even his own great aspirationscoincides with dereliction from the plain rules of honor betweenfriends, and with public humiliation to his wife, which he allowedhimself to inflict, notwithstanding that he admitted her claims to hisdeferential consideration to be unbroken. In this contrast, of theexaltation of the hero and the patriot with the degradation of theman, lie the tragedy and the misery of Nelson's story. And this, too, was incurred on behalf of a woman whose reputation and conduct weresuch that no shred of dignity could attach to an infatuation as dotingas it was blamable. The pitiful inadequacy of the temptation to theruin it caused invests with a kind of prophecy the words he hadwritten to his betrothed in the heyday of courtship: "These I trustwill ever be my sentiments; if they are not, I do verily believe itwill be my _folly_ that occasions it. "

The inward struggle, though severe, was short and decisive. Oncedetermined on his course, he choked down scruples and hesitations, and cast them from him with the same single-minded resolution thatdistinguished his public acts. "Fixed as fate, " were the remorselesswords with which he characterized his firm purpose to trampleconscience under foot, and to reject his wife in favor of hismistress. But although ease may be obtained by silencingself-reproach, safety scarcely can. One cannot get the salt out of hislife, and not be the worse for it. Much that made Nelson so lovableremained to the end; but into his heart, as betrayed by hiscorrespondence, and into his life, from the occasional glimpsesafforded by letters or journals of associates, there thenceforthentered much that is unlovely, and which to no appreciable extent wasseen before. The simple _bonhomie_, the absence of conventionalreticence, the superficial lack of polish, noted by his earlybiographers, and which he had had no opportunity to acquire, thechildlike vanity that transpires so innocently in his confidentialhome letters, and was only the weak side of his noble longing forheroic action, degenerated rapidly into loss of dignity of life, intoan unseemly susceptibility to extravagant adulation, as he succumbedto surroundings, the corruptness of which none at first realized moreclearly, and where one woman was the sole detaining fascination. Andwithal, as the poison worked, discontent with self bred discontentwith others, and with his own conditions. Petulance and querulousnesstoo often supplanted the mental elasticity, which had counted fornaught the roughnesses on the road to fame. The mind not worthilyoccupied, and therefore ill at ease, became embittered, prone tocensure and to resent, suspicious at times and harsh in judgment, gradually tending towards alienation, not from his wife only, but fromhis best and earliest friends. 

During the short stay of seven months in England, which ended with thesailing of the "Vanguard, " the record of his correspondence isnecessarily very imperfect, both from the loss of his arm, and fromthe fact of his being with his family. Such indications as there arepoint to unbroken relations of tenderness with his wife. "I found mydomestic happiness perfect, " he wrote to Lord St. Vincent, shortlyafter his arrival home; and some months later, in a letter from Bathto a friend, he says jestingly: "Tell--that I possess his place in Mr. Palmer's box; but he did not tell me all its charms, that generallysome of the handsomest ladies in Bath are partakers in the box, andwas I a bachelor I would not answer for being tempted; but as I ampossessed of everything which is valuable in a wife, I have nooccasion to think beyond a pretty face. " Lady Nelson attendedpersonally to the dressing of his arm; she accompanied him in hisjourneys between Bath and London, and they separated only when he lefttown to hoist his flag at Portsmouth. The letters of Lady Saumarez, the wife of one of his brother captains then serving with Lord St. Vincent, mention frequent meetings with the two together in thestreets of Bath; and upon the 1st of May, the day before leaving thefleet off Cadiz for the Mediterranean, on the expedition which was toresult in the Nile, and all the consequences so fatal to the happinessof both, he concludes his letter, "with every kind wish that a fondheart can frame, believe me, as ever, your most affectionate husband. "

On the 2d of May the "Vanguard" quitted the fleet for Gibraltar, whereshe arrived on the 4th. On the 7th Nelson issued orders to Sir JamesSaumarez, commanding the "Orion, " and to Captain Alexander Ball, commanding the "Alexander, " both seventy-fours, to place themselvesunder his command; and the following day the "Vanguard" sailed, incompany with these ships and five smaller vessels, to begin thememorable campaign, of which the Battle of the Nile was the mostconspicuous incident. 

FOOTNOTES:

[59] The British admiral in command of the fleet which fought atCamperdown. 

CHAPTER X. 

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF THE NILE. 

MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1798. AGE, 39. 

Between the time that Nelson was wounded at Teneriffe, July 24, 1797, and his return to active service in April, 1798, important and ominouschanges had been occurring in the political conditions of Europe. These must be taken briefly into account, because the greatness of theissues thence arising, as understood by the British Government, measures the importance in its eyes of the enterprise which it wasabout to intrust, by deliberate selection, to one of the youngestflag-officers upon the list. The fact of the choice shows theestimation to which Nelson had already attained in the eyes of theAdmiralty. 

In July, 1797, Great Britain alone was at war with France, and socontinued for over a year longer. Portugal, though nominally an ally, contributed to the common cause nothing but the use of the Tagus bythe British Navy. Austria, it is true, had not yet finally made peacewith France, but preliminaries had been signed in April, and thedefinitive treaty of Campo Formio was concluded in October. By itBelgium became incorporated in the territory of France, to which wasconceded also the frontier of the Rhine. The base of her power wasthus advanced to the river, over which the possession of the fortifiedcity of Mayence gave her an easy passage, constituting a permanentthreat of invasion to Germany. Venice, as a separate power, disappeared. Part of her former domains upon the mainland, with thecity itself, went to Austria, but part was taken to constitute theCisalpine Republic, --a new state in Northern Italy, nominallyindependent, but really under the control of France, to whom it owedits existence. Corfu, and the neighboring islands at the mouth of theAdriatic, till then belonging to Venice, were transferred to France. The choice of these distant and isolated maritime positions, coupledwith the retention of a large army in the valley of the Po, showed, ifany evidence were needed, a determination to assure control over theItalian peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea. 

The formal acquisitions by treaty, even, did not measure the fullmenace of the conditions. The Revolutionary ferment, which hadpartially subsided, received fresh impetus from the victories ofBonaparte and the cessation of Continental war; and the diplomacy ofFrance continued as active and as aggressive as the movement of herarmies had previously been. By constant interference, overt andsecret, not always stopping short of violence, French influence andFrench ideas were propagated among the weaker adjoining states. Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian Republics became outposts ofFrance, occupied by French troops, and upon them were forcedgovernments conformed to the existing French pattern. In short, theaggrandizement of France, not merely in moral influence but inphysical control, was being pushed forward as decisively in peace asin war, and by means which threatened the political equilibrium ofEurope. But, while all states were threatened, Great Britain remainedthe one chief enemy against which ultimately the efforts of Francemust be, and were, concentrated. "Either our government must destroythe English monarchy, " wrote Bonaparte at this time, "or must expectitself to be destroyed by the corruption and intrigue of those activeislanders. " The British ministry on its part also realized that thesea-power of their country was the one force from which, because somanifold in its activities, and so readily exerted in many quartersby reason of its mobility, France had most reason to fear the arrestof its revolutionary advance and the renewal of the Continental war. It was, therefore, the one opponent against which the efforts of theFrench must necessarily be directed. For the same reason it was theone centre around whose action, wisely guided, the elements ofdiscontent, already stirring, might gather, upon the occurrence of afavorable moment, and constitute a body of resistance capable ofstopping aggressions which threatened the general well-being. 

When the British Government found that the overtures for peace whichit had made in the summer of 1797 could have no result, except onterms too humiliating to be considered, it at once turned itsattention to the question of waging a distinctively offensive war, foreffect in which co-operation was needed. The North of Europe washopeless. Prussia persisted in the policy of isolation, adopted in1795 by herself and a number of the northern German states. Russia wasquietly hostile to France, but the interference contemplated by theEmpress Catherine had been averted by her death in 1796, and hersuccessor, Paul, had shown no intention of undertaking it. Thereremained, therefore, the Mediterranean. In Italy, France stood face toface with Austria and Naples, and both these were dissatisfied withthe action taken by her in the Peninsula itself and in Switzerland, besides sharing the apprehension of most other governments from thedisquiet attending her political course. An advance into theMediterranean was therefore resolved by the British Cabinet. 

This purpose disconcerted St. Vincent, who, besides his aversion fromthe war in general, was distinguished rather by tenacity andresolution in meeting difficulties and dangers, when forced upon him, than by the sanguine and enterprising initiative in offensive measureswhich characterized Nelson. Writing to the latter on the 8th ofJanuary, 1798, he says: "I am much at a loss to reconcile the plansin contemplation to augment this fleet and extend its operations, withthe peace which Portugal seems determined to make with France, uponany terms the latter may please to impose; because Gibraltar is anunsafe depot for either stores or provisions, which the Spaniards havealways in their power to destroy, and the French keep such an army inItaly, that Tuscany and Naples would fall a sacrifice to any thesmallest assistance rendered to our fleet. " In other words, the oldquestion of supplies still dominated the situation, in theapprehension of this experienced officer. Yet, in view of the seriouscondition of things, and the probable defection of Portugal under thethreats of France and Spain, to which he alludes, it seems probablethat the ministry were better advised, in their determination toabandon a passive defence against an enemy unrelentingly bent upontheir destruction. As Nelson said of a contingency not more serious:"Desperate affairs require desperate remedies. "

However determined the British Government might be to act in theMediterranean, some temporary perplexity must at first have been feltas to where to strike, until a movement of the enemy solved the doubt. In the early months of 1798 the Directory decided upon the Egyptianexpedition under General Bonaparte, and, although its destination wasguarded with admirable secrecy until long after the armament sailed, the fact necessarily transpired that preparations were being made on amost extensive scale for a maritime enterprise. The news soon reachedEngland, as it did also Jervis at his station off Cadiz. Troops andtransports were assembling in large numbers at the southern ports ofFrance, in Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Corsica, while a fleet of atleast a dozen ships-of-the-line was fitting out at Toulon. Varioussurmises were afloat as to the object, but all at this time were wideof the mark. 

On the 29th of April, less than three weeks after Nelson leftEngland, but before he joined the fleet, the Cabinet issued orders toSt. Vincent to take such measures as he deemed necessary to thwart theprojects of the Toulon squadron. It was left to his judgment whetherto go in person with his whole fleet, or to send a detachment of notless than nine or ten ships-of-the-line under a competentflag-officer. If possible, the government wished him to maintain theblockade of Cadiz as it had been established since the Battle of St. Vincent; but everything was to yield to the necessity of checking thesailing of the Toulon expedition, or of defeating it, if it hadalready started. A speedy reinforcement was promised, to supply theplaces of the ships that might be detached. 

Accompanying the public letter was a private one from the First Lordof the Admiralty, reflecting the views and anxieties of theGovernment. "The circumstances in which we now find ourselves obligeus to take a measure of a more decided and hazardous complexion thanwe should otherwise have thought ourselves justified in taking; butwhen you are apprized that the appearance of a British squadron in theMediterranean is a condition on which the fate of Europe may at thismoment be stated to depend, you will not be surprised that we aredisposed to strain every nerve, and incur considerable hazard ineffecting it. " This impressive, almost solemn, statement, of theweighty and anxious character of the intended step, emphasizes thesignificance of the choice, which the First Lord indicates as that ofthe Government, of the officer upon whom such a charge is to devolve. "If you determine to send a detachment into the Mediterranean [insteadof going in person with the fleet], I think it almost unnecessary tosuggest to you the propriety of putting it under the command of Sir H. Nelson, whose acquaintance with that part of the world, as well as hisactivity and disposition, seem to qualify him in a peculiar manner forthat service. "

In concluding his letter, Earl Spencer summed up the reasons of theGovernment, and his own sense of the great risk attending theundertaking, for the conduct of which he designated Nelson. "I am asstrongly impressed, as I have no doubt your Lordship will be, with thehazardous nature of the measure which we now have in contemplation;but I cannot at the same time help feeling how much depends upon itssuccess, and how absolutely necessary it is at this time to run somerisk, in order, if possible, to bring about a new system of affairs inEurope, which shall save us all from being overrun by the exorbitantpower of France. In this view of the subject, it is impossible not toperceive how much depends on the exertions of the great Continentalpowers; and, without entering further into what relates moreparticularly to them, I can venture to assure you that no good will beobtained from them if some such measure as that now in contemplationis not immediately adopted. On the other hand, if, by our appearancein the Mediterranean, we can encourage Austria to come forward again, it is in the highest degree probable that the other powers will seizethe opportunity of acting at the same time, and such a general concertbe established as shall soon bring this great contest to atermination, on grounds less unfavorable by many degrees to theparties concerned than appeared likely a short time since. " It may beadded here, by way of comment, that the ups and downs of Nelson'spursuit, the brilliant victory at the Nile, and the importantconsequences flowing from it, not only fully justified this forecast, but illustrated aptly that in war, when a line of action has beenrightly chosen, the following it up despite great risks, and withresolute perseverance through many disappointments, will more oftenthan not give great success, --a result which may probably beattributed to the moral force which necessarily underlies determineddaring and sustained energy. 

As has appeared, the Government's recommendation had been ratifiedbeforehand by St. Vincent, in sending Nelson with three ships to watchToulon. Upon receiving the despatches, on the 10th of May, theadmiral's first step was to order Nelson to return at once to thefleet, to take charge of the detachment from the beginning. "You, andyou only, can command the important service in contemplation;therefore, make the best of your way down to me. " More urgent lettersarriving from England, with news that a heavy reinforcement had leftthere, he, on the 19th, hurried off a brig, "La Mutine, " commanded byHardy, Nelson's former lieutenant, to notify the rear-admiral that asquadron of ten ships would be sent to him shortly from before Cadiz;and on the 21st this detachment sailed, under the command of CaptainTroubridge. 

The "Mutine" joined Nelson on the 5th of June. His little division hadso far had more bad fortune than good. Leaving Gibraltar on the 8th ofMay, late in the evening, so that the easterly course taken should notbe visible to either friend or enemy, he had gone to the Gulf ofLyons. There a small French corvette, just out of Toulon, was capturedon the 17th, but, except in unimportant details, yielded noinformation additional to that already possessed. On the 19thBonaparte sailed with all the vessels gathered in Toulon, directinghis course to the eastward, to pass near Genoa, and afterwards betweenCorsica and the mainland of Italy. On the night of the 20th, in aviolent gale of wind, the "Vanguard" rolled overboard her main andmizzen topmasts, and later on the foremast went, close to the deck. The succession of these mishaps points rather to spars badly securedand cared for than to unavoidable accident. Fortunately, the "Orion"and "Alexander" escaped injury, and the latter, on the followingmorning, took the "Vanguard" in tow, to go to Oristan Bay, inSardinia. The situation became extremely dangerous on the evening ofthe 22d, for, the wind falling light, the sail-power of the"Alexander" was scarcely sufficient to drag both ships against aheavy westerly swell which was setting them bodily upon the Sardiniancoast, then not far distant. Thinking the case hopeless, Nelsonordered the "Alexander" to let go the hawser; but Captain Ball beggedpermission to hold on, and finally succeeded in saving the flagship, which, on the 23d, anchored with her consorts under the Islands of SanPietro, at the southern extremity of Sardinia. The governor of theplace sent word that they must not remain, Sardinia being allied toFrance, but added that, as he had no power to force them out, theywould doubtless do as they pleased; and he supplied them with freshprovisions, --a line of conduct which illustrates at once therestrictions imposed upon British operations in the Mediterranean byFrench insistence, and at the same time the readiness of the weakerstates to connive at the evasion of them, other instances of whichoccurred during this period. By the united efforts of the division, four days sufficed to refit the "Vanguard" with jury-masts, and thethree ships again sailed, on the 27th, for an appointed rendezvous, toseek the frigates, which had separated during and after the gale. 

This severe check, occurring at so critical a moment, --more criticaleven than Nelson knew, for he remained ignorant of the French sailingfor some days longer, --was in itself disheartening, and fell upon onewhose native eagerness chafed painfully against enforced inaction anddelay. His manner of bearing it illustrated both the religiouscharacteristics, which the experience of grave emergencies tends todevelop and strengthen in men of action, and the firmness of a reallygreat man, never more signally displayed than under the pressure ofcalamity and suspense, such as he continually had to undergo. Theexceptional brilliancy and decisiveness of his greater battles--theNile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar--obscure the fact that each of themwas preceded by a weary period of strenuous uphill work, a steadyhewing of his way through a tanglewood of obstacles, a patientendurance of disappointments, a display of sustained, undauntedresolution under discouragements, nobler far than even the moments oftriumphant action, into which at last he joyfully emerges and freelyexerts his extraordinary powers. "I trust, " he wrote to St. Vincent, "my friends will think I bore my chastisement like a man. I hope ithas made me a better officer, as I believe it has made me a betterman. On the Sunday evening I thought myself in every respect one ofthe most fortunate men, to command such a squadron in such a place, and my pride was too great for man. " To his wife he wrote in the samestrain: "I ought not to call what has happened to the Vanguard by thecold name of accident; I believe firmly that it was the Almighty'sgoodness, to check my consummate vanity. "

Vanity was rather a hard name to call the natural elation of a youngadmiral, intrusted with an unusually important service, and proud ofhis command; but the providential interposition worked directly to hisadvantage. The delays caused by the repairs to the "Vanguard, " and bythe subsequent necessity of seeking the separated frigates at therendezvous appointed for such a case, made possible the junction ofTroubridge, of whose approach Nelson was totally ignorant. On the 2dof June Sir James Saumarez mentions speaking a ship, which a few daysbefore had seen eleven sail-of-the-line, supposed to be English. "Weare at a loss what conjectures to put on this intelligence. " Five daysbefore this, May 28, a vessel out of Marseilles had informed them ofBonaparte's sailing with all his transports. Nelson would doubtlesshave pursued them at once, in conformity with his instructions toascertain the enemy's objects; but for such operations, essentiallythose of a scouting expedition, the frigates were too necessary to beleft behind. On the 4th of June he reached the rendezvous, and, notfinding the frigates, waited. The next morning, by the arrival of the"Mutine, " he learned that he was to expect the reinforcement, whichconverted his division into a fleet, and enlarged his mission from oneof mere reconnoissance to the duty of overtaking and destroying agreat maritime expedition. 

Besides this good news, the "Mutine" brought word of anothermisfortune, more irretrievable than the loss of spars. She had fallenin with the frigates three days before, and the senior captain hadtold Hardy that he was going with them to Gibraltar, persuaded thatthe condition of the flagship, which he had seen, would necessitateher return to an arsenal for repairs. "I thought Hope would have knownme better, " commented Nelson, when he became aware of a step whichmaterially affected, in fact probably entirely changed, the course ofevents, and most seriously embarrassed all his subsequent movements. This untimely and precipitate action, and his remark, illustrateconspicuously the differences between men, and exemplify the peculiarenergy and unrelaxing forward impulse which eminently fitted Nelsonfor his present high charge. 

The inconvenience and danger arising from the frigates' departure wasinstantly felt. "Nothing, " wrote Saumarez, "can equal our anxiety tofall in with the reinforcement. Our squadron has been, these two days, detached in all directions, without falling in with them; and there isstrong reason to fear they think us returned to Gibraltar"--fromHope's reports. Such were the risks springing from misplaced caution, more ruinous than the most daring venture, and which from beginning toend well-nigh wrecked the great attempt upon which the Admiralty, St. Vincent, and Nelson had staked so much. In further consequence, theline-of-battle ships became separated by stretching too far apart intheir anxious care to find Troubridge, and when he joined the"Vanguard, " on the 7th, the "Orion" and "Alexander" were not in sight. The French having so long a start, and there being now with himeleven seventy-fours, Nelson with characteristic promptness would notdelay an instant. The fifty-gun ship "Leander, " which had come withTroubridge, was directed to wait forty-eight hours for the twoabsentees, with a memorandum of the course about to be followed. Confident that single ships would be able to overtake a squadron whoseroute they knew, the admiral at once pushed on for Cape Corso, thenorth point of Corsica, intending to pass between the island andItaly, seeking information as he went. The "Mutine" was all he had toreplace the missing frigates. 

June 7th thus marks the beginning of a chase, which ended only uponthe 1st of August in the Battle of the Nile. During this miserableperiod of suspense and embarrassment, occasioned and prolonged beyondall reason or necessity by the want of lookout ships, the connectingand illuminating thread is the purpose of Nelson, at once clear andfirm, to find the French fleet and to fight it the instant found. Noother consideration draws his mind aside, except so far as it mayfacilitate the attainment and fulfilment of this one object. In thisone light he sees all things. At the start he writes to St. Vincent:"You may be assured I will fight them the moment I can reach, be theyat anchor or under sail. " Three days later, he tells Sir WilliamHamilton: "If their fleet is not moored in as strong a port as Toulon, nothing shall hinder me from attacking them. " "Be they bound to theAntipodes, " he says to Earl Spencer, "your Lordship may rely that Iwill not lose a moment in bringing them to action, and endeavour todestroy their transports. " Such expressions are repeated with afrequency which proves the absolute hold the resolution had upon hismind. When obstacles occur to him, or are mentioned, they do not makeroom for the thought of not fighting to be entertained; only Toulonsuggests the idea of impossibility. He raises difficulties diligentlyenough, but it is only that they may be the better overcome, not thatthey may deter. All possible conditions are considered and discussed, but simply in order that the best fighting solution may be reached. The constant mental attitude is such that the man is unprepared torecede before any opposition; he fortifies his mind beforehand withthe best means of meeting and vanquishing it, but the attempt at leastshall be made. "Thank God, " he wrote at this moment, "I do not feeldifficulties;" yet the avowal itself accompanies so plain a statementof his embarrassments as to show that his meaning is that they do notdiscourage. This characteristic appeared most strongly at Copenhagen, partly because the difficulties there were greatest, partly from theclose contrast with a man of very different temper. 

Being entirely without intelligence as to the real object of theFrench, there was nothing to do but to follow upon their track, witheyes open for indications. They were known to have gone southerly, towards Naples and Sicily; and these two points, parts of the Kingdomof the Two Sicilies, had been mentioned by Jervis as probabledestinations. The "Orion" and "Alexander" rejoined in two or threedays, and on the 14th of June information, second-hand but probable, was obtained that on the 4th the French armament had been seen off thewest end of Sicily, steering to the eastward. "If they pass Sicily, "said Nelson in his letter to Spencer written the next day, "I shallbelieve they are going on their scheme of possessing Alexandria, andgetting troops to India--a plan concerted with Tippoo Saib, by nomeans so difficult as might at first view be imagined. " Troubridge wasnow sent ahead in the "Mutine" to communicate with Sir WilliamHamilton, the British minister at Naples, and with Acton, the primeminister of that Kingdom. He took with him letters from the admiral, who wished to know what co-operation he might hope from the Court ofNaples, in the matters of supplies, of frigates to act as lookouts, and of pilots for Sicilian waters. 

On the 17th the squadron hove-to ten miles off Naples, and Troubridgerejoined. The Neapolitan Government sent assurances of good wishes, and of hatred to the French; supplies would be given under the rose, and Acton sent a written order to that effect, addressed to thegovernors of ports in the name of the King. Naples being at peace withFrance, assistance with ships could not be given, nor, to use thewords of Nelson, "the smallest information of what was, or was likelyto be, the future destination of the French armament. With thiscomfortable account I pushed for the Faro of Messina. " Troubridgebrought word, however, that the French fleet was off Malta, about toattack it, which served to give direction for the squadron's nextmove. 

After leaving Naples Nelson wrote strong and clear letters to SirWilliam Hamilton upon the existing conditions. Why should Naples standin shivering hesitation about taking a decided step in support ofGreat Britain? She had looked and prayed for the arrival of the fleet, as the one force competent to check the designs of the French. Sicilycould be approached only by water, and the distance of Naples fromNorthern Italy rendered the control of the sea most advantageous, ifnot absolutely essential, to a French army attempting to hold the bootof the peninsula. Now the British fleet had come, in force adequate toneutralize the French Navy, and, in Nelson's belief, to defeat anddestroy it, if properly supported. Did Naples expect to escape by atimid adherence to half measures, when by her notorious preference forthe British she had already gained the ill-will of the French? "TheFrench know as well as you and I do, that their Sicilian Majestiescalled for our help to save them--even this is crime enough with theFrench. " Safety--true safety--could be had only by strenuous anddecisive action in support of Nelson's squadron. Did not the attack onMalta indicate a design upon Sicily? "Were I commanding a fleetattending an army which is to invade Sicily, I should say to thegeneral, 'If you can take Malta, it secures the safety of your fleet, transports, stores, &c. , and insures your safe retreat [from Sicily]should that be necessary; for if even a superior fleet of the enemyshould arrive, before one week passes, they will be blown to leeward, and you may pass with safety. ' This would be my opinion. .. . I repeatit, _Malta is the direct road to Sicily_. " If the French areovertaken, he continues, and found in some anchorage, it can scarcelybe so strong but that I can get at them, but there will be neededthings which I have not, fire-ships, bomb-vessels, and gunboats, whenone hour would either destroy or drive them out. Without such aid, theBritish may be crippled in their attempt, and forced to leave theMediterranean. In case of blockade--or necessity to remain for anyreason--the fleet must have supplies; which only Naples can furnish. Failing these it must retire, and then Sicily and Naples are lost. Since, then, so much assistance must be given in time, why postponenow, when one strong blow would give instant safety? Why should nothis own motto, "I will not lose a moment in attacking them, " apply aswell to the policy of an endangered kingdom as of a British admiral?

If this reasoning and advice took more account of the exigencies ofthe British arms than of the difficulties of a weak state of thesecond order, dependent for action upon the support of other nations, they were at least perfectly consonant to the principles and practiceof the writer, wherever he himself had to act. But Nelson could notexpect his own spirit in the King of the Two Sicilies. Even if thecourse suggested were the best for Naples under the conditions, it isthe property of ordinary men, in times of danger, to see difficultiesmore clearly than advantages, and to shrink from steps which involverisk, however promising of success. The Neapolitan Government, thoughcheered by the appearance of the British fleet, had to consider dangeralso on the land side, where it relied upon the protection of Austria, instead of trusting manfully to its own arms and the advantages of itsposition, remote from the centre of French power. Austria had pledgedherself to support Naples, if invaded without just cause; but it wasnot certain that she would interfere if the cause of attack was thepremature admission of British ships into the ports of the kingdom, beyond the number specified in the still recent treaties with France. The Emperor was meditating war, in which he expected to assist Naplesand to be assisted by her; but he did not choose to be hurried, andmight refuse aid if an outbreak were precipitated. 

Actually, what Naples did mattered little. Under some contingencies, such as Nelson was contemplating when he wrote his letter, it mighthave mattered much whether he received the abundant support of smallarmed vessels which he indicated; but in the end supplies only wererequired, and those he had orders from Jervis to exact at the mouth ofhis cannon from all powers, --friends or neutrals, --Sardinia onlyexcepted. The fleet passed the Straits of Messina on the 20th of June, and continued south, keeping close to the Sicilian shore in hope ofinformation, until the 22d, when it was off Cape Passaro, thesoutheastern extremity of the island. There a Genoese brig was spoken, which had left Malta the previous day. From her Nelson learned thatMalta had surrendered to the French on the 15th, a week before, whichwas correct; but the information further stated, that, after landing agarrison, the expedition had sailed again on the 16th--it was thoughtfor Sicily. This last news was untrue, whether by intention or not, for Bonaparte remained in Malta till the 19th; but upon it Nelson hadto act. Had he seen the captain of the stranger himself, he might havefound out more, for he was a shrewd questioner, and his intellect wassharpened by anxiety, and by constant dwelling upon the elements ofthe intricate problem before him; but the vessel had been boarded bythe "Mutine, " three hours before, and was now beyond recall. 

At this season the winds in the Mediterranean prevail from thewestward; therefore, with the six days' start the enemy was believednow to have, no time could be lost. Six days sufficed to carry theBritish squadron from its present position to Alexandria, which Nelsonwas already inclined to think the destination of the French. Yet, being dependent upon a wind then practically constant in direction, itwould not do to yield a mile of ground, except upon a mature, ifrapid, deliberation. Nelson's own mind was, by constant preoccupation, familiar beforehand with the bearings of the different conditions ofany situation likely to occur, and with the probable inferences to bedrawn; his opinions were, so to say, in a constant state of formationand development, ready for instantaneous application to any emergencyas it arose. But he had, besides, exercised the same habit in thecaptains of the ships, by the practice of summoning them on board theflagship, singly or in groups; the slow movement of sailing vessels, particularly in the light summer weather of the Mediterranean, permitting such intercourse without materially affecting the progressof the fleet. Invitations or commands so to visit the flagship werecommon. "I have passed the day on board the Vanguard, " notes Saumarezon one occasion, "having breakfasted and stayed to dinner with theadmiral. " "It was his practice during the whole of his cruize, " wroteBerry, the flag-captain, "whenever the weather and circumstances wouldpermit, to have his captains on board the Vanguard, where he wouldfully develop to them his own ideas of the different and best modesof attack, in all possible positions. " That such conversations werenot confined to tactical questions, but extended to what would now becalled the strategy of the situation, is evident from allusions bySaumarez to the various surmises concerning the probable movements ofthe enemy. Nelson never yielded a particle of his responsibility, norof his credit, but it is clear that such discussion would not onlybroaden his own outlook, but prepare his subordinates to give readierand sounder views upon any new conjuncture that might arise. 

He now summoned on board four captains "in whom I place greatconfidence, " Saumarez, Troubridge, --the two seniors, --Ball, and Darby, stated the case, and received their opinions. These seem to have beengiven in writing, [60] and from his letter to St. Vincent the resultsof the conference, as shown by his decision, may be summarized asfollows. With the existing winds, it would be impossible for such afleet as the enemy's to get to the westward. Had they aimed at Sicily, an object concerning which explicit disclaimers had been given by theFrench to the Neapolitan Government, some indication of their approachmust have been known at Syracuse, the day before, when the Britishwere off that city. Consequently, the expedition must have gone to theeastward. The size and nature of the armament must also beconsidered, --forty thousand troops, a dozen ships-of-the-line, besidesa staff of scientific men, --all pointed to a great, distant, andpermanent occupation. The object might be Corfu, or to overthrow theexisting government of Turkey, or to settle a colony in Egypt. Asbetween these, all equally possible, the last was the most direct andgreatest menace to present British interests, and should determine hiscourse. "If they have concerted a plan with Tippoo Saib, to havevessels at Suez, three weeks, at this season, is a common passage tothe Malabar coast, where our India possessions would be in greatdanger. "

Such was the conclusion--how momentous at the moment can only berealized by those who will be at the pains to consider a man stillyoung, with reputation brilliant indeed, but not established;intrusted with a great chance, it is true, but also with a greatresponsibility, upon which rested all his future. On slight, thoughdecisive, preponderance of evidence, he was about to risk throwingaway an advantage a seaman must appreciate, that of being to windwardof his enemy, --able to get at him, --the strategist's position ofcommand. The tongues of envy and censure might well be--we now knowthat they were--busy in inquiring why so young an admiral had so highcharge, and in sneering at his failure to find the enemy. "Knowing myattachment to you, " wrote his old friend, Admiral Goodall, alongsidewhom he had fought under Hotham, "how often have I been questioned:'What is your favourite hero about? The French fleet has passed underhis nose, ' &c. , &c. " Nelson was saved from fatal hesitation, primarily, by his singleness of purpose, which looked first to hiscountry's service, to the thorough doing of the work given him to do, and only afterwards to the consequences of failure to his own fame andfortunes. At that moment the choice before him was either to followout an indication, slight, but as far as it went clear, which, thoughconfessedly precarious, promised to lead to a great and decisiveresult, such as he had lately urged upon the King of Naples; or toremain where he was, in an inglorious security, perfectly content, touse words of his own, that "each day passed without loss to our side. "To the latter conclusion might very well have contributed theknowledge, that the interests which the Cabinet thought threatenedwere certainly for the present safe. Broadly as his instructions weredrawn, no word of Egypt or the East was specifically in them. Naples, Sicily, Portugal, or Ireland, such were the dangers intimated bySpencer and St. Vincent in their letters, and he was distinctlycautioned against letting the enemy get to the westward of him. Hemight have consoled himself for indecisive action, whichprocrastinated disaster and covered failure with the veil of nullity, as did a former commander of his in a gazetted letter, by thereflection that, so far as the anticipations of the ministry went, thedesigns of the enemy were for the time frustrated, by the presence ofhis squadron between them and the points indicated to him. 

But the single eye of principle gained keener insight in this case bythe practised habit of reflection, which came prepared, to the fullextent of an acute intellect, to detect every glimmer of light, and tofollow them to the point where they converged upon the true solution;and both principle and reflection were powerfully supported in theirfinal action by a native temperament, impatient of hesitations, ofhalf measures, certain that the annihilation of the French fleet, andnothing short of its annihilation, fulfilled that security of hiscountry's interests in which consisted the spirit of his instructions. His own words in self-defence, when for a moment it seemed as if, after all, he had blundered in the great risk he took, though rough inform, rise to the eloquence that speaks out of the abundance of theheart. "The only objection I can fancy to be started is, 'you shouldnot have gone such a long voyage without more certain information ofthe enemy's destination:' my answer is ready--who was I to get itfrom? The governments of Naples and Sicily either knew not, or choseto keep me in ignorance. Was I to wait patiently till I heard certainaccounts? If Egypt was their object, before I could hear of them theywould have been in India. To do nothing, I felt, was disgraceful;therefore I made use of my understanding, and by it I ought to standor fall. "

The destination of the enemy had been rightly divined, following out acourse of reasoning outlined by Nelson a week before in his letter toSpencer; but successful pursuit was baffled for the moment by thewiliness of Bonaparte, who directed his vast armament to be steeredfor the south shore of Candia, instead of straight for Alexandria. Even this would scarcely have saved him, had Nelson's frigates beenwith the fleet. Immediately after the council, the admiral with hiscustomary promptitude kept away for Egypt under all sail. "I am justreturned from on board the Admiral, " writes Saumarez, "and we arecrowding sail for Alexandria; but the contrast to what we experiencedyesterday is great indeed, having made sure of attacking them thismorning. At present it is very doubtful whether we shall fall in withthem at all, as we are proceeding upon the merest conjecture only, andnot on any positive information. Some days must now elapse before wecan be relieved from our cruel suspense; and if, at the end of ourjourney, we find we are upon a wrong scent, our embarrassment will begreat indeed. Fortunately, I only act here _en second_; but did thechief responsibility rest with me, I fear it would be more than my tooirritable nerves would bear. " Such was the contemporary estimate of aneye-witness, an officer of tried and singular gallantry and ability, who shared the admiral's perplexities and ambitions, though not hisresponsibility. His words portray justly the immensity of the burdenNelson bore. That, indeed, is the inevitable penalty of command; butit must be conceded that, when adequately borne, it should convey alsoan equal measure of renown. 

In the morning, before the consultation with the captains, threeFrench frigates had been seen; but Nelson, warned by the parting ofthe "Orion" and "Alexander" a fortnight before, would not run the riskof scattering the squadron by chasing them. No time could now be lost, waiting for a separated ship to catch up. The circumstance of thefleet being seen by these frigates was quoted in a letter from LouisBonaparte, who was with the expedition, to his brother Joseph, and wasmade the ground for comment upon the stupidity of the British admiral, who with this opportunity failed to find the armament. The criticismis unjust; had the frigates taken to flight, as of course they would, the British fleet, if not divided, would certainly not be led towardsthe main body of the enemy. Concentration of purpose, singleness ofaim, was more than ever necessary, now that time pressed and adecision had been reached; but the sneer of the French officerreproduces the idle chatter of the day in London streets anddrawing-rooms. These, in turn, but echoed and swelled the murmurs ofinsubordination and envy in the navy itself, at the departure from theroutine methods of officialism, by passing over the claims ofundistinguished seniors, in favor of one who as yet had nothing butbrilliant achievement, and yet more brilliant promise, to justifycommitting to him the most momentous charge that in this war haddevolved on a British admiral. A letter from one of the puisne lordsof the Admiralty was read publicly on board the "Prince George, "flagship of Sir William Parker, --the same who had the controversy withNelson about the Battle of St. Vincent, --denouncing Lord St. Vincentin no very gentle terms for having sent so young a flag-officer. [61]"Sir William Parker and Sir John Orde have written strongremonstrances against your commanding the detached squadron instead ofthem, " wrote St. Vincent to Nelson. "I did all I could to prevent it, consistently with my situation, but there is a faction, fraught withall manner of ill-will to you, that, unfortunately for the twoBaronets, domined over any argument or influence I could use: theywill both be ordered home the moment their letters arrive. " It will beseen how much was at stake for Nelson personally in the issue of theseweeks. Happy the man who, like him, has in such a case the clear lightof duty to keep his steps from wavering!

The night after Nelson made sail for Alexandria the two hostile bodiescrossed the same tract of sea, on divergent courses; but a hazecovered the face of the deep, and hid them from each other. When theday dawned, they were no longer within range of sight; but had thehorizon of the British fleet been enlarged by flanking frigates, chasing on either side, the immunity of the French from detectioncould scarcely have continued. For some days not a hundred milesintervened between these two foes, proceeding for the same port. Onthe 26th, being two hundred and fifty miles from Alexandria, Nelsonsent the "Mutine" ahead to communicate with the place and getinformation; a single vessel being able to outstrip the progress of abody of ships, which is bound to the speed of its slowest member. Onthe 28th the squadron itself was off the town, when the admiral to hisdismay found that not only the French had not appeared, but that nocertain news of their destination was to be had. 

Preoccupied as his mind had been with the fear that the enemy had sofar the start that their army would be out of the transports before heovertook them, the idea that he might outstrip them does not seem tohave entered his head. Only three vessels had been spoken since Sicilywas left behind, --two from Alexandria and one from the Archipelago;but these knew nothing of the French, being doubtless, when met, aheadof the latter's advance. That Nelson again consulted with his captainsseems probable--indeed almost certain, from casual mention; but ifso, their opinion as to the future course does not appear. Theunremitting eagerness of his temperament, the singleness of hispurpose, which saw the whole situation concentrated in the Frenchfleet, had worked together up to the present to bring him to the truestrategic point just ahead of time; although, by no fault of his own, he had started near three weeks late. [62] These two high qualities nowconspired to mislead him by their own excess. "His active and anxiousmind, " wrote Captain Berry, "would not permit him to rest a moment inthe same place; he therefore shaped his course to the northward, forthe coast of Caramania [in Asia Minor], to reach as quickly aspossible some quarter where information could probably be obtained. "

To say that this was a mistake is perhaps to be wise only after theevent. Had Nelson known that the French, when leaving Malta, had butthree days' start of him, instead of six, as the Genoese had reported, he might have suspected the truth; it is not wonderful that he failedto believe that he could have gained six days. The actual gain _was_but three; for, departing practically at the same time from pointsequidistant from Alexandria, Bonaparte's armament appeared before thatplace on the third day after Nelson arrived. The troops were landedimmediately, and the transports entered the port, thus making securetheir escape from the British pursuit. The ships of war remainedoutside. 

Meanwhile Nelson, "distressed for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, "was beating back to the westward against the wind which had carriedhim rapidly to the coast of Egypt. Rightly or wrongly, he had notchosen to wait at the point which mature reflection had indicated tohim as the enemy's goal, and the best course that now occurred to himwas to do with his fleet the exploring duty that frigates should havedone. "_No frigates_, " he wrote to Sir William Hamilton; "to which hasbeen, and may again, be attributed the loss of the French fleet. " Onhis return he kept along the northern shore of the Mediterranean, passing near Candia; but, though several vessels were spoken, he onlygathered from them that the French were not west of Sicily, nor atCorfu. On the 19th of July, he anchored the fleet at Syracuse, having, to use his own words, "gone a round of six hundred leagues with anexpedition incredible, " and yet "as ignorant of the situation of theenemy as I was twenty-seven days ago. "

At Syracuse fresh disappointments awaited him, which only theindomitable single-mindedness and perseverance of the man preventedfrom becoming discouragements. The minister at Naples had sentdespatches to await him at Cape Passaro; when he sent for these, thirsty for news about the French, they had been returned to Naples. The governor of the port, despite Acton's assurances to Troubridge, made difficulties about the admission of so many ships, and aboutsupplying water, which they absolutely required. This Nelson resented, with angry contempt for the halting policy of the weak kingdom. "Ihave had so much said about the King of Naples' orders only to admitthree or four of the ships of our fleet into his ports, that I amastonished. I understood that private orders, at least, would havebeen given for our free admission. If we are to be refused supplies, pray send me by many vessels an account, that I may in good time takethe King's fleet to Gibraltar. Our treatment is scandalous for a greatnation to put up with, and the King's flag is insulted at everyfriendly port we look at. " "I wish to know your and Sir William'splans for going down the Mediterranean, " he wrote to Lady Hamilton, "for, if we are to be kicked in every port of the Sicilian dominions, the sooner we are gone the better. Good God! how sensibly I feel ourtreatment. I have only to pray I may find the French and throw all myvengeance on them. "

These words show the nervous exasperation superinduced by thetremendous strain of official anxiety and mortified ambition; for thegovernor's objections were purely formal and perfunctory, as was theCourt's submission to the French. "Our present wants, " he admitted atthe same writing, "have been most amply supplied, and every attentionhas been paid us. " Years afterwards Nelson spoke feelingly of thebitter mental anguish of that protracted and oft-thwarted pursuit. "Donot fret at anything, " he told his friend Troubridge; "I wish I neverhad, but my return to Syracuse in 1798, broke my heart, which on anyextraordinary anxiety now shows itself, be that feeling pain orpleasure. " "On the 18th I had near died, with the swelling of some ofthe vessels of the heart. More people, perhaps, die of broken heartsthan we are aware of. " But the firmness of his purpose, the clearnessof his convictions, remained unslackened and unclouded. "What asituation am I placed in!" he writes, when he finds Hamilton'sdespatches returned. "As yet I can learn nothing of the enemy. Youwill, I am sure, and so will our country, easily conceive what haspassed in my anxious mind; but I have this comfort, that I have nofault to accuse myself of. This bears me up, and this only. " "Everymoment I have to regret the frigates having left me, " he tells St. Vincent. "Your lordship deprived yourself of frigates to make minecertainly the first squadron in the world, and I feel that I have zealand activity to do credit to your appointment, and yet to beunsuccessful hurts me most sensibly. But if they are above water, Iwill find them out, and if possible bring them to battle. You havedone your part in giving me so fine a fleet, and I hope to do mine inmaking use of them. "

In five days the squadron had filled with water and again sailed. Satisfied that the enemy were somewhere in the Levant, Nelson nowintended a deliberate search for them--or rather for their fleet, thedestruction of which was the crucial object of all his movements. "Ithas been said, " he wrote to Hamilton, "that to leeward of the twofrigates I saw off Cape Passaro was a line-of-battle ship, with theriches of Malta on board, but it was the destruction of the enemy, notriches for myself, that I was seeking. These would have fallen to meif I had had frigates, but except the ship-of-the-line, I regard notall the riches in this world. " A plaintive remonstrance against hissecond departure was penned by the Neapolitan prime minister, whichdepicts so plainly the commonplace view of a military situation, --theapprehensions of one to whom immediate security is the great object inwar, --that it justifies quotation, and comparison with the clearintuitions, and firmly grasped principle, which placed Nelson always, in desire, alongside the enemy's fleet, and twice carried him, atevery risk, to the end of the Mediterranean to seek it. "We are now indanger of a war, directly on Admiral Nelson's account; you see fairlyour position; will Admiral Nelson run to the Levant again _withoutknowing for certain_ the position of the French, and leave the TwoSicilies exposed in these moments? Buonaparte has absconded himself, but in any port he has taken securitys not to be forced. God knowswhere he is, and whether we shall not see him again in a few days, ifwe do not hear of what a course he has taken. I present all this toyour consideration. " To this letter, which oddly enough was written onthe very day the Battle of the Nile was fought, Nelson might well havereplied then, as he did in terms a year afterwards, "The best defencefor His Sicilian Majesty's dominions is to place myself alongside theFrench fleet. "

The fleet left Syracuse on the 25th of July, just one week before thediscovery of the enemy in Aboukir Bay put an end to Nelson's longsuspense. The course was first shaped for the southern capes of theMorea, and on the 28th Troubridge was sent into the Gulf of Koron forinformation. He returned within three hours, with the news that theFrench had been seen four weeks before from the coast of Candia, andwere then steering southeast. This intelligence was corroborated by avessel spoken the same day. Southeast, being nearly dead before theprevailing wind, was an almost certain clew to the destination of anunwieldy body which could never regain ground lost to leeward; so, although Nelson now learned that some of his missing frigates had alsobeen seen recently off Candia, he would waste no time looking forthem. It may be mentioned that these frigates had appeared off theanchorage of the French fleet, and had been recognized by it asenemies; but, so far from taking warning from the incident, the Frenchadmiral was only confirmed by it in a blind belief that the Britishfeared to attack. Immediately after Troubridge's return, the fleetbore up under all sail, and at 2. 45 in the afternoon of the 1st ofAugust, 1798, the masthead lookout of the "Zealous" discovered thelong-sought-for enemy, lying in Aboukir Bay, on the coast of Egypt, fifteen miles east of Alexandria. 

Suspense was ended, but Nelson's weightiest responsibility had yet tobe met. The enemy was still so far distant that he could not bereached till near nightfall, and it was possible that not only wouldthe battle be fought in the dark, but that some at least of the shipswould not have daylight to take their positions. The consequentdifficulty and risk was in any event great; but in this case the moreso, because the ground was unknown to every officer in the fleet. Theonly chart of it in possession of the British was a rude sketch latelytaken out of a prize. There was no time now for calling captainstogether, nor for forming plans of action. Then appeared conspicuouslythe value of that preparedness of mind, as well as of purpose, whichat bottom was the greatest of Nelson's claims to credit. Much had beenreceived by him from Nature, --gifts which, if she bestows them not, man struggles in vain to acquire by his own efforts; but the carewhich he took in fitting himself to use those gifts to their utmostcapacity is his own glory. The author of the first full narrative ofthese eventful weeks, Captain Berry, than whom no man had largeroccasion to observe Nelson's moods, used his capitals well when hewrote, "The admiral viewed the obstacles with the eye of a seamanDETERMINED ON ATTACK. " It was not for him, face to face withopportunity, to hesitate and debate whether he would be justified inusing it at once. But this preparation of purpose might have led onlyto a great disaster, had it not received guidance from a richly storedintellect, which had pondered probable conditions so exhaustively thatproper direction could be at once imparted and at once understood. TheFrench admiral, indeed, by his mistaken dispositions had deliveredhimself into the hands of his enemy; but that might not have availedhad that enemy hesitated and given time, or had he not instantlycomprehended the possibilities of the situation with a trained glancewhich had contemplated them long before. "By attacking the enemy's vanand centre, the wind blowing directly along their line, I was enabledto throw what force I pleased on a few ships. This plan my friendsreadily conceived by the signals. "[63]

It was, therefore, no fortuitous coincidence that the battle wasfought on a plan preconcerted in general outline, though necessarilysubject to particular variations in detail. Not only had manysituations been discussed, as Berry tells us, but new signals had beeninserted in the signal-book to enable the admiral's intentions to bequickly understood. To provide for the case of the enemy being met atsea, the force had been organized into three squadrons, --a subdivisionof command which, while surrendering nothing of the admiral'sinitiative, much facilitated the application of his plans, bycommitting the execution of major details to the two senior captains, Saumarez and Troubridge, each wielding a group of four ships. Amongthe provisions for specific contingencies was one that evidentlysprang from the report that the enemy's fleet numbered sixteen orseventeen of the line, --an impression which arose from there being init four Venetian ships so rated, which were not, however, fit for aplace in the line. In that case Nelson proposed to attack, ship forship, the rear thirteen of the enemy. That he preferred, whenpossible, to throw two ships on one is evident enough--the approachingbattle proves it; but when confronted with a force stronger, numerically, than his own, and under way, he provides what wascertainly the better alternative. He engages at once the attention ofas many ships as possible, confident that he brings against each aforce superior to it, owing to the general greater efficiency ofBritish ships over French of that date, and especially of those in hisown squadron, called by St. Vincent the _élite_ of the Navy. 

The position of the French fleet, and the arrangements made by itscommander, Admiral Brueys, must now be given, for they constitute theparticular situation against which Nelson's general plan of attack wasto be directed. Considering it impracticable for the ships-of-the-lineto enter the port of Alexandria, Brueys had taken the fleet on the 8thof July to their present anchorage. Aboukir Bay begins at a promontoryof the same name, and, after curving boldly south, extends eastwardeighteen miles, terminating at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. From theshore the depth increases very gradually, so that water enough forships-of-the-line was not found till three miles from the coast. Twomiles northeast of the promontory of Aboukir is Aboukir Island, sincecalled Nelson's, linked with the point by a chain of rocks. Outsidethe island, similar rocks, with shoals, prolong this foul ground underwater to seaward, constituting a reef dangerous to a strangerapproaching the bay. This barrier, however, broke the waves from thenorthwest, and so made the western part of the bay a fairly convenientsummer roadstead. The French fleet was anchored there, under theshelter of the island and rocks, in an order such that "the wind blewnearly along the line. " Its situation offered no local protectionagainst an enemy's approach, except that due to ignorance of theground. 

It was therefore Brueys's business to meet this defect of protectionby adequate dispositions; and this he failed to do. Numerically hisforce was the same as Nelson's; but, while the latter had onlyseventy-fours, there were in the French fleet one ship of one hundredand twenty guns, and three eighties. In a military sense, every linedivides naturally into three parts, --the centre, and the two ends, orflanks; and it is essential that these should so far support oneanother that an enemy cannot attack any two in superior force, whilethe third is unable to assist. Shallow water, such as was found inAboukir Bay, if properly utilized, will prevent a flank being turned, so that an enemy can get on both sides of the ships there, orotherwise concentrate upon them, as by enfilading; and if, inaddition, the ships are anchored close to each other, it becomesimpossible for two of the attacking force to direct their fire uponone of the defence, without being exposed to reprisals from those nextastern and ahead. These evident precautions received no illustrationin the arrangements of Admiral Brueys. The general direction of hisline was that of the wind, from northwest to southeast, with a veryslight bend, as shown in the diagram. The leading--northwestern--shipwas brought close to the shoal in thirty feet of water, but not soclose as to prevent the British passing round her, turning that flank;and there were between the successive ships intervals of five hundredfeet, through any one of which an enemy could readily pass. Brueys hadvery properly accumulated his most powerful vessels at the centre. Theflagship "Orient, " of one hundred and twenty guns, was seventh in theorder; next ahead and astern of her were, respectively, the "Franklin"and the "Tonnant, " each of eighty. By a singular misconception, however, he had thought that any attack would fall upon the rear--thelee flank; and to this utter misapprehension of the exposed points itwas owing that he there placed his next heaviest ships. Nelson'sfore-determined onslaught upon the van accordingly fell on the weakestof the French vessels. 

Such was the French order of battle. The proceedings of the Britishfleet, under its leader, show an instructive combination of rapidityand caution, of quick comprehension of the situation, with an absenceof all precipitation; no haste incompatible with perfect carefulness, no time lost, either by hesitation or by preparations postponed. Whenthe enemy were first discovered, two ships, the "Alexander" and"Swiftsure, " were a dozen miles to leeward, having been sent ahead onfrigates' duty to reconnoitre Alexandria. This circumstance preventedtheir joining till after the battle began and night had fallen. At thesame moment the "Culloden" was seven miles to windward. She wassignalled to drop the prize she was towing, and to join the fleet. Tothis separation was due that she went aground. The remaining tenships, which had been steering about east, hauled sharp on the wind toenable them to weather with ample allowance the shoal off AboukirIsland. It was blowing a whole-sail breeze, too fresh for the lightercanvas; the royals were furled as soon as close-hauled. As the Frenchsituation and dispositions developed to the view, signals were made toprepare for battle, to get ready to anchor by the stern, and that itwas the admiral's intention to attack the van and centre of theenemy. The captains had long been forewarned of each of thesepossibilities, and nothing more was needed to convey to them hisgeneral plan, which was intrusted to them individually to carry out asthey successively came into action. 

At about half-past five signal was given to form line of battle. This, for the ships of the day, was a single column, in which they wereranged ahead and astern of each other, leaving the broadside clear. Asthey came abreast the shoal, Nelson hailed Captain Hood, of the"Zealous, " and asked if he thought they were yet far enough to theeastward to clear it, if they then headed for the enemy. Hood repliedthat he did not know the ground, but was in eleven fathoms, and would, if the admiral allowed, bear up and sound with the lead, and would notbring the fleet into danger. This was done, Hood leading all the fleetexcept the "Goliath, " Captain Foley, which kept ahead, but outside, ofthe "Zealous. " No close shaving was done, however, at this criticalturn; and it is that steady deliberation, combined with such parsimonyof time in other moments, which is most impressive in Nelson. So fewrealize that five minutes are at once the most important and the leastimportant of considerations. Thus the British passed so much beyondthe island and the shoal, before keeping away, that, as the longcolumn swept round to head for the French van, the ships turned theirport broadsides to the enemy, and were steering southwesterly whenthey finally ran down. "The English admiral, " wrote the French secondin command, "without doubt had experienced pilots on board; he hauledwell round all dangers. "

The "Goliath" still leading the fleet, followed closely by the"Zealous, " the flagship was dropped to sixth in the order, --Nelsonthus placing himself so that he could see what the first five shipsaccomplished, while retaining in his own hands the power to impart anew direction to the remaining five of those then with him, should hethink it necessary. Captain Foley had formed the idea that the Frenchwould be less ready to fight on the inshore side, and had expressedhis intention to get inside them, if practicable. Sounding as he went, he passed round the bows of the leading vessel, the "Guerrier, " on theinner bow of which he intended to place himself; but the anchor hung, and the "Goliath" brought up on the inner quarter of the "Conquérant, "the second ship. The "Zealous, " following, anchored where Foley hadpurposed, on the bow of the "Guerrier;" and the next three ships, the"Orion, " "Theseus, " and "Audacious, " also placed themselves on theinner side of the French line. 

The two leading French vessels were at once crushed. All the masts ofthe "Guerrier, " although no sail was on them, went overboard withinten minutes after she was first attacked, while the "Conquérant" wasreceiving the united broadsides of the "Goliath" and the"Audacious, "--the latter raking. Nelson therefore placed the"Vanguard" on the outer side, and within pistol-shot, of the thirdFrench ship, the "Spartiate, " which was already engaged on the otherside by the "Theseus, " but at much longer range. His example was ofcourse followed by those succeeding him--the seventh and eighth of theBritish engaging the fourth and fifth of the French, which werealready receiving part of the fire of the "Orion" and "Theseus" on theinner side--the latter having ceased to play upon the "Spartiate" forfear of hitting the "Vanguard. " Thus five French ships were withinhalf an hour in desperate conflict with eight British, while theirconsorts to leeward looked helplessly on. 

The ninth and tenth of Nelson's fleet were less fortunate, owing tothe envelope of smoke and the growing darkness, which now obscured thescene. The "Bellerophon, " missing the sixth French vessel, the"Franklin, " brought up abreast the "Orient, " whose force was doubleher own, and which had no other antagonist. The "Majestic, " gropingher way, ran into the ninth French, the "Heureux, " where for somemoments she hung in a position of disadvantage and had her captainkilled. Then swinging clear, she anchored on the bow of the nextastern, the "Mercure, " and there continued a deadly and solitaryaction. Owing to the circumstances mentioned, the loss of each ofthese ships was greater, by fifty per cent, than that of any other ofthe British fleet. The movements so far described, and the resultantfighting, may be styled the first stage of the battle. Concerning itmay be remarked the unswerving steadiness, rapidity, and yet soundjudgment, with which all the movements were executed; and further, that not only was the first direction of the attack that prescribed byNelson's signal, but that the second, initiated by his own ship, wasalso imparted by him. The incident of passing round the "Guerrier, "and inside of the line, is a detail only, although one which cannot betoo highly praised. "The van ship of the enemy being in five fathom, "wrote Captain Hood, "I expected the Goliath and Zealous to stick faston the shoal every moment, and did not imagine we should attempt topass within her. " It is difficult to exaggerate the coolness, intrepidity, and seamanlike care of Captain Foley, to whom is to beattributed, perhaps, the whole conception, and certainly the entiremerit of the execution; but they no more detract from Nelson's honorsthan does the distinguished conduct of the other captains. 

The battle had begun a little after half-past six, the "Guerrier's"masts falling at sundown, which was quarter before seven. It continuedunder the conditions already given until past eight o'clock--none ofthe ships engaged shifting her position for some time after that hour. It was, apparently, just before the second act of the drama openedwith the arrival of the remaining ships--the "Alexander, " "Swiftsure, "and "Leander"--that Nelson was severely wounded; but the precisemoment has not been recorded. He was struck upon the upper part of theforehead by a flying piece of iron, the skin, which was cut at rightangles, hanging down over his face, covering the one good eye, and, with the profuse flow of blood, blinding him completely. He exclaimed, "I am killed! Remember me to my wife!" and was falling, but CaptainBerry, who stood near, caught him in his arms. When carried below tothe cockpit, the surgeon went immediately to him, but he refused to beattended before his turn arrived, in due succession to the injuredlying around him. 

The pain was intense, and Nelson felt convinced that his hurt wasmortal; nor could he for some time accept the surgeon's assurances tothe contrary. Thus looking for his end, he renewed his farewellmessages to Lady Nelson, and directed also that Captain Louis of the"Minotaur, " which lay immediately ahead of the "Vanguard, " should behailed to come on board, that before dying he might express to him hissense of the admirable support given by her to the flagship. "Yoursupport, " said he, "has prevented me from being obliged to haul out ofthe line. "[64] From the remark it may be inferred that the French"Aquilon, " their fourth ship, which became the "Minotaur's"antagonist, had for a measurable time been able to combine herbatteries with those of the "Spartiate" upon the "Vanguard, " and tothis was probably due that the loss of the latter was next in severityto that of the "Majestic" and of the "Bellerophon. " The inference isfurther supported by the fact that the worst slaughter in the"Vanguard" was at the forward guns, those nearest the "Aquilon. "

After his wound was bound up, Nelson was requested by the surgeon tolie quiet; but his preoccupation with the events of the evening wastoo great, and his responsibility too immediate, to find relief ininactivity, --the physician's panacea. He remained below for a while, probably too much jarred for physical exertion; but his restlessnesssought vent by beginning a despatch to the Admiralty. The secretarybeing too agitated to write, Nelson tried to do so himself, and it wascharacteristic that the few lines he was then able to trace, blinded, suffering, and confused, expressed that dependence upon the Almighty, habitual with him, which illustrated a temperament of so much nativeenergy and self-reliance, and is more common, probably, among greatwarriors than in any other class of men of action. This first outburstof emotion, excited in him by the tremendous event wrought by hishands, was identical in spirit, and not improbably was clothed in thesame words, as those with which began the despatch actually sent:"Almighty God has blessed His Majesty's arms. "

While Nelson lay thus momentarily disabled, important events weretranspiring, over which, however, he could have exerted no control. Ithas been mentioned that the "Culloden" was seven miles to thenorthward and westward of the fleet, when the French were firstdiscovered. Doing her best, it was impossible to reach the main bodybefore it stood down into action, and the day had closed when the shipneared the shoal. Keeping the lead going, and proceeding with caution, though not with the extreme care which led Hood and Nelson to make sowide a sweep, Troubridge had the mishap to strike on the tail of theshoal, and there the ship stuck fast, pounding heavily until the nextmorning. The fifty-gun ship "Leander" went to her assistance, as didthe brig "Mutine, " but all efforts to float her proved vain. Meanwhilethe "Alexander" and "Swiftsure" were coming up from the southwest, thewind being so scant that they could barely pass to windward of thereef, along whose northwestern edge they were standing. The"Alexander, " in fact, was warned by the lead that she was running intodanger, and had to tack. As they approached, Troubridge, by lanternand signal, warned them off the spot of his disaster, thuscontributing to save these ships, and, by removing doubt, acceleratingtheir entrance into action. As they rounded the stranded "Culloden, "the "Leander" was also dismissed from a hopeless task, and followedthem to the scene of battle. 

The delay of the two seventy-fours, though purely fortuitous, workedin furtherance of Nelson's plan, and resulted, practically, inconstituting them a reserve, which was brought into play at a mostauspicious moment. The "Bellerophon, " crushed by the preponderatingweight of the "Orient's" battery, had just cut her cable and worn outof action, with the loss of forty-nine killed and one hundred andforty-eight wounded, out of a total of five hundred and ninety men. Her foremast alone was then standing, and it fell immediately after. The firing, which had been animated from the French left towards thecentre, now slackened around the latter, at the point where the"Orient" and her next ahead, the "Franklin, " were lying. For thisspot, therefore, the captains of the two fresh British ships steered. The "Swiftsure, " Captain Hallowell, anchored outside the enemy's line, abreast the interval separating the "Orient" and the "Franklin, "between which he divided his fire. The "Alexander, " Captain Ball, passed through the line, astern of the "Orient, " and anchored close onher inner quarter. Just at this time a shot cut the cable of the"Peuple Souverain, " next ahead of the "Franklin, " and she drifted outof her place to abreast the latter ship, ahead of which a wide gap ofa thousand feet was thus left. Into this the "Leander" glided, fixingherself with great skill to rake at once the "Franklin" and the"Orient. "

These two French ships had already been much battered, and the"Franklin" was still receiving part of the fire of the "Orion, " SirJames Saumarez, on her inner bow, as well as that of the "Defence, "hitherto engaged by the "Peuple Souverain. " This accumulation uponthem of three fresh ships would doubtless have proved irresistible, even if a yet more dire calamity had not supervened. The new-comerstook their positions soon after eight, and a little before nine a firewas observed on the poop of the "Orient. " The British captains, seeingthe flames fighting on their behalf, redoubled their efforts, directing their aim especially upon the scene of the conflagration, and thereby thwarting all attempt to extinguish it. The blaze spreadrapidly, upward through the tarred rigging and the masts, downward tothe lower decks, where her heroic crew, still ignorant of theapproaching doom, labored incessantly at their guns. As the sublimesight forced itself upon the eyes of all about, friends and enemiesalike busied themselves with precautions for their own safety in thecoming catastrophe. The ships to windward held on; those to leewardfor the most part veered or slipped their cables, the "Alexander"fiercely refusing to do so till assured that the "Orient's"destruction was inevitable. Captain Berry went below to report to theadmiral this appalling climax to the night's work, and to his ownlong-sustained efforts in chase and battle. Nelson demanded to be ledon deck, where he gave orders that the only boat still in conditionfor use should be sent with the "Vanguard's" first lieutenant, to helpsave the unhappy crew. He then remained watching the progress of thefire. At quarter before ten the "Orient" blew up. At this time themoon rose, and from her tranquil path looked down, through the clearEgyptian air, upon the scene of devastation. 

Nelson was now persuaded to go to bed, but he neither got nor soughtrepose of mind. Throughout the night, and in the early morning, messages went from him to various ships to take this or that step, togarner in the fruits of the victory yet unculled. The fleet respondedsomewhat spasmodically, if not inadequately, to these calls. Men intruth were worn out with labor and excitement. "My people were soextremely jaded, " wrote Captain Miller of the "Theseus, " who obeyed asummons to move, "that as soon as they had hove our sheet anchor upthey dropped under the capstan bars, and were asleep in a moment inevery sort of posture, having been then working at their fullestexertion, or fighting, for near twelve hours. " Nelson, in common withother great leaders, could not be satisfied with any but the utmostresults. To quote again his words of years gone by: "Had ten shipsbeen taken and the eleventh escaped, we being able to get at her, Ishould never consider it well done. " His idea, Captain Berry tells us, was first to secure the victory, and then to make the most of it, ascircumstances might permit. The expression is so luminous that it canscarcely be doubted that the words are substantially those of theadmiral himself. [65] First, the great combination, which necessarilyfor the moment neglects a part of the enemy in order to disconcert andoverwhelm the rest; afterwards, the unremitting pursuit, whichcompletes the triumph. 

It was therefore perfectly characteristic of Nelson's habit ofthought, and not merely an egotistic expression of baseless discontentwith others, that he avowed his dissatisfaction with the results ofthe night's work, stupendous and wholly unparalleled as they were. Buthis own condition, prostrated and with disabled head, was doublytypical of the state of his fleet after the "Orient" blew up. Not onlywere men overcome with fatigue, --from weariness as great men have beenaroused by the inspiring call of a trusted chief, --but the guidinghead of the body was dazed and incapacitated; that was gone whichalone could sustain energy and give unity to movement. Although Nelsonindulged in no metaphorical allusions, he had this figure of the headclearly enough in his mind, when he wrote four weeks later to LordMinto: "I regret that one escaped, and I think, if it had pleased Godthat I had not been wounded, not a boat would have escaped to havetold the tale; but do not believe that any individual in the fleet isto blame. In my conscience, I believe greater exertions could not havebeen, and I only mean to say, that if my experience could in personhave _directed_[66] those exertions of individuals, there was everyappearance that Almighty God would have continued to bless myendeavours. " This opinion he reiterated to Lord Howe, even morepositively, after four months' longer reflection, in a letter datedJanuary 8, 1799; and, whether the result would or would not haveequalled his belief, the traces are clear that what was wanted, duringthe remainder of that eventful night, was just that concord of actionwhich the head imparts to the members. Messages went from ship toship, captains consulted together and proposed to move together, anddid move separately; there was no lack of good-will, nor, as Nelsonsays, of exertion; but men were not quite sure of what the other manwould do, and felt no authority to command him; and there washesitation over risks, and cautious delays about soundings and shakyspars, which, the author is persuaded, would not have deterred Nelsonin such conditions, where victory was decisive, though not yetcomplete. Illustrations would perhaps be invidious, as seeming toimply a blame upon individuals which Nelson expressly disavowed; blamethat officers of exceptional professional capacity, concerning whomthe measured professional opinion of Lord Howe affirmed that theBattle of the Nile "was unparalleled in this respect, that _everycaptain_ distinguished himself, " fell short of the peculiar excellenceattained by Nelson only among the men of his day. Moreover, this workdoes not aim at a discussion of battles, except so far as they touchNelson personally. It may, however, be permissible to remark, that theincident here under discussion suggests a doubt about the opinion, tooeasily current, that an admiral's powers of control cease when thebattle joins. Under the circumstances, it is probable that Nelson, being so far incapacitated as he thought himself, should havetransferred the direction of affairs, formally, to the next seniorofficer, with general orders to secure the best results attainable. 

The following morning it was found that the leading six ships of theFrench had already struck their colors. The "Orient" having blown up, there were six survivors. Of these, one, the "Tonnant, " next astern ofthe "Orient, " though dismasted, was still afloat, a mile behind herformer position, having dropped there to avoid the explosion. The"Heureux" and "Mercure, " which had slipped their cables for the samereason, were ashore and helpless. The spars of the three rear ships, the "Guillaume Tell, " "Généreux, " and "Timoléon, " were still standing, and they had received little injury. At about noon these vessels, commanded by Rear Admiral Villeneuve, got under way to go to sea; butthe "Timoléon" cast with her head inshore, and, after an ineffectualattempt to wear, ran aground, bows on, her foremast going over theside as she struck. The crew escaped to the beach, and she was thenset on fire by her captain, her colors flying as she burned. The twoother ships escaped, with two frigates which accompanied them. Onlyone British ship, the "Zealous, " was in condition to follow, and shedid so; but Nelson, seeing that she could not be supported, recalledher from the unequal contest. 

It is upon the chance that these sole survivors of the greatcatastrophe might have been secured, by action during the night, thatthe validity of Nelson's regrets turns. Concerning this, it isimpossible to affirm positively one way or the other; therefore hisregrets were well grounded. It is not certainties, but chances, thatdetermine the propriety of military action. Had Villeneuve, consciousthat he had done nothing as yet, and not fully aware how the fight hadgone, hesitated about running away, and had several British shipsdropped to leeward together, which was all they had to do, and whatthe dismasted French had done, it was quite within the bound ofpossibilities that the "Généreux" and the "Guillaume Tell" would havebeen crippled at their anchors. "If" and "but, " it may be objected. Quite so; it is on if and but, not on yea and nay, that militarycriticism justly dwells. A flash of lightning and a crash of thundermay be seen and heard; it is the still small voice that leads the heroto success. As regards Villeneuve, indecision was his distinguishingtrait; and Bonaparte wrote that if any error could be imputed to him, it was that he had not got under way as soon as the "Orient" blew up, for by that time the battle was lost beyond redemption. 

The extent of the victory was decided by this retreat, and Nelson, before devoting himself to the new duties entailed by his successes, paused an instant that he might first acknowledge his debt ofgratitude to God and man. A memorandum was issued at once to thecaptains of the Squadron:

 Vanguard off the mouth of the Nile, 2d August, 1798. 

 Almighty God having blessed His Majesty's arms with victory, the Admiral intends returning Public Thanksgiving for the same at two o'clock this day; and he recommends every ship doing the same as soon as convenient. 

 HORATIO NELSON. 

To those under his command he at the same time issued a generalorder, congratulating, by explicit mention of each class, thecaptains, officers, seamen, and marines, upon the event of theconflict. "The Admiral desires they will accept his most sincere andcordial thanks for their very gallant behaviour in this gloriousbattle. " It was this habit of associating to himself, in fullrecognition and grateful remembrance, those who followed and foughtwith him, that enthroned Nelson in the affections of his men; nor willit escape observation that the warmth, though so genuine, breathesthrough words whose quietness might be thought studied, were they notso transparently spontaneous. There is in them no appeal to egotism, to the gratified passion for glory, although to that he was far frominsensible; it is the simple speech of man to man, between those whohave stood by one another in the hour of danger, and done theirduty--the acknowledgment after the event, which is the complement ofthe famous signal before Trafalgar. 

The order closed with further words of commendation, which will nothave the immortal response of the human heart to the other phrases;but which, uttered at such a moment, conveyed a salutary warning, justified as much by recent unhappy events in the British navy, as bythe well-known disorganization and anarchy that had disgraced that ofFrance. "It must strike forcibly every British seaman, how superiortheir conduct is, _when in discipline and good order_, to the riotousbehaviour of lawless Frenchmen. "[67] Captain Berry states that theassembling of the "Vanguard's" ship's company for the thanksgivingservice strongly impressed the prisoners on board, --not from thereligious point of view, which was alien from the then prevalentFrench temper, --but as evidence of an order and discipline which couldrender such a proceeding acceptable, after a victory so great, and ata moment of such seeming confusion. No small amount ofself-possession, indeed, was needed thus to direct the attention ofsix hundred men, in the confined space of a ship, whose shatteredsides and blood-stained decks bore witness to the hundred dead andwounded snatched from their number within the few hours before; yet, on the other hand, nothing could have been better calculated tocompose the thoughts, or to facilitate the transition from theexcitement of battle to the resumption of daily life. 

If, by the escape of two ships-of-the-line, the British triumph lackedsomething in technical completeness, the disaster to the French was noless absolute. Victory, said Nelson truly, is not the name for such ascene as I have witnessed. There remained now to gather up the spoilsof the field, and to realize the consequences of the battle, great andsmall, near and remote. The first was speedily done; battered as theywere, "only two masts standing out of nine sail-of-the-line, " within afortnight six of the nine prizes were ready to start for Gibraltar. Little by little, yet with the rapidity of his now highly trainedintuitions, Nelson saw the greatness of what he had effected, and withhis full native energy struggled on, amid mental confusion and bodilysuffering, and in the heat of an Egyptian August, to secure all thefruits of success. With splitting head and constantly sick, asignificant indication of the rattling shock his brain had received, he was wonderfully helped, so far as the direction of his efforts wasconcerned, by the previous familiarity of his mind with the variouselements of the problem. First of all, the home government must beinformed of an event that would so profoundly affect the future. Berry's orders, as bearer of despatches to St. Vincent off Cadiz, wereissued on the 2d of August; but there were no frigates, and the"Leander, " appointed to carry him, could not sail till the 6th. Forthe same reason it was not until the 14th that the "Mutine" could besent off with duplicates, to go direct to the Admiralty by way ofNaples, --a wise precaution in all events, but doubly justified in thiscase; for the brig reached port, whereas the fifty-gun ship wascaptured by the "Généreux. " The "Mutine's" account, though hastenedforward without delay, reached London only on the 2d of October, twomonths after the action. 

The news was received at the first with an applause and a popularcommotion commensurate to its greatness, and promised for the momentto overflow even the barriers of routine in one of the mostconservative of nations. "Mr. Pitt told me the day after Captain Capelarrived, " wrote his old admiral, Hood, to Nelson, "that you wouldcertainly be a Viscount, which I made known to Lady Nelson. But it wasobjected to in a certain quarter, because your Lordship was not acommander-in-chief. In my humble opinion a more flimsy reason neverwas given. " Official circles regained, or rather perhaps again lost, their senses, and the victory, unquestionably the most nearly completeand the most decisive ever gained by a British fleet, was rewarded, inthe person of the commanding officer, with honors less than thosebestowed for St. Vincent and Camperdown. Nelson was advanced to thelowest rank of the peerage, as Baron Nelson of the Nile. "Incongratulating your Lordship on this high distinction, " wrote theFirst Lord, "I have particular pleasure in remarking, that it is thehighest honour that has ever been conferred on an officer of yourstanding, [68] in the Service, and who was not a commander-in-chief;and the addition [of the Nile] to the Title is meant more especiallyto mark the occasion on which it was granted, which, however, withoutany such precaution, is certainly of a nature never to be forgotten. "His Lordship's sense of humor must a little have failed him, when hepenned the platitude of the last few words. 

To the sharp criticism passed in the House of Commons on thesmallness of the recognition, the Prime Minister replied that Nelson'sglory did not depend upon the rank to which he might be raised in thepeerage; a truism too palpable and inapplicable for serious utterance, the question before the House being, not the measure of Nelson'sglory, but that of the national acknowledgment. As Hood justly said, "All remunerations should be proportionate to the service done to thepublic;" and if that cannot always be attained absolutely, withoutexhausting the powers of the State, [69] there should at least be someproportion between the rewards themselves, extended to individuals, and the particular services. But even were the defence of theMinisters technically perfect, it would have been pleasanter to seethem a little blinded by such an achievement. Once in a way, undersome provocations, it is refreshing to see men able even to make foolsof themselves. 

Nelson made to the First Lord's letter a reply that was dignified andyet measured, to a degree unusual to him, contrasting singularly withhis vehement reclamations for others after Copenhagen. Withoutsemblance of complaint, he allowed plainly to appear between the lineshis own sense that the reward was not proportionate to the servicedone. "I have received your Lordship's letter communicating to me theTitle his Majesty has been graciously pleased to confer upon me--anHonour, your Lordship is pleased to say, the highest that has everbeen conferred on an officer of my standing who was not aCommander-in-Chief. I receive as I ought what the goodness of ourSovereign, and not my deserts, is pleased to bestow; but great andunexampled as this honour may be to one of my standing, yet I own Ifeel a higher one in the unbounded confidence of the King, yourLordship, and the whole World, in my exertions. Even at the bittermoment of my return to Syracuse, your Lordship is not insensible ofthe great difficulties I had to encounter in not being aCommander-in-Chief. The only happy moment I felt was in the view ofthe French; then I knew that all my sufferings would soon be at anend. " To Berry he wrote: "As to both our Honours, it is a proof howmuch a battle fought near England is prized to one fought at a greatdistance. "

Whatever was defective in the formal recognition of his own governmentwas abundantly supplied by the tributes which flowed from otherquarters, so various, that his own phrase, "the whole world, " isscarcely an exaggeration to apply to them. The Czar, the Sultan, theKings of Sardinia and of the Two Sicilies, sent messages ofcongratulation and rich presents; the Czar accompanying his with anautograph letter. The Houses of Parliament voted their thanks and apension of £2, 000 a year. The East India Company acknowledged thesecurity gained for their Indian possessions by a gift of £10, 000, £2, 000 of which he, with his wonted generosity, divided at once amonghis father and family, most of whom were not in prosperouscircumstances. Other corporations took appropriate notice of the greatevent; instances so far apart as the cities of London and Palermo, andthe Island of Zante, showing how wide-spread was the sense of relief. Not least gratifying to him, with his sensitive appreciation offriendship and susceptibility to flattery, must have been the numerousletters of congratulation he received from friends in and out of theservice. The three great admirals, --Lords Howe, Hood, and St. Vincent, --the leaders of the Navy in rank and distinguished service, wrote to him in the strongest terms of admiration. The two last styledthe battle the greatest achievement that History could produce; whileHowe's language, if more measured, was so only because, like himself, it was more precise in characterizing the special merits of theaction, and was therefore acknowledged by Nelson with particularexpressions of pleasure. 

Besides the honors bestowed upon the commander of the squadron, andthe comprehensive vote of thanks usual on such occasions, a gold medalcommemorative of the battle was given to the admiral and to each ofthe captains present. The First Lord also wrote that thefirst-lieutenants of the ships engaged would be promoted at once. Theword "engaged" caught Nelson's attention, as apparently intended toexclude the lieutenant of the "Culloden, " Troubridge's unlucky ship. "For Heaven's sake, for my sake, " he wrote to St. Vincent, "if this isso, get it altered. Our dear friend Troubridge has suffered enough. His sufferings were in every respect more than any of us. He deservesevery reward which a grateful Country can bestow on the mostmeritorious sea-officer of his standing in the service. I have felthis worth every hour of my command. " "I well know, he is my superior, "he said on another occasion; "and I so often want his advice andassistance. I have experienced the ability and activity of his mindand body: it was Troubridge that equipped the squadron so soon atSyracuse--it was he that exerted himself for me after the action--itwas Troubridge who saved the "Culloden, " when none that I know in theservice would have attempted it--it was Troubridge whom I left asmyself at Naples to watch movements--he is, as a friend and anofficer, a _nonpareil_!" His entreaties prevailed so far that theofficer in question received his promotion, not with the others, butimmediately after them; a distinction which Troubridge bewailedbitterly, as a reflection upon himself and his ship. 

On the 9th of August, Nelson sent a lieutenant to Alexandretta, on thenorthern coast of Syria, to make his way overland, by way of Aleppo, to India, with despatches to the Governor of Bombay. Resuming brieflythe events of the past months, and the numbers and character of theFrench army in Egypt, he expresses the hope that special care will beexercised against the departure of ships from India, to convey thishuge force thither by the Red Sea. On the side of the Mediterranean, their fate is settled by the recent victory. They can receive nothingfrom France; they cannot advance freely into Syria, as water transportis essential for much of their equipment; even in Egypt itself theyare hampered by the difficulties of communication--on land by theguerilla hostility of the natives, and now on the water through hisown presence and control. The Nile, through its Rosetta mouth, hadbeen heretofore the easiest communication between Cairo andAlexandria. The garrison of the latter depended largely for dailybread upon this route, now closed by the fleet in Aboukir Bay. Byland, nothing short of a regiment could pass over ground where, evenbefore the battle, the French watering-parties from the ships had tobe protected by heavy armed bodies. He intended, therefore, to remainwhere he was as long as possible. "If my letter is not so correct asmight be expected, " he concludes, "I trust for your excuse, when Itell you that my brain is so shook with the wounds in my head, that Iam sensible I am not always so clear as could be wished; but whilst aray of reason remains, my heart and my head shall ever be exerted forthe benefit of our King and Country. "

It may be added here, that the scar left by this wound seems to havebeen the cause of Nelson's hair being trained down upon his forehead, during the later years of his life. Prior to that it was brushed welloff and up, as may be seen in the portrait by Abbott, painted duringhis stay in England, while recovering from the loss of his arm. Afterhis death, a young officer of the "Victory, " who had cut off somelocks for those who wished such a remembrance of their friend, speaksof "the hair that used to hang over his forehead, near the wound thathe received at the Battle of the Nile. "

The perception of his control over the communications from Rosetta toAlexandria dawned rather late upon Nelson, for on the 5th of August hehad announced his purpose of starting down the Mediterranean on the19th. This he postponed afterwards to the first part of September, andagain for as long as possible. While in this intention, most secretand urgent orders came on the 15th from St. Vincent, to return to thewestward with his command, and to co-operate with an expeditionplanned against Minorca. Six prizes, with seven of the Britishships-of-the-line, had started on the 14th for Gibraltar, under thecommand of Sir James Saumarez. The three remaining prizes were burned, and hasty temporary repairs, adequate only for a summer voyage, wereput upon the "Vanguard, " "Culloden, " and "Alexander, " the three mostdefective ships of his fleet. On the 19th he sailed with these threefor Naples, which he had from the first intended to visit, in order togive them the complete overhauling they imperatively needed. On andafter the 13th of August several frigates had joined him. Three ofthese, with three ships-of-the-line, were left with Captain Hood, toconduct the blockade of Alexandria, and to suppress the enemy'scommunications by water along the coasts of Egypt and Syria. 

FOOTNOTES:

[60] The author is indebted to the present Lord De Saumarez for a copy ofthe opinion of Sir James Saumarez, written on board the "Vanguard" at thismeeting:--

"The French fleet having left Malta six days ago, had their destinationbeen the Island of Sicily there is reason to presume we should haveobtained information of it yesterday off Syracuse, or the day before incoming through the Pharo of Messina--under all circumstances I think itmost conducive to the good of His Majesty's service to make the best of ourway for Alexandria, as the only means of saving our possessions in India, should the French armament be destined for that country. 

"Vanguard, at sea, 22d June 1798. JAMES SAUMAREZ. "

[61] Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson, vol. Ii. P. 100. 

[62] That is, counting from May 19, when Bonaparte left Toulon, to June 7, when Troubridge's squadron joined, and pursuit began. 

[63] Nelson to Lord Howe. 

[64] G. Lathom Browne's Life of Nelson, p. 198. 

[65] An interesting example of the illuminating effect of a sound maximupon different phases of a man's life and actions, and one illustrative ofthe many-sidedness of this motto of Nelson's, occurs later in his career, and not long before his death. When the frigates "Phoebe" and "Amazon" wereordered to cruise before Toulon in October, 1804, "Lord Nelson gaveCaptains Capel and Parker several injunctions, in case they should get anopportunity of attacking two of the French frigates, which now got underway more frequently. The principal one was, that they should not eachsingle out and attack an opponent, but 'that both should endeavour togetherto take one frigate; if successful, chase the other; but if you do not takethe second, still you have won a victory, and your country will gain afrigate. '" (Phillimore's Last of Nelson's Captains, p. 122. ) Whensummarized, this again is--Victory first; afterwards the results, ascircumstances may permit. 

[66] Author's italics. 

[67] Author's italics. 

[68] "Rank" doubtless is meant by this singularly ill-chosen word. 

[69] As General Sherman justly asked, "What reward adequate to the service, could the United States have given Grant for the Vicksburg campaign?"

CHAPTER XI. 

NELSON'S RETURN FROM EGYPT TO NAPLES. --MEETING WITH LADYHAMILTON. --ASSOCIATION WITH THE COURT OF NAPLES. --WAR BETWEEN NAPLESAND FRANCE. --DEFEAT OF THE NEAPOLITANS. --FLIGHT OF THE COURT TOPALERMO. 

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER, 1798. AGE, 40. 

The voyage of Nelson's small division from Aboukir Bay to Naplesoccupied between four and five weeks, owing partly to light andcontrary winds, and partly to the dull sailing of the "Culloden, "which had a sail secured under her bottom to lessen the dangerous leakcaused by her grounding on the night of the battle. This otherwiseunwelcome delay procured for Nelson a period of salutary, thoughenforced, repose, which the nature of his injuries made especiallydesirable. His mind, indeed, did not cease to work, but it was freefrom harassment; and the obvious impossibility of doing anything, saveaccept the present easy-going situation, contributed strongly to thequietness upon which restoration depended. Nor were there wantingmatters of daily interest to prevent an excess of monotony. Now thatfrigates were no longer so vitally necessary, they and other lightcruisers turned up with amusing frequency, bringing information, andbeing again despatched hither and yonder with letters from theadmiral, which reflected instinctively his personal moods, and hisactive concern in the future military operations. 

The distress from his head continued for some time with littleabatement, and naturally much affected his tone of mind. At the firsthe spoke of his speedy return to England as inevitable, nor did theprospect occasion the discouragement which he had experienced afterthe loss of his arm; a symptom which had shown the moral effect offailure upon a sensitive and ambitious temperament. "My head is readyto split, " he had written to St. Vincent before starting, "and I amalways so sick; in short, if there be no fracture, my head is severelyshaken. " A fortnight after leaving the bay, he writes him again: "Iknow I ought to give up for a little while; my head is splitting atthis moment;" and Nicolas remarks that the letter bears evident marksof suffering, three attempts being made to spell the word "splitting. "Yet by this time the pain had become at least intermittent, forSaumarez, whose squadron fell in with the admiral's division severaltimes, notes that on the 26th of August he spent half an hour on boardthe flagship, and found him in perfect health; and on the 7th ofSeptember Nelson himself writes to the British minister at Florencethat he felt so much recovered, it was probable he would not go homefor the present. A few days later he wrote to Hood, off Alexandria, that he relied upon the thoroughness of the blockade to complete thedestruction of the French army. "I shall not go home, " he added, "until this is effected, and the islands of Malta, Corfu, &c. , retaken. "

It is to the furtherance of these objects, all closely allied, and inhis apprehension mutually dependent, that his occasional letters aredirected. His sphere of operations he plainly conceives to be fromMalta, eastward, to Syria inclusive. "I detest this voyage to Naples, "he wrote to St. Vincent, two days before reaching the port. "Nothingbut absolute necessity could force me to the measure. Syracuse infuture, whilst my operations lie on the eastern side of Sicily, is myport, where every refreshment may be had for a fleet. " The presentnecessity was that of refit and repair, to which Syracuse wasinadequate. "For myself, " he sent word to Sir William Hamilton, "Ihope not to be more than four or five days at Naples, for these timesare not for idleness. " Not long after his arrival this conviction asto the movements requiring his personal presence underwent an entirechange; and thenceforth, till he left for England two years later, itwas only the presence of clear emergency, appealing to his martialinstincts and calling forth the sense of duty which lay at the root ofhis character, that could persuade him his proper place was elsewherethan at the Court of Naples. It is only fair to add that, upon thereceipt of the news of his great victory, the Admiralty designated toSt. Vincent, as first in order among the cares of the squadron withinthe Mediterranean, "the protection of the coasts of Sicily, Naples, and the Adriatic, and, in the event of war being renewed in Italy, anactive co-operation with the Austrian and Neapolitan armies. " Longbefore these instructions were received, the very day indeed that theywere written, Nelson had become urgently instrumental in precipitatingNaples into war. Next in order of interest, by the Admiralty'sletters, were, successively, the isolation of Egypt and of Malta, andco-operation with the Russian and Turkish squadrons which, it wasexpected, would be sent into the Archipelago, and which actually didattack and capture Corfu. The letter thus summarized may be taken toindicate the general extent of Nelson's charge during the twofollowing years. 

It may be said, then, without error, that Nelson's opinion as to thedirection of his personal supervision underwent a decisive changeafter his arrival in Naples. Before it, he is urgent with that Courtto support with active naval assistance the operations against Malta, and to send bomb-vessels, the absence of which he continuallydeplores, to shell the transports in the harbor of Alexandria. Hehopes, indeed, to find on his arrival that the Emperor and many otherpowers are at war with the French, but his attention is concentratedupon Bonaparte's army. To the British minister in Turkey he is yetmore insistent as to what the Sultan should undertake. If he will butsend a few ships-of-the-line, and some bombs, he will destroy alltheir transports in Alexandria; and an army of ten thousand men mayretake Alexandria immediately, as the French have only four thousandmen in it. Subsequent events showed this forecast of Nelson's to be aserroneous as those of Napoleon were at times in regard to navalprospects. "General Bonaparte, " he continues, "only wants acommunication opened by sea, to march into Syria, that the transportswith stores, &c. , for the army, may go alongshore with him. " This hehad learned from French officers who were prisoners on board, and weknow it corresponded with the facts. "If the Sultan will not sendanything, he will lose Syria. " "Naples, " he tells St Vincent, "issaved in spite of herself. They have evidently broken their treatywith France, and yet are afraid to assist in finishing the vastarmament of the French. Four hours with bomb vessels, would set all ina blaze, and we know what an army is without stores. " Thisanticipation also proved deceptive; but the expressions quoted arefair examples of the general tenor of his letters between Aboukir andNaples, and show his feeling that the important points of his commandlay to the east of Sicily. 

The same tendency was shown upon the appearance of a Portuguesesquadron of four ships-of-the-line, which entered the Mediterranean inJuly with orders to place themselves under his command. He firstlearned the fact upon this passage, and at once sent a frigate toAlexandria to beg the Portuguese admiral, the Marquis de Niza, toassume the blockade, as the most important service to be rendered thecommon cause. When the frigate reached its destination, Niza had comeand gone, and Nelson then headed him off at the Strait of Messina, onhis way to Naples, and sent him to blockade Malta. It may be addedthat this squadron remained under his command until December, 1799, and was of substantial utility in the various operations. Nelsonprofessed no great confidence in its efficiency, which was notsubjected to the severest tests; but he made a handsome acknowledgmentto its commander when it was recalled to Lisbon. 

On the 22d of September the flagship anchored at Naples. On the 15thher foremast had been carried away in a squall, and the "poor wretchedVanguard, " as Nelson called her, having to be towed by a frigate, hertwo crippled consorts preceded her arrival by six days. The news ofthe victory had been brought three weeks before by the "Mutine, " onthe 1st of September. The Court party had gone wild with joy, in whichthe populace, naturally hostile to the French, had joined withsouthern vivacity of expression. Captain Capel, who commanded thebrig, with Lieutenant Hoste, who was to succeed him when he departedwith the despatches for England, had been at once taken to Court andpresented. When they left the palace they were met by Lady Hamilton, who made them get into her carriage, and with characteristic bad tasteand love of notoriety paraded them until dark through the streets ofthis neutral capital, she wearing a bandeau round her forehead withthe words, "Nelson and Victory. " "The populace saw and understood whatit meant, " wrote Hoste, "and 'Viva Nelson!' resounded through thestreets. You can have no idea of the rejoicings that were madethroughout Naples. Bonfires and illuminations all over the town;indeed, it would require an abler pen than I am master of to give youany account but what will fall infinitely short of what was the case. "

By Nelson's orders the "Mutine" sailed in a few days to meet him withdespatches, and on the 14th of September joined the division offStromboli. With more important information, and letters from personsof greater consequence, she had brought also one from Lady Hamilton, giving a vivid picture of the general joy, and in particular anaccount of the Queen's state of mind, so highly colored and detailedthat Nelson could only hope he might not be witness to a renewal ofit, but which so impressed him that he quoted it at length to LadyNelson. When the "Vanguard" approached the town, crowds of boats wentout to meet her, and His Sicilian Majesty himself came on board whenshe was still a league from the anchorage. He had been preceded by theBritish ambassador with Lady Hamilton. The latter, having had onlythree weeks to recover from the first shock of the news, was greatlyovercome, and dropped her lovely face and by no means slender figureinto the arms of the admiral, who, on his part, could scarcely fail tobe struck with the pose of one whose attitudes compelled theadmiration of the most exacting critics. "The scene in the boat wasterribly affecting, " he wrote to his wife. "Up flew her ladyship, andexclaiming, 'O God, is it possible?' she fell into my arm more deadthan alive. Tears, however, soon set matters to rights. "

This was the beginning of an intimacy destined, in the end, to affectprofoundly and unhappily the future of Nelson. Although Sir WilliamHamilton, in his own congratulatory letter by the "Mutine, " called him"our bosom friend, " they do not seem to have met since the summer of1793, when the young captain carried Hood's despatches from Toulon toNaples; and Nelson, while acknowledging on the present occasion thekindness of an invitation to take up his quarters at the embassy, hadexpressed a preference for rooms at a hotel, on account of thebusiness to be transacted. This reluctance, however, was easily andproperly overruled, and immediately after anchoring he went to live atthe ambassador's house, which, under the management of the celebratedwoman who presided there, became the social centre of the welcomeslavished not only upon himself, but upon all the officers of theships. 

Emma, Lady Hamilton, the second wife of Sir William, was at this timethirty-three years old, her husband being sixty-eight. Her name, whenfirst entering the world, was Amy Lyon. Born in Cheshire of extremelypoor parents, in the humblest walk of life, she had found her way upto London, while yet little more than a child, and there, having abeautiful face, much natural charm of manner and disposition, utterlyinexperienced, and with scarcely any moral standards, --of which herlife throughout shows but little trace, --she was speedily ruined, fellso far, in fact, that even with all her attractions it seemed doubtfulwhether any man would own himself responsible for her condition, orbefriend her. In these circumstances, when not yet seventeen, she wastaken up by a nephew of Sir William Hamilton, Mr. Charles Greville, who recognized not merely her superficial loveliness, but something ofthe mental and moral traits underlying it, which promised a capacityfor development into an interesting and affectionate householdcompanion. Upon her promises of amendment, in the matter of futurerelations with men, and of submission to his guidance and wishes inthe general conduct of her life, he took her in charge, and the twolived together for nearly four years. 

Greville bestowed a good deal of pains upon her training, and wasrewarded, not only by gratitude and careful compliance with hisdirections, but by her sincere and devoted affection. The girl becameheartily and fondly in love with him, finding both contentment andhappiness in the simply ordered home provided for her. Her education, which hitherto was of the smallest, received attention, --her lettersshowing a very great improvement both in spelling and mode ofexpression by the end of their association. On the moral side, ofcourse, there was not much development to be expected from one whosestandards, with less excuse, were in no way better than her own. Onthis side Greville's teaching was purely utilitarian. Her positionwas considered as a calling, --success in which demanded certainproprieties and accomplishments, only to be attained by the practiceof habitual self-control, alike in doing and in not doing. 

The future Lady Hamilton was affectionate and impulsive, good-humored, with generous instincts and a quick temper; but she was also ambitiousand exceptionally clever. She loved Greville warmly; but she took toheart the hard truths of his teachings, and they sank deep in acongenial soil. Under the influence of the two motives, she appliedherself to gain, and did gain, a certain degree of external nicenessand self-control. Her affection for Greville made her willing, for hissake, because he was not rich, to live quietly, to accept modestsurroundings, and to discard whatever was coarse in associates, orunbecoming in her own person or conduct. He, while relaxing none ofhis requirements, repaid her with courtesy and increasing admiration, than which nothing was dearer to her; for, if not appreciative of thesatisfaction of self-respect, she was keenly alive to the delights ofhomage from others, though extorted by purely adventitious qualities. Glory was to her more than honor. This love of admiration, fostered, yet pruned, by Greville's shrewd precepts, was her dominant trait. Toits gratification her singular personal advantages contributed, andthey were powerfully supported by an unusual faculty for assuming apart, for entering into a character and representing its externaltraits. Thus gifted by nature, and swayed by vanity, her developmentwas for the time regulated and chastened by the disinterestedness ofher passion for her lover. Her worse qualities were momentarily keptin abeyance. Naturally lovable, not only in exterior but intemperament, she became more and more attractive. "Consider, " wroteGreville, referring to her surroundings before she passed into hishands, "what a charming creature she would have been, if she had beenblessed with the advantages of an early education, and had not beenspoilt by the indulgence of every caprice. "

Unfortunately the restraining influence, probably ephemeral in anyevent, was about to be rudely removed, permitting to flourish inunrestrained vigor the natural tendency to compel admiration andsecure advantage by the spell of physical beauty, and by the exertionof natural aptitudes for pleasing in the only path to success open toher. In 1782 Hamilton's first wife died, and in 1784 he came toEngland on leave. There he met Amy Lyon, now known as Emma Hart, inthe house provided for her by Greville. His admiration of her wasextreme, and its tendency was not misunderstood by her. He returned tohis post at Naples at the end of the year. In the course of 1785Greville, who was now in his thirty-sixth year, decided that thecondition of his fortune made it imperative for him to marry, and thatas a first step thereto he must break with Emma Hart. Hamilton'sinclination for her provided a ready means for so doing, so far as thetwo men were concerned; but her concurrence was not sure. After somecorrespondence, it was arranged that she should go to Naples in thespring of 1786, to live there under Hamilton's care, with theexpectation on her part that Greville would join her a few monthslater. Placed as she then would be, it was probable that she wouldeventually accept the offers made her; though it would be less thanjust to either Greville or Hamilton, to allow the impression that theydid not intend to provide sufficiently for her needs, whatever herdecision. 

In this way she left England in the spring of 1786, reaching Naples onthe 26th of April. When the poor girl, after many of her letters toher lover remained unanswered, fully realized, that the separation wasfinal, her grief was extreme, and found utterance in words oftenderness and desolation, which, however undisciplined in expression, are marked by genuine pathos. But anger struggled with sorrow for themastery in her soul. She was too keen-witted not to have had aninkling of the possible outcome of her departure from England, and ofthe doubtful position she was occupying at Naples; but her wishes hadmade her willingly deaf to any false ring in the assurances given herby Greville, and she resented not only the abandonment, but the deceitwhich she, justly or unjustly, conceived to have been practised, whileher womanliness revolted from the cold-blooded advice given by him toaccept the situation. The conflict was so sharp that for a time bothhe and Hamilton expected she would return to England; but Greville hadnot labored in vain at what he was pleased to consider her education. By the end of the year she was addressing Hamilton in words of veryfairly assumed affection, but not until she had written to Greville, with a certain haughty desperation, "If you affront me, I will makehim marry me. " The threat was two-edged, for Hamilton intendedGreville to be his heir; but the latter probably gave little heed to acontingency he must have thought very unlikely for a man of fifty-six, who had passed his life in the world, and held Hamilton's publicposition. 

To effect this, however, Emma Hart now bent her personal charms, strong purpose, and the worldly wisdom with which Greville had taughther to assure her hold upon a man. Love, in its unselfishness, passedout of her life with Greville. Other men might find her pliant, pleasing, seductive; he alone knew her as disinterested. She followedout her design with a patience, astuteness, and consistency whichattest the strength of her resolution, and her acute intellectualperception of the advantages at her disposal. Ambition, a naturaltrait with her, had been trained to self-control, in order to compassa lowly, colorless success. Unlooked-for opportunity now held beforeher eyes, distant and difficult of attainment, but not impossible, aposition of assured safety, luxury, and prominence, which appealedpowerfully to the love of pleasure, still dormant, and to the love ofconspicuousness, which became the two most noticeable features of hercharacter. 

With all her natural advantages, however, the way was hard and long. She had to become indispensable to Hamilton, and at the same time, andby the same methods, an object the more desirable to him because ofher evident attractiveness to others. Above all, she had to contendwith her own temper, naturally lively and prone to bursts of anger, which the prolonged suspense of the struggle, acting upon a woman'snerves, tended peculiarly to exasperate. Hamilton was of an age whenhe might be enslaved by fondness, but not constrained by strength ofpassion to endure indefinitely household tempests, much less toperpetuate them upon himself by lasting bonds. In all this Emma Hartshowed herself fully equal to the task. Tenderly affectionate to him, except when carried away by the fits of irritability which both he andGreville had occasion to observe, she complied readily with all hiswishes, and followed out with extraordinary assiduity his plans forher improvement in education and in accomplishments. The society whichgathered round them was, of course, almost wholly of men, who one andall prostrated themselves before her beauty and cleverness, with thesame unanimity of submission as did the officers of Nelson's divisionafter the Battle of the Nile. But, while giving free rein to coquetry, and revelling in admiration, she afforded no ground for scandal to theworld, or dissatisfaction to Hamilton. In the attitude of outsiderstowards her, he had reason to see only the general testimony to hercharms and to his own good fortune. At the end of 1787 he wrote toGreville: "I can assure you her behaviour is such as has acquired hermany sensible admirers, and we have a good man society, and all thefemale nobility, with the queen at their head, show her every distantcivility. "

Thus she persisted, keeping her beauty, and growing in mentalacquirements and accomplishments, but making little apparent headwaytowards the great object of her ambition. "I fear, " wrote Hamiltontowards the middle of 1789, when she had been three years with him, "her views are beyond what I can bring myself to execute; and thatwhen her hopes on that point are over, she will make herself and meunhappy. Hitherto her behaviour is irreproachable, but her temper, asyou must know, unequal. " He underrated her perseverance, andexaggerated his own strength of reluctance, innate and acquired. Impossible as it would seem, with his antecedents and with hers, hisfriends and acquaintances became alarmed for the result, and notwithout cause. "Her influence over him exceeds all belief, " wrote amutual friend to Greville in March, 1791. "His attachment exceedsadmiration, it is perfect dotage. " Shortly after this letter waswritten the two went to England, and there they were married on the6th of September, 1791. By the end of the year they were back inNaples, and did not again leave Italy up to the time of Nelson'sarrival in 1798. 

Lady Hamilton did not abuse the security of the place she had won withso much pains, nor on the other hand did her ambition and love ofprominence permit her to settle down to inert enjoyment of it. Thecareful self-restraint with which she had observed the proprieties ofher former false position facilitated the disappearance of prejudicesnaturally arising from it. Many English ladies of rank, passingthrough Naples, visited her, and those who refused to ignore the pastof the woman, in the position of the British minister's wife, were bysome sharply criticised. "She has had a difficult part to act, " wroteHamilton, six months after their return, "and has succeededwonderfully, having gained, by having no pretensions, the thoroughapprobation of all the English ladies. The Queen of Naples was verykind to her on our return, and treats her like any other travellinglady of distinction; in short, we are very comfortably situatedhere. " "We dined yesterday with Sir William and Lady Hamilton, " wroteLady Malmesbury, whose husband was among the most distinguisheddiplomatists of the day. "She really behaves as well as possible, andquite wonderfully, considering her origin and education. "

This last phrase, used at the culmination of Lady Hamilton's goodfortune and personal advance, was wholly good-natured; but it sums upthe best of the not very good that can be said of her during theheight of her prosperity, and in later years. Although, as has beenremarked, she did not at this time abuse the security which as a wifeshe had attained, --for policy too clearly dictated the continuance ofher previous circumspection, --the necessity for strenuouswatchfulness, exertion, and self-restraint, in order to reach adistant goal, no longer existed; and, although a woman of many amiableand generous impulses, she had not a shred of principle to take theplace of the motive of self-interest, which hitherto had been soperemptory in its exactions. What she was in delicacy in 1791, thatshe remained in 1796, --five years after the disappearance of hersocial disabilities; a pretty fair proof that what she possessed of itwas but skin deep, the result of a diligent observance of Greville'sproprieties, for her personal advantage, not the token of a nobleinner spirit struggling from excusable defilement to the light. "Shedoes the honours of the house with great attention and desire toplease, " wrote Greville's correspondent of 1791, before quoted, "butwants a little refinement of manners, in which, in the course of sixyears, I wonder she has not made greater progress. " "She is all Natureand yet all Art, " said Sir Gilbert Elliot, in 1796; "that is to say, her manners are perfectly unpolished, of course very easy, though notwith the ease of good breeding, but of a barmaid; excessively goodhumoured, and wishing to please and be admired by all ages and sortsof persons that come in her way; but besides considerable naturalunderstanding, she has acquired, since her marriage, some knowledge ofhistory and of the arts, and one wonders at the application and painsshe has taken to make herself what she is. With men her language andconversation are exaggerations of anything I ever heard anywhere; andI was wonderfully struck with these inveterate remains of her origin, though the impression was very much weakened by seeing the otherladies of Naples. " "I thought her a very handsome, vulgar woman, "curtly commented the lieutenant of a frigate which visited Naples inthe summer of 1798, while hunting for Nelson in the game ofcross-purposes that preceded the Nile. [70] Allowing for difference ofobservers, it is plain that the Lady Hamilton whom Nelson now met, hadnot improved in essentials over the Emma Hart of a half-dozen yearsbefore. 

Two years afterwards, the verdict of these men was confirmed by Mrs. St. George, [71] a lady in London society, who viewed her possibly withsomething of the repugnant prejudice of a refined and cultivatedwoman, yet evidently measured her words calmly, even in her privatejournal. "I think her bold, daring, vain even to folly, and stampedwith the manners of her first situation much more strongly than onewould suppose, after having represented Majesty, and lived in goodcompany fifteen years. Her dress is frightful. Her waist is absolutelybetween her shoulders. " Nelson measured her by a different standard. "In every point of view, " he tells herself, "from Ambassatrice to theduties of domestic life, I never saw your equal. That elegance ofmanners, accomplishments, and, above all, your goodness of heart, isunparalleled. " The same lady describes her personal appearance, at thetime when his devotion had reached the height from which it neverdeclined. "Her figure is colossal, but, excepting her feet, which arehideous, well shaped. Her bones are large, and she is exceedingly_embonpoint_. The shape of all her features is fine, as is the form ofher head, and particularly her ears; her teeth are a little irregular, but tolerably white; her eyes light blue, with a brown spot in one, which, though a defect, takes nothing away from her beauty orexpression. Her eyebrows and hair (which, by the bye, is never clean)are dark, and her complexion coarse. Her expression is stronglymarked, variable, and interesting; her movements in common lifeungraceful; her voice loud, yet not disagreeable. " Elliot's briefermention of her appearance is at once confirmatory and complementary ofthat of Mrs. St. George: "Her person is nothing short of monstrous forits enormity, and is growing every day. Her face is beautiful. "

To these opinions it may be not uninteresting to add the criticalestimate of William Beckford, uttered many years later. Beckford wasnot an admirable character, far from it; but he had known goodsociety, and he had cultivated tastes. Nelson accepted hishospitality, and, with the Hamiltons, spent several days under hisroof, about Christmas time, 1800. In reply to the question, "Was thesecond Lady Hamilton a fascinating woman?" he said, "I never thoughther so. She was somewhat masculine, but symmetrical in figure, so thatSir William called her his Grecian. She was full in person, not fat, but _embonpoint_. Her carriage often majestic, rather than feminine. Not at all delicate, ill-bred, often very affected, a devil in temperwhen set on edge. She had beautiful hair and displayed it. Hercountenance was agreeable, --fine, hardly beautiful, but the outlineexcellent. She affected sensibility, but felt none--was artful; and nowonder, she had been trained in the Court of Naples--a fine school foran English woman of any stamp. Nelson was infatuated. She could makehim believe anything, that the profligate queen was a Madonna. He washer dupe. She never had a child in her life. "[72] As to this lastassertion, Beckford was not in a position to have personal knowledge. 

But along with this native coarseness, which, if not ineradicable, wasnever eradicated, she possessed an intuitive and perfect sense, amounting to genius, for what propriety and good taste demanded in thepresentation of an ideal part, --the gift of the born actress. Of herpowers in this way the celebrated "Attitudes" were the chief example, and there is no disagreement among the witnesses, either as to theircharm or as to the entire disappearance of the every-day woman in theassumed character. "We had the attitudes a night or two ago by candlelight, " wrote Sir Gilbert Elliot in 1796. "They come up to myexpectations fully, which is saying everything. They set Lady Hamiltonin a very different light from any I had seen her in before; nothingabout her, neither her conversation, her manners, nor figure, announcethe very refined taste which she discovers in this performance, besides the extraordinary talent which is needed for the execution. ""You never saw anything so charming as Lady Hamilton's attitudes, "wrote Lady Malmesbury in 1791. "The most graceful statues or picturesdo not give you an idea of them. " "It is a beautiful performance, "wrote Mrs. St. George, who saw her in 1800, when the Hamiltons andNelson were travelling on the Continent, "amusing to the mostignorant, and highly interesting to the lovers of art. It isremarkable that although coarse and ungraceful in common life, shebecomes highly graceful, and even beautiful, during this performance. It is also singular that, in spite of the accuracy of her imitation ofthe finest ancient draperies, her usual dress is tasteless, vulgar, loaded and unbecoming. "

The stormy period of the French Revolution, which was about to burstinto universal war at the time she was married, gave Lady Hamiltonanother opportunity to come yet more conspicuously before men's eyesthan she had hitherto done. It is not easy to say what degree ofinfluence she really attained, or what particular results she may haveeffected; but she certainly managed to give herself so much the air ofa person of importance, in the political intrigues of the day inNaples, as at the least to impose successfully upon a great many, andto be accepted very much at her own valuation. The French ambassador, writing to Bonaparte in 1798, says: "If the preponderance which theFrench Republic ought to take here, removed hence Acton and the wifeof Hamilton, this country, without other changes, would be extremelyuseful for the execution of all your projects in the Mediterranean;"and Sir William himself, who should have known, speaks of her activityand utility, --"for several years the real and only confidential friendof the Queen of Naples. " Nelson, writing to the Queen of Naples in1804, after Hamilton's death, said: "Your Majesty well knows that itwas her capacity and conduct which sustained his diplomatic characterduring the last years in which he was at Naples. "[73] Certainly, Nelson believed, with all the blindness of love, whatever his mistresschose to tell him, but he was not without close personal knowledge ofthe inside history of at least two of those last years; for, in 1801, addressing Mr. Addington, then Prime Minister, he used these words:"Having for a length of time seen the correspondence both public andprivate, from all the Neapolitan ministers to their Government and tothe Queen of Naples, I am perfectly acquainted with the views of theseveral Powers. " For her success Lady Hamilton was indebted, partly toher personal advantages, and partly to her position as wife of theBritish minister and chosen friend to the Queen. Great Britain playeda leading part everywhere in the gigantic struggle throughout theContinent, but to a remote peninsular kingdom like Naples, protectedby its distance from the centres of strife, yet not whollyinaccessible by land, the chief maritime state was the one and onlysufficient ally. A rude reminder of his exposure to naval attack hadbeen given to the King of the Two Sicilies, in 1792, by the appearanceof a French fleet, which extorted satisfaction for an alleged insult, by threatening instant bombardment of his capital. 

Sir William Hamilton, who had been minister since 1765, thus foundhimself suddenly converted from a dilettante and sportsman, loungingthrough life, into a busy diplomat, at the centre of affairs ofcritical moment. At sixty-two the change could scarcely have beenwelcome to him, but to his beautiful and ambitious wife the access ofimportance was sweet, for it led to a close friendship with the Queen, already disposed to affect her, even in the notorious position she hadheld before her marriage; and the Queen, a daughter of Maria Theresaand sister to Marie Antoinette, was much more of a man than the King. The intimacy became the talk of Naples, and the report spread, easilybelieved, because in the nature of things very likely, that thepersonal relations between the two women cloaked a great deal ofunderhand work, such as often accompanies diplomatic difficulties. Nordid Lady Hamilton lack natural qualifications for the position intowhich she undoubtedly wished to thrust herself. She was a brave, capable, full-blooded, efficient woman, not to be daunted by fears orscruples; a woman who, if only nerve and intelligence were required, and if distinction for herself was at stake, could be fairly dependedupon. There was in her make-up a good deal of pagan virtue. She couldappreciate and admire heroism, and, under the stimulus of excitement, of self-conscious magnanimity, for the glitter of effectiveperformance and the applause of onlookers, she was quite capable ofheroic action. It was this daring spirit, coarsely akin to much thatwas best in himself, and of which she made proof under his own eyes, that Nelson recognized; and this, in the thought of the writer, wasthe body of truth, from which his enthusiasm, enkindled by her charmsand by her tenderness towards himself, projected such a singularphantasm of romantic perfections. 

Such was the woman, and such the position in the public eye that shehad gained for herself, when to Naples, first in the Europeancontinent, came the news which made Nelson for the moment the mostconspicuous man of the day. He had achieved a triumph the moststartlingly dazzling that had yet been gained, and over one who up tothat time had excelled all other warriors in the brilliancy and extentof his victories. Bonaparte was not yet the Napoleon whom historyknows, but thus far he had been the most distinguished child of theRevolution. That Lady Hamilton then and there formed the purpose ofattaching Nelson to her, by the bonds which have sullied his memory, is most improbable; but it is in entire keeping with the career andthe self-revelations of the woman that she should, instinctively, ifnot with deliberation, have resolved to parade herself in the glare ofhis renown, and appear in the foreground upon the stage of histriumph, the chief dispenser of his praises, the patroness andproprietor of the hero. The great occasion should shed a glamour roundher, together with him. "Emma's passion is admiration, " Greville hadwritten soon after they parted, "and it is capable of aspiring to anyline which would be celebrated, and it would be indifferent, when onthat key, whether she was Lucretia or Sappho, or Scævola or Regulus;anything grand, masculine or feminine, she could take up. "

Unhappily, Nelson was not able to stand the heady dose of flatteryadministered by a woman of such conspicuous beauty and consummate art;nor was his taste discriminating enough to experience any wholesomerevolt against the rankness of the draught she offered him. The quickappreciation of the born actress, which enabled her when on the stageto clothe herself with a grace and refinement that dropped away whenshe left it, conspired with his simplicity of confidence in others, and his strong tendency to idealize, to invest her with a charactervery different from the true. Not that the Lady Hamilton of realitywas utterly different from the Lady Hamilton of his imagination. Thatshe ever loved him is doubtful; but there were in her spirit impulsescapable of sympathetic response to his own in his bravest acts, thoughnot in his noblest motives. It is inconceivable that duty everappealed, to her as it did to him, nor could a woman of innatenobility of character have dragged a man of Nelson's masculine renownabout England and the Continent, till he was the mock of allbeholders; but on the other hand it never could have occurred to theenergetic, courageous, brilliant Lady Hamilton, after the lofty deedsand stirring dramatic scenes of St. Vincent, to beg him, as LadyNelson did, "to leave boarding to captains. " Sympathy, not good taste, would have withheld her. In Lady Nelson's letters there is evidenceenough of a somewhat colorless womanly affection, but not a thrill ofresponse to the greatness of her husband's daring, even whensurrounded herself by the acclamations it called forth. 

What Nelson had never yet found in woman Lady Hamilton gavehim, --admiration and appreciation, undisguised and unmeasured, yetbestowed by one who had the power, by the admission of even unfriendlycritics, of giving a reality and grace to the part she was performing. He was soon at her feet. The playful gallantry with which Ball, Elliot, and even old St. Vincent[74] himself, paid court to a handsomewoman, greedy of homage, became in Nelson a serious matter. Romanticin temperament, he was all day in flattering contact with her. Wornout and ill from that "fever of anxiety, " to use his own words, whichhe had endured since the middle of June, she attended and nursed him. "Lady Hamilton, " he exclaimed to Lady Nelson, with enthusiasmundiscriminating in more ways than one, "is one of the very best womenin this world; she is an honour to her sex. " A week later he tellsher, with an odd collocation of persons: "My pride is being yourhusband, the son of my dear father, and in having Sir William and LadyHamilton for my friends. While these approve my conduct, I shall notfeel or regard the envy of thousands. " The matter was passing rapidlyinto the platonic stage, in which Sir William was also erelongassigned an appropriate, if not wholly flattering, position. "What canI say of hers and Sir William's attention to me? They are in fact, with the exception of you and my good father, the dearest friends Ihave in this world. I live as Sir William's son in the house, and myglory is as dear to them as their own; in short, I am under suchobligations as I can never repay but with my eternal gratitude. ""Naples is a dangerous place, " he sagely tells Lord St. Vincent, "andwe must keep clear of it. I am writing opposite Lady Hamilton, therefore you will not be surprised at the glorious jumble of thisletter. Were your Lordship in my place, I much doubt if you couldwrite so well; our hearts and our hands must be all in a flutter. "Matters progressed; within ten days the veteran seaman learned, amongother concerns of more or less official importance, that "LadyHamilton is an Angel. She has honoured me by being my ambassadress tothe queen: therefore she has my implicit confidence and is worthy ofit. "

That such intimacy and such relations resulted in no influence uponthe admiral's public action is not to be believed. That he consciouslyperverted his views is improbable, but that he saw duty under otherthan normal lights is not only probable, but evident. His wholeemotional nature was stirred as it never had been. Incipient love anduniversal admiration had created in him a tone of mind, and brought tobirth feelings, which he had, seemingly, scarcely known. "I cannotwrite a stiff formal public letter, " he tells St. Vincent effusively. "You must make one or both so. I feel you are my friend, and my heartyearns to you. " Such extravagance of expression and relaxation ofofficial tone has no pertinent cause, and is at least noteworthy. TheCourt, or rather the Queen through Lady Hamilton, took possession ofhim. He became immediately one of the little coterie centring roundHer Majesty, and he reflected its tone and partisanship, which, fostered probably in the intimate conversations of the two women, werereadily transmitted to the minister by the wife whom he adored. TheQueen, impetuous, enterprising, and headstrong, like her mother andsister, moved more by feminine feelings of hatred and revenge againstthe French than by well-balanced considerations of policy, not onlyfavored war, but wished to precipitate the action of the Emperor byimmediately attacking the French in the Roman territory. The decisionand daring of such a course was so consonant to Nelson's owntemperament that he readily sympathized; but it is impossible to admitits wisdom, from either a political or military standpoint. It was anexcessively bad combination, substituting isolated attacks forco-operation, and risking results upon the chance of prompt support, by a state which would be offended and embarrassed by the step taken. 

Under ordinary conditions Nelson might have seen this, but he was wellhandled. Within three days he had been persuaded that upon hispersonal presence depended the salvation of Italy. "My head is quitehealed, and, if it were necessary, I could not at present leave Italy, who looks up to me as, under God, its Protector. " He continually, bydevout recollection of his indebtedness to God, seeks to keep himselfin hand. "I am placed by Providence in that situation, that all mycaution will be necessary to prevent vanity from showing itselfsuperior to my gratitude and thankfulness, "--but the current was toostrong for him, and was swollen to a torrent by the streams ofadulation, which from all quarters flowed in upon a temperament onlytoo disposed to accept them. "Could I, my dearest Fanny, " he writes toLady Nelson, "tell you half the honours which are shown me here, not aream of paper would hold it. " A grand ball was given on his birthday, September 29; and a rostral column was "erected under a magnificentcanopy, never, Lady Hamilton says, to come down while they remain atNaples. " Within a week the conviction of his own importance led him towrite to Lady Hamilton, evidently for transmission to the Queen, anopinion, or rather an urgent expression of advice, that Naples shouldat once begin war. It is only conjectural to say that this opinion, which rested on no adequate knowledge of the strength of theNeapolitan Kingdom, was elicited by the Queen through Lady Hamilton;but the inference derives support from the words, "I have read withadmiration the queen's dignified and incomparable letter of September, 1796, "--two years before. That his views were not the simple outcomeof his own unbiassed study of the situation is evident enough. "Thiscountry, by its system of procrastination, will ruin itself, " hewrites to St. Vincent, the very day after drawing up the letter inquestion; "the queen sees it and thinks"--not as I do, but--"as _we_do. " That Lady Hamilton was one of the "we" is plain, for in thepostscript to the letter he says: "Your Ladyship will, I beg, receivethis letter as a _preparative for Sir William Hamilton, _ to whom I amwriting, with all respect, the firm and unalterable opinion of aBritish admiral, " etc. Certainly these words--taken with those alreadyquoted, and written just a week afterwards, "Lady Hamilton has been myambassadress to the queen"--indicate that she was the intermediarybetween Nelson and the Court, as well as between him and her husband. 

There is no record of any official request for this unofficial andirregular communication of the opinion of a British admiral; and, ofcourse, when a man has allowed himself, unasked, though notunprompted, to press such a line of action, he has bound himselfpersonally, and embarrassed himself officially, in case it turns outbadly. Nelson very soon, within a fortnight, had to realize this, inthe urgent entreaties of the Court not to forsake them; and to seereason for thinking "that a strong wish for our squadron's being onthe Coast of Naples is, that in case of any mishap, that theirMajesties think their persons much safer under the protection of theBritish flag than under any other;" that is--than under their own. They could not trust their own people; they could not, as the eventproved, trust their army in the field; and the veteran Neapolitannaval officer, Caracciolo, whether he deserved confidence or not, wasstung to the quick when, in the event, they sought refuge with aforeign admiral instead of with himself. That Nelson should not haveknown all this, ten days after reaching Naples, was pardonable enough, and, if formally asked for advice without such facts being placedbefore him, he could not be responsible for an error thus arising; butthe case is very different when advice is volunteered. He is moreperemptory than the minister himself. "You will not believe I havesaid or done anything, without the approbation of Sir WilliamHamilton. His Excellency is too good to them, and the strong languageof an English Admiral telling them plain truths of their miserablesystem may do good. "

The particular position of Naples relatively to France was this. French troops had for a year past occupied the Roman Republic, whichhad been established by them upon the overthrow of the PapalGovernment. Their presence there was regarded by Nelson as a constantthreat to the Two Sicilies, and this to an extent was true; but ratherbecause of the contagion of revolutionary ideas than from the militarypoint of view. From the latter, it should have been obvious to a manlike Nelson that the French must be deterred, under existingconditions, from entering Naples unprovoked; because the farther theyadvanced the more exposed was their army, in case war, which wasdarkly threatening, should be renewed in Upper Italy. They dared not, unless by folly, or because first attacked, prolong their already tooextended ex-centric movement into Lower Italy. This was true, takingaccount of Austria only; but now that the British fleet was releasedby the entire destruction of the French at the Nile, and could operateanywhere on the coast, it would be doubly imprudent; and when the newsthat it had been done reached Egypt, Bonaparte, who had himself feltthe weight of Naples as a possible enemy, remote and feeble as shewas, exclaimed, "Italy is lost!" That Naples should co-operate in thegeneral movement against France was right, although, as Nelson wellknew, she had never dared do so under much more favorableconditions, --a fact which by itself should have suggested to himcaution; but that she should act alone, with the idea of precipitatingwar, refusing to await the moment fixed by the principal states, wasfolly. This, however, was the course determined, under the combinedimpulse of the Queen, Lady Hamilton, and Nelson; and it was arrangedthat, after visiting the blockade off Malta, he should return toNaples to co-operate in the intended movement. 

On the 15th of October Nelson sailed from Naples for Malta in the"Vanguard, " with three ships-of-the-line which had lately joined him. He still felt, with accurate instinct, that Egypt and the IonianIslands, with Malta, constituted the more purely maritime interests, in dealing with which the fleet would most further the general cause, and he alludes frequently to his wish to attend to them; but hepromised the King that he would be back in Naples in the first week ofNovember, to support the projected movement against the French. Heremained off Malta, therefore, only one week, during which adequatearrangements were made for the blockade of the island, which had beenformally proclaimed on the 12th of October, and was conducted for mostof the following year by the Portuguese squadron; the senior Britishofficer, Captain Ball, acting ashore with the insurgent Maltese. Thesehad risen against the French during the summer, and now held them shutup in La Valetta. The adjacent island of Gozo surrendered to theBritish on the 28th. Hood continued in charge off Alexandria withthree ships-of-the-line; while the Ionian Islands were left tothemselves, until a combined Russian and Turkish squadron entered theMediterranean a few weeks later. 

On the 5th of November Nelson returned to Naples. "I am, I fear, drawninto a promise that Naples Bay shall never be left without an Englishman-of-war. I never intended leaving the coast of Naples without one;but if I had, who could resist the request of such a queen?" He couldground much upon the Admiralty's orders, given when he was first sentinto the Mediterranean, to protect the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and he had understood that the Emperor also would give his aid, ifNaples attacked. This impression received strength from an Austriangeneral, Mack, --then of high reputation, but afterwards better knownby his surrender to Napoleon at Ulm, in 1805, --being sent to commandthe Neapolitan army. Sir William Hamilton, however, writing on the26th of October, was more accurate in saying that the Emperor onlyadvised the King "to act openly against the French _at Malta_, as hewould certainly support him;" for, Naples having a feudal claim uponthe island, action there could be represented as merely resistance toaggression. In consequence of this misunderstanding, great confusionensued in the royal councils when a courier from Vienna brought word, on the 13th of November, that that Court wished it left to the Frenchto begin hostilities; otherwise, it would give no assurance of help. Nelson was now formally one of the Council which deliberated uponmilitary operations. In virtue of this position he spoke out, roughlyenough. "I ventured to tell their Majesties that one of the followingthings must happen to the King, and he had his choice, --'Either toadvance, trusting to God for his blessing on a just cause, to die with_l'épée à la main_, or remain quiet and be kicked out of yourKingdoms. '" Thus rudely adjured, the King decided to be a hero afterthe pattern of Nelson. 

On the 22d of November a summons was sent to the French to evacuatethe Papal States and Malta, and a Neapolitan army marched upon Rome, commanded by Mack in person. At the same time Nelson took on board hissquadron a corps of five thousand, to seize Leghorn, the possession ofwhich, with control of the sea, was not unjustly consideredthreatening to the communications between the centre of French power, in Northern Italy, and the exposed corps at the foot of the peninsula. After landing this body, Nelson again went to Naples, leavingTroubridge in charge at Leghorn, with several ships; directing himalso to keep vessels cruising along the Riviera, and before Genoa, tobreak up the coastwise traffic, which had resumed great proportionssince the absence of the British from the Mediterranean, and uponwhich the French army in Piedmont and Lombardy now greatly depended. 

On the 5th of December the "Vanguard" once more anchored at Naples. Nelson's estimate of affairs as he now found them, is best told in hisown words. "The state of this Country is briefly this: The army is atRome, Civita Vecchia taken, but in the Castle of St. Angelo are fivehundred French troops. The French have thirteen thousand troops at astrong post in the Roman State, called Castellana. General Mack isgone against them with twenty thousand: the event in my opinion isdoubtful, and on it hangs the immediate fate of Naples. If Mack isdefeated, this country, in fourteen days, is lost; for the Emperorhas not yet moved his army, and if the Emperor will not march, thiscountry has not the power of resisting the French. But it was not acase of choice, but necessity, which forced the King of Naples tomarch out of his country, and not to wait till the French hadcollected a force sufficient to drive him, in a week, out of hiskingdom. " It is by no means so sure that no other course of action hadbeen open, though Nelson naturally clung to his first opinion. Byadvancing, the King gave the French occasion, if they were seekingone; and the Neapolitan army, which might well have deterred them, asit had embarrassed even Bonaparte in his time, had its rottennessrevealed as only trial can reveal. When reviewed, it had appeared toMack and Nelson a well-equipped force of thirty thousand of the"finest troops in Europe. " Brought face to face with fifteen thousandFrench, in a month it ceased to exist. 

Upon Mack's advance, the French general Championnet had evacuatedRome, into which the King made a vainglorious triumphal entry. TheFrench retired to Castellana, followed by the Neapolitans; but in thecampaign that ensued the latter behaved with disgraceful cowardice. Flying in every direction, with scarcely any loss in killed, andpreceded in their flight by the King, the whole force retreated inconfusion upon the capital. There revolutionary ideas had spreadwidely among the upper classes; and, although the populace both incity and country remained fanatically loyal, and hostile to theFrench, the King and Queen feared to trust their persons to the issueof events. Powerless through suspicions of those around them, apparently well founded, and through lack of any instrument with whichto act, now that their army was destroyed, their one wish was toescape to Palermo. 

To do this involved some difficulty, as the mob, like that of Paris, was bitterly opposed to their sovereign leaving the capital; but bythe management and determination of Nelson, who was greatly helped bythe courage and presence of mind of Lady Hamilton, the royal familywas embarked on board the "Vanguard" on the evening of December 21st. During several previous days treasure to the amount of two and a halfmillions sterling was being conveyed secretly to the ship. "The wholecorrespondence relative to this important business, " wrote Nelson toSt. Vincent, "was carried on with the greatest address by LadyHamilton and the Queen, who being constantly in the habits ofcorrespondence, no one could suspect. " On the evening of the 23d the"Vanguard" sailed, and after a most tempestuous passage reachedPalermo on the 26th. The youngest of the princes, six years old, takensuddenly with convulsions, died on the way in the arms of LadyHamilton, whose womanly helpfulness, as well as her courage, came outstrongly in this trying time. Nelson wrote to St. Vincent: "It is myduty to tell your Lordship the obligations which the whole royalfamily as well as myself are under on this trying occasion to herLadyship. " These scenes inevitably deepened the impression she hadalready made upon him, which was not to be lessened by her lapse intofeminine weakness when the strain was over. To use her own words, in aletter to her old lover, Greville, "My dear, adorable queen and I_weep together_, and now that is our onely comfort. " "Our dear LadyHamilton, " Nelson wrote again a few days later, "whom to see is toadmire, but, to know, are to be added honour and respect; her head andheart surpass her beauty, which cannot be equalled by anything I haveseen. " Upon himself the brief emergency and its sharp call to actionhad had the usual reviving effect. "Thank God, " he wrote to Spencer, "my health is better, my mind never firmer, and my heart in the righttrim to comfort, relieve, and protect those who it is my duty toafford assistance to. "

In Palermo Nelson again lived in the minister's house, bearing alarge, if not a disproportionate, share of the expenses. When theyreturned to England in 1800, Hamilton was £2, 000 in his debt. Theintimacy and the manner of life, in the midst of the Neapolitan court, whose corruptness of manners both Nelson and Troubridge openlycondemned, was already causing scandal, rumors of which were not longin reaching home. "I am quite concerned, " wrote Captain Ball toSaumarez, when Nelson was about to quit the station, "at the manysevere paragraphs which have been put in the newspapers respecting himand Lady Hamilton. I am convinced that there has not been anythingimproper between them--his Lordship could not fail being delightedwith her accomplishments and manners, which are very fascinating. "Lady Nelson, uneasy as a wife could not fail to be at reportsaffecting her husband's honor, and threatening her own happiness, quickly formed, and for a time entertained, the thought of joining himon the station; but, if she broached the idea to Nelson, he certainlydiscouraged it. Writing to her on the 10th of April, 1799, he said:"You would by February have seen how unpleasant it would have been hadyou followed _any_ advice, which carried you from England to awandering sailor. I could, if you had come, _only_ have struck myflag, and carried you back again, for it would have been impossible tohave set up an establishment at either Naples or Palermo. "[75]

The scandal increased apace after his headquarters were fixed atPalermo. Lady Minto, writing from Vienna to her sister, in July, 1800, says: "Mr. Rushout and Colonel Rooke, [76] whom I knew in Italy, arehere. Mr. Rushout is at last going home. He escaped from Naples at thesame time as the King did in Nelson's ship, and remained six months atPalermo; so I had a great deal of intelligence concerning the Heroand his Lady . .. Nelson and the Hamiltons all lived together in ahouse of which he bore the expense, which was enormous, and every sortof gaming went on half the night. Nelson used to sit with largeparcels of gold before him, and generally go to sleep, Lady Hamiltontaking from the heap without counting, and playing with his money tothe amount of £500 a night. Her rage is play, and Sir William sayswhen he is dead she will be a beggar. However, she has about £30, 000worth of diamonds from the royal family in presents. She sits at theCouncils, and rules everything and everybody. " Some of thesestatements are probably beyond the personal knowledge of the narrator, and can only be accepted as current talk; but others are within theobservation of an eye-witness, evidently thought credible by LadyMinto, who was a friend to Nelson. Mr. Paget, who succeeded Hamiltonas British minister, mentions the same reports, in his private letterto Lord Grenville, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Hamilton had asked to see his instructions. "I decided at once not todo so, for he would certainly have been obliged to show them to LadyHamilton, who would have conveyed them next moment to the queen . .. Lord Nelson's health is, I fear, sadly impaired, and I am assured thathis fortune is fallen into the same state, in consequence of greatlosses which both his Lordship and Lady Hamilton have sustained atFaro and other games of hazard. "[77]

The impressions made upon Lord Elgin, who touched at Palermo on hisway to the embassy at Constantinople, are worth quoting; for there hasbeen much assertion and denial as to what did go on in thatout-of-the-way corner of the world, Lady Hamilton ascribing thefalsehoods, as she claimed they were, to the Jacobinical tendencies ofthose who spread them. "During a week's stay at Palermo, on mypassage here, " wrote Elgin, "the necessity of a change in ourrepresentative, and in our conduct there, appeared to me most urgent. You may perhaps know from Lord Grenville how strong my impression onthat subject was. "[78] Troubridge, a pattern of that most faithfulfriendship which dares to risk alienation, if it may but save, wroteurgently to his chief: "Pardon me, my Lord, it is my sincere esteemfor you that makes me mention it. I know you can have no pleasuresitting up all night at cards; why, then, sacrifice your health, comfort, purse, ease, everything, to the customs of a country, whereyour stay cannot be long? I would not, my Lord, reside in this countryfor all Sicily. I trust the war will soon be over, and deliver us froma nest of everything that is infamous, and that we may enjoy thesmiles of our countrywomen. Your Lordship is a stranger to half thathappens, or the talk it occasions; if you knew what your friends feelfor you, I am sure you would cut all the nocturnal parties. Thegambling of the people at Palermo is publicly talked of everywhere. Ibeseech your Lordship leave off. I wish my pen could tell you myfeelings, I am sure you would oblige me. I trust your Lordship willpardon me; it is the sincere esteem I have for you that makes me riskyour displeasure. "[79] To this manly appeal Nelson seems to have madeno reply; none at least is quoted. 

FOOTNOTES:

[70] Colburn's United Service Magazine, 1847, part ii. P. 52. 

[71] Afterwards Mrs. Trench, the mother of Archbishop Trench. 

[72] Beckford's Memoirs, London, 1859, vol. Ii. P. 326. 

[73] Compare an equally strong assertion, Nicolas's Despatches, vol. Vi. P. 99. 

[74] St. Vincent at this time had not met her, at least as Lady Hamilton, but they exchanged occasional letters. 

[75] Pettigrew, vol. I. P. 220. 

[76] Lord Minto was at this time ambassador to Vienna. Rushout and Rookewere men well known on the Continent. Both are mentioned with someparticularity in the Memoirs of Pryse Lockhart Gordon, another continentalrambler. 

[77] The Paget Papers, London, 1896, p. 185. 

[78] The Paget Papers, London, 1896, p. 219. 

[79] Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. Ii. P. 355. 

CHAPTER XII. 

NELSON'S CAREER, AND GENERAL EVENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITALY, FROM THE OVERTHROW OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN NAPLES TO THE INCURSIONOF THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER ADMIRAL BRUIX. 

JANUARY-MAY, 1799. AGE, 40. 

The four and a half months of unbroken residence in Palermo, whichfollowed the flight of the Court from Naples, were full of annoyanceand distress to Nelson, independent of, and additional to, thedisquieting struggle between his passion and his conscience, which hadnot yet been silenced. The disasters in Naples continued. TheNeapolitan Navy had been left in charge of one of the Portugueseofficers, who soon found himself compelled to burn theships-of-the-line, to prevent their falling into the hands of therevolutionists, --a step for which he was severely, but apparentlyunjustly, censured by Nelson. The peasantry and the lower orders ofthe city took up arms, under the guidance of their priests, and forsome time sought, with rude but undisciplined fury, to oppose theadvance of the enemy; but such untrained resistance was futile beforethe veterans of France, and on the 23d of January, 1799, Championnet'stroops entered the city. This was followed by the establishment of theParthenopeian Republic, a name which reflected the prevailing Frenchaffectation of antiquity. For all this Nelson blamed the Emperor, andformed gloomy forebodings. "Had the war commenced in September orOctober, " he had written amid the December disasters, "all Italy wouldat this moment have been liberated. Six months hence, when theNeapolitan Republic will be organized, armed, and with its numerousresources called forth, I will suffer to have my head cut off, if theEmperor is not only defeated in Italy, but that he totters on histhrone in Vienna. " To this text he stuck. Three months later, when thepreparations of Austria and Russia were complete, he wrote: "TheFrench have made war upon the Emperor, and have surprised some of histroops. Serve him right! why did he not go to war before?" But therapid, continuous, and overwhelming successes of the Coalition, between April and August, showed how untimely had been the step he hadurged upon the King of the Sicilies, disregardful of the neededpreparations and of the most favorable season--February to August--foroperations in Italy. Naples never recovered such political equilibriumas she had possessed before that ill-advised advance. In Nelson'scareer it, and its reverses, were to the Battle of the Nile whatTeneriffe was to St. Vincent; and it illustrates the inadequacy tosuccess of merely "going ahead, " unless both time and method aredictated by that martial intelligence which Nelson so abundantlypossessed, but in this case failed to use. 

Not in Naples only did fortune now administer to him rebuffs, whichseemed singularly to rebuke the change of direction and of base whichhe had been persuaded to give to his personal efforts. Immediatelyupon his arrival in Palermo, he heard from St. Vincent that acomparatively junior captain, Sir Sidney Smith, had been sent out bythe Cabinet, bearing, besides his naval commission from the Admiralty, one from the Foreign Office as envoy to Turkey, conjointly with hisbrother, Spencer Smith. This unusual and somewhat cumbrous arrangementwas adopted with the design that Smith should be senior naval officerin the Levant, where it was thought his hands would be strengthened bythe diplomatic functions; but the Government's explanation of itsintentions was so obscure, that St. Vincent understood the new-comerwas to be independent of both himself and Nelson. This impression wasconfirmed by a letter from Smith to Hamilton, in which occurred thewords, "Hood naturally falls under my orders when we meet, as being myjunior, " while the general tone was that of one who had a right, byvirtue of his commission alone, to take charge of such vessels, and todirect such operations, as he found in the Levant. This impression wasfairly deducible from a letter of the Secretary of State for ForeignAffairs, that Smith forwarded to Nelson; after which, without seekingan interview, he at once went on for Constantinople. 

Nelson immediately asked to be relieved. "_I do feel, for I am aman_, " he wrote to St. Vincent, "that it is impossible for me to servein these seas, with the squadron under a junior officer. Never, neverwas I so astonished. " With this private letter he sent an officialapplication for leave. "The great anxiety I have undergone during thewhole time I have been honoured with this important command, has muchimpaired a weak constitution. And now, finding that much ablerofficers are arrived within the district which I had thought under mycommand, . .. And, I flatter myself, having made the British nation andour gracious Sovereign more beloved and respected than heretofore;under these circumstances I entreat, that if my health and uneasinessof mind should not be mended, that I may have your Lordship'spermission to leave this command to my gallant and most excellentsecond in command, Captain Troubridge. " In similar terms, though moreguarded, he wrote to Earl Spencer. At the same time he took propersteps to prevent the official impropriety, not to say rudeness, whichSmith was about to commit by taking from Hood his charge, withouteither the latter or Nelson receiving personal instructions tosurrender it. He sent Troubridge hastily to Alexandria to takecommand there, with orders that, upon Smith's arrival, he shoulddeliver up the blockade to him, and return to the westward. "I shouldhope, " he wrote to Spencer, "that Sir Sidney Smith will not take anyship from under my command, without my orders;" but he evidentlyexpected that he would, and was determined to forestall thepossibility of such an affront. 

Nelson's services had been so eminent, and were at this time soindispensable, and his exceptions to the manner in which Smith hadbeen intruded into his command were so well founded, that the matterwas rectified as rapidly as the slow round of communications in thatday would permit. The Admiralty disclaimed any intention ofcircumscribing his control in the Mediterranean, and Smith receivedperemptory orders from St. Vincent to report himself to Nelson byletter for orders. The latter of course carried out the Admiralty'swishes, by intrusting to Smith the immediate direction of operationsin the Levant, while retaining in his own hands the general outlinesof naval policy. He kept a very tight rein on Smith, however, andintroduced into the situation some dry humor, unusual with him. Thetwo brothers, envoys, he addressed jointly, in his official letters, by the collective term "Your Excellency. " "I beg of your Excellency, "he says in such a letter, "to forward my letter to Sir Sidney Smith, Captain of the Tigre. I have this day received letters from Sir SidneySmith, in his Ministerial capacity, I believe. I _wish_ that allMinisterial letters should be written in your joint names; for it maybe difficult for me to distinguish the Captain of the man-of-war fromthe Joint Minister, and the propriety of language in one might be veryproper to what it is in the other. " To the naval captain he writes: "Imust _direct_ you, whenever you have Ministerial affairs tocommunicate, that it is done jointly with your respectable brother, and not mix naval business with the other. I have sent you my orders, which your abilities as a sea-officer will lead you to punctuallyexecute. "

Nelson resented to the end this giving to a junior naval officer, by aside-wind, an authoritative position in diplomatic affairs, which, onthe naval side, properly belonged to him. "Sir Sidney shouldrecollect, " he told Earl Spencer, meaning doubtless that the latteralso should recollect, "how I must feel in seeing him placed in thesituation which I thought naturally would fall to me. " It was asingular step on the part of the Government, justified neither bygeneral practice, nor by particular ability on the part of the personchosen; and all Nelson's care and decision were insufficient toprevent the consequent evil, although he was perfectly clear in hisintimation to "Your Excellency, " the joint ministers, that they should"upon all occasions, arrange plans of operations with me, " and notwith Captain Sir Sidney Smith. Smith was active and fought well; but, as far as he dared, he did as he pleased in virtue of his diplomaticcommission, looked only to the interests of his own small part of thefield, and, as will appear later, flatly disobeyed both the spirit andthe letter of Nelson's orders, as well as the Government's purpose, concerning the French army in Egypt. The general sound judgment anddiplomatic ability of Nelson, who was thus superseded, had on theother hand been fully recognized--formally by the Government, explicitly by St. Vincent and Minto, both of whom had personalexperience of his conduct in such matters. "What relates toco-operation with the armies of the allied powers cannot be in betterhands than yours, " wrote the former. "You are as great in the cabinetas on the ocean, and your whole conduct fills me with admiration andconfidence. " "There is one other point of excellence, " said Minto inthe House of Peers, "to which I must say a single word, because I am, perhaps, the man in the world who has had the best opportunity ofbeing acquainted with it. The world knows that Lord Nelson can fightthe battles of his country: but a constant and confidentialcorrespondence with this great man, for a considerable portion oftime, has taught me, that he is not less capable of providing for itspolitical interests and honour, on occasions of great delicacy andembarrassment. In that new capacity I have witnessed a degree ofability, judgment, temper, and conciliation, not always allied to thesort of spirit which without an instant's hesitation can attack thewhole Spanish line with his single ship. " Of Nelson's superior fitnessin this respect, the unfortunate choice of Sidney Smith for hisanomalous position was to furnish the Government an additional proof. 

It was not in this matter only that maritime affairs in the East tooka turn contrary to Nelson's wishes. Since he had persuaded himselfthat to bolster up the corrupt and tottering throne of Naples was themost important of his functions, he had become desirous that theisolation and blockade of the French army in Egypt, --a factor sodecisive by its numbers, its brilliant efficiency, and the singulargenius and renown of its general and his lieutenants, --should beassumed by some of the allies of Great Britain, although he was neverslow to express his want of confidence in their navies. He was urgent, both with the joint ministers and with the representatives of Russiaand Turkey, that the fleets of these two powers should relieve Hoodoff Alexandria, in order to strengthen his own hands on the coast ofItaly and off Malta. Neither Russia nor Turkey was easily to beconvinced. Egypt was no affair of the former's, except as it concernedthe general cause; and from that point of view it was as much thebusiness of Great Britain, already on the spot, as it was hers. Withtwenty thousand troops about to enter into a campaign in NorthernItaly, as allies of Austria, Russia had undeniable interests there, aswell as in the Ionian Islands, which commanded the entrance to theAdriatic, a sea important to communications between Austria andLombardy. The islands also were, in the hands of France, a threat tothe Turkish mainland. It was against these, therefore, that theRusso-Turkish forces directed their efforts, greatly to Nelson'sdisgust, and there they remained, chained by the obstinate resistanceof Corfu, until the 1st of March, 1799, when it surrendered. Thefifty-gun ship "Leander, " which had been taken by the Frenchseventy-four "Généreux, " when carrying Nelson's despatches after theNile, was here recaptured and restored to Great Britain. 

Nelson viewed the progress and policy of Russia with a mind fullyimbued with the distrust, which, for the last quarter of a century, had been supplanting gradually the previous friendly feeling of GreatBritain toward that country. As soon as he heard of the intention toattack the islands, in November, 1798, he hurried off Troubridge toanticipate a seizure which he expected to be more easy than it proved. "You will proceed to sea without a moment's loss of time, " hisinstructions ran, "and make the best of your way to the Island ofZante; and if the Russians have not taken possession of that islandand Cephalonia, you will send on shore by the Priest I shall desire toaccompany you, my Declaration. If you can get possession of theislands before named, you will send my Declaration into the Island ofCorfu, and use your utmost endeavours to get possession of it. .. . Should the Russians have taken possession of these Islands and becruizing near with the Turkish fleet, you will pay a visit to theTurkish admiral, and by saluting him (if he consents to return gun forgun) and every other mark of respect and attention, gain hisconfidence. You will judge whether he is of a sufficient rank to holda confidential conversation with. " It is evident that Nelson's actionwas precipitated by the news of the Russian movement, and its tenordictated by a wish to sow distrust between Turkey and Russia. Theomission of any mention of a Russian admiral is most significant. "Captain Troubridge was absolutely under sail, " he wrote to SpencerSmith, "when I heard with sorrow that the Russians were there. " Hiseagerness in the matter is the more evident, in that he thus detachedTroubridge at the moment when he was about to start for Leghorn, wherehis trusted subordinate and his ship would be greatly needed. 

"I was in hopes that a part of the united Turkish and Russian squadronwould have gone to Egypt--the first object of the Ottoman arms, " hetells the Turkish admiral. "Corfu is a secondary consideration. " ToSpencer Smith he writes: "I have had a long and friendly conferencewith Kelim Effendi on the conduct likely to be pursued by the RussianCourt towards the unsuspicious (I fear) and upright Turk. The Porteought to be aware of the very great danger at a future day of allowingthe Russians to get footing at Corfu, and I hope they will keep themin the East. Our ideas have exactly been the same about Russia. .. . Surely I had a right to expect that the united fleets would have takencare of the things east of Candia. I never wished to have them west ofit. " "The Russians seem to me to be more intent on taking ports in theMediterranean than destroying Bonaparte in Egypt. "

It was well known at this time that the Czar was looking towards Maltaand the restoration of the Order of the Knights, of which he had beenelected Grand Master the previous October, immediately afterBonaparte's seizure of the island became known. Nelson held that theKing of Naples was the legitimate sovereign, and he directed CaptainBall, his own representative there, to have all the Maltese posts andforces fly the Neapolitan flag; but he, with Hamilton, got a note fromthe King, promising that Malta should never be transferred to anyother Power without the consent of England. "Should any Russian ships, or admiral, arrive off Malta, " he instructed Ball, "you will convincehim of the very unhandsome manner of treating the legitimate sovereignof Malta, by wishing to see the Russian flag fly in Malta, and also ofme, who command the forces of a Power in such close alliance with theRussian Emperor, which have been blockading and attacking Malta fornear six months. The Russians shall never take the lead. "

Three weeks later he authorized Ball, with the consent of the King, topreside over the meetings of the Maltese chiefs, and, by the desire ofhis Sicilian Majesty, the British flag was to be hoisted alongside theSicilian in every place where the latter was flown, "side by side, that of England being on the right hand, " to show that the island wasunder the special protection of Great Britain during the war. On the23d of March he cordially congratulates the Russian admiral upon thefall of Corfu, news of which he has just received, and he mentions, meaningly, "The flag of his Sicilian Majesty, with that of GreatBritain, is flying on all parts of Malta, except the town of Valetta, the inhabitants of which have, with his Sicilian Majesty's consent, put themselves under the protection of Great Britain. " "I attach novalue to it for us, " he said explicitly to the First Lord, meaning, nodoubt, for the purposes of the existing war. This opinion wasperfectly consonant to the secondary importance he had latterlyattributed to the presence of the British in the Levant, as comparedto their duties towards Naples, but though he reiterated it in thelater war, it was with the express qualification that, for thesecurity of communication with India, not then in question, the valueof the island was indisputable. 

But if, positively, Malta was of little use to England, --"a uselessand enormous expense, " to use his own words, --yet, negatively, theconsequences of its passing into the hands of a powerful rival weretoo serious to be permitted. "Any expense should be incurred ratherthan let it remain in the hands of the French. " The same distrust ofthe Russians was suggested by his keen political insight. "You willobserve what is said in the despatches of the Consul at Corfu, " hewrites to St. Vincent, "respecting the Russians being ordered toMalta. I know this is a favourite object of the Emperor's, and is aprelude to a future war with the good Turk, when Constantinople willchange masters. This is so clear, that a man must be blind not to seeit. " "I have just received the Emperor of Russia's picture in a boxmagnificently set with diamonds; it has done him honour and me apleasure to have my conduct approved;" "but, " he tells Ball, significantly, "this shall not prevent my keeping a sharp lookout onhis movements against the good Turk. " As regards Paul I. , ferociousand half crazy as he was, this imputation of merely interestedforesight scarcely did justice to the quixotic passions which oftenimpelled him to the most unselfish acts, but the general tendency wasundeniable; and Nelson's watchful attitude exemplifies the numerousdiplomatic, as well as military, responsibilities that weighed uponhim. He was, practically, commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, even if Government refused to recognize the fact by reward, or byproper staff appointments; for St. Vincent, autocratic as he wastowards others, could roll off upon Nelson all his responsibilitiesthere, --"the uncontrolled direction of the naval part, " were his ownwords, --and sleep quietly. Despite his objections to the islanditself, and his enthusiastic fidelity to the Neapolitan royal house, Nelson had evidently the presentiment that Malta must come to GreatBritain, a solution which Ball and the Maltese themselves were urgingupon him. "A Neapolitan garrison would betray it to the first man whowould bribe him, " he wrote; which, if true, left to Great Britain noother alternative than to take it herself. Neither he, Troubridge, northe sovereigns, had confidence in the fidelity of Neapolitan officers. 

The blockade of Malta was maintained with great tenacity, and, coupled with the maritime prostration of France in the Mediterranean, resulted in a complete isolation of the French garrison in La Valettaby sea, the Maltese people hemming it in by land. By the 1st of MayBall had erected a battery at the head of the harbor, sweeping it tothe entrance, so that the French ships, one of which was the"Guillaume Tell, " eighty, that had escaped from Aboukir, had to bekept in the coves. These affairs of Malta brought Nelson intodifficult diplomatic relations with the Barbary States, Tunis andTripoli. The island not affording sufficient food, strenuous effortshad to be made by him and Ball to get grain from Sicily and elsewhere, a matter very difficult of accomplishment even were the transitunmolested; but these petty Mussulman states, for the purposes ofpiracy, kept themselves in formal war with Naples and Portugal, andfrequently captured vessels under the Sicilian flag carrying corn toMalta. The British had too much on hand now to spare readily the forcenecessary to put down these depredators, at whose misdeeds they hadwinked in quieter days; and it required all Nelson's tact, combiningthreats with compliments, and with appeals to the prejudices ofbelievers in God against those who denied Him, to keep the maraudingwithin bounds. The irrepressible activity of Bonaparte's emissariesalso stirred the Beys up to measures friendly to France. "The infamousconduct of the French during the whole war, has at last called downthe vengeance of all true Mussulmen, " he writes to the Bey of Tunis;"and your Highness, I am sure, will agree with me that DivineProvidence will never permit these infidels to God to go unpunished. The conduct of your Highness reflects upon you the very highesthonour. Although I have a squadron of Portuguese ships under myorders, I have prevented their cruizing against the vessels of war ofyour Highness. For at this moment all wars should cease, and all theworld should join in endeavouring to extirpate from off the face ofthe earth this race of murderers, oppressors, and unbelievers. "

After these preliminary compliments, Nelson presents his grievances. He has given the passports of a British admiral to Sicilian vessels_bonâ fide_ employed in carrying grain to the besiegers of the French, and to such only; and he must insist upon those passports beingrespected, as the vessels bearing them are serving the great commoncause. He demands, also, that aid be not given to the common enemy. "Iwas rejoiced, " he writes the Bashaw of Tripoli, "to find that you hadrenounced the treaty you had so imprudently entered into with someemissaries of General Bonaparte--that man of blood, that despoiler ofthe weak, that enemy of all true Musselmen; for, like Satan, he onlyflatters that he may the more easily destroy; and it is true, thatsince the year 1789, all Frenchmen are exactly of the samedisposition. " His Highness, however, has relapsed into his formererrors. "It is now my duty to speak out, and not to be misunderstood. That Nelson who has hitherto kept your powerful enemies fromdestroying you, can, and will, let them loose upon you, unless thefollowing terms are, in two hours, complied with. .. . If these properterms are not complied with, I can no longer prevent the Portugueseships from acting with vigour against your Highness. Your Highnesswill, without difficulty, write me a letter, the substance of whichwill be dictated by the British consul. "

The vehemence with which the French are here denounced, though pitchedin a key deemed harmonious to the ears for which it was immediatelyintended, was entirely consonant to the feelings which had latelytaken possession of Nelson. They were the result, probably, in part, of the anxious rancor bred by the uncertainties and worry of thepursuit of Bonaparte; in part, also, of more direct contact thanbefore with the unbridled license which the French Government and itsgenerals, impelled by dire necessity and by an unquestionable lack ofprinciple, had given to the system of making war support war. Thefeebleness and corruption of the Directory had relaxed the reins ofdiscipline from top to bottom, and a practice which finds itsjustification only when executed with the strictest method andaccountability, had degenerated into little better than disorganizedpillage. "'Down, down with the French!' is my constant prayer. ""'_Down, down_ with the French!' ought to be placed in thecouncil-room of every country in the world. " "To serve my King, and todestroy the French, I consider as the great order of all, from whichlittle ones spring; and if one of these little ones militate againstit, I go back to obey the great order and object, to _down, down_ withthe damned French villains. Excuse my warmth; but my blood boils atthe name of a Frenchman. I hate them all--Royalists and Republicans. "Infidels, robbers, and murderers are the characteristic terms. Thisdetestation of the legitimate enemy spread, intensified, to those whosupported them in Naples, --the Jacobins, as they were called. "Send meword some proper heads are taken off, " he wrote to Troubridge, "thisalone will comfort me. " "Our friend Troubridge had a present made himthe other day, of the head of a Jacobin, " he tells St. Vincent, "andmakes an apology to me, the weather being very hot, for not sending ithere!" Upon the copy of the letter accompanying this ghastly gift tohim, Troubridge had written, "A jolly fellow. T. Troubridge. " Theexasperation to which political animosities had given rise may begauged by the brutal levity shown in this incident, by men of themasculine and generous characters of Troubridge and Nelson, and shouldnot be forgotten in estimating the actions that in due consequencefollowed. 

The duties as well as the anxieties of his situation bore heavily uponNelson, and may help to account, in combination with the tide ofadverse fortune now running strongly, for the depression that weighedupon him. "My public correspondence, besides the business of sixteensail-of-the-line, and all our commerce, is with Petersburg, Constantinople, the Consul at Smyrna, Egypt, the Turkish and Russianadmirals, Trieste, Vienna, Tuscany, Minorca, Earl St. Vincent, andLord Spencer. This over, what time can I have for any privatecorrespondence?" Yet, admitting freely that there is a limit beyondwhich activity may cease to please, what has become of the joyousspirit, which wrote, not four years before: "This I like, activeservice or none!" Occupying one of the most distinguished posts opento the Navy; practically, and almost formally, independent; at thevery head and centre of the greatest interests, --his zeal, whilepreserving all its intensity, has lost all its buoyancy. "My dearLord, " he tells St. Vincent, alluding at the moment to his stepsonNisbet, "there is no true happiness in this life, and in my presentstate I could quit it with a smile. " "My spirits have received such ashock, " he writes some days after, to the wife of his early patron, Sir Peter Parker, "that I think they cannot recover it. You whoremember me always laughing and gay, would hardly believe the change;but who can see what I have and be well in health? Kingdoms lost and aroyal family in distress. " "Believe me, " he confides to his intimatefriend Davison a month later, "my only wish is to sink with honourinto the grave, and when that shall please God, I shall meet deathwith a smile. Not that I am insensible to the honours and riches myKing and Country have heaped upon me, so much more than any officercould deserve; yet I am ready to quit this world of trouble, and envynone but those of the estate six feet by two. " "I am at times ill atease, but it is my duty to submit, and you may be sure I will not quitmy post without absolute necessity. " "What a state I am in!" he writesof one of those perplexities inevitable to an officer in hisposition. "If I go, I risk Sicily; as I stay, my heart is breaking. "This is not the natural temper of a man to whom difficulties andperplexities had been, and were yet again to be, a trumpet call thatstirred to animation, a stimulant that steadied the nerves, and sentthe blood coursing with new life through heart and brain. Mingled asthese expressions were with despondent broodings over his health, evenif the latter were well founded, they are the voice of a mind whichhas lost the spring of self-content. The sense of duty abides, butdogged, cheerless; respondent rather to the force of habit than to thegenerous ardor of former days. 

For over two months after the flight to Palermo, the condition ofaffairs for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was seemingly critical tothe verge of desperation; for neither the preparations of theCoalition, nor the hollowness of the French successes, wereunderstood, and news was slow to reach the remote city where the Courtnow dwelt. The republican movement extended, though superficially, tothe toe of Italy, many of the towns in Calabria planting the tree ofliberty, and the new flag flying on the islands along the coast. Sicily, though hostile to the French, was discontented with theexisting government, and disaffection there was feared. In that, Nelson truly observed, lay the danger. "Respecting an invasion of theFrench, I have no alarms; if this island is true to itself no harm canhappen. " Nevertheless, "it is proper to be prepared for defence, and, "if Calabria is occupied by the French, "the first object is thepreservation of Messina. "

For this purpose he ordered the Portuguese squadron there, immediatelyafter he reached Palermo; and, when the outlook grew more threatening, appealed to the Turkish and Russian admirals to send a detachment tothe Straits. General Stuart, commanding the troops in Minorca, whichhad passed into the hands of Great Britain the previous November, wasentreated to detail a garrison for the citadel of Messina, as nodependence was placed upon the Neapolitan troops. Stuart complied, andthe citadel was occupied by two English regiments about the 10th ofMarch. The danger, however, was considered sufficiently imminent towithdraw to Palermo the transports lying at Syracuse; a step whichcould not have been necessary had Nelson made Syracuse, as he at firstintended, the base of operations for the British fleet, and suggeststhe idea, which he himself avows, that his own presence with the Courtwas rather political than military[80] in its utility, dependent uponthe fears of their own subjects felt by the sovereigns. While thesemeasures were being taken he endeavored, though fruitlessly, to bringmatters to a conclusion at Alexandria and Malta, in order to releasethe ships there employed and fetch them to the coast of Naples. "Themoment the Emperor moves, " he wrote to St. Vincent, "I shall go withall the ships I can collect into the Bay of Naples, to create adiversion. " Nothing certain can be said as yet, "whether all is lostor may yet be saved; that must depend upon the movements of theEmperor. " Yet it was the hand of the emperor which he had advised theKing of Naples to force, by his ill-timed advance. 

Troubridge rejoined the Flag at Palermo on the 17th of March, havingturned over the command in the Levant to Sir Sidney Smith, after anineffectual attempt to destroy the French shipping in Alexandria. Bythis time matters had begun to mend. Calabria had returned to itsloyalty, and the insurrection of the peasantry against the French wasgeneral throughout the country, and in the Roman State. The Directory, taking umbrage at the advance of Russian troops to the frontiers ofAustria, demanded explanations from the latter, and when these provedunsatisfactory directed its armies to take the offensive. The Frenchadvanced into Germany on the first of March, and in Italy towards theend of the month. But the action of the French Government, thoughaudacious and imposing, rested upon no solid foundation of efficiencyin the armies, or skill in the plan of campaign. Serious reverses soonfollowed, and the fatally ex-centric position of the corps in Napleswas then immediately apparent. 

Before this news could reach Palermo, however, Nelson had sentTroubridge with four ships-of-the-line and some smaller vessels to theBay of Naples, to blockade it, and to enter into communication, ifpossible, with the loyalists in the city. As the extreme reluctance ofthe King and Queen prevented his going in person, --a reason thesufficiency of which it is difficult to admit, --Nelson hoisted hisflag on board a transport in the bay, and sent the flagship, in ordernot to diminish the force detailed for such important duties. Within aweek the islands in the immediate neighborhood of Naples--Procida, Ischia, Capri, and the Ponzas--had again hoisted the royal ensign. Onthe 22d of April the French evacuated the city, with the exception ofthe Castle of St. Elmo, in which they left a garrison of five hundredmen. In Upper Italy their armies were in full retreat, having beenforced back from the Adige to the Adda, whence an urgent message wassent to Macdonald, Championnet's successor at Naples, to fall back tothe northward and effect a junction with the main body, soon to besorely pressed by an overwhelming force of the Austro-Russians, atwhose head was the famous Suwarrow. On the 29th the Allies enteredMilan, and on the 7th of May the northern French, now under thecommand of Moreau, had retired as far as Alessandria, in Piedmont. Onthis same day, Macdonald, having thrown garrisons into Capua andGaeta, evacuated the kingdom of Naples, and hastened northward to joinMoreau. With the exception of these fortified posts and the city ofNaples, the country was now overrun by the Christian army, the nameapplied to the numerous but utterly undisciplined bands of rudepeasantry, attached to the royal cause, and led by Cardinal Ruffo. TheJacobins in the city still held out, and had in the bay a small navalforce under the command of Commodore Caracciolo. 

Troubridge's successes continued. A week later Salerno had been taken, and the royal colors were flying at Castellamare, on the opposite sideof the Bay from Naples, and distant from it only twelve miles by land. Nelson questioned Troubridge about the return of the King, whose mostevident political conviction was that the success of the royal causewas vitally connected with the safety of the royal person. "What areyour ideas of the King's going into the Bay of Naples, without foreigntroops? If it should cause insurrection [of the royalists] in Napleswhich did not succeed, would it not be worse? The King, if a rising ofloyal people took place, ought to be amongst them; and that he willnever consent to. " "The King, God bless him! is a philosopher, " he hadsaid, repeating an expression of Lady Hamilton's, referring to thedisasters which caused the headlong flight from Rome, through Naples, to Palermo; "but the great Queen feels sensibly all that hashappened. " The Queen also was extremely fearful, and Nelson intimatedto St. Vincent that a request would be made for British troops toprotect the sovereigns. "Their Majesties are ready to cross the waterwhenever Naples is entirely cleansed. When that happy event arrives, and not till then, a desire will be expressed for the British troopsto be removed from Messina into Naples to guard the persons of theirMajesties. " That Nelson should have considered it essential tomaintain in power, by any means, sovereigns devoted to Great Britain, is perfectly comprehensible. What is difficult to understand is theesteem he continued to profess, for those whose unheroic bearing sobelied the words he had written six months before: "His Majesty isdetermined to conquer or die at the head of his army. " Under otherconditions and influences, none would have been more forward toexpress dissatisfaction and contempt. 

Withal, despite the favorable outlook of affairs and the most joyousseason of the year, his depression of spirits continued. "I am farfrom well, " he writes on the 3d of May, "and the good news of thesuccess of the Austrian arms in Italy does not even cheer me. " But inthe midst of the full current of success, and of his own gloom, anincident suddenly occurred which threw everything again into confusionand doubt, and roused him for the time from his apathy. On the 12th ofMay a brig arrived at Palermo, with news that a French fleet ofnineteen ships-of-the-line had escaped from Brest, and had been seenless than a fortnight before off Oporto, steering for theMediterranean. 

FOOTNOTES:

[80] Palermo possessed a strategic advantage over Syracuse, in that, withwesterly winds, it was to windward, especially as regards Naples; and itwas also nearer the narrowest part of the passage between Sicily andAfrica, the highway to the Levant and Egypt. With easterly winds, the enemyof course could not proceed thither; and at this time there was no enemy'sforce in the Mediterranean, so that westward movements had not to beapprehended. All dangers must come from the westward. These considerationswere doubtless present to Nelson; but the author has not found any mentionof them by him at this period. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

FROM THE INCURSION OF THE FRENCH FLEET UNDER BRUIX TO THE RESTORATIONOF THE ROYAL AUTHORITY AT NAPLES. --THE CARACCIOLO EXECUTION. --NELSON'SDISOBEDIENCE TO ADMIRAL LORD KEITH. 

MAY-JULY, 1799. AGE, 40. 

The intention of the French to send a fleet into the Mediterranean hadtranspired some time before, and the motive--to retrieve thedestruction of their naval power in that sea by the Battle of theNile--was so obvious that the attempt was regarded as probable. As farback as the 7th of January, Nelson had written to Commodore Duckworth, commanding the detachment of four ships-of-the-line at Minorca, thathe had received notification of the force expected from Brest. If theygot into the Mediterranean, he was confident they would go first toToulon, and he wished to concert beforehand with Duckworth, who wasnot under his orders, the steps necessary to be taken at once, if thecase arose. He did not think, so he wrote to Ball, that they wouldventure a squadron to Malta or Alexandria, in view of the certaindestruction which in the end must befall it, even if successful inreaching the port. 

Both remarks show that he did not look for the number of ships thatwere sent--nineteen, as the first news said, twenty-five, as wasactually the case. An emergency so great and so imminent drew out allhis latent strength, acute judgment, and promptitude. The brig thatbrought the news was sent off the same night to Naples, with orders toproceed from there to Minorca and Gibraltar, and to notify Duckworthand St. Vincent what Nelson intended to do. A cutter sailed at thesame time for Malta. Troubridge and Ball were both directed to send orbring all their ships-of-the-line, save one each, to Minorca, there tounite with Duckworth. Troubridge's ships were to call off Palermo forfurther instructions, but not to lose time by coming to anchor there. Expresses were sent to the different ports of Sicily, in case anyRussian or Turkish ships had arrived, to put them on their guard, andto request co-operation by joining the force assembling off Minorca, where Nelson reasoned Lord St. Vincent also would repair. To thelatter he wrote: "Eight, nine, or ten sail of the line shall, in a fewdays, be off Mahon, ready to obey your orders (not in the port);" forhis intention was that they should remain outside under sail. "You maydepend upon my exertion, and I am only sorry that I cannot move[81] toyour help, but this island appears to hang on my stay. Nothing couldconsole the Queen this night, but my promise not to leave them unlessthe battle was to be fought off Sardinia. "

The next day he wrote again in similar terms, seeking to reconcile hispromise to the Queen with his impulses, and, it may be said safely, with his duty. "Should you come upwards without a battle, I hope inthat case you will afford me an opportunity of joining you; for myheart would break to be near my commander-in-chief, and not assistinghim at such a time. What a state I am in! If I go, I risk, and morethan risk, Sicily, and what is now safe on the Continent; for we know, from experience, that more depends on _opinion_ than on actsthemselves. As I stay, my heart is breaking; and, to mend the matter, I am seriously unwell. "

That evening, the 13th, at nine o'clock, a lieutenant arrived, who hadbeen landed to the westward of Palermo by a sloop-of-war, the"Peterel, " she not being able to beat up to the city against the eastwind prevailing. From him Nelson learned that the French fleet hadpassed the Straits, and had been seen off Minorca. The next day, the"Peterel" having come off the port, he went alongside, and sent her onat once to Malta, with orders to Ball to abandon the blockade, bringing with him all his ships, and to proceed off Maritimo, a smallisland twenty miles west of Sicily, where he now proposed toconcentrate his squadron and to go himself. Troubridge, having alreadyorders to come to Palermo, needed no further instructions, except tobring all his ships, instead of leaving one at Naples. Everyship-of-the-line in the squadron, including the Portuguese, was thussummoned to join the Flag, in a position to cover Palermo and theapproaches to the eastern Mediterranean. To these necessarydispositions was owing that the senior officer left at Naples wasCaptain Foote, who afterwards signed the articles of capitulation withthe insurgents, which gave such offence to Nelson, and have occasionedmuch controversy in connection with his subsequent action. 

Troubridge, having sailed at once on receipt of his first orders, arrived on the 17th with three British ships and one Portuguese. Aheavy gale prevented Nelson getting to sea till the 20th, when hesailed, and was joined the next morning by the fourth ship fromNaples. The same day came a Portuguese corvette from Gibraltar andMahon, with letters from St. Vincent and Duckworth. The formerannounced that the French had passed the Straits, and that he wasabout to start in pursuit. Duckworth, who also was asked to join offMaritimo, declined to do so, saying that he must await thecommander-in-chief. Nelson had of course immediately communicated tothe latter his change of plan. He hoped to collect tensail-of-the-line, which, "if Duckworth reinforce me, will enable me tolook the enemy in the face"--fourteen ships to nineteen; "but shouldany of the Russians or Turks be off Malta, I hope to get a force ofdifferent nations equal to the enemy, when not a moment shall be lostin bringing them to battle. "

On the 23d of May he was off Maritimo with seven ships, Ball nothaving joined yet. His spirits were fast rising, as in thought he drewnear the enemy. "Duckworth means to leave me to my fate, " he wrote toLady Hamilton. "Never mind; if I can get eleven sail together, theyshall not hurt me. " "I am under no apprehension for the safety of hisMajesty's squadron, " he said in a circular letter to his scatteredvessels, designed to heighten their ardor; "on the contrary, from thevery high state of discipline of the ships, I am confident, should theenemy force us to battle, that we shall cut a very respectable figure;and if Admiral Duckworth joins, not one moment shall be lost in myattacking the enemy. " It must be mentioned that St. Vincent hadexpressed his opinion that the French were bound for Malta andAlexandria, and Nelson, when he wrote these words, was hourlyexpecting to see their sails appear on the horizon. He did not knowyet, however, that they were twenty-five, instead of nineteen, of theline. To St. Vincent he expressed himself with the sober, dauntlessresolution of a consummate warrior, who recognized that opportunitiesmust be seized, and detachments, if need be, sacrificed, for thefurtherance of a great common object. "Your Lordship may depend thatthe squadron under my command shall never fall into the hands of theenemy; and before we are destroyed, I have little doubt but the enemywill have their wings so completely clipped that they may be easilyovertaken"--by you. In this temper he waited. It is this clearperception of the utility of his contemplated grapple with superiornumbers, and not the headlong valor and instinct for fighting thatunquestionably distinguished him, which constitutes the excellence ofNelson's genius. This it was which guided him in the great Trafalgarcampaign, and the lack of which betrayed Villeneuve at the sameperiod to his wretched shortcomings. Yet, as has before been remarked, mere insight, however accurate and penetrating, ends only in itself, or at best falls far short of the mark, unless accompanied by Nelson'sgreat power of disregarding contingencies--an inspired blindness, which at the moment of decisive action sees, not the risks, but theone only road to possible victory. 

Whilst thus expecting an engagement which, from the disparity ofnumbers, could be nothing short of desperate, he drew up a codicil tohis will, making to Lady Hamilton a bequest, in terms that show howcomplete were the infatuation and idealization now in possession ofhis mind: "I give and bequeath to my dear friend, Emma Hamilton, wifeof the Right Hon. Sir William Hamilton, a nearly round box set withdiamonds, said to have been sent me by the mother of the Grand Signor, which I request she will accept (and never part from) as token ofregard and respect for her very eminent virtues (for she, the saidEmma Hamilton, possesses them all to such a degree that it would bedoing her injustice was any particular one to be mentioned) from herfaithful and affectionate friend. " During this short cruise he wroteher almost daily, and at some length, in addition to the more officialcommunications addressed to Hamilton. At this same period he wasexcusing himself to his wife for the shortness and infrequency of hisletters: "Pray attribute it to the true cause--viz. , that in truth mypoor hand cannot execute what my head tells me I ought to do. "

On the 28th of May Nelson received letters from St. Vincent, dated the21st, off Minorca, which put him in possession of the movements of theenemy up to that date. The French fleet, under the command of AdmiralBruix, had appeared on the 4th of the month off Cadiz. It was thenblowing a half-gale of wind, and the French admiral did not care, under that condition, to engage the fifteen British ships-of-the-linewhich were cruising off the harbor, under Lord Keith, who had come outfrom England the previous autumn to be St. Vincent's second incommand. The intended junction with the Spanish squadron in Cadizbeing thus thwarted, Bruix passed the Straits on the 5th, and Lord St. Vincent, having recalled Keith, followed on the 12th with sixteenships. On the 20th he joined Duckworth, and learned that the enemy, when last seen, were heading for Toulon. Keith's removal had uncoveredCadiz, and St. Vincent fully expected that the Spanish fleet wouldleave there for the Mediterranean, which it did, and on the 20thentered Cartagena, to the number of seventeen of the line, but muchcrippled from a stormy passage. This Nelson did not yet know, nor thatBruix had reached Toulon on the 14th of May, and sailed again on the26th for the eastward. 

Satisfied that the enemy would not at once come his way, and knowingthat a vessel had passed up the Mediterranean from St. Vincent to putSidney Smith on his guard, Nelson ordered Ball to resume the blockadeof Malta with two ships-of-the-line. The rest of his squadron he keptmassed, and took to Palermo, where he arrived May 29th. Lookout shipswere stationed off the north end of Corsica and west of Sardinia. "Myreason for remaining in Sicily, " he wrote St. Vincent, "is thecovering the blockade of Naples, and the certainty of preservingSicily in case of an attack, for if we were to withdraw our ships, itwould throw such a damp on the people that I am sure there would be noresistance. "

On the 6th of June Duckworth arrived at Palermo from the main fleet, with four ships-of-the-line, among them the "Foudroyant, " eighty. Thisship had been designated originally for Nelson's flag, and he shiftedto her from the "Vanguard" on the 8th. Duckworth brought a report thatSt. Vincent was about to give up the command and go home, on accountof ill-health. This at once aroused Nelson's anxiety, for he had longfelt that few superiors would have the greatness of mind to trust himas implicitly, and humor him as tenderly, as the great admiral haddone. It is not every one that can handle an instrument of suchtrenchant power, yet delicate temper, as Nelson's sensitive genius. The combination in St. Vincent of perfect professional capacity withmasterful strength of character, had made the tactful respect heshowed to Nelson's ability peculiarly grateful to the latter; and hadwon from him a subordination of the will, and an affection, which nosubsequent commander-in-chief could elicit. He wrote to him:--

 MY DEAR LORD, --We have a report that you are going home. This distresses us most exceedingly, and myself in particular; so much so, that I have serious thoughts of returning, if that event should take place. But for the sake of our Country, do not quit us at this serious moment. I wish not to detract from the merit of whoever may be your successor; but it must take a length of time, which I hope the war will not give, to be in any manner a St. Vincent. We look up to you, as we have always found you, as to our Father, under whose fostering care we have been led to fame. .. . Give not up a particle of your authority to any one; be again our St. Vincent, and we shall be happy. 

 Your affectionate NELSON. 

This letter did not reach St. Vincent before he carried his purposeinto effect; but Nelson never quite forgave the abandonment of thecommand at such a moment. In after years he spoke bitterly of it, as athing he himself could not have done; failing, perhaps, to realize thedifference in staying power between forty-five and sixty-five. 

On the 2d of June, being then seventy miles southwest of Toulon, St. Vincent turned over to Keith the command of the twentyships-of-the-line then with him, and went to Port Mahon. For themoment he retained in his own hands the charge of thestation, --continued Commander-in-chief, --with headquarters at Minorca, and two divisions cruising: one of twenty ships, with Keith, betweenToulon and Minorca, and one of sixteen, including three Portuguese, under Nelson in the waters of Sicily. Friction between these two beganat once. Lord Keith was an accomplished and gallant officer, methodical, attentive, and correct; but otherwise he rose little abovethe commonplace, and, while he could not ignore Nelson's greatachievements, he does not seem to have had the insight which couldappreciate the rare merit underlying them, nor the sympathetictemperament which could allow for his foibles. Nelson, exasperated atthe mere fact of the other's succession to the command, speedilyconceived for him an antipathy which Keith would have been more thanmortal not to return; but it is to the honor of the latter'sself-command that, while insisting upon obedience from his brilliantjunior, he bore his refractoriness with dignified patience. 

After St. Vincent left him, Keith continued to stand to the northwardand eastward. On the 5th of June he received certain information thatthe French fleet, now twenty-two ships-of-the-line, was in Vado Bay. This word he at once sent on to Nelson. Next day his division was soclose in with the Riviera, off Antibes, that it was fired upon by theshore batteries; but the wind coming to the eastward, when off Monaco, did not permit it to pass east of Corsica, and, fearing that theFrench would take that route and fall upon Nelson, Keith detached tohim two seventy-fours, which joined him on the 13th of June. 

At the moment of their arrival Nelson had just quitted Palermo forNaples, taking with him the whole squadron. The King of Naples hadformally requested him to afford to the royal cause at the capital theassistance of the fleet, because the successes of the royalistselsewhere in the kingdom rendered imminent an insurrection in thecity against the republican party and the French, which held thecastles; and such insurrection, unless adequately supported, mighteither fail or lead to deplorable excesses. Lady Hamilton, whoseirregular interference in State concerns receives here singularillustration, strongly urged this measure in a letter, written to theadmiral after an interview with the Queen. Nelson consented, took onboard seventeen hundred troops, with the Hereditary Prince, who was torepresent the King, --the latter not wishing to go, --and was alreadyclear of Palermo Bay when the two ships from Keith appeared. Gatheringfrom their information that the French were bound for Naples orSicily, in which his own judgment coincided, he returned at once intoport, landed the Prince and the troops, and then took the squadronagain off Maritimo, where he expected Ball and the two ships off Maltato join him without delay. "The French force being twenty-two sail ofthe line, " he wrote in suppressed reproach to Keith, "four of whichare first rates, the force with me being only sixteen of the line, notone of which was of three decks, three being Portuguese, and one ofthe English being a sixty-four, very short of men, I had no choiceleft but to return to Palermo. "

With this incident of the insufficient reinforcement sent, began thefriction with Keith which appears more openly in his correspondencewith others. To St. Vincent, still commander-in-chief, he wrote: "Isend a copy of my letter to Lord Keith, and I have only stated myregret that his Lordship could not have sent me a force fit to facethe enemy: but, as we are, I shall not get out of their way; although, as I am, I cannot think myself justified in exposing the world (I mayalmost say) to be plundered by these miscreants. I trust your Lordshipwill not think me wrong in the painful determination I conceivedmyself forced to make, " that is, to go back to Palermo, "for agonizedindeed was the mind of your Lordship's faithful and affectionateservant. "

Nelson appears to have felt that the return to Palermo, thoughimperative, in view of the relative forces of himself and the French, would not only postpone and imperil the restoration of the royalfamily, but would bring discredit upon himself for not seeking andfighting the enemy's fleet. "I shall wait off Maritimo, " he wroteKeith, "anxiously expecting such a reinforcement as may enable me togo in search of the enemy's fleet, when not one moment shall be lostin bringing them to battle; for, " he continues, with one of thoseflashes of genius which from time to time, unconsciously to himself, illuminate his writings, "I consider the best defence for his SicilianMajesty's dominions is to place myself alongside the French. " "Mysituation is a cruel one, " he wrote to Hamilton, "and I am sure LordKeith has lowered me in the eyes of Europe, for they will only know of18 sail, [Ball having joined], and not of the description of them; ithas truly made me ill. " But, although not justified in seeking them, he had off Maritimo taken a strategic position which would enable himto intercept their approach to either Naples or Sicily, "and I wasfirmly resolved, " he wrote with another of his clear intuitions, "theyshould not pass me without a battle, which would so cripple them thatthey might be unable to proceed on any distant service. " "On this youmay depend, " he had written to Lady Hamilton, on the first cruise offMaritimo, three weeks before, "that if my little squadron obeys mysignal, not a ship shall fall into the hands of the enemy; and I willso cut them up, that they will not be fit even for a summer's cruise. "

On the 20th of June, off Maritimo, he received a despatch from St. Vincent that a reinforcement of twelve ships-of-the-line from theChannel was then approaching Port Mahon, and that Keith, havingreturned thither, had left again in search of Bruix, whosewhereabouts remained unknown. He was also notified that St. Vincenthad resigned all his command, leaving Keith commander-in-chief. Nelsonwas convinced--"I knew, " was his expression--that the French intendedgoing to Naples. He determined now to resume his enterprise againstthe republicans in the city; a decision which caused him great andunexplained mental conflict. "I am agitated, " he wrote Hamilton thesame day, in a note headed "Most Secret, " "but my resolution is fixed. For Heaven's sake suffer not any one to oppose it. I shall not be goneeight days. No harm can come to Sicily. I send my Lady and you LordSt. Vincent's letter. I am full of grief and anxiety. I must go. Itwill finish the war. It will give a sprig of laurel to youraffectionate friend, Nelson. " The cause of this distress can only besurmised, but is probably to be found in the fears of the Queen, andin the differences existing at the time between herself and the King. Possibly, too, Lady Hamilton's sympathy with the Queen, in a presentfear for Sicily, may have led her, contrary to the request so latelymade for the admiral to go to Naples, to second an entreaty that theisland should not now be exposed; and to refuse her may have causedhim pain. On the 21st he was at Palermo, and after two hours'consultation with their Majesties and Acton, the Prime Minister, hesailed again, accompanied in the "Foudroyant" on this occasion by SirWilliam and Lady Hamilton, but not by the Hereditary Prince, nor theSicilian troops. On the 24th, at 9 P. M. , he anchored in the Bay ofNaples. Flags of truce were at that moment flying on the castles ofUovo and Nuovo, which were in the hands of the Neapolitan republicans, and upon the frigate "Seahorse, " whose commander had been the seniorBritish officer present, before Nelson's own appearance. 

On the passage from Palermo, Nelson had received information that theroyalists, --with whom were co-operating some detachments of Russiansand Turks, as well as the British naval forces, under Captain Foote, of the "Seahorse, "--had concluded an armistice with the French andtheir Neapolitan allies, who were in possession of the castles. Theterms of the armistice, thus rumored, were that the castles, if notrelieved within twenty-one days, should then be surrendered; thegarrisons to march out with the honors of war, and to be transportedto Toulon in vessels to be furnished by the King of Naples. Thisreport was erroneous in important particulars, especially as to theperiod of twenty-one days. What really had happened was, that acapitulation had been concluded, which provided that the Neapolitaninsurgents should evacuate the two castles held by them--Uovo andNuovo--as soon as the transports were ready to take them to Toulon, but not before. The French, in the castle of St. Elmo, were notincluded in the arrangement, their only part being that it requiredthe ratification of their commander before becoming operative. Thisratification was given, and, when Nelson's squadron came in sight, [82]the treaty had received the signature of all the parties interested;the flags of truce indicating a cessation of hostilities until theterms of the capitulation were carried into effect. 

Nelson had been given full power by the King of the Two Sicilies toact as his representative. He was also, as commander of the fleet, therepresentative of the King of Great Britain among the allied forces, which were acting in support of the royalist cause. The doublefunction introduces great confusion into the subsequent transactions, especially as there are on record no formal credentials investing himwith the authority he claimed to have from the King of Naples. Theomission probably arose from the extreme shortness of his stay inPalermo on the 21st--only two hours and a half elapsing, by the"Foudroyant's" log, between the entering of the ship and her sailingagain; a time sufficient for an interview and a clear understanding, but scarcely for drawing up a regular commission. The fact rests uponhis own statement, adequately supported, however, by inferencesreasonably to be drawn from expressions in letters to him, both fromthe King and from Acton, the Prime Minister. That his power went sofar as to authorize him to remove Cardinal Ruffo, up to that time theKing's representative, would alone confirm the assertion of a manhabitually truthful. Sir William Hamilton also, writing to Greville, and alluding to his official despatch by the same mail, says, "We hadfull powers. " It may be accepted that Nelson himself was entirelysatisfied that he was authorized at the time to act for the King, whenemergency required; and it is certain that letters were speedily sent, empowering him to appoint a new government, as well as to arrest Ruffoand to send him to Palermo in a British ship. 

Seeing the flags of truce flying, from the two castles and the"Seahorse, " and being under the impression that has been stated as tothe terms of an armistice, which he called "infamous, " Nelsonimmediately made a signal annulling the truce, "being determined, " hewrote to Keith, "never to give my approbation to any terms withRebels, but that of unconditional submission. " As the execution of thecapitulation depended upon the embarkation of the garrisons in thetransports which were to be provided, Nelson was entirely master ofthe situation, so far as force went. Next morning, June 25th, he movedhis fleet of eighteen sail nearer in, mooring it in a close line ofbattle before the city, and at the same time sent for twenty-two gunand mortar vessels, then lying at the islands, with which he flankedthe ships-of-the-line. In this imposing array, significant at once ofinexorable purpose and irresistible power, he sent to Ruffo his"opinion of the infamous terms entered into with the rebels, " and alsotwo papers, to be by him forwarded to the insurgents and to theFrench. From the latter, who had not treated, was required simply anunconditional surrender; but the message to the insurgents, sent, singularly enough, not from the representative of the King of Naplesbut from the British admiral, ran as follows:--

 His Britannic Majesty's Ship Foudroyant, Naples Bay, 25th June, 1799. 

 Rear Admiral Lord Nelson, K. B. , Commander of His Britannic Majesty's Fleet in the Bay of Naples, acquaints the Rebellious Subjects of His Sicilian Majesty in the Castles of Uovo and Nuovo, that he will not permit them to embark or quit those places. They must surrender themselves to His Majesty's royal mercy. 

 NELSON. 

Ruffo refused to send the papers in, and said decisively that, ifNelson saw fit to break the armistice then existing, between thesignature of the capitulation and its execution, he would aid neitherwith men nor guns. Finally, he went on board the "Foudroyant;" butafter an animated discussion, which rose nearly to an altercation, neither party yielded his ground. "I used every argument in my power, "wrote Nelson, "to convince him that _the Treaty and Armistice was atan end by the arrival of the fleet"_, and this therefore may be takento summarize his own position. He then gave the Cardinal a writtenopinion that the treaty was one that "ought not to be carried outwithout the approbation of His Sicilian Majesty. " Neither his powersnor Ruffo's, he argued, extended to granting such a capitulation. Ruffo, indeed, had been expressly forbidden to do so; a fact whichrendered the paper void from the first. "Under this opinion, " reportedNelson to Keith, "the Rebels came out of the Castles;" "_as theyought_, " he wrote to his friend Davison, "and as I hope all those whoare false to their King and Country will, _to be hanged_, or otherwisedisposed of, as their sovereign thought proper. " They were then placedin transports, which were anchored under the guns of the fleet; and inthe end many of them were put to death. 

For his action in this case Nelson has been severely blamed. The pointat issue is perfectly simple, however it may be decided. Disregardingsubordinate considerations, of which there are many, such as themotives which induced Ruffo and Foote to grant terms, and the questionwhether they would have been justified, which Nelson denied, inconceding them under any conditions, the matter reduces itself tothis: When an agreement has been made, one of the parties to which isacting only as a representative, not as a principal, nor accreditedfor the specific purpose, has the principal, in person or by proxy, aright to annul the agreement, provided, as in this case, it has notpassed into execution, either total or partial? Nelson admitted thatthe persons of the insurgents would have been entitled to the immunitystipulated, if they had already delivered up the castles. They had notdone so; the flags of truce marked only a cessation of hostilities, not the completion of the transaction. By the terms, the evacuationand embarkation were to be simultaneous: "The evacuation shall nottake place until the moment of embarkation. " The status of theopponents was in no wise altered by a paper which had not begun toreceive execution. The one important circumstance which had happenedwas the arrival of the British squadron, instead of Bruix's fleetwhich all were expecting. It was perfectly within Nelson's competenceto stop the proceedings at the point they had then reached. 

[After writing the above, the author, by the courtesy of the ForeignOffice, received a copy of Sir William Hamilton's despatch of July 14, 1799, giving his account of the events happening after June 20th, thedate when Nelson left Palermo for Naples. In this occurs a statementwhich would seriously modify, if not altogether destroy, thejustification of Nelson's conduct in annulling the capitulation, whichrests upon the condition that it had not received any substantialexecution. Hamilton says: "_When we anchored in this Bay the 24th ofJune the capitulation of the castles had in some measure takenplace_. [83] Fourteen large Polacks or transport vessels _had taken onboard_ out of the castles the most conspicuous and criminal of theNeapolitan Rebels, that had chosen to go to Toulon, the others had_already_ been permitted with their property to return to their ownhomes in this kingdom, and hostages selected from the first royalistnobility of Naples had been sent into the castle of St. Elmo thatcommands the city of Naples, and where a French garrison and the flagof the French Republic was to remain until the news of the arrival ofthe Neapolitan Rebels at Toulon. .. . There was no time to be lost, _forthe transport vessels were on the point of sailing for Toulon_, whenLord Nelson ordered all the boats of his squadron to be manned andarmed, and to bring those vessels, with all the Rebels on board, directly under the sterns of his ships, and there they remain, havingtaken out and secured on board His Majesty's ships the most guiltychiefs of the rebellion. "

Occurring in an official despatch, from a minister of Nelson'ssovereign, his own warm personal friend and admirer, closelyassociated with him throughout the proceedings, and his colleague andadviser in much that was done, the words quoted, if they could standaccepted as an accurate statement of occurrences, would establish thatNelson had secured the persons of men who had surrendered on the faithof a treaty, and had held them, subject to the tender mercies of theKing of the Two Sicilies. They were in his power (accepting Hamilton'sstatement), only because the King's Vicar-General, his representativeso far as they knew, had guaranteed their safety if they came out ofthe castles. The least they were entitled to, in such case, was to berestored to the castles--not yet evacuated--to be placed as they werebefore surrendering. It is true that, as the terms of the treaty madeembarkation and evacuation coincident, and as the latter had certainlynot taken place, it may be argued that they had no claim to immunitywhen they had precipitated their action, and left the castle of theirown motion before the formal evacuation and embarkation; but one wouldprefer not to rest on such a technical plea the justification of acharacter generally so upright in his public acts as Lord Nelson. 

Fortunately for his fame, there is adequate reason to believe--to beassured--that Hamilton's despatch is very inaccurate in details, andspecifically in this one, so damaging as it stands. The incident ofarming the boats and bringing out the vessels took place, according tothe log of the "Foudroyant, " not when the fleet moored, on the morningof June 25th, or even shortly afterwards, but on the morning of the28th; two days after the castles, as shown by the logs of both the"Foudroyant" and "Seahorse, " surrendered and were taken possession of. Miss Helen Maria Williams, whose account of the affair was stronglytinged with sympathy for the revolutionists, says: "While the twogarrisons, to the number of fifteen hundred, _were waiting for thepreparing and, provisioning of the vessels_ which were to convey themto France, Lord Nelson arrived with his whole fleet in the Bay ofNaples [June 24-25]. On the evening of the twenty-sixth of June, thepatriots evacuated their forts, and embarked on board the transportsprepared for their conveyance to France. _The next day_ [June 27], thetransports were moored alongside the English fleet, each under thecannon of an English vessel. "[84] These several witnesses may beconfidently accepted, and prove that the embarkation and removal ofthe garrisons took place after Nelson's declaration to them, datedJune 25th, in which he said "he would not permit them to embark orquit those places. They must surrender themselves to His Majesty'sRoyal mercy. " Captain Foote, who had signed the capitulation thatNelson condemned, affords evidence which, though not conclusive, iscorroborative of the above. Writing to Nelson at 7 A. M. Of the 24th ofJune, fourteen hours before the fleet anchored, but only eight beforehe knew of its approach, he says: "the Republicans are about toembark, " and again, "when the Capitulation is put into effect;" bothwhich expressions show that up to that moment the agreement had notbegun to receive execution. On the 22d of June Ruffo wrote to Footethat there were no vessels in Naples on which to embark therevolutionists, and requested him to furnish them; a request thatFoote referred to Count Thurn, the senior Neapolitan naval officer, for compliance. It is therefore antecedently probable that the vesselscould not have been collected from other ports, and prepared for anunexpected voyage of at least a week's duration, before Nelsonarrived, forty-eight hours later. 

Hamilton's despatch contains another mistake, affecting the order ofevents, so circumstantial that, taken with the one just discussed, itshows his accuracy on such points was more than doubtful. "AdmiralCaracciolo, " he says, was hanged, "the day after the King's squadroncame to Naples;" the fact being that the squadron arrived on the nightof June 24-25, and that Caracciolo was executed on the evening of the29th. This error was not a slip of the pen, for he characterizes thealleged fact as "so speedy an act of justice" as to elicit loudapplause from the concourse of spectators surrounding the ship inboats. 

Hamilton was not only nearly seventy, but he was worn out in healthand constitution. Writing a fortnight after the events, and havingpassed that time in the turmoil and confusion attending there-establishment of order in Naples, it is not wonderful that he rantogether incidents that happened in rapid succession, and failed torealize the importance which might afterwards attach to the date oftheir occurrence. "I am so worn out, " he tells Greville, "by the longdespatch I have been obliged to write to-day to Lord Grenville that Ican scarcely hold my pen;" and again, "My head is _so confused_ withlong writing on this subject that I must refer you to my letter toLord Grenville. .. . You will find me much worn and am little more thanskin and bone, as I have very little stomach. "

Although they were on board ship together, Nelson cannot have seenHamilton's despatch, or he must have corrected a misstatement whichdirectly contradicted his own account of June 27 to Lord Keith, aswell as that he was sending by the same messenger, in a private letterto Earl Spencer. The latter ran thus: "Your Lordship will observe myNote (No. 1), and opinion to the Cardinal (No. 2). _The Rebels cameout of the Castles with this knowledge_, without any honours, and theprincipal Rebels were seized and conducted on board the ships of thesquadron. The others, embarked in fourteen polacres, were anchoredunder the care of our ships. "

Hamilton's statement remaining uncorrected, and being socircumstantial, though erroneous, has made necessary a fullerdiscussion of the evidence on this point than otherwise might havebeen required. 

Although, in the author's judgment, Nelson acted within his right indisallowing the capitulation, it is essential to note that a fortnightlater, when fully cognizant of all the circumstances, he characterizedit in a letter to Lord Spencer as "infamous. " "On my fortunate arrivalhere I found a most infamous treaty entered into with the Rebels, indirect disobedience of His Sicilian Majesty's orders. "[85] Such anadjective, deliberately applied after the heat of the first moment hadpassed, is, in its injustice, a clear indication of the frame of mindunder the domination of which he was. Captain Foote with his feeblesquadron, and the commanders of the undisciplined mob ashore known asthe Christian army, expected, as did Nelson himself, the appearance ofthe French fleet at Naples. In view of that possibility, it was at theleast a pardonable error of judgment to concede terms which promisedto transfer the castles speedily into their own hands. The mostcensurable part of the agreement was in the failure to exact thesurrender of St. Elmo, which dominates the others. It is to beregretted that Captain Foote, who naturally and bitterly resented theword "infamous, " did not, in his "Vindication, " confine himself tothis military argument, instead of mixing it up with talk about mercyto culprits and Nelson's infatuation for Lady Hamilton. ]

On the 27th of June, the day following the surrender of Uovo andNuovo, Troubridge landed with thirteen hundred men to besiege theFrench in St. Elmo, an undertaking in which he was joined by fivehundred Russians and some royalists. Forty-eight hours later Nelsonfelt called upon, as representative of the King of the Two Sicilies, to take action more peremptory and extreme than anything he hadhitherto done. 

On the 29th of June, Commodore Francesco Caracciolo, lately head ofthe Republican Navy, was brought on board the "Foudroyant, " havingbeen captured in the country, in disguise. This man had accompaniedthe royal family in their flight to Palermo; but after arrival therehad obtained leave to return to Naples, in order to avert theconfiscation of his property by the Republican government. Hesubsequently joined the Republicans, or Jacobins, as they were calledby Nelson and the Court. His reasons for so doing are immaterial;they were doubtless perfectly sound from the point of view of apparentself-interest; the substantial fact remains that he commanded theinsurgent vessels in action with the British and Royal Neapolitannavies, firing impartially upon both. In one of these engagements theNeapolitan frigate "Minerva" was struck several times, losing two menkilled and four wounded. Caracciolo, therefore, had fully committedhimself to armed insurrection, in company with foreign invaders, against what had hitherto been, and still claimed to be, the lawfulgovernment of the country. He had afterwards, as the republican causedeclined, taken refuge with the other insurgents in the castles. Whenhe left them is uncertain, but on the 23d of June he is known to havebeen outside of Naples, and so remained till captured. 

It is not easy to understand in what respect his case differed fromthat of other rebels who surrendered unconditionally, and whom Nelsondid not try himself, but simply placed in safe keeping until theKing's instructions should be received, except that, as a navalofficer, he was liable to trial by court-martial, even though martiallaw had not been proclaimed. It was to such a tribunal that Nelsondecided instantly to bring him. A court-martial of Neapolitan officerswas immediately ordered to convene on board the "Foudroyant, " theprecept for the Court being sent to Count Thurn, captain of the"Minerva, " who, because senior officer in the bay, was indicated bycustom as the proper president. The charges, as worded by Nelson, weretwo in number, tersely and clearly stated. "Francisco Caracciolo, acommodore in the service of His Sicilian Majesty, stands accused ofrebellion against his lawful sovereign, and for firing at his colourshoisted on board his Frigate, the Minerva. " The court assembled atonce, sitting from 10 A. M. To noon. The charges being found proved, sentence of death was pronounced; and Caracciolo, who had been broughton board at 9 A. M. , was at 5 P. M. , by Nelson's orders, hanged at theforeyard-arm of the "Minerva. " He was forty-seven years old at thetime of his death. 

The proceedings of the court-martial were open, but the record, if anywas drawn up, has not been preserved. It is impossible, therefore, nowto say whether the evidence sustained the charges; but the actsalleged were so simple and so notorious, that there can be littledoubt Caracciolo had fairly incurred his fate. Even in our milder age, no officer of an army or navy would expect to escape the likepunishment for the same offence; if he did, it would be because mercyprevailed over justice. As regards the technicalities of theprocedure, it would seem probable that Nelson's full powers, especially when committed to a military man, included by fairinference, if not expressly, the right of ordering courts-martial;whereas he had not at hand the machinery of judges and civil courts, for proceeding against the civilians who had joined in theinsurrection. Despite his fearlessness of responsibility, he wasalways careful not to overpass the legal limits of his authority, except when able to justify his action by what at least appeared tohimself adequate reasons. The Portuguese squadron, for instance, wasabsolutely under his orders, so far as its movements went; but, when acase of flagrant misconduct occurred, he confined himself toregretting that he had not power to order a court. Anomalous as hisposition was in the Bay of Naples, before the arrival of the King, andregrettably uncertain as is the commission under which he acted, thereis no ground for disputing that he had authority to order acourt-martial, and to carry its sentence into execution, nor thatCaracciolo came within the jurisdiction of a court-martial properlyconstituted. Having regard, therefore, to the unsettled conditions ofthings prevailing, no fatal irregularity can be shown either in thetrial or execution of this prisoner. 

But, while all this is true, the instinctive aversion with which thisact of Nelson's has been regarded generally is well founded. It wasnot decent, for it was not necessary, that capture should be followedso rapidly by trial, and condemnation by execution. Neither time norcircumstances pressed. The insurrection was over. Except the siege ofSt. Elmo, hostilities near Naples were at an end. That Caracciolo'sjudges were naval officers who had recently been in action with himwould be, with average military men, rather in the prisoner's favorthan otherwise; but it was very far from being in his favor that theywere men in whom the angry passions engendered by civil warfare, andlicentious spoliation, had not yet had time to cool. Neither thejudges nor the revising power allowed themselves space for reflection. Nelson himself failed to sustain the dispassionate and magnanimousattitude that befitted the admiral of a great squadron, so placed asto have the happy chance to moderate the excesses which commonlyfollow the triumph of parties in intestine strife. But, however hethen or afterwards may have justified his course to his ownconscience, his great offence was against his own people. To hissecondary and factitious position of delegate from the King of Naples, he virtually sacrificed the consideration due to his inalienablecharacter of representative of the King and State of Great Britain. Heshould have remembered that the act would appear to the world, not asthat of the Neapolitan plenipotentiary, but of the British officer, and that his nation, while liable like others to bursts of unreasoningsavagery, in its normal moods delights to see justice clothed inorderly forms, unstained by precipitation or suspicion of perversion, advancing to its ends with the majesty of law, without unseemly haste, providing things honest in the sight of all men. That he did not doso, when he could have done so, has been intuitively felt; and to theinstinctive resentment thus aroused among his countrymen has been duethe facility with which the worst has been too easily believed. 

Commander Jeaffreson Miles of the British Navy, writing in 1843, wasone of the first, if not the very first, to clear effectually Nelson'sreputation from the stigma of treachery, and of submission to unworthyinfluences, at this time. He has sought also to vindicate his hastyaction in Caracciolo's case, by citing the swift execution of twoseamen by Lord St. Vincent, at a time when mutiny was threatening. Itcannot be denied that, for deterrent effect, punishment at times mustbe sudden as well as sharp; but the justification in each case restsupon attendant circumstances. In the instances here compared, we havein the one a fleet in which many ships were seething with mutiny, andthe preservation of order rested solely upon the firmness of oneman, --the commander-in-chief, --and upon the awe inspired by him. Inthe other, we see rebellion subdued, the chief rebels in confinement, the foreign enemy, except three small isolated garrisons, expelledbeyond the borders of the kingdom six weeks before, and a greatBritish fleet in possession of the anchorage. Punishment in such case, however just, is not deterrent, but avenging. True, Nelson wasexpecting the appearance of Bruix's fleet; but he himselfcharacterized as "infamous" the capitulation granted by Ruffo andFoote, to which they were largely moved by the same expectation, whenwielding a much smaller force than he did. The possible approach ofthe French fleet did not necessitate the hasty execution of aprisoner. 

That Nelson yielded his convictions of right and wrong, andconsciously abused his power, at the solicitation of Lady Hamilton, ashas been so freely alleged, is not probably true, --there is no proofof it; on the contrary, as though to guard against such suspicion, hewas careful to see none but his own officers during Caracciolo'sconfinement. But it is true that he was saturated with the prevalentCourt feeling against the insurgents and the French, which foundfrequent expression in his letters. After living in the Hamiltons'house for four months, during which, to use his own expression, "Ihave never but three times put my foot to the ground, since December, 1798, " in daily close contact with the woman who had won hispassionate love, who was the ardent personal friend of the Queen, sharing her antipathies, and expressing her hatred of enemies in termswhich showed the coarseness of her fibre, [86] Nelson was steeped inthe atmosphere of the Court of Naples, and separated from that of theBritish fleet, none of whose strongest captains were long with himduring that period. The attitude more natural to men of his blood isshown in a letter signed by the officers of the "Leviathan, "Duckworth's flagship. Coming from Minorca, they were out of touch withNeapolitan fury, and they addressed Lady Hamilton, interceding for afamily engaged in the rebellion; a fact which shows the prevailingimpression--whether well founded or not--of the influence in her powerto exert. "We all feel ourselves deeply impressed with the horridcrime of disaffection to one's lawful sovereign, . .. But when weconsider the frailty of human nature, " &c. "Advise those Neapolitansnot to be too sanguinary, " wrote Keith to Nelson, apparentlyimmediately after receiving the news of Caracciolo's hanging. 

The abrupt execution of Caracciolo was an explosion of fierceanimosity long cherished, pardonable perhaps in a Neapolitan royalist, but not in a foreign officer only indirectly interested in the issuesat stake; and hence it is that the fate of that one sufferer hasaroused more attention and more sympathy than that of the numerousother victims, put to death by the King's command after ordinaryprocesses of law. It stands conspicuous as the act of an Englishofficer imbued with the spirit of a Neapolitan Bourbon official. "Could it ever happen, " he wrote to Acton, some months after this, "that any English minister wanted to make me an instrument of hurtingthe feelings of His Sicilian Majesty, I would give up my commissionsooner than do it. .. . I am placed in such a situation--a subject ofone King by birth, and, as far as is consistent with my allegiance tothat King, a voluntary subject of His Sicilian Majesty--that if anyman attempted to separate my two Kings, by all that is sacred, Ishould consider even putting that man to death as a meritoriousact. "[87] On the other hand, it must be considered that Nelson, thoughhumane, tended even in his calmest moments to severity towardsmilitary offenders. Writing with reference to a captain convicted ofmisbehavior before the enemy, he said, "If a man does not do hisutmost in time of action, I think but one punishment ought to beinflicted;" and it may be inferred that he would have approved Byng'sexecution, where cowardice was not proved, but grave militarydereliction was. 

On the 10th of July the King of the Two Sicilies arrived from Palermoin the Bay of Naples, and went on board the "Foudroyant, " which, forthe whole time he remained, --about four weeks, --became practically hisseat of government. There the royal standard was hoisted, there theKing held his levees, and there business of State was transacted. Inand through all moved the figures of Sir William and Lady Hamilton, the latter considering herself, and not without cause, therepresentative of the Queen. The latter had remained in Palermo, beingout of favor with the Neapolitans, and with her husband, whoattributed to her precipitancy the disasters of the previous December. The two women corresponded daily; and, if the minister's wife deceivedherself as to the amount and importance of what she effected, there isno doubt that she was very busy, that she was commonly believed toexert much influence, and that great admiration for one another wasexpressed by herself, Hamilton, and Nelson, the _"Tria juncta in uno"_as the latter was pleased to style them. "I never saw such zeal andactivity in any one as in this wonderful man [Nelson], " wrote she toGreville. "My dearest Sir William, thank God! is well, and of thegreatest use now to the King. " "Emma has been of infinite use in ourlate very critical business, " said Hamilton to the same correspondent. "Ld. Nelson and I cou'd not have done without her. It will be aheart-breaking to the Queen of N. When we go"--back to England, as wasthen expected. "Sir William and Lady Hamilton are, to my greatcomfort, with me, " wrote Nelson to Spencer; "for without them it wouldhave been impossible I could have rendered half the service to hisMajesty which I have now done: their heads and their hearts areequally great and good. "

The execution of Caracciolo was shortly followed by another verysingular incident, which showed how biassed Nelson had become towardsthe interests of the Neapolitan Court, and how exclusively heidentified them--confused them, would scarcely be too strong aword--with the essential interests of the Allied cause and the dutiesof the British Navy. On the 13th of July the castle of St. Elmo wassurrendered by the French, the whole city of Naples thus returningunder the royal authority. On the same day, or the next, Troubridge, with a thousand of the best men that could be sent from the squadron, marched against Capua, accompanied by four thousand troops. A letterhad already been received from the Commander-in-chief, Keith, toNelson, intimating that it might be necessary to draw down his vesselsfrom Naples to the defence of Minorca. "Should such an order come atthis moment, " wrote Nelson to the First Lord, forecasting his probabledisobedience, "it would be a cause for some consideration whetherMinorca is to be risked, or the two Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily? Irather think my decision would be to risk the former;" and he startedTroubridge off with a detachment that seriously crippled the squadron. Capua is fifteen to twenty miles inland from Naples. 

On the 13th--it is to be presumed after closing his letter to Spencerjust quoted--an order reached him from Keith, in these words: "Eventswhich have recently occurred render it necessary that as great a forceas can be collected should be assembled near the island of Minorca;therefore, if your Lordship has no detachment of the French squadronin the neighbourhood of Sicily, nor information of their having sentany force towards Egypt or Syria, you are hereby required and directedto send such ships as you can possibly spare off the island of Minorcato wait my orders. " The wording was so elastic, as regards the numbersto be sent, as to leave much to Nelson's judgment, and he repliedguardedly the same day: "As soon as the safety of His SicilianMajesty's Kingdoms is secured, I shall not lose one moment in makingthe detachment you are pleased to order. At present, under God'sProvidence, the safety of His Sicilian Majesty, and his speedyrestoration to his kingdom, depends on this fleet, and the confidenceinspired even by the appearance of our ships before the city is beyondall belief; and I have no scruple in declaring my opinion that shouldany event draw us from the kingdom, that if the French remain in anypart of it, disturbances will again arise, for all order having beencompletely overturned, it must take a thorough cleansing, and somelittle time, to restore tranquillity. "

When Keith wrote this first order, June 27, he was at sea somewherebetween Minorca and Toulon, trying to find Bruix's fleet, of which hehad lost touch three weeks before, at the time he sent to Nelson thetwo seventy-fours, whose arrival caused the latter's second cruise ofMaritimo. He had lost touch through a false step, the discussion ofwhich has no place in a life of Nelson, beyond the remark that it wasKeith's own error, not that of Lord St. Vincent, as Nelson afterwardsmistakenly alleged; querulously justifying his own disobedience on theground that Keith, by obeying against his judgment, had lost theFrench fleet. What is to be specially noted in the order is that Keithgave no account of his reasons, nor of the events which dictated them, nor of his own intended action. No room is afforded by his words forany discretion, except as to the number of ships to be sent by Nelson, and, though the language of the latter was evasive, the failure tomove even a single vessel was an act of unjustifiable disobedience. ToKeith he wrote privately, and in a conciliatory spirit, but nothingthat made his act less flagrant. "To all your wishes, depend on it, Ishall pay the very strictest attention. "

Conscious of the dangerous step he was taking, Nelson wrote on thesame day, by private letter, [88] to the First Lord of the Admiralty. "You will easily conceive my feelings, " he said, "but my mind, yourLordship will know, was perfectly prepared for this order; and morethan ever is my mind made up, that, at this moment, I will not partwith a single ship, as I cannot do that without drawing a hundred andtwenty men from each ship now at the siege of Capua, where an army isgone this day. I am fully aware of the act I have committed; but, sensible of my loyal intentions, I am prepared for any fate which mayawait my disobedience. Do not think that my opinion is formed from thearrangements of any one, " an expression which shows that he was awarehow talk was running. "_No;_ be it good, or be it bad, it is all myown. It is natural I should wish the decision of the Admiralty and myCommander-in-chief as speedily as possible. To obtain the former, Ibeg your Lordship's interest with the Board. You know me enough, mydear Lord, to be convinced I want no screen to my conduct. "

On the 9th of July, Keith wrote again, from Port Mahon, a letter whichNelson received on the 19th. He said that he was satisfied that theenemy's intentions were directed neither against the Two Sicilies, norto the reinforcement of their army in Egypt; that, on the contrary, there was reason to believe they were bound out of the Straits. "Ijudge it necessary that all, or the greatest part of the force underyour Lordship's orders, should quit the Island of Sicily, and repairto Minorca, for the purpose of protecting that Island during thenecessary absence of His Majesty's squadron under my command, or forthe purpose of co-operating with me against the combined force of theenemy, wherever it may be necessary. " The commander-in-chief, inshort, wished to mass his forces, for the necessities of the generalcampaign, as he considered them. Nelson now flatly refused obedience, on the ground of the local requirements in his part of the field. "Your Lordship, at the time of sending me the order, was not informedof the change of affairs in the Kingdom of Naples, and that all ourmarines and a body of seamen are landed, in order to drive the Frenchscoundrels out of the Kingdom, which, with God's blessing will verysoon be effected, when a part of this squadron shall be immediatelysent to Minorca; but unless the French are at least drove from Capua, I think it right not to obey your Lordship's order for sending downany part of the squadron under my orders. I am perfectly aware of theconsequences of disobeying the orders of my commander-in-chief. " Itcannot be said that the offensiveness of the act of disobedience istempered by any very conciliatory tone in the words used. The reasonfor disobedience makes matters rather worse. "As I believe the safetyof the Kingdom of Naples depends at the present moment on my detainingthe squadron, I have no scruple in deciding that it is better to savethe Kingdom of Naples and risk Minorca, than to risk the Kingdom ofNaples to save Minorca. " When he thus wrote, Nelson knew that Bruixhad joined the Spanish fleet in Cartagena, making a combined force offorty ships, to which Keith, after stripping Minorca, could opposethirty-one. 

None of Nelson's letters reached Keith until long after he had leftthe Mediterranean, which probably prevented the matter being broughtto a direct issue between the two, such as would have compelled theAdmiralty to take some decisive action. On the 10th of July thecommander-in-chief sailed from Port Mahon for Cartagena, following onthe tracks of the allied fleets, which he pursued into the Atlanticand to Brest, where they succeeded in entering on the 13th of August, just twenty-four hours before the British came up. The narrow marginof this escape inevitably suggests the thought, of how muchconsequence might have been the co-operation of the dozen shipsNelson could have brought. It is true, certainly, as matters turnedout, that even had he obeyed, they could not have accompanied Keith, nor in the event did any harm come to Minorca; but there was noknowledge in Nelson's possession that made an encounter between thetwo great fleets impossible, nor was it till three days after hisformer refusal to obey, that he knew certainly that Keith had given upall expectation of a junction with himself. Then, on the 22d of July, he received two letters dated the 14th, and couched in tones soperemptory as to suggest a suspicion that no milder words wouldenforce obedience--that his Commander-in-chief feared that nothingshort of cast-iron orders would drag him away from the NeapolitanCourt. "Your Lordship is hereby required and directed to repair toMinorca, with the whole, or the greater part, of the force under yourLordship's command, for the protection of that island, as I shall, inall probability, have left the Mediterranean before your Lordship willreceive this. Keith. " The second letter of the same date ended withthe words: "I therefore trust the defence of Minorca to your Lordship, and repeat my directions that the ships be sent for its protection. "On the receipt of these, though Capua had not yet surrendered, Nelsonat once sent Duckworth with four ships-of-the-line to Minorca, detaining only their marines for the land operations. 

It seems scarcely necessary to say that, while an officer insubordinate command should have the moral courage to transcend oroverride his orders in particular instances--each of which rests uponits own merits, and not upon any general rule that can beformulated--it would be impossible for military operations to becarried on at all, if the commander-in-chief were liable to bedeliberately defied and thwarted in his combinations, as Keith was inthis case. It does not appear that Nelson _knew_ the circumstanceswhich Keith was considering; he only _knew_ what the conditions wereabout Naples, and he thought that the settlement of the kingdom mightbe prevented by the departure of several of his ships. In thisopinion, in the author's judgment, his views were exaggerated, andcolored by the absorbing interest he had come to take in the royalfamily and their fortunes, linked as these were with the affections ofa particular woman; but, even granting that his apprehensions werewell founded, he was taking upon himself to determine, not merely whatwas best for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, but what was best forthe whole Mediterranean command. It was not within his province todecide whether Minorca or Naples was the more important. That was thefunction of the commander-in-chief. Had the latter, while leavingNelson's force unchanged, directed him to follow a particular line ofoperations in the district committed to him, it is conceivable thatcircumstances, unknown to his superior, might have justified him inchoosing another; but there was nothing in the conditions thatauthorized his assumption that he could decide for the whole command. And this is not the less true, because Nelson was in the general a manof far sounder judgment and keener insight than Keith, or because hisintuitions in the particular instance were more accurate, as theypossibly were. He defended his course on the ground, so frequently andso erroneously taken, that his intentions were right. "I am soconfident, " he wrote to the Admiralty, "of the uprightness of myintentions for his Majesty's service, and for that of his SicilianMajesty, which I consider as the same, that, with all respect, Isubmit myself to the judgment of my superiors. " Four years later, in1803, he used the following singular expressions concerning hisconduct at this period: "I paid more attention to another sovereignthan my own; therefore the King of Naples' gift of Bronté to me, if itis not now settled to my advantage, and to be permanent, has cost me afortune, and a great deal of favour which I might have enjoyed, andjealousy which I should have avoided. I repine not on those accounts. I did my duty, to the Sicilifying my own conscience, and I ameasy. "[89] "As I have often before risked my life for the good cause, "he told his old friend the Duke of Clarence, "so I with cheerfulnessdid my commission: for although a military tribunal may think mecriminal, the world will approve my conduct. " With such convictions, he might, if condemned, as he almost inevitably must have been, havemet his fate with the cheerfulness of a clear conscience; but nomilitary tribunal can possibly accept a man's conscience as the testof obedience. 

The Admiralty, who had sent Keith out knowing that St. Vincent, afterthree arduous years, meant soon to retire, could not of courseacquiesce in Nelson's thus overriding the man they had chosen to behis commander-in-chief. "Their Lordships do not, from any informationnow before them, see sufficient reason to justify your havingdisobeyed the orders you had received from your Commanding Officer, orhaving left Minorca exposed to the risk of being attacked, withouthaving any naval force to protect it. " To this measured rebuke wasadded some common-sense counsel upon the pernicious practice ofjeopardizing the _personnel_ of a fleet, the peculiar trained force sovitally necessary, and so hard to replace, in petty operations onshore. "Although in operations on the sea-coast, it may frequently behighly expedient to land a part of the seamen of the squadron, toco-operate with and to assist the army, when the situation will admitof their being immediately re-embarked, if the squadron should becalled away to act elsewhere [as Keith had called it], or ifinformation of the approach of an enemy's fleet should bereceived, --yet their Lordships by no means approve of the seamen beinglanded to form a part of an army to be employed in operations at adistance from the coast, where, if they should have the misfortune tobe defeated, they might be prevented from returning to the ships, andthe squadron be thereby rendered so defective, as to be no longercapable of performing the services required of it; and I have theirLordships' commands to signify their directions to your Lordship notto employ the seamen in like manner in future. "

It was evident that the Admiralty did not fully share Nelson'sattachment to the royal house of Naples, nor consider the service ofthe King of the Two Sicilies the same as that of the King of GreatBritain. Earl Spencer's private letter, while careful of Nelson'sfeelings, left no room to doubt that he was entirely at one with hiscolleagues in their official opinion. Nelson winced and chafed underthe double rebuke, but he was not in a condition to see clearly anybeams in his own eye. "I observe with great pain that their Lordshipssee no cause which could justify my disobeying the orders of mycommanding officer, Lord Keith;" but the motives he again alleges arebut the repetition of those already quoted. He fails wholly to realizethat convictions which would justify a man in going to a martyr's fatemay be wholly inadequate to sap the fundamental military obligation ofobedience. "My conduct is measured by the Admiralty, by the narrowrule of law, when I think it should have been done by that of commonsense. I restored a faithful ally by breach of orders; Lord Keith losta fleet by obedience against his own sense. Yet as one is censured theother must be approved. Such things are. " As a matter of fact, asbefore said, it was by departing from St. Vincent's orders that Keithlost the French fleet. Nor did Nelson's mind work clearly on thesubject. Thwarted and fretted as he continually was by the too common, almost universal, weakness, which deters men from a bold initiative, from assuming responsibility, from embracing opportunity, he could notdraw the line between that and an independence of action which wouldconvert unity of command into anarchy. "Much as I approve of strictobedience to orders, yet to say that an officer is never, for anyobject, to alter his orders, is what I cannot comprehend. " But whatrational man ever said such a thing? "I find few think as I do, --butto obey orders is all perfection! What would my superiors direct, didthey know what is passing under my nose? To serve my King and todestroy the French I consider as the great order of all, from whichlittle ones spring, and if one of these little ones militate againstit, I go back to obey the great order. " There is so much that is soundin these words, and yet so much confusion might arise in applyingthem, that scarcely any stronger evidence could be given that eachcase must rest on its own merits; and that no general rule cansupplant the one general principle of obedience, by which alone unityand concentration of effort, the great goal of all military movement, can be obtained. 

During this period of agitation and excitement, Nelson's health didnot show the favorable symptoms that usually attended a call toexertion. Much may be attributed to a Mediterranean summer, especiallyafter the many seasons he had passed in that sea; but it can readilybe believed that such exceptional responsibilities as he had justassumed could not but tell, even upon his resolute and fearlesstemper. "I am really sorry, " wrote Troubridge to him, from the siegeof St. Elmo, "to see your Lordship so low-spirited, all will go well;"and a few days later, "Your Lordship must endeavour to fret as littleas possible--we shall succeed. His Majesty's arrival will relieve yourLordship; and if he punishes the guilty, the people will be happy. "The day after he had refused to obey Keith's order, he wrote to him, "I am truly so very unwell that I have not the power of writing somuch as I could wish;" and the next day, to the Admiralty, he makesthe same excuse, adding, "I am writing in a fever, and barely possibleto keep out of bed. " "My dear friend, " he tells Locker, "I am so illthat I can scarcely sit up; yet I will not let the courier go offwithout assuring you that all your kindnesses to me are fresh in mymemory. .. . May God Almighty grant you, my revered friend, that healthand happiness which has never yet been attained by your affectionate, grateful friend, Nelson. " It cannot but be surmised that he did notfeel that profound conviction of right, which had sustained him onprevious occasions. The disquiet indicated resembles rather thatattending the uncertainties of the Nile campaign. As Colonel Stewartnoticed, two years later, "With him mind and health invariablysympathized. "

FOOTNOTES:

[81] That is, in person. 

[82] The commandant of St. Elmo signed on the 3d Messidor, June 21. Ruffo, with the Russian and Turkish representatives, had already signed. The paperwas then sent to Foote, who signed and returned to Ruffo on the 23d ofJune. The "Foudroyant" came in sight on the afternoon of the 24th. 

[83] All italics in the quotations from this despatch are the author's. 

[84] Nicolas, vol. Iii. P. 511. Author's italics. 

[85] Nicolas, vol. Iii p. 406. 

[86] Mr. Pryse Lockhart Gordon, who was in Palermo in January, 1799, tellsthe following anecdote of Lady Hamilton. He had been dining at theambassador's, and after dinner a Turkish officer was introduced. In thecourse of the evening he boasted that he had put to death with his ownsword a number of French prisoners. "'Look, there is their blood remainingon it!' The speech being translated, her Ladyship's eye beamed withdelight, and she said, 'Oh, let me see the sword that did the gloriousdeed!' It was presented to her; she took it into her fair hands, coveredwith rings, and, looking at the encrusted Jacobin blood, kissed it, andhanded it to the hero of the Nile. Had I not been an eye-witness to thisdisgraceful act, I would not have ventured to relate it. " (Gordon'sMemoirs, vol. I. P, 210. ) The author, also, would not have ventured toadduce it, without first satisfying himself, by inquiry, as to the probablecredibility of Mr. Gordon, and likewise testing his narrative. It bearsmarks of the inaccuracy in details to which memory is subject, but theindications of general correctness are satisfactory. 

[87] Nelson to Acton, November 18, 1799. (Nicolas. )

[88] Much confusion has been introduced into the times, when Keith'sseveral orders were received by Nelson, by the fact that the original ofthis private letter to Earl Spencer is dated the 19th (Nicolas, vol. Vii. P. Clxxxv); while the secretary, copying it into the letter-book, wroteJuly 13th. (Nicolas, vol. Iii. P. 408. ) Nicolas considered the formercorrect, probably because it came last into his hands. The author considersthe 13th correct, because the official letter to Keith bears that date, andreads, "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of June27. " (Nicolas, vol. Iii. P. 408. )

The date of Troubridge's marching against Capua is similarly brought intodoubt by these letters. The author believes it to have been July 13 or 14, from another official letter to Keith of the 13th. (Nicolas, vol. Iii. P. 404. ) "Captains Troubridge and Hallowell . .. March against Capua to-morrowmorning. " The odd Sea-Time of that day, by which July 13 began at noon, July 12, of Civil Time, also causes confusion; writers using themindiscriminatingly. The capitulation of St. Elmo was certainly signed onJuly 12. (Clarke and M'Arthur, vol. Ii. P. 294. )

[89] Nicolas, vol. V. P. 160. 

END OF VOL. I.